# SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

Robert Tenor, editor

12-15-2023

New Series Number 117

Editorial

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from a simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. The sum of our reviews are carefully pruned excerpts from the books themselves so as to preview the style and technicality of the text itself.

Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.

Each issue should surprise.

Contents: Religious Fictions

5

Religious Fictions

THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE edited by Barry Stocker, Michael Mack [Palgrave / Macmillan, ISBN 9781137547934]

This comprehensive Handbook presents the major perspectives within philosophy and literary studies on the relations, overlaps and tensions between philosophy and literature. Drawing on recent work in philosophy and literature, literary theory,

philosophical aesthetics, literature as philosophy and philosophy as literature, its twenty-nine chapters plus substantial Introduction and Afterword examine the ways in which philosophy and literature depend on each other and interact, while also contrasting with each other in that they necessarily exclude or incorporate each other. This book establishes an enduring framework for structuring the broad themes defining the relations between philosophy and literature and organising the main topics in the field.

Key Features

- ❖ Structured in five parts addressing philosophy as literature, philosophy of literature, philosophical aesthetics, literary criticism and theory, and main areas of work within philosophy and literature
- ❖ An Introduction setting out the main concerns of the field through discussion of the major themes along with the individual topics
- ❖ An Afterword looking at the interactions between philosophy and literature through itself enacting philosophical and literary writing while examining the question of how they can be brought together

THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE is an essential resource for scholars, researchers and advanced students in philosophy of literature, philosophy as literature, literary theory, literature as philosophy, and the philosophical aesthetics of literature. It is an ideal volume for researchers, advanced students and scholars in philosophy, literary studies, philosophy and literature, cultural studies, classical studies and other related fields.

CONTENTS

Broad Scope of Philosophy and Literature

Philosophy and literature is a very wide field and this handbook does not try to cover every possible aspect. The coverage is however broad in that the philosophy and literature largely stemming from Ancient Greece on through the Western tradition is covered in many aspects. No judgement here is made of the value of the Western tradition in comparison with others. No claim is made that the Western tradition is itself self-contained and continuous in any pure way. It is simply the case that this philosophy and literature most known to an English-speaking audience and that a genuinely global and comparative approach, also making allowances for variations on the canon, would be a truly vast enterprise which would require more than one volume or would have to sacrifice depth and detail.

There is no attempt here to summarise the chapters in the Handbook or offer bibliographical information except for suggested readings at the end. What is done here is to provide a view of the themes and topics explored in sections and chapters of the book, so that the structure of the book is explained and readers already have a general background to each chapter. The background provided in this introduction does not duplicate or summarise what each author has said, what it does is provide the context for what the author has said within the broad development of philosophy and literature according to the view of the editors, so it provides another perspective, though one shaped in accordance with the book as a whole and what has been done in the individual chapters. The volume has been constructed on the understanding that philosophy and literature cannot be thought of just as a confrontation between philosophy and literary texts or on the application of philosophical aesthetics to literature. There are various gradations of philosophy and literary studies which must be taken into account in order to have something like a fully representative survey of the field. The chapters have very different ways of dealing with the relation between philosophy and literature, broadly distinguished according to the structure of the book. The chapters are organised into sections on: `Philosophy as Literature', 'Philosophy of Literature', 'Philosophical Aesthetics', 'Literary Criticism and Theory', and 'Areas of Work Within Philosophy and Literature'. There is of course no absolute distinction between these areas, but in the view of the editors these distinctions are the best way of articulating what comes under philosophy and literature. That is, we can see the main elements of the field in this construction.

Part One: Philosophy as Literature

There is philosophy written as literature, the theme of Part One, which of course goes back very early in the history of philosophy and literature. There is no simple category of philosophy written as literature. The phrase itself might imply a kind of philosophy taking on the disguise of literature. This may be one approach to writing a literary kind of philosophy or thinking about the more literary aspects of philosophy, but what is more important is to think about the ways in which there is always something literary in philosophy and the deeper ways in which philosophy may be a particular kind of philosophy because of its literary style. Philosophy emerges from literature (also raising the status of myth in the beginning of both literature and philosophy) and is always at least in some minimal sense written in a style of some form, using figurative language and fiction to impress the reader. The

most anti-literary kind of philosophical writing nevertheless appeals to imagination and the concrete nature of words at some points, because there is little chance of completely effective philosophical communication otherwise. What this part is more concerned with is the way philosophy can appear in the main literary genres. This includes some account of the way philosophy deals with discussion of the genre in question, since the philosophical discussion of genres and the philosophical use of genres are interactive processes. The main focus though is the ways in which philosophy can be written through literary genres.

Dialogue

The first philosophical works that survive as whole texts are Plato's dialogues, and their appeal is certainly literary as well as philosophical. It is appropriate then that Dialogue is the topic of the first chapter of Part One. Aristotle also contributed to the literature of philosophical dialogues, though frustratingly these are lost. Cicero's dialogues are less remarkable than those of Plato, but add to dialogue as a major form of philosophical writing. Cicero's philosophical writings were part of his contribution to the formation of Latin style, towards the end of the Roman Republic. Boethius added to the use of dialogue in philosophy, shortly after the fall of the Roman state in the West. Later examples of philosophical dialogue include George Berkeley and David Hume, followed by passages in Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Martin Heidegger. This is philosophy written in such a way as to show the drama of ideas and of conflicts between ideas, presented though clashes between characters who speak. The genre of philosophical dialogue can itself be considered an element of novelistic form, since the conflict of ideas through the speech on characters features heavily in the novel, along with other forms of narrative including the more narrative kind of poetry. There is some division within philosophical dialogues between the ones with more literary and imaginative power, independent of the argument and the ones where the dialogue form seems more like clothing for the argument, maybe to make a provocative point of view seem more acceptable and more provisional since only held by a character in the dialogue. The former type begins with Plato and carries on through Kierkegaard. The latter type includes Cicero, carrying on through Berkeley and Hume. This is not to say that the latter type lack literary merit, but the dialogue form seems much more of a rhetorical adornment than a deep part of the argument. It is not clear that much is lost if they are transformed into direct prose, though of course even the role of dialogue here in making the argument more acceptable is a significant concern.

The dialogue as a form for accommodating conflict of ideas expands into forms which are not immediately defined as dialogues but present voices with differing ideas within an authorial voice. Maybe the most striking examples are the spiritual struggles in Augustine of Hippo and the essays of Michel de Montaigne. In the latter case, a whole genre is developed, in part, through a displacement of conflict of ideas within a dialogue to rival ideas considered by the author.

Essays

As has just been established, the essay as an aspect of philosophy and literature is very much associated in its origin with Michel de Montaigne. He developed the essay as an important form of writing and a philosophical approach concerned with subjectivity, at the same time. His philosophical legacy is the Essays, in which the possibilities of individual inquiry, storytelling, and discursive philosophising are all explored through essays which test the limits of coherence of writing. This approach permeates later philosophy, though the more digressive aspects of Montaigne's are mostly curbed in later practitioners from Francis Bacon through David Hume and Ralph Waldo Emerson to the authors of current scholarly articles in philosophy journals. Even though the philosophical essay in Bacon, Hume, and Emerson is relatively restrained and coherent compared with the work of Montaigne, it does provide an alternative to the technical style of the philosophical essay as it has developed since Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Their approach can be taken back a bit further to Charles Sanders Peirce, though he wrote in a less technical style. The technical philosophical essay can be taken back further to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in the seventeenth century. Montaigne's essay writing carries on through forms other than the essay, in the fragments of Blaise Pascal which combine variegated insights, the maxims, and reflections of Francois de La Rochefoucauld, the various forms of writing in Rousseau, and so on through all the ways of writing French philosophy. This philosophical history writing cannot be separated from a literary history of letters, memoirs, plays, and novels onto Marcel Proust and since. The essays of Montaigne stand at the beginning then of the multiplication and intersection of ways of writing both philosophy and literature which spread quickly outside France as can be seen in the use of the essay on cannibals in Shakespeare's The Tempest. Derrida's deconstructive style and the Analytic paper on necessary and sufficient conditions for use of a concept both come out of the form of the essay in Montaigne. Through Emerson, the essay becomes an expression of Transcendentalism; through Peirce it becomes an expression of Pragmatism. These

philosophical positions were articulated following a literary model in Montaigne of establishing a position, exploring criticisms and alternatives, ending with a final position. The same applies to the most austere work of investigation into the philosophy of logic, language, and science.

Narrative

Narrative in philosophy goes back at least to Plato as does philosophical analysis of narrative. Narration is regarded with suspicion in Plato as a means to communicate false ideas, even while he often has narratives embedded into his dialogues. Homeric epic, the major narrative presence in ancient Greek culture is regarded with the deepest suspicion as the portrayal of immoral gods. Perhaps theatre is worse with its use of actors pretending to be someone else and its provocation to enjoy improper pleasures at someone else's suffering. However, these are all present in Homeric epic which provides source material for ancient drama and which was sung by performers. In Aristotle, we see a more sympathetic approach to narrative, though with less use of narrative. On the latter point, it is still the case that Aristotle's philosophy frequently relies on mininarratives, very short stories that illustrate and build up an argument. His analysis of narrative is in the Poetics, where pure narrative as in Homeric epic is held to be inferior to tragic drama in some respects, but is also more complete than drama. Long narrative is episodic, revealing a reality about the world and the ways in which events are dispersed and loosely connected. Narrative has always been part of philosophy given the latter's tendency to use stories to clarify, reinforce, and emphasise. There is more of the latter in later philosophy. However, we do see elements of narrative in Cicero, Seneca, Boethius, and so on or even full-scale narrative as in Augustine's autobiographical work. Descartes' most widely read philosophical texts bring in narrative as central in the supposed birth of modern philosophy. The analysis of narrative is a far rarer thing in the history of philosophy, though a central work of Enlightenment eighteenth-century philosophy, Giambattista Vico's New Science does deal with narrative. Vico puts Homeric epic at the centre of a philosophy of history in a repeated cycle of stages. It cannot however be said that there is much narrative analysis in Vico's account. He provides more of an elevation of the earlier form of long narrative as revealing of the society which produced it. The central idea is that epic contains imaginative universals in which one thing stands for a universal class, while the development of philosophy shifts the whole of culture, including its literary aspect to abstract universals. The impact on literature is that narrative moves from myth to

illustration of moral maxims. So though Vico does not really analyse narrative, he does set out a view of its cultural place and the transformation of narrative. There is philosophical work on the novel from the late eighteenth century onwards, but close discussion of narrative really emerges in the twentieth century on the basis of linguistics, semiology, and hermeneutics, along with Analytic philosophy.

Poetry

Philosophy before Plato was often written in verse, so we can say that philosophy was largely poetry in the Miletian and Eleatic schools, and other pre-Socratic contributions. The study of the earliest philosophy is often the study of poetry. Even in the time of Socrates, Anaxagoras wrote his poetry in verse. Centuries later Lucretius wrote in this way at about the same time as Cicero wrote dialogues. Boethius uses poetry as well as dialogue-marking a final point in the classical use of poetry in philosophy. The use of poetry in later philosophy is distinctly unusual, but Nietzsche sometimes includes poetry in his philosophical texts. Some writers considered poets more than philosophers were engaging with philosophy as can be seen in William Wordsworth and Friedrich Hölderlin. More recently Stéphane Mallarmé, Rainer Maria Rilke, T.S. Eliot, Wallace Stevens, and Paul Celan are among those widely recognised to make a philosophical contribution, even if they are largely regarded primarily as poets. Since the time of Boethius, poetry has been seen as philosophical more through philosophical aspects of poetic language rather than the communication of philosophical ideas. The connection between poetic language and a deep experience of the linguistic, including what lies at the edge of language, is an idea from the Romantic era. However, we can see precedents for it stretching back into the Middle Ages, in the poetry or religious experience, as in Dante Alighieri's contribution and that of the Piers Plowman author. In comparison with later Romantic and Symbolist ideas of poetry, the religious and philosophical meanings are presented in very rhetorical ways, but still in a language connecting with the Romantic and post-Romantic worlds. The analysis of poetry goes back to Plato, if in a rather cursory form suggesting it relies on non-reasoned inspiration which may convey truths, but not the highest way of knowing them. Aristotle provides a more systematic approach in the Poetics, but what we have does not say much about lyric poetry. Out of classical sources, we do get the idea of lyric poetry as a subjective form of literature. It is in the late eighteenth century in Immanuel Kant that these ideas get elevated into lyric poetry as a particularly pure form of art, engaged with the deepest subjectivity. That idea is still very influential and informs

continuing philosophical interest, even where as in Heidegger the idea of subjectivity is treated with suspicion. In the more Heideggerian approach, Being reveals itself in its self-concealment in a particularly powerful way.

Autobiography and Biography

The poetry which contains philosophy may have an autobiographical component as can be seen in Dante and Wordsworth. Philosophical texts may be written as autobiography. René Descartes wrote some of his philosophy as prose narrative, making storytelling part of the formulation of modern philosophy and more specifically bringing autobiography into philosophy. This is one part of the way that a lot of philosophy, particularly of the Analytic variety, despite its separation from literary style, uses storytelling, or at least brief imaginative fictions with some of the qualities of literature, as a main aspect of philosophical argument. Augustine wrote a literary classic, Confessions, which is part of his philosophical and theological output at the end of the Roman world in the West while also providing a paradigm for literary autobiography. Like Descartes' Discourse, it is not strictly known as an autobiography but has elements of it and is an important part of the background. There are strong autobiographical elements in Boethius and Montaigne, continuing this tradition from Augustine. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Confessions might often be regarded as part of his literary output but also contains philosophical positions and arguments regarding the nature of the self and memory. This is a relatively straightforward kind of autobiography pioneered by Rousseau but of course always conditioned by fictional and aesthetic concerns which are very evidently at work in at least two texts. The generally accepted paradigm of the modern biography, James Boswell's The Life of Samuel Johnson appears later in the eighteenth century, suggesting that thought of this century, including philosophy, is entangled with the development of biographical form, through interest in mind, ideas, imagination, self-love, passions, and so on. Nietzsche presents philosophical autobiography as something much more detached from an account of a life and more the view of how a life is shaped from the point of view of philosophy.

Fragments and Aphorisms

Friedrich Schlegel made a perhaps underrated contribution to philosophy through a style of fragments and aphorisms, himself following precedents in writers like Anthony Ashley Cooper (Third Earl of Shaftesbury), Francois de La Rochefoucauld, and Blaise Pascal who straddle philosophy and literature. The aphorisms and fragments of French writers are fundamental to the development of French

literature as well philosophy. Ideas about the passions in French literature operate in close relation to philosophical, or moral, aphorisms which refer to paradoxical and conflicting aspects of the passions. The style of aphorism in Pascal and La Rochefoucauld itself conveys a view of the perpetually unsatisfied and incomplete nature of the passions. They pose a challenge to rationalistic views of the human and natural worlds, whether derived from antique Stoic or modern Cartesian sources. They are in some degree maxims, as the title of La Rochefoucauld's book. His own contribution is accompanied by other writers of aphorisms and fragments in the Jena or Athenäum circle of German Romantics or Romantic Ironists. His style of writing and that of his predecessors is echoed in the work of Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, so does form a large part of the philosophical tradition since the seventeenth century. Kierkegaard discusses the Jena Romantic Ironists early in his career; one of his books is Philosophical Fragments (though also translated as Philosophical Crumbs), and the whole of Either/Or I is a performative engagement with Romantic Irony including the use of aphorism and fragment. Theodor Adorno and Maurice Blanchot were the most obvious followers of the aphoristic and fragmentary style in areas of twentieth-century philosophy centrally concerned with literary aesthetics. Blanchot himself wrote literary fictions as well as philosophy. It is not only in French and German philosophers of Ludwig Wittgenstein through his two contrasting major works, between them marking at least and often two major transformations in thinking about logic, language, metaphysics, mind, knowledge, and foundations of mathematics. Wittgenstein was a great admirer of Kierkegaard, and though there are many differences in preoccupations, Wittgenstein's revolutionary philosophy is achieved using related forms of writing.

Part Two: Philosophy of Literature

Part Two is again organised around genres, and there is some overlap with the selection of genres in the first section. This approach has been taken to accommodate the different ways philosophy approaches different literary genres. If philosophy and literature is about interaction, if it is about more than philosophy taking literature as an object and literature illustrating philosophical claims, then it must deal with the ways that differences between genres are an issue for philosophy of literature as well as philosophy as literature. Just as philosophy is itself changed according to which literary form it might have, philosophy must change according to the kind of literature it discusses. While there must of course be general pure

aesthetics of some kind, this may at times obscure the degree to which different kinds of kind, and then different kinds of genre with individual arts, appeal to different aspects of philosophy. The aspects of language explored in the aesthetics of poetry must be different from those explored in the novel, and the weight of language is different. Poetry is where language will be most central, and the novel is the discussion of language as style is important, but not so much the details of linguistic devices which tend to be subordinate to narrative issues. So where there is philosophy of the novel, the questions are about integrating the complexity of events, characters, linguistic registers, and themes into a unity of some kind. In poetry, certainly in lyric poetry, unity of the complex is important but as the coming together of words and concrete ideas rather than the creation of a large literary world with time, space, structure, competing thoughts, and so on.

Myth

Both literature and philosophy have what can be described as a beginning and as a prehistory in myth. There are major questions about how far both philosophy and literature can be said to be distinct from myth at any time in their development, which include questions about the relationship of philosophy and literature. Myth contains explanations for natural and social phenomena. It is clear that by the time of Plato it had become normal to think of myth as having some rational basis, so as something that could be read philosophically. Plato's own form of rationalism still allows the deployment of mythic in his own philosophy. The investigation of the relation between myth and philosophy was central to the work of Giambattista Vico's version of Enlightenment and Adorno and Horkheimer's version of critique of Enlightenment. For Vico, his new science of the human world uncovers the reality behind myth, using the methods of philosophy and philology together. In this case, philosophy only has power to investigate the human world in conjunction with the study of literary texts, so is intertwined with literature. Homer's epics stand at the centre of historical progress from origins of human community almost lost to rational reconstruction and to the law-governed world in which the meaning of myth is almost lost. Adorno and Horkheimer also put Homer at the centre, seeing these epics as founded in a struggle of reason against nature in which myth is obliterated but rises anew within reason. The anthropological study of myth, itself rooted in the growth of social science following out of the work of Vic and other Enlightenment historical philosophers, comes into literary studies and philosophy again through encounters such as Mircea Eliade's philosophy of religion and history,

or, Derrida's commentaries on myth and early philosophy. The idea of the fixity and long-term nature of myth existing in contrast with the changeable and subjective nature of poetry can be found in Romantic thought, as can be found in the progress from Schlegel to Kierkegaard. In looking at myth in the context of philosophy and literature, we can then see two broad themes: myth as inspired or archaic thought versus reason and myth as dominating tradition versus individual subjectivity. The ways in which myth can be shaped to give an inspired aspect to philosophical argument while providing a carapace of traditional wisdom is itself an issue in Plato's philosophical writing which can be brought into later use and discussion of myth.

Epic

Epic is a way in which myth, philosophy, and literature mingle at the beginning of the development of literature and myth but not only the beginning. Homeric epic is a fundamental source for ancient Greek philosophy as well as an object of critical discussion. The successors to Homeric epic writing (Virgil, Dante, Milton, and others) have engaged with philosophical issues and in later development have become objects of philosophical discussion about their relations with romance and the novel. Homeric epic is also the source of stories taken up in Greek tragedy, itself leading us into philosophical questions about these genres and their relations. Ancient Greek drama, tragic and comic, interacts with Athenian philosophy as well as becoming an object for it. One route leads from ancient Greek epic to tragedy, another leads to Augustan Latin epic. Just as modern interest in Greek epic is almost entirely confined to Homer, interest in Latin epic is almost entirely confined to Virgil's Aeneid. Later epics still attracting attention are very largely in English (John Milton) or are Medieval to Renaissance works featuring knightly combat, which could also be classified as Romances, as in the cases of Torquato Tasso and Ludovico Ariosto. The big exception is Dante Alighieri's Divine Comedy, which can be grouped with John Milton's Paradise Lost as the central work in epic after Homer and Virgil. Though Dante and Milton are separated by centuries in time, by language and many other things, they both have a religious centre to their epics. Homeric epic was the major source of information about the Olympian deities and archaic heroes for the ancient Greeks. Virgil created a civic religion interwoven with theology. So the most grand epics in the tradition have had deeply and foundational religious aspects which generally separate from other instances of the genre, though does justify complete marginalisation of the other instances. Epic exists in relation

to Romance as well as to the novel. Remembering this should reduce any tendency to see epic as self-enclosed and monumental as has often happened. It should not be seen as the expression of a complete and untroubled world view which has been a tradition in looking at Homer in particular. In this respect, it may be useful to look at epic backwards; in the sense that when we look at Milton, we are able to place Paradise Lost in the context of other genres and his own variety of writing, in contrast to Homer where we lack framing texts and an idea of the writer as a complete author. We can further look at the epic tradition from its beginning in the context of the development of the novel. In his major novels, Joyce is engaged in encounter with epic in trying to write modern epic and play with the form of ancient epic. Hermann Broch gives another version of this in his novel on Virgil by making the context of epic creation and the presumed subjectivity of the writer a focus for a novel. This can be carried on through consideration of those novels (Miguel de Cervantes and Herman Melville), verse dramas (Goethe), and romances (Wolfram von Eschenbach) which have the most epic qualities.

Drama

The philosophical discussion of drama begins with a very critical reaction in Plato and a rehabilitation in Aristotle. The illusion of dramatic performance and the enjoyment of bad pleasures are identified as reasons for suspicion in Plato who sometimes seems to wish for a Greek culture free of drama as well as Homeric epic. In his own writing, he provides a counter in that dialogue is a variation of drama even if not performed. The non-performance may be an advantage from Plato's point of view. The essential quality of drama, that it is almost pure speech, is the essential quality of dialogue. Aristotle's reaction is to define tragedy as the highest art and give it moral dignity as a way in which develop awareness of the horror that can come from an error in the actions of someone of good, though not perfect moral character, and elevated stature in the community. The movement from ancient to modern tragedy has provided a particularly rich source of inspiration for philosophical discussion through G.W.F. Hegel, Kierkegaard, Walter Benjamin, and others. For them the development of tragedy shows the differences for philosophy of history and social philosophy between communal societies in compact city states and modern individualised societies under an impersonal state. There has also been a particularly persistent discussion about the possible primacy of tragedy as a literary form and even as the highest form of any art, since Aristotle. Aristotle was

himself following on from, and criticising, Plato's criticisms of the immorality and irrationality of tragedy. Related comments have been applied to comedy.

For Aristotle, comedy is inferior though as drama about low-status characters. The later discussion in German Idealism and Kierkegaard of comedy places it more as the counterpart of tragedy. What philosophy has often lacked with regard to drama is an account of the nature of the performance, of the specific qualities of text which should be turned into performance. Performance is always present in reading, which in earlier stages of history was very likely to be loud to an audience. The relation between text and performance to an audience is always an issue in literature and philosophy. Plato wrote philosophy which at least has some of the aspects of drama, in that his dialogues are dramatisations. The Ancient Greek dramatic performances brought together cities in ways which seem remote from modern theatrical performance, but do show how drama is embedded in the formation of community, the gathering of an audience for a collective experience. It is a community forming event in which writing and speech, text and body, interact and can pull against each other.

Lyric Poetry

The lyric poem was discussed in the earliest Athenian considerations of literary forms, as well as in Augustan Rome. It found a central place in the great eighteenth-century growth of philosophical aesthetics, in which the question arose of whether it was the most pure form of literature in the concentration on words as objects. Romantic lyric poetry had significant influence on and interaction with Idealist and Romantic philosophy, going on to become the centre of literary analysis in the New Criticism of the twentieth century. Immanuel Kant was the main Enlightenment and Idealist exponent of poetry as the highest form of the arts, as his aesthetics suggests a detachment of poetry from meaning in pure imagination. The idea music as the highest art in Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer also elevated poetry. For Kierkegaard, the highest form of music' is opera, the music exists through a poetic side. The poetic genre also attracted philosophical attention, particularly in the Continental philosophical tradition in its development from Romantic symbolism to modernism, with regard to the limits of words and meaning, sometimes of ethical hope. The lyric poem, in its most pure form, was a part of Renaissance literary high culture, where it had an elevated courtly and aesthetic status. It was however more part of rhetoric and less part of any ideal of aesthetic purity, at least with regard to the way it was understood. The journey of lyric poetry from the most subjective of

the literary genres recognised by Aristotle, less significant than epic and tragedy, to a continuing tendency to regard it as the most pure and absolute form of literature is striking, though in Plato there is already the idea of poetry as coming from ecstasy which is maybe revived to some degree in Romantic thought. The ideal of poetry spreads beyond the lyric poem itself to the prose poem and the idea of the novel as a work which might use poetic language of a lyric extended over an epic length. This is part of how the novel itself becomes elevated as a form. The focus on lyric poetry also involves a shift in the moral and epistemological issues that appear as from the Romantic period on, poetry is often taken up in challenges to the world which may appear alien in its reality and more claims from the point of view of the poetic voice. On way of looking at the development of literature since the Romantic era is of a shift of lyric poetry from illustration of a metaphysical or moral point of view to epistemological and moral challenge, through the intense subjectivity now attributed to poetry.

The Novel

The novel has a double history or prehistory in that its origins have been traced back to ancient epic and to ancient novels, along with other genres absorbed into the form. Despite its current place as a major component of literary culture, the elevation of the novel to a high aesthetic level worthy of extensive philosophical discussion is quite recent. The elevation of the novel in the culture maybe goes back to the mid-nineteenth century as the novel became the major literary way of commenting on the times or on history. The novel becomes part of history as it becomes part of the formation of nations, establishing a national language and a way of conceiving of the nation. The novel in a recognisably modern form does go back further, though exactly how far is itself not clear. There is a kind of double beginning of the novel in the sixteenth century with Francois Rabelais first in France with, then later in the sixteenth century and on into the seventeenth century, Miguel de Cervantes in Spain. This itself conditions philosophical discussion of the novel, with the more idealising high canon discussions tending to place Cervantes at the beginning, while the more popular culture and anthropological discussions tend to place Rabelais at the beginning, most famously in the work of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin. The latter approach also tends to bring in the plurality of genres feeding into the novel rather than treating it as the inheritor of the grandest aspects of the epic tradition. The idealising approach can be found in the first really notable work on the philosophy of the novel in late eighteenth-century Germany,

that is, the work of Friedrich Schlegel and other Romantic Ironists of the Athenäum circle in Jena. This approach which did elevate the status of the novel was resisted by Hegel, who generally resided the kind of elevation of subjectivity, fractured form, shifting perspective, and irony to be found in the Jena Romantics. For later readers, Hegel's judgement tends to self-undermine because he holds onto a relatively low aesthetic status for the novel, as part of his argument that art cannot reach the highest level after the perfection of Protestant Christian theology and modern philosophy amongst the German Idealists, particularly himself. Really major work on the philosophy of the novel does not appear again until the time of Kierkegaard, where it has a strange status since the novel as form and object of analysis is both an important area of Kierkegaard's and is not something he emphasises much. He discusses the form of the novel in his university thesis, along with some of his even earlier writing and later reviews. His own writing at some points can be regarded as a philosophical novel, an idea promoted by the Romantic Ironists. Kierkegaard does not present himself as a thinker about the novel, and the next work of lasting interest is that of György Lukács in the early twentieth century, followed by Bakhtin, Erich Auerbach, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, René Girard, Georges Bataille, and Maurice Blanchot.

Romance

Romance as a genre could be said to come between epic and the novel, suffering an eclipse as the novel takes over as the main long narrative genre of the culture. The rise of the novel itself includes a significant aspect of parody of romance, in Don Quixote. It can equally be said that romance lives on in the novel, which often brings in heroic, adventurous, and fantastic elements directly from romance or maybe reinvents them. Though it looks like the mediating term between ancient epic and the modern novel, it does not generally get much attention from that point of view. Attention tends to be limited to medievalist and Renaissance specialists, along with literary formalists, the archetypal criticism practised by Northrop Frye and Joseph Campbell. However, romance has enormous current cultural relevance. J.R.R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings trilogy, one of the most culturally significant works of twentieth-century literature, is a mixture of recreated archaic epic and romance. The ways in which Arthurian romance and the theories of Joseph Campbell have been present in cultural creation are numerous. The role of the parody of romance in Cervantes is really more of a reason for reading romance than not reading it.

Romance may summon images of medievalist fantasy, but does also include Renaissance foundations of modern English literature in Geoffrey

Chaucer and Edmund Spenser. Looking at the aesthetic philosophy of the twentieth century, work by Bakhtin and Benjamin mostly known for its relation with the novel does deal at length with folklore, a vital component of romance, while Bakhtin as noted above does give importance to romance as a forerunner of the modern novel. The work of Benjamin and Bakhtin, in particular, draws attention to the roles of timelessness, repetition, irrelevance of space, and the fulfilment of the hero in folklore which enter into romance. It is important not to see romance just in terms of a literary world lacking in modern subjectivity or formal play though. It draws on folklore but also incorporated the antique legacy along with the growth of medieval literary culture over centuries in which relatively realist and historical locations may combine with awareness of the impossibility of human desire and the failings of human institutions. Arthurian romance in its many iterations is a way of dealing with the role of kingship, the relation between religion and war, nature and human community, the conflicts between pure love and social community, at least in the later medieval versions, playing a strong role in sharing political visions of monarchy at the time. Romance is just as much about the tensions between the folkloric world and what appears to undermine its apparent certainties as it is confirmation.

Part Three: Philosophical Aesthetics

The central section of the book is on philosophical aesthetics, which is maybe appropriate if you think of philosophising about literary aesthetics as the foundation and centre of philosophy and literature. While there are good arguments for why this might be the case, the editors prefer to think that any section could be taken as equally close to the centre and foundation of philosophy and literature. What this section certainly does is provide a transition from discussions of genre in literature to discussions which cut across genres. The topics here are a mixture of philosophical approaches and areas of investigation. The distinction is not absolute though since Cognitive Philosophy and Language, Ontology, and Fiction are areas of investigation which tend to assume a philosophical approach though we should of course regard this always open to challenge and transformation. Any attempt to deal fully with philosophical aesthetics in Western philosophy must deal with the distinction between Continental European and Analytic philosophical approaches.

This distinction is itself complicated by a number of factors including the oddity that it appears to be a distinction between a geographical location on one side and a philosophical method on the other side, along with the uncertainty about whether cognitive philosophy should be grouped with Analytic philosophy or placed in a category of its own. The Continental-Analytic distinction is usually traced back to the nineteenth century, but has precedents from early on. Think about the antique distinction between Plato's literary approach and Aristotle's discursive approach, or the Renaissance distinction between Montaigne's version of the essayistic and Descartes' version of the philosophical discourse, or the early modern distinction between Pascal's aphorisms and the logical model of Leibniz's philosophical writing, or the Enlightenment distinction between Vico's literary historicism and David Hume's historically decontextualised work on ideas.

Analytic Aesthetics

The Analytic approach in philosophy can be taken back to Aristotle as suggested above, and maybe those Platonic dialogues which seem closest to an Aristotelian mode, possibly because Aristotle had an influence on Plato from within the Academy. However, the distinction as a recognisable one in terms of the way philosophy is done now is usually taken back to the nineteenth century, maybe with reference to John Stuart Mill's criticisms of European ways of doing philosophy. The real emergence of Analytic philosophy as we know comes later in the nineteenth century, in the essays and monographs of Gottlob Frege on the philosophy of language, logic, and mathematics followed by the related work of Bertrand Russell in the early twentieth century. An earlier precedent might also be found in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce on pragmatist philosophy in the earlier nineteenth century. However, Peirce's essays are much more discursive and less cornered with conceptual purity than the work of Frege and Russell, while at times also incorporating theological speculations foreign to the determination of Frege and Russell to exclude anything not strictly relevant to conceptual discussion. In one of the oddities of the Continental-Analytic distinction, the Continental side is usually traced back to the German philosophers who followed Kant, particularly J.G. Fichte, F.W.J. Schelling, and Hegel, in a period distinctly preceding the emergence of Analytic philosophy. The Continental side of the distinction seems to assume that all philosophy before the German Idealists was Analytic, something of a concession. It is certainly the case that Analytic philosophy tends to see precedents in Kant and most pre-Kantian philosophy; however, not all such philosophy fits this pattern

which is why it is suggested above that the distinction may in reality go back to antiquity. The Analytic position is less obviously tied to aesthetics than Continental approaches since the latter includes many philosophers who bring literary style into their philosophy and put aesthetics at the centre of their philosophy. Analytic aesthetics looks comparatively marginal; nevertheless questions of literary writing and the status of fictions can be found in Frege and Russell gave importance both to literary references and creating philosophical fictions. In this way, aesthetics may more be central to analytic philosophy than it appears to be, and this is why a chapter has been given to this topic. Looking at what is normally defined as Analytic aesthetics, there is a tradition going back to the 1950s which looks at conceptual questions such as: defining the art object, defining the location of aesthetic qualities, defining art as an institutional creation or an intrinsic quality, defining aesthetic appreciation as more cognitive or emotive, the nature of art criticism, the nature of metaphor, art, and the nature of consciousness. Cognitive issues appear in the list which might or might not be regarded as specific to Analytic philosophy.

Cognitive Philosophy

Cognitive philosophy, that is, work on knowledge processes in the brain and mind, might be considered part of Analytic philosophy, and large parts of it are very clearly related to Analytic work on mind, epistemology, science, and language. Two things distinguish it from Analytic philosophy. One is that the analytic aspect of Analytic philosophy is usually taken to refer to some kind of priority for at least one out of logical, linguistic, and conceptual modes of analysis rather than to natural, or even machine generated, processes of any kind. The other thing is that cognition refers to an area of philosophical investigation so does connected with Continental European philosophy as well as Analytic philosophy. Maurice Merleau-Ponty did not organise his phenomenology and philosophy of psychology around the theme of cognition, but cognition is a part of it, and Phenomenology of Perception is a major influence on recent work in cognition. Issues of cognition are clearly part of philosophy, but additionally in recent years they have also become a significant part of literary studies and should be included in a book on philosophy and literature. Cognitive philosophy of some kind goes back to the origins of philosophy, certainly appearing in the discussions of mind in Plato, Aristotle, and later schools of antique philosophy. The issues of cognition should also be recognised as part of literature from the beginning, since literature contains assumptions about how the minds of characters work at an individual differentiated level and at a more unified universal

level. Literary texts do not generally contain complete theories of perception and cognition, but do constantly rely on a view of how these processes work, or it could be said they create fictional worlds in which they work in certain ways. This is partly an absorption of the views of the time and is partly a creation of a way of thinking about it. On top of this, discussion of cognition in literature now combines the study of the cognitive theories of the past in literature with cognitive theory as it is now, interpreting the cognitive theories of the past. One classic examination of this is Benjamin's discussion of humours in the psychological assumptions of baroque (seventeenth-century) Europe. The theory of humours is itself a mixture of psychology and physiology. Current cognitive theory is concerned with neurology as well as psychology, perception as well as theoretical knowledge. Psychoanalysis may provide one entry point into these topics, but is doing something different in its concerns with the unconscious, and is of less weight within the broadly psychological aspects of literary studies than it used to be this philosophy relates to literary ways of dealing with experience. Later philosophical work of Heidegger does put literary texts at the centre. There is a major issue of how far there is continuity between earlier and later Heidegger. Leaving that aside as far as possible, it can be said that the later Heidegger continues to be concerned with Being as something that evades the more scientistic, logical, and empiricist forms of philosophy and that can to some degree be shown through poetic writing. Heidegger's own writing of this period sometimes tries to incorporate these poetic capacities. The hermeneutic tradition was carried on in philosophy by Hans-Georg Gadamer who establishes more of a systematic aesthetic approach than Heidegger. Paul Ricoeur was another major figure in hermeneutics after Heidegger, tending to be more systematic than even Gadamer and giving even fuller attention to what can be described as aesthetics or poetics.

Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics emerges out of German Idealism and Romanticism in the interpretation of the Bible and of ancient Greek philosophy. The key figure in the origins of hermeneutics is Friedrich Schleiermacher, who made major contributions to Protestant theology and to the interpretation of Plato, helping to establish the idea of a Socrates distinct from Plato within the dialogues. It is a philosophical approach to interpretation drawing on philology of classical texts and Biblical interpretation which are linked by the role of the philology of the Hebrew and Greek text making up the Bible. This is shaped by the rationalistic demythologised

understanding of Christianity in Kant and Hegel, itself drawing on an approach to Biblical literature going back to Baruch Spinoza in the seventeenth century. After Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey took hermeneutics into the sphere of social science, distinguishing between explanation as a method of the natural sciences and understanding as the basis of social science. More importantly from the point of view of literary studies, hermeneutics was taken up by Martin Heidegger in early work as a major aspect of his approach along with ontology. Heidegger's early philosophy is not itself a work of literary interpretation, but the centrality of 'Being-in-the-world' to its approach establishes philosophy in which anxiety, thrownness, care, authenticity, and inauthenticity along with other themes identified as part of the structure of Dasein' (the kind of Being humans have) interact strongly with themes both within literature and literary studies. The strong, but understated, roots of Heidegger's early philosophy in the often literary philosophy of Augustine of Hippo and Kierkegaard gives an idea of how

Phenomenology

Phenomenology overlaps with hermeneutics particularly in the case of Heidegger, so also in all the philosophy that came after Heidegger and was influenced by him including Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben. Phenomenology as a philosophical movement is associated with Edmund Husserl, who himself claimed Phenomenology was what philosophy had always been doing properly understood. In particular, he argued that he was carrying on the approach of both Plato and Descartes. He was more immediately building on work in psychology and philosophy of psychology, though he was insistent that phenomenology was anti-psychologistic. Husserl also built on work in philosophical anthropology, personalistic ethics, and other versions of phenomenology. His approach to phenomenology was formalistic, concerned with ideal objects and forms of intentional consciousness. He had a negative reaction to Heidegger's way of continuing his approach. Towards the end of his life, Husserl became more concerned with history and ethical goals in history, but it is the formalism work which had a great influence. Husserl himself did not work on literature, but some of his followers, most famously Roman Ingarden, brought literary objects within the scope of phenomenology. Heidegger pointed the way towards a phenomenology more concerned with history, time, authenticity, poetic experience, and all the things described under hermeneutics above. Discussion of literature appears not only in later Heidegger but also in Levinas, Foucault, and

Derrida. The reactions to phenomenology spread to philosophers not part of the phenomenological inheritance, most notably Gaston Bachélard who turned to writing a poetics of experience rather than his earlier work on the formation of science. Jean-Paul Sartre's most widely read philosophical work concerns phenomenology in the fields of imagination and ontology. Accordingly this work attempts to make questions of Being questions of concrete experience. There is not much discussion of literature, but it does establish a way literature might be discussed in philosophical terms, and Sartre had already undertaken the task a few years earlier in his novelistic work. Work on feminism by Simone de Beauvoir and colonialism along with racism by Franz Fanon confirms how far phenomenology can enter a variety of fields of human experience which can be taken up in poetics.

Language, Ontology, Fiction

Issues of language, ontology, and fiction in philosophy have largely been part of analytic philosophy, both with regard to general objects of philosophical analysis and the status of literary objects. This specific but also broadly encompassing issue in Analytic philosophy does allow other modes of philosophy and brings philosophy and literature close to each other around very central issues. These are the issues of the reality of literary objects and the fictions constructed by fiction. The issue is one of the reality claims of entities that apparently only exist in language. Given that there are reasons why some philosophers consider all objects to be fictions constructed from perceptions, the question of literary fictions can readily move into questions of the reality of physical objects, along with the types of abstract entities often discussed by philosophers. The basis of the discussion of language, ontology, and fiction is deep in the origin of Analytic philosophy, as indicated above with regard to the chapter on Analytic Aesthetics'. This is the issue of names and the place of fictions in philosophy as discussed by Frege and Russell. There is also an overlap with the tradition of phenomenology since Alexius Meinong is part of the discussion of fictional entities and was a part of the early history of phenomenology in the Austrian-German culture of the Habsburg Empire as the nineteenth century moved into the twentieth century. This coincides with the emergence of Analytic philosophy. The progress of phenomenology, as described with regard to the chapter on Phenomenology above, largely takes it away from Analytic philosophy, with some exceptions for the role of some later phenomenology in the philosophy of the mind. However, there are areas of interaction associated with early

phenomenology, particularly regarding the status of fictional entities. For Frege, a major aspect of his discussion of

naming entities is the status of the terms 'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star' used for a long time to refer to the planet Venus seen in the morning and at night, without knowledge that it is Venus on both occasions. This brings up the problem of what the fictional entities 'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star' take as a reference and what the ontological status of the object is. Frege also raises the issues of the status of objects in fiction, more briefly. Bertrand Russell approaches these issues through the example of the sentence 'The present King of France is bald'. In Russell's view all sentences must be true or false, but, there is difficulty where a sentence refers to a non-existent entity, such as the present King of France. Meinong is part of this discussion because he gave importance to the question of the status of sentences about fictional and impossible objects. Unlike Frege and Russell, he suggests they belong to an ontological realm of objects which have some kind of reality, but not existence. This has all fed into an important vein of discussion of the role of truth, meaning, and fictionality in literature.

Deconstruction

Deconstruction clearly belongs to the Continental European tradition and for some represents its most excessive aspects. In any case, it has been very influential in literary studies and has brought literature in to the heart of philosophy with regard to the style of philosophical writing and themes of philosophy. It is the form of philosophising most concerned with finding a joint basis in language with literature, while also relating literature to ethical and political questions of naming, identity, and sovereignty. Despite its difference from Analytic style, notable attempts have been made to integrate it with Analytic philosophy. It is very associated with the name Derrida but has strong roots in Heidegger's later philosophy, where the term 'deconstruction' was used for the first time, following Heidegger's earlier use of 'destruction'. As this indicates, there is no clear boundary in time or in other dimensions between Derrida's deconstructive philosophy and other philosophical writing. Derrida himself suggests that deconstruction is something that is part of all philosophy and all writing. The emphasis on writing in general, which is open to all forms of communication, makes deconstruction a particularly powerful force for interdisciplinary work. While Derrida's work is famously challenging to read, it's central deconstructive claims can be summarised in a simple manner. There is no pure meaning and the search for meaning always demonstrates the possibility of

different and contradictory meanings. The idea of meaning links with Being and various other terms, which all refer to the ideal of pure meaning, pure truth, metaphysical certainty, and so on. Deconstruction provides two main strategies to reveal this reduction and attempt to avoid it, though complete elimination of the reduction is never possible. The strategies are an affirmation of the differences beyond reduction to Being and a reduction to Being that itself shows the impossibility of the enterprise, manifesting the difference between Being and actual representation of Being. The first strategy is associated with Heidegger and Rousseau. The second strategy is associated with Nietzsche and with a literary writer, James Joyce. This is indicative of the extent to which Derrida explores his own philosophy through literary texts. Derrida's approach provides a way of reading the history of philosophy and has influenced a variety of philosophers concerned with literary questions, as well as large numbers of literary critics. Paul de Man stands out as the literary critic with his own distinctive version of literary deconstruction coming from interaction with the literary aspects of the phenomenological tradition as well as Derrida. French thinkers in philosophy and literature whose work has developed partly through an interaction with Derrida's thought include Blanchot, Levinas, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Jean-Francois Lyotard. His influence on English language work across the humanities and social sciences has been very widespread.

Part Four: Literary Criticism and Theory

The fourth section is on literary criticism and theory. The previous sections were already dealing with this, and there is no wish of any kind to suggest that a clear distinction can be made between philosophy, criticism, and theory. The work of philosophy certainly does not finish in these sections. However, it is necessary to acknowledge the contributions made largely by scholars in literature departments to the relation between philosophy and literature, through a practice of literary criticism formulated in the early twentieth century after the opening of departments of modern literature and then in the late twentieth century through absorbing philosophy, along with linguistics, semiology, psychoanalysis, and anthropology, political, social, historical, and cultural thought into literary studies. Some of the hopes of establishing a very unified field of theory, often with specific political commitments, have not lasted. The idea of theory as a separate but domineering part of literature departments has not lasted either. We cannot really call this failure. Theory dispersed throughout literary work and was taken up a wide variety

of scholars with a wide variety of commitments and interests. Some fragmentation was an inevitable part of this process as an aspect of growth. Theory has been absorbed into work on literature as part of its practice rather than as a distinct operation claiming sovereignty over literary studies and legislating for it. The idea of a massive rather mechanical apparatus for theorist literature through semiotics, narratology, psychoanalysis, Marxism, or anything else has given way to forms of theory more intimately engaged with texts and with the history of literature, along with the historical context.

Literature as Theory

The dispersal of theory is partly apparent in the relatively recent field of literature as theory, which is related to anti-mimeticism. Here literature is discussed with regard to the truths and the world it creates, not themes of mimesis, representation, and reality. There is a strong rejection of any philosophical attempt to reduce literature to philosophical truths. The language of literature is recognised with regard to the truths of the violence of the world, so that literature can be seen as what incorporates the violence. Meaning itself comes from the forces in which words exist, they do not exist as abstract entities. Literature carries traces of the externalities, which are understood through violence, and is made up of these traces rather than serving as a secondary representation of the real world. In this approach, literature is seen not as a distant representation or abstraction of the world. It is more composed of many ways of creating a virtual reality in which the aesthetic is not pure aesthetic detached from reality but is rather an aesthetic that creates alternative realities. These realities have an ethical reality in what they show about the ethical possibilities of a virtual world. The emphasis in literary studies shifts from representation to performance. Theatre and other performative activities are given priority over representation. This draws on Baruch Spinoza's criticism of transcendentalism and Arendt's emphasis on politics as performance in ancient Athens. In the case of Spinoza, the issue is that in the Ethics, he argues for one substance in the universe. God cannot be a separate substance from the universe, so is immanent rather than transcendent. That is, God is present throughout the world rather than existing separately from it. The idea of art as a transcending representation of the world has always been intertwined with the idea of a creator God standing apart from the world. The Spinozistic move from the transcendental to the immanent in the understanding of the divine allows a model for art of oneness with the material, practical world which is the world of ethical and political

activity. Arendt's understanding of antique republicanism in Greece is that it is deeply bound up with the Homeric culture of the aristocratic semi-divine warrior hero. The formation of cities in ancient Greece leaves the aristocracy with a transformed heroic view of the politics of the city as a place for competition for the immortal glory sought by the Homeric heroes. So, politics is an activity in the city, not a representation of the city This still applies when democracy comes, as the people exercise their will through assemblies not representation. Philosophical and political critiques of transcendence and representation on these models inform literature and theory as a philosophical and political enterprise. This kind of recent work itself builds on and adds to traditions of literary studies across disciplinary boundaries.

Rhetoric

Rhetoric is something that is itself being revived while itself coming from a long history in the sense that it is used to refer to a way of grouping studies in the humanities and social sciences round the literary and communicative uses of language. Compared with the origins of rhetoric in public persuasion, it is still less focused on debating victory. It does however cover something like the range of topics that appear in Aristotle's work on rhetoric. The Aristotelian idea of rhetoric is very embedded in assumptions about the inferiority of public speech as an area of study compared with the parts of philosophy devoted to practical judgement (ethics and politics) and even more so compared with theoretical philosophy (metaphysics, nature, deduction). This low status of rhetoric is associated with Plato and Aristotle's rejection of the Sophists, the first experts in rhetoric, as unconcerned with truth. Much more recently, de Man establishes a view of rhetoric as the set of value oppositions established within a literary text, undermined during the course of the literary text. There is something of the ancient sense of the fallen nature of the rhetorician in de Man, taken up in the idea that all writing is inevitable fully of rhetoric. More recently, the label rhetoric has been used to cover the university teaching of writing as well as a unifying approach to the humanities. For the political economist Deirdre McCloskey, rhetoric is a way of referring to the desirable non-formal aspects of economics and its relation with the humanities, including philosophy and literature. All of this takes place against the background of the loss of rhetoric as understood by Aristotle and later antique writers stretching on through the role of rhetoric in the school curriculum. Rhetoric continues to be central to the curriculum, via the contributions of Marcus Tullius Cicero and

Quintilian (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus), dealing with these issues, until the eighteenth century. Rhetoric does not look like a subject that is renewing itself by the time of the Enlightenment. One of the early

Enlightenment thinkers, Giambattista Vico, was a professor of rhetoric who moved from this background into an integration of philology and philosophy in a theory of the history of human communities published as the New Science. Vico puts the study of Homeric epic at the centre and takes the first steps towards literary studies as well as history as major independent disciplines. At this point, rhetoric appears to be spinning off into different parts of the humanities as we now know them, including the more historical and literary aspects of philosophy. This is perhaps confirmed when we consider what is now the most widely ready work on rhetoric from the eighteenth century and the most widely ready since Aristotle, Adam Smith's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. These lectures contain a large amount of what we now call literary criticism, but connected with discussion of the development of language, the use of literary language in history, philosophy, law, and political theory in relation to the political system. Rhetoric here is both a unifying way of looking at the humanities and is on the verge of breaking up between the different humanities. This all leaves rhetoric with a strangely ambiguous status in which it is often closely linked to period studies, within the long period of time in which rhetoric was central to the curriculum and so was part of what linguistic form writers used.

Feminism and Gender

The work of critics and theorists has been strongly affected by issues of gender difference and feminist analysis. This includes the themes of gender in literature, the study of literature overlooked and marginalised because of gender exclusion, and the place of gender analysis in relating literature to gender relations in society. These considerations themselves bring in questions of the roles of intimacy, desire, domesticity, and subjectivity which have been played down as feminine.

The role of feminism in literature goes back at least to the late eighteenth century in the influence of Mary Wollstonecraft on women writers of the time. Feminism as part of literary studies is a comparative later starter in that literature departments were not opened until the late nineteenth century and feminism as a major issue did not really enter then until Simone de Beauvoir's work of the 1950s and other feminist writing of the time. The understanding of the novel is significant here as

the difficulties in accepting it as an elevated genre are related to its status as feminine, as literature that appealed to a supposedly limited feminine taste and even corrupted that taste. Despite the constraints on women writers, literature has often been a way for women to have a voice denied in other fields including philosophy. Literary writing has enabled women to approach philosophy from a non-institutionalised position and therefore advance feminine and feminist perspectives. 'What feminism has often done is challenge assumptions about universal humanism, as gender biased so in need of reformulation or rejection, so providing a critical perspective on universalist humanist assumptions about literature along with appreciation for the ways in which literature may have always resisted this. The development of feminist theory after de Beauvoir has had significant presence in literary studies, which was not itself a major area of work for de Beauvoir, though she was a notable novelist. The most striking presence in feminist literary studies has been the influence of Freudianism and particularly the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. This emphasis on desire and the nature of subjectivity has been joined by interests in deconstructive approaches to gender difference and historical approaches applied to the literary history of female writers along with the broader historical context.

Psychoanalysis

As noted above, Feminist literary criticism and theory has often employed psychoanalysis, which itself is highly literary in its origins. While Sigmund Freud had very scientific ambitions, clearly his work uses a literary imagination and often refers to literary texts. Despite Freud's scientific ambitions, many see his work as more part of literary interpretation and creation in its approach to symptoms, dreams, and literature itself. Freud's psychoanalysis also has an ambiguous relation with philosophy, particularly that of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, which serves both as precursor and a barrier to overcome, because it does enter the same territory as psychoanalysis. How much Freud takes from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is itself a major area of discussion. The work of Jacques Lacan in renewing psychoanalysis and returning it to what Lacan regarded as the real Freudian insights has been a major presence in literary criticism and theory. This comes from the role that Lacan gives to the symbolic, language and literature. Some of Lacan's work can only be understood with reference to philosophy or literature or both. Equally his work has stimulated philosophical as well as literary debate about meaning in literary texts and the role that anxieties about meaning play in literary texts. Truth

and the evasiveness of truth are intertwined with psychoanalytic and literary issues in Lacan and those who react to him, including Derrida and Deleuze. Discussion in Lacan and Derrida of Edgar Allen Poe's short story

`The Purloined Letter' established a central debate in literary studies about the use of psychoanalysis. The work of desire in literature and the forms of literature has been centrally understood with regard to Freud and what come after them. Literary critical use of psychoanalysis has also focused on the theories of infant development in Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott, because the focus on infant use of language and understating of the environment may give insights into the more playful and mythical aspects of literature. The infant has a playful attitude to words along with a tendency to symbolise fears and anxieties. More recently, Slavoj Zizek has brought the established Lacanian approach more into relation with German Idealist philosophy and various political concerns to discuss literature. As this includes use of the kind of Lacanianism employed in film studies, there is an interaction between the Lacanianism of the literary text and of cinema images.

Postcolonialism

Postcolonialism has become a major part of the literary theory field as a result of the work of those who have encountered literary from the point of view of subordination to colonialism and its afterlife. We can of course take this back before the formation of what we know as literary theory in the work of Frantz Fanon, along with others who both criticised colonialism and recognised the possibility of its ending. This area of work necessarily brings in issues of race, ethnicity, identity, and the migration from what were colonised regions to the old colonial centres. Though the main impetus has come from the colonised and the critics of colonialism, the field also develops perspectives from those who celebrated colonialism or at least shared some of its presuppositions. We can find an awareness of some kind of the colonial situations and the beginnings of its representation along with critical discussion. Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Homi Bhabha have played central roles in this field which also addresses the literature of the colonised, the peoples of recently colonised countries, and the migrants from those countries. Since they often write in the language of the colonial centre, the field incorporates the changes of language, literature, and identity which come from these shifts associated with colonialism and its aftermath. Fanon's work precedes the development of the field of postcolonial studies, but its impact was greatly assisted by the rise of his work centred around his experience as a black African

subject of French colonialism in the Caribbean, then his move to Paris, and then his participation in the Algerian War of Independence in which he defected to the Algerian side. He interpreted this through his education in philosophy and psychoanalysis and a literary skill in his theoretical writing. All of these aspects of his life and work anticipate what became important in later postcolonial studies. The literary work of Aimé Césaire was also important to the formation of the postcolonial field before it became known as such. Edward Said's work on Orientalism had a decisive impact on the field in its articulation of the relation between power and knowledge in colonialism, with reference to literary texts. Said also had a major influence on the understanding of Palestine, again bringing a rather existential concern with a postcolonial image known to him through his origins in British mandate Palestine.

Part Five: Areas of Work Within Philosophy and Literature

The final section is areas of work within philosophy and literature, ending the Handbook with ideas about where there are particularly strong focuses in the field, without trying to suggest that this is the only work that exists or is worthy of attention. This provides a way of bringing the themes of the previous parts together. There is not absolute distinction between the topics in this part and the topics in the previous parts. These topics do however seem particularly useful for showing what work does tend to highlight what brings philosophy and literature together, along with the ways in which they are articulated. What is particularly striking about these ways of bringing philosophy and literature together is that they are practically oriented, in the sense of the parts of philosophy referring to the social world rather than pure theoretical philosophy. Law, politics, ethics, and political economy all clearly belong to practical philosophy. The possible exception is philosophical fictions. These very often refer to ethical situations, but certainly do not always. However, when they do refer to issues of epistemology, language, mind, and metaphysics, they do so in relation to practical social world situations and show a way from theoretical philosophy into practical philosophy. Literature then is shown to have a role in relation to philosophy of emphasising its practical aspects. Practical in philosophical language is to be distinguished from applied. Practical refers to the sphere of human action and can do so in the most abstract ways. Applied refers to the use of philosophy in very particular situations, which can of course enter into practical philosophy, but is not the same thing.

Law and Literature

Law and literature brings out the ways in which literature relates to judgement whether in addressing institutions of justice or bringing ideas about justice into play. Many works of literature have put issues of crime, the legal system, punishment, and the understanding of justice at the centre. Notable examples include Charles Dickens and Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky. A huge genre has grown up since of crime thrillers and detective stories. The law enters literary works in other ways. Franz Kafka's two major novels at the centre of modern literature revolve around laws, courts, judges, guilt, and punishment. Looking at the most recognised ancient epics, those of Homer and Virgil, we can see questions of laws of human communities and the consequences of breaking them at their heart. This is why Rousseau takes a quotation from Virgil as the epigram for his work on the social contract. Questions of justice are always present in literature, as there is always some sense of agency and responsibility. The very order of a literary work is suggestive of assumptions about moral order in the social world and maybe the natural world. Law and literature can deal with particular crimes and criminals, particular lawyers and court cases, in literature. The other side of this can be a sense of the literary in law, that is, the sense that the qualities of good judgement in court relate to interpretation of cases and legal texts. The justice derived from interpreting laws may differ from that derived from interpreting the facts of the case. This constantly possible dissonance between justice as law and justice as intuitions about cases is itself an issue for literary texts about law. It is a constitutive issue for law, that is in the question of how a court may resolve different understandings of what justice is. Here conflict between natural law and stature law, divine law and human law, individual justice and communal justice, outward actions and inner intentions, can all play a role. The ways the judge has of dealing with this, as well as of interpreting the legal tradition, all call upon forms of judgement related to literary judgement, that is, questions of how to interpret texts, resolve ambiguities and conflict, and form a whole from many parts. Questions of law may be questions of justice in relation to power, which is a political question as well as a legal question. So the law and its operations in literature raise questions of what unifies the literary work and how enters into questions of justice.

Politics and Literature

The field of politics, that is, power, is also a topic in itself. Literature may deal with this by incorporating the world of politics in the sense of high politics, individuals

near the top of the power system. It can also deal with the lowerlevel impact of politics and resistance to that impact. Politics may also have a literary aspect in that political thought can be written as literature. The political figure may be a kind of storyteller and artist, who is in some way a reflection of literature on itself. Literature may refer to politics as generally corrupt or lacking in real effects, so exclude it, but that is of course still a political gesture. Literature can be quite propagandist in a political way, and while literature as political propaganda is generally given low value, the reality is that even sophisticated literary classics often have some kind of political partisanship, sometimes disguised as a non-political set of values which do in reality become political when closely examined. Politicians and the political process tend to be promising territory for satire, so can be seen as a major impulse to satirical literature. The world of politics in literature can include political utopias and alternative realities. This itself overlaps with philosophical strategies in which arguments are supported by a thought experiment, which supposedly decisively supports or refutes a particular claim. Political thinkers themselves have written works of literature, most obviously the novels of Benjamin Constant, Rousseau, and Montesquieu. On the other side, Dante wrote on monarchy as well as producing an epic which itself is full of political commentary. More recently Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus are examples of writers who wrote on political ideas and engaged in political struggles, which they bring into novels and plays. Leo Tolstoy provided amongst other things an account of the Russian politics of the time. The genre of tragedy was political in its Greek origins and has tended to be political, if less so, since its revival in ancient Athens. In lyric poetry, Walt Whitman's poetry is tied up with admiration for Abraham Lincoln and a vision of American destiny. Though the idea of literature as political often encounters resistance, there is not much of complete and complex work in literature which does not have a political aspect, even if it is not like the novels of Anthony Trollope in nineteenth-century Britain, famous for their insights into the church and political struggles of the time. Just about all literary works deal with power, state, and political concerns in some way, however hidden.

Philosophical Fictions and Thought Experiments

Philosophical fictions and thought experiments as part of philosophy have been mentioned above and deserve a chapter of their own. The though experiment in philosophy may imagine a group formulating principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance about their place in that world, as in John Rawls. That is his suggestion

that principles of justice for a society could be best drawn up by a group deprived of knowledge of what place they have in that society. For Rawls, this is bound to lead to the adoption of principles which most benefit the poorest in that society. Whether the designers of justice behind the veil would really take such a risk in worst possible situations minimisation strategy is open to debate, but it is certainly an impressive and memorable presentation, the best known and widely read part of a famous book. It of course follows on from a tradition of writers who suggest an early contract or covenant as the foundation of a society. The writers are Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to which we might add Samuel Pufendorf. A contemporary of John Rawls', Robert Nozick used a kind of thought experiment to argue for his rather different political philosophy, referring to how Wilt Chamberlain the basketball player became rich from people choosing to pay money to see him play. This is less of a philosophical fiction, as Wilt Chamberlain did exist and did take money from ticket receipts. However those were tickets to see a team, so we see that philosophy tends to need to simplify thought experiments. On less political and more semantic cases, there is the example of Hilary Putnam. The philosopher may imagine a twin earth with some very precise and limited difference between the two earths, as Hilary Putnam does to test a theory of meaning. Going back further in history, the philosopher may imagine a deceitful demon, as Descartes does, in formulating his views on knowledge. In this case, we have what is set up as a revolutionary moment in modern philosophy, coming from the belongings in a closed order. Going back even further, the philosopher may imagine an ideal city as Plato did, or think about what happens when Achilles tries to overtake a tortoise in a race as Zeno of Elea did. These are all instances where philosophy engages in something which has qualities of literary imagination and fiction and does so as philosophically decisive moments.

Ethics and Literature

Just as philosophy may have literary moments, literature itself may have a kind of philosophical imagination in the way it deals with ethics. Some ethical element is always apparent in literature even where literature tries to avoid assuming ethically responsible agents itself. This is an act of ethical imagination questioning moral categories. There at least three major ways in which literature deals with ethics. Firstly, it may deal in a kind of ethical experiment where the actions and intentions of characters are evaluated as morally worse or better. Secondly, it may be concerned with what moral agency there is in humans or in the cosmic order.

Thirdly, it may present a moral order to be evaluated. In the third case, the fictional world itself presents a kind of moral order in which we can see whether ethical ends are maintained. Literature may provide moral criticism through satire or through an unrelenting realism. It may provide suggestions of moral improvement through the actions of exemplary questions. It very often shows some kind of moral growth in which the protagonist learns to deal with the world and other people without causing harm. The moral growth may be more in terms of a kind of inner orientation towards integrity and even perfection. The love situations often at the centre of literature may deal with questions of how people may understand each other, learn to evaluate each other properly, become better through interaction with a compatible person, or become better through deserving an object of love. What literature can also deal with are moral failures and blindness in this kind of situation. Tragedies have provided particularly rich material for considering moral fault. The growth of the novel as a form is part of the growth of morality more oriented to universal sympathy and care about personal interactions. Some novels have been taken as sources of moral psychology as can be found in Nietzsche's view of Stendhal and Dostoevsky. The nineteenth- and early twentieth-century novel in Britain often seems like an area of exploration of moral dilemmas and moral growth. The novels of George Eliot are certainly formed by a wish to replace Christianity with a sense of moral seriousness and enquiry in literature. Thomas Hardy's novels introduce a strong sense of tragic moral disasters in rural Southwest England. Literature has sometimes also been a scene of anti-moralistic revolt against religious, metaphysical, and social sources of morality. The fear that something like this might be the case goes back to Plato.

Political Economy and Literature

Literature and political economy may interact in significant ways. Any work of literature that deals with money, work, consumption, investment, and management in any way is dealing with political economy. This applies to the farmer trying to make the land grow and the banker worried about the safety of investments, both of which can be and have been literary themes. Even the most aestheticised work of literature can deal with the decline of a great family whose land or investments are running out. This is of course a typical literary background. The decline of a great family may be particularly suitable material for a very aestheticised novel mourning the passing of a cultivated family,

even a whole class. However, this is in itself a way of being involved in economic issues. Epic heroes and knights in romances have slaves and serfs, castles and farms, plunder and inherited wealth, and concerns about gifts and marriage. All of these topics are economic topics even if the economic side is played down. Equally economic texts have literary aspects, particularly if we go back to the original classics. Adam Smith and Karl Marx both wrote using a lot of literary background and a capacity for literary imagination. Smith himself, as mentioned above, lectured on rhetoric and belles lettres. Marx was very well read in ancient and modern classics, which often shows in his writing. This literary aspect declines as economics moves towards its current status as a specialised technical discipline. Nevertheless, economics is still sometimes written in relatively accessible non-technical ways, using at least some literary skill. John Maynard Keynes used some striking language and was close to the aesthete Bloomsbury group, which included Virginia Woolf. Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich Hayek, and Ludwig von Mises all wrote non-technical economics during the twentieth century, as have Rosa Luxembourg, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Jeffrey Sachs. It would be a stretch to say that most of this has much literary value, but it can at least be said that they have tried to communicate with a broad audience and use language with some literary value. Drawing on the above, there is a recent growth of awareness of the relation between political economy and literature, with the ways in which literature is deeply embedded in the economic assumptions and anxieties of the time. Bankruptcy, inheritance, marriage, work, legal cases, and investments are all aspects of novels which, directly or less directly, refer to issues of property and economic exchange which are part of the world of political economy. The use of language in literature can and should be linked with its use in economics in mutually illuminating ways.

Literature and Religion

Religion and political economy have been taken together and the classical political economy certainly had roots in a mixture or religious prudentialism regarding individual conduct and natural theology with regard to the possibility of a natural order within the world of human affairs. Religion itself has a frequent place in literature and has many literary aspects. The Bible is of course one of the major texts in world literature. Within English literature, we can add The Book of Common Prayer. The translation of the Bible into English as what we know as the King James Bible is one of the major events in the history of English language and English literature. For many people at many times, literature has really meant a few religious

texts. In the history of English- speaking countries, that has often meant the King James Bible, accompanied by John Bunyan's pilgrimage story or maybe John Milton's literary contribution in the form of epics. Sacred texts accompanied by literary texts on religious themes have been a large part of the role of literature. The questions of literary criticism and philosophical reading of literary texts are interwoven with questions of reconstructing, reading, and interpreting literary texts. Protestant Reformation models of individual reading and interpretation of the Bible established a model for reading literature. Hermeneutics and literary criticism have roots in the classical philology, which includes some Christian texts and in the Hebrew philology necessary to read the Hebrew Bible. They also have roots in the interpretative work undertaken throughout the history of Judaism and Christianity-. Religion is evidently less central to the culture now but still frequently informs literature and philosophy. Derrida brought religion into the centre of his work, as a space that needs to be understood regardless of faith or lack of faith. The aestheticism of romanticism, romantic symbolism, and high modernism has a strong element of relocated religious sensibility in its reaching for purity of elevated use and of words and literary forms. Theology and literature is a necessary part of the literary critical and religious studies sphere as it is also a necessary part of the philosophy and literature sphere. There is high proportion of philosophy and literature which cannot be understood without reference to religion. Enlightenment, humanist, and liberal forms of religion have often turned towards literary criticism, as in the case of Northrop Frye, and hermeneutics to understand the explicitly and implicitly religious sides of literary texts, as well as to study religious texts in ways detached from rigid assumptions about their literal truth.

Poetry's Truth of Dialogue

The Handbook finishes with an chapter on the performative aspects of philosophy and literature, which also serves as an editorial afterword, from, Michael Mack. This picks up from the discursive work on the parts of Philosophy and Literature which form the collection. It is writing on and engaged with the relation between philosophy and literature, in which there is continuity and difference between themes as well as between philosophy and literature. This is show what it is to be in the field of philosophy and literature, as an addition which completes and leads on from what is said directly in the earlier chapters. Showing is the more literary part of philosophy and literature, or at least that is the usual starting point which can become complicated in more boundary stretching kind of writing. That is, the

earlier chapters say what the discrete parts are of philosophy and literature, with the inevitable element of arbitrariness that comes from drawing boundaries. The chapter shows the continuity between philosophy and writing which have a performative aspect, showing this to be necessary in bringing philosophy and literature, saying, and showing, together. Of course, it particularly continues the themes of Mack's chapter on 'Literature as Theory' but also serves to bring together many aspects of philosophy and literature discussed in other chapters. It does so through showing the limits of representationalism in literature and the importance of literature that is performative rather than reflective or representational. Modern poetry can enact moral concerns just as much as Plato does in his dialogues though in less discursive ways. It does so however by encountering the greatest moral disaster of the twentieth century, the Holocaust, and the sense of collapse of transcendence that follows it. and literature is to concentrate on literature as the object of philosophy as Eileen John and Dominic Lopes do in the anthology they edited, **The Philosophy of Literature: Classic and Contemporary Readings** (2004). There is not really a great deal available beyond these works in the way of survey material though there is a very wide array available on specific topics within philosophy and literature. The best way of approaching the reading of multi-authored and introductory material in philosophy and literature may be to consult titles on philosophical aesthetics and literary theory. Some suggestions are made in the bibliography below along with the titles just mentioned. <>

THE CLOSED BOOK: HOW THE RABBIS TAUGHT THE JEWS (NOT) TO READ THE BIBLE by Rebecca Scharbach Wollenberg [Princeton University Press, 9780691243290]

A groundbreaking reinterpretation of early Judaism, during the millennium before the study of the Bible took center stage

Early Judaism is often described as the religion of the book par excellence—a movement built around the study of the Bible and steeped in a culture of sacred bookishness that evolved from an unrelenting focus on a canonical text. But in The Closed Book, Rebecca Scharbach Wollenberg argues that Jews didn't truly embrace the biblical text until nearly a thousand years after the Bible was first canonized. She tells the story of the intervening centuries during which even rabbis seldom opened a Bible and many rabbinic authorities remained deeply ambivalent about the biblical text as a source of sacred knowledge.

Wollenberg shows that, in place of the biblical text, early Jewish thinkers embraced a form of biblical revelation that has now largely disappeared from practice. Somewhere between the fixed transcripts of the biblical Written Torah and the fluid traditions of the rabbinic Oral Torah, a third category of revelation was imagined by these rabbinic thinkers. In this "third Torah," memorized spoken formulas of the biblical tradition came to be envisioned as a distinct version of the biblical revelation. And it was believed that this living tradition of recitation passed down by human mouths, unbound by the limitations of written text, provided a fuller and more authentic witness to the scriptural revelation at Sinai. In this way, early rabbinic authorities were able to leverage the idea of biblical revelation while quarantining the biblical text itself from communal life.

The result is a revealing reinterpretation of "the people of the book" before they became people of the book.

CONTENTS

A Brief Outline of the Project

This book is divided into two parts. The chapters that make up part 1 argue that, rather than valorizing the Pentateuch and its prophetic echoes as perfect transcripts of the divine will, many early rabbinic practitioners experienced the Bible as a problem. In the first chapter, "A Makeshift Scripture," the reader

is asked to reconsider the tenor of early rabbinic comments about the writtenness of scripture. The traditions analyzed in chapter 1 represent a stream of rabbinic thought in which the biblical text is theorized not as a perfect record of divine knowledge but as a treacherously limited and changeable vessel for preserving the divine will. The chapter begins by analyzing early rabbinic traditions about Ezra the Scribe and other scribal heroes who narrowly saved the biblical text from oblivion at repeated

junctures in the history of Israel—even, at times, reconstructing the lost text from memory. In these narratives, the vulnerable material nature of each instantiation of the Bible text has rendered the biblical tradition susceptible to repeated erosion, loss, and change. The chapter continues by investigating early rabbinic traditions that contrast the first tablets of the law destroyed by Moses with the second tablets of the law ultimately bequeathed to the people of Israel. These two tablet traditions are treated as a form of narrative theorizing about the nature of written text and its limits as a vehicle for divine revelation. In such stories, the first (lost) tablets of the law come to represent the impossibility of authentically capturing the divine will in a material written text. While the second (received) tablets of the law become a locus for reflection on the inherently brittle and imperfect nature of the written revelation that was bequeathed to history.

In the second chapter, "A Book That Kills," the reader is asked to question the widespread presupposition that rabbinic practitioners embraced the biblical text as "a tree of life to all who grasp it" (Prow 3:18). In the early rabbinic traditions collected in chapter 2, the biblical text is imagined as a mortally dangerous artifact that can leave death and destruction in its wake. Unlike the first chapter, chapter 2 is not organized thematically but is instead divided into a rough chronology to highlight distinct developmental stages in rabbinic thinking about the perils of biblical texts and its affordances. The chapter opens by analyzing tannaitic traditions in which the mortal dangers of the biblical text emerge when it is read by minim (sectarians, heretics, or early Jesus followers). These traditions often use images of an adulterous wife to capture a notion that the biblical text was hazardous because the lures of its lyrical beauty and spiritual pleasures remained intact even as the text was corrupted and put into the service of the enemies of Israel—transforming the biblical text into a Trojan horse for heresy and spiritual poison. Later Palestinian sources transfigure the motif of textual promiscuity so that the danger posed by the biblical text lies not in its potential to be shared between communities but instead in the way the written text makes its unbounded spiritual forces available to anyone who approaches it. In these early amoraic sources, the tannaitic triangulation between biblical textuality, heresy, and physical death was now applied to actors within Israel. As a hypostasized font of divine power, the biblical text portrayed in these narratives produces a proliferation of uncontrollable spiritual modes, many of them deadly. In later Babylonian traditions, the imagery that emerged in previous traditions is further concretized and expanded until simple proximity with the biblical text can wipe out both individuals and populations without any transparent spiritual mechanism at work. In such traditions, the very existence of a material written revelation had become a source of a multiform and inchoate terror.'

Chapter 3, "Neglect of Text," argues that the dangers attributed to the biblical text in these mythologizing narratives were also reflected in more quotidian practical measures that restricted use of the biblical text as a source of religious information

in many late antique rabbinic circles. Adopting a more expansive and nuanced definition of restriction and censorship, chapter 3 explores different modes through which late antique rabbinic authorities sidelined and restricted the written text of the Hebrew Bible as a source of communal information. The chapter opens by analyzing how practices of inaccurate citation both reflected and cultivated neglect of the written text of the Hebrew Bible by trivializing textual engagement as a potential source of knowledge. The chapter then looks at how diverse rabbinic injunctions deterred practitioners from deriving information directly from the written text of the Bible by discouraging informational reading in general, by placing restrictions on reading the Bible at certain times and on certain days, and by proscribing the circulation of vernacular copies of biblical texts. The third chapter thus completes part I of the book, which explores different ways in which early rabbinic thinkers approached the biblical text as a problem.

Part 2 asks how a community so deeply ambivalent about the biblical text nevertheless elevated the Hebrew Bible as a central pillar of communal thought. The chapters in the second half of the book argue that this apparent paradox was possible because early rabbinic practitioners approached the practices of reading and engaging with written text very differently from modem informational readers. It argues that the memorization-heavy reading practices described in early rabbinic literature had already rendered the written text of the Hebrew Bible a secondary, even superfluous, witness to the biblical tradition in daily practice. So much so, in fact, that early rabbinic thinkers came to think of these recited oral formulas of the biblical traditions as a distinct revelation in their own right. Until Spoken Scripture came to be theorized as a third type of Torah that flourished in the liminal space between the consonantal transcripts of the Written Torah and the emerging rabbinic traditions of the Oral Torah—a more authentic echo of the scriptural revelation at Sinai than could be contained in a scroll's limited parchment.

Chapter 4, "Rabbinic Practices of (Bible) Reading," demonstrates that common early rabbinic modes of Bible reading bypassed the written text as a source of information—treating written words as nothing more than a ritual corollary to spoken language, in whose spoken formulas true meaning and communication were thought to reside. The chapter opens by exploring a widespread early rabbinic commitment to memorized ritual recitation as the primary mode of engaging with biblical text and argues that these practices of ritual reading served to marginalize written texts of the Hebrew Bible as a source of cultural transmission and knowledge. Since this mode of early rabbinic liturgical reading was rooted in recitation formulas passed directly from teacher to student and did not derive meaning directly from written words, both transmission and meaning in this reading practice were thought to reside primarily in the spoken words. The rest of the chapter seeks to illuminate this conceptual inversion of text and meaning by looking at early rabbinic literacy pedagogies as both representative and formative of a reading

practice that treated written texts as secondary—and often temporary—props in the transmission of recited formulas from teacher to student.

Chapter 5, "The Third Torah," argues that this bifurcation of the biblical tradition into oral and written iterations was not merely an incidental development in rabbinic practice but was theorized by many early rabbinic thinkers as reflecting a more fundamental bifurcation of the scriptural revelation at Sinai into two distinct historical echoes: a limited consonantal transcript preserved in the biblical text that was bequeathed to history and a more authentic spoken iteration of the biblical revelation transmitted through the living recitation of the tradition by human mouths. These traditions characterized the memorized spoken formulas of the biblical tradition as a discrete, qualitatively different, and ultimately superior witness to the biblical revelation—a distinct third form of Torah preserved at the interstices between the Oral and Written Torah. Chapter 5 opens by exploring how early rabbinic thinkers could conceive of two largely parallel formulas of the biblical tradition as distinct forms of revelation. This section first explores early rabbinic traditions in which the small divergences that foreshadowed the Masoretic qere and ketiv ("read thus, though it is written thus" traditions) were taken as signs of deeper metaphysical divergences between the spoken formulas of the biblical tradition and the consonantal transcript. The discussion then moves on to consider Babylonian rabbinic traditions in which mikra (the spoken formulas of the biblical tradition) and masoret (the written transcript of the biblical tradition) were imagined as distinct revelatory works, configured in a hierarchy of authenticity in which the spoken version of the biblical tradition was embraced as the primary witnesses to the biblical revelation. The chapter then examines in more detail the ways in which these memorized oral formulas of the biblical tradition were envisioned as a qualitatively superior echo of the biblical revelation that passed down almost material traces of a living revelatory divine speech through the corporeal mechanisms of breath, scent, and taste. The chapter closes by tracing traditions in which this third Torah of Spoken Scripture was imagined as the survival of its own distinct moment of biblical revelation: the first, more authentic, biblical revelation that was temporarily inscribed on the first tablets of the law and then released into its natural form as speech and sound with the smashing of the tablets.

Chapter 6, "The Closed Book," asks how practitioners imagined the status and character of the written consonantal transcript passed down on parchment scrolls once they no longer functioned as communicative witnesses to the biblical revelation. While many researchers have suggested that Torah scrolls functioned primarily as ritual objects, this chapter argues that we should go further and take seriously the many early rabbinic traditions in which the Torah scroll was envisioned as a form of corporeal avatar—an almost-living biological body that could act as an intermediary between the divine and the human. The chapter opens by analyzing the ways early rabbinic traditions treat the Torah scroll like the human body, as an entity that

manifests sacred powers most strongly when it is closed, covered, and whole—so that the scroll's all-too-material textual facets are exposed to view only during the carefully regulated moments of intimacy allowed for liturgical recitation-reading. The chapter then explores the very biological bodily imagery utilized in traditions that imagine the Torah scroll being touched, moved, or physically manipulated in liturgical contexts—particularly in rituals in which the Torah scroll is treated as a member of the human community. The chapter closes by considering how the Torah scroll came to be imagined as a personified avatar of sacrality—a conduit between heaven and earth—in the absence of a sacrificial priesthood acting within the Temple cult. The chapters that make up the second part of the book thus argue that early rabbinic authorities were able to maintain the Pentateuch's central status in rabbinic thought and practice while retreating from the biblical text as a communicative document because the biblical text had come to be treated not as a written communication so much as a personification of revelation that housed a living recited soul within a powerful (if dangerous) parchment body.

The concluding chapter of the monograph asks how this portrait of the early rabbinic relationship with biblical text changes our perception of subsequent developments in the Jewish relationship with Bible. Contemporary Jewish approaches to the Bible are deeply rooted in the medieval tradition of systematic biblical commentary. Yet it has proven challenging to explain the sudden global rise of these new forms of commentary in the Middle Ages so long as medieval Jewish approaches to biblical textuality were projected back into the classical rabbinic period. With this new portrait of classical rabbinic approaches to the biblical text, stark contrasts begin to emerge between medieval Jewish conceptions of biblical textuality and those of the early rabbinic period. The conclusion thus suggests that the far-reaching transformations in Jewish modes of engaging with the biblical text that arose with the Middle Ages were not spurred by particular cultural or technological developments so as much as a sea change in Jewish conceptions of what kind of book the Bible was. That is, the conclusion theorizes that the all-important medieval shift in Jewish modes of engaging with the biblical text derived from a global transformation in the Jewish vision of the Bible's genre and affordances. <>

EXPLORING SEXUALITY AND SPIRITUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FIELD edited by Phil Shining and Nicol Michelle Epple [Series: At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, Brill | Rodopi, 9789004430792]

The wide spectrum of links and interrelations found amongst the diversity of human sexual expressions and spiritual practices around the world constitutes one of the most fruitful grounds of scholarly research today. Exploring Sexuality and Spirituality

introduces an emerging academic field of studies focused on the multiplicity of problematizations intersecting spirituality and sexuality, from eroticism and ecstasy embodiments to inner spiritual cultivation, intimate relationships, sex education, and gender empowerment. This collection of essays addresses subjects such as prehistoric art, Queer Theology, BDSM, Tantra, the Song of Songs, 'la petite mort', asceticism, feminist performative protests, and sexually charged landscapes, among others. Through varied methodologies and state-of-the-art interdisciplinary approaches, this volume becomes highly useful for readers engaged in the integration of scholarly and practical knowledge.

CONTENTS

From the raw sexual images of Upper Palaeolithic rock shelter engravings and rock paintings at La Ferrassie, Serra da Capivara or the Altamira Cave, to the high-tech,

cutting-edge 21st century neuroscientific research on orgasm and sexual ecstasy, the exploration of the intrinsic relations between sexuality and spirituality can be traced and detected as a recurrent event among human societies. Sexuality and spirituality interrelations had been problematized since prehistoric times by remarkably diverse cultures from all around the planet; its related inquiries were not extinguished, not even in the most severe historical periods of repression exerted by political and religious authorities.

In contemporary societies the exploration of sexuality through spiritual exercises and the exploration of spirituality through sexual practices increases and expands its reach, supported in social media, globalized networks, and the interaction generated between exponents of a vast multiplicity of approaches and heterogeneous sources of historical knowledge. Today, the diversified sexuality and spirituality interconnections are established by all kinds of agents, from celibates to sex industry professionals, from mainstream therapists to underground artists, from religious believers to bondage practitioners, from New Age communities to politically aware NGO's, from queer activists to sex education teachers, from personal trainers to alternative movements, just to name a few. There was a time when sexuality and spirituality knowledge was esoteric, but now, progressively, it becomes part of globalized popular culture.

Sexuality and spirituality research is usually produced by scholars, like religious studies and theology historians, commonly specialized in the study and interpretation of sacred texts; but also by sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, and gender studies communities, focused on the ethnographic investigation of the social and cultural implications of sexuality and spirituality phenomena; or by psychology and sexology scholars, interested in the inquiry of human psychology and basic physiology, as well as neuroscientists centred on the analysis of the states of consciousness and the neural processes associated to sexual embodiments and spiritual experiences. Nevertheless, another kind of rigorous sexuality and spirituality exploration simultaneously takes place outside the academic circles, persevered by authentic everyday practitioners of millenary eastern traditions like Tantra, Taoism, Yoga, and Buddhism, or committed practitioners of the western systematization of many ancient arts of ecstasy labelled, in modern times, as BDSM. Additionally, the real-life sexuality and spirituality exploration of, not only New Age 'sacred sexuality' communities, but also alternative sexualities organizations, and

even art world performers, designers, and film-makers, contribute to present a much more complex panorama of the state of-the-art of sexuality and spirituality research.

This book, Exploring Sexuality and Spirituality: An Introduction to an Interdisciplinary Field, is a brief overview of the diverse types of sexuality and spirituality scholarly research developing in the first decades of the 21st century, and its varied interconnections with the more popular, empirical, and pragmatic forms of non-academic expertise shared around the globe today. Through these pages, the central problematizations, themes, authors, and books founding the emerging sexuality and spirituality field of studies and research are referenced and debated, while singular and relevant objects of research are presented, revealing a vast multiplicity of methodologies coming from multi, inter, and transdisciplinary approaches, mixing both traditional and innovative knowledge perspectives, useful for individuals and collectives, and for both scholars and practitioners in our times.

Historical Overview of Sexuality and Spirituality Interrelations

The wide spectrum of resonances, intersections, interconnections, overlappings, and commonalities—as well as incompatibilities, exclusions, conflicts, oppositions, and even prohibitions—established between the vast multiplicity of spiritual practices around the globe and the limitless diversity of human sexual expressions, constitutes in the 21st century one of the most fruitful but also singular grounds of exploration and research. Nevertheless, what is normally recognized now as two independent and autonomous 'spheres' or 'dimensions' of human life, was a single and integrated experience during thousands of years, accessible to any human being, relevant for societies since the beginning of the species. The differentiation between 'sexual' and 'spiritual' domains is, in some way, a recent historical process moulding human cultures, whereas its complete separation has been refused and resisted for centuries, up until today.

There is not such a thing as a universal history of sexuality, nor either a universal history of spirituality, because sexuality and spirituality are not universal conditions; the history of sexuality and spirituality interrelations can be traced in every culture, bringing to light its own particularities and singularities. Notwithstanding, there is evidence of historical processes shared between cultures and civilizations during hundreds or thousands of years, and in this way, different historical formations or 'ages' can be mapped. Sexuality and spirituality constitute human potencies—more accurately, biological potentials. The big picture of the history of human sexuality

and spirituality interrelations reveals how fundamental this interaction has been in the evolution of human societies. Three major historical divisions along two significant historical sexuality and spirituality re-integrations can be clearly identified. These periods are not exactly sequential or successive—as human history is not linear; the regimes corresponding to the periods overlap between each other, and in the same age diverse regimes can be traced, even in the same geographical region. Yet despite all the discontinuities, a historical overview of sexuality and spirituality interrelations reveals how these two different but at the same time intrinsically related biological potentials had always been at the centre of power relationships' social diagrams throughout the entire history of humankind.

The Prehistoric Sex, Life, and Death Continuum

Archaeological registers support the hypothesis which postulates the experiences of sex, life, and death as the concrete foundations of human spirituality. This thesis has been presented since the very beginning of the formation of Religious Studies as an academic discipline, in the first decades of the 20th century, and was synthetized by one of its pioneers, Mircea Eliade, as a 'pattern' of prehistoric societies associated with the narrative of 'the mystery of creation': a problematization on the unexplained 'mystery' which 'governs the origin of life, the food supply, and death'. Sex is the only other problematization as ancient as death; between sex and death the mysteries of life became a human inquiry. The exploration of sex-related issues was not only relevant, but actually a vital matter within prehistoric cultures all around the globe, at least from the Upper Palaeolithic (50,000–10,000 BCE), as testimonies indicate. Sex was depicted through oral, visual, and tactile forms of expressions by the first developed communities of anatomically modern humans during thousands of years before the formation of the first civilizations, making part of their everyday life and their rituals, constituting one of the earliest matters of human knowledge.

Prehistoric cultures, Rosemary Radford Ruether explains, 'experienced energies that circulated in themselves, male and female, and in the animals, plants, and earth around them'. 'Animism' is the earliest spiritual approach, enabling humans to live in contact with forces and spirits. From this immanent ground emerges the primeval experience of the 'divine' in human history and the early notions of spirituality. 'The divine', says Ruether, is seen as 'the matrix of life-giving energy that is in, through, and under all things, sustaining and renewing life'. Sexual forces are perceived as a primordial part of the universe's matrix of life-forces and spirits, while sex is already

recognized by early hunter-gatherers as nature's primary source of life. Perhaps there were not yet fully formed experiences of 'sexuality' or 'spirituality' at this point of human history; maybe there were just instinctive notions of *sex* and *spirit*, integrated in the non-dual experience of everyday reality.

The Archaic Sexuality and Spirituality Division: Separating the Divine and Nature

The regular surpluses of agrarian societies, very soon, enabled a much greater degree of role differentiation, but also, of inequality; the greater the surpluses a society produced, the greater the levels of inequality generated. Wealth got increasingly concentrated in small numbers of families, leading to the formation of kingdoms and governments, while populations grew and societies got stratified. These tendencies spread over the globe, mainly from Eurasia and Africa to South and North America, just at different eras. The first chiefdoms, governments, and stratified societies were established in Mesopotamia and Egypt between 4,000 BCE and 3,000 BCE, laying the foundations of the first complex civilizations. Furthermore, correlatively to the first kingdoms and governments, the concept and experience of religion comes forth. Religion is as a form of administration of the spiritual experiences of a population, emerging in times of the formation of the early city-states as the correlate to kingship in archaic societies. From this era onwards, myths about kings and gods become the centre of human cultures. As Robert Bellah says, 'king and god emerged together in archaic society and continued their close association throughout its history'.

The transition from Palaeolithic and early Neolithic animistic communities to the Bronze Age theistic societies is characterized by an integral reconfiguration of the global spectrum of human politics, ethics, and worldviews. Ruether points out how, during this transition, nature's 'divine' forces and energies of the universe become visualized 'as gods and goddesses, personified as ruling-class humans', yet separated by something very particular: their 'immortality'. Religion is deity-centred, based in transcendent and immortal *gods* governing people's fate: 'Gods and goddesses were presumed to exist in the heavens, separated from humans', as Ruether explains; 'kingly and queenly gods and goddesses were inventions reflecting the same process by which urban society, social hierarchy, and literacy were developing'. This is the same historical process in which the *divine* shifts into the *sacred*, now regarded with reverence, as inaccessible to the large populations. Everyday rituals get transformed

into solemn ceremonies, ritual houses give way to temples, shamans are replaced by priests. Through religious institutions spirituality becomes governmentalized.

Archaic governmentality propitiates the first transcultural separation in human history between everyday life and spirituality with the introduction of the division between *immanent* nature and *transcendent* realms where only deities or gods exist. From now on, the access to the divine becomes imperatively mediated by authority figures—the gatekeepers of the sacred. Consequently, the sexual/spiritual continuum gets interrupted for the first time in history. In prehistoric cultures sex and sexuality issues are direct mediums to keep communities in contact with the divine, and in this way, transact their vital concerns with nature: cycling seasons, fertility, fecundity, longevity, ecstasy, knowledge about death, trance states, etc.—all the basic sexuality and spirituality problematizations. In archaic cultures, in contrast, communal vital concerns start to depend on their worship to gods and transcending realms outside everyday life. In these societies sex is still considered a powerful medium to get in contact with the divine, but now with a substantial difference: sexual relationships are now regulated by political and religious authorities, the gatekeepers of the sacred, self-appointed as divine figures themselves.

Cults get disseminated, like the cult to Innana-Ishtar, the goddess of love, beauty, sex, desire, and fertility in ancient Mesopotamia, in a new era, when the intercession of transcendent gods seems to be necessary to achieve contact with those forces. Sex was intrinsically related to power in prehistoric cultures, in terms of renewal of life in the universe, but also of human vigour. This perception didn't change in archaic regimes. Is well documented how Innana 'promoted vigour, fertility, production, and reproduction, increasing population and success in ancient civilization'. Innana was worshipped in Uruk, the major city of the time, the birthplace of the first writing system, the earliest great work of literature, the oldest recording king lists, and the prototypes of monumental architecture. 'Most people are (…) unaware', as Anne O Nomis points out, 'that these "hallmarks of civilization" developed from a Goddess-held area—a Goddesss whose power is sexual'; in fact, 'Innana made civilization possible', as Nomis asserts; 'civilization was nurtured with erotic vigour'. Sex was a driving force of cultural development, both in prehistoric and archaic societies. But a new dimension of the interrelation between sex and power emerged during ancient times: the use of sex and sexuality as political instruments;

it is not just a coincidence that, eventually, Innana also became the goddess of war and political power.

There is a 'close relationship between stratification, despotism, and polygyny in early agrarian states', as Laura Betzig's research has shown. Betzig demonstrates this governmental process is a constant of all ancient civilizations and empires, from Mesopotamia and Egypt to China and India, as also to Mexico and Perú, traceable from 3,000 BCE to the first centuries of our era. Patriarchs were in competition for the biggest harems, as a sign of power and prestige. But the use of sex as a strategy for sustaining power relationships was not only exerted at an inter-state level. The determination of the internal diagrams of power relationships of the communities is also driven by sex and sexuality. The most valued treasure for kings and emperors is the power of their descendants, because that is the only way to guarantee their own 'transcendence'. Driven by that egotistical quest, blood-based patriarchal structures got inserted in all civilizations, systematically empowering men over women. 'The sexual regulation of women', Gerda Lerner says, 'underlies the formation of classes and is one of the foundations upon which the state rests'. Correlatively, regulating sexual conducts is one of the distinguishing characteristics of religion. In governed societies, from the archaic age to present day, human's life cycle problematizations are a matter of state politics managed as sexual health public issues. The biological stages of female's life cycle—menstruation, virginity, pregnancy, etc.—have been the centre of sexuality regulations until modern times.

Patriarchies establish monogamy as the only accepted couple relationship model for the general populace, and marriage as an institution. Marriage's primary function is to bind women to men, ensuring the continuation of the family line and providing social stability; literally, through marriage, a woman becomes a man's property: the only respectable woman is the married woman, the one controlled by her husband; any other woman is now designated as a 'public woman', that is, 'unveiled' for men. Sexual conducts become restricted and regulated by laws and moral codes, although Betzig illustrates how 'in the six large, highly stratified early states, commoners were generally monogamous' while 'elites practiced de facto polygyny'. The wealthiest men had the chance of being polygamous, or being promiscuous having relations with prostitutes. 'By the middle of the second millennium BCE prostitution was well established as a likely occupation for the daughter of the poor', conditioned by 'the pauperization of farmers and their increasing dependence on loans in order to

survive periods of famine'. Commercial prostitution derived directly from the enslavement of women and the consolidation and formation of classes, as a simultaneous process to the development of what Lerner denominates 'cultic sexual services', offered by 'priestesses and temple sexual servants' as part of prosperity rituals. Sacral sexual services are mentioned in the Epic of Gilgamesh, confirming how in archaic cultures, although already governmentalized through religion, sex and sexuality issues are still considered civilizing.

The Axial Sexuality and Spirituality Reintegration: Re-Joining the Human Body and the Divine

The widespread despotism of early kingdoms, exerted through the concentration of political power and the monopoly of the relations with the divine, provoked severe consequences for archaic human societies, as 'class stratification, the magnification of military power, the economic exploitation of the weak, the universal introduction of some form of forced labour', including slavery, among others. These processes continued and expanded—at different times and degrees—all over the planet in the respective transitions of human societies from Bronze to Iron Ages that characterizes ancient cultures. But, across all Eurasia, something completely new was introduced between the 8th and the 3rd century BCE, in the period denominated by Karl Jaspers as the Axial Age. Throughout multiple ancient cultures 'new models of reality' and 'critical thinking' emerge in the Axial Age. 'This cultural dynamic does not entail that Iron Age societies became predominantly axial', as Nicolas Baumard pertinently clarifies. 'On the contrary, most people in Iron Age societies still lived only a little way above bare subsistence level, and consequently saw only minor modifications to their preferences'. It is a fact that the revolutionary innovations of the Axial Age only where experienced by elites and minorities without being diffused among large populations. Yet its concepts, practices, and perspectives had become significantly relevant in later human cultures, as it can be proved today.

The religious expansion in this historical era has been exhaustively documented, focusing research on 'the observation that most of the current world religions— from Hinduism to Buddhism and Chinese folk religion, from Judaism and Christianity to Islam—can trace their origins back to' the Axial Age. But the authentic revolution of the Axial Age consists in the introduction of alternative ways of life—alternative, in fact, to the religious mainstream and social massification of ancient civilizations. Concretely, what the Axial Age introduces are the first wave of

counterhegemonic cultures during the last millennium BCE in different regions of Eurasia, particularly in Greece, India, and China. Dissimilar social movements and schools of thought as Greek Cynicism, Indian Cārvāka, or Chinese Confucianism can be considered axial, in the sense all of them contribute in their respective territories 'to raise the critical question of the relation between god and king'. For the first time, the divine nature of kings and royal lineages are contested and challenged, through diverse intents of reconnecting the human and the divine. Bellah identifies the Axial Age breakthrough as a 'cognitive change', while Baumard as a 'behavioral' reconfiguration. From an integral perspective, the new axial knowledge experiences and the new embodied practices are interrelated elements of the first alternative lifestyles in human history.

Taking for granted the *saṃsāra* narrative, markedly different spiritual, religious, and philosophical approaches emerge between 600 and 500 BCE as a reaction to the 'problem of suffering existence and the allied doctrine of cyclic rebirth'. All these approaches are '*gnoseologies*', as David Gordon White denominates the 'theories of salvation through knowledge', oriented to 'know the truth', which would be, 'that in spite of appearances, one is, in fact, not trapped in suffering existence'. The archaic division between the divine and nature and the separation from sex from spirituality are prolonged and widened in Axial Age India with the popularization of many of the gnoseologies, because 'in all of these systems, the necessary condition for gnosis is the disengagement of one's cognitive apparatus from sense impressions' and from 'the matter of the body'. Renunciation practices, which had emerged parallel to the imposition of the caste system—at least since 1,500 BCE —get perfected in Post-Vedic India, opening the way for the *śramaṇa* movements promoting the figure of the 'holy man', the *sadhu*, like Jains, determined to cease all action to avoid *karma*; or the monks, like Buddhists, for whom 'the path of asceticism and the practice of meditation' are necessary to 'purge cognition of its inborn defilements'. From now on religious spirituality becomes a problem of liberation (*mokṣa*). So, even when the renunciation practitioners were effectively counterhegemonic, the macro-historical process of sexuality and spirituality separation was accelerated by the axial ascetic movements.

Nevertheless, some of the Axial Age cultures contribute to the sexuality and spirituality reintegration. Human physiology is explored by all axial alternative social movements, even by ascetics, by researching empirically on the functions of

the 'consciousness-body' complex. Moreover, a few of axial counterhegemonic cultures developed the pioneer models of what Michel Foucault denominates as 'arts of existence': bodies of values and practices 'by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria'. In this sense, the *corpus* of knowledge—always empirical and practical—of axial cultures as Stoicism or Epicureanism in Greece, the Fangshi and Xian proto-Taoist traditions in China, or the Siddha tradition in India, are examples of axial arts of existence. Instead of determining their behaviours by following 'codifications of conducts and the strict definition of what is permitted and what is forbidden', as is the case of religious believers following the moral code of its respective religion, the practitioners of the arts of existence adapt 'recommendations about the regimen one should follow' concerning diets, physical training, and sexual activity, among other vital components. In this way, Stoics, Epicureans, Fangshis, Xians, and Siddhas are very different from religious devotees, because they shape their conducts stylizing advices and prescriptions, but never following prohibitions or obligations, enabling 'individuals to question their own conduct, to watch over and give shape to it, and to shape themselves as ethical subjects'.

The arts of existence can be distinguished by the type of exercises cultivated by their practitioners, what ancient Greeks named as *askēsis* ('training', 'exercise'), and what Pierre Hadot denominates as 'spiritual exercises'. In fact, the term 'asceticism' comes from the concept of *askēsis*, but they are not equivalent; from all the types of spiritual exercises, only the renouncing exercises can be considered as *ascetic*; thus, asceticism is only one model of *askēsis* among others. As Hadot explains, there is a cosmic dimension intrinsically related with the ethical dimension of ancient Greek philosophies, which more than 'a theoretical construct', were methods 'for training people to live and to look at the world in a new way'; this is why, according to Hadot, 'the word "spiritual" is quite apt to make us understand that these exercises are the result not merely of thought, but of the individual's entire psychism'. This is the beginning of a fully formed experience of spirituality distinguished to religion, precisely in the sense in which Foucault defines spirituality, as the experience of 'a subject acceding to a certain mode of being and to the transformations which the subject must make of himself in order to accede to this mode of being'. Indeed, all

the Stoics, Epicureans, Fangshis, Xians, and Siddhas incorporated spiritual exercises into their everyday life routines as a method for transforming normal existence.

The stylization of sexual conduct is a pivotal component of the arts of existence. Sex becomes a matter of refinement and cultivation during the Axial Age, when the early developments of medicine open an inquiry about the physical consequences of sexual activity. Between the 6th and 5th centuries bce a new sexual problematization emerges, this time focused on the correlation between sexual activity and health. The center of this new human inquiry—as it would be expected in patriarchal societies like those of the time—is male's power; for that reason, the central problematization is no other than the emission of sperm. The Greeks created the pioneer prescriptive regimes of sexual pleasures, a prime concern for spiritual exercises practitioners, as Foucault shows, 'not simply because excess might lead to an illness; it was because in sexual activity in general man's mastery, strength, and life were at stake'. At the same time, macrobiotic hygiene develops in China, incorporating the inquiry about sex, health, and expenditure. Meanwhile, in India, the ascetic movements' narratives 'were combined with more or less magical notions concerning the loss of physical strength through sexual activity'; as Madeleine Biardeau describes it, 'it is the sexual act itself which provokes a weakening of the body and therefore a weakening of the mind which can no longer concentrate on the pursuit of the Absolute'.

This simultaneous problematization of ejaculation by Greek, Indian, and Chinese axial cultures is explained by Thomas McEvilley as a 'diffusion situation' presented in Eurasia, when the Persian Empire extended its limits from the Balkans to the Indus Valley. As McEvilley points out, 'there would seem to be some connection between the Indian and the Greek doctrines' of sperm production and the sperm function in male's bodies. Outstandingly, these ancient cultures share the same physiological model of sperm functioning, based in the hypothesis that semen is produced in the brain and rises or descends through the spinal column. This antique 'notion of the spinal column as a channel for semen and seminal thoughts', as White also annotates, 'that was both a medical and mystical notion dear to the Stoics', can be founded in medieval India; actually, White considers it 'the prototype' of all posterior Hindu models. While ancient medical tradition in India, Āyurveda, validates to this day the fundamental teaching concerning the loss of vitality intrinsic to ejaculation, only the alchemical traditions developed the antique notion

of 'the spinal channel connecting the brain and the penis', in both India and China. Nonetheless, as McEvilley says, there is a shared narrative about the 'upwardization' of semen that can be traced from Plato's *Timaeus* to middle ages *haṭha yoga* doctrine of the rising of the *kuṇḍalinī*;[39] and as White confirms, 'Greek "pneumatic" physiology appears to anticipate Indian *kuṇḍalinī* practices', Chinese inner cultivation exercises, and the narrative of the 'transmutation' of sexual fluids.

The axial stylizations of sexual conducts were 'a health precaution' but also, as Foucault clarifies, they were 'an *askēsis* of existence'. In China, 'all of the material on macrobiotic hygiene belongs to a medical tradition of *yangsheng* (nurturing life)', including the *fangzhong* (intra-chamber), the arts of sexual cultivation, because most of 'macrobiotic hygiene is identified with the immortality beliefs of the Xian'. Sex was used as a medium for cultivating vitality by the Asian shamanic cults that shaped both the Xian and Siddha traditions constituting the roots of Taoism and Hatha Yoga; this is why a common structure shared between the proto-Taoist inward trainings of the last millennium bce and the Hatha Yoga rising of the *kuṇḍalinī* practices of the first millennium can be clearly traced. 'Sexual relations', Donald Harper asserts, were used by Xian traditions as vital components of the 'therapeutic arts of physical cultivation'; actually, the axial *fangzhong* can be considered as the first *ars erotica* in humankind history. But this *ars erotica* is inseparable from the art of existence in which was shaped; as Harper corroborates, in ancient Chinese axial cultures, 'sexual intercourse was one of the methods for "nurturing life"'.

The immanent cultivation of vitality through sex introduced by both the Xian and Siddha arts of existence was also related with a transcendent quest for immortality, conforming together the roots of the Indian tradition identified after the 7th century as Tantra, the epitome of all the sexuality and spirituality spiritual traditions in the sense that, as Biardeau and White define it, Tantra is a form of spirituality centered on desire (*kāma*). If Buddhism can be considered the art of losing desire, Tantra can be understood as the art of using desire as the way to embody spiritual experiences. Buddhism and Tantra are two opposite but complementary arts of existence—in fact, Tantric Buddhism was also developed in South Asia during the second part of the first millennium CE, introducing the values of 'bliss' and 'ecstasy' into the arts of existence. As only in prehistoric times happened before, the human body becomes the physical ground for the exploration of the divine during the Axial Age, perhaps

not for the social masses, but certainly for minorities making an impact for the future. The arts of existence are the ultimate form of embodiment of the 'real change' propitiated by the Axial Age, as proposed by Baumard: 'the emergence of self-discipline and selflessness'. One of the defining characteristics of the ancient East arts of living—Taoism, Buddhism, Yoga, and Tantra—is their focus on the development of *technologies for dissolving the self*—what Hadot refers to as 'the dilation of the self'; and for that purpose, the 'erotico-mystical practice' was a privileged medium. Besides constituting models of what Robert Ford Campany denominates as 'biospiritual self-cultivation', axial *ars erotica* and its sex life stylizations were designed for embodying the divine.

The Medieval Sexuality and Spirituality Division: Separating the Divine and Pleasure

At the dawn of the common era all the major world religions—Hinduism, Jainism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, the Chinese folk traditions, and the institutionalized forms of Buddhism—were taking shape, expanding similar values around the globe, establishing moral codes, sets of laws, rules and norms 'in order to define what was permitted and what was forbidden', particularly, about issues concerning sex and sexuality. Moralities were established through laws; intimate relationships between social classes became strictly regulated, as also marital relationships and key issues like householding, reproductive behaviour, inheritance, divorce, and paternity. The first sexuality and spirituality regulations can be traced back to archaic governmentality, regarding new social dynamics like marriage and prostitution, when intimate relationships became subject of consideration for human cultures for the first time. But the processes of codification of sexual conducts never stopped during the ancient era. The focal point of the archaic and ancient problematizations on intimate relationships is the sexual conduct of the woman in its multiple roles, modelled at the service of men. It is a concern manifested in the earliest law codes in human history, from The Sumerian Code of Ur-Nammu (c. 2100 BCE), and the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (c. 1760 BCE), to the Laws of Manu (300–200 BCE), at the end of the Vedic Age in India, when the caste system was consolidated.

The transition from ancient to medieval societies is related with the emergence of new problematizations and new focal points of religious sexuality and spirituality regulations. Even when Eurasian cultures reached its middle ages at different times in history, there are common patterns between all of them. Middle ages are characterized by a new form of governmentality, where kings and dynasties still

rule, but now following the moral codes of religion. In the Hindu social system, for example, priests 'are at the top of social hierarchy'; 'only a Brahman is competent to know', Biardeau explains, 'the norms of men's conduct, not least those of the prince'. Brahmanical circles in India, deeply influenced by axial social movements, incorporate renunciation vows into their lifestyles; the figure of the *sannyasa* embraces practices like celibacy—sexual abstention—and adjust them into the orthodox Hindu doctrine. The Brahmans reform their principles in order to adapt their archaic belief system to the new cultural demands of the *saṃsāra* narrative—the endless cycle of rebirths—, reworking many Vedic mythologies to become themselves 'the best placed both to obtain liberation and to secure the best rebirths'. However, the sustainment of the patriarchal caste system would require a far more encompassing strategy by Brahmanical authorities in their intent of reforming Vedic institutions.

The Hindu synthesis started to develop between 500 BCE and 300 CE, but it was only until the middle kingdoms and the medieval period in India that Hinduism gets completely formed. In this new process, as Biardeau explains, Brahmanism was able to 'integrate almost anything without a change of structure' within their patriarchal caste system, including not only the ascetic values of the *śramaṇa* movements, but also the emotional forces driving the *bhakti* movement in Post-Vedic India. *Bhakti*, or 'devotional attachment to God', becomes the central component of the synthesis that gives shape to Hinduism; through the *bhakti* model of spirituality old forms of selflessness become assimilated by the masses, like *ahiṃsā* and self-surrender. The phenomenon of the Love for God, though, was not exclusive of ancient India. The formation of Judaism is driven by 'the love of God' expressed by the people of ancient Israel, in the same era the first *bhakti* manifestations appear in India, during the Axial Age. The people of Israel lived 'in covenant' with God, 'whom they serve in wholehearted devotion'; the love of God is identified 'with the performance of his commandments'—paralleling the relation of loyalty and servitude to the kings. Yet this love of God developed in very erotic ways, like the Song of Songs, a love poem composing the Tanakh and the Old Testament, describing 'the romance of God and Israel' as a celebration of sexual love. The Judaist prophets, as Jon D. Levenson explicates, soon will interpret that, 'Israel played the prostitute or the adulteress' and only believer's faith 'will redeem her and renew the broken marriage'.

Devotional attachment to God produces a new mainstream throughout all over Eurasia during the transition from ancient to middle ages societies. The expansion of Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam generates a new type of worship and belief: the faith of the devotional believer. This ancient transcontinental tendency to praise unconditional love and self-sacrificing devotion becomes determinant in the way religion problematizes intimate relationships in middle ages societies. Only in devotional societies 'love' becomes problematized, and soon starts to be associated with conjugal household. Love is habitually identified with the 'love of the couple' in religious societies, where marriage functions as an institution. The woman must be, not only faithful, but loving, amorous to her husband. 'Her duty is summed up in a formula', Biardeau explicates: 'to serve her husband as her God'. The awareness about the magnitude of love within human relationships is a collateral effect of the rising of devotion and the expansion of organized religion. Not only compassionate gods emerged in the first millennium ce, but also forms of love separated from sex. *Bhakti*, devotional love, is distinguished from *kāma*, desire and sensual pleasure. The middle ages axiological atmosphere helps to reinforce the institution of marriage, but also puts a new pressure on men: to remain sexually faithful to his wife, in the same way he must keep faithful to God.

After the fall of the Roman Empire the social diagram of power relationships in Europe gets reconfigured. Christian authorities progressively accumulate political power, and in order to achieve supremacy over the kings, they use the same strategy of the Brahmans in South Asia: they declare celibacy as a requirement for ordination to the priesthood, mainly to distinguish the clergy as an exceptional group identified with the highest goals. Clericals in the Catholic Church advocated for a mandatory form of celibacy to the priesthood since the 4th century, but they only took a stand in favour of its definitive implantation in the 12th century. During the first millennium religion expanded all over Eurasia, implanting codifications of the sexual conducts, and in this way, ensuring social control over the population— primarily, domination of men over women, and domination of social groups over others, separating social classes while prohibiting sexual contact between them; this early medieval ages diagram, therefore, does not facilitate a plenty sexuality and spirituality reintegration, except for the emergence of minorities and elites practicing sexual cultivation techniques and the arts of existence. Yet the biggest sexuality and spirituality division was still to come, during the second millennium of the common era, in the late medieval periods of each continent. After the 13th

century, when the celibate clergy becomes the paradigm of separation from the sinful world, the codifications of the sexual conducts get stricter and more severe than ever before. 'The marriage relation was the most intense focus of constraints', Foucault explains; it remained under confession and 'constant surveillance'. As he says, 'breaking the rules of marriage or seeking strange pleasures brought an equal measure of condemnation'. Now the prohibition is not only adultery, like in archaic and ancient societies. Late medieval regimes judge orientations like homosexuality and infidelity between couples, while punish practices like sodomy or masturbation.

Middle ages governmentality is the main cause for inhibiting desire and sexual experimentation, both in eastern and western regimes, because marriage is converted into a conservative social institution and devotion becomes a mainstream value in this era, displacing the ancestral social demand of ecstasy. But in addition to this transcontinental expansion of monogamy as an intimate relationship model, another historical process contributed massively to propitiate a new sexuality and spirituality separation. It is the moment when one of the most significant cultural differences between western and eastern societies emerge. Christianity introduces the notion of sex as a *sin*—as an obstacle to *salvation*—and, in this way, contributes to differentiate western cultures from eastern cultures, where sex has never been considered something equivalent to a sin—on the contrary, in the East 'sex is an expression of mystic union in terms of human love'. The Christian doctrine of original sin is associated with sex since the 3rd century, when Augustine of Hippo develops the notion of *concupiscence*. Sinful lust becomes subject of punishment in the late medieval period in Europe, after the Catholic Church starts to combat heresy through the Inquisition. The severe codes of regulation of sexual acts—conceived now as the *flesh*—implanted in Christian societies during the European middle ages would be inherited by colonial American cultures after the conquest of the new continent, enculturing the three Americas into the West. The influence of Christianity's' strict sexual conducts regulation will have a later repercussion in the 18th and 19th centuries, in middle and far eastern cultures going under processes of 'westernization'.

In India sex continues to be used as a medium to engage in spiritual experiences during the early medieval period, with Tantric Kaula cults all over the subcontinent practicing rites centred in the consumption of sexual fluids, and the appropriation of these rituals by Brahmans and kings between the 9th and 12th century,

developing into the Trika tradition within Kashmirian Hindu circles. At this point the practical dimension intrinsic to the original knowledge of the ancient Siddha tradition from where Tantra emerges has dissolved into the religious mythology of Hinduism. This is why in this age Tantra functions as a soteriology, a doctrine to attain salvation. However, in resonance with the western world, the moral regimes become strict and more severe after the 13th century in the Indian subcontinent, when Islam establishes itself during the course of a long gradual Muslim conquest extended from Africa to Asia. Medieval governmentality propitiates the second historical separation between sex and spirituality when sex becomes 'profane' and, when later on, many sexuality issues and practices become forbidden, prohibited, and persecuted, often making sex incompatible with mainstream spiritual paths. For religious communities, as James A. Brundage admits, 'sex represents a rich source of conflicts that can disrupt orderly social processes'; and he adds: 'throughout the ages communities have used various combinations of law, religion, and morality to achieve control. Not surprisingly, the regulation of sexuality has been a central feature of every legal system'. Desire was considered by the ancient ascetics the direct cause of suffering and attachment to the cycle of rebirths; this is when sexual desire becomes a hindrance for ascetic spiritual paths. But the gap between sexual desire and spiritual realization becomes an abyss in medieval cultures, when religious moral codes produce a division between sexual pleasure and the divine. After the 13th century, all the *ars erotica* and the sexual arts become *esoteric*: reserved for secret confidential circles and hidden initiates.

The Modern Sexuality and Spirituality Division: Separating the Divine and the Truth

The repercussions of the impact generated by the restrictive moral codes established in the medieval regimes lasts until the first centuries of the modern age. In fact, the moralities of the 18th and 19th centuries seem particularly conservative in almost all continents, from South and North America to Europe, the Middle and the Far East. Nevertheless, as Foucault has demonstrated, a parallel historical process develops at the same time that the repressive regimes are sustained. 'Sex' is systematically 'put into discourse' by modern institutions—the government, the clinic, the police, the fabric, the church, the school, the family, among others—as part of a macro-process that had not stopped to this day, 'a veritable discursive explosion' about sex in all its forms: statistical registers of population, sexual health politics, psychopathy of sexual behaviours, guidance on sexual relationships, etc.

The discourses about sex increase and propagate everywhere since Modernity starts, even when moral codes are still repressive, at least until the first part of the 20th century. This paradox can be consistently explained, as Foucault has documented copiously, as an overlapping between Christianity and Modernity; there is a continuation of the individualization processes first started in the West by early Christianity, and more specifically, the practices of inducing the population to talk about sex—like the medieval technique of confession—not because of religious social control anymore, but caused by other type of power and other form of governmentality.

The formation of urban capitalist societies and the decline of kingdoms related to modern cultures propitiates a new form of exercising power and domination over populations, very different than the archaic and medieval forms of governmentality. Between the 16th and 17th century emerges what Foucault calls '*biopower*', a relation of forces focused on the administration of life. *Biopolitics* is the correlative political process of capitalism; it can be distinguished because all its 'mechanisms of power are addressed to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate'. Only through the social control exerted through biopolitics the capitalist mode of production becomes a life system and an specific ethics centered on individual benefit. Within a capitalist system the concentration of power, as formulated by Marx, depends on the control of the means of production. But as Foucault complements it, the modern domination of large populations is only possible thanks to this new type of power, in which life is preserved and sustained, precisely, as a capital: human life is now a capital which must be conserved and protected. The modern political regime is the one in which 'political power had assigned itself the task of administering life'. In the middle of this new axiological atmosphere the discourses about sex multiply, as a strategy to guarantee a permanent access to the fundamental basis of human life. This modern transcontinental event propitiates the emergence of some unprecedented historical experiences, including the one that what we identify today as 'sexuality'.

Although what it is recognized with the term 'sexuality' describes a complex of biological potentials intrinsic to human beings—mixed with the particularities of the cultural environments—, only modern societies use the concept being conscious of its own problematizations. The formation of the conceptualization of sexuality starts in the 19th century, when modern 'western societies created and

deployed a new apparatus' designed for the assemblage of discourses, practices, and subjectivity- production habits, helping to maintain certain power relations diagram in capitalist societies. This *dispositif* of 'sexuality' quickly became one of the basic components of modern life, determining the construction of individual identities. The discourses about sexuality emerged in order to gain control over the lives of a population, taking care and preserving their value, promoted directly by 'a power organized around the management of life'. As Foucault states, 'during the 19th century you begin to see that sexual behaviour was important for the definition of the individual self. And that is something new'. Yet he adds: 'now sexuality seems to be a question without direct relation with reproduction. It is your sexuality as your personal behaviour what is the problem'. Globalized institutions like the World Health Organization and the World Association for Sexual Health define sexuality as 'a core dimension of being human which includes sex, gender, sexual and gender identity, sexual orientation, eroticism, emotional attachment/love, reproduction', which becomes the 'result of the interplay of biological, psychological, socio-economic, cultural, ethical and religious/spiritual factors'. The spectrum of sexuality is wide and loose, and its interrelations with spirituality compose an spectrum even wider and complex. So, as contemporary institutions reveal, even sexuality and spirituality issues are biopolitical interests, because any kind of sexuality process is used as a mechanism for individualization.

As Foucault points out, 'sex is the most speculative, most ideal, and most internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in its grip on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and pleasures'; correlatively, 'is sex itself which hides the most secret parts of the individual: the structure of his fantasies, the roots of his ego, the forms of his relationships to reality', he says; and adds: 'at the bottom of sex, there is truth'. However, western societies adopt a new 'procedure' to generate knowledge experiences about sex different than the axial *ars erotica*, the opposite procedure already present in ancient civilizations—including 'China, Japan, India, Rome, the Arabo-Moslem societies', among others. Notably, the humanist will of truth established by Christianity in the West is continued by modern science. The West has 'equipped itself with a "*scientia sexualis*"', a modern procedure that permits to rationalize sex and sexuality, in which sex is 'not only a matter of sensation and pleasure, of law and taboo, but also of truth and falsehood'. 'In the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a practice and accumulated as experience', as Foucault clarifies; 'it is experienced as

pleasure, evaluated in terms of its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the soul'. And he adds, 'this knowledge must be deflected back into the sexual practice itself, in order to shape it as though from within and amplify its effects'. On the contrary, the *scientia sexualis* 'connects the ancient injunction of confession to clinical listening methods'; confession 'gradually detached itself from the sacrament of penance' and 'migrated toward pedagogy, relationships between adults and children, family relations, medicine, and psychiatry'. This is how 'sex was constituted as a problem of truth': sexuality is 'the correlative of that slowly developed discursive practice which constitutes the *scientia sexualis*'.

Modernity spreads individualism, capitalism, and industrialization all over the globe—through colonialism—and accelerates the processes of urbanization at the same that intensifies the processes of stratification and social differentiation. When the centre of life is no longer a god, but the human being—and more precisely, the individual—, the processes of subjectification multiply and the problematization of personal identity is introduced to the masses. This is why sexuality is one of the most important *dispositifs* of capitalism: because the fundaments of all personal identity rely on sexuality issues—sexual identity, sexual orientation, sexual preferences, etc. Moreover, Modernity expands its values through science and its correlate processes of secularization; political and educational institutions conform their autonomous spaces, independent from religious institutions. This macroprocess induces human societies to rationalize their sexual experiences like never before. The rationalization of the sexual experience characteristic of modern life produces a new historical sexuality and spirituality division that only contributes to expand the already existing sexuality and spirituality everyday life gap.

Modern governmentality propitiates a new rational separation between sex and spirituality, disassociating the divine from the truth. In all archaic and medieval sexuality and spirituality divisions the divine—under the form of the sacred—was still considered the truth. In all modern societies, the divine—and consequently, spirituality and religion—is radically separated from the truth—or more precisely, the 'games of truth' present in every culture. The verificationist approach of science eclipses traditional sources of knowledge, delegitimizing the discourses and the practices related to spirituality, associating mysticism with superstition, while

reducing sex to a set of physiological functions, and conforming sexuality to a rational auto-operation. The dependence of religion on transcendent explanations make incompatible and unlikely the dialogue between religious traditions and modern science, and the lack of distinction between spirituality and religion closes all dialogue with immanent-oriented arts of existence. The archaic binary oppositions sacred/profane and transcendence/immanence, plus the ancient and medieval opposition matter/spirit, are joined by a new set of binary oppositions introduced by modern governmentality: anthropocentric/theocentric, subject/object, and secular/religious. All these binary oppositions contribute to the cultural sexuality and spirituality separation, and the modern division between the truth and the divine.

Within the new axiological atmosphere of secularization art separates itself from everyday life, constituting an autonomous sphere independent from religion. This is how the avant-garde wings of the modern art movements liberate desire against the strict moral codes of its time, and embrace sex and sexuality in their works like never before—as an expression of the individual freedom fuelling all Modernity processes. From Sade and the *poète maudit* poetic tradition to Georges Bataille and the novels of Henry Miller, from Picasso to Max Ernst and Francis Bacon, modern art captures the sublime of the sexuality and spirituality experience through different formal disciplines. Meanwhile, underground cultures develop in urban societies, and some of them look form some type of sexuality and spirituality reintegration to deal with the emptiness that modern life brings to the masses. Like Foucault envisions it, 'the death of God leaves an empty space: it has not been filled—the theological space remains open'; the death of God is tied 'to the ontological void which his death fixed at the limit of our thought'; that is why in modern cultures 'the body and sexuality assume a greater importance in the finitude of existence', and the erotic expressions erupt unprecedently: because 'eroticism can say what mysticism never could'. The autonomy of art in Modernity contributes to the problem of developing a classic type of *ars erotica*, when in pre-modern societies the separation between art and everyday life is unconceivable. Nonetheless, some of the underground movements and the western countercultures invent a modern type of *ars erotica*: stylizations of sex unlinked to arts of existence. The bdsm cultures are a source of modernized *ars erotica*, which reaches the experience of selflessness within individualistic environments. Non-normative sex practices develop since the 19th century, and keep growing to this day. When

mainstream societies are induced to break apart from the divine in their everyday life, sex helps to resist the separation.

The Global Sexuality and Spirituality Reintegration: Re-Connecting Human Life and the Divine

The expansion of modernization processes and modernist values from Europe to all the other continents through colonialism transforms the political administrations, spreading the republican models built upon secular values. In the 19th century, the rationalist secularization processes and the restrictive moral codes of the Victorian era marginalize the sexuality and spirituality knowledge and repress the sexuality and spirituality practices in the West, but also in eastern countries, with the rise of new religious fundamentalisms. So, it is not a surprise that in this century new alternative social movements emerge, looking for an effective sexuality and spirituality reintegration and new spiritual lifestyles. This is the moment when the first New Age social movements take form in Europe and, particularly, America, presenting sets of values 'which apparently rupture or transcend what modernity has to offer', providing 'solutions to the loss of certainty' in modern life. Some of these movements develop systems of thought, like Theosophy, incorporating concepts and values borrowed from eastern alchemical traditions, and actually, introducing the first vague notions of Tantra to western audiences. Moreover, new practices emerge looking to recover 'perennial' problematizations, like the practice of sexual magic, a western assemblage of ancient sexual inner cultivation techniques, paganism, and religious myths designed for the achievement of modern experiences of 'liberation'. The work of Madame Blavatsky, Pascal Beverly Randolph, and Aleister Crowley inspire a new sexuality and spirituality reintegration in which empirical experience and the embodiment is a priority, but always supported on an excessive amount of theoretical speculation, inherited not only from the ancient speculation of eastern alchemical traditions, but also from religious perspectives on transcendence. In any case, these communities and their systems of thought and practice were always presented as an alternative to religion by their own founders, looking for a 'sacralization' of Modernity, and above all, a reintegration of the divine and the truth.

The economic interdependence of modern nations accelerates at the end of World War ii, when the brand-new democratic regimes expand capitalist markets all over the planet, producing the integration of nation-states and cultures into a single system of life, the system of globalized capitalism. At the end of the 20th century the

entire humankind becomes integrated into Globalization, when supranational institutions get established; in the 21st century the global system consolidates itself supported in new technologies of communication and social media. Capitalist governmentality modulates its biopolitical exercise, evolving from a disciplinary biopower to a direct control biopower, in what Foucault and Gilles Deleuze had described as 'societies of control'. In these new globalized social diagrams individual freedom is regarded as the central value above all, and the self becomes the center of contemporary life. This explains why even the potential alternatives to mainstream lifestyles become captured in late capitalist societies. The New Age movements neutralize a significant part of their counterhegemonic potential when they become platforms of what Paul Heelas has accurately described as 'self-spirituality'. The New Age is reconfigured as a self-help market offering solutions to self-esteem problems, and although is full of religious and arts of existence references, it fails at proportionating real methods of losing or dissolving the ego—the selflessness virtue that characterizes religions and the arts of existence.

Nevertheless, the resurgence of spirituality in the 20th and 21st centuries' modern societies is not reduced to the New Age social movements. Globalization implies a new generalized 'post-secular' situation, in which governmental secular institutions integrate into post-modern cultures, were religion and spirituality are fundamental dimensions of life. This is how religious devotees keep growing in certain regions of the planet, and new alternative spiritual movements emerge everywhere. Some of these movements or cultures 'now prefer to call themselves "spiritual" rather than religious', as Heelas points out: those people who cultivate some form of spirituality without following the moral codes, nor either the doctrines of an organized religion, and instead, concentrate their exploration on 'subjective life'. And breaking apart with the binary opposition between religious spirituality and New age spirituality, the global age post-secular panorama presents at least another model of spirituality, the model created by the axial arts of existence, a practice-oriented spirituality that does not depend on religious institutions, but at the same time is not centred on the self, only in the practice, as a mode of achieving selflessness experiences. The arts of existence re-emerge in the 21st century, when Internet and the new technologies of communication diffuse their practices like never before. The arts of existence and the *ars erotica* are no longer esoteric in times of social media, they are now open to new populations. The ancient legacies of sexuality and spirituality knowledge are recovered in the global age, and not only by New Age movements, but also by

practice-oriented collectives and communities; the hype of New Age fusions like Osho's Neo Tantra sometimes eclipses the work of rigorous Yoga and Tantra practitioners around the globe, which explore today consistent modes of actualizing ancient knowledges, while focusing on the human body's potential as a ground for spiritual experimentation.

Both New Age seekers and contemporary arts of existence practitioners explore new forms of sexuality and spirituality reintegration, trying to keep sex and sexuality in contact with the divine: pleasure as a natural form of experiencing the divine and accessing ultimate reality. The global sexuality and spirituality reintegration, like the axial sexuality and spirituality reintegration, is not spread through the majority of the population, but this time the number of people composing the minorities involved with sexuality and spirituality explorations is enormous, and is no longer reduced to the elites, but to all kinds of social groups, lifestyles, and cultures in the planet. In the globalized societies of control the moral codes become very flexible, including those regarding sexuality. After the modern sexual revolution of the 1960's and the popularization of contraception methods, the globalized urban centres become more hedonist; and even with the aids counterrevolution of the 1980's, sexual conducts are less restrictive in the 21st century. The *dispositif* of sexuality keeps expanding its reach, but the processes of aestheticization of everyday life in globalized cultures are not always in function of capitalism and biopolitics. Some of the contemporary sex life therapy and sex life cultivation communities are looking for alternative ways of empowering feminine, masculine, and sexually indeterminate minorities, plus non-hegemonic life styles. The 'immanence of life' is the center of all new spiritualities conjuring self-centered ethics, what Heelas has named as 'spiritualities of life'.

Sexuality and Spirituality Key Issues and Problematizations

There are, at least, eight sexuality and spirituality problematizations defining the reach of the sexuality and spirituality field of research: life renewal, life cycle, feminine/masculine polarity, ecstasy, eroticism, inner cultivation, intimate relationships, and gender empowerment. The first five of these problematizations can be traced back to early modern humans and prehistoric social formations. The next two emerged in ancient times, and only the last appeared in modern ages. The sexuality and spirituality exploration is already present at the dawn of mankind, and constitute an integral part of the formation of the first civilizations and the emergence of counterhegemonic cultures, revealing in its deep historical roots the

relevance and the social pertinence of this field of research in globalized societies today.

Life Renewal

For early hunter-gatherers is vital and crucial to explore the mysteries of nature's cycling seasons and to understand how life generates and regenerates itself through the cosmos. Inquiring on the continuities between nature and the body they develop practices associated with what Eliade describes as 'the renewal of the original state of potency'. Earliest dancing in Africa is linked to a necessity of getting access to some of life and death mysteries, invoking what Ruether describes as the 'divine energy for life and the renewal of life' which 'sustains the cycling seasons'. Along with dances, collective sexual practices where at the centre of the earliest life renewal rituals, used as mediums for the instinctive exploration of 'the mystery of generation and fecundity'. This association between sex, fertility, prosperity, and fecundity is openly exposed in all early human cultures, from the Upper Palaeolithic until late archaic societies. Prehistoric sex rituals evolved into the ancient 'seasonal festivals' which included 'orgies' legitimated by the entire community, as a tradition part of popular folklore. Religious societies reconfigure the sexuality and spirituality problematizations and the way they were approached; celebration of life is not so relevant anymore, and the immanent relations get buried by complex theological myths about the origins of the world. However, some New Age groups recover today these perennial traditions.

Life Cycle

The transitions and changes experienced at every stage of the life cycle was another vital issue for Upper Palaeolithic societies, as archaeological registers indicate. The statuettes—carved or sculpted—known as the 'Venus figurines' are a clear example of the tools used by prehistoric cultures to produce knowledge experiences about the human life cycle. Patricia C. Rice suggests that female figurines represent women throughout their entire adult life, not just when they are pregnant, but through all female aging process, meanwhile Le Roy's McDermott's proposes a 'materialist hypothesis' for the figures to interpret them as 'accurate representational images of the female body at different stages of development' of the life cycle. These stages include, 'puberty, menses, coitus, conception, pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation', the 'regular events in the female cycle', or what Alexander Marshack describes as 'perceptible "time-factored" alterations in bodily function'. The social uses of the figurines, it seems, were related with 'needs of

health and hygiene', the mysteries of sexual reproduction, the relation with nature's cycles as an 'attempt at influencing and participating in the periodicities, equations, and difficulties of the processes involved', and 'the recognition of, and ritual, mythologized participation in the uncertainties and dangers that surrounded the processes of life, birth and death'. The early human sexuality and spirituality life cycle problematizations, revealed in archaeological cases like Çatalhöyük, constitute the foundations of the first sexual health programs, from ancient Chinese macrobiotic hygiene and Indian Ayurveda, to pre-modern American indigenous societies' regimes. Sex education programs reclaim these topics today.

Feminine/Masculine Polarity

The repeated vulvar and phallic motifs in prehistoric paintings and sculptures are the best evidence and testimony of the early human inquiry on sexual differentiation and biological complementarity. From the accuracy of the Aurignacian vulvar tradition in the Vézère Valley (c. 34,000 BCE–28,000 BCE), or the wide-open oval vulva engraved on the Monpazier statuette (c.25,000 BCE), to the ithyphallic figures at Lascaux (c.17,000 BCE), and the male genitalia depicted at Trois-Frères (c.13,000 BCE), the mystery of sexual differentiation was ordinarily explored by prehistoric communities. The problematization of feminine/masculine polarity is a key issue in early human societies, as André Leroi Gourhan points out; it is described by Eliade as the 'principle of complementarity of the two sexual and cosmological principles'. As he proposes, 'it is probable that this principle of complementarity was called upon both to organize the world and to explain the mystery of its periodical creation and regeneration'. This problematization continued in the archaic and ancient regimes in the form of the *hieros gamos* tradition, the ritual of the marriage between deities, or kings, and nature. The exploration of the possibilities of life renewal evolved into a new problematization focused on the distinction of female and male bodies, as well of feminine and masculine energies. The yin/yang complementarity of Taoism, plus its parallel fundamental opposition of *śiva/sakti* in *haṭha yoga* and Tantra, are the axial developments of this problematization. In modern days, criticism is exerted by gender theorists against the binary systems developed from ancient assumptions, but also speculative reinterpretations of its principles come from New Age communities. Religion also continued with this problematization to describe their divine order, like the Qur'an interpretations by Islam scholar Ibn Arabi—describing

devotion to God as both active and receptive—, and the Kabbalah's exegesis of Jewish scriptures in female and male complementarity terms.

Ecstasy

Prehistoric and tribal cultures, as Eliade explains, engage in 'ecstatic experiences' as their natural form of spiritual experience. Ecstasy was lived collectively, as a community, through chanting and dancing, and particularly through drumming, with the shaman leading the gathering as the 'master of ecstasy', at the very roots of the creation of music. Besides music and entheogens, sex was the other privileged medium used for the attainment of bliss, states of trance, mystical experiences, and embodied altered states of consciousness. Sexual intercourse was used and recreated in varied types of rituals and celebrations 'to increase the sexual vigour of the community'. In this way, ecstasy was explored as a way to enhance vitality and as a strategy to empower people, while at the same time the embodied trance states were the gates to access to non-ordinary realities and keep the community in contact with the 'divine' and the spirits of the universe. The Dionysian Cults are an example of the way in which this prehistorical tradition was incorporated into the first proto-religious cultures, with the ancient Greek's creation of Dionysus, god of ecstasy. In medieval Christian cultures ecstasy is problematized as *rapture*, a sacred experience linking religious mystical experiences and sexual bliss, like the type of ecstatic rapture embodied by Saint Catherine of Alexandria or by Saint Teresa of Ávila, where mysticism is understood as a matter of *union* with a transcendent Divinity. Meanwhile, in India, the Brahmanical elites of Kashmirian Hindu circles— notably, the theologian Abhinavagupta—reinterpret the Kaula Tantra tradition and invent a life origins myth centred on ecstasy, 'in which the entire universe' creation functions as the divine 'orgasm' of God, and the Trika art of existence in which the practitioner cultivates a 'divine state of consciousness homologous to the bliss experienced in sexual orgasm'. This version of Tantra constitutes the foundation of most of New Age Tantra reinterpretations, becoming popular in globalized hedonist societies. On the other hand, science explores today the neurophysiology of the orgasm or sexual trance, and its neural correlations with altered states of consciousness.

Eroticism

As George Bataille suggests, eroticism is one of the ways in which humans start to distinguish themselves from animals. Indeed, from within the simpler and rougher sexual depictions at Serra da Capivara (c. 36,000 BCE–25,000 BCE), or Magura

Caves (c. 8,000–6,000 BCE), another type of art emerges: the art of eroticism, which generates pleasure through sensuality. Although, as Bataille explains, is not enough to perform or to depict sexual acts to be considered erotic. 'The simple sexual act is different from eroticism', he explains; 'unlike simple sexual activity, it is a psychological quest'. Eroticism is a very specific kind of sexual stimulation, in which consciousness becomes decentered from the self. 'The whole business of eroticism is to strike to the inmost core of the living being, so that the heart stands still. The transition from the normal state to that of erotic desire presupposes a partial dissolution of the person'. In this sense, the Upper Palaeolithic pioneer forms of expression—dancing, chanting, painting, carving, sculpting, etc.—constitute the grounds in which the seeds of eroticism were planted in human evolution, like the images founded at Lascaux (c. 17.000 BCE–13,500 BCE) and the 'awareness of death' manifested in the pictures. As ecstasy and mysticism, eroticism is linked with higher and expanded states of consciousness, because of its exploration of the experience of the *sublime*; that is the substantial difference between eroticism and pornography, a practice which produces images to generate sexual excitation—like eroticism—but without embodying the sublime. Pornography starts to take form in patriarchal archaic societies like Mesopotamia, and developed with the drawings of ancient China, Greece, Pompeii, the Tlatilco figurines of Mexico, or the later Moche pottery in Peru. But eroticism also flourished in patriarchal regimes, like the Indian middle kingdoms' Tantric temples in Khajuraho—were majestic architecture is in function of absolute sexuality and spirituality integration—, or the ecstatic verses written by Sufi poet Rumi in medieval Persia. Eroticism exploration even continued in religious regimes, with the chiaroscuro paintings of Italian Renaissance master Antonio da Correggio, the classical Hinduism poem of *Gita Govinda*, or the Baroque sculpture of Saint Teresa created by Bernini. And it keeps developing in Modernity and Globalization regimes, from the formation of tango music in the brothels of Buenos Aires at the beginning of the 20th century, to the sensuality of samba in Brazil, and so on. bdsm practices, in the other hand, from bondage to sadomasochism, Shirabi, and Obi erotic asphyxiation, are examples of modern *ars erotica* without inner or self-cultivation.

Inner Cultivation

The axial counterhegemonic cultures embracing non-celibate arts of existence, like some schools of Stoicism an Epicureanism, but particularly Taoism, Tantra, and Yoga—the *haṭha yoga* tradition—, introduce the problematization and the

practices of inner cultivation through sexual exercises. Like Harper explains, the eastern arts of existence that developed *ars erotica* explore 'intercourse for the sake of physical cultivation rather than as a consequence of passion'. This is why the Chinese and the Indian *ars erotica*, since ancient times, generates knowledge experiences about 'postures, sexual positions, counting number of penetration movements, techniques, actions for the man to perform, movements for the body', and many other physical aspects of the sexual act. Yet the eastern sexual experimentation and its emphasis on the technique always has been in function of its spiritual purposes; that is why, since the pioneer shamanic, Xian, and Siddha traditions, the exercises of inner cultivation had been used as vehicles for uniting or *melting* with the 'absolute'—nature's field were the divine engenders itself. At least since ancient times, through medieval, and modern societies, the notion of *ars erotica* and the legacy of the arts of existence had been preserved by traditions like Vajrayāna Buddhism in the East, or Gnosticism in the West. Techniques like the *coitus reservatus*, praised by both ancient Chinese and Greek medicine traditions, has been explored by spiritual communities for more than two millenniums. Even ancient celibate traditions learned from the arts of existence problematization of semen expenditure, like the Hindu *brahmacarya* tradition, or the Buddhist art of *bodhicitta* cultivation. The sexual arts and inner cultivation exercises had been used for improving health, wellness, rejuvenation, and prolonging life. The myth of immortality achieved through sexual arts and inner cultivation not only was fascinating for ancient and medieval kings, but also for esotericism practitioners in the modern age, particularly in Europe and America, influenced by eastern traditions in their explorations. The arts of inner cultivation continue in the global age, with new developments; for example, Mantak Chia has modelled a metaphysics-free art of existence for the globalized generations, through a Sexual Kung-Fu system based in ancient Taoist traditions, in which sexual cultivation is a fundamental feature. Moreover, the resurgence of sexual cultivation practices takes distance from most of the patriarchal structures linked to the original *ars erotica* and arts of existence, and now women can actively engage in their own practices following female's priorities.

Intimate Relationships

The emergence of *bhakti* and the devotional movements, from Israel to India, is the reason why intimate relationships became a transcultural human problematization. Only after the expansion of the institution of marriage and the practice of

monogamy within religious cultures the problem of intimate relationships and married couples becomes a central issue in societies all around the planet, with the focus on conjugal household and the right ways to conduce couple's life. The definitive example of the ancient problematization on intimate relationships is the Kāmasūtra, an integral part of the Kāmaśāstra Hindu tradition. At the same time a love manual and a sex manual, the Kāmasūtra is also an an *ars erotica* and an arts of living handbook, prescribing without imposition 'the rules to be followed in order for a marriage to be dharmic', the advices for preserving 'fidelity' between the couple, particularly for the woman, 'and for maintaining their husbands love for them'. Nonetheless, the ancient sex manuals can't be reduced to mere *dispositifs* of domination from men over women. As Biardeau points out, there is a Hinduist initiative of 'seeking *mokṣa* in *kāma*' (liberation through desire) within their Tantric cultures, which can be detected in works like the Kāmasūtra, when it portrays how 'the couple reproduces the union of God and nature' and 'the experience of love is analysed as a self-dispossession'. This selflessness potential of the love and sex associated with intimate relationships has been problematized from ancient to medieval periods, from the *Ars Amatoria* written by Ovidio to the Islamic sex manual The Perfumed Garden, among many others. The tradition of the love and the sex manual has been prolonged in the global age by the New Age cultures, and the problematization of the intimate relationships has been recovered by contemporary psychology in their experimentation of sex life therapies, like Gina Ogden's pioneer large-scale survey designed to investigate the connections between sexuality and spirituality at the end of the 20th century, and her 'integrative model' of sex therapy, interconnecting physical, emotional, mental and spiritual elements into self-transformative processes. Sex therapy and couple therapy are common practices in globalized societies.

Gender Empowerment

Although gender-related issues had always been an integral part of social formation processes, gender only became a problematization in the 20th century, when identity construction and subjectivity production emerged as central components of modern culture. Feminist Theory was at the forefront of gender problematization, bringing light to more than five thousand years of oppression and domination by men over women. 'The power of women is strongly linked to sexuality', as Priyanka Thukral Mahajan affirms. 'Women, as objects of sexual attraction (...) have the power to influence and dissuade men from a higher purpose'. Therefore, 'to

perpetuate order', it is 'necessary to reign and control the power of women through restrictions on her sexuality'. Since ancient cultures, as Lerner demonstrates, 'the state has assumed the control of female sexuality', while social domination has been legitimated in the name of the sacred. Additionally, Queer Theory has contributed significantly to the gender problematization, after several centuries of hetero-normative intolerance. From ancient civilizations to early medieval cultures, homosexuality was never a problem, even when patriarchalism was deeply established; actually, there were not terms or concepts of heterosexuality and homosexuality in pre-modern cultures. But the moral codes of Christianity propitiated a change of perception, and its influence has remained until the present era. Parallelly, the other world religions had become conservative with non-heterosexual communities, and in this way, gender inquiries constitute political battles at the same time. Modernity debilitates classic kingdoms, but patriarchy continues through capitalism. Both Gender and Queer Theory analyse the modes in which female and male differences are socially constructed, including religious environments. Feminists and LGBTQI activists explore the challenges that non-heterocentric sexualities live in the interior of religious communities, with the support of the academia. Empowerment through spirituality is a central feature of all gender problematizations, although more identity-driven than selflessness-oriented. Queer Theology has developed since the 1990's, exploring problems as race, sexual orientation, and politics through the Holy Scriptures, like the book of Patrick Cheng, *Rainbow Theology: Bridging Race, Sexuality, and Spirit*, or the legacy of Marcella Althaus-Reid, mixing queer and feminist theory with Theology; Thealogy and Feminist Theology constitute other forefronts of religious sexuality and spirituality inquiry, at least, from 1978 with Phyllis Trible's book *God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality*. Yet gender empowerment has also been approached by communities living outside the moral codes of organized religion, like for example the cults of the 'goddess' popularized by Neo-Tantra female practitioners in the 21st century, reconnecting women with the divine.

Distinguishing the Sexuality and Spirituality Field and the Religion, Gender, and Sexuality Field of Studies and Research

The entire catalogue of the problematizations composing the full spectrum of sexuality and spirituality -related explorations is complex enough to distinguish more than one field of studies and research, even when all the areas of exploration keep their interconnections in everyday life. The heterosexist and heteropatriarchal

background of the millenary sexuality and spirituality explorations was confronted in the middle of the 20th century with a particular type of academic research exploring experiences also linked to sexuality and spirituality, but focusing in gender problematizations within religious adscriptions—not accidentally: organized religion has been the model of spirituality more deeply engaged with the instauration of heteropatriarchal structures and heterosexist views within societies during three thousand years. This specific scholarly inquiry is distinguished today as the Religion, Sexuality and Gender (RS&G) field of studies. Feminist studies and Queer studies became the pioneer areas of scholarly research. While the research matrix and axis of the sexuality and spirituality field of studies is *ecstasy*—the spiritual dimension of sexual ecstasy—, the research matrix and axis of the RS&G field of studies is *gender*—and in general, the processes of subjectivity construction. While sexuality and spirituality inquiry approaches embodied experiences of sex life cultivation and non-ordinary states of consciousness derived from the traditions of arts of existence experimentation, RS&G inquiry embraces all kind of processes of subjectivity construction as central problematizations, like genre construction, identity, and sexuality formation. While sexuality and spirituality research brings to light the health and wellness potential of sex and eroticism in its divine dimension—and the social pertinence of that quest—, RS&G research reveals the social construction dimension of sexuality and spirituality experiences, because even embodiments are affected by different kind of power relationships conditionings, helping to make visible the vast, complex, and heterogeneous multiplicity of real lived processes related to sexuality and spirituality, surpassing the natural oppositions and the cultural binary systems. Therefore, the problematizations exposed by LGBTQI communities, studied through RS&G investigation, result very pertinent to all types of sexuality and spirituality explorations, including the research on the ungraspable and ineffable *selflessness* embodiment, yet embracing power relationships analysis, socially-grounded perspectives, and real-life-supported diagnostics.

The picture of the full spectrum of sexuality and spirituality explorations only gets completed when the RS&G research is incorporated into the debate. That is why EXPLORING SEXUALITY AND SPIRITUALITY includes three chapters located within the interstices of the sexuality and spirituality and the RS&G fields of studies and research, in the hands of Rita Dirks, Huai Bao, Assumpta Sabuco Cantó, and Ana Álvarez Borrero. Dirks reflects on 'divine love' and 'the experience with the

divine', as all sexuality and spirituality authors; 'We experience love, God, through our erotic relationships', she says. But in this volume Dirks focuses on the exploration on 'homosexual experience as mediating the experience with the divine', and 'the sacredness of homosexuality', as any other RS&G researcher. Bao examines the everyday life experience of celibacy, one of the classical debates of sexuality and spirituality studies, but also takes time to analyse the particularities of homosexual celibates and spiritual seekers. 'Why in some, if not all, Buddhist discourses' (...) he asks, are 'homosexual desires and acts 'often regarded as a form of sexual misconduct?', embracing RS&G problematizations into his work. Finally, Sabuco Cantó and Álvarez Borrero inquire about 'new alternative forms of sacredness', but focusing on feminist demands and feminist perspectives. 'While feminist women think their own genitals are sacred', Sabuco and Álvarez say, 'some Christian sectors assume this conception as harmful against the respect for the traditions and popular beliefs'. In this mode, these chapters approach sexuality and spirituality explorations, but assembled with RS&G problematizations related to subjectivity and gender construction, making use of queer and feminist critic theory to trace and detect what Bao refers to as 'the power structures' inserted in the codes followed by religious believers constructing their subjectivity and gender identities, functioning as determinant influences in their lives and their life possibilities.

The complementarity of the sexuality and spirituality and the RS&G fields of research, even in this book, resides in the balance acquired after paralleling their opposite contributions. The RS&G research traces the social construction of subjectivity by individuals and communities who prioritize spiritual activities in their lives, particularly the people engaged in religious forms of spirituality; in this case, the analysis of the moral codes and the power relationships exerted by religious authorities results indispensable. As Bao explains, 'the regulation of sexuality by these religious institutions is largely impacting the subjects' perception of spiritual requirements and accomplishments'. And, when they don't follow heteronormativity, as he adds, 'members of gender and sexual minorities face even more sex-negative opinions and impressions'. Gender and subjectivity problematizations are always relevant in sexuality and spirituality explorations, because even if the mystical embodiment—conceived as Divinity or emptiness—is free from all cultural predeterminations, the complete lived experience includes more than the sublime, ecstatic, expansive state of consciousness; the experience includes also all the everyday processes allowing the embodiment to take place, and

all the processes opened and continued after the non-ordinary embodied state ends. The selflessness experience research includes all what happens before and after the embodiment; 'an individual seeking self-determination and independence from imposed heterosexual practices'—as Oscar Wilde, a case explored by Dirks in this volume—, for example, lives singular processes which delineate particular spiritual paths, which deserve to be differentiated from the mainstream. And, in a complementary, opposite direction, sexuality and spirituality research focuses on how subjectivity and any other self-construction becomes dissolved in the selflessness embodiment, in the physical core of the experience in which all cultural conceptual formation and all self-referentiality melts away, the embodiment of ecstasy in which self-consciousness, identity, individuality—and all its singularities—get momentarily vanished within embodied 'absorptive states of consciousness', as Shining explicates. If subjectivity is central for RS&G scholars, selflessness is the priority for, not only sexuality and spirituality practitioners, but also sexuality and spirituality researchers. 'Pleasure is impersonal', says Papadopoullos; 'it shatters identity and subjectivity'. This unique type of embodiment and the unique type of experiences that enables and allows to live, opens possibilities much more enriching that simple individualistic hedonism. Experiencing ecstatic embodiments opens non-conventional perspectives in spirituality, but above all, opens the possibilities for heterogeneous modes of life and alternative ethical models.

Sexuality and spirituality explorations are now recovering its relevance in the contemporary ways of life, within the communities and societies of present-day globalized urban centres, after centuries of repression in both eastern and western cultures—indeed, where the reactionary heritage continues to be contested to this day. Therefore, even when sexuality and spirituality explorations constitute one of the foundational grounds of human knowledge—and, perhaps, one of the defining characteristics of the human species—, is clear that an sexuality and spirituality academic field of studies and research only takes form in the 21st century, when the new millennium opens up. It was impossible to develop a proper 'area' of sexuality and spirituality scholarly research before, because the full spectrum of sexuality and spirituality issues can't be reduced to the academic domain of a modern discipline. The embracement of sexuality and spirituality inquiries was impossible, of course, in the Age of Enlightenment, because the secularization processes had not become effective yet. But it was also impossible in the 19th and the 20th century, in the age

of specialization of knowledge through compartmented disciplines. Sexuality and spirituality research is interdisciplinary by nature: sexuality and spirituality academic investigation is created between the intersections of the epistemological and practical boundaries of diverse modern disciplines, generating multi, inter, and transdisciplinary forms of research, as well as transversal academic communities and networks. This happens, simultaneously, to the increasing popular demand of everyday life sexuality and spirituality -related knowledge, the expansion of sexuality and spirituality practices, the multiplication of the self-managed networks, and the transcultural interaction of empirically cultivated practitioners making part of growing globalized communities.

Moreover, the sexuality and spirituality field of studies and research distinguishes itself from other sexuality and spirituality -related social spheres, like the New Age market of spirituality. Since the last decades of the 20th century, a New Age market has taken form within contemporary societies, nourishing an unprecedented demand for pragmatic and handy, everyday life sexuality and spirituality exploration. This is how a notion of 'sacred sexuality' finds its place in the public agenda, via the New Age market labels, using a religious word—'sacred'—connected with a secular construction—'sexuality'—as an umbrella term to include commercial alternatives responding to a vast multiplicity of social lacks and desires. Authors like Nik Douglas or Margo Anand helped to carved the niche of 'sacred sexuality' inside the New Age market, and inheritors as Michael Mirdad continue to exploit successfully the segment of the market, through 'bliss manuals', handbooks concerning the 'alchemy of ecstasy', and step-by-step guides to embody 'sexual ecstasy'. While the RS&G field, and in general all the traditional academic sexuality and spirituality research has dismissed nature—the absolute, the ecstatic, and the embodied spiritual experience—extra-academic fields of exploration keep embracing these millenary inquiries in the 21st century. Since its origins, in the 1960's, the New Age market became the territory for exploring 'metaphysical' sexuality and spirituality questions. The friendly-for-the-masses and corporative-indulgent perspective of Osho's trademark, for example, represents the mainstream sexuality and spirituality model of 'sacred sexuality', 'sexual magic', 'sexual alchemy', 'Neotantra', or any given name of the market segment, which successfully attends today a growing demand of emotional health. Habitually, this market spaces are focused on the improvement of s*elf-esteem* as the 'spiritual' priority of the work offered by self-appointed 'gurus', 'experts', or community-recognized 'masters'. In

spite of this, globalization opens the possibilities of reintegration of sexuality and spirituality practices in other forms beyond the services offered by self-centred capitalist markets. In the contrary, the priority of sexuality and spirituality scholarly and not scholarly research is knowledge, and the social pertinence of sexuality and spirituality -related knowledge experiences.

The production of subjectivity becomes richer and more complex as a result of the individualization processes globally forged by neoliberal capitalism since the end of the second millennium; this global contemporary condition produces an unlimited demand of individual and collective exploration of both sexuality and spirituality, expanding the limits of each autonomous sphere. In the 21st century the knowledge concerning sexuality and spirituality is disseminated through an overwhelming archipelago of scholar disciplines, ancient teachings and popular wisdom, divided and separated, but in increasing interaction, generating initiatives of integrative knowledge production. In the intent of bridging traditional—sometimes millenary—bodies of non-academic teachings with cutting-edge research, the S sexuality and spirituality field of studies and research starts to take form while the new millennium opens up, generating knowledge experiences in the age of ephemeral information. Some of the interdisciplinary areas of studies and research related to the sexuality and spirituality traditions currently being developed in globalized urban centres are *sex life* and *couple therapy*, *sex education*, and *sex life cultivation*, facing the challenge of bridging ancient teachings with modern methods, particularly with health sciences in the case of biospiritual and sexual cultivation practices.

Contents, Approaches, and Methodologies Presented in this Book

Evidently, is impossible to be 'representative' of the unlimited multiplicity of views and approaches, many of them in contradiction within each other. But this collection offers a very illustrative picture of the actual state of sexuality and spirituality exploration and research, registering the broad panorama of its transcultural situation, exposing the immense variety of the perspectives of understanding, problematizations, methodologies, and ethics involved, as also, the commonalities founded in their heterogeneous models of explanation, their own valuation of the experience, and their descriptions of lived embodiments.

Indeed, EXPLORING SEXUALITY AND SPIRITUALITY covers many approaches situated on opposite poles of the wide spectrum, from sacred scriptures interpretation to direct empirical experimentation; from revision of literature to fieldwork research;

from in-depth interviews to news reports analysis; from personal view recountings to collective educational proposals, among some others. This book encompasses the discourses of disparate types of practitioners, from lecturers to social activists, from worshippers to psychonauts, from celibates to sex masters, from analysts or coaches to subversive poets. It comprises the values, habits, and affections of dissimilar styles of living, from the ascetic to the sexually-centred, from the brighter and ecological to the more obscure and experimental, from the neutrally agnostic to the religiously devotional, from organized religious parishioners to individuals 'who claim that they would label themselves as "spiritual" rather than "religious"'. And moves from the strictly sacred to the openly profane, from the spiritual bliss of Saint Teresa of Ávila to the nocturnal ecstasy lived by the prostitutes of Georges Bataille's short stories, from consecrated celibates to present-day consensual sadomasochists, and so on.

The common interdisciplinary ground exposed in all the articles of the collection is not just a coincidence. Only through an interdisciplinary stance results possible to embrace many of the central problematizations of this book, located at the fringes of the specialized areas of knowledge, or within the interstices of the disciplines, if not completely out of academic programs, to this day. Some of the subjects of this book constitute crucial events in the history of the sexuality and spirituality explorations, like the relevance of the sex organs and sexual scenes depictions of prehistoric rock art—at least, since 40,000 years BCE—, the purpose of composing a sacred text devoted to sexual union like the Song of Songs—more than a thousand years before bce—, the epitome of a spiritual tradition centred on desire becoming a hegemonic religion, as is the case of the Trika Tantra of Kashmir Shaivism—between the 9th and 12th century—, the systematization of perennial sources of extreme, radical pleasure in modern times, like the BDSM scenes and communities—between the 19th and the 20th century—, and the globalized popularization of a very old expression that captures the spiritual potential of orgasm, the term *la petite mort*—in the 21st century. This ride takes us from Africa to Western Asia, and then from East Asia to Europe and America, to the globalized condition of present-day nations and societies in all continents, revealing some of the central problematizations repeated through the complete history of sexuality and spirituality exploration, even until today. Presenting this network of basic problematizations is a good introduction for anyone desiring to understand—or experience—the intrinsic relationships between sexuality and spirituality; is the

rich and vast multiplicity of the full spectrum of sexuality and spirituality explorations—generated all across the opposite poles and the binary systems—from where the academic field of studies and research supplies itself, and is within a complex web of transversal relations, intersections, and overlappings between the disciplines that the central problematizations can get traced, and therefore, the field of research can be mapped.

Nevertheless, this book is more than a simple compendium of eclectic material, politically correct multicultural inclusivity, or dialectics between opposite relations. EXPLORING SEXUALITY AND SPIRITUALITY functions as a map to detect, differentiate, and locate some of the central problematizations that compose the full spectrum of sexuality and spirituality contemporary explorations. Furthermore, this collection of essays and articles is an introduction to the emerging sexuality and spirituality interdisciplinary academic field of study and research. Sexuality and spirituality explorations are naturally and intrinsically interdisciplinary, and this volume proves it. Through its ten chapters the book provides concrete examples of integrative knowledge explorations and a space for experimentation for new models of inquiry, assembling multi, inter, or transdisciplinary projects of research and very different styles of writing. The authors are specialized in disciplines like religious studies, theology, anthropology, sociology, queer studies, literature, psychology, philosophy, and architecture. And from there, they compare, contrast, juxtapose, combine, blend, or synthetize their ideas, concepts, analysis, studies, and diagnostics with knowledge coming from other disciplines, like geomorphology, archaeology, neuroscience, ethnography, psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, musicology, education studies, feminist studies, poetry, performance arts, and ancient arts of existence, like Buddhism, Taoism, Tantra, and Yoga. Some of the most cited works in this book are the Old Testament's Song of Songs, *Madame Edwarda* by Georges Bataille, the three volumes of *The History of Sexuality* by Michel Foucault, and *Kiss of the Yoginī. "Tantric Sex" in its South Asian Contexts*, by David Gordon White. A sacred Judeo-Christian ancient scripture; a clandestine erotic short story; a critical genealogy of desiring man; and a religious studies history of Tantric Sex: this might give an idea of the unlimited horizon of the sexuality and spirituality interdisciplinary field of studies and research, and the complexity of the relations between its communicating vessels.

The book's ten chapters are distributed throughout five parts, each part linked to a specific research matrix, preceded by this introduction to the field of studies and research. The selected authors embrace interdisciplinarity, each one from its own singular perspective, from experienced scholars to young explorers, from academic associates to independent researchers, from religious believers to spiritual practitioners. What follows is a brief presentation of the sexuality and spirituality research matrixes used in EXPLORING SEXUALITY AND SPIRITUALITY, and a basic map of the transversal relations, common problematizations, interconnected practices, resonant concepts, and shared affections founded between different chapters, but also of its opposed perspectives, multiple methodologies, unlike practices, dissimilar values, and contrary intents.

Natural Instincts: Exploring the Natural Conditioning of Sexual Expressions

Part 1, 'Natural Instincts', introduces the readers to sexuality and spirituality research presenting distinct essays inquiring the immanent, natural conditions intrinsic to sexual experience and the inherent connection between spirituality and nature, like sexual differentiation or sexual impulses, and its modes of being manifested. The first chapter of this book, perhaps the more poetic and intuitive, illustrates the possibilities opened for thinking what has not been thought yet, by non-disciplinary or non-academic projects of sexuality and spirituality exploration. 'Spirituality of the Sexually Charged Landscape', presented by Dennis Alan Winters, embraces the research on 'sex as a driving force of life and instinct', not only of animal or human species, but also of non-animated forms of life, like *land* itself. Winters focuses on 'the erotic play of male and female forces expressed through visually distinct and expressive patterns of topographic and morphologic relationships', taking the ancient Eastern model of cosmological conceptualization based in the opposition and intrinsic relation between female and male forces—like the *yin-yang* Taoist model, or the *śiva-śakti* Tantric/Yogic model—to the exploration of the immanent sexual forces embedded in earth's landscapes. Linking psychology, geomorphology, and Buddhist teachings, Winters traces both the 'beautiful' and the 'sublime' experiences generated by landscapes, caused by the intrinsic sexual forces molecularly present in their landforms. Winters' work questions anthropocentrism, and the assumption that eroticism is exclusive human property through a provoking reflection: 'Revealing her most private parts, nature's divine intention all along has been to illuminate our providence as sexual beings', he says. 'Rather than appearing to succumb to our allegorical anthropomorphizing of hills and valleys as sexual

body parts, perhaps it has been the Earth Divine that has geopomorphized human beings'.

In the second chapter of this book, 'Spirituality and Sexuality in Prehistoric Art', Richard Alan Northover employs case studies of Palaeolithic and Neolithic rock art from Europe, North America, and Southern Africa, to explore prehistoric sexuality. Northover argues why and how 'prehistoric sexuality can only be understood within the broader spectrum of prehistoric spirituality', presenting a multidisciplinary study examining and comparing two dissimilar methodologies: David Lewis-Williams's ethnographical and empirical research, and Bataille's flexible poetic-philosophical inquiries. The parallel between the two theories 'reveals striking similarities among prehistoric societies since the Upper Palaeolithic and across continents', he asserts; from Lascaux and Çatalhöyük to Newgrange and the Game Pass of the Drakensberg, a pattern seems to be repeated: 'spiritual potency' is constantly related with 'sexual potency'. Northover emphasizes the links between animality, sexuality, spirituality, and death, exposing how 'prehistoric spirituality consists within an animistic and shamanistic approaches to spirituality which concerns immanence and embodiment rather than transcendence'. Both Winters' and Northover's articles demonstrate that sexual/spiritual experiences are not only the product of cultivated civilizations, but more a natural display of forces that exists independently of the historical formations of human societies. Before the emergence of religious spirituality—which is always supported on transcendental cosmologies—the 'adored' forces to get in contact with seem to be purely immanent. No sign of gods, no theistic patterns can be traced. 'In prehistoric people: in myth narration; the art that they carved and painted; the rituals they performed and the structures they erected. All involve the common themes of death and desire', as Northover points out.

Religious Rapture: Exploring Sacred Scriptures' Views on Sexual Mysticism

Part 2, 'Religious Rapture', comprises two examples of religious sexuality and spirituality exploration, embracing the experience of eroticism and mysticism in religious-oriented modes of life. As any other research on religious spirituality, the methodological procedures are supported in the study of the corresponding sacred scriptures of each particular religious tradition researched. The third chapter in this collection, 'A Spirituality of Pleasure: The "Thousand-Year" Intercourse of Śiva and Śakti', by John R. Dupuche, studies and interpret the work of medieval theologian Abhinavagupta to explore the 'spirituality of pleasure' intrinsic to Kashmir Shaivism

and the Tantric Kula ritual. Dupuche explains the meaning of the 'freedom' arising 'from the union of opposites' that characterizes Tantra, and how Shaivism's sacred scriptures depict the ultimate state of ecstatic pleasure within a sexual-spiritual experience as 'the "thousand-year" intercourse' of Śiva and Śakti, 'united in an eternal embrace from whose vibration the whole world emanates'. In all forms of Tantra, an integration of opposite sexual forces—female and male—constitutes not only the macrocosmic source of creation of the universe, but also the microcosmic fount of life for its human practitioners. In Trika Tantra, particularly, there is a conscious intent of trying 'to reach this Divine blissful consciousness', as Dupuche says, a state 'of unification of the Goddess with the God Śiva, at the crown of the head where they enjoy unbounded erotic bliss'. An important contribution by Dupuche in this debate is the way he includes the potential use of this form of spirituality of pleasure by committed celibates, pointing out how even the non-celibate practice of sexual *mudra* and *maithuna* in Tantra also makes use of ascetic components. Dupuche mentions *coitus reservatus*, a set of techniques incorporated by advanced practitioners—not in traditional Tantric popular rituals—which allows to embody 'the union of *eros* and *thanatos*, for he is sacrificing himself out of his desire for her. It is the ultimate ascesis, and at the same time the ultimate *eros*. The fullest *eros* is in fact achieved by the complete ascesis of self-emptying'. In this way, from a religious perspective, Dupuche identifies sexual practices where the erotic and the ascetic imply each other, and recovers the use of Tantra exerted by classic celibate practitioners—focused on visualization and meditation techniques—for 21st century new ascetic practitioners.

In the fourth chapter in this collection, 'Experiencing yada': Holistic Encounters of Spiritual Bliss between Christian Believer and God', Nicol Michelle Epple assembles phenomenological analysis with scriptural-based studies to meditate on the spiritual potential of intimate sexuality. According to Epple, 'Christians can *come* to "know" God more deeply and intimately by embracing the connection between spirituality and sexuality'. After her textual-study of certain passages of Song of Songs, Epple concludes that 'sex is used—and was created by God—as a metaphor for His desired intimacy with His believers'. Additionally, she exposes 'how music used for worship can facilitate these intimate experiences' and sketches 'the structure of contemporary Christian worship music and describe the sensual auditory affectation derived from such worship experience'. Epple explains how 'the Western Church has divorced itself from sensual experience, often asking people to

ignore their own bodies and desires. Underlying all desire, though, is the ultimate desire to know God. That desire is what drives believers'. In this way, Epple emphasizes the relevance of the body in 21st century Christian interpretations: not denying it, but embracing its capacity of generating pleasure, for spiritual purposes. Dupuche's and Epple's articles not only share the scriptural-interpretation methodology, but also an intent of, in Dupuche's own words, 'integrating eros into Christian mysticism. This paper wishes to make a contribution to this work'. Following Epple and Dupuche, it can be traced a Christian interpretation that 'does not oppose eros and spirituality'. Dupuche's theological inquiries stand at the 'forefront of interreligious dialogue' today, detecting 'striking correspondences' between Christianity and Tantra. 'The Tantric teaching, as this article suggests, opens up the possibilities latent in Christianity', asserts Dupuche. While Epple states that sex is used as a 'metaphor' in Christianity, Dupuche reveals how intercourse is expressed in 'symbolic' terms in Shaivism Tantra. Yet both of them help to clarify the 'spiritual dimension of the sexual relationship', as Epple says, and the fact that in eastern and western religions 'the relationship between the Word and the Spirit is also erotic, not in a limited way, but eminently', as their scriptural foundations and mystical embodiments can prove it.

Alternative Ecstasy: Exploring the Spirituality of Non-Hegemonic Sexuality

Part 3, 'Alternative Ecstasy', embraces research focused on the complex relations with spirituality and religion established by people and communities associated with non-hegemonic forms of sexuality, like non-heterocentric and non-patriarchal ways of expressing their sexual orientation or their gender identities. Queer and feminist perspectives are included in this book, tracing subjectivity construction processes in particular cases, individual or collective, related to spiritual or religious life events. In the fifth chapter in this collection, 'Oscar Wilde's Spirituality: The Erotics of Queer Theology', Rita Dirks immerses herself into the work of Oscar Wilde to explore the roots of modern queer theory. Wilde's writings, analyzed in relation to his 'plurality, or queerness', constitute a fertile ground for Dirks' interdisciplinary inquiry on the 'sacredness of homosexuality', assembling Literature Studies and Queer Theology into a text-based study. As she explains, 'Queer Theology, in part, desires to unite the spiritual and the erotic in order to encounter and express the sacred', and in this way, Wilde was a brave pioneer. Showing how Wilde 'almost identified himself with Christ', Dirks suggests that 'perhaps Wilde points the way, as a precursor or martyr for queer theology', as at least from 1895, 'he has become the

martyr for gay rights'. As she states, 'the churches are moving from oppressing practicing homosexuals in Christ's name to believers in Christ's identification with Christ as one who suffered because he was queer'. This critical RS&G approach resonates with 21st century's new ways of interpreting sacred scriptures, 'conceiving the Judeo-Christian tradition within an essentially egalitarian continuum'. Some others go further, and reclaim the 'Christian tradition as itself queer'.

In the sixth chapter in this collection, 'The Holy Rebellious Pussy: New Feminist Demands and Religious Confrontations', Assumpta Sabuco Cantó and Ana Álvarez Borrero focus on a study case of transgressive performative protests in several cities of Spain to analyse critically how sexuality and diverse conceptions of what is sacred are expressed. Through this research Sabuco and Álvarez offer new insights about the hegemonic conceptions of sexuality maintained by religious institutions to this day. Feminist protesters, 'united against the sacredness of motherhood proposed by the government's reform', proclaimed an alternative sacralization: the sacralization of women's genitals. They took the streets of Málaga and Sevilla carrying 'a plastic vagina a couple meters high' on their shoulders, accompanied by songs rewritten in feminist style, in the 'same fashion as people carry the Christ or Virgin images in processions during Catholic holidays'. As Sabuco and Álvarez argue, 'Virgin Mary is one of the most important archetypes in Christianity: she tells what it is to be a good woman, so the resignification and renewed appropriation of this figure is to transgress what being a good woman means'. In this sense, 'the more or less artistic reinvention of the meaning of the Holy Virgin is a common strategy of many feminisms which want to break with the models imposed by a religious or moralist vision'. Placing the vulva at the centre of the performances and protest acts directly broke the hegemonic religious imagery, but not just for gratuitous transgression: is the life of women around the globe what is at stake. Sabuco and Álvarez, through a critical approach, make visible the demand of women in the 21st century for a 'model of relations between sexes based on self-determination and no longer on inferiority'. The Holy Rebellious Pussy is a strategy of counter-conduct, a sexual response to the use of sacredness as a value for perpetuating domination relationships of men over women. The fact that the Holy Rebellious Pussy Procession was replicated in several cities across South America—actually, several years before the successful Chilean participative performance 'Un Violador en tu Camino' ('A Rapist in Your Path')—shows how the globalized demand for women's

sexual empowerment keeps growing when repressive habits and millenary patriarchal-religious sexual constraints are still systematically maintained.

Taboo Challenges: Obstacles and Strategies for New Sexuality and Spirituality Re-Integrations

Part 4 'Taboo Challenges' is focused on the tensions that still permeate the intents of integrating sexuality and spirituality in everyday life, mainly in cases of religious spiritualities. The works here included are not only centered on individual processes of subjectivity, but also in collective and sociopolitical processes; one brings light into the existing gap between religious spirituality values and the freedom of people to actually engage in sexual practices, while the other one is centered on education as the strategy to overcome the obstacles that impede the development of consistent forms of integrating sexuality and spirituality. In the seventh chapter of this collection, 'The (In)compatibility between Spirituality and Sexuality: Contemporary Chinese Case Studies', Huai Bao uses in-depth interviews to investigate 'the interrelatedness between spirituality and sexuality in the lived experiences of contemporary China', where 'modern spirituality is informed by a blend of Buddhism and other religions', and confirms how 'regulation of sexuality by religious institutions and dogma is largely impacting the subjects' perception of spiritual purity and accomplishments'. As Bao finds out, 'all the interviewees have expressed a common concern about the contradiction between spiritual empowerment and sexual urges and attractions', with direct consequences on their 'emotional stability and peace of mind', generating 'a lasting sense of guilt about their sexuality'. Bao also observes how 'the discourses over (in)compatibility between sexuality and spirituality appear to be informed more by stereotypes instilled by media and beliefs reinforced by those who hold more discursive power, rather than by first-hand data and real-life interactions'. And the situation is even more complex when LGBTQI communities' demands enter into the debate. As Bao confirms, 'of course, members of gender and sexual minorities face even more sex-negative opinions and impressions', when their decisions and choices are interpreted as threats to the power structures of the religious institutions. In this way, Bao's article helps to trace the power relationships diagrams embedded in the circumstances lived by Chinese people up to this day, and makes visible the gigantic gap between traditional religion's moral and current, globalized emotional demands.

In the eighth chapter in this collection, 'Sex Education and Tantra', Pavel Hlavinka analyses how the contemporary reconfiguration of ancient spiritual traditions can be used as a direct source of empowerment for people today. His work is an exploration of the possibilities of Trika Tantra and Kashmir Shaivism's spirituality of pleasure as a source of inspiration for innovative adult sex education programs. As Hlavinka reveals, 'institutions at present merely cover sex education in terms of the physiology of conception and the health risks involved'; Hlavinka adds that 'precious few young people receive guidance on having a satisfactory relationship at an erotic level or on the perception of sexuality from a spiritual perspective'. Hlavinka points out the two main factors that make of Tantra an authentic alternative to the western educational system: its '*ars erotica*' and 'self-knowledge'. 'The reduction of human sexual and emotional complexity to the instrumental, rational domain of a *scientia sexualis*', as Hlavinka states, 'differs substantially from Tantra, which is not about determining or studying behaviours, it is about developing abilities and skills, and about learning how to manage situations'. An *ars erotica* is based on the continuous practice, and the Tantic *ars erotica* consists in 'perfecting the skills of achieving union with the Divine through the sexual union' with a couple. This fundamental spiritual goal, an ultimate purpose traced in all sexuality and spirituality research, is mixed by Hlavinka in his program with the classic value of 'self-knowledge', helping to maintain a connection with the self-oriented demands of global capitalism, which constitute the mainstream concern of today's cultures, as Bao's research also can proves. The contemporary perspective of spirituality as a 'vehicle' for individual development is, in Dirks words, about 'the connection between spirituality and sexuality, the interconnection of both in one healthy identity, being authentic, honest with who we are for our ultimate individual development'. Indeed, individual development constitutes the driving force of most types of globalized spiritualities, as Heelas has demonstrated before, from the 'self-religion' of spiritual seekers to the selflessness in the 'spiritualities of life' of many communities all around the globe. In this sense, Hlavinka decides to play—as his pedagogic strategy—with the popular demand for 'personal growing' of New Age re-adaptations of Tantra. 'The tradition and the training of the arts of love are one of the most practical ways of gaining self-knowledge, while exploring our own sexuality', he says. And makes emphasis, as all other sexuality and spirituality authors, in the fact that 'everything starts with the body', proposing educating 'inputs and orientation for our body, since the very start, before anyone can be start

thinking in spiritual efforts, specially our younger people'. Its adaptability is more flexible than any other source of sex cultivation. Hlavinka argues that 'Tantric views regarding sexual and love relationships can be useful to persons and communities all over the world, even remaining faithful to other religions'. From his view, Tantric sex education becomes 'an alternative to the values of competitive struggle intrinsic to the marketplaces of the contemporary world, enhancing love, union and solidarity instead of greed and competition', but also, a real alternative to 'pharmacological manipulation of human sexual behaviour'.

Limit-Experience Embodiments: Erotico-Mystical Arts and Non-Normative Sexual Practices

Part 5, 'Limit-Experience Embodiments', joins interdisciplinary research on sexual practices that potentially generate spirituality experiences, and research on mystical embodiments generated through sexual practices. The ninth chapter in this collection, 'The Abandoned Self: Excess and Inner Experience in Sadomasochism', written by Catherine Papadopoullos, focuses on the limit-experience of sadomasochism (SM), approaching sm as an *ars erotica*, to explore the self-transformative 'possibilities of pleasure' and the spirituality of 'transgressive sex'. Assembling philosophy, avant-garde literature, and psychoanalysis within a phenomenological model and a critical-analytical approach, Papadopoullos researches on the mystical experience generated through consensual SM, exposing how its practice allows the individual to enter into 'an entirely different order of experience'. SM is the perfect example to appreciate the complex interaction between the opposite processes located at the extreme poles of the sexuality and spirituality spectrum: self-construction and selflessness. While Papadopoullos points out how SM is used by practitioners 'to make themselves into the persons they want to be', and subsequently 'establish the condition of a culture self-construction, where agents become the artisans of their own destiny'—exposing the problematizations of RS&G explorations—, she also illustrates how SM is part of the 'methods for provoking the loss of self' and 'annihilation of one's consciousness': 'the boundaries of the subject become challenged and subverted. Deconstruction of self-making and de-subjugation happen simultaneously through the embodiment of a radical limit-experience'. The sexuality and spirituality ultimate goal can be effectively embodied practicing SM, the embodiment of selflessness, the opposite goal to subjectivity realization. Pleasure is 'a place where identity can be temporarily displaced', Papadopoullos says; 'identity becomes "other" than itself',

and in this way, life becomes more fulfilling, because 'intense pleasure is de-subjectifying, is impersonal. It can disassociate and tear the individual from identity in such a way that they are no longer a subject as they were before'. If sexuality functions as 'the *dispositif* that binds pleasure to identity', she says, 'turning humans into subjects' in capitalist societies, SM is used as a gate for selflessness. This 'will to depersonalise oneself' executed through sadomasochism, like Papadopoullos asserts, makes possible to embody the instant 'at which eroticism passes without hindrance into the sacred', and implies 'the necessary separation or detachment of the person' to function as a spiritual experience by itself. Therefore, the sexuality and spirituality research on selflessness embodiments helps to uncover 'the revolutionary implications of sexuality and human desire'.

In the tenth—and final—chapter in this collection, 'Embodying "The Little Death" of Orgasm: An Interdisciplinary Research on Sexual Trance', Phil Shining embraces the academic exploration of the sexual trance experience and the erotico-mystical embodiment. Assembling 'heterogeneous forms of knowledge', like avant-garde poetry, post-structuralist philosophy, techniques of the four ancient eastern arts of existence—Tantra, Taoism, Yoga, Buddhism—, and neurophysiological models of scientific explanation, Shining presents an interdisciplinary research on orgasm and sexual bliss, looking forward transdisciplinary contents intended to be used directly in sexual practice. Shining focuses his research on the physical and biological ground supporting the expression *la petite mort*, a millenary French language game that had become popular today, because of the way it characterizes 'some unusual effects of sexual climax'. He traces the commonalities between all the heterogeneous forms of knowledge related to orgasm and sexual trance, finding that all sources problematize 'the interrelations between sexual ecstasy and the experience of dissolution, or death of the self'. In all cases, orgasm is regarded as an experience which 'enables a loose of the sense of the self through the embodiment of a—more or less—intense state of trance', and an 'absorptive state of consciousness': an active and perceptive state of consciousness without any type of mind production. In this way, Shining concludes that 'the expression *la petite mort* functions as a highly accurate description of the embodiment determining the neurophysiological core of sexual trance', but also, of 'trance experiences in general, and mystical experiences in general'. He proposes making emphasis on sexuality and spirituality empirical research, pointing out the urgency of bridging science and practical arts of living, to generate sexual and spiritual knowledge. And also opens

new debates on the spiritual potential of ancient arts of love techniques, like the *coitus reservatus*, which Dupuche and Hlavinka also highlight. Orgasm is a little death when man ejaculates, losing his vitality and vigor, but orgasm can be the direct experience of emptiness and ultimate reality without the loss of life, without the 'expenditure' that Bataille describes, *if coitus reservatus* is practiced.

The chapters of Papadopoullos and Shining share crucial sexuality and spirituality problematizations, especially those related with Bataille's and Foucault's avant-garde conceptualization on mystical experiences attained through challenging physical practices, recognized by them as 'limit-experiences', and characterized as the dissolution of the frontiers between subject and object. Through the work of Bataille and Foucault the articles of Papadopoullos and Shining offer tools for exploring profane forms of mysticism and secular selflessness, outside the reach of religious perspectives—*divine*, indeed, but not exactly *sacred*, as comprehended by religious morality. In secularized urban societies, the 'death of God'—in Nietzsche's tradition—has created an absence that, eventually, gets fulfilled through other type of sublime experiences, and eroticism is one of them. Eroticism is sexual and spiritual at the same time, that is what defines it. The ecstatic sexual experience can be used as an opportunity to live the 'death of the self', and experience the plenitude of life without an ego, when all self-narratives dissolves and auto-referentiality ceases in remaining brain activity—producing an altered state of consciousness in resonance with 'absolute emptiness'. For Foucault, the spiritual efforts consist in 'to render oneself permanently capable of getting free of oneself'. In this direction, Papadopoullos and Shining explore spirituality as 'self-transformation', in the way Foucault understands it, not only as an affective but also as an ethical life-reconfiguration, where spirituality is conceived and lived, in Papadopoullos' words, as 'a matter of doing, of praxis'.

Moreover, the interrelations and commonalities detected between the chapters focusing on sacred, religious rapture, and the chapters dealing with profane, spiritual ecstasy, are solid enough to delineate the basis of the sexuality and spirituality field of research—while demonstrating also how socially constructed is the binary system differentiating the 'sacred' and the 'profane', although not because of being constructed the differences are less real. Epple's chapter interconnects with Shining's research on orgasm as the immanent embodiment of a mystical experience, describing how in 'orgasm there is a physical, emotional, mental, and

spiritual transposition of oneself into a place of oneness with the partner'. Epple's, Dupuche's, Papadopoullos', and Shining's works coincide in bringing light on the experience of 'orgasm as a glimpse of divinity', and embracing scholarly investigation focused on 'the mysticism intrinsic to ecstasy—even maintaining their differences, the formers conceiving ecstatic bliss as the union with a transcendent Divinity, and the latter as melting within an immanent absolute reality. Although the ecstatic mystical experience is habitually understood in terms of 'self-transcendence' in times of New Age spiritualities, Winters, Papadopoullos, Northover, and Shining demonstrate that an immanent sense of the divine is always possible. While religious Buddhist teachers give him theistic interpretations about what he sees, Winters presents divinity directly, on Earth's landforms, without needs of any additional transcendental explanation. Papadopoullos and Shining exhibit the inherent divinity to sexual ecstasy without recurring to religious explanations, only to the biological and cosmological physicality of human bodies and its surrounding environments, and in this way, interconnect with Northover and his reconstruction of prehistoric, pre-religious spirituality, with shamans' and trance dancers' 'forays into the spirit world, during altered states of consciousness'. 'Perhaps the potency of the spirit world can be seen as a more general animating— or animal, or animistic—force', hypothesizes Northover, an immanent network of 'forces suffusing the entire universe, involving everything in an endless cycle of life and death'. And that is why Northover also sees, as Bataille saw first, 'the idea of sexual climax as "the little death"—*la petite mort*—' being a central component of prehistoric art expressions. The limit-experience and its intrinsic relation to ecstasy has always been at the center of sexuality and spirituality problematizations; as Northover says, 'Transgression, eroticism, excess and art involve the attempt to bridge this divide between continuous and discontinuous being, between life and death'.

However, as Hlavinka points out, 'sexual pleasure is now seen by many as a path of spirituality', perhaps too easily. It has been mainstreamed in the New Age market, incentivizing speculation regarding knowledge on sexuality for the sake of business, as promoting self-proclaimed forms of spirituality reduced to simple well-being, and self-indulgency. The intent of the authors of this volume, EXPLORING SEXUALITY AND SPIRITUALITY, is to contribute with their research to the development of the sexuality and spirituality and RS&G fields of studies, and support its embracement in academic spaces, in contact with everyday people's necessities. In times when

spirituality becomes everything and nothing, the sexuality and spirituality field of studies and research enhances the debate on the ethical dimension of spirituality, bringing back the attention to the ecstasy embodiment and the experience of bliss, not only as a 'natural high', but also as a self-transforming event, potentially reaching a non-individualistic ethical core, privileging the mother of all self-transformations: what Papadopoullos refers to as 'loss of self', and Shining as 'losing the ego' or 'ego-dissolution' experiences, what Northover mentions as the 'physical and spiritual rebirth' of communities even before the first civilizations. As Epple reminds, the etymological roots of 'the word *ékstasis* in ancient Greek means "to stand outside oneself", feeling outside, elsewhere': ecstasy as an opportunity to dive into the 'satisfying yet longing-producing desire reached through a giving up of oneself'. That is selflessness. It is 'bliss without distinction between the experience and the experiencer', as Dupuche affirms. 'The sense of ego disappears ... It is an emptying of oneself, a forgetfulness of oneself. It is a losing of oneself in the other'. Is the moment when pure, absolute sensation takes over the body and incarnates the sublime, as Winters beautifully pictures it, 'in one's skin as the border between self and landscape': right here, right now, in the frontier between inner experience and the infinite. <>

[Subatomic Writing: Six Fundamental Lessons to Make Language Matter](#) by Jamie Zvirzdin [Johns Hopkins University Press, 9781421446127]

See science writing fundamentals afresh through a subatomic lens!
In *[Subatomic Writing](#)*, Johns Hopkins University instructor Jamie Zvirzdin goes bravely into uncharted territory by offering a totally new kind of guide for writing about science—from the subatomic level up! *[Subatomic Writing](#)* teaches readers that the building blocks of language are like particles in physics. These particles, combined and arranged, form something greater than their parts: all matter in the literary universe. The six levels of language covered in this guide create writing that illuminates and energizes the reader to feel, learn, change, and act. This interdisciplinary approach helps scientists, science writers, and editors improve their writing in fundamental areas as they build from the sounds in a word to the pacing of a paragraph. These areas include

• Sound and sense
• Word classes
• Grammar and syntax
• Punctuation
• Rhythm and emphasis
• Pacing and coherence

Equally helpful for students who need to learn how to write clearly about science and scientists who need to hone their writing skills to create more effective course material, papers, and grant applications, this guide builds confidence in writing abilities as old skills are taught in new, exciting ways. Each lesson provides exercises that build on each other, strengthening readers' capacity to communicate ideas and data, all while learning basic particle physics along the way.

Review

Jamie Zvirzdin has written a quirky, quarky, marvelously helpful, relentlessly readable guide to effective science communication. Like particle physics, grammar and good writing are, at their core, a system of rules and relationships. Master these and the universe is yours!
—Mary Roach, author of *Fuzz* and *Stiff*

Metaphor is both the food of science and the spice of language. Jamie Zvirzdin links principles of physics with those of grammar and linguistics, adds a pinch of poetics, and serves up a tasty guide to scientific thinking and writing.
—Christopher Joyce, Correspondent, Science Desk, NPR

By equating the fundamental particles of the Standard Model to elements of writing, Zvirzdin has created an engaging book that teaches the mechanics of science writing. Her novel approach, interspersed with fiction, nonfiction, and poetry, is both valuable and refreshing. It is a book all scientists should have on hand.
—Steven C. Martin, senior programmer at NASA / Goddard Space Flight Center

Subatomic Writing—Jamie Zvirzdin's innovative guide to telling stories of science—uses particle physics, demons, science history, family life, and a terrific sense of humor to make its points. The result is smart, effective, and a whole lot of fun.
—Deborah Blum, Pulitzer Prize–winning science writer, director of the Knight Science Journalism Program at MIT, and founder of *Undark Magazine*

Inspired! *Subatomic Writing* provides an insightful and helpful new doorway into the foundations of language and writing, all wrapped up in some imaginative fun.
—Mignon Fogarty, author of the *New York Times* bestseller *Grammar Girl's Quick and Dirty Tips for Better Writing*

This is a fantastic writing resource for people like me, people whose first language isn't English. As a guide, the book develops your writing skills, but it also tells a story, which helps you walk through the harder parts of English step by step. Easy to read, informative, and entertaining!
—Jihee Kim, Argonne National Laboratory

Jamie Zvirzdin's brilliant, engaging writing guide, *Subatomic Writing,* is ostensibly here to help those who write about science, but her clear explanations, practical lessons, and gift for metaphor will help anyone struggling to assemble words into coherent strands. Who knew that the building blocks of language shared so much with particle physics? A wonderfully unique guide to vibrant writing.
—Dinty W. Moore, author of *The Mindful Writer* and founder of *Brevity Magazine*

Forget your preconceptions of what a book about grammar and writing is like. This is a wild ride, entertaining, enlightening, practical, and hands-on. Plus you'll learn some particle physics to boot! Zvirzdin's enthusiasm for clarity, conciseness, and vibrancy in science writing is contagious.
—Pierre Sokolsky, Dean Emeritus of the University of Utah College of Science, Distinguished Professor of Physics and Astronomy, and author of *Introduction to Ultrahigh Energy Cosmic Ray Physics*

Writing, as you may have heard, is not rocket science. In fact, it's particle physics, as Jamie Zvirzdin demonstrates in *Subatomic Writing*, her insightful new guide for the nerdy-minded scribe.
—Dava Sobel, author of *Longitude*, *Galileo's Daughter,* and, most recently, *The Glass Universe*

The type of book you can read from cover-to-cover to get an idea of everything you need to know about writing without being bored...I found new nuggets of insight that could help me write better.
—*Fancy Comma*

Contents

UNHALLOWED ORIGINS

> *Play is a strategy for learning at any age.* — Mara Krechevsky, Harvard University, Project Zero

THE NIGHT THE dEMON came to me, it was my turn to put my eleven year old, Maxwell, to bed. Like his nineteenth century namesake, the physicist James Clerk Maxwell, Max is passionate about science, works extra hard in social circles, and loves playing with language. Where science and language arts overlap is a comfortable place for us, and it's roomier than people think.

Max and I were sitting on his bed that chill October night, reading Gary Larson's The Complete Far Side, Volume 3—yes, Volume 3—when Max turned to me.

"Why do scientists in cartoons always act like morons?" he asked.

I closed the book, stood, and pulled his Star Wars blanket over him. Our black brown tabby cat, Tom, jumped onto the bed and curled up on Luke Skywalker's face.

"To be fair," I said, petting the cat, "every one in cartoons, including cows and chickens, does dumb stuff. It's easy to poke fun at scientists because they're brilliant and busy, but I think people are genuinely frustrated when scientists can't—or won't— communicate information so people understand the science. Some scientists never learned how— in fact, many of my friends say they never realized they'd be writing so much in their science careers. They often say they wish they'd taken the time to learn how to write better." I scratched Tom under his chin, and the purring grew louder. "James Clerk Maxwell was brilliant in physics, but he was even more brilliant because he knew how to write about physics in a way that was accessible to others. He wasn't afraid to use analogies and play around with a little fiction to explore ideas . . . like his thought experiment with a little demon, for example."

"Maxwell's demon."

"Yes. A demon that could reverse chaos. In a letter to his friend Peter Tait, Maxwell imagined that this 'finite being' could separate hot from cold particles inside a divided box. Sorting the particles lessened the chaos in the system, but it also seemed to undermine some universal laws. Then another scientist, William Thomson— Lord Kelvin— loved the idea and called it Maxwell's 'sorting demon.' The name stuck, spread, and helped people visualize and mentally sort all those invisible particles." I bent down and kissed Max on the forehead. "You know, Gary Larson actually loves science. He wanted to study bugs as an entomologist. But his cartoons show that the curse of knowledge is a prob lem for both scientists and society because we don't talk to each other in a way the other can understand. If we did, I suspect we'd have fewer pseudoscience scams, more brilliant breakthroughs— and more public support for science."

Max wriggled deeper under the blanket and pulled Tom close to his chest. "You should write a book for your students," he said. He brightened. "It could be a thought experiment— how we can reverse chaos in the world through better science writing."

"Hmm, maybe." I hedged, thinking of my epic todo list. "Anyway, g'night. Love you."

"Love you too."

I walked into the next room and turned on my computer to work on some programs for the Telescope Array Proj ect, an international physics collaboration in Utah. Even though I earned a master's degree in writing and lit er a ture, my first love is physics, so by day, I teach science writing to gradu ate students at Johns Hopkins University; by night, I work on analy sis programs or remotely run cosmic ray tele scopes. We use these sensitive detectors in the Utah desert to track ultrahigh energy cosmic rays, understand them, and figure out where they come from.

While Earth's atmosphere and magnetic field shield our planet from the worst of cosmic bombardment, these "rays" are actually highspeed subatomic particles, often protons, that zip through the universe and collide with our atmosphere, our Earth, and our DNA, causing small mutations within us. Outside Earth's protective magnetic field, cosmic rays can cause radiation prob lems for astronauts. We can't boldly go where no Shatner has gone until we figure out how to handle cosmic ray shrapnel.

While some physicists detect cosmic rays on satellites and other spacecraft, the Telescope Array Proj ect—and its Southern Hemi sphere sibling, the Pierre Auger Observatory— tracks cosmic rays from the ground. When a cosmic ray hits our atmosphere, the tiny blast creates a shower of other subatomic particles, including particles of light. The light—called photons, packets of energy— scatters out and hits our detectors, which we run on clear, moonless nights. With geometry and some data crunching, we see how those photons point back to where the cosmic ray entered and how much energy the original cosmic ray particle had. Where in the sky ultrahigh energy cosmic rays come from, how massive they are, and what causes them still needs to be proven with statistical accuracy. I am fortunate to work with marvelously talented people at the University of Utah, colleagues who not only take time to answer my questions but also make the learning pro cess enjoyable.

Although tracking subatomic particles is one of the greatest pursuits and pleasures of my life, sharing what I know through writing is another. Human communication, like particle physics, is complex, chaotic, confusing. I'm grateful my parents and En glish teachers read to me, listened to me read out loud, and helped me make sense of the hot mess that is the En glish language. Individual words shift sound, form, and meaning almost at random, jostle against other words, and combine or break down into new entities. Either by themselves or together in phrases, clauses, sentences,

and paragraphs, words can be slowed or accelerated, losing or gaining momentum rhythmically or erratically.

Other words zip past our comprehension entirely, or at low energies, they rain down on our heads, impacting the surface only and never reaching our brains. A few words, however, burrow deep into us, causing critical changes to our way of thinking, our way of being. If too many words smash into us at energies too high for us to handle, we simply shut down, as some of our Telescope Array detectors do when a plane flies by on a dusty, smoky night. The words are overbright: too much information, too much noise, not enough substance. Frustrated by unexplained jargon flung at them from atop university towers, many people have likewise shut down, turning to less reliable— and more soundbitable—sources for information.

That cold October night, while I stared at the twisted syntax of my Python program, it hit me: particles of language are like particles of matter. Maybe if we visualized language, especially writing, as specific sets of particles colliding and interacting with each other, we could be better science communicators and break the curse of knowledge— reverse communication chaos in a world prone to pseudoscience and error. At the very least, we could or ga nize the chaos so readers are better able to detect and reconstruct our words with more accuracy, ease, and interest.

My mind drifted further from my program to Ada Lovelace, mathematician and daughter of the poet Lord Byron. While Charles Babbage first worked on the Analytical Engine— the humble beginnings of the mighty computer—it was Lovelace who recognized its potential. And, more importantly, she wrote about the Engine's abstract algorithm clearly and accessibly in her 1843 work, Sketch of the Analytical Engine, which Babbage never did. Similarly, James Clerk Maxwell pored over Henry Cavendish's chemical, electrical, and geological research and then wrote about it, distilling the brilliance of shy Cavendish and adding his own original notes. Taking time to repack age information from others in writing has itself led to innovation and insight.

My science writing students at Johns Hopkins are marvelously diverse. Some are En glish majors fresh out of undergrad who love science and want to include it in their fiction, nonfiction, or poetry. Some are science journalists and write articles for news outlets, magazines, or educational companies. Still others work as medical professionals and scientists— across all disciplines— and want to write grants, lab reports, white papers, articles for research journals, and nonfiction books, including memoirs. The desire to communicate is there, as is the desire to understand the universe we inhabit.

My students' knowledge of English grammar and usage is as diverse as their science backgrounds, anywhere from "I never learned this" to "I forgot everything" to "I'm already an editor." Since no writing instructor can share all they know in one

semester or one book, I encourage my students to proactively fill in bits of missing knowledge by using Google, Wikipedia, Merriam-Webster Online, Khan Academy's free grammar course, or if they're really serious about improving their publication odds, by reading The Chicago Manual of Style directly, as I did in college and as my students often choose to do during the semester. There will always be some tiny issue to double check in the style guide of your choice (or your editor's choice), but most problems I've seen over the years as a science editor point back to a few missing fundamental lessons regarding the nature of language.

Particles of language are like particles of matter. Such a fragmentary approach to writing, using a meta phor from subatomic physics, would be a risky, interdisciplinary thought experiment, like Maxwell's sorting demon: speculative rather than definitive. I thought of Michael Faraday's fear, in 1852, as he wrote about a new metaphor for magnetism— "lines of force"—in Experimental Researches in Electricity:

> I am now about to leave the strict line of reasoning for a time, and enter upon a few speculations respecting the physical character of the lines of force. . . . It is not to be supposed for a moment that speculations of this kind are useless, or necessarily hurtful, in natural philosophy. They should ever be held as doubtful, and liable to error and to change; but they are wonderful aids in the hands of the experimentalist and mathematician. For not only are they useful in rending the vague idea more clear for the time, giving it something like a definite shape, that it may be submitted to experiment and calculation; but they lead on, by deduction and correction, to the discovery of new phenomena, and so cause an increase and advance of real physical truth, which, unlike the hypothesis that led to it, becomes fundamental knowledge not subject to change.

Maybe physics itself could give abstract writing principles a more concrete shape. As I stared out the dark win dow and listened to the wind howl in the nearby woods, I thought, We need to play with language again, bring back the spirit of speculation. Maybe I could write a book after all. I saved the program, shut down the computer, and went to bed.

As my husband slept like the loggiest of logs on the other side of the bed— both Andrew and Max are sound sleepers, a trait I envy— I had fi nally drifted into dreams when something heavy sat on my chest. I couldn't move, couldn't breathe. I struggled to open my eyes. A shadow loomed over me, and the blue light from the bedside phone charger dimly illuminated the shadow's wicked features. An electric shock of terror charged through me, and then I remembered: Sleep paralysis! Night hag! Not again. Schedule another sleep test tomorrow. Night hags are the worst!

"Who you callin' hag, b——?" the shadow hissed.

I jerked in surprise and found I could move again. My fight response kicked in, and I kicked that hag right off the bed. What ever it was fell with a satisfying thud onto the carpet. I heard an "oof," then a groan. The shadow picked itself up. "I'm

not a f——ing succubus, woman. I'm a demon. Your demon, in fact,

and you just summoned me."

"What?" I whispered. "I did not."

"C'mon, 'Bring back the spirit of speculation'? Methinks thou didst,

dumbass. Shall we go downstairs to talk?"

Great, I thought. Maxwell's mother's demon.

***

As odd as the encounter had been, I slept remarkably well the rest of the night, the best sleep I'd had in years. I opened my eyes Monday morning more cheerful than Winnie the Pooh in an ocean of honey. I shook off lingering whisps of the previous night with ease: the human brain is so easily duped by our own faulty senses. They say seeing is believing— maybe hearing, too, in the case of Socrates— but it shouldn't be. All the same, the dream had been refreshing, demon notwithstanding. In fact, it had almost convinced me to write a book.

"Have you seen Tom?" Max asked at the breakfast table. Andrew had already left for work. "Also, did you do a chemistry experiment last night?"

My honey bright smile slid off my face and dripped onto the linoleum. I ran into the library. Glass shards and cat brush on the floor. Starburst burn on chair and rug. I spotted my pencil and notebook on the coffee table. Among the graphite scribbles were three tables and a doodle of a three eyed demon.

I knew then I was destined to spend the next seven days crafting the strangest writing guide ever. I stomped back to the kitchen for a broom.

THE PARTICLE CHALLENGE

So here it goes, for poor Tom's sake, a fragmentary adventure with the particle nature of language. Since we might as well make the best of this nonsense, I invite readers to experiment with Subatomic Writing using the exercises at the end of each lesson. After you've finished the book, challenge yourself to use all six lessons to write one short, vibrant 700 word article, essay, or story teaching something about science (something accurate, please, based on reliable sources). I ask my students to use exactly 700 words, to practice concision and syntax flexibility. Then publish your writing or perform it somewhere! Feel free to join the conversation on Twitter with the tags #SubatomicWriting and @jamiezvirzdin. If, under demonic duress, you had

to match up the particles of the physical and literary universes, how would you do it?
<>

THE EXISTENTIAL HUSSERL: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS edited by Marco Cavallaro & George Heffernan [Contributions to Phenomenology, Springer, ISBN 9783031050947]

- This is the first book to cover Husserl's phenomenology of existence
- Collects the contributions of a team of internationally recognized scholars collaborating on a neglected but essential aspect of Husserl's phenomenology
- Remedies the widespread but misleading impression that transcendental phenomenology does not and cannot deal with existential questions

This book examines Husserl's approach to the question concerning meaning in life and demonstrates that his philosophy includes a phenomenology of existence. Given his critique of the fashionable "philosophy of existence" of the late 1920s and early 1930s, one might think that Husserl posited an opposition between transcendental phenomenology and existential philosophy, as well as that in this respect he differed from existential phenomenologists after him. But texts composed between 1908 and 1937 and recently published in Husserliana XLII, *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie* (2014), show that *the existential Husserl* was not opposed but open to the phenomenological investigation of several basic topics of a philosophy of existence. A collection of contributions from a team of internationally recognized scholars drawing on these and other sources, the present volume offers insights into the relationship between phenomenology and philosophy of existence. It does so by (1) delineating the basic outlines of Husserl's phenomenology of existence, (2) reinterpreting the tension between Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Jaspers's and Heidegger's philosophy of existence as well as Kierkegaard's and Sartre's existentialism, and (3) investigating the existential aspects of Husserl's phenomenological ethics. Thus focusing on neglected aspects of Husserl's thought, the volume shows that there is a consensus between classical phenomenology and existential phenomenology on the urgency of addressing the existential questions that in *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936) Husserl calls "the questions concerning the meaning or meaninglessness of this entire human existence". *The Existential Husserl* represents a major contribution to the clarification of the historical and philosophical developments from transcendental phenomenology to existential phenomenology. The book should appeal to a wide audience of many readers at all levels looking for phenomenological answers to existential questions.

Contents

This volume is the direct result of a contingent encounter with existential consequences. In July 2017, we, the editors, met at the 48th Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle in Rethymno, Crete. Heatedly debating the complex thought of a leading German philosopher in the midst of a hot Greek summer can have not only unhealthy but also salutary after-effects. Until now the association of Husserl's name with existential or existentialist philosophy has been unconventional, to say the least. Indeed, how is "der Meister der Wesensschau," as Dietrich Mahnke once dubbed him,1 to be thought of in connection with a philosophy that claims, famously or infamously, that "existence precedes essence"?

If, however, one refrains from making precipitous inferences regarding the rather palpable differences between the connotations of the words Wesen in Husserlian phenomenology and essence in French existentialism, and takes care to interpret Sartre's programmatic pronouncement only upon careful reflection, unanticipated associations may gradually emerge. Sartre namely says: "What they [les existentialistes] have in common is simply the fact that they think that existence

precedes essence [l'existence précède l'essence], or, if you will, that subjectivity must be our point of departure."2 As is well known, subjectivity figures as an equally central theme in Husserl's philosophy, and is, though not exactly the point of departure, surely the pivotal point of its chief methodological device, the transcendentalphenomenological epoché and reduction.

Despite this prima facie deep connection between Husserlian phenomenology and existentialist thinking, the current body of literature on this topic is not very extensive. It may have been for this reason as well that, inebriated by the Greek sun (not to mention the Cretan raki) and enthused by the lively discussions with the other participants at the Husserl Circle meeting, we came up with the idea of a collection of essays that would shed some light on this hitherto relatively neglected dimension of Husserlian scholarship. Thus was born The Existential Husserl: A Collection of Critical Essays.

This volume aims to initiate, or, more accurately, to revitalize, a long-delayed and long-dormant exploration of the existential and even existentialist aspects of Husserl's thought. At the latest since the publication of his research manuscripts collected in Die Lebenswelt,3 and especially of those gathered in Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie,4 an inchoate awareness of Husserl's existential philosophy and of what may perhaps even be called his "existentialism" (sit venia verbo!) has been growing in the community of Husserlian scholars. The contributions of this collection not only substantiate this fact, but also deepen the discussion and highlight important critical aspects of this promising direction in Husserlian scholarship.

In "Husserl's Phenomenology of Existence: A Very Brief Introduction," George Heffernan provides a preliminary justification for the collection by establishing beyond any reasonable doubt that there is such a philosopher as "the existential Husserl"—while bracketing, but also inviting, and even provoking, the accompanying question whether there is such a philosopher as "the existentialist Husserl."

In "Transcendental Anthropology and Existential Phenomenology of Happiness," Jagna Brudziñska proposes to overcome purely cognitive accounts of the phenomenon that do not do justice to phenomenal polarities and subjective ambiguities. She seeks to accomplish this by providing a phenomenological-anthropological description of happiness that focuses on both the intentional subject striving toward happiness and the lived experience of happiness by the subject itself. Thus she highlights the genetic-temporal, ethical-social, and existential-teleological aspects of happiness (Glückseligkeit) in Husserl's sense of bliss (Seligkeit).

In "'I Want, Therefore I Can': Husserl's Phenomenology of Heroic Willing," Marco Cavallaro investigates the concept of heroic willing in Husserl's late ethical thought and lays out the transcendental-phenomenological conditions of heroism. First he provides the basic outlines of the phenomenology of willing that Husserl works out

in the lectures and research manuscripts of his years in Göttingen (1901–1916). Then he considers the problem of the irrationality of life and world, which becomes a central issue in Husserl's reflections on ethics during his Freiburg period (1916–1938). Finally he sketches how Husserl responds to this problem by developing the concept of heroic willing. In short, Cavallaro argues that heroic willing is Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological solution to the existential problem of practical irrationality.

In "'Mag die Welt eine Hölle sein': Husserl's Existential Ethics," Nicolas de Warren explores the indigenous existential concerns of Husserl's ethical thinking after the First World War by focusing on his "Freiburg Manuscripts." These posthumously published research manuscripts contain reflections in which Husserl reframes the "imaginative destruction of the world," a centerpiece of the phenomenological method of suspension and reduction, in ethical terms. This move leads Husserl to confront existential questions: Is it possible to strive to become an ethical person if one cannot assure oneself of the ethical meaningfulness of the world? Would I still want to be an ethical person in a world that is hell? Can I even live in a meaningless world? In response to this haunting of ethical life by the scepter of its own impossibility, Husserl develops his original doctrine of absolute values, the affective basis of ethical imperatives, the significance of what we care about, and the idea of the autonomy of freedom as grounded in the self- responsibility of ethical persons and their responsiveness to their chosen values.

In "The Development of Husserl's Categorical Imperative: From Universal Ethical Legislation to Individual Existential Exhortation," George Heffernan argues that it is useful and fruitful to understand the development of Husserl's categorical imperative as a Leitfaden to the evolution of his moral philosophy, shows that his ethics presents at its different stages not one categorical imperative but several categorical imperatives, and explores the philosophical significance of his mature categorical imperative, which is distinguished not by its abstract, formal aspects, but rather by its concrete, material—and individual, existential—dimensions.

In "A Phenomenological and Logical Clarification of Individual Existence," Carlos Lobo attempts to explain how, in the context of the old conflict between abstract logical thought and existential subjective thinking, the problem of individuation emerges as a touchstone for deciding whether there is an existential turning point in Husserl's phenomenology. He does this by posing the question of how Husserl tries to surmount the classical metaphysical and logical opposition between existence and essence, as well as that between an extrinsic individuation (through space and time) and an intrinsic individuation (through complete logical determination of an individual essence), and by attempting to reformulate the old opposition between necessity and contingency in radically new terms, so that it can become possible to conceive, in a

formally coherent way, of a free individual without reverting to the intractable dilemma of freedom versus necessity.

In "Is Husserl's Later Ethics Existentialist? On the Primal Facticity of the Person and Husserl's 'Existentialist Rationalism'," Sophie Loidolt argues that Husserl's later reflections on ethics exhibit existentialist elements insofar as they acknowledge the unique existence of the concrete individual, not only as a theoretical topic, but also as "an issue" for this very individual; address the questions concerning existence and duty, for a whole life and for one in constant renewal; and recognize the individuation of the authentic person by a "call," that is, the moment of decision in a specific situation involving a choice of who one is, the impossibility of justifying oneself according to universalist standards, and the necessity of taking absolute responsibility for one's decisions. All these reflections lead Loidolt to speak of Husserl's "existentialist rationalism," which, in articulating the tensions between the rational and the irrational in the primal facticity of the person, remains obliged to the ideals of the Enlightenment.

In "Birth, Death, and Sleep: Limit Problems and the Paradox of Phenomenology," James Mensch analyzes what Husserl in The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology describes as "the paradox of human subjectivity," which involves our "being a [transcendental] subject for the world and at the same time [as human] an object in the world"; formulates the limit paradox that, as humans, we are mortal, but as transcendental subjects, we cannot assert that we are; and poses the question whether the phenomenological method, as applied to limit problems of life and death, can render intelligible the relation between a deathless transcendental subjectivity and its mortal human counterpart.

In "Husserl, Jaspers, and Heidegger on Life and Existence," Dermot Moran provides historical and philosophical insights helpful for understanding the decisive debates about the salient differences between the approaches of phenomenology, philosophy of existence, philosophy of life, and existentialism to various pivotal issues, including Husserl's universal rationalism, his late attention to the problems of existence, the primacy of subjectivity, the meaning of life and the life of consciousness, the freedom of the will and of the conscious agent, the life-world and the idea of a science of it, and intersubjectivity and the life of spirit.

In "Authentic Existence in Husserl and Heidegger," Thomas Nenon examines Heidegger's analysis of authentic existence in Being and Time (1927) and Husserl's development of the idea of genuine existence in the time leading up to Heidegger's magnum opus. He argues that, contrary to the common supposition that Heidegger has a great deal to say about the idea of authentic existence whereas Husserl does not, in his middle and later periods Husserl's work actually went in a direction that paralleled Heidegger's in certain significant respects. He cautions, however, that

there remained an important difference between these thinkers that came to separate them during the 1920s.

In "Kierkegaard and Husserl," Bernhard Obsieger presents a systematic exposition of Kierkegaard's view of the three different normative approaches to life, namely, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious; compares and contrasts this view with Husserl's apprehension of the meaning of human life; and attempts to show that Kierkegaard's account of the three fundamentally different approaches to life both poses a challenge to and offers an important alternative to Husserl's position that ethical life must be regarded as the only coherent life and as the only ultimately satisfactory life.

In "Husserl's Concept of the Absolute Ought: Implications for Ethics and Value Theory," Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl challenges the supposedly clear picture of two completely distinct theoretical approaches to a phenomenological ethics and value theory in Husserl's work, the one rationalistic and the other personalistic; clarifies the notion of an absolute ought by means of a three-level model that explains the transition from Husserl's earlier to his later views in terms of the difference between a purely object-oriented and a reflectively subject-related usage of "absolute ought"; and argues that, notwithstanding considerable reorientations between the earlier and the later elaborations, a strong continuity prevails in terms of an overarching theory of reason.

In "Revisiting Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology of the Ego: Existence and Praxis," Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner seeks to overcome the notion that Husserl's phenomenology, which is often misguidedly supposed to be primarily theoretical or monolithically eidetic, is unable to address questions concerning concrete existence, historical facticity, ethical life, and metaphysical problems, and aims to provide a novel, unitary interpretation of Husserl's philosophy by uncovering the eminently practical nature of transcendental subjectivity, which ultimately exists as an intersubjective community of active egos with essentially existential roots.

In "The Existential Situatedness of the Transcendental Subject," Rochus Sowa contrasts the human person, thematizable in the natural attitude with the general structures specific to persons, and the transcendental subject, thematizable in the phenomenological attitude as the subject that constitutes the world and itself as a human person in the world. Applying this distinction, he clarifies the concepts of world-constitution and self-constitution as a "letting-appear" of world and human subject to demonstrate the identity of the transcendental subject as transcendental person and human person and thus the situatedness of the transcendental subject in the world as well as in innumerable situations of human life. He concludes by showing that even in "deworlding" transcendental-phenomenological reflection, the transcendental subject situates itself worldly.

In "Existential Choice: Husserl Meets Heller," Andrea Staiti develops a vindication of Agnes Heller's conception of existential choice by drawing on Husserl's manuscripts and lectures on ethics. After reconstructing Heller's view and the criticism that has been leveled against it, he turns to Husserl and argues that existential choice is necessary in order to shift from a naïve to a self-reflective stage of the good life; that there is a tight link between existential choice under the category of difference and existential choice under the category of universality; and that the revocation of existential choices does not annul their impact on life. He suggests, as a result, that there is a certain irrevocability of existential choices even when life forces us to give up on them.

Taken collectively, the contributions of this volume demonstrate that Husserl's phenomenology provides rich resources not only for conducting investigations involving theoretical inquiries concerning logic, epistemology, and theory of science, but also for engaging in practical sense-reflections (Besinnungen) on existential—and perhaps even "existentialist"—questions concerning the meaning of life or a life of meaning.

At this point, we co-editors have the distinct pleasure of expressing our immense gratitude not only to our contributors but also to Panos Theodorou and Fotini Vassiliou, who graciously and generously hosted the 2017 Husserl Circle meeting at which the idea for this volume was conceived; to Burt Hopkins, the Permanent Secretary of the Husserl Circle, who also co-organized that event; to Dieter Lohmar and Jagna Brudziñska, who co-organized what amounted to a direct continuation of that meeting, namely, the conference titled "Husserl und das Denken der Existenz" at the Husserl Archives of the University of Cologne in 2018; and, last but not least, to Nicolas de Warren and Ted Toadvine, the Series Editors of Contributions to Phenomenology, for their patience and understanding in seeing this project through to its conclusion. <>

MIDDOT: ON THE EMERGENCE OF KABBALISTIC THEOSOPHIES by Moshe Idel [Ktav Publishing House ISBN: 9781602804401]

This study examines the theories about divine attributes in Philo of Alexandria, and the different models in Rabbinic literature, as the background of the emergence of the variety of theories about ten sefirot as divine attributes in medieval Kabbalah. The existence of some statements about ten divine attributes (middot) unrelated to early Kabbalah, served as a structure that was combined with the ten sefirotic discussions in Sefer Yetzirah. Moreover, the interiorization of the divine attributes in ecstatic Kabbalah, as referring to psychological processes, serves as a dissenting

development in the Kabbalistic literature, is analyzed, a development that preceded and influenced Hasidism.

CONTENTS

Conceived in the popular imagination as the innovator and bearer of an exclusive monotheism, the most widespread theologies in Judaism are, nevertheless, very complex and inclusive ones. The emergence and the fast floruit of a luxuriant theosophy in medieval Judaism in Kabbalah was regarded as an enigma, and sometimes even sharply criticized by more "rationally" — oriented thinkers. Adhering as these thinkers were to a stark exclusive type of monotheism, the inclusive nature of most of the Kabbalistic discussions were even regarded by the opponent to Kabbalah as idolatry, though this lore, in its various forms, has been gradually accepted by the greatest parts of the Halakhic elites since the 13th century.

The present study deals with processes of building growingly more complex and relatively systematic theologies conspicuous in Kabbalistic literature Those complex theologies, different as they are from each other, will be designated as theosophies. They emerged within the framework of Jewish canonical religious writings that were relatively indifferent toward systematic theology. This relative indifference is evident already in the Hebrew Bible, in the pseudepigraphic literature in antiquity and late antiquity, and in the vast Rabbinic literatures, all of them literary corpora that were more inclined to legalistic and mythical forms of thought. The transition from a non-theological religious modality in those earlier corpora to very complex theologies in the Middle Ages, was triggered by a variety of factors within Judaism and outside it.

In the cases discussed here, the process of harmonization between different and sometimes diverging approaches in the Scriptures and in Rabbinic literature was certainly an important factor, though not just a continuation or an elaboration. This is, to be sure, not an apology for Kabbalistic theosophies, neither a critique, since I do not adopt an essentialist vision of Judaism.

The following discussions are part of an historical and phenomenological analysis of some aspects of concatenations between theosophy and theurgy, which passed, for the time being, not sufficiently explored in the field, and sometimes even ignored. This concatenation affected not just the nature of those two topics but also other, more eminently, the nature of what scholars calls Kabbalistic symbolism, and the attention to the belief in efficacy of the rituals. This constitutes one of the main reasons for the reception of this type of Kabbalah in Rabbinic elites since the 13th century. The importance of theurgy and symbolic interpretation — issues that will be dealt with in more details in this study — lays in the pursuit of offering meaning to a certain way of life, namely Rabbinic Judaism, as mainly a ritualist type of religiosity.

The approach adopted here, as in many of my other studies, is a non-Romantic one; namely, an attempt to avoid the glorification of innovations, ruptures, Gnosticism, crises, antinomianism, paradoxes or historical teleologies, that inform much of the scholarship in the field. Instead, I prefer to pay attention to shifts and changes taking place in basic traditional notions, their new or different concatenations, and eventually their reception in Jewish society, in addition to highlighting external influences, and the conceptual tensions the latter triggered.

This does not mean that the categories mentioned as part of the Romantic approach are not pertinent at all. Instead they play, in my interpretation, a much more modest role in a proper understanding of the evolutions of Kabbalistic systems. If the various forms of Kabbalah emerged in conspicuously Rabbinic environments, and many of their exponents were figures that invested time in the study of traditional Jewish texts, the major effort I propose to invest is in understanding the dynamic or evolution within this type of literature, and afterwards in various intellectual contexts, important as they are. A balanced view should take in consideration both continuities and ruptures, without overemphasizing any of them on the expense of the other. This is the reason why a proper understanding of the emergence of Kabbalah in the Middle Ages should start first with an inspection of those elements inherited from earlier sources that were known, quoted and interpreted by Kabbalists.

This does not mean that in this study I shall try to explain all the complex processes that produced the various forms of theology in Kabbalah. However, I shall try to suggest affinities between different Rabinic models and some Kabbalistic theosophies. In other words, the present study does not attempt to explain the emergence of Kabbalah, since Kabbalah is an umbrella term for various schools and systems, each

one having a different history and in some cases different sources. The variety of theories about divine attributes, found in Rabbinic sources, inspired different views in medieval Jewish thought and especially in the various schools of Kabbalah.

The occurrence of several divine names in the various parts of the Hebrew Bible is a fact that triggered a variety of intellectual developments in understanding the Bible. The best known of them is the so-called theory of documents found in the Bible, a theory that opened, dramatically, a new page in the critical study of the Hebrew Bible. Though it takes in consideration a variety of factors that distinguish between the various parts of the Hebrew Bible, either conceptually or terminologically, the occurrence of different divine names constitutes nevertheless a major criterion.' In some biblical documents, some of the divine names are used together, as part of an effort to harmonize the discourse about the divinity. The gist of this scholarly approach is to identify various documents that resort to specific divine names that are less evident in other documents and thus to distinguish between them, and analyze each of them in itself.

Basically, those documents stem from different historical periods and what is even more important, from different religious groups that constituted the ancient Israelite societies.' Thus, the main vector of modern scholarship insofar as this topic is concerned, is to find out the stylistic differences, the specific conceptual views, which means that this is a theory grounded in a proclivity of separating between the authorship of some documents and that of others. This theory is gravitating around the occurrence of different divine names as one of the blueprints of different ancient authors or groups, as part of the approach of historical criticism.

However, when seen from a traditional point of view, which surmises that the Bible is a document authored ultimately by a divine power and consisting in an overarching conceptual homogeneity, the diversity of divine names reflects not different styles and some human authors, but various divine aspects and their activities. Sometime in late antiquity, most probably before the turn of the millennium, correlations between divine names and some modes of divinity activity can be discerned in some Jewish texts. Those are rather stable correlations and they convey the assumption of the existence of a more complex metaphysical structure than a simplistic exclusive monotheism, assuming a diversity of divine powers that is conveying God's diverse actions and thus the resort to those divine names. Those powers are called in Rabbinic literature by the Hebrew term middah, [in plural middot, literally measures, while in Philo of Alexandria they are described as dynameis, powers.

The earliest dated evidence is found in several of Philo's writings and despite the difference between the specific correlations of divine names and modes of actions in his books, and what is found in Rabbinic literature, the existence of such schemes testify to a prior existence of such a way of thought before the beginning of the first millennium CE. Also the obvious variety of understandings of the nature of the two

powers in both Philo, in early Christianity, and in Rabbinic literatures, that will preoccupy us in the first two chapters, militates in favor of an earlier date for the emergence of this theory of two divine powers, sometimes early in the intertestamental period. This variety precludes an essentialistic approach to this topic, in its Rabbinic sources or in their later Kabbalistic avatars.

To be sure: the Hebrew texts resort to the term middah, that relates to some form of divine reaction to the human behavior, as the Rabbinic dicta middah ke-neged middah, namely one measure against a measure,' or "in accordance to the measure you measure, you are measured." These principles became clues for understanding the relationship between different acts and their results in a long variety of authoritative commentaries of the Hebrew Bible, especially Rashi, Nahmanides and R. Bahya ben Asher. Measuring is also the case even when the topic of creation is engaged, where some form of measure involved in these acts is mentioned.' What seems to be missing in the earlier forms of Rabbinic discussions of the middot are more general questions, like the immutability of God or the transition from the one to the many. Philo, however, is concerned much more with the issue of hypostatic powers, influenced as he was by Greek philosophers, and much less with an interactive or correlative theology, as it is the case in many instances in Rabbinic thought, as we shall see in detail in chapter 2.

Provided the pair of divine powers includes a benificient and a punitive power, we may ask whether this theory is related in a way or another to the Qumranic dualistic theory of two camps, but at this stage of research it is hard to answer this question in a conclusive manner. In any case, the Rabbinic theory of two — and more rarely three or more — measures had a prominent place both in Rabbinic thought since its inception, and also in those speculative trends that emerged in the Middle Ages under the aegis of Rabbinic authority.

Nevertheless, so far only a little has been done in order to examine the richness of the Rabbinic discussions of those divine measures or attributes, and even less the nature of the complex affinities between them and the early Kabbalistic writings, emerging as they were in their vast majority in circles where Rabbinism was a decisive term of reference.

While no scholar would deny the plausible relations between early Kabbalists in late 12th century, and Rabbinism, as some of them were accomplished legalistic figures, an examination of the details of such linkages still wait for a much more detailed scrutiny. I hope that the following chapters will open the door for further and more detailed analyses in this direction. In any case, the discussions of the attributes are an evident case of terminological, and to a great extent also of conceptual continuity, between two types of Jewish literatures that are written mainly in Hebrew that constitutes a fascinating challenge for understanding the precise relationship between those distinct literatures.

This issue is especially relevant for the question of the sources and the beginnings of Kabbalah. What I would like to show is that a type of inclusive theology, found in a more modest manner in the Rabbinic and other Jewish corpora in the first millennium CE, was highly influential in shaping another sort of inclusive theology, namely, several different Kabbalistic theosophies, at the very moment when exclusive theologies of philosophical extraction made the most significant inroads in Judaism in the form of Maimonides' philosophical version of exclusive monotheism.

The existence of many Rabbinic statements about divine attributes, conceived as independent entities, which constitute an inclusive theology, should have, in my opinion, an important role in the emergence of the Kabbalistic theosophical inclusive theology, that deals with many more divine powers, resorting in many cases to the Rabbinic term middah/middot. Here we have terms rich in meanings and canonized in authoritative sources that are often quoted by Kabbalists, which can allow a much more secure insight in the processes related to the emergence of Kabbalah in the Middle Ages.

***

In other words the initial diversity of the biblical narratives, especially the recurrence of many divine names, generated attempts to "rationalize" — basically to reorganize the occurences of these names, by means of a theory of attributes — but these rationalizations elicited further distinctions, as we shall see in chapter 2, and those distinctions or models dealing basically with two attributes interacted with a system of tens — the sefirot — and impacted the various perceptions of those sefirot, contributing thereby to Kabbalistic theosophy in the earlier phases of this lore. In some cases, the existence of various views of sefirot required some forms of harmonization, which triggered more sophisticated theosophical theories, as we can see in Safedian Kabbalah. In other words, in a traditional religious world, which strives toward amalgamation of canonized values and harmonization that attenuates differences, the emergence of distinctions triggers later syntheses, which turn to be more and more complex, multiplying the numbers of the divine powers much more beyond the ten divine powers. This is a spiralic move. Here we shall be dealing with the earlier phases of this comprehensive process of distinctions, that produced smaller and smaller divine units, designated as aspects of the sefirotic worlds, later on called behinot, and they culminated in a theory of atomization of the divine into many sparks that are found, or fell, in the lower world, according to the views of R. Moshe Cordovero and R. Isaac Luria.

To a certain extent, the present study addresses some few topics of a broader field that still requires a much more detailed attention in scholarship: the emergences and development of the Kabbalistic theories of ten divine powers better known in scholarship as sefirot, but addressed here from the perspective of the term middot. This is a vast area of investigation, which is addressed here only in part, namely

insofar as the connections between those divine powers and the theories of middot are concerned. Interestingly enough, long after the canonization of the theosophical forms of Kabbalah, with their emphases on sefirot, especially since 16th century forms of Kabbalah, in 18th century Hasidism we witness a reversal of the meaning of the term middot; it now plays a much more important role than sefirot, at least as we can see especially in the traditions related to the Great Maggid of Mezeritch and his school. This oscilation between the alternating roles of the two terms, which were so important for Jewish forms of theologies, is a phenomenon that requires a more detailed analysis.

Another issue that deserves special attention, but will remain beyond the present study, is the parallelism between this atomization of the divinity and that of the soul, especially evident in the Kabbalah in the second part of the 16th century. Neither are the following pages a summary of my previous studies on topics related to early Kabbalah, like the topic of prayer and theurgy, of the ten sefirot above ten sefirot, for example. Nor do I see the topic of this book as a purely historical discussion of the emergence of Kabbalah in the Middle Ages or its antiquity. Since my view as to the existence of different schools that together resorted to the umbrella term Kabbalah, each of them should be understood as having its own distinct history, though later on in their development they intersected.

My topic here is a picture of certain specific topics, theosophy and theurgy, their sources and their concatenations. However, in order to highlight this concatenation, I shall deal also with Kabbalistic schools that did not adopt it, like the writings from circle of the Book of 'Iyyun — chapter 8 — or the ecstatic Kabbalah of Abraham Abulafia, in chapter 9. Likewise, the first chapter deals with Philo of Alexandria's theory of divine attributes, divorced as it is from theurgical overtones, because of the profound philosophical impact of Greek thought. The different treatments of the two attributes will serve also as a prism for emphasizing the often deep differences between those Kabbalistic schools, a fact not sufficiently put in relief in modern scholarship of Kabbalah, which is still containing some significant impulses toward harmonization and what I call theologization.

In my opinion, fusing discussions from different schools, because of a deep belief held by a scholar that they must coinncide, or at least correspond, brings about much confusion, even more so because of the conceptual fluidity of Kabbalistic thought, which means that even the same Kabbalist may embrace more than one theology in his books or even in one of them, a phenomenon that can be designated as chronical theological instability. <>

PRIMEVAL EVIL IN KABBALAH: TOTALITY, PERFECTION, PERFECTIBILITY by Moshe Idel [Ktav Publishing House, ISBN: 9781602804036]

Primeval Evil analyzes the various versions of a theory maintaining the Kabbalistic visions as to the precedence of evil before good, within the divine realm and in the lower dimensions of reality. It proposes a source for some of the theories of evil in medieval Kabbalah, in the Zurvanic version of Zoroastrism and their reverberations, which is different from the scholarly assumptions as to the influence of Gnosticism on Kabbalah. A series of pre-Kabbalistic, Kabbalistic and Hasidic texts have been addressed, in print and in manuscripts, in order to substantiate the understanding of these theories are related to visions of the divine as all-encompassing, and perfect or perfectible. <>

»FAITH IN THE WORLD«: POST-SECULAR READINGS OF HANNAH ARENDT edited by Rafael Zawisza, Ludger Hagedorn [Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Institute for Human Sciences, Campus Verlag, 9783593514888]

This volume offers a manifold approach to a less evident and until now much neglected undercurrent in the work of Hannah Arendt, namely her ambiguous relation to the Judeo-Christian religious heritage. Arendt's dissertation was dedicated to the concept of love in the work of Augustine, where she set her tone and developed her frame for approaching theological matters. Her understanding of secularity might provide a model for the reconciliation of secularization and the persistence of religious belief in the contemporary world. Though Hannah Arendt was certainly and outspokenly a secular thinker, her work also harbors ways of understanding secularization as the possibility of a new, maybe even messianic, attitude towards finite life and earthly reality. She famously depicts this attitude as »faith in and hope for the world«.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments
Editorial Note
Faith in the World or: The Philosophical Contraband of a Hidden Spiritual Tradition
An Introduction by Rafael Zawisza and Ludger Hagedorn
Part I: Two Faces of Earthly Love
Traces and Transitions to Hannah Arendt's Unwritten Book on Love by Sigrid Weigel

Faith in the World or: The Philosophical Contraband of a Hidden Spiritual Tradition: An Introduction by Rafael Zawisza and Ludger Hagedorn

On the 7th day of Tevet, 5687, Gershom Scholem wrote, from Jerusalem, a letter addressed to Franz Rosenzweig, who at that time was already unable to speak. It was at the invitation of Martin Buber and Ernst Simon that Scholem composed this text, one among forty prepared by Rosenzweig's friends. In Germany, it was the 26^h of December, 1926, just one day after Christmas. Characteristically, Scholem wrote this letter about the »renaissance« of the Hebrew language... in German. It is a unique document that captures an extraordinary moment, when new inhabitants of Palestine—themselves speaking all the languages of the world, including Yiddish, Polish, Russian and German—prepared the first generation of young people who, not having any other common tongue, would speak only Hebrew, this reborn language in which they would have to live and love, laugh and swear. Scholem is aware of the cruelty inscribed in the fate of those newcomers: »a generation of transition,« doomed to »live within that language above an abyss.« He repeatedly writes to Rosenzweig about »our children,« although he never had any of his own—it is clearly the kind of voice that comes from a father of a nation, a patriarch who awaits his progeny with a gaze full of passion, hope and, above all, fear. Scholem noticed that the Hebrew spoken in the streets was often a »ghostly language« (gespenstische

Sprache) that created an »expressionless linguistic space« (ausdruchslose Sprachwelt), a space he saw as arising from a secularization that he fiercely rejected: »the secularization of the language is no more than a manner of speaking, a ready-made expression. It is impossible to empty the words so bursting with meaning, unless one sacrifices the language itself.«

It was due to a justified fear for that crucial generation—who would have to live without tradition in an »abyss« (Abgrund) and »emptiness« (Leere)—that Scholem, in his letter, made such a powerful proclamation of faith in the autonomous life of names, stored in the holy language, always ready to erupt with revolutionary force. Scholem wanted to believe that when this hidden »force« of sacred language is evoked daily, even if unconsciously, that it does have unforeseeable consequences »[b]ecause at the heart of such a language, in which we ceaselessly evoke God in a thousand ways, thus calling Him back into the reality of our life, He cannot keep silent.«

Just four years later, in 1930, Hannah Arendt co-authored with her then husband, Gunther Stern, an essay dedicated to Rilke's Duino Elegies, which also touched upon the topic of secularization. The authors observed that since Jewish and Christian religions were of an acoustic character—one has to listen to God—modernity brings a specific crisis whose final result is not a logical passage to atheism but rather a »religious ambiguity« (Arendt and Stern 2007, 3). The fact that God is no longer audible can be interpreted as God's hiddenness or God's non-existence. Our time is characterized by »the absence of an echo« (ibid., 1). In stark contrast to Scholem, who expected God to speak again through Hebrew, the twenty-four-year-old Arendt dismissed the idea that God could ever speak again. Secularization doesn't lead to one particular destination that can be known in advance but, at the same time, it is a process that cannot be undone once it has happened. »The absence of an echo,« with its double negation, is the most salient metaphor for a God who has evaporated, or better yet, a God whom the various sonars of the Enlightenment revealed as »residing« beyond the boundaries of Creation. It is as if there was a very thick wall, impenetrable to any sound coming from outside the world.

Although she rarely recorded strictly personal views in her Denhtagebuch (>thought journal<), Arendt made the following entry in May of 1965:

Since I was seven years old, I have always thought of God [an Gott gedacht], but I have never really thought about God [fiber Gott]. I have often wished that I no longer had to go on living, but I have never posed the question of the meaning of life (Arendt 2016, II, 641).

The enigmatic nature of these words notwithstanding, Arendt expresses here a characteristically Jewish response to a post-Christian modern nihilism, one which culminates in the thought that without God life has no meaning and that everything is

permissible. From this point of view, nihilism and traditionalism are nothing but two sides of the same coin. Arendt's question is not how to rebuild a religious worldview or how to restore the vision of nature (physis) as sacred—something which was exactly the goal of Leo Strauss' philosophy. Instead, Arendt poses the question in this way: After the demise of metaphysics (closely connected to the Western concept of religious transcendence), must humanity necessarily conform to an absolutely secularized immanence? Hence, the central difficulty lies not in the disappearance of God hut in a human nostalgia for the absolute. Hannah Arendt's response to that was to rescue the world even while God seemed completely irretrievable.

The current collection of essays begins with two on the topic of love. Sigrid Weigel, through a detailed reading of Arendt's Denhtagebuch, discovers a completely unknown project, one never realized by Arendt. This is the project that could elucidate her tripartite description of the human condition as well as her often criticized division between private and public spheres of life. The Arendtian loving subject can be read as endowed with an existential dimension that resists any subsumption by metaphysics, and which remains in accord with Arendt's critique of »ordered love« in Der Liebesbegrif f bei Augustin.

Agata Bielik-Robson elucidates the substitution of amor Dei by amor mundi in Arendt as the proper expression of her Marranic cryptotheology. In order to do so, Bielik-Robson explores less known interconnections, like the influence of Franz Rosenzweig and Gershom Scholem on Arendt. The originality of Arendtian cryptotheology cannot be reduced, however, to external inspirations: it consists in the way Arendt revised certain ideas of Christian thinkers (especially Augustine and Duns Scotus) and created her own idiosyncratic discourse in which the worldly and the messianic cannot be distinguished.

The essay of Rafael Zawisza sheds light on the moment when this procosmic shift took place, namely, in Arendt's doctoral dissertation. Zawiszás analysis of the third part of Der Liebesbegriff demonstrates that Arendt's secularism was preceded by her deconstruction of theology, which was specifically directed against the doctrine of original sin. This seemingly apolitical deconstruction possessed a strong critical capacity in the context of Weimar era politics.

Another early encounter with theology is presented by Jim Josefson, who reflects upon the impact of German Lutheran and dialectical theologian Rudolf Bultmann. Although Arendt wrote to Karl Jaspers that she was indebted to Bultmann, that debt is far from obvious when one looks at her writings where there appears almost no reference to his works. Hence, Josefson attempts to reconstruct Bultmann's influence by connecting hints ii the Jaspers letter and Arendt's scattered theological reflections with Bultmann's writings from around 1925, when Arendt attended Bultmann's seminar on the anthropology of St. Paul. By unpacking Arendt's conclusion that »faith communicates itself, wants to be understood and so

understands itself,« Josefson claims that the basics of her cryptotheology can be traced to Christian sources, making her an exemplary philosophical Marrano.

The next two essays focus on Hannah Arendt's secularity. The underlying thesis of both authors is that even in her closest proximity to religious or biblical subject matter, Arendt remained a secular thinker, who interpreted the Judeo-Christian heritage liberally, that is, in the interest of culture and poitics. Martine Leibovici brings together Hannah Arendt's and Michael Walzer's reflections on revolution, the Biblical Exodus, and the question of liberation. Both authors engage with those topics differently, although they share a mistrust of political messianism. Yet, Leibovici demonstrates that it is not just a negation of Biblical tradition that guides Arendt and Walzer; it is rather a deep conviction that although certain religious motives can remain an inspiration for secular culture, the secularization of those motives or figures is not a direct transposition. This careful examination of the distance between religious and secular perspectives results in a rich reflection on the various modes of »living-in-time« and the basis of law.

Christina Schues undertakes a question that is very crucial to a post-secullar reading of Arendt, namely, to what extent the concept of natality can br regarded as a remnant of religion, as its afterlife. Schues resolves this dilernma by showing how Arendt extracts from religion only that which remains »within the reach of man« (Arendt 1958, 247). It is not justified to say

that Arendt simply appropriates what was invented or stored in religious literature because, in metaphysics, the trust in the world and the promise inherent in birth— two main phenomena analyzed by Schues—are tethered to the afterlife, which changes their significance. Hence, Arendt's post-metaphysical thought is not a secularization but rather a reconfiguration of the meaning given to human finitude.

The last, political part of the collection is dedicated to the consequences of secularization for politics. Roger Berkowitz reconstructs Arendt's discussion of immortality as the basis for a meaningful life. In contrast to Christianity which linked immortality with salvation in the extraterrestrial domain, Arendt invokes earthly immortality which in antiquity was given to great, memorable deeds. Berkowitz claims that the concept of »immanent transcendence« is necessary for the prospect of regaining this neglected dimension of public life, because politics must transcend actuality in order to reinforce the durability of the world.

Milan Hanys's essay deals with the problem of evil in Arendt, who overcomes the traditional theological dualism of good and evil by reflecting on absolute goodness and radical evil; in fact, both extremes turn out to be equally destructive for the world. Here a religious point of view is not disqualified but rather bypassed through her secular concerns. Arendt's hesitation about whether to name the evil of

totalitarian regimes »radical« or »banal« reflects her attempt to confront the Western theological legacy.

Aishwary Kumar offers an archaeology of political cruelty in India, the world's most populous democracy, and the consequences of its specifically subcontinental character for the place of public religion in global democratic life at large. Kumar analyzes in parallel the writings of Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar and Hannah Arendt and expands the scope of Arendt's theories by elaborating a new category: »a jurisprudence of neglect« which is a systemic organization of a political structure that prepares people to accept and enable the complete abandonment of the minorities, among them Muslims and outcastes. Kumar's reflection on politics is accompanied by the question of whether this cruel logic has a theological bedrock; it therefore could be characterized as a psycho-theological analysis of politics.

Vivian Liskas epilogue to the book constitutes both a summary and an opening. On the one hand, Liska reads the figure of Abraham in Kafka and Arendt to demonstrate that a transition from religious to secular language is possible and accomplished (yet not politically valid) in the doctrine of human rights. On the other hand, Liska's reading of the Biblical scriptures as an example of »great literature« is a gesture of validation, that is, it suggests that literary works, whether theopoetic or not, can invent, test, and codify new ways of living together. <>

CAMUS'S THE PLAGUE: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
edited by Peg Brand Weiser [Oxford Studies in Philosophy and Literature, Oxford University Press, 9780197599327]

La Peste (in English *The Plague*), originally published in 1947 by the Nobel Prize-winning writer Albert Camus, chronicles the progression of deadly bubonic plague as it spreads through the quarantined Algerian city of Oran. While most discussions of fictional examples within aesthetics are either historical or hypothetical, Camus offers an example of "pestilence fiction."

Camus chose fiction to convey facts--about plagues in the past, his own bout with tuberculosis at age seventeen, living under quarantine away from home for several years, and forced separation from his wife who remained in Algiers while he was abroad in Nazi-occupied France. His own lived experiences undergird an imaginative account of shared human realities with which we can identify: vulnerability to the disease, isolation, fear, and finally humanitarianism. *The Plague* teaches us to neither covet nor expect what we so casually took for granted.

This collection of original essays on philosophical themes in *The Plague* is of special relevance during and in the aftermath of Covid-19 but also provides reflections that

will be of lasting value to those interested in this classic work of literature. The novel explores questions of enduring importance. Do we collectively meet the threshold of ethical behaviour posed by Camus who wrote, "What's true of all the evils in the world is true of plague as well. It helps men to rise above themselves"? Or does the absurd undermine the compassionate? Do "heroes" dutifully fight a plague with "common decency," or does human nature resign itself to the normalization of uncontrollable suffering and death? There are myriad ways to approach the novel and this volume encourages readers to ponder human dilemmas in fictional Oran informed by our current pandemic.

CONTENTS

The Relevance of Camus's The Plague by Peg Brand Weiser

[T] here's no substitute for finally sitting down and reading the 1947 novel "The Plague," by Albert Camus. Its relevance lashes you across the face."

Camus's classic narrative La Peste (The Plague) is a timely philosophical read in an era when a deadly pandemic rages worldwide. An allegory rich with suggestion, it rewards an imaginative reader with innumerable meanings as our own lived experiences mirror the novel. We witness protesters who argue for individual freedom and the autonomy to defy government- imposed regulations. They openly clash with followers of science who recommend shared actions of self-sacrifice to mitigate the spread of infection. Choosing either to act in one's own interest or to sacrifice for the good of all has become a haunting theme of American life in which the "richest

nation on earth" experienced the highest number of cases and deaths in the world while under the leadership of former president Donald Trump as well as through the first year, 2021, of the administration of President Joe Biden. Political divisions over wearing masks, social distancing, police killings, Black Lives Matter, the January 6, 2021, assault on the United States Capitol, and recommended or mandated vaccines sow discord at a time when solidarity could have

1. Argelino Con Turbante [Algerian with Turban] En El Patio De La Mezquita, Oran, Algeria. Album/Art Resource, NY.

united the United States to lead the world against the pandemic. Instead, misinformation campaigns have stoked opposition among the populace and away from the virus. "We're all in this together," was repeatedly uttered by Dr. Bernard Rieux, Camus's narrator. How seldom did we hear that call for unity from the podiums of power, for example, the leaders of America, Brazil, and India (the three countries with the highest death counts in the world)? After two years into the coronavirus pandemic with over 1 million deaths in the United States and over 6 million worldwide, we might ask ourselves, do we measure up to Camus's optimistic assessment of human behavior under duress? Do we collectively meet the minimum threshold of ethical behavior posed by Camus who wrote, "What's true of all the evils in the world is true of plague as well. It helps men to rise above themselves"?

His Life and Work

Albert Camus was born on November 7, 1913, in Mondovi, Algeria. As a pied noir (black foot), he was the second- generation offspring of European colonists who settled in North Africa from 1830 until the 1960s, when indigenous independence was regained after the Algerian War of 1954–1962. Unlike Arab and Berber inhabitants, he was born a French citizen: a unique status. He was described by one scholar, Stephen G. Kellman, as both "a stranger in his native land" and "a ragged interloper among the literary sophisticates of Paris."

His father, killed in World War I in 1914, prompted his Spanish mother (born deaf) to relocate him and his older brother (born deaf- mute) to an apartment in Algiers where they lived with three other persons without electricity or running water. Diagnosed with tuberculosis at age seventeen, a transmitted disease for which there was then no cure nor satisfactory treatment, he was forced to leave home and live in self- imposed quarantine with an uncle. A lycée professor influenced him to study philosophy, particularly the ancient Greeks and Nietzsche. Forced to abandon his love of swimming and aspirations of becoming a professional football player, he relinquished the position of goalkeeper for a local team, later remarking, "What little I know on morality, I learned it on football pitches and theater stages. Those were my true universities."

Beginning in 1933, he studied philosophy at the University of Algiers and completed his studies (equivalent to a master's degree) in 1936 with a thesis on Plotinus. First married in 1934 and divorced in 1936, he wrote theatrical works and traveled Algeria as an actor. He visited Paris for the first time in 1937, where he wrote for several socialist newspapers, and in 1940 moved to Paris to become editor-in-chief of Paris-Soir. As the buildup to World War II intensified, he attempted to join the army but was rejected due to his illness. As Germany invaded Paris, he fled to Lyon, married again in 1940, and by 1942 had published The Stranger, The Myth of Sisyphus, and Caligula. He and his wife moved to Oran where he taught in primary schools, but due to a recurrence of tuberculosis, he moved again in 1942 to a mountain village in the French Alps where he began writing La Peste. Stranded in France, he was separated from both his wife and mother who were back in Algeria. In 1943, he returned to Paris to edit the underground newspaper Combat as part of the French Resistance. In 1944, he met Jean- Paul Sartre, André Gide, Simone de Beauvoir, André Breton, and, since he was already well- known, easily assimilated into the group of French intellectuals living in Paris. In Paris after the war in 1945, his wife gave birth to twins, and in 1946, as a celebrated writer, he visited the United States and Canada, delivering a speech at Columbia University and publishing a series of essays from Combat entitled "Neither Victims nor Executioners."

La Peste was published in 1947 and translated into English the following year. He continued to write, to travel to other countries— including Algeria where he expressed disapproval of oppressive French colonialist policies— and to see performances of his dramatic works on stage. In 1951, he published The Rebel to negative reviews, broke off his friendship with Jean- Paul Sartre, and rejected the label "existentialist." He repeatedly took political stands against oppressive governments, including France in the 1950s, when he tried to find a way to negotiate Algerian freedom amid anticolonialist uprisings. Conflicted by a complicated social dynamic of sympathy for the Algerian cause but also identification with his French lineage, he failed to satisfy both the Left— particularly those sympathetic to communism— and the Right. Yet the complexity of his views continues to provide opportunities for present- day readers to study his words and actions more carefully: to credit him for meeting his literary and humanitarian goals while withholding praise for what we judge, in retrospect, as failures and omissions. A pensive short story published in 1957, "The Artist at Work," captured the "good luck" and rise in popularity of a painter who, like Camus, vacillated between solidarity and solitude as he came to lose prestige and influence. That

same year, Camus accepted the Nobel Prize in Literature whereupon he wrote in his journal, "Strange feeling of overwhelming pressure and melancholy."10 He died in a car crash at age forty-six on January 4, 1960. An unfinished manuscript found with him at the scene of his death was later published in 1994 as Le Premier Homme (The First Man).

Then and Now

As winter turns into spring of an unspecified year in the 1940s, Camus's narrator, Dr. Bernard Rieux (whose identity is revealed only at the end of the novel), leads us through dire events in Oran as it is voluntarily shut off from the outside world. Oran is cast as a "treeless, glamourless, soulless" town of 200,000. Beginning with the first dead rat on April 16 and ending the following February with the ceremonial opening of the town gates, Rieux tracks time, the promise of a curative serum, and corpses. Death rates climb through the hot summer and into the fall. At first counted by the week— at 16, 24, 28, 32, 40, 100, 302, then nearly 700 per week— administrators switch to counting them by the day to report "lower" numbers (reaching 92, 107, then 130 deaths per day) in order to forestall panic. The narrative chronicles the progression of deadly bubonic plague through the town as its inhabitants deny the obvious, struggle to comply with orders of quarantine, and cope with denial, fear, isolation, and loss of loved ones. The invasion of the plague bacillus is unexpected, unwanted, and uncontrollable: exemplifying for Camus the inevitable human condition of "the absurd" and man's helplessness in the face of it. The response of Rieux is not to succumb, however, but to fight, thereby finding meaning in resistance. He cites his duty, urges others to decency, and invokes their shared concern for humanity. The novel raises issues of truth, honesty, ethics, the problem of evil, faith, the pathology of illness, death, the absurd, freedom, love, heroism, and time.

One might trace the relevance of the novel along at least three notable lines: (1) the narrative's depiction of a range of human reactions to the absurd, (2) its historical weight within the context of plague literature and pandemic fiction, and (3) its fictional triumph over the facts— the numbers, the data, and the daily developments— in chronicling a story of diverse individuals thrown together by fate who succeed in pulling together, acting in solidarity, and surviving the worst conditions of the plague. This story of plague could have easily resulted in a shallow, documentary- style work of nonfiction or a dry, didactic philosophical tome that, either way, ended on a less optimistic note. An alternative informed reading, on the other hand, casts the relevance of the novel in terms of three additional features conceptualized as what the novel lacks, namely (4) any significant description of women as fully functioning human beings— female caregivers, doctors, workers, wives, partners; (5) depictions of Algerian and Arab characters who represent the majority indigenous population; and (6) an awareness and analysis of class differences, only minimally represented in the text by starving, rioting, destructive mobs. On this competing interpretation, Camus's novel is relevant for revealing the long- standing hierarchical power structures of the privileged that maintained systemic inequalities and oppression of the less powerful, non- male, non- white, non- European, poor, and vulnerable populations. As a result, some readers of The Plague find Camus's advocacy of solidarity, cooperation, and hope a form of "naïve idealism" that ignores pervasive structural differences and ideologies that continually harm

those who are truly suffering and dying, particularly during a pandemic. On this reading, according to critics Kabel and Phillipson, Camus's book fails to inspire social change.

The unraveling of our own story parallels that of Oran. Some say we began to mark "Covid time" as early as December 2019, with March 11, 2020, as the official pronouncement of pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) due to a novel coronavirus that emerged from Wuhan, China, to blanket world populations in sickness and death. For over two years, government agencies and concerned citizens have tracked daily statistics of contracted cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. "The United States continues to have the highest cumulative number of cases and deaths globally . . . despite the widespread availability of vaccines in the country" and now lags behind in vaccines in comparison to much of the rest of the developed world. Reporters chronicled the experiences of front line medical workers in overcrowded hospitals. Families awaited a plan, a cure, and finally, a vaccine, while politicians and pundits posited an "existential crisis" to describe our world in peril. Under the new administration of President Biden— which began on January 20, 2021— vaccines-in- arms came to exceed 3 million per day while simultaneously more transmissible variants of the virus began to spread. Citizens cautiously sought a return to "normal" but medical epidemiologists doubted that even if at least 60– 70 percent of the country's population received at least one vaccine, it could escape the reach of the virus when other countries were unable to attain sufficient vaccines or control recurring outbreaks. What the vaccine has done, however, is severely limit the death toll, particularly in America. Not so in other parts of the world. On May 19, 2021, India reported the highest number of deaths in one day worldwide— 4,500, surpassing the highest number of 4,400 in the United States on January 20, 2021. Photos revealed dozens of Covid-infected bodies floating down the Ganges River due to shallow graves unable to hold them.19 After a long respite from conflict in the Middle East, fighting between Hamas and Israel posed the dual threat of war injuries and spread of the virus in Gaza.20 With severe shortages and unequal distribution of vaccines— "only 0.3% were in low- income countries, while richer countries administered around 85%"— some countries are not expected to obtain vaccines until 2024.

It should be noted that the numbers of both cases and deaths are assumed to be severely underreported in the United States as well as elsewhere, due to lack of testing and transparency of reporting. In May 2021, one study estimated an actual number of 912,345 deaths— compared to a then reported 578,555— in the United States alone. The uneven distribution of medical treatment, ventilators, vaccines, and proper burials worldwide has been criticized as evidence of the "catastrophe" of Covid that "makes indigenous peoples acutely vulnerable to the ravages of the virus, further deepening their material, physical and spiritual plight and collective loss."

Camus Sets the Stage

Consider the speech delivered by Camus at Columbia University on March 28, 1946, during his only trip to America, entitled, "La Crise de L'homme" ("A Human Crisis")— judged by one scholar as providing us with a "blueprint" to a number of Camus's works, including The Plague, The Fall, The Rebel, and First Man. Fresh from postwar France, the thirty- two- year- old Camus represented "his generation" of young French citizens as he addressed American academics sitting comfortably in a packed auditorium in New York City.25 Few listeners had undergone the

unspeakable horrors of World War II, survived the occupied rule of Hitler, been stripped of freedoms that resulted in being held prisoner in one's own country— trapped in one's home, separated from loved ones— as if attacked by a veritable plague. After the novel was published in 1947, Camus acknowledged its allegorical nature as a chronicle of Nazi invasions of Europe, but, as many authors in this volume have argued, it was so much more: it offers us relevance beyond its original place in time. It opens a lens that probes deep and wide; it portrays any person in any town at any unspecified time anywhere that becomes "victim" to the brutality of "the executioner" (referred to by Camus in his speech as "the brutes taking charge in the four corners of Europe"). Recall that in 1946, Camus also published a collection of essays from Combat entitled, "Neither Victims nor Executioners."

As Camus came to write in The Plague, through the words of Dr. Rieux's friend, Tarrou, who was adamantly opposed to capital punishment and violence: "on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and it's up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestilences." Foreshadowing the main themes of resistance against an oppressor, disease, or injustice by inspiring solidarity among men and women who come together in a common fight, Camus added, "I grant we should add a third category: that of the true healers." Surely this explains why Camus chose a physician, Dr. Rieux, as the main character and narrator:

> Nonetheless, he knew that the tale he had to tell could not be one of a final victory. It could be only the record of what had had to be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers.

In his 1946 speech, Camus outlined four symptoms of "the human crisis" resulting from human indifference and passivity within a world of violence, "mistrust, resentment, greed, and the race for power": (1) the rise of terror consisting in an uncertain future that begets fear and anxiety, solitude and unhappiness; (2) the impossibility of persuasion, that is, the failure of reason and passion to trump irrationality and indifference; his example is a concentration camp victim "who cannot hope to explain to the SS men who are beating him that they ought not to"; (3) the growth of bureaucracy where paperwork replaces persons; and (4) a "cult of efficiency" where "real men" are replaced by "political men" who engage in destructive abstractions (like Nazism) in which harmful instincts are "elevated to the status of an idea or theory."

The remedy for "the human crisis"— Camus's suggested "lesson of those years . . . of blood spilled"— is an end to "the cult of silence" in the face of "the reign of abstraction" and a rediscovery of "the freedom of thought" needed "to resolve any of the problems facing the modern conscience." This consists of freely seeking "the common good" in "communion among men" and in forming a "brotherhood of men struggling against fate." For the sake of justice, Camus argues, we must eliminate lying, violence, slavery, and terror.

It is too easy in this matter to simply accuse Hitler and to say, "Since the beast is dead, its venom is gone." We know perfectly well that the venom is not gone, that each of us carries it in our own hearts.

Consider that at the end of The Plague, Dr. Rieux ominously "remembered" to himself:

He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen- chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.

On a positive note, Camus shares Dr. Rieux's reasoning for chronicling the story of the plague in fictional Oran with another direct link to his speech that serves to explain why he himself was motivated to write his own fictional account, La Peste:

Dr Rieux resolved to compile this chronicle, so that he should not be one of those who hold their peace but should bear witness in favor of those plague- stricken people: so that some memorial of the injustice and outrage done them might endure; and to state quite simply what we learn in time of pestilence: that there are more things to admire in men than to despise.

This conclusion, in the face of the incomprehensible and insurmountable absurd— man's suffering, evil, and death— reflects a change in Camus's writings when he moved beyond advocating that one merely face the absurd, alone, like Sisyphus, to instead combat it by forming "a brotherhood of men":

[I] f there is one fact that these last five years have brought out, it is the extreme solidarity of men with one another. Solidarity in crime for some, solidarity in the upsurge of resistance in other. Solidarity even between victims and executioners.

We, too, witness a monumental human crisis enacted in real time. Our full story is yet to be written but one might conclude that ultimately nearly 81 million Americans (51.3 percent of the votes cast) denied Donald Trump a second term in favor of Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris, and that the state of Georgia elected two Democrats to the U.S. Senate to split the numbers 50- 50 with Vice President Harris becoming the deciding majority vote. In keeping with campaign promises, Biden met and surpassed his goal of 100 million vaccines within his first one hundred days in office and signed economic relief into law for economically disadvantaged citizens. No such political accounting surfaces in Camus's story while it is integral to understanding ours. The highest number of American citizens voted in a safe election that insured the country's turn toward fighting the pandemic rather than ignoring it or calling it a "hoax." President Biden acknowledged both the dead and grieving as he held the first communal memorial for the nation on the eve of his inauguration. Camus would have called this a form of resistance and a form of solidarity. He would have empathized with victims lost to the virus while valorizing the healers,

particularly health care personnel and other essential workers, for whose ordinary, everyday deeds of decency and healing he reserved the term "heroic."

Range of Human Reactions to the Absurd

Camus's characters adopt a variety of stances from the extremes of exploitation (Cottard) and religious fervor (the Jesuit priest, Father Paneloux) with a host of options in- between: the narrator, Dr. Rieux, who seeks to cure but cannot; Rieux's new friend and confidant, Jean Tarrou, who organizes squads of workers to fight the disease; the visiting journalist, Raymond Rambert, who longs to escape and return to his lover in Paris; the heroic yet nondescript office clerk, Joseph Grand, who diligently tallies the dead; other doctors, citizens, and the family of Monsieur Othan, particularly his young, innocent son— recipient of a long- awaited serum— who dies a painful death nonetheless. Rieux's inability to cure the sick moves him to lead others to volunteer, work, organize: to do something— anything— against an invading, unwieldy, arbitrary killing force. Doing nothing constitutes complicity with the enemy.

It is not until the New Year that hope begins to return to the inhabitants of Oran, although Dr. Rieux remarks, "it is doubtful if this could be called a victory." The story takes on new relevance and meaning as we, too, lived sequestered- in- place in our respective homes and communities— waiting: for adequate testing, for the death toll to drop, for social distancing requirements to ease, for a possible "next wave," for businesses and schools to remain open, for ample doses of a vaccine, and for the normalcy we once knew. The Plague teaches us to neither covet nor expect what we so casually took for granted. As we progress through long, drawn- out stages of our own twenty- first- century "plague," the passing of time reveals new problems such as loss of employment, hunger, eviction, lack of internet access for children to attend school remotely, and the disproportionate susceptibility to contracting the disease if one is a person of color, an "essential" worker forced to continue laboring in an unsafe environment, an "undocumented/ unauthorized noncitizen," poor, or someone lacking health insurance. As with the growing spread of the disease in Oran, crises we experience multiply over time. Covid "variants"— such as the deadly Delta and highly contagious Omicron variants of 2021— pose new threats to health and welfare, just as the extension of vaccines to young children and a third "booster" shot offer a glimmer of hope to the weary. Millions of anti- vaxxers, however, complicate recovery for all.

The Narrative's Historical Weight

Consider how Camus crafted the novel in its historical and literary contexts. Numerous commentaries have been written during our current pandemic to motivate readers to appreciate the novel's plot and details. For example, Clay Jenkinson gleans commonalities with other plagues from a study of pandemic literature dating back to the Justinian Plague of 541 CE, the Black Death (1348– 1352), the Great Plague of London (1665– 1666), the Third Plague Pandemic beginning in 1894 (China, Australia, India), and the Spanish Flu (1918). These documents record a pattern of human reactions of denial, flight (for the wealthy), suffering of the poor who are often essential workers unable to flee, legitimate strategies to mitigate the spread of the disease (government laws, quarantine, social distancing, masks), confidence men and conspiracy theories, economic fallout, and a rush to normalcy that often causes prolonged infection and death. Kim Willsher

notes that the novel is loosely based on a cholera epidemic in Algeria which reportedly killed a large proportion of the population in 1849, almost twenty years after French colonization began. Sean Illing suggests, "The beauty of The Plague is that it asks the reader to map the lessons of the pandemic onto everyday life. The principles that drive the hero, Rieux, are the same principles that make every society worthwhile— empathy, love, and solidarity."

Alain de Botton credits Camus with both exposing the absurdity of one's life which can end at any moment, for any reason, as well as encouraging an internalization of human vulnerability that necessitates loving our fellow man. Robert Zaretsky suggests that the lessons learned from Camus are complex wherein "ordinary" characters can function as role models who exemplify "resistance against the inhuman force of the plague," but it is the ignorance of the politicians and powerful that are the real threat (although, in the end, not a reason for despair, given Camus's faith in man). Simon Critchley argues that basic anxiety about vulnerability and death— experienced acutely during a pandemic— can actually function as a "vehicle of liberation." Ronald Aronson offers the observation that "there is nothing political about his plague, while our situation is profoundly so. . . . our plague takes place through the social and political madness of Trumpism. . . . its viciousness, its sense of grievance, its cult of personality, its proud rejection of science and reason." No comparable critique of Oran's leadership appears in The Plague.

Orhan Pamuk cites Daniel Defoe's chronicle of seventeenth-century London, A Journal of the Plague Year, as "the single most illuminating work of literature ever written on contagion and human behavior."42 That work influenced Camus, but it is worth noting that while Dafoe's narrator ends his chronicle bemoaning "all manner of wickedness among us," Camus cautiously celebrates the cooperation that sustained the doctors, workers, and the general populace. Moreover, Defoe notes the contributions of women as nurses, their tribulations as mothers, the many burdens of caregiving relegated to women: all of which are absent from The Plague. Other epidemic literature that preceded La Peste includes History of the Wars by Procopius (542 CE, The Justinian Plague), The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (431 BCE, The Plague of Athens), Giovanni Boccaccio's 1353 Decameron (fourteenth- century Black Death in Italy), and The Diary of Samuel Pepys (seventeenth- century bubonic plague in London). The closest factual description of plague in Algeria to that fictionalized by Camus is that referenced by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that occurred in 1946, just when Camus is writing The Plague (in France). Clearly he was able to pick and choose how to craft his version, resulting in an uplifting testament to men's strength united against an enemy, fighting a foe.

Not everyone responded positively. Even early criticisms by Jean- Paul Sartre and Roland Barthes found fault with Camus's moral message overwhelming his aesthetic concerns. More recent readings further problematize Camus's intentions, style, and overall effect on generations of readers and critics. Scholars influenced by the writings of Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, and other race theorists fault Camus for ignoring the indigenous population of Algeria, its struggle for autonomy, and the pervasive inequalities a colonized country bears: all of which were apparent to the author. As he engaged in various political pronouncements and publications in real life, he omitted them from his fictional account of Oran. He is criticized for deliberately evading the topic

of French colonial oppression and violence, "erasing" the Algerian uprising and resultant 1945 massacre of at least 20,000 Algerians, and "masking" the indigenous peoples' fight for freedom.46 For some critics, Camus silences the voice of the North African "subaltern" who fails to see herself reflected in the text; that is, "Individual travails overshadow the decimation of Arabs by the plague." More pointedly, as argued by Robert Solomon in a 2008 essay, "In The Stranger the Arabs who make up most of the population don't have names, but in The Plague they don't seem to have deaths either." Camus is accused of choosing to write a "classic imperialist discourse that, directly, overtly, and with complicity, accepts the racist hierarchy that all European countries imposed on other parts of the world. Solomon added, "Camus describes Algeria here as in The Stranger as if it is nothing but a European colony."

Fictional Triumph over Fact

The shift toward critical readings of the novel lies in the difference in time periods— ours and that of Camus— as well as what is considered to be Camus's outdated response to "the executioner," oppressor, or purveyor of injustice. Scholars Kabel and Phillipson write, "The anti- fascism that was important for Camus in occupied France is largely immaterial to Algerian politics. His advocacy of assimilation in Algeria predated and continued after the 'demise' of fascism." In effect, he grew out of step with the times— his own— with an exhortation to "universal humanism" that was said to exclude the indigenous population and conceal "his parochial colonialist politics," thereby rendering his "hope" for the future "romanticized." More awareness of what is missing, eliminated, and structurally barred from the novel results in reading the novel's advocacy of solidarity as incomplete, hollow, and empty.

LeBlanc and Jones, however, offer a 2002 reading of The Plague in which they see Camus offering an alternative narrative model that moves beyond "conflict models of discourse" to one in which "the binary logic of the conflict between France and Algeria" is rejected and "far from embodying and promulgating a colonial mentality, his second published novel actually anticipates postcolonial critiques of French control of Africa." They argue, "The intersections of religion, art, and politics in his work problematize models of political discourse and open a way to think about the place of narrative and story- telling and their meaning for being at home with 'others' and the self, in community, in a place."

Specifically with regard to the inequities seemingly perpetuated by Camus's neglect of the Arab population, David Carroll tracks the origins of the earliest and most intensely negative claims against the novel to a 1970 book by Conor Cruise O'Brien to which Camus never had a chance to respond. Carroll defends what he insists is Camus's clear and consistent anticolonialist stance with ample documentation from both his fictional and political writings. In explaining the complexity of Camus's strategic choice of Oran— "his least favorite Algerian city," Carroll offers evidence of contrasting procolonialist writings of Camus's literary predecessors, particularly from 1938.56 Carroll's incisive historical and textual analysis provides evidence that cannot be denied: "The charge that 'Camus and his friends' did not find colonial racism and oppression repugnant and that he did not denounce them and see a link between colonial and Nazi racism and violence simply does not hold up to scrutiny." Carroll's analysis also considers the literary fact stressed by

Camus himself, namely, that the novel was fictional and allegorical and thus necessarily resistant to historicalpolitical accuracy. Carroll emphatically argues that Camus was not only anticolonialist but also an Algerian who did not ignore his fellow Algerians. Moreover, Camus had always advocated multireferentiality, that is, multiple readings of "the plague"— for instance, Stalinism in addition to Nazism as a form of unacceptable political oppression (much debated by fellow French intellectuals of the day). Previously, O'Brien had questioned Camus's intentions on this matter, claiming that the author only intended "the plague" to refer to Nazism. Perhaps this entire controversy surrounding Camus's portrayal of Oran's citizens as colonialists would be moot if characters had just been given non- French names.

Thus, at this unique time in the wake of the work, when readers accumulate lived experiences of their own during an unprecedented pandemic and are acutely aware of systemic injustices, new commentators and critics should be given wide berth to find additional "layers of meaning" in the words on the page as well as names and phrases that do not appear. As informed readers and critics, we continue to question the author's literary and philosophical intentions, choices, and omissions in order to judge for ourselves. The essays in this volume begin that discussion in the twenty- first century, mid-pandemic.

Strategically, Camus chose fiction to convey facts. The Plague is not just fiction, since it is based on haunting facts from the historical past; nor is it merely literary journalism, as it attends to newsworthy details of everyday life in a storytelling setting.59 It may function as escape fiction, but our escape is illusory as we ourselves— living in a pandemic reproducing the restrictive conditions like those of bubonic plague in 1940s Oran— identify with the actions of fictional characters like those we witness in real life: in the media, on the streets, in hospitals, on Zoom, within our own families. Our lived experiences— the starting point for phenomenologists seeking to chart the theoretical— map onto Camus's narrative, confirming Simone de Beauvoir's similar intuition to choose to write fiction over philosophy. Her mode of existentialist writing, with an "emphasis on the particular and the concrete, from which philosophical propositions may be drawn, invites the use of fiction as a medium for philosophical discovery, especially at the ontological level." A similar observation might be offered of Camus, namely, "there is no question but that Camus's philosophical concerns were best captured in literary form." Even in English translation, Camus's prose is vivid, powerful, and arresting; it is often so pleasing that one risks becoming too absorbed in his words, similes, and metaphors, thereby forgetting the horrors of plague. Simple and direct, Camus elevates the words of everyday sights and sounds to an aesthetically high level of creative endeavor. Perhaps the frustrated writer, the clerk named Grand, said it best when he insisted, "It's only artists who know how to use their eyes." Borrowing from Defoe— in an epigraph intended to appear at the beginning of The Plague— Camus also chose fiction to convey what he imagined might have happened in a town called Oran: "It is as reasonable to represent one kind of imprisonment by another as it is to represent anything which really exists by that which exists not."

New Perspectives

This collection of essays invites contemporary thinkers to reflect— in light of Camus's original fictional narrative— upon the progression of the coronavirus as it spread worldwide, felled millions of victims, and posed moral challenges to us as individuals, governments, and global societies. Conversely, readers are encouraged to reread and reconsider Camus's fiction in light of contemporary life. Authors range from fields as diverse as philosophy, French and comparative literature, English, history, gender and women's studies, medicine, medical ethics, feminist bioethics, and medical humanities. Informative and provocative essays were penned at different times over the duration of one year, 2021, within an atmosphere that posed a dangerous and lethal level of political discourse: one of falsehoods, denials, and "alternative facts." This anthology seeks to explain what constitutes the timeliness and timelessness of Camus's fictional plague by drawing on contemporary commentary, prevailing scholarship, and personal observations, interpretation, and (aesthetic) judgments.

First, Steven G. Kellman interrogates the social context of our time in "The Plague and the Present Moment" when American protesters resisted both oppressive government tactics against their civil liberties and expressed demands for racial justice. These actions— during the 2020 presidential election— parallel the Algerian population's war for independence in the 1950s and 1960s. The dissimilarity to Oran's naturally occurring plague— for which no one was held morally responsible— highlighted the autocratic and punitive practices of former president Trump, who exacerbated an already urgent medical situation by denying its importance and calling it a hoax. Both the novel and the 2020 pandemic raise questions about human behavior that ranges from the heroic to the unethical, conspiratorial, and criminal.

The absence of women on the front lines of fighting the plague in Camus's Oran raises the specter of medicine as a masculinized and exclusionary profession at odds with our own contemporary situation. In "Present in Effacement: The Place of Women in Camus's Plague and Ours," Jane E. Schultz notes that the midtwentieth- century context of Algerian society is dominated by Camus's choice of nearly all male characters in the novel: leaders like Dr. Rieux, doctors, workers, and even patients. Women are relegated to marginal roles: maternal, spousal, or desired and distant lover. In contrast, the history of nursing illuminates the role of women who function as risk takers and caregivers in a profession in which they labor as active agents of change and comfort.

Camus's treatment of the arbitrariness and contingency of life— the absurd— leaves us, like many characters in Camus's novel, searching for order and purpose. Andrew Edgar examines the underlying foundations of this loss of control in an essay entitled, "The Meaning of a Pandemic." Invoking Camus's Myth of Sisyphus from 1955, Edgar contrasts various coping strategies in human behaviors that either acquiesce to the absurdity of existence or find meaning in the challenge the absurd inevitably presents. The influence of phenomenology, particularly the work of Heidegger, informs a reading of The Plague that elucidates the current pandemic.

According to Kathleen Higgins, those impacted by plague or pandemic are naturally afflicted with common psychological symptoms of grief following loss, but also with a sense of anticipatory grief

that might be diminished or overcome by means of collective action. In "Grief and Human Connection in The Plague," Higgins casts this sense of expected dread as contributing to one's sense of isolation, exhaustion, and apathy. We, however, like Camus's more heroic characters, can extract ourselves from loss and progress toward healing by working together toward common goals that benefit all.

The erosion of the physician's role as healer when faced with a fast- spreading disease in the absence of any prevention or cure is analyzed by Edward Weiser through a comparison between Dr. Rieux and contemporary medical practice in "Examining the Narrative Devolution of the Physician in Camus's The Plague." Much like the situation in Oran, the current pandemic thwarts medical successes which physicians routinely seek and expect. Comparisons between Dr. Rieux and today's physicians serve to highlight the achievements of medical practice in spite of its limitations.

Cynthia A. Freeland presents Camus's exploration of the multifaceted problem of evil— evidenced as great human suffering— in her essay, "Horror and Natural Evil in The Plague." She probes "zoonotic villains" such as rats and bats which function like monsters (reminiscent of Dracula) as well as Camus's use of natural phenomena like the incessant winds that rattle Oran. These nonhumanmade causes inspire dread, placing the novel in the category of "natural horror" to which Dr. Rieux must respond.

Particular words uttered by both patients on ventilators as well as Black Lives Matter protesters in the streets open a path to interpreting the tragedies of Covid-19 and Camus's plague. An essay by Margaret E. Gray, "'I Can't Breathe': Covid-19 and The Plague's Tragedy of Political and Corporeal Suffocation," recalls the last words spoken by George Floyd on May 25, 2020, that inspired maskwearing protestors to take to the streets by the thousands in the name of justice. The act of breathing, particularly when thwarted, prevented, or denied, functions as a trope for freedom and life— in opposition to oppression, death, and sociopolitical tyranny.

Not everyone faces "modern" death equally, whether in Oran or today's world.65 In the essay, "Modern Death, Decent Death, and Heroic Solidarity in The Plague," Peg Brand Weiser argues that the "difficulty" in Oran of "modern death" as described by Camus is still with us today in that Americans neither faced death together in any form of solidarity under the Trump administration nor faced death individually in any traditional "decent" manner (as proposed by the character Tarrou), that is, comforted by family or friends. One reason is overwhelming fear of death— what neuroscientists call "existential anxiety"— that can motivate human behavior toward either selfishness or an ethics of care. As a result of lived experiences of the pandemic, a sense of "heroic solidarity" has perhaps finally been achieved that moves us from despair to hope, confirming Camus's faith in humanity.

Conclusion

Within a year of its publication, The Plague had been translated into nine languages; current translations number at least twenty- eight. It is currently a worldwide bestseller with its British

publisher, Pelican/ Penguin Classics (now part of Viking Penguin, Penguin Random House, publisher of the original 1948 translation by Stuart Gilbert), struggling to meet demand. A second English translation by Robin Russ appeared in November 2001, with a commentary by Tony Judt noting the relevancy of reading the novel just after the September 11th attack on New York and the Pentagon. A new translation for the original English publisher (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.) by Laura Marris was begun before the current pandemic and arrived in print in November 2021; she argues that "while Camus was writing for the moment, he was also writing for the future. He knew that his book would be needed again, long after his death, in a context he couldn't predict or imagine." Indeed, an entirely new field of pandemic bioethics has begun.

Readers are invited to engage with Camus's text in new and innovative ways, allowing the fictional flow of events and imaginary human actions to triumph over the facts of the matter, the undeniable truths of our current state of affairs. The plague never really ends; it lies dormant while time passes and while we choose— or not— to address the persistent inequalities and sufferings of a world under siege. Remedies require solidarity and sacrifice, but we can imagine a future when the elimination of exterminators and the safety and health of all victims are realized. "Perhaps with the lockdown we will have some time to reflect about what is real, what is important, and become more human," observed Catherine Camus, seventy- four- year- old daughter of Albert Camus, early in the Covid- 19 pandemic (March 2020). Camus may not have provided the most complete account of how to achieve "a brotherhood of man," but he starts us down a path of self- awareness toward inclusivity and justice when he warns us early on, "no one will ever be free so long as there are pestilences." <>

READING HISTORY IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE edited by Mario Baumann and Vasileios Liotsakis [Millennium-Studien / Millennium Studies, de Gruyter, 9783110763782] Open Access

Although the relationship of Greco-Roman historians with their readerships has attracted much scholarly attention, classicists principally focus on individual historians, while there has been no collective work on the matter. The editors of this volume aspire to fill this gap and gather papers which offer an overall view of the Greco-Roman readership and of its interaction with ancient historians. The authors of this book endeavor to define the physiognomy of the audience of history in the Roman Era both by exploring the narrative arrangement of ancient historical prose and by using sources in which Greco-Roman intellectuals address the issue of the readership of history. Ancient historians shaped their accounts taking into consideration their readers' tastes, and this is evident on many different levels, such as the way a historian fashions his authorial image, addresses his readers, or uses certain compositional strategies to elicit the readers' affective and cognitive responses to his messages. The papers of this volume analyze these narrative aspects and contextualize them within their socio-political environment in order to reveal

the ways ancient readerships interacted with and affected Greco-Roman historical prose.

CONTENTS

The twenty-first-century could justifiably be deemed an era that was highly fertile to examining ancient readerships of classical historiography. This is because recent decades have contributed to the liberation of modern scholarship from the nineteenth century's persistently positivist outlook in scrutinizing the "objectivity" of ancient historians, which often led scholars to view them as no more than celebrated exemplars of critical acumen and scientific conscientiousness. As a counterpoise to this, if we try to summarize the prevailing modern perspectives on classical historiography, we can refer toa modern focus on four particular dimensions: (a) the ancient historians' views of the nature of historical development, (b) their goals in preserving the past by writing history, (c) the literary qualities of ancient historical accounts, and (d) the techniques which the ancient historians used in order to disseminate certain ideological and interpretive messages and to create specific emotions in their readers.

The questions emerging from these perspectives cannot be satisfactorily answered unless they are examined against the backdrop of the ancient readership of classical historiography. This is because the ancient historians' views of historical development are closely associated with several

features of their readerships (e.g. current philosophical trends, the readers' interests in the past, and their awareness of natural science), while topics such as the literary qualities of classical historiography and the rhetorical strategies which ancient historians used in order to lead their audience towards certain ideological and emotional reactions cannot be fully interpreted if we neglect the readers' mentality, as well as their literary and linguistic competence, as is attested both in the historical works themselves and in theoretical treatises of antiquity.

The present volume applies this perspective of reader-response criticism to the field of historiography during the period of Late Republican and Imperial Rome. The historical texts of the Roman Era area particularly suitable topic for such a reader-oriented approach because of the double expansion which characterizes the development of historical writing in this period: the audiences of historiography widen, and the number of writers in the genre increases. This evolution of the field is well attested, among others by Cicero, Strabo, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Lucian.

The pleasure – and utility– of reading history

Many chapters of this volume refer to Cicero's comments about the readership of historiography in his own lifetime. This is not only because the Ciceronian corpus provides us with an extraordinary number of explicit statements about the reception of historical writings, which, when they are all taken together, almost assemble a reader-response theory of historiographical texts. Moreover, Cicero's comments on reading history testify to two trends which form the backdrop against which the historians of Late Republican and Imperial Rome write: the audience of such texts has widened, both in number and in its sociological make-up, and reading history for pleasure is an established and, as it seems, common mode of reception. The famous question from Cicero's de Finibus: quid, quod homines infima fortuna, nulla spe rerum gerendarum, opifices denique delectantur historia?,"What of the delight that is taken in history by men of the humblest station, who have no expectation of participating in public life, even mere artisans?", neatly links these two trends– even opifices read history, and they do it for pleasure, as do (according to the same passage of de Finibus) readers in general who are lured by the intrinsic appeal of historiographical accounts: ipsi enim quaeramus a nobis [...] quid historia delectet, quam solemus persequi usque ad extremum: praetermissa repetimus, inchoata persequimur,"Let us ask ourselves the question [...] why we derive pleasure from history, which we are so fond of following up, to the remotest detail, turning back to parts we have omitted, and pushing on to the end when we have once begun".

The pleasure of history is also the focus of Cicero's reasoning in his letter to Lucceius, where he provides an explanation of the basic mechanism behind the delectatio lectoris: the reader is made involved by a good historical narrative, but he is also kept at a distance; the safety of histemporally and spatially removed position enables him to enjoy the depiction of past events. Or, in the words of Cicero, referring to his consulate which he wants to be treated byLucceius ina historical monograph:

> nihil est enimaptius ad delectationem lectoris quam temporum varietates fortunaeque vicissi-tudines. quae etsi nobis optabiles in experiendo non fuerunt, in legendo tamen erunt iucundae. habet enim praeteriti doloris secura recordatio delectationem; ceteris vero nulla perfunctis propria molestia, casusautem alienos sine ullo dolor e intuentibus, etiam ipsa misericordia est iucunda.
>
> Nothing tends more to the reader's enjoyment than varieties of circumstance and vicissitudes of fortune. For myself, though far from desirable in the living, they will be pleasant in the reading; for there is something agreeable in the secure recollection of bygone unhappiness. For others, who went through no personal distress and painlessly survey misfortunes not their own, even the emotion of pity is enjoyable.

The pleasure of praeteriti doloris secura recordatio stands at the core of Cicero's explanation, a point which is remarkably similar to models employed by the modern psychology of reading.

That many Ciceronian passages highlight the aspect of historiographical delectatio does not mean, of course, that reading for utility is absent from the broad spectrum of interactions with historiography that Cicero– or characters in his texts– unfold. Rather, different readers of history who appear in the Ciceronian corpus engage with historiography in distinct and often very personal ways, at times leaning more to one side of the utility versus pleasure debate, but often combining both approaches. We thus hear Antonius claim inde Oratore that he reads Greek historiographers non [...] utilitatem aliquam ad dicendum aucupans, sed delectationis causa, "not because I am on the look-out for aids to oratory, but just for pleasure", while Cicero portrays himself in the Brutus as a reader with a multifaceted interest in historiography: he has read Atticus' Liber annalis, and this rather short summary of Roman history proved to be pleasurable as well as useful because it gave Cicero solace ina moment of crisis and motivated him to take up writing again.

The picture of a diverse audience which emerges from Cicero's texts is mirrored in historiography itself: historical writers of the Roman Era are aware of the existence of multiple kinds of readers and often try to address as many of them as possible. Two telling examples are Strabo and Dionysius of Halicarnassus who explicitly state this aim. Strabo does so when he compares his Geography to his Historical Treatise:

> In short, this work [sc. the Geography] is meant to be both for the man in public life and useful to the common people, Just as was my history. [...] And just as in that earlier work only that which concerned distinguished men and lives was remembered [...], so too here we must leave aside what is small and obscure, and spend time instead with what is renowned and great, or which has practical use, or is easily remembered, or affords pleasure.

Strabo in this self-referential comment combines a wide social definition of his audience with an extensive set of "bonuses" his various readers can expect from his works. In a similar vein, Dionysius of Halicarnassus envisages a broad readership for his Roman Antiquities:

> The form I give my work […] is a mixture of every form of public eloquence and theoretical reflection, so that those who dedicate themselves to political eloquence, as well as those who are engaged in philosophical contemplation, and (if there are any) those who want only undisturbed amusement when they read history, will find it advantageous.

Again, a historian names a whole range of possible reasons for reading history and promises to cater for all these interests or needs.

Readers turned into writers

Penetrating into the readership of history-writing in the Late Republican and Imperial Eras becomes even more intriguing in light of the fact that the expansion of a historical readership was achieved in such a way that it affected   physiognomy of historical literature. Lucian, whose ideas about historical narratives are also exploited in the papers of this volume, reflects in a very illuminating way on how the widening of this historical readership, already pointed out by Cicero in the first century BCE, was consolidated until the second century CE as a dominant and formative parameter of historiography. First, according to Lucian, historians were fully aware of the fact that one of the audience's main motives in reading history is the pursuit of pleasure (Hist. Conscr. 9 – 10). Many authors thus colored their accounts with a laudatory flavor, poetic embellishments, myths, and plenty of other elements which they believed would render their works more attractive to readers (Hist. Conscr. 7– 8,22). Of course, in many cases Lucian's satirical eye is a misleading kaleidoscope of the likely truth, given that he often overstates the practices he wishes fruitful mutual communication contributed to the enrichment of the perspectives of reflection upon historical prose's style and its usefulness in a plethora of communicative situations in the lives of its readers.

Outline of the present volume

The contributions are organized in a chronological order. However, even chapters devoted to different authors or periods are closely linked by a number of common ideas and perspectives. First, many authors of this volume focus on the testimonies offered by the ancient readers themselves in non-historical works, such as treatises into literary theory, commentaries, and satirical prose (cf. especially the contributions by Aurélien Pulice and Pauline Duchêne). Greco-Roman literature offers a variety of passages in which these readers discuss their intellectual and affective reactions to past narratives, the process of reading them, and what they expected from such works with regard to issues of style and reliability. The treatises of literary theory, whose production had begun increasingly to flourish since the Hellenistic Era, can be seen as the first efforts, on the part of readers, to systematically penetrate their own evaluative mechanisms and their interaction with current literary genres, including historiography. These readers, who must have represented the Greek and Roman litterati, composed works that themselves constituted meta-reception, as it were, in which they aimed to coin terms to describe the emotions experienced by the audience of historical narratives as well as the qualities of the accounts that sparkled those emotional reactions and conveyed certain impressions of a historical work. By exploiting testimonies of this kind, the authors of this volume investigate certain aspects   as a

procedure (oral recitation, use of past narratives in language courses), which aspects of historical accounts enthused or disappointed, as well as the influence of current intellectual trends on the reception of narratives involving the past.

Some other papers   the aforementioned ones the complementary movement "from the text to the reader". This means that they engage in close readings of historical works and explore how these texts imply and "shape" a specific audience. To this end, the authors employing this perspective focus on the use of certain stylistic or narrative techniques which allow a definition of the texts' "imagined readers", and on explicit discussions of the readers' roles in prefaces or similar programmatic passages. In the context of the present volume, three findings are particularly important: (1) the texts analyzed in those studies all imply an active audience. Their narratives involve the reader, their style and programmatic statements call for critical reflection, and in the case of Pliny's letters (cf. Ari Zatlin's contribution) it is even up to the reader to   history in the first place. (2) The writers of history consciously exploit the widening of   for historical texts in Republican and Imperial Rome, be it to make full use of the enlarged readership, as in Livy's case (cf. Dennis Pausch's contribution), Or to deliberately restrict the audience, as Sallust does (cf. Edwin Shaw's chapter). (3) Even texts which do not present the reader with a historical narrative may take up these "historiographical" modes of appealing to and activating the reader, in order to create their own.

Moreover, most contributors share the belief that the "implied reader" of historiography in (and of) the Roman Empire is an active one who is willing to engage with the text. In this respect, special emphasis is laid on what is arguably the strongest form of involving the readers, i.e. stirring. Chapters as e.g. Dennis Pausch's, George Baroud's and Vasileios Liotsakis' study a broad spectrum of affective responses which the texts stimulate; they range from feelings of insecurity and suspicion to sheer pleasure of reading. In doing so, these contributions show that the emotional reactions elicited by the texts form an inextricable part of the historians' strategies to make   understand the historical processes.

Special attention is also paid to those cases in which readerly expectations dictated the authors of historical narratives to adopt manifold authorial masks. It is true that writing history in the Roman Empire was in many respects affected by   concern fora number of readerly demands. The treatises, for example, of literary theory reflect, if anything, on how literate a fashion readers expected historians and biographers to compose their works. Simultaneously, Roman monarchy imposed one further, and far more peremptory, agenda of what was "allowed" to be written down or not, and of how everything was supposed to be written. These, sometimes dangerous, readerly demands were to be respected especially by authors of non-Roman origins, who struggled through their accounts to defend their cultural identity while also showing the highest respect to their Roman readerships. The authors of this volume (especially Vasileios Liotsakis and Adam M. Kemezis) make the case that ancient historians and biographers took into serious consideration all these readerly expectations and defined their style and rhetoric on the basis of these demands. One from among their many tools in fulfilling this purpose was the fashioning of a multi-

dimensional– and thus flexible– authorial "I", through which authors endeavored to satisfy (cf. e.g. Liotsakis' paper) or, sometimes, to play (cf. Kemezis' contribution) in   provoking way   tastes.

Last, two papers (those of Marine Miquel and Christoph G. Leidl) focus on descriptions or narrations of spaces (both in a geographical and   topographical sense) in Latin historical texts. They explore the relation of such depictions to the texts' audiences by reconstructing the ancient readers' "horizon of expectations" (H.R. Jauss) as   and topography, thereby allowing them to interpret the specific– and, for modern readers, often peculiar– ways in which Roman historiography refers to spaces and places as strategies to engage with ancient audiences' expectations. These two contributions converge in one main result: historiographical descriptions or narrations of spaces mirror the experience of their Roman readers visà-vis the growing (cf. Miquel's chapter) or contested empire (cf. Leidl's contribution), and thus offer an interpretation of the contemporary state of affairs.

Here are the summaries of the papers: in his contribution, Edwin Shaw explores the idea that the form and content of Sallust's works imply– and construct– a particular audience of their own. Against the context of a fairly wide audience for various forms of historical writing in the late Republic, Sallust deliberately restricts access to his texts to an intellectual and political elite. He does so by setting up various "barriers to entry" within the text itself: (1) he emphasizes the difficulty of reading his works and thus explicitly problematizes the role of the audience; (2) he uses a difficult style characterized by broken syntax, a fondness for antithesis, archaic vocabulary and above all extreme breviates; (3) by selecting Thucydides as a literary model, he marks off his texts as something which requires serious and sustained consideration; (4) he opens his monographs with prefaces whose content configures the texts right from the beginning as being aimed at a philosophically engaged audience. In light of these findings, Shaw concludes that the restriction of Sallust's audience to an educated elite serves to distinguish its lessons from the didactic model of Latin annales and exemplary memorialization, in order to highlight the need for critical reflection on the historical content, and tolink it intoa wider intellectual context, for example to texts such as Cicero's philosophy, which formed part of a contemporary literary exploration of Republican values.

Marine Miquel focuses on geographical descriptions in Latin historical works of the first century BCE. She reaches a twofold conclusion. First, she suggests that the historical texts of this century were intended for an audience who was no longer the political elite, but who consisted of a broader part of the general population. The latter now had access to common ethno-geographical knowledge which was conveyed by texts, by orally transmitted information, by the images located all over the cities, and by spectacles like funeral or triumphal processions. Miquel contends that the spatial depictions in historical works were destined for the , and therefore that they contained the same common ethno-geographical knowledge. Historians seemed thus to try to shape their descriptions to fit to the expectations of their audience. Second, Miquel points out that both Roman and Italian audiences were eager to be told about unknown territories and longed for marvelous depictions, but also   deep interest for the new world that had been built by Roman conquest and most of all by the new ways of representing and looking at it. Ethno-geographical

depictions were thus written by historians as a means to understand better the new setting of the world. They no longer taught the elite how to rule the empire; they rather offered to a broader audience debates and questions on the role that spaces had in the realization of Roman conquest and its future.

In his chapter on Livy's Ab urbe condita, Dennis Pausch takes a close look at how Livy narrates   of the past and, in doing so, addresses the question of what kind of reader Livy had in his mind as the ideal counterpart in his conversation with his audience. Livy's narration of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps asa model case, Pausch shows that the historian wrote for an "imagined reader" who wanted to gain useful knowledge from his reading of historiography as well as the pleasure of being involved in a good story. To both ends of utility and pleasure, Livy uses, as Pausch demonstrates, narrative techniques which activate the reader and make him wonder about the future course of events: by shifting the object of focalization, Livy invites the reader to adopt the perspective of different characters or groups, especially the Carthaginians, while strongly focalized previews into the narrative future are meant to unsettle the reader and to shake his confidence about the assuredly "happy ending" of the story he is reading. In both cases, the resulting involvement in the narrative leads to pleasure, but it also enhances the understanding of history by teaching the reader about what in history is contingent and what perhaps is not.

Aurélien Pulice investigates how Thucydides was received by the Greco-Roman readership during the Julio-Claudian dynasty. His paper examines the commentary of the History that is preserved inP. Oxy. 853 of the second century CE, and whose prototype is dated in the period between the very end of the first century BCE and the first decades of the second century CE. In light of the Byzantine scholia on Thucydides' work, Pulice estimates that the author of this relatively unexplored commentary deviated from the traditional interest in grammatical issues and transferred the focal point of interest to the rhetorical aspects of Thucydides' style. Drawing from both Greek and Latin sources of the period, Pulice contextualizes the rhetorical orientation of the commentary in question and propounds the stimulating idea that the exemplifies a general shift of Thucydides' readership's interest in that period towards the rhetoric dimension of his style and its utility as a prototype in the procedure of acquainting oneself with the Attic language both in schools of rhetoric and generally in educational circles. As is the case with most ancient commentaries, the of P. Oxy. 853, being written by an educated reader of Thucydides and addressed to scholars and young students, reflects the way in which the interests of Thucydides' readership influenced the development of scholarly treatises on his work.

Pauline Duchêne broadens the scope beyond the reception of the fifth-century BCE historians and examines how Seneca satirizes in his Apocolocyntosis Divi Claudii the   of keeping up with current readerly demands in terms of reliability. Seneca programmatically explains to his readers that he will narrate the events pertaining to Claudius' end and what happened to him after his death. Although the Apocolocyntosis isa non-historical work, Seneca fashions himself as a caricature of contemporary historiographers, mocking their current typical declarations about their methodological pedantry and informative validity. The satirical attitude of Seneca as well as of other litterati of the Roman age (such as Tacitus and Lucian) against the ancient historians'

pompous schemes of self-fashioning betray the current readership's familiarity with the fact that Greco-Roman historians, despite the traditional practice of emphasizing the validity of their accounts, were far from reliable informants.

   analyzes the intersection between epistolography and historiography in Pliny's Letters. The key passage of his close reading of Pliny's text isa programmatic statement from the collection's opening letter: collegi non servato temporis ordine (neque enim historiam componebam), sed ut quaeque in manus venerat ("I have collected [the letters] here not as a slave to chronology – since I'm not writing history– but as each one came into my hands." Zatlin interprets this sentence as an expression of how to read the letters as a whole. In a first step, he shows that this opening statement contains a strong allusion to Ovid's Epistulae ex Ponto, by which Pliny establishes his prose letters to be considered as a kind of poetry, and to be read not in isolation, but as a whole and polished book. Zatlin then turns to the effects of Pliny's rejection of historiography: letters like 6.16 and 6.20 (Pliny's account of hisuncle's death on Vesuvius),taken on their own, stand as a kind of history; but when placed within their sequence, they betray their form as epistles, and in doing so, potentially withhold the notoriety, truth, and fame that they presented on first and separated inspection. Audiences, however, may take up the Letters, respond to them, and read and create from them a history that was never written. And this, Zatlin contends, is precisely what Pliny's epistolography calls for.

Tacitus' Annals and its infamously difficult language are the focus of George Baroud's chapter. Taking Tacitus' depiction of the "accession" of Tiberius (Annals 1.7) as a case study, Baroud zeroes in on three kinds of ambiguities: ambiguous chronology (the distortion of time), ambiguous grammatical constructions, and ambiguous diction. He argues that the resulting text is deliberately confusing, and even deceptive – a puzzle that "reproduces" for the audience feelings of insecurity, ignorance, and suspicion that highlight the paranoia and confusion felt by contemporaries at this transitional and deeply uncertain moment in Roman history. Based on ancient theories of vividness – enargeia –, Baroud's proposition is that certain details and intricacies of Tacitus' language reflect andrecreate the atmosphere of the time-periods in question, and are all designed to create a text so intensely vivid that the audience becomes implicated in the narrative itself. Thus, this style compels the audience to become active participants in the text and to undergo an analogous mental and emotional process to those which are experienced by the historical subjects themselves (as Tacitus presents them). Baroud concludes by contending that we must imagine both a private, solitary readership and a public audience listening to historical literature at recitations. He offers some examples of how these diverse modes of consuming historical literature might have conditioned the ways in which the historical writings were received.

In a second chapter devoted to Tacitus, Christoph G. Leidl analyzes the importance of the focalization of space in Tacitus' Histories. He highlights two main aspects of the Histories' narrative strategy: the spatial organization of the content is reflected in the narrative organization of the literary work, and multiple overlaying perspectives invite the reader and/or spectator to reflect on the narrative. The first effect is visible at the beginning of the Histories, where Tacitus

hints at the limits of the annalistic scheme: it becomes more and more difficult to mirror the structure of Roman history in the structure of a literary text. His vision is that of a circle of provinces around a dominating, but no longer indisputable, Rome. Rather than the centre of power, Rome stands at the centre of narratorial perspective. Tacitus does not try to make chronological simultaneity the basic structuring principle of the book, but rather the spatial outline of the empire: events are presented to the reader's eye as they affect the city of Rome. This focalization points to a reader who is sitting in Rome and whose experience of state affairs in his own time is mirrored by Tacitus in his book. A pertinent example of the second effect is Vitellius' visit of the battlefield near Cremona in Tac.Hist. 2.70– 71.1: here, the reader is led to see the battlefield from three different points of view at the same time (Vitellius, his generals, the soldiers; as well as possibly the Cremonans too), none of which can be seen as the correct one. Moreover, Tacitus leaves it to the audience to pass their judgement on the intra-textual observers of the scene, all of whom will be consigned to a sorry destruction.

Vasileios Liotsakis examines Flavius Arrian's Anabasis of Alexander. Liotsakis' main point of argument is that Arrian often composes the account of one and the same event by fashioning for himself multiple authorial persona in order to satisfy simultaneously a number of different, and very often colliding, readerly expectations. Liotsakis organizes his study in four sections pertaining to (a) the Homeric elements of the work, (b) geographical data, (c) the criticisms of Alexander, and (d) the exploitation of myth. On all these levels, Arrian very carefully seeks to render his work a multiply targeting composition, an effort which resembles and stems in many respects from the practices of the Second Sophistic rhetoricians who rendered their speeches attractive to as many listeners as possible from among their audiences.

Adam M. Kemezis takes the crux of the identity of Historia Augusta's author and the work's generic peculiarities as starting points for an original, reader-oriented approach of the work. Historia Augusta, a collection of thirty bioi of Roman emperors and carrying the signature of six authors, has been the object of intense scholarly dispute mainly with regard to the identity of its author(s), with the most prevailing view being that the work is the product of a single author, who hides behind the fiction of multiple scriptures. Kemezis addresses the question of how ancient readers engaged with this puzzle concerning the origins and physiognomy of the work in the process of reading it. Kemezis proposes two hypothetical stages of reading HA: the first stage is that of initial contact. At this phase, readers will leaf through the codex and look for the contents and authors by selectively focusing on the incipits, explicate, and potential headings of each section. In this way, they are very soon faced with intriguing questions pertaining to the work (second stage): it was composed by more than one author, and, equally interestingly, it includes the lives of non-canonical emperors. As Kemezis puts it, "understanding how a text like the HA worked in its historical milieu can illuminate what people in that milieu thought of the relationship of literature to politics in constructing and deconstructing an authoritative past and indeed of the Roman monarchy itself as a continuing but ever-changing political institution". <>

CITY OF CAESAR, CITY OF GOD: CONSTANTINOPLE AND JERUSALEM IN LATE ANTIQUITY edited by Konstantin M. Klein and Johannes Wienand [Millennium Studies in the Culture and history of the first millennium C.E., De Gruyter, ISBN 9783110717204] Open Access

When Emperor Constantine triggered the rise of a Christian state, he opened a new chapter in the history of Constantinople and Jerusalem. In the centuries that followed, the two cities were formed and transformed into powerful symbols of Empire and Church. For the first time, this book investigates the increasingly dense and complex net of reciprocal dependencies between the imperial center and the navel of the Christian world. Imperial influence, initiatives by the Church, and projects of individuals turned Constantinople and Jerusalem into important realms of identification and spaces of representation. Distinguished international scholars investigate this fascinating development, focusing on aspects of art, ceremony, religion, ideology, and imperial rule. In enriching our understanding of the entangled history of Constantinople and Jerusalem in Late Antiquity, **CITY OF CAESAR, CITY OF GOD** illuminates the transition between Antiquity, Byzantium, and the Middle Ages.

CONTENTS

Constantinople & Jerusalem in Late Antiquity: Problems – Paradigms – Perspectives

In the early fourth century AD, the city of Byzantium looked back on an urban history spanning almost a millennium: Greek colonists from Mega ra had founded the city in the first half of the seventh century BC. From the Archaic era to the Roman imperial period, however, the city had remained on the fringes of the larger power blocs, its geopolitical significance being largely defined by its location on the Bosporus, the maritime entrance to the Black Sea. The urban development of the city of Byzantium had always been limited, and it had never in any particular way been connected to the city of Aelia Capitolina in the province of Palestine, an even older city that was located about 1,200 Roman miles away in a different peripheral region of the vast Empire. In the early fourth century AD, the cities of Byzantium and Aelia Capitolina looked back on their own individual and separate millennium-old histories, and yet, at the same time, they faced the beginning of an entirely new era: no other two cities of the late-antique world experienced a more remarkable rise than the cities of Byzantium and Aelia Capitolina. Under their new and renewed names of Constantinople and Jerusalem, they rose to become the most important hubs of both the Christian Empire and the Church for centuries to come, and they were interconnected in an increasingly dense and complex net of reciprocal dependencies. The intensifying links between the two cities were reflected in the mid-620s by Theodore the Syncellus, an attentive observer who even saw in the capital of the Byzantine Empire 'the figure and the example of old Jerusalem'.

The impulse for this momentous and far-reaching development was given by the Emperor Constantine. In AD 326, he ordered the re-foundation of the city of Byzantium on the Bosporus, and only four years later, Constantinople was established as a new imperial residence. Initially, the city of Constantinople was an urban symbol, promulgating the lasting peace after the decisive military victory of Constantine over his remaining rival to the imperial throne. Over the years and decades that followed, the city transformed into the most important center of the Empire and for centuries served as the vibrant capital of the Byzantine Empire. Constantine also encouraged the construction of the first monumental churches in and around Aelia Capitolina / Jerusalem – a region that slowly but steadily transformed into the Christian Holy Land over the next centuries. The evolving Christian topography of the Biblical lands represented the power of Constantine 's newly adopted Christian religion. Jerusalem, with the imperially founded Church of the Holy Sepulcher (consecrated in 335) at its heart eventually became a theological reference point of both the Christian Empire and the Church.

Throughout late antiquity, the two cities were constantly transforming (and transformable) spaces of religious-political interaction between the monarch, the Church, and the population of the Empire. Imperial influence, initiatives by the Church, and projects by individuals transformed and reshaped both these significant urban centers into intertwined symbols of imperial and divine power and triumph. Constantinople and Jerusalem thus became important Christian realms of memory and identity as well as central places for Roman imperial representation and legitimation. The most vivid manifestation is to be found in the imperial building program and the development of sacred topographies in the two cities, but also in the translation of relics, in the imperial ceremonial, in the Church calendar, in the symbolic and pictorial idiom of the monarchy, and in pilgrimage. Each of the two cities, however, would run under their distinct frameworks with their own sets of rules for social interaction, communication, conflict resolution, ritual, and discourse. Presumably the most important factor reinforcing a fundamental asymmetry between the two cities was the emperor's almost continuous presence in Constantinople, but absence in Jerusalem: Heraclius in AD 630 was the first Christian emperor to visit the Holy Land – no less than three centuries after the implementation of the first imperial Church building projects in Jerusalem.

The chapters collected in this volume aim to shed light on the late-antique histories of these two cities, their roles for both the Roman monarchy and the Christian Church, their ideological impact, and their unique relationship of mutual influence and independent development. The individual chapters pursue a comparative approach, illuminating the reciprocal relations and interdependencies of Constantinople and Jerusalem in their late-antique contexts: To confine the role of Constantinople to the political and of Jerusalem to the religious sphere would not do justice to the complexity of both cities. Whereas the importance of religion in

Constantinople is obvious, it is more difficult to answer the question as to how political (or politicized) late-antique Jerusalem actually was and how the character of the two cities changed over time.

The volume examines the roles and perceptions of Constantinople and Jerusalem from a range of different perspectives and various disciplines. An introductory section (Part One: The Centers of a New World Order), with two complementary chapters, locates both cities in their distinct, yet interconnected, late-antique contexts, while the chapters in the subsequent sections cover archaeology and urbanism (Part Two: Urban Topographies Connected), the role of religio-political ideologies (Part Three: The Power of Religion and Empire), and the rising importance of eschatology on the eve of the Arab conquests, including the historic reverberations of imperial entrances to the Holy City up until the 20th century (Part Four: Jerusalem, Constantinople and the End of Antiquity).

In order to understand how the individual parts of this book approach the late-antique cities of Jerusalem and Constantinople within this transformation of world-historical significance and how the individual chapters relate to one another, it will be useful to provide brief outlines of their aims and methods and to introduce their themes and arguments.

Part One: The Centers of a New World Order

The two chapters that form the opening section of this volume provide the basic historical framework. They investigate the long-term developments, and analyze the forces that shaped the late-antique metropolis of Constantinople on the one hand and the Holy Land with Jerusalem as its religious center on the other. The first of the two chapters presents a thorough study of the history of the Holy Land that reevaluates the imperial influence exercised in the Holy City and its surroundings, while the second meticulously investigates the rise of Constantinople with particular attention paid to its relation to Jerusalem.

In the first chapter, Kai Trampedach draws a careful picture of the development and growth of Christian Jerusalem, firmly locating these processes within their Roman imperial context ('The Making of the Holy Land in Late Antiquity'). While for many Christians, and certainly for the emperor Constantine, it must have been clear that Jerusalem was and had always been a very special place, Trampedach shows that the parameters of the city's rise were confined within established traditions and models. This analysis provides an important reminder that while Jerusalem was conceived as the city of God, it became a city of the Caesars as well, who did lend their support to this religious center, but according to the same rules that applied for other cities in the late Roman Empire. At the same time, Trampedach's contribution on the city of Jerusalem firmly introduces important themes for the remaining volume, namely the rise of pilgrimage and desert monasticism, church constructions, as well as the capturing of the city by the Sasanians and the Arabs.

Rene Pfeilschifterinvestigates the political and religious impact of the new capital on the Bosporus and its complex relationship to Jerusalem ('Always in Second Place: Constantinople as an Imperial and Religious Center in Late Antiquity'). Constantinople became the center of the (East) Roman socio-political system which was characterized by an almost unbreakable bond between city and emperor. Pfeilschifter shows that, for Constantinople, being the city of Caesar went hand in hand with aspiring to become the city of God as well. As Constantinople lacked a distinctly pagan or Jewish character (as in Rome or Jerusalem respectively), an infusion of Christian elements faced fewer obstacles than elsewhere, and an important stimulus was the fact that the inhabitants of Constantinople persistently constituted themselves as a Christian community. In the process of becoming a city of God, Constantinople took more than it gave: It imported relics, eschatological meaning, and finally even the True Cross. Jerusalem received less in return, as Pfeilschifter shows. Above all, it did not become a political or administrative center. While Constantinople assumed functions that originally or primarily belonged to Jerusalem, the opposite did not occur. In fact, Constantinople did not become a model for any other city. In spite of all the importance and all the originality of its development, its political power was seen as having been transferred from Rome. Likewise, Constantinople's growing holiness and its importance for salvation only resulted in a Second, New Jerusalem.

Part Two: Urban Topographies Connected

Proceeding from the insights gained by Trampedach and Pfeilschifter in the opening chapters, the three case studies of the second section cast a close look at the urban, art historical, and archaeological developments in Constantinople and Jerusalem.

In their jointly written assessment of the late-antique city walls of Constantinople and Jerusalem, Neslihan Asutay-Effenberger and Shlomit Weksler-Bdolah start from close surveys of the construction methods, building techniques, and defensive qualities of the walls – both case studies are based on extensive archaeological fieldwork ('Delineating the Sacred and the Profane: The Late-Antique Walls of Jerusalem and Constantinople'). Both authors revise previous scholarly assumptions on the structure and chronology of the fortification systems. From there, the contribution tackles questions concerning the role of patronage for the walls and, in particular, what it meant for the population of Constantinople and Jerusalem that their cities became fortified. The contribution discusses the structural similarities and differences between the two fortification systems. It is striking that Jerusalem's walls deliberately incorporated largely unchanged and highly visible building blocks from dismantled Jewish structures, which were obviously meant to demonstrate the victory of Christianity over Judaism and to underline the founder's piety. The walls of Constantinople, on the other hand, were instead meant to express security and imperial power. Thus, the walls of the two cities delineate two different but complementary notions of the Christian monarchy.

In investigating the infrastructure that connected Constantinople with Jerusalem and vice versa, Marlena Whiting employs the concept of 'braided systems ' ('From the City of Caesar to the City of God: Routes, Networks, and Connectivity Between Constantinople and Jerusalem'). As she demonstrates, a complex interplay of three key needs brought about and maintained the communication networks between the imperial and the holy city: the needs of the imperial administration and the military; the need to ensure the movement of goods and trade; and the need newly arising in the fourth century of ensuring the safety and comfort of pilgrims. The roads to Jerusalem served pilgrims so well because they connected theatres of military activity and trade nodes, because they were maintained for transport of important raw materials and money, and because they were also needed to feed the capital, including products such as the holy wine of Palestine.

In his contribution, Konstantin Kleincasts a close look at the presence of saints as well as living holy men and women in the cities of Constantinople and Jerusalem ('Neighbours of Christ: Saints and their Martyriain Constantinople and Jerusalem'). Holy places commemorating the life and passion of Christ took a paramount role in Jerusalem from the beginning, but (in stark contrast to Constantinople) there were no churches and almost no private memorial sites for saints in Jerusalem before the mid-fifth century, and no attempts to incorporate living holy men and women within its walls. Then the situation changed rather suddenly: Klein shows that it was Constanti nopolitan influence in Jerusalem, namely the sojourn of the empress Eudocia, which brought the cult of saints back to the Holy City that once had produced Christianity's first martyr, St Stephen. With the construction of the first church to him between 438 and 460, Jerusalem's ecclesiastical landscape opened up to martyriafor saints, and Eudocia's endeavors were soon to be extensively imitated by other inhabitants of Jerusalem. At the same time, Eudocia also left her footprint on the urban topography of Constantinople. This set the stage for reciprocal influence of Christian topography between the Holy Land and the imperial capital on the Bosporus.

Kai Trampedach's contribution on the Ju stinianic Nea Church further explores this theme, focusing on one of the most ambitious imperial building programs in the history of Jerusalem (' A New Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem? The Construction of the Nea Church (531 – 543) by Emperor Justinian'). In this chapter, Trampedach examines the religious and political dimensions of the urban refurbishment in Justinianic times. Through a trenchant analysis of the archaeological remains and literary sources, Tr ampedach carves out the symbolic meaning of the edifice. Since the church did not highlight a locality of salvific history, our understanding of its position within the dense sacred topography of the Holy City depends on its spatial references and its embedment within the religious calendar of Jerusalem, among others. The analysis shows that the building was meant to compete not only with the Constantinian structures, but even with King Solomon's temple. As Trampedach is

able to show, Justinian's building activities in the Holy Land also served specific political and religious aims in the center of imperial rule in Constantinople.

Part Three: The Power of Religion and Empire

The third part of the volume focuses on the ecclesiastical, political, and symbolic meaning of Constantinople and Jerusalem.

In his contribution, JohannesWienand examines two of the earliest literary sources we have concerning the Constantinian re-foundations of Jerusalem and Constantinople: two orations by the bishop Eusebius of Caesarea, one given in 335 in the course of the inauguration ceremonies for the Constantinian basilica in Jerusalem, the other given in 336 in the imperial palace of Constantinople on the occasion of the festivities for the thirtieth jubilee of Constantine 's reign (' Eusebiu s in Jerusalem and Constantinople: Two Cities, Two Speeches'). Both speeches deal with the ramifications of the Constantinian religious transformation for the Roman monarchy in a religiously heterogeneous empire. As the differences in character between the two speeches clearly show, the two cities of Jerusalem and Constantinople played diverging but complementary roles in the imperial concept of a Christian monarchy on the one hand and in the interpretations by a Christian bishop on the other. A close examination of the two speeches in their ceremonial contexts sheds light on the earliest phase of the formation of a Christian Roman Empire and the two single most important cities of the new era.

Nadine Viermann's contribution shows how references to Old Testament Jerusalem were exploited for the political discourse in sixth-century Constantinople ('Surpassing Solomon: Church-Building and Political Discourse in Late Antique Constantinople '). In particular, King Solomon (as the builder of the First Temple) was used as a role model and point of reference for the staging of a distinct imperial self-perception. Viermann employs the example of the church of St Polyeuctus, built by Juliana Anicia, to show how the building's various semantic levels demonstrate the imperial aspirations of its founder. The contribution does not only discuss the famous epigram inscription with its explicit references to King Solomon but also places St Polyeuctus in the context of Prophet Ezekiel 's temple vision and of the contemporary eschatological expectations of the sixth century. This subversive and presumptuous concept of St Poly euctus is contrasted with Emperor Justinian's reactions to Juliana's provocation that also took on the shape of explicit references to the Biblical king. The contribution shows that Solomon served as a multifaceted bearer of meaning in various communicative contexts. We can thus observe the creation of a topospredominated by the aspect of surpassing the Old Testament king and his Temple.

The chapter by Jan-Markus Kötteranalyzes the impact the Council of Chalcedon (451) had on the status and standing of the Church of Jerusalem within the imperial church system ('Palestine at the Periphery of Ecclesiastical Politics? The Bishops of

Jerusalem after the Council of Chalcedon'). The outcome of the Council enabled Jerusalem to compete with the most important players within the empire-wide church hierarchy (Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch). However, prestige and relevance were not precisely fixed but subject to a broad spectrum of negotiation processes. To understand the quest of the Jerusalem church for empire-wide recognition of privileged status, Kö tter focuses in particular on the relations between Jerusalem and Constantinople, since the support of the imperial court had a crucial impact on the competition for authority and competences within the Church. Through an indepth analysis of the relevant power brokers, their social networks, and their communication strategies, Kötter shows that the Church of Jerusalem enforced its claim to pre-eminence vi s-à-vis the emperor on the one hand and the patriarchates on the other within a complex field between the two poles of autonomy and influence.

Part Four: Jerusalem, Constantinople and the End of Antiquity

The fourth part of the volume provides two case studies on the relationship between Constantinople and Jerusalem on the eve of the Arab expansion and an analysis of the historic reverberations of imperial entrances to the Holy City up until the 20th century.

Paul Magdalino's contribution analyzes the political and religious significance of the Church of St John the Apostle situated between the Hippodrome and the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople ('The Church of St John the Apostle and the End of Antiquity in the New Jerusalem'). The building process was begun under Phokas (602 – 610) and finished by Hera clius (602 – 641). It was the last recorded major religious foundation in Constantinople before the ninth century, and the last new construction of a major, free-standing public church. In more ways than one, therefore, it marks the end of late antiquity and early Christianity in Constantinople. Furthermore, the church was built in a distinctive form at a central and prestigious location. All this raises compelling questions about the motivation behind the remarkable edifice and the choice of its patron saint. Magdalino conclusively shows how all emperors of the early Byzantine era shared a strategy to accumulate relics and to increase the sacred status of Constantinople in order to transform it into a second Jerusalem and not, as a set of contemporary interpretations suggests, into a second Babylon.

James Howard-Johnston's contribution, on the other hand, analyzes the long-term political and religious repercussions caused by the capture of Jerusalem by Persian forces in spring 614 ('Jerusalem in 630 '). On the Roman side, imperial propaganda focused on the True Cross, which had been seized and removed to the Persian capital. On March 21, 630, H eracliu s staged a carefully orchestrated ceremony in Jerusalem to celebrate his victory in the long, hard-fought, ideologically charged war, by which the emperor finally restored Roman dominion over the eastern provinces and returned the True Cross to Jerusalem. The emperor tried to use his triumph to

bring together the main sectarian factions of the Church, and to bring recalcitrant Jews into the Christian fold. His plans, however, were overtaken by the course of events: the existing world order was challenged by the Arab conquest and its underlying ideology of Holy War. Again the prime focus was Jerusalem, claimed by the Arabs as descendants of Ismael. The cities of Palestine capitulated by the spring of 635 at the latest. Three years later, another solemn ceremony was staged in Jerusalem to receive the second Caliph, Umar I, who was marking Islam's emergence as the new world power.

Lutz Greisigertakes in a diachronic array of entry ceremonies into the Holy City of Jerusalem, starting with Biblical paragons such as Melchizedek and King David, and Jesus Christ's entry to Jerusalem according to the Gospels ('From "King Heraclius, Faithful in Christ" to "Allenby of Armageddon" : Christian Reconquistadores Enter the Holy City'). He defines both entries as epochal and – within their respective narratives – revolutionary acts. More than half a millennium later, Heraclius 's visit to Jerusalem and his restoration of the True Cross can be interpreted as a similarly epochal change with striking eschatological undertones. Greisiger traces the impact of imperial entry ceremonies in Jerusalem throughout the Middle Ages when, e.g. Godfrey of Bouillon's entry into the city in 1099 following the Crusader conquest was clearly meant to emulate Hera clius 's visit. The powerful imagery as well as the political importance the act engendered never became unfashionable, as Greisiger demonstrates in his discussion of the entries into Jerusalem by the Russian Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, the German Emperor Wilhelm II – and in particular the highly symbolic and meticulously planned entry by General Allenby, who in 1917 took possession of the city of Jerusalem on behalf of the British Crown and was again likened to Godfrey of Bouillon. Strikingly, the manifold connections between Jerusalem and Constantinople salient in the late-antique adventus narratives became less important for the Christian 'conquerors' of the modern age.

Taken together, the chapters that make up this volume situate the entangled histories of late-antique Constantinople and Jerusalem in their wider cultural settings. As the City of Caesar and the City of God, Constantinople and Jerusalem are nodal points in a fascinating transition from the ancient Hellenistic and Roman worlds to the more regionalized but still deeply entangled medieval cultures between the Mediterranean and the Middle East. <>

Hellenism, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity: Transmission and Transformation of Ideas edited by Radka Fialová, Jiří Hoblík and Petr Kitzler [Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, De Gruyter, ISBN: 9783110795073]

Papers collected in this volume try to illuminate various aspects of philosophical theology dealt with by different Jewish and early Christian authors and texts (e.g. the Acts of the Apostles, Philo, Origen, Gregory of Nazianzus), rooted in and influenced by the Hellenistic religious, cultural, and philosophical context, and they also focus on the literary and cultural traditions of Hellenized Judaism and its reception (e.g. Sibylline Oracles, Prayer of Manasseh), including material culture ("Elephant Mosaic Panel" from Huqoq synagogue). By studying the Hellenistic influences on early Christianity, both in response to and in reaction against early Hellenized Judaism, the volume intends not only to better understand Christianity, as a religious and historical phenomenon with a profound impact on the development of European civilization, but also to better comprehend Hellenism and its consequences which have often been relegated to the realm of political history.

CONTENTS

The individual papers collected in this volume are united by their aim to illuminate the links between Hellenism, early Judaism, and early Christianity. The interconnection of these phenomena defies holistic analysis due to the breadth of the topic; nevertheless, individual case studies can help us grasp different aspects of such ties and answer the question of the impact of Hellenism on the development of early Judaism and early Christianity. This question is rooted in an understanding of Hellenism as an epoch of Greek influence upon the Mediterranean and the Near East as a result of the expansion of Alexander the Great, exerted until the end of the Hellenistic empires and the beginning of Octavian's monarchist rule. However, we need first to emphasize the complex nature of the cultural exchange between these areas: the cultural impulses brought by Alexander vastly transcended the Peloponnese perspective, and in this regard the word "Hellenism" does not fully correspond to such complexity. By "post-Hellenism", a term used occasionally in this book but not yet fully and firmly established, we understand not a historical epoch but rather a sphere in which the secondary consequences of Hellenization are to be found, visible in action, for instance, in the evolution of early Christianity; we also use this term to indicate the continuity between Hellenism and later times. By studying the Hellenistic influences on early Christianity, both in response to and in reaction against early Hellenized Judaism, we intend not only to better understand Christianity as a religious and historical phenomenon with a profound impact on the development of European civilization, but also to better comprehend Hellenism and its consequences, which have often been relegated to the realm of political history.

Most of the studies in this book are based upon the selected papers delivered at "Hellenism, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity: Transmission and Transformation of Ideas", an international conference held in Prague on September 12-13, 2019, and organized by Radka Fialová, Jiri Hoblík and Petr Kitzler, who immediatelly afterwards began preparing this volume. This conference was attended by some twenty-five speakers, not only from Western, Eastern and Central Europe but also from further afield, such as from Argentina, Hong Kong, and the USA, its main objective being to investigate individual topics from the field of early Judaism and Christianity in the context of the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic period, especially with regard to the

history of thought. Both the conference and this volume contribute to a three-year project, funded by the Czech Science Foundation, researched by a team from the Centre for Classical Studies at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences. It is worth mentioning that within this grant-aided project the research team has also been working on the interdisciplinary "Encyclopaedia of Hellenism, post-Hellenism and early Christianity": this encyclopaedia, currently in an early phase of its development, aims to gather current knowledge in the field in the form of extensive entries, scholarly yet accessible not only to experts but also to the Czech public in general, and to boost Czech research into Hellenism, which despite its steady pursuit has been somewhat fragmentary.

To give just some examples of this long-term interest, there is the monograph Recke dedictviv Orientu (Greek Heritage in the Orient; Praha: OIKOYMENH, 1993), by one of the most prolific Czech biblical scholars, Petr Pokorny (1933-2020), which summarizes the political, philosophical and religious development during the Hellenistic epoch. Petr Pokorny was also one of the founders of the interdisciplinary Centre for Biblical Studies, a joint research facility of today's Centre for Classical Studies at the Institute of Philosophy, CAS, and the Protestant Theological Faculty of Charles University in Prague. For nearly thirty years, this Centre and its researchers have been striving to bridge the sometimes artificially fabricated gap between biblical scholarship, a broad conception of early Christian theology, and classical studies, and the present book can be considered one of the fruits of this endeavour. Petr Pokorny died in January 2020, just a few months after the conference at which he delivered his short paper which, thanks to the kind permission of his family, is posthumously printed in this volume. Unfortunately, in January 2021 he was followed by another Czech pioneer in the study of Hellenism, the doyen of Czech classical philology and an eminent historian of Antiquity, Pavel Oliva (1923-2021), who himself devoted two monographs to the history of Hellenism and its context: Recko mezi Makedonií a Rimem (Greece between Macedonia and Rome; Praha: Academia, 1995) and Svet helénismu (The World of Hellenism; Praha: Arista, 2001). It is to the memory of these two great scholars that we dedicate this volume.

***

The chapters in this book are arranged into two slightly overlapping thematic sections. The first section comprises papers illuminating different aspects of philosophical theology dealt with by different Jewish and Christian authors and texts, rooted in and influenced by the Hellenistic cultural and philosophical context; the second section features studies focused on the Jewish literary and cultural tradition and its reception.

The book opens with a study by Jiri Hoblík (Prague) on Philo and the concept of "power(s)" present in his vast oeuvre. Hoblík persuasively demonstrates the philosophical background of Philo's multifaceted understanding of this notion, in this

respect correcting the position held by David Runia. As also well documented in Hoblik's paper, this also provides the philosophical grounding, drawn from various philosophical traditions of Antiquity and transformatively employed to meet Philo's concept of monotheism, which can be seen to underlie his preference for the Greek over the Septuagint's when speaking about "power"; Hoblík also analyses this issue with reference to Philo's attitude to the concept of God's power found in the Torah. For Philo, as Hoblik concludes, the term "power" combines primarily cosmogonic and cosmological but also historical and anthropological elements.

The paper by Ana Carolina Delgado (Los Polvorines, Argentina) also deals with Philo. She focuses on the passage in Philo's Quod Deus sit immutabilis (51-69) in which the Alexandrian seems to deviate from his usual allegorical method of scriptural interpretation and prefers to cling to the literal meaning of the story of God's regret for having created people as recorded in Gen 6:1-8. As Delgado shows in an in-depth analysis, Philo's approach in this instance is most probably influenced by (and to be understood against the background of) Plato's account of "beneficial falsehood" found in his second book of the Republic. In following this argumentative strategy of Plato, Philo himself can interpret the anthropomorphisms as falsehoods beneficial to a certain type of reader, false only on a literal level whilst communicating a doctrinal truth.

With the brief essay by Petr Pokorny (Prague), we turn to the beginnings of Christianity: Pokorny ponders the early Christian redefinition of Hellenistic heritage and the attempt to construct a new Christian paradigm by transforming the Hellenistic and Jewish cultural and religious substrates. He uses as exemplar the Acts of the Apostles, especially Paul's speech in Athens (Acts 17), which documents Paul's confrontation with Greek philosophy, and which reveals not only the legacy of Hellenism, but also a significant tension opposing it.

With the paper by Jan Kozlowski (Warsaw) we stay on that same track leading to the very foundations of the Christian paradigm, to the message of Christ's resurrection conveyed by Lukan Paul in his famous Areopagus speech mentioned above (Acts 17:22-31). As Kozlowski shows, the overall contents of this speech and its grand finale announcing Christ's is only seemingly in discord, since from the beginning Luke alludes to this event through a subtle net of literary and cultural allusions deeply rooted in the shared classical tradition. Kozlowski not only unravels them but also offers possible explanations for this Lukan strategy.

Damian Mrugalski (Krakow) presents an overview of the concept of infinity from the Presocratics through Plato, Aristotle and Middle Platonism to Philo and the Greek Christian thinkers of the 2nd and 3rd centuries. He shows how, via Plotinus, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine and many others, this fundamental philosophical category has evolved, and through the philosophical reflection of the Bible has been transformed, losing its negative connotations, to positively refer to divine infinity.

In her study focused on Origen, to a certain degree summing up her numerous scholarly contributions devoted to the philosophical context of early Christian thought, Ilaria Ramelli (Milan and Durham) shows how this influential Christian theologian and thinker truly embodies the very title of the present volume and the conference upon which it was based. Ramelli abundantly documents how deeply Origen's thinking was rooted in the Greek philosophical tradition and how he applied many of its topics and methods to Christian philosophy and theology, providing in turn novel and original impulses to the development of Christian doctrine. Although Origen disapproved of certain (in his view false) philosophical doctrines, Plato's teaching he considered not only in accord with Christian ideas but his project of "orthodox Christian Platonism" was even conceived by him as a completion of Plato's thought.

Lenka Karfíková (Prague) further illustrates the philosophical background of Christian thought through the example of the arithmological metaphor used for the Trinity in one of the Orationes of Gregory of Nazianzus. While she identifies some similarities of Gregory's account with the speculations found in the Neopythagorean treatise Theologoumena Arithmeticae, an important witness to the influence of the Pythagorean tradition in Late Antiquity, Karfíková — in order to shed further light on the context of Gregory's thinking — also draws our attention to arithmological explanations of biblical texts found across the works of Philo, who himself was called "the Pythagorean" by some early Christian authors.

The second section of this book is opened by Agata Grzybowska-Wiatrak (Warsaw), who focuses on the noted piece of Jewish Second Temple literature, the Sibylline Oracles, specifically on the Titanomachy story found in the third book. Grzybowska-Wiatrak, subscribing to the dating of Sib. Or. 3 to the 1st century BCE and confirming the indebtedness of Titanomachy's account in Sib. Or. 3 to the Book of Jubilees, proposes a new interpretation of the function of this passage by emphasizing the literary dimension of the work, which tends to be overlooked in favour of its religious character.

Next, the paper by Barbara Crostini (Uppsala), focusing on the Prayer of Manasseh, is also grounded in Jewish tradition, or rather, on the ground where Jewish and Christian elements and contexts intertwine to such an extent as to baffle later interpreters in their assessment of this para-biblical text. Taking due note of its different pedagogical uses, Crostini surveys the various occurrences of Manasseh's story from the Didascalia apostolorum through Josephus and 2 Baruch. She ultimately concentrates on the hitherto unpublished 5th-century scholia on the Book of Odes by Hesychios of Jerusalem, also providing glosses on most verses of Manasseh's prayer (printed in the appendix to the paper) including the reference to Manasseh's torture in the bronze bull, which thus represent a conscious continuation of its combined Jewish-Classical exegesis in the Byzantine tradition.

The last two papers, by David Cielontko and Juraj Franek, whom the editors also wholeheartedly thank for their help with reading and editing this volume, focus on material culture. David Cielontko (Prague) deals with the newly discovered "Elephant Mosaic Panel" from Huqoq synagogue. Cielontko carefully examines and scrutinizes recent interpretations of the scenes depicted on the mosaic panel, and offers a new interpretation, suggesting that the mosaic depicts the martyrdom of the Maccabees, recorded in 2 and 4 Maccabees, as seen through the lens of the living collective memory. He also investigates potential issues with the suggested interpretation, such as offering reasons for the mosaic's lack of a mother figure, and corroborates his interpretation by stressing the importance of the Maccabean martyrs' story to the construction of Jewish identity within the context of the changing religious landscape of eastern Lower Galilee in Late Antiquity.

The last paper, by Juraj Franek (Prague and Brno), offers a fresh and original analysis of a Latin Carnuntum defixio, published for the first time in 1926 by Rudolf Egger, which along with a standard invocation of infernal deities, the curse itself being targeted at certain Eudemus, contains two damaged lines in Greek mentioning the "Seal of Solomon". Providing an ample Hellenistic context for the figure of "Solomon the Magician", a victor over demons, Franek proposes a new reading of the damaged Greek two-liner which, according to his emendation, would specify the apotropaic use of the "Seal of Solomon" to protect women during premature birth.

This volume, as a whole, does not pretend to capture in their entirety the complex influences of the Greek intellectual, religious and philosophical traditions upon both early Judaism and early Christianity. However, it is hoped that the studies collected in this book, authored by researchers with differing scholarly and cultural backgrounds and various research foci, convincingly demonstrate how vital the Hellenistic tradition has been to both of these religions, and that when approaching them, their Hellenistic dimension must always be taken into account. <>

THE ETHICS OF URBAN WARFARE: CITY AND WAR edited by Dragan Stanar and Kristina Tonn [Series: International Studies on Military Ethics, Brill, ISBN: 9789004522398]

This volume addresses key ethical issues and challenges of modern urban warfare through ten chapters written by acclaimed experts from eight different countries and three continents. The foreword to the volume was written by Gen. (ret) Mart de Kruif, while Professor Hugo Slim wrote the Introduction.

In addition to providing the reader with the history of the intricate relationship between city and war, authors offer critical insights into the ethical problems arising from various

dimensions of modern urban warfare: conflicting war narratives, imperative of victory, tactical and leadership specificities, use of non-lethal measures, international interventions, in bello peculiarities of urban warfare, introduction of new weapons and technologies, use of war games and simulations in training for urban warfare, and many more.

CONTENTS

Urban Operations, Better Be Prepared by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Mart de Kruif

Urban operations (uo s) are operations across the range of military operations planned and conducted on, or against objectives within a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where man- made construction or the density of population is the dominant feature (ATP- 99 – Urban Tactics, 2017).

Violence by state and non- state actors is increasingly more urban than rural. And the military is increasingly involved in assisting police forces or operating independently to counter this rising phenomenon. The terrorists' attacks, the clearing of parts of Rio de Janeiro since 2018, the fighting in Mosul and operations in and around 'Gaza' are all examples of this renewed dynamic.

What are the reasons for this trend, what are the characteristics of military operations in urbanized terrain and what does it involve for the components of military power? A short overview.

Why are Urban Operations becoming increasingly the rule? First, let's start with Clausewitz. Although the Afghanistan disaster1 might lead to a temporary freeze in counterinsurgency operations, friction2 in our world will not diminish. Climate change, the growing gap between the rich and the poor, religious fundamentalism and worldwide shifts in power will increasingly destabilize our world, which will inevitably lead to more conflicts and the need to include military effects in securing the nations' interests.

Second, most basically, conflicts happen where people live, and in the 21st century, for the first time in world history, more people live in urban areas than in rural ones. This change in global urbanization happened very rapidly. In 1990, the world population was 43% (2.3 billion) urban. By 2015, it had grown to 54% (4 billion). By 2050, nearly two thirds of the global population will live in cities. And while urbanization and population growth are global trends, the world's least developed countries, especially in sub- Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, are growing and urbanizing at a much faster rate than their wealthier counterparts. In some parts of the world, local governance, security and public services have trouble keeping up with the fast increase in population, which offers opportunities for non- state actors to challenge the government and secure their interests. Increasing urbanization might lead to resource competition, contested ownership and control of critical infrastructure.

Third, the growing disbalance between the capabilities of state armed forces on one side and less advanced military powers and irregular groups on the other, has an effect on urban operations (uo s). In order to avoid the increasing capability of long-distance precision effect, irregular groups or weaker military forces will seek cover in urbanized terrain, use the general protection of civilians in armed conflicts and

concentrate their efforts where media will offer them a stage. The example of Gaza demonstrates this perfectly.

To conclude, uo s will become increasingly dominant in military operations in the decades to come, whether we like it or not. So, let's focus on the characteristics which are likely to appear in the near future:

Perfect Terrain for the Defender

The urban environment is a perfect terrain for the defender. Technological advantages are negated. Operations require large numbers of personnel, while armored vehicles cannot maneuver freely. Area weapons such as field artillery are less effective. Roads become impassable fire lanes. Doorways are such obvious entry points they are known in the infantry as funnels of death. Sewers allow the enemy to reappear in areas previously cleared. Snipers, machine guns, IED s, suicide bombers — all can attack from a myriad of directions. Well prepared defensive operations can be a nightmare for the opponent, as the Marines know after Fallujah.

Magnified First and Second Order Effects

The complexity of the urban environment can be framed by a physical system with an underlying functional infrastructure, a human system comprising a population of significant size and varied composition, and an information system. These systems are interconnected as a system of systems, damage or destruction of one will have resounding implications on all. The complexity and interconnectedness magnify any conflict- induced fragilities in these systems.

Multiple Operational Themes

Multiple operations themes at the same time and space. Due to the characteristics of the urban environment, traditional unit operations can easily be fragmented or dispersed, and units will quite possibly be performing multiple missions at the same time. In other words, the 'three- block war' is a reality in modern uo s.

Technological Development

Strong influence of technological development. The fast pace of technological developments in consumer electronics and advanced (home- made) manufacturing possibilities result in a proliferation of commercial off- the- shelf (cots) capabilities for surveillance, and for (home- made) smart weapons. This will have a particularly strong impact on operations in urban environment.

The Resilience of the Urban Adversaries

Non- conventional opponents in uo will be characterized by the presence of extremely resilient state and non- state adversaries. They may not seek to hide the existence of operations or conceal the identity of a sponsor, but simply create enough ambiguity about their location or status to prevent an effective response. They will use minimized command & control, reducing the requirement for communication with senior leaders. They will have modularity in their force elements, combining and scaling interchangeable force elements, weapon systems and other components to be rapidly reconfigurable down to a much lower level than previously seen.

uo s will be characterized by high numbers of casualties, especially among the attacking force. US forces fighting to retake Hue during the Tet offensive in Vietnam suffered an average daily casualty rate (killed and wounded) of 20 per 1000 servicemen, almost three times that suffered during the assault on Okinawa in 1945. Facing such casualty figures, the military might tend to rely on the combination of surveillance assets and airstrikes to target insurgents. While undoubtedly saving military lives, the collateral cost of such a strategy is high in civilian casualties, in civilian infrastructure and in terms of negative reporting in the media.

To summarize the characteristics in keywords: uo s will be more and more congested, cluttered, contested, connected and constrained.

Which leads to the question: how to deal with this? What can we do to prepare our forces for successful uo s, starting tomorrow? In order to provide food for thought, let me use the components of military power to fuel the discussion.

Physically, uo s require professional soldiers who are physically and mentally extremely fit. The intensity of uo s requires having 'the best of the best' boots on the ground. Command & Control needs to be fundamentally differently organized then used to be the case. uo s require an extremely decentralized C2 system,3 in which the Sergeant not only has freedom of action, but also access to supporting assets organized at higher echelons. Communication will mostly go bottom- up, not the other way round. In addition, the availability of access to the design of infrastructure above and under the street level (think of sewers) is essential for planning and execution of uo s. Using this information for the preparation of uo s by means of training in a virtual environment is a prerequisite for deployment. Logistics is

crucial for every military operation, but the size of the logistic demands in uo s is staggering. The use of tremendous amounts of ammunition, the attrition rate, engineer equipment, communications, physical demands, make the uo s the ultimate logistic challenge. Here is where effectiveness beats efficiency. To rapidly be deployed in successful uo s and sustain these, the military need to have enough stock levels of the essentials in place and at hand. The use of state- of- the- art technology is crucial but requires a complete overhaul of existing procurement procedures. Precision effect is key in neutralizing the adversaries and limit collateral damage.

Conceptually, the counterinsurgency (CoIN) principles should be implemented as soon as the situation makes it possible. uo s are characterized by centralized planning, but with extremely decentralized execution. In fact, uo s are 'the Sergeant's wars'. It requires mission command in its ultimate form, with appropriate leadership. The integration of maneuver, fire and effects must be organized at the lowest level, including the peace- time organization of the force. Thus, also enabling to 'train as you fight'. Once established, this integrated and well- trained force at the lowest level will form the key to an effective tactical response against the growing threat of urban warfare. Thus, a response is created to which time is essential. One needs to have a rapidly deployable combined arms force, trained in urban warfare, which can respond quickly on first appearance of insurgents in towns or cities. Time is critical; the more time insurgents will have to prepare defenses, the harder it will be to dislodge them.

The ultimate challenge remains in the mental component of military power. It is the ability to detect, select, train and coach the leadership that is required for successful uo s, which in their ultimate form are a 'clash of wills' and in which professionalism, ethics, courage, resilience and determination will ensure success. Our values will give us the upper hand from a moral point of view, and even in extreme circumstances this will never lead to an inappropriate use of extreme violence. This ethical component of leadership, thus challenged in uo s, must be integrated in detection, selection, training and management development at all levels of our forces. That is our biggest challenge in the years to come.

***

The City and War by Hugo Slim

When we fight in cities we do not fight on a 'battlefield' but in the most intensely human space we have: a place crammed full of human being and human doing. Every city is dense with humanity in its high volume of human persons and its myriad manifestations of human activity. If a rainforest is the most intense accumulation of nature in our world, then the city is the most human space on earth because of its abundance of humanity. The city is, quite simply, the most human environment we have. This makes it a very particular battle space and a particularly tragic one in which so much of humanity can be damaged and destroyed. The city's profusion of humanity makes it a very challenging place to fight and win humanely.

This short chapter on the essential humanity of the city is intended to offer some general context to the more detailed ethical discussions which follow in this book. I will look at what constitutes a city, why cities are so important in war and why they are so operationally challenging for humane militaries and humanitarians alike. I start by looking back at the invention of the city and how it has evolved to combine such a density of human significance in a relatively small space. I then look at how the human intensity of cities has inevitably made urban space integral to warfare and humanitarian aid. Finally, I wonder if we can find some ethical and legal comparison between the environment as a space of nature and the city as a space of humanity which could justify greater restraint in urban warfare.

First, of course, I should define what I mean by city. I will use the word rather archetypally, but I recognize that there are vast differences of type in urban space and urban warfare. There are differences of scale between mega, large, medium and small cities, and differences of geography between littoral cities and inland cities. There are political and economic differences between rich and poor cities, capital and commercial cities. There are also different areas of any particular city whose distinctive characteristics are carved out by function, class, ethnicity and their proximity to the city's core or periphery as city centre or suburb. Increasingly today, there are also 'smart cities' that are operated digitally, and other largely manual cities. Urban warfare similarly takes different forms depending on whether its purpose is to raid, surveil, protect, suppress or control certain areas or assets of a city, or to besiege and conquer a whole city to then govern or destroy it. In this article, I am thinking mainly of large- scale cities and all kinds of urban warfare within them.

The Invention of the City

Cities were invented as new forms of human living about 5000 years ago. In areas around the Nile, the Euphrates and the Indus, and in ancient areas of China and Southeast Asia, human communities managed to create agricultural surpluses which enabled them to move beyond hunter- gatherer groups and simple mobile agriculture. They gathered together in larger groups of tens of thousands of people and began to settle and build elaborate human communities. No longer was everyone a farmer of some kind as expanding economies enabled specialization in crafts, trade, learning and government. These various functions of cities saw their architecture combine sacred, commercial, educational and military structures. Cities became the seats of governments and Gods. Cities like Beijing, Jerusalem, Persepolis, Rome, Angkor, Cusco and Mecca had cosmic significance as sites where heaven and earth touched, usually mediated through the person of a semi- divine ruler and impressive temples of some kind. This gave key capital cities extraordinary symbolic and ritual power alongside their political and economic might. Such auras still surround many big cities. Beyond their worldly and religious power, big cities represent a nation and embody the achievement, spirit and ideals of a people. They are massive markers of identity and pride.

As cities developed across the world, they became sites full of humanity. First in the sense that they contained lots of different people in an extremely dense space. Secondly, in the sense that they became the most complete manifestations of human accomplishment. Cities are filled with everything that humans do, think, create, exchange, dream and desire. They are full of business and trade, learning and religion, homes and offices, art and architecture, technology and crafts, food and fashion, associations and organizations, sports and entertainment. Writing was invented in a Sumerian city and the first book ever written, The Epic of Gilgamesh, starts and ends in a city to ponder the question of urban governance. All this goes to show that the whole human world is in a city. The city is an exceptional site of human totality which includes all manner of people and every kind of human activity and achievement.

Cities do not exist on their own as sealed, insular human settlements. They are an integral part of a single system of trade and government with the land, water and airspace around them. The relationship between a city and its hinterland, waterways, airways and digital networks is essential to urban and rural populations

alike. All cities are profoundly porous via their roads and ports which make urban and rural space essentially one system. Therefore many urbanists describe cities metaphorically as living organisms. Cities are 'alive 24/ 7' and they 'breathe' in and out through the seas, roads, rivers, seas, airways and satellites around them. When these airways, or arteries, are blocked and cut in war, then cities are no longer 'fed' by their surroundings and they begin to choke and die. So do the peri- urban communities around them.

The City as Integral to War

The dense human significance of cities means they have always been integral to war. Their operational significance as seats of political, military and economic power is matched sometimes by their symbolic power. This makes them key actors and objectives in war. They are contested as prizes, detested as sites of enemy power and routinely fought over. Homer's Iliad about the battle for Troy remains a foundational text in Western imagination and normalizes the fact that wars gravitate around cities. Sometimes it makes military sense to go around a city to crush an army on the move. At other times, it is inevitable that one must attack a city to crush an army and a government that is making a stand within it. Wars typically culminate in cities resisting or falling.

Many cities today started life as fortresses. Alexander developed his Asian empire across a string of fortified cities. Many of these, like Kandahar in Afghanistan today, were originally named after him. Like Kandahar, Alexandrian cities have seen war many times over the centuries while also growing into complete cities full of every kind of human activity. The city was introduced to a relatively backwards northern Europe by the Romans who also built a network of military garrisons across the countryside with which to conquer and pacify northern European tribes and fold them into empire. It was often military reasons and not commercial ones that dictated that cities were founded on water as ports, on hills as castles and on trade crossroads for taxation. The sites of many cities were chosen for strategic reasons of defense, oversight, pacification and control. As such they were built with military and governmental purpose. Their combination of political, military, natural, economic, religious and artistic power makes cities intrinsically strategic. Wars are often led, managed and resourced from cities even if military forces are fighting over a much wider area. All this makes it strategically unlikely that war can avoid cities.

The sheer density and intensity of humanity in cities makes it especially terrifying when war comes to the city because so much is at stake for so many. Urban warfare is fought out in the human environment not the natural environment. An urban battlespace does not see military forces fighting in nature – in a field, at sea, in the air, in the desert or in the jungle. Urban warfare means fighting in the most intensely human space on earth. Unless people evacuate en masse, urban warfare is fought amidst huge numbers of humans who are not actively fighting. It is also fought in, through and around thousands of sites which humans have made, like: homes, businesses, shops, markets, offices, banks, water, gas and electrical infrastructure, supply depots, factories, schools, hospitals and universities, and on which they depend for human growth and flourishing. Urban warfare is also fought in and around places of human beauty and spiritual purpose like religious sites, concert halls, museums, sports arenas and gathering places for ritual and social events.

This totality of humanity in urban space poses a fundamental moral problem for humane military forces fighting in cities: how to kill and destroy within reason in space that is so rich in human construction and human life? This question is well addressed in much of the discussion of military ethics in this book which rightly centres on the conduct of hostilities in urban warfare. But the question of reasonable humanitarian aid in cities is also an important one, not least because it must always be the intention of humane military forces to enable the provision of humanitarian aid wherever it is needed.

So, what is required of humanitarian aid in cities? The answer is almost everything. This is because a battlespace of total humanity requires a total humanitarianism. People who are wisely fleeing cities in advance of attacks need support as displaced people. People trapped in cities need help with evacuation or, if they are staying, with many of their basic needs as military action takes its toll on their livelihoods and living conditions. Failing businesses mean people need cash to buy food if markets are working, or food itself if they are not. Sickness and injury in the civilian population usually increases in war while clinics and hospitals are struggling for salaries and supplies while key workers may also be fleeing. Essential infrastructure for water, sewerage, electricity and rubbish collection must be maintained to save lives and prevent epidemics. Schools also need to be continued wherever possible as sites of learning, social reassurance and protection for children. Some humanitarian

aid will need to be delivered directly and at scale, but much can also be diffused indirectly through municipal and community organized humanitarian initiatives that always spring up during crisis. Civilians always help themselves as much, and often more, than they are helped by aid agencies.

War does not just destroy cities. It also creates new ones. As people flee away from a city, or from one part of a city to another, they change urban space forever as new unplanned urban space is suddenly made. These new impromptu settlements require significant aid as they start life as humanitarian cities. Maiduguri in Nigeria has seen a massive influx of displaced people from Boko Haram's largely rural insurgency in the last ten years. Before the war, Maiduguri was a relatively small regional town of tens of thousands. Now it is destined to be a city of millions. Cities in Turkey and Germany will forever be changed by the four million Syrians welcomed as refugees by Turkey and the 1.2 million welcomed by Germany. Most of these people will never return to their Syrian cities which will be greatly diminished in the years to come. Cities in Lebanon and Jordan have been similarly made and changed. The large refugee camps of Somalis in Kenya are effectively refugee cities today, as are the displaced camps of people in Darfur which are now fast becoming towns and cities, some of them being newly fought over as such.

How Can We Protect Cities in War?

Many humanitarians and several States increasingly feel that urban warfare is an especial abomination because of the immense and inevitably indiscriminate damage and injury that unguided and explosive weapons inflict on civilians and civilian objects in such dense human space. But is there some way we can expect special protection or immunity for cities beyond current legal regulation because of their especially dense humanity? Perhaps a comparison between cities and the natural environment could inform our thinking and create a new level of exemption for cities during war.

Humanitarian ethics increasingly places great value on the non- human life of the natural environment as part of our green turn to limit climate change and conserve biodiversity. The laws of war deem the environment worthy of an essentially civilian character because it is overwhelmingly natural, precious in itself and a vital instrument for human survival. In short, the environment should be protected and beyond the fight. The city, as we have seen, is overwhelmingly human and so intrinsically precious as a site of humanity. Its infrastructure and activity is also

instrumental to human survival for millions. So, perhaps cities are also deserving of an essentially civilian character? If the environment is dense nature then the city is dense humanity. A comparison with the environment might encourage us to see cities differently and worthy of protection and immunity as a whole. Maybe there is moral scope for arguing that all cities should be placed beyond the fight.

Sadly not. There is, of course, a difference between nature and humanity. Nature is genuinely disinterested in our human fights and has no moral agency within them. Unless nature is coerced and conscripted into our wars as stone,

trees, hills, metal, water, fuel, mules, dogs, horses and elephants it has no part in war. Nature is wholly abused in our wars. This is not true of cities. Urban humanity is much more morally ambiguous in war. Military forces, political leaders and their various command centres and operational units live in cities. Many civilians in cities take sides in war and play active and consenting roles to support the fight. They are not all neutral and coerced into war like trees and stones. The fabric of the city is routinely adapted to war for military purposes so that large parts of it become military objects and objectives by human choice. Nature does not fight back deliberately in war. As human constructs, cities do fight back. Because a city can contain deliberately warring humans as part of its total humanity it cannot merit total immunity and an essentially civilian character as a whole, but only in part.

This is the tragedy of urban warfare that unless warring parties are prepared to leave the city and fight outside it then urban warfare is morally justifiable and militarily necessary. Attacking part of a city may not be the same as attacking virgin rainforest. Dense humanity is morally problematic in a way that dense nature is not. This means that cities cannot expect general immunity but only specific protections for certain people and certain places. Urban warfare cannot be abolished. It will remain with us for the foreseeable future and create the many challenges for military ethicists and humane military forces that are so importantly explored in this book.

***

Modern human civilization emanates from primordial rural communities, primitive rural societies and overall, a rural habitat which seems to be the original natural environment of human species. Early humans relied on scavenging which eventually evolved into hunting and gathering; then societies transformed into pastoral and horticultural/ agrarian organizations which were intrinsically rural. It

was only after the industrial revolution that mankind started to shift towards urban environments en masse. Of course, cities have been home to people for more than five millennia now, but it wasn't before the mature stages of the industrial age that man became a predominantly urban species. After the symbolic mark of 50% percent of all humanity living in cities1 was passed, we could no longer perceive rural environment as man's natural habitat; on the contrary, by mid- 21st century more than two thirds of humanity will be living in cities. Without a shadow of a doubt, modern humanity is, and will increasingly continue to be, an urban species with cities as its natural habitat. Future of mankind unquestionably lies in densely populated megalopolises.

Regardless of how our societies were structured, where and how humanity moved during history, it seems as though the devastating phenomenon of war remained our permanent shadow – always and everywhere. As extended periods of peace are seldom and represent 'blank pages in history', to phrase it in a Hegelian style, it would be unwise to expect that our future will be rid of war, despite all of our noble efforts to prevent, hinder and mitigate this 'most ruthlessly amoral of all human activities' and establish the Kantian ideal of perpetual peace. Even the most prominent pacifists among us seem to be aware of the truism that 'so long as there are men, there will be wars'. Thinking about future wars, we cannot but wonder just how profoundly will the shift in mankind's natural habitat affect different aspects of war – what new tactical dilemmas, humanitarian issues, and potential moral pitfalls will stem from the fact that soon almost three quarters of the entire global population will be living in densely populated cities?

Urban warfare has, of course, always presented armed forces with a plethora of specific difficult challenges; we can only expect these challenges to grow more intricate, severe, demanding and morally ambiguous as technology advances, as urban infrastructure becomes more elaborate, and as urban population rapidly increases. This Volume represents a bold but very necessary attempt to provide both academics and practitioners with invaluable insights into the multifold complex dimensions of urban warfare in order to restrain violence, diminish devastation and minimize death in the most densely populated points on the planet – homes of civilization and humanity. Acclaimed and renowned authors, with diverse cultural and professional backgrounds and fields of expertise, provide unique perspectives on various aspects of urban warfare, and the relationship between city and war in

general: the very nature of modern cities, tactical challenges arising from modern urban warfare, the impact of narratives in urban warfare, the ethical restrictions on military power imposed by urban theatre, ethical challenges of tactical- structural changes occurring to adapt to urban warfare, important historical lessons and precedents, modern urban sieges, the intricate relationship between necessity, proportionality, and discrimination in the context of urban warfare, ethical challenges and dilemmas brought upon by 'eviction' tactics, the use of unmanned weapon platforms in sieges, the implementation of autonomous weapons and 'killer robots' in urban environments, the place and role of simulation games in ethical education in the context of urban warfare, and many more.

In the Foreword of the Volume, titled 'Urban operations, better be prepared', Lieutenant General (retd.) Mart de Kruif introduces readers to key characteristics of urban operations that will inevitably become the dominant form of military operations in future decades. General de Kruif explains how in urban operations the terrain works in favor of those who defend, how first and second order effects are magnified, how multiple operational themes coexist at the same time in urban warfare and how new technological advances will surely heavily impact military operations in urban settings. The former Commander of the Royal Netherlands Army, who headed the Regional Command South of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, also warns of the challenges met by armed forces in urban operations when faced with 'non- conventional opponents', and concludes that the 'mental component of military power' will be of extreme importance for future successful urban operations.

Hugo Slim's analysis of the very essence of the modern city and what it represents to humanity today wonderfully demonstrates that the city is 'quite simply, the most human environment we have'. In the chapter titled 'The City and War', Slim illustrates the birth, or 'the invention of the city', guiding readers through the ontological nature of urban settlements and their significance to mankind. Such nature and paramount importance of cities in modern human societies make them a permanent and fundamental factor in the context of war: as Slim notices, 'wars typically culminate in cities resisting or falling'. The cities are 'intrinsically strategic' in their essence, and it really seems highly unlikely that wars can bypass and avoid cities, regardless of how future commanders try. Urban warfare, unfortunately, brings about destruction of the most valuable, infrastructural, educational,

economic, cultural and spiritual sites, and requires 'total humanitarianism' in our efforts to alleviate suffering and desolation in urban environments. Slim concludes that despite the high moral and human cost of urban warfare, it cannot be abolished and that it will 'remain with us for the foreseeable future' generating difficult ethical challenges.

Narratives are fundamentally important for our everyday understanding of reality and various complex phenomena that surround us. They help attribute meaning to seemingly meaningless occurrences and provide explanations and causality for things that we do not completely understand – narratives help bring 'chaos to order'. In the chapter 'One damned thing after another: Battle of narratives and urban- war chaos', Patrick Mileham examines the dynamics and impact of confronting narratives in war, more particularly in urban warfare where multiple concurrent narratives exist and, so to say, compete. Every war implies the existence of two opposed, 'binary narratives', and in all warfare, including urban warfare, our aim is to 'destroy our enemy's narrative, chapter by chapter'. But, Mileham wonders, just how many narratives there are in modern urban warfare and 'does any side have a monopoly if truth', i.e., an exclusively 'right' narrative? Finally, the author warns of implications of excessive fixation on 'The Narrative' and reminds us of the practical elusiveness of the truth, especially in the state of war in which human subjective interpretations of reality are perhaps both the most pronounced and the most dangerous.

The chapter written by Srdan Starcevic and Ilija Kajtez, titled 'Enyo's wrath: War and the Fate of the City', provides a deep and detailed discussion about the historical relationship between the phenomenon of war and the city, reaching back to the Neolithic. From Mesopotamia, India and China to the Mediterranean, ancient Greece and Rome, larger and larger settlements were being created and never did they escape or evade war. Almost like there is a 'deeper connection between war and suffering of the city', a necessary metaphysical connection represented in Greek deities such are Ares, god of war, and Enyo, the goddess of war who especially enjoyed sieges and destructions of cities, who 'exemplified the horror of destroyed cities'. Modern cities share their faith and destiny with the ancient ones – they are intrinsically included in war destruction. The authors present us with numerous historical examples of urban devastation in recent centuries in order to bring us to the conclusion that urban warfare immensely augments and amplifies the

importance of moral conscience of commanders who always carry both the 'imperative of victory' and the duty to 'avoid unnecessary risk' on their shoulders. It is only through extensive and meaningful education and training that includes a deep inspection into social and humanistic sciences that armed forces can form officers with the necessary moral values and developed ethos, required for commanding in urban warfare.

Modern and future urban warfare also presents a whole set of significant challenges for military leadership, including ethical ones. Florian DemontBiaggi critically examines the 'strongest gang model' which aims to transform, inter alia, 'military tactics, command mindset, the use of technology and training' in order to better adapt to urban warfare. This model advises 'small, fast expert units, which operate independently', and which are envisioned to be more efficient and effective in urban warfare circumstances. Such approach places greater responsibility, especially moral, on small- team leaders, as there is an evident 'shift in command structure from command and control to mission command' which makes lower-level decision making more important than ever. Ethical issues arising from mission command are particularly highlighted by the intricacies and complexity of urban operations. In his studious analysis titled 'Virtues for the Smallest Gang? A Contribution to the Leadership Ethics of Urban Warfare', the author recognizes the specific demands of ethical military leadership and leader- virtues in the context of tactical level leadership in urban warfare, and raises the issue of perils of 'too much autonomy' given 'too early' to the 'smallest gang leaders'. The smallest gang model, admittedly innovative and 'a good idea' for urban warfare, can only be successfully implemented after serious and substantial deliberation and scrutinization of its ethical and moral demands on military leadership which must then be addressed in military training.

A somewhat different perspective of intricacies of urban warfare is added to the Volume by Hans- Peter Kriemann, who reflects on some practical issues of urban clashes which occurred during the conflict in Kosovo. 'The Kosovo Conflict as a Milestone in International Intervention Practice' represents a chapter which is perhaps more focused on matters of dynamics between political decision making and military action, evaluated through the lens of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999. Nevertheless, implications and repercussions of the bombing campaign were also inevitably reflected in urban areas, which contributes to the

argument presented by virtually all authors in the volume – namely, that war cannot avoid the city, and that urban warfare is an inherent and inseparable segment of all modern and future armed conflicts.

Nick Melgaard has focussed his research on just war theory in contemporary conflict. In his contribution to the volume, he contemplates the use of media and communication technologies as tools of, in his words, digital propaganda and therefore non- lethal weapons. In his contribution, he suggests that the ethical mores in armed conflicts have also changed and that it is therefore necessary to explore the causes of the changes and that it might be necessary to modify the ethical principles in the conflict as well. Coercion and interference come to mind. However, as the effects might not be only negative, for example the absence of physical violence, more than one ethical aspect becomes important. These are considered under the title: 'An Honest Siege: "Weaponising Honesty" and Non- Lethal Measures in Urban Operations'.

The next urban battlefield to be focused on is the seaport of Veracruz on the Gulf of Mexico. The major port city played an essential role in the AmericanMexican war between the United States and Mexico raging from 1846 to 1848. Author Eric Patterson, who is officer and commander in the Air National Guard, centralizes on just- war theory in his research. In his chapter, the Battle of Veracruz serves to dwell upon certain jus in bello principles. U.S. General Winfield Scott knew the dangerous diseases such as malaria and yellow fever which would threaten his troops in the tropical zone with the season advancing. By analysing Scott's choices, the author sheds light on the principles of military necessity, proportionality, and discrimination and how work together to assist the commander in making decisions. It does not give away the author's conclusions to reveal that Scott launched the first ever large- scale amphibious assault conducted by US military forces and bombarded the city with artillery until surrender and occupation. The contribution helps to understand the multi- dimensionality of moral obligations which leaders have in responsibility for human lives.

Charles Knight and Seumas Miller also look back at historical examples and more recent ones. From the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942 in World War ii to the 1985 battle of Grozny and even cases such as Mosul, Raqqa and Marawi, a line is drawn. To overcome hidden defenders who are protected by walls and buildings, the attacker of an urban area is likely to use high explosive firepower resulting in massive

destruction. The authors argue that weapons which force enemies to leave the urban space means lower casualties on both sides. Yet, eviction measures such as chemical weapons and fire are either banned in war or have moral challenges. So, in their contribution titled 'The Ethics of Eviction Agents Versus Bombardment in Urban War: Context for the Drone Debate' the authors examine several weapon systems in both a legal sense as well as an ethical sense. As a theoretic exercise to understand the ramifications of a weapon system, flame throwers which were used at the end of World War ii are also analysed. The question at core is which weapon type causes the least suffering for combatants (on both sides), and civilians (on both sides) and is not costly in terms of destruction, yet still effective. This is the key to the authors' conclusion that some weapons potentially could 'square the circle' such as direct fire explosives and non- lethal chemical weapons. Finally, the implications for emerging technologies are drawn, particularly to autonomous weapons in an urban surrounding.

The following study is dedicated to the 2016– 17 battle of Mosul, considered the toughest urban battle since World War ii. The number of civilians killed alone is estimated between seven and forty thousand; almost one million people were displaced and large parts of the city were destroyed. Early on, the author Maciek Zajac stresses the culpability of the Islamic State for causing a humanitarian catastrophe by effectively taking the inhabitants of Mosul hostage. He first provides an overview of the military campaign by the Iraqi Government forces with allied militias and international forces to retake the city of Mosul in Northern Iraq from the Islamic State. Ensuing, the circumstances of the Battle of Mosul are analysed in an ethical framework. The author concludes, Mosul shows all the signs of a tragedy of a hostile siege; a dilemma situation which can certainly reoccur. To prevent another Mosul, the author proposes unmanned technologies instead of heavy bombardment as a viable, if not the best way to assault hostile cities. Semi and fully autonomous robots in warfare comply with the jus in bello principles and limit both military and civilian death toll, the author argues. He furthermore suggests to take the specific scenarios more into consideration when moral and legal aspects of autonomous weapons are discussed.

In the article 'Can robots save the city? Ethics, urban warfare and autonomous weapons' by Jenna Allen and Deane- Peter Baker, the authors address the ethics and necessity of autonomous weapons of war. Arguably one great challenge for law-

abiding and ethical armed forces is that ranged weapons that are advantageous in rural warfare are less effective or even counterproductive in urban areas and could be replaced by autonomous weapons systems for fighting from a distance. The potential ability of such systems to operate within and around urban structures – rather than destroy them (urbicide) – while keeping human operators at a safe distance seems a promising tool. Autonomous weapons, however, are controversial. It is the authors' opinion that there has been a well- established normative shift towards individual rights- based morality that places a high value on the right to individual life, resulting in self- defense being seen as the only legitimate reason for states or 'belligerents' to use force. Therefore, the ethics of war, however, should not be treated as normatively 'pure'. Instead, it should be assumed that war, while terrible, is sometimes necessary to achieve just ends, and that the ethics of war should therefore be seen as a form of principled pragmatism. Allen and Baker argue that if one focuses exclusively on 'moral liability' one runs the risk of slipping into contingent pacifism. They consider that the just war tradition is not a normatively 'pure' approach to the ethics of war but has long been a negotiated compromise between the necessity of waging wars for just ends, on the one hand, and the desire to minimize the harms of war, on the other.

Experimental wargaming serves as 'a promising new tool for both the social science and wargaming communities' to 'answer broader questions about decision- making, crisis behavior and patterns of outcomes'. To this end, in March 2021, a team of researchers from unsw Canberra, in collaboration with experts on future warfare and wargaming from North America, Europe and Australia, conducted what appears to be – based on a preliminary literature review – the world's first wargaming experiment, focusing primarily on ethics.

Analyzing the results of the first wargame experiment: Advancing our understanding of the ethics of lethal autonomous weapons are important in future warfare. The authors believe that any serious assessment of the ethics of lethal autonomous weapons must seriously weigh the effectiveness of such systems in achieving the goals of belligerents in just conflicts. While this may seem to be what we hope for, attempts to limit warfare without balancing it against other considerations often create more ethical problems than they solve in the increasingly complex landscape of contemporary warfare.

The presence of non- combatants during the conduct of hostilities and the huge risk of wounding or killing them especially in an urban environment is also the starting point for Ioanna Lekea. Particularly for the protection of civilians, military personal must be familiar with international humanitarian law and ethics. So, here approach originating from practical experience presents an educational tool in support of the future officers' learning process. The idea is to prepare military personnel for ethical dilemmas and legal grey zones. Introductory remarks explain why difficult situations cannot be dealt with if the learning focusses remains focused solemnly on the theoretical background. Other teaching methods are also ruled out. In a following proposition, military simulation games are presented as a near- to- real experience for cadets with more details to the game scenario and its two parts. In fact, the game has been played by cadets and the extent to which virtual experience on the battlefield could be provided to them is explored in a following part. Were the hard choices ethical or unethical, lawful or unlawful? The results of an evaluation point to a better understanding of the complexity of urban warfare and immanent difficulties which can be achieved by the simulation game. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RELIGION AND WAR edited by Margo Kitts [Cambridge Companions to Religion, Cambridge University Press, 9781108835442]

Why is religion intertwined with war and violence? These chapters offer nuanced discussions of the key histories and themes.

This Companion offers a global, comparative history of the interplay between religion and war from ancient times to the present. Moving beyond sensationalist theories that seek to explain why 'religion causes war,' the volume takes a thoughtful look at the connection between religion and war through a variety of lenses - historical, literary, and sociological-as well as the particular features of religious war. The twenty-three carefully nuanced and historically grounded chapters comprehensively examine the religious foundations for war, classical just war doctrines, sociological accounts of religious nationalism, and featured conflicts that illustrate interdisciplinary expressions of the intertwining of religion and war. Written by a distinguished, international team of scholars, whose essays were specially commissioned for this volume, **THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RELIGION AND WAR** will be an indispensable resource for students and scholars of the history and sociology of religion and war, as well as other disciplines.

CONTENTS

The association of religion with war is as old as our earliest writings from China (Yates 2003) and the Near East (Ballentine 2015) and continues to find expression in contemporary discourse. Despite myriad laments about this association, it is indisputable that religious rhetoric has supported military aims across geographies and historical eras. While there is arguably a propagandistic dimension to some of this rhetoric, there is no good reason to suppose that warriors on the ground have been indifferent to it. For instance, it is well-known that some Christian crusaders were inspired by portents, dreams, prophecies (Housely 2008; Gaposchkin 2017) and by devotional songs (Riley-Smith 1997), and that the same have inspired passionate millennial groups in the USA and abroad (Graziano 1999; Filiu 2011; Barkun 2013; Hegghammer 2017). Even for seemingly secular wars, just war principles rooted at least in part in religious thinking (e.g., Gratian, Aquinas) seep into war's justifications, as do inspirational fighting models based on religious legends (e.g., David, Huseyn, Arjuna). However secular the aims of military leaders today, no astute historian can deny that religion has played a role in shaping the way war has been imagined for centuries. It still does so, as we see in today's strident religious nationalisms. In short, the subject matters.

This volume explores the link of religion with war under four rubrics: classical foundations; just war; religious nationalism; and featured conflicts. Part Ion classical foundations, consisting of eight chapters, investigates war as conceived at the origins of eight major religious traditions. Part II addresses just war theories as lodged in religious thinking, and Part III treats various expressions of religious nationalism, a subject with special relevance to contemporary times. Part IV features conflicts that illustrate interdisciplinary approaches to religion and war, touching on rituals, poems, piety, fierce goddesses, messianic rebellions and autonomous fighting groups thriving outside the margins of the Mughal state. This essay introduces the four parts and then summarizes each chapter.

CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS

While definitions of religion will be endlessly debated, that religion does bear on classical wars and literature about wars may be ascertained in part by art and in part by the attribution of extraordinary passions to warriors. Beyond vivid renderings of military triumph overseen by gods (Bahrani 2008) and poetic visions of gods leading battles (Kitts 2013, 2017), we have ancient reports ascribing a conspicuous religious enthusiasm to the fight, as if to elevate the fighting register. We see this, for instance, in zeal for the holy land, in righteous indignation about perceived wrongs and in devotional performances on the battlefield, all of which conceivably endow battles with the transcendent mantle of "cosmic war," as Mark Juergensmeyer has applied the term to certain terroristic impulses (2016). Rituals, both individual and communal, might confer some of this religious enthusiasm (Kitts 2010, 2018, 2022 and Chapters 19 and 20). On an individual level, bodily purifying, swearing oaths, praying and anointing weapons historically have sanctified warriors before battle,

whereas communal rituals, such as marching in formation, singing, waving standards and cursing enemies have been thought to strengthen solidarity (Von Rad 1991[1958]; Riley-Smith 1997; Hassner 2016; Gaposchkin 2017; Chapter 17). Postwar commemorations, such as passion plays, poetry, dance, art and pilgrimages, can add to the religious fervor, particularly when these celebrate victors or lionize the fallen (Sells 2003; Chapters 6 and 20). A further influence might be legends of betrayal and of the ethical dilemmas of heroes, which surely too disturb and engage audiences (Chapters 4 and 12). It would seem impossible to grasp war in religious imagination without studying these very human experiences.

At the same time, war as conceived in religious imagination can enjoy an obvious freedom from human experiences, or at least be not entirely tethered to them. Some of our earliest Near Eastern narratives, for instance, herald heavenly wars culminating in the imposition of order over chaos: Sky gods subduing riotous waters is a popular theme (Collins 2003, 2007; Fishbane 2004; Wyatt 2005; Schwemer 2007, 2008; Kitts 2013, 2017). While these violent encounters set in illo tempore may have signaled a feeling of relief for some audiences, others arguably were thrilled by them, as we can ascertain from reportedly regular oral performances of the Babylonian Enuma Elish and as we see on Mesopotamian cylinder seals depicting fantastic deicides, raging monsters and god-on-monster combat.' A certain glee in myths that violently impose order might be inferred too by the astonishing number of eschatological expectations in world religions, although such expectations are not only triumphal but can be mired in cataclysmic predictions and/or messianic hopes (see Chapters 1, 2 and 15). A diversity of aims for such narratives thus must be acknowledged, including aims to entertain as well as to comfort.

Narratives of religious war can be fantastic but also sentimental. Many religious war tales are set within cosmic schemes that emphasize mysterious forces at work in history and worldly conditions that have gone somehow awry. It is not uncommon for scriptures and classical epics to bemoan a pattern of fallen ages and to express a certain tristesse (e.g., the Heike Monogatari, the Mahabharata), qualities that make them universally appreciable and poetic. On the fantastic side, and especially within the epic genre, an effort to remediate chaos and suppress sinister foes may occasion the harnessing of supernatural weapons and godlike powers (Arjuna and his Gandiva bow come to mind). Despite the glamor to such tales, there is also a restorative theme. For instance, one Buddhist just war doctrine is rooted in the need to redeem an a-dhammic world through samsaric militarism until worldly dhamma is restored and people begin to behave morally (Frydenlund 2017). This example highlights the intersection of cosmic and human themes.

JUST WAR
As already implied, if there is a religious urge to correct worldly instabilities, it is not only poetic. We see real-time implications in just war theories that strive to clarify

the conditions and modes of justified military conduct. Just war theory has roots in the earliest centuries of virtually all the religious traditions treated herein. European just war theory stems actually from pre-Christian times (e.g., Cicero) and is still compelling in principle. However ancient, concerns for jus in bello, or the regulation of how warriors actually fight, are integrated into the Geneva Conventions, and violation of those rules today provokes feelings of outrage based on a presumed fairness whose religious roots are rarely contemplated (but see Chapters 9 and ro).

In fact, there are evolutions and historical contingencies to all just war theories. For instance, in the eleventh century Maimonides reinforced the prescriptions for biblically commanded war (Deuteronomy 20: 16-18) and at the same time softened those for optional war (Deuteronomy 20: 10-12), at a time when a war led by Jews had become virtually inconceivable. He famously engaged with Greek and Islamic notions as well as biblical ones (see Chapter 9). In Islamic traditions, although ideals of right conduct on the battlefield are laid out in the Qur'an, Islamic thinking on fighting evolved and adapted first when Islam expanded out from the Arabian Peninsula in contact with the multicultural empires surrounding it, and then later when it brushed up against European ideals (see Cook 2012; Chapter 11). Some contemporary dichotomies that we see in extremist thinking, such as the tension between Dar al Harb (abode of war) and Dar al Islam (abode of peace), appear to be adapted notions (Hashmi and Johnson 2012), and they diverge from the ideals of defensive war advocated in the earliest Quranic verses (Afsaruddin 2012; Chapter 3).

As for Asian traditions, some just war notions are embedded in literary classics. Indian ideals are exceedingly old and vary from text to text, but the epic poem the Mahabharata famously crystallizes religious rationalizations for war and right conduct on the battlefield (see Chapters 4 and 12). Karmayoga and rajadharma are some of the rubrics under which the ethics of fighting are explored, but there are also deeper themes, such as the imagined conflation of killing in war with killing in ritual sacrifice (Heesterman 1993; Johnson 1998; Brekke 2005; Chapter 4). As for Buddhism, the world's many Buddhist traditions do not universally reject the doctrine of just war, although they have come to terms with war in their own disparate ways (see Chapters 5, 7, 8, 13 and 18). Some just war doctrines, as represented above, are driven by a restorative theme, but others are symbolically ferocious, as we see in Buddhist tantric texts and spectacular rites designed to invoke protective deities and to shield warriors by defensive magic (Sinclair 2014). Even the most pacifistic of Buddhist doctrines is compelled to address the bloody aftermath of war, and consequently theories jus post bellum have resonated with some Buddhists (Chapter 13).

RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

It may seem strange that as all of us become more globally connected in our economies and social interactions there has emerged a number of fervent religious

nationalisms that seem to differ in sensibility from the old allegiances to nation-states. Whereas nation-states were once seen as guaranteeing individual liberties and freedom from constraint (per Hobbes, Hume and others; Gorski 2010), at least in the West, now in many parts of the world religious identities seem to be overwhelming national identities (Lahr 2007; Eisen 2011; Gorski and Perry 2022; Chapters 14-18). Arguably, religious fervor is not a new feature of politics, and nor, for that matter, are reports of theophanic battles led by marching gods and goddesses who rally warriors (Kitts 2013) and cradle their favorites in death (Chapter 21). Yet the merging of national and religious identities has become conspicuous today, in some cases built on foundational religious legends whose contemporary reconstructions are historically dubious. In many cases, religious nationalism is forged by conflict, such as by the flaring of antagonisms over contested religious sites (Sells 2003; Jaffrelot 2007; Hassner 2012). Collective rituals, such as pilgrimages, songs, dramatizations and also riots, tend to anchor these sites in public imagination (Van der Veer 1996; Chapter 17). Of course, many factors - economic, political, situational - can inflame religious nationalism (Juergensmeyer 2008).

FEATURED CONFLICTS

The point of Part IV is to offer a sampling of analyses of historical conflicts that cannot be understood well without consideration of religious imagination. Part IV therefore supports the aim of the entire volume through illustrations. Hence, Chapter 19 addresses the significance of liturgy and ritual for creating the mentality of earliest Christian crusaders. Chapter 20 explores how the pursuit of piety was understood to sanctify warriors before battle, as reconstructed from Islamic military history. Chapter 21 investigates the multilayered worship of Durga and Kali, Indian goddesses associated with destruction and protection, in various guises (also see Chapters 4 and 12). Chapter 22 highlights the messianic hopes of the astonishingly destructive Taiping Rebellion. Chapter 23 focuses on autonomous martial communities, violence and the state in early modern South Asia. All five chapters are authored by stellar scholars who can validate the premise of the volume, which is that religious imagination has infused and shaped the mentalities of warriors in diverse historical settings. Following are brief summaries of each chapter. <>

HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN SHORT STORY edited by Erik Redling, Oliver Scheiding [Handbooks of English and American Studies, De Gruyter, 9783110585230]

The American short story has always been characterized by exciting aesthetic innovations and an immense range of topics. This handbook offers students and researchers a comprehensive introduction to the multifaceted genre with a special focus on recent developments due to the rise of new media. Part I provides

systematic overviews of significant contexts ranging from historical-political backgrounds, short story theories developed by writers, print and digital culture, to current theoretical approaches and canon formation. Part II consists of 35 paired readings of representative short stories by eminent authors, charting major steps in the evolution of the American short story from its beginnings as an art form in the early nineteenth century up to the digital age. The handbook examines historically, methodologically, and theoretically the coming together of the enduring narrative practice of compression and concision in American literature. It offers fresh and original readings relevant to studying the American short story and shows how the genre performs American culture.

Contents

The American Short Story Past and Present

Short Story Studies: The Current State of the Field

Since the onset of the new millennium, the American short story has been praised as the perfect literary form for the twenty-first century. In an age in which brevity rules, the short story appears to meet the demands of mobile devices and limited attention spans. According to some critics, the short story is "the genre of today" (Botha 2016, 201). In its long history, however, the American short story has shown itself to be a highly dynamic and productive narrative form. From early on it embodied the technological and cultural changes that advanced American society from the colonial period to the present. Be it the nineteenth-century expansion of the mass-market newspaper and magazine industry or the late twentieth-century boom of electronic publication outlets, the short story is the art of brevity that makes it an attractive catalyst not only for narrative experimentations, but also for building communities of readers who want to hear and tell stories about themselves and others (Sketches, Tales, and Stories). While scholars noted that America is certainly not "the land of the short story, but 'the land of the definition of the short story'" (Levy 1993, 1), the current Handbook of the American Short Story does not intend to develop a new taxonomy or a typological description of the American short story, but rather reassesses the genre in terms of what has been called "bibliomigrancy" (Venkat Mani 2016, 60). As such, the chapters in this handbook illustrate the emergence, circulation, and distribution of the short story beyond national paradigms or a binary that repeatedly reads it in terms of an apprenticeship for the novel (Canon Formation). The chapters dedicated to individual authors also document each author's creative contribution to the genre and, by pairing two short prose texts from one author, provide a better understanding of the spectrum of creative

experiments performed by each author. Additionally, the volume's paired readings offer both practical and critical analysis of the short form's iteration, its narrative identity in terms of ambiguity, implication, and suggestiveness, as well as the genre's portability in different publishing contexts. Focusing on American short stories from the past to the present and relating them to the changing field of literary production and authorship, the Handbook of the American Short Story adopts an approach that "allows the co-ordination of immanent formal analysis of the individual text with the twin diachronic perspective of the history of forms and the evolution of social life" (Jameson 1981, 105). What sets this handbook apart from other accounts is its focus on genre, period traits, and material arrangements exposing the American short story as a cultural text that offers specific social and historical meanings distilled in the short story's aesthetic form and brought to light by a practice of close reading. Thus, this volume highlights the socio-poetic dimensions in the writing, publishing, and reception of the American short story.

Given the genre's communicative power and productivity, why is it that both authors and critics repeatedly feel urged to talk about the future of the short story? Are we dealing with an "endangered species" — as Joyce Carol Oates puts it (Oates 2000, 38-41) — that needs our constant reflections to reassure us that it has a future — or, is it already a "dead form," as the literary magazine n+1 proposes, "unnaturally perpetuated" by America's "fiction factory"? (Batuman 2006, 63-4). In a recent piece on the American short story in the twentieth century, Charles May speculates that "because American readers are more interested in nonfiction and the occasional novel than the short story, the form is currently in the literary doldrums in the United States" (May 2012, 324). Throughout its history, as Kasia Boddy aptly puts it, the American short story has been praised either as "a highly polished gem" or condemned as "literary fast food" (Boddy 2010, 15). In his astute evaluation of the anglophone short story in the context of today's writing and publishing, Paul March-Russell discusses the genre's major transformations from the pre-web era into the digital age. Given the many online self-publication options and new types of media authorship, he acknowledges the "split identity of the short story," referring to "the ambiguous identification of the short story as both rarefied object and commodified artefact," only to conclude: "the short story remains an indistinct process" (March-Russell 2016, 25). Although this is how the rise-and-fall narrative of the genre often goes, it is remarkable that it is mostly expressed by the lovers of stories highlighting the short story's transience rather than its enduring strength. Others, such as the French critic Claire Larriere, keenly concluded: "if anything, the short story is shorter today than it has been in the past. There are now collections of 'short shorts' and 'sudden fiction' which scarcely existed fifty years ago. The game of hide-and-seek is bound to be more exciting" (Larriere 1998, 198). Larriere's remarks point to the innovative potential of the short form and the resonance it has for readers. A good case in point for the short story's sociability, and its function as a transforming and

transfixing encounter between a world in miniature and the reader, is the rediscovery of Lucia Berlin's vividly conversational stories about human environments (see A Manual for Cleaning Women, 2015). Public short story reading events, sharing stories both in print and online, and short fiction contests show that the genre is in sync with a new wave of slow and mindful media and its focus "on the fertility of individual and collective imaginations" (Rauch 2018, 10). Given the mobility of the genre as a relational concept that is conditioned by numerous codes (compositional, social, economic, material, temporal) allows us to both consider the short story as a socially symbolic act and discuss the genre's "mediatory function" (Jameson 1981, 105). A genre like the short story not only contains conventions, but also deviates from them. In his incisive study on genre, John Frow argues that genre has no "essence." It is not a container. Genre functions productively and possesses a "historically changing use value" (Frow 2006, 125, 134). Likewise, in a most recent study on genres and functions of the short story in North America, Michael Basseler shows that the short form serves as "an organon of life knowledge" (Basseler 2019, 17; 713 Current Approaches). In doing so, he explores how the genre's "complexity of thematic, formal, stylistic, and generic choices" shapes "the reader's 'sense of life' . . . and how it can or cannot be understood" (16). Moreover, this volume's genre approach helps us compare, contrast, and untangle the family resemblances that constitute the American short story. Extending our knowledge of short prose works and their dynamic socio-poetic functions, The Handbook of the American Short Story exemplifies the genre's pragmatic and active sense to give us the world via a selection of individual responses highlighting the short story's past, present, and future.

The paired readings and model interpretations in The Handbook of the American Short Story illustrate that the short story has always been a demanding form. George Saunders, for instance, admits that it is more challenging to write a good short story than to write a novel, defining the latter as a "a story that hasn't yet discovered a way to be brief' (Saunders 2013a, n. pag.). Robert Stone praises the short story as an art form that explores realities "subjectively experienced from the inside" (Stone 1991, 102). Distinguishing the short story from other short forms like the anecdote or news account, Joyce Carol Oates asserts that "the short story is a prose piece that it is not a mere concentration of events . . . but an intensification of events by the way of events" (Oates 1998, 47-48). Despite the numerous approaches — by both critics and writers — toward explaining the essence of brevity in literature, the short story remains, as Martin Scofield aptly puts it, "the exemplary form for the perception of crisis, crux, turning point" (Scofield 2006, 238). Its narrative economy in terms of time and space records decisive, intimate moments of life that give them a broad social resonance. As such, the short story offers a vibrant field of research (see the new journal Studies in the American Short Story 2020).

In this sense, Charles May's prediction (May 2012, 324) is of interest here because he raises an important question: how to write about the American short story in the twenty-first century, especially after the minimalist boom of the 1980s? The most recent surveys and companions tell a progressive history of the American short story which roots in a long-lasting legacy of sketches and tales as it first appears in Washington Irving's influential The Sketchbook of Geoffrey Crayon, Gent. (1819-1820; 715 Irving). In her study on the "Beginnings of American Literature," Lydia Fash claims that Irving "established the utility of short fiction for conjuring an American people and supporting American literary professionalism" (Fash 2020, 55; see Scheiding and Seidl 2011, 67-80). Scholars deal with the evolution of the form in the nineteenth century and explain how short prose works became an art form in the opening decades of the twentieth century culminating in a neo-realist renaissance of the Eighties and Nighties (Nagel 2015). Departures from this master narrative of the American short story can be found in a number of studies written in the wake of Mark McGurl's The Program Era (2009) that saw a sea change in the study of postwar literature. A good case in point is Kasia Boddy's survey of the American Short Story after 1950 in which she focuses on institutional aspects of the form in the context of big magazines, the creative-writing industry in the U.S., and the production of the short story in a literary market depending on specific forms of recognition like literary awards and prizes (2010; see also Delaney and Hunter 2019). By contrast, Paul March-Russell's introduction to the short story (2009) reassesses the genre's stadial history. In doing so, he takes the reader on a transnational journey from the short story's beginnings in Western folk traditions to what he calls in the final chapter "Voyages Out," focusing on the "postcolonial short story." In her 2018 study on the American short story cycle, Jennifer Smith analyzes the expansion of short prose within a specific form of narrative composition. She claims that the "short story cycle has become the primary and best descriptor for the genre, because it most accurately captures the recursiveness central to the genre and privileges the short story as its formative element" (Smith 2018, 4). Along the line of earlier studies, such as James Nagel's study on the contemporary American short story cycle (2001), Smith reads the cycle as a productive format for "identity formations" (7). Since the multiethnic literature of the 1980s and 1990s turned toward multiplicity, polyphony, plurality, and fragmentation, the cycle's composite nature allowed ethnic writers to integrate new elements into the short story and expand it. Recent examples of the cycle's "ethnic resonance" (Nagel 2001) can be found in Junot Diaz's Drown (733 Diaz) in which he chronicles the world of the Dominican American diaspora unfolding the archipelagic histories of his characters. Diaz and African American writers like Bryan Washington spell out versions of the cycle that become manifest in geography. Lot, Washington's 2019 debut collection of stories about Houston, Texas, presents on the first page of the text a stark black-and-white illustration of an urban grid, a drone's-eye view of the "hood" and the arteries of freeways around it. It looks almost like an X-ray, signaling that the ensuing

stories have an almost supernatural power to see and know what others cannot know. Washington's stories spell out a regional understanding of the world that challenges major western epistemologies. By 2010, as Smith shows, the trend towards microfiction had changed the narrative outlook of the cycle. She claims that a new genre emerged under the term "novellas-in-flash" or "flash cycles" (Smith 2018, 169-177). These are novellas composed entirely of standalone flash fiction pieces organized into full narrative arcs. Smith not only highlights the cycle's duration as an art form, but also the ways in which the short story form resurges in the digital age. In light of new publishing trends like the flash fiction novel or the novella-in-shorts, her book also raises important questions about the commodification of shortness. If brevity becomes a commercially viable brand (see Amazon's short reads section), the novel becomes a label with weight and significance. By borrowing the label, the short story can share the novel's prestige and convince readers to buy it. Perhaps this is another reason for the booming of the short story cycle as a composite novel over the last decade. The traditional New York publisher Henry Holt and Company released Philip Caputo's collection Hunter's Moon (2019) under the label "A Novel in Stories."

Another notable approach to explain the genre's productivity is the 2019 collection of essays published as The Edinburgh Companion to The Short Story in English, edited by Paul Delaney and Adrian Hunter. The collection offers an analytical framework built upon five major themes: history, publication, form, place, and identity. In terms of future issues for the study of the short story, the most promising piece is Laura Dietz's essay on "The Short Story and Digital Media" (Dietz 2019, 125-139). Dietz discusses what Ellen McCracken calls "transitional literature" (McCracken 2013, 105). According to McCracken, multiform digital tools produce "electronic texts that mimic the format and appearance of print" and mark "a key stage in the shift between print and digital books underway in the 21st century" (105). Dietz writes that transitional literature adds "few or no features that take advantage of the affordances of screen reading . . . keeping open the possibility of moving, returning, to print without significant alterations" (Dietz 2019, 125). In his story collection Texts from Jane Eyre (2015), Daniel Mallory Ortberg condenses famous short stories like Charlotte Perkins Gilman's "The Yellow Wallpaper" into serialized smartphone chats. On its website, The New Yorker published Jennifer Egan's short story "Black Box" (2012) in the twitter format over a period of ten days. Egan tells her spy thriller in tweets that play with today's phenomenon of serialization, temporality, and interaction. The story is also a striking example for transmedia storytelling that mediates between scribal practices, online technologies, and print publication. In this sense, Dietz's essay raises important questions about the future of the story's form in the overlapping contexts of print, electronic (self-)publications, and digital fiction networks. In doing so, her analysis draws our attention not only to what the label "short story" means in today's e-age, but also

how stories or single-author short story collections climb out on new artistic and commercial limbs like digital-only formats, intersecting legacy publishing with short fiction distributed via digital social media. Recent print market evaluations show, for instance, that digital short-story collections provide an outlet for collections that have no print prospect at all. On the one hand, what becomes necessary are further investigations about new publication strategies and how writing emerges and find its readers today; on the other hand, the "ambitious leaps of genre and world-building" (Machado 2019, xviii), especially in the field of science fiction and fantasy, also concern the very form and consumption of the short story. Given these trends in writing and publishing the short story, we need to consider both the short story's economy and texture to better understand the complex weaving of material and aesthetic "forms that organize texts, bodies and institutions" (Levine 2015, 23; see also Hungerford 2016, 19-39;Textual Materiality).

***

As this overview shows, the American short story has always been characterized by exciting aesthetic innovations and an immense range of topics. This handbook offers students and researchers a compact introduction to the multifaceted genre with a special focus on recent developments due to the rise of new media. Part I provides systematic overviews of relevant contexts ranging from historical-political backgrounds, short story theories developed by writers, print and digital culture, to current theoretical approaches and canon formation. Part II consists of paired readings of representative short stories by eminent authors, charting major steps in the evolution of the American short story from its beginnings as an art form in the early nineteenth century up to the very present and such innovative voices like Lydia Davis, Yiyun Li, and George Saunders (7131 Davis, 34 Li, 32 Saunders). The handbook examines historically, methodologically, and theoretically the coming together of the enduring narrative practice of compression and concision in American literature. It offers not only original readings relevant to studying the American short story, but also provides ideas for fresh interpretations of and further reflection on this fascinating genre that has profoundly shaped the reception of American culture.

Even though several outstanding handbooks dedicated to the American short story have been published in recent years, a handbook that combines theory with paired readings of short stories and a focus on the rise of new media and new narrative trends is not available at the moment. Edited by Alfred Bendixen and James Nagel, A Companion to the American Short Story (2010) provides detailed readings, but does not discuss aspects such as print culture or topics related to current directions in literary criticism. A Companion to the Amercican Short Story ends in the 1990s; A History of the American Short Story: Genres - Developments - Model Interpretations (2011) edited by Michael Basseler and Ansgar Nunning and James

Nagel's The American Short Story Handbook (2015) contain original discussions, but do not include chapters on the short story development in the digital age or short fiction published since 2000. Our handbook seeks to fill this gap, offering students and researchers alike a compact introduction to the multifaceted genre with a special emphasis on current developments due to the rise of new media. <>

Essay: Lydia Davis (1947—) by Lynn Min

Abstract: This chapter is a paired reading of Lydia Davis's "Negative Emotions" and "A Story of Stolen Salamis" from her collection Can't and Won't. The stories have been chosen because they amply illustrate how Davis's pieces are reading lessons in themselves. By their very brevity, they invite us to pay attention to language in a very privileged way. They enable us, in the words of Roland Barthes to "see language" (Barthes 2002, 735). The chapter will seek to explain how these short-short pieces invite us to pay attention to details down to the very comma. My analysis will try and show how this invitation to pay attention to the minutest details of language gives readers indications on how it can be a useful tool for efficient close reading. We examine Davis the translator, Davis the adaptor, and Davis the short story *titer, we will discover how her very dexterous use of language conveys poignancy, humor, violence, and ultimately life.

Context

When Lydia Davis was seven years old, her father brought the family to Vienna, where he was invited to teach for a year and she was enrolled in an Ursuline convent school. In an interview with Eleanor Wachtel, Davis tells of finding herself in a Vienna still reeling from the war, surrounded by a language she did not understand. She speaks of how difficult that year was for her emotionally, because her mother was hospitalized shortly after their arrival. Though she managed to learn German in a month, the fact that she went from not understanding anything to things becoming 'transparent,' acquainted her with the notion of 'not feeling at home in a language.' She concedes that this experience was probably an important influence on her decision to become a translator. Later, when the family moved to New York City, she once again found herself in a strange environment in a new school much larger than the small-town school she had known in her hometown of North Hampton in Massachusetts. She had to have private tutoring in French to catch up with her classmates who had been learning it since kindergarten. These French lessons, she confides, with a teacher whom she liked very much, and a French grammar book which she refers to as her "Rosebud," enabled her to "come to a comfortable place" in a strange city (Wachtel 2008).

These notions of "not feeling at home in a language" and finding "a comfortable place" are primordial to us as Lydia Davis readers. This chapter shows that for us to feel at home in her art we too have to develop at least some of the reflexes of a translator, and an eye and an ear for grammatical details with a regularity that is perhaps not habitually part of our reading practice.

Today, Davis is considered one of the most important voices in American fiction, but it was as a translator, notably of Maurice Blanchot and Michel Leiris that she first gained renown. Virtually ignored at the beginning of her career as a writer, it was only in 2001, when Dave Eggers published her collection, Samuel Johnson is Indignant, that she started to gain attention - attention that grew to acclaim when in 2013 she was awarded the Man Booker International prize for the ensemble of her works. To date she is the author of one novel, The End of the Story (2004 [1995]) and seven short story collections, including Break it Down (1986), Almost No Memory (1997), Samuel Johnson is Indignant (2001), Varieties of Disturbance (2007), all to be found in her Collected Stories (2013 [2009]), and Can't and Won't (2015 [2014]). Her translation of Marcel Proust's Swann's Way won the 2003 French-American Foundation Translation Prize - an honor that was repeated in 2011 for her translation of Gustave Flaubert's Madame Bovary. In 2019, she published the first volume of a collection of her essays, Essays One - a compilation of pieces from the 1970s to the present day - on writing about literature and on writing itself, but also covering other topics such as the visual arts, history, and religion. The second volume, due in 2021, is to be devoted to her writings on and about translation.

Her short-short prose pieces, for which she is the most known, "miniatures" as they are sometimes called, take the reader by surprise. It is perfectly understandable that a reader will be taken aback by a piece such as "Collaboration with Fly," which reads:

> "Collaboration with Fly"
>
> I put that word on the page, but he added the apostrophe. (Davis 2013, 508)

> Can't and Won't
>
> I was recently denied a writing prize, because, they said, I was too lazy. What they meant by
>
> lazy was that I used too many contractions: for instance, I would not write out in full the words
>
> cannot and will not, but contracted them to can't and won't.   (2015, 46)

> "Circular Story"
>
> On Wednesday mornings early there is always a racket out there on the road. It wakes me up and I always wonder what it is. It is always the trash collection truck picking up the trash. The truck comes every Wednesday morning early. It always wakes me up. I always wonder what it is.   (2015, 3)

We might simply think of "Collaboration with Fly" as an intertextual reference to Emily Dickinson's "I Heard A Fly Buzz When I Died," as does Shelley Jackson writing in the Los Angeles Times (2007); "Can't and Won't" a tongue-in-cheek comment on the arbitrary choice of literary awards; and "Circular Story," as John Winters writes,

"typical of the dead ends that occupy most of [Can't and Won't's] pages' (Winters 2014, n.p.).

Davis leaves so much space for the reader, there can be as many interpretations as there are readers. However, if we consider them as an invitation to see language, we discover aspects that help explain these explanations. Conjuring up the fly on the page, we might consider what type of words need apostrophes — possessives like John's or contracted forms like can't and won't. Substitutes for cannot and will not, as the story recounts. But then we perhaps wonder why cannot is written as one word and will not as two. And this takes us to our grammar books, and we see that according to Huddleston and Pullum these forms are not completely interchangeable with the short forms. Not only are they considered more formal, they do not express negation in the same way. And if "will not" is written in two words and not one, it is because negation does not work the same way with each. When "not" follows "will," it negates the clause that follows. When "not" follows "can," it negates one auxiliary. Thus "She cannot write well" means "It is not possible for her to write well". Whereas, "She can not write well" means "On occasion it is possible for her to not write well" (Huddleston and Pullum 2002, 799-803). Since the theme of negation is a recurring one in Davis's works, we might want to look at what it entails — literally entails, as we will see below. We also notice that these words are all in italics, as is the title. And words in italics, the equivalent of emphasis in speech, are used to draw attention of the reader. And if they are emphasized, we are meant to pay attention. This piece might further be a reflection on fiction. Is the narrator speaking of Lydia Davis herself? Surely not. Lydia Davis readers know that she rarely uses short forms. It is one of the reasons her stories read so much as though they are 'over-translated' in English. A closer reading of "Circular Story" reveals itself to be about the pronoun "it" and the slipperiness of language. I will return to this at the end of the chapter.

We might also think that in leaving us so much space for interpretation, she is putting her readers through the same experience she had as a child, making us not feel perfectly at home in language, albeit our mother tongue. We understand the words, but 'we don't get it.' Her careful attention to syntax, to grammar, to form, to rhythm may give the impression of an 'over-correct' text.

Davis dates her earliest inspiration to becoming a writer to her discovery of Kafka and Beckett — Kafka for "the sparseness, the humility (whether assumed or real) or a combination, the imagination" (qtd. in Gunn 2014, n.p.) and Beckett for teaching her that "you could write about the self-watching the self-write, and also that you could write about anything" (Wachtel 2008, n.p.). She tells of her excitement upon discovering Malone Dies: "There was so little material, such plain language, no attempt at literalism whatsoever, or flowery language, that he would spend a page or two about how he dropped his pencil was so utterly strange and wonderful"

(Wachtel 2008, n.p.). Our impression as Davis readers of "seeing language" as Barthes once expressed it (Barthes 2002, 735) may come partly from her teenage pastime of cutting out her favorite Beckett sentences to study the sheer beauty of them (Manguso 2008, n.p.). This invitation to "see language" is a solicitation that is constantly renewed in our reading of Davis. For indeed, if, in her stories, there is a dearth of character, of place, of plot, it is amply made up for in the profusion of ways Davis summons us to examine language. The following close readings will show that Davis is first and foremost a reader's reader.

Close Readings

In Davis's preoccupation with the poetics of the normal, there is, as Eliza Haughton-Shaw points out, "an invitation and the permission to become unfamiliar to ourselves in our most ordinary moments" (Haughton-Shaw 2020, n.p.). The two stories "Negative Emotions" and "A Story of Stolen Salamis" are from her last collection Can't and Won't. The two ordinary moments rendered unfamiliar are an email, and a news brief. It is in this collection that the trademark characteristics of her writing are the most salient: (1) the short-short pieces — out of the 122 stories 97 fall into this category, 70 are less than a page long — the other 7, a page and a bit. (2) Found material: extracts from Flaubert's letters to his mistress Louise Colet, translated and turned into stories; dreams — her own and those of her friends turned into stories; complaint letters she wrote herself and sent — one to a frozen peas manufacturer complaining that the color of the peas in the can does not correspond to the color on the label.

Lydia Davis comments on "Negative Emotions" in Essays One. She speaks of the influence and her great admiration for the stories of Thomas Bernhard, notably "their tight structure, their completeness, and negativity of attitude. But also the hypercomplex syntax of some of the sentences" (Davis 2020, n.p.). More specifically in regard "Negative Emotions" she specifies the direct influence Bernhard's story "Near Sulden" exerted on her:

> (1) [. . .] my analytical readings of Bernhard's short pieces, all the closer since I was working on them in class; and more immediately, (2) the raw material - the email I encountered. The emotional impetus for the piece - since there is always, for me, strong feeling behind a piece of writing - was at least twofold: (1) amusement at what Bernhard does in his brief stories, and at the content of the email; and (2) admiration for Bernhard's writing and a desire to do something similar, although I did not see the influence of Bernhard (obvious to me now) until after I had written it.   (n.p.)

The following close reading is an attempt to explain how "emotion," "amusement," and "negativity of attitude" — all characteristics of Davis's works — are carried out grammatically and thus stylistically. We will notably be looking at the grammatical notions of direct and indirect reported speech, free indirect speech, pronouns, and

negation. These notions are admirably woven into the story and explain how politeness theory and the notion of face intertwine in how we interpret what we hear or read. We will discover how these notions enable us to discover unsuspected clues concerning narrative voice.

"Negative Emotions" (282 words) tells the story of a well-meaning teacher who sends an article that he found in a book written by a Vietnamese Buddhist monk giving advice on what to do about emotions to all the teachers in his school. The message is badly received by the colleagues resulting in an angry backlash with them writing back an irate message with an ironic twist: "They said, they in fact liked having negative emotions, particularly about him and his message" (Davis 2015, 103). It is a story that could be included in a textbook on professional writing entitled, "How Not to Write an Email." Though this will be part of my analysis, the essential of my task will be devoted to how we as readers interpret what is not said - a task required by every reader of great literature, but even more so with a Lydia Davis story, where the reader might conclude to there being a little too much silence.

My resume above of "Negative Emotions" is a combination of indirect reported speech, and a direct quotation from the story. The direct quotation is in inverted commas and is a faithful rendering of how the story ends. The reported speech, on the other hand, in being a resume is much less faithful. Not only have I left out details, I have also added my own interpretation - there is no mention of an email in the story, only a message.

Communicatively speaking, a message conveyed via indirect reported speech can be considered a regular culprit in failed communication. This is because it is, like the above, often a summing up of what the other person said - words are exchanged for others, things are left out, and a certain amount of subjectivity can enter into the transformed message. Here is the actual opening paragraph:

> A well-meaning teacher, inspired by a text he had been reading, once sent all the other teachers in his school a message about negative emotions. The message consisted entirely of advice quoted from a Vietnamese Buddhist monk.   (103)

Though the message is not explicitly referred to as being an email, we infer that this is how he sent the message to "all the other teachers." And we imagine the email sent via the professional mailing "reply-all" list to all his colleagues in the "to" section, with his name in the "from" section will be primarily received as a communication of professional tenor. However, there is no direct message from the colleague himself, just "advice quoted from a Vietnamese Buddhist monk about negative emotions." Though the narrator uses the term "quoted," we notice in the paragraph that follows that there are no quotation marks, and though there is the reporting frame "said the monk," and the absence of the inverted commas in direct reported speech is grammatically accepted (Huddleston & Pullum 2002, 1023), the effect of direct speech and the constraint upon this structure "to use the actual wording" of the

speaker (1023) can be held in doubt. We might question the reliability of the term "quoted," because, if taken literally this could also infer that the message would be in Vietnamese. Since the quote is in English, we must further infer that the monk in question was either fluent enough to write in English or, if not, that the text was translated. The formal, rather restrained tone of the message (for instance, the use of the formal "one") can be interpreted by the fact that English is not his mother tongue. But this can also be interpreted by a perception of Buddhist spirituality as being itself formal; or it can be interpreted as a general cultural abeyance to the oriental code of politeness. We might further ponder the idea of "negative" emotion, because the monk only speaks of "emotion":

> Emotion, said the monk, is like a storm: it stays for a while and then it goes. Upon perceiving the emotion (like a coming storm), one should put oneself in a stable position. One should sit or lie down. One should focus on one's abdomen. One should focus, specifically on the area just below one's navel and practice mindful breathing. If one can identify the emotion as an emotion. It may then be easier to handle.   (103)

Emailing, Business Letters, Context, and Politeness Theory

There is nothing immediately offensive about this email. "Emotion" is in itself not necessarily negative, but as the simile "emotion is like a storm" infers, it can be strong, powerful, and destructive. And, since, as the definition of the word "emotion" specifies, it is: (1) a "strong feeling deriving from one's circumstances, mood, or relationship with others; (2) an instinctive or intuitive feeling as distinguished from reasoning of knowledge," the introduction of such notions in a professional milieu can be understood as being inappropriate. If it had been sent to a few close friends, close enough for them to interpret it as a catechism for fellow Buddhists, for example, or as something to laugh about, either because they were all sharing negative emotions about a shared experience, or because they would all have in mind a friend or colleague Buddhist whose image of him/herself as the epitome Buddhist detachment and serenity is so far off the mark that it is laughable, the outcome would probably have been different. But assuming "all the teachers in his school" were not personal close friends, which is probable because being "close friends" with the entire staff is not possible ("can't" be friends with everyone and "won't" even try), the vicious harangue that followed is natural.

To better grasp what is at stake here, we are going to use the linguistics field of pragmatics or, as George Yule has put it, "the study of 'invisible' meaning" (Yule 2014, 126) as our guide. Invisible meaning often means the gap between the intended message and what is understood and what is meant (129). Inference in pragmatics is additional information used by the listener to logically create a connection between what is said and what is meant. Gaps between what is said and what is meant are not always a source of polemic. If someone says, "Could you please pass the salt?," even

though it is in interrogative form, we know that it is a polite way of asking for the salt, and not a question about our physical capacity to pass the salt, in which case we would answer, "yes" or "no." This is called an indirect speech act. And we use indirect speech acts to make requests because it is more polite than an imperative "Pass the salt" and "removes the assumption of social power" (132). Our adeptness in using indirect speech acts is tied to our sensitivity to the other person's face,' and in politeness theory is called a "face-saving act." We all have a 'negative face' and a 'positive face.' Negative face is the need to be independent and free from position; positive face the need to feel connected, to have a sense of belonging, be part of a group. As the colleagues understood this message not only as an imition, but as an accusation, the well-meaning teacher has managed not only to disregard their negative face, in threatening their negative face, he has unintentionally managed to address their positive face — creating a group of colleagues whose sense of belonging to a group has taken on a whole new dimension. And has excluded the sender.

Different cultures respond to these notions of face in various ways. Oriental cultures being more deferential than Western cultures is one possible explanation for the choice of the pronoun "one" instead of the more direct "you" in the monk's advice on emotion. But more specific to the story in regards to face and culture are those required of the professional world in regards to politeness. The inference of the remark made by a friend at a party will not be the same as the same comment made by a colleague or a superior in a professional context. Thus, simply the name of the sender would immediately condition the reaction of his colleagues. Factors such as their relationship to him and his and their place in the hierarchy of the school would all be determinant in their reception of his advice:

> The other teachers were puzzled. They did not understand why their colleague had sent them a message about negative emotions. They resented the message, and they resented their colleague. They thought he was accusing them of having negative emotions and needing advice in how to handle them. Some of them were, in fact, angry. (103)

Face and Culture; Context and Relationships; Negative Inference and Added Meaning

We have already noted that the term "negative" appears in the title of the story as well as in the summing up by the narrator, "sent them a text about negative emotions." I have suggested that it is this interpretation by the sender that led the colleagues to interpret it this way. But what if the title of his email were not "negative emotions" but "advice from a Vietnamese Buddhist monk"? Would the negative inference still be present? It would for the reader because of the title of the story, "Negative Emotions." But even without this title the adjective "well-meaning" in the opening noun phrase is also a clue. "Well-meaning" only means "to have good

intentions." But there is an added meaning that is "implicated" — the added meaning being something like "gone about in the wrong way thus doomed for failure." Note the term inference refers to the act or process of inferring by deduction, while implicature is an implied meaning. In the term "well-meaning" there is the additional conveyed negative meaning. We detect further implicature in the modal auxiliary "should" as advice is going to be understood by the listener as a suggestion to correct a behavior. Even though the pronoun "one" could be paraphrased by the general "everyone," thus less threatening than "you," colleagues might not appreciate being lumped into this "everyone" and being given the unsolicited advice to regard the area below their navel. They do not wish their positive face to be addressed in such a way.

Vocabulary

A term in this email that might take on additional meaning and could be considered as offensive is "Buddhist monk." Though Buddhism, in being nontheistic, is not strictly speaking a religion but a philosophy, the interpretation of the message as an inflicting of spiritual views upon others through the bias of a professional mailing list is a possible construal. And that the term 'emotion,' let alone those of 'abdomen' and 'navel' might cause offense, is linked to the fact that these terms belong not only to the personal domain, but to the intimate. We are beginning to have a clearer picture of a very authoritative narrative voice deftly guiding our way to the dramatic, albeit ironically funny denouement.

Narrative Voice

We note so far that there have been no outright negative sentences - only negative inference and implicature. This negative implicature continues with the adjective "puzzled," which implies "did not understand." However, it is not until "They did not understand why their colleague had sent them a message about negative emotions," that we encounter a negative sentence constructed via "analytic primary negation." That is, a sentence formed by a "primary clause containing a primary form of an auxiliary verb" negated by adding "not" after the verb (for instance, "did not"). It is opposed to secondary synthetic negation where the verb is inflected (for instance, "didn't") (Huddleston & Pullum 2002, 799). We further note that throughout the rest of the story, each time there is an outright negative sentence, it is systematically an analytic negative. We thus encounter a narrative voice that is omnipresent in Lydia Davis's stories. The somewhat stiff, overly pedantic, working a topic to the bone, non-conversational voice that is rather distant. The use of the full forms in the negative construction is partially responsible for this. Huddleston and Pullum explain that analytic and synthetic negation are not fully interchangeable, the main difference being one of style level, the synthetic forms, being more informal, are considered the default form. Analytic negation is preferred in formal writing and solemn contexts. Synthetic negation is preferred in ordinary conversation and is considered to increase the sense of familiarity, intimacy, and accessibility (800). Huddleston and

Pullum go on to specify that analytic forms sound unnatural in many conversational contexts unless there is some clear reason for their use, such as emphasis on the word "Not." This is because emphasis, which is not possible on the contracted form N'T, is possible on the full form NOT. This use is thus understandable in the contrastive sentences:

> The teachers did not choose to regard *their* anger as a coming storm. They did not focus on their abdomens. They did not focus on the area just below their navels. (Davis 2015, 103; emphasis added)

But it is not necessary in the explanatory, "They did not understand why their colleague had sent them a message [. . .]," as there is no contrast to the preceding sentence expressing the idea that the teachers were "puzzled." This sentence simply explains why they were puzzled.

We further notice that the narrative voice does not make use of grammatical ellipsis. For example, the above sentence could have been more concise. In coordinate sentences with "and" the repetition of the noun and verb in the compound clause is not compulsory. Thus, in preferring the more formal: "They resented the message, and they resented their colleague" (emphasis added) to the more concise and spontaneous "They resented the message and their colleague" (emphasis added), the narrator can thus literally pound home the point.

The verb phrases "resent," "accusing," "needing advice," "handle," "get over," "caused," along with the adjective "other" in "The other teachers were puzzled" (emphasis added) all combine in the mounting crescendo of negation, building up to the exclusion of the well-meaning colleague. The adjective "other," excludes the sender of the email. Idem for "Some of them were, in fact, angry" (emphasis added). "Some" implies "not all of the teachers were angry" and excludes the teachers who wrote back:

> Instead, they wrote back immediately, declaring that because they did not understand why he had sent it, his message had filled them with negative emotions. They told him that it would take a lot of practice for them to get over the negative emotions caused by his message. But, they went on, they did not intend to do this practice. Far from being troubled by their negative emotions, they said, they in fact liked having negative emotions, particularly about him and his message. (103; emphasis added)

The coordinating conjunction "but" sets up an opposition to something expressed or inferred in the previous clause, "it would take a lot of practice for them to get over the negative emotions caused by his message." This opposition can be argumentative or explanatory. Argumentative "but" does not oppose the preceding clause, but something inferred. "He is rich but happy," infers the rich are not happy. Explanatory "but," which we have here, introduces a clause that develops or explains the

preceding clause. The negative inferring verbs, "get over" meaning to recover or survive a difficulty, and the verb "cause" implying to make something (usually bad) happen, clearly enable the sentence introduced by "but" to be an explanatory refutation of even attempting the practice. But who in fact is explaining?

Reported Speech, Parentheticals, Supplements, and a Duo of Narrative Voices

On a first reading, the story seems to be a stable third person narration, as all pronouns in the text are all third person pronouns: "he," "they," "them," and "their." It is in the narrative past tense, and when there is reported speech, the necessary grammatical adjustments are in place. In direct speech the angry message of the angry teachers would read: "Because we do not understand why you have sent it, your message has filled us with negative emotions [. . .]" (emphasis added).

Did each angry teacher individually send this message — this exact message? In which case were they authorized by the others to use the collective "we," or did they use the first person singular "I"? Or was one teacher chosen to send it with all the angry teachers in copy? And what about the adverb "immediately." If taken literally this paragraph would lead us to believe that all the angry teachers were at the same place at the same time and speaking in one harmonious voice dashed off the angry email. Of course, this is not how we interpret the story, because we know that indirect reported speech is a retelling of what was actually said. The reporter in the story is the narrator and as narrator she has direct access to the content because the author has made her the spokesperson. The original speakers are the monk, the other teachers, and then some of the other teachers — the angry ones. The only information the story gives us about the original sender is that there was no message from him, just the quote.

The major difference between reported speech and direct speech is the question of deixis, that is the personal pronouns, time and place adverbs, the demonstratives, and tense. Reported direct speech, with quotation marks reports the words of an "I" talking to a "you," about some topic. In a normal conversation there is turn taking, where the "I" becomes the "you," when it is the other's turn to speak. In indirect reported speech, "I" usually becomes a third person — in our story "they" —and the present tense of the moment of utterance becomes the past tense, "here" becomes "there." In speech utterance linguistics, the third person pronouns are considered non-persons:

> The third person pronoun does not refer to a person because it refers to an object located outside direct address. But it exists and is characterized only by its opposition to the person "I" of the speaker who is uttering it, situates it as a non-person. Here is its status. The form "he' takes its value from the fact that is necessarily part of a discourse uttered by "I." (Benveniste 1971, 229)

Since the pronouns "they," "their," and "them" appear 21 times and "he," "his," and "him" 9 times, this repetition (nearly 12% of the text) merits a closer look into how they participate in the orchestration of narrative voice.

Framing Structures

The framing structures, in bold print in my examples below are the words of the narrator.

1.   Emotion, said the monk, is like a storm;
2.   Instead they wrote back immediately declaring that;
3.   They told him that
4.   But, they went on, they did not intend;
5.   Far from being troubled by their negative emotions, they said, they in fact liked (. . .1.

In indirect reported speech, there is a choice between an "embedded subordinate framing structure," found in 2 and 3 above, which are grammatically like any subordinate content clause introduced by "that," or a "non-embedded framing structure" which either follows the content clause, or like in our story, is in median position as in 1, 4, and 5. These non-embedded framing structures are considered less common than their embedded alternatives (Huddleston & Pullum 2002, 1025). We notice that, once again, as for the case of the analytic negation and coordinate sentences, Davis has chosen the less common of two possible grammatical structures.

Third Person Personal Pronoun and Content Clause

When the third person pronoun used in indirect reported speech is singular, it is easier to accept that the content corresponds to what the person said. However, when it is the plural "they," corresponding to a group, it is a little more complicated, as seen above. What is of interest in these non-embedded framing structures in the indirect reported speech without the inverted commas, is that in splitting the reported speech in two, we cannot entirely ascertain whether the beginning belongs to the original speakers or to the narrator. In 4 is "But, they went on," and in 5 "Far from being troubled by their negative emotions, they said" the words of the angry teachers, or the comment of the narrator?

There are several types of blurring going on in this story. In choosing not to use the inverted commas to introduce the reported speech, there is a constant blurring between the direct speech of the narrator and the indirect speech of the teachers. The non-embedded framing structures are termed parentheticals and act as supplements (952-953, 1024). Thus, like a passage between parentheses in a text, that is, a word or phrase inserted as an explanation or afterthought into a passage which is grammatically complete without it, in writing usually marked off by brackets, dashes, or commas (1748), we are invited to pay attention to why Davis chose this structure and not the more common one.

Free Indirect Speech

Free indirect speech is a grammatical and stylistic means of allowing an author to express the thoughts of a character. There are no inverted commas, and the third person pronoun of the narrative voice remains. Free indirect speech seamlessly allows the author to surreptitiously slide from the third person narrative voice into the minds of the characters. The reader can sometimes detect free indirect speech through the use of deixis — the passage remains in the past tense, but 'now' is used instead of `tchen,' here' instead of 'there'. The reader understands a "s/he thought/felt" etc. that is not present in the text. Our story, on the surface at least, seems to be entirely about the thoughts of the characters so free indirect speech may not seem to be immediately pertinent. However, upon examining these parentheticals as well as the other grammatical choices involving negation and coordination, the choice not to use inverted commas to introduce the monk's text, and the insistent use of third person pronouns we detect another very subtle narrative voice that stealthily makes its way into the story. Rather than the detached narrative voice of the third person narration, this voice becomes a double voice and takes on the voice of the community, one of the voices Rimmon-Kenan identifies as the unreliable narrator (Rimmon-Kenan 1989,100-103), here ironically recounting the hilarious but violent reaction of the teachers. We hear not only an echo of their anger, but also gain understanding of the first rule of professional writing: "Never write an email when you are angry."

We also better understand how this story echoes the three dimensions Davis admired in Bernhard's story: (1) Davis's particular use of negative structures has captured the negative attitude admired in Bernhard's story; (2) her ironic twist on positive face, where sense of belonging to a group concludes in the hilarious ending of the sheer jubilation ignited by the sharing of negative emotion, captures the amusement Bernhard's story procures for her; (3) in the response to a colleague, who has in fact said nothing, we detect an interesting twist on a theme that is very dear to another inspiration to Davis — Maurice Blanchot who wrote about how "the need to write is linked to the approach toward this point at which nothing can be done with words" (Blanchot [1955] 1992, 52). The "well-meaning" colleague, in not including a personal message has literally "done nothing with words," and thus captures the emotional impetus that makes this more than a humorous anecdote. In inviting us to examine reported speech, it is in fact a story about how we interpret text — the added meaning. Email is like conversation without the intonation, and without the immediate turn taking possible when we speak. The unsuspected violence of the colleague's message, and the violence of the reaction is language at work. Davis's over-careful narrator joining her voice with that of the community reminds us that it is only in taking great care with language that we can begin to feel at home with it and in it.

Reported speech and the undetected violence of language is present also in our second story, which is the opening story in the collection Can't and Won't. Davis's stories are better understood when perceived in their cohesive whole. The second close reading will demonstrate how it prepares us for the reading of much that goes on in her very short prose pieces, as she herself prefers to call them.

"A Story of Stolen Salamis"

My son's Italian landlord in Brooklyn kept a shed out back in which he cured and smoked salamis. One night, in the midst of a wave of petty vandalism and theft, the shed was broken into and the salamis were taken. My son talked to his landlord about it the next day, commiserating over the vanished sausages. The landlord was resigned and philosophical, but corrected him. "They were not sausages. They were salamis". Then the incident was written up in one of the city's more prominent magazines as an amusing and colorful urban incident. In the article, the reporter called the stolen goods "sausages". My son showed the article to his landlord, who hadn't known about it. The landlord was interested and pleased that the magazine had seen fit to report the incident, but he added: They weren't sausages. They were salamis. (Davis 2015, 3)

To analyze this story, I will be using the theoretical tools which are those of M.A.K. Halliday and Ruquia Hasan in their work Cohesion in English. Their work explains how a text functions as a semantic edifice, how one element connects to another via the following 4 tools: (1) Reference: that is, Pronouns: A noun is replaced by a pronoun; (2) Substitution: one word is replaced by another, that is, A dish on the table was cracked. The plate had been in the family for centuries; (3) Conjunction: A term is not only substituted, it is redefined; for instance: The plant her mother gave her before she died was losing its flowers. That blooming symbol of her love was disappearing also. (4) Ellipsis, which is substitution by zero. The easiest example is coordination ellipsis, which was explained in the previous close reading. These four tools will be applied to two ideas: One, by the linguist Andre Joly who has demonstrated how the title and first sentence of a literary text is the conditioning framework for the whole novel. I am extending this to apply to the first story in the collection. The first sentence is a suggestion of the text that is to follow — and what is to follow is a transformed version of this initial suggestion (Joly 2001, 151). The second idea is Lydia Davis's. In her chapter on writing in Essays One she writes of the importance of ending: "Do work hard on the very last words — they can sometimes make all the difference as to whether or not a story seems finished" (Davis 2020, n.p.).

Reference: There are several incidences of reference: "My son's Italian landlord" referred to as "he" twice; "my son" becomes "him"; "shed was broken into and the salamis were taken" beomes "it"; "sausages" become "they" four times; "the article"

becomes "it." "The landlord" is also replaced by "who" in a relative clause, and the "shed" by "which" in an adverbial clause introduced by the preposition "in."

Substitution: The term "stolen," as specified in the title, is replaced by "taken" and "vanished." "Salamis" is substituted by "goods" and "sausages" twice, once by the boy, the second time in article.

Conjunction: Conjunction is used in the most interesting manner here by Davis and in so doing she calls to mind what we have just discovered about indirect reported content. For when salamis is substituted by the word "sausages," it is not only substituted it is redefined. And this redefinition is at the heart of two challenges of translation. The first concerns what Walter Benjamin termed "the manner of meaning" (qtd. in Jacobs 1975, 761). Benjamin remarks that though the English word "bread" and the German word "Brot" refer to the same foodstuff made with water and flour and yeast - the manner of meaning is not the same. If a salami connotes a sausage, a sausage does not connote a salami. A sausage is what we in the English-speaking world eat with mashed potatoes, or for breakfast with eggs. A salami is an antipasto eaten perhaps with a glass of wine. The journalist who wrote the article has translated the term, and, in so doing, has ignored the landlord's cultural heritage.

Reported speech: The title "A Story of Stolen Salamis" is not exact. It is a story of a story of stolen salamis. Written up, not as "an incident in a wave of petty vandalism and theft," but as "an amusing and colorful incident." There is indeed here what Lecercle has termed a "violence of language" (Lecercle 1990, 141) - perhaps even an ever-so-slight mocking of the expected appreciation of the "woke" readers of "one of the city's more prominent magazines." We begin to touch here on a poignancy that can go undetected in Davis's fiction, if we are not conscious of how language can trip us up - a theme that is central to all of Davis's writing.

Ellipses: The direct speech of the landlord at the end of the story, "They weren't sausages. They were salamis," which at first seems to be a repetition of "They were not sausages. They were salamis" is not a repetition. The long form analytic negation has been replaced by the default, more spontaneous, more conversational synthetic negation. The landlord in his repeated complaint uses the contracted form of "were not". This, of course, is not an ellipsis of a word but a simple grapheme. But we can take this one step further and interpret it metaphorically. The substitution of NOT by a zero and an apostrophe could be metaphorically interpreted as a restitution of the landlord's identity. Davis, in substituting one form of negation for another uses this zero to indicate the integration of the immigrant landlord - and this through his use of a contracted form of negation. When looking through Lydia Davis's translations and adaptations of Flaubert's letters, we notice that contrary to most of her fiction, she does in fact use the contracted forms. She has explained that when she was translating Madame Bovary she went to Flaubert's letters to find a more spontaneous Flaubert (Davis 2020, n.p.). The narrative tells both the story of an

unrecognized other but ends with a transformation. A more spontaneous landlord expressing himself via synthetic negation has reminded us of his desire to be an integrated American.

Theoretical Perspectives

Any theoretical approach to Lydia Davis's work will bloom and flourish by an examination of what she herself has written, not only about translation and writing, but about the visual arts as well. Because of the very tight control she wields over the English language and her own particular manner of deploying it in the disarming brevity of most of her pieces, the ideal place to begin is a study of her Essays One (2020). Davis's concern for form reveals itself to be a necessary prerequisite to emotion. It is in her essay on artist Joan Mitchell that we find one of the best ways of apprehending her fiction. She speaks of a visit she made to Mitchell in the French village of Vétheuil and wandering out to her studio to look at the painting, "Les Bluets," which she liked very much. And yet, she admits to naively seeing it only as "shapes and colors, white and blue." It was only when someone told her that it was in fact a painting of the Vétheuil landscape, more precisely the cornflowers, and this came as a shock to her:

> Apparently I had not known before that an abstract painting could contain references to concrete objective, identifiable subject matter. Two things happened at once: the painting went beyond itself, lost its isolation, acquired a relationship to fields, to flowers; and it changed from something I understood, into something I did not understand, a mystery, a problem. (n. p.)

Even though Davis's stories in their seemingly obsessive manner of presenting us with the ordinary, the quotidian, appear to be about things we know, she, like Mitchell, throws new light on the concrete, the objective, the identifiable matter. "She is our Vermeer, patiently observing and chronicling daily life, but from angles odd and askew," writes Parul Seghal (2019, n.p.). And it is first and foremost through her use of the English language that she takes us unawares. This is because, as Paul De Man points out in his Introduction to Walter Benjamin's The Task of the Translator:

> We think we are at ease in our language, we feel a coziness, a familiarity, a shelter in the language we call our own in which we think we are not alienated. What the translation reveals is that this alienation is at its strongest in our own original language, that the original language within which we are engaged is disarticulated in a way which imposes upon us a particular alienation — a particular suffering.
> (De Man 1986, 84)

Davis exposes the capacity of language to go wrong, but she does not write against language. On the contrary, in making language her leading character, the main action, and the principal setting, she gives its study a whole new role in the understanding of a literary text. Since Davis's stories are sometimes seen as a defamiliarization of

English, or even, as someone once remarked, a translation of English into English, looking to the works on translation helps to better grasp this dimension of her work. It is via the concept of the defamiliarization of language brought to light by Walter Benjamin in The Task the Translator that we can better apprehend Davis. This is because, like for Benjamin, Davis firmly believes, what we take for granted in our language is up for questioning, that is the question of the compatibility between grammar and meaning (87).

It is Jonathan Evans's The Many Voices of Lydia Davis (2016) that gives us the most in-depth insight on how her literary works can be regarded as being in dialogue with the works she has translated. From Blanchot, whom Evans cites as being Davis's most enduring influence as a translator, she has learned and continualy sought to remain as faithful as possible in regards to syntax, word order and style of the source author's text (Evans 2016, 26. In his detailed analysis of her translation of Madame Bovary as well as in her reworking into short stories of various short extracts of Flaubert's letters to Louise Colet, we better discover not only Davis the translator, but also Davis the adaptor and Davis the appropriator. Moreover, Evans further contends that not only is Davis's novel The End of the Story a rewriting of Proust's Swann's Way, but in her extending of the practices employed in her translations of Leiris, he also contends that her translation of Swann's Way is a veritable rewriting of the canonical translation by Scott Moncrieff and the lesser known translation by James Grieve (71-88).

Our analysis in both the stories studied above exposed how a harmless email and an amusing news brief dissimulated a violence of language linked to the characters' disregard for how language means and does not mean. For insight into the defamiliarization and the violence of language, we can profitably look to Lecercle's The Violence of Language (1990) where he introduces the notion of the "remainder" - "that dimension of language that is there beneath the surface and resists the prescriptive rules of grammar" (141). The "remainder" is also studied in Venuti's The Translator's Invisibility ([1985] 2008) where the Davis reader can gain more insight into the concept of the foreignization of language with the "remainder" allowing for the cultural "other" to emerge from the text. As Davis's fiction often reveals ourselves as 'other,' these works in their delving beyond the surface are useful guides. Moreover, a look at how nonsense texts work is yet another theoretical context that is of help. In their study The Force of Language, Lecercle and Riley (2005) investigate how in refusing meaning, nonsense texts provoke interpretation. They are "forceful attempts to force meaning out of them or into them. Such forceful attempts develop intuitions about the workings of language, even as nonsense itself does" (81).

Davis does not like the term flash fiction, nor does she like her work to be considered experimental:

> To me, experimental implies that the writer had a plan to test some preconceived writing strategy and see if it would work, that what resulted might or might not prove anything, and might or might not be successful. It seems to me both preplanned, deliberate, conceptual, and at the same time rather tentative. Since I generally prefer to start a piece of writing without much of a plan, and not to be sure exactly what I'm doing, I do not consider the stories that result, in any way experimental. (Davis 2020, n.p.; original emphasis)

However, to get a view of how her fiction fits into the general picture of the short story, and more precisely short-short fiction, Kasia Boddy on Davis in her textbook The American Short Story from 1950 (2010) and Julie Tanner's chapter in Cocchiarale and Emmert's Flash Fiction (2017) each in their own way demonstrate how, if Davis is to be classified in the above genres, she takes them to a new level.

To conclude, as this chapter's close readings have striven to show, the very best place to start analyzing Davis's work is with a grammar textbook in hand — my favorite being the The Cambridge Companion to the English Language. In saying this, I am simply repeating the advice Davis herself gives to young writers. The book she advises is Virginia Tufte's Artful Sentences: Syntax and Style (2006). It is because the short story cannot afford the luxury of the novel to include passages that are present simply for the sheer pleasure of the skillful writing, we are called upon to take into account every word. In Lydia Davis's work, not only is it every word, it is every sign down to the tiniest phoneme or unobtrusive lexeme. The reader who, at first might believe that there is little to work on can discover, such as we did rapidly above, what the modest apostrophe can bring to the work; what a little verb phrase, like, "said the monk," can tell us about narrative voice, and how, when the grammar of a language gives us a choice between two seemingly synonymous structures, or words that may mean the same, we discover that what is expressed is different. But this difference often reveals itself to ring a bell with a theme, or an idea expressed further back in the text, or announces something we will discover further down.

Repetition in the short-short story is another source of investigation. Let us return briefly to "Circular Story," cited at the beginning of this chapter and examine the repetition. The pronoun "it" is used four times. Three of those times, the referent for "it" is clearly the noun anaphorically referred to in the preceding sentence; but in the last sentence we cannot replace "it" by the "the truck." The referent can only be "the racket out there on the road" located at the beginning of the text. And that is why it is a "circular" story. It brings us back to the beginning. And in bringing us back to the beginning it becomes what Roland Barthes considers to be the ideal text — the reversible text open to the greatest variety of independent interpretations and not restrictive in meaning (Barthes 1970, 11). Just like the pronoun "it."

While the study of grammar is an entry point to all her stories, grammar itself as title and/or theme predominates some of her most intriguing stories. The haunting

"Grammar Questions" (Davis 2013, 527), the story of the narrator's dying father recounted through grammatical questionings: "In the phrase 'he is dying,' the words `he is' with the present participle suggest that he is actively doing something. But he is not actively dying. j. . .] 'He is not eating' sounds active, too. But it is not his choice. He is not conscious that he is not eating. He is not conscious at all" (528; original emphasis). Or "Example of the Continuing Past Tense in a Hotel Room" which reads, "Your housekeeper has been Shelley" (715). Or again, the use of the subjunctive in her story "Honoring the Subjunctive": "It invariably precedes, even if it do not altogether supersede, the determination of what is absolutely desirable and just" (377; emphasis added). The choice between the five aspects of the present indicative tense in English (compared to only one in French) cannot be carried out adequately if the translator is only applying the grammar rules. The subjunctive mode has disappeared in British English but is still used in formal writing in American English, but as Davis said herself in her interview with Wachtel, "It's so wrong to the ear" (Wachtel 2008, n.p.). The study of grammar is at the heart of the very long story "We Miss You: A Study of Get Well Letters from a Class of Fourth-Graders" (534-560), which is a socio-anthropological study of 27 children via the letters they sent to her brother who was hospitalized after being hit by a car. Their use of verb phrases, their command of complex sentences, their choice of coordinate conjunctions and formulaic expressions are described in the minutest detail in the dry, analytic voice of a sociologist, which leaves the reader not only with a sentiment of deep poignancy at these letters, but also a fine lesson on how language means and does not mean.

Like Lydia Davis looking at Mitchell's "Cornflowers," we might naively think, "Oh, it's only an apostrophe, only a contracted negation. We understand that." But then we realize, we do not. Davis concludes: "I became willing to allow aspects of the painting to remain mysterious, and I became willing to allow aspects of other problems to remain unsolved as well" (Davis 2020, n.p.). And so it is with her stories — these ever-yielding miniatures. Lydia Davis has been said to be a writer's writer. But she is first and foremost, a reader's reader. And each of her stories contain a lesson in close reading.

Bibliography
Works Cited

Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Paris: Seuil Points — Essais, 1970.

Barthes, Roland. Oeuvres Completes IV. Ed. Eric Marty. Paris: Seuil, 2002.

Benjamin, Walter. The Task of the Translator. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Transl. Harry Zohrn. New York: Schocken Books, 1969.

Benveniste, Emile. Problems in General Linguistics. Transl. M. E. Meek. Miami: U of Miami P, 1971.

Blanchot, Maurice. The Space of Literature. Transl. A. Smock. Lincoln, Nebraska: Nebraska UP, 1992 [1955].

Boddy, Kasia. The American Short Story since 1950. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2010.

Cocchiarale, Michael, and Scott D. Emmert, eds. Flash Fiction. Ipswich, MA: Salem P, 2017.

Davis, Lydia. The End of the Story. London: Picador, 2004 [1995].

Davis, Lydia. The Collected Stories of Lydia Davis. London: Penguin, 2013 [2009].

Davis, Lydia. Can't and Won't. London: Penguin Random House, 2015 [2014].

Davis, Lydia. Essays One. New York: Picador eBook, 2020 [2019].

De Man, Paul. The Resistance to Theory. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986.

Evans, Jonathan. The Many Voices of Lydia Davis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2016.

Gunn, D. "The Lydia Davis Interview," http://quarterlyconversation.com-/the-lydia-davis-interview . The Quarterly Conversation. March 10, 2014. (4 July 2018).

Halliday, M. A. K., and Ruqaiya Hasan. Cohesion in English. London and New York: Routledge, 1976.

Haughton-Shaw, Eliza. "Essay - The Eccentricity of Lydia Davis's Essays," https://www.thelondonmagazine.org/essay-the-eccentricity-of-lydia-davis-s-essays-by-eliza-haughton-shaw/ . The London Magazine. August 18, 2020. (20 May 2021).

Huddleston, Rodney, and Geoffrey Pullum. The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language.

Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002.

Jackson, Shelley. But Is It a Story? https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-may-27-bk-jackson27-story.html . Los Angeles Times. May 27, 2007. (27 April 2021).

Jacobs, Carols. "The Monstrosity of Translation." MLN 90.6 (1975): 755-766.

Joly, Andre. "Lucy was Beautiful." De la Syntaxe a la Narratologie. Eds. Monique De Mattia and Andre Joly. Paris: Ophry's, 2001. 147-170.

Lecercle, Jean-Jacques. The Violence of Language. London: Routledge, 1990.

Lecercle, Jean-Jacques, and Denise Riley. The Force of Language. Basingstroke: Palgrave, 2005.

Manguso, Sarah. "An Interview with Lydia Davia," https://believermag.com/an-interview-with-lydia-davis. The Believer's. January 1, 2008. (2 May 2021).

Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith. Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics. London: Routledge, 1989.

Seghal, Paruhl. "Lydia Davis Loved Learning the Word 'Look.' These Essays Show Why," https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/books/review-essays-one-lydia-davis.html . New York Times. November 5, 2019. (4 April 2021).

Tanner, Julie. "'Art is not in some far-off place': Lydia Davis's 'One-Paragraph Freedom,'" Flash Fiction. Eds. Michael Cocchiarale and Scott D. Emmert. Ipswich, MA: Salem P, 2017. 130-145.

Tufte, Virginia. Artful Sentences: Syntax and Style. Cheshire, CN: Graphics P, 2006.

Venuti, Lawrence. The Translator's Invisibility. London: Routledge, 2008 [1995].

Wachtel, Eleanor. "An Interview with Lydia Davis," https://brickmag.com/an-interview-with-lydia-davis . Brick Magazine. June 1, 2008. (24 April 2021).

Winters, John. "Lydia Davis's New Collection Can't and Won't . . . Doesn't," https://www.wbur.-org/artery/2014/05/13/lydia-davis-story-collection . The ARTery. May 13, 2014. (2 May 2021).

Yule, George. The Study of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014 [2006].

Further Reading

Cohen, Josh. "Reflexive Incomprehension - On Lydia Davis." Textual Practice 24.3 (2010): 501-516. Culbert, John. "Lydia Davis in 2000 Words," https://johnculbert.wordpress.com/.../lydia-davis-in-2000-words/ . The Purgatory Press. June 3, 2015. (11 April 2018).

Davis, Lydia. "Eleven Pleasures of Translating," https://www.nybooks.com/articles-/2016/12/08/eleven-pleasures-of-translating/ . The New York Review. December 8, 2016. (16 April 2021).

Fludernik, Monika. "Second Person Fiction: Narrative You as Addressee And/Or Protagonist." Arbeiten aus Anglistik and Amerikanistik 18.2 (1993): 217-247.

Gardelle, Laure, and Sandrine Sorlin. The Pragmatics of Personal Pronouns. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2015.

Goodyear, Dana. "Long Story Short: Lydia Davis's Radical Fiction." New Yorker. March 17, 2014. 24-31.

Grice, Paul H. "Logic and Conversation." Syntax and Semantics: Speech Acts. Vol. 3. Eds. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan. New York, San Francisco, London: Academic P, 1975. 41-58.

Jakobson, Roman. Language in Literature. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1987.

Klinedinst, Nathan, and Paul Egre. Vagueness and Language Use. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Knight, Christopher J. "An Interview with Lydia Davis." Contemporary Literature 40.4 (Winter 1999): 525-551.

Mars-Jones, Adam. "Reality is Worse," https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v36/n08/adam-mars-jones/reality-is-worse . The London Review of Books 36.8, April 17, 2014. (20 May 2021).

Matthews, Brendan. "Lydia Davis: 'I kind of like the fact that my work isn't for everyone,'" https://www.salon.com/2014/04/28/lydia_davisj_kind_of_like_the_fact_that_my_work_isn°/0%80c/099t_for_everybody/ . Salon. April 29, 2014. (20 May 2021).

McCaffery, Larry. Some Other Frequency: Some Interviews with Innovative American Authors. Philidelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1996.

Parkes, Malcom B. Pause and Effect: An Introduction to the History of Punctuation in the West. New York: Routledge, 2016 [1994.

Pennebaker, James W. The Secret Life of Pronouns: What Our Words Say About Us. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011.

Ricks, Christopher. "The Art of Lydia Davis." The Collected Stories of Lydia Davis. London: Penguin, 2013. xii—xxii.

Sorlin, Sandrine. Inventive Linguistics. Montpellier: Presses Universitaires de la Méditerranée, 2009.

The Harlequin. "An Interview with Lydia Davis," http://www.theharlequin.org-/davis5/ . The Harlequin. 2014. (22 April 2021). <>

BECOMING THE EX-WIFE: THE UNCONVENTIONAL LIFE AND FORGOTTEN WRITINGS OF URSULA PARROTT by Marsha Gordon [University of California Press, ISBN: 9780520391543]

"Makes an excellent case for Parrott as an unjustly forgotten historical figure."—The New Yorker

"Remind[s] us of the brazenly talented women sidelined by convention."—New York Times

The riveting biography of Ursula Parrott—best-selling author, Hollywood screenwriter, and voice for the modern woman.

Credited with popularizing the label "ex-wife" in 1929, Ursula Parrott wrote provocatively about divorcées, career women, single mothers, work-life balance, and a host of new challenges facing modern women. Her best sellers, Hollywood film deals, marriages and divorces, and run-ins with the law made her a household name. Part biography, part cultural history, Becoming the Ex-Wife establishes Parrott's rightful place in twentieth-century American culture, uncovering her neglected work and keen insights into American women's lives during a period of immense social change.

Although she was frequently dismissed as a "woman's writer," reading Parrott's writing today makes it clear that she was a trenchant philosopher of modernity—her work was prescient, anticipating issues not widely raised until decades after her decline into obscurity. With elegant wit and a deft command of the archive, Marsha Gordon tells a timely story about the life of a woman on the front lines of a culture war that is still raging today.

Credited with popularizing the label "ex-wife" in 1929, Ursula Parrott wrote provocatively about divorcées, career women, single mothers, work-life balance, and a host of new challenges facing modern women. Her best sellers, Hollywood film deals, marriages and divorces, and run-ins with the law made her a household name. Part biography, part cultural history, **BECOMING THE EX-WIFE** establishes

Parrott's rightful place in twentieth-century American culture, uncovering her neglected work and keen insights into American women's lives during a period of immense social change. With elegant wit and a deft command of the archive, Marsha Gordon tells a timely story about the life of a woman on the front lines of a culture war that is still raging today.

Marsha Gordon is Professor of Film Studies at North Carolina State University, a former Fellow at the National Humanities Center, and the recipient of a National Endowment for the Humanities Public Scholar award. She is the author of numerous books and articles and codirector of several short documentaries.

What inspired you to write a biography about Ursula Parrott and what drew you to her work as a Hollywood screenwriter and author?

In 2015, I was tipped off to a collection of F. Scott Fitzgerald screenplays in the special collections archives at the University of South Carolina. When I made an appointment to look at the materials, I had a limited amount of time, so I picked the screenplay that had the best title— *Infidelity*! Fitzgerald had been hired by MGM to write this screenplay in 1938, and I will never forget what I wrote in my notes about the author of the story Fitzgerald was adapting: "Who is Ursula Parrott?" I had never heard of her!

The more I learned about her—from her 1929 best-selling book *Ex-Wife*, to her prolific publishing career and her movie work—the more interesting I found her and the more shocked I was that none of her books were in print. In fact, she had been totally erased from the story of 20th century American literature, film, and culture. I hope my book begins the work of telling her story and bringing renewed attention to her fascinating and immensely readable writings.

In what ways do you believe Parrott's writing was prescient, anticipating issues that were not widely raised until decades after her decline into obscurity?

Parrott saw a lot of the impossible contradictions of modern life for women, especially involving relationships, sex, marriage, child rearing, and work. If you read her writing and ignore the period-specific elements—speakeasies, slang, fashion, and the like—it's shocking how much of what she says would not be out of place in a modern novel or conversation. She called out a lot of male behavior that we are still reckoning with in the #MeToo era, even though she was engaging with these things in the 1920s and 1930s.

How did you go about researching Parrott's life and work, and what were some of the challenges you faced during the process?

Writing a biography is a bit like being a detective. You follow trails and clues, hit a lot of dead ends, pick up threads, make inquiries, and just keep on digging as you pull together the best paper trail you can to tell a version of a person's life. It's a heavy

responsibility, especially when you admire and are sympathetic to the person you are writing about. This gets especially challenging when it comes to someone who has left behind no archive. When Parrott died in the 1950s, she was down on her luck and there was not a single obituary published to commemorate her passing. Nobody tended to her legacy.

When I was a fellow at the National Humanities Center (2019-2020), I set about reading every novel, story, serial, and article Parrott ever published—which took me about a year. That gave me a fantastic sense of her interests and writing style. As I learned more about her personal life through her surviving correspondence with her literary agent and with one of her great loves— both of whom deposited their personal papers with archives — I also realized how much her fiction was about her own life experiences. I pieced together the puzzle of her life through her letters, the vast number of newspaper and magazine stories about her, and her body of published writings.

What do you think Parrott's legacy is in American culture, particularly in terms of her contributions to women's literature and feminist thought?

I think this remains to be seen, since influence can only be gauged by what people read, talk, and publish about in the present day. For so long Parrott has been sidelined, relegated beyond the margins of twentieth century literary and intellectual life. And she's a complicated figure, too—she claimed to have disdain for feminism, but she usually behaved and wrote like an ardent feminist! If people—especially teachers and professors, book reviewers and journalists—discuss and share her work with a new generation, I'm confident that she will have a well-deserved place at the table.

Can you talk about Parrott's writing style and how it evolved over the course of her career?

She had tremendous wit. Even in her darkest hours, she cracked jokes that would make me laugh out loud when I read them in her letters and stories. She had the capacity for the kind of zinger line that we associate with Dorothy Parker, whom I'm sure she associated with when she was hanging out at the Algonquin and the other smart New York places. I also believe that she's one of the great forgotten writers of life in New York City, describing life there in prose perfectly suited to its rhythms,

with details—musical notes, cocktail recipes, wisecracks, speakeasy descriptions—that masterfully evoke a time, place, and feeling.

How did Parrott navigate the challenges of being a female writer and Hollywood screenwriter during a time when women's voices were often marginalized?

Despite her alleged distaste for feminism, Parrott did what she could to represent the unvarnished truth about many pressing issues confronting women. When she went to Hollywood, she did her best to make the female characters she wrote scenes and dialogue for both worldly and smart. These were women who could hold their own in any conversation or setting, from the barroom to the bedroom. She spoke openly with the press and in her stories about raising her son without his father's help. In stories, interviews, and letters, she discussed how women had to learn to deflect men's advances—in cab rides home, at parties, while conducting business. When a banker once suggested to her that she could pay interest on a loan with sexual favors, she deflected his suggestions and proudly announced that "I pay 'em six percent interest, like all the men who borrow from them." Parrott knew, in other words, that all women had to fight different battles than their male counterparts. It's one of the things that made their lives so much more difficult, and their victories so much harder won.

What do you hope readers take away from your book, and what impact do you think Parrott's story and writing can have on contemporary debates about gender and feminism?

First and foremost, I hope that reading my book makes people want to read Parrott's books! Fortunately, McNally Editions is republishing **Ex-Wife**, Parrott's 1929 debut bestseller, in May, so that's the easiest way to get started with a really wonderful and interesting read. I hope that people will discuss what *Ex-Wife* had to say about women's lives in the 1920s, and also what it might reveal about the present state of debates over gender roles and feminism.

Finally, can you tell us a bit about any upcoming projects or research that you're currently working on?

I have a lot of different projects at their beginning phases, but there are two that directly grew out of writing this book. First, I'm trying to get a press interested in republishing *Breadwinner*, Parrott's phenomenally interesting 1933 novella, serialized in *Redbook*. It's about an ambitious and successful woman screenwriter who is also a single mother whose beau cannot accept how greatly her success outpaces his. I think that it might be the first women-centric work-life balance novel, as well, written at a time when the pull of career, family, and home were just emerging for women, who had never had so many opportunities and pressures before. I'd also love to edit a collection of Parrott's short stories, selected letters, and articles—including her amazing 1929 manifesto, "Leftover Ladies." I am really hoping that a press realizes how relevant her writing is, both for a general readership and for

classes in American literature and women's studies. Ursula Parrott richly deserves the attention!

Review

"As Marsha Gordon argues in her engaging new biography, **BECOMING THE EX-WIFE**, the novel 'offers a strong case for the protections of marriage and the dangers of being an unattached woman.' . . . In her biography, Gordon makes an excellent case for Parrott as an unjustly forgotten historical figure: a sociological flash point, a beneficiary of feminism and victim of patriarchy who got her enemies mixed up." — *The New Yorker*

"Why did a once-transfixed reading public turn away, and why is Parrott so often now eliminated from a pantheon of popular urban "working girl" writers that includes Helen Gurley Brown, Candace Bushnell, Nora Ephron, Dorothy Parker and, perhaps most comparably, Jacqueline Susann? . . . A reissue of Ursula Parrott's racy novel "Ex-Wife," and a new biography of its author, remind us of the brazenly talented women sidelined by convention. . . . [Gordon] surfaces plenty of colorful period detail: passport photos of everyone looking mussed and truculent in that Jazz Age way; correspondence from exasperated agents, editors and lovers; even an adorable 'mapback' version marked with key locations in 'Ex-Wife.'" — *The New York Times*

"Parrott led a scandalous, glamorous, sometimes lonely life in the public eye, and Gordon, professor and director of the film studies program at North Carolina State University, has done the world a great service by bringing her back into the spotlight." — *Washington City Paper*

"In **BECOMING THE EX-WIFE**, Marsha Gordon sheds welcome light on this remarkable and troubled writer, who knew too well how hard it was to be a modern woman who wanted sexual freedom and a career of her own choosing. In this well-researched and fascinating biography, Parrott emerges as a star who should be remembered alongside Jazz Age icons like Dorothy Parker and the Fitzgeralds." — *Newcity Lit*

"[O]ffers an in-depth look at Parrott's complicated and sometimes scandalous life." — *Walter Magazine*

"Ursula Parrott longed to be a hard-boiled city reporter, but when the sexism of the newspaper industry thwarted her ambitions, she found her voice—and made her fortune—by turning to fiction. She scandalized readers with her nuanced, world-weary stories of women who discovered that the sexual revolution of the Jazz Age wasn't always the great gift to women that it was cracked up to be. With her sharp wit, rebellious ambition, and tragic love life, Ursula Parrott deserves to be celebrated

alongside greats like Dawn Powell and Dorothy Parker. A pleasure to read."—Debby Applegate, Pulitzer Prize–winning author of *Madam: The Biography of Polly Adler, Icon of the Jazz Age*

"An incisive portrait of a thoroughly modern woman careening through a meteoric literary career and a reckless personal life, from the Jazz Age to the postwar era. Ursula Parrott's massive output of popular fiction, says Marsha Gordon, 'pulled back the curtain on women's debased circumstances in a permissive age'—which is precisely what Gordon does here, to devastating effect, with Parrott herself."—Thomas Schatz, author of *The Genius of the System: Hollywood Filmmaking in the Studio Era*

"Ursula Parrott finally gets her due in Gordon's revelatory book. Drawing upon exhaustive archival research, Gordon tells the fascinating story of the best-selling novelist whose tumultuous personal life eventually eclipsed her literary career. But Gordon does more than shine a light on an unjustly forgotten writer—she asks us to consider *why* she was forgotten. In her work and her life, Parrott explored the paradoxes of modernity for American women—what she saw as the illusory nature of equality for 'leftover ladies,' divorcees or unmarried career women whose lives did not unfold according to the conventional marriage plot. Parrott's trenchant observations arose from her own life but were ahead of her time. Thanks to Gordon's masterful biography, her moment has finally arrived."—Cara Robertson, author of *The Trial of Lizzie Borden*

"**Becoming the Ex-Wife** is just the kind of book I love to read—remarkably well researched and entertaining. Gordon deftly shows why Ursula Parrott more than deserves a place on the shelf."—Cari Beauchamp, author of *Without Lying Down: Frances Marion and the Powerful Women of Early Hollywood*

"In her sparklingly clear and vital new biography, Gordon recovers the story of a singular writer and unhappy woman, who shot to fame with a novel called *Ex-Wife* and carried that tag around with her for the rest of her life. Although she warns that it is not 'an inspirational feminist story,' Gordon's colorful account is salutary all the same, exposing the ways in which even the most successful women's writing can be dismissed and forgotten, and restoring Ursula Parrott to our attention with sympathy and warmth."—Joanna Scutts, author of *Hotbed: Bohemian Greenwich Village and the Secret Club That Sparked Modern Feminism*

"What a fascinating history Gordon charts! Long before Betty Friedan and Helen Gurley Brown, Ursula Parrott voiced the entanglements of modern femininity for educated white women of her generation. Gordon's account of Parrott's life and

work—at once typical and utterly astonishing—is smart, witty, and engaging."—
Shelley Stamp, author of *Lois Weber in Early Hollywood*

CONTENTS

Remembering a 'Leftover Lady"

If you were to sit down and read reviews of Parrott's novels and stories by many critics of her day or casual characterizations of her by commentators and columnists, you would expect her writing to be maudlin and romantic, her plots filled with champagne and late nights dancing at the smartest nightclubs, flowers and weddings,

babies and country homes. But her plots are possessed of these elements only to prime her characters—and her readers—for disappointment. The often trivializing evaluations of her work by critics of her time indicate how much she was misunderstood, making it less surprising that she is all but forgotten today.

Parrott published around 130 novels, stories, novelettes, articles, and serials—none of which are currently in print. At the peak of her career, she made $100,000 a year—the equivalent of roughly two million dollars today.' Although most of her stories depicted romance of some sort, usually of the failed variety, she also wrote about people (indeed, a man and a woman) stranded following a small plane crash in the Canadian wilds during winter, escape plots about people (indeed, a man and a woman) captured by Nazis and held prisoner on a West Indies island during World War II, and stories of young men leaving comfortable lives to fight a war they believed in (indeed, men leaving women behind). Coupling and decoupling play out in most of her stories, but this was just the tip of Parrott's literary iceberg.

Like many of her female contemporaries, she was categorized as a woman who wrote trivial and sentimental romances, although her tales were about much more: difficult divorces, phenomenally successful women's careers, and single parenting; female piloting, adventuring, and traveling; risk-taking on the Underground Railroad, combat, and labor organizing; World War II veterans returning to civilian life and nefarious Nazi plots. Romance writing is a dubious corral in which to contain someone who used the genre to think about women's place in the modern world, and much more.

Of course, she wrote her fair share of tales for the marketplace and made concessions in the process, and she was never able to dedicate herself to the craft of writing in the fashion she had dreamed of. It is certain that Parrott could not have sold stories for such high sums to the mass market magazines that kept her afloat during the 1930s and the 1940s without nesting them inside of a familiar guise and adhering to certain editorial expectations. But most critics never bothered to get past the surface, not noticing, for example, that it was almost always the men in Parrott's stories who experienced unrequited love, wringing their hands over how to convince women to accept their proposals. When the United States rolled out its first World War II—era Victory Book Campaign in the fall of 1942, it warned potential donors to desist from donating any "women's love stories," listing Ursula Parrott—along with Kathleen Norris, Faith Baldwin, and Elinor Glyn—as authors to be avoided. The limiting lasso of the woman writer had already been firmly drawn around Parrott while she was alive; without anyone tending to her legacy, there was no escaping it.

There is much to admire about Parrott's writing, including many of her stories and novels that receive woefully inadequate attention in these pages, like her 1933-34 "Breadwinner," a serialized novel that is a profound snapshot of a time, place, and

worldview centered around a successful writer and single mother who cannot convince the unsuccessful man she adores to get over his preposterous inferiority syndrome. In it, Parrott enacts a stunning takedown of male privilege in the workplace when Mark learns that his office will be laying off workers and tells Linda about his likely disposability: "Most of the smaller agencies, like mine, have been too well filled for years, with a good many allegedly bright young men like me, who did a half-days' work for a good day's wage, because we wore our clothes well, or because the daughter of the senior partner liked the way we danced. We didn't need particularly marked abilities." In a mere two sentences, Parrott eviscerated an entire generation of entitled white-collar workers by cutting them down to size in the voice of one of their own. No wonder Mark was so insecure—he had no legs to stand on, except for those granted by virtue of his maleness.

Her second novel, Strangers May Kiss, contains some exceptionally inter esting and adventurous writing, as when the novel's long-suffering female protagonist imagines New York City itself delivering her a pep talk:

> March on. It don't matter where or why—you had your fun, didn't you? It's finished? What of it and who cares? March on. Don't block traffic. You have a broken heart? Forget it. Applesauce. Bologna. March on. You're tired? Who isn't, sometimes? March on. You didn't get what you want? Nobody does in the end. All things pass, some slowly, some fast. It don't matter. The parade's the thing. Watch the parade. The band keeps playing. Keep step. March on, baby, somewhere or nowhere, in the end you won't know the difference. If you don't want to look at tomorrow, and you don't like today—hell, you had yesterday. And you can always watch the parade.

Written in a stylish staccato beat, this rallying cry brims with the forward-thinking ethos that carried its author through so many years of her life. It is sophisticated, witty, playful, and insightful. I wish I could go back in time to 1949 and scoop up the stack of Parrott's manuscript pages, which were so important to her that she dragged them around even as her life was falling apart, before they hit the dumpster at the Henry Hudson Hotel. Was a draft of her important novel among those pages? We will never know.

Parrott's life cannot be told as an inspirational feminist story. She was complicated, embodying and espousing many contradictions. A wildly successful woman who saw careers as impediments to women's happiness, especially of the marital variety. A romantic who pursued love and marriage in a serial fashion because she believed that a long-lasting relationship was the ideal path and the next walk down the aisle might lead her to it. A woman who craved stability but who could not resist making decisions that resulted in chaos. A radical who sometimes advocated for conservative values. Parrott did not always make sense, including to herself—but she

tried her best to reckon with and explain her bewilderment. She was a skilled dismantler of dreams, her own included.

Parrott once predicted, "Women like me will be better off in a hundred years": "We hunt about among the wreckage of old codes for pieces to build an adequate shelter to last our lifetime ... and the building material's just not there." "I do believe," she continued with equal parts hope and resignation, "that out of all this will come a comradeship between men and women ... fairer to men ... fairer to women. But not in time for us." She acknowledged, with a sense of defeat, "Women like me, here and now, feel one way, believe another ... and on neither side is happiness to be reckoned among the spoils.'"

I am convinced that Ursula Parrott was right, that it would have been significantly easier to be her now than it was a hundred years ago when many of her ideas and actions seemed untenable, off-putting, even outlandish. But as she struggled to make sense of the messy modern world and her place within it, she helped shape a conversation about women's lives during turbulent years of consequential change. If her inconclusiveness on these matters was as unsatisfying on the page as it was in her life, perhaps we should recall how she accepted this uncertainty but marched on nonetheless. "I'm sure I cannot tell whether the professional woman is happier than the wife or less so," she admitted. "But of one thing I'm sure—if we are able to make anything out of our mad era we must face the facts as we see them and piece out the salvation of our individual existence." <>

RECOVERING WOMEN'S PAST: NEW EPISTEMOLOGIES, NEW VENTURES edited by Séverine Genieys-Kirk [Women and Gender in the Early Modern World, University of Nebraska Press, 9781496231796]

Feminist rewriting of history is designed not merely to reshape our collective memory and collective imaginary but also to challenge deeply ingrained paradigms about knowledge production. This feminist rewriting raises important questions for early modern scholars, especially in bringing to life the works of our foremothers and in reconsidering women's agency.

Recovering Women's Past, edited by Séverine Genieys-Kirk, is a collection of essays that focus on how women born before the nineteenth century have claimed a place in history and how they have been represented in the collective memory from the Renaissance to the twenty-first century. Scrutinizing the legacies of such politically minded women as Catherine de' Medici, Queen Isabella of Castile, Emilie du Châtelet, and Olympe de Gouges, the volume's contributors reflect on how our

histories of women (in philosophy, literature, history, and the visual and performative arts) have been shaped by the discourses of their representation, how these discourses have been challenged, and how they can be reassessed both within and beyond the confines of academia. **RECOVERING WOMEN'S PAST** disseminates a more accurate, vital history of women's past to engage in more creative and artistic encounters with our intellectual foremothers by creating imaginative modes of representing new knowledge. Only in these interactions will we be able to break away from the prevailing stereotypes about women's roles and potential and advance the future of feminism.

Review

"Extremely important. In many academic departments, schools, and even in the public forum, we are having to fight for women authors, artists, or politicians to be added to historical records, monuments, libraries, and curricula. This is in great part, as this volume shows very well, because they are not treated by historians or researchers with the respect due to their achievements but always as women first, whether virtuous and pious mother types or courtesans and 'lunatics.' This book highlights the ways in which women of the past were and still are excluded from the history of their disciplines and contributes to their recovery."—Sandrine Bergès, author of *A Feminist Perspective on Virtue Ethics*

"This book refocuses and revivifies the field of early modern feminist studies at a moment when the humanities are rightfully reevaluating how knowledge is created and how this epistemic process has marginalized, abstracted, obfuscated, and repressed the lives and voices of entire cultural, ethnic, and gender groups. . . . Having all these essays and reflections on approaches to studying the field together in one volume is invaluable to both scholars and students of all these fields and this topic."—Abby E. Zanger, author of *Scenes from the Marriage of Louis XIV: Nuptial Fictions and the Making of Absolutist Power*

CONTENTS

In our endeavor to rescue early modern women from the cultural darkness in which their intellectual lives have been enshrouded, the field of feminist historiography keeps renewing itself, pushing off the boundaries of the normative, phallocentric unconscious that has hitherto shaped not only the academic community's but also society's symbolic encounters with our matrilineal cultural heritage. Certainly, one case in point is how women's works and lives have been presented in mainstream discourses, whether these form part of canon extension or are oriented toward the broader public (museum and art gallery visitors, film viewers, or general readerships). As philosopher Sarah Hutton warns us, it is not enough to "overcome amnesia"; we need to avoid a "new amnesia.'" In other words, "slotting in" women's achievements "within a pre-existing discourse, into a narrative originally constructed without them" can only result in a dysmorphic understanding of their actual contributions to the advancement of knowledge.'

Thanks to the colossal Female Biography Project (2005-14) under the lead of Gina Luria Walker,' a new field of collective feminist enquiry, at once transnational and transdisciplinary, is emerging—driven by the realization that "if women remain

studied through the prisms of male-knowledge-ordering systems, old inaccuracies will remain perpetuated."'

Karl C. Alvestad, Janice North, and Ellie Woodacre's collection of essays, Premodern Rulers and Postmodern Viewers, gives insight into the history of these representations through the medium of pop culture, where natural impulses feed on sensationalism and presentism. Despite the milestone advances in women's studies in the fields of literature, philosophy, history, and history of art, "presentist views" and "emotional historiographies" of women's lives, to borrow from the title of Susan Broomhall's chapter in this volume, perpetuate the enduring misrepresentations and mythification of women, and account for the near-absence of tangible narratives about women's roles as political, cultural, artistic, and literary agents and, more broadly, as producers of knowledge. However, such reflections, often carried out within the enclaves of our distinct disciplines, call for a broader transdisciplinary and transcultural reassessment of how we shape foundational knowledge and of how new research in the humanities and artistic practices can dialogue to add important correctives to "official" histories and standard feminist narratives.

This is the aim of the present volume, whose initial shape was conceived as part of the conference Recovering Women's Past: New Epistemologies, New Ventures, held at the University of Edinburgh, September 8—10, 2016. The title presented itself to me in an exquisite three-day gathering of minds and souls, a year earlier, in April 2015, at the University of Coruna's Seminario Internacional Mary Hays and Women's Biographies, where I was invited to give a guest lecture. To me, it became clear that in order to deliberately facilitate the project of a feminist historical recovery of women's past, if we were to continue Mary Hays's groundbreaking "invention of female biography," we needed to create a space for a fruitful conversation within and beyond the broader community of academics in the humanities, and to find points of convergence between past and present. Her work, as the modern editorial annotations of her Female Biography demonstrate, lends itself to the scrutinizing eyes of specialists from across the humanities. Hays has made us think critically not only about the processes of historical and academic practice but also about both "feminist history traditions" and "contemporary uses of female biography" beyond the conventional parameters of literary studies. The shape of this volume is thus the result of the lively discussions that arose from the 2016 conference in Edinburgh and have continued since in the inspiring context of the New Historia, founded in 2017 by Gina Luria Walker at the New School in New York City."

With a focus on how women born before the nineteenth century acted out a role in history and have been represented in the collective memory, the chosen timeline of this volume's journey between past and present spans the Renaissance to the twenty-first century. This allows for a better understanding of the history of feminism from earlier manifestations within the centuries-long debates on women known as the

querelle des femmes and of the impact of new feminist research, be it on school or university curricula or on curated exhibitions and artistic creations!' The chosen timescale, however, is not intended to replicate the conventional framework of periodization, which comes with inherently flawed categories of imposed knowledge. The notion of the "early modern" is here considered in its broadest sense with the aim to accommodate its conceptual and temporal fluidity in the transnational and transatlantic context of women's history from the Renaissance to Napoleon's memorable defeat in 1815. Although some of the women included here (Helen Maria Williams and the Purbeck sisters) were born in the middle of the eighteenth century and some of their most important works were published at the beginning of the nineteenth century, they were immersed in Georgian and ancien regime cultures while being, like Olympe de Gouges, key observers and participants in the formation of the political woman, albeit undermined by traditional historiography.

Scrutinizing the reception of the works of these politically minded women, a trained eye soon comes to realize that they were first romanticized, then lost in "translation" as these figures began to be excavated from the dusty bookshelves of national libraries and private collections. But why is that? In the absence of women in the official history of Western society, feminist scholars have admitted to being guilty of replicating andro centric readings of their foremothers' works.' As this volume proposes, the time has come to rebuild "the practice of history" and thus destabilize the foundations of prevailing "knowledge-ordering systems," not solely within the precincts of perfectly delimited time periods and subject areas, but from within a broader perspective aspiring to unlock disciplinary differences and open a new field of cross-cultural and transdisciplinary investigation that brings together academic experts and practitioners from philosophy, literary history, literature, theater, arts studies, and beyond.

The objectives of this collection of essays are therefore to reflect on how recovering women's past informs our own understanding of and raises questions about received methodologies across the humanities, that is, about epistemic responsibility. For example, how are the questions posed by philosophers different from questions posed by other disciplines in the humanities? What is the relation between biography and philosophy, biography and history of art, biography and the performative arts, biography and the collective memory? By answering these questions, the volume's contributors reflect on how our "histories" of women (in philosophy, literature, history, and visual and performative arts) have been shaped by the discourses of their representation, how these discourses are challenged, and why those need challenging both within and beyond the confines of academia. Taking issue with the notion of canonicity in the twinned contexts of reception and gender studies, the volume opens with a section on "new epistemologies," a theoretical framework that gives insight into the methodologies employed by feminist philosophers and historians to challenge the status quo.

In their respective contributions, Gina Luria Walker, Nancy Kendrick and Jessica Gordon-Roth, Lara Perry, and Susan Broomhall interrogate a range of approaches and assumptions that, despite their disciplinary specificities, reveal and stress the importance of making these practices dialogue with each other across the disciplines. Advancing knowledge-seeking and knowledge itself by exploring various fields of academic enquiry, and not just correcting or filling the gaps, forms the raison d'être of this volume.

By asking whether Virginia Woolf was wrong, and what else might have happened to Judith Shakespeare, Gina Luria Walker revolutionizes the way we envision the project of feminist historical recovery and urges us to challenge the assumptions that structure our deepest beliefs about culture. Rather than dismissing controversial monographs such as Shakespeare's Dark Lady: Amelia Bassano Lanier, the Lady behind Shakespeare's Plays (2016) by John Hudson or Sweet Swan of Avon: Did a Woman Write Shakespeare (2006) by Robin P. Williams, Walker takes these works and other similar ventures as thresholds into the uncharted waters of taxonomies, if not in the making yet, still unimagined.' In other words, these should inspire us to think outside the box, to question the validity of the canon as we know it, which has shaped our world vision from school textbooks to high and popular culture. As Walker argues, traditional academic models of periodization, genre, and intellectual schools are increasingly awkward and inherently biased and encourage repeating patterns of interpretation and representations that undermine women's cultural heritage.

Far from being all-inclusive, the phrase "cultural heritage" teems with potential for the recognition of women's contributions: gender neutral in appearance, unlike the French term patrimoine, it disguises centuries of ideological manipulation and indoctrination meant to condition how we read, interpret, tell, and retell women's stories and lives. The official reintroduction of the potent phrase journées du matrimoine in France, in addition to the conventional annual Heritage Day, thanks to academic and practitioner Aurore Evain, signals an important shift in the move toward sexual parity.' Across the globe, the heritage sector has been working harder at making women more visible in museum and library exhibitions, even in fashion magazines, such as Bazaar, which regularly features a section on a historical woman. Yet, even then, as the contributors remind us in this volume, we must be wary of how we present this matrimoine so as to avoid the traps of orthodox ideologies and enduring myths that encourage dualistic interpretations opposing male and female, reason and intuition, logic and emotion.

In their chapter "The Visible and the Invisible: Feminist Recovery in the History of Philosophy," Nancy Kendrick and Jessica Gordon-Roth put forward a useful framework for reevaluating how the epistemic space early modern women carved for themselves has been reduced to a subjective set of paradigms, the private and the

personal, which is in complete contradiction with the very practice of analytical philosophers. In a discipline where it is claimed arguments and their authors are distinct, it emerges that men's and women's texts are treated differently. Women philosophers' texts, such as Mary Astell's and Margaret Cavendish's works, are de-intellectualized, decoded through the lens of (auto)biographical records, such as labor and birth or intimate relationships, denying those women a philosophical standpoint on a par with their male counterparts. It may be argued that early modern women have had a better fate in literature and history departments; however, Kendrick and Gordon-Roth's argument resonates with the experiences of academics intent on disseminating knowledge about women's contribution to our cultural heritage but often working in isolation."

Lara Perry's perspective as a feminist art historian further testifies to the normative trends that have characterized the recovery of the history of women artists, despite Linda Nochlin's important 1976 essay reflecting on the apparent inaccessibility of women artists. Perry focuses here on female artists Mary Beale (1633-39), Sarah Hoadly (1676-1743), and Angelica Kauffman (1741-1807), whose lives and works were discussed in biographical collections such as Ellen Clayton's 1867 English Female Artists. However, what have the parameters been for the inclusion of their works in (and their absence from) the collections of national museums such as the National Portrait Gallery (founded in 1856) or the National Gallery (founded in 1838) ? How does one account for the (in)visibility of women artists, and when they are made visible, how is the general public's knowledge of these women's works channeled? With the Prado Museum's 2019 bicentenary exhibition of Lavinia Fontana and Sofinisba Anguissola in mind, Perry gives firsthand insight into how the journey for the recognition of two major Renaissance female artists on a grand scale has much to reveal about the complex mechanics and gender politics of curatorial methods and about historians' epistemological practice." Perry's analysis conjures up striking parallels with Susan Broomhall's groundbreaking research on the conceptualization of "emotional historiography.'" By investigating the historiographical practices that have characterized the formidably colorful afterlife of Catherine de' Medici, Broomhall proposes a novel way of reflecting on how our encounters with other historical women of power have been shaped (whether these women are queens, intellectuals, or artists). She draws our attention to the importance of reflecting on our own reading habits as more than just "interpretive acts" but as informed by affect, tinged with the ideological residues of conditioned, if not fabricated, knowledge about the historical women that made it into the gallery of the female greats.

In presenting these four chapters together, this section aims to show how new knowledge-ordering systems can provide innovative modes of thinking in both academic and artistic practice. In particular, how does the unearthing, (re)reading, reinterpretation, and even adaptations of "female genealogies" inform new and modern narratives (whether academic, artistic, or fictional)? Who and how are the

women remembered and represented? How have their lives been rescued, told, and retold? Do gender politics inflect the choices of philosophers, historians, biographers, or artists when they set out to make these women's voices heard? If so, how?

The second part of the book, "New Ventures," is an attempt at illustrating precisely this. Presented in a chronological and thematic order, the contributions in this section all are new case studies ranging from the seventeenth to the twenty-first centuries. Highlighting the vibrancy of feminist historiography across the disciplines and also across time, the opening chapters point to the necessity of further investigation into the quenelle des femmes and its effects on the philosophical and theological discourses in the mapping of womanhood. These are crucial both to our understanding of how the history of women came to be written and unwritten and, as recently posited by Derval Conroy in Towards an Equality of the Sexes (2021), for a rewriting of mainstream political thought that considers "the history of equality, and hence of gender equality" as an important analytical category of investigation that turns into "a dynamic construction which needs to be historicised."

Carme Font Paz's analysis of Samuel Torshell's early feminist work The Woman Glorie (1650) corroborates Conroy's assertion that "modern binary conceptions must be set aside" to achieve a more accurate and inclusive history of political philosophy.' Font Paz demonstrates how modern and subversive Torshell's views were, which she argues might explain why it fell into complete oblivion. Torshell's text is an important addition to the complex picture of the phallocentric regulation of woman's conduct in the early modern period. Erecting Anna Maria van Schurman and Queen Christina of Sweden as exemplars of intellectual achievement, he poses a whole epistemology of female learning that stems from early feminists' well-cherished motto that "the mind has no sex."' By presenting Torshell as ahead of his time in his promotion of "a sexual revolution based on a spiritual discipline for men and women," Font Paz's close reading of Torshell's little-known counterdiscourse provides interesting parallels with Sarah Hutton's chapter on eighteenth-century French philosopher and mathematician Emilie du Chatelet. In her essay Hutton identifies two types of dangers faced by women intellectuals asserting themselves as legitimate authorities in the male-dominated domain of sciences. Hutton's case study of one of the most famous women scientists further illustrates Nancy Kendrick and Jessica Gordon-Roth's portrayal of women intellectuals as key system-builders in philosophical discourse; in particular Hutton highlights the subtleties and incongruities of what Font Paz has identified as the complex game of "genderfluid textualities" in the quenelle des femmes. In so doing, Hutton offers a way of contextualizing how other women engaged in intellectual discourse that infringed upon men's dominion of knowledge—including Helen Maria Williams, the Purbeck sisters, and Olympe de Gouges, who are included in this volume.

Although Helen Maria Williams features more often in university curricula and although her profile as a maestra of poetical and political discourses has been well established, Paula Yurss Lasanta's case study provides another telling example of how women as authorities in late eighteenth-century political discourse can be partially distorted through lack of engagement with the full body of their writings. Here Yurss Lasanta brings to our attention two significant texts, Letters on the Events (180 and Narrative of the Events (1819), which were published more than twenty years after her much-better-known Letters Written in France (179o) and are yet to be fully analyzed.' Bringing to the fore spectatorship as a key paradigm in eighteenth-century historical and journalistic discourse, Yurss Lasanta offers a fresh assessment of Williams's work as a rational and objective account of the French Revolution by deconstructing normative analyses of her revolutionary narratives as "emotional?' She discusses how Williams's unconventional status as both a thinker and a commentator living abroad influenced the way her discourse, directed at an English audience, evolved between 1790 and 1815. By showing how Williams's commentary of the 1815 events is informed by both her personal engagement with Enlightenment philosophers (such as Voltaire) and her direct experience of the Reign of Terror, Yurss Lasanta portrays Williams anew as a political historian rather than as a political woman writer. Relegated to the fringe of politico-historical discourse, Williams is thus another example of how canonicity has affected the recognition of women's important contributions to history, which have been underrated, misrecorded, or simply have been read through the narrow lens of their gender.

New names continue to emerge and similar patterns of elision and obliteration recur as feminist scholars untiringly stitch newly excavated finds to the genealogy of women's feats in the production of knowledge. Maria Jesus Lorenzo-Modia's chapter on the Purbeck sisters further exemplifies the previous contributions' call for the need to persevere in destabilizing inherently misogynist paradigms and rethinking how women writers interacted with their male peers, whether as scientists, historians, or readers and interpreters of literature or as sociocultural agents and observers of political events. Like Williams and de Gouges, the Purbeck sisters engaged, under the guise of fiction, with "serious" topics such as Jacobinism and anti-Jacobinism, and the ideology of the Reign of Terror. The obscured) Purbeck sisters are yet another example of how early modern women of letters cultivated virtue in the Aristotelian epistemic sense: through their intellectual interactions with political and scientific discourses, they positioned themselves as knowers, if not publicly, at least within the confines of their private rooms. Font Paz's, Hutton's, Yurss Lasanta's, and LorenzoModia's case studies contend with how mainstream historiography, with its androcentric if not misogynistic overtones, has tended to represent, narrate, and shape early modern women's intellectual lives, often reducing them to the biographical, to the personal, and to the sensational. By and large, as many studies have shown in recent decades of feminist academic investigation, reading and

interpreting their works have been informed by traditional modes of thinking. These case studies resonate with Mary Spongberg's 2019 book Women Writers and the Nation's Past, 1790-1860: Empathetic Histories, which she had previewed at our 2016 conference. With "emotion" playing a crucial role in the reconstruction of how women's histories came to be written, ideologically driven patterns of phallocentric fallacies have led to a subjective and flawed assessment of these women's works and contributions to the arts and humanities across time.

The reliability of biographies of these women has therefore become objectionable. While the increase in studies on near-forgotten works has become more and more valuable in the recovery of women's voices, biographies of women (whether by men or women) as a genre have only begun to resurface as important documents for fully comprehending the narratives and counternarratives that have influenced the representation of women across the disciplines represented in this volume. The contributions by Begona Lasa-Alvarez, Anne Marie Hagen, and Armel Dubois-Nayt explore the importance of biographical sources as educational testimonies that are revisited and tailored for targeted audiences, especially women, and children or teenagers. In the wake of Spongberg's milestone work on women-authored courtly memoirs, Lasa-Alvarez examines women writers' contribution to the feminization of queenship studies in the nineteenth century: her focus on textual and iconographical representations of Queen Isabella of Castile in Victorian biographies of royal women serves to highlight the extent to which women biographers such as Anna Jameson, Mary Clarke, or Ann Hasseltine Judson engage with the domesticating and nationalist mainstream narratives created by their male peers and produce in the process alternative life stories intended for women readerships.

The popularity of biographies of royal and political women can be seen in the increasing number of novels and plays dedicated to the representation of queens and historical heroines especially throughout the Romantic period and beyond.' Particularly striking is their presence in children's fiction, which was on the rise from the nineteenth century onward. Hagen's chapter on the portrayal of Flora MacDonald, the famous eighteenth-century Scottish Jacobite heroine, deploys iconographic and paratextual material to discuss how the Victorian and Edwardian stories that feature MacDonald as a heroine guide their young audience's interpretation of female heroism and thus imprint on them codified modes of thinking about women of the past.

The repercussions of such representations solidified by mainstream nineteenth- and early twentieth-century biographical and fictional works about "illustrious" women are further illustrated by Dubois-Nayt's study on Mary, Queen of Scots, in juvenile fiction written between the 1980s and 2010s. Crucially, this chapter analyzes how novels by Moira Miller (1987), Terry Deary (1998), Valerie Wilding (zoos), and Kathryn Lasky (2010) shape young people's perception of the past and understanding

of historically authoritative women. In the process, Dubois-Nayt discusses the extent to which gender politics and current feminist discourse in media and society have influenced the authors' choices in their portrayals of the queen.

Capturing the inner lives of historically famous women is, however, no easy task; too subjective a mission for the scholar, it has creative potential for novelists, poets, and artists, but what of the women's own voices? Making these women's voices heard not just on the page but also on stage is another venture that has yielded passionate, colorful, sensational portrayals of historical women, which still remain to be fully investigated. Theater and performance studies have become essential to feminist historiographical work: interestingly, just as early modern women's lives have drawn the attention of historians, so have they caught the imagination of playwrights and filmmakers.

The "emotional history" of Ninon de Lenclos and Queen Christina of Sweden provides one such example, as it reveals a fascinating crossover between periods and genres (biographies, novels, portraiture, biopics, and theater). In my own chapter, "Theater and Women in Power: The Ninon de Lenclos Phenomenon from Olympe de Gouges to Hippolyte Wouters," drawing upon Broomhall's revisionist study of the Catherine de' Medici story, I have chosen to focus "on theater as a powerful art form in the creation of emotional historiographies." Voltaire appears to have created the first play dedicated to the famous seventeenth-century salonnière and courtisane. However, Olympe de Gouges's play Moliere chez Ninon ou les Brands hommes seems, despite the inimical criticism it received from the Comédie-Française, to have launched a trend in the dramatization of Ninon de Lenclos's eventful encounters with other seventeenth-century women, such as Queen Christina of Sweden, Madame de Maintenon, and Madame de Sévigné. Retracing these inventive recreations of Lenclos's encounters with other major historical women across time sheds light on the ways gender politics has affected the multifaceted portrayal of women as "female greats." Above all, the survey of the Ninon plays allows us to fully capture the originality and visionary quality of de Gouges's work as a blueprint for feminist historiography. When in her ivory boudoir de Gouges penned her "imaginary" dialogues between Ninon de Lenclos and Queen Christina, she created a utopic vision of cultural sisterhood—a powerful counternarrative for those who knowingly or not would follow in her footsteps. In Aurore Evain's words, "to make women's legacies visible is to reinvent our relationship to History and to reinvigorate our cultural memory. Women are not limited to the status of biological mother, but they are also cultural and artistic mothers.." This is what de Gouges did when she wrote her play on Ninon de Lenclos. She had sensed the importance of creating an alternative story that defied mainstream ideology.

Without any doubt, de Gouges's original play offers a unique female standpoint on the stories of Queen Christina and Ninon Lenclos on the eve of the French

Revolution, which can be compared and contrasted with how the playwright herself is portrayed as an eighteenth-century feminist activist and revolutionary in Clarissa Palmer's play-text Olympe de Gouges porteuse d'espoir (Olympe de Gouges a beacon of hope), first performed in Paris in 2012 at the Guichet Montparnasse and featuring since on its winter and spring program.' How Palmer and her cowriter Annie Vergne envisaged their creation of the historical Olympe de Gouges, with a modern audience in mind, is the subject of the concluding chapter, "Citoyenne Center Stage: The Creation of the Play Olympe de Gouges porteuse d'espoir." Palmer explains how "the presentation of this eighteenth-century woman alongside a timeless alter ego creates a link between the present and the past that encourages a reevaluation of women's roles then and now." In so doing, Palmer highlights the crucial role which the arts are to play in the revival and promotion of historical women's voices beyond the confines of academia, in a way that resonates with other similarly riveting productions: Aphra (2o15) by Alexandria Patience, Nancy Jo Cullen, and Rose Collard; Aphra Behn, Punk and Poetess (2017) by Aline César; Anna Birch's ongoing work on Mary Wollstonecraft since 2005 and her creative revival of Cicely Hamilton's A Pageant of Great Women (2011 and 2015): and productions by Aurore Evain's thriving theater company, La Subversive, from its debut with Madame de Villedieu's Le favori in 2015 to A la recherche de la princesse de Montpensier (2018-19) after Madame de La Fayette's eponymous novel, and more recently Mary Sidney, Alias Shakespeare (2021-22), based on Robin Williams's Sweet Swan of Avon. In the same spirit, the New York—based theater company On Her Shoulders has made it its call "to make it impossible to deny or ignore the great tradition or value of women's contribution to the theatrical canon." These recent endeavors coincide too with a revival of "the field of Women and Music" as works of early women composers such as Barbara Strozzi (1619-77) and Clara Schumann (1819-96) are brought to light.'

Thus a new dawn is emerging, and now is the time to further the dialogue between academics, practitioners, curators, and educators. If we want to disseminate a more vibrant and inclusive history of women's past, we must engage in more creative and artistic encounters with our intellectual foremothers by seeking imaginative modes of representing new knowledge in the visual and performative arts, in museum collections, and even further, in design and technologies as initiated by the New Historia project.' Only in these interactions will we be able to break away from the prevailing stereotypes about women's roles and potential; only then will the future of feminist ventures move forward. <>

EMPATHY: EMOTIONAL, ETHICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL NARRATIVES by Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar [At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, Brill | Rodopi, 9789004376762]

Empathy is sometimes a surprisingly evasive emotion. It is in appearance the emotion responsible for stitching together a shared experience with our common fellow. This volume looks for the common ground between the results of Digital Media ideas on the subject, fields like Nursing or Health and Social Care, Psychiatry, Psychology, and Philosophy, and finally even in Education, Literature and Dramatic Performance.

Contents

The Joyful Páthos from Oxford by Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar

> There is a problem here. But it is not so much a problem for my account of the appreciation of works of fiction as one for theories of emotion. What are admiration and pity? Believing that someone is admirable or that she suffers misfortune is not sufficient for admiring or pitying her (whether or not it is necessary); one can hold such beliefs without experiencing the emotion. Perhaps the emotions involve mere dispositions to feel in certain ways, or dispositions to react in certain ways to certain stimuli, dispositions of which one may or may not be aware [...] Whatever it is that combines with the appropriate belief to constitute the emotion (in those instances in which such a belief is involved), I suggest that some such state or condition, or one that is naturally taken [...] keep[s] our conception of quasi emotion flexible enough to accommodate any reasonable theory of emotion.– WALTON, KENDALL L., Mimesis as Make- Believe
>
> ^

Looking back, it could be said that we've come a long way since July 2016. On a hazy, English summer afternoon, this present editorial project came about under such special circumstances to attend to that emotion we usually call 'empathy' – a theme apparently not fit for table talk. Moreover, empathy is sometimes – for unfathomable reasons – a surprisingly evasive emotion. It is indeed a problem open to discussion. It can be particularly problematic since, for one thing, it is in appearance the emotion responsible for stitching together a shared experience with our common fellow. It is the emotion essential to bridging the gap between subjects – to making a community. We do not naturally live (nor want to live) alone: we do not want to take that state or condition as natural; not in the flesh; not even lost in our thoughts. This familiar and demanding condition is so fundamental that it poses a threat to perspective – perhaps even more so than when the haze in Oxford is so thick. But we do not want to take it for granted – that natural state which is already trivialised – and we do not want to think alone.

Thus, when this collective work was initially conceived in that faraway conference room, its future could not fully be projected. It has since evolved into the challenge to compile some of the proposed answers that had their origins there in 2016, but that are today in 2019 by all means actualised to the utmost extent – so much so that we dare to commit them to writing. They remain, though, answers that have their place of reference in the welcoming chambers of Mansfield College, at the University of Oxford (UK). The Empathy Project (an interdisciplinary academic initiative promoted by Dr Robert Fisher, founder of its network) held its third Global Meeting within the premises of ye olde constituent college at Mansfield Road from Thursday 14th to Saturday 16th of July 2016. Hosted by Susan Fairbarn in the role of the Conference Leader, around 40 scholars hailing from the most distant corners of the world shared on those days their good measure of the very condition being

studied. We spoke about, on, and with emotion – and we did it with joy. Whether having landed from Australia, India, Turkey, the U.S.A., or from so many of the places interconnected by the familiar paths that intimately unite our Europe (from Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, etc.), the attendees proffered both facts and intuitions, dedicating those three days to thoroughly rounding out the so- called 'problem' of the elusive emotion of empathy. Each of us gave her/ his 'pound of insights'. Whether scattered and drinking coffee under the shelter of the hall in The Tower, or gathered dining and chatting in The Chapel, we strove to highlight what is otherwise clearly evident. While we of course sought each to advance our best hypotheses on the subject as well, we also looked for the common ground between both the results of our conducted research and our experiences: Digital Media ideas on the subject worked just fine elbow to elbow with those proposed by fields like Nursing or Health and Social Care; and Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy got along quite well with the lines of inquiry of Education, Literature and Dramatic Performance, for example. As if collectively taking on the shape of a prism, all contributions officiated like facets of the same body – a delineated space not void, but rather full – and encompassed ever more suitable signs, symbols and expressions to incarnate the concept being pursued. Lastly, we intended to come back home if not having found the intellectual consensus on our 'empathetic' concerns, then at least having been found – having coincided at the crossroads of páthos, of affect and being affected – by others' speeches and personalities.

This book is in some way none other than the written emblem – perhaps a true milestone, or at the very least a meaningful souvenir – commemorating that at once now- distant and still- near success.

Sympathy, Empathy and Their Ilk

'Empathy' threatened (and whenever it reaches out to connect with someone, still threatens) to be a term too close to the chest to be properly grasped by plain, cold-blooded, intellectual articulations, but which is nevertheless too fundamental to dismiss as a mere functional tool that can be substituted by others of equal value. For example, consider the case made by our moral judgments. They count on empathy in order to praise or blame, to call out liars and hypocrites – and we certainly do judge morally on a daily basis.

Empathy is thus central, ultimately, to our judgments of others. But as Walton says, believing that someone is admirable (praiseworthy) or that he/ she is suffering misfortune (pitiable) is not sufficient for admiring or pitying him/ her; whether or not it is necessary to in fact have that belief, that certitude – to have that feeling. This latter can be a 'necessary condition' to a praxis, but it is not the only one. To praise or to pity are actions undoubtedly in need of the subjective certitude of the feeling – the alleged motivational drive. You cannot use the term and refer to the practice without incorporating the subjective state of 'feeling pity', nor 'praise someone'

without admiring him/ her – otherwise what you really practice is 'being an hypocrite', i.e. you are a user of the practice of 'hypocrisy'. They are complex devices (if we are allowed to call a concept a device), however – we have them in layers. The feeling accompanying the judgment, constituting it, is just one of those layers. They are complex states and conditions in which whatever it is that combines with the feeling to constitute the emotion has to accommodate a reasonable theory for its applicability. 'Reasonability' is the key here. It is a term usually attached to judicial vocabulary, close to 'warrant'. Here, closer to 'theory', the term presents discursive reasons as a type of justification. It is not sufficient on its own – but it does work as a criterion. In fact, such a component is central to empathy to so deep an extent as to demand the kind of public justification we have strived to achieve in each navigation around the concept. For it is here that 'sympathy' and 'empathy' part ways. Their proximity has always been a matter of theoretical concern. Here we should blatantly differentiate the foundations of an idea of empathy that severs it from its closest acquaintance, sympathy – and a good part of current discussions on the topic is intended to clarify once and for all both terms on the basis of that categorical difference. Professor Linda Zagzebski can help us at this point to better articulate it:

> The class of moral judgments I want to focus on are what I call ground level moral judgments. These judgments can be identified by two important features. First, they are "here and now" judgments. That is, they are made in a context in which the person making the judgment is confronted with the object [another person] of the judgment. Second, they utilize what I call "thick affective concepts." These concepts mostly coincide with what Bernard Williams calls "thick evaluative concepts." Examples of ground level judgments include, "She is pitiful," "He is contemptible," "That remark is rude," [...][They] combine descriptive and evaluative aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart [...][They] have both cognitive and affective aspects that cannot be pulled apart.

Investigating these judgments is the domain of praxis. Appreciating emotion has to do with the ability and practice of being sensitive to the vicarious experience of personal states that are capable of founding and making possible the recognition of another human being as a subject of special rights: the right to be appraised, the right to be defended from contempt or harm or humiliation – but all of this goes beyond the mere concept of a subjective state. The justification needs to be public in the sense a dialogue would entail. Furthermore, these cognitive judgment criteria are independent of time and space. We can be empathetic with fictions and protagonists of the past, 'here and now'. We can recognize them. Public justification is meant to work like a two-way warrant. It is a sort of credential, a safeguard. The justification – the reason(s) – is a word shared communally. The Greek word dialogue [^^^^^^^] exposes its inner meaning quite well: symmetrically, the word that parts the speakers is the same that connects them. It is like a rope that links the parties holding it, even as they perhaps pull in different directions. At its ends, two or more speakers tread

on common ground and pledge to respect each other. They are separated and united by reasons, by words shared. But reasons must be transparent to this end; they must go public to work in this manner. It is an openness of the criteria to judge others worthy of the empathic motions of feelings. Emotions are nothing but articulated systems. They substantiate a 'reasonable theory' by virtue of which the appellative function of language motions, by means of which an imaginative projection leading to objectivity is made:

> In the fields of developmental psychology and socialization research, it has long been agreed that the emergence of children's abilities to think and interact must be conceived as a process that occurs in the act of taking over another person's perspective [...] [T] aking up this person's view and steering it toward certain significant objects, is interpreted by these theories to be an indication of a phase of experimentation in which a child tests out the independence of another perspective on the surrounding world.

'To think' has to do with 'to interact'. The child tests out his/ her own judgments in the confrontation with the 'possible Other'. Empathy, as we shall see in the forthcoming pages, assumes then a theory of reference in which that very reference as an individual is bestowed with personality by means of a 'charitable act' (as Donald Davidson would say), but an act to which (in reverse) the charitable person is afterwards committed. An act based on the concept of a 'duty-right'.

In Search of Empathy in Prehistoric Times: Evolution and Revolution by Josefa Ros Velasco

Empathy is normally defined as the psychological identification with the feelings, thoughts or attitudes of another. Stated differently, empathy is the ability to understand what another person is experiencing and put oneself in someone else's position. This contribution attempts to be a reflection on the evolutionary and 'revolutionary' role of empathy in human evolution by paying attention to the conditions of possibility and the presence of empathic behaviours in pre- sapiens' prehistory. On the basis of the knowledge provided by specialists in multiple disciplines such as neuropaleontology, prehistoric ethnology, psychology and philosophical anthropology, we will first establish how different levels of empathy were possible in our ancestors as cognitive and social complexity was gradually developed over time and which factors were responsible for and made possible our current ability to empathise. Following from the above, we will address the understanding of the biological and sociological evolutionary function of empathy, that is to say, what was – or/ and is – the role of empathy in the evolution towards the species Homo sapiens. The aim of this exercise is not only to get to know more about the nature of empathy and its anthropogenesis but to show that the role of empathy in our global time remains the same in evolutionary terms, i.e., to promote

both the mutual understanding and cooperation necessary for the prosperity of peoples and the realisation of private interests.

Empathy or Compassion? On Rational Understanding of Emotional Suffering by Victoria Aizkalna

Abstract

The subject of empathy and the role it has in forming a well- functioning society has become widely discussed since the advances of modern technology of functional magnetic resonance imagery (fMRI) give us the possibility to read human brain and track what parts of brain respond to certain stimuli. High, therefore, is the temptation of falling into a rabbit hole of labeling certain parts of physical human brain to be the key to understanding of a complex world of human mind and consciousness, of feelings and emotions. In the present article the focus is on understanding phenomenon of empathy, and also to the downsides of the cult of empathy. Saying this, by no means I want to diminish the value of findings and discoveries of neurosciences, however I am going to argue that mapping the brain is not the key to understanding mind, and that empathy is not the key to the solution of conflicts, nor it leads to stronger societal bonds. What does, then? There is no one, nor two or three good answers. There are plenty of ways to approach the subject, and any of them are right and wrong to certain extend. However, it might be safe to say that going back to the roots is the place to begin. Complex mechanism of society is based on interpersonal relationships of individuals. Individuals are shaped by the society they live in. To understand how this process intertwines and where is the place for the empathy, if it is at all needed, in the present article is approached through the phenomenon of conceptual schemes and consciousness in the theories of Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. Through understanding of the ways of processing and storing information for further use and decision- making, we will see what are the dangers of over- using empathy, and argue for usefulness of rational compassion.

"Scratch an 'altruist', and watch a 'hypocrite' bleed" – said Michael Ghiselin once. What does this mean and how is it related to the subject of empathy? Does that mean that human beings can only care about themselves without ulterior motive? Would that make human kind to be monstrous creatures, willing to sacrifice others for own pleasure or benefit? Or are things not quite as simple as that? Perhaps, it is fairly safe to claim that human nature is not all black and white: that human can either only be altruists, disregarding own profits, or to be completely selfish, disregarding the well- being of others. However, for the purposes of the present articles we are not going to focus on the subject of the evolution, but rather we are going to explore the subjects of empathy and rational compassion, the difference between them and their role in social interactions though the phenomenon of conceptual schemes to make a step towards understanding the scale of importance and reliability of empathy in social encounters. The article, being an ambitious attempt to

give a diversified overview of empathy and the hidden hazards of it, and to advocate for a rational compassion as an alternative, the present article is interdisciplinary, contains references to neuroscience, psychology and psychiatry since the subject of empathy is complex and multi- dimensional, and to get a glimpse of the different aspects, it is important to establish interdisciplinary connections regarding the subject.

In the matter of the role of empathy in interpersonal relations and in its effect on an individual, not only the definition of empathy or the extent of it should be established. In order to enable the process of understanding of the complexity of the matter and to make a step towards certain clarity, we will address empathy from the perspective of Philosophy of Mind, in particular we will use the concept of the conceptual schemed in an interpretation of Daniel Dennett, with the links to Donald Davidson's theories.

In past several decades the subject of empathy and its role in interpersonal and intercultural communication has become widely discussed among social scientists, philosophers, psychologists, journalists and even politicians (for instance, Barack Obama's speech where the former president of the USA has claimed that the "empathy deficit is more serious than federal budget deficit).

In its very essence, the idea appears to have a potential of being panacea for many, if not most, of the problems that modern society is facing: intolerance, violence, discrimination, – hostility against everyone who is not one- of- us, be that gender, nationality, religious believes, body type, or any other quality that can be used for distinguishing a person from others or what is more essential: from us. If we actually feel what the other one is feeling, the assumption is that witnesses, influenced by the feelings of the suffering of the other person that they feel into, are more likely to interfere with injustice, violence, or any other type of harmful behavior against an individual or a group of individuals that are being victimized. It is not enough to have good intention of helping the other, but it has to be put into action to achieve good results, as Hume had claimed. However, Hume's description of 'sympathy' is not identical to modern definition of 'empathy.' Understanding of feelings and experience of others can be useful and can serve for the purpose of the ethical assessment for the individual, however, according to Hume, this experience should not be decisive. Further in the article it will be analyzed in more details whether empathy can be held as a reliable argument or ethical guidance of the moral justice. Although now it can be mentioned, that stimulated emotional response to the experience of the others caused by empathic identification with the other, can be misguiding, and furthermore, it can be used to achieve immoral goals by manipulating individuals to make impulsive decision while being under the strong influence of emotional response, rather than analyzing the situation rationally and coming to be a better and more adequate, rational solution.

Empathic response according to Adam Smith, implied not mere imagination of having the experience of suffering of another, but rather identifying self with the other and the feelings they experience as if we are them. The grief of the other becomes a grief of the individual as if his/ her own. Therefore, the experience is not in the least selfish. This, however, raises an important question: with what amount of others one individual can identify him/ herself with? It is essential to emphasize, that the statement Adam Smith has made comes from the 18th century. Even if from purely theoretical or philosophical point his argument sounds consistent and logical, and practiced consistently by all the individuals it would, perhaps, lead to the world with a lesser amount of suffering: identifying self with each suffering individual would serve as a strong motivation to take good actions for the good result. However, the issue here is with the accessibility of the information in 18th century and in the 21st. Even if it does not directly reflect on the quality of the argument of the complete identification, it does, as aforementioned, raise an important question: how many others one individual can identify with? Does someone, who is perceived as an outsider (outsider as an individual outside of one's 'community': be that someone with different believes, values, or any other separating qualia) is possible to identify with to the same extent as with someone towards whom an individual experience certain affectionate feelings, be that parental or romantic feelings, friendship or any other affections of the positive connotations?

This will be discussed further, in the context of Donald Davidson's theories.

First, Dennett

Before pursuing with an overview of conceptual schemes, perhaps it is adequate to explain a direction of the further argument: why is it important to address Philosophy of Mind when talking about such phenomenon as empathy. Here one can be quick with an answer: to understand how and why to use or not use empathy, or how to make a moral judgment, it is necessary to take a step back and up to analyze what influences decision- making process, but not purely from psychological and mechanical position where it can be measured in a laboratory, but from philosophical perspective. Humans are able to analyze data before decision making due to being conscious and possessing an ability of critical thinking, therefore it would not be enough to measure and determine what part of a physical brain is activated when an individual experiences certain emotions and feeling. To be able to make a judgment and build arguments one has to take a meta position and try to establish connection between external stimuli and internal responses, the correlation between those and the positive or negative outcome of uncritical or critical decision making.

Mind is – according to Daniel Dennett – a product of environment and culture an individual is raised and lives in. Deprived of social life and culture, a human is to be deprived of an opportunity to develop a kind of mind as is accepted to perceive to be human one. For instance, Dennett mentions children raised by animals. Not being

exposed and accustomed to human language nor to cultural traditions and habits, these individuals have not developed conceptual schemes that would allow them to integrate and successfully function in a human society as a productive member, who is capable of critical thinking and of rational decision- making. Human mind, therefore, can be described as a collective product of external influence of the surroundings that shape an individual, culture and a language it is exposed to. Conceptual schemes are created through the experience of external stimuli and expand with each extension of individual experience and knowledge (e.g. an individual is exposed and learns a new language. Experience of this type is to create a new conceptual scheme).

Perhaps, since the term 'experience' has been mentioned so many times in the present article it might be useful for the purpose of avoiding misconception and misunderstanding in the further discussion to make an attempt to define the meaning in which the term is used in the present discussion. For this, we shall refer to Daniel Dennett's definition of the intentional stances. In his Brainstorms (1981), intentional stances play the key role in connecting mental states to abstract phenomenons, but also in processing constructive (physical) stances. Human mind, unlike any other living forms' mind, has a need for explanation and understanding of a creation and functionality of an object in order to process it. First presented in the Beloit College lecture from the 23rd February 2011, Daniel Dennett used a curious example, comparing an anthill to the Sagrada Família – The Basílica i Temple Expiatori de la Sagrada Familia, a Roman Catholic church located in Barcelona (Spain) and designed by architect Antonio Gaudi. If one is curious enough to look for photos or can recall the images in their mind, the similarities between both objects cannot be neglected. However, for a human mind to produce such a product as the aforementioned Sagrada Família, for instance, the understanding of multiple concepts is necessary (such as religion, architecture, church, anthill, and others). For ants, on the other hand, the concept of functionality is not the condition for creation and usage of an anthill.

Based on the aforementioned, the term 'experience' is used here as a description of a complex intentional process of connecting abstract and physical stances – through understanding their functionality – with mental states. Learning behavior of other individuals and attempts to understand their mental states require vast intentional process and are not predetermined, based on Dennett's theory. Inability to interpret or explain certain type of behavior or unclarity is temporary, and if an object is observed through intentionality (connecting to own experience), model of certain behavior be determined and defined.

Human mind has ability to connect abstract and physical stances, which gives humans a possibility to observe and understand motived of certain behaviors, which gradually brings us back to the main subject of the present paper: empathy and its role in

human interactions. However, before we pursue with the discussion about empathy per se, it is useful for the discussion to clarify one more term that was mentioned earlier: behavior. Dennett defines behavior as pre- determined on a genetic level, those expressions of behavior that possess "truly rational models" necessary for the survival of the species. For instance, during the process of evolution, turtles have "learned" to grow a shell to protect themselves from the external dangers and from an evolutionary perspective this is highly rational behavior. To take an example from human behavior, one of the most widely used is, perhaps, an example of a crying baby: since it has not yet developed other means to communicate its needs, is not capable to provide for its own needs nor capable of protecting itself, a baby has to make a loud noise to attract attention of an adult that can protect them, and ensure baby's survival.

Also, when we address the matter of experience, we can not neglect that an individual is exposed to external impact whether they are conscious of it and experience it, or if they do not have access to certain experience due to being exposed to events while not being conscious. As Daniel Dennett says in his book:

> There is much that happens to me and in me of which I am not conscious, which I do not experience, and there is much that happens in and to me of which I am conscious. That of which I am conscious is that to which I have access, or (to put the emphasis where it belongs), that to which I have access. Let us call this sort of access the access of personal consciousness, thereby stressing that the subject of that access (whatever it is) which exhausts consciousness is the person, and not any of the person's parts.

According to the quote, the only experience an individual is able to access and therefore also to use is conscious experience, which has involved intentional process of connecting external physical and abstract objects with mental stances that has allowed a mind of an individual to create meaningful connection that affect also human behavior and perception of others.

At this point, we can address a statement that the human mind is a product of a culture and an environment an individual is exposed to. As it was discussed earlier, behavior is treated as a pre- determined, genetically programmed for survival, while the mind is responsible for creating connections between external physical and abstract stances and mental stances, creating experience. Conceptual schemes store the experience and we can assume that they do expand with every new gained experience which allows and individual to establish stronger connection between external stances and mental stances. With gaining more conscious experience, an individual extends own ability to understand more complex concepts and, perhaps, make more rational decisions since a decision would be based on more data than the one of a less experienced or less rational individual.

Here, however, appears a new temptation to continue an argument and insist on building it in favor of empathy: the more experienced an individual is, the better an individual can understand and, perhaps, experience, mental stances of other individuals. However, here it is important to distinguish ability to understand and experiencing the same emotion which empathy requires. Understanding of the emotional and/ or mental stance of an individual does not require from an individual to force themselves into the same mental or emotional stance. We are not going to discuss the possibility of experiencing the same emotional stance as another individual. Perhaps, it might be possible with completely identical individuals, who were exposed to the same culture, have created the same mental stances while experiencing the same physical and abstract stances. In the present paper, of the interest is the relationship between empathy and rational compassion, and what issue both pose.

Mind is a product of a culture and environment one is exposed to, where an individual creates experience. Since experience is constructed out of concepts that internal processes connected to mental stances, it can be connected to a language one is exposed to. Here we will address Donald Davidson's theory of conceptual schemes to empathize issues of transferability of emotions and ability to experience the same feelings as another individual.

Second, Davidson

Donald Davidson's approach to conceptual schemes is mainly based on a language, since concepts are linguistic phenomenons. In his book On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (2001) Davidson explores issues of translatability and defines two main phenomenons: partial and complete non- translatability of conceptual schemes. Completely non- translatable schemes are those schemes that differ to the extent where they have nothing in common and translation is not possible. In such a case, neither of the languages posses predicates of experience that are present in another language. That can lead to a complete dismissal of one of the languages: if the concepts are not translatable, are they even real? Davidson claims, that if a concept is not translatable, it is not possible to accept that a concept is meaningful. How can it relate to the question of empathy?

Considering afore discussed Davidson's understanding of concepts as linguistic phenomenons, we can state that emotions are also linguistic concepts that express mental stances. Since mental stances are affected by external impact (physical and abstract stances) it is safe to assume that if one of the external stances varies in different cultural environments, mental stance will be affected differently as well. Being a product of a culture, human mind, therefore, will experience distinguishing external stances with different mental responses that are appropriate in the culture where an individual has been raised. Therefore, the extend of experiences emotions also varies, even if experienced emotions are conceptually similar, but this difference

already denies an ability of experiencing empathy: an individual who belongs to a different culture can only experience the stance that is familiar to them, not what another individual experiences, even if the concept of a certain emotion is translatable. So, the identification with another individual's emotions, who does not share an individual's conceptual scheme and does not belong to the same 'community', will not be complete.

However, experiencing full identification with the other's emotions possess certain issues also when it comes to individuals who share conceptual scheme. Paul Bloom, Canadian- American psychologist, in Against Empathy: The Case of Rational Compassion (2016) brings up multiple issues empathy poses including undeniable bias that individuals experience towards representatives of certain groups. It is more likely that the jury – in the USA legal system – will feel more empathic towards an accused if a defendant is good- looking, has a respectable background or appeals to the jury on a personal level. A defendant who fits into certain negative stereotypes, does not have appealing looks nor right background, or belongs to a certain race or religion, is more likely to be found guilty and get a harsher sentence.

Furthermore, Bloom empathizes that an individual can feel empathic towards a limited number of others. It is easier to focus empathy if an individual can relate to feelings based on own experience, or is provided with a back story of a subject. For example, when charity campaigns take place in order to collect funds for a support of victimized group, for a region that has suffered from a natural disaster or is at war, it has become apparent that using an image of a suffering child is more effective in getting more resonance and response from a society than providing numbers of victims and costs of destruction. This leads us to another issue that empathy poses. Since it is apparent that certain images and other external stimuli can cause stronger emotional, empathetic response, it can be used for manipulating human minds in order to get rash and irrational, emotional response to a situation. Bloom claims, that strong feeling of empathy is likely to lead to a rash decision and even to violence: an individual, experiencing pain of a victim of a violent crime, can have an impulse to seek for revenge since in their conceptual scheme causing pain to innocent individuals is not acceptable and should be punished.

Also, empathy can prevent an individual from action. Being overwhelmed by emotions of another individual, an individual can be incapacitated which can lead to serious consequences. Bloom mentions several examples. For instance, a psychologist who is highly empathic towards his patients is not capable of providing any help and guidance for resolving an issue, since he will be drowned in it himself.

Besides this, empathy requires a lot of mental resources from an individual and is not sustainable long- term. Using psychological terms, it leads to emotional exhaustion according to Bloom. Experiencing struggles of others and more often than not feeling inability to provide any help while being overwhelmed by emotions can leave an

individual internally empty: an individual perceives external stimuli that address mental stances responsible for providing help, protection, or other similar response of justice, emotional comforting and etc., takes a lot of internal resources from an individual and shifts the focus of own well- being.

Rational compassion – on the other hand – calls for rational analysis of the situation. It does not exclude emotional experience though. Processing and analyzing external stimuli and data, an individual can feel compassion and yet be able to give appropriate response to a situation, be that comfort of a crying child, support of a charitable organization, or political vote. Unlike empathy, rational compassion does not require from an individual to experience whatever emotional stance is another individual experiences, but to be able to understand the stance and provide rational analysis of a situation. Rational compassion, therefore, can serve as a sustainable tool for interpersonal relations since it is less affected by biases that an individual might express towards representatives on another 'community.' However, an argument against empathy can cause some misunderstanding regarding the stance on the value of emotional response and the consequences of the lack of such. In past several decades, psychiatry has advanced a lot in studying and analyzing human psyche, identifying various conditions, including one that is of particular interest in the present paper: psychopathy. These findings can not be neglected by philosophical society: once a condition is identified and conceptualized, multiple questions come along with them, including those on the value of empathy and potential dangers of its absence.

Neuroscientists, due to technological advances in the field of neuroscience have been able to link feeling of empathy to a part of brain called cerebral cortex, and amygdala. Apparently, if it does not function correctly, an individual is deprived from the ability to feel empathy. This inability (or is it sort of emotional disability?) is linked to such mental disorders (or we can call them conditions) as psychopathy, sociopathy and narcissism. Jon Ronson in The Psychopath Test (2012) researches into the individuals who express traits of low or no empathy and are diagnosed with psychopathy. For the purpose of his research Ronson interviewed Robert B. Hare, a researcher in the field of criminal psychology, author of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist, which is used for the identification of psychopaths. The list consists of twenty points one of which is lack of empathy (it also includes lack of remorse, poor behavior control and other). In the interview, Hare shared the findings of his own research on psychopathy, confirming that psychopaths' brain is indeed different. Amygdala – a part of brain responsible for the emotional response, to put it simply– , in psychopaths' brain when being exposed to unpleasant stimuli (electric shock) did not respond in the way it supposed to respond in a normal brain.

> [A] mygdala, the part of the brain that should have anticipated the unpleasantness and sent the requisite signals of fear over to the central nervous system, wasn't

functioning as it should. [...] Bob learned something that Elliot Barker wouldn't for years: psychopaths were likely to reoffend.

In case when an individual does not experience feelings of empathy when being exposed to images depicting violent scenes, neither s/ he experiences fear of pain or punishment, an individual, according to the research conducted by Ronson and other expert researchers in the field of criminal psychology – for example, Christopher Berry- Dee, known for his best- selling books Talking with Serial Killers (2003) and Talking with Psychopaths and Savages (2017) – are likely to be of danger to society. According to them, inability to feel empathy does not affect one's intellectual abilities. An individual who does not experience empathy can be of high intelligence, and might use his/ her mental capacity against others, regardless of their belonging to his/ her community in order to gain personal profit.

Description of psychopathy can serve as a strong argument for empathy: without it a human being turns into anti- social, primal predator, who disregards rules of the society to pursue personal benefits. He uses his cold, cunning minds against others, and, assuming that such an individual possesses high intelligence, is capable of understanding human emotions if only conceptually, which enables him to use this knowledge against other members of society, posing danger to its other members. However, these statements are not accurate in an account of value of empathy in this specific case. Paul Bloom in Against empathy ... emphasized that it is not empathy or lack of such is the reason for an individual to become a dangerous, anti- social element of the society. Environment an individual is expose to is more likely to stimulate proneness to violence than lack of empathy. Empathy – Bloom argues – can provide strong insight into internal processes of another individual and their mental stances which can be used in order to deliberately cause harm.

Rational compassion should aim on providing an individual with an insight to another individual's mental stance, and seeking for the most appropriate actions in a certain situation. Rational compassion does not exclude the possibility for an individual to experience empathy, but serves as a better stance for decision making since it allows an individual to maintain ability of rational thinking and rational behavior. In a dangerous situation, rational compassion can lead to a better risk- calculation, content behavior and provide sustainable solutions. Also, since individuals' conceptual scheme expands due to gaining new experience, the response to the situation and provided solutions might improved as an individual's mind develops his conceptual schemes. It means that, unlike empathy that is purely based on emotional response and does not require a development of a human mind, rational compassion is affected by conceptual schemes.

Therefore, it can be concluded that empathy as a concept of experiencing another individuals' mental stance, is not a tool for solving and overcoming societal issues. Strong empathic response can cause more damage, while rational compassion can

help to keep mental stance emotionally stable and capable of rational decision-making.

Conclusions

To sum up, it can be said that human mind is a complex phenomenon and experiences various internal processes to create connection between external stimuli and mental stances. Conscious mind creates experiences and is shaped by culture and environment it is exposed to, and human culture and environment are essential in order for a human mind to develop. Not being exposed to any human culture, for instance, children that have been raised by animals, can never integrate into a human society. All human experience, gained under the influence of the culture, is structured in human mind as conceptual schemes that help distinguish different mental stances and establish connections between concepts, and therefore, expanding conceptual schemes affects rational compassion and quality of decisions.

Empathy, being tempting and popular concept, has various issues that can cause issues if it is used for decision- making and as a tool to overcome societal problems. Empathy, being rooted in emotional response to an external situation, is not rational and does not allow an individual to analyze a situation rationally to make the most suitable decision. Empathy can be used for manipulation and to achieve desirable results, and therefore should be treated with caution and should not be cultivated as a solution for misunderstanding. Rather development of conceptual schemes through gain of a new experience, including experience of another cultures, religions, races, can be more beneficial in social situations.

Bibliography

Berry-Dee, Christopher, Talking with Serial Killers: The Most Evil People in the World Tell

Their Own Stories (London: John Blake Publishing Ltd., 2003).

Berry-Dee, Christopher, Talking with Psychopaths and Savages: A Journey into the Evil

Mind (London: John Blake Publishing Ltd., 2017).

Bloom, Paul, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion (London: Penguin

Books, 2016).

Davidson, Donald, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, no. 47 (1973): 5– 20.

Dennett, Daniel, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays in Mind and Psychology (Cambridge-MA-London: The MIT Press, 1981).

Dennett, Daniel, Consciousness Explained (New York: Back Bay Books, 1992).

Dennett, Daniel, Kinds of Minds: Towards An Understanding Of Consciousness (New York: BasicBooks, 1996).

Dennett, Daniel C., From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds (New York:

W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 2017).

Ghiselin, Michael T., The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex (Berkeley-CA: University of California Press, 1974).

Hume, David, Treatise of Human Nature (London: Penguin Classics, 1986).

Obama, Barack, The 21st January 2002 Speech at the Rockefeller Memorial Chapel for the

Martin Luther King Day. Viewed on the 16th October 2018. https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=CAbQvJrDVv0.

Ronson, Jon, The Psychopath Test: A Journey Through the Madness Industry (London:

Picador, 2012).

Ross, Don; Thompson, David and Brook, Andrew, Dennett's Philosophy (Cambridge-MA-London: The MIT Press, 2000).

Smith, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: Penguin Classics, 2010). <>

TEN NEGLECTED CLASSICS OF PHILOSOPHY, VOLUME ONE
edited by Eric Schliesser [Oxford University Press, 9780199928927]

What makes for a philosophical classic? Why do some philosophical works persist over time, while others do not? The philosophical canon and diversity are topics of major debate today. This stimulating volume contains ten new essays by accomplished philosophers writing passionately about works in the history of philosophy that they feel were unjustly neglected or ignored-and why they deserve greater attention. The essays cover lesser known works by famous thinkers as well as works that were once famous but now only faintly remembered. Works examined include Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*, Jane Adams' *Women and Public Housekeeping*, W.E.B. DuBois' *Whither Now and Why*, Edith Stein's *On the Problem of Empathy*, Jonathan Bennett's *Rationality*, and more.

In this volume ten distinguished philosophers share their enthusiasm about ten unjustly neglected classic works in the history of philosophy. In so doing they explore the ways professional philosophy is practiced today, reflect on its patterns of exclusion, and offer exciting pathways to renewing philosophy. The essays are written in engaging and often personal style and are, thereby, invitations to join in the conversation(s).

While each chapter is an expression of engagement with an individual work, the volume as a whole, and Eric Schliesser's introduction specifically, address timely

questions about the nature of philosophy, disciplinary contours, and the vagaries of canon formation.

CONTENTS

Introduction: On Being a Classic of Philosophy

I borrow a so-called intuition pump—that is, a carefully constrained thought experiment—which induces, even shapes, readers to use their intuition to develop an answer to a problem—from Dan Dennett. Dennett's "Faustian bargain" is articulated as follows:1

For several years, I have been posing the following choice for my fellow philosophers: if Mephistopheles offered you the following two options, which would you choose?

Some philosophers reluctantly admit that they would have to go for option (B). If they had to choose, they would rather be read than right. Like composers, poets, novelists, and other creators in the arts, they tend to want their work to be experienced, over and over, by millions (billions, if possible!). But they are also tugged in the direction of the scientists' quest. After all, philosophers are supposed to be trying to get at the truth.

When I have presented the same Faustian bargain to scientists they tend to opt for (A) without any hesitation—it's a no-brainer for them. (Daniel C. Dennett [2013], "A Faustian Bargain," in Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, p. 411)

1 Gorgias's Encomium of Helen by Rachel Barney

Gorgias's Helen is one of the earliest and most enigmatic Greek philosophical texts. An epideoxis, or set-piece speech, it's a pioneering argument about moral responsibility and a fascinating

Sophist argument for the power of language [logos]. In it, Gorgias attempts to show that the beautiful Helen of Troy, whose adultery and flight with Paris was the proximate cause of the Trojan War, should suffer no unjust blame for the war nonetheless. If either fate, the gods, logos, or eros (love) compelled her, she is blameless. Though rigorously argued, it is also playful and self-undermining (it can be either a narrow argument that Helen's act was irrational and self-destructive, or a claim that no one is ever responsible for anything). This paper attempts to do justice to all these different dimensions.

2 Fénelon's Telemachus by Ryan Patrick Hanley

This paper examines three aspects of the treatment of the relationship of love to virtue in François Fénelon's Telemachus. As one of the great French intellectual figures of the early eighteenth century, Fenelon was at first admired but then banished from the royal court. This was largely because of Telemachus, an imagined narrative of the prince's search for his wandering father, Ulysses, during which he absorbs many moral and political lessons. The work was viewed as radical because of its stress on peace, austerity versus luxury, and an egalitarian ethical vision opposed to Louis XIV's ruling creeds. But Telemachus above all considers the place of love in ethics and politics: first the potential conflicts necessitating a choice between love, especially eros, sexual love, and virtue; second, the work's scheme for cultivating a different kind of love, the love of virtue; and third, its conceptual treatment of love as virtue.

3 Thomas Paine's "Agrarian Justice" and the Origins of Social Insurance by Elizabeth Anderson

In "Agrarian Justice," Thomas Paine developed the first realistic proposal in the world to abolish systematic poverty: a universal social insurance system comprising old-age pensions and disability support and universal stakeholder grants for young adults, funded by a 10% inheritance tax focused on land. He argued for a form of equality consistent with liberty. In justifying his proposal using social contract theories and John Locke's principles of property, Paine offered a third way between proto-communism—symbolized by the French Revolution's "Equals" radical contingent and their desire to confiscate all wealth—and England's Poor Laws, which offered humanitarian relief but stigmatized the poor and subjected them to harsh social control and workhouse conditions. Paine defended the private property system, while also theorizing large-scale poverty as preventable injustice and conceiving of universal entitlements to limit poverty caused by property-holding inequality. Thus Paine helped forge the modern idea of distributive justice.

4 Lotze's Mikrokosmus by Frederick Beiser

This article is a brief account of the context, genesis, and intention behind Hermann Lotze's Mikrokosmus, his three-volume largely forgotten magnum opus. Lotze's work was an attempt to resolve the conflict between science and faith that became especially intense during the second half of the 19th century. He aimed to create a new anthropology to answer the question of what meaning human life had in the cosmos, responding to new advances in chemistry, physics, and biology. In his defense of theism and critique of materialism (part of German philosophy's

materialism controversy), Lotze believed that he could resolve this conflict not only by a new distinction between scientific mechanism and teleology, but also by an even newer distinction between value and reality. Lotze's distinction between the realms of value and reality, and validity and existence, are still fundamental for modern thought.

5 Bradley's Appearance and Reality by Michael Della Rocca

This paper explains and defends F.H. Bradley's central argument in Appearance and Reality, i.e. his infinite regress argument concerning relations. Relata depend on other relata which depend on other relata and so on. Since Bradley's argument claims that relations have to be grounded, and he can find no rational grounding given such regress and circularity of relations, he concludes relations are not real. Bradley thus emerges as an idealist and a monist; like the ancient philosopher Parmenides and many succeeding philosophers, he rejects diversity and multiplicity in favor of an underlying unity. Bradley's central argument is strong and therefore the founding story of analytical philosophy, according to which Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore vanquished the hapless Bradley, is nothing more than a founding myth.

6 Jane Addams's "Women and Public Housekeeping" by Sally Haslanger

Jane Addams' broadside, "Women and Public Housekeeping" (1910), argues that household tasks keeping women out of the public realm also provide knowledge that would make them excellent city leaders. This is an early example of feminist epistemology that provides a social critique that tackles gender bias and also challenges assumptions about where to find excellent philosophy (in part due to its very form as a broadside, reflecting the need for women to keep their non-housework efforts brief). Addams' work is also an example of philosophy that might help advance women in politics, since it states men's military conception of government should give way to public housekeeping. Finally, Addams challenges the public/private distinction that has burdened political philosophy and leads to gendered concepts of work and labor that don't serve communities well. Civic housekeeping must learn from private housekeeping, and in turn such municipal participation would enrich women's lives.

7 On Making Philosophy Functional: Ernst Cassirer's Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff by Alan W. Richardson

This essay offers a reading of the importance of Ernst Cassirer's 1910 Substance and Function against the background of a now standard story of the rise of analytic philosophy from the ashes of Kantianism. Cassirer's book makes that story much more complicated and the history of early twentieth-century philosophy correspondingly more interesting. Kant rescued rationalism in philosophy: even if reason does not give us knowledge of beings beyond the physical world, the transcendental standpoint of the mind determines the world. But nineteenth-century philosophy undid that system, in part due to Bertrand Russell's elaboration of fundamental changes in logic, and led to analytic philosophy, which grounded antimetaphysical logical truths in the meanings of words. Nonetheless Cassierer wrote a neo-Kantian work stating mathematical and other concepts

are determined through relations among them and within the system of knowledge itself, restoring Kantian intellectual functions and continuing some form of the Kantian tradition.

8 Edith Stein: On the Problem of Empathy by Kris McDaniel

Edith Stein, who began her career as Husserl's research assistant, was an important philosopher in the phenomenological tradition, but her work was ultimately marginalized in Nazi Germany and she died in a concentration camp. This paper unearths and discusses her first substantive work, On the Problem of Empathy, which is the problem of how other persons and their inner states can be given to others. In terms of "the problem of other minds," how we perceive those is through the irreducible intentional state of empathy. Stein wants to distinguish between the descriptive-psychological (distinguished by Husserl's ideation of intentional states) and genetic-psychological (supported by empirical analysis) aspects of this problem. Stein felt empathy was an act of ideation through which we can systematically and comprehensively discern not only others' spiritual types but our own. Empathy is a prerequisite for both knowledge of others and the self.

9 W. E. B. Du Bois's "Whither Now and Why" by Chike Jeffers

W.E.B. Du Bois's 1960 essay, "Whither Now and Why," is a neglected but brilliant sequel to his 1897 essay, "The Conservation of Races," which inspired much of the pioneering work in philosophy of race. In both works DuBois stresses perpetuation of black racial identity and cultural difference; a race should predominantly be understood as a kind of cultural group. Discrimination must end, but cultural identity must remain. In "Whither Now" his position evolves to state the need for education of black children in socialism, but he also states that historical consciousness necessary for social progress mandates that all people, but especially African Americans, recognize Africa and the American Negro's distinct identity and cultural contributions to world civilization in ancient and modern times. For Dubois postracial thinking was dangerous if it went beyond dismantling an unfair American social hierarchy to blotting out voluntary education in cultural diversity and a pan-African cultural identity.

10 Jonathan Bennett's Rationality by Daniel Dennett

Bennet's Rationality is an imaginative essay that sought to change the methodology of conceptual analysis, i.e. ordinary language philosophy, by asking how language contributed to human rationality. Since this movement had been launched by towering figures like Wittgenstein and Austin it had gotten bogged down in analyzing nuances of meaning. Bennett considered much more ambitiously the central rational principles of "human talk." He began with Karl von Frisch's Nobel Prize-winning work on honeybees. Through an extended analysis of whether the waggle dances of honey bees transmitting information about the location of food constituted linguistic communication— and if not, what would need to be added—Bennett arrived at an understanding of rule-guided communication and other parameters as going beyond nonrational bee behaviors to constitute true rational language.

Neglected Classics of Philosophy, Volume 2 edited by Eric Schliesser [Oxford University Press, 9780190097196]

The prominent contributors to this edited volume were asked to discuss neglected classic works in both Western and non-Western philosophy, and to make a case for their contemporary importance in an accessible and inviting way. The result - a successor to an earlier 2016 volume, also edited by Eric Schliesser - is an invitation to consider new ways of defining, and doing, philosophy. The works discussed here are written in a variety of literary styles, in different ages and intellectual cultures. Many contributors note the meta-philosophical features of the works, and how these can be salient today, and thus inspire reflection on the nature of philosophy and the varieties of roles it can play professionally and existentially. In particular, many of the chapters inspire reflection on the gendered, racial, and cultural patterns of exclusion in the development of the contemporary philosophical canon.

CONTENTS

In this introduction I use Bertrand Russell's (1945) The History of Western Philosophy (hereafter: History) to introduce the metaphilosophical themes that recur throughout the chapters of this book. In particular, I focus on the way the distinction or opposition between rustic thought, which is supposed to characterize barbarous societies, and the urbane thought that is purported to characterize civilized society can help explain some entrenched patterns of exclusion visible in contemporary philosophy. I embed these remarks in a larger, speculative historiography of the very idea of "Western philosophy." Along the way, I provide an overview of the chapters of this volume.

In the twelfth century Ibn Tufayl, writing in what we would call Spain, presented himself as a "Western" philosopher in order to remind his readers that he was at the periphery in the vast world of learning within the interconnected Islamic empires. He did so not without pride, but also to call attention to the fact that he lacked access to manuscripts of some of the books he knew existed, penned by ancient authors like Plato and Aristotle and more recent luminaries writing in the "East," like Al- Farabi, Ibn Sinna (Avicenna), and Al- Ghazali.

Ibn Tufayl's book, Hayy ibn Yaqzãn, is a philosophical allegory that in addition to Islamic themes draws on Platonic, Sufi, and revealed sources. It offers the theoretical and spiritual journey of a man (Hayy ibn Yaqzan, or "Alive, Son of Awake") who grows up and develops intellectually outside civilization. It connects metaphysical speculation with subtle hints about the political context of philosophizing.

A 1671 Latin translation gave it the subtitle Philosophus autodidactus, or "The Self- Taught Philosopher"; this made it available to learned Europeans, who in turn translated it into various vernaculars. For example, Simon Ockley, who plays a nontrivial role in Edward Said's account of the origins of orientalism, translated it into English in 1708 as The Improvement of Human Reason Exhibited in the Life of Hai Ebn Yokdhan By Ibn Tufail. In 1672 it was translated into Dutch in the circle of Spinoza's friends. It then remained familiar to intellectuals for another century. For example, at the height of the German Enlightenment, Lessing enthused about the book, sending it to Mendelsohn, urging him to read it.

Did Ibn Tufayl originate the very idea of Western philosophy? I would not bet on it. Perhaps the phrase was already used in late antiquity, contrasting philosophical or clerical work being done in the Western Roman Empire with that being done in the Eastern Roman Empire. Of course, somebody may object that what Ibn Tufayl meant by "Western philosophy" is not quite how more contemporary thinkers use it. After all, in the present context, Ibn Tufayl's work would, despite its many debts to Plato and Aristotle, be often treated as "non- Western" in virtue of the fact that is the product, in part, of the Islamic world.

The first use of "Western philosophy" that I am familiar with to mark an implied contrast between the speculative thought of Europe with that of a distinct, contrasting civilization occurs in volume 4 of the Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy (originally in French: L'Espion Turc). This once hugely popular, eight- volume work was published around the time when translations of Ibn Tufayl's Hayy ibn Yaqzãn first circulated in European circles. The book is surrounded by mystery and

mystification, and the author of volume 4 is unknown. The conceit of the book is a series of missives from Paris sent to Constantinople, commenting on European mores, politics, and philosophy (among many other topics). The work is clearly a model for Montesquieu's (1721) Lettres Persanes, one of the foundational texts of the Enlightenment.

The context of that first use of "Western philosophy" in the more familiar sense is a bit complicated to convey succinctly, in part because it occurs in the midst of a ridiculing digression by the "spy" on the misguided faith in the divine origin of holy texts by various peoples. That was an explosive topic, then much debated in the wake of Spinoza's suggestion that the Hebrew Bible as we have it was pretty much the work of Ezra at the refounding of Israel as a political entity. He (the "spy") goes on to offer a heterodox argument to the effect that whatever else is true, something, be it God or a vacuum, must exist eternally. And at that very point the "spy" introduces a scholastic distinction, in part for comic effect, with terminology used by "Western philosophers." Part of the comedy is that the scholastic terminology of the Western philosophers must have felt already dated to the learned audiences of the Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy because a new, modernizing anti- scholastic philosophy (familiar to us through names like Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes) was sweeping away the Scholastic kind in that very "West."

With such suspect origins, it is no surprise that "Western philosophy" rarely gets used in subsequent centuries. In fact, as a scholarly term it starts to receive modest traction only as late as the start of the twentieth century, alongside growing interest in the very idea of a "Western civilization." In the context of an imperial and globalizing world economy, the phrase "Western philosophy" is then used regularly in scholarly discussions of what we would now call "comparative philosophy," comparing the philosophies of different "great" civilizations, primarily those found in Europe, India, and China.

The phrase "Western philosophy" gains wider currency in the wake of Albert Schweitzer's (1923) Civilization and Ethics. Schweitzer, a great humanitarian, was an admirer of classical Indian and Chinese philosophy especially, and so for him "Western philosophy" was not the standard by which he judged others. But he treats "Western" philosophy as the contrast to Indian and Chinese philosophy.

Bertrand Russell admired Schweitzer and his writings, but he wrote a critical review of Civilization and Ethics which included some reservations about Schweitzer's tendency to disparage Western philosophy at the expense of the philosophies found at the other "great" civilizations. When Russell published his History he focused, as the title suggests, nearly exclusively on "Western philosophy."

Russell was one of the outstanding philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century who made major contributions to logic, epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language. Together with Frege, he is naturally thought of as one of the founders of analytic philosophy. When he wrote his History, Russell had already become a public intellectual, well known for his pacifism and atheism, among other causes. In fact, the book is an enduring

bestseller. As it turns out Russell's History did not just popularize the phrase "Western philosophy"; it has shaped how philosophers think of their own past to this day.

The grand theme of Russell's History is the very survival of Western civilization— then in doubt amidst world war (pp. 400, 556, 640, 790). For Russell it would not be the first time that civilization could collapse. This is connected to the history of philosophy because Russell argues that ages and nations are shaped by philosophy and, in turn, shape it (pp. xiii– xiv). And so Russell gives special attention not just to academic philosophy, but to thinkers whose ideas had a big impact on the intellectual development of "the West."

Russell was, in turn, reflecting a wider discussion in English intellectual circles in which proposals for Anglo- Atlantic or Western federation (sometimes including their colonies) were a matter of great public interest. It was thought only such a federation could help save Western civilization against the twin evils of fascism and communism.

For Russell, philosophy is an intrinsic part of civilization. When it disappears, philosophy also vanishes. This is for Russell an urgent question, and this, alongside his opinionated and often insightful treatment of other thinkers, gives his book much of its poignancy. Because Russell and his early readers assumed there were multiple civilizations, the focus on Western philosophy in History can be a matter of intellectual humility; it does not entail superiority toward the philosophies of other (great) civilizations.

For example, Russell admits, in passing, his "undue concentration on Western Europe," noting for example how "the brilliant civilization of Islam flourished" from India to Spain during Europe's "dark ages" (History, 399). And he predicts that "if we are to feel at home in the world after the present [world] war, we shall have to admit Asia to equality in our thoughts, not only politically, but culturally" (History, p. 400).

However, embedded in this generous and capacious vision, Russell adopts a contrast between civilization and barbarism which, together with his definition of philosophy, involves a number of intellectual exclusions, some of which were new with Russell and some very entrenched in philosophy since Plato to this day. And I suspect that one unfortunate, and possibly unintended, effect of the manner in which the contrast is deployed shifts the use of "Western philosophy" from a comparative perspective where Western philosophy is one of several great intellectual traditions to a use of "Western philosophy" to be opposed to a more homogeneous category, non- Western philosophy, which in practice risks becoming no philosophy at all.

For Russell treats philosophy as standing halfway between science and theology. While echoing some Enlightenment philosophers, Russell treats religion as resting on the illicit authority of faith and tradition; science, by contrast, is the application of reason and rational methods of inquiry to generate secure knowledge. Philosophy is intrinsically speculative, but is based on autonomous reason (History, pp. xiii– xiv, 835– 836). Because of this attitude, the ninth- century monk John Scotus of Erigena, who maintained the "authority of a philosophy independent of revelation" (p. 403), is one of the unlikely and memorable heroes of the History. By contrast, works primarily

influenced by theology and revelation, or that present themselves as so influenced, are de facto treated as unphilosophical. Here Russell echoes the contrast between Athens and Jerusalem in which Jerusalem is disparaged.

While the previous paragraphs are a bit speculative, they help to account not just for the tendency to treat philosophy as Western, and to treat non- Western writings as religious and non- rational, but also for some of the curious patterns of exclusion in his work. So, for example, in Russell's History, Hesiod is mentioned a few times when Russell is conveying the views of other thinkers on Hesiod (pp. 40– 41), including the views of Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Socrates (as reported by Plato in the Apology), and Plato (in the Republic as summarized by Russell). With the exception, perhaps, of Socrates's desire to converse with Hesiod in the afterlife (p. 89, quoting Apology 41a), none of these passages suggests there is any philosophical merit in Hesiod, and he is treated as belonging to Greek religion rather than philosophy.

By contrast, in the first chapter of the present volume, Barbara Sattler makes the case that Hesiod's "poems can be seen as the starting point for central philosophical discussion, which has made him an important point of reference for philosophers in the past and that as such he should also be taken into account by philosophers today." And while she does not insist on the claim that Hesiod should be taken to be a philosopher, she argues for the claim that he is a systematic thinker.

Another consequence of Russell's distinction is that the Hebrew Bible is treated as lacking in philosophical content and quality. This helps explain why Russell spends quite a bit of time on The Fourth Book of Maccabees, which self- consciously shows that Judaism is in accord with Stoic philosophy. Yet, Philo of Alexandria, in whose writings one can find, say, a criticism of slavery and an early argument for gender equality, is only treated "as the best illustration of Greek influence on the Jews in the sphere of thought" (p. 322). The influence of Judaism on Christianity is treated as "simple" (p. 326).

Now, another view of the possibility of Jewish philosophy, and the significance of at least one rustic perspective, could emerge if we take Machiavelli's, Thomas More's, and Spinoza's conception of Moses as an exemplary rustic statesman seriously. In the Hebrew Bible, a key moment in Moses's education as a legislator occurs when, while dwelling in the desert, he accepts the advice of his (pagan) father- in- law, Jethro, who suggests to create a hierarchical judiciary, which will be guided by "statues and theory". Moses is advised to create norms or mores and articulate their works. That is to say, Jethro encourages Moses not just to embrace the judicial division of labor, but also to become a genuine lawgiver and an encompassing political theorist. Jethro is a nomadic shepherd. And it is a familiar trope of the Torah— derived from the root ^^^, which means "to guide" or "to teach"— to treat rustic wisdom favorably, in contrast to the corrupt cosmopolitan and urbane civilizations of the great empires of the day (Egypt, Babylon, etc.).

By contrast, in Plato's Phaedrus (e.g., 230D), Socrates is critical of rustic wisdom, which he thinks cannot ground the path toward self- knowledge. In particular, as the Stoics developed the point, rusticity stands for lawlessness and lack of self- control, that is, if we take the platonic inspired analogy between city and soul seriously, a tyrannical soul.17 Throughout the History, Russell

echoes the Socratic polemic against rusticity, which is homogenized as non- philosophical. One thing I am suggesting here is that undifferentiated, rusticity is itself a very broad category involving many different kinds of intellectual productions of different kinds of societies and examples.

A further problem is that the rustic perspective on this polemic tends to be underexplored. In Alexander Guerrero's Chapter 12 in this volume, "Ethics in Place and Time: Introducing Wub- e- ke- niew's We Have the Right to Exist: A Translation of Aboriginal Indigenous Thought," the question of who counts as "civilized," or who should become civilized, is never lurking far from the argument. The target of Wub- e- ke- niew is "an abstract entity, Western Civilization." And, as Guerrero shows, the picture that is presented is far from flattering.

One may suspect that the reason the rustic perspective is less familiar is that it tends not to be written down. However, traditional Islam is also treated as rustic by Russell in the History. Whatever philosophical sophistication it contains is, according to Russell, derived from Persian and Hellenic sources. Even so, according to Russell's definitions, Ibn Tufayl's allegory ought to be classified as a work of philosophy. Oddly, when Russell mentions how Ibn Tufayl's famous student, Ibn Rushd (also known as Averroes), was introduced to the "Caliph" Abu Yaqub Yusuf "as a man capable of making an analysis of the works of Aristotle," Russell does not mention Ibn Tufayl, the very man who introduces Ibn Rushd! This is no surprise because Russell treats the Islamic philosophers in brief, and as uninteresting and derivative.

In principle, Russell could have been more favorably disposed to intellectual history of India and China, which are not treated as rustic. Russell acknowledges that these traditions have a long history of sophisticated metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical theorizing. In his History, Russell primarily associates engagement with Buddhist philosophy with the thought of Schopenhauer, who was genuinely interested in Buddhism (p. 754). Unfortunately, Schopenhauer is treated as one of the key dangerous "romantic" thinkers to devalue knowledge. Even so, that Russell could appreciate Buddhism (which he associates with urbane philosophy (p. 772)) is clear from the following curiosity: when he turns to Nietzsche, Russell uses a fictional dialogue between Buddha and Nietzsche to try to refute Nietzsche (History, p. 771ff.)! Russell admits it will not fully persuade everybody.

By contrast, the present volume includes two chapters on two very different Buddhist thinkers. In Chapter 3, Bryce Huebner discusses Vasubandhu's The Treatise in Twenty Verses (Vi^šatikãkãrika). He seems to have been a Buddhist monk from Gandhãra (the northernmost part of the Indian subcontinent), who wrote during the fourth and fifth centuries CE. In discussing Vasubandhu's fascinating epistemology and metaphysics, Huebner argues that these, in the encounter with our own commitments, "can help us to change how we experience the world, by disclosing possibilities that have been obscured by the historical situation where we find ourselves." Yumiko Inukai, in Chapter 4, discusses Hõnen's Senchaku Hongan Nembutsu Shü. Hõnen is a Japanese Buddhist monk who founded the Pure Land ("Jõdo" in Japanese) School as an independent sect of Buddhism in Japan in the twelfth century CE. Senchaku Hongan Nembutsu

Shü defends and explains the uses of the recitation of the name of Amida Buddha, "Namu Amida Butsu." In Inukai's presentation, this is a book about the transformative journey of the self.

Russell name- checks Confucius a few times in the History, but there is no mention of Mencius, Master Mo, Master Zhuang (369– 298 BCE), or the (purported) authors of any of the other Chinese philosophical classis. This is no surprise, given his focus on "Western philosophy." In Chapter 2, Amy Olberding takes on the challenge of "commending the Zhuangzi to others"; it is a challenge because it is by no means obvious "how to accurately represent a text that not only declines to stay put, but that effectively mocks you for trying to hold it still." It would be misleading to suggest that the main interest in Zhuangzi is its therapeutic pretensions of curing us from certain philosophical maladies (of the sort now often associated with Russell's colleague, Wittgenstein); but that's because, as Olberding argues, part of the point is to dwell on living, not philosophy.

Given Russell's embrace of progressive commitments (including women's suffrage, contraconception, and more liberal divorce laws), the most surprising, perhaps,19 pattern of exclusion in Russell's History is the near- complete absence of women philosophers in the philosophical West, while a number of queens, royal princesses, mothers, and wives of philosophers are mentioned! Even when women of considerable philosophical ability are noted— e.g., Princess Elizabeth of the Palatine, who corresponded astutely with Descartes— Russell rarely mentions their philosophical ability or views. The exception to the rule, Hypatia, is primarily mentioned in order to illustrate the dangers of religious bigotry.

This pattern of exclusion is also illustrated by the major works penned by women that Russell praises. These are Jane Harrison's Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, and the novels of Jane Austen. The latter two are discussed because they fit his criticism of romanticism. Shelly's mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, who helped shape the feminist thought of subsequent ages, goes unmentioned altogether.

In his History, Russell offers an unwavering polemic against John Stuart Mill without ever once mentioning Harriet Taylor or their feminism. Feminism is mentioned only in the context of the cult of Bacchus and its impact on Plato's views. Russell's stance in all of this is really shocking because he was familiar with excellent female philosophers, including his then famous contemporary, Susan Stebbing, and he had reviewed May Sinclair, a philosopher of the previous generation, with whom he had corresponded.

In the present volume, several chapters show how much is lost by Russell's stance. In Chapter 7, Jessica Wilson treats Mary Shepherd (1777– 1847) not just as an astute critic of Hume's account of causation, but as herself a formidable and original metaphysician whose arguments are very interesting and whose positions anticipate views taken to be more recent inventions. While the neglect of Mary Shepherd raises important historiographic issues, to which I return below, that she should be treated as a philosopher does not require any interrogation of contemporary ideas or re- examination of contemporary categories about the nature of philosophy.

Liam Kofi Bright, in Chapter 8, also takes advantage of the idea that argument is constitutive of philosophy in order to show that a famous work of journalism, Ida B. Wells- Barnett's The Red Record (1895), is philosophical. In particular, Bright shows that in her critical survey of lynching, Wells- Barnett pioneers a form of argument that we now call "severe testing." Bright explains how this form of argument is especially suitable to a form of activism by those whose standing may be questioned.

By contrast, Lisa Shapiro's exploration of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz's poem "Let us pretend I am happy" (circa 1680– 1690), in Chapter 5, self- consciously explores the nature of such categorization. On the surface, this is a poem about, in part, the futility of arguments to refute skepticism about the possibility of knowledge. But there is more to thought than argument. And Shapiro suggests that "in the poem Sor Juana presents a conception of thought as essentially affective." And this opens the door to a kind of therapy that tempers our epistemic desires and so opens the possibility to "move beyond skepticism."

Audre Lorde was a poet, activist, and essayist. While she never worked in academic philosophy, her work has become a lodestone for recent feminist scholarship. In Chapter 11, Serene Khader focuses on Sister Outsider (1984), a collection of essays and speeches that is already "a classic source on what is now called 'epistemic oppression.' " In particular, Khader shows that Lorde provides a useful guide to a form of epistemology often ignored by professional philosophers: how "oppression impedes the attainment of knowledge about social reality."

One chapter that confronts the risk of intellectual effacement in nuanced yet polemical fashion is Joel Katzav's Chapter 9, "The de Lagunas' Dogmatism and Evolution, Overcoming Modern Philosophy and Making Post- Quinean Analytic Philosophy." Dogmatism and Evolution (1910) was written by Theodore de Laguna and Grace de Laguna. And Katzav takes full theatrical and argumentative advantage of the fact— highly significant from the perspective of such internal dialectics— that Grace de Laguna was part of the same symposium where Quine first presented "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Katzav offers the post facto judgment that the de Lagunas represent an epistemically and metaphysically more adventurous form of holism than the one Quine settled on.

I do not mean to suggest that this volume was conceived primarily as a corrective or in polemical opposition to Russell, or even to recent analytic philosophy. Russell's History is, despite its limitations, a gripping read that seduces people toward an intellectual voyage. In addition, we know that Russell was admired, not without qualification, by B. R. Ambedkar, just after he first wrote "Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development" (1916). In Chapter 10, Meena Krishnamurthy shows how Ambedkar argues that "the oppression of women— through the practices of sati, widowhood, and girl marriage— played an essential role in the establishment and maintenance of the caste system by ensuring the rigid boundaries of caste." Krishnamurthy uses Ambedkar's essay to show how analysis of concrete reality in political philosophy can lead "to new ideas about how to resolve social and economic inequality."

In addition, the intent of this volume is not to offer a programmatic statement of a new unified way of doing an inclusive history of philosophy. Even if the editor's heavy invisible hand were to try to nudge his authors in that direction, the underlying material would be recalcitrant. This resistance to our classificatory desiderata, and intellectual fashion, is, perhaps, best illustrated and thematized by Justin Smith's Chapter 6 on Anton Wilhelm Amo's Treatise on the Art of Soberly and Accurately Philosophizing (1738). Amo was born and died in Ghana, but "from 1707 to 1747, he lived in Germany, and from 1729 made a series of contributions to German jurisprudence and philosophy at the Universities of Halle, then Wittenberg, then Jena." Smith does not deny that "Amo's work is interesting and revelatory, both because it tells us quite a bit about the intellectual world he inhabited in early eighteenth-century Germany, and because it is a testament to the life and existence of a remarkable individual." But Smith also explains why one might feel unease with the idea that this is a work of "African philosophy." If Amo's Treatise has to be categorized at all, Smith prefers to call it an "academic Latinate German philosophy in the modern Lutheran university tradition, closely reflecting the curricula in place at the universities of Halle, Wittenberg, and Jena, and with a curious admixture of French Catholic late Scholasticism."

Rather, the main conceit behind this volume and its predecessor, Ten Neglected Classics of Philosophy (hereafter: TNCP), is to ask leading professional philosophers to share their passionate commitment to works in the history of philosophy they think their peers unfairly ignore. Behind the conceit lies the idea that this will not just tell us something about the commitments and aspirations of these thinkers, but also provide us with an oblique glimpse into the state of philosophy today and, perhaps, open spaces for reflection on its renovation where needed.

One other reason why the aims of the volume are less revisionary than they might seem at first is that unlike, say, in social theory or English literature, the dominant strain of contemporary anglophone philosophy, analytic philosophy, does not treat a canon as constitutive of the field. Perhaps because analytic philosophy's self- identity is constantly reinvented over time, it has no felt requirement for a fixed canon of texts to give it identity. So, for example, Feigl and Sellars's (1949) Readings in Philosophical Analysis was welcomed as a "book" which "contains a good number of the classics of analysis and should therefore provide useful source material for courses in Contemporary Philosophy, Problems, and Methods." Most of the authors of these classics are still familiar names: "Feigl (4 essays), Kneale, Quine (2), Tarski, Carnap (3), Frege, Russell, [C. I.] Lewis (3), Schlick (4), Aldrich (2), Adjukiewicz, [Ernest] Nagel, Waismann, Hempel (4), Reichenbach (2)." But it is to be doubted that most of the articles themselves, or even what they argue for, play much of an explicit role in contemporary undergraduate or graduate education (outside those that cater to specialists in the history of analytic philosophy). I also bet a few names are completely unfamiliar even to seasoned scholars. One can play a similar game with Rorty's (1967) more recent (and larger) Linguistic Turn. To be a classic within analytic philosophy is to risk oblivion quickly from the perspective of eternity.

The claims in the previous paragraph are compatible with the further thought that contemporary philosophy, despite re- enacting a gesture familiar from Descartes— to start totally anew without any reference to what has gone before— is shaped by commitments derived from preexisting

canons and intellectual traditions that have generated relatively enduring classics (Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, etc.). In the introduction to TNCP, I aimed to capture how there are many ways to be a classic within philosophy, and how many classics are capable of serving multiple functions.

Drawing on, and appropriating, J. M. Coetzee's "What Is a Classic" to my own ends, I argued in the introduction to TNCP that classics sustain and survive ongoing scrutiny in the long run from a variety of perspectives, which may include their creative rewriting. Such ongoing scrutiny comes close to being a necessary condition on being a philosophical classic; one may suspect it is a kind of performative requirement for a classic.

With Coetzee, I identify five features that enable a work to become a classic: (1) the work needs to be studied and discussed in small circles, relatively untouched by the general public's fashion; (2) one can become an advanced student in a discipline based on some kind of competent engagement with such works; (3) there needs to be ongoing learned commentary or criticism; and (4) the existence of a form of advanced emulation through creative imitation or reworking. In addition, (5) a work counts as a classic only if it can eventually catch the interest of a wider audience beyond the most advanced professionals.

In editing the volume in your hands, my dear adventurous reader, I see no reason to revise my earlier appropriation of Coetzee's analysis. I hope the twelve chapters collected here give you pleasure and food for thought. All of these chapters contribute to ongoing discussions in more general meta- philosophy, as well as ongoing discussions about particular philosophers and more specialist topics. I hope they invite you to explore and study some excellent philosophy and, perhaps, reconsider what you thought you already knew about its nature.

***

Introduction by Eric Schliesser

The Introduction to Neglected Classics of Philosophy, Volume 2, uses Bertrand Russell's The History of Western Philosophy (1945) to analyze the meta-philosophical themes that recur throughout the chapters of the volume. In particular, it focuses on the way the distinction or opposition between rustic thought, which is supposed to characterize barbarous societies, and the urbane thought that is purported to characterize civilized society can help explain some entrenched patterns of exclusion visible in contemporary philosophy. It embeds these remarks in a larger, speculative historiography of the very idea of "Western philosophy." Along the way, an overview and brief summary of the chapters of the volume is provided.

1 The Theogony and the Works and Days: The Beginnings of Philosophical Questioning in Hesiod by Barbara M. Sattler

This chapter shows Hesiod's work as the beginning of central discussions in the area of natural philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy and as the first attempt in Western literature to account systematically for the different phenomena in the universe. It is demonstrated that

Hesiod is the first to offer a general account of time and space: space is shown as a necessary condition for anything to come into being; time is depicted as cyclical in connection with the natural year and as linear in the progress of the divine generations and in the decline in human history. Hesiod's Works and Days is discussed as the first attempt to sketch the big structures of human history, which is seen a story of moral decline. Finally, Hesiod's suggestions for how to act rightly in corrupt times and how to account for normativity in terms of the natural world are investigated.

2 Zhuangzi by Amy Olberding

The early Chinese text, the Zhuangzi, can only count as "neglected" if we likewise neglect the millions and millennia of the East Asian regions broadly influenced by the text. So the author seeks to draw attention to the text for a particular audience, those trained largely or exclusively in Western-lineage philosophy. As both putative author and exemplar of the text, Zhuangzi offers a model of what a philosopher can be that we do well to notice. Comic, uncertain, and playful, Zhuangzi challenges a philosopher's impulse to order and sort the world, evincing instead a model of philosophical inquiry that largely eschews solutions to problems but revels in the curious, the ambiguous, and the puzzling perplexity of experience. Zhuangzi serves as an exemplar of a healthy and flourishing stupidity that one would do well sometimes to embrace.

3 Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikākārikā by Bryce Huebner

This chapter provides a brief overview of the philosophical framework, as well as some of the interesting arguments, that are presented by Vasubandhu in his Treatise in Twenty Verses. It is not, however, an attempt to provide a close reading of any part of this text. Instead, it explores several different ways of thinking with Vasubandhu, in contexts that include habituated understandings of the history of philosophy, experiences of dreams and hallucinations, and habituated understandings of the world as a space of racialized possibilities. And it concludes with an argument for treating this widely read and highly influential work of philosophy as a neglected philosophical classic.

4 Hōnen's Senchaku-Shū by Yumiko Inukai

This chapter explores Hōnen's teachings of the nembutsu presented in the Senchaku Hongan Nembutsu Shū, a doctrinal text of the Pure Land Buddhism founded in Japan in the twelfth century CE. It is shown how intriguing and astute Hōnen is, especially with regard to his sole endorsement of the nembutsu and his insight into its psychological implications. It is argued particularly that his teachings of the nembutsu are informed by his own spiritual journey of profound self-reflection and self-realization, and he consequently places much weight on the psychological process of the nembutsu practice in which the practitioner's sense of the self becomes transformed to the point where she "forgets herself." It aims to show the authenticity of the Senchaku-Shū, as it represents personal experiences and awareness of what it is to be a human, written by someone who indeed underwent very common aspects of human life—failure and disappointment.

5 Sor Juana's "Let us pretend I am happy" by Lisa Shapiro

This chapter considers Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz's poem, "Let us pretend I am happy." The poem on its face offers a series of skeptical arguments that undermine the possibility of knowledge. The author articulates this core argument, and argues that, unlike her contemporaries, Sor Juana does not think skeptical challenges can be answered by a recognition of the limits of human understanding. The interpretive question then is whether she thinks there is a response to skepticism, and if so, what it is. The author suggests that Sor Juana's choice of poetry as the genre to express her philosophy should be factored into one's interpretation. Taking into account its poetic form, the author argues that Sor Juana aims to temper the natural desire to pursue knowledge, to avoid its excesses, through affective elements of the poem itself. By tempering one's epistemic desires, it is possible to move beyond skepticism. The author further suggests that in the poem, Sor Juana presents a conception of thought as essentially affective, and that account of the nature of thought makes poetry a particularly appropriate genre for her philosophy.

6 Anton Wilhelm Amo: Treatise on the Art of Soberly and Accurately Philosophizing (1738) by Justin E. H. Smith

In 1738 the German-based African philosopher Anton Wilhelm Amo published the last and by far the longest of his three philosophical works: the Treatise on the Art of Soberly and Accurately Philosophizing. It is first and foremost a work of logic, evidently intended for students following the courses he taught. In it, Amo covers a wide range of topics, and notably makes some original contributions on the subject of hermeneutics. It also draws on some surprising and unexpected sources, and often poses difficult questions to today's reader seeking to understand why Amo was attracted to this or that predecessor's ideas rather than another's. Notably absent among his sources is any other African philosopher or author interested in African philosophical traditions, and here we are pushed toward another sort of interpretive question: Was Amo himself an African philosopher in any meaningful sense?

7 On Mary Shepherd's Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect by Jessica Wilson

Mary Shepherd (1777–1847) was a fierce and brilliant critic of Berkeley and Hume, who moreover offered strikingly original positive views about the nature of reality and one's access to it, which deserve much more attention (and credit, since she anticipates many prominent views) than they have received thus far. By way of illustration, this chapter focuses on Shepherd's 1824 Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of that Relation (ERCE). After a brief setup, the author canvasses certain of Shepherd's trenchant objections to Hume's argumentation; and then presents the positive core of Shepherd's response to Hume, which consists in providing novel accounts of how reason alone or reason coupled with experience can justify, first, that every effect must have a cause, and second, that it is necessary that like causes produce like effects. Among other contributions here, Shepherd provides a distinctively metaphysical argument for the claim that nothing can begin to exist "of itself" (going beyond an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, in particular), and leverages difference-making considerations to make the case that a single "experimentum crucis" can justify causal

belief (anticipating Mill's "method of difference"). The chapter closes by highlighting salient features of Shepherd's metaphysics of causation, whereby causation is singularist and local (anticipating Ducasse and Anscombe) and involves synchronic interactions (anticipating Mill's and certain contemporary accounts), and according to which objects are essentially characterized by their causes and effects (anticipating contemporary causal or dispositional essentialist positions).

8 Ida B. Wells-Barnett's The Red Record by Liam Kofi Bright

Ida B. Wells-Barnett's argument against the obvious moral crime of lynching has a lot to teach the reader. By paying attention to her own deliberate use of newspaper sources that were, by her own lights, biased toward white interests, one can gain insight into how best to be a scholar-activist. One can see that there are good epistemic reasons for Wells-Barnett's restriction of her own evidence set, and the underlying epistemic good she sought to attain has been precisely explicated in contemporary work on philosophy of statistics. That she sought this good, and why she did so, turn out to be illustrative for the virtues that a scholar-activist should seek to uphold.

9 The de Lagunas' Dogmatism and Evolution: Overcoming Modern Philosophy and Making Post-Quinean Analytic Philosophy by Joel Katzav

Willard V. Quine's 1951 article, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (Two Dogmas) was taken to be revolutionary because it rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction and the thesis that empirical statements are confirmed individually rather than holistically. The present chapter, however, argues that the overcoming of modern philosophy already included the overcoming of these theses by Hegelians, pragmatists, and two critics of Hegelianism and pragmatism, Grace and Theodore de Laguna. From this perspective, "Two Dogmas" offers a Hegelian epistemology that was already superseded in 1910. The perspective is largely based on the de Lagunas' 1910 book Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy. The de Lagunas' book also helps to make clear that the real revolution "Two Dogmas" participated in was the marginalization of their work and that of other speculative philosophers. Grace de Laguna surely recognized much of this when she stood opposite Quine as he first presented "Two Dogmas."

10 B. R. Ambedkar on "Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development" by Meena Krishnamurthy

In "Castes in India," Ambedkar gives a pathbreaking account of the origin and evolution of caste in India. This chapter begins by explaining what caste is and why it originated, in Ambedkar's view, and by discussing the role that caste plays in the oppression of women in India. The author argues that, in giving a causal explanation of women's oppression, Ambedkar departs from other important political works of the time, including Gandhi's, which all but ignore the oppression of women as an important form of social inequality. The author discusses the philosophical lessons that can be learned from reading Ambedkar's essay. Drawing on Charles W. Mills's criticisms of liberal political theory, the author closes the chapter by arguing that, because of the insights it

offers, Ambedkar's "Castes in India" serves as an important corrective to the traditional canon in political philosophy.

11 Civility, Silence, and Epistemic Labor in Audre Lorde's Sister Outsider by Serene J. Khader

Audre Lorde writes that conditions of oppression and injustice make it difficult to arrive at an accurate shared understanding of social reality. This chapter identifies three mechanisms by which Lorde takes oppression to impede shared knowledge of social reality. The first is a distorting or deficient conceptual repertoire. The second is unjust epistemic labor flows that demand that the oppressed, rather than devoting their energy to pursuing the questions that they prioritize, devote labor to the questions, and framings of those questions, that interest the dominant. The third is the perception that anger is epistemically disadvantageous, and that expressing it is a violation of the spirit of collective inquiry. The piece suggests connections between Lorde's ideas and contemporary discussions of cancel culture, emotional labor, and the expectation that the oppressed educate the dominant.

12 Ethics in Place and Time: Introducing Wub-e-ke-niew's We Have the Right to Exist: A Translation of Aboriginal Indigenous Thought by Alexander Guerrero

This chapter introduces the Ahnishinahbæótjibway philosopher Wub-e-ke-niew's classic book, We Have the Right to Exist: A Translation of Aboriginal Indigenous Thought. Wub-e-ke-niew presents a distinct philosophical worldview and way of life, that of the Ahnishinahbæótjibway, and contrasts it with what he calls the Lislakh (Western, Euro-American) perspective. This chapter concentrates on two central philosophical themes that emerge: (1) the contrast between Lislakh and Ahnishinahbæótjibway conceptions of time; and (2) the related differences between Lislakh and Ahnishinahbæótjibway conceptions of ethical life. In doing so, it suggests that the Ahnishinahbæótjibway ethical view articulated by Wub-e-ke-niew can help illuminate and support possible responses to the "cluelessness" objection to consequentialist ethical theories, in addition to grounding a principled environmentalist perspective. <>

FOOLOSOPHY? THINK AGAIN, SOPHIE: TEN REASONS FOR NOT TAKING PHILOSOPHY TOO SERIOUSLY by Colin Swatridge [ibidem Press, 9783838217888]

We all philosophize at times. What do we do when we philosophize? We think in a rather concentrated, deep sort of way. In so doing, we do not call ourselves Philosophers; it would be rather pretentious of us if we did. Philosophers are those—generally in university departments of Philosophy—who think, and ask questions, about what reality is made of, what we know, and how we should behave. Philosophers are not fools; but after two and a half thousand years, they have not come up with agreed answers to their questions that are any more useful, or certain, than thinkers who do not call themselves Philosophers. Many of those who do are

still caught up in the thought-forms of theology; all are in pursuit of a lost cause except those who write what might be written by thinkers in other domains. Is it not time to admit that there is nothing very special about Philosophy?

Review

I have spent enjoyable hours reading Colin Swatridge's book. I really did enjoy it and was very impressed by the range of sources he used and the scope of his analysis, the focus of his specific critiques. -- Anthony Morgan, editor of 'The Philosopher', the journal of the Philosophical Society of England

CONTENTS

The Argument

declined to play cards and was therefore requested to discourse on philosophy; after which no one spoke to me at all — a result which I did not regret. —Fyodor Dostoevsky, Poor Folk, 1845

Philosophy has been around for something like 2,500 years — or so we're told. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Russell, Wittgenstein: these and others were 'great' Philosophers. That's how we think of them. The subject 'Philosophy' is taught in all the 'great' universities, world-wide, and you probably regard it as a subject for those with sharp minds confronting the 'big questions'.

But is it a subject at all? The writer of Psalm 14 wrote: 'The fool has said in his heart there is no God'; I shall argue that there is no goddess Wisdom for the 'Philosopher'

to seek out; that it's foolish to make a subject of it, and to give it a capital P. We all philosophize at some time in our lives: we do so as children when we ask 'Do numbers go on forever without stopping?', or 'Why do we eat lamb, but not puppy?'; and we do so as adults when we cast about for answers. Plato, Aristotle, and company philosophized, asking deep questions, eager to understand the world they lived in. They weren't fools — on the contrary — though the answers they came up with aren't ones we can make much use of now.

Thinkers in the ancient world, and indeed, into modern times, believed in gods, or God — everybody did; one couldn't be wise and be an atheist. Their (public) thinking had to take God into account if they wanted to live, so there was very little difference between philosophy and theology — the study of God and (in practice, mostly the Christian) religion. Thinkers right up until the late 1800s who were later thought of as Philosophers with a capital P were theologians, too. Many of them were Theologians with a capital T. I shall argue that there are still echoes of theology in a lot of present-day Philosophy. (One such is the so-called 'mind-body problem': it has religious roots and taxes Philosophers and mental health services to this day.)

Who am I? More particularly, who am Ito call Philosophy foolish? I studied Theology when I was a believer (and was expected to be a believer), and Philosophy when I ceased to be a believer. Philosophy, I thought, would be more open-minded. Both were a disappointment. I have taught a number of subjects at the university level — but not Theology or Philosophy. I'm an outsider who has read his fill of Philosophy books, academic and popular; and much of what I read there I'm prepared to call foolish. There are those who profess Philosophy who've expressed doubts about the project; but they don't pin their theses to the doors of their Philosophy Departments. The doubters haven't resigned their posts, and they still call themselves 'Philosophers'. Why would they saw through the branch on which they're sitting quite comfortably?

I should add here that I don't call Philosophers foolish: they argue in wonderfully artful ways, and pick holes in each other's work, finding all manner of faux pas, fallacies, and category mistakes in it — and they'll probably do the same with this short book. I don't question their motives or their professionalism, just their loyalty to a lost cause.

And who are you, (whom I'm calling 'Sophie' because she was the first person to read the book, and because she has the last word)? I'm imagining that you've embarked on the study of Philosophy, or you plan to; or that you're a more than usually thoughtful 'general reader' who has always supposed Philosophy to be a rather rarefied subject pursued by donnish intellectuals. You may believe it to be a worthwhile, even necessary subject that has contributed immensely to our understanding of the world and of ourselves in it. Of course, we should all think, and the more we think reflectively the better; but such thinking shouldn't put us in the

rather small box that Philosophy has become, in which Philosophers mainly talk among themselves. I'll not base my argument on those works in which Philosophers write for each other; I shall focus in the main on those thinkers who address an intelligent, but non-specialist readership.

I shall argue that Philosophy as an academic subject — at any rate, in the 'West' — is not one that should be paid as much respect as it thinks it deserves; indeed, I shall give you ten reasons why you should revise whatever high opinion you might have entertained of the subject. Should those who call themselves Philosophers read this book, I shall not expect them to say: 'He's right'. I would be happy enough if you, whom I know to philosophize, were to say: 'He's not wrong'.

Note: this is not an academic book written for academics. It is written for outsiders like myself, or for only-just-insiders. It is, I hope, the final version of a string of versions, the last of which was provided with notes and references to all the scores of books listed in a bibliography. It was judged that its intended readers would find this apparatus unnecessary and off-putting —even you, Sophie, might not have got beyond the Introduction. So, this is a more straight-to-the-point, less cluttered version. If you find this one too hard-going, you've found reason number eleven for not taking up Philosophy.

I do quote a number of Philosophers in this book, and I do refer to the sources of the quotations, but there are no bibliographical details given. Further information about those sources can easily be found online.

(By the way, I hope all those of you who are not called Sophie will not feel excluded. This book is for you, too).

I have tried to show that philosophy, the quest for knowledge, the love of wisdom, became Philosophy, an academic discipline, only after long years in which it was indistinguishable from Theology, and later ran in parallel with it. Faith and Reason were sometimes happily married; sometimes one was dominant; and sometimes — and certainly in modern times — they have slept in separate beds. I have argued that, in a number of ways, and despite everything, the relationship is still a close one.

Philosophy as an institution has separated itself from Theology in most universities, though in some they have been reconciled, perhaps, for economic reasons. It is recognizably a 'humanities' subject — not maths, not science, not social science — alongside History, Literature, and Cultural Studies. It wears all the badges of membership of the academic community: it has its own specialist journals, its conferences, its PhD programmes. It enjoys prestige as (generally speaking) a post-school subject, whose subject matter is accorded respect by the uninitiated. A Professor of Philosophy is regarded with some awe, even though that professor may not be any clearer than the rest of us about what Philosophy is, or might be.

The closeness to Theology, though, is still evident in the way it thinks: there's still that assumption that its propositions apply universally, or that they ought to; it's still inclined to divide ideas, approaches, the world, in two; it views knowledge as hard won, if it can be won at all, and truth as an entity that's 'out there' ready to be pinned down; it's reluctant to accept that everything that exists is physical —that thinking is as physical a process as walking; and it tends to believe, or to hope, that there are moral facts to which we might all assent, wherever and whenever we live.

I hope to have shown that Philosophy, like Theology, has sought foundations for its beliefs: ultimate bases for propositions that hold in all possible worlds. They've wanted absolutes because what's only relative is too slippery, too subjective, too fashionable. They've shouted relativism down suspecting that it permits, where it only describes. They've pointed to torture, genocide, abuse of innocents, cruel and unusual punishments, to make their moral case, when none of us — on good days — would approve of these abominations. I've said they have looked for absolutes, foundations, ultimate principles, not that they do, because many Philosophers now settle for less. They recognize that it's not 'wrong' to let women choose whether or not to bring an unviable foetus to full term, or to campaign for doctor-assisted dying in defined cases, any more than it's wrong to prefer Bowie to Bach. It's not 'wrong' to legalize the recreational use of cannabis, or to grant citizenship to economic migrants, any more than it's wrong to favour the adaptation of a novel for the cinema over the hardback original.

There might have been less 'sting' in the arguments of Philosophers if they had preferred facts over truth. Facts by definition, and facts by discovery, aren't antagonists like truth and falsehood are. If they'd traded in facts Philosophers might have succeeded in being more like scientists, except —again as I hope to have shown — they don't have the tools to establish facts in Philosophy, both because there can't be any, and because the tools they've used aren't up to the job. Reason doesn't establish facts; intuition, thought-experiments don't establish facts; and logic does little more than demonstrate the 'truth' of truisms. Since it can't trade in facts, Philosophy can only trade in beliefs, and these — like all other claims that aren't facts — are matters of degree, and infinite petty dispute.

If Theologians and Philosophers hadn't given currency to the idea that there was Truth, out there, to be revealed or discovered, and believed in, we might have been spared talk of our own post-modern time being called a 'post-truth' age.

I've said that philosophy is an elevated word for thinking: I should, perhaps, have said that it's equivalent to critical thinking. This involves weighing the judgment of informed others to mitigate confirmation bias. Critical thinking is no more a subject than philosophy is: arguing effectively, by defining terms, considering counter-claims, marshalling facts, and coming to safe conclusions is what one hopes to do when one thinks in and beyond the borders of any subject, intuitive claims; choosing the claim,

or set of claims, that's supported by the best empirical evidence; coming to an informed judgment; and putting it to A case could certainly be made for a course in the history of ideas, just as a case has been made for rebranding Theology as Religious Studies, where the phenomenon under review is religion, rather than God or gods. Bryan Magee, when he wrote The Great Philosophers, in 1987, wasn't a Philosopher: he was Honorary Research Fellow, and later Visiting Professor, in the History of Ideas, at King's College, London (though his book only contained material on Philosophers as conventionally defined). A course in the history of ideas would certainly contain as many social and physical scientists, historians, fiction-writers, essayists, and political reformers as theologians and Philosophers. The choice of thinkers would vary interestingly from teacher to teacher. It would be a multidisciplinary subject in a world in which there is too much compartmentalization, at all levels of education beyond the primary phase. It would include many more thinkers who never thought of themselves as Philosophers with a capital P, than it would those who've professed Philosophy, and been paid to do so.

More and more Philosophers think outside the box — acknowledging as they do so that the conventional box of Philosophical tricks is too small for them —they think to take their theories into the boxes of other subjects. But what new thinking can a professor of social and political theory, for example, bring to sociology and political science that thinkers in these boxes can't devise for themselves? They have well-established bodies of knowledge, and methods of enquiry of their own. Of course, Philosophy is changing, as I hope to have shown, impressionistically, in Reason 1: as issues to philosophize about evolve and diversify, so Philosophers will train their sights on them alongside their colleagues in other departments. But if thinkers who call themselves Philosophers have neither subject content nor methods of thinking that mark them out as specialists, what confidence can they have that they have anything of value to contribute? And what value can their colleagues place on their judgments?

Historian and philosopher Yuval Noah Hariri wrote this during the coronavirus pandemic of 2020:

When the present crisis is over, I don't expect we will see a significant increase in the budgets of philosophy departments. (...) Governments anyhow aren't very good at philosophy. It isn't their domain. (...) it is up to individuals to do better philosophy. —Yuval Noah Hariri, in The Guardian, 25 April 2020

Philosophy with a small p is everyone's 'domain"; but I couldn't agree more that it is up to the individual to think— and to think again.

This is not an end-of-philosophy book, and it's certainly not an end-of-philosophizing book. If it was it might have borne these wordls in its title. Its an end-of-being-fooled-

by-Philosophy book that hopes to have questioned whether Wisdom should have been thought of as a holy grail once the 'holy' had gone Ire way of 'heaven'. <>

COMING BACK TO THE ABSURD: ALBERT CAMUS'S THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS 80 YEARS ON edited by Peter Francev and Maciej Kaluza [Value Inquiry Book / Studies in Existentialism, Hermeneutics, and Phenomenology, Brill, 9789004526754]

This collection of essays from some of the world's leading Camus scholars is a celebration of the enduring significance and impact of Albert Camus's first philosophical essay *The Myth of Sisyphus*. **COMING BACK TO THE ABSURD** examines Camus's unique contribution to philosophy through *The Myth* since its publication. The essays within are intended to engage students and scholars of existentialism, phenomenology and the history of philosophy, as well as those simply seeking greater understanding of one of the most influential philosophers and philosophical constructs of the twentieth century. In revisiting *The Myth*, the authors hope to inspire a new generation of Camus scholars.

CONTENTS

Can We Still Imagine Sisyphus Happy?

The task of introducing the reader to this volume is certainly a difficult one. It very rarely happens that one possesses the talent of introducing to the volume with such skill, as Albert Camus. Almost everybody who has read *The Outsider* may agree that he was the master of introductory lines. Alas, hardly anyone may forget the initial impact of words, that open the Absurd reasoning:

> There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.

It immediately follows that the essence of the Camusian *pensée* is far from abstraction, and rooted in the existential tradition of human centered approach. The task Camus has undertaken stems from awareness of severe cognitive limitations of the asking subject. These limitations are additionally enforced by Camus's stubborn decision not to resign from such a human-centered and limited approach. Such 'bracketing out' may have been – and almost instantly was – criticized and condemned as a form of implicitly introducing nihilism, by Camus's theistic counterpart Gabriel Marcel. Nevertheless, it seems that Camus firmly believed that he is simply offering 'merely the description, in the pure state, of an intellectual malady'. Such a phenomenological stance might not have allowed to broaden the description with anything else than criticism of answering through and by eternal values, transforming the serious initial question to a rhetorical one. Camus also noted that he is not inventing, but studying a phenomenon, 'an absurd sensitivity that can be found widespread in the age—and not with an absurd philosophy which our time, properly speaking, has not known'. In such a claim, Camus was far from isolated: French intellectuals at the time were engaged in a widespread debate, the 'Bad masters quarrel' accusing writers, poets and philosophers of poisoning the souls of the nation with philosophy of despair, leading, among others, to the military catastrophe of 1940. Instead of lamenting, like all generations have, on the scandalous disobedience of the young to the values of the old, Camus wanted to focus on the most disturbing aspect of the absurd, he felt, as represented by the literary figure of Kirilov from Dostoevsky.

The Myth of Sisyphus was (and still is), read as an analysis of using logic in decision-making process, regarding living on, or resigning from life by sheer act of suicide, making the absurd one of most disturbing representations of philosophy in practice. It may be that from an ethical standpoint, the question, whether life is or is not worth living is, in itself, far too abstract, to allow for a serious consideration, as it implicitly assumes that solving the issue in the realm of logic and reasoning will suffice. It may be that the context of the asking person is essential, and one can hardly separate the question from the situation of the asking person, his gender, culture, health and many other factors. On the essayistic level, however, Camus's stubborn resignation from eternal values along with his firm refusal to follow, like Caligula, the logic of absurd to the very end, have made him, and his Sisyphus remarkably interesting, leading to many, many excellent philosophical, ethical, and literary resonations.[1] It would seem unsatisfactory, however, to claim

that because of the resonance (and criticism)[2] of the philosophical theme, we should simply study it further, adding to countless books, and articles, published so far. There seems to be much more of an urgency, given our context and times, in the decision to celebrate the 80th anniversary of publication of *The Myth of Sisyphus.* Hardly anyone in 2022 would agree that the world, which was depicted as indifferent and distant to human struggles in 1942 can still be seen as such. As Dale Jamieson remarked: 'Climate change confronts us with questions of global justice, of how to live, of how to think about science and policy, and of how to move ourselves and others to act'.[3] It may have been that the world responded with silence to human questions about the meaning of life. But it seems to be shouting at us today, calling for action, for solidarity and care for the natural environment. In this context, the feeling of absurd Camus described, seems to resonate well to our growing anxiety, caused by alarming news about carbon dioxide, Earth's temperature and sea-level.

Shortly after the publication of his *Sisyphus,* Camus wrote his *Letters to a German Friend.* He noted, that conquest of Nazi-Germany was, at the heart, initiated by the same feeling of absurd, the French experienced in difficult interwar period. But one of possible ways of revolting against absurdity, Camus noted, was 'not to let yourself be "possessed" by the absurd, in any case, is to seek no advantage from it'[4] The political reaction to the absurd – Camus had warned – results in contempt of intelligence and affirmation of efficacy.[5] Both of these features may well be seen today in the global rise of populism and far-right political movements. Camus consequently developed his ideas to search for a remedy in renunciation (but not: resignation), in limiting one's desires and ambitions for the sake of common good and in dialogue and solidarity with others. Such advice, in the era of post-truth seems not only timely. It seems to be urgent, as being 'possessed' by the absurd seems to limit the possibility of communication. It seems to be urgent also, because the contempt for intelligence which Camus saw as one of dangerous consequences of the absurd, almost certainly may lead us back to watching political debates, where the winner simply shouts louder. Finally, what seems to change entirely our perception of Camus's essay nowadays is not only the political plague of post-truth and nihilism but the fact of living in the global pandemic, in isolation and fear for life, accompanying us since 2020. When enumerating ways, in which we may experience the absurd, Camus remarked: 'Men, too, secrete the inhuman. At certain moments of lucidity, the mechanical aspect of their gestures, their meaningless pantomime makes everything that surrounds them. A man is talking on the telephone behind a glass partition; you cannot hear him, but you see his incomprehensible dumb show'. So many of us today may relate to this experience after lockdowns. We have been seeing people we care about only on our phone or laptop screens; our brothers and sisters separated by hospital windows. A virus has alienated us from each other, teaching us to maintain social distance, to remain vigilant, to avoid others. At the very core, for the last two years we have been experiencing not a pandemic, but absurd.

...

Merleau-Ponty – who, shortly after the war, will be violently criticized by Camus for his political essays – inspired many generations of thinkers to closely study the subject of analysis in its

multiple relations with the environment. Camus's essay may easily be understood as a work, limited to the time and space of the French intellectual current, shaped by: Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Marxism and Existentialism. Hundreds of pages were written, to ground the place of Camus's absurd next (or against) the philosophical conception of Sartre, his ties with existential phenomenology and other philosophical conceptions of that time. In such view, rethinking Camus's essay is predominantly of historical value, appreciable mainly by academics.[7]

Others, like Benatar or Nagel, treat Sisyphus as a starting point for own reflections on the question of the meaning of life, developing, rather than situating the debate around the conception of the absurd, which Camus himself treated rather as a starting point, not a conclusive element of his philosophical journey. With different ways of understanding absurdity, quite obviously, conclusions differ, leading Nagel to a much more stoic approach to the 'cosmic insignificance'. Benatar seems to have gone in the opposite direction, judging that living with the consequence of awareness of life, suffering and inescapable death may lead to conclusions opposite to what Camus could have agreed to.

Much has also been written about the role of the writer or an artist, whom Camus portrays as an important figure for communicating the problem of absurdity by means of art, provoking scholars to devote special attention to the literature of the absurd, treating the feeling of absurdity as an aesthetic, rather than purely ethical or existential experience.

Interestingly, however, the discussion of the book in the Marxist or post-Marxist surrounding is rather scarce. Such an observation may be considered even stranger given the special place Simone Weil had in Camus's thought. If we focus on Camus's chosen, mythical character, this observation becomes even more curious. Sisyphus, as seen by Camus, derives his most notable (and famous) experience of accepting and revolting against absurd (accepting his condition while rebelling against consolation coming from outside of his condition) from labor. It is from seemingly endless, repetitive work that Camus's hero gains consciousness and, finally existential freedom, allowing him to find a way to live meaningfully (or, a meaningful life, see George Heffernan). Labor, like the absurd, is between consciousness and the world, Sisyphus and the stone: without the possibility to perform his seemingly useless job, Sisyphus would be condemned to immobility, to boredom; to an existential impasse of not having a moment to decide, whether to continue or surrender. Camus observers, in the presentation of different moments that initiate the feeling of absurdity: 'Weariness comes at the end of the acts of a mechanical life, but at the same time it inaugurates the impulse of consciousness. It awakens consciousness and provokes what follows'.

'The workman of today works every day in his life at the same tasks, and this fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious. Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory. There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn', making Camus's Sisyphus a mindful, conscious worker confronting his unsurpassable condition, rather than an

artist, resisting his fate by creation. And whilst each of our excellent, invited authors will give you a different answer, as to why we came back to *The Myth of Sisyphus* 80 years after the publication of the essay, we would like to add here another one we have recently debated. Many of us, forced to experience the pandemic and lockdowns, looked for an analogy between our situation and *The Plague*. In contrast, what we think is happening now, in times of 'disappearance of labor' and the development of 'intelligent capitalism' makes re-reading *The Myth of Sisyphus* especially interesting and thought provoking. Will we still be able to imagine Sisyphus happy, when his heroic, conscious effort is followed by the vision of him being replaced by "intelligent" machine, taking over his mundane, repetitive task? Or, on the contrary, will technology and science weaken our feeling of absurdity, by taking away the repetitive work, giving us more time for creation, art and finding meaningful lives?

The reality of Sisyphus of 1942 was the reality of industrialism and political violence; genocide performed on industrial scale and with industrial means, making his confrontation a revolt of human dignity, confronted with the cold silent and possibly meaningless world. Camus believed that to win, one has to confront this silence, to break this silence, and (*Combat* pp. 44–45) uncover the lies of ideologies, tied with *political realism.* His rebellion, initially levelled against metaphysics and suicide, gradually became more occupied with murder and politics. In both cases, Camus noted, courage is essential to act; awareness does not suffice. And while such rebellion, against both social and metaphysical absurdity is born in isolation of human consciousness, it (*Je me revolte*), it aims at solidarity with others (*donc nous sommes*) David Carroll perceptively noted, that '*Le Mythe* says nothing more as to where such a proletarian consciousness could lead in the case of the worker, however, especially if he were to join with others in active protest and then resistance'. In this aspect, reading *The Myth* without *The Rebel* seems incomplete and demands continuation in the study of the intersubjective realm of human fraternity and solidarity. But even if for Camus, the outcome of the absurd is to be found in rebellion, he quickly acknowledges that such a rebellion must rest on both negation (saying no to someone or something) and affirmation (affirming the truth, the bond between humans). In 1942, he seemed not ready yet to provide anything more than outlines of such a solution. But he was fully aware that such a state must require constant attention, and resistance to withdraw from the tension, caused by the tension between the desire to live meaningfully and the difficulty of finding such meaning in life.

An introduction to a volume, dedicated to Camus's study of the absurd would be pointless without noting, what consequences of the absurd Camus arrived at himself, after the publication of the essay. And it seems equally important to note, that separation of absurd from his later works is detrimental to the perception and understanding of his oeuvre. In 1940 when drafting the essay, Camus certainly had more questions than answers. But in his later works, he clearly underlined, that the experience he described in *The Myth if Sisyphus* was never a final position: 'Written fifteen years ago, in 1940, amid the French and European disaster, this book declares that even within the limits of nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism. In all the books I have written since, I have attempted to pursue this direction'.

It is not an isolated statement. The essay *Le Meurtre et L'absurde*,[12] later integrated as the introduction to *The Rebel,* contains confirmation that it is both possible and necessary to move beyond nihilism in search for meaning. The same statement is also presented in less-known but propably most important lyrical essay on the absurd, *The Enigma* (1950)*:*

> … in the experience which interested me, and which I happened to write about, the absurd can be considered only as a point of departure—even though the memory and feeling of it still accompany the further advances. (…) how can one limit oneself to saying that nothing has meaning and that we must plunge into absolute despair? Without getting to the bottom of things, one can at least mention that just as there is no absolute materialism, since merely to form this word is already to acknowledge something in the world apart from matter, there is likewise no total nihilism. The moment you say that everything is nonsense you express something meaningful. Refusing the world all meaning amounts to abolishing all value judgments. But living, and eating, for example, are in themselves value judgments.

Coming but to the absurd may then be seen as coming back to the doubt, that is a necessary first step for further development of a more positive answer. In an unpublished draft, Camus wrote down: 'The existential philosophy is the recognition and acceptance of the absurd. But the absurd should have been recognized, but not accepted'. Taking this judgment into consideration, Sisyphus never comes back to his stone in full acceptance of fate. He comes back, but with a new, redefined meaning of the world, of the stone and of himself: this is what allows us to imagine him happy. Our coming back to Sisyphus and to the absurd should have, and most certainly has accomplished this. Rather than being an acceptance of an agreeable vision of the absurd, we offer to the reader a multidimensional view of the absurd, taken from the perspectives of different scholars, different fields of thought. What binds them, we firmly believe, is the conviction that we all agree with Camus on one issue: if the absurd is – as he claimed – a serious philosophical problem relating to real-life experience, it demands constant attention and hopefully a possibility of transgression. Let us see, in the second part of this introduction, how such movement beyond the absurd is understood by our most-valued colleagues and friends.

Sisyphus at 80: The Essays

The following collection of essays mark some of the dynamic research that is currently be conducted within the field of Camus studies. In recent years the annual conference has helped germinate the ideas for some of these papers, and the field has grown considerably (despite the setbacks incurred due to the global covid-19 pandemic) and fostered new avenues for research, discussion and friendly debate (among these is Eric Berg's podcast 'Albert Camus Radio'). The scholars before you are some of the brightest minds within Camus studies and their approaches to *The Myth of Sisyphus* reflects the diversity of thought and perceptions of understanding from where we come in our appreciation for what Camus was trying to do with his philosophical essay. He was not, by any circumstances, trying to establish a foothold within the budding development of Existentialism (In fact, Camus famously argued that he was *not* a philosopher.), and while the authors here will not engage in that debate what we see, as a collective whole, is a work that is

fundamentally trying to guide its reader within the parameters of absurdism. The essays before you illustrate the ways in which one can explore Camus's absurdist philosophy by utilising *The Myth* as a 'guidebook' (if you will) to exploring and understanding this most relevant of humanistic philosophies.

The collection begins with Meaghan Emery's essay 'Sickness, Heartache, Punishment, and War: Lessons on the Absurd, or Birth of an Ethic'. Here, Emery examines Camus's early life and the circumstances surrounding his life that would enable the earliest of ideas to be planted in his mind. These ideas would then grow into *The Myth.* If life amounted to suffering for Albert Camus in 1936 and 1937, when he was formulating the ideas that would be central to his oeuvre on the absurd, then rising above suffering through resistance and love – without completely being relieved of it – is perhaps where his ethics lie. Eager to become a writer, but for whom tuberculosis had precluded brilliant university studies, Camus would nonetheless go on to engage with the most important issues of his time: colonialism and racism, antisemitism, the demise of the Spanish and French Republics, and world war. His personal life, however, would cause him the most heartache. Just at the moment when the meaning of life appeared to elude him, faced with a failing marriage. For in a world where one is condemned to suffer and die, which Camus believed to be an imminent sentence, suicide is an act of freedom. It is also potentially an act of sacrifice. However, as the first section of *The Myth* makes clear, the essay is not a philosophical reflection on whether to live but rather how to live. The ultimate question the essay raises, therefore, is what to do with one's freedom when death is the only absolute.

Camus begins his philosophical essay on the absurdity of life by approaching suicide as a conscious act. In his formulation of the literary genre that he would pursue, and his fiction come to embody, the search for meaning in a godless world was nothing less than a courageous quest. Emery argues that Camus takes as his point of departure this indefinable or indescribable feeling that made him alert to the precariousness of life's meaning and which ultimately led him to a purpose. For Camus, the absurd quest for creative self-realization as a writer had taken form when he was studying philosophy at university. Demonstrating that Camus seeks to avoid the 'leap of faith' taken up by Kierkegaard, Emery argues that he lays out his thoughts and ambition and specifically explores his own limitations which had to be overcome, or 'conquered' as she traces the emotional connection to the absurd.

Continuing with the 'emotional connection', Peter Francev's '*The Myth of Sisyphus*, the Absurd, and the Question of Empathy' seeks to establish a connection between Edith Stein's phenomenology of empathy and Camus's philosophy of the absurd. Whilst there is no mention of the empathy or ethics of Edith Stein (1891–1942) in the fiction and non-fiction of Albert Camus (1913–1960), one can easily surmise that Camus, being a part of the Parisian café scene during the years leading up to, including and beyond the second world war, would have encountered some discussions of Stein's thought through Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986) or Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), prior to his falling out with both men. Whilst these two philosophies appear mutually exclusive of one another, Francev contends that one can examine Camus's absurdist philosophy from a Steinian phenomenological point of view and

makes the case that these ideas can be taken together in order to see the absurd from an empathetic point of view.

Bruce Baugh's essay 'Benjamin Fondane and Albert Camus: Reason and the Absurd' continues the pattern of exploring the interconnected relationships that help shape Camus's thought, especially those related to the absurd. In June 1943, Albert Camus paid a visit to the Romanian expatriate Benjamin Fondane. The young Camus had recently attracted the literary world's attention with two books published the previous year: *The Stranger* and his essay, *The Myth of Sisyphus*. Fondane, for his part, was by then a well-known poet and exponent of the existential philosophy that forms the background to Camus's essay, most notably in his 1936 book, *The Unhappy Consciousness*. The two men would have had a lot to talk about, not least the philosophy of Lev Shestov, sharply criticized by Camus in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, and vigorously defended throughout Fondane's philosophical works. Baugh goes on to point out that had both men lived to meet each other again, after World War ii, then it is possible that Fondane would have help persuade Camus to soften his tone against Shestov, that, really, both men were aiming to achieve the same thing – a philosophy of existence, rather than a philosophy of existentialism as posited by Heidegger and Sartre.

Next comes Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray's essay 'Revolt, Absurdity, and the Artist as Sisyphus'. Here, she will argue that the necessary groundwork for 'Create Dangerously' was crafted in the pages of *Myth* – specifically, in the three consequences drawn from the absurd: revolt, freedom, and passion. She then connects these two works thematically; after a brief discussion of the absurd, the essay will explore absurd art and the absurd artist – the one who is supposed to take risks, envision better alternatives, and thereby thrust society forward by unsettling the status quo. For Camus, the artist must be truthful, and truth is always dangerous, 'To create today means to create dangerously. Every publication is a deliberate act, and that act makes us vulnerable to the passions of a century that forgives nothing'. The artist must draw attention to the social issues that crush and divide us, and this means she or he must be immersed in the reality of their time, to wrestle from it something timeless that can be understood by the audience as universal, and as beacon for change. The greatest hope lies in artists' obligation to their own freedom, which is also bound to that of others – present and future. The artist, much like Sisyphus, is an absurd hero but unlike the Greek tragic figure, the artist lives and struggles amongst us, and brings us along with each push forward. Finally, it should be noted that Baltzer-Jaray's essay is one of the first to examine 'Create Dangerously' in English, and it will no doubt foster new scholarship within the field.

'The Metaphorical Language of the Absurd' by Sophie Bastien examines the metaphorical language that Albert Camus used to express the absurd, and then the reclamation of that language by another writer, Samuel Beckett. It is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on *The Myth of Sisyphus*, the theoretical reference for the concept of the absurd, and identifies three main metaphors that Camus regularly employed to develop this concept throughout his essay: the theatre, the desert and the walls. The second part of the study looks at Camus's works of fiction in the cycle of the absurd. It demonstrates that *The Stranger* and the plays *Caligula* and *The Misunderstanding* apply the same three metaphors. Finally, the last part of the study examines the

treatment of these metaphors by a major playwright in the second half of the 20th century. Bastien's essay provides a nice balance between the analysis of language and a comparative study on Camus and Beckett, who clearly influenced the French-Algerian author.

'Why Did the Stranger Kill the Arab? A Study in the Absurdity of Moral Motivation' by George Heffernan continues the concentrated analysis of *The Stranger* and provides an added dimension to its analysis by looking at Meursault's motives in killing the Arab on the beach. During his interrogation, the examining magistrate repeatedly asks Meursault why he first fired one shot at the Arab, then paused for a short time, and finally fired four more shots into the motionless body lying on the beach. Meursault has no answer to the magistrate's question. Rather, he thinks that the magistrate is wrong to focus on it because it really does not matter. Yet Meursault learns at his trial that his pause is crucial because it makes all the difference between a case of self-defense and a case of premeditated murder, as well as that it has profound existential implications and legal-moral consequences. Heffernan thoroughly and methodically examines several plausible answers to the question of why Meursault not only shot but also killed the Arab and explores the roles of rationality and absurdity in human moral motivation.

Following Heffernan's essay, Eric Berg asks readers 'What is it about Camus that harnesses such a strong grip on Christian theologians and on Christian apologetics?' This thought-provoking question is the basis for his essay 'The Blood that Trickles from The Gospels Is the Color of Printers' Ink: The Relationship Between Religious Texts and the Absurd'. Berg's essay is the only one in this collection that looks to rectify the theist and atheistic positions in finding some common ground within the absurd. It seems there is an unusually strong bond between Christianity and Camus and Berg argues that beyond the intentional, relentless, Christian imagery and language Camus uses in his work, it is the relationship between his fundamental concept of the absurd, best articulated in *The Myth of Sisyphus,* and the historical construction of the foundational texts of the Christian faith, The Gospels. By way of this relationship, they both articulate the same unique metaphysic. Berg's essay is a desperately needed addition to the field of Christianity and Camus and will be of interest to all readers.

Matthew Bowker's essay 'Unlikely Heroism: Sisyphus, Camus, and the Absurd Posture' looks to re-establish the myth of Sisyphus for a new generation of scholars. Looking well-beyond the myth, as outlined at the end of Camus's essay, Bowker seeks to establish a connection with Greek mythology as a way for the reader to understand where Camus obtains his ideas that ultimately culminate in using the Sisyphean myth as the groundwork for his absurdist philosophy.

Next is the essay 'Explanation and The Unreasonable Silence of the World', by Craig DeLancy. Here, DeLancy offers an analytic philosophical interpretation of *The Myth.* DeLancy holds that some of Camus's concerns are teleological, and some of them are epistemic. The teleological accounts of the absurd concern purpose, and our sense that we lack a justified or sufficient purpose. Camus also makes use of a teleological approach when he uses the term 'absurd' to refer to a passion or experience. He describes a tension, a struggle, between our desire for a sufficient purpose, and a recognition that history and the universe are without purpose, but, in contrast to

these teleological uses, Camus also makes an explicit argument that the absurd is our inability to understand the world. This epistemic absurd he describes as a failure of 'rationality'. DeLancy continues by looking at these two different approaches to the absurd which present readers with a problem: they appear independent. Therefore, DeLancy asks 'Can we then reconcile Camus's two approaches? Or is he using diverse and independent notions of the 'absurd' in *The Myth of Sisyphus*?' In this essay, he will argue that we can reconcile Camus's approaches. Although they are distinct, and some aspects of his account are indeed independent of others, readers can reconcile the teleological and epistemic notions of the absurd by recognizing the central importance of teleological (often called 'functional') explanation in our everyday lives. By using this account of teleological explanation, DeLancy shows how the teleological and epistemic accounts of the absurd are fundamentally related.

The final essay in the collection is 'Sisyphus in Hell: the Absurd Through Against (New) Fascism', by Samantha Novello. Novello seeks to challenge the political philosophical input of *The Myth* by delineating 'Absurd Thought' as a phenomenological method of rational agency for resisting against phenomena of emotional contagion and mimetic behaviour which plague the political sphere coalescing in the contemporary phenomenon of (new) fascism. The first part of Novello's essay examines Maurice Blanchot's interpretation of *The Myth* by focusing in particular on the image of Hell as negation of the political community founded by the rebellious act. The second part of her essay explores the affinities and differences between Georges Bataille's and Camus's understanding of freedom. Finally, in the third part, Novello's contribution dwells on the role played by emotional acts in our capacity for revolt, bringing the phenomenological matrix of the 'Absurd Thought' as theorised in *The Myth* to the forefront of contemporary consciousness.

As you can see the field of Camus studies is alive and vibrant, and with each of these essays scholars have relied on their areas of expertise to elucidate and expound upon a new arena of scholarship – one that looks to *The Myth of Sisyphus* not as a document that has 'run its course', but one that is still very much at the forefront of Camus's philosophy. It is our sincere hope that each of these essays fosters an inquiry in their readers, as well as inspire a new generation of Camus scholars who can contribute to the absurdist discussion. <>

THE MYSTICISM OF ORDINARY LIFE: THEOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, AND FEMINISM by Andrew Prevot [Oxford University Pres, 9780192866967]

THE MYSTICISM OF ORDINARY LIFE: THEOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, AND FEMINISM presents a new vision of Christian mystical theology. It offers critical interpretations of Catholic theologians, postmodern philosophers, and intersectional feminists who draw on mystical traditions to affirm ordinary life. It raises questions about normativity, gender, and race, while arguing that the everyday experience of the grace of divine union can be an empowering source of social transformation. It

develops Christian teachings about the Word made flesh, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and the Christian spiritual life, while exploring the mystical significance of philosophical discourses about immanence, alterity, in-betweenness, nothingness, and embodiment. The discussion of Latino/a and Black sources in North America expands the Western mystical canon and opens new horizons for interdisciplinary dialogue. The volume challenges contemporary culture to recognize and draw inspiration from quotidian
manifestations of the unknown God of incarnate love. It includes detailed studies of Grace Jantzen, Amy Hollywood, Catherine Keller, Karl Rahner, Adrienne von Speyr, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Michel Henry, Michel de Certeau, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, Gloría Anzaldúa, Ada María Isasi-Díaz, Alice Walker, M. Shawn Copeland, and more.

Contents

Foreword, by Maria Clara Bingemer

Introduction: A New Vision of Christian Mystical Theology

Part 1: Catholic Mystical Theologians in the Twentieth Century

1. Grace in the Ordinary: The Mystical Theology of Karl Rahner

2. Obedience, Love, and Suffering: The Mystical Theology of Adrienne von Speyr and Hans Urs von Balthasar

Part 2: Christian Mysticism and Postmodern Philosophy

3. Immanence and Alterity: The Mystical Styles of Michel Henry and Michel de Certeau

4. The Other Within: Constructs of Mystical Femininity in Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva

Part 3: Intersectional Feminism: Mystical Traditions from the American Side of the Atlantic

5. The Divine in Between: Gloria Anzaldúa, Ada María Isasi-Díaz, and Other Mestizo/a Mystical Sources

6. Divine Darkness Revisited: Alice Walker, M. Shawn Copeland, and Other Womanist and Black Mystical Sources

Conclusion

The Path Ahead

This book updates a model of interdisciplinary scholarship practiced by twentieth- century Catholic theologians such as Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar, who combine fidelity to the Christian mystical tradition with a critical use of the regnant philosophical and cultural resources of their context (which, in their case, mainly consisted of certain German- language sources from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). Although a similarly conceived relationship between theology and philosophy remains attractive today, there is a need for mystical theologians to adapt their arguments to changing landscapes, such as those represented by the predominantly Francophone (but now also Anglophone) conversations of postmodern philosophy

and by certain underappreciated U.S. Latino/a and African American discourses— to name just a few possibilities. These diverse historical and intellectual contexts adjust, complicate, and expand the meanings of both ordinary life and mysticism. The task for Christian mystical theology going forward is not merely to think about how the Christian mystical tradition might offer a remedy for the woes of secularity. Christian mystical theology must also consider whether important changes to its self- understanding are warranted by its interactions with diverse takes on the mysticism of ordinary life arising after modernity and from beneath its ruins.

The Catholic model of interdisciplinarity does not subordinate the Christian mystical tradition to philosophical readings, as Jantzen and Hollywood do in their later works. It does not intermesh theology and philosophy in such a way that the two become one "anatheistic" contemplation of the divine unknown in worldly relations and processes, which is Keller's approach. It does not stipulate that the Christian mystical tradition one- directionally addresses the problems of postmodern culture, as Coakley suggests. Rather, the Catholic model of interdisciplinarity upholds a distinction between theology (as prayerful thinking of God) and philosophy (as an exercise of critical reason that does not necessarily presuppose such a relation with God). It prioritizes theological norms of interpretation drawn from Christian scripture and tradition (such as doctrines about creation, grace, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and so on), and it uses these norms to engage and evaluate Christian and non- Christian sources alike. In such interactions, it seeks to retain whatever is beautiful and true in philosophy and any other cultural products and religious traditions that do not adhere to Christian faith. It welcomes critiques, developments, and variations that come from such interactions, provided they support the most essential Christian and mystical theological norm of incarnate divine love.

This book has a distinctly Catholic character, not only because it adheres to a Catholic model of relating theology and philosophy but also because its sources have explicit ties to the Catholic tradition. Rahner, Balthasar, and Adrienne von Speyr are obvious examples. But beyond them, this book's main postmodern philosophical sources (Michel Henry, Michel de Certeau, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva) also have significant Catholic roots and inclinations, and several of its intersectional feminist sources (especially Ada María Isasi- Díaz and M. Shawn Copeland) are Catholic theologians. This contemporary Catholic focus is another feature that distinguishes this project from the comparable studies by Jantzen, Hollywood, Keller, and Coakley.53 While this book appeals to Catholic thinkers by offering a constructive theological discussion congruent with their own tradition, it is not meant only for them but for Christian theologians in general and, indeed, for anyone interested in how Christian mysticism and related mystical traditions are employed in various efforts to affirm ordinary life.

The argument is organized into three parts, each with two chapters. Part I, "Catholic Mystical Theologians in the Twentieth Century," bridges a divide between Rahnerian and Balthasarian approaches to the mysticism of ordinary life by demonstrating that the two are closer than some commentators assume. It retrieves insights from these Catholic theologians regarding the grace of divine union, connecting it with topics such as Christology, pneumatology, Mariology, asceticism, obedience, love, and the paschal mystery. At the same time, it advances a feminist interpretation

of their works that challenges aspects of their treatments of gender and suffering. The chapter on Rahner defends the Christian theological status of his understanding of mysticism against charges that it is overdetermined by modern transcendental philosophy, clarifies what he means by "ordinary life," questions his ability to offer a gender- neutral theory of divine union, and concludes with a discussion of his sometimes- neglected prayerful writings. The chapter on Balthasar is equally focused on his contemplative friend, Adrienne von Speyr. It considers the controversial question of how to understand their relationship, offers a feminist critique of their gender essentialism, reveals certain antiessentialist features of their hagiography, and attempts a critical retrieval of their mystical accounts of obedience, love, and suffering.

Part II of the book, "Christian Mysticism and Postmodern Philosophy," turns to a series of thinkers who draw selectively on Christian mystical sources to advance revisionist phenomenological and psychoanalytic theories of ordinary life. It recognizes various ways in which these postmodern theorists contribute to both philosophy and theology, while offering a critical assessment of them from the perspective of Christian mystical theology. The chapter on Henry and Certeau distinguishes two postmodern styles of the mysticism of ordinary life, which, though not atheistic, are arguably more philosophical than theological. One style, represented by Henry, locates the divine in the auto- affective immanence of the flesh. Another style, represented by Certeau, associates the divine with a condition of alterity vis- à- vis norms and structures. The chapter on Irigaray and Kristeva shows how these postmodern mystical styles of immanence and alterity are combined in "French feminist" constructs of mystical femininity. Although Irigaray's and Kristeva's understandings of "woman" as a potentially divine or quasi- divine "other within" resist the masculine focus of much theological and philosophical discussion of Christian mysticism, they do not overcome the problem of gender essentialism and remain, like the sources featured in previous chapters, Eurocentric. Nonetheless, Christian mystical theology stands to benefit from this mystically aspirated postmodern literature in many respects. Among other things, it can embrace Henry's praise for life as such, Certeau's love for others who suffer from and escape systems of control, Irigaray's affirmation of women's jouissance and subjectivity, and Kristeva's therapeutic care for the conflicted condition of human souls.

Part III, "Intersectional Feminism: Mystical Traditions from the American Side of the Atlantic," turns to a set of North American mestizo/a, womanist, and Black sources that are not always recognized as belonging to mysticism, let alone theology or philosophy, but that do indeed reflect the grace of divine union at work in quotidian lives and that do offer sophisticated interpretations of it in relation to Christian faith and other noteworthy intellectual and aesthetic traditions. This final part of the book discusses how the mysticism of ordinary life needs to be understood differently and what liberative ends it may achieve if it is approached through the interconnected matrix of gender, racial, and socioeconomic conditions that continue to be produced by the violent legacies of conquest and slavery. The chapter on Gloria Anzaldúa, Isasi- Díaz, and other mestizo/a mystical sources discusses several topics, such as a mystical way of interpreting mestizaje (mixture or inbetweenness) that resists the colonial and patriarchal violence often associated with this concept, experiences of an empowering divine presence in the context of la

lucha (struggle) and lo cotidiano (the everyday), popular devotion to La Virgen de Guadalupe (Our Lady of Guadalupe) and crit ic al feminist receptions of it, and mystical identifications with the crucified Christ in the midst of daily hardships and through communal celebrations of El Via Crucis (the Way of the Cross).

The chapter on Alice Walker, Copeland, and other womanist and Black mystic al sources similarly highlights a range of distinctive contributions, such as a meditation on Blackness as a mystically charged symbol of both being and nothingness; an account of the grace of divine union in the lives of nineteenth-century Black women evangelists and ordinary Black women struggling to survive and flourish; an account of mystical corporeality that unites bodies with one another in suffering, joy, and freedom (particularly in the crucified and risen Christ); and a reassessment of the meaning of divine darkness in view of the opacities of Black women's lives.

***

Although Christian mystical theology wants to speak with the words or silences of eternity, this does not change the fact that it has a history, indeed many histories. We have seen that these histories are not limited to Europe or the Middle Ages and that they feature various gender performances and embodied identities in diverse contexts, which challenge simplistic binaries and closures. The communal work to excavate and interpret these histories is far from complete. Such work honors the testimonies of the dead (who may indeed now live in God), but it is not primarily for them. It is for those compelled to live in the present and the future, those who must struggle with the hardheartedness of the world and seek God in its midst. To some extent, it is for monks and vowed contemplatives who dedicate their lives to mystical pursuits, but it is also for the vast majority of human beings who do not have such formal vocations but may nevertheless ex peri ence the grace of divine union in their quotidian lives. It is for everyday people who, in their strangeness and singularities, are more or less resistant to socially constructed norms. At the same time, it is an effort to remember the mysterious and all- important norm of incarnate love.

One scholarly aim is to get the history "right," to whatever extent this is possible. Another is to think with it in a constructive fashion, advancing immanent and intertextual critiques and formulating new proposals. Through its studies of twentieth- century Catholic theologians, postmodern philosophers, and intersectional feminist thinkers as readers of Christian mystical sources, this book has prioritized the latter objective. It has not, for example, sought to establish new facts about what Meister Eckhart, Teresa of Avila, Juan Diego, or Rebecca Cox Jackson did, experienced, or said. Rather, it has weighed the stakes of different theological and philosophical ways of using such sources to elaborate a theory of the mysticism of ordinary life.

The purpose of this sort of theory is to show that what is called "mystical" is not foreign to the lives of so- called "ordinary" people but rather deeply characteristic of them. To grasp how and why these phenomena go together, it is necessary to ask probing questions about various construals of mysticism, ordinariness, and their connection, recognizing that these terms do not mean the same thing to everyone who uses them. It would be possible to analyze the permutations of such a theory— tracking distinct ways of framing and answering these questions— without endorsing

any particular position or even the overarching idea of the mysticism of ordinary life. However, I have not taken such a neutral, distanced attitude toward my subject matter. In my hermeneutical efforts, I have been both analytical and evaluative. I have distinguished diverse instances of theological, postmodern, and intersectional accounts of the mysticism of ordinary life while seeking ways to adjust, integrate, and develop them.

More specifically, I have embraced a Catholic model of interdisciplinarity, which welcomes the contributions of philosophy while incorporating them into a Christian theological perspective centered on the grace of divine union. I have stressed that the philosophy under consideration need not only be that of a Greek or Latin antiquity or even German modernity, since there is much to learn about the mysticism of ordinary life from philosophical texts in Francophone postmodernity (in its phenomenological and psychoanalytic streams) and from analogous materials produced within Latino/a and Black cultures on the American side of the Atlantic. I have discussed challenges associated with treating transcendental consciousness, obedience, marriage, suffering, immanence, alterity, femininity, mestizaje, and Blackness as sufficient grounds on which to attribute a mystical meaning to ordinary life. At the same time, I have highlighted ways in which these philosophically describable aspects of human existence can mediate a theologically recognizable intimacy with the unknown God of incarnate love.

Following feminist authors, I have contested sinful norms of phallocentrism and gender essentialism that have shaped the construction of both mysticism and ordinariness. I have suggested that an abstract stance of gender neutrality, in which one would avoid stating or implying anything about this area of human difference, is neither desirable nor attainable. As an alternative, I have drawn specific attention to quotidian negotiations and subversions of such normative constraints and emphasized the ways in which union with God scrambles gender expectations. Following mestiza, womanist, and other intersectional theorists, I have argued that the feminist study of Christian mysticism needs to attend more rigorously to the mystical lives of poor women of color. I have suggested that gender and race must be interrogated together if we are to understand their effects on everyday existence and on the meaning of union with God. I have argued that, when interpreted in such critical- contemplative ways, the mysticism of ordinary life becomes a wellspring of spiritual consolation and material empowerment for women and other persons oppressed by histories of conquest and slavery.

Throughout this book, I have maintained that the God revealed in Christ and the Holy Spirit, in the goodness of the natural world, and in La Virgen de Guadalupe seeks to unite with human beings regardless of their status in any given social or religious hierarchies. This All- Good, this abyssal mystery, this undying wisdom, this nameless power does not remain aloof. It enters into histories and societies and supports only those norms that encourage holistic love, joy, and freedom. It is not a respecter of any other norms and, in fact, emboldens its recipients to resist them whenever they become harmful or overly entrenched. On my account, the mysticism of ordinary life is more precisely a normativity- critical mysticism of quotidian life, which celebrates the Christological, pneumatological, and apophatic features of human bodies, psyches, and relationships. All in all, I have not merely presented a map of different theories of the mysticism of

ordinary life. I have charted a particular course through such territory and given locally argued reasons for following this route.

To be clear, my goal has not been to persuade nonbelievers to become believers or, for that matter, philosophers to become theologians. In this regard, I acknowledge that the truth of my account of the mysticism of ordinary life is not something I can prove. Perhaps virtue is only ever a product of human effort or, at most, an effect of created (as opposed to uncreated) grace; perhaps the divine is nothing other than nature writ large; perhaps the desire to unite with the divine is a psychological wound caused by the loss of early attachment to one's mother; perhaps the evil of history shows that divine union is inaccessible in this life or even that there is no God. These objections and other argumentative or personal reasons might incline one more toward philosophy than theology, and I respect this possibility. To the extent that I have appraised philosophical sources from a Christian theological viewpoint, I have done so mainly for the benefit of Christian theologians who have an interest in understanding what can be gained from such an interaction, how much common ground can be found, and how certain theological traditions have been altered (for better or worse) through philosophical transpositions. Given the complexity, opacity, and variability of the mysticism of ordinary life, I believe that it makes sense to approach differences in the study of this phenomenon with a spirit of generosity and a desire for mutual understanding.

Yet my confessional, theological perspective is meaningful to me and to others who share it. I am committed to the view that mysticism is not merely a variable historical construct or replicable modification of consciousness but a gift of God's very life. When I read sources from the Christian mystical tradition, including from neglected racialized communities within it, they increase my desire for this grace and support my intuition that it is real and being poured out everywhere. In my moments of contemplative stillness, when I strive to perceive and bear the excessive beauty and violence of existence, I sense that there is a heart of love at the center of it, a longing for healing and connection that does not have its origin in finite things (however remarkable they may be) but in the infinite itself. This sense stays with me in my unexceptional daily habits and encounters. It sustains my experiences of wonder at the mysteries of the world. It guides my religious, intellectual, and political practices.

I hope that the arguments of this book have persuaded Christian readers to think more deeply about the mystical dimension of their faith in Christ and the ways in which it troubles certain intersecting norms of gender and race that have corrupted the historical practice of Christianity. For Christians, Jesus of Nazareth is the most perfect icon of God's desire to be one with humanity in all its precarity. He is the revelation of an uncreated grace that breaks into the hells of this world, both deadly institutions and anguished bodies and souls, and promises a liberation as yet unconceived. In the context of overlapping sinful structures, such as White supremacy and patriarchy, quotidian practices of resistance, lucha, prayer, and community nurture possibilities of divine union. The Spirit of Christ breathes life into persons left for dead. It works in and through them, inspiring prophetic words and actions. It gives women levels of subjectivity and authority unanticipated by male- dominated reason. It builds up intersectional feminist movements in

history. Mysticism is political but not only political. It is the abundance of eternity in time and place. It is an ever- greater love, which one can touch and embody but never capture. <>

BEING: A STUDY IN ONTOLOGY by Peter van Inwagen [Oxford University Press, 9780192883964]

A leading metaphysician offers a general account of existence

For millennia, philosophers have debated about the existence of things - not only the existence of things like God, demons and the soul, but things like mathematical objects, qualities and attributes, or merely possible states of affairs and people. Ontology is the present-day name for the part of philosophy that addresses such questions. *Being* attempts to answer these old questions-and the question of how one should go about attempting to answer them.

Brings together ontology ('What is there?') and metaontology ('How should we do ontology?')

This book presents and defends a meta-ontology and an ontology. Quine has taught us to use the word 'ontology' as a label for the part of philosophy that addresses "the ontological question" - 'What is there?' Meta-ontology, then, is the part of philosophy that addresses two questions, 'What is it to be (or to exist)?' and 'How should one attempt to answer the ontological question?' Chapters 1 and 5 are devoted to meta-ontology - Chapter 1 to a defense of the "neo-Quinean" meta-ontology, Chapter 5 to an examination of various alternative meta-ontologies. The essence of neo-Quineanism is that 'x exists' and 'Something is x' and 'The number of things that are x is not 0' mean more or less the same thing'. Neo-Quineanism obviously entails that there are no non-existent things, for nothing is such that nothing is it and everything is such that the number of things identical with it is 1. Chapter 2 is an examination of various positions that imply that there are non-existent things. The topic of Chapter 3 is the ancient "problem of universals," or the problem of the existence and nature of abstract objects. Chapter 4 is devoted to questions concerning possible worlds and other objects belonging to the ontology of modality.

Illuminates all kinds of existence - God, mathematical objects, abstract and possible objects, states of affairs, as well as everyday objects and properties.

CONTENTS
Preface
Introduction
Summary
I. Being and Existence
II. Being and Non-Being
III. Being and Abstraction

No one can deny that W. V. Quine wrote many splendidly quotable (and in consequence much-quoted) sentences. Among them is the first sentence of his preface to Set Theory and Its Logic: 'A preface is not, in my book, an introduction.' I refuse, however, to be simply one more philosopher who has quoted this sentence. I will not quote it. I will borrow it: A preface is not, in my book, an introduction.

One of the many introductions that this Preface is not—the Introduction to this book—follows it.

The intellectual context of Being: A Study in Ontology is this: it is an historical document, a book of the nineties of the last century. I began work on Being in the early eighties. The chapter headings of the original plan for the book were much the same as those of the book that is in your hands (or those of the book one page of which is on a screen before you), with two exceptions: Chapter VI was added in response to a suggestion made by a reader for O.U.P., and there was originally to be a chapter called "Being and Materiality." I had a year's research leave (thanks to the generosity of the National Endowment for the Humanities) and eagerly started work on the book. I began with the chapter "Being and Materiality" because, at the time, that was the area in which the ideas were coming. But that chapter took on a life of its own and eventually became a book—Material Beings. Material Beings (like An Essay on Free Will before it) took seven or eight years to write. But I was able to do quite a lot of work (here and there, now and then) on Being even when the main focus of my attention was on Material Beings. I submitted an incomplete draft of Being to the Oxford University Press and in 1994 it was—conditionally, of course— accepted for publication. I took it for granted that—given the time it had taken to write An Essay on Free Will and Material Beings—I should finish the book in a few years, certainly before the end of the century.

It was not to be. The pressure of other work—I was in those days the recipient of a seemingly unending series of invitations to write papers on topics I badly wanted to write papers on—caused me again and again to put off work on Being, each time "for a few months." I found myself unable to do any further work on the book if I could not devote my undivided attention to it for some considerable period of time, and no such considerable period of time ever presented itself.

Eventually my manuscript became obsolete, or at least I eventually began to think of it as obsolete. In 1994, no one to speak of was writing on the topic that today is called meta-ontology,' but, all of a sudden, at some point early in this century, it

seemed that everyone was. (In 2008, Ross Cameron published a paper that contained the soon-to-be-much-quoted sentence `Metaontology is the new black'.) And my manuscript addressed none of that work. A cloud of metaphysicians were now writing about fundamentality and grounding, Aristotelianism vs Quineanism, easy ontology, neo-Carnapianism, Ontologese, modes of being, ... And none of these topics was so much as alluded to in the draft manuscript of Being—for, of course, when I was writing the various chapters that draft comprised, I had never heard of any of them.

By the time the new century had got well under way, whenever I happened to be in Oxford, Peter Momtchiloff, the Senior Commissioning Editor for Philosophy at O.U.P., would give me lunch, during which meal he would delicately press me for information about how work on Being was coming along. Unless my memory deceives me, I was on every such occasion honest enough to tell him that it was not coming along at all. During one of the more recent of these luncheons, I laid out in some detail the problem I mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and Peter suggested that I publish the book as an historical document, a creature of its time—and that I refer readers to my more recent papers for my current thoughts on ontology and meta-ontology.

And this I have done. I have, I confess, deeply revised the "nineties manuscript" of Being in preparation for the publication of this book. And I have written a lot of wholly new material—for the manuscript that had been submitted to Oxford in the nineties was, as I have said, incomplete. But the revisions are revisions that might have been made, and the added material is material that might have been composed, before meta-ontology became the new black. For my current thinking about the matters addressed in this book,' the reader is directed to my collections Existence: Essays in ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) and The Abstract and the Concrete, which will be published by Oxford University Press. Almost nothing in these later essays contradicts anything in the present book. The rare inconsistencies between the later essays and the material in this book pertain to minor technical matters....

This book presents a meta-ontology and an ontology. An ontology is a detailed and systematic answer to "the ontological question": 'What is there?' A metaontology is a reflective answer to the question, 'What are we asking when we ask the ontological question and how shall we go about trying to answer it?' Or, to use the two words as mass terms: in ontology, we ask and attempt to answer the ontological question; in meta-ontology, we attempt to understand what we are doing when we do ontology.6 Chapters I and V are devoted to meta-ontology, Chapter I to the presentation of a meta-ontology, and Chapter V to consideration of its rivals. Chapters II, III, and IV are applications of the meta-ontology presented in Chapter I to questions about what there is: Are there things that do not exist?; Are there

abstract objects?; Are there objects of the sort that seem to be presupposed in much of our modal reasoning: unrealized possibilities, possible worlds, possible fat men in the doorway? (Chapter VI was not a part of the original plan of the book. It is based on a suggestion of a reader for the Oxford University Press. In Chapter VI, I present a single, unified framework within which the positions defended in the earlier chapters can be placed.)

The meta-ontology presented in Chapters I and V is, so to speak, deeply Quinean. This is no accident. I did not set out to develop a meta-ontology and later discover that the one I developed happened to be identical with Quine's. My meta-ontology is Quine's meta-ontology (or something very much like it) because I have read what Quine has to say on the subject and have been convinced by it. The ontology presented in Chapters II, III, IV, and VI is, by contrast, deeply anti-Quinean. (It is, for example, friendly to propositions and attributes and modality de re, although it agrees with Quine's views in the matter of non-existent things.) This is an accident. I did not set out to refute or disagree with Quine. I have simply come to different ontological conclusions from his, despite the fact that I have thought about ontological problems in the way (if I may so speak of my relationship to a philosopher who has been my teacher only through the written word) he has taught me to think about ontological problems.

I will try to give some sense of what I mean by saying that the meta-ontology I present in this book is "deeply Quinean." But I do not mean to anticipate the detailed and technical discussion of meta-ontological questions that comprises Chapters I and V. I will simply comment on two quotations that represent metaontological views antithetical to Quine's, and on one quotation that misrepresents Quine's views. The first is from Arthur Prior's Objects of Thought:

[Quine's difficulty with such quantifications as 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not'] seems to me to be quite unnecessary; like many other difficulties of his, it arises only through his insistence that all quantification must govern variable names. I see no reason why we should not— ... following Ramsey—quantify our sentential variables and concoct such complexes as Tor some p, Paul believes that p and Elmer does not believe that p', without thereby being `ontologically committed' to the view that there are objects which sentences name. (I doubt whether any dogma, even of empiricism, has ever been quite so muddling as the dogma that to be is to be a value of a bound variable.)

The burden—or a good sixty percent of the burden—of Chapters I and V could be summed up by saying that the ideas on display in this passage are radically defective.' In this passage—I say—, a philosopher accuses another philosopher of being wrong-headed and muddled on just those points on which he himself is wrong-headed and muddled and his target exceptionally insightful and clearminded. I will be particularly concerned to commend Quine for "his insistence that all quantification must govern

variable names" (that is, must govern variables that occupy nominal positions). More exactly, I will commend Quine for his insistence that there can be no such thing as a variable that does not occupy a nominal position—for it's not as if Quine conceded that there were, for example, sentential variables but held that, for some reason, quantification couldn't govern them...

Lightweight Platonism An Ontological Framework

This final chapter presents, in outline, a single, unified framework within which the conclusions of the five preceding chapters can be placed. It will, inevitably, contain some repetition of things said in the first five chapters. I'll try at least not to use the same words.

I will call this "framework" Lightweight Platonism. Lightweight Platonism comprises a meta-ontology and an ontology.

The meta-ontology incorporates the conviction that being is a thin concept. (And existence, since it is the same thing as being, is therefore a thin concept.) Heidegger has asked, "... is 'being' a mere word and its meaning a vapor, or is it the spiritual destiny of the West?'" One can see why he presents his readers with that opposition, for 'a mere word and a vapor' is the position of Nietzsche and 'spiritual destiny' is his own position and Nietzsche is one of the very few modern philosophers for whom Heidegger has any very great respect. However this may be, Heidegger has presented his readers with a false opposition. 'Being' is a word with a very precise meaning, not a vapor at all, and it is not the spiritual destiny of the West—not in the sense, which I take to be Heidegger's sense, that the spiritual destiny of the West is hostage to the West's undertaking to uncover the meaning of being. Being is an everyday concept, a hard-working concept, but it stands in no more intimate relation to the spiritual destiny of the West than does the concept of the antecedent of a conditional (or the concept of a planar projection or the concept of an accentual meter or...).

Both the thinness of the concept of being and the precision with which the concept of being can be defined are displayed in two facts (I say they're facts) about the open sentences in the following list: the fact that they are unambiguous and clear and the fact that each of them is necessarily co-extensive with each of the others. <>

PLATO OF ATHENS: A LIFE IN PHILOSOPHY by Robin Waterfield [Oxford University Press, 9780197564752]

A up-to-date introductory biography of the founder of Western philosophy

Considered by many to be the most important philosopher ever, Plato was born into a well-to-do family in wartime Athens at the end of the fifth century BCE. In his teens, he honed his intellect by attending lectures from the many thinkers who passed through Athens and toyed with the idea of writing poetry. He finally decided to go into politics, but became disillusioned, especially after the Athenians condemned his teacher, Socrates, to death. Instead, Plato turned to writing and teaching. He began teaching in his twenties and later founded the Academy, the world's first higher-educational research and teaching establishment. Eventually, he returned to practical politics and spent a considerable amount of time and energy trying to create a constitution for Syracuse in Sicily that would reflect and perpetuate some of his political ideals. The attempts failed, and Plato's disappointment can be traced in some of his later political works.

Provides a rich portrait of Athens at a time of great political and cultural change

In his lifetime and after, Plato was considered almost divine. Though a measure of his importance, this led to the invention of many tall tales about him-both by those who adored him and his detractors. In this first ever full-length portrait of Plato, Robin Waterfield steers a judicious course among these stories, debunking some while accepting the kernels of truth in others. He explains why Plato chose to write dialogues rather than treatises and gives an overview of the subject matter of all of Plato's books. Clearly and engagingly written throughout, **PLATO OF ATHENS** is the perfect introduction to the man and his work.

Review

"If all Western philosophy is as has been claimed a series of footnotes to Plato of Athens, it's fortunate indeed that all his dialogues have survived and attracted translators and interpreters of the caliber of Robin Waterfield. Brilliant, witty, profound--and perplexing: Plato's all those and more (a uniquely resonant stylist too), and it's no mean tribute both to him and to the author to say that Robin Waterfield has done him justice." -- Paul Cartledge, author of *Thebes: The Forgotten City of Ancient Greece*

"Whitehead once characterized the history of Western philosophy as a series of footnotes to Plato. Here, at last, we have an authoritative body text for the man himself. 'No philosopher,' Waterfield writes, 'is as accessible to non-specialists as Plato.' The same can be said for this remarkable, impeccably researched biography" -- M. D. Usher, author of *Plato's Pigs and Other Ruminations*

"Writing a biography of Plato is a tricky endeavor, to say the least. Robin Waterfield nonetheless succeeds in delivering a gripping, plausible, and enlightening portrait. Those new to Plato as well as seasoned scholars will come away from Plato of Athens not only with as rounded a picture of Plato the man as may be possible, but also with an excellent sense of his philosophy and the historical times in which he lived and with which he engaged." -- Iakovos Vasiliou, author of *Aiming at Virtue in Plato*

CONTENTS

The prospect of writing a biography of Plato is daunting, and many have judged it a lost cause. The sources are mostly thin and unreliable, the information sporadic and often uncertain, the chronology of his written works impossible to determine with precision. No official Athenian documents survive that mention him. Moreover, Plato hardly refers to himself in the dialogues (as his written works are called) and never speaks in his own name. Nevertheless, as I hope this book demonstrates, a book- length treatment is both possible and desirable. As well as unearthing biographical details, one has to delve into many areas that have the potential fundamentally to impact what one thinks of Plato, such as: What kind of writer was he? How should we read the dialogues he wrote? Is what we call "Platonism" true to its origins? Plato is a household name— a

rare status for a philosopher— and he effectively invented the discipline we call philosophy. It would be good to gain some idea of the man himself.

Naturally, many books on Plato start with a chapter or a few paragraphs on his life, but, as far as I am aware, the last dedicated biography in English of any length was published in 1839, when B. B. Edwards translated the Life of Plato by Wilhelm Tennemann and included it in his and E. A. Park's Selections from German Literature. The book you hold in your hands shares with this predecessor little except a critical approach. That is, I do not just write down "facts" and conclusions but also to a certain extent, suitable for a book designed for a general audience, explain what the evidence is and how I understand it, because nothing is uncontroversial in Plato studies. But otherwise my book is different in that it ranges wider and is longer than Edwards's fifty- six pages. And since the main fact about Plato's life is that he was a writer, my book will also serve as an introduction to his work. I do mean "introduction": finer points of interpretation and philosophical complexities play no part, and I have toed a fairly conservative line on most issues that exercise interpreters of Plato. This is not a book about Plato's philosophy but about Plato, though, as a biography of a philosopher, references to aspects of his thought are inevitable. But I focus more on general characteristics than the particulars and the ever- contended details. I am more likely to tantalize readers with suggestive and intriguing ideas of Plato's than elaborate them or spell out their pros and cons.

After about 2,400 years, Plato's books have scarcely aged; they are as brilliant, witty, profound, and perplexing as they have always been. Most of them are not only inspired but inspiring; they are very enjoyable to read, and even the few drier ones contain ingenious and delightful passages. No philosopher is as accessible to non- specialists as Plato. I hope that this book will stimulate readers to turn next to reading the dialogues themselves and to find out more about Plato's work. To this end, I have appended a fairly long bibliography. In terms of my personal biography, the book is a kind of summation, the fruit of many years of thinking and writing about Plato (not that he has always been my exclusive focus). Almost the first article I had published, more than forty years ago, was on the chronology of Plato's dialogues— a topic that, naturally, has exercised me in this biography. So, although I now disagree with the thesis of that article, the book completes a circle for me.

***

Plato's importance as a philosopher is universally acknowledged. He was the first Western thinker systematically to address issues that still exercise philosophers today in fields such as metaphysics, epistemology, political theory, jurisprudence and penology, ethics, science, religion, language, art and aesthetics, friendship, and love. He was the heir to a long tradition of thinking about the world and its inhabitants, but the use he made of this inheritance was original. In effect, he invented philosophy, and he did so at a time when there was little vocabulary or framework for doing so— no words for "universal," "attribute," "abstract," and so on. Moreover, he founded a school, the Academy, which was dedicated not just to philosophy, but to scientific research and practical politics, and fostered thinkers of the stature of Aristotle and Eudoxus, whose multiple influences

on subsequent thinkers were profound. The Academy taught philosophy and encouraged research for almost a thousand years, a span still unsurpassed by any other educational establishment in the West.

The range of topics Plato addressed, the depth with which he addressed them, and the boldness of his theories are astonishing. It is not just that he raised questions that still provoke us, but he also asked, as a philosopher must, whether it is possible to come up with secure answers to the questions, and even whether knowledge is possible at all. He was concerned not just with conclusions but with how we reach them. He had certain definite doctrines, or theories perhaps, but even they might find themselves tested in the dialogues. This sense of philosophy as an ongoing quest is one of the most attractive features of his work. What is more, these ideas are generally presented in a way that is accessible to every intelligent reader because Plato's brilliance as a philosopher was matched by his talent as a writer. In later centuries, many thinkers have written philosophical dialogues, but none of those dialogues has captured the fluency and conversational realism of Plato's work at its best.

I said just now that Plato raised questions that still provoke us, but the "us" in that sentence consists chiefly of practicing philosophers. It is more to the point to say that he raised questions that should still provoke us— all of us, not just philosophers. In a world in which even liberal democracies can be distorted by fanatical, incompetent, and emotionally immature leaders, should we perhaps not pay more attention to Plato's prescriptions for turning out political leaders who are both competent and principled? In a world in which information and misinformation are more widespread than ever before, especially thanks to social media and the Internet, should we not reconsider Plato's insistence that our actions should be based on knowledge, not belief or opinion? When many perpetuators of popular culture drag us down to the level of the lowest common denominator, let's reflect on Plato's reasons for loathing both trivialization and the unthinking acceptance of ideas and practices even when they are widely sanctioned by society. Plato was an idealist in that he believed that perfection, or at least a far better state of affairs, is achievable in every area of human life, starting with personal reformation. Should we not similarly devote our energies to improving ourselves and the world around us, so that each generation bequeaths to the next conditions that are healthier and more sustainable than what went before?

Plato's work generated discussion and responses throughout antiquity and in every generation since. There is still such an enormous output of scholarly books and articles every year that it would take more than a single lifetime to master all the publications and all the languages required to read them. He is read and studied in, I dare say, every country in the world. The indexes of a good proportion of the nonfiction books on any reader's shelf will have an entry for Plato.

Plato was not just important but super- important. And so he has been judged by some of the greatest intellects of recent times.

Perhaps the most famous such assessment is that of the English philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1861– 1947), who wrote in Process and Reality, published in 1929: "The safest general

characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." I believe this to be correct, in the sense that Plato invented what we call the discipline of philosophy, though like all great thinkers and innovators, he also built on the work of his predecessors. He could have echoed Isaac Newton: "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants."

But let's be clear on what Whitehead was saying: every great Western thinker, from Aristotle onward, has been indebted to Plato. Aristotle's debts are more close and obvious than those of, say, Judith Butler, but the foundations of even Butler's work were laid down by Plato. If the mark of genius, rather than merely great intelligence, is that the field in which the person works is forever changed, or a new field created, then Plato was a genius. In saying that he invented philosophy, Whitehead and I are not saying that he got everything right. Of course not: that would make all subsequent philosophy even more of a waste of time than many people already think it is! And in any case, it is the job of philosophy to inquire, more than it is to come up with solutions. Plato launched philosophical investigation.

Whitehead's estimation of Plato is so famous that it has long had the status of a cliché. But it is not commonly noted that Whitehead was preceded on the other side of the Atlantic by Ralph Waldo Emerson, leader of the Transcendentalists. Whitehead was ensconced within the establishment, while Emerson was more of an outsider; perhaps this is why the latter's saying has been forgotten. "Out of Plato," Emerson said, in his chapter on Plato in Representative Men (1876), "come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought." We note his "all things," a measure of Plato's great importance.

I could add testimonials from many others, such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770– 1831), who said in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy that Plato and Aristotle "above all others deserve to be called the teachers of the human race." I could add testimonials from thinkers and commentators of our own time, but it is the way of things that current philosophers and scholars have not yet passed the test of time and attained the stature of Whitehead, Emerson, and others. So I rest my case on these quotations from earlier thinkers, and on the fact that Republic at least, and often more of Plato's works, are invariably included in the canon of Great Books of the World. Nor is this reverence for his books a new phenomenon. Most ancient Greek literature has been lost, sometimes by accident, but more often because it was felt to be not worth preserving, in the sense that, in the centuries before the invention of the printing press, no one was asking scribes to make copies. Yet we have the complete set of Plato's dialogues; not a single word that he published has been lost. Every generation of readers in antiquity and the Middle Ages felt that Plato's work was worth preserving.

In short, without Plato, European culture would be poorer, or at least it would have had to struggle to attain the same richness. Plato cannot be dismissed as just a dead white male. It is safe to say that, apart from the Bible, no body of written work has had such an impact on the Western world as Plato's dialogues. Over the centuries, Platonism has reappeared in some form or other in philosophical contexts— in much early Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thought; in the ideas of the

Cambridge Platonists such as Henry More and Ralph Cudworth; in the slightly later seventeenth-century dispute between John Locke and Gottfried Leibniz; even in the late nineteenth- century "Platonism" of Gottlob Frege's mathematical philosophy. But that is not my point, which is that Plato bears some responsibility for forming and tuning the way all of us think, whatever our gender, skin color, cultural background, or philosophical or political affiliation. In saying this, I am not promoting the chauvinistic notion that the only discipline worthy of the name "philosophy" is the Western version, founded by Plato; but I am saying that, whether or not we know it, our minds have been affected by him. Moreover, I have suggested that he still has important lessons for us—that he should continue to affect the way we think about many of the issues that currently trouble or perplex us. This book, then, attempts to contextualize the work of this important thinker and to uncover as much as possible what else he did other than write books. <>

ARISTOTELES, › POETIK‹: EINLEITUNG, TEXT, ÜBERSETZUNG UND KOMMENTAR. MIT EINEM ANHANG: TEXTE ZUR ARISTOTELISCHEN LITERATURTHEORIE 2 volumes (ARISTOTLE, "POETICS": INTRODUCTION, TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND COMMENTARY; WITH AN APPENDIX: TEXTS ON ARISTOTELIAN LITERARY THEORY) by Martin Hose [Sammlung wissenschaftlicher Commentare (SWC), De Gruyter, 9783110703191] Text in German, Greek, Latin.

Aristoteles' Poetik ist der vielleicht wichtigste antike literaturtheoretische Text; er entwickelt und begründet erstmals den Begriff 'Poesie', definiert insbesondere Tragödie und Epos als Gattungen und liefert Kriterien, wie die Qualität von Poesie beurteilt werden kann. Der Text der Poetik wird seit Beginn der modernen Philologie intensiv analysiert und interpretiert: Für die Textgestalt und die teilweise schwierig zu verstehenden einzelnen Partien sind insbesondere in jüngerer Zeit erhebliche Forschungsfortschritte zu verzeichnen: Die Überlieferung ist durch die Neubewertung einer wichtigen Handschrift (B) und der arabischen Übersetzung neu geklärt, für zentrale Partien und Konzepte liegen bedeutende neue Verstehensvorschläge vor. Das vorliegende Buch will dies durch einen neu konstituierten Text, eine textnahe Übersetzung und einen philologischen Kommentar zur Darstellung bringen. In einem Anhang werden Partien zweisprachig vorgelegt und kommentiert, die für die Rekonstruktion des verlorenen Teils der Poetik relevant sind.

[This volume presents a revised Greek text of Aristotle's Poetics, a literal translation, and a commentary that summarizes the philological work that has been conducted

on this central work of ancient literary theory in the last thirty years. An appendix provides bilingual fragments (some of them recently discovered) and other ancient and Byzantine texts that are relevant to the reconstruction of the lost part of the Poetics.

Aristotle's Poetics is perhaps the most important ancient text on literary theory; he developed and founded the term 'poetry' for the first time, defined in particular tragedy and epic as genres and provided criteria for assessing the quality of poetry. The text of the Poetics has been intensively analyzed and interpreted since the beginning of modern philology: Considerable research progress has been made, particularly in recent times, on the form of the text and the individual passages that are sometimes difficult to understand: the transmission has been confirmed by the re-evaluation of an important manuscript (B) and the Arabic translation has been clarified, there are significant new suggestions for understanding central parts and concepts. This book wants to present this through a newly constituted text, a translation close to the text and a philological commentary. In an appendix, games relevant to the reconstruction of the lost part of the Poetics are presented and commented on in two languages.]

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

BAND 1

Vorrede

EINLEITUNG

1. Der Ort der Poetik in der griechischen Literaturgeschichte

2. Aufbau und Schlüsselbegriffe der Poetik

3. Die Poetik im Kontext des Corpus Aristotelicum

4. Die Datierung der Poetik und ihr Verhältnis zu Platons Dialogen

5. Die Leistungsfähigkeit und die Defizite der Poetik

6. Die griechische Literaturkritik und -theorie nach Aristoteles' Poetik

7. Überlieferung und Textgestaltung der Poetik

Text und Übersetzung

Kommentar

BAND 2

ANHANG

1. Einleitung

2. Aristoteles' Dialog Über Dichter – Περὶ ποιητῶν

3. TEXTE ZUR ARISTOTELISCHEN LITERATURTHEORIE

Einführung Wie aus dem Vorausgehenden deutlich geworden ist

Text 1: Der Tractatus Coislinianus

Text 2–4: Prolegomena Περὶ κωμῳδίας VI, VII, Xd

Text 5: Platonios

Text 6: Prolegomenon Περὶ κωμῳδίας III. Über die Komödie (p.7–11 Koster)

[CONTENTS

Das hier vorgelegte Buch hat eine dienende Funktion: es soll das Verständnis der Aristotelischen Poetik fördern, eines Textes, dessen Bedeutung für die Literaturwissenschaft nicht eigens herausgestellt werden muss.

Der Weg, der hierbei beschritten wird, bedarf einer kurzen Erläuterung. Im Zentrum soll der Text der Poetik stehen,' zu dem die Einleitung hinführt, der mit einem knappen kritischen Apparat ediert, übersetzt sowie schließlich kommentiert wird. Diese Erschließung der Poetik hat durchaus ihre Berechtigung, hat doch die Konstitution des Textes durch Neubewertungen der Überlieferungsträger wichtige neue Impulse erhalten. Dass der neu erarbeitete Text hier zudem übersetzt wird, mag begründungsbedürftig erscheinen, liegt doch die Publikation einer neuen Übersetzung (Schmitt 2008, mit ausführlichem Kommentar) erst wenige Jahre zurück.

Jedoch handelt es sich bei dieser wie auch bei den älteren Übertragungen von Olof Gigon (1950/1961), Walter Schönherr/Ernst Günther Schmidt (1960/1972) oder Manfred Fuhrmann (1976/1982) um Zielsprachen-orientierte Übersetzungen, die einen gut lesbaren, dabei jedoch auch geglätteten deutschen Text bieten.z Die hier neben den griechischen Text gestellte deutsche Version hat dagegen das Ziel, den griechischen Text — soweit noch bei angemessenem Deutsch möglich — in seinen spezifischen Schwierigkeiten zu übertragen und damit eine Art ersten Kommentars zu liefern. In der eigentlichen Kommentierung soll der griechische Text auch philologisch erläutert werden (aufgrund der Zielsetzung der Reihe, in der Schmitt

2008 erschienen ist, war dies Schmitt nicht möglich; die letzte im engeren Sinn philologische Kommentierung ist inzwischen über 5o Jahre alt: Lucas 1968; der letzte deutschsprachige philologische Kommentar ist sogar vor über 85 Jahren erschienen: Gudeman 1934).

Der Text der Poetik ist ein Fragment: das zweite Buch, das offenbar die Komödie (und vielleicht den Iambos) diskutierte, ist verloren. Indes: Wie spurlos ist dieses Buch verloren? In jüngerer Zeit sind bedeutsame Versuche unternommen worden, für das zweite Buch spätantike bzw. byzantinische Traktate als Zusammenfassungen oder Fragmente in Anspruch zu nehmen, und zudem bietet sich die Perspektive, aus neu edierten Philodem-Papyri aus Herculaneum neue Fragmente der Aristoteles-Schrift über die Dichter zu gewinnen, einer Schrift, die offenbar in auf ein größeres Lesepublikum hin berechneter Form über dieselben literaturkritischen und -theo-retischen Probleme handelte wie die Poetik. Hier ist die Forschung noch im Fluss. Es scheint jedoch der Mühe wert, auch diese immer wieder mit der Aristotelischen Literaturtheorie in Verbindung gebrachten Texte zweisprachig vorzulegen und wenigstens knapp zu erläutern, um der nicht-gräzistischen Literaturwissenschaft das Material zur eigenen Beurteilung zur Verfügung zu stellen. Dies soll der Anhang dieses Buches leisten….

Der Ort der Poetik in der griechischen Literaturgeschichte

Aristoteles' Poetik ist zwar vielleicht die bedeutendste literaturtheoretische Schrift der griechischen Literatur, doch steht sie, wie könnte es anders sein, in einer weit zurückreichenden Tradition der Reflexion über Literatur, die bereits mit den frühesten Werken dieser Literatur beginnt, den homerischen Epen. Dass die griechische Kultur so intensiv über ihre Literatur nachdachte und sich wiederholt Rechenschaft gab (und dies in einem Umfang und in einer Qualität, die in anderen Kulturen des Altertums mit Literaturproduktion nicht zu finden ist), verdankt sich einer Konstellation von Faktoren, die für die Genese einer veritablen Literaturtheorie günstig war. Diese Faktoren lassen sich mit den Stichworten ‚Konkurrenz' bzw. ‚Atonalität` „Intensität` und ‚Schriftlichkeit` charakterisieren.

Doch stellt die Poetik nicht nur eine literaturtheoretische Schrift dar, sondern gibt sich formal als, als eine, Dichtungs- Technik'. Mit dem Terminus Tim pflegt die griechische Sprache eine zunächst ‚praktisch' gedachte Fähigkeit in einem bestimmten Bereich zu bezeichnen, die auf Erfahrungen und Regeln basiert. Sowohl die demgemäß sachgemäße Handhabung einer Materie oder eines bestimmten Bereichs wie auch, in übertragenem Sinn, das Wissen um diese Handhabung kann mit bezeichnet werden. Die Vermittlung derartigen Erfahrungswissens erfolgte in der griechischen Kultur der Archaik einerseits durch mündliche Weitergabe, andererseits durch ‚Musterstücke' der betreffenden Techne. Seit dem 5. Jh., wiederum als Folge der sich intensivierenden Buchkultur, zeigt sich eine Tendenz, Technai als immer

deutlicher systematisch angelegte Lehrbücher zu vermitteln. In diesen Kontext stellt sich damit die Poetik als (dazu unten 1.2.).

Summa summarum kann man also festhalten, dass in der griechischen Kultur eine beachtliche Kontinuität der praktizierten wie auch reflektierten Literaturkritik zu erkennen ist, die sich im 5. Jh. zumal an einem Ort wie Athen verdichtete, der durch seine Festkultur vielfältige Notwendigkeiten zur Beurteilung von Poesie (die damit zudem per se als wichtig definiert war) geschaffen hatte und der zudem zu einem Zentrum geworden war, das Intellektuelle aus der gesamten griechischen Welt anzog. Kennzeichen der Literaturkritik am Ende des 5. Jh. ist dabei jedoch auch eine Fülle von ‚Einzelfällen', die dem Urteil überstellt werden: Einzelfälle im Sinn von Entscheidungen in konkreten Wettbewerben über bestimmte Dichter oder Einzelfälle als Fragen wie: Sind bestimmte Wörter bei Homer oder anderen Dichtern ‚richtig'? Ist Aischylos oder Euripides der bessere Dichter? Ansätze zu einer Generalisierung der Kritik sind erkennbar, wenn — wie in Aristophanes' Fröschen — die Frage gestellt werden kann, was der Zweck von Dichtung sei. Von hier aus sind zwei Möglichkeiten eröffnet, weiter über die Dichtung nachzudenken: Man kann im Horizont der Zweckbestimmung des späten 5. Jh. (d.h. der ‚aristophanischen' Zweckbestimmung) verharren und von da aus fragen, ob Dichtung diesem Zweck gerecht werden kann — dies ist der Weg, den Platon im Staat beschreitet; oder man kann die Zweckbestimmung selbst hinterfragen und daran eine Analyse knüpfen, was eigentlich gute Dichtung ist — dies ist, wie wir sehen werden, der Weg der Poetik. <>

Translation:

The book presented here has a serving function: it is intended to promote the understanding of Aristotelian Poetics, a text whose importance for literary studies does not need to be specifically emphasized.

The path that is followed here requires a brief explanation. The focus should be on the text of the Poetics', to which the introduction leads, which is edited with a brief critical apparatus, translated and finally commented on. This opening up of the poetics is certainly justified, since the constitution of the text has received important new impulses through re-evaluations of the bearers of tradition. The fact that the newly compiled text is also translated here may seem justified, given that a new translation (Schmitt 2008, with detailed commentary) was only published a few years ago.

However, like the older translations by Olof Gigon (1950/1961), Walter Schönherr/Ernst Günther Schmidt (1960/1972) or Manfred Fuhrmann (1976/1982), this is a target-language-oriented translation that makes for an easily readable , but also offer anti-aliased German text. The German version placed here next to the Greek text, on the other hand, has the aim of translating the Greek text - as far as

this is still possible with appropriate German - in its specific difficulties and thus providing a kind of first commentary. In the actual commentary, the Greek text should also be explained philologically (due to the objective of the series in which Schmitt appeared in 2008, this was not possible for Schmitt; the last philological commentary in the narrower sense is now more than 50 years old: Lucas 1968; der last German-language philological commentary appeared more than 85 years ago: Gudeman 1934).

The text of the Poetics is a fragment: the second book, which apparently discussed the comedy (and perhaps the iambos), is lost. However, how completely lost is this book? More recently, significant attempts have been made to use late antique or Byzantine tracts as summaries or fragments for the second book, and there is also the prospect of new fragments of Aristotle's writings on the To win poets, a writing that apparently dealt with the same literary-critical and theoretical problems as Poetics in a form calculated for a larger readership. Research is still in progress here. However, it seems worthwhile to present these texts, which are repeatedly associated with Aristotelian literary theory, in two languages and at least to explain them briefly in order to provide non-Greek literary scholars with the material for their own assessment. This is what the appendix to this book aims to do….

The Place of Poetics in Greek Literary History

While Aristotle's Poetics is perhaps the most important literary-theoretical work in Greek literature, it stands, how could it be otherwise, in a long tradition of reflection on literature that begins with the earliest works of this literature, the Homeric epics. The fact that Greek culture reflected so intensely and repeatedly on its literature (and did so on a scale and in a quality not found in other ancient cultures that produced literature) is due to a constellation of factors that genesis of a veritable theory of literature was favourable. These factors can be characterized with the keywords 'competition' or 'atonality', 'intensity' and 'literacy'.

However, the Poetics does not only represent a literary-theoretical writing, but formally presents itself as a 'poetry technique'. The Greek language uses the term Tim to designate an initially 'practical' ability in a specific area, which is based on experience and rules. Both the appropriate handling of a matter or a specific area as well as, in a figurative sense, the knowledge of this handling can be designated as . In the Archaic Greek culture, such experiential knowledge was conveyed on the one hand by oral transmission and on the other hand by 'patterns' of the relevant techne. Since the 5th century, again as a result of the intensifying book culture, there has been a tendency to teach technai as textbooks that are more and more systematically structured. In this context, poetics is placed as (on this below 1.2.).

All in all, one can say that in Greek culture a remarkable continuity of practiced and reflected literary criticism can be seen, which in the 5th century intensified in a place like Athens, which, due to its festival culture, had a variety of needs for the

assessment of poetry (which was also defined as important per se) and which had also become a center that attracted intellectuals from all over the Greek world. However, a characteristic of literary criticism at the end of the 5th century is a wealth of 'individual cases' that are subject to judgment: Individual cases in the sense of decisions in specific competitions about certain poets or individual cases as questions such as: Are certain words in Homer or other poets 'right'? Is Aeschylus or Euripides the better poet? Approaches to a generalization of the critique are recognizable when—as in Aristophanes' Frogs—the question can be asked what the purpose of poetry is. From here, two possibilities are opened up for thinking further about poetry: one can stay within the horizon of late fifth-century purpose (i.e., the 'Aristophanic' purpose) and ask from there whether poetry can do justice to that purpose—this is the way that Plato treads in the state; or one can question the purpose itself and tie it to an analysis of what good poetry actually is—this, as we shall see, is the way of poetics. <>

THE INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL ORIGINS OF CHAÏM PERELMAN AND LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA'S NEW RHETORIC PROJECT: COMMENTARIES ON AND TRANSLATIONS OF SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL ARTICLES, 7933–7958 edited by Michelle Bolduc, David A. Frank [Studies in the History of Rhetoric, Brill, 9789004528970]

Chaïm Perelman, alone, and in collaboration with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, developed the New Rhetoric Project, which is in use throughout the world. This book offers the first deep contextualization of the project's origins and original translations of their work from French into English.

Chaïm Perelman, alone, and in collaboration with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, developed the New Rhetoric Project (NRP), which is in use throughout the world. Sir Brian Vickers, in his historical survey of rhetoric and philosophy for the Oxford Encyclopaedia of Rhetoric, states that the NRP is "one of the most influential modern formulations of rhetorical theory." This book provides the first deep contextualization of the project's origins, offers seven original translations of the writings of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca from French into English, and details how their collaboration effectively addresses then philosophical problems of our age.

CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
Introduction: Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric Project (NRP) "The Single Most Important Event in Contemporary Rhetorical Theory"

Chaïm Perelman (1912–1984), a Belgian Jew, achieved global recognition as a scholar in the humanities. He was also celebrated for his leadership of the Jewish underground in Belgium during World War II, an experience central to the purpose of his scholarship, which was to redeem reason and civil society in the wake of war and genocide. After the war, Perelman alone, and in collaboration with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1926–1994), wrote more than 350 books, book chapters, and essays outlining a vision of rhetoric as an answer to the post-war "crisis of reason".

Perelman, alone and with Olbrechts-Tyteca who joined him in 1946, sought to answer the question: How can humans reason about values and cultivate a moral civil society in the aftermath of the Holocaust, World War II, and the absence of absolutes? Their answer was to develop a new rhetoric, or what we term the New Rhetoric Project [NRP]. The NRP was initiated by Perelman in his 1933 article "De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance" [On the Arbitrary in Knowledge], crystallized by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in their 1958 magnum opus, Le Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique [The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation], and brought to a finale in their 1983 contribution to a special issue of a Swiss journal dedicated to reviewing the influence of Vilfredo Pareto in the study of argumentation and their work sixty years after his death.

Sir Brian Vickers, in his historical survey of rhetoric and philosophy for the Oxford Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, states that the NRP is "one of the most influential modern formulations of rhetorical theory;" it is the only twentieth-century rhetoric mentioned in the entry. The University of Chicago's Wayne Booth, in his Rhetoric of Rhetoric, writes that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, with the publication of the Traité (and its translation a decade later into English as The New Rhetoric), launched a "major revolution" with "an amazingly deep, rich, all-inclusive exploration of rhetorical resources, both from classical giants, especially Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and from Renaissance anti-Cartesians on to 1969". Relative to the other twentieth-century rhetorics of I. A. Richards, Kenneth Burke, and others, Booth found Perelman's work (and that with Olbrechts-Tyteca) to be the "most complex effort to explore all the rhetorical resources for combating 'absolutism' and 'Cartesian' and 'views of truth'". James Crosswhite suggests that the New Rhetoric project is "the single most important event in contemporary rhetorical theory". Many European philosophers, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and Jacques Lacan, engaged with the NRP.

In our study of the NRP, we build on the insights that Christian Delacampagne made in his A History of Philosophy in the Twentieth Century.10 Delacampagne insists that the major philosophical movements in the twentieth century are products of history and culture. The material and cultural devastation left in the aftermath of World War I an intellectual crisis: reason had failed to prevent war, genocide, and the death of over 100 million people. European and Belgian intellectuals responded to this crisis with a host of philosophical balms, including logical positivism, existentialism, phenomenology, and Marxism.

Central to this crisis was Perelman's status as a Jew and that of the Jewish people in Europe. Reason did not prevent the rise of eliminationist antisemitism and the Holocaust, leading Delacampagne to argue that it is "[p]recisely because it constitutes the ultimate scandal of reason, the Nazi genocide forces us today to consider the Jewish question as the "turning point in history'".11 Toward the end of creating a civil society anchored in reason, accepting of the value diversity representing pluralism, and the lived experience of European Jews, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca established reason and justice as the polar stars of the NRP, a justice achieved through informal reason expressed through argumentation and rhetoric. The time period considered in this volume was dominated by the questions raised in philosophy by logical positivism and the threat to life posed by totalitarianism.

Those who founded logical positivism and empiricism held that they were "integral to the struggle against fascism" as they "represented Enlightenment values of reason and progress, sense against nonsense, truth against fiction".12 Perelman's agenda, from the beginning, was to extend reason beyond the spheres of sense and truth to include values, a topic that logical positivism and empiricism of this period defined as the realm of the irrational, without meaning. As Edmonds writes,

> Logical positivists held that in the end, there is nothing we can do to reconcile our disagreement, and there is nothing to be gained by my claiming that my values are true and yours false. We may simply have to live with our difference of opinion. … It is perfectly legitimate for me to posit ethical judgments, so long as I acknowledge that they do not belong in the same category as empirical statements.

We see Perelman struggling with these constraints. He agrees with and is committed to Enlightenment values of reason, but he resists the boundaries placed on reason by logical positivism. Values must be seen as reflections of reason, Perelman would later maintain, if fascism and totalitarianism are to be contained and defeated. Rhetoric and argumentation would, for Perelman, become the logic of ethical judgments.

Perelman, the budding philosopher, made an audacious debut at age 21 in 1933 when he confronts the problem of modality in his initial two scholarly articles.14 Modality in logic hosts claims of necessity and possibility, which can suggest that there are different modes and expressions of reason.15 In the tradition of logical positivism, modalism is either rejected completely, with reason limited to deduction and a logic of necessity, or severely restricted in its scope.16 In his earliest scholarship, Perelman embraces the coherence of logic, but he seeks its freedom from necessity and the arbitrary. However, during the decade of the 1930s, he nevertheless studies logic and reason within the worldview of those who subscribed to a version of positivism that embraces necessity and the arbitrary.

Over the course of Perelman's scholarly career, he would develop the modal logic of possibility and probability, which led him back to Aristotle, the father of Western logic. Aristotle had distinguished two forms of reason, analytic and dialectic, the former characterized by necessity and deduction, the latter by probability and rhetoric. The trajectory of Perelman's scholarship alone and with Olbrechts-Tyteca climaxes in the Traité with its goal of "breaking" with the Enlightenment's restrictive definition of reason, which limited it to the necessary, and effected a "rapprochement" between analytical and dialogical reasoning. As we will see, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also broke from their understanding of Aristotle's view of reason and rhetoric.

The NRP's take on justice, reason, and rhetoric remains an important influence on studies of law, ontology, epistemology, axiology, and argumentation, as well as in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. John Rawls, in his Theory of Justice, cites Perelman's 1945 De la justice, which Perelman wrote while in hiding from the Nazis and leading the Belgian Jewish underground (Le Comité de défense des Juifs, or CDJ).17 Oxford's H. L. A. Hart celebrated Perelman's scholarship. More recently, the NRP is seen as influential in contemporary Arab, Korean, Spanish, and Israeli

scholarship.19 Judges in Poland continue to cite the NRP in their legal rulings.20 Scholars in the English-speaking world make use of the NRP to study law, political communication, math, and a host of topics across the spectrums of humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences.

Between 1931 and 1947, Perelman set forth the questions at the center of the project, writing 50 articles and one book before Olbrechts-Tyteca joined him in 1947. In the period between 1947 and 1958, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca wrote 15 articles and two books to develop the NRP.23 Olbrechts-Tyteca would, after 1958, write two articles and one book, making use of the theories outlined in the NRP. Perelman would write over 200 articles and four books on his own between 1958 and his death in 1984 that defend, extend, and refine the themes of the NRP.

A vast number of the articles belonging to the NRP, which offer important and original insights on NRP's rhetorical theory, remain in French. Scholars and readers lacking access to the NRP's original French must rely on only four volumes containing essays of English translations: The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (1963), The New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and its Applications (1979), Justice, Law and Argument (1980), and The Realm of Rhetoric (1982).24 These volumes are foundational for scholars from wide-ranging disciplines, including rhetorical history, communication, philosophy, legal studies, religious studies, literary criticism, the history of ideas, mathematics, the history of science, women's studies, and history. However, these volumes contain only translations of articles written after 1958 and do not offer an account of the origins or beginnings of the NRP; furthermore, these volumes lack both commentaries and translator notes to explain difficult concepts and to clarify the specific sociohistorical and cultural context in which Perelman (and Olbrechts-Tyteca) were working, which would enrich the reading experience.

Some of the existing English translations of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's oeuvre are flawed, leading to misreadings and misleading interpretations of the NRP. Our translations and commentaries intend to fill a historical vacuum in the study of the NRP, making them accessible and readily available to the English-speaking reader. Even scholars with a command of French have not read the totality of the texts that make up the NRP, which prevents an appreciation of the diachronic development of its approach.

Our work answers criticisms of the NRP made by some modern critics who have not plumbed the intellectual and cultural depths of the NRP. Alan Gross and Ray Dearin note that "while there has been some useful exegesis in English, most of it merely perpetuates misunderstandings that stem from superficial acquaintance beyond recovery in dusty and largely unread periodical volumes". Gross and Dearin are right; far too many commentaries by English-speaking readers of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca betray and distort their analysis. Gross and Dearin are also right when they point to the articles Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca wrote offering explanations and embellishments of their central ideas that were not included in the Traité and that can be found in "unread periodical volumes".

Gross and Dearin are mistaken, however, when they write that there are but a "few articles" that could help illuminate the NRP.26 Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca's Traité was the result of a ten-

year collaboration, one that sought to set forth a system of argumentation designed to persuade embodied audiences. According to Perelman's daughter, Noemi Perelman Mattis, the final product was over 2,000 pages; the press required the collaborators to condense it to 734 pages. The rather underdeveloped, elliptical writing in Traité may thus be due to space limitations. Concurrent with the 1958 publication of Traité, Perelman alone and with Olbrechts-Tyteca published articles on the relationship between thought and action (Perelman, "Rapports théoriques de la pensée et de l'action"), classical and romantic topoi in argument (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, "Classicisme et romantisme"), pragmatic argument (Perelman, "L'argument pragmatique"), and the role of time in argumentation (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, "De la temporalité comme caractère de l'argumentation").

We have identified many articles that precede, appear alongside, and postdate the Traité that shed expository light on the NRP's central concepts. We have dusted off Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's unread articles, translated them into English (several of them here for the first time), and have provided commentaries specially written for this volume that situate these articles in their historical contexts. Our studies of the NRP, which include its history and cultural context, should provide the English-speaking reader with a better understanding of the historical origins and intentions of the key terms and arguments in the NRP, which have, far too often, been misunderstood by those who have not had access to adequate English translations and to the rich, multilingual cultural and political environment of the NRP.

We have studied the Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca collaboration in depth, conducted exhaustive research in the Perelman archives at the Université Libre de Bruxelles [ULB], the United States Holocaust Museum, and engaged in extensive interviews with Perelman's daughter, Noemi Perelman Mattis, and other contemporaries. We have also read the exchanges between Perelman and Hans Georg Gadamer, Richard McKeon, Norberto Bobbio, and many other prominent intellectuals contained in letters and philosophical society reports held in the archives, which have provided us with insight on the development of his thought.

Our archival research has allowed us to read first drafts of the articles that we have translated into English for the first time, lecture notes, and unpublished manuscripts. We have consulted the notebooks that Perelman kept between 1934 and 1948, which record the philosophical and rhetorical texts with which Perelman was engaged while at the early stages of his research on logic and rhetoric. These materials reveal the cultural and philosophical context in which the NRP was developed and provide the foundation for our translations and commentaries. We dedicate our commentaries and translations of the NRP to English-reading scholars and societies seeking to cultivate reason-based decision-making.

The Contribution of Translations and Commentaries on the NRP

Scholars from many disciplines and countries continue to turn to the NRP for insight on rhetorical theory and behavior. Our translations and commentaries of two of the NRP's keystone articles have been recently cited by two important scholars: James Crosswhite, Deep Rhetoric: Philosophy, Reason, Violence, Justice, Wisdom (Chicago, 2013) and Christopher Tindale, The Philosophy of

Argument and Audience Reception (Cambridge, 2015).28 Crosswhite draws heavily on our translation of and commentary on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's 1958 article on time in argumentation to develop the theme of his book.29 Tindale makes use of our translation of Perelman's 1949 article on "regressive philosophy" in order to anchor his appropriation of Perelman's thought.30 Our work in translating and commenting upon these early articles has also led to Bolduc's recent major work, Translation and the Rediscovery of Rhetoric.

We anticipate that scholars will welcome and draw from The Intellectual and Cultural Origins of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric Project. We translate the most significant pieces of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's work that remain in French, providing them with necessary contextualizations; we also aim to correct misunderstandings that derive from mistranslations. In 2014, we received a major National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Grant that has allowed us to complete a contextually sensitive series of translations and commentaries on the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. The present volume, one product of the NEH, entitled "The Intellectual and Cultural Origins of Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric Project: Commentaries on and Translations of Seven Foundational Articles, 1933–1958" ["Origins"] presents the initial phase of our project, featuring seven translations of and commentaries on articles published by Perelman alone and with Olbrechts-Tyteca between 1933 (Perelman's first article) and 1958 (the publication of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's Traité).

Readers of "Origins" will encounter here seven carefully selected translations and accompanying commentaries. They are intended to illuminate six touchstones in the NRP, offering readers insight into the development of the NRP and what these early writings offer to problems faced by contemporaries. These include:

1) The Intellectual Origins of the NRP: Toward a Logic of Values

Perelman, Chaïm "De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance". Archives de la Société Belge de Philosophie 5:3 (1933) 5–44.

This is the first substantive article Perelman wrote in 1933, at age 21, displaying many of the key concepts that would come to populate the NRP. Perelman's agenda, from the beginning, was to find a logic of values, a logic that acknowledged the sociology of knowledge and the need for reason-based judgments.

2) The Cultural Origins of the NRP: The Jewish Question and Double Fidélité

Perelman, Chaïm. "Réflexions sur l'assimilation". La Tribune juive. 31 July 1935. Perelman, Chaïm. "La Question juive". Synthèse 3 (1946) 47–63.

These two articles highlight the Jewish question and Perelman's response to it. Jews could be Belgian and Jewish, subscribing to double fidélité, Perelman argues, which thereby inverts the antisemitic slur of dual loyalty. This is an enactment of his philosophy of pluralism, one informing the NRP.

3) The Ontology and Philosophy of the New Rhetoric: Regression Toward Truth

Perelman, Chaïm. "Philosophies premières et philosophie régressive". Dialectica 3:11 (1949) 175–191.

Written in the aftermath of World War II and as a full professor, this article outlines a mature version of Perelman's views of axiology, epistemology, and ontology. The target of Perelman's system is "regressive" knowledge, which is served by rhetoric, which he mentions briefly.

4) The Debut of the NRP: A Rapprochement between Logic and Rhetoric

Perelman, Chaïm, and Olbrechts-Tyteca. "Logique et rhétorique". Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 140:1–3 (1950) 1–35.

This article, which is the first Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca collaboration, is the blueprint for the Traité-New Rhetoric. The article outlines a realignment and rapprochement of rhetoric and logic, placing them in equal relationship.

5) The Role of Reason in the NRP: Eternal or Temporal

Perelman, Chaïm. "Raison éternelle, raison historique". L'homme et l'histoire. Actes du 6e Congrès des Sociétés de philosophie de langue française. Paris, 1952: 346–354.

Perelman, in search of a logic of values, sought to extend reason into the realm of the temporal, which philosophers had limited to the eternal. This contribution, which is the first citation in the Traité-New Rhetoric, explains this new vision of reason.

6) Time in Argument: Dissociating Values

Perelman, Chaïm and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. "De la temporalité comme caractère de l'argumentation". Archivio di Filosofia 2 (1958) 115–133.

In this article, included in an Italian journal that had dedicated a special issue to the topic of time, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca develop the difference between formal and informal logic. The difference is the role that time plays in both logics and the need to dissociate and reorganize values with argumentation based on this exigence.

These six touchstones will help historians of rhetoric gain a better understanding of the NRP's birth and intellectual trajectories (touchstone one). Scholars of rhetoric, philosophy, and Jewish studies will hear the Jewish voice in the NRP and how it affects the interpretation of the NRP's stance on pluralism and reason (touchstone two). Scholars of rhetorical theory, the history of ideas, and philosophy will find Perelman's essay on first and regressive philosophies to be an enlightening reframing of the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. Perelman's study precedes and complements the work of European scholars newly available to English-speaking audiences on ancient rhetoric, particularly the epideictic (touchstone three).

Scholars who have drawn from the NRP in their research should leave the translation of and commentary on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's debut essay on their New Rhetoric with a much better understanding of the history and intent of their project to bring logic and rhetoric back into alignment (touchstone four). These same scholars should find Perelman's essay on reason and rhetoric illuminating, helping them to avoid misinterpretations of the NRP's take on logic (touchstone five). In addition, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's essay on temporality in argument offers scholars, irrespective of discipline, a surprisingly relevant and philosophical analysis of time,

one that both explains the underlying philosophical intent of the NRP and a framework scholars can use to critique rhetorical behavior (touchstone six).

Translation in/and the New Rhetoric Project

English and North American scholars with a command of French understood the striking breakthroughs made by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and the importance of translating their work into English. Richard McKeon, who served as dean of the humanities division at the University of Chicago, recommended the translation and publication of what would become Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's first article to appear in English in 1951.32 A. J. Ayer, one of the most important analytical philosophers of the twentieth century, translated Perelman's critique of pragmaticism in 1959. The University of Notre Dame's Otto Bird was one of the translators of Perelman's "The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning", published in the Great Ideas Today series by Encyclopedia Britannica. John Wilkinson, who had finished a translation of Jacques Ellul's La technique: L'enjeu du siècle (The Technological Society) in 1964, turned to the task of translating the Traité into English. A professor of philosophy at the University of California at Santa Barbara, and a fellow in the UCSB's Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Wilkinson collaborated with Purcell Weaver, known for his translations of Edmond Bordeaux's Cosmos, Man and Society: A Paneubiotic Synthesis, to move the Traité into English.

Michael Leff called the Wilkinson and Weaver's 1969 English translation of the Traité a "bombshell", a work that affected the trajectory of the humanities in North America. Scholarly audiences have found Wilkinson and Weaver's English translation of the Traité complex and challenging. As Gross and Dearin have observed, "The New Rhetoric [the English translation of the Traité] is difficult to read, a task made even more difficult for North American audiences because virtually all its examples and illustrations are from a literature in a foreign language". Wilkinson and Weaver do not provide commentary to elucidate these numerous references.

Further, as Richard Graff and Wendy Winn have pointed out, "even today many aspects of Perelman's work remain enigmatic". Near the end of his life, Perelman himself lamented in a 1984 article that much of his work remained inaccessible and misunderstood by non-Francophone, and specifically American, rhetoricians; nearly 40 years later, this situation has scarcely changed.

His daughter, Noemi Perelman Mattis, has told us that the 734-page Traité is a 'succinct' version of the NRP. The pages culled from the original 2,000-page manuscript seem to be the basis for two of the articles that appear in this volume. Indeed, several key ideas in the Traité-New Rhetoric that appear enigmatic or provoke misunderstanding are more fully developed in the articles we have translated. Wilkinson and Weaver's 1969 English translation of the Traité lacks an annotated commentary making reference to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's writings between 1931 and 1983. This left readers without competency in French with a weak grasp on many of the NRP's key ideas.

One idea that is as critical to the NRP as it is frequently misunderstood is that of the universal audience. In an article published the year of his death, Perelman pointed out how such scholars as James W. Ray and Laura S. Ede misunderstood the conception of the universal audience in the

Traité, which is due, as we have discovered, to a mistranslation in Wilkinson and Weaver's translation of a key passage concerning the universal audience.42 Readers with knowledge of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's 1950 article, "Logique et rhétorique", which discusses the universal audience, would immediately understand that something was amiss in Wilkinson and Weaver's translation. Translating these pre-1958 articles will provide scholars in English with a better development and embellishment of the key concepts of the NRP, leading to a more refined understanding of the project's presuppositions.

One might argue that scholars of rhetoric and the humanities should not have to read in translation. However, the reality of language learning for graduate degrees in rhetoric and the humanities generally demonstrates the opposite: Foreign language competency is not considered critical to the study of rhetoric, and the products of our doctoral programs in rhetoric are frequently at a beginning level of foreign-language competency. Making the assumption that doctoral students—the future professors of rhetoric and other humanities disciplines—will be able to read these articles in the French original, whose subject matter and stylistics are complex, is idealistic at best. This volume is destined for those scholars who are not well versed in French; moreover, it is also intended for undergraduate students and their teachers in many different fields. The demand for English translations of the NRP is not only felt in rhetoric and communication, for the NRP is finding its way into the citations of social and natural scientists, as these and other scholars transcend disciplinary boundaries.

Salazar has noted that "most of current French writing in rhetoric and philosophy, or philosophy and rhetoric, is unavailable in English". In the case of the NRP, this need for English translations of articles associated with the project was felt as early as 1963, when the first of four collections of NRP articles appeared in English. Despite the publication of these collections in English, misunderstandings of the key ideas of the NRP were common enough for Perelman himself to point them out. The translation of key articles that witness the origins and development of the NRP in this volume may respond to a particularly Anglo-American scholarly demand; furthermore, it is also a thematic well established in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's methodology. That is, as one of us has argued elsewhere, translation is an important feature of the New Rhetoric Project and was of specific interest to its authors.

Few scholars of rhetoric at the time, or today, would imagine that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were active as translators: Perelman was a logician and philosopher, and Olbrechts-Tyteca had a background in statistics and sociology. Translation was nevertheless an important facet of their scholarly work. It may be that Perelman's and Olbrechts-Tyteca's sensitivity to issues of translation was a natural outcome of their multilingual background and their European—specifically, Belgian—context. Perelman, who was born in Poland and emigrated to Belgium as a teenager, spoke numerous languages, including Polish, Yiddish, French, Flemish, German, Italian, and English. We know that Olbrechts-Tyteca read widely in French, German, Italian, and Spanish, and unlike in the Traité, she chose to quote directly from foreign sources in the original in her Comique du discours.

In any case, both Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were very involved in the translation of the works of the NRP. Perelman's correspondence shows him actively seeking to have translations made of his work into numerous languages, including German, Italian, English, Flemish, Japanese, Romanian, and Hebrew. Even one of the very last letters Perelman wrote, some five days before his death, was to Masashi Miwa, in hope that his "Logique juridique" would appear in Japanese. Perelman not only corresponded directly with his translators, offering to be a resource for their practice of translating his work, but he also actively assessed the quality of their translations (see Perelman, letters to Schick; Mayer [October]; Richtscheid; Krawietz). He even corrected the translations of his works, particularly those in German, Italian, and English; in a letter to Norberto Bobbio, for example, we find Perelman suggesting how to translate into Italian a particularly difficult French term. Olbrechts-Tyteca's role in translation was much more hands-on: on at least one occasion, she served as a translator from Italian for Perelman.52 She also ensured the quality of the Italian translation of their Traité, of which Perelman describes her as the primary reader and editor (Perelman, letter to Mayer [December]). Translation was thus at the forefront of their efforts to disseminate their new rhetoric.

While translation is an integral, if unacknowledged, facet of philosophical activity in general, it was for Perelman a matter of the utmost importance, and he publicly raised the issue of the importance of the translation of philosophy for the discipline at the report on the Commission of Translators, given at the General Assembly of the International Institute of Philosophy held in L'Aquila, Italy in September 1964. Translation was even a feature of Perelman's pedagogy at the ULB: in 1965 Perelman proposed replacing courses focusing on the translation of Greek and Latin authors with courses exploring the translation of Greek and Latin philosophical terms.

Translation also served to foster intellectual bonds with other scholars, as is witnessed by A. J. Ayer's personal investment in the translation and publication of Perelman's The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Arguments. Perelman's intellectual allies—A. J. Ayer, Norberto Bobbio, and Richard McKeon, among others—played a very active role in the translation of his works. Even Henry Johnstone, who eventually repudiated Perelman, translated Perelman's "Rhétorique et philosophie", which appeared in English before its publication in French.

The topos of translatio also figures prominently in the NRP. The Latin etymological source for the word "translation" in English, translatio, describes a transfer, especially of learning, in space and time. It is key to understanding the origins of the NRP in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's rhetorical 'turn.' Translatio is particularly effective for describing how Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca come to envisage rhetoric as a means of providing a logic of value judgments.57 That is, in retrospective accounts of their turn to rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca alike name Jean Paulhan's translation of Brunetto Latini's translation/adaptation of Cicero's De inventione as instrumental in their rhetorical turn.

As Bolduc has written elsewhere, both Olbrechts-Tyteca and Perelman tell the story of how their reading led them to trace in reverse order the transfer of knowledge from classical philosophers (Cicero and Aristotle), to a medieval notary and author (Brunetto Latini), to a contemporary

literary critic (Jean Paulhan). In their retrospective accounts of how they discovered rhetoric, they establish a modern version of the medieval trope of translatio studii et imperii, the complex notion referring to the transfer of the classical learning and power of Athens and Rome to Paris. In other words, Olbrechts-Tyteca and Perelman describe Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's stories of the origins of their work emphasize how translation—both in theory and in practical application—allowed them, through Latini's and Paulhan's studies and translations of rhetoric, to rediscover rhetoric.

Guiding Principles of Translation

We would like to set out here some of the principles guiding our edition and translation.

First, we observe the notions of accuracy, adequacy, appropriateness, consistency, and explicitness that underlie the overarching principle of reliability espoused by the MLA Guidelines for Editors of Scholars Editions. Second, we adhere to the best practices of translation as detailed not only in ISO 17100:2015 but also in the Code of Ethics of the American Translator's Association [ATA], the Code of Professional Conduct of the Chartered Institute of Linguists [CIOL], and the Charter of the International Federation of Translators [FIT].

Translation, the aim of which is frequently supposed to be a clear, unambiguous rendering of ideas from one language to another, is confronted here, as in philosophy generally, with the enigmatic nature of its philosophical subject matter.

Further complicating our translation activity is the fact that the articles we include here span a nearly 30-year period in which Perelman develops not only his ideas but also his scholarly ethos, which is manifest in his style of writing. The earliest article here, "De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance", shows Perelman as a young 21-year-old scholar, his style indirect and his ideas at times oblique, a reflection of how a youthful Perelman is still working out a way to chart a new path that diverges from that of his mentors. From the elliptical prose of "De l'arbitraire", Perelman quickly establishes his scholarly voice. In his later writings, then, his style follows that of a standard academic model, in which he systematically develops his ideas and relies upon the convention of an abstract, neutral voice.

Perelman's style of writing changes not only over time, but also in response to a particular article's subject matter and the context in which it was composed. When writing about philosophical questions, Perelman adopts a decidedly analytical methodology (and this, even as he refashions the very principles of analytical philosophy). He uses the language and processes of formal logical analysis (and especially deduction), his sentences often marked by a plethora of secondary clauses and the use of the impersonal, passive voice. On the other hand, when he writes in collaboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca, we find a disciplinary expansion beyond philosophy: in addition to references to philosophers such as Aristotle and Kant, references to literary authors and quotations in the original language are common.

For topics that hold personal resonance—assimilation and the Jewish question—Perelman's style of writing is particularly striking, revealing a literary and poetic style filled with undisguised

emotion. Our translations here aim to retain the linguistic and affective valences of Perelman's style of writing. We have also chosen to retain the original French titles of the articles translated here in our references to them in the commentaries, so as to remind the reader not only of our translational practice, but also of the linguistic and cultural alterity of the originals. For this same reason, in our notes to the translations, we endeavor to provide the most likely French sources of Perelman's and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's references, even when his citations are incomplete. Even if this means that we must speculate based on our knowledge of the most significant editions available in the years immediately preceding the publication of the article in question, we aim to remind the reader that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were not reading in English (or at least, only at times). By not smoothing over this alterity, or the gaps, of the originals, our translation takes to heart the notion that the principal work of philosophers and translators alike is the search for meaning.

We also recognize that any translation is fundamentally interpretive: George Steiner has cautioned translators not to forget that Aristotle's hermenia, or a discourse that signifies because it interprets, is inherent to translation.62 As translators, we aim not to do away entirely with the ambiguity of the NRP, but rather to provide readers with a scholarly apparatus for making better sense of the ideas proposed in these articles. As a result, we provide explanatory interpretive material both in brackets (especially terms in the original French) and in translators' notes, which appear in italics as a part of the footnotes to distinguish them from the original footnotes. We add translators' notes even to translations of articles previously published without notes ("Philosophies premières et philosophie régressive"; "De la temporalité comme caractère de l'argumentation"), although to a lesser extent than to the initial translation presented here, "De l'arbitraire". These notes intend to elucidate the meaning of Perelman's ideas and the intellectual context in which they should be read, serving as a gloss to Perelman's writing. They effect Kwame Anthony Appiah's practice of "thick translation", which prescribes providing readers of the target text with the cultural (and here, philosophical and intellectual) information necessary for "a thick and situated understanding" of the NRP. Please be aware that we have chosen to fill out Perelman's own footnotes, which are often abbreviated in form, and have made any necessary corrections to them.

The commentaries and translations we offer here are meant to excavate the intellectual origins and chart the trajectories of the NRP. Our goal is to nest the translations in commentaries that help explain the problems Perelman alone and then in collaboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca faced and addressed. We seek to give cultural texture to the ideas they set forth as they are responses to the twentieth-century crisis of reason and the Jewish question.

Six New Insights on the Origins and Meaning of the New Rhetoric Project
Perelman's Intellectual Journey to the NRP is an Evolution rather than a Conversion

From the beginning of his intellectual journey, Perelman resisted the overreach of logical positivism and sought to extend reason into human time as a vehicle to cultivate social tolerance. Perelman identifies a clear break in his thinking that took place after World War II. Before the war, he portrayed himself as a logical empiricist in despair about the possibility that reason could help make value judgments or enter human time. After the war, Perelman reports, he had a "revelation" when he read Latini's translation of Cicero and made his "rhetorical turn". This story, dramatic as it is, is not supported by our translations and commentary.

Our translation and commentary on Perelman's first major article (1933) reveal that his agenda from the start was to embrace the commitment to reason made by the logical positivists in the 1920s, to critique their definition of reason as overly narrow, and to seek an expansion of reason into societal affairs. The logical positivism movement of the 1920s was responding to the deep traumas of World War I, which many adherents traced to the disease of emotional-based nationalism, superstition, and the irrational. Their response was to develop an expression of reason and rationality that would lift human deliberation and judgment out of the human community into the realm of mathematics, geometry, and the impartial.

Over the course of his scholarly career, Perelman worked through the traumas of World War I, World War II, the Holocaust, and the founding of Israel by fetching out of human reason a rhetorically inflected nonformal logic intended to create the conditions necessary for social tolerance. This aspiration is crystal clear in the agenda he established in a brief 1931 article on the need for a logic of values. The logical positivists of the 1920s had declared them meaningless. The translation of and commentary on his 1933 article that we have included here corroborates our claim that Perelman, from the start, resisted the limitations placed on reason by the logical positivists and, as we have observed, was at work creating concepts in his early work that he and Olbrechts-Tyteca would later populate with a rhetorical vocabulary.

Our characterization challenges as much Perelman's description of his intellectual journey as it does the story told in the secondary literature of Perelman as a despairing logical positivist in the pre-World War II setting who had a conversion to rhetoric after the war. That story is more dramatic than the one we tell, which is based on our close readings of his articles of the 1930s and 1940s, and yet we recognize that it was precisely the dramatic nature of this conversion narrative that served him so well in his efforts to promote the NRP. In the end, we believe that Perelman's intellectual evolution provides a splendid illustration of a thinker engaged in serial episodes of the process of dissociating concepts, a process Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe in Part Three, sections three and four of the Traité.

2 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's NRP is an Answer to the Jewish Question

The fact that Perelman was a Jew born in Poland, faced antisemitism, led the Belgian Jewish underground against the Nazi occupiers, supported the state of Israel, and was a loyal citizen of Belgium influenced his views on philosophy and rhetoric. We draw significantly from the historian of philosophy Christian Delacampagne's position that the philosophies of the twentieth century do not fall, immaculate, from the air; they are functions of the century's traumas.3 Among the most important and consequential twentieth-century traumas, Delacampagne writes, was the Jewish question and the answer offered by eliminationist antisemitism, the Holocaust. This trauma, and the efforts necessary to work through its meaning, has a universal importance beyond the horrific murder of six million European Jews. Antisemitism generally, and the Holocaust in particular, reflect a mindset and system of discourse that mutate and destroy the possibility of human community. Delacampagne found within the Jewish tragedy a crisis of reason—why did Enlightenment values and Western culture's commitment to reason fail so spectacularly during the twentieth century?

Perelman alone and in collaboration answered by recovering a new rhetoric that would allow human communities to embrace pluralism, democracy, and the use of the argumentative method to deliberate in value disagreements. As our commentaries and translations of Perelman's writings on the Jewish question reveal, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca witnessed, resisted, and then sought by means of the NRP to work through the trauma of the Holocaust.

Scholars of rhetoric and rhetorical theory, who are quite skilled at a kind of contextual analysis that assumes that discourse is a response to a perceived exigence, often fail to place rhetorical theory itself and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's NRP in their respective culture and time. They view the NRP as a treasure chest of rhetorical tools, and do not reflect on the intent of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's endeavor to develop, over a 10-year period, what is a cornucopia of argumentative strategies. Their NRP was designed to inoculate against totalitarian and antisemitic impulses with the vaccine of philosophical pluralism, to strengthen and sponsor the common values necessary for just action with a reformulated epideictic, and to foster the use of the argumentative method and nonformal logic to equip advocates with the skills needed to judge well. Perelman recognized that these values and tools were available, but underdeveloped, in both the Western Classical and Jewish traditions.

3 The New Rhetoric Project is a Regressive Philosophy that hosts a Pluralistic Ontology, Axiology, and Epistemology, turning on Bergson's "durée"

Between 1931 and 1947 Perelman alone, and then between 1947 and 1958 in his collaboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca, developed the philosophical anchors for the Traité. Our translations and commentaries reveal the development of the NRP's philosophical anchors. The sources of these anchors can be traced to his mentors Dupréel and Barzin, the Lwów–Warsaw school of logic, Gödel's antimonies, Frege's mathematical logic, and the works of Gonseth and McKeon. His path to rhetoric begins with Paulhan's translation of Latini's Trésor, prompting his return to Plato, Aristotle, Quintilian, and, eventually, Vico.

By 1958, Perelman was clear that he found the essential foundations of Western thought problematic, because these foundations were, he held, advanced by the first philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and the classical tradition.6 Perelman's complaint centered on the ontology, axiology, and epistemology of first philosophies. In short, the shortcomings in logical positivism that Perelman identified in his 1933 essay on the arbitrary in knowledge had their origins in ancient Greek philosophy, which, he argued, sought the eternal rather than the temporal, contemplation rather than action, and saw first principles as ruling minor premises. After World War II, Perelman drew from philosophical traditions within Western culture, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, that aspired to bring into alignment the eternal and temporal, contemplation and action, and a reasoning that was not required to obey first principles.

The most complete expression of Perelman's philosophy is found in our commentaries and translations of his 1949 article "Philosophies premières et philosophie régressive" and his 1950 collaborative article with Olbrechts- Tyteca that, as its name implies, attempted a rapprochement between logic and rhetoric. Perelman's essay devoted to his understanding of a regressive philosophy sets forth a direct response to the limitations of first philosophies and those of logical positivism without abandoning the promise of reason to irrationalism. A regressive philosophy, Perelman maintains, is reflexive, adaptive, and learns from experience. It sponsors a view of ontology, epistemology, and axiology that is pluralistic, and located in human time. This article sets up the rapprochement Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca seek to accomplish in this 1950 article, "Logique et rhétorique".

4 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca attempt the first full rapprochement between Logic (Reason) and Rhetoric in the Twentieth Century

We do not believe it is a coincidence, as do some scholars, that several works appeared in 1958 that either turned to rhetoric as an answer to the post-World War II crisis of reason or sought to display more humane and pluralistic expression of rationality. Walter Ong, in 1958, published his monumental book on Peter Ramus. Perelman, as we noted, would later draw from Ong's research the claim that it was Peter Ramus who was responsible for the explicit division between logic (which he defined as the realm of reason) and rhetoric (the realm of tropes and eloquence). While Ong's biography of Ramus details how he affected the divide between logic and rhetoric, Ong does not concern himself with attempting to effect a rapprochement between the two.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do concern themselves with this rapprochement, one designed to achieve a realignment rather than the conflation commonly criticized in the secondary literature. They make explicit in the first pages of the Traité that they want to place reason and rhetoric into better relationship, that they view a reason limited to the eternal and abstract as sterile with no possibility of action, and that a rhetoric without a foundation in reason is dangerous. Their rapprochement has its critics. Some of the criticism is a function of poor translations; other criticism is the result of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's failure to define key terms carefully. Other critics, in our judgment, suffer from what Bloom termed the "anxiety of influence" in their attempt to overthrow Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's NRP as the prominent rhetoric in the Western world.

5 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca address the postwar Crisis of Reason with a rhetorically inflected definition of Reason

The rapprochement between reason and rhetoric Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca try to effect required both a redefinition of the received understanding of reason and a rescue of rhetoric from the realm of tropes and eloquence. In bringing reason and rhetoric into better alignment, Perelman understood that the role of time in a definition of reason was critical. If reason in a first philosophy seeks the eternal and timeless truths in moments of quiet, motionless contemplation, then it cannot dwell in the marketplace, deal with the ephemeral, or inform human action, a critique Hannah Arendt offers in her 1958 The Human Condition.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca redefine reason to include expressions of reason that deal with lived time, what Henri Bergson, who plays a major and yet unappreciated role in the NRP, called "la durée". The translation and commentary we offer of Perelman's essay on the role of time in knowledge is an attempt to broaden the range of reason to include human and lived time, and is the first modestly extended discussion of the universal audience. Although Perelman does condemn the overuse and misuse of apodictic reasoning, we do not find in his body of work a call to eliminate formal logic, only a proposal that the place of formal logic lies within the search for immutable truths.

On the other hand, a rhetorically inflected definition of reason, Perelman held, would produce mutable, reflexive, and regressive knowledge products, open to revision, change, repair and, if necessary, rejection if the evidence justified such a move. The key variable that distinguishes a formal logic, which seeks eternal truths, from a nonformal logic located in an unfolding and sometimes chaotic reality, is time. Formal reason does not concern itself with time; nonformal reason is hitched to what Bergson defined as the "la durée", the human experience of time.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, in the final commentary and translation we include in this volume, dedicate an extended article to the relationship between time and argument.

This relationship (human time and argument) is the Ariadne's thread in the NRP. The complaint Perelman makes about classical philosophy and logical positivism is that they do not allow reason to enter the world of the human, the courthouse and the marketplace, because they hold reason hostage within timeless realms of contemplation and the abstract. Reason belongs in the world of lived time, they argue, requiring readers to understand that their treatise (and they highlight this by placing it in italics) "constitutes a break with the concept of reason and reasoning due to Descartes …"

6 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca offer Rhetorical Reasoning in Human Time and the Argumentative Method as an answer to the Twentieth Century's Crises of Reason

We believe three articles in this volume best capture the trajectories of Perelman's intellectual trajectory and that of his collaboration with Olbrechts- Tyteca: Perelman's 1949 "Philosophies premières et philosophie regressive", Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's 1950 "Logique et rhétorique", and their 1958 "De la temporalité comme caractère de l'argumentation". The first

creates the philosophical justification of the NRP, marking Perelman's 18-year effort remain within the realm of reason but to expand it beyond the boundaries set by the first philosophies of classical philosophers and those enforced by the logical positivists. The second is the blueprint of a new rhetoric that affects a rapprochement between reason and rhetoric. The third, which is the last commentary and translation in this volume, describes how this rapprochement between reason and rhetoric works in their NRP.

In "De la temporalité comme caractère de l'argumentation", Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca develop a theory of reason marked by temporality: human reasoning takes place in lived time in concert with, and through, argumentation, a thesis recently developed by Mercier and Sperber, among others.12 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca held that formal logic was unaffected by the passage of time. In contrast, the problems humans face invite communal deliberation and require an expression of reason that is yoked to its social context and to time. It is here that their rapprochement between reason and rhetoric becomes concrete.

"De la temporalité" helps to explain the two steps that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca take to bring rhetoric into alignment with reason in the first pages of the Traité. First, the audience, rather than systems of timeless and abstract systems of rationality, becomes the focus of reason. How audiences and humans reason is thus primary. Second, social argumentation becomes the method of testing values and facts for their truth claims. Because audiences reason in human time and may disagree, argumentation is the method of using reason to make judgments about disagreements.

We believe "De la temporalité" outlines a sophisticated vision of rhetorical reason. Indeed, it may very well be a vision that captures something essential and timeless about human nature. We make this observation understanding its paradoxical implications, given Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's critique of formal logic's take on time. The NRP, we believe, remains the best site for the development of truly cosmopolitan theories of rhetoric, argumentation, and civil society.

We hope, in a second phase of our project, to provide translations of and commentaries on articles Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca that were published between 1958 and 1983. These demonstrate how nonformal reason and rhetorical argumentation may be applied in various domains, ranging from judicial decisions to medical ethics. <>

CONVIVIAL FUTURES: VIEWS FROM A POST-GROWTH TOMORROW edited by Frank Adloff, Alain Caillé [X-Texts on Culture and Society, transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, ISBN 9783837656640]

What steps are needed to make life better and more convivial? The Second Convivialist Manifesto (2020) has presented a short diagnosis of the current crises and sketches of a possible and desirable future. It has been a necessary work of theoretical synthesis, but preserving a viable world also requires passion. It is thus urgent to show what people

would gain from a shift to a post-neoliberal and post-growth convivialist future. This volume includes a theoretical debate on convivialism which reflects dystopias and shows the multiple and major obstacles that convivialism will have to face. Mainly, however, the contributors to this volume create sketches of a convivial future and collect accounts of another future world which is attractive for as many as possible.

Contents

Convivial Futures? by Frank Adloff, Alain Caillé

In 2013, the first Convivialist Manifesto (English edition: 2014 [hereafter cited as FCM]) was published, initially in French and later in many translations. Since then, many of the social and political problems described in the FCM have remained with us, whereas other trajectories are new and unforeseen. This is also the starting point of the Second Convivialist Manifesto, which was published in 2020 (Convivialist International 2020 [hereafter cited as SCM]). To be a pioneering, public political philosophy, convivialism must succeed in capturing the signs of the times and developing perspectives for the future. As difficult as it is to formulate such positive outlooks, that is precisely what this volume is all about. But let us first take a look at the last few years.

Our Times

In recent years, we have seen a strong social and political polarization. In particular, the election of Donald Trump as US president stands out, which entailed a decline in democratic culture in the US. Globally, Trump's presidency challenged many continuities in foreign policy, whether through his willingness to wage trade wars, compromise the importance of human rights, or withdraw from the Paris climate agreement altogether. Bruno Latour (2018) argued some time ago that Trump's presidency represents the first genuinely ecological regime, only under the opposite sign of completely contradicting the idea. For Trump embodied the clear will to simply carry on as before despite climate change. With his fossil-fuel policy, he abandoned, as it were, the jointly shared and limited space of the Earth. Trump's policy did not care about maintaining a "safe operating space for humanity" (Rockström 2009).

However, the unlimited consumption of resources is nothing new but merely an acceleration of Western hubris and capitalist accumulation, which for centuries has relied on nature as being at human disposal. This is contrasted with another, by now iconic figure: Greta Thunberg, the initiator of the widespread Fridays for Future protests. She has brought climate change to the attention of the public around the world like no one else. Trump's planet knows no limits; Thunberg's Earth trembles under the weight of human beings.

We see such polarization everywhere. While in the summer of 2015 there was still a broad sense of solidarity and a culture of welcome toward the refugees coming to Germany, the mood soon changed and the far-right political party Alternative für

Deutschland ("Alternative for Germany") was able to score points with its nationalist and racist platform. It is now represented in all federal state parliaments, and Germany as a country has moved to the right.

Despite the attention given to Fridays for Future, there is now something of a political "yellow vest" factor. Ever since the yellow vests (gilets jaunes) took to the crossroads in France in 2018–19 and staged mass demonstrations against President Macron's plans to raise fuel taxes, politicians elsewhere have also feared that any extra spending on climate protection would be another vote for right-wing populist movements and parties. This reveals the current political dilemma: Old leftwing coalitions between parties, trade unions, and the lower classes have broken down, and as long as the additional expenditure for an ecologically 'more sustainable' society is to be shouldered mainly by the lower and middle classes, they can only be persuaded to protect the climate to a very limited extent and may otherwise move to the right. Majorities could only be won for socio-ecological transformation if these classes were also to benefit materially through redistribution policies from top to bottom. These social and ecological questions are closely interrelated—as not only convivialism, of course, has emphasized.

So far, however, there is hardly a country to be found that has rejected the neoliberal redistribution from the bottom to the top. Social inequalities, especially with regard to wealth distribution, continue to increase unchecked, although the voices calling for caps on wealth inequalities and arguing for wealth taxes and higher inheritance taxes are becoming more urgent. Criticism of the capitalist growth economy is also growing louder. When the FCM appeared nine years ago, the call for a post-growth economy still sounded quite exotic or almost absurd in international public discourse. In the meantime, the degrowth movement has become much stronger and more influential across Europe. Many lines of critique come together here: a feminist critique of the economy, an ecological perspective, cultural critique, as well as a critique of asymmetrical Global North–South relations, which continue to be based on (post)colonial, unequal exchange relations and the North externalizing its problems to the South.

In voicing their criticism, many of these movements aim at an extension of democracy and call for a self-imposed limitation in the name of ecology. While the boundaries between classes and citizens should be transcended, new practices of self-limitation are needed at the same time, as this is the only way to guarantee

habitability on Earth. The great acceleration in the stress on the Earth system since the end of the Second World War—for example, through CO_2 emissions, energy consumption, water and fertilizer use—urgently needs to be limited, which would also have obvious consequences for Western consumption and lifestyles.

However, many governments and movements are currently opposing the expansion of democracy. In the name of 'true democracy' and the 'true people,' democratic participation rights as well as opportunities for opposition and critical interventions are being massively restricted and so-called illiberal democracies such as those in Hungary, Russia, Turkey, India, and Brazil strengthened. In many countries, we now observe that civic spaces that rely on the freedoms of expression and assembly are coming under pressure and have been shrinking.

The three principles of order of the second half of the 20th century—liberal democracy, free-market capitalism, and a pluralistic and individualistic culture— are currently no longer showing any great stability or attractiveness. In this phase of change, very different paths can be taken. Right-wing populist movements, illiberal nation-states, and notions of homogeneous communities stand in contrast to movements that advocate a deepening of democracy, want to overcome the logic of growth, and seek to reconcile individualistic with communitarian principles. However, the latter can only have an impact if they are able to illustrate to broad parts of the population what more conviviality could produce in terms of positive outcomes for all, including the non-human world. Therefore, the SCM, just like the FCM, tries to develop a language that is as inclusive as possible and to build a broad common denominator for convivialist political aspirations. It goes without saying that this inclusive language has to be reinvented and expanded again and again. After all, reflexivity is at the core of the convivialist program, and this volume is an expression of that.

Convivialism during and after the Coronavirus Crisis

The coronavirus pandemic, which began in the spring of 2020, has shown which problematic situations were already virulent: for example, the fragility of financial capitalism, the massive digital and educational asymmetries, or the deepening of gender inequalities through the re-feminization of care work. Added to these problems are the consequences of the current crisis management: collapses in the global economy, newly indebted states, rising unemployment, and so forth. Whether the pandemic opens or closes avenues for convivial reform has yet to be

decided at the time of this writing (August 2021). It seems clear that many things cannot go on like they have, but it will be important to draw the right conclusions from the crisis.

One lesson that the pandemic has taught us is that existing certainties can be shattered rapidly and that there is no firm base for eternal business as usual. Delusive certainties have been replaced by contin gency awareness. On the one hand, new things now seem possible. On the other hand, it is precisely this loss of illusory security and certainty that scares people. Can this fear be socially managed or, better still, made productive?

In the meantime, it is becoming increasingly clear that the coronavirus pandemic is only the beginning. C ompared to the consequences of climate change, dealing with COVID-19 is probably just a minor challenge. COVID-19 shows the different levels of temporality we are dealing with. The fact that many viruses have originated in animals, have been transmitted via zoonoses, and that the loss of biodiversity favors pandemics is increasingly becoming common knowledge. And what if the virus did instead originate in a laboratory in Wuhan, and its release is also part of the story of human hubris? Although the pandemic swept across the world in a matter of weeks, the groundwork was laid by a history of ecologically reckless globalization that spans more than a century.

The virus of neoliberalism, in turn, has been circulating for more than 40 years and has fueled the crisis through privatization and cuts in health care. This shows that the severity of the pandemic has an enormous temporal precedence and that these different temporalities overlap. Now that they overlap in this fashion, similar things will most likely happen again soon.

This is because climate change also leads to acute shocks and catastrophes, be they heavy rains with floods, droughts with water and food shortages, or migration from war and heat zones. The problem of climate change—or more generally, the rapidly changing habitability of the Earth—cannot be controlled. Rather, it will be a matter of interlinking social concepts of time with the rhythms of the warming planet. A critique of the modern separation of nature and culture has long been formulated in earth-system sciences, philosophy, and the social sciences. With COVID-19, societies are now even more aware that this separation is invalid, and the SCM itself correctly highlights that there is only one common nature, and humans do not live outside of it.

Since modernity is characterized by a sense of boundlessness and inscribed with ideas of omnipotence and hubris, COVID-19 brings with it the imposition of having demonstrated the limits of this historical path of development. Many social movements from the North and the South are calling on politicians, businesspeople, and academics to abandon the hubris of world domination that the SCM so clearly criticizes. Self-limitation and conviviality among humans and non-humans would have to be considered intrinsically valuable, and one would have to build completely new relationships of meaning that do not negate contingency and interdependence but rather affirm them.

COVID-19 has also made clear how interdependent our world is. It is more evident than ever how all beings (human as well as non-human) depend on each other—even if not symmetrically. Solidarity could grow out of this feeling of interdependence, which was the thesis of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1997 [1893]) as early as the end of the 19th century. He related this idea to the nation state; today, these dependencies have become visible to everyone on a global level. But it is not easy to derive a compelling new narrative of progress from this.

One question of the future will be whether fears, segregations, inequalities, and conflicts over resources of all kinds will increase or whether it will be possible not to exacerbate the fear of the future through more individualism and privatism, as has been the case so far, but to mitigate it through more solidarity and convivial solutions. Future hopes for growth, dominance, and prosperity have thus far integrated Western societies, even if these hopes are increasingly proving to be economically unrealistic, socially unjust, and ecologically fatal. Now the task must be to nevertheless develop an attractive vision of living together. Against the fear of losing out to others, new forms of conviviality must be established. It is precisely in response to this that convivialism is trying to formulate new positive answers.

The Way Ahead

Convivialism presents itself as a political philosophy destined to follow in the footsteps of the great ideologies of modernity—liberalism, socialism, anarchism, communism. These ideologies are no longer able to enlighten us on either the present state of the world or what it could or should look like tomorrow, if only because they have completely failed to anticipate the environmental crisis and global warming. Convivialism is therefore beginning to find some resonance. The SCM has already been translated into six languages. But so far, convivialism has

suffered from a major flaw compared to its predecessors, which explains why its audience is not yet broader: It does not 'say' enough. It does not say enough because it does not hold out the prospect of a bright future or at least a happier one for the majority, one that is worth fighting for, or even worth making sacrifices to bring it about. This part of the narrative is what its predecessors knew how to tell. Liberalism gave hope for the rule of autonomy, the end of submission to authority or despotism. Socialism promised equality, or at least a certain degree of equality, thanks to the regulatory intervention of the state. Anarchism trumped liberalism by adding the hope of economic self-sufficiency, of self-management; and communism one-upped socialism by adding fraternity to equality. Convivialism inherits all these promises and tries to combine them by sublating them ("aufheben" in German). But this sublation is still largely a conceptual principle. It now needs to be given flesh, breath, li5.5(e)-1.9(,)bili(y.il)4is(i(y.iThis)s(i(oth)e8bo(n(k)rfg)l(ch)in6(dthe)or8pq(i)-y.i sent to the authors of this issue.

Announcing a convivial world for tomorrow might seem both excessively timid and desperately ambiius   —excessively timid compared to what yesterday's secular religions such as socialism, communism, or liberal modernization promised us. All of them held out the prospect of a better and brighter tomorrow. We would end all forms of domination or exploitation of man by man. Or, at the very least, everyone would see their material living conditions assured, their health protected, their education sufficiently guaranteed, and would become fully respected citizens. These great hopes have been fading away over the last few decades. Today, for a whole range of reasons (ecological, economic, political, epidemiological, social, moral) that need not be spelled out here, it is rather despair and a dreary future that looms on the horizon. We no longer look to the future full of hope; on the contrary, the horizon of the future has closed. Claiming that tomorrow's world could be more convivial, less violent, less unjust, more secure, more symbiotic or ecological seems desperate and almost foolish.

Nevertheless, the indication of a more convivial future also comes in the wake of the SCM. The SCM's main idea can be summarized as follows: Despite the unprecedented progress in the fields of science and technology, the darkest predictions about our own and the warming Earth's future have a high probability of coming true (the coronavirus pandemic does not encourage us to be more optimistic). Our only chance of escaping a dreadful fate is to create a post-neoliberal or post-growth society as soon as possible. The SCM depicts some of its possible

ecological, political, social, and economic features. However, it is obvious that a convivial society has no chance of coming into existence if a global shift in public opinion in all countries is not triggered, a sort of axiological great transformation. But how can one hope, even for a second, that the power of Putin, Xi Jinping, Bolsonaro, Sissi, Modi, Trump, Wall Street, and the fossil-fuel industry will diminish? Let us remember, however, the strength of the republican ideal, which was able to overcome the absolutist monarchies, the power of socialist or communist (for better or for worse) or fascist (definitely for worse) ideals. Moreover, before these secular religions, there was the enormous energy generated by Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, or Buddhism. A comparable energy must once again be mobilized today.

One might say, however, that the rise in influence of the universal religions or quasi-secular religions has taken a long time, sometimes centuries; but now we live in times of absolute urgency. This is true, but our time is one of continuous acceleration: Ideas circulate and passions are unleashed at a speed unimaginable only a few years ago. Often for the worse—but why should it not be for the better?

The SCM has presented a brief but reasonable analysis of the situation in which we find ourselves and sketches one possible desirable future. It has been a necessary work of theoretical synthesis. Yet, it is also necessary to be able to speak to as many people as possible and awaken widespread passions for a better future. We are going to need this passion to preserve a viable world. For this, conceptual work is notoriously insufficient. The most urgent thing now is to show as many people as possible what they would gain from a shift to a post-neoliberal and post-growth convivialist future. It would be a world in which, at least in the richest countries, living better means less material wealth, with less money for the wealthy or upper middle classes, and much less exploitation of humans and non-human beings.

What steps are needed to make life better and more convivial? This volume brings together contributions that address this question and attempt to create sketches of a convivial future. This does not preclude us from having a theoretical debate on the status of convivialism or reflecting on dystopias and thus showing the multiple and major obstacles that convivialism will have to face. But the primary objective is to collect accounts of another future world, one that is attractive to an Italian worker, a Spanish peasant, a farmer in Senegal, an inhabitant of a favela in Rio or a slum in

Bombay, an Egyptian employee, an Iraqi doctor, a Chinese student, but also one that a French or German company director would be happy to live in.

Whether the future will be more convivial in this sense is decided by our actions in the present, which in turn are guided by the ideas we have about the future. Our bold bet is therefore that convivialist ideas about the future can help decide which future becomes the present. <>

BEING HUMAN AND A BUDDHA TOO: LONGCHENPA'S SEVENFOLD MIND TRAINING FOR A SUNLIT SKY: LONGCHENPA'S SEVENFOLD MIND TRAINING: PRACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS ON THE FOUNDATIONAL PRACTICES, original composition by Anne Carolyn Klein; prologue by Adzom Paylo Rinpoche, oral commentary on the Sevenfold Mind Training, translated and edited by Anne Carolyn Klein in discussion with Adzom Paylo Rinpoche [Series: House of Adzom; volume 1; Translation of *Sngon 'gro sems sbyong bdun gyi don khrid*; Wisdom Publications, ISBN 9781614297581]

In writing that sparkles and inspires, Anne Klein (Lama Rigzin Drolma) shows us how to liberate our buddha nature to be both human and a buddha too.

This first volume in the House of Adzom series centers on Longchenpa's seven trainings in bodhicitta, our awakened mind, the ultimate purpose of our practice and training. Anne Klein's original composition masterfully weaves in Adzom Paylo Rinpoche's commentary and Jigme Lingpa's five pith practices and commentary on the trainings, in keeping with Longchenpa's skillful integration of sutra, tantra, and Dzogchen, to resolve our most challenging questions about what awakening involves and how it relates to the truth of our human situation right now. As foundational teachings for Dzogchen practitioners, the seven trainings are framed as contemplations on impermanence, the adventitiousness of happiness and its short duration, the multiple causes of death, the meaninglessness of our worldly activities, reliance on the Buddha's good qualities, the teacher's pith instructions, and, ultimately, nonconceptual meditation on bliss and emptiness, clarity and emptiness, and reality itself.

House of Adzom is a special multifaceted series featuring new resources on the historical context, people, and practices connected with Adzom Drukpa (1842–1924), a vital figure

who influenced Tibet's initial encounter with modernity. Adzom Drukpa was a visionary, scholar, and treasure revealer (gter ston), as well as an influential political force central to reshaping Dzogchen education and nonsectarianism in his era. He was a key lineage holder of Jigme Lingpa's Longchen Nyingthig and Khyentse Wangpo's Chetsun Nyingthig. He founded the great printing press at Adzom Gar, the third largest in Tibet. He was student to some of the most significant nineteenth-century Nyingma teachers, including Patrul Rinpoche and Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo. He was teacher to supremely illustrious Dzogchen practitioners of the next generation, including Terton Lerab Lingpa, Khyentse Chokyi Lodro, and Dilgo Khyentse Rin-poche. Each volume illuminates in unprecedented richness unique features of Adzom Drukpa's life and work, or that of significant lineal forerunners and successors.

Reviews

"Thorough, informative, and written like a narrative from a lifelong friend—Klein weaves theory and storytelling together in a graceful and exciting way. A wonderful collection of ancient voices from India to Tibet, gathered here in the pages to further dissipate the devious myth of separateness."—Sharon Salzberg, author of Lovingkindness and Real Happiness

"**BEING HUMAN AND BUDDHA TOO** contains a lifetime of meditation on our deeply human capacity for contemplation, reflections on our brokenness and wholeness, and insights into the vastness and intimacy of our lives. Anne Klein weaves together a rich tapestry of memories of her decade of living with Tibetan teachers, texts, ideas, practices, and inspirations; her own deeply poetic reflections on wholeness and separation; and Tibetan voices from the Great Perfection tradition from Longchenpa to Jigme Lingpa and Adzom Paylo Rinpoche, talking about the pathways that wind through karma and impermanence to wisdom and awakening. In the language of the tradition, this is a book written in the jeweled letters of hard-fought realization and the easy grace that precedes and follows it."—David Germano, professor of Tibetan Buddhist studies and executive director of the Contemplative Sciences Center at the University of Virginia

"Anyone who has even thought about a practice or whose mind has alighted even once on the paths of buddhas and bodhisattvas will benefit from this book. Read Longchenpa's fourteenth-century Sevenfold Mind Training in its simplicity, and ordinary experience will become a door to wholeness. Then read the oral commentaries by Adzom Rin-poche and Anne Klein to find elegant insights on Dzogchen. The best of Indian, Tibetan, and Western traditions are strung together in this book—a garland of clear jewels that cannot help but reflect the open sky."—Laurie Patton, professor of religion and president, Middlebury College, author of Bringing the Gods to Mind and House Crossing: Poems, and translator of The Bhagavad Gita

CONTENTS

Buddhism arranges itself into paths and processes. Dzogchen, the Great Completeness, understands all these to move toward a natural state of wholeness. In the process, the path's inexpressible secret is revealed. This process is also the story of rivers seeking their ocean, of pained and promising humans like ourselves contending with something at once utterly foreign and also inseparability intimate with our human being. The river's journey looks long and winding. And yet the ocean is not only the river's destination but its source. The secret, if we can believe it, is that the river already is the ocean, and that we, all our anguishing to the contrary, may already be whole.

To feel whole is a state of intimacy with everything we know, sense, and are. Intimate with our sorrow, intimate with our joy, free in our fullness, easy and open to others. Like the sun that lights the sky, our loving knowing shows up everywhere.

Such is the premise of Tibet's most profound and secret teachings. Even when we are understandably skeptical about this, we want to look for ourselves. We sense something more is possible. That we need not be trapped inside our silhouettes, a solo sojourner on the road of life. This is not what we want. But then what? What

does awakening involve and how does it relate to the truth of our situation right now? Do we lose or amplify our humanness in the process? Our exploration of Longchenpa's sevenfold trainings, seven steps toward the wholeness Dzogchen celebrates, is in response to these questions, long a source of intense speculation for practitioners and philosophers alike.

All Dzogchen practices facilitate appreciation of the radical inclusiveness of our nature. These practices dissipate the separateness that ordinarily structures our experience. Other people, cultures, colors, tastes, and everything else our senses take in, seem outside of us. Do they not? For Dzogchen, for its own unique reasons, all this apparent separateness is simply a byproduct of confused imagination. Its resolution is in plain sight.

With this in mind, we encounter the open secret through the brilliant mind of Longchen Rabjam (1308–64) and the writings of his spiritual heir, Jigme Lingpa (1730–98). We reflect on their teachings on the seven trainings and their other philosophical or poetic Dzogchen writings that help amplify what those trainings make possible. We also follow the pivots by which Long chenpa, as Longchen Rabjam is also known, in other writings moves the reader- practitioner from sütra teachings on impermanence and emptiness to Dzogchen recognition of an unceasing dynamism that permeates all experience. To clarify this further we include an oral commentary on Long chenpa's Sevenfold Mind Training text by Adzom Paylo Rinpoche, one of the great Dzogchen masters in Tibet today, and widely considered an incarnation of Jigme Lingpa.

In this way we ride the great current of ancient voices from India and Tibet, reaching back to the earliest days of Buddhist writing and practice, borne forward to our time, when the possibility for wholeness in the world has never seemed more vital.

The Big Picture: At Home In Wholeness

Science and mystics say everyone is connected. We are all children of the Big Bang. We come from space. Everything we see and touch comes from space. Our blood carries iron, sourced in the explosive energy of supernovas. We are not a smallness separate from this grandeur. We are nourished by it and contribute to it. My breath, my iron, was once in someone else's body, and will be again. Yours likewise. With this vast perspective in mind, who among us is a stranger?

Wholeness and connection are central to our existence. But we rarely live as if they are. Our unwieldy sense of separateness is at the core of our suffering. How to repair this is the main lesson we humans need to learn. We feel separate from others, from society, yet we don't want to be alone. We feel separate from our own greatest potential, yet we want to succeed. We feel separate from our feelings and yearn to feel more alive. We don't want to feel fragmented, yet wholeness eludes us. Separateness is suffering. The separateness we address here is not the same as difference and disagreement. Wholeness is not one color. It is definitely not a call for everyone to be the same. It's about not getting so lost in the drama in front of us that we forget a deeper ground that holds everything. The earth we stand on holds us all. The passion for wholeness blazingly recognizes the multiplicities it contains.

Our sense of what is possible is always in dialogue with obstructionist proclivities provided by our psyches and social surround, which hide in plain sight what is actually available to us. This is not a small thing!

> **Nothing hinders waking more**
> **than remaining unaware**
> **of what is already there,**
> **right there without fuss or strain.**

Buddhist views on our human potential offer an optimism- cumrealism that seems unparalleled in contemporary schemata of human possibility. To explore such discourse, we cannot do better than consult a tradition whose very name suggests the truth and necessity of our actual and potential state of completeness.

This great completeness is known in Tibet as Dzogchen. "Dzog" means complete, perfect, whole, and all inclusive, and "chen" means great—underscoring that everything, just everything, is part of this picture. This inclusive reality teems with a variety that never breeches its wholeness. In an ancient poem from the Bon Dzogchen tradition, the voice of reality puts it like this:

> **Nothing, not even one thing,**
> **does not arise from me.**
> **Nothing, not even one thing,**
> **dwells not within me.**
> **Everything, just everything,**
> **emanates from me.**
> **Thus I am only one!**
> **Knowing me is knowing all.**
> **Great bliss.**

Such poetic exultation helps make the familiar strange, thinning out our addiction to the ordinary. The opaqueness in our self- sight fades a bit. Awakening, not to mention buddhahood, may sound esoteric or distant, yet Dzogchen's vision is exactly the opposite. Our sensibilities reveal themselves as naturally primed for the open expanse of inclusivity.

At their best, spiritual, political, social, religious, and psychological systems provide beacons toward wholeness; they are healers of separation. Villains and victims, politicians and those who serve them, as well as the horrific behavior of despots and of nations, peoples, races, and religious standard- bearers who use their power to hate and harm—these are all mired in structures that for the time being preclude wholeness.

On a personal level, there are simple ways to feel more complete: Walking in the woods. Looking at the sky. Sitting quietly with dear ones. In every case, feeling oneself safe in such a larger space is healing and holy. When I am relaxed, feeling safe and among friends, I have no wish to harm anyone. Writ large, this is transformative. In the middle of the Vietnam War, Thich Nhat Hanh famously advocated compassion for the villains and the victims, the hungry and the hunted. He also said, "If I could not be peaceful in the midst of danger, then the kind of peace I might have in simpler times is meaningless." This is not easy. Yet it is possible. In the midst of a cruel racist history, and as a direct target of its menace while spearheading the civil rights movements of the twentieth century, Martin Luther King said, "I believe that unarmed truth and unconditional love will have the final word in reality." Gandhi famously noted that an eye for an eye would make the whole world blind. We must counter injustice with everything we have. But we must not, and in fact ultimately cannot, utterly separate from one another.

Our ordinary human mind might rebel against what might sound like too much acceptance in these calamitous times—so much of the precious Amazon sold to oil interests, the unbearable US school-to-prison pipeline, all products of economic and racial injustices that threaten our world's priceless reroutes. Loss of connection to oneself and to a larger social contract fuels the multi- sourced turmoil we now experience. Recognizing our connectivity begins with seeing clearly into our own human experience. The closer we look, the less we may be able to separate it from what Buddhists call awakening.

The ideas and practices discussed here invite wholeness into our lived experience. Cultural, personal, sexual, racial, and all other distinguishing characteristics contribute to a grand horizon that has no limit. Variety does not create separateness because, again, wholeness is not sameness. Our lived experience is infinitely variable. And appreciation of variety is part of the path to wholeness. Wholeness is blissfully unboring. Or, as Borges put it, "Ecstasy does not repeat its symbols."

Recognizing the connections among things is a game changer. Awareness of intricate interdependencies behind climate change, human migration, economic disparities, and more is crucial. Recognizing interdependence can catalyze whole-hearted dedication to bring about maximum opportunities for everyone. Kindness and a sense of connection, a recognition that we are all in this together, changes priorities. It is a natural extension of the golden rule, central to spiritual traditions around the world. The seven trainings are for embracing unbounded benevolence toward all life.

The ocean is home to infinite waves and ripples, the nature of all of them is water. Our personal wholeness is home to infinite waves of experiences we do or do not want. Yet all of this occurs within the scope of experience. And all experience has the nature of knowing— some kind of awareness underlies every part of experience.

At its most subtle, this knowing is what Dzogchen calls our "incorruptible mind nature." Recognizing this is at the heart of Great Completeness practice. Such recognition conduces to kindness and joy, natural human qualities that can surface any time and enhance our experience right in that moment.

There is no barrier between ordinary and awakened conditions. From the perspective of Dzogchen, humans and buddhas are simply different ways of arising from the general ground of being. In the course of the seven trainings we flow back and forth between human and more awakened states, just as we do in everyday life. Right from the start, the state of being human holds intimations of awakening, even as it obstructs that very thing.

We glimpse these possibilities all the time. A college semester abroad brought me a glorious taste of freedom. I hitchhiked with friends over the San Bernadino pass, walking for miles on the lip of road, praying for a ride, then climbing high onto a transport truck. We spent hours roaring through the mountains, their silhouettes massive against the bright or starlit sky. After sunset, the driver stopped at a small

village near Tolve where a kind family put us up for the night. A few days later, headed toward Italy's boot, our hearts full, our stomachs often empty, a rough-looking driver gave us each a slice of warm Sicilian pizza. The world felt like a very friendly place, a seamless whole of adventure and possibility.

In Brindisi we caught a night- boat to Patras and disembarked in high spirits around dawn, the newly lit sky shining up the sea. I was relaxed and excited. Nothing was required and everything seemed possible. I walked slowly along the quay with my friend, not talking, letting my senses melt into blue vistas as far as the eye could see, the golden sun lying low, sky and water shining everywhere, feeling an intimate part of this expansive display and filled with a simple love for all of it. Something in me said, This is how it really is. Never forget how this feels. It was a kind of vow. I didn't speak of it to anyone, and I didn't forget, but I also had no idea what I might do in connection with this unprecedented exaltation of completeness. Awe and curiosity about this glorious feeling became a palpable force.

Many religious traditions have narratives of a wholeness that existed before variety was born, before separateness emerged, before there was light. Or, more personally, before any thought arose, or before our interfused infant senses condensed into a localized "me."

The boundary between uninterrupted vastness and the onset of variety is, after all, the moment of creation. The impulse to inquire into this process is at the heart of science and the pulsing center of spiritual, psychological, and phenomenological inquiry. Consider the familiar words of Genesis:

> **In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved over the face of the waters. And God said, "Let there be light," and there was light. And God saw that the light was good, and God separated the light from the darkness. God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night.**

The oldest religious document in human history, India's Rigveda also touches the mystery of a time before time:

> **Then even nothingness was not, nor existence. There was no air then, nor the heavens beyond it . . . The One breathed windlessly and self- sustaining. There was that One then, and there was no other. At first there was only darkness wrapped in darkness, All this was only unillumined water . . .**

Later Indian traditions speak variously of atman, brahman, emptiness, and buddha nature or reality as being eternally present in everyone. And in the Gospel of

Thomas, the cosmic vision of Genesis becomes a very personal relationship with originary light:

> Jesus said, "If they say to you, 'Where do you come from?' Say, 'We come from the light; the place where the light [first] came into being . . .' If they say to you, 'Who are you?' Say, 'We are the children [of the light] . . .'"

For Genesis, the Rgveda, and the Gospel of Thomas, creation's opening salvo is light itself. Creation generates boundaries between light and dark, creator and created, and the scriptures then immediately breech that boundary by suggesting the reader's connection with both sides of it, light and dark.

In the Rgveda, we are children of the One. For Saint Thomas, creation means we are children of light. The Tibetan master Padmasambhava, widely known as Guru Rinpoche and forefather of Tibet's Great Completeness traditions, also fused the cosmic and the personal. The fabled Indian king Indrabhüti discovered him, looking like an eight- year- old child, sitting alone inside a giant lotus flower. Naturally curious, the king asks, Who are you and where are your parents? The child responds:

> My father is the wisdom of spontaneous awareness
> My mother is the all- good space of all things
> My caste is indivisible space and awareness
> I have taken the unborn reality realm as my homeland.

The wholeness of a sunlit sky, the radically cosmic and intimate unities of the Great Completeness, resonate with all the above. From the earliest days of Dzogchen, its practitioners played with and explored the expansive, intimate horizon they saw as their real homeland.

Over the centuries, these yogis, poets, and spectacular thinkers created a magnificent legacy of practices, poetry, and philosophy evoking an innate completeness. The Dzogchen Heart Essence literature describes a fundamental ground that exists existentially prior to the division into buddha and ordinary being. This is known as the general ground (spyi'i gzhi) that has not yet been divided into samsara or nirvana. Longchenpa invokes it this way:

> Previously, before me
> there were neither buddhas nor ordinary beings . . .
> Previously, before me
> there was not even the name "buddha". . .
> Buddhas are born from me.
> I am the ultimate meaning of unborn sheer knowing.

There are many such statements in Dzogchen writings. Stories by definition have beginnings and endings. Instructions on practice and practice itself, however, reveal that this ground is actually a state that exists simultaneously, if secretly, with all the limitations that create the human- buddha dichotomy in the first place.

Only a wisp, which is not exactly anything, separates buddhas and humans. This sensed separation from our birthright of wholeness yields pain, restlessness, and dissatisfaction; it is not an abstract metaphysical idea. The tragedies of human history turn on an unwarranted sense of separation from those whom we identify as "not us." The not us, human or animal, seem fair game for colonization, slaughter, enslavement, and general exclusion from rights of any kind. These lines between friend and enemy, superior and lackey, grow vivid to the extent that we forget the larger creativity from which all emerged. And this creativity, for Dzogchen at least, is not a past event; it is an ongoing presence in the sky- space of our being.

I knew none of this when I first learned, through random reading in my teens, that the line between buddhas and humans wasn't so very real, a claim that struck me as absurd but interesting.

An Open Secret

When I was in high school, the few books on Zen then available intrigued me. But when I read that everyone, including me, was already awakened or already a buddha, I put the book down. How could anyone say such a thing? It just seemed impossible. I looked in the mirror, no Buddha there. Still, my curiosity was piqued. But information was hard to come by.

In college the only Asia- related course I could find was a semester of Old Vedic. After college, and after a master's in Buddhist studies from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, I studied Tibetan texts and practices with teachers raised and educated in traditional Tibet, sometimes in India or Nepal, and sometimes as part of graduate studies at the University of Virginia. I learned there were foundational principles to support this wild idea that we are all already buddhas, or the almost equally wild notion that with time we could become one—principles like impermanence, especially the changeability of my own mind and how, when you look really closely, things are different than they first appear. Slowly it sank in that none of us are as stuck as we think. The game of life is a game of change. And change means . . . change! It means possibility. The steely feel of my indignation softened a tad. Studies and practices in impermanence, causality, emptiness, and

compassion—all essentialized in the seven trainings—slowly softened into curiosity my earlier incredulity about the "buddha within" idea. Being introduced to Dzogchen the following decade softened it further.

In 1996 I was inspired to create a pilgrimage to Tibet with a few friends in order to visit places connected with Jigme Lingpa's Vast Expanse Heart Essence (Longchen Nyingthig) Dzogchen lineage. The greatest serendipity of my life was meeting the now- legendary Tibetan lama in the lineage of Long chenpa who was early in life identified as an incarnation of Jigme Lingpa. This was Adzom Paylo Rinpoche. It was only the second time he had come to Central Tibet from his native Kham.

Almost immediately, in the small nunnery where he was staying, and in between giving teaching to monks and nuns who descended single file in long lines from the high retreat caves all around us, singing songs of devotion, he raised the question that I'd been cooking on for so long, and upped the ante considerably: "Do you believe you can awaken in this lifetime?"

What would it be like, I had to wonder anew, to believe in this possibility? I certainly found it attractive and didn't really argue with it anymore, but . . . did I really believe it? I believed it doctrinally by then, but seeing this as part of me now, and not in some distant time but soon, was a wholly different matter.

Perhaps you can appreciate this from your own experience. Would you, right now, like to consider what qualities would you most like to embody? Qualities such as ease, confidence, clarity, or kindness, for example? Take a moment to stop and imagine actually having them in full measure. What would it feel like to walk through your house, to meet friends or strangers with those qualities in play? Can you imagine others having those same qualities in full? Does it impact you in some way to imagine these qualities? Are they not then already in fact present in your experience, already part of you, even if not robustly developed?

Slowly, finally, I began to get, in a more embodied way, that this matter was not a theory about an abstract possibility, nor was it anything I could just decide. I would have to connect what I "knew" about Buddhism with my own real- time felt sense of things. I still didn't know what awakening was, of course, but I was learning that there were ways of training that involved something quite different than gathering information.

Learning to distinguish conceptual abstraction from lived experience was a key step in the process. Getting that understanding from my head into my bones continues to be a compelling part of learning and practice, and was the subject of my earliest books. Being willing to leave the safe haven of ideas for the messier arena of experience was part of the challenge. I learned that I liked the creative space in which knowing and wondering flow forward together.

When we look into our actual experience, there are endless clues about where this might lead. A pioneering researcher into finely seen human experience, Claire Petitmengin, recently wrote: "Most of the time, we are cut off from ourselves, from what vibrates and lives within us, and this disconnection has catastrophic consequences in all areas of existence. Retrieving contact with our experience is the precondition that would allow the regaining of our lucidity, our dignity, and the courage to change our model of society."

The entire Buddhist tradition, starting with the practice of mindfulness so well known today, encourages a new familiarity with experience. At the same time, both Buddhism and science encourage us to cognitively understand the framework in which we live. Lived experience and cognitive understanding are distinctive and mutually enriching ways of knowing.

Longchenpa says that wisdom is present in every mind and body. This wisdom is not a knowing about something else; it is sheer knowing, seeing itself. It doesn't gaze outward or inward. It wakes up to its own unstoppable, incorruptible nature, like fresh water moistening or recognizing itself in its spontaneous, elemental rush down a mountain. Everything we experience is in the field of our knowing. There is no "out there" beyond that.

This is not something to take anyone else's word for. Can you separate your knowing from what it knows? Your senses from what they sense—sounds, sights, and all the rest? You don't have to decide now, it's part of our ongoing exploration here.

For Longchenpa, sheer knowing is the support and essence of every experience. We just haven't noticed this before. In retrospect, my glory moment by Patras harbor showed me something like that.

In a flash, something indescribably new was suddenly as obvious as the noonday sun. There was no separation here between knowing and what I knew. Knowing and known were equally part of the blue air and water, the whole horizon felt as

intimate as it was vast. The real secret, hard to believe but in the end impossible to ignore, is that this shining is the way of all knowing.

But how does this happen? How is it, really?

Backlit By Completeness

Do you remember learning to read? Did you learn individual letters first, or did you start with one- syllable words? Do you remember the shock of learning that a final "e" is not pronounced? The magic of not just looking at letters but reading!

When I saw a family friend, not much older than this five- year- old me, open a book and read it out loud, I was filled with admiration and ambition. How did he do that? How could I do that? Soon enough, I practiced at home with a book about a girl taking her first train ride. My first day, I could not get past the opening sentence. Then each day after, without understanding why, without any further instruction, I could read a little further. So I felt, deep in my bones, that learning can naturally unfold, step by step. Learning the alphabet of course was necessary, but that didn't explain why I could now read today what I couldn't read yesterday. I didn't try in any special way or ask anyone's help. I just showed up and my ability increased. The same thing happened when I learned to count. Each morning, I stood by our third- floor living- room window, looking down on the street below. Each day I could count a little higher than before. I didn't consult anyone or practice in between. The knowing was in there. Apparently it just needed incubation.

What I really think happened is that I learned to relax. After reading that first sentence, I was just too excited to go on. It wasn't the ability to read that threw me off, it was my habitual tight holding to a life- long conception of myself as someone who could not read. Breaking into a new identity, even a highly desired one, is a challenge. That challenge made me just tense enough that I couldn't continue reading. But by the next day I was used to seeing myself as someone who could read one sentence, so I could read a second. But a whole page? Not yet. So each morning I read until I reached that day's barrier, the moment when my self- sense as someone who could not read would rise up and I would freeze. I oscillated continually between these recently crystallized identities of reader and nonreader. Before I started to read, there was no such division. And now it wasn't because of mysterious letters that I couldn't go further. I just wasn't ready to be a certain idealized version of myself—a reader. Once I relaxed into the truth of that reader identity, it was easy to go on. This pattern is still true for me today. In writing this book, in practicing the

paths it describes, I am repeatedly showing up, getting stuck, then relaxing enough to make the next step possible. Relaxing makes us more whole, more available to our knowing. Moving into a new identity as a reader comes more easily. The same is true as we move back and forth from our ordinary human experience to more awakened states.

In large and small ways, I discover over and again how stress holds me back from joy and creativity. It is also hard on the body. But stress, no matter how ubiquitous, is not our natural state. It causes us to withdraw, lash out, lose our expansiveness. It divides us from deeper reserves of knowing, and especially from intimacy with ourselves and others. In practice, shedding identification with stress allows the currents of wakefulness to flow through us, just as taking a deep breath makes for relaxation.

The trainings discussed here reckon with our hopes, fears, and negative ideation as well as with the potential we have to be increasingly free from these. Confidence, trust, and commitment are essential. Modern culture seems to value skepticism, yet often rewards certainties of dubious merit: the glamorously confident movie stars, the ideologically fired- up politician, the profit- monger CEO. The confidence needed in these trainings is not of this type. It does not thrive on fanfare. It is a genuine certainty in our capacity to access something authentic in ourselves, something as basic as the capacity to read, and to recognize this capability in others.

It took me only a few decades to recognize that my skepticism about awakening was based, first of all, on having no idea what Buddhist traditions actually meant by this, and, second, on not knowing that there was actually a process for approaching it. Finally, and most important of all, it was based on my assumption that awakening lay entirely outside the bounds of natural human experience. In fact, exactly the opposite is true. Dzogchen in particular emphasizes that wakening is basic and intrinsic. Learning to get out of our own way is the challenge.

Dzogchen is for the ancient Nyingma Buddhist and Bon traditions the most sacred, swift, and hidden of the great traditions of Tibet. Longchenpa's seven trainings for the Great Completeness seek to loosen what binds us from wholeness and thereby allow us to experience what Dzogchen describes as our real nature, our vast expanse. The trainings engage your entire body, energy system, and mind. They reflect Longchenpa's key observation that wisdom suffuses the entire human body

and mind and distils the elements that transform ordinary flesh and blood into a body of living wisdom.

Jigme Lingpa's Reflections on Long Chenpa's Sevenfold Mind Training

Jigme Lingpa's expansive reflections on Long chenpa's seven trainings, his unique story- meditations, his pith practices, and the additional meditative instructions he brings forward show how these trainings engage every step of Nyingma's nine pathways.13 In the first three chapters of Part 3 we introduce Jigme Lingpa's text expanding on Longchenpa's seven trainings and note especially his teaching stories and pith instructions, along with the important role of imagination and the centrality of a compassionate heart, culminating in Long chenpa's distillation of the channel- wind practices' subtle integration of mind and body.

This puts us in a good position to appreciate the pivots by which Long chenpa moves practitioners toward Dzogchen's wisdom narrative that runs like a river through all the trainings. The wisdom narrative we refer to here has been transmitted from teacher to student, going back at least to the time of Longchenpa. Throughout Buddhist traditions from the time of the Buddha, human relationship is always part of the equation.

Longchenpa's own pivots toward Dzogchen, drawn from select philosophical and poetic writings, form the organizing principles of the closing two chapters of Part 3. Along the way, and in between chapters, we touch sequentially into Jigme Lingpa's five pith practices, found in his own discussion of the seven trainings. These distill the wisdom trail into single- sentence meditations that can inform our own wisdom turn for a lifetime.

Over time, these practices elicit new understanding and fresh feelings, gently undoing habitual distancing and feelings of separateness in relation to the world and to ourselves. As a vital foundation for all of this, we now start with Part 1, Long chenpa's own very succinct text on these seven trainings, to which I've appended a section on the background of the seven trainings. Part 2 is Adzom Paylo Rinpoche's oral commentary on the trainings. His distilled discussion of all seven trainings is the prologue and context for my reflections on them in seven chapters in Part 3. <>

Practical Buddhism: Mindfulness and Skilful Living in the Modern Era by Paramabandhu Groves [Aeon Academic, ISBN 9781913274214]

❖ **A complete guide to the Buddhist practices of meditation, right living, and everything else you need to know**

Who was the Buddha and why did he become such a significant historical figure? What were his most important insights and teachings? What can he tell us about the universality of suffering and the potential for freedom? How can we live a life with growth and harmony and without emotional pain? What is Buddhist understanding of the greater reality? With clarity and simplicity, wisdom and humour, Paramabandhu Groves takes us on a journey towards some answers to these questions.

The Buddha's remarkable passage through his own life showed him that ascetic practice in itself did not bring enlightenment, but a careful attention to internal processes combined with a compassionate attitude to self and others could bring an extraordinary freedom from suffering. The mainstay of Buddhist practice is mindfulness of breath, body and emotions leading to a more profound awareness.

The Buddha indicated a bigger picture, beyond words, based on the interconnectedness and impermanence of all things. Practical Buddhism shows us how we can use these practices to lead a moral and ethical life, receiving and giving friendship, not causing harm and achieving happiness while our consciousness becomes, brighter, clearer and more subtle. Paramabandhu weaves examples both from his own experience and other people's to demonstrate the value of Buddhist practice and techniques in managing the multiple demands and challenges of everyday life.

PRACTICAL BUDDHISM explores:

> * Mindfulness practice and misconceptions about meditation
> * Working with troublesome thoughts and difficult emotions
> * The practice of compassion and kindness
> * Guidelines for skilful living
> * Working through stress, relationship problems and addictive behaviour
> * The meaning of karma and dharma
> * Understanding freedom, impermanence and non-selfhood
> * Buddhism and psychotherapy
> * How Buddhist practice informs our relationship with sexuality, illness and pain, greed and sustainability.

CONTENTS

Do not go by oral tradition, by lineage of teaching,
by hearsay, by a collection of texts . . .
by the seeming competence of a speaker,
or because you think, 'The ascetic is our teacher.'
But when you know for yourselves,
'These things are unwholesome; these things are blamable;
these things are censured by the wise;
these things, if undertaken and practised, lead to harm and suffering,'
then you should abandon them.
—The Buddha

I was a medical student on one of my first retreats when I first studied the Kãlãma Sutta. The Kãlãmas were a clan living in remote part of the Ganges basin at the time of the Buddha, who were confused by all the different spiritual teachings around at that time and wanted to know what they could rely on. One teacher would promote one set of ideas, only for the next teacher passing through to debunk them and put forward a different teaching. So when the Buddha visited them, they explained their dilemma and asked him to clarify who was speaking the truth and who was not. The Buddha's response was pragmatic. As quoted above, he replied that you should not go on hearsay or blind belief. The twin tests of all teachings were their effect in your own experience and whether they were commended by the wise.

Back then, I particularly responded to the former criterion. For example, did the teaching, when put into practice, lead to greater happiness and contentment? If it did, it should be engaged in. Or did it lead to harm and suffering? In this case, it should be abandoned. This was the Dharma, the Buddha's teaching. I found this refreshing and a relief. Here was a set of teachings that did not rest on something I could not verify. I had to put it into practice and see if it was helpful. The implication was also that anything that could help move you towards inner freedom was the Dharma too, even if it was not formally Buddhist. So the teaching was not something that was frozen in time or exclusive to received Buddhist doctrines. If it helps, then use it. As a medical student interested in becoming a psychiatrist, it meant that approaches I might learn in my training, such as psychotherapy, could in principle be included in my practice of the Dharma.

As a young man with individualistic leanings — like many of us in the modern Westernized world — it was perhaps not surprising that I responded to the first criterion, but barely noticed the other test: the testimony of the wise. Although the issue of who are the 'wise' is something of a fraught question, over time I have come to see it is an important counterbalance to one-sided individualism. Without the benefit of those more experienced than me on the path, I can be blinded by my own biases. Like learning anything new we can benefit both from putting in effort and monitoring its effects and by being receptive to those with greater experience. Even on that retreat where I was learning the importance of testing the teachings of the Buddha in my own experience, I was also being taught. I was being introduced to this fundamental quality of how to approach Buddhism by the teacher. Inspired by the weekend of study (as would happen many times in the future when I met or was

introduced to something in Buddhism I found uplifting), I wanted to put it into practice straight away.

In this book, Practical Buddhism, I have tried to show the practical aspects of the Buddha's teaching, to indicate how you can use it in your life to make a real difference. Most of the chapters follow the sort of things you are likely to learn if you were to go to a Buddhist centre in order to put the Buddha's teachings into practice. Often people first go to a Buddhist centre to learn to meditate. So chapters two to four describe meditation, especially practising mindfulness and kindness (you will find a link at the end of the book that can take you to some guided meditations to listen to online or download). Our meditation is affected by what we do in the rest of our lives, just as meditation when practised diligently will affect our life outside of formal meditation. Chapter five looks at Buddhist ethical principles and how to live skillfully in a way that supports our meditation and conduces to our happiness. One of the main contexts that affects how we behave is our work. The theme of our livelihood is taken up in chapter six. Buddhism places great importance on friendship and this is explored in chapter seven. Ritual is an area of practice that complements meditation, although it sometimes comes as surprise to people that it is part of Buddhism. Chapter eight describes ritual and devotion, and its place in Buddhism. There has been a lot of interest by psychotherapists in the Buddha's teachings, particularly meditation. Moreover, many people who are practising Buddhism also seek psychotherapeutic help. As a psychiatrist, who has trained in psychotherapy, it seemed pertinent to address this area (chapter nine). The final chapter explores wisdom, which is a distinctive feature of Buddhism. Wisdom is both the final step that leads directly to enlightenment, the ultimate aim of Buddhism, and a way of talking about the content of the enlightenment experience.

To bring the book to life I have included various vignettes of people practising Buddhism. These are drawn from my experience of practising and teaching Buddhism over more than 20 years. To preserve people's anonymity I haven't described specific individuals. Rather, these are composite, with personal details changed, but I hope they will help to illustrate the sorts of issues that we face when trying to put the Buddha's teaching into practice.

Before we look at how we practise Buddhism, however, it might be helpful to have an idea of who the Buddha was. Chapter one therefore describes the Buddha and his context, and it is to this that we will now turn.

Riding The Spirit Bus; My Journey from Satsang with Ram Dass to Lama Foundation and Dances of Universal Peace by Ahad Cobb [A Sacred Planet Book, Inner Traditions, ISBN 9781644115350]

❖ **A memoir of spiritual awakening and travel in the 60s and 70s, sacred dance in the 80s and 90s, and astrological insight in the 90s and 2000s**

Recounts the author's deep involvement with three spiritual community movements originating in the sixties which are still thriving today: the Ram Dass satsang, Lama Foundation, and Dances of Universal Peace

Offers insights from his study of Vedic astrology, sacred dance, his search for love, and his personal work with past-life recordings, Jungian analysis, and trauma release

After coming of age and graduating in the tumultuous sixties, Ahad Cobb found himself wandering without direction. A chance road trip with a friend led him to Ram Dass, thus beginning an enthusiastic journey of spiritual awakening and deep involvement with three spiritual communities that originated in the sixties and still thrive today: the Ram Dass satsang, Lama Foundation, and Dances of Universal Peace.

Sharing his opening to the inner life, his poetry and dreams, and his spiritual passions and astrological insights, Ahad Cobb's memoir begins with his summer with Ram Dass, immersed in meditation, devotion, and guru's grace. His path takes him to New Mexico, to a newly established intentional spiritual community, Lama Foundation, where he lives on the land for thirteen years, experiencing the discipline and rewards of communal living and spiritual practice. At Lama, he is initiated into universal Sufism in the tradition of Hazrat Inayat Khan and the Dances of Universal Peace. He travels overseas to spend time with Sufis in Chamonix, Istanbul, Konya, and Jerusalem.

After the birth of his son, Ahad moves off the mountain and serves as sacred dance leader and musician for 35 years in Santa Fe and later Albuquerque. When Lama Foundation is nearly destroyed by a forest fire in 1996, Ahad serves as a trustee, guiding the rebuilding of the community. Ahad's memoir imparts insights from his personal work with Jungian analysis and trauma release, shares his search for and discovery of his soul mate, and details his twelve years of study with Hart DeFouw in the wisdom stream of Vedic astrology.

Offering a poignant reflection on life lived from the inside out, and the delicate balance between spirituality and psychology, this memoir leads readers on an outer and inner journey steeped in poetry, music, astrology, and spiritual practice in the context of community that is devoted to awakening.

CONTENTS

We live in two worlds: the inner world and the outer world. These worlds overlap and interpenetrate each other. These two worlds project on and reflect each other. Yet each world has its own logic, its own dynamics, and its own laws, so to speak. We see with two eyes: the inner eye and the outer eye. In order to live fully we need to develop, as Pir Vilayat said, stereoscopic vision, or, as Murshid Sam bluntly put it, controlled schizophrenia. The inner life is always present, always alive, coexistent with, distinct from, yet interpenetrating, the outer life. Yet for the most part, attention is on the outer life in the world.

After the grandiose dreams and fantasy play of childhood, my attention was focused on the outer world of school, sports, homework, and family dynamics. Only in adolescence did I become aware that part of my consciousness was discontinuous with consensual outer reality, that there was a self-arising, independent, authoritative mentation within me.

While sitting and sipping cocktails with my family in the backyard on a balmy summer evening, I had become aware of blood calling out from the earth, the blood of Native Americans slaughtered, the lives of black slaves sacrificed, so that we could sit in the shade and get a buzz on. Who could I tell this to?

No one was going to validate my inner world. In fact, I soon found out that the expression of my knowingness was considered subversive and unacceptable. My father would call me into his den for long serious talks after dinner. He would try to

educate me in history, politics, and economics, to the point where I would become bored. When he asked me what I was thinking and I told him, his standard response was, "Frank, I think you're crazy." I learned to keep my thoughts to myself.

I wrote down my thoughts and feelings extensively in diaries and journals. My journal writing—vital, vernacular, vulgar, enthused, stream of consciousness— came to an abrupt end one day when my father violated the privacy of my room, read what he needed to read of my journals, confiscated and destroyed them all— along with my love and trust in him.

Despite the atmosphere of paternal repression and censorship, there developed a very rich if submerged and inarticulate inner life, along with my sisters who tried so hard but at times could not contain their giggling and laughter from bursting forth during the solemnity of dinner time.

> Darkness gathers in family dinners
> in shells of laughter
> in lions of prayer
> Silent children run away
> through galleries sunk in the silverware
> through floodlit cellars and golf courses
> tunneling through secret love
> in the summer houses of the moon

Poetry and prose fiction turned out to be a more socially acceptable form of giving some expression to my inner voice, and even got some marginal recognition. I began to develop a craft and some identity around being a poet. By the time I was in college, what I came to call "the singing voice" of my inner world was far more essential and life-giving than the outer world of classwork and homework assignments.

By the time I heard Robert Bly say, "If you want to be a poet, you need to go be alone for a while," I was ready to take the plunge. I spent one whole summer totally alone on retreat in the White Mountains. I didn't write a single poem, so immersed was I for the first time in the silent world of essence.

Absorption into unity, expansion into diversity—this is the inhalation and exhalation of spirit, the ebb and flow of consciousness. All life rides on the swing of the breath—in and out, in and out. Absorption into unity returns one to essential

simplicity. Expansion into diversity brings one forth into the glorious, creative complexity of the manifest world.

My experiential reality is largely a matter of where and how I focus my attention. When focused solely on the external world, I find myself trapped in what seem to be endless cycles of suffering and self-replicating economies of conflict, futility, and despair: samsara . . . dunya . . . let alone the inevitable old age, sickness, anqd death, which we do our best to ignore.

Suzuki Roshi said, "Life is like stepping onto a boat that is about to sail out to sea and sink."

We don't want to look at that. In every age and in every condition, the single most valuable thing one can do is to take time to be alone with oneself outside of social influences, whether through meditation, retreat, solitude, or wandering, to let oneself know the silence of the inner life.

I wasn't born to be a hippie, spiritual or otherwise. I was born to be an investment banker, seduced by the muse in my youth, but eventually coming to my senses and perpetuating my genes in the good life in suburban Baltimore. But a massive wave of spiritual awakening swept through the post-war world in the sixties and seventies, and I was a sparkle in that wave. Ancient streams of blessing were flooding into the post-industrial West.

In my beginning God was dead—or hidden, or inaccessible. God was not alive in my family, nor in my school, nor, as far as I could tell, in my church. Life was obedience, discipline, and achievement in a very privileged prison, but the rewards were mostly empty. Something was missing, but I didn't know what it was. The family and culture I had grown up in was achievement oriented, cold, competitive, and mental. My soul had a song to sing, a life to live, but could not see its reflection in the world I grew up in. So, I developed brilliant, sarcastic, cutting, cynical, hyper-linguistic mental abilities, even as my heart lay dormant, with no companion other than the sweet soul music on the radio.

The promise of Holy Communion in the Presbyterian Church turned out to be a dud. There was no Christ in the thimble of grape juice or the cube of Wonder Bread. The presence of Jesus in his words has been with me throughout life, but the belief systems that grew up around the figure of Jesus made no sense to me. Although

millions of people for thousands of years have been united in Christian belief systems, it still made no sense to me.

The Buddhist concept of enlightenment and the high of smoking marijuana came into my life at the same time, and for a while they seemed to be the same. I had no teacher or guide other than my friends. I learned that nirvana was "a place or state characterized by freedom from or oblivion to pain, worry, and the external world," which seemed to be precisely the result of getting high. Time stopped, mind stopped, vision and hearing were acute, everything appeared as it really was, infinite. .. for a moment. Nirvana is "a blowing out," and getting high blows the mind ... for a moment, a split second in eternity ... until the music starts singing, the muse starts chanting, and ultimately . . . until the munchies come on with a vengeance. Although getting high was initially liberating, it turned out to be an addictive trap that it took me way too long to get out of.

Enlightenment may have been an appealing ideal, but it was the teachings of Mr. Gurdjieff that first awoke me to the reality of the human situation—that ordinary man is a machine, an automaton, with no free will, no real "I." I recognized that I had no real identity.

I had nothing but a mind that was ceaselessly churning information, words, and ideas, a mind on automatic, a mind that would not stop. I tried the stop exercise. I tried self-remembering. I tried and I tried. But I had no awareness of my emotional suffering. My mind would not permit it. I was not ready for this way of conscious labor and intentional suffering.

Ram Dass and the Maharaj-ji satsang welcomed me into a love I had been yearning for my whole life. What attracted me was not the philosophy or the mythology. The whole gestalt of guru yoga, Sanskrit chants, and blue-skinned, dewy-eyed multi-armed deities was strange to me—but the love I could feel was for real, the love, the joy, and the peace. Despite my skeptical mind, I experienced God as a living reality, living within and among us just as Jesus promised, and my heart blossomed.

The way given was to love, serve, and remember God always and everywhere. The methods given were to quiet the mind and open the heart through meditation, devotional chanting, and selfless service (seva). This path and these methods remained constant throughout all my years at Lama Foundation, with my further initiation into the Chishti Sufi path through Pir Vilayat Khan and Murshid Samuel

Lewis, into the practices of divine remembrance (zikr), invocation of the divine names (wazifahs), and the ecstatic Dances of Universal Peace.

The goal of all these Hindu and Sufi practices seemed to be mystical union, union with God, union with the Beloved. As articulated by Hazrat Inayat Khan, "There is one Path, the annihilation of the false ego in the Real. . . ." I vigorously pursued practices that brought me experiences of unity, not-self, no mind, white space, emptiness, and so on—but these were all temporary states. I rapturously fantasized in poetry that I had touched home plate.

But what no one told me and what I could not see for myself was that, in order to function in life on the Earth plane, one must have an ego to begin with. In order to annihilate ("soften" is the preferred word these days) the false ego in the Real, One must have an ego to begin with. And my ego was vague and fuzzy at best, shattered and disintegrated grated at worst. I could barely function outside of spiritual community. I was on a major spiritual bypass, using spiritual beliefs and practices to avoid dealing with my debilitating emotional pain.

My inner work with Joanna Walsh involved embracing an alternative and idiosyncratic belief system, which was a derivative of Scientology and Kahuna wisdom. The model was that the cause of dysfunction and suffering lies in the subconscious, in past-life traumatic recordings that automatically react out in present time, and that the dissolution of these past-life recordings removes obstacles to healthy functioning as superconscious in present time. I took all this at face value because the love between us was real and it gave me a way to begin to work on my emotional wounding that I had been in denial about for so long.

The study of jyotish connected me back with the sanatana dharma, the perennial philosophy of Hinduism, specifically Sankhya and Vedanta, a window initially opened by Ram Dass, now exquisitely articulated by Hart DeFouw. Jyotish was a method by which pure awareness (chit) of the soul (atman) could witness the delicate intricacies of karma manifesting in time and space—and see the unseen (adrishta). Jyotish offered practical and spiritual means (upayas) of engaging with karma in intentional ways.

I studied Sanskrit for two years. I studied both the Bhagavad Gita and Yoga Sutras with Nicolai Bachman. Vedantic philosophy and vocabulary deeply imprinted me. Sanskrit mantras joined my Sufi practices.

And for a while I sat on the back porch smoking and reading nondual advaita teachings, which assert that the soul is the same as the ultimate reality—until I realized that, although my soul recognizes the truth of these teachings, without a living teacher they result in little more than the spiritualization of the ego.

But when love came to town, and for the first time in my life someone loved me deeply, passionately, and truly, and that someone, MaryRose, was a practicing depth psychologist, I found that I finally had to engage in long-neglected personal work on my emotional complexes. For starters, I had to get out of my head, get in touch with my feelings, and learn how to communicate my feelings to my beloved. This may sound simple, but for me it was not.

More recently I have been working with the Jungian belief system, which posits two distinct psychological centers: the ego and the Self. The ego is the conscious personality—who I think I am. The Self is what we might call the higher self, the totality of conscious and unconscious, the inner presence that many of us know simply as God. What is crucial is the connection between—the dialogue between ego and Self—a dynamic process that never resolves but keeps moving toward greater wholeness, constantly cycling through ego inflation (identification with the Self) and ego alienation (disconnection with the Self). There is no get-out-of-jail-free card.

The Jungian belief system gives me a model with which to engage and unveil my actual psychological experience and to deal with long suppressed emotional wounds and trauma in a much more grounded way than chasing past-life fantasies. There is ample space for all the previous belief systems I have embraced to function without being invalidated or supplanted.

Reflecting on the Sufi symbol of the heart with wings, Widad and I agree that personal psychological work and spiritual practice are the two wings on which the soul soars.

I had been seeking love, lover, and beloved my whole life, and coming up against what I took to be my own inability to love, time and time again, until finally I just gave up. I couldn't get what I wanted, so I resolved not to want what I wanted and that left me very unhappy, or very stoically "content." I learned to live with unfulfilled desire. Dissociation, defiance, deception, and repression may have been necessary strategies for getting through childhood with some authenticity intact

(and well-hidden), but these habit patterns were disastrous obstructions to loving another person. My ingrained sarcastic responses undermined me at every turn.

Marriage is the belief system I subscribe to now, monogamy with my wife, who loves me and opens the way for me to love her. Ours is not a young marriage for creating a family. Ours is a mature marriage for bringing soul into the world, for polishing the mirror of the heart, and trusting each other when one says, "Hey! It looks like you missed something there!" I cannot see my own blind spots without the reflection of someone I know loves me and sometimes sees what I cannot. We definitely have a subscription to each other's issues, along with devotion to similar spiritual practices.

We all have belief systems, everything from cargo cults to ascended masters. Most of us have multiple belief systems, although we may not be aware of it. Our minds are like the blind men with the elephant, touching a part of the elephant and taking it for the whole, touching multiple parts and holding multiple "truths"—without apprehending the greater reality, which in truth is beyond the mind.

> When one looks at the ocean,
> one can only see that part of it which
> comes within one's range of vision;
> so it is with the truth.
> HAZRAT INAYAT KHAN

Hart used to say that the jyotishi should have lots of tools in his bag, lots of methods and approaches. The master golfer never approaches the same tee in the same way. The master investor does not make the same play the same way every day. Learn a new technique, try it for a while, use it all the time, then put it into your tool bag and move on, he would say.

A Quaker woman once said to me, "No religion has all the answers. That's why we study all the religions."

The overall dynamic of this inner life narrative has been the urge of the unconscious to move into consciousness, to bring forth richness and beauty, to liberate the conscious self from limiting conditions and identifications, and to bring that self into awareness of and alignment with the superconscious presence, divine life energy that lives in all beings, in all things.

We are all related. We are all one. There is no separation among all my relations. Hazrat Inayat Khan speaks of the intoxication of life. I imagine that we are all

packed into a crowded bar, drinking, smoking, talking, laughing, dancing, and carrying on. All the drinks are passed around and I taste everything. I'll have what you're having and more! Everyone is having a good time with good friends, except for a few inevitable loners. A good time is had by all—until it starts to feel too loud and noisy. I feel overheated and dizzy from too many drinks. I go outside into the cool night air and climb up a hill. I sit under a tree and gaze at the moon in the starry sky. Warm light and laughter spill out of the tavern far below. Sitting quietly in the still of the night, I slowly sober up and become alert and aware. In sobriety I touch my essential presence, the truth of my being. I sit there a little longer and then go back down the hill, back into the barroom, and greet my friends, and choose my booze....

I try to do my spiritual practices first thing in the morning upon awakening and after writing down my dreams. I sit in formless meditation, riding on awareness of the breath. I put Sanskrit mantras on the breath, followed by Sufi purifications, wazifahs, and zikr on the breath, vocal practice, singing zikr, and writing down what is given to me. Any and all, or none of the above.

And when my wife needs to talk with me, that takes precedence over my personal practice, although generally, she has her own morning devotions. And sometimes we sit together.

It used to be that spiritual practice was rigidly maintained and set apart from the rest of my life. Now spiritual practice is a good part of my life and permeates all that I do.

I return to sitting in silence, breathing. At first, I was disciplined, even rigid, about spiritual practice, enthusiastic, excessive, and then I grew lax and forgetful, then devoted and daily, now natural and flexible, almost casual. There is no longer a dividing line between meditation and everyday life, although I always love to, in the words of Pir Vilayat, take time for the timeless.

> Just before the dawn
> I awake and I am gone . . .
> and the road goes on and on and on
> in the breath of Er-Rahman
> When I feel the morning breeze,
> see the light come through the trees,
> then I fall down on my knees and breathe . . .
> Allah Hu Allah Hu Allah Hu

When I stay overnight in Santa Fe and take my morning walk along the river, each portion of the walk is the container for a particular prayer. The landscape remembers my prayers along with me.

I gaze directly into the light of the morning sun, filtered through the branches and leaves of a tree, and greet the path of light: Om Bhur Buvaha Swaha. . . . Then I walk on down the block: Om Gam Ganapataye Namaha . . . I walk down the street, until I reach the park and turn left, breathing a Brahma mantra. I reach the river and walk along the green path, breathing presence of the Goddess: Hrim Shrim Klim Parameshwari Swaha. ... I walk on until the path stops curving and lies straight ahead. I say the invocation, "Toward the One," and begin my Sufi practices: purification breaths all the way out until I turn around, then wazifahs and zikr all the way home, breathing "Allah," essence presence, into the very cells of my body.

***

Meditation engenders a state of bliss in the whole body, essential bliss, ananda. For me, this sensation of bliss concentrates in the forehead, just above the eyebrows. In meditation, my brow becomes open and expansive like vast blue sky with occasional wispy thought clouds drifting through. Behind the bliss is an abiding calmness, spaciousness, emptiness.

> Each morning I sit in a column of breath,
> inscribing names on this tower of breath,
> writing light on luminous space,
> windows of presence,
> power and glory,
> tap-tap-tapping the telegraph of my heart,
> imprinting every organ and cell,
> divine life presence awareness
> silent and utterly still,
> and feeling the blood pulsing and flowing
> at the base of my skull,
> Ya Hayy Ya Hayy.. .
> O Life O Life.. .
> deeply embedded in heart throbbing,
> libb lubb, libb lubb, libb lubb, libb lubb . . .
> live love, live love, live love, live love . . .
>
>
> Deeper the secret
> the heart mouth utters

> Hu Allah Hu Allah Hu Allah Hu
> As I live and breathe,
> (as my grandmother used to say)
> there is something someone living and breathing,
> something someone so much greater,
> so awesomely powerful and infinitely loving,
> living and breathing in every creature,
> listening to the heart in the center of my chest
> Hu Allah Hu Allah Hu Allah Hu

Friends, we are all on the journey; life itself is a journey. No one is settled here; we are all passing onward, and therefore it is not true to say that if we are taking a spiritual journey we have to break our settled life; there is no one living a settled life here; all are unsettled, all are on their way.

HAZRAT INAYAT KHAN

> My body is like a mountain.
> My eyes are like the ocean.
> My mind is like the sky.

Essence is simple like sunlight is simple . . . pure white light that contains all the rays of color in its wholeness.

Spiritual practice can be very boring, boring to the ego, although the ego can seek to attach its values to spiritual practice in all sorts of subtle and not-so-subtle ways. Spiritual practice can be beautiful, uplifting, inspiring, and all that, and still be empty and boring to the ego. As Reb Zalman says, "When zikr gets boring, that's when it gets really exciting."

I am aware of being the space surrounding the Earth, the space within and around the Earth. I am the atmosphere and all lives and breathes within me, all my thoughts and feelings, all my relations and creations, all my lifetimes and wife-times, all my ancestors and lovers and children, all live and breathe and move and love in the space I am.

It is all so intimately familiar and poignant. I have seen myself take birth and play and work and love and suffer and die time and time again, over and over and over again, and here I am, the seemingly eternal, unchanging, luminous space in which it all happens and to which it all returns.

The soul comes into life in order to have experiences. In order to have experiences, the soul needs to see its reflection in the world.

I was a hidden treasure and I desired to be known so I created a creation to which I made Myself known. Then they knew Me. HADITH QUDSI

Pure awareness is conscious—but not self-conscious. In order to be conscious of self, soul seeks reflection in experience by identifying with whatever is experienced. Soul itself is free from any identity.

The soul has no birth, no death, no beginning, and no end. Sin cannot touch it, nor can virtue exalt it. Wisdom cannot open it up, nor can ignorance darken it. HAZRAT INAYAT KHAN

In order to have experience, the soul can and does identify with whatever is presented to it and whatever form it finds itself in.

What I experience as reality at any one moment is largely a result where and how I focus my attention.

Over time, a series of self-identifications coheres in memory form a self-image with a personal history. Writing these memoirs creates a personal history. The process of writing these memoirs is a letting go of all of these experiences.

Hart says that moksha, which is usually translated as liberation, means the ability to let go of experiences. Without letting go of experiences cannot have new experiences. We just keep on recycling the same old san old. When we can let go of experiences, we can have new experiences.

Hold on tightly and let go lightly. RAM DASS

***

Each morning I sit in a column of breath,
inscribing names on this tower of breath,
writing light on luminous space,
windows of presence,
power and glory,
tap-tap-tapping the telegraph of my heart,
imprinting every organ and cell,
divine life presence awareness
silent and utterly still,
and feeling the blood pulsing and flowing
at the base of my skull,
Ya Hayy Ya Hayy.. .

SELFLESS MINDS: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE ON VASUBANDHU'S METAPHYSICS by Monima Chadha [Oxford University Press, 9780192844095]

SELFLESS MINDS offers a new interpretation of no-self metaphysics in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa-Bhasya. Monima Chadha reads Vasubandhu as defending not only eliminativism about self but also about persons, and illusionism about the sense of self and all kinds of self-representation. This radical no-self thesis presents several challenges for Abhidharma Buddhist philosophy of mind. Even if we then grant that there is no self, we are left with deeper questions about the sense of self or self-representations implicated in our ordinary everyday experience and thought about the world and ourselves. And if we grant that there are no persons, questions remain about the status of our person-related concerns and interpersonal practices. Selfless Minds answers these questions on behalf of the Abhidharma Buddhist.

The first part of the book defends the hypothesis that we can salvage much of our experience and thought without implicating self-representations. The second part of the book examines the revisionary implications of the no-person metaphysics. Some of these seem unpalatable, if not downright absurd. This, she argues, give us reason to re-evaluate both the Abhidharma metaphysics and our ordinary person-related practices and concerns in light of each other by using some sort of wide reflective equilibrium.

SELFLESS MINDS is a contribution to cross-cultural philosophy that studies the nature of selfless minds from a place at the crossroads of different traditions and disciplines: philosophy in the traditional Buddhist and contemporary Western traditions, and contemporary cognitive sciences.

CONTENTS

Index

Philosophical traditions in classical India agreed on one thing: We are not what we think we are. They disagreed, however, on the answer to the question: What are we? The disagreement, despite the agreement, is curious. And that drew me to Indian philosophy.

The self is central to our ordinary understanding of the mind. We ascribe mental states and activities to selves. We think of the self as the source of agency and the subject of experience. The dominant Hindu view of the self (ātman) as an eternal conscious substance trapped in the cycle of birth and rebirth sounded excessive to me. This Hindu view had many critics in ancient India, most famously the Buddhists. They argued that there are no such selves; we are nothing more than a bundle of constantly evolving physical and mental states. This no- self view sounded no less excessive. It is difficult to conceive of ourselves as mere bundles of physical and mental states without a self. The conflict between these irreconcilable views motivated me to probe deeper. The question in my mind was whether either of these classical Indian views is philosophically defensible. I spent a decade or so trawling through the classical Hindu- Buddhist controversy looking for an answer. Discussions of these issues in the classical texts always seemed to end in a stalemate. To get a purchase on philosophical issues which would help to make progress on the Hindu- Buddhist debate about the self, I found myself looking to contemporary philosophy for inspiration.

No-self views are becoming increasingly popular in contemporary philosophy, facilitated by the influence of the cognitive sciences. However, most con temporary views focus on the denial of the "self" as real entity, whether it is identified with a mind/brain, a persisting Cartesian substance, or some intermediate notion. But they are content to settle for metaphysically deflated notions of the self: self-models (Metzinger 2003), virtual selves (Bayne 2010), self- representations (Nichols 2014), etc. These surrogates, arguably, are introduced to do some of the work of the self. Metzinger claims that there is no such thing as a substantial self, but only a dynamic, ongoing process: a phenomenal self- model that is responsible for specific representational and functional properties. Bayne grants that experiences do indeed have "owners" or "bearers," but the owner of an experience is nothing "over and above" a virtual object. Similarly, Nichols argues that although the self- representation associated with episodic memory is not a good basis for a metaphysics of personal identity, it can and does serve as a trigger for self- conscious emotions, for example guilt.

This book is a major departure from these approaches. It develops a radical no- self view without the need to employ surrogates to do the work of the self. My point of departure is the insight, first formulated by the Abhidharma Buddhist Vasubandhu, that the self is causally inefficacious. This insight is not given the recognition it deserves in contemporary

philosophy. Instead, philosophers inspired by Buddhist thought sometimes defend process views of the self as the subject of experience and the agent of action (Thompson 2014), and at other times favor minimal views of the self as the subject of experience (Krueger 2011; Strawson 2017). On occasion when they do accept that there is no room for the self in Buddhist philosophy, they introduce conventional persons to do the work of the self (Siderits 2019; Ganeri 2017).

Vasubandhu (4th–5th century CE), arguably the most prominent Abhidharma Buddhist philosopher, deeply influenced three major Abhidharma traditions: Vaibhãshika, Sautrãntika, and Yogãcãra. His magnum opus, the "Commentary on the Treasury of the Abhidharma" (Abhidharmakoša-Bhãsya), is to this day the primary resource for knowledge of the Hinayana Buddhist philosophy that flourished in Northern India in the first millennium. In the Abhidharmakoša-Bhãsya, Vasubandhu argues against his Hindu opponents that the self (ãtman) conceived of as substantive essence of the psychophysical complex is causally impotent. He also argues against fellow Buddhist Pudgalavãdins that persons conceived of as the whole psychophysical complex exist in name only; they too do not do any causal work. This rejection of self and person is the central theme of this book.

If we grant that there is no self, we are left with deeper questions about how the sense of self or self- representations is implicated in our ordinary everyday experience and thought about the world and ourselves. A sense of self is involved in all kinds of experiential phenomena: episodic memory, unity of consciousness, sense of ownership, sense of agency, etc. And if we grant that there are no persons, questions remain about the status of our person- related concerns and interpersonal practices. My objective in this book is to answer these questions on behalf of the Abhidharma Buddhist. Inspired by a line of reasoning in the Abhidharmakoša-Bhãsya, I shall develop a no- self and no- person philosophy of mind with the help of tools, techniques, and empirical findings from the cognitive sciences. The convergence of cognitive sciences and contemporary philosophy of mind that has emerged in recent years is what makes this possible. I believe this approach would be welcomed by Vasubandhu and other classical Indian philosophers who creatively develop insights from the Vedas and Nikãyas; it is possible to hear an echo of the creation hymn in the Rigveda in the atomism of the Nyãya-Vaišesika philosophers.

The Abhidharma Buddhist tradition is known for its radically revisionary no- self ontology. It is also well known for sustained, in-depth inquiry into the phenomenological structure of conscious experience. Unfortunately, the results of this inquiry are not that well known in contemporary philosophical circles.

The Abhidharma presents a picture of world and mind in which the only ontologically real primitives are momentarily existing mental and physical dharmas, best understood as

tropes or quality- particulars. In this worldview, the work of the self is transferred to the mental dharmas. This dharma ontology replaces the (inner) self as the homunculus that observes, manages, and controls the cognitive processes as well as the central processor that produces experiences and thoughts. The mind, according to the Abhidharma, is nothing more than a multi-layered series of causally related and interacting dharmas. There is no longer a self in charge of the mind- body complex, nor is there an executive in control of cognitive and intentional processes and actions. And there is no longer a person who is the bearer of moral concern and responsibility. As Vasubandhu puts it, there is no owner of experiences, no agent of actions, and no bearer of burdens.

This sparse dharma ontology clearly has much work to do. So, the Abhidharma philosophers continuously debated the number, groups, and varieties of dharmas. These debates appear to be disagreements about the details of the nature and classification of basic constituents of reality (dharmas). They reveal that the classical Abhidharma philosophers were deeply concerned with the "observational ad equacy" (to borrow a term from Chomskyan linguistics) of the dharma ontology in accounting for the constitution of mental and physical states.

Any systematic no-self philosophy of mind must, however, account for the data of experience. This raises questions about the descriptive adequacy of the Abhidharma no-self view. Does the underlying dharma ontology adequately account for the phenomenology of conscious experience and thought in a selfless world? The Abhidharma project is concerned not only with cataloguing dharmas but also with explaining how the dharma ontology may account for conscious experience, thought, and action. These explanations turn out to be insufficient and in need of further work. It is here that I draw on resources from the cognitive sciences to complement the Abhidharma Buddhists' insights to produce a satisfactory explanation of the data of experience.

Furthermore, the no- self and no-person view is not just a descriptive thesis about the world. It also has normative implications. These call for a major reconfiguration of our ordinary person-related concerns and practices. The Abhidharma Buddhists are not interested in saving these practices because they claim that these concerns are misguided as they are borne out of the false belief in the self. And, that belief, they aver, is the root cause of suffering. Although these are fairly new hypotheses in contemporary philosophy, the ancient Indian Abhidharma Buddhist tradition has explored them in detail. In the Abhidharmakoša-Bhãsya, Vasubandhu provides us with an advanced point of entry into this topic of contemporary philosophical interest, which I will use as my starting point for exploring these hypotheses.

A natural strategy to account for descriptive adequacy might be to argue that one can have the sense of self or self- representations without a self. This, however, is not the strategy adopted by Vasubandhu. He is not just an eliminativist about the self but also an illusionist about the sense of self and all kinds of self-representation. His argument is that one can account for all the mental phenomena that need to be explained without positing self-representations or the sense of self. This is the strategy I will pursue here. The aim is to reconstruct Abhidharma explanations for a wide range of experiential and cognitive phenomena without implicating self- representations: conscious experiences, diachronic and synchronic unity of experiences, sense of ownership, and sense of agency.

A common approach among contemporary philosophers inspired by Buddhism is to introduce conventional persons to serve as a basis of person- related concerns and interpersonal practices like ascribing blame and apportioning punishment (Siderits 2019; Ganeri 2017). Although classical Abhidharma philosophers grant the conventional reality of persons, they do not think that merely conventional entities can carry the causal burden of the self. Rather than reconstructing persons from the remnants of the no- self view, the Abhidharma Buddhists recommend a wholesale revision of our person- related concerns and interpersonal practices.

Most contemporary philosophers writing on Buddhism think that the main problem plaguing the no- self view is that we are left without an explanation of the phenomenology of our ordinary conscious experiences. They are not troubled by the problems facing our ordinary person- related practices, because while they eliminate continuing selves they leverage the Buddhist distinction between the Two Truths to leave conventional persisting persons as part and parcel of the world. To reconstruct persons to do at least some of the work of the selves is, I think, to misunderstand the strategy employed by Vasubandhu. To pursue his argumentative strategy, we need to explain conscious experiences, thought, and action in a self- less and person- less universe. This, however, leaves us without a basis for our ordinary person- related concerns and interpersonal practices. But, as said, the Abhidharma Buddhists are not interested in saving these practices and concerns, their aim instead is to fundamentally overhaul them. This is what motivates their revisionary metaphysics.

This book defends the hypothesis that it is possible to salvage much of our experience, thought, and action without implicating the self. But I hesitate to follow the Abhidharma Buddhist recommendation that we need a wholesale reconfiguration of our person-related concerns and interpersonal practices. Since Peter Strawson there has been an assumption in contemporary philosophy that our person- related practices are sacrosanct, "not something that can come up for review" (1962, p. 14). I question this assumption. I

believe that the revisionary Buddhist metaphysics provides philosophers with an occasion to re- evaluate our person- related practices, attitudes, and concerns.

The main aims of the book, then, are to explore the descriptive adequacy and the normative implications of Vasubandhu's no- self view. The first chapter sets the scene by placing Abhidharma philosophy in the historical context of Buddhist thought, briefly recounting key divisions, seminal texts, and philosophers of its scholastic traditions, and introducing our protagonist, Vasubandhu. In the second chapter, I situate Vasubandhu's no- self view against the background of conceptions of the self in contemporary analytic philosophy, following which I explicate his argument for the no- self and no- person metaphysics. The rest of the book is largely dedicated to the defense of this Abhidharma Buddhist ontology of mind.

The biggest challenge for Vasubandhu, as I see it, is to give an account of the phenomenology and the subjective character of our ordinary conscious experience in the absence of selves and persons. This will be the focus of Chapters 3 through 7. The no- person view leaves us without a basis for our person- related concerns and interpersonal practices. This, I argue in Chapters 8 and 9, requires a major overhaul of our ordinary person- related concerns and interpersonal practices. Should we be willing to go that far with the Abhidharma Buddhists? I do not answer this question here but specify the costs and benefits of following the Buddhist Path. I do not endorse a wholesale rejection of our ordinary practices; that is practically impossible. The hope is to invite contemporary philosophers to commence a review of our ordinary practices in the light of Buddhist metaphysics.

This book sets forth a revisionary conceptual scheme envisaged by the ancient Indian Buddhist philosophers. I lay out the revisionary metaphysics and its normative implications as an alternative vantage point to challenge what we ordinarily assume and intuit. That said, I recognize the danger of losing sight of the fact that the Buddhist alternative is no less in need of philosophical scrutiny. As philo sophers, we should be willing to scrutinize both conceptual schemes and their normative commitments and be prepared to "rebuild our ship on the open sea" (Neurath 1959, p. 201). The best way forward, I think, is to question the priority relation between metaphysics of identity and ethics. Rather than aiming to establish the true metaphysics of selves and persons before applying it to ethics, as most philosophers tend to do, or constructing the metaphysics of selves and persons constrained by our ethical concerns as, for example, Marya Schechtman (2014) does, I recommend that we build theories of "what we are" and "how we should live" that are mutually constrained by some forms of reflective equilibrium. <>

WHY I AM NOT A BUDDHIST by Evan Thompson [Yale University Press, 9780300226553]

❖ **A provocative essay challenging the idea of Buddhist exceptionalism, from one of the world's most widely respected philosophers and writers on Buddhism and science**

Buddhism has become a uniquely favored religion in our modern age. A burgeoning number of books extol the scientifically proven benefits of meditation and mindfulness for everything ranging from business to romance. There are conferences, courses, and celebrities promoting the notion that Buddhism is spirituality for the rational, compatible with cutting-edge science, indeed, "a science of the mind." In this provocative book, Evan Thompson argues that this representation of Buddhism is false.

In lucid and entertaining prose, Thompson dives deep into both Western and Buddhist philosophy to explain how the goals of science and religion are fundamentally different. Efforts to seek their unification are wrongheaded and promote mistaken ideas of both. He suggests cosmopolitanism instead, a worldview with deep roots in both Eastern and Western traditions. Smart, sympathetic, and intellectually ambitious, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in Buddhism's place in our world today.

Review

"Following in the tradition of Bertrand Russell's WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN, Thompson delivers a timely rebuttal to what he calls Buddhist modernism, the idea, loosely, that Buddhism is not a religion but a science of the mind. The argument Western Buddhists need to hear."—*Kirkus Reviews*

"Presents a convincing case against Buddhist exceptionalism and scientific defenses of the tradition . . . The clarity of Thompson's arguments, including his explanations of models of consciousness, and his genuine regard for Buddhism (despite his skepticism toward claims of superiority) avoid the pitfalls of many similar critiques."—*Publishers Weekly*

"A truly compelling critique of Buddhist exceptionalism and of modern Buddhism as a whole."—Sam Littlefair, *Lion's Roar*

"WHY I AM NOT A BUDDHIST is an excellent work of philosophy. Thompson demonstrates a formidable understanding of the topic and his honest critique shows great intellectual courage. Anyone interested in Buddhism would do well to engage with this timely and compelling book."—Hane Htut Maung, *Philosophy East and West Journal*

"A provocative, insightful, and challenging critique of what he calls 'Buddhist modernism.'.

. . [A] philosophical and cosmopolitan conversation that Thompson exemplifes so eloquently."—A. Minh Nguyen, *Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies*

"A devastating and comprehensive critique."—Jonardon Ganeri, *Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies*

"Evan Thompson has given us another lovely book. . . . It is a penetrating look at the Buddhist modernist movement as we see it today, and a penetrating critique of some of the most problematic aspects of that movement. It is sympathetic, generous, and honest. It is full of insight, and a great read."—Jay L. Garfield, *Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies*

"A refreshing, original, and insightful contribution to our understanding of 'Buddhist modernism' . . . prodigious and important work, which promotes a way of thinking that embodies the very best of cosmopolitan philosophy."—Christian Coseru, *Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies*

"WHY I AM NOT A BUDDHIST . . . actively participates in a cosmopolitan project by considering and inviting interlocutors of its own. Thompson's writing is exceptionally clear, and his book is well suited to sparking conversations among readers from different backgrounds, which has the potential to lead to new and different collective forms of knowing."—Constance Kassor, *Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies*

 "Thompson's erudite and eminently engaging essay should be required reading of all those interested in Buddhist modernism."—Robert Sharf, University of California, Berkeley

"Philosophy should be a project reaching beyond age-old geographical divides, a project anchored on critical reason to promote human transformation. With inspiring intellectual courage, Thompson shows us the way forward."—Marcelo Gleiser, Dartmouth College

"In this beautifully written philosophical memoir, Evan Thompson takes us through his incredible intellectual journey that begins in boyhood at the utopia of Lindisfarne and brings him to the deepest precincts of both Buddhist philosophy and cognitive science. A deeply thoughtful book."—Owen Flanagan, author of *The Geography of Morals*

"This book should be required reading for the increasingly large number of scientists and philosophers who are interested in understanding Buddhism"—Alison Gopnik

"This is a wise and thoughtful book. Buddhism, from this perspective, turns out to be many things, but not a science of the mind."—T.M. Luhrmann, author of *When God Talks Back*

Understanding Buddhism through Cosmopolitanism

The author, as it is evident from the title of the book, is not a Buddhist but a friend of Buddhism. He wanted to become a Buddhist at certain times in his life, but found that the Buddhist communities with which he collaborated had very much a Buddhist exceptionalist attitude, a sense of having found the true path, a sense of superiority. So he feels more as cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitanism is the idea that all people belong to one human family and should encompass different ways of life. There are many different traditions and beliefs and ways of life, and they must be respected for their differences. Cosmopolitanism provides better framework for appreciating Buddhism and for understanding religion and science than Buddhist modernism.

For the writer, there is no doubt that Buddhism is a religion, just like Christianity. The latter believes in the teachings of Jesus while Buddhism believes in nirvana, karma, rebirth etc.. The question of whether science and religion are compatible or incompatible is the question of whether religion and art or science and art are compatible or incompatible. Religion is not in itself incompatible or compatible with science. It depends on how you practice religion and how you think about science.

The concept of 'Buddhist science' is also incorrect. All religions are trying to prove themselves compatible with science, and Buddhism is no exception here.

Very little is known about the historical Buddha. The Buddha did not write anything, nor is there anything written about him by his contemporaries. His teachings were recorded only centuries after his death, far from where he lived and in languages other than Buddha was using. There is much less known about Buddha as it is known about Jesus.

The author's central thesis is that cosmopolitanism, which views humanity as one collective, wherein each individual embodies a worldly citizenship, so to speak, is the best approach for Buddhism applications. The majority of the text serves to clear up what Thompson views as Western characterizations of Buddhism and Buddhist ideas and practices, such as enlightenment and meditation. Thompson argues that Buddhist modernism's downplaying of the mythological aspects of Buddhism while aggrandizing the aspects of meditation and its effects, namely enlightenment, is unjustified. Thompson argues that a divorce between Buddhist's more supernatural aspects and more naturalistic aspects is unwarranted because Buddhism's central ideologies are inherently soteriological and normative, and thus inseparable from what neural Buddhists and Buddhist naturalists seek to extract from Buddhism. Thompson also criticizes Buddhist exceptionalism arguing that it is a primary component of Buddhist modernism, and cites it as one of the reasons

why he cannot see himself as a Buddhist modernist.

Thompson also has done a wide survey of the other current books popular on the Western Buddhist bookshelves. Among the contemporary authors Thompson discusses are David Barash, Robert Wright, Sam Harris, Alan Wallace, Thomas Metzinger, Miri Albahari, Shinzen Young and Joseph Goldstein. I have also read quite a bit of these authors' works on these topics as well. Among Thompson's discussions of them, a favorite of mine is Thompson's critique of Robert Wright's 'Why Buddhism is True', wherein Thompson sympathizes with Wright's central claim that "Buddhism's diagnosis of the human predicament is fundamentally correct, and that its prescription is deeply valid and urgently important", while Thompson disagrees with Wright's line of reasoning to defend this. This summarized my sentiments when I finished 'Why Buddhism is True' exactly. Thompson also gives a staunch criticism of neural Buddhism striking down the notion that cognitive processes such as mindfulness, attention, and especially enlightenment can be identified to neural processes, and instead advocating for his enactive approach of embodied cognitive science. He is not in favor of the 2014 Scientific American article 'Mind of the Meditator', particularly its cognitive neuroscience perspective on the cycle of mindfulness and mind-wandering. Thompson also appears particularly fond of 'The Phenomenological Matrix' model (which reminds me personally of Allan Hobson's AIM model). Thompson wraps up his argumentation complimenting Kwame Anthony Appiah's philosophical cosmopolitanism.

Prior to reading this book, I was sympathetic to a lot of Buddhist modernism and Buddhist naturalism, and still am after reading the book. At times, I felt that Thompson's opposing of Buddhist modernism sometimes failed to represent it in its best light. Buddhist's modernists are onto something and are doing valuable work advancing a naturalistic understanding of the 'enlightenment' mental state and the practice of meditation. For example, the mindfulness-mindwandering cycle figure in the 'Mind of the Meditator' article is strong stride forward in contemplative neuroscience. I encourage more research like this. My view is that even though Buddhism's central focus is 'enlightenment', 'enlightenment' is not a uniquely Buddhist phenomenon. Cases such as Eckhart Tolle's awakening are exemplary that 'enlightenment' has its own independent existence outside of Buddhist context, which is the more encompassing perspective on it that the Buddhist modernists are framing. Such a cognitive neuroscience that employs the scientific tractability of 'enlightenment' and meditative practice would be fruitful for the human collective. Thompson himself has done a great job of making Buddhist contemplative practices more scientifically tractable and philosophically digestible to Westerners, such as the meditation, lucid dreaming and yoga nidra practices discussed in his previous book

(my personal all-time favorite) 'Waking, Dreaming, Being'. This is why I was surprised at his critique of the 'Mind of the Meditator' cognitive neuroscience model of meditation, seeing as his WDB book also offers a profound cognitive neuroscience perspective on meditation.

What I would love to see from Thompson in the future is a book that offers a positive thesis. I would love a book that offers a hypothesis for guiding a cognitive science and neuroscience approach to understanding the enlightenment state. Thompson could expand on the Shinzen Young quote he cited: "you can think of enlightenment as a kind of permanent shift in perspective that comes about through the direct realization that there is no thing called 'self' inside you". An accompanying expounding on topics such as the autobiographical self, narrative identity, reflective self-awareness and prereflective self-awareness and other phenomenological matters in a cognitive neuroscience context would be very interesting. Based on Thompson's prior works, I feel that Thompson has a book like this in him. I can envision work similar in nature to that of neurologist James Austin's book 'Zen and the Brain', which could be a role model for how one goes about discussing a cognitive neuroscience of enlightenment.

❖ **A provocative essay challenging the idea of Buddhist exceptionalism, from one of the world's most widely respected philosophers and writers on Buddhism and science**

Buddhism has become a uniquely favored religion in our modern age. A burgeoning number of books extol the scientifically proven benefits of meditation and mindfulness for everything ranging from business to romance. There are conferences, courses, and celebrities promoting the notion that Buddhism is spirituality for the rational, compatible with cutting-edge science, indeed, "a science of the mind." In this provocative book, Evan Thompson argues that this representation of Buddhism is false.

In lucid and entertaining prose, Thompson dives deep into both Western and Buddhist philosophy to explain how the goals of science and religion are fundamentally different. Efforts to seek their unification are wrongheaded and promote mistaken ideas of both. He suggests cosmopolitanism instead, a worldview with deep roots in both Eastern and Western traditions. Smart, sympathetic, and intellectually ambitious, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in Buddhism's place in our world today.

CONTENTS

Varela brought this conception of the conversation between science and Buddhism to his meetings with the Dalai Lama and to their creation of the Mind and Life Dialogues. They met for first time at the International Symposium on Consciousness at Albach, Austria, in September 1983. The first Mind and Life Dialo took place in 1987 in Dharamsala, India. Since then, thirty-three dialogues have occurred at various locations around the world.

The Mind and Life Dialogues are about topics of common interest to science and the Buddhist tradition, such as the nature of human knowledge and understanding human emotions. The dialogues are supposed to be guided by a recognition of the impossibility of separating intention from knowledge, that is to say, by a recognition of the ethics of knowledge. This orientation is put into practice by having the participants converse as equal partners with respect for one another. Especially important is for the scientists to avoid any tendency to view Buddhism as simply an object study, and to respect the Buddhist tradition's understanding of phenomena it describes within its own conceptual and theoretical frameworks. The dialogues have almost always included a philosopher whose task is to keep track of deeper and more fundamental issues about evidence, explanation, ethics, and worldview. (I have been the philosopher at two of the dialogues, the 2004 dialogue "Neuronal Plasticity: The Neuronal Substrates of Learning and Transformation," and the 2007 dialogue on the Dalai Lama's book The Universe in a Single Atom.)

Sometimes the dialogues have lived up to the ideal of a conversation guided by the ethics of knowledge. This happens when the individual representatives of the traditions allow their viewpoints to become unsettled in the service of the conversation. The conversation itself becomes a form of knowledge—a collective mode of knowing—with its own ethics of mutual respect and getting to know one another.

At other times the dialogues haven't lived up to the ideal. This happens when the participants fall into the extremes of embellishment and justification. Buddhists use science to embellish Buddhist teachings, and scientists use Buddhism to embellish scientific theories. And both Buddhists and scientists—and especially Buddhist scientists—use science to justify Buddhism. There is also a strong tendency for Buddhists to frame their theories and practices as a kind of science, as the Dalai Lama did at the recent Mind and Life Dialogue "Perception, Concepts, and the Self" when he said that the

dialogue wasn't between Buddhism and science, but rather was between "Buddhist science and modern science."

This move also reflects the strategy of these dialogues, which is to "bracket" the deeper metaphysical commitments of the two traditions—rebirth, karma, awakening, and liberation on the Buddhist side, and physicalism and reductionism on the scientific side. Given this bracketing strategy, it makes sense for the Dalai Lama to try to distinguish between "Buddhist science" and "Buddhist religious practice." Nevertheless, this bracketing strategy goes only so far and ultimately will not work for there to be a full and open conversation. Indeed, without the Buddhist religious commitment to awakening and liberation, the Buddhist ethics of knowledge has no solid philosophical basis and therefore has no power to reflect back critically on science. For these reasons, I agree with Buddhist scholar Donald S. Lopez, Jr., when he writes: "karma, rebirth, and the possibility of full enlightenment are among the most important foundations of Buddhist thought and practice. Physicalism [and] . . . reductionism . .. also are highly important, especially in neuroscience. These are precisely the topics that must be unbracketed and confronted in any discussion of Buddhism and science. It is also among these topics that the most intractable disagreements likely lie."

Sometimes the brackets have come off at the Mind and Life Dialogues. One of the richest dialogues was about the states of sleeping, dreaming, and dying, as seen from the perspectives of Tibetan Buddhism and modern science. Here the neuroscience viewpoint on the nature of consciousness confronted the Tibetan Buddhist viewpoint. The Dalai Lama explained the Tibetan Buddhist view of the dying process and the subsequent intermediate states between death and rebirth. The scientists were surprised at the detailed phenomenological descriptions of how the mind breaks down in death but pushed back against the idea that a kind of consciousness could exist apart from the brain. I describe another example in Waking, Dreaming, Being. I asked the Dalai Lama about the different Buddhist views of the mind-body relation at the dialogue on his book about science, The Universe in a Single Atom. He answered by describing the idea of "subtle consciousness," which Tibetan Buddhists believe isn't constituted by the brain but is linked to subtle energetic states. Again, the scientists pressed him on this doctrine. At these times, the brackets are off and the two traditions are fully confronting each other. These are the kinds of moments that interest me the most and are the ones I always look for.

Let's return to cosmopolitanism. Appiah makes a crucial point that connects to our discussion of the ethics of knowledge: "the methods of the natural sciences have not led to the kind of progress in our understanding of values that they have led to in our grasp of facts." So, we can't take the superiority of the scientific method for getting knowledge of

the facts as a reason to think that our understanding of values is superior to those of other cultures and traditions. On the contrary, "we may be able to learn about values from societies where science is less deeply implanted than ours."

The point here isn't the old Orientalist one—asserted, for example, by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in the Introduction to his and Charles Moore's **A SOURCEBOOK IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY**—that Asian traditions are spiritually superior, whereas Western culture is scientifically superior. Rather, it's that scientific accounts aren't the only ones we live by; we also and more fundamentally live by moral and ethical accounts, which scientific accounts presuppose and can't directly establish. So, the success of modern experimental science doesn't provide a reason by itself for thinking that our understanding of values is better than other people's understandings of value. Not only can we learn about values from other societies, but this kind of learning can affect how we think about the ethics of science and its technological applications.

Such learning is necessary for creating a viable cosmopolitanism that isn't Eurocentric or Americentric. We should draw from the concepts and vocabularies of many religious and philosophical traditions. As we've seen from the case of the Sanskrit cosmopolis. the cosmopolitan sensibility isn't the property of just one intellectual tradition or continent or historical epoch. At the end of The Ethics of ldentity, Appiah cites an African Akan saying: "Kuro koro mu nni nyansa, the proverb says: In a single polis there is no wisdom: Philosopher Michael Onyebuchi Eze uses the philosophy of Ubuntu, **"I am because you are; and since you are, therefore I am,"** to formulate an African version of cosmopolitanism. According to Ubuntu, "a person is a person through other persons; and strangers are potential relatives, because they bring new kinds of knowledge into the community." (A 2017 Mind and Life Dialogue in Botswana focused on the Ubuntu worldview and Buddhism.) Philosopher Philip J. Ivanhoe uses the Confucian idea of ritual or proper conduct (li) to suggest that "a cosmopolitan is not a citizen of nowhere but an interested guest or visitor." The ideal guest or visitor performs "the ritual of inquiry," observing and asking about local practices and their meaning: "As good guests, we defer judgment, at least in most cases, about the things we are seeking to understand until we are confident that we can see their true significance within the larger frame of this particular form of life:"

My argument has been that Buddhist modernism distorts both the significance of the Buddhist tradition and the relationship between religion and science. Buddhism gained entry to Europe and North America in the nineteenth century by being presented as a religion uniquely compatible with modern science. Now, in the twenty-first century, Buddhist modernist discourse is at its height. But this discourse is untenable, as we've seen. Its core tenets—that Buddhism is a "mind science"; that there is no self; that

mindfulness is an inward awareness of one's own private mental theater that neuroscience establishes the value of mindfulness practice; that enlightenment is a nonconceptual experience outside language, culture, and tradition; and that enlightenment is or can be correlated with a brain state—are philosophically and scientifically indefensible.

In my view, the significance of the Buddhist intellectual tradition for the modern world is that it offers a radical critique of our narcissistic preoccupation with the self and our overconfident belief that science tells us how the world really is in itself apart from how we're able to measure and act upon it. Buddhist modernism has been tangled up in these misguided impulses and ideas and has been complicit in reinforcing them. At the same time, the Buddhist modernist rhetoric of enlightenment as a nonconceptual experience outside of language and tradition has reinforced anti-intellectualism and irrationalism. The Buddhist intellectual tradition has the resources to mount its own critique of Buddhist modernism. The question I would pose to Buddhists is whether they can find other ways to be modern besides being Buddhist modernists (or fundamentalists).

The Buddhist philosophical tradition is crucial for addressing this question. Buddhist philosophers also have a huge amount to offer in the effort to create viable cosmopolitanisms that aren't Eurocentric or Americentric. I am not a Buddhist, but I wish to be a good friend to Buddhism. A viable cosmopolitanism would be Buddhism's greatest ally. <>

New Perspectives in Modern Korean Buddhism edited by Hwansoo Ilmee Kim & Jin Y. Park [State University of New York Press, 9781438491318]

Offers alternative approaches to the study of colonial and postcolonial Korean Buddhism, suggesting new directions for scholarship.

New Perspectives in Modern Korean Buddhism moves beyond nationalistic, modernist, and ethnocentric historiographies of modern Korean Buddhism by carefully examining individuals' lived experiences, the institutional dimensions of Korean Buddhism, and its place in transnational conversations. Drawing upon rich archives as well as historical, anthropological, and literary approaches, the book examines four themes that have gained attention in recent years: perennial existential concerns and the persistent relevance of religious practice; the role of female Buddhists; clerical marriage and scandals; and engagement with secular society. The book reveals the limits of metanarratives, such as those of colonialism, nationalism, and modernity, in understanding the complex and contested identities of both monastics and laity, thus

demanding that we diversify the methods by which we articulate the history of modern Korean Buddhism.

Reviews

"This book will be a great resource for students and specialists seeking to understand modern and contemporary Korean Buddhism. It covers a broader range of topics than any other monograph on the subject, and provides much more material on the role of women in the preservation of Korean Buddhism." — Richard McBride, Brigham Young University

CONTENTS

A decade has passed since the publication of the first English-language edited volume on modern Korean Buddhism, MAKERS OF MODERN KOREAN BUDDHISM, edited by Jin Y. Park (2010). The book included thirteen articles by leading scholars of colonial and postcolonial Korean Buddhism on topics ranging from modernity, nationalism, and colonialism to Buddhist reform, Son (Zen Pia) revivalism, gender, and politics. These articles problematized the tendentious interpretation of modern Korean Buddhism as divided between modernity and tradition and between nationalism and collaboration, thus enriching our understanding of modern Korean Buddhism.

Since the publication of MAKERS OF MODERN KOREAN BUDDHISM, six other monographs on modern Korean Buddhism have been published that, taken together, have furthered and finessed that volume's themes while also contributing new approaches and perspectives on the role and nature of Buddhism in modern Korea.' Numerous articles written over the past decade have also advanced the multifaceted aspects of modern Korean Buddhism. It is high time to gather some of this new research into a single volume, and the present one is a result of this need.

NEW PERSPECTIVES IN MODERN KOREAN BUDDHISM is composed of ten chapters divided into four parts. It continues to engage with the themes covered in Makers of Modern Korean Buddhism, namely colonialism, nationalism, and modernity, but it also emphasizes the lived experiences of individuals as well as the transnational and institutional dimensions of modern Korean Buddhism. The current volume also expands on four areas that, although mentioned in the first volume, have gained greater attention in recent years: perennial existential concerns and the persistent relevance of contemporary religious practice, gender issues, ethical concerns about clerical marriage and scandals, and engagement with secular society. These chapters reveal the limits of metanarratives, such as those of colonialism, nationalism, and modernity, in understanding the complexity of the individual's lived experience of religion: thus, they demand that we diversify the methods by which we articulate modern Korean Buddhism. Indeed, some of these issues have been sidelined because of the dominance of the nationalistic, modernist, and ethnocentric historiography of modern Korean Buddhism.

Spanning the period from the late nineteenth century to the present, NEW PERSPECTIVES IN MODERN KOREAN BUDDHISM addresses both ongoing and new themes to help the reader understand recent scholarly trends in the field and to rethink the role of religion in today's context. Is religious practice still relevant to modern, secular society? If so, which aspects of religion should scholars explore? What roles do gender and sexuality play in the

evolution and understanding of a religion? Where do the religious and secular worlds meet, and what kind of revelations do we encounter at that juncture? What might these revelations tell us about the current situations of religion and Buddhism? These are some of the questions with which the ten chapters in this compilation are engaged.

Korean Buddhist Nationalism, Modernity, and Institutional Reform

Following the end of the Neo-Confucian Chosón dynasty (1392-1910), Korean Buddhism faced two distinctive forces during the colonial period: the West and Japan. Western culture flooded in as an imperialistic force that highlighted the differences in power and resources between East and West. Japan was a neighboring country, but in the process of modernization. It also exercised imperial power over Asian neighbors.

The fact that Korean Buddhists were governed by Japanese colonizers who were fellow Asians and Buddhists complicated their responses to colonialism and modernity. Unlike Chinese Buddhists and Buddhists in other Asian countries, who were responding primarily to Western imperialists and Christian missionaries, Korean Buddhists faced a contradictory, complex situation. They had been marginalized by their own Neo-Confucian govt ernment for centuries. Though they were resentful about Japanese political rule, monastic leaders saw an opportunity to elevate Korean Buddhism by drawing on the status, resources, and connections of Japanese Buddhist sects and the pro-Buddhist Japanese state. On the one hand, Korean Buddhists considered Japanese Buddhism to be a model for modernizing themselves in terms of building on institutional structure, developing propagation programs, and forming a symbiotic relationship with the state in much the way that Chinese Buddhists looked up to Japanese Buddhism for their own modernization initiatives.' On the other hand, Korean Buddhists felt threatened by Japanese Buddhist sects, which were significantly more powerful politically, institutionally, and financially, and they worried that Japanese Buddhism would eventually take control of Korean Buddhism. This conflicted relationship was further complicated by the rapid rise of Christianity in Korea. Korean Buddhists found themselves competing with both Japanese Buddhism and Western Christianity in the religious marketplace, not to mention that they also had to counter the threat posed by the rapid spread of numerous new religious movements.'

The influence of Christianity in Korean society intensified following Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, which ended its colonial rule and heralded the arrival of Western forces in postwar Korea. To meet the challenges posed by Japanese colonialism and Christian aggression, Korean Buddhists appropriated ideas from multiple sources that were both Western and non-Western, as did Japanese, Chinese, and other Asian Buddhists. One could characterize this complex engagement of Korean Buddhists with two imperial

powers—the West and Christianity as well as Japan and Japanese Buddhism—as a distinctive feature of Korean Buddhist modernity.

During the colonial period, lacking political and material resources, some Korean Buddhists came to depend on the Japanese colonial government to keep both Japanese Buddhism and Western Christianity at bay while also drawing on the state to revitalize Korean Buddhism and restore it to social and political prominence.' Under these circumstances, Korean Buddhism's modernization, creation of a national identity, and institutional reform efforts were deeply enmeshed in the governing apparatus of the Japanese empire.' Some Korean Buddhists engaged with the practices, ideologies, and platforms presented by the Japanese empire to assert their own national and religious identity. But Korean Buddhists tended to avoid outright political and ethnocentric nationalisms in developing a sense of identity: they articulated their own form of what might be called a Buddhist nationalism. Likewise, many Chinese Republican monastic and lay Buddhist leaders developed an "alternative notion of nationalism" that was rooted in Buddhist moral and ethical values.' In the case of Korean Buddhism, this form of nationalism was informed by its interaction with Japanese Buddhism and further facilitated by global knowledge and ideas.

Korean Buddhists' strategic engagement and negotiation with the colonial government bore fruit as Japanese imperialism advanced further into China and beyond, especially as Japan needed effective support from the leadership of Korean Buddhism through the propagation of state ideology. After decades of attempts to centralize Korean Buddhism institutionally, all of them futile because of factionalism, internal power struggles, and the lack of support from colonial authorities, a great head temple was founded in 1938 to function as the administrative headquarters for Korean Buddhism. Denominational bylaws that established governance over monastics and lay communities were written in 1941, and the colonial government quickly recognized and approved them. This new, centralized system put an end to the traditional independence of the thirty-one head temples, placing them all directly under the great head temple T'aegosa (later, Jogye Monastery O, where the administrative central office was also located. Thus, the Jogye Order came into being upon its official recognition by the colonial government in 1941.

The centralization of Korean Buddhism turned out to be both a blessing and a curse for the Buddhist community. Like major Japanese Buddhist sects and the Catholic Church, Korean Buddhism had finally developed into a single, unified community under one administrative system. However, this modern institutional structure also centralized power into the hands of a small group of administrative monks, in particular the administrative head of the Jogye Order, which significantly changed the traditional model of sangha governance and leadership. Struggles over powerful administrative positions

have plagued Korean Buddhism since then, and its leaders have continuously wrestled with how to mold the institution into a workable governing system to both preserve traditions and respond to the needs of contemporary society. <>

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY edited by William Edelglass, Pierre-Julien Harter, Sara McClintock [Routledge, 9781138492257]

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY is the first scholarly reference volume to highlight the diversity and individuality of a large number of the most influential philosophers to have contributed to the evolution of Buddhist thought in India. By placing the author at the center of inquiry, the volume highlights the often unrecognized innovation and multiplicity of India's Buddhist thinkers, whose unique contributions are commonly subsumed in more general doctrinal presentations of philosophical schools. Here, instead, the reader is invited to explore the works and ideas of India's most important Buddhist philosophers in a manner that takes seriously the weight of their philosophical thought.

The forty chapters by an international and interdisciplinary team of renowned contributors each seek to offer both a wide-ranging overview and a philosophically astute reading of the works of the most seminal Indian Buddhist authors from the earliest writings to the twentieth century. The volume thus also provides thorough coverage of all the main figures, texts, traditions, and debates animating Indian Buddhist thought, and as such can serve as an in-depth introduction to Buddhist philosophy in India for those new to the field.

Essential reading for students and researchers in Asian and comparative philosophy, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY is also an excellent resource for specialists in Buddhist philosophy, as well as for contemporary philosophers interested in learning about the rigorous and rich traditions of Buddhist philosophy in India.

Review

'A splendid and comprehensive study of Buddhist philosophy in its country of origin. *The Routledge Handbook of Indian Buddhist Philosophy* is an important addition to the global philosophy movement.' - *Owen Flanagan, Duke University, USA*

'With an emphasis on the creative originality of key historical philosophers, and with a line-up of the finest scholars in Buddhist philosophy, this volume is sure to become an indispensable resource for teachers and scholars alike, and also serve as a magnificent

introduction to the dynamism and potentiality of the field.' - *Jonardon Ganeri, University of Toronto, Canada*

'This carefully edited volume provides an understanding of Indian Buddhist philosophy through the study of the authorial figures that shaped its schools and doctrines. From the early discourses to the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, a picture emerges of an active intellectual enterprise devoted to the exploration of some of the most profound issues in philosophy.' - *Anita Avramides, University of Oxford, UK*

'An amazing resource for scholar and student alike, the chapters in this book, written by very best scholars in the field, masterfully introduce the life and thought of the major figures of Indian Buddhist philosophy in clear and readable prose. There is no book quite like it. The next time I teach a course on this subject, this book will be atop the reading list.' - *José Ignacio Cabezón, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA*

'This Handbook is a landmark contribution to the field, offering superb coverage of the principal Indian Buddhist philosophers and showcasing the breadth and depth of one of the world's richest philosophical traditions. It will be an essential reference work for scholars and students alike for years to come.' - *Evan Thompson, University of British Columbia, Canada*

'This is a great resource for all those who want to learn more about Indian Buddhism and its philosophical traditions. It explores in great depth many different aspects of these rich traditions and will be an invaluable resource for those interested in further exploring Indian Buddhist philosophy.' - *Georges Dreyfus, Williams College, USA*

CONTENTS

The topic of this book, Indian Buddhist philosophy, is "vast and profound," to borrow a traditional Buddhist expression. Buddhists employ this phrase to refer both to the vastness of reality itself and to a buddha's profound and unerring realization and teaching of that reality. Ranging over approximately two and a half millennia, composed and preserved in diverse languages both in oral and written form, manifesting in myriad genres from lyric to scholastic, Buddhist philosophy in India is a field whose borders are yet to be found. Numberless manuscripts remain untranslated and even unedited, some located in India and some in monasteries, libraries, and private collections elsewhere in the world. Other works survive only in Chinese or Tibetan translations made centuries ago and are still mainly known to contemporary scholars through catalogs and by reputation. Other texts have nearly entirely disappeared and can only be glimpsed in fragmentary quotations or elusive references. No doubt, many others have vanished without a trace.

The expanse of Indian Buddhist philosophy is indeed vast. But it is also profound, as those who have explored Indian Buddhist philosophy very well know. Like the rest of Indian philosophy, Indian Buddhist philosophy touches on nearly every aspect of human experience, including the nature of suffering, reality, truth, goodness, compassion, love, freedom, death, the body, the self, matter, consciousness, and divinity. Furthermore, Indian Buddhist philosophy explores these aspects of human experience with a relentless ambition to get to the heart of the matter, interrogating everything from the instruments by which knowledge can be certified to the status of knowledge itself to the problems of language, perception, inference, argument, objectivity, properties, kinds, agency, causality, morality, transformation, illusion,

and much more. As the chapters that follow demonstrate, Indian Buddhist philosophers have come to a variety of conclusions about these diverse areas of inquiry.

The present volume, with its forty chapters, is a window onto the vast and profound world of Indian Buddhist philosophy. It is a multifaceted stained-glass window with numerous panes, each offering a view of complex philosophical topics colored by the perspective of a particular Indian Buddhist philosopher as read and presented by a particular highly qualified contemporary scholar. Our decision to place the author at the center of inquiry represents a deliberate choice to highlight the philosophical creativity and innovation of diverse Indian Buddhist philosophers, who too often are seen as mere exegetes working in the service of pre-existing schools. But categorizing thinkers according to schools, as if every thinker associated with that school had agreed to a stable set of doctrinal commitments, obscures the reality that schools are themselves amorphous and ever-changing streams made up of the thought of many individuals over periods of time. Even as each author reflects and refracts the innovations and ideas of their predecessors and contemporaries, it is individual thinkers who make up the schools, both in terms of comprising them and, more literally, inventing them. While it is true that Indian Buddhist philosophers do generally understand themselves as working from within a tradition to which they unabashedly belong, this is not in itself anything out of the ordinary for philosophers more generally. Indeed, it is important to remember that Western philosophers, too, have undertaken their work within a series of inherited philosophical traditions, with all the resources and blinders that come along with being so situated. The tendency to see Indian philosophers — whether Buddhist or not — as so deeply enmeshed in their particular schools as to be compromised in terms of their rational capacity is an Orientalist bias. The decision to prioritize authors over schools, then, is in part a decision to resist this bias. By presenting major figures who have contributed to the evolution of philosophical thought in Indian Buddhist traditions and in Indian philosophy more broadly, this volume thus implicitly makes a case for an enlarged conception of philosophy not restricted to its European embodiment.

To be clear, we are not suggesting that the study of Indian Buddhist philosophy can or should abandon reference to schools. It is important to recognize that doxographical classification, identification with a particular school, and refutation of opposing Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools were all key elements of Indian

Buddhist philosophical practices, especially in later periods. Moreover, as these practices spread beyond India, so did the role of schools in providing philosophical frameworks, authority, and identity for Buddhist philosophers. In Tibetan Buddhist scholastic curricula, school affiliation is still central to the study of Indian Buddhist philosophy. Leaving schools out of the equation is therefore not an option, and the reader will find that nearly every contribution in this volume makes reference to the various schools and sub-schools of the rich Indian Buddhist doxographical tradition.

Organizing a study of Indian philosophers by schools is thus not without justification. Indeed, many scholars of Indian Buddhism, both traditional and modern, have chosen to do so for a variety of reasons. Jan Westerhoff, for example, partially chooses this route in The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy, though he also acknowledges that much of the seemingly clear division between the different schools is an ex post facto arrangement, and that the individual thinkers concerned would have been unlikely to ascribe themselves to the specific schools they are supposed to have belonged to quite so readily.

To make up for some of what is lost through an organization based on schools, Westerhoff introduces sections dedicated to individual philosophers, where he also notes some of the ways such thinkers transcend any easy identification with a single school. Amber D. Carpenter, in her book Indian Buddhist Philosophy (2014), also takes something of a hybrid approach. While the book narrates the progression of Indian Buddhist philosophical thought mainly through themes, important chapters are also dedicated to the Madhyamaka, Yogacara, and epistemological schools, especially as exemplified by their most iconic representatives: Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and Dharmakirti.

Thus, even as we recognize that some reference to schools is necessary in the study of Indian Buddhist philosophy, we need to be clear about what we mean by the term "school: since the word can have several valences ranging from a concrete institutional reality to an abstract doxographical construct (see McClintock 2018). Many Indian Buddhist philosophers were engaged in the construction and reconstruction of schools as doxographical constructs, and some were no doubt interested in forming institutional structures to maintain particular philosophical views and lineages. But to structure our study of Indian Buddhist philosophy around these schools, however we understand them, risks giving the constructs more concrete reality than may be warranted. Doing so carries with it significant

hermeneutic consequences, as it would obscure the dynamic philosophizing and original contributions of individual authors. Our focus on authors pushes back against the tendency to default to a history of reified schools — even as the individual authors themselves often make claims on behalf of a particular school affiliation.

An alternative way to structure this Handbook might have been through themes, with contributions organized in sections such as metaphysics, language, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, political philosophy, argumentation, and so on. Organizing the volume according to these contemporary subfields of the academic discipline of philosophy would, perhaps, have made the volume more accessible to academic philosophers, who are one of the primary audiences for this book. There are indeed advantages to this tactic, despite the challenge of figuring out which authors should be situated in which categories, as so many of the philosophers in this volume span multiple areas of philosophical thought. But those advantages would likely have a better chance at being realized had the scope of the inquiry been expanded to Buddhist philosophy beyond only India. Indeed, such a thematic approach is employed in A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy (Emmanuel 2013), which treats philosophical topics across the whole development of Buddhism in Asia. Thus, while that book does contain some short contributions on regional schools (i.e., Theravada, Indian Mahayana, Tibetan Mahayana and Vajrayana, and East Asian Buddhism), the bulk of the volume consists of chapters that take up specific themes in one or more of these regions so that the audience can productively read them against one another. Our decision to organize this Handbook by authors resembles more closely the approach taken by Jonardon Ganeri in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy (2017), which also focuses on figures in an effort to better highlight both chronology and innovation and to make space for nonconformists whose role in the development of philosophical thinking should not be underestimated. While that work treats Indian philosophy more generally, this Handbook somewhat artificially and with more focus highlights just those Indian philosophers who identify as Buddhists. We do so not because we imagine that Indian Buddhist philosophy can be understood apart from the broader study of philosophy in India (it most emphatically cannot!). Rather, we want to make space for our readers to engage in a philosophically rich encounter with a greater variety of Indian Buddhist philosophers in a single volume than has been possible to date.

The decision to place the author at the center of inquiry in these contributions further raises the quite serious question: What is an author? While the notion of an author at first appears self-evident, closer examination reveals a complex and shifting ground. Foucault's proposal of an author function is instructive here, as it reminds us that an author's name is not the same as a proper name that points to an individual. Rather, an author's name performs a set of functions that serve to classify, define, authenticate, and establish relationships among diverse texts. By identifying a text as the product of a particular author, one also indicates something about how that text is to be read and received. Thus, in specifying that the contributions in the Handbook are to be organized by authors, we are pointing not only to individual historical figures but also to powerful authorial figures whose name and reputation have been associated with particular ideas, texts, practices, lineages, schools, and spiritual attainments. We believe that by attending to these authorial figures we gain a much richer understanding of the development and practice of Indian Buddhist intellectual traditions.

Having made the decision to organize this Handbook by authors, we were still confronted by how to choose and how to arrange the philosophers. Although we lack concrete dates for the majority of figures in this volume, there is general agreement about a relative chronology based on the ways prior texts and thinkers seem to be presupposed by a given author. We therefore decided to proceed chronologically when possible, with the understanding that each subsequent philosopher could be seen, in part, as responding to philosophers who had come before. At the same time, there are some authors who we believed needed to be placed into special groups based less on schools or time periods but more on the genres in which their philosophical material appears. The book opens with three parts organized by genre before moving on in the next five parts to a more strictly chronological approach employing a somewhat arbitrary periodization. Here again, however, we continue to prioritize the author as the central organizing principle.

We begin, perhaps somewhat unusually, with a part on buddhas as philosophers, based on our contention that buddhas should be considered philosophical author figures insofar as they may be credited with initially propounding - at least in our cosmic era - the foundational doctrines and ideas that serve as springboards for later Buddhist thinkers. This is true despite the fact that the various buddhas may appear not to agree with each other (or, for that matter, with themselves, given the diversity of texts attributed to the same buddha) and may also appear not to be historical

persons. The ideas of these buddha philosophers often emerge embedded in dialogical scriptures which typically have significant narrative elements. Thus, the first part of the book focuses on the genre of buddhavacana ("speech of the/a buddha") as a modality through which Buddhist authors - in this case, buddhas themselves - make known their philosophical ideas.

We next move on to another genre with a part on poet philosophers. Indian Buddhist philosophers composed their works in a wide variety of literary genres, with many of them employing poetry, narratives, and dialogues as well as treatises and commentaries. For some, the poetry, narrative, and dialogue do important philosophical work, as might also be said of the way that literary form has a philosophical function in Plato's dialogues, Montaigne's essays, and Nietzsche's aphorisms. In this part, we focus on poet philosophers whose philosophy can be said to be embodied in their chosen literary form and whose philosophically significant meaning would be lost if it were articulated in the more abstract language of a treatise.

The final part organized primarily on genre is concerned with abhidharma philosophers. Here we are often thwarted in highlighting the specific contributions of individual authors due to the fact that the texts themselves appear to have multiple authors. In this chapter, then, individual texts often take on the author function. But by resisting the urge to talk about Abhidharma" or "Abhidhamma" as a school and focusing instead on the individual texts or textual traditions, we come as close as we can to highlighting the contributions of particular authors even when we are lacking a name.

At this point, the parts shift and begin to focus more obviously on the iconic founding figures of Indian Buddhist philosophy. We start with a unit on philosophical founders, by which we mean philosophers whose names have become associated with the founding of a particular stream or school. The part begins with Nagarjuna and his student Aryadeva, and is filled out with chapters on the remaining four figures making up the "six ornaments" according to Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism: Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and Dharmakirti.

Following these formative figures, we consider a host of commentator philosophers, by which we mean authors who in many cases literally and in other cases more figuratively position themselves as commentators on the thought of one or more of the authors treated earlier in the volume. Because there were a great number of

these, we broke them into three major groups: early period, middle period, and late period commentators. In this way, we made room for thinkers from the fifth-twelfth centuries, bringing us close to the end of the flourishing of Buddhist philosophy in India. Throughout these chapters, we find authors who are bending, contesting, reformulating, and repudiating various doxographical labels while also promoting new ideas in the domains we mentioned earlier: metaphysics, language, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, political philosophy, argumentation, and so on.

The volume ends with a short part that is something of an outlier in that it treats modem Indian Buddhist philosophers. Here we have just two figures, both of whom, however, have played an outsized role in revitalizing Buddhist philosophy in India and beyond. The first is B. R. Ambedkar, whose philosophical writings on Buddhism, religion, and politics have become influential among practicing Buddhists especially in India - and scholars alike. The second is His Holiness, Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet. While not an Indian by birth, the Dalai Lama has spent more than half a century living in exile in India, where he has consistently engaged with and emphasized the Indian heritage of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. He has also been a key figure in the promotion of what he calls "the Nalanda tradition," a style of doing philosophy with deep roots in the thought of many of the figures found in this volume.

The chapters that follow illustrate the broad diversity of Indian Buddhist philosophy. They also exemplify the many ways in which contemporary scholars are engaging with Indian Buddhist philosophers and their texts, for our contemporary authors are as diverse as the Indian Buddhist authors treated in the volume, and their chapters showcase a range of approaches, some more historical, some more philosophical, some more literary, some more technical, some more playful. Like the Indian Buddhist authors who are the subject of this volume, our contributors have also inherited intellectual practices and views that are manifest in their own writings. Still, despite their differences, each chapter can serve in its own way as a window onto the major philosophical innovations and ideas of the figures we have chosen for this volume as seen through the eyes of our particular contributors.

BUDDHAS AS PHILOSOPHERS
The opening part of this Handbook proceeds on the premise that considering buddhas as philosophers is a worthy and interesting endeavor. This volume also

argues that approaching Buddhist philosophy through authors yields insights not available through other approaches. Yet buddhas are often not recognized as authors in the usual sense of the term. Rather, they are teachers whose discourse survives through the recollections of their disciples as preserved in written and oral texts. These recollections, moreover, do not consist merely of the verbatim contents of the buddhas' teachings. Rather, they typically narrate a scene of instruction in which a buddha appears as one actor among several, responding to the questions and circumstanccs of various interlocutors. Thus, whatever philosophy a buddha has taught must be accessed indirectly, much as what we learn of Socrates comes through witnessing his conversations with sundry characters in the dialogues of Plato.

For this part, we have chosen buddhas who are primordial, of this age, or of a future age. Their status as authors might not be obvious. However, the word "author" is etymologically related to "authority" (they are both derived from auctoritas), and in Buddhist traditions, buddhas are precisely those who have the most authority. Such authority is grounded in their long moral training and profound wisdom, their collection of merit, and their vision of reality as it truly is. While they themselves are not authors composing texts, their speech is recorded by others who attest to its accuracy and authenticity on the basis of their authority and thus make the buddhas authors as sources of the teaching. The words of these buddhas are embedded in narrative and doctrinal tracts full of rich philosophical content. As such, these buddhas — both those for whom we have seeming historical evidence and those whose identities come into greater focus only in literary or ritual milieus — can be considered foundational authors whose works generate and are justified by philosophical thinking.

We start with Gotama Buddha, the buddha of the early discourses, oral texts that were eventually written down and that today form important root sources for the Theravada tradition. Bhikkhu Analayo, in his chapter, pieces together philological evidence from these discourses in Pali and their parallels preserved in other languages to paint a picture that, as he writes, "takes us as close as possible to the historical Buddha" while acknowledging that this picture depends not on historical facts but rather on representations of the teacher Gotama Buddha as found in the surviving texts. Philosophically, this buddha appears most interested in how to attain the "deathless," a term that for Gotama indicates not a state of eternal life but rather "a supreme condition of freedom of the mind such that even the terror of

mortality has completely lost its sting." The picture painted here is of a philosopher of deep pragmatic concern, whose teachings therefore involve explicit instructions for undertaking the contemplative practices designed to lead one to this state of radical freedom.

Next, we move to Siddhartha Gautama, a figure who might be considered the same as Gotama Buddha but whose representations in the Sanskrit discourses associated with the Mahayana stream of Indian Buddhism yield a rather different personage. Richard F. Nance tackles the vexed question of the authorship of these Sanskrit discourses through a sustained analysis of their understanding of what counts as buddhavacana, the "word of the/a buddha." In contrast to the previous chapter, which sought to bring, us as close as possible to the historical buddha, this chapter urges us to look beyond the historical figure" to recognize that buddhavacana may, in the end, have very little to do with the question of provenance and much more to do with the effects that such inspired speech may have on particular audiences. In a manner quite different from that of Bhikhu Analayo, then, Nance arrives at a similar conclusion in urging us to read Siddhartha Gautama's philosophy more in terms of its enactment in embodied practice than as a set of philosophical doctrines.

The third buddha under consideration is the tantric Buddha, the quintessential "primordial buddha" (adibuddha) who appears in innumerable peaceful and wrathful forms and with a great plethora of names and attributes within the tantric streams of Indian Buddhism. Taking us still further away from "historical fact" toward something transcendent, Vesna A. Wallace explains in her chapter that the buddhas who author the texts known as tantras are traditionally understood as "nothing other than the ultimate truth" which reveals itself "in the conventional and at times symbolic terms that constitute a tantric text." The collapse of author and text is here complete, a situation that itself raises a complex of philosophical questions. Yet, these texts also contain explicitly philosophical passages, and Wallace helpfully guides us through some of them. The chapter reveals the tantric Buddha as engaging in philosophical disputation and offering arguments to refute non-Buddhists and Buddhists alike. Yet, it is also clear that this is but one small portion of a buddha's activity.

Finally, we turn to the future Buddha, Maitreya, whose role as an author is particularly complex due to his relationship with a human author, Asanga (who is also treated later in this volume). Although he is technically a bodhisattva, we

include Maitreya in this first part due to his transcendent and celestial status. Maitreya is a figure of great optimism for many Buddhists, as it is foretold that he currently resides in a heavenly realm, Tus ita ("Joyful"), waiting for the moment when all traces of the previous Buddha's teachings have disappeared from the earth. At that point, Maitreya will take birth in human form, attain nirvana, as did Sakyamuni Buddha before him, and reintroduce the Dharma to the world. Meanwhile, though, it is possible for some advanced meditation practitioners to meet Maitreya — as we find in the case of Asanga. In his chapter, Klaus-Dieter Mathes relates how Asanga is said to have received oral texts from Maitreya and then written them down. These texts include analyses of buddha-nature and buddhahood, as well as the path of transformation from ordinary mind to insight into the true nature of phenomena. While they have sometimes been interpreted as consistent with Madhyamaka philosophy, they generally present what came to be identified as a Yogacara Buddhist view. Mathes carefully examines one popular corpus of five Maitreya texts to conclude that there is sufficient evidence to hold that these works were all composed "by a single hand."

POET PHILOSOPHERS

Texts taught in a typical, contemporary academic philosophy curriculum include a wide variety of genres. While philosophers today are primarily taught to write academic articles and monographs, philosophers have historically experimented with a much broader range of literary forms, including dialogues, aphorisms, personal essays, confessions, epistles, meditations, autobiographies, and commentaries, in addition to treatises. Some Western philosophers, perhaps most famously Lucretius and Boethius, expressed their philosophical thinking in poetic form. For many philosophers, their chosen literary form is not merely one among several possible ways of clothing their thinking, but is essential to their thought. Consider Plato's dialogues, Montaigne's essays, Kant's treatises, or Nietzsche's aphorisms: in each case, the philosophy is inherently connected to the literary form and would be different if embodied in another genre. A similar diversity of literary form appears in Indian philosophical traditions, which have also included treatises, commentaries, dialogues, narratives, and poems. Much Indian Buddhist philosophy was written according to models of Sanskrit verse. Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, and Santideva, for example, and many other prominent Indian Buddhist philosophers, wrote some of their most important works following Sanskrit poetic forms and integrated elements of dialogue. Thus, in some sense, many Indian Buddhist authors

can be considered "poet philosophers." The poet philosophers we consider in this part, however, are poetic in a stronger sense: their philosophy is not merely articulated in verse but embodied in song and narrative, and their poetic and literary forms do important philosophical work.

In his chapter on Asvaghosa, Vincent Eltschinger notes that this poet from the first century of the Common Era — known for Buddhist dramatic works and refined court poetry (mahakavya) — was the first Buddhist philosopher to articulate systematic and sophisticated critiques of other religious-philosophical systems. In Life of the Buddha (Buddhacarita), an epico-lyrical poem, Asvaghosa defends the rationality of the Buddhist path — in contrast to other formulations of the path to liberation, especially Samkhya and Vaisesika — and therefore its effectiveness. In this account, the Buddha is a philosopher who justifies Buddhist doctrine and practice on the basis of reason, and reason is necessary for morality and liberation. Asvaghosa's views anticipate ideas that are more fully developed by later thinkers associated with Sautrantika and Yogacara. Moreover, Eltschinger argues, Asvaghosa may be the first Buddhist philosopher we can identify who pursues a distinctive intellectual agenda along with an argumentative and literary style to achieve it.

The following chapter, by Sonam Kachru, is a literary and philosophical reading of the Questions of Milinda (Milindapanha), a text that presents a dialogue between the Buddhist monk Nagasena and the Bactrian King Menander ("Milinda" in Pali). Kachru is interested in reading this text as a work of literature that can help us understand what it might be like to think and feel as a Buddhist. He wants to explore how the Questions of Milinda might be encountered in ways that can change us as readers. He therefore focuses not only on the arguments, but also on aesthetic features such as the use of examples and the drama of the dialogue. Kachru reads the drama as an exploration of the role of thought in our lives, and the tragedy of living a life for which we can give no justification. Kachru also suggests that the text itself can teach us how to read well and how to reason wisely about our own lives.

In the next chapter, Anne E. Monius addresses philosophy in the work of the Tamil author Cattanar (ca. sixth—seventh century). Cattanar is said to be the author of The Renunciation of Manimekalai (Manimekalai Turavu), an extended poetic narrative that traces the path of Manimekalai from a youthful courtesan to her ordination as a Buddhist nun. It is the first extant Tamil text of formal philosophy

and is representative of the ways in which many Tamil texts integrated philosophical reasoning into poetic narratives. Three of the chapters are explicitly philosophical: one critiques non-Buddhist views; the final two present a Buddhist account of inferential reasoning and interdependent origination. Manimekalai's understanding of inferential reasoning and especially interdependent origination as presented by her teacher, Aravanan, is what eventually leads her to commit to a life of renunciation. Like Manimekalai, the reader can look back and see how everything in her life was interdependently originated and what kinds of conditions can lead to freedom and renunciation of worldly life. As Monius argues, the beauty and rhetorical power of the narrative help the reader cultivate both an understanding and an emotional response intended to turn us toward renunciation and freedom.

In the final chapter of this part, Roger R. Jackson presents the late—first millennium Indian tantric poet, Saraha, as a philosopher. Saraha is informed by the metaphysical and ontological thought of Madhyamaka, Yogacara, and Vajrayana. Still, as Jackson argues, Saraha is a kind of philosophical anti-philosopher, as he is critical of philosophical study as a method to achieve awakening (just as he is also critical of meditation, pilgrimage, and tantric ritual and practice — all of which different Buddhists have held to be necessary for liberation). It is only when we let go of our attachment to conventional forms of practice, Saraha insists, that we can open ourselves to the ultimate reality beyond language and thought. In his songs, while arguing that the ultimate is beyond the grasp of words, he still seeks to somehow gesture toward it. This gesturing is accomplished with many terms, including: the innate, stainless mind, inmost nature, the real, the great seal, nondual mind, emptiness, awakening, Buddha. According to Saraha's nondual philosophy, everything in our lives — even what we take to be polluting and polluted — is ultimately somehow part of the radiant, pure, primordial reality. Instead of employing sustained rational arguments, Saraha seeks a direct understanding of reality and poetically presents the human potential for awakening.

ABHIDHARMA PHILOSOPHERS
The Sanskrit term "Abhidharma" ("Abhidhamma" in Pali) has multiple meanings. It often refers to a corpus of texts, one of the "three baskets" (tripitaka; tipitaka) of the Buddhist canon. In contrast to the discourses (Sutra, Sutta) and the monastic code (Vinaya) - the other two "baskets" of the canon - Abhidharma literature systematically analyzes forms of conscious experience and their objects in an explicitly Buddhist philosophical framework. One of the distinguishing features of

the Abhidharma texts is the comprehensive account of mental and physical factors authors try to achieve, often in the form of lists. There are two complete canonical collections of Abhidharma texts extant today - one preserved in Pali claimed by the Theravada tradition, and one preserved in Chinese ascribed to the Sarvastivada tradition - but previously there were additional Abhidharma texts associated with other schools, some of which exist in fragments while others are completely lost. The term "Abhidharma" can also refer to commentaries on these canonical texts, as well as to other texts that are intended to provide a systematic analysis, metaphysics, phenomenology, and evaluation of the varieties of consciousness and its objects using the earlier Abhidharma categories. Abhidharma can thus be a way of characterizing a style and approach to doing philosophy in Buddhist traditions, one of the first manifestations of Buddhist scholasticism. What these diverse meanings of the term share is that Abhidharma takes up the teachings from Buddhist discourses and gives a more formal and methodical account of Buddhist doctrine. While Abhidharma developed in the early centuries of Buddhism in India, later thinkers, including those associated with the Mahayana traditions of Madhyamaka and Yogacara, were working within an Abhidharma philosophical context, and many of them wrote Abhidharma texts. This is why Abhidharma can be seen as the backbone of so much Buddhist philosophy in India and remains a constant reference for Buddhist philosophers.

In the first chapter of this part on Abhidharma philosophers, Maria Heim describes the Enumeration of Phenomena (Dhammasangani) and Analysis (Vibhanga), which constitute the first two books of the canonical Pali Abhidhamma. Most traditional Theravada commentators, as well as modem scholars, have interpreted the Pali Abhidhamma as an ontology of ultimate reals. Heim defends an alternative interpretation for which she finds evidence in the Abhidhamma as well as in some postcanonical commentary, particularly that of Buddhaghosa. According to this interpretation, the Abhidhamma is a method of unending phenomenological analysis, a practice of continually exploring and then transforming experience. Heim uses the canonical Abhidhamma texts to demonstrate how they invite practitioners into a therapeutic and soteriological process of transformation through the endless exploration of experience that demonstrates that there is no final ontology, no final account of ultimate reality.

The next chapter, by Rupert Gethin, focuses on Points of Discussion (Kathavatthu), the fifth of the seven Abhidhamma texts collected in the Pali Canon. The text is

therefore regarded as "the word of the Buddha" (buddhavacana), even as it is also attributed to a particular figure, Moggaliputta Tissa, who is said to have lived in the third century BCE, because he is thought to be correctly explicating the Buddha's teachings in the work. Through dialogues between one voice advocating the views of the text and another voice presenting the opponent's views, Points of Discussion addresses more than zoo points of contention in early Buddhist doctrine. The dialogues follow a structure of reductio ad absurdum arguments, in which the opponent comes to understand that their beliefs are wrong because they are inconsistent. We are thus able to gain an understanding of both what some Buddhists were arguing about and the methods of argumentation they were employing. Gethin discusses these methods and then focuses on several particular points of doctrine debated in the text.

As Buddhism entered new geographical locations in the Indian subcontinent in its early centuries, different groups formulated distinctive interpretations of the Buddha's teachings. Abhidharma texts were composed in part to articulate and distinguish the doctrinal positions of diverse monastic communities. In his chapter, Bart Dessein discusses Katyayaniputra (ca. first century CE) and his Abhidharma Treatise in Eight   Sections (*Abhidharmatagranthastra or *Abhidharmastaskandhasastra), also known as the Source of Knowledge (Jhanaprasthana). Katyayaniputra is often regarded as the founder of the Sarvastivada school of Buddhism, and his text played a central role in the formation of the Sarvastivada identity with its own philosophy and an accompanying understanding of the Buddhist path. In the Abhidharma Treatise, he developed a comprehensive analysis of the material world and defended the role of reason and insight on the Buddhist path. Dessein presents some of Katyayaniputra's original contributions to Buddhist philosophy and traces two distinct developments that emerged from his work: the pedagogical digests that articulate the essence of Sarvastivada views compiled in Bactria and Gandhara, and the commentaries on the Abhidharma Treatise composed by the Vaibhasikas of Kasmira.

In the final chapter in this part, Peter Skilling discusses what he terms the "Vatsiputriya/Sammitiya" complex of schools — including the Bhadrayaniya, Dharmottariya, Sannagarika, and Kaurukulla-Sammitiya — which are often referred to by their opponents as "Pudgalavadins." One of the many views these traditions held was that the person (pudgala) was neither different from nor the same as the constituent elements of sentient beings, a position that many other Buddhists

critiqued as an abandonment of the traditional Buddhist understanding of "non-self." While the Vatsiputriyas/Sammitiyas probably did not think of this one idea as defining their tradition — the Sammitiya metaphysical texts surviving in the original language do not address the question of the pudgala — their opponents did. The Vatsiputriya/Sammitiya were absorbed by other traditions by the sixteenth century, and for many years they have been regarded as not genuinely Buddhist. In contrast, drawing on a variety of sources, Skilling argues that for well over a millennium the Vatsiputriya/Sammitiya schools were in fact a dominant form of mainstream Buddhism in South Asia. With this in mind, he makes the broader point that we should avoid thinking of one or another Buddhist school as somehow original, orthodox, or heterodox, and instead recognize the dynamic changes that have always marked the development of Buddhist thought.

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDERS

The great flowering of Buddhist philosophy that takes place in India has no founder. Even the Buddha himself is said to be just the most recent of those who have turned the wheel of the Dharma for the sake of the world; according to Buddhist traditions, other buddhas preceded him. But conventionally, it is nevertheless possible to identify developments that can, in retrospect, be recognized as new modalities in Indian Buddhist philosophical life. Of course, such beginnings are happening constantly, and this volume aims to show how a great number of individual philosophers leave their marks on how Buddhist philosophy gets done. Still, as in the West, the philosophical work of some figures affects subsequent thinkers in the tradition; in India, such figures have traditionally been identified as constituting new lineages of thought and practice.

We identify the thinkers in this part as "philosophical founders," taking our inspiration from the popular Tibetan schema of the "six ornaments and two supreme ones" (rgyan drug mchog gnyis). This group of eight luminaries, a popular subject for monastic scroll paintings, includes the six philosophers treated in this part - Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and Dharmakirti - along with two masters of monastic discipline (vinaya), Gunaprabha and Sakyaprabha. The six founders broadly also represent three significant streams in Mahayana philosophical thought, that of the Madhyamaka, Yogacara, and Pramana traditions, with two masters associated with each stream. We begin with_ Nagarjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka, along with his chief immediate disciple, Aryadeva. Following this, we have Asanga, the founder (with Maitreya) of the Yogacara, along

with his chief disciple and brother, Vasubandhu. And we finish with Dignaga, the founder of the Buddhist Pramana stream, along with his most influential disciple, Dharmakirti. Each of these six figures is treated in this part by authors who take distinct approaches. As they are all iconic for so many of the Buddhist thinkers who follow them, readers will find their names referenced repeatedly throughout the rest of the book.

Nagarjuna (second—third century CE) is widely regarded as one of the most influential philosophers in any Buddhist tradition. His Root Verses of the Middle Way (Malamadhyamakakarika), along with the other analytic treatises and devotional hymns that articulate his account of dependent origination and emptiness, became the basis of the Madhyamaka tradition of Mahayana Buddhism. Nagarjuna's notoriously terse verses led to a great diversity of interpretations by Buddhist intellectuals in India and in Central and East Asia, as well as among contemporary scholars. In her chapter, Amber D. Carpenter engages the most prominent interpretations of the Root Verses — as metaphysical, semantic, epistemological, and anti-rationalist — and offers a reading that emphasizes Nagarjuna's return to the Buddha's teachings on dependent arising (pratityasamutpada). Thus, according to Carpenter, Nagarjuna is a fundamentalist reformer, responding to the intellectual world of second-century Indian Buddhism by returning to what he believes is the true teaching of dependent arising and its rightful centrality in Buddhist thought. In contrast to the view of dependent arising as the way in which things arise or are in relation with each other, Nagarjuna's understanding of dependent arising functions to deconstruct metaphysical conceptions of individuation as such; according to Carpenter, for Nagarjuna, dependent arising means there are no things arising. By linking the original teaching of dependent arising with the Mahayana understanding of emptiness and the distinction between ultimate and conventional truth, Nagarjuna defends the Mahayana as the authentic embodiment of the Buddha's teachings. Carpenter sees in Nagarjuna's Precious Garland (Ratnavali) the implications for ethics of Nagarjuna's philosophy of dependent arising, emptiness, and the two truths. Reading Nagarjuna as embedded in communities of practice, she suggests that his ontology, epistemology, and philosophy of language do indeed inform the Buddhist practical-soteriological project.

Aryadeva (second—third century) is traditionally said to have been Nagarjuna's student and is credited as a cofounder of the Madhyamaka. While many Indian

philosophers argue that possessing an essence or intrinsic nature is a condition for something to be real, Aryadeva believes that there is no entity that meets this condition. Like Nagarjuna, he employs a dialectical method to deconstruct any claim of intrinsic nature; he argues that there is no essence or identity that is somehow independent of causes and conditions. Phenomena are then precisely empty of the intrinsic natures that are attributed to them. Thus, we must abandon any philosophical views that presuppose real entities. Focusing on Aryadeva's moat significant work, the Four Hundred Verses (Catuthsataka), Tom J. F. Tillemans gives an account of both Aryadeva's anti-realist metaphysics and ontology and his ethics, as well as how they may — or may not — relate to each other. Aryadeva's ethics are, as Tillemans argues, radically revisionist. That is, Aryadeva proposes a supererogatory morality that calls for a kind of moral sainthood. Tillemans suggests that there is a tension between Aryadeva's descriptive ontology and revisionary ethics, as the former undermines any possible philosophical foundation for the later. Tillemans also explores Dharmapala's Yogacara interpretation of the Four Hundred Verses and what it might tell us about early Yogacara-Madhyamaka syntheses.

The writings attributed to Asanga (fourth—fifth century) are foundational to the development of the Yogacara tradition of Mahayana Buddhism. Indeed, Asanga's texts are some of the earliest systematic presentations of core Yogacara ideas. Jowita Kramer, in her chapter, focuses on Asanga's two most important texts: the Compendium of the Abhidharma (Abhidharmasamuccaya) and the Summary of the Mahayana (Mahayanasamgraha). The Compendium of the Abhidharma is a systematic work of what some scholars call Mainstream (i.e., not Mahayana) Abhidharma that integrates characteristically Yogacara ideas. In the Summary of the Mahayana, Asanga articulates the core ideas that distinguish Yogacara from other Buddhist schools. These include the idealist ontology of the three natures, and that there is nothing external to the mind — that there is nothing other than presentation to the mind (vijnaptimatra). He also presents the doctrine of the eight forms of mind, including the storehouse mind (alayavijnana), a form of mind beneath the other forms that is the store of karma. Kramer suggests that while it may not be the case that Asanga himself first articulated these ideas, he was likely the first author to develop them into one coherent philosophical system.

Perhaps no Indian Buddhist philosopher justifies a wariness about categorizing authors according to schools as much as Vasubandhu (fourth—fifth century), traditionally said to be Asanga's younger brother. Vasubandhu is widely regarded as

one of the founding fathers of the Yogacara school. Yet he wrote a comprehensive account of the Sarvastivada Abhidharma, the Treasury of Abhidharma Verses (Abhidharmakosakarika). At the same time, in his own detailed and very influential Commentary on the Treasury of Abhidharma (Abhidharmakosabhasya) — the touchstone reference for Abhidharma in Tibetan scholasticism — he subjects the root verses to critique from multiple perspectives, especially from a view associated with the Sautrantika school. Some of Vasubandhu's other texts defending an idealist ontology and associated Yogacara ideas were also highly influential. Still, as Jonathan C. Gold notes, while Yogacara and Madtiyamaka came to be regarded as rival schools, Vasubandhu never actually uses the term "Yogacara," and he does employ characteristically Nagarjunian arguments. According to Gold, then, Vasubandhu should be read not as sequentially representing one school after another, but rather as a philosopher who works within multiple inherited traditions. Focusing on questions of causality and language, Gold traces a common theme across the diversity of Vasubandhu's texts. In particular, Gold unpacks Vasubandhu's view that while concepts and words cannot actually capture reality, even false concepts, when used skillfully, can point to an ineffable reality beyond language.

Dignaga (late fifth—early sixth century) is credited with founding the influential Buddhist tradition of logic and epistemology known as Pramana. Of course, Dignaga inherited and was informed by a rich tradition of philosophical inquiry into perception, cognition, and reasoning. He was especially influenced by Vasubandhu's writings on argumentation. Still, Dignaga's work, culminating in the Compendium of the Means of Valid Cognition (Pramanasamuccaya) together with his autocommentary, constitutes a significant development in Indian logic and epistemology. In contrast to some other Indian philosophers who accept verbal testimony (sabda) as a distinct valid means of cognition (pramana), Dignaga understands it as a form of inference (anumana), one of only two valid means of cognition, along with perception (pratyaksa). He subdivides inference into inference-for-oneself and inference-for-others, which makes it possible to treat argumentation within the broader epistemological category of inference. As Kei Kataoka notes, this was part of Dignaga's project of bringing epistemology (theories of the means of valid cognition), dialectics (theories of argumentation), and semantics (theories of word-referents) into one unified field of study. Relevant to all three domains, and one of Dignaga's most original and important contributions, is

the idea of pervasion (vyapti), a form of invariable concomitance that can guarantee inferences. In addition to giving an overview of Dignaga's project in the Compendium, Kataoka focuses on some of Dignaga's most crucial concepts, including the exclusion of what is other (anyapoha), the three conditions of a proper reason (trairupyalinga), the self-awareness of cognitions (svasamvitti), and non-perception (anupalabdhi). Kataoka carefully traces what Dignaga drew from his predecessors, what constitutes his original contributions, and where his successors — the Nrunamsaka Kumarila and the Buddhist Dharmakirti — recognized the limitations of his system.

Developing the work of his predecessors, especially Vasubandhu and Dignaga, Dharmakirti (ca. sixth—seventh century) is regarded as a cofounder of the Buddhist school of logic and epistemology, and was for centuries seen as the main representative of Buddhist philosophy for non-Buddhist philosophers in India. His most important work, the Commentary on the Means of Knowledge (Pramanavarttika), explicates and refines the Compendium of the Means of Knowledge (Pramanasamuccaya), synthesizing Dignaga's epistemology, dialectics, and semantics with traditional Buddhist doctrines to give them a whole new significance. While Dharmakirti is generally associated with the fields of logic and epistemology, as John Taber points out, he is primarily interested in defending the rationality of core Buddhist doctrines as he understands them. Thus, in addition to addressing his original contributions to theories of perception, inference, universals, and exclusions, Taber devotes much of his chapter to Dharmakirti's apologetic concerns. These include Dharmakirti's defense of the Buddha as tantamount to a means of knowledge (pramana) and the authority of Buddhist scripture, his critique of physicalism and defense of antirealism and momentariness, and his disagreements with Brahmanical philosophers. Throughout, Taber makes clear, Dharmakirti is primarily interested in logic and epistemology not for their own sake, but insofar as they can provide a systematic and rational defense of the Buddhist soteriological project.

EARLY-PERIOD COMMENTATORS

Indian Buddhist philosophers regarded as the founders of philosophical schools — such as the figures in the preceding part of this volume — often wrote texts that are terse and sometimes so obscure as to be incomprehensible without a commentary. Because the root texts were composed with the expectation of oral or written commentary to explain them, commentaries were not simply a supplement to an

otherwise sufficient work; they were essential to the root text. This is why some Indian Buddhist philosophers wrote auto-commentaries on their own texts. In many instances, it would be reasonable to consider the root text and its commentary as together constituting a kind of hybrid text, and this is one way in which authorship is rendered complicated in Indian Buddhism. Yet, it was through these hybrid texts that different schools were constructed as distinct and coherent. It was through the commentarial literature that these schools developed and became more sophisticated as commentators drew on the resources of their traditions and the indeterminate meaning of the texts they were explaining to introduce novel interpretations and ideas in response to new philosophical challenges. By the sixth century, developments in logic and epistemology contributed to the rise of debates across Indian philosophical traditions. Commentators often understood their role to include not just defending their own view but also demonstrating the deficiency of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical positions. As with other South Asian traditions, then, even as many Indian Buddhist philosophers were creative and original thinkers, they often presented their thought as explication and practiced philosophy though commentary on earlier works.

Buddhaghosa's commentaries on Buddhist scriptures and his formulation of a Buddhist life in the Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) played a significant role in the formation of what today is called the Theravada tradition. At the heart of Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad's chapter is what he terms Buddhaghosa's "hermeneutic of contextualization," which is especially attentive to the context in which the Buddha offers his teaching. Applying the hermeneutic of contextualization to Buddhaghosa's own texts, Ram-Prasad argues, suggests that he is not primarily concerned with the ontological analysis of objects of experience. Rather, Buddhaghosa practices a phenomenological method aimed at transforming human experience. Drawing on Buddhaghosa's hermeneutics and phenomenological method, Ram-Prasad shows how his account of understanding in the Path of Purification is a form of phenomenological practice that prepares the practitioner for systematic, methodical, and morally informed meditation.

In the next chapter, Karl-Stephan Bouthillette shows how Bhaviveka (sixth century) drew on recent developments in epistemology and argumentation to interpret Nagarjuna's philosophy of the Middle Way. Bhaviveka's interpretation —using the three-part inference (anumana) developed by Dignaga and the epistemological framework of valid means of cognition or knowing (pramana) —became the

dominant view of Nagarjuna in Indian Buddhist scholarship. Interpreting and defending Nagarjuna's philosophy with the fifth- and sixth-century methods of critical reasoning and debate firmly established it as a system that could compete with other Indian philosophical schools. Indeed, Bhaviveka devoted considerable resources to critiquing the views of other Indian philosophical traditions, setting up a doxographical hierarchy that became a model of much Buddhist philosophy. In this hierarchy, philosophy is paramount and wrong ideas need to be refuted because they are obstacles to liberation. Bhaviveka's work, then, emphasizes the importance of rational argument, and he himself was an original and rigorous thinker who was able to synthesize different philosophical approaches into a coherent Madhyamaka system.

Like Bhaviveka, Dharmapala (sixth century) employed Dignaga's logic and epistemology to interpret and defend views first articulated before the fifth- and sixth-century developments in argumentation and reasoning and to critique other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. In his chapter on Dharmapala, Ching Keng suggests that one of his opponents was in fact Bhaviveka and that the debate between the two thinkers is the beginning of the debates between Madhyamaka and Yogacara views that became important for many later Buddhist philosophers. While Dharmapala's commentaries are conservative, hewing closely to the root texts, works attributed to him also include original thinking on a variety of important Yogacara themes, especially meta-cognition. Keng suggests that perhaps this tension can be resolved by thinking of "Dharmapala" as including the Indian scholar and his students and followers and that it was their combined work that had such a significant influence on Buddhist philosophy in India and especially in East Asia. Authorship, in this context, works more like the label on a "workshop" rather than a designation of a single individual.

As Roy Tzohar and Jowita Kramer show in the next chapter, Sthiramati (ca. sixth century) used his commentaries on Yogacara texts to make novel philosophical contributions. In the first half of the chapter, Kramer provides an overview of current research on Sthiramati, including the philosophical themes he explored in his work. In the second half, Tzohar gives a close reading of Sthiramati's commentary on the beginning of Vasubandhu's Treatise in Thirty Verses (Trimsika), emphasizing Sthiramati's innovative understanding of meaning, metaphor, and language. Sthiramati's linguistic figurative theory of meaning complements the Yogacara account of the causal activity of consciousness resulting in a more

systematic philosophy. Indeed, it was through his commentaries that Sthiramati synthesized a variety of texts into one coherent Yogacara system.

Alexander Yiannopoulos, in the following chapter, focuses on Devendrabuddhi (seventh century) and Sakyabuddhi (seventh century), the two earliest commentators on Dharmakirti's Commentary on the Means of Knowledge (Pramanavarttika). Yiannopoulos reflects on how these commentators interpret Dharmakirti and explores particular distinctions and themes that exemplify their approach to the root text, such as Devendrabuddhi's account of "unmediated instrumental effect" and Sakyabuddhi's analysis of reflexive awareness. Because Dharmakirti's Commentary on the Means of Knowledge is so terse, it requires additional commentary to make the arguments explicit. Indeed, Dharmakirti's text is not just philosophically obscure; the commentaries are often necessary even to make sense of the syntax and grammar. Given how thoroughly interdependent this particular root text and its earliest commentaries are, Yiannopoulos suggests that we should consider them as together constituting one "hybrid text"

Candrakirti (seventh century) is widely regarded as one of the most significant Madhyamaka philosophers. This is especially true in Tibet, where his commentaries on Nagarjuna's texts are often taken to be authoritative on Madhyamaka philosophy. Focusing on Candrakirti's understanding of the two truths, the importance of his approach to language, and his overall philosophy as a form of anti-essentialism, Mattia Salvini gives an overview of Candrakirti's writings and an analysis of his main ideas. In addition, Salvini emphasizes three aspects of Candrakirti's work that are often neglected in English language scholarship. The first is how Candrakirti's philosophical practice is grounded in traditions of Sanskrit grammar, which is key to

philosophical practice is grounded in traditions of Sanskrit grammar, which is key to understanding his anti-essentialist philosophy of language. Second, Salvini shows how Candrakirti is attentive to the ways in which Nagarjuna himself was working in an abhidharma philosophical context and how Candrakirti employs abhidharma analysis in his own works. The third aspect is Candrakirti's inclusive hermeneutics, as he finds arguments for emptiness in both Mahayana and non-Mahayana sources and presents his own ideas without relying exclusively on the authority of any one circumscribed set of Buddhist sutras.

MIDDLE-PERIOD COMMENTATORS

Following the development and articulation of Madhyamaka and Yogacara as distinct and coherent philosophical schools, with thinkers from both traditions engaging Dignaga and Dharmakirti, in the eighth century, we see efforts to take stock of the diversity of philosophical positions. These efforts took different approaches, some critical and some syncretic, to address the hermeneutical and philosophical issues that such diverging orientations and interpretations posed to the coherence of the Buddhist tradition. At times, this meant presenting a path leading through a hierarchy of views from the lowest to the most liberating wisdom. At other times, it meant offering new interpretations that could bend the meaning of root texts in creative ways. It could also involve the creation of new conceptual and exegetical tools aimed at solving problems posed by Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents.

We see one version of a philosophical synthesis together with the development of original philosophical positions in Subhagupta (eighth century), who draws on the atomic theories found in Vaibhasika and Sautrantika traditions even as he is firmly rooted in the logic and epistemology of Dignaga and Dharmakirti. Serena Saccone explores how Subhagupta, while mostly interpreting and elaborating on Dharmakirti's thinking, develops his own ontological and epistemological views. This is especially true in his Verses on the Demonstration of External Objects (*Bahyarthasiddhikarika), in which he defends a form of externalism in contrast to the ontological idealism of Dignaga and Dharmakirti even as he employs their methods of argument. In the same text, Subhagupta argues against both the Sautrantikas and the idealists and defends the view that sense cognitions are not shaped by the image of their objects.

Subhagupta's student, Dharmottara (eighth century), wrote his own independent treatises, but he is primarily known for his commentiries on Dharmakirti's writings on epistemology. David Nowakowski, in his chapter, focuses on Dharmottara's commentary on Dharmakirti's Epitome of Reason (Nyayabindu). While Dharmottara presents himself as faithfully interpreting Dharmakirti's thought, in resolving tensions and constructing a more coherent and systematic account, Dharmottara nonetheless introduces novel ideas. In particular, Nowakowski spotlights how Dharmottara's epistemology and philosophy of mind blur Dharmakirti's clear distinction between perception, inferential reason, and inference-for-others. While he draws on Dharmakirti's resources, Dharmottara's

epistemology is much more cognizer relative, as he emphasizes the ways in which both perception and inference are themselves dependent on the particular conditions of individual cognitive agents. This rejection of Dharmakirti's more impersonal account of cognitive processes proved influential for some later Buddhist philosophers.

Ryusei Keira, in his chapter, discusses Jnanagarbha (eighth century), author of the Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths (Satyadvavibhangavrtti). Following Bhaviveka and informed by Dharmakirti's epistemology, Jnanagarbha is perhaps the first Indian Buddhist philosopher to explicitly integrate Yogacara views into a Madhyamaka framework. For example, Jnanagarbha employs the idea of "mind-only" (cittamatra) to argue for the selflessness of external objects. Keira argues that this moment of Yogacara thought illustrates Jnanagarbha's gradualism, as it is only one stage in what will ultimately be a Madhyamaka account that shows the selflessness of mind. Keira is particularly interested in Jnanagarbha's account of the two truths, how it is different from the account of the two truths found in other prominent Madhyamaka thinkers, and the diverse Tibetan interpretations of Jnanagarbha's distinction between the conventional and the ultimate.

Santaraksita (ca. 725-788) is said to have been Jnanagarbha's student and wrote a subcommentary (panjika) on his teacher's Commentary. He also employs Dignaga and Dharmakirti's logic and epistemology and is the first prominent Madhyamika philosopher to produce a commentary on a text by Dharmakirti. Allison Aitken, in her chapter on Santarakita, traces his syncretic method that was to become influential for much Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. This syncretic method employs and then rejects one view after another, culminating in the Madhyamaka relinquishing of all views. For example, in his Ornament of the Middle Way (Madhyamakalamkara ,) Santaraksita rejects the direct realist theory of perception associated with Vaibhasikas by using arguments from the Sautrantika representationalist theory of perception. But then he adopts the Yogacara idealist ontology — which, together with the Yogacara understanding of cognition as reflexively aware, he believes to be conventionally true — to critique that same Sautrantika representationalism. In the end, while the Yogacara position may be helpful for freeing us from misguided views of the reality of external objects, Santaraksita employs it instrumentally and leaves it behind with his famous articulation of the neither-one-nor-many argument for the Madhyamaka ultimate

truth of the emptiness of intrinsic nature, including the emptiness of the Yogacara concept of mind.

Continuing this lineage, Santaraksita's prolific student Kamalaslla (ca. 740-795) shows even greater enthusiasm for integrating Yogacara and Madhyamaka thought, often bolstered by elaborate arguments rooted in Dharmakirti's epistemological theories. In the following chapter, Sara McClintock presents an overview of Kamalasila's oeuvre, showcasing his range from philosophical treatises to sutra commentaries to meditation and monastic training manuals to epistles. Like his teacher Santaraksita, Kamalaslla is unusual in this volume in that we have historical records testifying to his existence as the result of his sojourn in Tibet, where he traveled at the invitation of the king and where he engaged in teaching and debate. Some of his works appear to have been written in Tibet and may also therefore represent his attempt to transmit the full range of scholastic knowledge of Nalanda, the famed monastic university in North India with which he is associated. Throughout his many writings, however, a consistent theme is the importance of understanding the conventional realities that allow reason to function. McClintock argues that Kamalasila sees even wisdom as a "necessary illusion" which the bodhisattva must embrace if they are to be of help to the world.

Another of Santaraksita's students, Haribhadra (eighth century), also draws on diverse Buddhist philosophical traditions in a syncretic fashion. Pierre-Julien Harter, in his chapter, focuses on Haribhadra's engagement with the Perfect Wisdom (Prajnaparamita) tradition. Haribhadra exemplifies those commentators who want both to appear subservient to texts and to manifest a creativity that opens new philosophical horizons. According to Harter, we see this in the alliance Haribhadra forges between the sutras of Perfect Wisdom and the Ornament of Realizations (Abhisamayalarnkara), of which he became a champion. This exegetical innovation is at the same time a philosophical innovation since it updates the Perfect Wisdom by giving it what Harter calls a "voice" and by giving to the Buddhist path a treatise (sastra) and a place within philosophical debates.

Santideva (eighth century) is the Indian Buddhist author whose work is most widely read by contemporary scholars as a contribution to moral philosophy. Both of Santideva's surviving texts — the Introduction to the Practice of Awakening (Bodhicaryavatara) and the Compendium of Trainings (Siksasamuccaya) — make significant contributions to understanding the moral dimensions of mindfulness,

concentration, virtue, well-being, and the relation between metaphysics and ethics. Stephen Harris, in his chapter, is particularly interested in Santideva's analysis of the virtues of generosity, patience, and wisdom and its role in the cultivation of the other virtues of a bodhisattva. He also focuses on bodhicitta, or "the mind dedicated to full awakening" and the vow to become a bodhisattva. Harris emphasizes the ways in which, throughout Santideva's account of cultivating the virtues of a bodhisattva, we see the convergence of altruism and self-interest, that attending to the good of the other is simultaneously to attend to our own most fundamental good.

In the final chapter in this section, Shinya Moriyama turns to another commentator on Dharmakirti, Prajnakaragupta (eighth—ninth century). Moriyama focuses on the most distinctive elements of Prajnakaragupta's thought in ontology, epistemology, and philosophy of religion. He begins with Prajnakaragupta's theory of "backward causation," according to which future entities function as causes of present entities. Moriyama then discusses Prajnakaragupta's ontological idealism, which equates existence with being perceived and which informs his epistemology. Then Moriyama turns to Prajnakaragupta's expansive account of the Buddha's omniscience, including the knowledge of all past and future entities. He ends with a discussion of Prajnakaragupta's doctrine of nonduality, the culmination of the Buddhist path of wisdom.

LATE-PERIOD COMMENTATORS

The tenth through twelfth centuries represent the start of the waning of the classical period of Buddhist philosophy in India. Yet this period is also marked by tremendous creativity, often in ways that modern scholars are only beginning to appreciate and understand, with Buddhist philosophers propounding new types of syntheses both in the debate halls of the great monastic universities of North India and in scholarly treatises. Tantric practice and thought are increasingly influential, while the epistemological theories of Dignaga and Dharmakirti continue to hold considerable sway. Madhyamaka and Yogacara continue to vie for dominance, even as thinkers like Ratnakarasanti attempt to knit them together, sometimes with the aid of tantric or Buddha-nature theories. Scholars like Jnanasrimitra and Ratnakirti continue to argue with non-Buddhist thinkers, extending conversations on topics including philosophy of language and the warrants for knowledge (pramanas) such as perception and inference, even as practitioners like Saraha (see Part 2) offer an alternative path rejecting such scholastic approaches. Some philosophers travel

outside of India, bringing new ideas to other regions and greatly influencing the course of Buddhist thought, as with Atisa's promotion of Candrakirti in Central Tibet. In turn, Tibetans and others visit the monastic universities, seeking knowledge to bring back to their homelands, where Buddhist philosophy would continue to develop long past the time of its demise in India.

According to Tibetan sources, Jitari (tenth century) was associated with tantric traditions and clearly defended Madhyamaka in his doxographical writings. However, as Junjie Chu shows in his chapter, two recently discovered manuscripts of a treatise attributed to Jitari, Topics of Debate, complicate our understanding of Jitari's own philosophical position. Topics of Debate makes possible a more comprehensive understanding of Jitari's philosophy than previously available texts because of the breadth of its scope: in seventeen chapters, he focuses on seventeen significant topics of debate among Buddhist, Brahmanical, and Jain philosophers. These chapters typically begin with an argument for Jitari's own position followed by refutations of objections and other positions. Chu gives an overview of each of these chapters and concludes that while Jitari may have been influenced by Madhyamaka thought, he is better understood as a Yogacara thinker in the tradition of Dharmakirti.

Jnanasrimitra (tenth century) belongs to a group of scholars from the great Buddhist university of Vikramasila. He also wrote from within the logical and epistemological tradition derived from Dignaga and Dharmakirti. Jnanasrimitra analyzes cognitions into "appearance" (pratibhasa) and "determination" (adhyavasaya). Any conceptual or nonconceptual awareness, according to Jnanasrimitra, involves the appearance of an image in consciousness. "Determination" is the process whereby a phenomenal image is given as presenting something other than itself; this is, Jnanasrimitra argues, conceptual awareness. But we are mistaken in taking a cognition that includes an image of something beyond itself as actually giving us an external object. Rather, as Lawrence McCrea makes clear in his chapter, for Jnanasrimitra, appearances in consciousness are just that —appearances in consciousness — for there is nothing that exists outside of consciousness. Jnanasrimitra defends an idealist position that there is only one undifferentiated mental image, what he calls "variegated nonduality" (citra-advaita). He deploys the distinction between appearance and determination to offer creative solutions to a variety of problems in ontology and metaphysics, philosophy of language, epistemology, logic, and

philosophy of religion, even as he grounds himself as an exegete of the Dharmakirtian tradition.

Jnanasrimitra's work was influential for much Buddhist philosophy in India and was also engaged by prominent non-Buddhist Indian philosophers for centuries. Ratnakirti (eleventh century), his student from Vikramasila, concisely summarizes, defends, and elaborates on the views of his teacher. Like Jnanasrimitra, Ratnakirti works within the broader Dharmakirtian tradition of logic and epistemology and addresses a range of issues in Buddhist philosophy. In his chapter, Patrick McAllister explores Ratnakirti's ontology with a particular focus on two themes. The first is Ratnakirti's position that for anything to be real, it must be momentary, because if something were not momentary, it could not be a cause. The second is Ratnakirti's ontological idealism that nothing exists outside of the mind. As McAllister shows, Ratnakirti devoted considerable attention to making sense of cognition and the Buddhist path from a perspective in which our everyday experience of enduring and external objects is thoroughly erroneous.

The Mahayana view that ordinary persons perceive conventional reality and take it to be ultimately real, while a buddha does not perceive conventional reality, raises the problem of how a buddha can communicate with and help ordinary persons. According to Ratnakarasanti (eleventh century), grasping subjects and the objects they grasp are both imagined. They are representational forms that arise in the consciousness of an ordinary person, but a buddha is precisely free from these erroneous representations and perceives reality as it ultimately is. As Gregory Max Seton shows, Ratnakarasanti makes the controversial argument that, motivated by compassion, a buddha purposefully retains a degree of cognitive error, which enables perception of the external objects and the grasping subject even as a buddha simultaneously knows these representational forms are erroneous. Seton focuses on the account of consciousness and the theory of error Ratnakarasanti employs as he attempts to develop an ontology and representationalist epistemology that would constitute the correct interpretation of both Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka and Asanga's Yogacara.

We can see another kind of syncretic project in the work of Atisa (982-105.0, who integrates Candrakirti's and Bhaviveka's methodological approaches to Nagarjuna's Middle Way philosophy, as well as teachings on the bodhisattva path and esoteric tantric practices. While Atisa primarily follows Candrakirti's reductio ad absurdum

method of demonstrating contradictions in the views of others, like Bhaviveka, he employs reasoning as an aid to cultivate insight, even as he eschews the approach to valid means of cognition (pramana) developed by Dignaga and Dharmakirti. The result, as James B. Apple suggests, is a form of nominalism, according to which cognitions and objects are mere appearances and not ultimately real because they are mental imputations. Even the mind, itself dependently originated, is also a nominal designation, an appearance that cannot be established as inherently existing. Atisa calls his approach the "Great Middle Way: integrating a multiplicity of teachings and practices to support progress on the path to a nondual awakening, ultimately letting go of even nonconceptual wisdom.

MODERN PHILOSOPHERS

Indian Buddhist philosophy is typically associated with early figures such as Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and their premodern commentators. But in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a number of Indian scholars and social reformers took up Buddhist thought in new and intellectually creative ways. Using the language of "Buddhist Revival" — and thus emphasizing what they described as India's glorious Buddhist past — they reformulated Buddhism as a modem way of life appropriate for democratic, egalitarian societies. Figures such as Iyothee Thass, Rahula Sankrityayana, Dharmananda Damodar Kosambi, P. Lakshmi Narasu, and B. It Ambedkar found in Buddhist traditions a universal religion, characterized by reason and morality, that they simultaneously proposed as a national religion for India. Responding to the pressing issues of the time - such as colonialism and independence; the formation of a new republic; and religious, class, and political conflicts — they sought resources and inspiration in Buddhist traditions for developing a non-sectarian morality; advocating for freedom of thought; and critically rethinking and reconstructing society to be more equal in terms of caste, gender, economics, and politics. The philosophers whose work is explored in this section thus display two of the many ways in which Buddhist philosophy has been adapted to address the challenges of modernity.

In the first chapter of this section, William Edelglass focuses on three intertwined threads of the philosophy of religion, Buddhism as a socially engaged practice, and Buddhist political philosophy in the writings of Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar 1891-1956), the most prominent of the modem Indian Buddhist figures. Ambedkar was born into an outcaste community, the Mahars, and went on to earn multiple graduate degrees at both Columbia and the London School of Economics, eventually

becoming the first minister of law in the newly independent India and chair of the Drafting Committee of the Indian Constitution: While he is primarily known as the chief architect of the constitution, Ambedkar was also a prolific author who worked in disciplines across the social sciences and humanities, including philosophy. According to Ambedkar's analysis, the inequality that permeated Indian society was due in part to the dominant forms of Indian religion; he argued for the annihilation of caste, as well as the abandonment of the religious framework that justified caste hierarchy. However, Ambedkar believed religion was still important, as it could provide the basis for a sacred morality and responsibility to others that would bind social groups together in a democratic society. Ambedkar devoted the last decade of his life to developing a Buddhist philosophy and practice that would explicitly center the experience of marginalized communities and lead to a more free, just, and equitable society.

Jay Garfield, in the final chapter, presents an overview of the philosophy of the Dalai Lama XIV (the Ven. Tenzin Gyatso, 19354 Characterizing the Dalai Lama XIV as a modern Indian philosopher may not be an obvious choice. However, the Dalai Lama XIV has lived his entire adult life in India, his own philosophical work is rooted in Indian Buddhist traditions as taken up in Tibet, and for decades he has been in dialogue with Indian philosophical and religious thinkers. The Dalai Lama XIV's philosophical writings include commentaries on Indian Buddhist texts, treatises in moral philosophy seeking to develop a universal ethic, reflections on science and Buddhist metaphysics, philosophy of religion and interfaith dialogues, and works devoted to nonviolence and political thought. As Garfield shows, these texts offer a distinctive synthesis of classical Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy with contemporary Indian and Western thought and make the Dalai Lama XIV one of the most significant and influential contemporary Indian philosophers. <>

THE MATTER OF WONDER: ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PANENTHEISM AND THE NEW MATERIALISM by Loriliai Biernacki [Oxford University Press, 9780197643075]

In the early 11th century, the Kashmiri philosopher Abhinavagupta proposed panentheism-seeing the divine as both immanent in the world and at the same time as transcendent--as a way to reclaim the material world as something real, something solid. His theology understood the world itself, with its manifold inhabitants--from gods to humans to insects

down to the merest rock-as part of the unfolding of a single conscious reality, Siva. This conscious singularity-the word "god" here does not quite do it justice--with its capacity to choose and will, pervades all through, top to bottom; as Abhinavagupta writes, "even down to a worm -- when they do their own deeds, that which is to be done first stirs in the heart." His panentheism proposed an answer to a familiar conundrum, one we still grapple with today: Consciousness is so unlike matter. How does consciousness actually connect to the materiality of our world? To put this in more familar twenty-first-century terms, how does mind connect to body?

These questions drive Loriliai Biernacki's THE MATTER OF WONDER: ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PANENTHEISM AND NEW MATERIALISM. Biernacki draws on Abhinavagupta's thought--and particularly his yet-untranslated, philosophical magnum opus, the Isvara Pratyabhijña Vivrti Vimarsini--to think through contemporary issues such as the looming prospect of machine AI, ideas about information, and our ecological crises. She argues that Abhinavagupta's panentheism can help us understand our current world and can contribute to a New Materialist re-envisioning of the relationship that humans have with matter.

CONTENTS

Introduction: The Matter of Wonder: Abhinavagupta's Panentheism and New Materialism
1. Abhinavagupta's Panentheism and New Materialism
2. The Matter of Wonder
3. The Subtle Body
4. Panentheism, Panpsychism, Theism: Abhinavagupta on Consciousness, Sentience, and the Paperclip Apocalypse
5. It from Bit, It from Cit: Information and Meaning
Notes
Bibliography
Index

I bow to him who pierces through and pervades with his own essence this whole, from top to bottom, and makes this whole world to consist of Šiva, himself. —Abhinavagupta
We may someday have to enlarge the scope of what we mean by a "who." — John Archibald Wheeler
Even down to a worm— when they do their own deeds, that which is to be done first stirs in the heart. —Abhinavagupta
If thou be'st born to strange sights, Things invisible to see, Ride ten thousand days and nights, Till age snow white hairs on thee, Thou, when thou return'st, wilt tell me, All strange wonders that befell thee
—John Donne

In this book I argue that the panentheism of an 11th-century medieval Indian Hindu thinker can help us to rethink our current relationship to matter. Writing in northern India from 975 to 1025 CE, the Kashmiri philosopher Abhinavagupta (950– 1016) articulated a panentheism— both seeing the divine as immanent in the world and at the same time as transcendent— as a way of reclaiming the solidity, the realness of the material world. His theology understood the world itself, with its manifold inhabitants, from gods to humans to insects down to the merest rock as part of the unfolding of a single conscious reality, Šiva. This conscious singularity— the word "god" here does not quite do justice to the pervasive panentheism involved— this consciousness, with its capacity to choose and will, pervades all through, from top to bottom; human and nonhuman, as Abhinavagupta tells us, "even down to a worm— when they do their own deeds, that which is to be done first stirs in the heart." His panentheism proposed an answer to a familiar conundrum, one we still grapple with today— that is: consciousness is so unlike matter; how does it actually connect to the materiality of our world? To put this question in more familiar 21st- century terms, how does mind connect to body? This particular question drives the comparative impetus for this book.

Abhinavagupta

A towering figure in India's philosophical landscape, influential far beyond the boundaries of his native Kashmir in the thousand years since his death, Abhinavagupta wrote extensively on Tantra, an innovative religious movement that began in India in the first half of the first millennium. Tantra as a religious system cut across religious boundaries, steering Buddhist groups and sectarian Hindu groups, Saiva and Vaishava, and even an abstinency-minded Jainism away from an earlier ascendant asceticism to a philosophy and a praxis more keenly focused on the body as part of the path of enlightenment and on ritual, especially ritual involving the body. Perhaps in keeping with Tantra's attention to the body, it may not be surprising to find Abhinavagupta exercising his keen intellect as well in the domain of the senses, writing also on aesthetic theory. And while Abhinavagupta is especially well known today for his writing on Tantric philosophy and ritual, it is probably fair to suggest that historically in India his pan-India fame rests especially on his writings on aesthetics, where his theoretical interventions shaped aesthetic understanding through the following centuries. This material, sensual orientation shapes a physical portrait we have of him as well. One of his devotees, as Pandey tells us, a disciple who studied directly with Abhinavagupta, Madhuraja Yogin, gives us a visualization of Abhinavagupta. Certainly, the intervening centuries make it hard to accord it any genuine accuracy; still the image we have is evocative, redolent of a sensual, physical embrace of the world. His long hair tied with a garland of flowers, bearing the insignia of a devotee of the god Siva, Rudrakali beads, and three lines of ash on his forehead, he plays a musical instrument, the vïna, and in an anticipated Tantric gesture,

two women are at his side holding lotus flowers and the aphrodisiac betel nut. Portraits aside, Abhinavagupta's writing is compelling and fresh even after these ten centuries precisely because of Abhinavagupta's ability to weave philosophy within a mundane material awareness. Keen in its psychological comprehension, his acute sensibility of how the mind works can help us navigate our own contemporary engagement with the matter all around us.

My Argument

Particularly for a New Materialism, I propose that Abhinavagupta's articulation of panentheism, centered around a foundational subjectivity, gives us a first- person perspective that may offer a helpful intervention for our world today as we rethink our own relationship to matter, to the natural world around us, other humans and nonhumans, and the rapidly disappearing insects and worms that cross our paths. Abhinavagupta's panentheism postulates a single reality, Šiva, which unfolds out of itself the wonderful diversity of our world. He tells us that the category called Šiva is itself the body of all things. "On the wall [of the world which is itself Šiva] the picture of all beings appears, shining forth"— This statement indicates the way that all these appear.

His panentheism aims to keep our sights on the world, with all its matter and multiplicity, as real. A tricky endeavor for a singular reality, Šiva, a nondualism. Classical, familiar attempts at nondualism try mostly to show us how our idea of the multiplicity of the world as real is just a mistake in judgment. Abhinavagupta's panentheism instead reformulates the relationship between matter and consciousness. He draws on psychological, linguistic modes, the idea of subject and object, to tell us that we find nested within materiality the possibility of a first- person perspective, even in a mere rock. We find consciousness at the heart of matter. Rethinking the boundaries of life, matter, and consciousness, his strategy offers a way to think through materiality, for a New Materialism in particular, compelling in its decentering of the human.

I focus on key elements of Abhinavagupta's panentheism to address central issues for a New Materialism. First, his use of wonder (camatkãra), I propose, serves to alter our vision of matter, pointing to its essential liveliness.

Moreover, it reinscribes transcendence within a bodily subjectivity. Second, I suggest his use of the term vimarša, a kind of active awareness, can help us think through how we get the idea of sentience, that is, to think through the relationship between what is living and what is not. Third, I propose that he uses his inherited cosmological map of what there is (familiar to students of India as the tattva system) to map phenomenologically how this originary consciousness, Šiva, progressively transforms its original subjectivity in stages to become objects, the materiality of earth and water that make up our world.

Fourth, in addition, I suggest that he draws on the tattva system to chart how we get the many out of the One. Fifth, I propose that we may read the theology he gives us of the subtle body as a way of affording intentionality to the affective processes of the body, outside of human egoic intentions.

Finally, I propose that Abhinavagupta's strategy for connecting consciousness to materiality can instruct our own century's adoptions of panpsychism and dual-aspect monisms, models that contemporary philosophers and scientists use to solve the problem of how life and consciousness relate to mere matter— particularly in terms of our current enthusiasm for ideas of information. In this, I use Abhinavagupta's philosophy to address issues relevant for us today, and I do so comparatively, drawing on our own current cultural preoccupations to frame his panentheism. In sum, I argue that Abhinavagupta's panentheism is too important a resource to not be used in our current construction of our world, particularly in the face of our rapidly increasing capacity to manipulate matter— and, indeed, in view of the consequent ecological results.

In the five chapters that follow I present an outline of Abhinavagupta's panentheism, charting how his panentheism maps the relationship between materiality and consciousness, between immanence and transcendence. But my particular focus is on the material side of the equation. Abhinavagupta's nondualist panentheism has, assuredly, been invoked more generally in the context of an idealism, that is, more on the consciousness side of things. Here, I contend that paying attention to his sophisticated articulation of materiality can help us in our own understanding of what matter is and how it matters. To get a feeling for the importance of matter in his nondualism, we can compare him with another nondualist, the great nondual mystic of the 20th century, the South Indian Ramana Maharshi (1879– 1950). Ramana Maharshi's philosophy is often aligned with the nondualism of Advaita Vedanta, the well-known Indian philosophical conception, in a nutshell (though this is perhaps too brief), that the world we experience here is illusory, is Māyā. Ramana Maharshi instructs us to ignore the world. We do not need to know about the world, he tells us; we just need to know about the Self. He instructs us

> [t]o keep the mind constantly turned inwards and to abide thus in the Self is the only Self- enquiry. Just as it is futile to examine the rubbish that has to be swept up only to be thrown away, so it is futile for him who seeks to know the Self to set to work enumerating the tattvas that envelop the Self and examining them instead of casting them away.

In other words, we do not need to know what our world is made of in order to get enlightened. It is rubbish, futile knowledge; simply toss it out. In contrast, Abhinavagupta tells us:

> **Now, it would not be correct to say that for our present topic— i.e., to convey the recognition of the Lord— it is not necessary to ascertain the world as object to be known; [this is not correct, because] only to the extent that one makes the world into an object, to the extent that it is known, can one then transcend the level of object, of thing to be known and allow the true sense of the knower to take root in the heart, its fullness being grasped by mind, intellect and ego.**

Abhinavagupta addresses head on the assumption that enlightenment means we drop the idea of a world out there. Even if his readers might think that the path to enlightenment means concerning ourselves only with the highest, the recognition (pratyabhijñã) of the Lord, as we hear in the echoes of Ramana

Maharshi's advice, Abhinavagupta instead reminds us that the fullness of insight also includes the materiality of the world. Only by knowing the world do we allow the real sense of the knower to blossom in the heart. It is, of course, important not to understate the legacy of transcendence and idealism that Abhinavagupta inherits and embraces. However, in this book I will focus especially on the materialist side of Abhinavagupta's thought. Rather than on the wall of the world that is Šiva, my center of attention is instead on the fantastic diversity of the picture, which has mostly been neglected in much of the excellent work on this thinker.

My Primary Source Material

My thinking on Abhinavagupta and his perspective on the materiality side of things has been especially influenced by my primary source material. I have worked particularly with the third section of one of Abhinavagupta's last works, his massive Ĩšvara Pratyabhijñã Vivnti Vimaršinï (Ipvv), the Long Commentary on the Elucidation of Recognition of the Lord, composed in 1015 CE. The Sanskrit text, handed down in manuscript form through generations from Abhinavagupta's time, was first published in Kashmir in three volumes from 1938 to 1943; I draw primarily from the third section, titled the Ãgamãdhikãra, comprising 100 pages of Sanskrit. Abhinavagupta's text is a commentary; he provides explanatory notes to a text written approximately 50 years earlier by his great grand teacher Utpaladeva, the Ĩšvarapratyabhijñãv ivrti (Elucidation of Recognition of the Lord), which is itself a commentary on a shorter set of verses composed by Utpaladeva, Ĩšvarapratyabhijñãkãrikã (The Verses on Recognition of the Lord). Thus, we have a commentary on a commentary on an original set of verses. Abhinavagupta also wrote a shorter commentary on Utpaladeva's compelling verses, and Utpaladeva wrote his own autocommentary as well.

The Ãgamãdhikãra deals particularly with received knowledge, what the tradition has passed down. Ãgama is typically translated as "scripture" or "revealed text." Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva, however, use the term not so much to focus on particular scriptures or

textual sources, but rather to discuss knowledge of the cosmos, the cosmology that we find in the tattva system, the classification of all that exists, handed down by tradition. Abhinavagupta explicates the received tradition of cosmology, the tattva system, within his understanding of a subject– object continuum, offering us a map of how an originary consciousness, Šiva, unfolds to become the myriad objects that make up our world. The two chapters of the Ãgamãdhikãra chart out what the world is made of, following Abhinavagupta's Tantric classificatory scheme of cosmology, the tattvas, and then addresses the tradition's understanding of different modes of subjectivity in relation to the objects we find in the world.

Describing these two chapters, Abhinavagupta tells us:

> **So far [Utpaladeva] has explained how the group of tattvas exist as object and immediately preceding that he explained the nature of the subject also. Here, because of its importance, the text reveals the essence of the object because it is helpful for the recognition of one's own divinity. So it is a topic worth delineating in detail.**

Again, we see Abhinavagupta telling us that we need to know the world; we need to know the essence of the objects we encounter if we want to achieve our own enlightenment. The Ãgamãdhikãra charts out the nature of the world, the materiality all around us.

Abhinavagupta's Long Commentary is interesting and helpful because he at times offers long and insightful expositions on various ideas that we do not find anywhere else; it is also difficult because Utpaladeva's autocommentary, the Elucidation (vivrti), has been lost. As a result, Abhinavagupta's Long Commentary makes reference throughout to particular specific words whose source is no longer extant. Still, many of his long excursions are coherent and compelling without recourse to Utpaladeva's lost text; the situation is also remedied to some extent by the availability of Abhinavagupta's earlier shorter commentary (Ipv). A translation for the Long Commentary as a whole and for this third section, the text of the Ãgamãdhikãra, is not yet available. For this reason, when I offer translations drawing from Abhinavagupta's writing and particularly this text, the Āgamādhikāra, to explicate Abhinavagupta's thought, I give the passages of Sanskrit in the notes section at the end of each chapter. All translations are my own.

Panentheism and the New Materialism

Abhinavagupta's panentheism maps out the nature of matter, telling us we need to understand matter if we want to understand ourselves and our own enlightened divinity. This focus on what matter is, I suggest, can help steer our own thinking as we face a rapidly crashing environment and help to rethink how we relate to our material world. For a nascent New Materialism in particular, keenly attuned to how the way we think about matter directs what we do, Abhinavagupta's panentheism with its sophisticated articulation of subjectivity in relation to the matter of our world may help to refine our

contemporary attitudes toward the rocks and insects and worms all around us. Of course, I am premising this suggestion on the provocative thesis that Lynn White articulated all those years ago— that our model of the world, our theology or cosmology, sets the stage for how we treat the matter of our world. Indeed, as the Oxford English Dictionary attests in its helpful list of dated examples of usage, as early as 1991 we start to see panentheism associated with a way of addressing our environmental challenges. What is it about panentheism that makes it environmentally friendly? The answer to that question, I might venture, has to do with the idea of linking things that seem quite different from each other. Panentheism links the material world to something that is quite apart from its materiality, an outside force, a divinity, that transcends matter altogether. This cozy material affinity is indeed encoded linguistically in the word. As a concept itself, the prefix pan— that is, the world, matter, and materiality— is affixed to theism, the transcendence of deity. The two are not made into one, merged as in pantheism, but rather the materiality of the world and the transcendence of deity are linked, yet still held apart in a productive tension. In this sense, panentheism operates as a ligature holding in tension both the many and the one, both matter and transcendence.

I suspect that what made panentheism particularly attractive for Abhinavagupta in the 11th century was the ligature, its rather Tantric assertion to have one's cake and eat it too— that is, its claims toward both the materiality of the world and the transcendence of divinity. Panentheism can give us both consciousness and matter, not dissolving one or the other. Consciousness as something outside transcends the materiality of our world, yet it is held in productive tension with the world, not erasing the messy matter of immanence.

In this respect, panentheism points to a way of thinking about the link between matter and consciousness, a metaphysical hitching together of two seemingly polar opposites. This book as a whole also proposes a similar sort of ligature, a comparative project bringing together disparate elements in the hope of a productive tension, an 11th- century Tantric on the one hand and a contemporary New Materialism on the other. It focuses on our contemporary concerns around what is sentient— animals? viruses? artificial intelligence?— set in relation to Abhinavagupta's articulation of what gives rise to sentience. And the book deals with our current conceptions of information as data— articulated in juxtaposition to Abhinavagupta's theology of mantra, mystic sound. In this sense, the comparative project that unfolds in the following five chapters operates in the style of the 17th- century English Metaphysical poets, like John Donne, hitching together disparate things to reveal at the heart of things a sense of wonder.

Chapter Outline

Chapter One looks at Abhinavagupta's conception of subjectivity (ahantã) in relation to matter, and specifically in terms of what it can impart for a New Materialism. Subjectivity,

(ahantã), a first- person person perspective, works as the fulcrum of his panentheism. What makes us sentient depends on our capacity to identify with the sense of "I," rather than the "this" (idantã), a state of being an object. Abhinavagupta reminds us that attention to subjectivity is needed for thinking through our relationship to matter. Notably, Abhinavagupta uses psychological, linguistic modes, rather than our more familiar ontological distinctions, to parse out the differences between humans and nonhumans and matter. Not ontologically driven, this modal formula, rather helpfully for a New Materialism, decenters the human in our cosmology.

Humans and rocks alike share a fluid ability to move between being a subject or an object, giving us consciousness innate to matter. At the same time that Abhinavagupta asserts an innate capacity for sentience, even for things that seem to be dead objects, like rocks, he also proposes a way to differentiate between things that are sentient and things that are not. With this distinction we also examine how Abhinavagupta helps us to think through how we get multiplicity within a philosophy that claims there is only one reality. Throughout this chapter I offer a comparative assessment of Abhinavagupta in relation to a New Materialism. Walt Whitman, for instance, a figure frequently invoked for a New Materialism, also poses an expansive first- person perspective in his poetry, a similarity, I suggest, that shares with Abhinavagupta's first- person-centered philosophy a capacity to enliven objects.

Chapter Two begins with a discussion of how science and scientists, from Carl Sagan to some contemporary neuroscientists such as Anil Seth, invoke wonder as a way of bringing in an atheistic transcendence. This chapter delineates Abhinavagupta's formulation of wonder (camatkãra), arguing that the phenomenology of wonder serves to underscore an inherent subjectivity, even in mere matter. Tracing out the Indian genealogy of wonder through its roots in cooking, we see Abhinavagupta emphasizes the sensory and sensual elements of wonder. At the same time, Abhinavagupta's conception of wonder offers a way of delineating between what is alive and what is not in a way that offers a permeable boundary between mere matter and life. Wonder happens,

Abhinavagupta explains, when the "I" can reflect on itself; it is the signal of life, sentience. With a keen phenomenological attention, Abhinavagupta's analysis of wonder turns on its head the way we usually think of wonder. He tells us that the power of wonder is not so much that it offers a transcendence that leaves behind the fetters of an earth- bound material body, but rather that wonder instead alters our vision of matter, pointing to its essential liveliness. This in turn alters how we understand transcendence. It is not an up and out situation, leaving behind sluggish dumb matter; instead it points to an inwardness, a heightened subjectivity. Abhinavagupta rewrites transcendence in one other way as well. We typically imagine transcendence as a space of timelessness, above the change of the

world. Abhinavagupta instead rewrites time back into this transformed notion of transcendence.

Chapter Three begins with a discussion of Darwin's description of his loss of faith when he witnesses the parasitic wasp infecting the caterpillar. How could a benevolent God create this sort of monstrosity, he asks— a parasitic wasp inside the caterpillar, two beings, one body, boundaries transgressed. Here the focus is on the boundaries of bodies and agency. In this context, I discuss Abhinavagupta's idea of the subtle body as a body also inhabited by something other than the person claiming the body. Here, however, in this Tantric case, the other consciousness inhabiting the body is not an invading parasite directing the body, but an image of deities directing the body. I suggest that Abhinavagupta's theological inscription of deities driving human action adds an important element to the notion of bodies and matter. Abhinavagupta's theology offers a perspectival shift toward recognizing the body's own claims to intentionality, an intentionality that typically is only accorded to mind or spirit. In this sense, the panentheism out of which Abhinavagupta fashions his conception of the subtle body enfolds within it an upgrade for the idea of bodies, of matter. Theology here registers a respect for the affective processes of the body. Locating gods in the body tells us that the mind is not the master in the house; rather, sentiency, will, and desire arise throughout the body's functions, separate from the mind's desires. Moreover, this theology of the body proposes these multiple affective registers in a way that does not dwell (neither lamenting nor rejoicing) on the subsequent disappointment and loss of the sovereignty of the ego and its free will. So while a contemporary thinker like Brian Massumi strives to find a model to understand the complex, refractory affective flows of the body in a language of the virtual, Abhinavagupta instead reads this complexity of multiple affective flows through a lens of the forces of deities with their own conscious trajectories. In this respect, this panentheist theology affords a foundational liveliness to the multiplicity of agencies that make up the body. Here it is referenced in Abhinavagupta's map of the subtle body, which sees the body itself as an ecology of beings, materially embedded.

Chapter Four opens with the conundrum of computer sentience: Stephen Hawking's and Elon Musk's deep fears of artificial intelligence. This chapter uses this framework to address a key element of Abhinavagupta's panentheism: how we attain sentience. This chapter first points to the differences we find between a currently popular panpsychism and Abhinavagupta's panentheism. Even as contemporary panpsychism is appealing precisely because it brushes aside dualistic conceptions of God, still we see in its formulation the influences of a Western legacy of transcendence. In this chapter I propose also that rather than look at the terms ubiquitously used to translate the notion of consciousness from Indian languages to English— terms like cit, citi, or samvid, which are

typically employed to talk about consciousness— instead the term vimarša more closely approximates what contemporary neuroscience understands as consciousness. I suggest that Abhinavagupta affords priority to vimarša precisely because of its links to activity, a capacity to do things in our material reality. With this observation, drawing on Harald Atmanspacher's classificatory work, we look at how Abhinavagupta's dual- aspect monism stacks up in relation to other 20th- century Western conceptions of dualaspect monisms. I conclude the chapter by returning to my initial query regarding computer sentience.

Chapter Five returns to Darwin's anguish and loss of faith over the parasitic wasp and discusses newer findings that suggest the idea of signaling and information- sharing across species. The parasitic wasp comes to lay its eggs inside the caterpillar because the plants being attacked by the caterpillars signal to the wasps via pheromones. Using this framework, I then take up the idea of information where information, as I have discussed elsewhere, takes on a dual nature, both as material substance and as something that conveys mental intentionality.35 I draw comparisons with contemporary Western ideas of information, its links to New Materialism and to Abhinavagupta's panentheism as a way of thinking about consciousness as information. The idea of information, I suggest, is attractive for a current perspective because it seems to take away the subjective element of knowledge, giving us something we can measure and manipulate. Yet, if we examine it more closely, I propose that instead what makes information powerful as a concept for us today is that it embeds an unspoken bivalency, which links back to the intentionality and meaning of the subject who knows. The final section of this chapter ties this bivalency back to Abhinavagupta's articulation of subjectivity (ahantã) and its corollary, a state of being object (idantã). Through this background,

I examine Abhinavagupta's account of how we get diversity, agonistic relations of wasps and caterpillars, in a nondualism, a system where there is only one consciousness. I suggest that interpreting the tattva system, the cosmology Abhinavagupta inherits, as a phenomenology of consciousness moving from subjectivity to object, Abhinavagupta demonstrates a panentheism that is capable of unfolding to embrace the rich diversity that makes up our world.

This book, then, is about this medieval philosopher's panentheism and what it might have to offer for our world today as we think through the complexity of our relationships to our world's myriad others, to both biologically living and nonliving matter. My hope is that it will afford us new ways of thinking about materiality that can help alleviate our current planetary predicament. <>

STAGES OF THE PATH AND THE ORAL TRANSMISSION: SELECTED TEACHINGS OF THE GELUK SCHOOL edited and translated by Thupten Jinpa, Rosemary Patton, Dagpo Rinpoché [Library of Tibetan Classics, Wisdom Publications, 9780861714452]

A major contribution to the literature on Buddhist practice according to the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism from its foremost interpreter.

Although it was the last major school to emerge in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, the Geluk school has left an indelible mark on Buddhist thought and practice. The intellectual and spiritual brilliance of its founder, the great Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), has inspired generations of scholars and tantric yogis to place him at the heart of their daily meditative practice. The Geluk tradition's close ties to the Dalai Lamas have also afforded it an outsized influence in all aspects of Tibetan life for centuries. At its peak its combined monasteries boasted a population in the tens of thousands, and its sway encompassed the religious landscape of Mongolia and much of Central Asia.

This widespread religious activity fostered a rich literary tradition, and fifteen seminal works are featured here representing four genres of that tradition. They include works on the stages of the path, or lamrim, the genre for which the Geluk is most renowned; works on guru yoga, centered around the core Geluk ritual Offering to the Guru (Lama Chöpa); teachings from the unique oral transmission of Geluk mahamudra, meditation on the nature of mind; and instructions on the three essential points—what to practice in life, at death, and in the bardo.

Your guide to these riches, Thupten Jinpa, maps out their historical context and spiritual significance in his extensive introduction.

Review

"Because so many of its doctrinal works have been translated into English, it is often assumed that the Geluk tradition is concerned above all with scholastic philosophy. However, like all Tibetan traditions, the Geluk has a rich canon of devotional works, meditation manuals, and practical instructions for the vision of reality. The most famous of those works are collected in this remarkable volume, works composed by some of the greatest masters and saints of the Land of Snows." —**Donald Lopez**, Arthur E. Link Distinguished University Professor of Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, University of Michigan

"Expertly curated and lucidly translated, *Stages of the Path and the Oral Transmission* is a magnificent collection of practice-oriented texts from the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism. The meditation manuals, oral instructions, and rituals found in this book are practiced to this day in Geluk institutions in the whole of the Tibetan plateau, and increasingly in hundreds of Dharma centers throughout the world. With more than a dozen expertly executed translations of the most beautiful and moving works ever written in the Tibetan language, this latest volume of *The Library of Tibetan Classics* is a wonderful gift to scholars and practitioners alike." —**José Ignacio Cabezón**, Dalai Lama Professor of Tibetan Buddhism and Cultural Studies, University of California Santa Barbara

"We only need to look at the table of contents of *Stages of the Path and the Oral Transmission: Selected Teachings of the Geluk School* to know that this book is a treasure chest of vital instructions on the path to awakening. Beginning with stages of the path literature (*lamrim*), it describes the vital points of the Buddhist worldview that frames our perspective and our values. This is followed by guru yoga—devotional practices that touch our heart and bring the Buddhist worldview to life. This, in turn, leads to profound instructions on both sūtra and tantra mahāmudrā, which focus on realizing the conventional and ultimate nature of the mind. Plus, these texts were translated by some of the best translators of our time. Who could ask for anything more!" —**Bhikṣuṇī Thubten Chodron**, abbess of Sravasti Abbey and author of *Buddhism for Beginners*

"Here, at long last, are presented the essential texts authored by key practitioners of the Ganden Oral Tradition. All fifteen texts included here are practice manuals. Carefully selected, and wonderfully translated, this group of texts gives us the very raison d'etre for the importance and prominence of this lineage: Tsongkhapa's teachings on the stages of the path; Panchen Losang Chökyi Gyaltsen's *Offering to the Guru*, the sine qua non of Geluk liturgy; and three additional texts by the Panchen Lama on Geluk mahāmudrā. Thupten Jinpa has translated and presented the fundamental works by these Ganden siddhas on the stages of the path (*lamrim*), guru yoga, mahāmudrā, and other essential Ganden Oral Tradition teachings. The crucial texts are all here, skillfully chosen, beautifully rendered and annotated. If you read only one book of key Ganden Oral Tradition teachings, it should be this one!" —**Jan Willis**, author of *Enlightened Beings*, *Life Stories from the Ganden Oral Tradition*, *Dreaming Me: Black, Baptist and Buddhist*, and *Dharma Matters: Women, Race, and Tantra*

CONTENTS
Foreword by His Eminence Ganden Tri Rinpoche
Preface
Introduction
Technical Note

It is a profound source of joy for me to be able to offer in English this special anthology of teachings of the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism, founded near Lhasa by the celebrated master Tsongkhapa in the early fifteenth century. This volume, number 6 in The Library of Tibetan

Classics, contains fifteen texts on four key areas of practice: (1) the lamrim, or stages of the path, based on instructions of the masters Atha and Tsongkhapa, (2) guru yoga based on Tsongkhapa's oral transmissions, (3) *mahamudra* and *guide to the view*, drawn on and inspired by Tsongkhapa's oral teachings, and (4) the three essential points, stemming from a unique instruction of the Indian mystic Mitrayogi.

Beginning with two short works in verse by Tsongkhapa himself, the texts in this volume enjoy deep affection by members of this Tibetan tradition, and some of them are published here for the first time in English translation. These texts serve as important guides for fundamental spiritual transformation, from the initial stage of turning one's mind to the Dharma up to the liberating stage of gaining insight into the ultimate nature of reality. Whether it is cultivating deep appreciation of the transient nature of life, overcoming attachment to objects of senses, experiencing deep devotional fusion of one's mind with that of the guru and meditation deity, developing universal compassion and the altruistic mind intent on enlightenment for the benefit of all beings, cultivating stillness of mind in the form of tranquil abiding, generating insight into no-self and emptiness, or actualizing mind's essential nature in the form of pure luminosity, this volume offers a truly rich resource. Most Geluk practitioners today use the two guru-yoga texts featured in this volume, Dulnakpa's *Hundreds of Gods of Tusita* and Panchen Losang Chogyen's *Offering to the Guru*, as essential parts of their daily practice. Panchen's text in particular is used by many, myself included, as an all-encompassing daily meditation manual covering the entire domain of Dharma practice, including even a daily dose of mind training, or lojong. <>

THE DARK SIDE OF DHARMA: MEDITATION, MADNESS AND OTHER MALADIES ON THE CONTEMPLATIVE PATH by Anna Lutkajtis [Aeon Books, ISBN: 9781913504595]
A dive into the less-known and undesirable side-effects of meditation and mindfulness.

Researcher Anna Lutkajtis investigates why these negative ramifications of meditation and mindfulness, which are well-known in spiritual and religious traditions, have been ignored in contemporary secular contexts, such as Western psychology.

Lutkajtis' research reveals that while meditation is commonly portrayed as a practice that is overwhelmingly positive, a growing number of research studies and anecdotal reports suggest that meditation can also have negative effects.

Some meditators believe that these adverse effects are a normal part of the contemplative path and a welcome sign of progress.

For others, such effects are completely unexpected and can be psychologically harmful. In religious traditions like Buddhism, difficulties associated with meditation are acknowledged and are usually viewed as milestones on the path to enlightenment or the result of an unbalanced practice.

In such traditional contexts, meditation teachers are equipped to deal with adverse effects if and when they arise. However, in the modern West, meditation adverse effects have been overlooked, under-researched, and generally misunderstood.

Given the current popularity of meditation, Lutkajtis argues that it is important to understand why meditation adverse effects have been ignored in contemporary secular settings.

CONTENTS

I first learned to meditate in 2011. Like many people, I came to the practice for non-religious reasons: stress relief and the myriad health and wellbeing benefits that were promised. I did not know exactly what meditation was or where it came from, only that it was "ancient" and associated with Eastern religions and gurus. I took a short course, learned a basic technique and diligently practised at least once per day as the teacher instructed. During the first week of my meditation practice I experienced strong headaches after each session. I thought this was unusual and checked in with my teacher, who assured me this was normal for some people and would pass after the first week or so (they did). I continued to meditate, and noticed another strange effect. Every time I would begin my practice, within several minutes I would feel myself drop into a trance-like state and I would see a purple sphere of light appear in the centre of my vision. This light was not at all unpleasant, but it was unusual and I was curious as to whether it meant something. Again, I asked my teacher. It was nothing, he said. Some people see lights when they meditate, others hear sounds. None of it mattered, just keep going.

To me, this was a highly unsatisfying answer, so of course I went straight to Google and typed in "purple light when meditating." After some basic searching I seemed to have an answer—the light appeared to be a nimitta. The Pali word nimitta literally means "sign" and the nimitta itself is a

mind-generated object that appears when a meditator has reached a good state of concentration. Immediately I was both intrigued and annoyed—either my meditation teacher did not know what a nimitta was (which was concerning, given his self-professed status as a "meditation expert" and the high cost of his meditation course), or he was concealing this information from me. Either way, I wanted to know why.

The experience with the nimitta was the first of a number of strange and unusual experiences that I went on to have while meditating. These experiences piqued my curiosity to such a degree that I decided to pursue postgraduate research in this area. In particular, I wanted to investigate a meditation-related phenomenon that I was regularly encountering in my personal conversations with other meditators, but which very few people were talking about openly—meditation side effects or "adverse effects." It seemed that many meditators, especially those with serious disciplined practices, were experiencing meditation adverse effects. For some, these effects were completely unexpected and undesirable. Others believed that meditation adverse effects were a normal part of the contemplative path, and as such they were a welcome sign of progress. There were various names that meditators gave to meditation adverse effects, including the dukkha nanas, kundalini crisis, and the "dark night."

My curiosity regarding meditation adverse effects eventually led me to the Religion Studies department at the University of Sydney, Australia. After a serendipitous phone call with Professor Carole Cusack, I ended up enrolling in a Master of Arts (Research) degree in Religion Studies. My thesis was titled The Dark Side of Dharma: Why Have Adverse Effects of Meditation Been Ignored in Contemporary Western Secular Contexts? Through my academic research I discovered that while the scientific studies and popular media coverage of meditation have been overwhelmingly positive, a small but growing number of studies also speak of meditation adverse effects. A close examination of the scientific literature revealed that adverse effects were described even in early meditation research. These effects included profound but de-stabilising insights, problematic spiritual emergencies, and the exacerbation of pre-existing mental health conditions. What I found particularly fascinating was that in religious traditions, such as Buddhism, these types of difficulties associated with meditation are acknowledged, and are usually understood to be either milestones on the path to enlightenment, the result of improper practice, or due to individual differences. Further, in traditional contexts, meditation teachers are equipped to deal with adverse effects when they arise. However, in modern Western secular contexts, negative effects associated with meditation have largely been overlooked or ignored in both the academic literature and in the popular media. Again, I wanted to know why.

During the course of my research project I became a more critical and analytical consumer of information about meditation. One of the first things I discovered is that it really does not make sense to talk about "Buddhist meditation" or "Hindu meditation"—rather, there are hundreds, possibly thousands, of different meditation techniques that derive from various religious sects and lineages. These techniques are heavily embedded within the specific contexts of particular traditions. I quickly learned about the rather short history of Eastern meditation in the West, and how a small number of meditation practices have been appropriated from religious traditions,

"secularised" and incorporated into Western psychology and medicine. I also discovered that there is no definitive boundary that separates "secular" meditation from "religious" meditation. In fact, some modern, Eastern-derived meditation practices and Western psychotherapies have co-arisen and been mutually informed by one another, making them very difficult, if not impossible, to separate.

My thesis argued that meditation adverse effects have been ignored in Western secular settings mainly due to three factors. Firstly, in contemporary Western society the goal of meditation has shifted from a religious goal (enlightenment) to a psychological goal (symptom relief and personal transformation), leading to the assumption that meditation is harmless and "good for everyone." Secondly, popular "secular" meditation techniques have been decontextualised and divorced from the religious literature and contemplative practitioners who could shed light on possible difficulties associated with meditation. Finally, the image of meditation that is portrayed by the popular media is radically simplified and overwhelmingly positive, to the point that meditation has been depicted as a type of panacea or "cure all."

The fact that meditation adverse effects have been under-researched and overlooked has significant implications given the current popularity of meditation practices in a large variety of non-traditional settings, including therapy, education, and the workplace. Meditation teaching is an unregulated industry, meaning that there are an unaccounted-for number of teachers who practise independently, possibly without any awareness of potential contraindications or adverse effects. Further, people now self-refer to meditation via the internet and seek meditation in highly variable settings outside of clinical programs, for example, in the form of performance improvement services such as coaching, or apps. Given the current popularity and proliferation of secular meditation-related products and services, it is important to understand why, in the modern West, meditation adverse effects have been overlooked, under-researched, and generally misunderstood. This book, which is based on my Master's thesis research, attempts to answer that question. <>

BUDDHISM AND ITS RELIGIOUS OTHERS: HISTORICAL ENCOUNTERS AND REPRESENTATIONS edited by C.V. Jones [Proceedings of the British Academy published by Oxford University Press, 9780197266991]

Throughout its history, Buddhism has developed alongside other traditions of religious belief and practice. Forms of Buddhism have in every era, region, and culture been confronted by rival systems that challenged its teachings about the world, how to behave in it, and liberation from it. This volume collects studies of Buddhist literature and art that represent the religious other to their audiences. Contributing authors examine how Buddhists in India, China, and elsewhere across Asia have understood their place in shared

religious landscapes, and how they have responded to the presence and influence in the world of traditions other to their own. The studies in this volume consider a variety of 'others' that Buddhists of different times and situations have encountered, and the variety of mechanisms that Buddhists have employed to make sense of them. Chapters of this volume explore the range of attitudes that Buddhists have expressed with respect to other religions, how they have either accommodated the other within their worldview or pronounced the redundancy of their ideas and activities. These chapters illuminate how over the centuries Buddhists have used and reused stories, symbols, and other strategies to explain religious others and their value, in which every representation of the other is always also a comment on the character and status of Buddhism itself.

CONTENTS

Buddhism among Religions

By the middle of the first millennium of the Common Era, Buddhism had spread from its homeland in North India to touch virtually every corner of South, Central and East Asia, across which proponents of different traditions of Buddhist teaching engaged with a wide and fluctuating variety of religious cohabiters. The majority of our sources for these encounters are literary or artistic products by Buddhists, who reflected upon the presence

of Buddhist teaching (Dharma) and its institutional basis in the world (the Sangha, or community of Buddhist monastics and their supporters). These sources acknowledge that both the Dharma and Sangha were opposed and sometimes genuinely threatened by the influence of other religions. Buddhist texts and art provide only murky windows onto the social-historical contexts which historians and scholars of religion may seek to investigate, but through them we nonetheless glimpse the opinions of Buddhists about the content and value of non-Buddhist ideas and behaviours, as well as insights regarding the status of Buddhism — its founder, his teachings and those who preserve them — in shared, heterogeneous religious landscapes.

The present volume has its origins in a workshop hosted in Oxford in 2018 (entitled 'Buddhism and the Religious Other'),' and concerns how forms of Buddhism conceptualised their rivals and neighbours as it competed for prestige, patronage and popular approval across different pre-modern Asian situations. The chapters in this collection investigate how creative Buddhist individuals or communities across Asia made sense of what they took to be, in the language of current scholarship, religious others: persons committed to traditions of thought and practice — whether systematised, or more nebulous, purportedly universal, or exclusive to some group— that Buddhists took to be different to their own.

Contributions to this volume follow a broadly historical trajectory, beginning with Buddhism's formation in the late-Vedic period of India, through its institutional diversification and the gradual success of Mahayana Buddhism, and on to different socio-religious climates that Buddhists navigated in South East Asia, China and Japan. The primary sources on which these chapters focus preserve traces of Buddhist thinking about the nature, status, or value of one (or more) other religion and, crucially, Buddhism in relation to it. In some examples, the religious other is projected back into the history of Buddhism's emergence in the world; elsewhere it appears more vividly in the form of contemporaneous interlocutors. Only rarely is the religious other given a voice that might have any authentic relation to any historical non-Buddhist. The sources investigated in this volume do not aim to facilitate dialogue or promote anything like a religious pluralism, but on a more immediate level make some statement about the fact that the words and deeds of Buddhists did not exist in the world unchallenged. Our starting point is that in spite of a common Buddhist heritage, modes of Buddhism across Asia and throughout the centuries repeatedly rethought how to make sense of religious others, and hence there is no single approach that Buddhism has to the fact that it shares the world with other systems of belief and practice.

Buddhists had different perspectives on their tradition relative to others, which is in no small part because their challengers themselves changed over centuries and across

borders. In India, representatives of Brahmanism, or the tradition of ritual practice centred around the Vedas, came to call Buddhists 'nay-sayers' (nastikas) with respect to the importance of the gods and sacrifices to them.' While opposing the value of Vedic ritual and the institution of Brahmanical heredity, early Buddhists presented themselves as `(true) Brahmans', whose purity was assured through progress in Buddhist instruction.' Buddhists otherwise situated themselves in opposition to rival traditions of renunciation, primarily Jainism and Ajivikas, to say nothing of the many other renunciant orders that may lurk behind vague and usually disparaging Buddhist references to 'other ascetics' (tirthika, nirgrantha, p4anda...).5 As exponents of the Buddha's teaching about the world and how to behave in it, and advocates of the Sangha as the institution that preserves these teachings, Indian Buddhists considered their tradition to be superior to like-kind systems of thought and practice that they encountered.' In East Asia, Buddhism was one of a number of traditions that offered different responses to human questions and needs, at times supported or condemned by fluctuations in Chinese state politics. Chinese authors came to acknowledge different 'ways' (dao or lineages of 'teachings' (jiao rt) associated with the Buddha, Laozi, Confucius, or otherwise, which evinces that Chinese authors acknowledged the existence of alternative personal and social commitments, not necessarily mutually exclusive, that were available to both rulers and their subjects.'

Well aware of the range of terminology that Buddhists have used to address their interlocutors, our work presumes the general applicability of the category 'religious other', and thus implicitly that Buddhism and other traditions with which it interacted are usefully described as 'religions'. We need not take a firm stance on the age or provenance of the concept of religion's to recognise that traditions of devotion and of ritual, of reflection upon beliefs and practices as well as institutionalised investment in their preservation, upon which we might pragmatically hang the label 'religions' are themselves not modern inventions, nor reducible to creations of the Western academy.' Conceptualising Buddhism as one religion among many is at least pragmatically valid, as this language communicates something of the competing commitments exhibited by pre-modern Asian sources regarding matters of human identity, responsibility and the pursuit of intrinsically valuable ends, such as liberation or union with a supreme divinity.

'Religious' matters under dispute between authors representative of Buddhism and its interlocutors or opponents shifted over the centuries, as chapters in this volume demonstrate. Arguments preserved in early Buddhist literature focus on which code of practice in the world — ritual, ascetical, or otherwise — led to purity and/or liberation from rebirth. But by the middle of the first millennium, Indian literature points to greater interest in the matter of to which deity or higher power (such as a buddha) one should devote one's attention, and why.' Apologists in the later centuries of the first millennium

became focused on which tradition offered the most persuasive account of knowledge and its acquisition, and whose religious adepts boasted the most valuable ritual initiations or programmes of self-empowerment (in broad terms, 'yoga'). When describing these disputes, Buddhist authors from across Asia retold stories of how notable Indian Buddhist masters defeated non-Buddhist philosophers and devotees, often casting them as cynical or corrupt figures, in sometimes public, high-stakes debate. Although the historicity of any of these legendary encounters is far from certain, the consistent importance to Buddhists of debate with non-Buddhists is not. The Chinese pilgrim Yijing (635-713), while a student at the great Buddhist monastery Wanda in the late seventh century, reports that a central aim of a monk's education was training to defeat non-Buddhists in philosophical debate." The monastic vinaya literature of more than one Buddhist order permits that Buddhist monks study non-Buddhist teachings for just this purpose. The present volume explores how Buddhists in different contexts, in India and beyond, understood those religious others that they took to be worthy of scrutiny, and whose very presence in the world called for some response.

Representation and Identity

Previous studies of how Buddhists have responded to religious diversity have sometimes focused on what Buddhist teaching has to say about interactions with dissenting voices, whereas others have sought to mine socio-historical data about how Buddhists in particular eras and climates navigated and responded to the existence of other religions. Important collections of articles devoted to these themes include those edited by Perry Schmidt-Leukel, one of which — attending to Chinese religion specifically — was edited in collaboration with Joachim Gentz. A further, very impressive collection of studies, focused on Indo-Tibetan contexts and the product of just a single author, is that by David Seyfort Ruegg. Ruegg's focus on how Buddhist authors presented the Dharma as the authority on matters `supramundane' (lokottara), against which other beliefs and practices are merely 'worldly' (laukika), identifies and explores a productive means by which Buddhists positioned themselves in relation to other religious phenomena in a number of settings. Further to Ruegg's treatment of 'local cults' in South and Central Asia are contributions to a volume edited by Henk Blezer and Mark Teeuwen, which attend to Buddhist interactions with and attitudes towards 'nativist' religion in (foremost) Japan and Tibet." The Japanese context, with special attention to the concept of 'original forms' (that are supramundane/Buddhist) and 'local traces' (that are worldly, and on face value perhaps 'not Buddhist') (honji suijaku), by which Buddhist authors affirmed superiority over local religious practices, is the focus of a collection of articles edited by Mark Teeuwen and Fabio Rambelli." Monograph-length studies of Buddhism and its interactions with specific religions across premodern Central and East Asia include those by Johan Elverskog (concerning Islam) and Christine Mollier (concerning Daoism)."

Given the varieties of Buddhism that the world has known, and the wealth of relevant literature and art in South, Central, or East Asian languages that is yet to receive scholarly attention, the scope for further study of how Buddhism has made sense of religious others remains broad. The present volume focuses on individual case studies of Buddhist sources that clarify the status and value of what they presume to be 'other' to Buddhism. Crucially, our contributions are less interested in influences between Buddhism and its religious cohabitors in different settings, and more concerned with how Buddhists imagined and represented to some audience the religious other and the relationship of Buddhism to it. To highlight this distinction, we might first consider a good account of how early Buddhist literature presents a variety of responses to the simple fact of the religious other's existence. Elizabeth Harris identifies in the Pali Suttapitaka five different modes of response to religious interlocutors: i) respectful debate; ii) teaching ideas to advocates of other traditions (proselytisation); iii) ridicule of the religious other; iv) subordination of the other, and v) appropriation of ideas or symbols from the other. Harris accounts for all of this with references to aptly chosen passages from the Pali Canon. The Buddha is reported to have taught calmly in the face of his detractors, yet advanced ideas that were clearly at odds to their own (for example, contra ritualism, or teaching about human identity between the conceptual poles of 'eternalism' and `annihilationism'); only rarely does the Buddha remembered in this literature actively chasten Brahmans or other renunciants (sramanas), and he instead challenges the reasoning by which they consider themselves either ritually 'pure', or on course for liberation from rebirth. The Buddha otherwise presents his teaching as a route to that which other religious adepts in India considered to be important, most famously in the Tevijjasutta (DN 13), in which the Buddha expresses the superiority of his knowledge over the learning of ritualist Brahmans. It has been well-established that Buddhist literature appropriates and clarifies language drawn from the Vedic ritual world; for example, Buddhism inverts the importance of sacrificial fires, so integral to the practices of a Vedic ritualist, by presenting the problem of the human condition as a state in which all of one's being is 'aflame' and in need of quenching.

However, not all of these aspects of Buddhism's relation to other traditions in ancient India entail clear reference to the religious other directly, nor tell us much about how Buddhists understood their place in one or more cultural setting. The Buddha is reported to have taught things that carefully distinguish him from others in his intellectual climate, but this is not in itself a response to the status of other ideas, practices, or their exponents. Similarly, appropriation of concepts or votabulary from a rival tradition is not the same as explaining how what is similar in another tradition relates to what is taught by the Buddha. A primary concern of the present volume is how Buddhist sources understood Buddhist Dharma in relation to the challenges represented by religious others. Whence

comes the religious other, especially if the Buddha's influence in the world is supposedly so great? Are they simply misguided, or deviant? Does the non-Buddhist arrive at a view about the world, or some practice in it, solely by their own imagination, or through some miscomprehension of Buddhist truth; or even having been led there, for some enigmatic purpose, by the Buddha himself? In light of the externality of the religious other, to what degree does the non-Buddhist require correction, conversion, or condemnation? To these kinds of questions Buddhist authors, down the centuries and across Asia, provided different answers, which often must be teased out of works that concern other matters. A key finding of studies in this volume is that while the expressed interest of Buddhist literature is often commitment to teaching and, in principle, liberating other beings, Buddhist authors did not shy away from confronting the threat posed by opposition to its authority in the world, either by undermining forces that necessitated critical engagement, or by, at the very least, offering clarity about their status relative to the Buddha and his activities.

Wherever and whenever we encounter Buddhism, it is three authorities — the Buddha, his Dharma and the Sangha — that constitute the three jewels or treasures (triratna) that are expressly relied upon, promoted and defended by its exponents. Reminding ourselves of these three authorities is important, as it is shared commitment to their value in and to the world that unites otherwise disparate expressions of what Western scholarship came to call Buddhism, whether these were local to Bactria or Japan, Mongolia or Java, or very much alive in any corner of the world today. Buddhists across Asia appealed to the same authorities to define their identity in relation to others: the Buddha Sakyamuni, associated with the Indian subcontinent; his teachings preserved in discourses attributed to him; and a monastic lineage which, for all of its divisions, understood itself to have a common founder in the Buddha himself. Questions worth asking are whether or not there are discernible trends in the history of Buddhism's approaches to other religions, and whether or not these can be associated with particular currents in Buddhist thought and practice that flow from the Indian subcontinent and influence its expressions across Asia. Although attending to over two thousand years of history, and a range of very different regions and cultures, the papers collected in this volume showcase what we find to be recurring strategies that Buddhists used in relation to other religions.

South Asian Encounters in Context/s

Informed reflection on Buddhist approaches to religious others depends upon close, critical attention to individual works, traditions, eras and contexts. A key aim of our chapters is to consider the specificity of Buddhism's dealing with religious others in different historical periods and regions. It serves us to situate these chapters and their findings in a loose narrative about the emergence, development and transmission of

Buddhism in India and across pre-modern Asia, together with the history of its frontiers with other religious traditions. Buddhism emerged in India in the middle of the first millennium BCE as one among several, institutions focused on renunciation from domestic and social bonds, into an environment occupied already by competing traditions of asceticism and mendicancy (including what comes to be known as Jainism), sacrificial ritualism (Brahmanism) and the veneration of innumerable spirits (yaksas), the last of which remains little understood."

Perhaps the greatest quantity of ink spilt in this area has concerned Buddhism's early relation to Brahmanism, a tradition which itself should not be considered either monolithic or static." As an enduring interlocutor of Buddhism, Brahmanism wore many faces over the centuries: the philosophical systems of Samkhya and Vaisesika, the ritual and exegetical traditions of Mimamsa and Vedanta, and the no less diverse forms of devotional religion that had as their foci deities such as Visnu and Siva. References to Samkhya and Vaisesika occur in Buddhist commentarial works from roughly the fourth century onwards, although awareness of their ideas can be seen in Buddhist literature produced closer to the dawn of the Common Era. Our earliest mention of Vedanta by a Buddhist author is likely in the work of Bhaviveka (sixth century), although the scriptural basis of that tradition, the Brahmanical Upanisads, were likely a foil to Buddhist teaching since its beginning. It is only a few centuries into the Common Era that Buddhist sources confront by name veneration of Visnu and Siva as supreme, creator deities, although there are older Buddhist rejections of Indian theism (isvaravada) that do not so clearly identify the cults or theologies of which our authors were aware."

At its foundations, Brahmanism commits to the preservation of ritual prescriptions and stories surrounding them: the content of the Vedic Samhitas, Brahm arms and other literature, by which its adherents elevated themselves and their practices over local customs or political structures. Early Buddhist literature, for example the content of discourses attributed to the Buddha in the Pali Canon, reports with great frequency the Buddha's interactions with proponents of a Vedic ritual order, who considered themselves to be rightly privileged in Indian society by virtue of their ancestry and their access to rituals that secured a level of ritual purity above others?' Early Buddhist discourses know the Buddha as a critic of persons who call themselves 'Brahman' (brahman/brahmana) by virtue of their birth or their adherence to traditions of ritual purification. Buddhism imagined itself apart from and in opposition to the authority of these Brahmans, whose defining characteristics, as far as early Buddhist compositions tell us, was their sense of self-importance and a reliance on sacrificial activity. Some scholarship, notably work by Johannes Bronkhorst, has challenged the dominant nineteenth- and twentieth-century perspective that couched Buddhism, at its origins, as a response to Brahmanism, and

instead stresses the common provenance of Buddhism and other traditions of renunciation (foremost Jainism and Ajivikism) in 'Greater Magadha'. It is nonetheless a well-known feature of early Buddhist and Jain literature that they contested over what kind of renunciant most deserved the title Brahman, at times lauding the memory of sages from bygone eras as 'Brahmans' due to their supposed commitment to mendicancy and an authentic desire for knowledge rather than social prestige.

Recent re-evaluation of the late-Vedic religious climate is that by Nathan McGovern (2019), who contends that Buddhism's opposition to Brahmanism evolved alongside and was entangled with the maturation of Brahmanism itself. McGovern sees in the literature of the late-Vedic period a 'raucous' environment of competing claims to 'Brahmanhood', in which different teachers and communities of their followers vied for recognition, at the expense of their detractors, as exponents of true Brahmanical purity. McGovern's re-imagining of late-Vedic India invites different perspectives on the stories that authors, both Buddhist and Brahmanical, have told to impose what are perhaps only retrospectively clear distinctions on a plausibly much more complex, but essentially shared heritage in the middle of the first millennium BCE. McGovern's focus in the present volume is Samkhya: a development in Brahmanical thinking with perhaps very ancient roots, but which only reaches maturity, and its classical articulation in the Samkhyakarika, closer to the fifth century CE. As a case study in how Buddhist authors represented religious others back into the accepted history of their own tradition, McGovern looks at the work of the poet Asvaghosa, perhaps writing in the second century CE, who imagines the Samkhya of his own day back into the story of the bodhisattva Gautama's early career as a renunciant. In so doing, Asvaghosa reinforces the sense that Brahmanical philosophy of the poet's own period had been surpassed already, the Buddha having known and exceeded the most sophisticated picture of the world that Brahmanical metaphysics had to offer.

Although McGovern is right to question the antiquity of the opposition 'brahmana and sramana' in late-Vedic India, we nonetheless witness early Buddhist literature address on the one hand the value and status of ritualists, who invested importance in sacrifices and their hereditary right to perform them, and apart from them renunciants whose defining characteristic is their having abandoned domestic and wider social obligations." Indian Buddhist sources offer a wide range of vocabulary to describe ascetics, mendicants, or exponents of traditions of renunciation that rival the Buddhist Sangha. (caraka, parivrajaka, nirgrantha, etc.). These individuals and their communities clearly posed an enduring challenge to the status of Buddhism in the world, competing for the same householder devotees while exhibiting an undeniable similarity to Buddhists." It is for this explicit reason that Buddhist vinaya literature instructs the adoption of particular clothing

for its monks and the avoidance of others (including nakedness), to distinguish followers of the Buddha from other, ostensibly similar renunciants."

Drawing upon analyses of religious othemess and othering in the broader study of religion/s, Claire Maes has attended to the means by which early Buddhist authors distinguished themselves from their 'proximate others'.38 In the present volume, Maes explores the degree to which terminology that Buddhists used to refer to their others finds its origins in language and imagery common to both Buddhism and Jainism. These terms and tropes likely stem from the wider renunciant milieu in which these two traditions first took shape. Very often, Buddhist authors refer to other traditions of renunciation under the general label tirthya/ tirthikas (Pan titthiyas), often shorthand for (e.g.) anyatirthyas (annatitthiyas), or 'adherents to some religious groups that are other [to Buddhism]'. This being the case, talk of 'crossing' out of liberation — and so of 'fords' (Pali tittha) and `forders' (titthiyas) related to this — was not anathema to Buddhism, but part of a shared terminology to describe the human predicament and the possibility of its end. Maes explores the imagery of 'crossing' the turbulent waters of rebirth as it appears in both early Buddhist and Jain sources, and considers the formative period in which Buddhists had yet to polemically distance themselves from the notion that their ford was one among many accounts, albeit the only reliable one, of how to 'pass over' from suffering.

Although sources for reliably constructing a social history of this period are sparse, it appears that the centuries either side of the Common Era were particularly kind to the Sangha. The edicts of Asoka bear witness to imperial support for it, although this was extended to other religious groups (pasandas) also.° The reigns of the Indo-Scythians (Sakas) and then Kusanas up until the middle of the third century coincided with the Sangha becoming increasingly landed through the support of merchants and guilds. A primary concern of Buddhist authors in this era, particularly among the scholastics of the Sarvastivada tradition, was reflection on abhidharma, or otherwise the finer points of doctrine that came to distinguish what was taught by different orders of the Buddhist Sangha (nikayas). Vincent Eltschinger's chapter looks at literature likely produced between the second and third centuries, and proper to the (Mula)Sarvastivadins, that provide some of our earliest known Buddhist attempts at something like doxography. Whereas earlier Buddhist works, for example the Brahmajãlasutta (DN 1), present lists of erroneous views without context or attribution to particular orders or schools, in this period Buddhist authors situate the Buddha in a climate of diverse teachers, traditions and lineages who appear in other Buddhist sources. In these literary settings, the Buddha is cast as a triumphant liberator, who enters the world to quash different teachings (paravadas: 'allodoxies') that are projected back into the history of the Buddha's life and activities. Imagined opponents attempt to best the Buddha in displays of power, but they cannot;

they are desperate, conniving and ultimately no match for Buddhist authority at the time of its most recent appearance in the world. Eltschinger examines how Buddhist authors used narrative creations to present non-Buddhist philosophers as deceptive, sophistic and even illogical; righteous audiences see through their schemes, and side with the Buddha as a figure superior in both magical power and in philosophical erudition.

Still more creative (re)imaginings of the Buddha's work in the world occur in discourses (sutras) proper to Mahayana Buddhism, which were produced throughout the early centuries of the Common Era. Foremost among their concerns is the superiority of the path of the bodhisattva, or how to achieve the fully-awakened status of a buddha for the benefit of all sentient beings, over the goal of the Buddhist sravaka: the `disciple' of mainstream Buddhism, who strives for an end only to their own transmigration.42 Some important works of the Mahayanist imagination, a famous example of which is the Saddharmapundarika or Lotus Sutra, also reflect on the myriad kinds of influence that bodhisattvas can have on the world, and with this idea to hand developed novel approaches to the status and value of non-Buddhist beliefs in

Bodhisattvas who are advanced in their progress, described across mainstream and Mahayana Buddhism, are said to take on many forms across their immeasurably long careers. It is noteworthy that among the many Indian Buddhist accounts of bodhisattvas taking on this or that form it is unusual to find them having adopted the guise of nonBuddhists teachers or adepts (tirthikas). My contribution to this volume addresses how Mahayanist discourses relate the ideal of the bodhisattva, who is supposed to work for the benefit of all sentient beings, to the reality that Buddhism was one among many religious traditions in the world. What I label the bodhisattva-tirthika' is the logical endpoint of the central Mahayanist belief that bodhisattvas work in mysterious ways for all kinds of audiences, whether these audiences know themselves to be witnesses to Buddhist Dharma or not. On the one hand, this suggests a certain tolerance that Mahayana Buddhism has for the religious other, who is never beyond the pale and remains included in the compassionate activities of bodhisattvas. On the other hand, inclusion of the religious other within the parameters of the Mahayana remained a device for announcing the power and dexterity of bodhisattvas, and the Mahayana specifically as the definitive form of the Buddha's teaching.

By the sixth century of the Common Era, by and large the most influential authors in Indian Buddhism known to us were all adherents to the Mahayana. This period marks a shift in the interests of Buddhist writing in general, as notable philosophers such as Dignaga and Dharmakirti turned their attention to the matter of defending and advancing the Buddhist view of the world against outside opposition." In this literature, we find a dramatic increase in reference to non-Buddhists, often more specifically as rival

'philosophers' (tarkikas), as well as previously uncommon nomenclature used reflexively to refer to Buddhism itself: its adherents are 'of the Buddha/Sugata (bauddha/saugata)', or `(sons) of the Sakyas (ssakya[putriya). Buddhist authors of this era sought to undermine the foundations of Brahmanical enquiry, attacking the epistemological basis of both its realist worldview and the scriptural reliability of the Vedas. The era in question is one in which Buddhism's religious (or philosophical) others could not be simply admonished, but had to be dealt with through systematic disputation.

Buddhist authors prepared their students for debates with a range of non-Buddhist opponents, not simply defenders of Vedic ritual (Mimamsa) but also systems of Brahmanical metaphysics (Sanikhya and Vaisesika), and beyond these — still a force on the Indian religious scene — Jainism.4 In our fifth chapter, Marie-Helene Gorisse guides us through the kinds of exchanges that we imagine taking place in the debating halls of early medieval India, and the kinds of arguments in which Buddhists and their sectarian opponents rehearsed and engaged. Gorisse's attention is focused on the complexities of how two Buddhist philosophers, Dharmakirti and Santaraksita (eighth century), went about refuting the positions of non-Buddhist adversaries. Gorisse's chapter highlights some of the methods by which Buddhist authors responded to their religio-philosophical opponents in their writings: by either citing them directly, or creating what we find to be polemical strawmen. In this environment, it was all the more important that Buddhists buttress the fundamentals of their teaching, such as the transience or illusionary nature of all phenomena, against the persuasive realism of Brahmanical philosophy and the slipperiness of Jain teachings (such as that of 'non-one-sidedness': anekantavada).

It is a curious fact of early medieval Indian history that this increased interest in apologetics and the arguments of other religions coincided with the burgeoning of esoteric ritual, or tantra, and literature concerned with it." Formative Buddhist tantric works from around the seventh century, such as the Manjusriyamulakalpa and Vairocanãbhisarnbodhi, confront the concern that what they teach — the practice of esoteric initiation (abhiseka), use of ritual diagrams (mandalas) and fire-sacrifices (homas)— might be better known in association with deities such as Siva and Visnu rather than as authentically Buddhist activities.' Scholarship diverges over how interactions between tantric traditions — which undoubtedly exhibit striking intertextuality, common ritual-philosophical presuppositions and iconography — might best be understood. Perhaps features of this ritualism shared by multiple traditions drew upon some shared substratum of medieval religious beliefs and motifs;" alternatively, they might be better thought of as the innovations one system (foremost Saivism) that were adapted by others (most productively Buddhism). Although there is little doubt that exponents of Buddhist and Saiva tantrism saw one another as rivals, scholars such as Verardi (2011) have advanced

the thesis that what underlies Buddhist-Saiva tantric production was persistent mutual antagonism. This imagines that iconographical representation of Buddhist deities (Trailokyavijaya, Samvara, etc.) trampling on Saiva deities (Mahavara, Uma, etc.) are symbolic representations of very real hostilities that played out between the exponents of each group as they vied for patronage from rulers such as those of the Pala dynasty (8th-12th centuries).

Aleksandra Wenta's chapter attends first to this symbolism: the representation of Saivism in Buddhist tantra through the mythic demonisation, conquest and conversion of the deity S iva-Mahesvara, crushed underfoot by one or other embodiment of Buddhist Dharma." This same motif repeats in Buddhist tantric rites that intend harm upon a given target (abhicãras), commonly aimed at malevolent spirits or demons (or, at their head, the deities Siva or Ganapati), but also at worldly opponents to the authority of the Dharma. Wenta hypothesises, against the strongly antagonistic interpretation of Buddhist-Saiva relations, that the primary targets of rituals such as these were any groups or individuals considered to be morally 'wicked' (dusta). This `weaponisation' of the Dharma was not for the purpose of suppressing non-Buddhists per se, but rather any trace of depravity that could be discerned inside or outside of the parameters of the Dharma, among whom Saivas were just one noteworthy category. In such a setting, Wenta argues, both Buddhism and Saivism may have drawn upon Indian legal thought for the language that they employed to condemn any number of felonious agents that they perceived to be active in the world.

Dynamics Beyond the Subcontinent

The greatest portion of information that we have concerning Buddhism's premodern interactions with cultures outside of South Asia comes from China, where in the early centuries of the first millennium Buddhism received fluctuating approval from various courts. Buddhism was at times condemned by a native ideology centred on ritualism and social obligation that revered a divinely legitimised imperial figurehead: what came to be known as Confucianism. It was also in tension with systems of meditative focus, alchemy, divination and philosophy that in time coalesced into what becomes known as Daoism. Both Confucianism and Daoism built upon cosmological presuppositions very different to those woven into the fabric of earlier Buddhist teaching, yet both Chinese traditions drew upon and defined themselves in opposition to the Dharma and its content." Further east, in Japan, Buddhism assimilated local customs and traditions while itself being absorbed into those islands' own distinctive culture, centuries before the formalisation of Japanese ritualism under the label Shinto (more anciently jindo)." In South East Asia, Buddhists again had to make sense of local forms of belief and practice, but also to wrestle once more with patronage offered to South Asian deities, all before the region was introduced to European Christianity — the first of Buddhism's objectors to knowingly define itself as a

'religion' as popularly understood today. For all of its success across Asia, Buddhism has seldom had a monopoly on religious truth or activity, and in each climate Buddhists shaped their identity and that of their tradition in response to the challenges presented by different religious others.

Associations between the religious other encountered in the world and malevolent or 'demonic' forces that affect it in a more insidious manner did not begin with Buddhism's tantric developments, nor were they confined to South Asia. The archetypal adversary in Buddhist tradition, known as far back as material in the Pali Nikayas and in Indian reliefs produced before the turn of the Common Era, is the deity or demon Mara. With the notable exception of a recent monograph by Nichols (2018), most scholarly attention to the role played by Mara in especially Indian Buddhism has focused on precisely his 'demonic' character, and his symbolic value as an embodiment of evil or the problem of recurring death (hence indeed his name, from the Indic 'mr: 'to die')." Originally presented as an obstacle to the Buddha's activities in his own right, evidence in Indian art and literature communicates that Mara became increasingly associated with the presence and influence of non-Buddhist forces in the world, both religious and political. Perry Schmidt-Leukel's contribution to the current volume examines Mara's role in Buddhist representations of other religious traditions, in instances where Mara as mythic opponent to Buddhist authority is associated with, and in iconographic contexts accompanied by, depictions of various kinds of real-world opposition to Buddhism. Schmidt-Leukel demonstrates that outside of India, the trope of the Buddha's victory over Mara has been employed as something like a call to arms, for protectors of the Dharma to come to its defence against a variety of 'demonised' aggressors. Where rivals to the Buddha's authority are cast as Mara, his followers, or offspring, there is little ambiguity about how those others are being imagined: as worldly manifestations of forces that have always sought to suppress the Dharma, who must be resisted if not, more decisively, removed.

In India and South East Asia, Buddhism faced comparable kinds of opposition, in evolving forms of Brahmanism and what would come to be called Hindu theism. Very different dynamics played out in East Asia, into which Buddhism was transmitted in the first couple of centuries of the Common Era, or the final centuries of the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE). Buddhist texts and teachers entered the west of the empire from Central Asia, and in China met an already developed literary culture focused on the study of 'classics' that were the foundations of what came to be known as Confucianism. During the course of the long and tumultuous era of Six Dynasties (220-589CE), modes of Buddhist thought and practice had great success and flourished under one or other regional administration, while still attracting opposition from members of one or other political court." These dynamics become more complicated during the late fifth century, around which time traditions of

Chinese ritual, alchemy and social organisation took clearer shape as what came to be called Daoism. Whereas it would take longer for Confucianism to model itself into anything of like-kind to Buddhism, Daoism was China's first indigenous 'religion' that would model its texts, teachings and most importantly institutions (monasteries) on what Buddhism had brought from 'the West', and competed with the Sangha for the attention of rulers and courts.

Much has been written about the borrowing of ideas between Chinese Buddhist and Daoist authors during formative periods for both. However, there is more to be explored with respect to how Buddhists and Daoists referred to one another in different periods or regions, especially as their statuses as discrete religious identities came into sharper focus." Buddhist sources suggest that between the fourth and sixth centuries the growing influence of Buddhism across China faced little opposition, and that the Sangha acquired a firm footing across both the Northern and Southern territories of a divided empire. Literature of this period seems relatively quiet with respect to what obstacles it did face, but an invaluable source is the Hongming ji, compiled by Seng You (445-518), which collects myriad Chinese Buddhist perspectives on how their ideas and practices were distinct from others in China, and should be promoted over them. In his chapter, Stephen Bokenkamp focuses on an exchange preserved in the Hongmingji between Zhang Rong (444-97) and Zhou Yong (d. 493?), in which we witness how Buddhists were aware of the dangers of the argument advanced by Daoists that two accounts of what is true, the Dao and the Dharma, were one in origin: a move which threatened to subsume Buddhism into native Chinese religious structures. One major takeaway of Bokenkamp's chapter is that Daoists were not without intellectual resources in their dealings with Buddhist polemicists, and that in engagement with one another, fifth-century Buddhist and Daoist authors were developing a clearer sense of their own beliefs, affiliations and differences.

In the context of China's divided empire, Daoist identity took shape through equal parts emulation of and distinction from Buddhism. Different dynamics played out further east, in Japan, which in this same period may have received its earliest meaningful encounters with Buddhist teachings from the Asian mainland. Japanese Buddhist commentators worked with Indian teachings refracted through a Chinese lens. Most significantly, and informed by the Chinese Tiantai tradition (later Japanese Tendai), Japanese Buddhism claimed to be able to account for the 'original ground' (honji) of which innumerable localised gods and their cults were only derivative 'traces' (suijaku). As in China, Japanese Buddhists presented the truths to which the Dharma provided privileged access as the common ground to which other religions could only gesture.

This productive model of how some religious phenomena can be subordinated to others framed Japanese debate over whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist articulations of religious

truth more fully account for what lies beyond the visible world. In her chapter, Benedetta Lomi explores the manner in which Buddhist authors of the Heian period (794-1185) accounted for the otherness of Daoist, Confucian and other streams of thought by accommodating them as either misremembered or strictly provisional expressions of Buddhist teaching. Notable Buddhist authors from this era argued that there is nothing that is totally other to the Dharma, including anything that is proper to 'other paths' of religious practice (gedo as these are all still refractions of Buddhist power (specifically, they can be thought of as products by the Buddha Vairocana [Dainichi], at the centre of the Shingon tradition). And yet, as Lomi explores, a paradigm in which there is nothing truly oppositional to the Buddha and his bodhisattvas facilitates the incorporation of non-Buddhist elements, such as deities and rituals, into the tradition. This still requires avenues to condemn what is unacceptable, such as the practice of 'outside arts' (gejutsu), or what we might call magic. What is then alien to Buddhism can be cast as miscomprehension of Buddhist truth, or misuse of what is ultimately Buddhist power: an accusation that Buddhist authors could use not only against true outsiders to institutional Buddhism, but also to belittle the deities and associated rituals of rival Buddhist sects and lineages.

Later disputes in East Asian Buddhism, which traverse the Chinese and Japanese cultural spheres, sustain arguments over how Buddhism and what is not Buddhism might be indebted to one another, thereby subordinating one to the other. Some of these debates concern the third of China's 'three teachings' (sanjiao) together with Buddhism and Daoism, namely Confucianism, forms of which have also played significant roles in the religious history of Korea and Japan. In China, early critiques of Buddhism and its intrusion into the life of Chinese populations (and, more outrageously, the life of the imperial court) are associated with Confucianism and the veneration of a social order supposedly inherited from a bygone era, outlined in classics traditionally ascribed to the sage Confucius. A notable development beginning in the Song period (960-1279) are efforts to reform Confucian tradition, influenced by the work of Tang dynasty figures such as Han Yu (c. 768-824) and Li Ao (c. 773-836), such that it was better equipped to respond to Buddhist teachings regarding human nature, cosmology and their relation to ethics. Returning to a focus of some of his earlier work, T.H. Barrett's chapter traces the history, from tenth-century China to present-day Japan, of Li Ao being remembered not simply as a Confucian scholar but also as a student of Chan Buddhism, and hence from the Japanese perspective part of the extended heritage of Japan's own Zen tradition.° A late but influential source for this myth, the work of the nineteenth-century Zen author Imakita Kosen (1816-92), posits that it was only through the involvement of Chan teachers in the lives of Tang-Song Confucian masters that the true import of Confucius could be recovered, understood and then expounded; the intent of Confucius is knowable only if illuminated by Chan/Zen Buddhist insight. Barrett shows that the background to this polemic is Imakita's

disagreements with Confucians not of Tang-Song-era China, who could be couched as students of Buddhist Dharma, but with the Japanese Confucian scholars closer to his own day. By perpetuating a creative reimagining of his own intellectual heritage and that of his rivals, another Buddhist author creatively subordinates the value of a rival tradition to Buddhist Dharma, employing a strategy that is as old as any other in Buddhism's repertoire of responses to religious others.

Religious Others, and What to Make of Them

The preceding sketch of different Buddhist encounters with and representations of other religions across Asia is far from complete, but it aids our reflection on some of the approaches that Buddhists used and reused in different settings. One thing that is clear is that the reputation for religious tolerance commonly attributed to Buddhism, which undoubtedly has a solid basis in very foundational aspects of Buddhist ethics, must also acknowledge Buddhism's robust responses to competition or opposition in the world. Throughout the chapters that follow we see the use of martial metaphors and imagery to confront religious others as combatants or enemies that must be defeated. Sometimes it is the Buddha himself who is imagined to have quashed opposition to the Dharma (Eltschinger), and in other cases it is tantric deities in ferocious service to it (Wenta); in the Theravadin world, where it is to this day Mara who symbolises all that opposes the Buddha's influence, it is Buddhists themselves who are instructed to step up and take action (Schmidt-Leukel).

Although the terms of engagement were quite different, the world of formalised debate in India that is the context of Gorisse's investigation of Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers was no less confrontational. In India and in East Asia, Buddhists entered into formal debate with their detractors, often to demonstrate Buddhism's superiority and greater claim to patronage.° In such contests, it must have been quite obvious to any audience who was and who was not Buddhist, or at least who was speaking as a representative of Buddhism as a discrete heritage of ideas and practices. But in other contexts competing identities were likely not so clear-cut. As explored in Maes' chapter, Buddhism in its early life shared common ideas, practices and metaphors with their religious others, and early Buddhist authors had to underline important distinctions between their kind of renunciation and that of rival traditions. The need to navigate the blurriness of Buddhist and non-Buddhist identity was not restricted to its early life in India, and as Bokenkamp shows the boundaries of the Buddhist and the Daoist were not always so clear in China. Sometimes a task for Buddhist authors was to shore up what distinguished one religious identity from another, the boundaries of which may have been clearer to some parties (renunciants and other adepts) than to others (devotees, who might offer support to some religious specialists, but not others).

A particularly productive response to religious others, which we encounter in several settings, both acknowledges these boundaries and yet, simultaneously, abolishes them. Associated foremost with expressions of Mahayana Buddhism, we see in several contexts the polemical inclusion or accommodation of what is ostensibly not Buddhist within the parameters of the Buddha's influence (Jones, Bokenkamp, Lomi and Barrett). Although not observable in all sources for Mahayana Buddhism, a general feature of its thinking is the sense that the content of the Dharma is not simply the correct account of the nature of experience, but the underlying truth to any utterance or activity that has any soteriological merit to it. Religions do not espouse different dharmas', so to speak, but all gesture to one Dharma, the real truth of things, with differing degrees of accuracy. All manner of persons, teachings and institutions can then be re-imagined as traces or expressions of specifically Buddhist influence, or examples of what is often couched as 'skill-in-means' (upayakausalya; fangbien) by buddhas or bodhisattvas whose words and actions come from beyond the world as it is apparent to us. Within this framework, Buddhism could deride as 'worldly' any phenomenon, including the appearance and expositions of different religions, while acknowledging a single `supramundane' basis to them all, known only through Buddhist teachings." That this conception of Buddhism and its relation to others has worked across a number of interreligious frontiers is testament to its versatility. It should however be stressed that admitting a 'common ground' to religious teachings is not evidence of religious tolerance, so much as condescension that neutralises the validity of another tradition, and awards to Buddhism a privileged voice with respect to any number of contested matters."

Even when it lays claim to account for the wider religious world, Buddhist teaching is still presumed to be one thing among many; assertions and behaviours advanced by it are correct, and alternative answers to concerns about human nature, action and liberation that are voiced by rival traditions are left wanting. The Buddha too is one teacher among many, even if — unlike other teachers in the world — his age-long pursuit of awakening elevated him to a special status above and beyond that which is enjoyed by any sage or deity who teaches differently to him. In various contexts, our chapters show how Buddhist authors project other religions back into formative periods in the history of Buddhism, and sometimes into the pivotal era of the Buddha's appearance in the world. The Bodhisattva (Sakyamuni) might be (re)imagined as having learnt from and surpassed what our authors see as rivals (McGovern), or the Buddha might be presented as the victor over wrong-minded, `worldly' thinking in broader terms (Eltschinger). Then again, retrospection might attend to a different era, to demonstrate, for example, that a Confucian master was more a student of Zen all along (Barrett). Sometimes these matters are contested in what is clearly mythic time; such is the case where the tensions between Buddhists and Saivas are played out between gods, Buddhas, bodhisattvas and their divine retinues (Wenta). Whenever

these dynamics are imagined, art and literature provide creative spaces through which to express the purported dominance of one religious heritage over another, imagined either as the subjugation of demonic forces or the humiliation of rival contemplatives and philosophers.

It is worth underlining that these explorations of Buddhism's relation to its religious others would not, in most cases, havAe had much weight for adherents to other traditions. Sources addressed in this volume exhibit little evidence of our authors trying to appeal to the other, and so were likely produced by Buddhists, for Buddhists. At most, they are for the benefit of audiences undecided as to whether Buddhist Dharma was worthy of personal investment. We might consider again how early Indian Buddhism situates the Buddha among his rivals, and in relation to an audience that might be undecided or fluid in its allegiances. The Pali Samannaphalasutta (DN 2) presents Buddhism in late-Vedic India as just one of many accounts of human action and its relation to suffering. King Ajatasattu (Skt. Ajatasattu) remembers his visits to a number of other teachers (the oft-called 'six heretical teachers'), and enquired of each about the fruits of renunciation. So too might a householder or aspiring renunciant, in India, China or elsewhere, ponder the merits of Buddhist teaching next to those of its rivals. The victor, for one day at least, would be whichever religion most persuasively spoke to the interests but also IIimagination of their audience. This might have entailed some display of philosophical acumen on the part of the advocate for Buddhism, but just as persuasive might have been the delivery of grand narratives about Buddhism's place in the world and its relation to myriad non-Buddhist ideas and practices found in it. Buddhism as a religious commitment, for those not tied to an ordained community or monastery, may have been less about mutually exclusive affiliation, and more about attention, or weighing up what were the most compelling stories or images in a diverse and competitive religious marketplace.

What can be said about Buddhist identity, and its relation to other religious affiliations, across its many forms around pre-modern Asia? To this question there is no single response. The sense of Buddhist identity to a renunciant in late-Vedic India would have been quite different to that of a scholastic monk a thousand years later, and different again to a householder in either India or China at that time, or in later centuries, or yet again elsewhere in the world. The limits and boundaries of what is meant by the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha have been re-imagined time and again in Buddhist history. What the studies collected in this volume go some way to showing is that awareness of the religious other has been a ubiquitous factor in these dynamics, albeit not always the stated focus of Buddhist literary or artistic creativity. In every context that these chapters address, Buddhist authors understood themselves to be adherents to one tradition among many,

but as Buddhism expanded its repertoire of ideas, stories, icons and practices so too did what was not Buddhist, and so how the religious other was represented to audiences has been revisited time and again. These studies draw attention to just some of the creative endeavours that Buddhists have made to express the character and value of their tradition in shared religious landscapes, which may continue to be revisited by Buddhist communities as they continue to occupy and make sense of a world that they share with what is not, at least to the naked eye, the work of the Buddha. <>

THE LAMP FOR THE EYE OF CONTEMPLATION: THE SAMTEN MIGDRON BY NUBCHEN SANGYE YESHE, A 10TH-CENTURY TIBETAN BUDDHIST TEXT ON MEDITATION edited and translated by Dylan Esler [Oxford University Press, 9780197609903]

This book presents an English translation of the *Samten Migdron* (*Lamp for the Eye of Contemplation*) by Nubchen Sangye Yeshe, a seminal 10th-century Tibetan Buddhist work on contemplation. This treatise is one of the most important sources for the study of the various meditative currents that were transmitted to Tibet from India and China during the early dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet. Written from the vantage point of the Great Completeness (Dzogchen) and its vehicle of effortless spontaneity, it discusses, in the manner of a doxography, both sutra-based-including Chan-and tantric approaches to meditation.

The unabridged, annotated English translation of this Tibetan treatise is preceded by a general introduction situating the author-a pivotal figure in what would become the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism-and their work in historical and doctrinal context. The detailed annotations provide elucidating comments as well as crucial references to the numerous texts quoted by the Tibetan author. This book makes this groundbreaking Tibetan work on meditation accessible in English and opens fascinating windows on early forms of contemplative practice in Tibet.

❖ **Includes the first complete translation of the Samten Migdron, the seminal Tibetan text on the subject of meditation, to be published in English-or in any other European language**

❖ **Provides a corrective understanding of early Tibetan Buddhism concerning the role of Chan in Tibet**

❖ **Features one of the earliest systematic presentations of Dzogchen, the vehicle of effortless spontaneity**

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements
Abbreviations and Symbols
General Introduction: The Text and its Author

Chapter I: Laying the Groundwork
Chapter II: Getting Ready
Chapter III: Gaining Perspective
Chapter IV: The Gradual Approach of the Classical Mahayana
Chapter V: The Simultaneous Approach of Chan
Chapter VI: The Tantric Vehicle of Mahayoga
Chapter VII: The Vehicle of Effortless Spontaneity of Atiyoga
Chapter VIII: Dedication of Virtue

Colophons
Bibliography

ANALYTICAL CONTENTS

Contents
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations and Symbols
General Introduction: The Text and Its Author
I.1. The text
I.2. The author
I.2.1. Birth
I.2.2. Travels and teachers
I.2.3. Conflicts in Tibet
I.2.4. Other activities
I.2.5. Death
I.2.6. The problem of gNubs-chen's dates
I.2.7. Conclusions
I.3. Reception of the bSam-gtan mig-sgron in Tibet
I.4. Overview of scholarly research on the bSam-gtan mig-sgron
I.5. Textual observations
I.5.1. Overall structure of the text

According to Buddhist doctrine, all compounded phenomena originate in the interdependence of causes and conditions; this is aptly summarized in the first part of the famous Pratïtyasamutpãdah^daya: "Those phenomena that originate from a cause, the Thus- gone One has declared their cause, and so has the Great Mendicant spoken of their cessation." Hence, a work of this kind is itself the outcome of various causes and conditions and would be impossible without the kind help of many.

In the 1970s, Chhimed Rigdzin Rinpoche (1922–2002; otherwise known as Prof. C.R. Lama of Visva- Bharati University, Santiniketan) published the first modern edition of the bSam-gtan mig-sgron from a copy he discovered in Calcutta. Without his foresight in publishing this text, the bSam-gtan mig-sgron would most likely have remained unknown to the scholarly world. Moreover, his deathless vision and blessings have been the inspiration behind my work.

Two years after Chhimed Rigdzin Rinpoche's passing, it was Lopon P. Ogyan Tanzin Rinpoche (former Lecturer and Head of Department, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath; Director, Ogyan Chokhor Ling) who encouraged me, Dylan Esler, to prepare a translation of this important text of early rNying-ma doctrine and practice. During his 2004–2005 visit to the United Kingdom, he took the time to grant me the full scriptural authorization (lung) of the text. Moreover, there are many ways in which his profound knowledge of and devotion to the rNying-ma tradition have nourished this study. Throughout the many years it has taken me to complete this project, his invaluable clarifications, instructions, and encouragement have been the sustaining force in my work on this fascinating but difficult text. I will never forget his incredible kindness and generosity as we worked on this and other texts at his home in Sarnath.

The translation was first presented as part of my PhD thesis, which was defended at the Université catholique de Louvain in June 2018. At the Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, it is a pleasure to thank my supervisor Prof. Christophe Vielle, who very graciously agreed to supervise my research and gave me the freedom to pursue my goals in a most congenial academic environment. It was through his support that I was able to receive the scholarships that partly funded this research. He provided me with generous feedback and advice during the various phases of my work and helped me locate some important bibliographical references.

It was a great boon to have Dr. Jean-Luc Achard (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris) as the co-supervisor of my PhD. His answers to my questions on various points of the translation as well as his pertinent remarks have greatly benefited my work. It has been an honor to conduct this research under the expert direction of this scholar whose profound insights into and encyclopedic knowledge of rDzogs-chen in both the rNying-ma and Bon traditions are breathtaking...

The text presented here, the bSam-gtan mig-sgron (Lamp for the Eye of Contemplation) by gNubs-chen Sangs-rgyas ye-shes, is a treatise on contemplation (Skt. dhyãna) that is of considerable interest for the study of the various meditative approaches current in 9th- and 10th- century Tibet; in fact, in this regard it is second only to the Dunhuang manuscripts. It is written from the perspective of the Great Completeness (rDzogs-chen).

However, as pointed out by Achard, the bSam-gtan mig-sgron is a doxographical treatise (grub-mtha'; Skt. siddhãnta) rather than a rDzogs-chen text per se; in fact, it is among the first indigenous Tibetan doxographies. Its author expounds a classification of four vehicles that can lead to enlightenment, hierarchically arranged as follows: the gradual approach of the Mahãyãna sütras; the simultaneous approach of the sütras, otherwise known as Chan; the tantric approach of Mahãyoga (which also includes Anuyoga); and finally the Great Completeness, also called Atiyoga. In this regard, the bSam-gtan mig-sgron is one of the first texts to treat the Great Completeness as an independent vehicle (theg-pa; Skt. yãna) rather than as a style (tshul) of practice,4 as witnessed in Padmasambhava's Man-ngag lta-ba'i phreng-ba. The latter, like gNyan dPal- dbyangs' rDo-rje sems-dpa'i zhus-lan, treats the Great Completeness not as an autonomous textual category but merely as a manner of practicing deity yoga.

In the Tibetan context, where later authors almost invariably considered the simultaneous approach (cig-car 'jug-pa; Skt. yugapat) as inferior to the gradual one (rim-gyis 'jug-pa; Skt. kramav^tyã), the very fact that gNubs-chen does the contrary is of no small significance. Indeed, the bSam-gtan mig-sgron is one of the rare Tibetan texts to give an extensive exposition of Chan. Rather than depreciating this tradition as is common in most later works, the bSam-gtan mig-sgron treats it with a certain impartiality, seeking to understand it in its own right.

In order to clarify his positions, the author of the bSam-gtan mig-sgron makes use of a procedure called "disputation" (brgal; Skt. vãda), where an imagined opponent poses questions, which are answered and refuted in the course of the text. In such cases, it should be understood that the opponent in no way needs to stand for an actual person or school and can in fact be long defunct or even fictitious. The views reproduced are reported second-or even third-hand and have the function of a rhetorical device enabling the author to clarify objections that could be raised to particular points of his exposition. gNubs-chen Sangs-rgyas ye- shes' method is first to expound a given approach on its own terms, before criticizing it from the perspective of the approach above it: the gradualist from the simultaneist's viewpoint, the latter from the Mahãyoga perspective, and Mahãyoga from the view of rDzogs-chen. This method becomes especially clear at the end of the four main chapters (i.e., Chapters 4–7), where the distinction with the vehicle(s) below is explained.

What transpires through gNubs-chen's work is a tireless concern to organize the teachings he had received and to present them in such a way that the distinctions between the various meditative currents of his time would not be lost sight of. This may well be in reaction to various syncretistic movements of his time that sought to blend rDzogs-chen, Mahãyoga, and Chan. In this respect, his task is facilitated by the parallel arrangement of

the four main chapters, each of which discusses a particular contemplative approach in terms of its view, meditation, conduct, and fruition. The fact that these four chapters mirror each other in their structure enables the author to present each of the four doctrines independently according to a coherent framework, while at once making comparison of individual elements relatively straightforward.

The bSam-gtan mig-sgron is known under a variety of names: rDzogs-chen-gyi man-ngag bSam-gtan mig-sgron (Lamp for the Eye of Contemplation, Pith Instruction of the Great Completeness), rNal-'byor mig-gi bsam-gtan (Contemplation That Is the Eye of Yoga), and sGom- gyi gnad gsal-bar phye-ba bSam-gtan mig-sgron (Lamp for the Eye of Contemplation That Clearly Distinguishes the Crucial Points of Meditation).

The author: Nubchen Sangye Yeshe

The author of our text signs gNubs-ban, meaning "the venerable (Skt. vandya) of gNubs," and also Ban- chung, meaning "small venerable." This is none other than gNubs-chen Sangs-rgyas ye-shes, an important figure of the rNying-ma tradition, known as a bodhisattva of the fourth stage and counted among Padmasambhava's twenty- five main disciples. Indeed, Rig- 'dzin Padma 'phrinlas (1640– 1718) recounts that Sangs-rgyas ye-shes attained the fourth bodhisattva stage while practicing in a charnel ground in India, whereby he had a vision of the protectress Ekaja^ï and gained the realization of wisdom arising in phenomena's open dimension (Skt. dharmadhãtu). Already in Nyang-ral nyi-ma 'od-zer's (1124–1192) Chos-'byung me-togsnying-po, gNubs- chen Sangs-rgyas ye-shes is listed as one of the twenty- five disciples to have been initiated by Padmasambhava into the eight injunctions (bka'-brgyad). He is mentioned at the beginning of the list, after King Khri-srong lde'u-btsan, Vairocana, and gNubs Nam-mkha'i snying-po. Sangs-rgyas ye-shes is also renowned as an eminent translator of both sütras and tantras. Concerning gNubs-chen's importance for the rNying-ma tradition, Dudjom Rinpoche (1904–1987) cites a saying according to which the Vajrayãna of the rNying-ma-pas "fell first to gNyags, fell to gNubs during the intermediate period, and fell to Zur in the end."

Reception of the bSam-gtan mig-sgron in Tibet

Despite its historical and philosophical importance, in Tibet itself the bSam-gtan mig-sgron has certainly not received the attention it deserves, even within the rNying-ma school of Tibetan Buddhism, to the literature of which it belongs. It was transmitted until the 13th century, after which it almost disappeared. Apart from a few disparate mentions or quotations over the centuries— mainly of an antiquarian character— it remained virtually unknown, and it would probably have languished in obscurity if in 1974 Chhimed Rigdzin Rinpoche (alias Prof. C.R. Lama, 1922–2002) of Visva- Bharati University, Santiniketan, had not published an edition of the text, thus bringing it to the attention of the scholarly world. Later, in the 1990s, mKhan-po Mun-sel (1916–1994) published a revised

edition as part of the fifty-two supplementary volumes to Dudjom Rinpoche's bKa'-ma rgyas-pa. More recently, a few other editions were published, but these either derive from one of the above pioneering editions or attempt to compare them.

A possible explanation for this lack of popular esteem is that contrary to what became the normative standpoint in Tibet, the bSam-gtan mig-sgron upholds the simultaneous approach as superior to the gradual one. Moreover, its statement that the simultaneous approach continued until Glang-dar-ma's religious persecution, which contradicts the assumption popular among most Tibetan scholars that it disappeared as soon as it was banned during the bSam-yas debates (792–794), may explain this state of affairs.

Perhaps because of his informed and detailed treatment of Chan, gNubs-chen Sangs-rgyas ye-shes was later accused by 'Bri- gung dpal- 'dzin (14th century) of mixing up the contents of Padmasambhava's Man-ngag lta-ba'i phreng-ba with Chan. Nevertheless, the bSam-gtan mig-sgron demonstrates that this criticism is quite baseless. On the contrary, gNubs-chen's concern at explaining the differences between the various meditative approaches of his time is evident. In fact, he is very critical of a syncretistic outlook presumably popular at his time, claiming that people who mix Chan and rDzogs-chen neither understand the view of the one nor of the other.

However, this is not to say that the bSam-gtan mig-sgron was completely unknown in Tibet: it is mentioned in an official decree (bka'-shog) of Pho- 'brang zhi-ba-'od (11th century). Furthermore, as pointed out by Karmay, extracts from the bSam-gtan mig-sgron appear in O-rgyan gling- pa's (1323– ca. 1379) treasure the Blon-po bka'-thang. Tanaka and Robertson have demonstrated in some detail that Chapters 12, 13, and 14 of the Blon-po bka'-thang are in fact a somewhat patchwork rearrangement of verbatim sections of the bSam-gtan mig-sgron. Matter that in the bSam-gtan mig-sgron occurs in a natural order is rearranged quite artificially in the Blon-po bka'-thang. Moreover, O-rgyan glingpa does not distinguish between the main text and quotations as differentiated in the bSam-gtan mig-sgron. Finally, the text of the Blon-po bka'-thang presents the material in such a way that it appears to be a debate between only the gradual and simultaneous approaches, whereas the bSam-gtan mig-sgron has a vaster scope since it also covers Mahãyoga and rDzogs-chen. O-rgyan gling- pa's motivation would appear to be to defend the rNying-ma school against the polemicists who claim that rDzogs-chen and Chan are identical. However, rather than simply disavowing a doctrinal identity between both traditions (which would have been perhaps more straightforward since this is very much one of the intentions behind the composition of the bSam-gtan mig-sgron), the author of the Blon-po bka'-thang sets about to prove the superiority of Chan to the gradual approach. In this he can base himself on the bSam-gtan mig-sgron, but he seems to bypass the distinction that this text then goes on to draw between Chan on the one hand and rDzogs-chen on the other.

As noted by Karmay, a bSam-gtan mig-gi sgron-ma is also mentioned by 'Gos Lotsãwa gZhon-nu dpal (1392–1481) as belonging to the Rong system of the Great Completeness. However, this probably refers to another work: indeed, a bSam-gtan mig-gi sgron-me is also mentioned by Klong- chen-pa among the texts received by his own master, Kumarãja, from Slob-dpon sGom-pa, himself a descendant of lCe-sgom nag-po. However, the text in question is not by gNubs-chen Sangs-rgyas ye-shes but, rather, by Vimalamitra.

As is clear from the colophon to our text, the bSam-gtan mig-sgron was known to Tãranãtha (1575–1634) and to sMin-gling Lo-chen Dharmašrï (1654–1718) since Tãranãtha's manuscript was apparently the source of sMin- gling Lochen Dharmašrï's copy. Furthermore, Ka^-thog Rig-'dzin Tshe-dbang nor- bu (1698–1755) quotes the bSam-gtan mig-sgron in his history of Chan in Tibet. In more recent times, a copy of the bSam-gtan mig-sgron (in all likelihood ^) was discovered by Ka^-thog Si-tu Chos-kyi rgya-mtsho (1880–1925), probably at the library of the bKra-shis lhun-po monastery in Central Tibet.170 Following this discovery, Ze-chen mKhan- chen Padma rnam-rgyal (1871–1926), who was at once Ka^-thog Si-tu's teacher and student, wished to have a xylographic edition of this rare text produced. This task was undertaken by his disciple, 'Jam- dbyangs mkhyen-brtse chos- kyi blo-gros, who prepared a block print edition from sMin- gling Lo-chen Dharmašrï's manuscript copy. These block prints (^) are the basis for the first modern edition of the bSam-gtan mig-sgron (C) and, via the latter, of its subsequent revised edition (M).

***

Nubchen Sangye Yeshe's colophon Chapter Summary

❖ **Chapter 1**

First are the defects and qualities of the place, the making of a commitment, and the undertaking of the [preliminary] activities. In undertaking the preliminary activities, there are requirements and the relinquishing of psychic attachment to one's wealth and friends. [When one is weary of the sanctuary, one thinks of the defect consisting in the frivolity of towns. By recalling the meaning of natural solitude and the sanctuary's qualities, one purges oneself [of weariness].

❖ **Chapter 2**

When approaching absolute meaningfulness, one should obtain the means and great means. Then there are the [four] compatible reliances, the repelling of [contrary] conditions, and the requisites. Because one's body is a ship, one should implement extensive [physical] treatments yet not become attached thereto. Then come the defects of not meditating. Those with ample knowledge of the qualities [of meditation] should rest in equanimity [rather than implementing] righteousness.

❖ Chapter 3

He who has accordingly come to a resolution with regard to absolute meaningfulness and comprehended its nature is like the king of predators. Abiding on being as it is, because he knows that thinking is an abyss, there is the non-imaging of the Tsen-min and of the sTon-mun, the thusness of inner non-discursiveness, and the non-discursiveness of spontaneous completeness [atiyoga]; these distinctions should be assimilated as being like [the rungs of] a ladder.

❖ Chapter 4

The Sautrãntika [Madhyamaka] meditating on emptiness indeed first meditates on the four immeasurables. He views and posits relative truth as illusory and posits that absolute truth is non-imaging. Some will generate insight after having meditatively familiarized themselves with calm abiding. Focusing their referential imaging, they rectify defects and pacify them, thereby integrating [calm abiding and insight]. Gradually traversing [the stages], they cleanse their obscurations and accrue the accumulations.

❖ Chapter 5

The sTon-mun come to a resolution [concerning absolute meaningfulness] in the manner of [a person who] sees everything when he has gone to the peak of the king of mountains. Even as this approach [concerns] simultaneous integration, which is idle, unborn, and intrinsically clear, in the state of absolute truth, one does not relinquish whatever defects are produced; it is maintained that the latter are self-originated and self-appeased. Hence, there is no [gradual] traversing [of stages]. Without [gradually] training, one treads [the stages] like the great garuda.

❖ Chapter 6

As regards the inner [Vajrayãna], there is referential imaging, coming to a resolution [through the view], and meditating. Furthermore, there is mental rectification, which pertains to the gradual approach; in the simultaneous approach, rectification is a flaw. Then there occur the indications and signs of experience. One should not become attached to them; whatever omens occur in one's dreams, one should not be attached to them. Without each of the accumulations [having been accrued individually], they are accomplished as one, like an alchemical tincture [a drop of which suffices to transform all kinds of iron into gold]. [The fruition of Mahãyoga] is self-arising, like the sun.

❖ Chapter 7

When one actually assimilates the state of the Great Completeness, there is nothing to posit; great absolute meaningfulness is intrinsically clear. Without there being anything to evaluate, great realization is free from involvement and is without meditation. Whatever defects occur, one's three doors are without rectification. To hold on to rectifying one's intrinsic mode is the dagger of obscuration. Since [suchness] is free from pauses, one

neither wavers from nor emerges from it. Since this great state is the seminal nucleus, there is no conduct that discretely emerges from and enters into it; everything is the behavior of the Bliss- gone One. Being inherently free from anything to relinquish or accept, in relative truth mere recollection is not inhibited, yet there is no recollection. Being free from hope and misgiving, whatever omens in dreams or indications arise as [signs of] the warmth of experience, one is without any attachment toward them. Since they are just like the signs appearing in the sky, the nature of spontaneous presence is like space.

❖ **Chapter 8**

Once in this borderland empire
The great vehicle was propagated; by the strength of these conditions,
There are many who abide in sanctuaries.
By the force of propagating these injunctions of mine,
May all abandon the four nets and,
Gaining the eye [of contemplation], attain the supreme stage!
May they be guides for infinite sentient beings!
May the teachings be compelling for all time!
To those who are arrogant, of evil character, and sectarian,
Who are eloquent, unaffectionate, and egotistical,
Who are free from a [good] bone lineage, have great attachment, and are crafty,
Who look toward human principles and do not listen to the injunctions,
Who are surrounded by wives, sons, and evil ruffians,
Who speak out their desires and are without pledges—
To these this should never be taught,
Even if one be thrust from the empire, be repelled, or have one's heart removed.
Sangs-rgyas, the small venerable of gNubs,
Gladdened the oral lineage of the scholars of India, Nepal, Tibet, Gilgit, etc.
He opened the door of the panditas' awakened mind
And obtained the pith instructions of the authoritative scriptures of the pinnacle.
The empowerment was conferred on me by the gods and ogres;
Hence, I wrote down the meditative familiarization of my own experience.
O sons, you supreme persons holding the bone lineage of the Victorious Ones,
It is by meditating perpetually and by relinquishing frivolity
That you must practice, O heirs of your father!
O sons, entrust this [text] only to those who are successors of the family!
If it is given to the many, you will be born in the adamantine hell.
May this heart pledge of the emanated small venerable
Be held in the ears of one or two disciples!
It is complete. Let there be virtue! Auspiciousness! Felicity!

<>

WISDOM WITHIN WORDS: AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF DOGEN'S CHINESE-STYLE POETRY by Steven Heine [Oxford University Press, 9780197553527]

WISDOM WITHIN WORDS is the first complete bilingual edition and annotated translation of the poetry collection entitled *Kuchugen*, which features 150 Chinese-style verses (kanshi) written by Dōgen Zenji (1200-1253), founder of the Soto Zen sect in early medieval Japan, and compiled in the eighteenth century by Menzan Zuiho. These poems are essential in highlighting several key aspects of Dōgen's manner of thinking and process of writing creatively while transmitting the Chan/Zen tradition from China to Japan in the first half of the thirteenth century. Dōgen learned the Chinese style of writing poetry--featuring four rhyming lines with seven characters each--when he travelled to the mainland in the 1220s. It was there that he first composed 50 verses, the only texts available from this career stage. He continued to write Sinitic poetry throughout his career at both Koshoji temple in Kyoto and Eiheiji temple in the remote mountains.

Dōgen's poems had various aims, including reflecting on meditation during periods of reclusion, commenting on cryptic koan cases, eulogizing deceased patriarchs, celebrating festivals and seasonal occasions, welcoming new administrative appointees at the temple, remarking on the life of the Buddha and other aspects of attaining enlightenment, and highlighting various teachings or instructions. Although Dōgen's poetry has often been overlooked by the sectarian tradition, these writings have played valuable roles in the development of East Asian Buddhist contemplative life.

CONTENTS

A few years ago, I started translating Wisdom within Words (Kuchügen), a collection of Zen master Dogen's Chinese- style (kanshi) poems that was initially compiled and commented on in 1759 by Menzan Zuiho, an eminent early-modern Soto Zen scholiast, and later reproduced with elaborate scholarly apparatus in an impressive modern edition published by Murakami Shindo. This compilation includes poetry written, among other sundry purposes, for diverse ceremonies and memorials performed at his temple, as incisive remarks on various cryptic koan cases or tributes to past and current eminent monks as well as communications with lay followers, or as expressions of Dogen's interior reflections during periods of reclusive meditation often carried out while he was secluded or isolated from routine monastic activities.

In the 1990s, when I published the first edition of The Zen Poetry of Dõgen: Verses from the Mountain of Eternal Peace (Tuttle), which is primarily a rendering of the master's Japanese 31- syllable waka collection, I also included translations of some of Dogen's kanshi poetry as an important supplement to the vernacular compositions. At that time, I was reliant on reading contemporary Japanese versions of the classic script. However, in past years, since focusing my attention on the study of continental Chan literary sources in addition to institutional influences rooted in Song- dynasty culture, I have been more thorough in my research and thereby truer, I feel, to capturing the original Sinitic content and rhetorical structures of that portion of Dogen's poetry. This book could well be read alongside my recent translation of kanshi verse in Flowers Blooming on a Withered Tree: Giun's Verse Comments on Dõgen's Treasury of the True Dharma Eye, also published by Oxford University Press.

The two introductory chapters of the current volume provide an overview of the origins, structure, and spiritual significance of Wisdom within Words as seen in relation to other Dogen works and ideas, in addition to comparisons with examples of Zen literature and thought. After these chapters, the main section features my translation of the 150 kanshi verses of Wisdom within Words culled from Dogen's ten-volume Extensive Record (Eihei kõroku), including a postscript poem added by Menzan, along with my interpretative comments concerning the historical background and religious symbolism of each entry. This chapter is followed by a short selection of supplementary poems I have translated from the Extensive Record to help readers gain a fuller sense of the variety of poetic styles utilized by Dogen. Then, appendix A provides a list of sources for every poem in the main collection based on where it originally appears in the source text.

Since the entire group of Chinese- style poems in Wisdom within Words was initially included in various sections of the Extensive Record, I have frequently consulted the excellent translation of this capacious work produced by Taigen Dan Leighton and Shohaku Okumura in DÅ□genâ€™s Extensive Record (Wisdom). I have additionally had

numerous conversations with Taigen and have spoken about the poetry collection in talks with his sitting group at the Ancient Dragon Zen Gate center located in Chicago. It is important to note, however, that Menzanâ€™s compilation uses a different version of the Extensive Record, known as the Manzan edition, rather than the Monkaku edition used by Leighton/ Okumura. The Manzan version contains variant wording and other discrepancies in numerous instances that often affect an appreciation of the poetry.

***

Neglect and Rediscovery

Menzan's Wisdom within Words, along with his additional volume of annotations and the voluminous verse compositions produced by him and his peers, call attention to the significance of Dogen's kanbun poetry, which has been discounted for centuries yet is crucial for evaluating the master's overall view of creating eloquent discourse. This outlook contributed greatly to the transmission of Zen's intricate literary traditions and ceremonial techniques from China to Japan at a critical juncture in East Asian cultural history. As noted, the compilation was used in Menzan's day primarily for liturgical purposes as a listing of poems to be chanted by novices. However, little information is available regarding the details or extent of this practice, so it is difficult to determine whether the monks who participated in such rituals tried to comprehend the full range of literary qualities embedded in Dogen's poetry or, instead, focused on learning moral teachings from the words.

The topic of poetry has not been broached very often in recent scholarship in large part because Dogen's kanshi are almost entirely left out of the vast collections of literature that were produced at Japan's Five Mountains Zen temples (Gozan bungaku). These works mainly included poems composed by monks from Rinzai school temples based in Kyoto and Kamakura, who often ventured to China to study versification methods from prominent continental teachers. In some cases, Japanese priests learned enough Chinese from émigré monks who settled in Japan that they could master poetic forms without the benefit of travel. Even though he was the first major monk to visit the mainland and write Zen- based kanshi, only a tiny handful of Dogen's poems are contained in standard Five Mountains collections, such as the verse on his Fukakusa retreat mentioned in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the works of several prominent Soto poets from the fourteenth century are generally included, such as Betsugen Enshi (1294–1364) from Echizen province and Daichi Sokei (1290–1366) from Kyushu, both of whom visited Eiheiji for significant studies of Dogenâ€™s works yet also interacted extensively with Rinzai practitioners while apparently remaining loyal to the Soto sect. In other instances, however, Soto monk- poets did end up joining Rinzai monasteries where an emphasis on poetry was consistently strong. Dogen is no doubt best known today for the rhetorical

features of the Treasury of the True Dharma Eye, which has received considerable praise from literary critics and linguists in addition to religious philosophers east and west for the way it integrates Chinese phrasings with Japanese syntax, thereby leading to complex wordplays and reversals of customary meaning. Some prominent Japanese literary scholars have analyzed the Treasury, including Nishio Minoru, Terada ToÌ„ru, and Yasuraoka Kosaka, among others, who have sometimes collaborated with Buddhist studies scholars in the burgeoning field of Treasury research that has triggered so many English translations and academic works over the past several decades. Recently, Dogenâ€™s kanshi has been examined extensively by several prominent sectarian interpreters, especially Sawaki Kodo, Kikuchi Ryoichi, and Otani Tetsuo, among others. <>

From the Series THE LIBRARY OF WISDOM AND COMPASSION

7. SEARCHING FOR THE SELF by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Venerable Thubten Chodron [The Library of Wisdom and Compassion, Wisdom Publications, 9781614297956]

In SEARCHING FOR THE SELF the Dalai Lama leads us to delve deeply into the topic of the ultimate nature of reality, presenting it from a variety of approaches while focusing on identifying our erroneous views and directing us to the actual mode of existence of all persons and phenomena.

Placing our study of reality within the auspicious context of a compassionate motivation to benefit all sentient beings, the Dalai Lama explains why realizing emptiness is important and what qualities are needed to do that, and he evaluates various tenet systems' perspectives on this vast topic. He then helps us understand our perceptions and the mental states involved in both our ignorant and accurate cognitions. He examines inherent existence and other fantasized ways of existence that we seek to disprove through reasoned analysis and presents the Middle Way view that abandons all extremes. The closing chapters by Thubten Chodron discuss the three characteristics of impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and not-self as explained in the Pali tradition and show how meditation on these can lead to the meditative breakthrough to realize nirvana.

Engaging in this investigation with His Holiness will challenge our deepest-held beliefs and uproot false ways of viewing ourselves and the world that are so habitual we don't even

notice them. Get ready to be challenged and intrigued, for realizing the nature of reality has the power to cut our defilements at the root and free us from cyclic existence forever!

CONTENTS

Many of the practices we do on the path to awakening are to prepare us to study, contemplate, meditate on, and realize the nature of reality, for this is the realization that has the power to cut our defilements from their root. So in the Library of Wisdom and Compassion, we now arrive at this topic. Although His Holiness has sprinkled his discussion of emptiness—the absence of inherent existence—throughout previous volumes, in this and the next two volumes he delves deeply into this topic, presenting it

from a variety of approaches. This first of the three volumes on emptiness, searching for the Self, focuses on identifying our erroneous views and directing us to the actual mode of existence of all persons and phenomena. Doing this will challenge some of our deepest-held beliefs—some false ways of viewing ourselves and the world that are so habitual that we don't even notice them. Get ready to be challenged and intrigued!

How This Book Originated

The Library of Wisdom and Compassion has been many years in the making. As relayed in the prefaces ofprevious volumes, the idea for such a series began in the early 1990s when I requested His Holiness the Dalai Lama to write a short text that Tibetan lamas could use when teaching the Buddhadharma to Westerners and other non-Tibetans. His Holiness responded that we should write something longer first, gave me a transcript of one of his teachings, and sent me off to work.

In interviews with him over the ensuing years, the focus and scope of the series became clearer. The following is some of His Holiness' advice:

> **Our main aim is to help practitioners of the Pali and Sanskrit traditions have a better understanding of each other's teachings and practice; a better understanding between the two traditions will bring closer contact, which will not only benefit individual practitioners but also enable the Buddhadharma to exist longer. In addition, it will enable Buddhist leaders from all traditions to speak in one voice about important issues in the world, such as climate change.**
>
> **Except for minor differences, the Vinaya practice in all traditions is basically the same; the Vinaya and pratimoksa are emphasized in both the Fundamental Vehicle and the Mahayana. The thirty-seven harmonies with awakening are also held in common. After reading this book, Theravada practitioners will have clearer understanding that Mahayana practitioners also engage in these practices and Mahayana practitioners will know that Theravada practitioners meditate on immeasurable love and compassion. The Pali tradition is the foundation of the Buddhadharma. Although there may be some people who think Vinaya is old-fashioned, that is a wrong view. The Buddha established the Vinaya, so deprecating the Vinaya and the value of monastic life is similar to dismissing the Buddha's wisdom and denigrating the path to awakening. It would be good to have more explanation in this series about the Theravada tradition, especially its Vinaya practice—how ordination is given, the three monastic practices (posadha, varsa, pravdrana)-and its practice of samadhi, insight, and the thirty-seven harmonies with awakening. I know that some practitioners in Theravada countries are very accomplished and some monks are considered arhats.**
>
> **When I meet monks from Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma, and so forth, we discuss Vinaya, the thirty-seven harmonies, the four truths, and so forth—Buddhist teachings that all of us share. When I meet Japanese tantric practitioners, we discuss tantra. But when Japanese tantric practitioners and Sri Lankan Buddhist monks meet, aside from the**

practice of refuge in the Three Jewels, they can discuss only a few common practices. That is sad. I would like us Buddhists to understand one another better.

I also try to create closer understanding between Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, Muslims, and Jews. Theistic religions' emphasis on faith in God, the creator, helps people to live better. When they think that they are created in God's image, that God is like a protective father, and that everything is in God's hands, it helps them develop single-pointed faith. Such faith reduces self-centeredness and supports them in abandoning harm and extending forgiveness, kindness, and generosity to others. Based on pinpointing self-centeredness, anger, greed, fear, jealousy, and so forth as destructive emotions, we can understand and respect practitioners of theistic religions. In the Tibetan community, some people stress their identification with a particular Tibetan tradition, "I'm Nyingma, you are Gelug; I am Sakya, you are Kagyu." Doing this in a discriminatory way is silly. By seeing our commonalities, I hope we Tibetans will overcome old divisions and that these misconceptions will not spread to Western, Chinese, and other practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism.

With this in mind, we'll explore the Buddha's teachings on the nature of reality. Although there are many educational systems in the world, each with its own methodology, here we follow the Nalanda tradition of India. In some educational systems today, teachers explain topics to students who are expected to remember all the information. They then take tests on the material to see if they have memorized it properly. Students are not necessarily taught how to think about the material or to question the ethical value of exploring a certain field of knowledge.

In the Nalanda tradition, our motivation for education is to increase our ability to contribute to the well-being of others and to progress on the path to full awakening. Here a teacher's role is to put forth varying ideas and help students to investigate them one by one, stating their qualms and debating the issues. Teachers don't give students all the answers, but present different viewpoints and questions that the students discuss and debate among themselves. This functions to increase students' discriminating wisdom and their ability to think clearly. They learn what is true by refuting wrong ideas and establishing correct reasons.

Overview of the Book

This volume begins with an introduction by His Holiness in which he places our study of reality within the framework of a compassionate motivation to benefit sentient beings. Since the value of whatever we undertake depends on our motivation, cultivating a motivation to contribute to the welfare of all beings places our study of emptiness in a beneficial context.

Chapter 1 explains why realizing emptiness is important and describes the qualities to develop to understand it correctly. Chapter 2 speaks of the Buddhist sages whose teachings

are the most reliable for us to follow. It culminates with a praise His Holiness wrote that introduces us to the seventeen great scholar-adepts of the Nalanda tradition followed in Tibetan Buddhism. Then in chapters 3, 4, and 5 we explore assertions of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical tenet systems. This topic is vast, so only the important positions regarding the topics of the present volume—selflessness and emptiness—are spoken of here. Although initially this material may seem replete with new terms and ideas, as you progress in your study and practice to develop insight into emptiness, you will see the value of learning these because they point out some of our own incorrect ideas and direct us to views that are more reasonable.

Chapter 6 provides some of the epistemological material that helps us to understand both cognizing subjects and cognized objects, and chapter 7 fleshes out some of the mental states involved in both our ignorant and accurate cognitions. Chapter 8 discusses inherent existence and other fantasized ways of existence that comprise the objects of negation—what we seek to disprove when meditating on emptiness—and chapter 9 establishes the Middle Way view that has abandoned the extremes of absolutism and nihilism. The view of absolutism superimposes false ways of existence, whereas the nihilistic view negates what does in fact exist. Chapter io looks more closely at the extreme of absolutism, as this is the view that we ordinary sentient beings usually cling to.

Chapter ix speaks of the two extremes as presented in the Pali tradition and the three characteristics of impermanence, duhkha, and not-self that counter the absolutist views. Chapter 12 goes into some of the many arguments presented in the Pali tradition that help to overcome clinging to a false notion of the I. Although the arguments to support selflessness in the Sanskrit tradition are expounded in the upcoming volume 8 of the Library of Wisdom and Compassion, readers who are already familiar with these will see the similarities with arguments found in the Pali sutras.

The coda is designed for people who have studied the tenet systems in the Tibetan tradition as well as for followers of the Pali tradition who want to learn more about their own Abhidharma system. Many Tibetans believe that modern-day Theravada corresponds to the Vaibhasika and/or Sautrantika systems as these systems are explained in the Tibetan tradition. However, this is not the case; although the Pali tradition shares many commonalities with these two systems, there are some important differences. In addition, this coda orients the reader to some of the foundational, canonical ideas informing the Tibetan treatises on the nature of reality, selflessness, and emptiness. Being aware of the development of the Abhidharma provides background for the refutations in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way.

When His Holiness said he wanted me to include the perspective of the Pali tradition in the Library of Wisdom and Compassion, his office gave me a letter requesting Theravada monks to give me teachings and allow me to stay in their temple. Thus I spent two weeks studying and practicing with Ajahn Anan at Wat Marp Jan in Thailand. This was followed by studying Bhikkhu Bodhi's lengthy series of teachings on the Majjhima Nikaya and meeting with him to ask questions. This led to reading about the Pali Abhidharma, participating in a vipassana retreat, and discussing the Dharma with Western monks and nuns whom I met at our annual Western Buddhist Monastic Gatherings. Having taught the Dharma in Singapore for almost two years, I also got to know some monks from that tradition, participated in panel discussions with them, and was invited to speak at their temples. This study and engagement with the Pali tradition has helped my own Dharma practice considerably.

Please Note

Although this series is coauthored, the vast majority of the material is His Holiness's teachings. I researched and wrote the parts about the Pali tradition, wrote some other passages, and composed the reflections. For ease of reading, most honorifics have been omitted, but that does not diminish the great respect we have for the excellent sages, practitioners, and learned adepts. Foreign terms are given in italics parenthetically at their first usage. Unless otherwise noted with "P." or "T.," indicating Pali or Tibetan, respectively, italicized terms are Sanskrit, or the term is the same in Sanskrit and Pali. When two italicized terms are listed, the first is Sanskrit, the second Pali. For consistency, Sanskrit spelling is used for Sanskrit and Pali terms in common usage (nirvana, Dharma, arhat, and so forth), except in citations from Pali scriptures. Tibetan terms can be found in the glossary. The term sravaka encompasses solitary realizers, unless there is reason to specifically differentiate them. To maintain the flow of a passage, it is not always possible to gloss all new terms on their first usage, so a glossary is provided at the end of the book. "Sutra" often refers to Sutrayana and "Tantra" to Tantrayana—the Sutra Vehicle and Tantra Vehicle, respectively. When these two words are not capitalized, they refer to two types of scriptures: sutras and tantras. "Mahayana" or "Universal Vehicle" here refers principally to the bodhisattva path as explained in the Sanskrit tradition. In general, the meaning of all philosophical terms accords with the presentation of the Prasangika Madhyamaka tenet system. Unless otherwise noted, the personal pronoun "I" refers to His Holiness. <>

8. REALIZING THE PROFOUND VIEW by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Venerable Thubten Chodron [The Library of Wisdom and Compassion, Wisdom Publications, 9781614298403]

The eighth volume in the Dalai Lama's definitive and bestselling LIBRARY OF WISDOM AND COMPASSION series, and the second of three focusing on emptiness.

In REALIZING THE PROFOUND VIEW the Dalai Lama presents the analysis and meditations necessary to realize the ultimate nature of reality.

With attention to Nagarjuna's five-point analysis, Candrakirti's seven-point examination, and Pali sutras, the Dalai Lama leads us to investigate who or what is the person. Are we our body? Our mind? If we are not inherently either of them, how do we exist, and what carries the karma from one life to the next? As we explore these and other fascinating questions, he skillfully guides us along the path, avoiding the chasms of absolutism and nihilism, and introduces us to dependent arising. We find that although all persons and phenomena lack an inherent essence, they do exist dependently. This nominally imputed mere I carries the karmic seeds. We discover that all phenomena exist by being merely designated by term and concept—they appear as like illusions, unfindable under ultimate analysis but functioning on the conventional level. Furthermore, we come to understand that emptiness dawns as the meaning of dependent arising, and dependent arising dawns as the meaning of emptiness. The ability to posit subtle dependent arisings in the face of realizing emptiness and to establish ultimate and conventional truths as non-contradictory brings us to the culmination of the correct view.

The second of three volumes on the nature of reality in the LIBRARY OF WISDOM AND COMPASSION series, REALIZING THE PROFOUND VIEW challenges the ways we view the self and the world, bringing us that much closer to liberation.

CONTENTS

SEARCHING FOR THE SELF, the previous volume of the Library of Wisdom and Compassion, delved into the topic of the ultimate nature of reality that has been sprinkled throughout the books in this series. In our Dharma study and practice, it is important not only to understand cause and effect and how things function to produce happiness or suffering, but also to know their ultimate mode of existence, for it is such awareness that cuts self-grasping ignorance, the root of samsara.

In the previous volume we discussed the different levels of misconception and distorted grasping sentient beings hold regarding persons and other phenomena, as explained by the four tenet systems—Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Madhyamaka. Each system has its own way of asserting the Middle Way, in which it claims to fall neither to the extreme of absolutism that superimposes a mode of existence that phenomena lack nor to the extreme of nihilism that negates what exists. We also began to investigate the nature of the person, the I or self, that lies at the center of our being by examining the Buddha's famous refutation in the Pali sutras, "This is not I, not mine, not my self."

In the present volume, we will continue the search for the self and expand it to see the relationship between grasping an inherently existent I and mine, on the one hand, and grasping inherently existent phenomena, especially the aggregates that are the basis of designation of the I, on the other. We will also focus on the subtlest object of negation—inherent existence—as rejected by the most 'sophisticated tenet system, the Prasangika Madhyamaka. To do this, we will investigate employing reasoning and logic, tools that His

Holiness and the other great masters have emphasized to clarify the nature of reality. Emptiness is not realized by blind faith, foggy belief, or incorrect arguments, but only by being open-minded, using our intelligence, and having an earnest aspiration to attain liberation and full awakening.

As in the previous volume, you will encounter new vocabulary and concepts. We are not expected to understand everything at the first reading, or even at the tenth. Deepening our understanding depends also on purifying our mind, accumulating merit, listening to teachings, self-reflection, and study that is guided by qualified spiritual mentors. So don't feel despondent if everything isn't crystal clear at the beginning. Continue your daily practice and continue to study, listen to, and contemplate teachings. Slowly, gradually, your understanding will grow and you'll come to realize the nature of reality and eliminate the scourge of duhkha and its cause, ignorance, that have been plaguing us since beginningless time. Equally important is to cultivate compassion and bodhicitta, so that as our wisdom increases so does our appreciation of the kindness of all sentient beings and our heartfelt aspiration to benefit them and show them the path to full awakening.

How This Book Came About

We shared the story of the origins of the Library of Wisdom and Compassion in volume 1, **APPROACHING THE BUDDHIST PATH,** and elaborated on it in the seventh volume, **SEARCHING FOR THE SELF**. The origins and the completion of this project span decades, and given the reality of impermanence and dependent-arising, the old vanishes and its continuum carries on with the creation of something new.

My initial request to His Holiness was to write a short text that Tibetan lamas could use when teaching non-Tibetans, especially people from the West who come to the Dharma with very different preconceptions and assumptions than those who grew up as Tibetan Buddhists. At His Holiness's wish, this transformed into my editing some of his Dharma talks to make a longer book. That in turn became a long manuscript that would consist of a few books. When His Holiness said that he wanted the project to also include teachings from the Pali tradition and from Buddhism in China, it again expanded. To my objections, he also insisted that I be a coauthor, not an editor.

When His Holiness said he wanted me to include teachings from the Pali tradition in the Library of Wisdom and Compassion, his office gave me a letter requesting Theravada monks to teach me and allow me to stay in their temple. Thus, I spent two weeks studying and practicing with Ajahn Anan at Wat Marp Jan in Thailand. This was followed by studying Bhikkhu Bodhi's lengthy series of teachings on Majjhima Nikaya and meeting with him, and later corresponding with him to ask questions. This led to reading about the Pali Abhidharma, participating in a vipassana retreat, and discussing the Dharma with

Western monastics whom I met at our annual Western Buddhist Monastic Gatherings. Having taught the Dharma in Singapore. for almost two years, I also got to know some monks from the Theravada tradition, participated in panel discussions with them, and was invited to speak at their temples. This study and engagement with the Pali tradition has helped my own Dharma practice considerably.

My knowledge of Buddhism in China also expanded, but that will be described in the next volume, Appearing and Empty, where we further our study of Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet and look at Madhyamaka in China as well.

Overview of Realizing the Profound View

His Holiness begins with setting the stage for this text by explaining how to practice and generate the proper motivation to practice. SEARCHING FOR THE SELF introduced us to emptiness, whereas this volume primarily explains the analytical investigations and meditations necessary to realize emptiness by forcefully and completely negating inherent existence.

We begin in chapter r with an overview of the main arguments used to establish the emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena, and then proceed to Candrakirti's seven-point examination using the example of a chariot—we updated the example to a car, which you are undoubtedly more familiar with. Candrakirti's argument can be traced back to the Pali sutras and to the Questions of King Menander (Milindapanha), a text written about 100 BCE, in which King Menander questions Bhiksu Nagasena, asking, "Who or what is the person?" The monk presents the seven-point examination in which he leads the king to see that something that is truly the chariot cannot be found either among its parts or separate from them. The chariot exists conventionally but cannot be found when analyzing its ultimate mode of existence. Chapter 2 follows up on this, explaining Nagarjuna's five-point analysis of the Tathagata found in his Treatise on the Middle Way and similar versions in his Letter to a Friend (Suhrllekha) and Precious Garland (Ratnavali). This analysis is also found in the Pali sutras. Chapter 3 then applies the seven-point analysis to the person and concludes that although the person is unfindable when searched for in the individual aggregates, the collection of the aggregates, or elsewhere, it still exists on the conventional level.

Chapter 4 presents an argument from a different angle, investigating whether an inherently existent I is findable in the six elements that form what we call "person"—earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness. We then follow the similar analysis in the Pali sutras examining whether any of these six elements are the self. Chapter 5 explains the meaning of ultimate analysis and probing awareness and clarifies two diverse meanings of "self"—the person and inherent existence. When studying these refutations, we must be

able to discern these two to avoid getting confused. But not finding the person under ultimate analysis does not mean there is no person or that the person is only a name, sound, or word. The mere I that exists by being merely designated in dependence on the aggregates exists, and this dependently existing person carries the karmic seeds from one lifetime to the next.

Chapter 6 discusses the argument entitled "diamond slivers" in which we investigate how a cause gives rise to an effect. Is something produced from itself, from something other than itself, from both, or causelessly? This well-known refutation is found in the first stanza of Treatise on the Middle Way and has been taught and debated for centuries ever since.

In chapter 7 we continue to examine whether the world exists objectively, using the refutation of the arising of existents and nonexistents to negate inherent existence and dependent arising to establish the conventional existence of the world. Up until this point, our analysis has focused on impermanent phenomena, so this chapter concludes with demonstrating the emptiness of permanent phenomena as well.

Dependent arising is called the "monarch of all reasonings" because it not only refutes inherent existence but also establishes conventional existence and in this way establishes the Middle Way, free from the extremes of absolutism and nihilism. In chapter 8 we learn the three levels of dependent arising as noted by Tsongkhapa as well as His Holiness's way of delineating them. This chapter also speaks of the three criteria for conventional existence and how the various types of dependence are related. Chapter 9 follows up on this by explaining how other reasonings meet back to dependent arising and how Madhyamikas differ from essentialists, who assert true existence.

Chapter 10 continues the discussion of emptiness and dependent-arising, showing how the two come to the same point. Here His Holiness fleshes out the argument Tsongkhapa presented succinctly in his "Three Principal Aspects of the Path" with a spectacular explanation of how, for a person who has realized emptiness, emptiness dawns as the meaning of dependent arising and dependent-arising dawns as the meaning of emptiness. This is the culmination of the correct view.

The perfection of wisdom consists of space-like meditation and illusion-like meditation, the former focused on disproving inherent existence and the latter showing that after emerging from meditation on emptiness, practitioners see people and phenomena as like illusions—they exist, but they do not exist inherently as they appear to. Just as it is important to establish what does not exist—inherent existence—it is equally important to establish what does exist—illusion-like dependent arisings. This is the topic of chapter 11.

Chapters 12 and 13 explore how selflessness is presented in the Pali tradition, relying on arguments the Buddha presented in the sutras. The Buddha made clear various types of wrong views to be abandoned and asks us to examine if there is a self that controls the aggregates. We often feel that there is an I that governs and directs our body and mind. But just because we feel there is and assume there is, does such a self exist? These chapters also discuss the three characteristics and insight meditation in the Pali tradition.

Through the interweaving of the Pali and Sanskrit traditions' analyses throughout the previous chapters of this volume, we see that Nagarjuna's and Candrakirti's analyses rest on refutations found in the Pali sutras. Chapter 14 explores other passages that show the common themes regarding selflessness and emptiness in these two traditions. Indeed, the Buddhadharma has one teacher but many traditions. <>

9. APPEARING AND EMPTY by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Venerable Thubten Chodron [The Library of Wisdom and Compassion, Wisdom Publications, 9781614298878]

In this final volume on emptiness, the Dalai Lama skillfully reveals the Prasangikas' view of the ultimate nature of reality so that we will gain the correct view of emptiness, the selflessness of both persons and phenomena, and have the means to eliminate our own and others' duhkha. In this last of three volumes on emptiness, the Dalai Lama takes us through the Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Svatantrika views on the ultimate nature of reality and the Prasangikas' thorough responses to these, so that we gain the correct view of emptiness— the selflessness of both persons and phenomena. This view entails negating inherent existence while also being able to establish conventional existence: emptiness does not mean nothingness. We then learn how to meditate on the correct view by cultivating pristine wisdom that is the union of serenity and insight as taught in the Pali, Chinese, and Tibetan traditions. Such meditation, when combined with the altruistic intention of bodhicitta, leads to the complete eradication of all defilements that obscure our minds. This volume also introduces us to the tathagatagarbha—the buddha essence—and how it is understood in both Tibet and China. Is it permanent? Does everyone have it? In addition, the discussion of sudden and gradual awakening in Zen (Chan) Buddhism and in Tibetan Buddhism is fascinating.

Review
"Appearing and Empty, the ninth volume in H. H. the Dalai Lama and Ven. Thubten Chodron's extraordinary Library of Wisdom and Compassion, is largely devoted to a discussion of various Indian Buddhist perspectives on the two truths: conventional and ultimate. These concepts are the interpretive key to understanding how Buddhists make

sense of the world and especially how they learn to distinguish between appearance and reality—through both philosophical analysis and insight meditation—in order to realize perfect wisdom and win spiritual freedom. There is also a wonderfully detailed exploration of the schools of Chinese Buddhism and their take on key issues in Buddhist theory and practice. Incisive, illuminating, and highly readable, Appearing and Empty is a welcome addition to the bookshelves of followers of the Dalai Lama and students of Buddhism everywhere."

—Roger R. Jackson, John W. Nason Professor of Asian Studies and Religion, emeritus, Carleton College

"Sravasti Abbey is a beautiful and secluded place with a wonderful, panoramic view of the outer world. Within its walls the nuns, led by Gelongma Thubten Chodron, practice Dharma, mirroring the Mahãyãna ideal explained in this book. I highly recommend Appearing and Empty to anyone who wishes to gain in-depth insight into Lama Tsongkhapa's understanding of the union of appearance and emptiness. This is facilitated by a presentation of emptiness in other Buddhist traditions, leading readers along a path to spiritual realization."

—Geshe Kalsang Damdul, former director of the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics

CONTENTS

Given the emphasis that Madhyamaka has in the Tibetan Buddhist community nowadays, I was surprised, during one of our interviews for the Library of Wisdom and Compassion, when His Holiness remarked that until the time of the Sakya sage Rendawa and his student Tsongkhapa, epistemology, not Madhyamaka, was the most popular topic in Tibet. Thanks to their interest in Madhyamaka, it has become a great topic of debate and discussion ever since, not only in monastic communities in Tibet, India, and Mongolia but also internationally as Buddhists, philosophers, and scientists delve into it.

Madhyamaka's early spread to China gave rise to translations of Nãgãr-juna's and Ãryadeva's texts by the great translator Kumãrajïva and his team. Yet it was the Yogãcãra and Tathãgatagarbha philosophies that later won the hearts of the Chinese. Nevertheless, Madhyamaka has influenced the indigenous Buddhist traditions in China, and renewed

interest in it has arisen in Chinese Buddhism beginning in the twentieth century when Fazun Shih and other Chinese monks studied in Tibetan monasteries such as Drepung. In recent years, Yinshun Shih (1906–2005), who systematized a lamrim for Chinese Buddhists, has further contributed to this by widely teaching Madhyamaka philosophy.

As with the Pāli tradition, Buddhism in China has many sects to meet the interests and dispositions of diverse spiritual seekers. All of these are to be respected because they originate from the same Teacher, the Buddha. This volume and the entire Library of Wisdom and Compassion were written with this in mind.

Overview of This Book

Appearing and Empty continues the Madhyamaka teachings begun in the previous two volumes of the series, Searching for the Self and Realizing the Profound View. The first three chapters of this book emphasize the two truths—ultimate and veiled truths—and their compatibility. What does it mean to be true? True to whom? True to what kinds of cognizers? Chapters 4 and 5 discuss reliable cognizers. How can we validate our cognitions if things exist only by mere dependent designation on the conventional level and ultimately lack any self-nature?

Chapters 6–9 explore the assertions of the Yogācāra and Svātantrika Madhyamaka tenet systems and how they explain what exists, how it exists, and how it is perceived. These chapters also explore the topics where these systems and the Prāsa^gika Madhyamaka system differ, which sharpens our understanding of reality. The debates among previous masters who hold diverse views have clarified many points for Buddhists of future generations, even though these masters frequently reached different conclusions. Studying these points of debate expands our wisdom and intelligence and reveals aspects of the Dharma that we may never have thought about left to our own devices. The essence of the debates is presented without going into the complex details, which you can find in other texts, some of which are mentioned in the recommended reading at the end of this volume.

Chapter 10 discusses Prāsa^gikas' unique positions, which depend on their distinctive views about the object of negation and the ultimate truth. Various traditions' views of insight meditation, its union with serenity, and how to realize the ultimate nature are covered in chapters 11 and 12.

We then turn to Buddhism in China, which is predominantly the Sanskrit tradition, explaining in chapter 13 the ten principal schools that were popular in China, many of which are also popular in Tibet. This includes discussion on sudden and gradual awakening in both Chinese and Tibetan schools and is followed in chapter 14 with an exploration of the three philosophies emphasized today in Chinese Buddhism—

Madhyamaka, Yogãcãra, and Tathãgatagarbha. We'll then look at some of the Chinese indigenous schools—Chan (Zen), Huayan, Pureland, and Tiantai—before exploring Chinese Madhyamaka more closely. The volume ends with a chapter on Buddhism today in China.

How This Book Came About

The story of the origins of the Library of Wisdom and Compassion was shared in volume 1, Approaching the Buddhist Path, and elaborated on in volume 7, Searching for the Self. My initial request to His Holiness was to write a short text that Tibetan lamas could use when teaching non- Tibetans— people who come to the Dharma with very different preconceptions and assumptions than those growing up as Tibetan Buddhists. His Holiness's response was to ask me to write a longer volume based on his teachings. That gradually grew in length, especially after he expressed the wish that teachings from the Pãli tradition and Buddhism in China be included. Over my objection, he also insisted that I be a co-author as well as editor.

His Holiness gave me a letter requesting Theravãda monks to instruct me. Thus I spent two weeks studying and practicing with Ajahn Anan at Wat Marp Jan in Thailand. This was followed by studying Bhikkhu Bodhi's lengthy series of oral teachings on Majjhima Nikãya and later corresponding with him to ask questions. This led to reading about the Pãli Abhidharma, participating in a vipassanã retreat, and discussing the Dharma with Western monastics whom I met at our annual Western Buddhist Monastic Gatherings. Having taught the Dharma in Singapore for almost two years, I also got to know monks from the Theravãda tradition, participated in panel discussions with them, and was invited to speak at their temples.

My knowledge of the Chinese tradition began with going to Taiwan in 1986 to receive full ordination. It continued during my time teaching in Singapore and expanded during the 1996 conference Life as a Western Buddhist Nun, where Bhikkhuni Master Wu Yin from Luminary Temple in Taiwan taught Vinaya. Over the years, Sravasti Abbey has developed a close relationship with Master Wu Yin and her students, who helped arrange interviews with monastics and professors of Madhyamaka and Tathãgatagarbha when I visited Taiwan. I've also enjoyed many discussions with monastic friends from the Pãli and Chinese traditions. The study and engagement with the Pãli tradition and Chinese Buddhists has helped my own Dharma practice considerably.

Please Note

Although this series is coauthored, the vast majority of the material is His Holiness's teachings. I researched and wrote the parts about Buddhism in China, the Pãli tradition, and some other passages; I also composed the reflections. For ease of reading, most

honorifics have been omitted, but that does not diminish the great respect we have for the excellent sages, learned adepts, practitioners, and scholars. Foreign terms are given in italics parenthetically at their first usage. Unless otherwise noted with "P," "C," or "T," indicating Pãli, Chinese, or Tibetan, respectively, italicized terms are Sanskrit. When two italicized terms are listed, the first is Sanskrit, the second Pãli. For consistency, Sanskrit spelling is given for Sanskrit and Pãli terms in common usage (nirvana, Dharma, arhat, ãrya, sütra, and so forth), except in citations from Pãli scriptures. To maintain the flow of a passage, it is not always possible to gloss all new terms on their first usage, so a glossary is provided.

"Sütra" often refers to Sütrayãna (Sütra Vehicle) and "Tantra" to Tantrayãna (Tantric Vehicle). When these two words are not capitalized, they refer to the sütra and tantra scriptures. "Mahãyãna" refers principally to the path to buddhahood as well as the attainment of a buddha's qualities and activities as explained in the Sanskrit tradition.1 In general, the meaning of all philosophical terms accords with the presentation of the Prãsañgika Madhyamaka tenet system as understood by Tsongkhapa. Other presentations of Prãsañgika Madhyamaka also exist in the Tibetan community. Unless otherwise noted, the personal pronoun "I" refers to His Holiness.

Bhikkhuni Thubten Chodron

Sravasti Abbey

We were received into this world at birth with kindness, and we continue to live and share with others due to kindness. But sometimes our anger and resentment prevent us from seeing the kindness around us. And that, in turn, may prevent us from showing kindness.

Our attitude is the key factor. Once I visited a garden in Switzerland and people were sitting on park benches scattering seeds and bits of bread for the birds. The birds flew there without having to be called. It shows that when you show kindness to others—even animals—they will automatically come. If you are fearful and suspicious, and distance yourself from others, they refrain from approaching you and you will become isolated. So an open, more compassionate attitude toward other sentient beings is helpful for both others and ourselves.

Wherever I go I smile, so people are naturally friendly in return. Paying attention to others' well-being and having an altruistic mind is the best way to secure your own physical and mental health. Whether you believe in religion or not, being compassionate will benefit you, whereas if you think just of yourself, you are miserable. Cultivating compassion is the best way to have a happy life.

Our educational system needs to emphasize the commonalities of all beings; each of us wants happiness and to avoid suffering. No matter what people look like, where they are from, their socio-economic level, their age, or their health, we are all alike in this way. Emphasizing the differences among us breeds fear, anxiety, and suspicion. These emotions and attitudes arise in our minds, but by changing how we look at others and how we interpret situations, we can release these disturbing emotions.

In the Nãlandã tradition, we emphasize reason and logic, and such analysis can help us cultivate compassion in meditation. One way to do this is to contemplate the disadvantages of the self-centered attitude— self-centered ness makes us sensitive to small slights; we interpret everything, even the smallest glance or mumbled words, in terms of ourselves; we become blind to the experiences of those around us, not recognizing that our indifference toward them leads to inequality in so many areas of life. When others believe their well-being is discounted, they become unhappy, and their unhappiness adversely influences us too. Being around unhappy people, be they friends, enemies, or strangers, makes us unhappy too.

Therefore I meditate on compassion and altruism, which are the opposite of self-preoccupation. When I wake up in morning, I recite a verse from Engaging in the Bodhisattvas' Deeds by the eighth-century Indian sage Šãntideva (BCA 10.55):

> **For as long as space endures**
> **and for as long as living beings remain,**
> **until then may I, too, abide**
> **to dispel the misery of the world.**

In addition, I also investigate: Where is the I? Am I my body or my mind? I'm not either of those. Even the Buddha wasn't his body, speech, or mind, so where is the Buddha? This investigation leads us to conclude that the feeling of a solid I—something that is inherently and really me—has no basis. The I exists—it is merely designated by term and concept—but we can't isolate exactly what it is separate from our bodies and minds. Thinking like this helps to reduce the strong thought of self.

People and other phenomena seem to be objective entities "out there" that are not related to our minds. They don't seem to depend on their causes or their parts—they are just "there." But if we investigate and try to find what they really are, there's nothing there; it is all mental fabrication. Buddhist philosophy and quantum physics are similar in this regard: nothing exists independent of our minds. Because things appear to be objectively existent entities, we grasp them to exist as such. Someone appears kind to us and we think they are an inherently existent friend. Another person says something we don't like and we designate them as a disagreeable person and think they will always be like that. All the strangers around us don't influence us one way or the other, so we navigate our way

around them and forget that they have feelings. But if we investigate exactly who the friend or enemy is, we can't find them in their body, speech, or mind. They don't exist as self- enclosed permanent entities.

Bodhisattva practice consists of cultivating wisdom—understanding the deeper mode of existence of people and phenomena—and method— generating bodhicitta and engaging in the bodhisattva practices. From the side of wisdom, nothing exists independent of other factors, such as its causes, parts, and the mind that conceives and designates them. From the method side, compassion and altruism are the basis for virtuous actions. Wisdom and method are my main practices. If you think of these two upon awakening every day, it shapes your mind and influences how you see and experience situations the entire day.

Every day I read a portion of a text by one of the great scholar-adepts. Nãgãrjuna's writings are exceptional, and those of his indirect disciple Candrakïrti are bold. Vasubandhu, Dignãga, and others are afraid to think everything is mentally designated; they fear that nothing could be pinned down if that were the case, so they rejected that belief. I feel fortunate because the idea that everything exists by being merely designated, not by having some inherent essence, is firm in my mind. I feel like a close disciple of Candrakīrti and every day I read his Supplement to the "Treatise on the Middle Way" and its autocommentary.

The two bodhisattva practices of method and wisdom combined are very powerful; we should practice these ourselves, then share them with others. If you just study and discuss the teachings but don't practice them, you become a hypocrite. Instead, you should be a good example for others; that is the proper way to serve sentient beings. If your speech and your actions aren't in accord, how can others trust you? Trust is the basis of harmonious and beneficial relationships.

I've heard that some psychologists say that our compassion fades as we get older and are exposed to more and more tragedy. I think if we just rely on whatever feeling or mood of discouragement arises in our minds, that could happen. But if we investigate our feelings and moods, our compassion can be sustained and enhanced. If you feel discouraged, investigate: What are the causes of this way of thinking? What are its effects? You can change your thoughts and feelings by investigating which thoughts and feelings are more realistic and more beneficial and then familiarizing yourselves with them.

Although single-pointed concentration (sãmadhi) is valuable, it is not the only quality to develop in our Dharma practice. Analytical meditation is essential because it cuts down all our justifications and excuses that support our self-centered attitude. We can't find one logical reason to cherish ourselves more than others and to ignore the well-being of others.

All the emotions that bring us problems have no logical basis. Contemplation of dependent arising and emptiness destroys the ignorance that is the basis of selfishness.

When I first became interested in science and began to learn about it, some people warned me not to get too close to scientists because my faith in the Buddha would decrease. But I use logic and reasoning to discern what is true and what to believe. Maybe I'm half Buddhist monk and half scientist! Both Buddhists and scientists seek truth. So we can learn from scientists and scientists can learn from us Buddhists. With a deeper understanding of reality, we can then use our human intelligence to solve problems. Just wishing that our problems would disappear doesn't make that happen. We created the problems, so we must develop our knowledge and ability to solve them.

The Buddha himself told us not to accept statements with blind faith, but to investigate. We should not sit back and say, "Oh, my lama said that, so it must be true." I sometimes read the teachings of some Tibetan lamas, but when I think about what was written or spoken, I cannot accept it.

The Buddha taught according to the two truths—ultimate and conventional (veiled). Understanding the ultimate truth is the direct opposite of following ignorance. Cultivating nonattachment, ethical conduct, and altruism enables us to relate properly to the conventional world. My meditation practice is based on these two truths.

Bhikkhu Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama

Thekchen Choling

<>

TANTRIC PSYCHOPHYSICS: A STRUCTURAL MAP OF ALTERED STATES AND THE DYNAMICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS by Shelli Renee Joye, PH.D. [Inner Traditions, ISBN 9781644113684]

- ❖ A bold synthesis of ancient sacred science, modern physics, and neuroscience designed to open access to higher consciousness
- ❖ Explores how esoteric teachings from India and Tibet offer specific methods for tuning and directing consciousness to reach higher stages of awareness
- ❖ Presents a wide-ranging collection of practical techniques, as well as numerous figures and diagrams, to facilitate navigation of altered states of consciousness and heightened mystical states
- ❖ Develops an integrated structural map of higher consciousness by viewing Tibetan and Indian Tantra through the work of Steiner, Gurdjieff, Teilhard de Chardin, Aurobindo Ghose, and quantum physicists Planck and Bohm

Throughout the millennia shamans, saints, and yogis have discovered how the brain-mind can be reprogrammed to become a powerful instrument facilitating access to higher states of consciousness. In particular, the written Tantric texts of India and Tibet describe, in extraordinarily precise detail, interior transformations of conscious energy along with numerous techniques for stimulating, modulating, and transforming consciousness to reach increasingly higher states and stages of awareness.

In this in-depth examination of esoteric Tantric practices, Shelli Renée Joye, Ph.D., presents a wide-ranging collection of psychophysical techniques integrating Tibetan Vajrayana and Patañjali's yoga to induce altered states of consciousness for the exploration of heightened mystical states. Sharing numerous figures and diagrams, she shows how these theories and techniques are not only fully supported by modern biophysics, brain science, and quantum physics but are also in line with the work of Rudolf Steiner, G. I. Gurdjie , Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Aurobindo Ghose, Max Planck, and David Bohm. e author also shares insights from her own personal practices for consciousness exploration, which include prayer, mantra, emptying the mind, psychedelics, yoga, and visualization of interior physiology.

Offering a structural map of the dynamics of consciousness, Joye reveals that one can develop new ways of tuning and directing consciousness to reach extraordinary modes of being and intense levels of lucid awareness, the requisites for the direct exploration of supersensible dimensions and sailing in the ocean of consciousness.

CONTENTS

An Invitation to the Modern Psychonaut

As a product of over fifty years of my own introspective explorations and experiences, this book presents a wide variety of traditional and contemporary material to assist explorers of consciousness at any level to expand their ability to activate new psychophysical systems of awareness. It has been my experience that such an expansion of awareness can lead to the activation of traditionally "occult" or "hidden" powers of perception that have been formally described in traditional Tantric texts and taught by shamans and mystics in a great variety of cultures and ages.

Tantric Psychophysics should appeal to anyone seeking a cohesive map of human consciousness and practical guidance as to how to proceed at any stage in the development of new modes of perception for the exploration of new regions of awareness. The material offers a variety of integrated approaches useful not only to the contemplative practitioner but also to those seeking a deeper understanding of consciousness itself: what it is, and why it is, and what might be done with it. Congruent maps of consciousness developed in Tibet and India as well as those of the West are laid out in detail to provide a practical framework of understanding for scientists, philosophers, and the general reader, but should be of particular interest to those who are actively exploring these new regions of consciousness. In addition to reviewing Tibetan and Indian psychophysics, a part called "Western Tantric Psychophysics" presents the work of three prominent twentieth-century psychonauts: Rudolf Steiner, G. I. Gurdjieff, and Teilhard de Chardin, who called his work hyperphysics.

Herein are a broad range of theories and techniques that will leave the reader with new approaches to explore the spirit world, the various Heavens, the implicate order, the Mind of God, Brahma, Ein Sof, and other rarified regions of awareness. Such regions have been previously encountered, explored, and mapped in varying degrees by every global culture down through the millennia and have been the focus of exploration by generations of reclusive saints, mystics, shamans, and psychonauts. While much of this experiential knowledge was handed down in great secret from master to disciple, many of these pioneers did leave various written records of their experiments in consciousness, records of which are now accessible via modern technology.

For over half a century I have consistently studied, practiced, experienced, and pondered the results of the many techniques described in this book. I have included additional material that I have found useful during my own lifetime of exploring consciousness, a journey that began for me in the summer of 1967 with my first psychonautic experience catalyzed by LSD-25 on a California beach during a star-filled moonless night. The past half century has brought an explosion of revelations to the forefront in printed material, lectures, and a plethora of new schools exploring esoteric methods for the enhancement of consciousness. Practical information that was formerly concealed within the arcana of mystical traditions and studied by only a very small number of explorers has now become widely available for those who seek to awaken these possibilities.

Since first meeting Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche as a young engineer I have continued formal contemplative practices daily and have gradually been able to integrate my experiences with what I know of physics, engineering, and philosophy. Included in this book is a wide range of essential information, much of it distilled from traditional Tantric texts and my own earlier publications. It is my hope that this material will be of practical use to those with a passion for exploring consciousness through direct effort and firsthand experience.

May you and yours stay well, and may this book help you to grow and thrive in the new worlds open to us all through psychonautic exploration!

HOW I BECAME A PSYCHONAUT AND DISCOVERED TANTRA

Throughout history there have been many individuals who have discovered that their human brain-mind systems can be reprogrammed in various ways to act as powerful tools for the direct entrance into vast new dimensions of conscious experience. Depending upon the culture and language, such rarified dimensions have been referred to with such terminology as "Higher Worlds," "the Akasha," "Heaven," "Eternity," or "the Void." The practices associated with meditation can lead directly to experiences of "non-dual awareness," (e.g., "samadhi," "cosmic consciousness," "trance," "satori," or "enlightenment," dependent on the traditions of the practitioner). However, efforts to sit down and actually practice these techniques on a regular basis require a certain threshold of motivation and knowledge that can be, at the outset, difficult to obtain without some clear understanding of the objectives sought and a map of the territory to be explored. At the very least, repeated studies have shown that these psychophysical exercises work to strengthen one's ability to maintain a calm, tranquil, centered state of being in the midst of a world filled with anxiety, change, chaos, and confusion.

The idea that we can modify our own consciousness through developing and activating our own instruments of supersensible perception (i.e., repurposing regions of our brain-mind to function as cosmic transceivers), has been supported by the recent neurophysiological confirmation of what is called neuroplasticity, the ability of the human brain to grow, change, and repurpose systems within itself during the lifetime of each individual. It was my own luck to have been introduced to this concept early in my life, while attending a lecture given by John Lilly in which he introduced his new book, Programming and Metaprogramming in the Human Biocomputer. Lilly's hypothesis was that we are all capable of reprogramming our

"biocomputer" to adapt and evolve new ways of operating, responding, and neutrally fabricating (through neuroplasticity) new modes of perception.

To my surprise, Lilly expressed a conviction that the future of contemplative practice in the West held great promise, evidenced b) the highly technical training undergone by large numbers of young scientists, engineers, mathematicians, and other academics.

Lilly explained that the current generation of adolescent students and young adults, during their school years of regular sustained attention upon abstract intellectual material, were inadvertently metaprogramming their brain-minds to develop and maintain new skill for the focusing of consciousness through the phenomenon of neurophstic imprinting. These very same skills are also required for success in traditional practices of advanced meditation and contemplation. Carly, said Lilly, college students, particularly in the areas of math, science, and engineering, were reprogramming their brain, creating (growing) new subsystems capable of sustaining one-pointed focus of awareness for prolonged periods, with the ability to ignore extended distractions.

Individuals completing advanced technical programs are likely to have developed the skills for making quick progress in the attainment of deep states and stages of meditation. Lilly believed that the many hours of practice in holding attention focused on a single point of abstract material would be of great use in the future, should they ever become interested in exploring consciousness through introspection; accordingly, there would be a great resurgence of skilled contemplatives in the future.'

What then is consciousness? While most people assume that they know what it is, consciousness continues to puzzle the scientific community. Until recently, consciousness was not even regarded as Icing a "thing" worthy of study and had been mostly ignored, much in the same way as fish ignore the water in which they swim. Many people assume that psychologists and psychiatrists do understand consciousness, and yet they would be wrong. Consciousness continues to be one of the greatest remaining mysteries among the sciences. Psychologists observe and record human behavior, but no psychologist claims to even begin to understand the physics or biology of consciousness, the actual phenomenon of consciousness itself. The situation has been quite different in most Asian cultures, where generations of individuals have sought to understand consciousness through direct exploration

and experimentation using every means available. Unfortunately, these efforts and their documented results have been labeled "mysticism" or "shamanism" by the scientific community and categorically dismissed without any concerted effort to examine the voluminous accounts of experiential data that might be worthy of consideration in the efforts to understand the nature and dynamics of the phenomenon called consciousness.

While significant research projects are currently underway to explore consciousness, often staffed with highly trained medical doctors, neurophysiologists, engineers, chemists, and even quantum physicists, several underlying preconceptions work to limit any truly broad, open-minded approach to the study of consciousness. Common to all of these efforts is the underlying assumption that consciousness is a phenomenon that only recently emerged in biological creatures, due to some as yet unidentified biophysical process involving neurons, generating collective holographic patterns generated by the firing of neurons, that can eventually be identified in laboratory experiments. Brain scientists assume that it is this electrical activity of billions of neurons that gives rise to consciousness, and many go further by asserting that consciousness is a rare phenomenon that is likely to be found nowhere else in the universe. Nevertheless, funding sources for "consciousness studies" continue to remain low compared to projects that are seen to further information technology, energy production, robotics, and even he entertainment industries, possibly because investors see no feasible financial gain in understanding consciousness.

In contrast, modern professional philosophers tend to view the phenomenon of consciousness as more than simply a biological phenomemon generated by neuroms. Many philosophers see consciousness as more fundamental than a biological construct. Many adhere to the philosophical stance of panpsychism—the view that consciousness is a phenomenon that pervades the universe and should be seem as the fundamental reality out of which everything else has emerged. Philosophers see consciousness less as something arising from recent biological activity but more as a substrate, the underlying ground of the entire cosmos of space-time phenomena. Yet neither the current scientific nor the philosophic approaches have yielded satisfactory results in their efforts to understand the phenomenon of consciousness.

But while the study of pure consciousness is relatively new to material scientists and professional philosophers alike, exploring the mysteries of consciousness has been at the heart of shamanic inquiry throughout history, although in religious writing and discourse we seldom find the word consciousness. Instead, the words most frequently encountered throughout the world in discussions and written records dealing with the exploration of consciousness are terms such as spirit, soul, anima, prana, or chi.

Perhaps it is this wide-ranging difference in terminology, or the fact that the subject matter is found deeply embedded within specific religious and cultural traditions (and often "dead" languages) that prevents modern-day academics from investigating the maps of consciousness laid down by contemplative saints, mystics, and shamans over the many centuries through direct experiential, first-person observation and experience. Yet throughout history psychonauts* have availed themselves of this rich cultural-specific ancestral knowledge.

Yet now in the early twenty-first century we find a growing community of psychonauts—unencumbered by the self-imposed limitations of established religious dogma, the myopia of materialist sciences, or the widespread consensual restrictions of social norms—daring to experience and explore new realms of consciousness outside of the purview of the scientific and religious establishments. Modern psychonauts are able to venture beyond the bounds of everyday human awareness using a wide range of means currently available, including the use of entheogenic drugs, physical exercises, and a variety of contemplative techniques.

Such intrepid noninstitutional explorers, experimenting with what have previously been considered esoteric and often secret practices found in the more arcane and mystical areas of religious traditions, have, in a relatively short period of time, begun to develop new ways of tuning and directing consciousness to reach extraordinary modes of being and increasingly intense levels of lucid awareness that are requisite for the direct exploration of the vast supersensible dimensions that make up the cosmos within which we exist. These psychophysical exercises, often accompanied with the aid of psychotropic substances (particularly cannabis) open up dimensions of supersensible experience normally only attainable during dream states.

The big surprise for many readers may be that traditional practices, which often go by the name's mindfulness, contemplation, or meditation, are not simply approaches to clearing one's mind or achieving states of serene tranquility amid a

world gone awry. They are also keys to approaching, unlocking, and activating a number of latent yet extremely powerful perceptual modes that are currently at the extreme frontiers of human sensory evolution. Such abilities emerge at the growth tip of an ascending arc of human sensory development and are operationally activated at the cutting edge of human conscious awareness. In Tibet and India the numerous techniques that have been discovered and developed to reach such higher stages of perceptual awareness are encapsulated in the word tantra, which literally means "a loom, a weaving" but can mow be interpreted more accurately as an interweaving of traditions and teachings, threads of practical techniques that have been found extremely effective for reaching higher states of awareness.

My own introduction to rarified states of conscious perception (which are the objectives of all Tantric practices) began at age twenty-one. During the summer of my final year in my electronics engineering program, I left Texas to work as a software programmer at the Point Mugu Missile Base in southern California, just north of Los Angeles. It was du rimg that summer of 1967 that I experienced my first encounter with an entheogen in the form of "Owsley acid," an exceptionally pure form of LSD, at night on a beach where the Little Sur Creek flowed out into the Pacific, just south of Big Sur. This experience radically changed the course of my life from my early fascination for electronic communications toward a new, much stronger, and lifelong quest to explore the nature of consciousness both experientially and in terms of what I had learned in my study of physics, engineering, and cybernetics. It also led, upon my return to my engineering program in Texas that fall, to further exploration of these newly discovered realms of consciousness.

My mind was opening to amazing new dimensions. On weekends I spent long evenings in the hill country near Austin exploring the psychedelic worlds through LSD, peyote, and psilocybin mushrooms. Nevertheless, I managed to graduate with my engineering degree and relocate from Texas to New York City, where I was able to find numerous teachers and books to help satisfy my ravenous appetite for material on contemplative practices and altered states of consciousness.

In New York I had the good fortune to develop and cultivate a consistent daily effort to explore consciousness through a wide variety of contemplative practices as taught not only by mainstream religions but also those found in the more esoteric

approaches of the Buddhist Vajrayana and Hindu Tantras, particularly in the theories of sound and consciousness elaborated in Kashmir Shaivism.

While employed as an engineer in the World Trade Center in New York I had become increasingly interested in consciousness, hatha yoga, and psychotropic experiences. My first serious relationship with a spiritual teacher (outside of my own childhood experience in Roman Catholicism) was with Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche (1939-1987), a Nyingma tulku* whom I first met at a lecture in New York. Trungpa (fig. 0.1) is known to have been the first tulku to introduce the esoteric practices of Vajrayana to Western students of meditation.

Chogyam Trungpa at age fourteen.

For several years I was able to study with Chogyam Trungpa in New York city and go on retreats he conducted at Tail of the Tiger, his monastic center in Barnet, Vermont. I continued to study with a wide range of teachers in New York until, encouraged during a workshop in 1974 given by the contemplative writer Alan Watts, I applied to a graduate program to study Sanskrit and Asian philosophy at the California Institute of Integral Studies in San Francisco. In 1978, I completed my in Master's thesis on "The History, Philosophy, and Practice of Tantra in South India." Twenty years later, while living in Saudi Arabia, I had the good fortune to travel to South India to spend time on retreat in a small ashram, Shantivanam ("Forest of Peace"), established in 1938 by French Benedictine priest Father Jules Monchanin (1895-1957). There I was able to go deeper in my explorations while meditating on the nearby banks of the Cauvery River, reputed to be the holy river of South India. Upon returning from Saudi Arabia, I entered a doctoral program in philosophy, cosmology, and consciousness studies in San Francisco, where I completed my doctoral studies and successfully defended my dissertation at the California Institute of Integral Studies.

Over this time period the cumulative growth of experiential practice allowed me to develop my own particular "contemplative technologies" based upon those practices that I found worked particularly well for me on a regular basis. It is my

belief that each individual can discover and develop his or her own uniquely appropriate combination of psychospiritual technique and practice to optimize explorative entries into the oceans of consciousness.

After completing all course work, I relocated to a cabin in the lower Cascade Range in northeastern California where I was able to explore consciousness in the silence of the Lassen Forest, where I continued my research and completed writing my dissertation.

Since then, in the shadowy silence of Mount Lassen Volcano, I have been able to go even deeper into contemplative practice, reading and integrating more of my many books. I now feel the time is ripe to share what I have learned and experienced with you in the book you now hold in your hands. <>

<>