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How We Make Our Self Another Self

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Philology and Criticism: A Guide to Mahabharata Textual Criticism by Vishwa Adluri and Joydeep Bagchee [Anthem Press, 9781783085767]

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Penis Envy and Other Bad Feelings: The Emotional Costs of Everyday Life by Mari Ruti [Columbia University Press, 9780231186681]

Mari Ruti combines theoretical reflection, cultural critique, feminist politics, and personal experience to analyze the prevalence of bad feelings in contemporary everyday life. Proceeding from a playful engagement with Freud's idea of penis envy, Ruti's autotheoretical commentary fans out to a broader consideration of neoliberal pragmatism. She focuses on the emphasis on good performance, high productivity, constant self-improvement, and relentless cheerfulness that characterizes present-day Western society. Revealing the treacherousness of our fantasies of the good life, particularly the idea that our efforts will eventually be rewarded—that things will eventually get better—Ruti demystifies the false hope that often causes us to tolerate an unbearable present.

Theoretically rigorous and lucidly written, Penis Envy and Other Bad Feelings is a trenchant critique of contemporary gender relations. Refuting the idea that we live in a postfeminist world where gender inequalities have been transcended, Ruti describes how neoliberal heteropatriarchy has transformed itself in subtle and stealthy, and therefore all the more insidious, ways. Mobilizing Michel Foucault's concept of biopolitics, Jacques Lacan's account of desire, and Lauren Berlant's notion of cruel optimism, she analyzes the rationalization of intimacy, the persistence of gender stereotypes, and the pornification of heterosexual culture. Ruti shines a spotlight on the depression, anxiety, frustration, and disenchantment that frequently lie beneath our society's sugarcoated mythologies of self-fulfillment, romantic satisfaction, and professional success, speaking to all who are concerned about the emotional costs of the pressure-cooker ethos of our age.

I returned to university as an adult to audit a course by Mari Ruti, as I have long been a fan of her writing. This book returns me to the joys of being her student, of hearing her lecture, of her lucid and lively intelligence which is grounded in lived experience and is open and probing in its analysis. I always left her classes with a renewed and expansive feeling about life and the human situation, and this book gives me the same feelings of liberty, outrage, excitement, and possibility. (Sheila Heti, author of How Should a Person Be?)

Mari Ruti is a treasure—equal parts learned, generous, and wise. Whether diagnosing and naming American culture's 'gender obsession disorder' or unpacking its absurd fixation on marriage, she puts the unspoken ailments of our everyday into words, and brings us that much closer to finding a cure. (Kate Bolick, New York Times bestselling author of Spinster: Making a Life of One's Own [Broadway Books])

Mari Ruti's Penis Envy and Other Bad Feelings is truly a unique book. Seamlessly weaving important concerns from recent queer and feminist theory into a quasi-autobiographical, quasi-polemical fabric, it addresses crucial issues that permeate our daily lives in the twenty-first century. Ruti's book moves from the large-scale to the intimate and back again, engaging both Western societies in general and specific instances of discomfort within their confines. (Gail M. Newman, Williams College)

Mari Ruti's Penis Envy and Other Bad Feelings brings the reader into an intimate conversation with its author, eliciting outright laughter, deep compassion, even heartbreak, and many wincing nods of oh yeah, #MeToo recognition. Fueled by a spirited appreciation of bad feelings and an affirming love of Lacan and language, Ruti deftly turns penis envy on its head into a feisty, feminist source of political agency. (Jill Gentile, author of Feminine Law: Freud, Free Speech, and the Voice of Desire [Routledge])

Through an intimate portrait of Mari Ruti's emotional landscape we encounter the phallic

predicaments of everyday life. Why the penis, we may ask? This book moves through psychoanalytic theory like fire in grass. Her ethical hope is that in taking on the full range of bad feelings, we may finally know what can be enough! (Jamieson Webster, author of The Life and Death of Psychoanalysis[Routledge])

Ruti offers lived experiences as well as cogent readings of Sigmund Freud, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Lacan, to make her case for how feelings of inadequacy are culturally reproduced, rather than biologically determined. . . .[Penis Envy and Other Bad Feelings] invites discussion among men and women, the repressed and the celebrated, as a way of correcting fetishistic acceptance of phallic primacy. (*Library Journal*)

This is a gutsy, original foray into feminist theory, at once memoirish, polemical and even self-helpful, just the book for anyone up for an intellectual bone to gnaw on. (Sarah Murdoch *The Toronto Star*)

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Excerpt: I opened this book with Freud's notion of penis envy, it seems important to raise the possibility that this hatred escalates when the theorist is female. It may be that because theory (philosophy) has traditionally been coded as "masculine," women who aspire to theorize are judged to wield illegitimate (and therefore infuriating) phallic power; they become the targets of envy. I'll return to this theme in chapter 4. Here let me simply state that this attitude is misdirected in the sense that being a theorist—at least the kind of theorist that I am—means giving up the fantasy of (phallic) mastery; it means that I can never be sure of anything, that everything is purely hypothetical, that the point is to question everything rather than to provide answers.

The problem may be exacerbated by the fact that many female theorists also happen to be feminists: because post-WWII (mostly French) theory, including deconstruction, arrived in the American academy during the 1970s and 1980s in large part through the work of feminist theorists, contemporary "theory" is often intrinsically feminist, so that it's sometimes difficult to tell if the phobia, hatred, and envy I've referred to is directed against female theorists because we are theorists, female, or feminists (or a combination of these).

This antipathy is one reason that female theorists can find it harder to claim their voice than male theorists. We may be encouraged to use our own voice to discuss "feminine" topics such as love, intimacy, and relationships, as I did in The Case for Falling in Love. But the minute we attempt to speculate (theoretically) about matters of general interest, such as the contours of the good life, we're asked to show our credentials, that is, our penises. Being a female theorist may give me illegitimate phallic power in the eyes of some nontheoretical colleagues, but it's an impediment—a castrating factor—in the world of publishing, at least in the world of mainstream publishing, the kind of publishing that reaches nonacademic readers.

I once even had a literary agent tell me that I should write a history of menstruation rather than the loosely philosophical book about the meaning of life I was proposing. This is what I wanted to say in response but didn't: "I'm not a historian. I don't have a clue as to how to write a history of anything. And why menstruation? What in my academic training and publication history makes you think that I'm an expert on the topic? Or is it that, as a woman, I'm supposed to just automatically know how to write about it? Like men automatically know how to write about the meaning of life by virtue of being men?" I didn't say any of this because I didn't want to insult this well-meaning man. I stayed polite, as women too often do in these situations.

But at some point, one gets tired of hearing that female theoretical voices carry no credibility. Last year I attended an academic meeting where a (female) colleague kept complaining about a prominent, hugely published feminist theorist who, in my colleague's opinion, illegitimately "gets away"

with the kind of writing that doesn't footnote everything. "She should be forced to footnote her ideas just like everyone else," my colleague insisted. I kept looking at her and thinking "penis envy": in this case, the envy of a fellow female (and feminist) academic who has been able to break the code within the (American—the French are better on this) academy that tells us that only really important thinkers—that is, male thinkers—get to write books without footnotes.

In this book, I've rebelliously minimized notes. And I steer clear of academic debates that would render the text uninteresting for nonacademic readers. For this reason, the theoretical apparatus I draw on is for the most part invisibly plaited into the fabric of my argument. My objective is to showcase theory's applicability to the kinds of basic questions that many people—both inside and outside the academy—are asking about what it means to live well, what the obstacles to the so-called good life might be, and why these obstructions can be so taxing to deal with, why they can feel largely intractable. Expert readers will hopefully discern a number of new directions for thinking about the psychological, emotional, and physical costs of daily life under neoliberalism. Others will hopefully gain some understanding of the extent to which dominant social ideologies permeate their everyday lives.

Some of what I'm about to say I've said before in more academic texts. There are some ideas that I repeatedly return to, that never feel quite "done." Sometimes this is because it feels like I can push these ideas further now than I might have been able to a couple of years ago. Other times it's because I'm not yet ready to let go of them. Certain ideas have a way of sticking; they demand a rearticulation in a new context, particularly when I shift to a different rhetorical register, as I do in this book by letting the personal slide into the mix. I suppose that I feel that some ideas are worth sharing with multiple audiences.

The first chapter of this book explores the dominant happiness narratives of today's pragmatic neoliberal society, focusing on their cruelly optimistic tendencies. Mobilizing Foucault's theory of biopolitics, Lacan's theory of desire, and personal material, it scrutinizes the deceptive seductiveness of the American dream of beating the odds. It also contemplates the themes of positive thinking, the metabolization of suffering, quotidian microtraumas, and the intergenerational transmission of trauma, focusing on the attrition of life that can result from our attempts to pursue the good life in our achievement-oriented cultural moment.

Chapter 2 investigates the ways in which our society's pragmatism can overtake even our intimate lives, causing us to rationalize our relationships, to trade passion for utilitarian concerns. It also contains a critique of the social glorification of marriage as an institution that's supposed to usher us into the folds of the happily ever after, asking if this is what marriage usually accomplishes. I don't mean to suggest that no happy marriages exist, for clearly some do. Nor do I want to argue that love doesn't have the power to exalt us and even to alter our destinies. In some of my earlier books, I've written at length about this power. Yet I have reservations about the sentimental ways in which our society celebrates love's institutionalization in marriage, for this institutionalization causes us to value stability and longevity over ardor and adventure. What could be more pragmatic than this? What's more, our society's overemphasis on romance as a route to happiness obscures other components of life that might be equally enriching, with the consequence that we may end up depressed and pining for love even when we have a multitude of other things that have the potential to contribute to a meaningful life.

Chapter 3 focuses on the damage done to women, as well as to (straight) romantic relationships, by our society's obsessiveness about gender differences and the stereotypical manner in which it categorizes individuals into a rigidly dichotomous system of gender. The chapter counters evolutionary psychological explanations of gendered behavior by a socially constructivist narrative of how gender becomes a lived reality. By showcasing the falsity of the quick fix that gendered thinking promises, it argues that such thinking is in the final analysis designed to let men off the hook for emotional incompetence, hurtful behavior, and relationship failures.

Chapter 4 proposes that what we call postfeminism is merely the latest edition of heteropatriarchy, that what looks like liberation is often merely a clandestine version of male dominance. It critiques the ways in which straight women are taught to eroticize their sexual objectification. In addition, it considers the dilemmas of pornification in the heterosexual context, including the fact that now that straight women are supposed to be sexually free, they have no political or cultural space to complain either about the misogynistic content of heteroporn or about the compulsive porn consumption of the men they love.

Chapter 5 examines the specificity of human desire: the fact that desire obstinately wants what it wants even when what it wants seems slightly insane (or at least inconvenient). This specificity renders desire partially resistant to social manipulation, giving rise to a stubborn, and potentially ethical, faithfulness to objects of desire that our social environment might deem inappropriate. Yet it also causes us to make irrational—and frequently painful—romantic choices, at times resulting in the kind of paralysis of desire (melancholia) that keeps us from finding a new object of desire even when the old one is no longer available. In this sense, it makes us enormously vulnerable to disappointment and other agonies of unrequited love, sometimes even asking us to replace the very thing that feels most irreplaceable to us.

Chapter 6 draws on Lacanian insights to investigate anxiety as a bad feeling that can arise in relation to other people. The goal of the chapter is to explain why so many of us feel like we are living in an age of anxiety by tracing anxiety to three causes: the fear of being wounded; the fear of being engulfed; and the fear of being overagitated by the enigmatic messages that emanate from others. The chapter also distinguishes between anxiety as an unavoidable component of human life on the one hand and anxiety as a context-specific, circumstantially generated bad feeling on the other.

The conclusion rounds up the discussion by highlighting the paradoxes of neoliberalism, including the fact that even those most critical of it might find it hard to discard some of its rewards. It also considers the advantages of forgetting as a way of life, drawing a connection between the ability to "declutter" the mind by acts of forgetting and the ability to "declutter" one's life by rejecting the lures of commercial culture. The book ends with personal reflections on loss, mortality, and writing.

Some readers may appreciate knowing ahead of time that, as my argument develops, I move from a predominantly Foucauldian register to a more Lacanian one. Even though Foucault works well for the critique of neoliberalism that I stage in the first two chapters, and even though he helps me explicate the impasses of (straight) female subjectivity that constitute the focus of the middle chapters, I've always been more Lacanian than Foucauldian. This isn't just because, for partly personal reasons, psychoanalytic theory—among other things a theory of how to handle suffering—compels me but also because Lacan leaves more space for agency and self-determination than Foucault does.

Readers who are used to the commonly held idea that both of these thinkers swim in the same soup of poststructuralist criticism may find this a surprising claim, but chapter 5 illustrates why I believe it to be true. I also believe that, contrary to common (academic) wisdom, Lacanian theory offers a dexterous critique of heteropatriarchy. A full account of this aspect of Lacanian theory—which has to do with the universalization of lack and the mockery of phallic authority I've already referred to—resides beyond the purview of this book, but I touch on it in chapter 6. However, the differences between Foucault and Lacan don't render these thinkers incompatible. In many ways, they complement each other, which is why chapter 1 begins with a combination of some of their most basic arguments. <>

Poetry Matters: Neoliberalism, Affect, and the Posthuman in Twenty-First-Century North American Feminist Poetics by Heather Milne [Contemp North American Poetry, University of Iowa Press, 9781609385774]

Poetry Matters explores poetry written by women from the United States and Canada, which documents the social and political turmoil of the early twenty-first century and places this poetry in

dialogue with recent currents of feminist theory including new materialism, affect theory, posthumanism, and feminist engagements with neoliberalism and capitalism. Central to this project is the conviction that a poetics that explores the political dimensions of affect; demonstrates an understanding of subjectivity as posthuman and transcorporeal; critically reflects on the impact of capitalism on queer, racialized, and female bodies; and develops an ethical vocabulary for reimagining the nation state and critically engaging with issues of democracy and citizenship is now more urgent than ever before.

Milne focuses on poetry published after 2001 by writers who mostly began writing after the feminist writing movements of the 1980s, but who have inherited and built upon their political and aesthetic legacies. The poets discussed in this book—including Jennifer Scappettone, Margaret Christakos, Larissa Lai, Rita Wong, Nikki Reimer, Rachel Zolf, Yedda Morrison, Marcella Durand, Evelyn Reilly, Juliana Spahr, Claudia Rankine, Dionne Brand, Jena Osman, and Jen Benka—bring a sense of political agency to poetry. These voices seek new vocabularies and dissenting critical and aesthetic frameworks for thinking across issues of gender, materiality, capitalism, the toxic convergences of nationalism and racism, and the decline of democratic institutions. This is poetry that matters—both in its political urgency and in its attentiveness to the world as "matter"—as a material entity under siege. It could not be more timely or more relevant.

I have has curated reading series, held a conference on feminist poetics and activism, and published numerous books and chapbooks and has always included Canadian writers as well as writers from numerous other countries in its initiatives and has been instrumental in facilitating key sites of exchange among feminist poets from many nations. In 2013 Belladonna" republished Theory: A Sunday, a key, collaboratively authored feminist text originally written in French and published in Quebec in 1988 by Louky Bersianik, Nicole Brossard, Louise Cotnoir, Louise Dupré, Gail Scott, and France Théoret. Belladonna's republica¬tion of this text as the inaugural book in its "Germinal Texts" series not only suggests that the legacy of Tessera and the kind of writing explored in its pages lives on, but also that it has transcended a Canadian context and has had an influence in a broader, North American context

even if the founders of Tessera conceived of their project as firmly Canadian and Quebecoise.

Other recent editorial projects suggest that innovative feminist poetics in Canada and the United States increasingly circulate and function transnationally. Toronto-based Jay MillAr, founder and editor of the pismall press BookThug, publishes American and international authors alongside Canadian authors and has a strong commitment to publishing works by women, LGBTQ writers, and writers of color. The Toronto New School of Writing, founded by Jay MillAr and Jenny Samprisi, regularly brings in writers from outside Canada to facilitate writing workshops, as does the Vancouver-based Kootenay School of Writing. The Brooklyn-based Litmus Press, with its keen interest in translation and its commitment to publishing the work of queer writers, has been instrumental in the development of multilingual poetics. Aufgabe, the poetry journal published by Litmus Press, published works from around the world in translation, forging crucial links between American poetry and other national literatures. We might also look to the role of web-based publications and resources like PennSound, Howe (a web-based offspring of HOW(ever)), Lemon Hound, Delirious Hem, Harriet, and Jacket which have played a key role in the facilitation of poetic exchange beyond national borders in recent years. We might also look to Juliana Spahr and Stephanie Young's "Tell U.S. Feminists" project, which surveyed women poets from around the world to find out more about the conditions in which they write and live. These projects indicate an increasing appetite for a transnational poetics rather than one articulated along national lines.

For many contemporary Canadian and American poets, the nation proves to be not only a site of contestation but also one of radical destabilization and interrogation to the degree that their writing is not easily readable within existing national critical models. Much of this work is marked by the disappearance of national spaces and the emergence of global spaces, movement, exile, and travel, as well as an investigation into the geopolitics of warfare and global markets. If this work has a setting or location, it is often the non-geographically determined locales of cyberspace, the genome, the television screen, and the global financial market.

When nation is invoked, it is usually done in order to challenge discourses of nationalism and mourn the victims of colonialism, slavery, and other acts of racialized violence that lie at the origins of settler-invader nations like Canada and the United States, or to challenge state-sanctioned forms of biopolitical surveillance and military force. In recent years, a body of post-9/11 American poetry has emerged in an ambivalent relationship to the nation and in which poets speak as what Jeff Derksen calls "transnational national" citizens asking the nation that is representative of them to be responsive to their calls for accountability. This work complicates "containments of literature to a national scale. .. but nonetheless investigates the role of the nation within globalization". This kind of critical engagement with the nation has roots in language poetry. As Marjorie Perloff explains, "Both in San Francisco and New York, the language movement arose as an essentially Marxist critique of contemporary American capitalist society on behalf of young poets who came of age in the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate".

Aspects of language writing live on in the work of many of the poets examined in this volume, but as already stated, not all of these writers identify with its legacy, nor do theories of language writing offer a full and satisfying account of the politics and aesthetics of this work. In addition to the fact that feminist poets have always had a somewhat conflicted relationship to language writing, the political and theoretical contexts in which language writing circulated are no longer as relevant as they once were. Cold War politics has given way to neoliberal politics and counterterrorism discourses, and the theoretical terrain has shifted from a focus on Marxism and post-structuralism to a different set of political and theoretical contexts and approaches. New technologies have changed the compositional strategies that procedural writers employ. New poetry movements such as conceptualism and flarf have emerged as labels under which some—but by no means all—of this poetry might fit.

In many respects, as I have been suggesting, the nation matters less now than it did two decades

ago. In recent years, poetics in North America has been characterized by an increasing degree of cross-border exchange facilitated in large part by the Internet. However, in other respects, the nation does continue to matter for poets in both countries.

On a very basic level, poets apply for national grants and publish their work with presses that are also funded in part by national grants. Furthermore, the nation does matter for Canadian writers because they are still writing and publishing in a national literary context in which America looms large as a dominant cultural presence. And the nation does matter for both American and Canadian poets because many of them write about their respective nations' participation in violent acts of nation-building and imperialism. From Rachel Zolf's engagement with Canadian settler-colonialism and genocide in Janey's Arcadia (2014) to Claudia Rankine's rendering of America as a toxic organ poisoned by the overuse of prescription drugs, rampant consumerism, racism, and problematic foreign policy in Don't Let Me Be Lonely (2004), the nation looms large as a target of critique and a site of ambivalent identification. The tension between the nation mattering and not mattering is both irresolvable and productive, and this tension informs my analysis of contemporary feminist poetics and my tendency to both invoke and override national specificity in my analysis of contemporary Canadian and U.S. poetry.

Poetry Matters places feminist poetics in dialogue with recent cur-rents of feminist theory, including new materialism, affect theory, the posthuman, and feminist engagements with neoliberalism and capitalism. The book is divided into three parts, each of which is subdivided into two chapters. Parts 1 and 2 read innovative feminist poetics through strands of feminist theory that argue for a return to a consideration of matter and materiality as a dimension of a posthuman, affective politics that poses an alternative to neoliberalism. Part 1, "Economies of Flesh and Word: Biopolitics and Writing the (Posthuman) Body in Late Capitalism," examines how feminist poets deploy what Jennifer Scappettone calls "strategic embodiment" as a mode of feminist critique (2007). The first chapter in this section considers Jennifer Scappettone's From Dame Quickly (2009), Margaret Christakos's What Stirs (2008), and Larissa Lai and Rita Wong's sybil unrest (2013). I argue that these three poets foreground an active resistance to the ways in which the female body is both marked and marketed in the context of biopolitics and global capitalism. Scappettone engages critically in her poetry with a history of Western thought that links the materiality of the body to the feminine and casts that body as passive. Christakos enacts a procedural poetics that addresses the affective vectors of what Jodi Dean calls communicative capitalism through an extended poetic engagement with the breast-feeding latch and digital communications (2010). Lai and Wong enact a posthuman, hybrid poetics of dispersal and deferral that locates the queer, racialized body as a site of resistance to capitalism and biopolitics. The second chapter in this section draws on recent cultural theories of disgust to posit corporeal disgust as a poetic and political strategy for critiquing capitalism in Nikki Reimer's [sic] (2010) and Rachel Zolf's Human Resources (2007).

Part 2, "Poetic Matterings: New Materialist and Posthuman Feminist Ecopoetics," examines recent works that displace or call into question the humanist subject and reevaluate the relationship between humans and the material world. Through readings of Yedda Morrison's Darkness (2012) and Marcella Durand's "The Anatomy of Oil" (2008), I explore the tendency of these poets to decouple language from the human and decenter the humanist subject that is so central to conventional nature poetry. I argue that these writers enact a politicized posthumanism by decentering the human from the frames of reference through which resource extraction is typically understood. I then read Rita Wong's (2015) undercurrent (a poetic attempt to think with water) and Evelyn Reilly's (2009) Styrofoam (a poetic meditation on plastic and Styrofoam) through recent critical and theoretical work that challenges engrained understandings of humans as separate from their environment. Together, these chapters argue that contemporary feminist ecopoetics enacts the very "displacement of our world-view away from the human epicenter" and "establishes a continuum with the animal, mineral, vegetable, extra-terrestrial, and technological worlds" that Rosi Braidotti

articulates (2013, 183) in her call for a posthuman feminist mode of inquiry.

Part 3, "Geopolitics, Nationhood, Poetry," consists of two chapters, each of which examines the relationship between contemporary feminist poetics and geopolitics. The first of these chapters reads Juliana Spahr's This Connection of Everyone with Lungs (2005), Claudia Rankine's Don't Let Me Be Lonely: An American Lyric (2004), and Dionne Brand's Inventory (2006) as antiwar poems written in the aftermath of 9/11 and during the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. I examine the tendencies of these writers to draw directly on news media as raw material in the construction of their poetry and to foreground the poet as a mediatized witness located in the domestic sphere but connected to world events through technology. I consider how this writing develops a poetics of political dissent that moves strategically between the intimate and the global, and I anchor my reading of these texts in relation to theorizing on the political dimensions of affect, recent feminist work on global intimacy, and theories of witnessing. The final chapter investigates poetry that is critically engaged in the implicit and explicit forms of violence and precarity upon which nations and national imaginaries are founded and maintained. Rachel Zolf's Janey's Arcadia (2014), Jena Osman's Corporate Relations (2014), and Jen Benka's A Box of Longing with Fifty Drawers (2005) draw on texts that are closely aligned with ideologies of nation-building and the state. Rachel Zolf engages with early Canadian settler and missionary texts to explore Canada's ongoing history of colonial violence and the crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous women. Jena Osman works with the transcripts of Supreme Court decisions in which judges drew on U.S. constitutional amendments to grant constitutional rights to corporations; Osman shows how corporate personhood has become progressively embedded in the American legal system since the Civil War. Jen Benka writes fifty-two poems inspired by the fifty-two—word preamble to the U.S. Constitution to illustrate the failure of the United States to live up to the goals and principles outlined in the Constitution. All three writers engage with foundational texts that are central to their country's national imaginaries; in the process, they enact critiques of national institutions and values. For all three, poetic form and process are integral to the articulation of political critique.

This book does not aim to offer a complete survey of the field of contemporary feminist poetics and political dissent. Rather, my goal is to start a conversation focused on the intersections between con-temporary feminist poetics, geopolitics, and recent currents of feminist theoretical inquiry. The archive of texts on which I draw in this volume is admittedly incomplete, and I have mapped only one of many potential paths through this rich and complex body of writing. There are many writers who could and should be included here but, due to the constraints of time and space, have been left out. Ana Bozicevic, Angela Carr, Amy Sarah Carroll, Jen Currin, Erica Doyle, kari edwards, Laura Elrick, Betsy Fagin, Liz Howard, Julie Joosten, Amy King, Rachel Levitsky, Shannon Maguire, Carol Mirakove, Erin Moure, Sachiko Murakami, Akilah Oliver, M NourbeSe Philip, Sarah Pinder, Kristin Prevallet, Sina Queyras, a. rawlings, Lisa Roberson, Trish Salah, Nancy Shaw, Catriona Strang, Nathalie Stephens/Nathanaël, and Stacy Szymaszek, among many other writers, are not given the attention they deserve in these pages. I name them here so that readers can pursue their writing and extend the conversation I hope to start here.

Coda

The poetry discussed in these pages maps a critical feminist space in opposition to the neoliberal, militaristic, and individualistic currents of the early twenty-first century. Much of this poetry is documentary. Much of it works with found text. It advocates embracing the materiality of language, bodies, and things. It is critical of hetropatriarchal capitalism, and of the ways in which nationalism is deployed in the interests of militarism and sometimes even genocide. It intersects politically and conceptually with recent theoretical work on affect, new materialisms, and the posthuman. All of the books discussed here were published in the fifteen years between 9/11 and the election of Donald Trump, a time that saw increasing political destabilization in the Middle East in large part due to Western military intervention and occupation; the intensification of news-as-entertainment and its circulation in digital environments, which eventually led to the rise of "fake news" and the refusal of

mainstream media to engage with policy issues in any depth; the increased deregulation and privatization of public services; the rise of white nationalism and neofascism; renewed attempts to outlaw abortion and regulate women's bodies and sexuality; the intensification of destructive forms of resource extraction, often at the expense of the health and well-being of Indigenous communities; the expansion of the prison industrial complex; the growth of a culture of conspicuous consumption fueled by global capitalism; the hollowing out of the middle class in North America and Europe; and the intensification of a culture of precarity. The bulk of this project was completed prior to Trump's surprise victory in the 2016 American presidential election, but I finish my last revisions as Trump finishes his first year in office. Trump's presidency signals a shift in the American political landscape that I could not have anticipated while writing this book, but in retrospect, the poetry explored in this volume critically documents and opposes the cultural and social shifts that created the conditions for Trump's victory.

I write this from Canada, a country connected to the United States culturally, economically, and geographically yet also at a remove. Canada remains governed by a neoliberal political party that shares much in common with the Democratic Party in the United States. There is much to criticize about the Canadian government, from its arms deal with Saudi Arabia to its approval of the Kinder Morgan Pipeline expansion to its continued oppression of Indigenous peoples; the Trudeau government has not presented an alternative to the neoliberal status quo. Nevertheless, the political situation in Canada at present is not as volatile as that in the United States, nor are its citizens as polarized. Much of this book has argued for reading innovative American and Canadian feminist poetries together, yet given the events of the past year, once might wonder if the issues facing Canadians and Americans will diverge, and whether this will be reflected in our national protest poetries, since Canadian poetry might remain anchored in opposition to a neoliberal state founded on colonial genocide,' while American poetry might respond to the rise of a racist and heteropatriarchal kleptocracy that has no exact parallel north of the border (although right-wing populist and white supremacist movements are on the rise in Canada as well).

The election of Donald Trump signals an alarming convergence of capitalism, xenophobia, and antidemocratic tendencies. In the words of Henry A. Giroux, America is "at war with itself":

> Democracy is under assault, and undisguised manifestations of violent proto-fascims are being propelled to the forefront of national political life. As this occurs, we bear witness to a media system that is enriched by a repugnant escalation of intolerance and violence. Today it's immigrants, com¬munities of color, Latinos, Muslims, and protestors. But the list is constantly under review, and if you are progressive and you are not already on it, you may be tomorrow. Given those conditions, it becomes frightfully clear that the conditions for totalitarianism and state violence are still with us, attacking multiculturalism, criminalizing protest, smothering critical thought, ridiculing social responsibility, foreclosing the ethical imagination, and dismissing democracy itself.

One could declare that poetry did nothing to stop the rise of Donald Trump and right-wing populist movements around the world; perhaps energy would be better spent marching in the streets, occupying public spaces in protest, and calling and writing to elected officials rather than writing or reading poetry. However, poetry and art have always accompanied protest and are crucial dimensions of political dissent. Poetry may not enact direct political change or facilitate revolution; however, poetry can provide a space of documentation, reflection, witness, and resistance. Poetry holds the potential to help us develop new forms of agency for engaging contemporary politics, and new literacies for reading our world.

A creative praxis of dissent, one that involves poetry as well as other art forms, is increasingly urgent, and must occur in tandem with grassroots activism and protest. In a recent article called "Poetry and Agency under Trump," David Micah Greenburg argues that although it is too early to determine how writers and artists will respond to a Trump presidency, poetry is a crucial form to watch because

poetry explores the nature of agency itself—what it means to summon the presence to act effectively and in relationship to others. Poems are intense, memorable, and require interpretation, in the same way that agency requires will, direction, and judgment. Poetry's concern with voice draws attention to issues of speaker and audience, in the way that action, by definition, must occur alongside and along with others. And just as agency brings together intention and experience, poetry elevates language to draw attention to the experience of text, even as the reader simultaneously interprets ways that formal and linguistic choices demonstrate some intention.

Greenburg argues that now is the time to pay particular attention to poets who devote much of their time to activism because they in particular will find ways to "bring a sense of agency to poetry."

A poetics that explores the political dimensions of affect; demonstrates an understanding of subjectivity as posthuman and transcorporeal; critically reflects on the impact of capitalism on queer, racialized, fe-male, disabled, and non-normative bodies; and develops an ethical vocabulary for reimagining the nation-state and critically engaging with issues of democracy and citizenship is now more urgent than ever. The poems discussed in this book bring a sense of agency to poetry; they seek new vocabularies and dissenting critical and aesthetic frameworks for thinking across issues of gender, materiality, capitalism, the toxic convergences of nationalism and racism, and the decline of democracy. This is poetry that matters both in its political urgency and in its attentiveness to the world as "matter," as a material entity under siege; it could not be more urgent or more relevant. <>

Sleep and the Novel: Fictions of Somnolence from Jane Austen to the Present by Michael Greaney [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319752525]

Sleep and the Novel is a study of representations of the sleeping body in fiction from 1800 to the present day which traces the ways in which novelists have engaged with this universal, indispensable -- but seemingly nondescript -- region of human experience. Covering the narrativization of sleep in Austen, the politicization of sleep in Dickens, the queering of sleep in Goncharov, the aestheticization of sleep in Proust, and the medicalization of sleep in contemporary fiction, it examines the ways in which novelists envision the figure of the sleeper, the meanings they discover in human sleep, and the values they attach to it. It argues that literary fiction harbours, on its margins, a “sleeping partner”, one that we can nickname the Schlafroman or “sleep-novel”, whose quiet absorption in the wordlessness and passivity of human slumber subtly complicates the imperatives of self-awareness and purposive action that traditionally govern the novel.

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Excerpt:

If sleep had never existed, it probably wouldn't have occurred to us to invent it. A state in which we don't speak and have no sense of the passing of time; in which we can't absorb information, perform even simple tasks or interact purposefully with the people around us; in which we are physically unprotected and prone to intermittent (and sometimes frightening) hallucinations; in which we have no sense of me in the here and now—it is difficult to imagine that the attractions of such a state would be immediately obvious to lifelong non-sleepers. Those who had never slept would probably not find much to disagree with in Aristotle's definition of sleep as a `privation of wakefulness'—a negative state of passivity and oblivion, that is, rather than one with positively desirable qualities of its own.

But what if our non-sleepers decided, collectively, that they would, after all, like to make sleep part of their lives? It would be hard to over-state the magnitude of such a transformation in their creaturely existence. The invention of sleep would create a strange new on-off life-rhythm, a constant oscillation between alertness, tiredness and oblivion whose peaks and troughs our novice sleepers would need to synchronize with the waking world's demands on their attention and active involvement. Sleep's invention would also confront societies and governments with the most formidable logistical challenge in human history. How to cater for the fact that, at any given moment, something in the region of two billion people worldwide will be unconscious? How to safeguard the privacy and well-being of sleepers whilst ensuring that social systems continue to function normally in their absence? How to ensure that human habitations—rooms, homes, towns, cities—are designed to accommodate sleepers in safety and comfort? How to ensure that there is a fair division of labour between sleepers and wakers at any given time? How to minimize any negative impact of sleep on the safe and efficient running of the waking world? How to guarantee that everyone has access to sleep and wakefulness in fair and appropriate quantities? It seems reasonable to assume that many countries would need to set up something like an interim Ministry of Sleep to guide policy and allocate resources during the months/years of the transition, though the private sector would doubtless see all sorts of lucrative opportunities in the new dispensation. New industries would spring up to meet the need for sleep-related products (beds and bedding, sleep-wear, curtains, alarms), whilst pharmaceutical aids for the regulation and enhancement of slumber and/or wakefulness would reach a huge market. New sleep-related, night-time jobs and tasks would also emerge—night-manager, night-nurse, night-porter, night-watchman—whose purpose would be to maintain social systems in a state of minimal operational `wakefulness' while the majority sleep.

The point of conjuring up this scenario is, of course, to indicate that the almighty logistical challenges that would be posed if sleep were invented `overnight', as it were, have already been addressed, in incremental and piecemeal fashion, through the course of human history. Over thousands of years, human societies have developed a multitude of informal systems that cater for the periodic suspension, by sleep, of our ongoing participation in the shared lifeworld of everyday experience. We have clothes to wear, rooms to retire to and furniture to occupy when we sleep—and a set of low-key rituals to mark our transitions between wakefulness and slumber. All societies have unwritten rules about when sleep happens, where it happens, when it counts as healthy or natural and when it counts as irresponsible or self-indulgent; when it can be interrupted and when it must be respected; whose sleep is valuable and whose is not. But to say that the challenges posed by sleep have been addressed is, of course, a long way from saying that they have been resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Sleep is a non-negotiable biological inevitability, but the parameters of sleep—when? where? with whom? for how long?—are all open to negotiation. Different versions of sleep can be performed, narrated and invented both by individuals and by entire cultures. Sleep has always been with us, but we invent it, and reinvent it, every day and night of our lives. One way in which we invent sleep, I want to argue in this book, is by writing about it.

WHAT IS/WAS SLEEP?

Sleep and the Novel examines the representation of sleep and sleep-related experiences in literary fiction from the early nineteenth century to the present day. It is a study of how novelists narrate human somnolence, how they envision the sleeping body, what narrative problems and possibilities they encounter when they engage with such a seemingly nondescript and uneventful region of human experience, what meanings they discover in sleep and what values they attach to it. And although sleep has always been a complex and protean region of human experience, it was in the period covered by the present study that a genuinely unprecedented series of transformations took place. The historical backdrop to this study is one in which sleep has been consolidated into seven- or eight-hour blocks and hived off into private bedrooms; in which it has become the measurable and recordable object of ever more

finely calibrated scientific analysis; in which the standards of comfort and hygiene enjoyed by many sleepers have improved considerably, even if, according to some commentators, natural slumber has been irreparably damaged by modern technologies from the electric light bulb to the online virtual worlds of the Internet. I should emphasize, even as I offer this thumbnail sketch of the modern history of sleep, that I do not propose to treat fictional depictions of somnolence as anything like empirical `evidence' in a history of human slumber, still less to weigh in on debates around what has been referred to as an unprecedented `crisis' in modern sleep; rather, I want to argue that any account of the human significance of sleep must attend to its representational history, and that the modern novel offers a remarkably rich and largely untapped archive of the ways in which the practices of modern sleep have been imagined, fantasized and reinvented.

Before I begin to explore any of these issues in more detail, however, we must return to a more fundamental question: What is sleep? In a sense, everyone knows the answer to this question. Sleep is not a jargon word or an abstract concept but a plain and uncontroversial part of everyday creaturely existence whose significance—and inescapability—we all grasp as a fact of lived experience from an early age. But a shared body of common-sensical knowledge does not necessarily translate into precise consensus about the nature—still less the function, purpose or value—of sleep. Part of the problem is that `sleep' is meaningful only in relation to non-sleep states. 'Tell me what the role of wakefulness is', the distinguished sleep scientist Nathaniel Kleitman is reported to have said, 'and I shall explain the role of sleep'. Kleitman's words raise existential questions to do with the final cause(s) of human subjectivity that lie well beyond the jurisdiction of sleep science, and he does not pursue them.' Leaving aside these philosophical enigmas for a moment, we can say that sleep is a reversible state of diminished awareness and bodily passivity into which human beings (and indeed all mammals) periodically fall, one that is usually marked by low responsiveness, recumbent posture, closed eyes and deep, heavy, regular breathing. Since the mid-twentieth century we have known that human slumber is characterized by a recognizable pattern of electrical activity in the brain as it cycles through different stages from shallow sleep to deep sleep to `paradoxical' or Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep and back again. But why do we sleep? It is a commonplace to say that 'no one knows' exactly why we sleep but it might be truer to say that there are all too many plausible scientific answers to this question—sleep is an indispensable period of physical rest and recuperation; it conserves energy and makes us inconspicuous and therefore safe from predators; it boosts immune function; it is associated with the consolidation of short-term into long-term memory; it clears away molecular detritus in the brain—no single one of which has yet definitively superseded the others. Nevertheless, even if what Steven W. Lockley and Russell G. Foster call the 'holy grail of sleep biology' remains elusive, a broad consensus has formed in recent years that sleep is an active and dynamic state, one that is of particular significance to the brain.? Ostensibly synonymous with passivity and uneventfulness, sleep is increasingly understood by modern science as a busy state, even a surreptitious mode of wakefulness, an indispensable multi-tasker that goes to work in our absence, rather than a condition of passive downtime in human consciousness. (The problems and paradoxes associated with this `activist' model of slumber will come into focus more than once in the pages that follow.)

The question of sleep's function(s) is complicated further when we factor in the possibility of analysing human slumber diachronically as well as synchronically. In recent years, as sleep has been increasingly understood as a historically variable dimension of human experience, we have begun to learn that the question 'what is sleep?' need not always be posed in the present tense. And once we find ourselves asking 'what was sleep?' then the prospects of our discovering, one fine day, the core or `essence' of sleep may begin to seem supremely unlikely. We should nevertheless acknowledge that the historicist model of human slumber is a startlingly counter-intuitive one. The notion that sleep has a history, that it changes over time in a response to shifting social circumstances, and that it could even be susceptible of periodization

(Regency sleep? Victorian sleep? modernist sleep?), might seem like an outrageous extension of cultural constructionism into the realm of pure biology. After all, one of the great proverbial qualities of sleep is its sameness. A cursory glance at literary evocations of human slumber reveals a proverbial insistence that sleep is the same for everyone, rich and poor, exalted and humble. Hera in Book 14 of the Iliad (ca. 750 BC) hails sleep as the 'lord over all gods and all men'. For Sir Philip Sidney, sleep is `Th'indifferent judge between the high and low'. In Cervantes's Don Quixote (1615), Sancho Panza describes sleep as 'the balance and weight that equals the shepherd with the king, the simple with the wise'. Running through western literature is a discourse in which sleep submits humanity to a biological egalitarianism in which all social differences vanish into an organic sameness that is seemingly indifferent to currents of historical change.

Though the universalizing and ahistorical language of Homer, Sidney and Cervantes continues to resonate in the twenty-first century, the primary and motivating discovery of recent work in the field of sleep studies in the humanities has been the fact of difference within the seeming `indifference' of sleep. Pioneering work by the anthropologist Norbert Elias, for example, shows how sleep arrangements that westerners now take for granted—private bedrooms and special night-clothes—have emerged only since the early modern period; in the middle ages, Elias points out, sleep had not yet been `privatized and separated from the rest of social life', and it was not uncommon for strangers to share beds, and for masters, servants and guests to sleep in the same room. More recently, the historian A. Roger Ekirch has uncovered evidence that the practice of `segmented sleep'—blocks of three or four hours of sleep separated by interludes of quietly wakeful reflection and reverie—was common in pre-industrial Europe; he therefore argues that the notion that eight or so hours of unbroken slumber is the `natural' allotment of the healthy adult is an artifact of industrial modernity. Benjamin Reiss, summarizing the invisible revolution in modern sleeping habits, concludes that `nothing about our standard model of sleep existed as we know it two centuries ago'.

In the light of work by Ekirch and others, `normative' models of sleep are now routinely treated with robust scepticism by humanist scholars.

According to the philosopher Simon Morgan Wortham, for example, sleep is 'a highly determined and constructed phenomenon, produced and managed in very specific ways to serve the interests of the "day". Sleep, he adds, is 'not so much "natural" as it is naturalized'. No less sceptical about natural or default ways of `doing' sleep are the anthropologists Carol M. Worthman and Melissa K. Melby, who observe in their discussion of the `ecologies of sleep normative among western populations' that

patterns of solitary sleep on heavily cushioned substrates, consolidated in a single daily time block, and housed in roofed and solidly walled space, con¬trast with the variety of sleep conditions among traditional societies. These conditions include multiple and multi-age sleeping partners; frequent prox¬imity of animals; embeddedness of sleep in ongoing social interaction; fluid bedtimes and wake times; use of nighttime for ritual, sociality, and informa¬tion exchange; and relatively exposed sleeping locations that require fire maintenance and sustained vigilance.

Worthman and Melby's scepticism about what counts as `normal' sleep is salutary, as is their emphasis on the sheer variety of sleep practices and conditions among traditional societies. Their work has contributed to what is now a wide and thriving range of anthropological analyses of varia¬tions in sleep behaviour across countries and continents, from the tradi¬tional siesta in Mediterranean cultures to the practice of inemuri (a kind of licensed sleep-within-wakefulness) in Japan."

Nor have anthropologists been the only humanities scholars to exhibit a renewed interest in human slumber. Having been written off in some quarters as a non-subject, the geography of sleep—the question of how spaces are designed, adapted or even appropriated for sleep—is now an emerging field of interest. Despite what Vilhelm Aubert and Harrison White have described as the apparent `social nothingness'" of human slumber, considerable advances have also been made in

recent years in work on the sociology of sleep. A particular focus of scholarship in this field has been on the unspoken rules and informal systems that govern relations and interactions between sleepers and non-sleepers in any given society. Of course the relationship between those who sleep and those who wake is always a power relationship—and a transparently uneven one at that. In the context of anxieties about globalization, the spread of digital technology and the emergence of a `24/7' society, there is also a new and urgent focus on the politics of sleep, as evidenced by a spate of recent studies on slumber and capitalist modernity.

The efflorescence of historical, anthropological, sociological and politi-cal work on sleep has been usefully characterized by Benjamin Reiss as constituting a new subfield in the humanities which he christens `critical sleep studies'. Some of the core questions that will engage scholars in this field are crisply formulated by Reiss as follows:

> How to recover this nightly oblivion and bring it back into the course of human history? What's mutable about sleep? How do societies organize themselves around the biological requirement that everyone shut down for at least a few hours a day? When do sleeping arrangements or patterns of sleep or inequities in the social distribution of sleep become notable and contested? When does sleep run afoul of social rules? Who gets to control sleep, and on what terms?

These are important and pressing questions for critical sleep studies, but I would like to supplement them with some of my own: When writers and artists look at sleep, what do they see? How has sleep been envisioned, reported, narrated? What fears and fantasies about human slumber have circulated in different human cultures? How have these stories served to confirm or contest dominant assumptions about what counts as natural and `orderly' sleep? How have different cultural and textual forms con-structed their own versions of what Reiss calls the `sleep—wakefulness continuum'? What values do we invest in the figure of the sleeper in literature, art and culture? What do we want from this figure? In posing these ques¬tions, I want to make a case for the importance of sleep's representational history, not simply as a decorative corollary to its occluded empirical his¬tory, but as an archive of stories we have told ourselves about the place of sleep in our lives, sustained attention to which may provide new answers to the enduring question of the purpose, meaning and value of human slumber.

SLEEPERS AND WATCHERS

The supercilious disgust with which Nabokov looks down on the `moronic' and self-debasing sleep of others brings us to the other pair of figures whom we will encounter regularly in this study: namely, the sleep-watcher and the watched sleeper. Although the image of watched sleep is a suffi¬ciently familiar motif in the visual arts to have attracted detailed scholarly commentary, few critics have examined literary representations of the same phenomenon. In any case, it would be difficult to find a better set-piece introduction to literary sleep-watching than Nathaniel Hawthorne's 1850 short story `David Swan: A Fantasy', in which the titular hero, a respectable young man with good prospects en route from New Hampshire to Boston, there to take up a retail job in a grocery business run by his uncle, grabs an hour's sleep in a shady spot near the roadside as he waits for the stagecoach to arrive. As David sleeps, he is glimpsed by series of passers-by, each of whom jumps to subjective and partial conclusions about the somnolent young man. A middle-aged widow decides that he looks charming in his sleep. A temperance lecturer decides that David is comatose with drink. A wealthy elderly couple who have lost their only son gaze tenderly down at David and toy briefly with the idea of adopting him. A pretty girl catches sight of him and blushes even as she feels disappointed that the handsome sleeper does not awake to reciprocate her ardent gaze. A pair of armed criminals stumble on him and decide to rob him but are deterred by a passing dog. Our hero wakes up after an hour, quite oblivious to the riches, romantic love and violent death that came so close to him in his sleep, and boards the stagecoach to begin his new life in Boston.

Hawthorne's story is broadly allegorical; it uses David's sleep to represent the structural limits of our knowledge and awareness of the historical circumstances that shape our lives. At any given moment, we are effectively `asleep' to many of the

forces that may impact powerfully and irreversibly, for good or for ill, on the course of our lives. No one enjoys 360-degree vision of the threats we've avoided, the opportunities we've narrowly missed, the lives we haven't lived. David Swan, c'est moi. But the story, even as it invites us to identify with its protagonist, is also a case study in the objectification of the sleeper by the gaze of the waking world whose imaginative claim upon Hawthorne's napping hero is by no means lessened by Swan's temporary suspension of social personhood. For Roland Barthes, a nap is a period of time in which `I am resting, not from others nor from myself, but from myself seen, thought, questioned, required by others.' Altogether less idealistic in its vision of sleep, `David Swan' gives us a hero who is never more conspicuously subject to the gaze, thoughts, questions and requirements of others than when he slumbers. What the passers-by see in David—a son, a lover, a cautionary tale, a victim—is a function of their desires; in his sleep, Hawthorne's hero becomes the very mirror of their needs and longings—the sanctimony of the preacher, the greed of the robbers, and so forth. So we have five ways of looking at a sleeper—or six, if we include Hawthorne's narrator. But what, if anything, does the narrator see in David's sleep? David is a mirror of the sleepwatchers' desires, but also has another job to do in the ideological economy of Hawthorne's tale. Crucially, however, he is no Sleeping Beauty or Rip Van Winkle; he does not wake up a changed man, nor does he wake into a changed world—rather, he wakes into the same life and the same world in which the same destiny of bourgeois hard work awaits him. Hawthorne's story effectively divests sleep of its old folkloric power as a short-cut through time or an agent of magical transformation but it does not wholly strip it of meaning. Fancifully misread or over-read by characters in the grip of love-at-first-sight fantasies and get-rich-quick schemes, Swan's sleep is understood by Hawthorne as a necessary phase of physical recuperation in a story of strenuous journeying, hard work and sober self-improvement. In other words, Swan's sleep reflects Hawthorne's own values even as he represents those values as a `neutral' corrective to subjective misreadings of his hero.

`David Swan' is an excellent primer in what Sullivan—in a discussion of sleep-watching in Shakespeare's I Henry IV—refers to as the 'hermeneutics of sleep'. Hawthorne's tale raises the question of how we go about interpreting human slumber, how we might distinguish between interpretation and misinterpretation of the sleep of others, and we might differentiate an act of disinterested interpretation from a gaze that converts the sleeper into an object of desire or projection of unconscious fantasies. In literary scenes of watched sleep, the hermeneutic of sleep is often complicated by a certain erotics of sleep-watching—one that is sometimes inflected by a certain pleasure-in-disgust, as in the case of Nabokov, who likens those who sleep in public to those who defecate in public. Finally, relations between those who sleep and those who watch are, inescapably, relations of power and control, though they don't always play out in ways you might expect. Sleep, in the tradition of literary somnolence, finds all sorts of ways to resist the proprietorial gaze of wakefulness.

Jane Austen's fiction occasionally lets her characters glimpse minor or secondary characters sleeping on the fringes of her social scenes, but as we shall discover in Chap. 2, the most powerful person in a given Austen scene isn't necessarily the one who is awake and alert. Charles Dickens—whose minor characters often seem to grab every chance they can for sleep, whether at the workplace, on the roadside or by the fire—often envisages the sleep—wakefulness continuum as a confrontation between paranoia and insouciance. Ivan Goncharov's hero in Oblomov (1859), on the receiving end of a stream of visitors, incredulous at his addiction to bed and sleep, is borderline exhibitionistic in his somnolence. He would rather let the world come and see him sleep than go forth and meet the world on its own exactingly wakeful terms. Proust's depictions of sleep also involve variations on the themes of exhibitionism and paranoia. His narrator, who effectively issues the reader an open invitation to watch him sleep, will devote the best part of an entire novel, The Prisoner (1927), to scenes in which he pores over the sleep of his lover and de facto captive, Albertine, in what is probably fiction's most sustained exploration of the pathology of sleep-

watching. Contemporary fiction, meanwhile, exhibits an ongoing fascination with the scientific observation of sleep by doctors and technicians in state-of-the-art sleep laboratories. In these novels, wakefulness seems to have harnessed technology to secure the cognitive and perceptual mastery of sleep of which it has always dreamed, yet even in the era of the polysomnograph and the infra-red camera, novelists will often have cause to see sleep as that which defeats or disarms the onlooker's gaze. To put it another way, the sleeping body is repeatedly visualized in the modern novel as that which cannot be satisfactorily visualized, that which—to borrow Louis Marin's description of the sleeping bodies envisaged by Poussin—`withdraws into itself in precise proportion to its oblation'.

FROM THE SOFA TO THE SLEEP LAB

Sleep and the Novel begins with a novelist who is rarely, if ever, associated with sleep: Jane Austen. Why start with Austen? Her fiction is exemplary in this context because it can be credited with inventing and in some ways perfecting the classic realist novel as a discourse that almost ignores sleep.

We have to look to the fringes of Austen's writing to find any engagement with somnolence, but the engagement is there in, for example, her curious interest in the rituals of the heroine's bedtime and in her emphasis on the forbidden pleasures and rewarding pains of sleeplessness. This chapter also traces a broader narrative arc in Austen from pre-marriage insomnia (something all of her heroines experience) to post-marriage somnolence (dotted around the fringes of Austen's social scenes are quietly dozing married men and women). Austen's `sociable sleepers'—minor characters who doze innocuously in the background while her heroes and heroines get on with the business of the day—are seemingly distanced by their sleep from the focus of the narrative, but despite this, I will argue, they embody Austen's sense of her own narrative as emerging from a place beyond narrative.

Chapter 3 examines the fiction of Charles Dickens as a discourse that looks at the sleeping body with much more candid directness than Jane Austen ever permits herself. Dickens, an insomniac who wrote a pair of memorable autobiographical essays on his sleepless nights, presents himself as an author who has in some sense traded sleep for writing and who enjoys a unique vantage point on the sleep of others, a spectacle he consumes with relish and frequent hilarity. With particular emphasis on Barnaby Rudge (1841), I will show that there is something irresistibly comical about the sleeping body in Dickens—indeed, sleep and laughter seem to be linked in his imagination as states that overcome all decorous resistance—though the comic qualities of sleep are by no means the whole story. Known primarily as a historical novel about collective political violence, Barnaby Rudge is, even by Dickens's standards, an extraordinarily sleep-obsessed text. Not that sleep figures in this text simply as a `quiet' counterpoint to its scenes of uproar and hectic violence; rather sleep has a politics of its own, more disturbing because more opaquely unpredictable than the open gestures of political violence in the novel. Many of Barnaby Rudge's disquieting concerns, I will argue, are coalesced into the stock Dickensian figure of the sleeping servant—a figure who will, by turns, be presented as an object of narrative comedy, perceptual uncertainty and political anxiety.

Both Austen and Dickens focus largely on the sleep of minor or secondary characters; neither one of them, however, could have contemplated building a novel around a sleeper. In Chap. 4 I examine Ivan Goncharov's absurdist comic masterwork Oblomov as a text that, on the face of it, has all the makings of a `novel of sleep', a Schlafroman that would displace the Bildungsroman from its prestigious status as the definitive handbook of modern subjectivity. Goncharov's sleep-loving hero is profoundly reluctant to get out of bed, adamant that the numb storylessness of slumber is preferable to the attritional discomforts of living; his story, I will argue, is a precocious manifestation of what I will call the 'world-from-a-bed' tradi¬tion that will come into its own with the advent of Proustian modernism in the early twentieth century, a tradition in which the horizontal self casts a blearily sceptical eye on the banal hyperactivity that characterizes the world outside the bedroom. However, despite its broadly affectionate evocation of Oblomov's lifelong devotion to slumber, the act of writing down the story of its hero's storylessness paradoxically allies

Goncharov's novel to the very regime of wakefulness that it would like to subvert—the would-be Schlafroman finds itself recaptured by the Bildungsroman.

Chapter 5 examines a text that seems to have overcome the antithesis between sleep and writing. Proust's In Search of Lost Time, the multivolume fictionalized autobiography of perhaps the most sleep-obsessed author in literary history, is dominated by the 'world-from-a-bed' perspective that would characterize many landmark works of modernist fiction, and represents a moment in cultural history when the bedroom is decisively annexed as the headquarters of modern subjectivity. Though In Search of Lost Time foregrounds somnolence in famous and inescapable ways, I want to bring out two sleep-related elements of the text that have not always received sufficient attention. First, there is the physicality and sociality of sleep in Proust, and its embeddedness in concrete social con-texts; second, there is the sleep of others in Proust—the sleep of secondary and minor characters, a pervasive area of concern in the novel, albeit one that is frequently eclipsed by the narrator's narcissistic fascination with his own slumber.

Whilst In Search of Lost Time seems to represent the arrival, at long last, of the `novel of sleep', it also marks a historical moment in which art and literature might appear to have been decisively outflanked by science in the race to create and exhibit authoritative knowledge of human slumber. With the birth of the polysomnograph, the establishment of sleep labora¬tories and the emergence of sleep science as an intellectual discipline in its own right, human somnolence was in the twentieth century for the first time describable and measurable in objective scientific terms. Not that these developments have escaped the attention of creative writers. In Chap. 6, I consider a generation of authors—including J. G. Ballard, Jonathan Coe, Alison MacLeod and David Foster Wallace—who have located their fictions in the uncanny quiet and transparency of the sleep laboratory. These authors have presided over the emergence of a subgenre at the interface of science fiction and sleep science which I call `sleep-science fiction', in which science and literature confront each other with rival versions of what each regards as `pure' or `natural' sleep.

In tracing the fictive sleeper's journey from the Regency sofa via the modernist bedroom to the twenty-first-century sleep lab, this study will show that sleep has finally moved centre stage in novelistic discourse. But this is not to suggest that the novel has, over time, got `better' at representing sleep; nor is it to congratulate Proust for discovering a theme of universal significance that his predecessors somehow contrived to neglect, or to applaud contemporary novelists for being more au courant with sleep science than their predecessors. To be sure, sleep is more dramatically and thematically conspicuous in, say, Proust's The Way by Swann's or Coe's The House of Sleep than it tends to be in nineteenth-century fiction, but this is not because pre-1900 writers were somehow negligent in their awareness of the vital significance of human slumber. For one thing, reading back through sleep-science fiction and through the bedroom modernism of Proust we can begin to think of Barnaby Rudge or Northanger Abbey as novels of sleep, and thus begin to wonder if the Schlafoman wasn't there all along, as the `sleeping partner' of the Bildungsroman, only waiting to be roused and coaxed into the light of day. We might even suggest that the `novel of sleep' is not so much a genre that has come into its own as a way of reading attentive to the marginality, silence and seeming uneventfulness of sleep—that we now need to learn.

Perhaps, however, there is a price to be paid for bringing sleep from the margins to the centre—a price that is exacted in the symbolically violent gesture of coaxing sleep into visibility and narratability. Roland Barthes has spoken slightingly of the whole business of the interpretation of dreams, Freudian or otherwise, because it seems to recapture the sublime idleness of sleep for the drudgery of meaning. But if we begin to argue for dreamless sleep as a content-rich category in its own right we risk betraying Barthes's attractive if inchoate utopianism by `rehabilitating' sleep as a productive and meaningful business, regardless of whether it produces dreams. To put it in other words, we might say that it is hard to think about sleep without converting it into a species of

wakefulness; it is hard to think about sleep and to let the sleeper sleep. Critical sleep studies, you might say, suffers from a congenital case of disciplinary insomnia.

Whilst there is no ready antidote to this intellectual malady, we may find reason here to caution ourselves against fixating too intently and vociferously on sleep. The emergence of sleep as a theme may well be a healthy corrective to its chronic under-valuation both in literary studies and in society large; but it may also be a sign of its reification in the modern world or a symptom of our insomniac obsession with a state from which we are increasingly alienated. It's hard not to suspect that only a culture that has forgotten how to sleep would feel the need to champion the importance and centrality of slumber as ardently as some contemporary self-help commentators do. If sleep has now moved centre stage in an era of generalized insomnia, then maybe we could be forgiven for glancing nostalgically back at a time when it could be ignored for the right reasons. <>

The Unpunished Vice: A Life of Reading by Edmund White [Bloomsbury Publishing, 9781635571172]

A new memoir from acclaimed author Edmund White about his life as a reader.

Literary icon Edmund White made his name through his writing but remembers his life through the books he has read. For White, each momentous occasion came with a book to match: Proust's Remembrance of Things Past, which opened up the seemingly closed world of homosexuality while he was at boarding school in Michigan; the Ezra Pound poems adored by a lover he followed to New York; the biography of Stephen Crane that inspired one of White's novels. But it wasn't until heart surgery in 2014, when he temporarily lost his desire to read, that White realized the key role that reading played in his life: forming his tastes, shaping his memories, and amusing him through the best and worst life had to offer.

Blending memoir and literary criticism, The Unpunished Vice is a compendium of all the ways reading has shaped White's life and work. His larger-than-life presence on the literary scene lends itself to fascinating, intimate insights into the lives of some of the world's best-loved cultural figures. With characteristic wit and candor, he recalls reading Henry James to Peggy Guggenheim in her private gondola in Venice and phone calls at eight o'clock in the morning to Vladimir Nabokov--who once said that White was his favorite American writer.

Featuring writing that has appeared in the New York Review of Books and the Paris Review, among others, The Unpunished Vice is a wickedly smart and insightful account of a life in literature.

Excerpt: Reading is at once a lonely and an intensely sociable act. The writer becomes your ideal companion—interesting, worldly, compassionate, energetic—but only if you stick with him or her for a while, long enough to throw off the chill of isolation and to hear the intelligent voice murmuring in your ear. No wonder Victorian parents used to read out loud to the whole family (a chapter of Dickens a night by the precious light of the single candle); there's nothing lonely about laughing or crying together—or shrinking back in horror. Even if solitary, the reader's inner dialogue with the writer—questioning, concurring, wondering, objecting, pitying—fills the empty room under the lamplight with silent discourse and the expression of emotion.

Who are the most companionable novelists? Marcel Proust and George Eliot; certainly they're the most intelligent, able to see the widest implications of the simplest act, to play a straightforward theme on the mighty organs of their minds: soft/loud, quick/slow, complex/chaste, reedy/ orchestral. But we also cherish Leo Tolstoy's uncanny empathy for diverse people and even animals, F. Scott Fitzgerald's lyricism, Colette's worldly wisdom, James Merrill's wit, Walt Whitman's biblical if agnostic inclusiveness, Annie Dillard's sublime nature descriptions. When I was a youngster I loved novels about the Lost Dauphin or the Scarlet Pimpernel or the Three Musketeers—adventure books enacted in the clear, shadowless light of Good and Evil.

If we are writers, we read to learn our craft. In college I can remember reading a now-forgotten writer, R. V. Cassill, whose stories showed me that a theme, once taken up, could be dropped for a few pages only to emerge later, that in this way one could weave together plot elements. That seems so

obvious now, but I needed Cassill to teach me the secrets of polyphonic development. In her extremely brief notes on writing, Elizabeth Bowen taught me that you can't invent a body or face—you must base your description on a real person. Bowen also revealed how epigrams can be buried into a flowing narrative. She said that in dialogue people are either deceiving themselves or striving to deceive others and that they rarely speak the disinterested, unvarnished truth. Henry James's The Turn of the Screw showed me how Chinese-box narrators can destabilize the reader sufficiently to make a ghost story seem plausible.

Sometimes I read now to fill up my mind-banks with new coins—new words, new ideas, new turns of phrase. From Joyce Carol Oates I learned to alternate italicized passages of mad thought with sentences in Roman type narrating and describing in a straightforward manner. To me the first half of D. H. Lawrence's The Rainbow shows how far prose can go toward the poetic without falling into a sea of rose syrup.

Each classic is eccentric. Samuel Beckett is both bleak and comic. Karl Ove Knausgaard is both boring and engrossing. Proust is so long-winded he often loses the thread of an anecdote; too many interpellations can make a story nonsensical—and sublimely interesting, if the narrator possesses a sovereign intellect. V. S. Naipaul's The Enigma of Arrival is both confiding and absurdly discreet (he doesn't mention he's living in the country with his wife and children, for instance; nor does he tell us that his madman-proprietor is one of England's most interesting oddballs, Stephen Tennant). I suppose all these examples demonstrated to me that any excess can be rewarding if it explores the writer's unique sensibility and goes too far. The farthest reaches of fiction are marked by Mircea Cãrfãrescu's monumental Blinding and Samuel Delany's The Mad Man and Compass by Mathias Énard—and there are no books more memorable.

If I watch television, at the end of two hours I feel cheated and undernourished (although I'm always being told of splendid new TV dramas I haven't discovered yet); at the end of two hours of reading, my mind is racing and my spirit is renewed. If the book is good…

I rely on other writers and experienced readers to guide me to the good books. Yiyun Li told me to read Rebecca West's The Fountain Overflows.

I'll always be grateful to her. My husband, the writer Michael Carroll, lent me Richard Yates's The Easter Parade and Joy Williams's stories in Honored Guest. The novelist and essayist Edward Hower, Alison Lurie's husband, gave me a copy of Elizabeth Taylor's stories, reissued by the New York Review of Books (not that Elizabeth Taylor, silly). Because I lived in Paris sixteen years, I discovered many great French writers, including the contemporaries Jean Echenoz and Emmanuel Carrère and the extraordinary historical novelist Chantal Thomas, and I spoke at the memorial ceremony of the champion of the nouveau roman, Alain Robbe-Grillet, who was a friend. Julien Gracq is in my pantheon, along with the Irish writer John McGahern.

I've read books in many capacities—for research, as a teacher, as a judge of literary contests, and as a reviewer.

As early as Nocturnes for the King of Naples (a title I stole from Haydn, who also contributed the title of my novel The Farewell Symphony), I was researching the odd bit. In that book, I liked the Baroque confusion between sacred and sexual love, and I threaded into it references to several poets and mystics. I also disguised poems (couplets, a sonnet, a sestina); I wrote them out as prose. With my Caracole I drew inspiration from the life of Germaine de Staël—but also from eighteenth-century Venetian memoirs I consulted in the library of the Palazzo Barbaro, where I spent several summers. Perhaps my biggest research job was my biography of Jean Genet, though I was helped on a daily basis by the great Genet scholar Albert Dichy. We read copies of the lurid magazine Detective, which inspired Genet at several junctures; old copies were stored in the basement of Gallimard. I read the semi-gay Montmartre novels (such as Jésus-la-Caille by Francis Carco) that Genet surpassed; we consulted everything we could find in print about the Black Panthers. I found a store on lower Broadway that sold political posters and other ephemera. Since it was the first major Genet biography, we interviewed hundreds of people he'd known. And all this was before

Google or the Internet. For my other two biographies (short ones on Proust and Arthur Rimbaud) I did no original research, though I had to read the enormous secondary literature on each writer; much of my work was done at the main Princeton library.

For my novel Fanny, about the abolitionist Frances Wright and Frances Trollope, the mother of the novelist, I was living in London and working every day in the then-new British Library at St. Pancras in 2001; I read endless books about America in the 1820s, crossing the Atlantic, slavery, Jefferson, what people wore and ate; of course I read each of my two ladies' books. I loved ordering up the day's books and waiting for them to arrive at my station. I loved passing teatime in the library cafeteria. I never got up the courage to say hello to anyone—but that, too, felt very English.

When I wrote my Stephen Crane novel, Hotel de Dream, I was a fellow of the Cullman Center at the Forty-Second Street library. I had millions of books at my disposal, hundreds of images of New York in the 1890s, even a complete set of menus for the period. Research librarians were at my disposal; I asked one, Warren Platt, to tell me how much a mediocre life-size marble statue would have cost in the 1890s—he studied the Stonecutter's Manual and auction catalogs of the day. I read newspaper accounts on microfilm of a bar raid of the first New York gay bar, the Slide on Bleecker. I read the biography of Giuseppe Piccirilli, who became a character; he was the man who'd sculpted the lions in front of the library. Even in my latest novel, I had a character who forges paintings by Salvador Dali; I had to bone up on art forgeries.

I love research, and in my next life I want to be a librarian.

I've taught creative writing (and occasionally literature courses for writers) since the mid-1970s at Yale, Johns Hopkins, Columbia, New York University, Brown, and Princeton, among other schools. Even in workshops we read published stories by celebrated living writers—Richard Ford, Ann Beattie, Joy Williams, Richard Bausch, and dozens of others, including stories by Deborah Eisenberg and Lorrie Moore, the best of the bunch. People assume that college kids are on the cutting edge of contemporary fiction, but if you want to know what's happening, ask someone thirty, not twenty. Undergrads are too busy reading about quantum physics or, if they're literary, Ulysses or To the Lighthouse.

When I taught literature courses for writers in 1990 at Brown, I tried to expose students to all kinds of international writing different from American realism. We read A Hundred Years of Solitude, The Tin Drum, Gravity's Rainbow, John Hawkes's The Blood Oranges, Yasunari Kawabata's The Sound of the Mountain (he'd won—and deserved—the Nobel Prize), Raymond Queneau's The Sunday of Life, and many others. Sometimes I felt I was the only one in the class who'd read the books. Brown, however, had a real avant-garde mission in both poetry and prose, and good writers came out of the program, such as Alden Jones, Andrew Sean Greer, and Ben Marcus, author of The Age of Wire and String.

I've judged many literary contests. For the Booker in 1989 (the year Kazuo Ishiguro won for The Remains of the Day), I had to read 130 books, but since I'd lived in France so many years I read them cynically à la diagonal (very rapidly, or only the first third); the other judges, being English, took the job much more seriously. I remember my fellow judge David Profumo saying of a particular title, "Wait till you read it a second time." I think Ishiguro's novel was an ideal prize candidate because it was short and very high-concept—the plot was easy to retain and summarize. I judged the PEN/Diamonstein-Spielvogel Award for the Art of the Essay. For several years I was on the prize committee of the American Academy of Arts and Letters, and for almost a decade I've been a judge for the Premio Gregor von Rezzori, an award given to the best book in any language translated into Italian that year (not the best translation, but the best book), though I read them in French or English. This job has led me to read a whole host of books written in Chinese, Arabic, German, Rumanian, and so on. Cărfărescu's Blinding is the best book I read for the contest.

Almost every literary gay book gets sent to me for a blurb, and I've become a true "blurb slut." It's a bit like being a loose woman; everyone mocks you for your liberality—and everyone wants at least

one date with you. I like to help first-time authors (if I admire their work), but serious writers aren't supposed to be so generous with their favors. Now that I'm old I turn down most manuscripts, and I always remind publishers that I might not like their new books if I do read them. A good blurb is pithy, phrased unforgettably, at once precise and a statement that makes broad claims for the book.

Reading books by friends is a special problem. They usually want a review, not a mere blurb. If I have mixed feelings about a friend's book, I phone him or her rather than write something. In a conversation one can judge how honest the writer wants you to be. He or she will clam up right away or press for a fuller statement. Sometimes I give writers reports as I read along; most writers can't wait for a week to get a full report.

I've written hundreds of book reviews, and I always overdo it. I feel obliged to read several other books by the same author—if not the collected works. A review should summarize the subject if not the plot, give a sample of the prose, relate this book to other relevant ones, and, most important, say whether it's good or bad. Of course a long review in the New York Review becomes an essay. All reviews take three times more effort than one foresees—at least for an American, slow-witted and thicktongued as we are, and so unused to having a sharp, biting opinion. I remember reading in George Bernard Shaw's youthful journals something about spending the morning at the British Library and dashing off his reviews. Reviews, plural.

Reading books for pleasure, of course, is the greatest joy. No need to underline, press on, try out mentally summarizing or evaluating phrases. One is free to read as a child reads—no duties, no goals, no responsibilities, no clock ticking: pure rapture. Proust's essay "On Reading" is a magical account of a child's absorption in a book, his regret about leaving the page for the dinner table, even the erotic aspect (he reads in the water closet and associates with it the smell of orris root). Perhaps my pleasure in reading has kept me from being a systematic reader. I never get to the bottom of anything but just step from one lily pad to another. The title of this book comes from Valery Larbaud's 1941 This Unpunished Vice: Reading. The French supervisor of the translation of James Joyce's Ulysses, Larbaud read in many languages; he had his English books bound in one color, his German books in another, and so on. He inherited wealth, but his fortune became meaningless when he succumbed to a paralysis that rendered him speechless and motionless the last twenty-two years of his life.

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Until something dire happens to me, I'll continue to read (and occasionally to write). Someone said a writer should read three times more than he or she writes. I'm afraid I read much more than I set to paper. There is no greater pleasure than to lie between clean sheets, listen to music, and read under a strong light. (I write to music, too—it cuts down on the loneliness and helps a nonmusician like me to resist and to concentrate.) I suppose everyone who has gotten this far in my book has felt the secret joy of knowing that a good, suspenseful book is waiting half read beside your pillow. For me, right now it's John Boyne's The Heart's Invisible Furies, dedicated to John Irving, whose books have kept me awake for decades.

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All my life I've been a tireless if slow reader, happy no matter where I find myself if I have words to look at, content to stand in a grim line in the cold, to undergo the worst sort of medical procedure, or to endure boredom if I can only read something—until I suffered a massive heart attack at the end of 2014. After open heart surgery, I was unconscious for three days. When I came to, the painkillers made me sound childish. I couldn't walk, I had no appetite, I slept all the time. And I had no desire to read!

In my twenties I'd known champion readers such as New York poets Richard Howard and John Hollander, who'd scribble down the name of any book that sounded intriguing and immediately order it, in a day when ordering wasn't just a matter of touching a key on a computer. Later I met Susan Sontag, again an encyclopedic reader, who would buy me (and many other friends) books she thought were essential to my education. She once said to me, "When you see a book you want, buy it instantly because you may never find it again." I

remember she bought me Sergey Aksakov's memoirs of his childhood among the Cossacks—a thrillingly beautiful hymn to the simple life, mare's milk, and the joyous arrival of spring on the steppes.

In the hospital I'd pick up a book, but I couldn't concentrate. The letters remained stubbornly crisp and sharp and separate, isolated, resistant to flow. They didn't resolve into words, nor words into paragraphs. I'd always been curious about things to the point of forgetting my own identity. Sometimes I thought I was preparing for the high-cultural questions God would pose as the price of admission into paradise. I wanted to know everything; until about age twenty-five, I'd guess, I'd remember most information I looked up, an arduous process before Google. I was a fierce little autodidact, to the degree that when I was eight my father warned me not to say "I know" to my elders but to temper my pronouncements by preluding them with "I may be wrong, but I think I heard somewhere that Cortés conquered the Aztecs," a wimpish disclaimer that irritated and humiliated me. I was a know-it-all then who cared more about ascertaining the truth than about appearing humble. I loved the truth and had no patience with those who said, "There are many truths" or "The truth is always relative." For me, the truth was absolute; circumstances could not modify it, nor differing cultural perspectives dilute it.

But after my heart attack? Now I took pleasure in telling tall tales, never submitting them to any sort of skepticism. I went from being a fierce absolutist to a sly imp of the perverse. Perhaps what really happened was far easier to explain: I suddenly couldn't tolerate any ambiguity, struggle, puzzle, or potential conflict because I felt too weak, too vulnerable, too simple to sustain complexity. Also I was living in a world without event except the arrival of meals (which I couldn't bring myself to touch) and the punctual measurement of my "vitals." I, who'd always swum in the muddy waters of psychological nuance (the fiction I made and read), now couldn't endure its trying suspense, its destabilizing subtlety, its openness to conflicting interpretation. If I rejected narrative as words on the page—and I didn't even watch TV!—the repressed returned in the form of elaborate, hallucinatory dreams. Someone said, "Your brain isn't getting enough oxygen. That's why your dreams are so vivid and surreal." These dreams became my new reality; I could scarcely distinguish between what I'd dreamed and what I experienced... <>

After Foucault: Culture, Theory, and Criticism in the 21st Century edited by Lisa Downing [After Series, Cambridge University Press, 978-1316506042]

The work of Michel Foucault is much read, widely cited, and occasionally misunderstood. In response to this state of affairs, this collection aims to clarify, to contextualize, and to contribute to Foucauldian scholarship in a very specific way. Rather than offering either a conceptual introduction to Foucault's work, or a series of interventions aimed specifically at experts, After Foucault explores his critical afterlives, situates his work in current debates, and explains his intellectual legacy. As well as offering up-to-date assessments of Foucault's ongoing use in fields such as literary studies, sexuality studies, and history, chapters explore his relevance for urgent and emerging disciplines and debates, including ecology, animal studies, and the analysis of neoliberalism. Written in an accessible style, by leading experts, After Foucault demonstrates a commitment to taking seriously the work of a key twentieth-century thinker for contemporary academic disciplines, political phenomena, and cultural life.

I don't write a book so that it will be the final word; I write a book so that other books are possible, not necessarily written by me. Michel Foucault, interview, 1971

The work of an intellectual is not to mould the political will of others; it is, through the analyses that he does in his own field, to re-examine evidence and assumptions, to shake up habitual ways of working and thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities, to re-evaluate rules and institutions and to participate in the formation of a political will. Michel Foucault, interview, 1989

Excerpt: Michel Foucault (1926-1984) considered himself a `historian of the present'.' By this, he meant that he intended his archeological and genealogical studies of institutions and phenomena, such as psychiatry, prisons, and criminality, to reveal, via analysis of the past conditions that produced them, a truth about our enduring relationship with them in the present. Foucault first used the term `history of the present' in Discipline and Punish (1975), where he rhetorically asks why he is motivated to carry out a historical analysis of the carceral system: `Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present'. Thus, a `history of the present' is not anachronism, that is, the past viewed and distorted through the necessarily biased lens of the present; rather, as Foucault put it: `I set out from a problem expressed in the terms current today and I try to work out its genealogy. Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question posed in the present'.

Given Foucault's desire to write a history of the present, it bears asking in what ways, and to what extent, the concerns of his present speak, still today, to ours. The work of Foucault is much read, widely cited, and often misunderstood. In response to this state of affairs, this book aims to clarify, contextualize, and contribute to knowledge about Foucault in a very specific way. Rather than offering either a conceptual introduction to Foucault's work for absolute beginners (for several works of this kind already exist), or yet a series of interventions aimed specifically at Foucault specialists, and contributing to the scholarly debates of a small group of initiates, After Foucault instead explores a range of Foucault's critical afterlives in an accessible and wide-ranging way, appealing to multiple readerships, contextualizing the place of his thought in current debates, and explaining the legacy with which Foucault leaves us today. While an array of disparate, disciplinary perspectives are brought together in the book, one contention underlies all the contributions: the ideas, concepts, and phenomena Foucault was working on in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s continue to speak to us today, some thirty-two years after his death.

Eight years ago, in the afterword to my Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault, I wrote:

> If readers continue to be interested in Foucault — and all the signs suggest that this is the case — it is, perhaps, because these very tensions and internal contradictions make him one of the most relevant thinkers for our current age.

The `tensions and internal contradictions' to which I drew attention here are key features of the Foucauldian oeuvre and are, for many, a source of fascination that keeps us going back to Foucault. These include his ability to evoke, at the same time, a rejection of `depth claims' and a paradoxical valorization of the transcendental or mystical voice of unreason exposed in the words of 'mad' writers. They recall his suspicion of the idea of the sovereign human self, on the one hand, and his propounding of `self-stylization' as a project of ethics, on the other. And they point to his critique of the dominance of discourses about sexuality over techniques for producing bodily pleasures in the modern West, at the same time as his own multivolume History of Sexuality cannot but also constitute an example of a `discourse about sex'.

My 2008 Afterword' reads, in hindsight, as a statement of the need, not so much for the book I was writing then, but rather for the current book. It signals the ongoing aptness of Foucault's thought for helping us to apprehend 'the political, ecological and ideological conditions in which we live's — conditions which are increasingly often marked by discourses of crisis, of conflict, of rupture, and of end times. In particular, our postmillennial condition seems marked precisely by this idea of `after', encapsulated in the discourse of `post-'. Yet being `post' is never so simple as it may seem. We are allegedly 'post-human', yet we are troubled, in an all-too-human way, by the ills of our age; we are immersed in neoliberal values and systems, and yet we often tend to understand our discontent in individualistic terms and to seek respite from it via the very consumerist pursuits neoliberalism encourages (so-called 'post-feminism' in particular epitomizes this trend); we are in an era of 'post-truth' politics, yet (therefore) in truly desperate need of the skills of apprehending in whose interests lies are being told. Foucault, in all his difficult, rich, debunking-yet-still-oddly-idealistic, complexity is relevant, then, precisely because we are living in profoundly contradictory times, in times in which surface and depth are often perceived as interchangeable, and in which the notion that something is over — is `post-' — may be used to exculpate those who benefit from getting us to avert our eyes from still-operational ideologies and phenomena. Just as Foucault's histories of the present involved identifying or `diagnosing' a contemporary phenomenon or problematic, and then tracing its emergence in order to destabilize or disturb the commonplace apprehension of it, so we may look back to Foucault and his methods to re-view our troubled world through fresh eyes.

The Foucault Industry

This book is not the first to consider how Foucault's writing and thought have gone on to shape ways of approaching the search for knowledge in the disciplines and in the world. Jonathan Arac's 1988 collection, entitled, along similar lines to the current work, After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges, reflects on possible applications of Foucault's work for a number of fields and disciplines, most notably philology, history, psychoanalysis, and feminism. Published only four years after Foucault's death, and emerging from a conference that took place three years prior to publication, the book's reflection on how Foucault's `history' speaks to 'the present' evokes, inevitably, largely the same `present' as that in which Foucault himself was working. Its disciplinary focus also very much reflects the fashions of the 1980s in the humanities disciplines, making it a historical work in its own right now, a product of its own (and of Foucault's) time. Therefore, while Arac's book is a valuable contribution to Foucault studies, which contains some significant essays, it is time for a work that brings some of the concerns raised therein bang up to date. More recently, Sophie Fuggle, Yari Lanci, and Martina Tazzioli's Foucault and the History of Our Present (2014) reads Foucault as a practitioner of `radical journalism', observing the present from a position of `dislocation from the space where we are'. The book sets out to examine analysis of sexuality to include also gender identity and gender performance.) Similarly, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's influential Epistemology of the Closet (1990, published in the same year as Gender Trouble, builds on Foucauldian ideas about the relationship of knowledge to power to explore the meanings of `closetedness', of knowing and not-knowing, in the sphere of sexual identity. She argues that, from the nineteenth century onwards, Western discourse has organized knowledge along binary lines, that can be understood as mapping on to the assumed heterosexual/homosexual dyad (where the former term is unmarked and positive and the latter othered and subordinated). More recently, Lynne Huffer's monograph, Mad for Foucault (2010, has re-envisioned queer's inheritance of Foucault by paying attention to Foucauldian texts other than the first volume of The History of Sexuality, in particular his early writings on madness, in order to show that the queer insights Foucault offers us for understanding the world are both sprinkled throughout his oeuvre and are, indeed at the heart of his entire life's project in all its disparate glory.

The existence of a not insignificant number of titles on varying aspects of Foucault's afterlives, then, corroborates the strength of his enduring relevance beyond his lived moment. Yet, what none of these

titles quite does, and what precisely motivates the writers of the present book, is, first, to offer clarification of key concepts from Foucault's oeuvre that persist in shaping our understanding of the world; second, to contextualize Foucault's texts and thought in a range of both traditional and emergent academic fields; and, third and finally, to carry out a series of readings after Foucault. In this way, by attending to these three distinct but connected concerns in one book, After Foucault does not stop at elaborating the ongoing usefulness of the Foucauldian `toolbox', but goes on to deploy it in a series of timely, innovative, and heuristic ways.

After Foucault

The division of the book into three parts is underpinned by its three aims, as stated earlier: clarifying, contextualizing, and carrying out readings. Accordingly, the chapters in Part I, `Going After Foucault', analyse what is particular to, or at the heart of, a series of key Foucauldian concepts. (They 'go after' the substance of these concepts.) These are notions that, despite first appearing in works by Foucault between the 1960s and the 1980s, continue to animate critical debates today. Beginning with the central question of thinking of history differently, the opening chapter by Robert Gillett shows how `genealogy', developed in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, and providing a distinct alternative in the nineteenth century to the contemporaneous and competing Hegelian model of dialectics, inspired Foucault precisely because it offers an account of history that foregrounds the place of power relations and discontinuity in historical processes. Gillett demonstrates how this concept, that animated Foucault's late work, continues to be productive for thinking about narratives of identity in our epoch. By showing how genealogical thought is key to queer thinking and politics, Gillett argues that understanding genealogy fully offers insight also into understanding the ongoing political necessity of queer. He therefore suggests strongly that, contrary to some recent claims, we are very far from being `post-queer'.

In their chapter on Foucault's multiple theorizations of subjectivity, Monica Greco and Martin Savransky contend that Foucault's work constitutes 'a veritable event in the history of modern thought', such that thinking about subjectivity after Foucault always, inevitably, involves thinking it with and through him. This is the nature, they suggest, of inheritance. Looking at the models of the self offered by Foucault enables them to plot two historical/philosophical ways of thinking: first of the self in relation to, and as revelatory of, truth, and second of the self as aligned with the question, not of what one is, but of what one might become. Following the second model, they offer a reading of Foucault's later work on the ethical care for the self as an interrogatory gesture, opening up for contemporary and later readers the question of what kinds of relationship we may build between subjectivity, truth, and freedom. The problematic nature of freedom and selfhood is picked up again in Nicholas Gane's chapter on Foucault's controversial and much-debated lectures and texts on neoliberalism. Gane focuses on Foucault's 1978-1979 lectures at the Collège de France, published in English as The Birth of Biopolitics in 2008, which are notable both for being one of Foucault's rare historical analyses of twentieth-century phenomena, and for having been delivered in France at the very time that the pro-free market ideology of neoliberalism was taking hold in Margaret Thatcher's United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan's United States. Rather than seeking to answer unequivocally the oft-posed question of whether Foucault's approach to neoliberalism was approbatory or condemnatory, Gane instead takes the eminently Foucauldian position of tracing the genealogy of neoliberalism back through Austrian and American economic philosophical traditions, in order to show up the logic and contradictions inherent to, and subtending, neoliberal philosophy. In the context of the recent financial crisis, and ongoing global economic uncertainty, the task of seeking a deeper and fuller understanding of where neoliberalism comes from, and what it aims toward, via the genealogical method, appears not only salient, but urgent.

The final chapter in Part I focusses on Foucault's concept of biopower and biopolitics, the system by which the organization and governance of human populations as living individuals and groups are arrived at. After situating biopower in Foucault's oeuvre, as one of several modes of power he chose

to investigate (along with sovereign power and disciplinary power), the authors, Kay Peggs and Barry Smart, explore an implication of biopower that Foucault himself raised, but did not pursue in any great depth: the question of the instrumentalization by human beings of non-human animals. Peggs and Smart show how Foucault's work is a central tool for thinking about the form of power that operates in battery farms and scientific laboratories, and for raising ethical questions about human—non-human power relations and the largely unchallenged bigotry of speciesism. The chapters in Part I, then, offer critical insights into some of Foucault's most intriguing ideas, enabling readers with an interest in Foucault to get to grips with the particularity of his theory and the flavour of his legacy, and, in each case, linking a key concept to phenomena, events, and debates that are relevant to the contemporary world.

The chapters in Part II, entitled `Coming After Foucault', attend to the chronological and influential senses of `after'. In particular, they examine the influence of Foucault's writings on a range of the disciplinary/discursive fields (in the academy and in political movements), where his ideas have permeated, sometimes in ways that are implicit, partial, or not apparent from outside the discipline in question.

In the first chapter of this part of the book, Simon During explores Foucault's impact on the sphere of literary theory. He charts Foucault's uneven reception in the Anglophone world and isolates an element in Foucault's writing about literature — a concern with the mystical and the sacred — that may have placed him at odds with what During identifies as the secular, identitarian, and liberatory underpinnings of critical theory of the late twentieth century. During argues that, where Foucault has been taken up for literary criticism, the texts that have been mined are those that examine institutions and power, not those that explore the transcendental voice of 'mad' writers. It is, then, this earlier, oft-ignored element of Foucault's corpus that During envisages as the potential inspiration for a `secular criticism-to-come, willing to risk attaching itself to literature's metaphysical and mystical capacities'. During's monograph, Foucault and Literature (1992), is one of the few extant, full-length works about Foucault's own literary criticism and on the uses of Foucault for literary criticism. In his chapter of After Foucault, he brings the insights in this key text up to date for the twenty-first century. In somewhat similar vein, Lynne Huffer's chapter on Foucault and queer theory, much like her ground-breaking monograph Mad for Foucault, discussed earlier in this Introduction, takes as its starting point the fact that, while the idea of Foucault as a progenitor of queer is widely accepted, only certain parts of Foucault's corpus tend to be credited with being properly queer (namely The History of Sexuality). Reading Foucault through queer theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's work on love, Huffer suggests that attending to a genealogy of love in Foucault may offer a new perspective on how he contributes to the history of queer. This suggestion comes in tandem with an observation that very recent texts of queer theory are marked by a move away from Foucault's hermeneutics of suspicion, and in the direction of an affective or 'new materialist' turn. This broad `turn', which has impacted critical theory in recent years, aims to relativize the post-structuralist focus on language (or discourse understood as language + power) with a consideration of embodied experiences of, in Huffer's words, `sensation, matter, and affect'.

In her chapter on Foucault, race, and racism, Rey Chow charts some of the criticisms levelled at Foucault with regard to race — particularly the common accusation that he is guilty of Eurocentrism. She then goes on to reject such easy accusations in favour of a more nuanced reading of Foucault's writing on race to show what it might bring to a critical apprehension of race and racism. She argues that a careful reading of Foucault allows for an understanding of racialization as, not simply a matter of prejudice based on perceived skin colour, but rather as aligned with `state institutions, social practices, and individual conscience productions that continue to be galvanized by Christian techniques of power'. Ending on a note of warning, Chow suggests that, at the time of writing, in 2016, Muslims have come to wear the mantle of `racialized other', with Islam consistently associated with the terror against which (Western) `society must be defended'.

Part II closes with Emma A. Foster's consideration of ecology and environmentalism, fields that are seldom considered in works about Foucault, but that have nevertheless been influenced in recent years by Foucauldian insights. Foster shows how Foucault's thought is pertinent for the field in terms of the challenge it poses to simple or singular definitions both of `Nature' and of the human subject who interacts with it. A Foucauldian analysis, fully aware of the workings of discursive power, allows for problematization of the notion of the 'good ecosubject', who is often constructed along `racialized, gendered and heteronormative lines'. Given the intensifying focus on ecological concerns in politics and international relations, and the recent turn in literary and cultural studies towards ecocriticism, Foster's chapter provides both a crucial survey of existing uses of Foucault for the field and an analysis of the import of resisting the normativity inherent in some assumptions underlying ecocritique.

Part III, `Reading After Foucault', addresses the question of how our readings of texts and visual culture, of cultural products, and of social phenomena have changed, or may be inflected, as a result of Foucault's intellectual legacy. This part of the book opens with a chapter by Tim Dean, who interrogates what is understood in the twenty-first century by`sex', how this differs from `sexuality', and how a close reading of Foucault may help us to make sense of both. Using examples from contemporary culture, including recent campaigns about sexual assault on US university campuses, Dean argues that Foucault offers a necessary corrective to 'US myths of individualism', by offering an account of (sexual) `power as relational'. Further, he wonders what would need to be done to wrest 'sex' away from `sexuality', that is, away from the discursive province of the medical and psy sciences, and to reframe it, as Foucault would have wished, on the side of aesthetics.

Jacques Khalip, in his chapter on Foucauldian ethics, also opens with a focus on aesthetics. Khalip uses an auto-fictional literary text (Hervé Guibert's To the Friend Who Did Not Save My Life, 1990) and a photographic artwork (Robert Mapplethorpe's Fist Fuck/Double, 1978), alongside Foucault's essays and interviews, to argue that ethics, for Foucault, must not be understood either as straightforward care for others, nor as material self-interest. Rather, he argues that Foucault propounds 'a care for the self that rejects narcissistic claims about defending the future well-being of one's own "life"'. Engaging with recent work in antisocial queer theory, by names such as Lee Edelman, Khalip posits that Foucauldian ethics takes us beyond the horizons of personal aims and ambitions to suggest an almost post-human commitment to detachment. In short, Khalip reads against the grain to reveal a cruel and depersonalized Foucauldian ethics that stands in stark contradistinction to the more commonly recognizable one that asks 'but couldn't everyone's life become a work of art?'

Also drawing on semi-auto/biographical fiction as a starting point, Oliver Davis's chapter on the `queer pharmatopia' examines Mathieu Lindon's novel, Learning What Love Means (2011), which depicts the life of a group of young students and philosophers, including a fictionalized version of the author, who frequented the apartment of the charismatic figure of `Michel' (the novel's representative of Foucault) in the 1960s, and partook of recreational drugs. Via discussion of the fictional work, Davis undertakes a Foucauldian critique of the contemporary medicalized discourse of drug addiction, and the pathologization of the practice particularly when carried out by gay men (referencing the contemporary `epidemic' — or `moral panic', depending on one's position — of `chemsex', or uninhibited sexual activity, enhanced by the influence of drugs, often in a party setting). Davis examines the extent to which Foucault's recreational drug use can be understood, less as a pathological practice, and more as a creative `practice of the self'.

Finally, Part III closes with my chapter on Foucault and true crime. This chapter considers the fact that much ink has been spilled in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in the service of writing about true crime and criminals, both in popular and academic contexts. It also notes that Foucault's analysis of the criminal figure as an exceptional, `abnormal' subject is a reference point for much writing of this kind. Yet, despite these facts, very little has been done to respond to Foucault's

recommendation in I Pierre Rivière... (1973) that researchers should assemble and analyse dossiers around crimes in order to identify the dominant discursive conditions surrounding and producing them. My chapter attempts precisely to take Foucault up on this: it undertakes a Foucauldian reading of three texts produced around a twentieth-century British criminal case, that of the Moors Murders (the killings of a number of children, carried out by Myra Hindley and Ian Brady in the North of England in the 1960s). The texts in the dossier are a work of classic New-Journalism inspired 'true crime', Emlyn Williams's Beyond Belief (1967), a book about the psychology of murder written by the killer Ian Brady, The Gates of Janus (2002), and Myra, Beyond Saddleworth (2012), a novel by Jean Rafferty that explores what might have happened had Myra Hindley not died in prison in 2002, but instead been released. The chapter reflects upon the place of genre writing in contributing to the non-normative and mythical subjectification of the criminal; it looks at the porousness of genre, since each book considered deviates in key ways from being mere reportage; and it asks, finally, why the figure of the `abnormal' criminal fascinated Foucault and continues to fascinate contemporary Western readers quite so much. In some ways, then, Part III is the most obviously relevant section of the book for students and scholars of literary and cultural studies, as three of its chapters take texts that span fact and fiction — semi-autobiographical novels and works in the true crime genre — as their objects of Foucauldian enquiry. Others `read' a phenomenon — sex in the case of Dean's chapter. <>

The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose by Andrew Brower Latz [Veritas Book, Cascade Books 9781532618376]

Gillian Rose was one of the most important social philosophers of the twentieth century. This is the first book to present her social philosophy as a systematic whole. Based on new archive research and examining the full range of Rose's sources, it explains her theory of modern society, her unique version of ideology critique, and her views on law and mutual recognition. Brower Latz relates Rose's work to numerous debates in sociology and philosophy, such as the relation of theory to metatheory, emergence, and the relationship of sociology and philosophy. This book makes clear not only Rose's difficult texts but the entire structure of her thought, making her complete social theory accessible for the first time.

Excerpt:

If you could create a phenomenology of consciousness, some part of it would be the systematic falsification of the foundations of our culture. —Marilynne Robinson

This book provides an original interpretation and reconstruction of Gillian Rose's work as a distinctive social philosophy within the Frankfurt School tradition. Rose's social philosophy has multiple achievements. It holds together the methodological, logical, descriptive, metaphysical, and normative moments of social theory. It provides a critical theory of modern society. It includes a distinctive version of ideology critique based on the history of jurisprudence, and offers interesting modulations of mutual recognition as the internal moral norm of modern society.

Rose's philosophy integrates three key moments of the Frankfurt tradition: a view of the social totality as both an epistemological necessity and normative ideal; a philosophy that is its own metaphilosophy because it integrates its own logical and social preconditions within itself; and a critical analysis of modern society that is simultaneously a critique of social theory. Rose's work is original in the way it organizes these three moments around absolute ethical life as the social totality, its Hegelian basis, and its metaphysical focus on law and jurisprudence. I construe Rose's Hegelian philosophy as an account of reason that is both social and logical without reducing philosophy to the sociology of knowledge, thereby steering between dogmatism and relativism. Central to this position are the historically developing nature of rationality and knowing, and an account of the nature of explanation as depending on a necessarily, and necessarily imperfectly, posited totality. Said positing is always provisional and can be revised through the combination of several different kinds of social theorizing. No totality is ever fully attained, in practice or theory, but is brought to view through the Hegelian-speculative exposition of history, of dirempted experience, and of the tensions immanent to social theories.' I thus call such totalities "implied" or "provisional." For example, any adequate understanding of the contemporary world must include a grasp of the global capitalist economy but no such grasp can be complete. Rose posited and explored one main social totality within her own social philosophy—absolute ethical life—as the implied unity of law and ethics, and of finite and infinite. In her trilogy (Hegel Contra Sociology, Dialectic of Nihilism, The Broken Middle) absolute ethical life enables a critique simultaneously and immanently of society and social philosophy in three ways. First, of both the social form of bourgeois property law and social contract theories reflective of it. Second, of social theorizing that insufficiently appreciates its jurisprudential determinations and/or attempts to eliminate metaphysics. Third, the broken middle shows the state-civil society and the law-ethics diremptions as two fundamental features of modern society and as frequently unacknowledged influences on social theorizing.

Rose's social philosophy speaks to a number of debates. In the field of social theory and sociology it provides a critical theory of modern society revolving around the law-ethics and state-society diremptions, which are also foci for empirical investigations. It provides a logical grounding for social theory, explains the presence of contradiction and appearance (Schein) in sociology, accounts for the historical nature of sociological knowing, foregrounds the need for an interplay between different sociological methods and between philosophy and sociology, and is exemplary in handling the relation between metatheory and theory. It shows that social philosophy cannot escape metaphysics or ethics, and that ethics must take on board at the ground floor the all-pervasive inevitability of mediation. It adds important textures to the ethics of mutual recognition, and suggests several aspects of practical wisdom for citizens of modern societies. It provides a significant contribution to the development of Hegelian-Adornian Frankfurt theories, including how such theories could be open to religion. It includes a unique version of ideology critique based on jurisprudence. It calls for a broad vision of philosophy of law, in which relations between legal, ethical, and metaphysical questions are foregrounded and addressed. Finally, its distinction between "Holocaust ethnography" and "Holocaust piety" addresses discussions in continental social philosophy about power and subjectivity after the Holocaust.

I use the term "social philosophy" to describe Rose's work because Rose preferred the term "philosopher" as a self-description since it covered the breadth of her interests—ethical, legal, political, metaphysical, epistemological and social:

"Only philosophy as I conceive it can accommodate my intellectual endeavors across their range.'" She also used the self-appellation "social theorist." Rose placed herself within the Frankfurt School tradition in a lecture given in 1986: "There are now generations of Frankfurt School students who occupy posts as sociologists and philosophers throughout the world. I really consider myself to be one of them" She was, more specifically, part of the Hegel-Adorno strand of the second-generation of the Frankfurt School. In line with this tradition she opposed the separation of philosophy and sociology. "My current and recent research and publishing has a common core: to investigate the separation of sociological thinking (methodological and substantive) from philosophical thinking which leads to the posing of sociological questions without a sociological culture." For the purposes of my argument, therefore, I use "social philosophy" and "social theory" (and their derivatives) synonymously.

My interpretation has five main advantages over the alternatives.' First and above all it presents Rose's work as a coherent social theory and shows how she deployed it in various ways, thereby making Rose's work more available for use as a social theory. It shows Rose sophisticatedly relates the main moments of critical social theory, has a critical theory of modern society, and it reveals for the first time her distinctive versions of mutual recognition and ideology critique. Second, it explains how and why Rose regarded Hegel Contra Sociology, Dialectic of Nihilism and The Broken Middle as a trilogy. Each is a way of pursuing the critique-of-society-and-sociology in relation to the social totality on the basis of a Hegelian philosophy and metaphilosophy. Third, by showing how Rose appropriated Hegel, Adorno, the Frankfurt School, the jurisprudential tradition, Marx, and Weber, it reveals her work as an original synthesis of all her main sources rather than concentrating only on some. Fourth, it is the most comprehensive and detailed interpretation available, encompassing not only her written works but also archive material, and recollections of former friends, colleagues and students. I have made the most extensive use to date of the Gillian Rose archives at Warwick and her taped lectures at Sussex. In the course of my research, I have retrieved the text of a paper she gave at a conference in Sweden in the early eighties that was heretofore unknown. I also register the influence of her teachers Dieter Henrich and Leszek Kolakowski. Continuities between Rose's work and these philosophers are revealing and noted where they occur. This comprehensiveness matters because the scope and ambition of Rose's work is crucial to it: her social philosophy is only properly understood in a synoptic vision; concentrating on only parts of it, rather than the whole, distorts those parts. Fifth, due to its comprehensive nature, my interpretation is able to answer the debate within the secondary literature about the role of religion in her work and her work's relation to religion. I show that religion was not a major source for her thinking but was rather material on which she exercised her mature social philosophy; at the same time Rose articulates a Frankfurt Hegelianism open to religion and theology.

Rose's Life and Work

Gillian Rose was born Gillian Rosemary Stone in London on 20 September 1947 to a secular Jewish family originally from Poland. She studied philosophy, politics and economics at Oxford, then continental social philosophy, sociology and the Frankfurt School at New York's Columbia University and the Freie Universität of Berlin. She also attended the New School for Social Research while in America. Her introduction to German philosophy began at Oxford, in a seminar set up by Hermínio Martins; continued in America and Germany; and resumed in Oxford when she returned to complete a PhD on Adorno under the supervision of Leszek Kolakowski and Steven Lukes. Rose studied Hegel with Dieter Heinrich in Germany.' She was reader in sociology at Sussex University from the mid-seventies to 1989 and professor of social and political thought at Warwick University from 1989 to 1995, a chair created especially for her. All ten of her PhD students moved with her from Sussex to Warwick. Rose was "one of a number of Jewish `intellectuals' chosen to advise the Polish Commission on the Future of Auschwitz." Rose published eight books, two articles and four book reviews. She made interventions into many fields, including German idealism, the Frankfurt School, Marxism, postmodernism and poststructuralism, sociology, Christian theology, Jewish theology and

philosophy, Holocaust studies, architecture and jurisprudence, and offered original readings of many figures, including Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Arendt, Luxemburg, Varnhagen, Girard, Mann, and Kafka. She read German, French, Latin, Hebrew and Danish. She died in Coventry on 9 December 1995, aged forty-eight, after a two-year struggle with ovarian cancer. She was baptized into the Anglican Church moments before her death by the then-bishop of Coventry, Simon Barrington-Ward. This was surprising and troubling to some, creating a debate about how or whether Rose's conversion related to her work. "Conversion," however, may be the wrong term, since she wrote in her final weeks in hospital, "I shall not lose my Judaism, but gain that more deeply, too ... I am both Jewish and Christian.'

Rose applied her social theory to Judaism and Christianity as she became both increasingly interested in religion and, indeed, religious. Some of her close friends were important religious figures or theologians (Julius Carlebach, John Milbank, Rowan Williams, Simon Barrington-Ward), and her work has been used theologically by figures such as Milbank, Williams, Andrew Shanks, Vincent Lloyd, Anna Rowlands, Marcus Pound, and Randi Rashkover. This has created a debate within the secondary literature about the role and status of religion in her thought. Does religion (especially Anglicanism) emerge as a telos for her whole corpus (Andrew Shanks)? Or is its role overplayed when she instead developed a "secular faith" (Vincent Lloyd)? Did her interest in religion make her work less coherent and less powerful (Tony Gorman)? Or does her work provide useful insight and resources for theology (Milbank, Pound, Rashkover, Rowlands, Williams)? Rose was not a theorist of religion per se and did not develop a separate theory of religion. Only in her posthumously published texts do explicit religious remarks appear. I will show she used the social philosophy she had already developed to assess certain aspects of religious philosophy and political theology. Thus theology was not a major source for Rose in forming her social philosophy but material on which she exercised it. This, along with the various uses by theologians of her work, clearly supports the view that her social philosophy provides useful insights for theology, without being itself directly theological (except in the record of her personal religious experiences in her posthumous writings). Hence her work's relation to theology cannot be understood apart from a proper understanding of her social philosophy. Yet Rose does show the possibility of a Frankfurt version of self-limiting rationality that is open to religious views. Rose does not develop this connection at length, however.

Outline of the Argument

I argue that Rose integrated the methodological, descriptive, metaphysical and normative moments of social theory, as well as three core Frankfurt School requirements for social philosophy—a view of the social totality," that philosophy be its own metaphilosophy, and that a critique of society be at the same time a critique of sociology"—around absolute ethical life. I argue further that she provides a critical theory of modern society and advances distinctive versions of ideology critique and mutual recognition. Rose's theory is also open to religion based on the Frankfurt doctrine of self-limiting reason.

Absolute ethical life is for Rose a central component of Hegel's Absolute, an impossible unity of law and ethics we are nevertheless compelled to posit by a speculative exposition of experience of society. In her trilogy she brought out three main aspects of this. First, Hegel's view of absolute ethical life as a critique of the bourgeois property form and its hold over the social contract philosophy of Kant and Fichte. Second, social philosophy's unavoidable entanglement in metaphysics and jurisprudence. Third, the diremptions between law and ethics and between state and civil society as fundamental to modern society and influencing social theories. I explore these in chapters 1, 3, and 4, respectively. Chapter 1 explains the Hegelian foundation of Rose's social philosophy, showing its integration of philosophy and metaphilosophy to supply methodological and logical guidance in sociology. Chapter 2 shows how, from the beginning, Rose's conception of the social totality was of a self-consciously imperfect grasp of a fissured whole, thus avoiding many of the problems associated with "totalizing." Her Frankfurt view of self-limiting rationality supported this conception and her reception of religion. I examine her versions of

ideology critique and mutual recognition in chapters 3 and 4, respectively. Chapter 4 elucidates the state-civil society and law-ethics diremptions as Rose's theory of modern society.

Chapter 1 exposits Rose's Hegelian framework for social philosophy as found in Hegel Contra Sociology. I begin by relating Rose's work to contemporary and earlier Hegelian scholarship in order to locate her controversial and somewhat eccentric interpretation of Hegel. I then explain the argument of Hegel Contra Sociology and her appreciative critique of classical and Frankfurt School sociology. Since any totality (both as social reality and our epistemological grasp thereof) is necessarily imperfect, Rose accepts the complementarity of different sociological approaches but aims to account for the good practice of social theory better than consequence of which is revealed in Rose's work on theoretical responses to Auschwitz. Chapter 3 shows how Rose pursued the reciprocal critique of sociology and society in Dialectic of Nihilism through "the antinomy of law" This names the permanent but changing tension between law and ethics, foregrounded by absolute ethical life and manifested socially in tensions between customs and constitution. Rose does not attempt to solve or dissolve the antinomy, by synthesizing its poles or making one primary. She analyzes its appearance in social philosophies as an ideology critique of said philosophies based on historical legal epochs influencing their work. Rose critiques Kant, neo-Kantians, and poststructuralists in this way, showing the effects of social forms ("objective spirit") on consciousness, relating the soul and the city, as she put it. By examining Rose's critique of Kant I show how her novel ideology critique is intended to work and how in Kant's case it fails, but suggest her critiques of poststructuralism are nearer the mark. This failure is nevertheless instructive insofar as it reveals some of Rose's constructive aims, namely, support for a social and political philosophy inspired by Hegel's Philosophy of Right, the use of law to gain a view of the social totality, and an expansive view of jurisprudence as examining the links between the metaphysical, ethical and legal. I explore the latter in dialogue with the work of Sean Coyle, as a positive example of "jurisprudential wisdom:'

Chapter 4 shows how, in The Broken Middle and later works, Rose developed in her mature position both the relation between philosophy and metaphilosophy and the reciprocal critique of sociology and society through the two fundamental diremptions of modern society: between state and civil society (using Marx and Arendt), and between law and ethics (using Weber). She examines how social philosophies of various stripes do not adequately reflect on these diremptions and so are determined by them in ways that undermine their intentions. In this way both postmodern political theologies and Levinasian forms of ethics are mirror images of one another, in flight from the rationalization of law and society. At this stage in the argument, with a view of Rose's social theory as a whole, it becomes apparent Rose applied her social theory to political theology rather than wrote directly theological material. I expand on the constructive side of Rose's theory as an analysis of modern society by drawing on the work of Sara Farris and Zygmunt Bauman to defend the enduring importance of the state-civil society diremption. I show the way in which Rose began to develop the law-ethics diremption in relation to ethics, politics and mutual recognition. I briefly explore the modulation Rose gave the latter. The conclusion summarizes Rose's mature social philosophy of the broken middle. <>

Against Innocence: An Introduction to Gillian Rose by Andrew Shanks [Hymns Ancient & Modern Ltd, 9780334041368]

Gillian Rose (1947-1995) was a highly original, enigmatic and pugnacious thinker, whose work draws together Continental philosophy, sociology, modern/postmodern Jewish and Christian reflection on ethics. She was also, famously, a convert to Christianity, baptised into the Church of England on her deathbed, from Judaism. She has been a major influence on many contemporary thinkers, not least on the thought of the Archbishop Rowan Williams. Her writings are teasingly poetic, often forbiddingly difficult, and yet at the same time vividly accessible, at any rate through her widely praised memoir, Love's Work. Here, a Church of England priest writes about Rose's thought as it relates to the future of the Church she eventually joined. A significant philosopher of this century,

they believe her thinking implicitly points towards a new form of Christian self-understanding. This captivatingly well written book is the first major study of Gillian Rose's thought from a theological point of view. It aims to make the work of this highly complex thinker accessible to a wider readership. <>

Love's Work by Gillian Rose, Introduction by Michael Wood [New York Review Books Classics, NYRB Classics, 9781590173657]

Love's Work is at once a memoir and a work of philosophy. Written by the English philosopher Gillian Rose as she was dying of cancer, it is a book about both the fallibility and the endurance of love, love that becomes real and lasting through an ongoing reckoning with its own limitations. Rose looks back on her childhood, the complications of her parents' divorce and her dyslexia, and her deep and divided feelings about what it means to be Jewish. She tells the stories of several friends also laboring under the sentence of death. From the sometimes conflicting vantage points of her own and her friends' tales, she seeks to work out (seeks, because the work can never be complete—to be alive means to be incomplete) a distinctive outlook on life, one that will do justice to our yearning both for autonomy and for connection to others. With droll self-knowledge ("I am highly qualified in unhappy love affairs," Rose writes, "My earliest unhappy love affair was with Roy Rogers") and with unsettling wisdom ("To live, to love, is to be failed"), Rose has written a beautiful, tender, tough, and intricately wrought survival kit packed with necessary but unanswerable questions. <>

Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation by Gillian Rose [Cambridge University Press, 9780521578493]

Mourning Becomes the Law is the philosophical counterpart to the late Gillian Rose's acclaimed memoir Love's Work. It presents a powerful and eloquent case against postmodernism, and breathes new life into the debates about power and domination, transcendence and eternity. Addressing topics such as architecture, cinema, painting, poetry, the Holocaust and Judaism, Gillian Rose enables us to connect ideas about the individual and society with theories of justice. This is philosophy for the nonphilosopher.

Excerpt: `I may die before my time', Gillian Rose says in this remarkable book. She did; but she understood dying as few people have, and she lived her drastically shortened time as a philosopher who believed both in the soul and in the necessary charm of earthly powers. The just city, for Gillian Rose, is not built by the abandonment of reason or the proclamation of uncompromised virtue. It is built by faith in the achievements of even ruined reason and in the different chances of politics that are not ashamed of themselves. Death is at the heart of this book, but no one has ever argued more beautifully or eloquently that "death is not for nothing", and that mourning, when it becomes the law, that is, when it returns to reason, could even put an end to what Gillian Rose calls the "endless dying" of life under tyranny.' -Michael Wood, Princeton University

`Mourning Becomes the Law extends and deepens Gillian Rose's critique of postmodernism, especially in its "ethical" guise. She demonstrates the complicity between a "holocaust piety", an escapist fantasy concerning a misrepresented Judaism, and a fetishization of death. This book heralds a new theoretical dawn.' John Milbank, University of Cambridge

Excerpt:

Athens and Jerusalem: a tale of three cities

We have given up communism — only to fall more deeply in love with the idea of 'the community'.

If `communism' stood for an ideal community, what does the current idea of 'the community' stand for? Quite contrary things. Consider, we say, 'the European community', and we tried not to say, 'the community charge'; 'the American nation and community', says President Bill Clinton, but he also says, 'the politics of the community'. We say 'the community of nations', and we say, 'the ethnic community', and 'the religious community'. On the one hand, 'the community' retains its universal connotations of the commonwealth, the collective interest, the general will; on the other hand, 'the community' resounds with the particular connotations of the locality, the exclusive interests

of specific people, the particular will. This exclusive 'community' implies traditional authority; that inclusive'community' implies legal-rational authority.

Of course, in classic, liberal political theory, the constitution provides a structure of institutions to represent and mediate particular wills and the general will, to generate the commonwealth out of the clash of competing interests: from the premise of the sovereignty of the people emerges the theory of the representative modern state. In de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, the local community is held to be the source of tyranny; we have forgotten, too, that Deutschland über alles was originally intended to affirm the general, liberal state, based on universal rights, the Rechtsstaat, against the myriad regional jurisdictions of Princes and privileges.

Our new affirmation of the local community arises from our equal distrust of the spurious universality of the liberal state and of the imposed universal of the former state-socialisms, two ideals of political community. We judge and believe that both modernity and the critique of modernity have broken their promises. And yet we revert to the equivocal promise harboured in the idea of 'the community'.

What do we hope for from the ideal of the community?

We hope _to solve the political problem; we hope for the New Jerusalem; we hope for à collective life without inner or outer boundaries, without obstacles or occlusions, within and between souls and within and between cities, without the perennial work which constantly legitimates and delegitimates the transformation of power into authority of different kinds.

Consider the case for community architecture, developed by Nick Wates and Charles Knevitt in their book published in 1987. Their case rests on the opposition between the evil empire and the perfect community, between imperium and ecclesiology, the perfect church. But who was to be the guarantor of this new community? Prince Charles.

All alien power is to be dissolved in community architecture: yet the regality and majesty of the 'popular' sovereign are needed to legitimise this proclaimed dissolution of power. In effect, all the paradoxes of power are transferred back into the community.

The argument for community architecture is summarised in a chart which appears in the book, entitled 'What Makes Community Architecture Different'. The chart sets out the contrasts between 'conventional architecture' and 'community architecture'.

> For conventional architecture, the user is passive, for community architecture, the user is active;
> for conventional architecture, the expert is imperious, for community architecture, the expert is companionable;
> for conventional architecture, people are manipulated, for community architecture, people manipulate the system;
> conventional architecture is large-scale and requires wealth, community architecture is small-scale and situated in decaying
> locations;
> conventional architecture has a single function,
> community architecture serves plural functions;
> conventional architecture draws on the international style and employs cold technology,
> community architecture draws on regional and vernacular building traditions and employs convivial technology;
> conventional architecture is preoccupied with financial and political profit,
> community architecture is concerned with the quality of life;
> the ethos of conventional architecture is hieratic' and
> totalitarian,
> the ethos of community architecture is demotic, mutual and pragmatic.

Yet the cover of the book bears an image of Prince Charles, shoulder-to-shoulder with a casually dressed architect, whose emphatic élan of arm and hand and pursed lip contrasts with the Prince's corrugated forehead and incredulous, gaping mouth. These two gesticulating figures appear freestanding against a background montage of photographs, one of apparently ordinary women,

who are conversing over a table covered with architectural plans, and the other of three, grubby, labouring lads, in what looks like an ordinary backyard.

What is going on here? The argument throughout the book seems to have an oppositional and dualistic structure: the idea of the community-in-architecture is developed in opposition to the coercive domination of modernist, bureaucratically managed, conventional architecture. Through every item on the stark list comparing conventional with community architecture, rationality is opposed to community, power abused is opposed to power dissolved and shared — old Athens is opposed to New Jerusalem. On the cover, the idea of a small-scale community, with no clash of particular wills, with, among the women, an ideal-speech situation, among the lads an ideal work situation, the idea of a non-coercive social cohesion, is insinuated by the montage of images. The idea of community depends, however, not only on its contraries, which are demonstrably attributed to conventional architecture, but also on the implied opposition of the community to the political and social totality. The inevitable political predicaments of sovereignty and representation have been projected beyond the boundaries of the community onto the presupposed but not thematised environing body-politic. Conceived without the politics of clashing interests and without the sociological actuality of how domination, including local domination, is to be legitimised as authority, all the oppositions held at bay in the chart will be reproduced within the community-in-architecture, and will take their revenge all the more for being unacknowledged.

The personality of the Prince is to provide the legitimating charisma for the community-in-architecture, as he rubs his contrapposto regal shoulder with the newly enhumbled expert — the architect. Could it be that this New Jerusalem is polluted by the third city, the fairy godmother who was not invited to this holy wedding of Prince and people? For does not each 'citizen' bear within herself two agonistic lives? As a member of civil society, she is legally autonomous and pursues her 'natural', individual and particular interests; and as a member of the community. she imagines her participation in a collectivity; she imagines it all the more when she is confronted by legitimate authority which seems to exclude her.

Doesn't community architecture encourage us to imagine a sham-community, a false Jerusalem? The opposition between the needs and interests of the people and 'conventional' architecture, the latter presented as continuous with the interest of the rationalised, coercive, modern state, is phantasmagorically overcome in the allegory of the Prince - the monarch-to-be serving his apprenticeship as the genie of every locality. Should we not in fact see ourselves in the architect, just as much as in the women or in the lads? The evils of civil society and of the state are merged in the figure of 'the architect', who takes on the anxiety of the separated life of each citizen - following his particular interests, he is vulnerable yet ruthless; aspiring to community, he is frail and self-fearing. An ethical immediacy, a community, is claimed for the people, while the separation between particular and universal is visible in the fraught bearing of the architect. And it is the architect who is demoted: the people do not accede to power.

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I propose that, in the wake of deconstruction and post-modernism (how I wanted to write this lecture without letting those words pass my lips), we have lost all sureness of political discrimination.

¡We no longer know where power resides - in social institutions? in organised knowledge? in the grand critiques of that knowledge? in ourselves, as will-to-power? The confusion in identifying the source and location of power goes together with the impossibility of analysing its structure. When a monolithic or plural character is attributed to power, conceived, for example, as patriarchal, this attribution perpetuates blindness to the reconfiguration of power which we may be assisting by our unarticulated characterisation of it.

It has become commonplace to argue that all social institutions, especially those based on knowledge, represent 'powers' (from the central state to local government, from professions - medicine, law, architecture - to the critical traditions in philosophy and in sociology). But by renouncing knowledge as power, we are then only able to demand expiation

for total domination, for we have disqualified any possible investigation into the dynamics of the configuration and reconfiguration of power - which is our endless predicament. The presentation of power as plural yet total and all-pervasive, and of opposition to power thus conceived as equally pluralistic, multiform and incessant, as the anarchic community, unwittingly and unwillingly participates in a restructuring of power which undermines those semi-autonomous institutions, such as knowledge or architecture, which alleviate the pressure of the modern state on the individual. The plural but total way of conceiving power leaves the individual more not less exposed to the unmitigated power of the state.

Athens, the city of rational politics. has been abandoned: she is said to have proven that enlightenment is domination. Her former inhabitants have set off on a pilgrimage to the New Jerusalem, the imaginary community, where they seek to dedicate themselves to difference, to otherness, to love - to a new ethics, which overcomes the fusion of knowledge. and power in the old Athens. What if the pilgrims, unbeknownst to themselves, carry along in their souls the third city - the city of capitalist private property and modern legal status? The city that separates each individual into a private, autonomous, competitive person, a bounded ego, and a phantasy life of community, a life of unbounded mutuality, a life without separation and its inevitable anxieties? A phantasy life which effectively destroys the remnant of political life?

Recently, I discovered a painting by Poussin, which illustrates the unintended consequences of our substitution of New Jerusalem for the missing analysis of old Athens. This substitution puts the idea of the community, of immediate ethical experience, in the place of the risks of critical rationality. Critical reason is discredited as domination, yet, at the same time, its authority, which was always drawn from absent but representable justice, is borrowed in the reduction to the immediate community or immediate experience.

Some of you may also have seen this painting not long ago. It was the first painting which was presented and discussed by Sister Wendy Beckett, in her recent series of ten-minute television programmes, `Sister Wendy's Odyssey', on BBC 2. Now I don't want you to think that I do my research only by watching television. I had in fact attempted to video a film on ITV, but, instead of the film, which I was longing to watch, 'The Heart is a Lonely Hunter', I got - a nun.

What is more, Sister Wendy Beckett is an anchoress – she belongs to an order of nuns who permit her to live and eat alone. She has lived in a caravan by herself for twenty years, devouring fine art from postcards. The programmes follow her `Odyssey', her first visits to galleries all over the country where the originals of her postcard reproductions are located. Anyone who has seen these programmes cannot fail to be struck by Sister Wendy's celebration of the entwining of human spirituality and human sexuality in the paintings she chose to present.

I was so struck by her discussion of the painting that I am going to show you, that I wrote to Sister Wendy, and attempted to set out my disagreements with what she said. To my delight, after several weeks, she replied, and we have entered into a lively correspondence on these and related matters.

The painting by Poussin, which hangs in the Walker Art Gallery, Liverpool, is called, Gathering the Ashes of Phocion. Poussin's source for the painting is Plutarch's Life of Phocion. According to Plutarch, Phocion was an Athenian general and statesman, who offered a model of civic virtue in his public and in his private life. During a period of deep unrest and political ferment in Athens, Phocion remained above reproach, and even refused the handsome benefices offered him by the king of Macedonia. He served as governor of Athens forty times, and often saved the city from destruction.

However, Phocion was eventually accused of treason by his enemies, and was sentenced to die, like Socrates, by taking hemlock. As an additional disgrace, Phocion's burial within Athens was forbidden, and no Athenian was to provide fire for his funeral. His body was taken outside the city walls and burnt by a paid alien; his ashes were left untended on the pyre.

In the middle of the story of Phocion, Plutarch introduces the character of Phocion's wife. Not named, she is, nevertheless, Individuated by her virtue: her modesty and simplicity are said to have been as celebrated among Athenians as Phocidn's integrity. The painting shows Phocion's wife with a trusted woman companion. They have come to the place outside the city wall where the body of Phocion was burnt so that Phocion's wife may Mather his ashes - for if they are left unconsecrated, his unapposed soul will wander forever. As she cannot bury the ashes in the tomb of his fathers, according to Plutarch, she takes the ashes to her home and buries them by the hearth, dedicating them to the household gods. According to Sister Wendy - although I can't persuade made her to reveal the source for this - Phocion's wife consumes the ashes of her disgraced husband, and thereby gives his unhappy soul a resting place, a tomb, in her own body.

Sister Wendy presented the gesture of the wife bending down to scoop up the ashes as an act of perfect love - as Jerusalem. She contrasted this gesture of love with the unjust nature of the city of Athens, which she saw represented in the classical architecture of the buildings, rising up in the combined landscape and cityscape behind the two women. According to this argument, the classical orders as such stand for the tyranny of the city of Athens. In this presentation of the rational order in itself as unjust power, and the opposition of this domination to the pathos of redeeming love, I discerned the familiar argument that all boundaries of knowledge and power, of soul and city, amount to illegitimate force, and are to be surpassed by the new ethics of unbounded community.

To oppose the act of redeeming love to the implacable domination of architectural and political order - here, pure, individual love to the impure injustice of the world - is completely to efface the politics of this painting.

Phocion's condemnation and manner of dying were the result of tyranny temporarily usurping good rule in the city. The tension of political defiance appears here in the figure of the woman servant, whose contorted posture expresses the fear of being discovered. The bearing of the servant displays the political risk; her visible apprehension protects the complete vulnerability of her mourning mistress as she devotes her whole body to retrieving the ashes. This act is not therefore solely one of infinite love: it is a finite act of political justice.

The magnificent, gleaming, classical buildings, which frame and focus this political act, convey no malignant foreboding, but are perfect displays of the architectural orders: they do not and cannot in themselves stand for the unjust city or for intrinsically unjust law. On the contrary, they present the rational order which throws into relief the specific act of injustice perpetrated by the current representatives of the city — an act which takes place outside the boundary wall of the built city.

The gathering of the ashes is a protest against arbitrary power; it is not a protest against power and law as such. To oppose anarchic, individual love or good to civil or public ill is to deny the third which gives meaning to both — this is the other meaning of the third city — the just city and just act, the just man and the just woman. In Poussin's painting, this transcendent but mournable justice is configured, its absence given presence, in the architectural perspective which frames and focuses the enacted justice of the two women.

To see the built forms themselves as ciphers of the unjust city has political consequences: it perpetuates endless dying and endless tyranny, and it ruins the possibility of political action.

That is what I wrote to Sister Wendy.

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New Jerusalem, the new ethics, has been developed from a dangerously distorted and idealised presentation of Judaism as the sublime other of modernity. I shall return to this later. At the same time, a fourth city, emblem of contemporaneous Jewish history and now of modernity as such, has emerged from the ruin of theoretical and practical reason to provide the measure for demonic anti-reason — the city of Auschwitz.

Now, how. can Auschwitz, the death camp of death camps, be a city? Philosophical, sociological, and architectural work on modernity and the Holocaust

displays an intensification of the opposition between Athens and Jerusalem. Much of this work judges that generalising explanations are in themselves a kind of collusion in what should not be explained but should be left as an evil, unique in human and in divine history; and it calls for silent witness in the face of absolute horror. But to name the Nazi genocide 'the Holocaust' is already to over-unify it and to sacralize it, to see it as providential purpose — for in the Hebrew scriptures, a holocaust refers to a burnt sacrifice which is offered in its entirety to God without any part of it being consumed. The familiar structure of argument then runs as follows: a tight fit is posited between the Holocaust and a general feature of modernity — its legal-rationality, its architectural history, the logic of meaning itself. This leads to the judgement that the feature in question made the Holocaust possible or realisable. Sociologists, architectural historians and philosophers conclude that the methods and means of their own disciplines are principal actors in the Holocaust. The devastation of the respective discipline is declaimed; paradoxically, the sociologist then invokes the new ethics, the philosopher turns to social analysis, and the architectural historian breaks off his book after 500 pages, and relapses into a desperate, dramatised silence.

In each case, the same reversal of logic has occurred: critical rationality conceives and organises the investigation and provides the causal or conditional arguments which are developed in the light of the relevant historical evidence; for example, architectural planning and architects were crucial for the conception, organisation and execution of the Holocaust. Then the roles are reversed: the protagonist, reason, becomes the antagonist, anti-reason. The Holocaust is now seen as the immanent telos of those procedures, and itself becomes the measure, the limit, the criterion, of the polity of those modes of organised thinking; for example, the oust demonstrates the corruption and corruptibility of the architectural tradition from the classical Athenian orders to the Tr movement. Reason is revealed by the Holocaust to be opinionated, and the great contaminator, the Holocaust itself, stands against the actuality against which the history, methods and hitherto of reason are assessed. The Holocaust provides the third for demonic anti-reason; and the Holocaust founds the r the new ethics.

The architectural version of this argument developed by t Jan van Pelt in his book written with Westfall, architectural Principles in the Age of Historicism (1991), Auschwitz plays a special role. At the other five death camps in d, all the buildings were destroyed by the Nazis; at Auschwitz, the only death camp which was also a labour camp, buildings or their remnants remain to this day. The Nazi t in the face of the advancing Russian army was too hurried to be destroyed — only the four crematoria were blown i the architectural argument, Auschwitz is called a 'postictal city', and is shown gruesomely to fulfil the five functions classic model of the five-square city — Athens. These five ons are said to be veneration of the dead, celebration of the government, which concerns the active present, dwelling, i concerns the passive present, and sustenance or trade. In order, the Athenian stelai or grave markers are said to correspond to the Nazi racial laws; the acropolis or shrine is said correspond to the crematoria; the agora, stoa or portico corresponds to the roll calls; the domus is said to correspond to the barracks; the taberna or emporium to the part of the known by the inmates as Kanada, because it was the store e precious belongings brought with them on the transports by Jews who believed that they were to be settled in new lands, in mew communities. I shall return to assess this strange, functional argument later.

Since 1990, I have been acting as one of a number of consultants to the Polish Commission for the Future of Auschwitz — a deeply equivocal nomenclature. This Commission was set up by the Polish Ministry for Culture in 1990, when the Polish government had just taken over the running of the museum and site of Auschwitz from the Soviet Union for the first time since the end of the war. Our continuing brief, in meetings which have taken place in Oxford, Krakow and Auschwitz, has been twofold. One, to advise the museum staff on the restructuring of the museum at Auschwitz I. The exhibitions in the former barracks have remained unchanged for thirty-six years and were originally designed to document Nazi crimes in a way which legitimised Soviet Communism. Two, to advise on

the organisation of visits to Auschwitz II Birkenau, the twenty-acre camp, three kilometres from Auschwitz I, with the infamous selection ramp, men's and women's camps, and the ruins of the four crematoria, built by the Nazis from scratch on the site of the demolished Polish village of Bzezinska.

On average, there are 750,000 visitors a year to Auschwitz, the overwhelming majority of them teenagers. No one under the age of thirteen is allowed on the site. We have been asked to reconsider the balance of cognitive, political, emotional and spiritual experience, which might be induced by the way a visit to the camp is organised. This reflection needs to be translated into the exhibitions at the museum at Auschwitz I and into the way visits are routed through Auschwitz II Birkenau. As it is currently organised, the main exhibition at the museum traumatises people so much that they never get to Birkenau, or if they do, they spend very little time there, even though it is by far the more important site.

This work at Auschwitz, 'the future of Auschwitz', raises in an acutely direct and practical way the question of the relation between knowledge and power. Are our attempts at independent critical reflection merely another stage in the culture industry which Auschwitz has become? While each consultant was invited on an individual and international basis, we soon became aware that our work is taking place in a theatre where Polish, American and Israeli interests clash. A number of Holocaust museums are currently being opened in America, the grandest of which in Washington DC was opened last year. We were horrified to learn that these museums have been outbidding each other for the acquisition of the last remaining, original, wooden barrack from Auschwitz-Birkenau. The Holocaust has become a civil religion in the United States, with Auschwitz as the anti-city of the American political community.

Working at Auschwitz has, however, convinced me that the apparently unnegotiable and expiatory opposition between reason and witness, between knowledge/power and new ethics, or between relativising explanation and prayer, protects us from confronting something even more painful, which is our persistent and persisting dilemma, and not something we can project onto a one-dimensional, demonic rationality, which we think we have disowned. New Jerusalem, the second city, is to arise out of Auschwitz, the fourth city, which is seen as the burning cousin —not the pale — of the first city, Athens. Might not this drama of colliding cities cover a deeper evasion — fear of a different kind of continuity between the third city and Auschwitz, which itself gives rise to the ill-fated twins of the devastation of reason and the phantasmagoric ethics of the community? For the perfection of the idealism of the political community is at the same time the perfection of the devastation of theoretical reason and of political action.

Let us approach this third city by reconsidering the fourth city: Auschwitz. A Dutch colleague of mine, who now teaches in Canada, Robert Jan van Pelt, recently spent three months working In the archives of the museum at Auschwitz and living in the town of Oswiecim. Oswiecim is the Polish name for Auschwitz. However, it acquired its German name around 1272 and reacquired it when it became part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Auschwitz I was originally a barrack of the Polish army, a cluster of thirty or so well-constructed, brick buildings on the main road out of the town of Auschwitz. The Nazis took over the buildings, added a further brick stores to each and installed the perimeter fencing with the infamous watch-towers. As, today, you drive through the Polish town of Oswiecim, you suddenly come to the Nazi quarter (now inhabited by Poles). It is a town within a town, built in -the German vernacular, with homes, schools, churches and a market, a stage-set phantasy of an idealised, gemütlich, familiar, German community.

In the museum itself, my colleague opened and analysed 300 archival boxes of architectural plans which have not been seen since the War — no architectural historian has worked at Auschwitz. Van Pelt has discovered that, before the Nazis began to lose the war, they had prepared plans for the town of Auschwitz to be developed into a major German city. Auschwitz was to become the administrative centre for the Germanification of eastern Upper Silesia, in the Nazi version of the medieval German ambition to civilise the Slav lands by colonising the territories between the River

Oder and the River Bug. The problem which Max Weber analysed in his famous essay, Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany, of replacing the large, moribund, Junkie estates of the East with a small-holding, vigorous, independent peasantry, was to be solved by transferring peasant families from Germany through Auschwitz to establish this new blueprint of land tenure to the east. Auschwitz was chosen for this role because of its situation at the hub of railway connections which ramified across Europe - which was why Auschwitz, rather than the other five death-camps in Poland, became the destination for transports of Jews from all over Europe. Unlike the other Polish camps, Auschwitz was planned primarily as a labour camp, and it continued to operate as a labour camp throughout the war.

The extent of the planning was demonstrated by van Pelt last term when he visited Warwick University; he spent three hours showing my MA students, who are taking a course in Holocaust sociology and theology, about 200 slides of plans and photographic material from the museum archive. We saw plans for the Germanification of nature - Polish forests were to be replanted with German trees; plans for German dog-kennels for German dogs; designs for German arm-chairs for off-duty German officials. We saw photographs of German soldiers with large canisters of chemicals fumigating the former houses of Jews who had been transported further east - it was called ethnic cleansing - and then we saw normal, happy, German peasant families sitting comfortably and securely in their new homes. We also heard evidence of inefficiency: of the poor design of barracks causing unplanned disease and death; of theft and improvisation by the Nazis, necessitated by the deficient supply of barbed wire for the perimeter fencing. Now the argument which might be developed from this kind of evidence that Auschwitz qualifies as a city has a fundamentally different logical structure from the strange argument, which I illumined earlier, that the five functions of the classical city of Athens have their functional equivalent in the organisation of Auschwitz as a death-camp, with the conclusion that the project at classical architecture and of architecture as such is implicated and condemned by Auschwitz. That argument, I suggested, sets Auschwitz up as the measure for demonic anti-reason. It rests on s dubious premise: that the meaning of the city is to be defined transhistorically, according to listed functions, rather than historically, according to the rule of law. According to the functional approach, the built types or forms of the city are classified by their eternally fixed function; according to the approach which would sec the city as requiring the rule of law, the variable types and styles of building could be analysed as representing the changing configuration of power and its legitimation. There was no rule of law at Auschwitz; and so, while the camp can be analysed as a social system - for the overthrow of normal expectations by the unpredictable mix of rules and terror required the socialisation of both SS and prisoners into a hierarchy of brutality – Auschwitz cannot be functionalised as a city.

The plans for Auschwitz as the administrative centre for the Germanification of central Poland present a different challenge.

These scores of unrealised plans cannot be simply understood as the indictment and condemnation of classic architecture, modern planning or modern rationality as such. That is too easy, and, I want to argue, in its blanket condemnation, too exculpatory, for it eliminates the possibility of any specific investigation into the contingencies of collusion by making collusion already a foregone conclusion. Instead, the plans can be analysed, first, in terms of the attempt to legitimise a colonisation which has a long history in the relation between German capitalism and land tenure in the east, and an even longer history in the German medieval mission lo the Slays. Secondly, they can be analysed in terms of the emphasis on political community - the cozy German quarters Oswiecim, the planned communities of German warrior-peasants in the east which, it was calculated, would have to defend their newly acquired land by force for generations against the Soviet Union. Thirdly, the plans can be analysed in terms of a reassessment of the identity of Auschwitz as a camp: it was designed to provide an endless supply of human slave-labour, and, according to van Pelt, became only secondarily a death camp,

when the fresh supplies of labour included persons not suited for work.

Analysis of this kind, as opposed to the refusal of analysis implicit in the demonising argument, does not see Auschwitz as the end-product and telos of modern rationality. It understands the plans as arising out of, and as falling back into, the ambitions and the tensions, the utopianism and the violence, the reason and the muddle, which is the outcome of the struggle between the politics and the anti-politics of the city. This is the third city - the city in which we all live and with which we are too familiar.

Although van Pelt's work is as yet unpublished - he hopes it will be ready for the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz in 1995 - it already provokes opposition. The discovery of the extent and ambition of the planned colonisation and change in land-tenure to be administered by the development of Auschwitz into a city seems to detract from the master-plan of the Final Solution, the plan to destroy the European Jews, which was carried out, and at Auschwitz, above all. Moreover, as I have tried to demonstrate, this approach also challenges the now-sacralised opposition between demonic reason and new ethics, between old Athens and New Jerusalem. According to that perspective, the new argument would normalise, or at least relativise, the evil which it explains. And why should it not? The answer would be: That he that shows no respect for those who died such terrible deaths and, that it depends on discredited methods of knowledge, which also expired, as it were, in the gas-chambers. Against this, I discern in this refusal to 'relativise' a deeper fear: that we would then he part of that relativity without there being any overarching law, determining our participation. And that would return us to avthection on the boundaries of the city and the boundaries of the soul, which we would like to think we have overcome in the opposition between Athens and Jerusalem.

Let us return to the boundary wall of the city of Athens - here, just outside the boundary we find mourning women: Antigone, burying the body of her fratricidal brother in defiance of Creon's decree, witnessed by her reluctant sister, Ismene, who urges her to desist in the name of conformity to the law of the city; and the wife of Phocion, gathering the ashes of her disgraced husband, with her trusted woman companion, who, as the look-out, bears the political risk in her own contorted posture.

What is the meaning of these acts? Do they represent the transgression of the law of the city - women as the irony of the political community, as its ruination? Do they bring to representation an immediate ethical experience, `women's experience', silenced and suppressed by the law of the city, and hence expelled outside its walls? No. In these delegitimate acts of tending the dead, these acts of justice, against the current will of the city, women reinvent the political life of the community.

By insisting on the right and rites of mourning, Antigone and the wife of Phocion carry out that intense work of the soul, that gradual rearrangement of its boundaries, which must occur when a loved one is lost - so as to let go, to allow the other fully to depart, and hence fully to be regained beyond sorrow. To acknowledge and to re-experience the justice and the injustice of the partner's life and death is to accept the law, it is not to transgress it - mourning becomes the law. Mourning draws on transcendent but representable justice, which makes the suffering of immediate experience visible and speakable. When completed, mourning returns the soul to the city, renewed and reinvigorated for participation, ready to take on the difficulties and injustices of the existing city. The mourner returns to negotiate and challenge the changing inner and outer boundaries of the soul and of the city; she returns to their perennial anxiety.

To oppose new ethics to the old city, Jerusalem to Athens, is to succumb to loss, to refuse to mourn, to cover persisting anxiety with the violence of a New Jerusalem masquerading as love. The possibility of structural analysis and of political action are equally undermined by the evasion of the anxiety and ambivalence inherent in power and knowledge. Why, I asked myself, did the large audience applaud so vigorously at the conference to celebrate the Centenary of Walter Benjamin's birth, held at University College London, last July, when told by a speaker that the masses have been

anaesthetised by mass culture and mass media? What satisfaction, intellectual and political, is there in hearing the affirmation of total control? The active investment in power and anxious projection of it are exhibited in the response of that angry, anarchic audience to the proclamation of their own ineluctable disempowerment. This is to exhibit the same phantasised desire for political community without boundary walls at which to mourn; and without a soul, with its vulnerable and renegotiable boundaries, to bring to wail at those walls.

The hope of evading the risks of political community explains the appeal of one widespread version of the new ethics - the ethics or the other. The thought of the French Jewish philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, has fast acquired the canonicity in modern philosophy that Maimonides has in medieval Jewish philosophy. It is thinking, above all, has made Judaism available to the end of philosophy - philosophy which has discovered that it has no ethics, and which turns to Judaism as the sublime other of modernity. Levinas's Buddhist Judaism offers an extreme version of Athens versus Jerusalem. Knowledge, power and practical reason are attributed to the model of the autonomous, bounded, separated, individual self, the self within the city, 'the alliance of logic and politics'. The self, according to this new ethics, cannot experience truly transforming loss, but plunders the world for the booty of its self-seeking interest. To become ethical, this self is to be devastated, traumatised, unthroned, by the commandment to substitute the other for itself. Responsibility is defined in this new ethics as `passivity beyond passivity', which is inconceivable and not representable, because it takes place beyond any city – even though Levinas insists that it is social and not sacred.

This new ethics denies identity to the other as it denies identity to the actor, now passive beyond passivity, more radically passive, that is, than any simple failure to act. But the other, too, is distraught and searching for political community - the other is also bounded and vulnerable, enraged and invested, isolated and interrelated. To command me to sacrifice myself in sublime passivity for the other, with no political expression for any activity, is to command in resentment an ethics of waving, whereas, as Stevie Smith put it in her poem *Not Waving but Drowning*.

> Nobody heard him the dead man
> But still he lay moaning
> I was much further out than you thought
> And not waving but drowning.

Stevie Smith drew a picture of him, too: with long, bedraggled tresses falling forward over his torso, erect above the indifferent waves. Without the sou] and without the city, we cannot help' anyone.

The presentation of this Buddhist Judaism as the sublime other of modernity, as the New Jerusalem, detracts from basic features of Judaism which are directly contrary to Levinas's thinking. First, rabbinic Judaism sees man as God's co-creator, not as creature, but as sublimely passive; secondly, prophetic Judaism stakes itself on transcendent justice that legitimates political activity, and does not place ethics beyond the world of being and politics; thirdly, rabbinic Judaism rests on the study of the law, Talmud Torah: it rests l not on the devastation but on the growth of the self in knowledge. i Learning in this sense mediates the social and the political: it works precisely by making mistakes, by taking the risk of action, and then by reflecting on its unintended consequences, and then taking the risk, yet again, of further action, and so on. Finally, far from being the sublime other of modernity, Judaism, in all its different modern forms, is immersed in the difficulties of modernity just as much as the philosophy, the sociology and the architectural history which have invested so much in its other-worldly beatification.

Elsewhere, I have tried to develop the idea and analysis of the broken middle in place of the opposition of Athens and Jerusalem (The Broken Middle, 1992). I try to develop the idea and analysis of activity beyond activity, to restate the risks of critical rationality and of political action, in place of this passivity beyond passivity. I do this by presenting the life, thought and politics of three German Jewish women within the political and social crises of their time: for the eighteenth century, Rahel Varnhagen; for the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Rosa Luxemburg; for the Mid twentieth century, Hannah Arendt. In her own way, each of these women exposed the inequality

and insufficiency of the universial political community of her day, but without retreating to any phantasy of the local or exclusive community: each staked the politics of identity without any security of identity.

Each suffered, struggled, acted and died at the boundary wall of the third city. Three modern women, for each of whom crossing lie boundary wall into the city of Berlin was critical in her political and personal formation: I like to think of each of them entering the city, as Rahel Varnhagen had to, at the Rosenthaler gate, and of each returning to mourn and to be mourned at that same Rosenthaler gate — one of the three legal entry-points into the city for Jews in the eighteenth century.

Rosenthal means valley of roses; it is my name — the name that one branch of my family adopted in order to enter German civil society. So with this, I sign and conclude this lecture. <>

The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno by Gillian Rose [Radical Thinkers, Verso, 9781781681527]

This is one of the best introductions to Adorno, with some particular strengths. First, Rose approaches Adorno from a sociological perspective, which leads her to emphasize the critiques of sociology, positivism, etc. Second, she parses "reification" and other important terms ("concept") with great care (there is an appendix of terms which stresses the mismatch between English and German terminology that is worth the price of the book alone). Rose reconstructs with exacting detail, the many aspects that constitute Adorno's difficult oeuvre, from his revamping of the Hegelian dialectic to the many rhetorical strategies of his writing. Through searching investigations of Adorno's work on Husserl, Heidegger Kierkegaard, and Marx, Rose develops finely detailed accounts of the theory of reification which figure so prominently in the Frankfurt school in general, and Adorno's thought in particular. Curiously, there is practically nothing in the book on "The Dialectic of Enlightenment" which is now most people's entry into Adorno and Horkheimer. This is a standard text for any Adorno student.

The Melancholy Science is Gillian Rose's investigation into Theodor Adorno's work and legacy. Rose uncovers the unity discernable among the many fragments of Adorno's oeuvre, and argues that his influence has been to turn Marxism into a search for style.

The attempts of Adorno, Lukács and Benjamin to develop a Marxist theory of culture centred on the concept of reification are contrasted, and the ways in which the concept of reification has come to be misused are exposed. Adorno's continuation for his own time of the Marxist critique of philosophy is traced through his writings on Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husserl and Heidegger. His opposition to the separation of philosophy and sociology is shown by examination of his critique of Durkheim and Weber, and of his contributions to the dispute over positivism, his critique of empirical social research and his own empirical sociology.

Gillian Rose shows Adorno's most important contribution to be his founding of a Marxist aesthetic that offers a sociology of culture, as demonstrated in his essays on Kafka, Mann, Beckett, Brecht and Schönberg. Finally, Adorno's 'Melancholy Science' is revealed to offer a 'sociology of illusion' that rivals both structural Marxism and phenomenological sociology as well as the subsequent work of the Frankfurt School. <>

Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to Interpreting Visual Objects by Gillian Rose [Sage, 9780761966647] At a time when the analysis of visual culture in all of its forms is expanding at an exponential rate, employing ever more complex theoretical and methodological tools, Gillian Rose has provided a welcome overview of the state of the field. Visual Methodologies succeeds both as an introductory text, certain to be widely adopted in the classroom, and as a sophisticated refresher course for those who have followed the rapid maturation of this remarkable interdisciplinary discourse.

Visual Methodologies is a critical introduction to the study and interpretation of visual culture. Written especially for the undergraduate or researcher who wants to learn more about working with visual materials, this book outlines which methods of

interpretation are available and explains how to use them.

The introduction contextualises recent debates about visual culture (situating the visual in social and cultural context); while each subsequent chapter reviews a different method for interpreting visual images. The methods explained are: compositional interpretation, contents analysis, semiology, psychoanalysis, types of discourse analysis, and the study of audiences. Each method is assessed in relation to an appropriate case study and in relation to the wider issues defined in the introduction; the conclusion demonstrates how different methods can be used in conjunction with each other.

A comprehensive and integrated primer in applied methods - including discussion boxes, media specific bibliographies and notes for further reading - Visual Methodologies will be an essential reference for the study of visual culture in the social sciences. <>

Hegel Contra Sociology by Gillian Rose [Radical Thinkers, Verso, 9781844673544]

This is perhaps her most significant work, Hegel Contra Sociology, Rose mounts a forceful defence of Hegelian speculative thought. Demonstrating how, in his criticisms of Kant and Fichte, Hegel supplies a preemptive critique of Weber, Durkheim, and all of the sociological traditions that stem from these “neo-Kantian” thinkers, Rose argues that any attempt to preserve Marxism from a similar critique and any attempt to renew sociology cannot succeed without coming to terms with Hegel’s own speculative discourse. With an analysis of Hegel’s mature works in light of his early radical writings, this book represents a profound step toward enacting just such a return to the Hegelian.

Gillian Rose's magnum opus was her second book, Hegel Contra Sociology (1981). Preceding this was The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno (1978), a work which charted Rose's approach to the relation of Marxism to Hegel in Hegel Contra Sociology. Rose thus established herself early on as an important interrogator of Adorno's thought and Frankfurt School Critical Theory more generally, in terms of the "Hegelian" dimension of "Hegelian Marxism." In her review of Adorno's book Negative Dialectics, Rose noted, "Anyone who is involved in the possibility of Marxism as a mode of cognition sui generis . . . must read Adorno's book." The core of the "sui generis" character of Marxism was to be found in Hegel. As Rose put it in The Melancholy Science, Adorno and other thinkers in Frankfurt School Critical Theory sought to answer for their generation the question Marx posed (in the 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts), "How do we now stand as regards the Hegelian dialectic?" For Rose, this question remained a standing one.

Rose sought to recover Hegel from readings informed by 20th century neo-Kantian influences, and from what she saw as the failure to fully grasp Hegel's critique of Kant. Where Kant could be seen as the bourgeois philosopher par excellence, Rose took Hegel to be his most important and unsurpassed critic. Hegel provided Rose with the standard for critical thinking on social modernity, whose threshold she found nearly all others to fall below, including thinkers she otherwise respected such as Adorno and Marx. Rose read Marx as an important disciple of Hegel who, to her mind, nevertheless, misapprehended key aspects of Hegel's thought. According to Rose, this left Marxism at the mercy of prevailing Kantian preoccupations. As she put it, "When Marx is not self-conscious about his relation to Hegel's philosophy . . . [he] captures what Hegel means by actuality or spirit. But when Marx desires to dissociate himself from Hegel's actuality . . . he relies on and affirms abstract dichotomies between being and consciousness, theory and practice, etc.".

Two parts of Rose's Hegel Contra Sociology frame its overall discussion of the challenge Hegel's thought presents to the critical theory of society: a section in the introductory chapter on what Rose calls the "Neo-Kantian Marxism" of Lukács and Adorno; and the final section of the concluding chapter "With What Must the Science End?," titled "The Culture and Fate of Marxism," where Rose addressed Marx directly. The arguments condensed in these two sections of Rose's book comprise one of the most interesting and challenging critiques of Marxism. However, Rose concluded her book with a rousing call: "This

critique of Marxism itself yields the project of a critical Marxism. . . . presentation of the contradictory relations between Capital and culture is the only way to link the analysis of the economy to comprehension of the conditions for revolutionary practice".

Rose thought such a possibility was undermined by what she called "Heideggerian postmodernity." As Rose wrote of her own book, in the preface for its republication in the year she died (in 1995, tragically prematurely, after a long bout with cancer), "The speculative exposition of Hegel in this book still provides the basis for a unique engagement with post-Hegelian thought. the experience of negativity, the existential drama, is discovered at the heart of Hegelian rationalism. . . . Instead of working with the general question of the dominance of Western metaphysics, the dilemma of addressing modern ethics and politics without arrogating the authority under question is seen as the ineluctable difficulty in Hegel. . . . This book, therefore, remains the core of the project to demonstrate a nonfoundational and radical Hegel, which overcomes the opposition between nihilism and rationalism. It provides the possibility for renewal of critical thought in the intellectual difficulty of our time". <>

The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society by Gillian Rose [Wiley-Blackwell, 9780631182214]

The Broken Middle offers a startlingly original rethinking of the modern philosophical tradition and fundamentally rejects the anti-philosophy and anti-theory of post-modernity. Extending across the disciplines from philosophy to theology, Judaica, law, social and political theory, literary criticism, feminism and architecture, this book stakes itself on a renewed potential for sustained critique. Against the grain of much contemporary thought, this work of criticism offers the reader a way beyond the spurious alternatives of "totalization" or acknowledgement of the "other".

The Broken Middle expounds the phenomenology of the diremption of law and ethics. By reconstructing the suppressed political history of modernity, it shows that contemporary thought belongs to a tradition which has become ancient. Following this drama in the configuration of anxiety of beginning, equivocation of the ethical, and agon of authorship, the logos opens out of the pathos of the concept.

The Broken Middle brings Rose's philosophical position into closer contact with the concrete concerns of social and political thought through an exegesis exemplified by The Broken Middle. Rose's notion of the broken middle operates both at the level of theory and practice and it is this brokenness (between universal and particular, law and ethics, actuality and potentiality) that speculative philosophy is centrally concerned with negotiating. Rose's critique of liberal and postmodern thought is that they privilege one half of these binary oppositions, rather than doing the work of negotiating their diremption. So what might this negotiation look like? In her later work, particularly Mourning Becomes the Law, Rose argues for an aporetic and struggle-filled response: one that works toward comprehension of dirempted thought and actuality, but not in order to effect premature closure or to 'fix' what is broken. Instead, Rose advocates a work of inaugurated mourning that sits with the anxiety of the middle in order to examine the contours of suffering and loss but that also insists on the need to take the risk of political action in pursuit of a 'good enough justice'. <>

Teaching Narrative edited by Richard Jacobs [Teaching the New English, Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319706771]

Narrative is everywhere and has unique powers: to enchant and inspire, to make sense of our lives and ourselves and to afford us an enriched understanding of alternative worlds and lives and of better futures – though narrative also has the potential to coerce and oppress. Narrative is at the centre at all stages of the English curriculum and has been the subject of a burgeoning critical industry. This timely volume addresses the many ways in which recent thinking has informed the teaching of narrative in university classrooms in the UK and the USA. Distinguished teachers from both countries range widely across narrative topics and genres, including the opportunities opened up by new technologies, and chapters articulate students' own individual and collaborative experiences in the teaching/learning process. The result is a volume that explores the pleasurable challenges of working with students to help them appreciate and assess the power that narrative exerts, to become reflective critics of its inner workings as well as exponents of narrative themselves.

Excerpt: The Introduction provides detailed summaries of the chapters that comprise the volume, and, before that, the Introduction discusses the teaching of narrative at university in terms of curricular stages, notions of enchantment and disenchantment, realism and modernism and, drawing on (among others) D. A. Miller and Peter Brooks, relations in narrative between closure and the narratable, and Freud's Eros and Thanatos. The latter provides an opportunity to develop some ideas about how teaching, narrative and desire connect. There is detailed discussion of how students respond to the experience of reading narrative fiction (as opposed to reading poetry and watching drama) and of working with 'conflicted' nineteenth-century novels.

Enchantment/Disenchantment; Closure/Narratability

Narrative is everywhere: and its pervasiveness makes it, in a sense, harder rather than easier to teach. Defamiliarizing what is so familiar, in students' lives and in the texts they've consumed, all the way from bedtime infancy to 'set texts' for exams, can be an unsettling experience. In addition, for a lecturer to convey and gauge the power of narratives, especially over his students' own lives (as well as his own: in teaching narrative, I make this very clear and personal) can seem intrusive. Fiction is fictive but narratives can occlude their own fictiveness so seductively as to seem true. This isn't just the trivial matter, say, of early readers of Gulliver's Travels indignantly complaining that they didn't believe a word about those little and big people (presumably such readers gave up before they got to the talking horses); it's serious.

I'm writing this in July 2017 not long after a momentous general election in the UK in which, to everyone's astonishment, a narrative of hope, communality and desire for a fairer society was at least as much listened to and believed (especially by students and other young people) than the narrative of fear, cynical inequality and hatred of others, a narrative relentlessly elaborated by the 'free' world's most aggressively partisan newspapers, that have poisoned British politics for so long. Earlier we had Brexit and Trump. Narratives swung both those results. The coerciveness of narrative—its power to lie, oppress and enslave—is just as significant as its more widely acclaimed and more benevolent powers: narrative being (in H. Porter Abbott's words) 'the principal way our species organises its understanding of time' (Abbott 2002: 3) and, through that, the way we come to terms with mortality; its power to make sense of our world, our lives and ourselves; and its power to give us an infinitely enriched understanding of alternative worlds and lives—and of a better future. Students can more readily accept the plausibility of the latter life-enhancing powers rather than the former coercive ones. Enchantment with narrative is more easily taught than disenchantment.

The balance between enchantment and disenchantment also operates differently across the student's educational experience. It may be one way of distinguishing what happens in university teaching from what comes before it that the balance there tips sharply towards the disenchantment pole, as we teach the application of critical literacy, with its attendant and necessary scepticisms, to the reading of narrative, whereas, at

the other extreme, in childhood, enchantment with narrative very much has its 'uses' (Bettelheim 1976).

But students also come to see that what is involved in their later reading of narrative is an oscillation between enchantment and disenchantment, in their experience not just of different sorts or genres of texts, or as to the liberating or oppressive nature of the narrative, but even within the same text. The narrative enchants us and simultaneously we are aware of, and meant to be aware of and meant to resist, that enchantment. It would be conventional to map this process or oscillation, and to assess the balance between the two processes, on to and in terms of the differences, or alleged differences, between realist and modernist narratives, with their sharply divergent allegiances to notions of coherence, wholeness, plausibility, dimensionality and hierarchies of discourse.

Students of literature at university are encouraged to see those differences in terms of linear chronology as they move from the great nineteenth-century realist narratives of, say, Jane Austen, Dickens and George Eliot to the high modernist post-war experiments of, say, Joyce, Woolf and Ford. These would conventionally be taught on separate modules. But this cleanly demarcated linear development should be destabilized and I give some examples of that process in the last chapter of this book, in relation to 'Bartleby' and to the 'Alice' books in dialogue with Freud's 'Dora' . And it's very pertinent that D. A. Miller observes that the standard account of the realist novel serving 'the repressive order of the nineteenth century bourgeoisie' whereas the modernist novel 'registers an implicit protest against this repression' is too simple. He doesn't say it but one complicating point would be to note that when realism was being heralded as a new breed of narrative fiction, in the form of Madame Bovary, Flaubert's novel and realism itself (though Flaubert hated and rejected the term) were being defined by reviewers as the politics of 'discontented democracy' and 'implacable equality'. Miller draws on Fredric Jameson to argue that modernist fiction can be 'suspiciously consonant, not to say complicitous, with aspects of the social order that provides its own context'.

Even more telling, however, is for students to come to see that single texts in the so-called realist or modernist traditions can be read as containing unstable compounds of the two traditions—both, in Barthes' famous terms, 'readerly and 'writerly', that reading them is a matter of negotiating between enchantment and disenchantment, and that it's less a matter of modernism being a chronological development from and break with realism and more that the two represent a tension in narrative texts that has been with us from the start (from at least Cervantes) and is still with us today. The 'realist/modernist' dynamic can be traced in manifold ways and places: students on a first-year 'Re-Viewing Shakespeare' module have been stimulated to notice the shifting proportions of 'realist' and 'modernist' narratives in the proto-realist Hamlet and the proto-modernist King Lear. As suggested above, it's a tension that's inherent in the very fictiveness of narrative.

Teaching nineteenth-century 'realist' novels to students who have been introduced to the critical approaches to narrative fiction pioneered by Peter Brooks and D. A. Miller has proved a very fruitful and bracing experience, whether working with second-year undergraduates on a 19th century module that takes in some of the usual landmarks or an MA module on rhetoric that pays close attention to Jane Austen (and, as we'll see, Mary Shelley). And we might relate the enchantment/disenchantment dynamic to the crucial feature that Miller (who is at his dazzling best on Jane Austen) identifies in narrative fiction as the permanent tension between closure and narratability: closure can only 'work' by abolishing the possibilities of what can be narrated, a process that involves the 'discontents' of Miller's title. For Miller closure depends on 'a suppression, a simplification, a sort of blindness', and is 'an act of "make-believe", a postulation that closure is possible', a postulation of 'self-betraying inadequacy'. There is, writes Miller, 'no more fundamental assumption of the traditional novel than [the] opposition between the narratable and closure' (267) and 'what discontents the traditional novel is its own condition of possibility'.

To put it another way, closure is defined, only made possible, by the elements that refuse closure.

When closure in narrative means happy love, that happy love may only be achieved because it chooses to forget the price of its happiness. That narrative closure is guiltily aware of exclusion (the coercions dictating who gets left out of the final happinesses, like Hetty Sorrel in Adam Bede) accounts for the sense of exasperation that students can hear as accompanying closure itself. The narrator, in the very act of managing the married couples, can suddenly betray an exasperated note as if aware of what has to be left out in novelistic management or housekeeping. We can hear this with varying degrees of intensity in Jane Austen, notably so in the chillingly bitter treatment (which students are invariably shocked by) handed out to the adulterous Maria at the end of Mansfield Park, condemned to live in a purgatorial misery with Austen's least 'liveable with' character, Mrs Norris:

> …where, shut up together with little society, on one side no affection, on the other no judgment, it may be reasonably supposed that their tempers became their mutual punishment. (Vol. 3, Ch. 17)

In an equivalent way, students are taken aback by the implausible (exasperated?) ending ofBleak House, which they find difficult to take seriously. This only 'works' by what Dickens himself must have realized was the staginess of superimposing an identikit new but happier Bleak House upon the old (bleak) one, so that Jarndyce can give Esther the appropriately grounded happiness. This is designed to justify the way Dickens simultaneously superimposes Woodcourt as Esther's 'new' husband (as-if her brother) upon the old one, Jarndyce himself (as-if her father).

Teaching Conflicted Novels

Miller's analysis of the dynamics of narrative in the realist novel is developed, in a more obviously Foucauldian direction, in his The Novel and the Police. Here the narratives of Victorian realism are shown to be complicit in a process by which readers, deluded by the image of private power offered by the narrative, are blinded to the operation of more pressingly real social and public power in which they are caught up, the narratives 'enlisting the consciousness of its subject in the work of supervision'. The effect is that the reader, the liberal subject, can only recognize himself fully 'when he forgets or disavows his functional implication' in a system of 'restraints or disciplinary injunctions'. The enchantments of narrative, in this respect, are the necessary occlusions of disenchantment, precisely in not knowing that by reading you have become your own policeman.

David Musselwhite, in an often brilliant and under-rated book that anticipates Miller's arguments, shows how in the classic realist novel, from Jane Austen to Dickens, the 'exuberance and threat' of revolutionary forces are 'steadily but ineluctably worked within a new axiomatic, a new set of rules and constraints, of prescribed places and possibilities that made them both manageable and self-monitoring', while at the same time 'the potential of desire, which should be social and productive' is 'slowly asphyxiated'.

These ideas have usefully informed discussions in university seminar classrooms during the MA rhetoric module when I've brought together two novels written within a few years of each other—years in the period between 1811 and 1819 when 'the possibility of a violent revolution in England was greater than at almost any other time and was contained, with ever increasing difficulty, by the resort to force alone' (Musselwhite 1987: 31). The two novels are startlingly different but share submerged structural anxieties : Emma and Frankenstein. (They also share an early recourse to doubling and othering, much more subtly so in Emma.) The asphyxiation of potentially social and productive desire is one way of describing what happens to Shelley's Creature, whose last words (deriving from Milton's Satan as he first observes the embracing Adam and Eve) register the agony of 'wasting in impotent passions' and permanently unsatisfied desires (1818, ed., Vol. 3, Ch. 7). Musselwhite notes that in these last pages the Creature pointedly refers (twice, actually) to his life not as a narrative but as the 'series of my being': as if he and he alone belongs to the non-narratable (despite his being the most eloquent narrator in the novel), with his plea to be 'linked to the chain of existence and events' (Vol. 2, Ch. 9), as if in a narrative signifying system, so cruelly denied.

But students recognize something similar about the structure of Emma in which marriage brings an end, but in a sense an arbitrary (discontented) end, to

what has characterized Emma's life hitherto—a 'series of being' lived as an arbitrarily strung together series of match-makings (driven in Harriet's case by the displacements of narcissistic pseudo-homosexual desire), a kind of anti-narrative or what Miller calls 'radical picaresque: an endless flirtation with a potentially infinite parade of possibilities' (Miller 1981: 15). And this match-making is like a 'bad' or 'othered' version of the novel's marriage-orientated dominant narrative: Emma's match-making (as 'bad novelist') is in effect positioned to empty the master-narrative of its ideological purposes, to naturalize and legitimize it.

Emma's desire to live through and in that picaresque 'series' must be bound up ('corrected') in closure, in effect asphyxiated in hetero-normative marriage. Students regularly see the radical feminist potential in what Emma desires to be and to do, to assert and exercise control and power, in effect to usurp power in a patriarchal world, to be the subject of her sentence, and students connect that desire with Frank Churchill's more obviously subversive undermining of social protocol—and they are very alive to the sharp irony of Emma discovering that it's Frank of all people whose power games have exposed the weakness of her supposed autonomy, that she's all along been a pawn in his game, the object of his sentence, in a feigned relationship, and then of Mr Knightley's, in marriage.

And students are richly exercised when we come to discuss the multiple ironies of the novel's version of 'closure', in which the married Emma and Mr Knightley will live chastely and as if childishly together with the tyrant-baby Mr Woodhouse—and as if forever: I've found that students feel that Mr Woodhouse will as it were 'live forever' when they project beyond the last pages (after all, as they say, there's nothing actually wrong with his health). In effect, and absurdly, the married couple will never be released into fulfilled desire in Donwell Abbey but instead will live suspended in Hartfield, which early in the novel is significantly mentioned as 'but a sort of notch in the Donwell Abbey estate to which all the rest of Highbury belonged' (Vol. 1, Ch. 16). We leave Emma and Mr Knightley living in a notch, she still mistress in her own home and he displaced and emasculated.

Marilyn Butler famously identified the political 'war of ideas' in the inner workings of Austen's novels and students can see in both these novels conflicting elements of conservative and Jacobin ideas and the way both texts have thereby generated contested critical readings. Chris Baldick in his indispensable study makes it very clear that the Burke–Paine post-revolutionary pamphlet-war shaped the intrinsic and internal debate that Mary Shelley articulated in the conflicted presentation of the Creature, especially in the poignancies of his demands for love and to be loved, and in the recognition that his murders were a direct result of the cruelty of his several rejections, most painfully by his 'father' Frankenstein. Baldick's careful assessment is that Shelley's own response is 'an uneasy combination of fearful revulsion and cautious sympathy' for the Creature, an 'anxious liberalism'. My students usually read Shelley's sympathies for the Creature and the novel's radical politics more forcefully than that.

Both novels have at their centres a conservative message about the dangers of playing God (Emma with Harriet who, Creature-like, turns on her 'maker' by aspiring to marry Mr Knightley) and of seeking to undermine given hierarchies of gender (Frankenstein appropriating the maternal role) and class (Emma's plans for Harriet). But many students are startled to discover that Frank Churchill, that great opener of windows and fierce advocate of the class-dissolving opportunities of balls, is rewarded (especially after he treats her at Box Hill with such callow cruelty) with the most desirable and 'perfect' of all Austen's young women, Jane Fairfax, in sharp contrast with how Austen handles those other deceptive charmers Willoughby, Wickham and Henry Crawford.

This may be a measure of Austen's critical scepticism about the values of landed conservatism, what D. W. Harding long ago called her 'regulated hatred' (Harding 1940) of much that sentimental Janeites (and makers of costume-drama films, and students who have only seen those films before reading the novels) profess or assume to see in her, as well as her not quite suppressed sympathies for and attractions to those pseudo-

revolutionaries who come in, like the Crawfords, from outside to undermine and even destroy it. (Miller and Musselwhite in different ways are excellent on what Austen had to fight against in herself when dealing with the contradictory forces in Mansfield Park.)

Emma uses very strongly worded, indeed for her unusually politicized language (again evoking Satan) when condemning Frank (and Jane) after hearing of their secret engagement. She describes him as deploying 'espionage and treachery—to come among us with professions of openness and simplicity' (Vol. 3, Ch. 10). This is Jane Austen's sole use of 'espionage', a word that only entered the English language in 1793. French words like this and 'finesse' are associated with Frank and add to the sense of his allegiance with Jacobin ideas. But it remains the case that the Frank–Jane relationship, though breaking all courtship protocols, has an intensity of process and outcome that marks it out as unique in all of Jane Austen. Students regularly find that Frank and Jane coming together is more credible and moving (and closer to later Victorian novels) than Emma and Mr Knightley doing so, about whose future they're often sharply sceptical (even allowing for the death of Mr Woodhouse), and some of them even suspect that Jane Austen, in another and final subversion of conservative values, intended her readers to respond in just that way.

When I ask students to assess the different 'weightings' the novel accords to the married couples, they recognize and quite properly question the narrative coercion involved in the way the novel privileges Emma and Mr Knightley's love as ontologically more 'real' than Frank and Jane's ('being' in love rather than 'falling' in love). This is because the former is positioned as an 'in-built', secreted feature of their relationship since she was a teenager, only activated and made visible to them both when dramatized in Girardian triangular jealousy (his love made 'real' when he thinks Frank is in love with her; hers when she thinks he's in love with Harriet), whereas Frank and Jane are as it were 'only' lovers brought together in casual (holiday) intimacy.

This is a coercive opposition, one drawing on what I encourage students to see as a 'depth-effect' illusion in narrative fiction whereby the 'revelation' of hidden 'truth' (that Emma and Mr Knightley have 'always' loved each other without knowing it) aims to persuade us of a 'deeper' reality attendant on some relations and characters at the expense of others. Students debunk this readily enough when we discuss the fact that the novel itself openly jokes with the notion of Emma and Mr Knightley being in effect brother and sister and is silent with the notion of their being in effect (with the sixteen-year age difference) father and daughter.

Narrative and the Erotics of Reading

The discontented conflict between the narratable and closure that Miller identifies connects powerfully with the no-less exemplary work of Peter Brooks in his brilliant and influential study Reading for the Plot (Brooks 1984). This is very evident in his chapter on Great Expectations where Brooks argues that, quite against the usual traditions of revelation through plot and its applications for happiness (in marriage), Pip in effect moves beyond plot and at the end his life has 'outlived plot, renounced plot, been cured of it' (Brooks 1992, ed.: 138). This is because, having at last, like a novelist or detective himself, solved the mystery of Estella's true parentage, he can do absolutely nothing with that revelation, least of all use it to marry her. Steven Connor reads Pip's situation at the end in a way that parallels Brooks' comments , in an analysis drawing on Lacan and Marx that students find compelling. He argues that the novel 'displays progressively Pip's alienation from himself' in so far as the novel's principal revelations are merely 'revelations of Pip's marginality in his own life… Pip is forced to recognise that not only are the objects of his desire unattainable, but also that his desires are not even really his own'.

This moving beyond plot, as if in proto-modernist rejection of plot itself, informs the notorious and itself unresolvable question of Dickens' two endings to the novel. Brooks is right to say that the choice between them is 'somewhat arbitrary and unimportant' (Brooks 1992, ed.: 136), given that Pip is already cured of plot. Nevertheless, when I teach the novel to undergraduates on their second-year 19th century module, and they read for the first time the original ending (having already got used to the famous later ending), the clear majority

of them invariably prefer it. This must be because there is a muted melancholy in two potential lovers parting in solitary lonelinesses (and, in the saddest of all the novel's misrecognitions, with Estella thinking that Pip is little-Pip's father), a melancholy corresponding not just to the air of disenchanted retrospection pervading the entire novel but specifically to the discontentment with narrative itself that is such a radical feature of this apparently classic-realist novel.

But it is Brooks' early theoretical chapters in his book that have had the most far-reaching influence on the teaching and understanding of narrative (though he hasn't gone unchallenged), above all through his determination to move away from a static or structuralist reading of narrative to a dynamic and, crucially, psychoanalytically informed reading, one which attends above all to the processes of reading itself. Of the theorists sampled on a first-year undergraduate narrative module that I teach (described in detail in the last chapter of this volume) it's Peter Brooks who speaks most eloquently and powerfully to the students and this is because he engages directly with, and helps them theorize, their experiences of reading narrative fiction, in his Freudian analysis of the erotics of reading. That is, Brooks is interested not just in what makes a plot move forward (and backward), why plots work the way they do, but also why and how we read on, what impels us to negotiate the dilations and digressions of the long 'middle' of novels, how we are driven (forward and backward) by what Brooks calls 'anticipation of retrospection'. If the focus for Miller (once Brooks' student) is on the discontented novel, for Brooks it is the erotically charged reader.

Brooks' innovation is to apply the struggle that Freud identified as at the heart of our psychic lives, between the pleasure principle and the death drive (Eros and Thanatos), to the unfolding and our reading of plot. From the initiation of desire at the start of plot to the satisfied quiescence of closure, plot moves through the amassing and binding of materials (plot-strands, subplots, seemingly diverse characters, all to be revealed later as coherently connected) in a process analogous to the totalizing drive of desire, seeking to bind more and more material into larger, fuller and more completed wholes—as in the erotics of love. And at narrative closure we are granted what we seek for ourselves in vain, a retrospectively cohesive and totalizing (and illusionary) understanding of our lives, at the moment of death.

We could develop Brooks' argument about the erotics of reading in relation to teaching in two ways. First, teaching literary narratives in higher education involves asking students to be self-reflective about their reading experiences and, teaching the long realist novel, I ask my second-year undergraduate and MA students to reflect on how the reading of those narratives is different from the reading of lyric poetry and attendance in a theatre audience. Students quickly identify two pairs of paradoxes. Reading the novel is, on the one hand, though principally a solitary experience, one formed and shadowed by the communal: the community of novel readers is self-evidently 'there', if only felt as materially present in, for instance, lecture-halls and seminars, though it's also the case that most readers, and not just teachers, feel the impulse to share and talk about their experiences with other novel readers. On the other hand, the reading of long novels is both charged in the moment and also protracted, spread over time (days and weeks) and thus often to ever more erotically charged effect, through interruptions to reading, with the added and necessary involvement of memory in the psychics and mechanics of reading (following or 'losing' the plot). The relationship between the reader and the text, when reading takes so long, is both more distant (because mediated by non-reading time) and more intense (because such reading soaks into 'living').

I could put it this way. The subject matter of the realist novel privileges the individual destinies of the protagonists but shows those destinies as formed and shadowed by the communities in which the protagonists' narratives are activated and shaped (what David Musselwhite calls the novel's 'determination to both "homogenise" and "individualise" the occupants of the social space'). At the same time, the realist novel oscillates between the intensities of dramatic moments and the protractions of felt time and history. What students realize is that those two notions are duplicated in the reading experience in the way

that isn't true for the reading of lyric poetry or being in a theatre audience.

Another crucial difference that we discuss involves the degree of activity and passivity in the reading experience of the realist novel. At the simplest level, the ability and indeed (because of the sheer length of novels) the necessity of interrupting the reading, positions the reader in a unique kind of involvement/detachment or activity/passivity paradox. All texts, and especially all narrative texts, are predicated, as Brooks shows, on the paradox of reading that is both forward and backward looking. The drive towards closure is always retrospective in its powers and illuminations. Not for nothing is the detective narrative so often cited as definitive for the novel: its unfolding forwards is by necessity an unfolding-reconstruction backwards.

The fact that readers of realist fiction, often under the implicit direction of the text (often explicit in the case of the modernist text), can and often have to stop reading forwards and can or have to literally turn the pages back to confirm or learn (or be misled about) something earlier in the narrative (or just to enjoy and savour something again, or to delay further the revelation of plot) suggests a suspended, active/passive, there/not-there kind of reading experience, one which (again unlike in the reading of the lyric or the watching of a play) involves a kind of blurring of the roles of primary consumption and secondary or critical reflection into a heightened and quite different experience. At the very moment (impossible in the theatre) at which we lift our eyes from the page—for momentary relief, in pleasurable reflection, extending an erotic foreplay, before returning to the text—we dramatize a scenario, itself a mini-narrative, of gain and loss, there and not-there, active and passive—a Freudian fort-da narrative (Miller also connects his narratable/closure analysis to Freud's fort-da game).

Students also come to realize that there is something qualitatively different about the relations felt between the solitary reader and novelistic characters as opposed to an audience's relations with characters in drama, or the evoked consciousness of the lyric poem's 'voice' with which the reader communicates only as a privileged eavesdropper. This must partly be due to the equally obvious fact that the stage-character is always structured and mediated by the performative (the bodily presence of the actor acts as a limit, a literal barrier, to the spectator's investment in felt relations with character) but more important is the sense that the narrator of realist narrative is the necessary agent, catalyst or go-between in allowing for the free-play of the reader's erotic involvement, necessary to allow and activate and provide the sacred space for such erotic involvement—and that the activation of those erotic feelings on the reader's part are a duplication of a felt erotics of feeling between the narrator (author) and his or her characters, a sense that doesn't seem to obtain for the felt relations between the playwright and his characters, because the crucial mediating voice of narrative is absent.

The free-play of the reader's erotic involvement in novelistic narrative creates a fictive space in which normal moral or ethical concerns can be suspended or at least bracketed off. This must account for transgressive adultery in the novel being not only necessary as motor to the plot (as argued by Rene Girard and Tony Tanner) but also why readers so willingly want to read about it and even identify with it. This issue is inescapable when teaching Madame Bovary, which features at my university on a third-year undergraduate module called 'Victorian Sexualities', and students easily see the way this ethically ambivalent fictive space connects with Flaubertian impersonality and free indirect style (and with both sides of the argument put forward in the Bovary trial). When students identify with Emma Bovary, or at least feel intense sympathy for her, it is not just a function of her being the centrally narrated consciousness of the novel but also because it answers to the vicarious need we feel, in the erotics of reading, to experience change without its responsibilities, change being the prime motor behind all realist plots.

Another idea we discuss is this. Plenty of evidence shows that the experience of being in the audience during a particularly charged and powerful theatrical event can lead to spontaneous demonstrations of something close to mass hysteria

or mass catharsis where the communality of the experience breaks down usual reticencies (for a fascinating account of actual theatre riots). That is, the individual response becomes overtaken by the communal response. But students come to see that the emotional intensities offered by the realist novel can be of the same power, though rather than issuing as communal response, in which the individual response is subsumed, the individual reader is returned to communal life in a more complex, more provisional but also more conscious and thus more long-lasting way. I discuss with students the feeling, which they too recognize, when moved to tears in the theatre or cinema that my tears are somehow not quite mine, and even that I resent being manipulated into shedding them, whereas, moved to tears by reading the end of a realist novel, alone, those tears are intensified by the sheer pain of their being shed, precisely, alone, in the presence (which, in terms of their power to evoke the communities in my solitude, is now an inconsolable absence) of just words on a page.

In an ideal university world, with unlimited time and insatiable students, we would then turn to Proust.

Narrative, Teaching and Desire

The other way I'd like to develop some ideas from Brooks (and to end this part of the Introduction) is with very brief and tentatively offered thoughts about how his model can be applied to the teaching of narrative, how we might theorize the relations between teaching, desire and narrative in higher education.

I start with the dynamics of desire. Rene Girard argued that desire is imitative and that processes of identification precede desire. As in Brooks' point that the protagonist's desire needs to be activated (by the pleasure principle) in order for plots to begin and that this is duplicated or mapped on to the reader's desire to read on, so an activation of desire is vital for literature teaching to thrive.

Narrative texts desire to be read. That is, they desire to be alive and not museum pieces, and to that end they need to be activated, made present and real in the lecture and seminar space. In this sense all narrative texts are performative and desire to be 'performed'. Their desire is a desire to be awakened, an erotic desire that can be mapped onto the protagonist's desire and the teacher/students' desire. The teacher's and the students' desires for the text are in an imitative, re-energizing and mutually identifying relationship, forming a kind of virtuous circle (< >text< >teacher< >student< >text< >), across which desire flows in all directions, enriching the text, the student and the teacher in what is in effect an erotically charged totality where the three elements merge.

And this activation or awakening of the text, the binding of its desire to the students' and the teacher's desire in the classroom's virtuous circle, happens in a space that is both richly democratic, where all voices are equal and students feel safe to voice ideas that can't be dismissed as 'wrong', and in an alternative 'narrative time' where the 90 minutes of the seminar create a paradoxical 'free time' or unwritten and unwriteable narrative which only ends by arbitrary fiat.

Brooks' argument can be developed to show the importance of narrative as a model for the teaching of literature. We could think of a dynamic process in three parts, beginning in the personal (the student reading the text in advance), moving to a communal experience shared in the lecture and seminar, and ultimately returning, with new insight, to the text. These correspond to Brooks' notion of how we negotiate plot as we read novels, the middle sections of which are where the pleasure principle totalizes the divagations and digressions that mediate between the linear beginnings and eventually endings where the death instinct as well as the pleasure principle are gratified.

If the experience of the literature lecture and seminar can be seen, taken together, as analogous to the desire involved in reading the extended 'middle' of novels, then we can also chart the lecture and seminar, seen separately, as a narrative beginning, middle and end. The (largely) uni-vocal and linear lecture gives way to the populated field of the communally voiced seminar where 'plot' diverges and dilates, and then both student and teacher are returned to linearity—another book, better reading, better teaching.

The Chapters That Comprise This Volume

The chapters that follow are from ten distinguished specialists in narrative, all of them recognized for the quality of their teaching, and each contributor was invited to reflect on and describe the way their specialist academic knowledge translated into pedagogical practice in their university teaching. Wherever possible the chapters are tied to actual units of work taught by the contributors and, again, wherever possible the chapters allow space for the students' actual experiences in the teaching/learning processes (including in collaborative experiences with fellow students and with the lecturer) to be articulated and reflected on. The arrangement of chapters moves from, in the first group of six, considerations of teaching narrative by topic and genre—time, race, tragedy, comedy, crime-fiction, historical-fiction—to a group drawing on innovative applications of digital technologies, the third of which connects well with the following chapter on the important field of auto-ethnography, and the volume ends with a description of a deliberately introductory and simply theorized first-year narrative module aimed at easing students' transition to university.

The paragraphs that follow are summaries of the contributors' own abstracts.

- Mark Currie's focus is on the experience of teaching narrative in the context of philosophical and social theories of time. Most critical writing about time and narrative is focused on the question of memory, but Professor Currie argues that expectation, anticipation and surprise are equally fruitful concepts for teaching narrative. He looks at the notion of 'epochal temporality', or the claim that different historical epochs have distinct and describable experiences of time, and asks what this might mean for an understanding of narrative time in the contemporary novel. He explores the idea that, in the historical present, there is a preoccupation with the unforeseeable, which differs significantly from predominant conceptions of time in the second half of the twentieth century. His teaching also aims to set out a range of useful narratological concepts, particularly related to the notion of narrative tense, which are useful for the description of time structures in epochal temporality and for the teaching of time experiments in contemporary fiction. The chapter is closely tied to a third-year undergraduate module in which students work on a range of modern novels.
- Sue J. Kim starts from the observation that students often have difficulty talking critically about race and narrative—particularly fictional narratives—because they seem so familiar and, therefore, have become naturalized. Students often take race and narrative as givens, rather than multifaceted constructions and ongoing processes arising from long, complex histories. Professor Kim reflects on her experiences using two short stories to teach narrative theory and racialization to undergraduate students: Toni Morrison's 'Recitatif' and Ted Chiang's science fiction 'Story of Your Life'. While students are more willing to believe that race is a central structuring element in Morrison's famous story featuring protagonists of unspecific race, they are more ambivalent about Chiang's story because it does not overtly deal with race and/or ethnicity as we generally understand it. But through discussions of narratological concepts, such as Gerard Genette's focalization, order and anachrony and David Herman's concept of story world, Chiang's 'Story' can become a way to talk about the logics and processes of racial formation, as theorized by Michael Omi, Howard Winant and others. In other words, 'Story of Your Life' defamiliarizes some key elements of narrative and racialization in ways that can enable students—sometimes—to recognize how they are inextricably intertwined.
- Sean McEvoy asks whether we should not reflect more on the ethical consequences of taking narratives of violent death, mutilation, pain and degradation—often with no sense of redemption—into a room

full of impressionable young people. In the ancient world, Plato and Aristotle clashed over the issue of the moral effects of tragedy upon its readers and audiences. Having considered their arguments, Dr McEvoy goes on to discuss how effective (and ethical) modes of teaching tragedy may be where role-play and distancing techniques are employed. He surveys political critiques of the genre, including some contemporary claims that certain texts can cause psychological harm to students. He concludes that when we teach tragedy we are actually conducting a philosophical exploration into the nature of value itself in an open-eyed, honest way which can only be of benefit to us all.

- Rachel Trousdale examines the challenges and rewards peculiar to teaching comic narrative. Readers frequently respond to humour as trivial, so students who expect readings in university courses to be 'important' often fail to recognize when a text is also funny. Instead, they find these texts confusing: why do the characters behave so illogically and say such contradictory things? Recognizing humour can be even more difficult when a text's comic elements depend on unfamiliar references, or when the subject matter is shocking. But jokes often provide the focal point for a text's thematic components, and are often where apparently contradictory ideas are brought into productive conflict. Using examples from Tom Stoppard, Sterling Brown and Virginia Woolf, and drawing on theories of humour from Plato to Bergson , Professor Trousdale examines ways to help students see how comic narratives construct substantive philosophical and political arguments.
- Will Norman examines the teaching of crime narratives in the context of an undergraduate module on American Crime Fiction. Dr Norman's purpose is to elucidate how the study of crime fiction can be a way of helping students understand the politics of narrative form. As such he traces the progression of the module from the reading of Poe's detective stories through the narrative disruptions of mid-century hardboiled crime fiction to more contemporary noir fiction by authors such as Sara Paretsky and Attica Locke. He discusses how students become accustomed to historicizing shifts in the ways crime narratives are constructed. Todorov's classic essay on 'The Typology of Detective Fiction' serves as an accessible Formalist introduction to the spectrum of crime narratives, distinguished by their various configurations of the relationship between fabula and sjuzhet . Dr Norman helps students to begin asking narratological questions about their reading, but one of the objectives of the module is to encourage students to discover the limitations of Todorov's ahistorical perspective. In discussing the transition from the classic whodunit narrative structure to the disorientating and tangled narratives of Chandler and his successors, students find their own ways of recuperating some of the historical content of the form, which has been evacuated from purely Formalist analysis. Using Franco Moretti's Marxist analysis of detective fiction as a corrective, the module moves into more sophisticated discussions of how readers undertake structural and functional analyses simultaneously, and thereby of how hardboiled and contemporary noir narratives represent entanglement with society and politics.
- Mark Eaton analyses Hilary Mantel's Wolf Hall Trilogy as a case study for what historical fiction can contribute to our understanding of history. In particular, Professor Eaton attends to what her novels reveal about the complex processes of historical and religious change that occurred during the Protestant Reformation. Guided by his experience teaching Mantel's fiction in courses on contemporary British fiction and historical fiction, he examines the ways that literary narratives offer a unique perspective on major historical developments in religion

and theology, especially by giving students, of whatever background or belief, an opportunity to encounter, and indeed inhabit, religious interiority. By showing how new religious ideas and sensibilities develop, how they come into conflict with older viewpoints, and how they are by turns absorbed, adopted, challenged, resisted or rejected, Mantel discloses how religion is subject to the same historical contingencies as anything else. Far from being timeless and unchanging, it is contextual and more often than not syncretistic. The Wolf Hall Trilogy offers students one example of how a writer can take even a period as thoroughly documented as the Tudor dynasty, or a movement as widely studied as the Protestant Reformation, and somehow defamiliarize them, or make them seem fresh. In turn, students are invited to reflect on their own methods of reading and interpreting literature. Reading historical fiction necessarily involves us in multiple temporalities: the time period when the work is set, when it was written, and when we are reading it. Students are led to reconsider their own beliefs, whether or not they are religious, in light of an earlier period of momentous historical change.

- Ellen Rosenman, who admits to having personally fallen victim to the romance of the archive, starts from her love of introducing students to primary sources that help them navigate the distant world of Victorian novels. Without contextual knowledge, they often find themselves puzzled or frustrated—why don't ill-suited spouses just divorce each other? Why are aristocrats so clueless about the Stock Exchange? Hoping to improve upon conventional assignments, Professor Rosenman tasked students with creating a wiki. To an online version of the novel, they attached their own essays, which they keyed to points of conflict or confusion in order to help future student readers understand the issues at stake. Students investigated the novelty of investment capitalism, attitudes towards Jews, the contested nature of the term 'gentleman', the history of medical reform, and domestic violence, among other topics. Students also came to see that their primary sources did not establish facts about Victorian beliefs but were no more authoritative than the novels. Moreover, certain genres, such as advice literature, attempted to stabilize social meanings, while the novels were more interested in opening up areas of ambiguity or change. Students traced the dynamic interrelationships among texts, as novels, conduct books, newspaper accounts and memoirs vied for authority over social meanings. They also noted the ways in which the novel itself registered competing values and ideas. In doing so, they became more sensitive to the features of different narratives and different kinds of narratives, developing a special appreciation for the heteroglossia of the novel.
- Suzanne Keen distils some of the benefits that can be realized in the undergraduate literature classroom by replacing one or more traditional writing assignments with group (crowd-sourced) or individual projects employing Digital Humanities (DH) techniques of analysis, visualization and interpretation of narrative. Professor Keen describes a modest mapping exercise in a course about London novels, with a frank account of the start-up effort required and the surprising cognitive gains realized by its incorporation into a traditional English syllabus. In a brief account of a pedagogically focused DH initiative at a small liberal arts college, she shows how undergraduates gain a digital skill set and more acute engagement with narrative texts by participating in the Text Encoding Initiative mark-up of a digital edition of a medieval epic poem. She refers to colleagues' DH projects, for example involving undergraduate students in research that maps characters' movements in space, leading to new interpretations of canonical texts. The centrepiece of the

chapter shares an original discovery about the sources and influences on Joseph Conrad's The Secret Agent that came out of DH pedagogy.

- Alec Charles notes that there are three main challenges in the teaching of narrative development in the area of new media: (1) the interactive, multilinear and ludic natures of new media platforms do not necessarily lend themselves to traditional narrative structures; (2) the emphasis which these media put upon users' otherwise unmediated forms of self-expression is not necessarily conducive to classical structures of narrative communication; and (3) many of the promises which these media forms have made in relation to narrative advances not only have not been realized and are perhaps unrealizable, but are also not always entirely desirable. Bolter and Grusin's scepticism as to the potential of introducing 'interactivity to the novel' is, for example, echoed by Koskinen's rebuttal of 'interactive narratives'—'no one in his right mind can write an alternative ending to the story of Jesus Christ'. Yet Professor Charles argues that these challenges also represent opportunities. The questions which these technologies pose as to how we teach narrative open up possibilities as to the development of narrative structures, practices and modes of reception—beyond blogging and citizen journalism, beyond Wikipedia, social media, virtual worlds and video games: not amateurish 'produsage' but a late postmodern incarnation of Roland Barthes' notion of scriptibilité. Such opportunities may promote ways to teach writing which themselves underpin the development of cultural identity and critical thought.
- Jess Moriarty argues that helping students to connect their academic research with their creative writing processes can often be a challenge but, when achieved, can provide valuable pathways between their personal experiences and the social world under study. Dr Moriarty identifies supporting this connection as a potentially powerful teaching and learning tool, helping undergraduates to make the leap from student to writer and researcher. She identifies possible ways in which the writing and sharing of autobiographical narratives can inform and enhance pedagogy in creative writing workshops with undergraduate students. Auto-ethnography is shown to be an evolving methodology that values and legitimizes personal stories and evocative academic work, and can facilitate recovery from personal events that have been difficult or traumatic. The chapter explores how the study of self-narrative can empower students to make explicit links between these personal experiences and their academic research. This chapter will be of interest to teachers and students carrying out research in education and to those trying to develop their own teaching practice to incorporate student-focused approaches to creative writing. Dr Moriarty suggests that an auto-ethnographic approach can contribute to an increased confidence in students' sense of their place within the discipline of creative writing and the place of their discipline within the wider world.
- In the final chapter, I describe the background, development and delivery of a first-year undergraduate narrative module. Designed partly as a module helping students in their transition from school and college work to undergraduate study, the module starts with fairy tales and folktales (drawing on Zipes , Bettelheim and Propp), myths (Frye, Eliade and Barthes), examines the central importance, as well as the potential coercions, of narrative in our culture (at one point the module brings together the 'Alice' books and Freud's case study of Dora), and moves on to the analysis of short novels or novellas (by Melville , James, Conrad , Joyce, Mann, Mansfield, Rhys and detective stories) that demonstrate some of the narrative techniques and issues—including the realist/modernist narrative 'divide'—that

the module explores in narratological theory (Walter Benjamin and Peter Brooks among others). The module concludes with a debate around 'Disneyfication'. <>

The Cambridge Handbook of Sociology 2 Volume edited by Kathleen Odell Korgen [Cambridge University Press, 9781107125896 (both volumes, 9781107099746, volume I: 9781107125896 Volume II: 9781107125858)]

Whether a student, an instructor, a researcher, or just someone interested in understanding the roots of sociology and our social world, The Cambridge Handbook of Sociology is for you. The Handbook provides a survey of the field, covering its origins; core areas, including theory, methods, culture, socialization, social structure, inequality, and social change; specialties within sociology such as race, class, and feminist theories; and special topics (e.g. the sociology of nonhuman animals, the sociology of disaster, the sociology of mental health, the sociology of science and technology, the sociology of violence, environmental justice, and the sociology of food); and related fields (e.g. criminology, social work, social psychology, and women and gender studies). Each essay includes a discussion of how the respective subfield contributes to the overall discipline and to society. Written by some of the most respected scholars, teachers, and public sociologists in the world, the essays are highly readable and authoritative.

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Whether you are a student learning about sociology, an instructor teaching a topic for the first time, a sociologist delving into a new area of research, or just a person interested in finding out more about the roots of sociology and what it contributes to our social world, The Cambridge Handbook of Sociology is for you. It provides a survey of the field of sociology, covering the most prevalent topics in research and teaching. A two-volume work, The Cambridge Handbook of Sociology gives an overview of the field that is both comprehensive and up-to-date. The chapters, produced by some of the most respected scholars, teachers, and public sociologists from all over the world, are highly readable and written with a lay, as well as a scholarly, audience in mind.

Sociology is a branch of learning well known for its fragmentation. This handbook, however, provides a unified perspective, showing how each subfield contributes to the overall discipline and to society. In addition to covering key areas in sociology, it offers a history of the field, showing how and why it developed, and entries on related areas of study. In doing so, it works to define the field of sociology and serves as an invaluable resource for all those working and teaching in sociology and related areas.

The first volume of the handbook focuses on core areas of sociology, such as theory, methods, culture, socialization, social structure, inequality, diversity, social institutions, social problems, deviant behavior, locality, geography, the environment, and social change. It also explains how sociology developed in different parts of the world, providing readers with a perspective on how sociology became the global discipline it is today.

The second volume covers specialties within sociology and interdisciplinary studies that relate to sociology. It includes perspectives on race, class, feminist theories, special topics (e.g., the sociology of nonhuman animals, quality-of-life/social indicators research, the sociology of risk, the sociology of disaster, the sociology of mental health, sociobiology, the sociology of science and technology, the sociology of violence, environmental justice, and the sociology of food), the sociology of the self, the sociology of the life course, culture and behavior, sociology's impact on society, and related fields (e.g., criminology, criminal justice studies, social work, social psychology, sociology of translation and translation studies, and women and gender studies).

Whatever your interest in sociology, you will find it in these two volumes. We hope that The Cambridge Handbook of Sociology increases your understanding and appreciation of both the overall field of sociology and closely related fields of study. As this handbook makes clear, all of society benefits from a sociological perspective. <>

The Oxford Handbook of Social Psychology and Social Justice edited by Phillip L. Hammack [Oxford Library of Psychology, Oxford University Press, 9780199938735]

The twentieth century witnessed not only the devastation of war, conflict, and injustice on a massive scale, but it also saw the emergence of social psychology as a discipline committed to addressing these and other social problems. In the 21st century, however, the promise of social psychology remains incomplete. We have witnessed the reprise of authoritarianism and the endurance of institutionalized forms of oppression

such as sexism, racism, and heterosexism across the globe.

Edited by Phillip L. Hammack, The Oxford Handbook of Social Psychology and Social Justice reorients social psychology toward the study of social injustice in real-world settings. The volume's contributing authors effectively span the borders between cultures and disciplines to better highlight new and emerging critical paradigms that interrogate the very real consequences of social injustice.

United in their belief in the possibility of liberation from oppression, with this Handbook, Hammack and his contributors offer a stirring blueprint for a new, important kind of social psychology today.

Excerpt:

Social Psychology and Social Justice: Critical Principles and Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century

This introduction presents the concept of social justice as an idea (and ideal) linked to Enlightenment philosophies and their realization in modern democracies. The historical emergence of social psychology as a discipline is discussed in relation to twentieth-century movements for postcolonial independence and civil rights, the demise of the eugenics movement, and challenges to ideologies of ethnic hierarchy. Five principles of a social psychology of social justice for the twenty-first century are proposed, orienting empirical work toward (1) a critical ontological perspective, (2) assumption of a normative stance toward justice, (3) alliance with the subordinate, (4) analysis of resistance, and (5) commitment to public science and scientific activism. Chapters within the volume are situated in relation to six areas of inquiry: (1) critical ontologies, paradigms, and methods; (2) race and ethnicity; (3) gender and sexuality; (4) class and poverty; (5) globalization and conflict; and (6) intervention, advocacy, and social policy.

Interrogating Injustice: A Roadmap

My intent in charting these five principles is to provide a common vocabulary for the paradigm that has already emerged in psychological science—a paradigm with a long history but a renewed relevance. This paradigm is critical of the relationship between self and society, sensitive to power and its impact on personhood, mindful of the privilege of authority we hold as scholars, committed to the production of knowledge useful in the quest for social justice. The chapters in this volume speak directly to how we might embody this type of paradigm. Here I briefly chart the major content areas of the volume, situating these contributions in perspective.

Historical, Theoretical, and Conceptual Foundations

Social psychologists who seek to embody a commitment to social justice in their work must first have a comprehensive understanding of the concept of "social justice" and its use in related disciplines, namely moral philosophy, politics, legal studies, and history. The first part of the volume seeks to achieve this end, through both this introductory chapter and Susan Opotow's (2018) chapter on social justice theory and practice.

Exceptional reviews of social psychology and social justice theory and research exist elsewhere, and so our intent in this first section of the volume was not to recapitulate those but rather to offer this set of principles as a generative guidepost for emerging scholars of social psychology and social justice. Opotow's contribution reviews the key ideas of social justice in social psychology, distinguishing among distributive, procedural, and exclusionary/inclusionary justice. She then applies a social justice lens to issues of the environment. Issues of environmental justice in social psychology are relatively new but incredibly important as we consider the link among social policy, health, and lived experience. Opotow uses the concept of the scope of justice to explain how injustices become legitimized by placing individuals and groups outside the vision of a moral community, a process Opotow calls moral exclusion (originally suggested by Ervin Staub in a symposium, as noted in Opotow). This area of theory and research, which Opotow has led for decades is incredibly useful for social psychologists to understand the perpetration and legitimization of injustice in many domains offers not just a review of models of social justice and their application (in this case, to the issue of environmental pollution). She also appropriately invokes three political philosophers—Martha

Nussbaum, Wendy Brown, and Iris Marion Young—to offer insights into how social justice research can live up to its potential for social change. Nussbaum's capabilities framework, for example, highlights how the unjust distribution of resources limits the social and psychological possibilities of entire classes of people. Young provides guidance to would-be activists on how to influence deliberative processes—for example, through the use of creative means such as images, poetry, cartoons, marches, and the like. Opotow argues that social psychologists must engage with these other disciplinary perspectives on justice to gain insights into effective activity for social change.

Critical Ontologies, Paradigms, and Methods

As the principle of critical ontologies suggests, a social psychology of social justice benefits from paradigms and methods that highlight the relationship between social structure and lived experience. Weis and Fine offer the concept of critical bifocality to "render visible the relations between groups to structures of power, to social policies, to history, and to large sociopolitical formations". In practical terms, what they call a "bifocal design" documents "the linkages and capillaries of structural arrangements and the discursive and lived-out practices by which privileged and marginalized youth and adults make sense of their circumstances".

The concept of critical bifocality is among the paradigmatic lenses we might call upon as we anchor the empirical work of documenting injustice and its resistance. And of course there are others. Social identity theory has long offered a way of linking concepts of social status and categorization with self and behavior in social interaction (e.g., Reicher, 2004; Tajfel, 1981). Feminist psychologists have always foregrounded issues of power and inequality in the analysis of women's lives in context. Certain forms of narrative psychology integrate analysis of both personal and "master" narratives (i.e., compulsory storylines about group history and identity). An inherently critical subdiscipline, community psychology has long offered a set of concepts and methods to understand the link between social injustice and psychological experience.

The second section of the volume offers two contributions that speak to issues of paradigm and method in the social psychology of social justice. Langhout and Fernández draw our attention to a relatively underappreciated but incredibly relevant concept in our current time—that of citizenship. The idea of citizenship is key to social justice, for it provides the legal and moral basis for the treatment of individuals in society. Drawing on a vast literature in diverse fields such as political science and feminist studies, Langhout and Fernández detail models of citizenship and their implication for justice. They are particularly critical of conceptions of citizenship in the context of neoliberalism, in which notions of the "good citizen" are linked to the individual's contribution to labor and material production. The bulk of the chapter proposes a focus on cultural citizenship among social psychologists who study social justice. Cultural citizenship refers to a set of practices, rather than a particular legal status in the traditional models of citizenship. It is practiced when individuals mobilize to construct a community, a shared identity, and rights and recognition within a society. Langhout and Fernández provide an agenda for research and action through the paradigmatic lens of cultural citizenship, pressing social psychologists to look beyond matters of individual, interpersonal, or intergroup dynamics, toward the way in which individuals and groups engage in social practice to realize social justice.

As one of the architects of psychology's "cognitive revolution," Jerome Bruner, describes in his landmark Acts of Meaning, the "proper study" of human life foregrounds issues of personal and cultural meaning. Part of the "narrative revolution" in psychology of the 1980s and 1990s, Bruner's treatise revitalized a hermeneutic paradigm for psychological science grounded in the analysis of lived experience once envisioned by Dilthey (1894/1977) at the dawn of the discipline. The aim was not, in contrast to the naïve positivism of behaviorism, to predict and control human behavior but rather to understand the meaning of social acts. In Bruner's (1990) own words,

> A culturally sensitive psychology ... is and must be based not only upon what people actually do, but what they say they do and what they say caused them to do

> what they did. It is also concerned with what people say others did and why. And above all, it is concerned with what people say their worlds are like.

The new version of psychology Bruner envisioned was one in which verbal accounts of meaning making in context become primary sources of analysis in their own right. Like other early narrative psychologists, Bruner viewed the human capacity to use language to construct intentional social worlds as a fundamental feature of human development, as well as a key mediator in the process of social stasis and change. This view of language, culture, and development has been enormously influential across several subdisciplines of psychology.

In his contribution to this section of the volume, Frost argues for the vitality of what he calls narrative evidence in the quest for social justice. Following Ouellette's treatise on critical personality psychology, Frost argues that documenting and communicating the meaning individuals make of "opportunity inequity" provides compelling evidence that can be mobilized for social and political change. While hegemonic forms of psychological science have often privileged quantitative evidence and assumed that decision makers would be inherently compelled by numbers, the reality is that the human stories provided by narrative evidence can be quite persuasive to many in power. Frost highlights the way in which his own research program on a key social justice issue—the recognition of same-sex relationships—created narrative evidence revealing the injustice of inequality for same-sex couples. Among other key findings, Frost discovered that narratives of same-sex couples revealed similar themes of intimacy compared to opposite-sex couples. However, narratives of same-sex couples revealed themes of stigma, prejudice, and discrimination, highlighting the way in which social injustice for same-sex couples (namely, the lack of cultural and legal recognition during the era of prohibition of same-sex marriage) created unique psychological stressors. As Herek notes in his later chapter in the volume, evidence of the psychological impact of inequity was key to the unique voice psychologists could assume in the legal fight for same-sex marriage.

A social psychology of social justice requires paradigms and methods that can work toward the goal of challenging oppression and inequality (Fine, 2006). These paradigmatic statements on cultural citizenship and narrative, respectively, offer just two of many possible lenses through which to frame social psychological research for social justice. The remaining chapters in the volume deal largely with domains of injustice.

Race, Ethnicity, Inequality

"... [Title problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line," as the luminary African American social scientist and public scholar, W.E.B. Du Bois, so aptly stated at the start of his landmark 1903 volume, The Souls of Black Folk. Indeed social psychology as a discipline came to be defined over the twentieth century precisely with its efforts to address this problem—more than an abstraction for social science, a lived reality for the many racial and ethnic minorities whose very being challenged the history of white supremacy in the United States and across the globe, gradually escaping the exploitation of European colonialism throughout the century (Fanon). Du Bois's (1903/1996) early analysis of the psychological legacy of slavery and the experience of racism was inspiring, poetic, and prescient. His notion of double consciousness ("this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity,") evokes this lived experience of "problematized" existence as a person of color in a world defined by white supremacy The ideology of ethnic hierarchy that defined and legitimized oppressive social systems such as exclusionary nationalism, slavery, and colonialism reached its apex with World War II. The atrocities of the War created a new world order, not just politically (e.g., the rise of US and Soviet dominance, the formation of new institutions such as the United Nations) but also scientifically, as social science disciplines consolidated their commitment (some more gradually than others) to a new ethic of cultural pluralism. Cultural anthropologists such as Franz Boas (1911), Ruth Benedict (1934), and Margaret Mead (1928) had already sought to use the tools of science to illustrate the benefits of diversity, at times romanticizing cultural difference, but intellectually

committed to documenting diversity and promoting its benefits to societies. As already noted, the founders of social psychology and their subsequent generations of students all took the value of pluralism and the repudiation of ethnic hierarchy for granted, as they charted the detriments of racism, authoritarianism, prejudice, and the like on perpetrators, victims, and society at large.

While at times there were moments in which this larger narrative of scientific consensus against racism may have been questioned (most notably in problematic studies of intelligence differences among different racial groups; e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1969), a commitment to cultural pluralism and intergroup harmony has characterized psychological science from the mid-twentieth century until today. It should, then, cause both alarm and a healthy dose of self-critique that we witness the extraordinary endurance of racism across the globe, the resurgence of the kind of exclusionary nationalism (including in the United States) that ignited all of the wars of the prior century, the erosion of faith in science to work for the common good, and the proliferation of propaganda designed to delegitimize the vital institutions of democracy—including science and media. Across the globe there are renegade resisters of this tyrannical trend—artists, scientists, activists, and some brave political leaders. In this new context of explicit racism, this renewed effort to reclaim white supremacy and condone new forms of colonialism, we need a new social psychology of race and racism—one that takes us out of the overly cognitive realm of implicit bias (important as that line of inquiry is, of course), back into the fray of explicit racism, which had never really faded to the extent many social scientists had proposed anyway.

The five chapters in this section of the volume speak to a new approach to the social psychology of race and racism in the twenty-first century—an approach which links social psychology more directly to the field of critical legal studies and to a more complete understanding of the relationship among race, identity, and power. Cristian Tileagã has been a vital contributor to the social psychological study of race and racism in Europe, especially among the Roma—an ethnic group that has long been persecuted across the continent. He has especially highlighted the use of discourse and other cultural artifacts to delegitimize groups in multicultural Europe. Engaging closely with sociology and anthropology, Tileagã (2018) proposes that our study of racism be characterized by critical analysis—an approach that views prejudice and racism as part of a larger cultural system intended to reify power asymmetries, rather than an individual psychological phenomenon. This position, as Tileagã notes, has emerged strongly in social psychology largely outside of North America. These and other social psychologists have increasingly challenged the notion that prejudice is simply a "cognitive" problem that can be addressed at the individual or interpersonal level. Tileagã's notion of critical analysis proposes that social psychologists move out of the lab and into the field, taking from other social science disciplines a rigorous approach to the study of culture and social structure.

Chapters by Stephanie Fryberg and colleagues and William Cross return to the North American context to posit new forms of inquiry in the study of racial minorities in the United States. In their very title, Fryberg and colleagues challenge the illusion that the colonization of indigenous people in North America is a phenomenon of the past. They illustrate the way in which colonialism endures through the denigration of indigenous people's cultures, identities, and practices in North America. They invoke the notion of a culture cycle to describe the mutual constitution of selves and societies, arguing that historic and ongoing colonization of indigenous people interrupts an existing culture cycle, creating tremendous psychological risk for healthy development. Colonization endures in the social representations of indigenous people in the media (largely invisible), as well as the formal educational system constructed originally by the colonizers themselves. Modeling a particularly laudable form of social practice for social psychologists, Fryberg and colleagues do not simply theorize or document the injustice against indigenous North Americans. Rather, they propose a theory of culture change and illustrate one attempt to decolonize not just individual minds but cultural contexts themselves. Social justice for Native Americans cannot be achieved absent the

legitimization of their cultures, which can occur through concrete changes in educational practice and policy that better "match" with traditional cultures. They offer an extended discussion of their attempt to decolonize the school context in the psychological interest of its indigenous students.

Cross's critical review of research on Black identity and social justice challenges several narratives of the impact of slavery and racism on the psychological development and well-being of African Americans. His expansive treatment of historical, psychological, and other social scientific literature reveals a "disjunction" between the potential contamination of oppressive social systems and the actual evidence of resilience and thriving among many Black people. I take Cross's challenge to suggest that the relationship between injustice and psychological experience is not simple or uniform, and it should not be necessary to highlight psychological "damage" in order to argue for racial justice. (There is an important parallel here to the role psychologists sought to play in the legal battle for same-sex marriage). In an argumentative thread that runs throughout the volume, Cross suggests that social psychologists reconsider the narrowness of traditional experimental methods to interrogate phenomena such as racial preferences in the real world.

A key tenet of a more critical approach to race, ethnicity, and culture is that the terms we use to describe difference across human communities are themselves subject to analysis. Our science becomes more "complete" when we ask not just about psychological experience in particular cultural settings or of individuals embodying particular identities but rather also about the meaning of cultures and identities themselves. Cross's chapter, for example, problematizes the tendency to expect that race itself is a marker of psychological distress. Okazaki's chapter on culture and social justice among Asians and Asian Americans offers a critical perspective on the use of the culture concept itself among psychologists to produce essentializing notions of culture and ethnicity.

As Okazaki (2018) argues, psychological approaches to the study ofAsians and Asian Americans have overly homogenized the experience of a vast diversity of cultural groups. While the emergence of cultural psychology has been tremendously important for psychological science to recognize its historic narrowness, Okazaki's analysis echoes prior critiques of the reductionism of mainstream cultural psychology and calls for a new paradigm for cultural psychology that can better serve the interest of social justice for Asians and Asian Americans. She proposes that we diversify our concept of culture in psychology through transdisciplinary dialogue, expand our methods (especially through the use of narrative methods), and diversify the knowledge production process itself by recognizing the implicit bias toward Europe and North America in journals. Okazaki's argument is thus comprehensive in its critical interrogation not only of the way in which Asians and Asian Americans have been represented in psychological science, but also of the reifying potential of an uncritical approach to social categorization (including concepts of race, ethnicity, and culture) and the enduring hegemony of Euro American scholars and epistemologies.

The final chapter in this section of the volume continues to interrogate simplistic notions of race and ethnicity, providing a primer and vision for the adoption of an intersectional perspective in social psychology. One of the earliest treaties on what we now call intersectionality was penned by social psychologist Aída Hurtado, whose pathbreaking work has brought social psychology (and social identity theory in particular) in direct dialogue with feminist theory. In her classic essay, Hurtado begins with this vital observation: "Each oppressed group in the United States is positioned in a particular and distinct relationship to white men, and each form of subordination is shaped by this relational position". The crux of her argument is that, because white women and women of color hold different positions in relation to white men, their experiences of privilege and subordination are distinct. The meaning of womanhood is distinct, then, for white women experience the allure of seduction, "... persuaded to become the partners of white men ... accepting a subservient role that meets the material needs of white men". Because women of color cannot provide white men with "racially pure offspring," they are ultimately rejected by white men and viewed merely as "workers and as objects of sexual power and aggression". Hurtado notes

that class position likely plays a role in these dynamics as well, with working-class white women more distant from the epicenter of white male power.

Ideas of intersectionality importantly call our attention to power and identity in a way that reflects the complexity of lived experience and responds to calls to center the study of power in social relations. Linked to the emergence of critical race theory (CRT) in legal studies , intersectionality highlights the way in which individuals are always positioned in relative places of power on account of their multiple social identities. Psychologists have increasingly documented the way in which intersections of race, gender, class, sexual identity, and other statuses or identities locate individuals distinctly in their relation to privilege. For example, Coston and Kimmel illustrate the ways in which class (i.e., working class), sexual orientation (i.e., gay), and disability status challenge the privilege typically inherent in masculinity.

Hurtado's chapter proposes an intersectionality paradigm for social psychological research that traces its origins to both social identity theory and borderlands theory, providing an invaluable sense of historical continuity to the concept. Hurtado's (2018) expansion of the intersectionality concept beyond Crenshaw's (1989) original focus on race and gender is important, for it speaks to the multiplicity of social identities individuals may hold at any given point in time. Hurtado calls these master statuses" of sexuality, class, ethnicity, and physical ableness. Bringing intersectionality more closely into dialogue with social identity theory is a great service to social psychology, for social identity theory was intended to describe the way in which status and hierarchy were negotiated through both intrapsychic processes and intergroup relations. Hence both paradigms are worthy of consolidation as they both foreground notions of power. Borderlands theory, articulated by Anzaldúa, expands upon Du Bois's notion of double consciousness. Anzaldúa invokes the physical concept of the border between Mexico and the United States to characterize the psychological experience of Chicanas growing up on the border, their mestiza consciousness providing them with a special tolerance for ambiguity and eroding the sense of "subject-object duality that keeps her a prisoner".

Hurtado's unique linkage of these theoretical perspectives opens up new ways of thinking about the lived experience of intersectionality and inequality. As she notes in her conclusion, intersectionality does not privilege one social identity over another. In an ever-diversifying US cultural landscape, in which identity pluralism has become a norm, intersectionality reveals that holding multiple group identifications is possible but that particular constellations of intersectional identities can have different implications for the experience of inequality. But with this experience comes opportunities for political coalition building, opportunities for individuals who inhabit particular configurations of social categorization to use identity to work for social change. Hurtado thus invaluably links the contemporary concern with intersectionality to longstanding theoretical considerations in social psychology and social justice.

Gender, Sexuality, Inequality

The subordination of women represents perhaps the most enduring evidence of systematic injustice over the course of human history. Patriarchy—the social system and accompanying ideology that privileges male authority and social power—continues to characterize most societies, codifying inequality in culture, custom, and law. Early psychological science, rooted in a eugenics paradigm of intelligence, contributed to hierarchical thinking about the sexes and legitimized gender-based inequality, largely ignoring research conducted by women that suggested structural explanations for sex differences. Over the course of its disciplinary history, psychology gradually came to repudiate sexism and patriarchy and to recognize the way in which women's experience and development may be psychologically distinct and the way in which structural disadvantage impacts women's identity and development.

In her pathbreaking book, The Lenses of Gender, Sandra Lipstiz Bem reveals the way in which the scientific study of gender contributed to the subordination of women by legitimizing sex differences in bio-essentializing terms. In a prescient treatise calling us to reconsider how we

frame the debate on sex inequality, Bem argues for gender neutrality and the eradication of gender polarization. She seeks to expose the way in which gender is a social construct, reified in science, politics, and law, designed to maintain patriarchy and androcentrism. I highlight this work because it represents a vital (and extremely successful) attempt to link psychological science and feminist theory, revealing the way in which our discipline had conspired in the subordination of women. And although queer theory had not yet made inroads into psychology at time of Bem's writing, her analysis is highly compatible with queer theory's more radical tenets about the socially constructed and performative nature of gender.

The late 1980s to early 2000s also witnessed several important new lines of inquiry that reoriented the study of women's lives toward an interrogation of the psychological consequences of inequality. For example, Fine (1988) argued that anti-sex rhetoric and the problematic nature of sex education in public schools conspired to exacerbate social and psychological vulnerabilities of adolescent females, especially those in low-income communities. Fredrickson and Roberts's objectification theory provided a vocabulary for psychologists to link the cultural construction of women's bodies through the heterosexual male gaze to the psychological experience of perceiving oneself as an object (i.e., self-objectification). They illustrated the way in which problems in women's health and development can be traced to objectification. Following Fine's call to study adolescent females' sexual desire directly, Tolman and Szalacha revealed the way in which the social location of adolescents impacted how they talked about desire. They found that urban girls described sexual agency "in the service of protection" (from AIDS, pregnancy, and reputation), while suburban girls described sexual agency "in the service of pleasure" (a more internal conflict about the management of desire). Glick and Fiske complicated perspectives on sexism by distinguishing between hostile and benevolent sexism, which represent complementary justifications for gender inequality.

By the end of the twentieth century, psychology had thus come to reconcile its own sexist and patriarchal past to provide paradigms through which to understand women's lives in the context of continued subordination and inequality. This critical perspective on sex and gender included an underlying theory of subjectivity (consistant with the principle of critical ontologies) as rooted in power, constrained by the historic asymmetry between men and women and the use of a bio-essentializing discourse in psychology itself that contributed to sex inequality. The social psychology of sex and gender was now characterized by a normative stance toward gender equality (i.e., the subordination of women is unacceptable; patriarchy is a problematic cultural ideology) and an explicit alliance with the subordinate through the production of knowledge intended to benefit women's lives.

Two of the three chapters in this section of the volume expand upon these perspectives on gender and social justice. Abigail Stewart has been a key intellectual architect of feminist psychology and the use of empirical methods to study women's lives in context. Her work not only assumes a critical ontological perspective and a normative stance toward social justice, it has also examined an analysis of resistance through the study of social activism on a global scale. Stewart and Zucker's chapter takes as its point of departure the notion that psychological well-being is directly connected to one's location in the social structure, fully embodying the principle of critical ontologies. Policies, laws, and cultural practices that place women in a subordinate position are detrimental to women's psychological well-being and development—an unacceptable outcome in a society that strives for justice and equality. Anchored in canonical perspectives in feminist psychology, Stewart and Zucker illustrate the way in which women's social positions limit or enable their physical and psychological well-being, focusing on experiences with discrimination, workplace harassment, and sexual and self-objectification. Importantly, they anchor their analysis in a framework of human rights, arguing that structural forces that negatively impact women's health and psychological well-being violate women's basic human rights.

In a similar vein to Stewart and Zucker, Grabe frames contemporary social justice issues for women through the lens of human rights. She connects women's psychological well-being to issues of political and economic justice by linking social psychological and transnational feminist perspectives. Grabe (2018) details a paradigm for the study of women's social justice in global perspective, anchored in the experience of grassroots activists working for gender equality and thus foregrounding an analysis of resistance. This analysis follows her empirical work revealing the link between land ownership and enhanced social and psychological well-being among women in numerous cultural contexts.

Grabe argues that a transnational feminist liberation psychology offers an ideal paradigm through which to study social justice issues for women on a global scale. A key goal of this paradigm is to document existing grassroots efforts intended to work for women's human rights, using methods that privilege marginalized women's perspectives (e.g., narrative methods). Importantly, Grabe notes that social psychologists engaged in this work must practice reflexivity by being fully aware of the power imbalances that exist between scholars and grassroots activists. Successful scholar-activist partnerships require recognition of power asymmetries and a commitment to the production of knowledge that will serve the interest of the oppressed. Taken together, Stewart and Zucker's and Grabe's contributions provide a new generation of social psychologists with key paradigms through which to interrogate gender injustice. Both contributions embody several of the critical principles I have proposed in this chapter, committed to a critical perspective on selves and societies, a normative stance toward justice, an explicit commitment with the subordinate, and an analysis of resistance.

Patriarchy is a cultural ideology that legitimizes gender inequality, but it is just one of the many pernicious ideologies associated with gender and sexuality that conspire to subordinate certain groups. Cissexism and heterosexism also represent oppressive ideologies that create and legitimize social and psychological injustice. Perhaps the lesser known of the two (but increasingly recognized), cissexism refers to the ideology that one's natal sex (i.e., sex assigned at birth) invariably corresponds to one's gender identity. Much as heterosexism once falsely conceived that opposite-sex attraction was the norm of healthy development, the expanding literature on transgender identity reveals this assumption to be incorrect, but society lags far behind our knowledge of the distinction between sex and gender. Cissexism creates a context in which transphobia—the outright denigration of transgender people—thrives. Evidence is growing on the link among cissexism, transphobia, and structural and direct violence against transgender people, with implications for their health and well-being.

One point of regrettable silence in the current volume is the absence of a dedicated chapter about transgender justice. Social psychology has lagged behind other branches of psychological science (namely clinical and counseling psychology) in its inquiry into the transgender experience. It is my hope that a new generation of social psychologists will expand the study of gender inequality beyond the traditional focus on cisgender women to consider injustices based not just on sexism but also cissexism and transphobia. Particularly in the context of the numerous legal battles now in play (the fates of which remain unknown in the Trump era), social psychologists ought to assume a central role in documenting and analyzing the experience of injustice for transgender people, much as we ultimately did with the study of homophobia and sexual prejudice.

In contrast to cissexism, heterosexism has received considerable treatment in the social psychological literature since the declassification of homosexuality as a mental illness in 1973. Adrienne Rich's classic treatise on compulsory heterosexuality as an ideological system that constrained women's lives and supported patriarchy offered a key frame through which to link sexual ideology and lived experience. Social psychologists in the 1980s situated the study of homophobia within the larger literature on prejudice, thus recognizing it as equally problematic as racism to a healthy society. Herek's defining essay on cultural heterosexism and anti-

gay violence argued that direct violence against sexual minorities could be linked to the cultural ideology that privileged heterosexuality and denigrated other forms of intimacy.

Meyer's minority stress theory provides the larger conceptual framework through which we have come to understand the link between prejudice and health for sexual minorities. He argues that a cultural context of heterosexism creates structural disadvantage for sexual minorities (e.g., workplace discrimination, lack of access to revered cultural institutions such as marriage) which in turn increases the likelihood of experiencing prejudice events that can trigger minority stress processes such as expectations of stigma and rejection, concealment, and internalized heterosexism or homophobia. These processes mediate the link between prejudice and health and mental health outcomes, and factors such as sexual minority community involvement and a positive sexual minority identity can moderate these associations.

Minority stress theory has become the dominant paradigm through which several disciplines, including psychology and public health, view the experience of sexual minorities. As already noted, both Herek and Meyer testified in the legal (Ins- that overturned California's ban on same-sex marriage, and their testimony along with other scholars was cited as key in the court's decision. Similar to the work of Stewart and Zucker (2018), the link these scholars make between social structure and psychological well-being provides a compelling scientific basis from which to argue for social justice through structural change.

One of the great social justice achievements of the past decade has, in fact, been the major structural change in the lives of sexual minorities, with the US Supreme Court's 2015 decision that same sex marriage is a constitutional right. While it would be premature to suggest that this major legal breakthrough has signaled the end of heterosexism and homophobia, it does begin to challenge the premise of minority stress theory. If same-sex intimacy becomes folded into the range of "normal" human behavior, as Hooker so long ago argued, what are the implications for the social and psychological lives of sexual minorities?

Langdridge offers a compelling, critical account of where this process of "normalization" of same-sex desire and sexual minority identity may lead. He challenges conventional scholarship in psychology on sexual minorities, positing a "benevolent heterosexism" that favors the assimilationist wing of the queer movement. For those outside the larger queer community, this perspective may not only be very new; it may also be perplexing and disruptive. The important point to consider is that the movement for sexual liberation has long been split between those who favor inclusion in the existing social structure through access to institutions like marriage, and those who favor the adoption of a queer culture and identity as a form of critique of normativity in all its forms. One of Langdridge's important points is that psychological research on sexual minorities has favored the assimilationist branch of the movement in part by neglecting documentation and analysis of what we might call the resistance branch of the movement. In other words, the dominant emphasis on documenting both the "equivalency" of same-sex and opposite-sex relationships and the effects of exclusion from heteronormative institutions has neglected the study of the full range of sexual diversity and the psychological benefits of queerness. Langdridge argues that the grounding of the LGBQ social movement in a liberal model of social justice that emphasizes individual rights and responsibilities comes at a cost: "... the loss of an aggressive, politically engaged—or perhaps better still, politically enraged—queer subject who seeks to effect radical social change rather than assimilate to the hegemonic demands of individual 'responsible' citizenship". In this audacious but compelling critique, Langdridge challenges the conventional wisdom on the perceived successes of the LGBQ social movement.

This section in the volume reveals on the one hand the strides made in social psychology toward developing new paradigms to understand and advocate for social justice on the basis of gender and sexual diversity. Both Stewart and Zucker and Grabe highlight the link between social structure and psychological well-being, and they stake out paradigms that I suspect will be highly generative for new research in the area of gender equality. On the other hand, Langdridge's more critical

contribution highlights the way in which dominant paradigms, well-intentioned to advocate for social justice for sexual diversity, may inadvertently subvert the radical potential of queer lives to critique culture.

My own position as a member of the sexual minority community and a scholar whose work actually seeks to integrate these perspectives is that we need not see these approaches as mutually exclusive. I believe it is both possible and scientifically responsible to produce knowledge that recognizes both the injustice of structural disadvantage and stigma and the injustice of a compulsory form of identity within the queer community. Langdridge's challenge can be interpreted not necessarily as a repudiation of prior frameworks but as a call for a more complete analysis of the sexual minority experience: one that fully analyzes resistance to notions of normativity. In my own work, I aspire to accomplish just this end: to document the injustice of stigma as well as the creative response achieved through diverse constructions of identity and intimacy.

To return to the radical potential of social identity theory, my perspective is that the study of gender, sexuality, and social justice benefits from a critical analysis of these social categories themselves. Anyone who engages with young people today and considers the dynamic way in which they are navigating labels related to gender and sexuality can attest to the contestation of existing social categories. I refuse to suggest that identities such as man, woman, gay, lesbian, and the like are irrelevant to today's youth, for empirical evidence reveals that such labels continue to have meaning and significance for contemporary youth. At the very minimum, social categories related to gender and sexuality are in a process of explosion, even in the case of heterosexuality with increasing numbers of youth identifying as either "heteroflexible" or "mostly straight".

Rather than taking the meaning and experience of gender or sexual identity for granted, social psychologists would do well to recognize that these identities, like all cultures and identities, are always in states of motion and that changes in the social context command empirical inquiry to assess how lived experience shifts with changes in law, policy, and cultural discourse. So while at times I find the claims of Langdridge and others who critique our dominant paradigms for understanding psychology and sexual identity overly expansive in the absence of sufficient empirical support, I think they appropriately force us to rethink our assumptions. It may not, as Langdridge suggests, serve the interest of social justice to implicitly advance a normalizing or assimilationist position through the assumptions many of our paradigms make about sexual diversity.

Similar to Grabe's views on methodological practice, my position is that we must anchor our theory and our advocacy in the grassroots efforts of gender and sexual minorities to advance a vision of justice and equality that responds to their needs. In the larger queer community I see diverse visions, and the community is by no means singular. As social psychologists, though, we must do a better job of broadening our paradigms to recognize and represent the radical potential of gender and sexual diversity to challenge existing social categories. We must avoid the common tendency in psychology to reify existing social categories, as if they were somehow reflective of the "natural" state of affairs.

Class, Poverty, Inequality

Notions of class and social position have been central to formulations of justice since ancient times (Johnston, 2011). Plato's conception of justice relied strongly on ideas about the "natural" status endowed various groups stratified according to social and economic position. Aristotle's emphasis on distributive justice highlighted relations of reciprocity only within particular social strata. And of course the political philosopher whose ideas inspired the entire concept of contemporary social justice—Karl Marx—focused almost exclusively on social class as the key source of social injustice in the industrial world. Marx and Engels (1848/2014) begin their enormously influential Manifesto of the Communist Party with this claim: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles".

Social class is a defining concept across the social sciences, in fields like politics, economics, and sociology. So it is perhaps somewhat surprising that the psychological treatment of social class, even

within social psychology, is relatively thin compared with other markers of social identity such as race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual identity. Psychology, with its individualistic bias, has largely conspired with the dominant US narrative of meritocracy and the "American Dream" to obscure the significance of social class and economic position in individual development and well-being.

Social psychology has gradually come to identify classism as among the pernicious ideologies that contribute to psychological injustice. Lott argues that classism functions not just through stereotypes and prejudice against the poor but also through cognitive and behavioral distancing processes in which low-income individuals are morally excluded from the larger community. Classism endures because it is deeply anchored in cultural beliefs that attribute poverty to individual, rather than structural, explanations (e.g., individual laziness rather than lack of opportunity). These beliefs are codified in dominant discourses about poverty and wealth—namely, the master narrative of the "American Dream" in which rapid social mobility across generations is credited to the social and economic system of the United States. The strong belief in meritocracy—that individual success can be largely attributed to merit, rather than being constrained by limited opportunity based on factors such as race, gender, and class—is also a core tenet of this master narrative. The proliferation of these often unquestioned discourses in US culture provides legitimacy for the distancing processes of moral exclusion Lott proposes. While media representations might show sympathy for the plight of the poor, they do little to contextualize the experience of poverty. The US educational system, riddled with inequities, supports the construction of distinct social classes and obstructs opportunity for most low-income individuals.

Discourses and narratives do not simply proliferate in societies, though. They are constructed and shaped through elite actors—namely, political leaders. In their contribution to this section of the volume, Bullock and Reppond (2018) take this elite political discourse as their point of departure for a critical social psychology of social class. The discourse of "takers" and "makers" promulgated by Republican leaders during the 2012 election, for example, legitimizes class disparities and economic inequalities by framing poverty and wealth in highly agentic terms. Bullock and Reppond's analysis assumes an explicitly critical ontological perspective, identifying discourse about wealth and poverty as constitutive of economic injustice. They reveal the way in which the "takers" discourse (i.e., individuals who draw more in aid and services than they contribute) is rooted in dominant US ideology of individualism, meritocracy, and rapid social mobility (i.e., the 'American Dream"). Bullock and Reppond argue for the dismantling of this ideology, rooted largely in mythology that benefits the wealthy and maintains inequities. Social psychological research can play a role in challenging this ideology by using empirical evidence to expose economic injustice. Such research ideally would lead to social policy change that recognizes the structural basis of poverty and the way in which opportunities and institutions might work for economic equality.

While Bullock and Reppond emphasize discourse, power, and social psychological processes such as stereotyping in the perpetuation of classism, Walker and Smith take a relational perspective on classism. They reveal the way in which class inequities are reproduced through processes of social exclusion. Walker and Smith (2018) propose that everyday human relationships serve as sites of social class construction. Drawing upon social theorist Pierre Bourdieu, they argue for a relational view of power: "Class hierarchies are created through a system of social relationships, in which we all play a part. Power is thus found in the domination of others—in the ability to have success at the expense of someone's failure".

Taken together, the chapters in this section of the volume highlight the way in which inequitable social positions are maintained through both language and social interaction, harkening back to critical social theories that emphasize the social construction of power and identity (e.g., Marx). Central to Marx's social theory was the notion that individual subjectivity is a product of the material basis of society. The economic structure of society determines the nature of social relations and individual psychology. Later social theorists such as George Herbert Mead (1934) would propose a

more dynamic model of self-society coconstitution (i.e., symbolic interactionism), but even he and other social theorists ascribed primacy to language as a central mediator of the social process. Volosinov, Vyktosky, and Bakhtin—architects of cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT)—fused Marx's ideas with a similarly dynamic view as those of the US symbolic interactionists, arguing strongly for the ideological basis of language. Foucault would later provide more evidence for the use of language and discourse to shape our understanding of social reality and social categories. My point here is that the underlying argument of both Bullock and Reppond and Walker and Smith is part of a long tradition of social theory that highlights the way in which social relations are produced and reproduced through language and social interaction. This critical ontological perspective views individual agency as always constrained by both structural forces such as discourse and social policy that maintain inequality and possibilities for social interaction. The contributors in this section of the volume have slightly different notions of the path toward economic justice, but both sets of contributors are united in their view that greater awareness of classism, class privilege, and the structural root of poverty is needed as an essential step toward equality.

Globalization, Conflict, Inequality

The technological and cultural advances of the twentieth century ushered in a new era of human history—one in which trade, migration, and opportunities for mutual cultural influence expanded exponentially. In this new heightened era of globalization, tensions have arisen which have largely been considered at the economic and political levels. For example, the 2004 Human Development Report of the UNDP emphasized the way in which globalization can create heightened political conflict as local economies and cultural values are threatened by exposure to global culture and markets.

Psychological perspectives on globalization have tended to emphasize issues of identity and conflict. For example, Arnett argues that globalization creates a new context for identity development, with many individuals developing bicultural identities (i.e., identities constructed in reference to both local and global cultures). Shifts in the life course, with delays in the assumption of adult roles compared with prior generations and the increasingly universal period of "emerging" adulthood, may constitute a key psychological response to globalization. Through exposure to new ideas and customs, globalization affords new possibilities for social and psychological understanding—new frames through which to make meaning, new opportunities, new technologies, and a new sense of solidarity across human communities. Globalization might challenge existing inequalities in societies, particularly with regard to gender, as global norms about gender equality challenge many patriarchal cultures.

These psychological consequences of globalization do not come without potential risk or cost, however. Individuals may experience cultural identity confusion as they are confronted with competing systems of meaning or social norms. Intergenerational tensions may occur in societies, as adolescents might be more likely than their parents to engage with the global culture through media. To the extent that cultural and religious groups feel threatened or excluded from social life or political participation, they may be more likely to become extreme or even violent. Societies may become more fragmented, cultures eroded and replaced with hegemonic Western norms and values. Economic inequality may become more pronounced, as the global capitalist marketplace takes hold in societies without adequate safeguards to manage disruptions to local economies.

The social justice implications of globalization are significant and worthy of study among social psychologists. Our unique contribution lies in the ability to theorize and empirically document the link among social structure, individual subjectivity, and well-being. Embracing a critical ontological perspective, we have the potential to illuminate the way in which the cultural and economic challenges that globalization brings impact individual lives and social relations.

The five chapters in this section of the volume are intended to address global issues of cultural pluralism, decolonization, and enduring conflict. Liu and Pratto integrate two social psychological theories—critical junctures theory and power basis

theory—to foreground considerations of power and history in the psychological study of social justice. Psychological theories have often overemphasized a decontextualized model of human agency. In this contribution, Liu and Pratto appropriately anchor their analysis of lives in the global context of history, power, and colonialism. They offer the case of New Zealand as a model to understand how critical junctures in history influence power, social relations, and self-understanding. Their contribution embodies a critical ontological perspective in which individuals and groups are understood through the lens of history and social structure.

Migration and belonging are key concepts in the new global order. Discourses and policies of exclusion (best exemplified in the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in the United States and Europe) compete with those intended to promote cultural pluralism and the benefits of globalization. Bhatia highlights the way in which a critical historical moment-9/11—has impacted social justice issues concerning the migration of South Asians to the United States. He highlights the strategies South Asian immigrants have used to navigate racialized discourses of citizenship and minority status. In this contribution, we see an alliance with the subordinate and an analysis of resistance that speak to the social psychology of social justice promoted throughout this book. Bhatia (2018) recognizes the diverse ways in which individuals negotiate marginality, distinguishing between empowering and distancing marginality, and he situates his analysis within the broader movement in social psychology to center a dynamic view of the social context. As a leader in the movement to understand how transnationalism and globalization impact individual lives, Bhatia is well positioned to call our attention to social justice in global perspective.

With its history of colonial expansion and its postwar social and economic policies that have opened borders, Europe has been a central site for our understanding of multiculturalism. European social psychology has also historically been more sensitive to issues of societal and collective influence on individual cognition and behavior. Chryssochoou's analysis of Europe raises a central issue in understanding social justice in the context of multiculturalism. Anchored precisely in the European social psychological tradition, she highlights the way in which distinct social representations of societal organization have implications for social justice in multicultural Europe. Recognizing the intersection of cultural identity and class membership, Chryssochoou suggests that societal organization that highlights cultural group membership over class may actually heighten tensions across ethno-cultural or religious identities, as those identities become the sole basis upon which migrants may organize to seek justice. In other words, the emphasis on societal divisions based on "culture" rather than class might exacerbate conflict by framing difference in cultural (and possibly then irreconcilable) rather than economic terms. Echoing other perspectives in the volume (e.g., Bullock & Reppond), Chryssochoou's analysis reveals the way in which the discourse about social categories themselves has vital implications for social justice and can influence how privileged citizens view subordinate groups. Here we see not only a critical ontological perspective but also an alliance with the subordinate that seeks to illuminate the psychological injustices of particular social representations.

Globalization is by no means a neutral cultural or economic process, and theoretical perspectives that can accommodate the relative positions of groups and social actors are vital to the social psychological study of global social justice in the twenty-first century. Warren and Moghaddam's chapter on positioning theory and social justice offers just such a perspective, with its overview of the theory and its application to two national settings of heightened conflict: Afghanistan and Iraq. Positioning theory makes several assumptions rooted in the critical principles outlined in this chapter. Most notably, the theory's assumptions about the relationship among social structure (or "normative systems"), language, and social reality can be linked to a critical ontological perspective on persons and contexts. Social and psychological realities emerge within the constraints of governing institutions and social systems through the appropriation of narratives and discourses. Unique to positioning theory is a concern with the concepts

of rights and duties, which Warren and Moghaddam highlight and which nicely links this theoretical approach to other fields concerned with justice, such as political philosophy and political science. Their rich application of the theory to Afghanistan and Iraq reveals the way in which the political positioning of the wars there created contested storylines about rights and duties in these contexts.

The final chapter in this section of the volume calls upon social representations theory to examine war and military intervention in the twenty-first century. Cohrs and O'Dwyer challenge the notion that the motivation for war is rooted "in the minds of men," as some social psychological research that focuses on individual attitudes toward war might suggest. They illustrate the way in which war and military intervention are rooted in social representations constructed by elite and media discourse. Embodying a critical ontological perspective, they argue that the mindset to engage in war and armed conflict develops in a social context in which military intervention is framed as necessary and just. They also offer an analysis of resistance, positing an alternative set of social representations that can construct "defenses of peace."

Intervention, Advocacy, Social Policy

The final section of the volume explicitly addresses the problem of action in response to social injustice. How might we, as social psychologists, intervene and advocate for social justice? Three of the four chapters in this section are anchored in what has arguably been one of the most promoted social psychological intervention strategies: intergroup contact.

> Everywhere on earth we find a condition of separateness among groups. People mate with their own kind. They eat, play, reside in homogeneous clusters. They visit with their own kind, and prefer to worship together....Once this separatism exists, however, the ground is laid for all sorts of psychological elaboration. People who stay separate have few channels of communication. They easily exaggerate the degree of difference between groups, and readily misunderstand the grounds for it. And, perhaps most important of all, the separateness may lead to genuine conflicts of interests, as well as to many imaginary conflicts. (Allport, 1954)

Writing and conducting research in an era of formal racial segregation in the United States, Gordon Allport (1954) famously viewed the root cause of prejudice as the separation of groups. While he viewed prejudice as a normal psychological out-growth of segregation and social categorization, Allport recognized it as the psychological mechanism through which irrational antagonism and hostilities endured. Hence, in his view, a core aim of social psychology is to thwart this process and intervene in the separation of groups. Contact between groups, he theorized, might reduce the prejudices that arise in a context of separation and, in turn, foster a culture opposed to segregation.

Allport developed his ideas precisely at a cultural turning point for race relations and legal segregation in the United States: the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision that ruled segregation unconstitutional was handed down the same year that The Nature of Prejudice was published (1954). And of course the Civil Rights Movement raised considerable visibility to the injustice of racism and segregation during this era. It is difficult, therefore, to disentangle the impact of social policy change, movement visibility, and actual intergroup contact efforts on a shifting cultural narrative of race relations at the time. But Allport's contact hypothesis took on a life of its own and emerged as one of the leading intervention approaches for social psychology in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

One setting in which intergroup contact has been extensively promoted and studied is in intractable political conflict, such as Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine. Such efforts have developed considerably since Allport's (1954) original articulation of the contact hypothesis, particularly since the basic conditions that Allport proposed for optimal effectiveness (e.g., equality between groups) are often unmet. Israeli social psychologist Ifat Maoz has devoted much of her career to studying these efforts among Israelis and Palestinians, and her chapter in this section of the volume reviews the distinct models of intergroup contact currently in use. Beyond prejudice reduction,

though, Maoz suggests that different models of contact may be more likely to promote social justice between groups in asymmetric conflict. For example, the traditional "coexistence" model which has been dominant in intergroup encounters between Israelis and Palestinians emphasizes prejudice reduction and cross-group friendship but does not address issues of history and power asymmetry, which critics have argued favors the status quo of the Israeli military occupation. A distinct "confrontational" model developed in Israel and rooted in social identity theory has sought to offer an alternative approach that can better address issues of power and raise awareness of privilege among the dominant group. Maoz highlights these and other approaches to social psychological intervention in conflict settings, revealing pitfalls and possibilities of such efforts to work for social change.

In 2005, the contact hypothesis was called into question in a critical analysis of its assumptions and aims. Dixon and colleagues offer what they call a "reality check" for the contact hypothesis, arguing against the overly optimistic attitude of most social psychologists. They suggest that the optimal contact strategy is utopian in its vision, neglects participants' own understandings of contact, and is rooted in an individualistic notion of conflict and prejudice. They question whether prejudice reduction ought really to be the outcome of study, rather than outcomes more directly related to social action or social justice .

Durrheim and Dixon's chapter in this section of the volume extends and updates this analysis, providing a historical analysis of the origins of the contact hypothesis. They posit that contact was indeed originally conceived as an important social justice tool in the civil rights era but that the relative emphasis on individual prejudice reduction and interpersonal outcomes such as friendship has obscured a social justice lens that could foreground issues of power. They note that researchers studying actual contact interventions in conflict settings, rather than those studying contact in rarefied laboratory settings or solely through self-report methods, have been able to study issues of power. They call for a renewed study of the substance of intergroup contact, to understand the way in which such efforts influence processes of meaning making and power relations between groups.

The approach to intergroup dialogue which Nagda, Gurin, and colleagues have developed and promoted for some time has actually developed independently from this line of contact research. Their notion of intergroup dialogue has been explicitly rooted in a social justice educational perspective from the start. Although they recognize psychological change (e.g., prejudice reduction) and relationship formation (i.e., friendship) as desirable outcomes, Nagda, Gurin, and Rodriguez highlight the way in which intergroup dialogue seeks to motivate collective action for social justice. Unlike many contact efforts which have a less formal pedagogy, intergroup dialogue has a specific curriculum intended to educate about difference and injustice. Nagda and colleagues outline this curriculum and also present findings from a multi-site field experiment to illustrate the potential of intergroup dialogue to work for social justice. Their approach draws upon contact theory, social identity theory, and critical pedagogy, thus providing an integrative perspective on intervention for social justice.

The final contribution to the volume offers a different model for how social psychologists can work for social justice through direct social policy influence. Greg Herek was at the forefront of social psychological research on heterosexism and homophobia in the 1980s when he situated the corresponding attitudes of these ideologies within the concept of prejudice. He was thus a leader in the movement to shift the lens of stigma away from the sexual minority person, toward a heterosexist society that created and legitimized homophobia and direct violence against sexual minorities. Beyond this significant contribution, though, Herek has been a leader among social psychologists who have penetrated the legal system to use psychological evidence to advocate for social justice for sexual minorities. Herek's contribution to the volume provides a narrative of his advocacy for sexual minority rights and legal recognition, focusing especially on the 2010 federal case that overturned California's Proposition 8 and paved the way for marriage equality across the nation.

Herek provides an invaluable blueprint for the would-be scientific activist, to better understand how the legal system can be influenced with the empirical evidence that social psychologists typically collect.

The scientific advocacy of social psychologists like Herek—along with others such as Craig Haney who has advocated for prison reform, Michelle Fine who has advocated for educational reform, and many others—is a model for our own disciplinary practice. Such a practice is at the core of a commitment to public science—a knowledge production industry committed not to personal advancement but to actual social change in the interest of social justice. We who are committed to this model of activist scholarship are part of a long and distinguished line of justice-oriented social psychologists, from Marie Jahoda, Kenneth Clark, Kurt Lewin, Gordon Allport, to Herb Kelman, Brewster Smith, Rhoda Unger, Michelle Fine, Craig Haney, Greg Herek, and so many others today. Now more than ever, social psychology must take up its call to produce knowledge that can fully be "of use" to society. This volume represents one attempt to synthesize approaches, consolidate commitments, and inspire a new generation of social psychologists to ask bold questions of deep social relevance, use diverse methods and epistemologies, and construct professional identities oriented toward practical social change for social justice.

Social Justice: An Imperative of the Present

This volume appears at a time in history in which the core problems that motivated the birth of social psychology—ethnic nationalism, racism and anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, and other threats to democracy—have returned to prominence. The election of Donald J. Trump in the United States, part of a larger movement across the globe characterized by rising nationalism and social policies of exclusion, reminds us that history does not always take the form of a linear narrative. The contemporary context for social psychological science, then, is one in which a once-repudiated rhetoric of social hierarchy has returned, even if at times veiled through the rhetoric of "security." The ethic of cultural pluralism that came to define postwar institutions such as the United Nations now competes with this revival of insular nationalism and protectionism. And so social psychology finds itself in a new context of extraordinary social relevance. The illusion that science, empiricism, or rationality would prevail—certainly the basic assumption of all the social sciences that flourished in the twentieth century—is no more. What, then, are we to do?

The chapters in this volume envision a new, more critical and less naïve vision for social psychology. These chapters are defined first and foremost with a key principle grounded in the empirical legacy of the twentieth century: the principle of critical ontologies—the notion that individual subjectivity is at some level a slave to the social structure and its accompanying discourse about social categories. This principle does not suggest that human agency is illusory, but it does emphasize the way in which agency is constrained especially by the force of institutions, social policies, and discourses. The chapters in the volume are also defined by the normative stance toward injustice they take. It is not ideological to suggest that fairness and equality characterize the nature of social relations and that societies codify a commitment to social justice in law and custom; it is rational, humane, and democratic. But it is a position we must explicitly take if we are to fully be of use to society. With this position inevitably comes an alliance with the subordinate in settings of injustice—a decision to use our skills to produce knowledge that actually benefits those who experience injustice. And in analyzing and documenting how individuals and groups resist injustice, we do a service to those in the midst of new and active struggle. We publish in scientific journals and prestigious academic presses because we recognize that we are more effective advocates when we achieve credibility through the rigor of scientific practice. But we do not, or should not, stop here. We must strive, even if ever evading us, for the most effective strategy to communicate to those in power, and to the broader culture, our wisdom and our expertise, as well as the wisdom and expertise of those experiencing injustice.

The present historical moment affords us a special opportunity—the opportunity to recognize our renewed relevance in a context of resurgent threats to the democratic social order, our

commitment to the ideals of social justice, and our passion to use scientific inquiry toward benevolent social ends. Our times may be "revolting", but if our energy is channeled away from despair, if our gaze is cast not in horror at this revulsion but rather toward the inspiring acts of resistance and rebellion that give us hope, we can find meaning and purpose in our quest for a just society. <>

The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust by Eric M. Uslaner [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780190274801]

This volume explores the foundations of trust, and whether social and political trust have common roots. Contributions by noted scholars examine how we measure trust, the cultural and social psychological roots of trust, the foundations of political trust, and how trust concerns the law, the economy, elections, international relations, corruption, and cooperation, among myriad societal factors.

The rich assortment of essays on these themes addresses questions such as: How does national identity shape trust, and how does trust form in developing countries and in new democracies? Are minority groups less trusting than the dominant group in a society? Do immigrants adapt to the trust levels of their host countries? Does group interaction build trust? Does the welfare state promote trust and, in turn, does trust lead to greater well-being and to better health outcomes? The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust considers these and other questions of critical importance for current scholarly investigations of trust.

CONTENTS

Excerpt:

The Study of Trust by Eric M. Uslaner

I came upon the study of trust by accident. In 1993 I published a book in which I linked the decline in comity among members of Congress to increasing incivility in the American public (Uslaner 1993). How to measure incivility? I used a survey question (available over time) on whether Americans believed that "most people can be trusted" or if they said "you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' A year later I received an invitation to a conference on "social capital" organized by Robert Putnam. It was a nice opportunity. There would be a lot of interesting people, the venue was fine (on Cape Cod), I would receive a small honorarium, and my wife could join me. I had to write a short paper (turned out to be ten pages). The only problem was that I didn't know what "social capital" was—or why I was chosen to write on it. Solving the problem was not quite so easy back then. There was no Internet, so I went to the library, searched through The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, and learned that "social capital" included "trust?' So I figured out how I qualified as a "social capital" scholar. I wrote a short paper on what the trust variable in the General Social Survey was correlated with and thought that would be the end of my work in this area.

Even as the paper was only available in mimeographed form, I received many requests for it and decided that I should pursue the topic further. I became convinced that trust was important in its own right—that it wasn't part of "social capital" since it was neither the cause nor the effect of membership in civic associations. We join groups made up of people like ourselves, but trust mattered to me because it helps connect us to people who are different from ourselves. It was nice, people would say, that I trust my wife. But this is not very surprising, nor does it help us understand why we should be interested in trust as an indicator of social cohesion. Trust matters, I argued in my 1993 book, because it helps us bridge partisan and ideological divisions in Congress. If everyone agreed with each other, we wouldn't need such a bridging mechanism.

I then began to think about where else trust would be important. Volunteering and giving to charity came to mind, but only for beneficiaries different from yourself. Being a parent volunteer at my son's school didn't tap any sense of trust. When he joined a youth group to help clean up houses in New Orleans a year after Hurricane Katrina, that did reflect trust since he was aiding people very different from himself. Invitations to present my work outside the United States led me to consider how trust varied across countries and to wonder why it was so high in the Nordic lands and so low in Romania

(the latter was my first foreign invitation). My initial guess was that democracies had far more trusting citizens than did authoritarian countries. Yet the data didn't support this claim. Authoritarian, especially former Communist, countries had low levels of trust. But so did many democracies such as Brazil and Turkey. Income equality was the key to understanding why some countries were more

trusting than others—and it was also the key to understanding why trust fell from 58% in 1960 to a percentage in the mid-30s as the distribution of income became less equitable.

These issues became more important to me as my research agenda switched from the American Congress to trust, both in the United States and across nations. This changing research agenda broadened my intellectual horizons as well as my social network. When David Pervin of Oxford University Press approached me to edit The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, I had a network working on a wide range of topics related to trust from a wide range of countries. This Handbook reflects the subject matter and the geographic diversity of researchers. Over the course of almost 30 years of research on trust, I had developed a distinctive argument about the basis of what has become known as social trust—the belief that most people can be trusted.

Social trust stemmed from socialization through one's parents, not from group membership or from government policies. Social trust, or generalized trust as it is also known in the literature, is distinguished from both particularized trust and political trust. Particularized trust is faith only in people like yourself. And political trust is confidence in institutions such as the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and the police. Generalized trust, on my argument, is not directed at specific people for specific purposes. It is general—not related to anyone in particular for any specified purpose. Particularized trust is based upon ties to one's own in-group and political trust toward specific institutions, often for specific purposes.

What leads to generalized trust will be negatively related to particularized trust. My argument is that there is little relationship between generalized trust and confidence in political institutions. Generalized trust is stable over time. Bad experiences don't lead people to become less trusting. Nor do "good experiences," such as contact with others, lead to greater trust. But political trust is all about evaluations of performance. Generalized trust rests upon a psychological foundation of optimism and control: The future looks bright and I can help make it better. Short-term setbacks (including bad experiences in life, such as injury, illness, divorce, and robbery) do not lead people to become misanthropic. It is long-term optimism that matters. Political trust, on the other hand, is responsive to short-term variations in the state of the economy, among other factors.

These are my arguments. Not all students of trust, either social or political, agree with them. The rationale for this Handbook is to lay out a wide range of ideas. I have sought out people who take different positions on trust and have urged them to discuss both their own positions and those they disagree with.

The literature on trust has exploded and so have the approaches. The origins of trust in economics and philosophy focused on how people developed trust in each other. Trust was seen as an interpersonal relationship based upon experiences such as lending money (and getting paid back) or business ties. Rosenberg (1956) and Mansbridge (1999) later saw trust in terms of putting faith in strangers—and this could not be based upon experience. Brewer (1979), her student Rodney Kramer, and Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) held that we are more likely to put our faith in people like ourselves—and many people only trusted people from their own groups.

The literature on trust expanded rapidly in the 1970s and afterward. Putnam's discussion of social capital (1993, 2000) put trust at the center of a collection of positive behaviors, such as participation in voluntary associations, civic participation (including voting), and participation in informal social networks. There was debate over whether social capital was a useful concept since it included such a wide range of values and behavior, not all of which were theoretically or empirically linked to each other. Yet, there continues to be a debate over whether trust is related to other forms of civic participation (see the chapters by Paxton and Ressler and Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli, this volume).

The rational choice approach to trust stems from early treatments by economists. The theoretical treatment of trust in rational choice is based upon exchanges between people: Negative experiences lead to the withdrawal of trust (Cook and Santana,

this volume). An extension of rational choice theory is the trust game. In these games (see the chapters by Wilson and Raub, Buskens, and Frey, this volume), people play games and decide how much to contribute to a collective good. The extent of their contributions is a measure of trust. Trust on this account is very short-lived. People may contribute in one game but not in another, depending upon the distribution of payoffs.

Accounts based upon socialization posit trust as much more stable. Some researchers see trust as based in long-standing psychological dispositions or even biological traits (chapter by Cawvey, Hayes, Ganache, and Mondak, this volume)—which makes trust difficult to change.

Political protests in the 1960s and the economic crisis resulting from the first oil embargo in the early 1970s led to sharp drops in political trust—and a research agenda on how such events brought about a decline in political trust, which had not been widely studied before then. Do people judge all governmental institutions using the same criteria? Are some levels of government—and some institutions such as the courts and the judiciary—more trusted than others? Is political trust just another form of trust, or is there something distinctive about political institutions? Is confidence in the state largely a function of economics (see the chapters by van der Meer and Listhaug and Jakobsen, this volume)? Or does it reflect other social divisions (chapter by Hetherington and Rudolph, this volume)? Is political trust or distrust "normal"? How do states, especially democracies, build trust among their citizens (see the chapter by Warren, this volume)? If democracy is the key to trust, do people living in new democracies become more trusting (see the chapters by Letki and Mattes and Moreno, this volume). And are supposedly neutral institutions, such as the judiciary, more supported than branches that are designed to be responsive to specific constituencies (Rothstein 2000; and the chapter by Bradford, Jackson, and Hough, this volume)?

Are some groups more likely to trust others or political institutions more than others? A sense of national identity makes people more likely to trust others, at least from their own group, more than others (Lenard and Miller, this volume). Minorities and immigrants are less likely to trust others but often have more confidence in government (which they see as providing them benefits). White majorities may be less trusting if they live in neighborhoods close to immigrants and minorites—but low trust levels may reflect residential segregation rather than proximity (chapters by Wilkes and Wu and by Dinesen and Sonderskov, this volume).

Why should we care about trust? Political trust makes it easier to enact controversial legislation, at least when the country is not badly polarized (Hetherington and Rudolph, this volume), and leads to other "positive" outcomes such as voting participation, willingness to pay taxes, and more support for an activist role in world affairs. Social trust leads to a greater sense of well-being and better governance.

The literature on trust is marked by many perspectives, and the disputes go beyond theoretical issues. How to measure trust is also disputed. The choice of an indicator may lead to different conclusions as to whether (and why) trust leads to cooperative behavior or whether social and political trust are related or distinct.

The study of trust is perhaps more important today than in the past. Putnam (2000) called our attention to declining social capital in his book, Bowling Alone. Even as he warned us about a weakened social fabric, the turn of the twenty-first century now seems to be the halcyon days compared to today. Throughout the West, ethnic conflicts and hate crimes have become major sources of concern. And the historically dominant political parties have either been torn apart by insurgents such as Donald Trump (in the United States) or displaced as dominant political forces (as in France, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Great Britain). Our social and political lives have become increasingly polarized. We need a stronger dose of trust—both social and political trust—but it doesn't appear to be in sight.

The Foundations of Trust

The central question is what does "trust" mean. Hardin (1992), together with others, sees trust as the perception that others are trustworthy. He sees trust as a three-way relationship: A trusts B to do X.

Rational choice theorists see trust as a three-way relationship (see the chapter by Cook and Santana, this volume). But so do others (Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli, this volume). My own view is rather different. Yes, there is such a form of trust, and it plays an important role in daily life. But it doesn't resolve collective action problems. It doesn't help us build bridges with people who are unlike us. Here is a deeper form of trust—generalized (or "moralistic") trust-that—does not depend upon experience and is not about any particular person or any particular thing.

The grammar of this type of trust is simply "A trusts". Generalized trust is not based upon experience, either with friends or members of associations. Nor does it lead people to join organizations with people like themselves. Rather, generalized trusters are more supportive of rights for minorities (people different from themselves) and give of themselves in charitable contributions and volunteering, but only for groups that are different from their own kind. So moralistic/ generalized trust connects us to people who may be different from ourselves.

Students of trust have differing positions on the foundations and consequences of trust. Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli agree that membership in voluntary associations does not lead people to become trusting. Paxton and Ressler disagree: "The power of norms and sanctions in associations to create trust among the members of the association draws from their ability to increase the predictability of interactions .... Social trust is generally thought to be learned through repeated interaction" (this volume). The key differences are whether: (1) interactions among people in groups can lead to trust; (2) people spend enough time in groups to learn to trust each other; and (3) civic groups are diverse enough to promote trust across a range of people with different backgrounds. Paxton and Ressler argue in favor of all three criteria. Some groups attract more diverse memberships than others, and people will join groups with few overlapping memberships so they can "spread" trust across voluntary associations.

Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli disagree with all three criteria. They argue that "the great majority of organizations attract members with the same social background. Rather than building bridges across a wide mixture of social differences, voluntary associations are typically homogeneous social groups that usually engage with other groups like themselves. This kind of segmentation of activities is more likely to generate particular than general social trust". Newton (1997) argues that people spend little time in groups, so associations are not a particularly good vehicle for creating trust.

Warren argues that good institutions—specifically democracies—can build social trust. He writes: "There are probably three ways in which democracies support generalized trust: (1) by reducing the risks of generalized trust through security and rule of law; (2) by reducing particularistic dependencies through universal welfare supports, thus freeing individuals from clientelistic or other kinds of dependency relationships; and, (3) by increasing the likelihood that interpersonal and socially mediated warrants can spread through institutions, such as public schools and universities that cut across particularistic ties" (this volume). Yet democratic government depends upon social trust according to Warren's account. The benefits of democracy may be elusive if strong ethnic and religious ties are more important than generalized trust in a society.

Paxton and Ressler agree with Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli on another issue: the stability of trust. They both see trust as an estimate of the risk of dealing with other people. Good experiences can lead to more trust for Paxton and Ressler. Government policies that promote equality or the rule of law will lead to higher levels of trust for Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli. Greater confidence in political institutions also leads to more social trust for them.

Letti and Mattes and Moreno are less sanguine about the impact of good institutions on leading to more trust. Letki examines social and political trust among new democracies. People in these countries expected the new market democracies to have higher levels of both types of trust. Yet, neither type of trust showed demonstrable increases. Letki argues: "Maladies such as corruption, grey economy, or ethnic divisions are present in authoritarian and democratic states alike, but the process of transforming a state from one type to another creates conditions under which numerous

negative phenomena intensify" (this volume). The weakening of traditional institutions did not lead to the emergence of new societies: Romania did not become Luxembourg just because it adopted new forms of political and economic institutions.

Weak institutions and especially growing economic inequality depressed both social and political trust. Mattes and Moreno find essentially the same pattern for Latin America and Africa. Initially trust in government rose with the development of new institutions. Yet, their poor performance—especially in failing to reduce inequality and because of the corruption of political leaders—led to sharp declines in trust. Their findings are similar to the results of both You and van der Meer in their chapters in this volume. Van der Meer argues that both poor economic performance and rising inequality lead to lower levels of political trust. You finds that corruption lowers both social and political trust—but it also is caused by low social trust. I have also found that both poor economic performance and corruption lead to lower levels of political trust across the world.

A central issue on trust is how to measure it. The "standard question" is: "Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted or can't you be too careful in dealing with people?" This question was first asked in a German survey in 1948 and then by Morris Rosenberg in studies of Cornell University students in the 1950s. It has been asked periodically in the American National Election Studies from 1964 to the present and continuously in the General Social Survey in the United States since 1972, as well as in the World Values Surveys and many other studies. The Swiss Household Survey and later the European Social Survey replaced the dichotomous measure with an 11-point scale. While some see this as a distinct improvement (see the chapter by Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli, this volume), I argue that this scale leads people to choose the middle options (4, 5, and 6 on the 0-10 scale) even if they are really trusters or mistrusters.

I argue that the dichotomous measure is the best—and that it should not be combined in a scale with other measures of misanthropy, such as "most people are helpful" and "most people are fair"—since these questions correlate only modestly with trust (see Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli, this volume). While some people have criticized the standard question, especially when dichotomized, most seem to understand it. In a "think aloud" experiment in the 2000 American National Election Pilot Study, three-quarters of respondents interpreted the standard question as a general measure, as opposed to referring to any specific act. Nevertheless Bauer and Freitag favor more specific measures of trust that distinguish between confidence in strangers (my interpretation of the question based upon American data). They find lower correlations between trust in strangers and trust in specific groups and suggest a more refined set of measures.

Alternative Sources of Social Trust

Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli favor a "top-down" approach to social trust. They see trust as stemming from good institutions and economic equality. I am more partial to a "bottom-up" foundation for social trust. The belief that "most people can be trusted" stems, on my account, from optimism and control—the belief that the world is a good place, it is going to get better, and we can make it better. Socialization—learning from one's parents—is the main source of generalized trust. But optimism and control also stem from an objective measure of economic equality. Unlike Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli, I do not see economic equality as a purely top-down mea¬sure. Government policy is the source of equality, but an egalitarian economic system itself depends upon a sense of social cohesion. So I see the relationship between equality and trust as reciprocal. Since equality is stable over time, so is trust.

Alternative approaches to the study of trust find both more and less stability over time. Lenard and Miller see trust as emerging from a sense of identity with others in the country. We are more likely to trust others who share our sense of identification with the country. And these are likely to be people who are similar to us, our in-group (Kramer, this volume). Minorities are less likely to trust most people—probably because they have faced discrimination from the majority population and have lower levels of income and education (Wilkes and Wu, this volume). Many immigrants are minorities, and they too have lower levels of social

trust (see the chapters by Dinesen and Sonderskov, this volume). Discrimination is one of the reasons for the lower trust of immigrants. Other reasons are their lower levels of economic and educational achievement. The overwhelming share of immigrants come from countries with lower levels of economic development and social trust. I argue that immigrants' levels of trust reflect the levels found in their home countries (Uslaner 2008). Dinesen and Sonderskov believe that immigrants in Europe adapt to the social values of their new homes: "trust of first- and second-generation immigrants to a very high extent tracks that of natives in their contemporary country" ("Cultural Persistence or Experiential Adaptation?," (this volume).

Where people live also shapes their values. Putnam (2007) argues that living in diverse areas leads to lower trust because people do not want to live among people who do not look like themselves. I have argued that it was not diversity but segregation that led to lower trust levels for both majority and minority populations. Dinesen and Sonderskov find that diversity only leads to less trust in the United States, not in Europe. However, they are able to measure diversity at a micro level and find a strong negative relationship between diversity and trust for Danish neighborhoods. At this level, diversity and segregation are virtually identical.

If moving to a new neighborhood leads to changes in trust, there is less stability in the level of faith in others. People adapt to new environments. Another approach that posits malleability in trust is rational choice. Cook argues that trust is based "on reasoned assessments of the evidence at hand that lead one to evaluate others as trustworthy given past performance, reputational information, and the incentives at play, including those derived from network embeddedness or the institutional context ... . Among the sources of trust are individual-level factors, such as those that allow for assessments of others' incentives and likely trustworthiness, as well as organizational and institutional factors that facilitate trust, not only by providing relevant information (e.g., on past behavior and reputations) but also by supplying a modicum of `insurance' against failed trust." In trust games, people choose their strategies for contributing to a collective good based upon their expectations of immediate payoffs and the strategies of other players. Each player's trust will thus vary from game to game, and this is a very different form of trust than what others (including myself) have examined. This is strategic, rather than moralistic (or generalized), trust.

Rational choice approaches to trust do not see faith in others as stable. My own analysis sees trust as mostly stable, both over time and across generations. Other studies, such as those focusing on immigrants, have a more nuanced argument on stability. Cawvey, Hayes, Canache, and Mondak examine two bases of trust that are much more stable. The psychological foundations of the "Big Five" values are based upon personality traits—especially openness to new experiences—that do not change readily. And the biological basis of trust and other values stresses genetic traits that are inherited from one generation to the next and thus are very stable. Genetic approaches are consistent with my argument that trust for most people is very consistent over time for most people (using panel surveys). But it is inconsistent with considerable changes over time in the United States, which track growing inequality strongly but cannot readily be linked to any biological changes.

The Bases of Political Trust

Political trust is fundamentally different from social trust. The factors underlying each type of trust are different. Or are they? Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli argue that the weak relationships that I and others have found between the two types of trust stem from measurement issues. We have traditionally measured institutional trust on a four-point scale, asking, "How much of the time do you trust the government in (capital of the country) to do what is right?" When the Swiss Household Survey and the European Social Survey switched to an n-point scale, they measured both social and political trust from o to io. The correlations between the two types of trust dramatically increased (Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli, this volume).

Are these measures based upon some underlying framework of trust that encompasses both social and political life? The answer is not so simple. Trust in people and trust in government are based upon different foundations. The former reflects long-term

optimism, the latter short-term outcomes and the evaluations of particular leaders. Trust in political institutions depends heavily on the state of the economy (van der Meer, this volume), while social trust is more stable and does not go up or down with the stock market or which party is in power.

There are also different consequences for social and political trust. When social trust is high, people are more likely have a collective sense of well-being, such as life satisfaction, and lower rates of mortality, suicide, and traffic accidents (Helliwell, Huang, and Wang, this volume). They are also more likely to have better health outcomes, ranging from physiologic stress (such as spikes in blood pressure) that will eventually result in coronary atherosclerosis to rates of childhood vaccinations (Kawachi, this volume). The strong connection between social trust and economic equality rests on the relationship between universal social welfare programs, such as education and medicine, and trust. Universal welfare programs lead to higher levels of trust, but trust facilitates such programs (Kumlin, Haugsgjerd, and Stadelmann-Steffen, this volume).

Ironically, the effects of social trust are more important in the international arena than are those for political trust. Generalized trust is the key to the establishment of negotiations in the anarchic international agreement. When there are no institutions that can ensure peace, generalized trust among a country's citizens will help establish the conditions for cooperation among nations (Rathbun, this volume). When people believe that most people can be trusted, they are also more likely to trust people of different nationalities and to favor a more internationalist role for the United States in world affairs. Political trust also leads to greater support for an activist role in world affairs (Brewer, Gross, and Vercellotti, this volume).

Political trust has distinct effects on elections. Higher confidence in government leads to greater participation and support for incumbent political leaders: "political trust tends to stimulate voter turnout, as distrusting citizens are less motivated to cast a vote. Second, low levels of political trust have been associated with an anti-incumbent vote" (Hooghe, this volume). Political trust also leads to higher levels of tax compli¬ance. Where trust in government is strong, people are more likely to feel an obligation to pay their taxes. They pay taxes to the government, not their fellow citizens, so there is no significant relationship between social trust and tax morale (Chan, Supriyadi, and Torgler, this volume).

Strong economic growth can build trust in government, but faith in political leaders will not suffice to bring about a robust economy. Social trust, on the other hand, can lead to better performance: "as trust increases, firms and individuals will rationally be able to divert fewer resources to protective purposes because higher trust reflects a lower probability of theft, violent crime and predatory litigation" (Bjornskov, this volume).

Trust in the law is one of the few areas that depends equally on political and social trust. People's trust in the criminal justice system depends in part on their experience with the police and the courts. Yet "people will be motivated to trust criminal justice institutions when and to the extent that they believe those institutions share group membership with themselves and/or represent social groups to which they feel they belong" (Bradford, Jackson, and Hough, this volume). The legal system holds a special place among political institutions. Legislative and executive bodies are expected to favor the voters who put them into office. They are partisan, and people's trust in government often is based upon party ties. However, the courts are expected to be fair and nonpartisan: "Feeling that the police and courts share their values, have the right intentions, and maintain at least a baseline level of efficacy are important factors shaping not only people's relationships with the police but also their ontological security and sense of belonging:

When Trust Fails

Politics in most Western democracies, most particularly in the United States, has been marked by increasing polarization between/among political parties. Hetherington and Rudolph argue: "Partisans' increased hostility toward the opposing party helps to explain the recent emergence of polarized political trust. People are typically unwilling to trust people and institutions they

dislike .... Polarized trust made it more difficult to obtain support for policies" (this volume).

Hetherington and Rudolph provide evidence for polarization in the United States and its negative effects on the policy-making process in the United States. The evidence on polarization, policy making, and social trust is not well developed. I did show a strong relationship between generalized trust and political polarization in the Senate over time, and it is likely that the polarization in today's politics in the United States and Europe is linked to a decline in social trust. As politics has become increasingly polarized, there may be a new agenda for the study of trust, even as the conditions leading to lower trust seem to herald rough times for societies and governments.

More generally, levels of trust in other people and institutions seem to be lower today than in the past. There are tensions in our societies and in our political systems—from declining optimism for the future to weakening ties of traditional political institutions and parties. How well we weather these potential crises in trust may be one of the critical issues of our time. <>

Criminological Theory: The Essentials by Stephen G. Tibbetts [Sage Publications, 9781506367897]

"I think this book does an absolutely fantastic job at capturing the balance between 'quality versus quantity' of coverage." —Adam Trahan, University of North Texas

Criminological Theory: The Essentials, Third Edition, offers students a brief yet comprehensive overview of classic and contemporary criminologists and their theories. Putting criminological theory in context, acclaimed author Stephen G. Tibbetts examines policy implications brought about by theoretical perspectives to demonstrate to students the practical application of theories to contemporary social problems.

New to the Third Edition

- A new chapter dedicated entirely to feminist perspectives (Chapter 10) introduces students to feminist models of crime while underscoring the importance of examining the related research.
- Case studies that examine offender motives are now included to help students apply the theories discussed to interesting and memorable examples.
- Policy is now integrated into each section to allow students to see the practical policy implications of each theory.
- Coverage of crucial topics has been expanded throughout to introduce students to important issues, such as the influence of employment on criminal behavior, the success of school programs in reducing delinquent behavior, and federal sentencing guidelines in regard to crack versus powder cocaine.
- Statistics, graphs, and tables have all been updated to demonstrate the most recent trends in criminology.

This textbook is intended to cover the essential topics of criminological theory in a more brief and efficient manner than other larger, more comprehensive texts on this topic. The third edition of Criminological Theories: The Essentials presents a comprehensive overview of the major concepts and perspectives of virtually all major theories in the evolution of criminological theory, reviewing some of the most recent empirical research on each theory that is currently available. Furthermore, in each chapter, as well as an entire concluding chapter, this book examines the various policy implications that can be derived from each type of criminological theory in addition to what can possibly be done but has not yet been tested.

A number of excellent criminology theory textbooks are available to students and professors, so why this one? This book can serve as the primary text for an introductory undergraduate course in criminological theory or as the primary text for a graduate course, given the depth and comprehensive nature of the discussion of virtually all theories in the historic and modern criminological literature. It is important to note that the book provides a comprehensive, yet concise, survey of the current state of existing scientific literature in virtually all areas of criminological theory as well as giving a history of how we got to this point regarding each theoretical model and topic area. A key feature of this text is a section in each

chapter that examines various policy implications that have resulted from most of the dominant theories in the discipline in addition to results from empirical evaluation studies of programs based on theories presented in each chapter.

Structure of the Book

This book uses a rather typical outline for criminological theory textbook topics or chapters, beginning with an introduction of the definitions of crime and criminology and measuring crime as well as what such measures of crime reveal regarding the various characteristics that are most associated with higher offending rates. This is a very important aspect of the book, because each theory or model must be judged by how well it explains the distribution of crime rates among these various characteristics. In the Introduction, the criteria that are required for determining causality are also discussed, including an examination of how extremely difficult (often impossible) this is to do in criminological research because we can't randomly assign individuals to bad parenting, unemployment, low IQ, and so on.

This book presents 12 chapters that chronologically trace the history and development of criminological theory with an emphasis on when such perspectives became popular among theorists and mainstream society. Thus, we will start with the earliest models (Preclassical and Classical School) of criminal theorizing in the 18th century. Then, we will examine the evolution of the Positive School perspective of the 19th century, which began with biological theories of crime. Next, the book will present the various other positive theories that were proposed in the early 20th century, which include social structure models and social process theories that were presented in the early or mid-1900s. Then, we will explore theoretical models that were presented in the latter 20th century, such as social conflict and Marxist and feminist models of criminality. Chapters 10, 11, and 12 then present the more contemporary theoretical explanations of criminality, which include developmental and life-course models, integrated theories of crime, and a separate chapter regarding feminist perspectives of crime, which we are very proud to present. This book is divided into 12 chapters that mirror the chapters in a typical criminology textbook, each dealing with a particular type or category of theories in criminology. Each of the chapters concludes with an evaluation of the empirical support for the theories and policy implications derivable. These chapters are as follows:

An Overview of Issues in Criminological Theory

We first provide an introductory chapter that deals with what criminological theory is as well as examining the concepts of crime and the criteria used to determine whether a theory is adequate for explaining behavior. This chapter introduces the facts and criteria by which all of the theoretical models presented in the following chapters will be evaluated. We also include a discussion of the criteria involved in determining whether a given factor or variable actually causes criminal behavior.

Preclassical and Classical Theories of Crime

In this chapter, we examine the types of theories that were dominant before logical theories of crime were presented, namely supernatural or demonic theories of crime. Then we examine how the Age of Enlightenment led to more rational approaches to explaining criminal behavior, such as that of the Classical School and neoclassical theory. We also discuss at length the major model that evolved from the Classical School: deterrence theory. We describe studies that have empirically tested deterrence theory.

Modern Applications of the Classical Perspective: Deterrence, Rational Choice, and Routine Activities or Lifestyle Theories of Crime

In this chapter, we review more contemporary theoretical models and empirical findings regarding explanations of crime that focus on deterrence and other recent perspectives—such as rational choice theory, routine activities theory, and the lifestyle perspective—that are based on the assumption that individuals rationally choose their behavior or targets. Some of these perspectives focus more on the perceived costs or benefits of a given act to the individual who carries it out, whereas other models focus on the types of

locations that people choose to commit crime or the daily activities or lifestyles that predispose them to certain criminal behavior.

Early Positive School Perspectives of Criminality

This chapter will examine the early development of theoretical models proposing that certain individuals or groups are predisposed to criminal offending. The earliest theories in the 19th century proposed that certain physical traits are associated with criminal behavior, whereas perspectives in the early 20th century proposed that such criminality is due to level of intelligence. This chapter also examines body type theory, which proposes that the physical body type of an individual has an effect on criminality. We will also examine modern applications of this perspective and review the empirical support such theoretical models have received in modern times.

Modern Biosocial Perspectives of Criminal Behavior

In this chapter, we will review the various forms of modern studies that investigate the link between physiology and criminality, including family studies, twin and adoption studies, cytogenetic studies, and studies on hormones and neurotransmitters. We will examine some of the primary methods used to explore this link as well as discuss the findings of more rational and recent empirical studies, which show a relatively consistent link between physiological factors and criminal behavior.

Early Social Structure and Strain Theories of Crime

This chapter reviews the development of the social structure perspective, which originated in the 19th century and culminated with Merton's theory of strain in the early 20th century. A variety of perspectives based on Merton's strain theory will be examined, but all of these models have a primary emphasis on how the social structure produces criminal behavior. We examine the many empirical studies that have tested the validity of these early social structure theories as well as discussing policy implications that these models suggested.

The Chicago School and Cultural and Subcultural Theories of Crime

In this chapter, we examine the evolution and propositions of the scholars at the University of Chicago, the most advanced form of criminological theorizing of the early 20th century. In addition to discussing the evolution of the Chicago School and its application of ecological theory to criminal behavior, we examine the more modern applications of this theoretical framework for explaining criminal behavior among residents of certain neighborhoods. Finally, we discuss several theoretical models that examine cultural or subcultural groups that differ drastically from conventional norms.

Social Process and Learning Theories of Crime

This chapter examines the many perspectives that have proposed that criminal behavior is the result of being taught by significant others to commit crime. When these theories were first presented, they were considered quite novel. We examine the evolution of various theories of social learning, starting with the earliest, which were based on somewhat outdated forms of learning theory, and then progressing to more modern theories that incorporate contemporary learning models. We also examine the most recent versions of this theoretical perspective, which incorporates all forms of social learning in explaining criminal behavior.

Social Reaction and Critical Models of Crime

In this chapter, we examine a large range of theories, with the common assumption that the reason for criminal behavior is factors outside of the traditional criminal justice system. Many social reaction theories, for example, are based on labeling theory, which proposes that it is not the individual offender who is to blame, but rather the societal reaction to such early antisocial behavior. Furthermore, this chapter examines the critical perspective, which blames the existing legal and economical structure for the "criminal" label that is used against most offenders.

Feminist Models of Crime

This chapter examines the various theoretical feminist perspectives of crime. Feminist criminology evolved when various assumptions and stereotypes about women in criminal justice were being questioned. Such questions included women as both offenders and victims. We discuss the importance of research regarding female offending, which was largely neglected in nearly all previous research before the late 19th century, and then discuss the extant literature that has been produced in recent years. This chapter discusses how important it is to examine the research that has been done on female offending and how key it is to understanding why women are so much less likely to commit serious violent offenses than males—and perhaps to using that understanding to reduce male chronic offending in society.

Life-Course Perspectives of Criminality

This chapter examines the various theoretical perspectives that emphasize the predisposition and influences present among individuals who begin committing crime at early versus later ages. We also examine the various stages of life that tend to have a high influence on an individual's state of criminality (e.g., marriage) as well as the empirical studies that have examined these types of transitions in life. Finally, we examine the various types of offenders and the kinds of transitions and trajectories that tend to influence their future behavior, along with various policy implications that can be suggested by such models of criminality.

Integrated Theoretical Models and New Perspectives of Crime

In this chapter, we present the general theoretical framework for integrated models. Then, we introduce criticisms of such integration of traditional theoretical models. In addition, we present several integrated models of criminality, some of which are based on micro-level factors and others that are based on macro-level factors. Finally, we examine the weaknesses and strengths of these various models based on empirical studies that have tested their validity.

New to Third Edition

A new chapter dedicated entirely to feminist perspectives (see Chapter 10) examines the feminist models of crime and underscores the importance of examining research related to female offending.

- Case studies that examine offender motives help students apply the theories discussed.
- Coverage of policy is now further integrated into each chapter as opposed to having a stand-alone chapter on this topic.
- Coverage of critical topics, such as the influence of employment on criminal behavior, the success of school programs to reduce delinquent behavior, and federal sentencing guidelines in regard to crack versus powder cocaine have been expanded throughout.
- Statistics, graphs, and tables have all been updated to demonstrate the most recent trends in criminology.

Digital Resources

To enhance the use of this text and to assist those using this book as a core text, we have developed high-quality digital resources for instructors.

Instructor Teaching Site.

A password-protected site, available at study.sagepub.com/tibbetts3e, features resources that have been designed to help instructors plan and teach their courses. These materials include an extensive test bank, chapter-specific PowerPoint slides, lecture notes, sample course syllabi, web resources, and links to SAGE journal articles.

Statistics for Criminology and Criminal Justice by Jacinta M. Gau [Sage Publications, 9781506391786]

Statistics for Criminology and Criminal Justice, Third Edition, demonstrates how statistics is relevant to a student's life and future career by illustrating the logical connections between basic statistical concepts and their real-world implications in criminology and criminal justice. Written for students with a limited mathematical background, author Jacinta M. Gau eases student anxiety around statistics by simplifying the overarching goal of each statistical technique and providing step-by-step instructions for working through the

formulas and numbers. Students use real data from the field to build a foundational knowledge of statistics rather than merely memorizing key terms or formulas.

New to the Third Edition

- A new Thinking Critically feature encourages students to apply the concepts in the chapter to real-life scenarios, with open-ended questions designed to inspire students to think about the nuances of science and statistics and their application to criminal justice.
- New Practicing Statistics Whiteboard videos, available in SAGE edge, walk students through statistical calculations to reinforce key concepts.
- Additional illustrations and examples in every chapter keep students engaged with the content and offer ample opportunities for them to practice the techniques.
- New and updated data sets from a wide range of relevant sources, such as the NCVS and UCR, BJS, LEMAS, the Census of Jails, and many others, have been incorporated to give students insights into the state of criminal justice research today.
- New research on critical topics such as the Census of Jails, inmate-on-staff assaults in prisons, and homicide rates encourages students to discuss changes happening in the field.

An Introduction to Statistics in Criminology and Criminal Justice

In 2002, James Comey, the newly appointed U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York who would later become the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, entered a room filled with high-powered criminal prosecutors. He asked the members of the group to raise their hands if they had never lost a case. Proud, eager prosecutors across the room threw their hands into the air, expecting a pat on the back. Comey's response befuddled them. Instead of praising them, he called them chickens (that is not quite the term he used, but close enough) and told them the only reason they had never lost is that the cases they selected to prosecute were too easy.' The group was startled at the rebuke, but they really should not have been. Numbers can take on various meanings and interpretations and are sometimes used in ways that conceal useful information rather than revealing it.

This book enters its third edition at a time when the demand for an educated, knowledgeable workforce has never been greater. This is as true in criminal justice and criminology as in any other university major and occupational field. Education is the hallmark of a professional. Education is not just about knowing facts, though—it is about thinking critically and treating incoming information with a healthy dose of skepticism. All information must pass certain tests before being treated as true. Even if it passes those tests, the possibility remains that additional information exists that, if discovered, would alter our understanding of the world. People who critically examine the trustworthiness of information and are open to new knowledge that challenges their preexisting notions about what is true and false are actively using their education, rather than merely possessing it.

At first glance, statistics seems like a topic of dubious relevance to everyday life. Convincing criminology and criminal justice students that they should care about statistics is no small task. Most students approach the class with apprehension because math is daunting, but many also express frustration and impatience. The thought, "But I'm going to be a [police officer, lawyer, federal agent, etc.], so what do I need this class for?" is on many students' minds as they walk through the door or log in to the learning management system on the first day. The answer is surprisingly simple: Statistics form a fundamental part of what we know about the world. Practitioners in the criminal justice field rely on statistics. A police chief who alters a department's deployment plan so as to allocate resources to crime hot spots trusts that the researchers who analyzed the spatial distribution of crime did so correctly. A prison warden seeking to classify inmates according to the risk they pose to staff and other inmates needs assessment instruments that accurately predict each person's likelihood of engaging in behavior that threatens institutional security. A chief prosecutor must recognize that a high conviction rate might not be testament to assistant prosecutors' skill level but,

rather, evidence that they only try simple cases and never take on challenges.

Statistics matter because what unites all practitioners in the criminology and criminal justice occupations and professions is the need for valid, reliable data and the ability

to critically examine numbers that are set before them. Students with aspirations for graduate school have to understand statistical concepts because they will be expected to produce knowledge using these techniques. Those planning to enter the workforce as practitioners must be equipped with the background necessary to appraise incoming information and evaluate its accuracy and usefulness. Statistics, therefore, is just as important to information consumers as it is to producers.

The third edition of Statistics for Criminology and Criminal Justice, like its two predecessors, balances quantity and complexity with user-friendliness. A book that skimps on information can be as confusing as one overloaded with it. The sacrificed details frequently pertain to the underlying theory and logic that drive statistical analyses. The pedagogical techniques employed in this text draw from the scholarship of teaching and learning, wherein researchers have demonstrated that students learn best when they understand logical connections within and across concepts, rather than merely memorizing key terms or steps to solving equations. In statistics, students are at an advantage if they first understand the overarching goal of the techniques they are learning before they begin working with formulas and numbers.

This book also emphasizes the application of new knowledge. Students can follow along in the step-by-step instructions that illustrate plugging numbers into formulas and solving them. Additional practice examples are embedded within the chapters, and chapter review problems allow students to test themselves (the answers to the oddnumbered problems are located in the back of the book), as well as offering instructors convenient homework templates using the even-numbered questions.

Real data and research also further the goal of encouraging students to apply concepts and showing them the relevance of statistics to practical problems in the criminal justice and criminology fields. Chapters contain Data Sources boxes that describe some common, publicly available data sets such as the Uniform Crime Reports, National Crime Victimization Survey, General Social Survey, and others. Most in-text examples and end-of-chapter review problems use data drawn from the sources highlighted in the book. The goal is to lend a practical, tangible bent to this often-abstract topic. Students get to work with the data their professors use. They get to see how elegant statistics can be at times and how messy they can be at others, how analyses can sometimes lead to clear conclusions and other times to ambiguity.

The Research Example boxes embedded throughout the chapters illustrate criminal justice and criminology research in action and are meant to stimulate students' interest. They highlight that even though the math might not be exciting, the act of scientific inquiry most definitely is, and the results have important implications for policy and practice. In the third edition, the examples have been expanded to include additional contemporary criminal justice and criminology studies. Most of the examples contained in the first and second editions were retained in order to enhance diversity and allow students to see firsthand the rich variety of research that has been taking place over time. The full texts of all articles are available on the SAGE companion site (http://www .sagepub.com/gau) and can be downloaded online by users with institutional access to the SAGE journals in which the articles appear.

This edition retains the Learning Check boxes. These are scattered throughout the text and function as mini-quizzes that test students' comprehension of certain concepts. They are short so that students can complete them without disrupting their learning process. Students can use each Learning Check to make sure they are on the right track in their understanding of the material, and instructors can use them for in-class discussion. The answer key is in the back of the book.

Where relevant to the subject matter, chapters end with a section on IBM® SPSS® Statistics2 and come with one or more shortened versions of a major data set in SPSS file format. Students can download these data sets to answer the review questions presented at the end of the chapter. The

full data sets are all available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/ and other websites as reported in the text. If desired, instructors can download the original data sets to create supplementary examples and practice problems for hand calculations or SPSS analyses.

The third edition features the debut of Thinking Critically sections. These two-question sections appear at the end of each chapter. The questions are open-ended and designed to inspire students to think about the nuances of science and statistics. Instructors can assign them as homework problems or use them to initiate class debates.

The book is presented in three parts. Part I covers descriptive statistics. It starts with the basics of levels of measurement and moves on to frequency distributions, graphs and charts, and proportions and percentages. Students learn how to select the correct type(s) of data display based on a variable's level of measurement and then construct that diagram or table. They then learn about measures of central tendency and measures of dispersion and variability. These chapters also introduce the normal curve.

Part II focuses on probability theory and sampling distributions. This part lays out the logic that forms the basis of hypothesis testing. It emphasizes the variability in sample statistics that precludes direct inference to population parameters. Part II ends with confidence intervals, which is students' first foray into inferential statistics.

Part III begins with an introduction to bivariate hypothesis testing. The intention is to ease students into inferential tests by explaining what these tests do and what they are for. This helps transition students from the theoretical concepts covered in Part II to the application of those logical principles. The remaining chapters include chi-square tests, t tests and tests for differences between proportions, analysis of variance (ANOVA), correlation, and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The sequence is designed such that some topics flow logically into others. Chi-square tests are presented first because they are the only nonparametric test type covered here. Two-population t tests then segue into ANOVA. Correlation, likewise, supplies the groundwork for regression. Bivariate regression advances from correlation and transitions into the multivariate framework. The book ends with the fundamentals of interpreting OLS regression models.

This book provides the foundation for a successful statistics course that combines theory, research, and practical application for a holistic, effective approach to teaching and learning. Students will exit the course ready to put their education into action as they prepare to enter their chosen occupation, be that in academia, law, or the field. Learning statistics is not a painless process, but the hardest classes are the ones with the greatest potential to leave lasting impressions. Students will meet obstacles, struggle with them, and ultimately surmount them so that in the end, they will look back and say that the challenge was worth it. <>

Women, Gender, and Crime: Core Concepts by Stacy L. Mallicoat [Sage Publications, 9781506399270]

Women, Gender, and Crime: Core Concepts provides students with a complete and concise view into the intersection of gender and the criminal justice system. Author Stacy L. Mallicoat explores core topics on women as victims, offenders, and criminal justice professionals as they interact with various areas of the criminal justice system. She investigates relevant subjects that are not found in many traditional texts, including women who work as victim advocates and international issues of crime and justice relating to gender.

Key Features

This text discusses women and victimization prior to covering women as offenders, because victimization is often a precursor to offending.

- Case Studies present compelling examples that connect concepts to real-life occurrences to reinforce learning and cover key issues such as sexual victimization in the military, stalking on college campuses, financial challenges for incarcerated women, pregnancy and policing, and self-care for victim advocates.

- Coverage of crucial topics introduce students to important issues such as gender representation in criminal justice academia, multiple marginalities and LGBTQ populations, cyberstalking, labor trafficking, and challenges faced by women as criminal justice practitioners.
- Statistics, graphs, and tables demonstrate the most recent trends in the field to give students an accurate picture of the criminal justice system today.

The purpose of this book is to introduce readers to the issues that face women as they navigate the criminal justice system. Regardless of the participation, women have unique experiences that have significant effects on their perspectives of the criminal justice system. To effectively understand the criminal justice system, the voices of women must be heard. This book seeks to inform readers on the realities of women's lives as they interact with the criminal justice system. These topics are presented in this book through summary essays highlighting the key terms and research findings and incorporating cutting-edge research from scholars whose works have been published in top journals in criminal justice, criminology, and related fields.

Organization and Contents of the Book

This book is divided into thirteen chapters, with each chapter dealing with a different subject related to women, gender, and crime. Each chapter begins with an introduction to the issues raised within each topic and summarizes some of the basic themes related to the subject area. Each chapter also includes case studies on critical issues or current events related to the topic. Each introductory essay concludes with a discussion of the policy implications related to each topic. These thirteen chapters include

1. Women, Gender, and Crime: Introduction
2. Theories of Victimization
3. Women, Gender, and Victimization: Rape and Sexual Assault
4. Women, Gender, and Victimization: Intimate Partner Abuse and Stalking
5. International Issues in Gender-Based Violence
6. Women, Gender, and Offending
7. Girls, Gender, and Juvenile Delinquency
8. Female Offenders and Their Crimes
9. Processing and Sentencing of Female Offenders
10. The Supervision of Women: Community Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry
11. Women, Gender and Incarceration
12. Women Professionals and the Criminal Justice System: Police, Corrections, and Offender Services
13. Women Professionals and the Criminal Justice System: Courts and Victim Services

The first chapter provides an introduction and foundation for the book. In setting the context for the book, this chapter begins with a review of the influence of feminism on the study of crime. The chapter looks at the different types of data sources that are used to assess female offending and victimization. The chapter concludes with a discussion on feminist methodology and how it can contribute to the discussions of Women, gender, and crime. The Spotlight in this chapter highlights the role of gender within the study of criminology.

The second chapter begins with a review of the victim experience in the criminal justice system. This chapter highlights the experience of help seeking by victims and the practice of victim blaming. The chapter then turns to a discussion of victimization and focuses on how fear about victimization is a gendered experience. The chapter then turns to the discussion of victimization and how theories seek to understand the victim experience and place it within the larger context of the criminal justice system and society in general. The Spotlights in this chapter look at the issue of victim rights in Mexico and the femicides of women along the border cities, and cases of kidnapping involving women and girls.

The third chapter focuses on the victimization of women by crimes of rape and sexual assault. From historical issues to contemporary standards in the definition of sexual victimization, this chapter highlights the various forms of sexual assault and the role of the criminal justice system in the reporting and prosecution of these crimes, and the role of victims in the criminal justice system. This chapter also looks at critical issues such as campus sexual assault, sexual violence in the LGBTQ communities, and racial and ethnic issues in sexual

assault. The Spotlights in this chapter look at issues of rape culture and sexual assault within the military.

The fourth chapter presents the discussion of victimization of women in cases of intimate partner abuse and stalking. A review of the legal and social research on intimate partner violence addresses a multitude of issues for i victims, including the barriers to leaving a battering relationship. This chapter also highlights how demographics such as race, sexuality, and immigration status impact the abusive experience.

The fifth chapter focuses on international issues for women and includes discussions on crimes such as human trafficking, honor-based violence, witch burnings, genital mutilation, and rape as a war crime. The Spotlights in this chapter look at the issue of witch burnings in Papua New Guinea and the case of Malala Yousafzai.

The sixth chapter focuses on the theoretical explanations of female offending. The chapter begins with a review of the classical and modern theories of female criminality. While the classical theories often described women in sexist and stereotypical ways, modern theories of crime often ignored women completely. Recent research has reviewed many of these theories to assess whether they might help explain female offending. The chapter concludes with a discussion of gender-neutral theories and feminist criminology. The Spotlights in this chapter look at the Manson Women as a classical example of strain theory.

Chapter 7 focuses on girls and the juvenile justice system. Beginning with a discussion on the patterns of female delinquency, this chapter investigates the historical and contemporary standards for young women in society and how the changing definitions of delinquency have disproportionately and negatively impacted young girls. The Spotlights in this chapter look at the issue of sexual abuse in confinement, arts programming for at-risk youth, and listening girls' voices to assess what girls need from the juvenile justice system.

Chapter 8 deals with women and their crimes. While female crimes of violence are highly sensationalized b the media, these crimes are rare occurrences. Instead, the majority of female offending is made up of crimes that are nonviolent in nature or are considered victimless crimes, such as property-based offenses, drug abuse, and sexually based offenses. The Spotlights in this chapter look at how a typically masculine crime of bank robbery can be gendered, a discussion of gender and self-defense, and an examination of the case of Michelle Carter, who was convicted for using text messages to encourage her boyfriend to commit suicide.

The ninth chapter details the historical and contemporary patterns in the processing and sentencing of female offenders. This chapter highlights research on how factors such as patriarchy, chivalry, and paternalism within the criminal justice system impact women. The Spotlight in this chapter looks at international perspectives in the processing of female offenders.

The tenth chapter looks at the experience of women in the community corrections setting. The chapter begins with a discussion of gender-specific programming and how correctional agents and programs need to address unique issues for women. The chapter then looks at the role of risk assessment instruments and how they need to reflect gender differences between male and female offenders. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the reentry challenges of women exiting from prison. The Spotlight in this chapter looks at life after parole.

Chapter 11 examines the incarceration of women. Here, the text and readings focus on the patterns and practices of the incarceration of women. Ranging from historical examples of incarceration to modern-day policies, this chapter looks at how the treatment of women in prison varies from that of their male counterparts and how incarcerated women have unique needs based on their differential pathways to prison. The Spotlights in this chapter look at how California's experience with realignment has impacted the incarceration of women, the financial challenges for women while they are in prison, and the Girl Scouts Beyond Bars program.

Chapter 12 focuses on women who work within criminal justice occupations within traditionally male-dominated environments: policing and

corrections. The Spotlight in this chapter looks at issues of pregnancy on policing.

Chapter 13 concludes this text with a discussion of women in the legal and victim services fields. The chapter looks at both women who work as attorneys as well as women in the judiciary. While women are a minority in this realm of the criminal justice system, women are generally overrepresented within victim services agencies. Here, gender also plays a significant role both in terms of the individual's work experiences as well as in the structural organization of the agency. The Spotlights in this chapter highlight the impact of gender on the U.S. Supreme Court, women in politics, and the value of self-care for victim services' workers.

As you can see, this book provides an in-depth look at the issues facing women in the criminal justice system. Each chapter of this book presents a critical component of the criminal justice system and the role of women in it. As you will soon learn, gender is a pervasive theme that runs deeply throughout our system, and how we respond to it has a dramatic effect on the lives of women in society.

There is coverage of critical topics, such as

- Representation of women in criminal justice academia
- Victim blaming
- Multiple marginalities and LGBT populations, including LGBTQ sexual violence
- Marital rape and rape as a war crime
- Campus sexual assault
- Economic abuse
- Cyberstalking
- Labor trafficking
- Women and pretrial release
- Challenges faced by female police officers
- The increasing number of women in the legal field

Spotlights cover key issues, such as

- Victims' Rights in Mexico
- Sexual Victimization at Military Academies
- Stalking and College Campuses
- The Manson Women
- Life After Parole
- Financial Challenges for Incarcerated Women
- Pregnancy and Policing
- Women in Politics
- Self-Care for Victim Advocates

Statistics, graphs, and tables have all been updated to demonstrate the most recent trends in criminology.

Digital Resources:
http://study.sagepub.com/mallicoat3e

The open-access Student Study Site includes the following:

- Mobile-friendly eFlashcards reinforce understanding of key terms and concepts that have been outlined in the chapters.
- Mobile-friendly web quizzes allow for independent assessment of progress made in learning course material.
- EXCLUSIVE! Access to certain full-text SAGE journal articles that have been carefully selected for each chapter.
- Web resources are included for further research and insights.
- Carefully selected video links feature relevant interviews, lectures, personal stories, inquiries, and other content for use in independent or classroom-based explorations of key topics.

The password-protected Instructor Resource Site included. <>

Women, Gender, and Crime: A Text/Reader by Stacy L. Mallicoat [SAGE Text/Reader Series in Criminology and Criminal Justice, Sage Publications, 9781506366869]

> "The Mallicoat text provides an excellent set of contemporary readings on topics relating to women and crime. I highly recommend this text for professors." — Sandra Pavelka, Florida Gulf Coast University

Women, Gender, and Crime: A Text/Reader, Third Edition, presents issues of gender, crime, and

criminal justice in context through edited research articles enhanced by brief authored sections. Each article is carefully edited to demonstrate the application of the concepts presented in the text. Author Stacy L. Mallicoat brings all the content together by highlighting underlying themes of race and diversity, helping students gain a better understanding of women as victims, offenders, and criminal justice professionals.

New to the Third Edition

More than half of the journal articles are new and introduce students to important topics such as transformative feminist criminology, human trafficking, gender-specific programs for juveniles, the impact of social ties on long-term recidivism, social relationships and group dynamics for female inmates, and more.

Fourteen new or updated case studies present compelling examples that connect concepts to real-life occurrences by covering key issues such as sexual victimization at military academies, stalking on college campuses, pregnancy and policing, and self-care for victim advocates.

Expanded coverage of critical topics make students aware of important issues such as multiple marginalities and LGBT populations, cyberstalking, labor trafficking, women and pretrial release, and challenges faced by female police officers.

Updated statistics, graphs, and tables demonstrate the most recent trends in criminology.

The purpose of this book is to introduce readers to the issues that face women as they navigate the criminal justice system. Regardless of the participation, women have unique experiences that have significant effects on their perspectives of the criminal justice system. Effectively understanding the criminal justice system means that the voices of women must be heard. This book seeks to inform readers on the realities of women's lives as they interact with the criminal justice system. These topics are presented in this book through summary essays highlighting the key terms and research findings and incorporating cutting-edge research from scholars whose works have been published in top journals in criminal justice, criminology, and related fields.

Organization and Contents of the Book

This book is divided into thirteen sections, with each section dealing with a different subject related to women, gender, and crime. Each section begins with an introduction to the issues raised within each topic and summarizes some of the basic themes related to the subject area. Each section also includes Spotlights on critical issues or current events related to the topic. Each introductory essay concludes with a discussion of the policy implications related to each topic. This discussion is followed by selected readings that focus on research being conducted on critical issues within each topical area. These readings represent some of the best research in the field and are designed to expose students to the discussions facing women's issues within contemporary criminal justice. These thirteen sections are as follows:

- Women, Gender, and Crime: Introduction
- Theories of Victimization
- Women, Gender, and Victimization: Rape and Sexual Assault
- Women, Gender, and Victimization: Intimate Partner Abuse and Stalking
- International Issues in Gender-Based Violence
- Women, Gender, and Offending
- Girls, Gender, and Juvenile Delinquency
- Female Offenders and Their Crimes
- Processing and Sentencing of Female Offenders
- The Supervision of Women: Community Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry
- Women, Gender, and Incarceration
- Women Professionals and the Criminal Justice System: Police, Corrections, and Offender Services
- Women Professionals and the Criminal Justice System: Courts and Victim Services

The first section provides an introduction and foundation for the book. In setting the context for the book, this section begins with a review of the influence of feminism on the study of crime. The section looks at the different types of data sources that are used to assess female offending and victimization. The section concludes with a discussion on feminist methodology and how it can contribute

to the discussions of women, gender, and crime. The Spotlight in this section highlights the role of gender within the study of criminology. The first article in this section, by Meda Chesney-Lind and Merry Morash, looks at the contributions of feminist criminology in the understanding of gender and crime issues and provides some insights for the future. The second article by Jody Miller focuses on issues of gender in qualitative research.

The second section begins with a review of the victim experience in the criminal justice system. This section highlights the experience of help seeking by victims and the practice of victim blaming. The section then turns to a discussion of victimization and focuses on how fear about victimization is a gendered experience. The section then turns to the discussion of victimization and how theories seek to understand the victim experience and place it within the larger context of the criminal justice system and society in general. The Spotlights in this section looks at the issue of victim rights in Mexico and the femicides of women along the border cities, and cases of kidnapping involving women and girls. The section includes two readings on victimization. The first article in this section, by Bonnie S. Fisher and David May, investigates the effects of gender on the fear of victimization by college students. The second article by Judy L. Postmus, looks at how ethnicity can impact the help-seeking experience.

The third section focuses on the victimization of women by crimes of rape and sexual assault. From historical issues to contemporary standards in the definition of sexual victimization, this section highlights the various forms of sexual assault and the role of the criminal justice system in the reporting and prosecution of these crimes, and the role of victims in the criminal justice system. This section also looks at critical issues such as campus sexual assault, sexual violence in the LGBTQ communities, and racial and ethnic issues in sexual assault. The Spotlights in this section look at issues of rape culture, and sexual assault within the military. The readings in this section highlight some of the critical research on issues related to rape and sexual assault. Beginning with a discussion of campus sexual assault, Rebecca M. Hayes-Smith and Lora M. Levett investigate whether information about these resources altered students' beliefs in rape myths. The second reading, by Clare Gunby, Anna Carline, and Caryl Beynon, investigates how alcohol consumption alters perceptions of rape and sexual assault claims.

The fourth section presents the discussion of victimization of women in cases of intimate partner abuse and stalking. A review of the legal and social research on intimate partner violence addresses a multitude of issues for victims, including the barriers to leaving a battering relationship. This section also highlights how demographics such as race, sexuality, and immigration status impact the abusive experience. The articles in this section address some of the contemporary issues facing victims of intimate partner violence. The section concludes with a discussion of stalking and highlights the issue of cyberstalking. The Spotlights for this section look at issues of intimate partner abuse within the NFL, international issues of IPA, and stalking on college campuses. The readings for this section begin with an essay by Alisa J. Velonis and the issues with nonphysical acts of intimate partner abuse. The second article, by Katie M. Edwards, Christina M. Dardis, and Christine A. Gidycz, investigates the disclosure practices of victims of dating violence.

The fifth section focuses on international issues for women and includes discussions on crimes such as human trafficking, honor-based violence, witch burnings, genital mutilation, and rape as a war crime. The Spotlights in this section looks the issue of witch burnings in Papua New Guinea, and the case of Malala Yousafzai. In the first article in this section, Chenda Keo, Theirry Bouhours, Roderic Broadhurt, and Brigette Bouhours investigate how issues of human trafficking in Cambodia have created a moral panic throughout the region. The second article, by Inger Skjelsbaek, looks at the experiences of women who endured sexual assault during the Bosnia-Herzegovina War.

The sixth section focuses on the theoretical explanations of female offending. The section begins with a review of the classical and modern theories of female criminality. While the classical theories often described women in sexist and stereotypical ways, modern theories of crime often ignored women completely. Recent research has

reviewed many of these theories to assess whether they might help explain female offending. The section concludes with a discussion of gender-neutral theories and feminist criminology. The Spotlights in this section look at the Manson Women as a classical example of strain theory. This section includes two articles that involve testing criminological theory on female populations. The first article is by April Bernard, who uses a case study to assess which theories of crime might best explain this offender's criminal behavior. The second article, by Kimberly J. Cook, looks at how classical theories of crime failed to include girls and women and concludes with a discussion on the future opportunities for feminist criminology.

Section VII focuses on girls and the juvenile justice system. Beginning with a discussion on the patterns of female delinquency, this section investigates the historical and contemporary standards for young women in society and how the changing definitions of delinquency have disproportionately and negatively impacted young girls. The Spotlights in this section look at the issue of sexual abuse in confinement, arts programming for at-risk youth, and girls' voices to assess what girls need from the juvenile justice system. The readings for this section begin with an article by Jessica P. Hodge, Kristi Holsinger, and Kristen Maziarka and explores the efficacy of gender specific programs by using juvenile justice staff members. The section concludes with an article by Juliette Noel Graziano and Eric E. Wagner and investigates the role of trauma and LGBTQ girls in the juvenile justice system.

Section VIII deals with women and their crimes. While female crimes of violence are highly sensationalized by the media, these crimes are rare occurrences. Instead, the majority of female offending is made up of crimes that are nonviolent in nature or are considered victimless crimes, such as property-based offenses, drug abuse, and sexually based offenses. The Spotlights in this section look at how a typically masculine crime of bank robbery can be gendered, a discussion of gender and self-defense, and a look at the case of Michelle Carter, who was convicted for using text messages to encourage her boyfriend to commit suicide. The readings for this section include an article by Judith A. Ryder and Regina E. Brisgone that focuses on the experiences of women and girls living and growing up during the era of crack cocaine and an article by Corey Shdaimah and Chrystanthi Leon on how women use their experience in prostitution as a way to assert power and control over their lives

The ninth section details the historical and contemporary patterns in the processing and sentencing of female offenders. This section highlights research on how factors such as patriarchy, chivalry, and paternalism within the criminal justice system impact women. The Spotlight in this section looks at international perspectives in the processing of female offenders. Two articles in this section investigate the effects of gender on the processing of offenders: Tina L. Freiburger and Carly M. Hilinski investigate how race, gender, and age impact decision making in cases of pretrial detention; and Jill K. Doerner and Stephen Demuth look at whether women in the federal courts benefit from chivalrous sentencing practices.

The tenth section looks at the experience of women in the community corrections setting. The section begins with a discussion on gender-specific programming and how correctional agents and programs need to address these unique issues for women. The section then looks at the role of risk assessment instruments and how they need to reflect gender differences between male and female offenders. The section concludes with a discussion on the reentry challenges of women exiting from prison. The Spotlight in this section looks at life after parole. The first article, by Tara D. Opsal, focuses on how women handle experience of being on parole. The second article, by Kelle Barrick, Pamela J. Mattimore, and Christy A. Visher, looks at how social ties during incarceration can prevent recidivism.

Section XI examines the incarceration of women. Here, the text and readings focus on the patterns and practices of the incarceration of women. Ranging from historical examples of incarceration to modern-day policies, this section looks to how the treatment of women in prison varies from that of their male counterparts and how incarcerated women have unique needs based on their differential pathways to prison. The Spotlights in this section looks at how California's experience

with realignment has impacted the incarceration of women, the financial challenges for women while they are in prison, and the Girl Scouts Beyond Bars program. The readings in this section begin with a discussion by Andrea Cantora, Jeff Mellow, and Melinda D. Schlager on how issues of trust can impact the rehabilitative process, and conclude with research by Holly M. Harner and Suzanne Riley on the mental health effects of the incarceration experience.

Section XII focuses on women who work within criminal justice occupations within traditionally male-dominated environments: policing and corrections. The readings for this section bring attention to the women who work within the domain of the criminal justice system and how gender impacts their occupational context. Following a discussion of the history of women in these occupations, this section looks at how gender impacts the performance of women in these jobs and the personal toll it has on their lives. The Spotlights in this section looks at issues of pregnancy on policing. The first article, by Robin N. Haarr and Merry Morash, looks at how women in policing cope with discrimination. The section concludes with research by Cassandra Matthews, Elizabeth Monk-Turner, and Melvina Sumter on promotional opportunities for women in corrections.

Section XIII concludes this text with a discussion of women in the legal and victim services fields. The section looks at both women who work as attorneys as well as women in the judiciary. While women are a minority in this realm of the criminal justice system, women are generally overrepresented within victim services agencies. Here, gender also plays a significant role in terms of both the individual's work experiences and the structural organization of the agency. The Spotlights in this section highlight the impact of gender on the U.S. Supreme Court, women in politics, and the value of self-care for victim services' workers. The readings for this section include an article by Christina L. Boyd on whether gender impacts judicial decision making in the trial courts, and conclude with research by Sarah E. Ullman and Stephanie M. Townsend on the barriers that rape crisis workers experience in working with victims.

As you can see, this book provides an in-depth look at the issues facing women in the criminal justice system. From victimization to incarceration to employment, this book takes a unique approach in its presentation by combining a review of the literature on each of these issues followed by some of the key research studies that have been published in academic journals. Each section of this book presents a critical component of the criminal justice system and the role of women in it. As you will soon learn, gender is a pervasive theme that runs deeply throughout our system, and how we respond to it has a dramatic effect on the lives of women in society.

New to the Third Edition

Nearly half of the journal articles have been updated and cover important topics, such as

- Transformative Feminist Criminology
- Women From Different Ethnic Groups and Their Experiences With Victimization
- Intimate Partner Violence
- Human Trafficking
- Social Identities of Women Who Experienced Rape During the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Criminology and Androcentrism
- Gender-Specific Programs for Juveniles
- Resilience Among Women Who Work as Prostitutes
- Women's Experiences of Parole
- The Impact of Social Ties on Long-Term Recidivism
- Social Relationships and Group Dynamics for Female Inmates
- The Impact of Incarceration on Women's Mental Health
- The Effect of Rank on Policewomen Coping With Discrimination and Harassment
- The Effects of Trial Judges' Sex and Race
- There is expanded coverage of critical topics, such as
- Representation of women in criminal justice academia
- Victim blaming
- Multiple marginalities and LGBT populations, including LGBTQ sexual violence

- Marital rape and rape as a war crime
- Campus sexual assault
- Economic abuse
- Cyberstalking
- Labor trafficking
- Women and pretrial release
- Challenges faced by female police officers
- The increasing number of women in the legal field
- Fourteen new or updated Spotlights cover key issues, such as
- Victims' Rights in Mexico
- Sexual Victimization at Military Academies
- Stalking and College Campuses
- The Manson Women
- Life After Parole
- Financial Challenges for Incarcerated Women
- Pregnancy and Policing
- Women in Politics
- Self-Care for Victim Advocates

Statistics, graphs, and tables have all been updated to demonstrate the most recent trends in criminology.

Digital Resources:
http://study.sagepub.com/mallicoat3e

The open-access Student Study Site includes the following:

Mobile-friendly eFlashcards reinforce understanding of key terms and concepts that have been outlined in the chapters.

Mobile-friendly web quizzes allow for independent assessment of progress made in learning course material.

EXCLUSIVE! Access to certain full-text SAGE journal articles that have been carefully selected for each chapter.

Web resources are included for further research and insights.

Carefully selected video links feature relevant interviews, lectures, personal stories, inquiries, and other content for use in independent or classroom-based explorations of key topics.

The password-protected Instructor Resource Site included. <>

The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law, in 2 volumes, 1st edition edited by Colin King, Clive Walker, & Jimmy Gurulé [Palgrave Handbooks, Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319644974]

The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law, a two-volume set, focuses on how criminal and terrorist assets pose significant and unrelenting threats to the integrity, security, and stability of contemporary societies. In response to the funds generated by or for organized crime and transnational terrorism, strategies are elaborated at national, regional, and international levels for laws, organizations and procedures, and economic systems. Reflecting on these strands, this handbook brings together leading experts from different jurisdictions across Europe, America, Asia, and Africa and from different disciplines, including law, criminology, political science, international studies, and business with an emphasis on the UK and US.

Editors are Colin King, Clive Walker and Jimmy Gurulé. King is Reader in Law and co-Founder of the Crime Research Centre, University of Sussex, UK, and was Academic Fellow of The Honourable Society of the Inner Temple from 2014-2017. Walker is Professor Emeritus of Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Leeds, UK. He was awarded an LLD degree in 2015 and was appointed Queen's Counsel (Hon) in 2016. Gurulé is Professor at the Notre Dame Law School, Indiana. He has also worked in public enforcement positions including as Under Secretary for Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Treasury.

The authors examine the institutional and legal responses, set within the context of both policy and practice, with a view to critiquing these actions on the grounds of effective delivery and compliance with legality and rights. In addition, The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law draws upon the experiences of the many senior practitioners and policy-makers who participated in the research project which was funded by a major Arts and Humanities Research Council grant.

In the US context, the expressed resolve to deal with the threats of criminal and terrorism financing

is arguably more trenchant than in the UK. Crime incorporated is a long-standing prime mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). That agenda is outstripped now by counter-terrorism, which mobilizes not only the FBI but also the whole nation under the joint resolution of the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). This instrument affords the President broad powers as Commander in Chief to `... use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons'.

The importance of the agendas of anti-money laundering (AML), asset recovery (AR), and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) cannot be doubted. But there is room for doubt about many aspects of these agendas. The authors' skepticism may be driven by the inadequate collection or release of official data and by an absence of comprehensive evidence-led independent research. The gaps are especially apparent in `follow the money' approaches to tackling financial-based crime. There is an evident need for deeper analysis of the relevant 'follow the money' policies, legislation, and institutions. There is a need to evaluate their impacts and to identify future directions in policy, practice, and research.

A prime goal behind The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law is to seek to understand legal structures and measures in the context of practice. Through putting the `law in practice', the authors seek practical insight into how the law operates in reality. Consequently, the project has at every stage included practitioners as well as academics. Their valuable insights are reflected in the book. Some were even persuaded (and allowed) to contribute their own chapters to the book.

The authors assess the appropriate design of relevant institutions. Institutional designs are clearly difficult to get right since they involve complex choices about the need for specialism and independence, the role of multi- and inter-agency cooperation and the deployment of special and sensitive powers and techniques.

Another important aspect of institutional design is accountability. Set against a high level of institutional fluidity, The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law examines the degree of accountability of specialist agencies. Their limited transparency and accountability may affect both public confidence and corporate trust which may provoke counter-productive consequences such as the failure to provide information.

More broadly, issues of legitimacy must be tackled. While policy discourse emphasizes the positive rationales underpinning the `follow the money' activities, which may be justified by broad claims to public security and protection, there are inevitable detriments to those affected by the broad powers invoked in enforcement action. Individual rights can be severely compromised. Furthermore, because of the concerted links between public and private stake-holders, the latter may be free to impose detriments on individuals without constraint by the doctrines of individual rights and accountability.

Next, the implications arising from the crossing of borders must be considered when dealing with transnational crime and transnational terrorism. Thus, some comparative work is required so that lessons can be learned while transcending a variety of jurisdictions. Their multi-national focus is therefore noteworthy. Much of the current research on AML, AR, and CTF tends to be focused on individual jurisdictions (typically the US or UK). The project deliberately adopts much needed international and comparative perspectives, drawing upon experiences of not just the UK and US but also European countries such as Italy, the wider common law world such as Australia and Canada, and international organizations including the EU and UN. There is now an unprecedented international regulatory focus on `dirty assets' by way of the EU Money Laundering Directives, UN Conventions, and Financial Action Task Force guides. The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law benefits from its comparative approach.

Finally, changing environments demand novel research and practical and legal adaptability by agencies, lawyers and researchers. Novel techniques may include barely encountered modes

of asset exchange such as *hawala*. Equally, electronic or virtual currencies (such as Bitcoin), which operate in barely regulated environments, challenge conventional approaches to asset recovery techniques.

To answer the foregoing agendas, the research fieldwork involved the organization and delivery of four symposia. Based on the earlier experience, and reflecting similar objectives, the authors of The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law held four further events which were designed, once again, to bring policymakers, practitioners, and researchers together to explore current, and future, directions in policy, law, and practice.

Based on the insights and discussions at these key events, as well as selected invitees who could provide the authority and depth demanded by the project, The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law provides innovative commentary in that it examines in a comprehensive way all aspects of tainted ('dirty') assets. The chapters together explore three distinct, but interlocking, aspects, namely, anti-money laundering, asset recovery, and counter terrorism financing. In this way, comparisons can be drawn from one aspect to the next. Second, the book is also comprehensive in terms of disciplines. The main theme is legal, but the contributors also reflect other disciplines – politics, criminology, business, and economics. In addition, there is practitioner input as well as legal input. Third, the jurisdictional coverage is suitably broad. Fourth, the chapters reflect new or substantially updated materials and not simply reprints of previous publications.

The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law focuses on three distinct, but related, aspects of `following the money' of organized crime and terrorist related activities: anti-money laundering, asset recovery, and counter-terrorism financing measures. Within each aspect, it examines the policy, institutional, and legal responses, set within policy and practice contexts, and with a view to critique on grounds such as effective delivery and compliance with legality and individual rights. These three broad themes are reflected in the structure of the book. Part II (Chaps. 2 through to 15) covers `anti-money laundering measures'. Part III (Chaps. 16 through to 29) deals with `asset recovery'. Part IV (Chaps. 30 through to 47) is devoted to `counter-terrorism financing'.

Chapters in Volume I of The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law and their authors include:

Part I Introductory Section
Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law: An Introduction – Clive Walker, Colin King, and Jimmy Gurule
Part II Anti-Money Laundering
Anti-Money Laundering: An Overview – Colin King
The Global AML Regime and the EU AML Directives: Prevention and Control – Maria Bergstrom
Globalization, Money Laundering and the City of London – Leila Simona Talani
The Production of Suspicion in Retail Banking: An Examination of Unusual Transaction Reporting – Vanessa Iafolla
Money Laundering, Anti-Money Laundering and the Legal Profession – Katie Benson
Cash, Crime and Anti-Money Laundering – Michele Riccardi and Michael Levi
Money Laundering in a Virtual World – Clare Chambers Jones
A Bit(Coin) of a Problem for the EU AML Framework – Mo Egan
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Chapters in Volume II of The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law and their authors include:

Part IV Counter-Terrorism Financing
Counter-Terrorism Financing: An Overview – Clive Walker
Counter-Terrorism Financing Assemblages after 9/11 – Marieke de Goede
The Financial War on Terrorism: A Critical Review of the United Kingdom's Counter-Terrorist Financing Strategies – Nicholas Ryder, Rachel Thomas, and Georgina Webb
Legal and Regulatory Approaches to Counter-Terrorist Financing: The Case of Australia – Christopher Michaelsen and Doron Goldbarsht
Examining the Efficacy of Canada's Anti-terrorist Financing Laws – Anita Anand
EU Measures to Combat Terrorist Financing – Oldrich Bures
The United Nations Security Council Sanctions Regime against the Financing of Terrorism – C. H Powell
The Intersection of AMIISFT and Security Council Sanctions – Kimberly Prose
Anti-terrorism Smart Sanctions and Armed Conflicts – Luca Pantaleo
Applying Social Network Analysis to Terrorist Financing – Christian Leuprecht and Olivier Walther
Criminal Prosecutions for Terrorism Financing in the UK – Nasir Hafezi, Karen Jones, and Clive Walker
The Failure to Prosecute ISIS's Foreign Financiers under the Material Support Statute – Jimmy Gurule and Sabina Danek
Counter Terrorism Finance, Precautionary Logic and the Regulation of Risk: The Regulation of Informal Value Transfer Systems within the UK – Karen Cooper
Responding to Money Transfers by Foreign Terrorist Fighters – Duncan DeVille and Daniel Pearson
Terrorism Financing and the Governance of Charities – Clive Walker
Governing Non-profit Organisations against Terrorist Financing: The Malaysian Legal and Regulatory Modalities – Zaiton Hamin
Kidnap and Terrorism Financing – Yvonne M. Dutton
The Illicit Antiquities Trade and Terrorism Financing: From the Khmer Rouge to Daesh – Mark V. Vlasic and Jeffrey Paul DeSousa

Money is the motive for organized crime and the essential ingredient for terror. Yet our efforts to 'follow the money' have proven inadequate. In this impressive collection of essays, diverse experts explore distinct but interlocking aspects of our efforts to combat financial crime. The result is a valuable study of AML/CFT and the collective argument that it is time to fundamentally shift the paradigm. – John Cassara, former U.S intelligence officer, Treasury Special Agent, and AML/CFT author.

The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law delivers original, theoretically informed, and well-referenced analysis, which is accessible to both practitioners and scholars alike in multiple jurisdictions. It is a comprehensive collection, a must-read for academics and practitioners alike with an interest in money laundering, terrorism financing, security, and international relations. <>

Applied Conversation Analysis: Social Interaction in Institutional Settings by Jessica Nina Lester and Michelle O'Reilly [Sage, 9781506351261]

Focusing on applied conversation analysis (CA), Applied Conversation Analysis: Social Interaction in Institutional Settings by Jessica N. Lester and Michelle O'Reilly offers practical insights and guidelines for CA scholars studying social interactions in institutional settings. Written in an accessible style and packed with case studies, examples, activities, and practical tips, the book takes readers through the entire process of planning and carrying out an applied CA research study. By highlighting challenges, debates, and important questions, each chapter provides the theoretical foundation necessary for making informed decisions at every stage of a research project. The book is divided into three sections (context and planning, doing a project using conversation analysis, and disseminating your research) to mirror the research process.

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Excerpt:

Aims of the Book

n this book, we focus on conversation analysis (CA), specifically applied CA, which offers important insights and perspectives about institutional talk. CA is a methodological approach that is rooted in the hermeneutic research tradition and is closely associated with the discursive turn (Tseliou, 2013). Broadly, language-based approaches include a range of methodological perspectives, including discourse analytic perspectives, rhetorical analysis, and conversation analysis, among others. The relatively recent critical "turn to language" has served to challenge positivist ideas about the way the world generally, and human interaction specifically, works. With this turn, language has become viewed as constitutive of social life, with increasing attention now being given to have language that creates and constructs reality. Applied CA is an especially useful methodology for understanding the implications of this turn to language, as it offers generative perspectives for applied fields and practitioners going about their everyday lives. Thus, when we developed this book, we sought to locate our discussions in relation to what applied CA might offer while intentionally working to craft a practical and accessible guide to planning and carrying out an applied CA research study.

Notably, a growing body of CA research has attended to varying institutional settings, including

legal settings, news and media settings , health care settings, mental health settings, and educational settings, among others. Across disciplines and geographic locales, there is certainly a growing emphasis on applied research as well as research that may have an impact on practice. Thus, in this book, we argue that applied CA has much to offer in this regard. Over the last several years, CA has been growing in popularity, as evidenced by several journals devoted to publishing this kind of work, such as Research on Language & Social Interaction, and international research networks for scholars practicing CA, such as the International Society for Conversation Analysis and Conversation Analysis Research in Autism. Further, a growing number of conferences are designed to showcase CA research, including the International Conference for Conversation Analysis and the Conversation Analysis and Clinical Encounters Conference, to name just a few.

Who This Book Is For

This book is not discipline specific, and thus, across the book, we point to a range of examples from different institutional settings and fields. Consequently, scholars and practitioners within a range of fields will find the book relevant to their work and research, including those working in the areas of counseling, criminology, edu¬cation, forensic science, health sciences, human geography, law, linguistics, market¬ing, media, mental health, social policy, social work, and sociology, among others. Further, we wrote this book with the hope that a range of audiences would find it accessible and useful to their work. As such, undergraduate students, graduate stu¬dents (both master's and doctoral level), postgraduate students, and scholars (new or returning) of applied CA will likely find it useful. In addition, we also crafted the book with the intent of inviting practitioners to engage with the core principles and practices of applied CA.

Organization of the Book

This book is divided into three sections that reflect the core issues at stake when conducting a project using applied CA. The early sections of the book focus on context and planning, and are designed to facilitate the reader through the main decision-making processes that will inform the research. In this section of the book, the chapters provide an accessible introduction to applied CA and set the context for the reader by introducing the key principles and terminology used. Specifically, the early part of the book differentiates applied CA from pure CA, and considers the institutionality of the talk. Using case studies, activities, and useful examples, we guide readers through the challenges that they may face during the planning stages, incorporating some of the broader qualitative issues that are relevant to this qualitative approach, such as ethical concerns, proposal writing, developing questions, keeping a reflexive diary, and developing ideas.

The second section of the book focuses on the practical aspects of carrying out research using applied CA. This section of the book is designed to help the reader navigate through some of the complexities of doing fieldwork, recruiting participants, working with naturally occurring data, transcribing, translating, and sampling. Applied CA research has some specific ways of carrying out research that reflects its epistemological and ontological foundations as well as its methodological perspective, and these steps are provided in a practical way. For applied CA to be robust, the analysis should be conducted carefully and within the parameters of the approach, and these are explained. Other issues that may be relevant for some readers, such as the use of digital tools, are also included.

The final section of the book focuses on disseminating your research and considers the stages of a project once data collection and analysis are close to completion. The iterative nature of qualitative research broadly, and applied CA specifically, is recognized as we guide the reader through complex issues such as assuring quality in the approach. This is an area that has created some tensions in the qualitative community and among CA scholars, and this is considered to help readers draw their own conclusions. This is particularly important, as in a contemporary context, applied research now considers the evidence-based practice agenda, and this has been hugely influential in terms of funding and publishing research, and recognizing its value. Nonetheless, it is an agenda that has created tension and one that applied CA researchers must

navigate. This relates to dissemination activities, and the book provides a specific focus on the different ways in which the applied CA research study might reach different audiences, including the dissemination through an educational qualification such as a dissertation/thesis. To consolidate the core messages, the final chapter provides examples of work in the field and highlights the importance of doing applied CA research.

How to Use This Book

The book includes a range of pedagogical activities, summaries for each chapter, interview boxes with experts, and learning points to highlight the main messages of each chapter. Notably, given that we developed this book to be a foundational text and therefore provide a basic platform for audiences to move on to other, more complex and sophisticated sources, we also include recommended readings at the end of each chapter. The pedagogical nature of the text serves to guide the reader through some of the more challenging aspects of doing this kind of research. <>

Un(intended) language planning in a globalising world: Mutliple levels of players at work edited by Phyllis Chew Ghim Lian, Catherine Chua, Kerry Taylor-Leech & Colin Williams [De Gruyter, 9783110518238]

The volume covers both intended and unintended outcomes of language planning. It introduces the different levels of players involved in process, highlights the importance of aligning both macro to micro planning. Shows the complexity of language planning due to the presence of global players, and the ´power` of micro level players having the ability to determine the outcome of the policy.

This first book provides a comprehensive overview of the different levels of players who have been involved in both intended and unintended language planning and policy, and shows how they have impacted multilingual language use. Specifically, it looks at the roles of different 'glo-national' (global national) players in directing the choices of language use in various parts of the world. Drawing on topics from numerous countries i.e., Basque country, Brazil, China, Europe, France, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Turkey, Vietnam, United Arab Emirates and the United States of America, this book showcases the complexity of language planning. The book not only provides examples to illustrate how globalisation has led to an increase in demand in learning English in many countries, it brings in other examples to demonstrate how globalisation has also promoted language diversity in other countries as well. Using the four stages of language planning framework – Supra Macro, Macro, Micro and Infra Micro levels of language planning, the book discusses the tension that surrounds the global, national and local demands on language choice, and presents the possible outcomes of the various intended and unintended policies, and strategies adopted by the different players found in these four stages of planning. The aim of the book is to highlight the importance of aligning the supra and macro levels of planning with the micro and infra macro levels of planning in any language planning in order to obtain positive outcomes.

Contents

Excerpt: As a young postgraduate student in the University of Queensland (Australia), I worked as a university tutor for Dick for the course 'Introduction to Teaching English as a Second Language'. When my then supervisor left the university, Dick did not hesitate to take me under his wing even though his supervision load was already over the quota. For that, I am eternally grateful to his kindness and generosity to 'adopt' me. In my study journey with him, he was always fatherly and nurturing. Basically, he wanted me to learn independently, and hence he never told me how to do my research. Instead I would often find myself sitting in his office, and he would be asking me a whole lot of questions until an idea, plan of action and solution occurred to me. Once, he jokingly described me as a 'coffee brewer' and explained that he needed to send me off to ponder upon problems because like a coffee brewer, I needed the time to 'brew' so that the results would be 'aromatic'. Over that period of time, Dick had influenced me greatly in the way I work; he had shown me the importance of academic integrity, honesty, hard work and never to be afraid to ask questions.

This book was a joint project between us but it was put on hold for three years. Therefore, I will like to thank all the authors in this book for their contributions to make this book a reality. Included in this book are some of Dick's friends and colleagues, who are also some of the most influential figures in the contemporary field of language planning and policy – Ulrich Amon, Jasone Cenoz, Francisco Gomes de Matos, Durk Gorter, Robert B. Kaplan, Jan Kruse, Anthony J. Liddicoat, Daniel Perrin, Bernard Spolsky and Christa van der Walt.

The ideas in this book were from Dick and they were drawn from our book chapter titled Global language: (De)Colonisation in the New Era published in 2011. Dick's interest was to highlight how the different 'glob-national' (Global national) actors have been involved in intended and unintended language planning and policy (LPP) and their impact on multilingual language use. For a long time, LPP has been done mostly at the national or government level. However in this globalised world, Dick opined that LPP is also done at the global level. To him, the emergence of global actors has to a certain extent artificially directed the choices of language use in various parts of the world. He brought attention to the role of these global actors and how their policies have strengthened or weakened the status of both majority and minority languages in polities around the world. This idea is in line with the premise that the emergence of transnational corporations has led to the expansion of the global capitalist system (Sklair, 2000; 2002), as such trends eventually

lead to global production, promotion of international outsourcing of labour and materials, as well as the emphasis on finance driven performance (Robinson, 2003; 2004). In the long run, the emergence of the integrated international economy has privileged certain advanced industrialised economies and emerging markets. Under these circumstances, LPP in this 21st century has taken new multiple structures that include global actors because external influences, such as economic demands play a significant role in influencing the types of languages and the standard that learners should attain. For example, there has been an increase in demand of learning English in many developing and emerging economies because English provides the learners a strong economic advantage in this globalised economy (The British Council, 2013). Currently, about more than 75 countries have English as their dominant or one of the foreign languages learned (Herther, 2009), and in the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), English is the lingua franca throughout the ten countries (Kirkpatrick, 2010). Research has also found that English-medium instruction programmes and courses are increasingly offered in many European tertiary institutions.

Global languages, such as French, German, Japanese, Spanish and recently Mandarin, are popular languages to learn, and English has been by far the most favoured language to acquire. Supported by 'The Rise of the Network Society' (Castells, 1996; 1997; 1998), new communication technologies, particularly the invention of the telephone, radio, television, movies, records, press and presently the Internet, "any language [English] at the centre of such an explosion of international activity would suddenly have found itself with a global status" (Crystals, 2003: 10). Inevitably, English has become the "world language" (Brutt-Griffler, 2002). In view of such converging trend, some globalisation theorists believed that the world is becoming homogenised in this new global era and learning English is one such consequence (Phillipson, 1996; Johnson, 2009; The Economist, 2011). For instance, homogenisation theories such as Robertson (1992), pioneering in globlisation theory, stated that the process of globalisation has led to the compression and integration of the world, and for Giddens (1990), the universalisation of modernity, and such modern universalism has given rise to English as a powerful economic tool.

Despite this general movement towards embracing English as the global language and the emergence of the global actors that seem to push for the learning of English, heterogeneous globalisation theorists argued that globalisation has also led to cultural autonomy, cultural clashes and polarisation, and that is, the promotion of cultural diversity. Kellner explained that the process of globalisation is highly complex, contradictory and ambiguous. For example, global brands such as Facebook, Starbucks, and Coca Cola are seen and felt in many countries around the world; however, such perceived homogenisation does not necessary mean that there is a general loss of identity. On the contrary, globalisation has also enabled certain cultures and languages to shine on a global level, such as Bollywood from India, Anime from Japan and the Korean wave from South Korea. In view of this diverging trend, the important concept of 'agency' – "who has the power to influence change in these micro language policy and planning situations" (Baldauf, 2006: 147) – has become important in LPP.

Building on Ricento and Hornberger's (1996) concept of "unpeeling the onion" whereby there are different English Language Teaching (ELT) professionals involved in LPP, Li (2008) proposed three distinct groups of actors in LPP – the state at the macro/national level, the institutions at the meso level (eg. schools, the media, private and public organisations and business organisations) and teachers at the micro level. Baldauf (2006) emphasised that LPP should include both macro and micro planning. He highlighted that at the macro level, large scale and usually national planning that normally encompasses four aspects: status planning (about society), corpus planning (about language), language-in-education or "acquisition" planning, and prestige planning (about image). At the micro level, he stressed that ecological context has gained greater emphasis as different actors have aquired the power to determine how national policies are played out at the ground level. For example, businesses, institutions and organisations exert a strong influence on the types of language

used. Therefore in his work, Baldauf posited that although the macro level plays an important role in setting out agenda and allocating resources in LPP, there are different levels of language planning whereby the context, roles and motivations of the different groups of actors play a critical role in the success or failure in LPP. In view of this claim, Chua and Baldauf's chapter on Micro Language Planning proposed that the policy translation process can be problematic due to the multiple layers of actors involved. Language policies made at the national level are subject to a number of contextual influences and not all micro language planning is related to macro policies since local players are also empowered to accept or reject national policies. With every negotiation in the policy implementation process by the different actors, there will be intended and unintended outcomes. In the chapter, Chua and Baldauf suggested four stages of planning process. The first two stages – Supra Macro and Macro operational levels that usually produced standardised results. The next two stages – Micro and Infra Micro operational levels that usually produce diversified results (see Figure 1).



Fig. 1.1: The four stages and ten levels of macro and micro planning (Taken from Chua & Balda 2011b: 940).

Figure 1.1 illustrates that the multiple forces exhibited by different actors (explicit and hidden) at different levels that facilitate and shape language management in any countries and the languages that they use. An important point to note is that unlike the classical language planning perspective, Figure 1.1 shows that the translation process may not follow a linear pattern. Even with the inclusion of glo-national actors at the supra-macro planning level, (supra) macro planning needs to complemented with bottom-up processes for any language planning to be successful especially in this globalised world. Kaplan and Baldauf (2003) explained that 'language planning' and 'language policy' are different processes – language planning refers to the preparatory work that leads to the formulation of a language policy. According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 3), "language planning is an attempt by someone to modify the linguistic behavior of some community", and there has been literature talking about the different forms of language planning - i.e., namely macro, meso and micro language planning (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997), and the various actors involved in these processes of planning. More importantly, although language policies exist in different forms in all societal domains (Ricento, 2006), it is in the domain of education that such policies are often most impactful (Liddicoat, 2013). In the domain of education, language policies are explicitly articulated in official documents, which reflect the societal beliefs and attitudes towards the value of the languages that the society has chosen or omitted. This language policy, according to Baldauf,

> (...) may be realised in very formal (overt) language planning documents and pro-nouncements (e.g. constitutions, legislation, policy statements, educational directives) which can be either symbolic or substantive in form, in informal statements of intent (i.e., in the discourse of language, politics and society), or may be left unstated (covert).

Therefore policies comprise "underlying assumptions and practices of language use and language learning in educational contexts", but more importantly the idea of "what is valued in a society" as "language policies represent articulations of the beliefs and attitudes" of that society towards the chosen languages and their use. Basically, language-in-education is a powerful instrument in language change, and the

teachers/educators play a critical role in educational language planning since the translation and success of the English curriculum and syllabus plans lie in the hands of the teachers.

Drawing on Chua and Baldauf's concepts of global players and the four stages of language planning, this book discusses the tension that surrounds the global and local demands on language choice, and evaluates the possible outcomes of the various intended and unintended policies and strategies adopted by global, national and local players. The following overview of the chapters attempt to cover the four stages of LPP. The broad range of papers contributed by the various scholars reflect Dick's 21st century concept of LPP as illustrated in Figure 1.1. The 16 chapters comprise a range of topics that span across numerous countries, such as Basque country, Brazil, China, Europe, France, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, Vietnam, United Arab Emirates and the United States of America.

The book starts with the chapter by Robert B Kaplan. It begins with a short history on the spread of English as an international language and a de facto dominant foreign language in many polities with an increasing number of non-native speakers of English. Following that, the chapter gives a brief overview of the evolution of English and how it was standardised by the invention of the printing press. Referring to specific examples from Japan, Russia and North Korea, Kaplan illustrates in detail how these countries have inherited and failed to enhance the status of English in their nation-states. Kaplan states that language planning is basically a political activity since language is associated with discrimination according to racial differences. The chapter concludes by highlighting the role of English in this global landscape. He explains that at present English will only enjoy its global status when it is linked to international economic activity and not when it is at the local level.

The next chapter builds on the first chapter on how international activity has strengthened the status of English as the dominant language and introduces the first glob-national player at the supra macro planning level. As Figure 1.1 indicated, in the supra macro level planning level, countries, government bodies and international institutions can have a major impact on LPP. In this example, Jan Kruse and Ulrich Ammon look at the European Union (EU) and discuss how despite overt policy to protect Europe's rich linguistic diversity, English has become the de facto working language in the majority of the EU documents. The chapter begins by providing an overview of how the EU has been advocating the protection of multilingualism and enforcing linguistic diversity. In principle, the EU has 28 member states with 20 languages, and languages of lesser use such as Danish, Dutch, Finnish and Swedish are acknowledged as official and working languages (Phillipson, 2003), and due to such linguistic diversity and to facilitate effective communication, English is preferred. The authors stress that this trend towards a monolingual structure of the EU is expected to continue, and has inevitably become a global force that standardises and privileges certain languages, in this case English over others.

Expanding on Chapter 3, Chapter 4 extends the influence of EU's language policy and includes the Bologna Agreement that has led to an increase in English-medium university courses in three countries – France, Germany and Switzerland. As France and Germany are EU member states, EU language policy has an influence over the language curricula of the graduate and postgraduate programmes in these two countries. While Switzerland is not a member of the EU, it shares national borders with these two countries. The chapter highlights how both vertical macro influences i.e., official EU language policy and horizontal macro influences (Bologna Declaration) have influenced language choice in these countries' higher education landscape. According to James Mcmenamin and Christa van der Walt, although the Bologna Declaration, a joint declaration of the European Ministers of Education to mutually recognise academic qualifications has been silent on the question on language planning, it has become a de facto language policy i.e., the horizontal macro influences that has strengthened the position of English in higher education due to international economic advantage. Thus, despite the strong commitment to promote linguistic diversity, there is a move towards learning English so as to increase transnational mobility of higher education students.

Besides global institutions such as the EU, in chapter 5, Tupas Ruanni shows how globalised business at the supra-macro level plays a part in influencing LPP in Philippines. Big multinational companies and big businesses located in countries across the world, such as those from Europe, Japan and United States have outsourced their labour to developing countries like India, Brazil and Turkey for low-cost workers. This business model is typically referred to Business Processing Outsourcing (BPO) where companies source for the cheapest human labour costs so as to increase company productivity. In this chapter, he discusses how such outsourcing of labour has impacted the language-in-education policy in Philippines. One such successful BPO industries is the call centre industry, also known as the "sunshine industry" in Philippines whereby employees answer calls from customers of companies located overseas. As these BPO companies require competent English speakers, this has resulted in a push for English-only education at the expense of a multilingual education in Philippines so as to prepare the students for 'life' and that is to flourish in the global labour market. Consequently, the Filipino government responded by creating and introducing educational initiatives and programmes to ensure that the English-language skills remain competitive in the global market.

The subsequent three chapters specifically look at the role of the country/ government in determining its language policy for its local needs. Chapter 6 brings the attention to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and discusses the complexity and ideological tension that surrounds its language policy. Although the UAE government empowers the nation through learning English to prepare the country to be a global player in business and tourism in this era of modernisation and globalisation, the status of English remains unclear. The chapter begins with a historical exploration of foreign language policies and the rise of English in formal education; it brings the attention to the tension and struggle in enforcing English in the local education system. Mira Al Hussein and Christina Gitsaki explain that in UAE the role of language is based on 'cultural preservation', that is, preserving the traditions, heritage, identity and culture of the Arab society. However for some, ELT is perceived to be a form of cultural imperialism and a threat to Islam. Although local teachers, parents and students perceive English to be an important skill to have for future survival, the role of English is still controversial due the serious concerns over the future of Arabic and local culture. This chapter shows the complexity that surrounds the position of English in the Gulf and how the government navigates the internal tensions that surround the language policy.

Chapter 7 continues to reinforce the important role of government in determining the choice of language(s) learned. Here, Anthony Liddicoat shows how language education brings forth particular ideologies into the articulation of governmental policies since LPP is often an attempt to address perceived problems related to language. In this chapter, he posits that language has been a critical element of national security although it is not identical with language planning in military contexts, such as the communicative needs of the military. Instead, language itself has been perceived to be a problem that is related to the country's national security. For example when language is perceived to pose a threat to the country and when language learning is used to address the threat. Using Turkey as an example where Kurdish is associated with terrorism and hence the justification to exterminate the language. Conversely, in the United States of America, language has been associated with its national defense strategy i.e., international activity where a lack of foreign language capacity has been identified as a security issue, which then justifies the critical need to develop the foreign language skills of American students. This chapter discusses how the government through its language education policies addresses national security.

In Chapter 8, Phyllis Chew makes a comparison between Singapore and Malaysia to illustrate the interface between religion and language policy in these two countries. Since the colonial days, the population in these two countries have been segregated into three major ethnic groups – Chinese, Indians and Malays, and within each group, it is highly diversified. Therefore, both countries are multilingual, multiracial and multi-religious, and the only difference is that in Malaysia, the majority population is Malay

whereas in Singapore the majority population is Chinese. This chapter examines how the governments in these two countries respond to globalisation with the Malaysian government gravitating towards "the halal connection" whereas the Singapore government prefers a secular and pragmatic approach in language planning. Although both countries adopt bilingualism, the Malaysian bilingual policy is infused with religious and cultural nationalism i.e., Malay as the national language whereas in Singapore, it is driven by a pragmatic economic reality, which justifies the implementation of English, a foreign language, as the country first language and the main medium of instruction in all government schools.

The first seven chapters provide a broad overview on how actors at super-macro level i.e., glob-national actors and government influence LPP at the local level. As discussed in these chapters, policy makers have the power to select certain languages as the country first, national or dominant foreign language, and to put in place policies that stipulate certain processes and expected outcomes i.e., formal and overt planning with specific goals. However, such large-scale interventions are subject to multiple interpretations by different actors at the macro, micro and infra-micro levels. Consequently, the policy translation process may be problematic because in reality policies will be negotiated and modified by a range of contextual circumstances and actors found in the different levels. As Sommer (1991: 129-130) summarised such difficulty as policy reforms that "can be effected – by both political representatives and by administration responsible for implementation", often due to the number of variable factors. The next section of the book shows how local government or regional state and local institutions play a critical role in LPP because they take into consideration the socio-political and educational contexts of that community. The first two chapters look at how the local government in Basque and the following chapter a local newsroom in Switzerland attempt to support their local languages despite English being the global language.

Chapter 9 looks at how actors at the macro planning level influence the learning of languages in addition to English. In Karin van der Worp, Jasone Cenoz and Durk Gorter's chapter, they show how in the Basque Country, global trade has led to the Basque government to put in place programmes and measures to revitalise the use of the Basque language in education, culture, media and private companies despite English being often used. The aim was to encourage the use of the local Basque language in Basque companies in their attempts to internationalise their companies i.e., local consumption but with an international outlook. The chapter provides an overview of the sociolinguistic and economic context of the Basque Country and the history of LPP for Basque. It explains how over the years the language has gained much popularity in the country as those students who are found to be proficient in Basque are performing well in school. Furthermore, in the country's labour market, there has been an increasing demand for certain proficient level of Basque especially for jobs in the service industry. This chapter reinforces the importance of macro planning for the revitalisation of any language.

Chapter 10 continues to expand on the importance of local actors in LPP, which in this case, how local newsrooms have facilitated in text production in Switzerland. Daniel Perrin and Maureen Ehrensberher-Dow discuss how journalists handle multilingual media sources and translate to the target language of the outgoing text. Although over the years, English as a head start on promulgating the language through traditional international networks, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and Cable News Network (CNN), in recent years recordings or video bites by amateurs or local media from different part of the world provide alternative media sources. Consequently, journalists have been bombarded with different languages. The data in this chapter was taken from large transdisciplinary research projects that used Progressive Analysis, a multi-method approach that combines enthographic observation and interviews, computer recording, and cue-based retrospective verbal protocols to understand the writing processes of language works, such as local journalists. This chapter looks at how local Swiss journalists select, translate and produce news texts for their local audience, and illustrates how local media plays an important role

in selecting and promoting their local varieties of languages.

Unlike the previous two chapters that discuss the promotion of local languages in Basque and Switzerland, Chapter 11 provides a contrasting example whereby despite overt policy and programme initiatives at the micro level to promote Afrikaans at the University of the Free State (UFS) in South Africa, Munene Mwaniki observes that in the face of globalisation, the Afrikaners do not need to engage in pursuit of a phantom in an attempt to prop the status of Afrikaans in higher education. The chapter begins by addressing some myths surrounding Afrikaans in higher education. Following that, the chapter discusses how the key intersections between globalisation and higher education in emerging economies, and the role of language since the forces of globalisation have also led to a convergence of language used in higher education i.e., the spread of English. Using three sets of data, Munene Mwaniki points out that the continued use of Afrikaans in higher education will not be possible since it will not be able to position its economy within the global research, knowledge and networks, most importantly, its institution's position in the international ranking lists of universities. As posited by Robert Kaplan in Chapter 2, English seems to have gained its status in the university due to the link to international academic activity.

The next four chapters provides in-depth examples on how LPP has been translated at the micro and infra micro level where individuals, such as teachers play a critical role in the success or failure of LPP. In all the four chapters, English is the preferred dominant foreign language to learn in view of the economic advantage in learning the language.

In Chapter 12, Hoa Thi Mai Nguyen, Huong Thu Nguyen, Huy Van Nguyen and Trang Thi Thuy Nguyen highlight the challenges in English education policy implementation in Vietnam despite the increase in the importance of English in Asia as it is a de facto working language in this modern world. The chapter provides an overview of the current English language policy and planning in Vietnam. Adopting the language-in-education theory posited by Kaplan and Balduaf (1997; 2005) in the three case studies, the authors highlight the challenges and implications, in particular, its Access policy, Personnel Policy, Methods and Material Policy, as well as Evaluation Policy. Specifically, the authors stress the importance of tertiary institutions such as the university to ensure that state policy is contextualised to meet the needs of the academics/teachers. At the same time, the university needs to provide the structure and platform for bottom up feedback for both teachers and students to voice their concerns. More importantly, the university needs to take into consideration the additional challenges the minority students will face since they have to learn English and Vietnamese at the same time.

Chapter 13 continues to stress the importance of individual choice i.e., teachers in determining the success or failure of LPP. Liza Nor Ali and Obaidul Hamid show how content-area lecturers (CALs) in a public Malaysian university displayed various types of agency – resistance, accommodation and dedication when making sense of and translating the English-medium instruction (EMI) policy in class. Although the use of English as the medium of instruction in Malaysian public universities is not official, it is a de facto policy. Based on the research findings, the authors posit that the subjective exercise of the various types of agency will determine the outcomes of the policy. This is because the policy-makers assume that both students and CALs should have adequate English proficiency and the 'natural' environment of EMI class will create the ideal situation for English language development. However in reality, the success of EMI lies in the hands of these lecturers since some CALs insisted on using Bahasa Malaysia despite the fact that English is positioned as the de facto language at the university citing students' inability to comprehend the content as the excuse.

Similarly, Chapter 14 reinforces the role of teachers in LPP in China. In this chapter, Li Minglin discusses the important role of teachers in bridging the intended and enacted curriculum in China. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with members in the Teaching and Research Department (TRDs) and English as a foreign language (EFL) teachers, the author explains how despite support and help given by the TRDs in the form of teacher training

programmes, the EFL teachers were still unable to fully understand the new syllabus, and not fully convinced to follow it. As the author explains, the assessment and high-stakes tests in China (Gaokao and Zhongkao) continue to drive the teachers to adopt traditional methods to ensure the students raise or maintain their test scores. To further complicate matter, the new textbooks are not user friendly and there has been a misalignment in what is tested and what is taught. Consequently, teachers preferred to take the safe method. Therefore, the translation of policy needs greater alignment in order to produce the intended outcomes.

Chapter 15 highlights one of the key challenges of policy implementation (including LPP) since it is a continuous improvement process. Using Singapore as an example, although the government adopts a centralised approach in governing the country, policy implementation produces both intended and unintended outcomes. In this chapter, Sandra Wu discusses how globalisation has influenced Singapore to adopt English in the country's language policy planning so as to stay competitive in the global economy. The Singapore's bilingual policy i.e., English plus one official Mother Tongue Language (MTL) has been hailed as a cornerstone of its successful education system. However, although national curriculum frameworks are provided for preschools, the preschool landscape in Singapore is largely decentralised and this has resulted in varying language abilities and proficiencies among the pre-schoolers when they enter formal education in Primary school. This makes MTL learning difficult for young children in a society that privileges the use of English in home and school environments, with English being the first language and the medium of instruction. One of the unintended outcomes of this policy is that it has accorded English a prestige status at the expense of MTLs that are supposed to help Singaporeans preserve their ethnic identity.

Chapter 16 sums up the role of English in the twenty-first century as the world is experiencing various stages of economic, social and demographic transition. According to Crystal (2003), English is rapidly becoming the first global lingua franca since many countries has either made English as an official language of the country (as seen in India and Singapore) or a priority in the country's foreign-language teaching such as in China, Russia, Spain and Brazil. In chapter 16, Francisco Gomes de Matos argues that instead of seeing English as a threat to one's language, identity and cultural heritage, English can be used as a peace promoting instrument since it is a 'common' language used in international activities – "communicating peacefully". Francisco begins the chapter by providing an overview on the birth of Peace Linguistics – a recent effort with David Crystal that focuses on using English to communicate peacefully in varied settings. It was started by Francisco in Brazil and was taught in Portuguese. Subsequently, due to the process of globalisation in the 1980s, influenced by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) the author adopted English with the aim to better spread the peace-oriented language planning. Francisco stresses that in order for peace-oriented LPP to be recognised, actors at the different levels are critical, in particular, teachers at the micro level since they interact with students at the ground level. This chapter reinforces the importance of both top-down and bottom-up approaches in LPP, and that there are many actors at the four stages of LPP who play an important part in the outcomes of any LPP, in this case peace-oriented language planning.

The book concludes with a chapter by Bernard Spolsky who addresses the complication of LPP in this globalised world. He posits that instead of using the term 'language planning', a term that was first used to address the linguistic problems of newly independent multilingual nations in the 1960s, the term 'language management' will be more appropriate in order to truly reflect the reality of this complex new world. Spolsky explains that in this volatile postmodern and neoliberal epoch, regular readjustments are needed. Consequently, the concept of language management is more encompassing since it includes indicators of ethnicity, race, nationality or territory and mirrors the changing economic and political conditions, such as the spread of major languages in particular English (Pennycook, 2006). The chapter suggests that the term will be able to truly reflect the dynamics of the complex social that surrounds LPP and the power of the different actors

(as discussed in the previous chapters) at the various levels of that society in translating language policies and modifying language practices.

The overall objective of this book, the first volume of the series, is to illustrate that in future, LPP will be more complicated. My aim is to provide examples from different countries to show how languages operate as a site of negotiation of class, race/ethnicity, religion, location, national security and economic standing in different ecological contexts, and how this tension creates both intended and unintended outcomes in view of the different actors interpreting and translating the policies into activities globally and locally. As Dick Baldauf once said, "the planned and 'unplanned' features often coexist in the same situation. As the unplanned aspects can interact with and change or pervert the planned, the language planner ignores the unplanned aspects of a situation at his/her risk".

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Philology and Criticism: A Guide to Mahabharata Textual Criticism by Vishwa Adluri and Joydeep Bagchee [Anthem Press, 9781783085767]

The Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata, completed between 1933 and 1966, represents a landmark in the textual history of an epic with a nearly 1500-year history. Not only is the epic massive (70,000 verses in the constituted text, with approximately another 24,000 in the Vulgate) verses, but in its various recensions, versions, retellings, and translations it also presents a unique view of the history of texts, narratives, ideas, and their relation to a culture. Yet in spite of the fact that this text has been widely adopted as the standard Mahābhārata text by scholars, there is as yet no work that clarifies the details of the process by which this text was established. Scholars seeking clarification on the manuscripts used or the principles followed in arriving at the Critical Text must either rely on informal scattered hints found throughout academic literature or read the volumes themselves and attempt to follow what the editor did and why he did so at each stage.

This book is the first work that presents a comprehensive review of the Critical Edition, with overviews of the stemmata (textual trees) drawn up, how the logic of the stemmata determined editorial choices, and an in-depth analysis of strengths and drawbacks of the Critical Edition. Not only is this work an invaluable asset to any scholar working on the Mahābhārata today using the Critical Edition, but the publication of an English translation of the Critical Edition by Chicago University Press also makes this book an urgent desideratum.

Furthermore, this volume provides an overview of both historical and contemporary views on the Critical Edition and clarifies strengths and weaknesses in the arguments for and against the text. This book simultaneously surveys the history of Western interpretive approaches to the Indian epic and evaluates them in terms of their cogency and tenability using the tools of textual criticism. It thus subjects many prejudices of nineteenth-century scholarship (e.g., the thesis of a heroic Indo-European epic culture) to a penetrating critique. Intended as a companion volume to our book The Nay Science: A History of German Indology [Oxford University Press, 9780199931347], this book is set to become the definitive guide to Mahābhārata textual criticism. As both a guide into the arcane details of textual criticism and a standard reference work on the Mahābhārata manuscript tradition, this book addresses a vital need in scholarship today.

The Nay Science: A History of German Indology by Vishwa Adluri and Joydeep Bagchee [Oxford University Press, 9780199931347]

The Nay Science offers a new perspective on the problem of scientific method in the human sciences. Taking German Indological scholarship on the Mahabharata and the Bhagavadgita as their example, Adluri and Bagchee develop a critique of the modern valorization of method over truth in the humanities.

The authors show how, from its origins in eighteenth-century Neo-Protestantism onwards, the critical method was used as a way of making theological claims against rival philosophical and/or religious traditions. Via discussions of German Romanticism, the pantheism controversy, scientific positivism, and empiricism, they show how theological concerns dominated German

scholarship on the Indian texts. Indology functions as a test case for wider concerns: the rise of historicism, the displacement of philosophical concerns from thinking, and the belief in the ability of a technical method to produce truth.

Based on the historical evidence of the first part of the book, Adluri and Bagchee make a case in the second part for going beyond both the critical pretensions of modern academic scholarship and the objections of its post-structuralist or post-Orientalist critics. By contrasting German Indology with Plato's concern for virtue and Gandhi's focus on praxis, the authors argue for a conception of the humanities as a dialogue between the ancients and moderns and between eastern and western cultures.

Philology [...] has become the modern form of criticism. —Michel Foucault, The Order of Things

Philology and Criticism: A Guide to Mahabharata Textual Criticism by Vishwa Adluri and Joydeep Bagchee [Anthem Press, 9781783085767]

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Excerpt:

Philology and Criticism is the first book of its kind. Incisive in its analysis, this book undertakes a rigorous defense of the Mahabharata critical edition. Following a prologue and an introduction, this book is divided into three chapters. Each chapter states a problem and discusses key concepts and principles in textual criticism pertaining to it. Thereafter, the authors guide the reader through a history of responses to the problem. Each response is posed as an argument (via citing the critic who raised it). The authors address each argument individually in a separate section. In each section, they consider whether the argument can be defended from some perspective. Once they establish that the argument is untenable, they state their conclusion. In this way, they systematically work through contemporary criticisms of the critical edition, focusing primarily on Andreas Bigger's and Reinhold Grünendahl's work.

The first chapter addresses the view that the constituted text of the critical edition reconstructs merely a late stage of the transmission. Although several scholars advocate this thesis (James L. Fitzgerald, for instance, thinks the critical edition reconstructs a "Gupta-era archetype," which he elsewhere calls a "written Sanskrit text" of the epic), the authors focus on the thesis's author: Andreas Bigger. Bigger holds that the critical edition merely reconstructs a text he calls the "normative redaction" of the Mahabharata, supposedly the result of "a uniform redaction" of the epic undertaken during its first transcription from a fluid oral tradition. Adluri and Bagchee demonstrate the circularity of this claim. The second chapter addresses the underlying assumption of Bigger's work, though it also broadens the scope to include other Mahabharata critics. The authors show that Bigger's thesis appears plausible only because scholars assume an oral epic preceded the written Sanskrit Mahabharata. The authors demonstrate that their arguments are not stemmatic and hence do not hold. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the so- called analytic approach to the epic. The authors argue that this approach is premised on an uncritical view of Indian history, whose origins they outlined in their book The Nay Science: A History of German Indology. The third chapter, the longest in this book, addresses a perplexing problem: How were the Mahabharata manuscripts classified? Were they classified by script as Grünendahl argues? The authors convincingly demonstrate that they were not. As they show, script cannot play a role in classification for it is an external marker. This chapter also addresses Grünendahl's claim that extensive contamination makes a critical edition of the Mahabharata unachievable as well as his claim that focusing on a regional recension would have led to a better edition. The conclusion provides a summation not only of this book but also of the authors' first book. It presents a serious challenge to contemporary Sanskrit philology inasmuch as it relies on opinion rather than argument.

While I disagree with the authors in some respects (most notably on the southern recension's place in the Mahabharata tradition), Philology and Criticism will stimulate debate. It poses a major challenge to scholars who have made unguarded statements about the Mahabharata's origins in an oral tradition. As I have argued since 2001 (Rethinking the Mahābhārata: A Reader's Guide to the Education of the Dharma King by Alf Hiltebeitel), the notion of an oral epic is a myth. The Mahabharata is clearly a written text. In all likelihood, a small group of Brahmans created it. T. P. Mahadevan identifies these Brahmans with the historical Pūrvaśikha Brahmans. In spite of the text's expansion and changes, no evidence exists that it was ever transmitted orally. Philology and Criticism conclusively vindicates this view. As I demonstrated in my review of Fitzgerald's translation of Books 11 and 12 of the Mahabharata (in the Journal of the American Oriental Society), those who resurrect the oral hypothesis do so for ideological reasons rather than because persuasive historical evidence exists. Relying on nineteenth- century views of the epic (whose assumptions Adluri and Bagchee criticized in their first book), they overlook the fact that the archetype presupposes a written transmission. Adluri and Bagchee have staked their position, and scholars in the future will have to account for their view in some way.

I hardly need add that Philology and Criticism is essential reading for Mahabharata scholars. This book significantly advances our knowledge of the

critical edition. It is an essential reference work— not least because of its appendices, which enable scholars to consult details of the edition without carrying around all 19 volumes of the edition. Philology and Criticism also addresses a major lacuna in Mahabharata studies today. It is the first work to explain what the Mahabharata critical edition is, how it was created, what its merits are and why criticisms of the edition are frequently based on insufficient knowledge of the principles involved. Though aimed at an advanced audience, the analysis is clear and systematic, and the arguments can be followed by anyone who takes the time and trouble (and perhaps uses paper and a pencil). In that sense it is not a difficult book to read, though its scope is breathtaking. Few today in Mahabharata studies have such a thorough grasp of the critical edition or are as qualified to speak to the issues of textuality, orality, the manuscript tradition, what can be reconstructed and what can be shown with philological methods. In my assessment, the authors present a cogent interpretation of the critical edition. Their clarification of its overarching project is brilliant and makes a lasting contribution to the field.

Alf Hiltebeitel Washington, DC

Philology and Criticism is a guidebook. That means it is intended for use. The reader must make use of the tools presented herein to test for herself the validity and rigor of the arguments of contemporary Mahabharata scholars. This is all the more necessary as hardly a field of scholarship existing today is as rife with competing and contradictory theories as contemporary Mahabharata studies. This book does not claim to be a comprehensive guide to textual criticism (for that the reader will have to read one of the classic manuals on the subject such as M. L. West's Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique or Giorgio Pasquali's Storia della tradizione ecritica del testo), but it does claim to bring to Mahabharata criticism the sort of reason, precision, clarity of thought and beauty that is a hallmark of textual criticism in other fields. Regrettably, Mahabharata studies has long been a stronghold of neo- Aryanist ideology, anti- Semitism and Romantic fantasy. Thus, this book has had to be equal parts guidebook and polemical essay. As such, it owes as much to the tradition of Nietzsche as to that of West. There is no doubt in our minds that the great editors of classical and medieval texts made enduring contributions to the study of texts and, in particular, to the canons of method that enable us to expunge centuries of error and dross and come closer to the authors' original texts. There is also no doubt in our minds that these techniques are also applicable (with the necessary riders and adjustments) to the study of Indian texts. As Pasquali wrote (and Paolo Trovato now affirms), "I, at least, cannot imagine that the original, say, of a Chinese or Bantu text could be constructed from copies or any other testimony, in sum, from its tradition, otherwise than on the basis of Maas's considerations and the rules he laid down." In fact, there is an entire tradition of Indian editors (not only V. S. Sukthankar, to whom this book is dedicated, but also S. K. Belvalkar, P. L. Vaidya and others) who could rightfully take their place alongside the great editors in the classics. But (and we are no less convinced of this than of the applicability of textual criticism to the Mahabharata) textual criticism cannot and may not be used to promote ideological agendas. Andreas Bigger writes, "That I make the critical edition of the Mahabharata the foundation of my work does not mean that I approve of the text constituted by the editors in all respects. [Reinhold] Grünendahl and others have demonstrated that in the domain of lower criticism of the Mahabharata the final word is yet to be spoken. The results of this criticism of the 'first critical edition'— for one may not forget that Sukthankar quite consciously referred to it as such— will flow into this work [Bigger means his book] and, where the evidence forces itself upon us, will be expanded upon." The reader will frequently encounter such statements in the work of Mahabharata authors quoted in this book. She will find examples of circular reasoning, conclusions that do not follow from their premises, arguments ad baculum and appeals to inappropriate authority. And she will find that the only two constants among these theses, theories and dogmatic positions are that Indians are not capable of reading their texts critically and that priests are corrupt and mendacious. This failure to engage with the theory of textual criticism has extracted a heavy price. It has meant that Mahabharata scholars have not kept abreast of recent developments in textual

criticism, whether in the areas of hermeneutics, literary criticism, structuralism, post- Lachmannian theories of critical editing or the study of variantistica— in short, that entire field that is today denoted by the term "ecdotics" and encompasses the study of textual cultures in the widest sense. It has meant that scholarship on the epic, even considered as arising out of and responding to the documentary impulse, has failed to contribute in any meaningful way to a history of the text. Against this intellectually stunted and resentment- driven science, Sukthankar's genius stands out all the brighter. <>

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