

Religion: Persistent Late Myths I

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[The House of Islam: A Global History](#) by Ed Husain [Bloomsbury Publishing, 9781632866394]

“Ed Husain has become one of the most vital Muslim voices in the world. [The House of Islam](#) could very well be his magnum opus.” -Reza Aslan, #1 New York Times bestselling author of [Zealot](#)

“This should be compulsory reading.” -Peter Frankopan, author of the international bestseller [The Silk Roads](#)

Today, Islam is to many in the West an alien force, with Muslims held in suspicion. Failure to grasp the inner workings of religion and geopolitics has haunted American foreign policy for decades and has been decisive in the new administration's controversial orders. The intricacies and shadings must be understood by the West not only to build a stronger, more harmonious relationship between the two cultures, but also for greater accuracy in predictions as to how current crises, such as the growth of ISIS, will develop and from where the next might emerge.

[The House of Islam](#) addresses key questions and points of disconnection. What are the roots of the conflict between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims that is engulfing Pakistan and the Middle East? Does the Koran encourage the killing of infidels? The book thoughtfully explores the events and issues that have come from and contributed to the broadening gulf between Islam and the West, from the United States' overthrow of Iran's first democratically

elected leader to the emergence of ISIS, from the declaration of a fatwa on Salman Rushdie to the attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo.

Authoritative and engaging, Ed Husain leads us clearly and carefully through the nuances of Islam and its people, taking us back to basics to contend that the Muslim world need not be a stranger to the West, nor our enemy, but our peaceable allies.

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Excerpt:

Inside the House

Muslims are shaping world events and constantly feature in the news, yet few among us genuinely understand them, so that our behaviour tends to be

based on ignorance at best, or half-truths at worse. This book surveys the foundations of the faith of Muslims and explains the design of the House of Islam. It describes how Muslims feel, practise and perceive Islam, and sets out to explore their minds and their worldview. I write as one born and raised as a Muslim in Great Britain. I am a Westerner and an observant Muslim. Caught between two worlds, I have learned to dovetail the two facets of my identity. This book is a reflection of that inner bridge between Islam and the West.

Globally, the Muslim population is 1.7 billion strong — that is to say that one in every five human beings is a Muslim — and there are fifty-nine Muslim-majority countries. By 2050, the Muslim populace is projected to grow twice as fast as the overall world population. After 2050, Muslims will probably surpass Christians as the world's largest grouping of humans based on a faith identity. While the global population is projected to grow by 35 per cent by 2050, the Muslim population is expected to increase by 73 per cent to nearly 3 billion, according to the Pew Research Center. Muslims have more children than members of other faith communities. Muslim women give birth to an average of 2.9 children, notably higher than the average of all non-Muslims at 2.2.

A convergence of five facts explains this worldwide surge in Muslim birth rates. Firstly, Pew estimates that Muslims in large numbers are approaching the stage of their lives in which to have children. The median age of Muslims in 2015 was 24, while the median for non-Muslims was 32. Secondly, more than a third of Muslims live in the Middle East and Africa, regions of the world expected to witness the largest population growths. Thirdly, most Muslim countries still retain a very traditional understanding of the role of women as wives and mothers. Therefore the emphasis on motherhood is stronger than for others. Fourthly, the firm Muslim belief in sustenance for children coming from God means that there is often reliance on God for food, clothing and shelter. Finally, the cultural value placed on the birth of boys is, sadly, still greater than girls. Therefore, many families will continue to have children until a boy is born to carry the family name to the next generation. Unlike Catholicism, Islam does not prohibit birth control.

With the mass movement of people globally, and since refugees and workers come to Europe mostly from Muslim-majority countries, what happens inside Islam will have an impact on us all. Extreme forms of politicised Islam will act to disrupt the peace in our societies through increased tendencies of social separatism, confrontation, attempts at domination, and political violence inflicted through terrorism.

Currently, there is a global battle under way for the soul of Islam. Why? What and where are the battle lines? Who will win? And how does this affect the West? In different ways, my life has been spent at the forefront of this struggle.

I was born in London to Muslim migrants from British India. Mine was the first generation of Muslims born and raised in the West. My first book, *The Islamist*, recounts my teenage journey into international, religious radicalism and my subsequent rejection of it. I have lived through Islamism, Salafism and Sufism. Seeking to better understand Islam, away from militant Muslims, I spent two years studying Arabic and Islam with mainstream Muslim scholars in Damascus, Syria, from 2003 to 2005. I lived in a dictatorship where I was free to study for as long as I did not express political views in public. In private, we were continually suspicious of fellow students and even of our teachers — who was the informant? The deep knowledge of Islamic theology, history and philosophy of Syrian scholars was second to none. Without freedom, however, our education always felt partial, compromised, and lacking in the full rigour of students entitled elsewhere to ask tough questions.

Yearning to be closer to the source of Islam, in 2005 I moved to live and work in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. I worked as a teacher with the British Council during the week, and at weekends I spent time in worship at Islam's holiest sanctuaries in Mecca and Medina. There, I prayed and interacted with Muslims from all over the world. My immersion in Arabic language, religion, culture and peoples was fulfilling to me, but back home in Britain my youngest sister escaped death on the London underground bombings on 7 July by minutes. When my Saudi students reacted by saying to me that Britain deserved this terrorism, that this was jihad against the infidels, I felt angry and a visceral need to return home to London. I knew that we had

a battle of ideas ahead of us. When Saudis in their twenties, followers of the holy Quran, could not commiserate, but actually celebrated the misfortunes of the West; when young Muslims born and raised in the West killed themselves and their fellow citizens on London's public transport, the sentiments and convictions that led to such actions would not easily subside. Indeed, in recent years the thousands of radicalised European Muslims who have turned to terrorism in their attacks on France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Norway, Canada and Denmark are offshoots of that same trend.

Back in Britain, I completed a postgraduate degree in Islam and Middle East politics. I then established a think tank in 2007, Quilliam, named after a Victorian-born Muslim, Abdullah Quilliam, to illustrate that Islam should not be associated in Britain with immigration or recent radicalisation. Led by Muslims to research and renounce radicalism, Quilliam was the first of its kind in the world. It was controversial work, but it was necessary to take the lead and show how Islam was being politicised by Arab political anger. I believed it was my religious and civic duty to speak out against the political hijacking of Islam, my faith. Quilliam was successful in its countless media appearances, helping to change British government policy, briefing multiple European governments, speaking on university campuses across the Continent, and thereby compelling Muslim activists to rethink

their confrontational anti-Western politics. But the backlash from objectors was strong. Death threats and physical intimidation are the default recourse of bullies who cannot win an argument. I felt that I needed to leave Britain for a while.

In late 2010 I became a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at America's leading foreign policy think tank, the Council on Foreign Relations. I lived in New York and Washington DC for four years, researching and writing about politics in the Arab world, national security, Islam and Muslims. The Council's members included professionals at the highest level of the US government, media, business and universities. I found myself in a unique position: a Brit, a Muslim, and an Arabic speaker explaining the challenges of the modern Middle East, and advising on America's policy options, to powerful audiences at the height of the Arab Spring

uprisings. Conversely, I was interpreting the actions of the West for Arab and Muslim governments and civil society when I travelled to Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf and Pakistan.

I have the rare privilege of being an insider both in the West and in the Muslim world. This book draws from that source: the conversations, reflections and experiences of the last decade enabled me to better understand the House of Islam from the inside. A story I was told in Nigeria helps explain further.

An American billionaire arrived in a large West African village. Rather than announce donations from his philanthropic office, he was keen to see, feel, smell and assess Africa for himself. It was a Friday morning. He parked his jeep by the home of the local tribal chief, and they sat outside the simple house, which was dusty and dwarfed by the shiny black vehicle.

As the African chieftain and the billionaire exchanged pleasantries and drank coconut water, the American saw groups of children carrying large, empty plastic bottles off into the distance.

'Where are those kids heading?' he asked, struck by the sight. 'Shouldn't they be at school?'

'They are going to get water from the river for their families,' the chief replied. 'They go every week around this time. An hour to the river, and an hour back. School will begin when they come back in two hours.'

This was a eureka moment for the American. He identified a need, and thought like a Western businessman: his unique selling proposition would be to build water-well pumps in this and other nearby villages. The children would be able to go to school, get an education, and prosper. He kept his thoughts to himself, and when he returned to New York he instructed his charity to install the pumps with central government cooperation.

The charity employed consultants, engineers, and local experts to implement this 'strategic initiative'. It was strategic because, they kept reiterating at meetings, it would facilitate education and prosperity — the pumps were a vehicle for change.

A year later, the American returned to the African village on another Friday morning. The chief

welcomed him, as did the village elders. With true African warmth of spirit, they thanked him for his contribution. But that was not enough. In the language of the corporate and charitable sectors of the West, this was an 'M&E' visit (monitoring and evaluation).

The water pumps looked new and clean. The American sat and made polite conversation with the villagers. Soon enough, throngs of children started to emerge from their homes with empty plastic bottles and the billionaire watched as they headed toward the pumps. But then they kept on walking. They continued walking as they had the year before: toward the river.

'But why?' protested the billionaire. 'Now they have water in the village!'

'Let us speak in confidence,' said the chief. He beckoned the American inside his house, away from their staff.

'My friend,' said the chief, 'your intentions are noble, but you did not ask us if we needed water in the village. Have you seen our tiny houses? Our families are large and many live together in the same bedroom. We send the children away to get water so that the husband and wife can be alone for a while and service their marital relationship!'

Even from his front-row seat, the American billionaire missed the insider knowledge, nuance, and realities of life in West Africa from within, and it did not occur to the chief to express them. In much the same way, the West today does not understand Islam and Muslims for who they are.

Western liberal individualism is all-pervasive: to question the West is perceived as backward and primitive. While the West prides itself on being progressive, Islam is now seen as the ultimate retrogressive religion. This is made worse by the daily provision of headlines from within Islam of extremism, terrorism, misogyny, and even slavery, which reinforce feelings of Western superiority.

When the Arab uprisings of 2011 took the world by surprise, overthrowing Western-backed dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, we were rightly in awe of a young generation of Arabs. They shouted that they sought *hurriyah*, *karamah*, *adala ijtimai'iyah* meaning 'freedom, dignity, and social justice' across the region. Our

impulse was to assume that these uprisings were secular. Our elites were programmed to think of 1789 and the French Revolution — at long last democracy had reached the Middle East. How wrong we were.

For those familiar with the Muslim world, the indicators were there. The Arab Spring protests were not held on Saturday nights, but on Friday afternoons. Why? Because that is the day for communal prayers. Every Friday Muslims went in their millions from the mosques to protest against their politicians. These were not radicals, but ordinary Muslims. The dead youth in Egypt and elsewhere were called *shahid* (pl. *shuhada*), martyrs, a word from the Quran that means those who died as witnesses for God. Verses from the Quran accompanied the photos of the dead.

Soon, Christians and Muslims were praying in public squares on Sundays and Fridays. In Egypt's Tahrir Square, Christians formed a protective ring around their Muslim brethren. We overlooked this religion-based energy until extremists appeared and hijacked the protests by burning churches and attacking the Israeli embassy in Cairo. In Tunisia they attacked the American embassy; in Libya they killed the American ambassador. That whirlwind of radicalism sweeping the Middle East found a home in the sectarian spaces of Iraq and Syria, in what our media mistakenly refers to as the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria', or ISIS. We award the self-styled caliphate a PR victory by referring to it as 'the Islamic State', even though we in the West do not feel we can pronounce on whether ISIS is Islamic or not.'

The West's miscalculations are widespread: whether it was mistakenly amplifying Khomeini's support base, tolerating intolerance from Muslims in the West after Rushdie, standing by and watching in Algeria as the military forbade Islamist democrats from taking power, failing to understand the religious sensitivities of basing US troops in Saudi Arabia, or ignoring warnings that removing a Sunni Saddam Hussein would invite a stronger Iranian Shi'a presence into the Middle East. The West is again blundering by supporting the imprisoning of Islamists en masse in Egypt after the ousting of the country's first Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi, in 2013. Did we learn nothing from the terrorism born of Egypt's torture prisons in

the 1960s? We armed and supported Arab and Afghan Islamists to fight Soviet communists in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and they turned into al-Qaeda. Now we are supporting Kurdish communists killing Islamists in Syria.

Lawrence of Arabia promised the same Arab kingdom to multiple tribal leaders to encourage them to rebel against the Ottoman Turks. We actively buttressed Wahhabism in the last century against Turkish Sufism (did we know the difference?), and now we tear our hair in despair as Wahhabist intolerance spreads across the globe. More fighters are joining jihadist conflicts and targeting our own Western Muslim populations.

Again and again the West misreads the political trajectory in the Muslim world. The British government promised in the Balfour Declaration in 1917 a 'Jewish homeland' in Palestine. What peace have we brought to Jews or Arabs since then? The Hussein—McMahon correspondence of 1915-16 colluded to partition Arab lands and depose the Ottoman Turks from their territories. What peace have Arabs in Iraq, Syria or Egypt known except to live under nationalist—socialist dictators? The Sykes—Picot Agreement of 1916 gave birth to nation-states that we carved in Europe reflecting Westphalia. What do these borders mean today as transnational Islamists and jihadists override

them in their organisations and operations? We helped popularise 'Ayatollah' Khomeini — there was no such formal title as Ayatollah, meaning 'sign of God', until the nineteenth century. He called himself Ayatollah, so we did, too. Why? He claims authority; we publicise, amplify, and help consolidate his position. We do not judge. The same principle is at play with ISIS today as in 1979. It matters not that the vast majority of Muslims recognise neither the authority of the Ayatollah nor of ISIS.

Religious extremism has gripped Iran's government since 1979. The West does not understand Iran's messianic creed of Wilayat al-Faqih (Rule of the Cleric), a form of caretaker government while waiting for their promised messiah, known as the infallible Mandi. In the name of preparing for this perfect Mandi, the clerical government justifies its

tyrannical rule. For a thousand years, Shi'a Muslims had no such concept of clerics governing in absence of their Mandi. They patiently waited for its utopia. Khomeini invented this power trick and now Iran seeks to influence other Shi'a communities around the world with this dogma of Wilayat al-Faqih. Iran's support for terrorism through its proxies Hezbollah or Hamas against Israel, or its attempt to acquire nuclear weapons are driven by an imaginary apocalyptic war with the West and its allies. The Iranian government has gained each time the West has blundered. In Iraq, after the removal of Saddam Hussein, today it is Iran that is strongest and controls several cities, including Baghdad. In Syria, after the West called for Assad's removal but failed to act, Iran murdered civilian protestors in the hundreds of thousands to consolidate the pro-Iran government in Damascus. If the West does not have the strategic stamina for the long fight necessary in Iraq or Syria, why take half measures and strengthen Iran? It is not only in the Middle East that the West falters.

We kill our own citizens with no recourse to the rule of law. In 2015, the UK's prime minister defended his decision to kill British Muslims in ISIS ranks with drone attacks. In 2012, the United States led the way by killing the American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, again with drones — in yet another case, the presumption of innocence was waived, the rule of law ignored, and trial by jury denied. If we valued these hallmarks of civilisation, our armed forces would be prepared to die in their defence. With no arrests or trials and this new summary execution, the line between dictatorship and democracy grows thinner. Worse, in this way we fuel the fury of fanatics by confirming their global narrative: that they have no rights and no dignity, and must kill or be killed.

The West keeps on fanning the flames with sensational headlines, penalises the innocent majority with sanctions, and uses drone warfare to deal with symptoms, while ignoring the causes of the conflicts against and within the Muslim world. Our political leaders cannot think beyond five-year election cycles. They strategise for the short term while our extremist enemies think far longer-term.

The West cannot reverse the anti-Americanism that is widespread among the world's Muslims without acknowledging the deep emotions of betrayal,

hurt, injustice and humiliation harboured by many — not just radicals. Like the American billionaire, our response is delineated through materialist lenses. We miss what is not in sight, but is all-powerful: feelings, narratives, and perceptions. In this, a chasm has opened up between the modern West and Islam.

Just over a century ago, writers and politicians referred to a global entity, Christendom. Today, that reference is limited to a handful of faith leaders. The deep influences of a strident secularism have chased religion out from the public domain in most parts of the West. What was Christendom has now become 'the West'. Modern, secular philosophers have taken the place of prophets. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), godfather of the French Revolution, argued that man is a self-sufficient individual with absolute freedom. Defying tradition and religion, he had five children with his laundrymaid and abandoned every child to a hospice. Family meant nothing to Rousseau. Just as children had no right to a family, there was no divine right of kings or queens. Royalty was overthrown and modern liberty was born.

Modernity's unquestioning adherents regard the Enlightenment project with awe — a blind faith of sorts. We forget that these men were as flawed as their contemporaries and were not always the contrarian liberators we have come to believe. The British philosopher John Gray exposes their regressive thinking. Voltaire, Gray reminds us, believed in a secular version of the anti-Semitic creed of pre-Adamite theory. This was the idea, advocated by some Christian theologians, that Jews were pre-Adamites, leftovers of an older species that existed before Adam. Immanuel Kant, the ultimate Enlightenment guru, asserted that there are innate, inherent differences between the races. He judged white people to 'have all the attributes required for progress towards perfection', Gray writes. Africans were 'predisposed to slavery'. Gray quotes Kant as writing: 'The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling.' Asians fared little better. John Stuart Mill in his *On Liberty* referred to China as a stagnant civilisation: 'They have become stationary — have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are ever to be farther improved it must be by

foreigners.' His father, James Mill, argued in his *History of British India* that the natives could only achieve progress by abandoning their languages and religions. Marx defended colonial rule as a way of overcoming the apathy of village life. 'Progress' was the Enlightenment's salvation. Gray reminds us that: 'All had to be turned into Europeans, if necessary by force.'

Voltaire mocked Catholicism and Islam. Nietzsche declared God dead. Rousseau, Bentham, Voltaire, Mill, Nietzsche, Marx, Lenin and their worldviews are preponderant in the West today. Just as Jews and Muslims venerate prophets and cherish their tombs, so too does the modern, liberal West its philosophers. Rousseau was dug up by the French revolutionaries and reinterred in the Pantheon in 1794, a mark of highest honour in secular France. Bentham was embalmed and remains on display in Bloomsbury at University College London. Lenin, too, was mummified in Moscow.

There is, however, another, lesser-known West: that of Edmund Burke (1730-97). Not widely known beyond the Anglosphere, Burke was a British Member of Parliament and an Irishman. A devout believer in God, he took principled stances against the French Revolution and foresaw the troubles and terror unleashed by it. He viewed the radical attacks on the French monarchy and seizure of Church property as godless. To Burke, Rousseau and Voltaire offered destruction and darkness. Burke's conservatism was based on religion; he hedged his support for the British monarchy with the need for greater parliamentary power. His political philosophy instituted the oldest political party in the world, the British Conservative Party.

Burke wrote in his seminal *Reflections on the Revolution in France* that: 'Society is a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are yet to be born.' He stated that this social partnership connected 'the visible and invisible world'. He considered our time spent on earth as stewardship of the planet's resources for the next generation, and our inheritance from the last generation. As such, he opposed tyranny and injustice against the creation of God. He therefore supported emancipation for the peoples of America, Ireland and India. In France, however, he swiftly concluded that it was the revolutionaries

who were the tyrants, for they sought to remove all residue of tradition and impose on society new and abstract ideas.

If the modern West has greater alignment with Rousseau and Bentham, the Muslim world is with the conservative Burke. By conservatism I mean that Muslims strive to preserve the collectively inherited wisdom and goodness of the past. Burke echoed this sentiment in his *Reflections*: 'When ancient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly be estimated. From that moment we have no compass to govern us; nor can we know distinctly to what port we steer.'» But we have not made the connection between Burke, conservatism and the Muslim world — instead, we have tried to impose Rousseau, Voltaire and Marx through wars, propaganda, education and occupation since Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. We are yet to understand the power of conservatism for building lasting alliances with the Muslim world.

For example, when asked: 'Are there traditions and customs that are important to you, or not?', majorities in Muslim countries say: 'Yes' — Jordan 96%, Saudi Arabia 95%, Turkey 90%, Egypt 87%. Compare these figures with postmodern societies in the United States of America (54%), the United Kingdom (36%),

France (20%) and Belgium (23%).⁶ These figures indicate that tradition, religion and custom are important in Muslim countries as diverse as Egypt and Turkey. If so, what are these traditions, what is this faith that unites more than a billion people around the world?

In contrast to a vanished Christendom, 'the Muslim world' still exists and is vibrant in its faith-based identity. A 2007 Gallup poll of more than thirty-five Muslim nations found that for 90 per cent of Muslims, Islam is an important part of daily life. From spirituality to food, dress code to bathroom etiquette, daily prayers to conduct with elders, a common civilisation and collective history bind Muslims together. From Morocco to Indonesia, Bosnia to Yemen, there is a presence of Islam in language, behaviour, prayers, architecture, food and habits that unite a people. There are, of course, linguistic, cultural, ethnic and political differences, but there is an underlying unity amid the diversity.

'You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing,' said Winston Churchill, 'after they have tried everything else.' Churchill's instincts about America were right then, and they are even more correct today. How many more wars, drone attacks and counter-terror operations will the West undertake? And how many more terrorist organisations will germinate in Muslim countries? The cycle of terrorism and counter-terrorism since 9/11 has not made our world safer. The West forgets that political violence is only a symptom of a much deeper malaise in the Muslim world that we have not fully grasped yet.

There are three dominant currents vibrating across the Muslim world. Every Muslim community feels these today, and has done so in various ways for several decades. Firstly, Arabisation, though the vast majority of the world's Muslims are not Arabs. Only 20 per cent of the Islamic world's population is Arab, but the conflicts and ideologies shaping global Muslim communities stem from Arab countries of the Middle East. Understanding the beating heart of Islam, the Middle East, is therefore vital to understanding the Muslim world. I will define Islam, Muslims, the Quran, and Sunni and Shi'a Muslims in the first chapters.

This disproportionate Arab influence on the Muslim world is driven by several factors: Islam was born in Arabia, the Quran is written in Arabic, the Prophet Mohamed was an Arab, Islam's primary history and personalities were in Mecca and Medina in Arabia, and Muslims around the world turn to pray toward Mecca five times a day. This piety, history, culture and geography matters. Wearing the Arab cultural dress of hijab for women; the centrality of the Palestinian conflict; the popularity of Arab Islamist authors among all Muslims — these, and many more, point to the Arab superiority pulsating through contemporary Islam.

A hundred years ago, Muslims in Turkey or India or Africa were culturally distinct, but now Gulf Arab culture is being adopted as a marker of Muslim authenticity and religious identity in dress, using Arabic religious terms in conversations, names of children, television-watching habits, popularity of Gulf Arab clerics, Muslim reading habits, and even styles of facial hair and female attire. This is not accidental: Saudi Arabia has spent an estimated

\$200 billion in the last seven decades building mosques, training and exporting clerics, and using its embassies to evangelise its own form of Arabised Islam.

Chapters 7 to 11 deal with the ideas, identities and consequences of this Arabisation that has been accompanied with a rise in levels of anger. Muslim discussions on the meaning and relevance of sharia, Sufism, Islamism, Salafism, Wahhabism, jihadism, and the reappearance of Kharijism are addressed in these chapters.

The second current is Westernisation and the loss of Muslim confidence: the entire Muslim world is being called to embrace secular, liberal, democratic forms of Western government. No other form of consensual government is allowed. If a state is not a democracy, the West will consider it to be an autocracy. Just as in the ancient world, if not a Greek then a barbarian. The West has not allowed for any global grey zones, no other forms of consensual or tribal government that allows for recognition of other civilisations. The North African scholar Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) wrote about a social contract 200 years before Hobbes. Just as Arabisation has disoriented traditional Muslim equilibrium, so has Westernisation. Those that are not Arabised are often Westernised in name, musical tastes, dress, preference for Hollywood, corporate lifestyle, and use of the English language. Chapters 12 to 16 address the control, positive and negative, of this enduring Westernisation and its discontents in the Muslim world.

The third current is confusion between Westernisation and Arabisation, with efforts to straddle the two, as well as the emergence of hybrids of people who speak fluent English, drive American cars, dine at McDonald's, wear jeans and baseball caps, but want to establish a caliphate or support the destruction of Israel.

Despite the perplexity, as chapters 17 to 20 illustrate, Islam retains an extraordinary hold over its adherents. Muslims value much that has been lost in the modern West. But that does not entail inherent conflict — global openness and coexistence is possible.

What is to be done about the multifaceted malaise in the Muslim world? The conclusion of this book

provides ideas for finding new ways forward for a better world.

Through the centuries, Muslims have been taught their sacred tradition of faith via oral transmission of storytelling. The Quran has chapters named after prophets and their stories. The great Sufis passed on their sagacity through tales. Muslims look to the past for validation and vision. Burke took a similar attitude: 'People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors.'

The modern West closes off the past, and imagines a future of 'creative destruction' as Joseph Schumpeter put it. This is rooted in an assumed belief in incessant progress. To Muslims, history and historic individuals are important: we look behind to look forward; we step back before jumping ahead.

When it comes to individuals and incidents that are household names for Muslims — the events in Karbala, historic personalities such as Rumi, Khayyam, Hafez, Ibn Arabi, Jahanara, Hasan al-Banna, to name a few — I have included details that give the reader a full grasp of the subject.

Most modern Western minds, for instance, find it difficult to believe in miracles, angels, the divine, or an afterlife. But for the fastest-growing group of human beings on the planet, these are vital beliefs. To better understand, let us suspend our prejudices.

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[Kant and His German Contemporaries, Volume 1: Logic, Mind, Epistemology, Science and Ethics](#) edited by Corey W. Dyck and Falk Wunderlich [Cambridge University Press, 9781107140899]

Volumes like this one edited by Corey W. Dyck and Falk Wunderlich are as important to the historiography of philosophy as they are for our knowledge of German philosophy in the eighteenth century. They show that the "grand narrative" approach to the history of philosophy, which only pauses to mention a few great works by a small number of major figures from a relatively small part of the world, is simply not satisfactory as a way of writing philosophy's history.

That grand narrative histories are shaped by prejudice is demonstrated by works like Peter Park's *Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy* (2013), which recounts how German historians of

philosophy during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries grounded their histories in racist anthropology and systematically excluded non-European philosophy from their histories. The studies of early modern women philosophers, undertaken by *Project Vox* and *New Narratives in the History of Philosophy*, make a similar point, though they do more than diagnose the prejudices that have excluded women from the history of philosophy. Their efforts to "reconfigure, enrich, and reinvigorate the philosophical canon" serve as helpful models for correcting the historical-philosophical record.

Works like *Kant and His German Contemporaries* may not directly confront the prejudices that guide the grand narrative histories, but they help us see that these narratives distort and misrepresent the history of philosophy in other ways too. They show that even philosophers, like Kant, who are recognized as major figures and play central roles in the grand narratives, were engaged in discussions of "enormous intellectual richness, vigor and importance" (1) with figures and works, ideas and arguments, that are routinely ignored by grand narrative histories. That Kant's philosophical exchanges with his German contemporaries "did not fit neatly into the narrative advanced by Kantian historians in particular, which divided the pre-Kantian philosophical debate into warring rationalist and empiricist camps, the better to retrospectively prepare the way for Kant's own novel synthesis" (2), is all the more reason to question the veracity of these narratives.

The book is divided into five parts, which reconstruct Kant's philosophical relationships with his predecessors, peers, and successors by focusing on different themes. In the first part, on formal and transcendental logic, Brian A. Chance argues that the conception of "purity" that Wolff employs in his empirical psychology had an important influence on the structure of *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1787). While Kant often uses "pure" as a synonym for "*a priori*," Chance suggests that he also uses "purity" to refer to "the ability of one cognitive faculty to create representation without relying on others" -- a sense of the term that derives from Wolff's *Deutsche Metaphysik* (1719), where the "pure understanding" is defined by its

independence from the faculties of imagination and reason (20). This conception of purity helps Chance to show that there is a "perfect similarity" (29) between the pure and applied parts of general logic and the divisions of transcendental logic that Kant lays out in the 'Transcendental Analytic' and 'Transcendental Dialectic.' Huaping Lu-Adler considers the relationship between mathematics and logic from a Kantian perspective, treating Kant's use of circular notation to represent logical relations as a kind of case study. She shows that Kant adopted this form of notation from Euler, though his views on the nature of logic led him to change the context in which it was used. Instead of using circles to sensualize logical abstractions, Kant used them to separate concepts and their extensions from their empirical sources, so that they could be considered purely formally (52-53).

In the second part, on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, Udo Thiel examines Tetens' conception of *Selbstgefühl*. Against Hume, Tetens holds that *Selbstgefühl* can ground the psychological unity of the self, though he acknowledges that the "ontological ground" of that unity remains an object of "theoretical speculation" (68). Kant rejects the claim that inner sense is sufficient for psychological unity, though he shares Tetens' views about the importance of unity for empirical psychological conceptions of the self as well as his claims about the necessity of psychological unity for our cognition of objects (72-75). Dyck turns to the rational psychology of Georg Friedrich Meier, who is remembered as the author of the *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre* (1752) that Kant used as a textbook in his logic lectures, but who also wrote on the immortality of the soul in a way that "constitutes a clear anticipation of Kant's own distinctive claim that the immortality of the soul is (merely) an object of a moral belief" (77). Central to Dyck's argument is Meier's critique of demonstrative proofs of the soul's immortality and his insistence that moral certainty of the soul's survival of death can be grounded in reason as well as in religious revelation (82). Brandon C. Look surveys Maimon's response to Kant's first *Critique* and his Leibnizian criticism of Kant's distinction between sensibility and the understanding. In the end, Look suggests that Maimon's criticism forced Kant to acknowledge that Leibniz had, in fact, distinguished sensibility and the

understanding and even to claim that, in his pre-established harmony, Leibniz "had in mind not the harmony of two different natures, namely, sense and understanding, but that of two faculties belonging to the same nature, in which sensibility and understanding harmonize to form experiential knowledge" (109).

The third part, on truth, idealism, and skepticism, begins with a chapter comparing Lambert's and Kant's conception of truth by Thomas Sturm. Starting with a discussion of "Putnam's Kant," that is, Kant as an internal realist, Sturm argues that Kant's conception of truth is "conceptually independent of his account of knowledge -- and in part even guides and restricts the latter" (119), which makes it difficult to situate him within contemporary debates between realists and anti-realists. Sturm then considers the distinction between logical and metaphysical truth in Lambert (120-124) and Kant's impossibility argument, which suggests that truth cannot be defined without reference to the content of a judgment (124-129), showing that, while there is broad agreement between them, Kant limits the explanatory power of a definition of truth (130).

Also working in a comparative mode, Paul Guyer explores the similarities between Mendelssohn's refutation of idealism in the *Morgenstunden* (1785) and Kant's arguments in the first *Critique*. Guyer argues, first, that Kant added his 'Refutation' to the second (1787, B) edition in part to respond to Mendelssohn and not only in response to the charge, made in the Feder-Garve review, that his idealism was indistinguishable from Berkeley's. Second, he notes that, unlike Mendelssohn, Kant denies the spatio-temporality of things in themselves (136, 148-150), thus embracing idealism, while also including "an *a priori* and anti-Cartesian proof that the possibility of self-knowledge is dependent upon belief in the independent existence of enduring objects," which "makes Kant's idealism a *transcendental* idealism" (136, 150-152).

Falk Wunderlich turns his attention to Platner's shifting criticisms of Kant in the second (1784) and third (1793) editions of his *Philosophische Aphorismen*. Wunderlich shows that, in the second edition, Platner accused Kant of being a Humean

skeptic, who denied "that there is a self beyond the operations of the mind" (157), despite the evidence of our "feeling of self" (157-158). In the third edition, Platner positions himself as a skeptic, while condemning Kant for dogmatically attempting "to measure the bounds of the entire cognitive faculty, and, based on that, to determine the bounds of metaphysics with demonstrative exactness" (161).

In part four, on the history and philosophy of science, Eric Watkins focuses on "two specific issues that are central to Lambert's and Kant's projects, namely what cognition (*Erkenntnis*) is and how it relates to science (*Wissenschaft*)" (180). He identifies a series of similarities and differences between Lambert and Kant (185-190), which show that, while the two philosophers understand *a priori* cognition in remarkably similar ways, Kant draws a clearer account of the relations between intuitions, concepts, and cognition than Lambert does and also explains, through his conception of reason, the unity and end of science, as well as its relation to morality and its place in a philosophical system, more fully than does Lambert. Jennifer Mensch calls our attention to Kant's appeal to Blumenbach's "formative drive" (*Bildungstrieb*) in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790). Mensch carefully reconstructs the context of Kant's reference to Blumenbach, namely, Kant's ongoing polemic against Herder; his developing views on generation, inheritance; and the criticisms that Forster had leveled against Kant's essay, "Determination of a Concept of a Human Race" (1785). Mensch shows that Kant's appeal to Blumenbach's "formative drive," in this context, is more strategic than substantive. Not only did Kant hope to "gain the support of the rising of the Göttingen medical faculty" (193) for his polemics against Herder and his response to Forster, he also hoped that Blumenbach would recognize and adopt the teleological interpretation of epigenesis that he presented in the third *Critique* (208-210). Mensch shows that Kant was largely successful, since Blumenbach later described his position as combining the "physic-mechanical with the purely teleological" (209).

Finally, in the fifth part, on freedom, immorality, and happiness, Paola Rumore argues that "Crusius' attitude towards the central topic of rationalistic

psychology and the critique he put forth opened a viable path to Kant, an alternative to the dominant options at the time" (215). She emphasizes Crusius' critique of metaphysical proofs of the immortality of the soul (216-219) as well as his moral proof (219-225), based on "an internal striving (*Trieb*) to an eternal final end in finite creatures" and on the claim that "happiness," understood as "the reunification with God which rational and freely acting creatures achieve by means of virtue" is "God's objective final end" (219-220). Kant is quite critical of these arguments, particularly in the transcripts of his metaphysics lectures (see 225-231), but, like Crusius, he does provide a moral justification for belief in the immortality of the soul in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788).

Stefano Bacin addresses the conflict between Kant and Feder over morality. Feder is known to Kantians as an empiricist and a hostile reviewer of the first *Critique*, but many do not realize that, in moral philosophy, Feder's view was "the most important philosophical alternative to Kant's novel approach in the German debates of their time" (234). Bacin identifies three main differences between their positions: Kant's opposition to the empirical investigations of the will associated with "universal practical philosophy" (237-241); Feder's defense of an intrinsic connection between virtue and happiness (241-246); and the methodological differences between Kant's rationalism and Feder's empiricism, the former insisting the moral principles be derived from pure reason, the latter demanding that morality be based on careful observation of experience.

Heiner F. Klemme, in the last chapter, considers Kant's response to Garve's views on morality, freedom, and natural necessity and their role in the development of his moral philosophy. This subject is of particular interest, because the composition of Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) can be traced back to Kant's plans to write a response to Garve's *Philosophische Anmerkungen und Abhandlungen zu Cicero's Büchern von den Pflichten* (1783) -- at least according to Hamann (251-252). Klemme indicates that Garve accepted the Wolffian conviction that "obligation and virtue imply freedom" (254), but remained skeptical about attempts to explain their relationship. Kant

tries to refute this skepticism, and the fatalism with which he thinks it is associated, through his deduction of the idea of freedom in Part III of the *Groundwork*. Klemme also suggests that we regard Kant's remarks on Garve in "On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice" (1793) as a "belated commentary on subsections four and five of his *Groundwork*" (262), acknowledging that it was Garve's skepticism that motivated Kant's appeal to the concept of freedom to "save the possibility" of moral imperatives (263).

Each of the chapters is rich in historical detail and carefully argued, so the volume as a whole is informative and rigorous. Readers will come away from the volume with a more authentic understanding of Kant, a more nuanced appreciation of his German contemporaries, and a better sense of the debates within which Kant's critical philosophy was situated. I think readers will also recognize that Kant, his contemporaries, and their debates, are not merely "of historical interest," since contemporary philosophers are still grappling with many of the same issues as Kant's predecessors, peers, and immediate successors.

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[Orphic Tradition and the Birth of the Gods](#) by
Dwayne A. Meisner [Oxford University Press,
9780190663520]

The hatching of the Cosmic Egg, the swallowing of Phanes by Zeus, and the murder of Dionysus by the Titans were just a few of the many stories that appeared in ancient Greek epic poems that were thought to have been written by the legendary singer Orpheus. Most of this poetry is now lost, surviving only in the form of brief quotations by Greek philosophers.

[Orphic Tradition and the Birth of the Gods](#) brings together the scattered fragments of four Orphic theogonies: the Derveni, Eudemian, Hieronyman, and Rhapsodic theogonies. Typically, theogonies are thought to be poetic accounts of the creation of the universe and the births of the gods, leading to the creation of humans and the establishment of the present state of the cosmos. The most famous example is Hesiod's *Theogony*, which unlike the Orphic theogonies has survived. But did Orphic

theogonies look anything like Hesiod's Theogony? Meisner applies a new theoretical model for studying Orphic theogonies and suggests certain features that characterize them as different from Hesiod: the blending of Near Eastern narrative elements that are missing in Hesiod; the probability that these were short hymns, more like the Homeric Hymns than Hesiod; and the continuous discourse between myth and philosophy that can be seen in Orphic poems and the philosophers who quote them. Most importantly, this book argues that the Orphic myths of Phanes emerging from the Cosmic Egg and Zeus swallowing Phanes are at least as important as the well-known myth of Dionysus being dismembered by the Titans, long thought to have been the central myth of Orphism. As this book amply demonstrates, Orphic literature was a diverse and ever-changing tradition by which authors were able to think about the most current philosophical ideas through the medium of the most traditional poetic forms.

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Excerpt: The topic of Orphism is a controversial one, and to many people it is enigmatic too. While some students and scholars might prefer to avoid Orphism and its controversies, there are a few others who bring outstanding expertise to the discussion. In fact, some of the biggest names in the fields of Greek literature and religion have written important works on this topic, such as the recently departed Walter Burkert and Martin West. And so, in order to research this bizarre ancient phenomenon we call Orphism, one must stand upon the shoulders of some of the biggest giants in Classical scholarship, and at the same time dive into the midst of one of the biggest debates on Greek religion. No wonder many shy away from it. However, as complicated and controversial as the topic of Orphism may appear, it is not incomprehensible. So, with a humble recognition that there will be little certainty, I present a study of Orphic theogonies in the hopes that, whether or not I can contribute something valuable to the ongoing debates on Orphism, at least I can make this topic more accessible to those who have not dedicated years of their lives to researching it. "I will sing to those who know" —and hopefully in the process, this topic will catch the interest of those who do not know.

Having first become acquainted with scholarship on Orphism when I was doing research on the Dionysiac mysteries for my master's thesis, I quickly became fascinated with the ongoing debates about Orphism as I read modern scholars from one end of the spectrum to another. Reading at the same time early scholars who saw Orphism as a unified religious movement and more recent and skeptical scholars who see it as mainly a literary phenomenon, I was never entirely convinced by either side of the argument. As a newcomer to the modern discourse on Orphism, in a sense I have the advantage of a new perspective, neither weighed down by outdated models nor deeply involved in the process of deconstruction, but I also have the disadvantage of having far less expertise than some of the scholars who are already engaged in Orphic discourse. Therefore, this book is not an attempt to propose an alternative definition of Orphism, or to critique the brilliant work that has already been done on the Orphic gold tablets or the Derveni Papyrus. Instead, I concentrate on a set

of fragments that has received less attention in recent years, by attempting to reconstruct four Orphic theogonies, based on the recent collection of the Orphic Fragments by Alberto Bernabé. I hope this book will contribute to discourse on Orphism by applying new models and interpretations to these often-neglected fragments, while also making that discourse more accessible to students and scholars who are new to the topic by explaining the Orphic literary tradition in the simplest terms possible.

This book is an adaptation of my doctoral thesis, which really did two things: first, it was a reconstruction of the literary history of Orphic theogonies, and that is the subject of this book; and second, it sought to explain the metaphysical allegories of the Neoplatonists who often referred to the Orphic Rhapsodies. These complex allegorical interpretations are the reason why we have more than two hundred fragments of the Rhapsodies, but few modern scholars have paid significant attention to explaining these interpretations and determining how the Neoplatonists manipulated their presentation of the text of the Rhapsodies. My work on Neoplatonic allegories has been mostly reserved for a future project, but it does come into play in this book when dealing with fragments from Neoplatonic sources. In every case I have endeavoured to keep the discussion of allegory as brief and simple as possible, always limited to that which is necessary for the reconstruction of the Orphic poems.

Introducing Orphic Theogonies

The aim of this study is to sort out the history, structure, and contents of four Orphic theogonies, in the hope that some of their major themes and concerns might be clarified. According to most modern reconstructions of Orphic literature by scholars such as Otto Kern, Martin West, and Alberto Bernabé, there were at least four major Orphic theogonies: (i) the "Derveni Theogony," which is the poem underlying the commentary contained in the Derveni Papyrus (fourth century BC), and three other Orphic theogonies known to the Neoplatonist Damascius (sixth century AD): (2) the "Eudemian Theogony" (fifth century BC), named after Eudemus, a student of Aristotle who made references to an Orphic theogony in his

philosophical works; (3) the "Hieronyman Theogony" (second century BC), a Hellenistic version known to two obscure authors named Hieronymus and Hellanicus; and (4) the Rhapsodies, or "Rhapsodic Theogony" (first century BC/AD), which was the longest version and the only one that Damascius considered current. The Derveni, Eudemian, Hieronyman, and Rhapsodic theogonies are preserved only in fragments by prose authors, mostly philosophers and apologists, and these fragments have been collected recently in Bernabé's *Poetae Epici Graeci* in a way that reflects modern assumptions about what a Greek theogony might have looked like.

Scholars have assumed that each of these theogonies was a lengthy, chronological narrative that stretched from the beginning of creation to the current state of the cosmos, similar to the format of Hesiod's *Theogony*. From this perspective, even though it seems clear that Orphic practitioners (whoever they might have been) used poetic texts in their rituals, it has been difficult to determine how a theogony of this type might have been used in ritual performance. If, on the other hand, Orphic theogonies were shorter narratives that functioned as hymns to particular gods, then instead we might call them theogonic hymns, similar to the Homeric Hymns in the sense that they describe the attributes of deities and narrate the way these deities stepped into their spheres of influence. If we view the texts in this way, then the particular performance contexts and varied purposes of these texts become far more complex than a lengthy theogony and the puzzle might become impossible to solve, but the basic function of these texts in ritual might become simpler to imagine in some cases. Many modern discussions about Orphic ritual have been driven by the controversy and confusion over what Orphism was. This confusion stems not only from our lack of knowledge about Orphic ritual, but also from our misunderstanding of the nature of the texts. Therefore, this study is about the texts. What were Orphic theogonies, and what role did they play in Orphism? And how does a reading of Orphic theogonies influence our definition of Orphism?

In this book, I attempt to reconstruct the history of Orphic theogonies based on Claude Lévi-Strauss'

concept of bricolage.⁶ As I argue in this chapter, rather than viewing these theogonies through the rigid model of a manuscript tradition, it would be preferable to interpret each individual text or fragment as the original creation of a bricoleur: an anonymous author who drew from the elements of myth that were available at the time, and reconfigured these elements in a way that was relevant to the pseudepigrapher's particular context. Beginning with the Derveni theogony, I point out that it combines well-known elements of Hesiod's *Theogony* with elements of earlier Near Eastern mythology to create a profound but enigmatic narrative, centered around Zeus and the act of swallowing. Moving on to the Eudemian theogony, I argue that the scattered references to Orphic poetry in the works of Plato, Aristotle, and others do not necessarily refer to the same theogony, and even if they did, this did not necessarily mean that they contained the earliest renditions of the Orphic Hymn to Zeus or the story of Dionysus Zagreus. In chapter 4, I review our only two sources for the Hieronyman theogony and suggest that in this case we might actually be dealing with two separate poems. The scattered fragments of the three earliest Orphic theogonies suggest a varied and fluid tradition, in which of an old alarm clock; and they can be used again either for the same purpose or for a different one if they are at all diverted from their previous function.

By viewing the Orphic pseudepigraphers who wrote theogonic poetry as bricoleurs who rearranged the "odds and ends" of mythical events at their disposal into a new arrangement of structures, I approach Orphic theogonies as products of bricolage. This approach is in accord with how the concept of bricolage has been applied to the gold tablets, and it is beneficial to an interpretation of Orphic theogonies in three ways. First, since scholars have become more receptive to the idea that Orphism was never a coherent, definable religious community, a useful approach will be one that allows more possibilities for diversity. Brisson has taken the first step by rejecting West's stemma and suggesting points of reference, but one can go further by exploring how these points of reference were rearranged in their individual contexts as the "odds and ends" of bricolage. Second, a bricoleur takes elements from

a "finite" but "heterogeneous" field of possibilities, which opens the door to a wide but limited range of sources and influences that could have contributed to the individual works in question. Not all of these are typically considered Orphic: among the possible sources for an Orphic mythical motif are Near Eastern myths, Hesiod and other mainstream literary texts (e.g., Pindar, Aeschylus, Aristophanes), and material from other overlapping categories and elements that are typically associated with Orphic myth and ritual, such as those derived from Eleusinian, Dionysiac, or Pythagorean contexts; in other words, they are derived from more sources than just earlier Orphic theogonies. Third, if we apply the concept of bricolage to the ancient sources themselves—that is, to the ancient authors who quoted the theogonies, such as the Derveni author, Plato, the Neoplatonists, and the Christian apologists—then it becomes clear that their own decisions about what material to include and how to interpret this material were also exercises in bricolage.

One result of my reading of Orphic theogonies as products of bricolage is that, in most cases, it appears that Orphic theogonies may not have been lengthy, comprehensive narratives like Hesiod's *Theogony*, as modern scholars such as West and Bernabé have assumed. Rather, they were shorter poems, analogous to the Homeric Hymns, which concentrate on one deity and how he or she came to a position of honour within the Greek pantheon. On this point, again I attempt to improve upon Edmonds' recent efforts to redefine ancient Orphism, since he has argued that the Sacred Discourse in 24 Rhapsodies consisted of a collection of shorter poems that was divided into twenty-four books, rather than "one complex theogonical poem that combines the length of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*," as Graf and Johnston have recently suggested. Comparing the Rhapsodies to the Sibylline Oracles, Edmonds argues that "the Rhapsodies were more likely a loose collection of Orphic poetry, containing a variety of poems [of varying lengths] that had been composed and reworked over the centuries by a number of different bricoleurs." He views the existence of a collection of shorter narratives as the solution to many of the contradictions that have puzzled scholars as they attempt to reconstruct one coherent

narrative. Edmonds suggests that "rather than trying to trace a stemma [as West has done] ... we may imagine that, at least until it was collected in the Rhapsodies, different works of Orpheus circulated in widely varying versions, with new additions and transformations made freely by each generation of pseudepigraphers," in which case differing versions are simply reflections of different narratives within the collection, and not internally contradictory. Edmonds presents an argument worthy of consideration, but he does not provide a detailed analysis of the Rhapsodies that reconstructs them as this collection of shorter poems. Therefore, part of the purpose of this book is to provide exactly that sort of analysis, not just of the Rhapsodies, but of the entire tradition of Orphic theogonies.

As we will see in chapter 2, the Derveni poem was a short theogonic poem that functioned as a hymn to Zeus. In chapter 3, I argue that the scattered references to Orphic poetry in authors from the Classical Period probably come from different Orphic texts in different collections, rather than from one poem called the Eudemian theogony. Although the Hieronyman theogony presents us with a detailed, coherent narrative, in chapter 4 I consider the possibility that this narrative might not have extended beyond Phanes, and that other events in our sources for the Hieronyman theogony might have come from other Orphic texts. In chapter 5, I study evidence that might confirm Edmonds' hypothesis that the Rhapsodies were a collection of shorter poems and not a continuous narrative, but nevertheless I conclude that it is quite possible that one of these twenty-four poems consisted of a six-generation succession myth, perhaps comparable in length to Hesiod. In chapter 6, I read the myth of Dionysus Zagreus in a way that sets aside modern assumptions about this story's supposed doctrinal significance and sees it in the context of the Rhapsodic narrative as a whole.

Reading the Orphic tradition of theogonic poetry as a loose collection of short theogonic hymns, rather than as a tight stemma of lengthy theogonic narratives, has two consequences for how we view the relationship between these texts and the Orphic rituals with which they were supposedly associated. On the one hand, as Edmonds suggests, "the

relation of these texts to the rituals founded by Orpheus must be more complex than has been previously assumed," since a loose collection of short texts can be applied to a wide variety of purposes and settings. But on the other hand, as I would argue, if Orphic theogonic material appeared mostly in the form of shorter poems, then, despite the fact that the specific performance context remains obscure, at least it is easier to imagine their performance as short hymns than as one continuous epic narrative. We may never know specifically what rituals involved the use of these texts, but if we accept that generally the texts consisted of brief hymns with theogonic content, then at least it is conceivable that, in general, the texts had a place in Orphic ritual performance. As their structure tends to differ from Hesiod's Theogony, so the context of their performance might have been quite different.

Mythical Poetry and Philosophical Prose
Orphic theogonies departed from the model of Hesiod not only in their mythical motifs and generic structures, but also in their overall worldview. They were a means by which Orphic poets asked questions about their universe, often addressing the same concerns as contemporary philosophers. Thus, some fragments of later theogonies appear to reflect a worldview that was more current in its philosophical orientation than the mythical world of Hesiod. From this perspective, Orphic poetry appears to exist as a point of contact in the discourse between myth and philosophy, which occurs in two directions: in one direction, it seems that philosophical ideas influence or underlie certain fragments of Orphic poems; and in the other direction, the vast majority of Orphic fragments are preserved by philosophers who interpret the poems in various ways. Whether or not they considered themselves philosophers or even Orphics, the Orphic poets were aware of and involved in discourse with current philosophical ideas, but they continued to express their ideas in traditional poetic forms.

In the first direction, it is an oversimplification to say, for example, that because a certain fragment of an Orphic poem appears to reflect a particular Stoic idea, then the poem must be a Stoic poem; this is like calling someone a psychoanalyst today

simply because he or she mentions a Freudian slip. Nevertheless, as early as the composition of the Derveni poem, it seems that Orphic poets and Presocratic philosophers were living at about the same time and thinking about some of the same ideas, so it is not unreasonable to allow the possibility that an Orphic poem was influenced by Presocratic or (in later periods) Stoic philosophy. The major difference between them was that Presocratic philosophers moved toward making more abstract arguments in philosophical prose, but Orphic poets continued to frame their discussions in the archaic form of narrative poetry. The various manifestations of the Orphic Hymns to Zeus stand out as examples of how Orphic poets continued to think about the gods in different ways over the centuries, sometimes varying widely in the way they perceived divinity, despite the fact that they did not depart from the traditional form of hexametric poetry.

In the other direction, we are so dependent upon the Neoplatonists for our knowledge of the Rhapsodies that it is often difficult to disentangle the content of the poems from the allegorical interpretations that these philosophers constantly apply to the myths. The tendency of modern scholars has been to set aside, ignore, and even treat with disdain the Neoplatonic allegories, in order to reconstruct the basic narrative of the Rhapsodies.⁶³ However, not only is it anachronistic and prejudicial to dismiss Neoplatonic allegory, but also this approach can lead to misinterpretations, as I argue in chapter 5—for example, Hermias' mention of three Nights has led to some confusion—so it is crucial to take into account the metaphysical allegories applied by ancient authors. There is much work to be done in clarifying the complex relationship between the Rhapsodic narrative and the Neoplatonic universe, but this would involve a separate study. The discussion here will be limited to places eventually include the metaphysical allegories of philosophers like the Derveni author, the Stoics, and the later Neoplatonists.

Likewise, the earliest Orphic poets used theogonies as a means to think about the nature of the gods in ways that were different from Hesiod. They were interested in the origin of the universe, as references to Night as the first deity indicate, and

they began to combine biomorphic with technomorphic models of creation. The clearest point of convergence between Orphic poetry and Presocratic philosophy is the Derveni Papyrus, written by an intellectual who claims to have ritual expertise and to be able to explain an Orphic poem by means of allegories that are clearly in line with Presocratic thinking. For this reason, since its discovery, the Derveni Papyrus has been seen as a meeting point between mythical and philosophical thinking.⁷⁰ But so is Empedocles, whose poetry contains both the mystical idea of reincarnation and the scientific idea of the four elements as "four roots," and Pythagoras, whose followers were noted for their advancements in mathematics, though he himself was a mystic who talked about reincarnation. The line between mythical and philosophical thought had not yet been drawn, so authors like Empedocles and the Derveni author found value not in one or the other, but in the discourse between both. The earliest written Orphic poems emerged out of the same intellectual context as the Presocratic philosophers. As Finkelberg argues, their "points of difference ... arose not from a difference in basic outlook, but from the fact that the shared outlook was molded in different ways." Orphic poets were concerned with the same questions and issues as their contemporaries, but instead of turning to prose philosophy, they used mythical narratives in poetry as a means to think about these topics.

In the other direction, the Derveni author is only the first in a long list of philosophers who referred to Orphic poetry in order to illustrate philosophical ideas. The next philosopher to do this was Plato, whose exegetical techniques were quite different from the Derveni author's. Plato's general tendency was to draw imagery from a traditional myth but to reformulate the myth in a way that supported his dialogue, thus causing the myth to become uniquely Platonic. Plato himself was a bricoleur, and this was no less the case with his use of Orphic poetry. In the *Gorgias*, he attributes to "some Sicilian or Italian" (493a) the eschatological image of souls in the underworld carrying water in a sieve and the idea that our "body" is a "tomb", so scholars have debated whether or not his source was Orphic, or perhaps Pythagorean. No matter what his source was for these particular mythical images, Plato

applies his own interpretation, connecting them with Socrates' argument about the futility of constantly fulfilling one's desires. In a similar manner, Plato does not quote Orphic poetry in order to explain Orphic theogonic myth, but in order to put forth one of his own ideas in an erudite way. When in the *Philebus* he attributes to Orpheus the verse, "with the sixth generation cease the rhythmic song," his point is not that there were six generations in the Eudemian theogony. Rather, he is simply making a trivial allusion to the number six, as a clever way of ending a list of virtues. Likewise, when in the *Timaeus* he refers to Ocean and Tethys as primordial deities, his point is not to explain the Eudemian theogony but to present his own unique cosmogonic account through the words of Timaeus:

76 This Platonic account later became the foundation for Neoplatonic cosmology, which also referred to Orphic poetry but used it in a different way. Unlike the Neoplatonists, Plato's method was not to allegorize Orphic poems, or even to quote Orpheus as an authority, but to incorporate elements of Orphic poetry whenever he thought they might add to the substance or literary quality of his dialogues.

The Hellenistic Period saw the emergence of new philosophical schools, including the Epicureans and Stoics, and it also saw the composition of new Orphic poems. Some fragments of these poems appear to reflect Stoic ideas, but the relationship between Orphic literature and Stoic philosophy is uncertain, and it moves in both directions. In one direction, Greek philosophers applied Stoic allegory to Orphic theogonies. Plutarch discusses the role of Apollo in bringing Dionysus back to life after his dismemberment by the Titans. He equates Apollo with unification and Dionysus with multiplication in the great Stoic cosmogonic cycle of the creation and destruction of the universe. In another text, Plutarch uses one version of the Orphic Hymn to Zeus in a discussion of the Stoic idea of primary and secondary causes of generation. He interprets the verse, "Zeus the head, Zeus the middle, and from Zeus all things exist," as equating Zeus with the primary, or superior, of "two causes." In these instances, the Stoic idea is not coming from the poem but from Plutarch himself; but there are other fragments that seem to suggest the expression of Stoic ideas in the poems.

Eusebius, discussing the later Rhapsodic version of the Orphic Hymn to Zeus, compares this pantheistic conceptualization of Zeus with the supreme deity in Stoicism, saying that it is "in agreement with the Stoics." However, as I argue in chapter 3, this does not mean that the hymn was a Stoic poem, at least not in the sense that Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus was consciously Stoic. On the other hand, scholars have argued that the Hieronyman theogony is indeed a Stoic poem: West calls it a "Stoicizing adaptation of the Protogonos Theogony," and Brisson interprets it as an attempt to make an Orphic theogony compatible with Stoic cosmology. The primordial substances of water and mud are similar to a fragment of Zeno that equates water and mud with Chaos in Hesiod. In chapter 4, I discuss the possibility that the Hieronyman theogony was influenced by Stoicism. This raises the possibility, as some have argued, of Stoic influence in the Rhapsodies if indeed the Rhapsodies were written later. Since Orphic poets operated as bricoleurs within the same general historical and intellectual contexts as contemporary philosophers, it is likely that they were at least familiar with Stoic ideas. Some of these ideas might have influenced the Orphic poets, but this does not mean that they wrote Stoic poetry. Caution is necessary, since these indications of Stoicism are indeed no more than indirect indications, and in the case of Plutarch it is clear that he is using the Orphic poem to discuss a Stoic idea, not reading the poem as a Stoic text. But there are enough correlations between Orphic poetry and Stoic philosophy to support the general argument that Orphic poetry was a point of contact in the discourse between myth and philosophy.

When we come to the Neoplatonists, it is dearly the case that they manipulate the material to make it fit their allegorical interpretations. In particular, Syrianus and his student Proclus (fifth century AD) were determined to demonstrate that Plato, Orpheus, and the Chaldean Oracles were all in agreement, and one of the ways they did this was by mapping out correspondences between the Orphic Rhapsodies and their own metaphysical system. Always concerned with the question of the One and the Many, the Neoplatonists from Syrianus to Olympiodorus took the Platonic idea of Forms to a new extreme by proposing multiple intermediary levels of existence between the One

first principle of everything (the Form that contains unity undifferentiated) and the Many things that exist as physical manifestations of the Forms. Each generation of deities in the Rhapsodies was then made to correspond to some level of this metaphysical system: the first god, Chronos, represents the ineffable One; Phanes represents the level of Intelligible Intellect (containing all Forms in an undifferentiated state); Zeus represents Intellective Intellect (containing all Forms in a differentiated state); and Dionysus represents Encosmic Intellect (through which the Forms are dispersed into the physical universe). The Neoplatonists comprehensively incorporated the Orphic gods into their metaphysical system, allegorically interpreting a wide variety of deities, episodes, and visual motifs, with each detail reflecting some aspect of the Neoplatonic universe.

Many of the allegorical interpretations of the Neoplatonists seem bizarre to modern minds, far removed from the basic mythical narrative underlying them, so modern scholars who study the Rhapsodies have often dismissed their interpretations: for example, Linforth calls their allegories "subtle and speculative fancies which pass beyond the bounds of reason," and West dismisses Proclus' interpretation of one fragment as "simply Neoplatonist construction." Sometimes the Neoplatonists obscure the meaning of the poem, making it difficult to separate the contents of the poem from the allegory. For example, were there three separate goddesses called Night in the Rhapsodies, or was there just one, whom Hermias splits into a triad? At other times, however, an episode from the Rhapsodies illustrates well the metaphysical idea that the Neoplatonists discuss: for example, Zeus swallowing Phanes is a perfect illustration of the way the Demiurge (Zeus) contemplates the Forms that are contained in the Paradigm (Phanes) and is filled with them.

The proto-Christian model by which some modern scholars have interpreted Orphism is in part a consequence of the ways in which the Neoplatonists represented and interpreted the Orphic Rhapsodies. By allegorically interpreting Orphic poems in their Platonic commentaries, the Neoplatonists preserved the vast majority of Orphic fragments that we have today: there are

more than two hundred in Proclus alone. But because of their allegorical practice, most of the content they preserve is entangled with philosophical concepts that may or may not have anything to do with the content of the poems. Therefore, the most crucial thing that must be done in order to reconstruct and understand the Rhapsodies is to attempt to understand how the Neoplatonists used the Rhapsodies as a source of allegories for their own metaphysical system. So far, not many modern scholars have been interested in doing this, but Luc Brisson has taken the most important step in this direction by showing how the six generations of the Rhapsodies correspond to the different levels of Proclus' metaphysics. Unfortunately, only in a summary fashion does he explain the metaphysical system itself, or demonstrate specifically how particular fragments relate to particular metaphysical concepts, so there is much more that could be said about how the Neoplatonists interpreted the Rhapsodies.

The allegorical interpretation of the Derveni author is more difficult to disentangle from the contents of the Orphic poem on which he comments, because he was writing at a time when early Orphic poetry, Presocratic philosophy, and even allegorical interpretation were still emerging for the first time in the history of Greek thought. The earliest Orphic theogonies evolved out of the same theogonic traditions as Hesiod and the same intellectual context as Presocratic philosophy, and they were concerned with similar questions about the nature of the universe, but they went about exploring these questions in different ways. Presocratic philosophers turned to prose arguments, but Orphic poets continued to use the traditional form of myth in hexameter. From the very beginning, the Orphic literary tradition had an intimate relationship with Greek philosophy, and it continued to be in constant discourse with philosophy throughout every period of its history. When prose philosophers referred to Orphic texts, they approached the texts in various ways: the Derveni author applied allegories that corresponded with Presocratic thought; Plato and Aristotle referred briefly to the Eudemian theogony; Plutarch applied Stoic allegory to certain episodes of Orphic myth; and the Neoplatonists developed a rich and complex

apparatus by which they allegorically interpreted the Rhapsodies. Orphic theogonies functioned as a point of contact in the discourse between myth and philosophy, so understanding this discourse is crucial to the process of reconstructing the poems themselves. <>

[Sophocles: A Study of His Theater in Its Political and Social Context](#) by Jacques Jouanna, translated by Steven Rendall [Princeton University Press, 9780691172071]

Here, for the first time in English, is celebrated French classicist Jacques Jouanna's magisterial account of the life and work of Sophocles. Exhaustive and authoritative, this acclaimed book combines biography and detailed studies of Sophocles' plays, all set in the rich context of classical Greek tragedy and the political, social, religious, and cultural world of Athens's greatest age, the fifth century.

Sophocles was the commanding figure of his day. The author of Oedipus Rex and Antigone, he was not only the leading dramatist but also a distinguished politician, military commander, and religious figure. And yet the evidence about his life has, until now, been fragmentary.

Reconstructing a lost literary world, Jouanna has finally assembled all the available information, culled from inscriptions, archaeological evidence, and later sources. He also offers a huge range of new interpretations, from his emphasis on the significance of Sophocles' political and military offices (previously often seen as honorary) to his analysis of Sophocles' plays in the mythic and literary context of fifth-century drama.

Written for scholars, students, and general readers, this book will interest anyone who wants to know more about Greek drama in general and Sophocles in particular. With an extensive bibliography and useful summaries not only of Sophocles' extant plays but also, uniquely, of the fragments of plays that have been partially lost, it will be a standard reference in classical studies for years to come.

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A Snapshot of Sophocles

Finding the man behind the writer is a difficult, even impossible enterprise, especially when a man of the theater is concerned. This is even more true for an ancient author than for a modern one, because biographical information about the ancients seems questionable from the outset, especially if we don't take the trouble to look into its origin and assess its relative value. However, Sophocles is in this regard an exception among ancient authors, because we have a contemporary witness's report concerning him. It is a snapshot taken during a reception at which Sophocles, who had stopped off at the island of Chios, was the guest star. The report was composed by Ion of Chios, a writer born on the island who was younger than Sophocles, but like him a man of the theater. He had had the idea, which was very original at the time, of keeping a diary on the celebrities who

passed through his homeland. Here is his account, as preserved in the work of a more recent author:

I met the poet Sophocles on Chios when he was sailing to Lesbos as a strategos; he is a man who gets happy after having a few drinks and who is very astute. Hermesileos, his host and the Athenians' proxenos, seated him at his table. The boy assigned to pour the wine stood near the fire; he was clearly [red]. Sophocles spoke to him: "Do you want me to drink under agreeable conditions?" The boy said he did. "Then move slowly as you give me my goblet and take it away from me." When the boy blushed even more furiously, Sophocles said to his neighbor, who was lying on the same couch as he: "How beautiful it is, the verse composed by Phrynicus where he says: 'The light of love shines in scarlet cheeks.'" To which his neighbor, who was a grammar teacher from Eretria, replied: "Sophocles, I have no doubt that you are an expert in poetry. However, Phrynicus did not express himself well when he described the handsome boy's cheeks as 'scarlet.' For if a painter chose the color scarlet to represent this boy's cheeks, he would lose his beauty." When he heard these words spoken by the man from Eretria, Sophocles burst into laughter: "So, stranger, you are pleased by neither this verse of Simonides, which the Greeks nonetheless find so eloquent: 'the young girl making her voice heard from scarlet lips,' nor by the poet who speaks of Apollo with golden locks; for if a painter painted the god's hair in gold and not in black, the picture would be mediocre; nor by the poet who says 'Rosy-fingered Dawn'; for if we took the color rose to paint her fingers, one would be representing a dyer's fingers, and not those of a pretty woman." This reply aroused laughter. And when the man from Eretria was stunned by this barrage, Sophocles resumed his conversation with the boy. As the boy tried to use his finger to remove a straw from the goblet, Sophocles asked whether he saw the straw clearly. The boy declared that he did. "Then blow it away, so as not to wet your finger." And when the boy tried to do so,

Sophocles brought the goblet close to his own mouth, so that his head was closer to the boy's. And when he was very close to him, he seized him with his arm and gave him a kiss. Everyone present applauded, laughing and shouting to salute the cleverness with which Sophocles had taken the boy by surprise. "Gentlemen," Sophocles declared, "I have been training myself in strategy since Pericles claimed that although I knew poetry, I was ignorant of strategy. But didn't my stratagem succeed?" So there is one example among many others of the shrewdness of Sophocles' words and his acts when he took part in banquets.

Here we are in the middle of the fifth century BCE, or more precisely, in the year 441/440. Sophocles was already over fifty years old. He had long been famous as a tragic poet and was occupying for the first time the political office of strategos along with Pericles. In this lively narrative in which Sophocles is sketched by a talented witness, we will point out, for the moment, only the overall impression.

It is a deliciously comic scene that shows two facets of Sophocles' character: in his conversation with the grammar teacher, it is the cultivated and brilliant poet who ridicules his interlocutor's professorial dogmatism and discreetly asserts the autonomy of poetry in contrast to painting: poetic technique must not be confused with pictorial technique! In the conversation between Sophocles and the young cupbearer, it is the strategist of love that we see at work. Here Sophocles, who was said to like boys, provides an example of his tactical skill by gradually drawing the victim into his trap. And there, he pretends to confuse military strategy and amorous strategy!

In the end, what unites these two facets of Sophocles' character is his power of seduction: by means of his great intelligence, full of irony and humor, he is able to win applause by mocking overly serious minds: that of the anonymous grammar teacher, but also that of Pericles, the master strategist. Sophocles, who was known for his ability to depict on the stage the misfortunes of the great, also knew how to make people smile in his private life, even when he was occupying a political office.

This report invites us to discover the man in all the diversity of his activities, not only literary, but also political and religious, and to assess the work of such an astute mind in all the wealth of its dimensions, while avoiding any dogmatism.

The Young Sophocles: Sophocles of the Athenian Deme of Colonus

Sophocles, whose life coincided with almost the whole of the fifth century BCE, was born in 497/496 or 495/494 in the city of Athens, where he died in 406/405. He was about a quarter of a century younger than Aeschylus, and about fifteen years older than Euripides. However, since he lived a long time, he died a year after Euripides.

The city-state of Athens included more than the urban area; it extended to all Attica. Athens had freed itself from tyranny only a few years before Sophocles' birth. The new Athenian "civic space," which was the foundation of Athenian democracy, had been defined by Cleisthenes: the basic unit was the deme. This was an administrative territorial district where every free Athenian had to be registered upon reaching majority in order to receive his civil and political rights. Each Athenian citizen thus belonged to a deme; and Sophocles' deme was Colonus, where he was born. In actuality, two demes bore the name "Colonus": one was called Kolonos Agoraios, the other Kolonos Hippeios. These two demes originally owed their names to a geographical peculiarity. "Kolonos" meant "hill." The first deme was in the city, near the public square or agora, as the adjective agoraios indicates. The second was outside the walls, northwest of the city, some distance from the ramparts of Athens and its acropolis. It was in this deme that Sophocles was born. It probably owed its qualifier "Hippeios" to a sanctuary of Poseidon Hippeios ("protector of horses") or to the eponymous hero Kolonos, who was a horseman.

Each deme had been a district belonging to one of the ten tribes since Cleisthenes' reform. The tribe to which Colonus belonged was the Aigeis tribe, which took its name from Aegeus, the former king of Athens. This tribe was second on the official list of the ten tribes.

Sophocles the Politician

Unlike Aeschylus and Euripides, Sophocles was not solely a man of the theater. To be sure, his life was regularly punctuated by the writing of tragedies, but he also held important political offices at times in his life that were also symbolic moments of Athens's most brilliant history, and then the most tragic. The fifth century BCE, which began so gloriously for Athens with its victory in the Persian Wars, and continued so splendidly with the years that have been called "the century of Pericles," ended with the fratricidal conflict between the two cities that had overcome the Persians, Athens and Sparta, leading to the humiliating defeat of Athens in 404. Sophocles died, however, before he learned the outcome of his city's tragedy.

Sophocles and Dionysus: The Theatrical Career

Let us now leave the sanctuary of Asclepius on the south flank of the Acropolis, which can symbolize the religious role Sophocles played in his city, and return to the theater of Dionysus adjacent to it: that is where Sophocles especially distinguished himself through his long career as a man of the theater, over a period of more than sixty years. When Pausanias visited the theater of Athens more than six centuries later, he could still see, among the statues honoring the tragic poets, that of Sophocles.

Happy Sophocles

The Date of Sophocles' Death and the Literary Homage Paid Him

The end of the preface to *Oedipus at Colonus*, after mentioning the eponymous archon Micon who presided over the Great Dionysia of 401, where Sophocles' last tragedy was presented by his grandson, goes on this way:

This archon is the fourth archon starting from Callias (= year 406/405), the archon under whom most people say Sophocles died. That is clear according to the following: on the one hand in *The Frogs* Aristophanes has the tragic authors return from the Underworld, and on the other Phrynichus, in the comedy entitled *The Muses*, which he presented at the same competition as *The Frogs*, expresses himself this way:

Happy Sophocles, who died after living

for a long time, a happy, clever man,
the author of many fine tragedies;
he had a happy end, without having
suffered any trouble.

This end of the preface discusses the date of Sophocles' death. It cites two testimonies that clearly indicate that Sophocles was already dead in January 405 at the time of the Lenaia competition.

The least well known of these is the comic author Phrynicus, who, in his comedy entitled *The Muses*, performed during this competition, resoundingly praised Sophocles after his death. The great merit of the preface is that it cites the four verses of this eulogy, which is all the more exceptional because comic authors spent their time making fun of their contemporaries.¹ These verses also suggest that Sophocles' old age was not unhappy. Plato's testimony tends to confirm this.² Sophocles, who was not a bitter old man, was delighted to have escaped love, as if he had escaped a furious and savage master. But this witticism may have hidden part of the reality. Sophocles suffered from senile palsy, and in his *Oedipus at Colonus* the chorus of old men devotes a whole song to the misfortunes of life that culminate in the miseries of "powerless, unsociable, inimical old age," in which personal overtones have been discerned.

The second testimony concerning his death is well known. At the same competition, Aristophanes, under the name of Philonides, had presented his comedy *The Frogs*, whose subject is directly inspired by the deaths in quick succession of two great tragedians, Euripides and Sophocles, not to mention that of Agathon. To be sure, Sophocles was definitely not central in the comedy; it is Euripides who remains the comic author's target, after his death as during his life. But in several passages in his comedy Aristophanes pays incidental homage to Sophocles.

First, when the god of the festival, Dionysus, noticing that there are no longer any tragic authors worthy of the name in Athens, decides to go to the Underworld to look for Euripides and to ask Heracles for information about the journey to be made, Heracles is astonished that he is not going to look for Sophocles. Here is the relevant passage in the dialogue between Dionysus and Heracles:

Dionysus: I want a clever poet, for the race is now extinct—all who survive are bad.

Heracles: What! Isn't Iophon alive?

Dionysus: Well, he's the only good thing left, if he's good at all. I don't even know for sure if that's the case.

Heracles: Why don't you bring back Sophocles, Euripides' superior, if you've really got to take one?

Dionysus: Not before I take Iophon aside all by himself, and test what he does without Sophocles. Besides, Euripides is such a scoundrel, he might well try to run away with me, but Sophocles was easy going here, and easy going there as well.

The setting aside of Sophocles is a way of paying him homage. The homage is twofold: it is paid to both the poet and the man. Dionysus is well aware of Sophocles' talent as a poet; but he wants to see what his son Iophon can do without his father's help. And he recognizes that as a man, Sophocles had a good character.

Next, in the middle of the comedy, there is a fine example of his good character, as opposed to Euripides' ambition. When the turbulent Euripides arrived in the Underworld, he tried to dislodge Aeschylus from his throne of tragedy. Sophocles, on the contrary, embraced Aeschylus, held out his hand to him, and left him the throne. However, he vowed to fight Euripides as a second-string athlete in the event that Aeschylus was defeated in the battle that was to oppose him to Euripides for the possession of the throne.

At the end of the comedy, Aristophanes again pays homage to Sophocles: when Dionysus, after arbitrating the struggle between Aeschylus and Euripides, decides, against all expectations, to bring Aeschylus back to Earth, and not Euripides, of whom he initially seemed so fond, Aeschylus advises Pluto, the god of the Underworld, to entrust his throne to Sophocles and not to Euripides:

As for my chair of honour,
give it to Sophocles to keep safe for me
in case I ever come back here. He's the
one
whose talent I would put in second place.

Bear in mind—the rogue right there, this clown,
this liar, will never occupy my chair,
not even by mistake.

Not without a sense of humor, Aristophanes ends his comedy with a ranking of tragic authors in a fictive competition bearing not on a year, but on a whole century of the tragic genre. In the fifth century, the three finalists are already Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the ranking given clearly assigns the first place to Aeschylus, the second to Sophocles, and the third to Euripides. This selection seems to us natural. And yet it presupposes, on the part of a contemporary, a lucid choice among a considerable multitude of tragic authors who had participated in the annual competitions in the course of the fifth century. This list of winners had to please the audience. It accorded the first prize to Aristophanes' *Frogs* in the Lenaia comedy competition in 405, and the second prize to Phrynicus's *The Muses*. Aristophanes' comedy had that much success when it was performed again.

[Alone Time: Four Seasons, Four Cities, and the Pleasures of Solitude](#) by Stephanie Rosenbloom [Viking, 9780399562303]

"In Paris (or anywhere else, really) a table for one can be a most delightful place." --Alone Time, as seen in The New York Times

A wise, passionate account of the pleasures of traveling solo

In our increasingly frantic daily lives, many people are genuinely fearful of the prospect of solitude, but time alone can be both rich and restorative, especially when travelling. Through on-the-ground reporting and recounting the experiences of artists, writers, and innovators who cherished solitude, Stephanie Rosenbloom considers how being alone as a traveler--and even in one's own city--is conducive to becoming acutely aware of the sensual details of the world--patterns, textures, colors, tastes, sounds--in ways that are difficult to do in the company of others.

[Alone Time](#) is divided into four parts, each set in a different city, in a different season, in a single year. The destinations--Paris, Istanbul, Florence,

New York--are all pedestrian-friendly, allowing travelers to slow down and appreciate casual pleasures instead of hurtling through museums and posting photos to Instagram. Each section spotlights a different theme associated with the joys and benefits of time alone and how it can enable people to enrich their lives--facilitating creativity, learning, self-reliance, as well as the ability to experiment and change. Rosenbloom incorporates insights from psychologists and sociologists who have studied solitude and happiness, and explores such topics as dining alone, learning to savor, discovering interests and passions, and finding or creating silent spaces. Her engaging and elegant prose makes *Alone Time* as warmly intimate an account as the details of a trip shared by a beloved friend--and will have its many readers eager to set off on their own solo adventures.

Here is a unique opportunity to travel along with someone who is exploring being alone in four of the world's most interesting cities, Paris, Istanbul, Florence and New York, as paradoxical as that may sound. A discrete intimacy develops as we, her unknown readers, stow away in her mind as she takes in the scenes around her to a degree not sustainable when company is shared. It is indulgent, full attention to her own interaction with what is both stable and mobile that is delicious in its focus on personal sensation. Sample chapters bring us along on a picnic for one in the Luxembourg Gardens, to the Rainbow Stairs in Istanbul, standing alone with Venus in Florence, and wandering the West Village in New York.

A celebration of the value of solitude and the fantasy of "the flaneur: the solitary stroller, following his curiosity with no particular destination in mind, nowhere to be but in the here and now", we learn about 'savoring' as a practice to enhance well-being. As we ensconce ourselves in a quiet corner with this book we can truly experience the relaxation that comes with giving ourselves over to it.

The author includes useful and important tips at the end for traveling in places with unfamiliar customs but before that she has the chapter that could most easily inspire us to new adventures. She

recommends traveling in our own home town as if it were a foreign city and to bring a reporter's (or tourist's) eye and habits, and care, to our daily life and to do it alone. <>

[Homo Religiosus?: Exploring the Roots of Religion and Religious Freedom in Human Experience](#) edited by Timothy Samuel Shah and Jack Friedman [Cambridge Studies in Religion, Philosophy, and Society, Cambridge University Press, 9781108422352]

Are humans naturally predisposed to religion and supernatural beliefs? If so, does this naturalness provide a moral foundation for religious freedom? This volume offers a cross-disciplinary approach to these questions, engaging in a range of contemporary debates at the intersection of religion, cognitive science, sociology, anthropology, political science, epistemology, and moral philosophy. The contributors to this original and important volume present individual, sometimes opposing points of view on the naturalness of religion thesis and its implications for religious freedom. Topics include the epistemological foundations of religion, the relationship between religion and health, and a discussion of the philosophical foundations of religious freedom as a natural, universal right, drawing implications for the normative role of religion in public life. By challenging dominant intellectual paradigms, such as the secularization thesis and the Enlightenment view of religion, the volume opens the door to a powerful and provocative reconceptualization of religious freedom.

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Excerpt: This volume invites a renewed inquiry into an enduring question: are humans naturally religious? Do they possess a set of common characteristics transcending time, place, and culture that incline them towards religion? The answer, according to growing body of research in the cognitive and evolutionary sciences of religion, appears to be yes. "A general theme emerging from ... cognitive and evolutionary studies," cognitive scientists Justin Barrett and Robert Lanman posit, "is the Naturalness of Religion Thesis," by which they mean that:

[r]eligious thought and action are common across human history and cultures because of their relationship with particular naturally occurring human cognitive systems. Religion springs naturally from the way ordinary human cognitive systems interact with ordinary human social and natural environments.

Echoing this notion is cognitive scientist Paul Bloom, who likewise holds that "there are certain early emerging cognitive biases that make it natural to believe in Gods and spirits, in an afterlife, and in the divine creation of the universe." Religion appears to be natural, therefore, insofar as religious belief and action are deeply embedded in human cognition, in the way people ordinarily think about and experience the world.

This does not mean that religious belief and religious observance are necessary or inevitable for all people, or that the human brain is ineluctably "hard-wired" for religion. To appreciate this caveat, one need only observe the

many people throughout the world who do not profess any religious belief at all, and the still more who do not regularly engage in religious practices. What the naturalness of religion thesis does suggest, however, is that the conscious and sustained rejection of religion and of the supernatural, wherever it might arise, may require an overriding mechanism—a cultural and intellectual scaffolding—that the acceptance of religion does not similarly require.¹ Accordingly, although religious beliefs and practices may not manifest in all people, the naturalness of religion thesis maintains that these phenomena still arise naturally—that is, they regularly and predictably emerge through the normal development of human cognitive systems, without necessarily relying on the presence of "artificial" cultural or intellectual support structures.

What does this mean in practice? Apart from merely satisfying a healthy sense of scientific curiosity, why does the naturalness of religion thesis matter? What, if any, are the ethical, political, or social implications of a presumptive "naturalness of religion?" Does it suggest anything consequential about human nature, the nature of religion, or the proper ordering of society?

Of the many possible angles from which to approach these questions, this volume pursues one in particular: how might the naturalness of religion bear on the proposition—now increasingly contested—that there is a natural or human right to religious freedom that transcends at least to some degree the confines of particular historical and cultural contexts? The chapters that follow revolve around this central question.

In so doing, they grapple, directly or indirectly, with what we shall term the "anthropological case" for religious freedom. The anthropological case for religious freedom is the contention that the viability and strength of the argument for religious freedom as a natural or human right rests at least partly on the claim that our species of *Homo sapiens* is also in a strong sense *Homo religiosus*, to borrow a phrase of Mircea Eliade. In other words, a case for the right to religious freedom can be derived in part from evidence that religion is in some sense not merely epiphenomenal or accidental, but a regular

and predictable feature of human nature and human experience, taken as a whole.

A proper examination of this question requires, first, that we situate the idea of religion's naturalness in a broader historical and philosophical context: a task to which we now turn.

The Enlightenment Critique and Secularization Theory

Notwithstanding a growing body of supporting evidence in the cognitive and evolutionary sciences of religion, the naturalness of religion thesis remains an underdog of sorts. It runs counter to a predominant narrative in Western thought, according to which religion is an irrational—indeed, unnatural—quirk of the credulous human mind, sustained only through inculcation, socialization, and indoctrination. Far from being natural, intrinsic, or otherwise fundamental to human experience, religion therefore represents a profoundly unnatural, unnecessary, and undesirable condition. While this outlook has remained prevalent and thriving in the present day, thanks in part to a vociferous cohort of self-styled "brights" and "new atheists," its origins lie in the intellectual revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, otherwise known as the Enlightenment.

Central to the Enlightenment was a broad and incisive critique of religion, fueled by fresh memories of Europe's sanguinary Wars of Religion, the tyranny of the day's reigning theocracies, and the nascent but profound revelations of modern science. On the one hand, these converging factors gave rise to a fervent anticlericalism that opposed the unbridled political authority of religious institutions. On the other hand, the Enlightenment engineered a major paradigm shift with respect to religion and its role vis-à-vis society. At the risk of oversimplification, one can nevertheless generalize that throughout most of Western history, religion and religious truth had been a taken-for-granted cornerstone—or canopy, to use a different metaphor—of individual, social, and political life. But the Enlightenment paradigm upended this prevailing norm with the development of two mutually constituting but dialectically opposed ideas: "religion" and "modernity." Religion came to be defined as essentially irrational, superstitious, despotic, and regressive, in contradistinction to

"modernity," which signified the domain of reason, science, freedom, peace, economic prosperity, and universal human progress. Religion came to embody a dystopian past, while modernity assumed the symbolism of an idealized and inevitable future. Where religion lingered in the so-called "modern" world, it did so as an anachronism, a vestige of humanity's primitive origins quivering in dynamic tension with a world that is and must be, by its very nature, hostile to religion's presence. With modernity and religion locked in mutual opposition, and with the arc of history trending inexorably towards modernity, the demise of religion appeared a foregone conclusion.

Perhaps no-one anticipated the demise of religion with more breathtaking confidence than the French philosophe Nicolas de Condorcet in his *Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1795). For Condorcet, modernity first dawned during the Renaissance, for it was then that "the sciences and philosophy threw off the yoke of authority" — by which he meant, of course, theological and ecclesiastical authority. And reason's complete global triumph is only a matter of time.

[E]very thing seems to be preparing the speedy downfall of the religions of the East, which, partaking of the abjectness of their ministers, left almost exclusively to the people, and, in the majority of countries, considered by powerful men as political institutions only, no longer threaten to retain human reason in a state of hopeless bondage, and in the eternal shackles of infancy ... Then will arrive the moment in which the sun will observe in its course free nations only, acknowledging no other master than their reason; in which tyrants and slaves, priests and their stupid or hypocritical instruments, will no longer exist but in history and upon the stage; in which our only concern will be to lament their past victims and dupes, and, by the recollection of their horrid enormities, to exercise a vigilant circumspection, that we may be able instantly to recognise and effectually to stifle by the force of reason, the seeds of superstition and tyranny, should they ever presume again to make their appearance upon the earth.

This assumption of religion's inevitable demise — in which "priests and their stupid or hypocritical instruments, will no longer exist but in history and upon the stage" — persisted among many Enlightenment thinkers as a taken-for-granted and almost subliminal doctrine, so effortless in its certitude that it scarcely needed explication. Indeed, it had become such an article of Enlightenment faith that Tocqueville, for example, could observe that the eighteenth-century philosophers brimmed with the simple confidence that "[r]eligious zeal ... will be extinguished as freedom and enlightenment increase. In the early- to mid-twentieth century, this predictive assumption began to receive systematic attention from a new generation of social scientists who sought to elaborate and explain the precise mechanisms of religion's "inevitable" extinction through new social scientific theories and methodologies. Over the twentieth century, this effort generated a vibrant scholarly paradigm and school of thought that came to be known as secularization theory.

The "theory of secularization," in fact, refers not to one theory, but to a diverse array of theories, each of which postulates some type — and often very different types — of religious decline. Like the Enlightenment critique of religion, these theories generally presuppose a fundamental incompatibility between religion and modernity. But unlike the Enlightenment critique, in which religious decline was implicit in an overarching religion—modernity dialectic, secularization theory sought to offer a systematic description and explanation of religious decline in terms of identifiable social, political, economic, and psychological processes." Some secularization theories predict that the advancement of science and technology undermines religion's core metaphysical claims, thereby rendering religious belief cognitively hopeless. Some posit that economic development and improved material well-being lead to decreased religiosity. In other cases, secularization theories pivot on the idea of structural differentiation, the theory that religion declines as society fragments into discrete compartments or spheres. And from the theory of structural differentiation, still others extrapolate secularization as religious privatization, according to which religion, confined to a single differentiated sphere, is forced to

retreat from public life and take up residence on the margins of society.

Despite these and other theoretical variations, secularization theory's common denominator has been an effort to outline the conditions, mechanisms, and parameters of a presupposed religious decline. What "decline" means may differ from theory to theory. But most retain an unflagging assumption that some sort of decline is on the horizon, if not already here, drawing closer and closer in lockstep with secular modernity. The sociologist of religion Peter Berger gave this assumption paradigmatic expression when in 1968 he predicted — with a confidence that recalled Condorcet — that "by the 21st century, religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture."

Now well into the second decade of the twenty-first century, however, it is hard to see evidence of an irresistible, "worldwide secular culture," or the reduction of the world's believers into small, isolated sects. (To his credit, Berger long ago abandoned his commitment to secularization as a description or prediction of modern global reality, as we note below.) To the contrary, for instance, a recent Pew study reports that 5.8 billion people — or 84 percent of the world's population — affiliate themselves with one religion or another. Although some indicators of decreased religiosity have undoubtedly been documented in certain regions, such as in the nations of industrialized Europe and, more recently, in North America, global religiosity remains decidedly high, and in some cases, resurgent. The rise of Pentecostal Evangelicalism in Latin America, Asia and Africa, of political Islam in North Africa and the Middle East, and of Hindu nationalism in India, offer just a few examples of socially and politically consequential religious resurgence that vex the traditional narrative of secularization.

What this suggests is that history does not march to a uniform, linear beat of secularization. Rather, it moves dynamically and unpredictably to the protean rhythms of religious transformation, whereby religion is not necessarily in decline, but constantly in flux. In recent years, appreciation of this important nuance has prompted many erstwhile

champions of secularization theory to lose faith in its explanatory potential. Even Berger, though an influential secularization theorist in the 1960s, demonstrated uncommon scholarly humility in 1998 when he acknowledged that "the world today ... is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled 'secularization theory' is essentially mistaken.

Where does this leave us? The aim here is not to engage in polemics against secularization theory but to bring critical attention to the assumptions that undergird its theoretical infrastructure. And it is precisely these assumptions that scholarly exploration of the "naturalness of religion" invites us to interrogate from a fresh perspective. Following the Enlightenment critique of religion, as we have seen, secularization theory presupposes that religion is inherently irrational, superstitious, and anti-modern. Just as important, however, is that secularization theory presupposes that religion is a contingent product of culture and society. On this assumption, religion enjoys no enduring connection to human nature or experience, much less human flourishing, but thrives only when a narrow set of artificial conditions and supports are in place. Remove these conditions and supports — think of Condorcet's "priests and their stupid or hypocritical instruments" — and religion will suffer a "speedy downfall" (Condorcet again). The implication is that religion is an inessential and indeed temporary facet of the human condition that is doomed in the face of the comprehensive and revolutionary transformations wrought by modernity. While religion may have once seemed necessary, intrinsic, and natural, it becomes optional, extraneous, and unnatural when humanity shakes off the "shackles" of tradition, and human beings appear for the first time on the stage of history in their natural and pristine form as "unencumbered selves.

If religion is not constitutive of "humanness," however, and if it is primed to evanesce in the face of an ever-approaching modernity, then we must wonder about what seems to be the stubborn persistence of religion in the modern world. What can explain that? What is more, how do we square the enduring presence of religion, or some

manifestation thereof, in all cultures throughout human history.

Perhaps, as this volume explores, the answer lies in religion's naturalness. Could it be that religion has survived the advent of modernization because it arises, not by accident or from contingent circumstances that obtain one moment and disappear the next, but from capacities and dispositions that are intrinsic to human nature and persist, albeit in different forms, across time and space?

Naturalness of Religion and Religious Freedom

If religion is indeed natural, how — if at all — does this bear on the idea of a natural or human right to religious freedom? Does the naturalness of religion generate ipso facto a corresponding right to religious freedom; one that all people possess by virtue of their humanity?

At first glance, the notion that a natural or human right to religious freedom logically follows from religion's naturalness encounters the problem, most famously raised by philosopher David Hume, of deriving an "ought" from an "is." Hume maintained that empirical observations are value-free, and therefore cannot, by themselves, generate prescriptive or moral claims, such as rights, duties, obligations, codes of conduct, or any similar ethical norms. Along this line of reasoning, "naturalness," as an empirical observation, merely describes how the world is; it does not prescribe how it ought to be. To assign value on the basis of naturalness would be to make an unjustified deductive leap. It would be, in Hume's estimation, to commit the logical fallacy of deriving an "ought" from an "is." Accordingly, the naturalness of religion cannot by itself generate a normative claim about a right to religious freedom. In order for people to have such a right, the Humean argument would insist, religion or the assertion of its naturalness must also be accompanied by some sort of normative principle — for instance, that religion is a basic human good, and goods should be safeguarded and promoted. But if this is the case, does religion derive its goodness from its naturalness? If not, then naturalness is irrelevant to the equation; some other factor must be responsible for the good of religion that generates the right to religious freedom. If so,

then a further principle is needed to bridge the gap between naturalness and rights — for instance, that what is natural is ipso facto good, valuable, and therefore worth protecting. But such a principle is question-begging, for it supposes that religion derives its goodness from its naturalness, while defining naturalness as necessarily good. And the principle raises still more undercutting questions: what does it mean to be "natural?" Is immoral, but otherwise seemingly "natural," behavior — such as dishonesty, violence, or oppression — thereby sanctioned? And by the same token, are things that we value, but which do not appear particularly natural or easily sustained — such as absence of suffering, peace, or democracy — therefore unworthy of protection? From the Humean perspective, religion must be proven to have value for human beings and their societies, but such a value must necessarily be independent of any putative naturalness.

On the other hand, and without dispensing with the Humean argument, there may nonetheless be a compelling *prima facie* and practical case for deriving a right to religious freedom from religion's naturalness. What if religion were not simply natural but also fundamental and intrinsic in some way to human nature and experience? If religion were natural to human beings in this sense, religion would be at the core of human life: so much so that suppressing it — depriving human beings of their freedom to exercise religion — would necessarily run against the grain of human nature and therefore require extreme and sustained coercion. Such coercion would not only be extreme and probably violent in itself, but it would presumably elicit a violent and reactive backlash, all of which would perpetuate human suffering and stifle progress. As cognitive scientists Roger Trigg and Justin Barrett point out, "one of the most important facts that CSR [cognitive science of religion] draws attention to is that religion is not a private and idiosyncratic phenomenon with no place on the public stage. It is there at the heart of human activity," which means that "religion cannot, and must not, be ignored in public life ... The more religion is privatized and thought to be beyond the scope of public, rational discussion, the more it will fester and break out in all kinds of unpredictable and undesirable ways."

In other words, if there were a strong case that religion were natural to human experience in the robust sense of being tied to fundamental or basic features of our humanity, this would all by itself suggest a need to carve out greater freedom for religion and its free exercise in society. If religion really were "at the heart of human activity," presumably it should be restricted or excluded in society for only the gravest reasons. Likewise, if religion were natural in this strong sense, we should expect — as a matter of empirical fact — that religion cannot be suppressed, or eradicated, or dismissed as obsolescent without highly disruptive and deleterious consequences for individuals and for society as a whole.

On this last point, a case study of Bolshevik Russia proves instructive. Upon taking power in the Russian Revolution of 1917, Vladimir Lenin and his Bolshevik party undertook a systematic program of religious repression, persecution, and reeducation. Churches were forcibly closed, expropriated, or plundered; the ringing of church bells was forbidden; monks and priests were banished from their posts, deprived of the right to vote, and discouraged from wearing clerical garb in public; and those who defied Soviet authority were often sent to labor camps or simply shot.

The Bolshevik's anti-religious campaign was unique in the history of religious persecution. Unlike most cases throughout history, it did not follow religious or sectarian lines; neither the perpetrators nor the victims belonged to any one religion or sect in particular. Instead, for the Bolshevik party the target was religion itself. Following Karl Marx, Lenin's Bolsheviks viewed religion as the pathological expression of human suffering — the "opiate of the masses" — engendered by capitalism. As such, not only was religion a dispensable human construct devoid of any enduring or inherent relation to humanity, it was an obstacle to overcome in the name of human progress and flourishing.

If the Marxist—Leninist rationale for persecuting religion rings familiar, it is because it is of the same pedigree as the Enlightenment critique of religion. If, as the Enlightenment critique suggests, religion embodies humanity's primitive appetite for irrational superstition, then religion is something to

overcome in the name of human progress. If religion's demise is foretold in the prophecy of modernization, as secularization theory supposes, then religion can be safely disregarded until its final disappearance. And if religion is something retrograde to overcome as well as doomed to disappear in any case, it hardly seems worthy of legal or political protection. Indeed, efforts to accelerate its inevitable downfall would simply amount to being on the side of human progress or, as the now-popular saying goes, "the right side of history."

But just as antireligious ideologies could plausibly justify denials of religious freedom on the grounds that religion is untethered to human nature and inimical to human progress, perhaps evidence that religion emerges from core human capacities and fosters the flourishing of human nature can plausibly supply a powerful (though perhaps not sufficient) defense of religious freedom. For if religion is embedded in the basic mechanisms of human cognition, if it is an anthropological constant, and if it even seems closely tied to human well-being and proper functioning, then religious freedom may be justifiable as a defense not so much of the rights of religion as of the rights of humanity and of core dimensions of human experience. On this reading, religious freedom would be the right to be human, for to be human is, in part, to be *Homo religiosus*.

On Definitions

Before proceeding, a final point of clarification is in order. The contributors to this volume face the challenge, inherent in most careful analyses, of definition. As we have already seen, what we mean by "natural" has an unavoidable bearing on the import of the naturalness of religion thesis. Similarly, we must inquire into the nature of the thing that we are calling natural: what is religion? Is it a system of personal beliefs about the supernatural? The expression of these beliefs in a comprehensive way of life? Sacred rituals performed collectively in public or private? Or perhaps adherence to a sacred moral code? Unfortunately, there is no easy answer, no consensus definition to fall back on. Religion is, and will likely remain, what W. B. Gallie termed an "essentially contested concept" — one that is

widely recognized and used, but whose meaning remains in perpetual dispute.

Without a conclusive and generally recognized definition of religion to fall back on, is the present analysis of religion's naturalness rendered futile? Perhaps so, according to an increasing number of scholars of religion subscribing to an "anti-essentialist" school of thought. In the view of "anti-essentialists," any attempt to define religion will ultimately fail, because "religion" is an invented category, a cultural construct with no intelligible or stable referent corresponding in the empirical world. When we look across the world and across history, we find no self-contained, common phenomenon that an impartial spectator could safely identify as "religion." Rather, what we find is "a diverse, shifting, and multiform field of lived religious practice." This field exhibits radical and incommensurable variation across time and place, because, in the end, "there is no transhistorical and transcultural essence of religion. What counts as religion and what does not in any given context is contestable and depends on who has the power and authority to define religion at any given time and place."

The locus of that power to define, the "anti-essentialists" roundly surmise, is and was the modern Protestant West. There, "religion" arose from the collective consciousness of Western culture through a process of reification, which involved "mentally making religion into a thing, gradually coming to conceive it as an objective systematic entity." But in the view of the "anti-essentialists," this artificial projection was not merely a passive intellectual fallacy; it was a positive bid by European hegemony to arrogate to themselves political power over religion. Religion, once diffused and embedded in everyday life, became an isolated, stand-alone entity distinct from other spheres of life and conceived mainly in terms of individuals' interior theological beliefs. Defined as both discrete and interior, "religion" could be newly identified, cordoned off from politics, and subjected to political subordination and control.

Taken to its logical conclusion, the "anti-essentialist" outlook precludes fruitful discussion of religion. If "religion" signifies nothing objectively real or enduring, if its meaning is historically dynamic and

purely socially constructed, then it is impossible to know what we are talking about when we talk about religion. To invoke it in any sense is to impute to it a non-existing essence, thereby manufacturing the very thing we wish to apprehend in its denuded form. Further, if "religion" represents nothing more than a hegemonic project of the modern West, then its continued use suggests something more insidious at work: a covert maneuver to commandeer and exert political control.

Now, there is some well-founded reason for the "anti-essentialist" angst. The signifier "religion" is an imperfect vehicle for communicating an imperfectly understood empirical phenomenon. But the problem the anti-essentialists fixate on is hardly unique to religion. As Nicholas Wolterstorff points out in his contribution to this volume, all terms and concepts are conditioned by the history of their use. Like religion, the concept "democracy," to take one example, was forged within a specific cultural milieu, shaped by historical contingencies, and lacks an agreed upon definition. But surely this does not mean we cannot engage in productive discussions about democracy, nor does it require that we jettison the concept itself or refer to it only in scare quotes.

Aware that religion, like many other words and concepts, is inherently ambiguous, this volume nevertheless maintains an outlook rooted in "critical realism." As helpfully articulated by sociologist Christian Smith in this volume, a critical-realist approach to religion recognizes that the concept "religion" does in fact correspond to a confluence of phenomena that really exist in the world, even if these phenomena can never be perfectly disentangled from other phenomena. Following the late University of Chicago religion scholar Martin Riesebrodt, Smith proposes the following definitional approach:

Riesebrodt defines religion as, "a complex of practices that are based on the premise of the existence of superhuman powers, whether personal or impersonal, that are generally invisible." People are religious, according to Riesebrodt, in order to tap those superhuman powers to help them avert and solve problems they confront — from getting hurt or sick to suffering a bad existence after death. In his approach,

Riesebrodt asks us to focus on religious "liturgical" practices rather than abstract belief systems, which avoids a number of problems in other definitions. This substantive (not functional) definition of religion provides traction for identifying when religion is present or absent, stronger or weaker in human life. At the same time, however, it does not focus us on the centrality of religious beliefs, but on religious practices. That deftly sidesteps the misguided thrust of recent radical-constructionist accounts of religion that liquidate the subject.

Though religion is always intertwined with other phenomena, it can be singled out for analysis, if always inadequately. Though efforts to define religion are often vulnerable to political manipulation, it can be identified in ways that are not wholly governed by ulterior motives to control and dominate.

The first step is to ask, what are some qualities that characterize this really existing thing called "religion?" In accordance with the focus on religious practices Christian Smith articulates above, following Riesebrodt, a major theme of this volume is that religion is not simply a set of personal beliefs about the divine or a matter of engaging in purely private religious practices. As Nicholas Wolterstorff argues in this volume, religion involves both a religious "temperament" — a belief in a transcendent realm that orders and explains existence — and the expression of that "temperament" in a way of life. This means that, in addition to a private dimension of personal belief, religion is also characterized by a public dimension in which people, consciously or unconsciously, translate their beliefs into a wide variety of everyday activities that are necessarily also social, political, cultural, economic, etc.

What difference does an awareness of this public dimension make? Why does defining religion as such matter at all? Apart from the well-founded desire for conceptual clarity, it matters because any conception of religious freedom necessarily depends on what we mean by "religion." To define religion is to demarcate the boundaries of freedom; it is to determine which pursuits, values, practices, and social spaces are entitled to protection. On one hand, if "religion" is simply a

matter of personal belief and private worship, then "religious freedom" is merely the right to form beliefs and express them privately in one's home or place of worship. To be sure, this private dimension is crucial to any robust definition of religious freedom. On the other hand, if Trigg and Barrett are correct in claiming that religion involves a public dimension, in part by virtue of its natural foundations in human cognition, a dimension in which religious faith invariably enters public life and informs a comprehensive way of life, then religious freedom necessarily includes the right to exercise one's religion in public life, including political and economic life. Failure to recognize this public dimension renders a vast swath of vital religious activity wholly unprotected.

This volume is the product of a seminar series hosted by the Religious Freedom Project at Georgetown University's Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs between 2010 and 2013. Under the leadership of Director Thomas F. Farr and Director for International Research Timothy Shah, this Project was, and its successor, the Religious Freedom Research Project, remains, the only university-based program in the world devoted exclusively to interdisciplinary inquiry about religious freedom — what it is and how it is related to the well-being of individuals and societies everywhere. It has been generously supported by the John Templeton Foundation and enjoys a close partnership with the Institute for Studies of Religion at Baylor University.

The seminar series hosted by the Religious Freedom Project brought together some of the world's most eminent scholars from a wide range of disciplines to discuss the overarching theme of "Religion as Intrinsic to Human Experience" and what bearing, if any, this theme has on the nature, universality, and status of religious freedom. Each of the five seminars began with an "anchor scholar" who presented an original essay, followed by a response from another expert in the relevant field. The structure of this volume reflects the structure of the seminar series: the articles are paired in a presentation—response format.

The first four chapters examine the naturalness of religion from the perspective of sociology, cognitive science, and evolutionary science. In the first article, "Are Human Beings Naturally Religious?" sociologist Christian Smith cautions that this question invariably depends on what we mean by "natural." If "natural" refers to an innate and irrepressible drive guaranteeing that all people are bound to become religious in some obvious and conventional sense, then religion is not natural. After all, Smith points out, many people live quite happily without religion. Similarly, if by "natural" we mean all human cultures have a functional need for making religion a "centrally defining feature of society," then religion is not natural in this sense either, for societies vary in how religion figures into their way of life. However, Smith proposes that religion is natural in the sense that all people possess "a complex set of innate features, capacities, powers, limitations, and tendencies that capacitate them to be religious (i.e., to think, perceive, feel, imagine, desire, and act religiously), and that, under the right conditions, tend to predispose and direct them toward religion."

According to Smith, these features, capacities, powers, limitations, and tendencies are constitutive of the human condition, which is itself characterized by four components that collectively incline people towards religion. First, the human condition is one of epistemological uncertainty. We lack access to foundational and indubitable truths because all knowledge is built on propositions, or chains of propositions, that must eventually take something as given. This makes humans fundamentally believing — not knowing — animals. Second, humans gravitate towards religion because they possess the capacity and desire to solve problems, especially ones that cannot be answered in finite, immanent terms. Third, humans desire to answer important "Life Questions" for which religion has historically been a primary source of answers. And fourth, humans are drawn to religion by what Charles Taylor has called the moral condition of unavoidably operating with reference to strong normative commitments, ones that are not culturally relative or based on personal preference.

Shifting to religious freedom, Smith argues that insofar as religion is natural, and hence

fundamental to human experience, governments professing a commitment to the values of liberty, equality, and human flourishing must therefore be prepared to protect religious freedom. To restrict religious freedom would be to suppress the basic capacities that make us human. What's more, because religion is such a fundamental aspect of the human condition, attempts to suppress, control, or eliminate it are bound to require highly coercive and violent measures. The preservation of religious freedom, then, is a practical necessity as a precondition for peace and social justice.

In "Are Human Beings Naturally Religious? A Response to Christian Smith," sociologist Phil Zuckerman concedes Smith's point that humans exhibit an innate capacity for religion, which, under the right conditions, compels them towards religion. But he emphasizes that humans also display natural capacities and tendencies to be nonreligious. And if both capacities and tendencies are natural, then "naturalness" is emptied of the conceptual substance necessary to say anything meaningful and useful about anything. For, under the right conditions, Zuckerman observes, people are predisposed to do just about anything. Under the right conditions, "people can be directed towards genocide, organ-donating, communism, graffiti-spraying ... Thus, to say that 'under the right conditions' people tend to be religious, isn't saying anything much at all." Accordingly, Zuckerman finds religion's naturalness (or lack thereof) to be immaterial to the question of religious freedom. Religious freedom should not be based on religion's naturalness but on the concern for human freedom more generally.

The third contribution is by Justin Barrett, a leading authority on the cognitive science of religion. In "On the Naturalness of Religion and Religious Freedom," he articulates and defends the naturalness of religion thesis from his extensive research in the cognitive sciences: "because of the nature of human minds, religious expression in beliefs and practices is nearly inevitable in most people." To support this claim, Barrett draws on budding research from the cognitive science of religion in particular, which suggests that religious behavior is embedded in several basic features of human cognition. First, human minds are predisposed to detect intentional

agents in their environments even when they are not visibly present. Second, once an agent is detected, human minds are inclined to draw inferences about the motivations and internal experiences of those agents. Third, human minds are conditioned to seek purpose and meaning in the natural world. When combined, these three modes of cognition generate religious reasoning about supernatural entities, such as gods and spirits, and about the natural world, to which human beings naturally impute teleological order and design.

Religion is natural, therefore, because it arises easily and predictably from basic human cognitive systems. In other words, it is our natural cognitive systems — as they interact with our surroundings — that predispose us towards religious ideas and behaviors. In calling religion "natural" in this way, however, Barrett takes care to point out that he does not advocate the view that religion is unalterable or "hard-wired" into the human brain. Religion is natural in that it is characterized by "ease, automaticity and fluency" — that is, basic religious beliefs and behaviors require little conscious attention or effort.

Barrett makes a further distinction between two types of naturalness. When behaviors require significant practice, cultivation, or expertise to reach the point of "ease, automaticity and fluency," they are forms of practiced naturalness. However, when they arise as part of normal human development, requiring little or no practice, they represent maturational naturalness. The central thrust of Barrett's chapter is that religion is maturationally natural, arising from within normal cognitive faculties, which include our hypersensitive tendency to perceive intentional agents, to reason about what other agents are experiencing, and to seek purpose in the natural world. Importantly, these faculties are embedded in our normal cognitive functioning; they are not "add-ons to human nature or systems that we can simply turn off." The implication is that, contrary to claims that religion constitutes pathogenic or defective behavior, human cognitive systems are properly functioning when they generate religious beliefs and religious forms of engagement with our surroundings. Likewise, contrary to the assertion that religion requires an elaborate cultural scaffolding

to support it, this suggests that religiosity is anchored in unmediated human experience.

On the subject of religious freedom, Barrett limits his focus to the practical consequences of coercively suppressing religion. He cites "adaptationist" evolutionary accounts of religion, which theorize that religion is adaptive because, for instance, it promotes cooperation and sociability. If religion has an important and adaptive social function, as adaptationist theories maintain, then it follows that inhibiting religious beliefs and practices will have deleterious effects on society, as examples of religious repression in places such as Soviet Russia and Maoist China arguably show.

If Barrett's interests lie in the cognitive mechanisms that make religious beliefs and practices nearly inevitable in most people, the authors of the next essay are interested in the evolutionary mechanisms responsible for religion's prominence in human culture. Responding to Barrett in "Sacred Versus Secular Values: Cognitive and Evolutionary Sciences of Religion and Their Implications for Religious Freedom," evolutionary anthropologists Richard Sosis and Jordan Kiper propose signaling theory as the best explanation for why and how religious beliefs and practices emerged and persisted in human history. Signaling theory hypothesizes that because religious activities often involve exacting and costly work, participating in them functions as a reliable indicator of trustworthiness and group commitment. Since trustworthiness and group commitment create the advantageous qualities of solidarity and cooperativeness within a community, religion has an adaptive value.

Viewing religion through the lens of signaling theory leads Sosis and Kiper to conclude, contrary to Barrett, that religion is most likely a case of practiced rather than maturational naturalness. In a way that is akin to Riesebrodt's practice-centered definition of religion, Sosis and Kiper understand religion primarily as a complex system of ritual practices that signal group commitment. As such, however, they conclude that religion does not naturally arise with ease, fluency and automaticity. Instead, it must be cultivated through continuous performances and sustained cultural norms. Furthermore, Sosis and Kiper conclude that whether religion is an instance of maturational or practiced

naturalness does not bear on the right to religious freedom. "[R]eligious freedom may be a fundamental political right that deserves legal protection, but the justification and the level of such protections cannot be derived from the naturalness of religion alone," they write. Deriving religious freedom from its supposed naturalness would confuse scientific description with normative prescription — two realms that do not overlap, in their view, in part because of their insistence on a Humean distinction between fact and value, description and prescription. At the same time, Sosis and Kiper emphasize that their research provides an indirect argument for religious freedom insofar as it "highlight[s] the potentially negative unintended consequences of manipulating or interfering with religious systems from the outside."

The fifth and sixth chapters turn to the theme of religion and its relationship to human rationality. In "Theism, Naturalism, and Rationality," philosopher of religion Alvin Plantinga explores the epistemological foundations of religious belief, on one hand, and materialistic naturalism, on the other. First, he argues that religious belief — here, belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God who created the world — is rational, but only if it is true. That is, the rationality of religious belief is predicated on the existence of a God who intentionally equipped humans with the capacity to perceive Him. Second, Plantinga pursues the stronger claim that belief in God is foundational to rationality — or, more precisely, that theism is a precondition for our confidence that our epistemic powers are reliable, while naturalism (which is necessarily atheistic) is incompatible with a rational confidence in our epistemic competence.

He advances this two-pronged argument primarily by way of showing that atheistic naturalism, which denies the existence of God or anything like God and presumes that human beings emerged through blind evolutionary processes, is self-defeating. If, as naturalism maintains, humans evolved via unguided natural selection, and if natural selection favors adaptive behaviors and beliefs irrespective of their truth content (which he suggests is the case), then it follows that humans would have evolved to have adaptive — but not necessarily true — beliefs. If naturalism were true, the naturalist cannot

have confidence in the reliability of her beliefs, including her belief in naturalism. And to argue in defense of the naturalistic worldview would be to rely on the very thing under question, namely the reliability of one's capacity to reason. This strong argument for the disjunction of rationality and naturalism and the conjunction of rationality and theistic religion provides an unusual and compelling argument for religious freedom. "Protecting the right to religious belief, therefore, simply amounts to a recognition of the human condition, a condition in which human rationality coheres best with a 'supernaturalist metaphysics' and a religiously grounded account of human cognition."

In "Alvin Plantinga on Theism, Naturalism, and Rationality," philosopher Ernest Sosa raises several objections to Plantinga's argument. First, Sosa highlights an inconsistency that tends to arise for theists confronted with the argument from evil. The argument from evil holds that the presence of evil in the world undermines the existence of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omniscient God. A typical theistic rejoinder to the argument from evil is that humans simply cannot comprehend God's mysterious ways. But by the same token, Sosa contends, theists cannot claim to know that God created humans with reliable cognitive faculties. It would, of course, be logically inconsistent to claim ignorance on the problem of evil while expressing confidence in God's epistemic benevolence. Next, Sosa objects to Plantinga's depiction of naturalism as the outlook that all phenomena are reducible to the activity of rote physical processes. This characterization is overly narrow, Sosa maintains, for "not all naturalists are so radically reductive as Plantinga's materialist is supposed to be." In the final thrust of the article, Sosa challenges Plantinga's assertion that the naturalist has an "undefeated defeater" for the claim that brute evolutionary forces produce reliable beliefs. Naturalism is only self-defeating, Sosa reminds us, if it has no recourse to establish the reliability of knowledge under naturalist conditions other than on the basis of its own tainted logic. "We do have another basis, however, beyond anything we may believe about the etiology of our faculties." That basis, he suggests, is the faculties themselves, which we tacitly accept and rely on for reliable information in everyday situations.

From here, the volume shifts to the theme of religion and health. Does religion promote well-being? Does it help maintain healthy populations? Is it a necessary condition for human flourishing? If so, if religion is indeed central to health, what are the implications for religious freedom? Does it generate or strengthen an obligation of governments to guarantee religious freedom for all people?

"Research on Religion and Health: Time to Be Born Again?" by sociologist Linda K. George, offers an illuminating appraisal of religion and health science to date. In it, George argues the field has become stagnant. Though religion—health science has demonstrated positive links between religion and mental and physical health, it has failed to explain these associational links in terms of a compelling, comprehensive theory. Instead, it has approached these links through a tunnel vision fixed on several standard causal mechanisms, such as that religious participation fosters social support systems, promotes healthy behaviors, and provides psychological resources — none of which, she contends, have advanced our understanding of the religion—health relationship appreciably. Future research should aim to broach new theoretical questions around these causal links, including: Does engagement in multiple dimensions of religious participation yield greater health benefits than engagement in one or two? How does the experience of having a close personal relationship with God — a surprisingly unexplored dimension of religious participation — bear on health outcomes? And to what extent might religious contexts (i.e., social, cultural, and geographic settings) promote health over and above personal religious involvement? In addition to formulating new questions, George recommends that future research develop and employ new methodological strategies. Specifically, future research should shift from examining micro-level causal mechanisms, to exploring meta-theories capable of accounting for society-wide belief structures and systems of meaning. She suspects that the religion—health relationship will ultimately lie in the comprehensive worldview and system of meaning religion often provides — imparting coherence and purpose to people's lives — rather than any particular religious belief or practice. "As articulated throughout this volume, there are many reasons to

sustain, protect, and celebrate religious freedom," George notes in the conclusion of her essay. "Although imperfectly understood, the well-documented links between religion and human health are surely one of those reasons."

Building on George's appraisal, epidemiologist Jeff Levin proposes new directions for research on religion and health in "Religion, Health, and Happiness: An Epidemiologist's Perspective." Levin reiterates George's observation that religion, viewed from a wide lens and across populations, is associated with salutary health outcomes. But this association remains poorly understood due to a lack of properly conceived and applied conceptual, theoretical, and methodological questions. Levin confronts this problem from an epidemiological lens, which begins by clarifying concepts such as "religion" and "health" and then moves on to exploring theoretical questions about how or why religion affects health. Here, Levin advises two methodological adjustments. First, he urges the design of longitudinal studies able to track religion—health impacts on individuals over time and across populations. Second, he advocates studies that are capable of evaluating policy-relevant questions. Such questions include, among others, whether religion improves well-being by mitigating the risks or health consequences of "deviant" behavior, whether religion is a necessary or sufficient condition of a good life, and whether religious institutions can function as effective conduits for the promotion of democratic values and global security.

While the chapters by George and Levin are designed to raise more questions than definitive answers, and while an adequate understanding of the associations between religion and health requires further research into underlying causal mechanisms and pathways, we can in the meantime begin to consider tentative implications for religious freedom. If religion plays a distinctive role in promoting mental and physical health and is therefore conducive to human well-being, then we may have yet another reason to believe that religion is not only natural in the sense of persistent and widely present in human experience but also natural in the sense of good for human nature and conducive to human fulfillment. Insofar as

governments are charged with promoting the public good, the positive relationship between religion and health offers a promising line of justification for a right to religious freedom.

However, this line of justification also raises further questions. If religion is a good or a source of good, is this by itself sufficient to generate a right to religious freedom? Can a good ipso facto generate a corresponding right? Taking another step back, what is the relationship between the good of religion and the right to religious freedom? And to address that question, we must take another step back and ask: what is the most philosophically defensible account of the basis for rights in the first place?

The final three chapters address these lingering questions in a discussion of the nature of the right to religious freedom, its philosophical grounding, and its practical meaning. In "Why There Is a Natural Right to Religious Freedom," philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that religious freedom is indeed a universal right, but not primarily because religion is a human good. It would be a great good, he points out, if an art museum gave him a prized Rembrandt painting, but it doesn't therefore follow that he has a right to this luxury. I have a right to X when I have a strong moral claim or entitlement to X, such that I would be wronged if I were denied X. Few of us would claim that we have a strong moral entitlement to a Rembrandt painting, as great a good as it might be in our lives, or that we're being wronged if we don't possess one. On the other hand, many of us would claim that we have a strong claim and entitlement to religious freedom, and that we would be gravely wronged if that right were denied or disrespected. All this suggests that we don't have a right to a Rembrandt painting, that we do have a right to religious freedom, and that something being a great good (such as a Rembrandt painting) can't be sufficient to generate or justify a right.

What, then, is the basis of the kind of strong moral claim or entitlement that constitutes a natural right? What kind of right does it yield? Wolterstorff argues that our right to religious freedom is natural, meaning that it arises from the essential, or natural, features of human experience. Unlike political or legal rights, which exist only in the

context of conferring political institutions or laws, natural rights may be ignored or violated, but they cannot be taken away, because they spring from an enduring source, such as human nature, independent of particular historical contingencies.

Inasmuch as the right to religious freedom arises naturally — that is, from human nature — the existence and contours of this right will fundamentally depend on our understanding of human nature — on what is deemed natural, intrinsic, or essential to being human. Wolterstorff thus builds his case for the natural right to religious freedom by way of introducing a conception of the human person as possessing a special worth, or "dignity," that stems from several basic human capacities. Whereas philosophical accounts of human dignity typically place emphasis on the capacity for rational and normative agency, the ability to use reason to determine one's actions and moral choices, Wolterstorff concludes that mere rationality provides an insufficient basis for grounding human dignity. If the capacity for rational agency is what gives humans dignity, he observes, people with an undeveloped sense of rational agency, such as children or the mentally impaired, would lack dignity. Without rejecting the relevance of rational and normative agency wholesale, Wolterstorff identifies two other natural capacities and suggests both that they are important sources of human dignity and "directly relevant to the natural right to free exercise of one's religion." The first is "the capacity to interpret reality and one's place therein." Although how we interpret reality is variable, the capacity itself is amazing. The second is the capacity to form a "valorized identity." People assign importance to various facets of their lives — their beliefs, commitments, plans of action, memories, persons, animals, objects, etc. — thereby creating a web and hierarchy of normative priorities. All human action begins with, and functions in relation to, this network of values. Christian Smith in this volume refers to this fact as the human "moral condition" of "unavoidably operating in relation to moral beliefs." Try as we might, we cannot escape the normative commitments that layer our conscious and unconscious decisions.

Taken together, Wolterstorff argues that these capacities endow human beings with a powerful and intrinsic value — a dignity — that demands respect. Respecting human dignity is not simply a matter of sustaining biological life; it is a matter of sustaining a specific kind of life, a life worthy of dignified beings. And central to a life of dignity is the free exercise of basic human capacities. Conversely, to experience the deliberate stifling or blockage of one's basic capacities is to suffer a kind of dehumanization.

How exactly does the right to religious freedom emerge from these two extraordinary human capacities? The answer hinges on Wolterstorff's conceptualization of religion, which consists, first, of a belief in the presence of an all-encompassing transcendent order responsible for the creation of the universe and our place, purpose, and value therein; and second, the expression of this belief in a comprehensive way of life. Formulated as such, the free exercise of religion is vital to the

capacity for transcendent interpretation and valorized identity formation. To the extent that people have a right to exercise these capacities, then, people have a right to religious freedom. In short, we have a right to religious freedom because our capacity to be religious is intimately related to our dignity as humans.

In his final analysis, Wolterstorff turns his attention from the philosophical foundations of religious freedom as a natural right to the limits justifiably imposed on religious liberty by liberal democratic societies. Wolterstorff observes that the political philosophy of liberalism typically revolves around the idea that religion must "shape-up" in specific ways in order to conform to the norms and values of liberal democracy. It is true, Wolterstorff grants, that religion must behave according to a set of governing democratic rules. But the problem is that the rules and boundaries regulating the relationship between religion and the state are often tilted in favor of the state, to the detriment of religious citizens. Wolterstorff ascribes this bias to the legacy of liberalism, which traditionally insists that religion must assume a privatized role vis-à-vis the state and society that, in other words, religious citizens and their institutions should not interfere in the public affairs of government and politics.

Though Wolterstorff deals with several variants of the idea that religion should "shape up," his critique of political philosopher John Rawls merits special attention. Rawls argued that in deliberation over important political issues, citizens and public officials should refrain from invoking purely religious reasons in support of their positions. Instead, they should make an effort to justify their views with reasons and evidence that are "public" in nature — that is, reasons whose cogency is widely accessible, depending not on particular metaphysical or moral doctrines, but on widely shared principles and modes of reasoning. In effect, Rawls's notion of public reason circumscribes the types of arguments that religious persons can and should make in public. This restriction is necessary, Rawls judged, because religious reasons are essentially incapable of being a broadly acceptable basis on which to exercise public authority over the diverse members of a political community.

Wolterstorff contends that Rawls's idea of public reason imposes an impractical and unjustified restriction on religious freedom. Some religious individuals, he points out, orient their lives wholly in terms of their religion. Whether taught to rely on religious reason as a matter of ethical principle or as a matter of fidelity to God, they know no way to reason about matters of justice and their obligations to their fellow citizens outside of the teachings of their religious faith. For these people, the requirements of public reason may be too great a demand. They may simply not be capable of articulating their political positions in "public" terms as Rawls would like, or they may be able to do so only with undue strain. In either case, Wolterstorff maintains, public reason imposes a unilateral burden on religious individuals to act against their consciences by conforming to secular norms — a kind of burden that public reason does not impose on nonreligious individuals. Pressing the natural right to religious freedom to its logical conclusion, Wolterstorff argues that this right requires, among other things, that deeply religious individuals enjoy the freedom to bring their religious reasons to bear on matters of public import.

The next chapter, "Religious Liberty, Human Dignity, and Human Goods" by philosopher Christopher Tollefsen, contrasts Wolterstorff's right- and dignity-based account of religious freedom with an alternative, goods-based approach. Recall that Wolterstorff argues that a right (in this case, religious liberty) cannot be derived solely from a good (in this case, religion). In order to establish a right to religious freedom, something else must be introduced to the equation. This "something else" is human dignity, grounded in several unique human capacities. Although religion, exercised via these capacities, may entail the actualization of a great good, Wolterstorff concludes that we have a right to religious freedom primarily because the free exercise of religion is closely tied to human capacities central to human dignity.

Like Wolterstorff, Tollefsen thinks that we have a natural right to religious freedom, and agrees that human dignity plays a role in characterizing and grounding this right. But unlike Wolterstorff, he thinks that this right follows primarily from the good of religion. Human dignity, Tollefsen contends, lacks meaning and substance unless it is ordered to an account of those basic human goods that orient and motivate human reasoning and choosing. Religion is one such basic good because it provides "intelligible reason for action by promising something desirable."

Moreover, religion is a basic good because it is desired for its own sake, not for some other good. And it is a common good because its goodness provides reasons for action that multiple agents can share and act on cooperatively.

To appreciate how Tollefsen's characterization of religion as a basic common good bears on the question of rights, we should consider the broader philosophical context in which Tollefsen reasons. As a proponent of the "new natural law theory," Tollefsen views human action as fundamentally motivated by, and directed towards, the pursuit of basic goods whose attainment enables human flourishing. Hence the protection of goods, especially basic ones like religion, is a fundamental precondition of human well-being. People have a right to religious freedom first and foremost because religion, as a basic good, is indispensable to human flourishing.

Although this goods-based account does not rely on a notion of human dignity, Tollefsen stresses that the two are not incompatible. In fact, human dignity, defined as the excellence of beings with the capacity for reasoned choice, is central to the pursuit of goods. To pursue and participate in the basic goods, one must have the capacity to freely choose which goods to pursue, and in what way. Human dignity and human goods are thus closely conjoined in Tollefsen's account. He cautions, however, that human dignity lacks normative force when it is not coupled with a corresponding account of human goods. This problem manifests in at least two ways.

On the one hand, if, as is often the case, human dignity is understood simply as the capacity to be self-determining, the injunction to protect dignity may indirectly lend credence to actions that are actually antithetical to basic goods. Taking assisted suicide, for example — an issue that is often framed and justified in terms of human dignity as self-determination — Tollefsen notes that the decision to end one's own life runs counter to the good of protecting life. If life is a basic good, and if basic goods are inextricable to human dignity, then the choice to die not only defies the moral obligation to protect the good of life, but it violates human dignity itself. On the other hand, though Wolterstorff does not reduce human dignity to the mere capacity for reasoned choice, or self-determination, Tollefsen maintains that Wolterstorff's account nevertheless succumbs to a different fallacy, that of failing to order human capacities to the goods to which they are naturally oriented. As a result, the correlative rights produced under Wolterstorff's account of dignity are better equipped to protect bare capacities than they are to protect basic goods — a crucial problem if the point of rights is to protect basic goods, as Tollefsen claims.

The volume's final article, "Public Reason and Democratic Values: A Reply to Nicholas Wolterstorff" by political philosopher Stephen Macedo, registers a critique of Wolterstorff's objection to the Rawlsian-style project of getting religion to "shape up." Does Rawls's demand for religious "shaping up" — that religious individuals offer only "public" reasons for their political

positions — impose on those individuals an unjustifiable burden, as Wolterstorff alleges? Moreover, is Wolterstorff on solid ground when he suggests that such a demand is also unrealistic in practice, as many people are either not in the habit of conforming to this particular demand, or are simply unable on principle or in good conscience to translate their deeply held religious beliefs into "public," secular language? Macedo demurs on both normative and descriptive grounds. The idea of public reason, he argues, reflects an important obligation of democratic citizenship, one that, in fact, is already prevalent and ingrained in American political culture. This is the obligation of citizens living in a pluralistic society to find "common ground" when determining basic and mutually binding rights, laws, and policies. When making important political decisions, in other words, people should try to justify their positions using "public" reasons and evidence that members of all faiths (or no faith) could share, not ones based on particular religious doctrine. The failure or refusal to offer publicly accessible justifications for one's political positions, Macedo concludes, is a clear violation of this obligation.

As it happens, however, most American citizens, even avowedly religious ones, already subscribe to the practice of public reasoning, Macedo points out. Studies of conservative Christian activists and advocacy organizations demonstrate that the religious often go to great lengths to formulate philosophical arguments not grounded in sacred scripture. Similarly, Macedo cites the debate over gay rights in America, which has shifted from a framework of overtly religious claims to more secular claims that invoke matters of public interest, such as procreation and the well-being of children. According to Macedo, this shift is, at least in part, a practical and necessary response to the fact of religious diversity. Because people disagree about religion in fundamental and intractable ways, purely religious arguments will often fail to win broad support.

Only by framing arguments in terms that adherents of multiple faiths could endorse is it possible for such arguments to prevail.

So is religion a feature of human nature and experience, and if it is, does religion's naturalness help to ground and shape a defensible account of religious freedom as a natural or human right? The questions are of both practical and theoretical importance for at least two reasons.

The first reason is that religious freedom is in global crisis. According to the Pew Research Center, roughly 5.5 billion people, or 77 percent of the world's population, were living with "high" or "very high" restrictions on religion in 2013. And this crisis is not abating. Though restrictions stemming from governments and "social hostilities" declined modestly from 2012 to 2013, social hostilities have experienced a steady rise, from afflicting 45 percent of the global population in 2007 to 73 percent in 2013. Government restrictions have likewise trended up from 58 percent in 2007 to 63 percent in 2013. Taken together, the share of the global population living with "high" or "very high" restrictions on religion, whether government restrictions or those stemming from social hostilities, has increased from 68 percent in 2007 to 77 percent in 2013.

Moreover, contrary to what one might expect, these increases are not limited to non-Western parts of the world. For instance, from 2011 to 2012, Europe was one of the few regions to experience a rise in government religious restrictions. Between 2007 and 2013, government restrictions in Europe rose from a median score of 1.6 to 2.5, and social hostilities rose from a median score of 2.2 to 2.3, well above the world average of 1.6 (and, notably, higher than every other region except the Middle East and North Africa). A separate study on government involvement in religion (GIR) conducted by political scientist Jonathan Fox draws similar conclusions. Assessing the prevalence of two models of religious freedom — "free exercise" and "equality" — across the globe, Fox finds that robust religious freedom is exceedingly rare, even within Western liberal democracies. When held to the "free exercise" model, which assesses the ability to practice one's religion freely and maintain religious institutions, only 14 percent of countries register as religiously free, and only 18 percent of Western democracies. Countries fared even worse when held to the

"equality" model, which measures the extent to which all religious individuals and groups in a society are treated "equally" (i.e., not systematically favored or discriminated against) by the state. By this standard, only 5 percent of all countries are religiously free, including no Western democracies. Even when relaxing the criteria to allow for minor infractions, still only 37 percent of all countries, and 48 percent of Western democracies, satisfied the "free exercise" standard of religious freedom. Likewise, only 17 percent of all countries, and 11 percent of Western democracies, met the "equality" standard. With this global crisis of religious freedom comes an increasing urgency to explore whether a case for religious freedom can be grounded in the universal language of human nature and human experience.

Affirming religious freedom as a right is imperative for a second reason. A new front has opened in the global crisis of religious freedom, this time waged not on the ground, as it were, but in the halls of Western academia, where a new cadre of religious freedom critics has emerged. The intellectual point of departure of these "new critics" is a postmodern suspicion of universal truth claims and a postcolonial sensitivity to cultural imperialism, which guides them to the "anti-essentialist" conclusion that like religion, religious freedom is a Western construct, invented and propagated as a means of exerting political manipulation. By historicizing religious freedom in terms of a genealogical origin in a particular culture at a particular time, the new critics conclude, "far from being a universally valid principle, religious freedom is the product — and the agenda — of one culture in one historical period: the modern West." There, the new critics' story goes, the concept "religious freedom" was created by modern, centralizing European nation-states as a technology of control and domination. Implicit in this story is a normative verdict, namely that religious freedom, as both an instrument of repression and the legacy of one particular culture, should not be advocated among people outside the West — people for whom the principle of religious freedom is bound to be conceptually and morally foreign. Doing so, the new critics say, amounts to cultural imperialism, offending non-Western people's dignity and native sense of morality.

The new critics' argument boils down to two pivotal but equally dubious claims, one normative and the other descriptive. The first claim is that religious freedom should not be foisted on non-Western societies. This thinking relies on notions of cultural relativism and assumes that a norm or value's sphere of validity is demarcated by the cultural and historical conditions in which it developed. The problem here, as with cultural relativism in general, is the conflation of cultural and historical particularity with normative validity. The new critics fail to recognize that the validity of moral norms and values does not hinge purely on the particular details and pathways of their historical emergence. For example, although there is now a consensus in the global community that slavery is an egregious wrong, formal proscriptions of the practice emerged locally and under culturally particular conditions. In fact, until relatively recently in human history, principled opposition to slavery was the exception rather than the rule. But does this mean that opposition to slavery has only local and contingent normative force and meaning, and that it is forever conjoined with the particular ideological, moral, and religious agendas of the earliest anti-slavery pioneers? The categorical evil of slavery, we can be sure, transcends geographic and temporal boundaries. Likewise, though the principle of religious freedom is not ahistorical, its moral force may still be universal, extending to all peoples of all cultures.

The other claim pertains to the empirical details of religious freedom's historical emergence — namely that religious freedom was an isolated invention of the modern West, developed for hegemonic political purposes. On the one hand, the new critics provide no evidence that modernizing states of early modern Europe developed and deployed the idea of religious freedom as a mechanism of political domination. Much to the contrary, advocates of religious freedom surfaced on the margins of society, often by victims of state-sponsored religious persecution acting in opposition to the governing authorities. On the other hand, there is much evidence that notions of religious freedom predated the modern West. While it is true that the first principled and systematic instantiations of religious freedom emerged in Europe following the Reformation, the idea of

religious freedom has historical roots in antiquity. Nearly two thousand years ago, a pair of North African Christian apologists, Tertullian of Carthage and Lucius Lactantius, articulated principled defenses of religious freedom. Writing in the early third century, Tertullian declared, "It is a fundamental human right, a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to his own convictions" (Ad Scapulam 2, 1—2). A century later, Lactantius echoed this view: "For nothing is so much a matter of free will as religion, for if the mind of the worshipper turns away it is carried off and nothing remains" (Divine Institutes V, XX). And on an adjacent continent in the third century BC, the Indian emperor Ashoka likewise urged religious tolerance and mutual understanding:

Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, desires that all religions should reside everywhere, for all of them desire self-control and purity of the heart. But people have various desires and various passions, and they may practice all of what they should or only a part of it." One must not exalt one's creed discrediting all others, nor must one degrade these others without legitimate reasons (Fourteen Rock Edicts, 7).

Later, Ashoka cautions that one should avoid "praising one's own religion, or condemning the religion of others without good cause" (Fourteen Rock Edicts, 14) out of concern for the collective well-being of all religions.

In view of the threats posed by the global crisis of religious freedom and the new critics, the chapters in this volume are of direct relevance and urgent importance. If religious beliefs and practices arise naturally from the normal development of basic cognitive faculties, as Justin Barrett suggests, then religion is no accidental phenomenon propped up by culture, indoctrination, or mere historical circumstance. If theistic belief strongly coheres with rationality and a justified confidence in the epistemic powers of human beings, as Alvin Plantinga argues, then religion is not diametrically opposed to rationality and scientific modernity but stands in indispensable relation to human reason and experience. If the exercise of religion is intimately tied to the use of core human capacities, as Christian Smith and Nicholas Wolterstorff

maintain, then religious freedom represents a vital bulwark of human dignity. If religion can be shown to play a decisive role in human health and happiness, then religion must be regarded as an important contributor to human physical and mental well-being. And if religion is a basic good, as Christopher Tollefsen holds, then respecting the good of religion entails protecting religious freedom.

To be clear, this volume does not purport to represent a definitive resolution of longstanding controversies concerning the nature of religion, human experience, and the foundations of morality and rights. It is precisely because of the dignity, nature, and freedom of human beings that searching inquiry about these questions will and should continue. But we trust that these compelling new studies from a wide range of disciplines will provide good reason to be skeptical of recent efforts to liquidate and deconstruct the categories of "religion" and "religious freedom" into infinitely malleable instruments of power. On the contrary, far from being purely artificial, shifting, and contingent constructs, there is good reason to think that religion and religious freedom may be rooted in some of the most enduring and amazing human capacities — capacities that accord with reason and help to make human beings creatures of extraordinary dignity and worth. Even apart from whether our species of *Homo sapiens* is also in some sense *Homo religiosus*, it may well be, then, that religious freedom at its core is less the right to be religious than the right to be fully human. <>

[The Cambridge Companion to Quakerism](#) edited by Stephen W. Angell and Pink Dandelion [Cambridge Companions to Religion, Cambridge University Press, 9781107136601]

[The Cambridge Companion to Quakerism](#) offers a fresh, up-to-date, and accessible introduction to Quakerism. Quakerism is founded on radical ideas and its history of constancy and change offers fascinating insights into the nature of non-conformity. In a series of eighteen essays written by an international team of scholars, and commissioned especially for this volume, the Companion covers the history of Quakerism from its origins to the present day. Employing a range of methodologies, it features sections on the history of

Quaker faith and practice, expressions of Quaker faith, regional studies, and emerging spiritualities. It also examines all branches of Quakerism, including evangelical, liberal, and conservative, as well as non-theist Quakerism and convergent Quaker thought. This Companion will serve as an essential resource for all interested in Quaker thought and practice.

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Excerpt:

Beginnings

It was in 1647 that George Fox had an experience of God breaking into his life, a transformative experience that was to change his life and lead to the founding of the Quaker movement, even whilst he claimed others had had a similar experience before him. Fox had left his home village of Fenny Drayton in Leicestershire four years earlier and had been searching across England for someone who might help him with his religious quest. He had spent a year with a Baptist uncle in London and had visited the army camps of the English Civil War where the most radical religious ideas were circulating. This was a time of great religious expectation, of the world turned upside down, and yet no one gave Fox any solace. He later wrote that his 'hopes in all men were gone' and that he 'had nothing outwardly to help' him (Fox 1952, n). In this bleak place of despair, Fox then hears a voice which claims 'there is one, even Christ Jesus, that can speak to thy condition.' Even or no less than Christ is to become Fox's spiritual guide and in that instant, Fox sees that he has been looking in the wrong places, to humanity and text, rather than to

the living Word, Christ Jesus. He understands that he has been 'shut up in unbelief and 'concluded under sin' but that now he 'may give Him all the glory'. He knows this 'experimentally' or through his experience.

This experience sets the mould for the formation of the Quaker movement based on a sense of intimacy with God. Quakerism emerges from this moment on, initially falteringly and then with great momentum in the north of England from 1652, as a group whose spiritual basis rests in an experience of direct encounter with God. This experience is

salvific and also entails an ability to resist sin, a perfectability. Nothing frustrated other Christians more than these claims. Fox does not set himself apart as a particular prophet but understands that 'convincement', the conviction of his former faith and the power to live a regenerated life, is available to anyone who did not resist the in-working and indwelling of Christ. Thus a second radical aspect of Quaker spirituality is that of spiritual equality, whereby all are ministers.

Third, Fox understood that he had had nothing outwardly to help him because the location of authentic spirituality was inward. Rather than install a rota of ministers to lead worship, Quakers adopted a liturgy of silence and stillness in which God might use any one of those gathered as a mouthpiece. Worship would typically last three hours, sometimes totally silent, at other times laced with vocal ministry.

And Quakers quaked. The term 'Quaker' was originally an insult handed to Fox by a judge who derided the physical shaking that often accompanied this approach to the divine. Quakers have been a group founded on a powerful collective mystical experience. They understood this to be their instalment of the inward second coming of Christ and the beginning of the culmination of the Biblical timeline. They lived their faith as if in the Book of Revelation; Fox justified inward communion (after Revelation 3:20) and the use of silence (Revelation 8:1) using that Scripture. Quakers were the vanguard for God over England and all other nations heralding the coming of the kingdom. Necessarily, as the true church, they were impelled to decry all those who held humanity back from this new dispensation, and they interrupted church services and preached wherever they could. Quakerism would moderate its views towards other Christians within twenty years but only really become ecumenical in the nineteenth century.

Quaker faith was thus straightforward and optimistic, offering the idea of a universal elect. It was egalitarian within its theocratic or pneumocratic paradigm. It offered certainty and clarity about what was right and what, and who, was wrong. 'The world' was to be trampled under and a particular lifestyle quickly emerged that was visibly Quaker. Quakers started to adopt plain

forms of dress and speech, use 'thee' and 'thou' to everyone instead of the deferential 'you' and number the days and months rather than use pagan derived names. Quakers eschewed outward war that contradicted the gospels and the idea of spiritual equality. Quakers withdrew from the corrupting temptations of the world.

Structure and process would follow in time, Quakers adopting a collective process of discernment to seek God's will on any matter, based again on a theologic of silence and stillness as the way to approach the Divine. Minutes are written and agreed within the meetings to reflect the discernment of the group. Unity implies reliability; disunity may require the matter to be brought back and for Friends to once again set 'self aside' in their quest to know God's leadings. Local 'Meetings' were grouped into regional groupings which met quarterly, with substantial constituencies of geographically discrete areas forming a 'Yearly Meeting' which met annually. All of these meetings were open to all Friends although 'meetings for church affairs' became separated by gender beginning in 1675. Witness was integrated into the spirituality. Quakers enacted signs, protested and petitioned and sought social justice as well as spiritual victory. This early form of an enacted and embodied spirituality has remained the basis for Quakerism in all its forms since. Whilst different groups have given more or less authority to revelation and to Scripture and whilst, since the 1870s, an increasing number of Friends have adopted a pastoral 'programmed' form of worship, the insights of George Fox and the other early Friends remain embedded in the faith, practice and witness of all Yearly Meetings. A pastor has no greater spiritual authority than any other Friend, just those Spirit-given gifts required for the role. Others serve as Elders, nurturing the worship and ministry of the group, still others as Clerks who help manage the meetings for worship for church affairs and who write the minutes reflecting the sense of God's will discerned by the group. Roles are often rotated, although some are 'released' financially to fulfil their ministry. Quakerism remains a distinctive part of the religious landscape and a compelling subject. We hope this volume brings the nature of Quaker history and development and distinctives of the Quaker faith into clear relief.

Contents

Whilst many introductory volumes have extended histories of the movement, we have compressed the 360 years into three chapters. The book then contains five chapters on expressions of Quaker faith, five on regional overviews and five on emerging spiritualities.

History

Robynne Healey covers the earliest period of Quakerism, how it fared during the persecution of the Restoration, how it managed emigration (notably to the Quaker colony of Pennsylvania) and how it developed in the eighteenth century. This latter period was one of relative stability, many of the earlier state-sponsored threats to the movement removed. Quakerism had become an acceptable part of the religious landscape. However, Quakers themselves were less spiritually confident and were wary of a corrupt and corrupting world. They aspired to the supernatural plane whilst fearing all that was 'natural'. At the same time, they were embedded in the wider society rather than removed from it and were active in commerce and social justice campaigns such as those for penal reform and the abolition of the slave trade.

Thomas Hamm and Isaac May cover the nineteenth century. This was the time when Quakerism started to disassemble, fracturing into two main branches (Hicksite and Orthodox) starting in 1827 and into three (Hicksite, Wilburite and Gurneyite) in the 1840s. Influenced by revival meetings that, for some, revealed the limitations of unprogrammed worship, a pastoral tradition emerged within Gurneyite Quakerism in 1875 with all but one Gurneyite Yearly Meetings maintaining pastoral meetings or Friends Churches by 1900. An uneasy tension between a modernist renewal tendency and Holiness revivalism beset this part of the Quaker tradition. At the same time, Gurneyite Yearly Meetings formed a strong coalition after a conference in Richmond, Indiana, in 1887 and by 1902 had founded an umbrella organisation, Five Years Meeting (FYM).

Timothy Burdick and Pink Dandelion cover the twentieth century. Modernist Quakerism emerged not only within parts of Gurneyite Quakerism but also within Hicksite Quakerism by the start of the twentieth century. Hicksite Friends founded Friends

General Conference as an umbrella organisation in 1900. FYM continued to be divided between modernist and Holiness Friends and from the 1920s between modernist and fundamentalist Friends. First, fundamentalist Friends pushed for their Yearly Meetings to disengage from the newly formed American Friends Service Committee for its lack of soteriological goals; later they would leave FYM for its lack of doctrinal specificity. By the 1960s, the Evangelical Friends Alliance had been set up as a third umbrella organisation. Conservative Friends (linked to the earlier Wilburite tradition) created a fourth grouping. Burdick and Dandelion concentrate on majority Quakerism, the programmed tradition and its mission work, which had by the end of the twentieth century come to represent nearly 90 percent of global Quakerism. Kenya, following 1902 mission work, is now the most populous country in terms of Quakers. Modernist or Liberal Friends became increasingly detached from their Christian heritage and also increasingly diverse, theologically, as the century wore on.

Expression

Nancy Cho charts Quaker expression through literary and print culture, among British and American Friends. Whilst early Quakers distrusted literature and the arts, Cho shows how Quaker writers have increasingly accepted and utilised a wide variety of literary genres. Initially Quakers worried about how the production and use of fiction fit with the Quaker testimony of integrity. In the early decades, the production of literature among Quakers grew more conservative, as prophetic and ecstatic literature fell out of favour with them. In the nineteenth century, however, John Greenleaf Whittier gained wide recognition as a Quaker poet, but other Friends also adopted the genre, such as abolitionist Elizabeth Margaret Chandler. In the mid-nineteenth century, Quakers were prompted to recognise the presence of beauty in literature and reconsider their objections to that aspect of the human endeavour. Since that time, Quaker literary endeavours have flowered, and Cho looks at the contributions of Quaker writers such as Jessamyn West, Elizabeth Gray Vining, Chuck Fager and Joan Slonczweski.

Katherine Murray continues this theme of action in the world with an overview of Quaker social justice

work and how that relates to more recent concerns for sustainability. She points out that seventeenth-century Friends were not dissuaded from Spirit-led actions, such as refusing to doff one's hat to monarchs and nobility, even when such actions were costly, landing them in prison or enduring other kinds of suffering. She briefly reviews the witness of Quakers such as John Woolman and Elizabeth Fry, as well as the contemporary work of organisations such as the American Friends Service Committee, the Friends Committee on National Legislation and the Quaker United Nations Office. She then examines various efforts by Friends in the 2010s on behalf of ecojustice, including the call issued by a worldwide conference in 2012 at Kabarak University in Kenya, asserting that Quakers 'are called to be patterns and examples in a 21st century campaign for peace and ecojustice'.

The section on expressions of Quaker faith continues with a chapter by Elaine Bishop and Jiseok Jung on the Quaker opposition to war. It usefully and deliberately begins, however, with a section on the nature of Quaker testimony, or faith-based expression, as a precursor for what follows. Bishop and Jung cover the history of the Quaker testimony against war and its evolution into a peace testimony. They introduce new work on five ways in which the Quaker peace witness has shifted in the past century and innovative scholarship on two ways in which that witness is now manifest, as peacemaking and as conflict transforming.

Stephen Angell and Clare Brown offer an overview of the Quaker involvement with education historically and in its global breadth today. They chart the changing attitudes and involvement in education over time as well as outline the scope of current Quaker educational provision. The first Quakers were distrustful of too much 'worldly' learning and focused on a 'practical curriculum'. In the eighteenth century, Quakers maintained a 'guarded' or 'select' education system for their children, keen to inculcate a Quaker curriculum in a purely Quaker environment. By the end of the nineteenth century as most Quakers began to see themselves as only a part of the true church rather than the true church itself, the desire to keep Quaker students away from non-Quakers waned,

and the curriculum began to broaden. At this time too, Quaker schools outside of Britain and North America started to appear, for example, in Palestine, Lebanon and Japan. Both of these trends continued into the twentieth century with renewed vigour based on the fruits of full citizenship in Britain (Quakers and other nonconformists could go to Oxford and Cambridge after 1871) and missionary work in general. The past century has been one of a huge expansion of Quaker education, both at school and since the 1830s college levels. Questions of appropriate curriculum have continued and Quaker Bible Institutes opened in the early twentieth century as an alternative to a more worldly liberal arts education offered by some Quaker colleges. The ethics of private education has also been a twentieth-century concern. At the same time, Quakers have become keenly involved in helping with the education of non-Quakers, especially those on the margins. The history of Quaker involvement with education is a complex and fascinating topic as Angell and Brown demonstrate.

Emma Jones Lapsansky looks at Quaker material culture and the paradoxical attention to the outward (e.g. in terms of dress or buildings) from adherents to a group centred on an interiorised spirituality. According to most seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Quakers, 'vanity' and 'ostentation' were to be avoided, and an aesthetic of 'plainness' embraced as godly.

Lapsansky enquires closely as to what such terms were taken to mean. For the first generation of Friends, it often meant dressing in 'unadorned, often undyed garb'. Quaker meeting houses were modest structures, very different from the ornate churches that arose in late seventeenth-century England. At the same time, wealthy Friends favoured 'meticulous craftsmanship', and in so doing they allowed themselves a certain degree of luxury, at least in terms of the quality of the product. Thus, they sought out consumer goods that were 'of the best sort, but plain'. The more low-cost fabrics of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have meant that Quaker tastes in clothes have become 'less obvious', but still, like their earlier predecessors, many Friends tend to avoid 'high-fashion trends' as well as 'clothing produced under

exploitative conditions'. Quaker architecture went through parallel processes, whereby Quaker plainness, or simplicity, has been reinterpreted over the centuries, but not rejected altogether.

Lapsansky concludes with an examination of the ways that simplicity has shaped Quaker liturgy and decision-making processes.

Regional Studies

Our 'Regional Studies' section takes each area of the world and offers a present-day overview in the area as well as a specific case study.

Stephen Angell and John Connell cover North America (the United States and Canada). They focus in particular on the three largest groupings of Quakers, Friends General Conference, Friends United Meeting and Evangelical Friends Church International, charting numerical gains and losses in the recent past alongside the shifting dynamics between meetings of different branches, particularly reunification and schism. A specific case study covers Western Yearly Meeting, an organisation of Friends that is located in Western Indiana in the Midwest region of the United States, and how its fortunes appear in the shortterm future. The chapter provides a useful insight into the way different Quaker traditions operate in parallel and where their differing points of vitality lie, as well as how the shape of global Quakerism is shifting away from the dominance of the global north.

Nancy Thomas and Ramon Longoria chart the mainly evangelical Quaker communities of Central and South America. Cuban Friends form the case study in their chapter. They tell a fascinating story that features many dedicated Friends missionaries hailing from a variety of American yearly meetings imbued with evangelical Christian Holiness fervour, but also sensitive profiles of many of the Latin American leaders themselves. In Bolivia, the nation with the most Friends in this region, most of the converts came from the Aymara people, a group that existed prior to the Incas and has its own language. Many Latin American Friends were not Christians prior to becoming Quakers; often they espoused animism. But the Friends in this region are strongly Christian and Quaker. They generally have a strong interest in Quaker testimonies and distinctives, but they also have adapted these to their often lively Latin American cultures.

George Busolo, Oscar Malande, Ann Riggs and Theoneste Sentabire focus on Quakerism in East Africa, with a focus on the Chavakali Yearly Meeting in western Kenya. There are more Quakers in Kenya, and in the East African region, than anywhere else in the world. Since the founding of the Kenyan mission in 1903, Quakers have grown markedly and matured under both colonial and post-colonial contexts. The authors note a variety of cultural and economic challenges as necessary background to their analysis. They also give an in-depth portrayal of African Quaker beliefs, providing contrasts with African traditional religions, and also noting variations between ethnic groups in Kenya. They provide a much needed 'thick' ethnographic description of faith and practice in Vozoli Village Meeting in Chavakali Yearly Meeting, part of the Luhya people dominant in Kenyan Quakerism. They conclude by pointing out that the maturity of Kenyan Quakerism has resulted in a transition from it being a 'mission receiving' to a 'mission sending' church. By 2017, Kenyan Quakers had sent missionaries to Congo, Tanzania and South Sudan, and then across the Atlantic Ocean to Belize, a Central American nation.

Hans Eirik Aarek and Julia Ryberg look at Quakerism in Europe with a particular focus on Friends in Norway and other Scandinavian countries. Quakers are to be found in thirty-five of forty-eight European countries, often in small numbers. In most places, modern liberal Quakerism is dominant, but in Hungary, Romania and Albania, there are significant numbers of evangelical Quakers. European Quakers have often been involved in significant humanitarian activities, especially during the two world wars and the intervening period, and in peace and reconciliation work, especially during the Cold War. In many contexts, European Quakers are experiencing growth and feel a special concern to nurture their small worship groups.

Finally, Stephanie Middori Komashin offers an overview of the highly diverse nature of Quakerism in Southeast Asia and Australasia (Asia Pacific) with a case study on Friends in Japan. While not ignoring other sorts of Friends churches and meetings, Komashin provides an important window

into the origins and growth of evangelical Friends churches in Bhutan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia and elsewhere in the region. Komashin draws a parallel between Asian Friends churches and those Friends churches in Latin America and Africa, in that Friends churches in each of these regions are primed for rapid growth. She also provides vivid detail about differences between all of these Friends churches, even those within the same branch. Mission is a central theme throughout all of these chapters as well as the continual development of new local groups of Quakerism, adapting to new contexts, new challenges and new opportunities.

Emerging Spiritualities

The final section of the book is entitled 'Emerging Spiritualities'. Each of the five chapters considers an aspect of the variety of current Quaker spirituality. Michael Birkel and Deborah Shaw look at Conservative Quaker spirituality, its distinctive practices and its enduring appeal, and then the way some pi Liberal Friends have chosen dual affiliation, for example, maintaining Buddhist as well as Quaker practice. They uncover a Quaker tradition which is 'not static but rather unfolding'. Friends holding dual traditions have combined them in varying ways, and they seek to bring benefit to their Quaker communities in disparate ways. Often they point to a more direct teaching of these varieties of Quaker spiritualities than what commonly occurred in generations past. William Taber, for example, was mindful of the Conservative tradition of intuitive acquisition of spiritual traits, but, believing that there was insufficient resources for contemporary Friends to gain spiritual depth by such means, he 'departed from Conservative tradition and wrote boldly' about a variety of spiritual concerns and practices. Dan Christy Randazzo looks at one aspect of the spectrum of Liberal Quaker belief, non-theism, and the debates that have emerged within liberal Quakerism, mostly in Britain and the United States, during recent decades over the use of the term 'God' as necessary or appropriate. He charts a great variety of arguments. Some non-theists, for example, use certain Quaker concepts to argue against others which they see as intrinsically theist. Others attempt to honour the Christian roots of Quakers by working systematically to bridge the

original Christian understandings and the non-theism of some contemporary Quakers. Randazzo perceives room for Quaker non-theism to grow but adds that it will need to remain in dialogue with other types of Liberal Quakerism to 'make effective contributions to the development of Liberal Quakerism' going forward.

Jon Kershner gives an overview of present-day evangelical Quaker spirituality. He provides a thorough overview of several types of evangelical Quaker spirituality, focusing especially on differences between North American evangelical Quakerism and the evangelical Quakerism of the Global South. He also points to commonalities and variations in worship forms among evangelical Quakers. He provides helpful summaries of some disputes that were current in the 2010s, especially in the manner that

evangelical regard for biblical authority-oriented evangelical Quakers when confronting issues of homosexuality.

Wess Daniels and Greg Woods build on Daniels's earlier work on 'Convergent Quakerism', a movement of mainly younger Friends from different Quaker traditions keen to conserve Quaker distinctives and yet engage with wider culture as part of the emergent church movement. This chapter typifies the continual dynamic interplay between constancy and change that we find throughout Quaker history and which has so dominated the past century.

Margery Post Abbott reviews the pioneering work of the North Pacific Women's Theological Discussion Group, which has successfully bridged different Quaker traditions in a powerful example of intra-Quaker ecumenism. She then broadens her analysis geographically by looking at ways that women in other parts of the Quaker world — most notably, Indiana (United States) and Kenya — have acted to empower women in the face of their exclusion from decision-making roles, or to preserve and to nurture Quaker unity when divisions have been threatened or actually have occurred. She proposes that this work by women is a concrete manifestation in the contemporary world of the ministry and teachings of Jesus.

Many books outline the history and expression of the Quaker movement, but this volume is distinct in at least three ways. First, it presents a new range of authors, many writing their first book chapters. Each is an accomplished scholar but as editors we have deliberately sought out those with a fresh and innovative edge to their work. This is not a book of 'settled scholarship' but of new ideas and ways of approaching the study of Quakerism. The section on 'Emerging Spiritualities' enables the volume to be timely and relevant.

Second, we trust that this volume redresses the erstwhile bias towards Liberal Quakerism inherent in the way that many earlier histories have been written by Liberal Friends rather than Evangelical ones.

Third, and crucially, we believe this volume is the first that is explicitly global in its authorship and coverage of the different branches of Quakerism. Too often, Quaker studies have been centred on Anglo-American history and experience. We hope this book goes some way to redress this deficit.

[Quakers Reading Mystics](#) by Michael Birkel
[Quaker Studies, Brill, 9789004372290]

Over the centuries, Quakers have read non-Quakers regarded as mystics. This study explores the reception of mystical texts among the Religious Society of Friends, focusing in particular on Robert Barclay and John Cassian, Sarah Lynes Grubb and Jeanne Guyon, Caroline Stephen and Johannes Tauler, Rufus Jones and Jacob Boehme, and Teresina Havens and Buddhist texts selected by her. Points of connection include the nature of apophatic prayer, suffering and annihilation of self, mysticisms of knowing and of loving, liberal Protestant attitudes toward theosophical systems, and interfaith encounter.

The series Quaker Studies is edited by Stephen W. Angell and Pink Dandelion

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Excerpt: Over the centuries, Quakers have read non-Quakers regarded as mystics. This study explores the reception of mystical texts among the Religious Society of Friends, looking particularly at Robert Barclay and John Cassian, Sarah Lynes Grubb and Jeanne Guyon, Caroline Stephen and Johannes Tauler, Rufus Jones and Jacob Boehme, and Teresina Havens and Buddhist texts selected by her. Points of connection include the nature of apophatic prayer, suffering and annihilation of self, mysticisms of knowing and of loving, liberal Protestant attitudes toward theosophical systems, and interfaith encounter.

Quakers and the Mystical Tradition

Any honest grappling with the relationship of Quakerism and mysticism is at best tentative and ephemeral. This is unavoidable: the very idea and systematic understanding of mysticism is constantly changing, always shaped by a host of spoken and unspoken theological and epistemological assumptions, and subject to the dominant intellectual trends of a given moment, whether that be modes of literary criticism, political arguments, or a budding field of inquiry such as neuroscience.' The subject is vast, but the scope of this introductory chapter is quite modest: a simple report on how others have considered this relationship and wrestled with questions that yield only provisional replies.

There is nothing more difficult in the world than to please everyone, nor easier and more common than to criticize books once they are made public. Without exception, all books that are published fall subject to the common risk of both of these harms ... What will happen to this little book? ... If you do not understand it, friendly reader, do not censure it for that. PREFACE TO THE READER, MIGUEL MOLINOS, *Guia Espiritual*

Was Quakerism mystical? Is it so today? It would be unwise to expect agreement on the answers to

these questions, both from Quakers themselves and from non-Quaker scholars who study Quakerism. Yet Quakers have found and continue to find meaning in mystical texts written outside their spiritual community.

This book has been an experiment in reading and reception, based on close attentiveness to texts in their contexts. Some of the comparisons have been based on incontestably solid ground: Rufus Jones directly quoted Jacob Boehme, as Teresina Havens quoted Buddhist writings. Other, some could argue, are more tentative. Despite the verbal similarities between Robert Barclay and John Cassian, the former did not explicitly refer to the latter by name. Sarah Lynes Gmbh and Caroline Stephen, on the other hand, did specifically refer to Jeanne Guyon and Johannes Tauler, respectively, but do not cite particular texts by them. This has required an informed and disciplined imagination, to point out likely ways in which the Quaker readers could have interpreted and interacted intellectually and spiritually with the ideas expressed by the other-than-Quaker mystics.

Interior Stillness and Recognition

All the non-Quaker mystics spoke of an aspiration to an interior stillness. For John Cassian, this stillness was understood as imageless prayer that led to purity of heart — his term for passionlessness of the soul. For Jeanne Guyon, it was resignation that opened the way to annihilation. For Johannes Tauler, stillness was the condition for union with God in the ground of the soul, beyond the experience of sense and time. For Jacob Boehme, this stillness led to the new birth and a restoration to the intimacy that Adam shared with God in Paradise.

Somehow the experience of individual and collective prayerful silence among Friends (which itself changed over the years) was similar enough to the ideals presented by the non-Quaker mystics that the Quaker readers felt beckoned by them into further spiritual experience and, at least to a degree, by the symbolic, theological world that each writer drew upon to issue that beckoning. At the same time, these Quakers remained Quakers. The sense of recognition in the experiences and in the espoused spiritual methods of the non-Quaker writers was edifying but did not require a full

identification with that theology or a change of religious identity. For the Quakers studied in this volume, reading non-Quaker mystical writings did not inspire conversion.

That sense of recognition can nonetheless introduce new ideas and spiritual ideas, such as the annihilation of the self, a gift from Jeanne Guyon to Sarah Grubb. Conversely, the response can be that the admiration for the earlier mystic can lead to a significant Quakerizing of the non-Quaker mystic in the eyes of the Quaker reader, as happened in the interpretation of Jacob Boehme. The varying responses reflect shifts within Quakerism itself as it moved from the early period as represented by Robert Barclay, through the deeply introspective piety of Quaker Quietism as seen in Sarah Grubb, to the mystical self-understanding of modern Quakers from the self-described rational mysticism of Caroline Stephen to the liberal ecumenical mysticism of Rufus Jones, to the universalist mysticism of Teresina Havens. These differing responses invite readers to consider both their own dispositions and contexts.

Robert Barclay and John Cassian

The chapter on Robert Barclay and John Cassian raises the possibility that a concept that seems quintessentially Quaker may in fact be borrowed. The immigrant terminology becomes a naturalized citizen among Friends and speaks Quaker without a trace of a foreign accent, even as its roots remain. While it may be humbling to have to confess that there is less originality than once thought in one's heritage, these shared terms to describe experiences that the historically later group would recognize as familiar in the former group can open doors to appreciation and to exploration of further points of contact and shared appreciation. Inter-religious borrowing has been around for millennia. To mention a famous example, where would Augustine of Hippo, the most influential theologian throughout western Christian history, have been without the ideas of the pagan philosopher Plotinus, whose works opened the path for Augustine to become a confessing Christian, as he himself acknowledged? Augustine thoroughly baptized neo-Platonist concepts with Christian Trinitarian language and thereby enriched immensely the theological legacy of the Christian West.

The comparison between Robert Barclay and John Cassian also invites spiritual practitioners to reflect on the relationship between apophysis and affectivity. How is the aspiration to imagelessness in prayer not contradicted by profound feelings of yearning and compunction? Is it possible that feelings can be without imagistic content? If so, does that render them protected from self-deception, as both writers claimed? Self-deceit is a considerable risk in any spiritual theology that leans heavily upon claims to direct revelation and inspiration from God, as Quakerism does. Bringing John Cassian and Robert Barclay into conversation therefore opens a gate to deeper consideration of religious experience itself.

Quietism and Quakerism, an Ongoing Story

The chapter on Sarah Lynes Grubb and Jeanne Guyon shows one moment in the complicated relationship between Quakerism and the movement known as Quietism. Because one intent of this book is to encourage further research into the topic of Quakers as readers of mystical texts from other traditions, some rehearsal of that complex history may be in order here, in the hopes that someone will carry the research further.

Despite whatever uncertainty may remain as to how Sarah Lynes Grubb would have fully responded to her reading of Jeanne Guyon, there is another text from her period that does reveal how some Quakers appreciated the Quietists. The focus in chapter two was on the translations of Josiah Martin and James Gough because Sarah Grubb herself shows some acquaintance with Guyon's biography (Grubb, 1848, p. 288), it is important to mention *A Guide to True Peace*. In 1813, two more Quakers anonymously edited a book on contemplative prayer drawn from the three Quietists Jeanne Guyon, François Fénelon, and Miguel de Molinos, entitled *A Guide to True Peace: Or, the Excellency of Inward and Spiritual Prayer*. If it can be argued that editorial inclusion is a form of endorsement, then the choices made by William Backhouse and James Janson are revealing. Although it is Fénelon's name that appears first among the three on the title page of *A Guide to True Peace* — perhaps simply because his material is quoted first — the overwhelming

majority of the book is drawn from Guyon's *Short and Easy Method of Prayer*.

Themes that dominate the Guide are ones already encountered in chapter two: the indwelling of the Spirit in the human, apophatic prayer, equanimity and indifference concerning unusual experiences and graces in prayer, spiritual aridity, resignation, giving up self to the destroying and annihilating power of divine love, so we cease to exist in self, annihilation of the will, and a perfect union of love in which God fills the souls with God's self because it is empty and clothes it with light and love because it is naked. Fundamentally, the book promotes a prayer "of inward silence, wherein the soul, abstracted from all outward things, in holy stillness, humble reverence, and lively faith, waits patiently to feel the Divine presence, and to receive the precious influence of the Holy Spirit".

It was through the excerpts of her *Short and Very Easy Method of Prayer* selected by Backhouse and Janson that Jeanne Guyon exerted a lengthy influence on Friends. Because the period of Quaker history from the early eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth century has itself been called Quietist, it is worth noting how Guyon and how Quietism as a Quaker phenomenon were regarded in the succeeding years.

Howard Brinton observed that *A Guide to True Peace* underwent at least twelve editions and reprintings between 1813 and 1877. Friends continued to refer to Molinos, Guyon, and Fénelon throughout the nineteenth century and beyond. As noted earlier in chapter three, Caroline Stephen refers positively to all three of these Continental Quietists in *Quaker Strongholds*. Only a few years later, at the turn of the century, in his essay "The Mysticism of Madame Guyon," J. Bendel Harris, director of studies at Woodbrooke, a Quaker study center in Birmingham, England, described Guyon as "the teacher from whom I have received more help and guidance in the things of God than from any other person".

Chapter four focused on Rufus Jones, one of the most influential Friends of the twentieth century. His attitude toward the Quietists — and on their influence upon Quakerism — was at best ambivalent and in the final analysis depreciative.

On the one hand he could appreciate Molinos as "a remarkable spiritual expert" and praise the "extraordinary insight" of Fénelon and "the rare sanity of his spiritual counsel". On the other, as seen with his estimation of Jacob Boehme, and as a disciple of the American philosopher and psychologist William James, whose work in psychology Jones taught for many years, he did not hesitate to classify Quietists as pathological and mentally disordered. In more recent times psychologists have been more reticent to diagnose psychological conditions across centuries and cultural norms, it was a common practice in the early twentieth century. William James, for example, was appreciative of early Quaker George Fox but had no professional qualms to pronounce that "from the point of view of his nervous constitution, Fox was a psychopath or détraqué of the deepest dye".

Jones judged Quietism as deficient because to him it lacked moral vigor aimed at improving society: "It lacked some concrete way of turning its moments of fecundity into the permanent stuff of moral character and ethical endeavor. It was a noble mood, but it was too rare and abstract to be translated into real human life". Jones's objections demonstrate his predilection as a theological liberal who held moral reform as essential for spiritual maturity. In this he reflected the wider concerns of his era and reckoned the past as deficient. Elaine Pryce has pointed out that Rufus Jones was in fact mistaken about Quietism's incompatibility with social action, noting that Guyon established a hospital with her own assets, and Fénelon was an advocate of the poor and the socially vulnerable.

Jones's further misgivings about Quietism are centered in his understanding of personality, which for him was the essential feature of both human and divine nature.

Every analysis of personality discovers that fact that God and man are inherently bound up together. Personal consciousness looms up out of an infinite background. Probe deep enough into any self and you come upon God.

For Jones, there must be a "basis for a unifying personality which binds into one organic and vital

whole the divine and the human, making a new spiritual creation". He noted

To become spiritual is to become a divine-human person — to be a person in whom the human nature and the Divine Nature have become organic and vital. The truth which comes will then be no injected revelation, no foreign irruption, but the genuine fruit and output of a personal life which unites in itself the finite and in infinite in one ever-expanding personality.

Personality is so central to Rufus Jones because it is salvific. God is an "Infinite Person". The redemptive quality of Christ is that he brought to light the "personal aspect" of God. For Jones, the mystical experience is one of what he perceived as increased vitality and enhanced personality. The Quietist suspicion of human will, desire, and activity, as well as their goal of annihilation, struck Jones as damaging, psychologically unhealthy and ultimately contradictory to his understanding of the redemptive work of Christ. In all this he reflected the thinking of his day, particularly the school of North American liberal theology known as "personalism," in which, as noted by religious historian Gary Dorrien, the real was the personal. Rufus Jones judged that the Quietists "succeeded in so far as they retained and ennobled their concrete personalities and their interesting individual characteristics, and that they failed in so far as they suppressed, and annihilated themselves and arrived at abstract love, non-desire, and no-willing.

Despite the considerable weight of Rufus Jones's influence, there were other voices. His student Howard Brinton, edited a reprinting of *A Guide to True Peace* in 1946, which remained in print for some sixty years. In writings published after the death of Jones, Brinton described the period of Quietists influence on Friends as the era of cultural creativity and mystical inwardness among Friends.

In recent years, some scholars have thoughtfully challenged Jones's negative evaluation of Quietism, paving the way for a renewed appreciation of Quietist spirituality, especially as it shaped Quaker spiritual practice. With respect to contemporary Quakers, a Friend from the Conservative tradition, which has preserved some elements of the Quietist dimension of Quakerism, once told me how when she completed her high school years in the 1940s

she was given a copy of *A Guide to True Peace*, almost as a kind of recognition of her coming into adulthood and therefore her readiness for contemplative prayer. Among liberal Quakers today, some still read *A Guide to True Peace* with benefit, but many find its concept of human nature too demeaning and turn elsewhere for guidance on contemplative practice, such as Buddhist mindfulness meditation or Sufi contemplative disciplines.

Caroline Stephen and Johannes Tauler

The chapter on Caroline Stephen and Johannes Tauler was perhaps the most tentative in that there was so little to go on, making it challenging to envision how the sermons of Tauler might have come live in her spirit as she read. Yet a painstaking reading of texts by each writer yielded a plausible case for a reconstruction of Stephen's reception of Tauler and a possible explanation for the popularity of Tauler among her contemporaneous Victorian Friends. Many questions, of course remain. If she had interpreted Tauler more directly, would she have presumed that his mysticism was as individualist and independent as her own? Would such a view dispose her not to see mysticism as a product of a rich matrix of a religious tradition in which it is rooted? She lived at the height of the British Empire, and some thinkers today would consider such a view as an intellectual colonialism that disregards the value of tradition and culture. This may be a cautionary tale for readers today to be as self-aware as we can of our own situatedness in a particular culture and its values, although at the same time it seems harsh to expect her to transcend the limitations of her own time when we today are imperceptive of the shortcomings of our own ways of perceiving and reflecting.

It is hoped nonetheless that this venture resulted in some fresh insights into Caroline Stephen and her understanding of Quakerism as a mystical form of Christianity. Her *Quaker Strongholds* was pioneering and paved the way for the innovative and revitalized Quakerism of Rufus Jones and his peers, although each of these two writers held to a different interpretation of the essentials of both Quakerism and mysticism. Caroline Stephen's work is far from exhaustively mined by historians of Quakerism or of Christian spirituality. She made

reference to others whom she regards as mystics, including Thomas à Kempis, Jacob Boehme, François Fénelon, Jeanne Guyon, Miguel de Molinos, Teresa of Avila, and William Law. Possibilities may lie here for other researchers into Quakerism and mysticism to explore fruitfully.

Rufus Jones the Historian of Mysticism

Similarly, many paths are open for further research into Rufus Jones's reception of Christian mystics. His historical studies, such as *Studies in Mystical Religion* and *The Flowering of Mysticism: The Friends of God in the Fourteenth Century* offer promising possibilities. Alternatively, there are many other Friends who read Jacob Boehme over the centuries, and an entire study could be written on Quaker reception of the visionary shoemaker and theosophical prophet of Görlitz. It may well be that there are a number of Boehmes among Quakers throughout their history, as the brief comparison of Rufus Jones and Howard Brinton suggests. Of the rich and dizzyingly complex word of Jacob Boehme's thought, different strands appealed in different ages, and the subtleties of that appeal merit further consideration. Of course Rufus Jones read Boehme as a liberal Protestant shaped by Romantic poets — how else could he? — but the details of that reading shed new light on how Rufus Jones saw the world. As noted, his enthusiasm for Boehme left out many particulars of the latter's thought-world, and a Quietist Quaker of the eighteenth century or a prophetic Quaker of the seventeenth would have made different choices.

Teresina Havens and Interfaith Understanding

Teresina Havens offered many surprises and opens a way to the future, in this time in which inter-religious inspirations are becoming mainstream. She also points a way forward in terms of her unrelenting insistence that dialogue across religions not blur their differences in some vague concoction. There are significant differences in how religions make sense of the world and of human life, and Teresina Havens treasured those differences and saw the honest recognition of them as a part of how religions can enrich one another. Consonant with his era and liberal Protestant theology of the early twentieth century, Rufus Jones could disregard inconvenient differences, such as Jacob

Boehme's sacramental piety, or his mixed estimation of the ethical status of violence in a time of brutal war, such as the Thirty Years' War that outlived him by some twenty-four years. Because she wanted to experience the rich treasures of both the Quaker and the Buddhist traditions, Teresina Havens carefully acknowledged the distinctiveness of each. Her example can be of use today to those who want to promote interfaith understanding.

The varying responses of the Quaker voices in this volume suggests the manifold richness of Quaker reception of mystical texts. As texts come alive for later readers, the possibilities for edification are deep and broad. That very richness can be intellectually invigorating and spiritually evocative.

[Handbook of East Asian New Religious Movements](#)

edited by Lukas Pokorny, Franz Winter [Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion, Brill, 9789004362055]

[The Handbook of East Asian New Religious](#)

[Movements](#) is the first comprehensive reference work to explore major new religious actors and trajectories of the East Asian region (China/Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam).

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Excerpt:

East Asian New Religious Movements:

The Handbook takes into focus eminent East Asian new religious movements (NRMs), that is, NRMs that originated in the East Asian region. Hence, in this introductory chapter the two key notions—East Asia and NRMs—have to be outlined before light is shed upon their amalgam that forms the subject of the Handbook. The choice of NRMs for inclusion in

the Handbook follows both contextual and pragmatic considerations. All NRMs discussed in the individual chapters represent major exponents of East Asian 'new religiosity' (often also expressed by a sizeable institutional manifestation). However, whereas the twenty-five groups indeed cover a wide spectrum in the articulating mode of East Asian NRMs, the assemblage is certainly not exhaustive when looking at the diversity of the new religious panorama in its entirety. Hence, the groups included were selected, above all, due to their wide-ranging significance within the religious landscape in past and/or present of the countries concerned. Thus, the NRMs introduced in the Handbook depict a well-rounded collocation of the most crucial new religious actors that took shape in this region, providing a sound cross section of the phenomenon of East Asian new religiosity. The pragmatic dimension behind the inclusion is largely fed by three conditions: the word count limitations of the Handbook, the ensuing attempt to avoid too many thematic overlaps, and the general unavailability of relevant expertise.

East Asia

There is no scholarly agreement in defining the term 'East Asia.' Approaches therefore vary, even more so in academe than in the political or demotic discourse. Traditionally, in scholarly parlance, starting in the late 1950s, 'East Asia' came to gradually replace the Eurocentric label 'Far East,' comprising China, (the) Korea(s), and Japan. This meaning is still widely associated with East Asia in colloquial usage, and also applied as a working definition by many scholars across disciplines. The notion of East Asia overall is a melange of geographical, political, economic, and socio-cultural demarcations, an imagined regionalist category (Park 2014; Miller 2008: xiii) with artificially set boundaries from an historical perspective. The United Nations have arranged what is classified as 'Eastern Asia' to encompass Greater China—that is, China, and the two special administrative regions Hong Kong and Macao—the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (i.e., North Korea), Japan, Mongolia, and the Republic of Korea (i.e., South Korea). This configuration of East Asia (commonly found with the explicit mention of Taiwan as well) is popular among those who advocate a politico-geographical rubric, often specifically tagged as

'Northeast Asia.' In this understanding, Northeast Asia is meant to contrast the sub-region of 'Southeast Asia,' which usually appears as an umbrella designation for the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), occasionally including Timor-Leste. For some scholars, in particular within the social sciences, East Asia is simply the sum of the two sub-regions, unfolding at the intersection of chiefly geographical and political determination trajectories. The cultural momentum

in defining East Asia is naturally taking centre stage in the Humanities and specifically within Religious Studies. In this respect, East Asia is held tantamount to the Chinese cultural sphere, the 'Sinic zone' and 'Sinic world', or the 'Sinosphere'—all referring to the region culturally engrained by the Hà 漢 Chinese discursive archive, politically (via tributary relations) and economically clustering in an historical perspective. Regional cohesion is seen to be given most notably through both the dissemination of the Chinese script and a distinctive portfolio of religious and ethical patterns crystallising in the recognition of the importance of self-cultivation and social harmony. For the proponents of a shared East Asian cultural heritage, it is mainly the Confucian nomenclature of reality and its practical application by behavioural patterns that lies at the core of the Sinic religious reservoir; the Chinese cultural sphere as essentially a 'Confucian cultural area'. By bracketing East Asia in this way, territorial lines are reshuffled—Mongolia is left out, whereas Singapore is added to the core bloc of China/Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, Japan, and Vietnam. The shift happening at the level of nation-states also takes place in the domestic context, where certain enclaves may presently (let alone historically) effectively be relocated either inside (e.g., concentrated Chinese diasporic settlements in Indonesia and Malaysia) or outside (e.g., Tibet and broad areas of Xīnjiāng 新疆) this culturally contoured enclosure. The constellation over a culturally connected East Asia is likewise not unanimously agreed upon, with Singapore and Vietnam being the movable elements. As for the latter, for instance, the level of 'Confucianisation' as to justify the inclusion into the

assumed Confucian cultural area is contested by some scholars.

The definition of East Asia employed in this Handbook draws on the assumption of cultural, and specifically religious, commonalities of the countries included; that is to say, the discursive aspects shared by the majority of those contributing to the vast nationally confined cultural repository. A determining factor to the East Asian cultural storehouse has been the process of sinicisation, fleshing out most saliently via a shared vocabulary as well as the ideological and material heritage of the 'Three Teachings' (Chinese: sānjiào 三教; Japanese: sankyō 三教; Korean: samgyo 삼교/三教; Vietnamese: tam giáo): Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism. The Three Teachings were adding significantly to the religious environment of East Asia,

mutually influencing each other as well as existing and newly arriving religious systems (e.g., Christianity). The ethical dimension of the Three Teachings, most resonantly voiced by the Confucian tradition in days past, supplied a widely recognised standard of mores deemed conducive across the region for the establishment/maintenance of social well-being. This became so deeply ingrained that it still remains, at least latently, a socio-cultural substratum. The discursive universe of the Three Teachings, in varying diachronic and local configurations concerning the magnitude of influence of each single 'tradition,' keeps serving as the matrix or the syncretising agent of newly emerging and transmigrated religious currents, given the accelerating religious globalisation.

East Asia according to this Handbook denotes the part of Asia whose sociocultural anatomy is conspicuously characterised by these discursive aspects inscribed through a millennia-long unfolding process in substantial parts of today's nation-states of China and Taiwan, Japan, South and North Korea, and Vietnam.

New Religious Movements

Religions have always been in motion. In addition to the transformations within existing religions, the

emergence of new movements is a constant factor in history. Some of them grow and may become an essential aspect of the religious panorama domestically or even internationally. Most of them, however, remain small or eventually disappear. Taken from this angle, the term 'new religious movement' is a relative term. Designating religions as NRMs or 'new religions' is a convention, which came into use due to the lack of a more suitable terminology with respect to recently emerged religious communities. At its heart, the term is defined by a temporal dimension considering the time of institutional formation qua discernible community based on a novel religious provider (founding figure) and consumers (adherents or practitioners). Accordingly, most scholars, taking the temporal aspect as defining for NRM, mark the beginning of 'new religiosity' after 1800, or, alternatively, from the middle of the nineteenth century. This rather broad definition of NRM is occasionally juxtaposed by an approach to the concept that limits its range to the mid-twentieth century by associating the origin of NRMs with the aftermath of the 1960s counter culture or, alternatively, with the end of World War II. This contraction, however, is Western-centric, for it is linked to the emergence of a striking number of groups particularly in the United States and, by extension, Western Europe, while ignoring other areas of the world. Moreover, this definition is further compromised since many of the movements that were first encountered in the West at the time can be traced back in history well before this apparent caesura. The general lack of a clear definition entails that the term 'NRM' is limited in its temporal and, especially, its regional usage. There is, for instance, no penchant to use this category in respect to recent developments taking place in the Islamic world, although one could easily think of a plethora of suitable groups, such as the Ahmadiyya, established in the closing of the nineteenth century.

From the perspective of Religious Studies, a proper definition of 'NRM' should be broad enough to be employed in regionally and temporally diverse contexts. This is most plainly done by adhering to one sole criterion with a flexible lower end, namely 'time.' This lower end is variously anchored throughout nineteenth century religious history in

conjunction with industrialisation, colonialism, and incipient 'glocalisation.' At the intersection of socio-cultural, political, and economic shifts that were notably taking shape in all areas of the world during the nineteenth century, novel religious programmes were devised inhaling a transformative spirit moulded by the surrounding discourse and the new paradigm of (unfolding) modernity. 'New religiosity,' whenever conceived in the history of religions, is a concerted attempt to introduce change (Beckford 1986: x) but with a temporally more recent and thus contextually demarcated anatomy.

One of the major concerns with the label 'NRM' is that this category's history is often depicted as a completely separate chapter. Such approach ignores that NRMs are indeed born and bred in a specific religious milieu, and, more often than not, brought forth by and may manoeuvre within a single 'parent tradition.' Hence, the expression 'NRM' should not be regarded a new branding of religion along the lines of Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam, but merely as an umbrella notion encompassing 'more recent' institutional manifestations. This approach challenges the nomenclature often applied to religious history, where NRMs are understood as a separate segment next to 'world religions.' NRMs are so multi-faceted as to defy any overall classification not grounded in a temporal definition.

In this Handbook NRM is used in preference to the more senior term 'new religion.' The latter is a direct rendering of *shinshūkyō* 新宗教, which has become the standard designation in Japanese academe. Closely following Japanese terminology, Korean scholars likewise adopted, as the first choice, this term as a calque—*sinjonggyo*. The rationale behind using NRM is its more inclusive semantics. The term 'movement' provides a broader spectrum of 'institutions,' ranging from legally incorporated bodies and hierarchically structured organisations to loosely based communities and religious networks in statu nascendi. In addition, the term allows embracing the dynamic character of new religious developments. The younger and smaller circumscribed institutions are, the more their visibility increases given how lived religion is always in a constant state of reshaping. Cowan

and Bromley (2015: 197-198) accordingly introduced the descriptor 'experimental faiths.' In particular, it better depicts the subtle dynamics within the early period of formation, which is often characterised by a slow process of emancipation with various stages of community building and separation. NRMs scholarship and adjacent disciplines have introduced a panoply of alternative terms, many of which explicitly or implicitly convey negative associations, or are bound to very particular circumstances concerning their usage. Most coinages are animated by a basal dichotomy, as is also incidentally the case with 'NRM' or 'new religion' (here: 'traditional' or 'established' versus 'new'). These include, among others: peripheral, marginal, or fringe religion; minority religion/fait; non-mainstream religion; sectarian religion or group; controversial or unconventional religion; alternative religion; and emergent religion. Expressions such as 'new religious organisation' and 'new religious current' are chiefly used in a distinct setting narrowing the semantics of NRM. These designations implicate a dichotomy by generally taking as a defining reference a religious 'mainstream' towards which they appear as an alternative. Such understanding of new religiosity as a non-mainline religious arena is not only relative, that is, depending on the regional and temporal context, but to some extent echoes inferiority vis-à-vis a mainstream ideal. Specific neologisms have spawned in many languages, mostly stimulated by the 'anti-cult' discourse. In this respect, blatantly derogatory labels such as 'cult' and 'sect' are being avoided, unless they are arranged within a specific sociological explanatory framework, which has its own problems of wider applicability, especially with a view to East Asian NRMs.

East Asian New Religious Movements

There is no universally agreed definition for the term 'NRM' (or alternative expressions), yet it is generally perceived as a very useful label—particularly when dealing with the history of East Asia from the nineteenth century—for it stresses a new mode of 'institutionalised' religious expression. The emergence and growth of new religious developments is an important aspect in any description of the religious context of the countries concerned. This is perhaps one of the major

differences to the situation in ‘Western’ countries, where the existence of NRMs is evident as well, but more often than not they lack a substantial followership and thus remain marginalised. This difference exists to a large degree due to the general religious history of the East Asian countries that is characterised by a greater variety in the religious realm, specifically the dynamic presence of the Three Teachings throughout millennia, rather than the dominance of just one specific religious system over several centuries (such as with Christianity or Islam). In other words, East Asia comprises a much more colourful religious scenery in time and space.

The tendency to use the term NRM in this context must also be evaluated against the background of the history of the last two centuries. Doubtlessly, this period constitutes the most crucial phase in the history of the region. Key societal and political changes have their beginning in the nineteenth century, rapidly transforming the lifeworld of the people. The period witnessed the end of the Chinese emperor system ranging back to the third century BCE and—following social upheavals and a civil war—the establishment of a Communist state in mainland China and a separate one on the island of Taiwan. In Japan, the Meiji Restoration (Meiji ishin 明治維新) put an end to the isolationist Edo {Y 戸} period (1603-1868) by introducing a centralist state focused on (and narrowed down to) the pre-eminence of the Japanese Emperor, which eventually resulted in problematic developments in the first half of the twentieth century culminating in the country’s disastrous involvement in World War II. On the Korean peninsula, Japanese ‘colonial rule’ (Ilje kangjŏmgi 일제강점기/日帝強佔期; 1910-1945) concluded the Chosŏn 朝鮮 dynasty (1392-1910), paving the way for the entanglements with the post-war geopolitical situation that eventually divided the country into a communist North and a capitalist South following a bloody fratricidal war (1950-1953). Vietnam became object of French colonial interests in the nineteenth century and had to struggle its way to freedom during the twentieth century, parting the country while being plagued by an atrocious war (1955-1975).

Fuelling further transformation also in the light of advancing industrialisation, technologisation, and globalisation, these developments deeply impregnated the religious history of the region and thus are also pivotal for the new religious domain. The underlying impetus of these massive shifts across East Asian societies was the imperialist encounter with the West, ‘glocalising’ East Asia. For the religious field, this encounter meant a rapid expansion of offerings due to transmigration of ideas and their accommodation on the one hand, and a self-adapting generative momentum as a response to foreign impact on the other.

The Vietnamese Đại Đạo Tam Kỳ Phổ Độ (Cao Đài) is a most well-known example of a movement accommodating both European, ‘Western’ features (most conspicuously from Catholicism and from Kardecian Spiritism) and Asian elements in the course of the formation into a new comprehensive religious system. A more recent example concerns the new manifestations impacted by the Euro-American so-called ‘New Age’ in East Asia in the second half of the twentieth century. Groups manoeuvring in this ‘new spirituality’ segment either embraced concepts to widen their religious portfolio or are a direct outflow of this reception process. Several of these actors, navigating noticeably on the trajectory of the New Age current, have now grown into seminal suppliers in the global ‘spiritual market.’

The formation of ‘new religiosity’ in East Asia at large is mainly based on an impulse brought forth by accelerated crisis. Whereas ‘crisis’ is certainly no universally applicable instrument for explaining the emergence of novel movements, it nevertheless serves well the East Asian context as a tool for understanding the specifics of its new religious developments. ‘Crisis’ is a defining factor of the human condition, a biographical disruption triggered by perceived deprivation. The deprivation felt may have numerous causes—social inadequacies, illness, identificatory disorientation, etc.—that are engendered or at least energised by the dynamics of one’s life environment. The aspect of crisis is well articulated in the East Asian new religious cosmos, manifesting in an all-pervading elaborate spectrum of millenarian expression that aims at closure of

collective deprivation. The rugged transformation process of the East Asian region continuously nourished the potential for crisis and thus occasionally gave rise to a social response in the form of NRMs. Conducive for this religious crystallisation is the pluralist religio-cultural East Asian heritage, offering a wide array of new avenues to spell out novel social programmes. It is this vast crucible of traditions old and new, native and nativised, soaked through by the Three Teachings and socially grammaticalised especially by Confucianism that distinctively circumscribe the East Asian religious context. Born and bred in this specific socio-cultural milieu, East Asian NRMs take on the traits of the wider religious framework, shaping the very category this Handbook attempts to explore. The millenarian aspect is one vital feature encountered in the East Asian new religious domain, more often than not coming to life in a saliently ethnocentric narrative. Other typological elements often listed as new religious attributes in the main—particularly a hierarchical structure centring on a founding figure or leader, and a generally this-worldly outlook—are likewise to be found among many East Asian NRMs, yet none of these may be taken as a truly universal feature.

Regarding East Asian terminology used for describing new religious developments, Japanese scholarship for the most part provided the jargon adopted as calques in the other East Asian languages—recently also English loanwords have entered the wider new religious discourse. The model label employed in Japanese and Korean NRMs scholarship, and increasingly so in its Chinese and Vietnamese counterpart as well, is ‘new religion’ (Japanese: *shinshūkyō*; Korean *sinjonggyo*; Chinese: *xīn zōngjiào* 新宗教; Vietnamese: *tôn giáo mới*). However, ‘new religion’ is by no means a universally accepted designation and thus seldom applied outside academe. Even in Japan, where the study of NRMs already has a long history and the term ‘new religion’ has its origin, the expressions applied in the media or public discourse as well as in academic disciplines beyond (and at times within) Religious Studies are diverse, chiefly ranging from being implicitly deprecating to outrightly pejorative.

The flexible ‘lower end’ concerning the temporal aspect of ‘new religiosity’ is particularly well illustrated in the East Asian context, where the historical departure points vary in the four countries concerned. The rationale behind each individual caesura is a twofold combination. On the one hand, it refers to marked historical developments: the transitory years prior to as well as the Meiji restoration in Japan; the onset of the imperialist ambit stretching out to a weakening Qīng 清 - China (1644-1912) (early nineteenth century) and, later also, Chosŏn-Korea (mid-nineteenth century); and the Southward Movement (Nam Tién; early nineteenth century) along with the dawn of French colonial rule (mid-nineteenth century) in Vietnam. On the other hand, it involves the emergence of individual groups that for the first time visibly inherited anatomical and contextual features in line with the general corpus of what now appears as ‘East Asian NRMs’—most prominently, Nyoraikyō じつぽん教 (1802) and Ch’ōndogyo 천도교/敎 (1860).

Each of the four regional sections in this Handbook is prefaced by a chapter outlining the specific context and new religious environment. The general themes touched on in these introductory remarks are further amplified therein, providing more comprehensive insights into the complex phenomenon of East Asian new religiosity. <>

[Studies in Hellenistic Religions by Luther H. Martin](#), selected and edited with an introduction by Panayotis Pachis [Cascade Books, 9781498283106]

This selection of essays by Luther Martin brings together studies from throughout his career--both early as well as more recent--in the various areas of Graeco-Roman religions, including mystery cults, Judaism, Christianity, and Gnosticism. It is hoped that these studies, which represent spatial, communal, and cognitive approaches to the study of ancient religions might be of interest to those concerned with the structures and dynamics of religions past in general, as well as to scholars who might, with more recent historical research, confirm, evaluate, extend, or refute the hypotheses offered here, for that is the way scholars work and by which scholarship proceeds. ""This outstanding set

of essays reminds us that the study of Hellenistic religions still has a lot to offer to historians and scholars of religions. With his erudition, sharp eye, comparative outlook, and dedication to new scientific methods, Luther H. Martin offers an indispensable volume to students and scholars interested in perhaps the most diverse, rich, and complex historical period in terms of religious beliefs, ideas, and practices." --Nickolas P. Roubekas, University of Vienna ""Bringing together articles that Luther Martin has written over a long period of time, this volume provides valuable insights into a wide spectrum of socio-political conditions and religious traditions that shaped the thought, worldview, and religious life of the Graeco-Roman era. The author's deep knowledge of the Graeco-Roman world and his unique theoretical thought embellished by his acquaintance with cognitive theories make this volume an astonishing contribution to modern understanding of past people." --Olympia Panagiotidou, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki ""This volume contains a set of valuable and thought-provoking articles by Professor Luther H. Martin, a distinguished scholar of the history of religions. You may not always agree with Martin's views and support his conclusions, but they are often eye-opening and always worth considering. Definitely a must-read for all scholars interested in Hellenistic religions." --Ales Chalupa, Masaryk University, Czech Republic ""This book is a goldmine for the student of Hellenistic religions. Martin's call for a cognitive and evolutionary approach is provocative and has the potential to transform the historical study of religions." --Istvan Czachesz, University of Tromsø ""This is a most impressive collection of essays by a distinguished scholar who for years has led the way in our understanding of the religions of the Hellenistic period. With uncommon knowledge, critical intelligence, and theoretical power drawn from the study of human cognition, Martin presents example after example of his brilliant explanation of the wide array of religious options in the period. This collection is not just an astute contribution to the study of Hellenistic culture and religion, it has the potential to change that very study." --Willi Braun, The University of Alberta, Canada Luther H. Martin is Professor Emeritus of Religion at the University of Vermont. He is the editor of *Past Minds* (2011) and

author of [Deep History, Secular Theory](#) (2014) and [The Mind of Mithraists](#) (2015). Martin is a founding editor of the *Journal of Cognitive Historiography*. He has been recognized as an Honorary Life Member of the International Association for the History of Religions.

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Excerpt:

When I began the study of Hellenistic religions in the early 1980s, the heterogeneity of Mediterranean religions initially embraced by the expansive conquests of Alexander the Great was studied largely by New Testament scholars interested in the pagan background against which the inauguration of a new Christian era might be contrasted. Since then, there has been an explosion of interest by historians in these fascinating examples of religious formations and transformations in their own right. The year in which my book [Hellenistic Religions: An Introduction](#) was published (1987) alone saw the appearance of Walter Burkert's important study of the Ancient Mystery Cults, an anthology of texts pertaining to these mysteries, and Robin Lane Fox's magisterial study of Pagans and Christians. I am gratified by any contribution that my studies may have made to this rekindled and still vibrant interest among historians of religion.

My approach to the often bewildering array of religious alternatives during the Hellenistic period of religious (in contrast to political) history, the period from Alexander (fourth century BCE) to the antipagan decrees of Emperor Theodosius (end of the fourth century CE), within which the early

Christianities are included, was to map their permutations and their transformations, their similarities and their differences, by situating them in relation to the spatial architectures of the emerging Ptolemaic cosmology and that of imperial expanse they all shared and in terms of which their mythic and iconographic expressions more or less explicitly referenced. Although I would most certainly revise and refine any number of my descriptions and conclusions in light of the profusion of more recent research, I believe that the fundamental structure of my understandings of these religions in terms of the spatial representations of the Hellenistic era remains sound. Consequently, the contents of the studies in the present volume remain unchanged apart from the correction of typos and references. Rather than altering or adding to the studies of Hellenistic religions that are collected in this volume, I should like to emphasize two additional levels of analysis in which I have suggested that the original spatial framework of my studies might benefit: the communal and the cognitive.

The spatial inferences characteristic of the Hellenistic era, like all representations of past cosmologies, are essentially artificial constructions that have subsequently been abstracted by scholars from the diverse inflections of and reflections by any number of groups and their traditions—schools of philosophers, guilds of astrologers/astronomers, practitioners of religion, all of which populated a stipulated geography over a specified period of time—upon sundry and intertwined issues and problems, differently perceived and variously addressed. Therefore, I began to explore the various kinds of social formations prominent during the Hellenistic era, and the kinds of perceived problems they addressed—whether social, political, economic, intellectual, or some combination of these. I discovered that sociopolitical—including religious—formations during this era could be modeled on the basis of two "ideal types" of social organization: "fictive kinship" (e.g., the community clubs and collegia that proliferated during the Hellenistic period) and kingship (the ambitions for the consolidations of power, whether political or religious, during this same period).⁴ By identifying the formal structures of any religious system with its expressive

productions, we come closer to understanding its diverse social, political, and economic aspects as well.

Despite formal practices of social formation (e.g., initiation rites, tokens of membership, rules of relationship, and so forth), the notion of a "discrete social group" is as much an academic abstraction as is "cosmology," for social groups are characterized by notoriously porous boundaries and exhibit among their distributed membership a diversity of interpretations of their rites and rules. Rather, it is more accurate to consider social groups as a stipulated aggregate of individual minds that share a more or less common set of ideas, beliefs, and practices. Such an approach opens a second complementary level of analysis that addresses questions about how human minds represent religious, social, and cosmological ideas in the first place, how they are transmitted from mind to mind, how and why just certain behaviors are associated with these ideas and representations, how these ideas and behaviors come to be related one to another among a population that shares a common environmental domain in order to constitute what might, in this sense, be termed a particular "culture;" and how that "culture" is remembered and transmitted in ways that constitute enduring sociopolitical features.

Consequently, I have explored the relevance of the capacities and constraints of human cognition in representing, selecting for, and transmitting just those cosmological ideas and communal structure that we associate with Hellenistic religiosity.

For any community, religious or otherwise, to be judged successful (i.e., to maintain itself transgenerationally), it must encode what it selects and holds to be significant values and knowledge in a way that is memorable, and it must effectively and efficiently transmit that information. The sociopolitical dynamics of any human association are determined, in other words, as much by universal biological and cognitive constraints as by its particularistic social and historical developments. I have recently attempted to illustrate these dimensions of religiosity from the example of the Roman cult of Mithras. The ability comprehensively to outline those mental mechanisms whereby the cosmological and communal representations of the

Hellenistic period and, consequently, of the religions of this, and of all eras, are produced and transmitted is a rapidly growing area of research.

The incongruous relationship between Greek assumptions about the ordered structure of the cosmos and widespread Hellenistic concerns with the capricious and unpredictable effects of luck during this same period might suffice to indicate the promises of a cognitive approach to the historiographical issues. If the diverse cultural—literary, philosophical, and religious—thought during the Hellenistic era referenced assumptions of a given, uncreated order expressed in the mathematically precise structures of Ptolemaic cosmology, why then did inhabitants of this era so often represent their existence as fortuitous—as subject to fortuna.

Hellenistic religiosity is largely concerned with representing luck as a kind of intentional agent—an agentic representation that cognitive scientists of religion have since argued is a necessary (if insufficient) characteristic of social formations that might be deemed "religious." Such representations suggest that the same cognitive templates that predisposed the Greeks and Romans to represent mundane occurrences as the intentional actions of gods and goddesses also predisposed them to personify luck. Such rerepresentations of nonagentic randomness as intentional agency, e.g., as in the guise of traditional deities, as e.g., allowed for an adoption of actions or rituals considered to influence, especially improve, their mundane fortune. This religious re-representation of capricious fortune as benevolent agent aligned the characteristic of luck as random with intellectual presumptions about the predictable character of cosmic order. The ready identification of intentional agency is a developmentally early bias of humans (and other species) that is itself a cognitive requisite for identifying events in the world on the basis of incomplete data and to infer causes from that data efficiently, both by-products of natural selection that would greatly enhance possibilities of survival in a complex world of predation and predators.

The assumptions of the cognitive sciences—that there is no distinction between mind and brain, that the morphology of human brain and the general functions of that morphology have been shaped by

evolutionary processes of natural selection and are common to the species *Homo sapiens*, both now and from the distant past—present the possibility that knowledge about the architecture of the human mind currently being researched might provide explanations for why humans have tended to organize themselves in terms of just the nonrandom types of sociopolitical organizations that they have and for why these groups have selected and transmitted just the ideas and behaviors they have, rather than others that were historically possible. Together, an integrated cosmological-communal-cognitive paradigm, such as I have suggested, can be sketched for Hellenistic culture, and presents a comprehensive paradigm by which historians (including historians of religion) might organize their often fragmentary data and draw their historiographical conclusions with greater precision and confidence than might otherwise be the case.

I would like to thank Professor Panayotis Pachis, the editor of this volume, my colleague, my collaborator, and my very good friend, for his continuing interest in my work, and for his invaluable editorial work in producing this volume. I dedicate this volume to him in recognition of his own many important contributions to the academic study of religion generally, and to the study of Graeco-Roman religions in particular, both within his native land of Greece and in the international community of scholars.

Religion flourished at this time. The traditional religious expression, despite the attacks it accepted, continued to be the mainstay for a large part of the population and especially for those who continued to live in their ancestral homelands. Many times it functioned as a means for surpassing the current adverse situation and returning to past glory and grandeur. A typical example is the effort of Lycurgus, who, when he took the power in Athens (330 BCE), sought to address the disorderly situation in the city with reforms inspired by ancestral traditions. At the same time, however, there also appeared new religious cults especially from the East, which complemented the overall picture of people's religiosity. These cults were initially considered strange but over time became accepted and influenced people's lives. Their

acceptance was distinguished by a particular ambiguity: these religious ideas were also influenced by the Greek way of approaching religious worship. Receptivity and adaptability played a decisive role for their establishment, originally in the Greek and later in the broader environment of the Graeco-Roman world.

Alongside traditional religion was an increasing domination of new cults in Greece and other parts of the wider oecumene. This period attests to the dissemination of many "cults of eastern origin," which were associated with the Greek language, the scientific and astronomical ecumenism, the political and ecumenical worldview of the Successors and later Roman emperors, and especially with the movement and constant migration of people from the one part of the world to the other. Those include the worship of Isis and S(e)arapis, Cybele and Attis, Adonis, and the Anatolian god Men. These cults, attractive and impressive compared to the traditional religion of the ancient Greek world, offered special experiences to the people of this era with luxurious rituals, ascetic trials, and complex rules of ritual purification. On many occasions, the new concepts were based on preexisting traditional views. In this direction, the influence of the so-called *interpretatio Graeca* played a vital role. The religions of the Mediterranean area, designated as "national," were known for their strict adherence to tradition, and therefore a foreign cult or an entire religious system could be accepted only after being purified through the filter of the *interpretatio*.

This became even more intense after the conquest of Egypt, the last bulwark against the Hellenistic world, in 31 BCE by Octavian Augustus. The beginning of the so-called imperial age and the prevalence of the *Pax Romana* set new standards for the free movement of different groups, commercial goods, and also religious and cultural beliefs from one part of the vast empire to another. Augustus's main objective was to make the empire a single sociopolitical entity. The polymerization of the Hellenistic kingdoms gave way to the vast and unified space of the Roman Empire. Those moving around the most were people in the service of imperial power (soldiers, officials, state administrators of the Roman Empire), merchants,

travelers (e.g., Pausanias), priests of various eastern cults (e.g., priests of the Great Mother, of the Syrian goddess), magicians, and philosophers (e.g., the Cynics).

Due to the great Roman conquests, from the second century BCE onwards, there was an increase in the movement of slaves, foreign citizens, teachers, philosophers, and traders within the vast Roman territory. All were moving—freely or against their will—in a state that was constantly transformed, likely feeling as prisoners of Fortune. Within this world of doubt, controversy, and discontent, all "eastern cults" found suitable ground for their dissemination. Of particular preference were the cults of Isis-S(e)arapis, Cybele-Attis, Mithras, and Jupiter Dolichenus. Propagation of such ideas started on the Italian peninsula and then in other places of the Roman Empire, mainly through the major ports, such as those of Ostia and Puteoli. Eastern cults became particularly popular in this area, since the suspicion of citizens gradually decreased mainly because the cults afforded a cosmopolitan character. The adherents of the so-called eastern cults came mainly from the ranks of slaves and freedmen, while one may observe at the inscriptions a lack of faithfulness among the members of the aristocracy, who maintained a particularly cautious attitude already from the beginning of the appearance of those foreign cults.

The surprise caused by the penetration of new cults and deities in the religious environment to Greeks, and later to conservative Romans, was succeeded by fear and hesitation. Official traditional religion (*religio*) was clearly distinguished from foreign religious perceptions (*superstitiones*). The latter were regarded dangerous for the harmony and greatness of the state, which was created by the victorious struggles against nations and with the full support and goodwill of the ancestral gods. The terms *sacra peregrina* and *sacra publica* constituted a crucial distinction in the devotional life of the Romans. But the initial resistance was gradually reduced during the first imperial period with the consolidation of Roman rule across the then-known world. From a simple urban center (*Urbs*), Rome was transformed into a global ruling city (*Orbis*).

During the imperial times, the agents of dissemination and propaganda of all foreign cults were not only the residents of the East who moved around in the Empire, but also the Roman soldiers, who during their stay in the East became acquainted with and eventually adhered to those cults. A typical example is the cult of Mithras, with the vast majority of followers found among the ranks of the Roman army. The prevalence of the *Pax Romana* and the domination of the common Hellenistic language throughout the empire were two additional factors that accommodated the spread of foreign cults.

From the early adoption stages, followers of most religious groups took special care to use the Greek and then the Latin language in their rituals. The complete adoption of the Greek language, particularly during late antiquity—in the so-called Second Sophistic period—was one of the most effective strategies to be followed by adherents of these cults. This virtually permitted a smooth movement and communication of people and ideas in an era characterized by a universal spirit.

The acceptance of a foreign cult was possible only if it provided the absolute assurance that it posed no risk to the destabilization of the city. This condition became even more imperative in Rome. This was the capital of the state and should therefore be protected against anything that could threaten its glory and grandeur. The same practice was followed later on, when the penetration and establishment of foreign cults in the Roman environment was easier. The followers of new cults were forced to show on a daily basis, during the performance of their religious duties, their submission to those practices that guaranteed the stability and happiness of the Roman state. Maintaining this attitude became even more imperative for the adherents of foreign cults in subsequent times (especially after the third century CE), when the idea that imperial authority was absolute and divine became even more prevalent. The same spirit of subordination and adaptation to the standards of the Roman state characterized the cult of Mithras, which according to R. Merkelbach, reveals the spirit of loyalty to the Roman state power.

Prescribing the connection of the state and the cult can be seen as a kind of defense, given the marginal position of the cults in relation to the official state religion. We should not of course overlook the fact that the usual practice of the members of these communities towards the representatives of the Roman power was one of conformism. It is worth mentioning here that modern research maintains that most of these cults were fully integrated over time in Roman society and actually became integral parts of the broader collective socioreligious life. On the contrary, the negative attitude of various groups of adherents toward Roman authorities—expressed primarily by rejecting the emperor's divinity—had negative repercussions on their living conditions and their acceptance into the imperial environment.

This was also the case with Christian, Gnostic, and Manichaean communities during late antiquity.

Most of the new cults were influenced by the Greek culture, thus developing a new form that was a product of syncretism. This is evident in the works of most scholars of this specific historical period, who characterize it as a "time of syncretism." This is a concept that causes—even nowadays—various reactions (both positive and negative) depending on the adopted viewpoints. The term syncretism was the creation of modern theoretical thought in order to address and describe—according to the data of a usually apologetic tactic—the conditions or trends of a particular era. Luther Martin's specific approach to syncretistic changes constitutes one of the most innovative aspects of his research. This specific approach to syncretism changes, particularly in Martin's work, constituting one of the most innovative aspects of his research. This is apparent in his view that "syncretism is the most characteristic phenomenon that prevails upon religions and cults of the Hellenistic era ... Hellenistic religious syncretism may best point to coherent patterns of relationships that must be described in their systemic particulars, rather than a cultural mixture born of historical happenstance."

Syncretism develops whenever a society is going through historical periods characterized as "periods of crisis" because of certain circumstances and constant changes. When foreign cultures and traditions come into contact with each other, new

religious phenomena arise. In the development of such new forms, the elements of the local tradition usually prevail. Any kind of comparison between deities from various cultures should always be based on analogy, and analogy on proportion. The concept of proportion, in accordance with the basic principles of historical-religious methodology, was based primarily on the principles of synchronic and diachronic comparison, and it is achieved when comparing two phenomena on the basis not only of their similarities but mainly of their differences. In this way, and by taking into consideration the specificity of the cultural environment from which the compared concepts are derived, we may obtain a more complete and comprehensive picture of the subject or ideas under study.

The syncretistic spirit of the time may find matches in the Ptolemaic worldview, which prevailed from the second century CE. The last book of Apuleius's *Metamorphoses* is the best example of syncretism in this time. The identification of Isis with other deities should be understood as a compilation of disparate concepts in the face of a special deity (that is, Isis), who is still depicted as dominating Tychē. For Plutarch, syncretism is considered to be a concrete system of relations, which is defined by similarities and organized on the basis of a relation of sympathy (similarities) and nonsympathy (differences).

Of the cults invading the space of the Roman world, it is worth concentrating mainly on the "mystery cults." Initiation was the major difference in relation to the previous category of ceremonies—that is, Roman state cults. Through initiation was achieved, which led to mystic beatitude and, eventually, to both worldly and posthumous salvation. Thus, the adherent acquired a feeling of absolute security and bliss that made him different from the rest of the population. The Mysteries of Eleusis, the Kabeiroi on Samothrace, and the cult of Mithras were considered to be typical mystery cults. The rites of Eleusis took place only at the Telesterion of Eleusis, which was regarded as the quintessential religious sanctuary. Even during the Hellenistic era, it preserved its ritual particularity, which was strictly linked to its local character. Conversely, the Mithraic worship, as a true creation of the ecumenical era, produced numerous temples

(Mithraia) throughout the Roman Empire. The worship of Isis/S(e)arapis and Cybele/Attis took a different form, distinguished by their external and public rituals, which were shaped in the regions where their worship was spread during this period.

After their dissemination in the Greek area, they were influenced by the rituals of the Eleusinian mysteries (between the first century BCE and the first century CE. The initiation ceremonies of these cults contributed to the creation of a special affinity between the adherent and the celebrated gods. This practice found its ideal form of application in the legal practice of adoption. The devotees stopped having any contact with the traditional family and tribal environment, and created within the frame of these groups new family ties, which were radically different. The practice of "adoption" of a foreigner in order for them to enter the environment of a social group was commonplace in the ancient Greek and Roman law. Once again, the traditional notions of the Graeco-Roman world decisively influenced the formation of these peculiar social groups of this era. The concept of the founder of traditional societies of the time was conveyed into the environment of these groups. The ceremony of initiation, which constituted the culmination of all rituals, contributed to the great transformation of the followers and their transition into a new reality.

The trends of this transitional period led modern research into generalizations that rather obfuscated the particular character of the Hellenistic period than led to correct scientific conclusions. Main exponents of these trends were the researchers of the nineteenth century, who argued that the Hellenistic era was distinguished by its individualism. We need, however, to examine a historical period without biases, taking seriously into consideration all the data and elements pertaining to both space and time. In regard to the Hellenistic period, individualism was only one side of the coin; the other was a type of intense social life that attempted to overcome unsettling new conditions. Hellenistic times represented a radical era and perhaps a precursor—*mutatis mutandis*, of course—of the modern era. The people of that period continued to seek integration into a whole

that would offer them, at any cost, the lost confidence created by belonging in a group.

Sociability was manifested in various groups, which appeared with striking frequency throughout the Hellenistic period. The environment of the Hellenistic cities of mainland Greece, as well as that of the Near East, was ideal for their activities. The same occurred later on throughout the Roman Imperium. Such groups had been well known in the Greek world since the ancient times—especially in Athens, after the reform imposed upon the city by Cleisthenes (507 BCE). The cosmopolitanism of the Hellenistic world, the great trade development, and the constant movement of people contributed to their flourishing: ports and commercial centers of the time became the epicenters of such activities. These groups were thought to provide the most amicable environments within the hostile and unfamiliar space of the ecumenical cities. Among them, individuals could find a safe haven and meet with people that came from the same place or faced the same problems, could talk with them, and so could feel more confident. The saying ("know thyself") was supplemented at this time by the saying ("know others"), while Aristotle's position seems to prevail: ("Man is by nature a social animal"). Their initial homogeneity eventually disappeared, as they admitted into their environments people of other ethnicities. All these communities were actually miniatures of the Greek system—with political, economic, and religious actors living harmoniously in their environment. Such communities could be likened to the imaginary isles developed in the urban environment in the form of utopian spaces, where people could find much-needed egalitarianism.

Within these environments, native kinship, which characterized traditional ancient social groups, took the shape of a fictive kinship. This was a typical characteristic of the so-called eastern cults of this period, as well as of the Christian, Gnostic, and Manichaean communities. The organization of festivals and feasts by the members, which included participation by "foreigners", was also typical during this period. Freedmen and slaves also took part in all these religious events. The spirit of brotherhood and equality that prevailed found its ideal expression within the context of such groups.

By entering and integrating into these socioreligious groups, members were automatically separated from the rest of society.

Thenceforth, they interrupted all contact with their traditional family and tribal environment and created, within the frame of these groups, new family ties shared only among the group members. This paved the way for an innovation: the coexistence of the traditional and the novel. The plethora of new perceptions, literally invading the Greek space, caused confusion for the Greeks of this period, who were eventually trapped in a maze of problems and became prisoners of a "peculiar crisis that resulted from unrestricted choice" of perceptions that dominated the ideology of that period.

Salvation was directly related to a new adherent's entrance into an alternative religious environment in one of these groups. The believer ceased to be an individual who lived outside the social reality (*dividuus*), and was then accepted into the community (*individuus*) as a full member, with obligations but also expectations that made him different compared to the rest of the population. This created explicit social boundaries between those who belonged and those who did not belong in such a group, thus inevitably leading to discrimination.

The sense of uncertainty became even greater during late antiquity, when the borders of the vast empire were threatened by the emergence of barbarian tribes living beyond the "boundaries" of the world. The dualism between the world of light and order and the world of darkness and disorder was further broadened. Occultism and apocalyptic prognosis revealed a growing anxiety among contemporary people to find, by any means, much-needed salvation in the turbulent period they lived in. Experiencing this unprecedented situation, they reached the point of suffering from "cosmic paranoia" They believed that they were threatened by dangerous forces originating in the area of the unknown—more specifically, by the oppressive and tyrannical influence of Fate, that made their lives increasingly difficult and unpredictable. In their effort to move away from the traditional way of life, they resorted to a utopian state, which was located beyond the limits

of the ecumenical world and knew nothing of the problems and uncertainties of this world. The real hero became the one who managed to escape the painful conditions of the everyday political-social reality. As such, people all the more felt the need to break away from this world's shackles, which were considered the main cause for their suffering—as well as a place of trial rather than salvation. Escape was achieved with their ritual ascension into the broader cosmic firmament, beyond the seven planets, which was considered to be the return to their ancestral homeland. It was a reverse movement, aimed at regaining the lost sociability and avoiding the oppressive effect of the seven planetary spheres. This was a time, as Jonathan Z. Smith has argued, when the individual felt as part of the wider cosmic firmament.

The value of this collection of Luther H. Martin's articles lies mainly in his proposed methodology as well as in his critical penetration into the complex world of the Hellenistic era. His tireless research does not cease there however, but continues with more fervor as he introduces us to the cognitive tendency that prevails in the modern study of religions. This groundbreaking initiative constitutes a transition that is also consistent with the transitional nature of this historical period. Martin's research initiatives have great value because they provide a more comprehensive picture of the religions of the Hellenistic period.

Martin's overall scientific approach is twofold: on the one hand, he offers proposals about the study of the religions and the cults of the Hellenistic world; and on the other hand, he lays out proposals in regard to issues related to the scientific study of religion. His scientific enterprise has been very successful due to his conscientious research, which can be compared with the investigations of a detective who patiently and insightfully is trying to find solutions to unresolved problems. Martin's detective tactics work in such a way that he always "goes behind the familiar metaphors, typologies or sets of concepts proposed on the modern historical assumptions" in order to achieve his goal.¹ His tools are principles of an explanatory approach for matters that lie at the core of current scientific study in order to achieve

"a theoretical filling-in of the evidential gaps that is based upon testable hypotheses.

In addition, Martin's research can be compared with the construction of a sophisticated mosaic in which one cannot completely represent the desired image unless every tessera is placed in the appropriate position. This is the only way to acquire the necessary basis for a complete and objective research. The modern scholar, especially of the scientific study of religion, should always keep in mind that the different testimonies which shape the framework of his study are a part of a system and must always be studied as such. Viewing religion as a social system, which is justified by the reference to a superhuman power, constitutes the sine qua non of current research. The interdisciplinary method of research is a necessary feature in the study of human religious events. If we do not take into consideration all the elements that shape the period in which a particular religious phenomenon takes place, we will inevitably end up with generalizations and shallow conclusions. <>

[Historical Atlas of Hasidism](#) by Marcin Wodzinski, cartography by Waldemar Spallek [Princeton University Press, 9780691174013]

The first cartographic reference book on one of today's most important religious movements

[Historical Atlas of Hasidism](#) is the very first cartographic reference book on one of the modern era's most vibrant and important mystical movements. Featuring seventy-four large-format maps and a wealth of illustrations, charts, and tables, this one-of-a-kind atlas charts Hasidism's emergence and expansion; its dynasties, courts, and prayer houses; its spread to the New World; the crisis of the two world wars and the Holocaust; and Hasidism's remarkable postwar rebirth.

[Historical Atlas of Hasidism](#) demonstrates how geography has influenced not only the social organization of Hasidism but also its spiritual life, types of religious leadership, and cultural articulation. It focuses not only on Hasidic leaders but also on their thousands of followers living far from Hasidic centers. It examines Hasidism in its historical entirety, from its beginnings in the eighteenth century until today, and draws on

extensive GIS-processed databases of historical and contemporary records to present the most complete picture yet of this thriving and diverse religious movement.

[Historical Atlas of Hasidism](#) is visually stunning and easy to use, a magnificent resource for anyone seeking to understand Hasidism's spatial and spiritual dimensions, or indeed anybody interested in geographies of religious movements past and present.

- Provides the first cartographic interpretation of Hasidism
- Features seventy-four maps and numerous illustrations
- Covers Hasidism in its historical entirety, from its eighteenth-century origins to today
- Charts Hasidism's emergence and expansion, courts and prayer houses, modern resurgence, and much more
- Offers the first in-depth analysis of Hasidism's egalitarian—not elitist—dimensions
- Draws on extensive GIS-processed databases of historical and contemporary records

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Excerpt:

I like maps, because they lie. Because they give no access to the vicious truth. Because great-heartedly, good-naturedly they spread before me a world not of this world. —Wisława Szymborska, Map. Translated from the Polish by Clare Cavanagh

The emergence of a religious ecstatic-pietistic movement called Hasidism (from the Hebrew *hasid*—pious) was undoubtedly one of the most significant events in the history of European Jewry in the eighteenth century. Although, as one of its

critics wrote, its "insipid buds" hardly foretold such wonderful growth, in the nineteenth century Hasidism became one of the most important and largest movements within Judaism, and one of the most significant religious movements throughout the whole of Eastern Europe, Jewish or non-Jewish. Its extensive influence remains evident in a great many areas of Jewish settlement up to the present day.

Furthermore, Hasidism has become with time not just a religious movement, its scope limited to a narrow circle of (exclusively male) mystical followers, but also a socio-cultural force of exceptionally wide influence, shaping a value system, imaginations, beliefs, social practices, and interpersonal relationships extending far beyond the confines of the Hasidic brotherhood itself. Over the course of the nineteenth century, enormous masses of Eastern European Jews residing in an area extending from Central Poland in the west, as far as Eastern Belarus and so-called New Russia in the east, and from Latvia and Lithuania in the north, to Galicia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania in the south, found themselves within the sphere of Hasidism's influence as a cultural force. Although not all Jews living in these areas were followers of Hasidism, the development of the Hasidic movement influenced the lifestyle of not just Hasidim and their families, but of nearly all the Jews living in this area. Hence Hasidism is often perceived as the quintessence of Eastern-European Jewishness, and the Hasidic culture as the one unblemished version of traditional Jewish culture. Although this is an incorrect assumption (the world of traditional, then Orthodox Judaism was far richer, and Hasidism is not necessarily the tradition's embodiment), Hasidism's great role in the collective imagination is a good illustration of the significance of Hasidism for the social and cultural life of the Jews and the enormous influence it had far beyond the boundaries of the actual Hasidic movement. Put simply, Hasidism has become in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries an icon of Jewishness.

It is, therefore, understandable that Hasidism is one of the most intensively studied aspects of the history and culture of Jewish Eastern Europe, and now also the United States and Israel. Indeed, today academic monographs published in English,

Hebrew, and other languages on virtually all aspects of Hasidism are legion.

This has not prevented the field, however, from neglecting some important aspects and focusing uncritically on others. Most generally, the main conceptual and methodological limitations of the research on Hasidism can be summarized in five categories: 1) focus on the intellectual history of Hasidism to the detriment of social, cultural, economic, or political histories and their methodologies; 2) inadequate use of sources of non-Hasidic origin, especially if they are not in Hebrew or Yiddish; 3) chronological focus on the earliest stage of Hasidism to the detriment of later developments; 4) elitist perspective focusing on the great and mighty to the detriment of the rank-and-file; and 5) essentialism and ahistorical approaches to the issue of what is and what is not Hasidism.

All those limitations have had a direct effect on the study of the geography of Hasidism. A focus on intellectual history and theological thought to the detriment of other perspectives allowed for the downplaying of local context, spatial characteristics, or topography informing the social and cultural landscape of Hasidism. Abraham Joshua Heschel, one of the most important Jewish thinkers of the twentieth century, of Hasidic origin himself, maintained that "unlike the spaceminded man," Jews, and Hasidim in particular, had lived in time, but not in space. According to his well-known dictum: "Judaism is a religion of time aiming at the sanctification of time." Needless to say, Heschel was not alone. Widespread assumptions that Hasidism was not only transterritorial, but indeed aterritorial, informed much of both scholarship and popular thinking on Hasidism. This was easily maintained in a post-Holocaust context when most of the scholarship stemmed from North America and Israel, far from and without physical contacts with the traditional spaces of the movement—when traditional places of Hasidism did not exist on contemporary maps. For many it was impossible to recognize that the famous Ger (Yiddish name of Góra Kalwaria) is identical to the Polish hamlet of Góra Kalwaria. For some it was indeed immaterial whether R. Nahman lived in Ukrainian Braclaw or Prussian Breslau and what the place looked like. Hasidism was to be the fruit of borderless Eastern

Europe, eastern Ashkenaz, or even more amorphous Yiddishland. Thus, despite the fact that many geographical concerns, such as the spatial dimension of Hasidic expansion and the regional characteristics of various Hasidic groups, have long belonged to the most contentious issues in the historiography of Hasidism, the geography of Hasidism as a field has never been thoroughly and systematically addressed.

This enduring neglect of geographical reflection on historical Hasidism is all the more surprising considering that the humanities—Jewish history and religious studies included—have been experiencing a significant renaissance of interest in the spatial aspects of reality. Further, geographical studies inform much of the burgeoning research on contemporary Israeli ultra-Orthodoxy (usually called *haredim*), of which the Hasidim constitute a very significant section.¹ Despite this and despite some very interesting publications on the geographical dimension of Hasidism, it seems that the spatial turn has not yet fully entered studies of the movement.

These research weaknesses find especially strong expression when it comes to the maps of Hasidism—the most popular, but also the most conservative mode of presenting Hasidic geography. Most contemporary atlases of the Jews or Judaism do not contain any reference to Hasidism whatsoever. While several other publications and several top atlases do have such maps, few of them advance our knowledge of Hasidism. The vast majority of these reflect an impressionistic view of the territorial scope of Hasidism, marking only the places of residence of the most famous Hasidic leaders or the areas in which the major Hasidic dynasties were dominant.

The essential defects of such maps and their underlying concepts are twofold. First, they depict a static and synchronic picture, without any consideration for the chronological development of Hasidism, merging centers dating from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries into one map. This inevitably obscures the historical dimension of a movement by reducing it to a cluster of timeless personalities, all seemingly active simultaneously.

Second, the criteria for selecting the Hasidic "centers" included in such maps are purely impressionistic, and are usually based on subjective judgments as to the "importance" of this or that Hasidic leader. Even if one agrees with the particular selection made in any one of these maps, it is not clear to what extent it reflects Hasidic political and social realities. Does it, for example, correlate the places of residence of Hasidic leaders with centers of Hasidic demographic, political, or social dominance? Are the selected localities Hasidic pilgrimage sites or were they densely populated by Hasidic followers? None of the maps addresses these uncertainties, and it is not at all clear what they actually show.

These weaknesses have prompted us to look for an alternative conceptualization of Hasidic geography, with the aim of creating a more meaningful—dynamic-diachronic rather than static-synchronic—representation of the spatial aspects of Hasidism. We sought to approach the issue with the new sources, new perspectives, and new methodologies and to translate these new findings into the language of cartography.

First, this atlas very consciously broadens its sphere of interest beyond the Hasidic leaders and shows thousands of their followers living in hundreds of small towns far from Hasidic centers. Even if this was at times difficult to portray, it attempts to escape from the dominant paradigm of the history of Hasidism as a history of its leaders. Instead, much attention has been given to mapping the rank-and-file, their prayer sites, pilgrimage routes, economic life, or contemporary dispersion. In a sense, it attempts to challenge what Jonathan Z. Smith called the "imperial map of the world" as seen by the priests from their perspective of the center and the temple, but not by the rank-and-file religionists in the provinces.

Second, it carefully avoids the still-dominant focus on the earliest phase of Hasidism. Instead, the vast majority of the maps in the atlas cover later stages of the movement and attempt to present them evenly throughout its whole history, from its emergence in the late eighteenth century through today.

Third, it attempts to adopt a wide variety of geographical perspectives, from a broad macroscale view on the Eastern European Hasidic expansion, to a mesoscale analysis of internal hierarchies of Hasidic groups and dynasties, to microscale research of the religious landscape in individual localities, down to the floor plan of an individual prayer hall.

Fourth, it attempts to grasp the interconnectedness of the material, mental, and social aspects of the space. While naturally the social space of interactions between the Hasidim, their institutions, and their leaders lies at the heart of this atlas, it pays equal attention to the material dimension of the space—to physical territory and natural landscape, as well as to the mental space; imagined spaces, places, and boundaries; memory of the space and place; and, finally, their symbolic significance." In other words, the atlas presents social and demographic information, but also physical/material, political, economic, intellectual, and cultural aspects of Hasidism. By doing so, it aims to present a comprehensive, multifaceted picture of the movement.

Most importantly, the atlas attempts to break radically with an inadequate use of available sources. Unlike the existing maps of Hasidism, it is based on the extensive and diverse collection of qualitative, but above all quantitative, data of diversified origin. Six of the nine chapters use extensive GIS-processed databases with hundreds of records. The largest database created for this atlas records more than 130,000 Hasidic households in 1,200 localities on six continents. Similarly, one microlevel map of pilgrims who traveled to an investigated Hasidic court is based on a collection of approximately 6,300 petitions delivered to a particular Hasidic leader in the 1870s. The atlas clearly demonstrates that rich and valuable historical resources still exist and, with the advent of digital humanities, might be easily available for research.

To be fair, the problematic nature of primary sources for the historical geography of religion is a more general issue for the entire discipline, not limited to the historiography of Hasidism. The atlas thus provides an indication of possible new research into historical geographies of religions

more generally. Scholars use historical materials allowing for analysis of the spatial aspects of religions, but despite the exponential growth of geotemporal databases, few of them find application in mesoscale research on the historical geography of religion. Instead, the vast majority of them present aggregated survey data on major world religions, by nature ahistorical, ethnocentric, and lacking any human-scale dimension. On the other hand, when more specific microscale materials are explored, these usually involve discussion of individual cases of the process of diffusion, emergence of individual pilgrimage sites, or politics of religious places, which often escape broader application. Mesoscale studies, in both a social/institutional and spatial sense (i.e., studies combining in-depth analyses of religious structures far below the global level of world religions with large resources on translocal religious phenomena) are still a desideratum.

We argue that sources for such analyses, even if hard to find, do exist, or rather they could and should be generated from a variety of indirect resources. While it might seem a Sisyphean task to comb through thousands of multilanguage volumes in search of dispersed, sporadic, and hard-to-process narrative data, we argue that these materials, once aggregated, are invaluable resources for a quantitative analysis of historical forms of religions. In other words, this atlas attempts to demonstrate the possibilities of in-depth quantitative GIS-based research of a mystical religious movement and a richly documented, deeply nuanced, and carefully contextualized historical research of a religious movement far smaller than world religions or major denominations. The atlas not only presents the spatial dimension of a mystical movement, but also it endeavors to demonstrate and interpret the meaningful interrelations between the movement's geography and spirituality. This is possibly the boldest argument of this atlas: Hasidism has been conditioned by the spatial characteristics of the movement not only in its social organization, but also in its spiritual life, type of religious leadership, or cultural articulation. And it is possible to capture this dimension of Hasidism with maps.

As the opening stanza by Wislawa Szymborska indicates, cartography is always a lie. The maps "give no access to the vicious truth," as the world they spread before our eyes is only a cartographical projection. We have been continuously reminded that "the map is not the territory." But it is precisely for the reason that it is only a kind of abstraction—an irony that seems to have escaped the author of this pun, Alfred Korzybski—that the map might communicate other, equally real, but more difficult-to-capture dimensions of space: mental and social. In the case of the atlas of a religious movement, maps have the potential to show phenomena one cannot see on the surface of reality, things "not of this world," things otherworldly. We very much hope this atlas gives such an insight into the history, life, beliefs, and spirituality of the Hasidim, past and present.

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Fall Narratives: an Interdisciplinary Perspective

edited by Zohar Hadromi-Allouche and Aine Larkin
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Throughout history the motif of 'the Fall' has impacted upon our understanding of theology and philosophy and has had an influence on everything from literature to dance. Fall Narratives brings together theologians, historians and artists as well as philosophers and scholars of religion and literature, to explore and reflect on a wide range of concepts of the Fall. Bringing a fresh understanding of the nuanced meanings of the Fall and its various manifestations over time and across space, contributions reflect on the ways in which the Fall can be seen as a transition into absence; how conceptions of the Fall relate to, change, and shape one another; and how the Fall can be seen positively, embracing as it does a narrative of hope.

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Excerpt: Fall narratives are not one, but legion; for they are many. The theme of the Fall appears already in the earliest documents available to us, and has maintained its significance in human culture ever since. The reason for this enduring relevance lies with the continuous presence of the phenomenon of the Fall in human experience. In Western cultural discourse, largely due to the influence of the

Christian tradition, the Fall has come to be closely linked with the text of Gen 3. It is thus perceived primarily as a religious, moral and theological term. However, the Fall exists on a variety of levels, including the physical, psychological, spiritual, financial or emotional, to name but a few. It is by no means restricted to the Christian, or biblical, or even monotheistic tradition. It should therefore be explored using a broad perspective, and an interdisciplinary approach.

In Western culture the theme of the Fall is commonly identified with biblical narratives. The book of Genesis, which opens the biblical corpus, begins with the creation of the world and humanity (Gen 1), a creation that the text repeatedly refers to as 'good' (Gen 1:4; 10; 12; 18; 21; 25) or even 'very good' (Gen 1:31). However, once humanity is created (Gen 1:27 and then again Gen 2:7; 21), trouble begins. Gen 3-11 contain a sequence of human and human-related Falls: woman and man in the Garden (Gen 3), Cain and Abel (Gen 4), Sons of God (Gen 6), the deluge (Gen 6-7) and the tower of Babel (Gen 11). Already at the end of Gen 8, God arrives at the conclusion that 'the inclination of the human heart is evil since youth' (Gen 8:21).

Genesis 3, the first link in this chain of Falls, is also the one that is most frequently identified as the definitive Fall. It tells the story of the first woman and man in the Garden of Eden. Encouraged by the local snake, they disobey the divine command not to eat the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. The woman and man's transgression results in a transformation of their consciousness, as they become aware of their lack of clothes.

This transgression, which is understood as a theistic and theologically-related human Fall (human disobedience to the divine decree), is divinely punished by God through a physical Fall that is consistently directed downwards. The snake becomes physically confined to the earth, crawling on his belly and eating earth (Gen 3:14) and located under humans' feet (Gen 3:15).

The woman is put under the governance of her man, and the action of bringing descendants into this world will cause her grief (Gen 3:16). For the man, the earth becomes accursed (Gen 3:17).

Instead of eating the fruit of the (high) trees (Gen 2:16), he shall now eat the weed of the (low) earth (Gen 3:18), and shall return down into the earth from which he has been erected (Gen 3:19). In addition, God sends the man (and, as is evident from Gen 4:1, also the woman) out of Eden, to the earth whence the man has been taken (Gen 3:23). For the woman and man, transgression is also accompanied by a process of renaming and specification: the man (ha-adam) becomes Adam (Gen 3:17); the woman, Eve (Gen 3:20).

Eve and Adam's transgression and Fall from Eden, therefore, have enduring implications for human (and slithering) kind. These implications are multidimensional: physical (reshaping for the snake; the experience of childbirth for the woman); spatial (moving from the realm of the divine Garden to the earth; human—snake communication changing from face-to-face to head-to-heel); conceptual (Paradise lost¹); and moral (typically, Gen 3 is followed by Gen 4, with the fratricide story of Cain and Abel).

It is the moral dimension that came to predominate in the cultural perception of the Eden narrative, particularly through the prism of the Christian reading of Gen 3, with its identification of the snake as Satan, and of the transgression with Original Sin. According to this interpretation, eating from the Tree of Knowledge was the physical representation of a moral Fall, and the primordial humans' Original Sin has affected their descendants for generations since. By the fourth century CE this view became Christian dogma.

It is, however, notable that the idea of Original Sin is not inherent to the text of Gen 3. The biblical narrative does not include the words 'sin' or 'Satan', and this particular interpretation of the Eden story is not shared by mainstream Judaism or by Islam. The case of Islam is of particular interest, since Qur'anic references to the transgression in the Garden do include Satan. According to Q 2:35-37 and Q 7:19-25, it was Satan who tempted Adam and his (unnamed) spouse concurrently to eat the forbidden fruit. According to Q 20:115-123, Satan tempted Adam alone. In all three references, both the spouse and Adam ate the fruit, and were hence expelled from the Garden. Nevertheless, according to Q 2:37 and 20:122, God then forgave Adam.

Furthermore, Islam regards Adam as a prophet. As such, according to the Muslim dogma of prophetic infallibility (*'isnia*), he is incapable of sin. The transgression in the Garden, therefore, should not be regarded as one. Original Sin, thus, is not a given in Gen 3.

Neither does the theme of falling originate in the biblical narrative. The Eden narrative is often taken as the paradigmatic Fall. However, this cultural and religious concept seems to have emerged well before the sixth—tenth centuries BCE (the time range within which many scholars date Gen 1-11). The Fall theme can be traced back further to ancient Sumerian literature, and specifically to the story of the powerful goddess Inana and her descent to the underworld. According to the Sumerian story of Inana's descent to the underworld, Inana, goddess of sexual love and agricultural fertility, wished to extend her rule to the underworld, which was the kingdom of her sister. For this hubris, the gods of heaven sentenced her to death. Her journey to the underworld became a process of gradual deterioration. First, she lost her clothes and jewellery. Then she was struck by all kinds of diseases and deficiencies. Eventually, she died. When finally, she was saved and returned to the world above (on condition that someone else took her place in the netherworld), Inana realised that her spouse, Dumuzid, was not overly distressed by her death. She thus had him sent down to the underworld in her stead. Inana was later struck by a sense of loss and missed Dumuzid. Dumuzid's sister sought to save her brother, and was granted divine permission to take his place in the underworld every six months.

A Fall thread is present throughout this story. Inana's expansionary aspirations express a Fall into hubris and transgression. Her voluntary, spatial journey from the heavens to the underworld is the physical expression of this Fall. In the underworld, she first falls from status and civilisation (jewellery and clothes), then falls ill (physical fall), and finally goes through the combined deterioration of her body and soul, as she falls from divine immortality into mortality and death. Upon her resurrection she continues to fall, through the collapse of her love and marriage. Inana's betrayal of her sister and then of her husband is contrasted with the loyalty

of Dumuzid's sister, who succeeds in retrieving half of his life. The nature of the Fall in this narrative is different to that described in the biblical Eden story.

Similarly, another early Fall narrative, which seems independent of the biblical Eden story, is Hesiod's myth of the ages of humanity (gold, silver, bronze, heroic and iron). These ages represent a gradual deterioration in the nature of humans and particularly in their morality. Whereas the heroic age might at first seem unrelated to the theme of Fall, Timothy Gantz's observation that the heroes themselves are likely to have come into being through the coupling of gods and humans puts at least their origins in a questionable, liminal context.

Despite such early Fall narratives, it was the Eden story that came to be identified in the cultural memory of Western culture as the predominant and definitive Fall. This is evident through the many references to this narrative, either explicitly or implicitly, in various aspects of human culture ever since. One of the most significant elaborations of this narrative is John Milton's (d. 1674) epic poem *Paradise Lost*. This poem has become not only a benchmark in the interpretation of the Edenic theme of the Fall but also a point of reference in its own right. Its continuous influence until present times is evident, for example, through works such as Philip Pullman's reinterpretation of this work in the *His Dark Materials* trilogy (Pullman, 1995-2001). Another contemporary example comes from the field of music. In his album *Rattle that Lock* (2015), the musician David Gilmour (formerly of Pink Floyd) was inspired by Milton's work when writing the lyrics of the title track, and the animated video for this song pays homage to Gustave Doré's illustrations of *Paradise Lost*. Inside the box, alongside the compact disc (or record), book II from Milton's *Paradise Lost*, 'The Fall of Satan', was included.

Such references in twenty-first-century literary and popular culture to a seventeenth-century literary work, itself a reinterpretation of an older, biblical Fall narrative, provoke questions regarding the continuous viability, endurance and attraction of the Fall. One possible answer would be that this is due to the significance of the Fall experience in human life. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a

fall is a 'dropping down from a high or relatively high position, by the force of gravity'. What follows is that falling is a natural movement, which is always headed downwards. The force of gravity makes it an inseparable part of life, a definitive characteristic of the human life span.

Falling is the initial human experience, present in human life from birth to death. Human life begins with a fall, as part of the natural process of childbirth — in particular in societies where women are not confined to a bed during childbirth but are instead free to allow gravity to assist their children to come into this world. At the other end of human life, death is also often perceived as a descent. The Hebrew Bible, for example, refers to death as a return into earth (e.g., Gen 3:19) or as going down to the underworld (she'ol; e.g., Deut 32:22; 1 Sam. 2:6; 1 Kgs 2:6, 9). In many cultures the bodies of the dead are lowered into a designated hole in the ground.

Falls are also an inseparable part of what lies in between the womb and the tomb. In addition to the physical and moral dimensions that are often ascribed to Gen 3, life is full of other kinds of falls. Language uses the idea of descent and fall to describe a range of phenomena, from physical falls to military, political or historical declines, with examples stretching from the walls of Jericho to the Berlin wall, and from Edward Gibbon's *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (Gibbons, 1789) to William L. Shirer's *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (Shirer, 1960). Other examples of falls include, among others, the financial (e.g. stock markets), emotional (falling in love) and mental (having a breakdown) realms. Falls might apply to individuals, institutions and societies. Falls are, therefore, an essential part of human life.

Moreover, rather than an unequivocal movement, fall are a transforming experience, often in more than one dimension. They can also lead into an ascent and improved position. For example, the Qur'anic narratives of expulsion from the Garden contain an explicit Fall language (God commands the humans and Satan to descend from the Garden: *ihbitū* Q 2:36; 7:24, 20:123). However, the Qur'an does not consider the idea of a descent as ultimately negative. Indeed, the Islamic *terni* for describing the process of revelation of divine

speech to the prophet Muhammad is *nuzul al-Qur'an* — the descent (or fall) of the Qur'án — from God, through the angel Gabriel, to Muhammad, and through him to humanity. Arguably, this descent led Muhammad to a higher stance. Fall stories, therefore, not only express the human situation, but can also express hope (the real treasure in Pandora's box, initially hidden underneath a pile of problems).

Fall narratives also remain present and highly visible in various cultural aspects of the modern and contemporary ages. These include, for example, the initial fall of Alice through the rabbit hole (Carroll, 1866, p. 1), as well as the final fall (into the Reichenbach Falls) of Sherlock Holmes in *The Adventure of the Final Problem* (Conan Doyle, 1894, pp. 256-279).¹ Other Falls might occur in a more explicitly moral context, although not necessarily relating expressly to the religious sphere, as in Albert Camus's *The Fall* (1966), or films such as Fellini's *Nights of Cabiria* (1957), or Joel Schumacher's *Falling Down* (1993). The concept of the Fall as an essential component of the human experience remains pertinent to this day. It preserves its relevance, vitality and significance in human lives and cultures and is represented through various dimensions — including, but not limited to, that of religion.

The present volume

So far, the Fall has been the subject of a great deal of analysis in specific areas. The present volume offers to approach this topic from a thematic point of view. It looks at the phenomenon of the Fall from a variety of perspectives, which as a whole is meant to give the reader a broader perception and hopefully to provoke some new insights in regards to what a Fall is: How does it affect us? Is there a way around it? Should there be one?

Moving away from the traditional focus of Western scholarship on the Fall as being first and foremost defined by the story of Eve, Adam and Original Sin, this book aims, by presenting multiple perspectives on the concept of Falls and falling, to suggest a new, integrative approach to it. While the essays in this volume contain various manifestations of the biblical narrative of the Fall, it is notable that this narrative it is not necessarily

the focus of discussion. The manifestations of this narrative do not necessarily occur within a theological context, nor is Sin a leading theme in this book; indeed, as is evident from the final section of the present volume, a Fall can also be regarded as a catalyst for an ascent. Rather, the essays gathered here demonstrate that the biblical narrative has become part of a broader cultural heritage, and must be considered as one motif among others. The Fall theme should not be confined to the moral and religious spheres; instead, its place as an inseparable part of human life experience should be acknowledged.

The volume is intentionally eclectic in an attempt to produce an inter-textual conversation between different disciplines, methodologies and approaches. The essays within it interpret the Fall, its meaning and significance, in different eras, social contexts and from different perspectives. These perspectives include disciplines such as dance, philosophy, cinema, literature, art, religious studies and theology, as well as an examination of the relationships between the various disciplines.

The book regards the Fall as a movement or a transition between (for example) states, times, places, or texts. A transition made on any of these levels (or some; or all of them) leads to an essential change in the moving (falling) subject. With this perspective as its starting point, the book points to the connections, echoes and contrasts in the conception and representation of the Fall across a range of disciplines and periods. The outcome of this interdisciplinary interrogation of the concept of the Fall is a fresh understanding of the nuanced meanings of the Fall in diverse fields of research, from its negative to its positive connotations across the included disciplines and throughout the ages. While differing from each other in their scholarly approaches, the essays tend to share a thematic approach to the Fall. Accordingly, this volume comprises four thematic sections.

Part I: Body and space: physical and figurative Falls

Part I begins with an exploration of an essential meaning of the Fall: Emma Cocker and Clare Thornton's *The Italic I'* focuses on the physicality of falling. The paper, which emerges from a practice-based collaboration between the two authors,

explores the various states of potential made possible by deliberately giving oneself up to the event of a repeated fall. The authors make use in their work of photography and language in order to capture and communicate, both visually and linguistically, the event of falling. Robert Segal offers further exploration of the physicality of the fall in 'Hell and paradise for Milton: physical places and states of mind'. Segal examines the relationship between the physical and psychological dimensions of the Fall, and particularly in regards to the Fall as it appears in John Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Using the work of such theorists of religion as Durkheim, Eliade and Robertson Smith, and that of the psychologists Freud, Jung and Winnicott, Segal analyses the representation in *Paradise Lost* of Hell and Paradise as spaces that are both outer and inner, physical and spiritual. He also examines in regards to religion the meanings of change over time and space, between inner and outer spaces, and the relationship between the sacred and profane. Segal then uses this discussion to question Milton's argument that a sacred space can be at once outer and inner.

The fall as a spatial concept is particularly emphasised in Brian Brock's 'Culture as flight from God: Jacques Ellul on the Fall'. Brock examines the curse on Cain (Gen 4) in terms of movement between wilderness and civilisation, according to the Fall as articulated in the work of the French social scientist and theologian Jacques Ellul. Through analysing a selection of Ellul's works, and in particular *The Meaning of the City*, Brock explores the relationship between city and Fall, and demonstrates the central role of the Fall in Ellul's culture-critical hermeneutic. This is true in particular with regard to Ellul's use of the biblical concept of the City as a means for making observations on the modern, technological, urban world.

Part II: Fall as absence

Moving on from the physical and spatial dimensions of the implications of falling, the second section of this volume deals with the Fall as the cause of lacunae and absences in human existence. The Cambridge English Dictionary defines falling as 'to suddenly go down onto the ground or towards the

ground without intending to or by accident'. This definition, which emphasises that temporary loss of control is part of falling, is suggestive of the perception that the Fall is accompanied by loss. The essays in this section discuss the Fall in terms of transition from presence into absence, a move from the state of having, to that of lacking. This view of the Fall, however, is approached through a variety of perspectives and disciplines.

In *The Fall in ancient stoic thought*, Erlend MacGillivray regards the Fall as a move from the state of human control over vices into a state where such control is lacking. This conception of the Fall, which endured for many years, is predicated on the notion that pre-philosophical, Golden Age humanity had contrived to behave and live virtuously in spite of their lack of philosophical guidance, and thanks to the existence of certain circumstances. Elizabeth S. Dodd's analysis in 'Thomas Traherne: doctrine and affection, a theological poetics of the Fall' also describes the Fall as a lack. In the context of Traherne, however, it is the lack of love. For Traherne, a seventeenth-century poet and theologian, divine love got lost as a consequence of the Fall from Paradise. However, according to him, it is also precisely this love that can bridge the abyss that the Fall has created between humans and God. Dodd offers a new perspective on the works of this lesser-known contemporary of John Milton. By arguing for the holistic nature of Traherne's theology, she breaks with the common scholarly tendency to divide Traherne's works into two binary, contradictory groups (old/new, public/private, etc.). Rather, she highlights the harmonising inclinations within his works and the particularly significant role that he assigned to love.

Giovanni Gellera in *The doctrine of the Fall in seventeenth-century reformed scholasticism: philosophy between faith and scepticism* discusses the substantial lack caused by the Fall from the point of view of philosophy. He examines the implications of the Calvinist view of the Fall on Reformed philosophy, in particular the suggestion that post-Fall humanity is incapable of knowing the truth. Gellera considers the threat posed to philosophy by the combination of scepticism on the one hand, and the doctrine of the Fall on the other.

Taking seventeenth-century scholastic philosophy as his starting point, he highlights how the Calvinist view of the Fall as a total corruption of humankind also affects mental faculties. Hence it implies - similar to the sceptic view - that truth cannot be achieved through natural reason alone. Gellera then presents seventeenth-century theological and philosophical answers to this challenge, in particular that of the Calvinist philosopher Pierre de Villemandy, which combines reason and the senses; to which Gellera suggests the addition of intuition. Finally, Lukas Pokorny's contribution, ' "Nusiel unbound": the archangel and the Fall in unification thought' examines the South Korean Church of Unification interpretation of the Adam and Eve story. The extent of loss caused by the transition of humanity from the 'Kingdom of Heaven' to the 'sovereignty of Satan' is manifested through the initial step on the path of the Fall, as the Satan-like figure of the archangel Nusiel engages in sexual intercourse with Eve on a spiritual level. Familial harmony is the solution offered by the Unificationists to free humanity from sin and vanquish Satan/Nusiel.

Part III: Intertextual Falls: across time and texts

This re-interpretation of the Eve and Adam Story leads into the third section of this volume. The five contributions in this section discuss intertextual Falls, and engage with the understanding of one Fall narrative through the eyes of another, and how these narratives relate to, change and shape one another. In 'Falling masonry and the redemption of public speech: reading Milton through Hannah Arendt', Helen Lynch uses Arendt's account of the Greek polis to shed light on the political failures and corruption depicted in Milton's Samson Agonistes. In Milton's poem, the collective consequences of an individual Fall, that of Samson himself, are very significant. The speech act itself is the means through which the poem communicates Samson's temptations, and it is also the subject of his temptations, which concern the possibility of grasping and communicating divine truth. Karl O'Hanlon's 'Language and the Fall in W. B. Yeats and Geoffrey Hill' explores the influence of the Irish poet W. B. Yeats, and in particular Yeats's preoccupations with language and the Fall, on the work of the English poet Geoffrey Hill. Hill

consistently stresses the significance of the Christian doctrine of Original Sin for his work. O'Hanlon argues that Hill's engagement with Yeats's work invites a reappraisal and offers a fresh understanding of the importance of Original Sin and its relationship to language for the Anglo-Irish poet's work.

In 'When Roth reads Milton: the Fall between Paradise Lost and American Pastoral', David Currell examines the intertextual relations between Roth's epic novel and Milton's cultural capital. Currell focuses on the way in which the replacement of the sacral content of Paradise Lost with modern American surroundings in American Pastoral enables Roth to concurrently ruin and resurrect the authority of Milton's work. Alongside this main line of discussion, however, Currell also engages with additional modern literary interpretations of the Adam and Eve story as well as with Milton's approach to that story. Eric Ziolkowski examines a different aspect of Eve and Adam's Fall. In The Fox and the Fall: vulpine associations with Heresy, the devil and Eden's Serpent' he traces the exegetical history behind that negative vulpine association and its subsequent persistence in literature and visual art. Ziolkowski uses Cornelis van Haarlem's Adam and Eve in Paradise as a starting point for his exploration of the Fall of foxes in Christian Europe and how their negative image developed from the Bible and Church fathers, through the Middle Ages and Luther, to the present day.

Finally, a particular trail of Adam and Eve's cultural adventures over the last two hundred years or so is tracked in Brian Murdoch's contribution. In 'Beyond The Blue Lagoon: some popular reflections of the Fall' he tracks the changing presentations of the Fall story across time and media, from the late-eighteenth-century novel Paul et Virginie into the 1990s, the eve (an Eve) of the twenty-first century. Murdoch looks at direct and indirect representations of the Gen 3 Paradise narrative in poems, plays, novels and films. His discussion of such works demonstrates the variety of responses that modern literary and cinematic tradition offers of the Fall and its circumstances; the possibility that the Fall might have been a good thing; and whether this even matters.

Part IV: Fall as ascent

A view of the Fall as advantageous underlies the essays in the last section of this volume. This section examines the view that the Fall embraces hope, for it is an opportunity, or even a necessity, for ascension. In "Name him 'Abd al-Hārith': Eve's Fall from monotheism, and ascent into motherhood", Zohar Hadromi-Allouche examines an Islamic narrative about Eve's pregnancies after the expulsion from Paradise, which led her to subjugate this child to Satan. The paper first examines the narrative within its main, Islamic exegetical context, which depicts 'Abd al-Hārith as a story of ingratitude, disobedience and Fall. An intertextual reading then follows, of 'Abd al-Hārith and other Near Eastern narratives of Fall and fertility. It reveals an alternative message, of human, and particularly feminine, fertility and ascent; and highlights a contrast between motherhood and monotheism.

The notion of the Fall as potentially beneficial is strongly evident in Jutta Leonhardt-Balzer's 'Fall as ascent: the exegesis of Gen 3-4 and 6:1-4 in the Apocryphon of John', which discusses Adam and Eve's disobedience as the basis of salvation. Leonhardt-Balzer identifies two myths of the Fall, one human, one angelic. The Apocryphon of John explains the Fall of humanity as repairing the damage inflicted by the Fall of the angels; thus Adam and Eve's disobedience may be regarded as the basis of salvation. Craig Bourne and Emily Caddick-Bourne, in 'Narrative normativity: four routes to redemption', look at ways in which Falls lead to subsequent redemption. Basing their discussion on a distinction between 'classic' and 'subversive' cases of 'narrative connection', they explore four ways in which a causal model of narrative explanation could try to deal with the role that redemption plays in understanding certain narratives. The possibility of appealing to agents is considered, and also the option of narrative normativity without agency. With this final section, the volume, which began with the physical Fall, concludes with redemption. <>

[Spirituality and the Good Life: Philosophical Approaches](#) edited by David McPherson
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This book presents a broad philosophical study of the nature of spirituality and its relationship to human well-being, addressing an area of contemporary philosophy that has been largely underexplored. David McPherson brings together a team of scholars to examine the importance of specific spiritual practices (including prayer, contemplation, and ritual observance) and spiritually informed virtues (such as piety, humility, and existential gratitude) for 'the good life'. This volume also considers and exemplifies how philosophy itself, when undertaken as a humanistic rather than scientific enterprise, can be a spiritual exercise and part of a spiritual way of life. Clarifying key concepts, and engaging with major religious traditions such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism, this book will appeal to students and scholars from various disciplines, including theology, sociology, and psychology, as well as to philosophers, ethicists, and other readers who are interested in modern spiritual life.

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Excerpt: In contemporary secular societies, many people would acknowledge a concern for something called "spirituality," even if they are not "religious" in any conventional sense. There is a recognition that human beings have what might be called "spiritual needs," in addition to their "material needs," and that fulfilling these needs is important for living well as human beings.' This is perhaps most dramatically illustrated in the common phenomenon of someone having a "midlife crisis," i.e., the person who may be successful in material terms but nevertheless feels a sense of existential malaise: there is an experience here of a lack of a deeper sense of meaning in life. But this experience and the questions it involves can arise for anyone provided he or she has reached a certain level of reflectiveness and self-awareness.

This collection of essays will examine the nature of spirituality and how it can contribute to "the good life" for human beings.' The editor's own general working definition of spirituality is that it is a practical life-orientation that is shaped by what is taken to be a self-transcending source of meaning, which involves strong normative demands, including demands of the sacred or the reverence-worthy. To unpack this definition some here (it is filled out more in Chapter 4): spirituality involves spiritual practices — e.g., practices of prayer, meditation, self-examination, repentance, mindfulness, study, contemplation, worship, thanksgiving, communal living, charity, fasting, keeping the Sabbath, ritual observance, going on retreats or pilgrimages, imitating saints, habituation in virtue, etc. — that aim to direct and transform one's life as a whole toward increasing spiritual fulfillment, i.e., toward a more meaningful life. The meaning that makes for a meaningful life here is "strong evaluative meaning," i.e., meaning or value with which we ought to be concerned and toward which we ought to orient our lives (which can and often does connect up with a concern for the meaning of life; i.e., there is a concern here with how our lives fit into the grand

scheme of things and whether there is a cosmic or "ultimate" source of meaning to which we must align our lives). Hence, spirituality is a practical life-orientation that is shaped by what is taken to be a self-transcending source of meaning, which involves strong normative demands. Especially important among these demands are those of the sacred or the reverence-worthy (used equivalently), which are "set apart" in that they place the strongest demands on us and play a central guiding role in our practical life-orientations.

This definition of spirituality, I believe, captures well the "spiritual" concerns of the different contributors, even though they might emphasize different aspects or state things in somewhat different terms. The dominant concerns here have to do with discovering a deeper sense of meaning in life, the place of the sacred or the reverence-worthy in human life, the quality and orientation of one's interior life, and the importance of specific spiritual practices and oft-neglected and sometimes contested virtues such as piety, humility, and existential gratitude.

This collection will also explore questions about the relationship between spirituality and religion: Are they distinct, and if so how? Even if they are distinct, does spirituality, at its best, lead to religion? How might specific religious traditions help to foster and enhance the spiritual life? As suggested previously, many people today would describe themselves as "spiritual but not religious," and one might take this to be a feature of our living in a secular age, where religion is often thought to have less significance. However, in *A Secular Age*, Charles Taylor argues that we should not understand secularity simply as the decline of traditional religious belief and practice and their perceived significance or as the removal of religion from public life (though both of these may be true in many cases). Rather, it should be understood primarily as a situation in which a religious life is seen as "one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace." Taylor goes on to remark: "An age or society [is] secular or not, in virtue of the conditions of experience of and search for the spiritual." He also describes this as the experience of and search for "fullness": "We all see our lives, and/or the space wherein we live our

lives, as having a certain moral/spiritual shape. Somewhere, in some activity, or condition, lies a fullness, a richness; that is, in that place (activity or condition), life is fuller, richer, deeper, more worth while, more admirable, more what it should be." Living in a secular age thus means that many of us will be "spiritual seekers" and with this comes the possibility that the search might fail and we can experience "exile," in which "we lose a sense of where the place of fullness is, even of what fullness could consist in; we feel we've forgotten what it would look like, or cannot believe in it any more. But the misery of absence, of loss, is still there." This leaves open the possibility that the "experience of and search for the spiritual" may require completion in religious terms.

This contested issue and others explored in this collection will be approached philosophically, and hence the subtitle: "philosophical approaches." Although the topic of spirituality has been explored extensively in empirical psychology, it is noteworthy that it has suffered neglect within the academic discipline of philosophy, and most glaringly within specializations such as philosophy of religion and virtue ethics, where one might expect to find an interest in spirituality, whether with respect to its relationship to religion (in the case of philosophy of religion) or to the good life (in the case of virtue ethics). This neglect is somewhat surprising given the prevalence and importance of spirituality in human life throughout recorded history up to the present, and given that spirituality connects up with concerns about meaning in life that are often what draw people to philosophy in the first place. However, the neglect is not entirely surprising. Many philosophers are likely to be suspicious of the idea of "spirituality," which can seem overly vague (though this just calls for philosophical clarification), too focused on inward life (in a way that is not easily amenable to the abstract or "disengaged" modes of discourse that are common in the discipline), "mystical" or "new-agey," and problematically dualistic (or "spooky") in referring to matters of "the spirit." The latter concern also points to the prominence of certain forms of "naturalism" within contemporary academic philosophy that can be resistant to "spiritual matters." Naturalism is typically (though not always) seen as opposed to "the supernatural." It

can also have a scientific aspect that privileges a "disengaged" (or third-personal or observational) standpoint that prescind from our "engaged" (or first-personal) experiences of the meaning of things for us. "Scientific naturalism" can go so far as to try to circumscribe reality within the bounds of what the natural sciences can validate, and it may also seek to offer reductive explanations of first-personal experiences of meaning or value (e.g., in terms of our brain "wiring," or a stimulus-response mechanism, or something else of the sort). This collection challenges scientific outlooks (especially with regard to their ability to make sense of our lives) and seeks to get past the aforementioned concerns and to put the topic of spirituality firmly on the contemporary philosophical agenda by showing the extent to which it connects with central questions about the good life for human beings.

This volume can be seen as heeding the call for a more "humane" mode of philosophy (as opposed to scientific modes), where it is regarded, as Bernard Williams puts it, "as part of a wider humanistic enterprise of making sense of ourselves and of our activities," and where this takes place "in the situation in which we find ourselves."⁹ Relatedly, this collection can also be seen as seeking to recover an ancient conception of philosophy as itself a "spiritual exercise" and part of a "way of life." Regarding this conception, Pierre Hadot writes:

The [ancient] philosophical school ... corresponds, above all, to the choice of a certain way of life and existential option which demands from the individual a total change of lifestyle, a conversion of one's entire being, and ultimately a certain desire to be and to live in a certain way. This existential option, in turn, implies a certain vision of the world, and the task of philosophical discourse will therefore be to reveal and rationally justify this existential option, as well as this representation of the world.

Elsewhere he writes:

Under normal circumstances, the only state accessible to [human beings] is philosophia: the love of, and progress toward, wisdom. For this reason, spiritual exercises must be taken up again and again, in an ever-renewed effort. ... To the same extent that

the philosophical life is equivalent to the practice of spiritual exercises, it is also a tearing away from everyday life. It is a conversion, a total transformation of one's vision, life-style, and behavior.

In the first essay, "Philosophy, Religion, and Spirituality," John Cottingham explores this conception of philosophy in more detail. He distinguishes between philosophy as a specialized academic discipline, which is often concerned with a careful examination of our concepts, and philosophy as a way of life, which is concerned with an examination of the overall meaning and purpose of our lives and with the "care of the soul," i.e., cultivating a life of integrity and virtue. Cottingham sees the latter conception of philosophy as clearly connected with "spiritual" concerns, and he explores this connection in the essay, first by seeking to get clear on what is meant by "spiritual" and "spirituality" (thus employing the first kind of examination in service of the second). He also explores how these spiritual concerns connect up with a religious outlook of a traditional theistic sort. Cottingham argues that when we examine common spiritual experiences, they often involve cosmic and moral dimensions that are not easily accounted for by a purely secular (i.e., non-religious) framework, but rather seem to point toward a religious framework, especially a theistic one, as what may be needed for sense-making.

In "The Problem of Impiety," Cora Diamond discusses Hume's critique of the absolute prohibition of suicide among religious people of his day, which he regarded as mere superstition. Diamond uses this to highlight what she calls "the problem of impiety": can any way of acting be ruled out as impious without appealing to divine prohibition? In other words, can human reason identify certain domains as being set apart as sacred or reverence-worthy and so as being absolutely inviolable? Diamond discusses different responses to this problem and how it pertains not just to the issue of suicide, but also to our treatment of the dead and to a host of controversial issues in biomedical, sexual, and environmental ethics. Moreover, she contends that it illustrates the difference between the sort of objectivity proper to science and that which is proper to ethics. Drawing on Iris Murdoch's work, Diamond suggests that our

moral concepts are deep moral configurations of the world, rather than merely different ways of judging the facts of a common world. She also draws on the work of Elizabeth Anscombe and others to explore how our moral concepts, such as the pious and the impious, can capture important truths about the world.

Whereas Diamond explores the possibility of a non-religious understanding of piety, in "The Virtue of Piety," Robert C. Roberts discusses piety as a religious virtue. Drawing on Plato's *Euthyphro*, Roberts discusses filial piety as a prelude to thinking about piety toward God. Filial piety, he argues, involves a reverence toward one's parents simply as one's parents, as the source of one's existence. This is an analogue for piety toward God, who is the fundamental source of all existence. But there is a crucial difference: whereas filial piety is directed toward one's parents in the role of parents, even if they are not good parents, piety toward God, properly construed, involves an affirmation of God's perfect goodness or "glory." Piety as a virtue is thus "a developed and temporally stable disposition to appreciate the glory of God and his creation and thus to feel inhibited from actions that violate its order, including, importantly, the glory of parenthood and inhibition from actions and thoughts that violate it." Roberts argues that this theistic account of the "glory of creation" (rather than mere divine command) can help make sense of the sort of examples of impiety that Diamond discusses.

In "Homo Religiosus: Does Spirituality Have a Place in Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?," I explore the place of spirituality within a neo-Aristotelian account of the good life. First, I lay out my understanding of spirituality. Second, I discuss why neo-Aristotelians have often ignored or explicitly excluded from consideration the issue of the place of spirituality in the good life. I suggest that a lot turns on how one understands the "ethical naturalism" to which neo-Aristotelians are committed. Third, I argue that through a deeper exploration of the evaluative standpoint from within our human form of life as "meaning-seeking animals" we can come to appreciate better the importance of spirituality for human beings throughout recorded history up to the present and

why we can be described as *homo religiosus*. I also discuss the draw to theistic spirituality in particular. Finally, I consider and respond to three important objections to giving spirituality, especially theistic spirituality, a central place within the good life: viz., (1) the wholeness objection; (2) the autonomy objection; and (3) the social peace objection.

In "Desire and the Spiritual Life," Fiona Ellis notes a common objection, articulated by Nietzsche and others, against traditional religious forms of spirituality: it supposes that religious outlooks, such as Christianity and Buddhism, deny a place for desire in the spiritual life by regarding desire as undesirable and so as something to be transcended. The charge then is that these views denigrate our this-worldly existence (a version of "the wholeness objection"). Ellis questions the fairness of this objection and seeks to give an account of the proper place of desire in the spiritual life that avoids both a problematic otherworldliness that rejects all desire and an equally problematic blank acceptance of desire. Some desires are desirable; some are not. To make sense of this, Ellis suggests that we need to move beyond a focus on appetitive desire to recognize non-appetitive desires that are responsive to objective values. It is such desires that are proper to the spiritual life. Ellis argues that this concession to "Platonism" (of a sort common to theistic religion) need not involve any problematic otherworldliness, and she further argues that Schopenhauer's work (representative of a Buddhist-type outlook) can be read in this light.

In "Between Heaven and Earth: Sensory Experience and the Goods of the Spiritual Life," Mark R. Wynn draws on Aquinas's account of infused moral virtue to explore a kind of good of the spiritual life that is "between heaven and earth" in that it concerns our relationship to created things as properly ordered to our relationship with God and so is a "hybrid good." Wynn also draws on William James's discussion of conversion experience to explore how the senses can contribute to the realization of such goods. The important point is that religious converts "enjoy not only a new relationship to God, but also a newly enlivened appreciation of the everyday sensory world," a "transfiguration" in light of "divine glory." There

can be two key forms of perceptual change here: (1) "a deepened sense of the significance of the sensory order considered as a whole," i.e., a general change in "hue"; and (2) "a deepened sense of the differentiated significance of objects," i.e., specific changes in "salience." Wynn thus seeks to show how achieving the goods of the spiritual life not only involves the proper ordering of our thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and behavior, but also a heightened quality of sensory experience.

In "The Jewish Sabbath as a Spiritual Practice," Samuel Fleischacker explores the nature and significance of keeping Shabbat, which is central to Jewish life. Fleischacker discusses how Shabbat as a spiritual practice is first of all about not doing certain things, thereby relieving us of concern for material needs and work (even ideal work) and making room for other important activities: viz., spending time with family and friends, sharing meals, singing, reading, praying, worshipping, attending religious services, and otherwise living out and contemplating the "telos of creation." The restraints of Shabbat also shape our lives as a whole through cultivating and enacting a "Shabbat-consciousness," which includes cultivating a humility that frees us from various forms of idolatry. Shabbat provides a "frame" with which to appreciate our work and the goodness of creation; it also helps us to perceive the world and human life in a particularly Jewish way (cf. Wynn on perceptual change resulting from religious conversion). Additionally, Fleischacker shows how the structure of Shabbat connects up with central aspects of Jewish theology, such as negative theology and the avoidance of idolatry. He ends with some reflections on what keeping Shabbat has to teach us about spiritual practices and spirituality in general.

In "The Power of the Spoken Word: Prayer, Invocation, and Supplication in Islam," Mukhtar H. Ali examines the role of the spoken word in Islamic spirituality. He begins by discussing "the Word" in Creation and in the Qur'ān and how they along with the human soul are seen as mirrors of one another, as knowledge of each can lead to a better understanding of the others, and in the case of the human soul, it is perfected by actualizing the realities of the Qur'ānic verses within itself. Here the

Islamic spiritual practices of prayer, invocation, and supplication have great importance, as Ali goes on to explore. These practices help to cultivate attitudes of worship, gratitude, and humility, as well as the remembrance of God as central to Islamic spiritual life. Ali's discussion here can be seen as providing a response to a common charge against theism as undermining human well-being in making us submissive to God (a version of "the autonomy objection"): for Ali, humble submissiveness to God in prayer, invocation, and supplication is in fact most truly liberating as it contributes to our human perfection and spiritual awakening.

In "Aristotelian Friendship and Ignatian Companionship," Karen Stohr draws on Aristotle's account of friendship and St. Ignatius of Loyola's account of companionship to consider how we can be a good friend or companion to others during their times of despair, grief, suffering, and isolation that are occasioned by serious illness, trauma, or death. The key issue here is how we can cultivate and practice a way of being fully present (or "coming close") to others during such times. Stohr argues that this requires that we accompany them on a difficult journey along an uncertain path and become aware of and then avoid our tendencies to make others' suffering into something more palatable for ourselves (in order to cope with our own fears and insecurities) and thereby fail to be fully present to others in their suffering and so to be a genuine source of consolation. Drawing inspiration from St. Ignatius's Spiritual Exercises, she writes: "Ignatian consolation requires that we be the presence of God for another, but it does not ask us to make sense of God or the suffering."

The issue of suffering is taken up in a different spiritual context in Richard White's "Starting with Compassion." White draws on the Buddhist tradition, though, as his title suggests, he seeks to provide, with his account of compassion, a starting point for anyone interested in the spiritual life, since an authentic spiritual life must take us beyond our selves. Compassion can also be a path toward and expressive of a spiritual wisdom regarding the world and our place within it. Here there is a primacy of practice over theory. White first discusses the nature of compassion, which he contrasts with pity and empathy. He also contrasts

a typical Western conception of compassion as a self-achievement (i.e., a personal virtue) with the Buddhist conception as a self-overcoming. Next, he considers and responds to some common objections to compassion by Western philosophers (viz., the Stoics, Kant, and Nietzsche), who consider it a vice insofar as it expresses weakness and abandons personal autonomy. White argues that compassion in fact often expresses inner strength and the abandonment of selfish concerns is a good thing. Finally, White explores some practical ways of enhancing compassion in our lives and thereby also achieving greater spiritual enlightenment.

In "Identifying with the Confucian Heaven: Immanent and Transcendent Dao," May Sim explores the question of whether Confucianism should be seen merely as a moral philosophy or as a moral philosophy and religion. Against those who deny its status as a religion, Sim seeks to show that Confucianism can be seen as affirming transcendent values and thus counting as a religion and offering a "spiritual way of life." In particular, though it differs from Western theistic religions in certain respects, Sim argues that Confucianism offers an account of the divine ("Heaven," or tian) that is the ultimate source of all things, and it also offers an ideal of ultimate personal transformation (i.e., "sagehood") that requires aligning oneself with a cosmic source of meaning and ethical purposiveness (i.e., "identifying with the Confucian Heaven"). She makes her case by exploring the goal of becoming Heaven-like in the writings of Confucius and Mencius, which requires that we align ourselves with the way (dao) of Heaven as expressed in the standards of ritual propriety (li) within a culture embodying the dao, or in our virtue-inclined human nature, or in the goodness inherent in the wider world.

In the final essay, "Agnostic Spirituality," John Houston writes on behalf of the agnostic who falls somewhere between the extremes of the confident, self-satisfied religious believer and the confident, self-satisfied unbeliever. He calls attention to a not uncommon phenomenon that is rarely considered by these extremes: viz., the person who deeply and perhaps desperately wants to believe in God (under some conception) because of the great goods of religious faith (understood here as theistic

faith), but is simply unable. And when this involves the loss of a previously cherished faith, the resulting experience can be disorienting and sometimes crushing. Houston is thus concerned with a particular kind of agnosticism, viz., "open" or "Socratic" agnosticism, which claims ignorance of matters of religious faith and ultimate reality, but is still very much concerned with them. Houston then draws on scripture and the work of William James to make the case for an agnostic spirituality that seeks to maintain religious faith without belief, on the basis of hope, where one acts as though God exists. <>

[The Chapters of the Wisdom of My Lord Mani: Part III: Pages 343–442](#) (Chapters 321–347) edited and translated by Iain Gardner, Jason BeDuhn, Paul C. Dilley [Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies, Manichaean Manuscripts in the Chester Beatty Library: The Kephalaia Codex, Brill, 9789004363366]

The Chapters of the Wisdom of My Lord Mani recounts Mani's mission, teachings and debates in the courts of the Sasanian empire. The first of four fascicles constituting the editio princeps of one of the largest papyrus manuscripts ever recovered.

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k 321 (This Chapter) ... (345.5)

k 322 This Chapter tells how the Apostle, being in the City of Ctesiphon, went to Thirousak the Commander of the King. (345.6–353.22)

k 323 ... went... the Palace of the King [of Touran (?)]. (353.23–356.14)

k 324 This Chapter tells [that] ... Limbs is this ... (356.15–357.18)

k 325 ... before him ... the Country of Touran. (357.19–358.20)

k 326 [When the] Illuminator [went to the City of [Hormēs]taksha[har](?), (he spoke with ?) the Judge, the (Great One of the ?) City. (358.21–364.9)

k 327 [About the] Wisdom that Goundesh the Holy (?) ... uttered with the Apostle from time to time. (364.10–368.5)

k 328 This Chapter speaks about Goundesh questioning the Apostle. (368.6–369.23)

k 329 [This Chapter] tells about Goundesh, [asking] the Apostle: Who is the first [Righteous One who received the Blessing]; or [who is] the first [Sinner] who received the Woe? (369.24–371.14)

k 330 This Chapter speaks about Goundesh, as the Apostle ... (371.15–372.25)

k 331 It speaks again about Goundesh, questioning the Apostle. (372.26–374.8)

k 332 It speaks again about Goundesh, sitting before the Apostle, as they read the [Great] Treasury of Life. (374.9–381.3)

k 333 This Chapter tells about the Apostle: How he causes the Scribes to write Letters, Sending them to Different Places. (381.4–384.20)

k 334 (This Chapter) ... (384.21–387.4)

k 335 It tells that the Apostle said: This Teaching of Insatiableness exists in every Person, except for me (?) and my Disciples. (387.5–388.29)

k 336 It tells again about Goundesh, that he came in before my Lord. My Lord asked Him: What are you doing? Says he: I am discontent! (389.1–390.13)

k 337 This Chapter speaks about Goundesh, who asked the Apostle: These Twelve Persons that you selected, by what Mystery did you select them? Or these Seventy-Two, moreover, by what Mystery did you select them? (390.14–400.23)

k 338 This Chapter speaks about a Man, Iodasphes being his Name, who is greater than Masoukeos and Goundesh. He came before Shapur the King. (400.24–409.11)

k 339 (It tells)... (409.12–413.23)

k 340 ... Kardel the Son of Artaban [went] in to ... Children ... (413.24–415.24)

k 341 [This Chapter] speaks about a faithful Catechumen, Pabakos is his [Name].... He asks the Apostle a Question. (415.25–420.28)

k 342 This Chapter says that, while the Apostle is sitting in the Church, a Noble came in before Him. He (i.e. Mani) spoke with him in the Wisdom of God. (420.29–427.27)

k 343 It tells again about Pabakos the Catechumen. He asks the Apostle about a Lesson. (427.28–433.14)

k 344 (This Chapter) ... (433.15–436.20)

k 345 This Chapter... (436.21–439.3)

k 346 This Chapter says that ... about Shapur the King in (the Land of ?) ... (439.4–441.3)

k 347 This Chapter speaks about the Apostle, who is in a City. Some Priests receive their... (441.4–442.6)

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Excerpt: The Chester Beatty Kephalaia codex constitutes the second part of a massive two volume, scholastic collection belonging to the Medinet Madi corpus of Manichaean texts, purporting to be oral teachings of the religion's founder, Mani (or, as our codex consistently has, 'the Mannichaios', although most of the time he is referred to simply as 'the Apostle'). The first part of this Coptic Kephalaia collection is contained in a codex held primarily in Berlin (p. 15996), entitled *The Chapters of the Teacher*, which has been edited and translated into German by Hans Jakob Polotsky and Alexander Böhlig (1935–1940), Alexander Böhlig (1966), and Wolf-Peter Funk (1999–2018). The second codex, a part of which is presented here, is held in the Chester Beatty Library, Dublin, and is entitled *The Chapters of the Wisdom of My Lord Mani*. Despite this distinct title, it continues the sequence of numbered chapters from the Berlin codex, and brings the collection to a conclusion.

Although the codex was discovered in the late 1920s, and conservation work on it begun in the 1930s was completed in the 1950s, earlier plans for an edition did not come to fruition. The current project to edit and translate it was initiated in 2008 by an editorial team consisting of Iain Gardner, Jason BeDuhn, and Paul Dilley.

Over the entire course of the project, the staff of the Chester Beatty Library have been extraordinarily understanding and helpful, beginning with two successive Directors, Dr. Michael Ryan and Dr. Fionnuala Croke, and two successive curators, Charles Horton and Jessica Baldwin (now Head of Collections and Conservation), along with librarians Celine Ward and Hyder Abbas, curatorial assistant Elizabeth Omidvaran, as well as the many others who have assisted at one time or

another, from the conservation laboratory to the photography room, from handling the glassed leaves to archival research.

In addition to many hours of autopsy of the glassed leaves at the Chester Beatty Library, the team worked with a variety of photographic images. One must mention first the facsimile edition published by Søren Giversen (*The Manichaean Coptic Papyri in the Chester Beatty Library, Facsimile Edition, Volume 1: Kephalaia*, Genève: Patrick Cramer, 1986). The CBL archive holds copies of the original black and white photographs that formed the basis of the facsimile, and these were consulted in the process of our work. Additional images were provided by our imaging team, Daniel Boone and Ryan Belnap, working under the auspices of the Northern Arizona University IDEALab, and its director, Marcelle Coder. It is very regrettable that this research-support laboratory has been subsequently dissolved. Digital photographs of some portions of the codex edited in this volume were supplied by the CBL in 2008 and enhanced by Boone and Belnap through computer-based treatments. Other portions were included in a set of photographs held by the British Museum, taken at the time of Rolf Ibscher's conservation work in the 1950s, discovered in the archive by one of the museum's archivists, Patricia Usick, and provided for our project with the kind permission of Dr. Ilona Regulski, Curator of Egyptian Written Culture, British Museum. Finally, multispectral images of the entire codex were produced by Boone and Belnap in 2012 (we wish to acknowledge the assistance of John Gee of Brigham Young University in preparing the protocols for this work). The editorial team benefitted from being able to cross-check readings between these various sets of images, and compare them to what can be read today from direct autopsy.

The editorial work on the manuscript proceeded as follows. First, the codex was divided into three parts, and each member of the team prepared a preliminary set of readings for his respective part. These readings were circulated among the other members of the team, each of whom added or corrected readings where possible from his own examination of the images and manuscript. At the

next stage, after team consultation on codicological matters, all of the provisional drafts were put into the hands of our team leader, Iain Gardner, who began extensive revisions and the imposition of certain protocols across the entire codex. Gardner's work at this stage constituted a significant advance in the overall continuity and sense of the manuscript, resulting in an extensively reworked Coptic text and a complete draft English translation in 2015. His text and translation were then recirculated among the other members of the team for mark-up and comment, assent or dissent on readings, and further suggestions for improvement, particularly review of pertinent Coptic grammar and syntax by Paul Dilley. In 2016 Gardner undertook preparation of the final draft of that part of the edition to be published in the current volume. At this stage, the electronic Concordance of Medinet Madi manuscripts prepared by Wolf-Peter Funk was able to be consulted, and the latter's provisional readings from the codex as found there contributed to the further improvement of the text. We are most grateful to Dr. Funk for making this resource available to us, and acknowledge that we have benefitted from his understanding of certain passages. It should also be made clear that he has made no direct input into the edition as it is presented, and is in no way responsible for it. Revision of the translation was then put into the hands of Jason BeDuhn, in the process of which a number of additional improvements to the text could be suggested. This translation, likewise, was circulated for review and comment by the other members of the team prior to finalizing the manuscript for publication. Paul Dilley began to prepare the index, and the three tasks of Coptic edition, English translation and indexing continued in tandem.

Authorship of individual readings is not credited as this has been an evolving edition of the text, worked over repeatedly by Iain Gardner with due reference to the drafts, comments and critiques of Jason BeDuhn and Paul Dilley. Provisional readings have continually been altered and indeed frequently used as a basis for the development of new readings and thus a steadily improved understanding of the overall work. This process continues and the print publication represents a snapshot of the reading of the codex at that

particular point in time. Unanimous agreement on text and translation was not always obtained, and although consensus or majority opinion has generally been followed, and the edition carries the collective efforts of the entire team, Iain Gardner has final responsibility for the Coptic text presented here. Jason BeDuhn bears final responsibility for the English translation. Paul Dilley has undertaken final responsibility for the index and associated grammatical identifications to be presented at the conclusion of the editorial process with the publication of the final volume.

An attempt has been made to apply standard protocols consistently across the entire Coptic text, reflecting an ideal form of the set of scribal practices as well as the actual conditions observed in the manuscript. These include matters such as ekthesis of new paragraphs of text, the use of larger font for initial letters, indication of breaks in the text, and placement of superlinear strokes, as well as the dotting of insecure letters and the use of brackets. This imposed uniformity at times obscures a certain variety (deliberate or otherwise) in the scribal practice. For example, the scribe was not always consistent in the placing of superlinear strokes. Some of the variety in the length and character of such strokes has been omitted in the service of editorial uniformity, and also the limitations of the fonts used for the edition, which in other ways also imposed constraints on rendering the text exactly. Although all efforts have been made to overcome such challenges, we are aware that certain inconsistencies may be unavoidable in the final edition.

This volume presents the third of four volumes into which the full text of the Chester Beatty Kephalaia codex has been parcelled for purposes of publication. Due to various exigencies of preparing the complete edition and translation, it has been published first. For a full codicological presentation on the codex, see the forthcoming introduction to Volume I. That volume will contain the poorly preserved remnants of the approximate first half of this codex, much destroyed. It would seem that substantial sections of the manuscript have been entirely lost. The total size of the original codex can be calculated as most probably 31 quaternios, i.e.

496 pages in length. Volume ii will contain a coherent set of quires that run from the approximate middle of the codex through the first part of the second half. The present volume contains pages 343–442 of the codex, which correspond to the final numbered chapters of the entire work (starting within kephalaion 321 and ending with the conclusion to number 347). A significant section of the original codex appears lost between the pages at the end of Volume ii and those at the start of Volume iii. Volume iv will contain the account of Mani's last days appended to the numbered chapters, starting on page 442. This is a version of the narrative cycle elsewhere termed *The Discourse on the Crucifixion*, together with some concluding comments to the whole work. That volume will include the indices.

Thus, the present volume contains the final sequence of chapters in the massive set that begins at the start of the first book of Coptic Kephalaia belonging to the Medinet Madi find, namely, the Berlin codex. The pagination of the Chester Beatty codex was first advanced by the reading of a quire number at the end of quire 22 (page 352); and the identification of subsequent quire numbers have confirmed that reading and the codicological sequence that follows to the end of the codex with only some minor questions remaining.

Conservation of the codex began with the part published here, when Hugo Ibscher started his systematic work in 1936 in the midst of what we know now as quire 22 (some leaves of the quire being decayed beyond salvage, and perhaps already removed before purchase by Chester Beatty). He continued through to the start of quire 26, numbering leaves 1–60, and assigned them to quires he designated b, c, d, e, and a single leaf of f. When his son Rolf Ibscher resumed conservation work in the 1950s, he worked on sections into which the book block had been separated, typically from back to front of each section. He completed work on a set of quires he designated i–x, the latter part of which (vi–x) has proven to be from the end of the codex, contiguous to and following on that part conserved by his father. Quire vi is the thirtieth in the codex, and thus R. Ibscher's quire designations proceed backwards until, with quire x, he reached the point (the start of quire 26) where his father's

work had left off. The single leaf designated f by Hugo Ibscher as the beginning of a new quire completes Rolf Ibscher's quire x. The present volume thus represents the great majority of Hugo Ibscher's conservation work, plus quires x, ix, and part of viii conserved by Rolf Ibscher, where the numbered chapters of the codex conclude.

The chapters edited and translated in this volume present 'our lord the Mannichaios' in the courts of the Sasanian empire during the reign of Shapur i. He debates with named government officials and a series of sages, culminating in his victory over Iodasphes, the wise man from the east. The sections concerning his visit to the King of Touran and his lengthy debates with the philosopher Goundesh have notable parallels with fragmentary texts recovered a century ago from Central Asia. Specific details such as toponyms, titles, and references to ritual practices and festivals are remarkable contributions to the historical record for a period of Iranian history that is otherwise poorly documented. References to, and quotations from, Zarathustra ('Zarades') as well, provide new evidence for studies of the development of the Mazdayasnian religion. Likewise, an extraordinary set of quotations of Jesus, both canonical and non-canonical, offer a boon to biblical studies. These and other elements of the chapters in this volume establish afresh basis from which to consider the origins of Manichaeism and its character as a religious movement in Sasanian Iran, as well as the hagiographical construction of Mani as an inimitable font of wisdom and emissary of God. Under relatively innocuous titles, the chapters build to a climax in which Mani stands triumphant over all rivals, and anticipates the needs of the church to which he has given birth, in the face of his impending, anticipated departure from life. <>

[4QInstruction: Divisions and Hierarchies](#) by Benjamin Wold [Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah, Brill, 9789004361447]

In [4QInstruction: Divisions and Hierarchies](#), Benjamin Wold challenges the interpretation of 4QInstruction as a deterministic and dualistic composition. In a re-examination of key fragments he offers new reconstructions and translations that indicate [4QInstruction](#) envisaged wisdom available to all humanity, divisions among humankind and

communities as the result of individual adherence to wisdom, and a hierarchy of authority as a result of individual merit.

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Excerpt: The three chapters of this book are interested in distinct but intersecting notions of divisions and hierarchies. Chapter 1 addresses hierarchies within the community and what separates different members from one another. While there are clear divisions between the activities and attributes of the speakersage and his varied students, one's place within the community's hierarchy is not immutable. In Chapter 2, the focus of questioning turns from the community to the whole of humanity. What is the nature and character of human beings and how is one group of humanity distinguished from another? The conclusion reached is that all humankind is created with the ability to distinguish right from wrong and that individual behavior separates the righteous from the wicked. Chapter 2 challenges a status quo, one which concludes that 4QInstruction conceives of a particular hierarchy, namely the bestowing of special revelation (i.e., 7+7] ri) only to the elect "spiritual people" while those who are "fleshly" are created without this privilege. The conclusion that 4QInstruction conceives of a universal creation, as well as a view that act-consequence are rooted in personal ethics and human merit, stands in sharp contrast with the status quo. Finally, in Chapter 3, the relationship of Mosaic Torah to the mystery of

existence is addressed. These two types of revelation are each authority constructs and one may, therefore, ask: if these two are not identified with one another (Torah = Mystery), then what is their relationship within a hierarchy of authorities? This chapter addresses the place of Torah within 4QInstruction and finds that it is never thematized nor mentioned (not even by way of “Moses’ hand”). Moreover, on three different occasions traditions that typically refer to “Torah” supplant “Torah” with the mystery of existence (or “truth”). This mystery, as argued in Chapters 2 and 3, is closely associated with creation. By placing emphasis on the mystery rather than Torah, 4QInstruction gives creation precedent over Sinai. These three chapters taken together contribute to a view of 4QInstruction as a composition distinct from the outlook and theological viewpoints of Yaḥad literature, one that is concerned with universal revelation and creation and hierarchies within which movement is possible.

How one understands 4QInstruction’s purpose and function is dependent on the assessment of what will be referred to in the following study as hierarchies and divisions. The meaning of these terms are unpacked in the chapters to follow; however, generally, “divisions” refer to a series of distinctions that 4QInstruction draws that are integral to its presentation of learning and “hierarchies” include cosmology, in terms of the structure of the world order, and also the ordering of the social world. One of the most notable lines of questioning about divisions has been expressed in other studies as “wisdom” and “apocalypticism,” often with questions about particular speech genres and the social location of their origin. However, such means of categorizing and organizing is not the direction of this study, but rather questions about hierarchy within the speaker’s community, perceptions of divisions among humankind, what “wisdom” is, and who has access to it. The relationship of the speaker to their audience, social relations within the community, and even the roles of different members of the family (fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, sons, daughters) are referred to in 4QInstruction. Moreover, within this composition revealed wisdom determines who is within the community and who is outside of it.

Carol Newsom has formulated the various types of questions one could ask about the discourse of the Qumran community. One of her central concerns is why speech in the community was important, how it was regulated, and what it accomplished in terms of the social life of the community. Several of Newsom’s questions are applicable here, in particular: how do we discuss what 4QInstruction may have accomplished for its community? How this question is addressed differs from Newsom’s study in so far as it is generally agreed that 4QInstruction is not derivative or reflective of the Yaḥad or the wider sectarian movement of which they were part. However, as this study unfolds one way to discern the function of 4QInstruction is to set it alongside the discourse of other communities, even those which came to value this composition even though they did not produce it.

Social-scientific theories and social-psychological approaches to “identity” that have been so successfully brought to bear on the Yaḥad, and the wider sectarian community of which they were part, certainly intersect with questions about divisions and hierarchies. The very manner in which distinctiveness and exclusivity is forged derives from competing assertions of authority. However, tensions observed between the Yaḥad (i.e., the assertion that a group has a distinct identity that needs to be constantly attended to) and a larger community may not be at play in the same way or to the same degree in 4QInstruction; indeed, such rhetorical purposes should not be unquestionably applied to this non-sectarian document with an uncertain provenance. With the notion of both “sectarian” and related writings in mind, we may ask why notions of “inside” and “outside,” degrees of authoritativeness, and dichotomies develop in different ways in different texts. While commonalities and differences between 4QInstruction and the Yaḥad are topics of discussion throughout, it is only in the conclusion of this study that trajectories can be analyzed and theories postulated as to how and why social movements and theological shifts may have occurred.

Hindy Najman discusses the authorship of biblical texts and the authority they claim for themselves. She points to questions of authorship as central to

the study of ancient literature, and the misperception that if we could just discover who wrote a given work, we would understand it historically. Authorial inscription and the authority of ancient documents maybe connected, but a great deal can be missed if we do not try to understand why so much of ancient literature seeks to express its own textual production in the ways that it does. Unlike the traditions that Najman addresses, the author of 4QInstruction does not explicitly ascribe his work to named privileged individuals (e.g., Moses or Enoch) so that we are dealing with a “pseudonymous” text. Instead, the speaker in 4QInstruction is an anonymous sage; he has a voice, and questions remain to be asked about the basis for his claimed authority, how the addressees related to him, where they themselves fit within the hierarchy of the community (and what those hierarchies are), and what the relationships within such a community may have been.

How may 4QInstruction have expressed meaning in different social locations, not only to its “original” community, but also among early communities that received and copied the text (e.g., the Yaḥad)? When the speaker of 4QInstruction addresses his audience, credibility relates to an appeal to revelation as well as to his being a practitioner of wisdom (i.e., the speaker’s own religious experience). Moreover, 4QInstruction as a “speech act” is responding to other discourses and, unlike many of them, he emphasizes revealed wisdom that is called (“mystery of existence”). This “mystery of existence” denotes something significant about where authority comes from and who has access to it. By studying this ideological sign, and what the text presumes about how recipients relate to it, glimpses are provided into a larger discursive context of ancient Jewish thought. This mystery, regardless of how one translates it, cannot be learned solely by contemplating human experience and pragmatism arising from it. If, as some suggest, it connotes the future, so that it translates as “the mystery to be,” then such revelation serves to teach about consequences in the hereafter. This understanding of the mystery is usually connected to a particular deterministic view of the document and division of humanity into two groups; thus, the future is assured and the addressees are to live their lives from the perspective of the eternal. The

consequence of living in light of the future is not that the mēvîn (the “understanding one”) neglects life in the present, but rather that he has wisdom that allows him to live properly in this world. The three chapters of this study deal with the “mystery of existence” in different ways, by asking about: (1) the sage’s relationship to it and what that means for his students; (2) how the division of “spirit” and “flesh” shapes views on humankind and who is privileged with access to the mystery; and (3) the relationship of the mystery to Torah and whether one is derived from or subordinate to the other.

4QInstruction may be characterized as teaching about how to live in this world in light of another world. In order to live rightly one must seek revealed wisdom. However, what this revealed wisdom actually is and how it is to be acquired is not clear. What is known is that at nearly every level relationships to teachers, creditors, and members of the community are associated with the mystery. Moreover, this revelation together with “Hagu” (i.e., engraved ordinances) is supposed to enable the mēvîn to distinguish between good and evil, although the consequences for not pursuing and acquiring it are not unambiguously grounded in this present world; future judgment for the wicked and reward for the righteous are envisaged. The assessment of divisions and hierarchies below influences perspectives on the composition’s eschatology, especially when deterministic and dualistic frameworks suggested by other interpreters are challenged.

4QInstruction was likely composed in the mid-second century BCE, although manuscripts (4Q415–418, 423; 1Q26) date to the late first century BCE and early first century CE. One reason for suspecting that none of these scrolls is the original autograph are indications of scribal copying. A date to the second century is further derived from: (1) viewpoints on the development of wisdom, and (2) locating terms and ideas in the document on an evolutionary trajectory that falls before so-called “sectarian” writings as a number of studies have shown. There is, however, no “smoking gun” that would compel one to agree with this particular date even though the majority opinion falls to a provenance from the mid-second century. The

dating of 4QInstruction is significant. If it is written earlier, then this complicates the manner in which particular compositions are grouped together as sharing common ideologies and theologies as well as how they are associated with identifiable groups and movements. Because of thematic and terminological correspondences between 4QInstruction and the Thanksgiving Hymns the hymns seem to provide a terminus ad quem.

The author of 4QInstruction appears to have been a pious Jew who composed this roughly thirty-column scroll in the Hebrew language. When compared with other surviving scrolls from the caves around Khirbet Qumran this is one of the longest. 4QInstruction is also known by its Hebrew title *Mûsâr lē Mēvîn*, although is not an expression found in the composition. The noun *mûsâr*, which is infrequently part of the document's discourse, relates to good conduct and morality, and is often translated as "instruction," "discipline," "training," "exhortation," or "warning." The addressee, the *mēvîn*, is regularly instructed to seek, grasp, gaze upon, and understand the mystery of existence. Although it has become common practice to refer to this document as 4QInstruction, it is technically inaccurate because fragments of a manuscript were discovered in Cave 1 as well as Cave 4. Labels external to the document, whether "4QInstruction" or "*Mûsâr lē Mēvîn*," may take on a life of their own and give rise to misleading presumptions about the composition.

What was the purpose of 4QInstruction and how did the author intend it to be used? Though some evidence suggests that 4QInstruction was composed primarily for an elite group of sages in training and that textual production and literacy are indicative of wealth, is it possible that parts of this composition were meant to be read aloud among a socio-religiously mixed company? The rare second person feminine address in 4Q415 2 ii could, for example, be interpreted in different ways: the author may be using *oratio obliqua* to instruct the male *mēvîn* how to teach women (e.g., "You, O *mēvîn*, instruct women in this manner, 'you O woman' ...") or, as seems less likely, if an *oratio recta* it may be directed to women, in this case perhaps within a mixed gathering of men and women. There are strong indications that

4QInstruction is "misogynistic," something found for example in specific terminology for women (e.g., "womb") and teachings about the subjugation of women to men (e.g., 4Q416 2 iii–iv).

Therefore, it is difficult to see how 4Q415 2 ii forms part of a direct speech and, consequently, how this composition would have been intended to instruct anyone other than men.

In the largest single fragment of 4QInstruction (4Q416 2 i–iv), which preserves significant parts of three columns, the *mēvîn* is repeatedly reminded that he is "poor." Poverty and elitism would, seemingly, be irreconcilable. Perhaps much of this language is addressing an original audience that lived at subsistence level, although why they needed reminding of it has been the subject of debate, as will be discussed below. Even if explanations can be found for why someone who lives in abject poverty needs prompting to recall this harsh reality, one cannot help but wonder whether the speaker-sage is contextualizing his message about—to borrow Douglas Adam's language—life, the universe, and everything within the economic hardships of a singular and monolithic audience. Economic language reflects the status of individuals, influences their relationship to others both in and outside of their community, and is an integral aspect of understanding hierarchies and divisions.

If the author's audience was straightforwardly being instructed about material poverty, and there is some agreement that at least on occasion poverty is used metaphorically, then questions arise as to how the Yahad, who was not the original audience, adopted it and related to the insistence of a text with the refrain "you are poor." Financial advice directed to others does not necessarily translate to another group's circumstances at another time, especially one that shares all things in common at least a generation later and uses "poor" self-referentially, as a nomenclature for their society. Moreover, attention may be given to scenarios available to explain how 4QInstruction interested the Yahad, and perhaps the wider community of which they were part, when it consistently communicates concern for marriage and female members of the family, a commonality shared with the Damascus Document. Economic and

marital status are embedded in 4QInstruction and yet these social groupings of the text were received by others, some of whom at least seem to have experienced different social conditions.

To whom the author first wrote and those who transmitted and used this composition should be differentiated. Scribes produced at least eight copies of the composition roughly a hundred years or more after it was first composed, and this suggests its importance during a relatively long time-span. In theory, more copies may have been produced but it is unlikely that we will ever know whether this is the case. That at least eight copies were made indicates importance and that it was read, or read aloud and listened to, by many within a community. Unfortunately, after reconstructing the manuscripts of 4QInstruction only about 30 % of the original document survives. What is known about the author and his audience must be inferred based upon these reconstructions and, as noted above, the majority view is that the author is not a member of the Yaḥad or, to use the language of others, it is a “non-sectarian” composition. Nonetheless, the Yaḥad movement was evidently interested in this scroll and its message about the mystery of existence.

In Chapter 1, I argue that 4QInstruction begins with first-person speech; the speaker is a *maskil* who teaches students how to live wisely and attain the status of a sage themselves. This specific pedagogic function as a *maskil*-text would have found a place within different didactic settings and, the evidence suggests, over an extended period of time. Why 4QInstruction is not preserved outside of Caves 1 and 4 is not known. In Chapter 3, the authority of Torah is discussed and, if the conclusions reached there are convincing, then we may speculate that 4QInstruction lost its appeal when the place of Torah solidified in later Jewish communities. However, how 4QInstruction was valued, and its place within ancient Jewish thought, should not be determined based solely upon inferences that the only extant copies are from Qumran. Moreover, there is no indication that 4QInstruction was forgotten or deliberately “abandoned.” Knowledge of the scrolls’ existence or whereabouts seems to have simply died away after the inhabitants of Qumran were killed or

enslaved by the Romans in the Great Revolt. Indeed, one explanation comes from Josephus who tells about Essenes being tortured and killed by the Romans during the Great Revolt (War 2.152–153). The numismatic evidence from Qumran indicates that in the year 68 CE, in the midst of the war, the community living at Qumran fled before the advancing Roman army. One assumption is that they hastily hid their scrolls in the surrounding caves before their settlement was destroyed. Perhaps some of them found refuge at Masada, a theory supported by the discovery of the liturgical work Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice atop the mesa; the only other place this text is known is from multiple copies found at Qumran (4Q400–407; 11Q17). Speculating on where precisely the Qumranites fled is less important than the fact that no one returned to collect these precious manuscripts. Given the value of these scrolls, the best theory is that they did not retrieve them because they could not; they did not so much lose their value to a community as much as they and their owners were lost (i.e., killed or enslaved).

A great many of the Dead Sea Scrolls had and continued a life beyond Khirbet Qumran. Many of the other “non-sectarian” texts such as Jubilees, Ben Sira or Tobit, to name only a few, were clearly read and appreciated longer and more broadly than for a brief time alongside the shore of the Dead Sea. Well-known is that the Damascus Document, a composition considered to be formative for the Yaḥad, was discovered in a cache of manuscripts in the Cairo Geniza in the late 1800s. The Damascus Document attracts our attention because it reflects a social group more diverse than other Yaḥad literature and was used, most likely, by the Karaite community. 4QInstruction was probably written before the emergence of the Yaḥad, was read and copied by the Yaḥad, and conceivably could also have existed outside of Cave 1 and Cave 4 for centuries after the inhabitants of Qumran left. The Damascus Document illustrates that plausible theories, such as suppression, could be considered which offer evaluations of 4QInstruction that during an earlier period of time it was less “marginal.” As divisions, hierarchies, and notions of inclusivity/exclusivity in the composition are considered here, it maybe seen

that its own self-presentation and viewpoints were at odds, or came to be at odds, with literature and movements that later dominated. Indeed, as we will see in Chapter 3, how mysteries and Torah relate to one another may alone have been sufficient reason that 4QInstruction eventually lost its appeal.

The difference in date of composition and transmission indicate that 4QInstruction had significance to audiences in more than one generation. Although “sectarian” as a category is highly problematic, one may surmise that if a document is labeled non-sectarian this implies that it represents a swath of Jewish thought and practice less narrowly defined. Pre-sectarian suggests that a work is representative of a way of thinking that is on a trajectory toward “sectarianism” and is the fertile soil that gives it sprout. If one is inclined to describe 4QInstruction as non-sectarian, rather than pre-sectarian, as some have, its circulation could conceivably have been broad. It falls into the same division of scrolls as Jubilees or the Book of Watchers. However, whereas these examples went on to have a longer and more vibrant life, 4QInstruction disappeared. Perhaps this is indicative of its importance, or lack thereof, in the Second Temple era. Maybe it is just a fluke that it vanished and arguments from silence should be avoided.

Sapiential instruction establishes boundaries and hierarchies, typically it is seen to teach that there are those who measure up to wisdom’s standards by birth, gender, propriety, or achievement and those who do not. “Conventional wisdom,” a somewhat misleading but at times useful category, consists of what is observable in the world around us and its practical character is taken for granted; a sage can teach how to live in relationship to it and this can be applied across peoples and cultures. Such wisdom is rooted in the consequences of the here and now, if one acts in such and such a way it will result in this or that. The divisions and categories used in sapiential teachings shape a community’s world, it orders and forms members’ self-perceptions and social identities. However, 4QInstruction presents its wisdom within a cosmological framework from the outset (4Q416 1) and how one is to live in the world is derived from the mystery of existence. Within the discourse of

this composition the one’s addressed relate to otherworldly beings (i.e., angelic beings) as well as to one another. The presentation of this worldview as fully integrated with sapiential discourse suggests that hierarchies and divisions within communities and between communities are in transition. The perspective of 4QInstruction’s speaker, details about organization of community and family, perceptions of humanity, and the question of whether or not the wisdom it conveys is exclusive are all foundational to understanding this composition and locating it among other writings in the era. <>

[The Oxford Dictionary of Late Antiquity \[ODLA\] Two Volume Set](#) edited by Oliver Nicholson [Oxford University Press, 9780198662778]

The Oxford Dictionary of Late Antiquity [ODLA] Volume One edited by Oliver Nicholson [Oxford University Press, 9780198816249]

The Oxford Dictionary of Late Antiquity [ODLA] Volume Two edited by Oliver Nicholson [Oxford University Press, 9780198816256]

[The Oxford Dictionary of Late Antiquity \[ODLA\]](#) is designed to provide easily accessible information, alphabetically arranged, about the history, religion, literature, and physical remains of the half-millennium between the mid-3rd and the mid-8th century AD in Europe, North Africa, and Western and Central Asia. It will therefore occupy a place on bookshelves and on the Internet in between the Oxford Classical Dictionary and the Oxford Dictionary of the Middle Ages, and it follows many of the conventions established by these trusted publications. Some of these conventions are explained in more detail in the Note to the Reader. Lawrence of Arabia excused his refusal to provide an index for the Seven Pillars of Wisdom by claiming that no one would insult their copy of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire by using it to verify a simple fact; those with access to the [ODLA](#) (as we shall call this book hereinafter) need never again offer such offence to the shade of Edward Gibbon.

At the beginning of Late Antiquity in the 3rd century AD, Europe, the Mediterranean basin, and Western Asia were dominated by two empires, the Two Eyes of the Earth as they called themselves in

their diplomatic exchanges, the Roman Empire extending from the northern half of Britain to the southern edge of Egypt, and the Persian Empire ruled by the Sasanian dynasty and extending from Mesopotamia to modern Afghanistan and northern India. [ODLA](#) covers relations between these superpowers. It covers also their dominant civilizations—those which expressed themselves in Latin, Greek, and Middle Persian. Roads and bridges held the empires together, but in Late Antiquity vernacular cultures emerged vigorously between the paving stones of Roman and Sasanian civilization in a way that is much more visible than it is in those earlier eras covered by the Oxford Classical Dictionary. [ODLA](#) gives substantial space to the broad variety of civilizations associated with those who spoke Armenian, Coptic, and Syriac, and also to civilizations beyond the borders of the empires in Ethiopia, the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, Central Europe, and Ireland.

There had been Jews in Babylonia since the Exile under Nebuchadnezzar (and indeed they were still there into the 20th century). Christians also formed a significant minority in Persian Mesopotamia from an early date, and in the course of Late Antiquity they carried their faith as far east as India and China. In the early 4th century the Romans stopped persecuting the Church, and in the course of the two centuries which followed, Christianity came to occupy the commanding heights of the Roman religious economy. Details associated with these profound shifts in mentality and institutions are covered in [ODLA](#), as is the development of Late Antique paganism, but not aspects of paganism which survived from an earlier period such as the minutiae of classical mythology, which are comprehensively covered in the [Oxford Classical Dictionary](#).

During the 5th century, Western Europe and Latin-speaking North Africa were invaded and occupied by peoples from Central Europe who spoke Germanic languages. They were Christians, except the Huns (who did not come to stay and were not Germanic) and the Anglo-Saxons, but they maintained a distance from those they governed because they subscribed to Homoean doctrine about the nature of God which had been rejected by Roman Christians. [ODLA](#) provides details of the

intricate symbiosis of the post-Roman residents and their new rulers in the barbarian kingdoms of early medieval Europe. It also covers the continuing East Roman Empire based in Constantinople, its attempts in the mid-6th century to regain North Africa, Italy, and parts of Spain, its prolonged conflict with its Persian neighbour, and its eventual loss of the Levant, Egypt, North Africa, and its territories in southern Spain to the Islamic invasions of the 7th century. The most recent entries in [ODLA](#) are concerned with the 'Umayyad Caliphate which dominated the Near East for most of the 1st century of Islam.

Scholarly engagement with the history of Late Antiquity is, as Augustine said of God, *tam antiqua et tam nova*, as old as it is new (Confessions, X, 27, 38). Learned study of the Early Church and its writers started in the 16th and 17th centuries, making it one of the oldest of all academic disciplines. The Bollandist Fathers published the first volume of their massive, erudite, critical (and still incomplete) series of saints' lives, the *Acta Sanctorum*, in 1643, the year Louis XIV became King of France. One of the glories of Louis's reign was the penumbra of patristic scholars gathered around his court, including H. Valesius, editor of Ammianus Marcellinus (1636) and of the church historians (1659-73), S. Baluzeus, first editor of Lactantius' *On the Deaths of the Persecutors* (1679), a text once described by T. D. Barnes as the most enjoyable work of history to survive from Antiquity, and Tillemontius (L.-S. Le Nain de Tillemont), compiler of the *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles* (16 vols., 1693-1712). These *érudits* had English counterparts, notably John Fell, Bishop of Oxford and editor of Cyprian (1682), the non juror George Hickes, a pioneer of Anglo-Saxon studies, and Joseph Bingham, who took seriously the Church of England's claim to represent the practice of the Undivided Church and so scoured the fathers to produce his *Antiquities of the Christian Church* (1708-22, repr. 2 vols., 1875). Late Antique secular writers were also read and appreciated into the 18th century, the general Prince Eugene of Savoy, ally of the first Duke of Marlborough, owned a fine humanist manuscript of Ammianus Marcellinus and Dr Johnson enjoyed the poems of Claudian. Edward Gibbon was therefore able to

draw on a substantial tradition of existing scholarship in order to write the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (first publication, 1776). Alas, it was at least in part Gibbon's depiction of the Later Roman Empire as an epoch of decline and fall which for almost two centuries discouraged English-speaking historians (aside from a few great men, such as Sir Samuel Dill, J. B. Bury, and N. H. Baynes) from taking an interest in Late Antiquity.

It is really only since the 1960s that English-speaking scholars have given Late Antiquity the same sort of treatment that has long been accorded earlier eras of the classical world, the Glory that was Greece and the Grandeur that was Rome. Two books marked the new interest, the series of lectures on *The Conflict between Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth Century* edited by A. Momigliano (1963) and A. H. M. Jones's massive study of Late Roman institutions *The Later Roman Empire 284–602* (1964), a compendium whose publication was greeted by one reviewer as 'like the arrival of a steel-plant in a region that has, of late, been given over to light industries'. These were followed by Peter Brown's biography of Augustine of Hippo (1967) and his masterly essay *The World of Late Antiquity* (1971). Since then, numerous aspects of the era have been reconsidered, from the composition of law codes to the archaeology of cities, from the rise of the monastic movement to the wine trade. Syriac studies have been revolutionized by the presence on the Internet of Beth Mardutho: The Syriac Institute. Some Latinists have come to appreciate the particular beauties of the jewelled style of Late Antique Latin literature. Late Antiquity no longer looks like a dismal coda to the classical period or an inchoate prelude to the Middle Ages.

The central pleasure of studying Late Antiquity, in fact, is its shifting kaleidoscope of contrasting civilizations and mentalities. At the heart of [ODLA](#) therefore is a wish to present the era in all its variety. This is meant to make it easier for specialists in one area to connect what they know with contemporary developments elsewhere, so that, for instance, the excavator of a beach in south Devon who finds 7th-century Byzantine pottery is introduced to the story told in a Greek saint's life about a bankrupt merchant from 7th-century Egypt

who was lent a ship belonging to the church at Alexandria so that he could fetch from Britain (it turned into silver—it was a miracle). Only connect—not by the bland general statements of a textbook, but by making available a mass of detail for the reader to choose from. With so much positive information to present, there has been no space in [ODLA](#) for the inclusion of modern theories. Rather, it is intended to provide raw material from which, should they so wish, scholars and students can form their own theories.

The sheer variety of the Late Antique world has also in recent times engaged the imagination of the general public. To appreciate Late Antique art and architecture it is no longer necessary to undergo the dangerous privations of the great Victorian and Edwardian travellers, learned and industrious pioneers like O. Parry (*Six Months in a Syrian Monastery*, 1895), H. F. B. Lynch (*Armenia*, 1901), Gertrude Bell (*The Desert and the Sown*, 1907), or C. F. Lehmann-Haupt (*Armenien Einst und, jetzt*, 1909). Yeats's sages standing in God's holy fire as in the gold mosaic of a wall can be contemplated by anyone willing to take the train to Ravenna; in 1977 crowds thronged the Metropolitan Museum in New York to see its exhibition on *The Age of Spirituality* and they did so again for *Byzantium 330-1453* at the British Academy in 2008-9. Equally, whether or not we recognize the fact, we still live with institutions which developed in Late Antiquity, with the Church, with the codex ([ODLA](#) is a codex), with Roman law and Germanic law, first codified in Late Antiquity, and also with less tangible attitudes, such as our sympathy for victims of injustice which might well be argued to have some roots in Christian veneration of martyrs. More immediately, a familiarity with the history of Sasanian Persia is a significant aid to understanding the present public life of that ancient land. Some of the most important events in the modern history of the Near East occurred in the 7th and 8th centuries AD.

Individual readers will surely have their own uses for [ODLA](#). Parents who have shared with their children Peter Dickinson's *The Dancing Bear* may want to know more about the reign of Justinian—or about stylites, or bears. Numismatists, bibliophiles, and military historians will discover the economic,

intellectual, and political conditions which gave rise to the objects of their enthusiasms. The student of climate change may seek information concerning the historical context of the Migration Period Pessimism or the Dust Veil of 536. A parson leading a party to the Holy Land can find out more about early pilgrims, and about the wisdom of the holy men many of them encountered—there is a sermon to be composed about the encounter of the author of the *Historia Monachorum* in Aegypto with what he thought was a dead crocodile.

In a world which becomes daily more homogeneous, the study of Antiquity, of its history and languages, is one way to school oneself to appreciate genuine difference and true diversity. For no era of Ancient History do we have evidence more varied in its character than that which we have for Late Antiquity. Late Antique people cannot be assimilated to modern norms. They did not drink Coca-Cola—indeed they did not drink coffee or tea. The core of Late Roman education was not science and mathematics but the rigorous and methodical study of language. More seriously, they instinctively considered some people were more valuable than others—'take but degree away, untune that string and hark what discord follows'. Religious practice was not a private matter, it was at the centre of civic ideology. Political power (whoever happened to hold it) was deemed to be a phenomenon comparable to the forces of nature; Pontius Pilate would not have disagreed when Jesus told him that 'Thou couldest have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above'. The German invaders of Western Europe employed butter for the purpose which was fulfilled in our fathers' generation by Brylcreem—a little dab'll do ya. These people are quite different from ourselves. We may or may not admire any or all of them. But the study of their history, their mentalities, and their language is not mere entertainment; it enables one to come to terms more seriously with all that it means to be human. The only worthwhile Student Learner Outcome of such study is the acquisition of virtue.

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Excerpt:

Arius and the Arian Controversy Arius (d. 336) was a Christian *priest of *Alexandria with distinctive ideas about the nature of God. This topic caused controversy in the 4th century, and gave rise to divisions which continued to separate Christians till long after the *Barbarian Migrations. Discussion was carried on at a high intellectual level, but Arius also wrote popular songs to publicize his convictions (*Philostorgius II, fr. 2), and theology was a topic of public debate: *Gregory of *Nazianzus was to complain that when he asked if his *bath was ready the attendant would reply that the Father is greater than the Son.

Arius: life and theology

Arius' theology and his confrontation with his *bishop, Alexander of Alexandria (d. 328), may be understood best in light of tensions within the theological perspective of another Alexandrian, *Origen, which by the beginning of the 4th century seemed inadequate. Origen (d. c.254) had taught that the Son was eternally generated from the Father, but had also spoken of the Father as transcending the Son. He also speculated that the eternal almightiness of God necessitated that there should always be a creation over which God, through his Word, is eternally almighty. In the 3rd century, such doctrines of the coexistence of God

and the world were attacked, most notably by *Methodius of Olympus, as an intrusion of Hellenic thought onto the biblical vision of God as absolutely sovereign and prior to the existence of Creation.

At the beginning of the 4th century, belief in the coexistence of God and His world was universally precluded by an emphasis, common among Christian thinkers, on Creation's coming to be out of nothing, by the sovereign will of God. In Arius' perspective, denying the coexistence of God and the world meant a strict emphasis on the oneness of God and His absolute priority to anything which is derived from Him as an effect of his sovereign will. Arius therefore held that the Son is the first and exemplary creature of God's will who came into existence from nothing; thus, Arius is reported to have coined the slogan, 'there was once when the Son was not'.

However, for Arius the Son is not like the other creatures. Rather, he is Creator of all other creatures and serves as the unparalleled exemplar of creation's relation to the one God. As a creature, the Son cannot fully know the one God nor even his own essence but he can lead other creatures in worship of the ineffable one God. Earlier scholarship tried to ascribe Arius' doctrine to a preference for philosophizing over faith. Such views are often exaggerated, but Arius was certainly rigorous in drawing out the logical consequences of his fundamental beliefs about the oneness of God and the absolute priority of this one God over everything that is caused, including the Son. Thus, God was not always 'Father', and the Son, as a creature, is by nature alterable, though the Son was granted a participation in divinity as a prevenient grace in anticipation of his future merits.

It is likely that Arius developed these doctrines in reaction to his bishop Alexander's emphasis on another Origenian theme, the eternal coexistence of Father and Son. The debate between Arius and Alexander led to Arius' excommunication by an Egyptian synod in the early 320s. Both sides immediately embarked on campaigns to win support for their respective positions outside *Egypt, with the result that in 325 the *Council of *Nicaea was convened to deal with the issue. The Nicene council sided with Alexander but recast the

doctrine of the eternal coexistence of Father and Son in language that Alexander had not himself used, declaring the Son to be of the same being or 'substance' ('homoousios') as the Father. The doctrine of Arius was anathematized, and he was sent into *exile. In 328, he was recalled from exile but the *Emperor Constantine I's efforts to have him readmitted to communion in the Egyptian Church were rebuffed by *Athanasius, by then bishop in Alexandria. A council at *Tyre in 335 deposed Athanasius and reinstated Arius, but Arius died in 336 before he could return to Alexandria.

Fourth-century developments

Both Arius and Alexander held distinctive positions that were not fully replicated by any notable participant in the subsequent debates, though the epithet 'Arian' was often employed by controversialists to stigmatize doctrines which were not those of Arius himself. However, the debate between Arius and Alexander did serve to highlight two basic options for understanding the relation between the Father and the Son. Either the Son exists coeternally with the Father and his existence is integral to the perfection of the Father, as Alexander held, or, following Arius' doctrine, the Son is brought into being as a product of the will of the one God whose perfection is associated with His absolute priority to everything caused by His will, including the Son. Those who followed the first trajectory were challenged by their opponents to explain how the biblical conception of a God who is related to all things through His sovereign will can be applied to the relation between the Father and the Son and, further, how the unity of being between Father and Son can accommodate the distinct existences of the two. The latter issue was exacerbated by reaction to *Marcellus of Ancyra, whose refutation of one of Arius' early supporters, *Asterius the Sophist, included a strict denial of any ontological distinction between Father and Son and ascribed any such distinction to the unfolding of divine action in relation to creation. Conversely, those who followed the second 'Arian' trajectory had to find a way to characterize the unity of Father and Son if this was not a unity of being. As the controversy progressed, both trajectories had to extend their preoccupation with the relation between Father

and Son to an explicit consideration of the Holy Spirit.

The 340s give some indications of the unfolding of this problematic. The bishops of the Council of *Antioch of 341 denied that they were followers of Arius and insisted on the distinct existences of Father, Son, and Spirit, while characterizing the unity of the three as one of concord. The opposite trajectory was represented by the Council of *Serdica of 343 which, citing John 10:30, spoke of Father and Son as 'one hypostasis' and declared 'blasphemous' the explanation that this unity is merely one of concord. At the same time, Athanasius, who was present at the Council of Serdica, explained in his Orations against the Arians that the unity of being includes a unity of willing, such that the Father begets the Son willingly though the Father does not exist at any point prior to or apart from that willing.

The 350s witnessed an increasing momentum directed against Nicene doctrine and its language of homoousios, from the warning against the doctrine of an 'extension' of the divine ousia in *Sirmium in 351 to the prohibition of ousia language in the Councils of Sirmium of 357 and 359, and the doctrine of Aetius and *Eunomius that the Son is of a substance different from that of the Father. In opposition to this momentum, Athanasius of Alexandria led a movement to retrieve the Nicene formulation as the only safeguard against all equivocations with respect to the eternal coexistence and unity of being between Father and Son. Also in the late 350s, the rise of a doctrine that the Son was fully divine but not the Spirit led to a clarification of the Spirit's divinity on the part of proNicenes. A further consolidation of the pro-Nicene position was achieved in the Council of Alexandria of 362 which affirmed the equal validity of expressing the unity of Father, Son, and Spirit, as one hypostasis or three hypostases. Implicit in this judgement was the affirmation of ontological distinction as well as unity of being between the three, an affirmation that was further solidified by *Basil of Caesarea's application of the language of a single ousia to affirm ontological unity and three hypostases to affirm ontological distinction, neither dividing the substance nor confounding the persons.

These consolidations and clarifications set the stage for the Council of *Constantinople in 381, which reaffirmed the Nicene *Creed, and extended it with a confession of the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Complemented by an imperial *edict prohibiting the assembly of 'Arians' and 'Eunomians', the Council of Constantinople marks the beginning of the universal ascendancy of the doctrine of Trinitarian unity of divine being, and is thus generally taken to mark the end point of historical accounts of the 'Arian controversy'. However, the *Visigoths, settled within the Empire from 378, and other Germanic barbarians who invaded *Gaul on New Year's Eve 406, had been converted by Christians who held a *Homoean Christology, characterized by its opponents as 'Arian'. Division between Germanic Homoean Christians and Homoousian ('Catholic') indigenous Christians persisted in *Africa, *Gaul, *Italy, and *Spain into the 5th and 6th centuries.

Qarara (Gk. Hipponon) *Village in the *Heradeopolite *Nome of Upper *Egypt on the eastern bank of the *Nile with a Roman army camp until at least the 6th century. A community of monks loyal to *Meletius lived within the village in the early 4th century (P.Lond. VI, 1913-22). A large Christian cemetery, with chapels and individual tombs, has been found south-east of Qarara.

Qardagh (4th/6th cent.) Legendary Persian Christian venerated as a *martyr. His 6th-century *martyr passion presents its hero as *Marzban of the Mesopotamian border region, north of *Nisibis, at the time of *Shapur II, who was converted to Christianity and took the Roman *Emperor's side against the Persians. He was stoned, and buried in *Arbela. The presentation of the protagonist follows narrative conventions inherited from Iranian epic literature.

Qaryat al-Fāw Oasis in the south of modern Saudi *Arabia containing remains of settlements from the 4th century BC to the 4th century AD. Al-Fāw straddles a strategic point on caravan routes passing through the southern Arabian Desert connecting south *Arabia (Arabia Felix, Yemen) with the Mediterranean basin and *Mesopotamian routes which formed the principal artery of the

*incense trade. Different groups occupied the site to control *trade. *Inscriptions of the 3rd century AD describe al-Fāw as ruled by '*Kinda and Qahtan' and/or 'Kinda and Madhhij' (al-Ghabban, 313). Kinda was a celebrated pre-Islamic Arabian kingdom. Although in its 5th-century heyday Kinda was based further south in *Hadramawt and this post-dates the abandonment of al-Fāw, al-Fāw may have been Kinda's first capital.

Archaeological finds from al-Fāw reveal economic prosperity, extensive Hellenistic cultural influences, and funerary and religious material giving evidence of the polytheistic religion of the pre-Islamic *Arabian Peninsula.

Qaryatayn and Dayr Mar Elyan Located on the Roman *frontier, Qaryatayn had been the centre of a Middle Bronze Age kingdom, but by classical times was a minor settlement on the more northerly of the routes linking *Damascus and *Palmyra. A substantial tell and Roman remains lie south of the modern town. West of Qaryatayn is the *Monastery of Mar Elian esh-Sharqi or esh-Sheikh (S. Julian of the East/the Old Man) which is a Late Antique foundation and held the *sarcophagus and shrine of the saint. The monastery was bulldozed by DAESH in 2015.

qasida Arabic form of lyric poetry. Usually, this lengthy poetic type consists of three components: reflection on the past (e.g. loss of the beloved), description of a journey on a *camel or *horse symbolizing the turn towards the present, and *praise (or derision) of individuals.

Qasr al-Hallabat An *Umayyad-era 'desert castle' located approximately 60 km (36 miles) north-east of *Amman. It stands upon a 6th-century *Ghassanid *palace and *monastery that was in turn built upon a 2nd- or 3rd-century Roman fort. *Caliph *Hisham (r. 724-43) redeveloped the Roman site as a complex that included a *mosque, a *bathhouse, and an extensive *irrigation system, suggesting that *olives and vines may have been cultivated there. The central palace was of square construction in basalt and limestone and lavishly decorated with wall paintings, *stucco sculpture, and *mosaics.

Qasr al-Hayr al-Gharbi and Qasr al-Hayr al-Sharqi Two *Umayyad *palace complexes

developed by the *Caliph *Hisham (r. 724-43) located on the *road between *Damascus and al-Rusafa/*Sergiopolis. The former is west of *Palmyra, and the latter east of it, hence their designation as 'western' (al-Gharbi) and 'eastern' (al-Sharqi). Al-Sharqi is a wholly *Umayyad construction with later additions; al-Gharbi was built on the remains of a *Ghassanid structure. Qasr al-Hayr al-Gharbi comprises a palace, small *bathhouse, reservoir, two further buildings constructed around courtyards, a water-*mill, dam, and agricultural enclosure of 46 ha (114 acres), irrigated by an *aqueduct. In contrast, Qasr al-Hayr al-Sharqi has been described as a 'new town'. It comprises a large palace and two very large agricultural enclosures of 746 and 160 ha (1,843 and 395 acres), irrigated by a number of aqueducts. Adjacent to the palace is a larger compound in two storeys. These monumental buildings are surrounded on three sides by a variety of others, covering more than 30 ha (74 acres).

Qasr el Lebia (mod. Libya) *City in *Cyrenaica and the site of a *basilica built in 539-40 by *Bishop Macarius. According to an *inscription in the church, the town was renamed 'New Theodorias' after the *Empress *Theodora, wife of *Justinian I. The church is decorated with *allegorical and *cosmological *mosaics: square panels frame *Nilotic *birds and *fish, the *Lighthouse (Pharos) of *Alexandria, and *personifications of Creation (Ktisis), Adornment (Kosmesis), Renewal (Ananeosis), the four rivers of *Paradise, and a spring (Castalia) located either at *Delphi or *Antioch.

Qasr-e Serij 6th-century *monastery and church in northern *Mesopotamia dedicated to S. *Sergius. The site was located at a spring 5 km (3 miles) south-west of Tell Hugna, and 60 km (37 miles) north-west of *Mosul. The *basilica (c.23 by 24 m, 76 by 46 feet) was constructed of limestone ashlar. An arcade springing from pilasters divided its nave into three aisles. In place of a *prothesis, a rectangular *martyrium lay south of the *apse. It was accessible through a large *arch from the south side aisle and a small door that led to the church's south porch. Though located in the *Persian Empire, its design stemmed from churches at north *Syrian *pilgrimage centres in the Roman Empire

such as *Sergiopolis (Resafa). The *metropolitan of the *Miaphysite Church in *Mesopotamia, Mar *Ahudemmeh (r. 559-75), founded Qasr Serij specifically to rival Sergiopolis-Rusafa (History of MarAhudemmeh, ed. Nau, 29-30). *Khosrow I reconstructed it after *Nestorians burned it.

Qasr-e Shirin Archaeological site between Holwan and Khaniqin in western Iran where *Khosrow II built a *palace associated in early Islamic lore with his Christian wife *Shirin. Situated on an artificial terrace 8 m (c.26 feet) high, it measured 285 X 98 m (935 X 322 feet) and was reached by a double staircase leading to a massive courtyard or *garden. A tall entrance hall with *ayvan led to a great hall area and apartments flanking successive courtyards or gardens.

Qasr ibn Wardan A 6th-century complex of church, *palace, and military barracks, located in the Syrian Desert approximately 60 km (c.37 miles) northeast of *Epiphania (Hama). It is architecturally striking due to its unusual 'tiger-striped' construction in bands of black basalt and yellow brick. This lavish construction technique necessitated the transport of many of the building materials long distances to the site, and was helped by the fact that this was an imperial project financed by the *Emperor *Justinian I (527-65) who built a line of new fortifications and strengthened existing outposts across *Syria in an attempt to stave off Persian invasions. <>

[Classical Art: A Life History from Antiquity to the Present](#) by Caroline Vout [Princeton University Press, 9780691177038]

How did the statues of ancient Greece wind up dictating art history in the West? How did the material culture of the Greeks and Romans come to be seen as "classical" and as "art"? What does "classical art" mean across time and place? In this ambitious, richly illustrated book, art historian and classicist Caroline Vout provides an original history of how classical art has been continuously redefined over the millennia as it has found itself in new contexts and cultures. All of this raises the question of classical art's future.

What we call classical art did not simply appear in ancient Rome, or in the Renaissance, or in the eighteenth-century Academy. Endlessly

repackaged and revered or rebuked, Greek and Roman artifacts have gathered an amazing array of values, both positive and negative, in each new historical period, even as these objects themselves have reshaped their surroundings. Vout shows how this process began in antiquity, as Greeks of the Hellenistic period transformed the art of fifth-century Greece, and continued through the Roman empire, Constantinople, European court societies, the neoclassical English country house, and the nineteenth century, up to the modern museum.

A unique exploration of how each period of Western culture has transformed Greek and Roman antiquities and in turn been transformed by them, this book revolutionizes our understanding of what classical art has meant and continues to mean.

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Excerpt: Every picture tells a story. Hang pictures together, and the conversation between them enriches that story. This book taps one such conversation. It traces the narrative that unfolds as ancient Greek and Roman artifacts are grouped first in sanctuaries, and then in new configurations, as they travel across cultures and time. As they travel—the lucky ones at least—they change the world around them. Symbiotically, they too are changed, accruing values positive and negative. These values, and the ongoing embrace of these values, create "classical art."

Overinvestment in value-laden categories makes them inevitably slippery. But that should not dissuade us from wrestling with them. "Classical art"

is sometimes used capaciously to describe the material cultures of the Greeks, Etruscans, and Romans from as early as 1200 BCE to the fall of the Roman empire.¹ But this underrates the values implied by both the "classical" and "art" labels, values that have evolved over centuries. This book is about that evolution, and employs "classical art" for a category comprising "chosen objects," objects that have outgrown their Greek or Roman origins, and often also their intended function, to become part of something bigger—an elite club or canon that dictates taste, and shapes culture and culture's questions. This book also privileges sculpture. It would be disingenuous to deny the part played by gems, pottery, painting, and architecture, but sculpture is the most eloquent advocate; indeed it is our only advocate, if what we are wanting to track is an available, moveable material that has been in the public domain from its production in Greece or Rome and its discussion in Greek and Latin literature, continuously through to the present—material that offers not just a close-up but a panning shot of classical art's entire trajectory. In as far as this book is concerned with more private narratives, it is less with the biographies of individual enthusiasts than with how these biographies have intersected with (inter)national narratives to dictate classical art's makeup and influence.

As I will show, the "classical art" of today's textbooks and galleries is different from the "classical art" of the nineteenth century, which is different again from the "classical art" of the Renaissance or of antiquity. Not that the terminology "classical art" existed in antiquity or in the Renaissance; it is an observers' category ("classical" derives ultimately from the Latin word "classicus" meaning of the first order), which I apply retrospectively to specimens of Greek and Roman production freighted with normative values. Nor is it a self-standing category: it is always relational. Were one able to ask the inhabitants of Ptolemaic Alexandria, Seleucid Mesopotamia, or Etruria to pick their "first order" artifacts from the remnants of the past, they may well have pointed to imported Greek artifacts, and they may equally have pointed to pharaonic, near eastern, or Italic styles respectively, creating a capacious and, to us, unfamiliar kind of "classicism." So too the residents

of imperial Rome, whose style palette blended Greek, Egyptian, Asian, and Italian motifs. Indeed it is arguably only in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, when Continental powers competed for ownership of the new world and defined the old world in opposition to it, each of them laying claim to an ancestral Greco-Roman imperial heritage that put them on a surer footing at home, that "classicism" became the Eurocentric model it is today. Even then, the Greek and Roman still interacts with the Indian, the Japanese, the gothic. The Greek and Roman was paradigmatic before it became uniquely dominant—had been made so by the reading of Greek and Latin texts. "Classical art" as a discipline comes into its own in the nineteenth century, when the Greco-Roman is prized apart from other ancient cultures in the lecture rooms of universities.

This book follows the Greek and Roman as it reaches these dizzy heights, and "classicism" its hellenocentric bias. When the Parthenon sculptures were making waves in London in the nineteenth century, they were bolstering an already burgeoning hellenism, the ideals of which were tied to the materiality of Greece, real and imaginary.³ But the Parthenon sculptures were also, inevitably, surprising, bringing many into contact with genuine Greek sculpture for the first time, and accelerating a refinement of the category of "classical art" to artifacts produced in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE when Athens at least was, for the most part, a democracy. Today, this concept of "classical art" will often be given a capital "C" to put it on an even higher plane than any broader "classical" category. The two definitions coexist. But when it is "classical" style that is being talked about, it is fifth- and fourth-century style that is typically meant, as distinct from the archaic, frontal style of earlier Greek production, or the "baroque" style of works produced after the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE. The naturalism of this "Classical art" gives it, and has always given it, a particular kind of potency.

Grappling with these variations on a theme means managing the linguistic problems they generate—not only the different versions of "classical," but also "classicism" and "classicizing." Avoiding "Classical" is not difficult: it is a subgenre as far as

this book is concerned; "fifth-century" or "fourth-century" are more precise as adjectives. But the other terms remain tricky: usually in what follows, they imply a debt to the arts of Greece and Rome, as interpreted by a particular period, but occasionally, as in the phrase "Augustan classicism," they infer the narrower nostalgia of our previous paragraph, one that urgently asks us to examine not only modernity's relationship to the classical antique and vice versa but "classicism's" relationship to "hellenism." I rely on the context to clarify, and work hard every time to qualify their different sense of timelessness. Harder is the distinction between "classical" and "classicizing": is an eighteenth-century cast of the Apollo Belvedere one or the other? Find the answer and we pin down the nature of the statue's imitation. But pinning down is not what "classical art" enables. It has a transcendent quality that defies logic. The best we can do is approximate its appeal, and focus our energies instead on its evolution and impact. If we are occasionally mercurial in our use of these terms, this is as appropriate as it is unavoidable.

All books on the classical have the additional problem of whether to adopt Greek, Latin, or anglicized spellings for Greek names. Because of the massive part played in my story by ancient and Renaissance Rome, I prefer the Latin, except when that is ugly in my eyes: so I call the fifth-century Athenian sculptor "Kritios," as opposed to "Critius," but otherwise prefer "Polyclitus," "Caria," "Doryphorus," and so on. "At best, I hope to have been consistently inconsistent."

"Classical art," as defined by Levett, is alive and well, but then Mougins's proximity to the French Riviera and its popularity during the Cannes Film Festival make it a peculiarly moneyed and arty kind of place (there are even yacht and real estate advertisements in the back of the catalog). That said, ask what my local museum, the Fitzwilliam, has done to its collection recently, and one gets a complementary picture. The only recent acquisition of note to have made it into the Greek and Roman gallery is a relief of dark gray limestone, punctuated with niches and decorated with scenes from Greek mythology including Dionysus and Odysseus and the Sirens (9.14). Found in the

Pantanello of Hadrian's Villa by Hamilton in 1769 and then shipped to the Earl of Shelburne, where it was installed as the mantelshelf of a chimney piece in the main gallery of Lansdowne House, it was first loaned to the Fitzwilliam before being bought with the help of the Heritage Lottery Fund in 2012.

There it joins three other artifacts from Hadrian's Villa: the bust of Antinous, which Hamilton had also acquired for the Lansdowne collection but which, latterly, was owned by Ricketts and Shannon, and two pilaster capitals, formerly in the collection of barrister and art collector John Disney (1779-1857). When the Fitzwilliam's Greek and Roman collection was redisplayed in 2010, the division of the museum into departments meant that introducing postantique works, such as Titian's Rape of Lucretia, Batoni's portrait of the fourth Earl of Northampton, Renaissance bronzes, or Wedgwood pottery was a step too far. But an emphasis on the collectors as well as the markers of artifacts, and on multiple contexts, ancient and modern, meant that these kinds of object histories were told, stressing continuities.

This display too is a success: the Greek and Roman cases are among the most popular in the building and issues of ancient craftsmanship, materials, polychromy, and function given as much airtime as issues of collecting, restoration, forgery, and conservation.

In terms of the way the objects are organised and the narratives constructed by the displays there is a clear engagement with new scholarship ... the redisplay attempts to construct a biography of each object or group by highlighting the role of people in the creation of meaning. The redisplay also focuses on making the processes of the museum transparent.

The display is an object lesson in museology as well as in classical art and classical antiquity.

Classical art and Greek and Roman antiquity need not be at odds with one another. Yes, there must be an acknowledgment that there are those artifacts that "classical art" does not reach, as well as an acknowledgment that those it reaches, it warps. But we might also acknowledge that "warping" is concomitant with admiration, collecting, excavation, and studying, and that in fixating on some artifacts

and down-playing, or downright rejecting, others, societies, or sections of society, from Ptolemaic Alexandria and Attalid Pergamum to Renaissance Italy to Enlightenment Europe and on into Victorian England, turned themselves from peoples to "culture(s)," and honed, and handed on, the image of Greece and Rome that we are working with today. Divisive this may have been; inflated most certainly, but it is also fortuitous. Without it, there would be no "heritage" to handle knowingly, or conscientiously.

We can keep Greece and Rome separate if we want to. But to define Greek "art," "artifacts," or whatever we want to call them, as those objects found on what is now Greek soil is to tell but a partial story and one that still creates false homogeneity. From the vantage point of Republican Rome, vast swathes of material culture produced across the Mediterranean, not to mention as close to home as Pompeii and Herculaneum, looked "Greek," but on the ground at Olympia or Delphi, Athenian dedications looked Athenian and Naxian dedications Naxian; the latter were even made of Naxian marble. "Greek" meant something different in Rome from in the Byzantine or early modern world, different again after Greek independence.

Restricting the "Greek" content of books on Roman art to "Augustan Classicism" or "Classicism in the Second Sophistic" is similarly reductive. The copies found at Hadrian's Villa are but the tip of the iceberg; copies are more than totems of a "distinctive archaism" or "revival of Greek culture" seeded in Roman oratory and literature. They were raw material and finished product, as Roman as they were Greek, and instrumental in shaping the "imperial" imagery and "freedmen art" with which they were in dialogue, just as they then shaped late antique art and, through ongoing display and increasingly explicit investment, western, even Chinese, sculpture and painting. If the hellenistic period had already made Greek sculpture and painting "art," then in Rome, this art increased in popularity and prestige, attracting Roman production (altars, columns, portraits, gems, coins) into its orbit. "When Romans discuss art in their literature, as they quite often do, 'art' for them means Greek art." Although few, if any, collectors

today attempt to collect only Greek art, they are driven by its Keatsian cachet.

Collectors are not the enemy, any more than art is the enemy. Private collectors and the patronage and collecting activities evidenced throughout this book are but part of a broader canvas of appropriation, repudiation, and response that witnessed sculpture being carted from Greek sanctuaries to Republican temples, from Rome to Paris, and from Athens, Bassae, and Bodrum to London. It saw artists restore and sketch this sculpture, making it the basis of their own creations, some of them truer to their models than others, a few so close as to trick their buyers and pass as originals. There is less of a gap than we might think between smoothing down surfaces and adding attributes so as to turn ancient marbles into a Hercules or Ganymede (8.31), and smashing or sawing up looted antiquities so as to send them, undetected by customs, across the Atlantic. Rendering them in polystyrene, or with a gazing ball or Mao suit, as Darbyshire, Koons, and Sui Jianguo have done, is reverential in comparison.

The admiration and acquisition of Greek and Roman antiquities have always been ethically problematic and explicitly debated, and these debates formative of "classical art's" status. We can hive collectors off, if we want to, cull many of the works that have made the "classical art" grade from our syllabuses, or leave them to those interested in the reception of antiquity and of classics as a discipline. But this is to sideline two thousand years of investment; and it would be disingenuous, given that the galleries of the Fitzwilliam and Metropolitan Museum, which "reveal classical art in all its complexity and resonance," are well visited, and that the British Museum's Greek and Roman Life display, now thirty years old, in contrast, feels a little jaded. "Classical art" is still with us; and still evolving, contributing to culture, and to discussions of what constitutes culture, as it does so. Understanding what is classical and artful about classical art has led us across millennia, back to the fifth century BCE. Far from producing a nostalgic narrative, the lessons learned from looking back ensure that we keep traveling.

And the Moral of the Story ...

This is, and was only ever destined to be, a life history of classical art. Other narrators would have emphasized different parts of the life, making it less British, more obviously political, with a greater emphasis on medieval Rome, or imperial Russia, or a wider reach into Gandhara or Mughal India. Inevitably, one has to make choices, and often, as in the chapter on the English country house, I have privileged areas where much work has been done, so as to experiment with what happens when one puts that work into a longer history. It was never my intention to write a synthesis or survey, but a biography or travelogue—a mapping not of facts, but of the ways in which Greek and Roman artifacts experience history. As these artifacts interact with different peoples and places, a shifting subset—or canon—emerges with a distinct personality, and it is this personality that has been our subject. In identifying the distinctive character and charisma of classical art, we can better assess its paradigmatic status.

The *longue durée* approach of this book is what marks its contribution. Classical art existed before it was christened as such, and survived Christianity and the fall of Rome and Byzantium, the French Revolution, the rise of modernism and fascism, to live on in galleries and auction rooms and make the heart soar, and the blood boil, today. The continuum of classical art offers an accumulation of values that invites us to measure our subjective and scientific categories against those of other periods. Winckelmann's "homoerotic encounter" with the Apollo Belvedere, "surely one of the most inspired and often-quoted texts in the entire history of artful writing about art," turns out to be a more studied form of Nicola Maffei's epistolary enthusiasm for the statue, which taps the Pygmalion myth that had already dictated how Master Gregory described a marble Venus. This "way of seeing" was live, and gendered, in the third century BCE, when Theocritus's female viewers of tapestries were struck by "how realistically" the figures stand, "and even dance, as if alive, not woven." And it became art historical discourse as the "lifelikeness of the poetically evoked image" was excavated from its epiphastic context, and applied to greater numbers of actual artifacts.

Alongside continuities, we have witnessed discontinuities. The Vatican of the eighteenth century was a different place from the Vatican of Maffei's day, and in a different world, in which being a man, never mind an art-loving man, was unlike what it had been. What counts as classical art had changed. For every Apollo Belvedere, which hangs on to its status, attracting tourists with their camera-phones, even as it has fallen out of favor with the exam boards, there are other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century favorites (Louis XIV's "Vestal" from Benghazi, for example), which have the lifespan of *drosophila*. The arrival of the Parthenon sculptures in London causes more ripples than most; the discovery of Tanagra figurines, archaic statuary, and Bronze Age artifacts from Mycenae and Knossos expanded and distorted Greek art's remit; the freeing of Roman art from hellenism's shackles purified it. The Apollo Belvedere preserves some prestige, not because of what it is, or where it was carved or found, but because of what it was, what it inspired, and what the exemplarity it accrued has made it: we remember Rubens's Council of the Gods, Batoni's portrait of Sir Wyndham Knatchbull-Wyndham, Sergel's statue of Gustav III, and MacPherson's albumen print. It is not simply that each period finds new heroes from an expanded set of artifacts. In engaging with the artworks canonic in the previous generation, each period starts from a distinct position.

What are we to make of this nexus of change and continuity? Currently, one of the most productive ways that scholarship has of working with Greek and Roman artifacts is to use the language of "material agency" and talk about the "affordances" of objects (i.e., the properties that they have in relation to their environment, but independent of the needs of the observer). Arguably, it is a language that rescues them from value judgments and gives them control over their own destiny. Yet this book too is about agency and affordances. In the same way that affordances are not absolute, so the "agency" of objects depends not only on their formal characteristics (shape, design, iconography, workmanship) and on their materiality, but also on their freedom to act. As far as classical art is concerned, this freedom is granted by the society, or the privileged few in

society, that controls the selection process, and the access.

In this way, the meaning of style ("classical" or otherwise) is not a given. Any select group of artifacts, and the antique it mourns or conjures up, is bound by communal concerns, whether practical constraints, forward-thinking ambition, or backward-looking cultural memory. We need only weigh Rome's embrace of Praxiteles's sculpture against that of Pergamum, or of Constantinople, with the spread of Christianity, and the denigration of polytheism that that brought with it, or think about Napoleon transferring the Apollo Belvedere and Laocoon to a city in which, if classicism spelled anything, it spelled Louis and the ancien regime. The saving grace was that they joined a palace, the Louvre, that was now a public museum. But even then, plaster arms after those made a century earlier by Girardon, restorer of the Venus of Arles, were added, and a national competition was planned to find an artist to restore the sculpture definitively in marble. These were complex negotiations, recognition of which also restores classical art's dynamism by seeing it always in conversation with its former self. To claim that each period gets the classical art it deserves is too passive. It inherits centuries of baggage and repackages classical art by restricting or developing its affordances or avenues.

Only by being immersed in this idiom can we appreciate what classical art has to offer us. When the curators at the Munich Glyptothek removed Thorvaldsen's restorations from the Aegina pediments, they did not so much take them back to a pristine state as out of the feedback loop, rendering them damaged goods. It was not a restriction of avenues or a change of direction that was being enacted here, but a refusal to speak the language, or rather an insistence that the only language worth speaking was an academic one. Where did this leave historical imagination, popular imagination? The lack that the Aegina pediments embody is a different lack from that of the Venus de Milo, which asks always to be completed, not opportunity but deprivation. In 2011, the Glyptothek marked the two hundredth year of the pediments' discovery by putting new versions of Thorvaldsen's restored figures on

display.¹ They had relearned the lingo. For art to be "classical," it has to know its place in the discourse.

What does a work of art know? The past life of classical art has been so eventful, its experiences so life-changing and its impact so momentous, that it knows a formidable amount. Knowledge is power. It is also dangerous. In the hands of Renaissance dynasts, classical art was as powerful a weapon as Christian imagery. Today, classical remains like those at Palmyra are fiercely fought over. In consumerist culture, the battle is between those who make classical art a language of globalization in perfume and clothing advertisements and those who want to keep it on its pedestal. But, as this book has repeatedly shown, classical art knows too much to be tied down. Indeed, when anyone thinks they have succeeded (and we need only think of "neoclassicism"), it wriggles free to mount a challenge.

Often, the most iconoclastic experiments in classical art are the most invigorating, and I think here not only of the sculptures of Rodin and Archipenko but of Sui Jianguo and Koons's contemporary artworks, through which the classical speaks of a vaster universe—of Communist repression and of sensory perception more generally.

Of a companion set of old master paintings with gazing balls, Koons writes, "These paintings are stronger for being together with the gazing ball—if you removed the gazing ball they don't have the same power, they don't have the same phenomenology." Koons's revised canon foregrounds the structures of consciousness that looking enables, and connects him with the canons of the past, in the case of his sculpture series, a canon shaped by centuries of artists, worshippers, dynasts, scholars, collectors, diggers, dealers; by politics, local and national; and by questions of competition, access, morality, beauty—but with daring additions (e.g., Gazing Ball [Stool] and Gazing Ball [Snowman]). He continues, "I enjoy participating in the dialogue." So has this book. In tapping classical art's life story, it throws down its own challenges. Classical art has plenty left to say. Let us not let our search for certainties stifle it.

[Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue: An Overview from the First-Generation Socratics to Neoplatonism](#)

edited by Alessandro Stavru, Christopher Moore
[Brill, 9789004321915]

[Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue](#) provides the most complete study of the immediate literary reaction to Socrates, by his contemporaries and the first-generation Socratics, and of the writings from Aristotle to Proclus addressing Socrates and the literary work he inspired.

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Excerpt:

Scope and Organization of This Collection

The last decade has featured a spawning of studies on Socrates and the Socratic literature that is unprecedented in both quantity and methodological variety. Nearly a dozen edited collections have appeared (among them three *Companions to Socrates*),¹ along with a great many editions, translations, monographs, and scholarly articles. Basic issues of Socratic scholarship that in the second half of the twentieth century had been bracketed or even rejected as uninteresting or fruitless—such as those of the “historical Socrates,” the “Socratic question,” or the “Socratic schools”—have returned as urgent research directions in this recent upsurge in Socratic studies.

The hypotheses advanced to resolve these issues still need to be verified, and some of them remain highly problematic. It is difficult, in the first place, to establish the extent and the reliability of “Socratic literature” as such, and, consequently, to determine whether and to what degree such literature can yield a “Socratic personality” or a “Socratic philosophy.”

One major feature of the “Socratic question” concerns the reliability of the extant sources’ apparent claims about the man named Socrates of Alopecce. Granted, these are all and without question literary portraits of Socrates, that is, fictional representations of his personality and teaching. But it is also a fact that these

representations (i) contain a number of realistic—while perhaps not altogether historical—features that exceeds by far those we can find in other fictional genres of antiquity, and (ii) exerted, both through their fictional and their realistic features, a great influence on ancient philosophy and history. These considerations limit or even undermine whatever hopes one might have to make univocal claims about the “fictionality” or the “historical reliability” of Socratic literature.

Many attempts have been made to solve the Socratic question by identifying and then studying those sources assumed to yield the “historical” or at least a “reliable” or a “realistic” Socrates. Scholars have often restricted their inquiry, accordingly, to specific texts, or to some range of texts, by a “quadriga” of authors, namely Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle. Such a selection led to important scholarly work, but it often failed to account for the literary and philosophical complexity to which these texts refer, and upon which they largely depend.

In fact most scholars opted for a focus on Plato alone. This yielded a wide range of studies that while meant to deal with “Socrates” actually investigated problems particular to the Platonic corpus. But a similar treatment was applied to the other major Socratic authors. Calls to re-examine their presentations of Socrates led mostly to studies restricted to the works or the portions of texts these authors explicitly devoted to Socrates—and only in rare cases to explorations of their literary and authorial context. For example, Socratic scholars dealing with Aristophanes mostly limited their study to the *Clouds* and some passages of *Frogs* and *Birds*; or those dealing with Xenophon to his Socratic works; or those working on Aristotle to the passages in which the name “Socrates” occurs. Little attention has been paid to the presence of Socratic themes in other works or passages of these authors, or to the conceptual and intertextual links between the Socratic passages of these authors and other testimonies of the Socratic literature.

This collection aims to set out on a new path. It presents a comprehensive picture of Socrates and the Socratic dialogue in ancient Greek and Roman literature, from the comedies of Eupolis and Aristophanes, written during Socrates’ middle age,

to the treatises of Proclus, more than eight hundred years later. Each chapter addresses an author or group of authors whose work reveals something significant either about the thinking associated with Socrates and his nearest associates, especially the authors of “Socratic dialogues,” or the power and texture of the Socratic icon as formed in these dialogues and passed down, reinterpreted, and redeployed in the thought, biography, oratory, and literature of the ensuing generations.

Special attention is paid to the Socratic literature of the first generation. Almost two thirds of the contributions directly explore texts written by authors who either knew Socrates directly (from the Comics to Xenophon) or may have relied on oral reports about him (Aristotle and Aristoxenus). Even the last third of contributions (from Epicurus to Proclus) contributes to reconstructing and understanding the dialogues of the first-generation Socratics, as it deals with the reception and interpretation both of well-known and of fragmentary Socratic literature.

That Socrates has left neither writings nor formal institutions comparable to the schools founded after his death (the Clouds’ “Thinkery” notwithstanding) shows the necessity of studying his thought through this second-hand, interlocutory, reflective Socratism. In other words, the way Socrates lived his life—in public, inconstant conversation, in pursuit of the promising youth of his city, in a shared philosophy of mutual examination—means that to study Socrates requires studying his effect and influence on those around him and those, in turn, around them.

We may note a basic dichotomy among the first-generation literature on Socrates. On the one hand we have the *logoi Sôkratikoî*, written by companions and pupils of Socrates; on the other, works by Comics or Sophists, whose main feature is their polemic against both Socrates and his circle. This collection includes both. The extant and fragmentary texts by Socrates’ associates constitute its main focus, as we will see, but not its only focus. Nor could it be, as the Comics and the Sophists provide an indispensable background for understanding how Socrates and the dialogues reporting about him were perceived “from outside.” Comic literature of the fifth century gives

important information for reconstructing the origins of the Socratic dialogue, especially the political and philosophical motivations prompting the Socratics to represent their master through a new literary form (chapters 1–3). Sophistic literature of the fifth and fourth century provides a lively insight into the way Socrates’ teaching was perceived before and after his death, as well as into the polemics between the Socratics and attentive readers of the *logoi Sôkratikoî*, such as Polycrates and Isocrates (chapters 3–4).

Most of the chapters (5–40), while “monographic” and concentrating on a single author or corpus of texts, deal with a wide range of extant and fragmentary Socratic dialogues. This applies to the section on the major companions of Socrates (Antisthenes, Euclides, Aristippus, Aeschines, and Phaedo) as well as to those on Plato, Xenophon, and later reception. Throughout these sections we get a vivid picture not only of Socrates and his teaching but also of the intra-Socratic polemics that characterize each of these authors’ work.

We can summarize and say that this collection tackles Socrates as he has been depicted in the *logoi Sôkratikoî*; in the literature that deals polemically with Socrates and these dialogues; and in the later reception that relies in turn on these dialogues and polemics. But these swathes of literature could prove too capacious taken without some principle of further selection. Our main criterion of choice was that of intertextuality: we decided to include only contributions about authors and texts that refer directly, and not merely hypothetically, to topics treated in the Socratic dialogues, or, from the other direction, about authors and texts to which the Socratic dialogues explicitly refer. This meant excluding from the collection figures who may have in fact played a pivotal role for Socrates’ education and teaching, such as Archelaus, Anaxagoras, or Euripides (cf. dl 2.18–19). Their importance for the Socratic dialogue can be only indirectly inferred, textual evidence for their influence on Socrates’ thought being very poor.

The Chapters of This Collection

Across forty chapters, the collection brings into one place, for the first time, and by an international range of scholars, the remarkable sweep of

sources, perspectives, and arguments worth considering by the present-day student of Socrates and the dialogues that rose around him, and of their philosophical legacy. We hold that understanding Socrates means, in an essential and pronounced way, understanding his significance to those who watched and talked to him, heard about him, and learned from him through the written testimony of the Socratic dialogues. The collection focuses therefore on the Socratic dialogues, their context, and their reception in later centuries. We have arranged the collection into two halves: the period and authors around Socrates, and later reception. In the first half, we address Athenian comedy, members and competitors of the Socratic circle, Plato, and Xenophon. In the second half, chapters tackle the Peripatetics, Hellenistic schools, Roman Imperial writers, Middle Platonists, Neoplatonists, and other authors important for understanding the reception of Socratic dialogues.

Around Socrates

The collection begins with a section on texts dealing with the literary and rhetorical context of Socrates' lifetime. Three chapters are devoted to Old Comedy and the peculiarly intense and ramifying force that Aristophanes—our earliest comprehensive witness to Socrates—had in influencing what everyone since Plato has thought about Socrates. Everyone remembers that in Plato's *Apology* (19c), Socrates blames Aristophanes, especially his *Clouds*, for fomenting prejudice and hatred against himself. But as Jacques Bromberg ("A Sage on Stage: Socrates and Athenian Old Comedy") reminds us, an entire sub-genre of comic drama arose in the 430s–420s, lampooning Socrates and parodying intellectuals of every variety. This broader vantage allows us to reassess Aristophanes' motivations in depicting Socrates as he did. On this reassessment, the anti-Socratism supposedly manifest in the *Clouds*' conclusion fits less a picture of a malicious playwright than a jokester who inserts every stock comic routine (including arson and shouting) into his putatively "novel" creation. Bromberg also advises us to remember our Athenian history. The *Apology*'s interpretation of the *Clouds*' public effect comes no less than a quarter-century after the play's performance, decades during which popular attitudes toward intellectuals underwent enormous

change and during which the memory of the plays by Eupolis, Cratinus, and Plato Comicus that also mocked Socrates and other intellectuals faded, leaving the depiction of an air-walking and logic-chopping Socrates both menacing and in splendid isolation. Plato's selective memory of a time in his infancy ended up affecting both ancient and modern understanding of Socrates' position in democracy and artistic Athens, Bromberg argues. It has also, he adds, determined the narrative arc of the biographies of many other ancient intellectuals.

Bromberg reads Aristophanes as a representative of Old Comedy; by doing so he can picture Socrates against the background of the thinkers and innovators of the late-fifth century parodied in the yearly comic festivals. This becomes a story of Plato's being late to a democratic-dramatic feast that may have been more playful than it later seemed. Andrea Capra ("Aristophanes' Iconic Socrates") shows the other side of the story: Aristophanes' effectiveness at determining the visual aspect, and the "iconic" status, of Socrates. As we see from Plato's *Symposium*, *Apology*, *Theaetetus*, and *Phaedo*, the *Clouds*' picture of a "skywalking, sun-scrutinizing Socrates-Silenus" did not go away; it defined the look, and thereby the character, of the Socrates of ensuing logoi Sôkratikoî. Socrates' first entrance in the *Clouds* reflects a story about Silenus that was familiar to the Athenians. When uttering his first words, Aristophanes' Socrates likely presents himself in the guise of Silenus, as a scholion to Pindar and a passage from Aristotle's *Eudemus* seem to suggest. Capra shows that this very image of Socrates is recalled by Plato both in the *Apology* and in the famous prayer to the sun in the *Symposium*, where the Silenic features of Socrates are explicit. This brings Capra to conclude that the mask of the comic actor of the *Clouds* was Silenic in character, as Eugène Dupréel had previously suggested.

The third chapter begins with yet another aspect of the *Clouds*' picture of Socrates: the image of one of his most illustrious educator-colleagues, Protagoras. Aristophanes gives to Socrates not only the interests in natural science characteristic of men like Diagoras of Melos but also the argumentative, grammatical, and even epistemological theses properly attributed to Protagoras, whose fame

helped the playwright consolidate in one man the major intellectual trends of his day. It is well known that Protagoras then appears in key roles in Plato's *Protagoras* and *Theaetetus*. Michele Corradi ("Protagorean Socrates, Socratic Protagoras: a Narrative Strategy from Aristophanes to Plato") argues, however, that Plato does not simply distinguish Socrates from Protagoras. Like Aristophanes, he brings them into ambiguous relations of similarity and parallel. Of course, the one's moral realism, and the other's moral relativism, push their favored epistemic theses far apart. But Protagoras' overriding concern for *paideia*, for the cultivation of his students' wellbeing, is Socrates' concern too, and Plato can demonstrate this, in part, by revealing this Protagorean side to his misunderstood hero.

Contemporary with the Socratics, equally committed to education and philosophy, but outside their circle, is Isocrates. Not so far outside the circle, to be sure: Isocrates respected Socrates, studied the written dialogues of his companions, presented himself in contrast to them, and thereby competed with them for students. Yet he rarely specifies exactly to whom his arguments apply. David Murphy ("Isocrates as a Reader of Socratic Dialogues") reconstructs Isocrates' charges against the Socratics. All major first-generation Socratics expounded ideas that display points of contact with Isocrates' works. In *Against the Sophists* Isocrates' criticism toward the "disputers" fits various Socratics, but most of all Antisthenes—as author of *Truth*, *Archelaus*, or *On Kingship*, and *Protrepticus*—who was the most prominent of them in the 390s. Once Plato achieved prominence after the foundation of the Academy, Isocrates turns attention to him. In *Helen* he comes close to citing the Protagoras; *Busiris* contains a parody of Sparta-inspired passages of the *Republic*; *Nicocles* defends the pursuit of *pleonexia* against Plato's *Gorgias*; and in *Antidosis* Isocrates counters the accusation Plato launched at him at the end of the *Phaedrus*. Even after Plato's death, Isocrates continues this assault: the *Panathenaicus* dismisses a kind of education Plato defends in *Crito*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, and *Laws*; *Antidosis* rejects the criticism of forensic activity Plato had formulated in the *Theaetetus*. It is notable that Isocrates' work does

not feature references to complex dialogues such as *Sophist*, *Parmenides*, *Statesman*, or *Philebus*.

This section ends with a chapter that reflects this collection's title. James Redfield ("The Origins of the Socratic Dialogue: Plato, Xenophon, and the Others") defines the "Socratic" dialogue, in its strictest sense, as a genre of more or less realistic historical fiction written by those who knew Socrates in 399 and were brought together by the trauma of his execution. Redfield claims that colloquial literature had already begun in the fifth century, in comedy, whence it migrated into tragedy. In the second half of the century, Socrates developed a characteristic manner of "conversing" with individuals, for the purpose either of questioning or instruction. After Socrates' death in 399, his companions, partly in compensation for the loss of their master, reproduced and fixed in writing these conversations, hoping to preserve their memory. In a burst of creativity, influenced by and in competition with one another, they created the genre of the Socratic dialogue. Through it each Socratic came to embody his own authorial goals, and while Plato's and Xenophon's dialogues reached perfection in their own way, we know that their less-well-preserved peers wrote dialogues that were famous, too, for their elegance and creativity throughout Antiquity.

This leads us to the next section, which is devoted to the immediate Socratic circle (excluding Plato and Xenophon for the moment). These chapters provide a thorough overview and fresh reappraisal of the methodological, scholastic, intellectual, historical, and philosophical evidence related to these authors lost writings. Each focuses on various issues debated in their fragmentary works, showing how Socrates' companions dealt with problems and themes derived from his conversations, life, and teaching.

The first chapter is on Antisthenes of Athens, the oldest and undoubtedly the most prominent of Socrates' pupils at his death in 399.¹² Vladislav Suvák ("On the Dialectical Character of Antisthenes' Speeches *Ajax* and *Odysseus*") addresses the author's best-preserved works, a pair of apparently epideictic speeches. Suvák undermines the appearance that the *Ajax* and

Odysseus are merely rhetorical works and that they therefore lack the dialectical character of other important Socratic writings. In fact, these paired speeches exemplify an argumentative pattern consistent both with Antisthenes' "theses" featured in his fragments and with Socratic investigation into virtue. They should count as part of the Socratic literature, Suvák argues, not relegated, as most scholars maintain, to the sophistic tradition.

Another major Socratic, probably a few years older than Plato, is Euclides of Megara. Aldo Brancacci ("Socratism and Eleaticism in Euclides of Megara") deals with the Socratic and Eleatic features that characterize the extant discussions of him—mostly reported by doxographical tradition. The one surviving fragment of Euclides, thought to derive from his *Eroticus*, dwells on his conception of a "double demon": a "positive" one that urges action in a specific way (as later in Xenophon's daimonion); and a "negative" one that inhibits action in a specific way (as in Plato's daimonion). A peculiar feature of Euclides' double demon is that it belongs not only to Socrates (as in Xenophon and Plato) but also to every human being. This prompts Brancacci to suggest that Socrates may have adhered to a traditional demonology, from which Xenophon and Plato would later detach themselves by introducing a more abstract notion, that of the daimonion. The "double demon" is a problematic notion, however, since it is at odds with the fundamental principle of Euclides' ethics, that of the non-existence of evil. In fact, the path along which Euclides developed Socrates' intellectual heritage was meant to ensure an ontological foundation of his ethics by introducing a conception of a good he recovered from the Eleatic tradition: the good is always one, equal, and identical to itself; and the good is not an abstract theoretical truth but an objective reality, while evil simply does not exist.

Aristippus of Cyrene, whose age might have been about the same as Euclides', has long been thought one of Socrates' rogue students. But this is surely unfair, as Kristian Urstad ("Aristippus on Freedom, Autonomy, and the Pleasurable Life") argues. Far from foregoing principle and self-control, Aristippus in fact prizes autonomy and self-sufficiency. This enables him to indulge in pleasures without being

enslaved by them: in Aristippus' eudaimonistic outlook, freedom is a condition of the soul that allows its possessor to engage in all sorts of pleasures without being worsted by them in any way. Urstad points out that this enables Aristippus to convert the Socratic principle of self-control (*sôphrosunê*, *enkrateia*) with respect to the desire for pleasure into the art of moving correctly within pleasure. Thus his idea of freedom should be understood as a truly Socratic detachment from contingencies, as a pull towards self-sufficiency that is characteristic of Socrates' eudaimonism as represented in the works of Xenophon and Plato in particular.

Another Socratic who might have been as old as Euclides and Aristippus, and who was a close friend of the latter, is Aeschines of Sphettus. Unlike Antisthenes, Euclides, or Aristippus, Aeschines did not found a school. He is, however, as Claudia Mársico ("Shock, Erotics, Plagiarism, and Fraud: Aspects of Aeschines of Sphettus' Philosophy") claims, essential for understanding what the Socratic circle debated. Mársico's chapter focuses on one topic of debate: how Socrates could educate both those he loved and those he did not. Aeschines' extant writings, and in particular his two fragmentary dialogues on *erôs*, display an innovative method of education: a "mental shock" that provokes the improvement of both their characters and their readers. In the *Alcibiades*, this mental shock takes the form of Socrates' violent back-and-forth tugging of Alcibiades' emotions. Similarly, in the *Aspasias*, Aspasias induces Xenophon's wife to blush by means of a series of prodding question. In both cases, the protagonist "shocks" or disrupts the interlocutor's assumptions of knowledge, leaving him or her calm and newly concerned for self-improvement. Aeschines' shock method was not confined, however, just to his writings. His biographical fragments show that he was a highly controversial personality, whose provocations enraged his many enemies. This makes him effectively a *Doppelgänger* of Alcibiades, who also drew the enmity of his fellow citizens.

One of the youngest companions of Socrates was Phaedo of Elis. Danilo Di Lanzo ("Phaedo of Elis: the Biography, Zopyrus, and His Intellectual Profile") traces his intellectual and biographical

profile, giving special attention to his dialogues Zopyrus and Simon. In antiquity, these were famous for their “great elegance,” and although we have only the scarcest fragments of them, what remains conveys illuminating glimpses of Phaedo’s thought. The Zopyrus deals with Socrates’ outward appearance. Zopyrus, a Persian physiognomist, diagnoses Socrates as wicked, stupid, and a sexual maniac (a pederast or a womanizer, depending on the testimonies). Socrates’ companions break into laughter (or become enraged), but this is promptly stopped by Socrates, who admits to these faults and that he has overcome (or erased) them only thanks to reason (or philosophy). Di Lanzo shows how this story and another fragment hint at a broader background. He reconstructs the whole dialogue as about the value of exercise and training against the supposedly indomitable force of passion. A similar theme can be found in the Simon, where in a fragment another associate of Socrates, the cobbler Simon, declares his dedication to wisdom and reproaches Aristippus’ proneness to luxury, reminding him that temperance can be achieved only through sobriety of hunger and thirst. As Di Lanzo points out, this fragment is important for visualizing the relationship between Simon and the Cynics, who saw in him the most authentic follower of Socrates. The Simon depicted by Phaedo represents therefore an intermediate position between Antisthenes’ rigorist Cynicism and Aristippus’ hedonistic stance.

Needless to say, the section about Plato could have been much longer. However, we deliberately decided to keep a balance with the other sections, since scholarly investigations into Plato, while hardly complete in terms of Socrates’ influence on his life, are easy to find. By this we mean papers and monographs about Plato’s depiction of Socrates; his travels from and life in Athens as a response to Socrates’ trial and execution; his pedagogical goals and the positive or negative influence on them by Socrates’ strictly conversational approach; and the dialectical, epistemic, and metaphysical positions Plato propounds or depicts and their relationship with those of his predecessors and contemporaries. Even a bibliographic sketch of the topics we omit would

overweigh this Overview; we trust the reader may appeal to the references and scholarly apparatus mentioned throughout the chapters on the Platonic dialogues.

The first chapter of this section provides a thorough study of Plato’s relations with his peers. Luc Brisson (“Plato and the Socratics”) combines an analysis of the intertextual relationships between Plato’s and others’ *logoi Sôkratikoî* with a discussion of later anecdotes telling of Plato’s competition with Socrates’ other pupils. Plato’s explicit and implicit references to his peers have rarely been studied in their complexity. On the other hand, the anecdotal evidence—or, as the case maybe, latter-day guess-work, score-settling, or free-wheeling attribution of unmoored chreia—provides a subtle if unstable picture of Socrates’ associates. Brisson tackles both aspects, thus providing a robust picture of the intellectual, doctrinal, and personal relations among the first-generation Socratics. He starts with the supposed rivalry between Plato and Xenophon, and goes on to outline Plato’s relations with the members of the Socratic circle. These include the politicians—Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides—and the associates who did not found schools of their own, including Chaerephon, Cherecrates, Crito, Critobulus, Apollodorus, Aeantodorus, Aristodemus, Aeschines, Phaedo (whose foundation of the Elia school Brisson doubts), Simon, Cebes, Simmias, Phaedrus, Glaucon, and Diodorus. He finishes by dealing with the purported enmities between Plato and the schools that claimed to rely on Socrates: the Cynics in the wake of Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope; the Cyrenaics with Aristippus; and the Megarians with Euclides.

One particular focus of cross-Socratic comparison is in the origins or popularization of the term *philosophos* and cognates, a word-group that Plato and Xenophon used frequently. It would be valuable to know more precisely the way *philosophos* and its cognates contributed to the self-constitution of the Socratics. Livio Rossetti (“Philosopher Socrates? Philosophy at the Time of Socrates and the reformed *philosophia* of Plato”) assesses the available evidence. We have good reason to suppose that this word-group existed already in fifth-century Athens—as we see from Herodotus and Thucydides—albeit infrequently.

After Socrates' death the number of occurrences increases significantly. Rossetti reviews references from the late 390s, including in Aristo-phanes, Alcidas, and Lysias. Among the Socratics, evidence is scanty—and perhaps not at all reliable—in Antisthenes, Aristippus, Aeschines, and Phaedo.

Hundreds of references, by contrast, are to be found in Isocrates, Xenophon, and Plato. Rossetti argues that Plato seems to have taken over an idea of philosophy common outside the Socratic circle that meant little more than an intellectual exercise performed among two or more interlocutors, and then reintroduced it among the Socratics as a technical term. In his work, *philosophia* became a reason for living for those who practiced it (“philosophy” as an excellence), and a qualifier for those who taught it (the “philosophers”), the institutions within which it was performed (the “philosophical” schools), and the books in which it was fixed for future generations (“philosophy” books).

A difficult topic in Socratic studies is Socrates' purported commitment to or visitation by a divine “sign.” The meaning of its intrusion into the eminently rational life of Socrates baffled even his contemporaries. The first writers of Socratic literature—among them Euclides, Plato, Xenophon, and the Academic author of the *Theages*—came to little consensus about its nature, function, or interpretation. Indeed, there is so much disagreement, Stefano Jedrkiewicz (“A Literary Challenge: How to Represent Socrates' Daimonion”) argues, that these authors may not have been trying to make factual claims about Socrates' life and references to his daimonion at all. In any event, its portrayal and narrative explanation seems to have become almost an intrinsic part of Socratic literature itself: Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Apuleius all came to write essays on the daimonion. Plato's portrait has some remarkable features, and a remarkable purpose, when we see it against these other portraits.

As much as the daimonion signifies Socrates in Plato and the other Socratics, so too does the analogy from experts. This is the analogy from the fact, for example, that a ship-captain ought not to be selected by lot to the conclusion that a statesman

ought not to be selected by lot. The frequency with which Plato, Xenophon, and even Aeschines put this in operation suggests that Socrates in fact used them; Aristotle seems to corroborate this evidence. But these “expert-analogies,” as Petter Sandstad (“The Logical Structure of Socrates' Expert-Analogies”) calls them, are often taken to be fallacious; and if one of Socrates' characteristic argument tropes is fallacious, then he becomes riskily akin to sophists and eristic arguers. Thus a defense of Socrates seems to require more careful logical analysis of this common argumentative figure. Sandstad diagnoses the familiar negative evaluations of the expert-analogy in Plato and other Socratics, and proposes a novel, plausible, and textually-supported one, where Socrates argues validly from species to genus to species. Sandstad's conclusion is that Socrates was, for his time, a good logician who made use of a valid logical form in his arguments.

The next five chapters study a select number of Platonic dialogues. The authors address both the “Socratic” context for Plato's writing dialogues and the “Socratic” context revealed by the dialogues. Unique in the Socratic literature is the “autobiography” section in Plato's *Phaedo* (95e–102a), where Socrates describes his early curiosity about, and then dissatisfaction with, materialistic causal explanation. Yet it is precisely from a curiosity about natural philosophy that both Plato and Xenophon take efforts elsewhere to distance Socrates. After all, his abuse in the *Clouds*, and his tragic downfall in his trial of 399, are both related to Athenian discomfort with the *phusiologia* typified by Anaxagoras and natural philosophy. Thus the “autobiography” section has a very uncertain status. Perhaps Plato treats what Socrates says in it as true but from so much earlier in his life as no longer to be a liability; or perhaps he treats it as false, either as narratively-valuable fiction or a presentation of his own coming of age. Jörn Müller (“Socrates and Natural Philosophy: the Testimony of Plato's *Phaedo*”) deals extensively with the “first” and “second” sailings described in the passage, and highlights the links with generally acknowledged and distinctive features of Socratic philosophy. Müller argues that the way Socrates tells the autobiography is true, or is to be taken as true, including his investigative self-reliance,

recognition of his epistemic limits, ethical intellectualism and teleological world-view (especially as seen in Xenophon), and optimistic theology. Plato's aim is apologetic: he wants to keep Socrates apart from Anaxagoras, who had also been accused for impiety. Thus Plato counterbalances the accusation of impiety levelled at Socrates in his trial.

In his dialogues Plato takes over structures, motifs, and language from such traditional genres as tragedy, comedy, and satyr play. Michael Erler ("Crying for Help: Socrates as Silenus in the Euthydemus") deals with the comic motifs of the Euthydemus: the unmasking of false avowals of knowledge; Socrates' comic features; and, most importantly, Socrates' "cry for help" as a reaction to aporia. In drama, the "cry for help" motif occurs to explain the entrance on stage of a person or a group to protect or rescue someone in need (the chorus, as in the parodos of Aristophanic comedies or in satyr plays such as Aeschylus' *Diktyulkoï* or Sophocles' *Ichneutai*). Plato integrates this motif in the Euthydemus: here Socrates calls to the eristic practitioners Euthydemus and Dionysodorus for help, hoping to get support in his investigation, but he is eventually disappointed. In fact, the motif of crying for help addressed to the eristic Sileni turns out to be a cry for help that Socrates addresses to himself. The comic flavor of the Euthydemus points therefore to a serious issue: that of unmasking Euthydemus' and Dionysodorus' claim that they are in command of a knowledge which in fact they do not have.

Plato's Gorgias is also profoundly influenced by contemporary literature. Ivan Jordović ("Bios Praktikos and Bios Theôrêtikos in Plato's Gorgias") tackles the last part of this dialogue, which contrasts the notions of a "practical" life (*bios praktikos*), personified by Calicles, with the "theoretical" life (*bios theôrêtikos*), which Socrates represents. As Jordović points out, this section of the Gorgias has intertextual connections with the contrast in Aristophanes' *Clouds* between the Better and the Worse Arguments, as well as with Euripides' and Thucydides' juxtapositions of "quietism" and "meddlesomeness" (*apragmosunê* and *polupragmosunê*). This dichotomy can even be observed in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, in the first

conversation between Socrates and Aristippus about the choice between three ways of life: of ruling, of being ruled, and of quietism. These connections reveal Plato's intimate knowledge of contemporary authors, and also that he aimed his dichotomy of *bios praktikos*–*bios theôrêtikos* at transforming philosophy into a powerful politics. Among his goals, perhaps the most important one was to delegitimize the court verdict of 399: as the jury was composed of members of the *demos* who led a *bios praktikos*, it was by definition incompetent to judge Socrates fairly, who by contrast led a *bios theôrêtikos*.

In the Platonic (Ant)erastai, or "(Rival) Lovers," whose authenticity has been doubted since Antiquity, Socrates examines a young man's optimistic view of *philosophia*. This conversation occurs at a grammar school, in view of two boys who, at the dialogue's opening, Socrates describes as eagerly drawing circles and imitating inclinations with their hands. He guesses they were debating about Anaxagoras or Oenipides. One of their admirers harrumphs that, at any rate, they babble about the things in the heavens and drivel on, philosophizing. It is at this point that this admirer's rival defends philosophy. He does not treat astronomical or mathematical investigation as definitional of philosophy; he suggests instead that philosophy is *polumathia*, then that it is having a measured amount of learning, then that it is appearing wise in all important skills. Even this last definition he cannot sustain. Sandra Peterson ("Notes on Lovers") provides a commentary for this infrequently examined dialogue, in the process rejecting the strongest arguments against Plato's authorship; situating the back-and-forth conversation in a context of dialectical games; clarifying Socrates' attitudes about philosophy; and speculating about the person of the harrumphing admirer. Whether the Rival Lovers is Platonic or otherwise Academic, it deploys many of the tropes of Socratic dialogue and presents Socrates in conversation about that most significant discipline, philosophy, more explicitly than anywhere else in the Socratic literature.

The last chapter of this section addresses the origins of the dialogues whose authenticity has been doubted. Often Plato's dialogues have been

thought, even if unconsciously, to have been written at once; and even if not at once, then eventually once and for all. Conversely, dialogues thought only doubtfully Plato's—written perhaps by a student or colleague in the Academy, or someone at least closely familiar with Plato's Socratic dialogues—are usually treated as independent of Plato. Harold Tarrant ("The Socratic Dubia") turns to statistical linguistic analysis of brief spans of the dubia and overturns these assumptions. The central passages of certain suspected dialogues—Socrates' radical history of Hipparchus' Athenian innovations in the Hipparchus, for example, or Socrates' radical history of the education of the Spartan and Persian royalty in the Alcibiades—look much more Platonic than the dialectical exchanges at the margins. Tarrant hypothesizes that the picturesque kernels of these dialogues were Plato's, never finished by the master but preserved and then fleshed out by members of the Academy. The consequences for our understanding of Socrates is that certain of these dialogues may reveal a picture of him developed over many years.

The counterpoint to Plato in Socratic studies has always been Xenophon. In recent years the literature on Xenophon's Socratic and non-Socratic works has grown in substance, rigor, and availability. This section of the volume therefore required an updated and thorough approach to Xenophon, with a chapter devoted to each of the *Memorabilia's* four books and to each of his other Socratic works. Since recent scholarship on Xenophon has shown that peculiar aspects of Socrates' personality and teaching can be found in almost every one of his works, a chapter deals with a dialogue in which the character Socrates is absent, the *Hiero*, and another with the Socratic features of Xenophon's non-Socratic works in general.

Socrates' defense strategy at his trial has been debated since the time of Plato and Xenophon. According to both authors, Socrates provoked the jury in many respects. Pierre Pontier ("How to Defend the Defense of Socrates? From the *Apology* to *Memorabilia* Book 1") focuses on the apologetic strategies displayed in Xenophon's *Apology* and in

the "defense pamphlet" (the *Schutzschrift*) included at the beginning of *Memorabilia*. As Pontier shows, Xenophon characterizes Socrates' defense speech as eulogetic: instead of defending himself, he legitimates his deeds, attributing them to the appearance of a divine entity, the daimonion, at all decisive moments of his life. Taking Socrates' "boastfulness" (*megalêgoria*) as a simple provocation would be wrong, however, according to Pontier, since Socrates' choice to die was prompted by a variety of circumstances, not least of which was the daimonion itself. The political background of this choice is outlined in *Memorabilia* 1, where Socrates is contrasted with the oligarchs Critias and Antiphon. The latter had a fate similar to Socrates', also condemned to death in a political trial after having defended himself in a memorable fashion. Xenophon was aware of the symmetrical trajectories of the defenses of Socrates and Antiphon: he deliberately brought them together, thus demonstrating that they should not be confused, since Antiphon's "best" defense would eventually be outclassed by Socrates' "most free and most just" defense.

Apology also characterizes Book 2 of the *Memorabilia*. Here Xenophon responds to the non-formal charges against Socrates, especially that he encouraged his companions to disparage useless family members and to engage in shameful activities. Gabriel Danzig ("Nature, Culture and the Rule of the Good in Xenophon's Socratic Theory of Friendship: *Memorabilia* Book 2") argues that Socrates' emphasis on utility in social relations led him to act in ways that, while they could be seen as problematic, in fact had a positive effect, promoting mutually beneficial alliances among friends and family members. In particular, Socrates persuaded his virtuous companions to form a network of friends that would enable them to profit personally and also to dominate the city in a virtuous oligarchy. Thus, Xenophon's Socrates rejected cultural norms in favor of a natural conception of human association that emphasizes mutual cooperation and benefit. In contradiction to the widely held opinion that Xenophon whitewashed the image of Socrates, this portrait shows how offensive the opinions and behavior he promoted were to his neighbors. Xenophon uses the necessity of a defense to offer his own broad vision

of Socrates, which means that in *Memorabilia* 2 he offers many more lessons than the narrowly apologetic ones.

In *Memorabilia* 3, Xenophon presents us with disparate material: seven chapters on leadership, two rather puzzling philosophical chapters, and a potpourri of conversations in which Socrates helps artists, advises a hetaera, and dishes out advice on physical fitness and gourmet dining. David M. Johnson (“From Generals to Gluttony: *Memorabilia* Book 3”) shows that all these issues are in keeping with the most general goal of the *Memorabilia*, to show how Socrates helped all who spoke with him. Such a variety of topics and interlocutors demonstrates Socrates’ all-around usefulness in a way a more unified piece of writing could not. In fact, *Memorabilia* 3 shows its greatest kinship with wisdom literature, especially in its use of brief exchanges in the form of *chreia*. With pithy bits of advice offered by a wise man aimed at broad utility rather than depth, ancient readers accustomed to this genre would have found this section of the *Memorabilia* less problematic than we moderns do—especially if we approach the book looking for the sort of organic, dramatic whole we find in Plato’s Socratic dialogues, or in Xenophon’s own *Symposium* and *Oeconomicus*. Xenophon’s way of presenting Socrates is to show him approached by an interlocutor with a specific problem or question: he responds to the issue at hand, giving his interlocutors the advice they can use.

In Book 4 of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon sets out the system of education that accounts for Socrates’ usefulness in his companions’ search for happiness. One chapter shows how Socrates persuaded different kinds of youth to take up that education; another deals with one of these propaedeutic methods in detail; chapters 3 through 7 treat of the five stages of the education; and the final chapter of the book (and of the whole *Memorabilia*) explains Socrates’ behavior at trial. The fact that this final chapter summarizes the previous seven chapters of the book, but not the three earlier books, suggests that Xenophon composed *Memorabilia* 4 for independent publication, or at least with a unified vision. Christopher Moore (“Xenophon’s Socratic Education in *Memorabilia*

Book 4”) argues for this hypothesis, and claims that Xenophon’s main concern here was to illustrate the precise way Socrates proved useful to his fellow citizens. Socrates taught a graduated curriculum, starting with *sôphrosunê* (which Moore shows to be distinct from *enkrateia*), then justice, *enkrateia* (“self-control”), conversation, and only in the last stage *autakeia* (“self-sufficiency”). Only in this last stage do we come upon the usual subjects of education, some of which Socrates could himself teach; for some of which he recommended an expert; and yet others of which (geometry, astronomy, cosmology, arithmetic, health, and forecasting) he thought his friends could learn for themselves.

A peculiar trait of Xenophon’s Socrates is the breadth of his knowledge and variety of skills. His competence at estate managing on display in the *Oeconomicus* has caused particular puzzlement to scholars. They have generally assumed that the main character of the dialogue, *Ischomachus*, serves as Xenophon’s alter ego, thereby supplanting Socrates. An important exception to this view was that of Leo Strauss, who saw in *Ischomachus* the representative of a way of life both opposed to Socrates’ way of life and disavowed by him. Louis-André Dorion (“Fundamental Parallels Between Socrates’ and *Ischomachus*’ Positions in the *Oeconomicus*”) distances himself from both threads of interpretation, and identifies sixty-two points of convergence between Socrates and *Ischomachus*. Dorion claims that these parallels point to a more or less complete agreement between Socrates and *Ischomachus* on a wide range of issues. Xenophon himself identifies with both of these characters, making it possible to speak of an *Ischomachus*-Xenophon with Socratic features. The *Oeconomicus* should therefore be understood as an attempt to valorize the kind of life led by this joint character, one that reflects both Xenophon’s own experience in estate managing and the Socratic teaching.

A completely different Socrates occurs in Xenophon’s *Symposium*, a dialogue that has connections to both the *spoudaiogeloion* genre of sympotic literature and the political sympotic elegy. Maria Consiglia Alvino (“*Aphroditê* and *Philophrosunê*: Xenophon’s *Symposium* between Athenian and Spartan Paradigms”) highlights the

political and educational aspects of Xenophon's Symposium, and dwells on the pedagogical value of music and dance. Alvino attends especially to the discussion of Socrates' *kalokagathia* and *sôphrosunê*, two notions that convey Xenophon's own philosophical and ethical ideas. This political aspect of the Symposium is confirmed by the sources Xenophon makes use of. He draws ideological inspiration from Critias' sympotic elegy, the Spartan Constitution. Another source Xenophon seems to refer to is Plato's *Laws*, and especially the section devoted to the sympotic laws. (Xenophon could have known this work in the form of public lectures, which would be a reason for dating the composition of the Symposium to the 360s.) As a result, Xenophon's Symposium mixes Spartan and Athenian ethical paradigms and the literary mimesis of sympotic genres, thus revitalizing a pedagogical institution that had been banned from Athens. The main purpose of the Symposium seems therefore to be political, not literary. Xenophon aims at reorganizing Athenian democracy through educational reform. Socrates' philosophical teaching aims at a general improvement and emancipation of the civic body.

A dialogue in which Socrates' name is not even mentioned is Xenophon's *Hiero*. Yet the dialogue deals with typically Socratic issues such as happiness, the good life, and political rule. As Federico Zuolo ("Xenophon's *Hiero*: Hiding Socrates to Reform Tyranny") points out, Xenophon uses the character of the poet Simonides to convey Socratic thoughts. Simonides functions as the emblematic wise man, who turns the tyrant Hiero from the commonsensical opinion that his life is preferable to all other types of life. Yet Xenophon "hides" Socrates behind Simonides, preempting the cognitive dissonance that would arise from representing Socrates in a non-Socratic situation. After all, the wise man in the *Hiero* is in intimacy with a tyrant and gives the tyrant remarkably realist—even immoralist—advice; and this is contrary to the moralistic image of Socrates represented throughout the *Memorabilia* and other dialogues. The *Hiero* offers a model for counseling tyrants meant to challenge the Platonic and Academic model.

Xenophon's experiments with a variety of literary forms (history, (auto)biography, technical treatise, Socratic dialogue) has led to a tendency to isolate his Socratic works (*Memorabilia*, *Apology*, *Symposium*, *Oeconomicus*) from the rest of his oeuvre, and to deal with these corpora as if they were written by two separate people. Recent scholarship has shown, however, the value of treating Xenophon's corpus as a whole, particularly when examining important concepts in Xenophon's thought, such as grace, disorder, and freedom. Noreen Humble ("Xenophon's Philosophical Approach to Writing: Socratic Elements in the Non-Socratic Works") examines Xenophon's non-Socratic works from six different angles. The first three concern methodology: the rhetoric of philosophical inquiry, the use of dialectic, and the adaptation of the medium to the intended audience. The remaining three treat pedagogical themes and principles at the core of the writings of both Plato and Xenophon: leadership and education, self-examination, and the usefulness of philosophy. The principles and methodology are general in nature, and therefore not confined to Xenophon's depictions of Socrates. Humble shows how Xenophon in his non-Socratic works tried to put into practice lessons he learned from Socrates. In many of his characters one can observe the same spirit of wonder and inquiry that pervades his Socratic works, the same concern with political life and leadership, and the same concern with leading a good life. The ensuing picture of a "Socratic" Xenophon is much closer to that recognized by Renaissance humanists than to that sketched out by more recent scholars.

Later Reception

The chapters of the second part of the book, devoted to the later receptions of the Socratic dialogue, take up a range of significant authors who did not themselves write Socratic dialogues but were instead readers, beneficiaries, critics, or chroniclers of them, from Aristotle and Aristoxenus to Epicurus, the Stoics, Cicero, Persius, Plutarch, Apuleius, Maximus of Tyre, Diogenes Laertius, Libanius, Themistius, Julian, and Proclus. This sequence of studies does not have the pretense of completeness, but it aims to address the varied uses to which certain authors put their readings of Socratic dialogues, and the evidence, interpretative

framework, and overall evaluation each relied on. The study of these authors is particularly important, as most of them very likely relied on first-generation Socratic literature since lost to time. In fact, it is partly thanks to them that we now have some of the precious few “fragments” of the lost Socratic dialogues.

In what Plutarch calls one of Aristotle’s “Platonic” writings, perhaps the lost dialogue called *On Philosophy*, Aristotle writes that the Delphic inscription “Know Yourself” set the tune for Socrates’ perplexity and search into it. He thereby puts self-knowledge at the beating heart of the Socratic project, and presumably puts Socrates squarely into the lineage of philosophers. But two important questions remain concerning Aristotle’s remarks about Socrates. One is about the extent of Aristotle’s appreciation for or distancing himself from the Socratic project. Another is about the sources of Aristotle’s knowledge about Socrates. It is to the latter question that Nicholas Smith (“Aristotle on Socrates”) gives a definitive answer. In his analysis of all Aristotelian references to Socrates, Smith shows that Aristotle relies on sources beyond Plato and Xenophon. Equally interesting, textual evidence suggests that Aristotle draws on a specific passage of Plato’s *Protagoras* (352c1–2) when recounting the Socratic denial of *akrasia* in *Nicomachean Ethics* (1145b21–27). Smith shows that Aristotle’s account of Socrates is based on a “developmentalist” reading of Plato, since he attributes the Socratic speeches from the “early dialogues” to the historical Socrates but those from the “later dialogues” to Plato.

Traditional scholarship has often found Aristoxenus’ *Life of Socrates* an untrustworthy testimony to the life of Socrates, given its apparent inconsistencies with Plato and Xenophon. Recent reassessments, however, note that Aristoxenus’ account provides a balanced picture of Socrates, which is not at odds with earlier Socratic literature. Alessandro Stavru (“Aristoxenus on Socrates”) follows this more positive hypothesis. He reviews all fragments available in the extant editions of Aristoxenus’ *Life of Socrates*, and provides new texts not included in these collections. Stavru shows that Aristoxenus’ characterization of Socrates as an irascible, sex-driven man who eradicates his licentiousness

through education is widely confirmed: not only by Aristotle and other Peripatetics, but implicitly also by Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, Phaedo, and other Socratics. Both the account based on Aristoxenus’ father Spintharus, who knew Socrates personally, and the report about Socrates’ youthful association with Archelaus, the historical reliability of which has been shown by recent studies, give us good reasons to claim that Aristoxenus had solid grounds for depicting Socrates the way he did.

We often think of Epicurus as forcefully independent of Socrates. But in some ways his pedagogical mode seems indebted to Socrates. Jan Heßler (“Socratic Protreptic and Epicurus: Healing through Philosophy”) argues that Epicurus uses the elements of Socratic protreptic known from the dialogues of Plato. Arguing this requires drawing out the features of protreptic writing found in the classical period, especially in the *Euthydemus* (though also the pseudo-Platonic *Clitophon*, the “*Euthydemus*” passage of Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (4.2), and Aeschines’ *Alcibiades* and *Aspasia*), and best articulated, as it turns out, by Philo of Larissa and Clement of Alexandria. These authors allow us to see that Epicurus employs the Socratic *logos protreptikos*, which was to exhort and promise a cure from passions. Epicurus’ *Letter to Menoeceus* features many aspects of this healing protreptic, but with a significant difference: while the protreptic of the Socratics is mostly aporetic, aimed only at liberating the interlocutor from his false beliefs, Epicurus provides concrete instructions for specific situations by giving advice in the form of fixed doctrines.

It is commonly held that Zeno of Citium founded the Stoa in the wake of Socrates, and that the early Stoics took themselves to be Socratics. Robert Bees (“From Competitor to Hero: the Stoics on Socrates”) challenges this view, claiming that, to the contrary, the early Stoics conceived their philosophy as an explicit alternative to Socrates and the Socratics, whom they considered as their competitors. Only in the so-called Middle and Imperial Stoa did the criticisms of Socrates fade away and Socrates became an exemplum. Bees dwells extensively on texts that seem to draw a succession line from Socrates to Antisthenes and Cynicism up to Crates

and Zeno, and shows how this line was very likely a forgery invented by later Stoics hoping to be called “Socratics” (as in Diogenes Laertius), if it is not an altogether modern reconstruction (since it does not feature in Philodemus’ *De Stoicis*). Other characteristics of early Stoicism seem to confirm that Zeno’s doctrine can be seen only as an alternative to the Socratic approach. For example, there are no grounds for claiming that Zeno connected the Stoic sage, who has secure knowledge and knows everything, to Socrates. Nor is there evidence that the central tenet of Stoicism, *oikeiôsis*, goes back to Socrates. Bees argues that *oikeiôsis* is an act in which nature induces man to behave according to the objects he deems “his own” (his own nature, descendants, and fellow human beings), while Socrates’ care of the self is a concern for the “true self” of the individual man, the soul. The fragments relating to Zeno’s immediate followers Cleanthes and Chrysippus confirm this polemical trend toward Socrates. The first Stoic to appreciate Socrates was Antipater of Tarsus, a scholar of the Middle Stoa. His pupil Panaetius of Rhodes also dealt with the life of Socrates, and defended him against the accusation of having been rich and bigamous. Posidonius of Apamea went even further in his admiration of Socrates. He explicitly criticized Zeno’s rational monism and posited an irrational part of the soul, as Plato did. In Imperial Stoicism, Socrates became a model for ethics: his way of life substantiated fundamental Stoic tenets, as the one that death is “unimportant”; for Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, Socrates was a philosophical hero, the embodiment of Stoic doctrine.

An author who was profoundly influenced by Stoicism is Cicero. Much of what he writes is of core importance for reconstructing first-generation Socratic literature, as it often draws on Socratic dialogues (e.g., of *Phaedo*) that are no longer extant. At the end of his life, Cicero sketched a theory of conversation, which he expounded in the first book of *De officiis*. Despite its relative brevity, the passage offers an account of the practical ethics of the Stoic Panaetius. As François Renaud (“Cicero and the Socratic Dialogue: Between Frankness and Friendship [Off. 1.132–137]”) points

out, there are good reasons to believe that Cicero’s theory of conversation points at the Socratic dialogues, which he considered the supreme instances of philosophical conversations. This seems to follow from a comparison of *De Officiis* with Plato’s *Gorgias*, from which one decisive agreement surfaces: for both Cicero and Plato, freedom of speech is a call at once for truth and friendship. The role that reproof and correction play in Cicero’s conversation hints, directly or indirectly, at the Socratic refutation as correction and at its analogy to medical treatment. Cicero’s position on this crucial issue is, however, intension with the kindness or civility demanded by the *humanitas* as well as with the “golden-mean” ethics, the prime issue of *De officiis*.

A Stoic representation of Socrates in early Imperial Rome is featured in Persius’ Fourth Satire, which is a satiric adaptation of the Platonic *Alcibiades*. The Fourth Satire focuses, on the one hand, on the differences between Persius’ depiction of Socrates and the “traditional” representation offered by Plato and Xenophon, and on the other hand, on the way the Socratic mode of life, as adopted and modified within Stoicism, shaped Persius’ poetics. Diego De Brasi (“Socrates and Alcibiades as ‘Satiric Heroes’: The Socrates of Persius”) argues that Persius’ depiction of Socrates is rooted in his own satirical poetics, but is also a genuine example of Socratic exhortation to philosophy. Persius, like Socrates, emphatically urges his interlocutors (that is, his readers) to live “philosophically,” that is, always to acknowledge their own shortcomings. In Persius’ Satires, Socrates is the greatest example of a life spent practicing and urging others to practice philosophy. But Socrates’ constant arousing and reproaching his fellow human beings is also an image of Persius’ own poetics, which consists in the uncovering and chastisement of human faults and sick morals.

The next three chapters deal with the reception of Socrates in Middle Platonism. It has been argued that Plutarch was particularly well informed about Socrates, as he had access to sources that have since been lost. Sometimes he provides relevant information for which he is the only testimony, which makes him a useful complement to the first-

generation Socratic literature and helps lay bare the ideological bias of Plato's and Xenophon's interpretations. Geert Roskam ("Plutarch's Reception of Socrates") shows how this is so. In addition to Plato and Xenophon, he mentions, as sources on Socrates, Aristotle's *On Nobility*, Aristoxenus, Hieronymus, Demetrius of Phalerum, Panaetius, the Megarian School, and Terpsion. Relying on these sources, Plutarch was familiar with the most important aspects of Socrates' life. He mentions most of the biographical details that are known to us, especially Socrates' association with Alcibiades and his divine sign. Plutarch also had a good knowledge of Socrates' philosophy, and in particular of topics such as the elenchus, ignorance, and maieutics, Socrates' attitude towards the sophists, and his refusal to be considered a teacher.

Another Middle Platonist who profoundly admired Socrates was Apuleius. His Socrates is the epitome of the perfect philosopher, who combines philosophical insight with religious worship. Friedemann Drews ("A Man of Outstanding Perfection': Apuleius' Admiration for Socrates") deals with the portraits of Socrates depicted by Apuleius in Books 1 and 10 of the *Metamorphoses*, as well as in *De Deo Socratis* and *Florida*. Each differs significantly from the others. In *Metamorphoses*, Socrates cannot control his bodily needs and passions, which has led scholars to claim that he is an anti-Socrates, since the historical Socrates was renowned for his physical endurance and temperance. Drews interprets this antithetical character as a *figura deformata* which in the course of the narration is restored to his true form. This happens at the end of the *Metamorphoses*, when the bizarre character of Book 1 is re-transformed into the true Socrates. So the reader is meant to recognize that the deformed Socrates is not the "real" one. His re-metamorphosis does not come as a surprise, but follows the development of the *Metamorphoses* from the world of witchcraft and deception towards one of true religion and philosophy. Apuleius' admiration of Socrates' divine wisdom is even more evident in *De Deo Socratis*, where Apollo testifies to his wisdom, and Socrates is able to communicate with his "god"—his daemon and guardian angel.

The Socrates of Maximus of Tyre's *Dialexeis* is more conventional than Apuleius'. Maximus' Socrates is one of the great philosophers of the past, all of whom deserve equal respect, according to Maximus, but who has the distinctive honor of supplying the jumping-off point for no fewer than eight of his surviving forty-one orations. These include *Dialexis* 3, in which the subject is Socrates' refusal to defend himself (or defend himself properly) when on trial for his life; *Dialexeis* 8–9, where the subject is the nature and function of daimones; *Dialexeis* 18–21, where the subject is Socratic (or Platonic) *erôs*; and *Dialexis* 12, which is devoted to the question of the morality of revenge. In each of these eight orations, the case of Socrates is used as a particularly vivid means of communicating a general philosophical truth, about values, conduct, soul, or cosmos, rather than an object of analysis in its own right. Socrates' presence in the *Dialexeis* is not just deep but pervasive; Michael Trapp ("Socrates in Maximus of Tyre") observes that Socrates fails totally to feature in only sixteen of the forty-one orations (a number of appearances that is exceeded only by Homer). Maximus finds no difficulty in combining information from different Socratic authors and treating them as all on the same footing: details from Xenophon's *Symposium* fit comfortably into the composite picture of Socrates the lover, just as material from the *Oeconomicus* helps paint the picture of his constant efforts to find suitable advisers for himself and his friends (itself a Xenophontic rather than a Platonic emphasis). Similarly, material from Aeschines' *Alcibiades* combines with elements from the Platonic *Symposium*, *Alcibiades*, and *Protagoras* to depict relations with the most charismatic and dangerous of the pupils, just as Aeschines' *Aspasia* meets Plato's *Menexenus* in references to *Aspasia* as a Socratically endorsed instructress.

Remarkably, the only extant *Life of Socrates* is that found in Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. Diogenes places Socrates fifth in the Ionian succession of philosophers, following Anaxagoras' student Archelaus. This is the Archelaus who, while called a "physicist," also studied law, value, and justice, thereby introducing

Socrates to “ethics,” who went on to augment the topic enough to be called the “inventor” of it. The remainder of Diogenes’ second book covers Socrates’ immediate successors and their students. Indeed, Diogenes arranges a majority of the books with Socrates as pivot: Book 3 on Plato, Book 4 on Academics, Book 5 on Plato’s student Aristotle and his followers, and Book 6 on Antisthenes and his Cynic legacy. Tiziano Dorandi (“Socrates in the Ancient Biographical Tradition: From the Anonymous PHib. 182 to Diogenes Laertius”) studies the structure, meaning, and value of this Socratic Life. He specifically draws out Diogenes’ reliance on sources that may not originate in Plato, Xenophon, or Aristotle; the Hellenistic traditions of biography from which Diogenes’ mixed form derives; and the important Cynic influences on the interpretations of Socrates. Dorandi also puts Diogenes’ Life of Socrates in relation with a little-known third-century bce papyrus from el-Hibeh (PHib. 182).

Another lively portrait of Socrates is that delivered by Libanius, a supporter of a return to pagan Hellenism. His *Apologia Socratis*, from 362 ce, exceeds in length all other extant *Apologiai*, and takes a novel form, purporting to be the speech of a beneficiary of Socrates’. Heinz-Günther Nesselrath (“An Embodiment of Intellectual Freedom? Socrates in Libanius”), after showing the stereotyped use of Socrates in Libanius’ letters, and dealing with the authenticity of some Socrates-featuring declamations, reads this long *Apologia* in its cultural context. The speaker ignores the charge of Socrates’ impiety—perhaps to avoid giving the Christians arguments useful in defense of their introduction of new divinities—instead focusing on the charge of corrupting the youth. As it turns out, though, when Libanius defends Socrates’ right to criticize the poets, he seems now to defend the Christians.

Socrates’ legend flourished in the rhetorical tradition of Late Antiquity, particularly in Themistius and Julian the Emperor. These two intellectuals of the fourth century ce are in many ways exact opposites: Julian was an idealist and a philosopher by vocation, remembered mainly for his ambitious

plan of pagan restoration despite the Empire’s large-scale conversion to Christianity (whence his epithet “Apostate”); Themistius, Julian’s erstwhile teacher, was a skilled politician successful as princeps’ advisor during the reign of several Christian emperors, his open profession of paganism notwithstanding. For Julian, Socrates is the savior of souls who directs all men towards the true knowledge of themselves and the true faith in their (pagan) gods; Themistius sees Socrates instead as a symbol of the *politikos philosophos*, a man who speaks in public with people of all ranks, in a simple and direct way. Maria Carmen De Vita (“Political Philosopher or Savior of Souls? Socrates in Themistius and Julian the Emperor”) shows that, despite their differences, these portraits are complementary. Both attest, in their *imitatio/aemulatio* of figures and myths of Classical Antiquity, to the rhetoric capacities of “new Hellenes,” and both employ the figure of Socrates, with his typical attitudes, as an appropriate testimonial for their own ideological program. Each of them highlights different aspects of Socrates and attests to the vitality the icon of Socrates had in Late Antiquity: Themistius focuses on the philosopher’s eloquence and his active life in the polis; Julian draws on the invitation to care for one’s soul and the necessity of having faith in the gods.

The Neoplatonists are thought to have turned their back on Socrates, given both their overriding commitment to Plato and their apparent uninterest in Socrates’ avowals of ignorance. Danielle A. Layne (“Proclus on Socratic Ignorance, Knowledge, and Irony”) shows that this presumption is wrong. Neoplatonists, despite being concerned mainly with Plato’s Socrates, advanced complex arguments on various “Socratic” subjects, including his confessions of ignorance and their seeming contradiction with his avowals of knowledge. Proclus insists that Socrates’ avowals of ignorance need not be qualified by an appeal to Socratic irony, since Socrates’ “grade” of ignorance would not taint the philosopher’s corresponding form of knowledge with “indeterminacy, mixture with ignorance, or uncertainty.” Proclus appealed to various activities of intellection as well as grades of not-knowing or ignorance, letting Socrates avow both a kind of knowledge and a kind of ignorance without

contradiction. This entails that when Proclus' Socrates speaks of his ignorance and his corresponding knowledge, he is referring primarily to different modes of intellection (opining/judgment versus understanding) and their appropriate objects (sense versus intellectual). Proclus' Socrates rightly claims both knowledge and ignorance insofar as his ignorance refers to sense phenomena and not to eternal reasoning principles. This ignorance is therefore justified since no one can know the sensible, and the recognition of this ignorance is a kind of wisdom itself, which evidences one's own awareness of the various kinds of intellectual activities and their respective objects. <>

[Virgil, Aeneid 8: Text, Translation, and Commentary](#) edited by Lee M. Fratantuono, R. Alden Smith [Mnemosyne Supplements, Brill, 9789004367357]

[Virgil, Aeneid 8](#) provides the first full-scale commentary on one of the most important and popular books of the great epic of imperial Rome. The commentary is accompanied by a new critical text and a prose translation.

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Excerpt: Book 8 of Virgil's Aeneid is a natural enough subject for investigation after Book 5; together the two books frame the second third of the poet's grand epic of Augustan Rome. Like Book 5, to date Book 8 has not been the subject of much in the way of expansive commentary; it has been both a pleasure and a challenge to work through Virgil's most Augustan book with a careful eye. Once again, we have learned much from the admirable efforts of our predecessors; for Book 8, special praise redounds to the names of Eden and Gransden. The work of both of these commentators has been supplemented by the admirable and diligent labor of Vivien Ellis in her Newcastle M. Litt. thesis, *The Poetic Map of Rome in Virgil Aeneid 8*, from which we have derived considerable profit and enjoyment.

Our method for Book 8 has been much the same as for its predecessor. Smith once again bears the lion's share of the responsibility for the critical text and translation, and for the first draft of the introduction; Fratantuono for the commentary—with both editors assuming full and shared responsibility for the integral work. Our intended audience is once again primarily anyone with a love for the poet, though throughout there is an assumption of a relatively good familiarity with the major trends of Virgilian scholarship. We have liberally cited from classical literature after Virgil (indeed, after Ovid), and from artistic works of later centuries and in other tongues that are indebted to Virgil's vision (especially the Old French Roman d'Énéas), out of a conviction that some of the finest commentary on Virgil has been composed by his epigones.

A number of new aids to the Virgilian scholar have appeared since our work on Book 5. Emil Kraggerud's *Vergiliana* offers a splendid and convenient assortment of the author's magisterial work on the text of the poet. Jim O'Hara's indispensable *True Names* is now in a second edition. Horsfall's *Epic Distilled* (on which Fratantuono has written for *BrynMawrClassicalReview*) offers an always intriguing, not infrequently delightful vademecum for the would-be commentator. Rogerson's *Virgil's Ascanius* could not have made a timelier appearance. And, too, we continue to plunder the riches of the Thomas-Ziolkowski *Virgil Encyclopedia*, without apology or disappointment. The same must be acknowledged of Damien Nelis' work on the intertextual relationship of the Aeneid and the Apollonian *Argonautica*, a volume whose seemingly inexhaustible treasures continue to inspire feelings of gratitude and abiding respect. So also the splendid three volumes of the *Oxford Fragments of the Roman Historians*, which together with Chassignet's richly annotated Budé provide a luxurious treatment of tantalizing texts.

Among older aids, it is not mere sentiment that inspires us to single out for special attention the work of Warde Fowler in his trilogy of Great War-era Basil Blackwell volumes on the Aeneid. Our work appears a century after Fowler's treatment of "Aeneas at the site of Rome"; it is a testament to the author's perceptive and sensitive reading of

Virgil that his commentary has not lost its freshness and power, notwithstanding how much has been added to the Virgilian bibliography since. Similar words of respectful homage could be offered to Cartault's splendid *L'art de Virgile*, which once again we have consulted with great profit. Roiron's mammoth tome on Virgilian sounds always repays close consultation; so also the judicious notes of Mackail for his 1930 Oxford bimillenary edition. On the grammar of Book 8, the small, unassuming school edition of Mme. Guillemin is indispensable; so too Hahn's impeccably rigorous volume on coordinate and non-coordinate elements in the poet. On matters historical and religious, Saunders' *Virgil's Primitive Italy* repays frequent consultation.

We have consciously avoided polemic in our attempt to explicate Virgil's text. We do this out of immense respect for the work of our colleagues across the ages, and also out of a sense of good manners. Book 8 is especially fraught with difficulties that have stirred contentious debate; we have deliberately steered a middle course that seeks to provide assistance to the reader of Virgil, all the while also making clear our (occasionally divergent, though usually happily harmonious) views on the poet. If one of the editors came to Book 5 as more of a pessimist, and the other as more of an optimist (to use crude though useful labels), then the same binary approach (not to say instructive tension) maybe felt in the journey through 8. We have found, however, that on closer examination Virgil's book of Rome offers perhaps surprisingly neutral ground for dispassionate critics; Virgil's Rome is also his Arcadia.

Once again we are indebted to the help and support afforded to us from colleagues and friends. Timothy Joseph of The College of the Holy Cross generously read through the commentary in its initial draft and offered numerous valuable suggestions. Jim O'Hara kindly afforded us the opportunity to consult a draft of his own commentary on the book for the Focus Aeneid series. Richard Thomas is an incisive and generous critic of our ideas (especially the misguided ones). Michael Putnam remains both friend and Virgilian mentor, and to him we express again our fondest sentiments of admiration and respect; his most welcome, self-described *munuscula* are cherished

pleasures of an internet age. Sergio Casali kindly sent Frantantuono a copy of his admirable edition of Book 2 in time to be of use on certain parallels between Virgil's books of Troy and Rome. Chris Renaud generously provided a copy of her Texas dissertation on Book 8. Emil Kraggerud responded to a textual inquiry with his usual acumen and judiciousness. Caitlin Gillespie offered her customary learning and much appreciated help on the problems posed by the Virgilian Cleopatra and the larger issue of the depiction of women at war in Latin literature.

The suggestions of the anonymous referee for the press vastly improved the final draft of this edition; we are indebted in particular to a helpful suggested emendation of the text at verse 475...

Two maybe enough; if there is a third, the three-act tragedy that is Book 4 poses its own seductive summons.

If the second, Iliadic half of Virgil's Aeneid has suffered comparative neglect from critics, Book 8—the least warlike of the hexad—might in some sense be considered a happy exception. Between the tour of the future site of Rome that the Arcadian Evander conducts for Aeneas, and the glorious revelation of the divine shield of the Trojan hero, Book 8 has proven popular even among those less inclined to plumb the depths of Virgil's Italian books. For those who prefer to view the Aeneid as a three-act tragedy rather than as a biform renewal of Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, Book 8 comes as the close of the poem's second movement, the culmination of the "intermediary" Books 5–8 of the epic that drive forward from the Trojan past of Books 1–4 to the nascent Roman (not to say Italian) future of Books 9–12.⁷ Book 8 is the most peaceful of the Virgilian books of war; it is a respite in the epic's second half. In it, Aeneas is reminded of his destiny, builds community with Evander, and kills no one; in fact, with the exception of the recollection of the Herculean victory over Cacus, no one dies in Book 8, though there is grim foreshadowing of the loss of both the Arcadian Pallas and the Egyptian Cleopatra.

In many ways, Book 8 is a companion of Book 5, the books that together frame the second third of

the Aeneid.⁹ Both books open ominously: Book 5 in the aftermath of Dido's suicide, as the eerie glow of the flames of her funeral pyre is glimpsed by the departing Trojans, and Book 8 with the clarion of war in Latium. Both books end with a haunting and abiding sense of unknowing, of ignorance of realities that confront and challenge the reader. At the close of Book 5, Aeneas is ignorant of the fate of Palinurus; he was not privy to what Virgil had revealed to his readership about the circumstances of the loss of the helmsman at the hands of Somnus. At the end of Book 8, Aeneas is able to marvel and wonder at the lovely and striking images on his divine shield—but he has no understanding of the significance of the events that are embossed on his shield, no appreciation for the unfolding of the future Roman history—a parallel to the hero's implicit response to the Heldenschau. That ignorance is a testament to the eventual suppression of Trojan mores in the final settlement of Rome—a suppression that is not mentioned in the consoling words of Jupiter to Venus amid the glorious, sonorous pronouncements of 1.254–296.¹⁰ Small wonder, then, that the close of Book 8 harks back powerfully to that of 2.¹¹ The second “fall of Troy” would be decidedly quieter than the first, though all the more profound. The ignorance of Aeneas with respect to the “future” Roman history depicted on the shield may well find a parallel, too, in the uncertainty of the historical Augustus about the future of the empire he had, by 19 B.C., created.

Despite the popularity of at least certain of its movements, the commentary tradition has not, however, been especially lavish in its consideration of the problems of this, the poet's second shortest book. The most extensive editions of Book 8 are those of P.T. Eden for Brill and of K.W. Gransden for the Cambridge “green and yellow” series, volumes that appeared amid a busy period of activity on the book in the 1970s.¹⁵ No commentary on the scale standard set by Nicholas Horsfall (and Pease, and Buscaroli, before him for *il libro di Didone*) has been attempted. Between 1975 and 1977, three commentaries on Book 8 were published; all are relatively brief in scope. Still, if the 1970s were a period in Virgilian criticism in which the poem's second half began to receive more focused critical attention, Book 8

certainly benefited the most from the renewed energies.

Foundational to the study of Book 8 is the extended interpretive treatment of Gerhard Binder, *Aeneas und Augustus*—a volume that is a defacto literary and historical commentary on many of the issues raised by the book, an explication de texte that proceeds line by line through the book as it considers Aeneas as Augustan prototype. Very different—but of inestimable value—is the classic treatment of Warde Fowler, *Aeneas at the Site of Rome*, a slender and unassuming volume written in the shadow of another Great War. On problems of Virgil's Latin, the undeservedly obscure school edition of Guillemin merits more attention. Beyond these noteworthy works, a rich array of journal articles consider various challenges posed by Virgil's book of the future Rome. Still, the close reader of Book 8 finds a surprising dearth of aids to the slow going labor, at least on certain points and for certain scenes. We have found Book 8 on the whole to be better served by existing scholarship than Book 5. But solutions to several interpretive (and, in a few instances, significant textual) problems remain elusive, and we hope to have contributed something worthwhile to the ongoing scholarly investigation and dialogue.

The eighth is arguably the most complicated book of the Aeneid (certainly a close rival of the sixth), for it encompasses pre-existing lore about Aeneas' arrival in Latium, touches upon religious issues that hark back to a mythical realm but point toward Virgil's own (Augustan) time, comprises the theme of *amicitia* (both as “friendship” and “alliance”), and anticipates Rome's future at several junctures, most notably when Evander takes Aeneas on a walking tour of the physical city, as well as in the politically charged description of the future history of Rome portrayed on Aeneas' new shield. *Qua panoply*, on the one hand, the shield is symbolic of a self-protective mentality, for shields are defensive; on the other hand, the shield maybe seen to betoken Roman martial prowess, for shields are weapons. And these are just a few of the themes that emerge as vital not simply to the book but to the Aeneid as a whole. Perhaps more so than in any other book of the epic (again, with the sixth as close rival), the poet indulges in anachronistic and even exuberant

blends of past and future. The shield unites the Homeric world and the Augustan; Aeneas is the conduit that provides a route of access between the ages. Book 8 is thus at once in some sense the poet's most Homeric and most Augustan of books.

Like all books of the *Aeneid*, Book 8 is deeply imbued not only with the spirit of Homer, but also that of later Greek poets (especially Apollonius and Callimachus, and with no small influence from the world of tragedy). From the Homeric world, in addition to the evocation of the Shield of Achilles from *Iliad* 18, the deception of Zeus in *Iliad* 14 is recalled in the seduction of Vulcan by Venus. From the Apollonian, it has been argued by Damien Nelis that Virgil's Tiberinus and Venus correspond to Hera and Aphrodite from *Argonautica* 3, with Evander as Medea and Rome as the Golden Fleece. The Homeric Hymn to Hermes is an influence on the narrative of Cacus' stolen cattle. Callimachus' Hymn to Artemis offered inspiration for the account of the forge of the Cyclopes where Aeneas' divine arms were crafted. Euripides' *Heracles* is also a significant influence on the eighth *Aeneid*. The pseudo-Hesiodic *Shield* casts its own spell, too, over Virgil's poetic composition. Stesichorus' sixth-century *Geryoneis* presents another important source.

Beyond concern with literary antecedents, the eighth *Aeneid* has proven an irresistibly fertile field for those interested in the topography of Augustan Rome. Evander's wonderland tour with Aeneas has provided rich material not only for lovers of the sites of the ancient city, but also for ideological battles. *Aeneid* 8 can be considered the most "Augustan," perhaps even the most "positive" or "optimistic" book of the epic—yet certain brighter features of its landscape will be seen to darken in light of the poet's backward glances, and especially in view of the progress of the Latin war and its divine resolution in Book 12.²⁸ There are glories in Book 8, to be sure, but as elsewhere in the epic the victories are suffused with hints of tragedy that sometimes come into sharper relief, especially when baleful events are prognosticated alongside future gains. In the epic of sacrifice, each boon is accompanied by a victim. The Tiber is the source of seemingly positive messages for Troy's hero and Rome's would-be proto-founder—but the

storied river is also associated with the tradition of Aeneas' death. The Tiber (and, for that matter, the Numicus) is not the Xanthus or the Scamander of Homeric, Trojan lore—but the last mention of the river in the book will come with a vision of the bones and blood that were as much the inheritance of Priam's city as of Romulus'. Evander's conveyance of Aeneas through the celebrated sites of the future city that is barely in its advent is a testament, too, to the Augustan building program and public works of the poet's own day.

To establish the themes that we have already touched on, Virgil employs several strategies. One of these is that of the narrative feature known as *ecphrasis*, which turns up in the book both for Evander's tour that includes his commentary on the future site of Rome and, most especially, in the aforementioned description of the shield. Another device that Virgil employs is carefully layered thematization. This narrative feature is achieved in a number of ways: first, by the poet's placing of aspects of one character upon another, as can be seen in Evander's playing the role of a father-figure to Aeneas, much as Anchises had been to him (155ff.); that relationship is itself mirrored in Aeneas' playing a similar role to Pallas, both of whom reprise the prototypical companion roles of Achilles and Patroclus from Homer's *Iliad*. Further, Book 8 is a book deeply invested in the dialogues of the generations; in this it supplements and expands on the lessons of Book 5, even as it looks forward to the sadness of Books 10, 11 and 12 (where the bill for *pietas* will, as it were, come due in the loss of Pallas and the death of Turnus). The theme of *amicitia* and the notion of a *foedus*—both matters of inestimable importance to the nascent Augustan regime—give way ultimately to the Homeric problem of vengeance in the wake of the death of a loved one. In Virgil, the hero's shield is awarded before the death of the Patroclus figure; the reasons for the war in Latium exist before Pallas meets Turnus, but the apparent need for Turnus to die, one could argue, comes only after the events of Book 10. The even-numbered books of the second half of the epic move inexorably toward the final scene of the poem, with no "tent of Achilles" interlude or scene to provide reconciliation and redemption for mortal heroes. Book 8 introduces Pallas (and Hercules); Book 10 will

witness the death of the young, ill-starred Arcadian (and Hercules will make another stage appearance there too, as it were); in Book 12 Aeneas will invoke Pallas' name as he exercises his revenge in an act that subverts the dream of the epic's proem. Book 8 is thus in part a meditation on *pietas* and the expectations of that lofty, eminently Roman virtue; it is the book wherein Virgil commences his exposition of the problem of Aeneas' response to the demands inherent to his relationship with both Evander and Pallas.

Yet there are still other aspects of layered thematization: Aeneas will prove to have a clear and remarkable parallel figure in the Hercules of the heroic, epic tradition, as more than Aeneas' Herculean attire superficially suggests (552; cf. 177). Hercules himself has a central role in this book, as he achieves a signal victory over Cacus, whose very name has more than merely a subliminal feel of evil to it. In the conflict between Hercules and Cacus, something of the ultimate engagement of Aeneas with Turnus in single combat may well be foreshadowed—typology on a grand scale. Additionally, a description of the site of Rome itself provides a foretaste of the great city that will later emerge, as does that of Aeneas' new shield, an object that portends the future, even as it elicits those aforementioned, haunting sentiments of profound unknowing.

Another interesting feature of Virgil's narrative technique is the possibility that numbers generally seem to prefigure both good and bad. Whereas a creature with a double nature such as Cacus, who is described as both *semifer* (267) and *semihomo* (194), comes up short, the number three, which so frequently occurs in this book, often serves as a harbinger of victory. The frequent repetition of threes points up the importance of one particular event depicted on the shield, the celebration of Octavian's victory, an event that anticipates in se the augmentation of his name in 27 B.C. by the lofty title of Augustus. Yet Virgil's personal opinion of the Augustan experience—a subjective subject that has so dominated Virgilian studies in the second half of the twentieth century and beyond—is not a particular concern to us.

Rather, our interest lies in Virgil's thematization of the book, specifically in the way that the poet

orchestrates the book's content towards a *telos*. In Book 8, that *telos* is the *pax Augusta*, inaugurated at the moment the doors of Janus were closed (29 B.C.). In that same year two other signal events took place. One was Octavian's dedication of the temple of Divus Julius. The third event was itself tripartite, for it occurred on three successive days. This was the majestic celebration of three triumphs: for Dalmatia, Actium, and Egypt. A triple triumph, then, and in fact three closings of the doors of Janus (though our poet may have known of only two). Augustus would never celebrate another triumph after that triduum of celebrations. The third and final movement of Virgil's epic will describe the events of Aeneas' war with the Latins; the outcome of that war will be a victory, though the fruits of the win will be bitter to those who would cherish the memory of the old city of Troy (an association that may well have been dearer to Julius Caesar than to his heir). In Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Aeneas is an ally of Latinus, not a foe; Virgil's apparently novel contribution to the tradition allows him to focus on what is ultimately his central concern—the suppression of Troy in favor of Italy.

With regard to the aforementioned importance of the number three in this book (a feature of Virgilian compositional technique that will prove inestimably valuable in appreciating the structure of the book), let us consider, too, that from the very outset of the book threefold patterns occur frequently, as can be seen already in the opening lines:

When Turnus raised up the signal for war
from the citadel of Laurentum and the war
horns clamored with their coarse song, and
when he smote his keen steeds and drove
on his weapons, straightway their minds
were vexed; at once all Latium swears
together in fearful uprising, and its young
people rage, wild. Aen. 8.1–6

Here Virgil lays out the action of an aggressor: Turnus has given the signal, he has roused the cavalry, and he has rushed into arms, thereby causing a threefold result: souls are troubled, Latium is described as being in an uproar, and the Latin youth are raging in a wild and uncontrolled fashion. The wars predicted by the Sibyl to Aeneas (cf. 6.83–97) have commenced in the person of Turnus and his followers. To explain as much, Virgil uses three successive temporal clauses, each relying

on the repetition of the subordinating conjunction *ut*. Similar clusters of three will be characteristic of this book. While, as in the case cited here, these clusters are not always positive in their import, there are so many of them—more than in any other book—that it is apparent that they point toward a thematic strategy on Virgil's part for the repetition of trifold groupings.

Deliberately, in fact, the book itself falls into three sections, beginning with the hero's encountering and conversing with an apparition of the god Tiber, who explains the situation that lies before Aeneas in Latium and explicitly predicts the white sow that Aeneas will encounter in short order, offering an etiology for the foundation of Alba Longa (47–49).

Book 8 in Overview

Already in Book 7, well before Tiberinus' apparition, Virgil had shown that the Latins themselves have also been hard at work in preparing for war. While the pact of Aeneas and Evander will be ratified in this book, we learn only in Book 11 of the failure of the embassy dispatched by Turnus to southern Italy to visit the resettled Homeric hero Diomedes (*mittitur et magni Venulus Diomedis ad urbem / qui petat auxilium, et Latio consistere*, 8.9ff.). And we shall learn in Book 11 of not only the failure of the Venulan mission, but also of the devastating report to Evander about the death of his son Pallas. For now, the youth of Latium are in rage (cf. 8.5–6); Aeneas is comparatively calm and reserved throughout the book, even in the face of an imminent war he did not seek. However one reads the close of the epic, the contrast in the Trojan hero's emotions from Book 8 to Book 12 could not be cast in sharper relief.

Though Book 8 commences with Turnus, he is not the figure who is to be the prime focus of the book's opening section—indeed, he will disappear from the narrative. Rather, Aeneas captures our attention, and though he characteristically does not say much, his encounter with the river Tiber is, as we have already stated, the principal focus. Aeneas is troubled as he lies down on that river's bank, even as he learns of a seemingly more positive future:

“O you born of the race of the gods, who
restore from enemy hands the Trojan city

and preserve for us eternal Pergamum,
you alone who have been long expected
in the land of Laurentum and the Latin
fields, here will be your secure home—do
not hold back—and here your household
gods will be secure, as well. Nor should
you be frightened by threat of war; all the
swelling and ire of the gods have
relented.” Aen. 8.36–41

The optimistic prophecy, as O'Hara has shown, is all too optimistic, as it turns out. Of course the gods have not relented, and indeed the remainder of the epic will feature the struggle that Aeneas will endure before he is able to accomplish his mission—all on a mortal plane seemingly divorced from the divine action of the crucial pact that is struck between Juno and Jupiter in Book 12.56 Like his putative descendant Julius Caesar, Aeneas is destined for apotheosis and reckoning among the gods; his mysterious death at the Numicus will be accorded a sort of compensation in divinity, just as Caesar's stab wounds would find healing (after a fashion) in the religious cult owed to the Divus Iulius.

Nevertheless, the prophecy of the sow with which Father Tiber follows his august address of the hero and the description of her litter of thirty piglets (43–45) is not a prophecy left unfulfilled. Ascanius will found Alba Longa (48) and Aeneas will prove, in the end, to be the victor, as the river god explains (50). The descendants of Aeneas are of obvious importance to the question of the endurance, indeed permanence of the whole enterprise (especially in light of the last word of the book).

This explanation allows Virgil, through this character's mouth, to give a general overview of who will play what role in the battles that will characterize the remaining third of the poem. Indeed, the river god goes on to offer Aeneas a *dramatis personae* for some of the key events in the book: Evander, the Greek elements of whose name means “good man,” hails from Greece, specifically Arcadia—and he has settled with his own band of refugees on the future site of Rome. Just after Aeneas' encounter with the river god, Evander will explain the political lay of the land to Aeneas, noting that Turnus has already made Evander's own group of refugees, the Arcadians, his enemies. Paradoxically, it will be Greeks,

formerly the enemies of Aeneas in the Trojan War that has only relatively recently come to a conclusion, who will now, once a pact has been struck, provide the troops necessary for the victory over the Rutulians:

These continually wage war with the Latin nation; receive them as allies to your camp and make an alliance with them. With my banks I myself will lead you to them, straight up stream, that impelled by oars, you may subdue the tide as it flows against you. Come! Rise up, goddess-born, and as the first stars fall from the sky, with all proper respect, make your prayers to Juno, and overcome her wrath and threats by suppliant vows. To me, once you have prevailed, you will pay tribute. Aen. 8.55–62

Complying with the Tiberine prophetic utterances, Aeneas promptly takes his ship up that selfsame river, ceasing from the journey only when he encounters Evander's son Pallas who is dutifully performing a religious festival rite in honor of the Greek hero Hercules (103 ff.). After a moment of greeting exchange worthy of the epic genre, Pallas, struck by Aeneas' status and reputation, sends for his father in short order. As noted above, when Aeneas and Evander meet there is no trace of the previous situation of hostility between them from their (even if only technical) alignment on opposite sides in the war that had just come to a close. Rather, Evander elaborates in some detail on the connection that a prior incident of guest-friendship and blood ties now affords them (132), thrice repeating the name of Atlas, the Titan who was their common forebear (135, 140, 141). While the past is one basis for their present alliance, the fact that they now share a common foe in Turnus underscores the need for a pact between them for the immediate future (169 ff.).

The importance of the setting to this alliance and to the narrative of the book is not forgotten, and soon Evander tells the story of Hercules' victory over the monster Cacus in response to his theft of the hero's cattle. This story is one of the two most important for understanding the action of this book, for though the hero will emerge triumphant, it is not without the cost of a great struggle and a leveling of justice in a brutal fashion. It is a story deeply invested in the traditions of Greek mythology, of

Heracles and Geryon, of Hermetian cattle theft—and, not least, of native, local folklore. In Virgilian hands it is transformed into something of a typological commentary on the conflict of Aeneas and Turnus—even as we do well to remember that the poet avoids crude dichotomies and broadly drawn characterization, and almost always invests his typological epiphanies with surprises.

Thrice does Hercules attempt to assail Cacus' den, and just so many times does he angrily scour the Aventine as he considers how to take the stony threshold. Weary from failure, Hercules also sits in repose three times, as each of his three offensives have been rendered fruitless (230–232). Victory comes, however, notably after Hercules is able to shine a brilliant light into the monster's dark cave (240–246).

Hercules' throttling of Cacus, which even causes the monster's eyes to pop out (261), presents not only the image of the victory of light over darkness, but also suggests the brutality that is a part of this particular victory. Virgil's description of Hercules standing triumphantly over Cacus' lifeless corpse evokes well-known portraits of the similar situation of Theseus standing triumphantly over the Minotaur, suggesting Hercules' role here not only as the half-divine son of Jupiter (whose victory over Cacus the cattle thief forges a connection between that hero and the local Italian tradition of the monstrous brigand), but also as a typos, a kind of exemplary heroic figure who may be associated with Theseus—a connection that had also been forged in Aeneid 6. There Hercules is explicitly put on par with Theseus and Orpheus (6.119–123), serving as an example to Aeneas, who in that very book makes his own corresponding katabasis.

Not only had Aeneas obviously been the central character in that descent to Avernus, but now in Books 7–12 he will engage in a Herculean struggle against Turnus. The battle of Hercules in this book against Cacus anticipates the poem's final scene, which can be seen as a victory, albeit a brutal one, of good over evil. In the case of the close of Book 12, to categorize the victory as that of good over evil is insufficient, though, to point up the nuances of the narrative, one in which Aeneas has donned some of the characteristics of the very mindset he set out to defeat. The poet's trick will be the

revelation that the “evil” side is actually victorious, at least insofar as Italy will dominate Troy. And the wrath of Juno from the commencement of the epic will be inherited by the Trojan Aeneas at the very end—with no redemption for Virgil’s hero in the manner of the Homeric Achilles.

Yet however one might interpret the close of the twelfth book, there can be little doubt about the implication of Cacus’ name here, for it evokes the Greek word *kakos* (“evil one”). Thus it is not surprising that Virgil describes a chorus as singing of Hercules’ heroic pursuits at the banquet that Aeneas now shares with Evander. Notably, the chorus sings of the particular struggles that Hercules undergoes in response to the labors imposed upon him by the goddess Juno, who is quite clearly Aeneas’ own divine nemesis, however appeased she may have optimistically been described as by Tiberinus just a few lines earlier (40ff.). And her final reconciliation (after a fashion) with the Trojan destiny will come only after she learns of the suppression of Trojan mores (12.832ff.). Neither Aeneas nor Turnus are ever made aware of the divine machinations of Jupiter and Juno that settle the question of the future Roman identity (Italian, not Trojan)—a final (and most telling and profound) case of ignorance in the epic. Turnus, like Cacus, may perish as part of the coming to be of a new order— but that new order will be one that is preeminently Italian, with the legacy of Aeneas’ (and Priam’s) Asian city relegated to the mists of mythology.

Yet in Book 8 Virgil does not dwell upon the binary parallel between “good” and “evil,” which he hints at but leaves to the reader to deduce. Instead, the narrative proceeds to the details of Aeneas strolling with Evander, who speaks to his new ally about the future site of Rome where once, Aeneas learns, Jupiter’s father Saturn had taken refuge in a specific region where gods once seem to have walked freely among men—“wo die Grenzen zwischen menschlicher und göttlicher Welt überschritten oder verwischt werden”—calling the region Latium because the word used for his time of hiding (lat-uisset, 323) contains part of the word Latium; thus the Latin tribal name. To this overarching etiological explanation details are

soon added that touch upon the particulars of what will come to pass in the Roman experience.

Among these details are specific place names, including sites connected with foundation myths such as the Luperca (343), the Tarpeian rock (347), and the Argiletum (344ff.). The first of these concerns the cave wherein the she-wolf rescued and nursed the twins Romulus and Remus; the second, the story of Tarpeia and her betrayal,⁷² and the third, the story of the death of Argus. Then, as the story unfolds, Evander comes to the very entrance to the Palatine Hill itself (362), where the *scala Caci* (Cacus’ steps) ascend toward a spot right beside the hut of Romulus, in the specific direction, too, of the very houses of Augustus and Livia. Scholars have noted that the connection between the house of Augustus and that of Evander, as described in the text, is an important parallel that serves in part to blend the past with the Augustan present.

After this description of the affairs of men (which features the visual connection of past with present via father and son, the resolution of tension between Trojan and Greek, the parallelism, however approximate, of Hercules and Aeneas, and the triumph of one hero over an essentially evil character), Virgil shifts the scene entirely towards Olympus.

Venus’ cleverness is highlighted in the next scene, as she convinces her husband, Vulcan the craftsman of the gods, to make a new set of armor. Paradoxically, this armor is not to be for their son but for another, her child fathered by the mortal, Anchises, with whom she once had a tryst. Nonetheless, Venus’ charms overcome the god, and he grants her wish to fashion the weapons. In that description, Virgil resumes the theme of thrice repeated ideas. Notably, Vulcan’s craftsmen forge three shafts from hail, another three out of storm clouds, while three more are crafted from flame (429–430). After this fanciful account, Virgil portrays with some detail the forging of Aeneas’ weapons, though he saves the description of the shield itself until Venus’ dramatic, portent-heralded presentation of those arms, when at the book’s close the reader is privileged to see the shield through Aeneas’ eyes—and with the benefit of a knowledge of “future” Roman history.

In the meantime, the poet redirects the narrative to the interaction of Evander and Aeneas. The two meet and validate the pact between them. This pact also includes the Etruscans, whose former king, Mezentius, had been driven into exile specifically for his Cacus-like behavior. While Cacus had appended the flayed visages of men upon his doors (*ora uirum tristi pendebant pallida tabo*, 197), Mezentius is described as having behaved in an equally macabre manner, morbidly pressing those captured together face to face and hand to hand as a kind of torture (*tormenti genus*, 487) that lasted until they died in that wretched embrace. The cruel Mezentius will prove to be a formidable foe for Aeneas. Their final confrontation will occur in Aeneid 10, where their violent clash offers a tragic foreshadowing of the epic's final battle, when the father-son relationship of Daunus and Turnus resumes and reverses the same connection between Mezentius and Lausus.

But in the case of Aeneas and Evander, a further aspect of their relationship is yet to be fully developed. Though Evander sees in Aeneas (who, as a Trojan, is thus *anon-Italian*) the fulfillment of the prophecy of the foreign ruler that the Etruscan haruspex had announced (498–503), there is, as yet, no guarantee of the final victory. Thus, Aeneas is commissioned for battle by Evander who himself offers an emotional farewell, imitative of Apollonius, Arg. 2.799–805, where the Mariandynian Dascylus (the son of the “wolf” Lycus—cf. the Arcadian connection to lupine lore) is entrusted to Jason.

The emotion for Evander runs deep, for he adds his own son Pallas to Aeneas' entourage, an action that is soon accompanied by a sign, both visible and audible, from Venus. This sign consists of a lightning bolt from heaven, a sign that would at first blush appear to be more suited to Jupiter than to Aeneas' mother. Yet, we have seen that the Venus of the Aeneid has, in terms of characterization, a great deal of range, as we recall that she had, in the first book, first appeared to her son in the guise of a Spartan huntress, a Diana-like, virginal woodland figure. Such range of characterization aligns well with her mythological range, as the Greek Aphrodite in Cythera, as at Sparta, was worshipped also as a goddess of storm and

lightning, and thus the apparent toponym Cytherea may have particular significance here. Aeneas interprets the Cytherean omen as a harbinger of victory; he may well have incorrectly (or at least incompletely) appreciated its import.

Though Pallas is now placed under Aeneas' tutelage, the Trojan leader does not immediately behave as an Achilles toward Patroclus. Rather, his actions continue to evoke those of Hercules, a character so very central to this book. And, too, Evander's prayer to Jupiter harks back to that of Nestor in Iliad 7, where Nestor complains of age holding him back from engaging in the fray (132–135). The fact that in the Homeric passage Nestor had, in a brief catalogue, mentioned the Arcadians is not insignificant, for it provides a further connection between Homer's Nestor and Virgil's Evander.

Nestor, of course, had been a prolix character in the Iliad, and this connection allows Virgil to give Evander, now nearly four-fifths of the way through the eighth book, a Nestorian moment when he can recount his *aristeia* without seeming out of step with the sequence of the narrative (563–567). In the rendering of this account Evander also resumes the notions of “thrice” this and “thrice” that, providing yet again a threefold repetition of triplets followed by a triple protasis (574–577), along with three *dum* clauses, reinforcing yet again the notion that threefold images and verbal patterns are important for this book.

That imagery will reach its culmination in Venus' presentation of the weapons to Aeneas and especially in the *ecphrasis* of the shield, which follows immediately upon this passage. Though each piece of weaponry is clearly worthy of Aeneas' consideration (618–619), the shield stands out because it, in particular, contains the stories that forge the Roman character. It is an artistic gem, eminently worthy of its divine origins. The story of Romulus and Remus (630–634), fittingly enough, opens the narrative which, from Aeneas' point of view is, of course, the distant future—but from the the Roman reader's point of view, the remote and mythical past. Other foundation tales of the Roman experience follow, including the abduction of the Sabine women, the tale of Tarquinius Superbus and Lars Porsenna (646–648) and even, well into

Republican times, the dies after of 390 B.C. when the Gauls sacked the city (655–662).

For by no means are all of the images of the Roman future on the shield positive. Catiline is portrayed as getting the just desserts that in the first Catilinarian (1.13.33) Cicero had prayed for when he condemned him to eternal punishment in the afterlife. Yet in spite of the various hardships and often self-inflicted wounds that the Romans have suffered, the center of the shield bears one very important story for the Rome of Virgil's day, a story of victory over the monstrous Cleopatra and her consort, Antony. The victory at Actium can be seen and is likely to have been portrayed both as justification of the nascent Augustan regime, and as an assertion of Roman identity in the face of eastern influence. Antony had, in Cleopatra, taken an "Egyptian wife" (8.688), and thus become un-Roman; he had fallen into the Didonic trap that Aeneas had escaped. That this foreign couple, who together form a solitary if variegated foe, suffers defeat is central to the assertion both of Roman identity in the face of both external influences and of the martial competence of Augustus and Agrippa. And in some sense at least the central image of the shield will come to fruition in the unfolding of the Latin War in Books 9–12.

To establish divine sanction for the military and political reality described herein, Virgil shows that the immortals have more than a background role to play in this war. They, too, are deeply concerned with the outcome of the battle, and thus Rome, whose origins are both mythical and historical, has not lost, in the substance of the Augustan present, a sense of its mythical dimensions. As we have noted elsewhere, this style of presentation accords with Virgil's earlier description of the fall of Troy (2.602–623). There Aeneas could view divine agents engaged in warfare that shaped and paralleled human events. Aeneas was given a rare chance by his divine mother to see the workings of the immortals; the mysteries of the divine colloquy between Jupiter and Juno in Book 12 would remain private to gods and the reader. The immortals participate also in the battle at Actium, where Mars rages in the midst. Anubis and the anthropomorphic gods of Cleopatra's Egypt face Neptune and Minerva—veterans of the destruction of Troy, we

might note—and also Venus (who was most decidedly not involved in the ruin of Priam's city).

Yet not only does the divine/human parallelism hold significance here, but also the frequent repetition of specific groups of three or threefold grammatical constructions all would seem to lead up to the paradoxically inenarrabile textum of the shield's description. Beyond the obvious tripartite temporal consideration of Rome's past and its future hinging upon the hopeful reality of the Augustan present, the repetition of threes has been pointing toward something very specific on the shield, a scene located at the center of the armor and being described at what is most certainly the climax of this section of the narrative and of the book as a whole:

But Caesar, borne in triple triumph into the walls of Rome, was consecrating to the Italian gods his undying votive offering—three hundred very great shrines through the entire city. The streets were resounding with happiness, games and applause; in every temple there was a chorus of matrons, and in all the sanctuaries there were altars, and before the altars slain bullocks were strewn upon the ground.
Aen. 8.714–719

That Virgil includes a detailed description of Augustus' triple triumph is far from insignificant. By its inclusion, Virgil places this triumphal procession on a par with the foundational myths and the great battles—whether victories or losses—of Rome's historical past. That this event is seen as central to the reformation of the Roman experience by Augustus—as the apex, as it were, of the Augustan Age—offers a cogent explanation for this book's frequent threefold repetitions. Notably, Augustus will celebrate the victory on three hundred altars. Roman history as a whole had led up to this grand celebration that, along with victories over Dalmatia and Egypt, focuses on the Actian victory. That signal event has rightly been called a feature that Weber has noted was a "public celebration, decreed by the government, that Vergil's contemporaries would themselves have witnessed."

Though the celebration of Augustus' triple triumph would seem to point to a welcome celebration of the beginning of the Augustan Age, the ending of the book does not leave us with the clear victory of

good over evil that the Hercules/Cacus battle had suggested. Rather, it is clear that Aeneas' perception of the events on the shield is well short of partial. However delightful the workmanship of the shield, Aeneas fails to understand the events recorded thereon (730), in the same way that the uninformed reader will fail to recognize in the reference to the river Euphrates a subtle recusatio of the epic genre and, with it, perhaps of the patriotic responsibility in the Augustan Age that engaging in the genre wholeheartedly might otherwise suggest. If the Euphrates reference questions the epic genre, does it also raise questions about the Augustan experience that Virgil's epic poem ostensibly celebrates? We shall never know, but the question is nonetheless legitimate.

We do know, however, that this poem is written on the theme of arms and a man, and there can be little doubt but that these are specifically the arms most central to this poem, along with the baldric that will spur Aeneas to the poem's ultimate act. We also know that, despite his lack of understanding, Aeneas will carry upon his shoulders the shield whose contents represent his own and his people's best hopes for the future. For the hero, the war that will prove to be the first forbidding step in the journey toward the Augustan future is itself by no means over. Indeed, it is just at hand. <>

[The Transformation of Athens: Painted Pottery and the Creation of Classical Greece](#) by Robin Osborne [Martin Classical Lectures, Princeton University Press, 9780691177670]

How remarkable changes in ancient Greek pottery reveal the transformation of classical Greek culture

Why did soldiers stop fighting, athletes stop competing, and lovers stop having graphic sex in classical Greek art? The scenes depicted on Athenian pottery of the mid-fifth century BC are very different from those of the late sixth century. Did Greek potters have a different world to see—or did they come to see the world differently? In this lavishly illustrated and engagingly written book, Robin Osborne argues that these remarkable changes are the best

evidence for the shifting nature of classical Greek culture.

Osborne examines the thousands of surviving Athenian red-figure pots painted between 520 and 440 BC and describes the changing depictions of soldiers and athletes, drinking parties and religious occasions, sexual relations, and scenes of daily life. He shows that it was not changes in each activity that determined how the world was shown, but changes in values and aesthetics.

By demonstrating that changes in artistic style involve choices about what aspects of the world we decide to represent as well as how to represent them, this book rewrites the history of Greek art. By showing that Greeks came to see the world differently over the span of less than a century, it reassesses the history of classical Greece and of Athenian democracy. And by questioning whether art reflects or produces social and political change, it provokes a fresh examination of the role of images in an ever-evolving world.

Excerpt: The pots painted in Athens in the middle of the fifth century BC depict different scenes from those painted at the end of the sixth century and depict them in a different way. This fact is so well known to scholars that it is taken for granted. In this book, I look more closely at what changes, and in particular at the changes in the scenes depicted, and I argue that rather than taking the changes for granted we should see them as the best evidence we have for the moral, political, and aesthetic preferences that constituted and distinguished classical Greek culture. Athenian pottery, I shall claim, not only offers us an unparalleled window through which to view the transformation from archaic to classical Greece, but also an insight into why that transformation took place.

[The Transformation of Athens: Painted Pottery and the Creation of Classical Greece](#) aspires to rewrite the history of classical Greek art by showing that the history of art—that is, the history of art of any period—needs to be a history that pays attention not only to an artist's style but also to an artist's choice of what to depict. It devotes its first chapter to establishing why, as a matter of theory, this is necessary and to showing what is problematic

about the way in which the history of Greek art has been written until now.

More particularly, this book aspires to rewrite the history of Athenian red-figure pottery in the years between the invention of the red-figure technique circa 520 BC and the middle of the fifth century. As chapter 2 argues, red-figure pottery offers unique possibilities for the sort of rewriting of art history that I am advocating because of the quantities in which it survives and because of the range of subject it represents. Past scholarship has often concentrated on the artists, at the expense of the subject matter of their art, or, when analyzing subject matter, has ignored the fact that the choice of scene changes over time; by contrast this study takes diachronic change as its central problem.

Most ambitiously, this book aims to change the way in which we write Greek history. In a way that both complements and reinforces the arguments that I made in *The History Written on the Classical Greek Body*, I argue that the changing representation of the world by painters of pottery offers a history of classical Athens that has the advantage of being quite independent of the categories, in particular the status categories, established and policed by literary texts.

In chapters 3-7 I look in turn at five subjects that attracted the attention of painters of red-figure pottery: athletics, warfare, sexual relations, relations with the gods, and the drinking party and its aftermath. My primary question in these chapters is how the choice of scenes relating to soldiers, athletes, courtship and sex, sacrifice and libation, the symposium, and the komos changed over time. But to assess the significance of these changes I run them against what we know from other sources of the history of these activities in Athens. I demonstrate that the changes in the scenes represented correlate most strongly not with changes in those particular activities in life but with the changes that occur in the representation of all scenes of "everyday life." That is, the history of images of warfare or of athletics or of sexual relations or of relations with the gods or of the symposium and komos is not determined by changes to fighting or what happened in the gymnasium, or to changes in how men and women or humans and gods related, or to changes in what

happened in and after drinking parties, but rather by a changed view of the world that encompassed all of these activities. I then test this observation by looking at the representation of the imagined life of satyrs and show that the changes that occur in the way that satyrs are represented follow precisely the same pattern as the changes in representation of areas of human life.

In the three concluding chapters I discuss how we might understand the historical significance of the pattern that I have discerned. I note that the pattern is exactly paralleled in sculpture that is produced throughout the Greek world. I explore the moral and political implications of the changes in the selection of scenes represented and make the case for the impact of aesthetic factors on how people saw the world and considered their own relation to it. I then discuss in some detail the ways in which the history of sculpture does and does not parallel the history represented in painted pottery and argue that the history of sculpture enables us to see an alternative view of the world being briefly espoused and then rejected. In a concluding discussion, I urge the historical importance of the impact of considerations of beauty.

It will not be hard, I hope, for a reader to perceive why this book aspires to change the way the history of art is written. What artists choose to represent was long neglected, as if style existed separate from content. But what of the revolution that I hope to effect in the writing of (Greek) history? The texts that we study were almost all written not simply at a definitive moment but for a definitive purpose; this makes it hard to recognize from texts when the way they present the world is instrumental, a means to an end, and when the way they see the world reflects a view generally shared across the society in which the particular text was written. Pots were painted at a definitive moment but rarely for a definitive purpose beyond "to sell." Painters wanted to attract buyers' attention, and might do that by being thought provoking, but they did not seek to teach. Insofar as the market for pottery was a discriminating one, it was certainly not narrow in its discrimination. The patterns of choice of scene to depict on pottery therefore have a strong chance of reproducing the way in which painters saw the world, unconstrained by any need

to persuade others or conform to others' views. Pots therefore offer us a much better glimpse of the way Athenians, and I maintain Greeks more generally, viewed the world than any text can do. Images offer us virtually no help with *histoire événementielle*, but it is with images that we should start in any discussion that concerns popular morality—and that means, among other things, every history of literature or history of philosophy. This is not simply because painted pottery offers a differently distorted and less distorting mirror, but because popular morality is so strongly shaped by how the world is seen, and how the world is seen is never not a matter of aesthetics.

The Argument of This Book

The story of making and matching is a story that might be told of many societies. Indeed, for Gombrich the attraction of the model was precisely its potentially wide application: what happened in Greece illustrated a bigger truth about the psychology of art. Gombrich was concerned with why what he termed the "Greek revolution" took place in Greece and not in Egypt, but the explanation he gave looked only to storytelling, and within storytelling to the possible magic of Homer: the *kouros* was turned into the *Kritios Boy* by the drive to narrative. Not every society has a widely diffused tradition of epic tales, but storytelling was certainly not limited to the Greeks.

Equally generalizable are the stories told of how one pot painter learns from and builds on the work of another. The particular tradition described may be peculiar to archaic Athens, but the pattern of craft apprenticeship, artistic education, and competition within the potters' quarter, fueled by the need to win and keep customers, is one that could potentially apply in any culture. Nor is Elsner's revolution in visuality one that can only happen once in history—the choice of whether to make the figures address the viewer or whether to have the viewer spectate a scene in which he or she is ill not involved is one that has to be made by every maker of figurative images.

That factors that can be found to operate across cultures play a part in the history of art in a particular culture is not in itself a problem—indeed it would be extraordinary if such factors were absent. But it is a problem if those factors are held

to act on their own. Art does not develop simply in accordance with the improving observational and motor skills of artists; the history of art is not simply an image of the development of the artistic skills of an individual from childhood to maturity.

But it is equally questionable whether explanations that have art's history shaped by outside "influence" or peculiar historical factors are any more plausible. Historical events and cultural influence shape art history only if they shape the way in which artists see the world, the world that artists see, or the world that their patrons want to have represented. Sculpture or painting on pottery are the means by which artists do things within the world, and when the sculptures or the paintings change, that is because what the artists want to do changes, or because to do the same things in a different world means doing them differently. But sculptures and pots do not do things in the world simply by the way they are painted or the style in which they are sculpted, they do things in the world because of what they represent, and what they represent is a matter of subject matter as well as of style.

The Athenian desire in the eighth century BC to have monumental grave markers created a demand met by outsize pots with figurative decoration. But the decision to show figurative scenes of burial on large pots was not a decision required by the use of pots as grave markers; rather, pots used as grave markers created an opportunity that artists exploited by showing scenes of the laying out of the body. In doing so, and perhaps even more in surrounding the scenes of the laying out of men's bodies with scenes of warriors, chariots, and ships, the artists fed back into the cemetery ideas that will themselves have influenced how Athenians viewed burial and regarded the dead. When, a hundred years later, an Athenian had the *Nessos Painter* produce an amphora in the black-figure technique showing Herakles attacking the centaur *Nessos* to stand on a grave, he was making a different sort of intervention in the cemetery—invoking not the idealized community on display at the funeral but the exotic world of myth with its monsters and hybrids. In doing so he presented those who visited the cemetery with an image of death not as a

social fact but as something coming from elsewhere that individuals fought with on their own. The different style of the later pot, and the greater proportion of its surface occupied by the scene, play a part in this story—but only a part. The changing subject matter cannot be ignored.

In this book, my concern is primarily with Athenian painted pottery of the later sixth and fifth centuries BC. Although substantial amounts of architectural sculpture survive from classical Greece, providing us with monuments whose temporal and physical context is unusually well secured, we are far less well supplied with freestanding sculpture. Large numbers of dedicatory statues have been recovered in excavations from archaic Greek sanctuaries, but the loss of classical freestanding statues to the melting pot once bronze became the usual material for such statues in the classical period means that even the architectural sculpture that we have cannot be properly contextualized.

By contrast several tens of thousands of the pots painted in Athens in the sixth and fifth centuries BC survive. And while a pot survives in only one of the many contexts in which it was used during its ancient life (most frequently its use in an Etruscan grave; sometimes simply its disuse in rubbish discard), their shapes and to some extent their own figurative decoration enable us to be reasonably confident about at least one other of their earlier contexts of use. What is more, although individual pots can be securely dated only in rare cases, when deposited in association with graves or buildings or episodes of destruction for which we have a firm date, the whole sequence of Athenian painted pottery has been studied in such detail that, despite some recent challenges to accepted chronology, we can be more or less confident of the broad date (plus or minus ten years) of any pot.

The combination of a very large sample, firm dating, and good contextual information means that in the case of pottery, by contrast to that of sculpture, we have a good chance of coming to understand what those who painted, bought, and deployed a pot were trying to do when they chose one scene rather than another. The figurative decoration on these pots is extremely various, but the scenes fall into a relatively small number of broad classes (representing myths and mythical

figures, war, athletics, sex, cult acts, the symposium and reveling, and such). In this book, I shall look at a substantial subsection of those pots and at some of those broad classes of scene. The patterns I am interested in are patterns of change in scenes representing, more or less directly, actions in which ordinary men and women engaged on a regular basis. I ask whether the marked changes that occur in the way scenes of athletic, military, sexual, sacrificial, sympotic, and satyric activity are represented on the red-figure pots painted between circa 520 and circa 440 BC can be accounted for by social, cultural, and political developments. In answering this question, I will try to show why history needs art history, but also why art history needs history. For, on the one hand, attention to changing representations of activities related to everyday life in art can offer us a guide to transformations of social expectations and values more sensitive than that offered by any textual sources. On the other, only when we can understand the implications of the artists' choices of what they represent and how they represent it, can we understand why those were the choices they made.

The chapters of this book fall into three sections. In chapter 2, I provide an account of the nature of Athenian painted pottery, to bring out the features of Athenian pots that make a study such as this possible. In chapters 3 and 4 I use the cases of scenes of athletes and of soldiers to establish the nature of the change in imagery that needs to be explained. In chapters 5 to 8, I examine how the change affects four other bodies of imagery that between them account for a great proportion of Athenian painted pottery—scenes of courtship and sex, of sacrifice, of the symposium, and of satyrs. In chapters 9 and 10 I explore how we can account for the change, and place the change in relation to the observations of both historians and art historians. In a brief conclusion, I then reflect back on what we have learned about classical Athens and what we have learned about the history of classical art. <>

[Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond](#) edited by Jacqueline Klooster, Baukje van den Berg [Mnemosyne. Supplements, Brill, 9789004365810]

[Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond](#) focuses on the important question of how and why later authors employ Homeric poetry to reflect on various types and aspects of leadership. In a range of essays discussing generically diverse receptions of the epics of Homer in historically diverse contexts, this question is answered in various ways. Rather than considering Homer's works as literary products, then, this volume discusses the pedagogic dimension of the Iliad and the Odyssey as perceived by later thinkers and writers interested in the parameters of good rule, such as Plato, Philodemus, Polybius, Vergil, and Eustathios.

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Excerpt: Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond: Introduction by Jacqueline Klooster and Baukje van den Berg

This book is the result of an international conference held at Ghent University in May 2015. It sets out to study the reception of Homer in the context of reflections on the good ruler in antiquity and beyond: how and why did later authors employ Homeric epic to reflect on various types and aspects of leadership? This also includes the reception of Homeric epic as Princes' Mirror. In this introduction, we address some preliminary points in order to shed light on the scope and importance of the topic. The first question to be addressed is what exactly is a Princes' Mirror and, next, whether the Homeric epics qualify as such or have been read as such (and if so, why). In a broader sense, this entails the question of how the reception of the epics functioned in various generically diverse ancient discussions of leadership. The last section considers the position of this book in the field of Homeric reception studies and announces its approach to the topic.

The Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond: The Princes' Mirror

The term 'Princes' Mirror' (*speculum regis/um* or *principis/um*) is not antique; it first appears as the title of Godfrey of Viterbo's treatise *Speculum Regum* (ca. 1180 AD). On the other hand, the concept of a guide of conduct for rulers, either explicitly didactic (in the form of a series of instructions) or implicitly so (through the narrative representation of fictional or legendary kings and princes), is already attested in Near Eastern and Egyptian texts of the second millennium BC, and knows a long tradition throughout classical antiquity. We do not find theorizing about such texts to the extent that speaking of an ancient 'genre' is warranted; it would rather seem that

there is a kind of anthropological universal at work in the desire to reflect on and advise the good king. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the title ‘peri basileias’, which is attested regularly throughout antiquity (e.g. for Dio Chrysostom’s *Orations* 1–4), did conjure up a set of specific expectations in readers.

As regards the image of the speculum or katoptron/esoptron, it may be pointed out that the particular metaphor of a ‘mirror (for rulers)’ does actually appear in antiquity, for instance in Seneca’s *De Clementia* when Seneca speaks to young Nero:

I have determined to write a book upon clemency, Nero Caesar, in order that I may as it were serve as a mirror to you, and let you see yourself arriving at the greatest of all pleasures.

SEN. Clem. pro. 1.1, trans. STEWART

To elaborate on the implications of this metaphor helps to pinpoint the aim of ‘Princes’ Mirrors’. As Schulte points out, through ‘reflection’ mirrors help the one who looks in them to adjust or correct himself; this goes for bathroom mirrors as much as for literary ones. Yet, as Seneca’s phrase makes clear, what is seen in the Princes’ Mirror is not necessarily an actual reflection of reality, but generally rather something that hovers between what is and what should be. The image in the mirror oscillates between a laudatory depiction of reality and admonitory praise of the (future) ideal (te tibi ostenderem perventurum ad voluptatem maximam omnium). In other words, Princes’ Mirrors usually have an encomiastic function as well as a protreptic and didactic one. Since such texts are aimed both at established rulers and at aspiring ones, we may expect them to frame their advice accordingly, now focusing more on praise (for the established ruler, e.g. Plinius’ *Panegyricus* for Trajan), now more on direct instruction and admonishments (for the young or prospective ruler, e.g. Seneca’s *De Clementia* for young Nero).

Numerous texts throughout antiquity reflect on aspects of leadership in generically and historically diverse contexts—we will encounter many of them throughout this volume. As regards the Princes’ Mirror more specifically, in the archaic and classical Greek world, selected passages from larger works

or entire texts could be said to answer to some degree to this ‘genre’. We can for instance think of Hesiod’s *Works and Days* (e.g. 201–204), and the fragmentary *Chironis Hypothēkai* attributed to him, which are allegedly based on the commandments of the wise educator of princes Chiron (whose advice is also referred to in Pindar’s *P.* 6.21–27). In addition, we have Theognis’ admonishments to Cynus; passages from Xenophon’s *Symposium* (e.g. 4.6), and more extensively his *Cyropaedia*, Agesilaus, and Hiero; Plato’s *State, Laws, Statesman, Charmides, Gorgias, and Critias*; Isocrates’ *Nicocles* and *Evagoras*.

From the Hellenistic era only fragments survive, but it is evident that there was a substantial literature on Kingship answering to the demand of the courts of the Diadochs. Besides the title of Stoic works ‘On Kingship’ from which unfortunately nothing remains, fragments of Neo-Pythagorean treatises by Diotogenes, Sthenidas, and Ekphantos survive, as well as the so-called *Aristeas* letter (second century BC), which describes in panegyric terms Ptolemy Philadelphus’ erudition and desire for knowledge of Jewish religion.

In the context of Roman rule we find Philodemus’ *On the Good King According to Homer*, a fragmentarily preserved treatise written for Calpurnius Piso, Philodemus’ patron. As mentioned above, Seneca wrote *De Clementia* for his royal pupil Nero. The four *Kingship Orations* of Dio Chrysostom are aimed at Trajan, as is Pliny the Younger’s *Panegyric*. Plutarch addressed his *Praecepta reipublicae gerendae* to a young man from Sardis who considered running for public office. Some also consider Marcus Aurelius’ *Meditationes* a form of Princes’ Mirror, ostensibly aimed at the author himself, but through him also at others. From late antiquity the *Caesares* of emperor Julian survive, a satirical dialogue about various historical imperial predecessors and their characteristics, and his panegyrics for Constantius II and Eusebia. To the same period belong the works of Libanius and Themistius, and of various Christian authors like Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*). We might say that Synesius’ *De Regno* forms the bookend of the ancient tradition, although the genre has a flourishing afterlife in the Byzantine era and the Latin Middle Ages.

Turning to a later age, we find that the topics regularly addressed in Princes' Mirrors are aptly summed up in the words of Niccolò Machiavelli, as Manuel Schulte also observes. In a letter to his friend Francesco Vettori about his treatise *Il Principe*, in 1513, Machiavelli writes that he has attempted to answer the questions 1) what a kingdom is, 2) what types of rule exist, 3) how one may obtain them, 4) how one may keep them, 5) and how one may lose them. It is between these five questions a Princes' Mirror plays itself out, also in antiquity. Some authors may be more interested in reflecting on the first two and produce theories and definitions of various types of rule and constitutions, others focus more on the latter three, i.e. the actual practice of (good or bad) rule and how it affects the state. These themes, of course, are also addressed in other ancient and later texts reflecting on the good ruler.

Besides these topics, a number of continuities in theme and form can be observed in the Princes' Mirrors. Most importantly, mythical, legendary, or historical examples illustrating specific virtues to be copied or vices to be abhorred occur frequently, to admonish established as well as prospective rulers (e.g. Alexander in Dio's second Kingship Oration for Trajan, or the many historical examples in Plutarch's *Praecepta reipublicae gerendae*, aimed at an aspiring young politician). This use of great examples from the past suggests that there is a similarity between Princes' Mirrors and ancient political biography, or even historiography more broadly. Looking at Cornelius Nepos or Plutarch, it is easy to understand how their descriptions of series of great men from the past were meant to function as Princes' Mirrors for aspiring rulers and the political elite. Plutarch actually uses the metaphor of the mirror himself to point out how this works:

I began the writing of my 'Lives' for the sake of others, but I find that I am continuing the work and delighting in it now for my own sake also, using history as a mirror and endeavouring in a manner to fashion and adorn my life in conformity with the virtues therein depicted. For the result is like nothing else than daily living and associating together, when I receive and welcome each subject of my history in

turn as my guest, so to speak, and observe carefully 'how large he was and of what mien' [Il. 24.630], and select from his career what is most important and most beautiful to know.

Plu. Aem. Paul. 1 trans. PERRIN

The Homeric quotation in this passage points to the pervasive influence of Homer in discussions of leadership. Indeed, Homeric heroes, too, could and often did function as exempla in such texts. Margalit Finkelberg in fact argues that throughout antiquity, there was a sense that the mythical past was continuous with Greek history and as a result, it became possible to mention Achilles and Brasidas, Nestor and Pericles in the same breath, as for example in Plato's *Symposium* [221], simply because they were seen as belonging to the same historical place.

Because of his status in education, Homer was the text par excellence when it came to the selection of such mythical examples, as will be addressed more fully below.

So what were the characteristics offered for imitation, whether through such examples or through direct instruction? Paradoxically, we may turn to an Anti-Princes' Mirror to explore this question. According to Wilhelm Blum (1981: 2), such an Anti-Fürstenspiegel is first found in Homer's description of Thersites (Il. 2.211–269). Thersites' physical appearance, social position among the heroes, manner of speech, and general character all point in the direction of an extremely negative appraisal, which reverses the aristocratic norm or ideal:

Now the others sat down and were restrained in their places, only Thersites still kept chattering on, of measureless speech, whose mind was full of a great store of disorderly words, with which to revile the kings, recklessly and in no due order, but whatever he thought would raise a laugh among the Argives. Ugly was he beyond all men who came to Ilios: he was bandy-legged and lame in one foot, and his shoulders were rounded, hunching together over his chest, and above them his head was pointed, and a scant stubble grew on it. Hateful was he to Achilles above all, and to Odysseus, for those two he was in the habit of reviling;

but now with shrill cries he uttered abuse against noble Agamemnon. With him were the Achaeans exceedingly angry, and indignant in their hearts. Il. 2.211–223

Thersites is ugly and disabled, he speaks both too much and not in an orderly way, he is only out for laughs, and he creates divisiveness. He is also hated by what are arguably the two best heroes of the Iliad, Achilles and Odysseus, and hates and reviles them in return. It follows, and can be amply illustrated by Homeric quotations, that a 'Good Ruler' according to Homer should in all ways be his opposite: he should be of sound body, perhaps even physically beautiful (as the Homeric heroes frequently are), he should be a wise and pleasant speaker, whose words are honey-sweet, he should aim at reaching consensus among the group, or at least be concerned with what benefits the community, and justly praise the good acts of his peers with friendly words. If this characterizes his behaviour, the people will revere him like a god, and he will be like a herdsman of the people, protecting them. In Thersites, reversals of these implicit norms and negative narratorial qualifications make abundantly clear what the audience's opinion regarding this 'hero' should be. Later texts, such as Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer*, indeed point to the use of Thersites as a negative example.

Yet, interestingly enough, there are also a number of works praising Thersites to be found in antiquity. These appear, not surprisingly perhaps, in the context of progymnasmata of the Second Sophistic and beyond. The fourth-century orator Libanius, for instance, in a full-blown encomium, ingeniously and counter-intuitively argues that Thersites is actually an excellent example of virtue: he is not of lowly birth, to begin with, but related to prince Diomedes. In his youth, he moreover participated in the heroic hunt for the Calydonian boar, like a true aristocrat. His deformity is the result of a disease that later befell him, and he should not be blamed on account of it. In fact, it is extremely praiseworthy in him that he should have come to Troy even so, instead of trying to escape his duties like the able-bodied Achilles and Odysseus had done. Odysseus' and Achilles' initial unwillingness to participate in the war also explains the mutual enmity between courageous Thersites and these 'heroes', according

to Libanius. Thersites' tendency to speak truth to power (as in Iliad 2.225–242) was not aimed at drawing the laughs, then, but to point out the despicable and unbeneficial behaviour of the leaders, enthralled as they are by their desire for women and money. That Odysseus resorts to violence and Agamemnon offers no response to Thersites' attacks proves only how well-grounded his accusations are—and moreover, he is really repeating what Achilles had already brought forward and which no one finds fault with. Thersites, in sum, is nothing less than a Demosthenes *avant la lettre*, Libanius triumphantly and no doubt playfully concludes.

As this Homeric passage and its reception demonstrate, even an ostensibly negative example can be used in several ways. The audience may extrapolate positive princely qualities from their negation, but one can also simply take any example as a starting point (*aphormē* is the word used by Philodemus in his treatise) and proceed to twist it around ingeniously, as Libanius does. Of course, the more regular mode of extracting or constructing a canon of virtues from examples was by quoting the positive descriptions of Homeric and other historical or legendary rulers and their great deeds. As we have now seen, a kingly physique, and a righteous and wise and eloquent manner of speech that benefits the community belong to the core values of Homeric kingship. In particular the descriptions of Agamemnon as a herdsman of the people (Il. 2.243), or a strong bull among the cows (Il. 2.480–484), and Odysseus' description of the blissful state of the country where a pious and just king rules (Od. 19.107–114) proceeded to have great influence on Greco-Roman thinking about leadership. The values incorporated in these 'good rulers' would have a long legacy, and numerous other similar qualities like clemency, constancy, magnanimity, generosity, truthfulness, piety, wisdom, urbanity, education, and physical courage would be added by later political theorists, often basing themselves on Homeric examples.

Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond: Homeric Epic as Princes' Mirror

This brings us to the question of whether the Homeric epics qualify as Princes' Mirrors. As Irene

de Jong points out in this volume, the answer to this question depends to a large degree on whether or not one chooses to ascribe to Homer a didactic intention. Most modern scholars would probably hesitate to state that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have an outright didactic outlook, even if in the past this view has certainly, and not entirely unconvincingly, been voiced, for instance by Werner Jaeger and Eric Havelock. The appraisal of Homer's didactic intentions necessarily also affects the question of whether Homeric

epic qualifies as Princes' Mirror, a type of text that qualitate qua has a didactic aim. Scholars have held various opinions about this. Richard Martin recognizes in *Odyssey* 19.107–114 elements of a widespread archaic doctrine of sacred kingship. This is why he argues that Homer participates in an age-old tradition of kingship literature or Princes' Mirrors. Manuel Schulte, who denies an overall didactic intent, sees Homer's epics mainly as Vorläuferliteratur in which various passages do point towards this tradition. Michael Roberts goes further and holds that Homeric poetry both stands in an age-old tradition of literature providing guidelines for rulers and 'formed the basis for the tradition of the Princes' Mirror for a millennium'. Finally, in this volume Irene de Jong focuses on 'the birth of the Princes' Mirror' in Homeric epic by pointing out various discrete passages that emphatically centre on the theme of the advice for the young or prospective ruler.

So whether or not we decide to label the whole of Homer's epics didactic, it is certainly true that in the *Iliad* advice for the ruler or education of a young prince is made central to the action in a number of important scenes. Thus, at 1.254–284 the wise counsellor Nestor advises Agamemnon and Achilles to stop quarrelling; at 9.434–605 Phoenix tries to convince Achilles to let go of his wrath by telling him exemplary tales; at 11.655–803 Nestor speaks at length to Patroclus to make him convince Achilles to return to battle—and the list could be made much longer. Important passages in the *Odyssey* can also be read as disquisitions on good rule (Odysseus' reign as it was on Ithaca before he left, in particular the ideals he expresses regarding kingship, 8.166–181; 19.107–122), and again, its opposite (the suitors' squandering of Ithaca's

wealth). Telemachus' 'Bildungsroman' in Books 1–4 in particular reads like an instruction for young aristocrats. Indeed, the figure of Athena, taking on the physical appearance of Odysseus' friend Mentos/Mentor and advising Telemachus on what steps to take, lives on even today in our word mentor.

Apart from these distinctly didactic passages, it is clear in any case that political themes like good governance, consensus and discord, the relation between individual and collective, or 'merit and responsibility', belong to the central concerns of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. As Osborne notes:

Homeric epic is highly political. The *Iliad* explores relations between paramount chiefs in the context of a rather exceptional form of intercity warfare. The *Odyssey* examines issues of political succession in an extreme situation of political vacuum and uncertainty. The desirability of self-government, and the importance to individuals of status and power within the community, go without question.

These political themes made Homer, as David Elmer notes with regard to the *Iliad*, 'good to think with' in political debate. Already in antiquity Aristotle and others used Homeric quotations to discuss issues such as the distribution of honour in proportion to the individual's contribution to the wellbeing of the community. Thus Aristotle (Pol. 1267a1) cites *Iliad* 9.318–319: 'Stay at home or work your hardest, your share will be the same, coward and hero are given equal honour.' And examples could—and will, in this volume—be multiplied.

This practice ran up against the objections of some ancient thinkers, most (in)famously Plato. As Nietzsche ([1887] 1988: 154) remarked, 'Homer versus Plato, that is the complete, the genuine antagonism.' He was no doubt thinking among others of the following famous passage, the ultimate demonstration of the way Plato's Socrates tries to dethrone Homer as 'educator of the Greeks':

'Then, Glaucon', said I, 'when you meet encomiasts of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator of Hellas, and that for the conduct and education of human affairs he is worthy of our study

and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet, we must love and salute them as doing the best they can, and concede to them that Homer is the most poetic of poets and the first of tragedians, but we must know the truth, that we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men. For if you grant admission to the honeyed Muse in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best.' 'Most true', he said.

PL. R. 10.606e–607a trans. Shorey

Plato's vehemence actually demonstrates how widely it was believed throughout antiquity that one could learn practically everything from Homer. Not only were *Iliad* and *Odyssey* read in schools as 'classics', but many also believed the epics could and did illustrate ideas about the management of human affairs and so about good rule. In other words, they also functioned as guidelines for rulers, which is precisely what is condemned and rejected in this passage. As Socrates argues, philosophers should rule, not the 'honeyed Muse in lyric and epic'. The point of this passage is clearly that philosophers are capable of reasonable government, whereas the poets' depictions of government are uninformed, irrational and hence not trustworthy, and certainly not to be adopted as authoritative.

But as is well known, Plato is the exception: antiquity's readings of Homer were predominantly positive and normative. This positive appraisal is reflected in the tendency to read his epics as *Princes' Mirrors*. The practice maybe illustrated, for instance, by a striking passage from Isocrates' *Panathenaicus*, which takes Agamemnon, often seen as a problematic ruler by modern scholars, as the ultimate example of good rule.

He commanded an army which had come together from every city, a host whose size may be imagined since it contained many of the descendants of the gods and of the direct sons of gods—men who were not of the same temper as the majority of mankind nor on the same plane of thinking, but full of spirit and passion and envy and ambition—and yet he held that army

together for ten years, not by great bribes nor by outlays of money, by which means all leaders nowadays maintain their power, but by the supremacy of his intelligence [*phronēsis*], by his ability to provide from the enemy subsistence for his soldiers, and most of all by his reputation of being better advised in the interest of others than others in their own interest. ISOC. *Panath.* 81–82 trans. Norlin, adapted

This passage illustrates how far such a positive reading of Homer's kings could go, and how natural it apparently was to take the example of the legendary ruler Agamemnon to say something useful about contemporary politics. Indeed, as has already transpired a number of times in this introduction, a variety of ancient works are entirely dedicated to the theme of learning about good rule from Homer, such as the first century BC epicurean philosopher Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer*, Dio Chrysostom's *Kingship Orations*, and Porphyry's lost treatise *On the Utility of Homer for Kings*, whose title is transmitted in the *Suda*.

Apart from these specialized treatises, the practice of reading Homeric epic as providing examples of good (and occasionally bad) rule and hence (implicit) instructions for rulers, or reflections on the practice of kingship, is extremely widespread in ancient literature, as this book aims to show. Since moreover discussion about the definition of good governance and the question what type of constitution was best are among the evergreen topics of Greek and Roman ethical and political philosophy, it is clear that the reception of Homeric epic as a reflection on politics and different styles of leadership is immense, as well as immensely important.

Aim and Scope of the Book

The pervasiveness and importance of the topic make it all the more remarkable that, to date, no scholarly attempts have been made to produce a sustained inquiry into the development of the reception of Homer's good ruler and the Homeric epics as *Princes' Mirror* in ancient Greek and Latin literature, let alone beyond. Some studies address specific aspects of the theme: the *Iliad* is discussed as a poem about 'politics' in a number of works.

The reception of Homeric epic as Princes' Mirror forms the theme of various monographs on specific texts, both in ancient and modern reception studies. Such analyses of, for example, Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer* and Dio Chrysostom's *Kingship Orations*, however, typically treat the theme solely in relation to their specific topic and text, not in the context of an overall and comparative treatment. Plato's reaction to Homer's influence on Greek education is a subject of its own. Bizer's 2011 study, [Homer and the Politics of Authority in Renaissance France](#), again, only looks at the political reception and appropriation of Homer in Renaissance France. What is lacking, however, is a fuller treatment of this pervasive and important theme throughout European culture.

A number of reasons for this absence can be identified. In the first place, despite many historical, sociological, and cultural approaches, modern scholarship has long tended to focus on Homeric poetry as 'literature'; it has often approached Homeric epic mainly through a study of stylistic, structural or thematic issues, rather than focusing on the cultural or societal roles its reception may have played in the ancient world. Although general awareness that Homer was read as a compendium of values has certainly never been absent, the modern tendency has nevertheless been to consider the epics as 'literary products' rather than didactic texts. As Eric Havelock phrased it:

To approach Homer in the first instance as a didactic author is asking a good deal from any reader and is not likely to win his early sympathy. The very overtones of the word 'epic' implying as they do the grandiose sweep of large conceptions, vivid action and lively portraiture, seem to preclude such an estimate of Greece's first poet. Surely for Homer the tale is the thing.

Whereas this focus on Homer as literature is no longer so predominant in Homeric studies, it does explain why studies of Homeric epic as Princes' Mirror and its reception have not been undertaken at an earlier stage.

As pointed out earlier, Homeric epic as Princes' Mirror can be considered a sub-topic of the theme of Homeric epic as a didactic, educative text, a compendium of societal values and ethical norms

with quasi-encyclopaedic stature for the Greeks. As such, it has been treated within the context of Homer's educative value in general, albeit mostly cursorily. For instance, the reception of Homeric epic as an instruction text for orators (who are often engaged in political rule) has been studied frequently. It seems likely that this somewhat scattered approach has obscured the possibility of attempting a more general focus on this specific strain of advice for rulers in Homeric reception.

Finally, the topic of the reception of Homer as Princes' Mirror and Homeric ideas of rulership is enormously, perhaps even dauntingly, broad, since, as Aeschylus already saw, the whole of Greek literature could be seen as 'slices of Homer's banquet' (Ath. 8.347e). This means that there are innumerable texts one could turn to for interpretations of the Homeric epics as Princes' Mirrors, and completeness becomes a near impossible aim—and let it be clear right away that this book does not strive for such completeness but merely wishes to undertake a first more sustained effort to look at this line of reception. It is hoped that this will inspire further research in this direction.

Of key importance in any study on (classical) reception is the idea that reception is a two-way process: studying the way in which Homer is received in, say, Silius Italicus' *Punica* elucidates the *Punica* as much as (Silius' reading of) Homeric epic. The source text is re-interpreted, reshaped, and received under influence of what Jauß, building on Gadamer's thought, designates as 'the horizon of expectations' of any given period. In other words, the reception of Homer is influenced by both the historical, social, and cultural context of the receiver and the generic and rhetorical constraints of the receiving text. For the didactic reception of Homer specifically, this means that the receivers tend to read their own programme into the Homeric epics, a programme that reflects the needs and preconceptions of their own period and genre. More concretely, this means that an ancient scholiast is likely to read into Homeric epic a different concept of the good ruler than Eustathios in twelfth-century Byzantium; Philodemus in the Imperial Period may use Homeric epic to propagate different qualities of the good ruler than Christophoros Kondoleon in sixteenth-century

Italy. Similarly, we may expect to find a different reading of Homer in Plato's philosophical works, Polybius' *Histories*, or Plutarch's anecdotal *Table Talk*, depending on differences not so much of historical period but of genre. This volume, then, aims to explore a multiplicity of 'receptions' of Homer's Good Ruler over a large span of time and in diverging genres. In doing so, it hopes to shed light on the reception of Homer as political and educational text, which was appropriated according to the needs of a specific period, on the one hand, and to explore these needs and ideas of good rulership in specific periods, on the other hand.

To illustrate this multiplicity and diversity, the current collection of essays studies generically different texts which each incorporate readings of Homeric epic in order to reflect on rulership and forms of governance. It offers readings of Homeric epic as a Princes' Mirror in the works of certain authors within their own historical context, in order to provide, in the end, a diachronic overview of how Homeric epic functioned as such throughout antiquity and beyond, in Byzantium, the Early Modern Period, and the twentieth century. It thus aims to trace both change and continuity in the reception of Homer and in conceptions of good rule throughout the ages.

In order to trace the diachronic development, the papers in this collection are arranged chronologically, starting with Homer himself. As mentioned above, Irene de Jong opens the volume by exploring the 'birth of the Princes' Mirror' in Homeric poetry by discussing discrete examples of advice to young or prospective rulers in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Next, Will Desmond highlights one aspect, viz. the piety of the Homeric ruler, who is godlike on the one hand and a representative of his people before the gods on the other. Desmond focuses on the important figures of Odysseus and Achilles in particular, tracing moreover the reception of the latter's piety as a model for Aeneas, Alexander, and Julian. The third paper, by Jacqueline Klooster, explores Phoenix' definition of the good ruler as a doer of deeds and a speaker of words (Il. 9.443), that is to say, as possessing both excellence in counsel and physical courage. The paper discusses both its implications within the

Iliad and its reception in antiquity, addressing topics and texts to be further explored in other papers along the way. As such, these three papers shed light on Homer's conception of the good ruler in both a synchronic and diachronic perspective, in Homer and in Homeric reception, and thus provide a useful basis for the readings of individual authors to follow.

These readings, ironically one may say, start with Plato, Homer's most passionate opponent. Patrick Lake analyses the Homeric quotations in Book 3 of the *Republic* and argues that Plato in fact uses his interpretation of these passages to support his idea of good rule and obedience, thus making poetry an ally of, rather than an adversary to philosophy. Elsa Bouchard explores the largely positive reception of Agamemnon—a problematic ruler in modern eyes—in the Homeric scholia and *zētēmata* tradition. Maria Gerolemou focuses on Odysseus, demonstrating how Polybius uses this figure in his *Histories* as an example of his idea of a good ruler who has gained geographical knowledge and useful experience through his wanderings.

The next papers explore various generically diverse texts from the Imperial Age, from its beginnings to its later ages, from the Greek as well as the Roman world. Jeffrey Fish identifies the qualities of the good ruler that Philodemus reads in the Homeric epics, providing a fuller picture than ever before thanks to newly edited fragments. Casper de Jonge studies a Greek scholar in Rome and argues that Dionysius of Halicarnassus' ideas on good rule—exemplified to some extent by Homer's swineherd Eumaeus—were part of the same intellectual and socio-cultural world as Augustus' ideas on good rule—exemplified to some extent by Virgil's Arcadian king Evander. David Driscoll delves into Plutarch's *Table Talk* and specifically the anecdotes told by middle-class symposiasts in which the Homeric epics are quoted to rulers, in order to shed light on the socio-cultural role of *paideia* and of knowledge of Homer in the Imperial Age. Elina Pyy takes us to Flavian Rome and analyses the reception of Homer's ideal of heroism and rulership in the heroic code as set out by Silius Italicus in his *Punica*, showing that this is no

longer appropriate to the situation in the Roman Empire after the civil wars.

The final papers move beyond antiquity to twelfth-century Byzantium, sixteenth-century Europe, and the Great War in the twentieth century. The paper by Baukje van den Berg analyses Eustathios of Thessalonike's praise of emperor Manuel I Komnenos as a good ruler qua orator. It points to similarities that Eustathios perceives between the excellent oratory of Manuel and of Homer as summus orator to shed light on twelfth-century ideas on oratory and the reception of Homer herein. Filippomaria Pontani provides an analysis of Kondoleon's *On the Good King According to Homer*, a text that has hardly been studied before. The document is a moralistic manifesto, providing rulers in sixteenth-century Italy with examples of qualities that good rulers should have and did have in the good old times. Finally, the *Iliad* is used as a negative Princes' Mirror in Robert Graves' translation *The Anger of Achilles*, as Laura McKenzie argues in the last contribution. Her paper explores how Graves attempts to come to terms with his traumatic experiences in the Great War through his translation of the *Iliad*, making the rulers in the *Iliad* 'mirror' the rulers in the War, i.e. the commanders of the army.

Taken together, all papers show how rich and versatile the history of reading the Homeric epics as Princes' Mirror is and will probably always remain. <>

[A History of Mind and Body in Late Antiquity](#) by Anna Marmodoro and Sophie Cartwright [Cambridge University Press, 9781107181212]

The mind-body relation was at the forefront of philosophy and theology in late antiquity, a time of great intellectual innovation. This volume, the first integrated history of this important topic, explores ideas about mind and body during this period, considering both pagan and Christian thought about issues such as resurrection, incarnation and asceticism. A series of chapters presents cutting-edge research from multiple perspectives, including history, philosophy, classics and theology. Several chapters survey wider themes which provide context for detailed studies of the work of individual philosophers including Numenius, Pseudo-

Dionysius, Damascius and Augustine. Wide-ranging and accessible, with translations given for all texts in the original language, this book will be essential for students and scholars of late antique thought, the history of religion and theology, and the philosophy of mind.

ESSAY: Iamblichus by John F. Finamore
Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 245-325 CE) was a pivotal figure in the history of Platonism. We know little of his early life, but Eunapius in his *Lives of Philosophers and Sophists* 458 reports that he studied with Anatolius, the pupil of Porphyry and later with Porphyry himself, probably in Rome. Iamblichus established his own school, perhaps in the 290s, in Syria, either in Apamea or Daphne.¹ Although Iamblichus studied with Porphyry, the two of them disagreed about the nature of the human soul and the role of religion in its salvation.

In this essay I will discuss Iamblichus' doctrine of the rational soul, its double nature, and its association with and separation from the Intellect. The investigation will lead to a related inquiry into the role of theurgy in human life, particularly the soul's re-ascent to Intellect and how Iamblichus framed his doctrine of the soul in line with his belief in the theurgic ascent.

Iamblichus set out his theory of the soul in the *De anima*, a work which exists in large fragments in John Stobaeus' *Anthology*. After a discussion and criticism of earlier authors (most of which is lost), Iamblichus sets out his own view in sections 6-7. Iamblichus begins by grouping other Platonists (Numenius, Amelios, Plotinus and Porphyry) into one camp and himself into another. These Platonists — each to a different degree, Iamblichus claims — do not properly differentiate soul from Intellect or indeed separate various grades of soul. Of the doctrine of these philosophers, he writes:

They establish in the individual soul the Intelligible Realm, the gods, daemons, the Good, and all the classes superior to it, and they assert that all things are present in the same way in all things but appropriately in each thing according to its essence.

What concerns Iamblichus is a kind of blurring of the boundaries between higher entities and the human soul. The human soul is different in its

essence from these higher sorts of being, and what previous Platonists have done (according to Iamblichus) is grant the soul too much authority and power. He writes:

But the opinion opposed to this one separates the soul, since it comes into being from Intellect in a secondary way in a different hypostasis, and explains the aspect of the soul that is with Intellect as dependent on Intellect but as subsisting with it independently in its own right, and it [the opinion] separates it [the soul] from all the superior classes.

Iamblichus makes three separate points. First, Intellect and Soul are separate hypostases, and as such the human soul is ipso facto inferior to Intellect and dependent on it. Second, there is some aspect of the human soul itself that is associated with Intellect but is nonetheless separate from it. (This, as we shall see, is an intellectual potentiality in the soul.) Third, besides being separate and distinct from Intellect, the human soul is also separate from higher forms of soul. Thus, the human soul derives or emanates from Intellect, but exists separately and independently from it, but in a distinctly inferior mode. In this way, Iamblichus says, it is truly a mean between the world of becoming and all the entities above it.

Later in the *De anima*, Iamblichus returns to the soul's connection to Intellect. About the soul's intellect (which in the passage above he had termed 'the aspect of the human soul that is with Intellect'), he writes:

The more ancient [writers] [hoi archaioteroi] beautifully [leaks] assign a boniform disposition, similar to that of the gods in intellect, and a caring for what is here [i.e., in the world of becoming].

The phrase *hoi archaioteroi* is a reference to writers more ancient than Plato, such as the Egyptians and Chaldeans, whose doctrines (Iamblichus believed) held older versions of Platonic truths. Their opinions are therefore Iamblichus' own.¹ The adverb *kalōs* further emphasizes that we are dealing with Iamblichean doctrine. The doctrine again differentiates Iamblichus' view from those of the other Platonists. The human soul does not have an intellect of its own; it rather has a disposition towards intellectual activity. Thus, the soul is

completely divorced from the Intellect except for a certain propensity towards it. The disposition is 'boniform' (*agathoeide*), literally 'good in form' because it derives ultimately from the Good or One. What the soul possesses is a capacity to engage at different levels (whether at the level of Intellect or the One), but the soul is not any of the higher entities. Iamblichus makes a similar point in *On Mysteries* 1.5, where he writes that whereas the gods have access to the Good itself, the essence of the Good (*ousia tou agathou*)⁹ is not present to human souls; rather the souls possess 'a kind of holding apart from and acquiring of it' (*epoche tis ap' autou kai hexis*). Here too the One and Intellect are not immediately present to human souls but are rather separate entities towards which souls must somehow strive. Indeed, as we shall see, the soul is dependent on the higher entities to activate its capacity to intelligize and eventually to unite with the One. The effect is to leave the soul isolated and in need of external aid even to engage in intellection. Earlier Platonists, such as Plotinus, who thought that they could initiate an ascent to the intellect and engage in intelligizing on their own were, Iamblichus believed, sadly mistaken.

In the first passage from the *On the Soul* that we considered (sect. 6), Iamblichus named various higher entities besides the Intellect and the One: the gods, daemons and classes superior to the soul. fr. 2 of his *Parmenides* commentary makes clearer what these superior classes are and how different they are from human souls. Proclus (in whose commentary the fragment is found¹⁰) remarks that Iamblichus has a unique view about the contents of the dialogue's Third Hypothesis. Rather than taking it as referring to rational human souls, as all other Neoplatonists did, he associates the Hypothesis with the superior classes (fr. 2.7-11). Iamblichus posits that the third [Hypothesis], not yet concerning soul, as those before them [had thought], but concerning the classes superior to us, angels, demons, and heroes — for these classes are immediately dependent on the gods and are also superior to the universal souls themselves. They make this most astonishing statement and for this reason they understand this group to come before souls in the Hypotheses.

The superior classes provide another layer of buffering between the human soul and Intellect. What Iamblichus has effected is simultaneously a further separation of soul from Intellect and additional links between them. These two seemingly contrary features are a cornerstone of Iamblican religious philosophy, making the soul isolated and at a greater remove from Intellect while providing the means (by gradual stages) to reconnect soul and Intellect. We will return to this dual role of the intermediaries at the end of the chapter.

Iamblichus differentiates the superior classes in book II of the *On Mysteries*. He considers separately, chapter by chapter, the different qualities displayed among the various ranks of these superior classes: the way they reveal themselves to us (*epiphaneiai*, 11.3), the speed with which they carry out their operations (*ochutés en tais energeiais*, 11.4, p. 56.4-22), the amount of illumination that accompanies their revelation (*megethos ton epiphaneion*, 11.4, pp. 56.23-57.19), the vividness of the images that appear from themselves (*enargeia tōn autophanon agalmatōn*, 11.4, pp. 57.20—8.9), and so on. Iamblichus ranks the visible gods, archangels, angels, daemons, heroes, and souls, along with cosmic and hylic archons, and shows that each quality discussed is best displayed by the gods at the top of the list and least by the souls at the bottom, with a decrease at each successive stage. This arrangement and associated decrease in power among the superior classes is well exemplified in 11.5, pp. 59.21-60.2, where Iamblichus assigns each rank its own effectiveness in the purification of souls:

The purification of souls is perfect among the gods, but anagogic among the archangels. Angels merely free souls from the bonds of matter, but daemons drag them down into nature. Heroes lead them down into the care of works of the world of sensation. The archons handle the supervision of things either in the cosmos or in the material realm. Souls, when they appear, tend somehow downwards towards the realm of generation.

This example serves well to demonstrate both the decreasing efficacy of the superior classes as we descend down the scale and also the pivotal point

of the chain at the level of daemons. The visible gods (the stars and planets), being gods, are able to effect the purification of human souls completely. Archangels may lead souls up (to the gods, presumably) for purification but do not effect the purification themselves. Angels free souls from the material realm, but leave the ascent to the archangels. Up to this point, the emphasis is on the higher world that is free from matter. With the daemons, we enter the material realm. Daemons take souls down into that world, while heroes lead them more specifically to tasks that occur in this realm. Pure souls" also descend into matter, where they no doubt aid human beings in coping with life there. Cosmic archons care for the cosmos, which is free from matter, and so would be ranked closely with the gods, archangels and angels; enhylic daemons with the world of matter and so are ranked with daemons, heroes and souls.

The embodied human soul, therefore, is separated by multiple entities from the Intellect and the Good. Each of the superior classes has an individual role to play based on how far they are directly involved with matter. The further removed from the material world and the taint that matter causes, the higher the power the divinity possesses. As natural a distinction as this may sound, it was controversial. Neither Proclus nor Damascius allowed any of the superior classes to descend into matter. The precise nature controversy is beyond the scope of this chapter, but in outline it may be expressed as follows. The role of the superior classes has its Platonic origin in the *Phaedrus* in Socrates' speech about the soul. Socrates imagines Zeus travelling in the cosmos with a band of eleven Olympian gods, each with a cohort of daemons and souls.' The gods travel easily to the boundary of the cosmos and commune with the Forms. The human souls in the gods' train have at best only a glimpse of the Forms and then descend to earth, live there, and are reborn in another body. Those who choose the philosophical life three lifetimes in a row escape the cycle of rebirths for a time (249a1-5). About this latter group, Plato writes: This is the Law of Necessity: Whichever soul becomes a follower of the god and sees something of true reality will be without pain until another cycle, and if it is always able to do so, it is always free from harm.' Proclus and Damascius interpreted this passage to mean

that all the superior classes were able to follow their gods eternally without suffering the pain of embodiment. Iamblichus, on the other hand, believed that it meant some of the superior classes (gods, archangels and angels) were free from matter and embodiment but that others (daemons, heroes and pure souls) were not. His reason is clear enough: daemons, heroes and pure souls appear in our realm and interact with matter (although in a pure way).

Iamblichus coupled this interpretation of the Phaedrus myth with Plato's doctrine in the Symposium 202d11-203a7 that daemons were intermediaries between gods and human beings to show that the human soul was trapped in the material world and lacked the means on its own to ascend again. The doctrine of Book II of *On Mysteries* shows that Iamblichus also believed that the superior classes and gods could aid in the soul's re-ascent. Theurgy provided the means of ascent, and philosophy provided the metaphysical explanation for its efficacy. Gradually, a human being could gain its higher place in the cosmos. Thus the soul's ascent is brought about by the higher beings in the great chain of divinities that stretches from the One through Intellect to the visible gods, and all the superior classes.

Iamblichus' doctrine of the ascent originates in part from his interpretation of the soul's descent in *Timaeus* 41d8-42a3, where the Demiurge distributes human souls among the stars, mounts them (as Iamblichus would have it) onto their own etherial vehicles, and then sows soul-and-vehicle into the planetary bodies, and from there they descend into material bodies. For Iamblichus, the descent of soul includes the souls' connection to the superior classes. The human soul is an immaterial substance fashioned by the Demiurge, who then places each soul in the souls of the individual stars. From there the soul is attached to its own immortal etherial vehicle that the Demiurge also fashions. This quasi-material vehicle allows the soul to descend into and through the etherial zone inhabited by the planetary gods, who have etherial vehicles of their own. Each soul attaches its vehicle to its own god's vehicle. (This would be the same god in whose train the soul followed in the *Phaedrus* myth.) Since the god also has superior

classes in its train (as we have seen), the human soul has a natural affinity with them as well. In the *Timaeus*, the Demiurge passes the soul to the planetary gods who then fashion the human body from the four elements, and the soul descends into the world of generation. It is natural, therefore, that the soul would rely on the superior classes to aid in its reascent, since these same divinities were present to it before the descent and are metaphysically closer to the souls than the gods are. The role of theurgy is to put us back into contact with the divinities from whom we became separated after the trauma of descent and birth.

Thus far we have seen that the human soul is isolated in the world of becoming, unable to ascend without divine aid, and incapable of intellection because it lacks an intellect of its own, possessing instead a disposition towards intellection. In order to understand how the human soul functions both when existing below in the world of becoming and above in the Intelligible Realm and how its intellectual potentiality is made actual, we must turn to the *De anima* commentary of Simplicius and the *Metaphrasis* in Theophrastum of Priscianus.

As we have seen, in section 7 of his *De anima* Iamblichus declared the median position of the soul — midway, that is, between Intellect and the gods above and the world of becoming below. This is the usual Platonic position. Simplicius, however, explains Iamblichus' position more fully, and we discover that it is more radical than the surviving fragments of the *De anima* indicate. For Iamblichus, Simplicius writes, the soul is a mean not just in its activities but in its very essence (Simplicius, *In De anima* 89 .33-5):

If, as Iamblichus thinks, a distorted and imperfect activity would not proceed from an impassive and perfect essence, it [i.e. the soul] would be somehow affected also in its essence.

Since the human soul, when it has descended into this lower realm, becomes engaged in lower-level activities, such as discursive thought, various desires and perceptions, these very activities must be a part of the soul's essence. This is another of Iamblichus' radical claims with which subsequent Neoplatonists disagreed. The soul in effect has a

double essence, one connected with its intellection and the other connected with its life in the body. It does not have intellection as a permanent trait, as Intellect does, nor does it have its lower-level activities permanently. This doubleness within the soul affects its life as it ascends and descends in its activities:

Because of its declension to the outside it simultaneously as a whole remains and proceeds, and it has neither [aspect] completely nor is [either aspect] removed from the other.

The 'declension to the outside' is the soul's descent away from its higher life with Intellect. Even in this descent, the soul both remains above and descends below. The soul is, as it were, at war with itself, having two contrary essences. It is, in a sense, like Heraclitus' logos, a vibrant balance between opposites.

Simplicius returns to this topic later in his commentary, and cites Iamblichus as his source for what he writes. In this long passage (240.33241.26), Simplicius discusses what happens to the soul as it alters from intellection to its lower activities and back again. The soul in its descent from its intellectual activity is described as being 'somehow dissipated or slackened' (241.9).³⁴ Iamblichus is attempting to differentiate between essential change (which he will not allow, since the soul remains soul throughout its alterations) and a slipping away (metaphysically and through descent) to a weakened use of the soul's essential properties. The lower soul's functions (desiring, perceiving and discursive thinking) are imagined as a diminished form of intellection. He differentiates two kinds of perfection in the human soul. One is attained at the level of Intellect when the soul itself engages in intellection; the other occurs once the soul has descended and actualizes its lower powers.³⁵ He then discusses the difference between the perfections. The perfection of the soul when it intelligizes he terms 'the highest perfection of the soul'. When it is engaged in activities below, he says that it is 'perfected and is perfect in a secondary manner'. He concludes

The [soul] that is sufficient to perfect its projected life, whether through theurgic practices or theoretical philosophy, although it is clearly not imperfect, would

itself perfect [itself] but not yet [be] perfect in accordance with lofty measures in such a way that it would belong to itself alone. But in the way of those things that perfect others (in accordance with which they exist), it leads itself forth and ascends to its own lofty perfection.

This passage is about the soul of an individual who has been trained via theurgy or philosophy to be prepared for ascent to the Intellect but who has not yet ascended. Such a soul possesses a sort of perfection (Iamblichus would say), but not the highest sort (in which one intelligizes). That highest perfection comes about from above, in the way that higher beings perfect lower ones. The soul, he says, owes its existence to these higher entities, and (it would seem) the soul rises to its highest perfection through them. Thus embodied individuals may perfect their corporeal life via theurgy and philosophy, and then (through further theurgy, presumably) may ascend further, with the aid of the Intellect, to the Intellect. The two perfections are opposed, and the soul possesses both (once it has attained them) simultaneously. As Simplicius writes (240.36-7), Iamblichus thinks that its highest essence doesn't remain the same when it descends. The soul is both free from its secondary lives and not free. As Simplicius also writes (241.11-12), the soul simultaneously preserves itself the same as itself and not the same. Its essence is to be both, and while it is one it is also becoming the other.

To see how Iamblichus' doctrine of the divided soul works together with his doctrine of the intellectual disposition in the soul, we must turn to Priscianus' discussion of the active and passive intellects in Aristotle's *De anima* (Metaphr. 25.30-26.29). Priscianus begins by looking at the association of the Intellect itself with what he calls 'the psychic intellect' (*ho psuchikos nous*, 26.12), i.e. with Iamblichus' intellectual disposition in the soul. It contains all the intelligible forms within itself, but not in the way that the Intellect itself does. Priscianus writes:

But because of its kinship to the soul, its essential relation to it, and its tendency somehow towards what is partial, it itself has descended from the unmixedly undivided and completely unified intellectual essence and activity. And the intelligible objects in it are removed from

the exceedingly bright and most self-revelatory hypostasis of the Primary Intelligibles. The nexus between the two [i.e. between the soul and its intelligible objects] has somehow been slackened and is not as sharp as the union in the separated [Intellect]

The vocabulary and doctrines in this passage are lamblichean. Just before this passage, Priscianus had begun with the soul's intellect existing at the level of the Intellect itself, and therefore capable of intelligizing, saying that it 'actualizes from itself and contains the intelligibles in itself' (kai aph' eautou energei, kai en eautō periechei ta noēta, 26.13-14). He then turns to the soul's descent from that high point to what lamblichus had termed the secondary perfection. The soul's intellectual capacity as it departs from the divine Intellect is reduced, and the soul begins its descent. As it does so its intellection becomes less pure; without the presence of the higher Intellect, its objects become less clear. Thus the psychic intellect and its relationship to and cognition of the intelligibles undergoes a slackening (kechalasmenē, 26.19), the same term we saw Simplicius use of the weakening of the soul in a similarly lamblichean context. The term suggests the soul's double nature.

Priscianus continues:

For these reasons with regard to purely undivided knowledge it has need of the Intellect that perfects in actuality, and the intelligible objects in it [have need of] the illumination from the separated intelligible objects in order that its own intelligible objects might be made perfect.

The soul when it has descended and lives in accordance with its lower life is separated from Intellect, and so its psychic intellect is, as we saw, weakened and cannot intelligize since it is bereft of the divine Intellect. Further, even the intelligible objects in it are rendered less clear. This combination makes intellection impossible for it.

Priscianus concludes by comparing the psychic intellect directly with the divine Intellect:

In this way the psychic intellect is potential as compared to the separated Intellect because the latter is purely undivided and unmixedly unified with regard to its Intelligible Objects, which are exceedingly

bright, primary, perfect lights, and thus it [i.e. the psychic intellect] is perfected by such an Intellect.

Priscianus employs Aristotelian terminology to express lamblichus' terms. The divine Intellect is the active intellect, and the intellectual disposition is the passive intellect. Echoing terminology from 26.14-20, Priscianus maps the Aristotelian intellects onto the lamblichean. The Intellect is completely undivided and unified; its objects are exceedingly bright. The human soul's disposition is not but is rather a pale reflection of what true Intellect and intellection are. The intellectual disposition in us is therefore unable to actualize and perform its intellection of the objects it potentially contains unless the divine Intellect actualizes it while its Intelligibles actualize the potential objects. Thus, for lamblichus, the human soul can intelligize only in the presence of Intellect.

The precarious situation of the human soul in the lamblichean universe is now apparent. It is stranded in the material realm, separated from the Intellect by an array of gods and superior classes, all of which have a higher perch on the celestial ladder than it. The soul is also hampered by the lack of an intellect of its own, requiring it to traverse the distance between itself and Intellect in order to engage for a time in intellection. Even should the soul be able to achieve this ascent, its double essence ensures that it cannot remain at the higher level to which it has ascended. Even when it arrives and intelligizes, it is already beginning its descent. Such is its double nature.

The soul's salvation depends not on itself but on the gods and divinities above it. Although the gods have sent us here, they have not abandoned us. They irradiate the cosmos with their light, and this light has an uplifting power to raise us (etherial light to etherial vehicle of the soul) up to the Intellect and even to the One. In *On Mysteries* III.14, lamblichus records a statement from Porphyry about various forms of ritual in which the subjects, while aware of what is happening during the ritual, nonetheless obtain inspiration in their imaginative faculty (kata to phantastikon theiazousin, 98.26). This is one of two sorts of ritual practice that lamblichus differentiates. In some rites, such as this one, the subject is alert and aware; in others, such as the oracles described in III.11, the

subject is unaware and in fact frenzied. In the former cases, the subject is not a mere instrument of the rite, but is a theurgist or theurgist-in-training, perhaps one of Iamblichus' better students. These subjects, then, are those who have achieved the secondary perfection that Simplicius described. They have reached the point that they can rise to Intellect. The imaginative faculty is involved in both types of theurgic practice, and the seat of that Aristotelian faculty in Iamblichean psychology is the immortal etherial vehicle of the soul. As Iamblichus goes on to write, all forms of ritual and divination are called 'light conduction' (photos agōgē, 99.8).

Iamblichus writes:

This [conduction] in some way illuminates with divine light the etherial and luminous vehicle that surrounds the soul, and from this [process] divine images, moved by the will of the gods, take hold of the imaginative faculty in us.

The gods, who cannot descend to us, send down their etherial rays, which illuminate our vehicles and thereby produce images in them that can, among other things, disclose future events. All theurgy (literally, the work of the gods, i.e. the work that the gods perform upon and for us) stems ultimately from the gods, and so all theurgy requires their illumination.

Iamblichus does not say much about how rituals are conducted, but in *On Mysteries* III.6, he discusses one that shows how in general the rite would unfold. He does not describe the context of the rite, but it is clear that is of the kind in which the subject is unaware of what is happening. Nonetheless the divine action within the rite would be similar to that in the case of a theurgist subject. Iamblichus describes the process as follows:

This is the most important point: the one conducting the god sees the descending pneuma, both how large and what sort it is, and mystically obeys and is governed by it. It is also visible to the one receiving the form of the fire before it is received. Sometimes it is evident to all who witness it, whether the god is descending or ascending.

Note that Iamblichus is describing a public event. There is the theurgic medium and the subject, but also an audience of believers witnessing the rite.

Since light is involved, the rites provide visual evidence as the rays from the divinity (a planet, Moon or sun, say) are visible. It is easy to imagine how the light striking the body of the subject would appear to be encircling it. It is also important to note that although the theurgist/ medium is guiding the divine light, it is the god who is in control; the theurgist obeys the god whose light is being conducted.

Ascent rituals would follow a similar pattern. The god's light strikes the subject's vehicle. Instead of images being formed in the imaginative faculty, however, the rays would lead the vehicle upwards. Neophytes would begin with rites led by the lower superior classes and would gradually over time ascend higher (with the help of the lower divinities) until eventually the soul in the ascending vehicle could reach Intellect itself. Although the Intellect has no etherial rays, of course, since it is completely immaterial, it nonetheless has an immaterial presence within the rays (just as our souls have immaterial logoi of the Intelligibles in them). Reversing the descent outlined in the *Timaeus*, the soul/vehicle complex ascends to its planet and from there to its star. There, on the outer boundary of the cosmos" the vehicle would remain with the etherial body of the star-god, while the rational soul could unite with the Intellect.

The moment of contact between the fully incorporeal rational soul and the immaterial Intellect is the first and highest perfection of the soul. At that point, the Intellect actualizes the soul's intellectual disposition, and the fully actualized Intelligible Objects in the Intellect actualize the potential intelligibles in the soul. The soul engages in intellection.

The nature of the soul being double, this intellection cannot be permanent. Indeed the intellection is beginning to cease even as it starts. The soul is fated to descend and lose contact with the Intellect and with its blessed existence above. There is, however, a benefit for the soul since it will have a memory of the Intelligible Objects in the world above. It will not be a clear memory, but it will help guide the individual to making correct choices in this lower life.

Theurgy is an essential part of Iamblichean religious philosophy, and he adapted it to dovetail with his Platonic metaphysics. His interpretation of Plato's dialogues led Iamblichus to believe that the descended human soul was near the bottom of the chain of gods and souls. Between it and the Intellect were various gods and superior classes. Theurgy bridges that gap, allowing the soul to rise to Intellect and in the case of some souls to the One itself. The dual nature of the soul ensures that the soul would descend again but also holds out the possibility of future ascents and of a return to Intellect after death. <>

[The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy](#) by George Karamanolis and Vasilis Politis [Cambridge University Press. 9781107110151]

Ancient philosophers from an otherwise diverse range of traditions were connected by their shared use of aporia - translated as puzzlement rooted in conflicts of reasons - as a core tool in philosophical enquiry. The essays in this volume provide the first comprehensive study of aporetic methodology among numerous major figures and influential schools, including the Presocratics, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Academic sceptics, Pyrrhonian sceptics, Plotinus and Damascius. They explore the differences and similarities in these philosophers' approaches to the source, structure, and aim of aporia, their views on its function and value, and ideas about the proper means of generating such a state among thinkers who were often otherwise opposed in their overall philosophical orientation. Discussing issues of method, dialectic, and knowledge, the volume will appeal to those interested in ancient philosophy and in philosophical enquiry more generally.

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Excerpt: What is an aporetic philosopher? It is hardly a philosopher distinguished by his or her mental condition of perplexity, puzzlement or confusion, much as this is what the term aporia signifies in its principal use in philosophy. We are all now and then subject to such a condition, but we do not all make use of it as do aporetic philosophers. Aporia signifies above all a certain state of mind, which it is as difficult to describe as it is easy to recognise when one is in it. Being in a state of aporia is a characteristic way of being perplexed, which philosophers have, from the beginning, used a variety of metaphors and images to describe. 'It feels like being tied (intellectually tied, tied in one's mind)', is a famous Aristotelian image. 'It is like being without means and without resource (intellectually, that is)', is a common metaphor going back to an original everyday use of the term *aporos*, to mean "penurious" and "needy". 'It feels like being numb, numb in mind and tongue', is a memorable Platonic image. 'It is a state of speechlessness and inarticulateness', is another Platonic description. 'It feels like an unstable, vertiginous state in which things won't stay fixed and are thoroughly shaken', or 'like being tempest-tossed', are yet other Platonic metaphors. To conclude with what is perhaps the first philosophical image of aporia, 'It is like being unable to reach through to a much-

desired place'. This image goes back to another original everyday use of the term *aporon*, to mean 'un-passable', 'un-traversable'. This image is immortalised by Heraclitus in a very early philosophical statement regarding *aporia*: 'Unless one hopes for that which is not to be hoped for (*anelpiston*), one shall not find it (*ouk exeurēsei*). For it is hard to search for (*anexereunēton*) and to reach through to (*aporon*)' (fragment DK18).

Is it distinctive of being an aporetic philosopher that one should take the generation of this mental condition to be a major part of doing philosophy? This, we believe, may justly be considered a basic mark of an aporetic philosopher. It means that an aporetic philosopher is a person who self-consciously assigns a certain function and significance to this mental condition, *aporia*, if the condition is generated in a peculiar way and through a peculiar intellectual enquiry — that is, the search for wisdom and, in that sense, philosophy (*philosophia*). However much ancient philosophers may disagree about the character and nature of philosophy, its means and its ends, they are all, even relativists such as Protagoras, agreed that philosophy is an enquiry — and a supremely important enquiry — aspiring, whether confidently or not so confidently, to a supreme intellectual state.

What is it to generate this state of mind, *aporia*, in a peculiarly philosophical way and in general through intellectual enquiry? As the contributors to this volume will demonstrate, about each and all of our candidate aporetic philosophers, it is to think that there is something distinctive which this state of mind, *aporia*, is about and by which it is caused; and this object and cause of the state of *aporia* is a certain form or forms of question: a question that, in one way or another, presents an intellectual problem or difficulty. (We shall presently consider what forms this question may take, according to our candidate aporetic philosophers.) The question which is the object and cause of this mental state, *aporia*, is itself properly called an *aporia*. This, as the contributors show, means that there are two basic, and related, uses of, the term *aporia*: one to mean the state of mind, and another to mean the object and cause of this state of mind. The contributors will commonly distinguish between the

two uses by referring to the first as the subjective use and to the second as the objective use. We may observe that to speak of an objective use of the term *aporia* is to mean that the state of mind, *aporia*, is object-directed, its 'object' being a certain form or forms of question. This means that the mental state of *aporia*, as understood by our candidate aporetic philosophers, is a cognitive state; cognitive in the sense of object-directed.

Our mark of an aporetic philosopher has the virtue of being flexible and allowing for a variety of ways of being aporetically disposed, depending on a variety of questions. These are questions that the contributors to this volume will take up in various and diverse ways. The following is a selection, without a claim to comprehensiveness or suggestion that each contributor is addressing but a single question: it is important to bear in mind that the volume is structured chronologically, not thematically, with each contributor addressing one or more philosophers and one or more works.

- What is considered the proper intellectual means (singular or plural) of generating this mental state of *aporia*?
- What is considered the place and the function of *aporia* in philosophical enquiry?
- Is being in this state of *aporia* important only for philosophical enquiry, or also for enquiry in natural science?
- Cannot the generation of this state of *aporia* just as much be used simply to trip up and confuse people?
- What is considered the ethical benefits, or the ethical harms, of being in a state of *aporia*?
- Is there something especially productive and creative in being in this state?
- What is the relation between *aporia*-involving argument and dialectical, disputative, and in general refutative argument?
- Is it necessary to go through being in this state of *aporia* if one aspires to knowledge?
- Is being in this state of *aporia* reason to question that it is possible to attain knowledge?

- Can the fact, or appearance, that the same thing has opposite qualities generate aporia? How?
- What is the place of hypotheses in a method of aporia-inducing argument?
- Can one be in this state of aporia about things that are familiar to us and that we take for granted in how we speak and think and act?
- Is there a preferred means of getting out of the state of aporia?
- If aporia is a troubled state to be in, is it necessary to get out of this state to attain intellectual tranquility, or is being in aporia compatible with tranquility?
- Is the commitment to aporia, as a method of philosophical enquiry, compatible with a commitment to systematic philosophy and speculative theory?
- May this state of aporia indicate that there are limits not only to what we can know but also to what we can think of and speak of?

The aim of the present collection of essays is to trace a continuous aporetic tradition through a millennium of philosophy in antiquity, from Heraclitus and Zeno, through Plato and Aristotle, and up to Plotinus and Damascius, and to examine different and potentially opposed ways of thinking that aporia occupies a major place in philosophical enquiry. The volume explores potentially shared commitments — relating especially to the source, the structure, and the aim of philosophical enquiry — of philosophers who may otherwise be wide apart in temper and convictions.

The topic of the present volume — the place of aporia in ancient philosophy — is quite novel, or as novel as a topic in ancient philosophy can be. Very useful groundwork has been done on the meaning and the uses of the term aporia and its cognates, up to Aristotle.¹ And considerable work has been done on Aristotle's *Metaphysics Beta*, in which Aristotle gives a central place to aporiai and aporia-based argument.² There has not been an attempt to trace the function that ancient philosophers assign to the state of aporia, or the proper means of generating this state, in philosophical or in scientific³ enquiry. Some of the

lacunae that mark the scant and uneven attention to the topic to date are surprising, such as the lack of an investigation of the role of aporia in Pyrrhonian, or indeed in Academic, scepticism.⁴

Such attention as the topic of the present volume has received is marked by some notable and questionable assumptions. First, there is a tendency to understand aporia-involving argument in Plato exclusively in terms of elenctic and refutative argument. But the equation of aporia-involving argument with elenctic or refutative argument is questionable — in Plato, in Aristotle, and in general. Secondly, this tendency has, it appears, stood in the way of recognising what it is that the New or Sceptical Academy was picking up on in Plato; namely, that argument based on an aporia can take the form of a two-sided question with apparently good reasons on both sides. Thirdly, there is a general and deep-set tendency to assume that an aporetic philosopher cannot at the same time be committed to systematic views and speculative theories: hence that we need to choose between thinking of a philosopher, such as Plato or Aristotle or Plotinus, as aporetic and thinking of them as 'dogmatic' (i.e. committed to dogmata, positive beliefs). But this assumption is open to question.

On the Mark of Aporetic Philosophy

If this is our basic mark of an aporetic philosopher — one who considers the generation of the state of aporia to be a major part of philosophical activity — then being an aporetic philosopher is compatible not only with being committed to the search for knowledge — this much would hardly exclude any ancient philosopher save for such extreme eristics and contradiction-mongers as those parodied by Plato in the *Euthydemus* — but also with believing that it is possible to attain knowledge and even that one may have attained knowledge. Does this not render our mark of aporetic philosophy objectionably broad? We need a broad mark, if we are to look for a common dimension, tendency or thrust — something like a single, continuous tradition — among such diverse philosophers as, on the one hand, Aristotle, Plotinus and Plato (supposing that there may be doctrines present in Plato's dialogues), and, on the other hand, Pyrrhonian sceptics. Is such a broad

mark a drawback and a fault? Consider the obvious alternative, which is to propose that an aporetic philosopher is one who considers the generation of aporia to be, not simply a major part of, but the principal and ultimate aim of philosophical activity. This would exclude everyone except sceptics. It is, we think, objectionably narrow. It stands in the way of recognising that whereas Plato, or Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, and Pyrrhonian sceptics end up in very different places regarding the attainability and attainment of knowledge and the desirability of speculative theory and systematic philosophy, they share basic commitments regarding the source and the structure, if not the aim, of philosophical enquiry." The point is that sharing in a single method, namely, aporia-based enquiry, and a single aim, namely, the attainment of knowledge through the resolution of aporiai, is compatible with different and even opposite outcomes, depending on whether or not the philosopher in question thinks there is a general reason to doubt that such aporiai are capable of being resolved.

If it did not exclude any philosophers, our mark of aporetic philosophy would be objectionable. How can a philosopher positively deny that the generation of the state of aporia is a major part of philosophical activity? Consider a philosopher who is committed not only to the search for knowledge and the attainability of knowledge but also to the existence of a criterion for knowledge. A criterion of knowledge is a cognitive experience and impression that is such as to guarantee its truth and to exclude the possibility of the subject of this experience being mistaken. Such a philosopher can admit that ridding oneself of a state of aporia, and, consequently, engaging as far as is necessary with the difficulties and problems that are responsible for such a state, is part of the preparation for the search for knowledge: a search which will be involved, rather, with the exercise of a supposed natural faculty for infallible knowledge. He or she will have to deny that the generation of aporia is part of the search for knowledge proper, since, as he or she believes, the search for knowledge does not stand in a substantial relation to the state of aporia and indeed has the means of bypassing it. Among the ancients, the Stoics appear to have thought of

knowledge along these lines, and they, at any rate, are not on any account justly characterised as aporetic philosophers." Indeed, their stance on this matter may well have been a deliberate reaction against Plato and Aristotle.

What Is the Proper Intellectual Means of Generating Aporia?

Aristotle is perhaps the first to have reflected on the meaning of the term aporia as this term is deliberately used by philosophers, when he says that it designates in the first instance a certain mental state but that philosophers — including Aristotle — use it also for that which generates the mental state (see *Topics* VI. 6, 145b16-20; he has just characterised an aporia as being 'an equality [i.e. equality in strength, or apparent strength] of opposite reasonings', 145b1-2), Aristotle appears to be right in this observation, which, as we have noted, identifies an important feature of the use of the term aporia; namely, that the object to which this state of mind, aporia, is directed is likewise properly called an aporia. This is an aporia in the sense of a certain form, or certain forms, of question, and a question that presents an intellectual difficulty or problem. An early instance of this twofold use of the term aporia is clearly recognisable in Plato, when, in the *Protagoras* (324d—e), and twice in quick succession, he uses the phrase *he aporia hen su aporeis*, in the sense of 'the problem (or "puzzle", or "difficulty" or "question") about which you are in a state of puzzlement' (or, 'which you are puzzling over').

What, according to the philosophers taken up in the present volume, is the proper intellectual means of generating the mental state of aporia? And is there in these philosophers, according to the findings of the contributors, a single means of generating the state of aporia? On any account, determining what is the proper means of generating an aporia requires establishing what those objects are at which this state of mind, aporia, is directed. If we follow Aristotle, we will expect an affirmative answer, for he supposes a single way of generating the state of aporia, that is, by means of what he calls 'an equality of opposite reasonings'. He means the advancing of competing apparently good reasons on both sides of a two-sided, whether-or-not question. (He calls such a question a

problema.) Aristotle's answer is very important, and it contains two related elements, which, we think, deserve to be considered separately. First, there is the reference simply to contradiction, and so the very notion of contradiction plays a role. Secondly, there is the reference to compelling contradiction, that is, a contradiction both sides of which are supported by apparently good reasons.

It is remarkable that, according to the contributors to the present volume, this account is largely correct, though not without exceptions. This means that there is among these philosophers, and spanning a millennium of philosophy in antiquity, very considerable agreement about the proper means of generating aporia in philosophy. Generally, though not exclusively, aporia is generated either through generating a contradiction or through generating a compelling contradiction. This finding — for it appears to be a major finding of the present project — is as important as it is remarkable. It also allays a worry that one may have as to whether the topic of the present volume — the place of aporia in ancient philosophy — may not be too broad and diffuse to sustain investigation. As Harte observes, 'Were we to identify anything capable of inducing aporia in the form of an intellectual condition as an aporia in the sense of a puzzle, the term aporia understood as puzzle would, I submit, become so broad in its compass as to become uninteresting.'

We should note, finally, a question regarding aporia that will emerge as prominent in, and perhaps controversial among, the contributions. It is the question of the association, especially since Aristotle and the method of dialectical argument of the Topics, of aporia-based argument with dialectical argument. Dialectical argument, as it is understood by Aristotle in the Topics, is a method of argument that, by using endoxa, that is, opinions that are credible owing to the number or the expertise of those who hold them, aspires to the power of disputing, against an adversary, equally and indifferently on either side of any two-sided question. The critical question is this: How close should we understand this association, of aporia-based argument with dialectical argument, to be? The closer we think it is, the more readily we shall associate aporia-based argument with elenctic and

refutative argument; because, clearly, dialectical argument is a form of refutative argument. And we have noted that the association of aporia-based argument with refutative argument is questionable if taken too far. Whereas dialectical argument is adversarial and involves competing persons or parties, aporia-based argument need not be adversarial; it can be cooperative. Aporia-based argument can be conducted by a single person by himself or herself - And, most important, whereas the basic reliance on endoxa may be proper in the case of dialectical and disputative argument, it may be questioned in the case of aporia-based argument, especially if such argument is thought to be an essential part of the search for knowledge. <>

[The Beginnings of Philosophy in Greece](#) by Maria Michela Sassi, translated by Michele Asuni [Princeton University Press, 9780691180502]

A celebrated study of the origins of ancient Greek philosophy, now in English for the first time

How can we talk about the beginnings of philosophy today? How can we avoid the conventional opposition of mythology and the dawn of reason and instead explore the multiple styles of thought that emerged between them? In this acclaimed book, available in English for the first time, Maria Michela Sassi reconstructs the intellectual world of the early Greek "Presocratics" to provide a richer understanding of the roots of what used to be called "the Greek miracle."

The beginnings of the long process leading to philosophy were characterized by intellectual diversity and geographic polycentrism. In the sixth and fifth centuries BC, between the Asian shores of Ionia and the Greek city-states of southern Italy, thinkers started to reflect on the cosmic order, elaborate doctrines on the soul, write in solemn Homeric meter, or, later, abandon poetry for an assertive prose. And yet the Presocratics whether the Milesian natural thinkers, the rhapsode Xenophanes, the mathematician and "shaman" Pythagoras, the naturalist and seer Empedocles, the oracular Heraclitus, or the inspired Parmenides all shared an approach to critical thinking that, by

questioning traditional viewpoints, revolutionized knowledge.

A unique study that explores the full range of early Greek thinkers in the context of their worlds, the book also features a new introduction to the English edition in which the author discusses the latest scholarship on the subject

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Excerpt: I began to think about [The Beginnings of Philosophy in Greece](#) during a conference organized in Lille by André Laks ten years before the book's publication in Italian in 2009. The conference dealt with a fundamental question: "What is Presocratic philosophy?". That question expressed the difficulty of giving a unitary definition of so-called "Presocratic" thought, but more important was that it brought to the fore an intriguing basic issue: is it appropriate to call this thought "philosophy," and even to say that it is precisely with that thought that Philosophy with a capital P is born?

Looking in hindsight twenty years later, that conference seems to have marked the rebirth of an already noble research trend on the Presocratics. In fact, there has been an extraordinary increase in publications on early Greek philosophy, whose authors are often, not by chance, scholars who participated in the Lille conference. As just a few examples, limited to the English-speaking world, we must mention at least the [Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy](#), edited by Patricia Curd and Daniel Graham (2008); Daniel Graham's two-volume edition and translation, [The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics Part 1](#) and [Part 2](#) (2010); and the completely revised edition, in 2011, of Richard McKirahan's [Philosophy Before Socrates. An Introduction with Texts and Commentary](#), first published twenty years before. The last, most important result of this rich season of scholarship has been the publication of the fragments and testimonia of Early Greek Philosophy by André Laks and Glenn W. Most in nine volumes of the [Loeb Classical Library](#). This edition is destined to change our perception of early Greek philosophy in a significant way, thanks to a series of choices that represent a firm break away from (though not a complete unhinging of) the patterns of reception consolidated during the course of the last century in the framework set up by Herman Diels's *Vorsokratiker*; the most remarkable indication of this is the inclusion of Socrates (in the section devoted to the Sophists), but there is also, for instance, an extensive section

devoted to "philosophies and philosophers" in comedy and tragedy.

Moreover, this relocation of texts and doctrines (and the addition of a good number of new monographs on single Presocratic authors) has gone hand in hand with a more properly historiographic reflection on the validity and limits of the definition of "Presocratic" thought, together with a consideration of the vastness and variety of the "intellectual endeavor" that took place in the period before Socrates. Laks himself undertook the latter path with a series of studies that eventually fed into a book with an eloquent title, whose English translation has been published as [The Concept of Presocratic Philosophy: Its Origin, Development, and Significance](#) (2018). I have moved in the same direction with the present book. Here I have not tried to delineate a "history" of the doctrines of single Presocratic authors, nor did I aim to illustrate cameos of strong intellectual personalities such as Anaximander, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Parmenides, or Empedocles—even though in certain sections of the book I ended up tracing an overview of these thinkers. Rather, I have tried to answer a fundamental question: To what extent are we able to trace the birth of the particular form of knowledge, which today we call philosophy, back to these thinkers, as well as to other more- and less-well-known ones, and also to poets such as Hesiod, or to personalities that are traditionally classified as sages, such as Pherecydes?

It is no longer possible today to accept more or less passively the image of Thales as the "first philosopher" that the ancient sources (starting with Plato and Aristotle) have handed down to us. We have known for a long time that this is not a historical fact but rather, the fruit of a representation stemming from a retrospective projection of a "philosophical ideal of life" that is a product of a time much later than that of Thales. As Werner Jaeger demonstrated in a memorable study (Jaeger 1928), the ideal of the superiority of contemplative life originated and developed in the Academy and the Lyceum in the wake of inquiries started by their respective founders, and it immediately accompanied (for promotional purposes, we might say) an elaboration of

exemplary images and stories of prior sages that was as rich as the available documentation was lacking (especially in the case of Thales).

Another fundamental landmark in the scholarship on the Presocratics was Harold Cherniss's acute and painstaking analysis of the wealth of references in Aristotle's writings, which enabled him to draw conclusions that are of paramount importance for any subsequent interpretation. In fact, not only is Aristotle the most generous source on Presocratic doctrines but he also inaugurated in his school a process of gathering and arranging the "opinions" (doxai) of the preceding philosophical tradition. This activity marked the beginning of ancient doxographical literature, still an indispensable tool for our knowledge of that tradition. (It is well known that no text by these thinkers has come down to us, with the exception of two great discoveries of the second half of the twentieth century, both included as new entries in Laks and Most's edition: the Strasbourg papyrus, containing more than seventy lines of a poem by Empedocles, and the Derveni papyrus, containing an allegorical commentary to a writing attributed to Orpheus, interspersed with references to Preplatonic cosmological doctrines.) Now, Cherniss has demonstrated that Aristotle's goal is not to write a history of the preceding theories (nor, after all, should we expect that of him) but rather, to identify single pieces of the puzzle and relocate them in different places of his reflection, at times to appreciate them and at other times to denounce their insufficiency in light of his own theoretical apparatus; the terms and concepts that Aristotle attributes to the Presocratics, then, are mostly the result of his reformulation. This "discovery" has been the foundation for a long series of studies that has emphasized the broader, general panorama of ancient historiography on the Presocratics, sounding out the particular modalities that govern the selection and classification of philosophical doxai in ancient doxographical texts, from Plato to Diogenes Laertius to the Christian authors. At the same time, scholars have expressed strong doubts regarding the validity of what was, since the beginning of the twentieth century, the essential research tool for studying Presocratic thought: Hermann Diels's arrangement of texts by and on these authors in *Vorsokratiker*, one of the

most influential products of nineteenth century *Altertumswissenschaft* (Diels 1903, after Diels 1879), a mature fruit of the "positivistic" confidence of being able to reconstruct "what the Presocratics really said," based on careful philological analysis of the sources that mention them, in the form of direct testimony or a more or less literal citation.

On the other hand, this framework was shaken by the long wave of an anthropological approach to Greek culture that owes much to the pioneering studies of Eric R. Dodds (1951) and Francis M. Cornford (1952), among others. The second half of the twentieth century saw a burgeoning interest in the great themes of myth and the irrational, which had remained in the background of a classicist perception of Greek culture described in terms of balance and rationality. Thus scholars gradually broke free of that dichotomy between rationality and irrationality (inherited from Aristotle, on one hand, and from the Enlightenment on the other) that had, until then, dominated a history of ancient thought seen as a history of the advances of reason. In the new perspective, the knowledge of the Presocratic period too has revealed new fields, such as the exposure to magic, the vitality of the mythical unconscious, soteriological aspirations—consider Walker Burkert's "shaman" Pythagoras or Peter Kingsley's "magician" Empedocles. It is also remarkably important, from this perspective, that more and more attention is finally being paid to the historical, sociological, and anthropological conditions of the Presocratics' intellectual activities. These factors have brought about an extraordinary widening of the horizons that has enabled scholars to align or, better yet, to interweave Presocratic thought with other manifestations of the broad "intellectual endeavor" of the period before Plato; an endeavor that involved not only natural philosophers but also doctors and mathematicians, geographers and historians.

The new panorama, brought to light by historical and comparative studies, is undoubtedly rich and well suited to the antihistoricist trend in contemporary culture. Yet I take issue with the fact that a great part of it is constructed not only without resorting to the information contained in the Aristotelian tradition but also, often, against Aristotle and his "falsifications" (among the most

malicious, the identification of *phusis* as the exclusive object of philosophical inquiry, from Thales onward). In other words, some interpreters seem to believe that in order to free ourselves from the historiographic patterns of Aristotle and other ancient sources, we should deny any validity to their writings, or perhaps systematically turn them around—and this seems to me to be a new form of slavery. Let us consider, for instance, how Andrea Nightingale developed (not without remarkable insights) her thesis that philosophy is a construction intimately connected with Plato's and Aristotle's speculations on the notion of contemplation (*theōria*) as the goal of the philosopher. Her argument hinges on the observation that the term *philosophic*, in its first attestations toward the end of the fifth century BCE, denotes generic intellectual activity, without referring to a specific discipline; and here Nightingale sees the proof that the earliest thinkers were not philosophers, since they did not give a specific definition of their own intellectual activity but instead aspired to be perceived as "wise men" (*sophoi*), engaging themselves more in the performance of a practical and political wisdom than in the knowledge of nature. Yet Nightingale is not the only scholar to deny the philosophical intent of the Presocratics' intellectual pursuits. Geoffrey Lloyd and Laura Gemelli Marciano, for instance, take somewhat similar positions, although they have very different perspectives. They too insist on the fact, undeniable in itself, that a characterization (and more importantly a self-characterization) of philosophy as an autonomous activity does not exist before Plato.

My approach is in stark opposition to the one I just described, which I would call "revisionist." In this introduction I will limit myself to raising two rather general objections. First, I observe that the absence of the noun for and/or the awareness of performing a certain activity does not prevent us from admitting that some significant elements of that activity are at work. Second, I should say that a hermeneutical process is always influenced by certain preconceptions, and in this sense the position of those who reject a priori the possibility of attributing to the Presocratics an activity comparable to what we call "philosophy" shows as much prejudice as the position of those who (like

myself), on the contrary, admit the possibility. Thus, my argument in this book is also driven by a certain preconception about the nature of philosophy (which I preliminarily take as the elaboration of a critical stance toward received opinions). Yet the precision of a hermeneutical process may be aided by a responsible illustration of its premises, such as the one that I am trying to offer in these pages.

I should add that I have tried in any way I could to avoid the risks of a predetermined construction. First of all, as is evident from the title, I prefer to speak of a plurality of beginnings of philosophy in Greece, and I trace its various beginnings in different contexts and different periods: in a study of nature centered upon the problem of cosmic order (chapters 1 and 2), in matters of cultural polemics (chapter 3), in the elaboration of a discourse on the soul (chapter 4), and in the formulation of principles of reasoning (chapter 5). Moreover, I have avoided seeking a teleological structure with a beginning and development that were too defined, opting instead to give my exposition a different design from the one normally followed in the histories of philosophy (which tends to be a progressive one, Aristotelian and Hegelian in character). To this end, I have tried to situate various authors, with their particular conceptions and even their respective critical stances, in their specific contexts, by which I mean not only the political environment but also the context of communication in which their intellectual activity took place before being circulated more broadly, thanks to the medium of writing. By applying the most specific and updated historical research on archaic Greece, I believe I was able to avoid a twofold temptation: either glorifying the birth of philosophy as the product of a Greek "miracle" (according to Renan's famous formulation) or aligning it with other intellectual "revolutions" that might have taken place in response to similar environmental or political transformations in distant societies such as Israel (with the Prophets), India (with Buddha), China (with Confucius and Lao-Tze), or Persia (with Zoroaster), in a phase that lasted six hundred years (800-200 BCE, the so-called "axial age" in Karl Jaspers's other famous formulation).

In the first chapter, I first dwell on the theories of great interpreters such as Francis M. Cornford and

Walter Burkert; both were interested in finding—though via different channels—the origin of Greek philosophy in the background of Eastern civilizations, and insisted on the similarities rather than the differences between the cosmological doctrines of the Ionians and the Mesopotamian creation accounts. With all due respect and admiration for this approach, which has been an ever-beneficial antidote to a rationalistic reading of Greek thought as a *logos* born and developed in stark opposition to *muthos*, I argue that the search for the *arche* started by Thales and continued by the other Ionians represents a truly new contribution to the understanding of the nature of things, basing my thesis on the claim that Aristotle's exposition is fundamentally correct. In general, I believe (as should be clear by now) that any attempt to reconstruct Presocratic thought should utilize not only the *ipsissima verba* of the Presocratics but also the data of indirect tradition. Philology offers excellent tools for grasping pertinent information, through the filters of theoretical stratification and anecdote, even from highly personal testimonies such as Plato's and Aristotle's; these data often facilitate our understanding of textual references and enable us to reconstruct, more or less, their hypothetical context. The alternative approach—regarding the ancient accounts as the product of not only a retrospective projection but also an inexorably falsifying reconstruction—is like throwing out the baby with the bathwater. This is why in the first chapter I opted for an unbiased reading and a "strong" interpretation of Presocratic thought like the one offered by Aristotle in the first book of *Metaphysics*, and found within it various signs of the problematic tension in Aristotle's construction, as well as still viable and interesting reflections on the character of the new wisdom of the naturalists (whose forefather is Thales), in its relationship with the knowledge of nature that arose from the mythological tradition.

In the second chapter, I found it appropriate to identify at least one common trait that allows us to call an intellectual activity "philosophical," and I defined this trait as a critical intent directed toward traditional, or at any rate established, points of view. This definition should be understood in a minimal sense, that is, it does not require that a

determined theoretical stance be accompanied by an explicit and explicitly polemic explanation against the points of view that have been rejected. It is enough that an idea is put forth knowingly, as innovation and as fact. This can already be said of endeavors such as Hesiod's in the *Theogony* and Pherecydes of Syros's (an occasion to discuss the relationships with a tradition between cosmology and "theology") and is even more true for the cosmic frameworks that Ionian thought began to construct, elaborating an idea of cosmic order that marks, in itself, an epochal break from the structure of the mythical cosmogonies.

In the third chapter, after dealing with the link between the rise of the polis and the beginnings of philosophy (by considering in detail the theses of Jean-Pierre Vernant and Geoffrey Lloyd), I turn my attention to the role that writing—or rather, the authors' specific and well-aimed expressive choices—played in the modalities of philosophical formulation. Convinced that the different types of writing contain very specific clues about the author's relationship with his or her original audiences (who receive the texts aurally), I tried to understand Anaximander in Miletus, engaged in discussions regarding the political choices of the time, Heraclitus before his fellow citizens in his attitude as a prophet, and Xenophanes in the far-flung places he visited as a professional rhapsode.

The fourth chapter reprises a thematic concern, focusing on the discourse on the soul that develops in this period and is intertwined with the discourse on the cosmos in diverse ways. Here, again, places matter—and I was pleased to see that a collective volume on [La sagesse présocratique](#) published a few years ago was organized according to the geographical location of the various Presocratic thinkers. We meet Empedocles of Akragas immersed in an Italian scene that is agitated by problems of immortality and spiritual salvation. Not far from Sicily, we find the followers of Orphic religion as well as Pythagoras and his first pupils. Against this backdrop we observe the cognitive experience of Parmenides of Elea, who, in the poem of his writing, presents it as the result of a religious revelation and initiation. Both Parmenides and Empedocles authored a poem in hexameters, the *evic* meter, and the fifth chapter revolves

around this fact: the adoption of poetry, which may seem problematic according to modern canons of philosophical communication, is on the contrary illuminating, because it confirms that these authors certainly did not think of themselves as philosophers; rather, they placed their activity within a recognized literary tradition, that of epic poetry, in order to give authority to their message, knowing full well how innovative their ideas were. At the same time, prose writing began to emerge among other authors whom I discuss, and I will show how, during the second half of the fifth century BCE, prose would become the medium of rational argumentation *par excellence*.

In conclusion, I have tried to represent Presocratic thought in all its variety and different directions, because so many of these were sacrificed in later philosophy, especially after the Aristotelian delimitation of a precise terrain of competence in philosophical reasoning. And I hope to have succeeded in putting together a narrative that is not blocked by a retrospective glance but rather takes a "perspectival" one, to use Michael Frede's hopeful term: a story that I have reconstructed while trying as much as possible to walk in the shoes of its protagonists, as it were, who knew where they were departing from and the new paths they wanted to open, but could not predict the twists and forks in the road or the obstacles that would appear later along the way. <>

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