Judging toward Essence

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Napoleon: A Life by Adam Zamoyski [Basic Books, 9780465055937]

The definitive biography of Napoleon, revealing the true man behind the legend "What a novel my life has been!" Napoleon once said of himself. Born into a poor family, the callow young man was, by twenty-six, an army general. Seduced by an older woman, his marriage transformed him into a galvanizing military commander. The Pope crowned him as Emperor of the French when he was only thirty-five. Within a few years, he became the effective master of Europe, his power unparalleled in modern history. His downfall was no less dramatic.

The story of Napoleon has been written many times. In some versions, he is a military genius, in others a war-obsessed tyrant. Here, historian Adam Zamoyski cuts through the mythology and explains Napoleon against the background of the European Enlightenment, and what he was himself seeking to achieve. This most famous of men is also the most hidden of men, and Zamoyski dives deeper than any previous biographer to find him. Beautifully

written, [Napoleon](#) brilliantly sets the man in his European context.

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Excerpt: A Polish home, English schools, and holidays with French cousins exposed me from an early age to violently conflicting visions of Napoleon—as godlike genius, Romantic avatar, evil monster, or just nasty little dictator. In this crossfire of fantasy and prejudice I developed an empathy with each of these views without being able to agree with any of them.

Napoleon was a man, and while I understand how others have done, I can see nothing superhuman about him. Although he did exhibit some extraordinary qualities, he was in many ways a very ordinary man. I find it difficult to credit genius to someone who, for all his many triumphs, presided over the worst (and entirely self-inflicted) disaster in military history and single-handedly destroyed the great enterprise he and others had toiled so hard to construct. He was undoubtedly a brilliant tactician, as one would expect of a clever operator from a small-town background. But he was no strategist, as his miserable end attests.

Nor was Napoleon an evil monster. He could be as selfish and violent as the next man, but there is no evidence of him wishing to inflict suffering gratuitously. His motives were on the whole praiseworthy, and his ambition no greater than that of contemporaries such as Alexander I of Russia, Wellington, Nelson, Metternich, Blücher, Bernadotte, and many more. What made his ambition so exceptional was the scope it was accorded by circumstance.

On hearing the news of his death, the Austrian dramatist Franz Grillparzer wrote a poem on the subject. He had been a student in Vienna when Napoleon bombarded the city in 1809, so he had no reason to like him, but in the poem he admits that while he cannot love him, he cannot bring himself to hate him; according to Grillparzer, Napoleon was but the visible symptom of the sickness of the times, and as such bore the blame for the sins of all. There is much truth in this view.'

In the half-century before Napoleon came to power, a titanic struggle for dominion saw the British acquire Canada, large swathes of India, and a string of colonies and aspire to lay down the law at sea; Austria grab provinces in Italy and Poland; Prussia increase in size by two-thirds; and Russia

push her frontier boo kilometres into Europe and occupy large areas of Central Asia, Siberia, and Alaska, laying claims as far afield as California. Yet George III, Maria Theresa, Frederick William II, and Catherine II are not generally accused of being megalomaniac monsters and compulsive warmongers.

Napoleon is frequently condemned for his invasion of Egypt, while the British occupation which followed, designed to guarantee colonial monopoly over India, is not. He is regularly blamed for re-establishing slavery in Martinique, while Britain applied it in its colonies for a further thirty years, and every other colonial power for several decades after that. His use of police surveillance and censorship is also regularly reproved, even though every other state in Europe emulated him, with varying degrees of discretion or hypocrisy.

The tone was set by the victors of 1815, who arrogated the role of defenders of a supposedly righteous social order against evil, and writing on Napoleon has been bedevilled ever since by a moral dimension, which has entailed an imperative to slander or glorify. Beginning with Stendhal, who claimed he could only write of Napoleon in religious terms, and no doubt inspired by Goethe, who saw his life as 'that of a demi-god', French and other European historians have struggled to keep the numinous out of their work, and even today it is tinged by a sense of awe. Until very recently, Anglo-Saxon historians have shown reluctance to allow an understanding of the spirit of the times to help them see Napoleon as anything other than an alien monster. Rival national mythologies have added layers of prejudice which many find hard to overcome.

Napoleon was in every sense the product of his times; he was in many ways the embodiment of his epoch. If one wishes to gain an understanding of him and what he was about, one has to place him in context. This requires ruthless jettisoning of received opinion and nationalist prejudice and dispassionate examination of what the seismic conditions of his times threatened and offered.

In the 1790s Napoleon entered a world at war, and one in which the very basis of human society was being questioned. It was a struggle for

supremacy and survival in which every state on the Continent acted out of self-interest, breaking treaties and betraying allies shamelessly. Monarchs, statesmen, and commanders on all sides displayed similar levels of fearful aggression, greed, callousness, and brutality. To ascribe to any of the states involved a morally superior role is ahistorical humbug, and to condemn the lust for power is to deny human nature and political necessity.

For Aristotle power was, along with wealth and friendship, one of the essential components of individual happiness. For Hobbes, the urge to acquire it was not only innate but beneficent, as it led men to dominate and therefore organise communities, and no social organisation of any form could exist without the power of one or more individuals to order others.

Napoleon did not start the war that broke out in 1792 when he was a mere lieutenant and continued, with one brief interruption, until 1814. Which side was responsible for the outbreak and for the continuing hostilities is fruitlessly debatable, since responsibility cannot be laid squarely on one side or the other. The fighting cost lives, for which responsibility is often heaped on Napoleon, which is absurd, as all the belligerents must share the blame. And he was not as profligate with the lives of his own soldiers as some.

French losses in the seven years of revolutionary government (1792-99) are estimated at four to five hundred thousand; those during the fifteen years of Napoleon's rule are estimated at just under twice as high, at eight to nine hundred thousand. Given that these figures include not only dead, wounded, and sick but also those reported as missing, whose numbers went up dramatically as his ventures took the armies further afield, it is clear that battle losses were lower under Napoleon than during the revolutionary period—despite the increasing use of heavy artillery and the greater size of the armies. The majority of those classed as missing were deserters who either drifted back home or settled in other countries. This is not to diminish the suffering or the trauma of the war, but to put it in perspective.

My aim in this book is not to justify or condemn, but to piece together the life of the man born Napoleone Buonaparte, and to examine how he became `Napoleon' and achieved what he did, and how it came about that he undid it.

In order to do so I have concentrated on verifiable primary sources, treating with caution the memoirs of those such as Bourrienne, Fouché, Barras, and others who wrote principally to justify themselves or to tailor their own image, and have avoided using as evidence those of the duchesse d'Abrantès, which were written years after the events by her lover, the novelist Balzac. I also ignore the various anecdotes regarding Napoleon's birth and childhood, believing that it is immaterial as well as unprovable that he cried or not when he was born, that he liked playing with swords and drums as a child, had a childhood crush on some little girl, or that a comet was sighted at his birth and death. There are quite enough solid facts to deal with.

I have devoted more space in relative terms to Napoleon's formative years than to his time in power, as I believe they hold the key to understanding his extraordinary trajectory. As I consider the military aspects only insofar as they produced an effect, on him and his career or the international situation, the reader will find my coverage very uneven. I give prominence to the first Italian campaign because it demonstrates the ways in which Napoleon was superior to his enemies and colleagues, and because it turned him into an exceptional being, in both his own eyes and those of others. Subsequent battles are of interest primarily for the use he made of them, while the Russian campaign is seminal to his decline and reveals the confusion in his mind which led to his political suicide. To those who would like to learn more about the battles, I would recommend Andrew Roberts's masterful [Napoleon the Great](). The battle maps in the text are similarly spare and do not pretend to accuracy; they are designed to illustrate the essence of the action.

The subject is so vast that anyone attempting a life of Napoleon must necessarily rely on the work of many who have trawled through archives and on published sources. I feel hugely indebted to all those involved in the Fondation Napoléon's new edition of Napoleon's correspondence. I also owe a great deal to the work done over the past two decades by French historians in debunking the myths that have gained the status of truth and excising the carbuncles that have overgrown the verifiable facts during the past two centuries. Thierry Lentz and Jean Tulard stand out in this respect, but Pierre Branda, Jean Defranceschi, Patrice Gueniffey, Annie Jourdan, Aurélien Lignereux, and Michel Vergé-Franceschi have also helped to blow away cobwebs and enlighten. Among Anglo-Saxon historians, Philip Dwyer has my gratitude for his brilliant work on Napoleon as propagandist, and Munro Price for his invaluable archival research on the last phase of his reign. The work of Michael Broers and Steven Englund is also noteworthy.

I owe a debt of thanks to Olivier Varian for bibliographic guid¬ance, and particularly for having let me see Caulaincourt's manuscript on the Prussian and Russian campaigns of 1806—07; to Vincenz Hoppe for seeking out sources in Germany; to Hubert Czyzewski for assisting me in unearthing obscure sources in Polish libraries; to Laetitia Oppenheim for doing the same for me in France; to Carlo De Luca for alerting me to the existence of the diary of Giuseppe Mallardi; and to Angelika von Hase for helping me with German sources. I also owe thanks to Shervie Price for reading the typescript, and to the incomparable Robert Lacey for his sensitive editing.

Although at times I felt like cursing him, I would like to thank Detlef Felken for his implicit faith in suggesting I write this book, and Clare Alexander and Arabella Pike for their support. Finally, I must thank my wife, Emma, for putting up with me and encouraging me throughout what has been a challenging task. <>

[Independence Corrupted: How America's Judges Make Their Decisions]()by Charles Benjamin Schudson [University of Wisconsin Press, 9780299320300]

With experience as both a trial and appellate judge, Charles Benjamin Schudson knows the burdens on judges. With engaging candor, he takes readers behind the bench to probe judicial minds analyzing actual trials and sentencings—of abortion protesters, murderers, sex predators, white supremacists, and others. He takes us into

chambers to hear judges forging appellate decisions about life and death, multimillion-dollar damages, and priceless civil rights. And, most significantly, he exposes the financial, political, personal, and professional pressures that threaten judicial ethics and independence.

As political attacks on judges increase, Schudson calls for reforms to protect judicial independence and for vigilance to ensure justice for all. Independence Corrupted is invaluable for students and scholars, lawyers and judges, and all citizens concerned about the future of America's courts.

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Sacred Words

I don't think writers are sacred, but words are. They deserve respect. If you get the right ones in the right order, you can nudge the world a little or make a poem which children will speak for you when you're dead. —Tom Stoppard, The Real Thing

I loved playing basketball, and in elementary school I was pretty good. Then classmates grew taller, and a few years later I was riding the bench for my high school team. But justice was coming—ten years passed and finally, in the courthouse gym's lunch-hour games, I was a star ... well, at least in comparison to thirtysomethings who hadn't stayed in shape.

But all too soon my speed declined, and, approaching forty, I seemed to have misplaced the skills to "perform" every day. So I cut back, playing every other day and then even less. I became aware of what, with a wink, I came to call "crossover time"—those precious few minutes, usually midway through each game, when I was "on" ... warmed up and loose but not too tired to hit the twenty-foot jumper.

Seems that writing this book also may have its crossover time—the precious few years when I am near enough certain events to remember them and appreciate their significance, yet far enough away to reflect and convey their meaning. Most gently, crossover time takes me close enough to certain people to see them again, yet distant enough to maintain perspective, free from tears that otherwise might blur my vision.

How does one know when the time is right to write? I'm not sure, but I believe that after more than a decade off the bench, my crossover time has come ... the time to search for "sacred words" to reach America's judges and all who care about their independence.

I invite you to accompany my search. Whether my writing will "nudge the world" by reaching America's judges may be for you and your children to decide. And whether my words will become a "poem" my own children speak for me will be for them to judge.

Excerpt: Independence and Corruption

The government may be administered with indiscretion ... offices may be bestowed exclusively upon those who have no other merit than that of carrying votes at elections; the commerce of our country may be depressed by nonsensical theories ... but, so long as we may have an independent judiciary, the great interests of the people will be safe. —Congressman John Rutledge Jr., 1802

[T]he greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary. —Chief Justice John Marshall, 1829

Mugged in Moscow. Sounds like a bad movie, but I wasn't in the cinema. At noon on a sunny spring day, I was in a dim hallway on the wrong floor of an old building two blocks from the Kremlin. A man grabbed my glasses and briefcase and pulled me toward an open apartment door. We scuffled; I regained my property and fled to the street. Down the block, I reentered the building, found the right floor, and hurried to the office of my sponsors, the American Bar Association and the US Department of Justice.

My mugging, I then learned, was unremarkable. "Shouldn't we call the police?" I asked. "What police?" American and Russian officials answered. When I pointed out that the thug, living or lurking just minutes away, posed an ongoing threat, they recounted their own attacks, some similar and others more serious. They explained that mugging had become part of Moscow life ... that I was lucky not to have been harmed.

I was in Russia teaching prosecutors and judges—first in Tula, the nation's weapons production center; then in Moscow, for a conference of chief judges. I had been directed to address only the subjects the Russian government had specified: organized crime, government corruption, courthouse security, and judges' safety. From that agenda, my mugger, and the weary response, I started to understand Russia's post-Soviet circumstances.

I learned more from the former KGB official who provided my orientation. Formal, fastidious, and vigilant, he always sat nearby at my lectures. Pedagogically rigid, he threatened to cancel my classes when, in answering a question, I strayed from the agenda to talk about battered women. And just before my lecture to the chief judges on organized crime, he warned with words I'll never forget: "Remember, half the judges in your audience take bribes on a regular basis; the other half worry about their lives because they don't."

His words were not hyperbolic. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, when many police went unpaid and quit, criminals helped themselves to law enforcement offices, equipment, and weapons. Some judges, unwilling to obey organized crime's commands, were murdered.

Teaching in Russia following the demise of its police state and, a decade later, in post-Pinochet Chile, I learned of two countries' efforts to re-establish justice systems—to bring transparency to courts that had been secret; to ensure civil liberties for all, including those who still feared becoming "desaparecidos" (the thousands of jailed activists and others who disappeared following Chile's coup d'état). Restoring its strong democratic foundation after "only" seventeen years of dictatorship, Chile succeeded in enacting impressive reforms. But, emerging from centuries of despotism and dominated by organized crime, Russia struggled to do so.

The chief judges I met in Moscow knew they were watched and endangered. Their most urgent concerns went unspoken. Their spoken concerns, however, were ironic. As I described the secret legal powers American prosecutors and judges deem essential to fighting organized crime (wiretaps, search warrants, contempt jailings, and others detailed in chapter 2), the Russian judges squirmed. Trying to correct for Soviet abuses, they wanted a new system without such methods. For their new "rule of law," and in their fight against organized crime, they wanted least the very powers they needed most to protect their nation and themselves.

In Chile, Russia, and many other countries, judges, determined to stock their systems with civil liberties, have turned to America—for statutory examples, and for judicial help in designing their rules of law. The judges I met were not naïve; they knew America's models were imperfect, but they admired our legal ideals and efforts to realize them. Like Congressman Rutledge, they believed that "so long as we may have an independent judiciary, the great interests of the people will be safe." And, particularly given their recent histories, the Chilean and Russian judges were acutely aware of "the greatest scourge" of which Chief Justice John Marshall had warned.

Thus, while focusing on America's judges, we would do well to glance away occasionally, broaden our view, and gain insights from abroad. Doing so, we would, of course, appreciate that America's judges do not "take bribes on a regular basis" or "worry about their lives because they don't." But

Congressman Rutledge, as I weigh his words, would not have been satisfied with a relatively independent judiciary able to avoid only the most blatant bribes and murderous risks. What was he saying?

Two centuries ago, Congressman Rutledge conceded the possibility—indeed, the inevitability—that from the popularly elected, rough-and-tumble legislative and executive branches would come some incompetent officials, indiscreet governance, and even "nonsensical" policies. But, he maintained, despite such politically generated problems, "the great interests of the people" still would be safe "as long as we may have an independent judiciary."

Why? Why would Congressman Rutledge set "an independent judiciary" as the delicate fulcrum for America's "great interests"? Why did he declare such a standard, separating our two elected branches from what, under Article III of our infant Constitution, was our only appointed branch?

Congressman Rutledge's words reflect his understanding that legislative and executive decision-making will always be subject to the shifting political pressures of the people. All well and good in many ways, he seemed to say, but only if a politically insulated third branch stands apart to calmly judge, according to fixed standards; to independently determine whether individual liberties were protected, and whether government itself obeyed the law.

But still, why? Why Rutledge's reverence for an independent judiciary? Why Marshall's extreme concern that "the greatest scourge" of "an angry Heaven" would be "an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary"? What do their words recognize?

History answers. America's Constitution—its supreme rule of law—was born in reaction to both unrestrained power and abject impotence. Neither King George nor the Articles of Confederation suffered the inconvenience of an independent judiciary—the king was left unchecked; the Articles, unempowered. History continues to answer. Whether in Chile or Russia or America, Heaven's "greatest scourge" suffocates, enslaves, and slaughters; demagogues reign, mobs rule, judges quiver ... courts are corrupted, innocent citizens die or barely survive behind barbed wire.

Most Americans seem to understand this, consciously or otherwise. Thus, they almost always seem to accept judicial authority despite the fact (or, depending on their philosophy, because of the fact) that the judiciary is, by design, the least democratic branch—appointed judges literally sitting above the people, least responsive to popular whim or will. Indeed, in her stimulating study Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin's Snuff Box to Citizens United, Fordham University law professor Zephyr Teachout identifies not only the "responsiveness to citizens" as "democracy's greatest promise" but also the "barrier of nonresponsiveness that ideally exists between judges and the people" as a vital component of the "American political experiment.'"

But things change, and America's judiciary changed rapidly. In the Constitution, the founders had established an appointed federal judiciary, insulating it with political protection—life tenure (subject to good behavior), and com¬pensation that legislators and executives could not reduce, regardless of their displeasure with the judges' decisions. But in the Constitution, the founders made no reference to state judges or elected judges. The states, however, responded. Often in enacting their own state constitutions (and often drawing on their colonial systems), states soon started establishing their own judiciaries. Thus, America's judiciary evolved into a federal/state mix of appointive and elective judiciaries, the vast majority consisting of elected state judges.

But would decisions of elected state judges remain untouched by legislative and executive branches? Could such elected judges remain independent while subject to electoral retention reviews or re-elections? Still, without such electoral ligaments to their judges, would Americans respect and defer to judicial authority?

Appointive or elective—the debate has continued throughout our history, judicial shapes shifting over time. For years, the debate pulled me in opposite directions. Witnessing the political posturing of colleagues and sometimes sensing my own, I wondered whether elected judges could ever be

independent. At the same time, however, gaining education and sensitization by campaigning, I valued my electoral ties to the people. Moreover, history, with its appointive/ elective pendulum swings, cautioned me to resist any simplistic appraisal of the relative merits of these two systems. After all, both historically and experientially, I could point to appointed judges who were unprincipled and elected ones who were fiercely independent. Thus, with judges themselves providing these ironic examples, I concluded that the debate scales balanced.

No longer. Due to four recent Supreme Court decisions, the debate is (or should be) done. These decisions—Republican Party of Minn. v. White (2002), Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2009), Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n (2010), and Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar (2015)—have trans¬formed America's elected state judges, who account for nearly 90 percent of our nation's judiciary. First, White upended constitutional law and judicial ethics codes by allowing judges and judicial candidates to speak out on legal/ political issues in the course of campaigning, regardless of whether those issues would be coming before them for decision. Then, taken together, Caperton, Citizens United (subject to a critical unresolved issue I explore in chapter 14), and Williams-Yulee incentivized judges and judicial candidates, as never before, to posture politically in order to secure financing for their campaigns. Chapters 14 and 15 examine these decisions and explain how, even if constitutionally correct, they have generated "a dependent judiciary."

It is that dependency—on preconceived legal/political positions and the campaign contributions that support them—that strips elected state judges of their independence (or, at the very least, of their appearance of independence). By contrast, appointed state judges, selected through merit-based processes, are less directly influenced by these Supreme Court decisions. Moreover, such state judges, appointed through various merit-based systems and to various terms, are far less affected than their elected counterparts in other states (though even these appointed state judges may feel political pressure from the elected

legislators and governors who appointed them). And although partisan battles and presidential posturing certainly suggest otherwise, federal judges, appointed by the president for life and subjected to merit-based review and Senate confirmation hearings, are, in theory, virtually unaffected by these recent Supreme Court decisions. In theory.

Still, as I shall explain, to understand how America's judges really make their decisions, we must focus most sharply on state judges, who make approximately 99 percent of America's judicial decisions, and of whom nearly 90 percent now are selected through the same or similar state elective systems as those for the legislative and executive branches. Therefore, increasingly, nearly 90 percent of America's judges now take the bench encumbered by their own campaign rhetoric and beholden to their own donors. At the very least, America's elected judges, even as they may try to maintain their independence, are chilled by the prospect of electoral defeat at the hands of opportunistic opponents who pander politically and, like legislators and governors, raise money from those who support their campaign positions.

Thus, political influence has come to America's judiciary like never before. And, as we will see, while other forms of corruption can compromise judicial independence, only political corruption can kill it. With these four Supreme Court decisions, an angry Heaven's "greatest scourge" has arrived; the "great interests of the people" no longer are safe.

But there's much more to the story of America's judicial independence and its corruption. Long before political corruption was propelled by these recent Supreme Court decisions, it was potent. And political corruption does not stand alone. Other corruptions—systemic and individual—corrode; they always have been consequential, remain so today, and will continue to undermine independence regardless of whether judicial selection is reformed. Dissecting independence and its many corruptions will reveal why that is so.

What, exactly, is judicial independence? While we may know it when we see it, can we define it? In chapter 3 I shall try. And what is judicial corruption? In chapter 3 I shall answer. For now,

however, it is enough to have introduced judicial independence historically and systemically, and to understand that, as Teachout explained, a "vast range of inappropriate dependencies and self-serving behavior ... made up the web of the world of corruption for the founders," and, as Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens wrote, corruption "can take many forms.... [and] operates along a spectrum" where judges often suffer "threats ... far more destructive to a democratic society than the odd bribe.'" The cases we will study highlight that spectrum.

Legislators, lawyers, and judges, of course, may seem the most prominent members of my intended audience, but students, educators, and concerned citizens are just as important. Writing for all, I blend history and contemporary cases, law and memoir. Doing so, I believe, offers a meaningful mixture of messages without which the analysis would be incomplete. And doing so, I hope, will convey the background and nature of our judiciary, the meaning of independence and corruption, the different decision-making dynamics of trial and appellate judges, and the judicial education and political reform needed to revive, strengthen, and preserve judicial independence.

Going behind the bench and into chambers, I shall describe how I, and my colleagues and I, decided actual cases. Therefore, no doubt, while certain chapters, reading as memoir as well as treatise, may seem too "touchy-feely" for some, I believe the human dynamics thus revealed to be among the most consequential components of decision-making. We're going beyond civics lessons and academic commentaries, beyond citizens' assumptions, pundits' positions, and judges' explanations. We're getting inside the judicial skin to feel and understand judging.

As a trial judge for ten years, I presided over tens of thousands of cases—from five-minute hearings to three-week jury trials. As an appellate judge for twelve years, I joined in deciding more than three thousand cases—some clearcut, resolved with ease; others complex, decided only after months of written and oral arguments, research, and authorship of published decisions. Here we closely examine eight. Why these? They are, diverse—civil and criminal, trial and appellate. Each exposes

elements of independence and corruption; each illuminates controversies consuming our courts.

- Abortion: State v. Miller—the trial and sentencing of a right-to-life leader and her very personal correspondence with the judge who sent her to jail.
- Health insurance: Peterman a Midwestern National Insurance—the appeal of parents and insurers contesting the costly coverage for a premature birth, and the chambered debate over two routes to justice—law and compassion.
- Runaway children: In the Interest of S. W the sentencing of a teenager, her disappearance, and a judge's decision holding the government in contempt for failing to deliver court-ordered services to her and many other children.
- Sex predators: State v. Schulpius—the appeal of a rapist who remained jailed for years despite judicial orders for his release, and America's new "sex predator commitment" laws.
- Murder and the "insanity" defense: State v. McClain—the trial and sentencing of a man who murdered his beloved ten-year-old son, and America's "insanity" defense.
- Corporate homicide and punitive damages: Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries—the appeal of the $100 million jury judgment resulting from the sports stadium construction collapse that killed three ironworkers.
- White supremacists: State v. Lange and O'Malley—the criminal trials and sentencings of two "skinheads" and their attempt to disqualify a Jewish judge.
- Electoral conflict of interest: State v. Clay—the jury selection, trial, and appeal of a rapist and the politically motivated denial of the new trial that, the judges knew, the law required.

These compelling cases, forming this book's core, present individuals, families, causes, conflicts, and tragedies. They touched me deeply. To do them justice in court, I tried to remember that, under the crushing caseloads and between the lines of every transcript, precious people were coming to our

courts—their courts—for help. To do them justice here, I try to help you hear their voices.

Four of these cases I decided as a trial judge, acting alone; four others, as an appellate judge, acting collaboratively with colleagues. Knowledge of the differences between trial and appellate courts should not be presumed.

Trial Courts

Trial courts are the many courts, some federal but mostly state (variously called "county," "circuit," "district," "superior"), that conduct almost all our nation's courtroom business." In both criminal and civil cases, they hold trials (decided by juries or judges) and pre-trial and post-trial proceedings (decided by judges). To reduce confusion, I refer to them all as "trial courts" (or, when necessary to draw the distinction, as "federal trial courts" or "state trial courts").

In trial courts hearing criminal cases, one sees pre-trial motions challenging arrests, confessions, or seizures of evidence; jury selection and trials for offenses ranging from disorderly conduct to murder; attorneys arguing to juries and judges; and finally, victims, defendants, defense attorneys, and prosecuting attorneys pleading to judges who pronounce sentences. In trial courts hearing civil cases, one may see trials and other hearings involving diverse subjects such as commerce and insurance, divorce and child custody, product safety and medical malpractice, and many others.

Trial courts are action-packed, crowded with witnesses and jurors, spectators and journalists, triumphs and tears. In smaller communities, trial court judges handle a wide variety of cases, criminal and civil. In bigger communities, for administrative ease and subject specialization, trial court judges work in what often are called "divisions" juvenile, criminal, family, civil, probate, and others.

Appellate Courts

Appellate courts are the relatively few courts, mostly state but some federal, that review appeals—challenges to trial judges' decisions and trial court outcomes. Here, for the most part, we will consider state appellate courts, while keeping in mind that the federal courts provide a similar

trial/appellate structure for the litigation of many important issues under federal law.

In most states, we find two levels of appellate courts. While in a few states the nomenclature is reversed, most appellate courts are called the state "court of appeals" (the level above the trial courts), and the state "supreme court" (the level above the court of appeals). Also, in almost all states, the former often is referred to as the "intermediate" appellate court; the latter as the "high" court. Here's the difference.

A state's court of appeals must consider any appeal a trial court litigant chooses to pursue. The court of appeals decides the appeal by either affirming the trial judge's decision or reversing the decision, in whole or in part, and returning the case to the trial court for reconsideration or a new trial. Sometimes a losing court of appeals litigant will further appeal to the state's supreme court. But, unlike the court of appeals, which must accept every appealed case, a state's supreme court need review only the few it selects from the many it receives.

Except for days of oral arguments, when attorneys directly address appellate judges in open court, appellate courts are quiet places, with almost all their activity behind closed doors. The judges and their law clerks (recent law school graduates usually serving a year or two in these coveted positions) read trial transcripts containing the verbatim record of trial court proceedings, briefs written by attorneys arguing the issues on appeal, and prior appellate decisions relevant to those issues.

For almost all litigants, a case ends in the trial court; relatively few appeal. For almost all who do, the case then ends in the court of appeals; relatively few appeal to the state's supreme court, and, even if they do, that highest state court usually declines the case. If, however, the state's supreme court accepts an appeal, its decision will conclude the case (except for the rare one that might move into the federal courts or, most exceptionally, to the US Supreme Court).

Trial Judges and Appellate Judges— Different Decision-Making Dynamics

In a trial court, and particularly in juvenile, criminal, and family courts, emotional subjects and overwhelming caseloads often dissolve in tears. A judge rarely needs reminders of real people and what they suffer; more often, I needed my bicycling commute each evening for comforting separation from court on my way home to my own family. In an appellate court, things are different. The people appear only in print-on-paper profiles traced in the transcripts and briefs bringing their cases. Thus, some suggest, appellate judges may seem more distant and even less "caring," an advantage or disadvantage depending on complex circumstances, some of which we will consider.

Trial judges act alone; their behind-the-scenes decision-making need not be exposed to anyone. And, of course, their processes may be good or bad. Many, often working at home late into the night, study briefs and presentence reports, research law, agonize over issues, and take the bench each day well prepared to consider each case on its merits. I have known many such judges. But I have known others. Unprepared, caring little for the people or their concerns, they may feign impartiality while indulging practices that range from lazy and discourteous to intellectually dishonest, legally unethical, and perhaps even criminal.

But on every case, the trial judge's private decision-making soon yields to public pronouncement in open court—a transparency we may take for granted but one sadly absent from some star-chambered systems abroad. No mere formality, the attorneys' in-court arguments and the judge's public pronouncements help ensure that, almost always, the decision-making has been honest. And a trial judge's decisions are not written in stone; re-argument and reconsideration in open court may occur, and appeal is possible.

Appellate judges, behind closed doors, also read and write alone, but they decide collaboratively. They confer with one another as desired and sometimes convene in open court for oral arguments. Much more writing follows, and later, sometimes months later, appellate judges issue their decisions to the parties, public, and press. Deciding

in groups of three or more, appellate judges work under the mutual scrutiny of their colleagues on each case, and, as a result, the "odd bribe" or other overt corruption is less likely than in trial courts. Behind the closed doors of appellate courts I have known excellent and honorable judges, and, again, I also have known others.

Necessarily, this book springs from cases I judged. Inevitably, therefore, it is personal. Thus, even as my experiences guide, they also may lead to tripwires: egotism, dishonesty, and breach of confidentiality.

Egotism

In 1788, during the state debates over ratification of the Constitution, a judge wrote: "The real effect of this system of government, will therefore be brought home to the feelings of the people ... through the medium of the judicial power.... [T]hose who are to be vested with it, are to be placed in a situation altogether unprecedented in a free country.... Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself."

Independent of heaven itself! Judges, after all, are not known for small egos. By design and of necessity, judges must be strong. At best, they are secure, confident, and authoritative, yet gentle and self-discerning. But some may be insecure, arrogant, and authoritarian, unkind and, as federal appeals judge Richard A. Posner has written, "often in error, never in doubt."

As a judge, I was exposed to the egotism virus. I tried to stay healthy but was not immune. Now, as an author, unrestrained by attorneys before me and uncorrected by judges above me, might I suffer the sickness? In analyzing America's judiciary but doing so, in part, through cases I judged, might I succumb to self-serving egotism?

Dishonesty

Candid accounts of my colleagues' work and mine will recount not only the public record but private communications. If I fail to honestly reveal my own failings, I will have betrayed my mission. And if, for reasons of delicacy or diplomacy, I fail to accurately describe my colleagues' conduct, commendable and otherwise, I will have become an unfair critic or false apologist. Thus, I ask, how may I honestly disclose problematic elements of actual

decision-making while remaining self-discerning and respectful of colleagues, several of whom have died since our years together? And how may I do so while respect-ing privacy, within the rules of confidentiality?

Confidentiality

At first glance, the ethical standards seem clear. The American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 3.5 provides, "A judge shall not intentionally disclose or use nonpublic information acquired in a judicial capacity for any purpose unrelated to the judge's judicial duties." Such a standard, I believe, is sound for several reasons, not the least of which is that, without it, the candor of appellate judges' case consultations would constrict. Still, "unrelated to the judge's judicial duties" may be in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, such standards must be reconciled with others that encourage judges to write and teach to increase understanding of the judiciary.

Confidentiality has costs. Unless judges speak out, how will we learn how they really make their decisions? In this least transparent branch of government, how could we see? Critics comment on how judges should make decisions, and cynics speculate that "they all do it" otherwise. But no one—concerned citizen, activist whistleblower, investigative journalist, regulatory official—really knows. And, apart from theoretical treatises, no judge has revealed how judges really decide real cases. Why? Why must policy makers and the public continue to wonder, with only criticism, cynicism, and speculation to guide them? Why? Because, pun intended, judges can't tell how judges really decide.

Figuratively, many judges can't tell; they do not discern their own decision-making processes. Judge Posner has asserted that they "are not fully conscious of the beliefs that determine their judicial votes." Consumed by caseloads, they have no time to reflect on (or write about) their own reflective processes. Blinded by their biases, many do not know what may be blocking their view. Sitting so close, many lack the perspective to identify and differentiate the factors, correct or corrupting, that form their decisions. Paraphrasing criticism of King Lear by one of the king's daughters, Judge Posner

observes that "most judges have ever but slenderly known themselves."

And literally, many judges believe, they can't tell—they're not allowed. As noted, however, the Model Code's preclusion—"unrelated to judicial duties"—may allow for more openness than judges assume, and standards vary from state to state. Further, apart from such uncertainties, Judge Posner saw something a bit more suspicious: "[M]ost judges are cagey, even coy, in discussing what they do. They tend to parrot an official line about the judicial process (how rule-bound it is), and often to believe it, though it does not describe their actual practices.... Judges have convinced many people—including themselves—that they use esoteric materials and techniques to build selflessly an edifice of doctrines unmarred by willfulness, politics, or ignorance."

This judicial reluctance to discuss decision-making, Judge Posner argues, "makes the scholarly study of judicial behavior at once challenging and indispensable." Instead of biographies or quantitative analyses, "we need critical studies of judges."28 And, I would add, we need critical studies of judges by judges. As federal chief judge Irving R. Kaufman declared: "Judges have the duty to speak on matters that affect the judicial system because the public interest cannot be served by silence. Silence is not always golden."

Thus, depending on one's viewpoint, judges either properly protect or all too conveniently conceal their decision-making processes. At what point does proper privacy end and counterproductive concealment begin? The answer may vary from case to case. The answer also may vary over time. Unquestionably, whatever one's admiration for transparency, one should recognize the value of confidentiality in judicial decision-making in practice. And yet there is a big difference between cases pending and cases completed, later considered in a reflective light.

What is appropriate here? To truly understand how America's judges make their decisions, I believe it necessary to touch untouched topics and examine honorable and dishonorable judicial conduct. To honor and protect judicial independence, without which the "great interests of the people" will be lost

forever, I believe we must push and probe where others have not, exposing chambered decision-making that has always been concealed.

The cause is compelling; the time is now. Respectfully, therefore, I ask you to come with me into our courts and carefully open our chamber doors. <>

Spiritual Compass: The three qualities of life by Satish Kumar [UIT Cambridge Ltd., 9781903998892]

In our modern, materialistic world it is easy to separate spirituality from everyday life, but this book encourages spirituality to be a part of our ordinary, everyday existence. It needs to be implicitly present in business, in politics, in farming, in cooking, and in relationships. To illustrate this, Satish Kumar draws on the Indian Ayurvedic tradition which characterizes the mind as having three gunas, or primary qualities: sattva (characterized by calmness, clarity and purity), rajas (energy and passion), and tamas (dullness and ignorance). These qualities can be applied to work and the environment. When we see ourselves in the light of the three gunas, they can orient us toward the direction in which we wish to go. They can help us to recover the art of living, and lead us towards a peaceful and contented existence. Extending the meaning of spirituality further, Satish explains that there is no dualism between spirit and matter—all matter is imbued with spirit, and spirit manifests through matter. This integrated world-view forms the core of his book.

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Excerpt: A Spiritual Compass

When we are on a journey we need a compass; even when we are at sea, surrounded by great waves, a compass can help us to find our direction. In the same way we need a spiritual compass to find our direction in life.

A spiritual compass can help us to navigate our path through confusion and crises, through the suffocating allure of materialism, and through delusion and despair.

The ancient Indian tradition of Ayurveda offers us such a compass: a compass of three qualities. This compass can help us to find the way of wholesome living.

Modern science recognises that nature is a play of the forces of creativity, transformation and inertia. When these forces are in balance, nature—including human nature—is in balance, and our lives express themselves in physical, emotional and spiritual wellbeing. The ancient Vedic tradition of wisdom defined these three forces in a similar way: they are named sattva, rajas and tamas, and are the governing principles in all of nature.

Sattva relates to creativity; rajas to energy; and tamas to inertia. At the present time humanity suffers from an excess of rajas. When rajas is out of balance and in excess, the outcome is an inflammation in all areas of life. Inflammation in the body is linked to an increased incidence of heart attacks, auto-immune diseases, cancer, and many other illnesses. Inflammation in the mind and emotions produces anger, hostility, resentment and grievances. Inflammation in society produces war and terrorism. Today's illness is the symptom of too much rajas, leading to the conditions of tamas.

In this book Satish Kumar offers a holistic approach to humanity's problems by showing how a sattvic lifestyle can allow us to heal ourselves and contribute to the healing of humanity and the world.

Those who wish to restore the broken balance in their lives will greatly benefit from the wisdom expounded in this book.

Deepak Chopra

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We are facing an unprecedented global crisis. That much is clear. Not a day goes by without the news media reminding us of climate change, endangered species, economic instability, pollution, poverty, famine, terrorism or war. Such problems are not separate, independent, issues. The Club of Rome, in its seminal report The Limits to Growth, called them a "global problematique", a complex intertwined set of problems. [Also see, Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Global Update] Yet, we usually treat them in isolation. We seek to control scarce resources, cap carbon emissions, fine the polluters, shore up failing banks, destroy terrorists and punish drug users. We seldom look into the root causes of our various problems.

We would not do this with our own bodies. If we visited a doctor because of a bad stomach pain, and all the doctor did was give us a painkiller, we would not think him or her a very good doctor. A good doctor would inquire deeper, to the cause of the pain. Is it something we've eaten? Is there an infection? Or is it, perhaps, due to stress? If the root cause is left untreated, then the symptoms will almost surely return. When it comes to treating our global malaise, however, we don't often consider the underlying issues. We focus on dealing with the many symptoms, then wonder why the problems haven't gone away.

When we inquire into what lies behind the global problematique, we find, time and again, human factors—human decisions, human thinking and human values. The crisis we are facing is, in essence, a crisis of consciousness—a crisis of perception and values. It is becoming increasingly clear that the dominating materialist values of efficiency and economy need to be balanced by the equally important values of care, compassion and respect.

Such values are not foreign to any of us, and can be found in all cultures. However, Western society's over-emphasis of life's material side has so filled our minds with wants, worries, schemes and regrets, these qualities seldom surface. The world's spiritual traditions, on the other hand, have safeguarded and encouraged such values. They have repeatedly reminded us of the truths we all know inside, but which are so easily overlooked in our struggle to make it in the world.

In the Vedas of ancient India it is held that everything is permeated by three fundamental qualities—the three gunas—sattva, rajas and tamas. Sattva means true, natural, nourishing; rajas is associated with change, achievement, excitement; tamas is connected with weight, control, inertia. Nothing is without these three qualities; what is important is which one dominates.

The notion of the three gunas may be new to many of us, but they have informed Indian culture for thousands of years. In recent times, Mahatma Gandhi exemplified a life dominated by sattvic values, revealing the quiet power of humility and non-violence. Spiritual Compass is a call for us all to live more sattvic lives. This does not mean giving up our worldly lives; it is an encouragement to live a more balanced life, one that is in harmony with our surroundings, neither taking too much, nor destroying unnecessarily.

Few people are better qualified to write this book than Satish Kumar. His own upbringing as a Jain monk in India has given him a deep personal intimacy with these principles. Living the last thirty years in the West has shown him both the need and practicality of applying these principles to daily affairs. Most importantly, his own life is an admirable example of simplicity, compassion and care. And this shines through on every page of this delightful, yet profound, little book.

An Invitation
Dear Reader

I would like to invite you to learn three new words in order to enjoy this book. These ancient words are from the Sanskrit language, and have been commonly used in India for millennia; they serve as a useful aid to good living.

The first word is sattvic, which I translate as elegant and simple. Basically, this word is used to remind people to follow the way which rings true to them at the deepest level, which is natural and real. Therefore, it is to be embraced.

The second word is rajasic which can be translated as extravagant and excessive. This word is used to warn people of the pitfalls of the glittering and the

glamorous. Even though the rajasic way of living may be tempting, because of its complicated nature it will tend to bring disappointment and discontentment; therefore, it is generally to be avoided.

The third word is tamasic, which I have defined as dark and depressing. This word is used as an alarm bell to alert people about danger ahead. Tamasic acts may appeal to people as daring and exciting, but the experience of wise people in the past has shown again and again that tamasic is destructive, disempowering and confusing; therefore, it is strenuously to be avoided.

I will be using these three words throughout the book and explaining their multi-layered meaning, and their relevance in the context of environment, development, food, farming, politics, power and much more. I will be making the obvious case for a sattvic life, and showing that elegant simplicity is a spiritual imperative.

These three qualities of life are as much external attributes as they are an internal state of being. Inner intentions and motivations are as important as outer actions. So, we are not to judge people only by their external appearances.

Ultimately there is the state of transcendence. At that secret centre of our being there are no compartments, no labels and no categories; no sattvic, no rajasic and no tamasic. We rise above all dualities and divisions, and live in perfect harmony with ourselves and the world around us. That is the state of unselfconscious existence. At that stage one is fully self-realised.

So, to live a good life, it helps to be aware of the sattvic, rajasic and tamasic qualities in everything. Firstly, we need to develop a sense of proportion, and the right mix of sattvic, rajasic and tamasic; secondly, to make the right and appropriate choices; and thirdly, to rise above them. Then joy is ours, and we will be able to live happier lives.

The Three Qualities of Life According to the Bhagavad Gita

Three Kinds of Food
1. Foods which promote vitality, health and joy, which are soft, sweet and nourishing are sattvic.
2. Foods which produce pain, grief and disease, which are bitter, sour, pungent and harsh are rajasic.
3. Foods which produce dullness, heaviness and lethargy, which are tasteless, stale and intoxicating are tamasic.

Three Kinds of Service
1. Service which is offered in accordance with the natural laws, expecting no reward in return is sattvic.
2. Service which is offered for display, for gain and reward is rajasic.
3. Service which is offered without faith and with an empty heart is tamasic.

Three Kinds of Practice
1. Pure, upright and non-violent acts, non-offensive, truthful, pleasant and beneficial speech, and gentle, serene and restrained thoughts are sattvic.
2. Practice which is performed for gain and honour is rajasic.
3. Practice which is obstinate and causes injury to oneself and to others is tamasic.

Three Kinds of Gifts
1. A gift which is made with pure motives, without expecting anything in return, given at an appropriate place and time is sattvic.
2. A gift which is made with the expectation of something in return is rajasic.
3. A gift which is made with contempt and which demeans the receiver is tamasic.

Three Kinds of Understanding
1. Understanding which sees unity in diversity, wholeness, relatedness and creates synthesis is sattvic.
2. Understanding which is based in disunity and causes separation is rajasic.

3. Understanding which focuses on a part and sees it as if it was the whole is tamasic.

Three Kinds of Action

1. Action which is performed without attachment, without desire for reward and with love is sattvic.
2. Action which is performed under stress and for the purpose of gratification is rajasic.
3. Action which is performed in ignorance, without regard for consequences and which brings injury is tamasic.

Three Kinds of Person

1. The person who has no ego and who is unperturbed by either success or failure is sattvic.
2. The person who is swayed by passion, who eagerly seeks results and who is greedy is rajasic.
3. The person who is unbalanced, vulgar, deceitful, malicious and despondent is tamasic.

Three Kinds of Thinking

1. The thinking which knows the difference between right and wrong action, what is to be feared and not to be feared, and what brings freedom and what brings bondage is sattvic.
2. The thinking which is confused between right and wrong, courage and cowardice is rajasic.
3. The thinking which conceives right as wrong and wrong as right is tamasic.

Three Kinds of Determination

1. Determination which maintains balance and harmony between thinking, breathing and sensing is sattvic.
2. Determination which seeks to fulfil the desire for wealth and power is rajasic.
3. Determination which brings depression, arrogance, grief and fear is tamasic.

Three Kinds of Happiness

1. Happiness which is a result of a clear understanding of the self and the world is sattvic.

2. Happiness which arises from the gratification of the senses, which seems like nectar at first but is like poison at the end is rajasic.
3. Happiness which comes from delusion and which is derived from sloth and negligence is tamasic. <>

On the Future Prospects for Humanity by Martin Rees [Princeton University Press, 9780691180441]

A provocative and inspiring look at the future of humanity and science from world-renowned scientist and bestselling author Martin Rees

Humanity has reached a critical moment. Our world is unsettled and rapidly changing, and we face existential risks over the next century. Various outcomes—good and bad—are possible. Yet our approach to the future is characterized by short-term thinking, polarizing debates, alarmist rhetoric, and pessimism. In this short, exhilarating book, renowned scientist and bestselling author Martin Rees argues that humanity's prospects depend on our taking a very different approach to planning for tomorrow.

The future of humanity is bound to the future of science and hinges on how successfully we harness technological advances to address our challenges. If we are to use science to solve our problems while avoiding its dystopian risks, we must think rationally, globally, collectively, and optimistically about the long term. Advances in biotechnology, cybertechnology, robotics, and artificial intelligence—if pursued and applied wisely—could empower us to boost the developing and developed world and overcome the threats humanity faces on Earth, from climate change to nuclear war. At the same time, further advances in space science will allow humans to explore the solar system and beyond with robots and AI. But there is no "Plan B" for Earth—no viable alternative within reach if we do not care for our home planet.

Rich with fascinating insights into cutting-edge science and technology, this accessible book will captivate anyone who wants to understand the critical issues that will define the future of humanity on Earth and beyond.

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INTRODUCTION
1 DEEP IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

This is a book about the future. I write from a personal perspective, and in three modes: as a scientist, as a citizen, and as a worried member of the human species. The book's unifying theme is that the flourishing of the world's growing population depends on the wisdom with which science and technology is deployed.

Today's young people can expect to live to the end of the century. So how can they ensure that ever more powerful technologies—bio, cyber, and AI—can open up a benign future, without threatening catastrophic downsides? The stakes are higher than ever before; what happens this century will resonate for thousands of years. In addressing such a wide-ranging theme I'm mindful that even the experts have a poor record of forecasting. But I'm unrepentant because it's crucial to enhance public and political discourse on long-term scientific and global trends.

A Cosmic Cameo:

Suppose aliens existed, and that some had been watching our planet for its entire forty-five million centuries, what would they have seen? Over most of that vast time-span, Earth's appearance altered very gradually. Continents drifted; ice cover waxed and waned; successive species emerged, evolved, and became extinct.

But in just a tiny sliver of Earth's history—the last hundred centuries—the patterns of vegetation altered much faster than before. This signalled the start of agriculture—and then urbanisation. The changes accelerated as human populations increased.

Then there were even faster changes. Within just fifty years the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere began to rise abnormally fast. And something else unprecedented happened: rockets launched from the planet's surface escaped the biosphere completely. Some were propelled into orbits around the Earth; some journeyed to the Moon and other planets.

The hypothetical aliens would know that Earth would gradually heat up, facing doom in about six billion years when the Sun would flare up and die. But could they have predicted this sudden `fever' halfway through its life—these human-induced alterations—seemingly occurring with runaway speed?

If they continued to keep watch, what would they witness in the next century? Will a final spasm be followed by silence? Or will the planet's ecology stabilise? And will an armada of rockets launched from Earth spawn new oases of life elsewhere?

This book offers some hopes, fears, and conjectures about what lies ahead. Surviving this century, and sustaining the longer-term future of our ever more vulnerable world, depends on accelerating some technologies, but responsibly restraining others. The challenges to governance are huge and daunting. I offer a personal perspective—writing partly as a scientist (an astronomer) but also as an anxious member of the human race.

* * *

For medieval Europeans, the entire cosmology—from creation to apocalypse—spanned only a few thousand years. We now envision time-spans a million times longer. But even in this vastly extended perspective, this century is special. It is the first when one species, ours, is so empowered and dominant that it has the planet's future in its hands. We've entered an era that some geologists call the Anthropocene.

The ancients were bewildered and helpless in the face of floods and pestilences—and prone to ir-rational dread. Large parts of the Earth were terra incognita. The ancients' cosmos was just the Sun and planets surrounded by the fixed stars spread across the `vault of heaven'. Today, we know our Sun is one of one hundred billion stars in our

galaxy, which is itself one of at least one hundred billion other galaxies.

But despite these hugely stretched conceptual horizons—and despite our enhanced understanding of the natural world, and control over it—the timescale on which we can sensibly plan, or make confident forecasts, has become shorter rather than longer. Europe's Middle Ages were turbulent and uncertain times. But these times played out against a `backdrop' that changed little from one generation to the next; devotedly, medieval masons added bricks to cathedrals that would take a century to finish. But for us, unlike for them, the next century will be drastically different from the present. There has been an explosive disjunction between the ever-shortening timescales of social and technical change and the billion-year time-spans of biology, geology, and cosmology.

Humans are now so numerous and have such a heavy collective `footprint' that they have the ability to transform, or even ravage, the entire biosphere. The world's growing and more demanding population puts the natural environment under strain; peoples' actions could trigger dangerous climate change and mass extinctions if `tipping points' are crossed—outcomes that would bequeath a depleted and impoverished world to future generations. But to reduce these risks, we don't need to put the brakes on technology; on the contrary, we need to enhance our understanding of nature and deploy appropriate technology more urgently. These are the themes of chapter 1 of this book.

Most people in the world live better lives than their parents did—and the proportion in abject poverty has been falling. These improvements, against a backdrop of a fast-growing population, couldn't have happened without advances in science and technology—which have been positive forces in the world. I argue in chapter 2 that our lives, our health, and our environment can benefit still more from further progress in biotech, cybertech, robotics, and AI. To that extent, I am a techno-optimist. But there is a potential downside. These advances expose our ever more interconnected world to new vulnerabilities. Even within the next decade or two, technology will disrupt working patterns, national economies, and international relations. In an era when we are all becoming interconnected, when the disadvantaged are aware of their predicament, and when migration is easy, it is hard to be optimistic about a peaceful world if a chasm persists, as deep as it is in today's geopolitics, between welfare levels and life chances in different regions. It is specially disquieting if advances in genetics and medicine that can enhance human lives are available to only a privileged few and portend more fundamental forms of inequality.

There are some who promote a rosy view of the future, enthusing about improvements in our moral sensitivities as well as in our material progress. I don't share this perspective. There has plainly, thanks to technology, been a welcome improvement in most people's lives and life chances—in education, health, and lifespan. However, the gulf between the way the world is and the way it could be is wider than it ever was. The lives of medieval people may have been miserable, but there was little that could have been done to improve those lives. In contrast, the plight of the `bottom billion' in today's world could be transformed by redistributing the wealth of the thousand richest people on the planet. Failure to respond to this humanitarian imperative, which nations have the power to remedy, surely casts doubt on any claims of institutional moral progress.

The potentials of biotech and the cyberworld are exhilarating—but they're frightening too. We are already, individually and collectively, so greatly empowered by accelerating innovation that we can—by design, or as unintended consequences—engender global changes that will resonate for centuries. The smartphone, the web, and their ancillaries are already crucial to our networked lives. But these technologies would have seemed magical even just twenty years ago. So, looking several decades ahead we must keep our minds open, or at least ajar, to transformative advances that may today seem like science fiction.

We can't confidently forecast lifestyles, attitudes, social structures, or population sizes even a few decades hence—still less the geopolitical context against which these trends will play out. Moreover, we should be mindful of an unprecedented kind of change that could emerge within a few decades.

Human beings themselves—their mentality and their physique—may become malleable through the deployment of genetic modification and cyborg technologies. This is a game changer. When we admire the literature and artefacts that have survived from antiquity, we feel an affinity, across a time gulf of thousands of years, with those ancient artists and their civilisations. But we can have zero confidence that the dominant intelligences a few centuries hence will have any emotional resonance with us—even though they may have an algorithmic understanding of how we behaved.

The twenty-first century is special for another reason: it is the first in which humans may develop habitats beyond the Earth. The pioneer `settlers' on an alien world will need to adapt to a hostile environment—and they will be beyond the reach of terrestrial regulators. These adventurers could spearhead the transition from organic to electronic intelligence. This new incarnation of `life', not requiring a planetary surface or atmosphere, could spread far beyond our solar system. Interstellar travel is not daunting to near-immortal electronic entities. If life is now unique to the Earth, this diaspora will be an event of cosmic significance. Yet if intelligence already pervades the cosmos, our progeny will merge with it. This would play out over astronomical timescales—not `mere' centuries. Chapter 3 presents a perspective on these longer-term scenarios: whether robots will supersede `organic' intelligence, and whether such intelligence already exists elsewhere in the cosmos.

What happens to our progeny, here on Earth and perhaps far beyond, will depend on technologies that we can barely conceive today. In future centuries (still an instant in the cosmic perspective), our creative intelligence could jump-start the transitions from an Earth-based to a space-faring species, and from biological to electronic intelligence—transitions that could inaugurate billions of years of posthuman evolution. On the other hand, as discussed in chapters 1 and 2, humans could trigger bio, cyber, or environmental catastrophes that foreclose all such potentialities.

Chapter 4 offers some (perhaps self-indulgent) excursions into scientific themes—fundamental and philosophical—that raise questions about the extent of physical reality, and whether there are intrinsic limits to how much we'll ever understand of the real world's complexities. We need to assess what's credible, and what can be dismissed as science fiction, in order to forecast the impact of science on humanity's long-term prospects.

In the final chapter I address issues closer to the here and now. Science, optimally applied, could offer a bright future for the nine or ten billion people who will inhabit the Earth in 2050. But how can we maximise the chance of achieving this benign future while avoiding the dystopian downsides? Our civilisation is moulded by innovations that stem from scientific advances and the consequent deepening understanding of nature. Scientists will need to engage with the wider public and use their expertise beneficially, especially when the stakes will be immensely high. Finally, I address today's global challenges—emphasising that these may require new international institutions, informed and enabled by well-directed science, but also responsive to public opinion on politics and ethics.

Our planet, this 'pale blue dot' in the cosmos, is a special place. It may be a unique place. And we are its stewards in an especially crucial era. That is an important message for all of us—and the theme of this book. <>

Faces of Charisma: Image, Text, Object in Byzantium and the Medieval West edited by Brigitte Miriam Bedos-Rezak Martha Dana Rust [Explorations in Medieval Culture, Brill, 9789004288690]

In Faces of Charisma: Image, Text, Object in Byzantium and the Medieval West, a multi-disciplinary group of scholars advances the theory that charisma may be a quality of art as well as of person. Beginning with the argument that Weberian charisma of person is itself a matter of representation, this volume shows that to study charismatic art is to experiment with a theory of representation that allows for the possibility of nothing less than a breakdown between art and viewer and between art and lived experience. The volume examines charismatic works of literature, visual art, and architecture from England, Northern

Europe, Italy, Ancient Greece, and Constantinople and from time periods ranging from antiquity to the beginning of the early modern period.

Contributors are Joseph Salvatore Ackley, Paul Binski, Paroma Chatterjee, Andrey Egorov, Erik Gustafson, Duncan Hardy, Stephen Jaeger, Jacqueline E. Jung, Lynsey McCulloch, Martino Rossi Monti, Gavin Richardson, and Andrew Romig.

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Faces and Surfaces of Charisma: by Brigitte Miriam Bedos-Rezak and Martha D. Rust

The idea for a volume entitled Faces of Charisma emerged from a conference that took place at New York University's Medieval and Renaissance Center in April 2013. The impetus for the conference was provided by C. Stephen Jaeger's recently published book, Enchantment: Charisma and the Sublime in the Arts of the West. A measure of the excitement the conference generated was the early emergence — already during the afternoon coffee break — of a conviction that the exploration of charisma that had begun that day in the form of 20-minute papers merited enlargement and dissemination in the form of a book. The present volume includes most of the papers presented at the conference, which have been subsequently expanded into chapters, as well as a number of essays written specifically for inclusion herein.

Midway through his introduction to Enchantment, Jaeger makes an arresting claim: "The terms 'charisma,' 'aura,' and 'enchantment' can be profitably rehabilitated as critical concepts to analyze art, literature, and films, their aesthetics, their impact on the audience, and the psychology of both star and fan." On its face this assertion might seem illogical given these terms' usual referents: charisma, a quality of exceptional people; aura, a quality of unique things and places; enchantment, a state of mind. As Jaeger

himself brilliantly demonstrates, however, a recognition of the symptoms of these phenomena together with the conditions that give rise to them affords a critic the means to study certain effects of art that otherwise elude analysis, remaining in the realms of faith, illusion, or subjectivity. Using the concept of charisma in particular, the critic is able to delineate that aspect of a life, a text, or an artifact that seems at once the most real and most ineffable to its viewers. Thus, Jaeger conceives of charisma as a quality that may apply to art as well as to person. His conception of charismatic art springs from the category-expanding insight that charisma of person is itself a work of art since, as with a work of art, it entails representation. To study charisma is therefore to study representation, and to study charismatic art, as Jaeger's work has shown, is to experiment with a theory of representation that is hospitable to the possibility of nothing less than a breakdown between art and viewer and between art and lived experience. The essays in this volume take up Jaeger's invitation to experiment, exploring the relationship between artifact and person and between art and charisma from the perspectives of premodern history, art, and literature. Some contributions substantiate the concept of charismatic art, others test its possibilities, still others challenge its premises; all found inspiration in Jaeger's gripping exposition.

We begin our introduction with a historiographic survey that situates Jaeger's notion of charismatic art within the several intellectual traditions from which it draws: histories of the concepts of personal charisma, of the sublime, and of aura. Having considered the theoretical foundations for Jaeger's charisma of art, we proceed to an analytical discussion of the three dimensions that underlie our contributors' own approaches to charismatic art: audiences, effects, and operative modalities. In this triadic formation, the vectors of charisma point in many directions: not only to and from the human faces that most works of charismatic art feature but also from and to a work of art's materials, the play of light, for instance, on the surface of a gilded sculpture. In this way, these analyses raise two related questions pertaining to Jaeger's insistence on an anthropocentric source in charismatic art: can the humanness of charisma as it is traditionally understood be imputed to things, and should the

exclusivity of an anthropocentric origin in matters charismatic be challenged? Parsing this latter point, further queries emerge: Is representation of a human being a prerequisite for art to act charismatically? And if so, how mimetic does such representation need to be? Does cultural contingency play a part in determining whether or not a work of art will be perceived by viewers as charismatic, or are such responses a matter of our species's neurobiological wiring, our tendency to see sentient life in things, or as Stewart Guthrie famously put it, to see faces in clouds? What is the role of artistic medium and technology in creating charismatic effects? These and other concerns animate the essays gathered in this volume.

From Charisma of Person to Charisma of Art, Via the Sublime and the Aura: *Max Weber to C. Stephen Jaeger: From Charisma of Person to Charisma of Art*

In contemporary English usage, the word charisma is the one to reach for when we want to describe an attractive yet ineffable quality of a person, whether a movie star, a politician, a TV newscaster, a religious figure, or even an attractive someone, spotted across a crowded room. An elusive charm, an enigmatic magnetism, an indefinable sparkle, charisma is sometimes described as the "X-factor," a term that captures well the essence of this quality as a personal "something" that defies precise description. Anthropologist Charles Lindholm observes that in this popular notion of it, charisma is a quality that certain individuals are perceived "to have"; that is, this X-factor is thought to "exist" in an individual in the same way "height or eye color exist," Frank Sinatra's blue eyes or Kareem Abdul Jabbar's seven-foot-two-inch stature, for instance. As prevalent as it has become as a term for such a winning trait, the word charisma is barely attested in English before the 1940s. Tellingly, the abrupt upswing in its appearance in print in that decade corresponds with the publication of the first English translations of the work of Max Weber. Indeed, a spike in the use of the term charisma in 1947 coincides precisely with the publication of A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons's English translation of Weber's Economy and Society (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1922), which contains his most extensive discussion of the concept. Economy and

Society also contains what is generally considered Weber's most explicit definition of charisma, which appears in the course of his explication of three kinds of leadership:

> The term "charisma" will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not access ible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.

Within a few paragraphs of this definition, Weber expands upon it by describing the role of those by whom the charismatic leader "is treated" as such: "the recognition on the part of those subject to authority is decisive for the validity of charisma." This all-important recognition, Weber further stipulates, "is a matter of complete personal devotion to the possessor of the quality, arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope."

Two aspects of Weber's definition of charisma are worth noting as starting points for establishing the theoretical basis for a charisma of art as Jaeger defines it: that is, as "a quality of works of art" that causes a range of inspiring, transformative, and elevating effects in viewers. First, we can discern that since its debut as a sociological term in the 1940s, the word charisma has acquired a sense in popular culture that deviates significantly from Weber's definition, for it is clear that the "certain quality" indicated in Weber's formulation is of a different order from such genetically determined features as height or eye color. Moreover, even though Weber ascribes that inner quality — be it supernatural, superhuman, or otherwise exceptional — to an individual person, he locates the crucial power of determining its meaning in the eye of the beholder. Whatever mysterious quality it is that sets a person apart from the crowd, the term charisma may be applied to it only insofar as it causes others to consider him or her extraordinary. In other words, in its essence, Weber's charisma of person is less personal than interpersonal, less about an individual than about a relationship.

Given that this charismatic relationship is brought into being by devotees' assigning meaning to a personal quality, it follows that charisma of person may be understood to spring from processes of signification, if only on the relatively unconscious level of stimulus and response, and to exist not solely within the charismatic individual but rather as a kind of magnetic field that operates between him and the followers he attracts. In this way, Weber's definition of charisma — the very locus classicus of the modern idea of charisma of person — already admits of its possible application to art, for interaction with a work of art is also a matter of stimulus and response, and the sensory stimuli a work presents to a viewer may also arouse a sense of devotion that may be experienced as an effect of a special quality of the work. Broaching the possibility of such an alternative use of the term charisma brings us to the second noteworthy aspect of Weber's definition: its self-consciously ad hoc nature. Opening with the declaration "the term 'charisma' will be applied," Weber clearly signals his act of appropriating for the purposes of sociological analysis a term with a broader range of senses than the specific phenomenon that he goes on, ever so influentially, to define as charisma.

With Weber's deed of disciplinary term-setting in mind, we may quickly recognize Jaeger's parallel act when, in the opening pages of Enchantment, he declares that his study will deal with a subcategory of the sublime "which I will call 'charismatic art.'" Just as Jaeger implicitly acknowledges his debt to Weber in this echoing phrase (and explicitly elsewhere in the book), Weber also acknowledges the source from which he drew in turning the word charisma to his own use. In Economy and Society he notes, "[t]he concept of 'charisma' ('the gift of grace') is taken from the vocabulary of early Christianity. For the Christian hierocracy Rudolf Sohm, in his Kirchenrecht, was the first to clarify the substance of the concept." A look at Sohm's writing on charisma will allow us to situate both Weber's and Jaeger's concepts of charisma in the context of its usage in the New Testament, where we will discover the origins of Weber's interpersonal charisma as well as key features of Jaeger's charisma of art: in particular, its experiential and medial aspects. Following our discussion of the legacy of Sohm in both Weber and Jaeger, we will

turn to more recent writing on charisma in order to provide a context for another major factor in Jaeger's concept of the charisma of art: that is, its precondition in the needs and aspirations of a work of art's audience and its stimulation of an audience's imagination.

While Weber's definitive statements on charisma make their first appearances in Economy and Society, his first use of the word appears in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1904-05). Speaking of the Zinzendorf branch of Pietism, he remarks that it "glorified the loyal worker who did not seek acquisition, but lived according to the apostolic model, and was thus endowed with the charisma of the disciples." Reading this remark with our post-Weberian understanding of charisma in mind, it may strike us as odd that a lowly "loyal worker" would have even a hint of it, accustomed as we are to thinking of charisma as a quality that sets a person above and apart from such anonymous and subservient figures. As John Potts explains, Weber's evocation of the Christian disciples' charisma in this remark reflects his study of Sohm's Outlines of Church History (Kirchengeschichte im Grundriss, 1894) and, in particular, its portrayal of the government of the early Christian community. In Sohm's account, the primitive church was understood to be governed by Christ alone, his followers knit together "solely through the gifts of grace (χαρίσυατα, charismata,) given by Him." For this reason, the Greek word ecclesia was well suited to the early church, for it was an assembly of people "ruled, not by man's word, but by the Word of God." As Paul stresses in his first letter to the Corinthians, each member of the ecclesia has his own gift, and though these gifts are various, the same spirit works in them all, for the good of all: "Now there are a variety of gifts (χαρισυάτων), but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of service, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of activities, but it is the same God who empowers them all in everyone. To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good." In the light of Paul's use of the word charisma (χαρίσυα), we can see that Weber's "loyal worker" does not "seek acquisition" because he is already

"endowed." He sees his work as an expression of his charisma: that is to say, his God-given gift, or, as Weber puts it elsewhere, his "life purpose willed by God."

In addition, we can see in Paul's writing that the charismata — the gifts of grace — constitute the medium through which the Spirit works. Like so many nodes in a charged network, the gifts establish the ecclesia as a gathering capable of holding and transmitting the beneficial charge of the Spirit, a gathering in which the difference between human and divine is thus at least partially dissolved. Writing at quite a different time and on a rather different topic, Jaeger describes the charisma of art in similar terms: that is, as a "medium" in which "opposites coalesce." He writes, "[t]he dichotomies of real and illusion, life and art, so fundamental to the cultic experience of art in the West, are resolved in the medium of charisma." And just as the gifts of grace sustain an elevating current in the early Christian community, a work of art, according to Jaeger, may "operate on the viewer" in such a way that "you live briefly in its field of forces." Beyond touching on the medial aspect of charisma, Jaeger's use of the second-person in "you live" serves to bring out the experiential quality of charisma, a quality that is also implicit in Weber's description above of the loyal worker who "lived according to the [charismatic] apostolic model," which was so rewarding in itself as to preclude acquisitive seeking.

Weber clearly understands the Pauline sense of charisma as a divinely given aptitude that contributes to group cohesion and well-being; how does he arrive at an idea of it as a specific aptitude for leadership and one, moreover, that sets a person above his community? A prompt for this shift may also be detected in the writings of Sohm. While stressing how egalitarian the early church was, Sohm also speaks of the "divinely gifted teacher," an individual who would appear to rank just below the apostles and prophets, according to 1 Corinthians 12:28: "And God has appointed in the church first apostles, second prophets, third teachers." The ecclesia "obeys" the words of the gifted teacher, Sohm asserts, "only if, and so far as, it recognizes therein the Word of

God." In this description of the divinely gifted teacher, we can see a prototype of Weber's charismatic leader. Just as Sohm's "gifted" — that is, charismatic — teacher elicits obedience to the extent that church members recognize his giftedness — in this case, his capacity to convey the Word of God — so Weber's charismatic leader is only manifest as such to the extent that he attracts followers who recognize something in him that is extraordinary, which makes him worthy of their devotion. But where for Weber, charisma stems from "a quality of an individual personality", for Sohm, it is a function of a person's ability to convey God's Word. On this aspect of Pauline charisma, New Testament scholar James D.G. Dunn affirms Sohm resoundingly: charisma, he writes, "is not to be confused with human talent and natural ability"; instead, it is "typically an experience, an experience of something being accomplished through me." Putting it in terms of our metaphor of energy transmission above, Sohm's charismatic teacher has the "capacity" to be a conductor — or mediator — of a current that the community shares. By contrast, in the case of Weber's charismatic leader, the current of energy flows to him, in the form of his followers' adulation. Weber's charismatic leader is less a conductor than a magnet, as the popular notion of the "magnetism" of a charismatic person attests.

If Sohm and Weber part ways on the issue of where, exactly, charisma is located — whether in the charismatic person or in the charismatic community — Weber's inheritors part ways with him on the issue of which comes first — or warrants the closest study — the charismatic individual or his followers, the magnet or the filings. Especially in work on charisma since the late 1960s, researchers in the fields of political science, sociology, anthropology, and psychology all tend to focus on followers while characterizing the charismatic leader as an expression of those followers' needs and aspirations, thus anticipating Jaeger's assertion that charisma of person is a matter of representation. In the vanguard of this new emphasis in the study of charisma were historian Robert C. Tucker and social anthropologist Peter Worsley, whose independent publications in 1968 may be seen, in retrospect, as having set the research agenda for much of the study of charisma of person that has followed. In

his publication, which appeared in a special issue of Daedalus devoted to the topic of leadership, Tucker argued that in order to understand the sway of charismatic leaders, "we must focus attention first upon the followers and their needs." Worsley struck the same chord in his The Trumpet Shall Sound, adding that looking solely at the "personality" of a charismatic leader "distracts us" from [his] "social significance as a symbol, a catalyst, a message-bearer." In this triadic description of the charismatic leader's significance, Worsley captures well the complex dynamics of representation, stimulus and response, and energy transmission that we have already seen at work in the New Testament notion of charisma and, at least with respect to the stimulus and response mechanism, in Weber's concept of it as well. As we shall see, these processes of mediation are also central to the workings of Jaeger's charisma of art.

In the latter decades of the 20th century, research on charisma took the idea of the charismatic person as a symbol and message-bearer further, in effect reversing its terms by arguing that both symbol and message are creations of the charismatic's followers. Writing in 1973, psychologist Irvine Schiffer is already explaining that act of "creation" in terms of artistic production. The charismatic leader, Schiffer argues, is a product of a group's "creative process of charismatic imaging," a process that culminates in the group's "projecting [the charismatic image] outwards onto a suitable chosen object." Even though Schiffer sees the group as the prime mover in the making of a charismatic figure, he still envisions a part for the charismatic himself to play: leader and follower alike, he contends, are "artists of sorts" participating "in an aesthetic illusion."

While Schiffer's description of the charismatic phenomenon — with its references to imaging, artists, and aesthetic illusion — suggests a kinship between the creation of a charismatic person and the creation of a work of visual art, Pierre Bourdieu's 1987 study of the charisma of prophets implies a likeness between charisma and the production of literary art. Akin to Sohm's gifted teacher, Bourdieu's prophet is charismatic by virtue of his "prophetic word." But while the gifted teacher mediated the word of God, the prophet,

as Bourdieu sees it, mediates the already present but inarticulate distress or longing of the people, people who become the prophet's ardent followers precisely because of his ability to represent their feelings. Bourdieu describes this interaction as a semiotic process: the prophet "brings about, in both his discourse and his person, the meeting of a signifier and a pre-existing signified." Expanding on Bourdieu, we might say that in signifying unspoken feelings and dreams, thereby arousing a devoted following, the charismatic prophet is like a poet, who, by presenting readers with a recognizable but previously unarticulated complex of sorrow or joy or desire, may leave them feeling not only "entranced," as Shelley described the nightingale poet's auditors, but also mystically allied with and grateful to the poet him or herself.

What are the preconditions of the creative acts Schiffer and Bourdieu describe? They, along with Tucker, Worsley, and other members of the "social construction of charisma school," uphold Weber's view, quoted above, that followers cleave to a charismatic leader "out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope." In this way, Tucker notes that a group's "acute malaise" predisposes it to follow a "salvationist character," and Bryan R. Wilson argues that the "growth of anxieties and the disruption of normal life" create a "demand" that is met by a person of "supposed extraordinary supernatural power." These and other late 20th-century scholars also follow Weber in appreciating that a group's distress may take many forms; Weber lists "psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, [and] political." Tucker's more concrete list runs from such threats to bodily integrity as "persecution, catastrophes (for example, famine, drought)" to threats to cultural identity such as "the feelings of oppression in peoples ruled by foreigners." On the topic of identity, developmental psychologist Erik H. Erikson counts living in an "identity vacuum" as a contributor to the condition of being "charisma hungry." In speaking of such a range of preconditions, these writers also support Weber's contention that charisma is a phenomenon related to "[a]ll extraordinary needs, i.e. those which transcend the sphere of everyday economic routines." Such "extraordinary needs" lead to Wilson's "demand" for the charismatic leader, to Erikson's "charisma hunger," and to

Schiffer's "creative process of charismatic imaging": all activities that also uphold Weber's view that charisma is "the specifically creative revolutionary force of history."

To the extent that charisma is a creative force, it is arguably also a force that draws upon our faculty of imagination, and here our survey of the reception of Weber meets up with Jaeger, who writes that one of the effects of charisma of person is that it stimulates the imagination. His conception of the charisma of art also entails the activation of viewers' imaginations as it may not only respond to a viewer's enthusiasm, despair, or hope but also create visions of an extraordinary, heightened level of existence. Reference to such elevating and transporting visions, however, does not appear in the history of the concept of charisma; to place that aspect of Jaeger's charisma of art in its larger context, we must turn to the history of the sublime, for Weber's writings, however influential, do not exhaust the sources upon which Jaeger has built his own approach to charisma. In fact, he may be the first scholar to integrate the phenomena of the sublime, charisma, and the aura.

The Sublime, Charisma, Aura

Jaeger understands charisma to be a subcategory of the sublime, but embedding medieval charisma within the sublime is an interpretative move that is beset with challenges. The sublime, a high rhetorical and literary style cultivated in antiquity, was specifically examined in a 1st- or 3rd-century CE unfinished treatise, On Sublimity (Περί Ὑίψους, Peri Hupsous). Written in Greek and attributed to the rhetorician Longinus, this treatise was unknown in western Europe until the 16th century. During the 18th century, modern interpretations of Longinus transformed his sublime (hupsos) into an influential critical concept in the fields of aesthetics and philosophy. Perhaps paralleling the historical diffusion of Longinus's disquisition, modern scholarship on the Middle Ages has tended to be equivocal about the question of the sublime, often concluding that its apparent absence in medieval culture is in character with the alleged mediocrity of the period. The revivification of a medieval sublime by Jaeger is integral to his conception of charismatic art.

Jaeger's approach to the sublime claims roots in Longinus, but a Longinus interpreted by a historiography that tends to downplay the Peri Hupsous's status as a technical treatise for teaching the sublime style, rather considering the work to be an investigation of the sublime as a transcendent quality present in writing. This shift of emphasis, from the technical brilliance of a sublime text to the sublimity encountered in written discourse originated with Nicolas Boileau's French translation, Traité du sublime ou du merveilleux dans le discours, traduit du grec de Longin (1674). Boileau transformed Longinus's sublime style, which belonged to language as an objective quality of discourse, into the sublime, conceived as an independent transcendent essence, expressed in and through language to be sure, but expressible by other arts as well. Boileau's redefinition of the sublime was immensely influential and, relayed by the codifications of Edmund Burke and Kant, still carries much weight in current scholarship as an aesthetic concept associated with a particular experience of art, nature, and the self. Boileau's neologism, however hermeneutically fruitful, nevertheless rests upon a reading of Longinus that remains controversial to this day. Interpretation of the Peri Hupsous is complicated: the surviving treatise is fragmentary, and the attribution to Longinus, though widely accepted, is still debated. Furthermore, the treatise does not fit neatly within the framework of didactic technical writing on rhetoric, while Longinus propounded no straightforward definitions of the sublime, offering only oblique descriptions.

Scholars who resist the transformation of the ancient sublime into an essence, argue that for Longinus sublimity pertained to an elevated style of rhetorical expression and did not extend to the visual arts, which were to be judged by other criteria. They contend that Longinus situated his work within the tradition of didactic and technographic exposition of rhetoric; that he was primarily providing practical advice for achieving greatness in discourse so as to produce a specific type of literary effect. They emphasize his characterization of language as a light for thoughts and arguments. They quote his statements on the effectiveness of purely stylistic devices, his examples of sentences that achieved sublimity purely through sentence-construction, and his allusions to the sublime as a discursive excellence that secured the everlasting fame of great writers while provoking an astonished and overwhelming ecstasy in the souls of experienced literary readers. Longinus's sublime is more than convincing: it is compelling and irresistible. However it seems to require education, moral stature, and expertise on the part of all involved for its grandeur to have full effect. Yet Longinus did also posit the universal impact of genuine sublimity, universal consent being for him the ultimate marker of truth.

Scholars maintaining that the sublime in Peri Hupsous is rhetorical are aware that Longinus identified five sources for the magnification of style: "thought, emotion, figures of thought and speech, diction [...], and composition [...]." Particularly with reference to thought as the first-mentioned factor for elevating speech, they stress that the great thought at work in Longinus's literary sublime consists primarily in the ability to balance in discourse the selection, combination, representation, and amplification of components so that the resultant phrases will grip and transport their readers. For Longinus, "thought in discourse and its expression are for the most part mutually implicated." He even questioned whether expression devoid of great thought could achieve sublimity and concluded his consideration of Demosthenes's Marathon Oath with an assertion that in this text no thought could have achieved sublimity independently of expression.

It is from Longinus's list of the five sources of sublimity that many interpreters, in the wake of Boileau, have come to consider that his Peri Hupsous was not about a category of style but concerned with transcendence instead. Since Peri Hupsous shows Neoplatonist tendencies and discusses the sublime as a human desire to reach "near to the greatness of the mind of God," they raise this aspiration for greatest things to the status of a sine qua non condition for sublimity, thus situating both the modes (high-mindedness, great thought, noble passions) and the effects (ecstasy, self-transcendence) of the sublime in the subject. This notion of the sublime thus originates in the subjectivity of the great, and affects the subjectivity of its audience directly. No longer a dynamic logic

of expression that sets forces into motion, the sublime here becomes an essential component of style, a revelation of a transcendental thought or being which, animating representation, produces rapturous emotion. Art discloses, in a flash of epiphany, that grandeur that imprints its sublime quality. From having been understood as a powerful capacity of expression, the sublime comes to be judged primarily by its effects within texts and on readers, as if its own reality were an ideal, not of this world.

Interpretations of the Peri Hupsous's legacy, thus, have been divided about the very nature of hupsos – whether it is a feature of rhetoric, or an un-locatable force – and about the degree to which subjectivity or craft, nature or art, may spark a sublime experience. Such interpretations are nevertheless unanimous in agreeing that the sublime produces elation, inspiration, transportation, and self-transcendence in beholders.

The philosophical and Neoplatonic Longinus has appeal for medievalists. His sublime condones religious transcendence as well as a belief in humankind's natural vocation to transcend sensible limits. It also implied the reality of the lofty powers (both divine and human) operating through representational media capable of generating transformative experiences of the grand, the marvelous, and the supernatural. Such a sublime rendered sublime; it was an intersubjective dynamic that communicated high-mindedness and was therefore also didactic.

In surveying this theoretical history of the sublime within which Jaeger has developed his reading of Longinus's hupsos, it becomes apparent that Boileau's realist and philosophical reading readily accommodates medieval understandings and experiences of grandeur, wonder, reality, pedagogy, subjectivity, and religious rapture. One may indeed wonder if Boileau's reading of the sublime might not in fact have been informed by an understanding of such medieval experiences, which were not confined to texts alone but occurred in the natural and artifactual world. This possibility, which would argue in favor of a medieval contribution to a post-Longinian understanding of the sublime, becomes more convincing if the Peri Hupsous is read as a late antique rhetorical treatise. In that

case, it is possible to trace, through 15th-century (and later) translations and interpretations of the Peri Hupsous, accretions that were generated by a medieval search for "the greatness of wonder," which lifted experience beyond the sensible world.

Our interest in Jaeger's treatment of the medieval sublime centers on his conflation of charisma with sublimity. Whereas the sublime has fairly recently entered the orbit of Jaeger's scholarship, charisma has long been a focus of his attention. In his Envy of Angels, he presented an 11th-century culture of charisma centered on the cultured body as a work of art capable of inspiring emulation and of didactically forming disciplined bodies. Both personal and exemplary, such charisma was communicable and transformative of raw material into talented human beings. Jaeger observed, however, that by the 12th century the charisma of human presence had become susceptible to textual representation, so that individuals were primed to realize that texts, and other lifeless forms of representation could, if skillfully crafted, both embody heroic and exceptional characters and compel admiration and imitation. In Enchantment, Jaeger further investigates the themes he developed in The Envy of Angels, but on a wider cultural scale extending from the world of Homer to that of Woody Allen. His essay in the present volume compares a charismatic personality (St. Francis) capable of being textually represented, to charismatic texts that had been authored by a charismatic figure (St. Bernard) whose personal charisma failed to come through in stories written about him by others. Bernard's own writings, however, are charismatic because, though not biographical, they present an unmediated encounter with his personality infused within his sublime style. It is in such circumstances that the overlap of Longinus's sublimity with Jaeger's charisma would be expected, since Longinus's sublime can affect audiences through such techniques as style. Jaeger, however, sees charisma as rooted in physical presence and character, and his concept of charisma encapsulates a sublime intrinsic to its effects, namely the ecstasy and alteration of the self. There might perhaps have been here an opportunity to consider how Longinus's technical approach to sublimity of style would have helped to produce a theoretical

underpinning for analyzing the effective expression of charisma by art.

Jaeger's charismatic art is necessarily representational, rendered hypermimetic by the appeal of that which it represents, typically a charismatic person. One is reminded of a late medieval conception of the term sublime as an alchemical operation that transformed a solid thing into a higher natural form. As with alchemy, the operation of reciprocal mimesis – between living characters and their inanimate representations further capable of prompting imitation by entranced beholders – tends to remain mysterious in Jaeger's Enchantment. The primary title of his book, Enchantment, indeed suggests an exploration of charismatic art by consideration of the magical fascination it exerts upon viewers. The actual transfer of charisma from person to object is explained (away) by hyper-mimesis, while the artifactual embodiment of the living reality of a person is inferred from the fact that charismatic art blurs the line between empirical reality and fiction, producing the enchanting illusion of a higher yet attainable reality. Because of its primary situation in emotional reactions, charisma seems principally to be a matter of subjectivity, that of the charismatic persons whose self-presentation and performance aesthetically display their extraordinary characters, as well as that of their enchanted followers. Jaeger's charisma of art seems fundamentally affective, measured by the beholder's stirred perception and imagination. The ability of art to be charismatic, remains rooted in the subject's acts of perception, and as such many additional factors that may contribute to the phenomenon remain to be explored.

Jaeger's concept of the aura reinforces the primacy of a beholder's subjectivity still further. Well aware of the decades of analysis devoted to Walter Benjamin's celebrated essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," Jaeger follows another lead, Benjamin's essay on Charles Baudelaire, to articulate his own definition of aura as a diaphanous halo of imaginative and commemorative associations an object triggers in the mind of a viewer.

As Jaeger has it, aura truly exists only in the mind of the beholder, who nevertheless projects back the aura onto the object of its activation, which is then perceived as auratic in and of itself. Aura thus overlaps with charisma, both being rooted in a subjective perception or collective consciousness, though without aura, there is no charisma. Aura therefore is the catalyst of charisma, a property held by a person, a style, or any medium and its entrancing recognition by an individual or group's reception. A product of a viewer's imagination, aura forms around all sorts of things; charisma, on the other hand, requires a person, who radiates toward an auratically susceptible beholder. Human bodies and subjectivity are critical to Jaeger's conception of the integrated operation of aura, charisma, and enchantment.

Enchantment. Charismatic Art, Agency, Materiality

In Enchantment, Jaeger considers the role of literary plots and artifacts for the construction and transmission of charisma, as well as the representational qualities of works of art which, magnifying the persons or worlds they represent, are capable of lifting their viewers beyond the natural human scope of their daily lives. Jaeger's commitment to reveal charisma's aesthetic processes supports an argument about the power of art to aggrandize, to shape a hyper-reality, to impact human thought and behavior. As such, Enchantment engages developing trends in art history that consider works of art as possessing qualities and capacities of living beings. As we have seen, however, Jaeger eschews a systematic tracking of the means by which art produces charismatic effects, preferring to infer charisma from a work's reception. Our volume seeks to counterbalance Jaeger's primary focus on reaction by considering the performance of charismatic art via its artifactual modes. We do not posit qualities inherent in the artwork, but we do complicate its representational strategy by drawing attention to a network of interactions particularly among its physical components, such as technicity, composition, dazzling arrangement of materials, inner dynamics of form and matter, tendencies for particular situational locations, any active combination of which may enthrall. Artifacts create settings that trigger cognitive and emotional reactions to be sure, but they also generate direct physical engagement and stimulate practices that play an

important role in transformative experiences. By examining both action and reaction as actions, we emphasize the multi-faceted agency of charismatic occurrences, querying the relationship between art and beholder so as to identify the multidirectional intermediary axes of relations between them.

Charisma, in this volume, transports and translates both artifacts and beholders; both reciprocally exercise agency and endure metamorphosis. Agency is traditionally considered an attribute of persons, and is controversially extended to the inanimate world. Yet when agency, defined as the capacity to cause, is distinguished from intentionality, a psychological human trait, it becomes possible to conceive that, in its extraordinary effect, charismatic art has agency, and not only as a mimetic mediator of personal charisma or a crystallizer of aura.90 It is to the study of the modalities of this particular agency that the present volume is devoted.

Charismatic Art:

Audiences

Jaeger, as we have seen, argues that evidence of a work's widespread appeal validates its charisma. For this reason, his study of charisma of art entails first and foremost a study of viewers and of reception, and the authors of all the essays in this volume highlight the popular renown of their objects of study. Indeed, taken together, these objects make a hit parade of some of the most well-known works of medieval art, not to mention the human figures they represent: from Andrew Romig's study of the biography of Charlemagne (d. 814) by Einhard (d. 840), to Jacqueline Jung's study of the Wise and Foolish Virgins of Magdeburg Cathedral, to Andrey Egorov's study of statues of the Nine Worthies, to name only three. What was it about these audiences that made them respond to these works in such numbers and what did they find in them that was so attractive? With respect to their characteristics and sensibilities, the audiences discussed in this volume vary widely: from Joseph Ackley's church-goers dazzled by the sight of a winged altarpiece opened to reveal its gilded reliquaries to Lynsey McCulloch's savvy theater audiences enjoying the enchantment of seeing through the enchantment of automata. Similarly, in examining such audience responses, our

authors vary widely with respect to their views regarding where exactly, between art object and art viewer, the charisma of a work of art lies.

In Jaeger's view, a state of need coupled with aspiration makes readers and viewers especially receptive to the spell of a work of art. In the essays collected here, this all-important mixture of psychological need and aspiration often pertains to matters of identity and recognition within a context of some form of redemption a work of art seems to proffer. The charisma of Eric Gustafson's Franciscan space, for instance, is grounded in the laity's yearning for a liturgical space that fostered intimacy with the praying friars and promoted a sense of spiritual ascent toward God. Paroma Chatterjee's spellbinding classical statues served to differentiate the educated elites of Constantinople, who perceived their wondrous sway, from the brutish Latin crusaders, who could not. In Gavin Richardson's psychoanalytical analysis, Thomas Hoccleve's Tale of Jonathas redeems Hoccleve (c.1368-1426) himself. The charismatic force here was self-reflexive: the poet responded to the tale's allure in translating it and that very process transformed him into the recipient of the redemptive effect of what Jaeger calls "life writing." In the examples of Andrew Romig's Carolingian biography and Jaeger's Franciscan hagiography, the projection of valor, beauty, virtue, and humility exerts a magnetic pull on beholders, persuading them to imitate the greater model. The brief openings of winged altarpieces described by Ackley offered tantalizing glimpses of elevated dimensions, thus fulfilling a desire both for extra-ordinary experience and a heightened sense of corporate identity.

To the extent that audiences respond to charismatic art on the basis of their hopes and dreams, hopes and dreams that may flame all the more brightly for having been awakened from states of privation, charismatic art entails certain forms of audience engagement and suppresses others. Audiences who respond to the charisma of a work of art tend to engage with its surface rather than its depth since they are drawn to imitate rather than to interpret it. In Enchantment, Jaeger writes that the question viewers put to this kind of art is not 'What does it mean?' but rather, 'How must I

act to be like Gawain, Tristan, or Lancelot, Jesus or Buddha?' He insists that meaning, interpretation, and hermeneutics — the apparatus of commentary inherited from Western exegetical tradition — are minor in the face of charismatic force; they are an intellectual charade played behind or above the surface drama of authority and influence. Many authors in this volume have this kind of audience engagement in mind in discerning the aspects of a work of art that may be subject to charismatological analysis. In this way, Ackley suggests that the symbolic meanings of silver and gold notwithstanding, his audiences were likely moved primarily by these precious metals' physical brightness. Similarly, Jung focuses on the facial expressions of the Wise and Foolish Virgins of Magdeburg as the sculptural innovation that would have made these Virgins charismatic compared to other instances of the motif that were only didactic. Again, Egorov argues that the gazes of viewers encountering the Nine Worthies of Mechelen would have been drawn less to their coats of arms, which register their historical significance, than to the gazes these figures seem to return.

Given an understanding of the charisma of art as an art of surfaces, one might conclude that an educated, interpretive approach to it would miss the point entirely, would break the spell. According to other authors in this volume, however, charisma of art is not so fragile. In Binski's view, audiences did not respond to the crafted surfaces of Gothic art with either emotion or with a desire to emulate. From the reactions such art caused, such as the awakening of charitable impulses, Binski concludes that Gothic statuary operated at the intersection of pleasurable experience and meaning. Whereas for Jaeger, critical judgment kills enchantment, for Binski, the experience of wonder and the apprehension of significance are inseparable aspects of viewers' engagements with works of Gothic art such as the Lady Chapel at Ely. Perceptions of the significance of a work of Gothic art would spring from its viewers' education. Education is also a key factor in Chatterjee's study of the projected audiences of De signis by Byzantine chronicler Nicetas Choniates (d. 1217), according to whom only those viewers endowed with rhetorical and historical sophistication were susceptible to the living, spellbinding quality of the

classical statuary that adorned the city of Constantinople. Yet to be susceptible to charisma did not mean, for this audience, to be swept away by overwhelming emotion; instead, it meant willingly acquiescing to the emotions of admiration and awe while also retaining the critical distance necessary for recognizing an artwork's historical significance, thereby investing it with meaning as well as wonder. It is this level of emotional and cognitive refinement that Choniates deploys as a shibboleth to distinguish the people of Constantinople as ideal viewers of its statuary from the Latin crusaders, whose gross ignorance rendered them impervious to its aesthetic and historical emanations. Blinded by their lack of education, the Latin conquerors of Constantinople had no compunction about sacking the city and purloining its art, turning a timeless historical fabric into booty.

Certain characteristics of audiences thus acted as filters, screening them from charisma's power. In Byzantium, an inadequate education was a bar to experiencing charisma; in the Carolingian world studied by Romig, the opposite situation prevailed: there, the desire to resist charisma — to throw up one's own screen against it — was a mark of wisdom. In this way, in his De imagine Tetrici (829, On the Statue of Tetricus), Walahfrid Strabo (808/809-49) mused over a statuary group centered on Theodoric the Great, king of the Ostrogoths (454-526), which had enthralled Charlemagne to the point of having it installed in Aachen. Romig's reading of the poem points to the charismatic effect the statue had on Charlemagne but also draws attention to Strabo's denunciation of Charlemagne's enchantment as a form of idolatry. As the poem continues, Strabo attempts to shield Charlemagne's son, Louis the Pious, against the influence of such art, asserting that it provided a false model of kingship.

Thus, some of the audiences analyzed in this volume's essays, though acknowledging the impact of charisma, proved insensitive or resistant to it. That audiences' reactions can fall short of enchantment raises a crucial question concerning the locus and operations of charismatic force, a point to which we shall return.

Effects

We began our discussion of the audiences of charismatic art by noting that their large size is their single shared characteristic and also the single best validation of a work's charisma. As we turn to the effects of charismatic art, we return to this statement to note its logical implication: the same widespread response that validates the charisma of a work of art also constitutes the primary effect of charismatic art, for it is only in the hearts and minds and bodies of those large audiences that charismatic effects are felt. Further differentiation of charismatic effects is a matter of identifying the varieties of response that a work induces. In Jaeger's view, charismatic art registers its effects in readers' or viewers' sense of intoxication and enchantment, in their urge toward devotion or imitation, in their coalescing around a cause or group identity, in their flights of imagination, and in their rapt participation in a heightened life, a life that seems to proceed in a realm between life and art, one whose real brilliance is a function of its admixture of illusion. In all of these ways — again, in Jaeger's view — charisma of art is like romantic love: though in most cases its beguiling force is for the good, it may also render a person vulnerable to such negative effects as seduction, obsession, disillusionment, and even hatred.

The focused and historically contextualized studies in this volume contribute new examples of the beneficent effects of charismatic art but also present several cases of its provoking negative attitudes or behaviors. Jaeger's and Hardy's essays both deal with works that expand the field of energy surrounding a charismatic individual — be it Francis of Assisi or the king-emperor Sigismund of Luxemburg (reigned 1411-37) — thus inspiring devoted, loyal, and enduring followings. A trio of essays examines aspects of church architecture, sculpture, and furnishings that have the effect of intensifying lay devotion. In Ackley's, recurrent opening of winged altar-pieces to reveal tiers of gilded figural reliquaries draws the laity to an experience of a higher plane, inspiring them both to worship and to give. In Gustafson's, the order of architectural space in Franciscan churches shepherds both the faithful and the friars into a single praying body, thus also granting the laity the experience of a realm apart from their ordinary lives. In Binski's,

the wondrous surfaces of Gothic art also impel viewers to strengthen the church with gifts. In another group of essays, charismatic art elevates its viewers by nurturing virtue or refined habits of mind: Jung's Wise and Foolish Virgins positioned at a portal to the Magdeburg Cathedral inspire repentance as churchgoers enter and empathy as they depart. Egorov's figures of the Nine Worthies model virtuous civic leadership among burgomasters. McCulloch's automata reward curiosity among theatergoers. Choniates's statuary, discussed in Chatterjee's essay, at once calls forth and ennobles the educated sensibilities of the citizens of Constantinople. To the extent that Choniates arouses disgust in readers toward the Latins, he also demonstrates that the purported charisma of art may be used for divisive purposes. While in Chatterjee's essay this dark side of charisma is implicit, other essays address negative charismatic effects explicitly, all of which have to do with improprieties of gazing that a charismatic work of art may compel, whether it be a work of statuary, as in Romig's essay, or a spectacle of misogynistic revenge, as in Richardson's.

While it is possible to document that all of the works of art examined in these essays had the primary charismatic effect of generating a robust audience response, the particular nuances of that response must, in most cases be inferred. Our authors could not avail themselves of any collections of interviews with medieval viewers and readers to match a volume like Starlust: The Secret Life of Fans, which was so useful to Jaeger in Enchantment for describing a range of charismatic effects beyond the sheer fact of a work's striking a chord among a large group of people. Lacking first-person testimonials to these works' effects, our authors take what documentation they have of a work's appeal as a starting point and infer a more nuanced understanding of its charismatic effects by examining the needs, aspirations, or filters its audience would have brought to an encounter with the work. Such considerations of audiences and charismatic effects lay the groundwork for the research that is ultimately of most interest to our contributors: the task of identifying the par-ticular ways that a work of art achieved its charismatic impact.

Modalities

Once the charismatic effect of a work is attested, charismatological analysis necessarily turns to the work of art itself to elucidate the mechanisms by which it produces that effect. Recurrently in Jaeger's work and in the essays collected here, such operative devices effectively redraw and even blur the boundaries between life and art, between presence and representation. The representational mode of charismatic art focuses on reality by way of mimesis and then casts a glow on it – makes it more real than real – through its use of hyper-mimesis. Even while positing that the charisma of texts and objects originates in the living bodies they represent in this mimetic-hyper-mimetic mode, our contributors also advance the idea that the charismatic flow may at times run in the opposite direction: that is, the force of enchantment may spring from a work of art and flow toward the living person it represents. For instance, texts and images referring to Sigismund, discussed in Hardy's essay, enlivened his persona, the personal image he projected. Hardy's essay as well as Romig's and Egorov's thus demonstrate that a central task of charismatology is to apprehend the circulation of charismatic forces among individuals, texts, and objects. As for the channeling of that force, the studies gathered here demonstrate the ways that narrative, ekphrasis, commensurability, sculptural technique, non-figural materials (gold, silver, gems), technological expertise, and audience participation may all be modes that mediate the flow of charisma, thus also serving as conduits of charismatic power.

Given the importance of mimesis for charismatic art, one might assume that cleverly mechanized statuary would be its highest form. McCulloch's essay on automata argues otherwise, though. As crafted entities that parodied life rather than actually being lifelike, automata tended to arouse beholders' curiosity. In McCulloch's argument, the mystique surrounding wondrous animation produced a fascination with the technological substructure of this phenomenon. Mystique alone would produce unintelligibility, which in turn would disenchant. Disenchantment, in McCulloch's analysis, was not a matter of demystification but of an obfuscating esotericism that prevented appreciation of technological wonder. Similarly,

Egorov's study of the statues of the Worthies, and Binski's exegesis of Alfred Gell's enchantment of technology suggest that viewers' apprehension of the mechanical achievements responsible for amazing phenomena actually contributed to the force of their impact rather than detracting from it. It was not their eerie identity with life that made moving statues fascinating, but rather an appeal based upon the audience's complicity in acknowledging the mechanical expertise capable of transforming inertia into movement. In such cases, art is rendered charismatic by a particular type of reception that derived from a critical appreciation of facture. As Binski argues, and as Jaeger shows in the writings of Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153), technology (or rhetoric) can mediate artistic effects to produce responses that range from overriding emotions to critical judgments. At the same time, to the extent that they provoke excitement, curiosity, and a thirst to know and to understand the nature of the prodigy, works of technological virtuosity stand as cases that prove by contrast that what sets charismatic art apart from fascinating art is its projection of lifelikeness, whether veristic or idealized – mimetic or hyper-mimetic – inspiring audiences' veneration and dreams of self-improvement through imitation. However, for Binski, who challenges the notion of charismatic art, the attractive beauty of the sinuous and insinuating forms of Gothic statues is a technique deployed to engineer thinking. Their gestural bodies are rhetorical, not mimetic; they persuade but they do not represent. This is a point also made by McCulloch. Binski and McCulloch thus complicate both Jaeger's concept of charismatic art as essentially mimetic and his notion that the characteristic response to it is emotional and imitative.

While most of the volume's essays touch in some way on mimesis, Ackley's and Jung's essays deal most directly with issues of mimesis and hyper-mimesis. Jung comments upon the trajectory of mimesis in medieval sculpture, from its absence in the early Middle Ages when statues were associated with real bodies (reliquaries, tomb effigies) to the emergence of a statuary art no longer affiliated with dead bodies that endeavored to simulate the movements and beauty of the living. Ackley's analysis of late medieval,

German figural reliquary statuettes in polychrome wood and precious metal shows that mimesis of the living could occur in the context of relics. Jung is sensitive to the context of mimetic representation, while Ackley points out that mimesis operates along a spectrum, with its processes modulated by the very mediation of the materials a statue might contain (relics), and by those used (metal, wood) in their making.

Both Jung and Ackley thus introduce variables within the concept and practice of mimesis, and explore their implications for charismatic art. The overarching question motivating Ackley's piece stems from Jaeger's argument that the power of Christian icons is seated in their simultaneous representation of a saint's human and divine qualities: the human in individualistic portraiture, the divine in hyper-mimetic focal points, such as large, dark eyes that seem to gaze directly at the viewer. Given an icon's two targets of mimesis, Ackley asks, what is the role of medium in representing relatively more of either a saint's human or divine qualities? And what are the effects of this balance on the image's charisma? To answer these questions, Ackley presents two late medieval figural reliquaries: one in polychrome wood, the other in hammered silver and gilded except for the figure's skin. He argues that the materials of these reliquaries regulated their mimetic and hyper-mimetic display, thereby heightening the humanity of one and humanizing the divinity of the other. In her comparative study of Gothic statues of the Wise and Foolish Virgins, Jung finds two forms of mimesis. In most instances of this statuary motif, mimetic renderings of the Foolish Virgins' courtly attire and ungraceful or flirtatious gesticulations make a strong visual contrast with the serene body language and demure accouterments of the Wise, thus prompting viewers to make moral judgments about the contrasting behavior of the two groups. The Wise and Foolish Virgins at the Cathedral of Magdeburg, however, display a sartorial consistency, all modeling a seductive elegance; they are distinguished only by facial expressions of inner emotions: the faces of the Wise evoke progressive contentment while the foolish visages crumble by degrees into despair. By eschewing the representation of proper and foolish behavior by means of a figural mimesis internal to their group

and instead focusing on facial expressions, these statues create empathy in viewers for those virgins denied entry into heaven. It is through identification with the pain of damnation that beholders may form a desire to avoid it by reforming their own lives. The effect of such charismatic art rests upon a two-tiered mimesis, which first stresses similarity among all the Virgins, leading onlookers to ponder the causes of joy and sorrow, and then steers them toward a personal mimetic experience, an identification with the suffering women and an imitation of their penitential mode. Jung concludes that the mimesis at work in Magdeburg's statues of the Wise and Foolish Virgins imparted their charismatic message less with didacticism than with the inspiration to cultivate empathy, an important aspect of 13th-century spirituality.

While both Jung and Ackley thus explore the variations of sculptural mimesis in the production of charismatic art, Romig, Jaeger, and Hardy undertake analogous investigations with respect to narrative mimesis. Jaeger argues in this volume that the sensational rhetoric and fabulous episodes of biographies, which make the subject come alive for readers, work charismatically because of their commensurability with that person's actions and attitudes toward the world, as related by his contemporaries. In the case of St. Francis, humility, charity, courage, mildness in overpowering violence, are all attested, and thus authentic. When the same qualities are depicted in tales of Francis that would seem inauthentic because they strain credulity – such as the fable of the Wolf of Gubio – they come across instead as hyper-authentic, or hyper-mimetic. In the case of Charlemagne, as Romig shows, the qualities of leadership, patronage, and effective imperial authority that are conveyed in his biography are all congruent with the testimony of multiple sources and thus have the ring of authenticity. Similarly, Hardy demonstrates that the noble guise, extravagant generosity, and golden tongue attributed to Sigismund in texts and images originating at his court are consistent, though idealized, with the writings of contemporary chroniclers. In these essays, a charismatological reading of texts has epistemological consequences since it provides a solution for the difficult task of separating the legendary from the historical in hagiographic and

biographical writing. Moreover, these charismatological analyses reveal that charismatic biographies do not so much infuse words with the power of their referents, replacing presence with representation, but rather render moot the impossible ideal of real presence since, as these analyses show, charismatic individuals are actually fictions both in their own lives and in their constructed legends. In life as in legend they are representations, actors of their own attributed virtues and status. Perhaps therein lies the source of their charisma: an alluring capacity for self-fashioning. It becomes problematic, then, to return to the received wisdom, which holds that hagiographers and biographers devised stories in order to revivify their protagonists since in fact these writers were expanding upon what was already a representation, sustaining its reality by a hyper-mimetic representational process. So it appears that two modes of representation are at work in charismatic biographies. Charismatic art mediates a fictional subject, replicating its representational performance.

If biographies may transmit charisma of person, what about a charismatic person's own writing? May it also transmit charisma, or act as a charismatic text? Jaeger remarks in his essay for this volume that Bernard's recorded vita radiated little if any charisma. His life as represented did not fire up the imagination because, as in a comparison with George H.W. Bush made by Jaeger, the stories told about him, however impressive, were just history, not the stuff of myth-making that instigates emulation. Yet, there were two ways in which Bernard was charismatic: he preached, and he wrote, thereby igniting the devotional ardor of his audiences and propelling multitudes onto the path of crusaders. Bernard's theological writings have been inspirational to a large audience over the longue durée. Bernard's charisma, it seems, was only projected when personally presented by him. Only he, not his biographers' representations, could infuse words with his personality. The ongoing impact of Bernard's writings thus raises interesting questions about their discursive nature. Have these texts worked charismatically, by indexing Bernard's very being, so that readers perceived them as seamless emanations of his vital, authorial, self? If so, unlike

those of his biographer, Bernard's writings do not represent him; rather, they stand for him. The force of Bernard's personality is present in the force of his rhetoric. Bernard's ideas and religious sentiments inserted themselves vitally into his writing, offering captivating models of behavior, by virtue of his style and technique. Thus Jaeger's argument that Bernard's charismatic writings, though rooted in the individual living body, were significantly mediated by technique, shares the perspectives Binski and McCulloch advance in this volume about the ways art acts upon its viewers.

To the role of technique in mediating the agency and, or, the charisma of art, Binski, Chatterjee, Romig, and Hardy add that of contextual knowledge. Binski brings up the tomb effigy (c.1290) of King Henry III of England and a 14th-century statue of Charlemagne (at Aachen), both strikingly beautiful. He doubts, however, that viewers would see beauty – let alone charisma – in both given their knowledge, mediated by independent texts, that Charlemagne was a model emperor while Henry III was a failure. Chatterjee makes a similar argument in her analysis of ekphrastic descriptions by the Byzantine poet Choniates. The ancient statues of Byzantium come to life by the means of such ekphrasis, but they lent themselves to ekphrastic treatment because they were already alive with the aura of their accumulated history, of which their educated viewers were well aware. Choniates's reference to Helen of Troy, for instance, blurs the differences between the statue and the historical character as known by beholders. Romig and Hardy both consider iconographic representations of rulers whose charisma was generally acknowledged, focusing in particular on Dürer's portraits of Charlemagne and Sigismund commissioned by the city of Nuremberg. It is noteworthy that, although both figures in this diptych stand for archetypical emperors, Charlemagne's image is idealized (hyper-mimetic) whereas Sigismund's is based on a physiognomic portrait (mimetic). Sigismund remains a historical figure but Charlemagne seems larger than history. Yet as bearers of imperial insignia, both compel the gaze, illustrating what Binski in his essay calls the contextual and insufficient nature of medieval art.

While Weber asserted the role of charisma in buttressing authoritative rulership, he opposed the idea of charisma as a feature of governmental institutions, locating charisma in the ruler's personality.108 In conveying the personalities of Charlemagne and Sigismund, however, Dürer makes use of material and official symbols: that is, the trappings of these rulers' governmental institutions. Picking up on the implications of Dürer's painterly choices, Hardy develops an appreciation of the charisma of authoritative institutions, seeing its output – in the form of documents, seals, livery badges – as capable of animating the idea of empire among independent local power centers of the late medieval Holy Roman Empire. Sigismund's subjects responded both to his living personality, and to the texts and objects that, diffused by his administration, bore his name or image. Charismatic art, in this way, extends active rule throughout an extensive and diffuse political space, and does so by conjuring the enthusiastic support of local elites and governments, keen to secure imperial privileges sealed in gold with the imperial image, with the effect that they acknowledged the legitimate hegemony of imperial rule.

One may well wonder if the golden seals so eagerly commissioned and then preserved by German corporate bodies were seen as invested with some protective, talismanic powers. In the Tale of Jonathas written by Hoccleve and here analyzed by Richardson, three such objects inherited by the titular Jonathas set his tale's charismatic power in motion: a ring that will get the wearer everyone's love, a brooch that will bring the wearer everything he wants, and a carpet that will take whoever sits on it wherever he wants to go. With the powers of the ring and brooch in particular, one might imagine Jonathas as being possessed of such charismatic traits as the magnetism of Charlemagne, the imperial authority of Sigismund, the generosity of St. Francis, or the good looks and appealing voice that were signs of charis among the ancient Greeks. As it turns out, Jonathas's gifts are only magical objects – not charis at all – and only isolate Jonathas from the world of actual human relations, triggering a narrative that ultimately leads to a horrific act of revenge. In Richardson's analysis, however, this same narrative presents perhaps the most complex

operation of hyper-mimesis examined in this volume, for as he argues, Jonathas's story works as a hyper-mimetic reflection of the famously troubled Hoccleve himself and thus – in the act of his translating it from the Latin – relieves him of his personal demons and offers him a redemptive path to "translating" himself back into society.

While Richardson sees Hoccleve as both the author and audience for the charisma of his Tale of Jonathas, Gustufson finds the lay worshipers in 13th-century central Italian Franciscan churches playing a similar role, also reminiscent of audience participation in Sigismund's administrative output, this time in the production of charismatic space. With the very idea of charismatic space, we would seem to be a long way from Ackley's and Jung's sculptural works, whose charisma flowed so directly from their imitation of human forms. However, recalling that the charisma of those works was also a function of their locations – the winged altarpieces of Ackley's figural reliquaries, the cathedral portal of Jung's Virgins – we may recognize that those locations became zones of charisma themselves, the charged places of viewers' worshipful transport or moral transformation. In the same way, we may recognize that Choniates's descriptions of Constantinople's statuary define the city and its appreciative dwellers before its invasion by the barbaric Latins as a charismatic space. The only iconographic representation in Gustafson's Franciscan space is a crucifix, but the more living works of art it houses are the members of the Franciscan Order themselves, who model their lives after the example of the charismatic St. Francis. By choreographing the movements of the faithful in the church, first through the nave, then through a narrow door in the tramezzo screen into a space just adjacent to the intimate space of the friars' choir, the design of Italian Franciscan churches responded to the laity's desire to participate in the mystic process of ascent to intimacy with God as envi¬sioned and practiced by the Franciscans, thereby partaking of the gifts of holiness – the charismata as Bonaventure called them. In this way, the charisma both of Franciscan churches and of Sigismund's seals and documents had a living fabric, one infused less with mimetic or hyper-mimetic representations of leaders – whether Francis or Sigismund – than with the participation of

living audiences whose physical role in the staging of liturgical events or the creation of documents was both constitutive of their charisma and essential for the higher status the same audience-creators derived from them.

Charisma. A Face-Lift

The charismatological analyses of audience and reception, effects, and operational modes advanced in this volume often identify the human visage as a radiant locus of charisma, emitting magnetism or a secretive ambiguity that keeps viewers at some distance. Our title for the present volume advertises the special relationship between charisma and visages, while also indicating our hope to contribute to Jaeger's extraordinary project of giving charisma a facelift, in multiple senses. In applying the concept to art, Jaeger gives charisma a face-lift in the sense of a makeover, one that entails its own methodology – charismatology – just as there is an art and science to cosmetic surgery. Jaeger's project also gives charisma a face-lift in that it lifts the charismatic face – be it the compelling face of an icon or the sur-face of an inspiring biography – to investigate the anatomy and physiology of its glow.

In our authors' furtherance of this investigation, historical contexts emerge as a significant component of charisma. In his essay, Binski emphasizes that backstories count. Martino Rossi Monti's essay makes clear that the notion, understanding, and terminology of charisma all have a history. In classical times and Late Antiquity, the concept of charisma was deployed to designate exceptional individuals and to note their endowment with special qualities. A charismatic person had a beautiful soul, which was reflected in his body. Physical beauty could thus be seen as a sign of divine favor and so, instrumental in winning the favor of others. Charisma implied mutuality between body and soul, between beauty and virtue or, at least recognition of the body's role as a medium for the expression of grace and consequent powers that rendered individuals thus endowed magnetic to their audiences. In the growing Christian context, charisma became identified as a gift of divine grace, often but not exclusively associated with prophecy, a connection, as we have seen, that underlies the Weberian and

Jaegerian understanding of charisma as a relational phenomenon between person, art, and audience. Gustafson's reading of the Breviloquium by the Franciscan Bonaventure, however, exposes aspects of medieval charisma that insisted on the individual and inner-oriented character of grace. For Bonaventure, charisma as a gift of grace works from within, directing the ascension of the Christian soul toward God. According to this understanding, a charismatic person results from the blessing of charismatic grace combined with his or her own personal effort to achieve spiritual unity with the divine. Thus, charismatic individuals are works of art themselves in Jaeger's felicitous formulation, but their art-self has become an end in itself, a part of the universal being. This scenario, however, leaves space for an intermediary type of charisma, animated by Francis's notion of exemplarity, and articulated through the architectural design of Franciscan churches. The Franciscan ideal of providing models and methods for approaching intimacy with God permits us to understand that even though charisma of person has outward-facing effects, it may spring from a person's inner-oriented, gift-assisted growth. Such an understanding of charisma emerges from a careful reading of medieval sources on the topic and stands as just one demonstration of the importance of using modern definitions of charismatic force with care so as not to obscure the medieval experience.

Relatively absent from this volume are reflections on gender and charisma. Franciscans did not prohibit women from moving through charismatic space, but Hoccleve and his character Jonathas relate to women as negative charismatic figures. The walls of town halls featured the figures of the Nine Worthies but not of their female companions, the Nine Female Worthies. Charismatic representations of historical and secular personages tend to be males, while compelling images of biblical and religious individuals such as those examined by Jung tend to represent women. How might a study of gender and charisma help us deepen our understanding of their roles in medieval society?

Other arguments presented in this volume consider the negative aspects of charisma of art and thus

challenge Jaeger's tendency to speak of charisma of art as positive by definition. If the effects of a work of art are not ennobling then its allure ought to be given another term, such as seductive or fascinating. Certainly such a boundary has not been drawn for charisma of person – Hitler being a primary example of negative charisma – should art also be considered capable of having a force for ill? Several essays find medieval authors considering this question. Romig's Strabo, in his De imagine Tetrici, staged a charisma whose attractiveness he derided and resisted on the grounds that the material stuff of images cannot convey special power. To this deceptive charisma, Strabo contrasted the properly charismatic art of writing, exemplified by Einhard's biography of Charlemagne. Carolingian intellectuals trusted the charisma of words, but not of images. Conversely, Chatterjee's Choniates, writing in the aftermath of the destruction of Constantinople by Latin crusaders, warned against words, encouraging viewers to let themselves be seduced by images, though not all images. Choniates's ekphrasis praised ancient statuary, but not Christian icons. Richardson's Hoccleve worried about the hate-mongering misogyny of the tale he was about to translate. All of these authors implicitly raise further questions: could charisma be controlled, directed? And what would it mean for a medieval writer to try to do so?

Perhaps the question that is most often raised in this volume has to do with the locus of charisma. The arc described by Weberian and Jaegerian scholarship enlarges that locus to include art and literature as well as human beings. Several authors in this volume contribute to this expansive project by identifying cases in which the medieval record itself explicitly locates charisma in works of art. Ackley notes, for instance, that Bernard of Clairvaux's biographer, wishing to convey the living image of Bernard's radiant body produced a description that calls to mind a figural reliquary executed in precious metal. The indwelling charisma of a work of art would also be indicated by its inspiring its own following in the form of similar works of art, which is what Egorov finds in the case of the Nine Worthies sculptural motif. As we have already mentioned, an effect of these figures was to inspire city councilors to lead a civic life of high ideals, but

that was not the only impact the images of the Worthies had: they also inspired the making of other images, modeling artistic formulae of grandeur and dignity. Moreover, when the burgomasters of Lüne burg decided to commission their portraits, the resulting stained-glass depictions were couched in the iconographic vocabulary of the Nine Worthies. An instance of the flow of charisma moving from art to person, here living persons sought to infuse their own being with the charisma of the Worthies' images. The charisma of the burgomasters was derived from the particular material presence of the Worthies, mediated by a mimesis linking the portraits of the Worthies and those of the burgomasters. Charismatic art had itself become a model, less a representation than a persuasive formula for a communal audience eager to be governed by a charismatic leadership. Similarly, as Jung shows, the figural art of late Gothic sculpture offered to the living, "in a kind of feedback loop," models of spiritual excellence, worth imitating to achieve moral distinction. For their part, Hardy and Gustafson suggest that the locus of charisma might be further extended, from human leaders through art to the viewers themselves, for audiences too may generate charisma, not only by adhering to persuasive leaders (the traditional argument) but also by their own participation in the production of charismatic art.

In its consideration of the locus of charisma, our volume hosts a ghost that challenges our very project. The ghost of a question that acquires a shadowy presence in Binski's essay, where the author contends that for art to have the effects of a living charismatic person, it needs an injection of aura, of an independent critical judgement and appreciation. Art must needs have charisma bestowed upon it. Binski insists on an unbridgeable ontological gap between life and art: artifacts cannot see, behave, or have intentions. Such a statement seems self-evident, yet challenging voices have arisen from the fields of anthropology, archaeology, and material culture studies. That intentionality is a human trait is not in question, but it is a trait that is pre-disciplined by and executed within the cultural and material environment in which human beings are situated. Charisma, as a particular form of agency, invites a reconsideration

of the traditionally unassailable distinction, so dear to western thought, between things and people. In many instances of the relationships between charisma and art presented in this volume, the charisma of art cannot simply be reduced to being an effect of its mimetic connection with human life. Nor does the critical role played by artifacts in the circulation of charisma appear to have been unilaterally conferred by particular human protagonists. For were that the case, how would we explain unwelcome surpluses of charismatic art, the impact of its materials and techniques, or the unsettling hybridity of automata?

The Volume

In the first section of the present volume, "Medieval and Modern: The Hermeneutics of Charisma," contributors embed their interpretation of terminology (charis), cathedral statuary (Magdeburg), and English Gothic within historical, theoretical, and methodological perspectives on the study of charisma and art. In his essay, "The Mask of Grace: On Body and Beauty of Soul between Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages," Martino Rossi Monti traces the development of the concept of charis (grace) from its attestations in Homeric poetry to its manifestations in ancient Roman culture under the term gratia to its adoption by Christian hagiographers. As Rossi Monti shows, this history is one of a gradual evaporation of charis from the body. Though always understood to be god-given, charis was first considered a wholly embodied quality, recognizable in such traits as a beautiful physique and an appealing voice. Beginning with Plato, however, a parallel tradition held charis to be a function of the beautiful soul instead, a quality that radiated through the body even as it was a force unto itself. Early Christian hagiographers took this dualistic understanding of charis further: for them the radiance of charis originated in neither the body nor the gifted soul but rather in the soul's surrender to Christ. In a paradoxical last stage of this rarefication of charis, hagiographers see only the brilliance of divine charis in their saintly subjects, and their physical characteristics disappear behind what Rossi Monti calls "the mask of grace."

In "Compassion as Moral Virtue: Another Look at the Wise and Foolish Virgins in Gothic Sculpture,"

Jacqueline E. Jung glosses Jaeger's analysis of the statues of the Wise and Foolish Virgins on the west facade of Strasbourg Cathedral (end of 13th century) by considering the slightly earlier rendering of the Wise and Foolish Virgins at Magdeburg Cathedral (c.1250). Jung argues that in the Magdeburg group interior emotional states were, for the first time, externalized in the Virgins' bodies which, dazzlingly carved, expressed joy and sadness even as they masked the moral conditions that had inspired the Virgins' attitudes. Whether foolish or wise, the Virgins resemble each other, compelling viewers to bask in their youth and loveliness, and also to consider self-reform channeled by empathy with the sad beauties who had preferred human praise to a good conscience.

In his "Charisma and Material Culture," Paul Binski considers the concept of charismatic art in the course of critically engaging with Alfred Gell's notion of the enchanting power of technology. Binski attributes to the curvilinear bodies and wondrous, insinuating surfaces of 14th-century British art, exemplified by the Lady Chapel at Ely (c.1320), a persuasive capacity and especially the power to convince beholders to practice charitable gift-giving. Rendered effective by virtuoso facture, this art, without expressing psychological states, seeks to guide its audience along a thinking, utilitarian path. For Binski, the agency of art is "causal and social," and highly contingent upon an enabling contextual network of ethics, aesthetics, meaning, and experience. Extending beyond the specific case of English Gothic art, Binski probes the extent to which charisma, as a form of agency, inherently animates artifacts. He concludes that charisma is a quality bestowed upon art by human consciousness.

The second section of the volume, "Charismatic Art," considers instances of charisma as a function of representation. Andrew Roming's "Charismatic Art and Biography in the Carolingian World" analyzes a reflection in Walahfrid Strabo's poem De imagine Tetrici (829) upon what constitutes good and bad charismatic art. The poem warns against the statue of the Ostrogoth Theodoric the Great (d. 526), which Charlemagne had brought from Ravenna and installed in Aachen, denouncing its idolatrous quality and its power to lead viewers

astray, and reproaching Charlemagne for being seduced by its false charms. Romig stresses that few images of Charlemagne himself circulated in his lifetime (a situation that dramatically reversed after his death), which paralleled his court's iconophobia evident in the Opus Caroli Regis (Libri Carolini). Romig submits that such distrust of images may account for the revival of secular biography at that time (exemplified by Einhard), based on the Augustinian notion that words provided a truthful medium for conveying charismatic representations of rulership.

In his essay "The Saint's Life as a Charismatic Form: Bernard of Clairvaux and Francis of Assisi," Jaeger asserts that the publication history of Francis's biographies together with the novels and films they have inspired evince the charisma of his life story. Acknowledging that some episodes in Francis's biographies appear patently untrue, Jaeger argues that they comprise the essence of his enduring legacy nevertheless. Moreover, he finds a kind of truth in the fables of Francis in the form of their commensurability with the narrative arc they share: the story of a humble, gentle, and courageous person who succeeds in not only overcoming dangerous and powerful foes but also in winning them over. This is the "real" Francis, Jaeger argues: the character whose story is conveyed in plausible and implausible episodes alike. By contrast, the sole major biography of Bernard of Clairvaux portrays him as unapproachable in his holiness, lacking, in other words, a basic element of charisma, that it inspires imitation. And yet, as Jaeger points out, Bernard is posthumously charismatic, thanks to his own writing, rather than to writing about him by others.

In this section's final essay, "Charismatic Rulers in Civic Guise: Images of the Nine Worthies in Northern European Town Halls of the 14th to 16th Centuries," Andrey Egorov traces the power these effigies had to create spaces of exhorta-tion where civic leaders were inspired to live according to the highest ideals of good government in Cologne, Mechelen, and Lüneburg. The topos of the Nine Worthies had originated in aristocratic culture, and Egorov argues that its surprising appeal for urban magistrates, who typically attained their dominance by challenging claims of local lords, lay in the

charisma of the Nine Worthies' material presence ensconced in town halls. Highly individualized figures positioned within broader iconographic programs that exemplified ancient and biblical justice, The Nine Worthies portrayed a history of good governance and materialized an imaginary genealogy of forefathers. Corporeal and mimetic as sculpture, numinous as stain glass, the Worthies enveloped the council members in the aura of their representational idiom. The Worthies and the magistrates formed a single auratic body of exemplary individuals.

The third section of the volume, "Dazzling Reflections: Charismatic Art and Its Audience," features essays that explore the charisma of art that offers viewers inspiring or redemptive reflections of themselves or that transmit ennobling reflections of themselves to others. Paroma Chatterjee's essay, "Charisma and the Ideal Viewer in Nicetas Choniates's De signis," studies the contrast Choniates (d. 1217) makes between Constantinople as a zone of historical and aesthetic consciousness owing to the beauty of its statuary and its appreciative Byzantine viewers, and the Constantinople that was brutally sacked in 1204 by marauding Latins unmoved by the charismatic power of those same public sculptures. Her close reading of Choniates's descriptions of Constantinople's life-like statues in the De signis elicits the Byzantine author's view that works of art function according to a principle of reciprocity, whereby individuals and cultures receive a measure of grace for their appropriate response to them. Chatterjee further examines the ways in which Choniates's reflections shaped viewers' ability to perceive and respond to this grace as an index of cultural characteristics and as a critical tool for investigating aesthetic and political trends.

Gavin Richardson's "Disenchantment: Hoccleve's Tale of Jonathas and Male Revenge Fantasy," focuses on the Middle English translation of the extremely popular story ofJonathas by Thomas Hoccleve (c.1368-1426), which Richardson classifies as a male revenge fantasy: that is, a tale in which a male lover wreaks usually violent and sexualized revenge on a woman by whom he feels himself to have been shamed. As Richardson shows, Hoccleve's example of the genre makes for an

elegant case study of disenchantment – what happens when a charismatic object is withdrawn – and of the virulent misogyny that emerges when the object is (or was) a female lover. The essay concludes with a suggestion that in the light of his bouts of madness, Hoccleve may have found a reflection of himself in the dark charisma of Jonathas's life story, a reflection that may have served as a "writing cure."

The final essay in this section, "The Emperorship of Sigismund of Luxemburg (1368-1437): Charisma and Government in the Later Medieval Holy Roman Empire," by Duncan Hardy, centers on the eventful career of the emperor by considering the narrative and visual evidence of his energetic personality's broad and transformative impact on the European political landscape. As Hardy shows, Sigismund's energy was effectively relayed and transmitted by such various institutional media as seals, documents, livery badges, and portraits. To explain the scope of the emperor's influential outreach, Duncan deploys the notion of charisma as an integrative force. Personally and institutionally projected by the monarch, promoted and perpetuated by admiration for and memory of a respected ruler, such charisma durably constructed and united an imaginary political community. Hardy therefore contends that charismatic leadership was a prominent operator in late medieval politics, challenging Weber's notion that European governmental structures were antithetical to the exercise of charismatic rulership.

The fourth and final section of the volume, "Mediation: The Intermediary Spaces of Charisma," includes essays that provide a perspective on realms intermediate between art and life that the charisma of art may call into being. Together these essays contribute to our understanding of charismatic art as capable of generating an enhanced environment, either secular or sacred.

In his essay "Medieval Franciscan Architecture as Charismatic Space," Eric Gustafson explores the agency of architecture in 13th-century central Italian Franciscan churches in leading lay people – both men and women – into a realm that inspires, feeds, and confirms a desire to draw nearer to God both within the church and in their daily lives. The partitioning of the church interior into three

spaces is key to the creation of this charismatic space: in particular, the division between the nave and the lay choir, by means of the tramezzo screen. Upon entering the church, a worshiper would be drawn forward by the sight of the door in the middle of this screen and by the crucifix above it. In passing through the door, a layperson would find him or herself in an intermediary space that corresponds, Gustafson argues, to the second of three levels of ascent to the divine articulated by Franciscan theologian Bonaventure (1221-74) in his Breviloquium. At this stage, the Christian's ascent is supported by the gifts of the Holy Spirit – the charismata, as Bonaventure terms them – and inspired by the life of Christ. Considered in relation to this second stage of Christian practice, the unique space of the Franciscan lay choir may be considered in itself a gift of grace.

Joseph Ackley's essay, "Precious-Metal Figural Sculpture, Medium, and Mimesis in the Late Middle Ages," examines two northern-European figural reliquaries that together define a polarity between mimesis and hyper-mimesis. The first is a bust of a radiant and rosy-cheeked Catherine of Alexandria in polychrome wood (produced in Germany around 1465-67). The second is a mid-14th century German Virgin and Child statuette in hammered silver, gilded except for the figures' skin. This second object would seem to be much less mimetic than the first; however, Ackley suggests that of the two, the precious-metal Virgin and Child figure might provide the stronger likeness of divinity, for it accurately pictures the radiance of saintly bodies, which Bernard of Clairvaux had compared to the luminosity of sunlight shining on silver or gold. Ackley's further discussion of the winged altar piece, the site in which the gilt of both polychrome wood and precious-metal figural reliquaries would have been viewed by medieval Christians, situates both objects as a part a drama of technological brilliance, which functioned both to fill viewers with reverential awe and to inspire them to participate in the church's financial support.

In the final essay in this section, "'I'll make the statue move indeed:' Charismatic Motion and the Disenchanted Image in Early Modern Drama," Lynsey McCulloch traces the material presence and literary motif of animated statues in early modern

culture, arguing that their auratic appeal was informed less by their esoteric than by their exoteric features, in particular their intelligibility. As McCulloch points out, early modern audiences were quite familiar with automata. They were featured in the theater as both devices and characters (Hermione in Shakespeare's Winter's Tale, Robert Greene's Brazen Head); they adorned pageants and urban buildings; they were incorporated into Catholic church services – and exposed as tricks by Protestant Reformers – and they loomed large in contemporary scientific and philosophical treatises. While the latter provided explanations of self-moving devices that ranged from the natural to the supernatural, the other media did not elucidate the origins of sculptural motion. Spectators and readers were thus presented with the choice of being enchanted by the supernatural, by the technological, or by both since, as McCulloch shows, an understanding of technical ingenuity did not necessarily limit the sense of wonder inspired by mysteriously moving objects. <>

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[Heidegger's Poetic Projection of Being](#) by Marius Johan Geertsema [Palgrave-Macmillan, 9783319780719]

This book investigates the relationship between poetry and ontology in the works of Martin Heidegger. It explains the way in which Heidegger's dialogue with poetry forms an essential step on the path of overcoming metaphysics and thinking the openness of presence. Heidegger's engagement with poetry is an important moment in the development of his philosophy—or rather thinking of Being. Being speaks itself poetically in his view. Rather than a logician or a thinker, Being is the first poet.

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Excerpt:

In thinking all things become solitary and slow. —Heidegger, From the Experience of Thinking

To present an introduction in philosophy means, in Heidegger's view, to assume that the one who ought to be initiated stands at first outside of philosophy.' But in fact, the historical human being stands essentially and therefore `always already' within philosophy, as Heidegger argues in line with a historization of Plato's thought that to be human implies knowing ideas. Hence, strictly thought, there cannot be an introduction to philosophy. The historical human being moves always already around in thought by `thinking of' (andenken) and `thinking towards' (zu-denken), which Heidegger calls the `wellspring' of poetry. As a remembering (andenkendes) being, the human being philosophizes. Philosophy, that is to say the human being itself, has a Janus head that looks at once back and ahead. That which is thought towards and at the same time already thought before is the human's area of abidance (Aufenthaltsbereich) as philosophy.

This area has a poetic source, according to Heidegger. Since all human beings are essentially thinking beings, they cannot be `in'troduced into what they already are. Philosophy is, in Heidegger's view, therefore rather the remembrance and appropriation of what one already is, namely a way, a becoming; that is, a historical self-appropriating being.

Although the human is a thinking being, not everyone is a thinker and at any given time already thinking. We should as thinking beings,

according to Heidegger, therefore first become thoughtful. This means that one might be reminded of one's thinking nature, like Heidegger intends to do by means of his writings and we attempt in his shadow in this 'introduction' as well. I say 'we', since it is essential that the reader is included in that contemplation. Thinking can only be disclosed by means of thinking itself, instead of mere representing, ordering or cataloguing. Let us not beat around the bush. What Heidegger calls `thinking' has little in common with ordinary scientific and academic aspirations. In Heidegger's view, thinking relates itself to that which is concealed from thinking by being reserved and still in store. In other words, thinking relates itself to that which is `withdrawing' instead of that which is positively given. According to Heidegger, this is the originary way of relating to truth. Thinking should heed what it is given to think, which is, in his view, first of all something negative, manifest as the thoughtless condition of ordinary thought. As such, the term `thinking' denotes an existential moment, and thinking itself is always directed towards the human existence. The reader of Heidegger's work is therefore him- or herself at stake. In Heidegger's view we are thinking beings, but we are not thinking yet. One might notice that it is not unusual for a philosopher to think that no one else is really thinking except for oneself, like a prophet often deems oneself the last loyal and true believer that has been left among one's people. But presumably Heidegger experienced something critical, which his own speaking and its reception could not escape either, namely the planetary uniform transformation of thought into mere calculation and information technology. Thinking that is not useful or universally communicable comes in need of having its say when cybernetics renders all meaning information, as merely successful `feedback' in a loophole of data. Consequently, the non-successful is simply selected out as senseless. Heidegger suspected that precisely the essential poetry and thought that are oriented by and towards the whole would suffer this fate. By giving rise to cybernetics, the language of traditional Western thought, namely metaphysics, has transformed into communication technology. Cybernetics takes being and meaning, in other words the ontological, exclusively as something ontical; that is, something present. About

absence or nothingness one cannot be informed. Information is stocked being. In the age of modern technology everything becomes framed, in its secured place and present as orderable. But this view on the whole is itself nowhere present, ordered, produced, framed, secured, stored or stocked, but expresses the hidden historical essence of modern technology. Heidegger speaks in this regard of a 'non-pictorial figure' (bildlosen Gebilde). Cybernetics stems from the heart of modern technology to which contemporary science belongs, in Heidegger's view, as well. However, within the uniformity of modern technology, a more primordial way of saying might be found. This saying is not representative, secure, exact, useful or informing, but rather hints and suggests. This saying is poetry. From Heidegger's perspective, to hear poetry in the midst of the present technological world means to hear the voice of Being. Precisely the thoughtless and thought-repressing character of modern technology forms for Heidegger not so much material for an introduction (Einleitung) to philosophy, but a thought-provoking occasion (Anleitung), since modern technology remains after all an intrinsic part of humankind's essential history. Nevertheless, such occasions wherein thinking emerges are rare, according to Heidegger. The path of thinking is abysmal, never a smoothly guided tour and constantly threatened by a relapse into the plain indifference of the ordinary. Heidegger pays attention in this regard to Nietzsche's saying: `Philosophy means living voluntarily amid ice and mountain ranges.

The particular occasion (Anleitung) that gives food for thought in this book is the ostensible lack of reference to poetry in Heidegger's formulation of the futural task of thinking. The essay The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking (1966) is one of the few writings after Being and Time (1927) that lacks an explicit reference to poetry.' In contrast with many of his later writings, Heidegger's magnum opus Being and Time had not been principally concerned with poetry. Heidegger advocates in The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking that with the emancipation of the sciences, philosophy, as metaphysics, has come to an end and suggests that on the path of overcoming metaphysics, futural thinking should think `truth' from its relation to aletheia; that is, un-concealment

as the openness of presence. In the same text Heidegger claims that metaphysics knows nothing of openness. Because it is a late work, there is reason to assume that the text is based on a broad trajectory of Heidegger's thinking, giving his exhortation a rather seminal character. Should one conclude on the basis of this text that the task of thinking openness and the overcoming of metaphysics are not related to poetry? In our view, the reverse is the case. The central question of this book is therefore: What is the relation between poetry and the openness of the truth of Being throughout the works of Heidegger? Our guiding thesis is: From the perspective of the later Heidegger, Being opens and appropriates itself first through poetry.

We will argue throughout the book that Heidegger's dialogue with poetry forms an essential step on the path of overcoming metaphysics and thinking the openness of presence. Heidegger's engagement with poetry is an important moment in the development of his philosophy—or rather `thinking'—of Being. Being speaks, in Heidegger's view, itself poetically. In our words, rather than a logician or a thinker, Being is the first poet. In line with Heidegger's attempts to let Being have its own say, this ostensible personification of Being rather means a poetization of Being.

A historical perspective on Being excludes mere empiricism. As the presencing abyss, Being can have its say, according to Heidegger, solely poetically. A denoting object language would fall short of signifying absence. If Being shows itself merely as refusal, denial and dissemblance, or as that which it is not, namely as entities, the language of Being must be an indirect language as well. Instead of a logical positivism, Heidegger's onto-poetology forms a poetic negativism, which is, however, never a pure nihilism. Only the sense of poetic language fits a discourse on—or rather from—Being, if Being is never an entity, object or thing. Concerning thinking the truth of Being, a philosophical reflection on language becomes finally inevitable, if it is true that thinking cannot exist without language. The essence of language is poetry, according to the later Heidegger, which he characterizes not as an ontical structure or in terms

of traditional poetics, but as an occurrence in terms of the `appropriating event' (Ereignis), Heidegger's final term to articulate the relation between being and time. The much-discussed `turn' (Kehre) in Heidegger's thinking is a turning of thinking towards Being itself. However, this turn happens, in Heidegger's view, first from Being, as the appropriating event itself. The appropriating event is the historical way in which Being turns futurely towards its own origin through originary thinking, which the philosopher therefore determines as a `homecoming'. Homecoming must always first traverse its own alterity and therefore experience its own `uncanniness' as the mood in which one finds oneself to be initially not at home in one's own being. According to Heidegger, it is Being itself that by means of a historical dialogue between poetry and thinking poetically has its say in this turning. The self-appropriation of Being occurs in this very conversation, which consequently constitutes the historical essence of the human being. It is therefore not the human being, traditionally conceived as the animal rationale, who speaks, but Being itself, according to Heidegger. Human language remains always a response to a preceding claim by Being. As the language of a people, this conversation is in its primal character poetic. As such, poetry is essentially the self-saying of Being articulated throughout the course of the history of a people. In its appropriation, Being projects, founds and heralds itself anticipatorily through poetry. We call this ontological view of poetry 'onto-poetology'. Since Being's homecoming first occurs in poetry and its interpretation, philosophy—or rather `thinking'—should leave the language of metaphysics, as the language of the being of entities and the mere present, behind on the path of overcoming metaphysics by letting it engage itself in an open dialogue with poetry. As such, it is Being's poetic saying that reveals Being to itself in the openness of the `clearing'—that is, the essence of the human—which has therefore, in Heidegger's view, in the end a poetic character as well. The meanings or the directions of time and history are always projected, founded and grounded in advance in language, which is essentially poetic, Heidegger argues. In turn, the essence of poetic language is open and, as such, mysterious, mystic and silent. As such, thinking the

openness of presence must imply thinking the opening, founding and grounding essence of poetry. Since the essence of language yields from concealed Being instead of the human being as a rational subject, language is in essence not rational or logical. Language is in its primal nature not clear and distinct, directed and adapted to human conceptual understanding, but first consists in poetic suggestions and conjectures.

In conclusion, what is at issue in this book is the triangular free and open relation between Being, time and language throughout the works of Heidegger, regarded from the perspective that poetry is the historical language of Being.

Initially, Heidegger had worked out the question of Being as the question concerning its access, which is the human being called 'Dasein'. Poetry is for the early Heidegger not yet an essential topic, because language had in his thought not yet returned to its essence. But the later Heidegger states in this regard that the essence of language is the language of essence, hinting thereby at Being. Heidegger asserts that his elucidation of poetry by no means claim to be contributions to research in the history of literature or aesthetics. They rather spring from a necessity of thought. The attempt of this book is to make this necessity intelligible. In Chap. 4 the book pays attention to the early Heidegger in order to demonstrate the ontological motives that drive Being homewards, in Heidegger's view. As such, the book attempts to provide ontological context for an interpretation of Heidegger's poetic elucidation.

We characterize Heidegger's ontological reading of poetry as onto-poetology'. The book inquires therefore not merely into poetry or language in Heidegger, but into the essential relation between Being and poetry. The course of the argumentation cannot head immediately to poetry as one theme among others that can be discussed and whereto the investigation should be delimited. In contrast, poetry should be approached from the question that has pervaded Heidegger's thinking through and through, namely the question of being. Throughout the course of the book we will pay particular attention to the notion of the `open' with respect to ontology and poetry and, as such, the open in 'onto-poetology', as a way of following

Heidegger's own exhortation concerning the task of thinking.

The book does not first take an interest in what Heidegger says in particular about this or that phrase from this or that particular poem, or for instance solely Heidegger's relation to Hölderlin (Heidegger has commented on a great many poets). But what is at issue, and concerns philosophy or thinking, is the `poetic' as principle; that is to say, the poetic as origin and how it is related to thought and being. Poetry is read therefore in our interpretation as an ontological notion and approached exclusively from the perspective of Heidegger's ontological problems.

The term poetology in onto-poetology is chosen over the more common term `poetics', since the latter is usually distinguished from hermeneutics by its focus on the understanding of the way in which different elements of a text come together and produce certain effects on the reader. The term `poetics' therefore commonly connotes the metaphysical thought that poetry resides in the domain of literature, rhetoric or aesthetics instead of philosophy. However, as a particular view among other views on poetry, poetics would merely be a form of `poetology'. The broader term poetology', as the theory of poetry, seeks to avoid a rigid dichotomy between the effect of forms, on the one hand, and content as meaning On the other hand. Secondly, Heidegger mentions the term `poetics' only deprecatorily and always in contrast with his own onto-historical intentions. Finally, as the reader probably could not have missed, the term forms an allusion to Heidegger's concept of 'onto-theology' and in a Heideggerian context the often-used term 'onto-history' as well."

We have examined Heidegger's concern with poetry in relation to the question of Being. `Being' means `presenting' for Heidegger, which itself, however, remains permanently veiled in its full historical course. Each way of presenting occurs in language, or at least against the background of language. Traditionally, being comes to expression in philosophical discourse as metaphysics. Heidegger thought, in contrast, that the presencing of entities occurs more essentially in and through poetry. As such, poetry is the place where hints and suggestions concerning ontological transitions are

concentrated and thus are most present. Poetry becomes, as such, the place of particularity where hints concerning the concealed whole are to be found.

Undoubtedly, a merit of Heidegger's concern with poetry is the way in which he demonstrates how poetic language is able to have an apophantic character. In the ancient quarrel between the philosophers and the poets, poetic language became sharply distinguished from the conceptual language of thinking as philosophy. The philosophers ascribed only to the first an apophantic possibilty, and, as such, only propositional language was conceived to be concerned with truth. This conception of language in relation to truth is convincingly corrected by Heidegger. He makes it sufficiently clear that poetic language is not concerned with present facts, but the way of being. Hence, if the way of being— that is, the way of presencing—is part of ontology as well, poetry cannot be any longer dismissed as non-apophantic language. Secondly, even if it is true that poetic language is vague, counter-factual or concealing, as it is often regarded, this will not be a reason for poetry to be dismissed as non-apophantic, since Being is precisely both a revealing and a concealing movement, as Heidegger argued. He deemed poetic language to be even more revealing than conceptual language.

Certain problems have arisen, however. What precisely is poetic language, and how is it distinguished from non-poetic language? 1f, according to Heidegger, in essence all language is poetic, this question will be difficult to answer from his point of view. In a similar way, Heidegger uses the term `language' in quite a peculiar way, since language becomes for him a name for each meaningful way of presencing as Being. He also uses the term `poetic' in a particular way, which is altogether quite different from its usual meaning in the sense of poetry as a genre of literature. For example, architecture or a metaphysical treatise could have a poetic character as well, in Heidegger's view. On the other hand, the poetic seems in his final analysis to be concentrated and found primarily in poetry in the traditional sense of the term; that is to say, as text under the rubric of literature. As such, the poem as a piece of

literature forms the access to or medium par excellence of the poetic. But here Heidegger fails to convince. Why would a poem as a piece of text be more apophantic or founding concerning the way things become present than, for example, a ritual, film, ballet or a piece of music? Admittedly, Heidegger also wrote on some works of plastic art, but nothing like as lengthily compared to his writings on poetry. Without further thoughts on the issue on his part, one cannot help forming the impression that text is simply the medium of traditional philosophy since Plato, and that Heidegger was simply part of that very same tradition. In a similar way, Heidegger suggested that Greek and German are languages eminently suitable for thinking, which is of course just as unconvincing, if these languages turn out to be precisely the two languages with which for arbitrary reasons he was most familiar himself. Not surprisingly, later thinkers like Marshall McLuhan, Jacques Derrida, Bernard Stiegler and Peter Sloterdijk took up the question of thinking as a question of media, perhaps not in the last place deployed by Heidegger's own thought, which mainly questioned the access to phenomena. Secondly, the question arises, if it is true that the poem as piece of literature is the medium par excellence of the `poetic', of what would justify a proper criterion for a selection of poetry with ontohistorical relevance? In what way is Heidegger's one-sided promotion of Hölderlin's poetry not simply a way of stellen—that is, positing—and, as such, part of en-framing, which is the counter-concept, in his view, to serenity and the poetic? Admittedly, in the last decade of his writings Heidegger also started interpreting works of other poets besides Hölderlin, but he was nevertheless convinced till the end that none of the other poets could come close to Hölderlin in an onto-historical ranking. Again, one cannot escape the impression of a completely arbitrary ground of selection. Moreover, the pompous attribution of historical relevance to certain pieces of text or particular events precisely matched Germany's Zeitgeist between the 1920s and the 1940s. Heidegger seemed to have been blind to the mood of his own time, which might altogether be part of the thrownness of a thinker. However, one could expect from the man who even coined this term to

reflect more deeply—perhaps some decades later—on this issue in relation to his own thought. One could argue in Heidegger's defense that he had spoken solely about the Western tradition and more particularly about the German people and its history. However, in that case, his reflections on poetry in relation to ontology will have limited value, while ontology or the question of being ought to be precisely concerned with that which transcends the arbitrariness of particularity, in as far as the concept of being implies transcendence and generality. In line with this, the question arises: if in Heidegger's view there does not exist a valid concept of humanism, what then unites different peoples? In what sense would it be justified to speak of 'the human being' at all, like Heidegger still does after all? Here he fails to convince as well. It is just unattainable that if different peoples do not share a common poetic history, they do not share anything essential at all.

Friedrich Nietzsche introduced a more poetic, literary way of writing into German philosophy and, as such, legitimated poetic language in philosophical text. Heidegger analyses such tendencies in the sense that his thought draws attention to the ways in which philosophical expression changes and is subjected to mood and prosody. However, he proceeds again by means of conceptual propositional language. His analysis fails to convince, maybe most evidently because his writings are not poetic or artistic themselves, as, for example, in contrast, the writings of Nietzsche were. Heidegger would have been perfectly fine with a humble role as a mere translator or pointer of the way when it came down to his interpretations of philosophers and poets. However, the same cannot be said concerning certain onto-historical claims that Heidegger as a philosopher made himself, such as claiming that Hölderlin's poetry is Germany's spiritual future. It is probably best to take his interpretations merely as paradigmatic, as a way of looking at poetry in relation to history and culture, which could be extended, as such, to other peoples and their poets.

At any rate, the way in which Heidegger, as a thinker, gave the floor to art remains in our view by far his most thoughtful gesture and greatest contribution to philosophy. His credo was simple:

Stop thinking in the limited ways of metaphysics and science, which are blind to the impact of the mystery and the unknown, and instead look thoughtfully at art, whence meaning and futural presencing emerge. As such, art essentially takes part in what he called the `openness of presence'. In his view, to meditate on the latter ought to be the futural task of thinking. <>

[Nietzsche on Consciousness and the Embodied Mind](#) edited by Manuel Dries [Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung, de Gruyter, 9783110246520]

Nietzsche's thought has been of renewed interest to philosophers in both the Anglo- American and the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions. [Nietzsche on Consciousness and the Embodied Mind](#) presents 16 essays from analytic and continental perspectives. Appealing to both international communities of scholars, the volume seeks to deepen the appreciation of Nietzsche's contribution to our understanding of consciousness and the mind. Over the past decades, a variety of disciplines have engaged with Nietzsche's thought, including anthropology, biology, history, linguistics, neuroscience, and psychology, to name just a few. His rich and perspicacious treatment of consciousness, mind, and body cannot be reduced to any single discipline, and has the potential to speak to many. And, as several contributors make clear, Nietzsche's investigations into consciousness and the embodied mind are integral to his wider ethical concerns.

This volume contains contributions by international experts such as Christa Davis Acampora (Emory University), Keith Ansell-Pearson (Warwick University), João Constâncio (Universidade Nova de Lisboa), Frank Chouraqui (Leiden University), Manuel Dries (The Open University; Oxford University), Christian J. Emden (Rice University), Maria Cristina Fornari (University of Salento), Anthony K. Jensen (Providence College), Helmut Heit (Tongji University), Charlie Huenemann (Utah State University), Vanessa Lemm (Flinders University), Lawrence J. Hatab (Old Dominion University), Mattia Riccardi (University of Porto), Friedrich Ulfers and Mark Daniel Cohen (New York

University and EGS), and Benedetta Zavatta (CNRS).

Introduction to Nietzsche on Consciousness and the Embodied Mind by Manuel Dries

This collection of essays aims to widen our understanding of the possible contributions Nietzsche can make to current debates on consciousness and the mind, both of which he conceived as fundamentally embodied. Nietzsche's philosophy has at times been brought into fruitful dialogue with a large number of different disciplines, such as anthropology, history, neuroscience, biology, psychology, and linguistics, to name just a few. His rich and unsystematic treatment of consciousness and the body cannot be reduced to any single discipline and has the potential to speak to all of the above, and more. In the famous note at the end of the first essay of GM, Nietzsche proposes an interdisciplinary research programme for the study of morality, and moral values in particular. His recommendation is to study morality from all possible perspectives, with the wider goal of better understanding human flourishing. His investigations into consciousness and the embodied mind are also not free-standing philosophical analyses but should be seen as part and parcel of what we could call his larger ethical concerns. We learn from Nietzsche's sympathetic and yet always critical perspective on the natural and other sciences (I am thinking here, for example, of GM III 23) that he supports specialized scientific enquiries (and presumably this would include research into consciousness and the mind e. g. by contemporary neuroscience) never merely as an end in itself, but rather guided by broadly ethical concerns. This volume offers a treatment of Nietzsche's philosophy of mind from a number of different analytic and continental perspectives and aims to show its connection to Nietzsche's broader ethical concerns.

It is commonly accepted that Nietzsche regards the body very highly. No passage better captures Nietzsche's admiration and shift towards a more

correct, adualistic embodied self-conception than the well-known passage from Z:

> the knowing one says: body am I through and through, and nothing besides; and soul is just a word for something on the body. The body is a great reason, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, one herd and one shepherd. Your small reason, what you call "mind" is also a tool of your body, my brother, a small work- and plaything of your great reason. "I" you say and are proud of this word. But what is greater is that in which you do not want to believe - your body and its great reason. It does not say I, but does I. (Z I Despisers)

What is perhaps still less well established, despite a lot of excellent work that has been done on the subject in recent years (cf. e. g. Schlimgen 1999, Abel 2015 [2001], Emden 2005, Richardson 2004, Constâncio et al 2012 and 2015, Leiter 2015, Gemes/Le Patourel 2015, Katsafanas 2016), is Nietzsche's position on reflective consciousness or self-consciousness. Nietzsche does not differentiate explicitly between the many different types of consciousness that we currently distinguish in contemporary philosophy of mind. His remarks are mostly focused on what we call today reflective consciousness or self-consciousness (Riccardi (this volume)). At first sight, much of what he says about self-consciousness is quite clearly deflationary, part of a sustained attempt to debunk the supreme importance that humankind, and in particular philosophers, have attributed to the self-conscious, rational parts of the human mind. As he famously put it in GS:

> The problem of consciousness (or rather, of becoming conscious of something) first confronts us when we begin to realize how much we can do without it [...] For we could think, feel, will, remember, and also 'act' in every sense of the term, and yet none of all this would have to `enter our consciousness' (as one says figuratively). All of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in the mirror; and still today, the predominant part of our lives actually unfolds without this mirroring of - course also our thinking, feeling, and willing lives, insulting as it may sound to an older philosopher. (GS 354)

I want to emphasize that, just because there is "much" that can be done without self-consciousness, and just because "predominant parts of our lives" may indeed happen without self-consciousness, this by no means commits Nietzsche to a conception of self-consciousness that strips it of all importance and function. In the same passage, Nietzsche presents what I want to call his developmental thesis of social self-consciousness. He regards self-consciousness as a late development and addition to the human being, an animal that could up to that point rely exclusively on her animal drives and instincts. His hypothesis is that consciousness was adaptive, arising due to the increased need to communicate, under circumstances of early group formation. This is how Nietzsche puts it:

> I may go on to conjecture that consciousness in general has developed only under the pressure of the need to communicate; that at the outset, consciousness was necessary, was useful, only between persons (particularly between those who commanded and those who obeyed); and that it has developed only in proportion to that usefulness. Consciousness is really just a net connecting one person with another - only in this capacity did it have to develop; the solitary and predatory person would not have needed it. That our actions, thoughts, feelings, and movements - at least some of them - even enter into consciousness is the result of a terrible `must' which has ruled over man for a long time: as the most endangered animal, he needed help and protection [...]. (GS 354)

It is clear that Nietzsche seeks to give an account that aims to debunk many of the features commonly associated with self-consciousness, e. g. that it has been permanent, reliable and transparent, the cornerstone of the individual rational capacities of our own and of other minds. A hypothesis like Nietzsche's can help us to make sense of the overwhelming evidence that conscious reports are far from reliable, are often biased, and at times are mere confabulations. In D, well ahead of today's experimental evidence, Nietzsche already asked if "all our so-called consciousness [is] a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, out feit text?" But, again, wnat ao we make or the more or less in um

passage? Just because something has only developed "in proportion to its usefulness," primarily with a social function, does this necessarily limit its entire scope?

In GM II, to give another example, Nietzsche describes the development of bad conscience (schlechtes Gewissen) among early humans: under the imposed order of early violent rulers, they were no longer allowed to express freely their natural drives, such as cruelty, enmity, or joy (in pursuit, in attack, in change, in destruction) (cf. GM II 16). Instead of being guided by their drives, Nietzsche conjectures that early humans were forced to turn against themselves to repress their drives, at the hands of their oppressors, who forced them into early forms of society. As a result, some human animals began to feel, and eventually to think, negatively about many of its antisocial drives and instincts. Nietzsche believes that these developments weakened the motivational force of the drives that had hitherto guided action "more or less" unselfconsciously, and increasingly "disengaged" them. It is from then on, Nietzsche thinks, that humans had to rely more and more on their most "errorprone" organ, their self-conscious minds, which were, from very early on, pitted against the "great reason" of their drive-driven bodies. It is clear that Nietzsche thinks this development of increased reliance on self-consciousness had far-reaching psycho-physiological consequences. He writes in GM:

> Just like the things water animals must have gone through when they were forced either to become land animals or to die off, so events must have played themselves out with this half-beast so happily adapted to the wilderness, war, wandering around, adventure - suddenly all its instincts were devalued and "disengaged." From this point on, these animals were to go on foot and "carry themselves"; whereas previously they had been supported by the water. A terrible heaviness weighed them down. In performing the simplest things they felt ungainly. In dealing with this new unknown world, they no longer had their old leaders, the ruling unconscious drives which guided them safely - these unfortunate creatures were reduced to thinking,

inferring, calculating, bringing together cause and effect, reduced to their "consciousness," their most impoverished and error-prone organ! (GM II 16)

Nietzsche's primary purpose, as already mentioned at the start, is to debunk humankind's deeply held illusions. Misconceptions regarding the scope and function of self-consciousness is one of them. An illustration of what we could call this superlative metaphysical view of self-consciousness can be found in A:

> People used to see consciousness, `spirit', as proof that humanity is descended from something higher, that humanity is divine; people were advised to become perfect by acting like turtles and pulling their senses inside themselves, cutting off contact with worldly things and shedding their mortal shrouds: after this, the essential element would remain, the 'pure spirit'. We are more sensible about all this too: we see the development of consciousness, `spirit', as a symptom of precisely the relative imperfection of the organism, as an experimenting, a groping, a mistaking, as an exertion that is sapping an unnecessarily large amount of strength away from the nervous system, - we deny that anything can be made perfect as long as it is still being made conscious. (A 14)

Again, it seems as if Nietzsche wholeheartedly criticizes self-consciousness. And as far as self-consciousness is taken as evidence for one of humanity's self-aggrandizing fantasies, he clearly is. And yet, in the second half of A 14, which culminates in what I will call Nietzsche's unconscious perfection hypothesis, does he not leave ample room for self-consciousness to be—or, perhaps better, become or develop into—a very important tool, if correctly understood? Let's take the well-known example of the pianist who, whenever she makes a mistake, starts reflecting on what it is that she actually does with her fingers on the keyboard. The natural flow of the play needs to be interrupted in order to figure out the best fingering combinations for mastering a certain complex musical sequence. Once this has happened, it will take a while until she eventually becomes habituated to the new fingering and it no longer demands her conscious attention. The pianist will have reached the kind of unconscious perfection

that Nietzsche describes only once she can play the piece without error and without any self-conscious, reflective monitoring. Perfection, in the sense Nietzsche uses it in A 14, cannot coincide with the slow, self-conscious working out of the fingering combination. But who would want to claim that self-consciousness did not play a vital role in the process?

The problem with self-consciousness, then, in the `acquirement reading' I only hint at but won't try to defend here, is not that it is necessarily deficient. Many of Nietzsche's remarks are consistent with a reading that aims to debunk the superlative metaphysical conception of self-consciousness (as "higher," or "divine," "fully transparent," "error-free"etc.) but without succumbing to the kind of fallacious inversion that Nietzsche identifies in his well-known debunking of "`freedom of the will' in the superlative metaphysical sense" (BGE 21). Just as he regards the inference to an utterly "'un-free will'" as pure "mythology," he may well regard the inference to the inefficacy or epiphenomenality of consciousness as "mythology" (BGE 21) (on the question of epiphenomenality, see e. g. Leiter (2015: xi, 72— 74) on Katsafanas (2005) and Riccardi (this volume), and Katsafanas 2016; for an expressivist account, see Pippin 2015; on intention and action, see Nehamas 2018). Just as it may be better to think of willing not as some sort of faculty, that is either free or unfree, but as something that comes in degrees, it may be better to think of self-consciousness as something that has developed under specific circumstances, to a certain degree, and awaits further acquiring. This thought is actually quite clearly expressed in GS where Nietzsche asserts:

> Since they thought they already possessed consciousness, human beings did not take much trouble to acquire it—and things are no different today! (GS 11)

Nietzsche often seems to privilege what he calls "becoming" over "being" — that is, he assumes non-teleological evolutionary and historical development, rather than the existence of any ahistorical essences that can be discovered once and for all. It is consistent with this commitment that Nietzsche leaves ample room for self-consciousness

to develop further, i. e. that quite possibly once the human animal came to understand its complex embodied nature better, it could come to acquire, augment, and shape its self-conscious capacities as well as appreciate its unconscious strengths and weaknesses.

Nietzsche conceives of self-consciousness not only no longer in isolation and as anything privileged, he quite clearly sees it as part of a larger, dynamic, embodied and embedded system of drives, affects, and unconscious and conscious mental states (with nonconceptual and conceptual content). Paul Katsafanas has recently proposed an account that is committed to Nietzsche's drive psychology and allows room for conscious thoughts and values as causally effective. Another account that has yet to receive the attention it deserves is Rex Welshon's. Welshon also offers an account that combines Nietzsche's strong commitment to the drives and leaves room for the efficacy of self-conscious intentionality. One of the crucial passages on which Welshon's account is based is found in GS 360, on the "Two kinds of causes that are often confused." (see also Constâncio (this volume)). Nietzsche distinguishes here between "driving causes" (drives) and "directing causes" (intentions). This is how Nietzsche puts it:

> This seems to me to be one of my most essential steps forward: I learned to distinguish the cause of acting from the cause of acting in a certain way, in a certain direction, with a certain goal. The first kind of cause is a quantum of dammed-up energy [the driving cause, MD] waiting to be used somehow, for something; the second kind, by contrast, is something quite insignificant, mostly a small accident in accordance with which this quantum 'discharges' itself in one particular way: the match versus the powder keg. Among these small accidents and matches I consider all socalled `purposes' [the directing cause, MD] as well as the even more so-called `vocations': they are relatively random, arbitrary, nearly indifferent in relation to the enormous force of energy that presses on, as I said, to be used up somehow. The usual view is different: one is used to seeing the driving force precisely in the

goals (purposes, professions, etc.), in keeping with a very ancient error; but it is only the directing force - one has mistaken the helmsman for the stream. (GS 360)

In Nietzsche's Dynamic Metapsychology, Welshon interprets this passage as follows:

> Reflective goals and purposes may therefore be causally efficacious, not as driving or implementing causes but as directing causes. A reflective goal's causal efficacy consists in constraining, structuring and shaping—directing—rather than being the propelling force, which, of course, no goal has. Hence, in the counterfactual absence of a particular goal, our various drives would continue to impel us to be active across the various domains over which the drives act, although the constraining and shaping associated with the goal would not occur. (Welshon 2014: 181)

What makes Welshon's reading attractive is that, like Katsafanas' different reading, it preserves two of Nietzsche's philosophical commitments. First, Nietzsche's philosophical commitment to a "soul" as a—often less, but ideally more—unified system of drives. And, second, it preserves the everyday phenomenology of a human animal that senses room for further acquiring and shaping of its complex embodied and embedded self.

We have only just started to take Nietzsche's reflections on the self and the mind seriously. Much further work is needed to allow us to see Nietzsche as a fruitful interlocutor for interdisciplinary contemporary research into the embodied conscious and unconscious mind, without losing sight of what I see as his primary commitment to questions of value. It is one of the aims of this volume to contribute to the beginning of this task.

The Chapters in Nietzsche on Consciousness and the Embodied Mind

The first chapter of this volume is devoted to the question of how much a dialogue with Nietzsche may contribute to current debates on consciousness and the embodied mind. In "Nietzsche and Embodied Cognition," Christa Davis Acampora reviews resources in Nietzsche's philosophy that potentially contribute to alternatives to brain-centred views of cognition—specifically,

contemporary work in embodied cognition and extended mind. Acampora surveys these positions and argues that while Nietzsche's philosophy is to some extent compatible with, or even prescient of, some contemporary views, she actually sees the real value of a dialogue with Nietzsche's work in what she calls "indirect critical engagement" (p. 17). She does not, however, rule out that Nietzsche's philosophical contributions could also "be used to vindicate theories of embodied cognition" (p. 44).

In "Early Nietzsche on History, Embodiment, and Value," I argue that already in his early texts, embodiment in Nietzsche's philosophy of mind is best understood via the central category of the drive. I propose that, as early as HL, Nietzsche uses his drive model of the mind. The "historical sickness" that is central to HL is diagnosed as failures of embodiment and drive control. In my analysis I focus on a largely neglected passage that contrasts the medieval memento mori with a modern memento vivere, arguing that Nietzsche took the former to function as an embodied mechanism of willing and self-control. In the final section I draw on recent research in embodied cognition to identify two plausible causes—"overload" and "semantic embodiment"—of the modern "historical sickness" that, in Nietzsche's view, undermines his contemporaries' ability to flourish.

In "Becoming Reasonable Bodies: Nietzsche and Paul Churchland's Philosophy of Mind," Helmut Heit situates Nietzsche within today's debates regarding the metaphysics of the mind. He compares non-dualist and non-reductionist philosophies of mind and argues that both eliminative materialism and Nietzsche are to be distinguished from Platonic views on cognition and knowledge. Heit then embarks on a comparison of Churchland and Nietzsche: the former's naturalized explication of mental states and the development of human minds on the basis of neural network studies and Nietzsche's understanding of the body as a dynamic living organization reveal at first sight significant similarities. In a similar vain to Acampora, Heit argues that Nietzsche's project directs both scientists and philosophers to go beyond scientific realism, which Nietzsche sees as only weakly justifiable. In his own philosophy of

mind Nietzsche gestures toward a more subtle and self-reflexive perspectival epistemology. Nietzsche's "naturalistically inclined agnosticism" must, due to his own methodological constraints, remain open to alternative constructions that self-reflexively enquire into the values that guide the metaphors—cultural and scientific—by which we live. As Heit puts it, Nietzsche's goal is to rearrange our set of metaphors in a more appropriate way as far as "cultural progress", "art" and "life" are concerned. Under such conditions, we should make up our mind regarding the kind of world we would like to live in, and albeit we might have good reasons to choose the current scientific world, we are not obliged or determined to do so. (p. 88)

In "Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness," which has already become a seminal contribution, Mattia Riccardi addresses the question of what exactly Nietzsche means by some of the contentious claims he makes about consciousness, namely that it is in some significant and hitherto neglected sense both `superficial' and `falsifying.' Nietzsche famously writes that "consciousness is a surface" (EH Clever 9). Riccardi makes sense of this `superficiality'. He focuses on two further claims that he believes substantiate Nietzsche's assertion. The first claim is that consciousness is superfluous— the "superfluousness claim" (SC). The second claim is that consciousness is the source of some deep falsification—the "falsification claim" (FC). Riccardi first considers Nietzsche's notion of consciousness and argues that it should be identified with (a version of) self-consciousness. He then addresses the two claims. Regarding FC he proposes that, for Nietzsche, the content of (self-) conscious mental states is falsified by virtue of being articulated propositionally. Regarding SC, he argues that it is best read as a weak version of epiphenomenalism about conscious causation. In arguing for weak epiphenomenalism, Riccardi does not want to deny that consciousness plays an important functional role. This is how he puts it:

> consciousness plays a fundamental role in our acquisition of public or cultural representations in general. Moreover, it is undisputable that such representations have an enormous impact on what we think and do. Nonetheless, I cannot see how this point should rule out the relevant kind of

superfluousness [...] For the fact that consciousness plays a crucial role in our acquisition of a wide range of representations is compatible with the physio-psychological causal role of those representations being independent from consciousness. (p. 107- 8)

João Constâncio's "Nietzsche on Will, Consciousness, and Choice: Another Look at Nietzschean Freedom" contributes to recent scholarly discussions that have been trying to make sense of Nietzsche's conception of will and willing. His point of departure and main textual focus is Nietzsche's well-known analysis of willing in BGE 19.

Here, Nietzsche presents his conception of willing in terms that involve his drive psychology and his conception of human consciousness as a mere "surface" of unconscious power relations. Constâncio argues that, on this basis, Nietzsche rejects not only human "free will," but also, and more generally, our usual overestimation of choice. On the other hand, the chapter also aims to show how Nietzsche's hypothesis of "the will to power" allows him to develop new, positive conceptions of "will" and "freedom." Finally, the chapter argues that these conceptions entail the need to reinterpret the polemic figure of the "sovereign individual" in terms of self-creation, and no longer in terms of freedom of choice.

Ulfers and Cohen's contribution, "Nietzsche's Panpsychism as the Equation of Mind and Matter," is premised on the claim that "Nietzsche's ontology of becoming" can, in its full radical tenor, be appreciated only when viewed in the context of his largely overlooked and, when noted at all, misinterpreted stipulation: his panpsychism. For Nietzsche, they claim, panpsychism constitutes an attribution of psychical aspects to what he calls the "essence of material things"—specifically, the attribution of "feeling" (Empfindung) and "memory" (Gedächtnis). In making this postulation, Nietzsche treats matter as something not entirely distinct from psyche, mind, or experience in their most general and rudimentary sense. Nietzsche's further assumes an ontology of a quantized universe, a universe in which space, time, and events occur in quanta, or "atoms." It is a conception of reality as event-like,

rather than stabilized into substantial objects: a process ontology of becoming rather than being.

In his "On the Place of Consciousness within the Will to Power," Frank Chouraqui also argues that it is important to take into account the hypothesis of the will to power in any account of Nietzsche's views on consciousness. Nietzsche's insistence on the strategic importance of ideas and acts of consciousness for his task bestows on consciousness an importance that many naturalistic accounts fail to justify. Not unlike Ulfers and Cohen, Chouraqui proposes a characterization of the will to power that is based on a rejection of the categorical distinction between the mental and the physical. He first discusses Nietzsche's conception of agency in order to determine what the will to power is intended to explain. He then moves on to characterize will to power as a psycho-physical principle that is not intended as some sort of synthesis of the mental and the physical but instead is better understood as a weakening of both concepts (and of their incompatibility). The final section of Chouraqui's chapter explores how Nietzsche's new conceptions (of the mental and the physical domains) allow him to do away with causation, and to propose an alternative account of interactions within the will to power.

Larry Hatab shifts the focus to the important relation between consciousness and language. In "Talking Ourselves into Selfhood: Nietzsche on Consciousness and Language in Gay Science 354," Hatab seeks to extend Nietzsche's well-known critique of the idea of atomic individualism. Nietzsche's subversion of consciousness and its storied role in defining individual selfhood offers another critical perspective. In GS 354 Nietzsche claims that consciousness is not an essential property of human experience and that it arises primarily out of the social network of linguistic communication. With words conceived as commonly understood signs, Nietzsche concludes that self-consciousness can never be truly individual or unique but is usually an appropriation of what is shared or "average." In his chapter Hatab shows that Nietzsche's claims find support in developmental psychology: that self-awareness seems to be an internalization of socially formed speech. He then poses some questions about

Nietzsche's analysis on its own terms: (1) How far does Nietzsche take the equation between consciousness and socially-based language? (2) Is self-awareness nothing more than a linguistic-communal phenomenon? (3) Is language nothing more than a communal network that averages out experience? (4) Given the possibility of creative language in Nietzsche's thought (and hinted at in GS 354), would such a possibility have to be distinguishable from the consciousness—language connection? (5) What sense can be made of unique experience and selfhood in the light of Nietzsche's analysis?—In attempting to answer these questions, Hatab draws on passages where Nietzsche speaks of a kind of immediacy in language and experience, which helps provide more subtle answers to the above questions.

Benedetta Zavatta's chapter maintains the focus on the close relation between consciousness and language. In "The Figurative Patterns of Reason: Nietzsche on Tropes as Embodied Schemata," Zavatta shows that Nietzsche rejects the idea that there is a purely denotative discourse that simply represents reality, which in some cases and for some purposes can be enriched with tropes and figures. He claims instead that all discourse is constructed through rhetorical strategies and that tropes are not to be conceived as an embellishment of an already formed discourse. Rather, they should be regarded as unconscious procedures through which human beings organize perceptual data into an image of the world (Weltansicht). Examining Nietzsche's considerations of rhetoric and tropes from the point of view of cognitive science reveals a surprising continuity in his thought from the Basle years to his later writings.

Anthony K. Jensen's "Selbstverleugnung—Selbsttäuschung: Nietzsche and Schopenhauer on the Self" traces a key transition in Nietzsche's thinking about the self against the backdrop of Schopenhauer's dual-aspect theory. Jensen argues that an essential element in Nietzsche's departure from Schopenhauer's theory of self involved Nietzsche's transformation and eventual rejection of the key Schopenhauerian notion of Anschauung. Nietzsche's mature position on the self should be understood within this framework. Despite the clear differences between their respective conceptions of

self, Jensen argues that [f]or both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, the self in normal circumstances is neither a subsistent thing nor an intellect nor any sort of causally efficacious kernel of being; it is the designation for a stream of drive-processes of which the individual material body is the material concomitant. All empirical forms of cognition must take place through the filter of the subjective facticities of the embodied will. (p. 230)

While Schopenhauer sees the self's embodied nature as an obstacle from which he derives both aesthetic and ethical conclusions, Nietzsche "embraces and affirms the body as the condition of life" (p. 230).

In "On Natural Beings: Nietzsche and Philosophical Naturalism," Christian J. Emden argues that Nietzsche's epistemological position is best understood by reference to philosophical naturalism. And yet, not unlike Heit, he argues that such a naturalism should not be construed as entailing physicalist reductionism. The central question of Nietzsche's naturalism, rather, is: how can we obtain an understanding of normativity without appealing to normativity as a standard that is separate from the agency, affects, conceptual commitments, and also cells and organs, that make us natural beings? Emden shows that Nietzsche's position emerges within the context of the nineteenth-century encounter between philosophy and the new life sciences. He further shows that philosophical naturalism is of crucial importance for the project of genealogy: Nietzsche's naturalized conception of normativity implies that the meta-ethical distinction between moral realism and moral anti-realism is only of limited relevance since both entail metaphysical commitments that Nietzsche is unwilling to share.

Maria Cristina Fornari's chapter "`Shadows of God' and Neuroethics" probes the close connection between Nietzsche's naturalist philosophy of mind and contemporary ethics. Much of present-day research into the origins of morality in the neurosciences attributes to human beings a moral disposition, broadly understood as the capacity to formulate moral judgements and apply them to behaviour. This disposition is increasingly considered as an evolutionary consequence of specific brain structures, combined with determining

epigenetic factors. What is notable, however, is how in the work of at least some writers in these fields, this disposition takes on a subtly normative form. Nietzsche, Fornari argues, was an acute critic of the naturalistic fallacy, and identifies similar tendencies in the work of his contemporaries (e. g. Herbert Spencer). The chapter examines Nietzsche's engagement with the debates among his contemporaries over the existence of moral faculties, in the context of the development of certain new evolutionary and biological theories, particularly those of a Spencerian kind. It then considers whether Nietzsche's criticisms of naturalistic fallacies in his contemporaries' positions can also illuminate difficulties in some of our own contemporaries' research into the origins of morality. Fornari shows that the details of the debates may have changed but Nietzsche's criticism of Spencer that the value of altruism cannot be established as a "result of science" still stands. Instead, Nietzsche argues, "the prevailing instinct (Trieb) of the day induces men of science to believe that science confirms the desire of their instinct" (NL 1880, KSA 9, 8[35]). Fornari then contrasts explanations that appeal to nature in order to explain "the existence of cooperative attitudes and genuine altruism despite the Darwinian struggle for life" (p. 269) with Nietzsche's proposed alternative: his appeal to equilibria of power tracked by the embodied mind (p. 270).

Nietzsche's idiosyncratic conception of life emerges as an important concept for anyone who wishes to make headway in understanding Nietzsche's philosophy of mind. And yet, what his conception of life consists of is hardly ever spelt out in much detail. Charlie Huenemann addresses this head on in his "Nietzsche and the Perspective of Life." His chapter provides what Huenemann sees as one technical way of making sense of a theoretical entity (called "Life"), which has values and a perspective. He turns to Nietzsche's perspectivism and explains why, for Nietzsche, Life's perspective should always be privileged. He explores how trying to live from this—Life's—perspective would force us to change our values—and, in particular, to disown the value we have placed on truth (for its own sake) and traditional morality. Huenemann also concludes that to understand Nietzsche's conception of Life we need to acknowledge the

close connection it has with his conception of power. As he puts it:

> Overall, it seems that [Nietzsche's theoretical conception of] Life encourages us to see individuals as loci of power, and to feel obligated to do what we can to strengthen that power. If, as Nietzsche presumes, an individual's power is strengthened by placing it in opposition to other forces or powers, then Life encourages us to seek out opposition for the sake of our power's advancement. Life urges us to face both our fears and the values and perspectives with which we disagree, so that we strengthen in response to them. (p. 284)

Huenemann is careful to distinguish truth (for its own sake), which Nietzsche famously criticizes if it is valued above all else, from a conception of truth that Nietzsche clearly values.

Vanessa Lemm's "Truth, Embodiment, and Probity (Redlichkeit) in Nietzsche" argues that, for Nietzsche, the concept of truth that enhances life is a conception of truth that can be better understood as Redlichkeit (probity). Redlichkeit makes possible a conception of philosophical life that is actually political through and through and yet that stands in critical tension with the conventional conception of truth that lies at the basis of social and political forms of life. Lemm's chapter first presents the relation between truth and embodiment in Nietzsche. She then distinguishes between what she calls "philosophical truth" and conventional or political truth. The goal is to show that these two conceptions of truth actually reflect two types of embodiment, which represent two different conceptions of political life and of society with others. Whereas political or conventional truth lays the ground for a form of social and political life based on an equalizing domination of the other, philosophical truth produces a form of social and political life that is characterized by openness to the other. This openness to the other takes the form of an agonistic friendship that favours a "probing" pursuit of philosophical truth. It is the life-enhancing idea of embodied philosophical truth that is exemplified by Nietzsche's conception of truth as Redlichkeit.

The idea of an embodied conception of truth is central also to Keith Ansell-Pearson's "When Wisdom Assumes Bodily Form." He focuses on the ways in which Marx and Nietzsche illuminate, in different ways, the character of an Epicurean enlightenment. Ansell-Pearson is especially interested in Nietzsche's insight into wisdom assuming a bodily form in Epicurus. He first examines Marx, before considering Nietzsche, highlighting both similarities as well as differences between them. He shows that, for both, Epicurus is an important figure in the history of philosophy on account of his doctrine of liberation from religious fear and superstition: Epicurus' philosophy is one of practical freedom. Ansell-Pearson further shows that, for Marx, Epicurus's teaching contains an incendiary political dimension, whereas for Nietzsche the significance of Epicurus is that he is an ethical reformer. Nietzsche's appropriation of Epicurus, by contrast, is more poetic and lyrical, centred on the needs of an ethical reformation, and it adopts the model of social withdrawal offered by the `garden.' The contrast with Marx enables Ansell-Pearson to show the extent to which Nietzsche is primarily an ethicist and not a political thinker, at least as far as his middle period writings are concerned. <>

Continental Philosophy and Theology by Colby Dickinson [Theology, Brill, ISBN 9789004361270]

Continental Philosophy and Theology illustrates the perceived tension between these fields: one is seemingly concerned with destroying normative, metaphysical order and the other with preserving religious identity in the face of secularism. He calls for a nondualistic theology concerned with complexity and comparative inquiry in order to realign their relationship.

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Continental Philosophy and Theology by Colby Dickinson

Continental philosophy underwent a `return to religion' or a 'theological turn' in the late 20th Century. And yet any conversation between continental philosophy and theology must begin by addressing the perceived distance between them: that one is concerned with destroying all normative, metaphysical order (continental philosophy's task) and the other with preserving religious identity and community in the face of an increasingly secular society (theology's task). Colby Dickinson argues in Continental Philosophy and Theology rather that perhaps such a tension is constitutive of the nature of order, thinking and representation which typically take dualistic forms and which might be rethought, though not necessarily abolished. Such a shift in perspective even allows one to contemplate this distance as not opting for one side over the other or by striking a middle ground, but as calling for a nondualistic theology that measures the complexity and inherently comparative nature of theological inquiry in order to realign theology's relationship to continental philosophy entirely.

Keywords

Broadly construed, continental philosophy underwent something of a shift in emphasis in the late 20th Century that various commentators working within the field have, with some distinction, described as a `return to religion' or a `theological turn'. As has become apparent, the epistemological focus undertaken within modernity (Descartes, Kant, Hegel) eventually yielded to a genealogical investigation of the 'origins' of morality and conceptual thought (Nietzsche) as well as a phenomenological turn toward the 'things themselves' (Husserl, Heidegger) which itself evolved into an ontological-existential reconfiguration of Being (Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty). Subsequently as these philosophies declared new methods and insights, continental thought was also modified by a 'linguistic turn' (the 'later Heidegger', Wittgenstein, Derrida, Foucault) and, roughly contemporaneous, an 'ethical turn' (Levinas) as well. In one instance, Jean-François Lyotard's ability to combine linguistic structural problematics alongside ethical imperatives in his Le Dérend—one of the major French philosophical works of the past century—is an excellent testimony to how such turns are in reality not entirely separate movements, but rather envelope one another and altogether overlap in their attempt to explore the complex nature of how existence evolves in multiple dimensions at once.' Much of the works of Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, for example, evidence similarly intertwined combinations of thought. Though each of these turns eventually yielded to a religious or theological turn, isolating and identifying the individual strains of each 'turn' can be helpful, no matter how incomplete a singular perspective might be in the face of multiple but essentially similar trends. From this perspective, taking a moment to discuss the 'turn' to religion or theological subjects within continental philosophy can be instrumental in seeing where

continental philosophy and theology converge in potentially unexpected ways in a contemporary context. Such a context of a 'theological turn' within continental philosophy is, in many ways, what I take to be main focus of the present work.

Though a host of writers working in the United States had already been progressing toward such a theological turn John Caputo, Richard Kearney and Merold Westphal spring readily to mind—philosophers working in French, German and Italian contexts had themselves instigated a profound shift in emphasis that would signal a deliberate reckoning with the impact that the Jewish and Christian legacies in the West specifically had made upon our comprehension of the (western) structures of thought and being. In many ways, the early to mid-20th Century fragmentation of continental philosophy into a variety of seemingly separate fields such as phenomenology, critical theory, existentialism, genealogy-archaeology, hermeneutics, particular psychoanalytic and Marxist schools of thought and deconstructionism was essentially given the chance to interconnect these loose and often apparently disparate strands of inquiry through a common probe into religiously inflected themes. At the same time, however, such a shared focus is difficult to sustain, as we will see, since most of these philosophical trends are decidedly critical, or negative, in their approach, whereas the theological always seems to maintain something of a positive, constructive (or even revealed) outlook. Those working in the various fields and subfields of theology are for this reason still trying to assess the impact which such philosophical study has made upon its own reflections and propositions. The present work is but one instance of such an ongoing assessment.

The theological turn within continental philosophy was perhaps inaugurated by Martin Heidegger's influential attempts to overcome the lasting impact of onto-theology in the West—that is, to reconceive entirely the ill-conjoined Greek-Christian metaphysical legacy in order to critique the notions of logic or order that undergird the language-logos configuration that humanity has been so dependent on for its collective existence (and which the history of theology seems to confirm, as the subsequent investigations of Giorgio Agamben and

Roberto Esposito, among others, have recently noted). What Heidegger was trying to isolate specifically was what we often take for granted: that order itself, as the rationality of a given community and so the foundation for ethical and political interactions, is instituted through its ability to exclude or marginalize certain elements, and that such activities were predicated on, and legitimated by, certain metaphysical-theological propositions. In his analysis, the 'as' structure—taking something 'as' something in particular—is the foundation of our understanding, and is as such based on a logic of representations (logos) that thrusts humanity into an either/or dichotomy of types (the basis of all categorizations). Many of the dualisms that structure western philosophical and theological thought (e.g. necessity/contingency, sovereignty/democracy, grace/law, among others) are caught up in particular representational logics that structure our world and the actions of humans within it. Critiquing metaphysics, therefore, by definition, meant also critiquing the existence and function of such dualisms and the ways in which they structured the various coordinates of power within a given field (e.g. politics, economics, religion, society, philosophy and so on).

Heidegger's bid for the destruction of metaphysics began a longstanding initiative in continental thought to eradicate the influence of metaphysics—what Jacques Derrida, following Heidegger very closely in this regard, referred to as a 'phallo-logo-centrism' at the heart of onto-theology. Derrida too had sought throughout his lifetime to isolate, de-construct and point beyond such configurations, though not to a particular, concrete or historical form, but only to an empty horizon of justice always yet 'to come'. The Heideggerian assault on onto-theology was so influential that multiple philosophers (and theologians) immediately came under its spell and sought in their works to jettison any previously unconscious dependency on metaphysical propositions that likewise indebted one to certain politically sovereign, and often exclusive or violent, representational forms (e.g. such as a sovereign, omnipotent God who acts out of necessity and predestines every occurrence, but which really conceals human exploits for power, wealth and to defend the status quo).

As has been highly persuasive in academia throughout recent decades, a critique analogous to Heidegger's was put forth by Michel Foucault, among others, whose questioning of established paradigms of order (including the order imposed within Christianity through pastoral power) was fundamental to his archaeology of western religious thought and its ability to create 'abnormal' and 'deviant' types through the hegemonic order it helped cement as the typical western rationality. Christianity, in his eyes, had played a central role in constructing a dominant and moral narrative that gave order to the world, certainly, but which also confined the human being to a rather limited identity (e.g. in terms of sexuality, gender, race, citizenship and so on) rather than explore the possibilities of living in a state of freedom beyond such imposed logics. In this sense, both Foucault and Heidegger were attempting, like their mentor Friedrich Nietzsche before them, to overcome those metaphysical-theological constructions that had bequeathed a certain rationality to the West through established religious logics. In many ways, this Nietzschean trajectory brought about a sustained revaluation of all values in the West through what appeared at first as their destruction (or de-construction, in Derrida's favored parlance).

As is commonly discussed amongst those more critical of 20th Century or postmodern continental philosophy, these efforts to overcome metaphysics and the almost sacred bonds of normative order they have inspired have often left readers wondering if there were anything redeemable to be found in philosophical thought other than a permanent and negative critique of whatever subject was under analysis. Continental philosophy, for this reason, has often appeared to some as being either a wholly nihilistic exercise with no concrete goals of its own, an orgiastic reveling in an ephemeral, antinomian celebration of the end of all governing norms (Nietzsche's Dionysian exuberance, Foucault's sadomasochistic hopes) or as a pointing toward a horizon of 'better things' that will never actually appear as a reality in our world (Derrida's messianic deconstructionism). For some, then, like Theodor Adorno, philosophy was the space needing to be left permanently open so that the critical powers of thought might always be able to function? For others, like Georges Bataille,

the push for an excessive transgression of any normative order almost gave birth to a new sense of sacrality—one that held forth dramatic possibilities for liberation, though it seemed also never to deliver on its promises in the 'real world'.

The more recent work of the French theorist René Girard on violence and the sacred has given rise to what is essentially a parallel suggestion to this line of inquiry, though beginning with vastly differing methods, source texts and presumptions: communities formulate their sense of order or 'peace' through the exclusion of a scapegoat or innocent victim who is deemed to have transgressed a particular social-sacred norm or boundary. Moving beyond the mimetic (imitative) contagion that would posit a collective, unanimous violence as (for some) the source of sacrality in our world—such is Girard's thesis—means that we cannot locate the means of overcoming such violence in this world, hence the apparently transcendent quality of finding the means to overcome violence, order and whatever nonnative representation we are presented with. At the same time, that which overcomes such violence appears to us as a 'most radical weakness.") Hence, as a prominent Girardian and theologian James Alison has noted, our conceptualizations of order and reason, not to mention our cultural and political institutions, are grounded in (more or less) violent exclusions—a point that Foucault strove hard to make in a number of his writings." This claim is made, however, not to suggest that we are able to live without order— what Girard relates to the notion of `belonging'— as if suspended in a permanently antinomian reality (and what many critics of continental thought have generally take to be the main result of anyone following this seemingly nihilistic Nietzschean legacy). Belonging, in Girard's eyes, should be neither a univocal or unilateral decision, which is the mistake of both `right-wing and left-wing ideologies', nor something to be `thrown off at all costs', as some revolutionary theories suggest. What Girard hints at is that belonging is a complex phenomenon that involves something like a `relational ontology, as Andrew Benjamin has described it, that takes a greater and an ever more accurate account of the complexities and frustrations of identity and life. Such a balanced perspective typically lingers underneath even the

most boisterous philosophical critiques of normative order, though not every critic of continental thought, or even the continental philosophers themselves, are frequently wont to admit as much.

Seeing how Heidegger and Girard somewhat converge in their challenges to the concepts of order and logic within our world might help us to make sense of why someone as radical in their political and atheistic thought as Slavoj Zizek has recently been able to maintain something like a direct fidelity to both authors in his work. It might also help us to understand why so many philosophers—with a good number of presumed and stated atheists among them—might have taken such an interest in more overtly theological topics within the last 30 years or so, as the destruction of one idea of the sacred almost inevitably gives rise to possibilities for another form to reemerge.

Though the insights of Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and even Girard were generally not considered enough to merit them being a `religious turn' in and of themselves in the 20th Century, such insights have opened a path directly toward the religious upon which many other continental thinkers have subsequently traveled. A variety of phenomenological writers in the late 20th Century, for example, have found a number of ways to produce conversation on theological elements within human experience that have found significant overlap with pre-existing theological themes. The writings of Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean Yves Lacoste, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Michel Henry and more have all pointed toward phenomenological methods and conclusions that resonate deeply with specifically theological themes and, in turn, offer theological discourse the opportunity to reflect critically upon its own operations and positions. As I will take up at the end of the present study, such pathways have offered us some of the most significant philosophical-theological considerations in recent memory. In some ways this is the case because they often do not seek to overcome one side in a dualistic schema in order to endorse another, but because they seek somehow to preserve both sides—a point that frequently gets them labeled as too conservative or religious in their work, but which

may end up being too an often mistaken impression.

At almost the same time as such strains of phenomenology were pursuing theological topics, the various returns to the letters of Saint Paul became evidence as well that other strands of continental thought could likewise begin to re-examine post-Heideggerian attempts to overcome traditional metaphysics vis-à-vis historical religious efforts to restructure our relationship to Being. In many ways, these readings of Saint Paul became a way to extend the excessive transgressions of earlier writers, such as Heidegger and Foucault, into the domain of the religious, thereby putting them at odds with the phenomenologists in some sense. The short works of Jacob Taubes, Stanislas Breton, Alain Badiou, Giorgio Agamben and Slavoj Zizek all explored how Pauline thought, or Saint Paul's reconfiguration of Jesus' teaching, might be read as transgressive of normative identities and how this early founder of Christianity may have actually been exploring important philosophical themes in his otherwise ostensibly religious works. Such readings of Pauline thought have opened our eyes toward the antinomian flavor of continental philosophy in general (in Taubes and Agamben's readings in particular) as well as the creation of a militant subjectivity (in Badiou and Zizek).

Following fast on the heels of such examinations, the publication and translations of Heidegger's lectures on Paul, Jean-Luc Nancy's radical deconstruction of Christianity, Ted Jenning's efforts to reread Derrida in light of Pauline thought, Simon Critchley's attempt to establish the 'faith of the faithless', not to mention all the commentaries and critiques of this quickly evolving discourse, soon quickly sped this philosophical-Pauline trajectory toward a much more theologically-inclined audience that was eager to further deconstruct theological and dogmatic norms. In many ways, philosophers and theologians alike are still contemplating the consequences of such readings and what implications they hold, if any, for theological and religious doctrines, practices and identities.

Some of the most noticeable traits of these theologically-significant and philosophically deconstructive writings, especially among the

Pauline commentators, are the political elements that have been brought to the forefront of the general conversation. That is, the context wherein the 'theological turn' has occurred has swiftly been noted as simultaneously bearing a re-examination of the domain of the political at the same moment as the religious, giving rise to a unique focus on political-theological themes within continental philosophical discussions. Hence, it has become impossible to study the works of Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben, Jean-Luc Nancy, Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, Gianni Vattimo, Simon Critchley or Slavoj Zizek without reference to the field of political theology in some fashion. This reality has brought a variety of young political theologians into deeper and noteworthy contact with continental philosophy, including Jeffrey Robbins, Clayton Crockett, Ward Blanton and Noëlle Vahanian, among others.

Taking each of these trends together, a number of illustrative theses have come to light as a result of such philosophical 'turns' toward the religious or the theological, which I believe could be summarized (though certainly not exhaustively) as follows: firstly, the commentary on Pauline thought essentially boils down to a discussion of the structures of thought, identity and existence that very much continues the ongoing, and at times genealogical, deconstruction of metaphysics. For example, we are able to follow these interpretations of Paul in seeing how antinomian impulses are the necessary result of any given normative identity or order (Taubes), hence all identities are subdivided from within (Agamben), and yet the self makes an all-important (political) decision to remain faithful to the Event that disrupted its previous existence in order to constitute a new form of subjectivity (Badiou). There is little effort made in such writings, however, toward contributing a positive sense of what a community or identity should look like, as this falls outside the scope of their intended criticisms.

Secondly, there is a final concession, made most prominently by Agamben in his conclusion to his Homo Sacer series, The Use of Bodies, that the time for isolated 'turns' is perhaps over, as we are now able to realize that one cannot make ontological formulations without recognizing that they are at

the same time ethical, political, economic and religious. In other words, we are not able to isolate one aspect of philosophical or theological thought at the expense of another. For this reason, theological subjects will need to be scrutinized as much as economic or political ones as we continue to investigate western models of thought. Such a conclusion resonates quite deeply, it should also be noted, with current work being done on the complexity of systems and networks, such as we find in Bruno Latour's thought. For Latour, systems of networks operate beyond any hierarchical representations of order—a point that allows us to assess entire fields of study, and their presumed methodologies, anew.

Thirdly, there is an implicit recognition within numerous continental writers' works that our material reality is 'not all' there is to existence. Whether viewed from the perspective of the 'saturated phenomena' (Marion), the 'liturgical reduction' of our world (Lacoste), as the poverty of existence (Agamben) or as a rift within existence itself (Zizek), each author points toward an opening to that which goes beyond our perceived, or represented, reality. Each of these thinkers, though there are many more I might mention, implicitly follows Heidegger's reading of the ek-static nature of our existence or being-there (Dasein) that throws us beyond ourselves, but which also begins from within the limited confines of existence itself. It is for this reason that such work is still carried on underneath Heidegger's shadow, as problematic and contested as his legacy continues to be. For others, however, such an ekstatic nature of existence is also the very condition of our being that points us toward the divine—though not everyone will follow this path of speculation.

What I argue in the chapters that follow is essentially that any conversation between continental philosophy and theology must begin at the present moment by acknowledging how their mutual interaction has been impeded at times by the presumption that there is an impossible distance between the two fields, that one is concerned with destroying all normative 'sacred' (metaphysical) order and the other with preserving religious identity and community in the face of an increasingly secular society. Though not every

theological voice would share in such a view, to be sure, this perceived gap has functioned as one of the greatest obstacles to their mutual dialogue in the modern period. Hence, the apparent impasse between the deconstructive genealogists who endlessly ('nihilistically') destroy whatever foundation had seemed to be most solid under our feet and the communitarians who rely upon the decisionism of sovereign power in order to establish the foundations of communal identity (and all identitarian representations) is a very real and present tension to be sure (as many have staked their careers on fighting for one side against the other), but it is also a misunderstanding of the way in which dualisms can and should be addressed in our world. That is, it is the nature of things like order, thinking and representation which typically take dualistic (and frequently metaphysical) forms that must be rethought, though not necessarily abolished. Hence, the genealogist/communitarian tension, undergirded by the sovereign/ democratic dualism, as I will here describe it, must be perceived anew, not as something that can be easily overcome, but as the inherent and ineradicable way things work. Such a shift in perspective might allow us too, as it has allowed many continental philosophers recently, to contemplate different ways of dealing with dualistic thinking other than simply opting for one side over the other, or by impossibly trying to strike a middle position that never seems to hold in the end.

Part one will therefore begin to unpack this impossible tension by returning to one of its modern sources: the either/or dichotomy for faith championed by Soren Kierkegaard, developed in a political context by Carl Schmitt and philosophically elaborated by Martin Heidegger. My aim is to demonstrate how such a challenge to philosophical thought has been highly influential upon various theological strains of thought and how we might need to reconsider the dominance of such an either/or dichotomy. The second part pursues this either/or dichotomy as it has become embedded in both continental philosophical lines of thought, particularly in its genealogical or deconstructivist forms such as in the writings of Jacques Derrida, and in (theological) communitarian propositions. By tracing this dualistic

lineage as it manifests itself in each camp as a sort of political theology, I hope to show how we might be able to begin thinking differently about this tension and look toward more creative ways to deal with the inescapable reality of utilizing dualistic thinking in order to have a shared sense of intelligibility at all (i.e. linguistic, religious, political, representational and so on). In the final part, then, I am able to address the various and contested uses of dualistic concepts within theological and philosophical thought in both modern and contemporary history. By isolating and critiquing the political usage of such dualisms, I point to various efforts to move toward a nondualistic way of performing theology as a type of critical political theology working in tandem with continental philosophical insights.

My aim is ultimately to develop a methodology that attempts to assess the political implementation of dualistic representations and thereby to find ways to think both philosophically and so also theologically in a nondualistic manner while also conceding the necessity of dualistic thinking for representational purposes. It is my hope that such research will enable a more sustainable engagement with (1) the historical and political uses of such dualisms alongside various parallel attempts to think `nondualistically' and (2) the establishment of a theology that deals with the existence of complexity and comparison within theological matters in a more realistic manner. Though the apparent obviousness of the political use of dualisms remains, little work has been done to unmask the political theological dimensions of such usage and to point toward a more constructive, critical account of the theological in relation to the political. Taking steps toward formulating a nondualistic theology that more accurately measures the complexity and inherently comparative nature of theological inquiry is therefore an essential task remaining before us. <>

Dreißig Jahre kollegialer Beziehung zwischen der Japanischen und der Internationalen Fichte Gesellschaft haben im Band 46 der Fichte Studien ihren Ausdruck gefunden, einer Sammlung von

Aufsätzen auf der Grundlage transzendentaler Philosophie (Kants, Fichtes und Husserls) und klassischer Texte des Mahayana Buddhismus (und der japanischen Kyoto Schule). Ohne unvereinbare Unterschiede zwischen westlichem und östlichem Denken zu leugnen, finden sie ihre Grundlage in prä-reflexiver Erkenntnis.

Beitragende sind Kogaku Arifuko, Martin Bunte, Luis Fellipe Garcia, Lutz Geldsetzer, Helmut Girndt, Katsuki Hayashi, Sasa Josifovic, Michael Lewin, Hitoshi Minobe, Kunihiko Nagasawa, Akira Omine, Valentin Pluder, Raji C. Steineck, Johannes Stoffers und Fabian Völker.

Thirty years of friendly connections between the Japanese Fichte Association and the International Fichte Society have found expression in volume 46 of Fichte Studien. It contains a collection of comparative studies between European and Japanese philosophy centered on transcendental philosophy (of Kant, Fichte and Husserl) and classical Mahayana Buddhism (plus Japan´s Kyoto school). Without denying irreconcilable differences between western and eastern thinking these essays demonstrate that western as well as eastern thinking is based on the universal ground of pre-reflexive cognition.

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Approximate English translation provided for convenience only:
The nothing and the being: Buddhist theory of knowledge and transcendental philosophy edited by Helmut Girndt [Fichte-Studies, Brill, Rodopi, 9789004375673]

The present volume attempts to philosophically examine the Asiatic thought, in particular the Buddhist, with particular reference to the transcendental philosophy. Above all, I find this attempt significant in the point that Buddhism seriously comes into question here in the field of philosophy. So far, European philosophers have

rarely come up with the idea of learning from Asians, although Karl Jaspers was, in exceptional circumstances, one of the great philosophers as early as 1957, Nagarjuna, who is famous in the Buddhist world as the founder of all Mahayana Buddhist teachings. Although Heidegger's philosophy has something that comes in terms of content with Asiatic thinking, it did not happen that he himself dealt with Asian thought.

Even in the present, perhaps not many will be interested in this experiment. But this is not to be lamented, since the worldly reputation actually has nothing to do with the search for the truth, as all philosophers since Socrates say unanimously. Now it is time to start noticing Asian thought, not because of the exoticism, nor because of the friendly relations between East and West, but as philosophizing. In fact, for example, and in my opinion, Buddhism is of great value to the philosophical debate. I believe that this volume, in which the subject has not yet been treated systematically, is groundbreaking. Mr Helmut Girndt, who has long been interested in this topic as a philosopher and has finally realized the publication of a volume, I would like to pay tribute and gratitude for his great efforts.

Here, Buddhism is considered above all in relation to transcendental philosophy. That is not without reason. At the beginning of the *First Introduction to Science*, Fichte writes: "Remember yourself: turn your eyes away from everything that surrounds you, and into your interior - is the first demand that philosophy makes of its apprentice. It is not about what is outside you, but about yourself ". This sentence aptly expresses the spirit of transcendental philosophy. For the search for the basis of the possibility of experience in which transcendental philosophy exists is nothing but the search for the self. Transcendental philosophy took the Delphic saying "*gnothi sauton*" seriously.

Buddhism is also about the self. The words of Dogen, a Japanese Zen master, "To learn the Buddhist truth is to learn" are well known in Japan. In Buddhism, which sees the cause of all suffering in the "I," the self or self is really the only problem to be solved. For example, in the history of Buddhism, the Self has been questioned in various ways and,

accordingly, discussed in many ways in many doctrines.

In the attitude that the self is not the one topic among many in the search for truth, but is actually the only topic to be treated, Buddhism agrees with transcendental philosophy. This correspondence is certainly not accidental but has its basis in the nature of man. So, the reflections on this correspondence that will be found in this volume are not only culturally interesting, but also philosophically important. I hope that our little attempt can contribute something to the serious search for the true self in human existence.

Contents

Excerpt: It's been two generations, seventy years, that Aldous Huxley described the situation: "One hundred years ago, Sanskrit, Pali and Chinese were virtually unknown. The ignorance of the European scholars was an explanation enough for their provincialism. Today, when there is a wealth of more or less satisfactory translations, there is not only no reason for this [...] provincialism, but also no excuse; and yet most European and American writers of works write about religion and metaphysics as if no one had thought about these objects except the Jews, the Greeks and the Mediterranean and western Europeans. This spectacle of something that in the twentieth century can only be a completely voluntary and deliberate ignorance seems [...] absurd and dishonorable. "

Today, in the second decade of the 21st century, the situation has not changed significantly. Current representatives of philosophy in Germany, even if they profess to the ideals of the Enlightenment, see their field mainly from a historical and culture-related perspective; As a rule, they do not confront the universal question of truth, which rises above considerations of intellectual history, otherwise they would have long since turned to the philosophical ideas of non-European cultures. Undoubtedly, philosophical legacies are always also an expression of their time and their culture-related horizon of knowledge. However, a view of history does not come into view, which once led to a lively philosophy of life: the universal claim of

philosophical knowledge that transcends all cultural boundaries. From this, the usual operation in philosophical faculties criticizing probably only the friends and interpreters of the transcendental philosophy of Fichte are to be extended, because his estate had to first have priority.

In the meantime, however, the editorial work on Fichte's extensive estate has been completed and the time has come to dedicate a separate volume to the universality claim of Kant's transcendental philosophy, and especially to Fichte's essays, after some essays by Japanese colleagues in the Fichte-Studien have already begun studies on the correspondence between transcendental philosophical and philosophical works Buddhist thought, and thus their universal claim.

Fichte's early death made it impossible to perceive non-European philosophical thought. A first relevant work known to him in his lifetime, 1808, Friedrich Schlegel's On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians, does not seem to have particularly interested him. From knowledge, even interest Fichte's non-European thinking, nothing is handed down. It is known, however, that Fichte's transcendental philosophy met with a great response from Japan's first Western-oriented philosopher, Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945). And although Nishida, after the original coincidence of his thinking with that of early spruce, made a mental turn from the absolute ego to a Buddhist-inspired philosophy of the place, Nishida's thinking took the same direction as the Fichtes after 1803. Thus, the several met Decades later, in 1986, Reinhard Lauth and Chukei Kumamoto took the initiative to found a Japanese Fichte Society in Hiroshima for a soil well-prepared by Nishida and his successors. Only one year later, in 1987, the founding of the International Fichte Society in Deutschlandsberg took place. The present volume of the Fichte studies titled Nothingness and Being / Buddhist Theory of Knowledge and Transcendental Philosophy is the first of its kind. It documents what was taken for granted by Buddhist philosophers from the beginning: the search for the reason for the possibility of Experience. And, as Mr. Omine rightly emphasizes in his preface above, as the spirit of transcendental philosophy, it is nothing else as the Socratic search for the self.

…

A long time ago, in 1994, at a conference of the International Spruce Society in Jena, its founding president, Professor Janke, raised the fundamental question of West-Eastern philosophizing: the question of "Being" in the Western and the "Nothing" in Eastern thought and their relationship to one another. The answer to this fundamental question of West-Eastern thinking is answered by the majority of the contributions unified in this volume. The reason for putting them together was a conference convened in Kyoto in 2004 by the then President of the Japanese Fichte Society, Professor Akira Omine, and the desire to publish the results of the lectures given there. But the insufficient number of articles for an independent band left the publisher hesitant to do so Desire to comply immediately.

More than ten years have passed since that conference and only now, after gaining further qualified contributions, does the publisher believe that the intention at last can be met. We confirm the findings of Nishida that go beyond that not only the earlier, but also in the later doctrine, Fichte has basic similarities with the Buddhist theory of knowledge.

1 On Western Understanding of Mahayanabuddhistic Thinking: Lutz Geldsetzer

The article points out some ancient, medieval and modern topics of western philosophy which come near or appear to be identical with features of Mahayana-Buddhist thinking. Whether they are due to mutual contact and transfer between the two intellectual cultures or are independent parallel phenomena is, because of total lack of pertaining documents, a merely hypothetical question in want of future research.

2 Subjectivity and Transcendence in Anattavāda: On the Validity of the Old Buddhist Conception of the Anatta Doctrine in the Interpretation of Georg Grimm in Relation to Kantian Transcendental Philosophy: Martin Bunte

Topic of the essay is the central philosophical question of Buddhism of the onto- and epistemological status of the true self (skr. Atman). Based on the Kantian critique of the psychologia rationalis concerning the doctrine of the soul I argue in favor that the doctrine of the non-self of the Anattavāda should be interpreted in an apophatic way. This interpretation sustains the so-called "old-buddhistic doctrine" of Georg Grimm after which the essence of buddhistic thoughts on the true self lies in its unknowability and its inexpressibility, but not in its non-existence.

3 The Being in Fichte and the Void in Mahayana Buddhism: Akira Omine

The author points out that there is an essential difference as well as corresponden- ce between the idea of the absolute in Fichte's philosophy and that of the emptiness (sunyata) in Mahayana Buddhism. Both ideas treat the origin of the subject which goes beyond the relation of subject and object. In this point they are in agreement. But if we pay attention to the point that the absolute in Fichte's philosophy is completely closed and therefore includes no negation in itself, it becomes clear that it is, however, different from the Buddhist emptiness which consists in self-affirmation through self-negation. According to the author, the consciousness which works as a creator of the world in Fichte's system remains out of the absolute. In this sense, Fichte's idea of the absolute is insufficient as a principle of philosophy.

4 Fichte's Philosophy of Being and Nāgārjuna's Philosophy of the Void: Helmut Girndt

The central cognition that supreme knowledge cannot be of thetic nature is common to Buddhism and transcendental philosophy. Nāgārjuna 's dialectic shows remarkable parallels to Fichte's method in his Science of Knowledge of 1804.

5 The Pre-reflexive Reason of Consciousness: A Transcendental-Philosophical Interpretation of Nāgārjuna: Fabian Völker

The article recapitulates the different phases of the western interpretation of Nāgārjuna (2nd—3rd century CE) and aims, proceeding from a foundation enriched by a critique of them, to obtain elements of a renewed transcendental-

philosophical interpretation of the philosophy of emptiness (śūnyatā), such as was initiated by Fyodor Ippolitovich Stcherbatsky (1866–1942) in his approach inspired by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Ba- sed primarily on Johann Gottlieb Fichte's (1762–1814) transcendental logic and Wissenschaftslehre, Doctrine of Knowledge" a systematic reconstruction of Nāgārjuna's thought is undertaken. Taking up an insight of Bhavya/Bhā(va)viveka (500–570 CE), we suggest that the absolute (tattva) known by Nāgārjuna as pre-reflexive being-conscious is the concept-bound appearance of the absolute in the medium of prapañca (saprapañca/paryāya-paramārtha) and not the absolute itself dispensed from prapañca (niṣprapañca/ aparyāya-paramārtha), which as the unthinkable beyond of all thinking can be im- mediately realized in actuality only by the self-annihilation of thinking (prapañca- upaśama). This will bring to light the cognitive yield of Nāgārjuna's effort, which is of a transcendental nature avant la lettre, and which makes him a witness for the claim to universality of transcendental-philosophical knowledge, beyond Europe.

6 Fichte and Nishida: The Absolute and the Absolutely Nothing: Hitoshi Minobe

This article compares the theory of knowledge of Fichte with that of the Japanese Phi- losopher Kitaro Nishida and brings out an essential correspondence between them. Both philosophers are not satisfied with the usual epistemology which is based on the contraposition of subject and object, and consider it necessary to go beyond the sche- me of the contraposition because it covers the truth of knowledge. They both diagnose that the scheme of contraposition stems from the objectification by the I, and suggest that the objectifying I should be nullified. According to the view that the I can be nulli- fied only by the I itself, they take the selfnullification of the I as their theme. They think that the I does not vanish by selfnullification, but rather touches its own life which by its nature cannot be objectified. The Absolute of Fichte as well as the absolute Nothing of Nishida are characterizable as an unobjectifiable life which can be reached only by the selfnullification of the I.

7 Built on Nothing: The Logic Core of Nishida Kitarōs Philosophy: Raji C. Steineck

Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945) is considered by many as the most important 20th century Japanese philosopher for his ability to employ modern concepts and termino- logies, and use them to construct a unique system carrying a distinctly East Asian flavour. In this system, the notion of nothingness plays a fundamental part both in terms of epistemology and ontology. While this conceptual choice was also inspired by Buddhist sources, Nishida also drew on the theoretical philosophy of Hermann Cohen to elaborate, how nothingness could function as both the guarantor of unity and generator of plurality. Close analysis, however, shows that Nishida's appropriation of Cohen's concept of the me on as a necessary feature in the "logic of pure knowledge" sheds the constraints carefully put in place by Cohen. As becomes evident in a comparison between both thinker's analysis of sensation, Nishida's unrestricted use of Cohen's terms collapses precisely those distinctions that give sensation its meaning in the rational assessment of reality. This leaves Nishida's concept of reality without the critical potential to distinguish between different kinds of normativity and their inter-subjective validity. Nothingness, as Nishida uses the term, is not a logical concept, but functions as an aesthetic symbol invoking sublime ideas of a perfect reality that is one and whole, and at the same time rich and diverse.

8 Knowledge and Life in Selfhood: Kunihiko Nagasawa

When, after all doubts and despair not only in others, but in oneself, philosophy re- mains as the only possibility, then this path to truth can be no other than through the I that I am. „Whoever philosophizes, speaks of selfhood; those who do not, do not philosophize." (Jaspers) After all despair only selfhood remains for me. Being oneself is the reason of all despair and also the reason of all hope. All philosophy must begin here. The philosopher who has explored the problem of selfhood in the intellectual tradition of the West most fundamentally is J.G. Fichte. In the East we find he deepest investigation of selfhood in Zen-Buddhisms, particularly in the teachings of Zen-

master Dogen (1200–1253). Both refer selfhood essentially to action: Fichte on „ought" and striving, and Dogen on meditation, and thus they try to conceive the essence of selfhood. Here the basic relationship of knowledge and life and their relationship is examined for selfhood, and thus the relationship between philosophy and life as well as the pro- blem of what is philosophy.

9 Body and Action in Buddhism: Salvation through Self-Preservation: Katsuki Hayashi

Subject matter is the significance of the Buddhist insight into Self-Awareness of acting humans. It will be shown what kind of relation Self-Awareness has to Relief in Buddhism. Section 1 demonstrates the convenience of the "five aggregate" theory of original Buddhism for the phenomenological constitutional analysis, disclosing the body as act. Section 2 analyses the relation between act and body on the basis of the Yogachara doctrin. Section 3 pursues the determining ground of Seeing as based in Self-Awareness and the "Determination of Nothingness" as conceived by Kitaro Nishida. Finally, the Buddhist concept of "Nothingness" will be elucidated as Self-Negation of the Absolute, i.e. by the work of the Buddha-Nature of the Mercy.

10 The Way of Knowledge, Vijñānavāda and the Fichte's Transcendental Philosophy: Helmut Girndt

Originating in the north-west of India during the fourth century B.C. the Vijñānavāda oder Yogācāra school of thought vanished from India together with Buddhism around the year 100. At 640 A.D. the great chinese pilgrim and scholar Hsüan-tsang translated the doctrine of Yogācāra as Cheng-weih-shih-lun, Treatise on the cognition that ever- ything is knowledge only. The doctrine entails essential parallels to transzendental philosophy and even surpasses it in some essential details regarding Fichtes Ethics and Philosophy of Religion. The present paper is the first one comparing the most important philosophical doctrine of Asia from the point of view of transzendental philosophy.

11 Buddhist Persistence Perspective and Nietzsche's Nihilism: Similarities and Differences: Kogaku Arifuku

Impermanence is one of the fundamental buddhist principles and of Japan's typical view on life and world as well. The paper attempts to clear up commonalities and diffe- rences between the buddhist view of Impermanence and of Nietzsche's Nihilism, and to compare the buddhist view with that of Nietzsche. The paper contains five chapters. The first argues for peculiarities of the buddhist, the second for Nietzsche's view of Impermanence by looking at their common principle of Negation. The third and forth chapter attempts to find and emphasize the superiority of the principle of Negation as transition and development from the negative and passive standpoint to the positive and active. The fifth chapter elucidates essential characteristics of the buddhist view of Impermanence and Nietzsche's Nihilism, by showing how their principles of Ne- gation differ from each other regarding Naturality and Artificiality, Temporality and Historicity.

Part 2 Contributions to Theoretical Philosophy

12 Knowing, Creating and Teaching: Fichte's Conception of Philosophy as Science of Science: Luis Fellipe Garcia

Independently of the discussions on the development of Fichte's philosophy, there is something that does not seem to change throughout the more than a dozen presentations of his doctrine, namely, his constant concern with the meaning of philosophy. This concern is such a structuring one for Fichte that he even decides to replace the very name of "philosophy" by another one, less heavy in meaning and better suited to elucidate the nature of this particular activity that constitutes his own project. He calls it the Wissenschaftslehre. In this term created by Fichte three verbs can be found: wissen (to know), schaffen (to create) and lehren (to teach) — we would like to propose that Fichte's conception of philosophy can be brought out as the orchestrated action of those three activities: knowing, creating and teaching. The point here being not to say that Fichte had the idea in mind of composing these three verbs (wissen, schaffen, lehren) when he created the term Wissenschaftslehre, but only that

those terms offer useful landmarks for the exploration of Fichte's philosophical landscape.

13 Pure and Absolute Knowledge in Scientific Theory 1804-11: Valentin Pluder

Fichte claims that it is a severe misinterpretation of his philosophy if one understands it as an absolutization of thinking or consciousness. Even more misguided is the assumption that this special thinking or consciousness can be achieved by abstracting from all empirical evidence. Nevertheless the term "pure knowledge" is of importance within the WL and it means precisely a formal knowledge which has been cleaned from all empirical contents. Therefore, Fichte's claim shall be examined by contrasting the pure knowledge with the absolute knowledge in the WL 1804-11. The hypothesis here followed is that no pure entity like the pure knowledge can be found at the head of the system of the WL 1804. The highest point within the realm of thought, meaning the first entity of knowledge, is in fact the absolute knowledge, which differs essentially from the pure knowledge.

14 Is Theoretical Reason Itself an Idea? Fichte's Handling of Kant's Ideas, 1810: Michael Lewin

The object of this study is to examine the way in which the later Fichte handles Kanti- an ideas. In the first part Kant's theory of principles will be investigated in order to find out how many types of ideas he uses. In the second part the ideas will be assigned to the basic moments of Fichte's Outlines 1810. Not only the transcendental concepts and postulates play a key role in the Science of Knowledge, but also the methodological ideas of a theoretical and practical reason. While the latter are mentioned by Kant only in passing, in Fichte's later works they constitute a pivotal part in the reflexions about the faculty of reason.

15 Fichte on the Ego: The Individual and the Supra-Individual Point of View in the Berlin Lectures on the "Facts of Consciousness": Johannes Stoffers S.J.

The inquiry analyses how Fichte rejects the reproach of founding the Wissenschafts lehre from the perspective of the individual I-subject in his lectures about the facts of consciousness (Tatsachen des Bewusstseins), held in Berlin between 1810 and

1813. Instead it becomes clear that according to Fichte, the crucial instance of "I" has to be considered as transindividual. Its individualisation matters only as far as causal effects on material bound reality are concerned, while the individuals join again the absolute life's unity by speculative thought and moral acting.

16 Was Henrich wrong? A Fichte - compliant interpretation of Hölderlin's "Judgment and Being": Saša Josifović

Hölderlin's „Urteil und Sein" is certainly one of the most intensively discussed fragments in German Idealism. Since Dieter Henrich's influential interpretation from 1965 it is firmly believed that Urteil und Sein represents a key reference for a unique and "courageous attack" on Fichte's principle of philosophy, the „Ich" of the intellectual intuition. According to Henrich and his followers, Hölderlin argues that the principle of philosophy ought to be "Sein" instead of "Ich". In contrast to Henrich, I believe that Urteil und Sein does not contain any kind of critical remarks on Fichte's philosophy at all. To follow my argumentation, it is only required to avoid the confusion between the content of the intellectual intuition ("Ich") and self-consciousness ("Ich bin Ich"). <>

Essay: Knowing, Creating and Teaching: Fichte's Conception of Philosophy as Wissenschaftslehre by Luis Fellipe Garcia

Independently of the discussions on the development of Fichte's philosophy, there is something that does not seem to change throughout the more than a dozen presentations of his doctrine, namely, his constant concern with the meaning of philosophy. This concern is such a structuring one for Fichte that he even decides to replace the very name of "philosophy" by another one, less heavy in meaning and better suited to elucidate the nature of this particular activity that constitutes his own project. He calls it the Wissenschaftslehre. In this term created by Fichte three verbs can be found: wissen (to know), schaffen (to create) and lehren (to teach) — we would like to propose that Fichte's conception of philosophy can be brought out as the orchestrated action of those three activities: knowing, creating and teaching. The point here being not to say that

Fichte had the idea in mind of composing these three verbs (wissen, schaffen, lehren) when he created the term Wissenschaftslehre, but only that those terms offer useful landmarks for the exploration of Fichte's philosophical landscape.

Keywords: Philosophy – Wissenschaftslehre – knowing – creating – teaching

Introduction

There is a substantial debate among Fichte's interpreters on the question of the diachronic unity of his philosophy. In fact, going through the different versions of his doctrine, it is hard not to notice the conceptual metamorphosis taking place, starting in the philosophy of the Ich, Nicht-Ich, Anstoß, and Trieb, passing through the philosophy of the Sein, Dasein, Licht, and Leben, and surprisingly arriving at a doctrine of Bild, Erscheinung, Blick and Sehen.[1]

Independently of the discussions on the development of Fichte's project, there is something that does not seem to change throughout the more than a dozen presentations of his doctrine, namely, his constant concern with the meaning of philosophy.[2] In effect, "philosophy" as well as „Wissenschaftslehre" (Fichte's name for philosophy) is one of the conceptual terms that occur at a fairly high and equal rate in each and every volume of his Gesamtausgabe.[3]

This constant concern reflects quite well the spirit of Fichte's project of pushing further Kant's revolutionary act, namely, that of looking for the sources and grounds of knowledge not in its objects but in the very cognitive activities of the subject; this Kantian gesture aimed at grounding the possibility of science remains however insufficient inasmuch as, according to Fichte, Kant does not explore the conditions of possibility of his own philosophical enterprise, that is, he does not philosophize about his own philosophy, and, as a consequence, his Critique only presents its results without going to the roots of its own possibility as an activity of knowing – as philosophy. In other words, in pushing Kant's revolution further, Fichte is looking for a philosophy not only capable of grounding science but also capable of grounding itself; Fichte is thus aiming at articulating a philosophy of philosophy – therefore, it is no

wonder the question on the meaning of philosophy remains a constant leitmotiv of his reflections during his whole life.

In this philosophy of philosophy, many definitions of the activity of philosophizing are brought forward. Philosophy is thus: (i) "the science of knowing";[4] (ii) "a pragmatic history of the human spirit";[5] (iii) "the grounding of the system of representations accompanied by the feeling of necessity";[6] (iv) "the activity of bringing diversity into unity";[7] (v) "the activity that generates a new organ: the spiritual eye";[8] (vi) "a comprehensive look (einverständiger Blick)";[9] (vii) "the understanding of knowing";[10] (viii) a renovation of the Spirit in its roots;[11] (ix) an experiment always to be renewed;[12] (x) a medicine of the soul (medicinam mentalis).[13] The list could go on and on. It would be fruitful to confront these definitions with the transformation of Fichte's conceptual background, particularly the transition from the notion of system to formulas more directly connected to the notion of performance such as experiment or medicine. But independently of these contrasts, there is an underlying similarity in all of these formulas: in effect, from the "pragmatic history" of 1794 up through "the comprehensive look" of 1814, philosophy has been understood throughout this period not so much as a corpus of knowledge, but rather as a particular kind of activity.

This new comprehension of what philosophy really means is such a structuring one for Fichte that he decides, so as to avoid entering into disputes over words (Wortstreit), to replace the very name of "philosophy" by another one, less heavy in meaning and better suited to elucidate the nature of this particular activity.[14] He calls it the Wissenschaftslehre. In this term created by Fichte three verbs can be found: wissen (to know), schaffen (to create) and lehren (to teach) – we would propose that Fichte's conception of philosophy can be brought out as the orchestrated action of those three activities: knowing, creating and teaching.[15] But what exactly does it mean? What does it mean, in Fichte's vocabulary, to know, to create and to teach? And, last but not least, what does it mean to orchestrate these three activities?

Wissen – Knowing

To know; this is the aim of what we do, this is what we want to achieve; but what does it mean exactly? The word Wissen, as an important commentator of Fichte has remarked, is an etymological derivativeofthe Indic word Veda, which means vision.16 This remark is not a mere scholarly curiosity. In effect, it actually touches on one of the most important conceptual displacements operated by Fichte in Kantian philosophy: precisely the enlargement of the notion of thinking and knowing so as to make space for a different kind of thinking, one that is not reducible to judgement, being more closely attached to vision.

A progressive replacement of the term Erkenntnis by the term Wissen in the discussions concerning knowledge is a sign of this quest for a new notion of thinking. In effect, while the transition from the question of the possibility of Erkenntnis, the leitmotiv of Kantian philosophy, to that of the possibility of philosophisches Wissen as such is already introduced by the works of Karl Leonhard Reinhold,[17] it is with Fichte that the notion of Wissen becomes explicitly associated with the semantic field of vision. This approximation is already noticeable in the Grundlage in 1794 where Fichte reformulates the famous Kantian formula according to which "thoughts without content are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind"[18] into a new version in which: "the intuition sees, but is empty; whereas feeling [Gefühl] is related to reality, but is blind",[19] thus replacing the notion of "thought and concept" by that of "intuition" and stressing the point that it sees. This alternative kind of thinking, more closely related to vision than to judgement or concept (in the discursive sense of concept), could thus be called intuitive thinking (anschauendes Denken) inasmuch as the term Anschauung (intuition) derives from anschauen, which means to look.[20] Since this early replacement, Fichte never stopped exploring the semantic field of vision: intellektuelle Anschauung, Sehen, Sicht, Einsicht, Ansicht, Blick, Sehe, Licht, Bild, and so on.

According to this notion of knowing, to know does not mean to make a subjective thinking correspond to a given object (for example the "table is white" corresponds in the objective world to an existing white table), but rather to reconstruct the activities of the self that constitute what appears as given; in other words, knowing is generating a vision capable unveiling the subjective activities in what is objectively seen: so that the fundamental question is not as much "what is this?" but rather "how do I come to see it this way?" From that perspective, acquiring knowledge means to discover that what appears as given is a concrete visible trace of a certain deployment of cognitive activities; knowledge thus being produced not when a connection is established between what is said and what is given, but rather when what is given is grasped as a result of a genetic process that made it come into being.

This new way of approaching knowledge represents an extension of Kant's reformulation of the main questions of philosophy. In effect, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had famously affirmed that all questions of philosophy could be brought back to three: "What can I know? / What ought I do? / What may I hope?"[21] thus replacing the typical approach to knowledge inaugurated by ancient philosophy – and so characteristic of the Platonic dialogues – in which the philosophical questions had the structure "What is X (where X is a noun)?" by the structure "What can / ought / may I x (where x is a verb)?" Thus, while preserving the interrogative pronoun what, Kant implements three fundamental changes: (i) the replacement of the copula (ist), which is responsible for identifying objects, by the modals, which are related to capacities and their limits (können, sollen, dürfen); (ii) the introduction of the very notion of subject (Ich); and (iii) the replacement of a noun X by a verb x. Fichte, while agreeing that knowledge is more closely related to verbs than to nouns as well as closer to the limits of subjective actions than to the essential properties of objects, adds that it would be necessary to substitute How-questions for What-questions. For instance, if Kantian answer to the question "what can I know?" is "I can know that which is in space and in time and judged according to the categories", the Fichtean question would be: "how do I know it?" that is, how do I come to know space, time, and those categories? And, moreover, how do I come to know them as limits?

To be sure, Kant has a very famous How-question that structures the reasoning of critical philosophy,

namely "how synthetic a priori judgements are possible?" The answer to this question – the transcendental deduction establishing the categories extracted through the metaphysical deduction from a table of judgements borrowed from Pure Logic – determines how objects are possible. However, from Fichte's perspective it does not yet answer the question concerning how do I know those very activities that render objects possible, that is, how do I know those categories and those judgements and, therefore, how do I know that those are limits? In other words, from Fichte's perspective, the famous Kantian How-question cannot be separated from the question how do I come to make and to know precisely those syntheses? The central difference lies in the question of whether Pure Logic is to be taken as self-evident or as something requiring a philosophical genesis: for Kant it contains "the necessary rules of thinking"[22] made explicit in the functions of judgement and thus requires no further grounding,[23] while for Fichte, on the other hand, even the most basic logical relations, such as identity, negation and non-contraction are to be grounded in the activities through which consciousness comes to be.[24] It is not the aim of this paper to evaluate those philosophical positions, which would precisely suppose an external criterion from which to judge them;[25] the point is rather to understand which possibilities of thought (and of comprehension of what philosophy is supposed to be) are opened by Fichte's refusal of any external criterion of evaluation of knowledge, thus transforming philosophical Wissen into a genetic self-analysis of its own way of knowing.[26]

The centrality of the notion of seeing coupled with this essential reflexivity of Fichte's procedure (which is precisely a quest to problematize an activity while doing it – philosophy of philosophy) leads Fichte to ascribe to Wissen the task of generating an insight (Einsicht) of itself, that is, a grasp of reason through the very activity of reason, or as he puts it "a seeing of seeing [ein Sehen des Sehens]".[27] To see its own seeing, to know, means to mobilise all the power of attention so as to see deep into the schemes operating behind the formulation of judgements and behind the very constitution of consciousness;[28] it is only then that we will be able to recognize the activity of our own

cognitive activities as a determinant operator in the delimitation of the visual field in which objects can arise.

In formulating the question of the hidden schemes generating consciousness and its modes of apprehension, Fichte opens a whole new semantic field in which notions such as feeling (Gefühl), effort (Streben), drive (Trieb), aspiration (Sehnen) and satisfaction (Befriedigung) will gain a major philosophical dimension inasmuch as behind the very constitution of consciousness one will now find a set of forces pushing reflection in one way or another without a complete awareness of the subject. In treating these forces and hidden activities as prior to the constitution of finite consciousness, Fichte opens the door to the exploration of what we would nowadays call processes of subjectivation, since, in effect, if the I is the source of knowledge, it is only so inasmuch as it is pushed by – in the sense of getrieben, the German word from which the notion of Trieb is drawn – a force which it does not entirely control and that does not always translate itself into facts of finite consciousness.[29]

If "the revolution of thought" brought up by Kantian philosophy was to transform questions of essence into questions of rights and limits, Fichte's philosophy implements the transformation of questions of limits into questions of genetic self-examination of consciousness, thus resulting not in a judgement of what is legitimate or illegitimate, but in a reconstruction of the activities through which things are seen one way or the other. This Fichtean notion of knowing thus implies a change of posture with regard to the knower. Indeed, when facing an object, what we shall do in order to know it, is not to describe its external appearance or judge its legitimacy, but rather to look for its genetic origin that makes it appear that way. In this manner, when facing what I see as my body, or as an exterior object, or as another being like me, the question would be: what are the activities generating this very "seeing as"? The activity of knowing is thus much less interested in those things that appear

to be given, than in the processes generating any given by operating what we could call declensions of seeing: in effect, it will culminate in quite an

original conceptual practice in the history of philosophy, namely, the nominalization of different sorts of prepositions that will be converted into fundamental philosophical concepts: Durch, Von, Als[30] – that is, precisely those linguistic tools expressing the declension of one through/from/as another, highlighting thus the unity underlying diversity.

This notion of knowing articulates two traditions in philosophy: in effect, it brings together Kant's transcendental idealism, in which subject and object are intimately connected, and Spinoza's realism in which unity and diversity are intimately connected. To illustrate this point, if we take for instance Aristotle's famous definition of philosophy as the "science which investigates being as being",[31] we could say that Fichte's original insight is, instead of taking being as the central notion of philosophy, to take rather the as in "being as being". In effect, the as here captures precisely the declension operated by vision, showing, thus, that what is there can be taken as the declension of a unity. The pair what is there x unity represents the ontological tradition for which Aristotle and Spinoza are paradigmatic figures and whose fundamental problem is the relation between unity and multiplicity; on the other hand, the "taken as" introduces the opposition subject x object and a tradition that one may call epistemological, of which Descartes and Kant are great representatives. Transforming the as (Als) into a key concept is a way of bringing together the epistemic problem of the subject-object relation with the ontological problem of the relation of unity-multiplicity.

Knowledge (Wissen) would thus be this ultimate articulation of subjectivity-objectivity and unity-diversity of which we can have a visual grasp, an insight, but whose effective achievement would dependon the production of a complete consciousness comprising all schemes that condition the very constitution of consciousness, that is, the identification of the whole visual field of objects within the subjective field of spiritual activities – as Fichte remains realistic concerning human finitude, this indication remains an imperative whose total achievement is all but inconceivable. To know in that is sense to strive in the direction of an unachievable horizon of the total

identification of the activity of human spirit, its seeing, and the specific field that it generates without knowing, the field in which seen objects arise – the identification of the projection of the image and the result of the projection, of the spirit and the letter it generates.

Schaffen – Creating

The semantic field of Schaffen (creating, producing) is another one that acquires a remarkable importance in Fichte's project. Beginning with the Grundlage – which reconstructs the whole deduction of the categories from the activity of the schaffende Einbildungskraft (productive imagination) –, erzeugen, (to produce) erschaffen (to create), bilden (to form) will thereafter be explicitly identified as the operations mediating the passage from vision to language.[32] There is a natural gap between the correlates of our concepts and the genesis through which they come into being; in fact, as Fichte puts it, it is not a natural tendency of the human spirit to see objects as the result of a genesis to be unveiled – we tend rather to see what is there as a non-genetic given.[33] Now if we are to produce Wissen, to produce knowledge, it is important to use all the tools we possess in order to establish the naturally cut link between genesis and result, between spirit and letter.

The introduction of the notion of Wissen – understood as an activity aimed at grasping the very activities through which what is taken as a given is unconsciously generated – poses thus a major problem for philosophical language, namely: how can we grasp an activity that precedes the given and constituted objectivity if the representative language (what Fichte calls "the letter") operates only with already fixed objectivities? If, once we talk, we transform what we say into objects, then what new relation to language is to be entertained by a knowledge whose aim is not to represent an object, but rather to grasp the very activities thanks to which the field of possible objects is constituted?[34]

This suspicion regarding representative language is clearly formulated in Fichtean reflections on the origin of language articulated in his lessons given in Jena on Platner's Philosophische Aphorismen,[35] and later published under the title Von der

Sprachfähigkeit und dem Ursprung der Sprache.[36] In this text, Fichte tries to deduce a priori from the nature of human reason the necessary invention of language. He advances the idea of ana priori history of language whose Ariadne's thread is the drive (Trieb) of unity with oneself that pushes the human to constitute relations of communication when faced with signs of the existence of reason outside him; these relations of communication prompted by the Trieb of unity always take more complex forms until resulting in concepts through which the human will, for the first time, try to thematise his own conceptual activity – here is the point where one encounters the fundamental problem posed by philosophical language.

According to Fichte, this problem manifests itself in a very striking way in the notion of the "I". In effect, when we try to reflect on the source of the operations through which objectivity is constituted, we are led to the super-sensible idea of a Soul or an I as something that could not itself be an object; however, once we try to represent it, we put it outside of us, meaning that we "submit it to the laws according to which objects are represented outside us, to the forms of sensibility". In this way, Fichte remarks, we are led to "an evident contradiction [...]: reason wants the I to be represented as incorporeal and imagination wants it to appear as filling a space, as corporeal";[37] in other words, on the one hand, we must grasp what is incompatible with the language of representation, on the other hand, once we express it, we inexorably objectivize it – philosophical language reveals itself paradoxical.

Fichte's strategy for facing the problem posed by philosophical language is summarized in his own words in a letter to Reinhold, written a couple of weeks before the publication of the first part of the Grundlage. He says: "I advise the one who wants to study my writings to take my words as nothing but words and to try to introduce himself at whatever point in the series of my intuitions",[38] since, as matter of fact, adds Fichte in writing to the same Reinhold two years later, "my theory can be exposed in infinite manners" rendering it thus necessary that "each person think it in his own way in order to think it by himself".[39] Fichte's solution constitutes thus an exercise through which he

searches, by highlighting the independence of the fundamental intuition of his philosophy regarding the envelope in which it is presented, to boost freedom in the creation of new expositions. Fichte thus tries, as one commentator puts it, "to express his thought in different philosophical languages",[40] presenting his intuitions as "a polyglot".[41]

Fichte's strategy thus aims at breaking the inertia of speech so as to prevent the reader from becoming a simple "calculator [Rechenmaschine]" or "a parrot [Nachbeter]".[42] Doing philosophy as a conceptual polyglot is a way of preventing the letter from reproducing itself without the spirit, without the schaffende Einbildungdkraft that animates it. It is in this manner that a whole vocabulary related to creation will acquire its fundamental role in the presentations of Fichte's philosophy: schaffen, erschaffen, schaffende Einbildungskraft, schaffendes Gesetz, erzeugen, hervorbringen, bilden, abbilden, nachbilden, vorbilden, etc.

In this creative experience, what is important is not as much as to possess a conceptual framework capable of organizing experience according to, say, certain laws of organization of the given, but rather to push spirit towards the production of concepts capable of establishing the missing link between what appears as a given and their genesis in the human spirit. In effect, just as much as thinking is not reducible to judgment, philosophy (the Wissenschaftslehre) is not reducible to a piece of written work; it is related to much vaster regions of spirit, some of them remaining inaccessible to discourse. That's why the scholar occupies such a large dimension in Fichte's project, since he is the one responsible of exploring the plasticity of language formulating and reformulating concepts that the reader must use as stairs to build himself his own path to seeing his own seeing.

This means not only taking into account the gap between words and the production of knowing, but also considering the anchoring of those words in certain intellectual contexts; when conceptual production loses connection with its temporal and spatial roots, it follows a systematic reproduction of old schemes of knowledge with the result thatone becomes unable to see the genesis of her own field of experience. In fact, what is at stake for Fichte is not as much the establishment of an ultimate set of

concepts (be they categories as in Kant or a set of developmental movements as in Hegel), but the very activity of connecting intuition and concepts, connecting vision and language — that is why from Fichte's perspective it is much more important to keep this connection alive through a permanent reinvention of concepts than to come to a fixed framework whose risk is an eventual blockage of intuition within an inert linguistic structure.

Lehren — Teaching

The importance of the figure of the scholar in Fichte's philosophy acquires a considerable dimension. In effect, he dedicates to it three sets of conferences, one in each period of his intellectual development: 1794, 1805 and 1811.[43] Here again, it would be fruitful to explore how these presentations change according to the metamorphosis of his conceptual background. However, following the path of the argument here developed, I would like to highlight a certain underlying similitude, expressed in the fact that there is a parallel in two conceptual displacements: (i) one, already mentioned in the latter section, regarding philosophical concepts, that are not considered as tools to organize the given, but rather as instruments of creative thinking and (ii) another, regarding the figure of the philosopher, who is not to be associated withthe figure of the judge and of the tribunal, typical of Kantian philosophy, but rather with the figure of the scholar and of the university.

The scholar and his creative use of language acquires such a paramount importance in Fichte's philosophy, inasmuch as no one can replace another person in the activity of using concepts to produce a vision of his own vision; as a consequence, the only way to lead the person to this genesis is by offering him some tools in order to make his spirit fit and ready to move by itself in the labyrinths of the mind. The awakening of the eye to the seeing of its seeing depends on the development of a very specific pedagogy, in which the learning of a body of knowledge is completely secondary to the ability of exercising knowledge by oneself. Lehren (teaching) remains here, just as Wissen and Schaffen before it, essentially a verb; an activity that one has to exercise constantly in order to have the spirit fit and prepared to employ

all its power and creativity in rendering the conceptual letter plastic so as to prevent it from blocking access to intuition in an inert repetition of the same words.

Inertia (Trägheit) is, as Fichte puts it, the source of all evils [44] and it reveals itself in time and in space. In time, when for example ancient languages block the conceptual development of new ones, so that people working with those concepts remain stuck in a certain way of articulating and formulating problems. Fichte explores this issue underlying the harmful influence, in medieval and early modern western Europe, of the Latin language, which, according to him, had considerably disturbed and even prevented the development of new philosophical concepts — it is important to highlight that most of the great names of Modern Philosophy were also the first ones to write philosophy in their own languages (and not in Latin), thus being responsible for establishing a philosophical vocabulary in modern languages (Hobbes, Hume, and Locke in English; Wolf and Kant in German; Descartes, Montesquieu and Rousseau in French; Machiavelli in Italian). The same argument applies to space, as Fichte insists on the necessity of each linguistic community to cultivate the ability to create symbols of the super-sensible from their own vocabulary. It shows the importance of the situation of spirit in the very activity of producing concepts so as to avoid the danger of being hidden behind a conceptual structure produced elsewhere.[45]

These multiple evils caused by inertia can only be duly faced through the power of creativity boosted by a pedagogical project; in effect, when a linguistic community repeats inertly the same conceptual structures, it is doomed to formulate the same old problems, remaining thus incapable of grasping its own spatiotemporal peculiarities and the particular social and philosophical problems inherent to it. When conceptual creativity fails, the past will persist in the present and repeat itself in the future; and this past can be a local past or an elsewhere past as it is the case today in so many ancient European colonies.

The scholar is then, in a word, responsible for connecting the letter of concepts with the spirit of a certain intellectual ambiance; in order to do it, he shall unleash the self from given conceptual

structures in such a way that the self could for the first time contemplate what is given, not as given, but as the result of the forces of the mind anchored in a specific time and space. Such a pedagogical activity requires, to be sure, a methodology that must take into account that the pedagogical process depends intrinsically on the students, as it depends on them for the production of this new seeing, otherwise they would not themselves see. The scholar has to thus grasp the starting point of the students' reflections and try to incite them to produce images allowing them to systematize, see their own seeing, a movement thus analogous to the transition from seeing, as everyday life, to the seeing of seeing, as philosophy.

Fichte's constant reformulation of the Wissenschaftslehre contributes to this pedagogical intention inasmuch as it avoids the establishment of any fixed body of theses for the sake of a constant exercise of abstract construction and deconstruction in which the listener takes an active part; this very specific aim of avoiding automatic constructions and operations reveals itself when Fichte, for instance, explicitly states that his philosophy is not a book but something to always be renewed "according to conditions of time and communication";[46] in effect, the final aim of what is done is not the establishment of a certain knowledge, but rather the exercise of the activity of knowing – an activity in which the production of concepts plays the most important part. In other words, the more the spirit exercises itself through difficult and multiple concepts, the closer Fichte's philosophy is to its very aim.

In this activity, spirit has to progressively develop the ability of tearing oneself away from the given structures of experience for the sake of exploring the formulation of concepts for what is not immediately perceived. For example, to surpass the concepts of door, table, t-shirt, and to go further with concepts like artefacts, work, desire, drive, self, being, image and so on – these are naturally only examples – it is not necessary and not desirable that the spirit of the student satisfy itself with those concepts; he should only use them as a tool of exercise to develop his own capacity of producing new ones, preferably those in connection with his reality and history. Once his spirit is fit

enough and he is then capable of producing concepts by himself, the work of the philosopher, according to Fichte's view of philosophy, is done; the mediator can finally disappear since the student can now produce concepts according to himself and his situation.

Conclusion

In a succinct formula, philosophy is neither a specific science nor a generic one; it's neither a mystical activity nor a selective doctrine reserved only for those already initiated; neither the privilege of an intellectual elite nor an exoteric entertainment; philosophy is rather an exercise, an activity, that is, the apprenticeship of creativity in order to produce an eye capable of seeing its genetic activity in the very objects it sees. Learning to create so as to see beyond the immediately visible, this is a notion of philosophy that emerges from the work of a philosopher that has devoted his life to formulating a philosophy of philosophy.

Notes

1   Starting with Fichte's contemporaries, the diachronic unity of Fichte's doctrine has been contested. Schelling is probably the first one to state it clearly in his Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophiezu der verbesserten Fichte'schen Lehre published in 1806, where he affirms, in a polemic tone, that Fichte, regarding "the idea of God, the immediate knowledge of the Absolute, the blessed life, love" among other key concepts, would have "accepted some truths that he formerly refused" (Schelling, F.W.J.: Sämmtliche Werke, Schelling, Karl Friedrich August (org.). J.G. Cotta'scher Verlag, Stuttgart and Augsburg – hereafter cited as S.W.), which he would have done "in order to conceal the error and original deformity of his system" (Schelling: S.W., vii, p. 29), according to which, originally, (that is, in conformity with what was stated in the first version of the doctrine): "knowledge of the Absolute would be impossible for man; [...] nature would be an empty objectivity; the basis of all reality [...] would be the personal freedom of man; the divine would not be known". In a word, Fichte's doctrine would have changed from a philosophy that, for the sake of man's personal freedom, denies the constitutive importance of the Absolute to a philosophy that affirms it as a central concept. This remarkably clear formulation contributed to the formation of a split tradition in the reception of Fichte's philosophy: (i) one upholding this very thesis of the change in

the doctrine; (ii) and another that tries to grasp the unity behind visible alterations in the vocabulary. Wolfgang Janke gives a good outlook on the consolidation of both traditions at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th through the readings of: (i') the neo-Kantians of Bade (especially Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert) supporting the thesis of the change from an ethics-based theory of action to a religion-based theory of being (see Windelband, Wilhelm: Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der allgemeinen Kultur und den besonderen Wissenschaften. T. ii, Leipzig 1880, pp. 282–284); and (ii) philosophers such as Kuno Fischer (professor in Heidelberg by the end of the 19th century) and Max Wundt (professor in Tübingen in the beginning of the 20th century), for whom Fichte's philosophy expresses always "the same history of the development of consciousness", and the only change to be found concerns a "more exact and more profound comprehension of the progression the Doctrine of Science towards a Doctrine of life", a question which is already at the kern, as highlights Fischer, of the early version of 1794 (Fischer, Kuno: Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Band vi : Fichtes Leben, Werke und Lehre. Heidelberg 1900, p. 709) – cf. Janke, Wolfgang: Die dreifache Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus. Schelling, Hegel und Fichtes ungeschriebene Lehre. Fichte Studien Supplementa. Amsterdam, New York: p. 174. Without going in the details of this fruitful discussion, what this paper aims to do is merely to highlight a general driving line traversing the whole path of Fichte's project.

2   As remarks Ives Radrizzani, there are at least 15 different versions of Fichte's philosophy, he proposes the following list: „[i] les cours zurichois, [ii] le Fondement de toute la Doctrine de la Science, [iii] la Doctrine de la Science Nova Methodo (1796–1799), [iv] l'exposé de 1801–1802, [v] le Privatissimum de 1803, [vi–vii–viii] les trois séries de cours prononcés à Berlin en 1804, [ix] l'exposé d'Erlangen de 1805, [x] celui de Königsberg de 1807, les W.-L. de [xi] 1810, [xii] 1811, [xiii] 1812, [xiv] 1813, et [xv] 1814.", cf. Radrizzani, Ives: „L'idée de système chez Fichte." Actes du congrès : „L'idée de système", Paris, 20–21 March, 1998 (forthcoming). p. 50.

3   The Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften in an outstanding editorial work, which published between 1962 and 2002, in 42 volumes, Fichte's complete works, including many unedited manuscripts, lecture notes and letters, thus giving rise to a renewal of interest in Fichte's

research. The remissive index included within it allows the Forschung to explore, in a sort of topographic way, Fichte's conceptual vocabulary throughout his works – Fichte, J.G.: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Fuchs, E. – Gliwitzky, H. – Lauth, R. – Schneider, P.K. (Hg.). Stuttgart 1962–2012 (hereafter cited as GA). This paper is a kind a topographic exploration of the conceptual landscape of the Wissenschaftslehre.

4   GA, II/14, 209.
5   GA, I/2, 147.
6   GA, I/4, 186.7   GA, II/8, 8.
8   GA, IV/3, 365.
9   GA, IV/6, 483.
10   GA, II/17, 321.
11   GA, I/10, 196.
12   GA, IV/2, 26;GA, IV/19, GA, I/8, 222.
13   Von Manz, G. – Fuchs, E. – Lauth, R. – Radrizzani I. (Hg.): Die späten wissenschaftlichen Vorlesungen, Stuttgart 2000, v. 1, p. 3.
14   As Fichte explains in his First Introduction to the Wissensschaftslehre from 1797: „Da wir jedoch auf diesen unfruchtbaren Wortstreit uns einzulassen nicht Willens sind, so haben wir an unserem Theile diesen Namen schon längst Preis gegeben, und die Wissenschaft, welche ganz eigentlich die angezeigte Aufgabe zu lösen hat, Wissenschaftslehre genannt", GA, I/4, 187. [Since, however, we are not willing to engage in this unfruitful argument, we have long since given this name its name in our part, and the science, which actually has to solve the task indicated, is called scientific theory.]
15   Such a decomposition of the termis suggested by Peter Österreich and Hartmut Traub, for whom „das Wort Wissen-schafts-lehre in nuce das gesamte Programm der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie Fichtes enthält". They analyze the three elements of the term in a similar manner as we do, even though they do not use such an analysis to effectively reconstruct Fichte's philosophical project – which they actually do by means of the notions of "popularity", "scientificity" and "metaphilosophy" (cf. Österreich, P. – Traub, H.: Der ganze Fichte. Die populäre, wissenschaftliche und metaphilosophische Erschließung der Welt, Stuttgart 2006, pp. 104–107). In a similar way, Alexander Schnell suggests that a good translation for the word Wissenschaftslehre would be „enseignement de l'engendrement du savoir" (cf. Schnell, Alexander: Qu'est-ce que le phénomène? Paris 2014, p. 34). To be sure, it is important to highlight that the presence of the verbs Wissen and Lehren in the

Wissenschftslehre is immediately visible, while schaffen, in its turn, comes from the suffix –schaft which is a derivation of the verb schaffen through the meaning of Geschöpf and Beschaffenheit as the Kluge Etymologisches Wörterbuch points out: „-schaft. [...]. Stammwort. Ebenso anord. -skapr; neben as. -scepi, afr.-skipi, ae. -sciepe, ne. -ship. Ursprünglich Komposita mit ahd. scaf m./n., mhd. schaft f., ae.gesceap ‚Geschöpf, Beschaffenheit' (zu schaffen)." – cf. Seebold, E. (Org.): Kluge: Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. Berlin 2002 (24th ed.), p. 1401. The point here is not to say that Fichte had the idea in mind of composing those three verbs (wissen, schaffen, lehren) when he created the term Wissenschaftslehre, but only that these terms offer useful landmarks for the exploration of Fichte's philosophical landscape.

16 „Wissen: Das deutsche Wort Wissen bedeutet in seiner indogermanischen Wurzel, die es mit dem indischen Veda verbindet, ‚erblicken, sehen'", cf. Österreich, P. – Traub, H.: Der Ganze Fichte. Stuttgart 2006, p. 104. [Knowledge: The German word knowledge means to see in its Indo-European roots, which it associates with the Indian Veda.]

17 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously defines as transcendental the Erkenntnis „which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our Erkenntnis of objects in so far as this mode of Erkenntnis is to be possible a priori" (KrV, B25), that is, the Erkenntnis of that through which we first obtain Erkenntnis "properly so called" (KrV, A78/ B103); as a consequence, the Erkenntnis of Erkenntnis should have a different status inasmuch as it cannot already be the Erkenntnis properly so called. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, between 1789 and 1791, devoted himself to explore the grounds of the knowledge in action in critical philosophy and in general in philosophy as such; in this period, Reinhold writes notably "On the Concept of Philosophy", "On the possibility of philosophy as rigorous science" (published in the Beiträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen, that came out in 1790 and whose common thread is the concept of philosophy) and On the Fundament of Philosophical Wissen (an essay published in 1791, where it is question of finding the foundation absent „jeder bisheriger Philosophie, selbst die kantische" – cf. Reinhold, K.: Über das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens, p. 3). Those researches introduce thus the notion of Wissen as the concept to be attached to be peculiar kind of

knowledge in action in philosophy. The transition from the question of Erkenntnis to the one of Wissen in Reinhold is thus closely related to the transition of the question of the possibility of science to the question of the possibility of philosophy as such, including critical philosophy.

18 KrV, A51/B75.

19 GA, I/2, 443.

20 The notion of intuitive thinking (anschauendes Denken) is present in the works of Salomon Maimon, a polish Jew whose genius is so remarkable in the eyes of Fichte that he declares to have "a limitless respect for his talent" regretting at the same time that " nobody notices it" inasmuch as people "look down on him" (Letter to Reinhold in April 1795, cf. GA, III/2, 282). Maimon identifies in mathematics a kind of thinking that constructs itself immediately without the intervention of signs, a kind of thinking that he calls intuitive (anschauendes Denken) as opposed to symbolic thinking (symbolisches Denken), which is always mediated by signs (Maimon, S.: Die Kathegorien des Aristoteles, p. 255). Moreover, according to Maimon, intuitive thinking, inasmuch as it constructs its objects, is the only one capable of bridging the gap between thinking and being, something that the symbolic kind is incapable of, thus being limited to the communication of knowledge (Maimon, S.: Die Kathegorien des Aristoteles, p. 257). This very same contrast between intuitive and discursive is also present in the works of Ernst Platner, a philosopher and scholar of medicine, who was in all likelihood one of Fichte's professors in Leipzig (GA, III/1, 18; GA, III/1, 175), and whose Philosophical Aphorisms were the subject of nearly a dozen entire faculty courses given by Fichte between 1794 and 1812 (see GA, II/4). Platner introduces the notion of intuitive knowledge (anschauende Erkenntnis) "in opposition to a purely symbolic knowledge" and associates it with imagination rather than with discourse (Platner, E.: Philosophische Aphorismen, (§361) – cf. GA, II/4-S, 89). Both notions, that of construction – to be precise, reconstruction – and that of imagination, would be combined with Fichte's notion of vision to form an original conception of Wissen.

21 KrV, A805/B833.

22 KrV, A52/B76.

23 This does not necessarily mean that Kant presupposes Logic without further discussion, but solely that he sustains the self-grounding character of it, which, as has been argued, can be shown through an immanent reading of the presentation of the table of judgements in the first Critique (cf.

Wolff, Michael: Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel, Frankfurt am Main 1995). The plasticity of the Kantian text certainly allows for more systematic (and so to say more Fichtean) explorations, according to which the forms of judgement would be functions of the self-determination of understanding and they could thus be traced back to the principle of apperception (cf. Bunte, Martin: Erkenntnis und Funktion. Zur Vollständigkeit der Urteilstafel und Einheit des kantischen Systems, Berlin 2015). We would like to argue however that Fichte's philosophy is irreducible even to this last reading of Kant's Critique, inasmuch as Fichte's option of grounding logic on the philosophical activity will lead him to a different notion of thinking irreducible to judgement (or self-determination) and more related to seeing.

24   Fichte formulates the idea of a circle linking logic and philosophy inasmuch as philosophy must presuppose logic in order to give a discursive form to its principle, while this very principle must offer the ground to the deduction of the very rules of logic (GA, I/2, 255–256). We can resort here to medieval distinction of Ratio Cognoscendi and Ratio Essendi to shed some light in Fichte's point: if logic is the Ratio Cognoscendi of the most basic principles of philosophical reflection as it allows us to put them into words, the principles of philosophical reflection are the Ratio Essendi of logic, for there would be no logic without the very activity of reflecting.

25   Kant calls pure or general logic a canon of understanding offering the ultimate criteria of evaluation of knowledge (KrV, A53/B77); however when Fichte requires that even logic should be grounded, he is precisely questioning the possibility of any external criterion in the evaluation of knowledge, for this criterion would be itself a piece of knowledge.

26   Christoph Asmuth offers a very perspicuous articulation of the contrast between Kantian and Fichtean philosophies and of the philosophical possibilities opened by the latter. As Asmuth puts it: Kant's philosophy is based on the notion of judgement, since for him „wahren Erkenntnisse lassen sich in widerspruchsfreie urteilslogische Formen verwandeln" [True knowledge can be transformed into contradictory judgmental forms]; whereas Fichte's philosophy is based on the notion of consciousness, which „ umfasst über das Urteil und die Diskursivität hinaus auch Anschauung, Empfindung und Gefühl"[includes not only judgment and discursiveness but also intuition, sensation and feeling]. Fichte's transcendental philosophy leads

thus to an „Erweiterung der Philosophie Kants" opening the way to the exploration of the „Zusammenhang der drei Kritiken", since it constitutes a project of grounding „nicht nur Wissenschaft, sondern Wissen überhaupt" – cf. Asmuth, Christoph: „Von der Urteilstheorie zur Bewusstseinstheorie – die Entgrenzung der Transzendentalphilosophie". In: Fichte Studien, n. 33, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2009, pp. 221–249, particularly, pp. 223–224.

27   GA, II/8, 398.

28   In characterizing the schematism of the imagination, Kant called it "a hidden art lying deep in the human soul" (KrV, A141/B180); we can say that Fichte's procedure consists in taking this hidden art as the very motor of the conceptual genesis, including the categories, so that the aim of the philosophical activity is to bring into light those hidden activities.

29   This treatment of the t, finite consciousness, as actually derived from a certain force that is prior to the constitution of its own consciousness, represents a remarkable conceptual innovation that Jean-Marie Vaysse expresses in the following perspicuous manner: „le Moin'est pas substance, maisénergie [et ainsi] le langage de Fichte estproche de celui de Freud. Le Moi Absolu précédant toute conscience est donc le nom fichtéen de l'inconscient : comme tel, il ne peut se phénoménaliser que comme pulsion ou tendance [Trieb]" – Vaysse, J-M.: L'inconscient des modernes. Essai sur l'origine métaphysique de la psychanalyse. Paris 1999, p. 237. [the Moin is not substance, but energy [and so] Fichte's language is close to that of Freud. The Absolute Self preceding all consciousness is therefore the Fichtean name of the unconscious: as such, it can only be phenomenalized as an impulse or tendency [Drive]]

30   This nominalized use of prepositions is inaugurated by the expositions of 1804 where the Durch is associated with the notion of concept and the Von with the notion of Light, that which lies behind the concept; the Als already present in 1804 would gain a whole developed theory in the exposition of 1812, where it will be defined as "the absolute form of every seeing" (GA, II/13, 102).

31   Aristotle: Metaphysics. Tr. Ross, David. In. Barnes, J. (ed.): The Complete Works of Aristotle, v. 2., Princeton 1984.

32   The centrality of the notion of this semantic field to Fichte's philosophy can be symbolized by the fact that in the three major periods of his philosophical expositions it will play a major role in

the argument: thus, in the Grundlage in 1794 Fichte says in order to understand his philosophy, it is essential that „ihre Grundlinien in jedem, der sie studiert, durch die schaffende Einbildungskraft selbst hervorgebracht werden müssen" (GA, I/2, 415)[their baselines must be brought forth in each one who studies them through the creative imagination itself]; in 1804, where he divides the exposition in two parts, he identifies the fundamental cognitive act of the first part as Abstraktion whereas that of the second part is „einen durchaus neuen und unerhörten Begriff in sich zu erschaffen" (GA, II/8, 269)[to create a completely new and unheard of concept in itself]; and in 1812, it is question of raising to consciousness of the reciprocity of „Subjekt- und Objektbilden" that are themselves identical to „Bilden schlechthin" (GA, II/13, 109). [make upright]

33   Creativity is thus essential inasmuch as it has to generate an unnatural way of seeing, a difficulty highlighted by Fichte in 1812 in the following way: „Schwierigkeit der W.-L.: Ihre Aufgabe, zum Bewußtsein zu erheben, und sichtbar zu machen, was in dem gewöhnlichen Bewußtsein durchaus unsichtbar bleiben muß: eine Erweiterung der Lichtwelt, ein Sehen gegen die Natur." (GA, II/13, 49). [Difficulty of W.-L .: Your task to raise consciousness, and to make visible what must remain completely invisible in the ordinary consciousness: an extension of the world of light, a vision against nature.]

34   Christoph Asmuth, in his classic study of Fichte's philosophy between 1800 and 1806, divides his chapter on „Was ist Wissenschaftslehre?" in two parts: (i) one entirely devoted to a discussion about language, and (ii) the other to an analysis of the concept of Wissenschaftslehre. The centrality of language to Fichte's philosophy, even though, as Asmuth remarks, „Fichte hat sich niemals umfassend über die Bedeutung der Sprache und des Sprechens geäussert",[Fichte has never fully expressed the importance of language and speech] cannot be exaggerated as it is at the same time, as Asmuth perspicuously highlights, the origin of a problem in its powerlessness „das Denken [...] adequät auszudrücken" and the key to a possible solution in its powerfulness „das Übersinnliche in verschiedenen philosophischen Sprachen auszusprechen" – cf. Asmuth, Christoph: Das Begreifen des Unbegreiflichen – Philosophie und Religion bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte 1800–1806. Stuttgart 1999, pp. 153–169. [adequately

expressing thinking "and the key to a possible solution in its powerfulness" to express the supersensible in various philosophical languages.] We advance here precisely the hypothesis that the formulation of the problem of language is the key to understanding the necessity of this creative variation constitutive to Fichte's notion of philosophy and covered here by what we called the semantic field of schaffen.

35   As Fichte held his position as professor in Jena in the beginning of 1794, he announced 4 courses to be given throughout the year: (1) a course on theoretical philosophy; (2) a course on practical philosophy; (3) a course on logic and metaphysics that was essentially a commentary on Platner's Aphorisms; and (4) a course devoted to the duties of the scholar (for a complete list of the courses given by Fichte throughout his career, see Fuchs, Erich: „ Verzeichnis der Lehrveranstaltungen, Predigten und Reden J.G. Fichtes in chronologischer Folge". In: Götze, M. – Lotz, C. – Pollok, K. – Wildenburg, D. (Org.): Philosophie als Denkwerkzeug – Zur Aktualität transzendental-philosophischer Argumentation – Festschrift für Albert Mues. Würzburg 1998, pp. 59–66). The compilation of the notes of the lectures on theoretical and practical philosophy gave origin to the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (cf. the preface of this work on the Academy edition, GA, i, 2, 175–247, particularly, 182–186); the lectures on Platner contain a set of reflections on logic and language that would play a crucial role in Fichte's understanding of strategies to escape from the limits of representative thought; and finally the lectures on the scholar, published in 1794 under the title Die Bestimmung des Gelehrten and reworked under a new perspective in 1805 and 1811, give the tone of the profoundly pedagogical character of Fichte's project. We have in those first courses, in an embryonic stage, the three driving lines that, according to our hypothesis, could offer useful landmarks to orientate oneself in the movement of Fichte's thought: (i) a new conception of practical and theoretical knowledge in which (ii) creativity acquires a fundamental role in face of the limits of language that requires, as we would like to argue, (iii) a pedagogical conception of philosophy. Knowing, creating, teaching: Wissenschaftslehre.

36   The article was published in the Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft teutscher Gelehrten directed by Niethammer in March and April 1795 – GA, I/3, 91–127.

37   GA, I/3, 114.

38   Letter to Reinhold, July 2nd 1795. „Wer meine Schriften studieren will, dem rate ich, Worte Worte sein zu lassen, und nur zu suchen, dass er irgendwo in die Reihe meiner Anschauungen eingreife." – GA, III/2, 344. [Whoever wants to study my writings, I advise words to be words, and only to seek that he intervene somewhere in the series of my views.]

39   GA, III/3, 57.

40   Cf. Asmuth, Christoph: Das Begreifen des Unbegreiflichen – Philosophie und Religion bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte 1800–1806, p. 165.

41   This excellent expression is used by Ives Radrizzani and borrowed from Reihard Lauth: „Fichte hat sich vorgenommen, seine Gedanken „polyglott" vorzutragen, um einen Ausdruck zu gebrauchen, den Professor Lauth mit Vorliebe verwendet" – cf. Radrizzani, I.: „Der Übergang von der Grundlage zur Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo". In : Fichte Studien, Band vi, Amsterdam & Atlanta 1994, pp. 355–366 (p. 355). [Fichte intends to present his thoughts "polyglot" in order to use an expression which Professor Lauth prefers to use.]

42   GA, II/4, 44.

43   In Jena (1794), Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten; (ii) in Erlangen (1805), Über das Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit; in Berlin (1811), Fünf Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten.

44   „Dies ists, was wir voraussetzen: der Mensch werde nichts thun, das nicht schlechthin nothwendig sey, und das er nicht, durch sein Wesen gedrungen, thun müsse. Wir setzen sonach eine ursprüngliche Trägheit zur Reflexion und, was daraus folgt, zum Handeln nach dieser Reflexion voraus. — Dies wäre sonach ein wahres positives radicales Übel" – cf. GA, I/5, 182. [This is what we presuppose: man will do nothing that is not absolutely necessary, and that he must not do, penetrated by his nature. We therefore presuppose an original inertia for reflection and, consequently, for action after reflection. This would be a true positive radical evil.]

45   See Reden an die deutsche Nation, particularly the 4th and 5th speeches.

46   „Die W.L. aber ist keinesweges ein gedruktes Buch: sondern sie ist ein lebendiger, ewig neu, u. frisch zu producirender Gedanke, der unter jeder andern Bedingung der Zeit, u. der Mittheilung sich anders ausspricht" – cf. GA, II/9, 181. [The W.L. but by no means is a printed book: but it is a living, eternally new, u. fresh thought to be produced, which under any other condition of the time, u. the message is different.] <>

[The Forgotten Creed: Christianity's Original Struggle against Bigotry, Slavery, and Sexism](#) by Stephen J. Patterson [Oxford University Press, 9780190865825]

Long before the followers of Jesus declared him to be the Son of God, Jesus taught his followers that they too were the children of God. This ancient creed, now all but forgotten, is recorded still within the folds of a letter of Paul the Apostle. Paul did not create this creed, nor did he fully embrace it, but he quoted it and thus preserved it for a time when it might become important once again. This ancient creed said nothing about God or Christ or salvation. Its claims were about the whole human race: there is no race, there is no class, there is no gender.

This is the story of that first, forgotten creed, and the world of its begetting, a world in which foreigners were feared, slaves were human chattel, and men questioned whether women were really human after all. Into this world the followers of Jesus proclaimed: "You are all children of God. There is no Jew or Greek, no slave or free, no male and female, for you are all one." Where did this remarkable statement of human solidarity come from, and what, finally, happened to it? How did Christianity become a Gentile religion that despised Jews, condoned slavery as the will of God, and championed patriarchy?

Christian theologians would one day argue about the nature of Christ, the being of God, and the mechanics of salvation. But before this, in the days when Jesus was still fresh in the memory of those who knew him, the argument was a different one: how can human beings overcome the ways by which we divide ourselves one from another? Is solidarity possible beyond race, class, and gender?

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The Unbelievable Creed

On a warm, June Sunday in St. Louis I wandered with an old friend through the church where, earlier that morning, my children had been baptized. We came to the baptismal font, around which our family had gathered for the ceremony during the regular Sunday service. It was about four feet high, just low enough for my daughter to reach up and fiddle her fingers in the water and watch the droplets dribble back into its shallow pool. My friend, who had grown up in a secular upper-class home in Tito's Yugoslavia, had little knowledge of fonts and baptism and the goings-on that morning. So he asked, what does it mean, baptism?

The question gave me pause. When you baptize a baby, it is a kind of naming ceremony, like those found in many societies. When you are baptized, like I was, on the eve of puberty, it is a coming-of-age ceremony, a rite de passage—again, a common practice across cultures. Sometimes, though rarely, an adult is baptized. Then it signals a religious conversion, the culmination of a profound personal transformation. I rambled. "But what do you think it means?" he asked. It was a fair question. I had just seen my own children baptized.

"It means," I said, "you're a child of God." "So you're saved?" No. That's not what I meant. That is what most people assume it means. That is what most people think the Christian religion is all about: salvation. But that is not really it. Earlier that morning the minister had used words from an ancient, nearly forgotten credo once associated with baptism. "You are children of God," she said. "There is no Jew or Greek, no slave or free, no male and female." The words were from a letter of Paul the Apostle, who had taken them, in turn, from an ancient baptismal creed he had come to know through the Jesus movement. That is what it's about—being a child of God. Ethnicity (no Jew or Greek), class (no slave or free), and gender (no male and female) count neither for you nor against you. We are all children of God. He was skeptical. An early Christian creed about race, class, and gender? Unbelievable.

Why not be skeptical? What has Christianity ever had to say about race, class, and gender? I suspect that most people would think nothing good. Sunday morning is still the most segregated hour in American life. From the time African slaves first began to convert to the religion of their masters, whites prohibited blacks from worshipping with them—still true in most American churches until after the civil rights era. Then, in the 1960s, white churches began to "open their doors" to African Americans and—surprise—most blacks said "thanks, but no thanks." This wasn't major league baseball, after all. Most African Americans preferred to worship in the churches their ancestors had built of necessity, theirs, now, by choice, rather than join churches that had shunned them for more than a century. The story of race and religion in America is pocked with indignities large and small. So, while police departments, public schools, restaurants, the United States military, and baseball have all become racially integrated, America's churches have not. It may be that the church is the last truly segregated public space in America.

How about class? Does Christianity have anything helpful to say about class? Perhaps. You might hear "blessed are the poor" on any given Sunday, but more likely you will hear "blessed are the poor in spirit." The words of Jesus are assumed to be about your spiritual life, not your finances—unless, of course, you attend one of the larger, far more successful churches where the "prosperity gospel" is preached, where the word is always about your finances. If you believe, keep the right company, straighten out your life, and tithe, you will prosper. The millionaire preaching these words to you is a witness to his own truth. The faithful definitely will prosper. And what of those who do not? Well, anyone can read those tealeaves. In today's fastest-growing churches, the gospel is all about class.

And gender? Simply put, the church is the last, greatest bastion of gender bias in American society. The Catholic Church does not ordain women as priests and probably never will. Neither do the Orthodox churches. The largest Protestant denominations do not ordain women as ministers, nor do most of the historically black churches. Only

the small denominations once known as the "mainline" churches ordain women—and these are the churches that are in decline. My own United Church of Christ, the oldest church in the United States, which ordained the first woman minister in the mid-nineteenth century, now has fewer than a million members. Today the Mormons outnumber the church of the Pilgrims seven to one—and the Mormons are not ordaining any women. The church is the last institution in America where it is still legal to discriminate on the basis of gender.

So, an ancient Christian credo declaring solidarity across ethnic lines, class division, and gender difference sounded a little unbelievable to someone who had come to see the Christian church as more a symbol of social ills than of starry-eyed utopian dreams. And that these words could have come from the Apostle Paul—to anyone with a passing familiarity with Christianity—would have seemed more incredible still. Most people today assume that Paul is the father of Christian anti-Semitism, was profoundly misogynistic, and was authoritarian when it came to slavery. Let wives be submissive and slaves be obedient, he taught. Or so they think. And why not? Clear statements to that effect appear in the New Testament letters claiming the great apostle's authorship—Colossians, Ephesians, 1 Timothy, and Titus. But every beginning student of the Bible learns that these letters are pseudonymous, forgeries. Paul did not write them. On the other hand, Paul himself did indeed write the Epistle to the Galatians, including the remarkable words of Galatians 3: 26-28:

> For you are all children of God through
> faith in Christ Jesus;
> for as many of you who have been
> baptized have put on Christ:
> there is no Jew or Greek;
> there is no slave or free;
> there is no male and female;
> for you are all one in Christ Jesus.

The debate about the meaning and significance of this passage began already in the early twentieth century. In 1909, the German Catholic scholar Johannes Belser noticed it and its remarkable claim and argued that Paul could not have meant anything social or political by it.' It simply meant that everyone is equal in the sight of the Lord. But the Protestant Liberal Heinrich Weinel, who helped

to found something called the Freie Volkskirche (the Free People's Church), a hotbed of theological liberalism and social democratic reform in early-twentieth-century Germany, saw it differently. He argued that Galatians 3:28 was at the heart of Paul's radical social vision—even if his own nerves would not quite tolerate the fullness of that vision in real time.' Today, most scholars do not deny the radical social and political implications of the saying, but they also do not assign the verse directly to Paul. To be sure, Paul wrote it into his Galatian letter, but for reasons that I shall explain in chapter 1, most students of Paul believe that he was drawing upon an ancient creedal statement originally associated with baptism. Paul knew it and quoted it, but he did not compose it. That honor belongs to some early Christian wordsmith now long forgotten.

The credo itself has also been mostly forgotten. The current, state-of-the-art scholarly treatment of the earliest Christian statements of faith scarcely mentions it. A recent nine-hundred-page study of baptism in the New Testament refers to it only in passing. Again, why not? In the long history of Christian theology, spanning centuries and continents, this creed has played virtually no role. How could it? The church became a citadel of patriarchy and enforced this regime wherever it spread. It also endorsed and encouraged the taking of slaves from the peoples it colonized. And within a hundred years of its writing, "no Jew or Greek" became simply "no Jews," as the church first separated from, then rebelled against its Jewish patrimony, eventually attempting patricide.

But thoughtful and sensitive scholars stir studied the creed. I recall first engaging students with it through the work of Elisabeth Schuessler Fiorenza, whose book, In Memory of Her (1983), introduced my generation of scholars to the hidden histories of women in early Christian texts. Schuessler Fiorenza insisted that you had to read between the lines, and sometimes just read the lines critically and carefully, to see what years of patriarchy had obscured from view. This ancient creed is a good example of how her methods could bear fruit. If you read the third chapter of Galatians, you'll barely notice the creed. The chapter is all about faith, and how faith has replaced the need for the

Jewish Law. Paul brings in the creed to shore up his idea that the Law no longer separates Jew from Gentile—"there is no Jew or Greek." The other parts of the creed—"there is no slave or free," "no male and female"—are irrelevant to the argument and scarcely register. But if you pause long enough to examine Galatians 3:28 carefully, you quickly see its formulaic qualities. You might even guess that it was a creed of some sort. In the first chapter, I will do a methodical close reading of the text to unearth the whole creed from its textual surroundings. The point is, this creed is part of a hidden history, but not just of women and gender. Here was another take on slavery quite radical for its day. And "there is no Jew or Greek" was perhaps the most challenging claim of the three.

As I began to think about this creed more and more over the years, it gradually occurred to me that if it was actually a pre-Pauline formula, then it would belong to the earliest attempts to capture in words the meaning of the Jesus movement. There are no Christian writings older than Paul's letters. Therefore, anything embedded in these letters could lay claim to the title of "first." Was this the first Christian creed? Arguably, yes. What does Christianity have to say about race, class, and gender? Everything, apparently, at least originally. Before Revelation made Christianity a set of arcane apocalyptic predictions; before the gospels told the story of Jesus as God's persecuted righteous Son; before Paul could argue that human beings are justified by faith, not by works of the Law—before any of that, there was first this elegant credo and the utopian vision it contained. It says nothing about theology proper. It asks one to believe nothing about God or the nature of Jesus Christ, nothing about miraculous births or saving deaths, nothing about eternal salvation. It says everything, though, about identity. We human beings are naturally clannish and partisan: we are defined by who we are not. We are not them. This creed claims that there is no us, no them. We are all one. We are all children of God.

In Christ Jesus. Ah, the caveat! Daniel Boyarin in [The Jewish Gospels](#), the last scholar to explore this creed in great depth, would be eager, and right, to point this out. Boyarin, an Orthodox Jew, urged caution before we all go running off down the road

to the utopia where all are one. "There is no Jew or Greek" in Christ Jesus just means that there is no longer Jew. Unity under the banner of Christ may sound good to everyone already under the banner of Christ, but to those who are not and do not wish to be, "we are all one in Christ Jesus" sounds more totalitarian than utopian. Quite so. Boyarin was concerned mostly about Paul, who wrote these words into his Epistle to the Galatians, and about the long-term impact Paul turned out to have on Western civilization, especially for Jews. But again, Paul did not compose the creed. He borrowed it, and in so doing, he changed it, adapted it. For Paul, indeed, it was all about being "in Christ Jesus." But those words are part of Paul's adaptation of the creed, not the creed itself. On the face of it, that must surely sound like special pleading. Believe it or not, though, there are very sound critical arguments for saying this, which I will lay out, anon, in chapter 1 But even without these scholarly gymnastics, one can see that the creed was not originally about cultural obliteration. "There is no Jew or Greek" stands alongside "no slave or free" and "no male and female." These are not distinctions of religion and culture, but of power and privilege. In the world of Greek and Roman antiquity, free men had power and agency, slaves and women did not. As we shall learn, the creed was originally built on an ancient cliché that went something like this: I thank God every day that I was born a native, not a foreigner; free and not a slave; a man and not a woman. The creed was originally about the fact that race, class, and gender are typically used to divide the human race into us and them to the advantage of us. It aimed to declare that there is no us, no them. We are all children of God. It was about solidarity, not cultural obliteration.

I live my life on a college campus, where a claim like this is really not so remarkable. In fact, it is a place so comfortable and proud of its ideals of inclusion and acceptance that we have already pressed on into increasingly finely tuned postmodern explorations of the limitations of oneness and solidarity. In that sense, what I am about to lay out in the chapters to follow may seem just a tad quaint to those on the leading edge of this conversation. I am putting the finishing touches on this manuscript, though, in the aftermath of a

historic American presidential election in which the newly elected president rode into office by telling white, middle-class Americans who their enemies really are: foreigners, who are taking their jobs; the poor, who are soaking up their tax dollars on the public dole; and women, who do not know their proper place. This message found a special resonance with Christians, most of whom voted for him: 58 percent of Protestants, 60 percent of (white) Catholics, 61 percent of Mormons, and 81 percent of (white) evangelicals. White evangelicals made up more than 25 percent of the American electorate in 2016. Without their record turnout and overwhelming support, Donald J. Trump would not have been elected president of the United States. Suddenly, we find ourselves living in a white Christian nation, in which race, class, and gender do matter after all. Difference does matter. There is an "us" and a "them." How far we will go down this road to fascism is, for now, anyone's guess. Are we fools now to fear the worst, or will we become fools to our descendants because we did not worry more?

Whatever the future holds for our little world, with its big fish like Trump, it is time now more than ever to tell the story of this forgotten first creed. History reminds us again and again that it has always been easier to believe in miracles, in virgin births and atoning deaths, in resurrected bodies and heavenly journeys home, than something so simple and basic as human solidarity. Here, then, is an episode of our history from a time long past, when foreigners were slaughtered, captives sold as slaves, and women kept in their place, when a few imaginative, inspired people dared to declare solidarity between natives and foreigners, free born and slaves, men and women, through a ceremony and a creed. This is the story of that first, unbelievable creed. <>

Jonah: The Reluctant Prophet by Erica Brown [Maggid, 9781592644858]

In Jonah: The Reluctant Prophet, Dr. Erica Brown takes us on a journey over land and sea, in the footsteps of the Bible's most recalcitrant prophet. Melding traditional commentators, rabbinic literature, modern biblical scholarship, psychological sensitivity, and artistic imagination, Brown travels through the four chapters of Jonah's story tracing his call to leadership, his subsequent intransigence, his momentary rise to duty and his tragic resignation in an effort to discover God's ultimate lesson for him.

With insight and feeling, Brown provides us with a glimpse into the tormented soul of the prophet as he grapples with the notion of a forgiving God who is concerned even with the welfare of Israel's strongest adversary. As God struggles to teach His prophet to expand his vision and take up his divine mission, we come to understand the Divine call given to each of us to rise up to the possibility of greatness. After all, if God can change His plan, we can change as well.

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Preface
Introduction

Excerpt: My romance with the Book of Jonah began early. Its whimsicality and visuality, its brazenness, and its poignant emotional and philosophical landscape make this short book heady reading. I began studying the Book of Jonah most intensely during my very first year of teaching. Its riddles made an outstanding impression upon students, who never failed to wrestle with its language and theology. Only once did I encounter a student who turned away from its gripping plot. While teaching

in a gap-year program in a seminary in Israel, I found that a young woman who was registered for the course on Jonah had dropped out before the first class. "I studied this book already in ninth grade," she sighed. Jonah is a biblical book that can fascinate a reader for an entire lifetime and still not reveal all of its secrets. Boredom handicapped this young woman's curiosity. She closed Jonah's pages much too early.

Every year we read this small book; it beckons to us from its place in the liturgy on our greatest Day of Awe, and the repetition might clue the listener in to its relevance. The words of the text do not change, but we do. We bring a new and ever-maturing self to the Book of Jonah each year, so that it yields new subtleties to us again and again if we keep its pages and our minds open.

Prophetic Hesitation

The Book of Jonah, simply put, is misnamed. This is not an account of a prophet, although an unusual Hebrew prophet stands at its center. This is a book about God, a God associated with a particular nation, Israel, who expands His divine embrace to include non Jews, animals large and small, and vegetation. Nowhere since the first chapters of Genesis do we find, in so few pages, mention of the world's totality and God's utter and urgent concern for the whole of creation. Jonah will serve as God's ultimate foil in this magical story, just as the sailors, the king of Nineveh, and the animals become foils for the prophet. Jonah's personal theological crisis will become the platform upon which God models divine compassion, urging Jonah to become more godly, more like his Creator. God serves Jonah as parent, friend, mentor, and teacher. God's props — from a fish to a storm to a gourd to a worm — are the teaching tools by which God patiently encourages the prophet to confront his ugliest self, predominantly his churlish disregard for a universe outside of his narrow, parochial concerns.

The world around Jonah is in constant flux. A group of sailors became a group of believers. A city and its king transformed themselves. A tree grew and died overnight. Everything and everyone changed, including God — but the prophet did not change. For this reason, we have no idea what happened to Jonah when the words written about him end,

unceremoniously, as if in mid-sentence or mid-story. There are only so many chances given to a person who fails to believe in personal transformation, let alone radical collective change. But more than the transformations personal or collective that appear in the book, it was God's ability to change that was the source of Jonah's caustic resentment.

We read this book on Yom Kippur not because of Jonah but because of the God of Jonah. If God can change, we can change. If God recruits all of nature to fight human nature in the story of one individual, then surely, we can all overcome the barriers to compassion, the niggling resistance to being different than we are, and the narcissistic pull that keeps our own worlds small and limited. Jonah was unmoved, but perhaps we will read his book as his critics and be moved precisely because he was not. Maybe we will see in the God of Jonah, the God of each and every one of us, a God who cares for us intimately and personally, a God who marshals the world's resources for our reformation, who asks us questions that force introspection. Can we adjust, adapt, amend, refine, and modify who we are on this holiest of days because God also changes? Or are we, like Jonah, secret believers that nothing ever changes, least of all who we are? The God of Jonah changes; that should be motivation enough. It was not enough for Jonah. Will it be for us?

This book will travel through the four chapters of Jonah's story and divide them into four distinct phases of Jonah's mission. We will trace his call to leadership and then his intransigence, his momentary rise to duty and then his tragic resignation. We will conclude with God's ultimate lesson for him. We begin with Jonah's retreat from responsibility that culminates in his drifting at sea, a powerful metaphor for a prophet unanchored. Jonah will be released from this aquatic adventure to a city in the throes of a transformation, a city he inspires that fails to inspire him. Finally, we will see Jonah swallowed by a different force than a powerful fish: God's word. God will frame Jonah's experience and his conclusions through questioning and modeling compassion. God's prodding, His subtle hints, His overt directives, and His manipulation of events will still not change the

prophet but, carefully read, may change the readers of Jonah's story.

I have called Jonah the reluctant prophet. I could have called him the unchanging prophet, but we do not know how the story ends. Reluctance carries with it a sense of hesitation, the nod of the unwilling, the disinclined, the resistant, the oppositional, the unenthusiastic. All of these descriptors fit Jonah as he goes through different stages in his evolution as prophet. Even the few hints at his body language in the book are redolent with suggestion of helplessness and resistance: both his deep sleep in chapter i and his three days in the fish are often rendered by artists as a grown man in fetal position, hugging himself and making his world narrower and smaller. Whether tossed at sea or crouching under a gourd, our prophet lives alone. He cannot even stay in Nineveh long before leaving the city and building himself a booth for one far away. Jonah is the far-away prophet, always on the escape even when he is physically present.

The Jonah Enigma

Shipmates, this book, containing only four chapters — four yarns — is one of the smallest strands in the mighty cable of the Scriptures. Yet what depths of the soul Jonah's deep sealine sound! What a pregnant lesson to us is this prophet! What a noble thing is that canticle in the fish's belly! How billow-like and boisterously grand!

Father Mapple, the religious voice of repentance in Herman Melville's Moby-Dick, draws his congregants at the New Bedford Whaleman's Chapel to this small biblical book with its maritime themes. He knew his audience. No one could empathize with Jonah's plight more than his congregation of seamen. There was "a low rumbling of heavy sea-boots" heard as they shuffled into the church to hear his passionate plea for personal change: "We feel the floods surging over us, we sound with him to the kelpy bottom of the waters; sea-weed and all the slime of the sea is about us!" Like Ahab, Father Mapple was a believer in a singular truth — God's justice — that must be pursued at all costs. He saw Jonah ben Amitai, the son of truth, as the biblical protagonist who could best represent his message.

Perhaps Father Mapple picked Jonah as his subject for the same reason that we pick Jonah as an inspiring text to read at the end of the holiest day of a Jewish calendar year:

> But what is this lesson that the book of Jonah teaches? Shipmates, it is a two-stranded lesson; a lesson to us all as sinful men, and a lesson to me as a pilot of the living God. As sinful men, it is a lesson to us all, because it is a story of the sin, hard-heartedness, suddenly awakened fears, the swift punishment, repentance, prayers, and finally the deliverance and joy of Jonah. As with all sinners among men, the sin of this son of Amittai was in his wilful disobedience of the command of God — never mind now what that command was, or how conveyed — which he found a hard command. But all the things that God would have us do are hard for us to do — remember that — and hence, he oftener commands us than endeavors to persuade. And if we obey God, we must disobey ourselves; and it is in this disobeying ourselves, wherein the hardness of obeying God consists.

Father Mapple asked the ultimate sacrifice of his congregation: the abnegation of self that true obedience demands — true obedience that Jonah himself was hard-pressed to provide. We obey God when we disobey a personal impulse to ignore duty. But when Father Mapple speaks of Jonah's deliverance and joy, we cannot help but wonder if the priest actually read the text before constructing his lesson.

Tumbling back many centuries from Melville's New England coastline, we find ourselves in Narbonne in the early thirteenth century. Rabbi David Kimche (or "Radak," 1160-1235) asked a question about the Book of Jonah: "And it could be asked why this prophecy is included in the Holy Scriptures.'" Indeed, why? Radak puzzles over a book devoted to a "gentile nation of the world." He concludes that, it was written to be a moral lesson to Israel, for a foreign nation that is not part of Israel was close to repentance, and the first time a prophet rebuked them, they turned to a complete repentance from evil. And Israel, whom the prophets rebuke from dawn to dusk, still do not turn from their evil!

His comments sting with their truth. Radak, following in his critique, suggests that Jonah fled so as not to bring punishment on his people, thereby demonstrating more honor for the Israelites than he showed toward God.' He also mentions the aggada that Jonah received prophecy twice but not three times because of his obvious failings as a prophet.' Yet he softens the blow by adding another lesson based on Jonah's miraculous salvation in a fish belly twinned with God's compassion for Nineveh: "God, who is blessed, is merciful to those who repent from any nation and grants them mercy, even more so when they are many." According to Radak, this book highlights both Israel's recalcitrance and God's expansive mercy. Yet these lessons are commonplace in the prophetic literature of the Hebrew Bible and told in ways far more believable than this fanciful tale. The oddity of the book offers its charms and, at the same time, its unlikely details can serve as a distraction from its deeper meanings. Before we begin an intensive study of the book's four chapters, we must deepen Radak's question rather than dismiss it: Why is this book included in the biblical canon?

To strengthen our question, we turn to the scholar Elias Bickerman, who included Jonah in his classic work, Four Strange Books of the Bible.' One wonders what he specifically had in mind in including Jonah in his exploration of "strange books." Was it God's unusual demand that a Hebrew prophet moralize to an important Assyrian stronghold, which was, not inconsequentially, a sworn enemy of the Israelites? Perhaps it was the absurd assumption that one can run away from the Almighty? Then there is the book's fairy-tale depiction of the great sea monster that swallowed but did not consume the prophet and then conveniently dropped the prophet off on assignment. The outsized fish is not the only animal to make an appearance here. In contrast to the leviathan, there is the lowly worm that destroyed Jonah's precious gourd. There are also the beasts of Nineveh, pious animals that wore sackcloth and ashes to beg, as it were, for their own redemption. Nature too served as an odd conduit to God's will — from the midrashic reading that the tempest in chapter i happened only over Jonah's ship to the description of the harsh east wind and sun that

provoked Jonah to ask for his own death in chapter 4. Sandwiched in between the negotiation between God and Jonah over his future is the mass conversion in chapter 3 of an entire city from the simple utterance of Jonah's five words. Never in the history of sacred literature could a prophet boast of such success, but still Jonah turned away, moved toward, and then turned away again from Nineveh. Is there anything that is not strange in the Book of Jonah?

All of these unusual elements mean that the Book of Jonah does not sit comfortably within any genre of typical epic hero legends or myths of antiquity. Jonah does not fit into Joseph Campbell's neat evolution of the protagonist; he did not accept great responsibility with enthusiasm nor did he face difficult trials of strength and patience.' He did not kill a beast in a string of events that prompted his self-actualization; instead, he was saved by a water beast making him, on some level, an antipode to the mythic Greek hero or perhaps even a parody of such figures. Judged by ancient Greek standards, Jonah was meek and cowardly, self-effacing and unsuccessful, even when he opted to accept God's challenge.

From a biblical perspective, however, the details and narrative arc of Jonah's story are not unusual. We find similar themes and linguistic parallels all over the Hebrew Bible, demanding intertextual treatment, the shaping of meaning through an understanding of the relationships between one text and another. Many of these relationships will be explored in depth on these pages. The scholar George Landes contends that the Book of Jonah has no fewer than sixty-three places in the text where the author's deliberate or inadvertent withholding of information poses at least some interpretive issue for the reader and, in addition, thirteen places where narrative features create a dissonance in the logic or coherence of the story.

The narrative choices on the part of the author create abundant opportunities for rabbinic interpretation and the work of modern scholarship in filling in the gaps and in speculating on meanings and intentions.

Jonah's Movement: Ascent and Descent

Moving away from language, we find that on a visual level, Jonah's story shares beguiling horizontal and vertical dimensions with other biblical stories of ascent and descent. Jonah was told to rise and go to Nineveh. He did rise, but he went elsewhere. His ascent was the wrong ascent. Running away on a ship and being carried by a fish stimulate in the reader an impression of horizontal movement, particularly Jonah's sojourn aboard the ship. The horizon scanned against the water and sky creates an image of forward propulsion on the surface of existence. And yet there are also multiple vertical commands and rejections that take the form of ascents and descents. Jonah was told by God and the ship's captain to get up. But Jonah consistently lowered himself, as many traditional and modern scholars have pointed out. Jonah went down to Jaffa, down into the ship, down into the recesses of the ship, and then finally down into a deep sleep. Varying conjugations of Y-R-D suggest a continual movement downward. And because Jonah did not take the horizontal path to Nineveh, he would suffer the vertical descent to Sheol. By the end of Jonah's prayer in chapter 2, Jonah was at the very bottom of the sea, on its sandbars: "I sank to the base of the mountains; the bars of the earth closed upon me forever" (Jonah 2:7). Jonah's reference to Sheol in his prayer suggests even greater depths, the pit or belly of the underworld, and a continuous and desired brush with death itself.

Yet God did not allow the prophet to pursue this descent. Once Jonah reached the very end of the known world, God rescued him, bringing him out of death waters and back to a life of purpose and service: "Yet You brought my life up from the pit" (ibid.). Once the descent and ascent were complete, the text moves back to its horizontal dimensions: "The Lord commanded the fish, and it spewed Jonah out upon dry land" (v ʋ).

Several biblical narratives follow this similar descent/ascent pattern. The most obvious are the narratives of Joseph who was thrown into a pit, rose out of it, and continued to rise in an almost meteoric upward gradient. Later, after his seduction at the greedy hands of Poti-phar's wife, he was thrown into prison. Lowering his rising star

at this stage would have meant a sharp climb downward given the speed of his professional ascent. But Joseph, ever the favorite, managed to work his way back up in the graces of the court until he became the vizier of Egypt, second only to Pharaoh himself. His youthful dream of having the sun and moon bow down to him meant that early on he regarded himself as a person who could soar vertically to heights unimaginable.

An additional important descent/ascent narrative with literary parallels to Jonah is present in another four-chapter book of the Bible, the Book of Ruth. The book opens with a small, intact family moving from the rocky terrain of Bethlehem, in the region of Judah south of Jerusalem, to the smooth plains of Moab during a famine. Yet as we travel with this family, we find that very quickly, its female protagonist Naomi suffered one loss after another: the loss of her people, her country, her husband, and her sons to Moabite wives, then childlessness (according to midrashic tradition), and then, finally, the death of her two sons. If we trace the opening five verses of Ruth, we find an inverted pyramid of loss and grief, plummeting Naomi into a personal descent she blamed on God's wrath: "The Lord has dealt harshly with me. Shaddai has brought misfortune upon me" (1:21). In one of the most extraordinary uses of the term vatakom, she rose to find her way back home (v 6) — no easy task for a woman of the time who could simply have resigned herself to permanent mourning. This rise informs the spirit of ascent that permeates the book, eventually culminating in the genealogy of King David.

Jonah, however, did not end his eponymous book on a vertical incline of success. He moved horizontally away from the book's supposed center. He moved eastward. Eastward is never a positive direction, biblically speaking; this is true from the very first chapters of Genesis. Eastward suggests a movement away from goodness and

intimacy, from holiness and purposeful existence. It affirms that this is a book to be taken seriously as a theological struggle between human beings and their Maker.

Larger Than Life

Despite the sober nature of the material, modern Bible scholar Arnold Band contends that the Book

of Jonah was originally conceived as a parody —
and not only a parody but the parody of the
Bible.' The outsized natural phenomena are meant
to be noted as part of the conceit of an outlandish
story,' as is the appearance of several leitworts —
repeated words that offer thematic suggestions —
and the distortion of serious themes present in
earlier biblical works. These leitworts draw us
again and again to intentioned meanings,
something lost on the reader without a grasp of
Hebrew. They also point to the multivalent nature
of the book. Translations often use synonyms to add
sophistication to biblical verse but, in so doing, they
can compromise the simplicity and value of a word
written again and again, like a hammer knocking
meaning into the reader. There are key words that
appear several times in this book of only forty-
eight verses — seventeen in the first chapter, ten in
the middle two chapters, and eleven in the last.

The word that appears with the greatest frequency
in the book is gadol, or "great"; it appears
fourteen times in forty-eight verses, most frequently
to describe the city of Nineveh itself. Its size,
according to the book's second verse, seems to
justify God's mission that Jonah make this city's
reformation his chief task and responsibility. Being
large in both size and population, Nineveh was
worthy of God's attention and the time and energy
of the prophet. This refrain repeats itself at the
very end of the book as well, this time with an
edgy jab at Jonah. God told him that He Himself
invested in this city because it was an irgedola, "a
very great city," and then backed up this
information with its numerical population of
120,000 people and their cattle. The fact that
these were people who did not know their right
from their left was not a reason to ignore them,
God implied; rather, it was a reason for a more
intensified divine investment. Whenever God
mentioned the city, He added the adjective; in the
narrator's description of Nineveh in chapter 3, an
additional adjective is added with an ironic twist:
"Nineveh was an enormously large city" (Jonah
3:3). This is a translation of a more complex
description, ir gedola leElohim, meaning that it was
"a city that was great to God" or for God. God is
often referred to in liturgy as HaGadol, "the Great
One"; thus the implication is that this city was large
even by divine standards. This also offers a subtle

wordplay: not only was this an expansive city; in
this narrative, it was God's city. If it was God's city
because it merited redemption and compassion
then it must have been a large or great city to
God's prophets. Jonah was not to be an exception.

Nineveh, the word most often modified by "large"
in the Book of Jonah, is by no means the only
element worthy of this adjective in the book's
pages. The book tells us of a great wind, a great
storm, a great fish. Nature in the book is outsized
and daunting. To Jonah, who was trying to escape
forces larger than himself, everything appeared as
an overwhelming taunt to his powerlessness.

If the book seems unbelievable because of its
dramatic expressions of size, it is far from the only
biblical text that employs unrestrained imagination.
The talking donkey in Numbers was wiser than her
master (22:28-29). Two female bears killed forty-
two children for ridiculing the prophet Elisha (II
Kings 2:23-24). When David asked King Saul for
permission to marry his daughter, the king, who did
not desire the match, demanded a bride price of
one hundred foreskins of his Philistine enemies;
David showed up with two hundred (I Sam. 18:25-
27). If the plot of Jonah seems fantastical, it is
because it is, or at least, according to some modern
Bible scholars, was meant to be:

The storm at sea and the threat of death by
drowning recall the Deluge; the brief oracle Jonah
recites in Nineveh uses the fateful term used to
portray the devastation of Abraham's pleading for
Sodom. These three referents are from Genesis, as
is what might be termed a burlesque of the Tree
and Serpent story, Jonah's dejection over the
eating of a gourd by a worm. Even a superficial
reading, then, situates one familiar with the Hebrew
Scriptures in a literary world which is extremely
familiar.

This pastiche of familiar tropes mashed together,
according to Band, highlights the way the author of
the book uses parody to show the absurdity of
Jonah's proposition — that a prophet can flee from
God. The facetiousness of a prophet sleeping while
his boat was capsizing or a king who quickly
responded to a prophet's words and even
commanded animals to fast and wear sackcloth all
point to a book ridiculing Jonah. How and why this

book was transformed into the serious text it is today, according to this theory, represents a fascinating departure into the world of hermeneutics.

Another pair of scholars, one a theologian, the other a clinical psychologist, contend that Jonah was written as a criticism of the narrow-minded upper classes of Jerusalem, who saw in Israel the realization of God's exclusive love; it is "a protest against a well-to-do party in Jerusalem in the fifth century BCE which abused its power in order to `ghettoize' Judaism.' By demonstrating that the same God could care for the residents of the capital of the Assyrian Empire by sending them a Hebrew prophet, Jonah was dispelling this notion with his very person.

Jonah's Liturgical Use

With all of the perils that Jonah presents, we may have imagined there would be a rabbinic tendency to overlook the book or tuck it away where its dangers are less glaring. But the very opposite occurred. The Talmud mentions the Book of Jonah's recitation as part of Yom Kippur liturgy many centuries after the book was canonized (Megilla 31a). This book was not shunned; it is read on the holiest Jewish day of the year, right before the fragile opportunity for the day's repentance is shut with the closing of the day's last gate: Ne'ila. Positioned here in the late afternoon service of Minha, the text cannot help but haunt and taunt its readers with one question: What are we to learn from the Book of Jonah?

Perhaps the miracles, the exaggerated details, the drama are only a platform for the larger theological pull of the story which confronts us on this most sober and intense day of the Jewish calendar. If repentance is predicated on returning to God, then Jonah becomes the ultimate model for the returnee: the one who could have gotten away but did not. Jonah is each one of us, afraid to fail, afraid to shine, fighting God's will for us, fighting ourselves.

Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel sees each of us in Jonah in a slightly different light. He does not blame Jonah for his recidivism. Rather, he looks at Jonah as a symbolic Everyman who runs away from social justice and obligation. "Jonah is running to

Tarshish, while Nineveh is tottering on the brink. Are we not all guilty of Jonah's failure?" He relates this failure to the casualties in Vietnam, to Hiroshima, and to the concentration camps dotting Europe during the Holocaust — all places where humanity did not live:

> The new situation in the world has plunged every one of us into unknown regions of responsibility. Unprepared, perplexed, misguided, the world is a spiritual no-man's land. Men all over the world are waiting for a way out of distress, for a new certainty for the meaning of being human. Will help come from those who seek to keep alive the words of the prophets? This is, indeed, a grave hour for those who are committed to honor the name of God.

The prophet must be the one to see and hear injustice and alert all of us to it. But Jonah failed in this regard. He became just like the rest of humanity, which turned a blind eye to our responsibility toward others. Heschel points less to the intellectual faculties of the prophet and more to the prophet as a powerful advocate for justice, a person who has larger-than-normal ears and eyes, who hears and sees that which others refuse to hear and see:

> To us a single act of injustice — cheating in business, exploitation of the poor — is slight; to the prophets, a disaster. To us injustice is injurious to the welfare of the people; to the prophets it is a deathblow to existence: to us, an episode; to them, a catastrophe, a threat to the world.

Naturally, this reading is most problematic when we consider Jonah's behavior. He was delinquent. He failed to recognize the importance of Nineveh's repentance and his stubborn rigidity in the face of God's mercy seems altogether puzzling. When faced with an opportunity to redeem the known world, he ran away — far, far away from his calling. His run reminds us of the powerful words of the polymath John Gardner:

> Human beings have always employed an enormous variety of clever devices for running away from themselves, and the modern world is particularly rich in such stratagems. We can keep ourselves so busy, fill our lives with so many diversions, stuff our heads with so much knowledge,

involve ourselves with so many people, and cover so much ground that we never have time to probe the fearful and wonderful world within. More often than not, we don't want to know ourselves, don't want to depend on ourselves, don't want to live with ourselves. By middle life, most of us are accomplished fugitives from ourselves.

To call Jonah a reluctant prophet is to understate his rejection of responsibility. God called out to him, inducing him to go out to an ancient and vast city first mentioned in Genesis. Yet he eviscerated God's word. He rejected responsibility once again when expressing happiness with a small tree that required none of his investment after leaving Nineveh altogether in a fit of self-righteous indignation. He faulted God for His mercy. God's grace for others made life for Jonah unlivable — until he needed it himself:

> But Jonah was greatly displeased and became angry. He prayed to the Lord, "O Lord, is this not what I said when I was still at home? That is why I was so quick to flee to Tarshish. For I know that You are a compassionate and gracious God, slow to anger, abounding in kindness, renouncing punishment. Please, Lord, take my life, for I would rather die than live." (Jonah 4:1-3)

Since we only meet Jonah abruptly in chapter i, we do not know about the conversation that we missed. What could Jonah have said while still at home? This is a critical detail to his story. Perhaps it does not matter if he did or did not say anything. What matters is that Jonah thought he had stated his case and that God felt that his self-defense was indefensible. If a prophet seeks death rather than life in a world in which God manifests grace through concern for the entire world then the prophet is doomed. Life and death ultimately become the same.

Nothing illustrates this concern more — both Jonah's self-concern and God's concern for the created universe — than the very last verse of the book:

> Then the Lord said, "You cared about the plant, which you did not work for and which you did not grow, which appeared overnight and perished overnight. And

should I not care about Nineveh, that great city, in which there are more than 120,000 persons who do not yet know their right hand from their left, and many beasts as well?" (vv. 10-11)

There is God's world, and there is Jonah's world. This prophet desired his own personal comfort at a time of fragility and transformation for a very large city for which he had no genuine concern. He cared more about the temporality of a plant that he never nurtured. Not only did he lack concern for the people of Nineveh; he did not share the concerns of his Maker for the universe at large or beyond himself, a seminal feature of the Hebrew prophet. Pointing out the immediacy of Jonah's relationship with the gourd — "which appeared overnight and perished overnight" (v 10) — God also tried to teach Jonah that his sense of urgency and disappointment, as well as his prior happiness over the gourd, were not justifiable feelings, neither for a prophet nor for a human being.

The Book of Jonah closes as strangely as it opens, bookending the text in mystery. Jonah, which opens abruptly and without the usual details that create context for the prophet's leadership, ends with a question, the only biblical book to do so. God, in His displeasure with the re-emergence of the prophet's refusal to serve, almost dared Jonah to judge divine compassion. Who was Jonah to deny compassion to an entire city and its cattle when the prophet's very purpose was to obey God's will and act in God's merciful image? This lingering question also stays with us at Yom Kippur's end, prompting our own self-reflection on justice and mercy and how far our compassion extends.

We have no idea what happened to Jonah. Perhaps he re-entered Nineveh in contrition and continued his task. Or perhaps he was punished for his recalcitrance and disappeared from the story, breaking down the small booth he built for his protection while mourning the loss of the impossible tree that rose and died in one day. In keeping with the strangeness of the book, this plant was Jonah's only source of happiness in the story. This is the only verse to use a variation of the Hebrew root word S-M-H, joy, amid the high tensions, the desperate pleas, and the fear and anger of everyone in the book — Jonah, God, the sailors, the king of Nineveh, and the city's citizens.

Alternatively, perhaps this strange ending, to be discussed at greater length in a later chapter, meant that Jonah was no longer needed because he had accomplished his task. The city repented. He had completed his assignment. It was time to go anyway. R. Akiva, referring to II Kings 14:25 where we first meet Jonah delivering a prophecy in the days of King Jeroboam, contends that God gave Jonah a mission only twice, once there and once here (see Yevamot 98a). The great sage is, in essence, suggesting that Jonah, son of Amitai, a prophet, was not to continue in the family profession. His resistance is a lesson to readers who doubt the power of God's word or who are overcome with a depth of self-doubt and unable to carry out God's calling. Twice and not three times, implies R. Akiva. There are prophets who engage in their duties over the course of a lifetime. Others may be needed to fulfill only one set of orders to achieve posterity. Those who fail are not asked again.

In some psychological interpretations of the book, the choice was not God's but ultimately Jonah's. While the prophet was able to stabilize himself and fulfill his task, he eventually sank back into the darkness that had engulfed him earlier:

> From a psychological vantage point, Jonah behaves like an acutely depressed person — hopeless, helpless, and feeling as if he were carrying a contagious disease. His injunction to the sailors to dispose of him is a gesture of suicide. "Despair expressed the feeling that time is short, too short for the attempt to start another life and to try alternate roads to integrity.

Leaving Nineveh, constructing a booth to isolate himself, now burdened by natural forces that once pursued, cradled, and saved him, the prophet returned to an earlier self, too late to identify alternate roads to integrity. And yet, we read this book, with its open-ended conclusion, on Yom Kippur. The reading suggests that it is indeed never too late to identify alternate roads to integrity, authenticity, and intimacy with God, especially when God models change with His own behavior. We may give up on ourselves. God, however, does not give up on us. <>

The Prodigal Prophet: Jonah and the Mystery of God's Mercy by Timothy Keller [Viking, 9780735222069]

An angry prophet. A feared and loathsome enemy. A devastating storm. And the surprising message of a merciful God to his people.

The story of Jonah is one of the most well-known parables in the Bible. It is also the most misunderstood. Many people, even those who are nonreligious, are familiar with Jonah: A rebellious prophet who defies God and is swallowed by a whale. But there's much more to Jonah's story than most of us realize.

In The Prodigal Prophet, pastor and New York Times bestselling author Timothy Keller reveals the hidden depths within the book of Jonah. Keller makes the case that Jonah was one of the worst prophets in the entire Bible. And yet there are unmistakably clear connections between Jonah, the prodigal son, and Jesus. Jesus in fact saw himself in Jonah. How could one of the most defiant and disobedient prophets in the Bible be compared to Jesus?

Jonah's journey also doesn't end when he is freed from the belly of the fish. There is an entire second half to his story--but it is left unresolved within the text of the Bible. Why does the book of Jonah end on what is essentially a cliffhanger? In these pages, Timothy Keller provides an answer to the extraordinary conclusion of this biblical parable--and shares the powerful Christian message at the heart of Jonah's story.

Prodigal Prophet

Like most people raised in a churchgoing home, I have been aware of the story of Jonah since childhood. As a minister who teaches the Bible, however, I have gone through several stages of puzzlement and wonder at this short book. The number of themes is a challenge for the interpreter. It seems to be about so many things.

Is it about race and nationalism, since Jonah seems to be more concerned over his nation's military security than over a city of spiritually lost people? Is it about God's call to mission, since Jonah at first flees from the call and later goes but regrets it? Is it about the struggles believers have to obey and trust in God? Yes to all those—and more. A mountain of scholarship exists about the book of Jonah that reveals the richness of the story, the many layers of meaning, and the varied applicability of it to so much of human life and thought.

I discovered that "varied applicability" as I preached through the book of Jonah verse by verse three times in my ministry. The first time was at my first church in a small, blue-collar town in the South. Ten years later I preached through it to several hundred young, single professionals in Manhattan. Then, a decade after that, I preached through Jonah on the Sundays immediately after the 9/11 tragedy in New York City. In each case the audience's cultural location and personal needs were radically different, yet the text of Jonah was more than up to the task of powerfully addressing them. Many friends have told me over the years

that the Jonah sermons they heard were life changing.

The narrative of Jonah seduces the reader into thinking of it as a simple fable, with the account of the great fish as the dramatic, if implausible, high point. Careful readers, however, find it to be an ingenious and artfully crafted work of literature. Its four chapters recount two incidents. In chapters 1 and 2 Jonah is given a command from God but fails to obey it; and in chapters 3 and 4 he is given the command again and this time carries it out. The two accounts are laid out in almost completely parallel patterns.

	JONAH'S PARALLELISMS	
SCENE 1		SCENE 2
Jonah, the pagans, and the sea		Jonah, the pagans, and the city
	JONAH AND GOD'S WORD	
1:1 God's Word comes to Jonah		3:1 God's Word comes to Jonah
1:2 The message to be conveyed		3:2 The message to be conveyed
1:3 The response of Jonah		3:3 The response of Jonah
	JONAH AND GOD'S WORLD	
1:4 The word of warning		3:4 The word of warning
1:5 The response of the pagans		3:5 The response of the pagans
1:6 The response of the pagan leader		3:6 The response of the pagan leader
1:7ff How the pagans' response was ultimately better than Jonah's		3:7ff How the pagans' response was ultimately better than Jonah's

	JONAH AND GOD'S GRACE	
2:1-10 How God taught grace to Jonah through the plant		4:1-10 How God taught grace to Jonah through the fish

Despite the literary sophistication of the text, many modern readers still dismiss the work because the text tells us that Jonah was saved from the storm when swallowed by a "great fish" (Jonah 1:17). How you respond to this will depend on how you read the rest of the Bible. If you accept the existence of God and the resurrection of Christ (a far greater miracle), then there is nothing particularly difficult about reading Jonah literally. Certainly many people today believe all miracles are impossible, but that skepticism is just that—a belief that itself cannot be proven. Not only that, but the text does not show evidence of the author having made up the miracle account. A fiction writer ordinarily adds supernatural elements in order to create excitement or spectacle and to capture reader attention, but this writer doesn't capitalize on the event at all in that way. The fish is mentioned only in two brief verses and there are no descriptive details. It is reported more as a simple fact of what happened.' So let's not get distracted by the fish.

The careful structure of the book reveals nuances of the author's message. Both episodes show how Jonah, a staunch religious believer, regards and relates to people who are racially and religiously different from him. The book of Jonah yields many insights about God's love for societies and people beyond the community of believers; about his opposition to toxic nationalism and disdain for other races; and about how to be "in mission" in the world despite the subtle and unavoidable power of idolatry in our own lives and hearts. Grasping these insights can make us bridge builders, peacemakers, and agents of reconciliation in the world. Such people are the need of the hour.

Yet to understand all of these lessons for our social relationships, we have to see that the book's main teaching is not sociological but theological. Jonah wants a God of his own making, a God who simply smites the bad people, for instance, the wicked Ninevites and blesses the good people, for instance, Jonah and his countrymen. When the real God—not Jonah's counterfeit—keeps showing up, Jonah is thrown into fury or despair. Jonah finds the real God to be an enigma because he cannot reconcile the mercy of God

with his justice. How, Jonah asks, can God be merciful and forgiving to people who have done such violence and evil? How can God be both merciful and just?

That question is not answered in the book of Jonah. As part of the entire Bible, however, the book of Jonah is like a chapter that drives the Scripture's overall plotline forward. It teaches us to look ahead to how God saved the world through the one who called himself the ultimate Jonah (Matthew 12:41) so that he could be both just and the justifier of those who believe (Romans 3:26). Only when we readers fully grasp this gospel will we be neither cruel exploiters like the Ninevites nor Pharisaical believers like Jonah, but rather Spirit-changed, Christ-like women and men.

Many students of the book have noticed that in the first half Jonah plays the "prodigal son" of Jesus's famous parable (Luke 15:11-24), who ran from his father. In the second half of the book, however, Jonah is like the "older brother" (Luke 15:25-32), who obeys his father but berates him for his graciousness to repentant sinners. The parable ends with a question from the father to the Pharisaical son, just as the book of Jonah ends with a question to the Pharisaical prophet. The parallel between the two stories, which Jesus himself may have had in mind, is the reason for the title of this book, The Prodigal Prophet. <>

Stilling the Mind: Shamatha Teachings from Dudjom Lingpa's Vajra Essence by B. Alan Wallace and edited Brian Hodel [Wisdom Publications, 9780861716906]

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Excerpt: Students of Tibetan Buddhism in the West have been extremely fortunate in recent decades to receive teachings from great lamas who were trained in Tibet before the Chinese Communist occupation. These superb teachers include the Dalai Lama, the Sixteenth Karmapa, Düdjom Rinpoche, Sakya Trizin Rinpoche, and many other great masters. There has also been a gradual increase in the number of texts from this tradition available in Western languages, as more and more students have learned the art of translation. As a result, we are now seeing a significant number of Westerners who have themselves become qualified teachers of Tibetan Buddhism, as well as a younger generation of Tibetan lamas who were educated in India and other regions of the Tibetan diaspora.

Despite these exceptionally favorable circumstances, it remains difficult for us to properly contextualize the teachings we receive and to put them into practice effectively. Tibetan teachers, as wise, experienced, and enthusiastic as they often are, and Western students—many of them willing to make great sacrifices to practice Dharma—are still, culturally speaking, worlds apart. Keep in mind that Tibetan Buddhism began its development in the eighth century and is itself an offshoot of Indian Buddhism, which began with Shakyamuni Buddha around 500 B.C.E. The distinctive qualities of these traditional Asian cultures are quite different from those of the modern world in which we live today. It took roughly four hundred years for Indian Buddhism to morph into Tibetan Buddhism.

Now the infusion of Tibetan Buddhism into today's global setting—the first globalization of Buddhism in its entire 2,500-year history-is taking place at a breathtaking pace.

The Buddhist texts and commentaries presented to people today were initially geared for the lives, and especially the psyches, of ancient, Asian students of Dharma. The cultural context of a second-century Indian or even a nineteenth-century Tibetan has very little in common with our globalized world of jet planes, cell phones, and the Internet. Certainly we can gain a great deal from reading such timeless classics as Shantideva's Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life or Patrül Rinpoche's Words of My Perfect Teacher. Great human and universal truths are expressed there that apply to all human cultures. At the level of particulars, however, Shantideva and Patrül Rinpoche were speaking primarily to students with views, values, and lifestyles radically different from ours.

Therefore, as a Western teacher of Dharma who has had the great good fortune, over more than forty years, to study with a number of eminent Tibetan Buddhist teachers, I have tried to mold my commentary on the [Vajra Essence](#) to the Western psyche. That, after all, is what I myself had to do in order to gain some understanding of Tibetan Buddhism. I have addressed a number of issues that often cause confusion among Western students, ranging from terminology (with terms sometimes defined differently in the context of different traditions and teachings), to the significance of

specific techniques within important sequences of meditation practices. It is my hope that as a Westerner with much in common with other Western Buddhists, I will be able to provide a bridge between worlds. I am, after all, someone who grew up mostly in southern California, went to high school, dreamed of becoming a wildlife biologist, played the piano, and-after being a monk for fourteen years—reentered Western society pursuing interests in both science and religion. I am fluent in Tibetan but am also fascinated by quantum cosmology, the cognitive sciences, and the wonders of modern technology.

The text presented here, the Vajra Essence by Düdjom Lingpa, a nineteenth-century master of the Nyingma order of Tibetan Buddhism, is known as the Nelug Rangjung in Tibetan, meaning "the natural emergence of the nature of existence."' This is an ideal teaching in which to unravel some of the common misunderstandings of Tibetan Buddhism, since it is a sweeping practice that can take one from the basics all the way to enlightenment in a single lifetime. The present volume explains the initial section on shamatha, or meditative quiescence, about nine percent of the entire Vajra Essence root text.

Shamatha is presented in the Vajra Essence as a foundational practice on the Dzogchen path. Dzogchen, often translated as "the Great Perfection," is the highest of the nine vehicles (yanas) in the Nyingma tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. Classically speaking, after achieving shamatha, the yogi will use his or her newly acquired powers of concentration to practice insight into the nature of emptiness (vipashyana), followed by the Dzogchen practices of tregchö (breakthrough) and tögal (direct crossing-over). These four practices comprise the essential path to enlightenment from the Nyingma point of view. The practice of Dzogchen brings one into direct contact with reality, unmediated by the individual personality or society.

Shamatha, in its various presentations, is used to make the mind pliant and serviceable for the more advanced practices. Shamatha is not found only in Buddhism. This practice of refining attention skills exists in religious contexts as distinct as Hinduism, Taoism, early Christianity, and the Sufi schools of

Islam. Within Tibetan Buddhism, shamatha practice maps on to the nine stages of attentional development wherein thoughts gradually subside as concentrative power is increased to the point at which one can effortlessly maintain single-pointed focus on a chosen object for at least four hours. The accomplishment of shamatha is accompanied by a powerful experience of bliss, luminosity, and stillness.

Shamatha requires more careful incubation than most other kinds of meditation. You can practice tonglen (taking on the suffering of others and giving them your happiness) very well while you are watching the news. Loving-kindness and compassion and the rest of the four immeasurables can be practiced down on "Main Street." Vipashyana you can cultivate anywhere. In fact, many other practices can be done under varying circumstances. If you wish to take shamatha all the way to its ground, however, it requires a supportive, serene environment, good diet, proper exercise, and very few preoccupations. The necessary internal conditions are minimal desires, few activities and concerns, contentment, pure ethical discipline, and freedom from obsessive, compulsive thinking. It is my feeling that the achievement of shamatha is so rare today because those circumstances are so rare. It is difficult to find a conducive environment in which to practice at length and without interference—even more so to have that and access to suitable spiritual friends for support and guidance. Therefore, if the causes are difficult to bring together, the result—shamatha—is also necessarily rare. I present a detailed guide to the general practice of shamatha in my earlier book, The Attention Revolution.

Düdjom Lingpa was a lay practitioner, married, and the father of eight renowned sons, including Jigmé Tenpai Nyima, the Third Dodrupchen Rinpoche, who was widely revered by lamas of all the Tibetan Buddhist orders. During the course of his life, Düdjom Lingpa performed many miracles, and he reached the highest levels of realization of tantra as well as the Great Perfection. Thirteen of his disciples attained the rainbow body— dissolution into light at death—and one thousand became vidyadhara tantric masters through gaining insight into the essential nature of

awareness. In short, he was one of the most realized and acclaimed Tibetan lamas of his time.

The Vajra Essence was essentially "downloaded" from the dharmakaya, the Buddha mind that is essentially coterminous with the ultimate ground of reality, and brought into our world in 1862, when Düdjom Lingpa was twenty-seven years old. He received it in a vision as a mind terma. However, while it was optimal for him to receive it in 1862, only about thirteen years later did the time come for it to be made public. It is clear from the opening that this text is not scholastic in nature but is intended for those who are dedicated to practice.

In the initial section on shamatha, the Vajra Essence has the practitioner take the mind as the path, using the specific approach of taking appearances and awareness as the path, also known as settling the mind in its natural state. In brief, this consists of observing all arising mental phenomena without grasping on to them. Your thoughts, emotions, images, and so forth are observed closely with mindfulness, but you do not encourage, discourage, or involve yourself in any way with the arising mental phenomena. The aim at this stage is to settle the mind in the substrate consciousness (alayavijñana)-the ground of the ordinary mind. The text also comments on the many meditation experiences (nyam) that may be encountered and how to behave when they appear. Pitfalls are described, along with some of the deeper possibilities of this phase of practice.

One of the central themes of the opening section of the Vajra Essence is how crucial shamatha is for success with more advanced practices, such as meditation on emptiness, tantric generation and completion practices, and Dzogchen. Given that the Buddha himself strongly emphasized the importance of developing shamatha and uniting it with vipashyana, it is remarkable the degree to which this key foundational practice is marginalized or overlooked entirely in all schools of Buddhism today. It seems that nearly everyone is in a mad rush to ascend to more advanced forms of meditation without noticing that the mind they are depending on for this is heavily prone to alternating laxity and excitation. In traditional Buddhist texts, such an attentionally imbalanced

mind is considered dysfunctional, and it is unreasonable to think that such a mind can effectively enter into meditations designed to sever mental afflictions at their roots. Although you can practice more advanced meditations without first achieving shamatha, you are bound to hit a plateau and then stagnate in your practice without recognizing that it is failing due to insufficient preparation in first refining attention.

Düdjom Lingpa's treatise explains a number of integrated practices, giving me the opportunity to provide some detailed comparisons among meditation techniques and their aims—something that can be easily missed by those unable to remain in intimate contact over long periods with their teachers. Such logistical problems, common to Westerners who must maintain careers and relationships while studying and practicing Dharma, often result in a lack of full understanding of the relationships among a wide variety of elements of Dharma. The difference in language and cultural background between teacher and student only exacerbates this problem. Here I have tried to use my own experience to fill in some of these gaps.

My commentary returns again and again to one particular dilemma presented in this initial section of the Vajra Essence: In its descriptions of meditation states, does the language at a given point refer to the substrate consciousness—the alayavijñana—or to the dharmakaya—that is, pristine awareness, or rig pa? The substrate consciousness is the foundation and source of an individual's psyche. Accessing it is the proper end of shamatha practice. The dharmakaya, or buddha mind, on the other hand, is much deeper than the individual mind, and that is realized through the practice of Dzogchen. The answer to the question of which "ground" of consciousness is indicated in a given passage depends both on the context in which similar terms are presented and in the nature of the experiences described. It is extremely important that this distinction be clearly understood, because it points to a major misunderstanding to which the uninformed practitioner can easily fall prey. So the question—"Is he talking about the substrate consciousness or the dharmakaya?"—runs like a thread throughout the commentary.

I address a number of such specific pitfalls pointed out in the root text, along with obscure and sometimes controversial issues such as the siddhis, or paranormal abilities, we obtain as we advance along the path. These include clairvoyance and walking through walls, powers that most Westerners—with their scientific and often secular upbringing—may find incredible. How are we to take these? Are they metaphor, myth, or reality? There are many complex issues in fully translating a document such as this, which is esoteric and subtle even for Tibetans, into a vernacular that can be absorbed by a contemporary audience that did not grow up steeped in this tradition.

One crucial area to examine at the outset of any study of Buddhist texts is the motivation that animates our efforts. There are many motivations for entering the Dharma. One example that I think is quite prevalent, especially in the West, is using Dharma to make samsara, or cyclic existence, more comfortable. Such a motivation is quite understandable—life has a lot of sharp edges. Today there is fear of terrorism, and as always we experience illness, conflict between spouses, unhappiness at losing a job—tension, depression, anxiety. Therefore, many people practice Dharma in order to cope better with modern living and feel a bit more comfortable. There's nothing wrong with that. But if the Dharma is reduced entirely to a kind of therapy, its essence is lost. The [Vajra Essence](#) is a teaching that can enable you to achieve enlightenment in one lifetime. It has done so for many practitioners. So its value goes far beyond smoothing samsara's rough spots. The true value of the Dharma is as a vehicle to the enlightened state in order to be of greatest benefit in the world.

To fully benefit from the teachings here, it is best to honor the fundamental teachings common to all schools of Buddhism; do not, in other words, indulge the feeling that you are somehow superior to the most basic teachings—the four noble truths, the four applications of mindfulness, the four immeasurables, and so forth. Not a single syllable spoken by the Buddha is too basic. All the words of the Buddha have a single taste and can be put into practice as means to liberation. It is best as well to revere the Mahayana, not thinking of the approach requiring three countless eons treading the path to

enlightenment—the cultivation of the six perfections, the insights presented in the Yogachara and the Madhyamaka views, and so on—as being beneath you. Though you may practice Dzogchen, the highest vehicle, you should not look down on Yogachara or Madhyamaka teachings. Finally, an ideal vessel for these teachings values the tantras of all three classes-outer, inner, and secret—and has a genuine desire to practice tregchö and toga!, the two stages of Dzogchen. In other words, such a student yearns to really put these into practice in this lifetime.

Another commonly held mistaken attitude toward Dharma is the thought, "Oh, but that's too high for me. I should always just stick with the basics." It doesn't take much experience of trying to settle the mind to conclude that one is just not cut out for enlightenment and that one should just ramp down one's expectations, leaving the exalted states for those who are more gifted. But this would be a mistake. Don't think that Dzogchen is beyond your reach. It takes courage to believe that such teachings are within your reach, but actually they were designed for people like us. You can do it.

Linlike the vast majority of Tibetan texts, the Vajra Essence is not subdivided into sections and subsections. It is written instead as a stream of consciousness that flows unimpededly for some four hundred pages. My translation, however, does divide it into chapters with subsections in order to help the reader navigate the material.

We begin with the introduction, which in many Dharma texts has two parts. First comes the homage, and second is the author's promise to compose the text, to take it to its completion. This text is no exception to that rule, although of course in this case the author didn't so much "compose" the text as he simply manifested it-an act very much in the spirit of Dzogchen.

> Homage to the manifest face of Samantabhadra himself, the Omnipresent Lord, the original, primordial ground!

The enlightened awareness lineage of the buddhas is so designated because the minds of all the buddhas of the three times are of one taste in the absolute space of phenomena. The symbolic lineage of the vidyadharas is so designated because the symbolic signs of ultimate reality, the

treasury of space, spontaneously emerge, without reliance upon the stages of spiritual training and practice. The aural lineage of ordinary individuals is so designated because these practical instructions naturally arise in verbal transmission as an entrance to the disciples' paths, like filling a vase.

> The homage—to Samantabhadra, the Primordial Buddha, the Timeless Buddha, the Buddha from which all other buddhas manifest—is quite concise. That is followed by a reference to the three lineages of the Dzogchen tradition, the first of which I am translating as "the enlightened awareness lineage of the buddhas." This lineage is identified thus because the minds of the buddhas are indistinguishable and of the same nature. This being so, there is no transmission as such.

This initial paragraph introduces some crucial terms, which I will provide in Sanskrit, since they are given different translations into English. The "absolute space of phenomena" is my translation for dharmadhatu. Dharma in this context means "phenomena." Dhatu means "domain," "element," "space," or "realm." "Absolute space" here means the space out of which relative space, time, mind, matter, and all other dualities and all other phenomena emerge. It is the ground of being, the primordial ground. Its relationship with primordial consciousness (plana) is nondual.

Primordial consciousness, your own rigpa, or pristine awareness, is that out of which all relative states of consciousness emerge and is nondual from the absolute space of phenomena. In that ultimate reality, the minds of all the buddhas—past, present, and future—are all of the same taste in that absolute space of phenomena. They are undifferentiated. This, then, is the ultimate lineage—if indeed we can label something that transcends time and is inconceivable as a "lineage."

The second of these three Dzogchen lineages is the "symbolic lineage of the vidyadharas." Vidya is Sanskrit for rigpa, "pristine awareness"; dhara is "one who holds." So a vidyadhara is literally "one who holds pristine awareness." A more precise meaning is "one who has gained a conceptually unmediated, nondual realization of rigpa, of buddha nature." This is a lineage transmitted from vidyadhara to vidyadhara. It is not vidyadhara to

ordinary sentient being, nor vidyadhara to buddha, but rather a community of vidyadharas, similar to the classic meaning of sangha, comprised exclusively of aryas—those who have gained a nonconceptual, unmediated realization of emptiness. In this case it is a sangha of vidyadharas, and they have a way of communicating, of transmitting Dharma horizontally—not down to us, not up to the buddhas. Their method is symbolic, and as such, it is not verbal in the ordinary sense of the term.

"The symbolic lineage of the vidyadharas is so designated because the symbolic signs of ultimate reality..." Here is another crucial term. In Sanskrit, "ultimate reality" is dharmata. Dharma, again, means "phenomena"; ta is like "ness," making for "dharma-ness," or "phenomena-ness," an abstract noun. This refers to the very nature of being dharmas, of being phenomena. Dharmata is a synonym for emptiness, for "thatness," and for "suchness": just that—reality itself.

The "symbolic signs," the symbolic manifestations, the archetypal symbols "of ultimate reality, the treasury of space"—this last term is used interchangeably with ultimate reality, space being of course empty, and a treasury—"spontaneously emerge," they just appear, like bubbles rising in water, "without reliance upon the stages of spiritual training and practice." In other words, this is pure discovery. They appear spontaneously. This is not the result of striving diligently along the path of training or practice—a developmental approach. Until we become vidyadharas, we needn't be too concerned with this. Basically we are being told that vidyadharas have a way of symbolically communicating with each other.

The third lineage is the one most pertinent to us: the "aural lineage of ordinary individuals"—folks like us. Note that it is not verbal but aural. In Tibetan, aural lineage is nyengyü. Nyen means "to listen," as in something is coming to the ears. How do we receive the transmission of Dzogchen? Through the aural lineage of ordinary individuals. It is "so designated because these practical instructions ..."—the Tibetan word means teachings that are synthesized into practice from the vast body of Buddhist teachings—"naturally arise in

verbal transmission," in words, "as an entrance to the disciples' paths, like filling a vase."

The practical instructions tell you what you actually need to do as opposed to receiving and assimilating a mass of theoretical context, background, and the like. The words being transmitted from mouth to ear—filling your heart and mind, like filling a vase with ambrosia, opening the way to your own path to enlightenment—are the entrance, the gateway.

So, depending on context, the transmission of Dzogchen can be mind to mind, it can be symbolic, or it can be verbal.

Düdjom Lingpa and the [Vajra Essence](#)

> These instructions were revealed by themselves, not by human beings, as the magical display of primordial consciousness. May I, the spiritual mentor of the world, embodying these three lineages, being blessed with the inexhaustible ornamental wheels of the three secrets of the buddhas and bodhisattvas, and holding the permission of the Three Roots and the oceanic, oath-bound guardians, bring this to perfection.

What is the source of these teachings? The ultimate source, the ground of the teachings, is not some human being. They arise spontaneously from the dharmata—the teacher is the Buddha. At this point we must take care, because the presentations and commentaries of teachings such as these are made by human teachers. They are not infallible. No matter how high the realization of the teacher, our task as students is not simply to absorb the words of the teaching and then apply them unquestioningly like soldiers acting under orders. In Buddhism we often encounter the metaphor of the empty vessel that is appropriate to be filled by the teachings, and we may come to believe that all the wisdom is coming from the teacher's side and that we as students must absorb it uncritically.

Though the teacher should not blindly be viewed as literally infallible, nevertheless every word is there to arouse our intelligence, to awaken our heart, to draw forth our buddha nature. As His Holiness the Dalai Lama has so often commented vis-à-vis the Buddhadharma as a whole, one of the core elements of spiritual maturation, which is absolutely

antifundamentalist, is developing our own discerning wisdom, our own discerning intelligence. If we ignore such advice, we run the risk of being unable to determine which meanings are definitive and which are interpretive. That can lead us, for instance, to accentuate ultimate reality while completely ignoring conventional reality. We are warned by Padmasambhava and by all of the realized teachers that this is a big mistake. There are two truths for a buddha—the ultimate and the conventional. Neither one stifles the other. They are of one taste.

"May I, the spiritual mentor of the world..." Here the author, Düdjom Lingpa, is using the true referent of the word I; he is not referring to some nineteenth-century Tibetan. He knows that he is a vidyadhara. He says so with no pretense, no arrogance; he is just giving us the truth. He tells us he embodies the three aforementioned lineages and that he is "blessed with the inexhaustible ornamental wheels of the three secrets of the buddhas and bodhisattvas." "Ornamental wheels" is a quite literal translation. Gyatrul Rinpoche comments: "The attributes of the buddhas and bodhisattvas are inexhaustible ornaments of reality, which continue on forever like everrevolving wheels. Hence they are called inexhaustihle ornamental wheels." The three secrets are the three mysteries—body, speech, and mind. Each contains an element of mystery. What is the true nature of the body of a buddha, the speech of a buddha, the mind of a buddha? That's very deep. The Three Roots are the lama (or spiritual mentor), your yidam (or personal deity—Tara, Padmasambhava, Manjushri, or whomever it may be), and the dakini (the enlightened feminine principle).

Düdjom Lingpa tells us he has been fully authorized to reveal, to manifest this text. He has been blessed by the qualities of the Buddha. He holds the permission of the Three Roots and the "oceanic, oath-bound guardians." By the blessings of all of these, "May I ... bring this to perfection." He doesn't say "compose," but rather he will bring it to perfection, manifest it perfectly. And he does this with the permission of the Three Roots—lama, yidam, and dakini-and the oceanic, oath-bound guardians. These are the dharmapalas, the Dharma protectors who have sworn an oath to guard and

preserve the Dharma. Therefore, Düdjom Lingpa has a great deal of support for manifesting this text, support that forms part of his commitment to offer it:

> May I bring this to perfection, may I reveal it perfectly.
> The primordial, originally pure nature of existence, which is great, intellect-transcending, ultimate reality, free of conceptual elaboration, is obscured by conceiving of a self and grasping at duality. Because of this, individuals are bound by clinging to the true existence of the three delusive realms of samsara. Still, there are those who have accumulated vast merit over many eons and who have the power of pure aspirations. Therefore, for the sake of those with the fortune to master ultimate reality, the treasury of space—by awakening the karmic force of engaging in the action of nonaction in great, self-originating, primordial consciousness—I shall present this fundamental king of tantras, spontaneously arisen from the nature of existence of the sugatagarbha.

"Primordial" is a technical term closely associated with the quality of being "originally pure" (kadag). Ka, being the first syllable of the Tibetan alphabet, implies "primordial," "original," and dag means "pure." However, Gyatrul Rinpoche explains: ka refers to the beginning of time and dag means "pure" in the sense of transcending—in other words, "timeless." So, although "originally pure" is a very common translation for kadag, the term also carries the connotation of transcending time, of being beyond past, present, and future.

Seeking to enrich each statement, this text commonly compounds adjective upon adjective as in "great intellect-transcending" (beyond conceptual grasp), "ultimate reality," (dharmata), and "free of conceptual elaboration." Conceptual elaboration is the entire matrix of "this and that," "up and down"—all of our mental contexts and designations.

Thus, this originally pure nature of existence, this ultimate reality that is free of conceptualization, is obscured by the concept of self, the notion "I am," and by grasping at duality. If "I am," then "you are," and all that other stuff out there "is."

Assuming that view, I respond to what's happening to me as if all these phenomena were absolutely real.

We have been given an elegant and very loaded sentence. At this point we could say, "OK, we're finished. That sums up everything." A student who understands the full meaning of this sentence could just go home and practice. But let's probe a little more deeply. Is this sentence no more than an elaborate way of saying that the nature of reality is obscured by thought? You could say that, but that would be only partially correct. Remember that in the practice of tantra and of Dzogchen, all thoughts are regarded as emanations of dharmakaya. Therefore, in those practices, simply putting an end to thoughts would not be appropriate.

Let us focus on something more subtle: grasping at thoughts. Here we must use language very carefully because the practice to which we are being introduced is neither elaborate nor complicated; it is very simple. Therefore, the few concepts we use to describe it must be applied with great precision. Otherwise our terms will be confused and all understanding will be lost. What does it mean to grasp at a thought? What is the nature of grasping? The Sanskrit gratia means "to hold on to," "to grasp." It's exactly that. When you say, "Have you grasped what I was trying to tell you?" this means "Have you understood?" but it also means, have you got a "hold" on it, did you "get" it? And as soon as you have done so, grasping is involved.

We can view a phenomenon such as grasping in gradations from coarse to subtle. The coarsest level of grasping, which blatantly obscures the nature of reality, would be to say something like, "How dare you say that to me! Don't you know who I am?" In such a case I, the speaker, am holding on to my great big, thick, robust ego, and since you've infringed upon it, I am reacting aggressively. We can grasp on to possessions as well as personal identity, as in: "This cup isn't mine. Why did you bring me this when my cup is in my room?" But grasping needn't be that coarse. When you are asked, "What am I holding in my hand?" and answer, "a cup," you have just grasped on to "cup-ness." You have identified an object within the context of a conceptual framework—a word, a

sign. So the mind that latches on to a sign—here an image commonly designated as a "cup"-does so through grasping. Although you are merely identifying "That's a cup," this is also a form of grasping. It may not be the kind of grasping that will lead to endless misery, but it is a subtle form of grasping.

Ultimate reality, then, is obscured by the concept of self. It is not the concept alone that is obscuring ultimate reality. Rather it is the reification, the grasping on to the concept, that creates the obscuration. The Tibetan term for reification (dendzin) means grasping on to inherent existence, grasping on to true existence. You decontextualize, you grasp something as existing independently, by its own nature. One example is to believe that there really is an inherently existing person—you or me or anyone—that could be praised or insulted. Moreover, anything believed to exist by itself is a product of reification. This reification is the root of samsara, the cycle of existence. On the other hand, grasping is a broader term. When I hold up a cup and ask, "What is this?" your answer that it is a cup doesn't necessarily mean you are grasping on to it as truly existent. It is still grasping in that you are holding on to the concept of "cup-ness," but by designating it as a cup you are not necessarily reifying it by grasping on to it as inherently real. It is possible to use language without being trapped by it, although generally we are unable to avoid it. To sum up, grasping can be more or less subtle, and one form of grasping is reification, the grasping on to inherent existence.

In the proper context grasping can be very useful. Madhyamaka insight practices can employ grasping to deliver you from grasping. Subtle grasping is also used in the tantric stage of generation, which is saturated by grasping. There, visualizing your environment as a pure land and imagining yourself as a deity, you develop some understanding that your normal sense of identity is only a construct, that it is conceptually designated. In those practices you are removing that construct and substituting another identity, one that is much closer to reality than your ordinary one. Seeing all of your thoughts as expressions of dbarmakaya, all sounds as sambhogakaya, and all appearances as nirmanakaya is grasping. You are seeing them as

something, overlaying an interpretation upon them. However, in Vajrayana Buddhism that is very useful grasping.

Bear in mind, though, that from a Buddhist perspective you do not consciously, deliberately use grasping on to true existence—reification—as part of the path. In Vajrayana particularly you avoid that. When you are generating divine pride or pure vision and so forth, you do not think, "I'm really a buddha," or "this is really Padmasambhava," and grasp on to the vision as having inherent existence. The whole point of Vajrayana is to simultaneously maintain the awareness of the emptiness of self, other, the environment, and so forth, together with the divine pride and pure vision. All of that is held in a delicate balance. In the same breath you generate the deity, the divine pride, and pure vision, knowing that all of it is apparitional. Therefore grasping is a tool to be used on the path but reification is not. Grasping also has its uses in Dzogchen. In most cases we cannot simply go directly to utter simplicity; we need teachings and methods to help us arrive there.

Because of this reification of the concept of self, grasping on to duality, "individuals are bound by clinging to the true existence"—a term that means existing by its own nature, independent of conceptual designation—"of the three delusive realms of samsara." "Delusive" is a good translation of the Tibetan trülpa. Phenomena, appearances, are not deluded; it is we sentient beings who are deluded about them. For instance, the color of a person's hair is not deluded, but it invites the delusion of sentient beings. Why? Because it appears to us to be truly existent from its own side—some phenomenon way over there that exists independently of my perception of it over here. It appears that I am merely a passive witness of truly existing phenomena, and in that way appearances are delusive or misleading. This delusion binds us to samsara.

In a striking metaphor, one of the most powerful I have seen in all of Buddhism, Tsongkhapa refers to existence in samsara as being in an iron cage, shackled, blind, in a river—a torrent, actually—in the pitch black of night. Can you imagine how terrifying that would be? On a starless night, in an

iron cage, being tumbled down a river. Sheer panic! If you were on the shore with a flashlight and saw someone in this situation, how could you respond with anything other than a massive, spontaneous outflow of compassion—"How can I help you?" Here Tsongkhapa is using the metaphor of the tumbling cage to say, "That's how it is, folks—that's what it's like to be in samsara." <>

Fathoming the Mind: Inquiry and Insight in Düdjom Lingpa's Vajra Essence Translation and Commentary by B. Alan Wallace, Edited by Dion Blundell and Eva Natanya [Wisdom Publications, 9781614293293]

Bestselling author B. Alan Wallace delivers the long-awaited follow-up to his Stilling the Mind: Shamatha Teachings from Dudjom Lingpa's Vajra Essence (2011).
Fathoming the Mind continues the commentary to Dudjom Lingpa's Vajra Essence that appeared in Stilling the Mind, daringly contextualizing Buddhist teachings on the Great Perfection as a revolutionary challenge to many contemporary beliefs. This companion volume stems from an oral commentary that B. Alan Wallace gave to the next section of the Vajra Essence, on the cultivation of contemplative insight, or vipashyana, that fathoms the nature of existence as a whole. Dudjom Lingpa's revelation consists of a fascinating dialogue that occurred during his pure vision of Samantabhadra, personification of primordial consciousness, manifesting as the youthful form of the Lake-born Vajra emanation of Padmasambhava, in dialogue with an entourage of bodhisattvas symbolizing various aspects of Dudjom Lingpa's mind.

In continuing to reflect on Dudjom Lingpa's writings and their relevance to the modern world, Wallace was inspired to elaborate extensively on his original commentary. This book includes introductory essays and an afterword, which explore how the insights discussed here might contribute to yet a new "contemplative revolution," one that would be as far-reaching in its implications as the scientific revolutions triggered by the discoveries of Galileo, Darwin, and Einstein.

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Excerpt: The Vajra Essence belongs to the class of teachings called pure visions. Unlike scholarly treatises and commentaries, such teachings come from the visionary experiences of a treasure revealer, or tertön, in this case, one of nineteenth-century Tibet's foremost masters of the Great Perfection, Düdjom Lingpa. His writings transmit profound teachings by the "Lake-Born Vajra," who was the speech emanation of the Indian master Padma-sambhava, who in turn is known in Tibet as Guru Rinpoché. The revelation appears in the form of a fascinating dialogue occurring within Düdjom Lingpa's mind. Various aspects of his mind pose questions to his own primordial consciousness, and the pithy and provocative replies elucidate what could today be called depth psychology that taps into the very ground of being!

Düdjom Lingpa's inspiring autobiography has been translated into English as A Clear Mirror. [Traktung Dudjom Lingpa, A Clear Mirror: The Visionary Autobiography of a Tibetan Master, trans. Chönyi Drolma (Hong Kong: Rangjung Yeshe Publications, 2011).] From a very young age, his visions of Padmasambhava, Mandarava, Yeshé Tsogyal, and

other enlightened beings guided his spiritual progress. Nonhuman deities, dākinīs, and accomplished adepts became his primary teachers. He remembered his past lives, including being one of the youngest of Padmasambhava's twenty-five principal disciples, Khyeuchung Lotsawa, or the "boy translator."

The Vajra Essence was revealed in a state of vividly clear meditation when Düdjom Lingpa was twenty-seven. In his pure vision, the primordial Buddha, Samantabhadra, manifests as the Lake-Born Vajra—an eight-year-old youthful form of Padmasambhava—surrounded by a circle of bodhisattva disciples. One by one, the bodhisattvas rise from their seats, pay homage, and pose questions to the Teacher, who responds with brief and extensive explanations, including pointed questions of his own. The ensuing dialogue explores every stage of the path to buddhahood in this lifetime, from the very beginning to the unexcelled result of the rainbow body, signifying enlightenment. Everything you need to know to attain buddhahood is complete in this text.

To give a panoramic overview of the Vajra Essence: A brief introduction leads immediately into the practice of šamatha, or the cultivation of meditative quiescence, which was the subject of my earlier commentary, 5 and then the text moves directly into vipašyanā, or the cultivation of contemplative insight, the subject of this current volume. Next come the stages of generation and completion, followed by the two main Great Perfection practices—cutting through 6 to pristine awareness and direct crossing over 7 to spontaneous actualization. Finally, through following these practices, one would be able to realize the rainbow body.

On the basis of šamatha and vipašyanā, the Teacher explains that there are two possible ways to identify the nature of the ground, Samantabhadra: "directly identifying it in your own being, and identifying it in dependence upon the expedient path of the stage of generation." The latter, more gradual path, revealed in its entirety in the Vajra Essence, includes elaborate descriptions of various practices within the stages of generation and completion. However, in pure visions that Düdjom Lingpa revealed subsequent to this one, the

Sharp Vajra of Conscious Awareness Tantra and the Enlightened View of Samantabhadra, Padmasambhava indicates that for practitioners who are drawn to simple, direct practices, only four are indispensable: šamatha, vipašyanā, cutting through, and direct crossing over.

Here we will be discussing the Vajra Essence section concerning vipašyanā, for which I received the oral transmission, teachings, and empowerment from the Venerable Gyatrul Rinpoché. He authorized me to teach this section of the text to serious students, even though they may not have received the Great Perfection empowerments or completed the traditional preliminary practices.

A Serviceable Mind

In this text, the practice of vipašyanā is referred to as "taking ultimate reality (Skt. dharmatã) as the path." One nice metaphor for this is cutting down the tree of ignorance with the axe of wisdom. To chop down this huge tree, you must first be able to plant your feet in a firm stance—this means having a solid foundation in ethics (Skt. fila). Then you must be able to swing your axe and repeatedly strike the right spot—this means meditative concentration (Skt. samãdhi). Finally, you must have a very sharp axe that can cut through ignorance—this means wisdom (Skt. prajnã).

In order to derive the full benefits of vipašyanā, the essential preparation is the practice of šamatha, with the goal of rendering the body and mind serviceable: relaxed, stable, and clear. On this basis, one is well prepared to venture into the profound discoveries and insights of vipašyanā, which, unlike šamatha, invariably entails an element of inquiry. Such inquiry may be primarily experiential, as in the four close applications of mindfulness, or it may be deeply analytical, as in the Madhyamaka, or Middle Way, approaches to vipašyanā. Samatha is exemplified by three practices that have been thoroughly described elsewhere. These are mindfulness of breathing, taking the impure mind as the path, and awareness of awareness. The Buddha taught that it is our close identification with, or grasping to, the five aggregates, and implicitly the body, speech, and mind, that fundamentally makes us vulnerable to suffering. In his pith instructions on šamatha

presented in The Foolish Dharma of an Idiot Clothed in Mud and Feathers, Düdjom Lingpa writes that in following the šamatha practice of taking the impure mind as the path, meditators "observe their thoughts 'over there' like an old herdsman on a wide-open plain watching his calves and sheep from afar." The theme of observing the tactile sensations of the body, the "inner speech of the mind" expressing itself in discursive thoughts, and of observing all mental processes and mental consciousness itself as if "from afar" occurs throughout each of these three šamatha practices.

The first of these, mindfulness of breathing, is itself taught in three phases, focusing on the sensations of the respiration throughout the entire body, on the sensations of the rise and fall of the abdomen with each in-breath and out-breath, and on the sensations of the breath at the nostrils. By closely applying mindfulness to the sensations of the respiration, one observes these bodily sensations in a detached manner, thereby counteracting the deeply ingrained tendency to identify with these sensations. In this way, one achieves some degree of separation from the body, which can open the way for the radical shift in perspective that takes place in a much more advanced Vajrayāna practice known as "isolation from the body."

The second šamatha practice, known as taking the impure mind as the path, or settling the mind in its natural state, is the principal method taught in the preceding section of Düdjom Lingpa's Vajra Essence. This entails observing the movements of thoughts rather than identing with them, and in its much higher evolution could be seen as analogous to the Vajrayāna practice of "isolation from the speech."

The third practice is awareness of awareness, for which Padmasambhava provides a detailed explanation in Natural Liberation: Padmasambhava's Teachings on the Six Bardos, where he calls it samatha without signs. In this practice one releases grasping to all the subjective impulses of the mind and observes the flow of mental consciousness itself, thereby counteracting the habit of identifying with any aspect of the ordinary mind. Though certainly not identical with the Vajrayāna practice of "isolation from the mind," the practice of awareness of awareness can, in its

ultimate evolution, lead to the direct realization of pristine awareness. Once breaking through to this level of primordial consciousness, awareness of awareness could become analogous to the Vajrayāna completion-stage realization of the indwelling mind of clear light.

There is a smooth progression among these three samatha practices. Engaging in mindfulness of breathing, we withdraw our attention from the environment and turn it inward, to the space of the body. While the primary object of mindfulness consists of the sensations correlated with the respiration throughout the body, we also use introspection to monitor the flow of the mind to see if it has fallen into laxity or excitation. Progressing to settling the mind in its natural state, we further withdraw our attention from all five sensory domains, including tactile sensations, and limit it to the mental domain alone. The primary object of mindfulness is the space of the mind and whatever thoughts, images, and other mental events arise within this space. In awareness of awareness, we withdraw our awareness even further; instead of the objects in the mental domain, we invert awareness exclusively upon itself.

You might imagine this to be like drinking a double shot of espresso, so that you are wide awake, and then entering a sensory deprivation tank, in which you are completely isolated from your environment and even your own body. Then, imagine that your mind becomes completely quiet—while at the same time wide awake. With absolutely nothing appearing to your awareness, what do you know? You still know that you are aware.

These three methods are like nested Russian dolls. In mindfulness of breathing, attention is focused primarily on the breath, while introspectively noting and releasing involuntary thoughts and images when they arise. Meanwhile, you're also aware of being aware; you are confident that you are not unconscious. So awareness of awareness is inherent in mindfulness of breathing, as it is while being aware of anything else. When you move to settling the mind in its natural state, the outer Russian doll of awareness of the body falls away, and you focus on the mind alone. But this also entails awareness of awareness. Finally, the Russian doll of the space of the mind and its contents falls away,

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nongrasping, together with the clarity of awareness illuminating the space of the mind—you enter into an effortless flow of the simultaneous awareness of stillness and motion: this second stage is manifest mindfulness. Eruptions of memories, desires, and mental afflictions surge up periodically rather than continuously, and over time, your mind gradually settles in its natural state, like a blizzard in a snow globe that gradually dissipates and settles into transparency.

In the third stage of mindfulness, awareness of the body and the five senses withdraws into single-pointed awareness of the space of the mind, and you become oblivious to your body and environment. Prior to this stage, thoughts and other mental appearances become fewer and subtler, until finally they all dissolve and your ordinary mind and all its concomitant mental processes go dormant: this corresponds to the absence of mindfulness. Bear in mind that the terms translated as "mindfulness" in Pāli (sati), Sanskrit (smrti), and Tibetan (dran pa) primarily connote recollection, or bearing in mind. Now you're not recalling or holding anything in mind; your coarse mind has gone dormant, as if you'd fallen into deep, dreamless sleep. But at the same time, your awareness is luminously clear. The coarse mental factor of mindfulness that allowed you to reach this state has also gone dormant; hence it is called the absence of mindfulness. When you are in this transitional state, you are aware only of the sheer vacuity of the space of the mind: this is the substrate (Skt. ãlaya). The consciousness of this vacuity is the substrate consciousness (Skt. ãlayavijñãna). Here is a twenty-first-century analogy: When your computer downloads and installs a software upgrade, it becomes nonoperational for a short time before the new software is activated. Similarly, when your coarse mind dissolves into the substrate consciousness, the coarse mindfulness that brought you to this point has gone dormant, as if you had fainted—but you're wide awake. This is a brief, transitional phase, and it's important not to get stuck here, for if you do so for a prolonged period, your intelligence may atrophy like an unused muscle. This is like being lucid in a state of dreamless sleep, with your awareness absorbed in the sheer vacuity of the empty space of your mind. That space is full

of potential, but for the time being, that potential remains dormant.

Finally, there arises the fourth type of mindfulness: self-illuminating mindfulness. This occurs when you invert your awareness upon itself and the substrate consciousness illuminates and knows itself. In the Pali canon, the Buddha characterized this mind as brightly shining (Pali pabhassara) and naturally pure (Pali pakati-parisuddha). This subtle dimension of mental consciousness is experientially realized with the achievement of šamatha, corresponding to the threshold of the first dhyãna, or meditative

stabilization. Resting in this state of consciousness you experience three distinctive qualities of awareness: it is blissful, luminous, and nonconceptual. Most important, this awareness is called serviceable; both your body and mind are infused with an unprecedented degree of pliancy, so they are fit for use as you wish.

The Buddha explains the profound shift that takes place upon achieving this first dhyāna:

> Being thus detached from hedonic craving, detached from unwholesome states, one enters and remains in the first dhyāna, which is imbued with coarse investigation and subtle analysis, born of detachment, filled with delight and joy. And with this delight and joy born of detachment, one so suffuses, drenches, fills, and irradiates one's body that there is no spot in one's entire body that is untouched by this delight and joy born of detachment.

A similar point is made in the Mahayana discourse known as the Sandhi-nirmocananitra:

> Lord, when a Bodhisattva directs his attention inwards, with the mind focused upon the mind, as long as physical pliancy and mental pliancy are not achieved, what is that mental activity called? Maitreya, this is not šamatha. It is said to be associated with an aspiration that is a facsimile of šamatha.

Even when you emerge from meditation, this body-mind upgrade is yours to employ in your dealings with the world. It's a radical psychophysiological shift; although not irreversible, it can likely be sustained for the rest of your life. The five

obscurations of hedonic craving, malice, laxity and dullness, excitation and anxiety, and afflictives uncertainty are largely dormant. There is an unprecedented pliancy and suppleness of both body and mind during formal meditation sessions and between them.

Such refinement of the body's energy system can be cultivated to some degree with controlled breathing and physical exercises such as prānāyāma, chi gunge, and tai chi. The Buddha knew well the many ascetic disciplines of body and breath practiced in his time, but they are not taught in the Pali canon; instead, he strongly emphasized the simple practice of mindfulness of breathing. This is a profound practice for settling the subtle body, the energetic body, in its natural state, and it is closely related to settling the mind in its natural state. The Buddha described the benefits of mindfulness of breathing with an analogy:

> Just as in the last month of the hot season, when a mass of dust and dirt has swirled up, a great rain cloud out of season disperses it and quells it on the spot, so too concentration by mindfulness of breathing, when developed and cultivated, is peaceful, sublime, an ambrosial dwelling, and it disperses and quells on the spot unwholesome states whenever they arise.

In the practice of settling the mind, through the process of bringing full, clear awareness single-pointedly to the space of the mind and releasing all control over what appears there, you allow your mind to heal itself. This occurs simply by being gently aware of whatever arises, without the grasping of aversion or desire, and without identifying with thoughts.

Keep in mind that this will not always be a smooth ride! All your angels and demons will rise up to greet you or assault you, depending on how you conceptually designate them. But all the buddhas that appear cannot help you, and all the demons cannot hurt you. You are becoming lucid in the waking state. Like someone who is adept in lucid dreaming, you know that nothing can harm your mind, because nothing you are witnessing is truly existent: everything consists of empty appearances to your mind.

In parallel fashion, the practice of mindfulness of breathing, as the Buddha taught it, is a natural kind of prānāyāma. Instead of regulating the breath—as one would in many classical practices of prānāyāma—here we're allowing the entire system of the subtle body-and-mind to balance and heal itself. This practice is especially relevant in modern times, when so many of us hold chronic tensions and blockages in the body; if we don't know how to release them, they will block our meditative practice as well as our vital energy (Skt. prāna).

In mindfulness of breathing, even as we allow the respiration to settle in its natural rhythm, we bring this same quality of awareness (that we bring to the space of the mind, when settling the mind) to the space of the body. We observe the sensations associated with the fluctuations of vital energy, or prāna, which correspond to the rhythm of the respiration as they arise throughout the body, and simply let them be. At times the breath may be strong, erratic, or halting; it may be shallow or deep, fast or slow, regular or irregular. Just let it be. Allow the flow of respiration to gradually settle in its natural rhythm, while keeping your awareness still, resting in its own place. After some time, the fluctuations in the energy field of the body corresponding to the respiration will become gentle, subtle, and rhythmic; but don't force this—allow it to occur naturally. Your entire body-mind system settles into equilibrium, and for this to occur, your mind must also become quieter and subtler. Learn how to release control and influence at increasingly subtle levels. Avoid any sort of influence or modification of the breath. The corpse pose (Skt. savāsana) is extremely valuable in this practice because it promotes total relaxation in both body and mind. The challenge is to avoid dullness and lethargy, maintaining the clarity of awareness.

Ordinarily when we know something, it's our conceptual mind that knows, and it knows within a conceptual framework. Nevertheless, all of us experience a state of nonconceptual awareness on a daily basis: deep, dreamless sleep. In nonlucid, dreamless sleep, the mind is nonconceptual and we have no explicit knowledge of anything at all. Even the most obvious fact of our experience—that we are asleep—is unknown to us.

In the practice of šamatha, we seek to cultivate an ongoing flow of explicit knowing that is simultaneously nonconceptual. Even if this knowing is not absolutely nonconceptual, it is not caught up in explicit thoughts. This capability for perceptual knowledge precedes any conceptual labeling or description. It accords precisely with the Buddha's teaching on mindfulness of breathing:

> Breathing in long, one knows, "I breathe in long." Breathing out long, one knows, "I breathe out long." Breathing in short, one knows, "I breathe in short." Breathing out short, one knows, "I breathe out short." One trains thus: "I shall breathe in, experiencing the whole body. I shall breathe out, experiencing the whole body. I shall breathe in, calming the composite of the body. I shall breathe out, calming the composite of the body." Thus, one trains.

There's no need to apply words to this perception. In the early phases of such practice, the duration of the breath may vary considerably during a single session, but as the mind and body settle into a deeper state of equilibrium, the respiration becomes shallow. In my own experience, I have found that it settles into a frequency of fifteen breaths per minute, and over time, the amplitude, or volume, of the breath decreases. Some studies indicate that in deep sleep the respiration occurs at about fifteen breaths per minute, and Vajrayāna Buddhist sources claim that humans experience 21,600 breaths in a twenty-four-hour period, which turns out to be fifteen breaths per minute. It would be interesting to study these parallels more carefully with a combination of contemplative and scientific inquiry.

Scientific studies of lucid dreamers have revealed that the flow of the respiration of the dreamer within the dream corresponds to the flow of the respiration of the dreamer's physical body lying in bed. If, for example, the lucid dreamer holds her breath within the dream, the respiration of her physical body is also suspended for as long as she holds her breath within the dream. This means that by deliberately breathing long and short breaths within the dream, the dreamer can send messages by Morse code to researchers observing the duration of breaths of the dreamer's physical body. It also demonstrates that a lucid dreamer can be

aware of the rhythm of her physical body's breathing even without being aware of any tactile sensations within that physical body. At an even deeper level of consciousness, meditators who are adept at becoming lucid while in dreamless sleep report that they are still able to mentally detect the rhythm of their respiration even though they are unaware of any tactile sensations within their body. This would imply that people who have achieved šamatha and are resting in the substrate consciousness may still be aware of the rhythm of their respiration, and such mindfulness of the respiration could continue even as one fully achieves the first dhyāna and beyond, with one's awareness immersed in the form realm. Such awareness of the respiration could continue until one achieves the fourth dhyāna, when the respiration ceases altogether for as long as one remains in that meditative state.

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Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoché

It is said that to bump into or hear the term Mahāsandhi or Dzokchen even accidentally will supposedly make our precious human bodies worthy and meaningful. So in that context, I rejoice that Alan Wallace's translation of the Vipasyanā chapter of [Vajra Essence](#) is now making some of these extraordinarily precious teachings available to a wider audience. I can only pray that at least a handful of those with the good fortune to seize this opportunity will not only hear but fully understand, practice, and realize the wisdom these teachings convey.

In this text, Düdjom Lingpa—one of the greatest masters and treasure revealers of the nineteenth century—explains the quintessential view of Buddhism with utmost clarity. But he does so in a unique way that requires no blind leap of faith on the part of the reader and practitioner.

On the contrary, in Düdjom Lingpa's pure vision, the teacher, Samantabhadra, manifesting as Padmasambhava, engages with interlocuters who give eloquent voice to the coarse and subtle doubts and objections to the Buddhist view that arise in our very own mind and practice as projections of our reasoning intellect. In the ensuing dialogue, we

recognize all our own qualms, worries, questions, and uncertainties to which Samantabhadra responds with precision, skill, and patience. Through the method of that remarkable interchange, this treasure teaching is perfectly suited to our present age of doubt and questioning.

But there is another dialogue that pervades virtually every chapter of this book. It's a dialogue with science and its various branches and methods—from physics, behaviorism, and neuroscience to empiricism and quantum mechanics.

It's a dialogue that I confess I have avoided like the plague, mainly because I despair that Buddhists, let alone Mahāsandhi practitioners, and scientists can even speak the same language in order to communicate genuinely. And so I am intrigued to see Alan Wallace engage in that discourse with such personal passion. I also find myself both cheering on his trenchant critique of scientific materialism and being a bit skeptical of his hopes for genuine collaborative research between Buddhists and scientists.

In my observation, what scientists generally miss is so basic as to make real interchange extraordinarily challenging. For example:

- Scientists generally reject the possibility of transcendence—that there is anything beyond what is observable.
- The method of yogic direct cognition that is fundamental to Buddhist logic and practice, which I think goes further than what Wallace calls "introspection." is generally unknown to scientists.
- In general, scientists do not seem to grasp the view of nonduality. As a result, they also don't understand the meaning of selflessness and wisdom, and they are therefore uninterested in what we Buddhists call "liberation."
- The distinction between ultimate and relative truth—so fundamental to Buddhism—seems alien to most scientists. Yet without that understanding, it seems impossible to engage scientists in discussion on rebirth and on past and future lives, which they say cannot be proved through analysis. In fact, the Buddhist distinction

between teachings that require interpretation and those that do not is strange to most scientists.

- And therefore, though they claim to share the Buddhist approach of exploring the relation between causes and conditions and their effects, I have yet to meet scientists who really understand cause and effect at the most subtle level.
- And therefore they also cannot understand practices like offering, praise, torma, mandala, and more, which they disparage as "religious" or "superstitious." We should engage in such discourse for very pragmatic, even samsãric, reasons. For example, I think Buddhist teachers can take advantage of the fact that 'Western intellectuals are attracted to Buddhism's reliance on reason and logic rather than belief.
- At the same time, I think the gaps in understanding between Buddhism and science are so wide that we should never portray Buddhism as science, as many people these days seem prone to do. It might sound chauvinist, but I am convinced that Buddhism has something unique to offer that science simply doesn't have in its arsenal.

For all these reasons I am delighted to applaud Alan Wallace's courage in exposing and dissecting the smug assumptions, dogmatic beliefs, and narrow measurement tools of scientific materialism that masquerade as empiricism and that he rightly says "are fundamentally incompatible with all schools of Buddhism throughout history."

Commenting on his thirty years of experience participating in Buddhism—science conferences, Wallace remarks:

> Time and again, experts from diverse fields, including psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy, have presented their cutting-edge research to Buddhists and then invited their response to these advances in modern science. In virtually all such meetings, it is the Western scientists who dominate, speaking for over 90 percent of the time .... Overall, I have found much greater openness on the part

of Buddhists to learn about scientific discoveries in the mind sciences than I have found open-mindedness on the part of scientists eager to learn about Buddhist discoveries.

And yet Alan Wallace remains remarkably hopeful about the potential for genuine collaborative endeavors between scientists and Buddhist scholars, and he sees a particular openness toward Buddhist views in the field of quantum mechanics. And so, a good part of this book is geared to furthering, expanding, and deepening that Buddhism—science dialogue based on genuine empiricism.

Call me conservative and old-fashioned, but I have to confess I remain much more enthralled with Samantabhadra's dialogue with his bodhisattva disciples, which to me makes Düdjom Lingpa's Vajra Essence one of the most powerful, relevant, and practical treasure teachings we could ever wish to have.

I cannot and will not dismiss the other dialogue that Alan Wallace is so determined to further. Indeed, if I were to do so, I would be as dogmatic and close-minded as the scientists he so roundly condemns. On the contrary, I truly aspire that Wallace's plea for scientists to respect Buddhist insight be taken seriously.

On that front, it is past time to puncture the subtle implication in Buddhism—science dialogues to date that we Buddhists somehow have to prove our validity in scientific terms if anyone is to take us seriously. I am glad to see Wallace show that to be impossible so long as the instruments of measurement and verification are decided by scientists.

But if Wallace can persuade scientists to open their minds to the possibility of transcending the observable, to the method of yogic direct cognition, to the view of nonduality, to the notion of liberation, and more, then I'll be delighted to see them explore our world and engage in whatever dialogue is needed.

In the meantime, I am happy to bask in the glory of Düdjom Lingpa's extraordinary Vajra Essence and am deeply grateful to Alan Wallace for bringing that brilliant and remarkable dialogue to a wider English-speaking audience. May all who touch and read this treasure benefit, and may its truth and power liberate all beings. <>

The Vajra Essence by Dudjom Lingpa, translated by B. Alan Wallace [Dudjom Lingpa's Visions of the Great Perfection, Wisdom Publications, 9781614293477]

A systematic presentation of the path of Dzogchen, the Great Perfection, by one of its most renowned proponents and rendered by a master translator.

Düdjom Lingpa (1835–1904) was one of the foremost tantric masters of nineteenth-century Tibet, and his powerful voice resonates strongly among Buddhist practitioners today. The Vajra Essence is Düdjom Lingpa's most extended meditation on the path of Great Perfection, in many senses a commentary on all his other Dzogchen works. Dzogchen, the pinnacle of practice in the Nyingma school, is a radical revelation of the pure nature of consciousness that is delivered from master to disciple and perfected in a meditation that permeates every moment of our experience.

Revealed to Düdjom Lingpa as a visionary "treasure" text in 1862, the Vajra Essence takes the reader through seven stages of progressively deeper practice, from "taking the impure mind as the path" up to the practice of "direct crossing over" (tögal). The longest of Düdjom Lingpa's five visionary works on Dzogchen, readers will find this a rich and masterful evocation of the enlightened experience. This is the first translation of this seminal work in any Western language, and B. Alan Wallace, with his forty-five-plus years of extensive learning and deep meditative experience, is one of the most accomplished translators of Tibetan texts into English. <>

Managing Corporate Design: Best Practices for In-House Graphic Design Departments by Peter L. Phillips [Allworth Press, 9781621536758]

Corporations increasingly view graphic design as a core strategic business competency in a highly competitive climate, and they are challenging their in-house designers to supply far more than a service or support function. Their new role is to provide sound solutions to real-world business pressures. Managing Corporate Design

addresses—head-on—these new challenges in a highly practical manner.

Peter L. Phillips writes specifically to corporate in-house graphic design groups searching for positive, accessible methods to better establish their group as a core strategic business competency. This guide covers:

- Developing a framework
- Assessing the value you offer
- Recognizing the business role of design
- Communicating in a corporate language
- Gaining and forming business relationships
- Developing design briefs and approval presentations
- Managing and hiring staff
- Incorporating creativity
- Overcoming obstacles and moving forward!

These fresh strategies and more provide actionable tools for helping corporate design teams meet the new business demands of today.

Contents

Excerpt: According to the latest online definition of the word "design" in the Merriam Webster Dictionary, design means: "to plan and make decisions about (something) that is being built or created; to create the plans, drawings, etc., that show how (something) will be made; to plan and make (something) for a specific use or purpose; to think of (something), such as a plan; to plan (something) in your mind."

The same dictionary defines "designer" as: "a person who plans how something new will look and be made; a person who creates and often produces a new product, style, etc."

It is also interesting to me that the term "design manager" seems to have no definition at all.

There are many people on this planet who call themselves "designers." Design has become a huge word covering a great deal of territory (see the reference above to something)! I have a friend who has a hobby of photographing signage he comes across during his frequent international business travel. His slide show contains (among hundreds of other types of designers) pizza designers, fingernail designers, dog grooming designers, employee benefits designers, curriculum designers, software designers, insurance designers, landscape designers (that specialize in mowing your lawn!), the child's play design center, party designers, floral designers, interior designers, package designers, industrial designers, and on and on. Of course, all of these folks are legitimately entitled to call themselves "designers."

When I was managing the graphic design function at Digital Equipment Corporation it was not unusual to get a phone call asking, "Is this the corporate design department?" I would reply, "Yes, it is." Then the caller would ask for the schematic drawings for the circuitry of a new microchip. Of course, the engineers who designed this circuitry were indeed "designers."

With all of these legitimate definitions of the word "design" it is understandable many people are somewhat confused when they hear the word "designer."

The design profession has also changed dramatically over the last twenty or more years. Technology has not only changed the way we approach design, but also added many new definitions of the term "design." At the same time the value of design to an enterprise is also becoming more respected.

This growing appreciation for graphic design in the corporate world is also responsible for a major shift in the perception of an in-house graphic design function. A great many corporations are just beginning to realize that an in-house graphic design department is far more than a "service function." They are instead beginning to realize powerful graphic design can be a critical strategic resource for the enterprise, especially as competition has become more intense. However, many managers of in-house graphic design functions are a bit unsure about just how to make the shift from graphic services to a critical corporate strategic resource. The information in this book is intended to assist the in-house graphic design department manager make the appropriate

transition from service provider to strategic partner.

Over the last few years of consulting with in-house graphic design departments and conducting workshops for these groups, I have noted that most groups tend to have many of the same questions. I tallied all of these inputs and developed a list of the top issues in-house corporate groups are facing currently. It has been remarkable how many of the following show up during each intake session!

In order of how frequently each issue has shown up, these are the top ten:

1. How do we move from being a drop-in service provider to a strategic partner?
2. How do we get enough time to execute projects properly?
3. Many internal groups go around us and use external resources instead? What can we do about this?
4. Design is not perceived as a core business competency in our company. How can we change this?
5. Our budgets for projects are minimal. How do we convince the company to give us adequate funding for major projects?
6. Projects come in at the last minutes and internal clients want a fast turnaround. How can we get involved earlier in the process? How do we prioritize projects?
7. Internal clients often hand us a brief telling us exactly what they want us to do—and how to do it! How do we convince them to change this practice?
8. We are basically understaffed to handle the ever increasing workload, but management doesn't want to increase the size of our staff. What options do we have to obtain more staff help?
9. We are largely perceived as a necessary support function, but not really credible as business strategists. We are not even involved in presenting our design solutions for final approval!
10. What techniques can we use to demonstrate our creative ability and skills more effectively

Well, there you have it! These seem to be the most common issues keeping in-house corporate graphic

design managers, worldwide, up at night. My intention in writing this book is to tackle all of these questions (and a few more) head-on.

Just to be very clear, this book has been developed for graphic designers working in an in-house corporate setting. If you are an employee benefits program designer, you will probably not find this book very helpful. The book is not intended to teach anyone how to do graphic design; rather the intent is to help people manage the graphic design function in a corporate environment.

A Few Important Lessons I Have Learned

o Lesson #1: Improve your business communication skills, and use the design brief process as a tool to communicate the strategic, added value of design.

Please note, I am suggesting your focus be on improving the perception of added value of graphic design as a core strategic competency. I have met many in-house graphic design managers who spend far too much time and effort trying to advance their own careers. They tend to work at making their own personal abilities stand out, hoping to draw attention to themselves as managers, rather than to draw attention to the added value of graphic design to the enterprise. If you can advance the perception of graphic design as a core, highly valued, strategic contributor to the business, trust me, your own personal stock and reputation will automatically advance as well. Having a let's-make-it-happen attitude and bottom up leadership style will bring you more respect in the corporation.

The design brief process I have described offers nearly all of the powerful opportunities really necessary to educate and persuade non-design business partners that graphic design is a core business competency that plays a major role in the success—or failure—of any business.

o Lesson #2: Develop a comprehensive action plan—and follow it. Be sure there is a time line for completion of each action item, and that there are one or more members of your staff accountable for the completion of each item.
o Lesson #3: Always involve your entire graphic design group in developing plans

for improvement of the function. Don't try to do it all alone.

- o Lesson #4: When you are in a position to hire new graphic designers for your group, look at not only a candidate's portfolio, but also look at their skills in communication, persuasion, business acumen, and confidence. Hire the brightest, most talented people you can find. Be sure their temperament will work in both your group and the company as a whole. Not everyone is really suited to work in a corporate environment. Corporate environments tend to have unique cultures, politics, and yes, some restrictions. Be sure your potential new hire will be an asset to your group and not a hindrance. Take your time in hiring. Check candidates out carefully. Interview each candidate more than once. It is usually too difficult to get permission to hire new staff. Be sure you get it right each time.
- o Lesson #5: Actively promote on-going professional development for each person on your staff. Consider all the available options including more formalized extension courses, and professional seminars and workshops. I constantly hear, "We have so much work on our plate, I can't possibly free up time for staff to participate in professional development programs." It is critical to find a way! Not only will you have staff with more knowledge and tools to do their jobs, but you will have staff that feel valued and refreshed after being permitted to leave the office occasionally.
- o Lesson #6: Be sure to spend meaningful one-on-one time with each of your staff. Group meetings are fine, but most of us deeply appreciate having the opportunity to chat with our manager more personally. When these meetings occur, actively listen to what they are saying. This is not the time for the manager to do all the talking. Make sure that all your staff realizes that you consider each of them unique individuals. Each of your staff wants to feel valued, trusted, and respected by you, the in-house graphic design manager.

General Precepts

Finally, I'd like to offer you several of my general "precepts" which I discovered over the years. I have touched on most of these in more detail in this book:

- Involve others in the work of the graphic design function. This doesn't mean designing by committee but rather valuing business input from others. Know your key stakeholders and talk to them.
- Be careful of the terms you use when describing graphic design activities. You are not the "art service bureau." You don't have "clients" or "customers," you have business partners. You don't work "for" people; you work "with" people, who are your partners.
- Get your nose into everything that has to do with the business of your company. Read the business press to learn more about your industry. Attend major industry trade shows. Ride along with salespeople as they contact customers. Attend major sales meetings, and talk to attendees about what they are seeing in the marketplace. Visit every functional group in the company. Learn about their activities and their business issues. Determine what role graphic design plays in each function. Then become an ally, an advisor on graphic design issues for every facet of the business.
- Understand, and then effectively communicate, the added value of graphic design to the success of the business. Become an ally—a partner—particularly with marketing people. You will be attending to challenges they never even thought about.
- Take your show on the road. Leave the graphic design studio and take a tour through your business. Send pertinent graphic design articles to strategic supporters. Write a monthly or quarterly article emphasizing the value of graphic design for your

internal employee newspaper or magazine. Think about producing your own "Graphic Design Quarterly" for employees. Don't emphasize beauty or cleverness; rather, emphasize business results and benefits of good graphic design.

- Enlist the support of your CEO. Do everything possible to ensure that the CEO is aware of your positive business contributions to the company. Invite him or her to visit your studio.
- Research executives to raise consciousness. It will make them part of the solution when you ask them about their issues and concerns. When they are part of the solution, they are truly your partners.
- Create an easy-to-understand graphic design policy statement for your function. Include strategic objectives in the policy. You will need one for credibility.
- Get your own budget. Potential supporters won't come to you if you are going to charge them for the privilege. You must be easy and accessible to partner with—not costly.
- Involve your staff in every discussion. They will feel empowered, involved, and more motivated.
- Invest all the time that is required to achieve your goals. Over the long term, it will actually save you time in the future.
- Network with other graphic design professionals outside of your company. Isolation only leads to loneliness and narrow thinking. Attend design conferences and seminars to meet with your colleagues. Keep in touch with them as you share ideas, strategies, triumphs, and failures. Learn from one another.
- Pursue ongoing professional development opportunities. Use your human resources group for assistance.
- Never, ever, forget the target audience. Know and understand the people you are designing for.

- Always think strategically. Become a leader, not a follower. Be proactive.

In conclusion, the single, most critical lesson is that in order for in-house graphic design to have credibility and trust in the organization, graphic designers need to learn how to think and communicate in a different way. Graphic designers need to be able to articulate the value of graphic design clearly and simply, in terms that are more about the benefits of graphic design than the design itself. They need to study

the business in depth, and to determine the roles of all kinds of graphic design activity in that business. They also need to proactively develop partnerships and alliances throughout the organization in order to get the support and trust they so desperately want. Finally, graphic design needs to be a true strategic business partner throughout the organization, working with people, not for people. It is possible to bring design out of the "trenches" and onto the organization's main playing field, but it is up to the graphic design profession to make this transition on its own. <>

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