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Religion in Social Space

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Essay: Yogacara Panpsychism by Paul Edwards (1968)

Essay: The Other Side of Realism: Panpsychism and Yogācāra by Douglas Duckworth

Bibliography

Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion
by Various authors, 19 volumes, 5,406 pages
[Routledge, 9780367023867]

This set collects together in 19 volumes a wealth of texts on Sociology of Religion. An invaluable reference resource, it contains classic books on a wide range of topics, including: religion and violence, religion and family life, religion and society, culture and class.

> Humanities: Religion: Alternative Traditions & Esotericism, Christianity, Islam – Religion, Jewish Studies, New Religious Movements, Religion in Context, World Religions.
> Social Sciences: Sociology & Social Policy, Sociology of Religion, Christianity, Comparative, Cults & New Religious Movements, Islam, Judaism, Social Theory

Editorial Appraisal:

Religious studies have blossomed into a sui generis academic field of enquiry that has been fed by many last-century academic study traditions such as psychology, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, phenomenology, and more recently cultural theory and neurotheology. This selection of 19 volumes offers highlights from the backlist of Routledge that remain relevant to the study of the sociology of religion today. It offers both mainstays in sociology as well as some idiosyncratic choices, that may well get a student thinking that sociology has more vagaries than the textbooks pretend.

Volumes in the Series with Reviews and Excerpts:

1. Christiantown, USA by Richard Stellway [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367024901]

Are Christian families more - or less - strong than other families? How important is sexual satisfaction to marital happiness? What impact does the arrival of children have on a marriage? How does income affect marital satisfaction? What pressures confront employed wives and their families and how content are these women with their marriages?

To accurately assess the influence of religion on the marriages of churchgoers, this book, first published in 1990, considers the significance of other

important forces as well - level of education, job satisfaction, income, sex life, patterns of decision making, coping strategies, and the demands of parenting. While most studies have been content to assess religion's impact by looking at church membership or church attendance, this book looks at several facets of religiosity in an effort to understand more clearly just how and when religion affects marriage quality and whether its impact is positive or negative.

A final concern of the book is to assess how the current generation of couples is adapting to intergenerational changes such as increased occupational status, more egalitarian patterns of decision-making, and smaller families. It examines the role modifications and coping strategies that couples are employing to deal with these changes and with the demands that accompany them.

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Excerpt: While growing up in a rather conservative working-class home and while attending a middle-class Protestant church, I recall various pronouncements being made on the virtues of Christian marriage, the Christian family, and the Christian home. I remember viewing television messages such as "the family that prays together stays together," and reading similar slogans on church bulletin boards. I recall hearing members of the middle-class Protestant church I attended give testimonial accounts of how Christ had made all the difference in their marriages. The message I was picking up was very clear: Christians have good marriages, and non-Christians do not.

There may have been a time when I uncritically acceded to these claims but I do recall struggling with apparent exceptions to the rule. Upon sharing these concerns with other church members, it was suggested to me that these exceptions did not invalidate the rule (namely, that Christianity makes a difference) since those Christians who did have marital problems experienced them because they were not "good" Christians, they failed to pray sufficiently, or they lacked sufficient commitment to God or to the church. This line of logic helped sustain my belief, at least during my high school years, that Christianity does indeed "make a difference."

When I attended college I majored in the social sciences. In the course of study, I became aware that the education people receive, the income they earn, their work environments and a host of other factors affect their outlook and behavior. It became obvious that many forces, in addition to religion, have an impact on people's lives and, insofar as this book is concerned, their marriages and family life.

I was also struck by how members of various social classes and cultures often subscribe to highly divergent convictions about reality, and by the seeming inconsistencies in their claims. Yet I was impressed by the potential of social science research methodology to assess the validity of many of these claims. By devising scientific (empirically testable) hypotheses and obtaining appropriate data, many of these claims could be objectively verified or nullified.

I fully realize that these methods are not appropriate for determining the reality of God or of certain beliefs about Him. I also acknowledge that some people will take exception to these methods and those who would apply them because they feel threatened or misunderstood. Yet I stand convinced that social science methods, when combined with other means of examination and discovery, can be immensely valuable in the pursuit of truth. These methods are useful tools for assessing many of the claims that people make about marriage and the family and about the

alleged impact that religion (and other forces) has on the marriage and family relationship. Moreover, carefully conceived and conducted research can provide insight into areas in which people and their marriages are hurting, as well as the causes of this hurt. These insights can be helpful in devising productive ways to respond to these problem areas. It is my hope that the material presented in this book will heighten perception of the pressures and problems confronting couples in contemporary suburban marriages and provide direction to those concerned with productively responding to them.

Christiantown Families: The Yuppy Generation

This book is based on a study of family life in a community which we have chosen to call Christiantown because it is viewed by many as a center of religious organizational activity. Unlike so much of what one reads or hears these days, it is not based on hearsay or speculation. On the contrary, it is based on the lives and experiences of fifty couples who participated in a study of marital and parental adjustment, communication, and conflict resolution, and who reported about themselves. The study addresses the impact of religion on marriage relationships, and focuses on how these relationships are affected by work and money and sex. It examines how the current generation of couples are adapting to increased occupational status, new and more egalitarian patterns of decisionmaking, and smaller family size. Also noted are the coping strategies couples use to adjust to marital conflict and the demands of child rearing; as well as the everyday life concerns and problems of people residing in suburbia.

The findings reported in this study should provide valuable insight and direction to pastors, counselors, social workers, program planners, and other professionals seeking to respond meaningfully to the needs of married parents and their families. The findings should also be of interest to laymen seeking a general knowledge of the contemporary family and to social scientists interested in assessing the impact of numerous forces on the family.

Motivation for Investigation

From its inception, a predominant concern of this study has been to assess the nature of religion's impact on marriage and family life. There are two major reasons why such assessment is important. First, it helps to expose inappropriate, misleading, and sometimes debilitating stereotypes for what they are. Second, it helps to clarify the nature and extent of problems in need of attention.

Until recently there has been little scientific study of the nature of religion's impact on marriage and family relationships. What studies were available tended to treat religion rather casually, reporting to have measured it by means of a question or two concerning religious affiliation or church attendance.

Contrasting Impressions

In the absence of available and reliable data on the state of the Christian family, pronouncements have tended toward extremes. On the one hand there are those who maintain that Christian marriages are not only different from, but far superior to, all other (non-Christian) marriages. Their view maintains that the Christian family is healthier, happier, better adjusted, and more prosperous — in short, it has more of the good things that one might look for in a marriage. On the other hand, there are those who insist that such assertions are merely a sales pitch. They see Christians as people afflicted with the same shortcomings as their non-Christian neighbors, and believe any semblance of superior well-being among Christian couples and families is superficial at best. Some critics even assert that Christian couples and their families are worse off because of theological rigidity. Alleged conflicts include the aggressive exercise of "divine" authority by husbands over their wives and by parents over their children. They also include the supposed reluctance of some Christians to admit their sexual nature, a problem that results in sexual suppression with its associated problems of poor sexual communication and lack of fulfillment.

How are these contrasting claims to be explained? Advocates of each position maintain that their perspectives are valid, and by inference, each maintains that the claims of the other are false. After listening to proponents of the respective positions, it seems that much of the polarity on this issue is due more to presupposition than to fact. Some religionists are quite convinced, for example,

that personal sin lies at the heart of every human problem, and that personal salvation from sin will solve all maladies. From this vantage point, the fact that Christian couples — those who, by God's divine grace, have been saved from sin — are in all respects better off than their non-Christian counterparts is a foregone conclusion.

Others operate from a different set of assumptions. Secular humanists, for example, are inclined to deny the potential of Christianity—or any religion—to significantly improve man's lot. In fact, some believe that religion interferes with and minimizes the humanizing and mutually self-actualizing potential of marital relationships—a value which the humanists tend to prize. The suggestion that Christian couples are in any way better off than their non-Christian counterparts is, for them, preposterous. On the contrary, they would argue that because of trappings like dogmatism and self-righteousness, Christian couples are actually worse off. For them, this "truth" is a foregone conclusion.

Those of us who have attempted to base our assessment on something more than ideological bias and attention-getting media imagery have often had little more to go on than the impressions of pastors, counselors, attorneys, and psychologists, whose experiences are generally limited to a small and rather atypical group of clients. Moreover, their studies have frequently attempted to assess the quality of Christian marriages more on inference than on explicit, in-depth measurement.

Some Provocative Questions

When preparing our interview materials, a number of questions came to mind. Just how and when does religion make a difference? What things tend to worry or concern spouses and parents the most?

Are the critics right in their suggestion that Christian couples have some serious problems?

To assess correctly the influence of religion on marriage, it is important to put it into appropriate perspective by considering the significance of other forces as well. What about the impact of education, job satisfaction, and income? What role do these forces play in establishing marital adjustment? How do they influence marital attraction?

Sociologists David and Vera Mace believe that the answer to this last question is of utmost significance in the context of contemporary society. They point out that the past few decades have witnessed the rapid withering of traditional constraints against divorce. In previous times the prospect of financial calamity kept many from seeking divorce. But in the context of today's relative affluence and the financial independence experienced by increasing numbers of working women, much of the financial risk has been removed. Another traditional constraint fast disappearing is the concern and consequence of tarnished reputation. Changing attitudes have substantially reduced this risk as well. As far as legal constraints are concerned, one thrice-divorced man summarized the situation when he mused that getting a divorce today is easier than taking a girl to the senior prom, and given the elaborateness of some proms, divorce can be less expensive as well.

Perhaps the behavior of churches, those traditional bastions of marital stability, portrays the changing situation best. With divorce becoming more prevalent among members, few churches are inclined to uphold divorce as a basis for removal from membership. Some have even eliminated divorce as a disqualification for church leadership. More and more one hears of special Sunday school classes and other church-sponsored programs for divorced persons. As if to give a measure of credibility to the institution of divorce, a few congregations have even devised public divorce ceremonies.

Reflecting on the significance of these changes, the Maces conclude that marital stability today is less a matter of external coercion than it is a matter of internal cohesion. Yet this cohesion depends on people finding a sufficient measure of attraction in, and deriving a significant amount of satisfaction from, their marriages.

In our search for factors having a bearing on marital satisfaction and attraction, we were concerned about finding the answers to several related questions: (a) What role does religion play in making marriages attractive and satisfying? (b) How important is sexual satisfaction to marital happiness? (c) How does financial income affect marital satisfaction? (d) Are working wives inclined

to be less satisfied with their marriages? (e) Is marital adjustment positively or adversely affected by the arrival of children? Questions such as these will be addressed in the upcoming chapters.

Generational Change

In addition to the changes that have had an impact on all members of our society, we found that Christiantowners departed from their parents in three significant respects. As a group, Christiantown couples have a higher occupational status, and therefore are likely to have a greater amount of education and income than their parents. They also manifest more egalitarian decision making where both husband and wife endeavor to make decisions jointly. Finally, they have chosen to have fewer children than their parents had. As we consider the well-being of Christiantown marriages, we will examine the impact of these factors.

Why Christiantown?

The study site is Wheaton, Illinois. With its population of 43,000 (1980) and proximity to Chicago (approximately 25 miles) Wheaton accommodates a fair number of residents who commute the metropolis and those communities surrounding it. Although Wheaton residents manifest a fair array of religious beliefs and practices, because of the large number of church-related organizations located there, we have referred to it as Christiantown… <>

2. Ecstasy and Holiness: Counter Culture and the Open Society by Frank Musgrove [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367025014]

This book, first published in 1974, argues that the counterculture is not the outcome of alienation, but of opportunity, being the result of a new generational consciousness, an openness which has characterised industrial societies of the West since the 1950s. Its roots lie in economic expansion and population movement and growth, the same factors that are cited in the decline of religiousness.

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Excerpt: We have argued that counter cultures arise in rich societies. But they are not simple and direct reactions to unprecedented wealth and new means of production: they are neither ascetic withdrawal out of surfeit and revulsion, nor joyous abandon at the prospect of still greater abundance. Counter cultures arise with steep population growth and intensive migration associated with great economic transformations. In these circumstances traditional social bonds are disrupted and old statuses brought into question. The counterculture is hungry for rootedness and community but lives a life of improvisation in loose, shifting social networks. The counterculture is not alienated, but anomic.

There is no deep and irreconcilable split between the political and the aesthetic in counter-cultural actions and beliefs. The counterculture as a group of ideas or as groups of people is apparently splintered, contradictory, divided. But we have argued an underlying unity and demonstrated a high correlation among apparently divergent attitudes. The counterculture has shifted profoundly in emphasis in its short history over less than a decade. It is less innocent and naïve, more pragmatic and instrumental yet probably more interested in madness and meditation, in exploration of the disordered regions of society and the mind. The last boundary to be denied is between madness and sanity.

We have argued that the counterculture is marginal, and that in marginality lies ecstasy — sharpened perceptions and re-ordered perspectives which come from a position outside the taken-for-granted, the socially programmed and the culturally prescribed. It is perhaps only in margins that true learning and self-awareness are possible (as great educators through the ages, with their deep contempt for relevance, have intuitively known): in the margins we are robbed of familiar

systems of classification which order, preprocess and filter the bombardment of impression and experience; the world is experienced with a terrifying immediacy and directness. Ecstasy has a ragged edge of melancholy. We have argued for due recognition and reinstatement of marginal men.

We have argued that the counterculture rises with weak rather than strong groups and 'grids' but aspires to the final dissolution of social roles and perceptual—experiential boundaries. And yet it seeks humanness in new categories, holiness in reclassification. It finds unreal and degrading the ancient boundary between men and animals: the counterculture is vegetarian and its imagination is haunted not by metamorphosed animals, but by metamorphosed machines. The confusion of men and machines is the new uncleanliness, the final abomination. We shall see science and scientists, technology and technologists, increasingly segregated and kept firmly in their subordinate, non-human place. In the new classification and definition of holiness the scientist is obscene. The consumption of unprocessed products is ritual purification which keeps man in his proper category and proclaims his holiness.

We have argued that the counterculture very deeply affects a minority of the 'new generation': it is rooted in the generational consciousness of those who were born around 1938-9, were in their 'teens in the late 'fifties, and today are rising forty. The new generational consciousness is the outcome not of repression and deprivation, but of a new affluence and openness; it is non-deferential, questioning the legitimacy of all power and authority (and led occasionally into tolerance by questioning the sanctity of the social contract itself. It dares even to question the authority and the legitimacy of majorities).

The counterculture is about human dignity and personal meaning: it finds the exercise of power no less degrading than submission. And this is one of its central dilemmas: the innocent anarchism of its first efflorescence has been succeeded by a more realistic exploration not of impractical zero power, but of minimum power. It is involved, like Marcuse, in the difficult definition of 'surplus repression' and acceptance of some inescapable residual. The commune is its principal laboratory for experiments in minimum power. Even sharing needs some organization. There is a tendency for the milk bottles never to be put out.

The counter culture probably 'peaks' in the 'twenties. It is not an exclusively or perhaps characteristically adolescent phenomenon. There may be a second 'peaking' in the late forties, in the form of executive dropout. But this may be no more than early retirement, when 45-year-old accountants decide to live (modestly) on their savings and take up painting and weaving. We have no systematic — or even exploratory — study of executive dropout, which seems to be occurring more widely in America and perhaps gathering momentum here. But we now have no Empire to drop out into; and the Royal Geographical Society is less prone to finance drop-out explorers who disappear up the Niger or set up desert harems. They are to be met with their sleeping bags in colder climes: on the ferry to Iona, or writing fairy tales, painting, and making somewhat inept excavations on Islay and Mull. The Hebridean world is a magical (even mystical) marginal world with a potentially great counter-cultural future ahead.

We have argued that the counterculture is distinguished by its rejection of careers and even of work as conventionally defined; and we suggested at the outset that it had something of the appearance of genteel poverty. This is not the poverty made necessary by overall scarcity; on the contrary, it is voluntary poverty in the context of plenty. (It may take the form of choosing to work in an undemanding and fairly poorly paid job well below one's capacities and qualifications.) But neither is it renunciation and self-mortification. It has, indeed, the mark of an untamed aristocracy rather than a pinched gentility. Its essentially aristocratic posture is notable in its attitude to time, in its contempt for and aloofness from the organization and processes of material production; its disdain for plumbing; and its involvement not in cautious, incremental progressions, but in exploits — discontinuous, unpredictable, without an obvious past or certain future. The counterculture has rediscovered the exploit as a means of expression and education. Life is not decently, modestly, and unobtrusively cumulative: it is periodically

explosive, a constellation of exploits rather than a finely graded array of achievements.

There is a sense in which the counterculture is a new leisure class. It is true that the counterculture rejects current conceptions of leisure, which it sees as dehumanized as work — routinized, commercialized, `not the antithesis of the world of work but, with its pressures (it) identifies itself completely with that world." And the counterculture is no leisure class as Veblen conceived it: marked, above all, by 'conspicuous consumption'. The counterculture resembles Veblen's leisure class only in the 'irrelevance' of its preoccupations and contempt for industrial production. But Veblen's leisure class, for all its archaic traits of character and 'disserviceable anachronisms', was certainly not 'marginal': it was extremely busy, for it included the occupations of 'government, war, sports and devout observances'. It was deeply rooted in society, even through its leisure activities (in clubs, at race-meetings and country house parties) which added social prestige to power and so turned it into authority. It was rooted, too, through property and its management — and through public honours which tie otherwise very private men to society. The counter culture as leisure class has no such material or symbolic social ties: its marginality is more like the pauper's than the clubman's.

Curiously, the counterculture is often like the social world for which Veblen hankered, and with which he contrasted the new leisure class: peaceful, cooperative, small-scale rural communities which de-emphasized both property and proficiency:

'They are small groups of a simple (archaic) structure; they are economically peaceable and sedentary; they are poor; and individual ownership is not a dominant feature of their economic system ... Indeed, the most notable trait common to members of such communities is a certain amiable inefficiency when confronted with force or fraud.

Veblen, at the turn of the century, was pointing the way to the greening of America.

The significance of automation

We have argued that the counter culture in some sense anticipates a world of great wealth based on a highly automated production system. It does so in the sense that it recognizes the wisdom of living well within the level of consumption that automation makes theoretically possible. The full economic potential is a safety-net that may never be used.

Those who are 'into automation' have an unbounded faith in its revolutionary possibilities. Studies carried out in the nineteen-fifties are replete with examples of greatly increased productivity with a dramatically reduced labour force. Norbert Wiener made confident predictions: it is perfectly clear, he maintained, that automation will produce unemployment 'compared with which the depression of the 'thirties will seem a pleasant joke." Marcuse saw in such developments unprecedented hope for humanity: 'Utopian possibilities are inherent in the technical and technological forces of advanced capitalism and socialism: the rational utilization of these forces on a global scale could terminate poverty and scarcity within the foreseeable future.'

In England Bagrit argued in the mid-nineteen-sixties that 'We have now reached a point where we could be moving into a golden age for most human beings . . . He predicted (in his Reith Lectures in 1964) that the concept of charity would be obsolete within twenty-five years since the majority of people would be supported without being productive.' Gabor's vision is not dissimilar. Even the middle ranks of 'organization men', it is argued, will be made superfluous by the new information technology.

One of the most recent pronouncements by computer men in America chides the layman for his disbelief: 'The majority of persons outside computer circles totally underestimate (automation's) potential and the speed at which the changes are coming upon us.'" They foresee unprecedented changes in the next fifteen years: 'The potential wealth that the good use of computers opens up to us is staggering.' Their most cautious estimate is that within two decades the average American will work a four-day week and take three months' vacation a year.

But it never seems quite to happen. On the contrary, labour shortages seem to become more acute and advanced economies survive only by importing cheap labour on a very large scale. (Thus in 1963 foreign workers constituted no less than 12

per cent of Switzerland's total population; a more modest 2.2 per cent in France and 1.5 per cent in Germany.) 'Abnormal' circumstances always seem to intervene and upset predictions. Thus Pollock, in the nineteen-fifties, foresaw a large 'surplus population' and argued that only America's war economy in times of peace had prevented a reduction of the labour force by 15 per cent.

Bagrit foresees a version of the counterculture as a direct outcome of automation, great wealth and a largely redundant population. The counterculture anticipates the future in a more subtle and appropriate way. For the counterculture confronts the paradox that an over-rich society cannot consume all that it can produce. Rich postindustrial societies choke on their wealth. The counterculture appropriately anticipates the future by cultivating a simple life. The point at which the postindustrial society is most effective is significantly below its level of maximum production. Thus, as Illich points out (in Tools for Conviviality and elsewhere), we reach a point in our consumption of motor cars where we lose more time than we gain by using them: they create more distances than they help to bridge. Our consumption of schooling, health services and other commodities reaches a similar watershed. There will probably be no need to wait hopefully for all men to renounce greed so that consumption may fall to a level below which this inversion occurs; transport systems and formal, qualified-teacher-run schools will simply become inoperative: most adults would have to become teachers and we should reach most urban destinations faster by bike.

It is a further paradox of the highly developed postindustrial society that many goods and services become more expensive as they become less valuable to the consumer. Costs rise as utility declines. (Motor cars are again a good example, and so is formal education.) This is, perhaps, some consolation for the dispossessed. But in over-rich societies many services previously available to most people at low cost are accessible only to the very rich. This is partly because we insist on professionalizing (and paying correspondingly professional salaries for) quite humble services which require modest talents (a partial solution to the overproduction of highly educated men and women who expect high returns from their long years of schooling). The de-professionalization of subprofessional services (in the less skilled sectors of education, medicine, social work, commerce and engineering) would be painful and perhaps politically suicidal — but finally inevitable when we face up to the absurdity that in societies of unprecedented wealth most citizens cannot afford services readily available (albeit on an unprofessional basis) in simple societies of abject poverty. The promised superabundance of post-industrialism is credit that must never be cashed in full, a promissory note that cannot be honoured. It is for life within limits below the theoretical full potential of a postindustrial economy that the counter culture is frugally vegetarian and without appetite for haute cuisine. <>

3. The Elementary Forms of the New Religious Life by Roy Wallis [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367025038]

This book, first published in 1984, examines the whole range of new religious movements which appeared in the 1960s and 1970s in the West. It develops a wide-ranging theory of these new religions which explains many of their major characteristics. Some of the movements are well-known, such as Scientology, Krishna Consciousness, and the Unification Church. Others such as the Process, Meher Baba, and 3-HO are much less known. While some became international, others remained local; in other ways, too, such as style, belief, organisation, they exhibit enormous diversity.

The movements studied here are classified under three ideal types, world-rejecting, world-affirming and world-accommodating, and from here the author develops a theory of the origins, recruitment base, characteristics, and development patterns which they display. The book offers a critical exploration of the theories of the new religions and analyses the highly contentious issue of whether they reflect the process of secularisation, or whether they are a countervailing trend marking the resurgence of religion in the West.

Contents

Excerpt: This essay presents a framework for conceptualising the new religious movements which have emerged in the West in the post-second world war period, particularly the extremely diverse range of movements which became prominent in the 1960s. This conceptualisation elaborates a logical trichotomy into three analytical types, and from this develops a theory of the origins, recruitment bases, characteristics, and developmental patterns which they display. Although some of the movements have been widely publicised, even attaining a certain notoriety through mass media treatment, for example: Scientology, Krishna Consciousness, the Unification Church, and the Manson Family; others such as The Process, Meher Baba, and 3-HO, are much less well known. While some became international, others remain small, local entities, or have already virtually disappeared. In multitudinous other ways too - style, ritual, belief, organisation, and so on - they exhibit enormous diversity.

While less discerning commentators have sought to describe and explain all the new religions as a unified phenomenon, or to treat each one as unique, more thoughtful and perceptive scholars such as Bryan Wilson have sought to distinguish them in terms of a limited number of types. Wilson, for example, constructs a classification on the basis of three themes which he finds to characterise the teachings of the new religions. The themes are:

> that salvation is gained by becoming acquainted with a special, perhaps secret, knowledge from a mystic source; that ultimate salvation and knowledge comes from the liberation of powers within the self; that real salvation is attained by belonging to a saved community, whose life-style and concerns are utterly divergent from those of worldly people.

Wilson's treatment of the new religions has been one of the more interesting and enlightening, but none the less it must be said that classification is of limited utility unless linked to a theory which explains salient differences distinguished by the classification.

Frederick Bird distinguishes between the various new religious movements in terms of 'the relationship of followers to masters or the relationship of the religious seekers to the sacred power they revere'. Thus, adherents may become '(a) devotees of a sacred lord or lordly truth, (b) disciples of a revered or holy discipline, (c) or apprentices skilled at unlocking the mysteries of a sacred, inner power'. In the first category would fall Neo-Pentecostals, Divine Light Mission and Krishna Consciousness. (Descriptions of these groups - albeit inevitably brief and selective - will be presented in the pages that follow.) In the disciple category fall some of the smaller groups such as Integral Yoga. or the Zen Centers in the American West. (Groups of this type have not been widely described, but on Zen,) . Examples of apprenticeship groups would be Silva Mind Control, est, Transcendental Meditation, or Scientology. Bird seeks to show that these different types of movement provide different ways of coping with the problem of 'moral accountability' which he believes to be one of the factors in their appeal.

Thomas Robbins and Dick Anthony have produced one of the best known and most influential typologies of the new religious movements. Drawing theoretically upon Robert Bellah's conception of religious evolution and 'civil religion', they argue that the new religious movements are to be understood as a response to a crisis in American civil religion. I shall examine this theory more closely in chapter four, when I consider the relationship between such movements and secularisation. Here, however, I wish to explore the typology which is associated with this theory.

Robbins and Anthony argue that two main types of response to the 'decline of civil religion' can be observed in the new religions: the emergence of 'dualistic movements which reaffirm elements of

traditional moral absolutism in an exaggerated and strident manner', and 'monistic movements which affirm relativistic and subjectivistic moral meaning systems' (ibid.). The former type are sometimes called 'civil religion sects' by Robbins and Anthony.

Dualistic 'Civil Religion Sects'

These movements articulate a protest against the ambiguity, relativism and permissiveness of modern culture, and reaffirm a 'theocentric ethical dualism'. They also aspire to reorder the political process and its assumptions, generally in a conservative direction. They fall into two sub-types: 'neo-fundamentalist', such as the Jesus People; and 'revisionist syncretic', such as the Unification Church. Other groups within this type are the Children of God, the People's Temple, and Synanon. In the face of resistance to their efforts to recast the political arena, or to initiate its transformation by supernatural means, they may 'create alternative communities as models of future American society'. They may thus become regimented 'total institutions' and sharply segregate their members from former associations and the wider society.

'MONISTIC GROUPS'

These movements articulate a 'vision of the universe in which there is an ultimate metaphysical unity or "oneness" which dissolves polarities and imparts an ultimately illusory or epiphenomenal quality (Maya) to the material world. They cultivate an inner spiritual awakening and 'the exploration of intrapsychic consciousness'. They may thus converge with psychotherapeutic preoccupations. They tend to be ethically relativistic. Various sub-types of monistic movement are suggested, depending on the means by which enlightenment is secured, i.e. technical or charismatic, and on whether enlightenment is seen as involving one or two levels.

Technical movements employ defined techniques and standardised procedures of an instrumental kind, for example, TM, est, Scientology and (surprisingly) Krishna Consciousness. Charismatic movements promise enlightenment 'through veneration and emulation of leaders who are regarded as exemplars of advanced consciousness'. Examples are Meher Baba, Guru Maharaj-Ji, and Charles Manson. One-level movements see their members as being enlightened as soon as they are converted, or are movements in which enlightenment is seen as being attained very rapidly. Again TM and est are offered as examples, along with Scientology. Two-level movements view enlightenment as 'a characteristic of a rare stage of spiritual evolution', for example, Meher Baba, Yogi Bhajan (Healthy-Happy-Holy Organisation).

This typology is ingenious and insightful. It illuminates the vast plethora of movements by dividing them into a set of categories which are economical in terms of the criteria employed, and which appear to be strong predictors of other attributes of the movements concerned. However, it is not without difficulties. ISKCON (Krishna Consciousness) may be monistic, as would be expected from a movement so clearly committed to Hindu traditional thought, yet it also possesses an aspiration to reform the social and political order, and has developed a model of the new world in its communal endeavours, such as New Vrndāvana. Thus, in many ways it would seem to have more in common with the Children of God and the Unification Church, than with est or TM. It also seems somewhat curious to refer to the devotional practice of ISKCON, notably chanting the Hare Krishna mantra, as merely a technique for securing enlightenment.

Frederick Bird has also raised some queries about the blanket description of the eastern-originated groups as monistic, 'not only because of the ontological and ethical dualisms which seem to be inter-related with Hindu Vedantism . . . but also because the significant differences between religions arising out of Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu and Taoist traditions are blurred. . . .' He argues that some of the groups identified by Robbins and Anthony as monistic are, in fact, dualistic, suggesting some ambiguity about the correct application of these labels. Moreover, I would also argue that some of the groups in the monistic category have quite significant political aspirations - albeit not of a nationalistic kind (e.g. Scientology, and ISKCON, perhaps even TM in more recent years). On the other hand, it is not entirely clear to me that a movement like Synanon can be said to advance a political perspective which reaffirms a

'theocentric ethical dualism', as the basis for the re-invigoration of national consensus, and thus that it qualifies as a 'civil religion sect'. Therefore, not all dualistic movements would seem to qualify as 'civil religion sects'. Some seem to have no political orientation at all to speak of (e.g. the followers of Brother Evangelist).

The Robbins and Anthony typology has achieved a substantial measure of descriptive validity, and its dimensions do appear to have some value in predicting further features of the movements in question. It must be recognised, however, that any given body of phenomena is susceptible to classification in terms of an infinite number of typological schemes. Thus, ultimately, the test of a typology lies not in its components, but rather in the uses to which it can be put, particularly that of identifying the significant characteristics of the phenomena in terms of a theory which turns out to be able to bear the heat of critical appraisal. It is at this point that the adequacy of the Robbins and Anthony schema falls most into question, but discussion of their theory, and that of Frederick Bird, will be reserved for a later stage, when I take up the issue of the role of secularisation, in chapter four.

These various typologies, then, all have considerable value in providing insight into the beliefs and structure of the new religious movements. However, in the pages that follow I shall advance an alternative typology which seems not only to provide some leverage on the divergent forms of the new religious movements, but which is also linked to an analysis of their sources of support, and of their developmental patterns.

A Typology of New Relgions

The typology I wish to present requires the construction of a conceptual space. This conceptual space is formed by the components of a logical trichotomy, the elements of which constitute an exhaustive set of ways in which a new religious movement may orient itself to the social world into which it emerges. A new movement may embrace that world, affirming its normatively approved goals and values; it may reject that world, denigrating those things held dear within it; or it may remain as far as possible indifferent to the world in terms of its religious practice, accommodating to it otherwise, and exhibiting only mild acquiescence to, or disapprobation, of, the ways of the world. A visual representation of this is presented in Figure 1.

I contend that there are definite types of new religion associated with these orientations, and in the two principal cases (rejection of the world and affirmation of the world) , knowledge of the dominant orientation is an excellent predictor of a wide range of further attributes. These will be presented as ideal types, not as mutually exclusive empirical categories. Empirical instances will therefore only approximate to these types, of course, often combining elements of more than one orientation. None the less, some actual cases approximate extremely closely to these constructs and will be drawn upon frequently as sources of appropriate illustrative material.

The third orientation, accommodation to the world, is not associated with an analytical type of new religion comparable in scope to rejection of the world and affirmation of the world. While the two latter orientations seem to create imperatives of, and constraints upon organisation, belief and behaviour over a very wide range, accommodation to the world seems compatible with a broad spectrum of forms and ideologies. Nevertheless it is possible to say something of the features and sources of such a religious movement and this will be briefly essayed.

The world-accommodating type of new religion will be treated more briefly than the other two, since it is less significant for the purpose of characterising those new religions which predominantly emerged in the post second world war period. Movements closest to this type often emerged in an earlier period than is our focus here, and are of little numerical significance (see Wallis on the Aetherius Society) , or they are an 'added blessing', an adjunct to an existing religious attachment (as in Neo-Pentecostalism) , rather than a complete alternative to it as a path to salvation. The only important exception to this is the western branch of the Japanese-originated movement, Soka Gakkai. The type is principally important, however, as a possible developmental path for the two main movement types, as they move away from an initial stage of zealous purity. Hence it is of importance

also, as a source of insight into the developmental tensions and internal strains in the beliefs and life-style of actually existing cases.

As a final preliminary, it must be observed that this analysis - the conceptual scheme and theoretical observations - are designed to meet only a limited purpose. There is no claim advanced here that the analysis is of universal applicability, relevant to all new religious movements in no matter what historical or cultural circumstances. The aim of this work is a more modest one, essentially involving an attempt to make some sense of the forms and dynamics of new religious movements in the West in the period since the second world war. I would be the very first to admit that the range of movements which emerged in this historically and culturally specific period differed in a number of ways from those appearing in other times and places. The restricted nature of the case being advanced must be borne in mind throughout.

I thus entirely agree with Dr Bryan Wilson's recent observations on this matter:

Perhaps the time has come to recognise the impossibility - in any terms that are not unduly vague - of any general theory of new movements. Certainly we should not aim - as sociologists have sometimes been wont to do - at a theory that seeks to be outside time and space, even though we wish our concepts to apply outside and beyond the confines of any one culture or historical epoch. If sociology is not to abandon the real world for purely theoretical artifacts, then, we are always likely to be in some degree captive to the empirical circumstances of given cultures, of geography, and of history.



Figure 1 Orientations of the new religions to the world

Figure 1 is intended to provide a broadly representational visual configuration rather than an exact mapping. The latter would not be possible, except for an extremely narrow time span, because a movement may shift around considerably during the course of its development. The representational convention employed places groups and movements which closely approximate the analytical types in the appropriate angles of the conceptual space. In the rectangular central section are located examples of more clearly 'mixed' cases.

A superficial appraisal of this construct by those possessing a passing acquaintance with the work of J. Milton Yinger may suggest a similarity with his conceptualisation of types of sect. There is, indeed a similarity - although this typology was not based upon his in any way, deriving rather from an earlier formulation in terms of a continuum between the base types - in that both employ a triangular visual configuration, and both are attempts to conceptualise types of new religious movement in terms of an attitude toward 'the world'. There is even some broad overlap in types.



Figure 2 Yinger's typology of sects (Source: Yinger, 1970:278)

Figure 2 Yinger's typology of sects

Yinger speaks of 'Acceptance' sects, by which he refers to what Wilson has termed 'Gnostic sects', and this category is clearly very similar to my 'world-affirming' category (see Yinger, 1970: 275). However, his 'Aggressive' sects are not at all coterminous with my 'world-rejecting' category, in that he has in mind here what Wilson has called 'Conversionist' and 'Adventist' sects. While the latter would be included in my 'world-rejecting' type, the former certainly would not. Moreover, my 'world-rejecting' type also includes Yinger's 'Avoidance' (Wilson's 'Introversionist') sects which thus do not form a separate type for my purpose here.

Yinger's typology has nothing approaching my world-accommodating type. Hence my construct is neither derived from that of Yinger, nor does it seek to supplant it, since its purpose is solely to help illuminate a particular range of new religious movements, i.e. those emerging in the West in the last quarter century or so. Yinger's construct aims at far broader descriptive utility, particularly in historical coverage and it is not my intention to dispute its general usefulness. Indeed the convergence of Yinger, Wilson and myself in approach and conceptualisation - in so far as it occurs - suggests that there really is something there, which we each articulate in different ways for our separate purposes.

In endeavouring to show the utility of my conceptualisation of the new religions and the theoretical insight which it makes possible, I shall need to draw upon a very broad range of available descriptive material and I am fortunate, therefore, to undertake this task at a stage when a considerable number of case studies of particular movements have appeared. Although some reference will be made to primary sources, it is upon this extant body of studies - by sociologists, anthropologists, theologians, journalists and even by former members - that I shall primarily draw. My use of any particular reference is not necessarily an endorsement of it as a whole, merely the utilisation of a particular point in such a work normally perfectly well available in other sources, but perhaps most conveniently, dramatically, or succinctly stated in the reference or quotation chosen. At some points, however, I shall draw upon my own research materials - in the form both of interviews and movement documents - which I have gathered over the ten years or so during which I have been engaged upon research into various of these movements. <>

4. God's Blueprints: A Sociological Study of Three Utopian Sects by John McKelvie Whitworth [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367025069]

Viewing the world with abhorrence, members of utopian sects isolate themselves from its influence. As this book, first published in 1975, shows, they seek to establish and promulgate radically distinctive forms of society according to what they claim to be God's blueprint and which they believe are destined by his intervention and their example to spread throughout the world. Rooted in the sociology of religion and more particularly in the concepts of sectarianism and communitarianism, this study presents an analysis of three sects: the Shakers; the Oneida Community; and the Bruderhof. The author examines the origins, religious conceptions, social structure and composition, modes of social control, and development of each group; and in a concluding chapter he discusses the utopian sect as a distinctive social form.

Contents
1. Introduction
2. Origins and Expansion of the Shakers, 1747-1835
3. The Shakers – Internal Revival and Decline, 1835-1905
4. The Perfectionists of Oneida – Origins and Incipient Communitarianism, 1831-1848
5. The Oneida Community – Communism of Property and Affections, 1848-1881
6. A Contemporary Utopian Sect – the Society of Brothers (or Bruderhof)
7. Conclusions

Excerpt: In the last quarter of the twentieth century there are few more important topics of study than the forms and styles and fate of utopianism. It is very easy to suppose that a scholarly study of three utopian sects provides mere footnotes to `real' history and to `normal' society. In fact, the footnotes to history often provide its most instructive material. One has only to recollect that for Tacitus and Suetonius Christianity itself had the status of an obscure footnote to see the force of this point. And the sects here described are part of the persistent undertow of Christian aspiration and expectation.

There are many ways of viewing utopian sects. There is, first of all, the point of view adopted by the sect itself. For the members of the holy community its boundaries form a colony of heaven, and the world outside is an overgrown untidy garden within which sin and corruption rage. Against that world they attempt to create the Lord's garden through what Dr Whitworth calls `viable isolation'. To achieve `viable isolation' you must first build a wall to protect the planting of the Lord. For some sectarians this is enough: they avert

their eyes from the world outside, and cultivate their own enclave of salvation. They have discovered how a garden should be run and they will now proceed to run the garden that way to all eternity. This form of perfectionist aspiration is, as Dr Whitworth shows, inherently stagnant and usually produces a `peasant' character: heavy, repetitious and circumscribed, though not necessarily uncreative or resistant with regard to specific economic and agricultural techniques.

Not all sects look inward towards the tiny enclave of perfection: some look over the wall, signal to the world outside and even make carefully controlled forays into the uncultivated mess brought about by sin. These belong to the kind of sect described with such scholarly care by Dr Whitworth. He gives us a historical account of three such sects and a sociological analysis of their origins. He also describes the sequence of their development, their techniques of social control, their options and limitations, and their ways of monitoring the traffic across their boundaries with the outside world.

Within a general category of `utopian sect' certain problems are solved in different ways, each involving specific opportunity costs and achieving a characteristic partial mesh with the solution of other problems. For example, two central difficulties are rooted in sexuality and property: which of these is to be held in common, or are both? Is sexuality to be denied, heavily restricted, or opened up to wider permutations than those available in `ordinary society'? All the central problems of community size, local economic viability, social stability and innovation, the ownership of goods and the expression of sexuality can be examined instructively within the context of utopian sects.

I have already trespassed on the second way of viewing sects: that of the social analyst. For the analyst of social arrangements there is more to the study of utopian sects than the balance of options within what are called `system problems'. There is also the interest belonging to the `uncontrolled experiment'. For the sectarian himself, of course, his experiment is incomparable and unique; for the sociologist the sectarians' sense of uniqueness is an item in a set of marginal variations between one example of a sub-category of sect and another example. The sociologist carefully moves through the superabundant data of religiosity and isolates a sub-class within which he observes the variant forms and their empirical correlates. The `uncontrolled experiment' of a given sect becomes an item in the vast laboratory of human history. The sociologist observes that solution to system problem X in a particular sub-category of sect S is susceptible to a, b, c ... n solutions, of which a and e are peculiarly congruent and empirically likely in conjunction with external circumstances of such and such kind. He then asks why this is so, i.e. he enquires why the socio-logic of this solution to a problem is congruent with that solution to another problem. And by working over all the extant examples he begins to approximate the likely sets of congruences, the possible incompatibilities, and the conditions under which the heavy congruences are likely to recur and those under which the incompatibilities are relatively likely. This approach is based on categorization, cross-categorization and comparison over time and over social and geographical space. To be quite short about it: Dr Whitworth employs the `comparative' method, the logic of which (as distinct from certain practical limitations) is identical with statistical logic. That is why Dr Whitworth begins with the problem of categorization.

The sociological study of sects teases the analyst with problems which transcend either issues of optimal size, economic viability, sexual regulation, boundary maintenance, or of what is involved in the logic of comparison. One is confronted by further questions about which most of us are too ill-informed to attempt a confident answer. The sect clearly sees itself in several roles: as exemplary and as anticipatory, as both set aside and potentially universal It is small, but God will use the small things of the world to confound the mighty. These varieties of self-conception are in sober fact varying empirical possibilities in human history. The sociologist wants to know whether these experiments are in their present form or in some transmuted form a marginal development permanently incapable of being universalized or whether they are nuclei which indicate the form of the future. He is teased by the issue as to whether they are inherently and forever parasitic on the fact that other men are not as they are, or whether all mankind will one day come together on some

basis pre-figured by the utopian sect. This set of queries fits into an enormous intellectual task: the role and place of utopian sects within the general schemata of social development. Given the vagueness of criteria, the lack of adequate knowledge, the disjunctions and partial disconnections of human history, and the reappearance of problems at higher levels which seemingly belonged to lower levels, there is room for varied answers, including maybe the answer which rejects the very notion of social development. Quite a lot begins to turn on one's own theological or philosophical position and the way this meshes in with and selects from the empirical data.

Thus the `theology' or social philosophy and philosophical anthropology of the observer itself plays a role in reflecting on the long-term implications of the theology, social philosophy and philosophical anthropology of the sectarians. It is not a determining role and it is one partially controlled by the data. When someone who does not believe in any of the varieties and transmutations of the notion of the Kingdom of God on earth is confronted by sectarian phenomena he views them quite differently from someone who believes that sectarianism is the preliminary essay in a perfection which must eventually be revealed to us. So far as I am concerned sectarian utopias represent the impossible possibility without which very little is possible. Their failures are endemic and inherent and are part of the ineradicable paradoxes of human organization. These paradoxes may be manoeuvred past with greater or less skill, and their worst consequences can in certain circumstances be ameliorated, but they are as implacable as Scylla or Charybdis. And those who deny this implacability, sociologists included, are themselves creatures of delusion identical with, analogous to and partly derived from the kind of utopian thought they are studying. Unfortunately, every generation has partly to relearn and re-cognize these paradoxes in its bitter experience, and by the time the lesson is relearnt the suffering of human beings has been that much the greater. Yet, of course, it is utopian to lament the fact that each generation has to relearn the limitations governing its own existence, though one may well protest at those modern systems of education which positively encourage an ignorance of limitations. A book like Dr Whitworth's should be read because it is both a primer of limitations for those with the wit to understand, as well as a commentary on those signals of transcendence which point beyond themselves and make faith the substance of things hoped for. Sociology does not encourage us to give up hope, but it does show us — or rather it is capable of showing us — what the genuine limits of hope are.

There are, if I may simplify, two schools of thought about Utopianism. One is that we move instalment by instalment along the way that leads to New Jerusalem. The road is one and the destination clear even though the way is rough and wayfaring men 'err therein'. The other is that we are constantly running against points or limits at which the aims that took us up to that point begin to turn their sharp edges progressively against us. As we push harder and harder the complex, many-sided blades of reality bite us more and more cruelly. This is why systems of liberation encountering a limit and a boundary begin to resemble and eventually approximate systems of oppression. Their own potentialities are not expanded but eroded by their extension according to some paradigm of persistent advance. There is advance, or rather there has been and can be advance, but this is only possible on the basis of experience of limitation and of the paradoxes attendant on alternative options, which are in part at least, mutually exclusive. Of this, Utopians whether Christian or Marxist or whatever, understand too little, but history and society are the arena within which, inevitably, they are forced to learn. If they won't cooperate they will be dragged. They might save themselves a certain amount of trouble by reading about previous Utopians, without using the characteristic Utopian trick of supposing that those they see as precursors are imperfect imitations of a reality yet more perfect to be embodied and exemplified in themselves.

There is one final question which leads me back to the point made at the beginning about Christianity. Whoever reads the literature of Utopianism, whether based on a swift, divine transition to New Jerusalem or on the more gradualist, semi-reformist notions so expertly discussed in those pages by Dr Whitworth, asks himself a question about

Christianity. Is the Galilean movement of the first century merely the most remarkable and celebrated instance of these impossible possibilities? In one sense it clearly is. Christianity constantly creates enclaves of perfection: those inside the church described in various works on religious orders and those outside the church described here. But the seeds of perfection clearly blow over the enclosed garden wall and fructify in the most unpredictable manner in the social world outside.

And there is also in Christianity the element of limitation and of a sombre celebration of the sharp blades which sink deeper and deeper in all human beings who advance towards the perfect society. Christianity is itself double edged: New Jerusalem yes, and the impalement of man. No one organization can fully contain within itself both this hope and this ineluctable sorrow, except at the symbolic level. Utopianism is one arm of the Christian thrust, separating itself off, and fruitfully impaled on the limitations of the world. <>

5. A House Divided: Protestantism, Schism and Secularization by Steve Bruce [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367025267]

The main concern of this study, first published in 1990, is the part played by Protestantism in the complex of social processes of 'secularization'. The book deals with the way in which Protestant schism and dissent paved the way for the rise of religious pluralism and toleration; and it also looks at the fragility of the two major responses to religious pluralism – the accommodation of liberal Protestantism and the sectarian rejection of the conservative alternative. It examines the part played by social, economic and political changes in undermining the plausibility of religion in western Europe, and puts forward the argument that core Reformation ideas must not be overlooked, particularly the repercussions of different beliefs about authority in competing Christian traditions.

Contents
1. Secularization
2. The Fragmentation of Protestantism
3. Dissent and Toleration
4. Establishments and Toleration
5. The Rise of Liberal Protestantism
6. The Decline of Liberal Protestantism
7. The Conservative Response to Pluralism
8. American Protestantism
9. The Spiral of Decline

Excerpt: The logic of Protestantism is clearly in favour of voluntary principle, to a degree that eventually makes its sociologically unrealistic.

In the introductory description of the collection of his essays from which this quotation is taken, David Martin says: 'This short book contains several long books which I will never write' (Martin 1978b: 1). It is my belief that the single sentence quoted contains one of those books that Martin will never write, and so I have presumed to write it for him.

The main concern of this study is the part played by Protestantism in the complex of social processes which, for brevity, we call `secularization'. Martin's claim that Protestantism is, eventually, sociologically unrealistic, will be examined at a variety of levels and will, I hope, be sustained by a detailed presentation of the evidence. The two main themes of the book relate to the precariousness of Protestantism. The first half deals with the way in which Protestant schism and dissent paved the way for the rise of religious pluralism and toleration. The second is concerned with the fragility of the two major responses to religious pluralism: the accommodation of liberal Protestantism and the sectarian rejection of the conservative alternative.

The underlying argument of both parts is similar. I take for granted much of the conventional wisdom about the part which social, economic, and political changes played in undermining the plausibility of religion in western Europe. What has rarely been given sufficient weight, however, is the role which Protestantism inadvertently played in its own collapse. Particularly overlooked are the organizational consequences of core Reformation ideas. I do not mean the specific teachings of Protestant leaders on the proper form for the Church, although those are not without importance. I am concerned to establish the repercussions of different beliefs about authority in competing Christian traditions.

As is the case in Max Weber's famous `Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism' thesis, this argument. although it concerns ideas and beliefs, operates at the level of unintended and

unanticipated consequences. It is thus not an `idealist' explanation, although those social scientists who believe that only social structures can be causative will regard it as such.

In a review of Werner Stark's enormous and strange The Sociology of Religion, Bryan Wilson remarked: `There is much to be said against ritualistic genuflection, which is too established a custom in sociology', before going on to chide Stark for almost completely ignoring the main body of sociology of religion literature. This book may be open to similar criticism, not because it is not permeated by mainstream sociological thinking on religion, but because it is constructed on the assumption that it is more important to do sociology than to discuss other sociologists. We all have our own pet theories of what it is that explains the present unpopularity of sociology. Mine is that nothing has recently damaged the reputation of sociology so much as its obsessive introversion; theorists writing critical commentaries on other theorists who built their careers on commentaries on the work of the founding fathers. The concern of sociology should be the explanation of social action, not the discussion of sociology. However, what the reader may expect from this book may be clarified by a brief word to locate its author's theoretical perspectives. The concern with the consequences of beliefs about authority and sources of knowledge is classically Weberian. Although there will be few specific references to it, Mead and Blumer's symbolic interactionism has also been a considerable influence, as have the sociology of knowledge and social psychology perspectives popularized by Peter L. Berger.

The major thesis of this book is not novel. It has long been recognized that Protestantism pioneered laissez-faire religion. As Martin notes:

> It was partly adopted on principle and partly accepted out of necessity. Necessity is often the mother of a new principle. If a new faith fails to capture the state it may withdraw into the sullen superiority of the elect, or half-recognize that there is a variety of paths to the truth. Once you recognize the variety of ways of truth you are part of the way to accepting the right to be wrong and the idea of one inclusive church is undermined. Religion splits into various voluntary associations.

Martin and others have sketched some of the consequences of this fragmentation. If the present book has value, it lies not so much in its novelty as in its detailed teasing out of connections and in the presentation of historical material to support the propositions advanced by sociologists of religion. Most scholars seem agreed about the inputs and outputs described here, but there remains considerable confusion about what is going on inside the black box of secularization.

THE LIMITS OF THE EVIDENCE

It is useful to offer some preliminary observations about the nature of the evidence on which the various arguments of this book are based. Although in some sections illustrations are drawn from a large variety of settings, a great many, especially in Chapter 3, come from the history of one form of Protestantism in one small country: Calvinist Presbyterianism in Scotland. A few words of justification are required. Taking the stress on Calvinism first, it seems reasonable to regard Calvinist Presbyterianism as being closer to the epitome of reformed Protestantism than its major sixteenth- and seventeenth-century rivals. There are some dangers of tautology; the way in which Protestantism is defined may unfairly ensure the validity of the subsequent explanations of some of its features and consequences. But such dangers are offset by the value of isolating something approaching a Weberian `ideal-type'. The Episcopalianism of the Henrican and Elizabethan Anglican Church was a compromise between pre- and post-Reformation structures. The papacy was rejected but the democracy inherent in the notion that all men are able to discern the will of God was muted, as was the process of simplificatiop of religious activity which the reformers set in train. Lutheranism similarly stopped short, the subordination of the Church to the

Prince tempering the Reformation stress on the believing individual. Calvinism pressed on to the logical conclusion. However, this argument will not be carried to extremes and is relevant only to the first post-Reformation period. Generally, themes will be illustrated initially with the Presbyterian material and then expanded with examples drawn

from other and later forms of Protestantism. The second part of the book draws eclectically on a wide variety of examples.

There are three good reasons for beginning the discussion of the rise of religious toleration with Scotland. In the first place, it is sensible to focus on one religious culture, irrespective of which one is chosen. If it is social action rather than social theory which is to be explained, sociologists need to know a lot about the action in question. Sociology is not history or biography but it deploys both. There is heuristic benefit in grand theorizing but it can embarrass itself by being so removed from the data which it claims to explain that it can be readily dismissed by anyone with a working knowledge of the place or the people under consideration. Even if, like Martin's General Theory of Secularization, the design is so competent that it cannot be ridiculed by historians, it still leaves unanswered many questions about detailed causal connections.

A good reason for concentrating a consideration of the source and impact of religious pluralism on Scotland, rather than any other predominantly Protestant country, is that it simplifies the search for causes. Very few of the changes in the religious culture of Scotland were the result of external cultural influences. Or, more precisely, where there were external influences, they were mediated through the interests and actions of native Scots. Until the nineteenth century, when the Irish arrived in numbers, the main direction of Scottish population movement was outward. Religious fragmentation is thus easier to analyse because it occurred without the stimulus of the arrival of large numbers of immigrants with varied religious belief-systems and traditions.

Another reason for favouring Scotland is that, thanks to the excellent work of Martin, Wilson, and their students, English dissent is well known to sociologists of religion, and there are so many American sociologists that a great deal is known about that country. The Scottish material has the advantage of novelty.

A fourth, and perhaps less good reason for giving considerable space to examples drawn from the history of Scottish Protestantism, is national pride. I long ago got used to having my country either ignored (English newsreaders saying `Britain' when they meant England) or caricatured (the shortbread tin tartanry of Bonnie Prince Charlie and Mary Queen of Scots) but I am a Scot and see no reason why I should be any more coy about generating general propositions from those parts of my country's history that are not unique than are American social scientists. Except where the Scottish case is so deviant that it will not bear generalization — and as Callum Brown (1987) has recently demonstrated, that is not often — the use of such examples will, I hope, add a certain freshness to the illustration of the general themes.

The first chapter `makes straight the way' for the rest of the text by countering those scholars who have argued that secularization is a sociological myth. Having established that something which can sensibly be called 'secularization' has occurred, I briefly discuss various causes of the decline of religiosity. The unusual element in this presentation is the stress on the secularizing effects of pluralism. Chapter 2 proposes a general theory of propensity to schism in order to explain why Protestantism should be prone to factionalism and schism.

Chapters 3 and 4 detail the extent and consequences of Protestant dissent in order to establish that the rise of religious toleration was an unintended consequence of Protestant fissiparousness. To put the argument at its simplest, the case is made that pluralism and its acceptance in the doctrine of toleration were ironic results of attempts by conservative reformers to purify the religious establishment in order to justify, not to end, the enforcement of religious conformity. The failure of each movement to conquer the establishment forced, first the dissenters, and then the establishment, to accept the reality of pluralism and to develop attitudes which were consistent with that reality. Here I might stress that my concern is not with ideological innovation. It is not the invention of religious toleration but the circumstances under which such a notion became popular and widely accepted that interests me.

The second part of the book deals with Protestant responses to the culturally plural modern world. Chapters 5 and 6 consider the rise and fall of liberal Protestantism and its associated ecumenism.

Chapter 7 examines the conservative Protestant alternative. Chapter 8 is concerned with Protestantism in America: a case which at first sight offers scant support for the proposition that pluralism undermines religiosity. Finally, a discussion of religious revivals is used as the basis for a summary of the main themes of the study.

One final preliminary point: there is no doubt that historians of the particular periods and societies touched on in this book will find things to trouble them in my borrowings from their discipline. They may even find the odd howler. I think it reasonable to ask that they remember that they are themselves divided on the correct interpretation of some of the movements which are introduced in this narrative. Such errors as may be found should be judged in the context of the overall arguments. The question should always be, not have I correctly understood this or that movement but would an alternative reading seriously undermine the thesis. <>

6. Jehovah's Witnesses: The New World Society by Marley Cole [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367031152]

This book, first published in 1956, is the first authoritative, comprehensive account of the worldwide activities of Jehovah's Witnesses. It traces their origins and development, and a special section covers the founding, organization and development of the movement in Great Britain.

Contents

Excerpt: To hear a ring on the doorbell and find one of Jehovah's witnesses standing on the doorstep is now part of the pattern of modern life in Britain. Their giant conventions, conflicts with authority, gruesome stories of concentration- and labour-camp sufferings, legal battles and unusual views often bring them into the headlines here.

Whether or not one agrees with their doorstep-religion methods, it is difficult to ignore the group. What are they trying to do? What sort of people are they to get into so much trouble? Exactly who is running them and who is financing them?

According to them, today's major happenings were all predicted in the Bible. They say that this world will be destroyed in our lifetime. But when they say `world' they do not mean the planet we live on, but the `world order' or system of society. That, they say, is what is about to end.

To some, that may sound depressing. But the Witnesses call it 'good news.' They say it will be followed, also in our lifetime, by a new system of peace and material prosperity world-wide.

They believe, moreover, they are the people specially chosen by God to pronounce doom to this world system and announce the New World system of God's Kingdom under Christ. If their conclusion about the end of this system and the beginning of a new is correct then the conclusion that they are chosen by God is inescapable. Certainly no other body has a message anything like it.

A society of people who believe all this might well be starryeyed fanatics, out-of-this-world visionaries, but the way they organize and run their conventions shows they are very downto-earth people. Their conventions throw some light on them in other respects.

BRITAIN'S BIGGEST CONVENTION

In July 1955 the famous Rugby Football Union ground at Twickenham was used by Jehovah's witnesses for a five-day convention. As a convention site it was ideal, for the ground is beautifully kept, is well equipped and has ample space around it. So the Mecca of the rugger fans was converted to a temple of worship for Jehovah's witnesses, a remarkable conversion. The Army and the Navy even sent along representatives to see how the throng was fed, for the attendance reached 41,970.

During the five days the Witnesses wanted to serve well over 100,00o hot meals, including hot breakfasts. Roast lamb chops, peas, potatoes, carrots, pineapple with cream and coffee was the sort of lunch they had in mind.

To do this at a football ground was a task bristling with difficulties. For one thing, there was not nearly enough water. They wanted 1,200 gallons an hour, most of it boiling. So the Witnesses, recruiting free, skilled labour from their own ranks, and drawing water supplies off the mains, installed their own water system. For the steam supply they set up a locomotive boiler to raise 1,500 lb. pressure an hour. To get upwards of 1,000 gallons of boiling water hourly they made a mixer valve, piped water and steam into it and easily got the needed quantity. They put in their own drainage system. They installed in marquees a battery of food boilers, ovens, fish fryers and food-preparing machines and then fuelled this kitchen-under-canvas with a 30o foot gas installation fed by a 4 inch pipe from the main 400 feet away.

How to buy meat at midweek prices and keep it for days in an open field in unexpectedly hot weather looked like a formidable problem, but the Witnesses solved it. One of their number, a refrigeration engineer in Lancashire, immediately volunteered to bring along a refrigerator door and a three-horsepower plant. Then from an old air-raid shelter insulated with hardboard and sawdust they made a 500 cubic foot cold store. Days ahead, plumbers, electricians and fitters arrived and worked long hours without pay. The estimated labour cost of the pre-convention work done in this way was put at £10,000 and it was all done free.

To serve hot meals the Witnesses built eighteen food-service conveyers each operated by a line ofservers. Diners filed through the serving lines pushing a six-divisioned tray, each item making up the meal being put into its appropriate tray-section. Passing into one of the four vast dining-tents, diners stood at tables (Witnesses built more than a mile of these tables) and ate the meal direct from the tray.

Two electric dish washers, designed and rebuilt from old conventional models by two of the Witnesses, scalded eight thousand trays an hour. Looking forward to a bigger convention next time, the designers say they intend to increase the feed-chain to handle twelve thousand an hour.

Motors operated on three-phase current. But there was only single-phase electricity at the Stadium. So the Witnesses hired and set up a single-phase generator and a convertor to supply the needed three-phase power. More than a thousand volunteers from the group's own ranks, cooks, servers, washers-up, operated the under-canvas high-speed meal service.

Most of the work was done against a background of Bible talks relayed over the public-address system from the speakers' platform erected at the south end of the playing field. And their public-address system was no less impressive than their catering organization. It appears that there is no legitimate field of human endeavour not represented amongst Jehovah's witnesses. Electronic, Post Office, radio and television engineers and a number of other volunteer helpers put in an 800 watt, 275 loudspeaker sound system that brought the platform within comfortable hearing distance of every point in the extensive grounds.

The installation included oscilloscopes with which perfection of sound could be checked by visual as distinct from auditory means. It included control devices enabling the technicians to see at a glance if any one section of the system failed, and apparatus for a complete switch-over to auxiliary amplifiers so that if a section should fail a new circuit could be brought into operation immediately. It included a battery of tape recorders to make permanent main items of the assembly, a bank of deaf aids for the hard-of-hearing and a two-way internal telephone system linking together key points of the convention. All of this took up more than three miles of cable. Test equipment alone was valued at £500; the control apparatus at £2,500. Much of this was designed and built, and all of it was erected and operated, by Jehovah's witnesses.

Since the forty thousand odd who attended the Twickenham convention came from fifty-six countries all over the world, the rooming needs called for organization of a high order. For eight weeks an army of four thousand volunteers made a house-to-house canvass including hotels. Briefing the four thousand at the Royal Albert Hall, A. P. Hughes, presiding minister of Jehovah's witnesses in Britain, said, 'We are going to live, eat, work and worship together as a family for five days.'

In the eight weeks more than thirty thousand accommodations were listed. The Rooming Office tabulated and filed them all according to price and district. Then from the thousands of applications from all over the world, rooms were booked and the householders as well as the delegates advised. The estimated value of this rooming work, by commercial standards, was given as £5,000, but the actual labour cost was nothing because the Witnesses did it all themselves.

Twelve hundred of the delegates did not need rooms. They brought their own tents and slept under canvas in a special camp set up on vacant land near Staines. Such camps are a feature of the big conventions of Jehovah's witnesses.

One camper with a paralysed leg travelled 200 miles from Manchester in a wheel chair. The journey took him two days. The first night of the trek he just stopped at the side of the road, pitched his tent and slept in that.

The Twickenham convention was one of thirteen, with an aggregate attendance of 403,682, held throughout Canada, America and Europe. All had the same programme but in the appropriate language. Interpreters relayed talks in other tongues. Of those who attended Twickenham, eight thousand went on to European assemblies. The travel arrangements were made by the volunteer Transportation Department, the fares involving some £30,000. This cost was additional to the outlay for the forty-two chartered planes, two chartered liners and the travel expenses of the thousands of other incoming delegates.

Special reception arrangements were made by the Witnesses' Information Department at every main-line station, airport and coach station in London and each of the other convention cities. Interpreters and guides were provided for every tongue except Finnish. This language did have the British Witnesses beaten until other Finns arrived who could speak English. The department had a card index system enabling them to find instantly the best route from Twickenham to any designated locality, and they handled thirty-two thousand visitors. In some cases, including London, this was a round-the-clock service. Couriers travelled on all special trains here and on both continents and took care of language and other difficulties.

Witnesses working in the First-Aid Department included an osteopath, a surgeon, a doctor, two dental surgeons, a chemist and a number of State Registered Nurses. Yet oddly enough, Jehovah's witnesses, even those having special qualifications, do not appear to object to doing menial tasks. The job assigned to, and willingly accepted by, an advertising executive, for example, was to tour the grounds at Twickenham picking up paper.

One end of the playing field was transformed into a colourful garden. Planned a year earlier, fourteen thousand blooms, planted to flower just at the right time, formed the setting of the speakers' platform. Cut-out letters erected on the green round the platform named the different convention cities as well as the title, ` "Triumphant Kingdom" Assembly of Jehovah's Witnesses.'

The Cleaning and Sanitation Department, besides looking after the toilet arrangements during the convention, even scrubbed out the stands and all the seats in them before it began. A band of volunteers, helped by children, cleared all litter.

After the convention, Colonel F. D. Prentice, secretary of the Rugby Football Union, wrote to the London headquarters of the Witnesses : `I . . . was enormously impressed with the organization and all the arrangements you made for so many people attending. Once again I must confess I was somewhat worried after the first day. On walking to my house I was ankle deep in paper, ice-cream cartons, etc., and I wondered what the ground would look like at the end of the five days. I was delighted to find next morning that all had been cleared up, and your volunteer cleaners deserve a special word of praise and encouragement. They did splendidly.'

Altogether twenty-six departments manned by five thousand volunteers took care of the entire convention.

At every assembly, big or small, Jehovah's witnesses hold a baptism service. The baptism calls for complete immersion and symbolizes dedication to God. The ceremony includes an explanatory talk by a senior Witness, the actual immersion being

done in a swimming bath, river, lake or in the sea. The number immersed at Twickenham Swimming Baths was 1,183. The baptism of a throng like this obviously calls for systematic handling and that is something the Witnesses do know how to do.

On the last day of the convention, almost before the closing words of President N. H. Knorr (who that afternoon had delivered the speech `World Conquest Soon—by God's Kingdom' to an audience of 41,970) had died away, an army of Witnesses moved in and began dismantling. The thousands of feet of gas and water pipe and electric cables were pulled out, equipment packed. Most of the structures made specially for this assembly were of a portable kind. They could be taken to pieces and re-assembled at another site. While all this was going on the exodus for the Continent began. The special trains chartered for the eight thousand continental delegates began to move out to the Channel ports.

The largest assembly on the Continent was at Nuremberg with a top attendance of 107,423. More than forty thousand of them slept under canvas in a temporary tent city. The city was laid out in streets, each with a Biblical name. All residents were registered in a street directory maintained at the tent city's 'Town Hall.' The entire camp, extending for about two miles in one direction, was wired with a public-address system connected to the microphones on the colonnade-flanked speakers' platform at the vast Zeppelin Field.

In the camp, electric street lighting, fire service, public telephone service, laundries, shops, post office, mail facilities, traffic control, direction indicators at crossings, free taxi service, good water system, all were laid on. Toilet facilities were better than those of many a town. There was constant running water carried away by specially built roofing-felt channels, soap, towels, a more than adequate supply of private canvas-sided W.C. cubicles each with a push-button flush, large mirrors, electric-razor plugs, facilities for bathing, and everything, including the atmosphere, wholesomely clean and fresh. Each toilet tent where all these utilities were housed was decorated with a large urn of flowers. The tents themselves were large canvas-covered wooden structures built by the Witnesses.

One daily evening newspaper (8 Uhr-Blatt) was so impressed with the convention that it devoted every word and picture of its eight-page Saturday evening issue to the assembly. The front-page heading was designed specially and took the form of a watch tower.

A sidelight on the Witnesses' approach to practical aspects of life is furnished by the arrangements they made on one of their chartered liners from Canada, the Arosa Star. Two programmes were put on each day for the 794 passengers on board. The programmes consisted of lectures on Bible topics, health, money, travel, convention photography, historical material affecting Jehovah's witnesses and legal fights. In addition, four-hour courses, divided into eight half-hour studies, covered elementary conversation in Italian, German, French and Swedish. Each four-hour course would enable most delegates to conduct a basic conversation with the natives of those lands they were about to visit. This, in conjunction with the other lecture topics, would help all to get the most from their European trip. It is scarcely necessary to add, all this was free.

FUNCTIONAL WORSHIP

Eye-opening as all this practical work might be, however, the Witnesses look upon it all merely as a means to an end. And that end, they say, is serving God. At the Twickenham assembly President Knorr announced, 'The primary purpose of our conventions is to provide our ministers with advanced and practical training in Bible education.' <>

7. Pray TV: Televangelism in America by Steve Bruce [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367025656]

In this book, first published in 1990, the significance of televangelism in America is examined in detail. This well-informed, measured analysis includes discussion of the place of televangelism in the history of American Protestantism; the styles of leading TV preachers and the televangelical star system; the relation of televangelism to conservatism and politics. It also answers the

questions of televangelism's organisation and audience, as well as providing an analysis over the wave of scandals which swept over Pray TV in the 1980s.

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Excerpt: This book was suggested to me by Chris Rojek of Routledge who felt that there was a need for a serious study of American religious broadcasting, especially one written with a European readership in mind. I was happy to accept the challenge because I had just finished The Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right, a study which concentrated on the recent political mobilizations of American conservative Protestants. In order to keep that study narrowly focused on the new Christian right as a socio-political movement, I had either to pass over or deal very briefly with a number of intriguing questions about American religious broadcasting and its audience. A chance to address those questions directly was welcome. I was also pleased to once again challenge what I regard as the hysterical exaggerations of the power of the new Christian right, this time armed with the evidence provided by Pat Robertson's failed campaign for the Republican party's presidential nomination.

It is worth saying a brief word about methodology. Most of my claim to understand the things I write about rests, not so much on the cited sources of quantitative research data (although such material has been influential), but on my direct involvement with the producers and consumers of televangelism. To be technical about it, I am an `interpretative' social scientist. While I do not entirely reject surveys and statistics, I do believe that the claim to be `scientific' must rest, not on apeing the quantitative methods of the natural sciences (although such methods have their place), but on being able to support one's arguments with sound reasoning from good evidence. That we are concerned with the beliefs and actions of people rather than with the regularities of chemical reactions means that our evidence consists largely of the accounts which are given by the people we strive to understand. I have not quoted from my original interview material or from the many notes on my observations because such material would not be available for critical examination by people who doubted my conclusions. That any reasonable person looking at and hearing the same things would have come to the same conclusion is something which the reader has to take on trust; the occasional illustrative quotation from any interview would not change that fact. But by way of presenting my credentials, I would like to stress the extent to which my work has been informed by considerable first-hand experience of American conservative Protestantism. Many hours have been passed in church services and crusade rallies in Fort Worth, Charlottesville, Washington, Greenville, Lynchburg, and Cincinnati. More time has been spent on a motel room bed staring at Oral, Pat, Jerry, and their many less well-known minor league colleagues on a television screen. Casual conversations with strangers in the cafes and bars of small southern towns always produced interesting glimpses of what members of the public thought of televangelists, and the dreariness of weeks away from home was lifted on a number of occasions by the generous hospitality of fundamentalist and pentecostal families who invited me to abandon Ramada, Econo-Travel, and Howard Johnson for their spare rooms. Although there is little direct reference in the text to the mass of `data' one inadvertently acquires just by being there, that experience laid the foundation on which the study is built.

Wherever possible I have avoided the technical language of sociology, not because I am ashamed of my discipline (far from it, I once tried to have `sociologist' listed on my passport as my occupation; the clerk said 'Yes, but what do you do for a living?'), but because I find such technical language unnecessary. With little or no loss of sense, most sociological notions can be expressed in ordinary English. A more difficult matter is to estimate accurately the theological knowledge of

the typical reader. Some of you may wonder why I am telling you what you already know and others may wish for more clarification. I can only ask that members of each group remember the existence of the others and bear with me.

Most conservative Protestants see televangelism as a powerful new addition to their evangelistic armoury; Armstrong, as executive director of the National Religious Broadcasters Association makes that case. Most mainstream Protestants deride its shallowness and are concerned that the conservative near-monopoly presents, not only a false gospel, but also a false picture of American religious life. Much of the argument between detractors and advocates is made with competing claims about the effects of televangelism. Those who applaud it believe that it takes the gospel to people who would not otherwise be reached. Those who abhor it believe that, by substituting passive watching for active worshiping, it undermines the local church. These and related claims are empirical and their resolution must lie in the world of evidence. We might have expected social scientists to provide such evidence and many have. Unfortunately, some commentators have sought to increase their own importance by inflating that of their subject matter; there seems no other explanation for the wildly exaggerated claims about the importance of televangelism.

One of the main aims of this study has been to deflate the hype of mass media religion. Televangelism is an interesting and important cultural and social institution. Like good furniture, it becomes not less, but more so, for being appreciated in its proper proportion and context.

TELEVANGELISM AND RELIGION

The first and most important point about televangelism was that made at the end of Chapter Five. For all that the audience for religious television is quite large (perhaps 8 per cent of the total viewing population), watching religious television programmes is still an infrequent activity of a small part of the American people. It only appears to be anything else because people who should know better take the most generous estimates of likely audiences for all religious television, add them up, and then compare the total with the audience for a single popular secular programme. To put it bluntly, not much televangelism is consumed by not many people. Even fewer actually give financial support. And for all the experimentation with new formats and new methods of making the product available, the audience is largely found among less well-educated older women who are already conservative Protestants.

If analysts had started with what is known about why people believe the things they believe or with what is known about the persuasiveness of the mass media, they would have been less likely to exaggerate the influence of televangelism on the ungodly. To return to the theme of Chapter Six, one study involved questioning a sample of people who had phoned religious station WCFG Channel 38 in Chicago during the previous two and a half years in response to an invitation to accept Christ. Note that this is not a sample of the televangelism audience at large but of those responding to an invitation to accept Christ by calling the station; that is, of those apparently converted through the medium. Of the sample, 30 per cent said they had already been Christians for at least 3 years (that is, their conversion pre-dated their phone claim to have just experienced conversion); 61 per cent identified their conversion with 'a church, a friend, or other situation' (Horsfield 1984: 135). Only 20 per cent associated their acceptance of Christ with either watching television or praying with a television counsellor.

Televangelism exists because there is a large conservative Protestant milieu; not the other way round. Once we get the direction of causality right we can explain the rise of televangelism. Although there were particular reasons related to the financial structure of American broadcasting which exaggerated the tendency, the conservative rise to domination of the air-waves is part of the wider cultural pattern of the relative decline of the mainstream churches. As evangelicals, fundamentalists, and pentecostals have become a larger proportion of American Protestants, so their cultural products have come to be an increasing part of religious broadcasting. I have made the point a number of times but it is worth repeating: presence in the American mass media is largely

(although not exclusively) a supply phenomenon. It represents the willingness of conservative Protestants to spend their money on funding this sort of activity. Only secondarily is it an index of demand and it is at best a very rough one.

This does not mean that televangelism does not have some important consequences. It just means that we have to look a little more closely to find them. In Chapter Seven's discussion of fund-raising, I stressed the importance of bricks and mortar projects. Diagnosed as terminally ill by liberal critics at the turn of the century, conservative Protestantism has not only survived but will reach the end of the century in better shape than the mainstream churches. Elsewhere I have argued at length that much of this resilience comes from the way in which its adherents built a supporting sub-society and subculture, an enclave in which the faith could be maintained and every subsequent generation raised in the 'old paths in perilous times'. The creation of independent conservative Protestant institutions as alternatives to those of the mainstream culture, is expensive. One of the enduring consequences of televangelism will result from its channelling of funds into institution-building. Much of the money raised by faith partnerships, blessing pacts, love offerings, and the like is consumed internally in paying for televangelism (and I will return to that) but much of it has gone into building new conservative churches and training young evangelicals, fundamentalists, and pentecostals in conservative academies. Most prominent is Oral Roberts, University but there is also Falwell's Liberty University, Robertson's CBN University, Herbert W. Armstrong's Ambassador Colleges, and before his scandal Jimmy Swaggart was planning to add a seminary to his Bible college. This extensive plant produces conservative Protestant pastors but it also produces graduates in a variety of disciplines and skills — law, medicine, accountancy, television production, and journalism are just the most obvious. This all strengthens the conservative milieu because it allows that world to acquire expertise and resources which are common in the mainstream without also taking on board the secular world's intellectual and cultural baggage. The conservative milieu possessed colleges — but not a christian 'theme park'! — before televangelism but the extended reach of the electronic mass media has allowed money to be raised from a wide audience on a new scale.

The money which is spent on buying more air-time to show more old time gospel to people who already get quite a lot of that sort of thing might seem wasted but we should not overlook the morale-raising consequence of televangelism. One does not want to exaggerate their sense of inferiority but, as many of Hoover's insightful interviews suggest, born again Christians are troubled by their apparent lack of standing in the world. Pointless as evangelistic exercises, Robertson's 700 Club or Bakker's PTL Club are significant because they have raised the profile of conservative Protestantism and made its adherents feel better about themselves and their place in modern America. Few born again Christians wanted Pat Robertson to be their President — more preferred George Bush — but many were pleased that their man could actually run without looking like a hick.

Increasing respectability is not acquired without cost and this study has stressed the extent to which the gospel now preached by televangelists departs from the conservative Protestantism of the post-war years. The social ethics have changed. Asceticism is dead. More than that, hard work is dead. Jerry Falwell, one of the more conservative religious broadcasters, can say 'material wealth is God's way of blessing people who put him first'. The Calvinist puritans would have said the same (although less often and not in the context of soliciting). What they would never have suggested is that 'giving money to your pastor' is a sufficient translation of 'putting God first' or that God is as easily pleased as televangelism suggests.

The theology, in so far as it is discernible, has moved a long way from the conservative Protestantism of the inter-war years. There is still a lot of talk about the authority of the Bible but distinctive teaching has been attenuated and its place taken by benign banalities. As Hunter's work (1986) shows, this is a reflection of changes in conservative Protestantism generally but the 'mass' nature of televangelism exaggerates the tendency. A pastor can challenge his congregation because he has an enduring relationship with it. People will not leave him because they dislike one or two

sermons. When the relationship between television preacher and viewer (with remote channel changer) is exactly that precarious, blandness becomes an attractive option. Furthermore, evangelists measure their success in the numbers who hear their preaching. Ever-increasing audiences become a 'good thing' in their own right. The more particular one's message, the more one will be confined in recruitment. This is not necessarily a problem. As Swaggart's career pre-scandal showed, it is possible to build a very large following for an orthodox, narrow, anti-Catholic gospel but there is only so much space in the marketplace for that. Oral Roberts, the Bakkers, and Pat Robertson preferred to reduce the distinctive theological content and go for the broadest possible appeal.

The broad road is the pursuit of self-fulfillment, self-satisfaction, and self-esteem. The 'power of positive thinking', roundly criticized by conservative Protestants for its 'this-worldly' orientation when it was presented by Norman Vincent Peale in the 1950s, now informs most religious television. This is less of a change for Robert Schuller (like Peale a Reformed Church minister and a man who has never claimed to be a fundamentalist) than it is for Oral Roberts, Jim Bakker, or Kenneth Copeland but the ghastly punning title of Schuller's The Be Happy Attitudes will stand as a sign of the orientation of most televangelism.

TELEVANGELISM AND POLITICS

Most recent interest in televangelism has centred on the political power of religious broadcasters. In the last chapter of their Televangelism: Power and Politics on God's Frontier, Hadden and Shupe predict that:

> In time, the conservative Christian movement has the potential to become solidified enough to 'take over the country'. If the Robertson campaign does not succeed in pulling them together, it will at least demonstrate to conservative Christians the real potential of their movement.

Robertson's campaign certainly demonstrated the real potential of their movement not a lot! As I tried to demonstrate and explain in Chapters Eight and Nine, conservative Christianity is not a particularly fertile soil for political mobilization. Taking just the conservative Protestants who form the core of the televangelism audience and the base for the new Christian right, these people are divided by region, occupation, education, and ethnic background. Not even their religion unites them. M the example of the hostile reception given by pentecostal PTL supporters to fundamentalist Falwell's rescue plans shows, if believers take the details of their religious beliefs seriously, they disagree. Only if they sublimate the particulars and see themselves as defending their shared `Judeo-Christian' heritage can there be consensus. But commitment to the particulars, the theological and ecclesiological fine print, goes hand in hand with strength of motivation. As the distinctive is attenuated enough for various sorts of conservative Protestants (and then conservative Christians) to work together, so the drive to promote a `conservative Christian' world weakens. One might suppose the problem can be solved by compartmentalization. The cadres of Hadden and Shupe's `solidified' conservative Christian movement might alternate between one set of categories for Sunday (only separatist Baptist fundamentalists are saved) and another for the rest of the week (we welcome the help of our Catholic, Jewish, and Black Baptist brothers) . It seems unlikely that many will be able to so easily abandon their anti-Catholic, antisemitic, and racist attitudes. But more important, to accept that the world can be divided into `Sunday' and 'the rest of the week', two spheres governed by different criteria of evaluation, is to concede to the modern world precisely the privatization of religion which fundamentalists have historically opposed. Religion is now something for the weekend, for the family, for the home.

With little comparative reference to Europe, Hadden and Shupe miss an obviously instructive case. Holland was initially divided into three 'pillars', each of which encapsulated and provided a wide range of institutions for its people. There were Catholic unions, Protestant unions, and secular trade unions. The triplication was repeated for schools, mass media, sporting associations, and for political parties. After the Second World War, the Catholic party and the Calvinist Protestant party found they had to make common cause against the secular parties. By the late 1960s, they had formed an alliance. In the early 1980s, they

merged to form a conservative Christian party which in turn had to work in alliance with secular conservatives. There is now nothing especially `Christian' about the party. As I argued at length in The Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right (Bruce 1988), the price conservative Protestants have to pay to achieve political leverage in a pluralistic democracy is the abandonment of almost all of the distinctive platform that initially motivated them to get involved in politics. Any movement which remains seriously `conservative Christian' will fail; any movement which succeeds will have abandoned its distinctively conservative Christian issues.

But this is to discuss the possibility at its strongest, assuming that most conservative Protestants want to Christianize America. In Chapter Nine, I questioned this assumption. It seems very clear to me that most conservative Protestants are not terribly unhappy with America. They might want prayer in schools, a ban on abortion, and the teaching of the oxymoronic `creation science' but there is no evidence that they want these things badly enough to place them on their agendas above more traditional concerns of politics such as the management of the economy and the pursuit of foreign policy.

For a `solidified' conservative Christian movement to be created would require a considerable amount of `consciousness raising'. This is where, in the Hadden and Shupe scenario, televangelism becomes important. Religious broadcasters have lots of money to buy lots of air-time to persuade viewers to coalesce as a conservative Christian movement. This is a vision intended more to sell books than to illuminate the phenomenon. We return to the lack of persuasiveness of television. All the research shows that television is not particularly good at influencing people. We return also to the size and composition of the audience. All the research shows that televangelism is not particularly good at attracting unbelievers. And what difference can televangelism make to the political attitudes of its core audience? The people presently watching Robertson and Swaggart and the like are already likely to be political conservatives.

American religious broadcasting is an interesting phenomenon which tells us a lot about changes in relative strength of different traditions within American Protestantism and about changes in fundamentalist and pentecostal thinking. Whatever it tells Hadden and Shupe, it does not tell me that a popular conservative Christianity will take over the country after the fashion of Iran's Shi'ite Islam. It does not tell me that a cadre of conservative Christians will seize power after the fashion of the Bolsheviks. It tells me only that a minority with a distinctive culture has found a new medium in which to express its beliefs and values and to strive for increasing acceptance and respectability. <>

8. Religion, Aging and Health: A Global Perspective edited by William M. Clements [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367031190]

This book, first published in 1989, attempts to identify from within religious cultures those elements of tradition, behaviour and lifestyle that are health protective in that, by adhering to them, physical, mental and social wellbeing will be maintained as people grow old. It examines how different faith traditions view aging and its impact on health.

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10. A Study of the Health of the Elderly from the Standpoint of Shinto by Takeshi Mitsuhashi
11. Religious Factors in Aging, Adjustment and Health: A Theoretical Overview by Jeffrey S. Levin

Excerpt: Stimulated by the movement to attain health for all people by the year 2000, the World Health Organization launched a worldwide programme in the 1980s to promote and protect the health of elderly persons.

All countries of the developed world have health and social programmes for their senior citizens. These are long established and have often evolved from altruistic actions inspired by the predominating moral and religious beliefs of the society.

Services and programmes for elders in developing countries are likely to arise by a similar process, depending on the particular cultural, religious or social pattern.

In both developed and developing countries, national programmes for elderly people are directed towards maintaining wellbeing in the three dimensions defined in the WHO Constitution, namely physical, mental and social. In 1984, the Organization's Member States discussed extending this broad definition even further, to include a spiritual dimension.

By the year 2000, some six hundred million elderly people will inhabit the earth, the great majority within developing societies that have dominant religious cultures— Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity and others. Any erosion of the lifestyles and the traditional behaviour associated with these religions will have consequences for the wellbeing of the older members of the society.

The purpose of this publication is therefore to identify those elements of tradition, behaviour and lifestyle that are health protective in that, by adhering to them, physical, mental and social wellbeing will be maintained as people grow old, and culturally relevant health policies will be developed.

The World Health Organization identified contributors to this volume, with the assistance of the staff of its six regional offices. The Organization is grateful to the contributors who are identified with the relevant chapter heading. The solicited contributions were then edited by Dr. William Clements, Editor of the Journal of Religion & Aging, to whom the Organization is indebted for bringing the volume to publication.

The publication offers a global perspective to religion, aging and health which is of relevance to all generations, not only to elderly people.

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Many factors influence human aging and longevity. Among these are phenomena such as culture, disease, nutrition, shelter, hygiene, genetics, religion, and education. The influence that each factor has on lifestyle, behavior and aging can be extraordinarily complex. These influential factors do not operate in isolation from all other matters that shape lifestyle, behavior and aging. At any one time in any single human life there is an enormously complex interrelationship between hundreds of variables. The task of describing these variables and isolating them from the context in which they naturally appear is a highly abstract activity. In order to accomplish the task of description scholars must choose some significant variables and ignore hundreds of others that undoubtedly have important influences on human behavior, lifestyle, and aging.

In this monograph, authors have reflected on religious phenomena as they interact with behavior, lifestyle and human aging in several cultures. Each religion, however, is found within a distinct set of cultural circumstances. These circumstances modify, enhance, and ameliorate various tenets of any particular religion. For example, the Buddhism found in Thailand might differ remarkably from the Buddhism found in China. Or the Protestantism of a tribal village in Africa might differ significantly in its influence on behavior, lifestyle and aging from that Protestantism found in Northern

and how each of the various traditions has chosen to enhance the life experience of human aging. Each culture or religious tradition is limited in terms of its ability to grasp and explicate the entire phenomena. However, knowledge about and reflection on traditions other than one's own can greatly enrich and enhance those values and

lifestyles and religious traditions that contribute to a meaningful advance into old age.

In "Lifestyles Leading to Physical, Mental and Social Wellbeing in Old Age," Paul Tournier writes from within the humanist tradition, using the methodology of personal experience and reflection. He lifts up for our consideration the importance of physical activity, and of mental activity, decrying the boring nature of a rigid routine and emphasizing a positive mood, curiosity, and social activity as themes which contribute to a positive process of aging.

Hakim Mohammed Said uses the sacred writings of Islam to discuss various tenets that relate to the elderly and aging in Islamic society. Solidarity with the elderly and service to parents and respect for elders are concepts found in Islamic writings in which parents are co-equal to the old and infirm, who have various designated rights. When speaking about service to parents, one is also speaking about service to the old and the infirm whether or not the old and infirm person is one's biological parent. Mohammed Said presents the notion that the rite of throwing the elderly over the mountainside is still practiced in societies in which the elderly are separated from younger people through hospitalization or confinement to homes for the aging against, presumably, the elderly person's will.

Using stories and parables, Daw Khin Myo Chit teaches many of the essentials of Buddhism in regard to aging and the elderly, especially as they are expressed in Thailand. In a society in which seniority is important, matters of age do not tend to go unnoticed. Stories teach the young respect for elders and the traditions of a society in which respect is paramount.

In their discussion of Protestantism found in the rural South of the United States, Rebecca Adams and Bonnie Stark utilize the methodologies of sociology to study differences in services offered to the elderly. Within religious communities in a rural North Carolina county, conservatism is divided into doctrinal conservatism and social conservatism. Socially conservative churches are found to provide fewer services for the elderly in this population.

In his discussion of Judaism, Michael Davies uses a historical perspective to develop the term "elder" in the definition of aging, describing the characteristics of elderly people as seen in earlier historical times. Characteristic attitudes toward honor and support, religious burial, work and retirement, and the duties of the elder are discussed as they relate to the history of the development of various Israeli social institutions such as the Hakdesh Hospital and Old Age Home and the kibbutz.

In describing the teachings of Confucianism on health, Takehiko Okada shows that Confucian teaching about health follows from a moralistic view of life, of society and of the world in general. In Confucianism, to lead a good life and to help others lead a good life are closely related to each other because Self and Other are regarded as one. From the moralistic standpoint, benevolence is seen as the highest virtue, containing all other virtues. Almost as important is the virtue of gratitude—gratitude for one's elders, for a stable government, for health, and for the universe.

Carmen Barros points out that Catholicism has little to say about physical wellbeing directly. Instead, Catholicism has a great indirect effect through other factors such as the attitude of charity that reinforces social solidarity and through the definition of other people in family terms. Catholicism values all of life because it is a gift from God. The prime influence of Catholicism on human lifestyles is achieved through mental constructions and is exerted at the psychological level of human existence.

Professor Fukui elucidates a Taoist view of the health and wellbeing of the elderly by tracing the development of Taoist belief in the supremacy of the natural law (TAO) and the rise of the idea that human life could be extended forever by following the Tao. Thus, longevity was pursued by means of thorough specific practices, leading to good health, including diet, exercise, and right relationships, and proper mental attitudes. In beginning his discussion of Shinto, Takeshi Mitsuhashi states that death presents a fundamental problem with regard to the elderly; to promote and preserve their health despite its closeness. Shinto, he says, offers a way of life which frees one from the fear of death and

its loneliness. Shinto rites celebrate renewal and Shinto philosophy emphasizes the coexistence, or coequality, of all living things, as well as a life of simple sincerity.

Jeffrey Levin utilizes a social gerontological perspective to review six theoretical viewpoints that have guided empirical research into religion and health among aging people in the United States. He concludes that a multidimensional disengagement perspective comes closest to predicting the way in which religion and health are interrelated as persons age. While the populations studied have been predominantly Catholic or Protestant, identical theories might be applied to populations with other religions.

The cultures and religions of the world are many and various — and we all too often tend to focus on our differences. We need reminders of our similarities. In sponsoring this collection of thoughts from many cultures and religion, the World Health Organization has offered us an unusual opportunity to examine from many points of view to a single issue of worldwide concern, the health and well being of the elderly. The differences are obvious, and the similarities are startling—whether one's approach is historical, comparative, ethical, theological, or existential; whether one's viewpoint is Shinto, Taoist, Buddhist, Catholic, Islamic, Judaism, or humanist. Proper diet and adequate physical exercise are obviously vital to the health of the elderly. Equally vital are the psychological components of well being—a sense of usefulness, a feeling of kinship, of relationship, with others, a recognition of one's part in the continuity of life. Virtually every society faces, or will shortly face, the rapid growth of an elderly population, and its accompanying problems. We need to know that at best our basic values do not differ significantly in this area. The groundwork for cooperation lies ready within each culture, awaiting recognition. <>

9. Religion and Advanced Industrial Society by James A. Beckford [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367024659]

This book, first published in 1989, demonstrates that sociologists have much to gain from a strengthening of the connections between general theories about the changing character of modern western societies and specific studies of religion. It combines an exegesis of sociological classics in the study of religion, and a history of their influence upon the subject's development; a criticism of Talcott Parson's attempt to synthesise classical viewpoints into a single theory of modernity; a discussion of post-Parsonian theories of religion's declining importance; and an argument that some quasi-Marxist thinkers may offer fresh insights into the place of religion in capitalist societies.

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Excerpt: The modern sociology of religion is remarkably self-contained. It has its own concepts, theories and general problematics. It also flourishes in some places as an area for empirical research. But its links with other fields of sociology are, at best, tenuous. As a result, it is rare for studies of religion to be based on, or to influence, broad ideas about the dynamics and problems of today's societies. The main aim of this book is to show how the estrangement between the sociology of religion and other fields of sociology has taken place and what its consequences are for sociological studies of religion.

This book is not an exhaustive compilation of theoretical ideas or empirical findings. Nor is it an account of the state of religion in the late twentieth century. Rather, it analyses the main theoretical currents within which sociological research on religion has been conducted. And it argues that the failure to take the changing character of industrial and advanced industrial societies into account has tended to obscure the fact that, as an object of methodical study, religion remains a puzzling phenomenon — not, however, for the reasons given by many sociologists of religion. For it is not my intention merely to add to the swelling chorus of claims that religion is alive and well in supposedly

secular societies. My point is different: it is that modern religion presents sociologists with theoretical problems. It challenges many taken-for-granted assumptions about their models of modernity. Religion also represents a challenge to social order in some places and continues to be controversial in many respects.

The central message of this book is that attempts to make sociological sense of present-day religion should take account of theoretical ideas about the distinctiveness of advanced industrial societies and the emerging world order. This necessarily involves a serious consideration of the ways in which ideas about the social significance of religion have changed over time. The pattern that emerges is one of continuity within change. It is questionable, however, whether sociologists of religion have been fully aware of the extent to which their ideas have been grounded in broad theories about industrial society. This book is offered in the hope that a stronger appreciation of these underlying theoretical ideas will lead to a more critical attitude towards them and a greater readiness to modify them in the light of findings from research on advanced industrial or post-industrial societies. Only in this way, I contend, can the sociological study of religion begin to regain the central position that it once occupied in sociology. If this can be achieved, the sociology of the modern world will be considerably enhanced.

The Isolation of Religion

The central argument of this book is that the contours of the sociology of religion have been shaped by specific ideas about industrial society. The sociological questions that have been asked about religion have therefore tended to reflect these ideas. I shall argue that the various meanings and different degrees of importance that have been attributed to such phenomena as secularization, rationalization and the rise of new religious movements are outcrops of underlying ideas about the transition from pre-industrial to industrial society. I intend to criticize these underlying, but rarely examined, ideas.

My main contention is that the legacy of `classical' sociologists is so coloured by assumptions about the nature of industrial society that attempts to explain the character of religion in a world dominated by advanced industrial societies have been hindered. Contrary to much received wisdom and to common sense, I shall argue that religion remains highly problematic for the sociology of advanced industrial societies.

The present chapter will define some of the terms which are important for my general argument and will then chart, first, the process whereby the sociological study of religion moved from the centre to the periphery of sociology; secondly, the broad changes in twentieth century religion which have taxed the explanatory capacity of the sociology of religion; and, thirdly, the factors which have insulated the sociology of religion against, and isolated it from, the influence of wider intellectual debates. The legacy of classical sociology is shown in Chapter 2 to have propelled the modern sociology of religion towards marginality. The argument of Chapter 3 is that the crystallization of general theories of modernization and industrial society after the Second World War led to distinctive but limiting explanations of religion's functional significance. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the responses to these limitations among sociologists who attempted to explain the increasingly controversial aspects of religion in the 1970s. Chapter 6 examines the evidence of a renewed interest in religion as a sociological problem among some Marxists and quasi-Marxists.

We must begin, however, with some brief comments on key terms. First, it should be made clear that the use of `industrial society' and `advanced industrial society' is intended to be as general and as inclusive as possible. I am well aware of the very special and diverse meanings that they have borne in the work of thinkers of many different outlooks. I also realize that these terms carry diverse ideological meanings.' Nevertheless, I intend to use them in a deliberately non-specific and all-embracing way. `Industrial society' refers to the kind of social formation that was believed to be emerging in parts of Western Europe and North America as early as the second decade of the nineteenth century. It implies, above all, a shift from agriculture to mechanized manufacturing on a large scale as the dominant means of producing goods for consumption or exchange. It cannot be separated from the decline of age-old communities,

the growth of markets and companies based on share capital, the process of urbanization, the emergence of organized labour movements, the consolidation of nation-states as sovereign power holders and the growing impingement of science on all spheres of life. `Advanced industrial society' refers to the kind of social formation that was believed to be emerging in various parts of the already heavily industrialized world in the 1960s. It is characterized primarily by the growth of world markets in goods and services, the ascendancy of service industries over manufacturing and agriculture, the growth in the numbers and power of multinational corporations, the separation of corporate management from share ownership, the levelling out of social class differentials and the crucial significance of theoretical knowledge and information technology.

For my purposes, these terms are merely convenient labels which signify that competing claims have been made about the general character and determinants of the forms of society which have emerged mainly, but not exclusively, in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The terms are clearly contestable and are more closely identified with the work of some social scientists than with that of others. But this will not represent a major problem because I shall indicate the precise ways in which the general notions of industrial and advanced industrial society are used in specific theoretical contexts. The main purpose of the terms here is to indicate that the understanding of religion has varied with the kind of interpretations that have been given of transitions to the two most important types of society identified in the past century and a half. In fact, the idea of major transformations in society is itself more significant than the precise labels given to the emerging forms of society.

It is certainly not my intention to suggest that the terms `industrial' and `advanced industrial' have any narrowly technological meaning for the character of societies in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On the contrary, as we shall see, none of the major theorists of these two types of society attributes crucial significance to technology alone. Theorists have accounted for the distinctiveness of the two broad types of society in terms of complex sets of very varied factors and circumstances; and, in turn, they have identified widely different implications for religion. The failure to perceive these differences of conceptualization has enabled some sociologists of religion to make the mistake of believing that there was a single (or at least a compound) characteristic of industrial societies which could explain the problems of religion in the modern world.

The concept of `religion' is no less contestable and variable than that of industrial or advanced industrial society. But, again, my strategy is to conceive of it in such an inclusive fashion that no important contribution to discussions of religious change since the early nineteenth century will be excluded by definition. For my purposes, then, it will be adequate to define religion as concern for the 'felt whole' or for the ultimate significance of things. It can take forms ranging from experiences in the individual person's consciousness to widely deployed symbols of societal identity or even human essence. The advantage of this conceptualization is that it subsumes all narrower definitions without excluding others. In any case, very little turns on the definition that I have stipulated. It will not be employed in claims about the `real' nature of religion; it will only demarcate the very broad areas of culture and society in which thinkers have located distinctive concomitants of the transition from pre-industrial to industrial society, and from the latter to advanced industrial society. <>

10. Religion and Social Class: The Disruption Years in Aberdeen by A. Allan MacLaren [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367074128]

This book, first published in 1974, shows how social class and origins in mid-nineteenth century Aberdeen were reflected in religious belief and observance, and how in turn this acted as a catalyst for change in society. Through a detailed analysis of this topic, particularly in relation to the Presbyterian denominations, the author directs fresh light on the emergence and development of the Free Church.

The Disruption in the Church of Scotland is examined within the context of changes which had

taken place in the form of industrial production, whereby the city as a centre of manufacturing had replaced the domestic production of the countryside. The concomitant changes in the social structure, and the divisions which resulted within the old ruling families, are probed. The social patterns of adherence to the Established and Free Churches are analysed in detail, and the subsequent development of the Free Church is examined in terms of the social support it enjoyed in 1843.

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Excerpt:

> No individual power could have reared this Free Church. It is the result of a confluence of circumstances.** Henry Cockburn, Journal, 1831-54 (Edinburgh, 1874)

Whilst Lord Cockburn—author of the above statement—was describing the diverse origins of the Free Church nationally, his observation is equally applicable with regard to the situation in Aberdeen. Furthermore, the same `confluence of circumstances' which reared the Free Church to a large extent explains its subsequent development.

Not all of the forces or circumstances, however, which were to mould and determine the nature of the new Church, were inherent in the Free Church itself. An important determinant was the fundamental weakness of the Establishment which failed on the one hand to coerce and intimidate those who challenged its authority, and on the other to make sufficient conciliatory gestures in order to blunt and weaken the force of the challenge. This failure is to a considerable degree explicable in terms of certain contradictions which were becoming increasingly apparent within the ranks of the old ruling oligarchy. These contradictions were of a structural and ideological nature. The old eighteenth-century alliance between the landed and merchant families on which the prosperity of the city had been built was breaking down. The contraction of industry away from its former domestic and rural basis into the city factories, and the changes in agricultural technology leading to greatly increased production, created a divergence of interest amounting to a rural/urban dichotomy. The urban sections of the old landed-merchant families sought to promote free trade which, rightly or wrongly, the landed sections saw as endangering their future economic prosperity, and rightly saw as a long-term threat to their social position in the community. On the issue of patronage in the Church, however, the urban sections, who would have lost nothing if reforms had been forthcoming, were not prepared to widen the developing schism between themselves and the landed gentry. Consequently, the urban families of the old merchant-landed oligarchy found themselves promoting a newspaper in order to advocate the ending of restrictions on trade—these having placed agriculture in a privileged position—and at the same time defending the privileges of the landed sections with regard to patronage in the Church. Had these families been able to make the break complete between themselves and the landed sections at this point, it seems a fair assumption that they could have taken over, or controlled and accommodated, many of the non-intrusionists. Instead they half-heartedly defended patronage on the grounds of the illegality of the demands of the non-intrusionists and allowed Adam and the Aberdeen Herald to ridicule, taunt, and ultimately drive into secession, clergymen who might well have been courted by conciliation and compromise.

The failure of the ruling oligarchy of city families to treat the demands of the non-intrusionists with some sympathy and apparent consideration, was not just the result of a lack of political foresight—although they would seem to have misjudged the extent of support the `nons' enjoyed. Their antipathy towards non-intrusion must certainly have been based on dislike and distrust of many of those most vociferous in support of its cause—men of increasing wealth but often of obscure origins; men who having been denied accommodation by their social superiors increasingly sought confrontation

with them. It is in this positive response by these men towards what was on the whole a negative attitude of the ruling oligarchy, that one detects an important circumstance which was to provide in Aberdeen the great initial impetus of the seceders, and was to shape the subsequent development of the Free Church in the post-Disruption years.

The differences between the old dynasty of ruling families and the newcomers ran deeper than the question of non-intrusion and contrasting social origins. The emergent middle class, who were to provide the dynamic elements of the new Church, were characterised by a high degree of social mobility based on a readiness to switch occupations and to diversify business interests. Thus it was not uncommon among the elders of the Free Church to find a stockbroker who had been a butcher in the east end, or a wholesale tea and coffee dealer who had formerly been a druggist, or a fancy and photographic goods warehouseman who had begun as an east-end hairdresser. Moreover, in their climb up the social ladder these same men might well have made and unmade several business partnerships, and occupied any number of business premises. But if their aggressive entrepreneurship in the field of business contrasted vividly with the staid respectability of their counterparts in the Establishment, so were their life styles sharply differentiated. Whilst the adherents of the Establishment clung to the older residential areas of the city around the Castle Street, Adelphi, east end of Union Street, the Upperkirkgate and Netherkirkgate, venturing as far as Belmont Street, the new men of the Free Church crossed over to the areas west of the Denburn often occupying several houses in a relatively short space of time in the new residential areas of Bonaccord Street, Crown Street, Dee Street, Union Place, Holburn Street, Carden Place and Rubislaw district. These men alone had the dynamism, enterprise, and wealth to raise stipends, build churches, and generally ensure the success of the Free Church which was clearly demonstrated by the census of religion in 1851.

However, in the making of the success they left their own peculiar stamp on its economic organisation. Urged on to fight a war against the residuary Establishment they fought it with all their economic expertise, treating each church, every congregation, and ultimately each individual member as part of a business enterprise. Contributions to national schemes such as the Sustentation Fund tended to become a measure of religiosity, the criterion for election to eldership, and to some extent for membership of the Church. The 'new shoots' of the Free Church, many of them insecure in the middle class of which they had only recently become part, saw the success of the new Church as a measure of their own ability. The desire to destroy the residuary Establishment led to the creation of a Free Church which in all ways was to be superior to the Church from which they had seceded. In the final analysis the Establishment survived despite, or perhaps simply because of, the success of the Free Church. In seeking comparability with the Establishment the Free Church became not the new Establishment, but another Establishment with all the financial disadvantages attached to maintaining such a position. The 'new shoots' having demonstrated their ability, lost the great motivating drive, and with this loss of motivation passed away the vigour which had characterised the Free Church at its inception. Thus the ultimate decline of the Free Church, rather paradoxically, was rooted in the circumstances at its inception and the social base of its original dynamism.

Notwithstanding its outstanding success as a denomination, the Free Church must be considered a failure in certain important respects. In its war against the Establishment it would seem likely that the first casualties were its working-class members who were driven out by the middle-class nature of the new Church and its inquisitorial financial organisation, coinciding as it did with a period of grave economic recession in the city. It was a loss which the Free Church failed to make good although considerable time and money was spent in attempting to do so. The widespread religiosity of the working class, measured in terms of their belief in church `connection', which was largely the result of historical circumstances and the efforts of the churches in the field of social control—notably in educational provision—was never fully exploited by any of the Presbyterian churches. Whilst this may be partly explained by the Calvinist view of conversion, in the case of the Free Church the difficulty ran deeper than this, involving the overall strategy of the Church in its struggle with the

Establishment, and the more subtle ideological changes which had occurred within its own organisation. It was now necessary to discipline the `impudent boys' who were threatening the structure of an `establishment' not so dissimilar from the one they themselves had disrupted in the previous decade. Whilst the Free Church, denominationally, was unable to embrace the spiritually destitute working class, it feared that the efforts of others might be successful. Consequently considerable time and effort was expended in exposing the doctrinal errors of men like Hugh Hart, in issuing dire warnings of the dangers of Popery, in condemning the concept of `ragged churches', and in winning back children who had fallen to the temptations of the Episcopal Church.

Of all the `confluence of circumstances' which went into the making of the Free Church in Aberdeen, the most vital in the understanding of its subsequent development was the nature of the social support it received in 1843. It was the 'new shoots' who were to direct the new Church along its initial dynamic course, shape its organisation, make it a success as a denomination, and having achieved their own ambition, and proved their ability, leave it with unsolved problems such as its role as a twin to the Established Church. Writing in 1844, and still fearful of the social consequences which she saw as resulting from the Disruption, one lady defender of the Establishment rather hopefully declared:

The Secession which has taken place will not weaken the Establishment, for this is not the first Dissent from the Church of Scotland, nor will it probably be the last.

She was, of course, wrong both in her fears and in her prediction. What she had witnessed was not the disintegration of society but a phenomenon that reflected social forces which ultimately would lead to its stabilisation. She was in fact observing the arrival of the new urban-based bourgeoisie. <>

11. Religion and the Family: Youth and the Gang Instinct by Geoffrey Hoyland [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367086534]

The purpose of this book, first published in 1945, is to consider the problem of religion in its relation to the family. Even in 1945 there had been much talk regarding the break-up of family life and the weakening of parental control, and this book examines the role of religion in the social changes within the family unit.

Contents
1. Brains: Old and New
2. The Primitive Family Gang
3. Young Gangsters
4. The New Family Gang
5. Primitive Religions and Parents
6. Minds and Words
7. Stories
8. The Art of Story-Telling
9. The Galilee Charter
10. The Gang at Prayer

Excerpt: We have heard much talk in recent years about the break-up of family life and the weakening of parental control. There are many reasons for this change, which amounts to little short of a revolution in the social life of the nation compared with the conditions of half a century ago. The enormous increase in the facilities for quick and easy transport, together with the equally great extension of public amusements, such as skating-rinks, dance-halls and cinemas, has been one powerful factor in the change. Moreover the whole attitude of the State towards the children has altered profoundly during the past century ; a hundred years ago children were regarded as the property of their parents who were free to do almost anything they liked to their offspring—short of actually murdering them. Now the State has assumed a general guardianship over the young and the parents are relegated to being little more than their temporary trustees. Compulsory legislation has invaded the nursery, insisting on vaccination in infancy and education from the age of five. Milk and the mid-day meal are to be provided by the State at school, relieving the parents from yet another responsibility. Nursery schools, voluntary to-day, may possibly be compulsory tomorrow ; few would be bold enough to maintain that the grandmotherly—or rather foster-motherly—activities of the State in regard to the children have yet reached their limit and that still more searching encroachments on parental responsibility may not be in store for us.

It is no part of my desire or purpose to decry—or even to criticize—these activities on the part of the

State. All of them are admirable in intention, and many, so far as they have been realised in practice, have proved of great benefit to the children. But they cast, none the less, a somewhat lurid light upon the civilization of our time and they form an ironical commentary conditions of modem society. In other words, we must make up our minds about the questions I have raised in the foregoing paragraphs before we can deal with the specific problem of religious training in the home. In the first section, therefore, I shall deal with the place of the ` family gang ' in the general social scheme, deferring to the second the problems of religious education. <>

12. The Religion of Ethnicity: Belief and Belonging in a Greek-American Community by Gary A. Kunkelman [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367085735]

The integrative role of religion has been a recurrent theme of sociological and anthropological theory. This role is apparent in the Greek-American community; religion functions as a cement of the social fabric. Indeed, it would be hard to overestimate the role of Greek Orthodoxy in joining people of Greek ancestry into a community and reinforcing their sense of ethnic identity. The nature of ethnic identity and the church's role in fostering and sustaining it are subjects of this study, first published in 1990. In ultimately focusing on the interplay between church, community and individual, the book suggests that understanding the relation of these people to their church is to understand them as a people.

Contents
1. Background Considerations: Prior Research, Assumptions and Approach
2. The Community's Early Years
3. Right and Wrong: Pride and Shame
4. Family: Marriage and Kin Relationships
5. Parent-Child Relationships
6. Education, Occupation and Success
7. The Ethnic Church
8. Contrasting Priestly Styles
9. Orthodoxy: Dogma and Cognitive Forms
10. The Concept of Ethnicity: Summary and Observations
11. The Religion of Ethnicity: Summary and Observations

Excerpt: When this study was completed in 1986, the Greek-American community in Bellevue was grappling with a difficult and delicate task: that of fashioning an ethnicity American enough not to interfere with mainstream upper middle class status, yet Greek enough to ensure ethnic distinctiveness. While not an easy trick to pull off, the challenge wasn't a particularly novel one; Bellevue's Greek-Americans had been doing precisely that since the community's earliest days. Through a largely implicit process, they have structured a cultural system that maintains their ethnicity despite continual change that objectively brings them closer to mainstream American. (While it must remain only a suggestion, a similar process may well be a hallmark of any viable ethnic unit).

Recent years have underscored the theme that ethnicity (and for the Greeks, religion as a central component of it) is anything but static. An enduring ethnicity is a dynamic ethnicity. It represents a process of tension and contention as institutions and cultural forces are focused on the largely implicit task of maintaining ethnicity within the overarching framework of the host culture. While we tend to think of ethnic cultures as traditional cultures doggedly maintained, this characterization doesn't hold water. The traditional definers of ethnicity-- the "cultural material" of attitudes, beliefs, folkways-- have proven remarkably fluid and open to change (again, at least in this community).

Building on this, the study suggests that cultural material plays an essentially symbolic role in setting the group apart. It isn't necessary for cultural material to be unique or even different from the host culture's, as long as group members embrace it as "theirs." That is, ethnicity is ultimately group defined; it is what members of the ethnic group agree it should be. This, of course, gives a certain tenuousness to it all. The cultural solutions fashioned toward the end of ethnic maintenance are never more than solutions of the moment. Yet it is this very flexibility that allows an "alien" ethnic culture to retain its vitality and distinctiveness in a notoriously incorporative larger culture.

In the years since this study was done, ethnicity in Bellevue has continued to change to suit community members' situational priorities-- as, indeed, it has throughout the community's existence. This is in

keeping with the notion that cultural material is continually modified; elements that conflict with the host culture are eliminated; elements that enhance group acceptance and solidarity are added. Thus, there continues a process of evolution by environmental selection in which ethnicity is redefined to fit the twin imperatives of compatibility with the host culture and maintenance of the group. Were it possible for an ethnic culture to exist as a static culture-- as a faithful reflection of a distant culture long ago imported to America-- it would exist only as a cultural artifact. While it might exude quaintness and charm, it would not be a functioning cultural system.

It may well prove that the change in Bellevue since the mid-1980s is considerably more than cultural change of the garden variety. Indeed, it appears that the Bellevue Greek-American community is in the midst of a revitalization in the classic sense. As is so often the case, religion is the vehicle. What gives a different spin to the phenomenon here, however, is that in this community a sort of institutional role reversal had taken place. The fundamental belief and behavior roles traditionally ascribed to religion had accrued to the community; the role of ethnic maintenance, generally a community function, had come to rest in the church. In Bellevue, ethnicity-- not religion-- had emerged as shaper of belief and regulator of behavior. While it's too early in the game to call the outcome, the changes underway portend broad ramifications for the community and its ethnicity.

Again characteristic of the classic revitalization scenario, the motive force rests primarily in one person. When these efforts to the extent of three-to-four hundred thousand dollars. And it is ironic that as the upper middleclass church has gone increasingly toward the Greek model, the other church-- that of the immigrants and less well-to-do-- has adopted an increasingly modern appearance. There is a fairly obvious explanation that seems to fit: members of the "class" church have become comfortable enough with their ethnicity to begin to reassert Greekness; "foreign" cultural material no longer places them in conflict with larger American culture. Members of the other church, newer to the United States and generally less successful, are arguably less at ease with the compatibility of Greekness and the mainstream American status they aspire to. They, too, are engaged in the process of ethnic redefinition to meet their situational priorities; and their situational priorities today are much like those faced by members of the older church in earlier years. It would no doubt be interesting a generation hence to see how closely the cultural history of the newer church recapitulates that of the older. But whether or not patterns will emerge, and despite what changes may or may not occur in that time, one thing is sure: Bellevue's next generation will define its ethnicity in its own way... and the result will be a different ethnicity from that of the generation before.

In the tradition of Durkheim and Malinowski, the integrative role of religion has been a recurrent theme of sociological and anthropological theory. So, too, is this role apparent in the contemporary Greek-American community; one need not look deeply to see religion functioning, to use Malinowski's classic phrase, as "the very cement of social fabric." Indeed, it would be hard to overestimate the role of Greek Orthodoxy in cementing people of Greek ancestry into a community and reinforcing their sense of ethnic identity.

The nature of ethnic identity and the church's role in fostering and sustaining it are subjects of this study. Fundamentally an ethnography, it looks at a three-generation group of Greek-Americans living in and around "Bellevue," an industrially-based area of some 360,000 people in the northeastern United States. In ultimately focusing on the interplay between church, community and individual, the study suggests that understanding the relation of these people to their church is to understand them as a people; that is, it proceeds on the notion that the Greek Orthodox Church provides the single best avenue for exploring and explaining Greek-American culture. As with seventeenth century Puritans, eighteenth century Quakers or nineteenth century Mormons, religion offers "the best way in" to the particular cultural group.

The attachment of the Greek-American to his church has been well documented by researchers. So is it shown in the records of the early Greek immigrants: their first tasks on reaching America invariably included securing a priest to perform the liturgy,

and then, organizing a committee to establish a church. In Bellevue, too, this was among the earliest actions of the Greek pioneers.

Yet despite visibly strong attachment by the immigrants' children and grandchildren, and the large body of scholarship on Greeks in America, relatively little has been written on the critical relationship of Greek-Americans to their church. Only scant attention has been focused on religious forms; there has been no systematic examination of cognitive forms and dimensions of religious belief; only rarely does one encounter an analytic exploration of the dynamics of a Greek community-- an avenue of investigation that would invariably lead to the Orthodox Church. This effort hopes to take a modest first step toward addressing areas such as these. In so doing, it hopes to gain insight into the nature of ethnicity and change in an ethnic culture.

The study is based in an ethnographic overview of the community. It asks what it "means" to be a Greek-American-how being a Greek-American differs from being an unhyphenated American. Building on that, it looks at the role of the church and belief in self-definition and ethnic

maintenance. The approach, which admittedly may appear somewhat circuitous, grows from this line of reasoning: to a Greek-American, ethnicity is synonymous with church. One is Greek not because he is a Hellene by birth; indeed, many of Greek parentage have abandoned their identities and disappeared into the American mainstream. Rather, one is Greek because he elects to remain part of the Greek community. And an individual is a member of the Greek community by virtue of his attachment to the Greek Orthodox Church, the framework on which the community rests. "To be a Greek is to be Orthodox" is axiomatic. While it is reasonable to maintain that the role of religion in Greek-American life has been severely delimited, it also is prudent to coincidentally suggest that the role of the church remains considerable by contemporary American standards. Very simply, religion in a Greek community (and arguably in any community) fails to lend itself to isolated study; there is constant interplay between the religious and secular spheres of life.

It would also be short-sighted to assume that Greek ethnicity can be explained wholly by church and religion. The influence of family is certainly too strong to be ignored, as is the drive for success and achievement in economic and non-economic spheres. Rather, there appears to exist an ethnicity of tension and contention as the varying elements fail (or at least seem they should fail) to fit together neatly. This yields no shortage of perplexing questions and apparent contradictions: why community members-- who would fail to qualify as "spiritual" under most definitions-- cling tenaciously to the church; why, in ongoing conflict with the church or its ministers on any number of points, they profess unquestioning acceptance of a little-understood body of doctrine; why, at the same time they display a heightened individualism and egocentricity, they invest enormous effort in strengthening their church-centered community; and how, despite unflinching commitment to achievement and acquisition, they are in little contention with the values and demands of strong family and strong church. Bellevue's Greek-Americans are, it seems, at the same time the most religious and the most secular of people (much as "neo-orthodox" thinkers have suggested of the larger American populace).

The game plan, very simply, is to define the attributes of ethnicity and to look for points of intersection with the church and religion. This process, in itself, creates somewhat of an abstraction (although arguably a necessary one given the goal of analysis); for rather than a loosely-spun web with defined points where the threads intersect, the social fabric of religion community-ethnicity is much more tightly woven. As important as isolating the individual threads is understanding how they are sewn together; it is in these interrelationships-- in the dynamics-- that one approach to understanding an ethnic religion and ethnic community may rest.

In keeping with the ethnographic approach, the study explores religion and belief at the individual as well as group levels. The attempt is to get beneath the largely stereotyped view of ethnic church affiliation and penetrate into the realm of basic belief and individually held values. The problems inherent in discovering how individuals express belief and in assessing the extent of

individual belief can be monumental. Results take on a tenuousness not only because of interpretive problems growing from the researcher's own concept of religiousness, but also because of the tendency of informants to be less than candid in revealing highly personal thoughts--particularly thoughts that conflict with the officially sanctioned. While I don't want to minimize the potential pitfalls in such an effort, I would suggest that in probing the limits and depth of personal belief one can begin to develop a meaningful profile of a community's relationship with its church and its religion.

As an ethnography, the study is grounded in the observer-participant technique. Through marriage, my association with Bellevue's Greek community spanned the better part of two decades. That has provided ongoing opportunity to know and see individuals and the community in their many guises. And it also has led me to understand, in varied contexts, the importance members attach to "being Greek." Data, gathered through July 1985, was collected in several ways: from documentary materials on the Bellevue community, by participating in activities of the church and community during the extended period of association, and through a steady stream of questions ranging from simple queries in context of casual conversation to carefully-formulated questions in formal interviews. While this effort grows from an anthropological approach, it also draws on the theories and tools of other disciplines, particularly the sociology of religion.

An object of ethnographic investigation is ultimately to be accepted as one of the community and, in so doing, to gain insight and information inaccessible to the outsider. A certain problem, however, arises when the relationship between researcher and community-- or at least certain members of it-¬is one of depth and long-standing. Barriers are lowered and, not infrequently, personal thoughts and private moments revealed. While this may be the true meat of the feast, the researcher must at the same time consider whether his access was as researcher or as friend and family member; the distinction is not arbitrary, for he must ultimately reconcile the contradictions that arise from the not-always-congruent roles. What of confidences--particularly those implicitly assumed? How can one employ what is often the most telling-- and most private-- of information without causing embarrassment or fostering antagonisms? How does one handle criticisms and even accusations, particularly when they offer important insights but also may represent a jaundiced view? A primary means of reconciling such conflicts in this study has been to mask the community. The name of the city, other place names, and the names of actors have been changed. <>

13. The Religious Roots of American Sociology by Cecil E. Greek [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367074241]

This book, first published in 1992, demonstrates that American sociology has deep religious roots which continue, both directly and indirectly, to influence the discipline today. Early American sociology was closely aligned with the social gospel movement in Protestantism, which hope to make use of the new science of sociology to help solve social problems and, ultimately, prepare America for the establishment of Christ's kingdom on earth. Although American sociology became secularized after 1920, it retained its ameliorative outlook, hoping to 'save' mankind through positivistic analysis and technocratic societal planning.

Contents
1. Social Reform and Protestant Theology: From the Colonial Period to the Civil War
2. The Rise of the Social Gospel
3. The Turn to Sociology
4. Protestant Theology in Mainstream American Sociology
5. The Demise of the Social Gospel
6. The Transvaluation of Christian Sociology

Excerpt: Within contemporary American sociology the reigning paradigm is that research must be "value-free." Religious beliefs and values are not only suspect, they must be eliminated, lest they contaminate sociological research. Sociology is generally considered solely a secular endeavor.

This work will show that American sociology had origins quite different from its current philosophical underpinnings. American sociology has deep religious roots which, in fact, continue to influence,

both directly and indirectly, the discipline today. During the early history of American sociology, between approximately 1880 and 1920, the discipline was understood by many, both those inside sociology and those outside of the field, to be a fundamentally religious undertaking. American sociology was closely aligned with the social gospel movement in Protestantism, which hoped to make use of the new science of sociology to help solve social problems and, ultimately, prepare America for the establishment of Christ's Kingdom on earth. The works of many of the founding fathers of American sociology such as Albion Small, Charles Henderson, E.A. Ross, and Charles Ellwood were based upon such religious beliefs, which they openly stated on many occasions. Sociology, through providing a holistic theoretical perspective to analyze American society, was to supply religiously motivated social reformers with the means necessary to ameliorate the newly industrialized, urbanized, and bureaucratized nation and thus help bring about a heavenly utopia, the Kingdom of God on earth.

Although American sociology was to become overtly secularized after 1920, it retained its ameliorative outlook, hoping to "save" mankind through positivistic sociological analysis and technocratic societal planning. "Applied sociology" in America has to this day retained the discipline's original soteriological aspirations.

In effect, this book represents an attempt to employ a social constructionist model similar to that developed by Blumer and Spector and Kitsuse to investigate a historical example of social engineering. While social constructionists have investigated contemporary moral entrepreneurs from the worlds of religion, psychology, business, and politics they have not, to date, explored the moral origins of their own discipline. An informed understanding of contemporary American sociology must begin with an analysis of the discipline's unique American origins and its links to the predominant religious beliefs of that era. This work should also be helpful to those interested in the history of American sociology's long-term fascination with social problems and their cure. It was religiously influenced sociologists who set the discipline's overall direction and initiated sociology's interest in such topics as minorities, crime and delinquency, marital and family breakdown, sexism, labor relations, and urban decay. One of the major reasons that early American sociology rarely investigated religion as a topic or ever produced a sociologist of religion on the scale of Weber or Durkheim was that the entire endeavor of sociology was, in effect, applied Christianity.

This book is divided into three major sections. The first documents the emergence of the social gospel within American Protestantism in the late nineteenth century and demonstrates why "Christian sociology" was needed to aid in hastening the arrival of Christ's earthly utopia. The first chapter briefly summarizes Protestant attempts at social reform in America during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries prior to the appearance of the social gospel, highlighting the theological differences between the latter and earlier Protestant reform movements. The important leaders of these movements are discussed, as well as some of the major sins targeted for eradication, such as slavery and alcohol consumption.

The second chapter analyzes the origins of social gospel theology in the 1870s and 1880s. The social gospel had five major tenets: (1) a strong allegiance to evolutionism; (2) faith in inevitable progress; (3) an optimistic view of human nature; (4) a belief that the Kingdom of God was to be an earthly utopia; and (5) the expectation that America was to be the place where the earthly Kingdom first would be established, then to serve as a model for the rest of the world.

The third chapter attempts to explain why the social gospel sought to create a new social science, sociology, to assist it in bringing about God's Kingdom on earth. It seems that the naively optimistic social gospelers were taken aback by the terrible negative consequences of industrialization and urbanization. Nevertheless, rather than reject their optimistic beliefs as being without empirical proof because of the continued existence of these evils, the social gospelers relabeled the evils as obstacles—social problems—that were blocking the arrival of the otherwise inevitable Kingdom. In addition, they believed these obstacles were God's way of testing the sincerity of their faith, and demonstrated that Clod intended for the church to

be His willing partner in helping Him to establish His Kingdom. The social gospelers attempted to redirect the church's mission toward the amelioration of social problems, so that the Kingdom's arrival could be hastened and assured. After their realization that earlier forms of Christian amelioration were now obsolete, the social gospelers called upon the fledgling discipline of sociology to help create new reform strategies, based upon social scientific truths that would be compatible with their theological beliefs.

The second section of the book specifically discusses the type of sociology produced during the 1890-1920 period. In the 1890s, the first flowering of American sociology, the discipline emerged as one closely aligned with religion. Sociology was to take on its primary ameliorative orientation during this period. In addition, early American sociology was to develop a critical—although distinctively non-Marxist—stance toward the s(t)3.3atus quo in socie(t)3.3y, directed oftentimes at current ruling elites in government and indus(t)3.3ry who appeared to be directly responsible for the continuation of certain social problems.

Chapter four analyzes the sociological writings of the first American sociology faculty established at the University of Chicago, and one of their students, Charles Ellwood, in order to discover the social gospel presuppositions that underpinned both their sociological theories and ameliorative ethodologies. The four members of the University of Chicago's first faculty were Albion Small, Charles Henderson, George Vincent, and Marion Talbot. From 1892 until 1904 all four were in the sociology department, uniting Small's concern for creating an adequate sociological theory and methodology with Henderson's and Vincent's advocacy of applied sociology—social reform, social work, settlements, penology—with Talbot's sanitary engineering. Women, such as Talbot, were to play a major role during the 1890s in sociology's development. Closely associated with the Chicago sociology department was Jane Addams, whose settlement house movement attracted a number of middle-class women to sociology with the hope of finding a way to expand the domestic sphere to include the traditional male worlds of business and government. Charles Ellwood was to take Chicago's brand of social gospel sociology to the University of Missouri. Ellwood's approach is particularly important because of his attempt to rid sociology of its biologically rooted Aryanism and ethnocentrism, an unfortunate legacy of sociology's Protestant origin.

Chapter five covers the work of Richard T. Ely, a social gospel economist, and his student E.A. Ross. They were to create another haven for Christian sociology at the University of Wisconsin and succeeded in uniting the university and the state government into an instrument for Progressive reform politics: a model that would later be brought to full fruition in Franklin D. Roosevelt's creation of the welfare state.

The one sociologist who served as the great critic of social gospel sociology was William Graham Sumner. He is discussed in chapter six. While many of the social gospelers' reforms represented attempts to socially control portions of the population that were deemed unsalvageable, Sumner advocated a form of civil libertarianism that would guarantee equal opportunity for all. But, Sumner's sociology can also be reinterpreted to reveal its own fundamentally religious roots. Sumner, a former Protestant minister, can be best understood as a Calvinist Christian who has been cut off from his God and left to find meaning in life solely through success in the world of work and faith in the inevitability of natural forces.

The final section of the book covers the demise of social gospel sociology and analyzes the continuing religious nature of American sociology. In the 1920s, the era of social gospel sociology was to come to a close. The Protestant denominations that had backed the social gospel pulled back from social reform with the emergence of Fundamentalism. World War I brought an end to the optimistic belief that human nature had fully outgrown its animal origins. Chapter seven covers the social gospel's decline.

The final chapter addresses what happened within the discipline of sociology, as the applied side of the field was taken over by positivistic sociologists such as William Ogburn who stressed an objective, value-free approach that would not permit overtly

religious, moralistic beliefs to be used in its methodology. However, Ogburn's positivism did not represent the end of "religion" in American sociology, since he merely secularized the conservative version of the social gospel advocated by his mentor, Franklin Giddings. Ogburn's applied sociology incorporated his own moralistic notion of cultural lag into his plan for the employment of a statistically trained technocratic elite who were to cure America's "lags," and thus insure societal wellbeing. Ogburn had his own vision of a kingdom just as the social gospelers had theirs.

One of Ogburn's ultimate goals was to replace sociological theory as well as other forms of social science methodology with statistical analysis. While the social gospelers had employed statistics frequently, they were eclectic in their methodology, making use of historical, comparative, and case study approaches. Ogburn's predicted demise for sociological theory has to some extent come true, particularly within applied sociology. Except for functionalism, applied sociology seems to have made very little use of the theories which emerged in the post—World War II era, such as neo-Marxian analyses or phenomenological sociologies. Sociology has been reduced largely to a technique but rarely openly asks itself which god that technique is serving, now that the discipline has rejected its original goal of service to the Christian God. It seems that applied sociology has focused its concerns upon solving problems assigned it by our society's secular gods, government and business. Having rejected God, sociology has chosen to serve Mammon instead, performing research for any institution willing to pay for it. <>

14. Rosicrucianism in America edited with an introduction by J. Gordon Melton [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367086688]

The material in this book, first published in 1990, provides important documentation for the first generation of Rosicrucianism in North America, especially the still vigorous Rosicrucian Fraternity. These chapters reprinted here are so necessary to the understanding of this most occult organization, and are otherwise difficult to locate and read.

Contents

Introduction.
1. The Grand Secret; or Physical Love in Health and Disease by Paschal B. Randolph
2. The Book of the Triplicate Order, Rosicrucia, Eulis, Pythianae by Paschal B. Randolph
3. The Master Key of Love and the Psychology of Human Behaviour by Harry O. Saxon
4. Rosicrucian Symbology by KHEI
5. Regeneration by F.B. Dowd
6. Rosikrucianism by Sergius Rosenkruz

Excerpt: That only the three brief documents were available as authoritative literature to anyone determined to create a Rosicrucian group, the main body of any group's teachings had necessarily to come from other sources. Thus as new Rosicrucian groups arose, they tended to look very different from each other and convey very different teachings to their members. As a result, Rosicrucianism as a movement is tied together by a common set of symbols and a romantic founding legend, and by little else.

Little heard from in the eighteenth century, either in Europe or North America, Rosicrucianism was revived in Europe by some British Masons under the leadership of Robert Wentworth Little (1840-1878) who founded the Societas Rosicruciana in Anglia. Membership was open only to Masons. The rebirth of Rosicrucianism was but one aspect of the occult revival that was in its beginning stages in the middle of the nineteenth century, especially in France, and was to blossom in the 1880s. Much of the occult revival in general and the rebirth of Rosicrucianism in particular is attributed to Eliphas Levi. Levi's three monumental magical works, The Doctrine of Transcendental Magic (1855); The Ritual of Transcendental Magic (1856); and History of Magic (1860) in a very real way mark the beginning of modern occultism. And it is in the midst of the new eon created by Levi and his colleagues that Paschal Beverly Randolph emerges.

Paschal Beverly Randolph, American Rosicrucian

The first Rosicrucian in the United States was Paschal Beverly Randolph (1825-1875), a self-educated orphan, whose father was a white man and mother a descendent of royalty from

Madagascar. The times defined him a negro, a label he continually tried to deny. When he was sixteen, he ran away to sea, but was forced to retire a mere five years later after injuring himself while chopping wood. It is about this same time, in 1846, that he claims to have received his initiation as the Grand Hierarch of the Rosicrucians in America. He did little with his credentials, however, concentrating instead on pursuing an education at one of the Eclectic medical colleges and after graduation became a doctor of natural medicines. In 1850 Randolph visited Europe where, he later claimed, he was initiated in the Rosicrucian Fraternity at Frankfurt am Main. There he also met General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, later a Civil War general and the author of a famous book on the magical teachings called hermetics. He returned to Europe on a second visit to continue his occult studies in 1854. On this visit he claimed to have set many of the soon-to-be famous occultists—Eliphas Levi, Kenneth MacKenzie, and Edward Bulwar Lytton (author of the rosicrucian novel, Zanoni).

In 1858, in Paris, Randolph was made Supreme Grand Master of the Western World and a Knight d'Ordre du Lis. He returned to the United States and founded the Fraternitas Rosae Crucis (Rosicrucian Fraternity). As the Civil War approached, he began a lengthy foreign tour during which time he was initiated by the Ansaireh in Syria. In London, he was admitted into the Order of the Rose by Hargrave Jennings, author of The Rosicrucians, Their Rites and Mysteries (1870). Shortly after his return to the United States, in 1861, he founded the first Rosicrucian Fraternity lodge in San Francisco. About this same time he authored his first book, Dealings with the Dead (1861), later retitled Soul, The World Soul. He followed it with The Grand Secret, or Physical Love in Health and Disease (1862) and Ravalette, the Rosicrucian's Story (1863).

The 1860s became an intense period for Randolph. He recruited black soldiers for the Union. At Lincoln's request, he moved to New Orleans as a teacher of freed slaves. He worked with anti-Johnson Democrats and advocated suffrage for blacks. He left politics, however, soon after Lincoln's assassination and settled in Boston as a physician. Here he opened a second lodge, the original one having been lost during the war, and authored several more books including Seership (1868); Love and the Master Passion (1870); and his most important book, Eulis, the History of Love (1874) later republished as Eulis, Affectional Alchemy (1874).

In 1872 Randolph was arrested and tried for writing and circulation books on free love. He claimed that the arrest was part of a plot by some former business associates to gain control over his copyrights. In a well-publicized trial, he was acquitted of all charges.

The charges against him reveal to a certain extent what Randolph had been teaching as a Rosicrucian. As a doctor he had become interested in the physical problems associated with sex and in several of his published books, he sought to give advice to the married couples on the sex life. Very early the advice developed an occult twist to it. In his privately published materials, he taught a form of what would later be called sex magic. Though one can see his teachings as a direct outgrowth of and reaction to the sexual doctrines being developed in Spiritualism, Randolph claimed that he discovered the secret of sexual occultism while in the middle East. In a cryptic passage in Eulis, he notes:

"One Night—it was far-off in Jerusalem or Bethlehem, I really forget which—I made love to and was loved by, a dusky maiden of Arabian blood. I of her, and that experience, learned—not directly, but by suggestion—the fundamental principle of the White Magic of Love..."

The sexual teaching became part of the inner secret of the Rosicrucian Fraternity, though Randolph continually made the point that its practice should be limited to one's spouse.

Randolph's Writings

Randolph's books, written for public consumption have been kept in print and are still available from the fraternity he founded. His privately printed material has become extremely rare, however, most especially in his key work, Magia Sexualis, of which only copies of the French-language edition have survived. Included in this collection are two other rare volumes, his last book on the organization of the Rosicrucian Fraternity.

After his return from the Middle East Randolph established a medical practice in San Francisco and organized the first Rosicrucian lodge. He quickly concentrated his practice on "diseases of the pelvic viscera," for which he had developed some unique medicines, but for which he preferred that his fellow humans adopt preventive measures. His advice on the sexual life is contained in his 1861 book, The Grand Secret; or Physical Love in Health and Disease. Ostensibly a sexual manual and interesting in itself as an additional perspective on mid-nineteenth century medicine, the persistent reader working through the necessary diatribes against both chastity and free love can see the first hints of the more complete occult approach to sexuality that would be developed in Eulis and Magia Sexualis.

For Randolph, the grand secret consists of knowledge of the secretions of the glands, the prostate in the male and the Duvernay for the female. This secretion he calls "Physical Love," and it is the diseased condition of the glands which secrete Physical Love which leads not only to all sexual disorders, but a variety of ills to which the race is afflicted. While never naming this secretion he does elaborate upon some of its properties. Lest anyone think the results of the secretion are of a purely chemical nature, Randolph claimed that the fluid actually changes, by a process never described, into "an impalpable etherial aura". In the healthy person, this aura can rush through the body, and those close to you can sense its presence as the magnetic emanations reach out in the immediate environment. Randolph will later elaborate on this aura, noting its complimentary differences in males and females, but it was already present in his thought when he founded his brand of Rosicrucianism.

The magnetic exchange which Randolph claims is the significant aspect of the sex act is further heightened by the practice of male continence, a practice Randolph derived from George Humphrey Noyes. While disapproving of what he views as the promiscuous lifestyle of Noyes' followers in the Oneida community of perfectionists, where male continence was used for birth control, Randolph adopted the practice as a means of conserving human sexual health and emphasizing the effects of Physical Love. Male continence, also known as carouse and coitus reservatus, involved the ending of sexual intercourse before the man reached a climax and ejaculated.

Among his last publications, Randolph put together an overview of the Rosicrucian Fraternity as it existed in the 1870s, The Book of the Triplicate Order. Shortly before this publication, he had reorganized the order in Boston with himself as the administrative head and main teacher. Within the order was a more elite body, the Brotherhood of Eulis. Nothing is said in this pamphlet, designed to be given to inquirers and potential new members, about its sexual teachings, but it should be noted that Randolph stipulated that "...every office in the Order is dual that is, every male has a female aid, equal in rank, power and influence; but said female or male cannot act independently of each other..." It was expected that those associated with the teachings of Eulis would have a healthy sexual life, but that it would be confined to one's spouse. The Book of the Triplicate Order significantly expands our picture of the actual workings of the Rosicrucian Fraternity at the height of Randolph's career.

The continuance of Randolph's teachings in the United States is well illustrated in Harry O. Saxon's The Master Key of Love. Saxon was an early twentieth century exponent of the Master Key System, a New Thought metaphysical variation developed by Charles F. Haanel. Saxon combined Randolph's sexual ideas with Haanel's New Thought and some ideas from Freudian psychology in what he hoped would be practical advice for the newly married. In Saxon one can see the Rosicrucian teachings as they were allowed to become public as general advice to couples. Saxon exhorted those married to understand the exchange of sexual magnetic forces as the main pleasure-giving element of sex and to utilize male contenence both for its contribution to marital bliss and its long-term benefit to the man.

Freeman B. Dowd

Following his death in 1875, Randolph was succeeded as head of the Rosicrucian Fraternity by Freeman B. Dowd. During the next generation, under the leadership of Dowd and his successor, Edward H. Brown, the fraternity had a very tenuous

existence, but survived until taken over and reorganized under the leadership of R. Swinburne Clymer. Dowd was the author of several books, the most substantive being The Temple of the Rosy Cross (18—), a popular work on occultism when there were still few volumes to which the small but growing occult community could turn. It had an audience beyond the more narrow confines of occultism, being serialized in several metaphysical periodicals, most importantly in 1888-89 by Melinda Cramer in her New Thought magazine, Harmony.

Regeneration, published in 1900, was issued as a sequel, actually part 2, of The Temple of the Rosy Cross. It has been selected for reprinting here for two reasons. First, it includes a discussion of reincarnation, one of the first outside of Theosophical literature. The fraternity became a second important advocate of this alternative to Christian understandings of death, resurrection, and heaven. However, the Rosicrucian understanding of reincarnation was quite distinct from that of the Theosophists.

Theosophy had developed a belief in reincarnation that mingled Darwinian evolution and Hindu notions in a complex fashion. The soul was heading on an upward journey. Its various incarnations helped or impeded that upward progress according to the balance of karma. An abundance of good karma pushed the soul forward. Ultimately, the soul would complete its need for further incarnations, and continue to evolve in a purely physical fashion.

To Dowd and the Rosicrucians, however, the goal was physical embodied immortality, a goal that could only be reached through a series of incarnations by the soul and a steady improvement in the quality of existence in each incarnation. Rosicrucian practice would teach humans the ability to utilize their inherent "power to change at will all the conditions of life in the flesh, to transmute this animal life into spiritual substance, thus rendering the flesh so ethereal and so pure that corruption can find no lodgment therein."

While a minor idea in the occult community a century later, in the late nineteenth century it was a very popular notion being pursued by both occultists and metaphysicians. Its most successful exponent was Charles S. Fillmore, the co-founder of the Unity School of Christianity. Fillmore shared Dowd's approach to reincarnation and immortality. He believed that not only New Thought metaphysics, but vegetarianism and chastity (i.e., rejecting Randolph's use of sex), paved the way to physical immortality and he impressed all three upon his followers in the early twentieth century. These teachings are clearly stated in the "doctrinal" statement Unity used to circulate, and their decentralizing these teachings was a part of Unity's withdrawal of the statement in the years since Fillmore's death.

Second, Regeneration clearly continues Randolph's unique teaching on sexuality and shows how it was integrated into the total Rosicrucian teachings. Dowd follows Randoiph in his delineation of the instinctive nature of man and woman, while noting that each possesses the essential qualities of masculine and feminine. Contrary to many occult teachings, whose emphasis on spirituality saw the occult life as leading away from something so base and physical as sex, Randolph and Dowd saw sexuality as inherent in evolution and hence spiritual progress. However, it had to be magical sex, not the animal lust which so subjugated human expressions of their sexual nature. The importance of sex is initially noted by its delineation as a necessary factor in human regeneration and is underscored by Dowd in pointing out the fatal nature of improper sexual activity.

The Rosicrucian Fraternity's emphasis upon sex and its integration into a life of proper occult sexual behavior runs as a significant thread of alternative thought in the large context of American occult religion. In North America and Western Europe, it would he joined by the magical sexuality developed from Randolph by the Ordo Templi Orientis and its major twentieth-century leader, Aleister Crowley. These two organizations would carry the teachings until the sexual revolution of the 1960s freed a new wave of sexual occultism in both its western magical form and its Eastern Taoist and Tantric forms upon a waiting occult community's significant audience.

Who Is Sergius Rosenkruz?

The final item in this anthology of Rosicrucian literature does not come from the Rosicrucian

Fraternity, but from an obscure organization which went under the names of the Holy Rosikrucian Church, The Sergian Brotherhood, and/or the Order of the Knights of the Golden Circle.

At the present time it is known only by the single pamphlet reprinted below. From this pamphlet, Rosikrucianism, which appeared in 1915, it can be surmised that the church was located in Los Angeles, but that it had no affiliation with any of the other then extant Rosicrucian bodies. Its leader chose a Russian name and the liturgical material shows a familiarity with Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic ritual. However, the writer has been plainly influenced by theosophical literature and has become an advocate of reincarnation. The service described in the last pages of the pamphlet also indicate an affiliation with spiritualism.

This pamphlet is reprinted with the hope that it will lead to more information about the church being discovered and copies of its other literature being retrieved.

The material in this volume provides important documentation for the first generation of Rosicrucianism in North America, especially the still vigorous Rosicrucian Fraternity. The Fraternity published a large number of books by R. Swinburne Clymer, and keeps the most important Randolph in print. However, the items reprinted here, so necessary to understanding the pre-Clymer era, are quite difficult to locate and should go a long way to revealing the early history of this most occult organization. <>

15. Social Science and the Cults: An Annotated Bibliography by John A. Saliba [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367085919]

This book, first published in 1990, brings together descriptive, comparative, and theoretical materials on cults and sects in Western culture, focusing on literature published since 1970. A historical section links the rise of the new movements to similar past phenomena in Western culture. Other sections examine the methodology of studying religious movements and the various theories which have been brought to explain them, current studies on traditional sects that are sometimes compared to the new religions, and many studies of individual contemporary cults.

Contents

Excerpt: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE CULTS: AN OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION

The decade of the 1960's was one of great social and religious turmoil. Social discontent, religious change, and disregard of traditional authority in civil, moral, and religious matters seemed to prevail, especially among young adults. This was the age when religion appeared to be in decline, when secularization, the process through which religion becomes less of a factor in sociopolitical matters and in the public domain in general, was deemed irreversible, and when religious beliefs looked as if they were crumbling under the advance of modern science. In retrospect, the appearance of the "Death of God Theology" by the mid-1960's was not a surprising development.

The late 1960's, however, did not witness the death of God nor the disappearance of religion. On the contrary, there are some indications that it experienced a resurgence of religious enthusiasm. This revival expressed itself in several distinct forms. On the one hand, Christianity witnessed an internal dynamic to growth and relevance. On the other, the influx of Eastern traditions to the West, particularly to the United States, attracted disillusioned and dissatisfied youngsters and gave impetus to an alternative religious tradition that has been part of Western culture for some time. Further, the growth of interest in occult matters rekindled religious beliefs and practices that had never quite died down in Western society. Added to these explicitly religious manifestations, the flowering of many human growth movements, though often secular in orientation, manifested itself in ideals, language, and rituals reminiscent of traditional spiritual paths. As the decade of the 1970's rolled in, it was already becoming

increasingly clear that what was taking place in the West was no passing fad.

The Social Scientific Study of Religion

The resurgence of religion and the advent of new religious movements have revitalized the study of religion in the social sciences (Robbins, item 919). Scholars interested in the field of religion have been given the opportunity to observe firsthand how new religions might come into being, how they interact with their sociocultural environment, and how they die out or else develop, adapt, and become gradually institutionalized. Insights gleaned from these direct personal observations have been used to reexamine other movements in different periods of history. And existing religious groups in the largely Christian West and to account for religious change and pluralism. The initial work in this area was spearheaded by Weber (items 139-40), Troeltsch (item 134), and Niebuhr (item 119), who dwelt particularly on the features that distinguished a church from a sect. Their writings still lie at the roots of contemporary speculations on the subject. Fundamental to the original distinction between church and sect is the relationship that these two religious entities have with society at large. Briefly stated, the church and the denomination are organizations that have achieved some level of accommodation with society and culture, whereas a sect tends to maintain a degree of tension with its environment. In this respect the cult (which did not figure explicitly in the speculations of these early sociologists) is similar to the sect. Sociologists disagree on exactly how cults differ from sects. One common explanation sees sects are groups that have split off from a major Christian church, while cults as composed of people recruited by a charismatic leader to a relatively new and syncretistic system of religious beliefs and practices (see, for example, Stark and Bainbridge, item 966, pp. 11-12). Sects and cults are then subdivided into a variety of types based on their ideology, goals, and/or position in, and relationship to, the larger society.

The debate in the social sciences on the various kinds of religious organizations has not led to a commonly accepted definition of terms nor to a universal typology. Critical evaluations of both the original terms and of the many existing typologies, as well as attempts to amend the theoretical formulations of early sociologists, tend to support the view that this area of the sociology of religion is likely to continue to be the subject of debate for a long time to come.

Several major conclusions, however, can be drawn from the voluminous literature on the subject: 1) the different kinds of religious groups represent ideal types and are more accurately placed on a continuum with the church and the cult situated at the ends; 2) religious organizations must be examined, not as static, but as dynamic entities that change over time; 3) all religious groups must be defined and understood in the context of their relationship with the society or culture in which they thrive; and 4) cults, like sects, are to be considered as marginal or fringe religions and/or subcultures. This viewpoint of cults contrasts sharply with the position that defines them as destructive, pseudoreligious organizations that have deviant (and often criminal) tendencies.

It follows that, from a social-scientific perspective, the emergence of new religious movements, be they labeled sects or cults, and their confrontation with society are considered almost a natural process that will occur, given the correct sociocultural conditions. From this general picture it is easy to conclude that the rise of new religious movements is an interesting but unremarkable event in a society that is changing rapidly under the influence of technology. While this does not logically lead to the view that sectarian and cultic developments are necessarily good in themselves or beneficial to the individual and society, it certainly leans toward the position that cults and sects should not be the subject of overwhelming concern, much less fear. Consequently, most social scientists do not exhibit the same level of anxiety, apprehension, and panic that one finds among psychiatrists and psychologists, parents of cult and ex-cult members, self-styled deprogrammers, and news media reporters.

Why and How Does One Study the Cults?

A second major issue regards both the reasons why and the manner in which cults should be studied (see, especially, items 1050 ff.). In general, the social scientists' interest in the cults is part of their academic concerns. The cults are a specific form of

human behavior. They reveal some aspects of humanity and are an expression of religious, social, and cultural dynamism. Social scientists, ideally at least, are not dedicated to the investigation of the new movements for personal reasons. Their research is not an aspect of their involvement in, or reaction to, a new religion, nor is it directly related to their own personal quest for religious meaning and experience, even though there might be some exceptional cases. How and to what extent or degree this initial attitude influences one's research is a debatable point. Because of this rather dispassionate motivation for studying cults, social scientists could easily appear to be cult sympathizers or even cult promoters.

The above approach contrasts sharply with the view of those whose study of the cults is motivated by the desire to combat them and to curtail their activities. Here the study of the new movements is not an end in itself, an academic activity pursued for the quest of human knowledge. Cults are studied because they threaten Christianity and/or Judaism and one cannot refute their doctrines and criticize their practices without first knowing what these are. Or else, cults are judged to be a menace to the social order, to family traditions, and to the established cultural values and must be scrutinized carefully in order that appropriate ways might be found to keep them at bay and to defeat their efforts to overrun Western civilization. While social scientists can at least make an effort at impartiality, students who are engaged in exposing the cults have already taken a negative stand on the nature of cultism and its effects on individuals and society. They become religious crusaders, champions of traditional moral values and family unity, and defenders of social norms. That such a zealous attitude could negatively influence the study of the new movements does not require much verification. Because of this highly charged, emotional stand, those people who denounced the cults as evil institutions can be readily perceived as "cult opponents" with little to offer to the academic study of cultism.

The two opposing views of the cults and of the reasons for studying them are buttressed by similar arguments. Social scientists insist that their firsthand investigation of these movements has led them to a nonpejorative opinion of a cult. Those who attack the cults are also convinced that their studies on the effects cults have on people support the strong, negative stand on the matter they have embraced.

Methods of Studying the Cults

Examining the methods used to investigate the cults is necessary because the validity of the information about the cults and its consequent interpretation ultimately depends on how researchers go about studying them. What are the procedures one should adopt for finding out exactly what cult members believe, what their goals and practices are, what effects they have on those who join them, and what demands do gurus make of their devotees? How does one reach conclusions about the way cults operate as distinct subcultures that are at variance or in conflict with the mainline religions and culture? Are there suitable methods that can help the researcher not only record the facts faithfully, but also understand their significance?

The methods employed by social scientists to investigate the new religious movements are essentially those that have been applied to the study of traditional religion and religions across cultures and to social processes in general. These methods are: the use of historical materials, comparisons between similar phenomena in the same society and across cultures, controlled experimentation where possible, sample surveys, content analysis, and participant observation. Many of these approaches emphasize the need for an investigation that entails direct contact and interaction with the people under study. The underlying assumptions are that 1) the social scientist can achieve some degree of objectivity and impartiality, and 2) those being studied are reliable informants.

The method of participant observation is at the heart of the current debate on how new religious movements should be studied. It should be borne in mind that such an approach is not new in the social sciences (cf., for instance, Bryun, item 73). Developed initially by Western anthropologists for the study of non-Western peoples, this method, which has been standard in anthropological circles for almost half a century, has been analyzed and discussed for decades and been adopted by most social scientists. The heart of this approach, to

understand people who have different worldviews and who follow diverse lifestyles, lies in its insistence that the observers should not apply an interpretation or judgment based solely on their own cultural assumptions and points of view. Rather, they should attempt to understand people's behavior from the perspective of the latter's own cultural norms and values. Thus, scholars are encouraged to beware of their own ethnocentrism, to be nonjudgmental, and to adopt a posture of cultural relativism. Some participation, be it overt or covert, in the activities of the subjects being studied is, therefore, considered necessary.

Several reasons have been advanced to show that participant observation has distinct advantages over most other methods (see, e.g., Bernard, item 1056). First of all, it allows the observer to see things from inside. Reports of what cult members do are based on direct eye witnessing rather than on hearsay or on what is publicly acknowledged by cult and ex-cult members.

Secondly, the observer can notice discrepancies between what people say and what they actually do. Religions tend to advertise the ideal that is often not realized at all. Thus, for instance, the utopian goals of reli-gious communes hardly ever materialize. Some statements that cult members make can be seriously questioned. The devotees of some cults have at times assured their audiences that joining their organizations does not imply that one has to abandon one's own religious heritage. Contact with the group may show, however, that the nature of the beliefs, practices, and commitment of a cult are incompatible with other religious systems and that most members actually abandon the religion of their upbringing as they become socialized in their new ideology and lifestyle.

The Variety of Cults

The phenomena that fall under such labels as "cults," "new religious movements," "alternative religions," and "marginal or fringe religions" number at least several hundred. When one reflects on the many new reli-gious groups that have sprouted over the course of history, one is faced with several thousands of religious entities. Whether they can all be included under the one label of "cult" becomes an important issue. Social scientists insist that cults differ among themselves in their belief sys-tems, their ritual practices, their ethical rules, their political, social, and economic structures, and their relationships with society. Too much generalization about cults might distort our understanding of their nature, structure, and import.

Two areas of research result from this preoccupation with the variety of cults and the quest for the generic denominators that unify them all into one phenomenon, namely attempts to draw up typologies and to list those features that cults share in common. Here one can identify, respectively, the third and fourth major issues that have divided those studying the cults into two distinctive groups, that is, how does one classify the new religions, and what are the distinctive features of cults that separate them from the established religious traditions?

Ideological Cult Typologies

In social-scientific literature one comes across two types of cult classifications, one historical and ideological in emphasis, the other sociological. Probably the most elaborate of the former is Melton's classification of all religions into 17 family groups, each with its distinct heritage, theology, and lifestyle (item 47). Contemporary cults fall into six of these clusters, namely the 1) Pentecostal, 2) Communal, 3) Metaphysical, 4) Psychic and New Age, 5) "Magick," and 6) Eastern and Middle Eastern families. This classification is largely descriptive and aims at situating the individual groups within one of the major philosophical and/or religious traditions. In so doing, Melton's typology stresses the continuity that contemporary cults have with other alternative religions in the history of the Christianity and other major religions and provides an intellectual framework for understanding cultic beliefs and practices.

A similar, though somewhat eclectic approach has been adopted by Ellwood and Partin (item 598) who restrict their classification largely to those cults that are based on Eastern religious and philosophical traditions.

Basically, these two historians of religion propose five main divisions: 1) Theosophical and Rosicrucian traditions; 2) Spiritualism and UFO groups; 3) Initiatory groups; 4) Neo-Paganism; and 5) Oriental traditions. They see the so-called new cults

not as complete novelties, but rather as developments of traditions that have existed concomitantly with the mainline Christian Churches. Cults, in the approach of Melton and Ellwood and Partin, are ideologically and ritually different groups. They often follow quite different lifestyles. Consequently, they cannot be evaluated morally, theologically, or socially as one homogeneous phenomenon.

The appeal of this approach seems to have had some impact on tradi¬tional sociological literature. In a recent article, Eileen Barker adopts a simplified typology based on ideological and theological differences (item 546). She constructs five major models that might distinguish con¬temporary cults, namely: 1) those that derive from the Christian tradition; 2) those that are based on Eastern religions and philosophies; 3) those that are parareligious (such as the Human Potential Movement); 4) the esoteric tradition; and 5) occult movements (including Witchcraft, neo-Paganism, and Satanism).

The difficulty of constructing a perfect typology is admitted by all the scholars mentioned above. Melton adds a category of "New Unaffiliated Religious Groups." Ellwood and Partin omit Jewish and Christian cults because they are not alternative religious groups in the sense adopted by the authors. And Barker recognizes that many of the movements do not fit easily in any one of the categories she mentions, that some would fit comfortably in more than one, and that several have altered sufficiently enough to merit being placed in a category different from the one they belonged to when they first came into being. The problems of classification are highlighted when one considers the fact, for example, that the Unification Church is listed by Melton with the unaffiliated groups or with Christian cults, by Ellwood as an Oriental movement, and by Barker with Christian groups.

Sociological Cult Typologies

Strictly sociological classifications of cults have tended to focus on the divergent conflicting relationships that cults might have with society at large. Wallis (item 906), for instance, proposes a much-used classification of cults in three different categories, that is: 1) the world-rejecting; 2) the world-affirming; and 3) the world-accommodating. This typology would be applicable to both sects and cults. Its main stress is not on the content of belief, but rather on the way each group defines itself vis-a-vis society. Implicit in such a classification is the principle that new religious movements cannot be understood simply as religious revivals or resurgences. They are rather envisaged as ways of reacting to society or to some particular sociocultural condition.

Another more elaborate proposal has been put forward by Bryan Wilson (item 1023) to account for the variety of sects, which he considers to be "deviant responses to the world." Seven types of such responses are then distinguished: 1) conversionist; 2) revolutionist (or transformative); 3) introversionist; 4) manipulationist; 5) thaumaturgical; and 6) reformist; and 7) utopian. Though developed primarily to account for the divisions within Christianity, several of the characteristics that are associated with each of this typology have been used to classify some of the new cults.

A typology tailored specifically for the new cults has been proposed by Stark and Bainbridge (item 966) who take the degree of organization, or lack of it, as the principal criterion for their distinction between the various new religious groups. These two sociologists classify cults into three types, namely audience cults, client cults, and cult movements. The first type (audience cults) is characterized by having virtually no organization; its members remain largely on the consumer level; they do not, as a rule, meet as a group; and they adopt cult beliefs and practices through printed materials, the radio, and television. This kind of cult provides a mythology for its participants. The second type (client cults) is made up of individuals who develop a relationship with their leaders similar to that of patients with their therapists. These cults never become organizations or communities; they have clients, not members, who may retain their formal association with an established church. They make serious magical practices available to those interested. The final type (cult movements) consists of organized religious entities which attempt to satisfy all the needs of their adherents. Though the levels of

organizational development, the intensity of commitment, and the demands made on the membership may vary, all cult movements look for converts who will break off their attachment to other religious organizations. Cult movements are genuinely religious and they alone provoke great hostility from their sociocultural surroundings.

It may be argued that these sociological typologies neglect both the ideological differences between the new religious and cultic groups as well as the experiential dimensions that most of them claim. It may be further objected that none of them would encompass all the cults. Moreover, they all seem to have been originally constructed to account for the divisions within Christianity, making their application to a broader religious base somewhat strained. Whatever the weaknesses of these sociological classifications, they certainly direct our attention to some crucial questions that must be answered if we are to understand the cults at some depth. When is the sociocultural environment conducive to the emergence and success of cults? What types of relationships with society do cults promote? To what extent is knowledge of the cult's organizational structure necessary for an understanding of the cult itself? What factors will lead a cult to grow or fail or to cultivate a lower or higher tension with society?

Popular Cult Typologies

It is not difficult to see why these historical and sociological discussions on the varieties of cults challenge the more popular classifications. Two cult typologies dominate popular religious or theological literature (see McDowell and Stewart, item 2162, and Enroth and others, item 600). One adopts a theological position and distinguishes between genuine Christianity and unorthodox and/or aberrant groups. The other takes a sooiopsychological stance and divides cults into destructive and benign groups. From a social-scientific perspective, these typologies look rather naive. They fail to address themselves to the real diversity that exists among the cults themselves and end up by placing side by side religious groups that require more careful differentiation. Moreover, they concentrate on one theme, orthodoxy or psychological deviancy, with the result that many, and possibly more important, aspects of cults are neglected or ignored.

The first typology (orthodox Christianity/unorthodox cults) leaves unsolved the main area of contention, namely what orthodox Christianity is. Though it concentrates on an important trait, namely the cult's ideological content, its weakness lies precisely in that fact that it leaves fundamental theological differences unaddressed and unsolved. To place as, for example, McDowell and Stewart have done, such groups as Mormonism, Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Science, the Worldwide Church of God, the Way International, the Unification Church, Theosophy, EST, Transcendental Meditation, and the Hare Krishna Movement in the same category of unorthodox groups that are a perversion and distortion of Biblical Christianity, fails to draw attention to the great theological, sociological, and practical differences that exist between them. This typology fails to realize that, since some new religious movements stem from Eastern religions, they have, first, to be evaluated in the context of the traditions from which they have emerged. Further, it has no sense of the historical roots of many cults and ignores religious pluralism, which has been part of the Christian tradition and world religions in general. It also tends to lose all objectivity, since the interpretation of a cult's Christian orthodoxy or unorthodoxy depends on the denominational background of the individual assessing the cult's theology. It also treats religious and theological factors as independent entities unrelated to other social aspects of life. To state that the Hare Krishna Movement is an Eastern religious group that espouses beliefs and practices that oppose and contradict fundamental Christianity may be quite accurate, but it doesn't throw much light on those who become members of the movement, on the motives, factors, and influences that might lead a person to abandon one's faith to join it, on why it should enjoy a measure of success in the West, and on the reasons why society reacts with such great hostility to its presence.

The second popular typology (destructive/benign cults), which is promoted by the Anti-Cult Movement, is based on the premise that certain

cultic beliefs and practices are harmful both to the individual and to society (see Levine, item 858). But it is precisely the nature of this harm and its applicability to specific religious groups that have to be determined. While in extreme cases, Jonestown being a case in point, it is evident that cultic life has led to suicide and murder, it is certainly less obvious how most of the so-called cults could even remotely be placed in the same category as the People's Temple (Richardson, item 1947). The tendency of those who oppose the new marginal religions is to place them all indiscriminately under the label of "destructive cults," with Jonestown as the all-encompassing paradigm. This method, instead of illuminating the tragic events at Jonestown, maligns all cultic groups. It would seem more reasonable to see the Jonestown phenomenon as one species of the various kinds of religious violence that has been recorded in different religions and cultures and in diverse historical periods.

The simplicity and clarity of popular typologies are probably their major appealing features. They neatly divide the varieties of religious expressions into absolute categories that leave little room for doubts or errors. Careful consideration and examination of the many types of cults, however, show that different cults make different demands on their adherents with, consequently, quite different physical, mental, social, and psychological repercussions. Further, the effects of cults on those who join them vary, if for no other reason than because people differ. Reading the literature on "destructive cultism," one wonders whether underlying this typology lurks the assumption that complete commitment, passionate devotion, and total dedication in a religious or semireligious context are impossible without serious physical, psychological, and mental harm to the individual. It is not surprising that some religionists and social scientists have interpreted anticult literature as an attack against religion in general. Social-scientific studies of cults do not support sweeping statements on the harmful effects of cult involvement and find that the application of the medical model lacks sufficiently objective criteria to make it a viable one (Robbins, item 2186).

Major Cultic Features

The fifth major area of debate centers around the main characteristics of cults that mark them off as unique religious manifestations distinct from more traditional expressions. Since there seems to be a general agreement that the cults or new religious movements in contemporary Western society, however much they differ, form a discernible phenomenon distinguishable from the mainline churches and denominations, the question of what theological, moral, social, psychological, ritual, and practical dimensions set them apart as a distinct group must be answered.

Two elaborate attempts to specify the major features of cultism will suffice to illustrate the issues involved in studying, understanding, and responding to the new movements. Ellwood and Partin (item 598), who rely heavily on social-scientific literature, list the following five major identifying marks of the new cults: 1) they represent a distinct alternative to mainline traditions from which they differ in size and in theoretical, practical, or sociological expressions; 2) they have strong authoritative and charismatic leadership; 3) they are oriented to bringing about deep subjective experiences and fulfilling personal needs; 4) they are separatist in that they make a clear distinction between their respective members and outsiders; and 5) they tend to see themselves as representatives of a long tradition of wisdom and practice.

In contrast to this list of relatively neutral elements, those who vigorously oppose the cults (like McDowell and Stewart, item 2162, and Levine, item 858) have brought together all the objections that have been raised against the new religions. Anticult organizations list many negative features of cults that are generalized and applied to all groups, even though little attempts are made to demonstrate that these features are applicable in each individual case. One can summarize these traits as follows: 1) total allegiance to an all-powerful leader; 2) discouragement or forbidding of rational thought; 3) deceptive recruitment techniques; 4) psychological weakening of the members who end up believing that all the problems can be solved within the group; 5) manipulation of guilt; 6) isolation from the outside

world; 7) assumption of all life decisions by the leader or cult; 8) vain promise to improve society; 9) full-time work for the respective cult; 10) an antiwoman, antichild, and antifamily orientation; 11) belief that the world is coming to an end; 12) a philosophy that the "end justifies the means;" 13) an atmosphere of mystery and secrecy; 14) an aura of violence or potential violence.

These two contrasting and irreconcilable descriptions of cultic features are symptomatic of two separate assumptions about, approaches to, and understandings of the cultic phenomenon. They show exactly why the two views of the cults are irreconcilable and why the debate has been carried out at a level of intensity not common in the social sciences. And they explain why, in court cases involving the cults, expert witnesses on both sides of the litigating parties have been identified as procultists and anticultists.

From a social-scientific point of view, generalizations about cults suffer from several major flaws. Any list of cultic features would be practically inapplicable to more than a handful of cults. Thus, for example, the above-mentioned list of fourteen cultic features, which are often highlighted at conferences run by anticult organizations, seems to be a combination of negative elements taken from diverse- cults and lumped together to create an impressive, negative image of cults in general. Many of the features listed--for instance, deceptive recruitment techniques and an aura of violence--cannot be applied to more than one or two groups. Several cultic traits, such as obedience to a leader and full-time work for the cult, are applicable to many traditional sects and religious and monastic institutions. Others, like the psychological weakening of the members, are somewhat difficult to substantiate. The same list assumes that all the mentioned attributes, such as authoritarianism and charismatic leadership, are always negative and harmful. It also fails to take into account the changing nature of many of the cults. And finally, the method employed is misdirected and misleading. It starts with several absolute generalizations, finds a few (sometimes questionable) examples in different cults, and then uses these instances to buttress the generalizations themselves.

The anticult depiction of the new movements has captured the imagination of the general public. Why is it, one might ask, that the list of negative features of cultism has become part of the folklore on cults? One reason, we may surmise, is that the alternative descriptions of cult features listed by social scientists and religionists are not without their flaws. The portrait of a cult outlined by Ellwood and Partin has several qualities that are, to the person who has been personally affected by cultic behavior, both problematic and unappealing.

To begin with what is probably the heart of the matter, these two authors assume an aura of impartiality in dealing with the thorny problem of religious pluralism, an approach that might seem both confusing and threatening to the average believer. Unless theological and cultural ways of handling religious pluralism are made available to the average person, any impartial attempt to study, describe, and understand the cults is bound to evoke hostile reactions. Second, the two scholars seem to suggest that, in spite of the differences between the mainline traditions and the new religions, both groups are equally valid. Third, they assign only positive functions to the cults. Fourth, they consequently appear to be critical of the main religions that are indirectly judged to be unable to satisfy the spiritual needs of some of their adherents, a position that several of the cults have explicitly advanced. Fifth, they fail to take into account that cultic behavior has, in some cases at least, created serious problems. The fact that some cults and sects (and several Christian fundamentalist churches) have refused medical treatment to their children cannot be neglected, no matter how isolated and untypical the instances might be. And lastly, they do not address themselves to the real difficulties that parents of cult members have to face.

The reason why the anticult view of a cult has had such an impact on the public is because it offers parents some psychological reassurance and a definite program for reacting to the cults. Ellwood and Partin's view of a cult, though objectively more accurate than that promulgated by anticult networks (like the American Family Foundation and

the Cult Awareness Network), seems to have little to offer to those people who have been negatively affected by the presence of the cults.

A more sociological approach, advanced by Bryan Wilson (item 1023), avoids some of the failings of the above descriptions. Wilson's catalog of ideal sect characteristics, most of which are applicable to the cults, might be a good example of an attempt to avoid giving either a good or a bad image of a cult. He enumerates the following eight features of sectarianism: 1) voluntariness; 2) exclusivity; 3) merit (such as the claim of a specific experience) for admission; 4) self-identification with clear boundaries; 5) elite status; 6) expulsion; 7) self-consciousness and conscientious commitment; and 8) legitimation by claiming sacred authority. These characteristics do not, by themselves, imply any positive or negative functions of sectarianism or cultism. Some of them, like authoritarianism and exclusivity, can conceivably have both good and/or bad effects, depending on the social circumstances and the state of mind of the individuals who join the cults.

Theories Explaining the Rise of New Religious Movements

The fifth major debate about the cults concerns their significance. Their apparently sudden emergence requires an explanation. Why is it that this particular period in the history of Western culture should witness the rise of so many cults? What factors must be taken into account to understand the dynamics of new movements? Most social-scientific literature takes it for granted that the roots of cultism lie in contemporary culture. Quite a few theories have been proposed to show how the Western world in the second half of the twentieth century has become a fertile ground for the successful presence of new religions.

The Functional Approach

Probably the most common interpretation of cult formation has been the functional one. Cults are seen as religious revivals that come into being to satisfy practical human needs that are not being met, to help people cope with new problems that cannot be addressed in other ways, and to act as catalysts for religious change. This view is usually labeled the deprivation theory of cult formation because it starts with the observation that disgruntled, alienated, and dissatisfied individuals look outside the religion of their upbringing to satisfy their normal human needs.

The functional approach is hardly new in the social sciences, especially in sociology and anthropology, where exploring the functions of religion has been a common undertaking. The following five major functions or needs which religion in general and, by extension, cults serve have dominated social-scientific literature, particularly anthropological studies on nonliterate cultures.

5) Adaptive functions. Several anthropologists have emphasized the adaptive functions of religious beliefs and rituals. Observing that there is a definite relationship between religion and the environment, they argue that through the use of religion, human beings have been able to adjust and utilize the environment to cater to their own needs. Religion, in this view, is seen as a tool for survival and can be better understood in terms of recurrent adaptive processes. This approach has been applied to show how many of the rituals (like divination and totemism) of primitive and prehistoric religions may originally have had ecologically relevant results. Marc Galanter's (item 799) application of the theory of sociobiology to cults like the Unification Church is an example of how adaptive functions can be attributed to new religious movements.

While it would be difficult to outline any direct relationship between the new cults and ecology, it is possible to build a case for their adaptive function. Many of the new movements, particularly those that align themselves with the New Age Movement, are very ecologically minded. In a time in history when the human race is overusing, polluting, and destroying the natural environment, it is possible that theological and moral views that bestow a divine quality to nature or see it as an expression of divine creativity that must be preserved may have a survival value.

Further, since membership in the new movements is largely transient, they may be indirectly acting as stages in an individual's psychological development and/or reentry into the larger society. It can also be maintained that some cults or cultic activities play the role of mental health care and counseling

agencies. Astrology, a form of divination, is clearly a process of self-reflection leading to a decision under the guidance of experts whose role is similar to that of counseling psychologists. Alternative forms of marriage, like the prearranged mass marriages carried out in the Unification Church, are a contrasting substitute for the current precarious married state embodied, for example, in the custom of "serial monogamy" that has become common in Western culture. There are different ways through which a person learns to cope with the stress of sexual gratification and regulation and one of them is to adopt a novel family life in a religious cult.

Current Theories of Cultism

The tendency among social scientists, particularly anthropologists and sociologists, to highlight the positive functions of religion is also reflected in their writings on the cults. If the new religious movements gratify some of the needs of those individuals who join them, then it is easy to conclude that they are beneficial institutions. And if the new cults offer genuine alternatives in an age of social turmoil, then one can readily be led to the view that cults perform a necessary and useful ser¬vice for humanity. It is not surprising, therefore, that cult opponents have seen social scientists as supporters of or sympathizers with the cults. The functional viewpoint is in direct conflict with the anticult conception of a cult as a spurious religious organization that can be better likened to a cancerous growth in an otherwise healthy organism.

It is necessary to bear in mind, however, that the functional explanation of religion and of cults has come under serious attack by several social scientists, even though it has not completely lost its appeal (see, for example, Fowler, item 798, and Glock, item 804). Besides the admission that religious beliefs and practices may not always have positive results, there are some who are questioning the whole approach that treats the cults as remedies for deprivation (see, for instance, Beckford, item 752, Heelas and Heelas, item 829, and Bibby and Brinkerhoff, item 297). Because this approach neglects the religious functions that cults might fulfill, it could easily be perceived as reductionistic, ignoring the fact that the human religious quest might be responsible for the success of the cults that may function, in part, as vehicles for mystical experiences. Several explanatory theories, some of which overlap, have been devised either to bypass the question of deprivation or else to reformulate it more cogently.

One approach considers the new cults as genuine religious and spiritual revivals (see Stark and Bainbridge, item 962). Observing that religious revivals or awakenings have been common in the history of the West, particularly the United States, it can be argued that such revivals appear in cycles and/or take place whenever traditional religions appear to have lost some of their original vitality. The advent of the new cults in the last few decades has coincided with a period in history when the mainline churches have so accommodated themselves to society that their ability to satisfy the religious needs of their adherents has diminished. In sociological terms, when religion becomes too secularized one can expect new religious groups to come into being. Secularization and cult formation go hand in hand. Most of those cults that survive will, in time, be swept away by the secularization process, thus recreating the conditions that give rise to new cults.

A second approach that contradicts the above considers the presence of the new religions as a confirmation of the secularization hypothesis (Wilson, item 1020). The new cults are a trivialization of religion and not a genuine religious resurgence. They may be considered to be the final gasp of religion, a last but futile attempt to restore the importance that religion used to have in daily life. In this view, secularization is an inevitable process because contemporary social developments leave no room for religion and spirituality. The cults could be considered a reaction to the process of secularization, but a reaction that will have little impact on that process.

A third hypothesis interprets the cults as a form of experimental religion (Wuthnow, 1141). Contemporary society is marked by a system of communication and mobility that increases one's knowledge of different religious options and makes available several spiritual opportunities. In a society that values individual experience and stresses freedom of choice, young adults, who form the bulk of people cults attract, become prone to

experiment even with religious forms. This experimental outlook may also be a result, in part at least, of the loosening of family ties. Unlike members of tribal societies, people in contemporary Western culture may be less attached to their cultural, family, and religious roots and more likely to embark on their own personal quest than to accept unquestionably the religion of their parents. More psychologically inclined scholars would stress the prevailing narcissism in our culture and maintain that the new movements are an expression of this growing trend.

Another theory focuses on the current political scene and argues that the new cults have sprung from political disenchantment (cf. Richardson, item 910, and Wuthnow and Glock, item 1046). The late 1960's saw for the first time widespread antagonism towards, and rebellion against, the economic and sociopolitical system in the West. Material success has become an all-embracing value that neglects or denies the spiritual dimension of life. It may also have created more problems (such as rival¬ry and intense competition) than it has solved. Joining a new religious movement is a way of opting out of the system, a form of escapism. One can expand this theory to include rebellion against Western culture as a whole and against one's parental authority. The values and lifestyles that have been passed on by the family and society are rejected as inadequate and unsatisfying.

Related to the aforementioned theory is the view that contemporary change has been too rapid and has, consequently, uprooted people from their parental and cultural moorings. The Western world is in a state of culture crisis (Bellah, item 756, Anthony and Robbins, item 735, and Eister, item 788). People feel lost and insecure in a world that questions all absolute values and norms and has become highly impersonal and utilitarian. Cults provide encouragement and certainty to people who are beset by moral and religious confusion and who are in a state of anomie. They fulfill needs that traditional religions have ceased to take care of. This is one form of the deprivation theory of religion tailored to suit the emergence of the new cults.

Another hypothesis, which has some similarities to the second theory mentioned above, speculates that the new cults are indicators of the emergence of new humanism. It starts with the assumption that religion is an evolving phenomenon and attempts to pinpoint the universal religious trends for the future. It implies that that religion as we know it is on the decline and that a new worldview is coming into being, a worldview that has been influenced by Eastern traditions and stresses the immanent, rather than the transcendent, nature of the divine. This new humanism is this-worldly-oriented. Though such a perspective has been present in the West for centuries, it now shows signs of becoming the dominant feature in contemporary spiritual life. This theory does not necessarily maintain that the traditional religious worldview will be replaced by a new one. But it does suggest that traditional religion might be undergoing some radical changes and might not remain the only dominant force in human spirituality.

The rise of the cults has also been related to the breakdown of the "American Civil Religion" (Robbins et al., item 1961, and Hammond, item 817). In many societies throughout history, there has been a religious or quasi-religious regard for civic values and traditions. The complexity of special festivals, rituals, creeds, and dogmas that flow from this nationalist attitude has been given the label of "Civil Religion." The United States is a vivid example of such a religion, which began with the divine mission ascribed to America by the Puritan settlers in New England. The cultural developments and turbulence of the 1960's are related to the incipient breakdown of Civil Religion in the United States. The cults may be considered as attempts to fill the void left by the decline of Civil Religion. Some cults, like the Mormon Church in the nineteenth century and the Unification Church in the twentieth century, that exalt the place

Moreover, to conceive of the emergence of the cults as the result of some kind of attack on Western culture from outside sources is, to say the least, unrealistic. Many of the ideals, values, and lifestyles adhered to by modern cults are hardly novel; their roots are well established in marginal groups that have been part of the Western cultural tradition for some time. Cults are not an external

problem, a kind of invasion from outside that can be stopped. Rather they are an internal problem and, hence, direct attacks against them will not succeed in exterminating them. The evidence suggests that Western culture is not being overrun by Eastern traditions; rather Eastern traditions are adapting themselves to Western utilitarian values and being influenced to some degree by Western secularization processes. While there is every reason for some concern, both for those individuals who have joined new religious movements hastily and without careful reflection on the profound implications of their actions and for the parents of cult members who have been affected by the presence of the cults, social-scientific studies do not condone hysterical fear of the cults, nor do they warrant a panicky reaction to them.

It is certainly not difficult to see why social-scientific views on the new religions have not been very popular. Those who hold that membership in cults implies pathology have at their disposal a simple, professional answer to involvement in a cult, namely optional or forced therapy. On the other hand, those who maintain that the cults are responsible for enticing and brainwashing young adults against their wills propound the equally straightforward solution that cult members should be deprogrammed and the cults suppressed. Both groups of people seem to find no great flaws in contemporary society and put the blame elsewhere--the former having recourse to mental illness, the latter to malicious people who found cults for their own profit. Social scientists think that these solutions do not fit the facts and offer superficial and simplistic explanations that neglect consideration of the many problems caused by modern industrialized society and by evolutionary forces that may not be easily controlled by human endeavors.

The social-scientific theories of cult formation alert us to the sociocultural matrix that makes cults possible. They direct our attention to the problems of Western society in a period of rapid social change and argue that it is precisely these problems that explain the reason why cults succeed and that, consequently, must be addressed. They make us reflect not only on the possible inevitability of the cults, but also on their manifold functions.

Though social-scientific studies could lead to the conclusion that the problems that the cults have brought in their wake may not be easily solved, they also provide the information and reflection for ways of coping with them.

Responses to the Cults

The sixth and final issue in contemporary cultism has to do with the response that society should make to the cults. Two opposing viewpoints have gradually emerged and solidified since the early 1970's. The first and more common one has been identified largely with the activity of the Anti-Cult Movement and has attracted the support of many psychiatrists, lawyers, ministers of religion, and the general public. Its main concerns are the effects of cultism on family members, on the well-being of the individuals who become cult members, and on what are perceived to be negative results on society and/or religion as a whole. Its methods are mostly confrontational. Besides the dissemination of literature that discredits the cults and the foundation of counseling centers that assist parents in their efforts to remove their offspring from the cultic milieu, those who adhere to this approach have had recourse to the courts to counteract cultic practices and to achieve their goals.

A second response, to which many social scientists subscribe, is aimed more towards diagnosing the activities of the Anti-Cult Movement itself and analyzing the various reactions to cultism than dealing directly with the personal problems brought into being by the presence and influence of the new religions (cf. Shupe et al., item 62). Instead of concentrating largely on the psychological and personal aspects of cultic involvement, many social scientists have drawn attention to the serious social implications that might follow a legally sanctioned anti-cult stand (Kelley, item 2149). They have stressed the importance of religious pluralism and freedom, particularly in American culture, and have contended that any defense of religious freedom has regrettably been seen as a procult stance. Some scholars have also drawn attention to the common sociological view that the persecution of cults has the effect of strengthening them, by making martyrs of their leaders and members, by enhancing their

ideological goals, and by contributing to a stronger sense of unity and purpose among cult members.

The issues about cultism are expressive of a deep division between two approaches to, and interpretations of, the new religious movements. The debates have assumed a crusading spirit that has intensified the split between so-called opponents and defenders of cults. Because of the antagonism that exists between these two camps, it would be unrealistic at this stage to hope for a quick and easy resolution to the problems discussed in this introduction.

Some Observations on the Social Scientific Study of the Cults

Because social science has taken a leading role in the study of the cults, it is legitimate to ask how it can contribute to the resolution of the social problems that the cults have inevitably brought with them. The approach to the new movements adopted by the majority of social scientists has much to recommend it; it has definitely broadened our understanding of cultic phenomena, thus laying the foundation for a solid response to their presence. However, it still suffers from a number of flaws that need to be corrected if any impact is to be made on public opinion and policy.

Several deficiencies become apparent to anyone who surveys the abundant literature on the new movements. The first thing one observes is that, given the number of cults and of scholars who have spent some time studying them, the ethnographic monographs on individual cults are relatively few. Without denying the role of theory in studying the new movements and without neglecting the fact that there is some excellent descriptive material on some of the more prominent new movements (like the Unification Church, the Hare Krishna Movement, the Charismatic Movement, and the Children of God Movement in its early phases), more comprehensive ethnographic studies of individual cults are needed.

A second observation, related to the first, is that too many of the studies on the cults are overshadowed by the debate about brainwashing. Barker's excellent study on the Unification Church (item 1698) is a case in point; the author subtitles her book "Brainwashing or Choice." Two recent studies on the Hare Krishna Movement (Rochford, item 1964, and Shinn, item 1983) have been written with the precise intention of disproving and discrediting the brainwashing hypothesis. Just as anticultists have studied cults with the intention of proving their basic assumption, namely that the cults are destructive organizations that brainwash or indoctrinate their members, so also have social scientists often begun their investigation of a cult with the aim of demonstrating that this assumption is false. Works like those of Chidester on Jonestown (item 1664) and Norquist on Ananda Cooperative Village (item 1892) are like a breath of fresh air. Instead of exerting their efforts to prove or disprove the claim that members of these new religious groups are intentionally brainwashed, the authors pursue a different line of investigation to give a meaningful interpretation of the Jonestown phenomenon in the context of religious history and of Ananda Village in the context of a long tradition of communal lifestyles. The results may not be emotionally arousing, but they certainly open up new perspectives and opportunities for making some sense out of the violence of Jonestown and out of the relatively restrictive environment of life in a commune.

A third observation deals with the rather lopsided volume of studies on the new cults. While certain new religious movements, like the Unification Church, the Hare Krishna Movement, and, more recently, the People's Temple, have been the object of numerous and intense research projects by different scholars, there are many cults about which there are few, if any, exhaustive studies. Scientology can be taken as a case in point. There are many popular books that describe and/or criticize some aspects of this new religious movement, but this writer could trace only two major works in the English language, i.e., Wallis's sociological monograph (item 2062) and Whitehead's anthropological study (item 2089).

Several reasons can be adduced to explain this state of affairs. While a handful of cults have actually encouraged researchers, many cults seem weary of inquisitive scholars and reporters. Developments in some cults have made them less accessible for study. The Children of God/Family of Love and the Divine Light Mission, about which

there are several excellent publications, have been in some form of self-imposed hibernation since the early 1980's. Others do not seem to encourage researchers. Some groups may have not attracted scholars to explore them. Or, in some cases, not enough funds could be generated to make the research feasible. Ideally, the student of cultism should have at his or her disposal several monographs on each cult written by different researchers. Recent publications on, for instance, the People's Temple, provide the needed factual information and historical background on this religious movement plus a variety of approaches and interpretations of its tragic demise. While admittedly there are a number of intensive studies on many cults, more are required for a better understanding of the individual movements and of the cults as a whole.

A fourth observation deals with the response to the new religious movements. That their presence has raised religious, moral, social, and legal issues can hardly be questioned. That some of these issues are urgent and relate to personal problems that the families of cult members have to face is equally obvious. Unless social science is alert and responsive to these issues, its efforts to understand the cults are likely to be ignored or repulsed. While it is difficult to endorse or condone the neglect of social-scientific studies on the new cults, one must concede that social scientists have to share the blame for their inability to influence the public and the news media.

The success of cult-counseling and information agencies that take a negative attitude to the cults has been due to two major facts: they have addressed themselves to the personal problems of those who have been negatively affected by cults' presence and activities; and they have proposed simple and direct answers to the challenge--real or apparent--of cultism. Those individuals who consult these agencies are likely to have their social and religious values reinforced and to have their hopes of getting people out of cults bolstered.

Scholars who have used social-scientific data and theory to address the same problems have run into serious difficulties. They have discovered that it is irrelevant to quote the statistics on cult defection to the parents of a cult member, no matter how corrects these statistics are. And it is quite unappealing and impractical to offer them, say, the theory of resource mobilization to help them come to terms with what they experience as a traumatic event in their lives. While it is relatively easy to support in principle the need to safeguard religious pluralism and freedom, it is quite another matter to try and convince religiously minded parents of these values when their offspring have abandoned the religious and cultural traditions of their upbringing. Although the attitude of cultural relativism is certainly a necessary scholarly requirement for a fair study, understanding, and evaluation of exotic movements, it cannot be easily incorporated in a popular societal response to the cults. On the contrary, it appears to be incompatible with most mentalities that are still very ethnocentric when religious and cultural values appear threatened by outside forces.

What is needed is some kind of applied sociology and/or anthropology of the cults whereby social-scientific data, analyses, and theories are translated into intellectual tools and practical means to help people cope socially, psychologically, and religiously with the new movements. Though there are both academic and ethical problems in any applied social-scientific method, we are convinced that the risks are well worth it. Otherwise, the social-scientific study of the cults might remain an academic discipline with very limited impact on the social, moral, religious, and legal responses to the new religious movements that have acquired a permanent footing in contemporary Western society. <>

16. Sociology of Religion by Joachim Wach [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367085858]

This book, first published in 1947, presents the then-new subject of sociology of religion in systematic and historical theology and in the science of religion, in political theory and the social sciences, in philosophy and psychology, in philology and anthropology. Its intention is to bridge the gulf between the study of religion and the social sciences, an exercise that draws strongly upon cultural anthropology.

Contents

1. The Method
2. Religious Experience and Its Expression
3. Sociological Consequences
4. Religion and Society: Religion and Natural Groups
5. Specifically Religious Organization of Society
6. Religion and Society: Religion and Differentiation within Society
7. Religion and Society: Religion and the State
8. Types of Religious Authority
9. Conclusion

Excerpt: The history of religion begins with the beginning of the history of man.

However, the latter will not permit us to picture man in a perpetual search for God, because, primitive or cultured, educated or ignorant, rich or poor, wise or foolish, he desires and aspires consciously or unconsciously to material blessings and satisfaction of all kinds of needs. It would be foolish to deny that just as foolish as to deny the genuineness of his spiritual cravings. No better formula has been found for man's ultimate longing than Augustine's "Cor nostrum inquietum est donec requiescat in te" ("Our heart is without rest until it finds it in Thee"). Because a wide range of ostensibly or allegedly religious acts and rites can be shown to be of a pragmatic character, all religious acts and rites have been suspected by some older and modern critics, who are inclined to draw from these instances conclusions as to the pragmatic character of religion in general. Such a generalization is entirely unjustified. The history of religion, as that of man's endeavours taken as a whole, reveals the amazing latitude of meaning identical gestures and signs, acts and deeds can have. That is what Hegel and Wundt have called "heterogeneity of purpose" and what Spengler had in mind with his theory of "pseudomorphosis of forms ". Interpretation and adaptation in the course of time have altered, often decisively, the purpose and meaning of religious acts and forms, and it is the task of the historian and sociologist to follow such changes and transformations with the keenest interest and to try to explain them.

It can be proved that individuals and peoples vary not only in the quantity and quality of their religious experience but also in their capacity to express it. Even those who tend to minimize the amount of actual creative ability and activity in religious life—semper eadem, sed aliter—cannot really deny the manifold and varied character of the expressions of this fundamental human urge in the different cultures and societies of the world. To a bird's-eye view the many resemblances and parallels may suggest monotony; under the microscope, however, a truly amazing wealth and variety are revealed. Even if we were disposed to deny inventiveness and genuine vital experiences to the unsung, the common man, to the "proletariat" in the history of religion, and to give credit merely to the mouthpieces, leaders, and "formulators ", as a modern anthropologist has called them, just a review of the productivity and abundance of their representation of man's intercourse with the deity and its sociological consequences will produce wonderfully rewarding results.

Man has always sought man's company, though he often met with indifference and rebuke in doing so. He had to rely on bonds which nature had created, but his inventiveness led him to find other motives and incitements to unite with his fellows. Religious experiences, we have seen, were a mighty factor in establishing as well as destroying human associations. It is significant that the loftiest and most comprehensive concepts of community, those of a universal character, have become possible only through the widening and deepening of religious experience, much as the secularization of these ideas and ideals may have obscured the story of their emergence and evolution to modern man.

The reader of these pages, we hope, may realize that religion is a less "aristocratic" phenomenon than some modern critics allow us to believe. Again and again in studying the history of religion we meet with tendencies and movements, reactions and developments which are the spontaneous, contagious expressions of the religious thoughts and emotions of whole groups and even of the masses. The student of religion joins the historian in dismissing the pseudo-problem: collective versus individual activity, since both ideas, being essentially complementary and correlative, are abstractions. It remains for the creative religious genius to find the formula to express that for which

the group has been consciously or unconsciously longing. Carlyle has phrased this very effectively: "They were the leaders of men, these great ones; the modellers, patterners, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain."

Our historical and systematic review warrants the conclusion that man in his religious attitudes seems to have, all through his history, at once felt very near to and very far from his fellow man. The peculiar tension resulting from the mixed feelings of separation and relatedness is one of the most decisive and effective stimuli and incitements to the formation and destruction of groups, and therefore becomes one of the fundamental factors in the dynamics of religious life. We find expressions of both extremes all through the history of religions, and, what is more important, we find a consciousness of this tension in individuals and groups everywhere, and most prominently in the development of the great world religions. The catechism of more than one religion divides the duties of man into two groups : those towards God and those towards his fellow man. This implies an acknowledgment that the two are complementary and mutually indispensable. In concentrating our attention on those religious acts in which worship and adoration—the realization and consummation of man's relation to God—find their expression, we shall have to conceive of man as he finds himself in his deepest and innermost self. Yet in and with those acts are others performed and included in which the first person singular widens to that of the plural, and the very first step on the path of a religiously conceived life in the light of this communion implies the concern and care for those whose existence alone makes possible the abstraction of his saying " I " and "mine". Some have been led to think that religious experience implies a negation of the simple basic fact of social philosophy—that man finds himself existing in the plural. Although communion with God necessarily implies detachment from finite things and may, at least occasionally, lead to temporary isolation, producing a profound feeling of loneliness, there can be no doubt, however, that the examination of one and every genuinely religious attitude reveals the intrinsically social quality and character of religion. In the very beginning of this study we attempted to show that inherent in all religious experience is an imperative urging the believer to act—to act according to the will of the deity or the nature of the universe as revealed to him. This is, in a broad sense of the term, the moral and social implication in all true religious experience. It creates the atmosphere and the attitude for concrete acts which necessarily will involve dealings with and reactions toward one's fellows. With the development and deepening of religious experience in history, this realization is put first, ahead of all attempts to share with others specific acts of worship, thus forming a religiously motivated fellowship and communion. The concept of a universal moral obligation resulting from the aforesaid realization takes, then, precedence over all requirements of a Binnenethik developed in any one particular religious fellowship or community.

One of the subjects of this inquiry has been the variety of forms in which religious communion manifests itself. The dualism of "natural" and "specific" religious groups could be traced practically throughout the history of religion, and the structure, value, and significance of each of these two types and their mutual relationship are topics of paramount interest in contemporary discussion. The parallelism and partial identity of cultic forms and institutions in natural cultic groups of different civilizations point to a fact of some significance: these groups do not possess history in the deeper sense of that word. Hence it is easier and more legitimate to compare ideas and institutions produced in identical groups with one another than with those developed in specifically religious groups. A study of the typical development of specifically religious organization in society, as traced in our fifth chapter, will have to try to do justice to the individual and historical factor which here enters in. The sociological ideals in different founded faiths vary in at least three respects: in the nature, degree, and comprehensiveness in which organization is conceived of in these religious groups. The concept of religious continuity in specifically religious groups necessarily implies a twofold regulation of the attitude which is deemed desirable towards the brotherhood in the faith and towards the outside world. An "atmosphere" is created within the group which we must understand in order to appreciate

the effects of any religion on the culture and society to which it is bound. We saw that historical developments are of greater importance in the history of the specific than of the natural cultic groups. Attitudes as well as atmosphere are likely to be transformed in and through these historical developments. Changes and compromises result not only from the impact of the outside world but also from internal evolution within the group as well. In the "natural" organization of society a kind of pre-established order (cosmic law) provides for a "natural" hierarchy of groups and assigns their position to the individuals living and functioning in them. With the creation of a specifically religious organization of society, a preliminary or final decision as to its relation to the outside world has to be hinted at or formulated, though the interpretation of this decision may undergo profound transformation with changing conditions. Two sets of problems result from this situation: the formulation of the proper attitude to be taken towards other religious groups—a less acute problem for natural cultic groups—and the attitude towards natural social groups, such as the family and larger units (clan, tribe) and particularly the state.

Much attention has been paid to the standardization of attitudes (" patterns ") in the examination of expressions of human experiences by sociologists and psychologists. Until further study has been made, the question as to whether there is a difference in this regard between natural and specific cultic groups must, however, remain open. We may not be altogether wrong in claiming that "patterns" will develop more easily in the relatively static atmosphere of the natural group. Then, again, we find within the specifically religious group a dissension on the issue of its constitution. "Definiteness" is the war-cry of one faction; "liberty" that of the other. The growth and systema¬tization of doctrine, cult, and organization will thus be evaluated differently in groups of typologically different structures, and correspondingly their own history and development will be viewed and interpreted in agreement with this basic conception.

The essential criterion of judgment on the vitality of any religious group will have to be the intensity or the comprehensiveness of its characteristic experience and the adequacy and genuineness of its expression. "Limitation" might be the expression of strength and "breadth" of weakness. But the former may also be interpreted as lack of elasticity, hence a sign of weakness; and the latter as comprehensiveness, hence as an asset. Extreme experiences will tend to produce extreme attitudes and ideas. The historical development of a specifically religious group may work in two ways, either to weaken the original religious intuition and substance or to purify and refine it. It may lead into extremes and, again, it may work for balance. It is important whether religious authority is acknowledged and exercised in one, several, or a number of different forms and whether it is exclusively charismatic or institutional in character or a combination of both elements. It is characteristic of the specifically religious group that it formulates an ideal derived from or attributed in its origin to a historical figure.

The basic sociological fact that society, even at lower cultural levels, is not the sum of individuals of sociologically identical position but a complex structure has a decisive bearing upon the study of the sociology of religion. The persons and institutions composing it contribute not only in proportion to their natural endowment but also according to the efficiency of their active co-operation and social organization. Men and women, young and old, high and low, have in their religious experience both a common and a private possession. A religious group, natural or special, may include people of different sex, age, and status. In specifically religious groups these differences will matter less than they do in identical groups. Yet, for the very performance of religious rites, sex, age, and status may be of either positive or negative importance. The theory of complete equality of all members in a religious group, as far as cultic duties and rights are concerned, is upheld only in a very few of them and carried out in practice in even fewer, whereas limitation and specialization of function, cultic privileges, and monopolies are found in all types of natural and specifically religious groups. Sex may exclude an individual from participation in some and qualify him for functions in other types of religious communities. Mature age secures a more active

part in rites and forms of worship the world over. As far as status is concerned, we found a wide range of differences : religious activities show the effect of specialization in work, of distinction in social rank, and of disparity in what an individual calls his own—to a different degree in more homogeneous and in highly stratified, in primitive and modern, society. Yet this estimation of the influence of social differentiation upon religious ideas and institutions will have to be supplemented by an appraisal of the effect of religious impulses and activities upon the process of social stratification. This effect, we realized, can be of very different nature: direct and far-reaching or subtle and elusive, it may make itself felt over long periods of time in the history of society or it may be concentrated in outbursts of revolutionary character. All these considerations tend to remind us that, because of the variety of ways and forms in which religion may act upon social institutions, conditions, and processes, we should guard ourselves against any one-sided interpretation of its character as a social force (" conservative ", " revolutionary", "aristocratic", "proletarian", etc.).

One fact stands out for everyone who reviews the history of society under the viewpoint of its interrelation and interaction with religion. Religious motives may work positively and negatively. They "build up" and they "pull down". It is our thesis that the constructive force of religion surpasses its destructive influences. Fundamentally and ultimately, religion makes for social integration, though it should definitely not be identified with its effect. We have tried to show that social integration is not the "aim" or "purpose" of religion. Religion is sound and true to its nature only as long as it has no aim or purpose except the worship of God. Yet, wherever genuine religious experience as the concentration and direction of the best that is in man speaks, nuclei are formed which are integrated into a close unit primarily by what they consider holy. These nuclei tend to grow. In the process of this growth they will absorb, modify, and destroy what opposes the realization of complete integration of a particular or universal religious community. To the extent to which the force and élan of the original experience wane and conditions and factors from outside make themselves felt, compromises will result. The actual development will be determined by the temper and the spirit which prevail in the group, and which may range from an exclusive fanaticism to a meek and forbearing, suffering attitude in its principal "policy" and actual dealings with the "outside" world. The vitality and strength of a religious group are put to a test with the rise of conflicting tendencies, views, and practices within the community. Our thesis of the pre-eminently constructive force of religion is confirmed by repeated attempts, movements, and processes aimed at a reintegration of true religious fellowship, illustrations of which we found in abundance when reviewing the history of the great founded religions. In both identical and specifically religious groups each attempt at reintegration is oriented on a concrete ideal. In most primitive and oriental societies we meet with the concept of a universal cosmic order, of which the order of society is a part and to which it must be oriented. There is usually some latitude of opinion about the methods, means, and ways by which this order can and ought to be realized and about the interpretation of the values for which it stands. In specifically religious groups the ideal community will be that realized and attempted in the incipient stage of its history. The emphasis is here not necessarily upon particular features of this ideal communion of brethren, such as mutual assistance or a readiness for self-sacrifice, martyrdom, etc., as all this might occur to an even greater degree in "secular" life. The important note is struck by the formulation of the concrete values and standards for which the group stands and which are determined by their basic religious experiences. "Love of Christ", "giving in imitation of the Buddha", and "obedience to the will of Allah" are examples of attitudes characteristic of the ideal community in the Christian, Buddhist, and Mohammedan concepts respectively. As to the definition of the nature, function, and organization of this ideally envisioned community, the differences between and within individual specifically religious groups are very considerable. Integration, however, is ever sought and striven for; and the prestige of those who heal breaches or prevent them where humanly possible and defensible in principle ought to be dearer and nearer to their brethren than those who provoke them. Yet a last question poses itself. Why should

religion be credited with so decisive a role as we attribute to it in defining it as the paramount force of social integration ? Are there not other means to achieve this end? Why should a secular society not find ways and means to integrate itself effectively and lastingly ? Perhaps it is only a terminological misunderstanding which prevents agreement among supposedly conflicting views. We like to think that the desired agreement among students of society could be reached on the basis of the formula that perfect integration of a society never has been nor can be achieved without a religious basis. However, the mistake must be avoided of defining " religion " in arbitrary fashion, in identifying it exclusively with ideas, rites, or institutions which are subject to change and transformation, instead of conceiving it as that profoundest source from which all human existence is nourished and upon which it depends in all its aspects : man's communion with God. Let us end with the witness Carlyle has borne: " It is well said, in every sense, that a man's religion is the chief fact with regard to him. A man's or a nation of men's. By religion I do not mean here the church-creed which he professes, the articles of faith which he will sign, and, in words and otherwise, assert; not this wholly, in many cases not at all... . But the thing a man does practically believe, and this is often enough without asserting it even to himself, much less to others, the thing a man does practically lay to heart, and know for certain, concerning his vital relations to this mysterious Universe, and his duty and destiny there, that is in all cases the primary thing for him, and creatively determines all the rest." <>

17. Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World edited by Mark Juergensmeyer [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367030865]

How is symbolic violence related to the real acts of religious violence around the modern world? The authors of this book, first published in 1992, explore this question with reference to some of the most volatile religious and political conflicts of the day: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Sikhs in India, militant Jewish groups in Israel, and Muslim movements from the Middle East to Indonesia. In addition to providing valuable insights into these important incidents, the authors – social scientists and historians of comparative religion – are responding to the theoretical issues articulated by René Girard in Violence and the Sacred (1977). The present volume is the first book of essays to test Girard's theories about the social significance of religious symbols of violence against real, rather than symbolic, acts. In some cases his theories are found to be applicable; in other cases, the authors provide alternative theories of their own. In a concluding essay, co-authored by Mark Anspach, Girard provides a response.

Contents

Excerpt: Is Symbolic Violence Related to Real Violence?

Violence has always been endemic to religion. Images of destruction and death are evoked by some of religion's most popular symbols, and religious wars have left through history a trail of blood. The savage martyrdom of Husain in Shiite Islam, the crucifixion of Jesus in Christianity, the sacrifice of Guru Tegh Bahadur in Sikhism, the bloody conquests in the Hebrew Bible, the terrible battles in the Hindu epics, and the religious wars attested to in the Sinhalese Buddhist chronicles indicate that in virtually every tradition images of violence occupy as central a place as portrayals of non-violence. This raises two haunting questions: why are these images so central, and what is the

relationship between symbolic violence and the real acts of religious violence that occur throughout the world today?

To explore questions such as these, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation convened an exploratory conference of scholars at Sterling Forest, New York, in September 1989. Most of those taking part were social scientists and scholars of comparative religion who have studied incidents of religious violence and terror caused by militant Muslims, Jews, Christians, Sikhs and Sinhalese Buddhists. One scholar, however, brought a more theoretical and literary perspective to these contemporary cases. This scholar, René Girard, has formulated theories about the social role of symbolic religious violence that have been widely discussed in his own field of comparative literature and throughout the humanities; they have been especially influencial in the field of religious studies. But despite the wide readership that his ideas have attracted, Girard has rarely come face to face with social scientists and other investigators of cases of religious violence in modern society. One of the significant moments in the conference was the dialogue among Girard and these scholars over the applicability of his theories to the contemporary world.

The dialogue that began at Sterling Forest continued in written form in 1990, culminating in a series of essays written by several of the participants on the relevance of Girardian themes to their own and violent urges can become focused on scapegoat enemies rather than on symbolic victims. Such is the situation a society confronts when it no longer has convincing symbols of sacrifice to dispel violence. The society then faces a `sacrificial crisis', as Girard puts it.

The two central aspects of Girard's theory — sacrifice and mimetic desire — are regarded by him as inextricably linked. But they are conceptually distinct. One can appreciate much of what Girard has to say about the function of sacrifice in symbolically displacing feelings of violence without accepting that mimetic desire is the villain that motivates the feelings. Similarly, one may see how mimetic desire plays a potent role in situations of conflict without looking for evidence of sacrificial displacement or even a `sacrificial crisis' — the situation of violence that occurs when rituals are inadequate to displace violent urges.

In some of Girard's later writings there is yet a third aspect to his theory: the uniqueness of Christianity. According to Girard, among the world religions Christianity is alone in its understanding of the sacrificial victim. Nowhere else is God perceived as having played this role. Christ provides all humanity with a `perfect model': one who, having no appropriate desire, does not run the risk of triggering mimetic rivalry.5 He thereby ends the cycle of sacrifice by allowing himself to be the sacrificial victim. As a result Christianity gives to the world an enduring message of pathos and peace. Like other aspects of Girard's theory, however, one can accept or reject this aspect of it without disturbing the rest of his theoretical design.

Looking at Contemporary Cases of Real Religious Violence

What, one might ask, do these various aspects of Girard's theory have to do about real acts of religious violence in the contemporary world? The death squads of Sikh and Sinhalese revolutionaries, the Muslim terrorists of Lebanese and Egyptian movements, and the extreme elements of militant Jewish and Christian activists are all engaged in violence in a direct and significantly non-symbolic way. It might appear that their actions do not fit Girard's theories: their sacrifices do not result in the peaceful displacement of violence that ritualized forms of religious violence are supposed to produce, nor are Christian activists less vicious than religious warriors of other faiths. Yet it is the conviction of most contributors to this volume that some of Girard's ideas about symbolic violence can be applied to these real cases as well, making symbol and reality not so removed from one another as first they might appear.

The essays in this book explore Girardian themes in relation to real contemporary cases. Each of the authors has taken Girard seriously as an analyst of sacrificial violence, and they have looked at their own case studies to see which of Girard's theories apply. Some of the authors have found quite a bit of correspondence between what Girard says about symbolic religious violence and what occurs in the real world. Others have found less. In both cases they differ in what they regard as Girard's

most significant contribution: some have found the notion of mimetic desire to be Girard's most suggestive idea; others have found to be more appealing his understanding of the role of sacrifice in displacing violence. Still others have replaced parts of Girard's theories with other theories, or found that his work, to be appreciated, must be understood in a broader theoretical context.

Among the authors in this volume, Mark Anspach, in `Violence Against Violence: Islam in Comparative Context', has made the greatest use of Girard's theories. After looking at a number of instances of violence in pre-state societies, Anspach concludes that, like many traditional cultures, Islamic communities often resort to vendetta and punishment to deal with expressions of violent feelings, rather than relying solely on the mechanism of sacrificial ritual. He agrees with Girard that such a situation can create 'a sacrificial crisis', where ritual is confused with history. Without an adequate sacrificial lamb, violence is pitted against violence, as Girard has sometimes said, in a spiral of reprisals. The violence of contemporary Islam shows what happens when the mechanism of sacrifice does not work.

Martin Kramer, in `Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon', is also concerned with the sacrificial motif in contemporary Islamic violence. Kramer focuses on the recent cases of `self-sacrifice' of those young members of the Hizbollah and Amal terrorist groups in Lebanon who have given their lives in suicide missions aimed against the American and Israeli military. What Kramer has found is that these young people bear many of the characteristics of sacrificial victims in traditional religion: they are physically and spiritually pure and yet in some ways socially marginal. They are of marriageable age, for instance, but not yet married; and some lack family ties. Kramer concludes that these agents of `self-sacrifice' are in fact chosen by society, or at least by social pressure: they are victims. He goes on to claim that there is a sacrificial competition between the Hizbollah and Amal groups, creating what amounts to a `mimetic rivalry' as each attempts to outdo one another in acts of self-sacrifice.

It is not Girard's notions of sacrifice, but his ideas about mimetic desire that initially interest Ehud Sprinzak in his essay, `Violence and Catastrophe in the Theology of Rabbi Meir Kahane: The Ideologization of Mimetic Desire'. Here Sprinzak examines the writings of one of modern Israel's most strident religious ideologues, and finds within the late rabbi's thinking a pattern of mimetic rivalry, involving a desire to be like the Gentiles and to supersede them. The main purpose of God's creation of Israel, according to Kahane, is vengeance: to be a 'fist in the face of the Gentile world'. Yet Kahane rejects the symbolism of sacrifice that might (in Girard's reckoning) save Israel from the violent implications of this mimetic desire. According to Kahane, Israel must repudiate the sacrificial role that history — and the Hebrew Bible — would seem to force upon it. It must not be the willing lamb. But in abandoning the image of sacrifice, Kahane loses one of the resources that Judaism offers for symbolically displacing violence. As Girard's theory would leave one to conclude, Kahane is left with a strategy for confrontation that is based on vengeance, power, and violence. His is mimetic rivalry in its most raw form.

The theme of mimetic desire is also explored by Emmanuel Sivan in 'The Mythologies of Religious Radicalism: Judaism and Islam'. The rivalry that interests Sivan is the curious one in the Middle East between fundamentalist Muslims and fundamentalist Jews. Although they are, in a sense archenemies, the conservatives aim their arrows of degradation at the apostates in their own religious communities rather than at their Muslim or Jewish counterparts. In certain ways they seem to respect and even emulate one another. The Muslim censuring of Salman Rushdie, for example, was met with a certain approval by orthodox Jews; and Sivan implies that in many ways they compete in their attempts to out-orthodox each other. The sacrificial consequences of this mimetic desire are also noted by Sivan. He quotes a Jewish rabbi as having suggested that the Intifada could be handled by Israel sacrificing 'a scapegoat' — in this case, the Gaza strip — in order that bloodshed might be avoided.

The last three essays in the book take a somewhat different tack. Rather than applying aspects of Girard's themes to specific cases, they use these cases to evaluate some of Girard's basic

assumptions. Bruce Lawrence, in The Islamic Idiom of Violence: A View from Indonesia', deduces from his study of the Indonesian case that what might appear to be religious violence in many parts of the world is in fact political violence. It is a part of (or a rejection of) the violence implicit in the construction of the modern nation-state. Taking cues from the British sociologist Anthony Giddens, Lawrence finds that Islam occupies a subordinate role in the modern world, and the violence attributed to it is in fact an aspect of modern nationalism. In Lawrence's view, Girard's theory, which initially emerged from the analysis of classical literary images, is not so much wrong in its own terms as irrelevant to the modern social situation.

My article, `Sacrifice and Cosmic War', based on insights gleaned from case studies of Sikhs in India, Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Christians in Nicaragua, and Muslims and Jews in the Middle East, also questions some of Girard's assumptions. I begin, however, by agreeing with him in many basic respects. I concur that ritualized violence is important to virtually all religious cultures, and that violence conducted by religious actors in the real world often exploits those images. I question, however, the necessity of the concept of mimetic desire for explaining the origins of these symbols, and the notion that sacrifice is the fundamental religious image. Instead, it seems to me, a case may be made that what stands behind virtually all religious activity is the quest for order. This quest involves a struggle between order and disorder that is often exemplified in the grand metaphor of cosmic warfare. Sacred war is a dominant motif in the rhetoric of modern-day religious activists engaged in violent endeavors, and this metaphor, I suggest, is more seminal to their thinking than sacrifice.

David C. Rapoport's essay is not so much an application of Girard's theory, nor a critique — although he is disappointed at Girard's failure adequately to deal with the conscious use of violence by religious actors — as it is an attempt to put Girard in context. In 'Some General Observations on Religion and Violence', Rapoport outlines five reasons to think that religious revivals will always be associated with violence. The first has to do with the capacity of religion to command loyalties and enlist total commitment — a line of reasoning that is employed by political theorists, including Machiavelli. The second, which incorporates my point of view, focuses on the language of religion and the way that it is by its nature suffused with violence and images of sacred war. The third reason — which encapsulates Girard's perspective — emphasizes the violent origins of religion, and the aspects of these origins that help to keep violence in check. The fourth reason, the study of the role of revivalist and apocalpytic doctrines in fomenting religious violence, is the one with which Rapoport himself is most closely identified. A fifth reason stresses the connections betwen religious and political communities and the lure of religion for the secular political actor. In presenting each of these reasons, Rapoport draws on a variety of sources, and suggests that many of these points of view are more compatible and intersecting than they may first appear.

At the conclusion of the book, Girard himself has an opportunity to respond. In doing so he confronts some of the theoretical challenges made directly by the contributors to this volume and indirectly in the case studies to which they refer. Girard restates and defends many of his basic positions, and shows their relevance to contemporary issues.

Yet at the end of the book the reader is faced with many of the same questions with which the book began. Among them is a central one: does an understanding of the origins of the symbols of religious violence help in understanding actual instances of religious violence in the modern world?

The essays in this book do not give a definitive answer. They do not prove that Girard's theory is intrinsically true or consistently useful; nor do they prove the opposite. They do demonstrate, however, that in some cases, aspects of Girard's theory are not only useful but directly applicable. And in all cases they demonstrate that the themes that have exercised Girard's imagination — the motifs of sacrifice, rivalry and religious violence — are of enduring, and pointedly contemporarary, concern. <>

18. Virtuous Pagans: Unreligious People in America by Thomas H. Davenport [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367024741]

This book, first published in 1991, examines the unreligious of America. Most sociologists of religion viewed religious belief and behaviour as having strong positive function for individual well-being – with the implicit assumption that unreligious individuals would lack meaning in life. This book applies statistical approaches to modelling causality as it analyses a controversial topic in American sociology.

Contents
1. Why Study the Unreligious?
2. Defining the Unreligious
3. A Sociological Profile of the Unreligious
4. The Psychological Well-Being of the Unreligious
5. Meaning and Purpose Orientations Among the Unreligious
6. Explanations for Being and Becoming Unreligious
7. Summary and Discussion of Roads Untaken

Excerpt: Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the dissertation was dividing up the world into two parts—religious and unreligious. I knew (and know) that religiosity is more a continuum than a dichotomy. However, I believed that choosing a group of people who were clearly at one extreme of the continuum, and comparing them to everyone else, would yield some interesting comparisons. Even though there are undoubtedly a few religious characteristics in the unreligious sample, and vice-versa, the two groups were certainly quite different in terms of religiosity, and there was substantial variance on other attitudinal and behavioral variables that might plausibly be linked with religion. Any methodological impurities are, I still feel, outweighed by the ability to talk about a group of people rather than a variable.

I went to great pains in the book to define a group of truly unreligious individuals, using a combination of measures of belief (in life after death), practice (church attendance), and self-perception (identification with a particular religion). No study I have seen before or since this work has questioned that individual religiosity is multi-dimensional, and I do not question the need for the three-variable model, however complex it made the concepts and the analysis.

The most valuable section of the book is Chapter 5, on the meaning and values of the unreligious sample. These issues are at the core of the broad question addressed by the book, Le., if religion brings meaning, what meaning can the unreligious have? Chapter 6, on the other hand, which addresses the causal relationships behind becoming unreligious, strikes me ten years later as rather commonsensical.

If I were to do the thesis again I would definitely make one major change, which would be actually to interview some unreligious people, rather than to rely on survey data and secondary research alone. This wòuld have made the book more human and accessible. Perhaps I did not do so because I was living and working in Cambridge, Massachusetts—reportedly a hotbed of unreligiousness—and I did not want to be overly influenced by my immediate surroundings. The best sociology has a human face, and in this work it can be seen only dimly (still, it may be a more human work than most recent dissertations in the field!).

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I have found no subsequent work that focused on the unreligious per se. The secularization debate, which is certainly related to the topic, continues to rage in both empirical and theoretical terms. No consensus seems to have emerged about whether religion is waxing or waning in the U.S.

There is clear evidence, however, that the percentage of individuals responding "none" when asked their religious preference is increasing—from 2 percent in 1952 to 7 percent in 1980 and 9 percent in 1987. As noted in the text of this book, however, this does not necessarily imply an increase in the percentage of unreligious people. Rather, the consensus view is more that individuals are adopting more private forms of religious expression. They are retreating from organized religion rather than from religion itself. Roof (1990) confirms the primary tenet of this book in reporting that the religiously unaffiliated have gained status as they have increased in number, and are no

longer "a small marginal group of atheists and social dissidents."

A recent statistically complex analysis of religious behavior—church attendance, to be specific—reports substantial change over time. Chaves (1990) found that since 1940, each successive cohort has attended church less than that which preceded it. This may also be interpreted as a decline in the more organized forms of religious behavior, though the length of the trend leads one to suspect that broader secularizing forces are at work.

The difficulty in interpreting findings based on a single religiosity variable confirms, I believe, the value of taking a multi-dimensional approach to studying the unreligious. No analysis since my dissertation that I could discover took such an approach. Of course, it is more difficult to make multi-dimensional comparisons in the frequency of unreligiousness over time, as different surveys employ different questions and wordings.

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In publishing my dissertation I would like, belatedly, to acknowledge the assistance of James A. Davis. As a member of my dissertation committee, he was uniformly supportive and insightful. He was uniquely helpful in my search for academic jobs. Finally, in retrospect I admire his approach to sociological teaching and research even more than I did in 1980. His contributions to the field in directing the General Social Survey, and in advancing the art of empirical teaching, have been immeasurable.

I would also like to thank my wife, Joan, for her love and support through multiple changes in career and discipline. Her discussions of religion with me have also given me a better understanding of what many unreligious people may be missing.
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19. Voices from the Gods: Speaking with Tongues by David Christie-Murray [Routledge Library Editions: Sociology of Religion, Routledge, 9780367074173

Glossolalia (paranormal speaking in tongues) and zenolalia (paranormal speaking in allegedly foreign languages) are features of many sub-cultures and religions. The most obvious example is Pentecostalism, where every believer in many denominations is expected to speak in tongues at least once – the gift in other cultures being limited to individuals, shamans and mediums. This book, first published in 1978, surveys the practice of 'speaking in tongues' in anthropology, Christianity and spiritualism, and provides an analysis of the psychological, theological and linguistic considerations of the phenomenon.

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Excerpt: My interest in speaking with tongues began when, some forty years ago, I heard an almost illiterate charwoman at a Pentecostalist meeting pour out a paean of fluent and ecstatic praise in what seemed a foreign language. Since then I have learned that glossolalia (paranormal speaking in tongues) and xenolalia (paranormal speaking in allegedly recognizable foreign languages) are features of many other sub-cultures, besides Pentecostalist Christian. Pentecostalism alone has grown so rapidly in the present century that something like one in every four or five hundred of the world's present inhabitants has spoken in Christian tongues at some time in his life; and if all the cultures which exhibit glossolalia, including Spiritualism, are included in the reckoning, the proportion is appreciably higher. It is true that in the latter cases tongues are more limited than

with Pentecostalists; for whereas every Christian in many Pentecostalist denominations is expected to speak in tongues at least once, as a sign of his baptism with the Holy Spirit, the gift in the other cultures is limited to individuals, shamans and mediums.

The bibliography of glossolalia is far more extensive than might be expected. The books and articles deal, however, with limited aspects of the subject — Christian, anthropological, Spiritivalistic, linguistic or psychological — and there has been no survey which tries to give an introduction to the whole subject and discover the relationship, if any, between tongues spoken by different cultures. Psychological explanations, moreover, which seemed final in the 1920s have been overtaken by recent developments. Tongues are not necessarily motorautomata exhibited by illiterates worked up into pathological mental states by revivalist campaigns. They are practised by educated, intelligent worshippers in quietness and without emotionalism and are taken seriously by many in the older-established Churches.

Nor is there any reason why there should not be varieties of glossolalia. Psychologists and theologians are apt to assume that outbreaks of motor-automata and charismata are always to be ascribed to approximately similar conditions. But each case must be taken on its merits and the evidence, after being studied as objectively as possible, allowed to speak for itself.

Changes in the law and in the atmosphere of thought mean that phenomena once suspect can be studied objectively in the open. There is also widespread contemporary interest in the occult and anything connected with it, both on a popular level and among serious scholars trying to add an understanding of psychical phenomena to the body of human knowledge. It is hoped that this book may have something of interest for both these, as well as for the ordinary reader who is perhaps only slightly affected by the contemporary interest in strange phenomena. All these types of reader may like to have a general introduction in all its ramifications, and a one-volume alternative to the collecting of a not-inconsiderable library.

In the end, acceptance or rejection of phenomena classified as supernatural or paranormal is a matter of personal belief. Many of the best-attested stories of past happenings rest on the testimony and personal integrity of witnesses whose creeds and convictions make them personae non gratae with sceptics and whose deaths, often decades ago, make a proper investigation impossible. That parapsychologists and many psychologists accept as normal faculties of the human mind such as telepathy, cryptomnesia, telemnesia, telesthesia and other abilities which may come under the general heading of extra-sensory perception, undermines any spiritual interpretation of the universe for many thinkers. Words `heard' are a common delusion of madness and are frequently terrifying in their intensity; if not due to madness, they may be internal auditions proceeding from the subliminal self, externalized so as to give an impression of physical hearing; or, again, they may be drawn by extra-sensory perception from the mind of a sitter who speaks the foreign language heard, or even from the cosmic consciousness, the existence of which may be as physical as the vibrations of a tuning-fork grown too faint to be heard by human ear yet capable of being picked up by an amplifier. Automatic writing of foreign tongues or writing by appliances like the planchette could also be an expression of extra-sensory perception or drawn from the universal subconscious. If the existence of the latter could be demonstrated for certain, it would be the answer to the evidence for reincarnation and to most, if not all, of that for the survival of individual spirits. Ancestral memory may be more of a factor in paranormal phenomena than is commonly thought, although few authorities give it much weight on the present evidence. The spirit controls of mediums can all be explained as subconscious personifications or dissociated personalities combined with extra-sensory ability in some instances. Although examples of Christian xenolalia may have happened, none has as yet been recorded on tape.

In spite of the enormous mass of evidence, there is little that can be quoted confidently as proof of any position, positive or negative. On balance the sceptic is justified rather than the believer, but always he is given pause by such phenomena as those of Patience Worth. There is room for

experiment. Are there sufficient devoted psychical researchers to repeat the Nepenthes experiments under the far stricter test conditions which could be imposed today? That is to say, men and women, a number of whom would have to be sceptics, who would discipline themselves strictly according to whatever ascetic principles were judged fitting to prepare for a possibly prolonged series of séances in the hope that a xenolalic spirit would materialize as Nepenthes is alleged to have done (perhaps, as a timeless spirit, she would manifest herself again and confirm her previous appearance) . Series of sittings with direct voice or clairaudient mediums could be held and recorded, in which groups of foreigners, their nationalities unknown to the sensitives, would sit; if there is anything in spirit communication one would expect something to come through in languages unknown to the medium but known to some of the sitters. Many more subjects could be regressed into `previous lives' by competent hypnotists, asked to speak the languages they used in them and requested to converse with linguistic experts in the tongues they spoke. No doubt other experiments could be devised, though always one is faced by the problem already mentioned that the very presence of sceptics, or even of disinterested, open-minded students, and the very existence of the clinical atmosphere surrounding tests may inhibit the phenomena to be studied. Perhaps there is no answer to this. Only one thing is sure: much more has to be made certain before the whole truth can be known about the voices from the gods. <>

Brill's Encyclopedia of Sikhism, Volume 1, History, Literature, Society, Beyond Punjab edited by Knut A. Jacobsen, Gurinder Mann Singh, Kristina Myrvold, Eleanor Nesbitt [Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 South Asia, BRILL, 9789004297456]

Brill's Encyclopedia of Sikhism Online edited by Knut A. Jacobsen, Gurinder Mann Singh, Kristina Myrvold, Eleanor Nesbitt [Brill Online, ISSN: 2589-2118]

Sikhism is one of the most important religious traditions of South Asian origin. Sikhs are historically connected to the Punjab region in South Asia, but their religious traditions are transnational and have a worldwide presence. The study of their history and traditions has become a significant field of scholarship and research, but no academic, authoritative, and up-to-date reference work exists. Brill's Encyclopedia of Sikhism aims to make available in-depth critical scholarship on all the main aspects of the Sikh traditions in a number of original essays written by the world's foremost scholars on Sikhs and Sikh traditions. The encyclopedia is thematic and seeks to present a balanced and impartial view of the Sikh traditions in all their multiplicity and as both historical and contemporary institutions. The articles, published in two volumes, focus on history, literature, and the rich social landscape of the Sikh community; their practices, places, arts, and performances; specialists and leadership; migration both within South Asia and beyond; and contemporary issues and relations.

Brill's Encyclopedia of Sikhism aims to make available in-depth critical scholarship on all the main aspects of the Sikh traditions in a number of original essays written by the world's foremost scholars on Sikhs and Sikh traditions. Forthcoming sections will be (1) Religious Practices, (2) Arts and Performance Traditions, (3) Leadership, Representation, and Communication, and (4) Contemporary Issues.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: Since 1969, the five hundredth anniversary of the birth of Gurū (or Bābā) Nānak (1469-1539), global interest in the academic study of the Sikhs, their traditions, and their history has increased, and a legacy of academic scholarship has emerged. These developments have paralleled an expanding migration of Sikhs from Punjab and the rest of India, which has given them a global presence. The Sikhs have a dramatic political history in Punjab and since the late 19th century – and increasingly during the past 50 years – the Sikh religion has spread beyond Punjab, with Sikhs currently found in many countries. Many publications have appeared, including not only monographs and edited volumes but also several academic journals that specialize in Sikh studies. Furthermore, several sponsored professorships at universities in North America have been established to promote the teaching about the Sikh religion and encourage academic research in the tradition.

The academic scholarship has dealt with many components of Sikh history, society, and culture, including the lived experience of the Sikhs, their social structure and diversity, politics, language, migration, sacred texts and literature, practices

and performances, arts and music, and education. Brill's Encyclopedia of Sikhism builds and expands on this scholarship, and presents the latest research on Sikh history, society, and culture. Intellectual traditions dealing with history, society, culture, and religious ideas are of course always debated, contested, and conflicting as they represent the plurality of human interests, identities, and situations; the encyclopedia has accordingly adopted an inclusive and pluralistic approach to reflect these debates.

The relationship of the Sikh tradition to the other South Asian religions is complex. More research is needed in order to understand the early historical development. The 15th and 16th centuries in northwest India were characterized by religious change and the coexistence of many religious traditions – Islamic traditions originating in the Middle East and a plurality of traditions that later came to be classified as Hinduism originating in South Asia. Hinduization has been an ongoing process in South Asia, in which religious traditions and figures have become transformed into or joined with the dominant social traditions, but the Sikh religion has maintained a distinct line of teachers and produced separate texts. Some 20th-century scholarship presented the Sikhs as one of the many religious groups, rooted in traditions that emerged in northern India that later came to be classified as Hinduism. Historical sources that have come to light in the early 21st century call for a reexamination of this position. Previous knowledge about the details of the founding of the panth (community), including its beliefs, practices, and social structures, the nature of the Sikh relationships with the land and culture of Punjab, as well as the Sikhs' religiopolitical aspirations and Sikhism's links with Islamic and Hindu religious traditions needs to be revisited.

Gurū Nānak founded the Sikh panth around 1520. He saw himself as the conduit of divine wisdom that came to him in the medium of poetry, which was preserved in the form of a pothī (book). The line of nine personal successors that followed him contributed greatly to the expansion and consolidation of the Sikh panth. The personal leadership came to a close with Gurū Gobind Siṅgh (d. 1708), who renamed the Sikh panth the Khālsā Panth ("Community of the Pure/Pure One"). The Khālsā Panth was to accept only the authority of Vāhigurū ("The Great Gurū [i.e. God]") and to seek guidance from the Gurū Granth, the revealed text that started with the compositions of Gurū Nānak and was expanded with additions by some of his successors.

The Sikhs challenged the authority of the Mughals, Iranians, Turks, and Afghans, and eventually succeeded in establishing their rule over the region of Punjab, which they regarded as their land by virtue of a divine gift to the Khālsā Panth. The Kingdom of Mahārāja Raṇjīt Siṅgh (the Khālsā Rāj) fell to the British in the 1840s. The initial difficulties encountered by the British in their efforts to overcome the tough resistance offered by the Sikhs as well as the Sikh surprise at having lost their rule, believed to be divinely ordained, eventually was followed by an era of cooperation in which the Sikhs played a much larger role in the British army and police than their numbers within the Indian population might have suggested.

Prefiguring subsequent scholarship, Gurū Nānak's successors elaborated on his belief in the unity of the divine, and on the human relationship with the creator, family, community, and society as a whole, and with the natural environment. The bards at the Sikh court sang about the majesty of the gurūs and the elegance of their surroundings, while others wrote the life story of the founder of the Sikh tradition, interpreted his ideas, and created codes of discipline. These areas of literary activity developed over time, and with the Gurū Granth, believed to be the repository of divine wisdom, becoming the central authority within the Sikh panth around 1700, its history, concordances, and annotations developed into a major field of scholarship.

Working within this broad framework, the first volume of Brill's Encyclopedia of Sikhism presents a way of looking at the emergence and development of the Sikh community that is not only fresh but also firmly rooted in primary sources of the tradition. The first section traces Sikh history; the second and third sections introduce the religious literature used in this reconstruction; the fourth, fifth, and sixth sections deal with Sikh society while giving

adequate attention to its multilayered complexity; and the seventh section traces the Sikh movement outside Punjab both within South Asia and beyond. The second volume will have sections on practices, places, arts, and performances; on literature; on leadership and education; on concepts; and on contemporary issues. The encyclopedia not only records the past, but also shows how a (primarily) local Punjabi ethnic community has developed under the influence of nationalism, colonialism, modernism, and postmodernity, and has turned into a global community. Readers may expect to see articles on a number of subjects, such as the Dasam Granth, the Vārs of Bhāī Gurdās Bhallā, and the Sarbloh Granth – they will appear in the second volume. On some other subjects more research is still needed, so that articles on these may eventually be incorporated in the encyclopedia.

A few, general conventions adopted by the encyclopedia are that post-c. 1850 names of people, organizations, institutions, and so on have no diacritics; languages and scripts have no diacritics and are Anglicized; finally, regions, towns, cities, and villages have no diacritics, though rivers, mountains/hills, and forts have.

And finally, many thanks to the highly qualified project team at Brill. Thanks to Jean-Louis Ruijters, the project manager, for coordinating the project, for achieving consistency in the spelling in general and in the transliteration of the Indic and Perso-Arabic scripts, and for providing input to the authors to make the specialized scholarship of the encyclopedia accessible. Thanks to Sibylle Meyer, Mariya Mitova, Aniek van Marissing van Wirdum, and Werner van Rossum for copyediting to achieve consistency in the style and/or for administering the project. And a special thanks to Robert Meyer for copyediting on the use of English language. They are responsible for numerous improvements, and we want to express our deepest thanks for their invaluable assistance. <>

The Origin of Israelite Zion Theology by Antti Laato, with Series Editors Andrew Mein & Claudia V. Camp [The Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies, T&T Clark, 9780567680020]

The Origin of Israelite Zion Theology is an examination of Zion theology and how it arises in the book of Psalms. Antti Laato's starting-point is that the Hebrew Bible is the product of the exilic and postexilic times, which nonetheless contains older traditions that have played a significant role in the development of the text.

Laato seeks out these older mythical traditions related to Zion using a comparative methodology and looking at Biblical traditions alongside Ugaritic texts and other ancient Near Eastern material. As such Laato provides a historical background for Zion theology which he can apply more broadly to the Psalms.

In addition, Laato argues that Zion-related theology in the Psalms is closely related to two events recounted in the Hebrew Bible. First, the architectural details of the Temple of Solomon, which can be compared with older mythical Zion-related traditions. Second, the religious traditions related to the reigns of David and Solomon such as the Ark Narrative, which ends with David's transfer of the Ark to Jerusalem. From this Laato in The Origin of Israelite Zion Theology builds an argument for a possible setting in Jerusalem at the time of David and Solomon for the Zion theology that emerges in the Psalms.

The aim of The Origin of Israelite Zion Theology is to deal with the early roots of the Zion theology as it is transmitted in the Hebrew Bible and especially in the book of Psalms. Zion theology is not a given concept in the Hebrew Bible, but a meta-level scholarly concept. In Laato's view, empirical models indicate that the Hebrew Bible can be regarded as a collection of writings in which older traditions have been preserved and actualized through editing and linguistic reworking in a way analogous to the literary development of the Akkadian epics. This means that older thematic patterns can play a significant role in later literary works.

Early Israelite concepts of god and religious structure shared similar parameters and expressions as, for example, those found at Ugarit. Laato is not claiming that we are dealing with direct borrowing, but rather with analogous thinking in the West Semitic religious milieu. Such a comparative analysis has its risks. Ugaritic material originates many hundreds of years earlier than the biblical books were composed into their final forms.

In The Origin of Israelite Zion Theology Laato argues that every interpretive model is based on several 'would be' statements which concern literary and redaction criticism, form history, tradition history and historical circumstances under which the texts have been written and transmitted. Therefore, he proceeds in the following way: In Chapter 3 he argues for one logical possible world for the historical circumstances which prevailed in Jerusalem at the time of David (election of Jerusalem) and Solomon (the building of the Temple). While such a possible world is certainly not the only alternative, it nevertheless functions as background for his thesis on Zion theology outlined in The Origin of Israelite Zion Theology and further stimulates scholarship by presenting one option for discussion.

Having clarified the outlines of the possible world concerning the beginning of the Jerusalemite temple at the time of Solomon, he examines the origin of the Zion theology in relation to this possible world. In Chapters 4 6 Laato works like an archaeologist who first digs the youngest layers and then proceeds to dig deeper into the older tradition layers. In Chapter 4 he detects new impulses which the building project of Solomon with the aid of Phoenician assistance gave to Israelite Yahwism. He argues that the imagery of the Storm-god became popular in Yahwism and that this imagery was also reflected in the Temple architecture and iconography. In Chapter 5 he takes one step backwards in history and discuss the ways in which the Shilonite cult with the Ark of Covenant influenced the Jerusalemite cult. Laato argues that the cult in Shiloh was based on the identification between 'El and Yahweh. He discusses the anti-Baal trend in early Israel more closely in Chapter 6. The focus in Chapter 6 is built on the analysis of Psalm 682.

In the summary and conclusions, Laato says that The Origin of Israelite Zion Theology the origin of Zion theology can be seen from larger historical perspectives where the focus was placed on the reigns of David and Solomon. The main source, the Hebrew Bible, is a collection of scriptures which received their final form in the exilic and postexilic period.

This empirical perspective to the tradition-historical investigations concerning Jerusalem is relevant in the Hebrew Bible. Jerusalem – which in the present form of the Hebrew Bible is the only place where the sacrificial cult of Yahweh is possible – is related to other cult sites in three basic patterns: (1) from cult place X to Jerusalem, i.e. the cult which was once conducted in a legitimate way in another cult place was moved to Jerusalem (e.g. the Ark from Shiloh to Jerusalem). (2) Jerusalem contra cult place X, i.e. another cult place is criticized because it is regarded as illegitimate beside the legitimate cult place of Jerusalem (e.g. Bethel). (3) From Sinai to Jerusalem, i.e. the Mosaic Torah which was revealed on Sinai is seen to get its legitimation in the cult of Jerusalem.

Empirical models give some interesting examples of cross-cultural translations where an old religious tradition has been adopted in a new religious context.

An important tendency in the Deuteronomistic History is to argue that David and Solomon managed to establish something which could be called 'an Israelite Empire.' David and Solomon – according to Laato's tentative hypothesis – managed to establish a status quo in the Land of Canaan which was accepted by Egypt. This is indicated by the marriage between Solomon and the daughter of the Pharaoh. The situation was apparently politically suitable for Egypt which had its own problems in foreign and domestic affairs.

Yahweh 'El was worshipped in Shiloh, which indicates the early nature of the Israelite religion – something which is also related to the theophoric name of Israel. The results outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated that, on the one hand, Yahweh was related to the Storm-god – and Baal was regarded as the Storm-god sui generis in the West Semitic religions – but, on the other hand, Yahweh was identified with 'El in Shiloh. Therefore, in Chapter 6, the discussion focused on the anti-Baal trend in early Israel and its implication on the imagery of the Storm-god used in psalms. The question posed was whether the use of the imagery of the Storm-god was an example of assimilation or occupation. This led to the analysis of Psalm 68, an example of religious traditions which originated from the Transjordan area and which were

recontextualized in Jerusalem. In this psalm, an anti-Baal trend is visible. Laato explains this as the worshippers of 'El reacting at the end of the Late Bronze Age to the popular myths that 'El allowed Baal to take care of the lower heaven and to be responsible for rains and fertility. Psalm 68 contains primitive rhetoric. It describes the theophany of Elohim with the aid of the Storm-god imagery and then identifies this Elohim with Yahweh or 'El.

The Origin of Israelite Zion Theology is a deep analytical study; scholars who do not accept Laato's historical conclusions may still find his tradition-historical analysis meaningful.

The book will certainly stimulate further scholarship. More studies are needed to clarify the archaeological evidence from Jerusalem as well as the historical and religion historical background of the reign of David and Solomon. Secondly, there are other interpretive models of how the imagery of the Storm-god to be investigated and understood. Thirdly, it is important to clarify how monolatry was understood in early Israel. There is no need to accept simple evolutionary lines from polytheism to monolatry and from monolatry to intolerant monolatry and finally to monotheism. If the United Monarchy was a glorious period in the history of Israel when the worship of Yahweh was glorified in Jerusalem by the building of the Temple, then the concept of the divine council may have been an early expression of monolatry in Israel which nevertheless contained a tolerant attitude towards other deities worshipped by other peoples. <>

Avicenna's Al-Shifā': Oriental Philosophy by Sari Nusseibeh [Routledge Studies in Islamic Philosophy, Routledge, 9781138485044]

This book deals with the philosophy of Ibn Sina - Avicenna as he was known in the Latin West- a Persian Muslim who lived in the eleventh century, considered one of the most important figures in the history of philosophy.

Although much has been written about Avicenna, and especially about his major philosophical work, Al-Shifa, this book presents the rationalist Avicenna in an entirely new light, showing him to have presented a theory where our claims of knowledge about the world are in effect just that, claims, and must therefore be underwritten by our faith in God. His project enlists arguments in psychology as well as in language and logic. In a sense, the ceiling he puts on the reach of reason can be compared with later rationalists in the Western tradition, from Descartes to Kant –though, unlike Descartes, he does not deem it necessary to reconstruct his theory of knowledge via a proof of the existence of God. Indeed, Avicenna's theory presents the concept of God as being necessarily presupposed by our theory of knowledge, and God as the Necessary Being who is presupposed by an existing world where nothing of itself is what it is by an intrinsic nature and must therefore be as it is due to an external cause. The detailed and original analysis of Avicenna's work here is presented as what he considered to be his own, or 'oriental' philosophy.

Presenting an innovative interpretation of Avicenna's thought, this book will appeal to scholars working on classical Islamic philosophy, kalām and the History of Logic.

Contents

Excerpt:

An apologia: a preface ... in retrospect

The past half century or so has witnessed a surge ofAvicennian scholarship. On the one hand, much new material came to light (e.g., D. Reisman's meticulous work on Avicenna's al-Mubāhathāt manuscripts); on the other, various specific ideas that already may have been touched upon by earlier scholars came under new lights (whether in entire tomes on major areas, as in R. Wisnovsky's Metaphysics, Amos Bertolacci's Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in al-Shifã Catareina Belo's comparative study on chance and determinism, J. Kaukuwa's and Deborah Black's on self-consciousness, and the latter on epistemology; or in diverse articles in specialized topics, such as T. Street's, K. el-Rouayheb's, and A. Q. Ahmed's separate and valuable works on logic, and many others besides). Without exception, all these different works presented old and new aspects of Avicenna in a reinvigorated form, all reaching a new level of in-depth analysis and rendering Avicenna's genius more accessible to the modem reader. Some of the studies mentioned above appeared as part of proceedings of two major Yale-sponsored study groups in the early 2000s — in effect a brainchild of Dimitri Gutas. (Reisman co-edited with A. H. al-Rahim the volume of the first proceedings, in which some of the aforementioned papers are published, while others, in memory of Reisman, appeared in the edited Interpreting Avicenna by Peter Adamson.) In many ways, and by admission of some of these scholars — and many others besides — a pivotal role to Dimitri Gutas at Yale University has been recognized. Indeed, ever since the first edition in 1988 of Gutas' work on Avicenna and the Aristotelian tradition, and partly having been directly influenced by it and by his other works, scholarship on Avicenna can be said to have spread, and become far more rigorous and intensive than it had generally been. Both due to the new material becoming available (including the completion of the translations into English by Shams Inati of the Remarks and Admonitions, I. Back's On Interpretation and Peter Heath's translation and commentary on The Book of the Prophet), and to major general studies — such as that by L. E. Goodman, described by another Avicenna scholar, Oliver Leaman, to be "the best introduction to Avicenna" he had read, or Jon McGinnis' equally captivating Avicenna, Parviz Morewedge's (controversial) The Mystical Philosophy of Avicenna, or the recently published Mathematics and the Mind, by Hassan Tahiri, and various other comparative studies besides —Avicenna has also become much more available to the wider English-reading public.

It would be hardly possible in these preliminary remarks to mention, let alone to provide even a fair appreciation of the very important studies that have come out in the past years, which have basically opened up a wide vista for more extensive analytic study of Avicenna's "philosophical project," as Gutas calls it. Therefore, what may be of relevance to do in this short preface — an apologia, in the circumstances — is to present an argument as to why despite the recent literature, this new book on Avicenna, whose basic skeleton was written close to four decades ago as a Harvard thesis, remains of interest as one that provides a new perspective on this philosopher both in terms of an approach as well as in terms of a thesis.

Let us first consider methodology: one of the major insights argued by Gutas is the need to view the discipline of philosophy by Avicenna as a single

corpus that incorporates both the Aristotelian and neo-Platonic traditions available to him, and to realize — in Aristotelian fashion — that Avicenna treats the different parts of philosophy (logic, Physics, Metaphysics, etc.) as an integral whole. Two important points follow from this: first, that Avicenna's al-Shifa' (covering all the parts of philosophy in consecutive order) promises to be the most likely comprehensive major work in philosophy from which his "project" could be elicited — always of course to be measured against his other works; and second, that in explicating this project it needs to be shown how the different parts of philosophy that he deals with in that work (e.g., language, logic, Physics, psychology, Metaphysics) cohere. Arguably, this study — unlike others to date — attempts to do precisely that through a close, step-by-step building-up and integration of all these different parts of Avicenna's major work together, beginning right at the beginning — where he offers his analysis of what a statement is. As can be seen in the introduction, the attempt has been to read Avicenna himself in this work as the author of what he says (rather than through the eyes of other authors or commentaries he was influenced by) — thereby taking seriously, for example, the statement that the studious reader will find all his distinctive ideas in this text; and to consider remarks that may seem out of line, once explicated, to be integral to his distinctive philosophy rather than idiosyncrasies to be explained away, or to be viewed as standing by themselves. The attempt, in addition, has meant not to allow oneself to be blinded by preconceived notions to understanding the important nuances he introduces as he treats what later came to be `run-of-the-mill' distinctions — for example what tasdīq ("assent") means for him, contra sādiq ("true"). In other words, the approach has been to try and understand his text at all critical philosophical junctures from his own perspective rather than from that of `informed' but preconceived ideas, or from that of the general corpus that was available to him — notwithstanding, of course, the important scholarly value of measuring the terms and ideas he uses against those in that corpus. (The perennial question here, always on the mind of scholars, is whether one can understand the author first, before looking into what were the influences on him; or whether understanding him requires seeing him through the lenses of the intellectual traditions available to him — those of another milieu or that of his own. A sensible approach would probably try to view him using different lenses, which would by default also include that of the student.) That said, the conscious approach of the present work has been to read Avicenna with a tabula rasa as one might an ordinary author, on the assumption that what an author typically sets out to do is to explicate her own thoughts using the indispensable but conventional language of the trade available to her. Admittedly, Avicenna is not an ordinary author, and the task was not altogether straightforward. What reading him this way meant, though, was to guard against assuming knowledge of meanings of words or subjects on account of their familiarity, and to keep hold of apparently slight departures from conventional meanings in some passages to be measured up against distinctive articulations of meanings in other passages. Underlining the approach was a constant 'look out' for coherence among all those `special' meanings Avicenna seemed to be articulating in the different passages, sometimes in altogether different areas: for example, the role and place of relative pronouns alongside those of such words as "necessary" or "existent"; or how his observations for formulating modal logic cohere with those in Metaphysics; or how his observations in psychology cohere with those on language. Some of his remarks on reference — rather than seen in isolation as part of a familiar context — are held up in support of his view on possible worlds (see below). In addition, what may be read as a passing introductory remark — such as that in the beginning of his On Demonstration where he subsumes knowledge under opinion (ra'ī) — is taken seriously rather than glossed over lightly: does he really mean to limit the reach of episteme?

Textually indexed important specific comparisons between different parts of Avicenna's work have already been interestingly pointed out by various authors in different studies (e.g., Belo's on matter — what body means — in both Physics and Metaphysics). Comprehensive interpretations, highlighting various aspects in Avicenna, are now also available. However, an integrated appreciation of his major work in the manner

described still awaits. As Gutas himself mentions, Avicenna's project — as he saw that himself — was to re-construct philosophy as a coherent corpus, taking his cue from Aristotle. Gutas observes — significantly I believe — that Avicenna's approach to philosophy as a single project was second only to Aristotle's. It follows that a study that tries to integrate Avicenna's ideas from what he says in different areas of philosophy and then seeks to formulate a single thesis on that basis must be one that still deserves consideration.

That said, the formulation this study makes of such a system constitutes a departure in many ways from "the project" as Gutas describes it and as it informs the general outlook of many recent (and previous generation) scholars. This leads us to consider content: while in agreement with Gutas to discard the two-Avicennas thesis, as the reader will realize this study proposes an interpretation quite contrary to that of Gutas especially with regard to viewing Avicenna as espousing, or continuing, a (Greek) tradition of "rationalist empiricism." True, this expression is fairly ambivalent — arguably, Falsafa's `rationalism' in this field was hardly empirical, especially contrasted with that of its intellectual nemesis: the kalām tradition, where reasoning at least tried to root itself in a language reality — the paradigm of course being the Qur'anic language, both as syntax and as semantics. But Gutas predicates his reading on certain assumptions, most importantly one having to do with the role of logic. This he takes to represent — despite or because of some explicit innovations and corrections Avicenna makes in syllogisms — Avicenna's otherwise wholesale acceptance of what role these `demonstrative' syllogisms are supposed to play in his theory of knowledge. In turn, this leads him implicitly to accept assumptions about the universe of logical discourse in Avicenna's system (therefore also about language), as well as about the ontology behind it. These "assumptions" — for example about modal logic, and about meanings or concepts or quiddities — are critically but separately questioned by other scholars (some previously mentioned) where conclusions are drawn that, if superimposed on other areas in Avicenna's philosophy, and were rolled out, may seem to reveal inconsistencies in his oeuvre. Yet, a sufficient "rolling out" of these conclusions, and of trying to understand them in a new light as elements of a single whole, will arguably reveal a "new theory" rather than an old one adorned with interesting but isolated patches with implications that do not go much beyond the contexts where they are found.

Let me here briefly pick out some examples of insights in seemingly unrelated areas as examples of what is meant: Deborah Black's critical analysis of certitude in Avicenna's work raises questions about logic's reach, and aligns his approach to that of kalām scholars. Though approached from a different angle, the analysis of this subject found in this work conforms with hers. Tony Street's poignant explication of Avicenna's modalities, setting them apart from Alfarābī's, and hiilighting his disagreements with some of the Aristotelian commentators, invites speculations about Avicenna's ontology. A. Rahman's treatment of modalities raises similar questions, while Z. Movahed's (see below) raises second thoughts. Rouayheb's exploration of the later critical tradition of Avicennian logic brings to light, I believe, fundamental aspects of Avicenna's philosophy of language that have hitherto not received their due attention, and which I hope will become clearer in this work. The reader will find that this work delves into the detailed arguments Avicenna brings to bear on these questions and speculations. Wisnovsky's analysis of quiddities, thingness, unity and existent — as well as his underlining of Avicenna's kalām milieu — raise questions about meanings. In turn, this raises questions about language and the statements making up a logical system. All of the above bear on such matters as causality, freedom and determinism — issues addressed, for example, by Y. Michot, M. Marmura and others; and equally on the subject of evil (theodicy) as addressed by S. Inati. Each of these mentioned areas in philosophy are arguably separate, and dealing with each of them competently on their own terms — informed by a close textual analysis — is an important achievement in its own right. But given Gutas' remark that Avicenna's work should be looked upon as a single whole, it would surely be something if an attempt is made to synthesize those parts together; to synthesize, for example, Avicenna's understanding of "secondary intelligibles" or "intentions" being the subject matter of logic — first

identified by A. I. Sabra — with Avicenna's preliminary analysis of the statements that make up his logical system, with his analysis of meanings, and with his Physics and Metaphysics. Of course, the present work predates the valuable studies mentioned. Even so, some of those insights resonate with this work — that is, invoke questions in the same areas of thought, though not always reaching the same conclusions. One could put the matter this way: in what way does Avicenna's remark on the rule of conversion of a negative universal statement (e.g., as explicated in Rahman's paper) relate to his views on quiddities (e.g., as treated by Wisnovsky)? What implications does the intensional/ extensional distinction in reference of the terms `thing' and `existent' — discussed by Wisnovsky — have on how to understand the principles of logic — indeed, of knowledge? One could go further: in what way does Avicenna's view on quiddities affect his view on the nature of logical discourse? Further still, one could ask, `In what way is Avicenna's explanation of certitude (even as discussed by D. Black) consistent with the conventional view about (demonstrative) syllogisms being the gateway to knowledge?' Finally, will the answers to these and similar questions come out in support of the thesis that his was a project of "rational empiricism"? Indeed, is there another way of seeing how to tie all these different elements — and the insights provided by these and other writers — by reading Avicenna's major work with a fresh eye? Is `rational empiricism' an appropriate description of Avicenna's project, and in what sense should one understand this?

The significance of these and similar questions also bears on current discussions: Timothy Williamson makes a reference to a recent paper by Zia Movahed, where Avicenna is argued to have been supportive of a modal rule nowadays associated with Ruth Marcus. According to this rule, the implication of the conclusion is allowed — from the contemplation of the possibility of something — that something is possible (thus attributing some form of existential status, characterized by possibility, to 'that thing'). Conceptually, this is a challenging view — at least, in some of its interpretations. Williamson seems to be attracted to it for the parallelism he sees between it and imagining as a bona fide, logical rule: if I can imagine a fear or a success, then there is some sense of there being a fear (or a success) I imagine. Imagining here is integral to knowing. In the realm of possible worlds, such a view has obvious ontological implications — relating to many of the questions already indicated (such as whether propositions are convertible, or whether a quiddity by itself is something intelligible). Indeed, given Avicenna's modalities — and quiddities — one is compelled to reconsider that "ancient" distinction between essence and existence and its interpretation in Avicenna's system. As Goodman already observes, this supposed distinction by Avicenna by which an ontic status is attributed to the former in order to explain the latter must be taken with a grain of salt. Yet not all manners of reference to possible worlds assume essentialism, and it is arguable (as it is in this work) that Avicenna's referential use of names of natural kinds and of mass terms in this context — vaguely evocative of Saul Kripke's approach to the same problem — is one that he consciously chooses to bypass essentialism. In any case the key question, 'Was he an essentialist?', cries out for a new answer, given the detailed analysis already done. The present work, as could be seen, answers this question in the negative — a departure in many ways from the classical view on Avicenna — but retains the necessity configuration of his system by substituting causality for essentialism. Yet, as Wisnovsky, Belo and others have aptly argued, the bi-directional relations of causality are already clearly laid out in Avicenna's system. So if necessity is already vouched for, so to say, by causality, then why stick to the outdated (partly Aristotelian, partly neo-Platonist) role of essences and essentialism to explain that necessity? Why continue attributing an essentialist meaning to a causal necessity? Indeed, why insist on a classical understanding of the meaning of meanings? Couldn't even a close reading of Avicenna's distinctions early on, say between accident as a property (`arad) and accident as a logical category (`aradi), or that in the context of a substance between (juz' — part) and (kull — whole) for matter and form, and (juz'i — particular) and (kullī — universal) — and therefore between objects and our categorization of these as subjects and predicates, including what we call

essential predicates — have saved us from assuming that he must have meant his logical statements to verifiably indicate essential relations in the external world (a correspondence theory of truth)? Have we not — even since A. I. Sabra's emphasis on secondary intelligibles constituting the subject matter of logic — simply misread Avicenna's view on what these are, missed seeing the full implication of the `constructivist' role he ascribes to logic, and therefore also missed seeing how this relates to the structure of the world as being — like his epistemological model — possible-in-itself? Yet, without essentialism the question hangs, as also discussed by the aforementioned authors: what meaning, then, is left for the notion of possibility (and human will) in Avicenna? What meaning is left for a `correspondence' theory of truth?

Part of the fascination with Avicenna is philosophical, and part is historical. Much of the recent work on Avicenna has upgraded our understanding of him in both respects. In this light his ideas could be assessed not only in terms of what preceded him (whether he was influenced by them or not) but also in terms of what came after him (whether these were influenced by him or not). Without meaning in any way to claim a philosophical foresight in Avicenna's work bearing on some present-day debate in philosophy on a specific issue, it is nonetheless as important to assess his analysis of that area of thought in light of contemporary debates as it is to see his work in light of earlier traditions. After all, this is his due as a philosopher. That is why Ruth Marcus or Quine or Kripke is as relevant as Philo of Megara for understanding Avicenna (on modalities). The works of recent scholars on Avicenna also view him in this light — accounting for modern philosophical scholarship even as they untangle historical curiosities. Their works testify to this developing trend. But the seeds of this approach were already planted by an earlier generation of scholars — not all of one mind — some of whom (like G. Hourani, M. Marmura, P. Morewedge, S. Pines, S. H. Nasr, S. Inati and many others) continued to publish on the subject after this work was finished. While the studies of these different generations of scholars — all the way back to the "pioneers" in the Western tradition like Carra de Vaux and Goichon's monumental Lexique and her later work on Avicenna's essence/existence distinction impact in Europe — have not necessarily all converged with one another in their appreciations of Avicenna and analyses even on specific points, one could still view them, as well as recent scholarship, as all complementing one another in a cross-generational effort or dialogue to give Avicenna his philosophical due. This present old/new contribution should be seen in the same light: as another inroad or one additional step into the Avicennian terrain, informed primarily by what he wrote/dictated in his major work. This starts with a treatment of language, its role and relation to logic. Rather than skim through what he says there — what makes a sentence a statement, what a proposition means, what an ascription of a truth-value means — in the rush to reach "meatier" subjects (epistemology, logic, Metaphysics), this work tries to elicit an accurate but distinctive account at this primary level that can next fit with his (unconventional) accounts in those other areas. Thus the attempt is made, through a close reading of the text, to link the elementary blocks of Avicenna's system with those that have wider reach. Both in terms of approach, then, as well as in terms of holistic conclusions, this (old) work still claims — perhaps unexpectedly — a sense of `freshness'.

One note should be added in conclusion to these remarks: given the integrated format of the body of the argument in this work, my choice was to retain this original format rather than be sidetracked within the text by addressing related or similar issues raised by some of the new scholarship mentioned earlier. After all, this work was meant to analyze Avicenna directly rather than studies about him, and this remains the main purpose now — this, notwithstanding those issues where my analysis will soon seem to differ, at least in some respects, with that of some of those scholars. One early example the reader will come across are the meanings of the terms `conception' and `judgement' — an issue that leads directly to the question of what the subject matter of logic is, and which has been dealt with (more or less along the same lines) by A. Sabra, T. Street and K. Rouayheb. While a few footnotes have been introduced to the text that recognize these differences, I did not find it necessary to

supplement my analysis with new arguments that will specifically address their divergent interpretations. Translation of key terms here is also important, and whether in the above-quoted works, or in the translations by M. Marmura (of the Ilāhiyyāt) or I. Back (of al- `Ibārah) of al-Shifâ', the reader will find that basic distinctions between `proposition' and `statement' matter. In more ways than one, after all, these differences only constitute the tip of an iceberg, each part corroborating the other, and unveiled to full view through a reading of the whole work. The `subject matter of logic' will be found to be a salient feature that will impress itself throughout Avicenna's entire work. Otherwise, and in general, some of the separate philosophical insights in recent work will be found to conform with findings here; what this work offers is a hypothesis

for how these and other insights are brought together in the form of a holistic "project." Also, I did not use the same formats in the appendices for presenting Avicenna's syllogisms as those used by Street and Ahmed — and before that, by Rescher or Shehaby among others; once again, though, I chose to maintain my format for reasons to do with consistency with the symbolism I generally use to express specific distinctions Avicenna makes at the level of meanings.

The list of (primary and) secondary material included at the end of this work is not meant as a general bibliographical guide, but simply as a list of references used in this work. This is supplemented at the end by a list of references of works referred to above, from which some specific references were also incorporated into the original footnotes. Other extensive bibliographies can be found in more recent works, including in some of those already mentioned. A whole mile's run can be done in Jules L. Janssens' An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sinai, 1991, First Supplement 1999 CLouvain-La-Nerve), and the third in 2017. In addition to references in European publications and languages, this monumental effort also includes references to non-English language publications (Russian, Turkish, Persian and Arabic). Needless to say, also, much work has appeared in the past decades in the general field of Islamic-Age philosophy that bears on Avicenna's intellectual milieu. One such comprehensive compilation is that done by Routledge, capably edited by S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman. Promisingly, serious work has also already begun on seeing Avicenna through the same lenses used by 'Abd al-Jabbār.

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My conclusion from this work and, therefore, thesis is simple. Oriental Philosophy is this: the world and our view of it correspond with each other only in the sense that each of them is the best of other logically possible alternatives. This —a providence rather than an empirical correspondence — constitutes the core of Avicenna's philosophy: not only things logically could have been otherwise, but they also could be otherwise than they are, on both fronts. Besides God Himself, everything in itself is just possible — that it is, and what it is.

Widening our horizons a little, one could observe various corollaries to the main claim. For example, it is by definition impossible to achieve intellectual perfection, or happiness on earth. The objects of our knowledge are distinct from the objects which constitute the nonlogical world. Therefore, conjunction (ittisāl) with the objects of our knowledge is not a conjunction with the Active Intellect, or with items (forms) that are provided by the Active Intellect. That said, Avicenna does not undermine from this Intellect's role, and indeed it is precisely by some means of revealing the existential connections between these forms to the human mind that this Intellect can help the inquirer to correctly guess which piece (construct) of the puzzle — the middle term — best fits into a syllogism. But epistemic perfection consists in becoming liberated from this need of `guess', and in striving to acquire that vision that allows the soul to behold the causal grid of the world itself and directly, rather than through the logical lens. Meantime, faith in the existence of this grid replaces conjunction with its components as the means of support for our knowledge-claims, while an intelligible account is thereby provided of why seers and prophets can acquire knowledge of the world as it is without reading Aristotle (or philosophy): after all, it is the Active Intellect that stands behind the intuitive guesses of the logician, and nothing prevents such and many more `guesses' to be intuited by the non-logician. While religion and prophecy are thereby upheld as pillars of

faith, philosophy itself comes to be viewed as a rationalist pillar for that faith rather than as a rationalist enterprise coming to replace it. Philosophy retains its value as an essential pursuit for the advancement of human `knowledge', but both its theoretic and ethical conclusions coalesce in upholding the importance of faith for leading the good life, and for achieving ultimate happiness.

Corollaries proliferate. Back to Chapter 2, we observe this: truths in this world represent conventional systems of belief, and this fact is reflected in one's logical system by the emphasis in this system being on consistency rather than on truths properly so-called. Indeed, logic does not verify propositions or truths, as Aristotle or Alfārābī proposed, though it protects us from errors. This attitude toward logic was later taken up by philosophers like Suhrawardi, but also challenged by 'conformists' whose influence marked the study of the subject in religious institutions right up to the present day. Back to Chapter 1, we find Avicenna's understanding of the role of logic reflected in his treatment of statements which bear truth-values by the emphasis in these statements being on assent, or on the conferral of other speakers of the language, rather than on the propositional contents of those statements.

Do these claims by Avicenna constitute a rational defense of faith? And, if they do, could one therefore argue that Avicenna attempted to kalamize philosophy (as Ibn Taymiyyah, for example, accused him of doing)? Certainly, Avicenna's enterprise — in showing that knowledge is not self-confirming — showed that faith in God's Providence is necessary for upholding human knowledge-claims. On the other hand, insofar as kalām is a rational — i.e., analytic — discipline whose primary purpose is to defend faith, one might indeed see a striking resemblance between Avicenna's enterprise and that of the kalām scholars. However, there are two important features — one in favour, and one against making that analogy — that have to be borne in mind: unlike kalām which bases its analysis on items of faith, and proceeds to defend them, Oriental Philosophy proceeds from analyzing the components of knowledge, only at the end concluding that faith is necessary for the upholding of that knowledge. This is not a distinction to be belittled. But there is more: insofar as Avicenna's approach in effect aimed at naturalizing philosophical discourse, thereby making it an analytic tool that can be applied to a pliable rather than a rigid subject matter, one could see a striking resemblance between it and the style of the kalām scholars whose discourse after all must have seemed more indigenous and relevant to the culture than did `Greek' thought. One must stress again, however, that unlike kalām scholars, Avicenna did not set out to defend articles of faith: the route that led him to uphold the value of faith was simply his objective analysis of the parts of philosophy that he put to test of his scrutiny.

More generally, `orientalizing philosophy' as Avicenna had in mind meant to naturalize it in the following two senses: (a) stylistically, by treating it as a direct Arabic (and Persian) discourse that is open to any adjustment informed by an independent analysis rather than as a self-contained treasure-chest of Greek truths which is to be jealously guarded against any innovative thinking; and, (b) substantively, by showing it to be barren precisely where it boasts fertility, that is, on its logical and epistemological fronts. In sum, it is to lay it bare to the Islamic milieu, and to give it the freedom to metamorphose into a shape and to assume a colour which would suit the Islamic intellectual terrain. However, it is not in this that Avicenna could claim a philosophical uniqueness to his project. Nor is it in this, therefore, that Oriental Philosophy could claim distinction. Rather, Avicenna's Oriental Philosophy claims uniqueness in his philosophical milieu through his distinctive analysis of the parts of philosophy he had before him in such a way as to provide a coherent argument for the fundamental thesis as I have presented it: that the world and our view of it correspond with each other only providentially — in the sense that each of them is the best of other logically possible alternatives. This thesis, being the core of Avicenna's philosophy, or indeed of philosophy as Avicenna viewed it, is the rational key required to open the Greek treasure-chest, and to replace its Greek truths by a system of beliefs which is ultimately crowned by faith.

Let us indulge in some more speculative thinking, now by incorporating other time periods into our focus. Avicenna's attempt to naturalize philosophy very nearly killed it. Paradoxically, instead of philosophy becoming naturalized or kalamized, kalām itself became philosophized (as Ibn Khaldūn charged), arguably due to Avicenna's influence. Al-Ghazālī, an avid reader and admirable exponent and critic of Avicennian philosophy, was able, a few generations after Avicenna, to argue that logic of itself does not constitute a threat to faith or to religion. It does not prove the validity of the philosophers' claims about God and the world. Logic, he argued, could be incorporated into the tradition. And so it was, leaving philosophy without its crutches. Later still, Ibn Taymiyyah, the Sunni traditionalist, went even further: al-Ghazali was wrong, he argued, even to believe there was anything special about classical logic. Traditional analogical reasoning — that used by the jurisprudents — is in fact a more reliable form of logical thinking, and subsumes classical Aristotelian logic under its wings. This, together with later attempts to `rehabilitate' classical logic as a verfcationist methodology by postAvicenna critics, effectively led to the incorporation of a classical logic that is divorced from its original Avicennian analysis into the teaching curricula of conservative religious establishments. Here, it survived as a stale discipline, taught to this day.

Without an analytic method of inquiry which it could claim to verifiably prove its metaphysical claims, philosophy as a discipline must have seemed singularly limited to intellectuals of the period. Indeed, major philosophical figures (in the eastern Muslim provinces) after him, such as Suhrawardi, would explicitly declare that logic is primarily a defensive tool to guard against making mistakes rather than a pathway to achieving knowledge. This may explain why a distinctive mark of post-Avicennian philosophy — from Suhrawardi and all the way to Mulla Sadra in the seventeenth century — is its bold `liberation' from its earlier rigid pseudo-Aristotelian form that was its feature in its early Baghdad days; and also why later figures like Averroes and Ibn Khaldun would come to see it as having transformed into a discourse that is almost indistinguishable from that of kalam. Averroes, reviewing the historical development of an Aristotelian discipline he must have held dear to his heart, would have understandably felt furious with what he thought Avicenna had done to philosophy. By `exposing' it, he must have thought, Avicenna had merely succeeded in extinguishing it. While ostensibly a refutation of al-Ghazali's critique of philosophy, his Tahãfut is effectively and prominently a critique of Avicenna himself, notwithstanding some cases where he defends him against al-Ghazālī's charges. Of course, we cannot consider Avicenna to have been a culprit in this sense. He had merely looked upon it as any philosopher might: a methodology and a set of principles that are not immune to a reformulation. He looked upon his project as one of inquiry, thereby laying bare the limits of the philosophical tradition that reached him, but not as someone who rejects its value. If its epistemology is not objectively verifiable, he has at least shown it to be the best our minds can project or describe. To take a parallel example from an altogether different domain (as Ali Paya pointed out to me), Karl Popper did not dismiss the value of science (or of epistemology more generally) when he argued for a falsifiability rather than a verifiability criterion as its measure. To be sure, scientists may continue to disagree with Popper — as indeed post-Avicenna critics who held on to the doctrine that logic provides verifiable truths disagreed with Avicenna on the subject matter of logic. But Popper's reformulation of what a scientific truth is is not regarded as a doctrine of devaluation of science. Likewise, all Avicenna did was to digest what philosophy was all about, and so to internalize it as an analytic skill which he used effectively to naturalize it — making it a live and updated discourse rather a mere regurgitation of the old masters. However, his very success in this made him into an object of attack, whether by traditionalists like al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyyah on the one hand, or by Aristotelian `loyalists' like Averroes on the other. Such criticisms, coming as they did from two entirely opposed camps, must surely if anything testify to Avicenna's originality and philosophical independence of mind. <>

Predication and Ontology: Studies and Texts on Avicennian and Post-avicennian Readings of Aristotle's Categories by Alexander Kalbarczyk

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In Predication and Ontology Kalbarczyk provides the first monograph-length study of the Arabic reception of Aristotle's Categories. At the center of attention is the critical reappraisal of that treatise by Ibn Sīnā (d. 428 AH/1037 AD), better known in the Latin West as Avicenna. Ibn Sīnā's reading of the Categories is examined in the context of his wider project of rearranging the transmitted body of philosophical knowledge. Against the background of the late ancient commentary tradition and subsequent exegetical efforts, Ibn Sīnā's Kitāb al-Maqūlāt of the Sifāʾ is interpreted as a milestone in the gradual reshuffle of the relationship between logic proper and ontology. In order to assess the philosophical impact of this realignment, some of the subsequent developments in Ibn Sīnā's writings and in the emerging post-Avicennian tradition are also taken into account. The thematic focus lies on the two fundamental classification schemes which Aristotle introduces in the treatise: the fourfold division of Cat. 2 ("of a subject"/"in a subject") and the tenfold scheme of Cat. 4 (i.e., substance and the nine genera of accidents). They both pose the question of whether and how the manner in which an expression is predicated relates to extra-linguistic reality. As the study intends to show, this question is one of the driving forces of Ibn Sīnā's momentous reform of the Aristotelian curriculum.

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Excerpt: In light of the great quantity, quality and impact of philosophical texts from the Islamicate world, the research on this rich intellectual tradition may still be said to be in its juvenile period. Notwithstanding some significant progress in the last years, this general assessment is to a large extent even true of the multifaceted oeuvre of the most famous and influential Muslim philosopher of all times, Abu `Ali al-Husayn b. `Abdallāh b. Sina (d. 428 AH / 1037 AD), better known in the Latin West as Avicenna. Philologically sound editions of at least his major philosophical works, such as the K. as-Sifã and al-Isārãt wa-t-tanbīhāt, are still missing - let alone complete and reliable translations into Western languages.

This rather discouraging state of affairs, by and large, also extends to the level of an analytical appraisal of Ibn Sinā's philosophy. To be sure, ever since Dimitri Gutas' seminal study Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition has laid the ground for a systematic philosophical engagement with the Corpus Avicennicum,l some important advances have been made - in recent years especially in the field of his syllogistic' and ontology. However, numerous parts of Ibn Sīnā's philosophical project continue to remain terrae incognitae. What is more, even though Ibn Sinā's enormous influence on subsequent scholarship and erudition, both secular and religious, has long been recognized, and even though the later tradition has been identified as a wide field of intellectual activities and achievements which deserves to be studied in its own right, comparatively little research has been dedicated to the analysis of philosophical issues and controversies in the post-Avicennian period.

Given the eminent role which Aristotle's Categoric, and the abundant commentaries on this short work

have played throughout the entire history of philosophy up to the present day and given the enormous amount of literature both on the Categories itself and on its exegetical history, it is all the more surprising that Ibn Sinã's reception of the Categories is still a seriously understudied domain. That is not to say that Ibn Sīnā's intense engagement with the Categories remained completely unnoticed. Dimitri Gutas discussed the introductory chapter of the K. al-Magi of the Sifa' where Ibn Sīnā forcefully argues for the exclusion of the Categories from the logic curriculum.' Richard Bodéüs very briefly contrasted al-Hasan b. Suwār's traditional reading of the Categories with Ibn Sīnā's critical attitude which he deemed to be inspiring for further research on Aristotle's treatise. In a similar mariner, Allan Bäck compared Ibn Sīnā's treatment of Cat. 1, in the course of which we see him introduce a complex division of various types of homonymy, with Ibn Rusd's much less original style of commenting — and concluded that Ibn Sīnā's creative approach makes him the ideal commentator for all readers, both medieval and modern, who appreciate a philosophically productive exegesis. Moreover, Amos Bertolacci and Alexander Treiger closely studied Ibn Sīnā's elaboration on Cat. 1 against the background of the preceding commentary tradition. Besides that, Amos Bertolacci also discussed Ibn Sīnā's reworking of Cat. 1 as a particularly apt case in point for the close interrelatedness between the logical and metaphysical parts of the K. as-Sifa'. Prior to this, Tiana Koutzarova had already made frequent recourse to the ontological doctrines which Ibn Sīnā expounds in the Maqūlāt of the Sifa' for the sake of gaining a better understanding of the Ilāhiyyāt of the gip', especially with regard to the concepts of `existent' (mawgūd) and `substance' (gawhar).

Apart from his reflections on Ibn Sīnā's role as a "commentator" of the Categories, Allan Bäck can also be credited as the first contemporary reader who paid attention to the remarkable reassessment of Cat. 2 which Ibn Sīnā pursues in chapter I,3 of the Maqūlāt of the Sifa'. As far as Ibn Sīnā's reception of the actual list of Aristotle's ten categories is concerned, Paul Thom made a first attempt at situating Ibn Sīnā's systematization of the scheme of categories within the earlier commentary tradition. In addition to these studies on particular chapters and issues of the Maqūlāt of the Sip', the recent discovery of an earlier Avicennian treatise on the Categories inspired some first considerations on how a developmental account might trace the various stages of Ibn Sīnā's reading of the Categories.

What is lacking, however, is a close reading of larger parts of Ibn Sīnā's extensive K. al-Maqūlāt of the Sifā'. The present study, therefore, intends to pave the way towards a deeper contextualized understanding of Ibn Sīnā's critical account of the Categories within his wider project of rearranging the transmitted body of philosophical knowledge - a transformation process whose impact cannot be overestimated. Against the background of the late ancient commentary tradition and the subsequent exegetical efforts advanced by the Baghdad Peripatetics, it will become clear that the K. al-Maq ūlãt of the Sifā' marks an important milestone in the gradual Avicennian reshuffle of the relationship between logic proper and ontology. In order to assess the philosophical impact of this realignment, I also take into account some of the subsequent developments in Ibn Sīnā's writings and in the emerging post-Avicennian tradition.

In doing so, my focus will lie on the two fundamental classification schemes which Aristotle introduces in the treatise: The fourfold scheme of Cat. 2 and the tenfold scheme of Cat. 4. Both schemes pose the question of whether and how the manner in which an expression is predicated of another expression is connected to extra-linguistic reality, that is to say, on issues pertaining to the relationship between logico-linguistic and ontological divisions. These two areas are at the core of Ibn Sinā's momentous reform of the Aristotelian curriculum - an ambitious philosophical project whose rationale, as we shall see, is given in the Maqūlāt of the Sifã' and whose implementation can best be observed in the Isarat.

First of all, I will inspect the classical question which all ancient and medieval readers - including Ibn Sina and his Arabic predecessors and contemporaries - discuss before commenting on Aristotle's text: What is the aim of the Categories or rather, what is the nature of the entities which are classified in the treatise (chapter 1)? As will become clear, it is precisely because Ibn Sīnā deems the answers provided by the Neoplatonic commentary tradition untenable that he argues for an exclusion of the Categories from logic. The consequences which this radical departure from the transmitted curriculum was to have for subsequent philosophical developments can well be observed in Fahr ad-Din ar-Rāzi's (d. 606 AH / 1210 AD) philosophical summa alMabãhit al-masriqiyya. Next, I will take a closer look at Ibn Sīnā's views on the nature, justification and use of the fourfold scheme (chapter 2) and the tenfold scheme (chapter 3). Once again, Ibn Sīnā's doctrinal disagreements with the preceding commentary tradition will also be studied under the aspect of their bearings on later Muslim philosophers. What both classification schemes have in common is the fact that they operate with the underlying dichotomy of substantial and accidental entities. While the division of Cat. 2 contrasts individual substances with universal substances and individual accidents with universal accidents, the list of categories outlined in Cat. 4 is commonly understood as consisting of one substantial genus and nine accidental genera. Finally, I will focus on exegetical discussions which concern the manner in which substance and accident can be said of whatever falls under them (chapter 4). Whereas Ibn Sina, by and large, adopts the traditional interpretation according to which accident - in contrast to substance - lacks conceptual unity and generic predicability, he discards the arguments which had previously been provided in favor of it as insufficient. This critical reassessment inspired some of his philosophical heirs to question the conceptual unity and generic predicability of substance as well. As we shall see, Ibn Sīnā's comprehensive reappraisal of the Categories - both with regard to the epistemological place of the treatise as a whole and of the fundamental classification schemes it contains - was to have a defining impact on the study of logic, metaphysics, and even natural philosophy in the ensuing intellectual tradition of the Islamic East. <>

Essay: 'Persian Perspectives on Prima Philosophia: The Reception of Avicennian Thought in the De Ente et Essentia' by Alexis Szejnoga

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Alexis Szejnoga: Introduction

This article is an adaptation of my master thesis in which I examined the historical-philosophical context of the tractate De ente et essentia, a succinct treatment of Aristotelian ontology, written by Thomas Aquinas infra magisterium. The very first research question that I posed was: what was the wider historicalphilosophical background against which Thomas Aquinas wrote the De ente et essentia? However, it did not take long before it became clear that one specific element of that historical-philosophical background was probably more influential on the metaphysical thought of Thomas than any other.

In the early thirteenth century, the philosophical landscape was primarily dominated by the interaction between Christian and Arabic culture. The mingling of cultures on the Iberian Peninsula generated an exchange on philosophical, theological, and literary levels. Among the most discussed works were commentaries on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Ibn Sīnā, who would become known in the West by his Latinized name, Avicenna. Upon a first reading of the De ente et essentia, it immediately becomes apparent that Thomas refers to Avicenna quite a lot. It would seem that Avicenna's interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics posed a major influence upon Thomas. Well-known scholars on the metaphysical thought of Saint Thomas have come to a similar conclusion regarding the De ente et essentia, although their reasoning is not always explicitly stated. James Weisheipl, a Dominican scholar who authored an extensive biography of Thomas Aquinas, says of the De ente et essentia: "This work is highly original, even though it is heavily indebted to Avicenna's

Metaphysics". Armand Maurer comments in the introduction to his English translation of the De ente et essentia that it has an affinity with Thomas's commentary on the Four Books of Sentences by Peter Lombard, "both in their metaphysical notions and their dependence on Avicenna". Anthony Kenny states of the De ente et essentia: "The treatise is heavily influenced by the eleventh-century Arabic philosopher Ibn Sina or Avicenna, whose Metaphysics is referred to in the very first lines of Aquinas' prologue". All three authors cited above not only mention Avicenna as an influence on the metaphysical thought of Thomas, but they also do so in an exclusive manner (besides Avicenna no other influence is mentioned) and in terms which denote more than a casual or minor influence ("heavily indebted", "dependent" and "heavily influenced"). This leads to a second specific question to engage the text with: how exactly does the influence of Avicennian thought upon Thomas become apparent within De ente et essentia?

Thus, my examination of the text of the De ente et essentia will be guided by questions regarding the historical-philosophical context of the tractate, and concerning visible signs of Avicennian influence within the text. This will be done in two consecutive steps. The first part will present the historical and philosophical context of the De ente et essentia. The second part will focus specifically on the influence of Avicenna, and his interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics. This influence will be examined by looking at explicit and implicit references to Avicennian thought made by Thomas in the text of the opusculum, and by briefly reviewing a comparative study of the ontologies of Thomas and Avicenna prepared by De Raeymaeker.

A final opening remark concerns matters of methodology. All citations of the Latin text of the De ente et essentia are taken from the Editio Leonina. Citations from the English text are taken from Bobik's Aquinas on Being and Essence: A Translation and

Interpretation. Reference to the titles of philosophical works is in the original language, with a translation in English within parentheses upon its first occurrence in the text. Whenever an original text was not written in Latin, the Latin title is used whenever Thomas refers to a Latin translation. Thus Avicenna's Ilāhiyyāt (Metaphysics) refers to the Arabic original, while Avicenna's Metaphysica (Metaphysics) refers to the Latin translation of the text. In those cases where Latin titles might be referring to different texts (for example, the Sufficientia or the Metaphysica), the context should clarify which version is meant.

Historical-philosophical context

In order to shed light on the historical-philosophical context of the De ente et essentia, it is first necessary to determine precisely when this opusculum was written. Bartholomew of Lucca (c. 1236 - c. 1327), disciple and confessor to Thomas Aquinas, mentioned the manuscript in his list of works by his fellow Dominican as Tractatus de ente et essentia quem scripsit ad fraters et socios nondum existens magister (Treatise on Being and Essence, which he wrote for his Brothers and Colleagues, while not yet a Master). Thomas's graduation at the theological faculty of the University of Paris has been reliably determined to have taken place in March 1256, and the De ente et essentia can therefore safely be assumed to have been written before then. It is generally agreed upon that he wrote the treatise while lecturing on the Libri quattuor sententiarum (Four Books of Sentences) of Peter Lombard (c. 1096 – 1164) at the University of Paris. This means that the De ente et essentia was probably written after his departure from Cologne, where he had been studying under Albert the Great (1193/1206 - 1280), in 1252. This limits the possible composition of the treatise within a four-year window (1252-1256). This means that for the construction of a summary of possible influences on Thomas's metaphysical thought, no events postdating 1252 will be considered.

Aristotelianism

In the broadest sense, Aristotelianism denotes the entire field of philosophy that is primarily inspired by the thought of the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BCE). In a way, he himself can be thought of as the founder of the tradition that bears his name, seeing as how he started the Lyceum in Athens, a school that educated students in his peripatetic tradition. Later philosophical movements became interested in his thought, causing renewed interest in his teachings. The first resurgence of

Aristotelian philosophy in the Common Era happened with the advent of Neo-Platonism in the third century, starting with the philosophy of Plotinus (204-270). Having become interested in the works of Plato (428-348 BCE), this school of thought extended its view to include the writings of his student Aristotle, commentating and expanding on them.

Starting in the ninth century, Islamic philosophers and theologians began translating and commenting upon Aristotle's work. Al-Kindī (801-873, also known by his Latin moniker Alkindus), al-Fārābī (872-950, known in the West as Alpharabius), al-Ghazālī (1058-1111, also called Algazel in Latin) and Ibn Rushd (1126-1198, known as Averroës) all wrote treatments of different parts of the Aristotelian corpus. The interest in the works of Aristotle in the Islamic world provided an impulse to Aristotelian research in the Latin West.

Liber de causis and Fons vitae

A specific work of philosophy that deserves mention here is the Liber de causis (Book of Causes), which in 1252 was still attributed to Aristotle. It treats the problematic relationship between the One and the Many, or how multiplicity can originate from unity. To bridge the apparent chasm between simplicity and diversity, the author posits the Spirit, which is both singular and a principle of diversity, and which includes in itself the multiplicity of Forms. Through the mediation of the Spirit, the One brings about the existence of the Soul, which in the Neo-Platonic tradition must be understood as the Soul of the World. It should be clear that this mediated creation of the Soul posed a problem for Islamic and Christian philosophers, as it touched upon certain tenets of Gnostic heresies.

Although unknown to Thomas Aquinas when he wrote the De ente et essentia, he later discovered that the Liber de causis had in fact not been written by Aristotle, as its contents were largely drawn from the Stoicheiosis theologikè (Elements of Theology, better known by its Latin title Elementatio theologica) by Proclus (412485). Thomas made this discovery after having received a translation of this work of Proclus from his friend and fellow Dominican William of Moerbeke (1215-1286), and reported on his findings in the proöemium of his Super librum de causis expositio (Commentary on the Book of Causes).6 Although the author of the Liber de causis has still not been identified with certainty, it is believed that he was a Muslim philosopher or theologian, who set forth to synthesize the Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation with the Islamic theology of creation. As such, the work is a combination of thoughts from both Proclus and Plotinus (204-270).

Another proponent of Neo-Platonism that has exerted a major influence on the De ente et essentia, was the Hebrew philosopher Solomon Ibn Gabirol (1021-1058) from al-'Andalus, who became known in the Latin West as Avicebron. Although an accomplished poet, he will primarily be remembered as one of the first philosophers to introduce Neo-Platonism to Western Europe. A collection of five tractates on matter and form, known by its Latin title as De materia et forma, or alternatively as Fons vitae (this is the name that Thomas refers to), was translated from Arabic into Latin in 1150. It should be noted that Thomas Aquinas, and his scholastic intellectual heirs, were of the opinion that the author of the Fons vitae was a Christian philosopher. It was only in 1846, when Solomon Munk discovered a Hebrew translation of the Arabic original of the Fons vitae, that it was concluded that Avicebron was in fact none other than Solomon Ibn Gabirol.

The five tractates of the Fons vitae presented several aspects of the doctrine of matter and form. Among these were the relationship between matter and form in physical substances, the existence of substantiae simplices which form an intermediary level between the prima essentia (God) and physical creation, and the thought that all created substances are composed of matter and form, even spiritual substances (a point of contention with Thomas, which was taken up by the Franciscan school of thought, for example in the works of Bonaventura). Moreover, Avicebron posits that all matter is one, although it becomes less spiritual as it is farther removed from the prima essentia. As Avicebron tried to strictly separate his philosophical thoughts from his religious beliefs, it can be contested whether the Fons vitae presents an attempt to reconcile Neo-Platonic philosophy with Jewish theology.

Avicenna

The final influence on Thomas Aquinas to be individually treated here, and the one of which the influence will be traced throughout the De ente et essentia, is that of Avicenna. This Persian polymath, who had the reputation of being somewhat of a genius (he claimed to have known the Qur'ān by heart at age seven), wrote extensively on such diverse subjects as medicine, geology, metaphysics and psychology. In addition to this, Avicenna also wrote multiple volumes of poetry, as well as composing parts of his scientific works in verse. He was also a devout Muslim, and part of his intellectual calling was to synthesize kalām, or Islamic theology, with the philosophical schools of Plato and Aristotle.

Avicenna was in fact so successful in reconciling Islamic theology with Greek philosophical thought, that he became the main proponent of Islamic philosophy in the twelfth century. However, in Europe his teachings would not be accepted as easily. His writings were met with heated discussions, about the real distinction between being and essence for example, which lead to a proscription of his work in the city of Paris in 1210 (sharing the fate of Aristotle's intellectual heritage). By the time that Thomas Aquinas arrived in Paris in 1252, this prohibition must have been lifted or otherwise weakened, as Maurer notes that Avicenna was "in vogue" while Thomas taught in Paris.

The thought of the real distinction between existence and essence, or between esse and essentia to use Latin nomenclature, was arguably first formulated by Avicenna. It means that on an ontological level, there is a difference between what an object is (its essentia or essence), and that an object is (its esse or existence). Admittedly, the distinction itself was already formulated by Aristotle in his Analytica posteria and his Metaphysics. However, it is argued that Avicenna is the first to uphold the distinction on a metaphysical level, whereas Aristotle limited it to an analytical level. The real distinction between being and essence will be one of the specific points that will be traced in the De esse et essentia. Its formulation by Avicenna and the context in which it arose will be treated in the second part of this article.

The literary output of Avicenna was enormous. Most famous among his many works is the Kitāb ash-Shifā' (Book of Healing), an encyclopedia of philosophical thought. It was entitled "Book of Healing" because through the wisdom that it held, it "healed" the reader of his ignorance, which according to Avicenna should be regarded as a sickness of the mind. Parts of this encyclopedia would be translated into Latin, and as such they were known to Thomas. That part of the Kitāb ash-Shifā' which had theological and metaphysical subjects as its topics (Ilāhiyyāt), was translated into Latin as the Metaphysica. This was a new treatise on the subject, not a commentary on the work of the same name by Aristotle. Likewise, the part which treated on physics was translated into Latin and was known by the name of Sufficientia, which is also the Latin title for the entire Kitāb ash-Shifā'. That part of the encyclopedia dedicated to psychology (al-Nafs') was translated as De anima. Finally, al-Mantiq, the part that expounded Avicenna's thought on logic, was known in Latin as the Logica. Although only the Metaphysica and the De anima are explicitly referred to by Thomas, we can trace the influence from all these four parts of the Kitāb ash-Shifā' in the De ente et essentia.

Avicennian influence on the De ente et essentia Explicit references to Avicenna and his works

We will start by examining those instances in which Thomas thought it prudent to explicitly refer to Avicenna and his works to construct or strengthen his argument. In total, there are thirteen of these explicit references to be found in the De ente et essentia. In fact, Avicenna is the most referenced author in the opusculum, with the exception of Aristotle.

If we look at the explicit citations of Avicenna, we note that Thomas mentions the name of the literary work to which he is referring in only six out of thirteen cases. In total, Avicenna's Metaphysics is referred to four times, while his On the soul is mentioned only two times, with both references being made to the beginning of the book (i.e. first book, chapter one). If we take all explicit references to Avicenna into account, we note the same skewed ratio: in ten out of thirteen explicit

references, Avicenna's Metaphysics is used as a source, while reference is made to his On the soul on only three occasions. Furthermore, all references to On the soul are made within the confines of the fifth chapter of the De ente et essentia, in which Thomas discusses the composition of the intelligences. Of the ten times that Thomas refers to Avicenna's Metaphysics, eight times reference is made to the fifth book of that literary work, the only two exceptions being the first two references. This is quite understandable, as they occur not in the main narrative of the De ente et essentia, but in the introduction in which the importance of the work is explained, and in the first chapter in which the different terms used to refer to essentia are listed. Considering the above, it would not seem to be an exaggeration to label the fifth book of the Metaphysics as the main Avicennian influence on the De ente et essentia, with the first book of his On the soul as a remote and far less important second.

The first explicit reference is worth commenting upon because it cites a general principle, formulated by Avicenna, which is then combined by Thomas with a citation of Aristotle, in order to accentuate the importance of the De ente et essentia. Considering that 'being' and 'essence' ('ens et essentia') are the first notions conceived by the intellect, as Avicenna posits, it is very important to understand these two concepts, as they constitute the fundament on which all other knowledge rests. The science of being-qua-being, i.e. metaphysics, thus starts with the exploration of the notions of 'being' en 'essence'; ontology constitutes the prima philosophia. The explicit mentioning of Avicenna in this first sentence of the De ente et essentia, in combination with a referral to Aristotle, could be considered a clear indicator that the works and thought of Avicenna are going to represent a major influence on the opusculum.

However, it seems that Thomas severely misquotes Avicenna, as the Latin translation of his Metaphysics reads 'being and thing and necessity' as the first notions ('ens et res et necesse').8 Wisnovsky puts forward the thesis that Avicenna introduced the Arabic word for essence (māhiyya), as a substitute for the Arabic word for thing (shay'). This substitution occurred over time, while considering the theological discussion on the distinction between things and existents, and had the abstract noun thingness (shay'iyya) as an intermediary.9 It is therefore possible that Thomas either possessed a manuscript of the Latin translation of the Metaphysics of Avicenna in which the translator used essentia instead of res, or Thomas might have substituted essentia for res himself, having knowledge of Avicenna's later work. Interestingly, the omission of necesse implies a purely philosophical interest in Thomas, as necessity in the teachings of Avicenna refers to necessary being, which is limited to the being of God, in contrast with his creation, which exemplifies contingent being.

Moreover, as Delfgaauw notes, being appears to be more intuitive as a first impression upon the intellect than essence. But this is instantly explained by Delfgaauw: we should not interpret Thomas here as positing that the understanding of an essence is a first impression upon the intellect, but simply that 'being' is instantly perceived as being in this or that manner. A third complication regarding this explicit reference to Avicenna may occur in translating the Latin word 'ens'. Considering the lack of indefinite articles in Latin, this word may be alternatively translated as 'being' or as 'a being'. The first possibility poses a problem as it may be read as either an abstract noun or a gerund, and is therefore ambiguous. The alternative seems to be synonymous to 'thing' and should therefore be rejected; a thing clearly refers to the composite of existence and essence, and should therefore not be used for one of its principles.

The second explicit reference merits extra attention, not because of its content, but because of the apparent uncertainty of its origin. Thomas refers to Avicenna to include the word 'forma' as another name for essentia in his list of synonyms in the first chapter of the De ente et essentia. This is the only occasion in which Roland-Gosselin and the editors of the Leonina edition disagree on the place in the Metaphysics that is referred to. The Leonina gives two options: the sixth chapter of the first book or the second chapter of the second book. Since Thomas himself refers to the second book ('ut dicit Auicenna in II Metaphisice sue'), the first option seems a bit puzzling, even more so because the word 'forma' is not encountered in the line cited from book 1, chapter 6 ('unaqueque res

habet certitudinem propriam que est eius quiditas'). To add to this enigma, Roland-Gosselin's text, which is based on eight Parisian manuscripts, reads 'ut dicit Auicenna in tercio Methaphysice sue'. As a possible source of this reference Roland-Gosselin proposes the fifth chapter of the third book, but with caution. Roland-Gosselin's critical apparatus notes no variations within the eight Parisian manuscripts. However, the Leonina edition notes five variations among its sources, consisting of inversion of 'Metaphisice' and 'sue', and different ways in which 'Metaphisice' is altered, but not one manuscript seems to refer to the third book of the Metaphysics. Moreover, in their introduction, the editors of the Leonina edition signal that some of the earliest manuscripts gloss Avicenna's Physics, rather than his Metaphysics. They evaluate this odd variation as an early misreading which was corrected at a very early stage, because 'the Sufficientia does not refer to forma in this sense'. In conclusion, it would appear that all manuscripts selected to be used by the editors of the Leonina edition refer to the second book of the Metaphysics, while all manuscripts which were used by Roland-Gosselin refer to the third book. In addition, the exact place that is referred to by Thomas is uncertain, both for Roland-Gosselin as for the editors of the Leonina. That this reference to Avicenna poses a problem also becomes evident from the commentary on the De ente et essentia by Thomas (cardinal) Cajetan. Although the 1907 Roman printing of the Latin text glosses 'sicut dicit Avicenna in II Metaphysicae suae', Kendzierski and Wade seem fit to translate 'as Avicenna says in III Metaphysicae' while referring to the fifth chapter of the third book, their translation being based upon the 1934 printing by Marietti.

At this point, it should be noted that Roland-Gosselin draws attention to the fact that the Latin translation of the Metaphysics often uses the word 'certitudo' where the Arabic word for essence appears in the original text. Taking into account all of the above, and the fact that Roland-Gosselin's text antedates the Leonina edition of the De ente et essentia, the following solution to the described enigma seems highly plausible: the text should read 'II Metaphisice' and refers to Metaph. 2/2:76r a 'hec certitudo... est forma', as suggested by the Leonina edition. The text variation of the Parisian manuscripts could be explained by a common original, whether included in those eight or lost, in which the text was altered by mistake (creating a corruption) or even on purpose by a scribe who thought he was correcting an error made by a previous copier of the manuscript. The alternative source for the reference quoted by the Leonina edition (i.e. Metaph. 1/6:72v a) might be taken from Roland-Gosselin, who presents it as an example of the use of the word 'certitudo' by the translator of the Arabian original of the Metaphysics, rather than a possible source of the explicit reference made to Avicenna by Thomas. The seemingly incorrect translation of the work of Cajetan can also be explained by a contrast between Italian and Parisian versions: in a footnote on the very first page of their translation, Kendzierski and Wade remark that they have used two Latin texts. One prepared in Turin by Laurent and printed by Marietti in 1934, and one prepared in Paris in 1883.16 This seems to corroborate the thesis that the Parisian versions refer to the third book, while Italian versions cite the second book.

On several occasions, the reference to Avicenna does not introduce a new element to Thomas's argument; rather it strengthens a thought introduced by Thomas or others, and therefore constitutes an appeal to authority. In two cases, Avicenna is referred to as agreeing with other philosophers: once he is cited in agreement with Boethius and Averroës, and once in agreement solely with Averroës. In both these cases, the keyword used in the conjunctional clause is 'etiam'. In other instances, Thomas uses a reference to Avicenna as the natural outcome of his own argument. These references are all introduced by the keywords 'unde', which is invariably translated by 'whence', and 'ideo', which is translated as 'this is why'. The fourth and final keyword used by Thomas to introduce a citation of Avicenna is 'ut', translated by Bobik with 'as'. When this keyword is used, a thought or principle of Avicenna is introduced which is new, or which is cited in contrast to the preceding argument.

Implicit references to Avicennian thought

In addition to the abovementioned cases in which Thomas himself felt it opportune to mention the

author of the incorporated influences on his opusculum, there are quite a few instances in which commentators on the De ente et essentia have noticed a striking similarity with parts of Avicenna's work, where Thomas does not reference his sources.

Three implicit references are included in the Appendix without specifying an Avicennian work as a source. All three of these are taken from the notes of Roland-Gosselin. In no. 2 he notes that the opinion that he rallies against is that of Averroës, and that Thomas agrees with the alternative opinion, as he himself wrote in his commentary on the Aristotelian Metaphysics. In no. 3, Roland-Gosselin notes that the technical term 'materia signata' entered the scholastic vocabulary because the translator of Avicennian works used it. In contrast, the translator of the works of Averroës used the term 'materia demonstrata' for the same gloss; no specific literary source is mentioned. In no. 7, Roland-Gosselin remarks upon Avicenna's multiple attacks on the Platonic notion of separate forms. In this instance, reference to Avicennian sources is given (Metaph. 5/1:87r b E, Metaph. 7/2:96r and Metaph. 7/3:96v) but these are not included in the table as their relevance to the citation from the De ente et essentia is not self-evident.

Three longer tracks of text which betray Avicennian influence deserve more attention. The editors of the Leonina note that lines 105-150 of chapter 2 are comparable to Thomas's commentary on the Four Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard, and that in that work reference is made to Avicenna (no. 5). Also, a direct reference to Avicenna is incorporated in the critical apparatus. Most interestingly, Roland-Gosselin has not noticed this Avicennian influence on Thomas. Another major passage of the De ente et essentia is thought to be of Avicennian origin by the editors of the Leonina: lines 195-222 of chapter 2. A third large portion of the opusculum which might be of Avicennian origin is lines 26-155 of chapter 3, making up most of that particular chapter. This is a reference to Avicenna's threefold consideration of essences, as described in 2.4 below.

In conclusion, it can be said that the list of implicit references to Avicennian sources includes a wider variety of literary works than that of the explicit references. In addition to his Metaphysics and his De Anima, his implicit references also include his Logica and the Sufficientia. Two sources are notable for their frequency: the fifth book of the Metaphysics and the first book of the Logica, occurring three and four times respectively. If we look at the length of the passages which show Avicennian influence, we note that some are considerably larger than those that Thomas cites while mentioning Avicenna as their author. Therefore, it might be said that the unmarked influence of Avicenna on the text of the De ente et essentia is significantly larger than is betrayed by explicit citations.

Avicennian influence on the De ente et essentia: De Raeymaeker

A third mode of influence is neither marked by Thomas himself, nor by the compilers of (semi)critical editions of the text of the De ente et essentia. In contrast, it is remarked upon in handbooks and articles on Thomist metaphysics. To give a broad indication of the extent to which Avicennian thought is regarded as highly influential on the works of Thomas in general, and on his De ente et essentia in particular, I will briefly review a short treatise precisely on this topic written by the Flamish Thomist Louis De Raeymaeker (1895-1970), as it focuses most specifically at the topic at hand. He starts by noting Avicenna's accent on the priority of three concepts: being, thing and necessity. These concepts are prior in that they constitute the first experience of the intellect and because one is not able to explain them in simpler or prior concepts. Existential knowledge is always a mixture of the experience of existence which is mediated or 'troubled' by quiddity: both sensory and mental experiences refer to being-in-this-or-that-manner. However, since Avicenna contents that existence is not included in any essence, they must in one way or the other, be separate. De Raeymaeker sets out to clarify their distinction within the Avicennian corpus. First, he summarizes Avicenna's understanding of quiddity or essence. First of all, an essence can be considered in three ways: absolute (in se), extramental (in re) or mental (in intellectu). Regarding these last two, it is posited that individuality characterizes an essence in re, while universality characterizes an essence in intellectu. De Raeymaeker comments on the similarity to the Elementatio theologica of Proclus

and the Liber the causis, attributed by the Arabian philosophers to Aristotle, in which a threefold causal hierarchy was described: (1) absolute perfection, (2) universal perfection and (3) individual things. That Avicenna was influenced by the Neo-Platonic tradition is almost a matter of certainty; Wisnovsky even refers to him as a 'Neo-Platonizing' Aristotelian. However, Avicenna does reject the Platonic notion of individual participation in an otherworldly idea; his teaching on essences is constructed in an Aristotelian fashion.

Most importantly, according to De Raeymaeker, Avicenna considers existence to be superadded to essences, labeling existence as mere accident. However, this does not denote one of the nine categories of accidents as described in Aristotle's ten genera. Rather, Avicenna calls existence concomitant to essences (concomitans), denoting that it is a necessary property of the essence. These concomitant properties either belong to the essence on account of itself (De Raeymaeker poses the property of unevenness which belongs to the number three on account of its own essence), or on account of some extrinsic principle, as is the case with existence, since it is caused by an action of creation by God. The external causation of existence is necessitated by the fact that existence permeates the ten genera, since it is found in all its categories. Therefore, the cause of existence of all essences should be sought outside the categories. This also explains why we can understand the nature of a being (a djinni for example) without knowing if such a being actually exists in reality, since its existence is not included in its essence. But even though it comes from without, existence still belongs to the essence as an attribute. Essences therefore seem prior in Avicenna's ontology. De Raeymaker succinctly summarizes Avicenna's stance by stating that in his ontology 'existence is a derivative of the totality of quidditative principles'.

Avicenna also claims that an essence which has non-being as a concomitant attribute (i.e. something which does not exist in reality), still sustains itself in an absolute sense, on account of its inner quidditative structure, independent of any relationship to external reality, including existence. An essence considered absolutely (in se), possesses an 'inner firmness' (cf. certitudo) and presents itself as such to our intellect. We may then conclude that for Avicenna both existence and non-being present itself as concomitant properties of essences; but while existence comes from without, having its cause in God who transcends the ten genera, it is supported by non-being, in which 'the inner firmness inherent to the essence absolutely considered is directly and necessarily expressed'. Existence does not exhibit the independence of quiddities. On the contrary, existence is always related to an essence, and cannot be considered absolute. Existence therefore only has relative value, while essences have absolute value. From the above, De Raeymaker concludes that for Avicenna, ontological priority lies with quiddities or essences, which he states is understandable given the influence of Neo-Platonic sources on his philosophy. Given the emphasis on the absolute quality of essences and their inherent connection to necessary being, Avicenna's ontology may rightly be called 'essentialism'.

De Raeymaeker then comments on Thomas's reception of Avicennian thought. He notes that especially Thomas's earlier works (such as the De ente et essentia) show a profound influence by Avicenna. Thomas too posits the priority of being in relation to the human intellect. It is precisely being which is first experienced by the human intellect, and which in fact constitutes its formal object. In addition, Thomas primarily connects the understanding of being with sensory experience of reality, or the world, following Aristotle. This goes against Platonic thought and several mental experiments proposed by Avicenna, in which the human mind experiences itself in an exploration of the inner world. However, for Thomas, the awareness of being is inherently linked to a fundamental openness of the human intellect to the world.

The threefold division of essences (in re, in se, in intellectu) can also be found in Thomas's works, for example in this excerpt from chapter 4 of the De ente et essentia:

> Now, a nature or essence signified as a whole can be considered in two ways. In one way it can be considered according to its proper content, and this is an absolute consideration of it [...] In the other way, an

> essence is considered according to the existence it has in this or that [...] This nature has a twofold existence, one in singular things, the other in the soul.

Taking into account that with 'soul' (Lat. 'anima') Thomas here refers to the human intellect, the Avicennian influence becomes evident. As noted above, this entire passage of the De ente et essentia has been linked by Roland-Gosselin to the first two chapters of the fifth book of Avicenna's Metaphysics.

Also with regard to the argument on the distinction between esse and essentia, the influence of Avicenna's thought is unmistakable to the point where De Raeymaeker claims that the evidence that Thomas gives for the distinction is actually identical to that given by Avicenna:

> Whatever is not of the understood content of an essence or quiddity is something that comes from without and makes a composition with the essence [...] it is clear, therefore, that existence is other than essence or quiddity.

So, although Thomas acknowledges the distinction between existence and essence and the external causation of existence on account of its independence of the essence's content, he still posits a strong relationship between the two principles of being, as they form a composition with each other. In accord with Avicenna, he sees existence as a concomitant property of essences (although that terminology is not yet used in the De ente et essentia), which is added to it by an external cause, which he claims to be God.

At this point, I would like to briefly comment upon the real distinction between essence and existence as proposed by Avicenna. It did not develop within an intellectual vacuum. In fact, the discussions among the different factions of mutakallimūn (Islamic theologians) on the relationship between the concepts of "thing" (shay') and "existent" (mawjūd), appear to have provided Avicenna with the necessary impetus to develop his thought. Moreover, the discussion on things and existents did not merely arise out of philosophical interest in ontology, but rather from a theological interest to revolve apparent paradoxes which presented itself in the interpretation of various verses of the Qur'ān.

The mutakallimūn were faced by two distinct problems: one the one hand, they sought to resolve the question whether or not it could be said that God is a thing. On the other hand, they were trying to make sense of the Qur'ānic verses in which the creative power of God was exalted, for example sura 36:82: "Verily His command, when He intends a thing, is only that He says to it, 'Be!,' and it is". What is this thing, the object of God's command to be, that is before it exists? How was this description of divine creative power to be reconciled with Neo-Platonized Aristotelian ontology, of which the Islamic dogmatists were the intellectual heirs? It was within the context of these theologically driven debates that the conceived relationship between things and existents gave rise to the Avicennian distinction between essence and existence.

We find Avicenna's approach of the subject matter in his Kitāb ash-Shifā' (Book of Healing), and more specifically in chapter 5 of the first book of the Ilāhiyyāt (Metaphysics). Here, Avicenna makes three important points: first, that 'thing' and 'existent' signify primitive, basic, and immediately apprehensible concepts. As such, they cannot be put in a genus. Second, he emphasizes that there is a clear difference in meaning between shay' and mawjūd: shay' refers to an entity with regards to its essence, while mawjūd refers to an entity with regard to its existence. Third, he affirms that thing and existent are co-implied (mutalāzimāni), and by inference, that neither term is logically prior to the other.

The development of the concept of mawjūd (existent) into wujūd (existence) seems obvious, but some explanation is required to follow the conceptual development of māhiyya (essence; lit. 'whatness') from the concept shay' (thing). A possible explanation is offered by a careful reconstruction of an argument in the Ilāhiyyāt, in which Avicenna shows in what sense thing and existent differ from each other. He does this by differentiating between specific existence (al-wujūd al-khāṣṣ) and affirmative existence (al-wujūd al-ithbātī). Predications of specific existence assert what something is, and is also called 'inner reality' (haqīqa, which would be translated into Latin as certitudo). It is called specific because it

denotes existence in a class (species) of things. On the other hand, predications of affirmative existence assert that something is. Since inner reality and specific existence are identical, argues Wisnovsky, and inner reality is also identical to māhiyya, it follows that specific existence is identical to māhiyya. The three concepts of specific existence, inner reality and whatness/essence are therefore intensionally identical. And since affirmative existence is distinct from specific existence, it follows that existence is distinct from essence.

According to Wisnovsky, there exists the possibility that the development of māhiyya from shay' was facilitated by Avicenna's use of the word shay'iyya (thingness). In another passage from the Ilāhiyyāt (38:20-23), he fulminates against people who defend the viewpoint that among all that is predicated, there are non-existent entities which have no thingness. He boldly advises these people to 'go back to whatever dogmatic formulae they babbled out unintelligibly'. As an aside, the entities that are referred to here are impossible entities, the third category of the triad necessary-contingent-impossible existence. The hypothesis that shay'iyya served as a bridge between the concepts of shay' and māhiyya faces two challenges: first, we would suspect broad usage of the term in the ninth and tenth century debates between mutakallimūn; and this is simply not the case. Despite the fact that only a fraction of kalām texts from that time period is available to modern scholars, there seems to be no indication that the term was widely used. There exists the distinct possibility that al-Maturidi is the original inventor of the term shay'iyya. This claim is even more credible given the fact that Avicenna grew up in the area outside Bukhara, where the influence of the Samarqandi Hanafism of al-Maturidi (a school of Islamic jurisprudence) was strongly felt. It appears to be a likely scenario that Avicenna encountered the term shay'iyya sometime during his early education. Naturally, it is also quite possible that Avicenna himself came up with the word shay'iyya; it is a straightforward abstract noun, constructed through use of the suffix -iyya, similar to the English suffix -ness, which serves a similar purpose. In his works, Avicenna showed a predilection to invent and use new abstract nouns.

However, Thomas was not merely influenced by the intellectual heritage of Avicenna; he would also significantly add to it. After his treatment of the argument for the real distinction between esse and essentia in all substances but God, he continues:

> It is necessary therefore that the quiddity itself or the form, which is the intelligence, be in potency with respect to the existence which it received from God; and this existence is received as an act. It is in this way that potency and act are found in the intelligences.

Thomas here applies the Aristotelian notion of potency and act to the metaphysical relationship between existence and essence. This also implies a radical opposition to the idea that essences are somehow prior to existence, and in fact, to the notion of essentialism. For following Aristotle, Thomas cannot but grant priority to act, although this sentiment is not yet fully voiced within the De ente et essentia. Not only because Aristotelian philosophy declares that act holds priority over potency, but also because potency can only be thought of in relationship to a corresponding act. Thomas's ontology could therefore be considered existentialist, rather than essentialist like that of Avicenna, if we are prepared to look beyond the limits of this first opusculum. Existence is the absolute ground of metaphysics as essences point to existence as modus essendi to actus essendi. Existence is the 'act of acts' and the 'perfection of perfections'.as Thomas would phrase it in his later works.

Conclusion

As mentioned in the introduction above, the aim of this article was to examine the historical-philosophical context in which Thomas wrote his treatment of Aristotelian ontology, and to look at the opusculum with special attention for the philosophical influence of the Persian polymath Avicenna.

The historical-philosophical context was discussed in the first part. We saw that the environment in which Thomas wrote the De ente et essentia was one of new developments. The intermingling of cultures on the Iberian Peninsula facilitated the exchange

between the bearers of Jewish, Christian and Islamic cultures. Thomas lived in a timeframe in which the translations of these works were becoming widely available, and as a result, their contents were fiercely debated by Christian theologians.

The influence of these debates on the De ente et essentia becomes clear in various passages where Thomas objects against the views of proponents of several distinct philosophical topics (such as the Franciscans with regard to the subject of spiritual matter, and the "Platonists" with regard to the real existence of essences independent of concrete individuals).

The De ente et essentia thus constitutes a treatment of Aristotelian ontology which includes mention of ways in which it was received by later philosophers and other comentators. The question arises whether within this discussion of Aristotelian ontology, Avicenna's voice could be considered as the one closest to that of Thomas. In other words: does Thomas value the Avicennian treatment on the Metaphysics of Aristotle above all other commentaries? I believe that, at least within the confines of the De ente et essentia, such a conclusion is warranted. Three points support my conclusion: first, the evaluation of explicit references made to other authors in the De ente et essentia shows that Avicenna is referred to more than any other author. Secondly, while the mere quantity of references in itself does not prove anything, we see in the De ente et essentia that Thomas only refers to Avicenna in agreement with his statements, while other authors are at times referenced to present an argument contrary to the interpretation of Aristotle presented by Thomas. Thirdly, in addition to the quantity and content of explicit references to the works of Avicenna, various passages of varying length exhibit a likeness to Avicenna's treatment of similar topics. Some discuss the same thought in different wording, while others are either paraphrases or verbatim citations of Avicennian texts.

Taken together, the three points mentioned above make the proposition, that the metaphysical thought of Avicenna constitutes the major influence on Thomas's interpretation of Aristotelian ontology, at least plausible (it should be noted at this point, that Thomas saw the same viewpoint strengthened by the Liber the causis and in the work of Boethius). In my opinion, this proposition is not only plausible but also true. If we limit our evaluation of the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas to the exposition of Aristotelian ontology which he presents in the De ente et essentia, then we must conclude that more than any treatment on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, the Latin translation of the Ilāhiyyāt determined the way in which Thomas interpreted Aristotelian ontology. Therefore, in the broadest sense we could say that Avicenna constitutes the most influential author with regard to Thomas's interpretation of Aristotelian ontology as presented in the De ente et essentia. The most specific identification of the major influence on the De ente et essentia would be the Latin translation of the Metaphysics of Avicenna.

In addition, the partial Avicennian origin of Thomas's interpretation of the real distinction between esse and essentia in composed substances is asserted by several authors. John Wippel comments in his handbook on Aquinas's metaphysics: "Avicenna has often been cited, both by thirteenth-century writers and by twentieth-century scholars, as an early defender of real distinction between essence and existence in such entities". Wisnovsky examines the origin of the Avicennian interpretation of the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures in no less than three chapters of his Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context. Even though he does not specifically refer to Thomas as a philosophical heir to the Avicennian distinction, he does examine the roots of the Avicennian distinction in the so-called Ammonian synthesis, a Neo-Platonic reconciliation of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, which Avicenna in turn tried to synthesize with theological claims made by Islamic dogmatic theologians. Parviz Morewedge connects the Avicennian formulation of the distinction to later Islamic and Scholastic philosophers:

> However, Ibn Sina's distinction is important not only because it occupies such a significant place in his own philosophical system, but also because of the role it plays in the philosophical systems of later philosophers, such as Ibn Rushd, Aquinas, and Ockham, who took issue with what

they believed to be his formulation of the distinction, and in so doing, centered some of their own significant doctrines around the alleged Ibn Sinian distinction.

But maybe more important for a proper understanding of Thomas's early metaphysical thought is not the admission that it is influenced by, or indebted to, the thought of Avicenna, but the realization of the way in which Thomas went beyond Avicenna and developed his own philosophical notions to arrive at a new and innovative way to view the relationship between creation and its creator. More specifically, it is precisely in the addition of the notion of an admixture of potency and act in created beings, that the De ente et essentia does not constitute a mere summary of Aristotelian ontology as interpreted by Avicenna, but a philosophical work which in and of itself is "highly original", to once again quote Weisheipl. As a result of the addition of this new way of viewing the fundamental difference between God and the created simple substances, Thomas also shifts the ontological priority to existence, whereas Avicenna proposed the priority of essences over existence.

Considered within these two contexts, the historical-philosophical situation in which Thomas wrote the De ente et essentia and the major influence exerted on him by the Book of Healing of Avicenna, the importance of this early work within the corpus Thomisticum becomes apparent: although it might have been intended as a treatment of Aristotelian ontology written on behalf of his fellow Dominicans at the Chapelle Saint-Jacques in Paris, it actually affords us a first, partial look at the philosophical groundwork on which Thomas's theology is built. In addition to being a treatment of Aristotelian notions interpreted in such a way that they may become the backdrop to Christian theological doctrine, Thomas presents a new and innovative interpretation of the distinction between creation and its creator. His notion of an admixture of potency and actuality in simple created beings is elegant in its simplicity, making the conjecture of incorporeal matter, as proposed by philosophers of the Franciscan school, obviously unnecessary. Furthermore, there is a foreshadowing here of the inherent connection between God and creation through the participation in existence: every being comes to be by receiving existence from the First Cause who is also Pure Being. In my opinion, this makes Aquinas's interpretation of the difference between God and other simple substances more conducive to theological and spiritual needs than the (unnecessarily complicating) notion of incorporeal matter. However, this does not mean a wholesale rejection of (Neo-)Platonic doctrine; the notion of emanation from, and return to God is reconcilable with his admixture of potency and actuality and is thus retained (although this schema of exitus and reditus is not part of the content of the De ente et essentia). Therefore, the characterization of Thomas as an Aristotelian as denoting a negative disposition toward Neo-Platonic thought seems unwarranted.

Appendix: Implicit references to Avicenna in the De ente et essentia.

1. 1 :50-52	But it is called essence from the fact that through it and in it a real being has existence.	Log. P/1:3v b Metaph. 1/6:72v a C Suffic. 1/6:17r b
2. 2:10-12	Neither can the form alone of a composed substance be said to be its essence, although some try to assert this.	
3. 2:73-75	We should notice, therefore, that the principle of individuation is not matter taken in just any way whatsoever, but only designated matter.	
4. 2:100-101	[rather], whatever is in the species is also in the genus, but as undetermined.	Metaph. 5/3:88r a A
5. 2:105-150	We can see how this comes about if we examine how body taken as part of animal differs from	Metaph. 5/3:88r a A

	body taken as genus; [...] And so the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, when body is its genus.	
6. 2:195-222	From this it is clear why the genus, the difference, and the species are E related proportionally to the matter, to the form, and to the composite in the real world, although they are not identical with them. [...] for we do not say that the definition is the genus or the difference.	Metaph. 5/5:89v D-
7. 3:16	[...] as the Platonists held [...]	
8. 3:26-155	Now, a nature or essence signified as a whole can be considered in two ways. [...] and it is in this way, too, that the notion of the genus and of the difference belong to it.	Metaph. 5/1-2:86v a-87v b
9. 4:11-13	The strongest demonstration of this is from the power of understanding in them.	De an. 5/2:22v b A De an. 5/2:23r b
10. 4:41	It is easy to see how this may be so.	
11. 5:5-7	[and] this is why we find some philosophers who say that God does not have a quiddity or essence, because his essence is not other than his existence.	Metaph. 7/4:99r b
12. 6:59-62	For, since the parts of substance are matter and form, certain accidents follow principally on form, certain others follow principally on matter.	Log. 1:4r a b
13. 6:85-86	[and] this is why it remains in him	Suffic. 1/6:17r b after death.
14. 6.102-103	But sometimes they cause accidents which are only aptitudes, their completion being received from an exterior agent.	Suffic. 1/6:17r b

Fragments cited from the Editio Leonina of the De ente et essentia, book 43 (pp369-381), as [chapter]:[line numbers]. "P" stands for prologus or proöemium (introduction). References to Avicennian sources: Metaph(ysica), De An(ima), Suffic(ientia) or Log(ica), [book/treatise]/[chapter]:[folio number][v(erso)/r(ecto)] [a/b] [A-F]. <>

Buddhist Encounters and Identities Across East Asia edited by Ann Heirman, Carmen Meinert, Christoph Anderl [Dynamics in the History of Religions, Brill, 9789004366008]

Buddhist Encounters and Identities across East Asia offers a fascinating picture of the intricacies of regional and cross-regional networks and the complexity of Buddhist identities emerging across Asia.

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Networks and Identities in the Buddhist World by Tansen Sen

By the first and second centuries CE, when objects and teachings associated with Buddhism started entering the ports and urban centres of Han China, several regions of Asia were already connected through networks of cross-regional commercial activity. People from diverse ethnic backgrounds operated these networks that linked the overland roads and pathways, rivers channels, and sea routes. The length and reach of these networks depended on various factors, including the nature of the terrain, the mode of transportation, profitability, as well as the political relationship among the various regimes involved. These networks facilitated the transmissions and circulations of commodities, ritual objects and ideas as well as the movement of craftsmen, artisans, and diplomats from one region of Asia to another. The long-distance spread of Buddhism took place through such networks. As Buddhist images, texts, and ideas spread across the Asian continent, they acquired new forms and interpretations, and subsequently entered re-circulation. For example, Indic texts were rendered into Chinese; later, commentaries explaining the teachings contained in these translated texts were composed by Chinese Buddhists. These translations and commentaries were then passed on to the clergy living in Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Tibet, and other places. Modifications took place with each rendition and movement, creating diverse forms of Buddhist practices, images, and philosophical traditions. Over time, these movements and modifications resulted in the emergence of distinct identities, often imposed by others, among Buddhist communities that are important for understanding the diversity and multiplicity of the Buddhist world that spanned from presentday Iran to Japan.

This collection of essays underscores the connections and the diversities within the Buddhist world. It becomes apparent from these essays that the history of Buddhism in premodern Asia was also the history of connectivities, circulations, conversions, and transformations that took place within the Asian continent prior to the colonial period. While the connectivities and circulations were intimately associated with the long-distance networks that linked far-flung regions of Asia, the processes of conversions and transformations highlight the diversity of the people and societies inhabiting the continent. Thus, although the core teaching of karma and retribution may have been the common thread that linked the vast Buddhist world, a detailed examination of local practices suggests the existence of distinct identities rooted in unique cultural practices, beliefs, and indigenous socio-political conditions. Before proceeding to summarise the essays included in this volume and their contributions to comprehending the diverse Buddhist world, this Introduction outlines the issues of network and identity as can be discerned from the Buddhist connections between India/South Asia and China.

The Networks of Buddhist Exchanges

The evidence for the presence of Buddhism in China during the first three centuries of the Common Era suggests a complicated and haphazard influx of Buddhist images and ideas. These images and ideas arrived through multiple routes, from different parts of South Asia, and were carried by people of diverse ethnic background engaged in varied professions and long-distance activities. A key factor facilitating the spread of Buddhist artefacts and ideas during this period may have been the commercial linkages formed by trading communities and the transportation networks of caravan and ship operators. Indeed, by the beginning of the first millennium CE, intra-Asian commerce and transportation, through both overland and maritime routes, had witnessed significant growth. Itinerant traders were travelling across the Asian continent more frequently than in the previous periods. The spread of Buddhism to Han China should be understood within this context of unprecedented connectivity and interactions taking place within Asia. The linking of distant markets, ports, and urban centres contributed not only to the circulations of commodities and the movement of traders, but also triggered the flow of objects and people who were not necessarily part of the commercial activities. Such objects ranged from mundane personal items associated with food intake to those that were connected to the faith of the itinerant individuals. Missionaries, technicians, and diplomats travelled with their own agendas on ships or caravans. With sustained demands, improvements in modes of transportation and navigational skills, and the formation of regular supply chain for commodities, the long-distance commercial ventures became a routine. Travel between sites of export and import became frequent and continued until changes in economic, political, or climatic factors interrupted these connections. The sustained movement back and forth between markets, ports, and urban centres formed the basis of networks that were operated by one or several groups of people who, in turn, interacted/negotiated with different polities across these networks. Given the interdependencies between traders, transport providers, and suppliers at ports and overland halting places, the long-distance networks were unlikely to have been exclusive to one group of people or monopolized by one faith. A 'Buddhist network',3 if there were one, therefore, had to be a part of or dependent upon other networks, with pilgrims and missionaries sharing transportation space with members of other faiths. Indeed, insisting on the existence of an exclusive Buddhist network, especially in the cross-regional context, fails to convey the complexity of the long-distance connections across Asia. Likewise, traders who supported the Buddhist cause did not solely deal with objects that were in demand for Buddhist rituals and construction activities. In both cases, the Buddhist clergy and traders engaged with a variety of people, faiths, and objects. Additionally, the contraction of a mercantile network or the decline of Buddhism in a region did not imply the corresponding termination of the other. The decline of Buddhist sites in the Gangetic plains of India in the thirteenth century did not, for example, result in the collapse of long-distance commercial networks in the region.4 In other words, it is important to separate the commercial networks that connected distant regions and the movement of Buddhist images and ideas that were facilitated by the existence of these networks.

Scholars have already examined the relationship between merchant communities and the spread of Buddhist ideas and monastic institutions in South Asia. James Heitzman, for example, has demonstrated the association between mercantile activity, political power, and the spread of early Buddhist institutions along the major trade routes in the hinterland regions of India. Similarly, Himanshu Prabha Ray has outlined the intimate bond between seafaring traders, Buddhist monasteries in the coastal regions of India, and the maritime transmission of the doctrine. Liu Xinru, on the other hand, has applied the conceptual framework of an intertwined relationship between long-distance trade and the transmission of Buddhist ideas to examine the early exchanges between South Asia and China. More recently, Jason Neelis has studied the relationship between trade networks and the transmission of Buddhism through the 'northern routes' in Gandhāra and Upper Indus regions into Central Asia.

Many aspects of the Buddhist networking, essentially the interactions between Buddhist

institutions, monks, and lay members frequently using the mercantile networks between South Asia and China, are evident in the travelogues of Chinese Buddhist monks Faxian (337?–422?), Xuanzang (600?–664), and Yijing (635–713). These are the main textual sources that reveal the association between Buddhism and the long-distance networks of traders and sailors. Also evident in these travel records are the relationships between Buddhist monks (as well as institutions) and rulers, officials, and various political elites. Individual monks and institutions formed their unique relationship with these members of the society, which often advanced personal objectives, benefited specific monastic institutions, or served the Buddhist cause in general. Additionally, the travel records demonstrate the existence of several hubs that were sites of interactions along the networks that connected South Asia, China, and several other regions of the Buddhist world. These hubs included Dunhuang (in present-day Gansu Province of China), Khotan (in present-day Xinjiang Province of China), Nālandā (in the present-day state of Bihar), Palembang (in the island of Sumatra in Indonesia), and Chang'an (present-day Xian in China). These places were centres of knowledge production and circulation, as well sites for cross-regional trading activity. They were vital for the spread of Buddhism across Asia.The circulations of goods, donations, and information through the networks of traders, urban settlements, and monastic institutions are reported in Faxian's work, entitled Foguo (Records of the Buddhist Polities, T. 875). Faxian was among the first Chinese monks who travelled to South Asia.9 During his journey to South Asia, embarking in 399 CE, Faxian does not mention any contact with merchant caravans or groups as he passed through the oasis towns of Dunhuang, Gaochang (present-day Turfan), and Khotan. Rather, as discussed below, Faxian's travels through the overland routes of Central Asia seem to have been facilitated by the networks of garrison towns, urban settlements, and monastic institutions. It is only when the monk started his return trip from Tāmralipta in Eastern India that he became depended on the network of seafaring traders. Indeed, his writing indicates a highly connected world of itinerant traders, monks, sailors, and circulating ritual and donative objects in the fifth century. One of the first indications of the existence of networks connecting the urban centres in the Gobi-Taklamakan desert region comes from Faxian's passing reference to a 'messenger' with whom the monk and his companions journeyed from Dunhuang to the polity of Shanshan. Although no detail about this 'messenger' is given in the text, it is clear that such persons frequently moved between the oasis towns of the Taklamakan desert. They were most likely part of the communication network between the governors or rulers of these towns, who either had their own modes of transportation or travelled with merchant caravans. Faxian, and later Xuanzang, suggests that information regularly circulated among the oasis towns through such messengers and their networks, in addition to the networks belonging to traders and caravan operators. All these networks facilitated the movement of Buddhist monks and objects across the treacherous routes traversing the Gobi and Taklamakan deserts.

There were several other aspects to these, what appear to be, intertwined or parallel networks of traders and itinerant officials/messengers. Elite monks, such as Faxian and Xuanzang, may have attracted the attention of local officials/rulers, who then supported their journeys and provided housing in their homes or palaces. Other monks travelling through the oasis towns lived in Buddhist monasteries. These monasteries formed important resting places not only for Buddhist monks, but also traders and perhaps the court messengers/diplomats. However, not all monasteries were receptive to travellers or accepting of monks from different regions. Faxian, for example, mentions that a monastery in Agni did not accept Chinese monks as members of the saṅgha. Faxian's implication seems to be that the Buddhist tradition practiced in Agni ('Hinayāna' according to him) and China were different and divisions existed among various Buddhist groups in the spaces between South Asia and China. This antagonistic, or at least complex, relationship between groups corroborates the likelihood that exclusive Buddhist networks, if they existed, may not have been easy to establish or operate in reality. Crucial to the networks that connected South Asia and China were roads, mountainous paths and stairways, bridges (including the rope

suspension bridge that Faxian used to cross the Indus River) and ports, as well as boats and ships. Buddhist monuments and temples, sites embodying Buddhist legends, and places that held relics of the Buddha in South Asia were important nodes on these networks for itinerant monks to—as in the abovementioned hubs—congregate, share information, and exchange goods. Many of these places housed objects that came from faraway places, donated by monks and merchants. Faxian, for instance, reports seeing a 'Chinese white fan' in Sri Lanka, which he says was offered by a merchant to the famous footprint of the Buddha at Adam's Peak.

Faxian's narrative of the maritime connections, first from Tāmralipta to Sri Lanka, then from Sri Lanka to Southeast Asia, and eventually to the coastal region of China from Southeast Asia, is one of the earliest accounts of the sailing networks that existed within and across the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea regions. The Chinese monk boarded a 'large trade ship' from Tāmralipta to Sri Lanka, which took fourteen days to reach the island with favourable winds. After staying in Sri Lanka for two years, Faxian took another 'large merchant ship' to a place called Yavadvīpa (Java?) located in South China Sea. This journey needed ninety days of travel. From Yavadvīpa he sailed on a third 'large merchant ship' going to China. During these latter two occasions, the ships encountered rough weather and deviated significantly from their intended course. When sailing from Yavadvīpa to China, fellow Brahmin travellers signalled out Faxian as the cause for the 'unlucky' encounter with treacherous 'black cyclone'. 'It is because we have a Buddhist monk on board our ship', one of them argued, 'that we have been so unlucky and suffered such great trouble. We should drop the monk on an island. We should not risk our lives because of one man'. This proposition by the Brahmins is not only indicative of the rivalries that existed among those travelling long-distance to proselytize their faiths, but also of the use of maritime networks by several different groups of missionaries between South Asia and China. Other Chinese Buddhist sources also mention instances when Brahmins and Buddhist monks journeyed together between South Asia and China.

By the time Xuanzang, in c. 629, embarked on his travel to India from Tang China, the networks of travel, communication, and material exchanges between the two regions had become significantly more vibrant. At the same time, the spread of Buddhism to Southeast Asia, Korea, and Japan brought new regions and groups of peoples into the networks of exchange and interactions. The movement of Buddhist clergy, objects, and ideas peaked in the eighth and ninth centuries. Within this context, the travels of Xuanzang, in addition to corroborating the existence of many of the networks alluded to in Faxian's work, contributed to the creation of what could be called the 'network of imagination' that bonded the Buddhist world. In their recent collection of essays, John Kieschnick and Meir Shahar have noted the Indian impact on the Chinese creative imagination and the Chinese imagining of India. This impact extended to other Buddhist communities in Asia. The Japanese, for example, imagined the Buddhist holy land from the writings of Xuanzang, representing his travels in drawings and mapping the Indian subcontinent. As Fabio Rambelli has demonstrated, the imagining of India, mediated through the Chinese texts, had a profound impact on the Japanese views on their place in the larger Buddhist world. It augmented the network of Buddhist exchanges between Japan and China, which, similar to that between China and South Asia, was intertwined with the networks of commercial specialists and official envoys.

Erik Zürcher has noted that the expansion of networks of monastic institutions was the 'driving force behind the spread of Buddhism all over Asia'. Xuanzang's writings provide important clues to the developing connections between Buddhist monks/institutions and the long-distance diplomatic networks. The Tang period witnessed frequent exchange of diplomatic missions between polities in South Asia and the Tang court. Especially noteworthy were the missions led by the Tang diplomat Wang Xuance to the court of the South Asian ruler Harsa. The Da Tang da Ci'ensi sanzang fashi zhuan (Biography of the Master of the Tripitaka of the Great Ci'en Monastery) suggests an intimate relationship between the Chinese monk and the ruler in Kanauj, Harsa's capital city. Additionally, the Xin Tang shu credits Xuanzang for initiating the diplomatic exchanges between the

Tang court and Harsa.18 These records are no doubt exaggerations, intended to underscore the importance of Xuanzang who had a close relationship with the Tang rulers Taizong and Gaozong, during whose reigns these diplomatic exchanges took place. Through either Wang Xuance or one of the other members of the diplomatic entourage, Xuanzang communicated and exchanged gifts with his acquaintances at Nālandā. In one of the letters he wrote to the monk named Prajñādeva, for instance, Xuanzang expressed his gratitude for the gifts that he had received from India and requested copies of Buddhist texts that he needed. These, he suggested, could be sent through a 'returning messenger'. In another letter Xuanzang notes that a Tang envoy returning from India had informed him of the passing of his teacher at Nālandā.

Similar connections between Tang diplomats and Buddhist monks are also reported in the works of the monk Yijing (635–713), who embarked on his trip to India in 671 and returned in 695. Yijing mentions the Chinese monk Xuanzhao, who interacted with the Tang princess Wenchang in Tibet, received help from the king of Nepal, and had audience with the Emperor Gaozong. The Tang emperor asked him to return to India and bring to Tang China a Brahmin named Lujiayiduo (Lokāditya?) from Kashmir. On his way Xuanzhao met a Tang envoy who requested the monk to instead go to Luocha; (Lāta) to fetch medicinal plants for longevity for the Tang emperor. After procuring the plants, however, Xuanzhao fell sick and died in Middle India.

The writings of Xuanzang and Yijing indicate that the relationship between itinerant monks and official envoys (and the courts), similar to that between the traders and itinerant monks, was reciprocal and the networks they used to travel between China and South Asia were intertwined.

Yijing mentions that he met the monk Xuanzhao in Nālandā, where the former had gone to study the practice of vinaya (monastic rules). As a centre for learning and missionary activity Nālandā played a key role in connecting several regions of the Buddhist world. From its founding in the middle of the fifth century through to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the institution functioned as a repository of knowledge, a site of interactions, and a place which accumulated and dispersed a variety of ritual objects and images. Indeed, from Yijing's writings (as well as that of Xuanzang before him) it becomes evident that Nālandā was at the centre of the cosmopolitan world of Buddhism in the seventh century. In his Da Tang Xiyu qiufa gaoseng zhuan, Yijing mentions several monks from Tang China as well as from the Korean peninsula who had travelled to Nālandā to study Buddhist texts. Some of these monks lived at the renowned monastic institution for couple of years; others, according to Yijing, decided not to return to their homeland. Monks from Sri Lanka, Sumatra, and Tibet are also reported to have studied at Nālandā by Yijing and other sources. Yijing also alludes to connections between Nālandā and other similar learning centres across the Buddhist world. These centres included Chang'an, the capital of Tang China, Palembang in Sumatra, and Tāmralipta in eastern India. In fact, at one point Yijing recommends that Chinese monks planning to visit South Asia should first learn Sanskrit in Palembang.

In sum, the records of the above three Chinese monks who travelled to South Asia reveal the existence of several intertwined networks that connected the Buddhist world in the first millennium CE. The networks of traders and sailors were clearly the most crucial for those travelling long distances. These networks not only facilitated missionary and pilgrimage activities, but also sustained the circulation of ritual objects and other goods associated with the practice of Buddhism. The networks of messengers and diplomats also facilitated these movements of people and objects. These different types of networks connected pilgrimage centres, sites housing important relics, and learning centres. Even the imagination of the Buddhist heartland created networks of connections that extended from Japan to India. It must be noted that the movements across these networks were not unidirectional. People and objects moved in various directions, some limited to specific regions and others across vast distances. These movements were often coordinated between the members of the Buddhist communities and the

operators of the networks. But there were also instances when the connections took place in arbitrary and unplanned fashion. In other words, the networks of connections across the Buddhist world were neither neatly organized nor part of a coordinated effort on part of the Buddhist communities or the operators of the networks. These haphazard and muddled movements, as well as the lack of an emphasis on universal ideology, seem to have defined the long-distance Buddhist networking. Indeed, the unsystematic spread of Buddhist ideas through the various networks of traders and transporters gives credence to Erik Zürcher's questioning of Central Asian oasis states as the staging ground for the initial transmission of Buddhism to Han China. Thus Zürcher contends that the spread of Buddhism from southern Asia to China was through 'long distance' transmission rather than a result of 'contact expansion'. However, it is possible that during the course of such 'long-distance' transmissions some Buddhist artefacts and ideas entered the in-between halting places and relay centres. The unsystematic spread of Buddhism may have also contributed to the development of localized forms of Buddhist practices, images, and teachings across this Buddhist world. The awareness of sectarian differences, the cognizance of the centre-periphery gap, and the distinctions made between the local and foreign led to the formation of unique and multifaceted identities among the advocates and followers of Buddhism.

Changing Connections, Changing Identities

Many of the abovementioned networks that facilitated Buddhist connections persisted into the second millennium CE. Itinerant Buddhist monks continued to use the networks of traders and sailors, rulers and court officials offered support to the members of the clergy embarking on long-distance travel, and pilgrimage sites, old and new, drew Buddhist patrons from different regions of Asia. The circulation of Buddhist paraphernalia also endured through these networks. However, a noteworthy development during this period was the fragmentation of the Buddhist world into smaller circuits of connections. These circuits had their own doctrinal emphases, pilgrimage sites, linguistic coherence, and exclusive commercial and diplomatic networking. Thus, the East Asian circuit that linked the monastic institutions in China, Korea, Japan, as well as those in the Khitan and Tangut territories; the Southeast Asia–Sri Lanka circuit that was integrated through doctrinal, commercial, and diplomatic linkages; and the Tibet–South Asia circuit united through missionary and pilgrimage networks emerged as the three main subregions of the Buddhist world by the twelfth century.

The origins of these distinct circuits lay in the earlier phases of Buddhist connections, especially in the seventh and eighth centuries, when the monastic communities, itinerant monks, and polities started encountering the notions of the 'self' and the 'other'. Distinct identities were either imposed or gradually taken throughout the Buddhist world. In the case of the Buddhist tradition labelled as 'Theravāda', Peter Skilling has pointed that the term did not exist in pre-twentieth century European writings, nor did it appear in indigenous sources of Southeast Asia. The category and the identity 'Theravāda' was clearly imposed after the nineteenth century. However, the realization of distinctiveness, the recognition of sectarian differences, and the awareness of the ways in which Buddhism could be used for political purposes existed among the Buddhist clergy at an early date. Distinctions were made between the 'Hinayāna' and 'Mahāyāna' practitioners (as is evident in the works of the three Chinese travellers mentioned above), between the sacred Buddhist heartland in South Asia and the peripheral regions of China, between native monks and foreign missionaries, and between Buddhists and non-Buddhists.

The chapter by Max Deeg in this volume explains the ways in which Chinese monks visiting South Asia perceived themselves and were, in turn, seen by others in the broader context of the Buddhist world, in which China was situated in the peripheral region. The feelings of belonging and not belonging, of being present in a foreign land even though among fellow Buddhists, and the creation and propagation of unique forms of doctrine led to the formation of dual and often times multiple identities. A Chinese monk, for example, was different from practitioners of other religious traditions; he was also unlike the foreign monks residing in China; his specific doctrinal pursuit gave

him a distinct identity, and his status within the monastic community also created a discrete identification. The distinctiveness became more complex if the Chinese monk travelled to foreign regions, including to the pilgrimage sites or learning centres in South Asia.

During the early phases of the spread of Buddhism the specific identities of Buddhist groups, icons, and teachings were most likely undistinguishable. Thus the early evidence of Buddhism in China, for example, indicates a mixture with local traditions, especially those related to funerary traditions. The cross-regional interactions and exchanges of the first millennium CE, especially during the second half, were an important factor in the recognition of distinctiveness and difference within the Buddhist world. This paralleled the creation of new spaces of pilgrimage, new doctrinal explanations and preferences, and new practices stemming from local cultural and social needs. The decline of Buddhism in several regions of India by the end of the millennium contributed to the strengthening of localized identities and eventually the segmentation of the Buddhist world into the self-contained circuits. As a result, the 'borderland complex' (see the chapter by Deeg), which was prevalent prior to the eighth century, abated and each circuit assumed its own distinct identity.

The Buddhist connections between South Asia and China witnessed dramatic changes due to the abovementioned segmentation. Contacts between the clergies of the two regions became limited, as those in China were content to pursue their own doctrinal interests. Arguments were even put forth by some members of the Chinese Buddhist community, such as the famous Song monk Zanning (919–1001), for the reverse transmission of doctrines to India. This feeling of a need to re-transmit Buddhist doctrines to India was apparent again in 1940, when the monk Taixu (1890–1947) visited India as part of a Goodwill Mission sent by the Guomindang regime in China.

Taixu was one of the many monk-intellectuals in the early twentieth century who were wrestling with the issues of colonialism and modernity. Already in the late nineteenth century the Sri Lankan Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933) had spearheaded a revival movement in India with his attempt to restore the Mahabodhi Temple in Bodhgayā as a key pilgrimage site for Buddhist followers. He established the Maha Bodhi Society in Colombo in 1891, which subsequently relocated to Calcutta (now Kolkata), to accomplish this goal. While Dharmapala's efforts to establish Buddhist control over the Temple site succeeded only after his death, eventually attracting a large number of pilgrims, it was the Maha Bodhi Society in Calcutta which became the centre for discourse among Buddhist monks and lay followers from around the world in the early twentieth century. These monks and lay followers tried to formulate a common agenda for Buddhism in the context of European and, subsequently, Japanese imperialisms. Several Chinese monks, officials, and scholars visited the Society, donated funds, and served on the governing committees of the organization. Taixu was one of the most prominent visitors to the Society, in both Calcutta and Sarnath.

The aim of the Goodwill Mission led by Taixu was to seek the support of the Indian Buddhist community and the political leaders in the war against the Japanese. Taixu met with people such as the future Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, delivered lectures at Buddhist gatherings, and visited the sacred pilgrimage sites in present-day Bihar state. During his public speeches, Taixu was introduced as a modern-day Xuanzang making pilgrimage in India. However, Taixu had his own agenda. From the moment Taixu disembarked in Calcutta, he was struck by the decline of Buddhism in India. He stressed in his writings and speeches, similar to the Song monk Zanning, albeit in a more melancholy tone, the need to re-transmit Buddhist doctrines from China to India. He even donated money to the Maha Bodhi Society to undertake this task. Taixu's feelings about his presence in India were clearly very different from those of the Chinese monks in the first millennium CE. Instead of sensing a 'borderland complex', Taixu felt that China had emerged as a centre for Buddhism with the responsibility to restore the doctrine in the Buddhist holy land. The sacred Buddhist sites in India no longer generated a sense of peripheral existence among the Chinese monks. Rather, they had attained an identity of their own as a central realm of Buddhism.

Another aspect that also needs to be stressed here is the use of Buddhism to create a distinctive identity for political regimes, communities, or groups. Prior to the colonial period, several polities, such as the Sui dynasty, Srivijaya in Southeast Asia, the Khitans and Tanguts in the northern steppe regions, and the Mongols in Persia used Buddhism to establish a unique identity and distinguish themselves from contending regimes, rival polities, or unify the subjects within a common ideology. The same was true for some of the Chinese migrant groups settled in Southeast Asia and Calcutta. Among many of these migrant groups, Guanyin was one of the most ubiquitous Buddhist deities. Other figures associated with popular practice of Buddhism, such as the monk Jigong and the monkey god Sun Wukong, also appeared in the temples and shrines belonging to the Chinese overseas. However, the Buddhist identities of many of these deities are not always evident as they are often worshiped alongside Taoist divinities, deified individuals from local regions, and Confucian figures. Within this context, the veneration of two so-called buddhas, Ruan Ziyu (1079–1102) and Liang Cineng (1098–1116), by migrants from the Sihui County in Guangdong province, is remarkable. Beyond the Sihui region, temples dedicated to the two buddhas can be found in Singapore, Malaysia, and Calcutta.

During the Song period, Ruan Ziyu and Liang Cineng, two commoners, lived near Shaoguan, where the mummified body of the Sixth Chan Patriarch Huineng (638–713) was preserved. Ruan Ziyu is supposed to have one day dreamt of Huineng and suddenly attained enlightenment. Liang, on the other hand, had a dream about Ruan and also instantaneously became enlightened. Two temples, Baolin (built in 1271) and Baosheng (built in 1290), dedicated to the two figures respectively, were erected in the Sihui region soon after the deaths of the two individuals. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the Cantonese-speaking people from the region started migrating to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Calcutta, they established temples and shrines dedicated to these two buddhas. The two buddhas served as the protective deities of the Sihui community as they moved from one region to another. More importantly, the Ruan and Liang buddhas and the temples dedicated to them became important markers of Sihui identity as the migrant group tried to differentiate themselves from other Chinese migrants living in Southeast Asia and Calcutta. These days, the Sihui migrants often travel to the original temples in Guangdong province. For those who are unable to do so, photographs of the original temples and the images of the idols of Ruan and Liang from these temples are displayed at the temples in Southeast Asia and Calcutta. These temples served a similar purpose as the earlier transplanted pilgrimage sites in foreign regions, such as Mt. Wutai in China, giving a sense of belonging and a common identity to people living in foreign regions.

Encounters and Identities

Translocal cultural encounters and the diversity of Buddhist identities are the focus of the twelve chapters that appear in this volume. Connections between several regions of the Buddhist world, from South Asia to Japan, are examined to explain the intricacies of regional and cross-regional networks and the complexities of identities. Subjects covered in these chapters range from artistic connections and notions of belonging to the movement of ritual objects. Together these essays illustrate the nature of the vibrant and multilayered Buddhist world prior to the colonial era. The chapters contribute to the understanding of the networks that facilitated Buddhist connections, and the transformations of Buddhist ideas and objects as they moved through these networks. They also detail the unique identities of Buddhism as the teachings of the Buddha were accepted, transformed, and re-transmitted within the Buddhist world.

The first section of the book, 'Translocal Cultural Encounters', examines the Buddhist connections that were fostered through the various commercial and diplomatic networks. They focus on the transmission of ideas, objects, texts, and people from one region of the Buddhist world to another. Claudine Bautze-Picron explores the art-historical impact of Bagan's connections to Yuan China. Using unpublished aspects of the late thirteenth-century murals found in several temples at Bagan, Bautze-Picron examines the ways in which specific iconographic motifs, such as the representation of

Mongols, the depiction of dreadful door-keepers, or the image of the short-necked Buddha from Yuan China, entered Burma (now Myanmar).

Rob Linrothe's essay focuses on a partial set of eight Ming dynasty textiles still in use at a shrine in the Western Himalaya that was never in contact with any Chinese state, and was in fact founded long after the Ming dynasty ended. Yet the group of relatively well-preserved embroidered textiles, at least one of which has a Chinese inscription on the back, are hung during the monastery's annual masked dance festival (Tib. 'cham), treasures displayed on an auspicious pair of days. How and when they were acquired by a monastery in southeastern Ladakh on the far Western border of Tibet is not known, though other objects in the same monastery can be shown to have been sent by the nineteenth-century 14th Karmapa. These objects, Linrothe asserts, are potent, physical reminders of the circulation and flow of people, ideas, practices, texts, and objects within Buddhist networks crossing linguistic, state, ethnic and cultural borders. Spectacular objects created at or by the Ming court were prized at the major Tibetan Buddhist monasteries supported directly by the Ming court—reminders of the monastery's participation in wider networks of Buddhist teachings and support, helping to define their identities.

Megan Bryson's essay deals with the Nanzhao (649–903) and Dali (937–1253) polities centred in the Dali region of what is now southwest China's Yunnan province. Bryson demonstrates that the ruling elites in the Nanzhao and Dali polities relied more heavily on networks linking Dali to Chinese territory for their Buddhist material, especially their texts, than to other Buddhist sites in Tibet or South Asia with which the region also maintained close connections. Despite this, Bryson argues, the ruling elites emphasized their links to India and downplayed the China connection. Employing texts and images related to the "border-crossing" Bodhisattva Guanyin (Skt. Avalokiteśvara), the essay shows how the documented and represented networks related to each other in the Nanzhao and Dali polities.

The basic characteristics and historical formation of the combination of Fudo and Aizen, two important esoteric Buddhist deities, in medieval Shingon esoteric Buddhism in Japan, are discussed in the essay by Steven Trenson. Looking at the issue from the standpoint of two different intersecting networks, a 'translocal' human network stretching between China and Japan and a 'local' conceptual network of ideas and practices developed in Shingon, Trenson highlights the belief that marked the identity of medieval Shingon, in particular of the Ono branch of that school. It contends that the Fudō-Aizen belief came to occupy a special place in the Ono branch as the result of ideas passing from China to Japan through certain human networks which were adopted at one time into the conceptual network of rainmaking.

Bryan Levman's contribution studies the transmission of the Buddha's teachings from India to China through the lens of the dhāraṇīs of the Lotus Sūtra. Kumārajīva was the first Chinese translator to undertake a transliteration of the dhāraṇīs that attempted to retain their ritual efficacy for Chinese Buddhists. His source text was Prakritic in nature and shown to be centuries earlier than the Sanskrit manuscripts that have survived. The transmission of the buddhadharma from India to China, Levman argues, was a highly complex process with dozens of human, temporal, spatial, dialectal, scribal, psychological and phonological variables, making it impossible to transmit the teachings error free. Levman's study of the dhāraṇīs opens a unique window on the networks of exchange of information between India and China in the early centuries of the Common Era and the interaction of two very different cultural and linguistic environments.

In the final chapter of this section Kaiqi Hua scrutinises the life of the last Song Emperor Zhao Xian(1271–1323), who travelled extensively across China and Tibet, and became a Tibetan Buddhist monk with the name Lhatsün (Tib. Lha btsun). Using various sources in different languages and literary forms, Hua not only reconstructs Zhao's travel routes, but also explains the motives and processes of Buddhist exile for the royals during the Mongol Yuan dynasty through physical migration in space and textual reproduction in time. The essay demonstrates the role Buddhism played in cross-cultural and cross-regional contacts in the lives of individual migrants.

The second section of the book, 'Negotiating and Constructing Identities', consists of six chapters that explore the attempts by the clergy to find, create, or assert their identities in different regions of the Buddhist world. Max Deeg's contribution draws on Antonino Forte's notion of a borderland complex and on the concept of the 'double belonging' of Chinese Buddhists in the medieval period. This was caused by the fact that China, the so-called Middle Kingdom, was not the centre of Buddhist cosmology. Indeed, it was not part of the Buddhist sacred realm at all, as Deeg argues. Nowhere can one observe this struggle better than in the records of Chinese pilgrims to South Asia, as noted above. In this regard, Deeg contends, the protagonists are, quite often, negotiating a dual cultural identity; they are both part of greater Chinese culture and express a sense of religious belonging to—and presence in—a Sacred Land that lays claim to cosmological and soteriological superiority over all the other regions in the world. The conflict that arose from this conflict of identities is expressed in the texts in the form of poems and narratives reflecting either homesickness or determination to stay in India (or both), as examined in the essay. The essay also addresses the different forms of expression of these identities and analyses them in the wider context of Chinese and Indian Buddhism.

The essay by Sem Vermeersch studies the way Chinese Buddhist monks looked at their Korean counterparts, and how this perception of a Buddhist 'other' changed over time from the beginning of the sixth to the late tenth centuries. This was the period when Buddhist exchanges between China and Korea were the most intensive. Throughout this period, a vast number of monks from peninsular kingdoms travelled to China and beyond; some eventually returned to their home country, but many stayed, and some left their marks on Chinese Buddhism. Given the lack of early Korean sources, much of our information about the biographies of these intrepid monks stems from Chinese biographic collections. So far, however, insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that these biographies were shaped by the ideals and motivations of their authors. Notably, Daoxuan, the author of a seminal collection of monastic biographies, projected his own ideals of the observance of the vinaya and doctrinal learning upon the biographies of Wŏngwang and Chajang. The way he creatively reimagined these biographies has been accepted in Korean scholarship and continues to influence even present-day perceptions. While later biographies do not show such a strong auctorial hand, they equally tend to ascribe Chinese monastic ideals or other motivations to the Korean material.

Henrik H. Sørensen devotes his chapter to the study of a specific phenomenon in the history of East Asian Buddhism, namely the quest for the Buddhist teaching (qiufa 求法) undertaken by Buddhist monks in regions other than their own. Based primarily on the analysis of epigraphical writings, Sørensen explains the experiences associated with Korean Sŏn (Ch. Chan) Buddhist monks journeying to Tang China during the eighth and ninth centuries.

The cult of Shotoku Taishi (Prince Shōtoku, 573–621) was a far-reaching movement across Japan throughout several centuries, and the belief that he was Huisi's (515–577) reincarnation was an important element in his extensive cult in the Buddhist world. Pei-Ying Lin in her essay examines the connection between the Japanese prince and the legend cycles of the Chinese patriarch Huisi from the eighth century onwards. In particular, the essay discusses the networks of authors of this reincarnation story, namely Du Fei (c. 710–720), Jianzhen (688–763), Situo (722–809), Saicho (767–822) and Kōjō"定 (779–858). This self-identification involved Buddhist monks who located themselves in a broader context of East Asian Buddhism. Lin argues that the reincarnation legend reveals the authors' motives of rearranging the association between China and Japan. Their self-identification, Lin contends, matured as the reincarnation story developed into complete form.

Bart Dessein's chapter argues that one's Buddhist identity is not a monolithic singularity, but a layered construct, consisting of the acceptance of the Buddha-word (Buddhavacana) as one's core Buddhist identity, then one's par-ticular monastic school and code as a first layer around this Buddhist 'nucleus', and finally philosophical interpretations of the Buddha-word as the outer layer of one's Buddhist identity. These three layers, Dessein points out, are represented in the

traditional three collections of Buddhist literature (tripiṭaka): sūtra, vinaya, and abhidharma. The 'canonical' status of the abhidharma collection is the least stable of these three. The 'Abhidharmic' layer is, according to Dessein, therefore, the layer that enables 'networking', as the acceptance of the Buddha-word and one's monastic affiliation are beyond negotiation. It is this intricate connection between identity formation, canonization, and networking in the Indian and Chinese political spheres that form the core of this chapter.

The final chapter of the volume by Ann Heirman examines the monastic life as a major factor in the creation of Buddhist identity. In several types of Buddhist texts, and particularly in disciplinary texts, monastic life received a great deal of attention, with monks representing the Buddhist community as well as the Dharma. This is also the case with respect to bodily care. Although bodily care practices might seem trivial, they reveal what the community stood for, at least normatively. Heirman explains how this normative ideal was transferred from India to China, taking into account the role of Buddhist monastics in the social networks to which they belonged. Heirman further explores the ways in which the threshold for becoming a monk advanced over time, with purity attaining an ever more central position in Buddhist discourse on bodily care. <>

The Buddhist Literature of Ancient Gandhara: an Introduction with Selected Translations by Richard Salomon [Wisdom Publications, 9781614291688]

Discover the fascinating history of a long-hidden Buddhist culture at a historic crossroads.

In the years following Alexander the Great's conquest of the East, a series of empires rose up along the Silk Road. In what is now northern Pakistan, the civilizations in the region called Gandhara became increasingly important centers for the development of Buddhism, reaching their apex under King Kaniska of the Kusanas in the second century CE. Gandhara has long been known for its Greek-Indian synthesis in architecture and statuary, but until about twenty years ago, almost nothing was known about its literature. The insights provided by manuscripts unearthed over the last few decades show that Gandhara was indeed a vital link in the early development of Buddhism, instrumental in both the transmission of Buddhism to China and the rise of the Mahayana tradition. The Buddhist Literature of Ancient Gandhara surveys what we know about Gandhara and its Buddhism, and it also provides translations of a dozen different short texts, from similes and stories to treatises on time and reality.

Excerpt: This book is a distillation of the results of twenty years of concentrated work by my many collaborators and me on the Gandhāran Buddhist manuscripts that were discovered during that period. These manuscripts and fragments, which now number in the hundreds, date from the early centuries before and after the beginning of the Common Era. Written in the Gāndhāri language in Kharosthī script, they have brought to light the previously unknown literature of Gandhāra, a major center of early Buddhism in the northwestern frontier of the Indian subcontinent. Gandhāra had previously been familiar mainly from archaeological remains, especially its world-renowned tradition of sculpture.

Until now, our findings have been published mostly in scholarly books and articles designed for an audience of specialists in academic Buddhist studies and Indian linguistics. A preliminary book, Ancient Buddhist Scrolls from Gandhāra: The British Library Kharosthī Fragments (Salomon 1999), introduced the first group of Gandhāran manuscripts to be discovered in a semi-technical format, while scholarly editions and translations of individual manuscripts from this and other collections have been published by the University of Washington Press in the volumes of the Gandhāran Buddhist Texts (GBT) series. These books are not intended for general readers. They are meant to enable those who work with Buddhist literature in more widely known languages such as Sanskrit and Pali to understand the Gāndhāri texts.

But almost from the very beginning of this project, I have also been aware of our obligation to avoid burying these discoveries in technical publications for specialists and to meet what I consider a scholar's duty to present new knowledge to interested readers in an accessible format. This

book is an attempt to meet that obligation by making the newly found Buddhist literature of ancient Gandhāra accessible to a wider audience, be they students of Buddhism or readers with a general interest in ancient religions, languages, or literature.

In addition to translating and explaining the contents of the manuscripts themselves, I have tried to give the reader some sense of the scholar's agonies and ecstasies involved in studying fragmentary, decrepit manuscripts that have lain unread for nearly two millennia. Each of these translations is a distillation of countless hours of labor by one or, more often, several scholars. In some places, I have presented a degree of technical explanation of the methods and techniques of decipherment to give the reader a sense of not only what has been done but also how and why.

The texts presented here were selected on a variety of criteria. First, an attempt has been made to sample each of the main genres of Buddhist texts now known in the Gāndhārī language. These are grouped together under five main rubrics: prose sutras, poetry, legends and stories about previous lives, scholarly treatises, and Mahāyāna literature. Within these categories, the specific texts were chosen on the basis of factors such as the amount of material preserved in the fragments, legibility and accessibility, and overall interest and significance. Most of the texts have either been previously published in scholarly editions or at least studied in detail by my colleagues and myself, though not yet fully published. Some of the texts (nos. 1-3, 5-6, 8, 12) are presented in full; these are generally the shorter and/or better-preserved specimens. The rest are representative selections from longer texts, most of them not previously published. From these, I have chosen passages that are relatively comprehensible, interesting, and representative of the text as a whole.

Readers will notice, and perhaps be surprised, that in many cases the introductory material and commentary is longer—sometimes much longer—than the translated text itself. This is a product of the special character of this literature. Nearly all of the texts are incomplete, and in many cases only a small fraction of the entire work survives. I have therefore tried to make up the deficiencies in the surviving material by explaining in some detail their meaning, their context within Buddhism in Gandhāra and beyond, and especially their relationships with parallel or similar texts in other Buddhist languages and traditions that help to clarify their meaning and importance. I hope that in doing so I will be contributing to, rather than distracting from, the reader's understanding and appreciation of the texts themselves.

Although nearly half of the texts presented here have already been translated in GBT volumes or elsewhere, the translations have been completely revised here and transformed into what I hope will be a more natural and readable style. The previous translations were designed primarily to help scholars and specialists compare them with the original texts and the parallels in other languages, and therefore they are strictly literal, with no pretension to literary qualities or readability. In the new translations I have, however, still stayed as close as possible to the structure if not the individual words of the originals, in the hope of giving the reader a sense of their style and rhythm. Thus, for example, I have translated in full all of the repetitions, sometimes quite extensive, that are so characteristic of Buddhist literature; see, for example, the introduction to translation 12.

The Rediscovery of Gandhāran Buddhist Literature

The Gandhāran Buddhist scrolls first came to my attention in 1994, when I received a set of blurry black-and-white photographs of some old manuscripts that had recently been acquired by the British Library. Having worked for many years on Buddhist dedicatory inscriptions in stone or on metal plaques from the ancient region of Gandhāra in modern northwestern Pakistan, it was immediately clear to me that these were genuine Buddhist manuscripts written in the Kharosthī script and Gāndhārī language of that region, dating from about the first or second centuries of the Common Era. This made them the oldest surviving specimens of original Buddhist texts in the world, as well as the oldest Indian manuscripts of any type, and the discovery was widely reported in media worldwide. Subsequent studies have confirmed that these and the other similar materials that were

discovered in the following years date from between the first century BCE and the third century CE.

In July 1995 I took the first of many trips to London to see the collection itself, which turned out to consist of twenty-nine fragments of scrolls made of extremely brittle birchbark. I spent my first few days in London surveying the material in a combined fog of excitement, puzzlement, and jet lag, and the more I pored over the scrolls, the larger loomed the intimidating dimensions of the work that would be so that many of the scrolls, especially those that had lain at the bottom of the pot, had degenerated into flat stacks of horizontal strips. The osmosis of groundwater through the walls of the pot also caused the portions of the scrolls that had been in contact with the sides to decompose, so that in many cases their edges, and often larger sections, had disintegrated completely. By the time I first saw them, the scrolls had already been painstakingly unrolled by the conservation staff of the British Library's Oriental and India Office division and permanently mounted between glass sheets in fifty-six separate frames.

Despite my awe at seeing this collection of dozens of Buddhist texts in Gāndhārī, I was not entirely surprised that it had come to light. For, almost exactly one hundred years earlier, a single specimen of a similar Gandhāran manuscript had been discovered, under unclear circumstances, in the region of the Central Asian city of Khotan in the modern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. The Khotan scroll contained a previously unknown version in Gāndhārī language of the popular Buddhist verse anthology entitled Dharmapada ("Words of the Dharma"), one chapter of which is presented as translation 4 in this book. For the next century, this manuscript constituted virtually the only known specimen, except for a few other tiny scraps, of Buddhist literature in the ancient language of the Gandhāra region. But on the basis of this unique manuscript it had been hypothesized that there must have once existed a more extensive Buddhist literature, perhaps even an entire canon, in Gāndhārī. Now, a century later, this hypothesis was about to be confirmed.

The first task was to identify the texts and to determine their relationship to other previously known Buddhist literature. After a few days of random grazing through the texts, the first breakthrough came after I noticed that in one of them an unfamiliar word, kharga, recurred in each line. At the time, I was camping out in the living room-cum-library of the London home of an old friend, the independent Buddhist scholar Tom Lowenstein. While randomly scanning his bookshelves one evening, my eye fell on a book by the great British Pali scholar K. R. Norman entitled The Rhinoceros Horn and Other Early Buddhist Poems, which consists of a translation of the Pali anthology of verse sütras called Suttanipãta (Collection of Sūtras). I then immediately realized that the repeated word kharga must be the Gāndhārī equivalent of Pali khagga, "rhinoceros," and that the manuscript consisted of a Gāndhārī version of the well-known Rhinoceros Sūtra (Khaggavisãna-sutta), which is one of the poems incorporated into the Suttanipãta. Since each verse of this poem concludes with the refrain "Wander alone like the rhinoceros," the repetition in each line of the corresponding word in its Gāndhārī form removed any doubt about its contents. This poem would soon become the focus of my first major project of editing, interpreting, and translating a Gāndhārī manuscript. The results of that project, in the form of a scholarly edition and study,' are summarized here in translation.

A second breakthrough came in connection with another scroll in which I noticed the repeated phrase anodate mahasare. Gradually it dawned on me that must correspond to a Sanskrit phrase, anavatapte mahãhrade, "at the great Lake Anavatapta," which is the refrain of another well-known poem, the Anavataptagāthã or Songs of Lake Anavatapta. This text describes how the Buddha and his disciples revealed, while seated on giant lotuses in the sacred Lake Anavatapta in the high Himalayas, the karmic factors from their past lives that led them to their present condition. A little further checking quickly confirmed that this was an early Gãndhārī version of this popular poem previously known in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese versions. This was to be the topic of my second

editing project, published in 2008, which is presented in this book as translation 5.

Gradually several other texts were identified, at least as to their genre if not their precise contents. They proved to embrace a wide variety of contents, styles, and subjects: poems, sutras and commentaries on sūtras, compilations of legends about the lives of famous figures in Buddhist history, commentaries and scholastic treatises on the fine points of Buddhist doctrines, hymns in praise of the Buddha, as well as quite a few unidentified and unclassifiable pieces. It also became evident that the manuscripts were the work of some twenty different scribes, many of whose works could be easily recognized from their distinctive hands. We had, in short, what seemed to be a random selection or culling of the contents of a monastic library, or perhaps of a personal manuscript collection, probably dating from the first century CE.

As work went on in the course of this and many subsequent trips to London, it became abundantly clear to me that the complete study of the British Library scrolls would occupy far more than one lifetime of one scholar. Deciphering fragmentary manuscripts in an incompletely known language requires special expertise in each of the various genres involved, and it was obvious that this was a job for a team, not an individual. For this, I turned first to my colleague and collaborator of many years, Professor Collett Cox, an expert in scholastic works of the abhidharma class, which happened to be abundantly attested among the British Library scrolls, and which were also one of the areas of Buddhist literature that I felt least qualified to work with. The two of us then teamed up, and with the generous support of officials of the British Library and of our home institution, the University of Washington, established in September 1996 the British Library / University of Washington Early Buddhist Manuscripts Project (EBMP), dedicated to the study and publication of the British Library Kharosthī scrolls. Early on in the project an agreement was reached with the University of Washington Press to publish in a dedicated series entitled Gandhāran Buddhist Texts (GBT) the results of research by EBMP members and associated scholars.

The majority of the manuscripts presented in this book (translations 1, 3, 5-7, and 9—11) belong to the British Library collection, mainly because that group, being the first to be discovered, is the one that has been most intensively studied to date. But in the years and decades following the discovery of the British Library scrolls, several more major groups of similar and equally important manuscripts, as well as some isolated individual texts, were discovered. By now over two hundred significant bodies of text are available for study. The majority have been made available for scholarly research and are being studied and published under the auspices of the University of Washington Early Buddhist Manuscripts Project and the parallel project Buddhist Manuscripts from Gandhāra at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Munich. The complete detailed study of this material is a huge job that will take many years to complete, but in the meantime Gāndhārī literature has already been established as a separate subfield of Buddhist studies, and from it a steady flow of scholarly publications can be expected to continue for a long time to come.' These new materials are described in chapters 2 and 3, but first we turn to the historical and cultural background of these manuscripts and the world that produced them.

What Have We Learned?

During a public presentation I gave during the early years of the study of the Gandhāran manuscripts, a member of the audience asked whether they contained "a fifth noble truth." I took the question to mean, do the texts reveal anything that challenges or overturns the basic doctrines of Buddhism as they have been understood until now? I answered him in the negative. I was therefore surprised to come across, some years later, an actual reference to a "fifth noble truth" in the abhidharma treatise presented above. But this initially shocking phrase must be understood in its proper context: it is part of a rebuttal to an opponent, showing that his position that "everything exists" requires that he accept, among other impossibilities, the existence of a fifth noble truth. This is intended to be absurd: the point is that there is not, and cannot be, a fifth noble truth, so that I

was relieved to find that the texts themselves do confirm my response to my questioner.

The material in the new manuscripts reveal a vast amount of new information about and insight into the literature and ideas of a previously little understood but highly influential Buddhist culture, but they do not overturn our basic understanding of the history of Buddhism. To the contrary, they tend, in broad terms at least, to confirm and clarify rather than to contradict some of the theories that have been proposed in both older and more recent academic scholarship; see, for example, the comments on the history of the Perfection of Wisdom literature in the introduction to translation. Perhaps most importantly, the discovery of manuscripts of several Mahāyāna texts, some dating back to the second or possibly even the first century of the Common Era, supports the previous consensus that Mahāyāna ideas and texts arose at about this period. While the earlier theory was reached mostly on indirect grounds, such as the dates of the early translations of Mahāyāna sutras into Chinese, the new material gives us direct confirmation of its general accuracy. It also confirms the suggestions made by several scholars that some of the early Mahayana sutras, previously known in versions in Chinese or Sanskrit, were derived from archetypes in Gāndhāri. And while the discovery of Gāndhārī versions of Mahayana texts does not conclusively prove that the sūtras were originally composed in Gāndhārī, it does confirm that—as also had been previously suggested—Gandhāra was a, if not the, major locus of the emergence and spread of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

The period covered by Gāndhārī manuscripts, from the first century BCE to third century CE, is a critical phase of the history of Buddhism in other respects as well. This is the time when various Buddhist communities were adopting and expanding the use of writing as a medium for the preservation and transmission of the canon. It is also the period in which fixed, definitive canons were beginning to take shape and in which Sanskrit was beginning to supersede the regional vernaculars as the canonical language. Even more importantly for the history of Buddhism as a whole, the Gandhāran manuscripts belong to the time and place from which Buddhism began to spread beyond the Indian world, first into Central Asia and thence into China, and eventually to Korea and Japan. The long-standing "Gāndhārī hypothesis," which posited that the archetypes of early Chinese translations of Buddhist literature were in Gāndhārī, has now found a firm basis in an actual—rather than a hypothetical—body of Buddhist literature in Gāndhārī.

The rediscovery of large numbers of Buddhist texts in Gāndhārī also strengthens the recent trend in Buddhist scholarship toward thinking of early Indian Buddhism in terms of "many Buddhisms," that is, as a complex of diverse and localized traditions—many of which have left little or no trace in the historical record—rather than as a monolithic entity. Such local Buddhisms have been revealed by earlier archaeological and textual discoveries, for instance at Gilgit and in the Tarim Basin in Central Asia, which brought to light enormous corpora of Buddhist literature in Sanskrit from the middle of the first millennium. But the Gandhāran material shows us a regional vernacular form of Buddhism at an earlier and more formative stage, and what we find there is an intriguing mixture of the familiar and the unfamiliar. Most of the sütra texts have more or less direct parallels in other Buddhist canons, and even those that lack parallels consist mainly of familiar wording, images, and ideas. This is not surprising, since the mainstream sūtras are typically the most stable part of Buddhist canons across space and time. Their relationships, however, are complex in the sense that, more often than not, a given Gāndhārī sūtra will agree more closely with one parallel text in Pali, Sanskrit, or Chinese in some respects but resemble other parallels in other respects. Rarely can we trace out consistent lines of descent or relationship between the several versions of a given sūtra.

In this regard, the emerging picture of relationships among Buddhist texts and literatures is interestingly analogous to the point of view current prevailing among scholars of human paleontology. They have abandoned the old, and in retrospect naïve, view of a linear, chain-like model in which only a missing link or two had to be found to establish the ancestry of the human race. For recent experience

has made it abundantly clear that the more hominid fossils are discovered, the more complicated and messy—not clear and simple—the picture becomes. Accordingly, paleontologists now typically envision the evolutionary history of humanity not as a chain or a ladder but as a "tangled bush," with many dead ends and no clear single line of descent from primitive hominids to modern humans. In much the same way, a given Buddhist text, linguistic tradition, or sectarian canon can rarely, if ever, be traced back in a neat line of transmission through other known texts and corpora leading to a single ancestor.

Moreover, the evolutionary bush is "tangled" not only in the sense that there have turned out to be a great many more branches (i.e., lines of descent) than earlier generations of paleontologists could have imagined, but also in the sense that the lines were probably by no means always fully distinct. In many cases, it now appears, individuals of different lines interbred, making it even more difficult to trace the relationships of the species. In much the same way, as more and more specimens of old Buddhist manuscripts come to light, the picture becomes more, not less, complicated. Buddhist communities were in regular contact, trading and borrowing ideas and words—pieces of the Dharma's DNA, as it were—and incorporating them into their own texts. The result is a conflated literary tradition, comparable to the interbred lines of human ancestry, which in few if any cases can be separated into straight lines of descent, simply because such straight lines do not exist. In short, an ancient lesson has been relearned: "The more you know, the less you know."

While this might seem disappointing in that it fails to provide us with clear and simple pictures of the historical development of individual texts—something that philological scholars always hope, though often in vain, to discover—on other levels it is revealing and important. The pattern reflects, first of all, the flexible attitude toward scripture that was characteristic of early Buddhism. But other factors are involved, among them the vagaries and complexities involved in the translation policy espoused by the Buddha and the frequent and extensive interchange between the Buddhist communities throughout the Indian subcontinent.

While the Gandhāran manuscripts confirm the "many Buddhisms" approach, they also show that these many Buddhisms were by no means islands unto themselves. A good example of this give-and-take among regional Buddhisms is the Songs of Lake Anavatapta, which is attested in several Sanskrit and Chinese versions as well as in Gāndhārī but does not appear as such in the Pali canon. Nevertheless, a Pali text of a related genre, the Apadāna, contains two inserted passages that were obviously borrowed from the Songs of Lake Anavatapta, possibly directly from the Gāndhārī version.

This pattern is sometimes even discernible among the Gāndhārī texts that have no parallel in other Buddhist languages. As explained in the introduction to the translations of the two Gāndhārī commentaries (translations 9 and 10), the hermeneutic method of categorial mapping that underlies their structure is evidently characteristic of the scholastic traditions of Gandhāra, but it is also observed in two paracanonical texts extant in Pali, the Petakopadesa and Nettippakarana, whose uncharacteristic format had previously been suspected of betraying the influence of other regional traditions. It now becomes clear that this external source was, in all likelihood, the Buddhism of Gandhāra.

But the most distinctive local feature of the Gandhāran manuscripts are the references in the British Library avadāna collections to two local historical figures, the satraps Jihonika and Aspavarma, who were previously known from coins and inscriptions but not mentioned elsewhere else in Buddhist literature. These references do however fall into a general pattern, observed in similar textual genres in other Buddhist traditions, of references to kings, such as Ajātasatru, Asoka, Kaniska, and Huviska, who patronized Buddhist establishments, or perhaps rather were being solicited for patronage. From these discoveries in the Gandhāran manuscripts, we can extrapolate that other regional Buddhist literatures, now lost, must have recorded similar historical information. The avadāna literature in which these historical names are recorded is also of special importance in that we seem to have, in these sketchily recorded

outlines of stories, the kernel of what was to develop into a formal literary genre in the Sanskrit literary traditions of later Buddhism.

Although the Gandhāran documents known so far are surely only a miniscule fraction of what must once have been a vast literature, scholars are beginning to discern, with the ongoing study of some two hundred documents, some sense, if only vague and tentative, of the overall scope of that literature. The results and conclusions presented in this volume must still be considered as preliminary and incomplete, and the scholars involved are conscious of the dangers of drawing conclusions on the basis of incomplete information. But we can only work with what we have; for example, in 1999 I wrote in reference to the British Library collection that "Notably absent from the new material is any significant reference to or indication of Mahayana concepts." But since that time, as we have seen, several Mahayana texts in Gāndhārī have been found among the other groups of Gāndhārī manuscripts.

No doubt some of the conclusions presented in this volume too will eventually be disproven or superseded by other discoveries and analyses. The study, translation, and publication of many Gandhāran manuscripts is currently being pursued by scholars in several countries. Moreover, besides the manuscripts and collections described in this book, it is known that a large number of others are held in private hands, and there is reason to hope that many of these will eventually become available for scholarly study. But the work is by its nature slow and painstaking, and the number of Gāndhārī manuscripts that have been fully published and translated is still only a fraction of the whole. We can, however, be sure that many more insights into the history of Buddhism will gradually emerge from these efforts, and it is to be hoped that a further anthology of translations of Gāndhārī texts will be compiled at some point in the future, which will build on this one and correct whatever needs to be corrected in it.

It only remains to put the Gandhāran manuscripts into a broader perspective. The new discoveries and the several scholarly projects involving them are only one part of a larger enterprise involving the study of a vast number of Buddhist manuscripts of all sorts that have been discovered or become newly available to scholars in recent years.

Besides the Gāndhārī works, several other projects in various European and Asian countries and in the United States are studying and publishing materials such as the enormous body of Sanskrit manuscripts from Bamiyan, important new manuscripts from the Gilgit region including a complete text of the Sanskrit Dīrghāgama, and a large collection of previously unavailable Sanskrit texts from Tibet.

It is no exaggeration to say that we are living and working in a golden age of Buddhist studies, and there is every reason to hope that this golden age will continue for many years to come. <>

Mount Wutai: Visions of a Sacred Buddhist Mountain by Wen-shing Chou [Princeton University Press, 9780691178646]

The northern Chinese mountain range of Mount Wutai has been a preeminent site of international pilgrimage for over a millennium. Home to more than one hundred temples, the entire range is considered a Buddhist paradise on earth, and has received visitors ranging from emperors to monastic and lay devotees. Mount Wutai explores how Qing Buddhist rulers and clerics from Inner Asia, including Manchus, Tibetans, and Mongols, reimagined the mountain as their own during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Wen-Shing Chou examines a wealth of original source materials in multiple languages and media--many never before published or translated—such as temple replicas, pilgrimage guides, hagiographic representations, and panoramic maps. She shows how literary, artistic, and architectural depictions of the mountain permanently transformed the site's religious landscape and redefined Inner Asia's relations with China. Chou addresses the pivotal but previously unacknowledged history of artistic and intellectual exchange between the varying religious, linguistic, and cultural traditions of the region. The reimagining of Mount Wutai was a fluid endeavor that proved central to the cosmopolitanism of the Qing Empire, and the mountain range became a unique site of shared diplomacy, trade, and

religious devotion between different constituents, as well as a spiritual bridge between China and Tibet.

A compelling exploration of the changing meaning and significance of one of the world's great religious sites, Mount Wutai offers an important new framework for understanding Buddhist sacred geography.

Excerpt: The multiple replicas, translations, lineages, and visions explored in the foregoing chapters collectively present a vista of the mountain that is contingent, expansive, and open. Each reimagining of the mountain in the forms of temples, images, guidebooks, hagiographies, and maps mirrors the broad visions and aspirations of their makers and users. These visions mediate how Mount Wutai has been perceived in ways that are dialogical to one another and to the physical site itself. The Qing Qianlong emperor sought to transfer and to transform Mount Wutai from a millennium-old residence of Manjusrī into that of his own. As chapter 1 demonstrates, he did so through appropriating the synecdochical efficacy of a miraculous icon. When combined with his scriptural translation and gazetteer compilation, Qianlong's embodiment of Mount Wutai's resident deity makes it amply clear that he did not simply acknowledge the appellation of "Manjughosa-emperor" given to him by the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, but reformulated his own interpretation of this bestowed title by fashioning an imperial Buddhist tradition out of it, with the intention not merely to appeal to his Tibetan subjects, but to enact the role of a universal Buddhist emperorship that subsumes all peoples, teachings, and traditions. The numinous potential of Mount Wutai was also of great import to the Tibetan, Monguor, and Mongol Gelukpa scholars living on or peregrinating the mountain, as seen in chapter 2. Out of the desire to encounter the great bodhisattva, they turned their attention toward Chinese language records that detail the physical and numinous topography of past encounters with Manjusri. Their efforts culminated in a selective translation of a Chinese gazetteer that displays at once a deft understanding of Chinese literature and a concern for the legibility of the Chinese text to their Tibetan- and Mongolian-language audience who are seeking to use the text as a pilgrimage guide to the mountain. At the same time, the work contributed to the construction of a Pan-Gelukpa, Tibetan Buddhist identity that could also encompass Chinese Buddhist history. From the point of view of the Gelukpa writers, the shared veneration of Manjusrī at Mount Wutai promises a bridging of the divide between history of Mount Wutai and their own traditions. The popular reception of the guidebook speaks to the success of this translation.

The interest on the part of Inner Asian pilgrims to see Mount Wutai in terms of its Chinese-language history and geography runs parallel to the veneration of the Gelukpa teacher Rölpé Dorjé, and the mapping of his sectarian and reincarnation lineages onto the landscape, as explored in chapter 3. Just like the Mongour polymath himself, portrayals of Rölpé Dorjé and his lineages of relations lie at the intersection of the multiple genres and media of Qing court art and of Tibetan Buddhist hagiography. In all of them, Mount Wutai plays a central role. I have thus argued to see Rölpé Dorjé's hagiography as a representation of the mountain. The imperial, scholarly, and hagiographical visions of Mount Wutai all found their way onto multilingual panoramic maps of the mountain. As the final chapter of this book shows, pilgrims everywhere collected, copied, venerated, and indeed relied on prints of one particular map image, which became the most authoritative image to mediate access to the mountain in the nineteenth century. The map image thrived not on simplicity or easy legibility, but on its comprehensiveness, precision, and pictorial fluency across multiple cartographic and visual traditions. It embodied and reinforced the cosmopolitan identity of a community of the map's makers and users, who were the authorities for disseminating knowledge about the site. Coextensively and congruently, architectural, ritual, and artistic copies—linguistic translation of the accumulated Chinese historical past, commemoration of the sustained physical presence of a master on the mountain, and detailed maps of the site and its various landmarks, routes, and miracles— all informed an Inner Asian understanding of Mount Wutai that was based not on abstract ideas but on first-hand encounters and received knowledge about Mount Wutai. They subsequently mapped the mountain beyond the boundaries of empirical time and space, connecting

it to other places and times within the Sino-Tibetan world, thereby bridging a previously wide gap between a religious, scriptural vision and a physical, historical reality. That the map carved by a Mongol lama eventually became the locus of Mount Wutai's knowledge production in the nineteenth century demonstrates the full extent to which Inner Asians identified with the northern Chinese mountain and made it their own. At a time when many parts of Mongolia and Tibet had recently became part of the Qing empire, Mount Wutai thus provided the Qing Inner Asians a unique space to engage with, and to reinvent their own genealogies and identities in relation to, the history and geography of China proper.

The promise of Mount Wutai's open space also transcends the shifting geopolitical, economic, and religious institutional structures of the Qing and beyond. Since the mid-1980s, the mountain has once again emerged as an important site of Tibetan Buddhism in eastern China in the wake of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that had virtually decimated all religious practice on the mountain: In spite of the very different realities of post—Cultural Revolution China, Mount Wutai emerges once again as a gateway between China and Tibet, and one of the only places in China proper to attract Tibetan pilgrims in large numbers. An extraordinary pilgrimage to Mount Wutai in 1987 led by the Tibetan charismatic teacher Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok (1933-2004; hereafter, Khenpo Jikpün) of the Nyingmapa tradition illustrates the revisionist potentials of pilgrimage to Mount Wutai in contemporary China. Khenpo Jikpün's arrival with tens of thousands of his disciples from Eastern Tibet was an unusual feat. It took place during a period of conflict between Chinese and Tibetan groups in the wake of the decades-long religious persecution after Tibet came under the rule of the Chinese Communist government in 1951.3 In addition to their language barriers and the near impossibility of transprovincial travel for a large religious group, what support there was on the mountain for Tibetan Buddhism had been reserved for the Gelukpas (owing to the history of Qing-Gelukpa dominance, explored in this book), not for monks from the Nyingmapa tradition. Nevertheless, Khenpo Jikpün's more than three months' stay at Mount Wutai played a significant role in reviving Tibetan Buddhism on the mountain, and helped to reconsecrate the sanctity of the politically restrictive and physically devastated ground. Correspondingly, the pilgrimage became remembered as the decisive turning point in the career of one of the most influential Buddhist leaders inside Tibet in the second half of the twentieth century. I close with a brief consideration of this event.' By examining a pilgrimage that represents yet a different tradition of envisioning the mountain from those of the Qing-Gelukpa or Chinese Buddhist, and under vastly different circumstances, my goal here is to highlight what remains the same—the means and mechanisms by which the sanctity of the mountain continues to manifest.

Khenpo Jikpün was the revered founder of the ecumenical Tibetan Buddhist academy of Larung Gar in Golok Serta on the eastern reach of the Tibetan plateau in the present-day Sichuan province,6 which became the single largest Buddhist institution in modern China. He belonged to a Nyingmapa tradition of visionary Buddhism in which treasure-revealers, known as Tertons, discover and conceal ancient texts and treasures, known as terma (gter ma), in the forms of physical objects buried underground or texts spontaneously recited through revelatory visions.' Due to the site-specific nature of these activities, Khenpo Jikpün achieved, as David Germano has characterized, an innovative and successful regeneration of Tibetan Buddhist identity inside the People's Republic of China. His 1987 pilgrimage to Mount Wutai and expansion of his visionary activities to Han Chinese areas were thus part of the larger project of recentering Tibet's fragmented modern religious identity and cultural geography through an inversion of Chinese migrations into Tibetan areas and the reclaiming of a Tibetan presence in northern China. Germano's model of Tibetan identity rejuvenation against the destructive forces of Chinese urbanism and Tibetan refugeedom complements Khenpo Jikpün's own stated reasons for the trip to Mount Wutai—providing spiritual aid to China and strengthening his connection with Manjusrī. Indeed, this responsibility to bring (and then reveal and conceal) the teachings of the Buddha in a time and a place of need, as well as

the ability to reestablish a connection Tibetan masters had been making for centuries up until the Chinese Communist revolution, also informed a sense of Tibetan pride." His pilgrimage to Mount Wutai subsequently marked the beginning of his teachings and discipleship outside Tibet, and the most significant expansion of his academy in size and number.

The host of political, logistical, and linguistic challenges to traveling to Mount Wutai is mirrored in an abundance of dreams, prophecies, and visionary encounters that detail the extensive preparations that culminated in the physical pilgrimage to Mount Wutai. In fact, Khenpo Jikpün was known to have traveled to Mount Wutai three times previously through a form of meditative dreaming, memories of which later helped him to navigate around the mountain: A string of events prompted him to disregard the warning of his elders to enter what was referred to as "the demon land" of Han China. In one, Manjusrī appeared and instructed Khenpo Jikpün to go to Mount Wutai during an empowerment (a ritual initiation of disciples into a particular tantric practice) of the Magical Net of Manjusrī (Tibetan: 'Jam dpal sgyu phrul drwa ba), an esoteric teaching cycle he delivered to more than one thousand disciples in 1986. During that time, after reportedly levitating three feet above the ground and descending back down to his seat, he informed his disciples that Manjusri and Vimalamitra, the eighth-century Indian scholar of the Great Perfection, personally had come from Mount Wutai to extend an invitation to them, and prophesized the arrival of many Han Chinese disciples at the Larung Academy. In order to generate the right conditions for such a visit, Khenpo encouraged all monasteries to perform thousands of ritual evocations of Manjusrī. On yet another occasion, the protector deity Yamãntaka (Tibetan: gshin rje fished) at the sacred mountain of Sotok (Bso thog) north of the city of Kardzé, offered him a guidebook to Mount Wutai in anticipation of his visit there, Once at Mount Wutai, Khenpo Jikpün gave mass teachings and empowerments, transmitted texts and practices, made numerous ritual offerings, underwent intensive retreats, experienced spectacular private and public visions, concealed and revealed religious treasures, all of which were detailed by his biographers and documented by photography. When he returned to Larung Gar with a small group of Han Chinese followers — the initial members of Khenpo Jikpün's Chinese-language discipleship, who numbered more than one thousand by 2001—he consecrated a surrogate Mount Wutai in the hills behind the Larung Gar Academy. Today, it remains the pilgrimage destination of choice for students and visitors, continuing a tradition of creating visual, architectural, and spatial "replicas" of Mount Wutai that began as early as the pilgrimage cult of Mount Wutai itself in the seventh century.

Indeed, spectacular narratives of Khenpo Jikpün's pilgrimage rehearse what are by now familiar tropes, rituals, and techniques of encountering Mount Wutai's resident bodhisattva. Seen everywhere from poetry and paintings of medieval Dunhuang to accounts of the Ming and Qing emperors' visits to Mount Wutai, magnificent apparitions of Manjusrī in the sky, accompanied by radiant play of light on clouds, saturate narratives of Khenpo Jikpün's stay on the mountain. These visual and textual descriptions of the happenings weave together a language of vision that not only serves to document past events but also prescribes future encounters with Manjusri. With the perpetuation of this mutually reinforcing interrelationship between image and vision for more than a millennium across Pan-Buddhist Asia, these miracles had become immediately recognizable, to such an extent that even witnesses who had come to Mount Wutai for the first time expected them to occur. For example, in one of the visions, which Khenpo Jikpün had attained after a three-week retreat at the Sudhana Cave, Manjusri was described as follows:

> The primordial wisdom manifestation of all the Buddhas of the three times, wearing a five-Buddha crown, with one face and two arms, holding a scripture in his left hand and raising the wisdom sword in his right, sitting in the vajra posture, fully adorned with Sambhogakãya garment, abiding in a peaceful manner.

At the moment of his vision, he was said to have spontaneously uttered a praise poem to Manjusri, which was jotted down by his disciples, translated

into Chinese and Mongolian for his non-Tibetan disciples, and placed on the walls of the Sudhana Cave, along with a triad of sculptural images of him, Sudhana, and Manjusri. The location was significant. Records make clear that the poem had issued forth from Khenpo's mouth at the same exalted spot where Sudhana met Manjusrī, and where numerous early masters of the Great Perfection lineage meditated. Furthermore, this took place on the morning of the anniversary of the passing of Mipham Rinpoche (1846-1912), whom Khenpo Jikpün recognized as his primary teacher by visionary means. By receiving a vision of Manjusrī where and when he did, Khenpo both affirmed himself as one in a long lineage of teachers and brought back to Mount Wutai the historical period of the introduction of Buddhism to Tibet in the eighth century, when the Tibetan empire was at the height of its strength and many eminent Indian teachers were invited to teach in Tibet. Although the Sudhana Cave had received little or no attention until the eighteenth century, the evocation of eighth-century Tibet propelled it into an alternative spatial and temporal dimension that transcends history and records in gazetteers. Detailed descriptions, photographic documentations, iconic images, and poetic verses generated from visionary encounters such as this one collectively affirm the presence of a spiritual lineage linking Khenpo to Manjusri. They attest to the notion that Khenpo Jikpün was at once a disciple and a manifestation of Manjusrī, an understanding of the interdependent identities and manifestations of all forms by which Tsongkhapa, Rölpé Dorjé, and Qianlong were also portrayed in their hagiographies.

The iconography of Khenpo Jikpün's visions, consistent with that of the many images offered by Khenpo Jikpün and his disciples throughout the mountain range, bears the cultural marker of a Tibetan rather than a Chinese manifestation. Just as displays of light in the sky affirm Manjusri's continuous and undeniable presence at Mount Wutai in a very public way, the ubiquitous presence of sculptural images of deities and saintly figures placed there by Khenpo Jikpün during his stay reinforces his presence and traces his spiritual lineage to Manjusri and an entire pantheon of religious teachers long after he left Mount Wutai. Like records of visions and miracles, these acts of image making were aimed at furthering Khenpo Jikpün's connection to Manjusrī and the presence of Tibetan Buddhism at Mount Wutai, as were subsequent images of Khenpo Jikpün that his disciples placed at various temples at Mount Wutai. Even though most of the halls and temples at Mount Wutai are no longer maintained by Tibetan Buddhist monks from Tibet and Mongolia, as they had been during the Qing dynasty (and some through the early Republican periods, when the mountain was still dominated by lamas from Mongolia and Tibet), and sculpted images from the Qing period and before are no longer present, these images offered by Khenpo and his disciples throughout the Wutai mountain range have formed a new corpus of Tibetan Buddhist holy objects that draw pilgrims to the site. The mapping of one's spiritual lineages onto the mountain range has been seen in a variety of objects explored in this book. Whether it is through depictions of previous masters on a panoramic map of Mount Wutai, or by evoking their names in the guidebook, hagiography, or praise poem of the mountain range, the invocation of earlier figures, and now through the materialization of their presence, the host of figures, with their varied origins, teachings, practices, and networks, also expands the spatial and temporal capacity of the mountain.

Stories of visionary encounters, intended to inspire faith in the devotees, directly results in the revelation and transmission of teachings. Manjusrī's instructions to Khenpo Jikpün led to many spontaneously uttered teachings. According to the Nyingmapa tradition of treasure-revelation, the provenance of these teachings is considered divine in the same way sacred objects and images are miraculously revealed. These teachings were treasures attributed to Khenpo Jikpün's spiritual teachers and predecessors, such as Manjusrī and Padmasambhava, the renowned Indian tantric adept who was invited to Tibet in the eighth century to found Tibet's first monastery at Samye, and who subsequently buried many treasures in Tibet. In general, treasures were believed to have been buried (either in the ground or in the mind of the future revealer) during the eighth century, when

Buddhism first flourished in Tibet, a period when the Tibetan empire was at its greatest military might and territorial extent. As an accomplished treasure-revealer, Khenpo therefore had been entrusted with the mission of uncovering these previously buried treasures at the appropriate time. He carried his practice of treasure-revelation beyond the conventional boundaries of Tibet over to Mount Wutai, uncovering treasures at various locations on the mountain in the forms of physical objects ("earth treasures;' or sa gter, including sacred texts, votive images, or objects buried or unearthed from the ground) and as spontaneous recitation of texts ("mind treasures," or dgongs gter), which resulted from his revelatory experience of pure visions (dag snang). His activities endowed Mount Wutai with another layer of numinous mystery. Within this visionary tradition, the treasure-revelations became an equally authoritative means of asserting presence—in this case, a Tibetan dynastic presence—as the record of visions and the making of images, adding a new dimension to Mount Wutai's already rich textual and material history.

In addition to uncovering texts and images, Khenpo Jikpün also buried many statues and precious boxes of Buddhist teachings. Just like the treasures he revealed, these concealed treasures would be exposed by a future treasure-revealer in a time of great need for the benefit of sentient beings. Khenpo's activities at Mount Wutai distinguished him from other Tibetan Buddhist treasure-revealers throughout the ages, who rarely practiced their profession outside Tibetan cultural areas:' While the particular tradition of treasure-revelation was introduced into Mount Wutai by Khenpo Jikpüns visit, the idea of Mount Wutai's landscape as a repository for sacred objects and teachings, however, was already firmly established by the seventh century, as has been noted in Raoul Birnbaum's study of the Diamond Grotto. Moreover, the notion that the timely introduction of a sacred text could quell all calamities in troubled times has also been integral to the establishment of the cult of Mount Wutai. The legend of Buddhapāli became such an iconic miracle story from Mount Wutai that by as early as the ninth century in Dunhuang, the figures of Buddhapãli and Manjusrī as the bearded old man became inserted into the iconographic sculptural group of Manjusrī riding a lion from Mount Wutai's Zhenrong Cloister discussed in chapter 1. A virtually identical story exists in Tibetan sources about the twelfth-century South Indian tantric siddha Padampa Sangyé. Padampa Sangyé reenacts Buddhapãli's meeting with Manjusrī in the seventh century, except that this time, the siddha possessing tantric powers had no need to undergo the toils of an arduous round-trip journey to India and back, and traveled instead through the cavity of a rock at Mount Wutai to reach back to Vajrāsana and effectively pacify the epidemics. That Padampa Sangyé could go back to Vajrãsana through the interconnected passageways of caves, rather than via the arduous conventional route, reveals yet again the expansive spatial and temporal dimension in Tibetan religious and literary imagination that acknowledges alternative means of travel and channels of connection between exalted places. The understanding of Mount Wutai's supra-geographical link to other exalted places of the Buddha's teachings, especially to India, served as a backdrop for Khenpo Jikpün's recoveries and concealment of treasures there.

The sites where Khenpo Jikpün experienced visions of Manjusrī and subsequently revealed treasures became several of the most visited sites on the mountain range today for pilgrims from Tibet and Tibetan Buddhist practitioners. Especially after Khenpo Jikpün died in z004, pilgrims and disciples of Khenpo go to these sites to venerate him and to receive blessings from the sites, affirmed and enhanced by Khenpo Jikpün's visionary encounters there. Many of these pilgrimages have been aided and encouraged by a new Tibetan-language guidebook to Mount Wutai written in 2007 by Khenpo Sodargye (Bsod dar rgyas), a chief disciple of Khenpo Jikpün and author of his Chinese- and Tibetan-language biographies. Sodargye consulted the Guide and other sources, but he also included, so far as I am aware, an unprecedented compilation of prophecies about Mount Wutai and journeys there by previous Indian siddhas of the Great Perfection lineage from dynastic Tibet that are most central to the Nyingmapa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. These descriptions, together with extensive descriptions of

Khenpo Jikpün's various activities, transmissions, and visions, did not displace the retelling of miracles and descriptions of sites contained in the Chinese gazetteers. Sodargye not only retained much of the information from the Chinese sources about the sites and their associated miracles but also updated them with apparitions of Manjusrī from the Cultural Revolution era, portraying a landscape with visionary activities that were not slowed down by the decimation of its monasteries and Buddhist practice.

The act of pilgrimage, the visions, the offering of images, and the concealment and revelation of treasures all authenticated Khenpo Jikpün's authority and identity in connection with the Manjusrī. The events were seen as the beginning of Khenpo Jikpün's teachings outside Tibet, not only in China proper but also all over the world. His pilgrimage to Mount Wutai was followed by travels to India, Europe, and the United States. It was also at this time that his institution back home in Eastern Tibet, the Larung Gar Academy, drastically expanded in size and number. The transformative quality of these visionary encounters is evident in the subsequent ways in which Khenpo was identified by his disciples. In the most frequently recited prayer of empowerment at Larung Gar today, Khenpo Jikpün is referred to as none other than "the one who has been empowered by the heart of Manjusrī from the realm of the Five Peaks," connecting him to the topography of Mount Wutai and illustrating how much his journey to Mount Wutai and, in particular, this meeting and merging with Manjusrī had become part of his permanently established identity.

In keeping with the way Mount Wutai has been re-created in various mediums and to various parts of Buddhist Asia since China's middle period, Khenpo Jikpün consecrated a new surrogate Mount Wutai when he returned to the Larung Gar Academy. Known as the "Riwo Tsenga" of Dokham, or the Five-Peak Mountain of Eastern Tibet, Larung Gar's Riwo Tsenga entailed no formal resemblance to Mount Wutai itself. Instead, a "Riwo Tsenga" was created through a ritual touring of the hills behind Larung Gar, led by Khenpo Jikpün, where five local mountain protector deities were invited to dwell on five different peaks. Annual rituals have since been conducted to propitiate these local mountain deities." These protector deities are important to Larung Gar and the surrounding regions, but they bear no direct connection to Mount Wutai. Students at Larung Gar are encouraged to make a pilgrimage circuit of the five hills during their scheduled vacation breaks from the academy. Khenpo Jikpün pointed out to his disciples that because the mountain range provides the same level of empowerment as the Mount Wutai in Shanxi, for those who make a pilgrimage at the five peaks behind Larung Gar, the efficacy would also be equal to that of making a pilgrimage to the actual Mount Wutai. The replication rests not on formal resemblance or connection, but on equal efficacy. In comparison to other mediums of replication, this method of bringing Mount Wutai home may be the least imagistic and referential, but as site of pilgrimage, it elicits an experience of physicality and communitas similar to that of an actual journey to Mount Wutai.

The rhetoric and imageries of sacred empowerment, visionary encounters, treasurerevelations, lineage-inscribed landscape, miraculous aerial occurrences, and replicas of surrogate pilgrimages seen in Khenpo Jikpün's pilgrimage all participate in a long tradition of translating Mount Wutai that can be traced back to the seventh century. At the same time, they are also grounded in specific lineages of a Tibetan visionary tradition. As such, Khenpo Jikpün's transformative pilgrimage both recentered the identity of Tibetan Buddhist geography and reaffirmed an intimate connection with Mount Wutai that was only completely fulfilled after his journey there. His historic 1987 pilgrimage is a contemporary case in point of the reimagining and reshaping of Mount Wutai. Manifestations of seemingly ephemeral or intangible experiences constitute the core of the mountain's identity, defining the ways Mount Wutai came to be viewed in the Tibetan Buddhist world with a power, resilience, and spectacle that outstrips its physical topography, material structure, or holdings. As a compelling response to what is lost and initially far-flung, the pilgrimage demonstrates the potential of an ecumenical religious vision to adapt and transform. <>

The Tibetan Book of Everyday Wisdom: A Thousand Years of Sage Advice by Thupten Jinpa and Beth Newman [Library of Tibetan Classics, Wisdom Publications, 9780861714667]

The Tibetan Book of Everyday Wisdom: A Thousand Years of Sage Advice presents a genre of Tibetan works known as "wise sayings" (*lekshé*). While most Tibetan literature focuses on the Buddhist path, wise sayings literature has traditionally been a centerpiece of secular education in Tibet and in the cultivation of social mores and an honorable way of life. Drawing inspiration from classical Indian literature on human virtue and governance (*nitisastra*), including the folktales in the *Pañcatantra*, the authors of these Tibetan works strove to educate young minds in the ways of the civilized world, especially by distinguishing the conduct of the wise from that of the foolish.

This anthology includes some of the best-loved classics of Tibetan literature, such as Sakya Pandita's *Jewel Treasury of Wise Sayings*, Panchen Sönam Drakpa's *Ganden Wise Sayings*, and Gungthang's *Treatise on Trees* and *Treatise on Water*. The final work is the intriguing *Kaché Phalu's Advice*. Ostensibly written by a wise Tibetan Muslim, this versified text enjoys great popularity within Tibetan-speaking communities, such that many Tibetans are able to recite at least a few verses from memory.

Excerpt:

Our Anthology of Tibetan Wise Sayings

(1) The first text, A Garland of Essential Advice on Societal Values, contains an anthology of practical advice that Dromtönpa (1004-64) gave to his disciple and translator Naktso as the latter was embarking on a long journey to Nepal and India. Naktso tells Dromtönpa that he is quite familiar with the Dharma teachings but would like practical advice on how to deal with people and maintain his composure, as he is bound to encounter all sorts of unpredictable challenges when away from the familiarities of home. (2) The second work in our collection is A Jewel Treasury of Wise Sayings by the great Sakya Pandita (1182—1251), which later came to be known affectionately as the Sakya Lekshé (Sakya Wise Sayings). This seminal text effectively established the tradition of Indian subhãsita literature in the Tibetan language. (3) The third text is the earliest prose commentary on the Jewel Treasury, composed by Rinchen Pal and corrected and revised during Sakya Pandita's lifetime by Martön Chögyal. (4) The fourth work is Ganden Wise Sayings: A Bouquet of White Lotuses by Panchen Sönam Drakpa(1478-1554), a famed scholar and noted historian as well a tutor of the Third Dalai Lama. (5) This is followed by a lengthy prose commentary on the same text by Yangchen Gawai Lodrö (1740-1827). (6) The next is a verse work by the Great Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-82) entitled A Pearl Garland of Advice, containing advice on both the religious norms of Buddhist practice and the worldly norms of human society. (7-8) The next two entries are original works by the great scholar and poet Gungthang Tenpai Drönmé (1762-1823) that use trees and water as metaphors and are thus titled Treatise on Trees and Treatise on Water. (9—10) The ninth and tenth texts, inspired by and fashioned on Gungthang's

two treatises, likewise use elements, in this case wind and earth, and were written by Kyilsur LosangJinpa (b.1821) and Panchen Chökyi Nyima (1883-1937)' respectively. The final text in our anthology is the popular Khaché Phalu's Advice, ostensibly written by a Tibetan Muslim named Phalu Ju (a pseudonym) for the benefit of his fellow Tibetans who are Buddhists.

Despite containing specific advice on Buddhist Dharma, the primary subject matter of all these texts are issues of everyday life and how these should be guided by basic human values, societal norms, and perhaps most importantly, commonsense wisdom. Furthermore, all these texts were written specifically for a lay audience, for whom questions of how to lead a good family life, how to relate to a ruler, how to treat servants, how to conduct such mundane tasks as commerce, and so on are pertinent. The beauty and power of the lekshé texts come from their unique literary style, which shuns the discursive approach and chooses the four-line verse, written in easy Tibetan and often structured so that the first two lines convey a point while the remaining two lines provide a striking analogy. The following from Gungthang's Treatise on Trees illustrates this style:

> For yogis to whom every perception appears as a metaphor,
> there is an abundance of spiritual instruction.
> In clearings within densely forested valleys,
> there is no end to the masses of leaves.

As we will see, the developed form of Tibetan lekshé reveals a strong Indian influence, particularly of the literary genre known as subhãsita, which is in turn a subset of the nitisastras, or treatises on ethics or morals. Subhãsita, or "wise sayings; not only contained "beautiful thoughts but were also drawn and set down in beautiful language."' As for the Indian niti treatises, the influential Sanskrit-English Dictionary by Monier Monier-Williams describes them as dealing with "right or wise or moral conduct or behavior, prudence, policy, political wisdom or science " Niti is a secular category of literature within which the classical Indian tradition organizes the important topics concerning everyday life in a society. They are dharma (law and duty), artha (statecraft, economic policy, and warfare), and niti (common sense and wise judgment). The Sanskrit term niti is, like the word dharma, impossible to translate into a single English word.' The early Tibetan translators chose the Tibetan word lugs, which can mean "norms; "system; "way;' "tradition; and "custom." As shall be explored later, this Indian influence can be discerned in three important aspects of lekshé literature: its poetic form, its similes, and its embedded stories.

Despite the Indian influence, there are clearly indigenous sources for the later lekshé writings traceable to pre-Buddhist Tibetan oral tradition, with its rich repertoire of stories, proverbs, and pithy sayings. For example, when it comes to the morals or values themselves, even a later text like Gungthang's Treatise on Water displays extensive influence from indigenous Tibetan sensibilities and norms. We know from anthropological studies of ancient preliterate peoples that stories and pithy sayings play a crucial role in perpetuating the values and norms of a given society across generations, and Tibet is no exception. We have explicit acknowledgment of this in Tibet's early historical writings. For example, according to the Deu History (Lde'u chos 'byung), a text dateable to the twelfth or thirteenth century, the Tibetan polity was governed through narratives or stories (sgrung), symbolic languages (Ide'u), and rituals (bon) during the rule of the first twenty-seven kings. Here "symbolic languages" refers to a host of sayings whereby a key point is made through an oblique or metaphoric reference. For example, if you wish to emphasize the need to cultivate a resource before you need it, you could say, "A cow to be milked in summer should be fed from winter onward." And if you wish to tell someone that he is caught in a no-win fight, you could say, "If you hit a rock with butter, the butter loses; and if you hit butter with a rock, the butter loses as well."'

Societal Values and Dromtönpa's "Garland of Essential Advice"

Thus while today most classically educated Tibetans think of Tibetan lekshé as inspired by Indian nitis'ãstra, Sakya Pandita's Treasury being the archetypical example, the story is more complex, with Tibet's indigenous tradition of stories and pithy sayings finding their way into later lekshé works as

well. We also have two known earlier texts that display hardly any awareness or influence of Indian wisdom literature. One is Dromtönpa's Garland of Essential Advice, featured in our volume, while the second is a remarkable secular work in prose, in the format of questions and answers between two brothers, found among the cache of Tibetan texts disovered in the Dunhuang caves at the turn of the last century.' A central concept in these two Tibetan texts is mi chos (pronounced micho, lit. "human dharma"), a term that can be translated as "human virtues" or "human values" or "societal values." In its original use, and as intended in these works, this term seems to be understood in contrast to lha chos (pronounced lhachö), which could be translated as "religious virtues" or "religious values." 'What is a societal value as opposed to a religious value, and how might one differentiate between the two? We find the following brief definition in Dromtönpa's text:

> Wherever you travel, in whatever direction,
> wherever you make camp or find a place to stay,
> whoever you seek to befriend or associate with,
> being considerate of others is the basis of societal values.

Here Dromtönpa identifies being considerate of others as the fundamental societal value. Thus any attitude and behavior that promotes mutual consideration could be understood as part of societal values.

The context of Dromtönpa's advice allows us to understand clearly what he meant by "societal values" (mi chos). As recorded in the text's preamble, the advice was ostensibly given by Dromtönpa at the behest of Naktso Lotsāwa, who asks specifically for advice on human norms. Naktso states that when it comes to things that need to be done on the Dharma front, for the sake of his future life, he knows what to do. What he would like instead is advice on how to deal with people in a way that is in accord with the norms of civil society, so as to get along with people while living in a foreign country. After identifying consideration of others as the root of societal values, Dromtönpa offers specific examples of what might promote mutual harmony. He lists the following: not boasting about one's accomplishments or what one has done for others, not belittling others, not showing off one's wealth, not coveting the wealth of others and having less greed, refraining from insulting both the learned and the untaught, having less pride and conceit, being humble and easy to engage with, being consonant with others whatever tasks one might be engaged in, respecting the collective laws of society, and maintaining confidence with respect to matters that need to be kept secret.

The text then spells out more specifically how these social norms and human values provide criteria by which one can differentiate between wise and foolish behavior. Drawing on these values, Dromtönpa offers a series of specific verses to Naktso Lotsāwa on how he might best navigate the challenges he will encounter during his time away from home. What is remarkable about Dromtönpa's text is that, despite his initimate familiarity with Indian Buddhist literature, his close association with the Bengali master Atisa, and his reading knowledge of Sanskrit, there is very little detectable Indic influence on his advice text with respect to content, literary style, or even the metaphors used. The text is as indigenously Tibetan as it can get, except for the concluding reference to having "inscribed these wise utterances in the lanca script, a form of Indian writing.

The second early Tibetan work, the Dunhuang text Advice from an Elder Brother to His Younger Brother, is not included in this volume. It is at least a century or so older than Dromtönpa's text.' This notable work of prose is composed in old Tibetan. The preamble sets the specific context, which is strikingly similar to that of Dromtönpa's text. In the opening scene the younger brother has to go elsewhere to do important work and is concerned that missing his brother might be too painful. As he prepares to leave, he asks his older brother for advice from a wise, experienced man to an inexperienced brother. In a long exchange of questions and answers, the older brother offers his younger sibling advice on life, family, relationships, society, and leadership.

Although the first exchange has a strong Buddhist flavor—"What is the best form of happiness in a human life? Mental happiness is the highest form of happiness"—the exhanges then move quickly to

matters of life, family, relationships, society, and leadership. Speaking of society, the older brother defines a just kingdom as fair rule. He goes on to explain how fairness is essential for anyone who wishes to lead. One of the remarkable features of these exchanges is the clear differentiation drawn between key terms like "just" (drang) and "fair" (snyoms), and being "wise" (mdzangs), "intelligent" or "learned" (mkhas). Of all the qualities of a leader, fairness is said to be the most important, and a leader should be as fair as the sky that makes no discrimination against anyone. In the course of these discussions, the crucial term mi chos is introduced with the following exchange:

> Younger brother: What are human values and what are the opposites of human values?
> Elder brother: Human values are being just and serving others, being honest and truthful, being compassionate and devoid of contempt for others, being conscientious and having a regard for your own legacy, and being kindhearted and diligent. If you possess these, everyone will find you appealing, and you will enjoy stability at home and in your community. What are the opposites of human values? Being unjust and aggressive, being unreliable, having no conscience or regard for your own legacy, not knowing compassion and delighting in belittling others, being conceited and indolent. These are the opposites of human values. Anyone who possesses these will be unappealing to others."

Reacting to his older brother's explanation, the younger brother expresses skepticism: Love of service could be a form of flattery, and honesty a form of polite trickery. Even out of compassion, aren't there some things one should not tolerate? Could aggression be a form of heroism?

The Concept of `Mi chos"

As we saw above, the term mi chos is composed of mi, "humans; and chos, the Tibetan equivalent of the Sanskrit word dharma. The meanings of dharma range from "duty" and "norm" to "law; "virtue," "attribute," "thing," and even "reality." The word dharma is derived from the root syllable dhr, which means to "hold or maintain; hence dharma means something that upholds its reality, whether it is a thing or law. Etymologically, the Tibetan chos connotes "transformation" or "change," and over time the term came to be used as referring to Buddhism in contrast to Bön, Tibet's pre-Buddhist native religion. Thus we read of the "dispute between Dharma and Bön" (chos dang bon gyi rtsod pa). This said, there is adequate textual evidence to suggest that around the eighth century, at least, the word chos (dharma) was being used more as a generic term referring to a system of beliefs and practices, wherein the "great religion" (chos chen po) of Buddhsim is contrasted against "small religions" (chos chung ngu) of ritual-based native beliefs. Given the state of our current knowledge, however, it is difficult to determine whether this usage as a generic term predates the arrival of Buddhism. Understanding chos to mean a system of beliefs and practices, mi chos would then refer to a system of beliefs and practices associated with human society. Hence my translation as "societal" or "human values."

Tibetan historians trace the terms mi chos (societal human values) and lha chos (divine religious values) all the way to the seventh century and the activities of the Tibetan emperor Songtsen Gampo. They recognize the formulations of common laws and societal values as one of the great civilizing achievements of this emperor, others being the invention of a writing system, standardization of a measurement system, and the building of the great Lhasa temple. Songtsen is also credited with promulgating the "ten vir¬tues of divine religious values" (lha chos dge ba bcu) and the "sixteen pristine societal values" (mi chosgtsang ma bcu drug). The ten virtues are abstention from the ten negative actions of body, speech, and mind: killing, stealing, sexual misconduct; telling lies, engaging in divisive speech, harsh speech, and senseless gossip; and covetousness, harmful intent, and wrong views. Abstention from these deeds constitutes divine religious values since they pertain to one's fate in future lives.

In contrast, mi chos or societal values relate more specifically to the wellbeing and health of a person in this life within society. The sixteen societal or human values are (1) cultivating reverence for the Three Jewels, (2) seeking and following the sublime Dharma, (3) repaying the kindness of one's parents,

(4) having respect for those who are learned, (5) honoring those who have higher staus and who are older, (6) helping one's neighbors and fellow natives, (7) speaking with fairness and being humble, (8) being loyal to one's family and friends, (9) emulating civilized people and maintaining a longterm view, (10) practicing moderation in food and wealth, (11) remembering those who have shown you kindness, (12) repaying debts on time and not tampering with measuring scales, (13) curtailing envy toward others, (14) ignoring bad suggestions and maintaining personal integrity, (15) using gentle speech and avoiding excessive talk, and (16) maintaining a resilient and courageous mind."

Most of these sixteen values have to do with promoting greater societal well-being and living one's life with dignity, honesty, and respect for others. Even the first two, though ostensibly religious in nature, could be perceived as crucial to a society in which faith and loyalty to Buddhism are deemed essential for greater societal cohesion and meaning. As we will see below, this concept of a dual value system, of human society and religion—mi chos and lha chos—evolved into the concept of dual norms (lugsgnyis)—worldly secular norms (jig rten gyi lugs) and Buddhist religious norms (chos kyi lugs)—in the Tibetan lekshé literature. Although the word lugs ("norms") is the Tibetan equivalent of the Sanskrit niti, its usage framed in a dual system of secular and religious standards appears to be a Tibetan invention. This brings us to the question of the relationship between the Tibetan lekshé genre and the Indian wisdom literature the nītikistras.

Sakya Pandita's Treasury and the Indian Wisdom Literature

There is no doubt that Sakya Pandita's Jewel Treasury of Wise Sayings is the first Tibetan text to be composed in the style of Indian wisdom literature, and the explicit use of the word lekshé (subhāsita, or "wise sayings") in the title indicates this close association. By Sakya Pandita's time several well-known works of Indian wisdom literature had already been translated into Tibetan. These include, among others, the famed Cānakya Treatise on Kingship (Cānakyarājānitikistra), A Hundred Stanzas on Wisdom (Prajfiāfataka), Staff of Wisdom (Prajnadanda),'7 and A Drop to Nourish a Person (Jantuposanabindu)—the latter three attributed to Nãgārjuna—as well a Nitisāstra (Treatise on Norms) by Masiiraksa. Of these, the first was translated in the eleventh century, the next three in the ninth century, and the final work sometime in the tenth century. There is no doubt that these Tibetan translations of Indian wisdom literature served as an important source for the composition of the Jewel Treasury. Contemporary scholars have identified some thirty-two stanzas in Sakya Pandita's Jewel Treasury that have parallels in Indian wisdom literature.

As noted above, I see three areas where a Tibetan lekshé work such as the Jewel Treasury displays a direct influence from the Indian wisdom literature. First and foremost is the unique poetic form that was adopted directly from Indian wisdom texts such as A Hundred Stanzas on Wisdom. Within a fourline, seven-syllable verse, an important piece of wisdom is shared followed by an analogy that often references a story. In Dandin's Mirror of Poetics (Kavyādarsa) classification of the use of similes in Sanskrit poetry, a system introduced to Tibet first by Sakya Pandita himself, this particular usage is called "simile in the form of a parallel" (zla bo dgnos poi dpe). The following two examples, the first from the Jewel Treasury and second from the Sanskrit Hundred Stanzas on Wisdom, illustrate this distinctive poetic form:

> A wicked man can destroy in an instant
> a treaty reached through the effort of great men.
> Hail can reduce to dust in an instant
> lands tended by farmers for months and years. (Treasury, 33)
> …
> In whom the eyes of wisdom have opened,
> for them misfortunes will come to cease;
> just as in front of someone holding a lamp
> there can be no darkness at all. (Hundred Stanzas, 9)

Although we do see seven-syllable verses in Tibetan prior to the Jewel Treasury, I know of no original Tibetan work composed in this unique lekshé poetic form prior to the Treasury. It is Sakya Pandita's Jewel Treasury that gave birth to this particular genre of indigenous Tibetan literature. The poetic form was adopted as the standard

format in which later Tibetan wise sayings were composed.

The second area of Indian influence on Tibetan wise sayings can be seen in the choice of metaphors or similes used in these texts. Whether it is the metaphor of "a hungry tiger's growl paralyzing and bringing down a monkey from a tree" (Treasury, 102) or "the scent of sandalwood trees blown by wind across the ten directions" (Treasury, 31), many of the analogies used in the Tibetan wise-sayings texts are clearly Indian in origin. Indic similes, so abundant in Indian wisdom texts such as A Hundred Stanzas on Wisdom, are appropriated by Tibetan authors and used in their own compositions. This is not to say that the Tibetan authors do not use analogies drawn from Tibet's own geographical, cultural, and historical resources.

The third area where we discern a powerful Indic influence is in the stories that are referenced in the second halves of many verses. Take the following example from the Jewel Treasury:

> If you know how it's done, how can it be hard
> to employ even the great as your servants?
> Even though a garda is very powerful,
> the golden-clad one made him his mount.
> (Treasury, 17)

The story of how the Hindu god Visnu made the powerful garda bird his mount is drawn from the ancient Indian Purāna (or origin myths) literature. There are two categories within these embedded stories. The first includes stories of such as myths of the Hindu gods, while the second are moral tales, often of animals, found in such well-known Indian works as the Pancatantra, attributed to Visnusarma, and its popular later version known as Hitopadesa. Although none of the Hindu Purānas were translated into Tibetan, thanks to Tibetan translations of works such as Prajnāvarman's extensive commentaries on the two hymns to the Buddha, Praise of the Exalted (Vifesastava) and Praise of the One More Perfect Than the Gods (Devātisayastotra), which both contain many of these Purina stories, the Tibetan authors and readers were familiar with many of the well-known Purāna stories.

As for the animal stories found in the Paficatantra and their use in Tibetan wisdom literature, the situation is little more complex. To begin with, not only was the Paficatantra never translated into Tibetan, but nowhere does any classical Tibetan author of wisdom literature, including Sakya Pandita himself, make any reference to this important Indian work. There is a pass¬ing mention of the Paficatantra in Sakya Pandora's biography, where this text is listed alongside other Indian wisdom literature he is supposed to have studied with his teacher and uncle Drakpa Gyaltsen. However, given that most of the animal stories cited in the Tibetan wise sayings can be found in the jātakas, the birth stories of the Buddha's former lives, or in the canonical Vinaya texts, which are filled with stories (avadāna) illustrating karmic consequences, most likely it is the Buddhist sources that served as the resource for Sakya Pandita rather than the Paficatantra. One popular collection of jātaka and avādana literature in the Tibetan scriptures is the Sutra on the Wise and the Foolish (Damamūkanidānasūtra), translated from Chinese. In addition, two important Indian works on the jātakas—Āryasura's Gar¬land of Birth Stories (Jātakamālā) and Ksemendra's Wish-Granting Tree (Avadānakalpalatā)—are available in the Tibetan Tengyur, the collection of Indian Buddhist works translated into Tibetan.

To return to the Jewel Treasury itself, Sakya Pandita succinctly defines what he means by "wise sayings," the subject of his text, in the second open¬ing stanza:

> This exposition is a jewel treasury of wise sayings
> pertaining to how respectable people behave,
> which, when examined with reason, does not contradict religion
> and helps accomplish all worldly activities.

Similarly, toward the end of the Jewel Treasury, the author returns to this same point about the synergy between secular worldly ethics and religious Buddhist practice:

> A person who thoroughly understands worldly activity
> is adept in the method of the holy Dharma.

> Thus the practice of the Dharma is indeed the way of life of the bodhisattvas. (457)

So, according to this definition, lekshé are wise sayings that, while not contradicting Buddhist teachings, help a person accomplish his or her worldly pursuits. This echoes a verse from the Indian text Hundred Stanzas on Wisdom, where we read:

> If you properly practice human ethics,
> the journey to the god realm will not be long.
> If you thus ascend the stairs of men and gods,
> even the liberation of nirvāna will be close by. (98)

With this understanding of lekshé as wise sayings that help a person to accomplish his or her pursuits, the Jewel Treasury can be seen as consisting of two main parts—the domain of secular worldly aims (chapters 1-8) and the domain of Buddhist religious practice (chapter 9). The overarching theme in the first part revolves around the characteristics and conduct of the wise, the learned, and the cultured, on the one hand, and the foolish, the ignoble, and the uncultured, on the other. The characteristics of an intelligent, wise person are given in chapter 1, followed in chapter 2 by the characteristics of a cultured, civilized, and honorable person. In chapter 3 we then find an analysis of the characteristics that make a person foolish, imprudent, and unwise. Having identified the differences between the wise and the foolish, the cultured and the uncultured, chapter 4 provides a series of comparisons between these two types of people. In chapter 5 the author elaborates on the theme of the preceding chapter and offers a separate arate treatment on the actions and deeds that are bad and dishonorable. Chapter 6, the second longest in the text, presents a series of what might be called commonsense wisdom drawn from tendencies that can be observed in people and the world. Some of the analogies cited in this chapter are the most memorable ones, my favorite being the statement that although we have eyes to look at others, we need a mirror to look at ourselves (193). Chapter 7 identifies conduct that is undesirable and unseemly from the point of view of societal values and norms of decency. Chapter 8, the longest in the text, contains the greatest quantity of explicit advice addressed to the reader, and many lines are phrased in the imperative "do this" and "don't do that" (bya and mi bya in Tibetan). The final chapter covers many key topics of Buddhist interest, such as taking refuge in the Buddha, the importance of generosity, appreciating the opportunities of birth as a human, awareness of death and impermanence, respecting the law of karma, dealing with anger, the value of studying the Dharma, the need for wisdom, and so on.

Drigung Rinchen Pal's commentary, featured in this volume, identifies three principal goals behind Sakya Pandita's composition of the Jewel Treasury. One is to illustrate the use of metaphors or similes, so essential in poetry.

Second is to teach Buddhist Dharma based on the approach of the Indian nītisāstras. Third is to offer the Tibetans a gift of verses on wise sayings akin to the ones found in India, "in regions lying to the south" (lho phyogs kyi rgyud) of Tibet, where scholars utter wise sayings as a mark of learning when they meet each other and when they are in the presence of the king at the court. Ever since its appearance the Jewel Treasury has enjoyed a widespread popularity among Tibetans. Unlike India and China, Tibet's two ancient neighbors with long civilizations, there is very little secular literature in Tibet's vast, written, language-based high culture. So a large part of theJewel Treasury's appeal and reputation probably came from the fact that the work is essentially secular in nature, and the rarity of that in Tibet made it a great gift to the educated lay elite.

Sakya Pandita's close personal association with the Mongol court also meant that his Jewel Treasury attracted the attention of the Mongolians; the work was rendered into Mongolian quite early. Some of the aphorisms that are part of the Treasury are even said to have found their way into Mongolian folk songs.

In Tibet it became a tradition for many people, especially those training to become lay officials, to memorize key parts of the Treasury. Writers would cite poignant verses to articulate particular points: "Until you beat a drum / what distinguishes it from other objects?" (verse 6), "Do not give up your former abode / before proper evaluation of another place. / Raising a foot without first planting the other / can cause you to fall" (verse

331), and so on. Most important, the Treasury ushered in an entirely new literary genre in Tibet, directly inspiring works such as Panchen Sönam Drakpa's Ganden Wise Sayings and Gungthang's Treatise on Trees and Treatise on Water.

One footnote to Sakya Pandita's Jewel Treasury is its relationship with his other lesser-known verse work Necklace for the Youth: Derentiations of People. This shorter work in five chapters is also composed in four-line, seven-syllable verse but not using the poetic device of parallel analogies typical of the Treasury. The text is written in a straightforward style as a series of maxims or aphorisms that capture commonsense wisdom and traditional Tibetan cultural sensibilities and societal norms. Like the Treasury, its central theme is to differentiate the characteristics of the wise and the foolish. There is even a shorter text in prose by the author, titled Wise Sayings: A Magical Net (Legs bshad'phrulgyi dra ba), which is essentially a compilation of select maxims and aphorisms drawn from various sources, especially the ancient folk tradition. Space prevents us from exploring these two texts here other than to observe that they could be viewed as a valuable link between earlier indigenous Tibetan works, such as Dromtönpa's Garland of Advice and the Dunhuang text, and the subsequent Indian-inspired wise-sayings genre so powerfully represented by the Treasury.

Later Tibetan Collections of Wise Sayings

Second to the Jewel Treasury, the most well-known Tibetan lekshé text is Panchen Sönam Drakpa's (1478-1554) Ganden Wise Sayings: A Bouquet of White Lotuses. This work explicitly acknowledges (in verses 121—22) its debt to the Treasury and is ostensibly written to help perpetuate the popularity and use of Sakya Pandita's Jewel Treasury. The entire work, running to 125 stanzas, focuses on the single theme of differentiating between the wise and learned, on the one hand, and the foolish and the unintelligent, on the other. Thus the work can be seen, as intended by the author himself, as an important supplement to the Treasury, elaborating particularly its first four chapters. Panchen adopts the exact same poetic form as the Treasury: there are allusions to stories woven in the last two lines of the four-line stanzas that provide analogies to a wise point being made. Panchen follows the norms established by Sakya Pandita of framing the wise sayings within the context of the dual norms of secular and religious Buddhist practice. This is evident beginning in the opening salutation verse, where the author pays homage to the Buddha as embodying "the knowledge of the two norms exactly as they are" (lugsgnyis ji bzhin mkhyen pa).

Just like the Jewel Treasury, Panchen's Ganden Wise Sayings draws on numerous sources, including the Hindu Purāna myths and on moral tales often involving animal stories from the jātakas and found in various Buddhist sources, including the Sutra on the Wise and the Foolish. Also featured in this volume is the extremely helpful commentary on the text by the nineteenth-century Mongol-Tibetan author Yangchen Gawai Lodrö. Though a much shorter text, Panchen's work contains proportionately far more references to stories than does the Treasury, a consequence perhaps of Panchen's love of history and tales. One unique feature of Panchen's text is its inclusion of important anecdotes from Tibetan history, including references to myths from the Pillar Testament (Bka' 'chems ka khol ma) and the Cycle of Teachings on the Mani Mantra (Mani bka' 'bum), both attributed to the seventh-century emperor Songtsen Gampo, as well as the birth stories of Dromtönpa's former lives as recorded in the Son Teachings of the Book of Kadam. All of these references have been sourced and can be identified in the endnotes to the commentary.

Next is the Great Fifth Dalai Lama's Pearl Garland of Advice, which also engages the dual domains of polity and religion. He laments that there has been a decline in the dual norms rooted in ancient tradition in lands such as India, China, Mongolia, and Tibet (verse 4). Interestingly, unlike Sakya Pandita's Jewel Treasury and Panchen's Ganden Wise Sayings, the Fifth Dalai Lama's text explicitly invokes (in verse 6) the earlier Tibetan schema of the twofold system of mi chos (societal values) and lha chos (religious values). With respect to its poetic form too, the Pearl Garland deviates from the Treasury's seven-syllable verse and parallel juxtaposition of a wise point and a poignant analogy and reverts more to the style of Dromtönpa's Garland of Essential Advice. In verses composed of nine syllables, the tone is more

authoritative and prescriptive compared with a typical wise-saying work like the Jewel Treasury. After the opening salution and two verses stating the intention to compose the text, the main part of the Pearl Garland relates to the two domains of secular worldly matters (stanzas 4-41) and the spiritual Buddhist path (42-56). Toward the end of part I, the author warns the reader to guard against conflating what might seem like similar attributes but are contrary: a coward and a prudent person, a simpleton and a charlatan, a courageous individual and a foolhardy one, a kind-natured person and one who does not care, an honest man and a fool, and so on (verse 39-40).

The text ends with some interesting historical reflections on the flourishing of Buddhism in Tibet and its spread to Mongolia, especially of the Geluk teachings that came about thanks to the meeting of the Third Dalai Lama with the Mongol ruler Altan Khan. The colophon indicates that the work was composed at the behest of the Tüsiyetü Khan, a Mongolian ruler of Genghis's descent who was on a pilgrimage in Tibet.

The next two texts are Gungthang's Treatise on Trees and Treatise on Water. Partly because of their compact size, the first consisting of 106 verses and the second of 140 verses, and partly because of their incomparable poetry, the two treatises became hugely popular in Tibet and its cultural sphere. They display the exceptional poetic and literary skills of Gungthang as well as the expressive power and fluidity of Tibetan versification in the hands of a truly gifted writer. As someone trained in Tibetan poetics, I have no hesitation to add that, of all the Tibetan wise-sayings texts I have read, when it comes to sheer elegance and poetic beauty, nothing compares to Gungthang's two treatises. Each has one element, trees or water, that runs through all the metaphors in the text. In these two works Gungthang explicitly invokes the dual-norms framework established by Sakya Pandita and followed by earlier Tibetan authors. In his Treatise on Trees, for example, Gungthang reverses the sequence of the two norms and deals with the reli¬gious Buddhist practice first (3-35) followed by secular wordly norms (36¬104). The treatise ends with two concluding verses, one extolling the benefits of looking into the mirror of the two norms—that is, his own treatise—and one dedicating the merits of having composed the advice work.

In his Treatise on Water Gungthang reverts to the traditional approach of first presenting the secular worldly norms (6-8o) followed by the religious Buddhist norms (81-137). The treatise ends with three concluding verses, the first two celebrating his treatise as "an ocean of magical wise sayings" and the third dedicating the merits from having composed the text. As stated in the colophon, Gungthang wrote this second text as a "meaning commentary" to his Treatise on Trees, which had come to enjoy such great popularity that readers requested that he write a commentary to it. Other than an explanatory glossary of key terms in the Treatise on Trees by Yangchen Gawai Lodrö, I am aware of no commentaries on either of these two treatises by earlier Tibetan authors. My own teacher, Kyabjé Zemey Rinpoché (192.7-96), wrote a lucid word-by-word explanation of the Treatise on Trees aimed primarily at young Tibetan students.

Inspired directly by Gungthang's two treatises, and modeling his use of only one element as the key metaphor, later Tibetan authors wrote other wise-sayings treatises using elements like wind, fire, and earth. In our volume we have included Kyilsur Lobsang Jinpa's Treatise on Wind and Panchen Chökyi Nyima's Treatise on Earth. I had heard of the existence of similar treatises on the remaining elements of fire and metal but had not succeeded in obtaining those texts at the time of compiling our Tibetan anthology.

Although not included in the present anthology, two other Tibetan treatises belonging to the lekshé genre need special mention here. One is the famed Ornament for Kingship: A Treatise on Norms by Ju Mipham Gelek Namgyal (1846-1912). Modeled on the Cãnakya Treatise on Kingship, it is a long text running to 1,200 verses composed at the behest of, and as advice to, a prince who aspired to the throne of the Dergé kingdom of Kham in eastern Tibet The second is a treatise by Jampal Rolpai Lodrö (1888-1936), similarly written at the behest of a Tibetan ruler in the Amdo region by the name of Akyong Tenzin Drakpa. The treatise combines advice to his subjects and advice on

rulership. Titled The Wish-Fullling Tree: A Treatise on Norms, it consists of approximately one thousand verses in thirteen chapters The scope is wide and ambitious, covering both secular and religious topics. At this point we have no adequate understanding of the context in which this later text emerged, although my conjecture is that it was written sometime around 1922. This author is more known, at least in central Tibet, for his work on grammar—an extensive critical commentary on Thönmi Sambhota's Thirty Verses (Lung stop pa sum cu pa), one of the founding works of the written Tibetan language. Judging by his rather lengthy verse text on Dzogchen, Heart Essence of the Great Perfection of Mafijusri, this Geluk master seems to have been an active member in the Geluk-Nyingma ecumenist movement as well.

The Intriguing Advice of the Muslim Phalu Ju

The final work in our anthology is the intriguing and much-loved Tibetan text known as Khaché Phalu's Advice. The Tibetan word khaché can mean either Islam or Kashmir (the latter being the primary region that the Muslims in central Tibet traditionally hailed from). The verse text is written in vernacular style, making it easy for even less-educated lay Tibetans to understand and enjoy both the wit and wisdom of the verses. Almost every Tibetan would know what is meant when someone says, "If you do not guard your oblong tongue, / your round head might find itself in trouble" (76), or "Your eyes and stomach, the two can never be sated, / so it's best to set limits on your food and eating" (100), or "This world has many plateaus and valleys. / With countless differences in wealth, status, and strength, / clearly no two people are the same, / so it's best to find your own contentment" (66), or "I, Khaché Phalu, have offered my heartfelt advice. / Whether you listen or not, that is your own choice" (37).

Ostensibly penned by a Tibetan Muslim by the name of Phalu Ju and written as advice to Tibetan Buddhists from a Muslim, the text contains a remarkable series of observations about the attitudes, values, and habits of the Tibetan people and their religious sensibilities as well as explicit references to Islamic practices. The work appeared sometime in the eighteenth century and is rumored to have been written by Panchen Losang Palden Yeshé (1738-80) or by someone in his circle at Tashilhunpo Monastery. We know from several sources that this Panchen was quite ecumenical in his interest and supported an eclectic group of scholars and religious practitioners at Tashilhunpo, including Muslims and Hindus. Thanks to his mother's background and links to Ladakh, Panchen spoke Hindi, the main Indian language, through which he maintained a lengthy communication with the British colonial officer George Bogle (1746-80). So the conjecture that this Panchen was the author of this vernacular Tibetan work does not seem as preposterous as it appears at first glance.

Strictly speaking, Khaché Phalu's Advice does not belong to the lekshé genre. Nor could it be classified in the earlier, indegenous category of mi chos. However, given its huge popularity, especially among lay Tibetans, the text has been included in this special anthology.

Essay: Yogacara Panpsychism by Paul Edwards (1968)

Panpsychism is the theory according to which all objects in the universe, not only human beings and animals but also plants and even objects we usually classify as "inanimate," have an "inner" or "psychological" being. The German philosopher and psychologist G. T. Fechner wrote:

> I stood once on a hot summer's day beside a pool and contemplated a water-lily which had spread its leaves evenly over the water and with an open blossom was basking in the sunlight. How exceptionally fortunate, thought I, must this lily be which above basks in the sunlight and below is plunged in the water—if only it might be capable of feeling the sun and the bath. And why not? I asked myself. It seemed to me that nature surely would not have built a creature so beautiful, and so carefully designed for such conditions, merely to be an object of idle observation.... I was inclined to think that nature had built it thus in order that all the pleasure which can be derived from bathing at once in sunlight and in water might be enjoyed by one creature in the fullest measure.

To many readers this may seem to be merely charming poetry, but Fechner was writing in

defense of a philosophical theory for which he argued with great passion and resourcefulness. "Where we see inorganic Nature seemingly dead," wrote the American panpsychist Josiah Royce, "there is, in fact, conscious life, just as surely as there is any Being present in Nature at all" (The World and the Individual, Second Series) "All motion of matter in space," in the words of Hermann Lotze, "may be explained as a natural expression of the inner states of beings that seek or avoid one another with a feeling of their need.... The whole of the world of sense ... is but the veil of an infinite realm of mental life" (Microcosmus).

Panpsychism and Related Ideas

Although panpsychism seems incredible to most people at the present time, it has been endorsed in one way or another by many eminent thinkers in antiquity as well as in recent times. Among those who were either outright panpsychists or who inclined to a position of this kind, in addition to Fechner, Royce, and Lotze one may count Thales, Anaximenes, Empedocles, several of the Stoics, Plotinus and Simplicius; numerous Italian and German Renaissance philosophers (including Paracelsus, Girolamo Cardano, Bernardino Telesio, Giordano Bruno and Tommaso Campanella); G. W. Leibniz, F. W. J. von Schelling, Arthur Schopenhauer, Antonio Rosmini, W. K. Clifford, Harald Høffding, C. B. Renouvier, Eduard von Hartmann, and Wilhelm Wundt; the German freethinkers Ernst Haeckel, Wilhelm Bölsche, and Bruno Wille; C. A. Strong, Erich Adickes, Erich Becher, Alfred Fouillée, C. S. Peirce, and F. C. S. Schiller; and, in our own day, A. N. Whitehead, Samuel Alexander, Bernardino Varisco, Paul Haeberlin, Aloys Wenzel, Charles Hartshorne, and the biologists Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, C. H. Waddington, Sewall Wright, and W. E. Agar.

Few panpsychists, writing in recent years, would make the claim that their position can be proven, but they do assert that the available evidence favors their theory or at the very least enables it to be a serious contender. According to Fechner, it is the best, clearest, most natural, and most beautiful account of the facts of the universe. According to Schiller, who was both a pragmatist and a panpsychist, the doctrine "renders the operation of things more comprehensible" and also enables us to "act upon them more successfully" (Studies in Humanism). Similarly, Whitehead, after quoting a passage in which Francis Bacon declared his belief that "all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense ... yet have perception," claims that this line of thought "expresses a more fundamental truth than do the materialistic concepts which were then being shaped as adequate for physics" (Science and the Modern World). Agar, who was a follower of Whitehead's, conceded that there can be "no coercive demonstration" of the truth or falsehood of panpsychism, but it "leads to a more consistent and satisfying world picture than any of the alternatives"; and, unlike these alternatives, panpsychism is not committed to the paradoxical view that "the mental factor ... made its appearance out of the blue at some date in the world's history" (The Theory of the Living Organism).

Modern panpsychists have been quite aware that their theory ran counter to what Fechner's distinguished follower Friedrich Paulsen called "the obstinate dogmatism of popular opinion and of the physical conception of the universe" (Introduction to Philosophy). This obstinacy they attributed to the prevalence of the "night-view" of the universe—an outlook natural in a mechanized civilization in which people are incapable of noticing and appreciating anything that cannot become the subject of measurement and calculation. In arguing for panpsychism, Fechner and Paulsen (among others) believed that they were counteracting a pernicious tendency in modern life, not merely defending a philosophical viewpoint. Fechner conceived of himself as "awakening a sleeping world" (Religion of a Scientist) and frequently appealed to his readers to "meet nature with new eyes". Whether plants have souls is not, in the opinion of these writers, an idle or trivial question but on the contrary has a "broader bearing," and its answer decides many other questions and indeed determines one's "whole outlook upon nature". It is only by accepting panpsychism that a modern man (who finds it impossible to believe in the claims of traditional religion) can escape the distressing implications of materialism.

Unlike Fechner and Paulsen, Lotze supported the traditional religious doctrines of a personal,

immaterial deity and a substantival, immortal soul; and hence he did not claim that we had to embrace panpsychism in order to avoid materialism. Lotze also repeatedly insisted, quite unlike Royce and Schiller, that we must not introduce panpsychism into science. Nevertheless he, too, greatly emphasized the emotional benefits accruing from the acceptance of panpsychism. Although science may and should set aside all reference to the "pervading animation of the universe," the "aesthetic view of Nature may lawfully fill out the sum of what exists." If we are panpsychists we no longer "look on one part of the cosmos as but a blind and lifeless instrument for the ends of another," but, on the. contrary, find "beneath the unruffled surface of matter, behind the rigid and regular repetitions of its working, ... the warmth of a hidden mental activity." Lotze was particularly concerned to vindicate "the fullness of animated life" in such lowly things as "the dust trodden by our feet [and] the prosaic texture of the cloth that forms our clothing." Dust, Lotze declares, is "dust only to him whom it inconveniences," and he asks us to remember that human beings who are "confined" in a low social position, in which the outflow of intellectual energy is greatly impeded, are not by any means deprived of their "high destiny." If in the case of such "oppressed fragments of humanity," of "this dust of the spiritual world," we may yet affirm a divine origin and a celestial goal, then we have far less reason to deny an inner life to physical dust particles; uncomely as these "may appear to us in their accumulations, they at least everywhere and without shortcoming perform the actions permitted to them by the universal order" (Microcosmus).

Hylozoism

Panpsychism is related to but not identical with hylozoism. "Hylozoism" is sometimes defined as the view that matter is "intrinsically" active and in this sense is primarily opposed to the view of philosophers, like Plato and Berkeley, who asserted that matter is "essentially" inert or passive. More frequently, it refers to the theory that all objects in the universe are in some literal sense alive. Any panpsychist who endorses the usual view that mind implies life would automatically be a hylozoist in the latter sense, but the converse does not hold. In fact most panpsychists have been quite ready to have themselves labeled hylozoists, but there are some exceptions, of whom Schopenhauer is perhaps the most famous. According to Schopenhauer, all objects have an inner nature which he calls "will," but although this will may be described as psychic or mental, it is not necessarily a form of life. "I am the first," Schopenhauer wrote, "who has asserted that a will must be attributed to all that is lifeless and inorganic. For, with me, the will is not, as has hitherto been assumed, an accident of cognition and therefore of life; but life itself is manifestation of will" (On the Will in Nature).

William James is responsible for some terminological confusion that should be cleared up before we go any further. In several of his later writings James strongly supported a theory which he stated in the following words: "... there is a continuum of cosmic consciousness, against which our several minds plunge as into a mother-sea or reservoir.... we with our lives are like islands in the sea, or like trees in the forest" (Memories and Studies). Not only psychical research, he held, but also metaphysical philosophy and speculative biology are led in their own ways to look with favor on some such "panpsychist view of the universe as this." Elsewhere he remarks that the evidence from normal and abnormal psychology, from religious experience and from psychical research combine to establish a "formidable probability in favor of a general view of the world almost identical with Fechner's" (Varieties of Religious Experience). It is true that Fechner held to a theory of a cosmic reservoir of consciousness, regarding God as the universal consciousness in which all lesser souls are contained, but it was not the acceptance of this theory that made him a panpsychist, and James himself was not a panpsychist. He nowhere maintained that plants and inanimate objects have an inner psychic life, and it is not easy to see how the reservoir theory by itself logically implies panpsychism.

World soul. It should also be pointed out that the theory of the "world soul" is not identical with and does not necessarily follow from panpsychism. A number of panpsychists have in fact maintained the existence of a world soul, and they regarded it as a natural extension of panpsychism. Thus, Fechner in his Zend-Avesta concluded that "the earth is a

creature ... , a unitary whole in form and substance, in purpose and effect .. . and self-sufficient in its individuality." It is related to our human body as "the whole tree is to a single twig, a permanent body to a perishable, small organ." "Nothing," in the words of Zeno the Stoic (as approvingly quoted by Cicero), that "is destitute itself of life and reason, can generate a being possessed of life and reason; but the world does generate beings possessed of life and reason; the world therefore is not itself destitute of life and reason" (On the Nature of the Gods, Bk. II, Sec. VIII). In a very similar vein Paulsen argues that the earth, since it "produces all living and animated beings and harbors them as parts of its life," may itself be plausibly regarded as "alive and animated." Only the person who is "not open to the inner life of things" will find it difficult to regard the earth as a unitary organism with an inner life as well as a body (Introduction to Philosophy). To demand to be shown the eyes and ears, the mouth and digestive systern, the skin and hair, the arms and legs, the nervous system and the brain of the earth is quite improper. Unlike an animal, the earth does not need a mouth and a stomach because it does not have to take in substances from outside. An animal pursues its prey and in turn attempts to escape its pursuers, and hence it needs eyes and ears, but the earth is not a pursuer and is also not pursued. An animal needs a brain and nerves in order to regulate its movements in response to its environment, but the earth moves around without any such aid. Much like Fechner, Paulsen concludes that "it has regulated its relations to the external world in the most beautiful and becoming manner." "Please do not," he adds, slightly hurt by the irreverent objections of some critics, "please do not ask it to do what is contrary to its nature and cosmical position" (ibid.). This elevated idea of the earth soul has not won general acceptance among panpsychists. Charles Hartshorne, a contemporary panpsychist who, like Fechner, is a friend of religion, pays tribute to the "eloquence" of Fechner's account but questions whether "the advances of science since his time have served to confirm" his view. While it may be plausible to regard an electron as "a rudimentary organism," the larger systems that Fechner and Paulsen dealt with so enthusiastically "seem to contemporary knowledge rather too loosely integrated to be accepted as sentient subjects." A tree, it seems plausible to argue, has less unity than one of its own cells, and, similarly, the earth has less unity than the animals which inhabit it ("Panpsychism"). Hartshorne, as just observed, is a religious thinker, but there have also been atheistic and agnostic panpsychists, and there is no doubt that they would dismiss the theory of the world soul as quite absurd and as an illegitimate extension of panpsychism.

Degrees of consciousness. There is one other terminological confusion against which we should be on guard. Eisler, in the article on panpsychism in his Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe, first supplies the definition that we have adopted here and which is the one generally accepted. Later, however, he remarks that many panpsychists merely assert that all matter has a "disposition towards the psychological"—that is, that they ascribe to inorganic things no more than a "hypothetical" or low-grade mentality. Now, panpsychists have indeed generally emphasized that there are degrees of "mentality" or "soul life" and that the mentality or psychic nature of inanimate objects is of an exceedingly simple order, but a low degree or level of mentality must be distinguished from "hypothetical mentality" or the capacity to become the subject of mental activities. To qualify as a panpsychist a person must claim that all bodies actually have an inner or psychological nature or aspect. That all matter is potentially the subject of mental activities or characteristics is something that many other philosophers, including not a few materialists, would concede. To say that a stone is made of elements which, when suitably combined, form an entity that thinks and feels is not the same thing as to say that the stone itself has an inner, psychological being.

Royce is a notable exception to the statement that panpsychists regard the psychic character of inorganic bodies as much lower than that of human beings or animals. He thought that the difference was mainly one of speed and that the "fluent" nature of the inner life of inorganic systems tends to go unnoticed because of its "very vast slowness." To this he added, however, that slowness does not

mean "a lower type of consciousness" (The World and the Individual, Second Series).

Naive and critical panpsychism. Eisler distinguishes between "naive" and "critical" panpsychism—by the former he means the animism of primitive peoples and of children, by the latter he means panpsychist theories which are supported by arguments. In this article we are, of course, concerned exclusively with the "critical" or philosophical variety of panpsychism. Most critical panpsychists would probably endorse Agar's judgment that although primitive animism was "in its analogical way of thinking basically sound," it was also "full of errors" and "ludicrously mistaken in detail" (The Theory of the Living Organism).

It should be observed that some philosophical panpsychists are not consistently "critical" in the sense just indicated. Thus, while offering elaborate arguments and conceding quite explicitly on numerous occasions that the inner psychic processes of plants and inanimate objects are not given to us in immediate experience but have to be inferred, both Schopenhauer and Fechner occasionally take the opposite position. In a remarkable passage, Schopenhauer tells us that if we consider various inanimate objects "attentively," we shall observe (among many other things) the "strong and unceasing impulse with which the waters hurry to the ocean, [the] persistency with which the magnet turns ever to the North Pole, [the] readiness with which iron flies to the magnet, [the] eagerness with which the electric poles seek to be reunited, and which, just like human desire, is increased by obstacles [as well as] the choice with which bodies repel and attract each other, combine and separate, when they are set free in a fluid state, and emancipated from the bonds of rigidity." Furthermore, if we attend to the way in which a load "hampers our body by its gravitation towards the earth," we shall "feel directly [that it] unceasingly presses and strains [our body] in pursuit of its one tendency." This passage is taken from the early first volume of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung . His later work Über den Willen in der Natur consists largely of lists of scientific facts "proving" Schopenhauer's assorted philosophical theories, including his panpsychism. Here we are told to "look attentively at a torrent dashing headlong over rocks," whose "boisterous vehemence" can arise only from an "exertion of strength." As for the celestial bodies, if we observe them carefully we shall see that they "play with each other, betray mutual inclination, exchange as it were amorous glances, yet never allow themselves to come into rude contact". Fechner, a milder man than Schopenhauer and more interested in plants than in boisterous torrents or burdensome loads, records experiences in which "the very soul of the plant stood visibly before me," in which he "saw" not only a special "outward clarity" of the flowers but also "the inward light" which in all likelihood caused the outer appearance.

To see what is at issue between panpsychists and their opponents, it is important to point out that passages such as these are aberrations. It may indeed be held that in addition to the more familiar properties, to which philosophers refer as the primary and secondary qualities, physical objects possess a further set of qualities that are not noticed by observers who lack certain gifts or a suitable training. Such a view need not be mystical and has been plausibly defended in the case of the so-called "tertiary" qualities, especially those of artistic productions and performances. However, the initial definitions of "soul," "psychic," and "inner," or of any of the other terms used by panpsychists in statements of their position, preclude them from adopting a position of this kind. The "soul," the "inner" nature of an object, its "mental side" is by definition—a definition to which the panpsychists subscribe—something private which only the object itself can experience or observe. Hence, even if one grants that panpsychists possess gifts of which other mortals are deprived, these cannot possibly be the means of directly perceiving the inner qualities or states of any object external to the observer. Moreover, the great majority of panpsychists, including Schopenhauer and Fechner, do not, in their more considered presentations, claim any special faculty for themselves which the opponents of panpsychism supposedly lack. On the contrary, it is implied that, starting from certain generally accessible facts, sound reasoning will lead a person to a panpsychist conclusion.

Arguments for Panpsychism

The arguments for panpsychism may be conveniently grouped according to whether they presuppose the acceptance of a particular metaphysical system or some controversial epistemological theory or whether they are or purport to be of an empirical or inductive character. Some of the arguments of Leibniz and Royce are based on their respective versions of metaphysical idealism, and some of the arguments of Schopenhauer and Paulsen presuppose a Kantian theory of knowledge. It is impossible to evaluate any such arguments without getting involved in an appraisal of their particular metaphysical or epistemological framework, and we shall therefore confine our discussion to arguments of the other kind. It is perhaps worth noting in this connection that especially during the last hundred years, many panpsychists have regarded themselves as opponents of metaphysics, or, if they did not object to being labeled metaphysicians, they took care to add that theirs was an "inductive," not a speculative, variety of metaphysics. Fechner in particular prided himself on dispensing altogether with "a priori constructions," and he was a leading figure, along with von Hartmann and Wundt, in a movement to renounce any claim to a special philosophical method distinct from the method employed in the natural sciences. The only method which, on his view, could lead to a tenable theory about the universe as a whole was "generalization by induction and analogy, and the rational combination of the common elements gathered from different areas," as he observes in Zend-Avesta. Furthermore, even some of the panpsychists who were also speculative metaphysicians appealed to empirical considerations. They thought that panpsychism could be supported in different ways that were logically independent of one another. Royce was one of the philosophers who adopted this approach. Insisting that his "Idealistic Theory of Being ... furnishes a deep warrant" for panpsychism, he nevertheless regarded panpsychism as also resting on "a merely empirical basis". "Wholly apart from any more metaphysical consideration of the deeper nature of Reality," certain empirical facts suggest panpsychism as the conclusion of "a rough induction." In this connection, the theory should be treated as a "hypothesis for further testing".

Genetic arguments. The arguments which have been most widely urged in defense of panpsychism and which go back at least as far as Telesio and Campanella rely, in one way or another, on the assumption that mental facts can be causally explained only in terms of other mental facts. Philosophers who have arrived at a parallelistic answer to the body—mind problem have been especially prone to endorse such arguments, but these can be stated independently of any commitment to parallelism. It is perhaps interesting to note in passing that many early champions of Darwinism (for example, Clifford in England and Haeckel and Büchner in Germany) were attracted by reasoning of this kind, although they were frequently repelled by the analogical arguments considered later in the present article. We shall here examine two such genetic arguments—one advanced by Paulsen, the other by a contemporary British scientist.

How, asks Paulsen, did soul life originate? Modern biology assumes, quite rightly in Paulsen's opinion, that organic life had a beginning on earth and that the "first creations" arose from inorganic matter. The question then arises how "psychic life" came into being. "Is the first feeling in the first protoplasmic particle something absolutely new, something that did not exist before in any form, of which not the slightest trace was to be found previously?" (Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 99-100). To suppose that the first feeling in the first protoplasmic particle was something "absolutely new" would, however, imply a "creation out of nothing," which would be totally at variance with the basic (and well-founded) principles of science. You might as well, Paulsen remarks, ask the natural scientist "to believe that the protoplasmic particle itself was created out of nothing." The natural scientist rightly assumes that natural bodies arise from pre-existing elements. These enter into new and more complicated combinations, and as a result the bodies are capable of performing "new and astonishing functions." Why does the natural scientist "not make the same natural assumption" in the case of the inner psychic processes as well? Why does he not say that "an inner life was

already present in germ (keimhaft) in the elements, and that it developed into higher forms?"

It is not easy to appraise this line of reasoning because of the vagueness of the expression "absolutely new." As Ernest Nagel and others have pointed out, it is frequently not at all clear whether two processes or occurrences are to be counted as different instances of the same property or as different properties—whether they are or not usually depends on the purpose of the particular investigation. Furthermore, what may be "absolutely new," in the sense of not being predictable from certain initial conditions in conjunction with a certain set of laws, may at the same time not be absolutely new in the sense of being predictable from these initial conditions together with a different set of laws. However, let us assume that in a given case all parties agree that if at a moment T, the features of a system were of a certain kind and if at a subsequent moment T2 they were of a certain different kind, something "absolutely new" came into being at T2. More specifically, let us assume that the conditions at T, do not include any mental fact but that at T2 they include "the first feeling" in the first protoplasmic particle. Now, according to Paulsen's argument, anybody who supposes that this is the kind of thing which actually happened—and a person who accepts certain scientific facts while rejecting panpsychism has to suppose that this is what happened—is committed to the view that something came from nothing. But to suppose that something came from nothing is unscientific and absurd.

There is a simple answer to this. By saying that something must always come from something and cannot come from nothing, we may mean either (1) that every phenomenon or event has a cause or (2) the scholastic principle that any property residing in an effect must also have been present in its cause. If we suppose that at time T, there was no mental fact in the universe while at a later time T2 the first feeling occurred in a protoplasmic particle, we would indeed be violating proposition (2), but we would not at all be violating proposition (1). Yet if anything can here be regarded as "unscientific" or "absurd" it would be exceptions to (1). For reasons explained earlier, it is not easy to state (2) or its denial with any precision, but, in the most familiar sense of "new," experience seems to show that there are any number of effects possessing new properties—properties not present in the cause. The very course of evolution, to which Paulsen and other proponents of the genetic argument appeal, provides a multitude of illustrations of this. At any rate, an opponent of panpsychism would deny proposition (2) and would insist that such a denial is in no way unempirical or unscientific. To assume the opposite without further ado would surely be to beg one of the basic questions at issue.

Let us now consider a more recent version of a genetic argument: "Something must go on in the simplest inanimate things," writes the distinguished British geneticist C. H. Waddington; "which can be described in the same language as would be used to describe our self-awareness" (The Nature of Life). It is true, he continues, that we know nothing of its nature, but the conclusion is forced on us by the "demands of logic and the application of evolutionary theory". Waddington's argument opens with the declaration that the phenomenon of self-awareness is a "basic mystery." This is so because awareness "can never be constructed theoretically out of our present fundamental scientific concepts, since these contain no element which has any similarity in kind with self-consciousness." But self-awareness undoubtedly exists, and hence we must infer that the mode we experience "evolved from simple forms which are experienced by non-human things." It is not difficult to accept this conclusion as far as animals like dogs and cats are concerned. But, Waddington proceeds, we cannot stop there if we take the theory of evolution seriously. According to the initial premise it is inconceivable that self-awareness "originated from anything which did not share something in common with it and possessed only those qualities which can be objectively observed from outside." Hence, we are forced to conclude that "even in the simplest inanimate things there is something which belongs to the same realm of being as self-awareness." Waddington's argument is not overtly based, as Paulsen's was, on the contention that somebody who accepts evolution but rejects panpsychism is committed to the absurd proposition that something comes from nothing. According to Waddington such a person would be

committed to the view that self-awareness is not a mystery—that is, that it is explicable in physical terms—and this Waddington takes to be plainly false.

In reply it should be pointed out that Waddington appears to use the word "explanation" in two very different senses in the course of his argument. Sometimes when we ask for the explanation of a phenomenon we are looking for an account of its make-up, of how its parts are related and how they work. We use the word "explanation" in this sense when we want to have the nature of a car or a clock or perhaps a human eye explained to us. At other times, and more frequently, in asking for the explanation of a phenomenon we are looking for its cause. It is not easy to see why awareness should be said to be a "mystery" just because it cannot, in the first sense of "explanation," be explained in physical terms (this betrays a strange materialistic bias which regards a phenomenon as properly explicable, in the first sense, only if it is something material—one wonders why physical objects are not equally mysterious, since they cannot be explained in terms of predicates that are applicable only to mental states). But waiving this point—allowing, that is, that awareness cannot be adequately characterized by the kinds of predicates usually applied to material objects and that this makes awareness incapable of explanation in the first of the two senses distinguished, none of this implies that awareness cannot be explained, in the second sense of the word, in terms of purely physical factors. Avoiding the word "explanation," the point can be expressed very simply: granting that awareness is not a physical phenomenon, it does not follow that it cannot be produced by conditions that are purely physical. When the matter is put in this way, it becomes clear that we are back to the difficulty besetting Paulsen's form of the argument. Waddington's argument does not, aside from the acceptance of the evolutionary theory, depend merely on the admission that awareness is not a physical phenomenon, that it "cannot be constructed" out of physical concepts: it also depends on the maxim that any property of the effect must also be present in the cause. We have already mentioned reasons for rejecting this principle, but perhaps it is worth adding that in the context of the body-mind relationship it seems particularly implausible. Brain tumors and other damage to the body, to give some very obvious examples, lead to all kinds of psychological states, but we do not for this reason refuse to regard them as explanations of the latter.

Analogical arguments. The second set of arguments commonly employed by panpsychists, independently of any metaphysical system, purport to be of an analogical kind. Here the more systematic panpsychists usually proceed in two steps: the first consists in arguing that plants are in "essential- respects so much like animals that one cannot consistently attribute a psychic or soul life to animals but refuse it to plants; it is then maintained that the borderline between animate and inanimate objects is not sharp and that a careful examination of inanimate objects reveals them to have many impressive likenesses to animals and plants, indicating the existence of inner psychic being there also.

Plants manifest many of the same vital processes that are found in animals: nutrition, growth, reproduction, and many more. Like animals, plants are born and also die. Moreover, it is simply not true that plants lack the power of spontaneous movement which we observe in animals. "Does not the plant," asks Paulsen, "turn its buds and leaves to the light, does it not send its roots where it finds nourishment, and its tendrils where it finds support? Does it not close up its petals at night or when it rains, and does it not open them in sunshine?" If there is so great a "correspondence" between the visible processes, why should there not be a similar correspondence in "the invisible processes"? (op. cit., pp. 96-97). If it is argued that these analogies are too vague and trifling, because plants have neither a brain nor a nervous system, the answer is surely that there are animals which also lack brains and nervous systems. Fechner was particularly concerned to exhibit the weakness of this counterargument. He observes that if we remove the strings of a piano or a violin it becomes impossible to obtain any harmonic sounds from these instruments. If somebody concluded from this that the presence of strings is essential to the production of musical tones, he would be completely mistaken, because there are many

instruments, like flutes and trombones, with which we can produce musical sounds although they have no strings; but this argument would be not one whit worse than that of the critic of panpsychism.

There are, to be sure, differences between plants and animals, and these a panpsychist has no wish to deny, but, according to Paulsen, they "may be conceived as indicating a difference in inner life also" rather than the absence of any inner processes. The differences indicate "that plants possess a peculiar inclination to receptivity and a decentralized extensity, whereas the psychical life of the animal shows more spontaneity and centralized intensity" (ibid., p. 98). Fechner is even more specific and compares the difference in psychical life between animals and plants to the difference in the psychology of men and women. Elsewhere he compares the former difference to that between the emotions of travelers and those who are "homebodies," between the pleasures associated with "running hither and thither" and those accompanying a "quiet and sedentary sphere of endeavor" (Religion of a Scientist) However, Paulsen adds, it does not really matter what we think about the details of the inner processes, since all such attempts at conceiving the nature of the psychic life of plants are "at best feeble." It should be remembered that we do not really fare any better if we try to "interpret" the psychical life of animals, especially that of the lower species. We know very little, Paulsen remarks, "about the inner experiences of a jelly-fish or the feelings of a caterpillar or a butterfly."

When we come to inanimate objects, Paulsen continues, the first thing to note is that organic and inorganic bodies must not be regarded as belonging to two separate worlds. There is constant interaction between them. They are composed of the same ingredients and acted on by the same forces. If this were all, however, the analogy would not be strong enough. It would be objected that unlike animals and plants, objects like stones are lifeless and rigid, that they lack all spontaneous activity. This opinion, Paulsen argues, is totally mistaken and is based on the Aristotelian—scholastic theory, taken over by materialistic scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that matter is inherently and absolutely passive. This theory, whether in its original or in its modern atomistic form, is quite untenable. In fact a stone is not an "absolutely dead and rigid body" and devoid of "inner impulses." Modern physics has discarded such a view. Its molecules and atoms are "forms of the greatest inner complexity and mobility." Not only are the constituents of an apparently rigid object like a stone in continuous motion, but the entire system is "in constant interaction with its immediate surroundings as well as with the remotest system of fixed stars". In the light of this it is not only not absurd but quite plausible to conclude that "corresponding to this wonderful play of physical forces and movements" there is a system of inner psychic processes "analogous to that which accompanies the working of the parts in an organic body." We thus arrive, on the basis of scientific evidence, at a view substantially like that of Empedocles that "love and hate form the motive forces in all things"—not, to be sure, quite as we know them in ourselves, but nevertheless in a form that is "at bottom similar" to these human emotions.

It is natural to object to such arguments that the analogies are altogether inconclusive. It is true that there are certain similarities between, say, a stone and a human body, but there are also all kinds of differences. Paulsen assures us that the similarities are "essential," but if "essential" here means that, as far as the inference to an inner psychic process is concerned, the similarities count and the differences do not, that they are relevant whereas the differences are irrelevant, one may well ask how Paulsen knows this. Surely no proposition has been or could have been established to the effect that inner physical movement is always and necessarily connected with psychic activity. Any such general proposition is precisely what the opponent of panpsychism would deny or question. Furthermore, leaving aside any discussion of whether those who regard matter as "active" and those who maintain it to be "passive" are engaging in a factual dispute (so that one party could be said to be right and the other wrong), it must be emphasized that in rejecting panpsychism one is in no way committed to the view that matter is devoid of "inner activity." The view that matter has no inner psychic aspect in no way precludes the admission

of inner physical processes such as those postulated by modern physical theory.

These criticisms, however, do not go far enough. They assume, what seems very doubtful, that the arguments under discussion are of a genuinely empirical character. In this connection it is pertinent to raise the question of what the universe would have to be like so that there would be no evidence for panpsychism, or, more strongly, so that the evidence would clearly favor the opposite position. We saw that Paulsen considered the fact that human bodies and inanimate objects are composed of the same elements to be evidence for his position. He also regarded the internal movements of the particles of apparently stationary objects as evidence of their inner life. But suppose that stones and human bodies were not composed of the same elements; would this constitute evidence against panpsychism or would it at least deprive panpsychism of evidence which is at present supporting it? Suppose that electrons were not buzzing inside the stone; would this show or would it be any kind of evidence for the view that the stone does not have a psychic life? From the writings of panpsychists it seems probable that the answer to these questions would be in the negative: If the elements of stones were quite different from those of human bodies, it might be an indication that the psychic processes in stones are even more different in detail from those of human beings, and if the internal constituents of the stones were not in constant motion it might indicate a more restful psychic life, but it would not indicate that no psychic life at all is going on. If this is an accurate presentation of the panpsychist position, it shows that the analogical arguments we have been considering are not genuinely empirical, that the facts pointed to are not, in any accepted sense, evidence for the conclusion. This is a far stronger criticism than the claim that the analogies are weak or the arguments inconclusive.

Is Panpsychism Intelligible Idea?

Some contemporary philosophers who have given more thought to the conditions of meaningful discourse than was customary in previous times are inclined to dismiss panpsychism not as false or unproven but as unintelligible. Thus, in his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein raises the question "Could one imagine a stone's having consciousness?" and comments that if anyone can imagine this, it would merely amount to "image-mongery". Such image-mongery, Wittgenstein seems to imply, would not show at all that in attributing consciousness to a stone one is making an intelligible statement. It would probably be pointless to try to "prove" that panpsychism is a meaningless doctrine. Any such attempt is liable to involve one in an elaborate and inconclusive defense of some controversial meaning criterion. However, it may be of some interest to explain more fully, without intending to settle anything, why not a few contemporary philosophers would maintain that the panpsychists do not succeed in asserting any new facts and in the end merely urge certain pictures on us.

To this end let us first consider the following imaginary disputes about the "inner" nature of a tennis ball. A holds the common view that the ball is made of rubber and not of living tissue, while B holds the unusual opinion that if we were to examine the inside of the tennis ball under a powerful microscope we would find a brain, a nervous system, and other physiological structures usually associated with consciousness. Furthermore, B maintains that if we listened very attentively to what goes on while tennis balls are in their can we would hear one ball whispering to the other, "My brother, be careful—don't let them hit you too hard; if you roll into a bush on the other side of the fence you may spend the rest of your days in blissful peace." There is genuine empirical disagreement between A and B and, as far as we know, A would be right if the ball or balls in question are of the familiar kind. Let us next suppose that C, after reading Paulsen and Waddington, becomes converted to panpsychism and starts saying such things as "the tennis ball is not a mere body—it has an inner psychic life, it is moved by love and hate, although not love and hate quite as we know them in human beings." To an uncritical outsider it may at first appear, chiefly because of the images one associates with the word "inner," that C, like B, is asserting the existence of strange goings on inside the ball, never suspected by the ordinary man or the physicist. In fact, however, if C is a philosophical panpsychist, he will not expect to find a brain or a

nervous system or any kind of living tissue inside the ball, and he will disclaim any such assertion. Nor will he expect that tennis balls whisper gentle warnings to one another when they are alone. If he should start serving less forcefully in order to avoid hurting the ball, a professional panpsychist would undoubtedly advise him not to be silly, explaining that although their lives are governed by love and hate, balls do not get hurt in any sense that need concern a sympathetic human being. In other words, C does not disagree with A about what would be found inside the ball or about the ball's behavior while it is in the can, and he is also not treating the ball any differently from the way A does—or at any rate no different treatment is logically implied by his opinion that the ball has an inner psychic life. B really contradicts A and, at least in the case of the balls we all know, he is quite certainly mistaken. C is not mistaken, but one begins to wonder whether he is asserting any facts not allowed for in the ordinary, nonpanpsychist view of the ball. A semantically sensitive observer might comment that ordinary people (and uncritical philosophers) are apt to suppose that they understand well enough what panpsychism asserts and that they proceed to dismiss it as silly or incredible (that is, as plainly false) because they regard panpsychism as a theory like B's unusual opinion about the tennis ball. In fact, panpsychism is not like B's opinion but like C's, and the appropriate criticism seems to be not that it is a false theory but that one does not really know what, if anything, has been asserted.

Schiller. Let us now turn to the procedure of an actual panpsychist to see the full relevance of the preceding reflections. F. C. S. Schiller argued that inanimate objects, contrary to the usual opinion, take notice of other inanimate objects, as well as of human beings. "Inanimate objects," he wrote, "are responsive to each other and modify their behavior accordingly. A stone is not indifferent to other stones" (Logic for Use). Nor are stones indifferent to human beings: "In a very real sense," he wrote elsewhere, "a stone must be said to know us and to respond to our manipulation" (Studies in Humanism). It is "as true of stones as of men" that if you treat them differently they behave differently (Logic for Use, p. 447). It must be emphasized, however, that the responsiveness, the nonindifference, of stones is not quite what we mean when we talk about the responsiveness and nonindifference of human beings. How does a stone exhibit its nonindifference to other stones? Very simply: in being gravitationally attracted to them. Nor are we "recognized" by the stone "in our whole nature." It does not "apprehend us as spiritual beings," but this does not mean that the stone takes no note whatever of our existence. "It is aware of us and affected by us on the plane on which its own existence is passed." In the physical world which we and stones share, " `awareness' can apparently be shown by being hard and heavy and colored and space-filling, and so forth. And all these things the stone is and recognizes in other bodies" (Studies in Humanism). The stone "faithfully exercises" all its physical functions: "it gravitates and resists pressure, and obstructs ether vibrations, etc., and makes itself respected as such a body. And it treats us as if of a like nature with itself, on the level of its understanding, i.e., as bodies to which it is attracted inversely as the square of the distance, moderately hard and capable of being hit." The stone does not indeed "know or care" whether a human being gets hurt by it; but in those operations which are of "interest" to the stone, as, for example, in housebuilding, "it plays its part and responds according to the measure of its capacity." What is true of stones, Schiller continues, is also true of atoms and electrons, if they really exist. Just as the stone responds only "after its fashion," so atoms and electrons also know us "after their fashion." They know us not as human beings but "as whirling mazes of atoms and electrons like themselves." We treat stones and atoms as "inanimate" because of "their immense spiritual remoteness from us" and "perhaps" also because of "our inability to understand them".

Some of his readers, Schiller realizes, will "cry" that the views just reported amount to "sheer hylozoism," but he does not regard this as any reason for concern. "What," he answers, "if it is hylozoism or, still better, panpsychism, so long as it really brings out a genuine analogy," and this, he is convinced, it does. "The analogy is helpful so long as it really renders the operations of things more comprehensible to us, and interprets facts which had seemed mysterious". Schiller illustrates his claim by considering the chemical phenomenon of catalytic action. It had "seemed mysterious" and

"hard to understand" (presumably prior to the publication of Schiller's "humanistic" panpsychism), that two bodies A and B may have a strong affinity for each other and yet refuse to combine until the merest trace of a third substance C is introduced, which sets up an interaction between A and B without producing an alteration in C itself. But, asks Schiller, "is not this strangely suggestive of the idea that A and B did not know each other until they were introduced by C, and then liked each other so well that C was left out in the cold?" To this he adds—and here surely not even the most hostile critic would disagree—that "more such analogies and possibilities will probably be found if they are looked for." However, panpsychism does not merely render the operation of things more comprehensible. It has a further virtue, to which Schiller alludes later in the same discussion: "The alien world which seemed so remote and so rigid to an inert contemplation, the reality which seemed so intractable to an aimless and fruitless speculation, grows plastic in this way to our intelligent manipulations".

Perhaps the most striking features of Schiller's presentation are the constant modifications or retractions of what at first appear truly remarkable assertions. Inanimate objects are "responsive to each other," but not the way in which human beings or animals are—they are responsive in being gravitationally attracted by other inanimate objects. The stone is "aware of us," but not, of course, in the sense in which human beings are aware—it is aware on "its plane"; the stone "recognizes" other bodies and is "interested" in operations like housebuilding, but "on the level of its understanding"; it "plays its part," but "according to the measure of its capacity"; atoms and electrons know us no less than we know them, but "after their fashion." It is not, perhaps, unfair to say that Schiller takes away with one hand what he gives with the other, and it may be questioned whether anything remains. When one is told that the stone is aware of us one reacts with astonishment and is apt to suppose that a statement has been made which contradicts what an ordinary nonpanpsychist believes; but this turns out to be more than doubtful since the stone's awareness, on its plane, seems to consist simply in being hard, heavy, space-filling, and colored. The stone makes itself respected and is interested in operations like housebuilding, but in its own fashion, and this consists in gravitating, resisting pressure, and all the usual characteristics of stones, which are not questioned by those who do not subscribe to panpsychism. Schiller plainly believed that the panpsychist asserts (if he has not in fact discovered) facts about stones and atoms which are denied by, or whose existence is unknown to, the ordinary person and the materialist. He evidently did not believe that it was just a question of using words in different senses. But, if so, what are the facts which he asserts and which his opponents deny? Schiller's qualifications remind one of a song in the musical Kiss Me, Kate in which a light-hearted lady sings of her numerous and constantly changing amorous involvements, adding at the end of each verse, "But I'm always true to you, darling, in my fashion; yes, I'm always true to you, darling, in my way." How does the stone's awareness in its own way differ from what other people would refer to as absence of awareness?

Empirical pretensions of panpsychists

Even if one is disinclined to go so far as to dismiss panpsychism as meaningless, there is surely good reason to dispute the empirical and pragmatic pretensions of certain panpsychists. We saw that Royce regarded panpsychism (among other things) as a hypothesis "to be tested," but unfortunately he did not tell us anything about the way or ways in which this was to be done. Royce did indeed guard himself by maintaining that the mental processes in physical systems occur over "extremely august" temporal spans (The World and the Individual), so that a human being would be unable to detect a process of this kind. However, making the fullest allowance for this qualification and granting ourselves or some imaginary observer the "august" time span required by Royce's "hypothesis," this would still not do, since Royce omitted to inform us what such an observer should look for.

Schiller, it will be remembered, assured us that as a result of accepting panpsychism the previously "remote" and "rigid" reality "grows plastic ... to our manipulations." But he did not explain how and where these happy transformations would take place. Is a bricklayer who has been converted to panpsychism going to lay bricks more efficiently?

Does a tennis player's game improve if he becomes a disciple of Schiller? No, but perhaps the chemist will find catalytic action more comprehensible, and "more such analogies and possibilities" will make other "intractable" processes less "mysterious." Regrettably, the opinion that panpsychism makes any of these phenomena easier to understand is the result of a confusion which hinges on an ambiguity in "comprehensible" and related expressions. Sometimes we attempt to make phenomena or correlations of events more comprehensible. In this sense, a phenomenon (for example, a certain disease or a plane crash) is comprehended or understood if its cause is discovered, and a correlation or a law becomes comprehensible if it is subsumed under a wider law (if, for example, the administration of a certain drug has in many cases been followed by the cure of a given condition, the correlation becomes comprehensible if we determine what it is about the drug that has this effect; and this is another way of saying that we subsume the correlation under a law). But at other times when we talk about making something comprehensible, we are concerned with explaining the meaning of theories or statements, not with the explanation of phenomena or of correlations. Unlike the first, this kind of problem may be regarded as pedagogical, and here all kinds of analogies may be helpful which do not or need not shed any light on the causes of the phenomena dealt with in the statements we are trying to make more comprehensible. It cannot, of course, be denied that an analogy such as the one Schiller offers may well make catalysts more comprehensible in this pedagogical sense—it may, for example, help school children to understand what a chemist is talking about. It is equally clear that such an analogy does absolutely nothing to make catalytic action more comprehensible in the earlier sense we mentioned, and it was surely in this sense that Schiller claimed panpychism to make things less mysterious and easier to understand. It is difficult to believe that either Schiller or any other champion of panpsychism would be satisfied to have the theory regarded as no more than a pedagogical device in the teaching of natural science.

Bibliography on Panpsychism

The fullest systematic defenses of panpsychism during the last hundred years are found in the writings of Paulsen, Fechner, Lotze, and Royce. Paulsen's arguments are presented in his very influential Einleitung in die Philosophie (21st ed., Stuttgart and Berlin, 1909), translated by F. Thilly as Introduction to Philosophy (2d American ed., New York, 1906, with a preface by William James). Fechner's main writings on the subject are Nanna: oder über das Seelenleben der Pflanzen (3d ed., Leipzig, 1903) and Zend-Avesta: oder über die Dinge des Jenseits (2d ed., Hamburg, 1906). There is an English translation of selections from Fechner's works by W. Lowrie entitled Religion of a Scientist (New York, 1946). Fechner's ideas are discussed in some detail in G. Stanley Hall, Founders of Modern Psychology (New York, 1912); G. F. Stout, God and Nature, A. K. Stout, ed. (Cambridge, 1952); Otto Külpe, Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland (Leipzig, 1902), translated by M. L. Patrick and G. T. W. Patrick as Philosophy of the Present in Germany (London, 1913); and G. Murphy, "A Brief Interpretation of Fechner," in Psyche, Vol. 7 (1926), 75-80. Although Wilhelm Wundt condemned Fechner's speculations about the souls of the stars and the earth as "a fantastic dream," he himself concluded that mental life can arise only out of conditions which are themselves mental (System der Philosophie, Leipzig, 1889). Lotze's defense of panpsychism is contained in Vol. I of Mikrokosmus (Leipzig, 1856-1864), translated by E. Hamilton and E. E. C. Jones as Microcosmus (New York, 1890). Royce's panpsychism is presented in Lecture V of The World and the Individual, Second Series (London and New York, 1901). The American neorealist W. P. Montague, a student of Royce, relates how he "jumped with almost tearful gratitude" at Royce's "hypothesis about the varying time-spans in nature." He regarded this "hypothesis" as "a new and challenging contribution to the great panpsychist tradition," as "a clear and great thought" which "might even be true" (The Ways of Things, London, 1940, p. 669). Montague referred to his own position as "animistic materialism," and he is sometimes classified as a panpsychist, but in fact it is very doubtful whether

his animism implies panpsychism as we have here defined it.

Little was said in this article about A. N. Whitehead, probably the most distinguished champion of panpsychism in the twentieth century, chiefly because his views on the subject could not have been discussed without consideration of other features of his difficult system. Whitehead would have disagreed with many other panpsychists about the "units" that are to be regarded as the bearers of psychic life. These, he held, are not stars or stones but the events out of which stars and stones are constituted and which Whitehead calls "occasions." His views are presented in Science and the Modern World (London and New York, 1925), Process and Reality (London and New York, 1929), and, most fully, in "Nature Alive," Lecture 8 of Modes of Thought (London and New York, 1938). Panpsychistic views strongly influenced by Whitehead are put forward in Charles Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism (Chicago, 1937) and Man's Vision of God (Chicago, 1941), and in W. E. Agar, The Theory of the Living Organism (Melbourne, 1943). Samuel Alexander, whose metaphysical position has many similarities to Whitehead's, also expresses views akin to panpsychism in his British Academy lecture "The Basis of Realism," reprinted in R. M. Chisholm, ed., Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (Glencoe, Ill., 1960).

Of works by earlier panpsychists, special mention should be made of G. W. Leibniz, Monadology (various editions), and Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 3 vol s. (Leipzig, 1818), translated by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp as The World as Will and Idea (London, 1883), as well as his Über den Willen in der Natur (Frankfurt, 1836), translated by K. Hillebrand as On the Will in Nature (London, 1889).

Giordano Bruno's panpsychist views are presented in the second dialogue of De la causa, Principio e uno; for translations see Sidney Greenberg's The Infinite in Giordano Bruno (New York, 1950) and Jack Lindsay's version in Cause, Principle and Unity (New York, 1964). The works by Telesio and Campanella in which their panpsychism is expounded are not available in English. There is a very clear summary of their arguments in Harald Høffding, A History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. I (London, 1908). The texts of the pre-Socratics, some of whom were hylozoists rather than panpsychists, are available in English translation in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957). Because of his remarks about the "plastic nature in the universe" in The True Intellectual System of the Universe, Ralph Cudworth is described as a panpsychist in various reference works, but it is doubtful that this classification is accurate. Cudworth appears to have postulated the "plastic nature" for living things only and he should be labeled a "vitalist" in a sense in which this theory does not automatically imply panpsychism. C. B. Renouvier's panpsychism, which is in many ways similar to that of Leibniz, is expounded in several of his works, most fully in La Nouvelle Monadologie (Paris, 1898). Eduard von Hartmann advocates the view that even atoms possess an unconscious will in Grundriss der Naturphilosophie, Vol. II of System der Philosophie im Grundriss (Bad Sachsa im Harz, 1907). Spinoza and Bergson were not listed as panpsychists in the text because there is some doubt as to how some of their remarks are to be interpreted. In Spinoza's case there is at least one passage (Ethics, Pt. II, Note 2, Prop. XIII) supporting such a classification. Similarly, some of the remarks in "Summary and Conclusions," in Bergson's Matter and Memory (London, 1911), may be construed as an endorsement of panpsychism.

C. H. Waddington's genetic argument is presented in The Nature of Life (London, 1961). W. K. Clifford advocates very similar arguments in his essays "Body and Mind" and "On the Nature of Things-in-themselves," in Lectures and Essays, Vol. II (London, 1903). The American critical realist C. A. Strong also employs genetic arguments in support of panpsychism in The Origin of Consciousness (London, 1918). Sewall Wright, a distinguished contemporary biologist, defends panpsychism on scientific grounds in "Gene and Organism," in The American Naturalist, Vol. 87 (1953). Haeckel's views are found in Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte (4th ed., Berlin, 1892), translated by E. Ray Lankester as The History of Creation (London, 1892), and in Zellseelen und Seelenzellen (Leipzig, 1909). Panpsychism is also defended on the basis of an appeal to continuity in nature in Harald HØffding, Outlines of Psychology (London, 1919).

HØffding, however, is rather more diffident than the other writers mentioned in this paragraph. Schiller's defenses of panpsychism are contained in his Studies in Humanism (London, 1907) and Logic for Use (London, 1929). There is a full discussion of William James' views on panpsychism and various related theories in W. T. Bush, "William James and Panpsychism," in Columbia University Studies in the History of Ideas, Vol. II (New York, 1925).

A defense of the scholastic doctrine that an effect cannot possess any perfection which is not found in its cause is contained in G. H. Joyce, Principles of Natural Theology (London, 1923), Ch. 3. The question of what may be meant by the claim that an effect contains a "new" property is discussed in Arthur O. Lovejoy, "The Meanings of 'Emergence' and Its Modes," in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy (New York, 1927); Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York, 1961); and Arthur Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (New York, 1962). Certain contemporary arguments about the alleged causal inexplicability of human actions, similar to the genetic argumepts by Paulsen and Waddington, are examined in Bernard. Berofsky, "Determinism and the Concept of a Person," in Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61 (1964), 461-475.

General surveys of panpsychism are found in A. Rau, Der moderne Panpsychismus (Berlin, 1901), and Charles Hartshorne, "Panpsychism," in V. T. A. Ferm, ed., A History of Philosophical Systems (New York, 1950). Almost all extended discussions of panpsychism occur in the works of writers who accept the theory or who are at least sympathetic to it. One of the few highly critical discussions is contained in Alois Riehl, Zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart (Leipzig, 1903). Eisler's article on panpsychism in his Wörterbuch der Philosophische Begriffe (4th ed., Berlin, 1929) contains a very elaborate list of panpsychists and their writings. Paul Edwards

Essay: The Other Side of Realism: Panpsychism and Yogācāra by Douglas Duckworth

Yogācāra, "the yogic practice school" — from yoga and ācāra (practice) — came to be one of two main lines of interpretation of Mahāyāna Buddhism. There is a good deal of internal diversity within this "school," and this chapter will make some distinctions among its interpretative strands, including an important one between subjective idealism and absolute idealism. Subjective idealism is the claim that only mind exists (as Berkeley said, "existence is perception"), and absolute idealism is the claim that everything is unitary and thus that all relations are internal. The latter does not necessarily entail the former.

The place of mind in Yogācāra texts remains an open question. Namely, are external objects reducible to mind (subjective idealism)? Or are objects co-dependent with minds (in a relational network), or in some sense nondual (absolute idealism)? I wish to argue that Yogācāra is not necessarily a form of subjective idealism, although it can be. Yet when read as subjective idealism (as in the philosophy of "mind only"), it is not so interesting. Other readings, such as absolute idealism or relational pluralism, are more promising. Absolute idealist and pluralist readings are clearly distinct from subjective idealism, for subjective idealism collapses objects into a subject. In contrast, in absolute idealism, external relations (like those between subject and object) are unreal as they are subsumed by the whole. Alternatively, neither mind nor matter need have a privileged place in a relational ontology where the world is constituted by relations. -

Just as is the case with Yogācāra, there are a number of different interpretations of panpsychism. "Panpsychism," from the Greek pan (all) and psyche (mind or soul), has been defined as "the view that all things have mind or a mind-like quality" (Skrbina 2005, 2). Like Yogācāra, there are parallel distinctions to be made in terms of how panpsychism has been conceived: in a relational, pluralistic, or singular (or nondual) way. In its strong form, panpsychism can mean that everything, including electrons, has a mental dimension along with a physical one. I will refer to this strong form of panpsychism as "animistic panpsychismi (but since this is not a form directly relevant to Yogācāra, I will not discuss it further here). Panpsychism also can be taken in a singular form as absolute idealism, where everything takes place within a unified structural whole. Yet a panpsychist

position need not be so extreme; a weak form of "relational panpsychism" can simply refer to observer-dependence, whereby mind is affirmed to be everywhere simply because any actual reality is always an experienced one.

A singular (or nondual) form of panpsychism presents a necessary unity of the whole, while deeming relations to be unreal. F.H. Bradley articulates this absolute idealism by stating that "Everywhere in the end a relation appears as a necessary but a self-contradictory translation of a non-relational or superrelational unity" (Bradley 2012 [1914], 209 n.1). The "non-relational or super-relational unity" is the supermind of absolute idealism.2 On the other hand, a relational form of panpsychism (as the one put forward by William James, who critiqued the "block universe" (James 1977, 140) of Bradley's idealism as a static singularity) does not presume a singular whole, but only acknowledges a relational structure. Like the singular (or nondual) account of absolute idealism, relational panpsychism is not subjective idealism, either. It need not be an assertion that mind is only internal, nor that the world is only mental, but expresses a dynamic process of interactions.

For example, consider the case for this kind of panpsychism with the appearance of something like a rainbow. For a rainbow to appear we need at least three things in place: white light (e.g., the sun), a refracting medium (e.g., water), and a receptor of light (e.g., eyes). Of course the eyes have to be looking in the right direction, and the light coming to the eyes at the right angle (between 40 and 42 degrees) to be visibly refracted, too. Without any of these things (light, water, eyes) properly configured, no rainbow appears. It is not that the rainbow is "out there" in the world, nor is the rainbow only "in here" in our eyes or minds. Rather, the appearing rainbow is the result of an intricate relational structure in which the perceiving eye is intertwined. Just as the eyes are integral to the perception of a rainbow, we need not be subjective idealists to affirm that the mind is constitutive to the world. In other words, "beauty is in the eye of the beholder" does not necessarily mean that beauty is totally subjective, as if it were "all in our heads," but it can simply mean that the subject is an integral part of the dynamic process by which beauty takes place.

Buddhism and Panpsychism

Buddhists describe an irreducibly complex matrix of interrelation: a causal process that denies singularity and difference to cause and effect (temporal entanglement), and likewise posit a spatial entanglement that denies real singularities (and real differences, too). Buddhists like Nāgārjuna have claimed that there is nothing really singular because nothing exists independently; there is only ever a relational presentation of the world — nothing can be found that is truly singular because everything is dependent on something else.

A.N. Whitehead made this point in the twentieth century:

> The misconception which has haunted philosophic literature throughout the centuries is the notion of "independent existence:' There is no such mode of existence; every entity is only to be understood in terms of the way in which it is interwoven with the rest of the Universe.

A relation entails at least two things, but there is not a single thing that is outside the relational matrix (and if there were, we could not know it, because knowledge implies the relation of knower and known). The only viable candidate for "one" is the whole itself, the universe — the unified structure of the multiplicity — yet the "one" of the universe cannot be a determinate, static one, for it is constituted by interpenetrating relations.

Panpsychism can be understood as a theoretic articulation of the relational structure of existence — the matrix of dependent arising as the Buddhists call it. The mind is clearly implicated in this structure, as a dependent component, and a necessary condition for the arising of anything. Whereas the mind is a necessary condition for a world, it is not necessarily a sufficient condition for a world because the mind alone — as if floating in a vacuum in space — cannot know or be known without being immersed in a field of interaction — stimuli, the phenomena of a world. This does not mean that phenomena are simply reducible to mind (as in subjective idealism), it just means that they do

not exist — and cannot exist — as they do without mind.

We can take a lesson straight out of modern physics: observers always affect a phenomenon. It is not that what we observe is totally controlled by our observing, but it is just that being there as an observer plays a part, an inextricable part, of the phenomenon that is observed. Reality is a participatory affair. This is not just true on the quantum level; this is true everywhere. When the truth of this fact everywhere is taken seriously, writ large, we come to panpsychism, at least in its weak form (i.e., mind-dependence).

Importantly, panpsychism does not treat the substance of the world as a mysterious thing called "matter," the working assumption of materialism, nor does it posit a non-material spirit or "ghost in the machine," as in dualism. Rather, for a panpsychist, the mind inhabits the world fundamentally — whether relationally ("weak panpsychism"), constitutively ("animistic panpsychism"), or comprehensively ("absolute idealism"). In any case, the takeaway from panpsychism is that mental life is the one experiential reality of which we have certainty — not as the grammatical subject of Descartes' cogito, but the sheer facticity of cognitively inhabiting a lived world. To claim anything more (or less) than the experiential world is to delve into the realm of metaphysical speculation.

Panpsychism is not only a claim in the realm of metaphysics, it can be an empirical claim, too. A motion to take seriously the matter of experience was put forward by William James in his radical empiricism: "To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced". James sought to overcome abstract metaphysics, which rely on "faith" in notions like "matter" to build knowledge. In doing so, panpsychists like James clarify the implications of empirical knowledge and their foundations, all the way to their counter-intuitive and uncomfortable conclusions.

F.H. Bradley, despite being criticized by James, formulated a logical foundation for this kind of experiential metaphysics in his Appearance and Reality:

> Find any piece of existence, take up anything that any one could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced.

This kind of analysis is the starting point of panpsychism.

While the notion of panpsychism may strike a casual reader of philosophy as strange, the strangeness of the notion "materialism" is too often casually overlooked, as Galen Strawson starkly observes:

> If one hasn't felt a kind of vertigo of astonishment, when facing the thought, obligatory for all materialists, that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon in every respect, including every Experiential respect — a sense of having been precipitated into a completely new confrontation with the utter strangeness of the physical (the real) relative to all existing commonsense and scientific conceptions of it — then one hasn't begun to be a thoughtful materialist. One hasn't got to the starting line.

Whether or not panpsychism is true, it is no stranger than materialism (and arguably less so).

Contemporary philosophers like Timothy Sprigge have argued that panpsychism offers a more coherent account of the world than the alternatives of physicalism (a.k.a. materialism) and dualism (Sprigge 1983). David Ray Griffin also makes this case, citing his mentor, Charles Hartshorne, who argued that materialism is "dualism in disguise" because materialists implicitly acknowledge a difference between experiencing and non-experiencing things. Materialists reduce mind to matter, yet idealists do just the opposite: they reduce matter to mind. In this way, idealists, too,

are crypto-dualists. The environmental philosopher Freya Matthews articulates how panpsychism offers a way around the crypto-dualisms of materialism and idealism:

> Dualistic theories are typically contrasted with materialist theories, on the one hand, which explain mentality or ideality reductively in physicalist terms, and idealist theories, on the other hand, that posit forms of mentality or ideality that cannot be thus theoretically reduced to physics and in which indeed matter is often written off altogether as a mere mirage of appearances. But materialism and idealism are in fact just flip sides of dualism itself... The true converse of mind-matter dualism is neither materialism nor idealism but a position that posits some form of nonduality of mind-matter unity, implicating mentality in the definition of matter and materiality in the definition of mind.

Contrary to idealists (who describe a matter-independent world) and materialists (who describe a mind-independent world), panpsychism can be understood as a relational philosophy of mind-matter, a philosophy of nonduality. Matthews continues to formulate this alternative:

> A theory that posits mind-matter unity should be described as panphysicalist as well as panpsychist, since psychic or ideal phenomena will be as physically based, from the unified point of view, as physical phenomena will be psychically based.

Matthews argues that panpsychism is not only compatible with "panphysicalism, she furthermore contends that panpsychism, in contrast to materialism and idealism, offers a sound basis for ethics:

> Materialism — the deanimation of the world — has always been in a relation of philosophical codependency with idealism. Materialism tends to front up as the commonsense version of dualism, idealism as the esoteric, philosophical version. Idealist philosophies are thus always current in materialist cultures. (Poststructural relativism is the prevalent form of idealism in Western societies today: poststructuralism disallows inference from cultural constructions of reality to any postulate concerning an "objective" dimension of things, such as that which was traditionally regarded as the province of physics.) Materialism and idealism are equally retrograde from an environmental point of view: the materialist regards the world as an inert lump of putty for his own designs; for the idealist it is an inconsequential mirage of appearances, unknowable and hence for practical purposes nonexistent in its own right.

Clearly, not every panpsychism is a metaphysical idealism. As is the case among Buddhist (and Yogācāra) philosophies, we find a range of meanings for panpsychism.

One of the takeaways from panpsychism, besides the fact that non-experiential matter is incoherent, is that the notion of mental-matter can serve pragmatic purposes, just like mindless-matter. Nothing need be lost by including mind in matter, and there is much to gain, particularly when we recognize the important difference between (methodological) objectivity and (ontological) objectivity: the former serves to remove biases of prejudice (interests that color subjective orientations such as wish-fulfillment or fear), while the latter presumes to remove the subjective component of experience in toto. The former is an important component in a pragmatic, scientific method, yet the latter is an impossibility for the simple fact that everything known is necessarily experienced. A common mistake in modern notions of the world is the presumption that materialism is a predetermined fact — the realm of hardnosed scientists — whereas panpsychism is a flakey, metaphysical notion. Yet as the contemporary analytic philosopher Galen Strawson pointed out, "We really don't know enough to say that there is any non-mental being".

In his influential article subtitled "Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism," Strawson makes a distinction between physicalism, "the view that every real phenomena in the universe is...physical," and physicSism, "the view — the faith — that the nature or essence of all concrete reality can in principle be fully captured in the term physics". A problem inherent in the position Strawson outlines as physicism (a.k.a. physicalism) has been dubbed

"Hempel's dilemma" Hempel's dilemma (named after the philosopher Carl Hempel) points to a major problem with the tenet of physicalism, namely, that it cannot account for phenomenal experience within the current model of physics, so it must appeal to a future physics that supposedly will be able to do so. Yet the idea of what constitutes "physical" in the future may be quite different from what is held to constitute the physical in present-day physics, and if history has taught us anything, the future physics will conceive the world in a much different way than the physics of today. So that leaves us with the dilemma: will the future "physical" include the mental?

Panpsychism is not so easily dismissed just because it is counter-intuitive or "weird," a common complaint about it (if it is taken seriously at all and not just ignored). Thankfully, simply being counter-intuitive is not enough to exclude a topic from intelligent inquiry, for where would science be if any claim that was counter-intuitive were a priori taken off the table of reasonable truth?

Subjective and Absolute Idealisms in Yogācāra

Buddhist Yogācāra traditions do not postulate a metaphysical notion of matter independent of experiential reality. Since the "stuff" of the world is cognitive, the primary material of the world is not completely opaque to cognition, unlike a physicalist's mysterious notion of "matter:' The eighth- and ninth-century Indian Buddhist Prajnākaragupta conveyed the problem with the claim to an external world concisely as follows: "If blue is perceived, then how can it be called `external'? And, if it is not perceived, how can it be called `external'?"

In Yogācāra texts we find a number of arguments that deny a mind-independent world, such as the dream argument (that our perceptions of external objects are as mistaken in waking perception as they are in dreams), arguments that objects are observer-dependent (e.g., water appears differently to fish and humans), and arguments that objects are always accompanied by cognitions (objects are always known objects).

Other arguments found in Yogācāra texts attack the very notion of materiality, such as Vasubandhu's arguments against partless particles constituting extended phenomena (Vimsatikā v. 11-14; Vasubandhu 1957), Dignāga's argument that neither external particles nor their combinations can provide an account of the perception of phenomena (Ālambanaparīksā v. 1-5; Dignāga 1957a), and Dharmakirti's argument that perceived objects are not real because they are neither unitary nor singular: "That form in which entities are perceived does not exist in reality, for these (things) have neither a unitary nor a multiple form" (Pramānavārttika 111.359; Dharmakirti 1957a). It is needless to say that these Buddhists, famous for proclaiming the absence of a self, were not afraid to follow logic to its counter-intuitive consequences, including the denial of an external world.

Vasubandhu is the godfather of arguments against external realism. In the fifth century, he clearly pointed out a central problem of emergence: that we cannot get extended objects from what is not extended. His successor, Dignāga, pointed out a further problem with a dualistic metaphysic, namely, dualism's inability to provide a coherent account of the phenomenal world. Both of these influential figures raised philosophical problems in terms of a coherent account that can relate the (indivisibly) small with the (macroscopically) large.

Dignāga's arguments shed light on a problem in terms of (i) the relation between extended things and what is not extended, and (ii) the relationship between mind and matter. For the first problem, Dignāga echoes Vasubandhu's argument in the Twenty Stanzas that extended objects cannot be constituted by indivisible particles that lack extension. The second problem — the relationship not between macro-objects and micro-objects, but between cognition and matter — is known as the "hard problem" of consciousness. It is a version of the mind—body problem that addresses the question: how can experience arise from matter, which does not share its nature? This problem is set up by the presumptions of a mental—physical dualism, but can be answered with monism. Dignāga's answer is not, however, a physicalist monism (which is left with an explanatory gap that

fails to address experiential reality), but rather the monism of panpsychism.

A distinctive feature of Dignāga's panpsychism is that he makes external realism compatible with idealism — the same principles that guide a coherent causal process in terms of external entities can function without those entities as well. That is, we might call something "matter" or a "configuration of energy" and presume a causal story around the kind of entity we designate. We can presume that matter is external and separate from mind, or we can presume that matter (or energy) is the same kind of stuff as the mind and still have the same regularity of causal processes that external realism demands.

Furthermore, with panpsychism the causal process need not be initiated by mind (as in the "top-down" mental causation of subjective idealism) or by matter (the "bottom-up" causation of physicalism) but by means of a third entity, which is neither external nor internal but the cause of both. In fact, this third alternative, as a form of neutral monism (that is neither mental nor physical but shares properties of, or is the cause of, both), is another possibility available to describe a Yogācāra metaphysic. In fact, the status of the world, as either subjective idealism or absolute idealism (or neutral monism), is another level of ambiguity at play in Dignāga's philosophy (in addition to the one between external realism and subjective idealism). We can say that the ambiguity here is one between subjective idealism (everything that exists is perceived) and absolute idealism (nothing is outside the unitary structure within which there are only internal relations). In the former case, mind is constitutive of the world; in the latter case, mind is intertwined with the world. In both cases, there is nothing outside mind.

An important feature of Dignāga's Yogācāra is his notion of self-awareness, which is not simply a subjective feature, but the unity of the subject—object structure of the world. In Dignāga's self-awareness, as in absolute idealism, the subjective and the objective components constitute two facets of a larger whole. With this kind of account, the content of mental perception need not be a mental projection, as in the fictional objects of (subjective) idealism, for the subjective mental image along with the objective mental image form the structure of self-awareness (Pramānasamuccaya 1.8-10; Dignāga 1957b).

The dual-aspected nature of self-awareness resembles the substance of Spinoza's dual-aspect monism. Like Spinoza, who used thought and extension as examples of attributes of substance, Dignāga and his commentator, Dharmakirti, outlined subjective and objective features of self-awareness. In his Pramānaviniscaya, Dharmakirti claimed that "What is experienced by cognition is not different [from it]10(Dharmakirti 1957b). Self-awareness in this case is thus both the means and content of knowledge, similar to Spinoza's notion of substance, which he defined as "what is in itself and is conceived through itself" (Spinoza 2002, 217 definition 3). Spinoza also supported the case that subjects and objects only appear to be distinct but in fact are not by following the principle that unlike things cannot be causally related, like Dharmakirti.

While a supermind of absolute idealism is not explicated by Dignāga or Dharmakirti, such a form of self-awareness, as the ultimate substance or truth, is found in the works of the Tibetan scholar Sākya Chokden (shākya mchogldan, 1428-1507). Self-awareness for S. Chokden is sui generis, like

Spinoza's substance (a.k.a. God). In the way that for Spinoza, mind and matter are nothing but attributes of the one (infinite) substance of God, Sākya Chokden claims that the only thing that is real is self-awareness, and that this self-awareness is the ultimate reality — the real ground for the unreal subject—object presentation of duality. Yet the self-awareness that Sākya Chokden claims to be real is exclusively a nondual awareness, not ordinary (conventional) self-awareness, for he denies the reality of any awareness that perceives duality (Sākya Chokden 1975, 477-478). Real self-awareness for him is of another order than ordinary cognitions. Sākya Chokden creates a third category for self-awareness, beyond dualistic subjectivity and objectivity. This self-awareness is thus a kind of supermind, or gnosis (ye shes), as opposed to ordinary consciousness (rnam shes).

Although Dignāga may not necessarily follow S. Chokden down the road to absolute idealism, his explanation does not simply reduce cognition to the subject, as in a simplistic model of subjective idealism (a.k.a. "mind-only") in which objective percepts are simply the products of a subjective mind. Rather, there is a more complex and arguably more nuanced causal story.

Dignāga's account of perception entails a temporal, self-generating, and self-regulating process of conscious experience, which is driven by a feedback loop of predisposition and habituation to predispositions. That is, he says that the capacities for perception reside in cognition, and cognition arises from these capacities. In this way, his account of the cognitive process exemplifies the cognitive coupling of agent and environment, which mutually cooperate to create a life-world. In this system, moreover, both the dualist's and physicalist's problem of emergence — how mind arises from matter — is skirted, because the transcendental structure of the world is not spatially located in here or out there, and so is not bound by the temporality that it shapes.

The status of the external world is clear in Yogācāra: there is none. Yet what constitutes reality is ambiguous: is it all mind or not? This question is reflected in the status of the dependent nature in the Yogācāra theory of three natures: the imagined nature, the dependent nature, and the consummate nature. Conceptual construction is the imagined nature — what we impute as the reality of things like trees, selves, and tables, and the concepts we use to capture these entities. We hold these things to be real and a natural part of reality, when they are in fact cultural artifacts; that is to say, they are not separate from our conceptual constructions. The real world is not the way we construct it to be; reality's emptiness of constructions is the consummate nature. Reality is the dependent nature, the basis of our false conceptions, which is the inexpressible field of reality and an indeterminate matrix of relations.

The dependent nature is structured by dependent arising, a structure that implicates the mind, too. The dependent nature is thus entangled with cognition; it constitutes a panpsychist world. The dependent nature has been identified with the distorted mind, like the foundational consciousness, and we can see how both these notions play pivotal roles in Yogācāra, as the causal story of the world. Like the dependent nature, the foundational consciousness is a structure that is not only internal, nor only mental, but a causal process that is the source and content of the attribution of subjects and objects.

While the foundational consciousness, being nominally a "consciousness" (vijnāna), may be identified with the subjective pole of perception, it is the source not only of the subjective representations of mind, but also of objective representations of bodies, environments, and materials as well. Thus, the function of the foundational consciousness supports a form of panpsychism — that all is mind or mind-like (or at least a weak form of panpsychism, that all is mind-dependent). Alternatively, the foundational consciousness can be seen as a form of neutral monism: a causal matrix that is neither mind nor matter, but the ground of both. This is because rather than simply being a form of subjective idealism, the foundational consciousness constitutes the content of subjects as well as objects.

At the end of the day, Yogācāra may better be described in the more neutral terms of panpsychism rather than the subjective idealism of "mind-only" because panpsychism not only captures the fact that the foundational consciousness is a consciousness and the content of object presentation, but also conveys that the foundational consciousness is the content of the presentation of subjectivity, too. In this way, the reality of the subject along with its subject—object presentation can be denied while affirming a conscious process (like the dependent nature), just as when the mere flow of consciousness is affirmed in a causal story that denies any enduring entity like a unified self. This process comes from something that is not itself a subjective consciousness, but from what is said to be an "internal" consciousness nonetheless (simply because it is not "out there").

We can discern a tension in Yogācāra, namely, a tension between subjective idealism and panpsychism, as seen in the respective meanings ascribed to subjectivity, internality, and cognition.

Given that the foundational consciousness is said to be "internal," the meaning of internality — retained as something distinct from ordinary subjectivity, and particularly in the absence of external objects — leaves the ambiguity of Yogācāra in place.

Conclusion

Yogācāra is often harnessed with the unspecified label "idealism; and thus saddled with the problems associated with subjective idealism — such as those of solipsism, there being an asymmetry between a (real) mind and an (unreal) object, and there being no way to drive a wedge between an "internal" mind and an "external" object (the wedge upon which subjective idealism depends, since there is no place to stand outside of a subject—object relation to split those up and privilege the former). Yet the importance of Yogācāra analyses is often overlooked in one-sided caricatures of this tradition.

While subjective idealism is logically problematic, absolute idealism (or panpsychism) is not. In fact, A.K. Chatterjee puts forward Yogācāra as a philosophy of idealism that cannot simply be replaced by another constructive philosophy, but one that can only be challenged by deconstruction or silence:

> Yogācāra philosophy is...a perfect example of coherent construction. It is not to be challenged by other constructive philosophies; one dogmatism is not refuted by another dogmatism. If one refuses to accept idealism, one can do so, not by embracing another speculative philosophy, but only by ceasing to have any speculation at all.

The logical coherency of absolute idealism is quite different from the critical or skeptical modes of thought that simply unmask the shaky foundations of any system of thought. Like panpsychism, Yogācāra is a formidable philosophy, even while it is often represented in the form of a straw man, and criticized as simply subjective idealism. Panpsychism, however, cannot be dismissed simply because it is counter-intuitive, for it remains a coherent model of the universe, and a metaphysic with empirical and logical support. <>

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