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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

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EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. Our Annotated Bibliography will review, list and link the titles under discussion, providing a faithful summary of its content and audience.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

Table of Contents

Religion in Ephesos Reconsidered: Archaeology of Spaces, Structures, and Objects edited by Daniel Schowalter, Sabine Ladstätter, Steven J. Friesen and Christine Thomas [Novum Testamentum, Supplements, Brill, 9789004401129]

Religion in Ephesos Reconsidered provides a detailed overview of the current state of research on the most important Ephesian projects offering evidence for religious activity during the Roman period. Ranging from huge temple complexes to hand-held figurines, this book surveys a broad scope of materials. Careful reading of texts and inscriptions is combined with cutting-edge archaeological and architectural analysis to illustrate how the ancient people of Ephesos worshipped both the traditional deities and the new gods that came into their purview. Overall, the volume questions traditional understandings of material culture in Ephesos, and demonstrates that the views of the city and its inhabitants on religion were more complex and diverse than has been previously assumed.

Excerpt: This project began with two stimulating sessions at the 2014 international meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in Vienna. The volume that has grown out of that conference has provided an opportunity to interface directly with the archaeologists from the

Österreichisches Archäologisches Institut (öaI) and elsewhere, who have been engaged in work at the site of Ephesos in western Asia Minor. As we approach the close of the second decade of the 21st century, this volume provides a detailed recap in English of the current state of research on many of the most important Ephesian projects. The common theme among the chapters is the pursuit of a better understanding of religious practice in the ancient Roman city.

The chapters that follow touch on many issues related to structures, spaces, and objects that are connected to religious activity in the city during the Roman period and into late antiquity. In every case, the analysis is based on current field work and research and represents the latest in thinking on the Ephesian excavations. In the Structures section (Part 1), the authors consider major monuments from throughout the city, including imperial temples, the so-called Serapeion, the grotto of Thekla and St. Paul, and domestic space from the early Byzantine period. Examination of Spaces (Part 2) includes the Upper Agora, traditionally known as the 'Staatsmarkt' or State Agora; the area of the Magnesian Gate, a major point of entry and a place of ritual on the east side of the city; areas for burial and funerary practices outside the city gates; an extensive area above the theater which appears to have been used for the worship of Dionysos; the area surrounding the famous Temple of Artemis as it can be reconstructed in the Roman period; and the use of geophysical surveys to understand unexcavated areas in and around the city. Finally, the first essay in the section on Objects (Part 3) looks at epigraphic and literary evidence for the worship of the Roman emperor in Ephesos. This is followed by two pieces on religious practice within domestic spaces—one looking at architectural and decorative evidence for ritual activity in the slope houses and another concentrating on terracotta figurines from those houses and what they can reveal about religious images and actions.

Throughout this collection of essays, the reader is treated to a review of the latest information on archaeology and interpretation of Ephesos, presented with a special regard for religious concerns and in a way that is accessible for the non-specialist. This approach opens new opportunities to investigate how archaeology can and cannot provide context for understanding the ancient Roman world. Recognizing both the potential and the limitations of archaeological knowledge allows the reader to appreciate the insights that are available without reaching beyond what the evidence can bear. Most of the essays in the book take a fresh look at evidence that has been known for a long time, or bring new evidence to bear on long-standing assumptions. The result is a reconsideration of how Ephesians in the Roman and Byzantine periods practiced their religion, and a chance for all readers to re-examine their own assumptions about the ancient world in which Christianity developed.

In the first chapter, the director of the Ephesos Excavations, Sabine Ladstätter, discusses the latest research on the monumental precinct of the Flavian Temple (Temple of Domitian) near the Upper Agora of the city. In order to create this sanctuary in the middle of the first century CE, a huge portion of the city was buried underneath a massive podium on which the temple stood. Ladstätter reviews the history of excavation and interpretation of this complex and re-evaluates long-standing assumptions about its architecture and decorative scheme. Geophysical investigations and excavation of the temple platform in 2009–2011 have provided conclusive evidence for the destruction of the temple in the early 5th century and a detailed picture of the reuse of the space in late antiquity.

The so-called Serapeion at Ephesos is one of the largest and most impressive ancient monuments in the entire Mediterranean world. In her chapter, Thekla Schulz reports on the extensive effort at clearing, measuring, scanning and imaging this amazing structure. The result of her research is a better understanding of the architecture and a reassessment of "the existing interpretations of the precincts." Schulz reviews the history of excavation and interpretation of the site and comes to endorse its association with worship of the Egyptian gods. In support of this connection she comments throughout on how various details of the construction could have related to the practice of Egyptian religion, especially the provision for the symbolic, ritual use of water.

Renate Pillinger presents a comprehensive view of the architectural and artistic compositions that make up the grotto of St. Paul, and especially images related to the apocryphal story of Thekla. Careful cleaning and examination of the remaining architectural elements provide information on the original design of the space and its reuse in subsequent periods. Analysis of the walls reveal numerous examples of graffiti and other writing that give clues to later stages of usage of the space. It is the multiple stages of wall painting, however, that provide for the identification of the cave as an early Christian cave church, with differing phases of decoration and, possibly, dedication. The layer with the paintings related to Thekla and Paul also includes a unique representation of Theokleia, the mother of Thekla, who plays a prominent part in the Acts of Paul and Thekla. Pillinger's analysis of the cave reveals why the site remained a sacred place into the 19th century. And why it is a fascinating artifact of the early centuries of Byzantine Christianity.

The late Roman and Byzantine periods are also the focus of the paper by Andreas Pülz, who investigates evidence for Christian presence in the city. Pülz does not consider the several formal church buildings in Ephesos, but rather looks at Christian symbols that have been carved into stone architecture such as city gates, fountains, and other public monuments. He also examines evidence from private houses which are constructed in the area between the theater and the harbor after earthquakes devastated other areas of town in the late 3rd century cE. Excavations of the so-called Byzantine Palace have now been augmented with geophysical research that shows the massive extent of this building, and which lead Pülz to support the likely identification of this structure as the residence of the Ephesian bishop. Other domestic structures are much smaller, but contain crosses and other Christian symbols carved on architectural elements and marked on various small finds such as lamps, jewelry, and tableware. Pülz also points out various inscriptions that use Biblical language or make specific reference to Christian concepts, including the famous Abgar inscription and several lesser-known examples. Finally, Pülz considers space within private houses that could be identified as liturgical installations or rooms for religious practice associated with Christianity. The overall collection of evidence is quite clearly indicative of Christian presence, but Pülz cautions the reader that it is risky to assign particular beliefs to individuals based on this evidence, since there could be a variety of explanations for the presence of Christian symbols in a given space.

Dirk Steuernagel focusses on a large specific space in the eastern part of ancient Ephesos and re-considers evidence for identification of this space as the Staatsmarkt or "State Agora" (in this volume known as the "Upper Agora"). Steuernagel reviews the history of excavation and interpretation of this important space, highlighting the development of a consensus view that the area was constructed as part of an architectural master plan ("Bauprogramm") that was undertaken during the reign of Augustus. According to Steuernagel, this consensus

began to fray in the early 21st century, with questions raised about various aspects of the complex. In order to resolve these questions and to understand more about the phases of construction of the Upper Agora, Steuernagel began a research program in 2014 involving archaeologists and architectural historians. Results of the first seasons of work on this plan have led to a further weakening of the single “Bauprogramm” idea and an appreciation for a complexity of construction over time. Steuernagel and his colleagues are calling into question the architectural process associated with this space, and challenging a common “Roman-centered” interpretation that saw the Upper Agora as a sign of imperial ideology driving construction in the provincial capital of Asia. Instead, they see archaeological and architectural indications of a more socially diverse process that eventually leads to the final Roman form of the Upper Agora.

The area of the Magnesian Gate is immediately east of the Upper Agora, and it served as one of the most important entrance/exits for the city. Alexander Sokolicek has conducted excavations in the area of the gate and as a result has obtained a better understanding of the architecture. He also presents suggestions about the possible function of the gate in civic ritual activity. Sokolicek’s research has led to a redating of the massive gate complex to around 100 SCE, and the suggestion that the new gate was connected to the construction of “supra-regional” road systems throughout the new Roman province of Asia. Research on the architecture of the gate also raises issues regarding its function. Beyond simply serving as a point for controlled access to the city, Sokolicek sees the gate functioning as a liminal point in sacred processions. According to the Salutaris inscription, sacred objects change hands at the Magnesian Gate. They are transferred from the priests who have brought them from the Artemision to young male citizens (ephebes) who conduct the statues on their ritual path through the city. Based on careful analysis of the Salutaris inscription, Sokolicek believes that this transition of control of the sacred objects may also signal a division of labor, or power, that reflects the social realities of the Greek city functioning within the Roman empire.

Martin Steskal turns primarily to spaces outside the city walls to take a closer look at burial practices and what they might reveal about Ephesian society. He highlights important examples of burial within the city (intra-urban), starting in Hellenistic times and becoming more common among Christians in the middle-Byzantine period. Outside the city walls, however, research efforts have found evidence for more than 1200 individual burial sites from the Roman period, including 528 burial sites found and recorded through surface survey. While Steskal points out that excavations of a city like Ephesos are bound to reveal a wide diversity of burial practices, he does elaborate on several important tendencies in the evidence. Examples of cremation burials are rare compared to examples of inhumation. Evidence for tomb buildings or other burial structures also seems to speak to the social order in Ephesos, but in a somewhat unexpected way. Steskal notes that there is a certain commonality of size and design among the burial houses that does not reflect an attempt by wealthy individuals to advertise their prominence. Decorations on the interior could be more or less elaborate, but would not have been visible except during funeral or memorial activities. This more egalitarian approach to commemoration of the dead is seen by Steskal as an indication of a stable society in which elites did not have to reinforce their status through ostentatious grave moments. There was still opportunity to highlight a family’s standing, especially during pre-burial activities, but the actual tomb buildings reflect a society in which people understood and accepted their place.

Hilke Thür constructs a detailed analysis of archaeological evidence for the worship of Dionysos in Ephesos. Building on literary testimony and inscriptions, she reviews various locations where Dionysos is attested in some way. These include the theater, a very interesting set of buildings above the theater, the so-called Domus in Terrace House 1, and Terrace House 2, unit 6, the home of C. Fl. Furius Aptus, who was a priest of Dionysos. Both elite residences included elaborate meeting spaces, most likely for a private Dionysos association. The area above the theater extends from the very top section of the theater itself (porticus in summa cavea), and includes an open area on the street, a small temple, a banquet hall, and yet another elite residence. Based on comparisons to other known sanctuaries of Dionysos, Thür concludes that it is likely that this area above the theater also served as space for Dionysos worship. Furthermore, she suggests that this sanctuary within the Roman city stands on ground beyond the territory of the Classical city and as such fits the association of Dionysos as pro Poleos ("outside the city"). Such a connection would not only underline the venerable nature of the Dionysos cult in Ephesos and elsewhere, but also provides an important insight into the shadowy topic of religious practice by the Ephesians in the Classical period.

The next chapter in the Spaces section looks at an area that is outside of the main Roman town, but is a center of cultic life at Ephesos throughout all periods. Today, the Temple of Artemis is viewed in a ruined state, and largely apart from any other architecture. In the Roman period, however, the temple was surrounded by various structures which were indicative of ritual, social, and political activities going on around the temenos. Lilli Zabrana begins with the excavations of John Turtle Wood from the second half of the 19th century, and details the evidence for Roman structures that Wood encountered on his way to finding the Artemision. Research in the British Museum archives turned up more complete records of Wood's efforts, and Zabrana provides an updated plan of the sanctuary. Zabrana also considers a building discovered by Wood in 1870 that stood south of the Artemis altar and east of the Odeion and contained a statuary head of Caesar Augustus and inscriptions tied to priestly affairs and worship of the emperor. She affirms the observation of Simon Price that this building should be associated with the Augusteum/Sebasteion within the Artemision mentioned in inscriptions. Zabrana suggests that the long (at least 700 ft.) portico building described by Wood northwest of the Temple of Artemis could be accommodations for priests as suggested by Wood, but it could also have provided residence for individuals who sought asylum inside the great sanctuary. Finally, to complete this picture of the busy area around the temple, new excavations to the southeast determined that the structure formerly labeled as a "tribune" was in fact an odeion that probably housed some of the artistic events that took place as part of the Artemisia festival.

The chapter by Christine Thomas closes out the section on Spaces. Thomas relies on evidence from geophysical surveys of Ephesos to investigate likely locations for the first-century community of Jesus followers in the city. Both magnetic resonance and ground penetrating radar provide data that help to understand the nature of occupation in the area of the harbor. New space had been created in this region due to the silting up of the harbor during the Hellenistic period. Geophysical analysis shows that the new space was predominantly occupied by commercial and industrial installations. Thomas argues that this type of "peripheral" neighborhood would have been a likely area where followers of Jesus would have lived and worked, in contrast to the monumental structures that have historically been the focus of many excavations and reconstructions.

The final section of the book considers objects that provide insight into religious practices in Ephesos. François Kirbihler looks at epigraphical evidence for the development of the worship of the emperor in Ephesos from the 1st century scE to the 3rd century cE. Kirbihler calls on epigraphical and numismatic evidence to conclude that there was a cult established for Roma and Divus Iulius starting in 40/39 or 39/38 scE, and suggests that this cult would have been located in the Artemision and was probably connected to the founding of the Augusteum in the sanctuary as discussed by Zabrana. As for evidence for worshipping the emperor inside the city itself, Kirbihler cites material gathered in the area of the Upper Agora, and posits a temple in the area. He is cautious, however, about describing that area as a formal Sebasteion given the work of Steuernagel described above. According to Kirbihler, the local nature of imperial cults in Ephesos changed when the city received its first neokorate temple under the Flavians. He offers support for the "identification theory" claiming that the two epigraphically attested titles both refer to the same office of provincial high priest of the emperor. In addition to discussing the large percentage of these priests whose names are attested in the epigraphic record, Kirbihler reviews their ceremonial and administrative duties and discusses their role from the first neokorate up until the massive destructions caused by earthquakes in the later 3rd century cE. After this, evidence for imperial cult and other non-Christian religious phenomena in Ephesos becomes much more scarce.

The last two chapters return to the Terrace Houses and survey details of the architecture, decorations, and small finds from Terrace House 2 that provide indications of religious practice. Norbert Zimmermann looks at evidence ranging from complete rooms to niches dedicated to gods, from paintings and statuettes of divinities to thymiateria (incense burners), and from small altars to foundation deposits. Given the complicated building phases, destruction events, and remodelling of Terrace House 2, Zimmermann is appropriately careful about his interpretation of the material. Nonetheless, he can provide new understandings of the insula by looking at different parts of the dwellings (entrances, niches, cult rooms), decoration (relief sculpture, painting, and free-standing sculpture), as well as graffiti found in many areas of the building. His conclusion is that religious activity does not seem to be confined to any one part of the house, such as the lararia in Pompeii. Rather, a range of religious phenomena appear throughout the different parts of each dwelling unit. The evidence for foundation deposits consists of largely unbroken ceramic or glass vessels that were intentionally buried at critical points. These deposits are repeated in later phases of remodeling, or even repairing damage which occurred when earlier dedications failed to keep the building safe.

Elisabeth Rathmayr focuses on terracotta figurines that were found in excavations of both Terrace House 2 and the so-called "Domus" in Terrace House 1. The figurines in the final destruction layer of the houses are dated before the late 3rd century cE. Those found in excavations below the final floor level date from the Hellenistic period to the 2nd century cE. Rathmayr notes that the percentage of terracotta figurines compared to those made of marble or other valuable materials decreases over time from the Hellenistic to the later Roman period, and suggests that this decline is caused by a number of factors. She points out that the theme of the figures changes over time as well, with traditional Greek deities declining and the Egyptian gods, Nike, and gladiators growing in number. Rathmayr also provides a discussion of where and how figurines could have been displayed or used in the dwelling units. Finally, Rathmayr suggests that terracotta figurines were placed side by side

with images made of more valuable substances. This observation seems especially significant in an elite domestic setting where the cost of an image might not have been of primary importance.

Ranging from huge temple complexes to hand-held figurines, this book considers a wide range of evidence for religious activity in Ephesos during the Roman and Byzantine periods. Careful reading of texts and inscriptions is combined with the latest in archaeological and architectural analysis to give the reader a selective glimpse of how the people of Ephesos worshipped both the traditional deities and new gods that came into their purview. Overall, the essays raise questions about traditional understandings of material culture in ancient Ephesos, and come to conclusions that reflect more complicated and diverse views of the city and its inhabitants.

At a site like Ephesos, that has been excavated for a century and a half, there is also an implicit lesson about the mutability of our archaeological information. New excavations, new technologies, and new perspectives can modify or supercede long-held views. This means that archaeological data must be used with care. Conclusions about any type of religious practice in Ephesos (or any other place) must be sensitive to new insights on structures, spaces, objects, or any other aspect of the archaeological enterprise. <>

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF HINDUISM: THE GODDESS edited by Mandakranta Bose [The Oxford History of Hinduism, Oxford University Press, 9780198767022]

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF HINDUISM: THE GODDESS provides a critical exposition of the Hindu idea of the divine feminine, or Devi, conceived as a singularity expressed in many forms. With the theological principles examined in the opening chapters, the book proceeds to describe and expound historically how individual manifestations of Devi; have been imagined in Hindu religious culture and their impact upon Hindu social life. In this quest the contributors draw upon the history and philosophy of major Hindu ideologies, such as the Puranic, Tantric, and Vaisnava belief systems. A distinction of the book is its attention not only to the major goddesses from the earliest period of Hindu religious history but also to goddesses of later origin, in many cases of regional provenance and influence. Viewed through the lens of worship practices, legend, and literature, belief in goddesses is discovered as the formative impulse of much of public and private life. The influence of the goddess culture is especially powerful on women's life, often paradoxically situating women between veneration and subjection. This apparent contradiction arises from the humanization of goddesses while acknowledging their divinity, which is central to Hindu beliefs. In addition to studying the social and theological aspect of the goddess ideology, the contributors take anthropological, sociological, and literary approaches to delineate the emotional force of the goddess figure that claims intense human attachments and shapes personal and communal lives.

Reflections upon divinity in any religious system are endless. The Hindu discursive tradition is particularly preoccupied with questions about the Great Goddess as part of a wider and never-ending questioning of the origin, composition, and process of creation initiated by the ancient musings of the RgVeda: "Whence this creation has arisen—perhaps it formed itself, or perhaps it did not—the one who looks down on it, in the highest heaven, only he knows—or perhaps he does not know" (RV 10.129.7). While such uncertainty is absent in later texts, the intensity of the need to know never abates. Of relevance to the present context, finding an answer by placing Devi at the fountainhead of creation never loses its appeal and explains what Vidya Dehejia has called the "phenomenal rise of female divinity." The centrality of Devi becomes foundational in much of Hindu theological discourse, in Tantric belief and Sāmkhya philosophy, expanding its ramifications in theology and worship practices in the Purãnic era (third-sixteenth century CE), and gives rise to the goddess tradition as a whole. Of great philosophical complexity, the supremacy of the Great Goddess impinges significantly also upon belief systems built around other dominant deities such as Šiva and Visnu. The approaches to understand the concept of goddesses are immense and

often at odds with one another. Sectarian religious arguments and practices have treated goddesses differently in terms of both their relationships with male gods and their individual roles, some conceiving them as consorts to gods, though possessing great power, and some as manifestations of a single supreme creative and sustaining power.

Necessarily, this volume begins with two chapters that probe what that singularity means as they consider the nature of Devi as an idea, launching the first of the four parts ("The Idea of Devi") into which the fourteen chapters of this volume are arranged. They are followed by studies in the formation of some of the major Hindu goddesses, their historical development, the brahminic as well as Tantric rituals relating to them, and their roles in the contemporary Hindu tradition. Part II ("The Development of the Goddess Tradition") deals with the appearance of goddesses of regional origin and following in medieval times, who continue to influence the religious life of Hindus just as powerfully as the major pan-Indian goddesses discussed in the preceding chapters. Part III ("The Regional Heritage") contains studies of the presumed flow of the divine spirit between goddesses and women on earth as we consider the extent of such linkages from the unveiling of the divine spirit in some women to their actual apotheosis. Turning to present times, Part IV ("Devī in the Modern World") offers in the final two chapters two examples of contemporary worship practices, one in South Asia and the other in the United States. The unifying theme of these explorations is the general Hindu belief in the oneness of Devi, the Great Goddess who manifests herself in multiple forms.

The groundwork for understanding this fundamental tenet of goddess worship is laid by Tracy Pintchman in Chapter 1, where she considers what the Great Goddess means as an idea and as a presence in worldly life. Noting that while Hindus believe at once in many goddesses and a single Great Goddess, Pintchman explains that Devi is a single transcendental being, the source of the cosmos and the sum of three cosmic principles termed Sakti, prakrti, and māyā, or energy, materiality, and delusion (that is, her constant play of shifting form, substance, and purpose). Addressing the principles Sakti, prakrti, and māyā, Pintchman raises such essential questions as what transcendence signifies and whether or in what sense divinity may be immanent in creation. Pondering the relationship between divinity, embodiment, and the natural world, Pintchman considers the link between the divine and human realms and its implications for women. Her study thus aims at mapping the cosmological, devotional, and sociological understanding of the goddess tradition. Noting that although Hindus recognize and revere a variety of different, discrete goddesses, they also tend to speak of "The Goddess" as a singular and unifying deity, Pintchman looks at the Goddess (1) as a cosmogonic/ cosmological creative force that creates, sustains, and permeates the universe, (2) as a being worthy of devotion who is also manifest as individual goddesses, and (3) as a potential role model for human women who in many contexts are viewed as special manifestations of the Goddess. The idea of the divine feminine thus has strong social implications for conceptualizing the nature and roles of women, for whom the goddess persona is made into a model, though 0nly by abstracting her gentler attributes for emulation.

As much as the Goddess acts in the material world, it is as an abstraction and ultimately an impenetrable mystery that she preoccupies Hindu contemplation. In Chapter 2 of this volume Bihani Sarkar tracks the analytical processes by which some thinkers attempt to unveil the mystery of maya, which is one of the most intriguing aspects of Devi, especially when exalted as Mahãmãyã in the influential Šakta text Devīmãhãtmya. As an idea

Mahãmãyã is hard to pin down in that she is at once insentient yet consciously active, binding beings in the coils of existence and freeing them to reach for an ultimate, non-material reality. Who is she, where does she come from, what does she do, and above all, how may we have knowledge of her? The task of finding answers is complicated by the notion that she is the source of delusion, occluding human perception, especially as objective knowledge is limited in the face of the action of māyā. Sarkar seeks an answer in early Hindu discourses on cosmogony, particularly Sãmkhya and Siddhãnta views on the context of the formation and structure of reality. Her own search demonstrates how determinedly one must weave one's way through the maze of speculation expressed as much in allegories and myths as in exercises in exegeses and argument. Not an anthropomorphized deity, Mahãmãyã is an ambivalent concept of being and non-being, an idea rather than an icon that propels the movement of beings within and between the delusional forms generated by karma and salvation by merging with the ultimate reality.

The infinite variety of forms that the active energy known as the Great Goddess may assume is indicated by Sanjukta Gupta in Chapter 3 on the cult of goddess Lalitã/Tripurasundari, whose dual name hints at her intriguing identity. Gupta traces the development and transmission of the cult from Kashmir to South India through a close study mainly of two texts, Lalitopãkhyãna, which is part of the Brahmãndapurãna, and Saundaryalaharī, attributed to Sankarãchãrya. Traced through an ascending hierarchy of the forms of Devi, goddess Tripurasundari is venerated as the divine power of action (kriyãsakti) and the primordial source of the universe as the consort of the Supreme Reality. In the Kashmir version of the cults of Trika and Kaula she is the highest aspect of Devi. The name Lalitã, later appended to the goddess, indicates she is beautiful, charming, and desirable. Her cult arose in South India very early, absorbing that of a powerful local goddess called Kãmãksi located at Kãñcipuram, which was the capital of the Pallava kings. Gupta argues that the name Lalitã was added to the goddess Tripurã later, when the doctrine of the cult attempted to attach to the word Lalitã the connotation of kãma (desire) understood as a means to achieve liberation. The meaning of the word kãma was thus taken beyond erotic sentiments to mean krpā, emphasizing the goddess's compassion for her devotees and her readiness to grant them her grace. At the same time Lalitã's other name Rãjarãjesvari connected her to the aspiration of kings who worshipped her to supplicate for sovereignty and unlimited power. The Lalitopãkhyãna makes it clear that by the time this myth came to be recorded she had become for her devotees the all-powerful Šakti who was superior to all other deities, at once a vanquisher of evildoers, especially false pretenders to power such as the legendary figure of Bhanda, and a loving protector of her supplicants. It is also an illustration of the expansion of the ideology and worship practices of the Great Goddess, and how she expresses herself as the Trika and Kaula goddess Tripurā who is also Lalitã. Implicit in this one form, then, is the manifold potentiality of Devi.

How the idea of the goddess takes a more concrete form in worldly life is traced in my essay (Chapter 4) on goddess Sri/Laksmi. One of the earliest Hindu divinities, Sri/Laksmi has commanded veneration from Vedic times till now as the source of all wellbeing, worldly bounty, sovereignty, and good fortune, although in later times she came increasingly to be worshipped for her gift of wealth. But even as Hindu thought focused on wealth and fortune as her province, it emphasized her identity as one form of the Great Goddess and as such proximate with the fundamental energy that creates, drives, and permeates all existence. Related to this view is that of Sri/Laksmī as the consort of Visnu, one of the three principal

Hindu deities, and thus intimate with the inmost power of the cosmos. In medieval times her nearness to Visnu elevated her divine action not just to intercession with Visnu. on behalf of humanity, as viewed in the Srīvaisnava school of Vaisnava thought. More emphatically, the Pāncarātra school accorded her the status of the actual initiator and controller of the creation, preservation, and dissolution, for even though Visnu is the superior deity he remains inactive in cosmic action. For less philosophical worshippers, though, it is Sri/Laksmi's worldly gifts and benevolent persona that primarily matter. As a feminine divinity she has been readily turned into a model for women, upon whom rests the achievement of orderly and prosperous domesticity. It is also a duty that calls for inexhaustible patience and self-denial. The figure of Sri/Laksmi is thus the locus at once of human—divine interaction and of an ethic of women's self-abnegation. In the construction of Sri/Laksmī as a model for women we may thus see the irony of female deification effecting the confinement of women within socially prescribed roles that deny them self-determination. As we find in Pintchman's discussion of the humanization of Devi in Chapter 1, this is a theme that must be constantly kept in view as we consider the place of Hindu goddesses in philosophy and society.

The many ways of viewing Sri/Laksmi indicate the complexity that dominates the conception of Hindu goddesses. This is what we observe in Chapter 5 by Elizabeth Rohiman on Sarasvati, who has been venerated both as a goddess of learning and as a sacred river. Rohiman argues that Sarasvati is the most ancient individualized goddess of Hinduism, and perhaps the first river to be worshipped as a goddess by Hindus. Generations of Indologists have carefully traced the evolution of Sarasvati, from the river mentioned in the Vedas through her association with the Vedic goddess of speech, Vāc, to her emergence as a deity who is both a river goddess and the goddess of knowledge. Yet cataloguing Sarasvai's textual appearances does not tell the full story of her place in the Hindu pantheon. She is a figure who is both omnipresent—countless Indic texts from a variety of traditions begin with an invocation to Sarasvati—and liminal: premodern images of Sarasvati are exceedingly rare, posing the question of her place in extra-canonical aspects of Hindu life. Treating the river that bears her name as a metaphor, Rohlman examines the elusive and sometimes paradoxical position of Sarasvati in the history of Hinduism. Even when taken literally (i.e. geographically) as a river, Sarasvati cloaks herself in mystery: already described as "lost" in the Vedas, she is a river that is believed to appear and disappear from the surface of the earth at will. The very mysteriousness of this phenomenon is suggestive of a potency more profound than earthly powers in its hint of the elusiveness of purification. As a river, Sarasvati defines the religious geographical tradition of the land, as we find in numerous regional Sarasvatī traditions across India, and indeed to sanctify the vast land of Bhārata, as asserted in the Mahābhārata. Rohiman maintains that Sarasvati the goddess is no less elusive or powerful than the river, and that it is because of her compound role as river, speech, and goddess that Sarasvati is such a perplexing figure.

In Chapter 6 on Rādhā, Tracy Coleman addresses a distinctive mark of Hindu religious culture; that is, the presumption of human-divine exchange. Not only are deities imagined in human form and attributed human motives, they are placed in close relationships with men, women, and children. Rādhā is a particularly challenging figure in Hindu devotional thought, undercutting as her legend does the idea of wifely faithfulness and exalting her faithlessness in her surrender to Krsna. For that matter, how may one countenance the seduction of a married woman by a god? One way out of this ethical quandary is to argue that the intimacy

between Krsna, that most intriguing of Visnu's human forms, and Rãdhã his mortal lover is so close, virtually so organic, that the dividing line between god and mortal disappears, and with it the rules of worldly conduct. Coleman considers how this happens and what it means for understanding the divine-human relationship by examining the literary representation of the passionate love of Rãdhã and Krsna mediated by bhakti, the absolute surrender of the devotee to her deity. The issue is not only Rãdhã's absorption in her love for Krsna, it is also his own immersion in his desire for her. That desire, Coleman demonstrates by an extensive analysis of Jayadeva's Gita Govinda (twelfth century cE), is one for physical, not metaphorical, union and of such intensity that it merges the human into the divine. The bond between Rãdhã and Krsna is so profound that theologians sometimes describe them as one being with two bodies, a concept represented in art by their gracefully intertwined limbs and their playfully erotic role reversals. Since narratives about Rãdhã depict her as a simple gopi, a woman from the pastoral community of Vraja where Krsna spends his childhood and youth, she stands as a model of devotion theoretically capable of emulation by all human beings, irrespective of caste, class, and gender. Moreover, because Rãdhã is a woman, theologians and scholars alike have often claimed that women enjoy a privileged position in Vaisnava bhakti traditions, a uniquely feminine position that legitimizes erotic love to salvation. But the question remains whether Rãdhã is thought of in Vaisnava texts as a mortal woman, and thus somehow a model for other women, or as a goddess come to earth who transcends gender and sexuality as constructed by society and embodied by human women. Coleman explores the socio-religious tensions represented by the figure of Rãdhã and revealed in theological debates about the nature of her love considering her marital status. That love relationship, Coleman argues, has to be viewed on more levels than the theological, for debates about kãma vs. prema and questions about Rãdhã's status as Krsna's wife (svakiyã) or adulterous lover (parakiyã) betray anxieties about female sexuality and women's capacity to experience divine grace and attain liberation from samsãra.

The impulse in Hinduism to attribute divinity to women—of socially valorized virtue, needless to say—developed early and has remained steady, as Heidi Pauwels demonstrates in her study of Sitã in Chapter 7. Reviewing the long history of the legend of Sitã from its earliest record in Vãlmiki's Rãmãyana to the modern era, which continues to attract its reiteration in many forms and in many types of media, Pauwels notes how consistently Sītã is revered as a wife unconditionally devoted to her husband to the point of enduring endless suffering and humiliation. Her absolute and unflinching devotion to Rãma, who is regarded as Visnu in human form, has qualified her as an object of devotion herself for her numerous devotees who worship her jointly with Rãma. The Vaisnava tradition exalts Sitã as the model for the soul's passive dependence upon God for its salvation; necessarily, then, the Rãmãyana is seen to affirm the soul's need for mediation via the Goddess, manifest as Sitã, who is the embodiment of grace. Yet Sitã's representation is not entirely uniform, nor is her reception. While the majority of Rama tales show her accepting her suffering without complaint—or at least stoically—such passivity is set aside in Sãkta renditions of the Rãmãyana, such as the Adbhuta Rãmãyana, in which she is the real force behind Rama in saving creation from the demons. As for the reception of Sitã as the epitome of suffering, the general response of sympathy has at times viewed her as a persecuted woman who does protest against the injustice she suffers and thus stands as the representative of women oppressed by the rules of a patriarchal ethos. Present especially in rural and working women's songs and stories, this alternative construction of Sitã has stimulated many modern Rãmãyana scholars, especially feminist critics, to reconsider the purpose and process of confining Sitã within the

matrix of devotion. While the general view of Sitã among Hindus perhaps remains constant in viewing her as a model wife and therefore deserving of worship, she is also revered precisely as an icon of resistance, futile as it was yet potentially empowering and thus worthy of veneration.

Chapter 8 by Madhu Khanna considers the trajectory between divine and human femininity in the context of the myths of the Great Goddess imagined as a kumãri, a sacred virgin, which she argues can be a great resource for countering the subordination of the girl child in India. The election of a young, prepubescent girl as the vehicle of the Great Goddess underscores the ambivalence in Hindu attitudes to the feminine in that it causes veneration on the one hand and subjugation on the other. Brenda Beck's study of the royal kumãri of Kathmandu in Chapter 9 examines the process of electing a young girl into a goddess wielding miraculous powers; Khanna views that election with the potency of myths that reveal unbreakable bonds between a kumãri and Devi, which may indeed elevate the status of girls and women if only by association. The traditional neglect of the girl child in sacred books as in real life is a historical fact of Hindu society and part of the systemic reduction of women. Khanna notes that modern feminist scholarship has responded to this degradation by reductionist readings of myths, rituals, and beliefs, which essentialize gender relations into an exclusive male-female binary, and dismiss cultural traditions as regressive. While the systemic neglect of and oppressive indifference to girl children must be acknowledged and resisted, Khanna argues that there are resources within Hindu religious belief and practice to support the empowerment of girl children. Drawing attention to rituals of Shakta Tantra, Khanna proposes a fresh approach to reconnect the archaic, under-researched past with modern programs to empower the girl child. Recounting several myths of all-conquering goddesses, Khanna argues that it is possible and necessary to explore the ways in which cultural resources such as the myths and legends of child goddesses can be reclaimed to create space for a dialogue with contemporary development programs to promote the autonomy of girl children and solidarity with their community.

The goddess-woman link receives a very different treatment from Beck when she studies women who "become" goddesses. Taking four instances, a mother-daughter duo from a Tamil bardic narrative and two from contemporary India, Beck details the processes by which these women and young girls achieve goddess status. While that status is founded on each woman's personal potentiality, its achievement varies from legend to real life. The mythic construction of the two women of The Legend of Ponnivala emphasizes the limitless penance and self-mortification that they go through to earn their life-giving, evil-conquering powers, which they achieve by their own effort, although there is a pre-existing potential for that achievement. By contrast, the two "living goddesses" are born with divinity organic to them. One of them, a woman revered as Amma or Mother, began to express her goddess-like traits, such as divination and power to protect and punish, from an early age and did so with increasing self-assurance as she assumed the insignia (of dress, chants, rites) and forms of conduct traditionally associated with a devi. The other, a girl child called the royal kumãri of Nepal, was discovered by Nepal's priestly establishment and venerated as a vehicle containing the spirit of goddess Taleju, a form of the Great Goddess, until at puberty the goddess left her to invest another child with the same powers. Unlike the kumãri and Amma, the women in the legend Beck studies have to strive to acquire their powers, often through strenuous esoteric rites, but her account of every case underscores the action of the divine in the human as one of creation supported by conservation—by violent means if

necessary—which affirms the conception of the feminine divine in Hindu thought and the place of women in the scheme of existence.

A goddess closely associated with women and the generation of life in nature is the subject of Prabhavati Reddy's description of the celebration of Bathukamma in Telangana in Chapter 10. Celebrated in that region of India, she has a festival dedicated to her, which has been going on for several centuries, reflecting, as Reddy tells us, a rich oral tradition of Telugu folk songs narrating the life of Bathukamma and her importance in the life of women, especially in agrarian society. Bathukamma means "mother of life" or "mother live on" and she is figured as a mound of flowers constituting a flower shrine, which represents life, death, and rebirth. Not one of the mainstream goddesses of the Hindu pantheon, she is thought by her devotees to be a form of Laksmi, Gauri, and Durgã, and like those goddesses she is supplicated for the kind of gifts that enrich agrarian life, such as abundance of rainfall, good crops, and the conservation of nature. The annual festival in autumn takes place around these flower shrines which are made for that purpose and thought by devotees to be invested with the spirit of Laksmi or Gauri. Needing no complex ritual, women worship her by singing and dancing around these shrines, and finally immerse them in local waters. Bathukamma is a goddess of transitory presence, for she has neither a temple of her own nor an iconic image, nor is she worshipped daily or through pilgrimage. She is nevertheless a sacred presence in the hearts of women, for whom she represents the fullness of life that autumn brings, signaling hope for the rejuvenation of nature and humanity.

The study of regional goddesses continues from Reddy's chapter to the next, on one of the most colorful of Hindu goddesses, albeit one with a regional rather than pan-Indian following. This is the serpent goddess Manasã, the subject of Chapter 11 by Krishna Datta. An important feature of Datta's work is that she not only covers the extent of the Manasã cult and her worship rites but also considers its impact on popular Bengali literature of the Middle Ages. Drawing upon legends in early Sanskrit texts as much as folklore, Datta traces the growth of the cult of Manasã, her legendary origin, her debated identity, and patterns of action. While serpent cults have existed in many parts of India, Manasã's most devoted adherents have been from Bengal (as the province of India was called before the Partition of India, now divided into West Bengal and Bangladesh), especially the snake-infested part of eastern India. Datta describes the rites of Manasã worship in its varied forms, which include the recitation of her legend, forming a very substantial part of a body of verse narratives known as mañgalakãvyas that dominated popular religious literature in Bengali through the Middle Ages. The hold of this genre on popular culture is examined by Saswati Sengupta in Chapter 12. At once celebratory and cautionary in praising a deity, promising every imaginable reward to devotees and threatening disbelievers with dire punishment, mañgalakãvyas have left their mark on pāncālī literature in Bengali, verse tales recited at the rituals of gods and goddesses commonly worshipped at home. Mañgalakãvyas relating to Manasã, like those devoted to other deities, mirror their times both socially and politically as they correlate worldly events with the set ideas about gods and goddesses into which speculative religious thought had become fixed in the popular mind. Taken together, the legend of Manasã and the elements of her rites throw light on how a goddess identity may come to be formed and what ethical issues it involves—or ignores.

The regional location of some of the most widely worshipped Hindu goddesses gives rise to modes of belief and worship regimes distinct from those sanctioned by ancient brahminical authority, as Sengupta notes in her chapter on the forms of goddess Candi in Bengal.

Commanding widespread devotion and lauded in mangalakãvyas dedicated to her deeds, the Candīmañgalas composed by numerous poets asserted the greatness of the goddess by telling or retelling a long, usually two-part, story of her munificence to her devotees and her wrath towards their adversaries. In this she acts as the protector Mother Goddess of ancient Hindu tradition even though here she is not as independent as, say, Durgã, but subject to a greater male god. There is also a hint running through the narratives, says Sengupta, that the goddess has a closer kinship with the chthonic goddesses of the lower social castes and as such is confined to a lower level of metaphysical authority. Sengupta argues that while the narratives do celebrate the goddess, they also fit her into the pattern of female dependency, just as the abilities, virtues, and consequent worthiness of the human actors are explained and validated by tracing them to higher social locations than they actually occupy. These narratives not only provide glimpses of social conditions and social relations of medieval eastern India, they also stratify religious belief on a scale of power and dependency.

In Chapter 13 Rachel McDermott points at an intriguing twist in the devotional culture of Kali in modern India in its spread across religious boundaries, of which a particularly notable example is the poetry of Kazi Nazrul Islam, a twentieth-century poet who has left a dual legacy in West Bengal and Bangladesh. The absorbing attachment to Kali of this Muslim poet who had a Tantric guru manifested itself in some of the finest lyrics that comprise the Šyãmã Sangita genre. While they underscore the power that Kali rcan exert on both the spiritual drive and the poetic imagination of individuals, they also raise questions about religious identities inasmuch as they assail Muslim sensibilities, especially in Bangladesh, where this Hindu voice adopted by its National Poet troubles the Bangladeshi sense of what Bangladeshi Islam is or should be. This chapter thus addresses the complex issue of why and how a Hindu goddess could have exercised so strong a pull on a Muslim, especially a poet possessing so powerful an imagination and so clear a voice.

In Chapter 14, Tracy Pintchman describes a new vision of Devi and a new way to claim her as the focal point of Hindu religious identity. Indicating new directions in religious belief and regimens and extending into social organiza1Ition, this vision informs Hindu religious life in the Indian diaspora with intensity in North America. Pintchman traces in her article the establishment of the Parashakthi Temple in Pontiac, Michigan, which is dedicated to the "Eternal Mother" who is the "Divine Pure Eternal Consciousness" as she is termed on the temple's website, although at her original location in South India she is recognized as a regional deity named Karumãriamman (Black Mãriyamman). Reviewing the history and ideological basis of the temple's establishment at Pontiac, Pintchman notes the powerful appeal of its universalist claim which co-opts Native American spirituality in tapping into the shamanic energy of a sacred space as the temple site is declared to be. While the temple hosts icons of many other Hindu deities and holds orthodox Hindu rites of worship, all this coalesces around the Eternal Mother who is believed to have chosen her seat at this location as the locus of her protective energy for the protection of all. The development we see here is thus from a regional deity into a universal one who by implication may reach outside the Hindu community to participate, as Pintchman puts it, in a "transcultural, transnational, and transhistorical economy of divine power." A new vision of Hindu religiosity is at work here, one that disrupts mundane boundaries of ethnicity, religion, and geography while still grounding the Goddess in a specific place, or, in this case, places (South India and

Michigan). The Goddess becomes both local and universal, Tamil and American, Hindu and pan-religious.

This overview of the chapters in this volume should make it clear that they do not presume to offer the reader all that there is to know about Hindu goddesses. Nor do the contributors suggest that they have the final word on their subjects. If anything, they confirm rather the necessity for many different ways of thinking about goddesses in the Hindu climate of thought and of observing how they are worshipped, bearing in mind, above all, the emphatic—and exciting—acceptance of the simultaneous indivisibility and plurality of the Goddess. This book is not a general survey and does not cover all there is to know about the goddess phenomenon in Hinduism; rather it represents scholarly scrutiny of particular approaches to thinking about the Feminine Divine and modes of worship. The opportunities for exploration are limitless; why else would so much new writing on the goddesses keep appearing? What the excursions in this volume show is that, like all abstractions, Hindu goddesses resist simple explanations and demand constant scrutiny. To the mystical, metaphysical, and ritual complexities one must add their place in the social reality of Hindu life to understand how they are conceived and the varieties of their conception, given that the presence of the goddess as the One and the Many is always felt in the everyday life of Hindus, informing their speculative philosophy as much as their social relations, personal and public conduct, and political positions. The chapters that comprise this volume are constantly aware of the earthly presence and action attributed to goddesses even as they navigate their way through complex—sometimes hairsplitting—arguments and interpretations. A common interest of these studies is in aligning themselves with the modern, lived experience of Hindu society, which should allow them to reach out to readers engaged in Social Studies, especially Gender Studies. This interest will be particularly useful in discussions on goddesses in modern Hindu life but should in addition encourage the reader, as the book draws to its conclusion, to look back through time to widen the view of goddesses in Hinduism beyond theology and ritual practice to situate them in the human world of their times. <>

Apophasis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite: "No Longer I" by Charles M. Stang [Oxford University Press, 9780199640423] Oxford Scholarship Online Open Access

This book examines the writings of an early sixth-century Christian mystical theologian who wrote under the name of a convert of the apostle Paul, Dionysius the Areopagite. This 'Pseudo'-Dionysius is famous for articulating a mystical theology in two parts: a sacramental and liturgical mysticism embedded in the context of celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchies, and an austere, contemplative regimen in which one progressively negates the divine names in hopes of soliciting union with the 'unknown God' or 'God beyond being.'

Charles M. Stang argues that the pseudonym and the influence of Paul together constitute the best interpretive lens for understanding the Corpus Dionysiacum [CD]. Stang demonstrates how Paul animates the entire corpus, and shows that the influence of Paul illuminates such central themes of the Corpus Dionysiacum as hierarchy, theurgy, deification, Christology, affirmation (kataphasis) and negation (apophasis), dissimilar

similarities, and unknowing. Most importantly, Paul serves as a fulcrum for the expression of a new theological anthropology, an 'apophatic anthropology.' Dionysius figures Paul as the premier apostolic witness to this apophatic anthropology, as the ecstatic lover of the divine who confesses to the rupture of his self and the indwelling of the divine in Gal 2:20: 'it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me.'

Building on this notion of apophatic anthropology, the book forwards an explanation for why this sixth-century author chose to write under an apostolic pseudonym. Stang argues that the very practice of pseudonymous writing itself serves as an ecstatic devotional exercise whereby the writer becomes split in two and thereby open to the indwelling of the divine. Pseudonymity is on this interpretation integral and internal to the aims of the wider mystical enterprise. Thus this book aims to question the distinction between 'theory' and 'practice' by demonstrating that negative theology-often figured as a speculative and rarefied theory regarding the transcendence of God-is in fact best understood as a kind of asceticism, a devotional practice aiming for the total transformation of the Christian subject.

This book argues that the pseudonym, Dionysius the Areopagite, and the influence of Paul together constitute the best interpretive lens for understanding the Corpus Dionysiacum. This book demonstrates how Paul in fact animates the entire corpus, that the influence of Paul illuminates such central themes of the CORPUS DIONYSIACUM as hierarchy, theurgy, deification, Christology, affirmation (kataphasis) and negation (apophasis), dissimilar similarities, and unknowing. Most importantly, Paul serves as a fulcrum for the expression of a new theological anthropology, an “apophatic anthropology.” Dionysius figures Paul as the premier apostolic witness to this apophatic anthropology, as the ecstatic lover of the divine who confesses to the rupture of his self and the indwelling of the divine in Gal 2:20: “it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me.” Building on this notion of apophatic anthropology, the book forwards an explanation for why this sixth-century author chose to write under an apostolic pseudonym. It argues that the very practice of pseudonymous writing itself serves as an ecstatic devotional exercise whereby the writer becomes split in two and thereby open to the indwelling of the divine. Pseudonymity is on this interpretation integral and internal to the aims of the wider mystical enterprise. Thus this book aims to question the distinction between “theory” and “practice” by demonstrating that negative theology—often figured as a speculative and rarefied theory regarding the transcendence of God—is in fact best understood as a kind of asceticism, a devotional practice aiming for the total transformation of the Christian subject.

Excerpt: In early sixth-century Syria there began to circulate a collection of writings allegedly authored by Dionysius the Areopagite, the Athenian judge who, according to Acts

17, converted to Christianity after hearing Paul's speech to the court of the Areopagus. At the climax of the longest of the four treatises, the *Divine Names*, the author says of the apostle: “Paul the Great, when possessed by the Divine Love, and participating in its ecstatic power, says with inspired lips, ‘It is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me.’ As a true lover, and beside himself, as he says, to Almighty God, and not living the life of himself, but the life of the Beloved, as a life excessively esteemed.” For ancient readers, for whom these were the authentic words of a first-century Christian convert, Dionysius the Areopagite reveals his teacher Paul to be the exemplary lover of God, whose fervent *erōs* carries him outside himself in ecstasy, and therefore renders him split, doubled, and so open to the indwelling of Christ, as the apostle himself confesses in Gal 2:20. For modern readers, who know that these are the words not of a first-century disciple of Paul but of a sixth-century author writing under the name of the Areopagite, this *Pseudo*-Dionysius is merely clothing his own theological program in apostolic garb.

This book aims to rebut this predominant modern reading by demonstrating that the key to understanding the *Corpus Dionysiacum* lies in investigating the pseudonym and the corresponding influence of Paul. Why would an early sixth-century author choose to write under the name of a disciple of Paul, and *this* disciple in particular, who was converted from pagan philosophy by the apostle's famous invocation of the “unknown God” (*agnōstos theos*) in Acts 17:23? The *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* forwards an elaborate hierarchical account of the universe, a complementary regimen of austere negative theology, and a description of deifying union with the “God beyond being” as “unknowing” (*agnōsia*)—what does all *this* have to do with the apostle Paul? The common answer is “very little indeed.” Modern scholars have by and large assumed that the pseudonym was a convenient and mercenary means of securing a wider readership and avoiding persecution in an age of anxious orthodoxies and that the pseudonymous framing could be removed without significant interpretive cost. This is certainly the approach taken by the first wave of Dionysian scholars who, in the wake of the revelation in the late nineteenth century that the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* could not be the authentic writings of the first-century Dionysius the Areopagite, were eager to document the nature and extent of the author's obvious debt to late Neoplatonism, especially the fifth-century philosopher Proclus. Unfortunately, the second wave of Dionysian scholars, who in reaction to the first were understandably eager to situate the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* firmly in the context of late antique Eastern Christianity, have been—with some notable exceptions—equally comfortable with passing over the significance of the pseudonym.

Over the course of this book, I will demonstrate how Paul in fact animates the entire corpus, that the influence of Paul illuminates such central themes of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* as hierarchy, theurgy, deification, Christology, affirmation and negation, dissimilar similarities, and unknowing. Most importantly, I contend, Paul serves as a fulcrum for the expression of a new theological anthropology, what I am calling (following Bernard McGinn and Denys Turner) the “apophatic anthropology” of Dionysius. Dionysius' entire mystical theology narrates the self's efforts to unite with the “God beyond being” as a perpetual process of affirming (*kataphasis*) and negating (*apophasis*) the divine names, on the conviction that only by contemplating and then “clearing away” (*aphairesis*) all of our concepts and categories can we clear a space for the divine to descend free of idolatrous accretions. What Paul provides Dionysius is the insistence that this ascent to “the unknown God” delivers a self that is, like the divine to which it aspires, cleared away of its own names, unsaid,

rendered unknown to itself—in other words, *no longer I*. Thus apophatic theology assumes an apophatic anthropology, and the way of negation becomes a sort of asceticism, an exercise of freeing the self as much as God from the concepts and categories that prevent its deification. Dionysius figures Paul as the premier apostolic witness to this apophatic anthropology, as the ecstatic lover of the divine who confesses to the rupture of his self and the indwelling of the divine in Gal 2:20: "it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me."

Building on this notion of apophatic anthropology, I offer an explanation for why this sixth-century author chose to write under an apostolic pseudonym. He does not merely sign the name of Dionysius the Areopagite to his writings. He goes much further and literally assumes the identity of this first-century figure. He writes not treatises but letters addressed to other apostles and disciples; he imagines himself into this apostolic community, to the point that he is present at the Dormition of Mary; he counsels John sequestered on Patmos. And yet all the while the author is also somehow in the sixth century: quoting—sometimes at great length—from Proclus' works; treading dangerously close to contemporary Christological controversies; describing the ceremonials of Byzantine churches rather than the home churches of the New Testament. The author seems to be writing as *both* a sixth-century Syrian *and* a first-century Athenian. The fact that his own pseudonymous writing renders him two-in-one suggests that it is much more than a convenient literary conceit, and that the pseudonymous writing in fact aligns with the mystical anthropology. I argue that the very practice of pseudonymous writing itself serves as an ecstatic devotional exercise whereby the writer becomes split in two and thereby open to the indwelling of the divine. Pseudonymity is thus integral and internal to the aims of the wider mystical enterprise. In short, Dionysius both offers an account of what it is to be properly human in relation to God—namely, as unknown to ourselves as God is—and, *in the very telling*, performs an exercise aiming to render his own self so unknown. The result of such *agnōsia*, however, is no mere "agnosticism" but rather the indwelling of the unknown God (*agnōstos theos*) as Christ, on the model of Paul in Gal 2:20, wherewith the aspirant simultaneously "unknows" God and self. Thus this book aims to question the distinction between "theory" and "practice" by demonstrating that negative theology—often figured as a speculative and rarefied theory regarding the transcendence of God—is in fact best understood as a kind of asceticism, a devotional practice aiming for the total transformation of the Christian subject.

I want to insist, however, that this approach to the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* does not preclude or impugn the two dominant trends in Dionysian scholarship; in fact it depends on and hopefully furthers both. As I have said, the first trend has been to assess the nature and extent of the author's debt to late Neoplatonism, often implying (if not stating outright) that the author was only nominally Christian. The second trend, spearheaded by Orthodox theologians, has been to weave the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* into the rich tapestry of late antique Eastern Christianity and to downplay the Neoplatonic influence. Both trends continue to this day. At their worst, both trends have retreated into antithetical and mutually exclusive readings of the true identity of the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, as *either* a Christian *or* a Neoplatonist. From this framing of the question of the author's singular identity there followed equally unsatisfactory debates about particular themes in the *CD*, whether this or that element of the whole was *really* Christian or *really* Neoplatonic. Is "hierarchy"—a term Dionysius coins to describe the structure of the created order—a pagan import or his peculiar *translatio* of a Christian notion? Does the *CD* possess a robust

Christology or is Christ simply “draperies” adorning an otherwise pagan vision? What of his enthusiasm for "theurgy" or "god-work," a term associated with pagan wonderworkers who dare to use magical means to compel the gods? Perhaps most acutely, whence comes this author's championing of “negative” or “apophatic” theology in the aim of union with the God “beyond being”? Is this a wholesale import of late Neoplatonism's efforts to solicit union with the ineffable One or a properly Christian strategy of resisting idolatry, of safeguarding the “unknown God” from our domesticating efforts to make that God known? These and other questions have to some degree been held captive by the first framing of the inquiry, whereby one starts with the assumption that the author is one or the other, a Christian or a Neoplatonist.

Thankfully, the renaissance in Dionysian scholarship in the past thirty years—inaugurated by the work of Alexander Golitzin, Andrew Louth, and Paul Rorem—has set readers on a more constructive course than the former binary of either/or. On the one hand, scholars who today explore the relationship between the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* and late Neoplatonism are no longer keen, as many of their predecessors were, to fault the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* for his obvious debt to “pagan” philosophy. Instead, they are more interested in charting the way in which the author creatively innovates on this philosophical inheritance. On the other hand, scholars who today focus on how the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* fits into the landscape of late antique Eastern Christianity are no longer as prone to downplay the influence of Neoplatonism, on the understanding that “pagan” philosophy was always being “baptized” for Christian use. In short, a consensus has emerged that the rhetorically and often doctrinally charged labels of “Christian” *vs*. “Neoplatonist” (or more widely, “pagan”) present a false dichotomy, unfaithful to the historical record, and are motivated instead by *contemporary* theological and identity concerns that ultimately obscure our appreciation of the late antique religious landscape.

But the significance of the pseudonym and Paul by no means displaces the influence of late Neoplatonism or of late antique Eastern Christianity—both of which are, to my mind, undeniable. The pseudonym and Paul, I argue, constitute the best interpretive lens for understanding the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* not because they push these others influences to the margins, but rather because they help us precisely to organize, appreciate, and bring into better focus these influences. In other words, they allow us to understand better how the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is *both* a Christian *and* a Neoplatonist and that the questions we put to the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* need not be governed by this disjunction. Specifically, I argue, attention to the pseudonym and Paul allows us to made headway on the stalled questions mentioned above: hierarchy, Christology, theurgy, *apophasis*, and others. One contribution of this book, then, is to demonstrate how this shift in perspective can allow us to make headway on some central but contested questions in the scholarship on Dionysius.

I also aim to show that this new understanding of the Dionysian corpus raises important questions that go beyond scholarly debates about how best to understand the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, questions that are relevant for the study of Christian mysticism and of religion more generally. First, because for Dionysius a mystical theology assumes a mystical anthropology, it becomes clear that “mysticism” is as much, or more, about exercises for the transformation of the self as it is a description of the mystery of the divine. Thus “mysticism” becomes an important source for understanding theological anthropology and its implementation, that is, normative accounts of human subjectivity and the development

of exercises meant to realize these new modes of selfhood. Second, my interpretation of the significance of the pseudonym suggests that we understand the pseudonymous enterprise as an ecstatic spiritual exercise. This opens up the question of whether and how writing serves as a spiritual exercise not only in the case of Dionysius, but also for Christian mysticism and religion more widely.

This book falls into two parts. In the first part, Chapters One and Two, I survey the late antique milieu from which the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* emerges and the modern scholarship thereon. My aim in these two chapters is to widen the horizon of our understanding of the sense and significance of the pseudonym and the influence of Paul. In Chapter One I chart the reception of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* in the sixth century, focusing on whether and how early readers understood its authorship. From the sixth century I then jump to the late nineteenth, where modern scholarship on the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* begins in earnest with the exposure of the pseudonymous quality of the corpus. I survey the subsequent scholarship on the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, again with an eye to discerning whether and how modern readers understood the sense and significance of the pseudonym and the influence of Paul. From this survey I highlight three promising leads: Alexander Golitzin, Andrew Louth (along with Christian Schäfer), and Hans Urs von Balthasar.

In Chapter Two, I widen the inquiry and consider the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* against three relevant late antique historical backdrops: pseudepigrapha, notions of writing as a devotional practice, and convictions about the porous or collapsible nature of time. From among the vast scholarship on ancient and late ancient pseudepigrapha, I consider the "religious" or "psychological" approach to pseudonymous writing, according to which pseudonymous authors believe that the distance between past and present can be collapsed such that, through their writing, the ancient authorities come to inhabit them and speak in their stead. To buttress this approach, I marshal two bodies of evidence. First, building on the consensus of a generation of scholars, I argue that late antique Christians understand time to be porous or collapsible, and that the apostolic and sub-apostolic past can intrude on the present. Second, again relying on a more recent but mounting body of scholarship, I argue that late antique authors understand writing as a practice that could effect this collapse of time, could summon the past into the present. And in order to deepen an understanding of these peculiar notions of time and writing, I look closely at two case studies: the anonymous *Life and Miracles of Thekla* and John Chrysostom's homilies on Paul.

The first part serves as the foundation for the second (Chapters Three through Five), in which I demonstrate how the figure and writings of Paul animate the whole corpus. In Chapter Three, I examine how Paul animates the Dionysian hierarchies. That this chapter concerns the hierarchies should not be taken to mean that I drive a wedge between the "theology" (as found in *DN* and *MT*) and the "economy" (as found in *CH* and *EH*) of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, as has often been done in order to devalue the hierarchies. Following more recent scholarship, I insist on the coherence of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*: that the affirmation and negation of the divine names (*DN*) in the service of "unknowing" the "God beyond being" (*MT*) must be understood within the sacramental life of the church (*EH*), which in turn is a reflection of the celestial orders (*CH*). In this chapter, I address several of the stalled questions in the scholarship on the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, questions to which the influence of Paul, I argue, offers a fresh perspective. Specifically, I suggest that Dionysius' own definition of hierarchy derives from Paul's understanding of the "body of Christ" as a divinely ordained ecclesial order. I show how Dionysius' Christology, so

often found wanting, derives from Paul's experience of the luminous Christ on the road to Damascus. And I argue that Dionysius' appeals to Iamblichean "theurgy"—understood as "cooperation" (*sunergeia*) with the work of God that deifies the "co-worker of God" (*sunergos theou*)—are also consistent with Pauline phrases.

Paul is just as relevant for Dionysius' understanding of how we solicit unknown with the unknown God through the perpetual affirmation (*kataphasis*) and negation (*apophasis*) of the divine names. In Chapter Four, I trace Dionysius' appeals to Paul as he heightens the tension between the immanence and transcendence of God in the opening chapters of the *Divine Names*. I argue that his understanding of "unknowing" (*agnōsia*), which marks our union with the unknown God, derives from a creative reading of Paul's famous line from Acts 17, "What therefore you worship as unknown [*agnoountes*], this I proclaim to you." This line from Paul's speech to the Areopagus then prompts a close reading of that entire speech, with an eye to understanding how it serves as a template for Dionysius' understanding of the relationship between pagan wisdom and Christian revelation.

Finally, in Chapter Five, I chart the "apophatic anthropology" of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, the notion that the self who suffers union with the unknown God must also become unknown. Paul is Dionysius' preeminent witness to this "apophasis of the self." For Dionysius, Paul loves God with such a fervent *erōs* that he comes to stand outside himself, in ecstasy, and thereby opens himself to the indwelling of Christ, and so appears to his sober peers as a lovesick madman. This ecstatic madness, wherein Christ "lives in" Paul, is equivalent to the descent of "unknowing," the condition that befalls us as we suffer union with the divine. Dionysius draws on the Platonic and Philonic taxonomies of madness and ecstasy, but, I argue, complements and corrects this philosophical inheritance by appeal to Paul. Finally, I consider a challenge to apophatic anthropology, namely Dionysius' lone but important refusal of ecstasy in *DN* 11. In accounting for this refusal, I distinguish between the denial (*arnēsis*) of the self, which Dionysius impugns, and the *apophasis* of the self, which he commends. I conclude the chapter by returning to the definition of hierarchy with which Chapter Three begins and arguing that the second element of that definition—hierarchy as a "state of understanding" (*epistēmē*)—must be understood as a play on words, that through hierarchy we can enjoy an ecstatic *epistēmē*, that is, an *under*-standing predicated precisely on standing-*outside* ourselves.

If Chapters Three through Five address how Paul animates the entire corpus, in the Conclusion I return to the question of the sense and significance of the pseudonym. Gathering threads from the previous chapters, I settle on three interpretations of the pseudonym, each leading to and buttressing the next. First, the pseudonym "Dionysius the Areopagite" signals that the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is attempting, just as Paul is in his speech to the Areopagus, some rapprochement between pagan wisdom and Christian revelation. By writing under the name of this Athenian judge, the author is looking to Paul, and specifically that speech, to provide a template for absorbing and subordinating the riches of pagan wisdom to the revelation of the unknown God in Christ. Second, the pseudonymous writing of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*—the author's journey back in time to the apostolic age—is at root no different from the widespread late antique practice of summoning the apostles into the present age. Thus I argue that the pseudonymous author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, like the anonymous author of the *Life and Miracles of Thekla* and John Chrysostom in his homilies on Paul, aims to collapse historical time so as to become a *present* disciple to an apostle, here Paul. Writing becomes the means of achieving

intimacy with the apostle and, by extension, with Christ, who "lives in" the apostle (Gal 2:20). The notion that writing might be a devotional practice leads me to my third and final interpretation of the pseudonym. I argue that the practice of pseudonymous writing aims to effect the apophasis of the self, that is, it aims to negate the self by splitting it open so that it might be, as Dionysius says of Moses, "neither [it]self nor other." By helping to breach the integrity of the singular self—the "I"—writing opens the self to the indwelling of Christ. In this way, "form" (pseudonymous writing) and "content" (mystical theology), "theory" (theology), and "practice" (asceticism) are wed, united in their efforts to divide the self, integrated so as to disintegrate the known self that would suffer union with the unknown God.

Ancient and Modern Readers of the Corpus Dionysiacum

Pseudonymity and Paul

Charles M. Stang charts the reception of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* from its first appearance in the sixth century to modern scholarship in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This survey focuses on the manner in which readers have attended to questions of the authentic authorship of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, the relationship of its author and his theological enterprise to the life and writings of Paul, and the significance both of pseudonymity in general and of the particular pseudonym, Dionysius the Areopagite. The first section covers the contested reception of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* in the sixth century. The second section leaps forward to the end of the nineteenth century and surveys the history of modern scholarship on Dionysius. The third and final section considers three promising leads from four scholars, Alexander Golitzin, Andrew Louth, Christian Schäfer, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, who have attempted to explain the significance of the pseudonym and the relevance of Paul.

This chapter selectively charts the reception of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* from its first appearance in the sixth century to modern scholarship in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This survey focuses on the manner in which readers—ancient and modern, devotional and scholarly—have (or indeed have not) attended to questions of the authentic authorship of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, the relationship of its author and his theological enterprise to the life and writings of Paul, and the significance both of pseudonymity in general and of the particular pseudonym Dionysius the Areopagite. My investigation concentrates on the first and last centuries of the vast and winding history of the reception of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* because it is in these two distant periods—the sixth and the twentieth centuries—that these were especially burning questions. In the sixth century, the abrupt appearance of this collection of rarefied theological reflection provoked ancient readers both to suspect and to defend its authenticity as a sub-apostolic document. By the end of the sixth century, the advocates of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* had prevailed over the skeptics, and its place among the tradition was relatively secure—apart from some doubts voiced in the Reformation and Renaissance—until well into the modern period. It would of course be interesting to trace the reception *continuously* from the sixth through the twentieth centuries. But given that the occasional doubts did not significantly challenge the place of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, I feel justified in the making the great leap from the late antique to the modern reception. The modern reception can be said to begin at the very end of the nineteenth century, when the authenticity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* was again put on trial, this time by two German scholars, Hugo Koch and Josef Stiglmayr, who were finally able to demonstrate that the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* was not an authentic first-

century document, but a pseudonymous late fifth- or early sixth-century document. Their demonstration inaugurated modern scholarship on the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, which has largely passed over the significance of the pseudonym and the influence of Paul in favor of assessing the nature and extent of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*'s debt to late Neoplatonism, offering far-flung hypotheses as to the true identity of the elusive author, or firmly situating the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* in late antique Eastern Christianity. I contend, however, that the pseudonym, Dionysius the Areopagite, and the corresponding influence of Paul is in fact the single most important interpretive lens for understanding the aims and purposes of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* and its author. In what follows, then, I survey two centuries of heated readings of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* precisely in order to discover what sorts of questions regarding pseudonymity and Paul are being asked and, more important, what sorts are not. The first section (I) covers the ancient reception of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, including: (a) its first citations by Severus of Antioch; (b) its use in the Christological debates of the sixth century; (c) its first scholiast, the Chalcedonian bishop John of Scythopolis; (d) its parallel early reception in the Syriac tradition. The second section (II) leaps forward to the end of the nineteenth century and surveys the history of modern scholarship on Dionysius, giving special attention to how scholars have gauged the relevance of the pseudonym and the influence of Paul to the aims and purposes of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* at large. The third and final section (III) considers three promising leads from four scholars, Alexander Golitzin, Andrew Louth, Christian Schäfer, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, who have attempted to explain the significance of the pseudonym and the relevance of Paul. In subsequent chapters, I will develop some of these leads, especially those of Schäfer and von Balthasar, as I make my own case as to why we must read the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* through the lens of the pseudonym and against the backdrop of Paul.

The early reception

Evidence for the first appearance and the early reception of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is scant. What evidence we do have, however, suggests that doubts about the authenticity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* were raised from the very beginning. By tracing the citations of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* in the sixth century, we can begin to discern how advocates and skeptics handled questions regarding the authenticity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* and its purported author and the relationship of both to the apostle Paul.

Severus of Antioch

The date of composition of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is impossible to pinpoint. A search for the *terminus post quem* has yielded uneven results. The influence of Proclus (d.485), *diadochos* of the Academy in Athens, is certain and vast, putting the composition of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* not before the late fifth century. As for the *terminus ante quem*, it is a Monophysite, Severus of Antioch (d.538), who first cites the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*: twice in his polemical works against his errant, fellow Monophysite, Julian of Halicarnassus, and once in his third letter to John the Hegumen. These particular works of Severus, however, are notoriously difficult to date: the first two are dated after 518 but before 528; the third is dated only sometime before 528. Thus there are forty odd years in the late fifth and early sixth centuries in which the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* may have been composed. Paul Rorem and John Lamoreaux are inclined to push the composition well into the sixth century, closer to the date of its first citation by Severus, on the assumption that its appearance would not likely have gone unnoticed. Of course the *CORPUS*

DIONYSIACUM could have been composed considerably earlier than it was circulated, but this also seems unlikely. Mention of circulation raises the question—to which we have to date no adequate answer—of exactly *how* the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* was "discovered" and introduced to readers in the late fifth or, more likely, early sixth century, in such a way that writers began to cite it as an authentic sub-apostolic document. At this point, we may only speculate as to how such a remarkable collection of texts was launched into circulation.

In the first two citations, Severus mentions *DN* 2.9 in support of the claim that the flesh of the Incarnate Word was formed from the blood of the virgin mother. In the third citation, Severus argues that the Dionysian phrase "theandric energy" is fully consonant with the traditional Cyrillian formula, "one incarnate nature of God the Word." These citations have led many scholars to conclude that the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* was first put to use by—and indeed may have emerged from—a Monophysite milieu. According to this construal, the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* had subsequently to be rescued from its first advocates and rendered sufficiently orthodox—that is to say, Chalcedonian. Closer attention to Severus' texts, however, reveals that his interpretations of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* are clearly rebutting *prior*, presumably dyophysite, interpretations. Thus we join the reception of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM in media res*: the conversation is already well under way; or, to choose a more apt image for the controversies of the sixth century, we witness a battle in which Severus' is not the first volley.

The "Collatio cum Severianis" and beyond

The next volley appears in the context of a sixth-century Christological council. Since the Definition of Chalcedon was established in 451, Byzantine emperors each sought to reconcile the unforeseen and increasingly bitter differences of the various Christological parties. In 532, Justinian called a meeting at Constantinople, the "Collatio cum Severianis," to address the deepening divides. In advance of the meeting, the Monophysites, who felt themselves to be on the defensive, sent Justinian a letter in which they cite Dionysius, among others, in support of their stance. When the Collatio proper began, the Chalcedonians named Hypatius of Ephesus as their spokesman. Hypatius targets the Monophysites' proof-texts, especially their citation of Dionysius, "who from the darkness and error of heathendom attained," so the letter reads, "to the supreme light of the knowledge of God through our master Paul." Hypatius begins his interrogation:

Those testimonies which you say are of the blessed Dionysius, how can you prove that they are authentic, as you claim? For if they are in fact by him, they would not have escaped the notice of the blessed Cyril. Why do I speak of the blessed Cyril, when the blessed Athanasius, if in fact he had thought them to be by Dionysius, would have offered these same testimonies concerning the consubstantial Trinity before all others at the council of Nicaea against Arius' blasphemies of the diverse substance. But if none of the ancients made mention of them, I simply do not know how you can prove that they were written by Dionysius.

It seems as if Hypatius is "caught off-guard" by these citations, and so challenges their authenticity rather than their orthodoxy. Indeed, he seems to think that on matters of Trinity, Athanasius himself would have done well to cite Dionysius if he had had his text at hand. Rather surprisingly, Hypatius offers the first and only surviving challenge to the authenticity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* in the sixth century. Other skeptics abound, no

doubt: we can infer their existence from the fact that subsequent advocates of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* address their suspicions.

Fortunately for the survival of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, however, the majority of Chalcedonians do not share Hypatius' suspicions. Within only a few years, both Monophysites *and* Chalcedonians are citing the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* in support of their positions—indeed "[r]epresentatives of just about every major Christological party in the early sixth century at some point appealed to the authority of Dionysius." These citations do not, however, reflect a robust or nuanced encounter with the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. Rather, writers for whom Christological concerns are paramount raid the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*—specifically *DN* 1.4 and the Fourth Letter—for polemical purposes. However, a narrow focus on the sixth-century citations of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* might give the false impression that this rather short body of texts "washed over the theological landscape of eastern Christianity and radically changed the way theology was being done." As Rorem and Lamoreaux insist: "Far from it! Apart from John [of Scythopolis'] own work, one must search far and wide for any evidence that the works of Dionysius were being read at all." Although often cited, the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* therefore seems not to have played a substantial role in the Christological controversies of the sixth century.

John of Scythopolis

Within ten or twenty years of its first citation, the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* was to receive its first scholia. About the scholiast, John, bishop of Scythopolis, we know unfortunately very little. His episcopacy seems to have run between 536 and *circa* 548. Yet, despite the fact that his theological works are lost and sources for his life and career meager, we have recently come to learn a great deal more about John. The Greek scholia affixed to the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* are traditionally attributed to Maximus the Confessor: in the Migne edition they appear as *Scholia sancti Maximi in opera beati Dionysii*. We have long known that this single compilation included the scholia of at least two authors: Maximus and John. Until recently scholars have been unable to distinguish the authorship of the scholia. Beate Suchla, however, has discovered a group of four Greek manuscripts of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* that include only about six hundred scholia, all attributed to John. This Greek manuscript tradition is corroborated by a Syriac translation of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* and its scholia by Phocas bar Sergius in 708. In his preface to his translation, Phocas mentions that he is able to produce a new and better translation because he has had access to the scholia of John, "an orthodox man, of good and glorious memory, by trade a *scholasticus*, who originated from the city of Scythopolis." While Suchla has only produced a definitive examination of the scholia on *DN*, Rorem and Lamoreaux have extended her approach to the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* in general and produced a provisional identification of all those scholia authored by John: "roughly six hundred scholia (all or in part) can be assigned to John with certainty." They propose a date of composition somewhere between 537 and 543, that is, in the first half of John's episcopacy.

John's prologue to his scholia falls into three parts. In the first, John rehearses the narrative from Acts 17, in which Paul delivers a speech to the court of the Areopagus and succeeds in winning over one of its esteemed judges, Dionysius the Areopagite. John embellishes this account with some Athenian history and an imaginative reconstruction of events. As for the importance of Paul for this new convert, John insists not only that "Dionysius was perfected in all the doctrines of salvation by the most excellent Paul," but also that he "was seated by the Christ-bearing Paul as bishop of the faithful in Athens, as is recorded in the seventh

book of the *Apostolic Constitutions*." In the second part of the prologue, John defends Dionysius' orthodoxy. Although there are "some [who] dare to abuse the divine Dionysius with charges of heresy," John will insist, here and throughout the scholia, that with respect to matters of essential doctrine—the Trinity, the Incarnation, resurrection, and the final judgment—"there is as much distinction between his teachings and those idiocies as there is between true light and darkness."

For our purposes, it is the third part of the prologue that is most interesting, for here John is keen to defend the authenticity of the corpus. John begins his defense by citing those critics who wonder—much as Hypatius did in the "Collatio"—why the works of this Dionysius were never mentioned by either Eusebius or Origen. John insists that even these two great bibliophiles understood that their record of early Christian texts was woefully incomplete. John then turns to the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* itself and calls these critics' attention to the fact that "most of [Dionysius'] works" are addressed "to the thrice-blessed Timothy, companion of the apostle Paul." He uses the fact that Timothy was by tradition regarded as the first bishop of Ephesus to help explain why Dionysius' works seem to be responses to Timothy's prior requests: since Timothy "suffered many things {{at the hands of the foremost men of Ionian philosophy at Ephesus}}," he had of necessity to consult the educated, former pagan Dionysius "so that he might become learned in non-Christian philosophy, and thus contend still more." Nor, according to John, does Timothy wish to become learned in "non-Christian philosophy" so as only to rebut it. On the contrary, "even the god-beloved apostle Paul employed the sayings of the Greeks, {{having by chance heard these from his companions}} who were well-versed in {{Greek}} philosophy." And so it is only with the help of Dionysius, with his dual degrees from Paul and Platonism, that "the bastard teachings of the Greek philosophers have been restored to the truth."

John sees this connection to Paul as ultimately securing the authenticity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*: "the beneficial epistles of the god-beloved Paul show the authenticity of these writings, and most especially the faultlessness of all these teachings." In other words, the views expressed in the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* find corroboration in the letters of Paul. This becomes a guiding interpretive principle throughout the subsequent scholia. For instance, in *Corpus Dionysiacum* 6.2, Dionysius remarks that "the Word of God has designated the whole Heavenly Beings as nine, by appellations, which show their functions. These our Divine Initiator divides into three threefold Orders." It is unclear, however, who this "Divine Initiator" is: Paul or Hierotheus? John insists that Dionysius must be referring to Paul and thus attributing his triadic taxonomy of the celestial orders to some private and privileged communication from the apostle, based on the latter's own ascent to the "third heaven" (2 Cor 12:2): "here I think [Dionysius] is speaking of none other than St Paul, for he alone was taken up into the 'third heaven' and initiated into these things." Just a few scholia later, John explains the fact that Dionysius' angelic ordering differs from Paul's own in Rom 8:38, Col 1:16, and Eph 1:21 by insisting that "the great Dionysius thus shows that the divine apostle Paul passed these things on to the saints in secret." Even when Dionysius differs from Paul, then, the difference betrays neither inauthenticity nor heresy, but rather the transmission of secret teachings. There is thus a tension in John's interpretive strategy: if the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* agrees with Paul's letters, it is a sign of its authenticity; but if the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* differs from Paul's letters, it is a sign of an esoteric teaching that abrogates the exoteric letters.

Further evidence for the authenticity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is the fact that the author "offhandedly mentions the sayings of men who were his contemporaries, and who were also mentioned in the divine Acts of the apostles." John seems to accept at face value these references to first-century figures. "Although such passages are now considered to be an intentional part of the Dionysian pseudonym," Rorem and Lamoreaux tell us, John cites Dionysius' quotation from Bartholomew or Justus and his mention of Elymas the magician as evidence for the antiquity and authenticity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. The *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, however, also makes mention of two prominent early Christians: "Clement the philosopher" (presumably Clement, the third bishop of Rome, not Clement of Alexandria) and Ignatius of Antioch. These remarks would seem to be missteps on the part of an author keen to maintain his pseudonymous identity, for in order for the historical Dionysius to have known Clement of Rome (d. *circa* 98) or especially Ignatius of Antioch (d. *circa* 107), he would have had to have lived to a very great age indeed. John, however, passes over these difficulties in silence, and focuses his attention instead on another pair of chronological discrepancies. First, Dionysius, who clearly became a Christian *after* Timothy, refers to his "fellow-elder" as "child." Second, Dionysius lived long enough both to witness the eclipse that accompanied the crucifixion (*Letter 7*) and to write the evangelist John in exile on Patmos (*Letter 10*). Sixty years separate these two events, and John arranges Dionysius' dates accordingly: he must have been a young man, perhaps 25 years old, when Jesus was crucified, and a very old man, perhaps even 90 years old, when John was on Patmos. Throughout the scholia, then, John's faith in the authenticity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is so firm that he misses some potentially troubling discrepancies (i.e. Clement and Ignatius) and goes to great lengths to explain away others.

To modern readers, the most conspicuous chronological discrepancy is the philosophical terminology of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. How could ancient readers such as John have accepted the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* as an authentically sub-apostolic first-century document when it seems so obviously infused with the language of late Neoplatonism? John himself is of two minds regarding the Greek philosophical tradition: half of his references to "the Greeks," the "ancients," or "the philosophers" are critical, but half are almost appreciative. And yet he still seems reluctant to acknowledge the philosophical terminology that pervades the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, and when he does, he is keen to indicate that Dionysius is using the language of the Greeks to rebut their errant views. This reluctance, however, cannot be attributed to John's ignorance of Greek philosophy: throughout his scholia he evidences a thorough knowledge of Plotinian metaphysics and draws widely from the *Enneads* to handle such issues as the problem of evil. And yet he never acknowledges that his scholia on the problem of evil in *DN* 4.17–33 are in fact an extended dialogue with Plotinus—why not? Probably because he is attempting to preserve the "primitive simplicity and authenticity with which he is trying to endow the works of the great Dionysius." Keeping with his claim in the *Prologue* that the connection to Paul establishes the authenticity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* and the truth of its teachings, when Dionysius explains the meaning of the Pauline phrase "the foolishness of God" (1 Cor 1:25) apophatically—as the application of "negative terms to God"—John rushes in to buttress this all too philosophical gloss with appropriately Pauline material on the Incarnation and the Cross. In general, therefore, John handles the challenge of the philosophical idiom of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* (and, by consequence, his own philosophical acumen) by either failing to name it as such or steering the reader back to the Pauline backdrop that guarantees the work as authentic and true.

A quick glance at some of John's successor scholiasts is interesting by way of contrast, as they take less hedging approaches to the conspicuously philosophical character of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. The Migne edition of the *Prologue* to the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*—like the scholia, also attributed to Maximus—contains a later interpolation, probably authored not by Maximus, but by the Byzantine philosopher John Philoponus (d. *circa* 580):

> One must know that some of the non-Christian philosophers, especially Proclus, have often employed certain concepts of the blessed Dionysius…It is possible to conjecture from this that the ancient philosophers in Athens usurped his works (as he recounts in the present book) and then hid them, so that they themselves might seem to be the progenitors of his divine oracles. According to the dispensation of God the present work is now made known for the refutation of their vanity and recklessness.

Philoponus was well versed in the works of Proclus and so easily spotted the many similarities between the two authors' vocabularies. He inoculates Dionysius from the possible implications of this similarity by reversing the charge: not only is Dionysius the Areopagite the true author of all that is commendable in Greek philosophy, but the jealous Greeks are to blame for the disappearance of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* for several centuries. This disappearance itself led, according to Philoponus, to the anxiety that "the forger of these works was an abandoned wretch...[who] falsely presented himself as a companion of the apostles and as corresponding with men he was never with and never corresponded with." But God has arranged that the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* make an appearance and so set the crooked record straight—"for the refutation of their vanity and recklessness."

Later, in the eighth century, the East Syrian author Joseph Hazzaya takes an entirely different approach to this same problem. When Hazzaya finds an objectionable claim made in the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*—namely that the Seraphim first receive knowledge of future events—he attributes this misstep not to the Athenian saint himself, but to the presumptuous translator, who, in rendering the Greek into Syriac, willfully corrupted the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*:

> For scribes, especially those who translate from one language to another, often interpolate the divine books, and the most celebrated interpolator is that writer who translated the book of Mar Dionysius. As wicked as he was wise, he changed the passages in the divine books to his own profit. If I had the time, I myself would translate it and eliminate from it all the errors which this translator there inserted.

Moreover, Hazzaya cannot help but notice the elevated, densely philosophical style of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. Like Philoponus, then, he recognizes that the style fits ill with the prevailing expectations regarding early Christian literature. While Philoponus offers a revised chronology such that Dionysius becomes the source rather than the derivative of such style, Hazzaya again attributes the elevated style to the presumptuous translator.

The early Syriac reception

The presumptuous translator whom Hazzaya impugns for importing philosophical terminology into the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is Sergius Reshaina, whose **(p.24)** translation of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* was the first into Syriac. He was a physician, trained in Alexandria, and an accomplished translator from Greek: besides the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, his translations include several of Galen's medical writings, and perhaps—although this is now contested—Porphyry's *Isagogē* and Aristotle's *Categories*. From

the *Ecclesiastical History* of Pseudo-Zachariah of Mytilene, we learn that Sergius was an avid Origenist. In this regard he was *au courant*, since Origenism was enjoying a resurgence of interest in early sixth-century Syria and Palestine. Sometime before his death in Constantinople in 536, Sergius translated the whole of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* and affixed to it a long introduction. If Rorem and Lamoreaux are correct in dating the composition of John's scholia to sometime between 537 and 543, then Sergius' translation and introduction antedate the annotated Greek edition that John produced and thereafter circulated in the Greek-speaking world.

It is unclear whether Sergius believed that the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* was in fact Dionysius the Areopagite. On the one hand, he never explicitly calls the pseudonym into question, and his introduction to his translation of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is full of quotations from Paul. On the other hand, as Perczel has shown, Sergius' introduction is infused with the "gnoseology" of Evagrius of Pontus, whom these Origenists regarded as providing the authoritative interpretation of Origen. The fact that Sergius interprets the entire Dionysian system in terms of an unmistakably Evagrian framework might lead us to think that he knew all too well that the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* was a pseudonymous work—perhaps even who the author was—but that he chose not to expose this fact.

Recently, Perczel has drawn attention to the fact that in his summary of the various works that constitute the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, Sergius mentions several of the "lost" works, and does not differentiate between them and the "extant" works (which he translates). The "lost" works are seven texts that Dionysius mentions in the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, sometimes describing them in detail, but for which we have no record. The standard view is to understand the author's citation of these "lost" works as contributing to the alleged authenticity of the collection: like other early Christian bodies of literature, it has come down to the reader incomplete. Following von Balthasar, Perczel suggests that these works are not fictitious, but were in fact composed. But whereas von Balthasar suggests that they were composed or at least sketched and then lost, Perczel argues that the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* published these works under different pseudonyms. According to Perczel, then, Sergius had access to at least some of these "lost" works and, although he did not include them in his translation, draws on them in composing his introduction. Furthermore, Perczel believes that he has identified some of these lost treatises. Years ago, Perczel argued that the bewildering treatise *De Trinitate*—which has been variously attributed to Didymus the Blind and Cyril of Alexandria—is in fact the "lost" treatise mentioned in the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* under the name of *The Theological Outlines*. Recently, he has announced his intention to publish similar philological demonstrations that the "lost" works can be identified and that the author published them under different pseudonyms. With these demonstrations will presumably come a new hypothesis as to why the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* wrote not only under one pseudonym, Dionysius the Areopagite, but also under other pseudonyms.

While I eagerly await the publication of these demonstrations and the corresponding hypothesis, I have my reservations. If, as Perczel argues, the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* published the "lost" works under different pseudonyms, then why in the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, when he is writing under the name of Dionysius, does he refer to those works as his own? Furthermore, if Sergius knew that both the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* and the "lost" works were all composed by the same author, why would he draw on the whole body of literature for his introduction but then translate only the *CORPUS*

DIONYSIACUM? In fact, as Perczel admits, Sergius' description of the "lost" works in his introduction could just as easily come from the few remarks that Dionysius makes about these works in the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, and so Sergius need not have had these works in hand to compose his introduction.

Modern scholarship on the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*

Hugo Koch and Josef Stiglmayr

Modern scholarship on the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* begins in earnest in 1895, when two German scholars, Hugo Koch and Josef Stiglmayr, publish independent arguments with the same conclusion. Both demonstrate that the ***(p.27)*** *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is considerably indebted to the fifth-century philosopher Proclus and therefore cannot be the genuine writings of the first-century Athenian judge, Dionysius the Areopagite.[66] The fulcrum of both arguments is *DN* 4.17–33, wherein Dionysius treats the question of evil under the rubric of the divine name "Good." Koch and Stiglmayr demonstrate that in these chapters Dionysius—now *Pseudo*-Dionysius—quotes extensively (often with little or no cover) from Proclus' *De malorum subsistentia*. In that same year, Stiglmayr published a companion article arguing that the provenance of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* was late fifth-century Syria-Palestine—a conclusion that, with some refinement, still holds sway today. For his part, Koch subsequently published the definitive study of the pagan philosophical backdrop of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*.

These two scholars, then, set the terms for the subsequent study of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* in the twentieth century. Since Dionysius was exposed as *Pseudo*-Dionysius, scholars have consistently dismissed the pseudonym. They have argued that it was a ploy on the author's part to win a wider readership in a time of anxious orthodoxies. The preponderance of scholars have worked in the wake of Koch, attempting to assess the nature and extent of the author's debt to late Neoplatonism. For most of these scholars, the debt to Plato precludes Paul. Müller finds "no trace" in the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* of the salvation by the blood of Christ, which he understands to be the essence of Paul's teaching. J.-M. Hornus insists that the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* "totally ignores…the central affirmation of Pauline faith," again here the atonement through the blood of Christ. For E.R. Dodds, the great scholar of later Greek philosophy, the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is little better than a poor attempt at "dressing [Proclus'] philosophy in Christian draperies and passing it off as the work of a convert of St. Paul." R.A. Arthur laments that while "[Dionysius'] main Christian influence ought to be that of Paul…his much vaunted discipleship is simply not convincing." While her overall assessment is that "his own theology owes very little indeed to Paul," she notes one similarity: "both [Paul and Dionysius] more or less ignore the human Jesus." In short, the dominant scholarly stream has consistently neglected to examine the aims and purposes of the pseudonym and the influence of Paul.

Almost as popular has been the hunt to unveil the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, to name the writer who went to such efforts to write under the name of another. In 1969, Ronald Hathaway amassed a list of no less than twenty-two scholarly conjectures as to the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, including: Ammonius Saccas, the mysterious teacher of Plotinus; Severus of Antioch, the Monophysite who first cites the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*; John of Scythopolis, who then would have produced scholia on his own pseudonymous corpus; Sergius of Reshaina, who first translates the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* into Syriac;

and Damascius, the last *diadochus* of the Academy in Athens. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed far fewer conjectures published, as none of these proposals succeeded in winning many supporters beyond their authors. Despite the occasional hypothesis still offered up, I am inclined to agree with Alexander Golitzin that, "[b]arring the discovery of new evidence, any future attempts at identifying our author will doubtless be met with the same failure to convince any save their sponsors as has met all previous efforts."

Endre von Ivánka and Ronald Hathaway

Two notable exceptions to the prevailing trend—which form a convenient diptych—are Endre von Ivánka and Ronald Hathaway. In his *Plato Christianus*, von Ivánka argues that author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is a Christian for whom the pseudonym and the consequent and seemingly wholesale import of late Neoplatonic philosophy serves a primarily apologetic end. Drawing on Oswald Spengler's term "pseudo-morphosis" (likely through the lens of Hans Jonas), von Ivánka argues that the pseudonym offers the author a literary pretense with which he can fill the shell of pagan learning with a new and living organism, Christian revelation. Close attention to the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, von Ivánka avers, reveals that the author in fact sabotages late Neoplatonism by clothing Christian theology in Platonic "drapery" (*Gewand*)—precisely the inverse of Dodds' claim. On his construal, the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is the premiere instance of the achievement of Christian Platonism, for it entirely subsumes the *Geist* of the past into the present dispensation: "much of the Platonic Spirit...somehow lives on in Dionysius' system, but very little (it has to be added) of the actual Platonic or Neoplatonic philosophy, i.e. of the ontological principles and the structural implications of the system." While von Ivánka may be right about particular Dionysian departures from late Neoplatonism, he clearly misrepresents the undeniable influence of Neoplatonic philosophy on the most central and cherished themes of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. Unfortunately for those who would like to inoculate Dionysius from the "anxiety of influence," Neoplatonism is no mere vacant shell or petrified outer form of a void system. For our purposes, von Ivánka is relevant because he provides a rare instance of a scholar who attempts to view the pseudonym as integral to the aims and purposes of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* at large.

His twin in this regard is Ronald Hathaway, who delivers the opposite conclusion, namely, that form and content should be reversed: "Ps.-Dionysius combines surface features of a Christian apology with a concealed Neoplatonist metaphysics." Just as for von Ivánka, the aim of this deception is sabotage, but the roles are reversed. Dionysius' true commitments are to Neoplatonism, and so he seeks to smuggle this philosophical "propaganda" into Christianity, thereby "vicariously promoting a ghostly Neoplatonist Succession." And while Hathaway devotes a considerable amount of time to the pseudonym—even insisting that "it is certain that Ps.-Dionysius writes every word in the context of Acts 17"—he attributes the senses of the pseudonym and the influence of Paul to the expedient packaging of Plato. And so while he acknowledges that the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* offers a "unique juxtaposition of the wisdom of Athens with the message of St. Paul," he categorically denies any substantial Pauline influence. In his view, the wisdom of Athens and the message of Paul are fundamentally inconsistent and thus Dionysius' "profession of Pauline humility in the very first line of *On Divine Names* obviously must not be taken with too great literalness." The result of this elaborate pseudonymous deceit is the wholesale import of alien wisdom into the emptied framework of Christian revelation—a wolf in sheep's clothing: "[Dionysius]

claims discipleship under St. Paul and…transforms *agapē* religion into *erōs* theology (or *erōs* metaphysics, as it turns out).” Here Hathaway reveals his debt to Anders Nygren, who in his widely influential book *Eros und Agape* laments the fact that the primitive Christianity, or *agapē* religion, was subsequently corrupted by the infiltration of Greek philosophy, or *erōs* religion. Nygren singles out Dionysius for introducing this philosophical contaminant with an “exceedingly thin veneer” of Pauline Christianity.

Von Ivánka and Hathaway are relevant not only as exceptions to the prevailing scholarly trend to dismiss the pseudonym and the influence of Paul. For while they each offer accounts of how the pseudonymous discipleship to Paul is germane to the aims of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* at large—accounts which, it must be said, are wanting—they also each provide clear and instructive instances of the manner in which the scholarship on Dionysius has been overly determined by the question of form and content, substance and rhetoric: was Dionysius *really* a Christian or was he *really* a Neoplatonist? This urge to identify one of these names as essence and the other as accident has led to a certain stalemate in scholarship on Dionysius.

Three promising leads

I contend that in order to redress the situation as it stands and move beyond the stalemate—was Dionysius *really* a Christian or *really* a Neoplatonist?—we must focus our attention on the pseudonymous character of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* and the corresponding influence of Paul. The last century of scholarship has largely passed over these questions in favor of appraising the influence of late Neoplatonism. When scholars such as von Ivánka and Hathaway have paused to consider the import of the pseudonym and the influence of Paul, the results have been conditioned by the language of essence and accident. Here I wish to focus on a handful of scholars who have offered interesting and even compelling explanations for the pseudonymous enterprise in general, the specific pseudonym, Dionysius the Areopagite, and the relevance of Paul for understanding the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. I have ordered the presentation not according to chronology, but in an ascending order of those I find to offer the most productive hypotheses.

Alexander Golitzin

As has already been rehearsed, scholarship on Dionysius since the groundbreaking studies of Koch and Stiglmayr in 1895 has been largely devoted to assessing the nature and extent of his debt to late Neoplatonism. Some twenty years ago, Alexander Golitzin began to question this approach and sought instead to situate the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* in the context of the late antique Christian East. While Golitzin never denied the influence of late Neoplatonism on the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*, he endeavored to highlight the many lines of continuity between the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* and its Christian forerunners.

More recently, he has extended this approach to hazard an explanation for the author's choice to write under a sub-apostolic pseudonym. The key for understanding the pseudonym, Goltizin contends, is a proper appreciation of the world of Syrian monasticism that forms the backdrop of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. *Letter 8* chastises a certain monk by the name of Demophilus for presuming to trump the authority of a priest and enter the altar area so as to protect the “holy things,” that is, the reserved sacrament. For Dionysius, Demophilus has upset the order (τάξις) of things, and so this troublesome monk must be reminded that the ecclesiastical order and the authority of his superior are part of “our

hierarchy," which is, after all, "an image of the supremely Divine beauty." Golitzin reads this reprimand as responding to a widespread contemporary problem: namely, monks usurping the authority of their ecclesiastical superiors. Such monastic presumption derives from "popular belief, universal throughout the East and especially concentrated in Syria, that the monks were the successors of the seers and prophets of old." This belief that monks were the *pneumatophoroi,* or "spirit-bearers"—in contrast to the bishops, who were viewed more or less as politicians—finds abundant corroboration, Golitzin argues, in apocryphal literature from Syria, including the *Gospel of Thomas*, the *Acts of Judas Thomas*, and the *Ascension of Isaiah*. More specifically still, this presumption also recalls the so-called "Messalians," a Syrian monastic movement whose members allegedly were indifferent to or even contemptuous of the sacraments and the ecclesial authorities on the grounds that access to God was through solitary prayer alone. This movement emerged in the fourth century and, despite a series of episcopal condemnations culminating in the Council of Ephesus in 431, seems to have survived in Syria well into the sixth century.

It is precisely in order to rebut this popular tradition, Golitzin argues, that the author chose to write under a pseudonym. For just as this monastic tradition could look to its own ancient pedigree (based on its own apocrypha), so the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* needed "to answer appeals to ancient tradition with a countervailing antiquity." This is, Golitzin concludes, "a very good reason, perhaps even *the* reason, for his adoption of a sub-apostolic pseudonym." As for the specific pseudonym, Dionysius the Areopagite, Golitzin speculates that the author took on the mantle of "the philosopher-disciple of St. Paul" in order both to "invoke the authority of the Apostle" against rebellious monks and to "sustain the legitimacy of deploying the wisdom of the pagans." The specific pagan wisdom that helps the author rebut the monastic presumption is the conviction of the late Neoplatonists Iamblichus and Proclus, *contra* Plotinus and Porphyry, that the human soul is too weak to ascend to the divine of its own and requires the aid of divinely revealed "theurgic" rites. Thus the late Neoplatonic notion that "a traditional and ancient worship" was necessary to "communicate a saving knowledge and communion" helped the author's efforts to have the monks—confident in the efficacy of their own prayer to grant them a vision of the divine—submit to ecclesiastical authority and acknowledge the efficacy of the sacraments.

The first half of Golitzin's explanation—that the author took on a sub-apostolic pseudonym so as to "fight fire with fire"—fails to explain why he took on the *particular* pseudonym he did. If all that the author needed was to contest the monks' appeal to Thomas, then why did he land on this particular figure, a disciple of St. Paul? The second half of Golitzin's explanation attempts to answer this question. Because Dionysius the Areopagite was the "philosopher–disciple" *par excellence*, Golitzin argues, he was perfectly suited to issue the monks a corrective from pagan wisdom. While Golitzin is certainly correct that the pseudonym suggests some important and fruitful interaction between pagan wisdom and Christian revelation, his appeal to this single theme of the weakness of the soul and the consequent need for liturgy, while also suggestive, seems incomplete. Given the extent of the pseudonymous enterprise—the fact that the author literally assumes the identity of Dionysius the Areopagite—I suspect that there is considerably more to his decision to write under this pseudonym than this single corrective to wayward monks.

Andrew Louth and Christian Schäfer

Along with Golitzin, Andrew Louth is credited with highlighting the Eastern Christian backdrop to the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. Years before Golitzin offered his explanation of the pseudonym, Louth intuited that the pseudonym signaled some significant interaction between pagan wisdom and Christian revelation. Unlike Golitzin, he cuts straight to the specific pseudonym: "Dionysius was the first of Paul's converts in Athens, and Athens means philosophy, and more precisely, Plato." Thus the pseudonym has something to teach us about the content of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*: "Denys the Areopagite, the Athenian convert, stands at the point where Christ and Plato meet. The pseudonym expressed the author's belief that the truths that Plato grasped belong to Christ, and are not abandoned by embracing faith in Christ." According to Louth, then, the pseudonym suggests that Dionysius' obvious debt to Neoplatonism does not in any way obviate his faith in Christ. To the contrary, the choice to write under this pseudonym signals that, just as the learned pagan Dionysius the Areopagite was converted to faith in Christ by Paul's speech to the Areopagus, so ancient, pagan wisdom can also be baptized into a new life by the revelation in Christ. Although the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* often strikes the modern reader as a "strange mongrel," or a servant with two masters, the author understands himself as offering a "pure-bred pedigree," recapitulating the "original specimen of the series," which is surely Paul's own speech to the Areopagus. For the author, Paul is the first to synthesize Greek philosophy and Christian revelation. By assuming the identity of the very disciple who was converted by this synthesis, our author signals that he will also attempt a further synthesis of his own.

More recently, Christian Schäfer has developed Louth's insights and offered the most sustained treatment to date of not only the pseudonym but also the corresponding influence of Paul on the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. Strangely, given that his is an avowedly *philosophical* perspective, Schäfer is the first scholar to state boldly that "[t]he pseudonym of 'Dionysius the Areopagite' is to be taken as a programmatic key for the understanding of his writings," for indeed, "the key to a proper interpretation of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is the methodical acceptance of the literary fiction of reading an author who—Athenian born and raised in the pagan culture of Christ's times—finds himself faced with early Christian doctrine." Schäfer also asserts, in my view correctly, that if we read the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* with the pseudonymous identity foremost in our minds, then "many of the traditional vexed questions and unsolved problems of modern Dionysius studies clear up." Chief among these questions is whether the author was *really* a Christian or a Platonist: "The question at all times [in nineteenth and twentieth century scholarship] appeared to be one of substance and accidents, of Platonic core and Christian 'outward limbs and flourishes' or vice versa, of compulsively 'hellenising' Christian faith or 'churching' Platonism by hook or crook."

Advancing Louth's insights, Schäfer hopes to move beyond this framework of substances and accidents by reading the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* against the backdrop of Paul's speech to the Areopagus, which was responsible for the conversion of the Areopagite under whose name he writes. For Schäfer, the author takes up the name of Paul's convert so as to suggest that he is "doing the same thing as the Apostle did": just as Paul appropriated the tradition of pagan wisdom—preeminently the altar "to the unknown god" in Acts 17:23—in order to show the Athenians that they already possessed an incipient faith that needed only the corrective of Christian revelation, so too Dionysius "wants us to understand that Greek

philosophy was on the correct path in its understanding of the Divine, but it obviously needed the eye-opening 'superaddition' or 'grace' (if these are the right words) of Christian revelation in order to be released from its ultimate speechlessness and residual insecurity concerning the last Cause." This also squares with Rom 1, where Paul laments the fact that although all of the nations once knew God—"his eternal power and divine nature" (1:20)—all but the Jews fell away from this ancient faith and "became fools" (1:22). The Gentiles "exchanged" (1:23, 25) their ancient faith in "the unknown god" (Acts 17:23) for idolatrous images and human foolishness masquerading as wisdom. Like Paul, then, Dionysius is calling pagan wisdom—the "wisdom of the wise" (1 Cor 1:19)—to return to its once pure origin, the understanding of God's "eternal power and divine nature" (Rom 1:20), the "wisdom of God" (1 Cor 1:24), that was subsequently corrupted by human folly.

Thus, according to Schäfer, Dionysius takes on the name of Paul's convert from Athens precisely in order to "baptize" pagan wisdom into a new life in Christ: "he wanted to show that, given the Pauline preaching to the pagans, a Christian adaptation and re-interpretation of pagan lore (and of Greek philosophy in particular) was the necessary and mandatory next step." If we return now to the question of whether Dionysius is *really* a Christian or a Platonist, with Schäfer we can safely answer that he is both. But he is both insofar as the pagan wisdom of Platonism (or Neoplatonism) is the residuum of a divine revelation from ancient times, needing only to return to the fold of the original "wisdom of God." While in Chapter Five I disagree with Schäfer's views on the implications of Dionysius' normative ontology for his theological anthropology, here I fully agree with his reading of the significance of the pseudonym and the corresponding influence of Paul. Much of what follows, especially Chapter Four, will corroborate, extend, and deepen Schäfer's conclusions by tracing in great detail the influence of Paul on the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* and the many senses of the pseudonym. Furthermore, I will endeavor to extend Schäfer's claim that reading the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* against this pseudonymous backdrop clears up many vexing problems in previous scholarship on Dionysius.

Hans Urs von Balthasar

The most importance influence on my own views, however, is a handful of suggestive remarks by Hans Urs von Balthasar. Apart from these few remarks, I differ from von Balthasar on a number of points. First, he opens his learned and prescient essay "Denys" with a lament that for modern scholarship "all that remains" of the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* "is PSEUDO-, written in bold letters, and underlined with many marks of contempt." Von Balthasar distances Dionysius from the pejorative connotations associated with pseudonymity—lest he be esteemed a mere "forger"—by refusing the standard scholarly prefix. However, this refusal of the prefix "pseudo-" acquiesces to these pejorative connotations and so misses an opportunity to reassess the pseudonymous character of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. Furthermore, in his rush to defend Dionysius from the charge of clever forgery, von Balthasar misses another opportunity when he treats the "lost" works of Dionysius. Von Balthasar insists that he did in fact write, or at least sketch, these seven texts and that they must have subsequently been lost. This seems very unlikely. It is more likely that Dionysius includes mention of works he did not write precisely so as to buttress the aura of authenticity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. On this reading, his mention of these works contributes to our impression that what we have in the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is the incomplete transmission of a much larger corpus. Furthermore, while many of the addressees of his treatises and letters and even the persons mentioned therein

are familiar to us from the traditions of the early church—Timothy, Polycarp, Titus, the apostle John, Elymas the Magician, Carpus—others are completely unknown: most conspicuously Hierotheus, but also Gaius, Dorotheus, and Sosipater. The mention of texts that may not have survived the notorious exigencies of transmission or figures whose names are now lost to memory would impart to a sixth-century reader the sense that what he is reading—the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*—is indeed an authentic sub-apostolic collection. The evidence thus leans in the direction of Louth's conclusion that "such a silence in the tradition makes one wonder whether the missing treatises are not fictitious, conjured up to give the impression, perhaps, that the works we have were all that survived to the end of the fifth century of a much larger corpus of writings written at the end of the first." These features of the text should not be dismissed as merely clever, "literary" devices. On the contrary, they testify to his "tendency to telescope the past," to collapse the distance between himself and the apostles. The *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* is a sophisticated work of literary and theological imagination whose pseudonymous character we should endeavor to appreciate, not disown. We cannot inoculate him against criticism by refusing the scholarly prefix or those "fictions" embedded in the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*.

Ironically, then, despite these two missed opportunities, von Balthasar himself provides to my mind the most compelling—if, at times, enigmatic and indirect—treatment of the question of the pseudonymity of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. For von Balthasar, the author does not so much assume the identity of Dionysius the Areopagite as he does suffer "identification" with Dionysius the Areopagite. Nor is this "identification" an option executed so much as a "necessity" obeyed: "The identification of his task with a situation in space and time immediately next to John and Paul clearly corresponds for him to a necessity which, had he not heeded it, would have meant a rank insincerity and failure to respond to truth." The necessary truth to which our author submits is the fact of a "mystical relationship" between himself and Dionysius the disciple of Paul, much like the disciples of the great prophets who wrote under their masters' names: "so a monk, dying to the world, assumes the name of a saint." No imposter, then, the author can only be sincere by heeding this call: "One does not *see* who Denys *is*, if one cannot see this identification as a context for his veracity." The "whole phenomenon"—the "mystical relationship" and the writing it necessitates—exists on an utterly different level…[on the level], that is, of the specifically Dionysian humility and mysticism which must and will vanish as a person so that it lives purely as a divine task and lets the person be absorbed (as in the Dionysian hierarchies) in *taxis* and function, so that in this way the divine light, though ecclesially transmitted, is received and passed on as immediately (*amesōs*) and transparently as possible[.]

Von Balthasar is the first modern scholar who suggests that pseudonymity is somehow integral to the mystical enterprise of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM*. For he proposes that it is only by heeding the call of the "mystical relationship" between himself and the Areopagite that our author succeeds in "vanish[ing] as a person" and becoming instead a "divine task" through whom the divine light passes.

This anticipates many of the themes I will explore in the second part of this investigation, Chapters Three through Five and the Conclusion. The only piece that is missing from von Balthasar's suggestive comments is any mention of the relevance of Paul for the entire enterprise. In what follows, then, I will highlight the way in which the author of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* grounds these and associated themes in the life and writings of Paul. First of all, in Chapter Three, I will consider the question of Dionysius' appropriation of the language

of pagan “theurgy,” principally from Iamblichus' *On the Mysteries*. Rather than attempt to distinguish sharply between Iamblichean (pagan) and Dionysian (Christian) theurgy, I will instead focus on the fact that for both Iamblichus and Dionysius, deification consists in our consenting to have the “work of God” (ἐργὸν θεοῦ)—or “theurgy” (θεουργία)—displace us, so that we become ciphers or conduits of divine activity. Thus to “vanish as a person,” as von Balthasar puts it, is necessary to our becoming a “divine task.” In Chapter Four, I will argue that Dionysius looks to Paul as the premier mystical theologian and witness to mystical union, and that Dionysius' understanding of “unknowing” (ἀγνωσία) derives from Paul's speech to the Areopagus. In Chapter Five, I will explore how for Dionysius this mystical theology requires a corresponding “apophatic anthropology,” for which Paul again is the authority. In the Conclusion, I will consider how the very practice of writing pseudonymously—answering what von Balthasar calls the “necessity” of the “mystical relationship” and thereby “vanish[ing] as a person—is integral to this apophatic anthropology. But before we turn to those themes in the second part of this investigation, I want in the next chapter to situate the pseudonymous enterprise of the *CORPUS DIONYSIACUM* in the context of the peculiar understandings of time and writing at play in the late antique Christian East. <>

Unsaying God: Negative Theology in Medieval Islam by Aydogan Kars [Oxford University Press, 9780190942458]

What cannot be said about God, and how can we speak about God by negating what we say? Traveling across prominent negators, denialists, ineffectualists, paradoxographers, naysayers, ignorance-pretenders, unknowers, I-don't-knowers, and taciturns, **Unsaying God: Negative Theology in Medieval Islam** delves into the negative theological movements that flourished in the first seven centuries of Islam.

Aydogan Kars argues that there were multiple, and often competing, strategies for self-negating speech in the vast field of theology. By focusing on Arabic and Persian textual sources, the book defines four distinct yet interconnected paths of negative speech formations on the nature of God that circulated in medieval Islamic world. Expanding its scope to Jewish intellectuals, Unsaying God also demonstrates that religious boundaries were easily transgressed as scholars from diverse sectarian or religious backgrounds could adopt similar paths of negative speech on God.

This is the first book-length study of negative theology in Islam. It encompasses many fields of scholarship, and diverse intellectual schools and figures. Throughout, Kars demonstrates how seemingly different genres should be read in a more connected way in light of the cultural and intellectual history of Islam rather than as different opposing sets of orthodoxies and heterodoxies.

Why Sufism, and Why the Thirteenth Century?

Traveling across negators, denialists, ineffectualists, paradoxographers, naysayers, ignorance-pretenders, unknowers, I-don't-knowers, and taciturns, this book aims to introduce the apophatic theological positions that developed in the medieval Islamicate

world. It is particularly interested in tracing their circulation among Sufis, and specifically in the thirteenth century. I should add a note, however brief, in justification of my choice to concentrate on thirteenth-century Sufism in this book. I will mention only three main reasons, which respectively correspond to the current literature on apophasis in Islam, comparative mysticism, and theories of mysticism.

First, Sufis of the thirteenth century compose the most unexpected yet prominent group cited in the current scholarship of apophaticism in Islam. The 1970s witnessed the rise of the concept "apophasis" in the study of religion, as a term that indicates not just a speech-act but also a new, ethicalized divine transcendence associated with mysticism. Within this broader turn in reinterpreting negative speech in religion and philosophy, a large body of works on Islam has cited primarily thirteenth-century Sufi masters, especially Ibn al-`Arabi and Rūmī, as the foremost representatives of Islamic apophasis or negative theology.' In this background of scholarship, it is paradox and mysticism that widely come to mind when we talk about apophaticism. Ibn al-Arabi and Rūmī are by far the most cited names for apophasis in Islam, while Henry Corbin's (d.1978) list added Persian Sufi masters who lived in the same century, such as Najm al-Din Kubrã (d.1221), (Alā' al-Dawla Simnānī (d.1336), and (Aziz Nasafi (fl.l.13th CE). A closer focus on this period and its figures not only reveals how forms of apophaticism adopted by these Sufis fit into the larger Islamicate world but also elucidates what was apophatic in theological context—in which sense, under which specific historical conditions and discursive regulations, and with which peculiar performative dimensions. Through a focus on Sufism, I will test whether the common equivalence of mysticism and negative theology is tenable. This study suggests that it is not.

Second, the description of thirteenth-century Sufism as the pinnacle of Muslim apophaticism reflects the broader description of the period in a comparative scholarly perspective. These were the most exciting times for the study of apophaticism—the golden age of Abrahamic apophatic theologies—as Michael Sells remarked:

The 150-year period from the mid-twelfth to the beginning of the fourteenth century constitutes the flowering of apophatic mysticism. Almost simultaneously, the apophatic masterpieces of the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian traditions appeared, which would include, among others, the writings of Ibn `Arabi (d. 1240), Rumi (d. 1273), Abraham Abulafia (d. ca. 1291), Moses de Léon (d. 1305), the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Beguine mystics culminating with Hadewijch (fl. 1240) and Marguerite Porete (d. 1310), and Meister Eckhart (d. ca. 1327).

Apophasis lived on after this period in the post-exilic Kabbalah of Isaac Luria [d.1572], in the Spanish mystics, in Jacob Boehme [d.1624], and widely throughout the Islamic tradition. Yet it never again held as central a place in mystical language.' This argument is extremely enticing for any student of comparative mysticism. What might be the reasons for such a synchronic and widespread blooming—if indeed this was the case—of apophaticism across kin religions? Why did such apophaticism never resurface?

While the depictions of the thirteenth century as the pinnacle of Sufism are widespread, the extent to which these representations inherit the earlier orientalist or Muslim modernist baggages is not always clear. The preeminent British scholar of Sufism, Arthur Arberry (d.1969), for example, adopted an essentializing yet popular decline paradigm of Sufism, wherein the thirteenth century became the period when Islamic mysticism reached its climax and then gradually decayed (for nearly eight centuries!), never to recover.' An in-depth

study of apophaticism in Islam up to the end of the thirteenth century provides a better understanding for such larger comparative perspectives on mysticism. The present study does not find substantial evidence in support of a conspicuous flowering of apophaticism on the divine essence among Muslims during this period. Paradoxical forms of negative theologies did intensify, but we also witness the decay of other forms that were more powerful in the previous centuries. Hence this study refuses to uphold the thesis of the thirteenth-century flowering of apophatic theologies among "the daughters of Abraham." We will unearth strong trans-religious interactions of apophaticism, particularly among the Muslim and Jewish mystical and philosophical traditions. On the other hand, these cross-pollinations developed much earlier than the thirteenth century, and mostly beyond the mystical currents of these religions.

The final reason is related to an even broader theoretical challenge on the relationship between mysticism and its institutionalization. The supposed opposition between mysticism and institutional religion has long overshadowed the study of religion as well as Sufism. Like Arberry, Spencer Trimingham (d.1987) in his **Sufi Orders in Islam** (1971), among other influential studies, depicted a progressively institutionalized history of Sufism, which meant for both men the gradual regression of authentic mysticism in Islam. This commonly presumed opposition between institutional religion and mysticism has been challenged since the late 1970s. Most remarkably, a group of comparative religionists developed what is called the constructivist approach, which has literally reversed the perennialist claims on mysticism and highlighted the importance of religious institutions, doctrines, scriptures, and established norms and practices in grounding, catalyzing, and even constructing mystical experiences. Accordingly, mysticism is not the experiential, authentic seed of religious institutions and doctrines but rather their fruit. Within this theoretical context, how apophaticism relates to the institutionalization of mysticism emerges as a pivotal question that awaits a historically grounded answer. Depending on the theoretical position a religionist adopts, the expectations will be diametrically opposed to each other. Does the organization of mysticism in the form of orders [tawā`'if] and idiosyncratic methods [tarīqāt] associated with specific eponymous Sufi masters inhibit, or rather intensify apophaticism among Sufis?

The assumed flowering of apophatic mysticism curiously follows the beginning of the long process of the formation of Sufi orders. Yet an unresolved theoretical dilemma appears here: many scholars, including those who assume a golden age in the thirteenth century, also hold that apophaticism is inherently resistant to institutionalization, systematization, formality, and organization. Hence the relation of apophaticism with institutionalization is yet to be addressed on historical grounds. With its focus up to the beginning of the organization of Sufism in the form of orders, the current study traces whether the emerging institutionalization catalyzed or hindered Sufi variations of apophaticism in the thirteenth century. The present analysis does not find any tangible intensification or waning in apophatic theologies as a direct result of the institutionalization of mysticism in the f0rm of nascent Sufi groups beginning to construct and gather around the lineages, methods, and practices associated with charismatic eponymous figures. The absence of such correlation further suggests that the ubiquitous association of mysticism with apophaticism is a problematic one.

A Guide to Negative Theology: Are the Mutazilites Negative Theologians?

So who were the negative theologians among medieval Muslims?' Until recently scholars of religion associated negative theology or negativist forms of theology in Islam particularly with a group of speculative theologians who emerged in eighth-century Iraq: the Mutazilites. Doxographers of other theological schools usually called them "the negators," or "deniers," of God's attributes. When Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'arī (d.936) introduced the Mutazilite view on divine unity in a few sentences, he employed the Arabic negations some seventy times in a dizzying one-page "description," if it can be called that.

The image of Mutazilites as the most famous standard-bearers of Islamic negative theology has persisted right up into modern scholarship, though what is meant by "negative theology" is rarely explained. The Mu`tazilite doctrine indeed indicates a fundamental weakness of "negative theology"—the standard term via which modern scholars of religion conceptualize apophatic performances in theology. While the Mutazilite firmly negated the reality and applicability of divine attributes to God, they did not follow the unknowability principle widely associated with negative theology. They maintained that God's essence, or the truth of Her ipseity [haqīqat dhāt Allah], was rather knowable. Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzis (d.1209) observation is perceptive:

> Dirār [d.815] among the theologians, and [Abū Hamid] al-Ghazālī among the later ones, argued that we do not know the truth of the ipseity of God—which is the claim of the philosophers. The majority of the theologians among us [i.e., the Ash`arites] and among the Muctazilites have argued that She is, indeed, knowable [annaha ma'lūma].

Al-Razi's point about the essential accessibility of God to human intellect is widely supported by a variety of prominent sources. Hence there is an unjustified leap from the negation of attributes to the divine unknowability and inaccessibility in calling a Mutazilite scholar a negative theologian. Medieval scholars were keenly aware of the difference between the two theological questions, and the Mu`tazilites embodied a reference point for scholars to clarify their own positions. In his correspondence with the eminent philosopher Nasīr al-Din Tusi (d.1274), the Sufi master Sadr al-Dīn Qūnavī (d.1274) argued that "everybody who ponders seriously agrees that the divine reality is unknowable [majhūla]." In his response, Tūsī felt obliged to correct Qūnavi s generic statement, clarifying the philosophical stance that he followed:

> it was necessary for Qūnavī rather to say: "the philosophers have agreed upon this (unknowability)." For, the Mutazilite masters among the theologians assert that the divine reality is rather knowable to human beings as She is [haqíqatihi ta'ala ma`lūma lil-bashar kamā hiya]."

In turn, Qūnavī indeed agrees with the refinement that Tūsī brings to divine unknowability. In his response to Tūsi s correction, Qūnavī indicates that he actually meant the Aristotelian philosophers and the verifier Sufis, and not theologians, by the phrase "everybody who ponders seriously."" While Sufis and philosophers agree on divine unknowability, the Mutazilites state the opposite, both for Tūsī and Qūnavī. Observers like Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328) and al-Dhahabī (d.1348), however dissident they were toward these traditions, confirmed their schema.

The claim that "God is known" (in the sense of both ma`lūm and ma`rūf) is repeated and underscored in Mutazilite texts from early on. In the Epistle of Whoever Seeks Guidance [Kitab al-Mustarshid] al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm (d.860) employs both Arabic verbs to emphasize that God is knowable: "people know that things can be perceived as they really are and

certainly known even if they are absent from us, for God is cognized and after the quotations will consistently use singular female pronoun. In both cases, the pronouns addressing God will be capitalized. I find four benefits in distinguishing my voice from the voice of my sources in terms of gender, creating a tangible tension. First, it faithfully transmits my original sources. Subtle examples of gender play in my sources will become visible, and possible anthropomorphic inclinations will make better sense, as we will see particularly in the final chapter. Second, the gender difference between the voices of author and of the sources and scholars explored in the book will better highlight the gender tension inherent in Islamic theological writings. It will constantly remind the English reader that the Arabic "He" of my sources is predominantly a term that transcends gender when referring to God. The popular Muslim conception of "He beyond 'h' and `e" will be better transmitted to the English reader. Third, differentiating my voice will distance me from the conventional linguistic practice in Anglophone scholarship. Through this distance, I will be able to challenge the implicit normativity of an English and Arabic (rather than, say, Persian or Turkish) theology and gender ideology in academic writing. "He" is a valid pronoun to address God only in some of the languages that Muslims speak, and this author aims to avoid the common practice of endorsing theologies that are meaningful only in these languages. Finally, my use of feminine pronouns will not only remind us of the trans-male nature of the referent, but also the unjustifiable use of male pronouns today as a transgender term in Anglophone scholarship. I hope to resist the hegemony of androcentrism in academic and theological discourse without compromising historical rigor in rendering my sources.

Compass

The current chapter has introduced the framework, content, and the basic conceptual problems in discussing "negative theology" as such. Accordingly, the move from "negative theology" to "negative theologies" is not sufficient to solve our conceptual problem in approaching Islamicate theological landscapes. Any question about "negative theology," in singular or plural, does not have a precise answer, mainly because "negative theology" is too broad and vague a term if we survey the theological questions that were asked or if we recall the breadth and depth of theological discourses. The current chapter has provided a conceptual introduction and narrowed down the scope of the next chapters to the negative theologies of the divine essence.

The following four chapters of the book thus focus on the wellspring of the field of theology: the divine ipseity. Within this narrower theological and dearer conceptual topography, they trace four distinct yet interconnected paths of negative speech on the nature of God that widely circulated in the medieval Islamicate world. These families of negative speech formations are loosely defined as "double negative," "philosophical," "paradoxical," and "amodal" apophatic paths. The formation and career of each of these paths are analyzed in a separate chapter of this book. These studies suggest that Islamicate scholars could apply more than one of these methods of negating the discourse on God's essence in different works or contexts. Moreover, the same methods of negation could be adopted by rival groups. For example, the set of strategies that define philosophical apophaticism were also adopted by the critics of philosophy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In the transmission of philosophical apophaticism in Andalusia from al-Kindi to Moses Maimonides, not only polymaths like al-Batalyawsī (d.1127), but also surprising names such as the ascetic mystic Ibn Masarra (d.931) played significant roles. On the other hand, the Jewish

theologian Nethanel al-Fayyūmī (d.n65) and the Shāfi`ī judge of Fa-timid Cairo, al-Qudā`ī (d.1062) followed Ismā`īlī apophaticism by adopting not only their famous "double negation" but also their complex cosmology. In the same vein, the apophatic strategies that Sufis applied were often shared with non-Sufis, and even anti-Sufis. The cases the book introduces illustrate not only the plurality of negative theologies of the divine essence but also the porousness of intellectual boundaries between schools, sects, and religions, Judaism and Islam in particular. Conversations on "Islamic," and for that matter "Jewish" or "Christian," negative theologies, should bear in mind the theological osmosis that took place across religious traditions. If we tend to define religions as separate belief systems—and we still widely do—such definition attributes theology a decisive yet undeserved role in determining religious differences and boundaries. This study encourages finding another definition of religion that goes beyond beliefs and ideas, insofar as it demonstrates that theologies were shared intellectual projects that had little respect for religious boundaries.

The presence of multiple ways of negating discourses on divine essence indicates that there is no single "negative theological tradition" even with reference to one problem within the Islamic intellectual heritage. While there is no unified theology or creed among Muslims in the absence of an authoritative "church," clergy, or consistent state regulation, the questions asked and the answers provided were not only diverse and contextual but also considerably overlapping among scholars and intellectuals from different backgrounds and religious affiliations. From a wider methodological perspective, the study adopts a historicist, contextualist approach to the study of negative theologies and apophasis. Accordingly, every discourse is composed of a finite set of connected propositions and performatives, and there is neither one method nor infinite methods of negating a given discourse. Apophatic possibilities are discourse-dependent insofar as the rules, methods, performative dimensions, and wider implications of negating a discourse are partially defined by the discourse itself. The book hopes to convince the reader that there is no unbounded, absolute, or infinite negation; negative speech is a historically embedded performance that should be contextualized within the multilayered discursive spaces that it affirms in order to operate.

This study displays the inherent affirmativity in any given speech performance, and its findings are in stark contrast with the popular associations of "negative theology" with broad themes like "infinite critique," antidogmatism, mysticism, or morality. Yet, the book avoids extended theoretical discussions, comparisons, or reflections on the contemporary significance of, or appeal to, apophasis and negative theology in philosophy, comparative religion, or constructive theology. The primary purpose of the current book is to inform readers about negative theologies of divine essence in Islam, introducing a historical perspective, vast fields of scholarship, and diverse intellectual schools and figures. It has a clear theoretical framework, while theoretical discussions are either completely removed or minimized in favor of deeper analysis of Islamic intellectual history. Such valuable and unavoidable philosophical discussions and comparisons should wait until we have a better grasp of Muslim negators, denialists, ineffectualists, paradoxographers, naysayers, ignorance-pretenders, unknowers, I-don't-knowers, and taciturns. Their diverse self-negating speech formations not only stated but also performed the unsayability of the excessive, saturated theme of theological discourse through their own failure of saying. <>

The Irony of Modern Catholic History: How the Church Rediscovered Itself and Challenged the Modern World to Reform by George Weigel [Basic Books, 9780465094332]

A powerful new interpretation of Catholicism's dramatic encounter with modernity, by one of America's leading intellectuals

Throughout much of the nineteenth century, both secular and Catholic leaders assumed that the Church and the modern world were locked in a battle to the death. The triumph of modernity would not only finish the Church as a consequential player in world history; it would also lead to the death of religious conviction. But today, the Catholic Church is far more vital and consequential than it was 150 years ago. Ironically, in confronting modernity, the Catholic Church rediscovered its evangelical essence. In the process, Catholicism developed intellectual tools capable of rescuing the imperiled modern project.

A richly rendered, deeply learned, and powerfully argued account of two centuries of profound change in the church and the world, The Irony of Modern Catholic History reveals how Catholicism offers twenty-first century essential truths for our survival and flourishing

Catholicism reacts; end of story. The only tension in the drama is over the degree of reaction: How much should, or will, or can the Church concede to this, that, or the other modern claim, be that claim political, social, or cultural?

Modernity as active protagonist, Catholicism as defensive reactor: many historians, and virtually the entire Western mainstream media, frame the story that way, down to yesterday and today. Interestingly enough, both twenty-first-century Catholic traditionalists and twenty-first-century Catholic progressives share this conventional meta-narrative about Catholicism and modernity. The traditionalists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries argued, and the traditionalists of the twenty-first century continue to argue, that there should be no Catholic accommodation to modernity, or at least as little as possible. Catholicism should always fight a stern rearguard action, surrendering as little ground as possible until that happy day when the modern project crumbles—after which the Church can help the chastened survivors pick up the pieces and start civilization again. By contrast, Catholic progressives throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries urged a fulsome embrace of cultural, social, and political modernity, and continue to do so in the twenty-first century. The traditionalists tend to think of the progressives as abject, even heretical, appeasers. The progressives return the favor by treating the traditionalists as merciless, anti-intellectual reactionaries frozen in ecclesiastical amber.

But suppose the story is more complicated? Suppose Catholic traditionalists and Catholic progressives (and conventional historians and the mainstream media) are all wrong, because they all think of modernity as the sole protagonist of this drama: a force to be

resisted, accommodated, or embraced, but still the driving force of the historical action? Yes, there were indeed moments (even decades) of Catholic "reaction" to modernity, moments (or decades) that the progressives vigorously resisted, often at cost. Yes, there was a moment when the Church seemed to offer social, cultural, and political modernity a warm embrace: an embrace the traditionalists loathed, and thought a terrible mistake. But amidst all that, suppose something else was going on: something that looks, from the second decade of the third millennium, like a surprising renewal of Catholic identity and mission, one that reaches back two thousand years to the Church's founding generation of believers and thereby hears a call not to resist or embrace modernity, but to convert it?

And suppose further that—in another irony—the Catholic Church helped the modern project to a deeper self-understanding? Suppose Catholicism helped modernity discover that it did n0t spring full-blown from the brow of Voltaire but had a longer, far more complicated, and much more interesting history that owed a great deal to biblical religion? Suppose Catholicism helped the postmodern West in the twenty-first century understand how things came to the point where the contemporary passion for equality became self-destructive, threatening free speech and open academic inquiry? At a curious (or ironic) moment, in which a pope insists that "the Church proposes; she imposes nothing," while proudly modern (and thoroughly secular) universities struggle to maintain free space for argument, might a differently configured idea of the relationship of Catholicism to modernity help the West find a more rational, humane path into the future?

Answering all those questions is beyond the scope of this modest experiment in revisionist historiography. But the claim here is not a modest one. The claim is that the conventional telling of the story of Catholicism-and-modernity is wrong. What follows is an attempt to start a conversation about how we might better understand that dramatic and ongoing encounter.

The drama to be explored will unfold in five acts, the last two of which overlap chronologically, further complicating an already complicated story. So before getting into the drama proper, a modest Playbill, a plot summary to help orient what follows, is in order.

Act One: Political and cultural modernity mount a fullscale assault on Catholicism. Popes Gregory XVI and Pius IX respond by hurling anathemas. Several promising starts at reconciling Catholic faith and modern political aspirations come to unhappy ends.

Entr'Acte: Theologians working in the interstices of Catholic intellectual life try to build bridges of conversation between the Church and modernity even as, somewhat to everyone's surprise, Catholicism flourishes in the first great modern democracy, the United States of America.

Act Two: Pope Leo XIII, elected in 1878 as an elderly placeholder, launches what will become a revolution in Catholic thought by gingerly exploring the modern project in its political, economic, social, and cultural expressions. That Leonine Revolution continues through fits and starts (and often brutal political and ecclesiastical controversies) for the first six decades of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, the Counter-Reformation that began in the sixteenth century draws unexpectedly to a close.

Entr'Acte: While Catholicism struggles with the political turbulence of two world wars, and then the Cold War, creative Catholic thinkers in Europe and America extend the Leonine

Revolution into virtually every field of Catholic thought, preparing the way for a future that will arrive with unanticipated rapidity—and turbulence.

Act Three: Another elderly pope thought to be a papal placeholder decides to focus the energies first set loose by Leo XIII through the prism of an ecumenical council. John XXIII opens that council, Vatican II, by calling the Church to convert modernity rather than deplore it. The Council advances the Leonine Revolution across the full spectrum of Catholic thought and practice, but is less successful in bringing the modern world and its immediate future into clear focus.

Entr'Acte: Amidst two decades of intra-Catholic turmoil over the proper interpretation of Vatican II, three key markers are laid down by a pope, a future pope, and a diverse company of theologians, suggesting the possibility that John XXIII's original, evangelical intention for the Council just might be recovered, and then acted upon.

Act Four: In sharp contrast to the anathemas of Act One, a bold Catholic critique of political and cultural modernity from inside modern intellectual premises is developed by John Paul II and Benedict XVI: two popes who, as younger men, had helped guide the Leonine Revolution through the contentions and controversies of Vatican II.

Entr'Acte: As the struggle to get Vatican II right continues, late modernity morphs into postmodernity, and the cultural crisis of the West intensifies, John Paul II challenges Catholicism to rediscover its originating purpose as a missionary enterprise, not least through the experience of the Great Jubilee of 2000.

Act Five: While Act Four continues to unfold in a new and bracing encounter between Catholicism and political modernity, the Church begins to grapple with the challenges of twenty-first-century evangelism—and is confronted by scandals that threaten Catholicism's capacity for public witness and for mission.

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Finally, and as a last bit of orientation, a preliminary clarification of terms will be helpful. By "Catholic Church," I mean primarily the teaching authority of Catholicism as embodied in the Bishop of Rome as universal pastor of the Church—and, at one significant moment (known here as Act Three), in the bishops of the Church

gathered in ecumenical council with and under the Bishop 0f Rome. This definition certainly does not exhaust what "Catholic Church" means, and many other influential characters will come on stage during what are styled here the drama's entr'actes. Given the unique authority-structure of Catholicism, however, a close focus on the papacy and its teaching about modernity provides a clarifying angle of vision for considering the complex set of relationships and interactions being examined here.

By "modernity," I mean societies characterized by the decline of aristocratic authority based on inherited power and land-based wealth; the desacralization of power by the sharp differentiation of religious and political authority and the dominance of the latter in public life; industrialization, urbanization, and mass education; social mobility; popular participation in government; the rationalization and bureaucratization of virtually every aspect of life; great improvements in nutrition and medicine with a concomitant rise in life expectancy; and a vast expansion of the leisure time available to everyone.

Playing on the name of the eighteenth-century German thinker Ludwig Feuerbach, sociologist Peter Berger added one more piece to our understanding of "modernity" that will be useful to keep in mind in what follows. The turn into modernity, Berger proposed, was a matter of societies passing through the "fiery brook"—a boundary beyond which religious conviction becomes personal decision rather than cultural or ethnic inheritance. Because of that crossing, "modernity" also means societies deeply marked by pluralism, which Berger described as "the coexistence of different worldviews and value systems in the same society." Both modernity and Catholicism have struggled with "pluralism," in Berger's descriptive sense of the word. One question to be explored below is whether, in another of the ironies of Catholicism-and-modernity, certain aspects of Catholic thought might help a fractured and contentious postmodernity discover a normative, not merely descriptive, meaning of "pluralism" that reanimates civil conversation about the human future.

But enough of plot summaries and definitions. Now to the dramatic story of Catholicism-and-modernity: reconsidered, reimagined, and refocused.

The Culture-Converting Counterculture

Incorporating its fourth act, the fifth act 0f the drama of Catholicism-and-modernity will continue to be played out amidst ecclesiastical and cultural turbulence, some of which will be quite severe.

Throughout this drama, and even in those moments when the Church's own grave human failings became massive obstacles to its witness and teaching, the Catholic Church has been the bearer of a message that is of critical importance to the realization of the modern project's highest aspirations. That important message can be summed up in the term "human ecology." The term as such was introduced to Catholic social doctrine by John Paul II and stressed by Benedict XVI, but the idea has been implicit since Leo XIII: it is insufficient to attend solely to the machinery of economic and political modernity; attention must be paid to culture, to the truths (including the moral truths) by which modern men and women live, if the machinery of modernity is to lead to genuine human flourishing. After a twentieth century that had become an abattoir because of false and wicked ideas about the truth of things, it might have been hoped that the appropriate ecological lesson would have been learned. Moreover, the "twentieth century"—considered as an epoch on which the curtain rose with World War I and fell with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—ended on a different, more hopeful, note, with the defeat of totalitarian power by a revolution based on what Czech human rights activist Vaclav Havel called "living in the truth." In the twenty-first century, however, that lesson remains contested.

Thanks to what it learned from its engagement with modernity, Catholicism has recommitted itself to missionary discipleship and permanent evangelization: to proposing to the world what it believes to be liberating truths about salvation and the ultimate destiny of human beings, which include truths about how we ought to live together in society. At a moment of deep cultural confusion and political tension throughout the West, when some are questioning whether modernity is worth saving, and others are defining the modern project in terms of a profound rupture with any concept of "givens" in personal and public life, Catholicism's task is to be a culture-converting counterculture that offers skeptics a path beyond doubt, relativists a path beyond the naked will to power, and nihilists a path beyond emptiness. The core of that offer is friendship with Jesus Christ, whom the Catholic Church proclaims to be the answer to the question that is every human life. The offer also includes

proposing truths essential to the rescue of the modern project from its own self-demolition: truths whose reality and veracity can be engaged by all people of goodwill.

What are the truths that will make it possible for modernity to realize its noblest aspirations and longings?

Among the most important is the truth that every human being has an inherent dignity and value, not ascribed by government but hard-wired or built in.

Then there is the truth that reflection on the built-in dignity and inalienable value of every human life discloses certain moral obligations and responsibilities, including the obligation to defend innocent life, the obligation to contribute to the common good, and the obligation to live in solidarity with others, especially those who find living their obligations and responsibilities difficult.

And there is a further and deeper truth about the moral nature of the human person. For citizens of a democracy to think of themselves and others, for constitutional and legal purposes, as nothing more than twitching bundles of commensurable and morally inconsequential desires is not an act of tolerance but an exercise in self-abasement, even self-degradation, that reduces human beings to an infantilism that cannot indefinitely sustain the modern aspiration to democratic self-governance.

The truth that the good life cannot be measured solely, or even primarily, in financial terms must also be proclaimed and reclaimed. The aspiration to prosperity and abundance that is characteristic of modernity is not the problem; the problem lies in the reduction of "the abundant life" to indices of financial status. The human person is more than his or her salary, investment portfolio, or net financial worth, and the twenty-first-century world needs to be reminded of that.

Finally, there is the truth that a vulgar culture appealing to the basest of our instincts, be that high culture or popular culture, damages the human ecology necessary to make political and economic modernity work. For a degraded and debased culture is likely to produce a vulgarized political culture in which base instincts dominate, as Berlin during the Weimar Republic ought to have demonstrated.

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There have been many ironies in the drama of Catholicism-and-modernity over the past two centuries or more. No doubt some will find it not merely ironic, but ridiculous, to suggest that the Catholic Church is a safe deposit box of certain truths about the human condition that are essential for the survival and flourishing of civility and tolerance, self-governance and the rule of law, prosperity and solidarity, liberty and equal justice for all. In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the failures, sins, and crimes of the Church's own priests and bishops loomed large as obstacles to the effective proclamation of those truths. Indeed, an argument could be made that corruption and scandal in the twenty-first-century Church reflected a Catholicism not so much converting modernity as imitating it. For the wickedness evident among churchmen in the United States, Canada, Ireland, Great Britain, and elsewhere often reflected late modern and postmodern confusions (and worse) about what makes for happiness, beatitude, and genuine human flourishing—including, most particularly, the many false promises of the sexual revolution. There can be no doubt that serious, deep-reaching reform, particularly of the Catholic priesthood and the Catholic

episcopate, is essential if the Church of the future is to live its commitment to being a culture-converting counterculture in a transformative way.

The fact remains, however, that the noblest aims and moral commitments of the modern project were not self-generating in a world begun anew by Voltaire and Rousseau. Nor is their successful pursuit in the twenty-first century and beyond going to be possible in a public culture dominated by skepticism, relativism, spiritual boredom, and vulgar decadence. Modernity's finest aspirations grew from cultural soil long tilled by the Catholic Church. After the many twists and turns of the Catholic encounter with modernity, Catholicism embraced those aspirations and now seeks to serve the world by setting them on a firmer foundation for the future. If crossing the fiery brook of modernity was the prerequisite for the Catholic Church to rediscover both its own evangelical character and the essential contribution it can make to saving the modern project from incoherence, well, that is just another irony in the fire.

Some might even call it a providential irony, for both modernity and the Church. <>

Jews and Muslims in Contemporary Spain: Redefining National Boundaries by Martina L. Weisz [The Vidal Sassoon Studies in Antisemitism, Racism, and Prejudice, DE GRUYTER OLDENBOURG, 9783110637908

The book analyzes the place of religious difference in late modernity through a study of the role played by Jews and Muslims in the construction of contemporary Spanish national identity. The focus is on the transition from an exclusive, homogeneous sense of collective Self toward a more pluralistic, open and tolerant one in an European context. This process is approached from different dimensions. At the national level, it follows the changes in nationalist historiography, the education system and the public debates on national identity. At the international level, it tackles the problem from the perspective of Spanish foreign policy towards Israel and the Arab-Muslim states in a changing global context. From the social-communicational point of view, the emphasis is on the construction of the Self–Other dichotomy (with Jewish and Muslim others) as reflected in the three leading Spanish newspapers.

Events taking place in Spain and its colonies in the late medieval period and early modernity were crucial to establishing the global structures of religious and racial difference that persist in today's world. It was indeed in the Iberian Peninsula, during the 1430s, that words like raza `race' and linaje `lineage', which had hitherto been associated to horses and dogs, begun to be applied to Jews and "Moors". This phenomenon coincided chronologically with the appearance of anti-converso ideologies, which would turn theological categories (like Jew and Muslim), into biological ones (limpieza de sangre).

It is precisely this concept of "race", one that associates issues of blood purity with relatively recent conversion to Christianity, which was later applied to the classification of peoples in the Spanish colonies. This ordering was crucial for the correct organization of a colonial enterprise whose stated mission was to impose Christianity upon a population of pagans and heretics. Yet the consequences of these developments went far beyond the already vast Spanish Empire. Indeed, it was through the repudiation of its ethnic diversity and the subsequent establishment on the American continent of systems of production based on the exploitation of ethnically differentiated groups that Spain established, more than five hundred years ago, the fundaments of globalized modernity.

In Spain, the conceptualization of religious difference as a biological "problem", and the subsequent hierarchization of the human population along "racial" lines was indeed an intrinsic part of Empire building. This intimate relationship can be encapsulated in three decisive events that took place during the historic year of 1492. That was the year of the "discovery" of America by Christopher Columbus, but also of the definitive victory of the Catholic Kings over the Muslim-Arab rulers of Al-Andalus, a cultural-political entity that had ruled major parts of the Iberian Peninsula for almost eight hundred years. Lastly, that same year the entire Jewish community was expelled from the Catholic Kingdom by Royal Edict,

establishing a precedent that would subsequently be applied to Muslims as well 4 After the expulsion of Muslims and Jews, Spanish "racial-spiritual" purity was preserved in Spain and its colonies through the `blood purity statutes' (estatutos de limpieza de sangre). Considered as a proof of the Spanish people's chosennes, this "purity" became a central pillar of the imperial task of global evangelization.

These seminal moments in Spanish history have affected the construction of Spanish national identity until this very day. Up to the eighteenth century, no relevant political group contested the assumption that the Spanish collective body had to be protected from the "contaminating" influence of both Muslim and Jewish blood through institutions like the blood purity statutes and the Tribunal of Inquisition. The advent of the Enlightenment broke this consensus, although it did not call into question the self-identification of the vast majority of the Spaniards with Catholicism. Even the Spanish liberals and reformists of the nineteenth century, despite their strong anti-clericalism and their vehement repudiation of anything related to Catholic integrism, perceived Spain as a Christian State. In fact, they claimed that both the Inquisition and the blood purity statutes went against the essence of the Spanish people precisely because tolerance is one of the core values of Christianity. This trend persisted until at least the first half of the twentieth century. According to Christiane Stallaert, the ethnic identification of the Spaniards with Catholicism was not only a fundamental trait of the Francoist side during the Civil War of 1936-1939, but was also widespread among the Spanish "reds" (socialists, communists and anarchists). Furthermore, some of these revolutionary Spaniards, such as Juan Machimbarrena and Segismundo Pey Ordeix, interpreted their Christian identity as the negation of Muslim/Jewish identity, in spite of the pluralistic and philosemitic politics of the government of the Second Republic during its first years (1931-1933).

With the advent of democracy after Francisco Franco's death in 1975, Spain created the institutional and political basis for the establishment of a multiethnic and non-denominational state. Since that time, the Spanish government has expressed its desire for historical reparation through a series of official acts, like the declarations of both Judaism and Islam as religions with `clear and deep roots' (de notorio arraigo) in Spain, declarations which took place in 1984 and 1989 respectively. In 2015, the Cortes (Spanish parliament) passed a law granting citizenship to the descendants of expelled Jews, which constituted an important landmark in the long process of re-encounter/reconciliation between Spain and Sephardic Jews all over the world. Without any doubt, the will of the successive Spanish governments of the democratic era to reconnect Spanish culture and identity to its Jewish and Muslim-Arab roots has been reinforced with its incorporation into the European Community, due to the Europe institutions' emphasis on pluralism, multiculturalism, and respect for human rights.

This book analyzes the place granted to Jews and Muslims in the construction of contemporary Spanish national identity, with a special focus on the transition from an exclusive, homogeneous sense of collective self toward a more pluralistic, open and tolerant one, in a European context. The Spanish case is particularly suitable for this study, given Spain's crucial role at the genesis of the global hierarchization of the world population along "racial" lines that took place about five hundred years ago. Interestingly enough, by the end of the twentieth century globalized modernity had produced an inversion of the ethnic and religious patterns that led to its establishment. The obsession with borders and collective homogeneity that pervaded early modernity was challenged by the increasing valoration of

diversity, borders permeability, and coexistence of minority cultures within the nation state. In that sense, the efforts undertaken in the Spanish cultural, social and political realms to adapt the country's structures to these dramatic developments can be considered as paradigmatic of the reassessment of religious difference and national identity in late modernity.

The main focus of this study is on the period 1986-2006, which witnessed critical developments in Spanish contemporary history, but the analysis extends beyond these dates. In 1986, Spain became a member state of the European Community, and established diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. Moreover, in 2006 the Spaniards commemorated the seventieth anniversary of the beginning of their last Civil War.

The study of national identity is especially problematic in the Spanish case, given the secessionist tendencies of some of its Autonomous Regions like Catalonia and the Basque Country. The complex dynamics generated by these tensions have been taken into consideration in this work, but the focus remains on the construction of Spain as an identity framework.

While the contemporary struggles over the construction of a Spanish collective identity have been given considerable scholarly attention, the specific subject of the remodeling of Spanish national identity vis-à-vis its Others has inspired a number of academic publications only during the last few years. Jo Labanyi's edited volume Constructing Identity in Contemporary Spain, published in 2000, was a pioneer in analyzing the country's recent engagement with its "ghosts" and dealing with the often-blurred boundaries between self and Others in a Spanish context. This book, whose efforts are mostly directed at cultural theorizations, offers important insights concerning the challenges and particularities of the Spanish cultural scene. The study of difference is mostly centered on gender and migration issues, as well as on Gypsy otherness.

Regarding the Muslim as Other, one of the most important works in this field is Christiane Stallaert's Etnogénesis y etnicidad (1998), in which she analyses Spanish ethnicity from the perspective of its confrontation with the "Moro" (Moor'), through the lens of an historical-anthropological analysis. Equally important is Kitty Calavita's Immigrants at the Margins, which examines the dynamics of immigration, law, race and exclusion in contemporary Italy and Spain. In addition, Parvati Nair, Daniela Flesler, Ana Rueda and Raquel Vega-Durán have focused on the social and identity issues raised by Maghribi immigration to Spain from cultural perspectives. Furthermore, Barbara Fuchs and Susan Martin-Márquez have analysed Spain's ambiguous role in the orientalized-orientalizing dichotomy from cultural and historical perspectives. More recently, Avi Astor and Ana I. Planet Contreras have focused on different aspects of Islam's presence in contemporary Spain.

More general works on Spanish alterity include Gabriela Yones-Aharoni's MA Thesis (in Hebrew) on the "Other" as reflected in the Spanish cinema between 1983 and 2000; Danielle Rozenberg's Minorias religiosas y construcción democrática en Espana, which analyzes the place of religious minorities in the construction of Spain's democracy; and Joshua Goode's Impurity of Blood, dealing with the meanings of racial identity in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Spain. Moreover, in La política de inmigración en Espana: reflexiones sobre la emergencia del discurso de la diferencia cultural, Belén Agrela scrutinizes the cultural and societal aspects of Spain's immigration policies from the standpoint of anthropology.

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As stated above, this book analyzes the role played by both Jewish and Muslim difference in the construction of contemporary Spanish national identity. The fact that this kind of analysis has rarely been done before is rather surprising, given the many parallels and points of contact between these two ethnic minorities throughout Spanish history. On the other hand, this trend fits the pattern followed by the whole field of Jewish studies, in which research projects including both Muslims and Jews within a single analytical frame have been until recently quite uncommon."

The second main originality of this work resides in the three different perspectives from which this process is analyzed. At the national level, this study follows its reflection in historiography, the education system and the public debates on national identity. At the international level, it focuses on Spanish foreign policy towards Israel and the Arab-Muslim States in a changing global context. From the social-communicational point of view, the emphasis is put on the construction of the self - Other (that is, Jewish and Muslim Other) dichotomy as reflected in the three leading Spanish newspapers. In addition, attention is paid to the processes undergone by the Jewish and Muslim communities since the democratic transition. Clearly, these distinctions are made for the purpose of analysis; these dimensions are in fact interconnected and mutually influence one another.

Finally, the research on which this work is based adopts a trans-disciplinary approach, bringing together elements from the disciplines of international relations, political science, sociology, social psychology, cultural studies and history. It combines a qualitative approach to the sources with the quantitative methodology called "content analysis," to conduct the assessment of the images of "Jew" and "Muslim" as reflected in the three main Spanish newspapers: El Pais, El Mundo and ABC.18 It makes significant contributions to the study of racism and antisemitism, Iberian studies, European studies, and history.

The Consolidation of Spanish Democracy and the National Identity Debate

Since the return of democracy, the Spaniards have been faced with the task of constructing a national identity that could be considered legitimate in the contemporary European and global contexts. This was not an easy task since in Spain, as in most countries of the world, the process of nation-building has been concomitant with the construction of significant Others, a mechanism often problematic in post-holocaust Europe. The disarticulation of the mechanisms of otherness can therefore be considered as one of the most important challenges involved in the re-creation of Spanish identity after the return of democracy. This process is particularly complex because it implies not only a change in the previous distribution of material and immaterial values at the national level, but also a re-positioning of the country in the global scene. For instance, the maintenance of a perception of Spain as essentially characterized by goodness, power, leadership, and altruism necessarily entails ignoring those voices whose individual or collective experience contradicts that perception. From another standpoint, the acknowledgement of the fallible and perfectible condition of the nation could be perceived as harmful to the country's national interest, since it opens the door to claims for reparative actions by its historical victims.

This chapter evidenced the great malleability of national narratives, and the ease with which they can be adapted, at least superficially, to the spirit of the times. Yet the main challenges remain at the material level, where conceptual frameworks shape reality. That is why the almost universally consensual endorsement of pluralism, diversity and understanding

between the different peoples and religions has often been countered by a less evident permanence of the most discriminatory and exclusivist traditions of Spanish nationalism. This central contradiction has permeated historiography, the education system, and also the different conceptions of nation that predominate in the country's public space. In the following chapter we will focus on a complementary aspect of the place granted to Muslims and Jews in Spanish national narratives: Spain's international relations with Israel and the Arab world.

Spanish Foreign Policy towards Israel and the Arab States

The analysis of Spain's international relations with Israel and the Arab world evidences the existence of a central contradiction between the insistence on establishing a self-celebratory monologue concerning the idyllic memory of the historic coexistence of Christians, Muslims and Jews in the Iberian peninsula, on the one hand, and the stubborn persistence of discriminatory practices and perceptions toward these two ethnic minorities, on the other.

It seems that the more the Spanish leaders insist on presenting their nation-state as the incarnation of the Good principle in world history (be it Catholic Christianity or "development"), the greater is their country's shadow, reflected in the Spaniards' construction of their Others. In that sense, Ambassador Alvaro Iranzo's affirmation that "immigration is the core issue of otherness in Spain" is especially relevant. The renewed efforts deployed by Spain to safeguard "fortress Europe" from the immigrants' "invasion", in the context of a public discourse where immigration is sometimes associated with criminality (particularly among the Spanish conservatives), mirror some dark aspects of Europe's "development": in their respective colonies, the Western European powers effectively invaded other countries and fought to impose an order based upon racism and exploitation.

In addition, the very presence of the members of the former European colonies on Spanish soil makes tangible the contemporary persistence of global structures of coloniality. Economic migration exposes the fact that the natural resources, as well as the labor of the peoples of the South, are worth less than those of the North, and that people pay a very heavy price for being born on the "bad side of geography".

Spanish attempts at establishing a cultural hegemony in the Arab countries should be considered in this wider context. They are an effort to preserve Spain's interests through the achievement of a moral and cultural consensus. On the other hand, this cultural sphere is also an arena where hegemony is contested.

Clearly, historical narratives play a critical role in legitimizing the politics of the present. The dissimilar approaches of the Aznar and Zapatero administrations concerning the history of Spanish-Arab relations, for example, are indicators of the contrasting approaches of these two Spanish leaders concerning the role their country should play in contemporary world affairs.

In the case of Israel, despite the rapprochement, many indicators point to the fact that this country is sometimes perceived as the ultimate victimizer against whom the identity of Spain as the supreme freedom fighter is defined. Interestingly enough, Spanish diplomacy's adoption of international strategies colored by insinuations of Jewish control of the American press and government gives us an important clue concerning the construction of a new international role for contemporary Spain. In a globalized, capitalist world, the traditional

stereotype of the Jew as financially clever, powerful, and influential paradoxically makes of him a player worth befriending.

In the concluding paragraphs of "Latin America and Spain's Image in the World," the Spanish researcher Javier Noya, from the Real Instituto Elcano, showed unconventional sincerity. He asserted that the Spaniards should thank Latin Americans for their criticism of what they perceived as the "business recolonization of the 1990s," because this "image of Pizarro coming back in the shape of a capitalist —equally cruel, although more civilized because the [new] conquistador employed money instead of arms- expanded the aura of Spain's hard power among the world powers." He further explained: "A less hostile reaction would not have raised as much respect among those who are not scandalized when they have to use the force of money or of arms to defend their interests, whether they coincide or not with those of the rest of Humanity. A Black Legend in Latin America can be a Pink Legend in the leading developed countries." In other words, if you want to have power and respect in this harsh, competitive world, you might want to adopt some of the Evil's characteristics. That is, you may be willing to imitate the antisemite's mythic Jew.

Spain and the Jews

The content analysis of the three main Spanish newspapers during the period 1997-2006 reveals the persistence of anti-Jewish motifs in all three of them. Yet the references and emphases on each of these features vary according to the internal and external political circumstances, the ideological allegiances, and the repressed memories and passions of each daily's readership.

This persistence is particularly striking in the light of the involvement of Spanish writers and editors with the issues of the Holocaust and the "new" antisemitism. What seems evident is that these important issues have not yet been addressed with the necessary depth and reflection. As we saw in the part of this chapter dealing with antisemitism, especially in Spain, anti-Jewish hate and the Shoah are intrinsically connected to the issue of evil and the concept of "Crimes against Humanity." True confrontation with these questions would require, therefore, a willingness to transform the age-long projection of evil against the individual and collective Jew (world Jewry, the State of Israel), into a conscious introspection into the roots of evil inside the Spanish individual and collective self.

Spanish uniqueness in the European context, especially in relation to its transition to democracy and the pact of silence upon which it was based, has led to a closing of the gates that compartmentalize the worlds of the conscious and the unconscious, the self-image of goodness and the projected image of evil, Man and his shadow (in Carl Jung's terms.) This compartmentalization explains the contradiction between rational acknowledgement of the existence of Jews and the State of Israel as complex entities with essentially human characteristics and the phantasmagoric, demonic perception of a Jewish Other that keeps resurfacing in the three dailies' pages. This stubborn re-emergence of monstrous images associated with the Jews are symptoms of what Sigmund Freud calls the "return of the repressed," and they will not disappear unless the material that forms them is made conscious and elaborated.

The virtual invisibility of contemporary Spanish Jewry has favored dissociation between the abstract, disembodied Jew and the actual Jew of flesh and blood with whom Spaniards share an essential part of their culture and life. There is no doubt that Spanish society as a whole has made major progress since the end of the 1960s towards a greater inclusion and

acknowledgement of the Jewish world in general and Spanish Jewry in particular. Yet the difficulty of Spanish society in recognizing Jewish "differance" contributes to the persistence and multiplication of demonic traits in the construction of its image of the Jew.

The analysis of the specific antisemitic stereotypes used to construct the "Jew" is especially useful for the identification of some of the main elements that are being repressed and/or denied in the different sectors of Spanish society. As we indicated, the Jew as Other can be approached as a mirror reflecting core issues which are not being acknowledged in a given society. In Henri Zukier's words, the "`other' [...] embodies central and intimates features of his host society, which, like the outsider himself, have often been disavowed and repressed."

The scrutiny of the three main Spanish newspapers led me to identify three specific elements that are being projected onto the Jews. The first is the memory of Francoist crimes, the second is the memory of Spanish colonial expansion, and the third is the desire to return to the "glorious" days when Spain was the head of an empire on which, according to Phillip II's famous words, "the sun never sets."

In his article on the "Ironies of Spanish History," José Brunner argued that "Spanish democracy was consolidated through the adoption of Francoist means for democratic ends." In his opinion, the political pact of silence on which the transition centered, was based on the political culture of self-censorship that was imposed during Franco's dictatorship. The brutal crimes of Francoism, which according to the Spanish Judge Baltazar Garzón fall under the definition of "Crimes against Humanity," were committed with the active or passive complicity of broad segments of the Spanish population. The emotional and psychological suffering, as well as the social conflicts that the acknowledgement of such facts could have generated, has been avoided by expelling those memories outside the institutionalized public space. But they resurface through the ghostly figures of Spain's Others.

The same process happens with the memories of the Spanish colonial expansion on the American continent and in the Maghreb, spiritually supported and legitimized by the Catholic Church. As we saw in previous chapters, the "unpleasant" aspects of these historical memories have been banished from the official historical narratives. Despite this fact, the "benefits" brought by these expansionist policies, especially in terms of international influence and economic prerogatives, are often celebrated.

This "glorious" imperial past has been interpreted, especially since the 1990s, as a proof of the Spanish nation's "natural" leadership in the West. This has been especially evident in the conservative camp, where the desire to transform Spain into a world power with a marked global influence has been particularly popular.

The demonic features attributed to the Jew and/or the State of Israel in the Spanish press are in effect grotesque representations of these repressed elements: the cruelty, racism, lust and desire for world influence that permeated yesterday's empire and fuel today's global ambitions are mirrored in the association between Jewishness and greed, inhuman cruelty, a materialistic approach to the Divine, or all-powerful lobbying. In Henri Zukier's words, "In his congenital blindness, the imaginary Jew is the externalization of insight." Indeed, it is the blindness towards their own "dark side" that causes Spaniards to project their own shadow onto a mythical Jewish Other.

From the perspective of political influences, we can suggest a reading according to which El País has been shaped, in the external dimension, by Soviet influence, particularly in using the argument that Zionists duplicate Hitler's crimes or the manipulation of the "chosen people" concept. On the social-psychological side, the forced silence imposed on Francoist crimes, to which the PSOE has greatly contributed despite having been persecuted during the dictatorship, appears as a particularly painful historical memory in desperate need of projection.

Anti-Jewish prejudices of Catholic origin are especially strong in ABC's pages. Regarding the repressed elements, the memories of Francoism and also of past colonial expansion, in which conservative and Catholic Spain played a crucial role, seem to be predominant. So is the belief in a providential Spanish leadership of Western European civilization. This last aspect is mirrored in the particular approach of the daily to a presumed "Jewish Lobby," which is both admired and condemned. In this case, the megalomaniac fantasies concerning Spain's "chosen" destiny are projected onto a fearsome and all-powerful Jewish collective with global ambitions. El Mundo shares this emotional, paradoxical approach to an imagined "Jewish Lobby" with ABC, apparently based on similar repressed elements.

Despite different emphases, all of these variables listed, as well as Spain's specific approach the history and memory of the Holocaust, have influenced in different degrees each of the three newspapers' approach to Jews and Judaism. Notwithstanding the increasing pluralism and tolerance of Spanish society, the steady revalorization of Judaism and the philo-Semitic trends, the force of anti-Jewish beliefs does not seem to recede. It probably will not unless the Spaniards find the necessary strength to look evil in the eye and realize that what they see is a monstrous reflection of their own denied self.

Spain and the Muslims

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the US and March 11, 2004, in Madrid, Muslims gained increased mentions in the Spanish press. The issue of terrorism became particularly prominent, together with the topics of immigration and religion. As indicated elsewhere, the mere fact that problematic or negative issues are rife in the press treatment of Islam contributes to the formation of an unfavorable image of this social group.

The three main Spanish newspapers approached these issues differently, according to their ideological perspectives and interests. El País and El Mundo showed a greater willingness than ABC to acknowledge and amplify the many voices of Islam. Yet all three newspapers mostly avoided dealing with the stereotypes. They know how it feels, how it hurts. They also know that there is something in their faces, in the color of their skin, and in their customs, that will preserve forever their otherness compared to "true" Europeans.

Around 2008, the pendulum begun to swing the other way. The deep economic crisis, rampant unemployment and consequent social unrest have blown apart the Spanish dream of eternal European prosperity. The French media, for example, have been enjoying this "return to normality," re-Orientalizing Spain by commenting ironically on its people's allegedly spurious (drug-induced) achievements in sports and by celebrating a movie portraying Spanish characters as belonging to an "exuberant" and "folkloric" world filled with "simple pleasures." The Spanish artist Aleix Saló put it bluntly in a cartoon describing the housing crisis of 2008: "... we discovered, suddenly, that we were poor. And what is worse, that we had never ceased being such. And that maybe this is not Spain anymore, but

Espanistán." structural bases of North-South relationships, which have historically constructed racism, orientalism, and today's neocolonialism.

Moroccan immigrants are indeed a reminder that the same global structures that secure for the Spaniards their privileged status as Europeans condemns to exclusion and poverty the inhabitants of the world's South. On Spanish soil, the duality between the full rights granted to Spanish citizens and the often instrumental, and sometimes even dehumanizing treatment of immigrants concretizes even more global asymmetries: "The immigrant carries the stigma of having born badly, at the wrong moment, on the bad side of geography."

There is, however, a significant difference between the Spaniards, the English and the French. The first know by experience how it feels to live on the "bad side" of geography. Over a period of decades they have accepted in the rich European North the most unrewarding, harsh and socially despised jobs, as their inferior status was legitimized by an array of negative preconceptions.

By the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries, religious difference had acquired in Spain a certain malleability. Empathy and appreciation were often incorporated into official policies and public discourse dealing with Jews and Muslims. Leaders from across the political spectrum explicitly considered pluralism and respect for difference as core values in the construction of a democratic Spanish identity, as overtly xenophobic and discriminatory ideologies were mostly marginalized.

Yet this book has also shown the tenacity of negative conceptualizations of religious difference whose roots go deep into history. In the case of Muslims, these prejudices resurfaced massively following immigration waves towards the end of the 1990s, when many North Africans came to Spain to fill the role of a cheap labor force. The contrast between the negative perceptions of low-skilled workers whose contribution to the growth of the country's economy was acknowledged by many, and the positive attitudes toward the mostly middleclass residents of Arab origin who had arrived in Spain as students one or two decades before, and were absorbed successfully into the local social fabric, are very telling. Clearly, the numeric difference between the relatively few young immigrants from Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and other parts of the Arab-Muslim world who went to Spain to study between the 1970s and the 1990s and decided to stay, and the more massive cohorts of immigrant workers that arrived from the end of the 1990s are significant, and may to some extent explain the change in the Spaniards' attitudes. Yet the economic factor is also important, and should not be underestimated.

There is a strong line of continuity between the perceptions of Muslims prevalent at the birth of the Spanish empire, which according to Anibal Quijano laid the basis for the global structures of coloniality still prevalent in today's world, and those widespread in today's Spain. Although in-depth analysis of the place of both Muslims and Jews in the Spanish colonial system must be left for further research, it is possibly to identify some important elements of continuity.

As mentioned earlier, the theological justification for the establishment of blood purity statutes against Muslims in early modernity was that they were considered descendants of Hagar the slave, and therefore seen as a "bastard lineage, slave, unworthy of ruling or filling important positions." This early "racializing" of religious difference that initially took place in the Iberian Peninsula acquired a global magnitude with the utilization of the figure of

Santiago Matamoros (Saint James "the Moor-Killer") as a "rallying and attacking cry" in the conquest of the American continent, and the incorporation of the blood purity statutes into the legal system of the Spanish colonies. This development had far-reaching consequences, since the conceptualization of the colonial populations as inherently inferior and unworthy of ruling even themselves lies the very core of global structures of coloniality.

During the period under study, Muslim otherness had two main dimensions: the complementarity between their legal marginalization as immigrants and their incorporation into the economic system as underpaid laborers, on the one hand, and their construction as internal and external enemies, on the other. If in the first case otherization legitimized both their economic exploitation and the denial of rights as citizens, in the second it conveniently contributed to developing a sense of a "civilizing" mission that immediately translated into territorial invasions of "uncivilized" lands. When none of those functions were necessary, as in cases of the "Spanish-Arab friendship" or building projects in Spain by wealthy Arab elites, Muslims lost their "color" and became "white". Just as by the end of the eighteenth century mestizos in the Spanish colonies could be officially considered as "white" by paying a tax (Gracias al sacar), Muslim otherness can also be neutralized when doing so leads to political, economical and cultural rewards.

In the case of Jews, the central role they have historically played in the construction of Spanish national identity and their small numeric presence in contemporary Spain make their difference more conceptual than practical. Unlike Muslims, Jews - even those coming from North Africa - are not "colored" in contemporary Spain. They are not assigned attributes of "racial" inferiority to justify economic exploitation and/or political paternalism. Instead, Jewish otherness is related to deeply rooted notions of extraordinary power and moral purity/impurity.

As stated, Imperial Spain saw itself as replacing the Jews as God's chosen people, and the "cleansing" of their land from any Jewish presence was considered by the Spaniards as evidence of this divine replacement. Thus the struggle for "racial-spiritual" purity played a key role in the consolidation of Spanish nationalism. In this context, demonization of the Jew became the mirror against which the notion of Spanish righteousness was historically erected. In the contemporary setting, this conceptual mechanism remains active across the Spanish political spectrum, as it serves to establish a sense of moral superiority and legitimize the many privileges enjoyed by Spaniards in today's globalized world.

A strong continuity can also be detected in the association of the Jews with forces which, although often considered as demonic, are also the source of power and prosperity. This tendency, observable throughout Spanish history, is at work in contemporary Spain in the perception of Jews as the dominant force in the financial world, the government of the United States, the mass media, and countless other conspiracy theories. Sometimes, the negative conceptualization of this extraordinary power attributed to the Jews is inverted and transformed into an incentive to befriend them.

The Spanish case shows how in late modernity the symbolic and material roles attributed to both Muslims and Jews remain intrinsically linked to global structures of coloniality. Moreover, just as the imposition of the blood purity statutes in the Iberian Peninsula inaugurated a process of "racialization" that changed the face of the globe, in today's world Muslim difference is still often constructed as a justification for economic exploitation, political paternalism and military intervention. No less importantly, demonized or idealized

images of a "Jew" that often surpass any religious or "racial" definition are also a remnant of the imperial period. In the contemporary setting, as in the past, these images are often used in the context of power politics or claims of Spanish moral superiority, playing a key role both in the struggle for cultural hegemony and the pursuit of economic, political and military supremacy. <>

Sing a Rhythm, Dance a Blues: Education for the Liberation of Black and Brown Girls by Monique M. Morris [The New Press, 9781620973998]

A groundbreaking and visionary call to action on educating and supporting girls of color, from the highly acclaimed author of **Pushout**

"Monique Morris is a personal shero of mine and a respected expert in this space."
—Ayanna Pressley, U.S. congresswoman and the first woman of color elected to Boston's city council

In this highly anticipated follow-up to Pushout, which explored the criminalization of Black girls in schools, Monique W Morris invokes the spirit of the blues to articulate a radically healing and empowering pedagogy for Black and Brown girls. The blues have long been an essential form of resistance, healing, and learning; in **Sing a Rhythm, Dance a Blues**. Morris lays out how everyone working with youth can respond proactively with empathy. She reimagines what education might look like if schools placed the flourishing of Black and Brown girls at their center.

Wise Black women have known for centuries that the blues have been a platform for truth-telling, an underground musical railroad to survival, and an essential form of resistance, healing, and learning. In her highly anticipated follow-up to the widely acclaimed **Pushout**, now a core text for teachers and principals on the criminalization of Black girls in schools, leading advocate Monique W. Morris invokes the spirit of the blues to articulate a radically healing and empowering pedagogy for Black and Brown girls.

A clarion call for educators, parents, and anyone who has a stake in a better tomorrow to transform schools into places where learning and collective healing can flourish, these pages journey from Oakland to Ohio and from New York to Iowa City and beyond. Morris describes with candor and love what it looks like to meet the complex needs of girls on the margins. In doing so she offers a collection of gems from educators who are attuned to the patterns of pain and struggle, and who show how adults working in schools can harness their wisdom to partner with students and help the girls they teach find value and joy in learning.

Sing a Rhythm, Dance a Blues reimagines what education might look like if schools placed the thriving of Black and Brown girls at their center. Morris brings together research and real life in this chorus of interviews, case studies, and the testimonies of remarkable people who work successfully with girls of color. The result is this radiant manifesto—a guide to moving away from punishment, trauma, and discrimination toward safety, justice, and genuine community in our schools.

In the tradition of **For White Folks Who Teach in the Hood** and **Other People's Children**, Morris's new book is a clarion call—for educators, parents, students, and anyone

who has a stake in a better tomorrow—to transform schools into places where learning and collective healing can flourish.

This book speaks directly to educators, those working with youth, and anyone who works towards a future where girls can grow in an environment that prioritizes their needs.

Trauma Survivors

To better work with girls of color who are survivors of trauma, educators and others in the school community must grapple with what it takes to be healing-responsive. They can begin by asking these questions:

How might what I'm teaching—or not teaching—participate in the oppression of my students?

How does my classroom pedagogy reflect my understanding of intersectionality?

How does my classroom culture respond to harm as an exchange that can be remedied or resolved in community?

How can I better facilitate conversations, breathing exercises, and quiet moments for meditation / reflection that provide my student community an opportunity to safely interrogate difficult, potentially triggering, subject matter?

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I had an opportunity to visit the Taller Tambuyé dance and drum studio in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico, during a conference on educational justice in 2018. I was there with a group of about twenty other scholars, organizers, and advocates, convened by a funding partner to improve strategies and practices for educational justice. The workshop was intended to give us information about the history of bomba, a Puerto Rican style of communal music and dance based on use of the barrel drum. We learned why the drums are built from rum barrels (honoring the roots of the music as developed by Africans on sugar plantations) and how the art is preserved in modern-day Puerto Rico. The dancers begin by performing one at a time, and we learned about the relationship between the dancer—typically a woman—and the drummers, usually men. However, the Tambuyé troupe features female drummers

and male dancers, so as to resist notions of power historically left unchallenged in the art form. It was all intellectually stimulating—and then we danced.

I was dancing beside my daughter. Others had brought their children and siblings with them as well. We moved closer together, then farther apart, working in and around each other's space in laughter and syncopation. The African-inspired movement quickly connected us in waves that amplified for me the words of Nikki Giovanni in her poem "Revolutionary Dreams" when she wrote that if she did what she does "when she's natural," she'd "have a revolution."' Sweat beading our foreheads and feet becoming sore, we all participated in the labor of knowing the history of Puerto Rico, in the movement to retain one's self in the context of oppression.

Then the magic happened.

Dancing with us had been two-year-old Aquilah, her angelic little body weaving between the adult bodies around her to make her presence known. She was wearing a pink dress, with a matching bow peeking out from her tiny, tightly coiled Afro. She was the only dancer under five years old until Luna, the daughter of the primo drummer and lead dancer, arrived with her own contributions. She walked in with bright brown eyes, her loose Curls formed into an Afro. When they found each other, Aquilah and Luna instantly decided to be friends. One spoke English, the other Spanish, but they understood their common language and used it to bond in an ancestral legacy of dance.

They hugged each other, laughed, and then hit the dance floor. Aquilah's pink dress was now Covered in a red skirt, while Luna wrapped herself in a pink and white floral-print skirt. Their dark chocolate and caramel-hued skin formed a blur as they jumped together, held hands, let each other go, kicked, twirled, spun, bent over to touch their toes, and carelessly rolled around the floor—getting lint in their hair, and everything.

In their youthful play, they were teaching us. Educational justice isn't just what happens in the classroom. It's also about the relationships we build as a community to strengthen our capacity to recognize the common thread of humanity in one another. They were reminding us to be free in our expression, to hold each other when we need to, and to let go when we need that too. They were in movement together, connected by a drum that found its way into hymns and dance throughout the African Diaspora and left us with different ways to interpret how we show up in the world.

Finally, when they were done, and all of us were gathering for a group photo, I watched as they gave each other a shared look of satisfaction—an agreement that seemed to confirm that what they had done was meaningful. Embedded in their breaths, now heavier from the play and dance they'd shared, was a discovery of alignment.

> Deep breaths in ...
> Deep breaths out.
> Deep breaths in ... a tiny chuckle as the air escaped again.

In their breathing was a reminder that when we honor our shared humanity, we are free to be—not just for ourselves, but also for others who share this journey with us. Our breath makes room for the possibility of freeing ourselves from the narrative of exclusion. It allows us to speak our ' truths—with all the sass, crass, and boldness we can muster. It allows us to dance—with all of the energy we can conjure. It allows us to be free. <>

Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture 13th-18th Centuries by Jean Delumeau, translated by Eric Nicholson [St Martins Press 0312035829]

Discusses Christian-based fears surrounding sin, death, and the soul's immortality, from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

On the dust jacket of “Sin and Fear” is a detail of the Bosch painting in which men and women in their baptismal suits are disporting themselves about a garden of earthly delights. Whether the ladies and gentlemen are enjoying lust, or just a bit of artistic luck, is not quite clear, but it does serve as an appropriate introduction to sin and fear and guilt, at least in the 15th Century.

In the inside back flap of the book’s dust jacket, author Jean Delumeau is identified only as a professor of history at the College de France, Paris. According to the translator, this is the second volume of a tetralogy, but only the first to appear in English. The first book deals with fear in the West, and the last with a history of Paradise.

Whatever comes before or after, the present volume divines, among the medieval and Renaissance kings and clergy, “a propensity to sensationalize the message of Holy Scripture,” and the author asks why these potentates did it.

“This book has attempted to answer this enormous question,” he writes, “by considering sin as a ‘historical object.’ It was, I believe, a new enterprise to undertake a cultural history of sin in the West.”

Indeed, Delumeau’s work is a sort of tour de force through the Museum of Spiritual History (my metaphor, not the author’s), wherein one can see “more than 600 years of guilt-instilling efforts.” Leading the tour is Delumeau, acting as a sort of historical curator.

In the first hall of the ground floor, one sees various manifestations of “contemptus mundi,” a once-useful ascetical concept of amazing plasticity; in a thousand forms it relentlessly urged the denial of all earthly enterprise.

In the next hall is “Danse Macabre,” the image of death that was rendered so imaginatively, if grotesquely, adding a little Fred and Ginger to the otherwise dull sermon, the otherwise static painting.

On the second floor in an exhibit entitled “A Failure of Redemption?” Delumeau presents the examination of conscience, the practice if not the sacrament of penance, the concept if not the doctrine of original sin, the relative paucity of the saved; under “Religious Uneasiness,” he dazzlingly displays the doctrine of pain, the disease of scruple, the difficulty of death.

On the third floor, where the placard reads “An Evangelism of Fear,” he details sermons and hymns, the tortures of the afterlife, the judgment or vengeance of a “lynx-eyed” God, the classifications of sins as mortal and venial, and the ascetic model, the svelte ideal.

The Catholic world comes in for a lot of corporal punishment at the hands of the historical curator, but the Protestant world also suffers from his lash, especially because of its emphasis on eschatology and predestination.

It isn't that there was so much sin in the centuries covered by the book, the author seems to argue, as that there was not enough forgiveness. "A pessimistic brand of preaching" and "a series of vast collective disasters that besieged Europeans" seemed to have fueled the imaginations of princes and priests.

When the 18th Century began to alleviate the "serious threats to daily life," however, such persuasion as the politicians and preachers possessed began to erode. Sin and fear began to disappear. Guilt too has been evanescing, but seemingly at a far slower rate.

Delumeau's perceptions are not without spiritual perspective: "I think that sin exists," he confesses. "I feel its presence in me. Furthermore, I cannot see how one can eliminate the idea of an Original Sin, whose scars we still bear.

"Freud felt this and tried to explain it, while both Bergson and Gouhier observed that 'everything happens as if there were an original defect in man.'

"My book must therefore not be taken either as a refusal of guilt or the need for a consciousness of sin. On the contrary, I think it will shed light on the excessive sense of guilt and 'culpabilization' . . . that has characterized Western history."

A most amusing afternoon, with vivid memories of the Black Death and the Wars of Religion. Out into the sunlight again. I can't remember when I enjoyed sin and fear more.

But if I were to reread the book, re-enter the museum, as it were, and take the tour through the same materials, this time accompanied by the spiritual curator, the effect might be quite different. He would propose that what appears to be historical artifact may be as alive today as it was centuries ago.

Are those Rodinesque figures of "Lust" and "Sloth" really made of stone, he would ask, or are they Marceau-like mimes, motionless as one approaches, but after one passes, pouncing on one's very back and clawing at one's very existence?

"Sin and Fear" is full of pleasures and delights, but not for everyone who has suffered at the hands of theologically manipulated sin and fear, who has been ground down by clerically originated guilt. It is certainly for those who like to rummage around the European centuries, especially from the 13th to the 18th.

CONTENTS

A Cultural History of Sin

It might easily be thought that any civilization—in this case Western civilization from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries—which was besieged (or believed itself to be besieged) by a multitude of enemies—Turks, idolaters, Jews, heretics, witches, and so on—would not have had time for much introspection. This might have been quite logical, but exactly the opposite happened. In European history, the "seige mentality," which I have analyzed in a previous publication,' was accompanied by an oppressive feeling of guilt, an unprecedented movement toward introspection, and the development of a new moral conscience. The fourteenth century witnessed the birth of what might be called a "scruple sickness," a global phenomenon that soon reached epidemic proportions. It was as if the aggressivity directed against the enemies of Christendom had not entirely spent itself in incessant religious warfare, despite constantly renewed battles and an endless variety of opponents. A global anxiety, broken up into "labeled" fears, discovered a new foe in each of the inhabitants of the besieged city, and a new fear—the fear of one's self.

Expressing the feelings of the entire teaching body of the church on the fourteenth Sunday after Pentecost, Lefèvre d'Etaples commented on the Epistle to the Galatians (5:16-24) in these words: "All things considered, the life of a Christian in this world is nothing less than a continuous battle ... His greatest adversary, however, is none other than himself. There is nothing more difficult for him to overcome than his own flesh and his own will, which are, by nature, inclined to all evil."2 In much the same spirit Bourdaloue wrote: "It is no paradox, but rather certain truth when we say that our most fearful enemy is our own self. How is that possible? ... I am ... more dangerous to my own self than the rest of the world, for it is up to me and me alone whether or not I condemn my soul to death and exclude it from the Kingdom of God." Both Lefèvre d'Etaples and Bourdaloue pushed to a similar extreme their interpretations of Saint Paul, according to whom a Christian must free himself from his evil instincts in order to rise above his baser nature.

This religious theme was the direct descendant of a long ascetic tradition. It was also linked to two other recurrent affirmations, which have been examined in La Peur en Occident. The first affirmation contended that a causal relationship linked the sins of mankind to a variety of collective punishments sent by an irate God.

Although bishops and preachers were most active in affirming this connection, they were not alone. Heads of state also considered wars to be a form of celestial chastisement for the faults of the people, and even doctors such as Ambroise Paré discerned divine wrath behind diseases such as plague and syphilis.' The authors of almanacs also shared and spread this conviction. An almanac of 1573, for example, gave the following warning, placing it in the mouth of God so as to be all the more convincing: "If you despise my prescriptions [sic] and commandments I shall turn my face against you and you will fall before your enemies ... I shall send pestilence among you. I shall turn your sky to iron and your earth to stone so that the earth will not bear its fruit. You will eat the flesh of your sons and daughters."

Another almanac of 1578 reads: "Now, more than ever before, [God] is preparing to loose his anger upon our vices, daily afflicting us with war, torrents of blood, extortion, pillage, theft and oppression, and even with disease and unknown maladies."

A 1593 almanac joins the lugubrious chorus: "It is certainly our hideous sins and our lamentable and mad persistence in all sorts of evil deeds which have increasingly irritated our Good Lord."

Insofar as these threats accompanied incessant appeals for conversion and penitent they reinforced the second affirmation of the church, according to which Satan was omnipresent—and therefore also present in the heart of everyone. Were it not for the intervention of divine grace, every man and woman born after the Original Sin would have belonged to the demonic empire. In this respect, the remarks of Saint Catherine of Genoa (d. 1510) on mankind in general and herself in particular are as revealing as they are stupefying:

> What is man by himself, without grace? A being more evil than the demon, for the demon is a spirit without a body while a man without grace is but a demon clothed with a body ... I then thought that were God ever to withdraw his grace from me, I would be capable of all the crimes committed by the demon. I therefore judged myself to be even worse than Satan himself, and much more hateful. I then saw myself as a devil incarnate, and all this seemed to be so true, that if all the heavenly angels had come to tell me that I had even one good thing

> in me, I would not have believed them. For I clearly perceived that all that is good resides in God alone, whereas in myself resides only evil.

Thus reasoned a saintly widow who devoted herself to the poor and who was subject to visions. She so despised herself that she even avoided pronouncing her own name. A theatrical attitude? This judgment would be too hasty. Agrippa d'Aubigné confessed: "My head has a great many less hairs than sins" and, moreover, "My dreadful transgressions horrify me ... growl in my ears, hiss like serpents in the night, constantly appear before my eyes like so many fearful specters, accompanied by the hideous image of death. Worse still, these are not the vain smoke of dreams but rather the living portraits of my very own deeds."' A contemporary, Saint Francis de Sales, used similar rhetoric in writing to Madame de Charmoisy: "Your faults are greater in number than the hairs on your head, greater still than the sands of the sea," and he invited Philotée to confess: "I am but an excrescence of the world, a sewer of ingratitude and iniquity."

Such excesses of humility cannot be fully understood unless they are viewed in context—that is, within the parameters of the history of sin in the Western world, where they appear side by side with all the other fears and real or imaginary enemies described in La Peur en Occident. Among the multitudinous agents of Satan whom the men of God strove to track down and drive out of their hiding places, they could not omit the most secret and dangerous of them all. This agent was no other than each and every individual, insofar as he (or she) might conceivably relax his guard and lose control of himself. Seen in this perspective, the terrors that tormented early modern Europe before the discovery of the "unconscious" can be understood in terms of a much larger phenomenon. In addition to the "fear," the "dread," the "terror," and the "fright" occasioned by exterior perils of all kinds (natural or human), Western civilization was afflicted by two supplementary and equally oppressive causes for alarm: the "horror" of sin and the "obsession" of damnation. The church's insistence on both of the latter eventually led an entire society to condemn material life and daily concerns. Whence the inspiration for hymns such as this one, sung in the beginning of the eighteenth century by the congregations of Grignion de Montfort:

> Leave your wood awhile, carpenter,
> Put aside your iron, locksmith.
> Set down your work, craftsman
> Let us seek Grace.

Then, more than ever before, did the West's religion of "anxiety" differ from the Eastern religions of "tranquility": Hinduism and Buddhism. It is true that from the point of view of power politics, the dramatization of sin and its conse- quences reinforced clerical authority. The father-confessor became an irreplaceable figure whose unshakable status inspired the naïve and revealing affirmations of a canon from Bologna who declared, in 1602, that God sent three kinds of scourges to punish men for their sins: famine, war, and pestilence. No matter how serious famine might be, however, it was still the least terrible scourge of all, for whereas war and pestilence struck all men indiscriminately, famine spared the priesthood and therefore one could confess one's sins before dying. Famine also spared notary publics, so that one could draw up one's will, as well as princes, who were responsible for the welfare of the state." It was certainly no accident that the father-confessor should have headed the canon's list, for it was he, after all, who opened and shut the doors of paradise. In the end, the only thing that really mattered was the aftermath of death.

It is precisely due to the importance accorded to this final objective that the history of guilt cannot be reduced to a mere history of clerical power. The two were most certainly connected, but the former extended far beyond the latter. Both Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung agree on the key role that all societies attribute to the notion of sin. Freud considers guilt one of the prime problems of civilization, and Jung affirms that "There is nothing better for stimulating consciousness and awakening than a disagreement with one's self."

No civilization had ever attached as much importance to guilt and shame as did the Western world from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries. This major fact cannot be underestimated, especially as any attempt to write the history of sin (that is, the history of a negative self-image) within a given period and a specific geographical area will inevitably involve the entire universe as it was then conceived. Any history of sin must also study the networks of relationships and attitudes that make up the collective unconscious. Similarly, it will shed light upon the society's conception of the individual and freedom, of life and death, of failure and harm. It must necessarily explore the society's conception of the relationship between man and God and investigate its image of divinity. Within certain limits, the history of sin also entails writing the history of both God and man. Is God more good or more just? This question provided an entire civilization with food for thought for several centuries.

Insofar as Western man was concerned, however, his intense guilt feeling led him to examine his own past, to know himself better, to develop his memory (if only through self-examination and "general confession"), and to explore his own identity. The notion of "bad conscience" developed at the same time as the art of the portrait and accompanied the rise of both individualism and the sense of responsibility. A connection surely exists among guilt, anxiety, and creativity.

At this point I feel it would be expedient to clarify my feelings on the subject at hand and state my own position as I see it.

First, the historian should not judge the past but make it understandable. Even though this book inevitably reflects contemporary thought, it aims, first and foremost, at being a historical record of an era that is rapidly receding into the past. It also aims at documenting a massive cultural phenomenon—a profound and widespread pessimism that permeated even the "optimistic" Renaissance. This observation occupies the first part of this study, where origins and causes are traced back in time according to the methods of "regressive" history. The entire second part is dedicated to the doctrine of sin and to an investigation of the world of fault and transgression as they were formerly perceived and practiced. The third part closes the circle, for doctrine automatically entailed pastoral diffusion: If preaching spread pessimism, pessimism also motivated preaching. In fact, neither ever ceased influencing the other.

The second point I would like to make concerns the relation of the historian to his research. It has long been obvious that historians cannot stand "outside" of their work. Voluntarily or not, they become involved in their investigations and commit themselves to their conclusions. I myself cannot hide my own feelings on the documents that are discussed here, and thus I prefer to say things clearly. I think that sin exists, I feel its presence in me. Furthermore, I cannot see how one can eliminate the idea of an Original Sin, whose scars we still bear. Freud felt this and tried to explain it, while both Bergson and Gouhier observed that "everything happens as if there were an original defect in man." My book must therefore not be taken as a refusal of either guilt or the need for a consciousness of sin. On

the contrary, I think it will shed light on the excessive sense of guilt and "culpabilisation" ("guilt-ification") that has characterized Western history. By excessive "culpabilisation" I mean any of the arguments that inflated the dimensions of sin over and against those of forgiveness. It is this very discrepancy—between fault and forgiveness—that furnishes the material for this book.

This discrepancy has long weighed heavy on the Western world. Pierre de Boisdeffre had his twentieth-century Goethe say:

> Although redemption should have freed man from anguish, the church continues to insist upon self-examination, which the approach of death renders unbearable. There will be many called but few chosen, won't there? An "infinitely small number" says your Julian Green. Furthermore, subsequent generations have only aggravated the consequences of the Original Sin. God is only there to condemn and punish! What an atrocious interpretation of the role played by the Father! Hell, Purgatory ... why are so many tortures inflicted in the name of love? He who has loved, be it only once in his life, is he not worthy of being loved for all eternity?

Such a terrifying image of God actually existed, and for centuries—whence the need to distinguish between a filial and reverential fear of God and a dread terror of God. My book will examine only the latter and will not question authentic Judeo-Christian maxims, such as: "Blessed is everyone that feareth the Lord" (Psalms 128) or "His mercy is on them that fear Him" (Magnificat). The following pages are, in fact, concerned only with exploring the gap that appeared between the fear of God and the dread of God.

The third and last point to be made is the following: We of the late twentieth century have more reasons than ever to exercise prudence when tempted to pass a verdict of "guilty" on the ecclesiastics of the past. Our era constantly speaks about liberating itself from guilt feelings without noticing that, in the entire history of guilt, the accusation of others has never been as strong as it is today. In a country as democratic as France, the Right and the Left accuse each other of unspeakable political sins. In states subjected to totalitarian yokes, the indictment of the adversary—capitalist or socialist, reactionary or progressive—has legitimized torture and led to the execution of millions and millions of people. In terms of excessive accusations of guilt we have—alas!—far surpassed our ancestors.

The historical inquiry that has resulted in this book would never have been completed were it not for the help of many friends who brought me texts and references, who proffered helpful suggestions and criticisms. I have therefore chosen to thank them in the course of this study and have quoted the names of those who so kindly furnished material in the notes. At the beginning of this book, however, I would like to express my profound gratitude to all my friends and colleagues, and in particular to Angela Armstrong and to Sabine Melchior-Bonnet, who were deeply involved in this project from beginning to end.

Fear has Two Sides

Fear has two sides. According to the particular case, it can be either salutary or destructive. As a modern philosopher wittily puts it, "Timeo, ergo sum,"' and it is true that, when viewed in clear focus, fear is a "call to being." It is "creative of being," for "the control of fear provides access to the world." The concept of sin can itself engender a potentially fruitful fear of one's self. Experienced positively,

guilt creates tensions that can redeem the elite. These tensions can actively foster well-being, stimulate creative anxiety, help to develop a sense of responsibility, and also, thanks to introspection, open treasures locked deep within ourselves.

On the negative side, however, excessive fear as well as an excessively promoted language of guilt can paralyze, discourage, and alienate. Time and again the present study has revealed, among Catholics as much as Protestants, this temptation to despair, which especially afflicted individuals on their deathbeds. These people, after all, had heard more talk of sin than of pardon. It is necessary to fear real danger. It is useful to warn others when they are imminently threatened. The weapon of fear, however, cannot be wielded without its own risks and dangers. Too great an emphasis on death and the macabre, on the tortures of the afterlife, on ill-made confessions and communions proved dangerous to the psychological health of a certain number of listeners. The aggressivity toward sinners was suspect. Throughout my presentation, I have shown the religious discourse's slide from the moderate to the excessive, as well as its astonishing misuse of biblical quotations, whether ripped from their context or taken to the limit of their sense. The discourse of fear most often leaned on garbled references or misunderstood texts.

Yet why this propensity to sensationalize the message of Holy Scripture? This book has attempted to answer this enormous question, by considering sin as a "historical object." It was, I believe, a new enterprise to undertake a cultural history of sin in the West. The choice of this study has had the advantage of providing access to a kind of observatory, from where we have been able to survey more than six hundred years of guilt-instilling efforts.

Across the "longue durée," this aerial view has revealed previously ill-distinguished facts and clarified historical ensembles of which only a few scattered elements had been given rudimentary attention. Thus have emerged the continuity and the extraordinary cultural importance of the contemptus mundi doctrine, first highlighted by Robert Bultot. The world is a "vale of tears": This was the general belief of Western directors of conscience, from the church fathers to Anglo-Saxon Puritans. Thus from one end of this period to the other, the discourse of the church was predominantly pessimistic. Moreover, the ideology of the contemptus mundi claimed to have universal value and made a critique of all human destiny in this vile world. It devalued sexuality, was disgusted by procreation and childbirth, laid heavy stress on our miseries and diseases, had a strong taste for the macabre, and pronounced the human mind incapable of any true knowledge. For the most part, then, medieval and early modern preachers taught their congregations a monastic ethics and a philosophy of "denial."

If the diverse components of the contemptus mundi discourse formed a coherent whole—the coherence of pessimism—it was primarily due to the belief in a myth. This myth was that of the golden age, known in the Christian lands as the "Earthly Paradise": that Eden where Adam and Eve lived like "angels." The consequence of the Original Sin, whose dimensions were truly cosmic, was the extraordinary wrath of God who, in His just "vengeance," condemned mankind to suffering, death, and damnation. True, the sacrifice of the Son would someday appease the wrath of the Father. Some would therefore escape the "mass of perdition." This assessment, at one time accepted by nearly all Western theologians, inevitably engendered dramatic pastoral messages and activities and pushed the entire teaching church toward strict severity.

In this light, it comes as no surprise that the Renaissance appears far gloomier than is ordinarily taught. This less sunny complexion should not be perceived without qualification. Should one dismiss Manetti's and Pico della Mirandola's praise of man, or Raphael's serene paintings, or the festivals of the Renaissance? This is not my aim. All the same, I have wished to demonstrate that humanism does not necessarily mean optimism (for example, in Machiavelli, Budé, and Montaigne), that several eminent figures of the Renaissance moved toward religious anxiety (the same Pico della Mirandola and Michelangelo), and above all that the most representative people of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries hardly felt Promethean. Instead, they most often felt fragile and sinful, susceptible to melancholy, and anguished by the rapid decline of an aging, decrepit world. It has been said that Neoplatonism was the principal philosophy of the Renaissance. It would be equally accurate—though not contradictory to the preceding statement—to see Augustinism as the predominant philosophical system of this period of Western history, especially during the sixteenth century—the birth date of Protestantism.

There are many equally valid ways of conducting the historiography of "mentalities." The road taken here has been to clarify the expansion and dissemination, from the level of elite groups, of a discourse of fear and intimidation. How and why did it gain credibility? The answer would seem to lie in a coincidence, which might otherwise not have occurred, between a pessimistic brand of preaching that was rapidly widening its appeal and a series of vast collective disasters that besieged Europeans from the Black Death to the end of the Wars of Religion. The preachers seemed to have good reason to say that mankind was guilty and to foretell punishments in both this world and the next. In the eighteenth century and after, the alleviation of serious threats to daily life encouraged challenging the validity of these dire pronouncements.

Circumstances helped to steer this type of pastoral discourse toward tactical measures as well as toward dramatic devices that impressed audiences. At issue, however, was something far more serious. In La Peur en Occident I emphasized the fear of the elites. This fear is the key to the investigations I have made in the present book. The most saintly individuals were often those who most deeply feared themselves. The death of the devout was never easy. Tronson, for one, was convinced that even among priests there would only be a chosen few. Can there be much surprise that people haunted by truly metaphysical fear would divulge it in their preaching? Augustinism, which must be cited once more, could only have brought on fears among both the instructors and pupils of the church (or at least among the most motivated of these people). In any case, the result was a type of preaching that spoke more of the Passion of the Savior than of His Resurrection, more of sin than of pardon, of the Judge than of the Father, of Hell than of Paradise. There was thus a true deviation from Saint Paul's tidings that "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound" (Rom. 5:20). Hence one might consider whether the rejection of an oppressive doctrinal campaign was one of the causes of the "de-Christianization" of the West. <>



The Digital Image and Reality: Affect, Metaphysics, and Post-Cinema by Dan Strutt [Amsterdam University Press, 9789462987135]

The media technologies that surround and suffuse our everyday life profoundly affect our relation to reality. Philosophers since Plato and Aristotle have sought to understand the complex influence of apparently simple tools of expression on our understanding and experience of the world, time, space, materiality and energy. The Digital Image and Reality takes up this crucial philosophical task for our digital era. This rich yet accessible work argues that when new visual technologies arrive to represent and simulate reality, they give rise to nothing less than a radically different sensual image of the world. Through engaging with post-cinematic content and the new digital formats in which it appears, Strutt uncovers and explores how digital image-making is integral to emergent modes of metaphysical reflection - to speculative futurism, optimistic nihilism, and ethical plasticity. Ultimately, he prompts the reader to ask whether the impact of digital image processes might go even beyond our subjective consciousness of reality, towards the synthesis of objective actuality itself.

This introduction lays out the coordinates of the book's main philosophical contention — that the world is perceived and felt to be different under a general condition of digitality as a form of `digi-thinking'. It establishes a synergy between digital visual media and theoretical physics and suggest that current screen culture, rather than being only orientated to spectacle, actually equips us with new skills in perception for a world of experience which is increasingly virtualised. The chapter refers to a set of embodied effects specific to the digital image; of flying, floating, swarming, morphing, and glitching, within the context of recent cinematic content such as INTERSTELLAR (2014) to set the scene of a contemporary digital imaginary.

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Within this view, digital processes are the latest technological condition of humanity which frame our world view, from our individual capacity to imagine potential futures as fictional (cinematic) images, to actual tangible scientific progress. Faith, science, and art can thus all be co-defining; aesthetic fabulations going together with empirical discovery, both consequences of the given technological condition. Seeing things this way, it ceases to be any mystery why a digital post-cinema experiments with images which twist time, space, force, and materiality at the same time as physicists reached to discover the Higgs Boson 'god' particle that gives mass to the `immanent flux' or 'pea soup' of the other elemental atomic particles. [In July 2012, at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, Switzerland, the discovery of the Higgs Boson was announced. In much of the press around the announcement, the particle was referred to in the context of the Higgs Field — an invisible force that explains how the universe moved from a nascent `intergalactic atomic pea-soup' state to one composed of stars, life, and planets. This provides an interesting analogy for the philosophical concept of immanence.] Both processes fundamentally dwell on the same ontological futurist problematic. The dynamics of influence between artistic imagination and scientific discovery can be described in different ways — as anticipating or inspiring each other — but, by tracing both back to the same technological condition the philosophical division between them is, to a certain extent, collapsed. [There is an idea that much scientific discovery is anticipated in works of science fiction. See, for instance, 'The Science Fiction Effect' by Laura H. Kahn (2012). In the concept of fabulation (deployed philosophically by Bergson, extended by Deleuze and, more recently, John Mullarkey) inexplicable facts (of the senses) are made sense of through the imagination. This concept is held to explain early forms of theism in the invention of an intentional force behind natural processes, but also explains artistic creativity. Furthermore, holding to a Bergsonian concept of intuition as inspiration following the inhabitation of facts — rather that the intellectual and rational examination of facts — fabulation could be seen to be the true process of scientific discovery as creative problem solving.

In subsequent chapters, I address the issues outlined above, through reference to specific films and practices within a contemporary digital visual culture. I stress that my objects are not cherry-picked for purpose, nor are they random, but rather have emerged during the writing of this text, since 2010, as conspicuous tangents or events within digital visual culture (with the exception of the 1982 film TRON, though this explicitly relates to its 2010 update in TRON: LEGACY). Out of these images, I have drawn dynamic links between content, affect, and technological circumstance to make observations about what I can describe as the digital, affective syntheses of metaphysical reality in contemporary media. These links fall into three areas which I address in three separate chapters: the dynamics of digital virtuality, the structural dynamics of digital images, and the dynamics of consciousness.

Before tackling these dynamics through image analysis, in Chapter Two, The Affective Synthesis of Reality by Digital Image', I expand on the issues and theorists laid out in this

first chapter, which fall into four broad areas: the philosophy of technology, processes of affection and cognition, theoretical approaches to the digital image, and ethics and aesthetics. I expand on three philosophical concepts that prove useful in understanding how our consciousness of metaphysical qualities develops and is maintained within the mind/body, and the technological condition for their affective synthesis: these are Stiegler's `grammatisation', Hume and Husserl's `passive synthesis', and Deleuze's `spiritual automaton'. It is these concepts, framed by Deleuze's notions of cinematic aesthetics/ethics and Heidegger's technics, that largely structure this work, and it is through these notions that I add complexity and nuance to an often vague, multidisciplinary conception of `affect'.

In Chapter Three, 'A Digital Frontier to Reshape the Human Condition', I begin analysis by looking at the films TRON (1982), TRON: LEGACY (2010), and ENTER THE VOID (2010). Identifying the challenge to metaphysical consciousness posed by digitality as an ontological problematic, I ask how these films engage aesthetically with digital systems and processes to sculpt anthropomorphic metaphors for this problematic. In this process, I identify two approaches to the challenge of digital virtuality roughly represented by each film: one in which an idea of the emotional and tactile body is restored to the impersonal domain of the digital, and another in which the body is discarded and abjected as consciousness enters an immaterial dimension. What emerges as similar, however, is the affective tone of the represented middle space between worlds, the boundary or frontier space in which metaphysics are suspended in an immanent flux. I ask what these digital images, reflecting on the material conditions of their own creation, express about the way we can position ourselves within a digitally connected world.

Do we move into a post-human, object-orientated form of vision through which we abandon the body, or do we instead reinterpret the corporeal in a more dissolute sense of digital embodiment?

Chapter Four, `Dynamic Digital Spaces, Bodies, and Forces', focuses on how exactly metaphysical awareness is synthesised within the formal aspects of digital systems of image capture and presentation, and how these might be understood within a much broader view of the evolution of consciousness. I look to the examples of the dance and the battle scene, raised within digital cinematic culture to the status of the 'spatio-temporal-energic' image tour de force in which structural relations of kinesis are heightened and stretched. This analysis is grounded within a genealogy of technical advances (from the first `moving' images, to spatial simulations, and to digital 3D and digital slow motion), and within a theory of consciousness which speaks to how fundamental our proprioceptive sense is to our grounded dynamic presence in the world. What emerges is an experimental aesthetic and a new spatio-temporal image regime (seen in the neo-baroque folding of objects and spaces), expressed through structural and formal relations within the digital image. In my analysis, this is an aesthetic which collapses the distinction between the scientific truth of detail, and the artistic truth of expression, into a new `digital naturalism'.

In Chapter Five, `Reality Sutures, Simulation, and Digital Realism', I extend the issues raised in the previous two chapters surrounding our cognitive engagement with images in our conscious shaping of the world around us. I look at the concept of suture as how we aesthetically and affectively interface with images, asking how (and if) we successfully police the boundary between actual and virtual in experience. This discourse then engages with the discovery of mirror neurons, with a simulation theory of mind, the metaphorical

structure of memory, and the mimetic capacity to establish that we are, in a non-pejorative sense, influenced and conditioned by the images we consume to inhabit certain fields of immanent possibility intuitively and corporeally. Within digital images, this field of possibility is rendered plastic, subject to reformation, modulation, and regeneration, and I argue that this encourages a more plastic mind in which actuality and virtuality fuse. By then looking at the films AVATAR and SOURCE CODE, I illustrate how the real is exploded and reformed, with the virtual, quantum flux supplanting notions of stable reality not just within the image, or just within our phenomenal experience of the world, but potential in every metaphysical sense of the real world.

Finally, in Chapter Six, `Digital Nihilism: Ethical Reflections', I turn to the more pragmatic political concerns of the project, asking whether we can ascertain an ethics of the digital image. I address the concerns of Deleuze and Stiegler about the potential for insidious affective conditioning of desires, alongside their stated need for creative thought, political engagement, and new industrial practices within a condition of neoliberal cultural capitalism. I suggest that the digital in fact breeds a cognitively active consumer who capably negotiates affective lures, and creatively and playfully (though not necessarily intentionally) synthesises new metaphysical awarenesses as ontological truths. While both see an indirect form of activism through the resistance and transgression of images, for Rancière, this issue is `meta'-political and, for Pisters, it is a form of `micro'-politics. These ideas come together through my use of Vattimo's concept of a `mellow nihilism', which dispels rigid metaphysical notions for a new `weak' ontology which is open and plastic, strategic rather than complacent. I move to establish a clear notion of an ontological plasticity within contemporary digital image culture.

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I have argued, using examples from the very first digital spatial, temporal, and material impingements into the moving image, through different dynamics of movement in screen space — in dance, in immaterial spaces, and in the epic battle scene — through baroque architectures of space and the 3D technology used to render them, and through the flexion and distortions of real-world form with projection-mapping, that we now have a well-evolved and qualitatively different image regime from that which came before. The new digital screen technologies synthesise original sensations of space and time, materiality, force and rhythm, generating new dynamic landscapes which comes to feel like a very real part of our world. Furthermore, I have tried to establish, through the work of Sheets Johnstone and Erin Manning, that this technological shift in spatial and kinetic expression could have a real impact on evolutionary phenomenology, from corporeal proprioception and other anthropomorphic kinaesthetic dynamics, to abstract thought about metaphysical properties — for Scott Richmond, a `technics of the flesh'.

At first, these technological shifts compensate for the deficiencies of the human perception, in the work of Marey and Muybridge through to Michalek's SLOW DANCING and BBC wildlife's complex digital time-lapse tracking shots, opening new micro-sensations of existence (at the same time, creating uncanny perceptual experiences), but then these sensations surpass human perception altogether, become simple lines of force and flight in maximalist hyper-baroque architectures of space. As previously described, for William Brown (2013), this amounts to anti-humanist and non-anthropocentric cinema, but we can see through the above analysis that we are always still dealing with a human proprioceptive

phenomenology, only one that moves metaphorically and emblematically into Malabou's plastic ontology, Bogost's alien phenomenology, or Marinetti's 'extrahuman' logics.

As a final point, and to support the argument that we are here involved in a real technical evolution of corporeal consciousness, I would like to call on a couple of empirical studies to demonstrate how malleable our sense of the real actually is within the new immersive technologies, studies that suggest that what we often think are fixed, consistent, and unchanging physical qualities of the world are actually relatively fluid within our metaphysical consciousness. The first of these studies tested the ability of participants to project objects intuitively into a fourth dimension through their immersion in a virtual reality simulation. The researchers state:

> Representations of space and time are deeply rooted in human thinking, reasoning, and perception of the world. However, living in a physical world of three dimensions, humans have their perceptual and cognitive systems tailored for sensing, storing, transforming, and reasoning about three-dimensional (3-D) objects.

The researchers aimed then to prove that our ability to conceive of, and to intuit, complex higher dimensional space can be dramatically and quickly expanded by quite minimal exposure to three-dimensional virtual (VR) simulation. They describe:

> It is a long-lasting question whether human beings, who evolved in a physical world of three dimensions, can overcome this fundamental limitation to develop an intuitive understanding of four-dimensional space. [...] Here we show evidence that people with basic geometric knowledge can learn to make spatial judgments on the length of, and angle between, line segments embedded in four-dimensional space viewed in virtual reality with minimal exposure to the task and no feedback to their responses. [...] These results suggest that human spatial representations are not completely constrained by our evolution and development in a 3-D world.

The researchers suggest that, by developing and using new technologies of representation, we can relatively easily adapt to a new intuitive sense of space and time. They note that, while this was previously hypothesised, it was not possible to test until virtual reality created the possibility of inserting test subjects into a spatially coherent `other dimension'.

In the second empirical study, again using virtual reality, researchers claim to have altered embodied thought and behaviour by `transferring men's minds into a woman's body' (Sample, 2010). In a VR simulation, men could look down and see a woman's body beneath them in place of their own. During one experiment, virtual embodiment was strengthened when a second (simulated) female approached and touched the participant's arm in VR — a virtual image reinforced by actual physical sensation when a researcher in the lab simultaneously touched the participant in the same spot. Later, the participant flinched, and their heart rate jumped when being struck by the virtual character in the simulation. The researchers stated:

If you can temporarily give people the illusion that their bodies are different, then the evidence suggests it also affects their behaviour and the way they think. They can have new experiences: a person who is thin can know what it's like to be fat. A man can have experience of what it's like to be a woman.

While here they principally describe an empathetic identification effect, thinking that a man could `feel' like a woman, the significance of this research seems to be about the malleability of our mental image of our own bodies and its capabilities from only a little

exposure to an altered sensation of corporeal presence within a technological simulation. The research suggests that corporeally immersive technologies can instigate a suspension of disbelief and an erasure of cognitive dissonance to the extent that the participants can have a strong physical reaction in response to an event occurring to their virtual bodies projected into a virtual world. The researchers thus conclude that 'our minds thus have a very fluid picture of our bodies'.

What these two examples evoke (without, I hasten to add, categorically proving) is the idea that, through digital simulation — through virtual representations of bodies and their positioning within a virtual reality — we can easily alter what actually proves to be fairly plastic mental models of reality. This can be a heightened intuition of the world's metaphysical properties, or a different kinaesthetic sensation of our own bodies within the world if indeed, following Sheets Johnstone's thought, the two sensations can be separated at all. In digital screen media — through CG1, D3D, digital mapping, digital

HD, digital slow motion, morphing, glitching, and deep-dream software, and with new emerging technologies — we have an immersivity and intensity of physical detail which can afford us emergent and original sensations of abstract bodies within abstract spaces and the energic force with which they move. This is best perceived as a playful, interactive learning process, even though it often proceeds through experimentation which can occasionally seem bizarre, redundant, superficial, or gimmicky. However, there can be no doubt that these effects amount collectively to a new image regime, and the impact of this new image regime on a generation that was born into a digital era is only beginning to be understood. <>

Satyendra Pakhalé: Culture of Creation by Alberto Alessi E.A. [Nai010 Publishers, 97894620851 45]

Satyendra Pakhalé stands at the crossroads of the diverse currents shaping contemporary design. His design work is an act of unity going beyond any binary such as high and low tech, industrial production and traditional crafts, functionality and poetic significance, blurring boundaries of time and place. 'Culture of Creation', the first comprehensive monograph devoted to his work, explores the way that the designer navigates these currents on multiple levels.

Twelve essays by leading design thinkers, Juhani Pallasmaa, Paola Antonelli, Jacques Barsac, René Spitz, Tiziana Proietti, Aric Chen and Stefano Marzano, illustrate the world view and intellectual position underpinning the designer's 'culture of creation'. Contributions from leading industry figures, such as Alberto Alessi, Giulio Cappellini, Cristiano Crosetta and Vittorio Livi portray him at work. Documentary passages give insight into his studio practice, close-up encounters with specific processes and stunning imagery complete a book that can be enjoyed on many levels – a portrait of a unique 'culture of creation'.

About Culture of Creation: Jane Szita

Satyendra Pakhalé, born in 1967, India, trained both in his native country and in Switzerland. For the past two decades, he has been working globally from his studio in Amsterdam. His design work is an act of unity going beyond any binary such as high- and low-tech, industrial production and traditional crafts, functionality and poetic significance.

You might say that he stands at the crossroads of the diverse currents shaping contemporary design.

SATYENDRA PAKHALÉ: CULTURE OF CREATION, the first comprehensive monograph devoted to his work, explores the way that the designer navigates these currents on multiple levels. The notion of a 'culture of creation' refers simply to the ancient and innate impulse behind human making. It engages with the very roots of the human need to create, to design, to make, to build and bring something into reality.

Over the last twenty years or so, Pakhalé has cultivated a design practice that focuses on the culture of creation, from mass-produced industrial products to experimental one-offs, always with the aim of returning to objects and their environment the sensorial qualities that have so often been lost due to the excesses of industrialization and consumerism. A sensorial object resonates with humanity's broadest needs. It is charged with those qualities that connect people to the object itself. Therefore, we are unlikely to discard it.

Any design monograph is necessarily visual, and this one is no exception. Yet it is also much more than that. Over the years, intellectual curiosity has been a constant feature of Pakhalé's design practice. Besides his own research, he has been in dialogue with professionals from various fields including architects, writers, curators, academics, and prominent figures in the design industry, several of whom have contributed to this book.

Themes such as the culture of making, poetic analogy, perception, sensorial design, atmosphere, social modernity, secular humanism, craftsmanship, technology and more, in which his thinking and his work are rooted are addressed in twelve critical essays by authors like architect and architectural-design thinker Juhani Pallasmaa, Helsinki; Paola Antonelli, Sr., curator MoMA, New York; René Spitz, scholar on HfG Ulm, Cologne; Aric Chen, curator at large of M+ Museum, Hong Kong; Jacques Barsac, director of the Fondation Charlotte Perriand, Paris; Tiziana Proietti, architect and professor, University of Oklahoma, Norman and Stefano Marzano, former CEO Philips Design, Eindhoven.

Through these essays, the monograph illustrates the de-signer's world view and intellectual position, and the theoretical heritage underpinning the cultivation of a 'culture of creation'. The essays put his design projects into a wider, deeper context, offering the kind of food for thought on which he himself thrives.

The monograph structure consists of three overlapping layers, namely a project layer, documentary (studio practice) layer and research (critical essays) layer. The essays are interwoven with the project layer and documentary layer that give an insight into Pakhalé's studio practice, and with accounts from his industrial partners such as Alberto Alessi, Giulio Cappellini, Cristiano Crosetta, and Vittorio Livi. The project layer meanwhile zooms in on specific processes and approaches called 'project clusters' that are presented in the monograph with a dense graphical layout. Over the years there have been several topical design explorations carried out at Pakhalé's studio. Some of the results went into industrial production; some became limited edition gallery pieces and others remained ideas. Theory, practice and production – concepts, words, photos, sketches, watercolours, models, prototypes and more – are linked throughout these pages. Concluding the book is Satyendra Pakhalé's Chronology of Works, introduced by Ingeborg de Roode, curator of Industrial Design, Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam, which provides an overview of his body of work.

Satyendra Pakhalé: Culture of Creation illustrates the designer's journey by placing his work in the cultural, artistic and intellectual context to which it belongs, and to which it always returns. At the same time, it anticipates what is yet to come. <>

ENGLAND IN THE AGE OF SHAKESPEARE by Jeremy Black [Indiana University Press, 9780253042316]

How did it feel to hear Macbeth's witches chant of "double, double toil and trouble" at a time when magic and witchcraft were as real as anything science had to offer? How were justice and forgiveness understood by the audience who first watched *King Lear*; how were love and romance viewed by those who first saw *Romeo and Juliet*? In *England in the Age of Shakespeare*, Jeremy Black takes readers on a tour of life in the streets, homes, farms, churches, and palaces of the Bard's era. Panning from play to audience and back again, Black shows how Shakespeare's plays would have been experienced and interpreted by those who paid to see them. From the dangers of travel to the indignities of everyday life in teeming London, Black explores the jokes, political and economic references, and small asides that Shakespeare's audiences would have recognized. These moments of recognition often reflected the audience's own experiences of what it was to, as Hamlet says, "grunt and sweat under a weary life." Black's clear and sweeping approach seeks to reclaim Shakespeare from the ivory tower and make the plays' histories more accessible to the public for whom the plays were always intended.

CONTENTS

Excerpt:

> The west yet glimmers with some streaks of day;
> Now spurs the lated traveller apace,
> To gain the timely inn. —Macbeth, III, iii

Or enter the theater and see the First Murderer speak these lines as he prepares to kill Banquo and his son, Fleance, at Macbeth's behest. The audiences of Shakespeare's day knew that they were seeing a play, but playwrights sought to capture the understanding of the audience and to craft works that would resonate with their collective and individual experiences. That situation is very different for modern audiences of Shakespeare's plays. They go to a production, but their experiences are not the same as their predecessors'. As a

result, many who now attend the theater spectate on the plays and register the experience as an occasion or as a school or family obligation, as much as entering into the spirit or meaning that the play would have had for Shakespeare's contemporaries.

In this book, I shall try to do the latter—that is, enter into that spirit—while accepting that such an endeavor is difficult and problematic. The responses of contemporaries (for example, to reports of witchcraft) are unclear. There is written evidence that not all of them believed in witches. The argument cannot be readily settled by recourse to historical evidence, as there is not enough of it and it is open to varied interpretations. Clues are offered by the status of the character that makes comments in a play. Is the character a credible witness? Is he or she joking? Are we supposed to believe him or her? The plays moreover are structured so as to suggest differing views, but that is not the same as encouraging the audience to feel some equality of skeptical response toward the characters and their views. This is a point demonstrated by the likely response to Macbeth, where the protagonist, his wife, and the witches are all clearly and repeatedly presented in a strongly hostile light.

If "all the world is a stage," then that stage and its historical setting repay continued examination. Such is the approach taken in this book, which focuses on Elizabethan and Jacobean England but also ranges further, both historically and geographically. The stress will be on presenting the current historical understanding of Shakespeare's world with an emphasis that will extend our interpretation of the plays. This book, then, is a historical account of the interacting political, social, economic, and cultural contexts in which Shakespeare's plays were written, performed, and received and which helped to shape and influence his contemporaries. His age is understood primarily as his lifetime (1564-1616), but we must also consider the previous generation, the memories of which could readily be recovered by and for Shakespeare. Some of the audience would also have been older than the playwright. The impact of these contexts can be seen in the themes, plots, language, and presentation of the plays.

This book is lightly footnoted, but both footnotes and the "Selected Further Reading" section at the end are intended to direct readers toward relevant scholarship. That scholarship is crucial, but even more so is seeing, listening to, or at least reading the plays. Engaging directly with the works is valuable whatever the medium selected; and the expansion of available media over the last century has greatly increased the number of ways in which Shakespeare can be presented and approached. So also with translations of Shakespeare into the cultures and occasions, as well as languages, of many other peoples.

For myself, this book brings back memories of over half a century, from childhood onward, of going to Shakespeare's plays in many places, but most notably Arundel, Cambridge, Exeter, London, Newcastle, Oxford, Plymouth, and Stratford; in openair variety (from pouring rain to soft evenings) and in closed-in intensity; and with many different people. Recollections can be bittersweet, but these plays have been a cause and occasion of many memories. The echoes of these memories and in particular of those with whom I went to the theater are with me now. I would like in particular to thank my beloved father for taking me, then an impressionable young adult, for the first time to see the Royal Shakespeare Company (RSC): a commanding and dynamic production of Henry V in Stratford in 1975, with Alan Howard in the royal role, one played without the antiwar critique, more especially anger, that is at the fore in so many recent productions. Living in North East England from

198o to 1996, I benefited greatly from the RSC bringing its productions to the provinces, especially in the shape of Newcastle's excellent Theatre Royal and the Playhouse. More recently, the open-air productions in the Rougemont Gardens in Exeter have occasioned family outings, as well as providing another linkage back to Shakespeare himself, for Rougemont Castle features in Richard III with a brief mention. The Bristol-based company Tobacco Factory has offered some especially memorable productions in the South West.

I first saw Shakespeare onstage at my school, Haberdashers' Aske's, notably a lively production of Much Ado About Nothing, and another of Julius Caesar with the battle scenes made disorientating by stroboscopic lighting, and I first acted onstage there as a very young "Wall" in A Midsummer Night's Dream, an appropriately limited part. Yet again, I am reminded of how lucky I was to go to such an imaginative school. The decision of Michael Fitch, our teacher, to squeeze the entire A-level English course into one year and spend the other year on a Grand Tour through English literature, which he felt was a necessary part of education, provided another term of Shakespeare to add to Macbeth and Antony and Cleopatra, which were the set texts we had to cover. We also dealt with his contemporaries, including Thomas Kyd, while Thomas Middleton's The Revenger's Tragedy' was another set text. I irritated Michael by telling him that I preferred the plays of John Webster, notably his tragedies, The Duchess of Malfi and The White Devil, but benefited from the opportunity to discuss Hamlet and King Lear with such a fine teacher and also from comparing Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra with John Dryden's All for Love; or, The World Well Lost, his version of the story. Michael had scant time for theory, once sardonically remarking that "a phallic object is anything longer than it is broad."

This teaching also provided me with the encouragement, when young, to go to the theater myself, benefiting from transport by the London tube and from inexpensive matinee tickets, moving forward as soon as the lights went down, from the back row to more expensive but empty seats nearer the stage. Sir Laurence Olivier as Shylock and Paul Scofield as Prospero proved espe¬cially memorable, but I also liked the vigorous productions at the Young Vic.

"He was not of an age but for all time!" Ben Jonson's assessment in his poem "To the Memory of My Beloved the Author, Mr William Shakespeare" (1623) is still so apt. The insistent nature of Shakespeare's imagery can be found across the range of world culture. Moreover, the presentation of Shakespeare has offered accounts for England at the time, as well as of many other periods and cultures. The coverage and style in individual productions, as well as in works based on or referring to Shakespeare, varied greatly. For example, Olivier's Henry V (1944) opened with a panorama of London in about 1600, but it was a model shot, M. and, thereafter, the first act took place within the theater. In contrast, far more authentic images of street life appeared in the film 10 Shakespeare in Love and in "The Shakespeare Code," a 2007 episode of the hugely popular British television series Doctor Who.

In the latter, Doctor Who visits Shakespeare's London, informing his black companion that Africans then lived in London (as indeed they did), thus helping to ground an idea of identity that was of current relevance.

Variety is still very much to the fore at present. For example, the 2017 program of the Theatre Royal, Plymouth, included Yukio Ninagawa's production of Macbeth, part of a tour reviving the highly successful 1985 production, which is performed in Japanese with English

subtitles. There was also Brett Dean's Hamlet, a new opera based on the play, with the central issue being how vengeance was thwarted by introspection.

The exact composition of Shakespeare's theatrical canon is a matter of great controversy, while the dating of many individual plays is unclear.' Many commentators have doubted authorship of all or some of the plays by Shakespeare. The following should be seen as suggestions, and there is much room for debate, about dates, order, and authorship. For respected, recent attempts to discuss the entire play canon in order—their order inevitably differing from each other and from what follows—

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The World of Print

The printing of vernacular Bibles gave ordinary individuals an opportunity to consider God for themselves and to question traditional teachings from the perspective of their own understanding of scriptural authority. Thus, knowledge was not so much freedom as a cause of the demand for freedoms. The populace was not a passive recipient of policies and initiatives from the more powerful. Yet, while the Reformation was heavily dependent on the ability of publications to overcome traditional constraints on discussion and the spread of ideas, it also reflected the power of the state. Protestant worship was introduced by means of the Book of Common Prayer (1549), which contained the forms of Prayer and Church services requisite for every religious event. parliament passed a Uniformity Act decreeing that the Book of Common Prayer alone was to be used for Church services, which were all to be in English. After an order of Convocation (the clerical parliament of the established Church) of 1571, cathedral churches also acquired copies of Foxe's Book of Martyrs, a highly potent account of the Protestants killed during Mary's reign; and many parish churches chose to do likewise.

As yet, the impact of popular literacy and the print revolution upon oral culture was, while important, still limited. Visual experiences remained highly significant, including with books. Foxe's Book of Martyrs was illustrated, and these images were arguably more potent than the text, a point also true of images of witches. While these images fueled the anxieties of the age, other images could be celebratory and consoling. Important aspects of visual culture included pageantry and costume.

About 8o percent of London craftsmen were literate by the 1600s, but literacy rates were lower, much lower, for the poor, for women, and for the rural population. Most people could neither read nor afford books. Thus, printing exacerbated social divisions and gave an extra dimension to the flow of orders, ideas, and models down the social hierarchy. The inability of the poor to express themselves was accentuated. Yet there were also possibilities of expression even if they could be mocked. In A Midsummer Night's Dream, Bottom awakes from his encounter with the fairy world, proclaims its uniqueness, and seeks to fix it for posterity in a work of poetry that will be recited:

> The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man's hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report what my dream was! I will get Peter Quince to write a ballad of this dream; it shall be called "Bottom's Dream," because it hath no bottom. (IV, i)

The literate Quince, the carpenter, allocates the parts in "Pyramus and Thisbe," and writes and speaks the prologue. Bottoms muddling of the senses has biblical provenance, and even he dimly realizes it is a mystery.

Education, the world of print, the impact of government, and the role of London all encouraged the gentry increasingly to view politics and society in national terms. London dominated printing, and language was standardized through London-based printing, which reduced the impact of regional linguistic differences. Standardization was related to the interlinked authority of print and the capital.

The impact of print was often indirect and subtle but was nevertheless significant in establishing assumptions. For example, printing changed the law by easing and encouraging the processes by which injunctions, information, and outcomes were recorded and stored. In place of the variations of the oral transmission of information and custom, there came a demand for certainty and precision linked to the written record. With customary law, a largely oral system was transformed into a written one. Such changes enhanced the prestige of text and its capacity to act as a system of validation and thus of arbitration and settlement. Shakespeare referred to a new world in All's Well That Ends Well:

> They say miracles are past; and we have our philosophical persons to make modern [everyday] and familiar, things supernatural and causeless [inexplicable]. Hence is it that we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves into seeming knowledge when we should submit ourselves to an unknown fear. (II, iii)

There were textual variations with printing, notably as a result of errors, changes introduced in new editions, and also censorship, Printing, nevertheless, represented a way to fix texts in a fashion different from the instability arising from the continual alterations that resulted from hand-copied texts and, even more, by the oral transmission of information and opinion. Thus, the character of textual memory and of memory as a whole was changed. The more fixed character of print was linked to the more Public response to what was published, a response also seen with the development of printed commentary.

Report and Rumor

It is important to note both the still-thriving manuscript culture of the period and the contemporary understanding of printed texts as unreliable 32 Nevertheless, at the same time, the culture of print brought new authorities and new processes of authorization. The prestige of print, it has been suggested, was linked to a new stage in the relationship between reality and the fictional in the shape of the perception and strength of particular fictional ideas. Authorization was in part a matter of censorship, which served a range of goals from religious and political control to attempts to regulate the book trade as a business activity. Censorship and licensing, however, were not simply means of restriction but also of legitimation, marking the boundary of what was respectable. Licensing included the granting of commercially valuable privileges to publish, which was a variant on monopoly rights.

This was to be important in the development of novel forms of news reporting. As Shakespeare's plays made clear, much news was not in a form that would be regarded as central today. Instead, it could be repetitive and cyclical, as with the cycle of days on which parish bells were rung and the telling and retelling of familiar tales and superstitions. These activities afforded some security in an insecure world. A sense of news as frequent, even daily, did not represent a secular rejection of a religious world view but, instead, with some

similarities to a play, was a common theme in society, offering interest and explanation in the form of narrative continuity. At the same time, print, drama, and greater interest in recording and "telling" time were all aspects of a cultural shift. The development of time-based forms of publishing) such as astrological publications, news pamphlets, and newspapers, was part of this shift.

As a result, gossip was given new forms and authority. In more conventional forms, gossip was a key element in many of Shakespeare's plots, notably the comedies, and was shown as lethal in Othello. Present at all social levels, gossip, as in Othello, frequently played on the anxieties of the powerful and forceful.

In England, government concern with rumors was seen in 1580, when a proclamation was issued against the spreading of rumors that invasion by Philip II and the pope was imminent, rumors that were indeed inaccurate. The world of report was shaped by government regulation, entrepreneurial activity, and the purchasing, reading, and viewing decisions of many, for whom such choices were acts of political and/or religious affirmation, as well as signs of interest. In a pattern reminiscent of Casca's speech in the second scene of Julius Caesar, branches of knowledge fed by (new) information, such as astrology and the journalistic genre of "strange newes," could be used as vehicles for articulating topical grievances. So also with the use of the occult in Henry VI, Part II (I, iv).

However expressed, including on the stage, the information and opinion that circulated were not confined to a system of government-directed control or to hierarchic patterns of deference, and Ben Jonson was to sound a warning in his play The Staple of News (1626). Attempts to control the flow and dissemination of unwelcome material stemmed from concern about the political, religious, and, to a lesser extent, social possibilities of print and drama, including its influence on those who could not read or, indeed, afford to go to the theater but who might be swayed by those who could. The nature of the intelligence gathering required by governments was affected by print and the theater.

The development of pamphlets, newspapers, and theater was located within a wider cultural shift that focused attention on What could be presented as news: news from elsewhere. This information became more prominent in the sixteenth century, not only with the increase of public or semipublic forms, such as manuscript newsletters, but also as a result of a greater internalization of news, apparent with the growing number of diarists, many of whom recorded public news. The extent to which this process of engagement with clearly defined news, especially from distant places, was related to institutional developments—such as the increase in public postal links and of mercantile correspondence systems—as opposed to cultural changes, is unclear.

Entrepreneurial activity helped foster a process in which different media joined, overlapped, or separated. In England, the genre of "strange newes" was used to provide accounts of providential tales, and this possibility attracted entrepreneurial publishers. Plot devices in plays that to us may appear far-fetched would scarcely have done so to the readers of such tales. However, although providential tales remained an important topic for report, news and fact were increasingly differentiated from exemplary prose in which morality was seen as defining accuracy, for ex ample, sermons. So also with plays, although they responded to the possibilities of a range of genres. Political information became a valuable commodity that was turned to profit by the writers of newsletters, as well as providing material for satirical works that, in part, dwelt on the contents and implications of morality.

The interest in new developments both at home and abroad, the latter notably due to religious conflict and even warfare from the 1520s, ensured that information circulated more widely. This was a process encouraged by governmental and ecclesiastical activity and by translations of items. Publications, like plays, contributed to and drew on a heightening, focusing, and, to a degree, polarization of public opinion. They brought a new intensity to the political contention already seen there, notably in the 1580s, 1590s, and 1620s, and both reflected and sustained the particular issues of specific political moments. Thus, Thomas Dekker argued the case in 1606 for a militant Protestantism, one in which anti-Catholicism was taken to the fore, in both domestic and international affairs, in the aftermath of James I's accession in 1603 and the Gunpowder Plot in 1605.35 Rumor, which Shakespeare brings onstage at the start of Henry IV, Part II, was an aspect of public (and private) opinion. It was seen under Elizabeth, but James's court and his personal style of rule through favorites encouraged rumor still more.

Imagination and Print

A key element in the world of print was provided by the publication of plays. This was very much a way in which Shakespeare's works could be fixed, and he could be identified and also criticized. In 1S98, there was the first appearance of Shakespeare's name on the

title pages of his printed plays, in the shape of a quarto printing of Love's Labour's Lost. The original authored "Complete Works" appeared only after Shakespeare's death, in the "First Folio" text of 1623, that is, a large "Folio" format. This was assembled by Shakespeare's colleagues John Heminges and Henry Condell, both actors in the King's Men, for whom Shakespeare wrote.

The dimension of publication was important, but the plays were staged; they were not appreciated primarily as written texts.

This staging involved adaptation to the constraints of contemporary productions and theaters, but these constraints both offered opportunities and could be pushed against. Moreover, the theatricality included the display that could provide an important component in the visual appeal of the plays. This display was notable in terms of the solemn processions or dances that could end plays: tragedies and comedies respectively. Neither solemn processions nor dances were new features of the culture of the period, but their setting in theaters, in which people were paying to see plays written for commercial ends, was new. The context and the content of national culture were changing.

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Familiarity with the heavens united the new learning of the Elizabethan Renaissance with the old learning from the Middle Ages, two worlds that Shakespeare straddled and drew on. His characters regularly make astrological references. In Much Ado About Nothing, Don John says to Conrade, a fellow villain: "I wonder that thou—being, as thou sayest thou art, born under Saturn—goest about to apply a moral medicine to a mortifying mischief" (I, iii). This is a reference to the gloomy and "saturnine" character of those born under this sign but also an acceptance that free will can play a role. In the same play, Beatrice, a far more positive character, remarks, "there was a star danced, and under that was I born" (II, i). At the start of Cymbeline, the First Gentleman observes:

our bloods
No more obey the heavens. (I, i)

In Twelfth Night, Sir Toby Belch points out to Sir Andrew Aguecheek that they were both "born under Taurus" (I, iii) and should therefore be able to dance. In King Lear, as part of a more general questioning in the play of purpose, morality, and causation, there is a bitter attack on astrology and the zodiac. However, the attack is given to the morally bankrupt (and illegitimate) villain Edmund, an allocation that, arguably, compromises, if not invalidates, the argument:

> This is the excellent foppery of the world, that when we are sick in fortune, often the surfeit of our own behaviour, we make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon, and the stars; as if we were villains by necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion, knaves, thieves, and treachers [traitors], by spherical predominance, drunkards, liars, and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence, and all that we are evil in by a divine thrusting on. An admirable evasion of whoremaster man, to lay his goatish disposition to the charge of a star! My father compounded with my mother under the Dragon's tail, and my nativity was under Ursa Major, so that it follows I am rough and lecherous. 'Sfoot! I should have been that I am had the maidenliest star in the firmament twinkled on my bastardizing. (I, ii)

Astrology meant a geography as well as a moral sphere that needed to be navigated. This was a geography of the factors that affected fate, a geography that, in practice, brought the occult into peoples' lives and enabled its possibilities to be understood. Indeed, the measurement, presentation, and understanding of physical space on the earth's surface scarcely exhausted the geographies of Shakespeare's world. The geography of the stars appeared far more present than that of distant continents, in part due to the influence, if not control, that the zodiac was believed to wield over peoples' lives. The zodiac was part of an ordered world. In Troilus and Cressida, although his argument is aimed at specific ends, as well as being a reflection of his somewhat tricky character, Ulysses also offers a much-quoted general account when he declares:

> Degree being vizarded,
> The unworthiest shows as fairly in the mask.
> The heavens themselves, the planets, and this centre
> Observe degree, priority, and place,
> Insisture, course, proportion, season, form,
> Office, and custom, in all line of order;
> And therefore is the glorious planet Sol
> In noble eminence enthroned and sphered
> Amidst the other; whose medicinable eye
> Corrects the ill aspects of planets evil,
> And posts, like the commandment of a king,
> Sans check, to good and bad: but when the planets
> In evil mixture to disorder wander,
> What plagues, and what portents, what mutiny,
> What raging of the sea, shaking of earth,
> Commotion in the winds, frights, changes, horrors,
> Divert and crack, rend and deracinate
> The unity and married calm of states
> Quite from their fixure! O, when degree is shaked,
> Which is the ladder to all high designs,
> The enterprise is sick. How could communities,
> Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities,
> Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,
> The primogenitive and due of birth,
> Prerogative of age, crowns, sceptres, laurels,

> But by degree, stand in authentic place?
> Take but degree away, untune that string,
> And, hark! what discord follows. (I, iii)

Thus, the world, and not just the earth but the wider world within which the earth was located, had order and therefore purpose, and humans needed guidance to understand this order and its underlying structure. This guidance had to have both a mental and a physical component. The zodiac gave a key form to this structure and explained how it operated and how best it could and should be understood.

The magician was a great guide, for the magician could range beyond Christian magic to conjure up evil or to seek to lessen it. At the same time, the magician, not least for dramatic effect, moral purpose, and Christian belief, had to leave room for individual will and action. Prospero is the most impressive instance of Shakespeare's magicians, hut he is scarcely alone. As king of the fairies, Oberon, in A Midsummer Night's Dream, is another. He is able, for example, according to Titania, to take "the shape of Corin," a mythical lover, in order to woo Phillida (II, i). Seeking to understand as well as direct, with the latter very much dependent on the former, the magicians could scan the skies and indeed generally did so. But the magicians also looked at a full range of means to gauge the future, many of which involved reading natural runes on the earth: from human health to animal or other equivalents.

This was a guidance that was notable in Shakespeare's London, as can be seen from the great reputation enjoyed by John Dee (1527-1608), a leading mathematician and cartographer. On the Continent, the court of the (Holy Roman) Emperor Rudolf II (r. 1576-1612), located in Prague, the capital of the kingdom of Bohemia, was a major center of astrology, and Rudolf was greatly interested in the spirit world, the occult, and alchemy. Those involved sought to be at the cutting edge of advances in astronomy, mathematics, and other subjects; they were not "reactionary" figures. More humble astrologers lacked such patronage, facilities, and education but benefited from the reputation of the prominent and from the knowledge and information provided by relevant publications.

Again, this was a world that was well understood and presented by Shakespeare. Fortune-telling was a matter of small talk among young men discussing marital prospects, as much as a risk to souls, as in Macbeth, or an engagement with affairs of state. In Henry IV, Part I, Owen Glendower (Dwain Glyndwr) and Harry Hotspur row about the astral signs that allegedly accompanied the birth of the former, a vainglorious figure keen to assert and demonstrate the drama of his life. Astrological speculation also played a part in conspiracies, such as the unsuccessful one of Perkin Warbeck in the 1490s by discontented Yorkists against Henry VII.

Belief in the devil was related to apocalyptic ideas, and these ideas encouraged great interest in astronomy. Astronomy was regarded as enabling predictions about astral movements that could then be aligned with astrological theses. Moreover, both comets and horoscopes were linked to political reflection. Thus, experimentation, in the form of astronomy, was designed to support an established and all-encompassing interpretative pattern. Portents and signs were looked for as a means of prophecy. Given the extent to which modern scholarly opinion credits sunspot activity with responsibility for the climatic deterioration that affected agriculture, social stability, and much else during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the interest in those centuries in astronomy and astrology

appears more reasonable, albeit totally different in character, context, cause, and consequence to the modern scholarly approach.

Astronomy was a key element in the discussion and understanding of fate and one that was developing rapidly. Thus, Thomas Addison's Arithmetical Navigation (1625) provided detailed knowledge about the effective use of maritime charts and about the celestial bodies. The heliocentric system of Nicolas Copernicus (1473-1543), which held that the earth moves about the sun, was rapidly disseminated by print, while the Rudolphine Tables (1627) of Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) provided tables of planetary positions based on his discovery that the orbits of planets were elliptic and on his ability to ascertain their speeds. Kepler, the author of Astronomia Nova (1609), succeeded the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) as court astronomer to Rudolf II.

Copenhagen was an important center of astronomy under both Frederick II (r. 1559-88), father of James I's wife, Anne, and patron of Brahe, and Christian IV (r. 1588-1648), her brother, and this offers a different linkage between the two courts from that suggested by Hamlet. Kepler's Harmonice Mundi (The Harmony of the World, 1619), reflected both his continuing research in planetary motion and the belief that astronomy was necessary to understand the inherent design and order of the universe and, therefore, its capacity for good. Kepler also saw the impact of music on human emotions as an aspect of cosmic harmony. He argued that humans vibrate in sympathy to the universe's divine order and also respond to the disruptions of this order that are related to dissonance. To Kepler, musical counterpoint was analogous to the interlocking nature of planetary orbits.

There was an interest in the idea of other inhabitants of the cosmos, which helped to explain concern with the moon, where such inhabitants were believed to exist. In The Tempest, Stephano tells Caliban that he had been "the man i' th'moon" and had come from the moon to the island (II, ii), while Prospero describes Caliban's mother, the witch Sycorax, as

> one so strong
> That could control the moon, make flows and ebbs (V, i)

The last line indicates her power to cause change. The predictive power of the imagination was seen in written accounts of fictional lunar voyages, such as Kepler's Somnium (Dream) of about 1609 and Francis Godwin's The Man in the Moone: or A Discourse of a Voyage Thither (1638). Playwrights, however, did not turn to the topic of journeys to the moon.

Astronomical research encouraged an interest in mathematical understandings of the cosmos and its workings. This was particularly seen in the work of Shakespeare's contemporary Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), professor of mathematics at Padua and then mathematician to Cosimo II, Grand Duke of Tuscany (r. 1609-21). His earliest publication, Le Operazioni del compass geometrico e militare (1606), focused on military engineering, not navigation, but there was an emphasis on using an instrument (a compass) and on the importance of applying mathematical rules. Subsequently, Galileo's empirical research focused on the newly invented telescope. First appearing at The Hague in 1608, this was an instrument greatly improved by Galileo.

Moreover, in revealing what he had discovered with his telescope—which, by the close of 1609, magnified twenty times— Galileo's Sidereus Nuncius (The Sidereal Messenger, 1610) transformed the understanding of the moon by showing it to be like the earth: uneven and

with mountains and valleys. Such a similarity challenged the view of an essential contrast between the nature and substance of the earth and the heavens, an argument made by Aristotle. Drawing on the authority of the latter, the thinkers of medieval Christendom had seen the moon as being like the planets, perfect in shape and orbit and unchanging, whereas the earth was prone to change and decay. As a result, the earth was believed to be the appropriate setting for redemption. By revealing that Jupiter had four satellites, Galileo also showed that the earth's moon was not unique. In 1613, Galileo's astronomical ideas were attacked on scriptural grounds, and, subsequently, formal proceedings were launched against him.

White magic and science were not polar opposites, although there were differences between them. To contemporaries, both alchemy and astrology, while studies of mysteries, were also intellectual pursuits and sciences, part of the longstanding overlap of natural and supernatural phenomena and analysis. In contrast, in the value judgment of the period, "magic" was the technique either of the humble (wise women) or of the suspect (ritual magicians). In 1456-57, the English government licensed groups of prospectors to continue their efforts to transmute base metal into bullion; but alchemy, alas, was not to be a substitute for taxation. The alchemical enthusiasms of Henry Percy, Ninth Earl of Northumberland (1564-1632), led him to be known as the "wizard earl." He was a patron of key figures in geographical enquiry, including Thomas Harriot.

Far from being considered miraculous, such beliefs had a rationality in contemporary terms that helped to make them central to ways of understanding the world. In The Tempest, Prospero is a learned figure, able to direct storms and to use his power for both good and ill. Indeed, he has mastery over death, boasting that

> graves at my command
> Have waked their sleepers, oped [opened], and let 'em forth
> By my so potent art. (V, i)

This ability indicates the unfixed nature of death, and that is repeatedly a theme in Shakespeare's plays or language.

However, as with other such potent figures and entities, Shakespeare felt that he needed to confront the question of how far such power takes free will away from the other characters in the play.

Without free will, there can be no guilt, no search for grace, no apology, and no redemption. To dramatic effect, while also capturing theological, psychological, and philosophical uncertainties, the interplay of determinism and free will repeatedly plays a major role in the plays. This interplay reflects and interacts with the ambiguities of personality and also captures some of the issues involved in audience judgment and response. Thus, the future Richard III accepts the murdering fate for which "was I ordained" (Henry VI, Part III, V, vi), a choice of words that underlines the sacrilegious character of killing the anointed monarch, a sacral figure.

The contemporary belief in predestination was connected to providential thought, each creating a sense of determinism. The interplay of determinism and free will can be seen both in the responses of individuals and in the difficulties faced by those trying to control particular situations. Despite being a potent magician, Prospero is not able to direct enemies until "a most auspicious star" comes into play (The Tempest, I, ii). Julius Caesar seeks to

take advantage of superstition in order for Calphurnia, his wife, to become pregnant, which is essential if he is to found a dynasty (as Pompey had done), observing that The barren, touched in this holy chase, Shake off their sterile curse (I, ii)

But when faced by the option of a prescient warning by a soothsayer—"Beware the Ides of March" (March 15)—he dismisses him as "a dreamer" (I, ii). This is presented as an aspect of Caesar's hubristic pride, but (as well as, not instead) it is not clear how much free will he has. So also for other characters. In that play, the conspirator Cassius makes a vigorous rejection of determinism as part of the longstanding dialogue with his coconspirator, Brutus, through which a whole series of ideas is explored:

> Men at some time are masters of their fates;
> The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
> But in ourselves, that we are underlings. (I, ii)

In King Lear, Edgar vanquishes his half brother, the evil Edmund, and then tells him:

> The gods are just, and of our pleasant vices
> Make instruments to plague us. (V, iii)

This is a verdict on evil, for Edmund's malice has played on the faults of their father, the Earl of Gloucester. Such malice is within but, crucially, is not simply internal. Instead, this malice is part of the real presence of evil in this world, a real presence that seeks to thwart good by working on human clay. Thus, Adam's Fall, the original act of human sin, is reenacted by individuals and across human history. Indeed, if the good call on God or, depending on the setting, the gods, so also can the evil, as when the villainous Claudius, operating in the Christian world, tells Hamlet that the latter's grief "shows a will most incorrect to Heaven ... 'tis a fault to Heaven" (I, ii). Othello claims that Desdemona has "gone to burning hell!" only for Emilia to call him "a devil" (V, ii). Othello realizes that no one can control his or her fate but, due to his crime, regards himself as destined for hell, crying out:

> O cursed, cursed slave! Whip me, ye devils,
> From the possession of this heavenly sight!
> Blow me about in winds, roast me in sulphur,
> Wash me in steep-down gulfs of liquid fire! (V, ii)

This is a vivid recollection of images of the fate of the damned. Iago is called a "demi-devil" who has "ensnared" Othello's "soul and body" (V, ii). The future Richard III "will buzz abroad [spread] such prophecies" as will doom his brother Clarence, and thus he fulfils the prophecy of Henry VI, one that draws on the ominous portents of Richard's birth (Henry VI, Part III, V, vi).

White magic of a type was seen with the touch of the monarch, although it was not regarded as magic. Royal "touching" to cure scrofula (the King's evil—a skin disease), a quasi-magical sign of royal majesty, was observed in Macbeth in the case of King Edward the Confessor of England (r. 1042-66), a holy figure to whom the ability was usually traced in England. The practice of touching for scrofula was abandoned in 1603 by James I, who was also against making the sign of the cross, only to be reinstated by him in 1605 and to become more common under Charles I (r. 1625-49), Charles II (r. 1660-85), and James II (r. 1685-88). Having been dropped by William III (r.1689-17o2) and reinstated by Anne (r. 17O2-14), "touching" was not abandoned permanently until by George I (r.1714-27).

Very differently, as an instance of love magic—to bind someone's life with magic, Shakespeare has Othello deploy references to white magic in order to explain the significance of the hand¬kerchief he has given Desdemona:

> OTHELLO: That handkerchief
> Did an Egyptian to my mother give;
> She was a charmer, and could almost read
> The thoughts of people. She told her, while she kept it
> 'Twould make her amiable and subdue my father
> Entirely to her love; but if she lost it
> Or made a gift of it, my father's eye
> Should hold her loathed, and his spirits should hunt
> After new fancies. She, dying, gave it me,
> And bid me, when my fate would have me wive
> To give it her. I did so; and take heed on 't;
> Make it a darling like your precious eye.
> To lose't or give't away were such perdition
> As nothing else could match.
> DESDEMONA: IS't possible?
> OTHELLO: 'Tis true. There's magic in the web of it.
> A sibyl that had numbered in the world
> The sun to course two hundred compasses,
> In her prophetic fury sewed the work;
> The worms were hallowed that did breed the silk,
> And it was dyed in mummy which the skilful
> Conserved of maidens' hearts. (III, iv)

Mummy was a substance derived from embalmed bodies that allegedly had magical qualities. In this case, the dye was made from the hearts of virgins. Egypt was a noted source of mystery and "charmer" means enchantress. Othello is depicted in the play as a successful warrior but an unsophisticated and simple person and therefore possibly credulous.

Understood as intermediaries with the knowledge that was present in this wider world, individuals involved with the occult were frequently prominent figures. Moreover, the understanding of intellectual developments was one in which skills related to the occult could be central. Thus, the well-connected John Dee wished to be able to receive information from angels so as to establish a reliable guide to God's plans. Far from the relationship with God being seen as one mediated solely by the Church and unchanging until the Second Coming of Christ brought human time to the climax of judgment, there was a belief that this relationship could be created anew by other means. Indeed, Dee was in some respects a Prospero figure, albeit without the personal majesty or even regality, let alone the sexual probity, of the latter. Dee recorded conversations with angels in his "angelic laboratory," where experimentation apparently served to advance the cause of true religion. Ultimately, the requisite information for understanding the Book of Nature and redeeming nature depended on the angels, but human effort could help draw it forth. Dee's conversations with angels looked back to medieval magical traditions and folk religion. Far from being an isolated figure, Dee, who enjoyed the favor of Elizabeth I, had many rivals in magical learning and service.

Contemporary thought had both complexity and unity. Belief in prediction, astrology, alchemy, and the occult was apparently especially strong in England in the early

seventeenth century. Astrology itself represented a powerful continuation from medieval thought, a continuation that was made stronger and more dynamic both by the attempt to revive the supposed purity of its ancient roots and by the incorporation of new astronomical and mathematical knowledge. Thus, astrology should not be automatically typecast as a redundant system of information and insight. Indeed, astrology benefited from a range of recent and new developments, for, not least with its almanacs, printing was as much about astrology and strange providences—for example, interventions by divine or diabolical agents or sightings of peculiar animals—as it was about a more secular account of life. This was not a new situation. In the later medieval West, secret alphabets had increased in quantity, and whole manuscripts were written occasionally using them. The same was true of the world of print.

Knowledge that was secret, in source and form, was a significant concept that drew on Neoplatonic theories of essential form and truth and the belief that truths, while not inscrutable, were encrypted, notably by suprahuman agencies, and that astrological and other wisdom was necessary to decode them. "Rapt in secret studies" (I, ii), Prospero in The Tempest is a potent instance of such knowledge. Official concern about such activity, always a factor, was enhanced as a result of the Reformation, which pushed heresy to the fore as an issue and thus encouraged attempts to control the expression of opinion.

The true path of Christian virtue and salvation was apparently challenged not only by false prophets, indeed pseudochurches, laying claim to the word of Jesus, but also by a malevolent world presided over by the devil, a world that could be seen as including these prophets and operating through them. The future Richard III compares himself to Judas, a powerful image, when kissing Edward IV's sons at the close of Henry VI, Part III (V, vii).

As already mentioned, the Christian world picture provided many grounds for fear, with millenarian, apocalyptic, and eschatological anxieties drawing heavily on the Bible's Book of Revelation. Already potent prior to the Reformation, not least in response to such calamities as savage epidemics and the Ottoman (Turkish) advance into the Balkans, these anxieties became stronger as a consequence of the Reformation and of the accentuation of this Ottoman threat; Turkish armies assailed Vienna in 1529 and Malta in 1565, albeit unsuccessfully in each case. Warfare and the rise of evil power and powers were seen as signs of the approach of the millennium. The Reformation, which began in 1517, encouraged millenarian anxieties, as did repeated political and environmental crises, such as rebellions and outbreaks of epidemic diseases. Together, these factors fueled belief in a powerful, ambitious, and remorseless devil, one endlessly challenging the existing order.

The linkage of human events with the natural world was expressed not only in terms of zodiacal influence but also with reference to disturbances in the natural phenomena of the world that accompany major events, as, most conspicuously, with the assassinations of Duncan in Macbeth and of Julius Caesar. Lenox, a Scottish thane in Duncan's party, comments on the first:

> The night has been unruly: where we lay,
> Our chimneys were blown down; and, as they say,
> Lamentings heard i' th' air; strange screams of death,
> And, prophesying with accents terrible
> Of dire combustion, and confused events,
> New hatched to the woeful time, the obscure bird

Clamoured the livelong night: some say, the Earth
Was feverous, and did shake. (II, iii)

"Dire combustion" may be a reference to the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. The night before he is assassinated, Caesar notes, "Nor heaven nor earth have been at peace tonight," and Calphurnia, his wife, tells him what the watch in Rome has seen:

A lioness hath whelped in the streets,
And graves have yawned and yielded up their dead;
Fierce fiery warriors fought upon the clouds
In ranks and squadrons and right form of war,
Which drizzled blood upon the Capitol;
The noise of battle hurtled in the air,
Horses did neigh, and dying men did groan,
And ghosts did shriek and squeal about the streets. (II, ii)

This leads Caesar to reflect on free will:

CAESAR: What can be avoided
Whose end is purposed by the mighty gods?
Yet Caesar shall go forth; for these predictions
Are to the world in general as to Caesar.
CALPHURNIA: When beggars die, there are no comets seen;
The heavens themselves blaze forth the death of princes.
CAESAR: Of all the wonders that I yet have heard,
It seems to me most strange that men should fear,
Seeing that death, a necessary end,
Will come when it will come. (II, ii)

Othello responds to his murder of his wife by crying:

Methinks it should be now a huge eclipse
Of sun and moon, and that th'affrighted globe
Should yawn at alteration. (V, ii)

The last means that the world should split open. Othello also refers to the influence of the spheres in order to lessen his responsibility:

It is the very error of the Moon.
She comes more nearer
Earth than she was wont
And makes men mad. (V, ii)

At the same time, anxieties were not always expressed in apocalyptic terms. Instead, there were more immediate responses, those in particular associated with more humble characters, especially if lowlifes. Thus, Mistress Overdone, a Vienna brothel keeper in Measure for Measure, complains: "what with the war, what with the sweat, what with the gallows and what with poverty, I am customshrunk" (I, ii). Austria was at war with the Turks from 1593 to 1606, but the reference to the war would have resonated with an English audience whose long war with Spain had just drawn to a close.

Science, or, rather, all the various sciences, could be regarded as adjuncts of theology, itself the "queen of sciences." The sciences were aspects of knowledge as a unity, with God's work and intentions reflected across the material world. Christian thinkers sought better to understand the workings of a cosmos created by a Christian God. Moreover, useful knowledge cannot be defined and understood simply in modern terms. For example, the balance of the four humors was regarded as important for the health of rulers and their realms, and the balance was a typical theme in alchemical prophecies.

There was an assumption that human nature responded naturally to opportunities and constraints, the sympathetic Claudius remarking in Measure for Measure that he was arrested because of too much liberty...

> As surfeit is the father of much fast,
> So every scope by the immoderate use
> Turns to restraint. Our natures do pursue,
> Like rats that ravin down their proper bane,
> A thirsty evil, and when we drink we die. (I, ii)

The Church had originally set its face against any systematic "scientific" enquiry, on the grounds that man was only intended to know the mind of God as interpreted by the Church. Yet, in practice, there was a range of responses. Natural philosophy, the predecessor of modern science, was understood as a discipline that looked to God and the Bible, as well as to Nature. Early Protestants, similarly, although rejecting the intermediary role of the Church, believed that all necessary knowledge was to be found in the scriptures and therefore had to be found there. Religious themes were to the fore. Many, accordingly, were wary of the alchemists' search for the springs of hidden natural forces, as there was apparently a magical dimension to this search.

Meanwhile, the humanistic learning and tendencies of the Renaissance encouraged a critical reading of sources. Moreover, the response to the exploration of a suddenly wider world, notably the Americas, greatly tested existing intellectual categories, particularly as animals and plants unknown to classical writers, especially Aristotle and Pliny, the great classifiers, were discovered. As a consequence of new knowledge, the validity and thus authority of current explanatory systems were called into question. So also with earlier notions of geography and anthropology: commentators had to confront a range of peoples that had not been within the knowledge of their predecessors.

In London, there was a largely unregulated ferment of interest in the physical and natural worlds. New equipment, in the shape of the telescope and the microscope, was to qualify existing ideas even more in the seventeenth century. Meanwhile, the Reformation had challenged the authority of the Catholic Church, not only in what would today be seen as explicitly religious terms but across the field of knowledge as a whole, especially in judging truth. This questioning was not incompatible with religious issues, for such topics as the treatment of the relics of saints, an important aspect of Catholic religious practice, involved both religion and the linked discussion of truth.

The role of the Reformation in scientific developments was therefore indirect but very important. Indeed, the assault on the monopolistic position of the Catholic Church entailed an attack on its role as a source and guarantor of truth. For example, the Gregorian reform of the longstanding Julian calendar in 1582 by Pope Gregory XIII was unacceptable to Protestant Europe precisely because it had papal validation. This assault on the position of the Catholic Church was also an attack that encompassed the established nature of university scholarship because that was Church based.

The question of truth was pushed to the fore in many of Shakespeare's plays, with questions as to the real nature of phenomena, such as those that are shown to Hamlet, Macbeth, and Pericles (who sees Diana as in a vision), and, separately, as in The Winter's Tale and even, very differently, The Comedy of Errors, over identity. When Macbeth asks if he sees a dagger before him, he is asking what is happening; but he is doing so in a way that draws

powerfully on uncertainty as to phenomena and observation. That human perception is uncertain is a key point that is not abstract philosophy but a matter of personal salvation in the war between good and evil. The staging of this is not simply an artifice to draw attention to being in the theater but also a presentation of human dilemmas in the context of the dilemma of being human.

The crisis centered on the methods to be used for the establishment, authorization, and protection of truth was given greater force by the extent of intellectual curiosity and the related willingness to challenge the traditional knowledge represented by the Church's endorsement of Aristotle. In England, Francis Bacon (1561-1626) addressed the issue. The son of the Lord Keeper and a cousin of Robert Cecil, Bacon played a significant political role and, under James I, was Lord Chancellor from 1618 to 1621. He argued for authentication not in terms of institutions—notably the Church, which now very obviously could offer only a contested authority, especially in England—but, instead, with reference to the method employed. "Experimental learning" was seen as providing a universally valid approach able to comprehend the course of nature. Indeed, experimentation, a positive not a contemplative approach, was crucial to the research that led to William Harvey's account of the circulation of the blood. Experimentation, publication, and a pursuit of utility were all significant to the vitality of science in London?'

Drawing on the rise of expertise in Elizabethan England (including in mathematics), the place of scholars and experts in government business, and the role of entrepreneurial projecting, Bacon suggested that God actually intended man to recover that mastery over nature that he had lost at Adam's Fall: it was (along with the Reformation), he argued, part of the preparation for the Second Coming of Christ—which was a frequent lodestone and at least ostensible goal for commentators. Thus, scientific inquiry became not only a legitimate pursuit but almost a religious duty for the devout Protestant. Empirical perception, and thereby objectivity, was a way in which God revealed the order of life; and research in this form was therefore necessary. As an instance of empirical research, dissection was important in acquiring and displaying information about the body.

Knowledge was reconceptualized in terms of the creation of theory in the light of the evidence gained by observation, rather than being thought of as a demonstration of theory in the form of a syllogism. Writers and painters, knowing nature through imitating it, offered a parallel to this gathering and expression of evidence. This idea of knowing nature through imitation became immensely influential among the English intelligentsia later in the seventeenth century.

The notion of mastery over nature, however, was not one that playwrights always tended to address positively. Instead, they could prefer, as in Marlowe's powerful and dramatic Doctor Faustus (c. 1592), to see dangerous necromancy and pride at work, with the danger pushed to the fore as the work of diabolic forces, which are able to act because Faustus revokes his baptism and abjures scriptures. Faustus strikes a deal with Lucifer in which he gains the use of magic for twenty-four years but agrees then to go to hell. It was claimed in 1632 by William Prynne, a hostile critic, that actual devils had appeared on the stage during a performance.

Alongside empiricism, there was also a continuing emphasis on the role of classical knowledge. This was seen as being of value for modern natural philosophy (science), as well as for dealing with such practical issues as calendar reform. Thus, in addition to

instruments, books played a major role in establishing and verifying knowledge. New scientific ideas were frequently heavily dependent on earlier learning. For example, Harvey (1578-1657), in his De Motu Cordis (On the Motion of the Heart and Blood, 1628), drew on Aristotelian concepts in his rejection of the ideas of Galen (129—c. 210) about the f

culmination of the most emotionally charged relationship of Julius Caesar, one of murderously disloyal friendship. In his military camp near Sardis, Brutus is visited by the ghost of Caesar but does not really know what he sees, asking,

> this monstrous apparition...
> ... Art thou any thing?
> Art thou some god, some angel, or some devil.

He earns the reply that the ghost is "Thy evil spirit" (IV, iii). The ghost tells Brutus that they shall meet again at Philippi. At the Climactic battle there, where his cause goes down to total defeat, Brutus exclaims:

> O Julius Caesar, thou art mighty yet!
> Thy spirit walks abroad, and turns our swords
> In our own proper entrails. (V, iii)

Shakespeare thus offers a powerful account of guilt and retribution, one given physical form with the ghost. Shakespeare adds to the ghost the claim that it is that of Caesar. Seeing the ghost leads Brutus, indeed, to conclude "my hour is come" (V, v) and to resolve on suicide.

This is at once a description of what Brutus did do, a more noble fate than that of Macbeth at Dunsinane or Richard III at Bosworth—and a product of the difference between classical values and Christian teachings. Cassius, Antony, and Cleopatra, each in their own way honorable as well as flawed, are all shown killing themselves, while, in contrast, Macbeth, who lives in the Christian era, declares:

> Why should I play the Roman fool, and die
> On mine own sword? whiles I see lives, the gashes
> Do better upon them. (V, viii)

Although this was not Macbeth's motivation, Christian teaching decried suicide, treating it not only as dishonorable but also as a sin because of a defiance of the divine capacity for mercy, as well as of the teachings of the Church. A warrior, Othello commits suicide, which is, at once, an aspect of his depiction as a Moor, psychologically truthful, and a product of the play as a bloody revenge tragedy, and one, moreover, as with much of the genre, with an Italian setting, albeit among the Italians in Cyprus. In contrast, the suicides of Pyramus and Thisbe in A Midsummer Night's Dream are part of the comedy, distanced by being in the comic play within the play and thus a contrast to the tragedy of suicidal young love in Romeo and Juliet, a tragedy made more potent by its being unnecessary.

The inherent connections between the earth and salvation were aspects of a world in which God was present and active, able and willing to act in the world as part of a wider process of spiritual travel and action through spaces that were immediate. This situation linked the modern to the classical world, for, in Cymbeline Jupiter descends in thunder and lightning to upbraid "you petty spirits of region low ... you ghosts" for pressing him on behalf of the condemned Posthumus; the ghosts are those of family members (V, iv).

Salvation was not an outcome that had to await death. Instead, in a universe bounded temporally by the Fall and the apocalypse, time and space took on meaning in terms of the divine will and spiritual redemption. "The wills above be done!" declares Gonzalo as the ship splits in the dramatic opening scene of The Tempest (I, i). Redemption could be seen in the case of individual characters, such as Lear, and the language employed was frequently religious, as with Lear's meritorious daughter, Cordelia, of whom it was observed

> she shook

The holy water from her heavenly eyes
That clamour moistened. (IV, iii)
Uncertain of his situation, and specifically as to whether he is in
hell, Lear subsequently awakes to tell Cordelia in truly memorable lines:
You do me wrong to take me out o'th'grave:
Thou art a soul in bliss; but I am bound
Upon a wheel of fire, that mine own tears
Do scald like molten lead.
You are a spirit, I know. (IV, vii)

King Lear is set in pre-Christian times, indeed is one of the English "history plays," but, as in those plays set in classical Rome, Christian themes are to the fore. Alongside classical ideas and references, notably to Oedipus, such themes are especially prominent in King Lear—althoughmore for Gloucester and Lear, both of whom experience redemption, than for Cordelia, who ends up as a sacrificial figure. She is ostentatiously meritorious, in so far as such a phrase can be employed to describe a character who is a pure moral center. Forgiveness of others and a surrender of the goods of the world are presented in King Lear as key elements in redemption, the forgiveness depending in part on the self-knowledge that becomes an important part of that play. Self-knowledge, however, cannot itself redeem, as is shown throughout by Iago and, more hesitantly, by Macbeth.

Free Will and Salvation

In addition to tensions about free will and salvation, and alongside continuities and ambiguities in religious practice and thought, the Protestant Reformation had caused a profound psychological crisis, one that helped explain the problems faced by those trying to enforce the new religious settlement and also by those seeking to keep magical elements in accord with Christianity. Traditional patterns of exposition, faith, and observance were put under great strain and, in part, shattered. For example, the belief in the efficacy of prayers for the souls of the dead in purgatory, to help them toward salvation, was fundamental to monasticism as well as to chantries. Its disappearance, or at least discouragement, represented a major and disturbing discontinuity in emotional and religious links between the generations, as well as of a crucial link between the earth and the supranatural.

In this new ecclesiology, doubt was probably a condition ofboth life and death. This condition was captured by Hamlet: itis clearly linked to his indecisiveness and a central part of the inaction that characterizes much of the play. The same condition is seen to affect Claudius in Measure for Measure. Unfairly treated by Angelo's arbitrary and hypocritical interpretation of the law and denied mercy, Claudius contemplates his own imminent execution, declaring:

Death is a fearful thing.
to die, and go we know not where;
To lie in cold obstruction and to rot;
This sensible warm motion to become
A kneaded clod; and the delighted spirit
To bathe in fiery floods, or to reside
In thrilling region of thick-ribbed ice;
To be imprison'd in the viewless winds,
And blown with restless violence round about
The pendant world; or to be worse than worst
Of those that lawless and incertain thoughts
Imagine howling: 'tis too horrible!

> The weariest and most loathed worldly life
> That age, ache, penury and imprisonment
> Can lay on nature is a paradise
> To what we fear of death. (III, i)

Doubt can be linked to the notion that "Shakespeare's hallmark is ambiguity. If plays have any social value it must be because the conflict of opinion contained in dialogue allows audiences to think the previously unthinkable." Possibly so in modern terms, but that would have been far less the case in Shakespeare's lifetime.

Alongside doubt, there is repeatedly in Shakespeare an affirmation of value and values, including in Measure for Measure by the thwarted villain, Angelo. Most powerfully, Macbeth, in his final battle, realizes that he has been misled by the second apparition brought forth by the witches. In a culmination of his metaphysical despair, Macbeth speaks to the audience as much as to himself:

> be these juggling fiends no more believ'd,
> That palter [equivocate] with us in a double sense;
> That keep the word of promise to our ear,
> And break it to our hope. (V, viii)

His vanquisher, Macduff, bearing Macbeth's head, proclaims the time is free" (V, ix). Modern directors sometimes stage the Closing scene to suggest that Macduff will try to overthrow the new king, Malcolm, but that is not Shakespeare's play, no more than it is to present Henry V as an antiwar play. Instead, it is the moral order that is affirmed in Macbeth, one already seen in the court of Edward the Confessor, where Malcolm had taken refuge. The king is shown using his touch to cure scrofula, a gift discussed in Holinshed, while, employing the language of Christianity, Malcolm affirms goodness and proclaims continuity and the defeat of the devil:

> Angels are bright still, though the brightest fell:
> Though all things foul would wear the brows of grace,
> Yet Grace must still look so. (Iv, iii)

The human devil, Macbeth, "Hell-hound" according to Macduff, once so promising to Duncan, is defeated, and with him, the devil. <>

Maurice Blanchot and Psychoanalysis by Joseph D. Kuzma [Contemporary Psychoanalytic Studies, Brill | Rodopi, E-Book: 978-90-04-40133-4, Hardback 978-90-04-40132-7]

Maurice Blanchot and Psychoanalysis by Joseph D. Kuzma offers an exploration and critique of Blanchot's various engagements with psychoanalysis, from the early 1950s onward. Kuzma highlights the political contours of Blanchot's writings on Freud, Lacan, Leclaire, Winnicott, and others, ultimately suggesting a link between these writings and Blanchot's broader attempts at rethinking the nature of human relationality, responsibility, and community. This book makes a substantive contribution to our understanding of the political and philosophical dimensions of Blanchot's writings on madness, narcissism, and trauma, among other topics of critical and clinical relevance. Maurice Blanchot and Psychoanalysis comprises an indispensable text for anyone interested in tracing the history of psychoanalysis in post-War France.

Contents

Excerpt:

Overview

This book is composed of two parts, roughly divided along chronological lines. In Chapter One, I begin by examining Blanchot's discussion of Freud and Lacan, and his appraisal of their importance and impact. I focus primarily on Blanchot's 1956 essay, "Freud," and its significantly revised and retitled, 1969 version, "The Speech of Analysis," in order to explore how Blanchot's view of Freud and Lacan comes to be modified across these two versions, as well as noting areas in which Blanchot's appraisal remains unchanged. Building from this account, I turn toward a consideration of madness in Chapter Two. Focusing initially upon Blanchot's 1951 essay, "Madness par excellence," I turn toward an examination of how Blanchot's approach to the question of madness undergoes rather significant alteration over the course of the 1960s, due in large part to the interventions of Michel Foucault and Pierre Klossowski. My thesis, here, is that the manner in which Blanchot comes to rethink the notion of madness in terms of fragmentation, singularity, and the exigency of return, exerts a significant influence upon the manner in which he will later engage with psychoanalysis in The Writing of the Disaster.

The second part of this book features a detailed examination of the status psychoanalysis in The Writing of the Disaster, arguably Blanchot's most difficult and multifaceted text. I begin, in Chapter Three, by looking at the problem of narcissism. Blanchot plainly tells us that narcissism is inescapable. It encompasses all the positions of being and non-being.

Nevertheless, Blanchot appears to undertake, in the pages of his text, a sophisticated and nuanced critique of the conventional conceptions of narcissism. How can something inescapable be made subject to critique? I proceed to ask whether narcissism might, in fact, presuppose an outside which remains somehow beyond the grasp of mastery, power, and possibility. I examine Blanchot's reading of Ovid's Narcissus myth, as well as taking-stock of the major psychoanalytic accounts of narcissism, in order to discuss the nature of Blanchot's critique and its political implications.

In Chapter Four, I turn my focus squarely to what is widely-considered Blanchot's most famous engagement with psychoanalysis. This is his fragment entitled, '(A primal scene?).' I draw the fragment into conversation with Freud's Wolf Man case, as well as the other psychoanalytic accounts with which Blanchot engages. These include D.W. Winnicott's "Fear of Breakdown" essay, and Serge Leclaire's A Child is Being Killed. My aim, here, is to retrace Blanchot's critique of the psychoanalytic notion of the primal. My account builds toward Chapter Five, which is in some ways the key chapter of this text. Here, I suggest that the dominant trope in Blanchot's engagement with psychoanalysis, in the pages of The Writing of the Disaster, is something I term the trauma of responsibility. I make use of both Laplanche and Levinas in order to develop a reading of Blanchot's '(A primal scene?)' which highlights the manner in which Blanchot, throughout his text, seems to portray responsibility in terms of trauma. This approach, carried out along the margins of Blanchot's text, allows psychoanalysis and philosophy each to contest one another, and push one another to their respective limits.

Finally, in Chapter Six, I bring Blanchot's text into dialogue with the writings of André Green and Julia Kristeva, among others, in order to address the status of the maternal in Blanchot's text. What I suggest is that, despite her apparent absence, the figure of the mother in fact plays a crucial role in Blanchot's account by gesturing us toward an understanding of responsibility that is entirely irreducible to all reciprocity or symmetry.

Rather than seeking, at any point within the pages that follow, to subject Blanchot's writings to 'psychoanalytic' interpretations, my more modest aim is simply to open a channel of conversation, a space for further discussion, between those fascinated with the writings of Blanchot, and those who see in psychoanalysis a perennially-vibrant field of study. It is my hope that this book will contribute in some small part to a broader consideration of the relations linking psychoanalysis, politics, and responsibility, in Blanchot's writings – and beyond.

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In closing, I want to return to a consideration of Lacoue-Labarthe's statement: "I'm convinced that what [Blanchot] wanted to destroy is, quite simply, the conventional conception of narcissism."

Over the course of the preceding chapters, we have grappled with how to respond to this provocative assertion. What would it mean to destroy a conception of narcissism? Would not any such attempt itself be a *narcissistic* endeavor?

What about Blanchot's suggestion that all the positions or being and non-being are narcissistic? Does not every action, we might ask, ultimately bear some relation to narcissism, or betray an underlying narcissistic motivation? Self-preservation and self-annihilation, as Blanchot notes, both suggest narcissistic motives. Asceticism and altruism

are no exception. If the realm of narcissism is indeed coextensive with the realm of the possible, then narcissism's hold over the psyche, over culture itself, must truly be understood as inescapable, insurmountable, and utterly suffocating. Such was the provocation that led us into the heart of Blanchot's text.

Yet what we discovered, over the course of the preceding account, was that every structure that aspires to totality, omnipotence, or enclosure, always presupposes a point of origination, or a foundational principle, that remains partly unassimilable within the system itself. This is the system's dark secret, namely, that it draws its resources from something beyond itself, something it can hope, but never fully manage, to control. It is this very outside which serves as the silent, hidden condition of possibility for the inside, allowing the latter to assert itself – on the condition that it be ruptured in advance of being whole. The very thing that makes the inside possible, in other words, has always already rendered it impossible as a coherent, self-identical totality. This is what Blanchot calls "the generous effect of the disaster [*L'effet généreux du désastre*]." The disaster ruins, in advance, the very totalities (be they textual, political, egoic, or philosophical) which it conditions.

But if this is indeed the case, we had asked, then what is narcissism's *outside*? What is the conditioning element without which narcissism is unthinkable, yet in relation to which it has always been preempted and destabilized? If the realm of narcissism is coextensive with the realm of the possible – and possibility, in turn, is defined in terms of power – then might this outside mark, in some strange sense, the very point at which power (without being negated) ceases to be power?

It now becomes clearer how Blanhcot, in *The Writing of the Disaster*, conceives of all this. Increasingly, we have found that the *outside* of narcissism is marked in Blanchot's text by the recurrence of a certain kind of trauma radically anterior to the installation of any ego or any self. In the same fragment where Blanchot writes of the generous effect of the disaster, one also finds the words: "The trauma of poetry and of philosophy, indistinct one from the other."[74] The word 'trauma' here is actually an interpolation on the part of the translator, but not an improper one. For the exact phrase Blanchot employs, '*L'insulte majeure*,' carries a clinical connotation which its author would surely have recognized, given his early medical training. An 'insult,' in medical terminology, is the cause of any kind of physical or mental injury. A 'major insult' is thus the cause of an injury that can only be understood as severely traumatic in nature. Blanchot's point is that poetry and philosophy haunted by an ongoing trauma, a recurrent violence, without which they would not have meaning, yet in whose wake they are irreparably ruined. Indeed, I think that something similar might be said with respect to narcissism itself.

In a key passage, Blanchot draws a direct parallel between the manner in which the murder of the *infans* recursively lacerates the lived-experience that it conditions – and the way in which *le Dire* incessantly interrupts the totalizing discourse of *le dit*. The notion of *le Dire*, or 'Saying,' refers to the act of glorious heralding through which the other is addressed in his singularity, beyond the static conceptuality of the said [*le dit*]. Blanchot tells us in this passage that the temporality of the child's murder, a temporality characterized by the return of an anarchic event which has never been present, is a temporality which "destroys (effaces) time." And this effacement of time, this interruption of temporal continuity, is the *very* effacement or destruction "which has always already been exposed in the precession of Saying [*Dire*] outside of anything spoken [*dit*], the sheer saying of writing

whereby this effacement, far from effacing itself in its turn, perpetuates itself without end, even in the interruption that is its mark." Just as the impossible yet necessary death of the *infans* remains outside both the temporality and the language that it inaugurates, haunting and endlessly interrupting the work of narcissistic recuperation – so, too, does Saying cut-across the time of dialectical progress, suspending it, and opening discourse to that which remains outside all possibility, all power. Saying marks the limits of every totality, every enclosure. It marks the recurrence of the disaster that forestalls any identification (imaginary or otherwise) between the two Narcissi, keeping Narcissus and anti-Narcissus from ever merging together or coinciding.

The fact that this comparison, which engenders a slippage between the psychoanalytic and the socio-political dimensions of the text, appears immediately before Blanchot's '(A primal scene?)' fragment, makes it doubly significant. For what we see here is that the otherness of dying, exemplified by the unaccomplished death of the *infans* and the vertiginous swoon of anti-Narcissus, comes to be subtly transposed by Blanchot into the "death of others ... for which we bear the unbearable responsibility."[77] This is the crucial pivot. It suggests that the consolidation of the narcissistic ego has been always already interrupted not only by a fall into the 'other' imaginary (*à la* Ovid), or by an impersonal, archaic dying which cannot be completed (*à la* Leclaire) – but also by the manner in which the death of the other person is suffered 'in us' before we have even become ourselves. Before I am ever 'me,' I bear in advance an impossible burden of responsibility for others.

It is responsibility that makes narcissism possible, on the condition that this narcissism be construed from the start as always already interrupted by the impossible. If responsibility makes narcissism possible, it is because it confronts me with an obligation, a demand, so overwhelming and urgent that it conscripts my 'self' into service, demanding of me that I act efficaciously to bring aid to the other person. On the other hand, if responsibility has always already rendered narcissism *impossible*, it is because the 'self' which it installs for the sole purpose of giving aid, is ultimately little more than *le moi sans moi*, a proxy, a simulacrum, a hostage, 'the other in place of the self.' Narcissism is impossible to extent that it has been preempted by an invasive demand to which no self can possibly respond, yet to which it must respond.

It is the trauma of responsibility, in short, that makes total narcissistic integration, total nationalistic integration, total discursive integration, impossible. This is not a trauma that would afflict, for example, an already-established ego, wounding a self already constituted; rather, the trauma of responsibility is a trauma that precedes any installation of selfhood, any consolidation of a unified whole, whatsoever. It is utterly disastrous, ruining in advance what has never yet been given. The trauma of responsibility returns ceaselessly from a past which has never been present, shattering the continuity of time, and contesting every form of totality, omnipotence, enclosure, and integration. Moreover, by virtue of the *après coup*, this traumatic event returns always as different from itself. This means that the nature of our responsibility to the other person – a responsibility that is unchosen, pre-original, impossible to bear – demands to be translated and retranslated without end, always in relation to the nameless one still to come.

I have argued, over the preceding pages, that Blanchot's account of traumatic responsibility, in *The Writing of the Disaster*, marks a unique point in his writings where psychoanalysis and philosophy might be seen to contest one another. In light of this, one might read

Blanchot's '(A primal scene?)' as a text in which the traumatic irruption of maternal rhythms, long-since encrypted within a child incapable of deciphering their enigmatic meaning, finally makes the young boy (entering the age of moral maturity) aware of an impossible, yet necessary demand. It is a demand which not only involves a doubly dissymmetrical responsibility which makes him responsible for *all* others – but which has also thereby denied him any possibility of death. Occupied by the other from before the very start, he cannot lose what he has never called his own. This is his 'secret' which he must continue henceforth to live. To find oneself confronted with the infinite demand of responsibility is to find oneself confronted by the sheer impossibility of dying. If the boy at the window thus smiles through his stream of tears, it is because he senses that the task of infinite translation to which he is consigned by the trauma of responsibility has always already deprived him the gift of real life, much as it will deny him the finality of real death. <>



On Fear, Horror, and Terror: Giving Utterance to the Unutterable edited by Pedro Querido and María Ibáñez-Rodríguez [At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, Brill, 9789004397989]

On Fear, Horror, and Terror: Giving Utterance to the Unutterable brings together essays that examine a vast gamut of different contemporary cultural manifestations of fear, anxiety, horror, and terror. Topics range from the feminine sublime in American novels to the monstrous double in horror fiction, (in)security at music festivals, the uncanny in graphic novels, epic heroes' Being-towards-death and authenticity, atrocity and history in Central European art, the theme of old age in absurdist literature, and iterations of the "home invasion" subgenre in post-9/11 popular culture. This diversity of insights and methodologies ensures a kaleidoscopic look at a cluster of phenomena and experiences that often manage to both be immediately and universally recognizable and defy straightforward categorization or even description. Contributors are Emily-Rose Carr, Ghada Saad Hassan, Woodrow Hood, María Ibáñez-Rodríguez, Nicole M. Jowsey, Marta Moore, Pedro Querido and Ana Romão.

Contents
Notes on Contributors
Introduction by María Ibáñez-Rodríguez and Pedro Querido

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Both Victimizer and Victim: Terror and the Feminine Sublime in American Psycho and Fight Club by Emily-Rose Carr

Terror and the sublime have been linked in theoretical material by numerous academics, including notable sublime theorists Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, and Barbara Freeman. In the traditional sublime theories of Burke and Kant, terror is experienced at a distance, and it is precisely this distance which facilitates the sublime emotion. However, instances of contemporary American fiction indicate a rejection of this separating distance: they portray characters who desire to be participants in, and facilitators of, terror, thus aligning closely with the feminine sublime theory that Freeman champions. This chapter will explore, specifically, how the protagonists of Chuck Palahniuk's Fight Club (1996) and Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho (1991) explore manifestations of Freeman's feminine sublime through their dual role of violator and victim of the terror they perpetuate in the novels. While a notable amount of violent, frightening, or Gothic literature portrays a world in which a monstrous anomaly disrupts an otherwise normal society, American Psycho and Fight Club refute this tradition with examples of inherently unstable, frightening, and terrible environments in which they are willing participants. Considering this, this chapter will argue that American Psycho and Fight Club indicate not only a sublime experience with the application of terror in the novels but also that it is through this application that the specific feminine sublime manifests itself – the protagonists of each novel demonstrate the desire to

be victims of the very terror they are perpetuating, suggesting a rejection of the distance that defines the traditional sublime formula.

Fearful Manifestations: a Comparative Study of the Monstrous Double in Ahmed Khaled Towfik's Utopia by Ghada Saad Hassan

The term "monster" usually defines an entity that is extremely large or unnatural, inhuman, horrible, or wicked. However, that term has evolved to acquire various connotations over the years – connotations that are related to the cultural and historical contexts in which the monstrous is produced. Thus, the study of the monster paradigm in works of fiction necessarily requires an examination of the historical, social, and cultural environments which contribute to the shaping of various monsters in different contexts. This chapter will attempt to analyze and interpret the nature of the monster, namely the "abject" monster, and how each culture produces the type of monster that embodies its anxieties and fears. It aims at analyzing literary representations of the monstrous double in Arabic contemporary horror fiction, and in Ahmed Khaled Towfik's Utopia (2008) in particular. The analysis of manifestations of monstrosity within the cultural molds that produced it calls for a Foucauldian approach of power relations, the better to interpret the literary text and its cultural, historical, and socio-political dimensions.

Music Festival (in)Security: Transgression, Transhumanism, and Immorality by Woodrow Hood

Studying recent news events, music festival security may prove antithetical to the idea of a music festival – the free flow of emotions and ideas in fluid spaces. This chapter looks at the performative nature of attending a music festival and the driving forces beneath a particular set of ideas and behaviors. The case study is Moogfest, an electronic music festival in North Carolina.

Myths of the Uncanny in the Contemporary Graphic Novel by María Ibáñez-Rodríguez

Fear, Death, and Authenticity in the Hero: a Look at Heidegger, Achilleus, and Harry Potter by Nicole M. Jowsey

Gothic, a hybrid form, has absorbed and adapted other literary forms and changed its own conventions in order to fit newer modes of writing. In the more than two centuries it spans, Gothic has moved in and out of mainstream culture, leaping from genre to genre. The important number of Gothic adaptations of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries therefore comes as no surprise. In order to create an atmosphere of mystery and, thus, reader engagement, the Gothic makes use of the mechanics of terror and horror, and so have been doing the writers and artists behind some contemporary graphic novels, such as the award-winning novelist and comic book writer Joe Hill, whose series Locke & Key is of interest to this chapter. The story of Locke & Key revolves around the Locke family, who move to a manor in New England after the murder of their father. Filled with fantastic doors that transform all who walk through them, and home to a malevolent demon that will not rest until its forces open the most terrible door of them all, Keyhouse Manor, the type of house that whispers in the dark, becomes a character with its own history and identity. Considering both the physical setting and other incarnations of traditional Gothic, this chapter intends to explore the emotional connection that the horror of Locke & Key

heightens with its multiple stories, which braid together to create an overwhelming feeling of being trapped: a definite success in any horror story.

Fear, Death, and Authenticity in the Hero: a Look at Heidegger, Achilleus, and Harry Potter by Nicole M. Jowsey

In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger argues that death is always impending, and as such our existence in the world is one that is Being-toward-death. Despite the fact that we can never escape death, we are constantly trying to flee it and distract ourselves from it. There is a certain anxiety and fear in the face of death that mortals experience, hence the reason we try to outrun it. Looking at the figure of the hero, we see an individual who, at times, experiences horror and terror in their lives. They face death, and they too are afraid to die; however, the hero is able to overcome such fears, in spite of the horror and terror, and meet death head on. In this respect, the hero embodies what Heidegger calls authenticity, and therefore lives an authentic life. This chapter seeks to examine the hero's relationship to death, their fear of it, as well as their ability to overcome it and achieve authenticity. Using Achilleus and Harry Potter as examples of Ancient and Modern epic heroes, I will show how both heroes experience fear and anxiety, while facing death, but then embrace and overcome them in order to fulfill their allotted destiny and measure. Both Achilleus and Harry experience deep loss and mourning, and yet through the pain and horror are able to come to terms with their own fate and finitude. This shared experience demonstrates Heidegger's theory and allows them to be thought of as achieving authenticity.

Ornaments of Pain and Survival: Central European History, Literature, and Film by Marta Moore

The focus of my analysis is a specific literary and film genre that has emerged in a strictly defined time and space. The time is the communist era that followed World War II and the Holocaust; the place is Central Europe. The underlying assumption of this chapter is that the unparalleled upheavals shaking Central Europe over the past several decades have produced not only profound social-political changes but also a distinctive literary and film genre. Though deeply European, this body of work must be distinguished from the literature and film produced elsewhere in Europe during this period of time, with its roots springing from a specific geographical area and from a specific intellectual climate characterizing the political, social, and historical worlds of that space. The authors and directors of these Central European texts come from a variety of countries, most of which belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. While ethnically and religiously diverse, these countries share a common fate determined by the common experience of their respective peoples. Among the determining factors shaping their experience were such jolting events as the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1920, two World Wars, and the Holocaust. And when these disruptions came to a halt after the Allies' victory, new, heretofore unimaginable ones started. The Soviets set up their own concept of government, which not only created terror for over half a century in these countries, but foisted a foreign civilization upon one hundred million people.

A Horror of the Vacuum: an Overview of Old Age in Absurdist Literature by Pedro Querido

The relevance and lasting influence of artistic expressions of the philosophical concept of the absurd have been highlighted by many scholars, notably by Martin Esslin in his pioneering work The Theatre of the Absurd and by Neil Cornwell in The Absurd in Literature.

Interestingly, a cursory glance at the works of the practitioners of the absurd deemed most significant by Esslin (Adamov, Beckett and Ionesco, but also Pinget, Pinter and Hildesheimer) and Cornwell (Daniil Kharms, O'Brien, Kafka and again Beckett) reveals an intriguing pattern: virtually all of them have at least one important work with older people as main characters. In this chapter, my main aim is to understand why old age is so prominent in absurdist literature. First, I will examine some of the most archetypal interactions between the aged protagonists and their absurd universes, refining my working definition of the absurd (wherein "resistance" is an operative word) in the process. Then, after assessing the congruity of outliers and the pertinence of alternative causal explanations for this correlation, I will demonstrate that the thematization of aging characters in absurdist works owes much to the fact that in them old age may be seen as the radicalization of the human condition.

Hospitality in Post-9/11 Representations of "Home Invasion": Michael Haneke's Funny Games (1997/2007) by Ana Romão

The symbol of the "home" and the relationship between host and guest have had a long tradition of depictions in fictional narratives. Countless artists have contributed, with their creations, to several social debates by commenting on the threat an outsider might pose to the "home" (household, homeland, etc.). After the attacks on 11 September 2001, the cultural manifestations regarding representations of the "home" have accompanied an anxiety-ridden social instability, and were quick to encapsulate Western societies' new standpoints concerning the "foreigner" in newly shaped narratives. A cinematic approach that has incisively explored the concerns with the violation of the "home" has been the horror subgenre of the "home invasion." This approach typically sees a family relentlessly threatened by outsiders, whose only drive seems to be the extermination of the owners/inhabitants of a particular house. In this chapter, I seek to explain how the contemporary treatment of the "home invasion" theme differs from its origins (1970s through 1990s), exposing the inherent bleakness and hopelessness of post-9/11 films. Through this analysis, I also explore how this subgenre plays on the current Western fear-inducing rhetoric that presents the "foreigner" as an anonymous, violent, and restless threat to the "home." As a case study, I propose to examine the film Funny Games (1997) and its shot-for-shot remake (2007), by Austrian director Michael Haneke. I intend to expose how the post-9/11 remake calls the public's attention to their own evolved/devolved perceptions of the "home invasion" and the roles of host/guest within Derrida's Law/laws of hospitality.
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Words, Deeds, Bodies: L. Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, M. Merleau-Ponty and M. Polanyi by Jerry H. Gill [Value Inquiry Book Series Online, Value Inquiry Book Series, Philosophy, Literature, and Politics, Brill, E-Book: 9789004412361, Hardback: 9789004412354]

Words, Deeds, Bodies by Jerry H. Gill concentrates on the interrelationships between speech, accomplishing tasks, and human embodiment. Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin,

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Michael Polanyi have all highlighted these relationships. This book examines the, as yet, unexplored connections between these authors' philosophies of language. It focuses on the relationships between their respective key ideas: Wittgenstein's notion of "language game," Austin's concept of "performative utterances," Merleau-Ponty's idea of "slackening the threads," and Polanyi's understanding of "tacit knowing," noting the similarities and differences between and amongst them.

Excerpt: My theme in these reflections is the intersections between language, action, and human embodiment in the thought of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Michael Polanyi. Each of these thinkers stresses the idea that linguistic activity is primarily a *behavioral* phenomenon, something that human beings *do* in relation to each other with and by means of their *bodies.* Although a great deal of attention has been given to such notions as Wittgenstein's "language-games," Austin's "speech acts," Merleau-Ponty's "embodiment," and Polanyi's "tacit knowing," very little attention has been paid to social and behavioral aspects of these notions. Moreover, little if any attention has been paid to the interconnections among these thinkers' key notions.

It is my purpose in these explorations to focus on the social, behavioral, and physical dimensions of these key ideas and to show how they interconnect with one another. Although they arose and worked in quite different philosophical contexts, each of these thinkers sought to overcome the traditional bias of philosophy toward the content and logical format of linguistic activity. Each in his own way tried to call attention to the behavioral and social dynamics involved in all human communication. Wittgenstein's emphasis on "getting jobs done" with language, Austin's stress on the "performative" dimension of speech, Merleau-Ponty's focus on the role of the body in human communication and Polanyi's stress on tacit knowing all converge on the relationship between and among "words, deeds, and embodiment."

Bringing them all together

It is time now to bring these explorations of Polanyi's to bear on those of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Merleau-Ponty. It seems clear that Wittgenstein's understanding of the dynamics of linguistic activity run parallel to Polanyi's insights, especially that of tacit knowing. The whole concept of language-games is dependent on human participation in shared linguistic activities, or "linguistic games" if you will, by means of which we carry on our daily behavior, both social and personal. The verbal and physical give-and-take of everyday life is packaged in the ongoing flow of our speech.

In initially finding their way into linguistic activity, the very young children often proceed as if language is, in fact, a game. They ask and answer questions, expecting other children or adults to respond in appropriate fashion, and act on what they hear or see as steps or

"turns" in an on-going game. Just yesterday I witnessed a young child in a park talking with his mother about the weather; was it too hot or just about right? She took his questions seriously, and he took her answers seriously as well. The young boy decided that he did not want to wear his hat "because it makes me too hot."

Last week I observed a small child conversing with his father as they walked through the supermarket. He said: "After we get our ice cream we will drive to Grandma's for lunch." The father replied that they would have to go by the gas station on the way since their car was almost out of gas. This, like the other, was a real, meaningful conversation between two people about their circumstances and plans; they were participating in regular, commonplace "language-games" which were directly connected to their current and subsequent behavior. The children clearly understood what was being said and what was going on without grasping much of anything about the complex world of gas stations and ice cream beyond that immediate context.

Moreover, certain utterances and "turns" in the games in question were assumed and patterned so that everyone's behavior was connected to what would happen next, etc. There was a flow, a vector to these conversations even though they were genuine, open-ended exchanges and connected to concrete activities. Although they had not been "scripted" ahead of time, these exchanges were a vital part of the on-going relationship between child and parent. Things were being decided and getting done. If the parent had suddenly interjected a question about the upcoming election, say, the children would no longer be able to participate. It would be like shifting from chess to baseball or some other game.

What is obvious in all such situations is that the knowledge required to "play" in these games had been acquired *tacitly* through previous encounters which may not have all gone well. This knowledge is obtained by the newcomers through full participation in the specific moves surrounding the activities, trying to imitate the adults involved as they went along. We adults have become so habituated to the various scenarios that we generally fail to see them at work. Sometimes, of course, the child makes a mistake and the whole process may get sidetracked. Generally the flow picks up again rather quickly and other "games" are embarked upon. Various "language-games" overlap with and crisscross over one another.

A young newcomer must read the situation and connect it up with what he or she has already ingested. Anyone who has paid attention to child-talk understands how youngsters find their way into language by means of imitation and enacting what they are learning. One minute you are sure they do not understand a particular move in the game, and the next they introduce their own version or parallel pattern which keeps the game going. Put into Polanyi's framework, the beginner indwells the subsidiary input from previous and the current exchange, interacts with it in terms of his or her own integration of it, and all without conceptualizing about it at all.

A similar process characterizes the way an adult speaker picks up on the latest joke, snide remark, or inferred inference. Learning the "lingo" surrounding the game of baseball or football, for instance, or that involved in the world of computer technology and video games, always takes a learning period, especially for those of us who start out completely unfamiliar with them. Also, acquiring facility in a foreign language follows the same tacit awareness dynamic, one "fakes it until one makes it." In such situations we often find ourselves way over our heads, saying things that work but not being able to say why they

do. Subsidiary awareness allows things in through the backdoor upon which we act, and eventually these are integrated into our explicit, conceptual understandings.

It will be recalled that near the end of his *Investigations* Wittgenstein makes reference to what he termed "imponderable evidence." At bottom this notion ties in well with his remarks about the "bedrock" character of our human "form of life," as well as with his notion of how we often "get a nose" for something without being able to explain how it turns out to be true. As he put it in one place, when I reach this level, "My spade is turned, I cannot go further down." To change the image, elsewhere (in *On Certainty)* he says that it is important to "begin at the beginning and not try to go further back." In a sense, then, with respect to our knowing, we are all like little children learning language, we must begin, as it were, "in the middle," assuming we know what we are doing before actually doing so.

Clearly these notions and claims fit in very nicely with Polanyi's concept of *tacit knowing*. We always "know more than we can say" because we, like beginning swimmers, have to dive into speaking before we actually know fully what we are doing. As Wittgenstein puts it with respect to imponderable evidence, even though we cannot always explain how and why we know, "one can get a nose for it." This, of course, does mean that everything we think we know we do in fact know. Nevertheless, in order to get started we often have to act as if we do in fact already know. If we do not begin in this way, like with swimming, we shall never know at all.

This was illustrated by Wittgenstein's veiled reply to Hume's demand for "grounds" for relying on the past to predict the future. He said "If you say that the past does not provide "grounds," I do not know what you would think "grounds" are. If the past is not grounds, what else do you have in mind?" In short, there is no absolute basis for human knowledge. There is only our human "form of life," our human way of conducting business and speaking together about it. Here again, we must simply dive in and justify our actions, both linguistic and behavioral, as we go. This does not lead to skepticism because we jointly accredit our common beliefs by mean s of what Polanyi calls "universal intent." This does not guarantee knowledge and truth, but it enables us to guard against subjectivism and fanaticism.

To change the image, although there is no "foundational" truth at the bottom of the stack of turtles ("It's turtles all the way down"), we are all engaged in our conversations and searches for truth together, and this means that "its turtles all the way around." Our *universal intent* allows us to continue our dialogues about the truth and knowledge, so that we are already embarked and our common life and quest is, in Plato's words, its own reward. The search for truth, even the denial of its possibility, backhandedly underwrites its viability, even as the skeptic's claim presupposes it by claiming to know that there is no such thing as knowledge.

The application of Polanyi's insights to those of J.L. Austin can be seen to follow a similar pattern as those of Wittgenstein. The major concern is to acknowledge social and active character of human linguistic behavior. In short, speaking words is a kind of action, a way of getting things done in the world. Only some of these actions involve describing or "picturing" the world around us. More commonly they are part of a broader behavioral pattern which is shared with other people and aimed at effecting specific goals and accomplishing concrete tasks. In short, language is "proactive" rather than passive in relation to the surrounding world.

This fact can be seen as fitting into Polanyi's distinction between conceptual and bodily activity. Language is as much bodily as it is conceptual, for not only does it involve sound making motor activity, but it literally inserts itself into realm of human social and political interactions. This is the point of Austin's insight that by speaking we are actually changing the world, we are "doing things with words." To change the image, this is what Wittgenstein meant by learning to think of language as a *tool* by means of which we get things done in our common reality. Both Austin and Wittgenstein saw language as an activity, not simply as a mirror of the world.

Obviously, linguistic activity must often follow certain conventions if it is to accomplish its goals. The sorts of cases and examples provided by Austin's analysis put this fact front and center. One cannot simply speak in a random fashion and expect to accomplish specific goals. What is crucially important to note in this regard is that in the vast majority of cases our participation in such conventional behavior relies on our knowing when, where, and how to use them. Moreover, by and large such knowledge is never taught or learned by specific lessons, but is rather "picked up" through observation and/or practice.

In other words, the sort of knowledge we generally display in such ways and cases is clearly tacit in character. I remember, when washing the dishes with my two year old son, that if I handed them to him in the wrong way I would say "I'm sorry." Soon he picked this pattern up and would say "Sorry" every time I handed him a dish, even when I did it correctly. Clearly a "misfire" according to Austin's terminology. However, in this way he eventually learned the proper circumstances in which it is appropriate to say "I'm sorry." He learned to *indwell*, as Polanyi would put it, this utterance through practice in relation to the way the dishes were handed to him. Eventually he accomplished an *integrative act* when he began to use the utterance appropriately.

In parallel fashion, my two year old granddaughter must have heard someway complain that they were "Too old for this" with respect to some particular activity and she appropriated the expression when she got tired of using her walking-bike. She said: "I'm too old for this," which of course made everyone laugh. Another misfire, to be sure, but she will eventually come to use this conventional humorous expression in the right contexts either by being corrected or by seeing the humor in using it in the wrong circumstances. Then it will become a tacit usage rather than an explicit one.

All of this may seem unduly obvious, but the actual acquiring of informal conventional expressions is as subtle as it is important. Of course, the more formal conventions, such as "I promise" or "I apologize," are generally acquired more by explicit teaching, either in personal or public circumstances. The former cases often arise in family give-and-take around the home, while the latter may be learned at school or in athletic contests. In any case, the slide, as it were, from the tacit to the explicit, or vice versa, is generally unconscious. Generally speaking, we have little memory of ever having acquired such conventional performatives. They usually slide from our subsidiary awareness into our focal awareness, or vice versa, depending on the circumstances and the linguistic purposes.

Perhaps the most interesting and important connection between Polanyi's insights and those of J.L. Austin pertain to the area of epistemology. Both have sought to break down the traditional dichotomy between what Austin called the "constative" and the "performative" character of language and knowing. Austin, for his part, asks: "Can we be sure that stating truly is a different *class* of assessment from arguing soundly, advising well, judging fairly,

and blaming justifiably? Do these not have something to do with facts?" and a bit further on: "But consider also for a moment whether the question of truth or falsity is so very objective. We ask: 'Is it a *fair* statement?' and are the good reasons and good evidence for stating and saying so very different from the good reasons and evidence for performative acts like arguing, warning, and judging?" (*How to Do Things with Words,* p. 141).

Polanyi, too, wants to establish a cognitivity continuum between explicit and tacit knowing based on the interactive dynamics between the awareness and activity dimensions of our human experience. As he says: "We always know more than we can say, and we can know nothing at all apart from tacit integrations." The title to his magnum opus, *Personal Knowledge* says it all. In all knowing there is a personal component operative that grounds cognitivity in the judgments of each person as he or she participates in the common search for truth. As mentioned earlier, truth, like knowledge, is always *somebody's* truth.

Finally, Austin is well-known for exploring the parallels between saying "I know" and saying "I promise." "But when I say 'I promise,' a new plunge is taken; I have not merely announced my intention, but, by using this formula (performing this ritual), I have bound myself to others, and staked my reputation in a new way. Similarly, saying 'I know' is taking a new plunge. But it is *not* saying 'I have performed a special feat of cognition,' superior, in the same scale as believing and being sure, even to being merely quite sure ... When I say 'I know', I *give others my word:* I *give others my authority for saying* that 'S is P'" (*Philosophical Papers,* p. 67).

This point, and this way of expressing it, is very much in line with Polanyi's emphasis on the personal quality of all knowing. In his Preface to *Personal Knowledge* he acknowledges this commitment: "I have shown that into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and that this coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge" (*Personal Knowledge,* Preface, xiv). This is extremely similar to the point that Austin makes in the above quoted passage.

Finally, it is time to turn to the thought of Merleau-Ponty by way of focusing his participation in the overall theme of this investigation, namely the direct connection between words, deeds, and bodies as it bears on the relationship between human linguistic, social, and physical behavior. Chapter 3 traced the main lines of Merleau-Ponty's approach to these issues by focusing on his view of the centrality of embodiment in human experience and knowing. So, here I shall expand on this emphasis as it relates to those of Michael Polanyi's thought.

The obvious place to begin is with the fact that both Merleau-Ponty and Polanyi place a great deal of emphasis on the central role played by the body in human existence, especially in relation to questions of linguistic meaning and knowing. As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty's main theme in his *Phenomenology of Perception* is that of the axial role of our embodiment in the development of our interaction with both the physical and social worlds in which we find ourselves. For him, in a very deep sense we *are* our bodies, we do not *have* bodies. Even our self-knowledge is largely a by-product of these interactions.

Polanyi, too, sees bodily activity as the ground-zero for all human knowing. Indeed, his schema for understanding the development of all human cognitivity begins with our embodied activity as we interact with the input from our subsidiary awareness of our various environments, both physical and social. The things that we *do* in and with our bodies

engender the patterns and development of very existence, especially as it pertains to the formation of the tacit structure of our knowledge, of what we *know*. Bodily skills lie at the heart of all knowing, both in everyday life and in the acquisition of scientific knowledge.

There is an obvious parallel between Polanyi's dynamic of the "from-to" nature of our awareness and Merleau-Ponty's notions of intentionality and the "project centered" character of its embodiment in everyday life. Both of these thinkers speak out against the mind/body dualism of traditional Western approaches to cognitivity as it has been developed by empiricists and rationalists alike. For both, human beings are seen as holistic agents who function as unitary entities in relation to physical and social reality. Our intentional behavior arises out of our inherent desire to interact with our surroundings, including each other.

In particular, we live and move in and from our physical bodies toward both concrete and abstract projects, both personal and social, from the very beginning of our human existence. From, or even before, birth tiny infants seek connection with their surroundings, grasping, sucking, searching out faces, and even imitating sounds. In their accounts there is no place for any "Lockeian-like" view of the human mind as a passive "blank tablet" on which experience writes. Humans "hit the ground running," as it were, seemingly already engaged in their surroundings.

In this regard, the notion of "imitation" plays a crucial role in the approaches of both Merleau-Ponty and Polanyi. It will be recalled that at the close of the chapter dealing with Merleau-Ponty's thought we discussed his approach to language acquisition. There he stressed the role of imitation in all linguistic learning. Children seek to participate in the adult world, trying to copy what they hear and see. They are continually invited to participate in the "dance" of language, indeed often forced to participate, and for the vast majority of cases, play along enthusiastically.

In that chapter we examined as well a wide variety of situations and moves that comprise the linguistic "dance." One example from my own experience that I neglected to mention was that of my ten month old daughter's invention of a word which she inserted into our family's regular vocabulary. Whenever we sought to feed her the morning cereal we would warn her that it might be hot by saying "Blow on it Jodie." She would try to copy this word, but it always came out as some sound like "Bleh." Soon this sound became the family word for cereal and whenever we were going to the store someone would say "Be sure to remember to get some Bleh." After a while we no longer thought of this new word as odd; it had become a real part of our family vocabulary.

So in some ways and at some levels the learning of language can become a two-way street. Grownups often learn to copy their child's speech patterns as well as the other way around. By and large, however, the dynamic functions in the reverse direction. Children learn to enter into the dance whenever and however they can, even if they fail to get everything absolutely correct. The point is that everything depends on the process of imitation, and eventually nearly everyone learns to get most of it right. Of course, sometimes a child will come off sounding like "Mrs. Malaprop" in Sheridan's "The Rivals," substituting the wrong word or making one up as they go along.

All this lines up rather well with Polanyi's account of how we acquire all our knowledge, including linguistic knowledge. By indwelling the input of subsidiary awareness through imitation and practice we ingest such experience and it becomes part of us. Then we attend

from it to other, as yet undigested experiential input. When these aspects of our experience are thus incorporated into our cognitive storehouse, Polanyi says this is accomplished by means of what he calls an *integrative act*. Once an item has been thus incorporated it has become a feature of our cognitive landscape. As with Merleau-Ponty, the key here is repetitive imitation through bodily interaction.

The important thing to bear in mind here, for both Merleau-Ponty and Polanyi, is that this process is essentially a tacit one. That is to say, the vast majority of what a child learns is acquired indirectly, through ongoing interaction with other, adult speakers of the language. For instance, by far most adult speakers cannot remember ever learning any particular word or expression in their mother tongue. These all come in through the back door, as it were, of our daily experience. Thus we generally work forward on the basis of such language to yet other, newer, language. The dynamic is "from" what is now tacitly known "to" that which is currently being known.

Once again we see Polanyi's insights into cognitive experience casting a strong light on our understanding of the concept of knowledge, especially that pertaining to language. In addition, his approach to such matters by means of the notion of tacit knowing provides an excellent basis for our grasp of the philosophical works of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Merleau-Ponty as they wrestle with the implications of the relationship amongst "words, deeds, and bodies." <>

Scholarly Personae in the History of Orientalism, 1870-1930 edited by Christiaan Engberts and Herman J. Paul [Brill, hardcover: 9789004395237 ebook: 978900440631 5]

This volume examines how the history of the humanities might be written through the prism of scholarly personae, understood as time- and place-specific models of being a scholar. Focusing on the field of study known as Orientalism in the decades around 1900, this volume examines how Semitists, Sinologists, and Japanologists, among others, conceived of their scholarly tasks, what sort of demands these job descriptions made on the scholar in terms of habits, virtues, and skills, and how models of being an orientalist changed over time under influence of new research methods, cross-cultural encounters, and political transformations.

All interested in the history of orientalism, the role of virtues and vices in scholarly self-understanding, and changing scholarly personae in the history of humanities.

Contributors are Tim Barrett, Christiaan Engberts, Holger Gzella, Hans Martin Krämer, Arie L. Molendijk, Herman Paul, Pascale Rabault-Feuerhahn and Henning Trüper.

Contents
Acknowledgments
List of Illustrations
Notes on Contributors
Introduction: Scholarly Personae in the History of Orientalism, 1870-1930
Herman Paul
1 The Prussian Professor as a Paradigm: Trying to "Fit In" as a Semitist between 1870

Excerpt: In 1884, the Lebanese philologist Ibrāhīm al-Yāziğī (1847-1906) filed a harsh complaint about Arabic studies in Europe when he reproached the then just-deceased Reinhart Pieter Anne Dozy (1820-1883) for never having visited the Middle East. How could Dozy or any of his colleagues in Europe claim Arabic expertise without ever having heard the language spoken on the street or sought the opportunity to meet and learn from native speakers? Al-Yāziğī dissociated himself from generations of European Arabists when he concluded:

> In spite of all research proficiency, in spite of the high ambitions, in spite of all patience in observing and writing, the man [Dozy] lacked the best means for understanding the Arabic language, the classical and the modern alike, because, to our knowledge, he has never traveled to one of the Arabic-speaking countries, such as Egypt or Syria, and conversed orally with only few Arabs, but learned the language solely from books, with the help of people among his fellow-countrymen whom are called Orientalists.

By the late nineteenth century, such complaints were voiced not only in the Middle East, but also among younger European Orientalists such as Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921) and Martin Hartmann (1851-1918). Even at Dozy's *alma mater*, Leiden University, where Michael Jan de Goeje (1836-1909) faithfully built upon Dozy's legacy, disparaging words on Dozy's philological heritage could be heard. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) was the most outspoken of these critics. Although his doctoral dissertation on *Het Mekkaansche feest* (1880) still contained a few polite words on his *Doktorgroßvater*, his dissociation from Dozy became apparent when, in 1884, he deemed it necessary to travel to Mecca to do fieldwork in the center of Islam.[3] Such fieldwork required different qualities than manuscript study as practiced by Dozy. It demanded not only active command of, in this case, Arabic, and the ability to gather relevant data, but also, as Snouck's adventures illustrated, social and political skills for acquiring funding, organizing research on foreign territory, and winning support from local communities – not to mention contempt for death in the case of scholars reckless enough to join the Hajj.

Recent scholarship mostly treats this late nineteenth-century dissatisfaction with "armchair philology" as indicative of a paradigm shift that took place in Arabic studies. Suzanne

Marchand, for example, distinguishes between the "lonely Orientalists" between 1820 and 1870, who devoted most of their energies to "specialized, historicist study," and a generation of "furious" Orientalists in the decades around 1900, who for various reasons dissociated themselves from a philological heritage and instead attached increasing value to conducting fieldwork, studying contemporary problems, and rendering services to colonial administrations. Consequently, in Marchand's assessment, "going there" became nothing less than a career requirement. Likewise, Sabine Mangold highlights the frustration that German Arabists around 1900 felt about the philological inheritance of especially Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer (1801-1888), the influential Leipzig Orientalist. Drawing on the cases of Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-1933) and Georg Kampffmeyer (1864-1936), among others, Mangold shows how an increasing interest in Arabic *realia* (economics, politics, religion) went together with growing disdain for philological text fetishism.

Obviously, not all fields of Oriental studies underwent the same changes as did Arabic studies around 1900. At the time, Orientalism (*Orientalistik*, *orientalisme*) was the name of a cluster of fields, including but not limited to Islamic, Sanskrit, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese studies.[7] Although these subfields were related, and populated by overlapping groups of scholars, the historical trajectories of these emerging disciplines took different forms, depending, among other things, on national contexts, colonial politics, and commercial interests. Chinese studies, for example, underwent a transition almost opposed to that of Arabist studies. Here a philological ethos, defended in terms of *Wissenschaftlichkeit*, only emerged in the early twentieth century, aftera period of mostly "practical," linguistically oriented teaching and writing aimed at educating interpreters and civil servants. Field-specific patterns of development and national differences notwithstanding, the Arabist examples mentioned above hint at something important. They suggest that the emergence of new research questions, new methods, or new societal demands could change the very idea and reality of "being an Orientalist." Just as, at Leiden University, Jan Julius Lodewijk Duyvendak (1889-1954) represented a new type of Sinologist, compared to his predecessor Gustaaf Schlegel (1840-1903), so Goldziher, Hartmann, and Snouck represented a generation of Orientalists that conceived of themselves, their academic tasks, and their professional identities in terms that would have been implausible to Fleischer or Dozy.

This raises a question that so far has received only limited attention in the historiography of Orientalism, or in the history of the humanities more broadly: how did scholars experience and define their professional identities? What did it take for them to be a professor, *Privatdozent*, or non-academic researcher in the field of Oriental studies? What talents, virtues, or skills did this require? Also, how were these skills and virtues acquired or molded, especially but not only in educational practices, and what positive or negative models were invoked in contexts of socialization? If the models that Dozy and Fleischer had embodied came to be regarded as old-fashioned, what alternative models did Snouck, Hartmann, and Goldziher put in their place? And how were these different understandings of what it meant to be an Arabist, Egyptologist, or Sinologist related to professional identities in other areas of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, not to mention the emerging social sciences?

Historians of science have developed the concept of "scientific" or "scholarly personae" to capture such different, overlapping, and often conflicting templates of scholarly selfhood that scholars developed, tried to appropriate, and sought to instill in their students. In what follows, I will (1) briefly introduce this concept in its three main variants, (2) explain why scholarly personae need to be studied empirically, in different fields of study, (3) make a

case for Orientalism as a suitable case study for trying out this concept, and (4) briefly summarize how the chapters brought together in this volume contribute to this project.

Scholarly Personae

The newly founded journal *Persona Studies* represents a first approach to our subject: an approach that is largely rooted in cultural studies but appeals to scholars throughout the humanities. Central to this approach is the assumption that social life requires people to present themselves in ways that are recognizable to others as well as effective in granting people "identities" that help them navigate the demands of social life. Drawing on the old Latin *persona*, which among other things could refer to a mask worn by theater actors, advocates of this first approach conceive of *personae* as shorthand for identities that people articulate or "perform" in contextually sensitive ways. Although adherents of this first approach acknowledge that identities are not created *ex nihilo*, but are indebted to social traditions that make certain public identities appear as more plausible than others, the founding editors of *Persona Studies*, P. David Marshall and Kim Barbour, highlight the agency of individuals to shape their own *personae*. For Marshall and Barbour, then, *personae* are performances of identity, acts of self-fashioning, or tools for public "impression management" (to borrow a term from Erving Goffman). Accordingly, their analysis of the use and function of *personae* focuses near-exclusively on how individuals "produce," "perform," "enact," "inhabit," "negotiate," and "manage" their identities – in personalizing their game avatars or through playful mixture of professional role identities in work environments.

Applied to the history of scholarship (or the history of science, if this is understood to cover the social sciences and humanities, too), this first approach encourages research on what Richard Karwan calls "scholarly self-fashioning." A noteworthy contribution to this research agenda comes from Mineke Bosch, who highlights the importance of scholarly self-fashioning in the claiming of academic authority. To be accepted as a trustworthy member of a scientific community, scholars not only need to engage in serious research, but also must follow social conventions extending well beyond the realm of ideas. In Bosch's own words,

The scholarly identity makes use of specific bodily practices such as dietetics and routines of physical conduct (sexuality and sports for instance), but also of dress and other tools to keep up the appearance of a "truth-speaker" – beards and moustaches, or for women "ascetic dress" or "comfortable footwear" instead of high heels.

Bosch thus uses the persona concept to draw attention to how scholars present themselves to each other, not only verbally, but also with their bodies and through their "emotion management." Like Marshall and Barbour, Bosch acknowledges the importance of culturally shared repertoires, but highlights the unique touches that individuals add in adapting such models to their own purposes. Consequently, she can attribute *personae* to individuals, speaking for instance about "[Robert] Fruin's scholarly persona" and "[Pieter] van Winter's scholarly persona."

This would be inconceivable within the second approach that must be mentioned here – an approach inspired by the anthropology of Marcel Mauss but articulated most forcefully by Lorraine Daston and H. Otto Sibum in a seminal 2003 theme issue of *Science in Context*. For Daston and Sibum, scientific *personae* are cultural templates for the social role of a *Gelehrter*, *savant*, man of learning, orscientist. Although these templates can be adapted

to new circumstances or even disappear in favor of others, as happened to the *Naturforscher* and the *femme savant*, they usually change at a slow or even very slow pace. As time-, place-, and discipline-transcending models of how to be a scientist, *personae* belong to what historians of science, with a nod to Fernand Braudel, call a *histoire de longue durée*. Consequently, *personae* are best regarded as collective entities, of which Daston and Sibum claim that they ontologically precede individual social existence:

To understand personae in this sense is to reject a social ontology that treats only flesh-and-blood individuals as real, and dismisses all collective entities as mere aggregates, parasitic upon individuals. Personae are as real or more real than biological individuals, in that they create the possibilities of being in the human world, schooling the mind, body, and soul in distinctive and indelible ways.

Applying Daston's and Sibum's definition of scientific *personae* to the world of early modern learning, Gadi Algazi likewise treats *personae* as "materials that persons are made of." As his discussion of Johannes Kepler suggests, men of learning in early modern Europe could navigate between several *personae*. But as Kepler found out, they could not easily transform them: the power of these cultural institutions was too large for individuals to challenge. As collective representations, *personae* could not be changed "by force of personal decision."

This implies that real differences exist between the first and second approaches to the concept of scholarly *personae*. While the first one revolves around self-fashioning and self-presentation, the second one focuses on broadly shared images of what it takes to be a scientist or man of learning. While the former zooms in on individuals in specific cultural settings, the latter engages in macro-level analysis, tracing scholarly *personae* across centuries. And if Daston and Sibum are right about the social ontologies underlying these persona concepts, these are more than differences in emphasis. Insofar as the two approaches are rooted in different anthropological assumptions, or different metaphysical views of human agency, they are irreconcilable.

Yet as Algazi rightly notes, we are not left with these alternatives. There is a third approach – a conception of scholarly *personae* of which Algazi is not entirely uncritical, but one that has the advantage of occupying a middle-range position between the biographical and the social, or between individuals engaged in "impression management," on the one hand, and powerful cultural institutions, on the other. This third approach, to which most chapters in this volume relate, is specifically tailored to situations of disagreement or uncertainty about the marks of a good scholar. Treating scholarly personae as "models" of what a scholar is, characterized by distinct combinations of talents, virtues, and/or skills, this third approach is premised on the assumption that personae never come in the singular. The persona that Dozy embodied became visible only when it was contrasted with others – when al-Yāziğī and others began to criticize it, when Snouck began to adopt a different model of "how to be a scholar," or, much earlier, when Dozy and his colleagues advocated philological criticism as a mark of *Wissenschaftlichkeit* over against older, theologically-inspired modes of Arabic scholarship.

Personae, in this third definition, are models, past or present, inherited or invented, of what it takes to be a scholar. Usually, they are attributed to influential individuals, who thereby come to serve as their embodiments, positively or negatively. Thus, for Carl Heinrich Becker, "Fleischer's era" referred to a time in the history of Orientalism when philological criticism such as practiced by Fleischer was regarded as the defining mark of an Orientalist scholar. This is not to say that Fleischer created his own persona, as the first approach

would say, but rather that, for various reasons, the name Fleischer came to serve as shorthand for a persona that assigned great significance to source critical attitudes. The proper name was thus turned into a generic one, sometimes (not necessarily in Fleischer's case) even to the point of becoming a stereotype that no longer maintained a clear relation to its name-giver.

The third approach encourages research on how personae served as models for imitation, emulation, and dissociation alike. It draws attention to how virtues, vices, skills, and talents were associated with specific individuals – the name of Heinrich Ewald (1803-1875) being widely perceived as synonymous to dogmatism and arrogance, for instance – and how such embodied personae were remembered, positively or negatively, for the sake of advocating (or criticizing) certain constellations of virtues and skills. Also, it examines why scholarly personae were often defined in contrastive terms, as means for remedying the perceived shortcomings of other personae. Scholarly personae are thus a conceptual tool for distinguishing between competing models of how to be a scholar, as defined by historical agents or as distinguished in hindsight by historians of science. This implies that the third approach is particularly suited to examining clashes or tensions between generations, schools, traditions, or cultures, each with their own expectations regarding the virtues or skills characteristic of a scholar.

Case Studies

To what extent, then, did al-Yāziğī's criticism of Dozy, with which I started, reflect a clash between different, perhaps even incompatible personae? Admittedly, the persona cultivated by al-Yāziğī and his Arabic nationalist compatriots in the Syrian Scientific Society, among other associations, cannot be neatly classified as a *scholarly* persona (one that only professional scholars could appropriate). This, however, was the whole point of al-Yāziğī's criticism: the philologist, poet, and journalist that was al-Yāziğī had little patience for "bookish" scholars such as Dozy. His ideal of philological scholarship in the service of Arabic nationalism made him rebel against what he perceived as a much too narrow persona.

At the same time, academic Orientalists defended "narrow" professional identities by dissociating themselves from "accidental Orientalists," or from non-academic authors writing about their experiences in the Near or Far East. Clearly, such criticism served purposes of academic boundary work. However, as Max Müller (1823-1900) experienced, such demarcation strategies could also be employed within the academic world, even against famous Orientalists. When Müller, a prolific author of popular books on Hinduism and Sanskrit literature, was criticized for "cater[ing] to the public so long that scholarly work had become of only secondary consequence," this showed that at least part of his work was seen as not befitting an Oxford professor. In Arie L. Molendijk's analysis, Müller's problem was that he tried to combine a scholarly persona with the persona of a sage in a time and place where this was deemed inappropriate. Likewise, Dozy's controversial study of the Israelites in Mecca, published in 1864, elicited critical feedback from colleagues who believed that speculation did not befit a serious student of Arabic – one that Dozy had been, judging by his *Recherches sur l'histoire politique et littéraire de l'Espagne pendant le moyen âge* (1848). The persona at stake in this controversy, then, was one that Dozy himself was perceived as having embodied in an earlier phase of his life.

What these examples show is that scholarly personae can be located, or indeed were located, at different levels: within fields of research, in and outside of academic scholarship, as well as geographically, between Europe and the Arab world. If scholarly personae are

often defined in contrastive terms, this implies that the contrasts can be drawn at different levels of generalization. This, in turn, suggests that a concept like scholarly personae is better not defined in the abstract. Empirical historical research is needed for adding muscle and flesh to the bones of the concept, that is, for showing when, how, and why historical agents felt a need to distinguish between different models of being a scholar.

Orientalism

Orientalism is obviously not the only field of study in which the scholarly persona concept (in the third variant) can be tested. In the past few years, attempts have been made to apply and refine the concept in fields as diverse as nineteenth-century history and twentieth-century statistics. In the meantime, stimulating work has been done on how funding agencies in the early twentieth century helped shape scholarly personae. Still, the work has only just begun: comparisons with other disciplines, in and outside of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, are as of yet hardly possible. There are three reasons, then, why Orientalism in its late nineteenth and early twentieth-century European incarnations seems an interesting case for further exploring and testing the persona concept.

First, just like other emerging humanities disciplines at the time, late nineteenth-century Orientalism went through processes often referred to as "professionalization." Concretely, this meant that a field in which academic scholars had always found themselves accompanied by "a broad range of explorers, adventurers, and travelers: missionaries, theologians, and preachers; eccentrics, frauds, and crackpots; social reformers, political advocates, soldiers, spies, and diplomatic representatives of various European regimes" tried to define itself in more academic terms. As Suzanne Marchand puts it: "Part of this effort was focused on pushing out, or at least getting around, the aristocrats, missionaries, and diplomats who still contributed much to Oriental studies": they were perceived as embodying different personae than those befitting a serious Orientalist.

Secondly, Orientalism was a field fraught with religious, political, and ideological struggles, with perennial disagreement not only over the boundaries, but also over the very essence of what constituted Oriental studies. The degree of divergence was even such that, in Robert Irwin's assessment, "there was hardly an Orientalist type or a common Orientalist discourse" in Europe. Regardless of whether this is true or not, correspondences in which Oriental scholars continuously evaluated each other's scholarly conduct – not only their academic output, but also their teaching and their political engagement – suggest that issues of scholarly selfhood ranked high on the agenda, perhaps precisely because agreement was hard to reach. Time and again, Orientalists quarreled over the relation between academic reputation and popularizing work, the desirability of studying living languages, or the pros and cons of doing advisory work for colonial administrations.

A third and final reason as to why Oriental studies in the decades around 1900 is an interesting case study for testing the concept of scholarly personae is that intercultural exchanges such as al-Yāziǧī's criticism of Dozy were more likely to occur there than in history or statistics. In comparison to other humanities disciplines in Europe, Oriental studies was a field that found itself more frequently subjected to critical evaluation from outside of Europe. Did al-Yāziǧī's criticism of Dozy and his colleagues "whom are called Orientalists" have any impact on what it meant to be an Orientalist? How was the Orientalist persona affected by fieldwork in countries far away from European libraries and universities?

This Volume

This volume thus approaches the world of Oriental studies between, roughly, 1870 and 1930 through the prism of scholarly persona. Its key question is a heuristic one: to what extent does the persona concept (in the third variant) contribute to a better understanding of unity and disunity among European Orientalists around 1900? In pursuing this question, the chapters that follow touch upon a range of sub-questions. What were the crucial factors that made some scholarly personaemore successful, or at least more visible, than others? How did scholarly personae relate to non-scholarly ones, or to hybrid role identities like the "missionary–scholar," the "political professor," and the "public intellectual"? How did such personae affect day-to-day practices, such as the writing of book reviews – a genre in which evaluative standards often became quite explicit? And how different or similar were the subfields of Arabic, Semitic, Sanskrit, Chinese, and Japanese studies in these respects? Although this volume cannot possibly pretend to address these questions in satisfactory depth, it tries to put them on the agenda, so to speak, by showing in some detail what kind of historical analysis can be done through the prism of scholarly personae.

In his opening chapter, Holger Gzella shows how late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German Semitists (Hebraists and Aramaicists) struggled with the emerging persona of a "secular" university professor. Although this persona with its corresponding intellectual virtues was recognized as a new professional ideal across the discipline, it posed difficult dilemmas for scholars whose confessional loyalties made them prefer different configurations of the "sacred" and the "secular." Drawing on the cases of Gustav Bickell (1838-1906), Jacob Barth (1851-1914), Mark Lidzbarski (1868-1928), and Hans Bauer (1878-1937), Gzella shows how different German Semitists responded differently to these tensions, thereby suggesting that, for them, scholarly personae served as points of orientation more than as models for imitation.

As Arie L. Molendijk shows in his chapter on Max Müller, transgressing standards of conduct embodied by scholarly personae was not without consequences. Although Müller in many respects personified the philological virtues that late nineteenth-century students of Sanskrit perceived as marks of scholarly virtuosity, his popular lectures and publications targeted at "young ladies and easy-going people" (as one critic phrased it) were not seen as befitting a real academic. Likewise, the entrepreneurial qualities that Müller needed for successfully carrying out his *Sacred Books of the East* project (50 vols., 1879-1910) did not fit a philological persona. Like other nineteenth-century pioneers in "big humanities" projects, then, Müller had to navigate between multiple personae, thereby invariably invoking criticism from colleagues committed to distinguishing sharply between "scholarly" and "non-scholarly" personae.

Henning Trüper explores the moral dilemmas in which Orientalists could get entangled by presenting themselves and their colleagues as virtuous scholars, even in cases where this was less than obvious. When the Strasbourg Semitist Enno Littmann (1875-1958) edited the travel diary of the German Orientalist Julius Euting (1839-1913) from his journey to "Inner Arabia" in 1883-1884, Littmann tried to present Euting as an epitome of scholarly virtue, even if this required editing or reworking problematic passages in Euting's manuscript. Ironically, then, Littmann's defense of scholarly virtue required committing a philological vice – an observation that clearly challenges rigid distinctions between scholarly virtues and vices.

If Littmann was an arduous scholarly traveler – in the early 1900s, he conducted fieldwork in Eritrea and Ethiopia – so was the German-born Iranologist and Indologist Martin Haug (1827-1876). As Pascale Rabault-Feuerhahn shows in her chapter on Haug, German Indology underwent a transition like Arabic studies in that "armchair philology" was increasingly perceived as an old-fashioned mode of Orientalist scholarship. Yet, as illustrated by the opposition that Haug met with among his German colleagues after his Indian travels, this development was neither linear nor uncontested. The emergence of new scholarly personae might be better understood in terms of accumulation than in terms of succession.

Timothy Barrett's chapter on Herbert Giles (1845-1935), the second Professor of Chinese at Cambridge University, nonetheless shows that certain scholarly practices, such as hostile book reviews in *ad hominem* language, became increasingly rare, and therefore more spectacular when they still made it into print. During Giles's lifetime, the lonely Sinologist, working in splendid isolation from others, was gradually replaced by a new persona: a university professor with colleagues and students, working in professional environments where "old-fashioned warriors" like Giles himself were no longer given much space. What this example shows, among other things, is that scholarly personae must be understood against their social backgrounds. A discipline with journals and conferences requires more collegiality, and therefore different standards of public evaluation, than the non-institutionalized field that was Sinology in Giles's young years.

Just like Chinese studies, Japanese studies was a field to which Christian missionaries actively contributed. Also, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, Buddhist priests from Japan played a major part in furthering the study of Japanese religion. This leads Hans Martin Krämer to wonder to what extent the category of *scholarly* personae can be applied to the founding fathers of Japanese studies. Isn't the adjective too restrictive, especially if "scholarly" is treated as synonymous with "academic"? A persona perspective nonetheless enables Krämer to distinguish between three groups of actors in early Japanese studies: European philologists like August Pfizmaier (1808-1887) and Léon de Rosny (1837-1914), Japanese scholars and practitioners of Buddhism such as Akamatsu Renjō (1841-1919), Nanjō Bun'yū (1849-1927), and Kasawara Kenju (1852-1883), and, finally, European missionaries *cum* fieldworkers like Robbins Brown (1810-1880), James C. Hepburn (1815-1911), and Hans Haas (1868-1934).

Christiaan Engberts, finally, examines how classic tensions between nationalism and internationalism, such as experienced most dramatically in times of war, affected the scholarly persona as defined by Dutch and German Semitists in the 1910s. During World War I, Carl Heinrich Becker and Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje came to disagree sharply, not only on Germany's colonial politics, but also, more importantly, on the relation between scholarly work and nationalist commitments. Was Snouck's scholarship still respectable when the Leiden Orientalist, much to Becker's annoyance, failed to acknowledge Germany's world historical role? Was international cooperation, for instance in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1913-1938), still possible when its contributors found themselves taking different political stances?

Scholarly personae, then, were invoked at different occasions and contrasted in different ways. As shown by the chapters in this volume, personae were not etched in stone: they took shape in response to circumstances that varied across time and place. Often, they were articulated in response to perceived threats, or held up as alternatives to "others" in time (old-fashioned armchair philology), place (non-European learning), or social position

(amateurism). This is hardly surprising: only when a mode of being a scholar was perceived as being under threat, or as new and not yet sufficiently accepted, did its defining features have to be articulated and defended. Interestingly, this not only explains why scholarly personae were debated most explicitly in contexts of controversy, but also why relative outsiders such as Ibrāhīm al-Yāziǧī often had a sharp eye for them.

This, finally, reveals one of the most important historiographical differences that looking at scholarship through the prism of scholarly personae can make. While existing literature on the history of Orientalism and the history of the humanities more broadly often focuses on *diachronic development*, especially in employing teleological categories like "professionalization" and "specialization," the prism of scholarly personae encourages historians to acknowledge *synchronic variety*, especially insofar as scholarly identities are concerned. Consequently, it is much better equipped to deal with non-European scholars like al-Yāziǧī, or with Buddhist students of Japanese religion as discussed in Krämer's chapter, than are histories that focus on the "development" of Western scholarship. Even if only applied to European case studies, the prism of scholarly personae naturally draws attention to "internal subaltern" groups, such as the Jewish and Catholic scholars examined by Gzella. If only for this reason, the promise of the perspective adopted in this volume reaches well beyond the field of Oriental studies. <>

Evaluative Cognitivism by Simon Kirchin [Oxford University Press, 9780198803430]

We use evaluative terms and concepts every day. We call actions right and wrong, teachers wise and ignorant, and pictures elegant and grotesque. Philosophers place evaluative concepts into two camps. Thin concepts, such as goodness and badness, and rightness and wrongness have evaluative content, but they supposedly have no or hardly any nonevaluative, descriptive content: they supposedly give little or no specific idea about the character of the person or thing described. In contrast, thick concepts such as kindness, elegance and wisdom supposedly give a more specific idea of people or things. Yet, given typical linguistic conventions, thick concepts also convey evaluation. Kind people are often viewed positively whilst ignorance has negative connotations.

The distinction between thin and thick concepts is frequently drawn in philosophy and is central to everyday life. However, very few articles or books discuss the distinction. In this full-length study, Simon Kirchin discusses thin and thick concepts, highlighting key assumptions, questions and arguments, many of which have gone unnoticed. Kirchin focuses in on the debate between 'separationists' (those who think that thick concepts can be separated into component parts of evaluative, often very 'thin', content and nonevaluative content) and 'nonseparationists' (who deny this).

Thick Evaluation argues for a version of nonseparationism, and in doing so argues both that many concepts are evaluative and also that evaluation is not exhausted by thin positive and negative stances.

In conclusion considers what implication this study's account of thin and thick concepts has for metaethics more generally. If one thinks that thick concepts are basic and fundamental concepts, does that mean one is committed to the existence of thick properties? Or, in other words, is there a (thick) evaluative reality? This chapter unpicks a number of assumptions

lying behind some evaluative realist accounts (particularly mind-independent accounts of evaluative properties) and shows the way in which a more modest cognitive account of evaluation may work. The chapter ends by indicating at least one further direction for our thoughts, namely the question of how one should understand the difference between concepts and conceptions, and what implications this has for how people communicate with each other and how one should conceptualize agreement and disagreement.

Keywords: cognitivism, concept-conception, evaluative property, evaluative realism, metaethics, mind-independence

As advertised, this concluding chapter deals with an issue that has bubbled up every so often, namely what we are to say of the ontology that lies behind our conceptual categorizations? This is, to be frank, a topic worth a book or more itself. My aim here is very modest, namely to sketch some recent philosophical currents and draw together some of my thoughts to show what we may begin to say on this issue in connection with points made in this book. Although this chapter uses 'cognitivism' in its title, 'realism' could have been used in its stead.

A Train of Thought

The concepts that we use are typically couched in and expressed by various judgements we make. It is natural to think that many of these judgements can be true or false, correct or incorrect, and we think it is important that such judgements are this way. The truth value of 'Jupiter is bigger than Saturn' really matters for many reasons, one of which is just that we think there is a fact of the matter about the comparative sizes of planets. Some judgements and issues are more important than others. It really matters how those bacteria behave and what we say about their nature, for people are getting very ill and the bacteria may be the cause. In contrast, it is typically not so important exactly how many worms are in my compost heap.

We often express thick concepts in ways that indicate we are trying to make judgements about the world. We are categorizing the world in certain ways, and want to present it correctly. And, when it comes to evaluations, we are often doing things of importance. It really matters whether the action was cruel or kind, and it really matters whether the dress is classy or vulgar. If so, and if they are important, we had better make sure that we can support the idea that evaluative judgements get to be true and false.

When it comes to many other sorts of judgement and concept, we typically assume that we should look to the world. Rightly or wrongly we might assume a sort of correspondence theory of truth: our linguistic expressions are attempts to map onto the world in some way, and when they do it successfully we call such expressions true, and when they fail we call them false. Now, there is much to be said about the correspondence theory of truth, and the problems it faces, but it has a strong grip on people, be they philosophers or not. If we go down this path, we confront the obvious question, 'What sort of thing is there which makes evaluative judgements true?' The obvious answer is to postulate the existence of a type of evaluative entity: a property, fact or similar thing. There is some evaluative stuff that is real and which is such that if judgements correspond with it (whatever 'correspond' may mean), such judgements are true. If we do not postulate the existence of such stuff, then it is unclear how such judgements could be true. When it comes to evaluations and evaluative concepts, in particular, people have different views and employ different concepts. There is

no way that there can be truth unless there are things—evaluative things—that anchor all of those judgements.

Indeed, once we reflect on that last point we must realize that we have to conceive of the existence of these evaluative things in some way which is free of human influence. Built into the train of thought I am following is the idea that people have all sorts of views and employ all sorts of concepts. We can thus distinguish two ways of going wrong: applying a concept to the wrong thing (because we are foolish, or uninformed, or mad, say), and using a bogus concept in the first place (perhaps by using SCHMABOO instead of TABOO, perhaps by using racist slurs). If we base the existence of the evaluative things that make judgements true and false on anything to do with humans and our influence then we are basing them on biases, prejudices, and other undesirable things. We need to assume such things are created and maintained in some mind-independent fashion. Or in other words, while it is a human matter which judgements we make, if we want to ensure the legitimacy and authority of evaluative judgements, we should say that the things which the judgements are judgements of, are decidedly not human matters: humans do not determine or influence what evaluative things exist and their nature.

So, in short, when we say that some action is cruel, or some dress is vulgar, there really is a fact of the matter that determines whether we speak truly. Further, this fact of the matter is not itself based on anything human, be it whim or something more solid and measured. It is determined mind-independently. Indeed, once we think like that, it could be that the dress is neither vulgar nor elegant. That is, the concepts and terms we use are all hopeless; none of them capture or 'cut' the world correctly. Why think that our human-based concepts are correct, particularly as we have now invoked the notion of mind-independence? Perhaps there are better ways to categorize the world, such as those the Martians use. Perhaps the dress is schmelegant not elegant.

Thoughts about that Train of Thought

There is a lot that goes wrong in this train of thought. I will not worry too much about the end point. Mind-independent evaluative realism, particularly in ethics, will always have its supporters, both within philosophy and outside. It is easy to see why. It is fuelled by a fear of relativism and clamour for a certain sort of certainty. While some people (even philosophers) may be more inclined towards relativism of at least some variety when it comes to aesthetics, in ethics the stakes seem higher. Even if we care passionately about the transcendence of art, in ethics we are thinking about suffering and death, and prolonged happiness and freedom. We may feel happier to live and let live in art, but in ethics we cannot leave things there. (Or so many philosophers assume.) It seems to matter strongly whether we keep promises and whether a society is just. And these matters cannot be left to human judgement alone. We had better get these judgements right, and getting it right cannot simply be a matter of reflecting our own prejudices and biases, because for all we know we may be simply repeating what we are comfortable with, not getting at the truth.

I can understand why this view of ethical matters has it adherents, and why the quest for truth turns into a postulation of mind-independent ethical or evaluative entities. I believe, however, that this position is fundamentally misguided. But I am not going to argue against it here, and instead I turn to think about the various ways in which we can respond once we recognize it as an option.

Many different sorts of theorist will reject this notion of an ethical or evaluative property. Some will think we can do away altogether with any notions of truth and will fall back on to a type of relativism or nihilism. Others will try to retain something of the idea of truth while rejecting the ontology. These are the more interesting positions in contemporary metaethics.

But of these more interesting positions some still go wrong, in my view. Let me sketch two. Error theorists, particularly those influenced directly by the arguments of John Mackie, think that the ethical properties—or 'objective prescriptions'—that everyday moral thought and language can be seen to rely on simply do not exist. Why not? Because, according to those that follow Mackie, the sort of conception of ethical properties to be found in everyday moral thought and language is that given above, and the idea of a mind-independent value property is an incoherent notion. So, ethical thought is in systematic error, for we are making judgements using a bogus notion. There is a lot to say about Mackie's version of error theory, and error theory generally.4 One main worry is that Mackie and others have misidentified their target. It is unclear how strong this conception of ethical properties is in everyday moral thought and language. If other options are on the table, ones that make the truth of true moral judgements more palatable, then we should not reject something as old and as useful as ethical thought at all. And, further, what are we to say about other sorts of prescription and evaluative property, particularly such as those found in epistemology where there seem to be requirements or reasons to believe such-and-such?

A second position that goes wrong is noncognitivism/expressivism. Things are tricky here. Noncognitivism is, strictly, a view about the mental states that typically accompany everyday ethical judgements (or should be viewed by philosophers to accompany them). Similarly, expressivism is strictly a view about how language works (or how it should be seen to work). It is not, strictly, a view about ontology. However, ontological and conceptual claims about ethics come in noncognitivism's (and expressivism's) wake. For if we can show that ethical language and thought work in a certain way, and work well in a certain way, without the need for a postulation of ethical properties at all, then why bother postulating such things?

Why and how does noncognitivism go wrong? Again, there is much to comment on, and some of this has already occupied us in this study. As with error theory, I think its failure is due to a misunderstanding about what a sensible sort of realism could be: a realism that can respond to the challenge of relativism sensibly, yet which does not go as far as postulating mind-independent properties and which accommodates some of what is good in noncognitivism.

During the 1980s and beyond, analytic philosophy saw the rise of this sort of sensible position, labelled in various ways. For simplicity's sake, let me call it 'sensibility theory'. (The name relates to people's sensibility, not the fact that many regarded it as sensible.) It was associated most famously with the work of McDowell and Wiggins. In short, values were seen to be analogous to Locke's idea of secondary qualities. There were not mind-independently existing things, but things whose reality could be said to depend, in some way, on human beings and how they perceive and experience the world. In forming his view, McDowell was, famously, explicitly arguing against error theorists and noncognitivists.

There are questionable aspects of this view. For example, we require details of how some natural stuff and some human stuff combine to create some value stuff that in turn can be

seen, by philosophers, to constitute the stuff to which our judgements are answerable. There is devilish detail here. Despite that detail, I believe this view broadly get things right, or at least it is better than error theory and noncognitivism.

And yet...the sort of realism that is developed is, perhaps, far too optimistic. (In fairness, as I read them Wiggins was more reluctant than McDowell in his use of 'realism' and 'features'.) There is a confidence that ethical judgements are true and false, and that we can determine which ones are which and why. There is a confidence that we can indicate the better sorts of judge—the virtuous and wise judges—who will act as our determiners (if not stipulators) of the moral compass.

Williams' views on these matters, which I summarized in the previous chapter, are more nuanced. They are also more realistic, realistic in that everyday sense of the word that sometimes goes unconsidered in philosophical debates. Forming moral judgements is a hard process, and not just because there may be many considerations to bring to bear. It is hard because there is no clear sense that we have a best judge who can determine what we should say; even a philosophical fiction of such a person designed to further certain intuitions may stand in the way. It is also hard because it is one thing to say that we want to be able to distinguish the better concepts from the worse concepts; far harder to arrive at neutral criteria that would enable such a comparison. Perhaps the confidence on show in sensibility theory is misplaced.

This is, as advertised, deliberately sketchy. Let me break out of this survey to make three points relevant to our concerns in this book. First, recall one of the notes from Chapter Five. It seems as if a commitment to the shapelessness of KIND involves a commitment to existence of something we can call kindness. The challenge is to reflect on the reality of kindness. I pointed out there that cognitivism and realism are distinct positions, just as noncognitivism and non-realism are distinct. However, this is not to say that the two cannot be embraced by one overall stance, nor that the insights of one position cannot be shared by the other. Williams and McDowell have their differences, a few of which I have touched upon in this book. The best hope I can see of forming a position concerning the reality of the thick, if we call it that, is one that, like Williams' position, does not give in to easy views about realism but which, unlike him, is optimistic about our confidence in forming views and using evaluative concepts. In the previous chapter I indicated the ways in which we should be more confident than Williams is. If, over time, we find that our use of concepts results in a better life—I leave this notion vague here—then why should we not be confident in how we live, categorize, and justify? Given that we categorize and justify by looking at how the world works, why not call this position a type of realism? Why not assume that we can, within our own justificatory system, have the resources to draw meaningful divisions between the better and worse and, therefore, between the true and the false? Why not think that such divisions and justifications that started from within a worldview could not gain legitimacy and authority that reached beyond these initial confines? This would take, of course, a focus on what sort of theory of truth we would wish to adopt.

We can also call this position 'cognitivism'. I am, as a second point, not too fussed about labels here. Despite my use of labels through this book, what really matters to me are the ideas that stand behind them. (And I hope my dissection of various labels shows how important that is to me.) Blackburn has often criticized McDowell, and other realists, for a seemingly simple postulation of something within one's philosophical view—reality, truth,

knowledge—that really should be earned through honest toil, by which Blackburn means analysed, justified, and constructed in a plausible fashion. I am all for honest toil. Yet, in my view what we can earn has the right to be called a realist account, even if it falls short of the mind-independent realism I sketched earlier. Blackburn's position is labelled by him, accurately, as 'quasi-realism'. In my view there is no reason to think that we have to retain the 'quasi-' prefix, even if such a view postulates the existence of evaluative stuff that exists in a way different from the way in which, say, some scientific properties exist.

But this brings me to a third and most important point. Every so often I have mentioned the fact–value distinction, and I have discussed it earlier in this book. Thick concepts, it has been said, hold out the hope that this distinction is erroneous. A sensible challenge to those that advocate it does not claim that there are no value-free facts. Rather, it claims that there may be some things that appear to be factual but which, on closer inspection, are not as value-free as one thinks and, further, that the division between the two supposed groups is blurred. One reason noncognitivists, and possibly error theorists, go wrong is that they begin by thinking there is such a clear distinction, possibly influenced by the thought that if there are clear examples of both groups, then there must be a clear dividing line between the two groups (and, in effect, label them as two distinct groups). Ethical and other evaluative talk has to be part of one or other group, and therefore it is clearly not factual.

This is not, as I indicated in Chapter Five, to signal that ethical and other evaluative facts and properties are of the very same ontological cast as scientific properties and entities, and facts based on scientific ideas. To end on this point would be madness, I think. Yet, the importance of reflecting on thin and thick concepts is to show how far evaluative thought can go and how factual it can be. Understood in the right way, such thought can be the vehicle for claims that be true and as claims to knowledge. My discussion of Williams in the previous chapter began us on that road.

Williams was right, I think, to contrast the conceptual schemes of our making with the absolute conception of the world. Yet, the conceptual schemes that are imposed on such a world be better and worse than other schemes, and we can be confident, I think, in saying which ones are better.

Overall Conclusion

There were few details in the previous section. As I said, providing those details is a book. The main point, instead, is that we should not think we have an impossible task here. We are not fated to embrace mind-independent evaluative realism, nor a type of relativism. And, within the middle ground, we are not forced to say that because the stuff of evaluative concerns is not science, it therefore cannot be factual or truth-apt. To echo a thought from Chapter Five, (p.188) we can say that these issues call into question what might be meant by 'truth' and 'fact'. We should not cut off potential routes before we have begun: we need to think hard about truth and the factual, not assume we know about them already. Perhaps the correspondence theory of truth is not the right theory for evaluative concerns, for example.

That is one of the lessons of this study. In Chapter Seven I criticized Väyrynen. He argues that most standard thick concepts are not inherently or essentially evaluative because they do not conform to certain rules and norms about core semantic meaning. My criticism was partly based on the idea that we should think through how concepts are used and use this

as a prompt to think about how the evaluative may be a broader category. In microcosm that is the overarching conclusion of this study. What I hope I have shown is that evaluation, and evaluative concepts, come in a variety of guises, but they are all no less the evaluative for that. Part of the point and joy of philosophy, particularly in its modern analytic variety, is an attempt to make clear various ideas. Yet it goes astray too often when it fails to realize that the phenomenon with which it is dealing is neither clear nor clean. It is straightforward to say that thick concepts are just specific types of evaluative concept, but beyond that there is not as much clarity as some suppose. Separationism imposes a clear division on matters where they may not be a division. Nonseparationism is to be preferred because it tries to understand thick concepts on their own terms. Thick concepts are simply evaluations of a sort different from thin ones.

One Last Thought

Having seemingly concluded, I break the rules and make one last point. In both Chapters Six and Eight I hid away in the main text and in footnotes a topic that could be one of the most important questions in this book. It is important to question how a concept can be held together as a single concept. We often find people agreeing about some idea, yet disagreeing because they have different conceptions that clash. The real-life debate between Rawls and Nozick over what it is for a distribution of resources to be just is one such example. Despite their differences—over particular points and over starting assumptions—no one could doubt that Rawls and Nozick were engaged in a dispute about the same concept, and had points of contact. But is it possible to pick out certain traits, or even necessary and sufficient conditions, that enable us to say when we have two ideas that are properly classed as conceptions of the same concept, and when those two ideas are just different concepts? If we can, what are they? And, further, do different sorts of concept (and conception) admit of different answers to these questions? Probing these ideas will give us a sense of some of the most everyday and fundamental of human social activities: communication with other people, understanding them, and agreement and disagreement with them. By getting a sound understanding of what it is for a concept to be evaluative, and what it is for it to be thick or thin, we can begin to make progress on these broader issues. <>

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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RELIGION IN EPHESOS RECONSIDERED: ARCHAEOLOGY OF SPACES, STRUCTURES, AND OBJECTS edited by Daniel Schowalter, Sabine Ladstätter, Steven J. Friesen and Christine Thomas [Novum Testamentum, Supplements, Brill, 9789004401129]

RELIGION IN EPHESOS RECONSIDERED provides a detailed overview of the current state of research on the most important Ephesian projects offering evidence for religious activity during the Roman period. Ranging from huge temple complexes to hand-held figurines, this book surveys a broad scope of materials. Careful reading of texts and inscriptions is combined with cutting-edge archaeological and architectural analysis to illustrate how the ancient people of Ephesos worshipped

both the traditional deities and the new gods that came into their purview. Overall, the volume questions traditional understandings of material culture in Ephesos, and demonstrates that the views of the city and its inhabitants on religion were more complex and diverse than has been previously assumed.

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF HINDUISM: THE GODDESS edited by Mandakranta Bose [The Oxford History of Hinduism, Oxford University Press, 9780198767022]

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF HINDUISM: THE GODDESS provides a critical exposition of the Hindu idea of the divine feminine, or Devi, conceived as a singularity expressed in many forms. With the theological principles examined in the opening chapters, the book proceeds to describe and expound historically how individual manifestations of Devi; have been imagined in Hindu religious culture and their impact upon Hindu social life. In this quest the contributors draw upon the history and philosophy of major Hindu ideologies, such as the Puranic, Tantric, and Vaisnava belief systems. A distinction of the book is its attention not only to the major goddesses from the earliest period of Hindu religious history but also to goddesses of later origin, in many cases of regional provenance and influence. Viewed through the lens of worship practices, legend, and literature, belief in goddesses is discovered as the formative impulse of much of public and private life. The influence of the goddess culture is especially powerful on women's life, often paradoxically situating women between veneration and subjection. This apparent contradiction arises from the humanization of goddesses while acknowledging their divinity, which is central to Hindu beliefs. In addition to studying the social and theological aspect of the goddess ideology, the contributors take anthropological, sociological, and literary approaches to delineate the emotional force of the goddess figure that claims intense human attachments and shapes personal and communal lives.

APOPHASIS AND PSEUDONYMITY IN DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE: "NO LONGER I" by Charles M. Stang [Oxford University Press, 9780199640423] Oxford Scholarship Online Open Access

This book examines the writings of an early sixth-century Christian mystical theologian who wrote under the name of a convert of the apostle Paul, Dionysius the Areopagite. This 'Pseudo'-Dionysius is famous for articulating a mystical theology in two parts: a sacramental and liturgical mysticism embedded in the context of celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchies, and an austere, contemplative regimen in which one progressively negates the divine names in hopes of soliciting union with the 'unknown God' or 'God beyond being.'

Charles M. Stang argues that the pseudonym and the influence of Paul together constitute the best interpretive lens for understanding the Corpus Dionysiacum. Stang demonstrates how Paul animates the entire corpus, and shows that the influence of Paul illuminates such central themes of the Corpus Dionysiacum as hierarchy, theurgy, deification, Christology, affirmation (kataphasis) and negation (apophasis), dissimilar similarities, and unknowing. Most importantly, Paul serves as a fulcrum for the expression of a new theological anthropology, an 'apophatic anthropology.' Dionysius figures Paul as the premier apostolic witness to this apophatic anthropology, as the ecstatic lover of the divine who confesses to the rupture of his self and the indwelling of the divine in Gal 2:20: 'it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me.'

Building on this notion of apophatic anthropology, the book forwards an explanation for why this sixth-century author chose to write under an apostolic pseudonym. Stang argues that the very practice of pseudonymous writing itself serves as an ecstatic devotional exercise whereby the writer becomes split in two and thereby open to the indwelling of the divine. Pseudonymity is on this interpretation integral and internal to the aims of the wider mystical enterprise. Thus this book aims

to question the distinction between 'theory' and 'practice' by demonstrating that negative theology-often figured as a speculative and rarefied theory regarding the transcendence of God-is in fact best understood as a kind of asceticism, a devotional practice aiming for the total transformation of the Christian subject.

UNSAYING GOD: NEGATIVE THEOLOGY IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM by Aydogan Kars [Oxford University Press, 9780190942458]

What cannot be said about God, and how can we speak about God by negating what we say? Traveling across prominent negators, denialists, ineffectualists, paradoxographers, naysayers, ignorance-pretenders, unknowers, I-don't-knowers, and taciturns, **UNSAYING GOD: NEGATIVE THEOLOGY IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM** delves into the negative theological movements that flourished in the first seven centuries of Islam.
Aydogan Kars argues that there were multiple, and often competing, strategies for self-negating speech in the vast field of theology. By focusing on Arabic and Persian textual sources, the book defines four distinct yet interconnected paths of negative speech formations on the nature of God that circulated in medieval Islamic world. Expanding its scope to Jewish intellectuals, Unsaying God also demonstrates that religious boundaries were easily transgressed as scholars from diverse sectarian or religious backgrounds could adopt similar paths of negative speech on God. Also see

THE IRONY OF MODERN CATHOLIC HISTORY: HOW THE CHURCH REDISCOVERED ITSELF AND CHALLENGED THE MODERN WORLD TO REFORM by George Weigel [Basic Books, 9780465094332]

A powerful new interpretation of Catholicism's dramatic encounter with modernity, by one of America's leading intellectuals

Throughout much of the nineteenth century, both secular and Catholic leaders assumed that the Church and the modern world were locked in a battle to the death. The triumph of modernity would not only finish the Church as a consequential player in world history; it would also lead to the death of religious conviction. But today, the Catholic Church is far more vital and consequential than it was 150 years ago. Ironically, in confronting modernity, the Catholic Church rediscovered its evangelical essence. In the process, Catholicism developed intellectual tools capable of rescuing the imperiled modern project.

JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN CONTEMPORARY SPAIN: REDEFINING NATIONAL BOUNDARIES by Martina L. Weisz [The Vidal Sassoon Studies in Antisemitism, Racism, and Prejudice, DE GRUYTER OLDENBOURG, 9783110637908

The book analyzes the place of religious difference in late modernity through a study of the role played by Jews and Muslims in the construction of contemporary Spanish national identity. The focus is on the transition from an exclusive, homogeneous sense of collective Self toward a more pluralistic, open and tolerant one in an European context. This process is approached from different dimensions. At the national level, it follows the changes in nationalist historiography, the education system and the public debates on national identity. At the international level, it tackles the problem from the perspective of Spanish foreign policy towards Israel and the Arab-Muslim states in a changing global context. From the social-communicational point of view, the emphasis is on the construction of the Self–Other dichotomy (with Jewish and Muslim others) as reflected in the three leading Spanish newspapers.

SING A RHYTHM, DANCE A BLUES: EDUCATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF BLACK AND BROWN GIRLS by Monique M. Morris [The New Press, 9781620973998]

In this highly anticipated follow-up to Pushout, which explored the criminalization of Black girls in schools, Monique W Morris invokes the spirit of the blues to articulate a radically healing and empowering pedagogy for Black and Brown girls. The blues have long been an essential form of resistance, healing, and learning; in **Sing a Rhythm, Dance a Blues.** Morris lays out how everyone working with youth can respond proactively with empathy. She reimagines what education might look like if schools placed the flourishing of Black and Brown girls at their center.

Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture 13th-18th Centuries by Jean Delumeau, translated by Eric Nicholson [St Martins Press 0312035829]

Discusses Christian-based fears surrounding sin, death, and the soul's immortality, from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

The Digital Image and Reality: Affect, Metaphysics, and Post-Cinema by Dan Strutt [Amsterdam University Press, 97894629871 35]

The media technologies that surround and suffuse our everyday life profoundly affect our relation to reality. Philosophers since Plato and Aristotle have sought to understand the complex influence of apparently simple tools of expression on our understanding and experience of the world, time, space, materiality and energy. The Digital Image and Reality takes up this crucial philosophical task for our digital era. This rich yet accessible work argues that when new visual technologies arrive to represent and simulate reality, they give rise to nothing less than a radically different sensual image of the world. Through engaging with post-cinematic content and the new digital formats in which it appears, Strutt uncovers and explores how digital image-making is integral to emergent modes of metaphysical reflection - to speculative futurism, optimistic nihilism, and ethical plasticity. Ultimately, he prompts the reader to ask whether the impact of digital image processes might go even beyond our subjective consciousness of reality, towards the synthesis of objective actuality itself.

Satyendra Pakhalé Culture of Creation by Alberto Alessi E.A. [Nai010 Publishers, 97894620851 45]

Satyendra Pakhalé stands at the crossroads of the diverse currents shaping contemporary design. His design work is an act of unity going beyond any binary such as high and low tech, industrial production and traditional crafts, functionality and poetic significance, blurring boundaries of time and place. 'Culture of Creation', the first comprehensive monograph devoted to his work, explores the way that the designer navigates these currents on multiple levels.

Twelve essays by leading design thinkers, Juhani Pallasmaa, Paola Antonelli, Jacques Barsac, René Spitz, Tiziana Proietti, Aric Chen and Stefano Marzano, illustrate the world view and intellectual position underpinning the designer's 'culture of creation'. Contributions from leading industry figures, such as Alberto Alessi, Giulio Cappellini, Cristiano Crosetta and Vittorio Livi portray him at work. Documentary passages give insight into his studio practice, close-up encounters with specific processes and stunning imagery complete a book that can be enjoyed on many levels – a portrait of a unique 'culture of creation'.

England in the Age of Shakespeare by Jeremy Black [Indiana University Press, 97802530423 16]

How did it feel to hear Macbeth's witches chant of "double, double toil and trouble" at a time when magic and witchcraft were as real as anything science had to offer? How were justice and forgiveness

understood by the audience who first watched *King Lear*; how were love and romance viewed by those who first saw *Romeo and Juliet*? In *England in the Age of Shakespeare*, Jeremy Black takes readers on a tour of life in the streets, homes, farms, churches, and palaces of the Bard's era. Panning from play to audience and back again, Black shows how Shakespeare's plays would have been experienced and interpreted by those who paid to see them. From the dangers of travel to the indignities of everyday life in teeming London, Black explores the jokes, political and economic references, and small asides that Shakespeare's audiences would have recognized. These moments of recognition often reflected the audience's own experiences of what it was to, as Hamlet says, "grunt and sweat under a weary life." Black's clear and sweeping approach seeks to reclaim Shakespeare from the ivory tower and make the plays' histories more accessible to the public for whom the plays were always intended.

MAURICE BLANCHOT AND PSYCHOANALYSIS by Joseph D. Kuzma [Contemporary Psychoanalytic Studies, Brill | Rodopi, E-Book: 978-90-04-40133-4, Hardback 978-90-04-40132-7]

MAURICE BLANCHOT AND PSYCHOANALYSIS by Joseph D. Kuzma offers an exploration and critique of Blanchot's various engagements with psychoanalysis, from the early 1950s onward. Kuzma highlights the political contours of Blanchot's writings on Freud, Lacan, Leclaire, Winnicott, and others, ultimately suggesting a link between these writings and Blanchot's broader attempts at rethinking the nature of human relationality, responsibility, and community. This book makes a substantive contribution to our understanding of the political and philosophical dimensions of Blanchot's writings on madness, narcissism, and trauma, among other topics of critical and clinical relevance. **MAURICE BLANCHOT AND PSYCHOANALYSIS** comprises an indispensable text for anyone interested in tracing the history of psychoanalysis in post-War France.

ON FEAR, HORROR, AND TERROR: GIVING UTTERANCE TO THE UNUTTERABLE edited by Pedro Querido and María Ibáñez-Rodríguez [At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, Brill, 9789004397989]

ON FEAR, HORROR, AND TERROR: GIVING UTTERANCE TO THE UNUTTERABLE brings together essays that examine a vast gamut of different contemporary cultural manifestations of fear, anxiety, horror, and terror. Topics range from the feminine sublime in American novels to the monstrous double in horror fiction, (in)security at music festivals, the uncanny in graphic novels, epic heroes' Being-towards-death and authenticity, atrocity and history in Central European art, the theme of old age in absurdist literature, and iterations of the "home invasion" subgenre in post-9/11 popular culture. This diversity of insights and methodologies ensures a kaleidoscopic look at a cluster of phenomena and experiences that often manage to both be immediately and universally recognizable and defy straightforward categorization or even description. Contributors are Emily-Rose Carr, Ghada Saad Hassan, Woodrow Hood, María Ibáñez-Rodríguez, Nicole M. Jowsey, Marta Moore, Pedro Querido and Ana Romão.

WORDS, DEEDS, BODIES: L. WITTGENSTEIN, J.L. AUSTIN, M. MERLEAU-PONTY AND M. POLANYI by Jerry H. Gill [Value Inquiry Book Series Online, Value Inquiry Book Series, Philosophy, Literature, and Politics, Brill, E-Book: 9789004412361, Hardback: 9789004412354]

Words, Deeds, Bodies by Jerry H. Gill concentrates on the interrelationships between speech, accomplishing tasks, and human embodiment. Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Michael Polanyi have all highlighted these relationships. This book examines the, yet, unexplored connections between these authors' philosophies of

language. It focuses on the relationships between their respective key ideas: Wittgenstein's notion of "language game," Austin's concept of "performative utterances," Merleau-Ponty's idea of "slackening the threads," and Polanyi's understanding of "tacit knowing," noting the similarities and differences between and amongst them.

SCHOLARLY PERSONAE IN THE HISTORY OF ORIENTALISM, 1870-1930 edited by Christiaan Engberts and Herman J. Paul [Brill, hardcover: 9789004395237 ebook: 9789004406315]

This volume examines how the history of the humanities might be written through the prism of scholarly personae, understood as time- and place-specific models of being a scholar. Focusing on the field of study known as Orientalism in the decades around 1900, this volume examines how Semitists, Sinologists, and Japanologists, among others, conceived of their scholarly tasks, what sort of demands these job descriptions made on the scholar in terms of habits, virtues, and skills, and how models of being an orientalist changed over time under influence of new research methods, cross-cultural encounters, and political transformations.

All interested in the history of orientalism, the role of virtues and vices in scholarly self-understanding, and changing scholarly personae in the history of humanities.

Contributors are Tim Barrett, Christiaan Engberts, Holger Gzella, Hans Martin Krämer, Arie L. Molendijk, Herman Paul, Pascale Rabault-Feuerhahn and Henning Trüper.

EVALUATIVE COGNITIVISM by Simon Kirchin [Oxford University Press, 9780198803430]

We use evaluative terms and concepts every day. We call actions right and wrong, teachers wise and ignorant, and pictures elegant and grotesque. Philosophers place evaluative concepts into two camps. Thin concepts, such as goodness and badness, and rightness and wrongness have evaluative content, but they supposedly have no or hardly any nonevaluative, descriptive content: they supposedly give little or no specific idea about the character of the person or thing described. In contrast, thick concepts such as kindness, elegance and wisdom supposedly give a more specific idea of people or things. Yet, given typical linguistic conventions, thick concepts also convey evaluation. Kind people are often viewed positively whilst ignorance has negative connotations.

The distinction between thin and thick concepts is frequently drawn in philosophy and is central to everyday life. However, very few articles or books discuss the distinction. In this full-length study, Simon Kirchin discusses thin and thick concepts, highlighting key assumptions, questions and arguments, many of which have gone unnoticed. Kirchin focuses in on the debate between 'separationists' (those who think that thick concepts can be separated into component parts of evaluative, often very 'thin', content and nonevaluative content) and 'nonseparationists' (who deny this).

THICK EVALUATION argues for a version of nonseparationism, and in doing so argues both that many concepts are evaluative and also that evaluation is not exhausted by thin positive and negative stances.