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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

Robert Tenor, editor
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EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. Our Annotated Bibliography will review, list and link the titles under discussion, providing a faithful summary of its content and audience.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

Contents

JESUS AND JUDAISM by Martin Hengel and Anna Maria Schwemer, translated by Wayne Coppins [Baylor-Mohr Siebeck Studies in Early Christianity, Baylor University Press, 9781481310994]

The debate over the extent of Jewish influence upon early Christianity rages on. At the heart of this argument lies the question of Jesus: how does the fate of a first-century Galilean Jew inspire and determine the nature, shape, and practices of a distinct religious movement? Vital to this first question is another equally challenging one: can the four Gospels be used to reconstruct the historical Jesus? In **JESUS AND JUDAISM,** Martin Hengel and Anna Maria Schwemer seek to untangle the complex relationships among Jesus, Judaism, and the Gospels in the earliest Christian movement.

JESUS AND JUDAISM, the first in a four-volume series, focuses on the person of Jesus in the context of Judaism. Beginning with his Galilean origin, the volume analyzes Jesus' relationship with John the Baptist and the Jewish context of Jesus' life and work. Hengel and Schwemer argue that there never was a nonmessianic Jesus. Rather, his messianic claim finds expression in his relationship to the Baptist, his preaching in authority, his deeds of power, and his crucifixion as king of the Jews, and in the emergence of the earliest Christology. As Hengel and Schwemer reveal, Jesus was not only a devout Jew, nor merely a miracle worker, but the essential part of the earliest form of Christianity.

Hengel and Schwemer insist that Jesus belongs *within* the history of early Christianity, rather than as its presupposition. Christianity did not begin after Jesus' death; Christianity began as soon as a Jew from Galilee started to preach the word of God.

Editorial Appraisal

JESUS AND JUDAISM compresses a lifetime of learned consideration so that its claims parade a measured synopsis of twentieth century the New Testament scholarship. The mastery of primary and secondary literature is seamlessly woven into the arguments. Currently there is no better treatment of how Jesus interacted with Second temple Judasm in Roman occupied Palestine.

The Baylor—Mohr Siebeck Studies in Early Christianity series aims to facilitate increased dialogue between German and Anglophone scholarship by making recent German research available in English translation. In this way, we hope to play a role in the advancement of our common field of study. The target audience for the series is primarily scholars and graduate students, though some volumes may also be accessible to advanced undergraduates. In selecting books for the series, we will especially seek out works by leading German scholars that represent outstanding contributions in their own right and also serve as windows into the wider world of German-language scholarship.

As the seventh volume in the BMSEC series, we have chosen Martin Hengel and Anna Maria Schwemer's book Jesus and Judaism, which represents the first volume of their history of early Christianity and the last major work completed during Prof. Hengel's lifetime. As a substantial contribution to the study of early Judaism and the historical Jesus, it is noteworthy for its rigorous methodological and historiographical reflections, its characteristically intensive engagement with the primary sources, its substantial discussion of Judaism in its own right, its incisive presentation of the form and content of Jesus' proclamation, its sustained focus on Jesus' messianic claim, and its robust analysis of Jesus' passion and the testimony to his resurrection.

With regard to the translator's divided allegiance to the source and target languages, Wayne Coppins has generally attempted to adhere closely to the German wording, while allowing for some adjustments for the sake of clarify and readability in English. In some cases, of course, communication with Anna Maria Schwemer has led to more extensive reformulations and occasionally to minor additions or subtractions vis-à-vis the German version. With regard to primary and secondary literature in foreign languages, we have sometimes provided our own translations and sometimes quoted from existing translations. In a few cases, we have modified existing English translations. For example, when quoting from the LCL translation of Josephus, we have changed the name Ananus to Annas, so that it conforms with our spelling of this name elsewhere in the volume. While great efforts have been made to add references to existing English translations of German works at many points, only a modest number of new references to secondary literature have been added in the course of translation. These have usually been marked with expressions such as "cf. now" or "see now." The following specific points of translation may be

mentioned here. For the sake of precision, I have translated the term Eiferer with "zealous ones," Zeloten with "Zealots," and zelotisch with "zealot." The term Persongeheimnis has sometimes been rendered with the "secret of his person" and sometimes with the "mystery of his person"; it could also be translated with "secret identity". The technical term Fortschreibung has been translated with "updating." The word Lohn has sometimes been rendered with "wages" and sometimes with "reward." The terms Annäherungen and Annäherungsversuche have sometimes been translated with "attempts at historical approximation" and sometimes with "attempts to approach" or "attempts to draw near." With some reservations, I have translated jesuanisch with "dominical" rather than with "Jesuanic," Bauhandwerker and Handwerker with "craftsman" or "artisan" rather than with "carpenter" or "handworker," Naherwartung with "near expectation" rather than "imminent expectation," and endzeitlich with "eschatological" rather than with "end-time" or "eschatic."

Author's Preface to the English Edition

I am very happy that Martin Hengel's and my jointly authored book Jesus and Judaism, the first volume of a planned four-volume history of early Christianity, is now appearing in English.

Martin Hengel (1926-2009) would also have greatly welcomed this development and taken special delight in the publishers' courage in launching a new series with the name Baylor—Mohr Siebeck Studies in Early Christianity. I regard it as a great honor that our work was selected for this series by the editors, Wayne Coppins and Simon Gathercole, and thus found its way into the English-language sphere through the translation of Wayne Coppins.

In the time before the publication of Jesus und das Judentum, Martin Hengel said to me that I should brace myself for harsh reviews. But such reviews did not come, and they have not appeared to this day. I have consciously refrained from continuously adding supplementary material to the English translation, from taking up the most recent discussion in German scholarship, and from responding to reactions to this volume in the notes. However, Wayne Coppins has judiciously supplemented the bibliography for the English version.

Small errors and oversights were silently improved. However, I wish to make note of one addition that I regard as important. Since knowledge of the Aramaic language in the first century CE, i.e., in the time of Jesus, has improved in the last decade, and the retranslation of the Lord's Prayer into Aramaic in particular stands on a much better philological basis, I have added brief references to this in the English translation.

Martin Hengel and I consciously did not want to write a "Jesus book," and yet it became one. Since it is the first part of a multivolume history of early Christianity, our concern was not only with embedding the history of Jesus and the emergence of Christianity in the history of early Judaism, but also, especially, with the question of the continuity between the Galilean Jesus, the primitive community, and Paul. This continuity proved to be more extensive than had been assumed for a long time in German scholarship. Christianity did not first begin, as many scholars like to claim, with the Easter appearances. For this reason, the first volume of our history of early Christianity had to begin with Jesus and his social and cultural Jewish background.

In our view, the key to the historical and theological understanding of the person of Jesus and the emergence of Christology lies in the messianic claim of Jesus and in Jesus' certainty that it is precisely with his activity that the kingdom of God already becomes present (Luke 11.20; 17.21). Closely

connected with Jesus' messianic claim is his talk of himself as "Son" and of God as his "Father," in distinction from "our Father" as the Father of the disciples. This Father-Son relationship forms the center of Jesus' own self-understanding, his Persongeheimnis. In this question we can only approximate the figure of Jesus historically, but there is no reason for radical skepticism in relation to the sources. Historical work is not possible without hypotheses, but we must provide good justifications for our assumptions and at the same time remain conscious of the limits of our attempts at historical approximation.

I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to Wayne Coppins—and his helpers—for his careful and sensitive translation. He sticks closely to the German text and translates it into English with the expert knowledge of a New Testament scholar. I have great respect for his ability to translate our complicated, multiclause German sentences and the technical terms of German New Testament scholarship in a clear and comprehensible way. —Anna Maria Schwemer

Preface to the German Edition

The first volume of the planned history of early Christianity contains a concise description of Judaism in the motherland between 63 BCE and 70 CE, followed by a presentation of the activity of Jesus. Christianity has its origin in Palestinian Judaism and is much more strongly shaped by this than scholars in earlier decades wanted to believe. Through his activity and fate, the Galilean Jew Jesus of Nazareth also determined the way of the church in a decisive way. Both of these conclusions emerge from our most important sources, the four Gospels, and no longer require justification. The influence of Hellenistic civilization, which had been in effect for more than three hundred years in Syria and Palestine, also did not bypass the Jewish people. The "Hellenists" who founded the Gentile mission came from Jerusalem. The message and passion of Jesus also influenced the former Pharisee Paul in a more lasting way than many scholars had long assumed.

Since the historical quest for Jesus of Nazareth has been controversial since the eighteenth century and will remain so in the future, we have placed detailed reflections on the course of research on the sources before the actual historical presentation. These reflections clarify that in this quest it can only be a matter of attempts at historical approximation, which do, to be sure, allow very clear contours of this unique figure to become visible. A special emphasis is placed on the still largely misjudged problem of the messianic claim of Jesus, without which the accounts of the Gospels cannot be understood. The ever so popular "unmessianic Jesus" never existed. This is shown by the comparison of Jesus with John the Baptist, his proclamation in authority, his deeds of power, the passion story with its accusation that he is "the king of the Jews," and the emergence of the earliest Christology, which has its ultimate foundation in Jesus' activity and way. <>

The Identity of John the Evangelist: Revision and Reinterpretation in Early Christian Sources by Dean Furlong [Fortress Academic, 9781978709300]

This book examines the various Johannine narratives found in writings in the period from Papias (early second century) to Eusebius (early fourth century). Dean Furlong argues that the first major

revision of the Johannine narrative was the identification of John the Evangelist with John the Apostle, the son of Zebedee, at the beginning of the third century. This in turn initiated a process of reinterpretation, as the previously-separate narratives of the two figures were variously spun into new configurations during the third and fourth centuries. This process culminated with Eusebius's synthesis of the Johannine traditions, which came to form the basis of what is considered the "traditional" Johannine story. Furlong concludes that in the earliest narrative, found in Papias, John the Evangelist was identified, not with the Apostle, but with another disciple of Jesus known as John the Elder.

This is an excellent examination of the historical sources regarding the John who wrote the Gospel, and the various traditions concerning his identity, his death, and his place amongst the Evangelists. This will no doubt become a standard reference point for many years to come. —Fr John Behr, St Vladimir's Seminary, New York, and Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam

The frequent claim that the early church was unanimous in identifying the Fourth Evangelist as John the son of Zebedee obscures the complexity of the ancient sources. In this carefully-argued monograph, Dean Furlong presents a robust challenge to this claim. Like a skillful detective, Furlong interrogates the early witnesses, with a keen eye for detail, concluding that 'the traditional view' results from the conflation of independent traditions about the Zebedean John and Papias's John the Elder. His proposal provides compelling explanations for some of the puzzles in the Johannine traditions, such as Epiphanius's otherwise bewildering dating of John's exile and death to the reign of Claudius. Furlong's thesis deserves serious consideration as a valuable contribution both to authorship questions and to the early reception history of the Johannine corpus. —Ian Boxall, The Catholic University of America

In this clearly written and thoroughly researched volume, Dean Furlong argues that John the Elder, mentioned by Papias, was the author of the Fourth Gospel, rather than John the son of Zebedee.

This study is a highly learned and detailed investigation of all the relevant evidence on this matter. It has the great merit of helping us to understand and take seriously all – and not just some – of the evidence about the authorship of John's Gospel from patristic sources. Anyone interested in the Fourth Gospel will greatly benefit from this highly significant study. —Paul Trebilco, University of Otago

Excerpt: This study seeks to examine the reception of John the Evangelist in early Christian sources. It does not address the historicity of the various claims and traditions which sprang up around this figure, though no doubt some traditions were more historically grounded than others.

Traditionally, early Christian sources have been understood as reflecting a generally uniform Johannine narrative, according to which John the Evangelist, also identified as the Apostle John, the son of Zebedee, settled in Ephesus (probably from Jerusalem in the mid-60s), where he remained until the end of Domitian's reign, at which time he was banished to Patmos. He later returned to Ephesus in the reign of Nerva and died there a few years later, early in the reign of Trajan.

Challenging elements of this narrative, this study will seek to reconstruct the earliest traditions pertaining to John the Evangelist, delineating the development of the Johannine story in the period from Papias, who probably wrote in the early second century, to Eusebius in the early fourth century. It will argue that John the Evangelist of the earliest sources was most likely the John referred to by Papias as "the Elder," and that the Evangelist only later came to be widely identified with the Zebedean John, probably from the third century onwards. This identification, it will be argued, initiated further revision, as traditions previously associated with the separate figures of the Evangelist and Apostle came to be variously configured into new narratives, the most significant of which were those of Hippolytus of Rome (c. 170-c. 235) and Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 263-339).

Hippolytus of Rome's synthesis of the traditions seems to have favored the Apostle's early martyrdom as the template for its version of the Johannine story. This would have necessitated the early dating of the Patmos exile (associated with the Evangelist) and probably gave rise to the narrative of John's Claudian exile and death, found in a number of sources that appear to have been dependent on Hippolytus. Eusebius's later and more complex retelling of the Johannine story likewise identified the Apostle and Evangelist, but it favored the tradition of the Evangelist's long life and peaceful death at Ephesus for its template, leading to the displacement of the martyrdom narrative.

Early evidence supportive of John's late, natural death is relatively sparse compared to that of the Apostle John's early martyrdom. To bolster the narrative of John's long life, Eusebius seems to have constructed a context for John's exile in the unlikely setting of Domitian's persecution of the Roman nobility at the end of the first century, which he effected by conflating various unrelated accounts from secular and ecclesiastical sources and by misinterpreting ambiguous statements by Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria.

The final section of this work will seek to reconstruct the earliest Johannine narrative. After laying out evidence that the earliest writers contextualized John's exile in Neró s reign, it will go on to argue that Papias identified the author of John's Gospel with John the Elder and that he placed the writing of this Gospel in Ephesus, late in Domitian's reign, in what was once a well-established narrative before it was displaced by Eusebius's.

Section 1: The Identity of the Evangelist

This section of the study will challenge the view that the identification of the Evangelist with the Apostle John, the son of Zebedee, informed the earliest sources of the Johannine tradition. Its starting point will be a discussion of Papias's John the Elder, a figure who is often considered to be obscure or whose historical existence as a separate John is denied altogether. After laying out evidence that Papias did intend to speak of a second John who had, like the Apostle, known and followed Jesus, it will argue that the principal authors of the second and early third century, including Papias, Justin Martyr, Polycrates, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria, are best interpreted as presupposing an identification of the Evangelist with the Elder rather than the Apostle.

Section 2: Conflated Figures, Revised Narratives

In the early third century, a Johannine narrative emerges which seems to have conflated the Apostle and the Evangelist, indicating that the two Johns had by then come to be identified. This revised narrative, which was likely constructed by Hippolytus of Rome maintained the Apostle's early martyrdom as the template of its Johannine story but seems to have combined it with the Patmos tradition associated with the Evangelist by bringing John's life to an end on Patmos, at the end of Claudius's reign (41-54) (cf. chapter 4). Possibly Hippolytus constructed this narrative within the context of his defense of the Johannine writings against Gaius of Rome (cf. chapter 5).

This dispute over the Johannine writings seems to have left in its wake some residual distrust toward the canonical text of Revelation, which likely influenced Eusebius's revised narrative in the early fourth century. While Eusebius identified the Apostle and Evangelist, he favored the tradition of the Evangelist's natural death in Trajan's reign over the Apostle's early martyrdom for his narrative. His subsequent view that the Apostle died in Trajan's reign necessitated that Papias's Elder, who was active a generation later than the Apostle according to Papias, had lived too late to have been an eyewitness disciple of Jesus. The Elder, stripped of his eyewitness status, was then conveniently suggested by Eusebius as a potential author of Revelation, the canonicity of which he evidently doubted. To buttress his case for John's natural death in Trajan's reign (presumably against the rival martyrdom traditions), he constructed a late Domitianic context for John's exile (cf. chapter 6), which formed the basis of what would become the traditional Johannine story.

Section 3: Toward a Reconstruction of the Earliest Tradition

In the final section of this work, an attempt will be made at reconstructing the Johannine narrative as it likely existed before the identification of the Apostle and Evangelist. In particular, evidence will be presented for the following three propositions: (1) that John's exile was contextualized in the reign of Nero; (2) that Papias identified the Evangelist with his second John, the Elder; and (3) that the publication of the Gospel of John was placed within the context of the Asian elders imploring John to write at the end of Domitian's reign.

While it has traditionally been held that the earliest writers identified the Apostle and the Evangelist, this study has shown that the traditional reading of the evidence often qualifies or rejects the most important and earliest of sources. It thus sometimes suggests that Papias spoke of one John but carelessly expressed himself and that he had identified his "elders" as "apostles," contrary to how his earliest readers defined them. If it allows that Papias spoke of two Johns, it is then obliged to dismiss instead the testimony of Irenaeus, one of the foremost witnesses of the Asian tradition, since he made Papias a hearer of the Evangelist while Papias himself claimed to have been a contemporary

only of the Elder. The tradition of the Apostle John's martyrdom, attested in a wide array of early sources, is often dismissed or explained away simply because it contradicts presuppositions about the identity of the Evangelist. Ad hoc explanations are offered for why Polycrates described John as a priest: perhaps Polycrates confused the Evangelist with a priest of the same name; perhaps John really was a priest and the Synoptics simply failed to mention it. Likewise, the traditional view struggles to account for Tertullian's claim that John underwent relegatio, reserved for the ruling classes, or for Jerome's assertion that John was born to wealth and aristocratic status, and it must dismiss Clement of Alexandria's assertion that the teaching ministry of the twelve had ended by Nero's death by attributing it either to imprecision or to a momentary slip of the memory.

This study provided instead a number of reasons for thinking that early Christian sources distinguished the Evangelist and Apostle. First, Papias, who wrote in the early second century or earlier, spoke of two important figures named John from among the disciples of Jesus—John the Apostle and John the Elder — allowing the possibility that the "John" known to early sources was the second one. Secondly, there appears to have been separate traditions concerning the deaths of the Apostle and the Evangelist in the early centuries, one of which placed the Apostle John's martyrdom prior to the end of Nero's reign, and one of which placed the Evangelist's natural death in old age at around the turn of the second century, which is consistent with the chronological information Papias provides concerning his Apostle and Elder respectively. Thirdly, the earliest sources (e.g., Justin, Polycarp, Polycrates, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria) fail to identify John the Evangelist explicitly with the John of the Synoptic Gospels. Indeed, some of their statements seem incongruent with such an identification and better harmonize with Papias's Elder. Fourthly, much of the development of the Johannine traditions, such as the variations with respect to the timing of his exile and death, can be accounted for on the supposition that two separate Johns were conflated. Lastly, evidence was presented suggesting that Papias's Elder, who had discussed the "arrangement" of the Synoptic Gospels, was for Papias the same John as the one who was credited with authoring the Fourth Gospel.

The greatest challenge to the reconstruction posited here is no doubt in accounting for the use of the title of "apostle" with respect to John. While it may seem too convenient, or even disingenuous, to exploit the fluidity of this title in early sources to remove the Zebedean identity from the Evangelist, it is, rather, the very ambiguity and fluidity of the title that likely gave rise to the confusion between the two Johns known from the third century onward.

The identification of the Apostle and Evangelist may have originated in the Acts of John; alternatively, it may have first been made by Hippolytus in his defense of the Johannine works against Gaius and the Alogoi. In any case, Hippolytus seems to have originated a conflated narrative which identified the two while privileging the Apostle's early martyrdom, thus necessitating the early dating of John's exile, which was placed in the reign of Claudius.

A century later, Eusebius, who also identified the two Johns, constructed a narrative which favored the tradition of the Evangelist's natural death in old age at the expense of the martyrdom tradition. This was an important revision, as it allowed Eusebius to reconceive John the Elder as a later, marginal figure, whom he subsequently also suggested as the author of Revelation

To provide further evidence for the Evangelist/Apostle's long life (presumably against the martyrdom tradition), and possibly to bring John's sojourn on Patmos closer to the time of John the Elder,

Eusebius placed John's exile in the unlikely context of the persecution of the Roman nobility late in Domitian's reign, displacing in the process both the Neronian exile narrative and the tradition of the late Domitianic publication of John's Gospel. Eusebius's revision proved remarkably successful and came to form the basis of the "traditional" Johannine narrative.

In the final section of the work, three conclusions were reached: first, that the earliest Johannine narrative contextualized John's exile in Nero's reign; second, that Papias likely identified John the Evangelist with John the Elder rather than with John the Apostle; and third, that Papias likely placed the publication of his Gospel late in Domitian's reign, after sixty-five years of oral preaching, shortly before John's death at Ephesus during the reign of Trajan. <>

A Guide to Early Jewish Texts and Traditions in Christian Transmission edited by Alexander Kulik, Editor-in-chief, and Gabriele Boccaccini, Lorenzo DiTommaso, David Hamidovic, Michael E. Stone, Associate editors and With the assistance of Jason M. Zurawski [Oxford University Press, 9780190863074]

The Jewish culture of the Hellenistic and early Roman periods established a basis for all monotheistic religions, but its main sources have been preserved to a great degree through Christian transmission. This *Guide* is devoted to problems of preservation, reception, and transformation of Jewish texts and traditions of the Second Temple period in the many Christian milieus from the ancient world to the late medieval era. It approaches this corpus not as an artificial collection of reconstructed texts--a body of hypothetical originals--but rather from the perspective of the preserved materials, examined in their religious, social, and political contexts. It also considers the other, non-Christian, channels of the survival of early Jewish materials, including Rabbinic, Gnostic, Manichaean, and Islamic. This unique project brings together scholars from many different fields in order to map the trajectories of early Jewish texts and traditions among diverse later cultures. It also provides a comprehensive and comparative introduction to this new field of study while bridging the gap between scholars of early Judaism and of medieval Christianity.

The Voice of Jacob by Alexander Kulik

The voice is the voice of Jacob, yet the hands are the hands of Esau. Genesis 27:22

Jewish literature of the Hellenistic and Roman periods has attracted different groups of scholars for different reasons. In modern times, it was Western Christian scholars—or Western scholars interested in the beginnings of Christianity—who first took up the challenge. They were fascinated by the opportunity to reconstruct the context and background of the New Testament world and benefited from the accessibility of manuscript sources preserved in Greek, Latin, and the vernacular languages of the West. Eastern Christian scholars, in turn, often belonged to emergent national schools and were thrilled that their heritages, typically unknown to Western scholars, could also contribute to the study of an ancient and universal legacy.

It took some time, however, before Jewish scholars overcame their sense of alienation from the overtly non-Jewish modes of transmission of Second Temple sources and joined the venture. Their motives were diverse: some welcomed a Jewish alternative to Rabbinic tradition; others discerned instructive similarities in the conditions of the Jewish people in the GrecoRoman and modern periods; still others rediscovered for themselves important pages in the history of the Jewish people in its own land. This last interest, combined with the achievements of archaeology, opened new opportunities to juxtapose physical and textual evidence.

Without ignoring these extra-academic agendas, some scholars—among them the initiators of this volume—approach the field motivated by intellectual curiosity of another kind. Second Temple literature represents a methodologically fascinating object of research. The fact that the absolute majority of evidence about one civilization (early Judaism) has been preserved by another (late antique and medieval Christianity) creates an intricate set of challenges that overlap diverse academic disciplines yet are complexly intertwined.

An integrative analysis in this field should therefore involve the tools of linguistics, textual criticism, translation studies, literary criticism, comparative religion, history of art, cultural anthropology, folklore, thematic criticism, and more. From a purely philological perspective, we are often dealing with texts and traditions that have an especially complicated intercultural history, with ancient and medieval translations that usually involve more than one or two languages and scribal traditions. From a historical-cultural perspective, we face the most tangled knot of factors to be considered at every stage of analysis. To mention only a few:

- The preserving civilization (Christianity) claims succession to the preserved one (Judaism), but largely neglects its ethnic elements and filters it theologically.
- The earlier civilization at the same time seeks to maintain its national components as it develops over the centuries but nonetheless undergoes transformation in every respect, including politically, geographically, etc. Thus later versions of the preserved civilization almost completely erase from their memory the ancient tradition under discussion.
- The divergence is also linguistic. The civilization that preserved the data is itself split into linguistically distinct traditions. These appertain to its various successors, which were themselves distinct in culture, religious confession, and political character.
- Two subsequent catastrophes—the destruction of Jewish national life and the fall of the Roman Empire in the West—caused further divergence among and within all the traditions.

Yet, the situation of which we speak was even more complex, because the divergences were not unidirectional. Dialogue between the two traditions continued, even when not explicit, and inevitably affected the transmission of the older common heritage, making its reconstruction even more challenging.

As a result, the edifice of Second Temple Jewish culture, originally an amalgam of various Near Eastern, Greek, and Roman elements, crumbled, and its pieces were taken away separately by subsequent Christian authors and communities. These pieces must therefore be carefully excavated from the treasuries of the many later and equally diverse cultures. In this volume we aspire to contribute to reassembling such fragments and making sense of them. The format we have chosen for doing so is conditioned by two main considerations.

First, we aim to introduce a certain balance into scholarly perspectives on early Jewish literature. There is a need to consider this corpus not from the point of view of a reconstructed product—that is, a body of hypothetical, unpreserved originals (as usually portrayed in accordance with the agenda of specific religiocentric disciplines)—but from the point of view of the extant materials (thus in a more philologically oriented framework), with a strong emphasis, where appropriate, on the manuscript evidence. This does not necessarily mean that we hold a hypercritical view on the possibility of such hypothetical reconstructions. In fact, the authors of this volume represent the entire range of opinions on this matter. We simply agree in recognizing that such an integral survey

is lacking. Although certain traditions have received focused attention, none of the standard surveys approach the corpus of early Jewish literature from the perspective of the transmission, reception, and, often, modification of the preserved sources. Instead, they present it as a reconstructed corpus, often ignoring the transmission history or at least making no attempt to deal with it in an integrated fashion.' We believe that filling this lacuna will open new research perspectives and initiate a process of bridging the gap between scholars of early Judaism and of medieval Christianity.

Second, one finds much research pertaining to each distinct tradition and corpus, as well as some intertraditional insights here and there. But what we are missing—and this is most significant—is a systematic dialogue among scholars who are (understandably) often restricted to their own fields and to sources preserved in languages that they have mastered. In our view, this dialogue should commence with a presentation of the state of the field, that is, with a general survey of the research situation documented in a reference volume. This volume is designed to yield just such a result, and to take the most necessary step of providing a basic platform, a map for discussion, and a useful tool for scholars of various disciplines, approaches, and backgrounds.

The present volume is therefore devoted to problems of preservation, reception, and transformation of Jewish texts and traditions of the Second Temple period in diverse ecclesiastical traditions. The chapters present (a) general up-to-date surveys of separate traditions (addressing, inter alia, recent developments in the state of research and perspectives for future research); (b) discussion of the fate of specific texts and corpora among diverse traditions; (c) methodological issues (including the distinction between originally Jewish and Christian material, modes of medieval transmission and compilation, early Jewish texts and motifs in liturgy and iconography, etc.); and, when possible, (d) innovations relevant to the topic. The central purpose of the book is to map the trajectories of early Jewish texts and traditions among diverse later cultures,'and thus provide a comprehensive introduction to the field.

The volume consists of three main sections. Section A, "Traditions," provides surveys of the Christian linguo-confessional traditions that preserve early Jewish materials, including Greek, Latin, Ethiopic, Slavonic, Syriac, Coptic, Armenian, Georgian, Christian Arabic, Celtic, and Germanic. To achieve a more stereoscopic and richer perspective, we then present a different cross-section of the same material, this time organized according to the most distinct corpora of Jewish literature preserved by Christians. Section B, "Corpora," looks at different corpora of texts from the point of view of their Christian preservation. It includes a discussion of Old Testament pseudepigrapha as corpus and category; the works of Josephus, Philo, and minor Jewish Hellenistic authors; liturgical works; works found in Qumran in their connection to Christian traditions; Enochic books and traditions, and remnants of the ancient Jewish science as preserved by Christians. Section C, "Comparative Perspective," offers surveys of alternative non-Christian tracks for the survival of early Jewish materials: Jewish (Rabbinic and Karaite), Islamic, and Manichaean traditions that also preserve elements or echoes of early Jewish texts.

Each chapter discusses early Jewish texts belonging to a certain tradition or corpus (including texts that are of dubious or Christian provenance but preserve early Jewish motifs), together with information, as appropriate, on their estimated dates of composition, translation provenance, and languages of Vorlagen. Special consideration is accorded to texts preserved uniquely (or primarily) in the tradition under consideration. The chapters aspire to examine the peculiarities of the given

tradition or corpus in comparison to other traditions or corpora, the relation of the given tradition or corpus to Greek or other related linguistic traditions, the Sitz im Leben of translations and their connection to major cultural processes, and sometimes also the Nachleben of translations. The authors often pay attention to the functioning of texts; their incorporation into major collections; and, when possible, their reception in textual, visual, and oral traditions. Together, the chapters provide an outlook on the current state of research and on perspectives and tasks for future research, accompanied by a basic bibliography that gives the main editions, translations, and research works, often including projects in progress.

The present volume shares one trait with its object of research. It has been conceived and implemented by a diverse team, whose members belong to different fields of knowledge and when they do not, then to rival schools of thought—or, if neither of these, then they at least hold opposing views on cardinal issues. Although such diversity may come at the expense of uniformity of presentation, we view that, not as an inevitable constraint, dictated by the hitherto disciplinary disintegration of the topic, but as a positive and fundamental advantage of this project, which exposes the reader to a richness of views and approaches. Hence, united by our mutually complementary dissimilarity no less than by our common aspiration to catch the subdued voice of Jacob, as captured and preserved by brotherly hands, we submit our work to the judgment of the reader. <>

Augustine and the Economy of Sacrifice: Ancient and Modern Perspectives by Joshua S. Nunziato [Cambridge University Press, 9781108481397]

Business is generally viewed as a means to generate personal or corporate wealth, but business transactions can also sacrificially serve the common good. In conversation with contemporary social theorists, Joshua S. Nunziato in this book critically evaluates the spiritual significance and aims of economic exchange. Inspired by Augustine's vision of the Church as a 'universal sacrifice', he explores how Augustine's approach teaches us detachment - both personal and collective - which releases us from illusory claims of ownership and reframes business as an exercise in loving and letting go. Nunziato's volume engages with the big questions of economic life and considers both why and how we acknowledge people through business in a way that results in collective well-being. It will be of interest to scholars and students of Augustinian studies, philosophy of exchange, and economic ethics.

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Acknowledging Community

Stanley Cavell has devoted himself to exploring how we sound out the limits of our common language and life by recognizing our true needs and desires. He thereby illuminates the Augustinian logic of sacrifice. For Cavell, our recognition of one another simultaneously communicates that we are alone and that our solitude links us to one another. And this conjunction — our incarnation, the flesh we share with one another as those given to be alone — is not simply something we know. It is something that we acknowledge — or decline to.

Typically, skeptical worries have been regarded as epistemological problems, begging for conceptual solutions. But Cavell demurs. Instead, he sees skepticism as the partial expression of a genuine ethical insight into the character of what it means to be human. Skepticism is the knowledge of our solitude, coupled with the refusal to acknowledge how interiority links us together in community. Skepticism attempts to substitute the pursuit of knowledge for the responsibility of acknowledgment. And it stems, Cavell implies, from our persistent inability to distinguish being alone from being isolated. Our shared flesh leaves each of us alone. But it does not (have to) leave us stranded. Therefore, the body need not be regarded as a prison occluding, excluding, or precluding communication. Rather, human flesh mediates our contact with one another. We communicate through the limits of our body. Sometimes we commune. The boundaries of our flesh bind us together. But our commerce in the body links us together only because we are always alone. Indeed, our shared solitude is precisely what our acknowledgment of one another expresses. I will argue that this expression of our collective solitude commits us economically to one another.

Like Augustine — and because of Augustine (especially as he was interpreted by Wittgenstein and Luther) — Cavell remains exquisitely attuned to the enigma of human interiority. Humans have insides. To be alone is to be capable of expression, not incapable of expression or capable of withholding all expression. This also means: empowered to acknowledge ourselves and one another.

Having an inner life, Cavell suggests, is not like owning private property. My thoughts, emotions, feelings, convictions, and experiences are not simply available to me to be used as I see fit. But neither, on the other hand, are they simply manifest aspects of my persona, to be appropriated and exploited by others as they see fit. My inner life is not simply myself as I know myself. (This would leave my self-knowledge excluded from the inner life it knows.) Nor is my inner life simply myself as others know me. (This would dissolve inner and outer life. There would be no difference between how I know myself and how others know me.) Rather, my inner life expresses me. It reveals to others what remains within me. (And, by dint of my self-consciousness: my intelligibility to myself as a self — I am also, always, other to myself.) And by expressing me, my inner life invites others to do more than know me. It challenges them to acknowledge me. Indeed, by the same token, it challenges me to acknowledge myself. But it is not access to this inner life — private knowledge of it, as if it were a possession to be disposed of as I wish — that singles me out from others. Rather, expressing my inner life expresses my solitude — the fact that I am one person, one creature, and not another. But it does this in a fashion that will sometimes give others better understanding — and more compassionate attention to who I am — than I myself have. Thus, Cavell remarks: "At least we can say that in the case of some mental phenomena, when you have twisted or covered your expressions far or long enough, or haven't yet found the words which give the phenomenon expression, I may know better than you how it is with you. I may respond even to the fact of your

separateness from me (not to mention mine from you) more immediately than you. To know you are in pain is to acknowledge it, or to withhold the acknowledgment. — I know your pain the way you do." To acknowledge my inner life (or another's) with open heart means expressing myself — my attention, my intention, my awareness — as an offering. And that offering invites others to cultivate attentive detachment through mine.

Although Cavell offers a richly nuanced exploration of the human condition, he does not always provide a clear and unambiguous affirmation that our solitude is good. Indeed, a subtle pathos runs through Cavell's writings. It is as if his work has transmuted skeptical desperation at the prospect of being left alone into a softly resonant sadness in our solitude. There is something deeply Augustinian about this. However, for Cavell, the experience of being alone is profoundly shaped by the modern condition. More specifically, the pathos of his work is conditioned by the presumptive disintegration of a culturally persuasive ecclesiology. Thus, Cavell comments:

> When Luther said, criticizing one form in which the sacraments had become relics, 'All our experience of life should be baptismal in character,' he was voicing what would become a guiding ambition of Romanticism — when religious forms could no longer satisfy that ambition. Baudelaire characterizes Romanticism as, among other things, intimacy and spirituality. This suggests why it is not merely the threat of fraudulence and the necessity for trust which has become characteristic of the modern, but equally the reactions of disgust, embarrassment, impatience, partisanship, excitement without release, silence without serenity. I say that such things, if I am right about them, are just facts — facts of life, of art now. But it should also be said that they are grammatical facts: they tell us what kind of object a modern work of art is. It asks of us, not exactly more in the way of response, but one which is more personal. It promises us, not the re-assembly of community, but personal relationship unsponsored by that community; not the overcoming of our isolation, but the sharing of that isolation — not to save the world out of love, but to save love for the world, until it is responsive again.

Contemporary art communicates something about our spirituality: the basis of communion now is not simply being alone. Rather, it is suffering isolation together. Simply to be alone need not be a cause for grief. But being isolated is. Therefore, Cavell's acknowledgment of the limits of embodiment under the conditions of modern culture evokes a sadness that grieves the fact that we are bound now to be isolated, and not merely alone. Skepticism grows in the soil of such cultural ferment. Nevertheless, our modern condition still need not imply that we must be lonely. But it does imply, Cavell suggests, that we must grieve our conditional — so to speak, our given — isolation.

We lack the community, Cavell suggests, in which to harbor solitude as the means of communion. Espen Dahl reads the passage just cited by observing: "This is probably a scant foundation on which to build an ecclesiology, but at least it suggests the importance of acknowledgement, in aesthetic, philosophical, as well as religious terms." Perhaps. But perhaps Cavell's point in this passage is stronger. He is claiming something more than that corporate isolation fails to foster spiritual belonging. He is also suggesting that humans now tend to experience their interiority in terms of a refusal to acknowledge any religious community that might articulate it. We have forfeited — Cavell suggests — any viable ecclesiology. As a consequence, we no longer share a corporate identity — or collective flesh — through which we might express our interiority. So we are left alone with our grief. Perhaps living together at places of parting will lead toward different possibilities for

recognizing one another. Perhaps. But maybe there are means of sacrificial recognition still accessible to us, even now, that maintain the promise of communal belonging. Augustine himself, I argue, evokes the perdurance of such unacknowledged possibilities.

When ecclesial community is pushed to the margins of public life, political economy takes on a stopgap role of religious mediation. In this respect, it serves contemporary culture much as art served the Romantics. This is (part of) what Cavell observes when he notes: "Political economy is the modern form of theodicy, and our labors are our religious mysteries." Why must we suffer the limits of our flesh? Political economy will answer in terms of the "sacraments" of production, consumption, capital, labor, and marginal utility. Instead of allow¬ing us to grieve our isolation — or relieving us of it — political economy confirms our isolation by assuming it as given — and then constructing systems that promise to make it tolerable. Sans an ecclesiology to accord our acknowledgment of one another the significance of communion, our stopgap economic systems will settle for conditioning our isolation and making it (feel) preferable to any alternatives.

For Augustine, on the other hand, our common solitude — the interiority that remains ours as we share it with others — expresses the goodness of having been created. It is good for us to be together alone. Recognizing as much allows the human spirit to dilate in an offering of detached attention and mindful devotion. This insight translates Cavell's vision of acknowledgment into an Augustinian perspective on the economy of sacrifice.

In what follows, I will follow Cavell's lead in an Augustinian direction that sometimes goes beyond what Cavell himself is willing to say. I will argue that economic life affords humans the conversational context in which to communicate the goodness of our mutual solitude. Such communication embodies our acknowledgment of one another through the limits of our flesh. Solitude is the condition of communion with one another and with the divine. Economic life expresses that communion (or, like skepticism, fails to express it when it refuses to acknowledge our common good).

Drawing on Cavell's insight about the logic of acknowledgment, while joining his vision to the conviction that Augustine's ecclesiology is not yet obsolete, I argue that Augustine's conception of sacrifice as the work of parting does not merely achieve a greater good through loss. It embodies an acknowledgment of our common good in limited, mortal flesh. Sacrifice thereby teaches us how to die well. Suffering and death challenge us to recognize the good in the midst of the economy that links these terms together. The limits of our flesh commit us to a shared responsibility for one another's well-being. Our real economy "leaves us in one another's keeping."" In Augustine's case, ecclesiology offers the picture of what it looks like to he left in one another's keeping. The Church, for him, is a community whose role it is to acknowledge the good of each member's incarnate solitude as God's. That acknowledgment defines both the Church's internal economy and its relationship to the broader economy as of one sacrificial responsibility. Such responsibility embodies and reflects — embodies by reflecting — the economy of sacrifice as a universal offering. That offering commits all humans to one another in the flesh of Christ. In this body, humans are invited to acknowledge the limits of their flesh as the condition of communion alone.

Augustine and Contemporary Economic Culture

Many perceive an acute need today for moving from narrowly trans-actional exchange relationships toward an economic culture that better acknowledges the full range of human experience and

desire. Augustine, at first glance, seems an unlikely source of inspiration for such an effort. Although much has been written about his politics, very little has been written about his economic theory. Augustine seems mostly focused on other things. In his early life, he was an intellectual who made his living as a professor of rhetoric. In his later life, he was a religious leader, preacher, and polemicist who lived in a commune. He was never a businessperson — much less an economist. Matters of the marketplace often seem to slip into his writings as potential distractions from more important affairs. Even if he had given close attention to the structural details of his late antique North African economy, these would probably survive as little more than historical trivia. In light of all this, it takes some imagination to read Augustine as a philosopher for today's economy. But that is the reading given here.

Two convictions guide this reading. First, as already mentioned, economy is an idea much bigger than we normally admit. It organizes facets of our life that we often try to exempt from its logic. And if we understand the big economy of human life better, we will also better understand the smaller sphere where we buy and sell things using money. Second, when Augustine talks about sacrifice, the body, and death, or when he discusses family life, religious community, and politics, he is outlining economic relationships. Although the economy governing these relationships is often tacit, it is real. And it operates according to a logic that casts light on our economy today, both in its more expansive guise and its narrower, financial expression.

Augustine does not speak to us about perennial questions out of an indistinct and irrelevant past. Augustine belonged to a vivid political epoch. He lived in an empire that thought of itself as a global economy. His was a complex, cosmopolitan world. Although by the time of Augustine, Christianity had become considerably more influential in the political affairs of Roman life than it had been during the previous century, Augustine still lived in an era of religious pluralism. As in our own epoch, the late Roman Empire was a mix of highly devolved modes of self-government regulated by a tightly centralized nexus of political power. As in our own context, wealth was concentrated in the estates of a small group who were able to maintain their status by passing on their property to kin. Noting the huge social importance of fungible assets in the fourth century, Peter Brown characterizes the period as an "age of gold." And Georg Simmel, writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, provides a link from Brown's "age of gold" to the modern era: "At present — as in the period of decline in Greece and Rome — and far beyond the inner state of the individual, the whole aspect of life, the relationships of human beings with one another and with objective culture are coloured by monetary interests." Now, well into the twenty-first century, Simmel's comparison continues to ring true.

In the case of late antiquity, the sack of Rome was the spectacularly abrupt sign of the whole social system's slow disintegration. Death was threatening a centuries-old, transcontinental economic and political order. Indeed, the subsequent flight of the wealthy to the relative safety of Roman North Africa prompted Augustine to write the City of God (civ. Dei). These well-endowed fugitives represented more than a harried elite, who were wealthy enough to be mobile and vulnerable enough to move. They were figureheads of an economic system that had stopped expanding its frontiers and become unsustainable. And that made them privileged refugees, wondering how to make sense of social disintegration. Augustine wrote the civ. Dei in response to this political crisis among the learned guardians of the collapsing order. Facing the prospect of an entire economy's destruction, they began an alarmed self-examination. Was there anything that could have been done

— or could yet be done — to preserve the old economic order? Some of Augustine's would-be readers were wondering whether a disciplined cultural pluralism might have been more politically sustainable than the ascendant Christian synthesis. Augustine's massive response takes a subversive approach by claiming that sustainability was not the key economic or political problem facing the threatened empire. Augustine suggests that, instead of asking how to survive, the most important question was how to live well together; and living well requires the discipline of memento mori — remembering one's death. During times of personal and social disintegration, the imperatives of endless growth or limitless sustainability can be at their most beguiling. And that paradoxical fact gives special urgency to the problem of how to die well. Although Augustine wrote civ. Dei in a context historically remote from our own, he was grappling with problems that remain proximate to our own sources of economic anxiety.

As Cavell suggests, people like Augustine raise a bigger question for us than whether we can usefully adapt their ideas to our contemporary problems. Rather, they invite us into a living conversation. The inability to enter such a conversation may hint at an impoverished, provincial self-understanding — at least when it comes to our theory of economy. Perhaps the distance between Augustine and us is not best gauged by our powers of creative reappropriation and application. Maybe, instead, it is best sounded out by the quality of conversation that Augustine sparks with us and for us now.

Structure

This book has five main chapters. The first two criticize the role that sacrifice plays in supporting the economic ideals of endless growth and limitless sustainability. They do so by bringing contemporary social theorists Max Weber, Rene Girard, and Nancy Jay into conversation with Augustine's deconstructive analysis of sacrifice in the first ten books of City of God. Augustine divides his analysis there into two halves. The first half analyzes pagan sacrifices made for the sake of increasing access to economic goods in this mortal life. The second considers pagan sacrifices made for the sake of achieving limitlessly sustainable life (cf. civ. Dei 6, Preface and Chapter 1). I follow Augustine's division in my first two chapters. The first makes an Augustinian case against sacrifice as a means to endless growth in the service of private appetites. The second makes an Augustinian case against sacrifice as a means to limitless sustainability in the service of tribal self-preservation. Together, these chapters critique sacrifices taken simply as losses for the sake of "higher" economic ideals.

In slightly more detail: Chapter 1 looks at the sacrificial loss of any claim to a common good in our exchange relationships, which we accept as the condition for unlimited collective growth in pluralistic Weberian marketplaces. By drawing on the recapitulation of the first five chapters of civ. Dei in 19.17, this chapter shows how Augustine's wayfaring city provides a model that represents another vision of sacrificial community: one that acknowledges a common good, shared even with those who imagine that all their goods are private. The growth of that community is limited by the flesh of those whose common good it serves. Along the way, I critique Danielle Allen's picture of democratic society as a political economy predicated on the composition of wills, rather than a harmonized unity of will rooted in openhearted attention to a shared good.

The second chapter evaluates sacrificial losses accepted for the sake of partisan corporate sustainability. Corporations collectively embody human groups. When we try to maintain these groups by strategically excluding certain members, we turn sacrifice into an instrument of cruel economic manipulation, which corrupts the very identities that it seeks to conserve by sequestering

them from the larger community to which they belong. Augustine plays out the logic of strategic loss management for the sake of limitless corporate life in his account of demonic immortality, which is appropriated by human worshippers through sacrifices that animate bodies for malignant possession.

The final three chapters shift away from critique and toward a constructive task: reframing sacrifice as an offering of detachment, which teaches humans how to die well by incorporating them into a sacrificial community of openhearted exchange. These three chapters trace the story of Augustine's conversion narrative told in con f. 7, 8, and 9, respectively, while simultaneously drawing on his later thinking in civ. Dei 10 and 13. Together, these passages outline what the economy of sacrifice does, what it looks like, and what it reveals about ourselves — personally and collectively. And it shows how Augustine models a process of growth and illumination through which people discover their place in that economy.

More specifically, Chapter 3 considers how death shadows contemporary economic culture in the form of sacrificial losses, large and small, that we accept as the means to survival. Death, of one kind or another, is the price of living — and living well. But separating death from the goods that it is serves codes loss into the matrix of exchange as a necessary evil. Death is the antagonistic enemy of the ends served by economic culture. Therefore, exchange is always shadowed by the specter of fear. However, by recovering the Platonic discipline of memento mori (as adapted by Augustine) and learning what philosophy has to teach us about dying well through our economic exchanges, it is possible to see death as a good end, quietly accompanying us in all of our transactional means — not as a nameless fear but as the promise of offering a life in love through all our works of parting. Making that offering of sacrificial acknowledgment is what the economy of sacrifice does.

Chapter 4 explores what the economy of sacrifice looks like. It shows how seeing the parting of exchange as an offering, rather than a loss, opens new possibilities for relating to economic partners as friends. Exchange is not merely a transaction inspired by different judgments about marginal utility. It is a conversation that helps us see who we are more clearly. Augustine discovered his place in the economy of sacrifice — represented by the community of the Church — through friends and family, who already knew their place as one of open-hearted hospitality. Responding to their invitation released Augustine from manipulative uses of sacrifice. Ultimately, joining the sacrificial economy is about finding friends who offer us opportunities for offering ourselves more fully by providing the stuff of life to one another together in an intensifying circuit of exchange that acknowledges our common good. Therefore, the economy of sacrifice is embodied by a specific, visible community with borders open to all.

The fifth, and final, chapter outlines what the economy of sacrifice reveals about ourselves. Following Augustine, it considers how humans offer a "universal sacrifice" (civ. Dei io.6): an offering that offers all for the sake of each. Augustine came to understand this universal community through his experience with his mother at Ostia, right before her death. Universal sacrifice teaches us two things about ourselves. First, each of us is always alone, singular, and unique. And, second, all of us are always together, connected, in community. To explore this paradox, I rely on both Cavell and Henry David Thoreau, while engaging Sherry Turkle's Alone Together — a book that challenges us to recover the value of solitude within a technology-driven culture marked by loneliness. Together with these thinkers, my reading of Augustine ultimately suggests that we offer each other the sacrifice of solitude: not its loss, but its compassionate opening to include the solitude of others. All that is ours

to offer is love. And that love can be expressed through the media of everyday exchanges in the marketplace.

Where does such a reading leave us? It commends a specific work of inner transformation that reorients our personal and collective attitude about ownership. It detaches us from claims to private gain and loss. And it keeps the media of our common well-being in continuous circulation. The lesson is not that we are only "stewards" of someone else's property (whether that be God or the state). That style of thinking tends to recapitulate the questionable logic of ownership by simply projecting it onto a bigger screen. It makes us into agents of transcendental proprietors. They are the true owners, and we are simply borrowing what is theirs. But transferring owners does not change the logic of ownership. The power of attachment to what may be gained or lost remains unaltered. Whether acting as civil servants or as divine functionaries, designated agents continue to exercise the power of ownership on behalf of their nominal proprietors. For Augustine, God offers sacrifice — and thereby offers up claim to ownership even over the creation God made. Thus, in sacrifice, we do not just give back to God what is already God's own. Instead, we (like God) express through the work of parting the unity of love. Economic life teaches us that finally (like God) all that is ours is our love.

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From first to last, life is a work of parting. What began at the dawn of natural history with the division of the first protozoan continues in each human life at conception and birth. Cells divide. The child enters the world from its mother's womb. The umbilical cord is cut. We learn what it means to be different from others: from family, from teachers, from friends. We change and grow. We slough and molt. The work of parting continues until death, that decisive moment of departure. These are the farewells of a lifetime. And in between the monumental occasions, we carry on the work of parting and call it business. We strike deals. We make exchanges. We give and take, buy and sell, teach and learn. Always we are parting: with things we care about, with people we love, with ideas we hold. And these everyday moments — no matter how insignificant — point us back to life itself. They remind us that our lives are wholly (and, maybe, holy) works of constant parting. Every day, our business poses the tacit question: Will we see our partings as losses or as offerings? Either way is always open to us. But Augustine's vision of the economy of sacrifice suggests how the conditions of our exchange might look different if we took the second way.

We are present in the bits and pieces of our lives: those results of the ongoing work of parting. But, for Augustine, we cannot hold together the fragments of a life as our life. We do not grasp ourselves (cf. conf. X.xvi (25)). We cannot see how the moments cohere. Or how we cohere. The only action that unites the parts ís the work of parting, offered beyond all possibility of gain or loss. In that gesture, we find ourselves met by one whose unity burns in every splinter and joins our lives past every prospect of recall — of our recollection, or of any.' So Augustine cries: "You are my eternal Father, but I am scattered in times whose order I do not understand. The storms of incoherent events tear to pieces my thoughts, the inmost entrails of my soul, until that day when, purified and molten by the fire of your love, I flow together into you" (con f. Xl.xxix (39), Chadwick modified). We burn. Our lives are aflame. And in the burning, we part, split, and divide. We pass over. And through the separations, we find ourselves given over and given up. We lose our voice. But we find

ourselves given up to one who speaks in us, through us, and to us with the voice of openheartedness and says that ours is simply to offer. Unity alone lies there.

The journey toward seeing one's life as an offering does not do away with one's losses or gains. But it changes their significance wholesale by transforming the significance of ownership. Ownership is a claim that only runs so deep. It does not penetrate to the roots of what it means to be human. It defines us at neither our edges nor our center. We enter and leave the world with nothing. And even in the midst of life, we experience moments of beauty, belonging, and connection that remind us that we are not the same as what we have or lack. This truth gets half-acknowledged (and, hence, entirely distorted) when we treat business as a human pursuit lower than those — like art, sports, science, or music — which supposedly express our higher faculties. These higher activities, we tend to think, manifest who we really are or who we truly wish to be. And, although business enables such pursuits, it remains wholly subservient to them. But the economy of sacrifice undermines such habits of instrumental thinking.

It is true: business does trade on ownership. Yet our business still carries the power to signify something deeper than the ownership conditions it assumes and perpetuates. Something rudimentary. Something primordial. Something that does lie at the root of who we are: the utter simplicity of a life, complicated only by its own unoriginality. Ownership can teach us the wisdom of loving and letting go. Herein lies the hidden spiritual power of business.

Augustine's perspective on the economy of sacrifice teaches us that ownership is not a mode of attachment. The things we own are not attached to us. And we are not attached to them. But parting with the illusion that ownership is attachment represents the work of a lifetime. Letting go of the illusory bonds tying us to what is ours means refusing to imagine that our gains and losses define us — or that winning makes us who we are. Instead, it requires the recognition that our possessions are simply associated with us in order to enable the practical task of provisioning: taking care of ourselves and those we love. Learning detachment also teaches us something deep about our relationships. It trains us to let go of the twinned assumptions that we cannot be separate from one another and that separation cannot join us together. Parting with those assumptions connects us to each other's open heart. And that openhearted unity is the wisdom of sacrificial economy.

Luce Irigaray gives rhapsodic voice to the economic wisdom of sacrificial detachment in a meditation inspired by female Christian mystics:

> Everything is relentlessly immediate in this marriage of the unknowable, which can never be evaded once it has been experienced. In a deeper unity than the still, already, speculative unity that underlies the sense of these most wrenching contradictions. The bottom, the center, the most hidden, inner place, the heart of the crypt to which 'God' alone descends when he has renounced modes and attributes. For this most secret virginity of the `soul' surrenders only to the one who also freely offers the self in all its nakedness. This most private chamber opens only to one who is indebted to no possession for potency. It is wedded "only in the abolition of all power, all having, all being, that is founded elsewhere and otherwise than in this embrace of fire whose end is past conception. Each becomes the other in consumption, the nothing of the other in consummation. Each will not in fact have known the identity of the other, has thus lost self-identity except for a hint of an imprint that each keeps in order the better to intertwine in a union already, finally, at hand.

The ecstatic community of exchange Irigaray pictures here is an economy — but not one premised on ownership. It is the economy of sacrifice, which is realized through loving detachment. She pictures it in terms of erotic interplay, beyond the conditions of possession or dispossession. It is, if you like, the economy within. Our economy — but lived from the inside out. Neither the exchange nor its terms are claimed or owned, taken or given. They are only extended in a continually openhearted expression of rapture and delight. The gesture Irigaray imagines is an opening of love, desire, and recognition: "Now I know it/myself and by knowing, I love it/ myself and by loving, I desire it/myself. And if in the sight of the nails and the spear piercing the body of the Son I drink in a joy that no word can ever express, let no one conclude hastily that I take pleasure in his sufferings. But if the Word was made flesh in this way, and to this extent, it can only have been to make me (become) God in my jouissance, which can at last be recognized." This love accepts the work of parting only to join the means of life to its end. Here and now and always. It acknowledges God in the flesh, as one's flesh. This is the sacrificial yes: not the closure of self around itself, but the dilation of self into an offering that releases all claim to the self that is offered. And yet offers. This voice voices the self beyond gains and losses — yet in them, too. It bespeaks a quiet desire reminding us always and everywhere that ours is only to open the heart in attention and devotion. To delight. To love. Such is the open secret of our business with one another.

To acknowledge one's place in the economy of sacrifice is to make an offering of active openheartedness: having without holding and parting without losing. Active openheartedness aspires to elicit the same disposition from others. We respond to inspired offerings in order to offer our own inspiration to those who may, or may not, yet be in a position to respond. But we continue to offer in faith. Why? Because our economy is a universal sacrifice.

There is a paradox at the heart of parting. We part with what had never been our own. In coming to see and acknowledge as much, we manifest what had always been the case. True sacrifice costs us nothing. It gains us nothing. When we learn to love and to let go — to love by letting go — we come to recognize that we had never really grasped what we are now releasing. We had always simply been letting it go. (Though, perhaps, we only come to know the love of it too late — if ever.) And, yet, the voicing of that very acknowledgment — the recognition that we have never had anything to offer — that offers something new. Something true. It alone is all we ever had to call our own. Even the power to consecrate the products of our creativity, the work of our hands, the labor of our hearts to the divine service of others: even that is offered up. In the end, even the offering we make is not our own. Ours is simply the love that voices as much. And that is as much as we ever had to offer. <>

Augustine on the Will A Theological Account by Han-luen Kantzer Komline [, Early Christian Studies, Oxford University Press, 9780190948801]

By analyzing a variety of texts from across Augustine's career, the book traces the development of Augustine's thinking on the human will. Augustine's most creative contributions to the notion of the human will do not derive from articulating a monolithic, universal definition. He identifies four types of human will the created will, which he describes as a hinge; the fallen will, a link in a chain binding

human beings to sin; the redeemed will, which is a root of love; and the fully free will, to be enjoyed in the next life, when perfection is made complete. His mature view is theologically differentiated, consisting of four distinct types of human will, which vary according to these diverse theological scenarios. His innovation consists in distinguishing these types with a detail and clarity unprecedented by any thinker before him. Augustine's mature view of the will is constructed in intensive dialogue with other Christian thinkers and, most of all, with the Christian scriptures. Its basic features shape, and are shaped by, his doctrines of Christ and the Holy Spirit, as well as creation and grace, making it impossible to abstract his views on willing from his account of the central Christian doctrines of Christology, Pneumatology, and the Trinity. The multiple facets of Augustine's conception of will have been cut to fit the shape of his theology and the biblical story it seeks to describe. From Augustine we inherit a theological account of the will.

We begin by introducing the most significant debates surrounding Augustine's understanding of the will (*uoluntas*), and the hybrid methodology employed in this work, and the thesis that Augustine articulates a theologically differentiated notion of will. Is Augustine's notion of will original in the history of Western philosophy? Can his affirmation of free will be sustained given his approach to the problem of evil, foreknowledge, predestination, and grace? How does the concept of free will fit, or fail to fit, within the larger scope of Augustine's thought? Traditional questions in the literature are adumbrated along the way to show the fruitfulness of a theological account.

Augustine's conception of the will has proven elusive in two ways. On the one hand, it has defied a stable location in the philosophical tradition. Was Augustine the first to employ a unified concept of the will as distinct from both reason and emotion? No consensus has been achieved on this point. The persuasiveness of Augustine's approach to the will, on the other hand, especially in relation to his other theoretical commitments, has prompted perennial debate. Is Augustine's understanding of the will cogent and coherent? Controversy continues.

The idea that pre-Christian philosophy lacked a notion of will has been circulating at least since the eighteenth century. In *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume intimated that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary action, absent from ancient thought, arose as an unnatural abstraction to ground morality as theology came to dominate ethical theory. In the following century, Kierkegaard observed that the notion of willful wrongdoing is alien to classical Greek thinking, which does not accord the will moral relevance, as Christianity does. A number of studies from the past fifty years have lent further support to the view that ancient philosophy was bereft of a distinct concept of will, coupling this claim with the thesis that Augustine was the first to articulate such a notion clearly.

While Mary T. Clark stopped short of claiming that no one before Augustine had developed a full-fledged theory of free will, in her 1958 study she deemed the notions of free will in ancient philosophers before Augustine "inadequate." Clark presented Augustine as "a pioneer philosopher of freedom" if not as the "the first philosopher of the will." Hannah Arendt bestowed the latter title on Augustine in *Willing*, the second volume of her tripartite work, *The Life of the Mind*, whose material came from the Gifford lectures she had begun in 1974. Contrary to Gilbert Ryle, the latest, at the time, in a string of philosophers who had questioned the will's existence, Arendt insisted upon the self-evidence of this phenomenon of human experience and underlined its necessity to any ethical or legal system.[6] The emergence of the concept of will in the history of philosophy, according to Arendt, was due to discovery, not invention. With the insight that the will was "a faculty distinct from desire and reason," Augustine had uncovered it.

In the same year Arendt began her lectures on "willing" at Aberdeen, Albrecht Dihle delivered the Sather Lectures at Berkeley, which provided the basis for his book *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*, published in 1982. Dihle, like Arendt, argued that ancient philosophy lacked a full-fledged theory of will and that the rise of Christianity played an integral role in its emergence. While the notion of the will of God was articulated in the Christological controversies of the fourth century, the notion of the human will, Dihle contended in the final chapter of his book, originated with Augustine. By converting the Roman legal concept of *uoluntas* or *uelle* to an anthropological one, and defining this concept in relation to the will of God, Augustine arrived at a concept of the will assumed in the Bible but never articulated in ancient Greek philosophy or earlier Christian theology.

Dihle's seminal work, especially his provocative claim that "St. Augustine was, in fact, the inventor of our modern notion of will," has stimulated a number of further studies. Building on Dihle's thesis, C. H. Kahn offered in 1988 a multifaceted picture of the sources of the notions of will found in Augustine and Aquinas. Kahn supports Dihle's contention that there was something new about the notion of will in Augustine and that the effort to understand the implications of the biblical portrayal of the divine will played an essential role in shaping this notion. He also observes, however, that philosophical, especially Stoic, notions of will, which had not yet coalesced into a single coherent concept to the degree they would in Augustine and much later in Aquinas, were highly influential upon the bishop of Hippo. Augustine derived his notion of will from an eclectic synthesis of theological ideas drawn from the Hebrew and Christian scriptures and Stoic theories of assent.

Whereas Kahn seeks to complicate Dihle's picture of the sources of Augustine's new theory of will, Christoph Horn seeks to clarify the argument that Augustine was the originator of the concept of the will in light of critiques, like that of Christopher Kirwan, which have suggested that Dihle failed

to specify adequately the criteria for a bona fide theory of the will. Horn defends Augustine's claim to the title of first philosopher of the will as sustainable when a philosophical concept of the will is defined as a concept that "1) acknowledges a capacity to which fully conscious wrongful actions may be traced and 2) holds that this capacity for which it allows (namely the capacity to choose consciously to do what is wrong) is not reducible to some other cause or explanation." Horn, then, like Arendt, Dihle, and Kahn, seeks to defend the originality of Augustine's understanding of the will but does so by introducing philosophical criteria rather than by analyzing philosophical influences.

Another stream of scholarship has tended to undermine all forms of the "originality thesis" by supporting the conclusion that Augustine's notion of the will did not in fact achieve a genuine advance upon previous theories of the will. Since most of these arguments are based on proving that certain ideas were already present in other thinkers, rather than proving that certain ideas are absent in Augustine, it is not necessary to explore all of them at length here. André-Jean Voelke's study of Stoic notions of the will, *L'idée de volonté dans le Stoïcisme*, appeared in 1973. The year 1979 saw the publication of Anthony Kenny's *Aristotle's Theory of the Will*, whose title, like that of Voelke's work, proclaims its incompatibility with the "originality thesis." An article by Japp Mansfeld from 1991 is titled "The Idea of Will in Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Galen." These studies call into question the general consensus that until Augustine ancient philosophy operated without a clear theory of the will.

In his Sather lectures of 1997–1998, Michael Frede presents the most direct challenge to Dihle's thesis. As Dihle had done in his own series, Frede builds to a climactic final chapter that assesses Augustine's originality. Frede concludes, however, that the originator of the concept of "free will" was the late Stoic Epictetus, not Augustine. Augustine's own thinking on free will, Frede seeks to prove from *De libero arbitrio*, was thoroughly Stoic. The sole difference Frede finds is Augustine's elimination of the Stoic distinction between willing, which applies to intentions that may be thwarted, and choosing, which applies to things like mental assent that cannot be thwarted. Due to the strictures of Latin, Augustine was forced to use *uelle* for both. Thus "Augustine's notion of the will is just a version of the more complex Stoic notion of the will."

Like Frede, Sarah Catherine Byers seeks to highlight Augustine's indebtedness to the Stoics for his notion of will (*uoluntas*). In *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis*, she argues that Augustine uses the term *uoluntas* to refer to the Stoic notion of *hormē*: an impulse to action, which, according to reconstructions of Stoic theories of motivation, is the product of intellectual assent to an interior self-command. As the subtitle of the volume conveys, however, Byers also, like C. H. Kahn and Richard Sorabji, characterizes Augustine as an eclectic synthesizer. Though his notions of will (*uoluntas*) and free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) find precedents in the Stoic tradition, Byers contends, Augustine's use of these terms fits into a larger theory of moral motivation that creatively combines both Stoic and Platonic elements. The result is an account of moral motivation that advances upon preceding Stoic versions.

The vigor of the debate surrounding the originality thesis regarding Augustine and the will is more than matched by disputes about how to assess Augustine's view of free will. These disputes center on three basic issues that arise in conjunction with the will in Augustine: theodicy; God's knowledge of the future of creation, often referred to as God's "foreknowledge"; and grace. The first issue concerns the sufficiency of Augustine's concept of will for a so-called free-will defense in response to

the problem of evil. The second and third issues have to do with the compatibility of Augustine's views about the will with other key elements of his thought. Can free will be reconciled with divine knowledge of events that lie in our future? Can free will be maintained in light of Augustine's mature teaching on the power of grace and predestination?

David Sedley observes in his foreword to Michael Frede's *A Free Will*, "The origin of the concept of the will, and more specifically free will, has been endlessly debated, and the inconclusiveness of the debate has mirrored the philosophical indeterminacy of the concept itself." The indeterminacy to which Sedley points unfortunately applies not only to the criteria for a general transhistorical theory of will that might serve as the basis for adjudicating the question of when such a theory first emerged but also to particular theories of the will associated with individual figures. This is especially true of Augustine. Behind the "endless" disputes about whether Augustine discovered the will and how his theory of it relates to other issues in his thought lies a more mundane question: How did Augustine actually understand the will?

Among the studies that have tackled this more fundamental problem directly is Simon Harrison's monograph *Augustine's Way into the Will*. Harrison approaches the puzzle by means of a close reading of *De libero arbitrio*, which, he argues, is designed to yield not a definition of the term *uoluntas* but a sense of what willing is that emerges in the process of questioning: Augustine's unique "way into" the concept of the will. Earlier studies include articles by J. Ball, M. Huftier, and N. W. den Bok, who has perhaps done the most to formulate precise definitions of *uoluntas* and *liberum arbitrium*. According to den Bok, it is essential to recognize the distinction between these two terms, which renders Augustine's mature assessment of the human condition and workings of grace compatible with his affirmation of free will. The reliability of this distinction, however, has been disputed, most recently by Lenka Karfíková. These helpful studies, then, invite further work to test, refine, and identify the larger relevance of their findings in the context of a broader investigation of the significance of the will in Augustine's thought.

Approaching the Augustinian Will

Challenges present themselves to both chronological and thematic approaches to Augustine's conception of the will. On the one hand, a chronological exploration of a single theme in Augustine's thinking on the will would seem at first to have the potential for opening up a vista of larger patterns in his thinking through a narrow cleft. Two problems, however, beset such efforts. First, as will become clear, the distinctive shape of Augustine's view of the will cannot come into view when one considers but a single theme. Multiple themes must be protracted to bring into view the organizing pattern of Augustine's thinking on this subject. Second, not all of Augustine's writings can be dated precisely and reliably. Thus a strictly chronological approach would automatically disqualify certain works that might be of material importance for understanding Augustine's views. On the other hand, one could organize a study of the will thematically by chapter, drawing on Augustine's relevant writings irrespective of chronology. Yet this approach could risk flattening out the important developments that occur in Augustine's thinking on issues such as the relation of grace to the will and combining perspectives that did not relate organically in the context of the unfolding of his thought.

This book merges these two approaches in order to have the best of both worlds. Each chapter is devoted to a different theme, ensuring that the most important sources of material significance to

the topic can find a structural home in the work despite uncertainty regarding dating. However, each chapter also finds its center of gravity in a certain period of Augustine's thinking, with successive chapters moving forward chronologically. This ensures the book's coherence and allows it to build momentum as chapters elapse. At the same time, the thematic focus of the chapters will allow flexibility to explore how various themes spill over before and beyond each chronological period that serves as a center of gravity, in light of the fact that Augustine does not simply start or stop thinking about certain issues before or after periods when the volume of his writings on them happens to be the greatest. In sum, this kind of hybrid structure simultaneously reflects the integrity and the evolution of Augustine's thinking on the will.

The structure of Augustine's own thought makes possible the structure of this study. The key to the affirmation of both the continuity and the development of Augustine's conception of will is the thesis that his mature conception of will is "theologically differentiated." In other words, Augustine's conception of the will comes to encompass multiple, often strikingly different accounts of how the human will works, each of which is indexed to theological events in the narratives of scripture. The will works in different ways in different theological contexts. Given its theologically differentiated character, Augustine's perspective on the human will can embrace his previous conceptions even as it continues to evolve.

A Theologically Differentiated Notion of Will

Diagnosing, in different terms, the same ambiguity Sedley observed in conversations about the origins of the will, Kahn makes the point that in order to ascertain when the concept of will was "discovered" one must first determine what this concept is: "If we do not know what we mean by *the will*, we will not know what we are looking for." In response to this quandary, Kahn distinguishes among four different ways of thinking about the will that have held sway during the past two millennia. Each of these, he suggests, has added its own convolutions to the labyrinth from which our contemporary notions of the will have emerged.

Kahn's fourfold schema is instructive, not just because it provides a rubric for participants in the metaquest for the origins of "the will" but also because of what it suggests about the distinctive characteristics of each conception of will he describes. A post-Cartesian conception sees the will as a mental cause of a physical act. Kahn identifies this family of perspectives as the target of Ryle's critique in *The Concept of Mind* and as the one "which has had a bad press in the last generation of Anglo-American philosophy, though it may currently be undergoing a revival." Kantian and post-Kantian approaches see the will as the locus of self-legislation and the inner reality of the self. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche find a place in this family line. There is also the perennial issue of free will versus determinism. This debate overlaps each of the other ways of thinking about the will Kahn describes but qualifies as its own major category of approach. Of particular interest in this study is the fourth conception of will Kahn identifies, which he associates with Augustine and his heirs. According to these thinkers, the human will is analyzed in relation to God's will and understood as "modeled on, or responding to, the will of God." Kahn calls this the "theological concept of will."

The idea that Augustine's understanding of will is inherently theological, and perhaps even inherently Christian, has been proposed in various forms not only by Christian theologians but also by philosophers from Kierkegaard to Arendt and Dihle. Many studies of Augustine on the will have

sought to locate his view of the will in larger historical trajectories, to utilize his understanding of the will to solve philosophical problems, or to evaluate his conception of the will for theological or philosophical cogency in terms of external criteria. The aim here is to address the more basic question of how Augustine describes the will and to do so by attending to the theological contexts in which *he* articulates and employs it.

Ideas about creation, the triune God, and Christ are not merely incidental to Augustine's notion of will but—at least in his way of talking about things—are essential for understanding what the will is. The moral significance of the will, in turn, depends upon how these theological contexts condition it. In other words, the moral capacities of the will depend on its theological ontology. What the human will can *do* depends on what the human will *is* in relation to God—what it is in light of its creation ex nihilo in the image of God, its plight due to sin, its re-creation in Christ, and its future glorification. How the will functions varies given each of these theological contexts. In this sense, Augustine's notion of the will is "theologically differentiated." It is calibrated to particular theological events, according to which the capacities and character of human willing vary drastically. Taking into account the specific theological and exegetical contexts in which Augustine develops his notion of will throws into relief the distinctively variegated shape of his theory of the will while at the same time highlighting its coherence. These particular events are tied together in a coherent story: Augustine's retelling of the story of God's relationship with the human race he finds recorded in scripture.

Augustine's biblically indexed and theologically differentiated view of the human will corresponds to, though it is not exhaustively summarized by, the classic idea that human beings exist in four states. In the primitive state of integrity represented by the first parents, human beings could refrain from sin (*posse non peccare*); in their fallen state, they sin necessarily (*non posse non peccare*); redeemed human beings regain the paradisiacal possibility of avoiding sin (*posse non peccare*); glorified human beings will be sinless by blissful necessity (*non posse peccare*). This pattern, often associated with Augustine, served in the later tradition of Augustinian theology to structure theological anthropology and, indeed, to undergird the general tendency of Christian theology as a whole to read scripture as a drama with four acts: creation, fall, redemption, and consummation.

While Augustine nowhere sums up his views in a single systematic statement that enumerates the four states of the human being in exactly these terms, his theology considered from a macro perspective clearly provides a conceptual framework for a fourfold view of the will corresponding to these major epochs. The biblically indexed and theologically differentiated perspective on the human will that emerges from a synthetic and genetic reading of his corpus thus vindicates the genuinely Augustinian character of the multiple states view. Moreover it shows how a fourfold structure can serve as a hermeneutical key not only to Augustine's teaching on will but also to his development as a thinker.

Philip Schaff once remarked that "Augustine had in his own life passed through all the earlier stages of the history of the church." This statement can be pushed further following Schaff's own insight that Augustine's renown stems from his "clear development of the Biblical anthropology." In his thinking on the will, Augustine passes through the earlier stages of the history of the church and through the epochs he finds in scripture. Creation, not just the specter of Marcion behind the Manichees, was in play from the beginning; the eschaton, not only Julian, captured his imagination at

the end. The four states of human willing were not only progressive in content but also progressively discovered.

For Augustine, the will is a highly complex phenomenon, whose workings and key features vary drastically in different contexts: the character and capacities of human willing depend on when willing occurs in relation to certain key theological events. Augustine's understanding of the significance of these events, in turn, emerges from his efforts to make sense of scripture—both in terms of its larger narrative arc, running from creation to eschaton, and in terms of specific pericopes, especially those from the writings of Paul. In this sense, Augustine's conception of will is not only inherently theological; it is inherently biblical. It does not make sense apart from the story of God's relationship to human beings as recorded in scripture. It is the story of this relationship that holds Augustine's multifaceted conception of will together as one coherent account.

In a way, the idea that the will works differently in its created integrity, after the human race has been mired in sin, given the redemptive work of Christ, and in the context of eternal beatitude, seems unremarkable, even commonplace. Yet Augustine articulated this idea with a kind of clarity, precision, and depth that no one before him had quite achieved. If it seems self-evident today, this only further indicates the importance of his contribution; the very influence of the theological paradigm he developed for thinking about human willing may have served to obscure its novelty.

The idea that Augustine develops a theologically differentiated conception of will has implications for the contested question of locating his view of will in the Western intellectual tradition and its line of philosophies and "philosophers of the will." However, just as interesting as this question is the issue of how Augustine's theory of the will situates him in the history of Christian theology. This book's conclusion will therefore indicate some important theological precursors, both Greek and Latin, to Augustine's thinking on the human will. The resulting overview of Augustine's debts to previous philosophical and theological traditions will help to identify both the similarities of his thinking on the will to previous conceptions and the features that make it unique.

An evaluation of Augustine's place in the tradition intentionally follows, rather than precedes, inquiry into the peculiarities of his own evolving conception of will found in the body of this book. It has become almost standard to approach Augustine's theory of the will by appending him to the end or beginning of a trajectory in the history of philosophy or by injecting him into contemporary philosophical or theological debates. But Augustine's evolving view of the will is more than a philosophical inception or conclusion, a conceptual problem or solution—one page in a much longer story. It tells a story unto itself—it retells the biblical story—of transformation from division to delight. <>

Vagaries of Desire: A Collection of Philosophical Essays by Timo Airaksinen [Value Inquiry Book Series, Philosophy, Literature, and Politics, Brill Rodopi, Hardback: 978-90-04-41029-9, E-Book: 978-90-04-41030-5] Open Source

Vagaries of Desire is a major collection of new essays by Timo Airaksinen on the philosophy of desire. The first part develops a novel account of the philosophical theory of desire, including Girard. The second part discusses Kafka's main works, namely *The Castle*, *The Trial*, and *Amerika*, and Thomas Hobbes and the problems of intentionality. The text develops such linguistic tropes as metaphor and metonymy in connection with topics like death and then applies them to Kafka's texts. The third part makes an effort to understand the mysteries of sadism and masochism in philosophical and rhetorical terms. The last article criticizes Thomas Nagel's influential account of sexual perversion and develops a viable alternative.

Excerpt: This volume contains eleven essays on philosophical theories of desire, their applications and rhetorical aspects. They move via analysis towards rhetorical literary and metaphysical case studies on Kafka and Hobbes. The final two chapters deal with kinky sexual desire and its moral and motivational mysteries, first by focusing on BDSM and consensual S/M, and then reading Thomas Nagel's influential article on perversions and their psychological genesis. In this way, the chapters display the use of several philosophical strategies, such as analysis, criticism, literary interpretation, and rhetorical speculation side by side and one after the other, proceeding from modern logical clarity towards postmodern suggestiveness. This makes the volume multifaceted and, as I hope, polyphonous in a way that is not immediately obvious or trivial. All the papers can be read individually, they are self-contained and hence somewhat repetitious, which I apologise, but they also display a

methodological progress from relative triviality towards what looks like an interpretative deep end where the philosophical ladders do not quite reach the bottom or where philosophy ends. Plato thought that philosophy should lead us up and away from the cave, but another way of seeing it is that it leads us to the bottom of the cave where all the fundamental secrets lie in eternal gloom and darkness. Plato dreams of truths in bright sunlight, which is nice but far too optimistic. In the end confusion and mystery prevail and the world, as I see it, covers itself in semantic noise, ambiguity, and metaphors as if to avoid the intolerable truth. In the end, linguistic tropes rule. When I looked at the essays in this volume in toto, I noticed, to my initial surprise, that the key metaphor here is travel. I was not planning it that way but when I think of it now I am inclined to say that it is a perfectly good one.

My long standing interest in desire is an offshoot of my struggles with the notions of happiness. I originally toyed with the argument to the effect that satisfied desires make, or should make, a person happy. This contrasts with the idea that one cannot satisfy a desire de se, like some Buddhists may argue, which is to say that happiness is an ever delusive notion. Also, a crucial moment was when Dr Gerald Doherty (Turku) defined, in personal communication, de dicto desires as narrative idealizations referring at the same time to Jacques Lacan. I do not think he himself ever developed this idea but he seemed to take it as an obvious truth. I connected narrativity to the semantics of possible worlds, and this is how it began. Another key idea is that desire de dicto has a metaphorically and metonymically characterized intentional object. One can say that desire has a metonymic structure, as Lacan says; this is another way of admitting one never gets what one wants. We get an object that is only metonymically connected to what we want.

Depicting Desire: Definitions

Excerpt: Desire has many names: desire, want, will, wish, longing, craving, need, lust, greed, aspiration, appetite, and hope among others. Dictionaries make many of these, in different patterns, synonyms and they can be used as metonyms. They may indeed be synonyms but as well they can be given a specific meaning. For instance what is will and how is it related to desire? The problem is that the specific relations between such ordinary language terms are impossibly messy. It is a bad idea to start analysing them. Of course, we feel they all somehow belong together. Each of them represents a subject's vision of a better world or a transformation of the actual world into something better, or at least into a more desirable place. Even greed does so, although in a perverted manner. Perhaps this indeed is the common core of them all and thus they would represent variations of one and same theme. This is possible and I presume it is the case. Perhaps we may even assume that only one basic type of desire exists. At the same time we must agree that to find its proper definition is impossible. You cannot define ordinary language terms because they are used in such variable ways.

In what follows I review some attempts and later on we will find more. All of them are inadequate, which is to say that desire is a fuzzy concept. My own favoured characterization of the concept of desire is below. In the course of my deliberations on desire in this book, I

am afraid I will deviate in many ways from the following ideas, but as a first approximation it may be useful:

> Desire or rational desire means, by definition, a subject's propositional attitude, that is, the subject recognizes and prima facie presents a claim to a salient feature of an imaginary possible world that one also hopes to get, or the intentional object of desire, which object is such that (a) its meaning can be disambiguated, (b) it is intrinsically attractive or desirable and can be socially understood as such, (c) it is plausible to consider the success of the claim in an accessible, new possible world; moreover, (d) the object is more desirable than any of the relevant features of the actual world, (e) the object is more desirable than any other object in those alternate possible worlds that are at least equally accessible, and (f) the possible world where the desired object is located is acceptable in toto.

Let me explain. "Rational" means that we are not interested in, say, plain urges or addictions; desires are motivated by some reasons that are based on the desirability of the desired objects. The basic idea is that I recognize an object, consider it attractive, and make a claim to it as if I demanded it. I want to move over to a possible world in which my demand is satisfied. It can happen that some objects of desire are initially too vague or figuratively expressed and this must be corrected. The subject must not already possess the desired object, and it must be possible to get it. Also, the designated possible world must be better than the actual world. If this is not the case, one has no reason to consider that possible world and thus no desire emerges, but it is not enough to consider one possible world, and I cannot only consider the object in question but I must check what comes along with it, that is, the world. Too much extra bad baggage there means that I cannot afford to choose the given object, because it is located in a bad environment. I want to kill Bill but that spells twenty years in prison, which is to say that the object of my desire is located in a bad possible world. I may then reject the desire or the world. I drop the idea of killing him; I now want Bill dead or, alternatively, I accept the actual world where Bill and I both live. We may say the desire must not be too costly in the possible world where its object is located.

Richard Wollheim argues that "[o]ur desires do not generate a possible world." His argument for this is as follows: "Each desire offers us, as it were, a view through a keyhole, but there is no reason that there should emerge from these views of a coherent picture of what lies on the other side of the gate." He compares desire to belief and says the latter, all things considered, forms such a coherent picture. But all the (true) beliefs together form the picture of this actual world, which is of course also a possible world, too. Desires, on the other hand, sketch an aspect of a novel but accessible possible world, which is better than this actual world; that is the whole point of desiring. The possible world revealed by beliefs may be a coherent totality and in this sense a reconstruction of what we already have. However, when I desire something and tell the full story of its desirability conditions that I expect to be there, I sketch an aspect of the world that does not exist. It is a non-actual possible world such that the world where the sketch holds true is similar to the actual world in all other respects. It is not the actual world because of its novel features but it is a whole possible world because it is its novel features plus the remaining features of the actual world. In this way, desire constructs its own possible world. [R. Wollheim, The Thread of

Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 53.] When I want to drink beer the new world contains me drinking beer and the rest remains the same.

Any idea and concept can be employed either as a definiens or a definiendum, or as that which explains or that which is to be explained. I may try to say something about desire or about something else by means of desire. In the first case I am interested in desire per se and in the second case of something else. If I am interested in desire, as I happen to be, the definition or characterization of desire is bound to be long, complicated, and yet incomplete. Actually, it may look like a theory rather than a definition. But in the case of desire as a definiens one may be brief – the briefer the better. It all depends on what one tries to explain and what kind of explanatory machinery one needs; of course, one makes an attempt to use tools that are as simple as possible. For instance, Mark Schroeder uses "desire" as a "stipulative abbreviation" that is fit to explain his key cases and examples. But he consoles the reader by saying that "desires in this technical sense really are desires." Minimal features create minimal problems but technical stipulations may lose contact with reality. Perhaps for this reason we have so many simplicistic definitions of desire, some of them too brief and some rather strange. Let me list a random sample plus some comments.

Richard Brandt in his "Rational Desires" says, "a person who desires S is in a state such that, were he to think of S, S would seem attractive to him" (italics in the original). I wonder why he uses a counterfactual construction here. He sums up his view as follows: "These two aspects of desire appear to be logically distinct: Seeming attractive seems to be somewhat different from being ready to do something if one sees it will produce something else. But psychologically I suppose they are connected in a law like manner." This is to say, according to Brandt, that desires are motives, which I think is not true, and most philosophers today would approve.5 Sometimes desire as an explanans is part of action explanation, if action is called for, but never as a motive. Of course we also have contexts like "Q: Why are you here? A: I wanted to see you," which justifies what I have done, but this is a different matter. Anyway, the idea that the person who desires O is, for that reason alone, also motivated to act on one's desire for O has been quite popular earlier (we will return to this). What comes to Brandt's characterization of desire, I find it too simple to be plausible. It indeed spells out a necessary condition of desiring, namely, that one finds the object desirable but of course it is not sufficient. I read classic car magazines and find most cars attractive so that I could consider myself as owning them, but yet I for all kinds of reasons do not desire any of them. Say, the possible world where I own such a car is alien to me. Moreover, I cannot see why Brandt talks about "seeming attractive." An object is or is not attractive to me and thus one cannot make sense of a qualification like seeming in this context. If an object seems attractive to me it is attractive to me and also the other way round. Also, some features of an object may be attractive to me without making the object desirable. I see an attractive painting that I do not find desirable because I see the painting in a disinterested aesthetic perspective. I may find little kids very attractive but I abhor any ascription of desire to our mutual existence. Desirability means attractiveness in a special way that is open to desire.

Allan Gibbard says, “What’s desirable, we can say, is what one ought to desire,” when “ought” here is what he calls the “basic normative ought.” Such ought is at work when we consider what we ought to believe given some positive and negative evidence.7 The question about the nature of desirability is as important as it is difficult. Think of it in the past tense: “I ought to have believed he is a crook,” when the relevant evidence was there but I refused to believe what it entails. However, it does not make sense to say, “I ought to have desired it,” when I failed to desire something I had found desirable. Belief and desire behave differently here. Evidence forces belief and we should accept that, if we are rational. When I see you I must believe you are there. If counterevidence is present I ought to handle it properly. Nothing similar can be said of desirability and desire. Desirability does not force desire because it only allows for desire. We can say, “I ought to have chosen it,” if my utility calculations indicate it is so. But it does not make sense to say “I ought to have desired it.” Considering desirability, the normal strategy is to pass them by. You recognize a desirable object and you pass it by without normative consequences. Given that an ought is at work, this is impossible. Think of belief: if I accept some evidence I ought to formulate a corresponding belief. If I do not, I am irrational and that is a negative characterization and an unfavorable evaluation. Desirability is a prima facie invitation to explore the situation further in order to see whether you desire the intentional object in question. You start from its desirability and you narrate the case; finally you watch your desire to emerge or fail to emerge. In this sense desire generation is not an act but rather like a spontaneous mental event. Desirability is prima facie invitation to explore, and that entails permission. Therefore, evidence forces belief, which is a two place relation; desirability considerations do not force desire because a third variable is needed here, which indicates a three place relation: subject, desirability, and desire. I desire ice cream not only because it tastes good, which is its desirability condition, but because all people around me eat ice cream.

Desirability is a problematic notion, though. Think of the following desire and its motivation, when motivation is based on desirability conditions: “I want to hurt people because I do not want they hurt me.” First we need to eliminate the second reference to wanting, for instance, by saying hurting is bad. Now we have an inconsistent looking sentence: “I want to hurt because hurting is bad.” Perhaps the person wants to say: “I hurt people so they cannot hurt me,” which sounds like an implausible strategy. If we accept it, the original picture of the desire changes accordingly: what I really want is not to get hurt and, thus, hurting others is just my instrumental desire or need. Another strategy is to find a set of mediating propositions between “I want to hurt” and “Hurting is bad.” One can imagine that the mediation will prove to be complex and controversial and also that the person herself may not have much to say about it. Perhaps it has something to do with childhood traumas. I suspect such cases have given some psychologists and psychiatrists a motive to speak about unconscious motivation. Anyway, my basic idea is that the gap between a desire and its desirability conditions must be spelled out by means of a narrative that concerns the details of the case. Our motives tend to be deeper and more complicated than they first appear. Another lesson, as we saw, is that when we spell out the desirability conditions in full, our picture of the intentional object may change, too. What looked like the object

appears as a grammatical construct that hides the psychological topics we need to discuss. The object disappears and a topic of desire appears in its place. We can ask, when I desire an object, what do I desire?

Graham Oddie puts his point in an impressively exact manner: “Goodness =df that property X such that, necessarily for any state P whatsoever, if one believes [...] that P has X, then one desires that P.” This is to say, if I believe an object is good, I also desire it. However, if an object is good it is, therefore, intrinsically desirable, but I do not desire all desirable objects, as I already argued above. If desire is a mental state or episode, to desire all that is desirable must be an overwhelming task; it defies all the laws of cognitive economy. To kill Bill is a desirable idea to me. I can kill Bill in two different possible worlds, in the first one with no risk, and in the second with the risk of dying myself. It is misleading to say I want to kill Bill in both worlds just because the idea of killing Bill sounds so good. In the theory of desire, one must make a clear distinction between desire and desirability. For instance, many desirable things are impossible to get and, hence, you cannot desire them.

The simplest possible desire theory comes from Brian Loar: “I shall use ‘desire’ and ‘want’ interchangeably for the general pro-attitude.” He continues: “The contents of desire are a matter of their potential interaction with certain beliefs leading to decisions.” Here again we find a confusion between desire and desirability, or pro-attitude. Actually, I may have a pro-attitude towards something I do not find desirable. Moreover, most of our pro-attitudes have nothing to do with our decision making. My son introduces his new girlfriend whom I instantly like but I have no power to make any decisions in this situation. Loar’s idea resembles Brandt’s definition. Michael Smith’s definition is as follows, “desires [are] states that represent how the world is to be.” This focuses on the thesis of different directionalities of desire and belief, which says that desire determines a possible world and the actual world determines belief. In other words, when I say I desire something I hope the world will change accordingly. I may say, “I want you to do X” and thus I issue a command to you to change the world so that X. In this sense desire is an immodest propositional attitude. Smith also is sympathetic to the dispositional model of desire, that is, if I desire to act I am disposed to act accordingly, given that my beliefs concerning the relevant circumstance are correct. To put it simply, desire indicates a disposition to act. But this idea applies only to desires that one may label actionist. Many, or most, desires are not actionist in the sense that they do not mention action. For instance, John desires that Mary loves him vs. John wants to make Mary love him. Desires of the type “I want to act” are a special case. The source of the overemphasis on the actionist cases seems to be Elizabeth Anscombe’s idea, so elegantly formulated, “The primitive sign of wanting is trying to get.” Yes indeed, one may add, if one has something to get. I find it

strange that so many writers on rational action explanation use such an idea of desire; for instance, Richard Holton, “Desire in the sense we are after is a state that preoccupies an agent’s attention with an urge to perform a certain action.” Holton gives the reader an ad hoc definition of desire tailor made to serve action explanation, but then he needs a desire in a special sense. When a gourmand says, “I want that dish,” we cannot infer what he may

do in order to get it, perhaps nothing. So, the problem is that an expression of desire may leave the relevant action ambiguous, or the very possibility of action is uncertain. In some cases action is impossible: “I want that you forget what I did.” I may do something that is somehow relevant to the case, like pleading her or confusing her, but it is not quite like the action that I have in mind, namely, an act that makes her to forget. No such action exists.

Here is a simple argument against the idea that desires logically entail actions. I say, I want that I do not act, when I could act ceteris paribus. I may desire that I do not act, not in the sense of an omission that may itself be an action, but in the sense of bypassing all considerations of action. Action is then out of the question. This argument works also in those cases where one says that a non-actionist context excludes desire and calls for wish or hope. I do not think this is so but it of course is a possible standpoint. I say, I want her to want me, implying that I cannot directly, do anything about it. You may say, then you only wish or hope that she will want you. My first argument is immune to this caveat.

What about the dispositional theory of desire? This theory says desire logically entails the desiring agent’s disposition to react by acting, if he could, in order to secure the subjectively desirable change of the world. A lover would act if he could in order to get the partner he wants. He cannot act but still it is true that he would if he could. Such a disposition is said to be a mark of the mental state properly called a desire. I cannot actively better my situation in the life-boat on the ocean but of course I am disposed to do so – if I could. The counterfactual here is true. Obviously desire and disposition to act are closely connected. Yet it is easy to show that this is not a necessary connection. Suppose you desire a change of the world such that its voluntary production is, for you, impossible either factually or normatively. In such a case it is irrational to want it in the dispositional sense. Suppose I want Bill dead. That does not imply I am disposed to kill him, if I believe that killing is wrong and I am a moral person. A young man wants to be a soccer star but he is too lazy to practice; hence, he is not disposed to act in terms of his desire. If he thinks he is a natural soccer star he has a reason that backs up his desire without allowing for any disposition to act. Suppose I want Bill dead but I have no disposition to kill him because I think I am no killer. Under no conditions would I kill him, or act with the intention to kill him or otherwise facilitate the relevant change of the world. I am not disposed to do so even if I want him dead; I have my good reasons for my omission. Of course someone may argue that I as a desiring person I am disposed to act regardless of the relevant impossibility, namely, in the following sense: suppose it were not impossible and then I would be disposed to act. This is too far-fetched to be plausible. The basic point is, I am not a person who kills and that is why I am not disposed to kill even if I desire him dead. The dispositional theory supposes that desire rests on a two place relation S – O, which is not true.

In this book I am interested in desire qua desire, or desire independently of action explanation. Human existence is so much more that action and hence desire as an explanandum should be taken seriously. William James puts it well: if the satisfaction of a desire, or obtaining its intentional object, is dependent on action, the mental state is called

the will.14 Given that I want to kill Bill, I can say it is my will to kill Bill: this usage does not seem to exist today in the relevant literature, which is a pity.

Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder famously promote a reward theory of desire: "[T]o have an intrinsic desire regarding it being the case that P is to constitute P as a reward," when aversions indicate punishment.15 This only says that if I desire P, P must be a reward, which is to say that the only way an object can be desirable is to be seen as a reward. Therefore, here we meet another theory of desirability in disguise. To say whatever is desired must be rewarding, sounds like a prima facie plausible idea. Of course, a reward is not something like a social prize but some kind of subjective positive experience that tends to make me want more of it – but this sounds circular: if something is desirable it is rewarding, but only those things are rewarding that are desirable. There are desirable and undesirable rewards. I can imagine rewards that I find undesirable all things considered. I may find sexual voyeurism personally rewarding in the sense that I want more of the same; perhaps I feel like a potent predator and at the same time I shun from it. I may find it fearful and repulsive to find it rewarding. Voyeurism is rewarding to certain people, I know it is, but it also is too costly, or I may not find it fit for me as a person. If it is not, one's voyeuristic desire does not seem to be based on rewards. A good example is revenge.

I consider personal revenge, and to get it is typically deeply rewarding; yet, I refuse to see it as a desirable strategy because I know revenge is unethical and I am an ethical person. Hence, Schroeder's idea looks dubious: I may find a reward repulsive, and yet I want it; if I want it its desirability conditions must be found elsewhere.

In what follows, I will work under the assumption that whatever is attractive may also be desirable, and many types of attractive things exist. An attractive object pulls me towards it. Finally, it seems that the reward theory focuses on actions, which I said above is not a valid idea. Normally we think that some actions deserve their reward. Reward entails merit. If I get something from you, without my own effort, merit, or desert, I may be happy but where is the reward? Many desires are desires to get the object without personal effort. In a non-actionist context the idea of reward does not seem that attractive. One final point: instead of reward, we should talk about expected reward. Desires are often connected with time consuming projects where rewards are endlessly delayed. If my desire stays alive it must be for other reasons than expected rewards. I try to learn French pronunciation, which I know is endlessly frustrating. Where is my reward now?

Let us next take a peek on empirical psychology in order to see how psychologists may understand desire. Here is an example: desire is defined "as those wants and urges that are intricately linked to motivation, pleasure, and rewards." Like Schroeder's definition this mentions rewards. However, as I said above, most philosophers do not like to link desire directly to motivation of action. The main problem, however, is that wants and urges are desires or at least so closely related to desire that the definition now becomes patently circular. The authors also say desires they are mostly interested in are appetitive desires, and they seem to mean desires that aim at some desirable object. This is the pull theory of desire based on the idea that the desiring person gravitates towards some desirable objects,

or desire is based on reasons that motivate it. The opposite theory is a push theory that is normally understood as a naturalistic causal theory: some physiological states called drives push us towards certain objects that are believed to extinguish them. No reasons are mentioned here. Such push-desires aim at their objects that signify the return of physiological equilibrium or status quo, which also can be seen as pleasure.

In this sense, desire entails a specific physical and, hence, mental disturbance, which can be understood as a lack or a consequence of an experienced lack. Pull theories do not presuppose such a disturbance although some theorists have assumed otherwise, perhaps under Platonic influence. Push and pull theories must not be conflated.

Finally, let me mention a strange new definition of desire, which "concerns the various things one would like to have or to do even if it is impossible." The first part is typical of such short characterizations of desire and hence I need not comment on it, but the last part is truly strange. What could it possibly mean to argue that the intentional objects of desire are impossible to get? What does it mean that I want to be the richest man of the world now; I may entertain this idea but that is all. I can say I wish I were rich, but then I use a counterfactual formulation. Of course, some varieties of desire, like longing, happily take an impossible object, as in "I long for my lost youthful vigor." Or, "I wish Bill would not be here," when he already is present, but here again we are dealing with a counterfactual possibility. If an object is believed to be impossible to get, we must first ask whether this impossibility is a logical or practical problem. In both cases, one cannot keep it as the object of one's desire. But if the problem is practical, we may still wish. If it is a logical impossibility, we cannot even wish for success. Thomas Hobbes wanted to square the circle; had he understood the self-contradictory nature of his efforts he should have dropped the project and quit thinking of it.

Now, one cannot desire objects one believes to be impossible or nonexistent, or if they exist, impossible to get. I cannot desire my youthful years back. I cannot want to see a centaur. These objects do not exist. I cannot desire that President Trump would serve me tea each morning from now on. I believe that it is a practically impossible scenario. I have no chance here and to entertain the idea is wishful thinking or daydreaming. Of course one can define desire so broadly that it includes such items as daydreaming and irrational desires but I cannot see why we should do so.

It is easy to confuse wish, hope, and desire. About hope, I want to use "hope" mainly in the following context: Desire logically entails hope – I cannot desire an object that I already have or that I cannot have. And hope entails desire. Thus, when I desire or even act according to my desire, I also hope to have or get it. Of course, I can say, for instance, "I hope to see you tomorrow," but then I want to see you and I hope that this will be the case tomorrow. If I wish, I may have no hope and therefore no desire: "I wish I were younger," All this is controversial and my view is partly stipulative, of course. But we need to standardize the use of these concepts for theoretical and argumentative purposes.

Concerning rational desire, Brandt's idea in his above-mentioned paper looks attractive: A desire is rational if no amount of additional information can change and correct it; otherwise it is irrational. This is end-state rationality meaning a situation in which all our relevant reasoning and information gathering is already done. However, a more natural way of thinking here is process rationality: A desire is rational if and only if it responds to new information in a positive manner, that is, becomes better adapted to its environment of beliefs, values, and other desires. If it does not respond at all, it can be called obsessive-compulsive. If it responds only partially and too reluctantly, it is defective. Brand's theory looks obviously wrong if you look at it from the process point of view: fixed desires are indeed obsessive-compulsive. One may view the theory from the end state perspective and then it looks better. It says, if you cannot fix your desire it must be irrational. If any new thought makes a woman endlessly vacillate between her desires to marry her fiancé or leave him, her desire is in bad shape, that is, irrational. Obviously, we can approach the problem of rationality in two mutually incompatible directions. Another well-known way to understand rational desire is to ask whether I desire my desire or not. I want to smoke but I do not want to want to smoke, hence my desire is irrational. I want to be a good father and find no reasons against it, so my desire is rational.

Two Types of Desire

Historically speaking, desire was an emotion, feeling, or passion of the soul, of which the paradigmatic type is love. Anthony Kenny says, "Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, and Hume all included desire among the passions of the soul." Love indeed is a perfect combination of desire and emotion, but I love what I already have, which is an anomaly. Normally we desire what we could but do not have, but I cannot love what I do not have. However, love is loaded with emotion and feeling. Moreover, when you say you love him, you express your

desire but you do not specify the object, or what you want. Proper, virtuous love does not want anything, does not demand anything, or seek personal satisfaction – desire does all that when it is considered as a propositional attitude. Think of sexual love. Sexual love wants sex, and that is why it differs from virtuous love that wants nothing. Yet, virtuous love entails desire, pure benevolent objectless desire that is like a feeling or emotion. It does not want anything. Yearning and longing are good examples, too. Both of them contain objectless desire. I long for something better in my life without knowing what it is. Here desire blends with feeling, or a feeling that something better should come about. When I long for something it cannot be said that I want something. This is to say, the modern discussion of desire as want is one sided. Let me take a historical example, Thomas Aquinas. Nicholas Lombardo writes, "Desire is a movement towards a good, while love is an inclination or a kind of complacency, and, as such, the principle of pleasure and the rest of passions." Next, "It is difficult to imagine how love's intentional object might be defined without compromising love's status as a distinct and elemental passion. Only for love and hatred does Aquinas avoid any clarification of the nature of the intentional object vis-à-vis presence and absence." According to Lombardo, Aquinas fails to specify "exactly how love is different from desire."

Above I have sketched some basic ideas of desire as a propositional attitude that has its intentional object and whose desirability conditions are subject to their own motivational considerations. However, a different, Platonist context exists, where desire is a universal notion or a principle that lives its own life regardless of its instances. It is like the idea or form of desire as such and its role in human life and existence is far more fundamental compared to par-ticular petty propositional desires. For instance, male desire as a phallic idea is not just a collection of propositional desires that happen to bother some men. Male desire is a universal principle of man and malehood and is only imperfectly or partially reflected in men's life understood as male life. Like in Plato's cave, men live a life determined by their propositional desires at the same time failing to understand that this is not what defines them. That is done by male desire and its phallic references. In Hegelian terms, men are alienated from their essence. Such a philosophical theory may sound dubious but in actual fact the concept of desire is still used in a way that corresponds with the Platonic usage.

In an analytical perspective, desire is a propositional attitude. Its paradigmatic form is "Subject S desires that P," when P specifies the intentional object O of S's desire. When P occurs and S obtains O we say the relevant desire is satisfied and, as we may add, S is gratified. S got what she wanted. In this sense one can say that desire tracks satisfaction. In the same way, belief tracks truth, and therefore, G.E. Moore's famous "The cat is on the mat but I do not believe it" sounds so paradoxical. Also, desire is synonymous with want; or "I want P" and "I desire P" are synonymous: they are connected with the idea of motivation in the sense that both are conative states or episodes that focus on a goal or an object that one finds desirable in a suitable, non-actual possible world, which means a world the subject may actually reach. Such a possible world is accessible when the idea of accessibility can be operationalized by saying one knows what, realistically speaking, will realize the new possible world. Sometimes our own actions may do it, sometimes not. Mere wishes and daydreams are then another thing. They do not depend on any considerations of realism.

I hope this view of desire may sound convincing but, as I said above, we also can find an alternative characterization of desire. From the analytical point of view, its existence is dubious, but this is no reason to reject the idea. What I am saying is that desire is desire but the two contexts of the use of "desire" are radically different. Let me illustrate this by means of two quotations from a popular philosophical text:

> Freud argued that the female homosexual is a woman with a man's desire for a woman-phallus.

This sounds grammatically correct and thus prima facie familiar. Regardless of what it means, one can see that woman's intentional object of desire is a woman-phallus. So far so good, but then we find something new and disturbing:

> Irigaray calls for a more adequate treatment of female narcissism, which psychoanalysis undermines by repressing the woman's perspective in the imaging and symbolizing of her sexuality. Irigaray deconstructs phallocentric desire by replacing the single male organ with

> multiple female sex organs, and in this way addresses a female auto-homo-erotic desire not mediated by phallic intervention.

In this second quotation "desire" is used in a new context. The question is, can we reduce phallocentric and auto-homo-erotic desire back to some oratio recta reports of propositional mental states and episodes called desire? I suggest this is not the case, which is to say that the second, Platonic way of using the concept of desire is both plausible and interesting. I am not saying that the reduction is always impossible; on the contrary, sometimes it is possible and such cases open up new vistas on desire and its objects. As I said above, we can distinguish between conatively based desire, which makes want and desire synonymous, and feeling based desire that defies this synonymy. Let me illustrate. Prison as a social environment is infused with desire. Inmates, guards, and visitors wallow in an emotional whirlwind that oscillates between apathy and passion, hopelessness and hope, calm and anger etc. All this entails desire that is not reducible to individual wants. It is related to shared and culturally construed feelings as a frame of mind (I use feeling, in spite of its obvious inadequacy, but I cannot find a better term) that penetrate the whole social world that is prison.

Think of a football stadium just before the start of the match, or a boxing arena. All the spectators pack in to share the feeling and participate in collectively shared desire. What desire? The desire to win and conquer is evident but equally well the desire to be there and share the multiple, complex desires that one can feel but not conceptualize. We desire to share the desire, which is then objectless. I want to be there, that is all I want; what is the object of this desire? It is "to be there," which is not an object but a feeling and an ever so ambiguous state of social existence, an altered state of mind and new normal. It is not an object of desire but desire itself coming into being, or desire in flesh, the essence of being there. Of course, this kind of desire is never satisfied, it is not satisfiable at all. Of course it does not track satisfaction; on the contrary, it feeds itself until it collapses to apathy and then returns with vengeance. It is then stronger than ever wanting more of the same, not any object but itself as that special desire and its associated feeling. Football riots in England and elsewhere are a good example of the collective frustration that follows.

My last example is hospital, although school would be almost the same. What we have in a hospital is desire as quiet desperation and exaggerated hope, which means desire to get out of there – by the patients of course. For the staff the same environment is diametrically opposite, but let us focus on the patients. Their desire cannot be reduced to individual desires and their intentional objects. They want to be healthy, that is true, they all want to be painless, some want to die, etc., but I am not talking about that. I am talking about an environment where desire rules as a kind of feeling of hope and hopelessness, in this case as an expression of all that is undesirable; in the same way a prison works as a social frame. The desire in question is "Let me out of here," "I wish I were somewhere else" or "I'd love to be somewhere else" or perhaps most accurately "I'd rather be anywhere else." They all hate the desire they share. Formally, this is desire to get away from the desire. In the sport stadium scene the same is expressed by "This is what I love, let it stay forever like this."

The feeling we now understand as desire is objectless as it concentrates first on the situation and ultimately on itself. Or, as Jacques Lacan puts it,

> The enigmas that desire seems to pose for a "natural philosophy" – its frenzy miming the abyss of the infinite, the secret collusion with which it envelopes the pleasure of knowing and of joyful domination, these amount to nothing more than the derangement of the instinct that comes from being caught on the rails – eternally stretching forth towards desire for something else – of metonymy. Hence its perverse fixation at the very suspension point of the signifying change [...] There is no other way to conceive the indestructibility of unconscious desire.

All this relates to an aspect of desire already known to Plato, that is, desire is unsatisfiable and always demands more. Or perhaps we want to read it as follows: Every instance of desire is satisfiable as such but desire itself is not – it has nothing to do with satisfaction because what it wants is more, first more of the same and then of something else. In that way desire is scary and anxiety ridden so that we want to control and even prevent it as much as we can. But notice, to prevent all desires distributively is a different project from eliminating desire itself. One can still act on particular desires after desire is eliminated from one's life. Someone can say "I want to go to bed early," in which case his desire is part of the explanation of his action; at the same time we can say in his life desire plays no role, which happens in the life of, say, a Buddhist guru. Desire can be eliminated unlike the effects of desires.

The main example of desire is sexual desire but others can also be mentioned, for instance hatred and revengefulness in addition to many violent urges. The analytical idea of desire fails to explain this; on the contrary, satisfaction of desire looks like a simple fact. I want ice-cream and I get it, which satisfies my desire. I want to kill Bill – why would I want to kill other people? How about hoarding desire? I want stuff and then more until I drown in it, but the more I suffer from this mania the more stuff I want. It is easy to dismiss this as irrational behavior. It may be irrational but it is also real. Think of a hospital without desire. Sam Shepard puts all this into a wonderful literary form when he writes about unsatisfiable and ever increasing desire, "When it comes back there'll be nothing left but the hunger eating the hunger when it comes back. [...] Nothing left but the hunger." Here, analytically speaking, the object of desire is the desire itself understood in a self-referential manner. Desire that desires itself is unstoppable even in those cases where desire is something negative like it is in a prison and a hospital. Even there, desire desires itself or feeds on itself. It is eternal and self-perpetuating.

I have used some mid-sized social frames as examples above, but what I said can now be said of individual cases as well. I love to be where I am now and I desire what I have; analytically, I cannot desire to be here now because I already am here. Yet, my desire is evident and unquestionable. I say I love the place. The explanation is, I want something one cannot conceptualize as an intentional object and that is why this something is not an object and, accordingly, my desire is no desire, or it is another kind of desire. The key to this mystery is feeling-for-here-and-now, or what we simply call feeling. I do not want as

there is nothing to want but still I desire in the sense that I feel it all at the emotional level of my being.

Now, more analytically, we can dub this kind of desire that is not reducible to propositional attitudes feeling desire or for short f-desire, in contrast to propositional desires or p-desires. F-desires have their own properties, namely, they are typically but not necessarily shared, they stay unsatisfiable, and most of all they are self-focused and self-perpetuating, as if their intentional object or goal were the desire itself. Think of an expression like “male desire,” which as an f-desire is not the sum total of men’s p-desires. On the contrary, it is like an oration obliqua report on the male attitude towards male life understood as lust and striving after sex or whatever might work as if it were sex. Notice here the circularity, which replaces the linear drive towards the intentional object. Male desire is man’s life as if constituted of, say, sex and violence, now understood as topics and fields of desire where the relevant feelings roam. And part of this desire is that man wants to be man because this desire actually constitutes him. All f-desires are circular in the sense that they, as desires, focus on desire itself, which is natural if you think that f-desire means feeling for what there is, really or in imagination. These feelings are not directed towards some better possible words as p-feelings always are here-and-now. Hence, male desire understood as an f-desire is what men, as reported by others, desire as a feeling of the typical enjoyment of what they already have. Male desire is never what man reports oration recta. When I visit a hospital, prison, or a sports stadium I feel and share the relevant f-desire but then it is not my desire in the sense p-desire is, or de se. F-desire is ambiguous since I may have it but at the same time it is a social construct to be reported oratio obliqua.

As a male I share what is called the male desire and in this sense it is my own desire but as well it is what is reported as if from outside of me. An essential feature of male desire is male gaze. As a male, perhaps I never actually look at anybody in that way but still I may be accused of male gaze; I do not even know how to perform a male gaze but I find it easy to be guilty of it; that is, I do it according to others. The same can be said of male desire. Anyway, the main thing about f-desire is the feeling of being in a special place so that the desire reinforces my desire to be there. In what follows, I deal with p-desires. However, in some places, and especially in the case of Girard’s mimetic desire, we will witness the return of f-desire.

Finally, here is a note on desires, important and less important. Jürgen Habermas says about concepts like knowledge as true, justified belief, or the classical Socratic definition, that it cannot be the correct definition because knowledge is something important and the definition does not reflect that.ss In a sense this is true, knowledge is power but much what we tag as knowledge is not, like I know that it may or may not rain today. Perhaps the Socratic definition indeed is lacking, or it is not. In the same way one may say desires are important so that “I want ice cream” is different from “I want to be a good father to my children.” Real desires introduce a new possible world, mere whims do not. From the point of view of my theory of p-desire this looks embarrassing: my theory requires that the subject situates the intentional object in a better possible world where it looks desirable

everything considered. In other words, we consider the new possible world to be similar to our actual world except for the intentional object but then we allow the world change to see how much the emergence of the object changes it. When a good father emerges, much will change. But why talk about possible worlds and their changes if I just want a cone of ice cream? Minor desires that come and go like whims are different from major desires that alter and make the world better.

Why name such minor desires desires? They indeed seem to be p-desires and they possess all the necessary features of a desire, as it is easy to see. They have an intentional object and they track satisfaction. My solution is that the minor desires behave just like the major desires but the changes to the world that they entail are less important to us so that we do not bother to think about them. Therefore, minor desires are not really minor; what is minor is their effect on the world and that is why we are not interested in them or their full description. Their desirability conditions are seemingly simple: I like ice-cream and that is all. I want it, I get it, and I forget it; and to get it extinguishes the desire. It is an occurring desire that is conditional on its own satisfaction. If I want to be a good father, I know only approximately what the object is and what its requirements are. The object is intrinsically fuzzy. Hence now I never can reach the goal, except in the Pickwickian sense. I also must explain why I want what I want, and by doing it, I start playing with the idea of a novel and better possible world.

All this resembles Habermas' idea that knowledge is important. Real desires are important but one still must admit that minor bits of knowledge and small desires cannot be dismissed. Certainly, certain varieties of unimportant things are so unimportant that we need to pay no attention to them in practical life. Nevertheless, they can be used as examples, at least in philosophy, because they are so simple, but then we should not forget that the big and complicated things are what we really should be interested in. That is where the money is. Knowledge is power and desire makes us switch between worlds. It is interesting, though, that those perfectly good examples of minor knowledge and desire are meaningless as such. When a Buddhist says desiring makes us unhappy, he cannot mean such things as ice cream.34 It is perfectly plausible to say that I can satisfy such a desire even if we know that all desires are in principle unsatisfiable. The answer to this dilemma is that ice cream desire is unsatisfiable but if we discuss it as an object of choice it may well happen that I got what I chose and in this sense wanted. I have already explained and will explain later what it is to desire ice cream in the full blown sense of p-desire. Its desirability conditions may grow until they look too grand to take seriously. Like Marcel Proust's little madeleine expands the narrative until it covers all his life world.

Wishful Thinking and Wish-Fulfilment

Let us start from an idea of Thomas Nagel,

> That I have the appropriate desire simply follows from the fact that these considerations motivate me; if the likelihood that an act will promote my future happiness motivates me to perform it now, then it is appropriate to ascribe me a desire for my own future happiness.

Here we see once again the dubious view of the essential connection between desire and action but let us forget and forgive it now. My point is, you may replace “an act” with “a thought” and rewrite. We get “if the likelihood that a thought will promote my future happiness motivates me to think of it now, then […]” and now we find something interesting, namely, the key idea behind wishful thinking. It is certainly possible to become happy by thinking of happy things. We want to think pleasant thoughts and we arrange our other thoughts in a way that satisfies the desire. All this comes to us naturally and it contributes significantly to our happiness levels. People who are unable to do it will find it difficult to live. They suffer from depression and other similar ailments.

Wishful thinking is somehow related to f-desires, although it is not always easy to see how. What is wishful thinking? The man from La Mancha, Don Quixote, is guilty of it for the following reason. He imagines a possible world of noble knights, a world that is inaccessible to him simply because it is fictional. It is not his private fiction, that is, it is not idiosyncratic, but derived from the contemporary genre of popular novels. His mimetic wish is to live in that exciting world and do heroic deeds. He imagines he lives there and he dresses accordingly, performs heroic deeds, and treats the people around him as if they were living members of his new brave world. Don Q says he wants to be a hero and then he is gratified; he believes he is a knight. His wish is fulfilled.

The main point about wish and wish-fulfilment is that the same thought that constitutes the wish also satisfies it. This fact clearly distinguishes between wish and the other relevant types of mental states discussed here. When I read a book of poetry and see myself as a fellow poet, the thought itself is fulfilling or satisfying. I may not believe I am a poet – that would be both unnecessary and irrational. I simply think of myself as a poet and thus satisfy my wish. We do this all the time even if we seldom notice what is going on. It is also remarkable that such wish-fulfilment may also be guilt ridden and anxious, think for example of nasty sexual thoughts and various types of unclean fantasies. This is to say those wishes are not idle thoughts but on the contrary they are mental episodes we feel are part of our personality and something we are responsible for. Many wishes are delightful but they also can be anxious, or both at the same time. Now, the main point is that the same thought that constitutes the wish also satisfies it or is a sufficient condition of its fulfilment.

I argue that wish-fulfilment is spontaneous in the sense that wishes, if understood in the way I described above, are self-satisfying. This is the case because the wish in its new possible world is construed in a suitable manner. Think of Don Q. He imagines a world where he is a knight; he believes that he is a knight in a world that satisfies his desire to be a knight. He wants to be a knight and hence he constructs in his imagination a world in which he is a knight. To verify his success, he acts and deals with other people as if he were a knight.

Don Q’s new world is imaginary in two ways: first, as a literary construct (what he reads about) and, second, as his own mental construct (what he imagines). The first world is devoid of him but the second contains him as a knight. Such a double jeopardy is not necessary, though. A small man wishes he were tall and buys platform sole shoes. His

favourite world (where he is tall) is not available to him, even if the new world where he thinks he is tall is possible. No known path from here to there exists and, thus, the only way the short man can get there is in his imagination. Now, when he responds to his imaginary world he verifies its existence and validity by buying those shoes. Thus the world is construed in such a special way that his wish is fulfilled, or his desire is satisfied.

I do not say that all wishes are fulfilled in this spontaneous manner. I only say wishful thinking has this occasional property. Many wishes are not instances of wishful thinking. I may refuse to construct such a special possible world where I am spontaneously gratified. I say "I wish this cancer goes away" but I do it without constructing the world where my cancer has disappeared. Hence, I have a wish that is not an example of wishful thinking.

As we know from psychoanalysis and elsewhere that wishful thinking can also be painful. I may imagine a bad possible world and place myself there, which makes me bad. As I understand it, wishes are not necessarily good and personally flattering. I suffer, say, from guilt feelings and by constructing a suitably bad world for myself I make myself guilty, which is a painful feeling. Suppose a person has paedophiliac wishes, which play with the ideas of acts he knows are both socially condemned and dangerous. He tends to agree that he should not entertain them and thus he should free himself of them. Perhaps he should get psychological help, although his abnormal sexual preferences have remained latent. His problem is that he tends to construct imaginary possible worlds where he is an active paedophiliac predator, a world that is modelled after the real world, as he knows it, containing real paedophiliacs. He knows he must not try to satisfy his sexual desires in the real world. He sees it as a royal road to a personal catastrophe, which is probably a valid belief. Next, he imagines it all and in this way satisfies his abnormal wishes. It is easy to see why this is painful to him because now he is an active paedophiliac, which promises him not only gratification but also the sense of personal catastrophe and verifies his belief that he is an abnormal, dangerous, and bad person.

Wish fulfilment does not necessarily entail a p-desire because desire entails an accessible possible world. Think of Don Q. However, the sexual case above shows that desire and wish-fulfilment are systematically connected. Our paedophiliac possesses the relevant desires because he has an access to the relevant possible world. He just thinks he must not take that path. Instead he constructs an imaginary world where he can satisfy his wishes. Empirical evidence shows that wish-fulfilment is often related to some surrogate actions, that is, it is not solely imaginary. As I said, such actions verify the success of wish-fulfilment to the person himself. Don Q actually starts wandering around dressed funny and followed by Sancho Panza. He attacks windmills and wine barrels. A small man buys platform shoes and the paedophiliac tries, innocently, to relate to young people and, less innocently, say, collects their suggestive pictures. Wish fulfilment may have its typical behavioural correlates. To move to the imaginary world where spontaneous wish-fulfilment is to occur one needs some behavioural items also as indicators of the pseudo-realism of the effort. In anxious cases, this makes one's anxiety ever more real and true.

My last question is, how are f-desire and wish-fulfilment related? We already saw that the Don Q case can be approached from both sides with an equal success. The difference is this: the existence of f-desire explains wish-fulfilment. If we do not mention f-desire we have hard time understanding why Don Q starts acting as he does, that is, what motivates his wishes. He starts a new life focusing on desire which he loves. He is a supreme expression of unadulterated desire. What desire? The desire to desire knightly things in the world where he believes he resides. Notice that only f-desire can do that, p-desire cannot. We know that p-desire always tracks satisfaction in an accessible possible world, unlike f-desire that loves the actual world of the person's desire. Don Q's desire does not track satisfaction because it is already satisfied. But that does not stop our knight. When he rides out dressed and equipped as a noble knight, he indeed sees himself as a noble knight. The negative case of the short man of

course requires its own explication, which must somehow be consonant with the Don Q's case – the difference between the two cases is illusory. Both agents create their own imaginary worlds where their f-desires flourish, and then they can proceed to the next stage, that is, wish-fulfilment. The construction of the imaginary world in question is now guided by the agent's f-desire, which he cannot enjoy in his actual world. An f-desire is the desire to stay in this new world, and wish-fulfilment handles it as if it were the actual world.

De Re and De Dicto: a Paradox

I will argue for the following paradox: Suppose that desire is a three place relation Subject – Object – Desirability Conditions, that is, all desires are conditional in this sense. A desire sentence is open to de re and de dicto readings. The problem is, if you read it de re you miss the desirability conditions. If you read it de dicto you miss the object but retain the desirability conditions. How can you tell that both interpretations concern one and the same desire? Desire is de dicto if in the context of the sentence that expresses the desire is referentially opaque; if it not, the desire is de re. I love Mary who happens to be a nurse. De dicto I do not love a nurse but de re I do. Notice that Frege's Morning star/ Evening star puzzle is an epistemological variant of de dicto/de re, in the sense that once we know that the two observed stars are actually planet Venus we have our de re object of belief. Incidentally, we have now a good reason to say that desire de dicto has no object, except in grammatical sense; instead it has what one may understand as a topic. As long as I pay attention to the fact that she is a nurse, Mary is not an object of love to me. I will clarify this in what follows.

From a grammatical point of view, a de dicto desire is, for instance, "I want that my car is red and fast," which picks a red and fast car as a desirable object. Compare de re: "I want a car that is red and fast," which picks a car that happens to be red and fast among other things. Here the de dicto topic is my car together with its essential properties, or its satisfied desirability conditions. These conditions are part of a narrative concerning the good-making features of the car, and their function is to motivate my desire. As I said above, no desire is without its reasons, which is to say that desire is a three place relation. De re desire has its object that is complete in the sense that its context is quasi-extensional or minimally

intensional in such a way that the context is not referentially opaque – even if we have an intentional object here. The object has all the properties a car has. The car that I want may be red and fast but its colour may also fade fast. In de dicto context this does not make sense because the topic can handle only desirability conditions.

Think next of the following textbook style example of de re and de dicto desire (S) "I want the fastest car on the planet, that is, F." Then the world changes so that F no longer is the fastest car on the planet. If I originally read (S) de dicto, I no longer want F. I want B that is now the fastest one. If we originally read it de re, I wanted F and I still want F. In other words, I want the car, whatever car happens to be the fastest one now; or, I want this given car that once happened to be the fastest one. De re I desire the object in such a way that its change of status does not matter. In the de dicto case, to be the fastest car is an essential consideration: without it I cannot fix my desire. In a de re case this is not true. Once I have picked my intentional object of desire I have picked a real thing that has certain accidental properties. It remains the same thing even if it no longer is the fastest car on the planet. All this looks perfectly sound and understandable.

Alas, once you start thinking it in psychological terms you notice a troublesome fact, namely, the desirability conditions of the de re interpretation of sentence (S) have mysteriously vanished, yet you cannot desire without them. Why did I originally want that car that used to be the fastest on the planet. We have no hint. Desire is a three place relation but now the third place holder is missing. I say I want a car that is red, which does not mean that I desire the car de re because it is red. I say it happens to be red, among many other things. I must have a reason for desiring it, but now I cannot tell what it is. This is to say that de re interpretation of desire does not pick a desire but a bare object. In this way, desirability conditions figure only in de dicto interpretations of S. Let us look into this. As I said, the de dicto interpretation is clear: "I want F because F is the fastest car on the planet," specifies high performance as the essential or necessary desirability condition in the sense that I desire F if and only if it is the fastest car on the planet. If it is not, I do not desire F. It follows that, given the new possible world where F fails to be the fastest car, I no longer desire F de dicto. In other words, if the world changes so that the desirability conditions of a given desire do not hold, the desire vanishes. According to its de dicto interpretation, to be the fastest is, ceteris paribus, necessary and sufficient for the desire to emerge and endure.

How can one and the same desire have two interpretations one of which is a three place relation and second a two place relation? This looks as if de re and de dicto desires were two different desires, a fact that leads to a problem concerning the individuation of desires. It is not possible to say only that de re and de dicto interpretations concern the same desire if and only if both of them are concerned with F as the given object of desire. When F fails to be the fastest car, the de dicto desire changes, unlike de re; therefore, we now have two different desires. Let me specify: I say "I want the fastest car on the planet, F" and then F loses its elevated status. If I lose my interest in F, my original desire was de dicto, if I do not, my original desire was de re. Now the question is, as I said above, why did I desire F de re in the first place? The question is irrelevant. The only thing that matters is that it is F

that I desire de re. De dicto it does not matter that it is F because the only thing that matters is the speed. I have a hard time seeing that behind the two interpretations we can find and see one individual desire. First, we find no object and an explanation for desiring, and then no explanation and an object. F does not join the interpretations and neither do the desirability conditions.

To solve this problem we need to give de dicto reading a priority position. I love the most beautiful man in the world (de dicto) and he happens to be Archibald (de re). When he no longer is so beautiful, I switch my love to Felix who now is aesthetically the best and my de re object changes accordingly. Why cannot I love Archibald now? The reason is that my de re reading of the situation mentions no desirability conditions, which is to say that I need to derive them from my current de dicto reading; hence, I de re love Felix. De re specifies the object but only de dicto tells us what the desirability conditions are in the given case. Archibald has de re all kinds of properties none of which are, considering my love, essential and hence I can love him for any different reasons. But only one set of properties is essential in the de dicto case and exactly those properties I must find in my de re object, if I am going to love him so that the de re and de dicto readings pick the same desire, or they are mutually complementary. If I still love ugly Archibald I must find myself a new desire de dicto. Most mysteriously, if I picked Archibald (de re) when I still desired the best beauty (de dicto), why did I pick him in the first place? If I still love him in the new world, I must have picked him for reasons that do not show in "Archibald is the most beautiful man in the world." The world has changed and I still love him – why did I originally pick him? Here we see two different desires at work. To get back to one desire, we must require that de re tracks de dicto desirability conditions. In this case, when the world changes I no longer love Archibald.

SUMMARY: Suppose I desire X because of Y, or my topic is XY. The object of my desire is X. What is the name of my desire? If you identify XY and X, you must tell why you do so. You can explain it by starting from XY and deriving X form it. In this way, the solution is by rank ordering the two interpretations so that de re becomes logically dependent on de dicto; or, de dicto is original and de re derivative in relation to it.

A de dicto desire may have no intentional object but rather a topic, which runs together with the description of the object and its desirability conditions; for instance "the fastest car." Think of a non-definite description "Fast car" and think of de dicto "I desire a fast car." De re this picks the class of fast cars, and any member of the class satisfies the desire. Now, it is strange to say that a class of fast cars would be the object of desire, except in a grammatical sense. This class is intrinsically fuzzy and anyway, it is a class of things, which to a non-realist is not a legitimate object. Hence, a definite description like "the fastest car on the planet" is misleading. It suggests that de dicto desires have objects. The dilemma is this: de dicto desire has no object and de re, while it has an object, does not specify any desirability conditions and thus one cannot say why it, and not something else, is the object of desire. Obviously, de dicto and de re must go together so that they are two aspects of one and the same desire. We need to know what the intentional object is and why it is an

object of desire. This also becomes evident when we think of the following example. I want to marry John who is a serial killer, although I do not know it. De dicto I do not want to marry a serial killer, I want John. De re my object of desire is a serial killer.

> De dicto: I want to marry John because John is so tall.
> De Re: I want to marry a serial killer, who happens to be tall.

In this case the de re and de dicto desires do not share a common concept that would unify them and justify the idea that we have only one desire here. How do we individuate the desire? As I said, we must consider de dicto first and find the object in this way. I cannot say I want to marry a serial killer because I want to marry John. It may happen, of course, that I get a serial killer but that is another thing. De dicto desire fixes the de re object, which is the only object of desire, by specifying some desirability conditions that it alone possesses. Sometimes de re objects are not real objects. In that case, your desire fails altogether or you need to think of a very strange possible world where the object becomes real. I say, "I want you to know everything." This allows for no object in the real sense of the term but we may construct a possible world where one knows everything. In this sense the topic is this world and de dicto is the all the knowledge in it. Again, we need to proceed from de dicto to de re.

Let me make a couple of additional remarks. If I desire de re F that is not so fast, I need to tell why. Desire logically entails desirability. When I tell why, I refer to a desire that is different from the original that focused solely on speed. That is why in the de re case F must be speedy too. We only speak about F as if this fact were irrelevant. Of course I may still de re desire F in a world where it is not that fast, but then my desire has changed or the earlier desire de dicto was not a desire for the fastest car. It was for something else. <>

HANDBOOK OF MEGACHURCHES edited by Stephen J. Hunt [Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion, Brill, Hardback: 978-90-04-39988-4, E-Book: 978-90-04-41292-7]

open source

The growth of the megachurch (generally defined as a regular attendance of over 2,000 people) is undoubtedly one of the most exceptional religious trends of recent times, certainly within the Christian sphere. Spreading from the USA, megachurches have now become common globally - reaching different national and cultural contexts. The edited volume Handbook of Megachurches offers a comprehensive account of the subject from various academic perspectives: sociology, religious studies, religious history and religious studies among them. Topics covered include: the historical developments and growth, typologies, theology, popular culture, revivalism, social engagement, and the manifestation of megachurches in such countries as Canada, Russia, India and Africa.

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HIGH ON GOD: HOW MEGACHURCHES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA by James Wellman, Katie Corcoran, and Kate Stockly [Oxford University Press, 9780199827718]

Humans are homo duplex, seeking to be individuals but knowing this is only possible in communities. Thus, humans struggle to integrate these two sides of their nature. Megachurches have been enormously successful at resolving this struggle. How do they do it, and what is it about their structure and rituals that makes so many feel as if they are high on God? The affective energies and emotional valences that characterize religious ecstasy are the primary focus of our study of megachurches. Empirically, humans want and desire forms of what Randall Collins calls "emotional energy." Drawing on extensive qualitative and quantitative data on twelve nationally representative megachurches, we identify six desires that megachurches evoke and meet: acceptance, awe and spiritual stimulation, reliable leadership, deliverance, purpose, and solidarity in a community of like-minded others. Megachurches satisfy these desires through co-presence—being in the presence of other desiring people—a shared mood achieved through powerful musical worship services, a mutual focus of attention on the charismatic senior pastor who acts as an emotional charging agent, transformative altar calls, service opportunities, and small-group participation. This interaction ritual chain solidifies attendees' commitment and group loyalty, and keeps them coming back to be recharged. Megachurches also have a dark side: they are known for their highly publicized scandals often involving malfeasance of the senior pastor. After examining the positive and negative sides to megachurches, we conclude that they successfully meet the desire of humans to flourish as individuals and to do so in a group.

This book has been a long time coming. It was delayed for personal reasons, in which I (James K. Wellman, Jr.) took time to care for myself and my family. But in coming back to this project, a surge of energy seized me and we began to think of this book as not just about American megachurches, but about the nature and character of human beings as they experience and embody their religion. This exploration has been my life journey, a search that has been full of bumps and bruises, but also moments of exhilaration. So, for us, this is a book about megachurches but it is also, more profoundly, a book about the contours of human religiosity.

Along the way, we rediscovered Émile Durkheim as the father of the sociology of religion—humans must make and dwell in worlds, and these worlds, for better or worse, are sacred. Durkheim's notion of homo duplex—I became a definitive way for us to understand human beings as they construct, negotiate, and sometimes destroy religious worlds. World building, of whatever kind, is a sacred act, but nonetheless one that is full of ambivalence, promise, and trouble. American megachurches are one way that humans have tried to navigate this tension. From our research, megachurches have been enormously successful in resolving this multivalent challenge. How do they do it, and what is it about their structure and rituals that makes so many feel as if they are high on God?

In this Preface, I describe an experience that I had while conducting this research, which helped me connect, existentially, with the question, "What does it mean to be high on God?" For many scholars of religion, especially sociologists, religious ecstasy seems like an epiphenomenon: an illusion that is talked about as something "they" do, but not always believed or taken with great seriousness. We will take this experience very seriously in this book. As authors, we take religious experience to be something quite real, as a phenomenon that is as valid as any experience in human life. In fact, religious emotions and ecstasy have, in many ways, throughout history and across the world (including in twenty-first-century America), played a formative role in shaping human lives and cultures. In this way, humans, it seems to us, are homo religiosus. People build and place their trust in unseen worlds to which they pray, in which they find meaning, and about which they doubt and ask questions. American megachurches are simply a rather delicious exemplar of how human beings are homo religiosus—doing what we explain in this book, getting high on God.

So, here is an example of how the experience of the God-high might manifest—even in a scholar (myself), even as I fully intended to remain a neutral observer.

I have been studying, going to, and preaching at churches for most of my life. I've visited nearly every conceivable form of church. And so to visit a megachurch is nothing out of the ordinary. Indeed, my

first book was a study of a liberal Protestant megachurch—a rare breed I might add.3 So when I visited one of the twelve megachurches that we explore in this book, I knew what to expect. It was a typical Sunday and I was there to witness and experience all five of the services offered that Sunday. I estimate that I witnessed around 12,000 people come through the doors that day; most were on the youthful side, but they were of every ethnicity and racial background. The ethnic diversity stunned me—every imaginable ethnic blend mixed together as if all the tensions in our country never existed. It struck me to watch a young white woman and an African American teenager dance to the worship music, utterly caught up in the moment, as they stood only one row away from each other. I thought about how remarkable this combination was, both historically and culturally, especially given that Martin Luther King, Jr. once said that 11 a.m. on Sunday is the most segregated hour in America. From the perspective of my own liberal Protestant tradition, which incorporates the teachings of the social gospel, this is the kingdom of God. A holy habitation where harmony mediates all classes, races, and social divisions.

As is common for megachurches, this church had renovated an old warehouse and remodeled it, nicely I might add, into a modern theater with stage and lighting gear that compete with the most sophisticated venues I have experienced. They executed the show—and it was a show—with great mastery and professionalism. HD screens loomed across the front. From any angle in the theater, no matter where one was sitting, attendees could see every pirouette of the singers and every strum of the (electric) guitar. The close-ups of the lead singer invited listeners to feel her pathos. But what struck me about her was that she seemed depressed and even desperate. My intuition was supported by the fact that at midday she began to lose her voice, and by the fourth service she was encouraging the congregation to sing along with her and for her. I thought, "Wow, why don't they give her a break?"

The other soloist was a young Hispanic man, whose voice stunned me. He stood in front of us like a Southern Hispanic god. I kept thinking about his ethnic history, and wondering by what Catholic tributary he was nurtured into this quite remarkable future. All my dreaming was taking place as a prelude to what was coming—the senior pastor. His beauty struck me as he strutted onto the stage, all decked out in stone-washed jeans and a casual but stylish dress shirt; his broad smile and energy immediately captured and enchanted the audience. He clapped his hands, saying, "How are you? How are you? How are you?" And I thought, "I am good." And, truth be told, when I saw his picture online before attending the service, I had thought, "This guy is not very impressive." Well, in person, his eloquence and intelligence struck me with some force. I was smitten.

His sermon engaged me not only because of his charisma and his winning personality, but also because it made sense. He covered familiar ground, arguing that proof of God's existence is found in the beautiful design of nature (a classic theological argument): if we see order around us, there must be a designer. And intuitively, on a certain level, this makes sense. Though, as Kant has shown, no necessary inference can be drawn about a first cause, but I didn't expect the pastor to be reading German philosophy.

At the end of the "talk," he began the altar call. He proclaimed that our "sinful blood is damning," and that only "the innocent blood of the savior Jesus Christ can cover us." This is hardly original or unusual; the blood atonement theory is nearly universal throughout megachurches. When individuals responded to the altar call by coming forward to the stage, the pastor would prance across the

platform, saying, "God bless you, God bless you, God bless you." The "audience," who were instructed to pray, had their eyes closed; I did not. It appeared to me that his machine-gun rapid-fire "God bless you"s acted as a kind of reverse-action pepper spray that lifted people and propelled them to come down front and be saved at the altar.

By the third service of the day, I had settled into my role as a "participant observer." I looked at every detail of each service, scribbled notes throughout, and did my best to blend in with the young multi-ethnic sweep that rose and danced all around me. The bass drum literally beat on my chest cavity—I thought, maybe I am too old for this kind of thing. After all, the only demographic not represented at the services were post–sixty-year-olds. It seemed clear that this was a young person's game.

During the third altar call, as my head leaned into my note taking, I realized that, unbeknownst to my researcher mind, my body had invited itself to get up and go forward for the altar call. I literally felt a power in my limbs rising and going down to join the train of those moving toward the stage to seize the pastor's hand—to catch one of the pastor's "God bless you". The act came utterly involuntarily—the force of it stunned me. My mind began a negotiation: on the one hand, "Why not? Who would be hurt if I went to the altar?" and on the other hand, "This is nethical! You are doing research! It would be professionally embarrassing."

The whole experience lasted a minute or two. I decided not to go, at which point I forcibly pulled the energy that had prompted me to walk down the aisle back up into my head, and the feeling finally stopped. As I relaxed back into my seat, I thought, "Well, that was a close call."

I am familiar with altar calls, and I can see how they function as deeply emotional forms of engagement, for good and ill. But the power of suggestion from the pastor surprised me and caught me off guard. His charisma and the pull of that service became a somatic marker empirically verified in my body. I thought later, "This is what it's like to be high on God."

Religious ecstasy is not the product of some detached rational assent to a philosophical idea—it is a full-body experience. The affective energies and emotional valences that characterize religious ecstasy are the primary focus of our study of megachurches. These experiences can engender powerful benefits as well as important dangers, both of which we will explore. In both cases, the body is where the somatic marker imprints. The conscious mind merely negotiates and, in the long run, rationalizes the physiological experience.

In this book, our focus is on the dynamics of desire. Desire is in the body, and so affect and emotion rule this territory. In the past, because of my own training in the power of the mind and rationality, I have been suspicious of emotion and the body. However, over this last decade, research has shown that many of our thoughts, decisions, and beliefs are reactions to what our body either wants or rejects. We sometimes critique certain rational explanations as ex post facto—after the fact—but our growing suspicion suggests that conscious thought is in fact exclusively ex post facto. We experience a problem or a situation and our bodies spring into action: our heart races, our hands sweat, a surge of adrenaline floods our bloodstream. We interpret these physiological events as evidence, and they propel us to respond quickly. Only later—perhaps milliseconds, minutes, or a month later—do we rationalize our behavior, choices, and explanations.

My attention to desire came by way of René Girard's early work, Deceit, Desire and the Novel. Girard intuited the triangular nature of desire in his study of classic novelists. He argued that a person sees what the other desires and they mimic it, molding a genuine desire within them. A triangle is formed between the person, the other, and what becomes, through the person's mimicry of the other, their mutual object of desire, thus setting up a rivalry between the two desirers—we compete with those whom we mimic. During the altar call, my desire to touch the pastor's hand mimicked those who had already responded, and our shared desire to participate in the aura of religious ecstasy that exuded from the stage mimicked the pastor's performance. I, too, wanted to touch the pastor's hand, to be washed in Jesus's blood. I saw what others desired and that desire sprung up in my own body. Thus, what we desire is always mediated—either externally or internally, either by models out there or models that we have internalized.

So, for instance, this is the essence of advertising: one may or may not want a new Mac laptop, but when one sees another wanting this particular laptop design, one's desires are stimulated and the passions rise. The lust for a computer is banal of course, but the causal matrix can be compared to the imitation of the Christ: one experiences that another wants the Christ, and one (p.xiv) begins to want what that person wants. And that person develops an intent to have it through imitation, at times even unto death. We might be saying to ourselves, even now, "Well, that is not me, I want things because I want them, not because of others." And, of course, Girard would say, yes, the culture has constructed that myth of individuality, so even our rationalization of desire is a mimicked response. We easily fool ourselves into thinking that our desires come first. And marketing knows this truth: all purchases are personalized, and only those of unique tastes, like our own, would want these things. So, this circle of desire binds us and deceives us, and for Girard, this mimetic tornado leads to crisis and competition, which all cultures must manage and channel. No one avoids this mimetic circle of desire, and since it starts in the body, the mind uses ex post facto reasoning to save our pride.

All of this, by the way, is perfectly captured in a scene from Monty Python's Life of Brian:

> BRIAN:
> Look, you've got it all wrong! You don't need to follow me, you don't need to follow anybody! You've got to think for yourselves! You're all individuals!
> THE CROWD (IN UNISON):
> Yes! We're all individuals!
> BRIAN:
> You're all different!
> THE CROWD (IN UNISON):
> Yes, we are all different!
> MAN IN CROWD:
> I'm not.

For instance, why do I want to study and write on megachurches? Most liberals despise these institutions and many of our readers will likely also feel this way (mimicking, as it happens, this liberal judgment). The most typical remark that we receive is that these places are dens of consumerism and false-messianic profit takers, which represent a brand of Christianity that is below us. Even worse, they may even view the "superstitious" theology and "unconstrained" worship styles as a form of primitivism. My sense is that for many, these judgments are based on hearsay, and on the news stories of particular megachurches that have gone astray or become utterly craven in their

appeals. Many such churches exist. Perhaps even jealousy of megachurch success rumbles amidst these reactions, as well as ignorance of what actually occurs in these churches. These reactions and uninformed hostilities are partly what we aim to overcome. To be sure, we will engage very serious critiques of megachurch culture in the final part of the book, but first, our (p.xv) task will be to "normalize" megachurches as a part of what humans do when they do religion. And perhaps, even more than this, what humans do because that is what we are pulled to do in our condition of being, using Durkheim's felicitous phrase, homo duplex.

As humans, we swim in desires that are borrowed and framed in us, often without much foreknowledge. And this quintessentially human desire to participate in and merge with the desire of the other is an evolved mechanism that enables us to build the social coalitions imperative for our species' survival. We must construct and merge with groups, ideas, and constructs bigger than ourselves, which Durkheim calls the sacred. We explore this tendency more fully in Part I. The underlying thesis of this book is that humans, in order to survive, desire to join something bigger than themselves. The self is never enough; we must move out and participate in Durkheim's sacred. But this desire for communion is in constant tension with our desire to be distinct, an independent self, so harmony in togetherness is rarely easy, no matter how much we want it. It is the complicated work of culture. We will argue that religion is one of the primary ways humans exercise and enact this desire.

But what about my own desires when it comes to these churches? Well, I notice that I feel some forms of envy when I'm at some of these churches. "Wow, look at their success. Their leaders seem so powerful and persuasive. Why can't I be that way?" This passes, of course, but then I sometimes think, "Hey, these folks look truly happy with their religion. Why can't I be like that?" And, I sometimes feel, "Wow, look at how much actual good they are doing." And I ask, "Why are liberal religionists so pretentious and self-righteous? They talk about social action and social justice, but in reality, they do little of it, particularly when compared to these megachurches."

To make my point, the weekend I was at the megachurch where I experienced this bodily desire to touch the hand of the pastor, the church reported that the day before, they had sent out 600 volunteers to completely refurbish an entire city park, something city officials said would take them five years to complete. On top of this, the pastor announced that the church had given out free vouchers to their thrift and food warehouse to all 2,000 police officers and firefighters in the city, encouraging them to give the vouchers to those in need. This was real, direct social service to many of the neediest people in this midsize city. I began to desire to be a part of what this church had done; my body wanted to touch the pastor's hand, to be somehow be close to him (p.xvi) as an embodied symbol of charisma and goodness. I wanted to be close to, as Randall Collins names, a special individual like this pastor, the "energy star," the source of that power, which felt like a power of love, a power to forgive, a power to persuade so many to serve their communities and those in need.

And true to this process, in reading the nearly 300 transcriptions of megachurch focus groups and interviews, the people in these churches were doing what I was doing, catching the desire of the energy stars in theirs churches, wanting what those charismatic figures wanted. Particularly in churches that were at the height of their growth, peaking as it were in popularity and power, congregants' references to these charismatic figures constructed them as sacred objects. Yes, the

Bible was talked about and songs were sung, but the sacralization of leadership was something we noticed consistently. The construction of pastors as sacred objects of ultimate desire formed and informed our research about megachurches. With their charismatic leadership and example of holy desire at the helm, megachurches are motivated to acts of service that benefit themselves, each other, and their communities.

Out of this fierce fire of charisma and catalyzed sacred communities, we emerged with a slightly edited version of my own definition of religion, adding the Durkheimian notion of a moral community:

> Religion is the socially enacted desire for the ultimate that binds a group into a moral community.

Our sense is that humans first and foremost want or need energy that constructs stable social groups. Often, religion offers that opportunity, though other social forms can do this as well. Empirically humans want and desire forms of what Collins calls "emotional energy." They also want it to last—and religion tends to make the claim of unlimited permanence. This powerful claim draws many—like a magnetic pull, summoned to an ultimate source that appears and is claimed to be unlimited. Religion, in this sense, can provide the ultimate promise of a source that will never run out. Individuals who represent, embody, and communicate this energy in ways that enliven the imagination and emotions of followers can galvanize and motivate moral communities. What struck us about megachurches is that they speak about these churches and their leaders in intimate and tender terms—it's not about dogma or a theology as much as it is about the charisma of their pastors and the intimate nature of the truth that has brought them home. Congregants spoke in reverent terms: "He speaks to my heart," "I feel like he knows me," "He has a pastor's heart," "It's never dull," "I never fall asleep," "It doesn't feel like church," "It's applicable to me."

And here Collins's interaction ritual chain theory serves both to specify the pattern of religious experience as well as to broaden how the interactive ritual process forms the very essence of human social interactions. Religion is a functional expression of what all humans do.11 Humans are, in Collins's terms, energy seekers, or emotional energy desirers. It all begins with a desire, a willingness, and motivation to focus on something that is of interest. But this focus is always in relation to others—there is a co-presence, whether real (as in other human participants) or perceived—or an observation that others seek the same object. Humans want to be with other "desiring" people. You see this on Dancing with the Stars when the camera focuses on the audience looking at the dancers; this co-presence enables one to see and feel inspired and to be moved with, in, and toward other people. This co-presence is often accompanied by a charismatic leader, who functions as an emotional charging agent that is at once both the object of focus and the source of desire. At other times, the leader facilitates a focus on other objects of interest, symbolic or material. Co-presence, in essence, triggers the flux and current of stimulation: people feel the co-presence of other seekers and an emotional charge is instigated, perhaps by the leader or by music. Stimulation builds, even to a crescendo, or what Collins calls a "threshold for shared mood." And sometimes there is a peak, a collective effervescence where the air is palpably filled with contagious fervor, and something more takes over—everyone knows it—it is "in the air." Some interpret this energy as deliverance, others enlightenment, some are satiated in the moment, and some are moved to act, but all are moved to think and feel more deeply. All people who experience this want to make it happen again and again.

How Academics Might Read This Book

Finally, why is it challenging for us, as academics, to come to grips with a desire for the ultimate in the religious sense? Why are emotions and the affective desires in our bodies so sublimated in our lives and in our approaches to this subject matter? Why is there such a deep and inherent distrust of the kind of passion and ecstatic joy found in religion? It seems to me a piece of this goes back to Durkheim's homo duplex—as academics, who are often secularists, we struggle with the dual nature of our beings. As Durkheim describes, "In brief, this duality corresponds to the double existence that we (p.xviii) lead concurrently: the one purely individual and rooted in our organisms, the other social and nothing but an extension of society."

Academics are deeply dedicated to their own exploration of what they study and the need to understand and explain it. At the same time, they are committed to a sense of discovering the truth of their subject matter, and a deep aversion to anything that would force them to submit to anything that is bigger than themselves. In this sense religion is a bridge too far: it not only demands they submit to forces that are above and beyond them, but also that they give over control. Religion is at the far end of our ability to construct society, while being an exhibition of the very core of what it means to be human. It is no wonder then that religion becomes something that secular elites resist and often reject as a form of coercion. In fact, for many academics, it constitutes a menacing political force that is often considered a source of totalitarianism.

But desire is also in us as academics. Our argument is that we should be more aware of it in ourselves and more comfortable with the fact that our desires, too, are socially constructed. That we, too, are all mimetic desirers—we can't stop this, but we can be aware of it. As Jonathan Haidt has said, in the academic world, we are mostly WEIRD—"white, educated, industrial, rich and democratic." And I would add secular. Our desires, while rooted in our human nature by virtue of our evolutionary heritage, are also determined and shaped by our culture, and we as selves are constructed through them as we negotiate the world. Some would say we do this with a rather large bias, that rationality is the only way to make decisions. Many might argue that that, too, is ex post facto reasoning. We've been taught, or we have caught the idea, that rationality is the only way to measure one's worth. This book allows WEIRDS to rethink and evaluate their prejudices about American megachurches and encourages them to deconstruct their own antipathy toward ecstatic desire—to rethink their own personal relation to the far side of homo duplex—one's own personal desires and interests on the one hand, and the interests and desires of the socially constructed world of religion on the other. In this way, we invite the many skeptics of American megachurches to take a tour of this strange social and religious beast—allowing it to interpret them, even as they will necessarily interpret it. <>

THE PETRINE INSTAURATION: RELIGION, ESOTERICISM AND SCIENCE AT THE COURT OF PETER THE GREAT, 1689-1725 by Robert Collis [Aries Book Series, Brill, 9789004215672, 9789004224391]

The reign of Peter the Great (1672-1725) was marked by an unprecedented wave of reform in Russia. This book provides an innovative reappraisal of the Petrine Age, in which hitherto neglected

aspects of the tsar's transformation of his country are studied. More specifically, the reforms enacted by the tsar are assessed in light of the religious notion of instauration – a belief in the restoration of Adamic knowledge in the last age – and a historical and cultural analysis of the impact of Western esotericism at the Russian court. This book will appeal to scholars of Russian history and religion, as well as being of wider interest to those studying Western esotericism in Early Modern and eighteenth-century Europe.

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Excerpt:

Quirinus Kuhlmann's Millenarian Mission to Moscow in 1689

At eleven o'clock, on the morning of October 4, 1689, Quirinus Kuhlmann (1651–1689), a Silesian mystic from Breslau (Wroclaw) who was greatly influenced by Jakob Böhme (1574–1624), and Konrad Nordermann (d. í689), a Dutch merchant and resident of the Nemetskaia Sloboda (Foreign Quarter), in Moscow, were led out onto Red Square in the Russian capital to be burned at the stake as heretics. The ensuing gruesome spectacle was witnessed by Kuhlmann's mother who subsequently wrote a letter dramatically describing the last moments of her son's life. A copy of this letter was reprinted in the notable work Kirchen und Ketzer-Historie (1699–1700) by the Pietist Gottfried Arnold, which discussed a number of heretics in a favourable light. In the letter she describes how they were led out on to Red Square as false prophets where a 'small house' (a stake) had been prepared and furnished with tar barrels and straw. She then adds:

> When these innocent people approached death and saw that nobody around them would give consolation and did not want to grant them a reprieve, they both came to a halt and began to pray, turning their eyes to heaven. When they approached the stake and already saw that they had no salvation, my son then raised his hands and exclaimed in a loud voice:

> "You are just, great Lord! And right is your judgment. You know that we die now without guilt." And both, consoled entered the small house and were immediately consumed by fire; and no longer was there heard any kind of voice.

This unsavoury public event marked the high tide of Patriarch Ioakim's wave of Orthodox reaction against foreign influence. The Patriarch felt emboldened by the downfall of the Regent, Sophia, in September 1689, and utilizing the tacit support of the Naryshkin clan surrounding the young tsar, Peter Alekseevich, he sought to assert his authority. The burning of Kuhlmann and Nordermann at the stake was the clearest example of his determined zeal to eradicate what he perceived to be the contaminating influence of heterodoxy (and confessional competition) emanating from the Foreign Quarter.

In many ways, however, the unfortunate fate of Kuhlmann and Nordermann had been decided as early as 26 May, 1689 – only a matter of weeks after the arrival of the former in the Russian capital. It was on this date that the first interrogation of Kuhlmann took place, carried out by offficials of the Posol'skii Prikaz (Foreign Ministry). A leading player in Kuhlmann's arrest, however, was not the Patriarch, but Joachim Meinecke, a Lutheran pastor in the Foreign Quarter. It seems Meinecke felt threatened by the presence of mystical Protestants preaching a brand of radical chiliasm at odds with his orthodox doctrine. Consequently, the Lutheran pastor was skilfully able to manipulate the religious and political environment in Moscow. Indeed, Kuhlmann was soon labelled a heretical 'Quaker' and compared to the Russian raskol'niki (schismatics) by two early Russian translators of his texts working in the Posol'skii Prikaz.

The knowledge that Kuhlmann was en route to Moscow had induced a tangible air of excitement among a sizeable group in the Foreign Quarter, led by the merchant Nordermann, who were already favourable to the mystical theosophy of Jakob Böhme and interested in the Quaker movement. Kuhlmann himself had been an ardent follower of Böhme since 1673, when he was given a copy of the latter's Mysterium Magnum. Subsequently, he immersed himself in Böhme's work, which he read with "enthusiasm and astonishment" and came to believe that his Silesian predecessor was divinely inspired.4 In 1674 Kuhlmann published his principal work, Neubegeisterter Böhme, which combined the chiliasm he had inherited from a Dutch prophet, Johannes Rothe, the Heilsplan of Valentin Weigel and Böhme's belief in the imminent coming of an 'eternal kingdom.' This Enochian age would be marked by a union of the Protestant sects and the arrival of a new and true knowledge of God.

It is also interesting to note that Kuhlmann had been greatly influenced in the early 1670s by the Jesuit polymath, Athanasius Kircher (1602–1680), writing in 1671 that he "is like a miraculous magnet: his almost unprecedented learning fills (me) with amazement and attracts the whole earthly globe." Kuhlmann engaged in a lengthy correspondence with Kircher in which he expressed his admiration for the latter's Ars Magna based on the divine art of combing numbers in order to unlock the secrets of nature. Kuhlmann also wrote to Kircher regarding his renowned scientific collection, the revelations of Adam and Solomon and he proclaimed to Kircher that he had "read and re-read" the work of Ramon Lull (c. 1232–1316) on divine attributes which was closely linked to Jewish Cabbala. According to Kuhlmann, Lull's wheel – upon which were placed the nine divine dignities or names – "provides a method for opening the secrets of nature and the truth of wisdom." Kuhlmann's admiration for Kircher was most fully expressed in a tome dedicated to the work of the latter, entitled, Kicheriana de arte magna sciendi sive combinatorial, which was published in London in 1683. Other important influences on Kuhlmann were the proto-Pietist Johann Arndt and the mystical physician and alchemist, Paracelsus, cited as a reference in the preface to his prose work

Lehrreicher Geshicht-Herold. Kuhlmann also became acquainted with Jane Lead the founder of the Philadelphian Society and fellow disciple of Böhme, during his stay in England in 1684.

By 1687 Kuhlmann had become firmly convinced in the special role to be played by the Russian monarchs (the Regent Sophia and the two co-tsars Ivan and Peter) in his chiliastic vision and in his own revelatory mission. Indeed, he published a collection of prophecies dedicated to the Russian monarchs in Amsterdam in this year, entitled Drei und Zwanzigstes Kühl-Jubel Ausz dem ersten Buch des Kühl-Salomons an Ihre Czarische Majestaten.10 This edition was drawn directly from Jan Amos Comenius's Lux e Tenebris (1657), in which he published the prophecies of his friends, Miklás Drabik, Christoph Kotter and Christina Poniatowska. This was one of six works sent to Archangel in December 1688 with the aim of promoting Kuhlmann's ideas in anticipation of his arrival.

One can detect a distinct political dimension to Kuhlmann's fixation with the special role of Russia. After all, it was in May 1687 that Russia embarked on a Crimean campaign against the Ottoman Turks and the Crimean Tartars, in alliance with Austria, Venice and Poland. Kuhlmann was vehemently against this so-called 'Holy League,' as he wished to see the destruction of the Hapsburg Empire and the Papal Church. The Silesian also saw Russia's prophetic role as actually being fulfilled in alliance with the Ottoman Turks and the Crimean Tartars. This stance drew heavily on the prophecies of Drabik, Kotter and Poniatowska, as well as those of Stephen Melish. In 1643, for example, Drabik had a series of visions in which God purportedly "whispered to the East and to the North to come up, and revenge the injuries of my servants." In these visions, Drabik also envisages the destruction of Babylon (Vienna) by an alliance of Turks, Tartars and Muscovites, in which the 'infidels' would then convert to Christianity. Thus, Kuhlmann went to Moscow in order to beseech the Russian monarchy to break with its allies, who in the service of the Papacy, he writes, "seek to shamefully charm you." Needless to say, this political agitation was not appreciated in all quarters in the Russian capital and greatly contributed to Kuhlmann's eventual downfall.

Later, whilst under interrogation in Moscow, Kuhlmann explained that he went to the Russian capital according to the visions of an angel. The "many great and secret matters" revealed to him in these visions would be revealed to the "great monarchs" if he was given his freedom and allowed to reside in the city. Immediately prior to his arrival in Moscow, whilst staying in Novgorod, Kuhlmann also wrote a fresh appeal to the Russian monarchs exclaiming their special role in achieving his chiliastic vision of an "eternal kingdom." This appeal was dated 26 April, 1689 and was entitled Kühl-Jubel (Fresh Triumph). In it, Kuhlmann exclaimed that Sophia would become a new Miriam, Ivan would become a new Aaron and Peter would become a new Moses. He also exhorts them to unite and hurry to apostolic power, when the Tabernacle of the last age approaches, and where they will be shown the truth that David and Solomon had revealed to Kuhlmann himself. When approaching their "fresh ark" Kuhlmann would also inform them that they should behave according to the customs of the Samaritans.

These sentiments were enthusiastically shared by Nordermann, who during his second interrogation pronounced a similarly powerful Biblical vision of the imminent foundation of a New Jerusalem and a new Solomon's Temple on Russian soil, which N. S. Tikhonravov directly compares to Masonic ideals:

> Like the later Masons, Norderman was waiting for a spiritual Christianity to formally achieve a new church, to create from itself a new Solomon's Temple, the internal beauty of which would eclipse the blessed model of the Temple of the Old Testament Tsars.

This powerful vision, furthermore, is explicitly linked to the East and Russia in particular: "to the East shall Jerusalem return and a single faith . . . it shall be better, as in antiquity and as it was in the time of Solomon." What is more, the Temple of Solomon will be built again, "better and more glorious."

Yet despite the lofty Biblical role envisaged for the Russian monarchy by Kuhlmann and Nordermann, the pair won little favour in Moscow. In reality, they offfered little to the Russian monarchy, apart from reverent praise. Whilst chiliasm and esotericism were at the heart of their message, they failed to fully comprehend the religious, cultural and political environment in Moscow. Indeed, Kuhlmann was much more concerned with the fall of the Hapsburg monarchy than the advancement of the Romanovs. Thus, in essence it is easy to see how they created many enemies and few supporters. Ultimately their fervency lacked a progressive and dynamic dimension, in which the foundation of a New Jerusalem and a new Solomon's Temple on Russian soil could be aspired to by advancing knowledge (in both religious and scientific terms). Nevertheless, Kuhlmann's mission to Moscow marks a significant moment in Russian history. After all, one of Europe's most prominent mystical thinkers had assigned a special providential role for Russia and its monarchs. Thus, although expressed with a degree of uncommon fervency, Kuhlmann's sentiments epitomize a phenomenon that gained wider and greater currency during the sole reign of Peter the Great (1672–1725). Namely, that the Russian monarch had been granted a divine role to play in the unfolding Biblical drama at a crucial culminating period in history.

In that day will I raise up the tabernacle of David that is fallen, and close up the breaches thereof; and I will raise up his ruins, and I will build it as in the days of old. (Amos: 9:11)

In March 1697 Peter the Great embarked on his famous Grand Embassy to Western Europe. This venture aroused considerable excitement among many of the continent's leading scientific, philosophical and religious figures. Naturally, part of the sense of anticipation stemmed from the unprecedented sight of a Russian tsar exploring the West. However, many figures interpreted the Grand Embassy in a providential light, and envisaged Peter the Great as a Christian monarch capable of defeating the Ottoman threat from the East and spreading the light of Christianity. Thus, Peter the Great's journey to the West was efffectively viewed as a symbolic act in a grand, unfolding religious drama.

Most notably, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) followed the tsar's progress across Europe with keen interest. Indeed, he attached a profound providential significance to Peter the Great's reign. In addition to envisaging the monarch as a defender of the Christian faith against the Muslim Turks, Leibniz believed that Peter the Great could cultivate "until completion," as he wrote, "the plantation entrusted to him by God."1 According to Leibniz providential foresight had brought Peter the Great to power in Russia in order to carry out a grand and pivotal mission to facilitate the spread of light and knowledge to the East in the guise of Reformed Protestantism.2 Crucially, Leibniz shared this vision of the spread of Reformed Protestantism with a number of other eminent correspondents whilst Peter the Great undertook his Grand Embassy – most notably August Hermann Francke (1663–1727), the German Pietist leader based in Halle, and Nicolaes Witsen (1641–1717), the burgomaster of Amsterdam. It is significant that all three of these figures went on

to exert a powerful influence on the Petrine reforms at the beginning of the eighteenth century through direct contact with the Russian monarch or via his close servitors.

Leibniz felt that the ideal mentor to guide the young Russian tsar in his God-given task, whilst he was residing in Holland in the autumn of 1697, would be Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont (1614–1698). However, Leibniz lamented that van Helmont, who was his friend and collaborator, was too old for the task, although he wrote that "if he was younger he would prove very useful to the tsar" as he "possesses an astonishing knowledge in all subjects." Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont was the son of Jan Baptista van Helmont (1577–1644), the famed alchemist. The younger van Helmont maintained his father's alchemical outlook, whilst also embracing a form of Christian Cabbalism. Thus, Leibniz considered the ideal tutor for the young Peter the Great to be a man who displayed a profoundly esoteric outlook.

As mentioned above, Leibniz was far from being alone in foreseeing a lofty destiny for Peter the Great. This becomes apparent if one reads the proposals given to the Russian tsar by Dr. Francis Lee (1660–1719), whilst Peter the Great was resident in London in the early months of 1698. Lee was the editor of Jane Lead's mystical writings and the driving force behind the Philadelphian Society – a millenarian group based in London that drew heavily on the theosophical thought of Jakob Böhme.

The proposals outline a practical scheme to advance learning and the institutions of government in the Russian realm. More specifically, Lee recommends the establishment of seven colleges for (1) the advancement of learning; (2) the improvement of nature; (3) the encouragement of the Arts; (4) the increase of merchandize; (5) the reformation of manners; (6) the compilation of laws and (7) the propagation of the Christian religion.

Lee's concern with the practical management of faraway Russia was based on the same hopes as Leibniz. In other words, he envisaged the young Peter the Great as being capable of fulfilling a vital role in the imminent millenarian drama, as the following prologue from the text suggests:

> Sir,
> An invisible hand has conducted you to what is a Mystery to all Europe, and being followed, will conduct you to what may be for the Astonishment and Praise of all the World. There remains somewhat behind the Scene to be unveil'd, which will affford, perhaps, a more agreeable Surprize to your great searching in all your Travels; not beneath the Cognizance of the highest Potentates of this terrestrial Globe, and which may have a particular Regard to the present Motions of your Caesarean Majesty.
> An extraordinary Genius may efffect extraordinary Things; and it is an extraordinary Age in which we live, that calls for a more than common Application and Penetration: The vulgar Methods are all too short to compass any thing considerable: Wherefore others are to be searched out more suitable to the Greatness of your Mind, and more efffectual to all the Aims of Government, and fitted to raise you, Sir, above the ordinary Level of your Predecessors.

When reading Lee's extolment of Peter the Great as an "extraordinary genius" able to bring about "extraordinary things" in an "extraordinary Age," it should be borne in mind that many millenarians at the close of the seventeenth-century were expecting the arrival of the prophesied Fifth Monarchy (after the fall of the Babylonian, Persian, Grecian and Roman empires) drawing on Daniel (2:44), which states: "And in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed." The Philadelphian Society, with Lee at its head, was one such millenarian group

that actively heralded the pending arrival of the Fifth Monarchy, led by a ruler who embodied the virtues of David and Solomon.

Given the decidedly mystical and esoteric nature of Francis Lee's and the Philadelphian Society's form of millenarian thought, it is fascinating to note that Lee's proposals explicitly state that they were formulated at the specific request of the Russian tsar. Thus, less than a decade after the death of Quirinus Kuhlmann on Red Square, Peter the Great himself, it seems, sought out a man in London who espoused a similar chiliastic and esoteric worldview.

Yet whilst Kuhlmann offfered no concrete and positive vision for the transformation of Russia, both Leibniz and Lee did provide such practical plans. I would argue that these practical plans envisaged the tsar as a divinely sanctioned catalyst, whose providential role was to bring about an instauration, as opposed to mere reform, of Russian society. In this study I will argue that Peter the Great was receptive to the potency of this grand vision of his mission and, moreover, actively promoted his reforms accordingly, with the aid of a number of foreign servitors. By drawing on such strands of thought it was possible to portray Peter the Great as a ruler destined to fulfil divine prophecy by advancing the cause of learning; thereby rekindling the legacy of David and Solomon in constructing the Temple and Jerusalem and ultimately in bringing about a restoration of prelapsarian knowledge. Importantly, this cause of learning did not preclude an acceptance, or at least tolerance, of Western esotericism.

The Study of Western Esotericism and Petrine Russia

In the past two decades the study of Western esotericism has gained much from the methodological work of a number of notable scholars, who as Kocku von Stuckrad has noted have sought "to present esotericism as a structural component of European history of religion and culture, while playing a significant part in the evolution of modernity."

In this regard, the work of Antoine Faivre, in particular, has been pivotal in establishing a sound methodological framework for the academic study of Western esotericism. Thus, his interpretive model incorporates a diverse array of traditions and disciplines, including alchemy, magic, astrology, Platonic and Hermetic thought and Christian Cabbala that date back to Antiquity and which were reinvigorated during the Early Modern period. In the Early Modern period some scholars and thinkers referred to this tradition as a philosophia perennis (perennial philosophy), thereby advocating universal truths that could be traced back to Genesis via Antiquity.

According to the model advanced by Faivre, one can discern four intrinsic characteristics related to esotericism: 1) Correspondences. The realm of nature, or the various classes of reality (humans, minerals, plants, planets etc.), whether visible or invisible, are linked via a series of correspondences. 2) Living Nature. This posits that the cosmos is a complex, hierarchical and ensouled entity that is empowered by a living energy. 3) Imagination and mediations. As von Stuckrad summarizes, this category indicates that esoteric knowledge of correspondences requires substantial power of symbolic imagination, which is, moreover, revealed (or 'mediated') by spiritual authorities. 4) The experience of transmutation. Akin to alchemical transmutation based on refinement and purification, Faivre postulates that a similar process also relates to the change of being that can result from illuminated knowledge.

Furthermore, Faivre outlined two further minor categories that also correlate with the other four features. Namely, 5) The practice of concordance. This describes the ambition to discern common

ground between various esoteric traditions over time. Lastly, 6) Transmission or initiation through masters. This final category relates to the tendency to restrict the transmission of knowledge to select initiates who are led by a guiding authority.

Hitherto, such a methodological approach has not been systematically applied to the history of Russia in the early eighteenth century. More specifically, I would argue that the adoption of such a method has much in regard to broadening our understanding of Petrine Russia vis-à-vis the complex nature of the religious, cultural and scientific attitudes prevalent at the Court of the so-called 'Tsar Reformer.'

The Idea of Instauration and Petrine Russia

The notion that a divinely appointed monarch could play a prophetic role resonated strongly in the writings of many prominent seventeenth-century thinkers. In 1600, Tomasso Campanella (1568–1639) wrote Monarchio di Spagna, for example, which sought to demonstrate through astrological, astronomical and prophetic evidence that the Spanish monarchy was in fact the long-awaited fifth monarchy. Two decades later, Francis Bacon (1561–1626) published Instauratio Magna, in which he outlined his grand plans to reform society through the advancement of learning in the arts and sciences. By using the Latin word instauratio Bacon was explicitly providing his visionary programme with a powerful sense of prophetic symbolism. As Charles Whitney has noted, Bacon drew heavily on the use of the word as denoted in the Vulgate Bible where it combined ritual, architectural, political and prophetic meanings:

> The Vulgate in effect creates a typology or symbolism of instauration by lexically connecting the architectural instauration of Solomon's Temple both to a prophetic "rebuilding" of Israel and to a Christian instauration of all things in the apocalypse.

Thus, in the narrow sense of the word, instauration was closely tied to the restoration of Solomon's Temple. In the broader sense, instauration expressed the belief in the return of a prelapsarian state at the end of time, when man would regain the knowledge lost at the Fall. In his Instauratio Magna, Bacon quickly makes it apparent that his work should be seen in both senses. In the epistolary dedication to King James I, Bacon champions his monarch as a latter-day Solomon worthy of building a restored Temple of Wisdom. Moreover, the frontispiece to the work depicts in emblematic form the prophetic significance of the increased sense of knowledge being made possible by the voyages of discovery. A ship is depicted sailing into unknown waters through the mythical Pillars of Hercules, which also bring to mind the pillars of Jachin and Boaz at the entrance to Solomon's Temple.

An inscription is also included underneath the ship, which is drawn from the prophetic Book of Daniel (12:4): "Many shall go to and fro and knowledge shall be increased." Hence, Bacon is effectively implying that God has facilitated the increase of knowledge seen during the Renaissance in order to carry out divine prophecy. Bacon articulates such an understanding in the following way:

> All knowledge appeareth to be a plant of God's own planting, so it may seem the spreading and flourishing or at least the bearing and fructifying of this plant, by providence of God, nay not only by a general providence but by a special prophecy, was appointed to this autumn of the world: for to my understanding it is not violent to the letter, and safe now after the event, so to interpret that place in the prophecy of Daniel.

As indicated in his epistle to King James I, Bacon bestowed great hope upon a monarch capable of rekindling the wise reign of Solomon. This sentiment is most fully expressed in New Atlantis (1626),

where he extols the wisdom of a fictional King Solamona, who had founded "the noblest foundation . . . that ever was upon the earth . . . dedicated to the study of the works and creatures of God."

The manner in which Francis Bacon viewed reform and the advancement of learning within an eschatological framework struck a chord with many eminent thinkers throughout the remainder of the seventeenth century, such as Johann Valentin Andreae (1586–1642), Jan Amos Comenius (1592–1670), John Dury (1596–1672), Samuel Hartlib (c. 1600–1662) and Jan Jonston (1603–1675), and was a crucial element in the development of German Pietism under Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705).

Moreover, the belief that society was living through an age of instauration, in which long-lost knowledge was being rediscovered, greatly encouraged many individuals and groups to embrace distinct elements of esotericism that could help in the quest to reveal divine secrets. The publication of the Rosicrucian Manifestos in Germany in 1614 and 1615, for example, bears witness to how a chiliastic call for reform embraced a wide spectrum of the esoteric arts. The opening of the first manifesto announces how God has "in these latter days . . . poured out so richly his mercy and goodness to Mankind, whereby we do attain more and more to the perfect knowledge of his Son Jesus Christ and Nature."Such perfect knowledge of the wisdom of God had not been obtained, according to the prologue to the Fama (the first Rosicrucian Manifesto), since the reign of "wise King Solomon." However, the Rosicrucian Fraternity purported to have discovered the vault of "our most godly and highly illuminated Father, our brother C.R.," who had travelled extensively and had acquired a profound knowledge of magical practices and Cabbala. In unearthing the secrets contained therein, the Fraternity took on the responsibility of preserving this knowledge until "the Lion doth come, who will ask them for his use, and employ them for the confirmation and establishment of his kingdom."

Although the furor unleashed by the Rosicrucian Manifestos was significantly dampened during the course of the Thirty Years' War, the underlying chiliastic spirit of the movement was far from smothered by the chaos that rent much of Europe asunder. Indeed, it can be argued that the peak of millenarianism in Europe actually only occurred at the close of the seventeenth century. In other words, this period marked an era of great agitation regarding the Christian expectation of a last earthly age, as prophesized in Revelation 20:2 and 20:7, in which Christ will reign again and will bring the true harmony of the Church and the containment of evil.

A number of factors conspired to encourage the spread of millenarian sentiments towards the end of the century, such as the renewed threat from the Ottoman Empire, which as recently as 1683 had besieged Vienna; the Edict of Nantes in France in 1685 that prohibited the French Huguenots and led to their mass exile; and the English Revolution of 1688, which revived eschatological sentiments that had first emerged during the civil war years in the 1640s. Across Europe various radical religious groups began to attract a certain degree of popularity such as the Pietists in Germany, the Quakers and French Huguenots in England, various Reformed sects in Holland and Quietists in France.

Furthermore, this millenarian spirit was coupled with a continued fascination with the esoteric arts among many learned sections of European upper-class society. This goes against the notion that the Scientific Revolution marked a decisive Kuhnian paradigm shift, whereby religion and esotericism were rejected as progressive forces. In the past forty years it has been powerfully demonstrated by the likes of Allen Debus, Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs and Richard Popkin that many elements of esoteric thought still played a crucial role in the religious and scientific worldviews of the ruling elites across

Europe at the close of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century. Hence, even the supposed paragons of the Scientific Revolution, such as Newton, still displayed a profound curiosity in alchemy. Thus, I would argue that it is too simplistic to advance the theory that Peter the Great introduced a paradigm shift in Russia. This historical perspective rests upon a plethora of dichotomies: pre and post, traditional and modern, religious and secular, which only succeed in forging artificially clear-cut boundaries.

In essence I argue that Peter the Great's reforms of Russian society can be viewed against the backdrop of the widespread millenarian expectations that were so prevalent among both leading religious and scientific figures across Europe at the onset of the eighteenth century. An appreciation of this profoundly religious outlook, alongside an understanding of the continued role of the Western esoteric tradition, enables one to view Peter the Great's undertakings and the symbolic landscape of his royal court in a new light. In this regard, it is worth citing Kocku von Stuckrad, who argues in general that an understanding of Western esotericism (and I would add millenarianism) "enables us to demonstrate the complexity of European cultural history, without playing offf religion against science, Christianity against paganism, or reason against superstition."

However, by arguing that Peter the Great drew on a Western concept of millenarian thought, I do not mean to suggest that the tsar ignored the deeply messianic role outlined for Russian monarchs and the providential fate destined for Russia as a whole. Rather, Peter the Great was able to utilize the dynamism and progressive potential of Western millenarian thought – with its embrace of esotericism and scientific experimentation – alongside an embrace of the traditional messianic role of the Russian tsar. This potent combination reflects his Janus-like approach to governing his country.

At this point it is worth briefly outlining the messianic and providential tradition that emerged in Russia, or more specifically Muscovy, in the fifteenth century related to the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome. Inherent in this notion, as Boris Uspenskii has demonstrated, was the idea of Moscow as not only the inheritor of the Roman Empire (after the fall of Constantinople – the Second Rome – in 1453), but also the consciousness of the Russian capital as a holy and theocratic city, or, in other words, a New Jerusalem.

One of the earliest recorded Russian documents demonstrating the extensive use of Old Testament parallels and images dates back to the late fifteenth century. At this time, Bishop Vassian Rylo wrote a letter to Grand Prince Ivan III (the Great) of Muscovy, in which he compared God's liberation of Muscovy from the Tartar Yoke, which took place in 1480, to the Israelites liberation from the Egyptians and directly named Moscow as 'the New Israel.'

During the sixteenth century, symbolic references to Old Testament parallels were frequently adopted in Muscovite Russia, as the nation began to flex its muscles and believe in its unique Orthodox mission. Daniel B. Rowland has argued that Russians (and Europeans in general) still experienced time within a Biblical framework that progressed from genesis to the apocalypse. Thus, as Muscovy became more powerful and unified as a national state it became extremely tempting for monarchs and theologians to view their nation's destiny in messianic terms. They were to be the 'New Israelites,' led by the House of David, who were to establish the New Jerusalem in God's chosen land.

At the coronation of Ivan the Terrible, in 1547, for example, Metropolitan Makarii recited a prayer in which he directly stated that the new tsar was the blessed heir of King David and that his subjects were to inherit the sacred role of the ancient Israelites.

King of Kings and Lord of Lords, Who by Samuel the Prophet didst choose Thy servant David and anoint him to be king over Thy people Israel . . . look down from Thy sanctuary upon Thy faithful servant the Great Prince Ivan Vasilievich . . . Thou hast redeemed with the precious blood of thine only-begotten Son.

In ideological terms, Markarii's prayer formed part of a much more extensive literary campaign in chronicles and historical accounts, which sought to chart the divinely ordained ascendancy of the Russian nation.

Religious rites were also utilized to maximize the symbolic space of Moscow, which was experienced in sacred terms. Undoubtedly the best example of this was the lavish Palm Sunday ritual, which entailed the tsar and metropolitan symbolically entering Jerusalem, accompanied by an ass – a journey re-enacted from the Kremlin to Red Square. In this way, the city was not only used to commemorate past events, but was actually sensed as the holy city of Jerusalem. From the 1560s, St. Basil's Cathedral came to play a prominent role in this ritual. Indeed, the west (and largest) chapel of the cathedral was dedicated to the Entry into Jerusalem and acted as the focal point of the ceremony.

In fact, the whole of St. Basil's Cathedral was commonly referred to by many in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as 'Jerusalem' and believed that it was based on the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. Indeed, it has been argued that the raised profile of the cathedral and its surrounding chapels evoked Jerusalem as a whole. Even the square adjacent to St. Basil's was known as Lobnoe mesto (Skull Place) in reference to Golgatha. It has also been suggested that the unusual floral decorations adorning the internal passageways of the cathedral were meant to represent the gardens of paradise.

During the reign of Boris Godunov, between 1595–1605, the notion of Moscow as a New Jerusalem was stressed still further. Godunov planned to build a new church in the Kremlin, which would be intentionally modelled on Solomon's Temple, or the 'Holy of Holies' in ancient Jerusalem and on the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in contemporary Jerusalem. At the time, the Dutchman Elias Herckmann wrote that the tsar ordered his assistants to scrutinize the works of Josephus Flavius and other authors, who had described the ancient temple, in order to draw up an appropriate model of the church. It has even been suggested that the fortified wall constructed around Moscow, during Godunov's reign, was designed to symbolize the walled city of Jerusalem.

However, arguably the most daring attempt to symbolically create a New Jerusalem on Russian soil in the seventeenth century actually took place some sixty kilometres northwest of the city, by the River Istra. It was at this spot, in 1657, that Patriarch Nikon (1605–1681), the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, founded his own messianic retreat – the New Jerusalem Monastery. This grand undertaking was to be one of the most extensive architectural undertakings in seventeenth-century Russia and was only completed in the 1690s, after its founder had died.

In planning the monastery complex, Nikon acquired plans of contemporary Jerusalem drawn by Bernardino Amico from Florence, requested information and possibly a model from Patriarch Paisios

of Jerusalem and sent an envoy (Arsenii Sukhanov) to the Holy Land in order to undertake further research. The centrepiece of the monastery complex was the Cathedral of the Resurrection, which was directly modelled on the Holy Sepulchre Church in Jerusalem.

The entrance and fortified towers of the New Jerusalem complex were given names stressing their sacred association with the centre of the Holy Land. For example, the entrance tower was also the site of the Church of the Entry into Jerusalem, whilst towers were named after David, Ephraim, Damascus and initially it would seem that there were also Zion and Gethsemane Towers. The complex was also intentionally erected on a small hill to mimic Golgotha in Jerusalem. What is more, even the outlying area was envisioned as an exact topographical replica of Jerusalem's environs. Thus, not only the monastery buildings, but the entire topography of the surrounding area was transformed into a new holy land.

Nikon's decision to build his New Jerusalem outside Moscow would have been controversial at any period in early modern Russia, but in the mid-seventeenth century the country was convulsed by religious schism, social unrest and an outbreak of the plague. To many Russian at the time, all these calamities seemed to provide evidence that the end of the world would indeed occur in 1666, when the number of the beast came to pass. Indeed, the official schism of the Russian Orthodox Church took place in 1666, and at this time eschatological fears only served to intensify the religious debate. Nikon himself was at the heart of the religious controversy, as he became a despised figure among many so-called Starovery (Old Believers), who rejected his attempts to reform church texts and rituals along Greek lines. Thus, when he chose to locate New Jerusalem outside Moscow, many saw this as an act of blasphemy.

After the official church raskol (schism) in 1666–7, Nikon was sent into exile and was separated from his beloved New Jerusalem. Ultimately, Nikon's highly ambitious and symbolic architectural scheme did not replace Moscow as Russia's New Jerusalem, as he did not possess sufficient authority to challenge the religious and state hierarchy – centred in Moscow – which was able to preserve the myth that Moscow was the only New Jerusalem. The next challenge to Moscow's divine status came nearly half a century later and was orchestrated by Peter the Great. Whereas Nikon's New Jerusalem was still in the geographical shadow of Moscow, Peter the Great's monumental architectural project was carried out some 700 kilometres to the north, in a zone relatively devoid of expressions of Muscovite religious and state authority.

If one looks purely from a Russian perspective, one can note that the country experienced three periods of particularly acute apocalyptic anxiety during the seventeenth century: (1) during the so-called Time of Troubles at the beginning of the century; (2) during the religious schism in the middle of the century and (3) at the end of the century. During the first period, Tsar Boris Godunov (1551–1605) sought to legitimize his grip on power by immersing himself in architectural plans centred on promoting his symbolic inheritance of King David's Jerusalem. In the middle of the century, Patriarch Nikon undertook his grand endeavour to build a New Jerusalem in an oasis outside Moscow, whilst the country as a whole was being torn apart by strife.

At the close of the century, apocalyptic sentiments peaked again, especially after 1698, when Peter the Great returned prematurely from his Grand Embassy to Western Europe. The reason for his hasty return was primarily because large elements of the strel'tsy (royal guards) had mutinied. In a highly symbolic twist of fate, the showdown between the rebellious guards and the forces loyal to

Peter took place very near the site of Nikon's New Jerusalem. It was as if two opposed camps were fighting a duel over not only the political, but also the spiritual future of Russia.

Ultimately, I believe Peter the Great was acutely aware of the eschatological mindset of his people, in which the role of the tsar assumed messianic importance. Effectively, he could be viewed in negative apocalyptic terms as nothing less than the Antichrist, or, alternatively, as a positive messianic figure (an embodiment of King David). Drawing on Western millenarian thought, this Davidic image could be imbued with prophetic import and with a positive sense of dynamism that actively encouraged the instauration of Russian society. Thus, with this in mind, religion and esotericism become key components of the Petrine reform programme, rather than simply being perceived as relics of a bygone era rigorously discarded by Peter the Great. Hence, it is extremely useful to undertake a study of Peter the Great and a number of his closest foreign advisers and officials in light of notions of Christian-scientific renewal, which bear distinct similarities to the religious and intellectual spirit of Kuhlmann. These plans not only encompassed Christian belief, but also drew on Hermeticism, Neo-Platonism and other esoteric pursuits, including most notably alchemy and astrology.

However, it is still customary to exempt Peter the Great and the Petrine Court from such influences, despite the evidence revealing the extent to which millenarian sentiment fused with elements of esotericism in the upper echelons of Western European society at the turn of the eighteenthcentury. This is all the more surprising if one considers how O. A. Belobrova and Aleksandr Gorfunkel have provided tantalizing glimpses into the chiliastic and esoteric worldviews of two relatively minor government officials in early Petrine Russia.

In 1978, Belobrova published the aesthetic works of N. G. Milescu-Spafarios (1636–1708), a Romanian nobleman who settled in Moscow in 1671.39 During his years in Russia Milescu-Spafarios combined roles as a government chancellery official and a translator, with that of a notable scholar. The subject matter of his works reveal a man obsessed with ancient prophecy. He wrote a tract on the Sybilline Oracles, for example, in which he contemplated their names and number and the meaning of their prophecies. What is more, in Krismologion he wrote about the four ancient monarchies, beginning with Daniel's prophetic words regarding King Nebuchadnezzar.

Significantly, Milescu-Spafarios was patronized by a number of leading supporters of the Naryshkin family. Most notably, the prominent boyar Artamon Sergeevich Matveev (1625–1682) employed Milescu-Spafarios as a private tutor to himself and his son, Andrei Artamonovich Matveev (1666–1728). Indeed, Artamon Matveev's enemies orchestrated his fall from power after the death of Tsar Aleksei in 1676 by claiming that MilescuSpafarios read a 'black book' to him and his son in a concealed room.

In addition, over several decades the Russian émigré scholar Aleksandr Gorfunkel has illustrated how the Pole Andrei (Jan) Belobotskii (c. 1640s– c. 1700s) played an important role in disseminating mystical literature in Russia that emanated from Western Europe. Belobotskii had undertaken studies in the philosophical and theological sciences in France, Italy and Spain in the 1660s and 1670s, prior to arriving in Moscow in 1681 in the retinue of Simeon, the Archbishop of Smolensk. When in Moscow Belobotskii converted to Orthodoxy and took the name Andrei and succeeded in securing the patronage of two influential courtiers – Petr Matveevich Apraksin and Fedor Iakovlevich Volynskii – both of whom were close to the Naryshkin party of Peter the Great. Belobotskii's

patronage by two courtiers close to Peter the Great provides an early illustration of how esoterically-minded individuals were actively endorsed in early Petrine Russia. It is also known that Belobotskii worked as a translator in the Posol'skii Prikaz in the 1680s and participated in an Embassy to China under the leadership of Fedor Alekseevich Golovin.

Little other biographical information is known about Belobotskii apart from the fact that he was the first figure to translate a series of seminal mystical and esoteric tracts into Russian, including Thomas à Kempis's Imitation of Christ and Ramon Lull's Ars Magna and Ars Brevis. Belobotskii's translations of Lull are known to have circulated widely among Old Believer sects at the turn of the century. This was largely due to the standing of one of their foremost leaders, Andrei Denisov (1674–1730), of the Vyg community near Olonets in Northern Russia, who even prepared his own illustrated version of Belobotskii's translation of Lull's Ars Magna. Contrary to the stereotype of Old Believers simply being narrow-minded obscurantists, Denisov was a learned man who sought out theological and philosophical literature and was a skilled polemicist. His knowledge of esoteric forms of religion is even testified in the hagiographical account of his Zhitie (Life), written in the late eighteenth century. This Zhitie proclaimed that "God gifted him with the most precious talents," which in addition to a knowledge of rhetoric, poetry, logic, grammar and art included "Cabbalistic philosophy."

Denisov's interest in esotericism was combined with a fervent belief that Patriarch Nikon's church reforms in the 1650s and 1660s had initiated, as Robert Crummey notes, "the first act in the apocalyptic drama described by St. John the Divine and St. Cyril of Jerusalem." Thus, whilst not believing that Peter the Great was the Antichrist, as many Old Believers did at the time, Denisov did view contemporary events within a wholly eschatological framework.

At this point it is also worth referring to the important contribution of the Belorussian cleric Simeon Polotskii (c. 1629–1680), and his followers (Sil'vestr Medvedev and Karion Istomin), who brought a potent form of Baroque symbolism to the Muscovite court in the last decades of the seventeenth century. As L. I. Sazonova has outlined, Polotskii and his followers developed an abstruse, religiously infused form of allegorical symbolism that heavily drew on the mystical ideas of Polish Catholicism in the seventeenth century. This Baroque symbolism was saturated with religious and esoteric themes, and, as will be argued in this study, continued to exert a powerful hold on the highest ecclesiastical officials in eighteenth-century Petrine Russia and on the mindset of Peter the Great himself.

Lastly, it should be noted that David Zdenek, in an article on the influence of Jakob Böhme in Russia, mentions that a Pietist by the name of Johann Kellner arrived in Moscow in 1690, with plans for a religious community based on Böhme's principles. What is more, Zdenek writes that a number of manuscript copies of work by both Böhme and Kuhlmann were preserved in Russia after Kuhlmann's death.

The dearth of scholarly work on the religious and esoteric interests of Peter the Great and prominent officials at the Petrine court is unsurprising if one considers the long history of portraying the Russian monarch as a progressive embodiment of the early enlightenment ideals of rationalism and secularism. Until the failed Decembrist Revolt in 1825 and the ascension to the throne of the authoritarian Nicholas I (1796–1855), for example, the image of Peter the Great was predominantly one of an enlightened despot who heralded the arrival of scientific knowledge and the 'Age of Reason' throughout the Russian Empire. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the poetry, odes and orations of Russia's greatest eighteenth-century polymath, Mikhail Lomonosov (1711–1765). A

fine example is found in his "Laudatory Oration to Lord Emperor Peter the Great of the Blessed Memory, Pronounced on the Twenty-Sixth Day of April of the Year 1755," at the Imperial Academy of Sciences:

Our most wise Monarch foresaw that it was strictly necessary for His great intentions that knowledge of all kinds spread in the fatherland and that people skilled in the high sciences and also artist and craftsmen multiply there . . . Then the Mathematical and Physical science, formerly considered magic and sorcery, received reverent respect . . . What good the sciences and the arts of all sorts, surrounded by this radiance of majesty, brought us is proved by the overabundant mass of our multivaried satisfactions, which our ancestors, before the great Enlightener of Russia, not only had lacked, but of which in many cases they even had no idea.In 1872, Sergei Mikhailovich Solov'ev delivered a lecture to commemorate the bicentenary of Peter the Great's birth. Among his many words of praise, he remarked that "a great man appears as the son of his time." By this he meant that Peter the Great embodied the 'new' age of enlightenment,

in which belief in the significance of superstition, chance and arbitrariness had been overcome. This view had been commonplace for over a century when Solov'ev made his speech. Indeed, here it was necessary to create such polarities where, as Gary Marker has noted, secularization, enlightenment and progress were championed against religion, reaction and backwardness.

Riasanovsky describes the historical approach towards Peter the Great and the Petrine era in the period between 1860 and 1917 in Russia, as led by "the decline of metaphysics" and the rise of "scientific history." This is epitomized by the so-called Moscow University School, led by Solov'ev, which also included V. O. Kliuchevskii, P. N. Miliukov and M. M. Bogoslovskii. Kliuchevskii, in particular, developed the argument that Petrine reforms were merely the result of day-to-day necessities and "were stimulated by the requirement of war." Thus, whilst he provides a vivid descriptive account of the loutish and drunken behaviour of Peter the Great, he still maintains, as Lindsey Hughes puts it, "that Peter spelled Progress."

Even the Slavophile movement, which began to flourish in the 1830s, did not seek to fundamentally revise the historiography of Peter the Great and the Petrine era. The elements extolled by 'Westernizers' – secularization, enlightenment and progress – were merely denigrated, and notions of religion, backwardness and reaction were championed in the guise of a true national heritage. As Romanticists, they harked back to the supposedly authentic nature of pre-Petrine Rus. They did not seek, however, to broaden their perception of the emperor or his reforms; they merely sought to cast the individual and the era as a whole in a negative hue for their own rhetorical purposes. In many ways this negation of the Petrine myth was continued, and even deepened by Fyodor Dostoevskii in the 1860s and 1870s. In Notes from the Underground (1864) and Crime and Punishment (1866), for example, St. Petersburg, the crowning jewel in the Petrine myth, is portrayed as a poisonous and rancid city. The reforms engendered by Peter the Great were based on a Western model, and led to the disintegration of Russia's identity and faith symbolized by the artificial and alien atmosphere of its imperial capital. This notion was carried into the twentieth-century by the great writer of the Silver Age, Andrei Belyi, and can be seen most vividly in his prose masterpiece, Petersburg (1916).

In the post-revolutionary era, the merits of 'scientific history' continued to be extolled within a Marxist framework. In his Brief History of Russia (1920), for example, M. N. Pokrovskii sees the forces of economics as the determining factor in Petrine reform. He is contemptuous of any notion of a pedagogical enlightenment based on theological assumptions. After the Second World War, Soviet historians of the Petrine era became more balanced in their appraisals of the socio-political transformations, but remained dismissive or blinkered to the relevance and import of theological, let alone esoteric, matters. Nikolai Pavlenko, for example, has produced a volume of work on the Petrine era that is rich in fact and anecdote but the author does not address the theological and intellectual climate of the age. This can also be seen in the works of Sergei Luppov and M. S. Fillipov in their surveys of book publications and collections in the eighteenth century.

One of the most recent proponents of the 'progressive' school of thought is Aleksandr Kiriukhin. He argues that whilst Russia needed specialists and educated people in various areas of military and civilian life, it was hampered by an educational system that carried a 'divine character.' This, in his view, could not satisfy the demands of the new state, led by Peter the Great. Thus, according to Kiriukhin, advocacy of a thorough grounding in the Old and New Testaments was simply replaced by the study of fortification, artillery and shipbuilding.

A number of Western academics have also interpreted the Petrine transformations solely from a secular and rationalist perspective. In so doing, they simultaneously underplay the role of religion. This stance is characterized by M. S. Anderson:

> In a limited way Peter was a religious man . . . His faith lacked both psychological depth and intellectual subtlety . . . His personal faith was real. But it was also narrow and above all practical . . . To him religion meant morality, education, positive action.

This 'limited' religious worldview did involve, however, believing that he was an agent of God's will. Thus, Anderson acknowledges religion as part of Peter's everyday life on the one hand, whilst downplaying its significance on the other.

In the past twenty years, however, a number of scholars have sought to chip away at the enlightened and rational model of Peter the Great that has been erected and reinforced by generations of Russian and Western historians. In doing so, they have begun to modify the one-dimensional image of Peter the Great by revealing long hidden complexities in the tsar's religious worldview.

In his fascinating study of the artistic representation of spatial dynamics in St. Petersburg, for example, Grigorii Kaganov notes how Peter the Great's new capital was imagined as a New Jerusalem during a ceremony to mark the unveiling of Aleksei Zubov's Panorama of Petersburg (1716). This astute observation uncovered a potent and intriguing religious dimension at the very heart of "rational" St. Petersburg.

In his study of eighteenth-century paradise myths in Russian literature, Stephen Baehr also brings the role of religion to the fore. He demonstrates how a process of appropriating religious concepts, vocabulary and symbols for state institutions was enacted up to fifty years prior to the Ecclesiastical Regulation published by Feofan Prokopovich in 1721. According to Baehr, however, these theological motifs were utilized for the benefit of the secular state and do not in themselves represent a religious ideal.

The comprehensive study of the Petrine age by Lindsey Hughes and her biographical study of Peter the Great are also much more receptive to the influence of religion. She casts doubt on the validity of adopting a strictly bipolar approach and rejects what she calls the "religious = bad and backward" and "secular = good and progressive" interpretation, characteristic of many Soviet writers: "But did individuals really have to make a stark choice between secular and sacred, between the traditional and the new culture, a sort of religious decision, binding a man for his whole life?" She answers this by stating that religious culture maintained a powerful hold on everyday life and behaviour at all levels throughout Peter's reign. Moreover, she notes that Peter and his supporters had no problem combining the sacred and the profane. What is more, Elena Pogosian has illustrated the key role religion continued to play in Peter the Great's new calendar of public and civic events.

More recently, Ernest A. Zitzser, in his study of the carnivalesque activities of Peter the Great's long-running mock court – the so-called Most Comical All Drunken Council – has powerfully demonstrated how Peter the Great's supposedly 'secular' reforms actually stemmed from a religious conception of his political mission. Zitser draws on the original JudaeoChristian notion of charisma, or gift of grace, which expressed the idea that God conveyed grace and authority through divine inspiration to the Old Testament prophets and the House of David. Zitser uses this understanding of charisma to demonstrate how Peter the Great sought to invest his rule with divine authority.

However, whereas one can note a revision in recent years vis-à-vis Peter the Great's religious mindset, scant scholarly attention has been paid to the relationship between science, religion and esotericism in Russia for the period under discussion. This is unsurprising considering the way in which science was enthusiastically championed as a bastion of secular process. It was commonly assumed that the rational and enlightened basis of science had liberated it from supposedly 'backward' and 'superstitious' remnants of the past, such as the occult practices of alchemy, astrology, prophecy and mystical Cabbala. This is epitomized by Alexander Vucinich, when he states the following in his history of science in Russian culture: "Peter lived in another age – an age that had gone beyond elementary scientific knowledge and demanded an extensive secularization of both the search for and the distribution of knowledge." This sentiment is shared by Valentin Boss, in his study on the influence of Newtonian thought in Russia between 1698 and 1796, when he argues that the secular state became the guardian of a 'new science' during Peter the Great's reign:

> In Russia the "new science" was often regarded as an alternate faith. This in fact is what it eventually came to represent once the revolutionary implications of the Petrine reforms were realised . . . Having crushed the autonomy of the Church, the new secular state that Peter built became the official protector of science, and Newton its undeclared patron saint.

According to Boss, this 'new science,' epitomized by Newton, was an alternate faith devoid of any sense of religious or esoteric motivation. It was simply a progressive and secular movement disassociated from all vestiges of an 'old' religious mentality and superstitious beliefs.

Moreover, in his lengthy work dedicated to magic in Russia, W. F. Ryan states that "Peter's practicality belonged more to the Enlightenment than to the seventeenth-century." Thus, while Ryan recognizes that 'occult interests' were present at the courts of Peter the Great's father, Tsar Aleksei, and his half-sister, the Regent Sophia, he adds that "there is no evidence that these subjects interested him as anything more than offences against good order and manifestations of discontent." Ryan effectively divides the history of magic at the Russian court into the classic pre and post-Petrine periods, thereby accepting the notion that Peter the Great ushered in a Kuhnian paradigm shift.

Hence, whereas Ryan acknowledges the presence of many Western alchemists and astrologers at the Russian court during much of the seventeenth-century, this tradition suddenly ceased on the accession of Peter the Great.

In Russia there still remains a scarcity of serious literature on the history of esotericism within the country. The most comprehensive work remains the study by B. E. Raikov on the history of the heliocentric worldview in Russia, which was initially published in 1937. Whilst not a study of esotericism per se, Raikov's work contains particularly valuable information on astrological pursuits in Early Modern Muscovy. There are only two modern studies of alchemy in the Russian language. Both are by V. L. Rabinovich and the texts broach the subject without reference to alchemy as a phenomenon existing in Russian cultural history. Rabinovich also views alchemy as a medieval phenomenon, thereby divorcing it from the development of science that was taking place in the early modern period. Timofei Rainov's general history of Russian science up to the seventeenth century briefly mentions alchemy but it does not warrant an entry in the index. V. K. Kuzakov's essay on the development of natural science in Russia between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries is marginally more expansive. He observes that Albertus Magnus, Ramon Lull and Michael Scott were known in Russia by the seventeenth century but then fails to comment further on the matter.

In essence the general consensus among both Russian and Western historians is that the combination of religious mysticism, esotericism and the advancement of the sciences only seriously penetrated into elements of Russian society during the reign of Catherine the Great (r. 1762–1796). This accords with the supposed introduction of Rosicrucian ideas via various esoterically minded Masonic groups amongst which the Muscovite circle led by Nikolai Novikov (1744–1818), the prominent publisher and satirist, was the most important. However, without dismissing the importance of these groups in the latter half of the eighteenth century in disseminating mystical, eschatological and esoteric views close to Rosicrucianism, I believe one can look to the Petrine court for an earlier penetration of such a potent mix of ideals.

At present one normally only encounters reference to esotericism at the Petrine court in the various brief descriptions of a secretive 'Neptune Society' that convened at the Sukharev Tower in Moscow, which was the home of the Moscow School of Mathematics and Navigation founded in 1701. F. Veselago recorded one of the first known descriptions of such a 'Neptune Society' in 1852, when he noted:

> There exists another legend, that in the Sukharev Tower there were meetings of some kind of society of "Neptune", where were represented Lefort, the tsar himself as overseer, Feofan Prokopovich as orator; other members were Menshikov, Apraksin, Bruce, Farquharson, Prince Cherkaskii, Golitsin and several other grandees close to the tsar.

He then goes on to refer to a popular legend in which it was assumed that the Sukharev Tower contained within its walls a 'black book,' subsequently set in a wall, which guards twelve spirits.

Various subsequent Russian historians supplied a Masonic dimension to these legends, without ever broadening their studies to engage the intellectual and religious climate of the Petrine court. In the 1860s, for example, M. N. Longinov recounted a tale whereby Peter was said to have brought a Masonic statute back to Russia after his European Tour in 1717. This statute supposedly gave Peter the authority to found a lodge and according to Longinov this may have been founded on the island of Kronstadt.

A. I. Pypin added to Longinov's Masonic legends in his history of Russian Freemasonry in the eighteenth century. In Pypin's history, more legends are drawn on to connect Peter the Great with Freemasonry. In addition to Longinov's legend relating to 1717, Pypin discusses a legend that Christopher Wren (1632–1723), the famed English architect and polymath, actually initiated the tsar into Freemasonry. This allegedly took place in 1698 during Peter's residence in England. Pypin also discusses the so-called 'Neptune Society,' and lists Franz Lefort as the chairman, Patrick Gordon (1635–1699) as first overseer, and Peter the Great as second overseer. Reference is also made to the fact that later in the eighteenth century Russian Freemasons were known to sing G. R. Derzhavin's Pesni Petru Velikomu (Song to Peter the Great) and to revere his name at lodges. P. F. Vernadskii, in his pre-revolutionary account of Russian Freemasonry, also reiterates legends surrounding the 'Neptune Society' and the initiation of Peter the Great as a Freemason.

One other significant legend, recited by the émigré writer Tatiana Bakounine in 1940, describes how one of the tsar's chief lieutenants in the 1690s, Franz Lefort (1656–1699), was initiated as a Mason whilst in Holland on the Grand Embassy in 1697 or 1698. She also retells the legend about Peter the Great being admitted to the Masonic Order by Christopher Wren in London and explains how the first lodges in Russia were founded by Scotsmen: Patrick Gordon and Jacob Bruce.

In recent years the Masonic legends surrounding Peter the Great and his court have frequently been cited and often dismissed but have never been thoroughly investigated. Nor have they been placed in the wider European intellectual and cultural context in which religious and esoteric currents of thought created the milieu for Freemasonry to prosper. Thus we find Douglas Smith, in his history of Russian Freemasonry, briefly referring to nocturnal gatherings of the so-called 'Neptune Society' at the Sukharev Tower. He qualifies this by stating that it is unclear what transpired at these meetings. Anthony Cross also draws attention to the tales surrounding the 'Neptune Society' but argues that any links between Peter the Great and Freemasonry were "essentially the creation of later generations of Russian Freemasons who were known to sing Derzhavin's 'Song to Peter the Great' at their lodges."

It is undoubtedly true that many of the legends surrounding Freemasonry and the Petrine court are in some cases highly speculative in nature and in others blatantly ridiculous. However, this is not a study seeking to authenticate or deny the various legends surrounding Peter the Great and his circle; rather it is an attempt to analyse the religious, philosophical and scientific worldviews of four high-placed foreign servitors to Peter the Great – Jacob Bruce (1669–1735), Robert Erskine (1677–1718), Stefan Iavorskii (1658–1722) and Feofan Prokopovich (1681–1736) – in an effort to determine the extent to which religious (principally millenarian) and esoteric ideas regarding a scientific reformation informed their political activity during their years of service to Peter the Great. By analyzing the personal contributions of these individuals to the reforms undertaken during the Petrine era, I will also seek to determine whether their activity informed the policies of the tsar himself, and, if so, the extent to which Peter the Great shared their outlooks.

However, whilst this work focuses on four particular foreign servitors, it should be categorically stated that more research needs to be undertaken on the religious and esoteric worldviews of a host of other figures at the court of Peter the Great. In other words, it is necessary to view Bruce, Erskine, Iavorskii and Prokopovich as illustrative examples of a wider phenomenon, and not merely as the sole purveyors of a limited trend at the Petrine court. In this regard, one can point to the notable astrological interests of Boris Ivanovich Kurakin (1676–1727), who enjoyed a glittering

diplomatic career in Paris, The Hague and London in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, as well as serving Peter the Great as the commander of the Semenovskii Regiment during the Battle of Poltava in 1709. Among his archival papers, for example, one finds a written horoscope, entitled Latitude of Planets, which relates directly to Kurakin's own life. His autobiographical Vita also follows in the tradition of astrological diaries, such as those written by Marsilio Ficino and Giorlamo Cardano, which ruminate on the influence of celestial factors on the body and temperament.

Moreover, one can point to a coterie of Russian officials at the Petrine court, about whom little is presently known regarding their religious and philosophical outlook, yet who display an interest in aspects of Western esotericism. In particular one thinks of the prominent diplomat Andrei Artamonovich Matveev, and the tsar's close associate Prince Dmitrii Mikhailovich Golitsyn (1665–1737). In terms of foreign servitors, one especially thinks of the Genevan Calvinist Franz Lefort, the Catholic Scot Patrick Gordon and the Dutch convert to Orthodoxy Andrei Andreevich Vinius (1641–1717). This triumvirate of foreign officials played a pivotal role in Peter the Great's formative years, yet little is known about them beyond their official military or government duties.

The first part of my book will concentrate on two of the most prominent foreign servitors during the pivotal first two decades of the eighteenth-century: Jacob Bruce and Robert Erskine. Remarkably both emanated from esteemed Scottish families in Clackmannanshire with strong links to the Stuart monarchy and the Jacobite cause. When studying these two figures, I believe an understanding and awareness of Freemasonry, with its religious and scientific foundations, can help to shed new light not only on their individual worldviews but also on the symbolic and intellectual landscape of Petrine Russia as a whole. This is particularly true when one considers the developments that have been made over the past eighteen years in the academic study of Scottish Freemasonry, led by David Stevenson who has drawn attention to its sixteenth-century origins. However, he also places the development within a wider European context in which the occult sciences were to the fore of experimental inquiry.

The implications of Stevenson's work have a direct impact on the study of Petrine Russia as Peter the Great surrounded himself with a plethora of Scottish Jacobites at the heart of the Russian court. The first notable Scottish Jacobite at Peter the Great's court was General Patrick Gordon. Yet whilst Gordon played a crucial role in Peter the Great's early years as Russian monarch, his death in 1699 meant that his role in government affairs never went beyond military concerns. Consequently, this study will concentrate on examining Jacob Bruce and Robert Erskine, both of whom became pivotal figures in Peter's drive to reform Russia in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. In my opinion it is important to bear in mind the mystical and esoteric hallmarks of Scottish Jacobite Freemasonry when studying the worldviews of these two Jacobite supporters.

However, the overall aim of the first part of this study – comprising the chapters on Bruce and Erskine – is not to reveal Masonic influence at the Petrine court, but to examine how these two senior figures at the Petrine court were fascinated in strands of Western esotericism and elements of mystical and chiliastic religiosity. This is of considerable import as they were both instrumental in shaping the development of Russian science during the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Consequently, if one can observe distinct religious and esoteric elements in their respective scientific worldviews, the foundation of Russian science – commonly perceived as a grand exercise in implementing progressive embodiments of rational and enlightened thought – needs to be re-evaluated.

In methodological terms, the first part of the study draws extensively on the private library collections of both Bruce and Erskine in order to examine their particular worldviews. Historians have largely ignored these valuable sources, which provide a unique insight into the mindsets of two of Petrine Russia's most prominent foreign servitors. Admittedly the library collections on their own would only allow a partial view into the intellectual makeup of these two figures. However, in combination with an examination of a wide variety of source material including correspondence, medical notes and prints – outlined below – it is the aim of the first part of this book to reveal fresh perspectives on these two underestimated statesmen.

The first chapter will concentrate on a study of Jacob Bruce who, although born in Moscow, was descended on his father's side from the Bruces of Clackmannan in Scotland. Bruce was one of the highest-ranking military officials in Petrine Russia as well as being at the head of Russian industry and mining and at the forefront of Russian printing. He was one of the leading diplomats in Petrine Russia and was at the head of the Russian delegation at the peace talks with Sweden on the Åland Islands in 1718–1719 and at Nystad (now known as Uusikaupunki) in Finland in 1721. Bruce was also a man esteemed for his great learning and has been called Russia's first Newtonian. He actively participated in the development of science in Petrine Russia, yet his monumental achievements have not been viewed in light of his deep religious and esoteric interests. I will argue that without such a perspective one cannot fully appreciate Bruce's contribution to Russian culture and society.

In attempting to highlight Bruce's attraction to various branches of esotericism and by stressing his strong religious outlook, I hope to illustrate how these interests were allowed to flourish at the court of Peter the Great. I will endeavour to achieve this by utilizing a wide variety of source material. The personal library of Bruce – originally amounting to over 1500 tomes – provides a valuable source in order to gain an insight into the Russo-Scot's worldview, and it has surprisingly received little scholarly attention. A profusion of alchemical and other assorted esoteric texts can be detected in what remains of this collection and provide a rich and valuable source for historians. The extensive catalogue of Bruce's private cabinet of curiosities also constitutes an invaluable source for historians seeking to understand the statesman's specific scientific interests.

In conjunction with the above sources I will also extensively draw on the so-called Bruce Calendars, published between 1709–1715, which were closely associated with Jacob Bruce. These astrological-astronomical publications illustrate the strong link between Bruce's private interests in esotericism and his willingness to promote such a worldview as the director of the Civil Typographers. In addition, I will also cite Bruce's involvement with various mathematical and scientific publications in order to illustrate the extent to which religion still played a central role in his worldview. Archival sources will also be utilized to trace Bruce's Scottish ancestry and Jacobite links. Bruce's travel itinerary when he was resident in London in 1698 will also be consulted, as well as correspondence he undertook on scientific (particularly chemical) matters. Lastly, I will cite various oral legends that circulated widely in popular Russian culture in the centuries after Bruce's death in 1735. By drawing on these sources, as well as citing contemporary European parallels, I hope to reveal a new side to Bruce's outstanding legacy to Russian society, which was actively infused by religious and esoteric notions.

The second chapter of this study will undertake a long overdue reevaluation of the prominent role of Robert Erskine in Petrine Russia. He was not only the tsar's personal physician but was also the chief medical officer in Russia, the founder of the St. Petersburg botanical garden, overseer of the

kunstkamera, a State Councillor and an unofficial diplomat. He was a man of great learning – he became a Fellow of The Royal Society in 1703 – and descended from an extremely prominent Scottish family from Alva in Clackmannanshire with intimate connections with the Stuart dynasty and intriguing links to mystical, heraldic and Masonic thought. Thus, rather suggestively the families of both Bruce and Erskine emanated from Scotland's smallest county – highlighting the interconnected and clannish world of Scottish Jacobitism.

In seeking to reveal Erskine's immersion in esotericism and religion, I will also draw on the Scotsman's personal library. In doing so I aim to reveal Erskine's deep and learned interest in all aspects of esoteric and mystical thought. Erskine's astonishing library collection – amounting to over 2,300 tomes – has remained an almost entirely untapped source. A study of its esoteric and religious content – especially of its huge collection of Paracelsian, Rosicrucian and alchemical texts – in tandem with new insights into his Jacobite family background, his educational training and his adoption of iatrochemical techniques whilst serving Peter the Great can throw a considerable amount of new light onto this remarkable figure.

In terms of his links to the Jacobite movement, I will draw on his private correspondence with close family members, which not only reveals Erskine's key role within the wide network of Jacobite agents on the European Continent, but also strongly hints at a Masonic dimension to the clandestine association of disaffected Stuart sympathizers. I will also draw on archival sources to highlight the influence of the chemical philosophers Jacob Le Mort (1650–1718) and Johann Conrad Barchusen (1666– 1723) in shaping what I argue to be Erskine's iatrochemical approach to medicine, which he came to embrace during his years at university in Paris and Utrecht. This iatrochemical approach was still common at the turn of the eighteenth century in European medicine and, as the name suggests, was based on a chemical approach to medicine that drew heavily on the alchemical theories of Paracelsus (1493–1541) and Jan Baptista van Helmont. Medical notes and correspondence dating from Erskine's time in Russia will also be used to reveal his iatrochemical approach to medicine, which remained open to esoteric influences. What is more, I will also study the extent to which medicine remained tied to astrological predictions during Erskine's tenure as the leading medical figure in Russia. This will be carried out by examining the manner in which state sponsored annual calendars, including those overseen by Jacob Bruce, continued to advocate medical treatments according to astrological conditions.

Furthermore, in addition to consulting archival material directly related to Erskine, I will also study the medical and religious opinions of his close associates in London, such as George Cheyne and Richard Mead, prior to his departure for Russia. By examining their worldviews, I hope to illustrate how Erskine was far from being on the fringes of accepted medical practice at the turn of the eighteenth century.

Whereas the first part of the study will concentrate on two Scottish figures, the second part will focus on two Ukrainian clerical figures – Stefan Iavorskii (1658–1722) and Feofan Prokopovich (1681–1736) – who were undoubtedly the most important ecclesiastical figures in Petrine Russia. Both Iavorskii and Prokopovich displayed a distinct form of erudition acquired from their mutual training at the Kiev Academy and at various Jesuit institutions. The influence of Simeon Polotskii's baroque panegyrical style is evident in both clerics and is testament to its continuing importance in Petrine Russia, yet they ultimately expressed their debt to their predecessor by developing their learning in different (and sometimes opposing) ways. In essence Iavorskii remained closer to the

legacy of Polotskii, who espoused the power of "fast flowing type." Prokopovich, on the other hand, sought to extend his influence beyond the page and envisaged sweeping educational reforms based largely on the Pietist model of August Hermann Francke.

Yet, in spite of their diverging theological worldviews, both figures not only worked within the clerical realm but also played key roles in forwarding the Petrine vision. In this manner, their contribution to the reforms enacted by Peter the Great – particularly Prokopovich – far exceeded their official responsibilities as church officials. Thus, it is of great significance that both of these figures were steeped in knowledge of chiliastic, mystical and esoteric thought.

The third chapter will focus on the striking sermons of Stefan Iavorskii who between 1701–1722 was the de facto head of the Russian Orthodox Church. Whilst Iavorskii was a fierce rival of Prokopovich and displayed none of the latter's interest in Pietism and experimental science, it would be a mistake to assume that he did not display distinct signs of a mystical and esoteric outlook. In fact, as this chapter will demonstrate, if one undertakes a close study of his numerous sermons one can discern the startling use of apocalyptic themes, Jewish Merkavah mysticism and various strands of esoteric thought – particularly astrology and strong elements of a Cabbalistic emphasis on the significance of names and numbers.

Crucially, the use of such themes was utilized to extol the reign of Peter the Great and to champion the reforms the tsar was making to the Russian state. Thus, in his own highly distinctive manner, Iavorskii served the cause of Petrine Russia. He principally did this by formulating a panegyrical style that actively drew on the deep reservoir of Christian mysticism and esotericism inherent in elements of seventeenth-century Jesuitism. Iavorskii's familiarity with this vein of seventeenth-century religious mysticism will be illustrated by referring to the large presence of such literature in his sizeable private library collection.

The fourth chapter will focus on Feofan Prokopovich, who was in effect the chief religious propagandist of the Petrine era and as Archbishop of Pskov and Novgorod commanded considerable ecclesiastical authority. Prokopovich displayed a breadth of knowledge and susceptibility to scientific inquiry and Protestantism early in his career when he began teaching at the Kiev Academy in 1704. This open-minded and broad outlook, unrivalled among ecclesiastical figures in Petrine Russia, ensured his success at the Court of Peter the Great. He was a master of the panegyric and was the author of the Ecclesiastic Regulation (1721), which not only transformed the Russian Orthodox Church, but also the entire Russian educational system. Though scholars have noted his inclination for mathematical and scientific pursuits and for Protestantism, the extent to which this was framed by elements of Christian Neo-Platonism and German Pietism has not been fully explored. What is more, the scale of Prokopovich's interest in millenarianism, Hebraism and esoteric subject matter has not been addressed.

In order to illustrate the extent to which Prokopovich infused his worldview with the above elements, I will undertake an in-depth examination of the cleric's religious and scientific writings. In terms of theological literature, special attention will be paid to the series of tracts written by Prokopovich between 1712–1716, when he was still resident in Kiev.

These tracts represent Prokopovich's most complete articulation of his theological system and are consequently a vital means of understanding one of Russia's most influential clergymen and thinkers. The fullest exposition of Prokopovich's scientific beliefs can be found in his lengthy Natural

Philosophy, or Physics (1708), and consequently I will devote considerable attention to this key work. In seeking to understand Prokopovich's attitude to religion and science, these works provide an invaluable source, yet have not attracted the scholarly attention they merit.

The same applies to Prokpovich's private library, containing over 3000 tomes, which provides a largely unexamined source that is fruitful for the scholar wishing to explore the multifaceted nature of Prokopovich's worldview. The above-cited Ecclesiastic Regulation will also be studied in order to illustrate Prokopovich's debt to German Pietism, alongside the rules formulated by the cleric for his own school on the outskirts of St. Petersburg. The selection of relevant pieces of Prokopovich's correspondence, which variously highlight his eschatological mindset and his close links to Pietism, will further demonstrate the cleric's religious worldview.

After illustrating how key figures at the Petrine court embraced religion and esotericism as a means to enact reform, the third part of my study will place the spotlight on Peter the Great himself. Chapter Five will concentrate on examining how Peter the Great's attempt to reform Russia was consciously represented as a providential mission. In particular, it will be argued that Davidic motifs played a pivotal role in framing perceptions of Peter the Great. This will be illustrated by drawing on a series of official sermons, in which the Davidic theme is heavily utilized to place Peter the Great's actions within a Biblical framework. Other primary sources, such as memoirs and correspondence will also be studied in order to reveal the extent to which the Russian monarch wished others to perceive his actions in Davidic terms. Visual sources depicting Peter the Great in a Davidic guise, such as bas-reliefs, sculptures and personal seals, will also be examined in order to highlight the all-encompassing nature of the Biblical parallel.

The focus on Davidic themes will be followed by a section concentrating on the prophetic significance attached to the victorious Nystad Peace of August 1721, which ended the Great Northern War with Sweden. A particular emphasis will be placed on revealing the concerted attempt made by the authorities to stress the divinely governed length of the war. Moreover, an examination of the manner in which motifs connected to Noah and his Ark were utilized will be carried out. It will be argued that this imagery was adopted in order to stress the fact that God had granted the Russian monarch and his people a new dispensation after the deluge of war. Once again a variety of primary sources will be analyzed, including official sermons and a selection of visual sources used at the official celebrations, such as commemorative medals, panel displays and the spectacular use of Peter the Great's first boat.

The final section of Chapter Five will focus on the remarkable manner in which St. Petersburg was envisaged as the embodiment of New Jerusalem, as prophesized in the Book of Revelation. It will be argued that the concerted campaign to portray Peter the Great as a 'New David' went hand in hand with St. Petersburg being perceived as the 'New Jerusalem.' In a sense the two motifs were inseparable. If Peter the Great was indeed a 'New David' then his new northern capital could be nothing less than a 'New Zion' inhabited by God's chosen people.

Such an interpretation runs counter to conventional thinking vis-à-vis St. Petersburg as the embodiment of rational and enlightened thinking. Yet by drawing on Peter the Great's personal correspondence, official sermons, maps, architectural features and officially sanctioned foundation myths, the vital role New Jerusalem motifs played in legitimizing the new capital on the shores of the Gulf of Finland will be demonstrated.

The final chapter will emphasize the influence of religion and esotericism on Peter the Great's scientific vision. More specifically, it will be argued that the notion of instauration played a key role in shaping the manner in which Peter the Great sought to implement scientific and educational reforms. The opening section of the chapter will focus on analyzing the scientific proposals presented to Peter the Great by Francis Lee and Gottfried Leibniz. It will be stressed that both plans were heavily indebted to a religious notion of the advancement of learning, which were open to esoteric influences.

The second part of the chapter will then move on to a study of how Peter the Great enthusiastically developed the St. Petersburg Kunstkamera as both a temple and laboratory dedicated to the advancement of knowledge. I will argue that it can be viewed as the last of the great kunstkammers of Renaissance Europe and as a symbol of Russia's divinely ordained instauration. It will be demonstrated how the tsar's attitude towards this institution bore all the hallmarks of a monarch profoundly intrigued by – and curious in – the secrets of God's divine creation. Such an argument will be advanced by citing the tsar's personal correspondence as well as his official decrees. Official reports on missions undertaken to purchase and study curiosities across Europe will also be studied, along with catalogues describing the contents of the St. Petersburg Kunstkamera. What is more, contemporary descriptions of the burgeoning kunstkamera and its exhibits will also be cited to illustrate the particular nature of the tsar's newly founded establishment. Lastly, the religious beliefs of contemporary collectors – particularly in the Dutch Republic – will be analyzed in order to demonstrate the continued theological dimension inherent in a great number of European cabinets of curiosities.

In the final section of the chapter an examination of the esoteric inclinations of Peter the Great will be undertaken, with a particular emphasis being placed on astrology, alchemy and his profound fascination with perpetual motions machines. First, in terms of the tsar's stance towards astrology, I will examine personal notes and correspondence, alongside his official promotion of state calendars replete with astrological predictions,

in order to illustrate his penchant for this esoteric science. Secondly, the tsar's approach to alchemy will be assessed by studying his travel itineraries in Western Europe, contemporary memoirs and announcements and by examining alchemical literature present in his personal library collection. Lastly, the tsar's fascination with perpetual motion machines will be highlighted by citing extensively from correspondence, official decrees, official reports and from a contemporary account by a military officer in Russian service.

Jacob Bruce (1669–1735): A Scientific Sorcerer at the Court of Peter the Great

On the death of Peter the Great in January 1725 the formidable task of organizing the funeral arrangements was given to Jacob Bruce. In effect Bruce had been entrusted with coordinating the symbolic encapsulation of the Petrine legacy in the funeral ceremony and the official period of mourning. This duty was carried out with aplomb, combining religious and secular imagery that championed the wondrous feats undertaken by the monarch for the benefit of the Russian state. A fine example of this mixture of the religious and the secular can be seen in the decoration of the Hall of Mourning, which was resplendent with four pyramids of white marble on pedestals. These pyramids bore the legends 'Solicitude for the Church,' 'Reform of the Citizenry,' 'Instruction of the

Military' and 'Building of the Fleet' and compared Peter the Great with figures in the Old Testament such as Japheth and Samson.

The choice of Bruce for such an important duty was entirely fitting. He had been one of Peter the Great's key associates, throughout his reign and enjoyed the reputation of being one of Russia's most learned individuals. This vast learning was extensively utilized by the Russian State. Bruce was pivotal, for example, in the creation of the first astronomical observatory and the Moscow Mathematical and Navigation School in 1701. He also became the Director of the Grazhdanskaia tipografaria (Civil Typography) in 1706, overseeing the rapid expansion of the printing press. In addition to these positions Bruce was appointed the President of the newly created Mining and Manufacturing Colleges in 1717. His workload was further increased in 1720 when he was entrusted with the posts of Director of the St. Petersburg Mint and the General-Director of fortifications. Bruce was also one of Russia's most astute diplomats, acting as the First Plenipotentiary Minister at the Åland Congress in 1718 and negotiating the eventual Nystad Peace with the Swedes in 1721. Whilst in charge of all these posts Bruce pursued a long and successful military career, retiring in 1726 with the rank of General Field Marshall. Furthermore, in recognition of his military service to Russia, he was awarded the prestigious Order of St. Andrew the First-Called in September 1709 after his exploits at the Battle of Poltava and he became a Count in February 1721.

The sheer scale of Bruce's interests and his contribution to the grand scheme of reforms undertaken in Russia during the reign of Peter the Great are breathtaking. Indeed, the scope of his activities has posed problems for the relatively few academics who have attempted to determine his role and position within the Petrine system of government. The Russian scholar P. P. Pekarskii, for example, writing in 1862, focused on the astronomical interests of Bruce. Another nineteenth-century Russian scholar, M. D. Khmyrov, cast Bruce in his military guise as General Feldtseikhmeister (Commander of Artillery), whilst the Marxist historian Pokrovskii dismissively stated that he "was not a politician but simply a good technician." The Canadian scholar Valentin Boss affforded Bruce greater respect but concentrated on characterizing him as a disciple of rational and secular Newtonian science. Thus, according to Boss, as Russia's "first Newtonian" Bruce played a crucial role in the secular transformation of the country which was, as has been noted, "often regarded as an alternate faith."

By far the most enduring and popular portrayal of Bruce in Russia, however, has been as a sorcerer – efffectively a court magician – who allegedly engaged in all manner of weird, wonderful and often diabolical exploits. The first recorded legend concerning the magical pastimes of Bruce was recorded in the Ukraine at the beginning of the nineteenth century by an old soldier. This soldier purportedly heard the legend himself from an old shepherd sitting at a bonfire and then narrated it to a student at Moscow University. It was only published in 1871, however, in the journal Russkaia Starina. Therein it is stated that Bruce "knew all the secret herbs and miraculous stones and concocted various things from them." A much more influential contribution in the development of an aura of magic and sorcery surrounding Bruce was made by Alexander Pushkin (1799– 1837). In his unfinished novel Arap Petra Velikogo (The Moor of Peter the Great), Pushkin likened Bruce to a 'Russian Faust.' The Faustian image of Bruce in nineteenth-century Russian literature was strengthened by Ivan Lazhechnikov's novel Koldun na Sukharevoi Bashne (The Sorcerer at the Sukharev Tower), published in 1840, which in large measure drew inspiration from Pushkin's personification. A fictitious letter, dated 12 September, 1726, addressed to Bruce by his real-life diplomatic colleague Baron Andrei Ivanovich Osterman (1686–1747), typifies the characterization of

Bruce by Lazhechnikov. Osterman is rueing the death of Peter the Great and beseeches Bruce to use his magical influence to restore the old order:

> You can serve otherwise: by advising, suggesting and connecting with the Cabbalistic . . . We can use your secret influence on the minds and opinion of the people to our benefit . . . You are all powerful, not only on the earth but also in heaven.

Evgenii Baranov devoted a section of his collection of Moscow legends to the popular oral tales surrounding the sorcery of Jacob Bruce that had survived into the 1920s among workers in Soviet Russia. A certain painter-decorator named Vasilii, for example, narrated to Baranov in a tearoom in the Arbat district of Moscow in March 1923 the legend of how Bruce had engendered a housemaid from flowers:

> Bruce lived in the Sukharev Tower. Only jars stood there with various compositions and a telescope, but the main workshop of his was underground – it was there that he worked through the night. He was a master at everything. One time he took there and made a housemaid from flowers. She was a genuine girl: she cleaned the bedroom, served cofffee, only she could not speak.

This tale bears a striking resemblance to a popular legend about the medieval ecclesiast and alchemist Albertus Magnus, in which he reputedly created an android in his secret workshop. A further legend, narrated by an old worker in 1924 tells of Bruce's magical power over the elements:

And yet another things happened: in the middle of summer, during the heat of the day, it rained and thunder crashed . . . Here Bruce went out of his tower . . . and threw about some concoction to the left and right. And here . . . was thrown snow! . . . The whole of Moscow in snow! A regular winter: snow on the roofs, snow on the ground, snow in the trees . . . and thunder clapped. Well, it is known that the people were alarmed and frightened . . . They ran out into the street, and saw Bruce standing on the tower and laughing loudly. Well, here the people understood that this was his work and noticeably swore at him because snow was harmful to their vegetables.

As another legend remarks, Bruce's interest in the elements was based on the desire "to comprehend everything in the world: what was on the earth, what was underground," in order to "find out the wisdom of nature." In addition to his power to create housemaids and to control the elements, Bruce was also credited with enormous technical and scientific knowledge in many legends. Indeed, one legend accords the invention of the aeroplane, telephones and telegraphs to plans and blueprints made by Bruce, which were taken to Germany after his death.

The plentiful legends concerning the magical feats of Jacob Bruce provide a rich series of fantastical tales. They have succeeded, however, in attaching an air of notoriety to the name of Bruce, which has led to a scarcity of serious scholarship intent on studying the man behind the legends. While dubious methods of inquiry are still being employed in Russia, such as a purported formula of Bruce's soul based on his astrological chart, this long history of neglect appears to be drawing to a close, with a noticeable fresh upsurge in interest among Russian scholars in the pivotal role played by Bruce in Petrine Russia. A. N. Filimon, for example, has recently written a full-length biography in an attempt to rectify this imbalance and to provide a more rounded appraisal of the achievements and character of Bruce. This is unquestionably the most concerted study to date seeking to find a synthesis between Bruce the soldier, Bruce the astronomer, Bruce the Newtonian and Bruce the 'sorcerer.' Extensive biographical material regarding his official positions is combined with a discussion of his scientific pursuits and a pioneering section on Bruce's occult and mystical interests,

as reflected in his library collection. Filimon's work is also generously interspersed with lengthy extracts of the popular legends recorded by Baranov.

A weakness in Filimon's work, however, is his discussion of the relationship between Bruce and Freemasonry. The various Russian legends linking Bruce with Freemasonry are cited, but merely as proof of a fantastical distortion of historical reality. An article written in 1997 by the Russian President of Independent Astrologers, K. Dilanian, is also cited as proof of the "threatening scale" of a modern movement intent on branding Bruce a Freemason. It is true that Dilanian's article is of a speculative bent but in linking Bruce with the Knights Templar tradition the Russian astrologer opens up an interesting, if tenuous, line of thought.

Thus, despite Filimon's vehement opposition to the notion of linking Bruce with Freemasonry and his apparent belief that this is part of a wider Masonic plot, I will argue that Bruce's scientific interests and philosophical and religious worldview was similar to the ideals and philosophy of early Scottish Freemasonry. Thus, in light of the revisionist history carried out by David Stevenson, one can draw Bruce into a world in which a myriad of esoteric ideas based on Christianity, utopianism, a profound veneration of the divine geometry of the universe and a faith in experimental science came together in the complex and secretive world of Scottish Freemasonry. Characteristic of this movement was a fascination with Solomonic myths and architecture – most notably the Temple in Jerusalem – Hebraism and an immersion in a heraldic worldview. It was also intrinsically linked with scientific experimentation based on Hermetic and Christian notions of renewal and transformation, the most notorious expression of which was undoubtedly the continued passion for alchemy. It should also be noted that an important factor in the spread of the esoterically minded Scottish Rite form of Freemasonry in the eighteenth century was the establishment of Jacobite communities on the continent after the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688. The continued presence of many Jacobite mercenary soldiers on the continent also helped to promote the ideals of mystical Freemasonry. It should be noted here that Bruce's father – William Bruce (d. 1680) – had been a mercenary soldier in Moscow. What is more, Bruce's mentor in the Foreign Quarter – Patrick Gordon – was not only a staunch Jacobite but also had links with Scottish Freemasons. Thus, despite being raised in Moscow, Bruce's world had been opened to Jacobite influence at a young age.

With this in mind, it is possible to reassess Bruce's family origins, career and role in Petrine Russia. Freemasonry provides a relevant contextual backdrop serving to enlighten and explain the rationale behind Jacob Bruce's phenomenal intellectual and practical knowledge, esoteric interests and loyal service to the Russian tsar. Thus, whilst there is no evidence to suggest that Bruce was a Freemason, it is productive to assess his intellectual and philosophical interests within the context of a similar cultural milieu in which Freemasonry flourished.

Robert Erskine (1677–1718): An Iatrochemist at the Petrine Court

The untimely death of the Scottish physician Robert Erskine on November 30, 1718 (St. Andrew's Day), at the age of forty-one, was keenly felt by Peter the Great. His funeral, which was accorded full state honours, took place in St. Petersburg on January 4, 1719. It was a solemn and magnificent occasion befitting a man holding a number of key positions in Petrine Russia. A vivid description of the proceedings is provided by Friedrich Christian Weber, the Hanoverian Ambassador to the Russian court at the time:

> Doctor Areskin the Czar's first Physician and titulary Councellor, being lately dead at Alonitz, his Corpse was sent for to Petersbourg, from whence it was carried in Procession with great funeral Pomp on the 4th of January 1719 to the new Monastery Alexander Nevsky, seven Wersts from Petersbourg. The Czar himself assisted at the Funeral; in the House where the Corpse lay in State the Minister of the Reformed Church made a funeral Speech in Low-Dutch in Praise of the deceased: His Majesty hereupon gave some Marks of the Esteem he had had for the deceased, and at the same time shewed particular Favour towards his Relation Sir Harry Stirling, who was come to Russia under the Czar's Protection to see the Doctor's last Will put in Execution. The Corpse was carried on the Shoulders of the Physicians and the principal Surgeons who wore long Mourning Cloaks, and was followed by a numerous Procession and two hundred Flambeaux, as far as the Bridge of the German Slaboda. From thence the Funeral proceeding upon Sledges to the aforesaid Monastery, Soldiers being ranged on both Sides of the Way leading from the Gate to the Chapel, with lighted Flambeaux in their Hands. The Czar himself followed the Corpse carrying a burning Taper in his Hand according to the Russian Custom, as far as the Vault, which was built between two others in which the Corpses of the late Princess Natalia, and a certain Dutch Rear-Admiral were deposited.

At the time of his death Erskine had become one of the tsar's closest and most intimate advisers and exercised considerable influence on shaping the direction of the monarch's grand reformist project. Having arrived in Russia in the summer of 1704, Erskine was initially the house doctor for Alexandr Menshikov, the tsar's personal favourite. According to many sources, however, by January 1705 Erskine had already been appointed chief physician to the tsar. Indeed, a letter written to Erskine in June 1705, by his close friend Thomas Crawley, addresses him as "Chief Physician to the Tsar" and in the same year Charles Whitworth, the British Ambassador in Russia, also listed him as "Phisician to the Czar." Furthermore, in March and April 1706, two official ukazy confirmed Erskine as Archiator and President of the Aptekarskaia kantseliariia (Medical Chancery), making him the chief authority on all medical matters in the vast empire. Charles Whitworth acknowledged the importance of Erskine within the Russian hierarchy when he wrote to the Royal Society in London on March 7, 1713 stating that Erskine's "Imployment there [is] of very great Consideration and Power." In Danzig (Gdansk), on April 30, 1716, Peter the Great not only officially reconfirmed these prestigious posts but also awarded his chief physician the title of State-Councillor, which brought with it the privilege of hereditary nobility.

In addition to these responsibilities Erskine was also the driving force behind the creation of Russia's first wholly medicinal and botanical garden – the St. Petersburg Apothecary Garden – on the appropriately named Aptekarskii Ostrov (Apothecary Island) in 1714. This year also marked the appointment of Erskine as the Director and Chief Librarian of the newly established St. Petersburg Kunstkamera, a position which required an encyclopaedic knowledge of all branches of the arts, science and religion. This learning was greatly appreciated by the tsar and was utilized on his second foreign embassy between 1716 and 1717, when Erskine facilitated meetings with some of the most learned and eminent scientists, medics and theologians in Denmark, Holland, France and a number of German states.

Even from this cursory overview of Erskine's key responsibilities within Peter the Great's Russia it is clear that he was no second-rung official, merely attracted to the eastern fringe of Europe by the lure of financial rewards. Yet, with this in mind it is remarkable to note the extent to which his valuable contribution to Petrine Russia has been largely overlooked by historians. This is a sentiment

expressed by Mark Mirskii, who has written that "unfortunately the contemporary reader knows hardly anything about this remarkable personality." His brief ten-page article sought to redress the balance by outlining some of Erskine's noteworthy achievements. In addition to this work one can also refer to an article written in 1983 by I. N. Lebedeva, dedicated to Erskine and his library, for some additional information regarding the Scottish physician.

In the West one must thank two British historians for doing much to preserve Erskine's legacy. In 1904 the Reverend Robert Paul published a series of letters and documents pertaining to Erskine in a Scottish historical journal. Drawing on these documents, John Appleby devoted a chapter of his doctoral thesis (submitted in 1979) on British doctors in Russia to the medical career of Erskine. Subsequently he wrote articles focusing on Erskine as a natural scientist and on his personal library. Arguably his greatest service to preserving the legacy of Erskine, however, was to transcribe the catalogue of the Erskine library collection held at the Academy of Sciences Library in St. Petersburg.

With the exception of these two praiseworthy figures, the modern English-speaking scholar is faced with limited material regarding Erskine. The most comprehensive study of Erskine published in recent years can be found in Rebecca Wills's The Jacobites and Russia, 171,–17,0, where a number of pages are devoted to his role in the political intrigue surrounding the lead up and aftermath to the Jacobite Rebellion in 1715. Steve Murdoch also discusses Erskine's Jacobite links in an article dating from 1996 and in a publication on Scottish networks in northern Europe between 1603–1746.13 In addition, one can glean general biographical information on Erskine from three pages in Anthony Cross's By the Banks of the Neva (1997).

Although there is a need for a thorough biographical account of the life of Robert Erskine, this chapter does not attempt to analyze all sides of Erskine's character and career. Its primary objective is to reveal his fascination with, and knowledge of, all manner of experimental esoteric pursuits – particularly alchemy – and attraction to mystical forms of Protestantism. Furthermore, I will argue that these 'unorthodox' scientific and theological leanings were imbued by a sense of Paracelsianism and Rosicrucianism inherited from his tutors at university and his intellectual peers in both Edinburgh and London. In this regard, it is also of crucial importance to trace the roots of Erskine's interest in esotericism to his family background in Scotland, to his direct links with Jacobites and to his medical training in Paris and Utrecht.

No legends exist in Russia concerning the Faustian sorcery of Erskine as they do with Bruce, yet this does not detract from the fact that in many ways they shared a similar outlook regarding science, esotericism and religion. Thus, when light is shed on this side of Erskine's life and character it also directly reflects onto both Peter the Great personally and Petrine Russia as a whole, as the Scottish physician was able to exert tremendous influence at a critical period in the tsar's attempt to transform Russia.

Stefan Iavorskii (1658–1722): An Esoteric Wordsmith at The Court of Peter the Great

In January 1700 Stefan Iavorskii set out from Kiev en route to Moscow on a mission entrusted to him by Varlaam, the Metropolitan of Kiev. This was to prove a life-changing event for the forty-one year old Ukrainian clergyman, who at the time was the igumen (Father Superior) of the St. Nicholas the Hermit Monastery near Kiev. Iavorskii was accompanied on his journey by Father Zakhariia Kornilovich and the nature of their Moscow mission was relatively modest: they were to present a

letter to Patriarch Adrian from Metropolitan Varlaam, in which the latter requested permission to found an ecclesiastical diocese at Pereslavl. The patriarch was also asked to appoint one of the two messengers as the new bishop of this new eparchy.

The two monks arrived in Moscow in February 1700 and presented their letter to an ailing Patriarch Adrian, who promised to give a reply after consulting Peter the Great. In expectation of a lengthy wait, the two monks settled into the Little Russian (Ukrainian) Residence in the city. However, Iavorskii was not to enjoy a winter sabbatical in the Russian capital as he soon became embroiled in the maelstrom whipped up by the onset of the tsar's campaign of reforms. Indeed, Iavorskii's arrival in Moscow coincided with an intense period of eschatological expectancy and anxiety in the city following the successful Azov Campaign against the Turks in 1696 and Peter the Great's return from Western Europe in August 1698. In addition to crushing the Strel'tsy Revolt and infamously shaving offf the beards of his Boyars, in the autumn of 1698, Peter the Great also fanned the sense of fijin de siecle anxiety in Moscow in January 1700 by adopting the Julian calendar. This deeply symbolic action was intended to signal the arrival of a new age in Russia, in which the custodians and adherents of the old era were to be banished. Thus, on his arrival in Moscow Iavorskii entered an extremely tense atmosphere, which, on the one hand was awash with reforming zeal, but on the other hand was seething with religious and political resentments.

It was not to be long before the Ukrainian Father Superior was to be enlisted by Peter the Great in the bitter campaign against the old guard and their perceived obscurantism. Indeed, the event that was to change the course of Iavorskii's life and precipitate his rise to the top of Russian Orthodoxy occurred during the Ukrainian's first weeks in the Russian capital. This event was the oration delivered by Iavorskii at the funeral of General Aleksei Shein (1662–1700), a hero from the Azov Campaign, who had died on February 12, 1700. It is unknown who recommended Lavorskii for such a prestigious and exacting duty, but their good faith was not disappointed. Despite the fact that Iavorskii had little time to prepare, he successfully managed to dazzle Peter the Great at the funeral with his oratorical skills. This favourable outcome was helped by the fact that at one point during the sermon, Iavorskii personally addressed the tsar and uttered the following glowing remark: "My eyes have seen your salvation, which you have prepared by tearing down the mighty fortresses of Azov, Kizirm and the Tatars."

Shortly afterwards, the tsar went to speak with the patriarch regarding the necessity of installing Iavorskii in a Great Russian bishopric in close proximity to the capital. Evidently, the tsar wished to enlist the support of Iavorskii (and his gift with words) in his bitter campaign against the old guard. The tsar's entreaty was soon granted, as in March 1700 Avramii, the Metropolitan of Riazan and Murom, wrote to the patriarch requesting to be relieved of his ecclesiastic duties. This convenient turn of events led to the rapid investiture of Iavorskii on April 7, 1700 as the new Metropolitan of Riazan and Murom. What is more, within just over six months, Patriarch Adrian died and the tsar appointed Iavorskii as the temporary administrator of the Patriarchal domains, efffectively making him the most powerful clerical figure in Russia.

This meteoric rise was primarily founded on Iavorskii's literary and oratorical skills, which the tsar envisaged as a valuable weapon against his numerous domestic (and foreign) enemies. With this in mind, it is remarkable to note that prior to his arrival in the Russian capital Iavorskii had written a series of panegyrics saturated with mystical, astrological and apocalyptic themes. Thus, the first part of this chapter will concentrate on elucidating the extent to which the above elements formed

central motifs in a number of Iavorskii's key panegyrics written in the 1690s. This will be accompanied by examining Iavorskii's debt to a number of eminent seventeenth-century Jesuits, whose writings exuded distinct mystical, emblematic and astrological qualities. It will then be argued that in the years following Iavorskii's arrival in Moscow, Peter the Great utilized the Ukrainian's abundant use of mystical, apocalyptic and esoteric themes in his panegyrics and sermons as a potent and extraordinary propaganda weapon. Their objective was nothing less than to reveal and explain the divine and prophesized mission of Peter the Great to construct a holy realm befitting his status as the long-anticipated messianic heir to Noah and the House of David and Russia's status as a New Israel.

Mystical Orthodoxy, Progressive Pietism and Esoteric Science: The Eclectic Worldview of Feofan Prokopovich (1681–1736)

Archbishop Feofan Prokopovich (1681–1736) was undoubtedly the most influential ecclesiastical figure in Petrine Russia and is rightly regarded as the chief ideologist of Peter the Great's reforms of the Russian State. Prokopovich only arrived in the Russian citadel of reform – St. Petersburg – in October 1716 after being summoned by the tsar from his post as Professor and Rector of the renowned Kiev Academy late in 1715. Thenceforth the Ukrainian cleric quickly established himself as Peter's principal church ally: a process no doubt accelerated by a series of powerful panegyrics extolling the virtues of the tsar's ideology of absolute rule. In 1718, Prokopovich was appointed Archbishop of Pskov and was commissioned by the tsar to formulate the Dukhovnyi reglament (Ecclesiastical Regulation), which was published and enacted in 1721. This seminal document provided the blueprint for the radical transformation of the Russian Church along the lines of the pre-existing administrative college system and outlined the manner in which a Holy Synod would replace the Patriarchy.

In addition to theology and oratory, Prokopovich's abundant intellectual abilities were utilized by the tsar in many other branches of learning. He was the author, for example, of a historical account of the reign of Peter the Great up until the Battle of Poltava (Istoriia Imperatora Petra Velikago, 1773) and in 1717 assembled a table of Russian rulers from the reign of Vladimir I. There is considerable evidence that he penned Pravda voli Monarshei (The Justice of the Monarch's Right) in 1722, which drew extensively on the theories of Samuel Pufendorf and Hugo Grotius in order to justify Peter the Great's right to absolute rule and he also made a Russian translation of Diego de Saavedra Fajardo's influential symbol and emblem book, Idea Principis Christiano-Politici.

In this chapter, I will seek to challenge long-held attitudes regarding the belief-system underpinning Prokopovich's espousal of progressive, 'enlightened' policies. This approach will seek to broaden our perception of the Ukrainian cleric by illustrating his eclectic worldview, which I argue drew heavily on elements of Christian mysticism, chiliasm and esotericism. In particular, I hope to suggest that the so-called 'enlightened' outlook of Prokopovich actually rested on three theological and philosophical pillars: 1) Pietist Protestantism; 2) an Orthodox faith based on the writings of Eastern Church Fathers and 3) an esoteric worldview that embraced eclectic elements of Aristotelianism, Christian Neo-Platonism and Hermeticism. Thus, I will argue that an embrace of modern, rational science did not fundamentally fuel the momentum for reform enacted by Prokopovich. Instead, one can see a uniquely Russian (or more accurately Ukrainian) Early Modern expression of eclecticism that incorporated Reformed Protestant chiliasm and Biblical exegesis, the distinct mysticism of early Eastern Church Fathers and a continuing belief in occult correspondences and powers.

Prokopovich's staunch advocacy of state and church reform immediately courted controversy in Russia and undoubtedly contributed to subsequent polarised, clear-cut assessments of his legacy. Indeed, many of his ecclesiastic colleagues denounced him at the time as nothing less than a heretic. In 1726, for example, Markell Rodyshevskii wrote a tract, entitled About the Life of the Heretic Feofan Prokopovich, in which he charted incidences of Prokopovich's heresy against the Orthodox Church. Rodyshevskii did not mince his words when elucidating his charges against Prokopovich:

> With daring and great audacity he began to manifestly wrestle with the Holy Church and destroy and reduce all dogma and tradition, and godless Lutheranism and other heresies were introduced and inculcated, and this time was highly lamentable for the people.

Rodyshevskii's fervent attack on the reforms enacted by Prokopovich provides an early and pertinent example of how this seminal figure in Russian history has been consistently characterized in stark black and white terms. The reason for such characterizations is based on a clear dichotomy revolving around an accepted notion of Prokopovich as a harbinger of the Russian Enlightenment. Within the confines of this dichotomy, one can either castigate or extol Prokopovich as a rational, secular and progressive anti-cleric.

Archpriest Georgii Florovskii (1893–1979) wrote one of the most influential negative portraits of Prokopovich in his seminal work The Ways of Russian Theology (1937). As an émigré writing in the wake of the revolutionary upheaval in the early decades of the twentieth century, Florovskii is scathing of the legacy bequeathed to Russian society by Feofan Prokopovich. According to him, Prokopovich "simply did not experience Orthodoxy" and "was a typical man of the 'Enlightenment'" who fought against delusions, such as miracles, "with the tenacity of an arrogant rationalist." Indeed, Rodyshevskii is championed by Florovskii and takes on the guise of a martyr who "sufffered cruelly" for his boldness.

In opposition to Florovskii's scornful denouncements one can cite a long and diverse tradition of commentators who have championed Prokopovich's immense contribution to the development of a 'modern' Russian state. Recent positive descriptions still write of a man who "went from scholasticism to the philosophy of the enlightenment" and represented "the first authentic voice in Russia of the Early Enlightenment."8Such accolades are hardly surprising, and not entirely unwarranted, when one considers that he possessed an intellect on a par with any of his illustrious colleagues at the Russian court. He was one of the most vociferous advocates of the advancement of learning and displayed a genuine passion for scientific experimentation. Prokopovich not only played an active role in the foundation of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in 1725 and provided help to its scholars; he was also a principal founder of a literary-philosophical circle in St. Petersburg – the Uchennaia druzhina (Brotherhood of Learning) – which included Jacob Bruce, V. N. Tatishchev and Antiokh Kantemir. Indeed, Prokopovich's patronage of young academics and literary figures, such as Tatishchev and Kantemir – whom he called a 'Learned Guard' – was an important factor in their subsequent intellectual development and success.

Soviet historians viewed Prokopovich as a progressive figure in eighteenth-century Russia and tended to echo G. V. Plekhanov's earlier assertion that "Prokopovich and his friends were staunch enlighteners." Prokopovich's angry opposition to the "moral vices, money-lending and ignorance of the clergy," according to one Soviet historian writing in the 1960s, demonstrates evidence of his overriding anti-clericism, which he viewed as the "chief bulwark of obscurantism, and the main enemy of science and enlightenment."

As the above statements testify, Prokopovich's religiosity has been routinely dismissed and should be viewed as a major contributory factor in the continuing predominance of simplistic portraits of an extremely complex figure. It has readily been taken for granted, for example, that Prokopovich was anti-clerical per se because he was a wholehearted foe of what he believed to be the conservative obscurantism of many within the Russian Orthodox hierarchy and the corruption of the Roman Catholic Church.

With this in mind, the first part of this chapter will focus on Prokop-ovich's theological writings in order to illuminate the way in which his Christian faith, based on a literal interpretation of the Holy Scriptures and grounded in the writings of Eastern Church Fathers, fundamentally shaped his understanding and vision of the world. This will then be followed by an analysis of his scientific writings – in particular his Natural Philosophy, or Physics (1708) – in which one can detect a synthesis of his Christian faith with strong elements of occult belief derived from an eclectic mix of Aristotelianism, Neo-Platonism and Hermeticism. Lastly, I will examine how religion and science were harmoniously combined in Prokopovich's educational vision. I will argue that Prokopovich actively sought to enact his educational vision along the lines of August Hermann Francke's Pietist model, which was enthused with millenarian goals.

Prokopovich's Theological System: Introduction

Prokopovich expounded his theological system in a series of seven Latin tracts written to accompany his course in theology whilst he was Professor of Theology at the Kiev Academy between 1712–1716. These tracts were entitled: (1) An Introduction to the Tasks of Theology and about the Holy Scriptures (Prolegomena); (2) On God and his Attributes; (3) On the Trinity; (4) On the Procession of the Holy Spirit; (5) On Creation and Prophecy; (6) On the condition of Man before the Fall and (7) On the condition of man After the Fall.

In the first tract, Prokopovich emphasizes that it is necessary, first and foremost, to hold to a literal understanding of the Holy Scriptures, echoing St. Basil, who declared that he "takes all in the literal sense." Prokopovich states that the Scriptures are an infallible higher authority and utterly refutes the stupidity of those who adhere to allegorical interpretations:

> You see in order to correctly interpret the Scriptures, it is necessary to have an intellect, common sense, to lengthily examine the Holy Scriptures and the works of the Fathers, in general – to do much studying and labour; but anyone has the ability to invent stupid allegories, even the most ignorant street charlatan.

It might initially strike one as amazing to find Russia's "first authentic voice of the early Enlightenment" adhering to a view that is nowadays regarded as wholly unscientific. Yet, Prokopovich – like a host of other 'progressive' ecclesiastic figures and natural scientists across Europe – passionately advocated a scientific approach to exegesis in order to demonstrate the divine truth of the Holy Scriptures. Underpinning this scientific approach, as Matt Goldish has pointed out, was a belief that God was granting a key to the people of the 'Last Times' in order to unlock the secrets of the prophets. I would argue that this essentially outlook also characterized the exegetical method of Prokopovich.

Biblical Prophecy

Tellingly, in his Prolegomena Prokopovich cites both pagan and Biblical prophecy as a fourth demonstration of the divine origin of the Holy Scriptures. Prokopovich places great emphasis, for

example on the Sibylline Oracles as predictions that anticipated Christian milestones and thereby validated the authority of the Holy Scriptures. In support of the prophetic powers of the Sibyls, Prokopovich draws on a host of Church Fathers, including Lactantius, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, Theophilus of Antioch and Augustine. Thus, he directly cites from Lactantius's Divine Institutes in support of the authority of the Sibylline Oracles, as therein the Church Father wrote that "all these Sibyls . . . bear witness that there is but one God." What is more, Prokopovich devotes an entire tract to citing the positive testimony of a host of Church Fathers in regard to the Sibylline Oracles.

However, Prokopovich goes on to refute Porphyry's objections to the genuineness of the Book of Daniel and champions the pre-eminence of Biblical prophecies over his "pagan forebodings." Thus, he states that pagan prophecies were either demonic delusions or conjectural predictions based on natural reasons and paled in comparison to the prophecies of Daniel, Ezekiel and others. Essentially the same message is repeated in his fifth tract on prophecy, where he names magicians, soothsayers and ventriloquists as people who "voluntarily give themselves over to the devil under the conditions of known service from his side." This is followed by a brief study on pacts with the devil and on methods of extricating oneself.

Whilst Feofan Prokopovich's enormous contribution to the Petrine reform programme – in both theological and pedagogical terms – has been widely recognized, this chapter has endeavoured to broaden our understanding of the wide philosophical foundation upon which this was developed. It has not been my intention to simply reject the modern and progressive aspects of Prokopovich's worldview, but rather to cast fresh light on areas hitherto neglected. In other words, I have attempted to reveal how the Ukrainian's distinct and marked form of Orthodoxy, which was open to a myriad of intellectual currents, enabled Prokopovich to prosper during the reign of Peter the Great. Thus, I would argue that the progressive sense of dynamism at the heart of Prokopovich's outlook was not wholly the product of a rational and secular intellect. As with many other contemporary European scholars, scientists and theologians, Prokopovich embraced a heady mix of beliefs in order to mold his own form of Russian Orthodoxy. This vision sought to banish obscurantism in favour of an inquisitive theological doctrine that looked to build a brighter future in which the whole of Russia would be pulled out of its state of ignorance. Ultimately, I would argue that this was not education for educations sake, but was premised on a profound and zealous understanding of what I believe Prokopovich saw as his Christian mission.

Religion in the Life of Peter the Great

It is still customary to limit the role religion played in the life of Peter the Great. It is commonly reduced to a "narrow and above all practical" influence, which was akin to "a simple soldier's faith." His secular and empirical outlook is seen to be typical of "a child of the age of rationalism." Accordingly, the tsar's renowned passion for western science is routinely portrayed as being devoid of a religious foundation and is highlighted as a clear example of his enlightened, eighteenth-century sense of practicality. A distinct dichotomy exists, whereby the individual faith of the tsar is confined to the periphery, where it does not encroach upon important matters of state.

Thus, the copious evidence one can find of Peter the Great's profound and intense Christian faith is restricted to the private sphere, whereas in the public arena one views a secular crusader attacking all vestiges of religious superstition and magical nonsense. In this manner the conflation of religion

and science is avoided and consequently a clearer (and more one-dimensional) image of Peter the Great as a rational, secular and enlightened modernizer can be established.

In the third part of this work I argue that religion and science were intrinsically bound in Peter the Great's worldview. Hence, religion comes to play a pivotal role in shaping the nature of the entire Petrine reform project. It will be argued that religion – in harmony with science – formed part of an overarching worldview for Peter the Great, in which Biblical paradigms served to symbolize and direct his reforming zeal, which was encapsulated in the foundation of St. Petersburg.

Indeed, it will be argued that motifs associated with the idea of instauration, or in other words a restoration of Adamic knowledge in the imminent run up to the onset of the millennium, helped to shape the Petrine reform project. The concluding sections of Chapter 6 will also seek to illustrate how Peter the Great's inquisitive and open-minded attitude towards scientific inquiry was imbued with distinct traces of esoteric thought – particularly in regard to astrology and the search for perpetual motion.

The Role of Religion and Esotericism in Shaping Peter the Great's Vision of Scientific Reform

It is no coincidence that the first two comprehensive plans for scientific reform in Russia were formulated in a six-month period between the autumn of 1697 and the spring of 1698. This period marks the time Peter the Great was resident in Amsterdam and in London during his first Grand Embassy to Western Europe. Whilst many of Europe's leading scientists eagerly kept informed of the latest news regarding the tsar's travels, only Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Dr. Francis Lee were sufficiently excited to draw up specific plans intended for the benefit of the Russian monarch.

As outlined in the introduction, both Leibniz and Lee were spurred on to devise their respective schemes because of the vital providential role they assigned to Peter the Great. In both cases this involved the spread of Christianity throughout the world and in overcoming the Islamic threat posed by the Ottoman Turks. Lastly, both Leibniz and Lee shared a belief that Peter the Great possessed the necessary will and intelligence to foster an instauration in his own kingdom, based on their plans, which would restore man's dominion over nature.

Thus, in outlining the respective schemes drawn up by both Lee and Leibniz it is essential to bear in mind their debt to the seventeenth-century Christian-utopian tradition of universal reform. Most notably, one can discern the influence of Bacon, Andreae, Comenius and the Hartlib circle, who were all fuelled by the notion of an imminent instauration of knowledge based on Biblical prophecy – most notably Daniel 12:4 – and the promise of increased knowledge prior to the onset of the millennium. One can also note contemporary parallels with the Pietist pedagogical goal embodied in the foundation of the University of Halle in 1694 and the subsequent charity schools founded by August Hermann Francke.

At Peter the Great's funeral on February 25, 1725, Prokopovich performed a memorable oration that lamented the loss of his beloved leader and sought to crystallize his legacy. Peter had been Russia's Samson, whom "the world admir'd" and had made Russia "firm and durable as a Rock," once again playing on the meaning of the name Peter. Moreover, Prokopovich adds that Peter had also been Russia's first Japheth (the grandson of Noah), "who has efffected and brought to Perfection what was never before known," that is shipbuilding and navigation. What is more, Prokopovich

extols Peter for being Russia's Moses, who was "famous for so many excellent institutions." Next, the orator compared Peter with Solomon and stated: "whom God endow'd with extraordinary wisdom and prudence! Proofs of this are as many as the numerous philosophical experiments he himself made, and demonstrated by his own observations." In other words, Peter the Great had been a philosopher-king, in the image of Solomon, who had endeavoured to reveal and utilize the secrets of God's creation. Lastly, Prokopovich likens Peter the Great to both King David and Constantine in terms of his wide-sweeping ecclesiastical reforms, which, of course, had been orchestrated by the orator himself.

Prokopovich's numerous parallels with Biblical personages and the first Christian emperor were designed to solidify Peter the Great's legacy as a divinely appointed monarch. This image had already been forcefully propagated for a quarter of a century, whereby the transformations enacted by the monarch were cast in a prophetic sense. Vladimir I may have brought Christianity to Russia in 988, but it was Peter the Great who had pushed Russia onto the world stage, in order to carry out its providential role.

The allure of such a grandiose interpretation of Peter the Great's reign was not simply restricted to the likes of Prokopovich and Iavorskii, however, as many eminent Western Europeans, such as Kuhlmann, Lee, Leibniz and Witsen also viewed the Russian monarch within an eschatological mindset, to varying degrees. Indeed, it is fascinating to note the profound sense of loss expressed by Aaron Hill, the well-known English poet, playwright and theatre manager, on hearing of the tsar's death:

> He was truly God's VICEREGENT, and irradiated the Human Nature, with such lively Beamings of the Divine, that, as He obey'd, He resembled, the Deity! – He could not, indeed, create Men; But he new-moulded, and inspir'd them.

Hill's image of Peter the Great being divinely sanctioned to mould, rather than create, new men, is a striking metaphor reminiscent of Prokopovich's gushing oratorical praise. As mentioned, Prokopovich compared Peter to a sculptor in 1726, for example, who had recast Russia into his own emblem. Here the orator is not only alluding to Peter sculpting his realm into his own image, but also plays on the fact that the tsar's personal emblem was in fact a sculptor crafting a glorious statue.

Moreover, in the letter written in March 1720 to August Hermann Francke, already cited in Chapter 4, Prokopovich utilized the metaphor of Peter as a divinely sanctioned metallurgist, with his subjects portrayed as precious metals buried in the earth. Hence, the monarch's providential task was to extract these hidden precious metals in order to burn and polish them until they are utterly transformed.

Thus, in both Hill's and Prokopovich's eyes Peter the Great is unambiguously portrayed as a monarch charged with a divine mission as a royal artisan. In other words, Peter the Great was not meant to spread the word of God through preaching, but through sheer will. His subjects are effectively portrayed as pliable materials transformed by an agent of God able to harness the divine powers and potential inherent in the cosmos, but only accessible to a chosen few.

This potent image of Peter the Great cleverly fused traditional Davidic representations associated with the Russian monarchy with notions of progressive millenarianism, which emerged as a powerful religious movement in Western Europe in the seventeenth century. In this work I have aimed to

illustrate that Peter the Great actively drew on both reservoirs in order to fashion his monumental reform programme.

Thus, this entailed a combination of deeply religious and traditional conceptions of an ideal ruler and realm with progressive notions of reform, which were still intrinsically linked to Biblical paradigms. In this manner it was entirely logical for Peter the Great to fashion himself as a new King David building a new House of Israel and New Jerusalem in Russia. Such an image harnessed a notion of kingship that perceived the monarch as the pivotal driving force leading his country on a providential mission to restore Adamic knowledge. In other words, Peter was fulfilling his Davidic destiny to build a New Jerusalem in which an instauration of knowledge was able to flourish amidst a setting of Edenic bliss.

This image accords with Viktor Zhivov's penetrative analysis of the speech delivered by G. I. Golovkin (1660–1734), the chancellor of Foreign Afffairs, on October 22, 1721 in honour of Peter accepting the titles 'All-Russian Emperor' (vserossiiskii imperator), 'Father of the Fatherland' (otets otechestviia) and 'the Great' (velikii). Zhivov astutely notes a millenarian dimension to Golovkin's famed praise of Peter as a ruler who had brought Russia "from the darkness of ignorance into the theatre . . . of the whole world, so to speak, from nothingness into being, into the company of political peoples." Thus, by drawing on the opening line of Genesis, which also served as the crux of an important liturgical prayer in the Orthodox Church, Zhivov states that Golovkin was portraying Peter as the creator of a new dispensation envisaged as the realization of the prophesized millennium.

Viewed in this sense Peter the Great's enthusiastic promotion of the arts and sciences tapped into millenarian expectations, firstly in terms of Daniel's prophecy of an increase in knowledge immediately prior to the millennium. Secondly, in terms of the description of New Jerusalem in the Book of Revelation, which St. John the Divine portrays as a city in which the "root and offfspring of David" (Revelation 22:16) will ensure that "there shall be no more death" (Revelation 21:4). From a millenarian perspective this passage was crucial as it seemed to suggest that science and learning had a key role to play in restoring man's dominion over nature.

Thus, far from banishing religion from his court, I have sought to show how it could be utilized as a driving force, rather than being perceived as a hindrance, behind reform. Moreover, the millenarian emphasis on the need for an advancement in learning as a necessary prerequisite in the unfolding Biblical drama of the last days encouraged an inquisitive and open approach to revealing the secrets of God's creation. In other words, many millenarians in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century actively embraced esoteric pursuits as a means of advancing knowledge. This is particularly noticeable, for example, in the case of Francis Lee and also played a part in shaping Leibniz's approach towards science. One can also discern such an inquisitive and open approach to esoteric pursuits, I would argue, in Peter the Great's approach to learning and science.

In propagating the notion of himself as a Davidic monarch creating a New Jerusalem in Russia, it was necessary for Peter the Great to ensconce individuals in key positions of authority who were capable and willing to realise this grand vision. In this work I have focused on four key foreign servitors at the Petrine court, who in my opinion each displayed propensities towards religious thought and esotericism that helped to shape Petrine Russia.

In the first part of this book I concentrated on two members of the tsar's inner circle – Bruce and Erskine – who instilled a distinctive Scottish Jacobite flavour to the Petrine court. Indeed, it is

remarkable that two such prominent servitors emanated from neighbouring Jacobite families from the Scottish county of Clackmannanshire. In the case of Bruce, we can observe a figure who remained close to Peter the Great for over forty years. Graduating through the ranks from Peter's poteshnyi polk (play regiment) in the 1680s, Bruce went on to occupy pivotal posts in the Petrine regime. What is more, he was a member of Peter's so-called 'unholy council' (neosviashchennyi sobor), which only included those utterly loyal to the monarch and was a knight of the Order of St. Andrew the First Called.

Thus, it is of no small consequence that this 'Russian Faust,' as Pushkin labelled him, displayed a strong attraction towards astrology, alchemy and the occult in general. What is more, this interest in the esoteric was combined with a religious worldview close to that espoused by German Pietists in Halle. Indeed, as Winter states, it was from Bruce's home that Pietists "took their first steps" in Russia. Bruce was not only free to hold such esoteric and religious interests, but was actually placed in positions of authority by Peter, whereby these views were able to directly influence the course of Russian learning. Thus, as the first director of the Moscow Mathematical and Navigational School and the director of the Civil Typography, Bruce was able to impart his knowledge of astronomy and reformed astrology to a generation of students. In addition, as the head of the College of Manufacturing and of the St. Petersburg mint, Bruce could place his knowledge of experimental chemistry at the service of the state. Bruce also acted as one of Peter the Great's most trusted scientific advisers and was given the responsibility of hiring talented foreigners into Russian service, as well as entering into correspondence with the leading lights of the day, such as Leibniz.

Although dying at the relatively young age of forty-one, Robert Erskine also made a lasting contribution to the Petrine reform project. In medical terms, Erskine carried on the Romanov tradition of employing foreign physicians, such as Arthur Dee, seeped in knowledge of alchemy. His iatrochemical approach to medicine can be seen in his treatment of the tsar and in his enthusiastic endorsement of balneotherapy. Furthermore, as the first director of the St. Petersburg Kunstkamera and the head of its library, as well as the founder of the city's botanical garden, Erskine left an indelible mark on the cultural and scientific life of the capital and Russia as a whole. One also has to bear in mind Erskine's powerful advisory role as a State Councillor, as well as his active endeavours as a Jacobite agent with connections to Masonic circles.

In all, Erskine provides a fascinating illustration of the extremely complex and intricate world of early eighteenth-century medicine and science, in which religion and esotericism could still exert enormous influence. What is more, Erskine's breadth of learning ensured that his impact on Petrine life went far beyond the boundaries of medicine. Indeed, Erskine can be viewed as an encyclopaedist, who approached the study of nature in the same inquisitive spirit as the likes of Kircher and Ashmole. This was undoubtedly an approach much admired by Peter the Great and helps to explain why the monarch cherished Erskine's contribution to his reform project so highly.

The second part of this book focused on the remarkable contributions made by two Ukrainian clerics – Stefan Iavorskii and Feofan Prokopovich – to the Petrine programme of reforms. In many ways both figures illustrate the profound way in which they were influenced by their early training in Kiev. Drawing on the so-called Russian baroque tradition exemplified by Simeon Polotskii, which was saturated in mystical and esoteric imagery, Iavorskii and Prokopovich were able to adapt these themes to the Petrine era.

In the case of Iavorskii, his service to the Petrine cause manifested itself in a stream of incredible sermons extolling the Russian monarch and his innovations. Deliberately promoted to the post of Metropolitan of Riazan and Murom in 1700 and quickly installed as the de-facto head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Peter the Great saw in Iavorskii a cleric capable of expressing the visionary nature of his reign in the critically important sermons he delivered on significant occasions in the court calendar. In efffect, Iavorskii's role was akin to a modern-day press officer and spin-doctor, whereby he was charged with interpreting and extolling the actions of his monarch. In this sense, the rich and systematic utilization of eschatological and esoteric motifs reflects not only the legacy of the Russian baroque style of Polotskii, but also reveals much about how Peter the Great himself wished to be perceived.

Prokopovich was also extremely adept at incorporating eschatological and esoteric motifs into the official sermons he delivered for the benefit of the Russian monarch. However, I would argue that his role as the instigator of educational and ecclesiastical reform was of equal or even greater import. It was in this area that Prokopovich went beyond the scholastic training he received Kiev and in Rome. By absorbing various strands of thought – particularly elements of the occult philosophy of Daniel Sennert and the Pietist educational model advanced by Francke – and fusing them with mystical elements of Russian Orthodox theology contained in the works of early Church Fathers, such as Dionysius the Areopagite and the Cappadocian Fathers, Prokopovich was able to form an intellectual worldview in harmony with the goals of the Petrine reform project.

Thus, in the first two parts I hope to have illustrated how Peter surrounded himself with "loyal disciples," as Ernest Zitser fittingly describes his inner circle, who all embraced worldviews that were more complex than simply being manifestations of secularism and enlightenment. In contributing to Peter the Great's grand endeavour to bring about what I refer to as an instauration, these servitors embody the kaleidoscopic spirit promoted by the monarch. This spirit undoubtedly included classical motifs and secular ideals. However, to overlook the crucial role played by religion (particularly in the form of Davidic providentialism) and esotericism denies the Petrine reform project its vital colouring and sense of mission.

In this regard it is worth returning to Golovkin's apt motif of Peter being a performer on the world stage. Using this metaphor, it is possible to say that the Russian monarch assumed his role in 1697, after the victorious Azov campaign and upon embarking on his pivotal first Grand Embassy to Western Europe. On his travels the tsar's every move was eagerly reported and aroused considerable excitement among many learned figures. Of course, much of this excitement stemmed from simple curiosity. After all this was the first time most people would have witnessed the exotic sight of the tsar of Muscovy. However, I would argue that many of Peter's audience imbued his role on the world stage in prophetic terms, belying the fact that Western Europe was far from being a uniformly secular and rational enclave in the early modern world. Such perceptions are clearly discernible, for example, in Francis Lee's pronouncement of Peter as an "extraordinary Genius" able "to efffect extraordinary things" and Leibniz's declaration that the monarch was a divinely appointed gardener cultivat-ing his plantation. Fittingly the playwright Aaron Hill expressed the most dramatic interpretation of Peter's role on the world stage: "There, a New Sun inflames the Land of Night. There, Arts and Arms the Worlds Fifth Empire raise." In other words, Hill perceives Peter's role on the world stage as the prophesized universal monarch leading his nation (and the whole world) towards the millennium.

I would argue that Peter cultivated this prophetic role, most commonly adopting the garb of King David, although also on occasions drawing on other Biblical paradigms, especially Moses, Noah and Solomon and on the potent image of the monarch as a new Constantine, the first Christian Emperor. In assuming such a role Peter invested enormous symbolic importance to his actions. Consequently, if one believed in the role, the Russian monarch embodied a figure of Biblical magnitude forging a New Jerusalem on the banks of the Neva and a New Israel throughout his realm. Thus, when his audience viewed Peter as a monarch leading his country out of darkness through the establishment of the arts and sciences in his realm, they were being encouraged to envisage him as a prophetic instaurator. This is an image, or ideological programme, Peter deliberately fostered and necessarily relied upon in order to be seen as a monarch capable of revealing the secrets of God's universe. In other words, it was an image that encouraged esoteric pursuits at court. Consequently, his supporting cast can also be seen to have played their parts with some aplomb. <>

The Hajj and Europe in the Age of Empire edited by Umar Ryad [Leiden Studies in Islam and Society, Brill, 9789004323346]

The present volume focuses on the political perceptions of the Hajj, its global religious appeal to Muslims, and the European struggle for influence and supremacy in the Muslim world in the age of pre-colonial and colonial empires. In the late fifteenth century and early sixteenth century, a pivotal change in seafaring occurred, through which western Europeans played important roles in politics, trade, and culture. Viewing this age of empires through the lens of the Hajj puts it into a different perspective, by focusing on how increasing European dominance of the globe in pre-colonial and colonial times was entangled with Muslim religious action, mobility, and agency. The study of Europe's connections with the Hajj therefore tests the hypothesis that the concept of agency is not limited to isolated parts of the globe. By adopting the "tools of empires," the Hajj, in itself a global activity, would become part of global and trans-cultural history.

With contributions by: Aldo D'Agostini; Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste; Ulrike Freitag; Mahmood Kooria; Michael Christopher Low; Adam Mestyan; Umar Ryad; John Slight and Boguslaw R. Zagórski.

The Hajj and Europe in the Pre-Colonial and Colonial Age

The Hajj, or the Muslim Pilgrimage to the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina, is not merely a religious undertaking of devotion for Muslims; it is a global annual event that included political, social, economic, and intellectual aspects throughout world history. The study of Hajjhistory inthe pre-modern and modern eras unravel important mundane human ties and networks of mobility that go beyond its primary religious meanings for millions of Muslim believers around the globe. In other words, throughout history the Hajj traffic routes and itineraries regularly created new religious, political, social, and cultural contact zones between Muslim regions on the one hand, and with the geographical boundaries of other parts of the world on the other. Since medieval Islamic history, the Hajj had "accelerated sea trade as thousands of pilgrims and merchant-pilgrims made their way to Mecca and Medina by sea, stopping at coastal towns where they often traded goods."

European connections to the Hajj have a lengthy history of centuries before the influx of Muslim migration to the West after World War ii. During the colonial age in particular, European and Ottoman empires brought the Hajj under surveillance primarily for political reasons, for economic interests in the control of steamships and for the fear of the growth of pan-Islamic networks. Another important motive for the European scrutiny of Hajj was their anxiety for the spread of epidemic diseases in their colonies after the pilgrims' return.

The present volume focuses on the political perceptions of the Hajj, its global religious appeal to Muslims, and the European struggle for influence and supremacy in the Muslim world in the age of pre-colonial and colonial empires. Bythe term "empire," we follow in this volume Jonathan Hart's particular reference to "those western European nations who, beginning with Portugal, began in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to expand offshore and later overseas." In the late fifteenth century and early sixteenth century there was a pivotal change in seafaring through which western Europeans played important roles in politics, trade, and culture.3 Looking at this age of empires through the lens of the Hajj puts it into a different perspective by focusing on the question of how increasing European dominance of the globe in pre-colonial and colonial times had been entangled with Muslim religious action, mobility, and agency. The study of Europe's connections with the Hajj therefore tests the hypothesis of how the concept of agency is not limited to isolated parts

of the globe. By adopting the “tools of empires,” the Hajj, which by nature is a global activity, would become part of global and trans-cultural history.

With this background in mind, the volume is a collection of papers, most of which were read during the “Europe and Hajj in the Age of Empires: Muslim Pilgrimage prior to the Influx of Muslim Migration in the West” conference, held at the University of Leiden (13–14 May 2013) in collaboration with King Abdul-Aziz Foundation in Riyadh. A group of scholars were invited in order to investigate European connections with the Hajj on various levels. The read papers reflected on how much first-hand primary sources can tell us about European political and economic perceptions of the Hajj. How did the international character of the Hajj as a Muslim sacred ritual influence European policies in their struggle for supremacy over the Muslim world? How did Muslim subjects under European colonial rule experience the logistic, economic, religious, and spiritual aspects of the Hajj?

In early-modern and modern history, the Hajj became connected to the long European tradition of seafaring in the Western Indian Ocean firstly by the Portuguese in the 16th century, the Dutch during the 16th to 18th centuries, and the English presence during the 19th to late mid-20th century. It is true that the Portuguese introduced a new kind of armed trading in the waters of the Indian Ocean. This period was “an age of contained conflict” in India and the Indian Ocean.6 In the early modern period in particular, Muslim ships carrying pilgrims were threatened by the Portuguese. In 1502, for example, a large ship was captured by the Portuguese, which had 200 crew and numerous pilgrims aboard. Muslim ships carried warriors in order to resist Portuguese arracks. The arrival of the Portuguese in surrounding seawaters put the Hajj at risk, since they were keen on opposing Islam and monopolizing the spice trade. From the start, they attempted to patrol the Red Sea entrance and block the “pilgrimage to the accursed house of Mecca.” The Ottomans had difficulties dealing with the increasing grievances of the Muslim believers who were unable to “go to the house of Mecca, to take their alms and fulfill their pilgrimage, because the Christians take them at sea, and also within the Red Sea, and they kill and rob them and the least that they do is to capture them.”

Other European mercantile entrepreneurs started to compete with the Portuguese in the East. In later centuries, such conditions of piracy and robbery relatively started to change. In the colonial age, despite the fact that Mecca and Medina were officially under Ottoman rule, the Hajj was put under the surveillance of European imperialist powers. Therefore it became a significant arena for politics and expansion. Under colonial rules, however, the Hajj bore a wider global imprint and was enhanced by European technology such as the steamship. A journey that used to take months or even years by land or sea was now shortened, which had consequently increased the number of pilgrims and their logistics. European competition in the expansion of maritime supremacy demanded the surveillance of pilgrims and the spread of epidemic diseases, such as cholera and plague. In that sense, the Hajj had acquired several aspects, such as modern transport, hygiene, espionage, exoticism, political colonial interests and trade, and diplomacy.

European Colonial Control of the Hajj and Public Health

On another level, Mecca and Medina were, and still are, significant centres of religious education for Muslim students belonging to different backgrounds, who come to acquire normative and traditional religious knowledge and carry it back to their places of origin. In the colonial period, the Hajj and these religious educational centres created transnational, anti-colonial, pan-Islamic networks that were sources of fear for colonial officials. Due to the transmission of subversive politics to the colonies, European officials became suspicious of any underlying allegiances of the Hajj that could be the binding trigger for international anti-colonial sentiments and uprisings. In the early twentieth century, for example, the Dutch colonial government cooperated with Dutch-owned shipping companies in order to control Hajj maritime networks linking the Netherlands East Indies and the Middle East.

Besides, Jeddah as a port city served as the nodal point of exchange and interaction not only for the Hajj (as the main entry point for pilgrims) but also for trade as well as the European consulates. Sources are scarce regarding the beginning of European political or commercial agency in Jeddah. It is clear that Jeddah was chosen for the establishment of the European consulates for its strategic position that facilitated European political penetration of foreign powers in the region. By 1832, for example, an Armenian of Baghdadi origin, Maalim Yusof, was appointed as East India Company (eic) agent in Jeddah. However, the French consular agency (later variously consulate and vice-consulate) was officially founded in 1839. The Dutch, who had long trade relations in the regions, established their consulate in 1869 or 1872 when they became concerned with the large numbers of Southeast Asian pilgrims. In January 1876, the Swedish King appointed a consul for Sweden and Norway with the authorization to collect certain taxes from Swedish merchants in accordance with consular regulations. Austria opened its consulate in 1880, succeeded bythe Russians who dealt with rising numbers of Central Asian pilgrims in 1891. In her well-documented article, Ulrike Freitag argues that European consuls in Jeddah had less relative power and local influence than other European consulates elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. A strong international balance of power could not be easily established in Jeddah “due to the special role ofJeddah for the Islamic legitimation of the empire, as well as the local awareness of its location in the vicinity of the holiest city of Islam, both of which in turn prevented the settlement of significant Christian communities.” In general, a few dozen non-Muslims resided in Jeddah but did not represent a coherent community. European consuls were present in Jeddah for the sake of pilgrims from the colonies and merchants from the European empires who were “not normally perceived as allies.”

In the nineteenth century, European nations had already become highly concerned about the spread of diseases to European colonies, and more significantly within European borders, as a result of the crowd of the annual gathering of the Hajj. To keep European authority intact, colonial administrations exploited their calls for international health and safety standards for the Hajj not only as a medical strategy to prevent the spread of epidemic diseases but also as a surveillance tool aimed at stopping the spread of political unrest in the colonies. Besides ship monopolies, health regulations and “sanitary politics” surrounding the Hajj created a power situation that required intellectual knowledge and

promoted cultural and technological hegemony of the empires. Despite the fact that many countries were involved in the sanitary regulations of the Hajj, the British and the Dutch played the largest role in administering this field in the Arabian Peninsula due to the high number of colonial subjects traveling to Hajj. Therefore, due to any potential health danger that might be caused by the Hajj, the Ottoman Empire was sometimes viewed in the European press as "a gateway for contamination" in Europe itself. As a matter of fact, cholera was found in Arabia in 1821 for the first time. Ten years later it was in the Ḥijāz; and since then it became a mainstay on the pilgrimage routes. In 1831 the epidemic killed twenty thousand people in the Ḥijāz, followed by other subsequent epidemics in the region of the holy cities in 1841, 1847, 1851, 1856– 1857, and 1859. Cholera entered Europe around the same period, most likely not through the Middle East, but rather over the Eurasian steppe, from Russia and eventually into Germany. Nevertheless, the 1865 epidemic in the Ḥijāz was so powerful that its damage reached Europe and the western parts of the United States.

As a matter of fact, international surveillance of the public health ramifications of the Hajj was put forward for investigation at the works of the 1851 Paris International Sanitary Conference for the first time. With this conference, France claimed herself to be "at the forefront of the nineteenth century's international drive to come up with regulatory codes applicable to Mecca-bound ships and pilgrims alike." In some uncontrollable cases in French African regions, central and local colonial authorities sometimes tried to "justify their decisions in the face of public opinion when the prohibition of Hajj seemed to be the only option."

Quarantine stations were set up as preventive rubrics to securitize epidemics among pilgrims on the one hand and to control their socio-political actions on the other. For example, the Kamaran quarantine station in the Red Sea, established in 1881 as a site for surveillance over pilgrims, their diseases, and politics in the region, enabled the British and Dutch colonial governments to register lists of passengers aboard pilgrim ships. In Kamaran the British were even said to have established an equipped radio station and an excellent landing area that was regularly visited by British war planes. Therefore, the Dutch became alarmed that Britain was using the site as a spy station. In sum, by the late nineteenth century European colonial powers generally became anxious about a "twin infection" of the Hajj, namely Muslim anti-colonial ideological infection and bacteriological infection.

Nevertheless, British India provided the largest number of pilgrims in the late nineteenth century. Likewise, the British policy of Hajj was similarly shaped by political calculations and public health concerns. On the surface, the British were not keen on interfering in Muslim religious affairs, especially after the famous promise by the Queen in the wake of the massive uprising across much ofIndia iní857–í858. Saurabh Mishra argues that by the turn of the twentiethcentury such British political calculations started to change into increased surveillance of pilgrims due to the perceived fear of jihad and fanaticism. As European demands for regulating the Hajj out of fears for disease spreading to their borders

increased, medical concerns became the most important aspect of British international policy towards the Hajj, which resulted in what Mishra calls a European “Medicalizing Mecca.”

Europeans in Mecca

On the cultural level, the creation of a Hajj public knowledge was taking place in Europe in the background of such political and medical discourses. Indigenous Muslims in Central and Eastern Europe, a few Muslim emigrants (especially in Great Britain, France and somehow in Germany), and European converts to Islam in other parts of Europe were making their way to the Hajj and left behind interesting accounts, such as diaries, published and unpublished travelogues, press items in European newspapers, etc. European and non-European national and private archives enlist fascinating political, medical, religious and social reports of such narratives. In the pre-modern and early modern age, Europeans, either converts to Islam or in disguise, entered Mecca. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, European encounters

with the Orient in general challenged western historical and religious understandings. However, European narratives of the Hajj should be read as colonial texts, which reflect a process of shift in European learning and culture that occurred in the context of interaction between East and West. One of the most remarkable figures who visited Mecca in the nineteenth century was the Dutch scholar of Islam Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936), whose contacts with Mecca and Arabia embodied both colonial and scholarly projects. The prime reason behind his mission in Arabia (1884–1885), after his conversion to Islam and circumcision, was to collect accurate information about the pan-Islamic ideas resonating among the Southeast-Asian community in Mecca. In addition, he was motivated by his scholarly interests in Mecca, its intellectual life and the Hajj. In Mecca he collected a huge amount of information and established a good network of Muslim friends. His writings formed the basis of scholarly western knowledge of Mecca and the Hajj in the nineteenth century and beyond.

In recent years, many archive-based historical analyses have argued that many European converts entered Mecca in order to achieve specific political goals for their countries. In that sense, their roles are seen as part of the political and cultural conflict between Europe and Islam in the age of empires. It is true that in the colonial period the accounts of European pilgrims conveyed a sense of “passing” and “surpassing” due to their access to Western power and knowledge. However, in some other cases reading their accounts of Hajj engagement reveals a certain complexity by which they attempted to constitute a means through which they would refashion their spiritual life standards. Such sources are significant in their representation of a new literary genre that shaped a European image of Muslim pilgrimage.

The Contributions

The present volume looks at the Hajj and its ties with Europe through a variety of windows. The contributions posit three major elements related to the Hajj as a Muslim universal undertaking and its enmeshed history of European precolonial and colonial powers. Firstly,

some tackle the questions of how European links and struggles to control the Hajj and the movements of the pilgrims were part of broader European political objectives and competitions in colonial regions. By strengthening a “Hajj policy” in colonial administration, European powers tried to take hold of the political, shipping, and hygienic aspects of it by means of the creation of quarantine stations for the fear of epidemics. Secondly, some essays explore the linkage between early Islamic anti-colonial networks and the Hajj. In that regard, European imperial administrators and consuls in Muslim regions were deeply concerned with recording and monitoring the pilgrims. In order to counteract such perceived “negative” influences, Mecca and the Hajj were seen on the political agenda as a breeding ground for “religious fundamentalism.” Thirdly, some chapters deal with the Hajj as an intercultural arena in Europe by focusing on a few examples of Europeans who travelled to Mecca and recorded the Hajj through European eyes in the colonial period. The chapters cover a wide range of perspectives including historical surveys, political reports, and individual European accounts of the Hajj related to Portugal, Great Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, and Spanish Morocco. These different cases highlight the Hajj on a global scale by showing its socio-political and economic aspects, routes, means of transport, logistics, hygiene problems, and cultural production and dissemination of ideas and knowledge about the Hajj in Europe.

In that context, Mahmood Kooria starts off the discussion by focusing on the early sixteenth-century Portuguese/European encounters with the Hajj in the Indian Ocean. He argues that this Portuguese interference in the Hajj was provoked by multiple layers of economic, political, cultural, and religious interests.Despite Portuguese economic motivations that had no direct prerequisites to intercept the Hajj, a correlation between the “secular” and “religious,” the Portuguese relationship with the Hajj was deeply rooted in a long-tradition of European encounters with the Muslim world in the pre-modern age which had significant religious undertones. The religious collision between “Christian” Europe and the “Muslim” world that intensified in the time of the Crusades continued to exist in the waters of the Indian Ocean. The chapter argues that the Portuguese had a special interest in the Hajj, and their attacks on pilgrim ships could not be totally isolated from the emphasis on the contemporary developments in Europe, conflicts in the Indian Ocean, and the association of Catholic missions with Portuguese undertakings in Asia. By the turn of the sixteenth century various misconceptions about Mecca, the Hajj and the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad had prevailed in the West. By centering the analysis on a few examples of anti-Portuguese Muslim polemical treatises and poems in India, the chapter concludes that the ritualistic corpus of the Hajj had become a matter of hostile engagements during the early stages of European expansion.

In the realm of European competition for the monopoly of hajj-shipping and the control of sanitary regulations, Michael Christopher Low analyses the involvement of Thomas Cook & Son in the Hajj in the late nineteenth century. The chapter demonstrates a dissonance between Cook’s reputation for elite travel in the Orient and its role in the pilgrimage trade. In sharp contrast to such princely travels, the Hajj in this time was viewed as an anachronistic, even dangerous, mode of travel that was mostly characterized by the mass

movement of the poor. The role of Thomas Cook reveals how British officials in India framed their reform of the pilgrimage-travel industry as a question of direct regulation of pilgrims versus indirect commercial intervention by reconfiguring the system of guides, brokers, and shippers in India and the Ḥijāz. The chapter attempts to identify the political and commercial forces that proved so resilient in thwarting British regulation of the Hajj for so many decades. The Thomas Cook Hajj project was the embodiment of indirect intervention by the British whose entrance into the pilgrimage-shipping industry immediately altered price structure, ticketing procedures, and flexible timetables.

Amid European political, medical, and economic interests in the Hajj, a new arena of knowledge about this Muslim religious practice was created in Europe. John Slight discusses British efforts to obtain, collate, and interpret information on the Hajj by officials working for the British Empire. On the basis of information recorded by the British Consulate in Jeddah, the chapter starts in 1870, when Britain's engagement with the Hajj hugely expanded, and continues to the eve of the Second World War, which marks a caesura in the pilgrimage's history. The chapter demonstrates the change of British knowledge production on the Hajj over time, being a combination of wider concerns about the threat of epidemic disease and political turmoil in the Ḥijāz, primarily the shifts from Ottoman to Hashemite then Saudi control after the First World War. Slight argues that the outcome of hajj knowledge was not purely a European production, but represented a sense of entanglement between colonial officers and consuls and Muslim indigenous informants. The Muslim employees of the Jeddah British Consulate had played a vital role in the production of British knowledge related to the Hajj. These reports immensely contributed to the creation of "colonial knowledge" on the Hajj. Their representations of the Hajj and pilgrims mirrored—and shaped—the prejudices of their British employers.

Aldo D'Agostini points out that although French control of the Hajj in the nineteenth century was inspired in part by humanitarian worries about the spread of diseases, their interest in the Hajj was also influenced by myths and prejudices and in some cases was ascribed to "strong Islamophobia." The chapter argues that European administrators in French Algeria were anxious about the possibility that pilgrims were exposed to political propaganda which had made them more "fanatical" than before. This situation led to the French adoption of a policy of repression of the Hajj which also included proposals to completely ban it. By focusing on the political policy of Jules Cambon, a governor ofAlgeria in the period 1891–1896, towards the Hajj and the pilgrimage trip of Jules Gervais-Courtellemont, a French traveller and convert to Islam, D'Agostini argues that both types of knowledge certainly affected French policy towards the Hajj. Such debates on Islam in the French colonial administration and public opinion were therefore a prelude to the institutionalization ofIslam in France in the later inter-war period, such as the establishment of the Great Mosque in Paris.

Gervais-Courtellemont entered Mecca as a European convert to Islam. Some other European narratives of the Hajj were sometimes a mixture of reality and imagination. Ulrike Freitag reflects upon the German adventurer Heinrich von Maltzan and his two volumes, My

Pilgrimage to Mecca, published first in 1865 and ostensibly accounting for his voyage to the Holy City of Mecca in 1860. His detailed account is of a clearly Orientalist variety, with a keen interest in the more scandalous aspects of society and life in the Ḥijāz. By comparing his published travelogue with his diaries, which was made available by one of his descendants, Freitag suspects the historicity of the account, since the diary entries point to a stay in the Swiss Alps instead of the Ḥijāz. The chapter looks at textual evidence in otherverifiable writings byvon Maltzan, such as his account of visiting Jeddah and Aden in 1870, so as to argue that von Maltzan played on notions of reality and dream, drug induced high, and pilgrimage induced salvation. In the following chapter Bogusław R. Zagórski analyses a similar genre of imagination about the Hajj, which emerged in the nineteenthcentury Polish-Lituanian Tatar tradition. It presents a legend of two mystical travels to the Holy Cities of Islam. The first one was written by a local holy man and countryside dweller who claimed, due to his exceptional piety, to possess a faculty of translocating his body to Mecca. The second is a nonfiction travel report by a certain Ignacy Żagiell (firstly published in 1884) that gained a certain notoriety and popularity in the history of Polish travel writing. By re-reading such works, the chapter underlines a Muslim Polish move from reality to a cherished dream and how the Hajj consequently found its way in to popular beliefs. The latter travel account belonging to a non-Muslim cultural environment in the same geographical area highlights how such works expose a Polish "orientalność"—"Orientality" that was probably typical of Eastern Europe in contrast to the Orientalist engagement with the Hajj in Western Europe.

By the turn of the twentieth century, and specifically in the interwar period, a new transcultural dimension emerged in world history, with the Hajj playing an important role therein. After World War i, we can observe a "multiplication of new borders and the variety of transgressing institutions, concepts, actors, men and women inventing themselves as global subjects." Highlighting the Hajj and Europe from this transcultural historical perspective puts forward a new research tool that will therefore "explicate the history of transnational secular and religious communities." Chapters seven and eight try to serve this goal by focusing on the structure and narratives of the accounts of two European converts to Islam who travelled to the Hajj in 1935 but probably never knew each other. Common narratives are mentioned in their travels, but in their special cases the Hajj was seen through the eyes of a Dutchman and a Hungarian. Umar Ryad discusses the pilgrimage of Dr. P.H. (or Mohammed Abdul-Ali) van der Hoog (1888–1957), a Dutch bacteriologist whose name is much connected nowadays to a famous cosmetic company in The Netherlands (http://www.drvanderhoog.nl/). Van der Hoog's role as a medical doctor in Jeddah in the late 1920s was colossal in his conversion to Islam, visit to Mecca, and performance of the Hajj. As a vivid account of a European Hajj, Van der Hoog never identified himself as split from his Western, and particularly

Dutch, background. Examining his activities and writings on Islam and Hajj, the chapter exposes Van der Hoog as an "in-between being" who tried to define his new religious belonging as trans-cultural mixture and hybridity that went beyond his original religious and cultural boundaries. His account reveals the experience of a European adventurer in search

of new spiritual experiences in the Hajj. In chapter eight Adam Mestyan pinpoints the Hajj narrative of Gyula or Julius Germanus (1884–1979), a Muslim Hungarian Orientalist and a contemporary to Van der Hoog. By using Germanus' travels to the Ḥijāz and hitherto unstudied documents in Hungarian, Arabic, and English, the chapter shows how the Hajj functions as cultural capital even in the age of mass travel. Germanus attained state recognition by claiming knowledge as a pilgrim of scholarship. Having represented himself as a cultural bridge between the Middle East and Eastern Europe, Germanus tried to instrumentalize his Hajj and connections with the Saudi officials for several goals: to improve his Arabic, to build a personal network which later was useful for cultural diplomacy, and to boost his popularity in Hungary.

The Hajj was affected by World War ii and started to take another shape in its relations with Europe in the decolonization era. The emergence of flight itineraries gradually replaced long sea trips, and new Hajj business was created. The last chapter chronologically ends the age of empires and European colonial ties with Hajj by addressing a historical chapter from Southern Europe, specifically the Spanish involvement in the Moroccan Hajj in Franco's time after World War ii. Within the context of the Spanish policy towards Islam, Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste analyses a report by a Spanish colonial officer about a pilgrimage via air voyage that was arranged by the Spanish authorities in 1949 for a group of Moroccan notables. Throughout the 1930s the Hajj was a propaganda tool in the hands of the Spanish authorities, especially during the Civil War. Sponsored by the colonial office, the chapter shows how much the Spanish political exploitation of the Hajj was bold in many ways. The trip itself in the last year of European colonization to the Muslim world brings evidence of forms of differentiation exerted by the new nation-states or the colonial powers. Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste remarkably concludes that the Hajj was a vibrant example of entanglement in its ritualising of the Spanish colonial policy and its serving a dual role of Spanish political ceremony and propaganda. <>

Islam in a Post-Secular Society: Religion, Secularity and the Antagonism of Recalcitrant Faith by Dustin J. Byrd [Studies in Critical Social Sciences, BrillAcademic, 9789004325357]

Islam in the Post-Secular Society: Religion, Secularity and the Antagonism of Recalcitrant Faith critically examines the unique challenges facing Muslims in Europe and North America. From the philosophical perspective of the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory, this book attempts not only to diagnose the current problems stemming from a marginalization of Islam in the secular West, but also to offer a proposal for a Habermasian discourse between the religious and the secular.

By highlighting historical examples of Islamic and western rapprochement, and rejecting the 'clash of civilization' thesis, the author attempts to find a 'common language' between the religious and the secular, which can serve as a vehicle for a future reconciliation.

The best of people are those that bring most benefit to the rest of mankind.—PROPHET MUHAMMAD

…

Preach the Gospel at all times, and when necessary, use words.—ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI

…

When Philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.—GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

…

Indeed, ask every man separately whether he thinks it laudable and worthy of a man of this age to hold a position from which he receives a salary disproportionate to his work; to take from the people – often in poverty – taxes to be spent on constructing cannon, torpedoes, and other instruments of butchery, so as to make war on people with whom we wish to be at peace, and who feel the same wish in regard to us; or to receive a salary for devoting one's whole life to constructing these instruments of butchery, or to preparing oneself and others for the work of murder. —LEO TOLSTOY

The idea for this book came about when I attended the 38th annual Future of Religion conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia, in April of 2014. The theme of the 2014 conference was Witnessing and Confessing – a perfect theme for my interests in Muslim communities in Europe, relations between the West and the Muslim world, as well as my main theoretical foundation, the Critical Theory of Religion, as developed out of the Frankfurt School's critical theory of society. After presenting my paper in the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, and

listening to the other scholar's valuable critiques, I chose to continue my research and expand it into a book. The result is this modest volume.

To the reader, I hope my use of technical and foreign language, born out of philosophy, religion, theology and sociology, doesn't prove to be too impenetrable. For some this verbiage may seem like mesmerizing jargon; I assure you it is not. Certain categories, concepts, and notions (and some in languages other than English) are necessary in order to clarify, analyze, and debate the subject at hand. As philosophers dealing with complex issues that pertain to a multiplicity of cultures, wherein we both have to speak about the universal and the particular, the use of various languages to penetrate into the heart of the vexing problem is sometimes necessary. Each language provides another avenue by which the thinker can journey into the darkest recess of the dilemma. Through our conceptual language and categories we come to understand, interpret, differentiate and engage the world. If we are lacking in the conceptual tools to do so, we experience the world as an untranslatable phenomenon that lacks determinacy, lacks clarity, and consequently lacks subjective importance. In this blunted form of living, existential issues are reduced to a series of experiences and sensations that do not find sufficient articulation in meaningful language, which essentially leaves us with an amorphous biography of random impressions and passions. However, the world becomes unlocked to many students and scholars once they've acquired the language and conceptions to think systematically, abstractly, dialectically, concretely, as well as through what Walter Benjamin called "constellations." Without such philosophical, theological, sociological and religious language, the status quo remains reified – it is experienced as simply "the given" and not the socially constructed and therefore mutable phenomenon that it is. Although much of mankind's history is the product of mere nature, most of it is the product of the way man choses to be through his labor, his passions, and his will. History and society are not fixed, nor are they on an unalterable trajectory, nor are they simply the product of the natural world. Society, and therefore history, can be changed when we can first understand their internal dynamics and characteristics. If we are able to articulate our worldview, identify our disagreements, and find the courage to transcend the status quo, than we can construct better and more penetrating arguments through which social change can be imagined and actualized.

In Marx's article, The Ruthless Critique of Everything Existing, he calls upon his reader to (1) have courage to accept the consequences of one's critique, and (2) to not be afraid to challenge the status quo, i.e. to be martyr material if history calls one to be such. In light of the increasing barbarity of the modern world, it may be an absolute necessity to adopt this attitude if we are to remedy the seemingly intractable ills that plague our present world. As every student of political philosophy knows, Karl Marx's famous 11th Thesis on Feuerbach states, 'Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.' In this quote, Marx presupposes that philosophers already have the linguistic and conceptual capabilities to interpret the world adequately – some more than others for sure – but does not slip into a state of ataraxia—tranquility— in doing so, but rather becomes maladjusted to the pathological sickness of their society. Philosophers, and consequently those who learn from philosophers, must go beyond the mere conceptualization of the world

– although it is the necessary precondition – they must also contribute to a radical praxis adversus mundi (against the world) with its unnecessary injustices, and must never fuga mundi (flee the world) like cloistered mystics.

This same desire to transubstantiate the world for the better was echoed in a religious form by Pope Francis in his 2013 exhortation Evangelii Gaudium (The Joy of the Gospel) when he wrote,

> An authentic faith – which is never comfortable or completely personal – always involves a deep desire to change the world, to transmit values, to leave this earth somehow better than we found it.

For the critical theorist of religion and society, it is the role, some may even say the duty, of those who find themselves with the intellectual tools to see beyond the necessary appearances of the given, who have escaped Plato's Cave, who can pierce through the façade of the mesmerizing consumer society, and see clearly through the impenetrable darkness of the night-side of neo-liberalism, to engage not only the world via thought, but through deed as well. The Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek encourages intellectuals to return to thinking, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Marxist international. For him, we need to think through the catastrophic that was communism, and to also take stock of the ingenuity of capitalism to survive its own inner-contradictions, catastrophes and frequent collapses. However, as right as Žižek is, and he is most assuredly correct about the need to re-think, we must also not lose sight of revolutionary and Socratic praxis. The victims of the world's pathological exploitation and oppression – created by the distorted logic and rapacious greed of globalized neo-liberalism – are still being manufactured, still being abused, and still being oppressed, and have not the time for self-satisfying intellectual theorizing. Yet this is not a call for action for action's sake. It is clear that the immediacy of unnecessary human, animal and environmental suffering needs not to be rethought. As such, we should avoid a perpetual state of praxis paralysis – satisfied within ourselves to only think about the victims but do nothing concretely to stop the creation of new victims. If religious believers and secular revolutionaries cannot change the world entire, or bring about the utopian Kingdom of God on earth, and must content themselves with waiting for the long-awaited and long-delayed messianic figure, we must not in our activist-slumber forget the suffering that is in the world at this very moment. Those whose suffering will never be recorded in the footnotes of history must not be forgotten, but rather their suffering must be expressed, as all perennial suffering, Adorno reminds us, has the right to be expressed, and academics are in a privileged position to articulate the suffering that today's societies fights to mute. It may be the appropriate moment in which philosophy retires its feeling of intellectual superiority and once again learns from the prophetic religions, especially as it has been articulated today by Pope Francis, who encourages the faithful to live in solidarity with the poor, which means to 'eliminate the structural causes of poverty and to promote the integral development of the poor.' Pope Francis reminds us to remember that, as long as the problems of the poor are not radically resolved by rejecting the absolute autonomy of markets and financial

speculation and by attacking structural causes of inequality, no solution will be found for the world's problems, or, for that matter, to any problem. Inequality is the root of social ills.

In light of the overwhelming social degradation that is occurring around the world with the spread of values that are diametrically opposed to the prophetic values of mercy, solidarity, and brotherly love, Pope Francis bravely calls the world to cultivate its inner sense of fairness and justice as a countervailing force to the tyranny of the markets and to engage in loving praxis in the hopes of redirecting our ailing world towards a greater sense of brotherhood and equality. Critical theorists of religion share this sentiment, albeit through humanist philosophy.

In the process of writing this book, I attended not only the 2014 Dubrovnik conference in Croatia, but also the Loyola University conference on Critical Theory in Rome, Italy, a week later. However, during the Dubrovnik conference, I listened intently to an individual with nationalist leanings voice some of the crudest stereotypes about Muslims and their faith. Astonishingly, he boldly articulated his belief that Muslims were inherently incapable of enlightened thought, inherently undemocratic and unwilling to accept the superiority of European religious culture. No matter how much I argued against his ill-informed thesis, he remained steadfast in his narrow and shallow beliefs about a community comprised of 1.6 billion individuals. The cacophony of Muslim opinions, philosophies, cultural practices, etc., were all artificially harmonized and reduced to a single concept: the Muslim, just as the Jews had once been conceptualized as der Jude (the Jew). Once singularized, he could dismiss all the Muslims with crude generalizations and stereotypes. An echo of fascism hung thick in the cool Adriatic air.

In Rome, under the shadow of the Pantheon – once dedicated to "all the gods" and now to Saint Mary and the early Christian martyrs – I was appalled to witness a tourist couple from Northern Europe berate an African immigrant trying to sell them a knock-off luxury purse. In front of their child, they yelled at him, hurled insults, and brushed him away like a vexatious fly. The pain of being belittled and disrespected in front of a child could be seen in the weary face of the already broken man who was only there trying to scratch out a meager existence, most likely to send most of what he earned back home to his family in Africa. What was most poignant to witness was the tourists' young boy, who was no more than ten years old. Without any thought, he mimicked his father's dismissive gestures – waving away the immigrant man without ever recognizing the humanity that dwelled within him. The father clearly approved of the boy's mimetic actions as he looked down at his son with pride. Unfortunately, this abusive and dehumanizing behavior ensures a cycle of antagonistic relationships with the "other," one that further entrenches already deeply held racist beliefs as well as their after-effect, a feeling of disrespect among the immigrants – especially those of Islamic faith. However, from the solidarist perspective of Pope Francis, it was in the suffering of that despised immigrant that one can find the presence of Jesus of Nazareth; he too, for Francis, was dismissed by the tourists – when history offered an opportunity to express Christian agape with the suffering, dejected and despised, they instead showed cruel and cold callousness, more typical of the bourgeoisie. These two footnotes of history

shows us that this kind of hatred and disgust for others is not natural, it is not inborn, and it is not genetic; it is a learned phenomenon and an acquired attitude. It results in a cycle that is blindly repeated through the generations unless people who can think critically voice their firm opposition and begin to work against a world that devours itself based on small differences. Auschwitz – the inevitable outcome of pathological hatred and misguided metaphysics – begins with such inherited attitudes and gestures.

In his reflection on metaphysics after the horror and terror of the Shoah, Theodor Adorno wrote,

a new categorical imperative has been impose by Hitler upon unfree mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen.

In order to make forbidden to history that which is already forbidden in Abrahamic morality – pathological hatred of the other – all instances of injustice must be opposed by an equal commitment to justice, mercy, and solidarity. The mass annihilation of others, rooted in a mass disgust, contempt, and hatred for their existence, must be forever eradicated as a potential for human relations.

Auschwitz, which forever doomed mankind's optimism about itself, cannot and must not be repeated. Yet, only decades after this great catastrophe, the conditions for another conflation of worldviews and peoples are already being produced in Europe, North America and the Middle East. In Europe, the ranks of anti-Immigrant political parties continue to swell while ISIS continues to call for lone wolf attacks on targets in the capitals of western nations.

The potential for fascism and fascistic-like tendencies survived the Third Reich and are now once again being exploited within the debate about Islam in the West. The mirror image is happening among the Muslims, as the growth of extremist and terrorists groups in the Middle East continues unabated, but thankfully do not represent the vast majority of believers. Fascism has many forms and, like a cameleon, can camouflage itself in many different cultures; from the far right in Europe to ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the human capacity for absolute destruction of the other is swiftly becoming a renewed reality. The "new imperative" of "never again," that resulted from fascism's cruelty and destruction, has gone unheard between the clamor of militaristic slogans and the battle cries of war between nations and religions.

Despite the rise of the often Islamophobic and neo-Randian Tea Party in American political life, the situation has become worse in Europe. In the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Greece, etc., political parties whose platform includes anti-immigrant rhetoric have made significant headways into the political system. For the first fifty years after World War II, or the Great Patriotic War as it is called in Russia, xenophobic far-right political parties were unthinkable, fascistic policies and thoughts were unspeakable in the public sphere, but now they have been reborn with a sense of credibility. Then the target was the communists and Jews, now there is a new target: the Muslims. The language that Europe

thought it had left behind after WWII has reappeared and has forcefully made its way back into political discourse. The critical theorists Horkheimer and Adorno already foresaw the folly of believing Europe could resign its fascistic tendencies after the catastrophe of World War ii. With the proper catalyst, all of Europe was capable of the same authoritarian and violent tendencies that were cultivated in Nazi Germany. They wrote,

> fascism triumphed under a crassly xenophobic, anti-cultural, collectivist ideology. Now that it has devastated the earth, nations must fight against it; there is no other way. But when all is over, a spirit of freedom need not spread across Europe; its nations may become as xenophobic, as hostile to culture, and as pseudo-collectivist as the fascism against which they had to defend themselves. Even its defeat will not necessarily break the motion of the avalanche.

Conversely, the Muslim community hasn't always given their fellow European and American counterparts a sense of security, as many within the community have often contributed to the suspicion of violence that surrounds them. From rallies that fanatically condemn European culture, to terrorist acts upon European and American cities, radical Muslims – having rejected the values of European society as well as traditional Islam – have often pushed their American, Dutch, British, German, Italian, French, etc., neighbors into the anti-Islamic political parties for fear that they are losing their culture, their nation, and their way of life.

This new and rabid Islamophobia draws upon a different legitimation than the neo-pagan fascism of Hitler and Mussolini; it is often clothed in the language of "defending the Enlightenment" itself. These far-right and often neofascist politicians and activists are drawing their legitimacy by appearing to defend what was once thought to be the universal values of the European Enlightenment, and they often have help in this endeavor from liberals and anti-religion leftists. Having traveled around Europe often in the last ten years, I've witnessed this growing trend firsthand and have noticed that it has only worsened as Europe has become increasingly entangled in Middle Eastern and North African affairs and as emigration from Muslim countries to Europe has increased beyond its capacity (or national will) to accommodate them. Unfortunately, I see that a new dark and ominous specter is forming over Europe: neo-fascist Islamophobism, or what I have defined as miso-Islamism, or "pathological hatred for Islam." The hatred of Islam will spread like a virulent cancer unless people of good will, revolutionary faith and Socratic faithlessness, who are committed to the peaceful cooperation between the religious traditions and secular citizens – a being-with-each-other that is rooted in mutual recognition, respect and shared commitments – work together for a common goal: a more reconciled future society. Absent a discourse movement such as this, both the neo-fascist nativists of Europe and the extremist Muslims who find no real attachment to their western societies, and who dream of an "Islamic Europe," will continue to pull western society to the political and cultural margins – an unsustainable situation under any analysis. Without discourse there will be no true knowledge of the other; without knowledge there will be no potential for reconciliation; and without reconciliation there will only be a state of war.

When examining Dr. Siebert's time in Dubrovnik during Yugoslavia's civil war, it's important to note the great courage that was demonstrated as he continued to travel to the Balkans during the fighting; he never missed a year despite the heavy bombardment that surrounded him; he refused to take sides between the Croats, the Serbs, and the Bosnian Muslims, but rather stood steadfast for what he believed was morally right; he suffered with whomever was suffering unjustly. Dr. Siebert not only brought a penetrating philosophical analysis and critical religiology to the Balkans but also cared for the physical and material needs of the victims. Medicine was given to whoever was in need, regardless of their national identity and/or ethnicity, and he welcomed any discourse partner who was willing to offer their constructive and critical thoughts. Amidst the artillery shells falling on the worker owned Hotel Argentina, in which the conference was being held, he had the prophetic and Socratic commitment to continue his lectures on Immanuel Kant's most hopeful proposition for Perpetual Peace (1795). In the face of war, he embraced a revolutionary yet illusive peace. It is in this light – the undiminished search for a better world – that I offer this book as a small attempt to help find a way towards that more reconciled future society that Dr. Rudolf J. Siebert taught about and longed for since he was a soldier in World War ii, through the Yugoslav civil war, and until today. Dum vivimus, vivamus.

Professing Islam in a Post-Secular Society

The post-September 11th world has brought a new concentration upon the nature of Islam and the Muslim world, especially in light of the millions of Muslims that live in the West. The turmoil in Syria and Iraq, as well as in parts of North and East Africa, has brought hundreds of thousands of Muslim immigrants and refugees to the shores of Europe. Once there, they join the millions of other Muslims who have already made their homes in the West. Although the secular democracies of Europe are seen by many as places of opportunity and freedom, many Muslims find their presence to be unwanted, unwelcomed and hated; their religious sensibilities disrespected; their culture maligned, and their faith positions mocked and degraded. Indeed, the post-secular society, in which both religious communities remain an important and powerful presence despite the continual secularization of the lifeworld, is a contentious mix of worldviews, cultural norms, epistemologies and moral systems. Following the philosophical work of Jürgen Habermas and the Frankfurt School, such a society can either chose to embrace the diversity and live in a dynamic democracy, or retreat into stagnant provincialism, in which the various secular and religious communities fail to engage in a productive discourse. As such, the challenge of the post-secular society can either result in a vibrant multicultural and cosmopolitan democracy, where constitutional values are the basis for shared citizenship, or the various factions can continue their discourse avoidance and fragment into waring faction, which will inevitably lead to in-creased social conflict.

The purpose of this study is to probe the various points in western society, especially Europe, where the issue of professing Islam can either be a force for solidarity among religious communities and secular citizens, or a force of division. Informed by the Frankfurt School for Social Research, especially Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and the 2nd generation philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas, this

study will be attempt to shed light on the future possibilities of a more reconciled future society wherein Islam finds a welcoming place within the post-secular society. As both a critical scholar of religion as well as a citizen of a secular state, I and many others wish to avoid the situation in which western societies degenerate into rigid communities of exclusivity; we wish to arrest and reverse the entrenched economic marginalization that so many experience, as well as to abolish the religious bigotry that plagues both the Muslim community as well as the post-secular – and post-Christian – West. Rather we choose to seek out ways to peacefully co-exist and thrive together as one community regardless of the other's faith or faithlessness. In order to explore the possibilities of such a future reconciled society, we, like the Frankfurt School's critical religiology, will turn to philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, cultural studies and even theology. Although some remain skeptical, I find a turn towards theology to be extremely insightful, as its transcendent nature can inform us of the innerdynamics of any given situation and help point us towards the ought, as opposed to simply abandoning the future to the is. Furthermore, "reconciliation," which is an underlying theme throughout this work, is not simply a matter of eschatology, but one that we recognize as being within the realm of possibility in the here-and-now. Just as Karl Marx's vision of a classless society reconciles the antagonism of class by the removal of that which antagonizes – oppression and exploitation of one class over all others; just as 'Ali Shariati's visions of a society beyond the colonial/colonized paradigm pointed to the reconciliatory potential of revolutionary Islam; just as Malcolm x, in his last days, saw a vision of the world that no longer used the yardstick of race to judge others, but rather judged based on the deeds of individuals; and just as Che Guevara had a radical vision of a society unified under the principle of equality and social justice, so too do we want to search for the potential for reconciliation within the context of our contemporary times. In order to do this, we will examine, interrogate, and critique both religion and secularity in a dialectical fashion, hoping to determinately negate that which leads mankind into continuous cycles of hatred and violence, while simultaneously preserving, augmenting, and fulfilling the prophetic and Socratic spirit that dissolves such irrational and destructive antagonisms. That being said, our aim, predicated on the permanence of the modern secular society in the West, wishes to see the construction of a more humane post-secular society; a society that values both the achievements of secularity as well as enlightened religion. In working for such a better society, we must turn our attention to one of the most vexing issues within western society today: the trouble with recalcitrant faith, especially Islamic faith, in the context of the post-secular West and its post-Christian society. <>

The Shahnameh: The Persian Epic as World Literature by Hamid Dabashi [Columbia University Press, 9780231183444]

The *Shahnameh*, an epic poem recounting the foundation of Iran across mythical, heroic, and historical ages, is the beating heart of Persian literature and culture. Composed by Abu al-Qasem Ferdowsi over a thirty-year period and completed in the year 1010, the epic has

entertained generations of readers and profoundly shaped Persian culture, society, and politics. For a millennium, Iranian and Persian-speaking people around the globe have read, memorized, discussed, performed, adapted, and loved the poem.

In this book, Hamid Dabashi brings the *Shahnameh* to renewed global attention, encapsulating a lifetime of learning and teaching the Persian epic for a new generation of readers. Dabashi insightfully traces the epic's history, authorship, poetic significance, complicated legacy of political uses and abuses, and enduring significance in colonial and postcolonial contexts. In addition to explaining and celebrating what makes the *Shahnameh* such a distinctive literary work, he also considers the poem in the context of other epics, such as the *Aeneid* and the *Odyssey*, and critical debates about the concept of world literature. Arguing that Ferdowsi's epic and its reception broached this idea long before nineteenth-century Western literary criticism, Dabashi makes a powerful case that we need to rethink the very notion of "world literature" in light of his reading of the Persian epic.

The Shahnameh is a long beautiful poem in my mother tongue. It was composed in Persian with poise, patience, perseverance, as if performing an act of poetic piety, of moral obligation, of the ritual ablution of a people. It has been loved and admired since its completion in the year 1010 in the Khorasan region of Iran, the singular lifework of one poet who in more than fifty thousand couplets summoned the full historical imagination of a people. It is the longest epic poem in the world composed by one poet.

The Shahnameh is the surviving relic of many beautiful and exquisite tales informing bygone and forgotten empires. It is forever loved, beautifully written, ceremoniously read, happily recited, and then, generation after generation, memorized, performed, painted, praised, critically edited, and even revered by Iranian and other Persian-speaking people around the globe. People name their children after its heroes. They call their loved ones names immortalized in these tales. Living histories are made of stories told in this book.

The Shahnameh is an epic of many empires. Its stories date back to time immemorial. It tells stories of legends and heroes and histories long since otherwise forgotten—the Sassanids, the Arsacids, Alexander the Great, the Parthians, the Kiyanids ... stories of who knows what other forgotten gathering of unending pride and enduring prejudices.

Hakim Abolqasem Ferdowsi Tusi is the name of the poet who wrote the Shahnameh. He finished it around the year1010 in the Christian calendar, though he lived on a different calendar, an Islamic, an Iranian calendar. The original text of the epic is carefully researched, judiciously documented, impeccably preserved—every single word of it lovingly cherished, meticulously honored, thoroughly documented.

Beyond and above its imperial pedigree, the Shahnameh has been the companion of multiple nations across the colonial and postcolonial worlds, deeply rooted as these nations are in a common moral imagination. The Persian epic is the shared memory of that active and enduring imagination.

The poetic gift at the heart of the Shahnameh extends the totality of its mythic, heroic, and historical narratives deep into an open-ended infinity they collectively invest in those who read it. When the narrative roots of this text began, we do not know; when it will end, we have no clue. The Persian epic remembers and perpetuates itself—in and of itself. It has sustained itself through the thick and thin of a history that has always had but limited, passing, fragile political claim on its unfolding poetic horizons. The Shahnameh is a renegade epic.

The paramount question today is, how are we to read the Shahnameh beyond its past and lost glories—today meaning almost two decades into the twenty-first century in the Christian calendar, which is not the calendar in which the Persian epic was written, or in which it is now read in countries where people can read and recite it in its original?

The Shahnameh has been widely translated into various languages and admired by readers around the globe. To read it in a language other than its original Persian, people have had to read it mostly in English, some in French, and less so in Arabic, Turkish, German, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, or Spanish. That fact is not accidental to the way the Shahnameh is read today. The primacy of English in reading it in its translation reflects the colonial context of its reception over the past two hundred years plus. Ferdowsi wrote the Shahnameh in Persian, once an imperial language of its own. Today people around the world, the world in which this Persian text is to be or not to be considered as part of what is called "World Literature," mostly read it in English. In that factual paradox dwells the ironic power of an epic living beyond its destiny.

In reimagining the Shahnameh as a piece of world literature first and foremost that Eurocentric world needs to be reassessed and reimagined. The "World" in "World Literature," as we use the term today, is a fictional ("Western") world—an imperial, colonial fiction, a fiction that has factually impaired the larger world in which we have lived. It is a decidedly European world, positing a Euro-universalist imagination upon the moral and normative universe in which humanity lives within multiple worlds. It is a colonial confiscation of the real world. It is the imperial appropriation of a world that has been denied its own inhabitants and their varied and multiple worldliness. Any text from any part of that real world that wants to enter this warped world of "World Literature" must first and

foremost ask permission from a fictive white European literary critic and thus distort itself to the aesthetic, poetic, and above all mimetic

particularities of that European world he represents before it is admitted, and once it is thus admitted it has ipso facto disfigured itself. In making the case for world literature, we must first and foremost dismantle and overcome the European fiction of that "World Literature" as theorized from Goethe forward. What Goethe and his followers have theorized is not "world" literature. It is the imperial wet dream of European literature. It is theirs. It is their world. It is not worldly, it is not real, it is fictive, imperial, cherry-picking aspects of other people's literature and twisting and turning it to its liking. It is therefore innately abusive of the world it wishes thus to appropriate and narratively (as politically) to rule. The world, the real world, the world at large, is entirely outside the parameters of that European manufactured, colonially fictional "World."

Where exactly is this "World," we can now ask in earnest, when they say "World Literature"? Can we question the location and the logistics of this world? Might this world perhaps be a specific world, a Eurocentric world, a world mapped to look dominant under the sign of "Europe," a world in the shadow of Europe, a world imagined by European cartographers, philosophers, world conquerors, and enlightened thinkers, and all their North American descendants? If so, might we perhaps think of another world, a world ravaged by European colonialism and now rising from the enduring conditions of its postcoloniality to claim a dignity of place for itself, including a claim on world literature beyond the limited imagination of "World Literature" perhaps? If so, can the Shahnameh be read as a piece of world literature in that world—the real world, the postcolonial world—as part and parcel of a global claim on the pride of place not mapped in "World Literature"? Can we reverse the order of these worlds and begin theorizing from "the wretched of the earth" upward, rather than the other way around, the way "World Literature" has been theorized?

To enter this real, larger world, to become part and parcel of world literature (without any imposing Euro-universalist capital letters), my argument in this book is very simple: the Shahnameh must be read and remembered for the imperial worlds it once occupied and the postcolonial world it now inhabits—the world in which it was created, the world it envisions, and the world in which it has been read. My consistent argument throughout this book is that to place the Persian (or any other non-European) epic in the context of real (not the colonially fictional Eurocentric) world literature, we must detect the ways in which its epic nature consistently overcomes its imperial uses and abuses and theorize the manner in which its poetics triumphs over its passing politics. To do so we need to see how its stories tower more prominently over its histories and show how its form trumps its formalities. Above all, you will see me consistently demonstrate how its Oedipal (or what I call Sohrabaneh) trauma dismantles its patriarchal order, and how its subdued eroticism undermines its flaunted warmongering, or how its festive bazms undermine its fighting razms. Ultimately this line of argument leads to my basic proposal that the sense of tragic in the Shahnameh embraces its sense of triumph, and how its subversive narrative foreshadows its triumphalist prosody. The result of this decidedly worldly reading of the

Shahnameh places it against the very grain of the triumphalist reading of European epics from the Iliad to Virgil, a sentiment now evident in the very imperial diction of the idea of "World Literature."

By placing the Shahnameh far beyond the foreclosed totality of Eurocentric "World Literature," we open up its expansive vistas onto the infinity of a planetary conception of world literature that will liberate the very ideas of "modern epic" and "world text" into far more emancipatory literary and moral horizons. Ferdowsi's Shahnameh is neither triumphalist nor defeatist, if we were to place it on a common Eurocentric classification of epic. It is a decidedly defiant epic, drawing attention to its own form by the power of its expansive poetics. It is to that poetic force that I first and foremost draw your attention in this book. The Shahnameh is rich. It is diversified. Historians can draw historical evidence, biographers biographical data, emperors seek legitimacy, tyrants fish for justification, as could linguists rely on its syntax and morphology for their own purposes. But it is first and foremost as a poetic act of ingenious originality and power that I emphasize the enduring significance of the Persian epic in order to place it in the context of a radically reconfigured conception of world literature.

The Shahnameh began from the scattered sources in both Persian and Pahlavi. It was gathered and composed into a singularly beautiful and compelling narrative by a gifted, driven, and visionary poet. It was then loved, celebrated, admired, produced in beautiful illustrated manuscripts and, as such, served successive empires as the talismanic touchstone of their always fragile legitimacy. All those empires eventually collapsed, and European colonial modernity dawned on the Persian-speaking world—from India to the Mediterranean shores. Postcolonial nations emerged and laid varied claims on the Persian epic, as did states seeking legitimacy from the bygone ages the Persian epic represented. It was a mismatch, but it worked. The varied worlds the Shahnameh has historically inhabited are no longer there. The world in which it now lives is no longer a Persianate empire. It is an American empire—fragile, clumsy, dysfunctional, self-destructive, abusive, vulgar, producing its own unconvincing epics, therefore in no need of any "Persian epic."

The poetic power of the Shahnameh, however, was never contingent on any imperial anchorage or abuse. It gave those passing empires the symbolic legitimacy they needed and lacked but kept the substance of its own poetic sublimity to itself. It is now precisely that poetic sublimity that must be matched and mixed with the fragile world the Shahnameh today inhabits. The fragmented world in which the Shahnameh now lives, and in which it can lay a claim to being world literature, renders its stories allegorical, as indeed the closed-circuited totality of this world opens up the infinity of its poetic possibilities, its intuition of transcendence, now as forever definitive to the Shahnameh. My book is about this matching, this approximation: bringing the Persian epic to a close encounter with a fragmented empire it now inhabits, it can never legitimize, and it will ipso facto, discredit.

The Shahnameh is a long beautiful poem now mostly read in English, the language of an empire upon whose flag "the sun never set." It is reported that Herodotus once used that phrase for the Persian empire. From the Achaemenids to the British and now the American,

empires rise and fall, all reflected in the shining pages and magnificent stories of a Persian epic that has endured and survived them all—to teach them a lesson or two in humility, and give the rest of us the good tidings of resistance, resilience, and triumph, so we can all learn that if empires lasted the whole world would be reading the Shahnameh in its original.

It takes certain audacity, a lofty sense of purpose, an abiding determination to do, or to have done, what is necessary, to begin a book with that kind of magisterial pronouncement and authorial power: In the Name of the God of Soul and Reason! And then to bring the evocation home: For beyond this, (human) intellect cannot reach!

Khodavand is God in Persian, the language in which this poem is composed. But the poet opts to specify what kind of God is to sit so majestically upon the commencement of his poetic edifice: the God that has given us life and reason, a soul and a sense of right and wrong, the ability to think, for beyond the invocation of the name of such a God human intellect itself cannot reach. He then goes on to specify who exactly this God is: the God that makes it possible for us to secure a good name for ourselves and ascertain a respectable standing among our peers, and the God that gives us our daily sustenance and who guides us, the God that created this vast universe and its planets, and the God who brought light to the Sun, the Moon, and Venus. The poet then confesses this God is superior to our ability to name, to identify, or to speculate about his nature, so we must think of him as an artist perhaps whose work of art is quite evident but not his own whereabouts. I keep using the gender-specific pronoun "he" or "him." But in Persian we don't have gender-specific pronouns. So this God is beyond gender and thus beyond any pronouns. So as you see you enter the commencement of these lines of poetry, and before you know it a whole different universe is opened up to you. You keep reading and going down the lines, every line a step upward and downward and sideways into the making of an edifice that the poet and you build together. The imperial world he inherited and the poetic world he built, before you know it, become your world too, the world in which you live and read and teach and learn. He gives you the line and you keep reading and fathoming what they could mean. The play is endless. The game joyous. The stage sparkles with magic.'

Who is the poet who wrote those words at the commencement of his monumental epic? Whence his pious vigilance, this august sobriety, this power and poise with which he commands the attention and secures the respect of any person who can read and understand Persian anywhere around the world, from the epicenter of Khorasan in northeastern Iran where the poet lived around the world into the home and habitat of any Afghan, Iranian, Tajik, or any other person who can claim Ferdowsi's mother tongue as his or her own.

Ferdowsi's Shahnameh. There have been many Shahnamehs in the course of Persian poetic history—both before and after Ferdowsi's Shahnameh (composed ca. 1010). But today as indeed throughout history when we say "the Shahnameh" we mean Ferdowsi's Shahnameh. "The Book of Kings": that is what "Shahnameh" means, for it is a book about kings, queens, and heroes. But the word "shah" does not only mean "king" but can also mean "the Best," "the Most Significant," "the Chief." Shah-daneh means the best seed, Shah-tut means the

best berry, Shah-rag means the most important vein, Shah-parak means the most beautiful wings and thus a "butterfly": thus Shahnameh can also mean "The Best Book," "The Master Book," "The Principal Book," or simply "The Book."

"The Shahnameh to me is what the Hebrew Bible is to an orthodox Jew." Mahmoud Omidsalar, one of a handful of eminent Shahnameh scholars alive today, is not usually taken by hyperbole. I still remember this phrase with his solid Isfahani accent and I wonder. Every time I come near Ferdowsi's Shahnameh, Omidsalar's phrase first stands between my reverential fingers and the opening page of the Persian epic. The first few lines I read still echo Omidsalar's voice, but soon Ferdowsi's magic begins to strip you of all your worldly concerns and seduces you into its poetic power, storytelling panache, wise missives, heartbreaking asides, rising crescendos of battlefields, erotic corners of his heroes' amorous adventures, and above all the triumphant defiance of his sublime gift of storytelling. You become a character, willy-nilly, in his plays. You act out, you sing along, you recite the lines out loud that demand and exact elocution.

I write this book to tell you all about the Shahnameh, most everything I have learned reading and teaching the Persian epic for a lifetime. But first let me tell you one of the stories of the Shahnameh before we go any further. <>

The Poetry of Thought in Late Antiquity: Essays in imagination and religion by Patricia Cox Miller [Routledge, 9781138711990]

This title was first published in 2001. These collected essays by Patricia Cox Miller identify new possibilities of meaning in the study of religion in late antiquity. The book addresses the topic of the imaginative mindset of late ancient authors from a variety of Greco-Roman religious traditions. Attending to the play of language, as well as to the late ancient sensitivity to image, metaphor, and paradox, Cox Miller's work highlights the poetizing sensibility that marked many of the texts of this period and draws on methods of interpretation from a variety of contemporary literary-critical theories. This book will appeal to scholars of late antiquity, religious literature, and literary critical theory more widely, illustrating how fruitful dialogue across the centuries can be - not only in eliciting aspects of late ancient texts that have gone unnoticed but also in showing that many 'modern' ideas, such as Roland Barthes', were actually already alive and well in ancient texts.

"God was not dead in the Roman Empire", as Averil Cameron has observed in a recent study. "Religion became, and continued to be, a main focus for discourse, and the more so as traditional political discourse closed off'. Not only was God not dead, neither was the human imagination. Many of those who produced the discourse of religion referred to by Cameron were deeply engaged by the creative possibilities of language and drew on a wide variety of images to give shape and texture to the beliefs and practices that structured their world and themselves. Almost anything—flocks of sheep, a bride munching apples, even the letters of the alphabet—could be subjected to the metaphorizing process that turned the ordinary into an extraordinary vehicle of meaning. As Mark C. Taylor has remarked in another context, "religion often is most effective where it is least obvious".

In the essays that comprise this volume, "religion" is constituted by literary texts from the Christianities, Gnosticisms, Neoplatonisms (and in one case, magical traditions) that claimed allegiance in the late ancient world. Despite the very real differences that mark the ways in which these texts characterize their gods and reflect on their own practices as adherents of these traditions and communities, they all share what I claim is a "poetic" apprehension, that is, a sensitivity to the allusive, shifting qualities of human attempts to state what is most fundamental to their lives. I often use the term poiēsis and its derivatives in English in the basic sense of "creation", a "making" that is consonant with the line of the poet Wallace Stevens that "reality is an activity of the most august imagination". By using these terms, I wish to call attention to the late ancient sensitivity to image, metaphor, and sign and so to highlight the figurative sensibility that is a distinctive feature of many of the texts of this period.

Of course, as Jonathan Z. Smith has argued, the student of religion must be aware of her own "poetic" apprehension, that is, her own stance as interpreter and maker of meaning. Noting the modernity of the term "religion", Smith observes that, "If we have understood the archeological and textual record correctly, man has had his entire history in which to imagine deities and modes of interaction with them. But man, more precisely western man, has had only the last few centuries in which to imagine religion. It is this act of second

order, reflective imagination which must be the central preoccupation of any student of religion". Thus in what follows, I will be focusing not only on the late ancient imagination but my own practices as an interpreter as well.

In her study of the role of memory in medieval culture, Mary Carruthers remarks that, "when we [in Western culture] think of our highest creative power, we think invariably of the imagination. `Great imagination, profound intuition,' we say: this is our highest accolade for intellectual achievement, even in the sciences". She goes on to make the following observations about the role of imagination in medieval culture that are relevant to late ancient culture as well.

We make such judgments (even those of us who are hard scientists) because we have been formed in a post-Romantic, post-Freudian world, in which imagination has been identified with a mental unconscious of great, even dangerous, creative power. Consequently, when they look at the Middle Ages, modem scholars are often disappointed by the apparently lowly, working-day status accorded to imagination in medieval psychology—a sort of draught-horse of the sensitive soul, not even given intellectual status. Ancient and medieval people reserved their awe for memory ... Because of this great change in the relative status of imagination and memory, many modems have concluded that medieval people did not value originality or creativity. We are simply looking in the wrong place.

The relevance of Carruthers' observations for late antiquity is twofold. On the one hand, "imagination", insofar as it stands as an adequate translation of the Greek and the Latin imaginatio, did not generally carry the high estimation of creativity with which it is endowed today, especially since both terms could point in the direction either of unreality or mere fancy.' On the other hand, the statement that "we are simply looking in the wrong place" opens up other possibilities for finding resources in late antiquity for a sense of what is now termed "imagination".

Carruthers' study of memory provides one body of literature for locating a "right" place to look in order to recuperate ancient and medieval ways of valuing originality and creativity. And there were other pedagogies of the imagination as well. One might, for example, look to certain techniques of rhetorical training such as the ethopoiia, an exercise in composition defined as "a speech giving the imagined words of an historical, mythological, or biblical character", or the ekphrasis, an exercise that trained students to compose speeches that brought a particular subject—whether it be a person, place, artistic object, or event—so vividly before the eyes of the listener, and with such emotional affect, that the listener was transformed into a spectator.

My own quest for the late ancient imagination has focused on theories of interpretation and language as well as on texts that, whether implicitly or explicitly, use images not as mere reflections of reality but as vehicles that generate meaning and, in so doing, transform the reader's perception at the same time as they alter the conditions of meaning. The authors of the texts considered here did not use images simply as ornaments or rhetorical embellishments that could be discarded as secondary to their arguments. Rather, images

were constitutive of the insights of such texts. As a contemporary literary theorist has put it, "Some metaphors enable us to see aspects of reality that the metaphor's production helps to constitute".

In a word, figuration has been the locus of my explorations of late ancient imagination. Figuration, however, is a complex affair, no less in antiquity than today. Ancient writers had at their disposal a large vocabulary of figurational terms, as the following catalogue shows: "eikōn, eidolon, morphē, mimēma, tūpos, and graphē—image/likeness, image/simulacrum, shape/form, imitation/copy, stamp/impression, and painting/drawing". Such a generous range of terms suggests that the question, "What is an image?", drew as broad a spectrum of answers in antiquity as it does now, and it suggests further that one way to engage the figurative qualities of ancient texts is to affirm what a contemporary literary theorist has called "the value of recognizing the equivocal richness of apparently obvious or univocal language".

Some of the texts in discussed in this volume were explicit about their own status as figural discourse. The Gospel of Philip, for example, states that "[t]ruth did not come into the world naked, but it came in types and images. The world will not receive truth in any other way". True to its own axiom, this text argues by means of several enigmatic images such as the well-known "mirrored bridal chamber"." Further, its revisionary metaphorizing both of early Christian ritual (for example, its view of baptism as a process of being tinted by God the "dyer") and of central Biblical texts (as in its alternative view of the trees in Eden as bearing human beings and animals) demonstrates how figural discourse can create hitherto unimagined perceptions of familiar texts and experiences.

This kind of imaginal consciousness, that is, the propensity to think in images rather than in discursive, propositional language, can be seen in the work of the Neoplatonist philosopher Plotinus as well. Plotinus was distrustful of discursive reasoning because it sets up a subject-object dualism, an unbridgeable gap between perceiver and what is perceived. As Sara Rappe has explained, for Plotinus " (t]ruth cannot be ascertained by means of linguistic or conceptual representations; it can be apprehended only when there is an identity between the knower and the known ... Metaphor enters as one of the ways in which Plotinus, holding to this theory of truth, tries to bring the possibility of the identity of the knower and the known into the sphere of experience"." One of his best-known spiritual exercises, in which the reader is asked to imagine the earth as a diaphanous sphere, is illustrative of what Rappe calls his method of proof by metaphor; rather than using images for revisionary or iconoclastic purposes like the author of the Gospel of Philip, Plotinus used metaphor to achieve a "rhetoric of immediacy".

Aside from such intentional uses of figures to subvert the binarisms of discursive prose, however, Plotinus was wary of the tendency of all language toward fixity or referential closure. Knowing that "every act of naming delimits", Plotinus resorted, on the one hand, to the technique of apophasis, un-saying or negating positive statements, and, on the other, to explicit statements about the figural quality of language per se, insisting that all language about ultimate reality be glossed with a metaphorical "so to speak". Thus displaced from any

direct reference to what Plotinus called "real being", language was paradoxically both fragmenting and evocative of the realities that Plotinus pursued in writing.

This view of language itself as a system of signs was shared by Plotinus's older contemporary, Origen of Alexandria. Origen, however, was more positive about the signifying possibilities of religious language, which for him was above all the language of Scripture. Given his view, as a Christian, that the Holy Spirit had authored the Bible, Origen viewed all of its words as icons, images virtually bursting with a plenitude of meaning. Such linguistic polysemy was understood by Origen to be an invitation for interpretation; as Martin Irvine has observed, "Scripture was seen to be a vast field of continuing signification productive of a limitless play of meanings. Exegesis unfolds the continuous productivity which is the Text". Origen used an agrarian trope to express the generative aspects of both text and interpreter: "I think each word of divine scripture is like a seed whose nature is to multiply diffusely ... Its increase is proportionate to the diligent labor of the skillful farmer or the fertility of the earth".

Such effervescence concerning the richness of linguistic play, however, is only one side of Origen's theorizing about figural discourse. For allegory, the interpretive method that Origen privileged when dealing with language as a system of signs, can not only uncover meaning, it can also scatter it. This problematic aspect of textual semiosis was well expressed by the philosopher Gaston Bachelard when he wrote that, "to grasp the imagining role of language, we must patiently search out for every word its inclinations toward ambiguity and double meanings". Interpretation is thus virtually endless, and agonistic as well since, however polysemous their potential, words were for Origen like "gates of brass" that must continually be broken open by active interpretation. Because words were further understood by Origen to be riddling, they actually worked to decenter or defer meaning. Finally, like Plotinus, Origen had to confront the dispersive tendencies of human attempts to articulate religious truths.

In these samples of late ancient views of figuration, it is clear that speculation about images leads ineluctably to theories of—and anxieties about—interpretation. As Irvine has observed, ancient interpreters like Origen "acknowledge the necessity for multiple interpretations but are disturbed by the multiplying of texts which forever seek to reveal the unity of the Logos over against the multiplicity of discourse. This multiplying of discourse includes the possibility of heretical interpretation: signs require interpretation, but according to which ideologically encoded discourse?".

Such troubling questions about how meaning is produced in and by language have also been characteristic of contemporary theorists who inquire into the nature of images. Since "iconology"—the discourse that people produce about images—has recently been explored primarily in the area of literary theory rather than in religion, the problematic aspects of the relations among image, text, and ideology have not been construed in terms of heresy, nor do god-terms usually function as the ground of signification. Nonetheless, among those today who ask the question, "What is an image?", many of the issues seen above in ancient

authors regarding referentiality, immediacy and deferral, and the enigmatic play of language are once again central to their discussions.

In his book Iconology, which is a sustained analysis of historical and contemporary understandings of the nature and function of images, W.J.T. Mitchell has observed that for Enlightenment philosophers and critics, language and imagery were "perfect, transparent media through which reality may be represented to the understanding". Today, however, "the situation is precisely the reverse". "For modern criticism, language and imagery have become enigmas, problems to be explained, prison-houses which lock the understanding away from the world". What Mitchell is describing is the "linguistic turn" in contemporary critical theory, succinctly defined by the literary critic J. Hillis Miller as "the moment of criticism which hovers in a prolonged interrogation of language as such".

As Miller elaborates elsewhere when discussing what he calls "the linguistic moment", this new turn in criticism is marked by "a return to the explicit study of rhetoric" understood as "the investigation of figures of speech rather than the study of the art of persuasion". Viewing literary works as heterogeneous and dialogical rather than homogeneous and monological, such critical analysis, again in Miller's summary, "involves an interrogation of the notion of the self-enclosed literary work and of the idea that any work has a fixed, identifiable meaning". And, in terms that are remarkably consonant with those of Origen, Miller characterizes the linguistic moment's perspective on texts as "open and unpredictably productive. The reading of a poem is part of the poem. This reading is productive in its turn. It produces multiple interpretations, further language about the poem's language, in an interminable activity without necessary closure". While this form of criticism does not typically petition "the imagination"—a concept viewed as hopelessly entangled with Romantic idealism—still its insistence on the problematic, subversive but nonetheless productive character of language in general, and of the "inherence in one another of figure, concept and narrative" in particular, has revolutionized practices of reading writing for a whole generation.

The "linguistic turn" is a phrase that encompasses a wide variety of critical practices over the past thirty years. Variously called "postmodern", "poststructualist", and "deconstructive", these are the literary-critical contexts in which my own practices as an interpreter of late ancient texts have been formed. Any historian is, of course, nourished by her own intellectual culture. Further, as Elizabeth Clark, following Hayden White, has pointed out, "history has no distinctively historical method, but borrows its models from a variety of other disciplines". Long dominated by the model of "decline and fall" associated with the work of Edward Gibbon, the study of religion in the late Roman empire has been through a series of "sea changes" in recent decades. Methods drawn from psychoanalysis, cultural anthropology, sociology, and feminist theory have dramatically altered the way in which the history of late antiquity, once dominated by positivism and by theological motivations, is written.

My own contribution to "redrawing the map" of late ancient religious culture has been to initiate a dialogue across the centuries between "postmodern" theorists and late ancient

writers. In drawing on an eclectic range of contemporary literary criticism, what I have found most valuable is the performative view of textuality that underlies how many of these interpreters view the function of a text's images. "Performative" in this case means "generative": the principle that I have followed, in the concise formulation of Hillis Miller, is that there is "no such thing as an innocent image or myth ... No metaphor or myth is a mere `symbolic convenience', separable from the thought it embodies. It is the body of that thought, the secret generator of the concepts it incarnates". In all of the essays in this volume, I have begun by asking what might claim attention if a text were approached through a striking or discordant image or group of images. By thus following the logic of a text's figuration, new dimensions of the text can be disclosed.

In other words, texts often "speak otherwise" when one is attentive to what might be called the storytelling function of the specifically poetic image, that is, the image that deforms or changes how one apprehends a text's meaning rather than conforming to habituated modes of understanding. The poet Ezra Pound defined images as "clusters of fused ideas endowed with energy". It is that "energy" that I have tried to tap. In reflecting on his own experience as a writer, Italo Calvino gives a good description of the energy that is activated by the storytelling image:

> [T]here was a visual image at the source of all my stories ... In devising a story, therefore, the first thing that comes to my mind is an image that for some reason strikes me as charged with meaning, even if I cannot formulate this meaning in discursive or conceptual terms. As soon as the image has become sufficiently clear in my mind, I set about developing it into a story; or better yet, it is the images themselves that develop their own implicit potentialities, the story they carry within them.

As for Calvino, there has usually been such an image at the source of the essays in this volume. Adam eating from an animal tree, Christ imagined as a lunar panther, a witch, a centaur, an ascetic body ablaze with desire or angelic radiance: these are some of the poetic images whose narratives I have followed in my own "stories".

Some of these figures seemed, at the beginning, to be marginal to the interests of a given text; Jerome's Life of Saint Paul is not, after all, "about" a centaur. Yet such textual details have what Roland Barthes, writing about arresting details in photographs, calls "a power of expansion". Such a punctum or detail is paradoxical: "while remaining a detail, it fills the whole picture". Following the associative movements of such "details" can, however, reveal aspects of a text's interpretive thrust that an author may (or may not) have intended or been conscious of. In the case of Jerome's biography, taking his image of the centaur seriously—that is, allowing it to become the punctum of his text—led to an understanding of how animal "wildness" was fundamental to his theory of ascetic identity. Whether consciously or not, Jerome constructed a strongly transgressive image of the ascetic life, and it is an image that virtually "pictures" his theory of asceticism.

The interpretive approach of many of these essays has been influenced by Roland Barthes' argument that an author is not "the subject with the book as predicate". That is, the explicit intentions of an author cannot always control or limit the meanings that arise from the

configurations of his text's tropes. Texts can articulate perspectives and bear significations that are quite different from the announced goals of the author. For example, Origen of Alexandria would probably be surprised to read Chapter Two of this volume, which argues that he composed a virtual bestiary of the soul in the course of his allegorizations of beasts that are mentioned in various biblical passages. Yet, once alerted to his animal metaphors, one can see that they are not mere details; they "fill the whole picture" of his profound grasp of human psychology.

Privileging the poetic image does not lead only to the so-called "death of the author", however. It can also clear up certain conundrums in ancient texts as well as enable the development of new paradigms for interpretation. For example, when I began studying the literature of desert asceticism, I was at first startled, even repulsed by the way in which observers of desert ascetics could view ascetics' sometimes mutilated and emaciated bodies as angelic bodies. By staying with such images instead of dismissing them as fanciful (or pathological), I was led to see that theological explanations of the phenomenon of asceticism, while helpful, could not account for these unusual observations. Turning to contemporary theories of perception and ritual (which I would not have done had it not been for these perplexing images) not only enabled me to "see" these images as meaningful constructs, it also aided in the development of a paradigm for the study of ascetic behavior that brings forth its ritualized, performative aspects. Finally, privileging the poetic image can also lead to the recuperation of the integrity of texts that have been negatively valued in the scholarly tradition, as I found when dealing with such controversial texts as those from Gnostic and magical traditions. "Metaphors are risky," as the critic Stanley Hopper once remarked. They have a habit of unsettling one's tidy interpretive structures.

The fact that these studies have constituted a dialogue across the centuries, as I indicated earlier, rather than a monological "application" of contemporary theory to late ancient texts, is clearest in Chapter Six, which is structured as contrapuntal exchange between Roland Barthes and Origen of Alexandria on the topic of an erotics of textuality, and Chapter Thirteen, in which certain contemporary theories of textual semiosis are shown to have been already formulated, although with a different vocabulary and mythos, in Gnostic texts from the Valentinian tradition. In all of the essays in this volume, however, there is a certain concordance of image and perspective between the ancient and modern texts that I have considered. This is not only because I have chosen my reading companions carefully (although I have); it is also because "it can always be demonstrated that the apparent novelty of any new development in criticism is the renewal of an insight which has been found and lost and found again repeatedly through all the centuries of literary study since the first Homeric and Biblical commentaries. The novelty of any 'new criticism' is not in its intrinsic insights or techniques but rather in the `accident' of its expression ...".

I therefore offer this volume of my own "accidents" in the spirit of the poet Wallace Stevens, who wrote about

> Thinkers without final thoughts
> In an always incipient cosmos,

The way, when we climb a mountain,
Vermont throws itself together

and in the spirit of my husband and colleague, David Miller, who wrote that to begin and end one of his books with a poem was "not only to indicate that things are better said poetically, though that of course is true, but rather to express the view that some things can be said, if at all, only in image, metaphor, and likeness ...".

Poetic Images and Nature

Nature engaged late ancient authors in a variety of ways. It produced sheer wonder at its strange beauty, but it also provoked complex readings that treated it as a cache of riddles that needed to be deciphered. Beginning with the Hellenistic Physika (literary compendia of the elements of nature often arranged alphabetically) and continuing through the late ancient Christian genre of the Hexaemeron (commentaries on the six days of creation in the book of Genesis), interpreters surveyed the natural world for the wisdom it had to offer.

Although the Physika and the Hexaemera included plants and other natural phenomena like rocks and planets within their purview, it was nature's animals that were most compelling. Whether real or imagined—scowling lions, an animal tree, frugal ants and playful partridges, as well as such hybrid monsters as centaurs and satyrs—animals claimed the attention of writers who meditated on nature in late antiquity. Generally, animals claimed attention in this period not as objective specimens to be classified scientifically but rather as indicators of a dynamic process that was defined both theologically and psychologically. What I have thus called the "bestial imagination" is the focus of the essays included in this section.

For the late ancient interpreters presented here, animals were "good to think with." Although authors like Marcus Aurelius sometimes seemed to portray nature, and especially nature's beasts, as a discreet "real" world valuable in its own right, there was typically another, specifically religious perspective at work that transformed "real" animals into images bearing meanings quite different from those of naturalism or zoology. For example, when Marcus included "the drip of foam from a wild boar's jaw" in one of his lists of the signs of nature's grace and fascination (Meditations 3.1), he not only conjured up a "real" animal; he also poetized it by making it an image of that vast providential order whose intricate workings thus manifested themselves.

This penchant for theologizing "nature" by turning its elements into tropes of the spirit, whether in Stoicism, Gnosticism, or Christianity, is the main theme of the essays that follow. Natural phenomena were used as the vehicles through which to explain religious conceptions of reality. Animals, in particular, were not the subject-matter to be explained; instead, animals became part of a "language" of divine images and patterns that could be "read" in such a way as to disclose stark truths about human life in a world thought to be shot through with riddles and enigmas of the divine.

The key to the theological art of meditation on nature in late antiquity is the beast-as-metaphor. This zoological rhetoric was wielded for different purposes: in some texts, animals images were used to explore the very process of figuration of which they were a

part, while in other texts, animals were metaphors of the irrational aspects of the human soul whose "wildness" expressed one aspect of the multiplicity of the self. In still other texts, animals figured the cunning presence of God in the world. Despite the tendency among modern interpreters to slight these "textual" animals as naïve or romantic fabrications, bestial images were not the product of an ancient credulity. On the contrary, they formed part of an imaginal sign-system in which nature was infused with religious and emotional sensibilities.

Whenever bestial metaphors appear in the texts studied here, they are agonistic images; they carry the violence, discord, and dissonance that attend the breaking of habituated modes of consciousness and structures of thought. The violence of many of these images is understandable, since the bestial imagination tended to expose areas of human life that were unsettling, as the following examples from the chapters in this section demonstrate.

Drawing on Scripture for the veritable menagerie of animals that appear in his theological writings, Origen of Alexandria used beasts as figures for unexplored dimensions of the human soul that must be dragged into consciousness, wrestled with, and tamed. Serpentine, horse-like, and piggish, these psychic fantasies represented for Origen both the pitfalls and the opportunities for ethical and spiritual development. Jerome likewise used an animal to picture human identity. Paradoxically using as figure for the celibate ascetic the sexually-aggressive centaur—a half-human, half-bestial monster from mythology—Jerome portrayed the radical but ambivalent self-consciousness demanded of the Christian ascetic as he experimented with physical and psychological transformation.

In such texts, animal were metaphors used to evoke and contemplate the often discordant complexity of the human soul. Religious psychology, however, was not the only haunt of the beasts. Theology was also subject to the violent insights associated with these images. The most stunning presentation of the "animalization" of the divine realm studied here can be found in the Physiologus, a text whose bestial images of Christ as stealthy lion and savage panther complicate simplistic definitions of divine beneficence. With its use of animal stories to provide connections between passages from the Old and New Testaments that are often quite disparate, this text also introduces a jarring note into the allegorical tradition of interpretation to which it is indebted. Even sacred texts were subject to bestial dissonance.

I have emphasized the violent quality of so many of these bestial images because, at least in the case of the texts presented in this section, there is an underlying realization that to see with the eye of the beast—that is, to accept metaphor as the foundation of human language and consciousness—is itself violent. It is violent because its premise is that meaning is not single, simple, or literal, but multiple, allusive, paradoxical, and riddling. The bestial imagination of late antiquity offers a view of reality that is as uncomfortable as it is rich.

Poetic Images and The Body

Late antiquity was a period during which the body and its pleasures were viewed with increasing suspicion. The old Platonic cliché—that the body was the "prison" of the soul—

had broken down, or become more complex. Thus it was not enough simply to ignore or debase the body because it had been reconceptualized as an essential part of the self. This reimagining of corporeality, however, did not lessen but rather heightened awareness of the body's dangerous association with the passionate senses and thus with vice. Seen as playing an integral, if ambivalent, role in the well-being of the psyche, the body now drew the anxious gaze of those who sought spiritual and moral improvement.

Practices designed to control the body's perceived tendency to excess, particularly with regard to food and sex, developed along a continuum from moderation in diet and love-life to the more extreme forms of asceticism in desert monasticism. Yet sheer physicality did not exhaust the significance of the human body in late ancient thought. Although medical schools developed therapies of the literal body, in religion and philosophy the body was appropriated as a map of meaning useful for exploring divine and human creativity in a variety of ways. In cosmology, anthropology, and hermeneutics, the body's desires provided a sensuous language for expressing the world's most basic structures and dynamics.

The sensuous idiom of the texts presented in this section was derived Primarily from aspects of human sexuality; shifting love-making and giving birth from a literal to an imaginal key, these texts used physical metaphors to express human longing for knowledge of God and the self. When poetized in this way, the body became supremely articulate, capable of signifying both spiritual lack as well as spiritual plenitude.

The prevalence of sexual metaphors in late ancient texts presents something of a paradox given this era's view of the problematic character of the body and its sexual desires. In the context of the various asceticisms that proliferated in late antiquity, the "fiery flesh", as Jerome called it, was viewed as particularly dangerous not only to the body but also to the soul. Yet when used theologically, metaphors of desire were powerful articulations of the soul's longing, whether for union with an ultimate principle of being or for self-transformation.

In many, especially Christian, texts, the denial of literal erotic activities resulted in their figural intensification. Like the body itself, however, erotic metaphors could be ambivalent; that is, they could have both positive and negative valences, sometimes at once. Because eros, desire, was typically construed in the double sense of the word "want", connoting lack and loss as well as desire and longing, erotic images tended to be radical metaphors that collapsed pain and pleasure into a single but complex linguistic expression.

When Plotinus, for example, wanted to convey the anguish—but also the ecstasy—of a writer's attempt to find words adequate to that "love passion of vision" regarding his supreme principle, the One, he used as figure a woman giving birth, her pain nonetheless bringing her "so close to what she seeks" (Ch. 5). Likewise, in his allegory on the Song of Songs, Origen of Alexandria presents the bride, who is a figure for both soul and reader, as "intolerably inflamed with love" (Ch. 6). These are good examples of ancient philosophical and religious uses of the poetic body as a signifier of desire in all its complexity.

In this section, three of the essays pertain to early Christianity, and one to Gnosticism and Plotinian Neoplatonism. Despite the variety of image and tradition that they represent, they all have in common a problematic well expressed by Lawrence Sullivan, who has observed that in the history of religions, "critical knowledge of the body is frequently related to critical experiences that are religious. Such critical experiences are envisaged as crises..." The authors of the texts in the essays that follow did not always make explicit the particular "crisis"—whether cosmological, anthropological, or theological—in which they found themselves. My readings as interpreter have often been conducted "against the grain" of a given author's announced or surface intention in order to elicit the underlying fabric of images and metaphors that speak to the critical experiences around which the text is organized.

The crisis addressed in the texts in the first chapter of this section was both cosmological and theological. Meditating on the creative activity of God, these texts objected to conceptions of divine creativity that presented God as a maker of "things". Rejecting such a technological model and the resulting dichotomy between the divine and material realms, both the Gnostic and the Neoplatonic author redefined God and the cosmos by appealing to metaphors of divine making that were organic, feminine and sexual. The cosmic and existential reality that emerged from this crisis of definition—embodied, for example, in the Gnostic On the Origin of the World by mythopoetic images of Eros, Psyche, and Aphrodite—was characterized as pleromatic connectedness rather than as a hierarchy of power.

In the chapters on Christian texts that follow, the crises had arisen in the areas of anthropology and hermeneutics. Origen of Alexandria, confronted in the corpus of texts sacred to his tradition with a highly erotic text, the Song of Songs, used allegorical interpretation in order to claim (and tame) the text for Christianity. Yet what resulted was an erotic Christology as well as an "erotics" of reading: the Bridegroom/Christ, described as beguiling and flirtatious, offers words to the Bride/reader that are described as kisses, darts and love-charms. Jerome, also preoccupied with images of the Bride from the Song of Songs, was engaged in anthropological redefinition prompted by a keen sense of the danger of sexuality to Christian holiness. Yet when he used those erotic images to develop, ironically, a theory of asceticism, he produced a theory in which erotic sensibilities were intensified despite his attempt to express desire in a non-carnal way.

The crisis that underlay the texts in the final chapter in this section was perceptual. The phenomenon of desert asceticism in late ancient Christianity was founded, at least in part, on the premise that human holiness could somehow be seen or perceived visually. The body itself could serve as a marker of an ascetic in the process of being transformed into an angelic "man from heaven". Yet, given the ravages that ascetic practice could wreak on the literal body, how could such holiness be perceived? This chapter explores how new conditions of visual perception enabled observers to imagine how the human body could signify both lack and spiritual plenitude.

Overall, the discussions in this section focus on late ancient appropriations of the body and metaphors derived from it. Despite the ascetic tenor of many of these texts, the critical

knowledge that emerged from them was sensuous because these "poetic bodies" were signifiers of desire. Eros was a generative concept in late ancient religion.

Part III: Poetic Images and Theology

In late antiquity, theology as a discipline was defined straightforwardly as teaching about or naming God. Unlike other systems of explanation, however, theology found itself in the unique position of attempting to account for something that many thought exceeded the categories of human reason. Especially in the philosophically-oriented theologies of Christianity and in Neoplatonism, the contrast between the spirituality and eternity of God and human finitude raised questions about the limitations of theological discourse. Because God was often understood negatively as beyond the realm of being and therefore essentially unknowable, questions about the status of theological language vis-à-vis its referent became so acute that language itself became an object of scrutiny central to the theological enterprise. How was theological language to be understood by those who conceived of theology as an attempt to express the inexpressible?

Many theological thinkers would have agreed with Plotinus that visions of divinity "baffle telling" because any given linguistic formulation was ineluctably partial and incomplete (Ch. 12). As unsettling as such an observation might seem to the success of the theological enterprise, what it reveals is that in this period the distinction between theology and philosophy of language was blurred. When faced with naming the unnameable, theological thinkers were forced to confront the limits as well as the resources of their own practices as writers. In the texts presented in this section, theological inquiry was constituted as an analysis of discourse; authors asked not only what words mean in a discourse of transcendence, but also how they mean.

When they engaged in talk about God, many late ancient writers knew that theirs was a figurative enterprise. Using words to express the inadequacy of words, theologians like Origen and philosophers like Plotinus recognized that their interpretive structures were ghosted by an ironic "so to speak". This recognition of the gap between theological language and its subject could produce hermeneutical despair when words seemed to defer rather than to secure the presence of the divine. However, many ancient theologians knew that the dissemination of meaning in language could also be understood positively as an indication of semantic richness. Viewing language as evocative rather than as prescriptive, the writers presented in this section developed a hermeneutic that might best be characterized as a poetics of reading.

Thus despite their recognition of the inadequacies of language for theological disclosure, writers in traditions so apparently diverse as Christianity, Gnosticism, and magic developed remarkably similar perspectives on the central role of image and metaphor in human attempts to articulate the enigma of the divine. Keenly aware of the limitations of logic and discursive analysis, these theologians used language to produce intimations of divinity rather than systematic definitions.

Of the writers studied here, no one was more insistent on the importance of figuration for the theological task than Origen of Alexandria, to whom the first three chapters are devoted. He frequently emphasized the metaphorical character of words in his theological commentaries on Biblical texts. Language was not a passive mirror of meaning for Origen; rather, there was an energy in language that actively constructed the world, as the following catalogue of his metaphors for words indicates: seeds, goads, seducers and flirts, shepherds, and springs. These terms are all presented as figures for the creative dynamic that made Biblical language an explosive cache of divine mysteries. Furthermore, Origen's major technique for interpreting the Biblical texts upon which his theology was based, allegory, was itself an affirmation of linguistic polysemy. Described by a modern interpreter as a "lateral dance" involving "incessant movement from one displaced figural point to another" (Ch. 11), allegory led Origen to a view of theology as an endless disclosure of the imaginal depths of the divine in language.

Like Origen, the authors of the magical texts treated in this section approached theological language as a speaking of the unspeakable. Unlike Origen, however, their method of interpretation was not allegory but rather what I have called "nonsense language". Composed of meaningless strings of letters of the alphabet, theirs was an incantatory use of language that scrambled ordinary words in order to elicit dimensions of reality that were normally not available to human perception. Matching the riddle of the divine with an equally riddling form of discourse, the magical texts were more radical than Origen was in terms of their deconstructive manipulations of the alphabet. Yet there is surprising consonance between the two as well, for both Origen and the magicians understood the transgressive aspects of theological language. Origen's use of Christ harrowing hell as a figure for the interpreter is intriguingly paralleled by the magicians' use of language against itself in the service of meaning.

The idea that meaning occurs in the breaking of form arose in Gnostic theologies as well. The final chapter in this section considers two Valentinian Gnostic texts whose concern centered in part on the dangers of literalism in theological discourse. In conversation with these two texts, the discussion in this chapter addresses a particular dilemma of language considered as metaphor. Its very richness can suggest that theology can achieve closure, that is, that the plenitude of language can lure the interpreter into believing that a final, complete telling is possible. Paradoxically, the danger of polyvalence is fixity. Like Origen, for whom allegory was a figure for an endless narrativity in theology, these Gnostic authors resolved the dilemma by conceptualizing theological knowing as a search rather than as a fixed content. In fact, all of the texts in this section seem to have entertained the uncomfortable thought that what theology offers is the promise of referential meaning together with the rhetorical subversion of that promise. Finally, theological words are traces, trajectories of desire. <>

The Transformations of Tragedy: Christian Influences from Early Modern to Modern edited by Fionnuala O'Neill Tonning, Erik Tonning and Jolyon Mitchell [Studies in Religion and the Arts, Brill, Hardback: 9789004416536; E-Book: 9789004416543] open source

The Transformations of Tragedy: Christian Influences from Early Modern to Modern explores the influence of Christian theology and culture upon the development of post-classical Western tragedy. The volume is divided into three parts: early modern, modern, and contemporary. This series of essays by established and emergent scholars offers a sustained study of Christianity's creative influence upon experimental forms of Western tragic drama.

Both early modern and modern tragedy emerged within periods of remarkable upheaval in Church history, yet Christianity's diverse influence upon tragedy has too often been either ignored or denounced by major tragic theorists. This book contends instead that the history of tragedy cannot be sufficiently theorised without fully registering the impact of Christianity in transition towards modernity.

Historicizing 'Tragedy and Christianity'

Tragedy as a dramatic art form is a subject of enduring popular and scholarly interest. Within the Western tradition it has experienced three great historical flowerings: classical, early modern, and modern. Classical tragedy, of course, considerably predates Christianity. Early modern tragedy and modern tragedy, however, both emerged alongside, and engage with, periods of remarkable upheaval within the cultural, theological, and political history of Christianity: first following the European Reformation, and secondly with the emergence of modernism following the slow and piecemeal 'death of God' during the long nineteenth century. Focusing on these latter two periods, this book offers a systematic and detailed study arguing for Christianity's creative influence upon the development of experimental new forms of tragic drama in the West.

These two periods both reveal a Christian culture in crisis, radically transforming itself in response to the stresses and revolutions of modernity. It is thus a key contention of this volume that the dialogue between tragedy and modernity (which has received considerable

recent attention) is inseparable from a dialogue with Christianity and the Christian past. This claim is rooted in the parallel 'turns to religion' over the last twenty years within both Early Modern and Modernist scholarship, where scholars have begun to treat late medieval Catholicism, as well as mid-nineteenth to twentieth century Christianity, as on-going, dynamic, inescapable influences on cultural creativity, rather than as something simply left behind or overcome. The field of interdisciplinary and theoretical tragedy studies has yet to fully recognise the implications of this changed emphasis.

One difficulty in bringing about such recognition is the contested relationship between tragedy and Christianity within this field. Scholars of tragedy too often assume that Christianity, with its message of hope and redemption, has little to say to tragedy. Modern tragedy and tragic theory are sometimes felt to begin at the place where Christianity, confronted with the obscene fact of inexplicable human suffering and agony, discovers its own limits and falls silent. In the past, influential tragic theorists including Friedrich Nietzsche and George Steiner have argued at length that Christianity is not only inherently alien to tragic drama but actively hostile; and indeed that it has been instrumental in the supposed 'demise' of tragedy as a pillar of Western civilization.

In fact, putting the origin of this debate back into its historical context offers one apt illustration of how the 'turn to religion' within a field like Modernism Studies can challenge received ideas. Nietzsche specifically sought to revive tragedy as an antidote to a decadent, bourgeois, soporific, and finally nihilistic modernity that he held Christianity responsible for instigating. His idea of tragedy, which he explicitly conceived of as an 'anti-Christian counter-doctrine', thus became a tonic concocted to cure and revitalise this diseased modernity. For Nietzsche, the project of returning to Greek origins was not just an antiquarian exercise, it reached back before the advent of Christianity's influence to provide new possibilities for the modern era to become rooted in an alternative cultural history. The contemporary revival of tragedy (effected, for the young Nietzsche, via Wagner) thus pointed forward, towards a regenerated, post-Christian culture of the future. As Jeffrey Perl has shown, an ongoing *agon* with Christian thought and culture was fundamental to the influential drive towards a 'Second Renaissance' within literary modernism:

The central question faced by the modernists was, historically speaking, What is the meaning of the middle period? or, put in its more usual form, What is Christianity? What purpose did it or does it serve, and has it a future? [...] In general, the modernists attempt to deconstruct Christianity and its cosmology at the same time that they attempt to construct a post-Christian cosmology based on pre-Christian ones.

In other words, theorisations of tragedy as 'inherently' anti-Christian are often rooted in distinctively modernist ideas, which can be historically situated as rhetorical gestures within a continuing cultural and religious battle of the mid-to-late nineteenth century and beyond. So far from being irrelevant to tragedy, then, Christianity turns out to be a formative influence upon the very terms of modern discussions of the topic.

Similarly, the 'turn to religion' in Early Modern Studies has led to widespread reassessment of the continuing influence of late medieval religious culture throughout the sixteenth century and well into the seventeenth. This has had profound implications for scholarship on early modern theatre, including tragedy. Many scholars are now keenly aware that the rediscovery of and experimentation with classical modes of tragedy were necessarily filtered through established traditions of late medieval theatre. Take, for instance, the centrality of the wounded body to English Renaissance tragedy, and the discovery of its violent power when displayed as tragic visual spectacle. This forms the sharpest possible contrast with classical tragedy, where the wounded body is vividly described, often by a messenger, rather than visually displayed. The emphasis on visual spectacle in English Renaissance tragedy is inherited straight from late medieval Corpus Christi plays, which do not shrink from displaying the graphic torture and murder of Christ or the Massacre of the Infants, and it represents an entirely new departure in the history of tragic theatre.

Furthermore, these lingering late medieval traditions were also being re-shaped under the immense pressure of the Reformation in its many guises: its theological debates, its new crises of doubt and scepticism, and the sweeping and sometimes culturally traumatic changes to visual and material culture, such as the iconoclastic assaults upon devotional images in English churches, that followed in its wake. An emergent new body of scholarship showing how these religious concerns migrated into the ostensibly secular plays of Shakespeare and his contemporaries is transforming the way we understand both early modern tragic drama and the historical periodization of literature itself. Together they reveal the Reformation as a watershed moment for tragedy; a crucible of late medieval religious and theatrical tradition, cultural loss, and radical new theological and philosophical ideas, from which dramatists drew inspiration to generate new and experimental modes of tragic art.

The essays in this book are thus rooted in two very different historical epochs: early modern and modern(ist). Read together as part of the broader framework of this book, however, they enter into dialogue with larger theoretical and interdisciplinary questions about the history of Christianity as a productive and shaping force upon the development of Western tragedy. The proper theorisation of tragedy has always called for a diachronic and interdisciplinary approach: the willingness to examine works within their specific historical and performance contexts, alongside an approach which plots these historical studies as part of the broader history and recurring problematics of tragedy as a genre. Accordingly, the realisation that Christianity, far from stifling creativity in tragic modes of writing, has been a demonstrably potent force in the historical development of tragedy makes it possible for literary scholars and theorists of tragedy to engage in fresh ways with more theologically-oriented work on the intersection of tragedy and Christianity. Despite a recent attempt by a reviewer to confine the work of Rowan Williams and other theological critics of tragedy strictly to 'the corpus of Christian writing on Western literature [which] will feature on theological bibliographies alongside works by a sub-set of other philosophically minded Christians', there is in fact a rich field here of formative tensions and creative overlaps to explore. The 2011 collection *Christian Theology and Tragedy* notes a number of common

concerns including ‘the experience of suffering, death and loss, questions over fate, freedom and agency, sacrifice, guilt, innocence, the limits of human understanding, redemption and catharsis’, arguing along with Donald MacKinnon that ‘tragedy is vital to a properly disciplined Christian theology, and that, by the same token, Christian theology can be a way of vouchsafing the true significance of tragedy’. Thus the theologians can help by sharpening the critic’s sense of common, and contested, ground. It is true that Christian theological discourse can sometimes run the risk of appropriating tragedy, thereby losing historical specificity and sometimes blunting the impact of individual works and performances. Equally, though, literary critics of tragedy have at times failed fully to acknowledge the fact that two of the most transformative and experimental periods in the development of tragedy are saturated with Christian influences and creative tensions. Properly interdisciplinary conversations about tragedy and Christianity therefore need to acknowledge more extensively not only these shared conceptual concerns but also the important role of Christian religious history and discourse in shaping the conditions in which tragedy has flourished. Ultimately, to reject Christianity’s contribution to tragedy is to risk ending up *critically* confused, reaching in the end the logical extreme espoused by George Steiner of rejecting almost all post-classical tragedy, including much of Shakespeare’s, as somehow ‘not tragic enough’. This volume contends instead that the history and problematics of tragedy as a genre cannot be coherently theorised without fully registering the impact of different aspects of and traditions within Christianity in transition towards modernity.

Understanding the intertwining relations between Christianity and tragedy is also inevitably complexified by historical events, such as the ‘seminal catastrophe’ of the ‘Great War’ in the twentieth century. In **Life After Tragedy: Essays on Faith and the First World War** edited by Michael W. Brierley and Georgina A. Byrne 9 Wipf and Stock, 978-1532602283] writers, many based at Worcester cathedral in England, explore ‘the tragedy of the conflict from a theological perspective’. Drawing on the life and work of the British army chaplain Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy, the authors explore ‘how God ... might be spoken of in the midst and wake of tragedy’. Much has been written on the centenary of the First World War; however, no book has yet explored the tragedy of the conflict from a theological perspective. This book fills that gap. Taking their cue from the famous British army chaplain Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy, seven central essays--all by authors associated with the cathedral where Studdert Kennedy first preached to troops--examine aspects of faith that featured in the war, such as the notion of ""home,"" poetry, theological doctrine, preaching, social reform, humanitarianism, and remembrance. Each essay applies its reflections to the life of faith today. The essays thus represent a highly original contribution to the history of the First World War in general and the work of Studdert Kennedy in particular; and they provide wider theological insight into how, in the contemporary world, life and tragedy, God and suffering, can be integrated. The book will accordingly be of considerable interest to historians, both of the war and of the church; to communities commemorating the war; and to all those who wrestle with current challenges to faith. A foreword by Studdert Kennedy's grandson and an afterword by the bishop of Magdeburg in Germany render this a volume of

remarkable depth and worth. ""Padres were given a rough ride by British memoir writers of the First World War. However, Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy, 'Woodbine Willie' to the soldiers, demonstrates how wrong they were. His reflections on the war and its implications for his own Christian faith resonate to this day. The innumerable insights in this powerful book make plain how the conflict's spiritual challenge still reverberates.

Life After Tragedy is an apposite title, representing an attempt to reflect on living through and in the aftermath of a war that claimed around 19 million lives, with over 20 million wounded. Many writers and theologians were significantly influenced by their own experiences in the First World War trenches or observations of this or other cataclysmic wars. These 'Dangerous Memories' of experiencing actual wastelands informed how tragedy was considered or represented, turning expectations on their heads as theologian Johan Baptist Metz writes: 'The memory of human suffering forces us to look at the public *theatrum mundi* not merely from the standpoint of the successful and the established, but from the conquered and the victims'. Tracing the transformations of tragedy thus includes looking at painful pasts and harrowing representations in new ways, while also bearing in mind that they emerge from diverse religious perspectives, traditions, and histories.

While it is important to recognise the differences between and within Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox traditions in relation to tragedy, a comparative analysis is not one of the aims of this book, nor is exploring the significant role of other religious traditions influencing understandings of tragedy (although one or two of the chapters do touch on the role of non-Christian traditions, see for example Olga Taxidou's discussion of Hellenism and Primitivism in the work of the Cambridge Ritualists). It is also beyond the scope of this volume to delve into the world of Ancient Greek Tragedy, religion, and 'the practices of the worship of Dionysus'. Neither is there space to explore, for instance, how George Steiner's and Gillian Rose's Jewish backgrounds informed their work, nor to analyse how 'The Tragedy of Karbala' is still regularly re-enacted by Shi'a Muslims in Iran and beyond. In aiming for a more limited scope, the editors hope that the parallels between the Early Modern and modern(ist) cases emerge more clearly as a historically specific basis for exploring the ongoing creative tensions at work between that shape-shifting pair, 'tragedy and Christianity', across the whole modern period and towards the present.

The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400-1580 by Eamon Duffy [Yale University Press, 9780300053425]

This important and provocative book offers a fundamental challenge to much that has been written about the pre-Reformation church. Eamon Duffy recreates fifteenth-century English lay people's experience of religion, revealing the richness and complexity of the Catholicism by which men and women structured their experience of the world and their hopes within and beyond it. He then tells the powerful story of the destruction of that Church - the

stripping of the altars - from Henry VIII's break with the papacy until the Elizabethan settlement. Bringing together theological, liturgical, literary, and iconographic analysis with historical narrative, Duffy argues that late medieval Catholicism was neither decadent nor decayed but was a strong and vigorous tradition, and that the Reformation represented the violent rupture of a popular and theologically respectable religious system.

The first part of the book reviews the main features of religious belief and practice up to 1536. Duffy examines the factors that contributed to the close lay engagement with the structures of late medieval Catholicism: the liturgy that was widely understood even though it was in Latin; the impact of literacy and printing on lay religious knowledge; the conventions and contents of lay prayer; the relation of orthodox religious practice and magic; the Mass and the cult of the saints; and lay belief about death and the afterlife. In the second part of the book Duffy explores the impact of Protestant reforms on this traditional religion, providing new evidence of popular discontent from medieval wills and parish records. He documents the widespread opposition to Protestantism during the reigns of Henry and Edward, discusses Mary's success in reestablishing Catholicism, and describes the public resistance to Elizabeth's dismantling of parochial Catholicism that did not wane until the late 1570s. A major revision to accepted thinking about the spread of the Reformation, this book will be essential reading for students of British history and religion.

'Tragedy and Christianity' in the Early Modern Period

The first section of this volume centres on Early Modern studies, where a sharper realisation of the continuities between late medieval and early modern culture, and of the ongoing trauma of religious change, has been spearheaded by revisionist histories of the Reformation such as Eamon Duffy's landmark *The Stripping of the Altars* (1992). Extending Duffy's insights into the cultural field, major studies by, among others, Helen Cooper, Beatrice Groves, Sarah Beckwith, Curtis Perry, and John Watkins have rejected rigid notions of periodization to demonstrate the pervasive continuities between late medieval theatre, culture, and religious practice, and the theatre of Shakespeare and his contemporaries. Furthermore, scholars including Stephen Greenblatt, Huston Diehl, Michael O'Connell, Alison Shell, Brian Cummings, and Gillian Woods have demonstrated how early modern drama was pervasively engaged by Reformation doctrinal and cultural changes, from the abolition of purgatory and changing beliefs in the sacraments, to the transformation in visual culture and the legacy of religious iconoclasm.

The relevance of these scholarly shifts to our understanding of tragedy in the period can be suggested under three broad headings. Firstly, a realisation of the impact of medieval religious culture and drama upon the fundamental assumptions or grammar of what a 'play' *is*, and upon the material culture, visual language, and rhetoric that sustained play-making, play-going, and performance. Secondly, a heightened realisation of the ongoing tensions between cultural memories of medieval Catholicism and the new Reformation language and imagery, leading to a specifically theatrical thematization of religious crisis that also encompasses intense doubt and scepticism as a subject for tragedy. Thirdly, a reconsideration of the influence of Greek and Roman sources on early modern tragedy, in

that these were profoundly reconfigured and appropriated by the religious assumptions, dramatic traditions and ongoing theological controversies of a specific Christian culture in transition. The essays in this volume extend the debate in all these fields.

Under the first heading, Helen Cooper's study **Shakespeare and the Medieval World** has shown how the generic mixtures and lack of classical decorum of the early modern stage – with its premise that 'multitudes, space and time' can be staged and enacted with the aid of an audience's 'imaginative complicity' – would be unimaginable outside a theatrical culture shaped by the great medieval cycle plays and moralities. Helen Cooper's unique study examines how continuations of medieval culture into the early modern period, forged Shakespeare's development as a dramatist and poet. Medieval culture pervaded his life and work, from his childhood, spent within reach of the last performances of the Coventry Corpus Christi plays, to his dramatisation of Chaucer in *The Two Noble Kinsmen* three years before his death. The world he lived in was still largely a medieval one, in its topography and its institutions. The language he spoke had been forged over the centuries since the Norman Conquest. The genres in which he wrote, not least historical tragedy, love-comedy and romance, were medieval inventions. A high proportion of his plays have medieval origins and he kept returning to Chaucer, acknowledged as the greatest poet in the English language. Above all, he grew up with an English tradition of drama developed during the Middle Ages that assumed that it was possible to stage anything - all time, all space.

Shakespeare and the Medieval World provides a panoramic overview that opens up new vistas within his work and uncovers the richness of his inheritance.

In this volume, Beatrice Groves adds further weight to Cooper's argument through her exploration of the material culture of early modern theatre (Ch. 1). For Groves, the physical continuities between medieval and early modern staging practices through richly symbolic objects reveal how early modern tragedy is an 'inheritor of the dramaturgy of the mystery plays'. This is a key source of the unique dramatic power of early modern tragedy, which 'responds to the raw emotional power of the drama of the Passion. And it is often at the moments of supreme suffering that the connection with medieval dramaturgy is at its most palpable'. Stuart Sillars's contribution (Ch. 2) focuses on visual allusions to Christian rite, belief, and iconography in Shakespearean tragedy: a grammar of signs and gestures (such as rites of kneeling in *Richard ii* and *Hamlet*, or funerary monuments and the *pietà* in *Othello* and *King Lear*) that are both recognisable and unsettling in their richly 'dynamic imprecision' or 'generative ambivalence'. His essay also points forward to a comparable modern ambiguity about Christian echoes in Sean O'Casey's *The Silver Tassie*, R.C. Sherriff's *Journey's End*, and J. M Synge's *Riders to the Sea*.

Groves and Sillars discover both medieval and Reformation contextual echoes, thereby reminding us that emphasising the medieval in early modern drama is simultaneously to sharpen our sense of the ongoing religious crisis brought about by the Reformation. Indeed, this crisis itself becomes potentially innovative and productive subject matter for tragedy, through the impact of political-theological revolution, anxiety over disjunction and rupture with the past, and new forms of potentially corrosive sceptical doubt. One topic that

naturally generated a theatrical response was Reformation iconoclasm. As Fionnuala O'Neill Tonning's essay recalls (Ch. 3), the commercial theatre, even if divorced from its medieval grounding in religious ritual that implicated the spectator specifically as a Christian believer, was yet accused by the English Puritan anti-theatricalists of falsely claiming to deliver an experience of 'real presence' on the stage through mere pretence. This continuing anxiety about the power of images to mediate any form of contact with the divine thus impinged directly on playwriting and performance. Tonning's reading of *Timon of Athens* as a tragedy that mourns the lost power of art through a broken image of Eucharistic communion, where flesh turns into stone, suggests the complexity of the imaginative clash of liturgical and commercial spectacle on the early modern stage. This also indicates a broader lesson about the relationship between tragedy, Christianity, and the emergence of early modernity in this period. As Tonning argues, tragedy's response to the Reformation is crucially to cast it as 'a problem of representation'.

The third way in which a reconsideration of early modern religious culture affects our understanding of tragedy in this period is through the realisation that appropriations of Classical sources were no mere 'revivals', but were necessarily filtered through Christian thought and imagery, and yoked to pressing theological, cultural, and political concerns. In this volume, two essays by Adrian Streete (Ch. 4) and Giles Waller (Ch. 5) explore distinctive mixtures of the Christian and the Classical in tragic form. For Streete, John Webster's savage Jacobean tragedy *The Duchess of Malfi* is a searching examination of the value of pity versus control of the passions, explored via the 'interface between Christian and neo-Stoic discussions of the emotion'. Pity, on this reading, is 'mimetically dangerous', and the Duchess's final enactment of constancy offers the audience an 'exemplary neo-Stoical self' that does not embrace persecution as a form of tragic ennoblement but instead affirms such immovability as a form of political resistance to tyranny. Waller's essay examines Hugo Grotius' widely circulated Latin version of the Passion play *Christus Patiens* (1608, translated into English by George Sandys in 1640). Maintaining a strict observance of Aristotle's 'unity of time', the play remains circumscribed within twenty-four hours and ends on Good Friday, so that the risen Christ remains hauntingly absent from the stage. In contrast with those scholars (such as Cooper and Groves, above) who focus on the power of the wounded body in early modern tragedy, and its medieval inheritance, Waller argues that 'the Christianization of classical and neoclassical dramaturgy can be seen to be differently, but no less affectingly powerful, precisely in the haunting *absence* of these wounded bodies'. Streete's and Waller's contributions together provide an acute re-examination of pity, horror, and spectacle as elements of the Christian-Classical compound in early modern drama, demonstrating conclusively some of the theatrically generative possibilities arising from the encounter between neo-classical tragedy and Reformation theology.

'Tragedy and Christianity': Modernism beyond the 'Death of God'

While early modern commercial theatre could provide a liberating space for practical experiments in tragic form that baffled contemporary theorists of tragedy, from the late nineteenth century onwards theorisation itself has often acted as a driving force for generic experimentation and innovative performance practices. The list of theorist-practitioners is

extensive: and whether arguing for a more hieratic, mystical tragedy (W.B. Yeats), a democratic tragedy (Arthur Miller), a neo-Christian tragedy (T.S. Eliot), or for a rejection of tragedy itself as a bourgeois, deceptive form (Bertolt Brecht), or alternatively as grotesquely comic in its overassertive heroism (Samuel Beckett), it is clear that a creative contestation of tragic form has itself been a fundamental source of renewal in modern theatre. And of course, the practitioners are themselves aware of the existence of a formidable and sophisticated body of analysis, with thinkers like G.W.F. Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud at the helm. The point made before in relation to Nietzsche therefore bears repeating, and can in fact be generalised: arguably, all modernist discussions of tragedy are indelibly shaped around various kinds of ongoing, creative tension with Christianity. Whenever tragedy is theorised in this period, the question of how to assess the Christian past, and whether Christianity has any viable future, is never far away.

Of course, such epochal thinking stems from a religious crisis that was no less severe than that of the Reformation. Whether characterised in terms of J. Hillis Miller's 'disappearance of God' (a widening gap or withdrawal), or through Peter Berger's stress on the breakdown of the 'sacred canopy' of religious and social order (fuelling *anomie*), or via Charles Taylor's more nuanced account of the multiplication of competing religious and ethical alternatives (as opposed to simplistic 'loss-of-faith' stories) within late modernity, the recurring note here is doubt, tension, conflict, and the search for some form of future renewal. Yet as scholars of modernism such as Stephen Schloesser, Pericles Lewis, Michael Bell, Leon Surette, Suzanne Hobson, Roger Griffin, and Erik Tonning have demonstrated over the past few decades, it is no longer possible to construe this crisis as a straightforward 'secularisation narrative', from faith to doubt to secular scepticism. On the contrary, modernism was fuelled by various religious impulses and replacement religions. Furthermore, Christianity itself remained an inescapable presence, both for those modernists seeking to somehow overcome it, and for those who appropriated or converted to it in order to advance some version of cultural and spiritual revitalisation. The residually Christian culture of the post-nineteenth century West, then, has created fertile ground for experimentation in tragic form through motivating both theorisation and practice. Yet this volume is the first to explicitly address this creative interaction between the reconfigurations and reinventions of modern tragedy, on the one hand, and the ongoing impact of Christianity, on the other.

Modern theorisations of tragedy begin from G.W.F. Hegel, but it is seldom fully recognised how concerned this thinker was with prefigurations of Christianity (linked to modernity) within the Greek corpus. Peter Valeur's essay (Ch. 6) for the first time brings together Hegel's scattered references to Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, under the headings of undoing/forgetting the past, mourning, and the grave. Hegel was the first to invoke the 'death of God', and Valeur traces the resonances of the ancient Greek cult of graves, Christ's empty tomb, and burial in the syncretic, museum-like Pantheon in Rome, while interpreting Hegel's philosophy of tragic art as itself an ambivalent form of mourning for that death.

Nihilism is the stage beyond such mourning, and Ronan McDonald's essay (Ch. 7) offers an original reading of the intersections of tragedy, Christianity, and nihilism in Nietzsche's work.

McDonald traces the 'self-negations' of both tragic and nihilistic views: how the tragic doubles into the aesthetic/valuable, and the nihilistic into the ascetic/renunciatory, while linking this with Christian traditions (the *via negativa* and apophatic theology) emphasising the unknowability of God. For McDonald, Nietzsche's philosophy is ultimately haunted by the Cross, as the perpetual opposite or mirror-image into which both his readings of tragedy and nihilism always threaten to collapse.

Olga Taxidou's essay (Ch. 8) explores a complementary aspect of Nietzsche as inspirer of the Cambridge Ritualists and, in the modernist dramas of W.B. Yeats and T.S. Eliot and the Greek translations by Ezra Pound and H.D., the catalyst for a 'heady fusion of Christianity and Greek tragedy'. The 'death of God' was followed in modernism by a fascination with the potential revitalisation offered by the 'savage God', and Taxidou analyses a range of those sometimes unholy and blasphemous alliances that bring together Classicism and Christianity in ways that help create a specifically modernist theatricality.

Similarly, as Erik Tonning's essay (Ch. 9) shows, Samuel Beckett's ambivalent engagement with tragedy and tragic theory was shadowed by Christian concepts of sin and redemption. His earliest definition, drawing on Schopenhauer, calls tragedy the statement of an 'expiation' of the 'original sin of having been born'. Beckett's exemplary tragic dramatist was thus the Jansenist Jean Racine, whose work, for Beckett, staged a divine condemnation of human desire as such. Yet Racine's characters *achieve* expiation: their final clarity about their own state may point towards redemption. For Beckett, such clarity and hope were unacceptable, and his rejection of an achieved expiation is the basis for his conscious attempt to go 'beyond' tragedy, first in *Waiting for Godot* and later (with many Racinian echoes) in *Play*. While that 'beyond' verges on indifference and nihilism, Beckett's continuing ethical revulsion with Christian theodicy is nonetheless what ensures that suffering remains acute and significant in these plays.

Tragedy and Christianity in Transformation: Towards the Present

The third section of this volume offers a series of soundings of the ongoing dialogue between tragedy and Christianity towards the present. The capacity – or otherwise – of both tragedy and Christianity to adequately recognise suffering becomes an ever more acute question in light of the genocides and catastrophes of the twentieth century, and the resurgence of sectarian terror and apocalyptic fundamentalisms in the present century.

Beckett's stark vision offers a starting-point for reflection here, as his tortured, confined and endlessly interrogated figures in *Play* – almost-already mere ash in their urns – evoke a distinctly post-Holocaust version of Dante's *Inferno*. In his radio talk 'Capital of the Ruins', a report from his work with the Irish Red Cross in the devastated city of St. Lô in late 1945, he argued that only the 'time-honoured conception of humanity in ruins' could give 'an inkling of the terms in which our condition is to be thought again'. Central to Beckett's critique of both tragedy and Christianity is that neither goes far enough in recognising and contemplating humanity in ruins. Nazism had precisely tried to sanitize and expel the 'degenerate': a cancer or poison was to be eradicated from the *Volkskörper*, whether by burning paintings or Jewish bodies. Already in 1937, eagerly in search of 'degenerate'

paintings in museum cellars during his German trip, Beckett noted in his diary his visceral distaste for the 'NS gospel': 'the expressions "historical necessity" and "Germanic destiny" start the vomit moving upwards'. For Beckett, German nationalism with its imagery of a 'new dawn' for the *Volk* had exposed the potential grotesqueness and sacrificial underbelly of *all* narratives of redemption. By contrast, an authentic 'fidelity to failure' requires steadfastness in rejecting all false redemptions or renewals of order, whether cosmic, socio-political or personal. Measured against this radical criterion, both tragedy and Christianity ultimately fall short in Beckett's reading.

However, if we step back to consider the genealogy of Beckett's uncompromising identification with the position of the victim, his work can itself be seen as emphatically post-Christian. As René Girard has argued, the very idea of sympathy for the sacrificial victim is biblical and, in its developed form, distinctively Christian, from the 'suffering servant' of Isaiah to the crucified man-God of the New Testament. Anthropologically, this represents a radical departure from the archaic sacred, where a scapegoat victim is unregretfully (often festively) sacrificed for the sake of community cohesion. For Girard, this is done to suppress or contain a crisis of imitative-competitive ('mimetic') desire that might otherwise perpetuate a disintegrative cycle of violence and revenge. Nevertheless, the figure of Christ unmasks and critiques this victimizing mechanism at the basis of human society, in that the peace Christ's cross offers his followers is one that claims to transcend the false sacred of collective sacrificial violence. But as Scott Cowdell's recent study **René Girard and Secular Modernity** points out, this unmasking itself plants the seed of a desacralized modernity in which 'sacred protection is dwindling away and violence is less reliably held in check'. The 'secular' here names a condition in which mimetic desire finds no outlet that is socially cohesive in the old way, since a plurality of competing worldviews proliferates endlessly, and all the gods are doubted. Secular modernity thus releases ever new cycles of violence through its failing attempts to invent substitutes for the gods: an insight that applies to the totalitarian and genocidal political religions of the twentieth century such as Fascism, Nazism, Stalinism and Maoism, no less than to our contemporary clash of a ruthless global consumer capitalism versus resurgent religious and political fundamentalisms that both imitate and seek to destroy the system of substitute desires that postmodern capitalism generates.

In **René Girard and Secular Modernity: Christ, Culture, and Crisis**, Scott Cowdell provides the first systematic interpretation of René Girard's controversial approach to secular modernity. Cowdell identifies the scope, development, and implications of Girard's thought, the centrality of Christ in Girard's thinking, and, in particular, Girard's distinctive take on the uniqueness and finality of Christ in terms of his impact on Western culture. In Girard's singular vision, according to Cowdell, secular modernity has emerged thanks to the Bible's exposure of the cathartic violence that is at the root of religious prohibitions, myths, and rituals. In the literature, the psychology, and most recently the military history of modernity, Girard discerns a consistent slide into an apocalypse that challenges modern ideas of romanticism, individualism, and progressivism. In the first three chapters, Cowdell examines the three elements of Girard's basic intellectual vision (mimesis, sacrifice, biblical

hermeneutics) and brings this vision to a constructive interpretation of "secularization" and "modernity," as these terms are understood in the broadest sense today. Chapter 4 focuses on modern institutions, chiefly the nation state and the market, that function to restrain the outbreak of violence. And finally, Cowdell discusses the apocalyptic dimension of Girard's theory in relation to modern warfare and terrorism. Here, Cowdell engages with the most recent writings of Girard (particularly his *Battling to the End*) and applies them to further conversations in cultural theology, political science, and philosophy. Cowdell takes up and extends Girard's own warning concerning an alternative to a future apocalypse: "What sort of conversion must humans undergo, before it is too late?"

For Girard, both tragedy and Christianity share an emphasis on unflinching recognition of the victim. Where tragedy exposes and analyses collective violence and its scapegoating mechanism, Christianity actually reconfigures the divine itself in the image of victimhood. From this point of view, Beckett's 'fidelity to failure' seems ultimately in alignment with this imperative of recognition, while also offering a useful challenge and corrective to superficial reassertions of heroic virtue or redemptive order. Moreover, this insight can provide tools with which to confront the bewildering variety of postmodern violent mimetic desire. When – and how – do Christianity and tragedy help us in recognising the victim, in confronting and really processing and assimilating failure? This question resonates through the three essays of this section, as well as in the Afterword by Rowan Williams.

In drawing on tragedy as a source of insight for contemporary Christian theology, Paul Fiddes is determined to confront scepticism about tidy theodicies head-on, even to the point of arguing that 'there is eternally a cross in the heart of God'. His essay (Ch. 10) thus poses a forceful challenge to the Steinerian assumption that a story of forgiveness and transformation is inherently un-tragic. Fiddes proposes his own revision of Donald MacKinnon's idea of a Christian 'tragic theology', based on the positive model of Shakespearean rather than Greek drama. Readers of this volume will recognise Fiddes's emphasis on consolation in Shakespearean tragedy not as 'a metaphysical explanation for evil and suffering, but the simple affirmation of human values that death cannot destroy', such as forgiveness in the face of moral frailty. Yet a confrontation with the cross, no less than with the end of a tragedy like *King Lear*, still reaffirms 'all the ambiguity of tragedy: we are left with an open question, "Is *this* the promised end?"' Fiddes's argument may here suggest a key insight about the sub-genre of those tragedies that are creatively transformed by their encounter with Christianity: they thrive on such ambiguities and endure that open question.

If contemporary Christian theology can find in tragedy a source of insight and challenge, so too can political tragedy find itself reinterpreted through different kinds of artistic expression. This is the insight that informs Jolyon Mitchell and Linzy Brady's essay (Ch. 11), which explores how a wide range of portrayals of the Massacre of the Innocents adapted for painting and literature, theatre and film, can become 'like a mirror to the context out of which they are produced'. Spanning several centuries of art and theatre, from the medieval Corpus Christi plays to contemporary revivals in theatre and film, the essay shows how this

poignant and powerful narrative has routinely been used to bear witness to wartime killings and child massacres from the slaughter of women and children during the siege of Otranto in 1481 right through to World War Two, with the most recent example being the death of the three-year-old refugee Aylan Kurdi in 2015. Mitchell and Brady show how representations of the narrative vary: some appear to be reticent, leaving the violence offstage or outside the frame, reflecting 'an understandable desire to turn away from the horror and tragedy', others, like Mark Dornford-May's politically-engaged *Son of Man* (2006) show Jesus refusing 'to escape the world of bloodshed and injustice': 'He says, "This is my world," and fully enters in to its suffering and violence'.

The interplay between contemporary political tragedy, Christianity and war is also central to the final essay of the collection. The insight from Modernism Studies that a continuing creative confrontation with Christianity remains indispensable to understanding the modernist revolution in both arts and politics has gained new purchase in light of the more recent 'post-secular' return of religion in public life. Following on from this, the contemporary relevance of Christianity to tragedy is suggested not least by the so-called War on Terror and the related rise of Islamist fundamentalism, a violent ideology which casts itself in an ongoing heroic struggle with blasphemy in a heretical Christian or post-Christian West. In her essay (Ch. 12), Jennifer Wallace argues that whereas 'At the end of the twentieth century, it was a much-repeated commonplace to consider both tragedy and religion as anachronistic concepts ... since 2001, religion has become the ostensible premise behind the clash of cultures which constitute the War on Terror and an appetite for tragedy, both the revival of classical tragedy on the stage and the generation of new forms of tragic representation, has been re-awakened'. Wallace is concerned with the function of 'recognition', a key Aristotelian concept which has become a cornerstone not only of tragic theory but of a great deal of post-Holocaust theological, philosophical, and political thought concerning the way we relate to the Other and his or her suffering. If tragic drama has traditionally revealed to us 'the degree to which we both do not want to recognize or acknowledge aspects of ourselves and we do not want to put ourselves in a vulnerable position of shared vulnerability and reciprocity' then it faces new challenges in the age of modern military technologies which allow war to take place remotely, on the other side of a screen, disrupting and distorting forms of recognition between friend and foe. Analysing two recent dramas about the War on Terror, the film *American Sniper* and the prize-winning play *Grounded*, Wallace argues that 'the War on Terror, both because of its technological developments and because of the nature of its ideology and discourse ... is producing new forms of tragedy, new ways of thinking about recognition, responsibility, pity and fear, and therefore new forms of religious thinking'.

This volume concludes with an Afterword by Rowan Williams which takes Beckett's 'fidelity to failure' as its starting-point and probes the subtle ways in which such fidelity can be betrayed or distorted, while also insisting that tragedy and Christianity share a concern with witnessing and recognition that still calls for language, for images, for narrative. As Gillian Rose's well-known essay on the Holocaust suggests, there are any number of ways to sentimentalise or appropriate atrocity. In light of this, Williams asks how we can avoid either

'appropriating suffering to the self-interest of the observing ego or dissolving the particularity of suffering into a general edifying pattern'. For Williams, both tragedy and Christianity test the limits of recognition and in doing so pose a challenge to the ego's complacency, namely 'what will upset and finally dissolve that security in such a way that a truly disturbed and self-scrutinising response to the suffering of others is made more possible'. As such, they remain not just historically and thematically interconnected, but also still able to unsettle and transform our capacity for attention to wounded humanity.

Wounded and grieving human forms fill the picture on the front cover of this book: *Golgotha* (1937), by the Jewish artist Bob Hanf. In it, the mix of spiky curved lines and human figures draw the eye towards the central figure fixed on a symmetrical wooden cross. This familiar crucified shape, with a long history of representation, is surrounded by light and then by lines cutting through space. The angles of the other two crucified forms are part of an encircling movement which is continued on the left by a female spectator's outstretched arm. She reaches towards the suffering, as another female figure raises her hand to cover part of her face. The male watcher on the right, with a beard and an angular face, holds his arm back in a contorted gesture. The suffering of the three figures on the crosses appears to provoke different kinds of grieving, questioning or shock from the three spectators. This print, found in Amsterdam's Rijksmuseum, neither sentimentalises nor appropriates atrocity. Instead it captures different, ambiguous responses to suffering.

This is reflected in the life and death of the artist, Bob Hanf (1894–1944), who printed *Golgotha* seven years before his death in Auschwitz on 30 September 1944. Born in Amsterdam and brought up in Germany, Hanf was a talented and versatile painter, writer, musician, and award-winning composer. Later described as one of the first 'anti-fascist artists' in the Netherlands, his haunting music was silenced and his expressionist art banned during the Nazi occupation. It would not be until the 1960s that some of his drawings were displayed and the 1990s that his compositions were performed again.

Golgotha stands out among his artistic work for its very explicit treatment of suffering and grief. Hanf's *Golgotha* is a very different kind of crucifixion from the better known *White Crucifixion* (1938) by Marc Chagall (1887–1985), which explicitly depicts Jewish persecutions and Christ as a Jewish martyr. Hanf's own Jewish background, and his involvement in the resistance, meant that he himself had to go into hiding during the Second World War, where he wrote a vivid poem under a pseudonym entitled *Mijmeringen over de Nachtzijde des levens*, 'Musings about the Dark Side of Life'. In it he captures the atmosphere of Amsterdam during the German occupation. For example, he describes the reflections in the canals as 'wavering light imprisoned', 'like dead people turned to stone'.

The people in his *Golgotha* print are far from turned into stone. The movement of the observers is inscribed in the picture, which draws the eye towards the muted agony in the background. The centre of the image is in darkness, even if there is light above. *Golgotha* challenges tidy theodicies. But tragedy itself resists watertight definitions and neat resolutions. The same is true of the dramas, pictures and other texts considered through this book. As we underlined earlier, the chapters that follow trace a range of

theologically creative influences upon attempts to represent tragedy in the West. Like the picture on the front of this book these were often experimental, coming from unexpected sources, presented in unexpected ways. As we shall see these evolving theatrical, literary, and visual experiments frequently both enrich and interrogate the genre of tragedy itself.
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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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JESUS AND JUDAISM by Martin Hengel and Anna Maria Schwemer, translated by Wayne Coppins [Baylor-Mohr Siebeck Studies in Early Christianity, Baylor University Press, 9781481310994]

The debate over the extent of Jewish influence upon early Christianity rages on. At the heart of this argument lies the question of Jesus: how does the fate of a first-century Galilean Jew inspire and determine the nature, shape, and practices of a distinct religious movement? Vital to this first question is another equally challenging one: can the four Gospels be used to reconstruct the historical Jesus? In **JESUS AND JUDAISM,** Martin Hengel and Anna Maria Schwemer seek to untangle the complex relationships among Jesus, Judaism, and the Gospels in the earliest Christian movement.

THE IDENTITY OF JOHN THE EVANGELIST: REVISION AND REINTERPRETATION IN EARLY CHRISTIAN SOURCES by Dean Furlong [Fortress Academic, 9781978709300]

This book examines the various Johannine narratives found in writings in the period from Papias (early second century) to Eusebius (early fourth century). Dean Furlong argues that the first major revision of the Johannine narrative was the identification of John the Evangelist with John the Apostle, the son of Zebedee, at the beginning of the third century. This in turn initiated a process of reinterpretation, as the previously-separate narratives of the two figures were variously spun into new configurations during the third and fourth centuries. This process culminated with Eusebius's synthesis of the Johannine traditions, which came to form the basis of what is considered the "traditional" Johannine story. Furlong concludes that in the earliest narrative, found in Papias, John the Evangelist was identified, not with the Apostle, but with another disciple of Jesus known as John the Elder.

A GUIDE TO EARLY JEWISH TEXTS AND TRADITIONS IN CHRISTIAN TRANSMISSION edited by Alexander Kulik, Editor-in-chief, and Gabriele Boccaccini, Lorenzo DiTommaso, David Hamidovic, Michael E. Stone, Associate editors and With the assistance of Jason M. Zurawski [Oxford University Press, 9780190863074]

The Jewish culture of the Hellenistic and early Roman periods established a basis for all monotheistic religions, but its main sources have been preserved to a great degree through Christian transmission. This *Guide* is devoted to problems of preservation, reception, and transformation of Jewish texts and traditions of the Second Temple period in the many Christian milieus from the ancient world to the

late medieval era. It approaches this corpus not as an artificial collection of reconstructed texts--a body of hypothetical originals--but rather from the perspective of the preserved materials, examined in their religious, social, and political contexts. It also considers the other, non-Christian, channels of the survival of early Jewish materials, including Rabbinic, Gnostic, Manichaean, and Islamic. This unique project brings together scholars from many different fields in order to map the trajectories of early Jewish texts and traditions among diverse later cultures. It also provides a comprehensive and comparative introduction to this new field of study while bridging the gap between scholars of early Judaism and of medieval Christianity.

AUGUSTINE AND THE ECONOMY OF SACRIFICE: ANCIENT AND MODERN PERSPECTIVES BY Joshua S. Nunziato [Cambridge University Press, 9781108481397]

Business is generally viewed as a means to generate personal or corporate wealth, but business transactions can also sacrificially serve the common good. In conversation with contemporary social theorists, Joshua S. Nunziato in this book critically evaluates the spiritual significance and aims of economic exchange. Inspired by Augustine's vision of the Church as a 'universal sacrifice', he explores how Augustine's approach teaches us detachment - both personal and collective - which releases us from illusory claims of ownership and reframes business as an exercise in loving and letting go. Nunziato's volume engages with the big questions of economic life and considers both why and how we acknowledge people through business in a way that results in collective well-being. It will be of interest to scholars and students of Augustinian studies, philosophy of exchange, and economic ethics.

AUGUSTINE ON THE WILL A THEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT by Han-luen Kantzer Komline [, Early Christian Studies, Oxford University Press, 9780190948801]

By analyzing a variety of texts from across Augustine’s career, the book traces the development of Augustine’s thinking on the human will. Augustine’s most creative contributions to the notion of the human will do not derive from articulating a monolithic, universal definition. He identifies four types of human will the created will, which he describes as a hinge; the fallen will, a link in a chain binding human beings to sin; the redeemed will, which is a root of love; and the fully free will, to be enjoyed in the next life, when perfection is made complete. His mature view is theologically differentiated, consisting of four distinct types of human will, which vary according to these diverse theological scenarios. His innovation consists in distinguishing these types with a detail and clarity unprecedented by any thinker before him. Augustine’s mature view of the will is constructed in intensive dialogue with other Christian thinkers and, most of all, with the Christian scriptures. Its basic features shape, and are shaped by, his doctrines of Christ and the Holy Spirit, as well as creation and grace, making it impossible to abstract his views on willing from his account of the central Christian doctrines of Christology, Pneumatology, and the Trinity. The multiple facets of Augustine’s conception of will have been cut to fit the shape of his theology and the biblical story it seeks to describe. From Augustine we inherit a theological account of the will.

VAGARIES OF DESIRE: A COLLECTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS by Timo Airaksinen [Value Inquiry Book Series, Philosophy, Literature, and Politics, Brill Rodopi, Hardback: 978-90-04-41029-9, E-Book: 978-90-04-41030-5] Open Source

VAGARIES OF DESIRE is a major collection of new essays by Timo Airaksinen on the philosophy of desire. The first part develops a novel account of the philosophical theory of desire, including Girard. The second part discusses Kafka's main works, namely *The Castle*, *The Trial*, and *Amerika*, and Thomas Hobbes and the problems of intentionality. The text develops such linguistic tropes as metaphor and metonymy in connection with topics like death and then applies them to Kafka's texts. The third part makes an effort to understand the mysteries of sadism and masochism in philosophical and rhetorical terms. The last article criticizes Thomas Nagel's influential account of sexual perversion and develops a viable alternative.

HANDBOOK OF MEGACHURCHES edited by Stephen J. Hunt [Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion, Brill, Hardback: 978-90-04-39988-4, E-Book: 978-90-04-41292-7] open source

The growth of the megachurch (generally defined as a regular attendance of over 2,000 people) is undoubtedly one of the most exceptional religious trends of recent times, certainly within the Christian sphere. Spreading from the USA, megachurches have now become common globally - reaching different national and cultural contexts. The edited volume **HANDBOOK OF MEGACHURCHES** offers a comprehensive account of the subject from various academic perspectives: sociology, religious studies, religious history and religious studies among them. Topics covered include: the historical developments and growth, typologies, theology, popular culture, revivalism, social engagement, and the manifestation of megachurches in such countries as Canada, Russia, India and Africa.

HIGH ON GOD: HOW MEGACHURCHES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA by James Wellman, Katie Corcoran, and Kate Stockly [Oxford University Press, 978019982771 8]

Humans are homo duplex, seeking to be individuals but knowing this is only possible in communities. Thus, humans struggle to integrate these two sides of their nature. Megachurches have been enormously successful at resolving this struggle. How do they do it, and what is it about their structure and rituals that makes so many feel as if they are high on God? The affective energies and emotional valences that characterize religious ecstasy are the primary focus of our study of megachurches. Empirically, humans want and desire forms of what Randall Collins calls "emotional energy." Drawing on extensive qualitative and quantitative data on twelve nationally representative megachurches, we identify six desires that megachurches evoke and meet: acceptance, awe and spiritual stimulation, reliable leadership, deliverance, purpose, and solidarity in a community of like-minded others. Megachurches satisfy these desires through co-presence—being in the presence of other desiring people—a shared mood achieved through powerful musical worship services, a mutual focus of attention on the charismatic senior pastor who acts as an emotional charging agent, transformative altar calls, service opportunities, and small-group participation. This interaction ritual chain solidifies attendees' commitment and group loyalty, and keeps them coming back to be recharged. Megachurches also have a dark side: they are known for their highly publicized scandals often involving malfeasance of the senior pastor. After examining the positive and negative sides to megachurches, we conclude that they successfully meet the desire of humans to flourish as individuals and to do so in a group.

THE PETRINE INSTAURATION: RELIGION, ESOTERICISM AND SCIENCE AT THE COURT OF PETER THE GREAT, 1689-1725 by Robert Collis [Aries Book Series, Brill, 9789004215672, 9789004224391]

The reign of Peter the Great (1672-1725) was marked by an unprecedented wave of reform in Russia. This book provides an innovative reappraisal of the Petrine Age, in which hitherto neglected aspects of the tsar's transformation of his country are studied. More specifically, the reforms enacted by the tsar are assessed in light of the religious notion of instauration – a belief in the restoration of Adamic knowledge in the last age – and a historical and cultural analysis of the impact of Western esotericism at the Russian court. This book will appeal to scholars of Russian history and religion, as well as being of wider interest to those studying Western esotericism in Early Modern and eighteenth-century Europe.

THE HAJJ AND EUROPE IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE edited by Umar Ryad [Leiden Studies in Islam and Society, Brill, 9789004323346]

The present volume focuses on the political perceptions of the Hajj, its global religious appeal to Muslims, and the European struggle for influence and supremacy in the Muslim world in the age of pre-colonial and colonial empires. In the late fifteenth century and early sixteenth century, a pivotal change in seafaring occurred, through which western Europeans played important roles in politics, trade, and culture. Viewing this age of empires through the lens of the Hajj puts it into a different perspective, by focusing on how increasing European dominance of the globe in pre-colonial and colonial times was entangled with Muslim religious action, mobility, and agency. The study of Europe's connections with the Hajj therefore tests the hypothesis that the concept of agency is not limited to isolated parts of the globe. By adopting the "tools of empires," the Hajj, in itself a global activity, would become part of global and trans-cultural history.

ISLAM IN A POST-SECULAR SOCIETY: RELIGION, SECULARITY AND THE ANTAGONISM OF RECALCITRANT FAITH by Dustin J. Byrd [Studies in Critical Social Sciences, BrillAcademic, 9789004325357]

ISLAM IN THE POST-SECULAR SOCIETY: RELIGION, SECULARITY AND THE ANTAGONISM OF RECALCITRANT FAITH critically examines the unique challenges facing Muslims in Europe and North America. From the philosophical perspective of the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory, this book attempts not only to diagnose the current problems stemming from a marginalization of Islam in the secular West, but also to offer a proposal for a Habermasian discourse between the religious and the secular.

THE SHAHNAMEH: THE PERSIAN EPIC AS WORLD LITERATURE by Hamid Dabashi [Columbia University Press, 9780231183444]

The *Shahnameh*, an epic poem recounting the foundation of Iran across mythical, heroic, and historical ages, is the beating heart of Persian literature and culture. Composed by Abu al-Qasem Ferdowsi over a thirty-year period and completed in the year 1010, the epic has entertained generations of readers and profoundly shaped Persian culture, society, and politics. For a millennium, Iranian and Persian-speaking people around the globe have read, memorized, discussed, performed, adapted, and loved the poem.

THE POETRY OF THOUGHT IN LATE ANTIQUITY: ESSAYS IN IMAGINATION AND RELIGION by Patricia Cox Miller [Routledge, 9781138711990]

This title was first published in 2001. These collected essays by Patricia Cox Miller identify new possibilities of meaning in the study of religion in late antiquity. The book addresses the topic of the imaginative mindset of late ancient authors from a variety of Greco-Roman religious traditions. Attending to the play of language, as well as to the late ancient sensitivity to image, metaphor, and paradox, Cox Miller's work highlights the poetizing sensibility that marked many of the texts of this period and draws on methods of interpretation from a variety of contemporary literary-critical theories. This book will appeal to scholars of late antiquity, religious literature, and literary critical theory more widely, illustrating how fruitful dialogue across the centuries can be - not only in eliciting aspects of late ancient texts that have gone unnoticed but also in showing that many 'modern' ideas, such as Roland Barthes', were actually already alive and well in ancient texts.

THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF TRAGEDY: CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES FROM EARLY MODERN TO MODERN edited by Fionnuala O'Neill Tonning, Erik Tonning and Jolyon Mitchell [Studies in Religion and the Arts, Brill, Hardback: 9789004416536; E-Book: 9789004416543] open source

THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF TRAGEDY: CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES FROM EARLY MODERN TO MODERN explores the influence of Christian theology and culture upon the development of post-classical Western tragedy. The volume is divided into three parts: early modern, modern, and contemporary. This series of essays by established and emergent scholars offers a sustained study of Christianity's creative influence upon experimental forms of Western tragic drama.

THE STRIPPING OF THE ALTARS: TRADITIONAL RELIGION IN ENGLAND, 1400-1580 by Eamon Duffy [Yale University Press, 9780300053425]

This important and provocative book offers a fundamental challenge to much that has been written about the pre-Reformation church. Eamon Duffy recreates fifteenth-century English lay people's experience of religion, revealing the richness and complexity of the Catholicism by which men and women structured their experience of the world and their hopes within and beyond it. He then tells the powerful story of the destruction of that Church - the stripping of the altars - from Henry VIII's break with the papacy until the Elizabethan settlement. Bringing together theological, liturgical, literary, and iconographic analysis with historical narrative, Duffy argues that late medieval Catholicism was neither decadent nor decayed but was a strong and vigorous tradition, and that the Reformation represented the violent rupture of a popular and theologically respectable religious system.