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Scriptable

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Editorial

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. Our Annotated Bibliography will review, list and link the titles under discussion, providing a faithful summary of its content and audience.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

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REDISCOVERING THE ISLAMIC CLASSICS: HOW EDITORS AND PRINT CULTURE TRANSFORMED AN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION by Ahmed El Shamsy [Princeton University Press, 9780691174563]

The story of how Arab editors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries revolutionized Islamic literature

Islamic book culture dates back to late antiquity, when Muslim scholars began to write down their doctrines on parchment, papyrus, and paper and then to compose increasingly elaborate analyses of, and commentaries on, these ideas. Movable type was adopted in the Middle East only in the early nineteenth century, and it wasn't until the second half of the century that the first works of classical Islamic religious scholarship were printed there. But from that moment on, Ahmed El Shamsy reveals, the technology of print transformed Islamic scholarship and Arabic literature.

In the first wide-ranging account of the effects of print and the publishing industry on Islamic scholarship, El Shamsy tells the fascinating story of how a small group of editors and intellectuals brought forgotten works of Islamic literature into print and defined what became the classical canon of Islamic thought. Through the lens of the literary culture of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Arab cities—especially Cairo, a hot spot of the nascent publishing business—he explores the contributions of these individuals, who included some of the most important thinkers of the time. Through their efforts to find and publish classical literature, El Shamsy shows, many nearly lost works were recovered, disseminated, and harnessed for agendas of linguistic, ethical, and religious reform.

Bringing to light the agents and events of the Islamic print revolution, **REDISCOVERING THE ISLAMIC CLASSICS** is an absorbing examination of the central role printing and its advocates played in the intellectual history of the modern Arab world.

It was the late summer of my second year in graduate school, and my train was speeding away from the urban moloch of Cairo toward Alexandria on the Mediterranean coast, cutting through the Nile delta, whose lush greenery was sprinkled with the white of the first cotton buds of the season. I was taking some time off from the neatly printed books of Harvard's Widener Library to explore Arabic manuscripts at the Egyptian National Library in Cairo. After it had closed for the day, I had spent a few hours book shopping around the Azhar mosque, one of the oldest still functioning institutions of learning in the world, and was now on my way back to my temporary home.

I was exhausted and had clearly gotten too much sun, but I was making an effort to review the notes I had taken that day. My haphazard stabs at the National Library's large manuscript collection, at the time housed in a dingy concrete block in Cairo's Bulaq district, had yielded a surprising find: a work on Islamic law, written 1,200 years earlier by an Egyptian named Abu Ya`qūb al-Buwaytī, which recent academic publications had declared extinct. Sitting at the microfilm reader that morning (the library did not allow access to the manuscript itself) and realizing what I was looking at, I had scrolled frantically through the text, scribbling notes as I went. The work appeared to be a complete treatment of the principal areas of Islamic law, and it included a methodological discussion on how to read and interpret scripture—one of the oldest such discussions to be found. I had immediately requested a copy of the manuscript, but this would not be ready until the following week, so for now all I had were my hastily jotted notes. The last thing I had written in my notebook was the name of the copyist—a certain 'Abd al-Ra'ūf from Kazan, the Tartar Muslim city on the Volga River—and the year in which the manuscript had been copied: 1325. That year fell in the Mamluk period, when Egypt and Syria were the intellectual centers of the Muslim world. But revisiting my notes, I frowned: why had I written only 1325, without its Hijri counterpart? The Islamic Hijri calendar is more than six centuries behind the Gregorian calendar, though the gap shrinks by about eleven days each year, as the Hijri calendar tracks lunar rather than solar years.' When I wrote down the date, I reasoned, I must have automatically converted it into its Gregorian equivalent, but why had I not made a note of the original Hijri date also? I was too worn out to ruminate on the matter further that day, but when I awoke the following day with my headache gone, the answer struck me: 1325 was not the Common Era date; it was the Hijri date. This meant that the manuscript of al-Buwayti's book had been copied as recently as in 1907 CE. No wonder I had, in my groggy exhaustion after a long day of work, misread my own notes. Why would a hugely important work have been copied by hand in the twentieth century, even as it remained unknown in the published literature?

Puzzling though the manuscript's provenance was, I had to push it to the back of my mind. My dissertation research focused on the early period of Islam, and it was the content of al-Buwaytī's book, not the textual history of this particular manuscript, that was immediately relevant to my investigation of the genesis of Islamic law. But the twentieth century reasserted itself a year later, when I found a second manuscript copy of the same book in Istanbul's magnificent Süleymaniye Library. This copy had been written in 1228 CE (AH 625), but a short note had later been added to the otherwise empty last page: "I, the poor servant of God `Abd al-Ra'ūf from Kazan, have made a copy of this work on the seventh day of [the month of] Jumada al-Ãkhira, 1325 [July 18, 1907]."2 The Cairo manuscript thus turned out to be a copy of the Istanbul one. Why had a work originally composed in Egypt ended up in Istanbul, and how had its copy found its way back to Cairo? Examining the two manuscripts for further clues, I noticed an ownership seal on the margin of the Cairo copy, carrying the name Ahmad Bey al-Husayni. Some digging revealed that al-Husayni was an Egyptian lawyer who died in 1914; he possessed quite a collection of manuscripts and had evidently traveled to Istanbul in order to procure the text I had stumbled on in Cairo.

I was intrigued by this individual I had never heard of whose hunt for written treasure had yielded such a find in my own quest. Once I returned to Egypt for further archival work connected to my dissertation project, I looked for more information about al-Husayni and unexpectedly came across his name in the card catalog of the Egyptian National Library as the author of a twenty-four-volume manuscript book with the cryptic title Murshid al-anām li-birr umm al-imam, "The people's guide to respecting the imam's mother." Curious, I asked to see the work's first volume. I spent the rest of the day reading al-Husaynī's extensive introduction, and by the evening I knew that I would one day write the book that you are holding now.

When we think of the classics of Islamic thought today, we think in the first instance of works written by the founders of the various schools of theology, philosophy, linguistics, Sufism, and historiography and by subsequent scholars who shaped these fields through their seminal contributions. The 'sles of the bookshops around al-Azhar that I browsed for hours during my visits to Cairo could be relied on to contain, for example, Sibawayh's eighth-century grammar, al-Ash`arī's tenth-century survey of Islamic theology, al-Tabarī's voluminous ninth-century exegesis of the ran, al-Makkī's tenth-century Sufi manual, al-Shāfi`ī's ninth-century legal treatise, and Ibn Khaldūn's fourteenth-century sociology of history, usually in multiple editions and copies. These same classics formed the basis of the foundational works of Orientalist scholarship that I pored over in preparation for my qualifying exams at Harvard, and they are the same works I now teach in my classes as the "great books" of the Muslim world.

But this landscape of relatively established classics was not what al-Husayni faced at the turn of the twentieth century. Far from ubiquitous, these works were scarce and difficult if not impossible to find; not only had most not yet been edited and printed, but there were few manuscript copies of them, and the whereabouts of those few that existed were often unknown. Instead, the literature that was available and abundant consisted of a very different pool of writings: dense, technical commentaries on earlier works, typically written centuries after the original works' composition. It was this state of affairs that drove al-Husayni to embark on the grand quest that he describes in the introduction to his massive book. Deeply dissatisfied with what he saw as the narrow horizons of Islamic scholarship in his time, he had set out to gather the largely forgotten foundational early works of the Shāfi`ī school of law, to which he adhered, laboriously hunting down manuscript fragments across the Middle East, and then sought to reintroduce them to his contemporaries in the form of an exhaustive synthetic commentary on al-Shāfi`ī's magnum opus, al-Umm (The mother[book]). In addition to producing this commentary, which brought together and summarized countless key works of earlier Shāfi`ī scholarship, al-Husayni arranged and financed the publication of

the Umm itself; the seven-volume book appeared in print between 1903 and 1908, much earlier, thanks to al-Husayni, than the foundational legal works of most other schools.' Given its rich information on contemporary juristic trends and debates, the Umm subsequently became the lens through which Western scholars of Islamic law, such as Joseph Schacht, perceived the early history of their subject.

Al-Husaynī's account changed the way in which I viewed the "classics" on which my work—like that of other scholars of premodern Islam—was largely based. I realized that I had been wrong to assume that the printed classical literature, whose many known gaps were gradually being filled as new editions were completed and published, naturally reflected the essence of the Islamic intellectual tradition. To me as to Schacht, familiarity with al-Shāfi`ī's Umm had seemed indispensable to any serious study of Islamic law; but al-Husaynī's description of scholarship in his time made it clear that just a century or two ago, even Shāfi`ī jurists saw absolutely no need to have read al-Shāfi`ī's own words in order to be considered leading experts in their field. The fact that books that had been so thoroughly marginalized and ignored had, in such a short time, attained the status of classics clearly owed much to their availability in printed form, but as al-Husayni's travails demonstrated, their printing was by no means inevitable: in the case of many of these long-forgotten works, the publication of a reasonably complete and accurate text constituted a major achievement that had required the marshaling of an array of philological, organizational, and financial resources, all underpinned by considerable time and commitment. But commitment by whom, and for what purpose?

These are the questions that this book seeks to answer. My aim is to sketch the transformation of the Arabo-Islamic intellectual tradition that accompanied the adoption of printing in the Middle East, and to bring to light the stories of the hitherto mostly invisible individuals who effected this transformation. They collected books, resurrecting forgotten works, ideas, and aesthetics that they felt could contribute to the revival of Islamic and Arabic culture; they inaugurated institutions dedicated to the preservation and dissemination of their discoveries; and they developed practices and systems of editing and publication that led to a wave of printed editions of classical works from the late nineteenth century onward. Their motivations, goals, and approaches were diverse. Some sought to reinvigorate the established scholarly tradition, others to undermine it. Some emphasized the socially relevant messages conveyed in rediscovered older works, while others focused on their aesthetically superior form. Some consciously adapted the Orientalist tradition of editing and scholarship, whereas others sought to excavate an indigenous Arabic philology to counterbalance Orientalism and its claims to privileged expertise. All had to contend with the formidable challenges posed by centuries of cultural neglect of the classical literature: locating and obtaining manuscripts in the absence of catalogs, piecing together complete works out of scattered fragments, deciphering texts in spite of errors and damage, and understanding their meaning without recourse to adequate reference material. Their painstaking, frequently solitary, and often innovative efforts opened up the narrow postclassical manuscript tradition into a broad literature of printed, primarily classical works—the literature that we today consider the essential canon of Islamic texts.

This renaissance of classical literature by means of print was part of a broader constellation of sociocultural changes that has often been referred to as the nanda, "awakening." Although there is no agreed-on definition of this phenomenon, developments that are typically placed under its umbrella include the large-scale translation of European works into Arabic, the adoption of European genres of literature, and engagement with the modern natural and social sciences.' An interest in the classical past appears less often among the features of the nanda, although Western observers contemporaneous to it pointed out the connection. But as this book shows, the resurrection of the classical heritage, particularly in the form of published editions of classical texts, was an integral facet of the activities of many key nanda figures? They were not, as is often assumed, rejecting the

AraboIslamic intellectual tradition wholesale in favor of an imported modernity. Instead, they drew on the classical tradition in order to undermine the post-classical one, which they decried as restrictive and ossified, and in order to reconstruct a classical literature that could serve as the foundation of an indigeneous modernity.

My focus on the individual agents of this cultural transformation reflects my conviction that the technology of print was not a cause of the transformation as much as it was a site and a means of it. Influential studies of the history of print in the West, published between the 1960s and the 1980s, portrayed an inherent logic that connected the adoption of printing to subsequent sociocultural changes. It is undeniably true that a manuscript culture differs in many respects from a written culture perpetuated through mechanical reproduction. But I reject the deterministic hypothesis that grants technology the power to override individual agency and to move societies along a fixed, inevitable trajectory—especially when the hypothesis rests on the blanket generalization of a particular (in this case Western) historical experience. Instead, this book tells the stories of the people who harnessed the multidirectional potential of print to further their diverse agendas, and it describes how the printing of rediscovered classical works, together with a host of related phenomena, such as the reassertion of classical Arabic and the foundation of modern libraries, permanently transformed the landscape of Islamic thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

* * *

The narrative of this book opens in the early nineteenth century, when Arabo-Islamic book culture was still carried overwhelmingly in manuscript form, its practices of teaching, copying, and transmission perpetuating a continuous written discourse that was, by then, well more than a millennium old. But the literature that was taught, transmitted, and circulated at this time represented only a fraction of the extant Arabic literary corpus: early and classical works had been marginalized and often forgotten, and many clung to existence in rare, dispersed copies or fragments. In chapter 1, I outline the key factors that constrained the availability of such books—namely, the dramatic decline of traditional libraries and the voracious appetites and deep pockets of European collectors of Arabic books. Meanwhile, chapter 2 examines the reasons for the dearth of indigenous interest in these works: the dominant scholasticism of postclassical academic discourse preferred late commentary works over their classical predecessors, and the growing influence of Sufi esotericism undermined the authority of book-based learning altogether.

The adoption of printing to reproduce Arabic and Islamic literature changed the literary landscape. Not only could copies of books now be made available in much larger quantities than when each had to be copied by hand; more importantly, access to the presses was open to anyone who wished to publish a particular text and could come up with the money to have it printed. Chapter 3 describes the birth of the Arabic printing industry and the new opportunities that it created for the propagation of established as well as novel ideas and works, and chapter 4 uncovers the emerging constituency of elite bibliophiles such as `Abd al-Hamīd Nãfi` and Ahmad Taymūr whose enthusiasm for classical literature, supported by social capital and access to financial resources, drove the rediscovery of long-lost classical works. As the movement to publish classical texts gained momentum, the challenges of reconstituting fragmentary and corrupted texts gave rise to the new cultural function of the editor, inaugurated by Ahmad Zaki and described in chapter 5.

The technology of printing appealed to reformers of various stripes, who recognized its potential for promoting social and religious change. Chapter 6 discusses the editing and publishing activities of Tāhir al Jazã'irī and Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom believed in the power of eloquent language and the importance of ethical literature in the project of public edification. In chapter 7, I introduce

other, less well-known reformist scholars, such as Jamal al-Din al-Qāsimi and Mahmūd Shukri al-Alusi, who formed a transnational network of like-minded individuals dedicated to rescuing classical texts from oblivion. Their choice of works to publish reflected their goal of challenging the postclassical scholarly orthodoxy on both methodological and substantive grounds. Their emphasis on the objective representation and evaluation of positions on their own merits found an echo in the developing discourse of textual criticism, discussed in chapter 8, within which philologists such as Muhammad Shakir and Ahmad Shākir grappled with issues of truth and authenticity and confronted the complex legacy of Orientalist scholarship in the shadow of European political and economic dominance.

Finally, a word on terminology and the limitations of the book's scope. I have striven to minimize the use of labels, and the few labels that I do use should be considered descriptive rather than evaluative. Accordingly, a "reformist" is simply someone who seeks to reform something, not necessarily along progressive lines; "scholasticism" is not intended (as it is sometimes used) as a term of abuse but simply as a descriptor of a specific mode of scholarship; and "postclassical" thought is so called because its central feature was its sidelining of the classical textual corpus. Geographically, my investigation of the Arabo-Islamic scholarly tradition and the printing movement has dictated a focus on the heartlands of this tradition where, for many decades, the movement was concentrated—especially Egypt, the Levant, and Iraq—with only marginal attention to regions less influential in the early stages of this movement and almost total disregard for editions and writings in languages other than Arabic. I do not discuss lithography, a technique of reproducing manuscripts mechanically that dominated the Indian, Iranian, and North African printing industries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, because it represented a continuation of the preprint scribal tradition and lacked the features of moveable-type printing—such as clear script, distinct editors, and substantial print runs—that made the latter so pregnant with possibility. Lastly, the aim of this book is to trace the evolution of the discourses of Islamic scholarship, and I therefore consider nonscholarly religious practices and ideas only insofar they are reflected in the arena of scholarship. <>

ESOTERIC IMAGES: DECODING THE LATE HERAT SCHOOL OF PAINTING by Tawfiq Daʿadli [Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture, Brill, Hardback: 9789004398009; E-Book: 9789004398412]

In **ESOTERIC IMAGES: DECODING THE LATE HERAT SCHOOL OF PAINTING** Tawfiq Daʿadli decodes the pictorial language which flourished in the city of Herat, modern Afghanistan, under the rule of the last Timurid ruler, Sultan Husayn Bayqara (r.1469-1506). This study focuses on one illustrated manuscript of a poem entitled Khamsa by the Persian poet Nizami Ganjavi, kept in the British Library under code Or.6810. Tawfiq Daʿadli decodes the paintings, reveals the syntax behind them and thus deciphers the message of the whole manuscript. The book combines scholarly efforts to interpret theological-political lessons embedded in one of the foremost Persian schools of art against the background of the court dynamic of an influential medieval power in its final years.

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Excerpt: During the rule of the sultan Ḥusayn Bāyqarā (r. 1469–1506), the elite of the court at Herat (modern Afghanistan) were patrons of the arts of the book, from paper manufacturing and calligraphy to illumination, illustration, and bookbinding.[1] This Late Herat school of painting marks one of the highest moments in Persian painting. Based on previous schools of art, especially the Early Herat school of painting, the artists of the Late School created new compositions and encoded several levels of meaning into their paintings. However, the illustrations contain a paradoxical relation between form and content. Those paintings bear relationship to mystical Persian poetry which is composed of sophisticated verse and includes ambiguous metaphor. The fundamental objective of this book is to analyze the visual language of these illustrated manuscripts in relation to the circumstances in which they were produced.

One of the most celebrated illustrated manuscripts of the *Khamsa* (Quintet) of the Persian poet Niẓāmī Ganjāvī (1135 or 41–1202 or 9) serves as a case study for the whole school. Currently kept in the British Library under code Or.6810, the manuscript reveals the extraordinary quality and revolutionary approach of this school. It was originally created for Amīr ʿAlī Fārsi Barlās, ruler of Samarkand. The history of the manuscript is documented with more than 70 inscriptions and seal impressions dating from 1564/65 to 1782 testifying to its transition from the Timurid to the Mughal. Among its owners in the Mughal court were Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Awrangzeb. The manuscript was restored in the Mughal court and some paintings were retouched. The manuscript was acquired by Richard Johnson on 17 December 1782 and purchased by the British Museum on 27 February 1908.[2] The page size of this manuscript is 17 × 24 cm and the poem is written in four columns of 25 lines per page. Interlaced within the text of the poem are one double and 20 single miniatures in the Herat style. The attributions to various artists beneath the lower margins of the miniatures were added later, but the miniatures folios 37v, 135v, 190r, 214r, 225v, and 273r are considered to be the work of Bihzād. One of the paintings (f 284a) is clearly dated 900 AH (1494/95).

The paintings illustrate scenes from the five poems of the *Khamsa*; the *Makhzan al-asrār*, that consists of twenty discourses, each exemplified by a representative story; *Khusrau and Shīrīn*, based on the love story of the Sasanian King Khusrau II Parviz (590–628) and Princess Shīrīn, who seek to be together in the face of significant obstacles; *Laylī and Majnūn*, a rendering of an Arabic legend about two star-crossed lovers—the poet, known as Majnūn, and his uncle's daughter, Laylī; *Haft Paykar*, where the Sasanian King Bahrām Gūr (420–438) becomes a prototype of the ideal king; and the *Iskandar-nāma* in two parts. In this poem, Alexander/Iskandar is the ideal king and reaches prophet status, his physical integrity reflected in royalty, his spiritual integrity in prophecy.

In some cases, the poem presents the story of one protagonist, as in the *Iskandar-nāma*, where the artist chose to illustrate Iskandar's different natures. In other cases, poems depict different episodes, sometimes unrelated to each other, as in the case of the *Makhzan al-asrār*, where the painter illustrates episodes that tackle moral issues along didactic lines.

While a few of the paintings were based on earlier versions of compositions, the majority were newly created by the Late Herat painters. Those painters, it seems, did not only illustrate the text, but created their own pictorial texts and embedded in them clues to deeper layers of meaning. Some of the clues are only visible in the original paintings. In later retouches, they were brushed over, leaving the illustrations without important symbols and metaphors.

Some research, including a short monograph by Martin and Arnold, and an article by Stchoukine, has been conducted into the illustrations of Or.6810. Paintings from this manuscript are reproduced in books on Islamic art in general, and in those on Persian painting in particular. However, the discussions tend to be about the identity of the painters, rather than about the paintings' meanings. For example, while some of the miniatures have been attributed to the famous painter of the Late Herat school, Kamāl al-dīn Bihzād, only few studies engage with the question of the meaning of illustrations affiliated with this school. For me, the question of attribution or the identity of the painters is secondary to the discussion of the art itself and its significance.

In the early stage of research, the illustrations from the manuscript were examined separately in order to get an understanding of the iconography behind each. During this stage it became obvious that illustrations in *Khamsa* Or.6810 contain details redundant to a straightforward illustration of episodes described in the text of Niẓāmī. My premise is that these additional details point to a parallel narrative with didactic intent.

After dividing the manuscript into individual illustrations, I found that the paintings covered common ground and consequently regrouped them according to theme. The reconstruction of the manuscript unmasked what I see as a general theme and dictated the further choice of scenes. That is to say, most of the scenes illustrated in this manuscript were selected to demonstrate one particular idea—the revelation of Sufi mystical beliefs and concepts. Moreover, the idea of just rule, where the ruler seeks the truth and is humble before the Sufi dervish who encapsulates this truth, is discussed in various chapters and is intrinsic to the idea behind the illustrated manuscript.

As the book focuses on the Herat school of painting under Ḥusayn Bāyqarā, and especially on one illustrated *Khamsa* from this school, an introductory chapter is provided with background material. The introduction first presents a (brief) history of the Timurid dynasty, especially the days of Sultan Ḥusayn Bāyqarā and the cultural conditions that prevailed in Herat under his rule. The second part discusses the poet Niẓāmī Ganjāvī, author of the *Khamsa*.

The meaning of the paintings cannot be understood without decoding the pictorial language of the Late Herat school. The second chapter attempts to decode and reinterpret some paintings from Late Timurid Herat by pointing to a character, here called a focalizor, whose function it is to point out a specific event. By situating focalizors in a central place in the composition, whence eye contact is established between them and the observer or another feature in the painting, the painter attracts the observer to the focalizor himself or to the object of his gaze. The focalizor in the painting becomes the lens through which the observer can "read" the illustration. This reading can, I suggest, be mystical in nature which would be in keeping with the cultural context of Herat under Sultan Ḥusayn Bāyqarā.

Chapters 3 and 4 look at the didactic aspect of several scenes. In several illustrations the Sultan is depicted as the main protagonist who practices justice and helps his subjects, while in other paintings he is depicted as a mystic seeking to reveal the truth. In some of these illustrations, one of the Sultan's sons, perhaps the crown prince, is illustrated as well as the Sultan. Where acts of justice are depicted, the son is seen beside his father; in the mystical illustrations, the son is separated from his father and relegated a lower spiritual status.

Beside the didactic scenes in the Or.6810 *Khamsa*, the painter also illustrates scenes in chapter 5 that emphasize the fleeting nature of the material world. Man should avoid false representation and seek the path to his true destiny, attainable only through divine love. Illustrations of the deaths of mystical lovers combine two aspects—earthly death and the path to salvation. This is not far removed from the moral aspect of the other scenes, as the Sultan who seeks the truth is aware of the transient nature of the material world and the need to escape its temptations.

The sixth chapter offers conclusions regarding the formal building of compositions and the creation of a pictorial language. The discussion in this chapter is largely based on conclusions that emerged after deciphering the narratives of the paintings studied. By this I mean the elements or tools used by painters of the Late Herat school to build the meaning of their compositions. This chapter is followed by a concluding section in which I attempt to bring together the connecting themes in this illustrated manuscript.

While I have arranged the scenes to support my argument, the scenes can of course be regrouped to reflect other lines of enquiry. For example, the two chapters discussing the ancestral line of Sultan Ḥusayn can be merged into one group: scenes depicting the Sultan alone and those where the Sultan and his son are together; or illustrations that depict the Sultan seeking the truth as distinct from those that also depict his acts of justice.

And finally a word about the texts used to support the arguments. Nizami's text was the first source examined to unravel the illustrations' meanings; later came the poems of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī, the influential poet of late fifteenth-century Herat. Other sources derived from various poems that were popular in Herat in that period.

Since the cultural life of late fifteenth-century Herat was so rich, the proposed reading of its pictorial language—admittedly only a section of it—is but a step in widening the crack in the shutters that might afford us a glimpse into what was once a vibrant civilization. <>

Sainthood and Authority in Early Islam: Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī's Theory of wilāya and the Reenvisioning of the Sunnī Caliphate by Aiyub Palmer [Studies on Sufism, Brill, Hardback: 9789004408302; E-Book: 9789004416550]

In **Sainthood and Authority in Early Islam** Aiyub Palmer recasts wilāya in terms of Islamic authority and traces its development in both political and religious spheres up through the 3rd and 4th Islamic centuries. This book pivots around the ideas of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, the first Muslim theologian and mystic to write on the topic of wilāya.

By looking at its structural roots in Arab and Islamic social organization, Aiyub Palmer has reframed the discussion about sainthood in early Islam to show how it relates more broadly to other forms of authority in Islam. This book not only looks anew at the influential ideas of al-Tirmidhī but also challenges current modes of thought around the nature of authority in Islamicate societies.

Excerpt: Through this work I have sought to reimagine the way we think about *wilāya* in the early Islamic period, by bringing a new methodological approach, new textual sources to bear, as well as a close reading of al-Tirmidhī's major works. The results have provided significant explanatory potential for numerous social, political and religious movements in early Islam. I did not want to simply write a book about al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and his ideas. That has already been done by previous authors. My purpose was to reframe the discourse around al-Tirmidhī and his ideas and provide a new and hopefully beneficial approach to the study of Islamic Mysticism that other scholars may be able to reproduce and explore in further detail. After several attempts to apply Weber's paradigm to early Islamic *wilāya*, it became clear that there was a lack of congruence between the theory and the subject matter. Early on, I had tried to apply Foucault's concept of the episteme, and that too produced mediocre results. It was not until I looked for a structure within early Arab/Islamic social and political history that I began to notice the transactional and socially dynamic manner that authority conveyed within Islamicate society. This approach has the possibility of allowing us to rethink not only certain aspects of Islamic Mysticism but also the way Islamic history is understood generally. I have pointed out some of these insights throughout the book.

Instead of looking at al-Tirmidhī's gnoseology through the prism of sainthood, I looked at *wilāya* as it was playing out socially and politically in the two centuries prior to al-Tirmidhī. This required tracing the historical roots of *wilāya* as it grew out of the early Arab/Islamic conquests and the rule of the Rāshidūn caliphs up to and including the first couple of centuries of the ʿAbbāsids. When looking across numerous Islamic movements during the first three centuries of Islam, it is clear that *wilāya* occupied a very different social-semantic universe than sainthood, while overlapping in only a few distinct areas. If *wilāya* was not the same as sainthood then, based on its various meanings and usages, it must be related to authority or some discourse around the negotiation of power. In fact, we find that *wilāya* speaks to a range of power relations in pre-Islamic and early Arab/Islamic society that coalesce around the solidarity group. It is the solidarity group that is primary in this model rather than the individual. We find social structures connected to the way solidarity groups form and interact at both the political and social levels. The city-based mercantile classes had developed strong ties of dependence with the nomadic Bedouin ethos that surrounded the urban oases. This *Weltanschauung* proved to imbue early Arab/Islamic social structures with durable patterns that gave precedence to transactional and diffuse types of authority that varied significantly from the more hierarchical agrarianate models often used in Islamic Studies.

This approach to early Islamic history helps us look at the development of Sufism in a different way. It brings into question Melchert's thesis that Sufism developed out of a transition from asceticism to mysticism in the 3rd/9th century. His thesis does not resolve a number of outstanding anomalies that have plagued the study of Islamic Mysticism for decades. For example, why are 'wearers of wool' always characterized differently in the literature than Ṣūfīs? The problem partly lies in the persistence of certain assumptions about Ṣūfīs, such as their being primarily mystics, and their vaulted mystical doctrines being the centerpiece of their efforts. Rather, Chapter 1 shows us that the Ṣūfīs were more concerned with correcting what they saw as negligence and abuse by the caliphal establishment. When the state persecuted them, the Ṣūfīs transformed from being a diffuse subversive movement to following a more stable contractual model founded on the doctrine of al-Junayd. One of the significant points about the Ṣūfīs is that, in doing so, they developed a solidarity group that could absorb other solidarity groups and thus become a type of meta-solidarity group. Al-Tirmidhī developed out of the same Baṣran-based milieu that gave rise to the Ṣūfiyya. Al-Tirmidhī focused on the *wilāya* model of the early *zuhhād* such as Ibrāhīm b. Adham and Fuḍayl b. ʿIyāḍ, who were Traditionists representing a contractual authority structure outside of the nascent *madhāhib*. It

is these two types of authority that eventually merge to then be reconstituted in Nīshāpūr in the 11th-century ce.

Chapter 2 explains how al-Tirmidhī thought about *wilāya* through the prism of clientage (*walāʾ*). Through a close reading of al-Tirmidhī's works, it is clear how he is not as interested in promoting *virtuosi* as he is concerned with working out the relationship of the *ʿulamāʾ* to the common Muslims and the political rulers. He is focused on reforming the scholarly class and preserving its position of authority in a time of political instability and rapid social change. Clientage (*walāʾ*) could schematize both the path towards freedom (in a spiritual sense) and a new basis for social dependence and authority that prioritized Islamic norms rather than Arab descent. The beneficiaries of al-Tirmidhī's model are the *ʿulamāʾ*, who become the class from which the *awliyāʾ* arise. These are the *awliyāʾ* who are worthy to be followed; however, their precise characterization always remains amorphous.

In Chapter 3, we looked at al-Tirmidhī's notion of *ḥikma*. The debate has swung back and forth about whether or not al-Tirmidhī was influenced directly by Hellenistic thought. I position myself somewhere in between Radtke and those who say that al-Tirmidhī incorporated Greek learning directly in its Aristotelian and Neoplatonic forms. What is significant, however, about my presentation is that it shows how al-Tirmidhī attempts to encompass and synthesize a foreign knowledge-paradigm within his traditional Islamic scholarly framework. What is more important than the content of this imported knowledge is the way in which al-Tirmidhī interacts with that knowledge. *Ḥikma* and the purveyors of *ḥikma*, i.e. the *ḥukamāʾ*, are not adopted by the later Ṣūfī tradition as authority figures. This is not necessarily because they saw *ḥikma* as a foreign implant, but more probably because the authority of the *ḥukamāʾ* was ultimately subversive to the authority of the *ʿulamāʾ*.

Chapter 4 serves to demonstrate al-Tirmidhī's connection to the normative scholarly tradition as exemplified in the works of early Murjiʾī/Ḥanafī creedal texts. Al-Tirmidhī's discourse on the *awliyāʾ* was part of a much wider discourse among the *ʿulamāʾ* that sought to place the *awliyāʾ* as the true inheritors of the *anbiyāʾ*. By the end of the 3rd/9th century, the *awliyāʾ* figure prominently in these creedal texts, and it is assumed among large numbers of Muslims in the Eastern lands of Islamdom that the *awliyāʾ* not only exist, but that their miracles (*karamāt*) are recognized by the normative tradition. Again, this provides a correction to the view that al-Tirmidhī was an outlier or that his views were incompatible with the normative tradition. While al-Tirmdhī's notion of *ḥikma* was not adopted by the later Ṣūfī tradition, it does seem to have influenced the Māturīdī theologians of Transoxania as a theoretical basis for their theological discourse. In this sense, the theoretical approach we can call *ḥikma*-based was disassociated from its connection to the *ḥukamāʾ* and so also its potential to generate authority. However, *ḥikma* for the Māturīdīs seems to function in a similar way to Aristotelian philosophy for the Ashʾarīs after al-Ghazālī.

In Chapter 5, we looked at how al-Tirmidhī develops a schematization of *wilāya* that reflects the primary binary structure of diffuse versus contractual modes of authority. He does this through a tripartite approach to authority types focusing on the *ʿulamāʾ*, *ḥukamāʾ* and *awliyāʾ*(*khulafāʾ*). The *ʿulamāʾ* and the *awliyāʾ* represent the two primary modes of both contractual and diffuse structures, while the *ḥukamāʾ* represent a subversive authority that frames *wilāya*. Chapter 5 also addresses a number of aspects of al-Tirmidhī's concepts of *wilāya* and *ḥikma* that are important for his overall gnoseology. Examples of these are the light-based nature of al-Tirmidhī's notion of *wilāya* as well as the potential ramifications of *wilāya* and *ḥikma* for Islamicate social and political

history. While *ḥikma* does not become important for Islamicate authority, it does become important as a conduit for foreign knowledge elements to enter into the Islamic scholarly discourse.

In Chapter 6, I complete the book by showing how the discourse on authority and al-Tirmidhī's notions of *wilāya* were important building blocks for the Great Mystical Synthesis of the 11th-century ce in Nīshāpūr. Again, I show how al-Tirmidhī was not necessarily the outlier that many characterize him to be, even for the discourse stream of Islamic Mysticism. One of the important lessons of this work is that the solidarity group should be understood as the primary basis of negotiating authority in Islamicate societies. Al-Tirmidhī's ideas and his contributions to Ṣūfī discourse are more important than the figure of al-Tirmidhī himself for Islamicate society. What is clear is that al-Tirmidhī was actively working through central issues at the center of Islamic social, political and religious thought. For that reason, we should not view al-Tirmidhī as only an Islamic mystic but as one of the important early ideologues of Islamic social, religious and political thought. His approach to new knowledge paradigms is still very relevant today as we see Islamicate societies grappling with the challenges of modernity while attempting to ground their claims to authority through Islam. Al-Tirmidhī exemplifies the process of Islamic renewal and a path that leads forward in a time of political and social change. <>

Re-Making the World: Christianity and Categories: Essays in Honor of Karen L. King edited by Taylor G. Petrey, Carly Daniel-Hughes, Benjamin H. Dunning, Anne-Marie Luijendijk, Laura S. Nasrallah [Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament, Mohr Siebrek, 9783161565816]

This edited volume brings together important scholars of religion in the ancient world to honor the impact of Karen L. King's scholarship in this field. Her work shows that Christianity was diverse from its first moments - even before the word "Christian" was coined - and insists that scholars must engage both in deep historical work and in ethical reflection. These essays honor King's intellectual impact by further investigating the categories that scholars have used in their reconstructions of religion, by reflecting on the place of women and gender in the analysis of ancient texts, and by providing historiographical interventions that illuminate both the ancient world and the modern scholarship that has shaped our field. Contributors:Carlin Barton, Giovanni B. Bazzana, Daniel Boyarin, Bernadette Brooten, Margaret Butterfield, Carly Daniel-Hughes, Benjamin H. Dunning, Judith Hartenstein, T. Christopher Hoklotubbe, Ronit Irshai, Denise Kimber Buell, Marcie Lenk, AnneMarie Luijendijk, Laura S. Nasrallah, Elaine Pagels, Silke Petersen, Taylor G. Petrey, Adele Reinhartz, Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Sarah Sentilles, Angela Standhartinger, Stanley Stowers.

Telling Karen King's story of New Testament and Early Christianity Studies

Telling the story of Karen King's many contributions to the study of New Testament and early Christianity is a difficult task. One distillation of her decades of work in the field is found in an important 2008 chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, "Which Early Christianity?" The very title gives us a glimpse into King's contributions, which provide data and analytical tools for investigating the varieties of early Christianity. In this chapter, she offers a succinct formulation of one of the most pressing historiographical issues in early Christian studies:

Throughout the history of Christianity, diverse beliefs and practices would ebb and flow on the tides of historical change and conflict, navigating and sometimes floundering with ever-shifting geographical, social-political, and cultural contexts as Christianity expanded from a tiny movement to a global religion. The issues, actors, and contexts would vary, but diversity would continue to characterize Christianity, even in the face of powerful claims to unity and uniformity. The question is how to represent this ever-shifting diversity adequately.

The drive to present (true) Christian belief and practice as singular runs deep in the tradition, inflecting many of its earliest narratives and theological claims and even cutting across specific positions that conflict with one another. We can see the template for what King calls "the master narrative of Christian origins" emerging at least as early as the conclusion to the Gospel of Luke: "And [Jesus] said to them, 'Thus it is written, that the Messiah is to suffer and to rise from the dead on the third day, and that repentance and forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed in his name to all nations, beginning from Jerusalem. You are witnesses of these things— (24:46-48 NRSV). Here Jesus reveals a supposedly pure, original gospel to his disciples and charges them as witnesses to carry this deposit to the rest of the world. The book of Acts further clarifies that this initial deposit is entrusted first and foremost to twelve male followers and that their charge entails both pneumatic

empowerment and a specific geographical mandate, which subsequently shapes the text's narrative arc: "But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of the earth" (1:8 NRSV). Diversity of opinion and dissension within the movement are therefore presented either as temporary and eventually resolved (Acts 15) or as the seeds of heresy, threatening the otherwise unbroken chain of truth - as in the case of Simon, a believing and baptized follower of Christ (8:13) who, by virtue of his conflict with Peter, comes to be figured by numerous sources in the later tradition as diabolically inspired and the father of all heresies (see, e. g., Justin, 1 Apol. 26, Irenaeus, Haer. 1.23; 3, preface).

King's "Which Early Christianity" and her larger corpus ask that we pay attention to nascent templates for making sense of difference in Christianized terms, such as the one found in Eusebius of Caesarea's enormously influential Ecclesiastical History in the early fourth century:

> It is my purpose to record: the successions from the holy apostles and the periods extending from our Savior's time to our own; the many important events that occurred in tbe history of the church; those who were distinguished in its leadership at the most famous locations; those who in each generation proclaimed the Word of God by speech or pen; the names, numbers, and ages of those who, driven by love of novelty to the extremity of error, have announced themselves as sources of knowledge (falsely so-called) while ravaging Christ's flock mercilessly, like ferocious wolves; the fate that overtook the whole Jewish race after their plot against our Savior; the occasions and times of the hostilities waged by heathen against the divine Word and the heroism of those who fought to defend it, sometimes through torture and blood; the martyrdoms of our own time and the gracious deliverance provided by our Savior and Lord, Jesus the Christ of God, who is my starting point. (1.1.1-2; trans. Maier)

Here we see more fully articulated a trajectory that has served, more or less, as the basic hegemonic narrative of Christian origins for the greater part of two millennia. There is rhetorical power to this plot, a story of twists and turns whereby God managed to preserve Christian truth, embodied in Jesus Christ, through all sorts of external attacks, until finally bringing about deliverance through the Emperor Constantine. And yet, while this may be a compelling plot, it is also a selective one. It is an account of certain locales, communities, and events but not others. It is an account that erases legitimate debates whose outcomes were genuinely not known in advance, whitewashes competing visions of Jesus' teaching and why it matters, and positions diversity that could not be easily assimilated or coopted as irredeemably beyond the pale.

Unsurprisingly, alternative evidence abounds, and King's career has been steeped in detailing and explaining such evidence. Eusebius's rhetorical alignment of a fixed origin ("my starting point" - that is, Jesus Christ as singular and singularly understood) with essence and truth works to obscure the otherwise seemingly obvious historiographical insight that whatever point we fix as the beginning is always, historically speaking, already a point in the flow. In this particular case, the tradition itself problematizes any notion of a singular point of origin, insofar as the New Testament preserves four conflicting accounts of Jesus' life, death, and ongoing significance (the last not necessarily always aligned with bodily resurrection in a straightforward way). Many more possibilities and stories exist or did exist at some early point, even if now lost.

For example, the Gospel of Mary - with its theological promise of a Jesus who dialogues with a woman, on the one hand, and whose words allow for a questioning of the very idea of sin, on the other - is only one voice, but a key one that King has made accessible through her translation and contextualization of the text. Yet evidence for debate and contrary opinions at Christianity's very start is not limited to this one early (perhaps second-century) extracanonical text. Diversity characterized Christ-following communities from the very beginning. In his first letter to the Corinthians, the apostle Paul buttresses his appeal for unity with the acknowledgment that "it has

been reported to me by Chloe's people that there are quarrels among you, my brothers and sisters. What I mean is that each of you says, `I belong to Paul,' or `I belong to Apollos,' or `I belong to Cephas,' or `I belong to Christ' (1:11-12 NRSV). Citing this passage, King notes, "It would seem that the questions `Which Christianity? Whose Christianity?' were posed very early, even before the gospels and most of the New Testament literature had been composed, and at a time when the number of believers must have been very small indeed." Yet the drive to answer definitively the question of "which early Christianity" in the singular by way of domesticating or demonizing difference appears to be equally early - and to extend through the tradition in ways not limited to the New Testament or other texts that later came to be classified as "orthodox" (see, e. g., Apoc. Pet. 76-79; Testim. Truth; Ptolemy, Flor. 33.3.2-3).

Karen King's work shows that Christianity was diverse from its first moments - even before the word "Christian" was coined - and insists that scholars must engage both in deep historical work and in ethical reflection. Whatever one's goal in reconstructing early Christianity, she argues, "such work should be based in an adequate comprehension of the multifarious practices of early Christians, including their constructions of identity and difference."6 To this end, a class that King has long taught, titled "Orthodoxy and Heresy," deconstructs the history of those terms. In this course, as in her publications, King demonstrates how ancient Christians accused each other of heresy - a term originally emerging from the Greek haeresis, meaning "choice" or "sect" or "school" – and made claims of orthodoxy for themselves. In the introduction to her translation of the Apocryphon of John, she explains that "[early Christians] developed distinct ways of contesting orthodoxy and heresy, and in so doing they created discourses of identity and difference that would pervade the West for millennia to come." King has long argued that the texts discovered at Nag Hammadi in the mid-twentieth century should not be read as "Gnostic," but instead as part of the diversity of early Christianity. Her expertise in the Coptic language has allowed her to bring these texts into the orbit of mainstream scholarly conversations within early Christian studies. One important aspect of King's work has been to break down the barriers that ecclesial and scholarly traditions have constructed between various forms of Christianity in antiquity. Thus, in her work, a text from the so-called gnostic author Valentinus can sit alongside one from Origen, and Irenaeus can join the conversation even as the Apocryphon of John does.

King does this sort of work by precise attention to the details of ancient literature. Her first book, Revelation of the Unknowable God, is a text, translation, and explanation of Allogenes, a challenging text within the Nag Hammadi codices. Her Gospel of Mary of Magdala makes that fascinating dialogue between Mary and the Savior accessible to popular audiences. The Secret Revelation of John provides in lucid translations the extant versions of the Apocryphon of John; she contextualizes the text within Jewish and Christian interpretive trends in antiquity and shows the way in which its imagination of a utopian Divine Realm still draws from the "central values that underlie the power arrangements current in the Mediterranean world under Roman domination." Her co-publication with Elaine Pagels of Reading Judas provides an accessible translation and discussion of the fragmentary Gospel of Judas, a text that indicates, according to King's interpretation, that the very idea of and meaning of a martyr was contested among early Christians.

King's careful work in translation and the production of accessible editions needs to be situated within her larger undertaking of reconsidering the historiography of early Christianity. Her What is Gnosticism? exposes the way in which a scholarly category, once invented, was then naturalized as a historical phenomenon. She demonstrates that what is at stake in the scholarly work of defining Gnosticism is a theological and ideological struggle not unlike those that we find in early Christian texts, which worked to include and to exclude various proximate others. She also illuminates how much is at stake for scholars as they approach the project of telling the story of Christian origins. Scholarly interpretations of how similar Christianity was to Judaism, or how many affinities

Christianity had with so-called Hellenistic philosophy or with celebrations of knowledge found among those then labelled "Gnostics," reveal something about ancient texts and communities. But they reveal just as much about the scholars' own times and commitments: how they define Christianity, how they define Judaism, what assumptions they make about how a pure and sui generis religion can emerge.

King's work emerges from the traditions of historical criticism, which produced such narratives of the origins of Christianity and its distinctiveness from - and/or similarities to - "Judaism" and "Gnosticism." But her work also breaks from historical criticism in important ways. The advent of historical criticism within modern New Testament scholarship opened up new possibilities for interpreting ancient evidence, not only providing methodological tools to render early Christian diversity more easily visible, but also situating it within new historical narratives. Walter Bauer's landmark thesis that the earliest forms of Christianity were regionally specific - that is, originally characterized by a highly localized diversity of belief and practice - is well known. While critiquing many facets of Bauer's analysis, scholars have built on and amplified his larger thesis, integrating newly discovered textual evidence (e. g., Nag Hammadi, Oxyrhynchus) along with familiar sources in order to reconstruct distinct and bounded (hypothetical) communities of early Christians. Here particular locales, noteworthy theological positions or interpretive techniques, and the authority of individual apostles have all functioned in various combinations to demarcate putative social formations. As King summarizes, "Texts were read as reflections of the historical situations of communities that produced them. Theological differences in the texts frequently (and problematically) came to be read as ciphers for communities in conflict."

These historiographical techniques rely on questionable methodological assumptions; accordingly, more recent scholarship has done much both to clarify the theoretical issues and to question the historical conclusions that such assumptions yield. A rich tradition of feminist biblical interpretation has emphasized that early Christian texts are tendentious and rhetorical. These texts do not reflect a preexistent social reality in a simple or straightforward way, but rather work to persuade readers, inducting them into and/or confirming their place within particular systems of truth and meaning. As Elizabeth Clark reminds us from the standpoint of the so-called linguistic turn, the evidence we have from the ancient world does not necessarily lend itself to techniques of analysis drawn from the social sciences: "social-scientific appropriations obscured the fact that scholars of late ancient Christianity deal not with native informants, nor with masses of data amenable to statistical analysis, but with texts - and texts of a highly literary, rhetorical, and ideological nature." Frederik Wisse puts a finer point on one of the key historiographical difficulties that afflicts the project of reconstructing Christian origins: "It is as difficult to disprove that specific communities were the real referents of early Christian literary texts as it is to prove it ... [T]here are simply too many contingencies that bear on the composition of literary texts to allow inferring indirect evidence from them about the historical situation in which they were written." But if this point is granted, what then? How might we sift, organize, and evaluate the evidence differently in order to tell the history of early Christianity otherwise?

To tell a different history of early Christianity, we must question not what analytical categories we ought to use, but the very nature of categorization itself: what it is, how it works, whom it serves in any given context, and to what ends. Jonathan Z. Smith rightly notes that "`otherness' is not a descriptive category, an artifact of the perception of difference or commonality ... Something is `other' only with respect to something `else: Whether understood politically or linguistically, `otherness' is a situational category. Despite its apparent taxonomic exclusivity, `otherness' is a transactional matter, an affair of the 'in between.'" King has been at the forefront of thinking through the challenges and the opportunities that these insights pose to the task of narrating the history of

early Christianity. The formulation of a way forward that she has offered to the field remains characteristically her own:

> Given that there are many ways to map difference, and given that any categorization of early Christian diversity will both illumine some things and distort or hide otbers, depending upon its aims ..., any resulting typologies would necessarily be positional and provisional; that is, they would be understood as scholarly constructs intended to do limited kinds of carefully specified intellectual work in order to serve some particular end.

Elsewhere, she specifies, "I have suggested that to think hard and speak differently require revising our notions of tradition and history, reshaping discourse, categories, and methods, and above all, rethinking the ethically informed goals of historical analysis.

One way to revise our notions of tradition and history, King suggests, is to move away from a static model of strictly delineated "communities in conflict" to one that attends to the variegated and ever evolving work of ancient identity formation. Such an approach eschews the essentializing assumption that early Christian difference was simply there - and is thus now available to the contemporary historian as a kind of fully formed "found object" to be situated uncritically within a historical narrative. Rather, this approach "aims to understand the discursive strategies and processes by which early Christians developed notions of themselves as distinct from others within the Mediterranean world (and were recognized as such by others), including the multiple ways in which Christians produced various constructions of what it meant to be Christian." It includes being attentive to both the ways in which Christians sought to carve up the world into "us" and various forms of "them" (Jews, Greeks, Romans, etc.) and also the rhetorical strategies they used to conjure internal plurality into being by way of marking certain differences among Christ-followers as those that made a difference (the discourse of orthodoxy and heresy).

King also analyzes what early Christians said and wrote as a mode of practice, following the insight, expressed well by Foucault, that "to speak is to do something - something other than to express what one thinks .... [A] change in the order of discourse does not presuppose new ideas, a little invention and creativity, a different mentality, but transformations in a practice, perhaps also in neighbouring practices, and in their common articulation." Here King has been one of the key scholars to introduce to the field of early Christian studies the work of the sociologist and practice theorist Pierre Bourdieu. Drawing on Bourdieu's notions of habitus, field, and doxa, among others, she has unpacked with clarity and precision the complex logics whereby early Christian discursive formations impose regularity while allowing for some modicum of improvisation, spontaneity, and change. "The results of this historiographical method," she contends, "[is] to demonstrate where and how the `textual' resources, cultural codes, literary themes, hermeneutical strategies, and social-political interests of various rhetorical acts of Christian literary production, theological reflection, ritual and ethical practices, and social construction simultaneously form multiple overlapping continuities, disjunctures, contradictions, and discontinuities, both locally and trans-locally." King's emphasis on practice works to decenter the primacy of high literary or theological texts in the project of historical reconstruction. Yet, as noted above, her work does not neglect close textual analysis (and indeed, many of her signature contributions have been in the interpretation of specific early Christian texts), but rather resituates these texts as one kind of evidence among many, always in dynamic relation to alternative genres of textual evidence, material culture, institutions, and other social structures.

This work of resituating, redescribing, and recategorizing entails ethics. For as her former and current students can attest (ourselves included), in both her research and her teaching, King not only poses questions of practice - i. e., what work does the historical data under analysis do within a given cultural field? - but also relentlessly asks: what is at stake for the ancient world, the contemporary world (with an eye to the plurality of worlds and selves - scholarly, religious, etc. -

that we all inhabit), and the complex interplay between the two in how we both formulate and answer such questions? Questions King regularly poses in the classroom insist on historical precision. Her oft repeated question "What is the evidence evidence of?" makes colleagues and students alike turn to situate a piece of evidence in a broader social and political context of power; the simple question requires the difficult two-step path of describing the evidence and contextualizing it adequately, not allowing oneself to be swayed by the rhetorical context of an ancient text or the assertions of modern scholars about the nature of the evidence. Her frequent phrase "good to think with" (bonnes à penser), borrowed from Lévi-Strauss, pushes students and colleagues alike to notice tropes in early Christianity and to consider the varied use of an idea - suffering, for example, or a paradigmatic female figure such as Mary Magdalene - toward ethical ends in antiquity and today.

For example, in her "Christianity and Torture," King explicitly confronts the issue of the lack of a condemnation of torture in New Testament texts, and the ethical problems this raises:

Some might wonder why I, as a Christian who opposes torture, go to such lengths to expose the possibilities within Christian tradition for supporting torture .... Opposition to torture on religious grounds will not be effective without acknowledging and addressing the fact that enculturated ways of thinking and structures of feeling cultivated in Christian stories, images, and theological discourses are implicated in a wide variety of attitudes and behaviors, both for and against torture .... How do religious communities, human rights advocates, or other voices effectively engage this tradition without enabling its potential for violence? This is a dilemma not only for believers but for all whose heritage includes these and similar cultural "logics" of feeling and thought.

Elsewhere, King argues, "The task at hand is to enable an ethics of critical-reflexive practice in historiography and theology ... we must explore critically [religious traditions] past and potential implications in violence as well as liberation, in injustice as well as justice. Critical practice necessarily involves accountability." Such critical self-reflexivity need not lead to the disavowal or dismantling of the tradition. Rather, King avers, "For myself and others, the ethical point that follows from diversity is not relativism, but the need to take responsibility for how scripture and tradition are read and appropriated."

Karen King's publications and teaching upend facile uses of New Testament texts and simple narratives of early Christian history. Her work has demonstrated, with philological, historical, and historiographical precision, the effervescence of what we call early Christianity but might well call early Christianities: the leadership of women; the complexities of theological debates over the worth of the body, sin, and martyrdom; the possibilities for transformative modes of thought; and, indeed, the scholarly and ideological stakes of how we define the ancient religious formations we study. The scholars in this volume engage her signature contributions to the field in three parts or acts. The first act treats the topic of categories, celebrating the sort of work that King did in What is Gnosticism?, which fundamentally pushed us to throw away a scholarly construction of people called Gnostics that we had naturalized as existing in early Christianity or even before. The second act treats the topic of women and gender. Since her first edited volume, Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism, and her contributions to feminist projects such as Searching the Scriptures, King's work has long helped to open our eyes to evidence for the agency, significance, and power of women in earliest Christianities, the variety of ways in which gender could be performed in antiquity, and the engagement of early Christian texts in ethical debates that demonstrate how sexual practices and theology go hand in hand. The third act focuses on historiography, asking how we can write different histories of the earliest Christianities that King has helped us to see, or different stories of women and gender in the study of religion.

Categories

One of the major contributions of Karen King's work has been to question what used to look like stable categories in the history of early Christianity: Gnosticism, orthodoxy, heresy; her work exposes the ways in which theological and scholarly communities either have invented or have continued to trade in labels that limit our understanding of the diversity and choices available among earliest Christian communities. Several chapters engage the question of category criticism.

In "Mark 7:1-23, Finally," Daniel Boyarin begins by acknowledging the significance of King's work and conversations with her for his own developing sense of how the categories of "Jews" and "Christians" can obscure our understanding of ancient interactions in antiquity. He then offers a detailed analysis of Mark 7, reading the words of Jesus regarding food and cleanliness within halakhic debates of the time. He argues that Mark 7:1-12 not only presents an attack on Pharisaic deviations from Leviticus, but also demonstrates that Jesus kept kosher - or that the Gospel of Mark thought he did.

Elaine Pagels's "How John of Patmos' Readers Made Him into a Christian" questions whether the category of "Christian" can be applied to the visions of the Apocalypse of John. She offers a resounding no, joining those who have pointed out John's Jewishness. Her chapter shows that John's engagement with Isaiah's prophecy fits within the logic of Jewish prophetic material and offers a vision of the entry of Israel, and then repentant Gentiles, into a new Jerusalem.

T. Christopher Hoklotubbe's chapter, "What is Docetism?," suggests that we set aside our modern category (and subcategories) of docetism. We should instead look for "more productive classifications and more dynamic questions about the representation of Jesus' body in early Christian literature." Treating a span of literature and figures such as the epistles of John, the corpus associated with Ignatius of Antioch, Basilides, Marcion, Valentinus, the Gospel of Peter, Julius Cassian, Saturninus and Cerdo as we know them from Irenaeus and (Pseudo) Tertullian, and the Acts of John, Hoklotubbe shows a variety of Christian responses to the idea of Jesus' body. He writes, "Following the exemplary critical insights and pedagogy of King, I strive to (re)enchant students with the ambiguity, creativity, scriptural interpretation, the pastoral and polemical motivations, and existential stakes involved in early Christian questions about the nature of Jesus' human experience that were by no means simply apparent - Christianity was still 'in the making!"

Giovanni Bazzana s "Beyond Gnosticism: Pneumatology and Ecclesiology in 2 Clem 14" focuses on the theology and conversation partners of this difficult passage. Bazzana argues that the image of a pre-existent church makes sense in relation to other first- and second-century literature, especially the Shepherd of Hermas and aspects of Paul's 1 Corinthians. Christ, understood as pneuma, as well as an experience of spirit possession, were "foundational for membership in the Christ movement." Yet 2 Clement offers a surprising twist. Christ-followers are possessed not by pneuma but by ekklesia, a pneumatic entity, in that text.

Judith Hartenstein's "The Designation `Gnostic' for the Gospel of Mary and Its Implications: A Critical Evaluation" takes up the Book of Allogenes and the Gospel of Mary. New fragments of the former from the Tchacos Codex allow for clearer parallels to be drawn between Allogenes and the Gospel of Mary. Hartenstein shows that the Gospel of Mary has access to and understands what she terms a "mythologically founded alienation toward the world," but that it contains its own unique theology. Moreover, the text makes an unusual move in that it "depicts how esoteric knowledge is made public."

Marcie Lenk and Sarah Sentilles bring us to present-day categories. Lenk's "Parted Ways Meet Again: Messianic Judaism in Israel" alludes in its title to a long debate between scholars of antiquity: when did the ways between Christianity and Judaism part, if ever? She focuses on the Messianic Jewish

community in Israel and the challenges that this community poses to a stable understanding of Judaism and Christianity and to legal status within Israel. After defining the term "Messianic Jew" and historically contextualizing Messianic Jewish traditions from the Hebrew Christians of the nineteenth century to the present, Lenk offers a survey that shows a range of Jewish messianic claims over time, within which "faith in Jesus as the Messiah has long been viewed differently." Lenk uses a variety of theoretical tools, from the postcolonial theories of Homi Bhabha to the performance theory of Judith Butler, to make sense of the complex identity of Messianic Jews as a possible act of resistance to claims of stability that undergird the categories of "Jew" and "Christian."

Women and Gender

Carly Daniel-Hughes's contribution moves us from the "categories" subsection of the volume to "women and gender" by working on both. Her "Mary Magdalene and the Fantasy Echo: Reflections on the Feminist Historiography of Early Christianity" traces aspects of anglophone feminist historiography "to consider how the attachment to the category `women operated in the feminist historiography of early Christianity." Daniel-Hughes considers the particular historical and social-psychological forces that shaped fantasies of "women's solidarity" within this scholarship, as well as those that ultimately lead some feminists to challenge these. Weaving analysis together with the personal, she ultimately seeks to describe the affective landscape sustained by this critical feminist work and to reflect constructively on some of its negative effects, both for feminist historians and for those captivated by their work.

In her analysis of "Wise Women in the Gospel of John," Adele Reinhartz argues that the fourth evangelist is hardly proto-feminist. Yet her close analysis of five women in the gospel - Mary the mother of Jesus, the Samaritan woman, Martha and Mary of Bethany, and Mary Magdalene - shows ways in which "the Gospel of John - perhaps inadvertently - does allow us to consider the behavior and qualities of these women separate from their re-domestication." Focusing on the narratives of these women "allows us to consider their wisdom, as exemplified by their behavior towards Jesus." For instance, analyzing Jesus' mother, Reinhartz argues that "we may quietly appreciate the wisdom of a mother who can see beyond her son's rude behavior and is able to prompt him to act when and where he does not yet understand he should."

The women of Philo's De vita contemplativa and the Testament of Job are the focus of Angela Standhartinger's "Performing Salvation: The Therapeutrides and Job's Daughters in Context." Yet her contribution is nearly encyclopedic in the evidence it provides of representations of women's leadership in the Septuagint, New Testament texts, and the writings of the likes of Plutarch and Pausanias. These regular representations of women's ritual work and competence allow Standhartinger to argue that "While Philo's Therapeutrides and Job's Daughters remain literary figures, their cultic roles are by no means exceptional or historically implausible. To the contrary, female singers and dancers who act out parts of the central myth of a given religion are broadly attested also among their Greek, Roman, and later Christian sisters." The work allows us to see the cultic leadership of women in antiquity as represented in the literature of the time and even as performed in the retelling of such literature in ritual settings.

Margaret Butterfield's "The Widow, the Wife, and the Priestess: Tertullian's Life Plans for Widows in Ad uxorem" also takes up Standhartinger's theme of women's participation and leadership in cult. Tertullian, she notes, details "gentile" women's involvement in religious roles, including the Vestal virgins and the prophetesses at Delphi, and "provides chaste Christian widows with an identity parallel to that of the gentile priesthoods - the identity not of wife, but of altar of God." Tertullian focuses on the widow as wife - even as God's wife - precisely to avoid the danger of her role as sacerdotally powerful; yet the very image of woman as altar, as well as his detailing of the roles of

religious leadership among non-Christian women, hints at the irrepressibility of some Christian women's religious authority.

Silke Petersen sets aside the category of Gnosticism as unhelpful in her analysis, titled "Marriages, Unions, and Bridal Chambers in the Gospel of Philip." She notes how "disruptions" in the text - points where the reader or hearer might be confused - are a deliberate technique to slow down the reading process and to note that different levels of meaning are being deployed. Images like bread and the marriage chamber have multiple meanings. Petersen concludes that the Gospel of Philip's "bridal and marriage imagery is used to speak about community and ritual in terms of union and separation, thus interpreting something else rather than denoting a discrete ritual." Such language points to the close union of marriage in order "to speak about ritual, community, baptism, or incarnation."

A Valentinian Exposition, Tripartite Tractate, and sections of Irenaeus's Against the Heresies are closely attended to in Taylor Petrey's "Cosmic Gender: Valentinianism and Contested Accounts of Sexual Difference." He demonstrates that "so-called Valentinian texts do not offer a single perspective on gender, reproductive capacity, gender roles, bodies, hierarchy, or moral tendencies, and in fact provide numerous models that challenge a heterogendered interpretation." After providing a history of scholarship on Nag Hammadi texts and gender analysis, Petrey demonstrates that we cannot easily reconstruct a singular cosmological schema from these texts nor the sexual practices of the communities that read and valued them. They instead provide "conversations ... about gender and sexual difference," even suggesting that "disruptions to male-female complementarity" are a solution as well as a problem; Valentinian texts provide "queer alternatives to male-female complementarity."

Ronit Irshai's "Feminist Research in Jewish Studies: What's in a Name?" tries to put some order into what is called "feminist scholarship in Judaic Studies" by proposing to distinguish four categories within it. Those categories are not merely conceptual. They also serve as an analytical tool that can produce new research. The chapter presents several opinions on male homosexuality in order to consider how feminist scholarship that takes gender as an analytic category can produce new knowledge about the ways in which male and female identities are constituted in recent halakhah. Feminist critique, she concludes, can help in such analysis as it lays bare the mechanisms by which "`natural sex' is created."

Historiography

Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza's chapter, titled "Revisioning `Christian' Beginnings," engages with the question of Christian origins, in order to underscore the contribution of the work of Karen King to early Christian historiography in a feminist key. She argues for the importance of feminist historiography in the revisioning of Christian beginnings. Karen King's feminist work on Gnosticism as well as on critical category formation and framework-analysis continues to be pathbreaking in this work of a feminist re-description of early "Christian" history.

In "Locating the Religion of Associations," Stanley Stowers participates in and nuances historians' attempts to understand "synagogues" and Christian groups in light of associations. He creates a clear taxonomy of four modes of religiosity, and demonstrates that the bias of our data - which comes from literate and entrepreneurial experts - means that we can overlook how these groups participated in the religion of everyday social exchange.

Carlin Barton's contribution, titled "A Roman Historian Looking at Early Christian religiones: the coniuratio and the sacramentum in Second and Early Third-century North Africa," argues that Latin-speaking African Christians of antiquity sought to sacralize themselves as individual persons and as groups. Barton unravels with philological precision the terms that Latin-speaking Christians used for

themselves. Focusing primarily on Tertullian, she avoids our modern conceptions of religion, our mistranslations of religio, and our inattention to the significance of binding, framing, setting apart, which, she demonstrates, were fundamental acts in the process of sacralizing. In this way, her work asks questions at the intersection of historiography and philology How do we translate words from our historical distance, and how do our misperceptions or even our desires drive such translation? By bringing attention to the details of ancient texts and to the investments of modern readers, Barton enlivens the complexities of late second- and early third-century Carthage and the Latin of its day.

Related historiographical questions drive Denise Kimber Buell's "This Changes Everything: Spiritualists, Theosophists, and Rethinking Early Christian Historiography." The chapter explores the nineteenth-century to mid-twentieth-century context of spiritualism and theosophy, showing how these practitioners and theorists were adjacent to and sometimes participants in academic conversations about biblical studies, classics, and early Christian history. Their understandings of spirit and flesh, of the enduring nature of what they thought was gnostic thought, of "a non-linear temporality - futures and pasts commingle in the present," and of ideas of mysteries and initiation were part of a larger discourse on early Christian origins and the nature of so-called Gnosticism. Buell shows that tracing the impact of theosophists and spiritualists is essential to understanding the historiography of early Christianity.

Bernadette Brooten's chapter re-examines the depiction of enslaved persons in the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, which depicts a woman named Blandina as subverting the Roman slaveholding assumption that enslaved persons are weak in character. Blandina, who shares her mistress's religion and stands by it until the very end, is an owner's best possible enslaved laborer. In contrast to Blandina, "certain of our gentile slaves" enter the stage of the bloody drama as "also arrested." The Christians apparently expect these enslaved gentiles to suffer torture silently, which aligns with what other slaveholders expected. The Roman officials believe them, even though they speak freely and not under torture, which constitutes a breach of Roman criminal procedure. Brooten invites us to think about how these texts project ideals for enslaved persons rather than simply Christian heroism in the face of martyrdom.

With "The Gospel of Mary at Oxyrhynchus (P. Oxy. L 3525 and P. Ryl. III 463). Rethinking the History of Early Christianity Through Literary Papyri from Oxyrhynchus," AnneMarie Luijendijk returns to a text that Karen King has published and made widely known. Some might argue that the Gospel of Mary was a marginal source to the majority of Christians in antiquity, and the story of a woman who followed Jesus and understood his teachings better than did the male disciples was a strange tale. By looking closely at one fragment of the Gospel of Mary from Oxyrhynchus, Luijendijk shows by the form and the hand of this papyrus that "Such texts, like the Gospel of Mary, which disappeared in the course of history, were not just random and aberrant sources. They were not merely the fodder of heresiologists, examples of disregarded sources. Rather, these sources circulated and were widely read, appearing in different forms and hands."

In an epilogue Sarah Sentilles draws the lens out, challenging us both to consider how we see and to investigate the visual as well as structural elements of racism. She argues, in "As If the Way We Think about the World is the Way the World Is," that "mis-seeing" others' bodies has violent results. Exploring language of eye-balling, the visible suspect, and the mug shot's origins in eugenics, as well as educating the "untrained eye" to see drone warfare, the deaths of Black men and women in the U. S., and casual racism, Sentilles challenges the reader to see differently pointing to analogous interventions made by Karen King.

In Sum

King's scholarship has long worked to create a welcoming and capacious new world of possibilities for her fellow scholars, including those whom she has taught. In a quiet voice and with an intense value for loyalty, she has changed the face of early Christian studies, setting a large table with hospitality. She has helped to bring her beloved Coptic texts, which used to be considered marginal to the story of earliest Christianity, into conversation with the canonical and authoritative texts with which the field was already familiar. She has helped us to see how the voices and authority of women may be suppressed in a text, but the traces of such authority nonetheless remain, opening up possibilities for writing different kinds of history. She has consistently insisted that scholars consider their own ethics and the ethics of the texts that we study. In doing so, she has not only contributed to the intellectual diversity of the field, bringing in voices from feminist studies and anthropological theory in particular, and bringing marginalized texts into the full reconstruction of early Christian history, but also helped to create a diverse, international community of scholarly friends, whose words can be found in the pages ahead. <>

NOTHINGNESS IN THE HEART OF EMPIRE: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE KYOTO SCHOOL IN IMPERIAL JAPAN

by Harumi Osaki [SUNY Press, 9781438473093]

Reveals the complicity between the Kyoto School's moral and political philosophy, based on the school's founder Nishida Kitarō's metaphysics of nothingness, and Japanese imperialism.

In the field of philosophy, the common view of philosophy as an essentially Western discipline persists even today, while non-Western philosophy tends to be undervalued and not investigated seriously. In the field of Japanese studies, in turn, research on Japanese philosophy tends to be reduced to a matter of projecting existing stereotypes of alleged Japanese cultural uniqueness through the reading of texts. In **NOTHINGNESS IN THE HEART OF EMPIRE**, Harumi Osaki resists both these tendencies. She closely interprets the wartime discourses of the Kyoto School, a group of modern Japanese philosophers who drew upon East Asian traditions as well as Western philosophy. Her book lucidly delves into the non-Western forms of rationality articulated in such discourses, and reveals the problems inherent in them as the result of these philosophers' engagements in Japan's wartime situation, without cloaking these problems under the pretense of "Japanese cultural uniqueness." In addition, in a manner reminiscent of the controversy surrounding Martin Heidegger's involvement with Nazi Germany, the book elucidates the political implications of the morality upheld by the Kyoto School and its underlying metaphysics. As such, this book urges dialogue beyond the divide between Western and non-Western philosophies, and beyond the separation between "lofty" philosophy and "common" politics.

This book is a critical examination of the Kyoto School philosophers' prewar and wartime political discourses, with specific reference to the philosophical and metaphysical theories that worked to reinforce them. Prior critical works on the Kyoto School have tended to focus on the philosophers' alignment with Japan's war effort. However, as such critiques do not address the philosophy in depth, they have tended to leave open the possibility that the problem lies not in the Kyoto School thinkers' philosophical endeavors, but in their historical circumstances. By the same token, even when critiques seem to bit the mark, advocates of the Kyoto School have tended to blame the critics for not understanding the philosophy, and have ignored these assessments peremptorily. With a goal of moving the dialogue beyond this rupture, this book argues that the Kyoto School's moral and political philosophy tends to align itself with nationalist and imperial formations, conceptually and logically. By undertaking a philosophical investigation of the problems found in the Kyoto School thinkers' political discourses, this book shows that there is no strict separation between "lofty" philosophy and "vulgar" politics. Instead, it argues that seemingly genuine philosophy can be a source of political problems.

In this examination, despite the Kyoto School philosophers' frequent emphasis on the uniqueness of Japan, the East, or the Orient, I do not adopt such particularism. Rather, I elucidate how the particularistic assumptions of these philosophers constitute an essential part of the problems their political discourses gave rise to. There is a persistent tendency for Western thinkers to read into the texts of non-Western philosophers something particular to their own cultural tradition. Although I do not completely disagree with such an approach, the arbitrary insertion of idealized images of "Japan," "the East," or "the Orient" often obscures what is written in these texts and covers up the difficulties that exist there. Reading philosophers' texts in this way makes an intellectual dialogue with them almost impossible. For, when people idealize others, they treat them

simply as the representatives of cultural stereotypes and refuse to face them as status-equal interlocutors. Moving against such a tendency, I read the Kyoto School philosophers' discourses without reducing their meanings to cultural particularities, and present the problems in these discourses in a way sharable with anybody, in principle, regardless of whether they are of the West or the East. In doing so, I hope to pave the way for future dialogues and exchanges that can traverse such dichotomous divisions.

The founder of the Kyoto School, Nishida Kitarõ, once dreamed of a philosophy in which the particularity of the national culture of his own country could contribute to the universality of humanity. However, he seemed to be swayed by the ambition of identifying this particularity with true universality. His followers, even in the present, do not seem to be free from a similar desire to celebrate "Japaneseness" over and above the particularities of other cultures. Still, in his philosophy, there is a line of thought that gestures toward another universality that can enable all such particularities to coexist and interact, without being superior or inferior to one another. Although Nishida conceived place or nothingness to be such a universality, the sense of cultural superiority he retained in the name of the dignity of particularity prevented him from fully developing the potential of this line of thought. Thus, to locate a point from which we can start this pursuit differently than Nishida did—that is, to open a "place" where dialogues and exchanges of Particularities actually can occur—is also a key objective of this book.

The first aim of this book is to read the philosophy of Japan's Kyoto School as philosophy. As I shall explain in greater detail below, such a project is not without precedents. However, those who have read Kyoto School work as philosophy have tended to introduce a divide between philosophy as such and politics, often to avoid being critical of the Kyoto School or to redeem its philosophers. In contrast, in reading Kyoto School philosophy as philosophy, I hope to provide a more detailed account of the political implications of its intellectual project, neither to dismiss nor to redeem it, but to open up questions about the project of modern philosophy more generally. As such, the second aim of this book is to explore the politics of Kyoto School philosophy as philosophy.

The Kyoto School was a group of Japanese philosophers who were under the tutelage or influence of Nishida Kitarõ, the school's founder. Nishida is often regarded as the first Japanese philosopher who tried to express religious insights from Zen Buddhism through the medium of Western philosophy in order to establish a mode of philosophy unique to East Asian cultural traditions. Although some Japanese scholars still identify themselves as members of the Kyoto School, or descendants of Nishida's philosophy, the school was at its zenith before and during the Second World War, when Nishida was still alive. In postwar Japan, the Kyoto School philosophers' involvement with Japan's wartime situation as famous intellectuals aroused much controversy: in the prewar and wartime periods, some of Nishida's disciples frequently made statements supporting wartime policies, and even had meetings with military authorities. While not as active as his followers, Nishida published works in line with the ideology of the wartime regime, and also offered his work to military authorities who asked for his advice.

In contrast, when the Kyoto School's philosophers first became known in Europe and North America, their involvement with Japan's wartime situation was not brought to the public's attention. The ways in which the Kyoto School's thinking was received went through gradual changes until issues surrounding their wartime involvement started to draw notice. In the preface to Rude Awakenings, a 1995 anthology that was intended to "examin[e] the relationship between Japanese nationalism and intellectuals in the Kyoto school" (vii), James W Heisig and John C. Maraldo give a short overview of these changes. According to these two scholars, the Kyoto School philosophers' ideas began to spread through translated texts in Western countries in the 1980s. At the time, they were warmly welcomed as Zen thought, which, as specific to Oriental culture, had gained some

popularity in the West. However, since Heidegger's association with the Nazis had drawn substantial attention within academia in the late 1980s, people also started to scrutinize the Kyoto School's commitment to the wartime politics (Rude Awakenings vii—viii).

In 2011, Bret W Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M. Wirth published Japanese and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School, which addressed intellectual dialogues between the Kyoto School and continental philosophers. In the introduction to this collection, they review the reception of the Kyoto School's philosophies and emphasize the fact that "the members of the Kyoto School thought of themselves first and foremost as philosophers, rather than as religious, cultural, or political theorists" (Japanese and Continental Philosophy 2). From this standpoint, the three editors intended their volume to be "the first anthology to be fully committed to developing philosophical exchanges between the Kyoto School and modern and contemporary Western philosophers in the Continental tradition" (Japanese and Continental Philosophy). What is expressed here is concern about the Kyoto School thinkers' inquiry into philosophy as such that goes beyond mere introduction to or interpretation of their thought, which formerly tended to be understood in the context of politics or Eastern religions.

Even before this, the increasing interest in philosophical approaches to the Kyoto School had manifested itself in its study. In the introduction to Re-Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy in 2008, Christopher Goto-Jones describes this anthology as "the search for the politics of the Kyoto School qua philosophy" and explains its goal as "shifting scholarly priorities away from `historical evaluation and assessment of socio-political implications' at a specific point in history and towards the quest to `apprehend philosophical architectonic and conceptual coherence' in philosophical texts" (11). While addressing the Kyoto School's political thought by following the general trend of scholarship since 1990s, Goto-Jones emphasizes the importance of philosophical inquiries, rather than socio-politico-historical investigations that have previously been carried out. For example, seven years before the publication of this anthology, Heisig, who wrote the forward of Re-Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy, published his book, Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School. Heisig's 2001 work is an extensive study of three major philosophers of the school, namely Nishida, Tanabe Hajime, and Nishitani Keiji. Other similar examples, such as Goto-Jones's 2005 Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity and Robert Wilkinson's 2009 Nishida and Western Philosophy point to a kind of "philosophical turn" that has been going on in Kyoto School scholarship, so to speak.

However, this philosophical turn cannot be celebrated without reserve, since it seems to include some problematic tendencies, depending on how "philosophy" is understood. If one assumes, even if tacitly, that only Western philosophy is philosophy in the exact sense, from this standpoint, the Kyoto School's philosophy, which was created outside the region called "the West," could be judged as not properly philosophical. In Nishida and Western Philosophy, Wilkinson seems to take this stance. What matters is not that Nishida's philosophy is compared with Western philosophy, but rather how this comparison is conducted.

For example, annexing the proviso that, "It is a mistake, of course, to regard either East or West as monolithic; Wilkinson insists "there are general tendencies of the kind" between them (158). Then he discusses what he believes to be a main difference between them with regard to rationality, which in his view consists of "working out rigorously the consequences of one's foundational beliefs, the beliefs in turn being dependent on equally foundational experiences":

> Rationality manifests itself in the same way both in the East and in the West. The chief difference (if one may simplify so complex a matter) lies in the centrality given to non-dual or mystical experience in the East by comparison to its relative non-centrality in the West. (Wilkinson 159)

Although Wilkinson may seem to simply present his idea of a general differ¬ence between the East and the West here, his further statements on Nishida suggest, although avoiding explicit mention, he reduces this difference to a matter of degree to which thought is worth being called philosophy. For example, Wilkinson states:

> The fact that Nishida's philosophy rests on experiences of the kind described is not in itself a problem. From the philosophical point of view there is a greater problem in the fact that he does not try to argue that the insights which he tries to conceptualize are veridical. (159)

"Overcoming Modernity" was the title and theme of a symposium organized soon after the beginning of the Asia-Pacific War. Its goal was to discuss the war's significance, which the symposium's title was supposed to represent. Famous intellectuals, including a few members of the Kyoto School, were invited to contribute essays and exchange their opinions. Before and after this symposium, a series of three other symposia also took place. Only four prominent members of the Kyoto School participated, including the two who attended the "Overcoming Modernity" symposium. Since all four thinkers shared a particular conception of world history, their philosophy was a consistent topic across these symposia. In pursuit of the symposium's goal, these thinkers discussed the importance of a Japanese national subjectivity that could lead to the overcoming of modernity, and also bring world history into perspective. Thus, for these four philosophers, the themes of overcoming modernity and Japanese national subjectivity were inseparably connected, reflecting their thoughts about not only what the Second World War was, but also what it should be. Although their mentor, Nishida, distanced himself from his four disciples' project during these symposia, this does not necessarily mean the former's philosophy was completely removed or resolutely opposed to that of the latter. As I will discuss, the ideas of similar subjectivity and the lines of thought that constituted another attempt to overcome modernity can be discerned in Nishida's philosophy in the same period. Nishida's thinking thus conceptually buttressed the ideas his disciples expressed during these symposia.

The Kyoto School philosophers' pursuit of universality and their concern for overcoming modernity have an inherent connection. Modernity, as we usually understand it today, originated in the West and then spread globally. As such, it appeared as something universal, but only as an effect of historical processes of universalizing. The nation-state, as a polity that is characteristic of modernity, is also the universal in a similar sense. Indeed, it is an amalgam of the universal and the particular, a combination of the state as a universalized form of a political body and the nation as a particular (or particularized) human group. In Japan's case, Japanese people largely equated modernization with Westernization at that time. It, along with the importation of Western philosophy, began almost concomitantly with the establishment of the nation-state in the Meiji period. Following this time of importation and adaptation, "Japanese" modern philosophy developed and culminated in the emergence of the Kyoto School. The Kyoto philosophers' bid for universality only took place under specific conditions, in which the Japanese nation-state had already been established and universalized. More precisely, in the prewar and wartime periods when these philosophers were most active, Japan struggled to expand its power beyond itself as a particular nation-state. Considering this situation, it is not a coincidence that the Kyoto School's bid for universality, in line with Japan's policies and war efforts, sought the universality beyond that of modernity and the West. Reflecting the amalgam of the universal and the particular in the Japanese nation-state, these philosophers' pursuit of this "higher" universality was permeated by their allegiance to the values of the particularity of their nation. Therefore, it is not surprising that these philosophers viewed the task of overcoming modernity and the West as connected to the realization of this "higher" universality to Japanese national subjectivity in particular.

Doubt has been cast on the success of the Kyoto School's attempts to overcome modernity. As the title of his 2002 book, Overcome by Modernity, suggests, Harry Harootunian evaluates the

philosophers' attempts as failures, claiming the Kyoto School was overcome by the modernity they tried to surmount. This claim might be criticised as a sweeping generalization that does not inquire deeply into the philosophy at issue. Still, his formulation on the general historical context concerning the theme of "overcoming modernity" is helpful to situate the Kyoto School's philosophy within a broader scope, and explore it in line with "the structural complicity between the West and Japan; which Sakai emphasized.

Harootunian's statement may be misunderstood as a Western-centric claim that non-Western countries must follow the same path of modernization as the West, and therefore are fated to be overwhelmed by the West forever. However, this is not what he means. When he qualifies Japanese modernity as "co-eval" in the sense that it "shared the same historical temporality of modernity (as a form of historical totalizing) found elsewhere in Europe and tbe United States", he does not propose that European or American modernities are/were at more advanced stages than Japanese modernity in a single, linear course of progress. As history shows, Japan was urged to modernize through its encounters with Western modernity, and it achieved modernization through its confrontation with the West. To this extent, Japanese modernity was born from the same historical process as Western modernity. This coevality does not necessarily imply that the latecomer is doomed to be overwhelmed by the predecessor. The point is that, as the result of this coevality, Japanese modernity, in spite of or precisely because of its rivalry with Western modernity, ran the risk of internalizing its structural oppression against the non-West. This is the same oppression which Japanese modernity is supposed to counter to achieve a non-Western form of modernity for itself. More concretely, Harootunian raises the question of whether it can be said that a Japanese modernity overcame Western modernity when the former appropriated the latter's modes of imperialism and colonialism that have historically tormented the non-West. It is from this perspective that Harootunian claims the Kyoto School was overcome by the modernity they tried to surmount. What he means is not that the West defeated, and will continue to defeat Japan, but that Japanese modernity has been, and will be challenged by its own self-contradiction, just as Western modernity has been, and will continue to be. Another question raised is whether the Kyoto School philosophers, in their discourses on overcoming modernity, could develop ideas that aimed to break such complicity between Japanese and Western modernity.

Along this line of thinking, this book asks: Could the Kyoto School philosophers' thoughts about overcoming modernity offer a valid prospect for the Japanese people to overcome modernity, rather than being overcome by it? Could their ideas about a Japanese national subjectivity, as the agent for this overcoming, offer visions of a mode of existence that differs from Western-centric subjectivities? Attending to these questions by focusing on the two themes of overcoming modernity and Japanese national subjectivity, and by thoroughly examining these philosophers' discourses, are the tasks this book sets out to achieve. The criteria for evaluating these philosophers' attempts will be taken from their own criticisms of Western modernity and the subjectivity that is characteristic of it. Thus, evaluating their attempts entails examining whether their moral and political philosophies were true to the ideals they themselves professed to uphold and, relatedly, elucidating how these philosophers particularized their own country and people by using universalistic philosophical terms against their own ideals. It will be shown that this particularization of the universal, in terms of how it was expressed, will take the shape of the universalization of the particular in terms of the content of expression in the discourses at issue.

In part I of this book, I will examine the discourses of four prominent members of the second generation of the Kyoto School: Kõsaka Masaaki, Kõyama Iwao, Suzuki Shigetaka, and Nishitani Keiji. While only Suzuki and Nishitani participated in the "Overcoming Modernity" symposium, all four thinkers participated in the three subsequent symposia, during which they discussed their philosophies of world history. I will explicate these thinkers' philosophy, as expressed in these

symposia, on Japanese national subjectivity and the philosophy of world history, based on which they asserted the significance of this subjectivity and the necessity to create it. By looking into its three salient characteristics, I will inquire whether this subjectivity could become the agent for overcoming modernity, as these thinkers envisioned. I will also question whether this subjectivity could become the agent for ethicitly transforming the Japanese wartime state or its military government, as recently claimed by some scholars.

In part 2, I will turn to these thinkers' mentor, Nishida, and examine his discourses, published almost contemporaneously with these symposia. My analysis will turn an eye to the overlaps and continuity between his lines of thought and that of his disciples. In reference to the above three characteristics of Japanese national subjectivity, I will argue that Nishida not only promoted ideas of a similar subjectivity, but also elaborated a theory of the structure of the Japanese state that could condition the possibility of this subjectivity. By unpacking the visions of the state and the world that Nishida believed this subjectivity would create, I will inquire whether such views could offer alternatives to the forms of the state and world that are characteristic of modernity, thus constituting a successful project to overcome modernity. <>

THE DREAM AND ITS AMPLIFICATION edited by Erel Shalit and Nancy Swift Furlotti [Fisher King Press, 9781926715896]

THE DREAM AND ITS AMPLIFICATION *unveils the language of the psyche that speaks to us in our dreams.*

We all dream at least 4-6 times each night yet remember very few. Those that rise to the surface of our conscious awareness beckon to be understood, like a letter addressed to us that arrives by post. Why would we not open it? The difficulty is in understanding what the dream symbols and images mean. Through amplification, C. G. Jung formulated a method of unveiling the deeper meaning of symbolic images. This becomes particularly important when the image does not carry a personal meaning or significance and is not part of a person's everyday life.

Fourteen Jungian Analysts from around the world have contributed chapters to this book on areas of special interest to them in their work with dreams. This offers the seasoned dream worker as well as the novice great insight into the meaning of the dream and its amplification.

Contributors to this edition of the Fisher King Review include: Erel Shalit, Nancy Swift Furlotti, Thomas Singer, Michael Conforti, Ken Kimmel, Gotthilf Isler, Nancy Qualls-Corbett, Henry Abramovitch, Kathryn Madden, Ron Schenk, Naomi Ruth Lowinsky, Christian Gaillard, Monika Wikman, and Gilda Frantz.

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The Amplified World of Dreams by Erel Shalit and Nancy Swift Furlotti

> The dream is a little hidden door in the innermost and most secret recesses of the soul, opening into that cosmic night which was psyche long before there was any ego-consciousness, and which will remain psyche no matter how far out ego-consciousness extends. —C. G. Jung

Humans have always expressed themselves in images of their outer and inner worlds—seemingly a characteristic of our genetic structure. The dream is a communication from the psyche in the form of images arising from the realms of the unconscious, beyond conscious ego control. The deeper layers within us speak to us nightly through dreams, mostly appearing during the stage of REM (rapid eye movement) sleep, usually at the end of each of the four to six sleep cycles a night. Whether we remember our dreams or not, they affect us.

Constantly at work, the psyche brings forth that which is positive and creative, as well as all that is negative and destructive in the depth of our soul. The psyche may guide us or lead us astray; it behooves us to consciously take part in determining which direction we are led. We participate by attempting to understand the meaning of our dreams and by discerning the inner voices that speak to us, to distinguish between the inner figures of wisdom and the ghosts behind our complexes.

In this book we focus on the amplification method that Jung developed to uncover the meaning of the dream, a procedure that reflects his approach to the psyche and the understanding of dreams. In contrast to free association, which reflects a causal view of neurosis, amplification indicates the movement from etiology toward understanding the meaning and symbolic value of the image. Rather than reductive causal explanations of the individual's symptoms, amplification aims at enhancing consciousness by focusing on the image. As the term implies, we attempt to enlarge the dream image by amplifying it—by relating it to its roots in the objective psyche and its appearance in culture, history, mythology, and religion. The psyche speaks in images; thus, in order to gain from its wisdom, we need to understand the language of images, to be aware of their depth and meaning, and to study them in their personal as well as collective contexts.

Dream and Culture

From the beginning of humanity, a wide tradition of dream work has existed in countless cultures. In the oldest preserved myth, the four-thousand-year-old Gilgamesh epic, we are told one of humanity's oldest reported dreams, dreamed by the king and interpreted by his mother Ninsun, queen of the wild cow, the wise and all-knowing goddess. She explains to Gilgamesh that the star that in his dream has fallen down to him, which he is unable to remove, is his companion. We might say that the star pertains to that aspect of fate that cannot be evaded.

Jung gave examples of dreams and how they were interpreted in other cultures, as well as in antiquity. Referring to a series of dreams, Jung, relying on Josephus Flavius, concluded that Simon the Essene, who was a skillful dream interpreter, understood dreams not only sensibly, but in a way similar to his own. Analyzing Nebuchadnezzar's second dream in the Bible,' in which he dreams of a tree growing up to heaven that is cut down and the king turned into a beast, Jung followed Daniel's interpretation of the dream. Jung wrote that it was "easy to see that the great tree is the dreaming king himself. Daniel interprets the dream in this sense. Its meaning is obviously an attempt to

compensate the king's megalomania, which, according to the story, developed into a real psychosis." Jung considered this historical dream, "like all dreams," to have a "compensatory function" of counterbalancing the king's disproportionate sense of power. For him to achieve a semblance of wholeness, Nebuchadnezzar's psyche deemed that the tree must be cut down to size. Jung aptly summarized Nebuchadnezzar's condition as "a complete regressive degeneration of a man who has overreached himself."

Daniel similarly understood the meaning of the dream as referring to the king's inflation and warned him "to repent of his avarice and injustice." Since the king did not repent, he was cast out to live as a beast.

In Africa, Jung understood that "magic is the science of the jungle." He visited the Elgonyi in East Africa, from whom he learned the distinction between the ordinary and the "big" dreams—dreams that affect the entire group and are dreamed by the medicine man, who would know "where the herds strayed, where the cows took

their calves, and when there was going to be war or a pestilence." Now, however, the medicine man wept and told Jung that even he had no dreams anymore, "since the British came into the country." Because the colonizers knew "when there shall be war; ... when there are diseases," there was seemingly no need for dreams as "guidance of man in the great darkness." Jung traced the tribally significant "big dreams" in different cultures, including "in the Greek and Roman civilizations, where such dreams were reported to the Areopagus or to the Senate."

"Big" dreams seem to emerge at important periods in one's life and may reflect a transition from one stage of development to another, during which the individual is particularly open to collective, archetypal imagery that is believed to be pertinent for the group. "These dreams in particular make us understand why the ancients attributed a pronounced prognostic meaning to their dreams. Throughout the whole of antiquity, and to a large extent still in the Middle Ages, it was believed that dreams foretell the future."

Many ethnic groups developed specific ways of sharing dreams and cultural codes for their interpretation. Jung reported that in some parts of Africa, the indigenous people were shy about sharing their dreams, perhaps out of fear that "harm may come to them from anyone who has knowledge of their dreams." The Somali and Swahilis, on the other hand, says Jung, consulted an Arab dream book and turned to Jung for advice on their dreams.

In Ancient Greece there was a widespread practice of using dreams for healing. The word incubation comes from the Latin incubare, to sleep in a sacred precinct, which was a practice in ancient Greece of seeking healing dreams in a sacred place.

In her initial dream in analysis, a woman dreams that she walks to a house "further away, a bit on the side; no one has been here for quite some time. It is like a hide-out, set apart from the rest of the city. I lie down to sleep." In the dream, she is guided to the place of incubation, a condition of openness to dreaming and symbolization, which here takes place in the dream itself.

Around the third century B.C.E. there were more than four hundred sanctuaries creating a network of what we would regard today as general and mental health clinics. These sanctuaries were termed Asclepieia, after Asclepius, the god of medicine and healing. Hippocrates, for example, was director of the Asclepeion at the island of Cos.

Henry Miller explained how he had not known the meaning of peace until he visited the principal sanctuary of Asclepius at Epidaurus, where dream incubation began around 600 B.C.E. "There was a

stillness so intense that.... I heard the great heart of the world beat," he writes, and he makes it clear the sanctuary is really an internal space "in the heart."

In the procedure of dream incubation at the Asclepeion, the person seeking healing first underwent a ritual cleansing bath. Then, the "patient" visited the temples of Aphrodite (of love and nature) and of Apollo (of understanding and clarity). Finally, the person would be called into the abaton of the Asclepeion.

The abaton was the innermost sanctuary, the sleeping chamber, where the person slept on a couch, called kline (from which we have the word "clinic"), until a healing dream would appear. (Abaton means "an impassable place," or metaphorically, "pure or chaste.") The person was to await patiently for the arrival of an initial dream in which Asclepius would appear—that is, until a transference dream occurred in which the image of the healer would evoke and be attached to the internal healing function. Asclepius could appear, for instance, in the shape of a bearded man or a boy, as god or as dog. In particularly powerful treatment, Asclepius might appear as a snake: What can kill and poison can also heal, a reality of which the physicians' snake-coiled staff, the caduceus, reminds us. In fact, it was with this staff that Hermes, the mediator god, put people to sleep and sent them dreams.

According to Barbara Tedlock, cultures frequently have rules concerning the sharing and interpreting of dreams. For instance, dreams involving the ancestors or the earth deities are shared with the shamans, who are dream interpreters. However, there may be forbidden dreams that are not told to anyone. For the Zuni, telling a good dream would diminish its positive effect on the dreamer; therefore, more bad dreams are shared than good ones. In the Momostenango culture, all dreams, whether good or bad, even small fragments, are shared. Initially they are told in private but later shared at length in public groups with initiated "daykeepers," who are the official dream interpreters. Chronic bad dreams are thought to cause illness. The Zuni and Quiche believe that all dreams provide information about future events.

A dream sequence, especially if told to others, moves from its original state of mere sensory imagery in one's mind to a verbal form. This form is then filtered through language-centered, secondary-process thinking and shaped into a cohesive narrative.

Quite naturally, different languages can impart a completely different meaning to the dream. Each dream can be interpreted in various ways, depending on the interpreter.

Additionally, the underlying implied purpose of the dream can be different in different cultures. For example, the word for dream in Zuni is a verb, indicating that the dreamer acts upon something, whereas in Quiche it refers simply to a state of being. The English word dream refers to the imaginal sensations that pass through a person's mind when sleeping. The Germanic origin of the word refers to deception, illusion, ghost, apparition, merriment, and noise. On the other hand, the old English word for dream referred to joy, mirth, music, and vision.

The Hebrew word for dream, chalom, has the same root as hachlama, meaning recovery. In Arabic, it means both dream and to mature, as well as seminal fluid. In Hebrew, the word originally meant soft, moist, and viscous. This is the state of "healthy humors," when one's body liquids, or humors, are free and flowing. In this condition imagination can spring forth, and growth can take place. This life-enhancing moisture can be compared with the nurturing part of the egg, the yolk (in Hebrew, chelmon!), in which the fetus develops.

"Emission of seminal fluid" and "to attain puberty" are noted as the key meanings of the root for chalom, dream. Furthermore, a development has been suggested from the Tigre language, wherein the root means "coming of age," to the Arabic and Hebrew "sexual dreams," on to the generalized meaning of "dream."

So what we have is a conglomerate of moisture, sex, and maturity, all combined in the dream, chalom. Maturity of soul is achieved by raising instinct into imagery—and what is more powerful than sexual imagery! In the dream, instinct is expressed by imagery, which then powerfully activates the instinct. The moisture of imagination may then drive the person to nightly emissions during a sexual dream.

Jung's View on Dreams and the Unconscious

Although Jung credited Freud with the "boldest attempt ever made to master the enigma of the unconscious psyche on the apparently firm ground of empiricism," his view of the unconscious was strikingly different from Freud's. For Jung, the unconscious is limitless and cannot be fully known, even by consciousness. It is not merely a repository of repressed thoughts and emotions, which, when these are made conscious by interpretation, will be emptied out. Rather, the unconscious is a vast ocean from which consciousness emerges as an island. "It is from these all-uniting depths that the dream arises," said Jung. "No wonder that in all the ancient civilizations an impressive dream was accounted a message from the gods!"

Explicating his view of the unconscious, Jung stated,

> It remained for the rationalism of our age to explain the dream as the remnants left over from the day, as the crumbs that fell into the twilit world from the richly laden table of our consciousness. These dark depths are then nothing but an empty sack, containing no more than what falls into it from above.... It would be far truer to say that our consciousness is that sack, which has nothing in it except what chances to fall into it.

Jung's writings speak the language of images, rather than the more ego-centered language of mechanisms, such as in the term defense mechanisms. The dream's real meaning does not lay hidden, latent, lurking behind the overt text. Rather, for Jung, the dream is "part of nature, which harbors no intention to deceive, but expresses something as best it can, ... but we may deceive ourselves, because our eyes are shortsighted."

According to Freud, the instinctual truth of the unconscious hides behind the manifest dream text. Jung, on the other hand, viewed the individual's consciousness as small and shortsighted, whereas the unconscious is honest and healing.

Furthermore, Jung differentiated between the personal and the collective unconscious. The personal unconscious, said Jung, "contains lost memories, painful ideas that are repressed, subliminal perceptions, ... and finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness." Complexes reign over the personal unconscious whether in their purposeful task of bringing archetypal energy and images into personal experience, or when autonomous, detracting energy that would otherwise be accessible to the ego.

In sweeping contrast, the collective unconscious, according to Jung, "contains the whole spiritual heritage of mankind's evolution, born anew in the brain structure of every individual." It is in this universal layer of the unconscious that mythological motifs reside, sometimes rising into consciousness. We deduce the existence of archetypes in the collective unconscious from the appearance of archetypal images in, for instance, mythology and culture. In Freud's view, the mythical structure of the psyche needed to be resolved (e.g., the Oedipus complex), whereas for Jung, the modern mind would be ensouled by an encounter with the mythical layer.

The dream is a picture from the unconscious that reflects the soul's capacity to produce images and symbols. We might say that the dream is a prism and a mirror of the soul. Through this prism, elements from the archetypal layer of the unconscious emerge and crystallize as images, persons, events, and symbols. The dream serves as the Self's mirroring of the psyche, which enables us to reflect on our behavior and the one-sidedness of our consciousness.

The individuation process, when taking place in analysis, for instance, means making the unconscious, conscious—but Jung also said,

> Consciousness must confront the unconscious and the balance between the opposites must be found. As this is not possible through logic, one is dependent upon symbols which make the irrational union of opposites possible. They are produced spontaneously by the unconscious and are amplified by the conscious mind.

That is, more important than tracking the rational mind's logic and interpretation is to allow the spontaneous symbol-forming activity of the unconscious to come into sight. Jung came to see the dream as a manifestation of the Self's image-creating and symbol-forming capacity, not as the result of "non-creative dream-work." The dream is, said Jung, a "spontaneous self-portrayal, in symbolic form, of the actual situation in the unconscious."

The fundamental element of the dream is the symbol. Symbols are the powerhouses of the psyche, equivalent to the mitochondria of the cell. They are representations of wholeness and the union of opposites, thus carrying the potent and current connection between humanity and the greater Self.

Symbols act as transformers of psychic energy, libido. Jung pointed out that the symbol "has an eminently `healing' character, that it helps to restore wholeness as well as health ... by removing and transforming the blockages and obstructions of psychic energy." One experiences a charge, a sense of numinosity, when presented with a symbol, like having come into contact with something truly other. Unlike signs, symbols contain more than the mere fact of what they represent. When a symbol no longer carries its potency because of a change in the culture or religious beliefs, new, living symbols emerge from the psyche to maintain the human-spirit connection and to reconcile the opposites on both individual and cultural levels. The psyche offers up symbols as a way to help us reconcile these opposites within ourselves, ultimately leading us to develop a working relationship with the greater Self, the archetype of wholeness and meaning. The Self both guides the process and is its goal. Through its guidance, the Self offers us symbols and images in our dreams to direct our way.

Symbols are archetypal representations. The word archetype is derived from arche or "first principle," which points to the creative source that cannot be represented or seen, and from typos, "impression" or "imprint," which refers to a manifestation of the first principle. Archetypes are universal patterns or motifs appearing in the form of symbolic images in religions, mythology, fairy tales, legends, and psychological symptoms. They are the primordial, structural elements of the human psyche seen in images and symbols that manifest through universal patterns of human behavior. Like crystals with many facets, we cannot see or understand an archetype in its totality. We may discern one or more facets at any one time, but nevér the whole crystal.

Archetypal images express patterns of human existence, and complexes represent the actual embodiment of these patterns. Complexes contain a set of archetypal motifs or images at their core, with a web of related behavior patterns around that core. It is through the body and our emotions that the archetypes touch ground in material reality, manifesting these common human patterns. Archetypal images mostly appear in our dreams in the shape of personalized complexes; that is, the complexes in our dreams give personalized shape to the archetypal images, so that these can be assimilated into the ego and consciousness.

The ego is the center of consciousness and contains all that the person is aware of, including thoughts, feelings, sensations, and intuitions. Through the process of individuation we increasingly assimilate unconscious elements and integrate complexes as aspects of our personalities. This is a continuing process of enlarging the ego complex by bringing the darkness of the unconscious into the light of consciousness. Jung believed that this process was the meaning and purpose of life itself

and that it is facilitated by the Self's offering up dreams for us to unveil. Clarifying the themes in Jung's Answer to Job, Edinger considered the process of making conscious what is unconscious to be the ultimate task of transforming the dark, unconscious side of the god image.

Jung pointed out that he differentiated "the dream process according to how the reactions of the unconscious stand in relation to the conscious situation." From his study of dreams in different cultures and in his work with patients, he distinguished four ways in which dreams offer us meaning and comment on our lives:

1. Dreams can be the unconscious reaction to the conscious situation, resulting in content that compensates or is complementary to what transpired during the day.

2. Dreams can show us a conflict that exists between the unconscious and consciousness; the unconscious offers us another viewpoint that is in conflict with our current attitude.

3. Very significant dreams try to actively change the conscious attitude.

4. Dreams may give us archetypal material from the unconscious that has no connection to our daily lives; these are the "big dreams" that are experienced as illumination.

Jung emphasized that this last category of dreams can occur before the outbreak of mental illness, when contents from the unconscious may break through into consciousness. Jung also clarified that,

> Dreams prepare, announce, or warn about certain situations, often long before they actually happen. This is not necessarily a miracle or a recognition. Most crises or dangerous situations have a long incubation, only the conscious mind is not aware of it. Dreams can betray the secret.

Freud warned against an excessive respect for "a mysterious unconscious." Rather, "[when the work of interpretation has been completed," wrote Freud, in italics, after having completed the first psychoanalytic dream interpretation, "the dream can be recognized as a wish-fulfilment." An apparent example of wish-fulfilment (and sleep protection) is a dream in which the dreamer, who has been asked by her employer to arrive one hour earlier for work, dreams: "I wake up, get dressed, take my pajamas to work, and there I go back to sleep." The important aspect of Freud's hypothesis is perhaps that the "dream takes the place of action," which has wider implications than mere wish-fulfilment.

Jung believed that dreams result from five main causes and conditions:

1. Somatic stimuli, body positions, illness, and physical perceptions. (How many times have you dreamed you had to go to the bathroom, to finally wake up to that pressing physical need?)
2. Other environmental stimuli such as light and temperature, or an alarm clock going off;
3. External psychical stimuli that affect the unconscious (e.g., distress of a family member, moods, or secrets); family members can be so attuned to each other that they dream each other's dreams;
4. Past events, whether forgotten personal ones or historical events that contain archetypal contents;
5. Anticipation of the future, both what may transpire in actual life, as well as psychical and emotional changes in the dreamer, even if not yet recognizable to him or her.

Furthermore, Jung claimed that, except in posttraumatic dreaming, dreams do not repeat a previous experience exactly.

Personal dreams are limited to the affairs of everyday life and one's personal process, offering information and guidance pertaining to what is going on in our current lives. These are the everyday

dreams, the "bread and butter" of the dream world. It is frequently the small, seemingly insignificant dreams, easily forgotten, that offer us important information about our inadequate conscious standpoint.

The big dream, as mentioned, stretches beyond the boundaries of the current affairs in one's life. Jung's experience prior to World War I is interesting in light of his category of prospective dreams. He had a horrific series of nine visions and three dreams, showing scenes of blood flowing in the streets of Europe, frozen landscapes, and dead bodies. Some of these images erupted into his waking state as visions. At first he wondered if he were having a psychotic break, but with the commencement of World War I, he realized that the images were portraying a collective reality, revealing what would happen during this war. A number of other people across Europe at this time experienced the same phenomenon. It was a powerful reaction from the unconscious, commenting on what was "in the air" but not yet a reality. The dreams spoke to the collective situation as well as to Jung's own impending descent into the unconscious to explore the nature of the psyche.

Jung viewed dreams as stages in the classical drama and believed a great many dreams have a definite structure to them. "The whole dream-work is essentially subjective," said Jung, "and a dream is a theatre in which the dreamer is himself the scene, the player, the prompter, the producer, the author, the public, and the critic."

Jung followed the Aristotelian outline of the structure of drama:

1. The introduction or exposition states the setting, time, and place, what is said and not said, the people, and the statement of the problem to be addressed, the theme of the dream. For example, "I was in an old house and it was dark outside."
2. The development is the movement of the plot through which things become complicated, and we do not know what will happen next: "Suddenly, someone knocked on the front door and when I went to answer, there was no one there, so I left the room. Just then, my grandmother saw someone's face in the window and was terrified. She screamed out for me."
3. The peripeteia is the twist of the story, crisis, or the turning point: "I ran back into the room and opened the window. I saw my brother walking across the lawn and called after him."
4. The final stage is the lysis, the solution or conclusion, whether the way out or catastrophe: "This had been the first time we had seen my brother in years. We were happy to see him, and I sat talking with him into the morning after our grandmother went to bed."
5. Furthermore, we can observe the progression of images by studying entire dream series. In the natural rhythm of the psyche, images emerge into consciousness, replacing others that return to the waters of the unconscious, in a constant progression, cycling through the vegetative, the animal, and the spirit realms.

Dreams are not moral. Nature does not necessarily take a side between good and evil or between other opposites. It is up to our ego consciousness to filter the dream through our cultural sensibility to determine the value of the message.

By actively interacting with dreams, we realize the centrality of the Self as a guiding force in our life. Through dreams we are able to see where libido, or life energy, is blocked and where it wants to go. Although dreams can be viewed from different perspectives and understood in more than one way, they always move us toward a more conscious life by helping to locate the source of creativity, the water of life within. By attending to our dreams, we can gain clues to help us balance the opposing aspects of our personalities, such as our instincts, with our spiritual needs.

Amplification

The psyche speaks to us in metaphors, a language we must learn as we embark on our journey to reveal the meaning of dreams. Jung wrote,

> The "manifest" dream-picture is the dream itself and contains the whole meaning of the dream.... What Freud calls the "dream-façade" is the dream's obscurity, and this is really only a projection of our own lack of understanding. We say the dream has a false front only because we fail to see into it.... We do not have to get behind such a text, but must first learn to read ít.

The means that Jung devised to "read" the text of the dream was the process of amplification, which deciphers meaning through comparison. Metaphors and analogies depict scenes of life, and the dream images show that of which we are unconscious. In contrast to the view that dreams "were not designed by nature to serve any function—not rehearsal of instincts, not release of otherwise unreleasable impulses. Nothing, nada, just noise, like the gurgling of the stomach," we recognize that images emerge in our psyche to send us messages. These messages are offered for our understanding, although the interpretation can vary depending on the interpreter, as we filter these metaphors through our own unique psychology.

Jung's method of amplification reflects his distinction between the personal and the collective layers of the psyche. Parallel to the ego as center of consciousness, and as one's

conscious sense of identity, the Self encompasses both consciousness and the unconscious. The (capital S) Self stands as a guardian at the crossroads between the personal and the objective layers of the psyche. In its capacity as archetype of meaning, the Self provides the archetypal foundation on which the ego and consciousness develop, the blueprint on which the house of conscious identity is erected. As the psyche's symbol-forming faculty, the Self brings archetypal images into the personal level of awareness, dressed in the garb of complexes, appearing as images in our dreams.

The technique of free association enabled Freud to abandon hypnosis as a means of going beyond the limits of ego consciousness. By means of free associations, a dream image will find its place in the context of personal complexes and repressed memories. By amplification, on the other hand, the conscious ego reaches out toward the meaning and symbolic value of the image. The image and its roots in the objective psyche become the focal issues.

With amplification, the focus turns from the dream leading the ego into the personal unconscious, to providing the objective psyche a way to manifest in the world of consciousness.

Even though not explicitly using the term, Jung introduced the idea of amplification in a 1914 lecture "On Psychological Understanding." He contrasted a causal-reductive standpoint with a synthetic (or "constructive") approach, whereby the question is asked how "out of this present, a bridge can be built into its own future"? Jung then differentiated between a reductive approach, leading a male patient to his father-complex, and amplifying the image of a sword in the patient's dream, enabling him "to face the dangers of life through firm and brave decision," as illustrated by "the words `I will' [as] mankind's oldest heritage [which] have helped it through innumerable dangers." Jung mentions how, from a comparative analysis, "typical formations can be discovered."

Amplification is not merely an intellectual expansion of personal dream images, but a way of tapping into the treasures of humankind's spiritual heritage, so that the fountain can bring the living waters to nourish the individual psyche by means of the image. The images, in fact, serve in the role of angels, which, "are personified transmitters of unconscious contents that are seeking expression!"

Jung clearly explained his thinking behind the process of amplification:

> It is simply that of seeking the parallels. For instance, in the case of a very rare word which you have never come across before, you try to find parallel text passages, parallel applications perhaps, where that word also occurs, and then you try to put the formula you have established from the knowledge of other texts into the new text. If you make the new text a readable whole, you say, "Now we can read it." That is how we learned to read hieroglyphics and cuneiform inscriptions and that is how we can read dreams.

The dreamer's personal associations are always a starting point in working with dreams, whether predominantly personal or of a more archetypal nature. Jung emphasized this point by "making sure that every shade of meaning which each salient feature of the dream has for the dreamer is determined by the associations of the dreamer himself." Unlike free association, which leads to a person's core complexes, it is crucial to remain within the context of the specific dream image. Thus, the dreamer's associations are bound to the specific image, exploring it by circumambulation, that is, by staying close to the image, circulating around it.

With the personal associations flushed out, there may remain obscure images that would benefit from archetypal amplification. We enter fairy tales and legends, explore the mythical dramas, and turn to comparative religion. We go back to the language that has been formed over the course of human history and that draws from the emerging creative imagination of humanity. We find the archetypal associations in the deep well

of human, divine, and nature's wisdom. These supplement and support our personal associations, which together allow us to decipher the meaning of the dream, which has arisen to us from the Self. Particularly, it is the big, archetypal dream that we remember all throughout life. But the archetypal kernel is present even in the simplest of dress; often it may be the simpleton, the common clerk, barely noticeable, the unsophisticated neighbor, who serves as psychopomp, as guide along the road of our soul's travels.

The task, then, is to find similarities or associations between the dream image and mythic stories and fairy tales, in culture and religious thinking. The story will open up the gates to a world of experience for the dreamer to see and ponder. The psyche beyond our consciousness may often help us find the stories and the archetypal representations that expand the information transmitted through the dream.

Active Imagination

Amplification means more than seeking cultural and other parallels. In active imagination, the ego reaches out to grasp the archetypal essence and meaning of the drama and the images in the dream.

Jung considered his method of active imagination to be a "spontaneous amplification" of archetypal material. In active imagination, the person assumes an attitude of passive consciousness, enabling openness to "unconscious influences." "On this natural amplification process," Jung continued, "I also base my method of eliciting the meaning of dreams, for dreams behave exactly in the same way as active imagination; only the support of conscious contents is lacking." Amplification by means of active imagination can take place in a variety of ways, such as writing down dialogues with dream figures or circumambulating the images of a dream.

For example, after a year in analysis, a fifty-year-old highly successful male CEO dreamed the following:

> It is nighttime. I am milking a cow, but there is no milk coming. I am then told [by what amounts to an inner voice] to bring the cow to the entrance of Jerusalem, to bury it there in a pit and let it cook for several hours or days, and then bring it to Mount Scopus, where we have to run to change the buckets because it gives so much milk.

The dreamer amplified the dream by active imagination, going through the events of the dream in a state of reverie, writing down his experience. The following is abbreviated from his active imagination:

> It is night, very dark. I am not the one who decides here about this. I am being led, not leading. Wouldn't imagine myself milking a cow! But ok, that's my task, and I accept.

This cow is huge, much bigger than real cows. She is majestic. I approach hesitantly, but she doesn't move. I start milking, but no milk comes. I don't know what to do—to try harder? I ask her, but she doesn't answer, just stares back at me, as if reproaching me.

Then I hear this voice, don't know from where. It's a very strong voice—strong but soft, not loud at all, almost a whisper, yet very clear, penetrating. It's clear to me that this voice knows something that I don't, and I do as I am told—I start walking toward Jerusalem, a long and uphill road, pulling the big cow by a rope. It follows silently. I almost feel like I am riding an elephant, though I am pulling the cow behind me. It's simultaneously easy, I feel elevated, and heavy and burdensome.

We get to the gates of the city, and even though it's at night, I can see the people who have gathered there: beggars and thieves, all kinds of outcasts. And here I come with my cow! Looks kind of funny! Don't know if I am inside or outside the gate, but I am in that area, on a hilly slope, where I dig a pit. It feels terrible to bury the cow, but she doesn't seem to mind. I am quite horrified, in fact. The big cow lies there, melting in the boiling water, bubbles of water.

I sit and wait. I just wait. Very strange mood. It's so quiet. No life around. Really nighttime. I am all alone. Nothing happens. Very long time. Nothing I can do. I hardly move as I watch those bubbles in the boiling water as the cow is cooking. It's as if nothing is ever going to happen.

Then the sun rises, the cow climbs out of the pit, and I know I have to take it to Mount Scopus. I am not surprised at all that she is well and alive—it's all very natural, I think.

There, on top of the mountain, the view of Jerusalem and its surroundings is breathtaking. A bird's-eye view, seeing it all, but without really being there—nearby, but not fully inside the city. Yet, getting the full map of it.

It's incredible to feel how the milk flows! Don't know who all the people there are—I think it might be all those that I met at the entrance to the city, at the city gates. But it's too much milk, we can't handle it all. Somehow I need to back down, or find a solution.

In the absence of personal associations, this dream is not a personal, but predominantly an archetypal dream, as the magical cow that is cooked, brought back to life, and then found to be overflowing with milk clearly indicates.

The meaning of the dream's message is unveiled by associations bound to each image in the dream. Jung suggested that one think of a circle with rays emanating from its circumference. Each ray represents one image in the dream.

In order to make sense of the nonlinear time of the unconscious, as we wake up from a dream we place the images in linear sequence, even though actually any image can come first. The images are arranged around the circle of the diagram or the central meaning of the dream.

In this dream, the cow that accompanies the dream ego all through the dream is undoubtedly the main image to explore. We go through this process for each image, and then look at the bigger picture we have created, to find the thread that leads to an understanding or a statement of meaning. The images we would then explore by amplification are the cow, the absence and then the abundance of milk, the inner voice, the entrance to Jerusalem, cooking the cow in a pit, Mount

Scopus, running to get buckets, and the others in the dream, described as beggars, thieves, and outcasts.

A cow represents a domesticated animal associated with milk and nurturing; in archetypal terms the cow is associated with the Great Mother. We find her as the cow goddess Isis from Egyptian mythology, and in Ninsun, the wise dream interpreter and queen of the wild cow, as well as in Hindu mythology, where Kamadhenu is the mother goddess of all cows. The sacred red cow can be found in both Jewish and Christian tradition, as well as in Greek mythology.

This cow, however, gives no milk. She is not a nurturing cow and is unable to properly support the dreamer. This man's cow instinct has dried up. The cow reproaches him, because he has ignored her for too long.

His relationship with and attitude toward the unconscious, represented by the Great Mother, do not nurture him and need to be reestablished. He has lost the ability to extract the warm, sweet milk in life—a metaphor for joy, nurturing, care, and relationship. Now, however, this successful man, clearly with a strong ego, agrees to do the humble work.

Compensation from the unconscious comes in the form of the voice of the Self, guiding the dreamer to bring the cow back into its fructifying state, and thereby to bring himself into relationship with it. He needs to bring the cow to the entrance of Jerusalem and let it cook in a pit for several hours or days.

The gates of the city signify an entrance to a center, pregnant with archetypal meaning and symbolic significance. Here Jerusalem is a city in a dream—Heavenly Jerusalem, as a representation of the Self—rather than Earthly Jerusalem, which might have emerged through personal associations. The shadow, represented by the beggars and the thieves, stands at the gateway to the Self.

The big cow now needs to boil in water for hours or days. Although the dreamer feels terrible about this apparent brutality, he needs to remain in a state of being rather than doing, succumbing to forces and processes beyond his ego's control. The scene is quite ritualistic and similar to what we see in fairy tales about animals that must die and be reborn in a new form in order to help the protagonist. This cow represents an instinctual part of the dreamer that has become a huge burden and lost its creative juices, the nurturing milk. It needs to be transformed at the threshold of the city, at the point of transition.

The ritual takes place during the night. There is a need "to sit in the dark," to patiently remain in a state of depression, or in the alchemical nigredo, waiting for the sun to rise and the light of consciousness to emerge, as the dreamer contemplates the transformation of the cow energy.

This is the time of thoughtful introversion as the cow boils and then emerges transformed as the sun rises. The light of consciousness has awakened the new cow image in the dreamer. Now the cow has to be taken to Mount Scopus, where the dreamer is then confronted with the problem of the transformed cow's providing too much milk. The dream ego does not know what to do with all this libido, flowing in such abundance. The dreamer is put to work with the group of shadow figures to collect the milk. He needs to relate both to those shadow figures and to the nurturing cow to keep the flow of the milk in balance—without the participation of the shadow elements, he would be too one-sided. This hard work might be necessary as a way for the dreamer to reengage with a feeling aspect of his life that is connected with feminine instinct and feminine spirit.

From Mount Scopus the dreamer has a "bird's-eye view" of Jerusalem and its environs. He is not in the center, at the heart of the city, but can see it from above. The stage has moved from the nigredo, or sitting in depression, to albedo, or whitening, where there is an influx of conscious

PAINTING OF KAMADHENU, MOTHER GODDESS OF COWS

awareness, the clear view of the bird flying overhead, seeing the map of the city. The map or the layout of the terrain is clear, but it is overwhelming; too much view, too high, too much white milk.

The next stage in alchemy is the reddening or rubedo, which involves the embodiment of the transformation whereby one makes it one's own. This dreamer is not there yet, but instead is quite overwhelmed by the experience of change. The inner voice, Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, the magical cow all point to a spiritual attitude that perhaps needs to be mediated by reality before it can be realized.

The image in the dream of more milk than the dreamer can contain points to an important psychological issue. The flood gates of the psyche have been opened and the dreamer is inundated with creative energy, more than he can handle. At such times it is crucial that the ego step in and object by taking a stance against the psyche, asking that it curtail the flood, reducing its offering to just enough energy for the person to manage. The dream image of the cow's milk swings from its absence, the lack of psychic energy, to too much. A balance between the extremes needs to be found, and it is the ego's job to find it by taking a strong stance at the doorway between consciousness and the unconscious.

The dreamer allowed himself to follow the inner voice and was willing to be changed by the process, but he must then, as well, find a balance between his ego and his deeper resources.

Amplification of images from the objective layer of the psyche is important if one is to achieve a more complete picture and meaning of a dream, in conjunction with the personal experience and associations. The chapters that follow, written by prominent Jungian analysts, illustrate the many ways in which the meaning of dreams can be deepened by a variety of approaches to amplification. Each of the contributors to this volume has chosen a particular direction, whether art and poetry,

myth and fairytale, culture and religion, or initiation to the stages of our life, to paint a kaleidoscopic gestalt of the dream and its amplification. <>

THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS BY ARTEMIDORUS edited by Peter Thonemann, translated by Martin Hammond [Oxford World's Classics, Oxford University Press, 9780198797951]

Artemidorus' **THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (ONEIROCRITICA)** is the richest and most vivid pre-Freudian account of dream interpretation, and the only dream-book to have survived complete from Greco-Roman times. Written in Greek around AD 200, when dreams were believed by many to offer insight into future events, the work is a compendium of interpretations of dreams on a wide range of subjects relating to the natural, human, and divine worlds. It includes the meanings of dreams about the body, sex, eating and drinking, dress, the weather, animals, the gods, and much else.

Artemidorus' technique of dream interpretation stresses the need to know the background of the dreamer, such as occupation, health, status, habits, and age, and the work is a fascinating social history, revealing much about ancient life, culture, and beliefs, and attitudes to the dominant power of Imperial Rome.

Martin Hammond's fine translation is accompanied by a lucid introduction and explanatory notes by Peter Thonemann, which assist the reader in understanding this important work, which was an influence on both Sigmund Freud and Michel Foucault.

AN ANCIENT DREAM MANUAL: ARTEMIDORUS' THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS by Peter Thonemann [Oxford University Press, 9780198843825]

Artemidorus' *Oneirocritica* ('The Interpretation of Dreams') is the only dream-book which has been preserved from Graeco-Roman antiquity. Composed around AD 200, it comprises a treatise and manual on dreams, their classification, and the various analytical tools which should be applied to their interpretation, making Artemidorus both one of the earliest documented and arguably the single most important predecessor and precursor of Freud.
Artemidorus travelled widely through Greece, Asia, and Italy to collect people's dreams and record their outcomes, in the process casting a vivid light on social mores and religious beliefs in the Severan age: this volume, published as a companion to the new translation of **THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS** by Martin Hammond in the Oxford World's Classics series, aims to provide the non-specialist reader with a readable and engaging road-map to this vast and complex text. It offers a detailed analysis of Artemidorus' theory of dreams and the social function of ancient dream-interpretation, while also aiming to foster an understanding of the ways in which Artemidorus might be of interest to the cultural or social historian of the Graeco-Roman world. Alongside chapters on Artemidorus' life, career, and world-view, it also provides valuable insights into his conceptions of the human body, sexuality, the natural world, and the gods; his attitudes towards Rome, the contemporary Greek *polis*, and the social order; and his knowledge of Greek literature, myth, and history. In addition, its accessible exploration of the differences and similarities between ancient traditions of dream-analysis and modern psychoanalytic approaches will make this volume of interest to anybody with an interest in the history of dreams and dream interpretation.

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The Snake and the Whale

It is shortly before dawn. Two slaves, Sosias and Xanthias, are guarding a house, and both of them keep drifting off to sleep. In their moments of slumber, both men see curious dreams, sent—or so they claim to believe—by the god Sabazius. They start describing their dreams to one another. Xanthias goes first.

> XANTHIAS: I seemed to see a huge eagle swooping down to the marketplace, snatching up an aspis in its claws—a bronze-plated one—and carrying it up into the heavens; and then the aspis was dropped by... Cleonymus.
> SOSIAS: Ah yes—Cleonymus makes a perfect riddle.
> XANTHIAS: How so?
> SOSIAS: It's the kind of riddle someone might pose for his drinkingcompanions: 'One and the same creature has thrown away its aspis on land, in the heavens, and at sea.'
> XANTHIAS: Oh no—what evils do I have in store for me, now that I've seen a dream like that?

In his dream, Xanthias sees an eagle flying down and seizing a snake in its claws—specifically, an asp is, the kind of snake known to us as a cobra. Although eagles do catch snakes in real life, this image would immediately have evoked a world of terrifying omens for an ancient Greek dreamer. In the twelfth book of Homer's Iliad, the Trojan army are horrified at the sight of an eagle flying before them from right to left, carrying a monstrous blood-red snake in its talons, which they take to be an omen from Zeus (Iliad 12.200-29). Eagles clutching snakes in their talons are a common symbolic motif in Greek art, usually representing conflict and combat; the scene could even be used as visual shorthand for the profession of a seer (mantis), as on the fourth-century BC tombstone of the seer Cleobulus of Acharnae. It is not hard to see why Xanthias instantly took this dream to foretell `evils in store' for him.

In fact, the dream immediately veers off into parody and wordplay. (As I should perhaps have indicated at the outset, this is in fact the opening scene of Aristophanes' Wasps, a comedy first performed at the Athenian Lenaea festival of 422 BCE.) The Greek word aspis (`cobra') also means `shield', and this aspis is, says Xanthias, 'a bronze-plated one'. After being carried high up into the heavens, the cobra/shield is dropped by, not the eagle, but Cleonymus, a well-known Athenian politician of the 420s. Cleonymus allegedly once threw his shield away in battle (a stereotypical mark of cowardice), and this becomes a standard running joke in Aristophanes' comedies of the 420s and 410s. One can almost hear the audience groan.

Next it is Sosias' turn to recount his dream.

> SOSIAS: During my first spell of sleep, I seemed to see a flock of sheep sitting together in assembly on the Pnyx [the meeting-place of the Athenian assembly], complete with their walking-sticks and worn cardigans. Then I saw a voracious whale haranguing these sheep with the voice of a blazing sow.
> XANTHIAS: Ugh!
> SOSIAS: What is it?
> XANTHIAS: Stop, stop, don't go on: this dream reeks horribly of rancid hides.
> SOSIAS: Then the disgusting whale was holding a balance and weighing out beef-fat (dêmós).
> XANTHIAS: Woe is me! He's planning to dismember the citizen-body (dêmos).
> SOSIAS: And I seemed to see Theorus sitting on the ground next to him,
> but he had the head of a crow (korax). Then Alcibiades lisped in my
> ear: `Look, there's Theolus with the head of a sycophant (kolax).' XANTHIAS: Well,
> Alcibiades certainly lisped that one correctly.
> SOSIAS: You don't find that dream inauspicious, Theorus turning into a crow?
> XANTHIAS: Not at all, it's very good indeed.
> SOSIAS: How so?
> XANTHIAS: Well: a man who suddenly turned into a crow—surely the obvious interpretation is that he's about to leave us and go 'to the crows' [i.e. 'to hell']?
> SOSIAS: Evidently I ought to be hiring you at a two-obol fee, since you're so smart at dream-interpretation.

Sosias' dream begins with a vision of the sheep-like old men of the Athenian assembly, listening in a stupor to a vile sea-monster spouting angry demagogic drivel at maximum volume. Xanthias instantly identifies the whale as the arch-demagogue Cleon, often mocked by Aristophanes for his background in the tanning industry (hence the smell of `rancid hides'). This is followed by two bizarre images, both of which are `translated' into political jokes by Xanthias by means of some nifty wordmagic. Sosias dreams that the whale/Cleon is weighing out some beef-fat (dēmós), which signifies, according to Xanthias, a malign outcome: Cleon is going to `divide against itself' the body of Athenian citizens (démos). The Greek words for 'fat' and `people' are spelled the same (demos), but pronounced differently (like the English sewer, `someone who sews' vs. 'a waste-pipe').

Finally, Cleon's sycophantic henchman Theorus appears with a crow's head on his shoulders. This is auspicious, says Xanthias, since it signifies he'll 'go to hell' (in Greek, 'go to the crows'). Aristophanes throws in a further bit of wordplay based on the similarity of the Greek words for `crow' (korax) and `flatterer' (kolax). Since the aristocratic politician Alcibiades was famously unable to pronounce the letter `r', his attempt to describe Theorus as `korax-headed' serendipitously nails him as a kolax—the truth in a lisp, as it were.

At the risk of stating the obvious, neither of these dreams are real. They serve as warm-up jokes in the opening scene of a comedy: Aristophanes is trying to get his audience laughing (and I do apologize for killing the humour with my laboured explanations). But if we want to get at `typical' ancient views on the nature and significance of dreams, comedy is perhaps not a bad place to take some preliminary soundings. The scene would simply not be funny if the assumptions underlying it were not instantly recognizable to the play's audience. So here are five simple propositions about the attitude towards dreams that seems to be assumed in the opening scene of Wasps.

(1) Dreams—or at least some dreams—come from the gods. That (some) dreams are sent by the gods is a standard assumption of Greek and Roman literary authors from Homer onwards: `dreams too come from Zeus' (Iliad 1.63). In the opening scene of Wasps, the deity concerned is the obscure Anatolian god Sabazius, perhaps because fifth-century Athenians saw him as a typically `slavish' deity (Sabazius comes from Phrygia, a major source of Athenian slaves in the fifth century BCE). There were, it is true, a few sceptics. In the view of the philosopher Aristotle, the very fact that low-lifes

such as Sosias and Xanthias get to see interesting dreams shows that dreams are unlikely to have a divine origin: `Apart from its general irrationality, the idea that it is a god who sends dreams, and yet he sends them not to the best and most intelligent, but to random people, is absurd' (On Divination in Sleep, 462b21-3). We will come back to the divine origin of dreams in Chapters 3 and 9.

(2) Dreams—or at least some dreams—are predictive. When correctly interpreted, dreams can provide precognition of things that are going to happen in the future, which may be auspicious (Theorus will go to hell) or malign (Cleon will divide the people against itself). Today, I hope it is fair to say, not many of us believe that dreams offer encoded predictions of future events; in antiquity, even thinkers at the outermost sceptical and rationalist end of the intellectual spectrum (Aristotle again) were not prepared to rule this out altogether, as we shall see in Chapter 3.

(3) Predictive dreams deal in symbols, not narratives. In English, we tend to speak of dreaming `that' something occurred (`Last night I dreamt I went to Manderley again'). That is to say, we are accustomed to think of our dreams as narratives, whose meaning (if they have one) is determined by the particular sequence of events or experiences presented to us. By contrast, Greek and Roman authors do not speak of `having a dream' or `dreaming that x happened', but rather of `seeing a dream', where the dream is objectified or personified as a thing or person that appears to the dreamer in his or her sleep. The archetypal Greek or Roman dream is therefore not an experience (`having tea with the Queen'), but a kind of apparition, like the ghost of Jacob Marley. In their dreams, Sosias and Xanthias 'see' a sequence of discrete and isolated dream-elements (an eagle, a flock of sheep, a whale), each of which is then individually decoded as a symbolic representation of a person or thing in their waking world. (As it happens, almost all of these static symbols consist of animals or parts of animals: an eagle, a snake, a flock of sheep, a whale, a sow, beef-fat, the head of a crow—see Chapter 6)

(4) Predictive dreams are a bit like riddles. The two slaves in Wasps `decode' the meanings of their dream-objects in a variety of ways: by the intrinsic character of the thing concerned (sheep are subservient, like assembly-voters; a whale is big and horrible, like Cleon); by pseudo-etymology and wordplay on the thing's name (dēmós, 'beef-fat', sounds like Amos, `citizen body'); or by an associated myth or proverb (a crow signifies going 'to the crows'). Sosias is quite right to compare the `decoding' of Xanthias' eagledream to the `decoding' of a riddle at a drinking-party (what creature throws away its shield on land, in the heavens, and at sea?). Much of the ancient science of dream-interpretation, as we will see, is dedicated to formulating rules or guidelines for solving these riddle-like problems.

(5) Accurate dream-interpretation calls for a professional dreaminterpreter. In Athens, in 422 BCE, a slave with money to burn could go and consult a professional dream-monger, to have his dream interpreted at two obols a pop (cheap, but not that cheap: a third of a day's wage for a skilled craftsman at this period). And this is where we come in. Today, thanks to the vagaries of literary survival, this entire Graeco-Roman tradition of specialized, 'scientific' dream-interpretation is known to us essentially through a single book: the magnificent, credulous, labyrinthine, pedantic, and endlessly fascinating Oneirocritica of Artemidorus of Daldis.

Artemidorus after Antiquity

We have no idea how and why the Oneirocritica survived the end of antiquity. The main dream-book traditions of both Byzantium and the medieval West stem from a much shorter work, the Somniale Danielis (attributed to the Hebrew prophet Daniel), compiled some time between the fourth and seventh century CE; the author of the Somniale seems not to have known or used Artemidorus' book. Indeed, for some 650 years after the book's completion (around CE 210), we cannot securely identify a single reader of the Oneirocritica. The dream-interpreter Artemidorus of

Ephesus' is mentioned in passing by the anonymous author of the Philopatris, a curious Greek dialogue on paganism and Christianity attributed to the satirist Lucian; unfortunately, the date of the Philopatris is completely uncertain (proposed dates stretch from the mid-fourth to the twelfth century CE). Macrobius' Latin Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, composed around CE 400, includes a typology of dreams (oneiros, horama, chrematismos, enhypnion, phantasma: 1.3.2) which superficially resembles that of Artemidorus (1.1-2, especially 1.2.4), but it requires the eye of faith to suppose that Macrobius was drawing directly on the Oneirocritica.

Not until the mid-ninth century BE does the Oneirocritica resurface in, of all places, `Abbasid Baghdad. A single manuscript, now in Istanbul, preserves an Arabic translation of the Oneirocritica, undertaken by the prolific Nestorian Christian physician and translator Hunayn b. Ishâq (died CE 877). The surviving copy of Hunayn's translation is incomplete (it omits the opening of Book 1, and the whole of Books 4-5), but the use made of his work by later Muslim dream-interpreters makes it clear that Hunayn did indeed translate the whole thing. Hunayn's translation sticks very closely to the Greek, although he does make a few quiet alterations in order to make Artemidorus conform to contemporary religious norms. For example, Artemidorus claims in Book 2 that 'to dream of Asclepius set up as a statue in his temple and standing on his plinth, and to do him worship, is auspicious for all' (2.37.4). Hunayn converts Asclepius into an angel (a standard strategy for dealing with pagan deities) and excises the reference to worship (only appropriate for God): 'as for the angel called Asclepius, when someone saw him as if he was in a temple or standing on a pedestal, howsoever he saw him—this is a good sign in all things and all actions'.

This ninth-century translation is, in fact, our earliest (indirect) witness to the text of the Oneirocritica, and here and there, where our later Greek manuscripts have errors or omissions, Hunayn's translation seems to preserve Artemidorus' original wording. Perhaps the most spectacular example comes towards the end of Artemidorus' account of dreams about the gods in Book 2, where our extant Greek manuscripts tell us that 'the so-called Mother of the Gods' has the same significance as the chthonic Hecate and the Erinyes (2.39.4). The Arabic translation, instead of `Mother of the Gods', reads d.n.dūmī, which can only be a transliteration of the Greek Dindymie or Dindymene, a rare local epithet for the Mother of the Gods in Artemidorus' native Asia Minor (e.g. Herodotus, Histories 1.80.1).

Hunayn's translation of Artemidorus exercised an enormous influence on later Muslim divinatory literature. Large chunks of it were incorporated piecemeal into later compilations of dream-wisdom like those of Dīnawarī (AD 1008) and Kharkiishī (before AD 1015). But the most sustained and powerful engagement with Hunayn's Arabic Oneirocritica is to be found in the dream-manual composed by the great Persian scholar Avicenna (Ibn Sind, AD 980-1037). Avicenna explicitly rejects the standard `Arabic' structure of dream-manuals (which tend to begin with dreams of God, the prophets, angels, and so forth) in favour of the `Greek' (i.e. Artemidoran) approach which begins with the human body. His own dream-book opens with a long philosophic discussion of sleep and dreams, much of which summarizes and expands on the theoretical treatises that open Books 1 and 4 of the Oneirocritica; his main catalogue of dream-elements and their significations follows the structure and content of the Oneirocritica with remarkable fidelity.

Artemidorus' profound influence on early traditions of Muslim dream-interpretation was not paralleled in the medieval Greek-speaking world. The earliest evidence for the rediscovery of the Oneirocritica in Byzantium comes from the tenth and eleventh centuries AD. The vast tenth-century Byzantine encyclopaedia known as the Suda includes a short biographical entry for Artemidorus (see Chapter 2), as well as a large number of unattributed quotations from the Oneirocritica; our earliest surviving Greek manuscript of the Oneirocritica (L, Codex Laurentianus 87.8) dates to the eleventh century AD. However, Artemidorus seems never to have been widely read in Byzantium. It was long

believed that the longest and richest surviving Byzantine dream-book, the Oneirocriticon of Achmet (probably tenth century AD), was directly influenced by Artemidorus; in fact, we now know that Achmet's work was wholly based on Arabic sources, and these apparent links result from Artemidorus' spectral presence (via Hunayn) in ninth- and tenth-century Arabic dream-books. The only other individual in the Byzantine world known to have so much as cast his eyes over a Greek text of the Oneirocritica is a certain Pascalis Romanus, author of a short Latin work on dreaminterpretation called the Liber thesauri occulti (CE 1165); large parts of this book consist of verbatim translations of miscellaneous bits of the Oneirocritica.

At any event, what matters most for us is that two complete Greek manuscripts of the Oneirocritica survived the fall of Constantinople in 1453, both of them apparently shipped out to Crete by a notable Greek scholar and scribe by the name of Michael Apostolis. Artemidorus arrived for the first time in western Europe at the end of the fifteenth century: one of Apostolis' two manuscripts (L) ended up in Florence, and a copy of the other (V), in Apostolis' own hand, is now in Venice. The first printed edition of the Oneirocritica was produced by the Aldine press in 1518. Two decades later, Artemidorus was translated into Latin by Janus Cornarius (1539), and this was quickly followed by a rush of vernacular translations: into German, by Walter Hermann Ryff (1540); into Italian, by Pietro Lauro of Modena (1542); into French, by Charles Fontaine (1546).

In England, the earliest (partial) vernacular translation seems to have been Thomas Hill's A pleasaunt treatise of the interpretation of dreames, gathered part of out of Ponzettus, and part out of the Greek Author Artemidorus (1559). This book no longer survives, but its contents must have been more or less identical to Hill's extant The most pleasuante arte of the interpretation of dreames (1576). In the long central chapter of this book (`Of those Dreames whiche were reported to have bene proved'), Hill translates a large number of dreams cherry-picked from all five books of the Oneirocritica, including—perhaps surprisingly—some of the more hair-raising sex-dreams from Book 1, which are silently omitted in most other early modern translations of the Oneirocritica (1.78.6-7):

> To be moved therto of a richer or older man signifyeth good, for that the manner is to take of suche. And to be moved of a yonger and needy person, is evil for to suche the manner is to give. And the same signifycation also if the elder shall be the mover or procurer, and a begger. And a certayne person beyng a servaunt dreamed that he thought he handled his maysters privitye: who after was made schole mayster, and bringer up of his children, for he had then in his hands the masters privityes, being signified of the proper children of his master.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Artemidorus reached a wider English readership through the drastically abridged translation by `R.W.' (probably Robert Wood, a prolific translator of Latin and French texts), first published in 1606. Originally entitled The iudgement, or exposition of dreames, written by Artimodorus [sic], an auncient and famous author, this frankly execrable little book went through twenty-six cheap editions between 1606 and 1786 (fourteen of which survive today). Wood, unlike Hill, followed the original sequence of topics in the Oneirocritica, but he hacked down the contents to around a tenth of their original length. The long Prefaces to Books 1 and 4 are omitted altogether, and Book 5 is reduced from ninety-five to seventeen dreams, padded out with a few dream-anecdotes from Valerius Maximus' Memorable Deeds and Sayings. Other vernacular translations and abridgements of Artemidorus continued to appear throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including—remarkably—a Welsh-language epitome, Gwir ddeongliad breuddwydion, published at Shrewsbury in 1698. (No complete English translation of the Oneirocritica would appear until 1975.)

Today, Artemidorus' Oneirocritica remains a fairly niche interest, though a few imaginative historians of the Roman world—most memorably Michel Foucault (Chapter 5)—have amply demonstrated

quite how much there is still to be got out of this extraordinary book. It is, I suppose, unlikely that anyone will again read Artemidorus as a practical guide to interpreting dreams. Curiously, one of the very last people to take Artemidorus seriously as a `living' source of dream-wisdom was Sigmund Freud, with whom this book may appropriately draw to a close. In the first edition of Die Traumdeutung (published in 1899), Freud referred only twice to Artemidorus, once to castigate an earlier German translator for omitting Artemidorus' account of sex-dreams, and once as an illustration of the `popular method of dream-interpretation' as a sort of cryptography, that involves `decoding' the various elements of a dream by means of a fixed key:

> An interesting variant of this decoding procedure, which to some extent corrects its character as a purely mechanical transposition, appears in the treatise on dream-interpretation by Artemidorus of Daldis. Here not only the content of the dream but also the personality and the circumstances of the dreamer are taken into account so that the same element in the dream has a different meaning for the rich man, the married man, or the orator from the meaning it has for the poor man, the unmarried man, or, say, a merchant. The essential thing about this procedure is that the work of interpretation is not directed towards the dream as a whole, but at each piece of the dreamcontent by itself, as if the dream were a conglomerate in which each little fragment of rock required a separate definition. (Translation by Joyce Crick.)

In later editions of Die Traumdeutung, Freud added several further references to Artemidorus, highlighting the continuities between Artemidorus' method and his own. He quotes Alexander the Great's dream of a dancing satyr (4.24.3) both as 'the most beautiful example of a dream-interpretation handed down to us from antiquity', and as an exemplary case of why a dream cannot be translated into another language (because the interpretation depends on a wordplay that only works in Greek: see Chapter 3). He praises Artemidorus' focus on 'the principle of association', and goes so far as to declare that his own technique of dream interpretation differs only in one essential respect from 'the ancient method', namely that 'it imposes the task of interpretation on the dreamer himself', rather than the interpreter.

Freud's emphasis on the similarities between the new science of psychoanalysis and Artemidorus' techniques in the Oneirocritica is, as Simon Price rightly emphasized in a classic essay on Freud and Artemidorus, deeply misleading. Freud was increasingly concerned to place his work in an intellectual lineage stretching back to antiquity, and this naturally led him to downplay the profound differences between Artemidorus' approach and his own. As we saw in Chapter 3, Artemidorus has no particular interest in the origins of dreams; he does not believe that the meaning of a dream depends on a dreamer's individual personality, let alone his suppressed desires; he assumes that dreams are precognitive, offering insight into future events. The only real connection between Artemidorus and the Freudian tradition is the use of the allegorical or `decoding' method for interpreting individual dream-elements, and this method is employed to very different ends. If Artemidorus' Oneirocritica still commands our attention today–as it most certainly should—it is because of the remarkably sharp and unexpected light that it sheds on the norms and assumptions of people in the past, not for any practical value that it might be thought to possess for the modern psychoanalyst. <>

THE WORLD OF GREEK RELIGION AND MYTHOLOGY COLLECTED ESSAYS II by Jan N. Bremmer [Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament, Mohr Siebeck, 9783161544514]

In this wide-ranging work on Greek religion and mythology, Jan N. Bremmer brings together his stimulating and innovative articles, which have all been updated and revised where necessary. In three thematic sections, he analyses central aspects of Greek religion, beginning with the gods and heroes and paying special attention to the unity of the divine nature and the emergence of the category 'hero'. The second section begins with a discussion of the nature of polis religion, continues with various facets, such as seers, secrecy and the soul, and concludes with the influence of the Ancient Near East. The third section studies human sacrifice and offers the most recent analysis of the ideal animal sacrifice, combining literature, epigraphy, iconography, and zooarchaeology. Regarding human sacrifice, it concentrates on the famous cases of Iphigeneia and the werewolves of Mount Lykaion. The fourth and final section investigates key elements of Greek mythology, such as the definition of myth and its relationship to ritual, and ends with a brief history of the study of Greek mythology. The multi-disciplinary approach and rich footnotes make this work a must for anybody interested in Greek religion and mythology.

27. Myth and Mythography: The Pride of Halicarnassus
28. Myth and the Novel
29. Myth and Personifications: The Birth of the Seasons (Hôrai)
30. A Brief History of the Study of Greek Mythology
Appendix
Gerardus van der Leeuw and Jane Ellen Harrison
Acknowledgements
Index of Names, Subjects and Passages

It is a pleasure for me to offer here the second volume of my Collected Essays, containing a sizable part of my writings on Greek religion and mythology.) Greek religion is not a subject that has always held my interest and attention. During my all too long study of Classics at the Free University in Amsterdam (1962-1969), the subject was taught only once by my Doktorvater G. J. D. Aalders (1914-1987), a scholar of real substance and a somewhat shy man. His course on Asclepius interested me, but not quite enough to leave me fascinated by Greek religion. My attitude towards the subject began to change when, during my military service in the Intelligence branch of the Dutch armed forces (1970-1972), I discovered the work of the Latinist and historian of religion Hendrik Wagenvoort (1886-1976).3 Wagenvoort was an imaginative scholar, who combined great philological expertise with a wide interest in folklore, archaeology and anthropological studies. His book on inspiration by bees in dreams, in particular, led me to take up the study of the soul in ancient Greece and also directed my attention towards conceptions of the soul among Native American and Siberian peoples.' The latter topic, in turn, led me to shamanism, which has remained an abiding interest in the years since.

Military service gave me plenty of opportunities to read but no theoretical framework within which to situate what I was learning. This gradually changed in the 1970s when I discovered not only the French Annales school, with its interest in mentalité and longue durée, but also the work of Victor Turner (19201983) and Mary Douglas (1921-2007),6 and the École de Paris of Jean-Pierre Vernant (1914-2007: Ch. 15), Pierre Vidal-Naquet (1930-2006), and Marcel Detienne (1935-2019), whose recent death marks the passing of that generation of scholars. Yet the greatest influence on my thought was the work of Walter Burkert (1931-2015: Ch. 1.5). His Homo necans made a lasting impression on me, even though I found the original German edition extremely hard to understand at times.' His work on myth and ritual has been a continuing source of inspiration and, sometimes, contestation, as has his focus on sacrifice.' I was equally inspired by Burkert's turn in the late 1970s towards an interest in the contacts between Greece and the Orient, although most of my articles on that subject have been collected elsewhere.' Here, I concentrate on influences from Anatolia (Ch. 16), an area barely touched on by Burkert, undoubtedly because at that time most of the epichoric languages had not yet been deciphered or had only been studied in an unsatisfactory manner.

Equally important for me was a meeting with Fritz Graf in the summer of 1974, when we both attended a conference in Lancaster (UK) organised by the International Association for the History of Religion. I had just been assigned to review his book on Eleusis and Orphic poetry and was eager to get to know the author of that remarkably learned dissertation. We immediately hit it off, as we shared many of the same interests and took very similar approaches to the study of ancient religion. Through him, I met Richard Buxton, another old friend, and in the course of these and the following years I also made the acquaintance of Claude Calame, Albert Henrichs (1942-2017: Ch. 15, Appendix 2), Robert Parker, and Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood (1945-2007: Ch. 8). These friends, each in their own way, have been instrumental in moving the study of Greek religion away from issues related to agricultural fertility and towards a focus on myth and ritual, and their contextualisation in Greek culture. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, they all contributed to Interpretations of Greek Mythology. In retrospect, it is hard to imagine that most of us were in our early forties and still without a Chair.

Even though in the early 1980s I also became interested in early Christianity, I continued to work on Greek religion and mythology. A persuasive case can be made that mythology is an integral part of Greek religion: mythology is one of the important ways in which the Greeks reflected on their gods and rituals, even if in later antiquity knowledge of mythology became primarily a way of displaying cultural capital (Ch. 30.1). It is therefore surprising that there are no separate chapters on myth in the great handbooks of Nilsson (Ch. 1.4) and Burkert (Ch. 1.5), or in Robert Parker's recent study of Greek religion. Given the contemporary scholarly acceptance of an almost all-embracing connection between myth and religion, the title of my book, The World of Greek Religion and Mythology, might have seemed more familiar to the nineteenth-century German scholars who still strongly distinguished between the two. Yet, since many non-specialists still today seem to consider Greek mythology a subject separate from religion — take for example Stephen Fry's bestseller Mythos (2018) — I opted to bring the words together in my title while also making them distinct. Admittedly, this distinction reflects modern ideas rather than those of the ancient Greeks themselves, but we cannot understand anything of the ancient world except through the concepts that provide the building blocks of our own thought.

It will be useful to give a brief survey of the contents of this book. I begin with a section dealing with gods and heroes (Chs. 1-7). It is remarkable how little attention the gods receive in the great works on Greek religion of the twentieth century (Ch. 1), a trend that can also be observed in more general handbooks of and companions to religious studies. This neglect and downplaying of the gods, probably the result of the modern process of secularisation, has always seemed strange to me and it is for this reason that I started my own analysis of Greek religion, after a survey of its general characteristics, with the gods. This was also why I proposed a conference on the gods when I was Visiting Leventis Professor in Edinburgh in 2007.

It is rather striking that a number of books have since appeared that have reacted against this neglect (Ch. 1, note 1). Nevertheless, these can only begin to compensate for the disregard of the subject over such a long period and there are several aspects of the gods that deserve further discussion, including the nature of Greek polytheism, the modes and spheres of activity of the individual gods and their mutual relationships, the nature of the divine identity (person or power), divine epiphanies and metamorphoses, and, last but certainly not least, the problem of what constitutes a god. As I have argued before, `poetry, art, and cult all incessantly impressed upon the Greeks the personal aspects of their gods'. In contrast to the claims of our francophone colleagues, it is anthropomorphism, rather than the gods being primarily `powers', that is therefore critical to understanding the Greek divine world, even if the dimension of `powers' should not be neglected either. Yet there are also other aspects of the Greek conception of the gods that we should look at and which have not received much attention in recent times.

What is the underlying unity of each Greek divinity? It is obvious that one Greek god or goddess often has a range of very different functions and a multitude of epithets. Many of them were worshipped from Mycenaean times (Ch. 1.1) up until late antiquity, that is, for well over one-and-a-half millennia. It would be odd if during this period some divinities had not developed differently in one place or region from the changes they underwent in the rest of the Greek world. Yet, as so often, the exceptions usually prove the rule. Thus, we can see that Aphrodite is the goddess of persuasive charm, not only in love, but also in calming the sea and bringing citizens together, and Poseidon, as I argue here (Ch. 2), the god of brute force. Other divinities, such as Dionysos (Ch. 3), are more challenging to define, and analysing this aspect of the Greek pantheon still remains a hard nut to crack.

In general, little thought has been given to the hierarchy within the pantheon and to the emergence of the pantheon itself. The birth of the classical pantheon with its twelve gods and goddesses,

influenced by traditions native to Anatolia, (Ch. 1.1), was concomitant with the rise of the religious category of `hero' (Ch. 6.1) and the gradual differentiation between divinities and their statues (Ch. 7.2). This whole process, which is still not well understood, effected a clear distinction between gods and heroes, but also between major and minor gods, which is to say between those inside and those, such as a number of Orphic divinities (Ch. 5), who stood outside the pantheon. Indeed, it is obvious that certain gods were considered to be more important than others in the lives of the ancient Greeks, as is made plain by the prominence or absence of their temples, their location in the centre or margin of the community, or their place at the front or the back in divine processions on Greek vase paintings. In the case of a minor god like Hephaistos (Ch. 4), the Greeks constructed his persona by letting him ride on a randy animal, by giving him a minor goddess as his wife, and by picturing him as physically malformed. Both myth and cult, then, helped to create a picture of a divinity mediated not only by poetry or prose but also by the many representations on coins, sculptures and vase paintings.

The next section in this collection takes up a number of key themes in the study of Greek religion (Chs. 8-16). It is probably fair to say that in recent years the most heated discussions concerning Greek religion have focused on the idea of polis religion. As first formulated by Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood and then instantiated in Robert Parker's two splendid books on Athenian religion, the idea that the polis defines and controls Greek religion has lately been criticised from various directions. The sharpest critic has been Julia Kindt, who has pointed to structures above and below the polis, the lack of coherence within the polis, and the relative neglect of religious beliefs. In addition, Jörg Rüpke, with his Lived Ancient Religion (LAR) project, has stressed the agency of the individual within ancient religion. My own view is that there are a number of messy margins to the idea of polis religion (Ch. 8), found in those areas where the polis clearly had little or no control, such as divination (Ch. 9), magic (Ch. 10), or eschatology (Chs. 11 and 12). The stress on agency in the LAR approach has also pointed to the weakness of the polis religion idea when it comes to accounting for innovation and private initiative. Yet the LAR approach itself does not, perhaps, recognise sufficiently that there were certain limits to religious initiatives, and that the polis, and later the Roman administration, could penalise those innovators or dissidents who, in their opinion, went too far.

One might also wonder if the polis religion approach is not too Athenocentric, overly influenced by the wealth of material we have for Athens. When we look to the West, to Magna Graecia, we find such innovators as Pythagoras, Xenophanes, the Orphics, and Empedocles (Ch. 12). Did the colonies perhaps leave more space for religious innovation? To the East we find in Anatolia and Persia, for example, areas that influenced Greek religion in various ways (Ch. 16). Again, does the focus on Athens perhaps make us neglect somewhat the religious developments that took place in the areas outside the Greek mainland?

In the early 1980s, second-wave feminism reached Europe from the US and women's history became popular. I was one of those attracted to this new subject. In addition to writing a number of articles on early Christian women, I also looked at women in ancient Greece more broadly. In the process, I came to realise that old women have never received much attention. My chapter on this topic here (Ch. 14) is clearly much indebted to John Gould (1927-2001), whose anthropological approach to Greek culture I greatly admire. I was also inspired to take a closer look at the behaviour of women in maenadic myth and ritual (Ch. 15) by a meeting with Albert Henrichs and by his studies of maenadism. The insight that we should be aware of the differences between these two media of Greek religion arose initially from my study of the scapegoat ritual and will also be reflected upon in this volume (Ch. 24).

Any admirer of Burkert must have some interest in sacrifice (Chs. 17-22), a subject with which he himself remained fascinated all his life. While some of his insights remain valid, such as those concerning the hunting ancestry of sacrifice,38 our understanding of the topic has increased considerably in the time since he wrote his Homo pecans. Great progress has been made in three areas, in particular. Whereas Burkert mainly had to work with literary material, more recent research has noted the evidence from vase paintings and votive reliefs, has stressed the importance of zooarchaeological excavations and analyses, and has drawn attention to the many local and regional differences through a better knowledge of the so-called sacred laws. It is for these reasons that I attempt here a fresh analysis of the ideal animal sacrifice, which aims to take into account all these new developments (Ch. 17). The epigraphical evidence, especially, has shown that, at the local level, Greek sacrifice displayed many subtle differences, the study of which is still in its infancy. For example, people could sacrifice young or old, black or white, pregnant or non-pregnant animals, as well as front or back legs, or with or without wine. Here, I discuss one of these differences: the sacrifice of pregnant animals (Ch. 18). As always, we should first collect all the available material, as I have aimed to do, and only then look for an analysis. I have tried to combine the objects of the rituals, the divinities, with what I call the `logic of ritual', that is, the ways the Greeks used various elements, such as age, colour, time of day, and the absence or presence of wreaths and wine, to give meaning to their rituals. It is only via such an approach that we will gain a better understanding of the symbolic system of ancient sacrifice.

The Greeks not only sacrificed animals but, at least in myth, also humans, and girls in particular (Chs. 19-22). Human sacrifice remains a subject of endless fascination to the wider public, as is witnessed by the publicity surrounding the recent discovery of a skeleton at Mt Lykaion, supposedly proving ancient tales about local human sacrifice (but see Ch. 19.3). The most famous case of ancient sacrifice is, undoubtedly, Iphigeneia. I discuss Iphigeneia's myth in detail (Ch. 20) but also pay attention to the ways in which Euripides imagined her sacrifice (Ch. 21) and her role as a priestess in the act of human sacrifice (Ch. 22). The playwright's fascination with such sacrifices is well documented but, as I try to show, it is only via close attention to the vocabulary and practices of animal sacrifice that we can understand the ways in which Euripides presented Iphigeneia's myth on stage.

The final section of the volume concerns myth (Chs. 23-30). I have long been interested in the relationship between myth and ritual (Ch. 24), but myth is such a broad subject that scholars continually discover or focus on new areas, such as, recently, its narrative, cognitive and emotional aspects. Despite this ongoing evolution, more traditional features remain important too, such as the relationship of myth to history (Ch. 25), propaganda (Ch. 26), and local mythography (Ch. 27). Myth can be part of a specific genre like the novel (Ch. 28), but it can also have a broader scope, as when it shapes our ideas about the four seasons through personifications (Ch. 29). Finally, knowledge of myth could function as cultural capital in Roman times, offer access to repositories of (supposed) truth in the Middle Ages, open roads to Greek pre-history in the Romantic period, and can suggest keys to Greek culture in general to scholars in modern times (Ch. 30). With so many different functions and so many different ways of approaching the subject, one can only remain sceptical about one's own results!

I would like to thank the friendly and efficient staff of Mohr Siebeck, Rebekka Zech in particular, for making this such a nicely produced book. My thanks also to Berghahn (New York), Blackwell Publishing (Oxford), Brill (Leiden), the Department of the Classics at Harvard University, Diagonal Verlag (Marburg), Edinburgh University Press, De Gruyter (Berlin), Habelt (Bonn), Kernos (Liège), Museu d'Arqueologia de Catalunya (Barcelona), the Norwegian Institute at Athens, Osrodek Praktyk Teatralnych `Gardzienice' (Gardzienice), Oxford University Press, Peeters (Leuven), Presses Universitaires de Liège, Routledge (London), Steiner (Stuttgart), the Swedish Institutes at Athens and

Rome, and the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (Darmstadt) for their permission to reprint the articles mentioned in the Acknowledgements. As I noted in the Preface to my first volume, it is impossible to completely redo one's own research of nearly four decades. Yet I do not want to reprint views that I no longer support or to offer the reader out-of-date references. I have therefore updated the bibliography, made a number of small changes and corrections, removed overlaps where possible, reorganised a few sections and added more evidence when available. Naturally, this could not be done in every case, but I have always tried to bring the volume up to date with regard to the more important issues. In two chapters, on the Ancient Near East (Ch. 16) and sacrifice (Ch. 17), I have used the original text and notes, which I had to abbreviate, sometimes considerably, before their previous publication in order to stay within the prescribed chapter lengths of the handbooks. There is one exception to this updating. In 1984, I pioneered a kind of neuro-scientific approach to maenadism (Ch. 15). My references at the time reflected the state of the art, but the world of neuroscience has since exploded with new developments and it would be preposterous to claim that I have been able to keep up with it. Thus, I offer this chapter more as a model for inspiration than as a claim to the last word on maenadism.

The many debts I have incurred in the course of the years spent writing these articles I mention at the end of each chapter. Here I would single out Walter Burkert, Albert Henrichs and Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood. These friends and colleagues have inspired and stimulated me over many years, and their passing away has made the study of Greek religion and mythology so much the poorer. That is why I dedicate this volume to their memory.

The collective importance of myth

Having seen that Greek myths can be tales from time immemorial but also contemporary inventions, we will now look at their place in Greek society. In the modern Western world, myths of the Greeks and other peoples are primarily read, but mythos 'is, in Homer, a speech-act indicating authority, performed at length, usually in public, with a full attention to every detail'. The oldest mythoi, then, are tales recited in front of an audience. The fact of oral performance means that myth cannot be looked at in isolation; we must always consider by whom and to whom the tales were told. It is impossible to trace here in detail the development of the triad narrator—mythos—audience through the whole of Greek history; for our purpose it is sufficient to make a few observations about the main differences between the archaic age and later periods.

In Homer, the narrator of mythoi was the poet, the aoidos, who was society's bearer of tradition and its educator par excellence. Public performance obliged him to remain aware of his public's taste; unpopular new myths or unacceptable versions of old ones would be rejected by the public and, surely, not repeated in further performances. The poet's stature in society was reflected by his, in a certain sense, near-supernatural status. He and his songs were called `divine' and he himself 'of the gods'. His epic poetry was believed to have been transmitted by the Muses who `watch everything'. The divine origin of his poetry enabled him to invent new myths or change the content of the old ones; he could also freely change the poetic form — the original Indo-European eight-syllable line was developed into the hexameter.

In the course of the archaic age, a whole complex of factors, such as colonisation, the growth of democracy, and the introduction of writing and money, dramatically changed the character of society. These developments also changed the status of the poet, the acceptance of myth, and the nature of the poet's audience. As Claude Calame has shown, the Muses played an increasingly subordinate role in archaic poetry. This declining position, as he persuasively suggests, reflected the poet's more secular role in society and growing consciousness of his own creativity. Moreover, the arrival of literacy enabled intellectuals to fix and scrutinise the tradition. The traditional mythoi now came under attack from philosophers, historians and mythographers — authors who wrote in prose

and who did not subject their opinions to the censure of the community in public performance. At first sight, the audience of the myths remained the same, as the poets continued to perform in aristocratic circles, but their patrons were now in the process of losing part of their political power — a development that must also have had repercussions for the poet's position in society.

These developments accelerated in the course of the classical period, although poets still continued to relate myths (tragedy!), and in the Hellenistic age the poet's function in society had largely been lost to philosophers and historians. The versions of myths that Callimachus and his friends wrote were no longer directed at society at large, but rather primarily at a small circle of literary friends. Other authors started to rationalise the myths, a process already begun in the classical period.20 Post-Hellenistic travellers, such as Pausanias, still recorded the archaic myths connected with the temples they visited, but these tales now had lost completely their erstwhile relevance to the community.

In one area, however, certain aspects of myth continued to prosper. The Greek colonisation of the East promoted feverish activity in the invention of mythical founders and genealogies, and in the explanation of strange names. In general, however, the new myths, which were mostly bricolages of the old, established ones, no longer were composed by poets but by historians, who wrote in prose and did not claim to be divinely inspired. The popularity of myth lasted well into the Roman Empire, but the mythoi, which once helped men to understand or order the world, now functioned primarily as a major part of a cultural tradition whose importance increased as Greek independence diminished. As various cities lost their political significance, it was their mythical past that could still furnish them with an identity and help them to distinguish themselves from other cities. Myth, then, meant rather different things to the Greeks at different stages of their history.

Myths and other traditional tales

When we take the triad poet-mythos-audience as our point of departure, it becomes easier to see the difference between Greek myth and other genres of popular tales, such as the fairy tale or the legend. Fairy tales are told primarily in private and in prose; they are situated, furthermore, outside a specific time and place. Whereas Greek myth always details the place and origin of its heroes, fairy tales content themselves with stating that 'once upon a time' a king was ruling — we never hear in which country or in which age. An individual fairy tale therefore exists in isolation, while a Greek myth evokes further myths in which the same named heroes are involved; it is almost true that every Greek myth is ultimately connected in a chain of association with every other Greek myth. Moreover, fairy tales are told not to order or explain the world, but to entertain their audience, although moralistic overtones were often introduced.

The English word `legend' comprises two genres of tales that in German are distinguished as Legende and Sage. The Legende is primarily a hagiographical legend, a story in prose about a holy person whose life is held up to the community with the exhortation: 'go and do likewise'. These stories, then, clearly were invented or told by the church to influence the lives of the faithful. As such, they are restricted in scope and also are typical products of a more literary age — 'legend' comes from the Latin legenda, or `things to be read'.

The Sage is a legend that explains buildings or stresses the boundaries between man and animals, such as those about werewolves; it accounts for extraordinary events and catastrophes; and it describes a world peopled by spirits and demons. For those who believed these legends, Sagen will have functioned very much like mythoi in archaic Greece. And just as mythoi helped to bolster the identity of the Greeks under the Roman Empire, Sagen acquired a political significance in the later nineteenth century when they were collected by the German bourgeoisie in search of a common past.

On the other hand, although these legends claim to be true, there are no claims of divine inspiration; moreover, the stories normally are told in private and in prose. The word Sage probably presupposes an archaic, perhaps even Indo-European, narrative prose tradition. Unlike at Rome, however, where the foundation myth of Romulus and Remus was apparently handed down in prose, in archaic Greece myths were the exclusive territory of poets. It is true that scholars have made use of the notion of the folktale to explain motifs of Greek myth, but it must be stressed that such tales simply are not attested in archaic Greece.

What exactly is a Greek myth? We started this chapter with Burkert's definition of myth as 'a traditional tale with secondary, partial reference to something of collective importance'. This definition has proved to be valid for the whole period of Greek history. At the same time, however, we have seen that myths are not always traditional tales, nor is their collective importance the same during the whole of Greek history. Perhaps one could propose a slightly simpler definition: `traditional tales relevant to society'.26 It is true that to us the appearance of

gods and heroes is an essential part of Greek myth, but the supernatural presence is only to be expected when religion is embedded in society. Western secularised societies have nearly abolished the supernatural, but they usually still have their favourite (historical) tales that serve as models of behaviour or are the expression of a country's ideals. It is their relevance to Greek society that makes the mythoi still fascinating today, for however different the Greeks were from us, they were also very much the same. <>

THE HERMENEUTIC SPIRAL AND INTERPRETATION IN LITERATURE AND THE VISUAL ARTS by Michael O'Toole [Routledge Studies in Multimodality, Routledge, 9781138503779]

This collection brings together eighteen of the author's original papers, previously published in a variety of academic journals and edited collections over the last three decades, on the process of interpretation in literature and the visual arts in one comprehensive volume. The volume highlights the centrality of artistic texts to the study of multimodality, organized into six sections each representing a different modality or semiotic system, including literature, television, film, painting, sculpture, and architecture. A new introduction lays the foundation for the theoretically based method of analysis running through each of the chapters, one that emphasizes the interplay of textual details and larger thematic purposes to create an open-ended and continuous approach to the interpretation of artistic texts, otherwise known as the "hermeneutic spiral". Showcasing Michael O'Toole's extensive contributions to the field of multimodality and in his research on interpretation in literature and the visual arts, this book is essential reading for students and scholars in multimodality, visual arts, art history, film studies, and comparative literature.

This archive is a collection of 14 original papers from academic journals and book chapters published between 1971 and 2015, exploring the process and nature of interpretation in literature, film and the displayed visual art of painting. Running through all of them is a search for methods of analysis which can be (and have been) shared by students, other researchers and ordinary readers and viewers.

The whole collection stresses the centrality of artistic texts in the study of multimodality. It combines close detailed analysis of literary texts and films (art forms that unfold in time on the one hand) and paintings, which are simply "displayed," out of time.

The book articulates a theoretically based and consistent method of analysis relating artistic texts in three different modalities (or semiotic systems). It argues for a coherent and consistent process of interpretation, linking pre-existing knowledge and attitudes in the reader/viewer with patterns discovered in the process of detailed analysis. Each chapter stresses the labile and open-ended process of interpretation ("the hermeneutic spiral"). Most of the works analysed are well known and have attracted a wide range of literary and art-historical commentary, but it is my contention that the hermeneutic spiral, with its detailed and multi-layered analysis makes new interpretations possible and provable.

The German literary theorists Hans-Georg Gadamer (1768-1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) drew ón a tradition of biblical scholarship which related linguistic detail in a text to overall meanings discovered in the process of interpretation: "Hermeneutics." This notion of "seeing both the forest and the trees" was exemplified in the Austrian Leo Spitzer's approach to French texts in his attempt to marry linguistics and literary history in what he termed "the philological circle" (1948). The present author, armed with a powerful contemporary linguistic model and an education in literature, film and the visual arts, prefers the metaphor of a "hermeneutic spiral" where the interplay of textual details and the larger thematic purposes of the text leads to an open-ended and continuing "spiral" of interpretation.

Hermeneutics and Explication de texte

It was at the age of 15 that I was introduced by my French teacher, Eric Smedley, to the method of study of literary texts then currently popular in France known as "explication de texte." This involved confronting a school student with a page or so of one of their "set books"—a novel or

short story or play that they were studying for their national examinations. The student would have half an hour or so to pick out features of the text which seemed to stand out and reflect the larger thematic purposes of the literary work.

As an illustration of this process I want to look at a short English text, the poem "The Road Not Taken," by Robert Frost, as I have approached the hermeneutic process through my teaching career in stylistics and semiotics, which is roughly traced in the course of this book.

The columns in italics alongside the text of the poem represent two stages in the analytical process: NS (Narrative Structure) recognises the story line in the poem and—as a first stage of the hermeneutic process—pinpoints features of Setting (in space and time), Character and PV (Point of View) which we visualise.

The Tense/Modality column focuses on the linguistic structures of verb tense and modal auxiliaries and comments which cast doubts on the poet's resolve: (sorry, could not, as far as I could, as just as fair, perhaps, as for that, about the same, no step, I doubted if I should ever, somewhere ages and ages hence) My first pass through this text tended to focus on its narrative structure (NS), noting the complex shuttling between the Setting, the Character of the narrator, and the progress of his decisions about which road to choose (all overshadowed by the poem's title: The Road Not Taken. The verbs describing the Setting are mainly Intransitive (diverged, stood, bent, wanted wear), while those describing the narrator involve Mental Process (sorry, looked down, knowing, doubted) or Verbal (shall be telling).

The second pass focussed on the prevalence of various degrees of Negativity: e.g., Not existent (no step had trodden black); Not other: (could not travel both/And be one traveller; looked down one; for another day; one less travelled by); Negative modulation/ ability (I could not; as far as I could) and negative modalities (sorry, just as fair, perhaps, wanted wear, as for that, really about the same, how way leads on to way, doubted if I should ever, with a sigh, somewhere ages and ages hence, has made all the difference). The lack of resolve reflected in these modalities, of course, culminates in the ambiguity of his sigh (Ohl in line 13; and with a sigh in line 16) and the total lack of resolution of the last line of the poem: that has made all the difference, which is—in normal speech—the celebration of a good outcome.

I was discussing this play with modality and the lack of resolution in the grammar and word choices in Frost's poem with a phonetics specialist in my department and he immediately homed in on what he saw as a patterned lack of resolution in the sound structure of the poem. (Often it takes two or more readers to develop the Hermeneutic Spiral.) The sound structure includes rhyming schemes, alliteration and metre and this is more like the non-verbal patterning in paintings or films which was beginning to attract my attention after years of focussing on the lexical and grammatical patterning of short stories. Andrew (the phonetician) pointed out that the rhyme scheme of "The Road Not Taken" was a—b—a—a—b (wood—both—stood—could—growth) and that this delay in resolving the rhyme pattern was sustained throughout the poem until the last stanza where the stressed monosyllable of hence (line 17) is "resolved" (or not!) by the polysyllables of all the difference (line 20), the most ambiguous phrase in the whole poem.

It is very satisfying when a pattern from one semiotic system (e.g., sound patterning) matches patterns we have discovered in the narrative structure and lexicogrammar of a work. As our analysis of short stories by Chekhov, James Joyce, Conan Doyle and from the Bible in Part I shows, visual elements of Setting, Character and Narrative Structure often match or enhance the verbal plot.

Parts 2 and 3 of this collection argue that in the case of cartoons and classic films the basic plot is carried by caricatured participants and the silent (or subtitled) conflicts of montage. The early

Russian masters of silent cinema had to make their moving visual images tell the story. It helped, of course, that they had an important historic story to tell and that they commanded a remarkable repertoire of cinematic tricks to create both continuity and conflict.

My multimodal analysis of painting and architecture from the 1980s onwards (Chapters 9 to 13) was made feasible by my adaptation of Michael Halliday's distinction between the semantic "metafunctions" of the Experiential, Interpersonal and Textual, so that a clause of language was expressing not only facts and processes in the real world (Experiential meanings), but moods and attitudes to that reality and between speaker and listener (Interpersonal meanings). These were then realised through the Textual meanings which make speech coherent and situationally appropriate. Halliday's chart of systems and functions in language (Chart 1) inspired a similar chart (my Chart 2) of systems and functions in painting, where the painter Represents some aspect of the real (or imaginary) world, varies the Modality of that reality to engage the viewer, and incorporates both the Representation and the Modality into a coherent Composition.

Frank Hinder's painting The Flight Into Egypt (Chapter 9) was the winner of the 1952 Blake Prize for Religious Art in Sydney. Its award aroused a storm of criticism from both conservatives and modernists among the critics and followers of art of that period. I have tried to show how quite small features in the three functions are at interplay with each other to create a hermeneutic spiral that reflects the social semiotic of both parties at that time.

There was no such controversy over the social semiotic of one of the world's great paintings, Rembrandt's The Night Watch (Chapter 10). The Amsterdam dignitaries who "sat" for the painting fell over themselves and paid good money to have their representation recognised, and in fact a whole room next to the gallery in the Rijksmuseum where the painting hangs is dedicated to proving their identity. Most visitors—and even the gallery guards—regard this aspect of the Representational function as paramount and fail to complement their hermeneutic spiral by noticing the way the painter has framed and lit his figures and (Modally) depicted the central figure's left hand in three distinctive ways and the way this has fixed the Compositional structure of the whole work.

The story-line of John Longstaff's (1887) painting in the Art Gallery of Western Australia Breaking the News is fairly easy to reconstruct—and I have reconstructed it as the thought processes of the young woman to whom the "news" of the mine disaster is being broken (Chapter 11). It was fortunate that this disaster at Bulli in New South Wales was also recounted verbally in a contemporary newspaper report and a historical account nearly a century after the event, so that we have contrasting modes of discourse for comparing their representation of the scene, the emotional involvement of the participants and the way they are composed verbally and pictorially. My claim is that this juxtaposition of verbal and pictorial records offers a powerful educational tool and that the close analysis of the linguistic and visual details contributes to our hermeneutic spiral rather as the interplay of narrative structure and sound patterning does in our analysis of Robert Frost's poem.

After some ten years of writing about paintings, sculptures and buildings within various European traditions, I felt that the launch of the new journal Linguistics and the Human Sciences in 2005 would be a good opportunity to educate myself about another set of painting techniques and cultural assumptions by studying a seventeenth-century Chinese landscape scroll by Gong Xian (1689), Chapter 12. This was also a good time to celebrate Michael Halliday's lifelong commitment to Chinese language and culture and to recognise the fast-growing interest in systemic-functional linguistics and semiotics among Chinese academics and students.

A favourite genre of multimodal studies is the analysis of the simultaneous discourses of verbal and pictorial texts in commercial advertisements (Chapter 13). By good fortune I happened upon an

advert for Canon Photocopiers which incorporated a famous painting by Picasso, his Girl Before a Mirror (in The Australian Magazine, 2-3 May 1992). By less good fortune, although the reproduction of this painting in the advert is excellent, the digital image of the page on which it is printed can no longer be traced, so readers will have to manage (as they would in a dentist's waiting room) with a scan of the page of the magazine. The interplay of the painting in full colour with the design and verbal text of the advert is still clear and very revealing about the intentions of both Picasso and Canon Photocopiers.

If Chapters 12 and 13 deliberately juxtapose the codes of verbal and pictorial texts, my final chapter (14) is an analysis of the opening of a sequence in the TV comedy series Fawlty Towers, where the participants' movements in architectural space are interplayed with the codes and dialects of their speech. The chapter concludes with a series of images of Basil Fawlty, Sybil Fawlty and a guest engaged in spatial interaction simultaneously with their verbal interaction. I have also added two pages of the script of the episode, pinpointing the simultaneous play with verbal discourse and architectural space.

Interpretation in all the arts should be fun. Most of the works studied employ elements of humour or irony, and so do my analyses. (I would not presume to compare my work with that of Viktor Shklovsky, the great pioneer of Russian Formalism, but I believe his humour and lively style made him immensely readable and very accessible, even when discussing serious works and complex theoretical issues.)<>

Arts of Connection: Poetry, History, Epochality by Karen S. Feldman [Paradigms, De Gruyter, 9783110630589]

This new series presents original scholarly and essayistic work addressing the central status of literature in and for the human sciences. At stake in the monographs and essay collections are paradigms of literary forms for thinking the human sciences: the knowledge involved in a literary work; how modes of reading and writing shape and depend on an epoch or area of thinking; literature's affinities and points of resistance to what we call the humanities and the sciences. In other words, the series examines how literature works with and upon philosophy, rhetoric, technology, anthropology, sociology, statistics, economics, history, experimental science, mathematics etc. *Paradigms* is primarily concerned with German letters, but also includes its European and comparative literary contexts.
All volumes will be published in English and are first reviewed by the series editors followed by a peer review from two academics in the particular area of specialization. Two to four volumes are planned annually.

Excerpt: The following chapters respond to these questions by surveying specific instances in which plot or the overarching narrative arc comes into tension with prescriptions for the representation of contingency. Such contingency may take the form of freedom, spontaneity, wayward connectibility, and ungovernable imagination. In the context of poetry, plot involves an artistic fabulation; in history, there is a demand for fidelity to worldly events; in phenomenology, the description of modernity delineates specific characteristics that define an epoch. We will see that the unity of plot and the intelligibility of narrative require connections between individual events but cannot represent the connections between events and epochs directly, just as causality itself cannot be represented or discerned directly but instead only inferred. The chapters that follow therefore deal, broadly speaking, with the confluence of literary techniques, historiographical prescriptions, and philosophical demands for producing narrative continuity — i.e., the formal conditions of representing connections between events — in the context of poetry, the philosophy of history, and twentieth-

century phenomenology. They will thematize the hazardous art of narrative connection, in particular the literary and rhetorical devices that both create connections between events and also disrupt them. Each chapter explores a punctual moment in a lengthy historical trajectory, beginning with Aristotle's formulations regarding plot; via Gottsched and the critical differentiation of literature, history, and philosophy in the eighteenth century; through the appearance of the philosophy of history from Kant to Ranke; to twentieth-century invocations of history in phenomenology. It is not the goal in these pages to provide a comprehensive history of thought on these topics. Rather, each of the thinkers treated here epitomizes a particular key moment in the shifting relationships between poetry, history, and philosophy, in which the question of how events are connected pushes to its limit the genre of discourse in question. Indeed, when we look at prescriptions for composing narratives, we may observe attempts to contain contingency within plot and overall form that nonetheless also seek to preserve and represent contingency within the sequence of narrated events. It is precisely at this junction that narratives shuttle between the second-order reality within their pages and extra-narrative hopes or fears regarding worldly contingency and human freedom.

Part I deals with the variegated reception of Aristotle's prescriptions in the Poetics for connecting tragic events. Chapter One centers on Aristotle's emphasis within his account of tragedy on the centrality of plot, for the emplotted trajectory of the tragic action as a whole demands a strictly causal relationship between key individual events. For the legacy of literary criticism, Aristotle provides the most influential and succinct expression of the requirement that events be represented as connected to each other. Nonetheless, there is much dispute regarding how to interpret Aristotle's prescriptions for connection — e.g., in terms of precisely how the individual tragic events should be connected, the effect of this connection on the audience, and the very purpose of the tragedy that depends on this connection. Aristotle's Poetics is also, of course, a cornerstone when it comes to canonical claims for the value of literature. In traditional readings, the Poetics is understood to be saying that the value of tragedy — and by extension the value of literature — lies in the following: it offers a catharsis of fear and pity, and insight into our own finitude, most particularly by way of a climactic plot that turns on the unexpected conjunction of events. Chapter One contrasts these canonical claims about the value of tragedy and literature as such with several noncanonical, even heterodox, interpretations of how and why the tragic events must be so tightly connected. It highlights widely divergent views of the Poetics in interpretations ranging from Lessing to twentieth-century philosophy in order to unsettle canonical understandings of Aristotelian plot.

The Poetics was also central in the emergence of critique proper in the eighteenth century, as the operations of poetry, historiography, and philosophy came to be differentiated from one another. Within the German tradition, Gottsched's 1730 treatise Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst (Attempt at a critical art of poetry) highlights a key moment in the emergence of distinct disciplines. Chapter Two looks at the exemplary, and for non-German readers largely unknown, case

of Gottsched's eighteenth-century uptake of Aristotle's poetic prescriptions. Gottsched's work offers an important angle on the reception of Aristotelian thought. He formulates rules derived from Aristotle in order to attempt to govern the promiscuous association of thoughts in poetic writing. The chapter will show, however, that the ungovernable connectibility of thought raises difficulties when it comes to regulating the principles of connection between narrated events in historical and poetic writing. For thoughts can connect to other thoughts ungovernably and yet both poetic and historical narratives require, in an Aristotelian vein, a principle of connection and a governing unity. Hence with regard to Gottsched's Dichtkunst, Chapter Two considers the connections of events in light of his reception of Aristotle's Poetics; the role of Witz [ingenuity], Scharfsinnigkeit [acuity], and imagination; and the definition of Fabel [plot or fable]. Gottsched claims that there is a difference between the connection of events in poetic narratives and the connection of events in historical narratives. But Gottsched's attempt to illustrate this difference between the principles of connection

in poetry and in history-writing, as the chapter will show, confound his own prescriptions. In particular, his treatment of Fabel indicates that whether historical or poetic, narrative is in each case a hybrid of actuality and possibility, worldliness and subjectivity, promiscuous associability and rules.

Part II focuses on the significance of artful connection in the development of the Kantian and Rankean philosophies of history. Whereas poetic continuity obviously involves the writer's craft in order to create a compelling plot, Chapter Three investigates a subtle eighteenth-century modification in the now-obscure notion of cognitio historica, or historical knowledge, that marks the introduction of diachronic narrative into the concept of history itself. In the German tradition before Kant, "historical knowledge" referred to empirical knowledge rather than to anything historical in the modern sense. Kant's early lectures on logic, based on a handbook by Georg F. Meier, explain historical knowledge instead as knowledge of the past. In that context, Kant's descriptions of historical knowledge invoke examples of diachronic narratives of connected events rather than synchronic descriptions of static elements. Kant's lectures thereby illuminate a move toward a temporalized understanding of history and toward a view of the past as a narratable series of connected events. This largely unremarked shift in the notion of historical knowledge, Chapter Three will argue, suggests that Kant developed a temporalized and narrativized notion of history.

Chapter Four takes up a more familiar topic in Kant, namely his reflections on the connection of events in the project of universal history. Kant, and Hegel after him, thematizes the apparent incompatibility between the narration of worldly events on the one hand and the philosophical occupation with concepts and reason on the other. Here, the question of how events are connected to each other is seen as an explicitly philosophical one, insofar as rational connections are imposed upon worldly happenings in order to produce a historical account that matches the philosophical demands of reason. Nonetheless, freedom for Kant is understood as a matter of self-governing, self-causing, spontaneous action, i.e., action not determined by what comes before. Freedom is thus "anarchic" or unprecedented; it occurs as a breach with respect to the events that preceded it, i.e., an interruption of causality. And yet, how can a unitary story represent human freedom if freedom is precisely a break from causal connection? In the context of history-writing, the problem becomes a narrative one: what would it mean to describe human actions as not determined by what came before and therefore as contingent? The consideration of the structural unity of historical narrative poses a problem to the representation of freedom. Does Kant, in other words, face a historiographical problem with how freedom is to be represented in a unitary narrative, when in his practical philosophy freedom functions as a disconnection from any foregoing events and causalities? In the wake of Kantian aesthetics there emerged the question — and various solutions — regarding how to represent events as causally connected one by one in historical contexts while also depicting them as part of a unitary human history by means of concepts, above all "progress," deployed as plotlike devices.

Chapter Five takes up the reception of Ranke and German historicism, in which Kantian universal history and its demand for a unitary presentation is rejected in favor of other philosophical and aesthetic principles. Its claim is that if we take Walter Benjamin at his word in his description of a linear, positivist tradition of German historicism, we neglect the aesthetic, disruptive, and even anti-ideological elements that can be found in Ranke's rejection of universal history and in his prescriptions for aesthetic principles of historiography. Chapter Five shows that Ranke's prescriptions for historiography, for instance his commentary on Italian Renaissance historian Francesco Guicciardini, speak against Benjamin's characterization in a variety of ways. What is more, Ranke's rejection of historiographical predecessors may itself be seen as a topos, a historical misprision. For instance, just as Ranke rejects the techniques of earlier historians, Johann Gustav Droysen in his turn rejects Rankean historicism on both aesthetic and historical grounds. The self-

conscious development of the art of connection in historiographical representation seems to demand a gesture of disconnection from historiographical predecessors and their artful procedures.

Part III explores the adjuvant role of plot in the historical ambitions of twentieth-century phenomenology as found in the epochal narratives deployed by Heidegger, Arendt, and Koselleck. Phenomenology encompasses numerous strands of inquiry and bears the marks especially of Hegel and Husserl. The present context attends to the epochal stories told by mid-twentieth-century phenomenology in attempting to account for modernity itself. Each chapter lays out a distinct attempt on the part of post-Husserlian phenomenology to reclaim history for philosophy in ways that complicate the relationship between overarching narrative trajectory and one-by-one connections of events. Through the 1920s, Heidegger used the term Geschichtlichkeit [historicity] to describe our human way of being-in-the-world. Heidegger's procedures for investigating this historicity follow an arc or what we could call a plot structure — i.e., dismantling a series of everyday conceptions and uncovering a "foundational" event of disclosure and concealment. For Heidegger, historicity also comes to designate the epochal history of metaphysics. Chapter Six argues that Heidegger's epochal narrative of the forgetting of being recapitulates and allegorizes, in its emplotted form, precisely the stepwise procedure of Heidegger's account of Dasein's historicity. Chapter Six also suggests that this procedure is typical across Heidegger's corpus: a discovery of a forgotten or eclipsed eventlike disclosure is recounted in the history of metaphysics but also represents the path of Heidegger's general mode of phenomenological inquiry, including his essays "On the Essence of Truth" and "The Origin of the Work of Art." The conformity of his epochal story with the "plot" that structures his own investigations represents a formal continuity between his phenomenological inquiries and his epochal narratives.

Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism, in contrast to Heidegger's long sweep of historical narrative, takes up a particular moment in history in order to illuminate the conditions of politics, Mitsein [being-with-others], and freedom. Chapter Seven demonstrates, however, that Arendt's historical approach to the investigation of totalitarianism interferes with her phenomenological goal. In particular, her claims for newness and the significance of the unprecedented is undermined by the inadvertent elements of emplotment that structure her massive historical study. Within particular textual moments and turns of phrase, a tension appears between Arendt's analysis of the historical origins of totalitarianism (as promised by the book's title) and her phenomenological description of the events and elements that mark totalitarianism's emergence. The chapter argues that insofar as Arendt makes use of historical material, her claim for the radical contingency and newness of the totalitarianism she recounts is compromised. Taken together, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven show that Heidegger and Arendt each make epochal claims about history — claims about how events are connected over particular stretches of time and disconnected from other stretches of time — in ways that complicate their preponderant concerns for a quasi-original disclosure of possibility (Heidegger) and human freedom and spontaneity (Arendt). Heidegger composes an epochal history of being and Arendt offers an epochal analysis of totalitarianism, but for both, the element of plot intrinsic to historical narrative works against the task of illuminating possibility, freedom, and spontaneity, for these are unsuited to the tight connection of events entailed by plot.

Chapter Eight investigates Reinhart Koselleck's Begriffsgeschichte, or conceptual history, of the concept of history itself. Koselleck claims that in premodern history-writing, stories about the past served not as information about the past, nor as a way causally to connect the events of the present to the past, but as exempla offering lessons to the present within a cyclical temporality. There was no question of speaking for the past because there was no deep disconnection from the past in the first place. Only with the advent of modern historiography in the late eighteenth century, so Koselleck's story goes, was the past seen as essentially disconnected from the present, as something historiography could "speak for," which therefore demanded styles of writing that would produce a

connection to that past. In defining a new sense of historicity after 1800, Koselleck produces an epochal history. That epochal narrative also serves as the foundation for a phenomenological study of the structure of historical time and a quasi-transcendental investigation of conditions of possible histories. Koselleck's structural and quasi-transcendental inquiries nonetheless operate in some tension with the begriffsgeschichtliche narrative of epochs. In fact, as the chapter will show, Koselleck's phenomenology of historical time undermines itself in key respects, each of which are related to the thorny problem of how to represent connections between events.

The authors treated in these chapters illuminate a variety of possibilities for representing connection — whether in terms of imagination, reason, causality or plot — and for the deployment of formal and figural elements that come into play in each case. In each of these moments at the nexus of history, philosophy, and literature, the various claims for how connections are made or should be made reflect otherwise unthematized dilemmas regarding how to represent contingency, possibility, and freedom at the level of form. The ungovernable ramifications of connection and disconnection provide a bridge, albeit an unstable one, when it comes to the supposed divide within the context of "theory" between formalism and historicism. In other words, narrative as such at the formal level has an effectivity that belongs to a particular historical moment without being reducible to it. The tensions between interstitial, one-by-one connection and overarching plot are different in each case, but the goal is to show that the disjunction between them both produces and threatens to thwart the dynamic unfolding of narratives. <>

Life as Insinuation: George Santayana's Hermeneutics of Finite Life and Human Self by Katarzyna Kremplewska [Suny Series in American Philosophy and Cultural Thought, State University of New York Press, 9781438473949]

In this book, Katarzyna Kremplewska offers a thorough analysis of Santayana's conception of human self, viewed as part of his larger philosophy of life. Santayana emerges as an author of a provocative philosophy of drama, in which human life is acted out. Kremplewska demonstrates how his thought addresses the dynamics of human self in this context and the possibility of sustaining self-integrity while coping with the limitations of finite life. Focusing on particular aspects of Santayana's thought such as his conception of the tragic aspect of existence, and the role of the doctrine of spirit in his philosophical anthropology and critique of culture, this book also sets Santayana's thought in substantial dialogue with other thinkers, such as Heidegger, Bergson, and Nietzsche. Like Santayana's philosophy, this book seeks to build passages between theoretical reflection and practical life with the possibility of a good life in view.

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Excerpt: In this book I am undertaking the challenge of reconstructing George Santayana's conception of human self as embedded in a larger project of philosophy of life. Meanwhile, I am tracing the connections in-between different areas of Santayana's philosophical engagement—from his ontology through literary criticism to his critique of culture—while striving to bring to light its hermeneutic coherence, corresponding to the idea of hermeneutic unity of life, which I find constitutive of an overarching project inherent in Santayana's philosophical endeavor. I choose the metaphor of life as insinuation—borrowing it from Henri Bergson—to emphasize the dramatic, theatrical style of the hermeneia in question. By setting the thinker from Avila in dialogue with selected twentieth-century representatives of the so-called continental philosophy, I hope to enrich the interpretive potential developed in the course of Santayana studies so far and stimulate further discussion of his legacy.'

The delayed reception of Santayana's work and his status of a philosophical outcast in early twentieth-century America was related to the fact that both his idea of philosophy and his philosophical method were at odds with the trends reigning at the American intellectual scene, where actors oscillated in-between Darwinism, radical empiricism of William James, social constructivism of John Dewey, Charles S. Peirce's commitment to panpsychism, and the idealism of Josiah Royce. When his contemporaries started to reduce the role of philosophy to the philosophy of science or "a procedure of linguistic sanitation," Santayana was devoted to creating a "synoptic vision" of conditio humana and a corresponding philosophy of self-procured salvation, as I call it in reference to the ancient, therapeutic meaning of philosophy. In other words, a few different but convergent and intertwining streams in Santayana's eclectic thought—from his idiosyncratic, nonreductive naturalism through a sort of ancient and to an extent sapiential style of philosophical engagement to astute criticism of culture—stood in stark contrast to the increasing professionalization of philosophy at that time.

Among the alienating factors there were also Santayana's intellectual sympathies and cultural identifications like the advocacy of a cosmopolitan, Epicurean individualism, which was viewed by his contemporaries as verging on a decadent nihilism. "To subordinate the soul fundamentally to society or the individual to the state is sheer barbarism," Santayana would declare in the age when this sort of personal autonomy was rather unpopular in America. Particularly harsh critique came from the side of pragmatists on account of the alleged "uselessness" of Santayana's "anti-social" doctrine for any constructivist project 4 This misreading of the idea of disinterestedness implicit in Santayana's vision of spiritual life is an example of some common misunderstandings of his thought.' "I care very little whether, at any moment, academic tendencies favour one unnecessary opinion or another"' wrote the thinker many years after he moved to Europe, giving an explicit expression of his detachment from the mainstream academic culture, which in time became deliberate and cultivated.

A serious overlooking in the early reception of his oeuvre, as noted one of the scholars in the 1980s, rested in the underestimation of "the special signature of his genius"—a synthesis of materialism with a peculiar kind of transcendentalism.' Meanwhile, Santayana's engagement in developing the ontology of realms within the frame of his idiosyncratic naturalism, viewed by some early critics as an attempt to revive scholastic metaphysics, had a counterpart in the so-called ontological turn in continental philosophy, as represented by thinkers like Henri Bergson or Martin Heidegger. Interpreting and understanding a philosopher's work involves, among others, placing it in a broader comparative context of other thinkers. Even though the two final decades of the twentieth century brought a remarkable revival of interest in Santayana's heritage, little attention has been devoted to the possible relations between the thinker from Avila and contemporary continental philosophy. Bridging this gap, as I suggest, may enhance our interpretive potential in relation to Santayana's thought even to the point of rethinking his entire oeuvre.

Today a variety of interpretations is available. Some focus on his materialism and nonreductive naturalism as rendering his thought valid and inspiring for the contemporary continuation of these traditions. Scholars like Timothy Sprigge, John Lachs, and Angus Kerr Lawson undertook the task of an in-depth analysis of Santayana's ontology as well as discussed his writings from the perspective of philosophy of mind and action. Others read Santayana as a critic of American culture or looked at his work via the lens of literary interpretative categories.' The scope of comparative contexts in Santayana scholarship ranges from Democritus, Plato and Aristotle, through Spinoza and Schopenhauer to his contemporaries, the pragmatists.' Santayana also came to be viewed "as anticipating a major theme in existentialism:" Michael Hodges and John Lachs uncovered the (post-)modern face of Santayana's "ironic ontology" by juxtaposing it with the late Wittgenstein's thought. Thus, they confirmed Whitehead's and Putnam's opinions about Santayana being ahead of his time and misunderstood in some respects." Santayana has also been viewed as a philosopher of religion and a phenomenologist. Most recently, Daniel Moreno proposed a reinterpretation of Santayana's thought focusing on the ontology of realms of being and the idea of philosophy as a form of life that Santayana himself is said to embody. While Santayana scholarship is becoming international, an increased interest in his philosophy of culture and politics may be noted.

Still, as already mentioned, surprisingly little has been written with respect to Santayana and European thinkers of the twentieth century, even though it is occasionally mentioned that during the last thirty years of his life, which he spent in Rome, the thinker, removed from the philosophical currents of the day, "struggled" with his reading of the seminal works in phenomenology and existentialism. The "late" Santayana for a long time has been viewed as a thinker encaged in a glass house of his own philosophical idiosyncrasies, radicalized by a growing mystical bent.

Meanwhile, Santayana's correspondence and the recently published marginalia seem to disavow this stereotype. In the 1930s and 1940s the thinker, while completing his opus magnum Realms of Being, followed by his last book Dominations and Powers, was engaged in an intense dialogue with existentialist and phenomenological texts of the day. Perhaps no other thinker of the era was the recipient of such a long-lasting appreciation on the part of Santayana as Heidegger was. "I think my separate army corps are all alive and advancing slowly towards the appointed positions. Heidegger, whose book has splendid broad margins, which I cover with notes, is a great stimulus" Santayana wrote to his secretary, Daniel Cory, in February 1936. It is also certain that Santayana read Husserl and Bergson, the latter being perhaps his last major intellectual fascination.

One of the aims of this book is to set the thinker from Avila in a broader dialogical context with a number of contemporary (in a broad sense of this term) philosophers—from Nietzsche, through Bergson and Heidegger, to Paul Ricoeur. As for Heidegger, I am discussing possible similarities between his thought and that of Santayana with the support of Santayana's marginal notes in his copy of **SEIN AND ZEIT**, which have never been subject to research thus far. Establishing this kind of hermeneutic dynamics between both thinkers contributes to the task of reconstructing Santayana's philosophy of life as a modern philosophical project which I propose to call contemplative vitalism.

As mentioned at the beginning, the thematic axis around which a large part of this dialogic and comparative book oscillates is the issue of human self. What made Santayana's perspective to an extent exceptional was his reliance on the classical pairs of concepts, like matter-spirit, existence-essence, or vita activa—vita contemplativa. This, in the eyes of his colleagues the pragmatists, revived some old, unwelcome dualisms. There seems to appear a problem of connection, or rather, a danger of disconnection, between psyche and spirit, followed by a disquieting suggestion of a double self: a psychic agent and a spiritual, oneiric self. Moreover, Santayana, by means of the recognition of the ideal realms of essences and spirit, declares consciousness irreducible to material processes and at the same time deprives it of causal efficacy by announcing spirit impotent. As I argue in this book,

this sort of nonreductive ontology, this trace of idealism in Santayana's architecture of being is of incomparable benefit from the point of view of philosophy of life and culture. While inquiring into the intricacies of Santayana's enigmatic and aporetic conception of human self, I explore the potential of his ontology as making the reality of human life irreducible to the relations of power.

The scarcity of research in respect to the issue of human self is not particularly surprising given that Santayana's anthropology and his treatment of the questions concerning the subject and self seem haphazard and fragmentary. What is more, the thinker quite explicitly claimed that "subjectivity is a normal madness in living animals. It should be discounted, not idolized, in the philosophy of the West." He thus secured for himself an opinion of a staunch opponent of philosophy of subjectivity (as exemplified by German idealism in particular). Having said this, I find the above quoted words of Santayana—particularly in the light of his well-known critique of egotism in philosophy—tellingly misleading and forming an inspiring couple with those of Heidegger, selected as a motto for one of the chapters of this book, namely: "Philosophy must perhaps start from `subject' and return to the `subject' in its ultimate question, and yet for all that it may not pose its questions in a one-sidedly subjectivist manner:'

What I mean is that despite the fact that one may search in vain for an exhaustive treatment of the issue in question in Santayana's body of work, a reader of Santayana's philosophical and literary works may be under an impression that, paradoxically, this question, more than any other, is the unuttered "wager" the main but silent preoccupation of his philosophical effort—the unsayable of Derrida. This of course must remain only an arbitrary impression, but whether one agrees with it or rejects it, Santayana's conception of selfhood calls for an inquiry. By way of digression, at least one thinker—Kenneth Burke—regarded the question of selfhood as central for Santayana's thought. However, it is not Fichte's idealistic, absolute and pure Ego that one finds there but rather the self who is both a conscious agent, the center of a dramatic world, and a subject of spiritual life, of vita contemplativa, where essences, as appearances, enjoy the dignity of becoming ends in themselves. In this latter case, claims Burke, we are dealing, in a sense, with a "contemplation of death;' which makes us realize that "the realm of essence is ultimately a thanatopsis" (!). Whether such a treatment of consciousness does indeed make, as Burke suggests, for a "philosophy of retirement" and brings a prospect of a "long life of euthanasia" will be left for the reader of this book to judge.

Furthermore, once we become sensitive to this issue and start asking ourselves what kind of the self, and possibly what conception of human being, is implied by the basic philosophical categories like psyche, animal faith, or impotent spirit, we are likely to have at once an intuition that the question abides no unequivocal answer, that the self emerging from this philosophy is problematic, or, as I propose to call it—aporetic. This is evident when comparing the available scholarly opinions. Daniel Moreno argues that a dissolution of the self occurs in the context of Santayana's atheism, his critique of egotism, and his objectivist ontology of material flux set against the eternity of essences and truth. One may think of it in the context of post-modern subject, which—after Nietzschean deconstruction of the self, backed up by the logical investigations of Russell and Wittgenstein—may at best be a logical or a useful construct, if not an epiphenomenon of larger, objective processes. The question is whether Santayana's non-egological perspective is enough to speak of a dissolution of the self. Besides, there is in his philosophy a powerful idea of psyche linked to that of an individual life and its interests, which promises a stronger and more affirmative vision of selfhood rooted in the plane of action. This reading, confirmed by many passages in Santayana, has been persuasively presented by John Lachs. Yet another perspective comes from Irving Singer, who sees the different conceptions of the self held by Santayana and by pragmatists to be the key to "all their mutual distrust, mistaken criticism, and inability to appreciate one another." Santayana, claims Singer, opts rather for a "kernel" model, i.e., one assuming an external or "separate," presumably immutable center, surrounded by concentric circles of experience. Pragmatist thinkers, in turn, view the self in

terms of an experiential circle or a spiral devoid of any "real" center. Signer's brief discussion inspires a number of questions, for example, what kind of "kernel" is meant—a Cartesian, a transcendental one, or maybe a Lockean center of control? These concerns will be addressed later in this study. For now the juxtaposition of the three dissimilar interpretations of Santayana's conception of the self illustrates the complexity and ambiguity of the issue, which resonates in the idea of "aporetic self'

I have drawn the reader's attention to two research problems, namely, Santayana's possible affinities with continental philosophy of the twentieth century and his conception of human self as part of his overall project of philosophy of life. I have also signaled that the main aim of this study is an inquiry into the latter in the context of the former. At this point let me introduce another issue to be tackled in this book, namely, the idea of the tragic. As I will try to show, there is an interesting connection between Santayana's conception of the self and his understanding of the tragic. Putting this relation into scrutiny allows for shifting the whole discussion into the context of Santayana's critical philosophy of culture and politics. Finally, in reference to the analysis of the tragic, I am going to employ the idea of (tragic) necessity, ananke, as one of the interpretive keys—next to the ideas of governing the living and rationality—helpful in a preliminary and sketchy attempt at "unlocking" and rethinking Santayana's philosophy of politics. This final part will allow us to go beyond the individual perspective into the common world and, thus, complete the task of unveiling Santayana's philosophy of life.

The structure of the book, its division into sections, is thematic and problem-centered. Each section addresses a specific question, some provide an overview or merely a digression supporting a thesis or illuminating some additional aspects of the issue. The first and the sixth chapters stand out in that they are largely devoted to tracing the history of an idea and offer critical, selective overviews meant to articulate and develop key philosophical questions relevant for the discussion that follows. The method of my inquiry is predominantly hermeneutic, at some points enriched with phenomenological and speculative elements. In more technical parts of the book, I reconstruct and/or reinterpret parts of Santayana's thought on the basis of the analysis of his texts with respect to the basic philosophical concepts in their mutual relations as well as in comparative contexts with other thinkers and in reference to the existing secondary literature. Hermeneutic approach seems especially helpful in comparative sections, in particular whenever two non-analytical thinkers, coming from different cultural backgrounds and using a different set of philosophical concepts each, are compared. In line with the hermeneutic tradition, possible shifts, tensions, and ambiguities within meanings of particularly problematic concepts are treated—within reasonable boundaries—as an evidence of the vividness of philosophical language. When tracing Santayana's conception of human self, so vaguely and fragmentarily treated by the thinker himself, I was initially inspired by Derrida's method of inquiry into the unsayable and his investigations into the "missing" concepts in other philosophers' work, as exemplified by his well-known book Of Spirit.

For the sake of clarity and due to the large thematic scope of the book, let me summarize the above introductory remarks in points. After providing a brief, selective overview of the history of the idea of the self in the first chapter (1), in the second (2) and the third one (3) I analyze the basic concepts of Santayana's philosophy and trace the passage from naturalistic philosophy of action toward mature ontology with particular attention given to the impact this ontological turn must have had on his conception of the self. I argue that the setting of Santayana's ontology makes his conception of the self inescapably aporetic. Placing the categories of Santayana's nonreductive materialism in a phenomenological and existential-hermeneutic context allows me to uncover and elucidate a number of aporias, which I later address with reference to, among others, the Aristotelian distinctions zoe-bios (as reinterpreted by some contemporary thinkers) and process-activity. This interpretive strategy promises a possible solution to the controversy around psyche-spirit connection and allows to see a creative potential resting in the aporias, particularly if set within the

holistic framework of Santayana's philosophy of life, which I call contemplative vitalism. What emerges out of this interpretive endeavor is a multidimensional (triadic), non-egological conception of the self, which combines a naturalistic anchoring with an idealistic/transcendental bent.

In the third chapter I also address the problem of the integrity and freedom of human beings within the framework of hermeneutic unity of life. With references to Paul Ricoeur's idea of authorship of life, as well as some conceptions coming from contemporary philosophy of mind, I hope to offer a novel perspective of looking at the controversial problem of freedom and free will in Santayana's thought. The analysis of the recur-rent motives of masks and theatre as well as the concept of authenticity helps to illuminate Santayana's peculiar, dramatic hermeneia of life. Finally, in this section I suggest yet another interpretive venue for the idea of a hermeneutic self. Guided by hints provided by Santayana, I translate the triadic structure of the self into the categories of the Holy Trinity, with reference to Paul Ricoeur's interpretation of the biblical concept of kerygma.

In the fourth chapter (4), entitled "Life as Insinuation" I analyze certain aspects of Henri Bergson's philosophy of life, with particular attention given to the metaphysical make up of his dramatist vision of human life and freedom. I point to interesting affinities within these two—Santayana's and Bergson's—apparently utterly dissimilar philosophies.

In chapter five (5), on the basis of archival materials, namely Santayana's marginalia in his private copy of Heidegger's Sein and Zeit, with the support of other primary sources, including Santayana's letters, I raise the question of possible similarities between both thinkers. The discussion is centered around (although not limited to) the core matter of Santayana's "negotiations" with Heidegger's text and the guiding problem of this book—the issue of the self and the way it is embedded in a philosophy of life. My thesis is that one may speak here of a number of similarities, some of which stem from a common source of inspiration being Aristotle. The return to ancient sources and the choice of ontological language within a major endeavor to reconcile finitude with freedom emerge as the main strategic affinities between both thinkers. The wager of the very preoccupation with the self in the case of both thinkers is, as I suggest, a "worldly salvation," or—in other words—working out such a strategy of entering into the relation with one's own finitude, where this finitude becomes voluntary. It is possible to say that both thinkers' anti-subjectivist sympathies do not serve to dissolve the self, but rather to strengthen it by redefining and exorcising the demons of an isolated "ego." The redefinition of selfhood inescapably involves winning back time, the world, and finitude for the self—a task which arises as one of the main issues in the subsequent discussion of the tragic.

In the sixth chapter (6), I focus on the idea of the tragic, which, besides being a problem on its own, may serve as a heuristic tool which: a) allows to shed a different light on the aporetic nature of the self and b) allows for a meaningful passage from the technical analysis of concepts and the "structure" of the self into the context of Santayana's critique of culture, which—as I argue—is of high relevance for the whole discussion. An overview of a broad spectrum of other philosophical conceptions of the tragic—from Aristotle, through Hegel, to Nietzsche, provides a background for the articulation of the specificity of Santayana's approach. Next, I discuss Santayana's critique of Nietzsche, which I interpret in terms of a polemic on the possibility and the necessity of spirituality. Yet another comparative perspective—Harold Bloom's and Santayana's interpretations of Hamlet—illuminates the fact that understanding Santayana's conception of the self is incomplete without regard to his critique of culture (in particular his critique of egotism and instrumentality in thinking). References are made to the well-known idea of instrumental reason developed by the members of Frankfurt School, which I connect to the temporal perspective called by me "immobilizing fallacy" and elucidate with the support of Northrop Frye's analysis of tragedy and his idea of fatalistic reduction.

The final, seventh chapter (7), being the shortest one, goes beyond the individual perspective to the common world, while keeping in mind and developing the findings and theses of the previous

sections. It offers a preliminary, synthetic look at Santayana's philosophy of politics and a very brief reconstruction of its conceptual apparatus by employing the idea of managing necessity as the main interpretive key.

What follows is a highly selective overview of the evolution of the idea of selfhood and subjectivity. I largely rely on the work of those thinkers who have already accomplished this task—Charles Taylor and Dan Zahavi in particular. Martin Heidegger's critique of Cartesian and transcendental models is also of help. My aim is to select, articulate, and associate certain ideas so as to prepare a mental setting that will subsequently serve as a source of concepts, ideas, and criteria helpful in reconstructing Santayana's conception of the self. Throughout the review I also gradually formulate a side thesis, or a major digression, namely that certain philosophical strategies of weakening the "ego" may be viewed as serving the strengthening of the self rather than its dissolution. <>

MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: WHAT BLINDNESS BRINGS TO ART by Georgina Kleege [Oxford University Press, 9780190604356]

In the quarter century following the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, art museums, along with other public institutions, were tasked with making their facilities and collections more accessible to people with disabilities. Although blind and other disabled people have become marginally more visible in recent years, the vast majority of blind Americans remain undereducated and unemployed. In **MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE**, Georgina Kleege shows how the scrutiny of one cultural issue-access to arts institutions-in relation to one subset of the disabled population-blind people-can lead us to larger and more general implications.

Kleege begins by examining representations of blindness, arguing that traditional theories of blindness often fail to take into account the presence of other senses, or the ability of blind people to draw analogies from non-visual experience to develop concepts about visual phenomena. Following this, the book shifts its focus from the tactile to the verbal, describing Denis Diderot's remarkable range of techniques to describe art works for readers who were not able to view them. Diderot's writing not only provided a model for describing art, Kleege says, but proof that the experience of art is inextricably tied to language and thus not entirely dependent on sight.

By intertwining her personal experience with scientific study and historical literary analysis, Kleege challenges traditional conceptions of blindness and overturns the assumption that the ideal art viewer must have perfect vision. **MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE** seeks to establish a dialogue between blind people and the philosophers, scientists, and educators that study blindness, in order to create new aesthetic possibilities and a more genuinely inclusive society.

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It's true that the vast majority of blind artists working today and exhibiting in a growing number of shows around the world are people who were formally sighted or else retain some residual vision. So again, statistically speaking, when I refer to blind artists I'm talking about adventitiously visually impaired artists with some usable sight and/or visual memory and/or a prior history of art practice. But what if I'm imagining a future for real blind people creating real art? What would that art look like? Or would the look of it be the most relevant aspect. If for instance, the blind artist I'm imagining was making sculpture meant to be experienced tactually, as she experienced it, what materials would she have to use. How should it be displayed? Should the museum hand out blindfolds for sighted visitors? Would we need to enlarge our vocabulary to describe this new aesthetic experience? And how would these new, previously unstudied tactile aesthetics expand outward from the realm of the fine arts to influence other aspects of the culture?

The Plan of the Book

I will begin this study with four chapters about traditional representations of blindness. Chapter 1 surveys the figure I call the Hypothetical Blind Man in philosophical thought. In his Optics, Descartes compared the human visual system to the way a blind man uses a stick to move through space. Later, William Molyneux posed his famous question to John Locke: If a man, born blind, who has learned to recognize geometrical figures such as a sphere and a cube through touch, then has his sight restored by some hypothetical operation, will he be able to recognize the same figures through sight alone? Both these instances rely on an over-determined analogy relating touch in the blind to sight in the sighted. I will argue that these theories fail to take into account the presence of other senses or the ability of blind people to draw analogies from nonvisual experience to develop concepts about visual phenomena. Touch in the blind is not necessarily more sensitive than touch in the sighted. The difference is that experienced blind people learn to interpret their tactile perceptions with a higher degree of conscious awareness, as many have described in their autobiographical accounts. Yet, the Hypothetical Blind Man continues to reside in the imaginations of many researchers in cognitive science, perception, and visual studies, as I will show in chapter 2. Chapter 3 will argue that the use of Braille in public sites and works of contemporary art often serve merely as signifiers of blindness rather than as a true access tool. In chapter 4, I will describe my experience of touch tours at art museums around the world. I argue that these programs risk failure when they are based on a limited definition of touch perception and a rudimentary notion of aesthetic pleasure. Too often, programmers assume that the point of tactile exploration is to recognize forms through tracing their outlines, as if viewing a work of art were merely a matter of identifying the objects depicted. I have found that the most rewarding touch tours engage the full spectrum of touch sensation—texture, temperature, resiliency, as well as form—and draw attention to features that are not apparent to the naked eye. I go on to suggest that since the majority of art lovers are denied the opportunity to touch the art, museum educators would do well to collect the observations of the privileged few who enjoy this exceptional access. Thus touch tours would cease to be random acts of charity and become a way to enlarge cultural understanding of art.

The next four chapters will shift focus from the tactile to the verbal. In chapter 5, I will return briefly to Denis Diderot. His Letter on the Blind (1749) builds on and also diverges from other philosophical treatments. Ideas about blindness engaged him throughout his life even when he was writing on other topics. I will argue that this preoccupation contributed to the ways he wrote about art. In his Salon criticism, he employed a remarkable range of techniques to describe art works for readers who were not present to view them for themselves and had no access to reliable reproductions. He combined detailed descriptions, invented narratives and mocking rebukes of the artists to express his opinions and to recreate his viewing experiences. In a quite literal way, Diderot was writing for readers who were blind to the art he described. His criticism not only gives us

models for verbal description of art but also proclaims that the experience of art is inextricably tied to language and thus is not entirely dependent on vision. His criticism offers a powerful warrant for bringing the specter of blindness out of the shadows and into the foreground of visual experience.

Chapter 6 surveys literary depictions that pair blindness with visual art. While these representations still follow the contours of the Hypothetical Blind Man, they also allow authors to extol the power of language to perform even the most difficult tasks, such as describing visual experience to the blind. In chapters 7 and 8, I combine these observations to critique the theory and practice of audio description for the blind. Originally invented to provide blind people access to live theater, film, and television, audio description would seem the ideal choice to give blind people access to works of art that cannot be touched. However, while a picture may be worth a thousand words, the assumption seems to be that those thousand words—or even a million words—will not do justice to the picture. This holds even though ekphrasis, or poetry that describes visual art, has been around at least since Homer. Guidelines for audio description seem founded on the most reductive notion of what blind people can conceptualize. While I critique the current practices, I call for innovations that could elevate audio description to the status of a new literary and interpretative genre that can serve all audiences of visual culture.

I conclude the book with a discussion of artists with impaired sight, specifically their self-portraits. When celebrated artists such as Monet and Degas lose sight late in life, biographers tend to represent it as a tragic irony and call for predictable responses of pity and admiration. But a careful reading of these artists' accounts of the experience presents a more complex picture. After a lifetime of coordinating their eyes, hands, and minds to create images, their adaptation to diminished sight involved a heightened reliance on tactile and cognitive skills. But here I am mainly concerned with artists who also make blindness a theme of their work and speculate on how acceptance of the idea of blind artists and blind art lovers can change future museum practices and aesthetic values.

When I began this project more than a decade ago, I thought I could write about all the blind artists then practicing in the world. Now, even my imperfect research finds so many that I have to choose only a very small sample whose work seeks to remake the image of blindness. I don't know if this is due to the fact that I was ignorant back then. Or if there has been a proliferation of the number of artists with impaired vision. Has the rise, however incremental in awareness and accessibility for blind people, encouraged artists who lose their sight to continue their practice and encouraged other blind people to consider art as a pastime or career?

It is fitting that I end this book with the words, ideas, and art work of blind people. Indeed, throughout the book I seek to put blind people in dialogue with the philosophers, scientists, and educators who study blindness and speak on behalf of the blind. It's not that I think that artists who become blind and find ways to continue their art practice deserve extra recognition beyond what may have been accorded them before. From writing a book about Helen Keller, I recognize that when a disabled individual is put on a pedestal and praised as exceptional and inspirational, it is just another form of exclusion. My point is rather that artists who continue working even after sight loss seem in the best position to advise the museum art educators designing programs for blind visitors. Sometimes, arts institutions gesture in this direction. At conferences about access for museum professionals, a few blind or visually impaired artists may be mentioned or invited to speak about their work. Many museums offer art-making classes for blind children and adults. Frequently the work of professional artists and amateur novices is conflated. Museum professionals do not always reckon with what the artists are doing beyond formulaic admiration for their fortitude. The fact that they may be invited into the museum to comment on access programming does not necessarily inspire museums to commission or acquire their work. This has a great deal to do with the hierarchies within arts institutions where art educators and collection curators exist in very different

realms, remote from each other. Still, art educators seem more engaged with cognitive scientists who investigate what blind people can and cannot conceptualize, when surely the work and testimony of blind artists can enlarge and enliven general cultural understanding.

This book is not a how-to manual for museum professionals. In fact, I've observed in the rise of books, conferences, and websites devoted to arts access that the reification of rules can be counterproductive. Moreover, as will be apparent to scholars in these fields, I am not a philosopher, scientist, or art historian, but I hope this collection of observations suggests new avenues of research. Furthermore, I hope others can extrapolate from this example of blind people and visual art to examine other cases of cultural marginalization.

In the quarter-century since the Americans with Disabilities Act, blind and other disabled people have become minimally more visible, though as the statistics cited earlier indicate this visibility has not necessarily resulted in higher levels of education or employment. The general public is aware that the law requires wheelchair ramps, Braille signage in elevators, and closed captioning on television, but apart from an abstract notion that this is more humane than sequestering disabled people in institutions, there has been little articulation of the larger benefits of these accommodations. True access needs to be understood as something more than a one-sided act of generosity or charity. The presence of those formerly excluded people must be understood to invite a wholesale scrutiny of what the culture takes for granted about itself. So the ultimate goal is not merely to explain visual art to blind people in the hope that this cultural access will compensate for the loss of sight. Rather, the hope is that blind people can bring a perspective that has not been articulated before. If we can abandon the notion that blindness can only diminish, damage or destroy identity, and adopt instead the idea that the experience of blindness, in all its varieties, can in fact shape and inform other facets of personality and personal history, we will move toward a more genuinely inclusive society. The integration of blind perceptions and experiences will change the foundational assumptions of the culture; change how the human condition is defined. And I believe this is the goal worth working toward. <>

I Had Nowhere to Go (1944–1955) by Jonas Mekas [Spector Books, 9783959051460]

"Jonas Mekas' diaries have an aching honesty, puckish humor and quiet nobility of character. Many readers curious about the early years of this seminal avant-garde filmmaker will discover here a much more universal story: that of the emigrant who can never go back, and whose solitariness in the New World is emblematic of the human condition." -Phillip Lopate

"I was enormously moved by it." -Allen Ginsberg

Legendary filmmaker Jonas Mekas actually came to filmmaking relatively late in life, and his path to New York was a difficult one. In 1944, Mekas and his younger brother Adolfas had to flee Lithuania. They were interned for eight months in a labor camp in Elmshorn. Even after the war ended, Mekas was prevented from returning to his native Lithuania by the Soviet occupation. Classed as a "displaced person," he lived in DP camps in Wiesbaden and Kassel for years. It was only at the end of 1949 that Jonas and Aldolfas Mekas finally found their way to New York City.

A new edition of Mekas' acclaimed memoir, first published by Black Thistle Press in 1991, *I Had Nowhere to Go* tells the story of the artist's survival in the camps and his first years as a young Lithuanian immigrant in New York City. Mekas' memoir—the inspiration for a 2016 biopic by Douglas Gordon—tells the story of how an individual life can move through the larger 20th-century narratives of war and exile and tentatively put down new roots. In the words of Phillip Lopate, "This is a lyrical, essential spiritual anthropology."

Jonas Mekas (born 1922) lives and works in New York. Filmmaker, writer and poet, he is a cofounder of Anthology Film Archives, one of the world's largest and most important repositories of avant-garde film. An influential figure in New American Cinema and New York underground culture, he worked with Andy Warhol, George Maciunas, John Lennon and many others. Mekas' work has been exhibited in museums and festivals worldwide.

I SEEM TO LIVE: THE NEW YORK DIARIES 1950–1969, VOLUME I by Anne König and Jonas Mekas [Spector Books, 9783959052887]

I SEEM TO LIVE *chronicles the beginnings of New York's avant-garde film world and the emergence of a counterculture*

Jonas Mekas' **I SEEM TO LIVE** picks up in the 1950s, where his extraordinary and popular memoir *I Had Nowhere to Go* left off. These were crucial years for the artist: Jonas Mekas and his brother Adolfas, having arrived in New York, shot their first experimental films, and Jonas began to develop the essayistic film diary format that he would use to record his day-to-day observations for the rest of his life. In 1954 the two brothers founded *Film Culture* magazine, and in 1958 Jonas began writing a weekly column for the *Village Voice*. It was in this period that Mekas' writing, films and unflagging commitment to art began to establish him as a pioneer of American avant-garde cinema and the barometer of the New York art scene.

Assembling Mekas' diaries from this exciting period, enriched with his own personal visual material, *I Seem to Live* offers an intimate, unparalleled view of the postwar New York underground scene from one of its most beloved fixtures.

The first installment of Mekas' diaries, **I HAD NOWHERE TO GO (1944–1955),** was published by Spector Books in 2017. **I SEEM TO LIVE**, the sequel to that work, will appear in two volumes: the present volume, covering the years 1950 to 1968, and a second, forthcoming volume, covering 1969 to 2004.

Jonas Mekas (1922–2019) was born in Lithuania and arrived in New York in 1949 via a wartime displaced-persons camp. Cofounder of the Anthology Film Archives, Mekas was a filmmaker, writer, poet, tireless advocate for experimental art and a New York City legend.

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Excerpt: In September 2016, Jonas Mekas copied a document to my hard drive that comprised over 1 GB of material. It contained his diaries I Seem to Live, 1950-2011. All the other books we had published together up until that point had arrived in the post in blue ring binders, with texts and pictures already organized by him, meaning that our graphic designers in Leipzig needed no further explanations. His New York Diaries—the first part of which, covering the period from 1950 to 1969, is now appearing posthumously in the year that also marks its author's death—was too big to fit in any folder. The digital document consists of a total of more than two thousand pages, some eight hundred of which are pictures.

The first chapter of The New York Diaries begins with a question: "Was I born a Displaced Person?" In his diary I Had Nowhere to Go, published in 1991 in New York by Black Thistle Press, he hadn't yet experienced the displacement thrust on him by fate as a hand that might have been dealt to him at birth. In the book he describes his escape from Lithuania, together with his younger brother Adolfas, and their internment, en route to Vienna, in the forced labor camp in Elmshorn near Hamburg, followed by years of being shifted between DP camps in Germany at the end of the war. The Mekas brothers were among the last displaced persons to board ship for North America in 1949. They planned to head for Chicago, but New York—the first port they arrive at in the New

World—was so overwhelming that they decided on the spur of the moment to stay. The last chapters of I Had Nowhere to Go, documenting Jonas's arrival in New York, overlap with the beginning of I Seem to Live, but they are not identical. The feeling of being alone in the big city, the irretrievable loss of the home he grew up in—the small Lithuanian village of Semeniskiai, where Jonas was raised as part of a large family—the displacement, and the sense of being no longer rooted run like a basso continuo through the early entries in his New York Diaries. On December 27, 1954, he wrote, "Like so many times in the past, I'm trying again to organize my confused life... Looney or lonely. Anyway, ..." The 1950s were about struggling to make ends meet, bad neighborhoods in Brooklyn, his initial forays into filmmaking with the Bolex, and the painful effort of learning the language.

Jonas forced himself to read and write English as a means to find his feet in the vibrant metropolis. Together with Adolfas, he founded the magazine Film Culture in 1954, which he established as one of the first independent US American film journals outside of Hollywood. It was his mouthpiece, and he used it to build a bridge connecting the cinematic avantgarde in Europe and expressionist film in Germany with the burgeoning underground scene in New York, which he was personally involved in seeding.

Writing, committing ideas to paper, was one of his daily routines, whether it was film reviews, manifestos, love letters, or poems. "So I'm writing again. But it has always been so in my life. My writing is part of myself, an inseparable part of my existence, it's all in the stars," he wrote in 1957 in an undated entry. Jonas made no distinction between private and public—he was an author on multiple levels: he could be a filmmaker, critic, frontman of the Film-Makers' Cooperative, which he founded in 1962, fundraiser, film projectionist, ticket seller, poet, lover, and a great deal more. All these voices found their way into his notes, which he would not edit until right at the end of his life, assisted by Charity Coleman, who transcribed his handwritten texts, and by his son Sebastian. It was a job that was evidently right up his street, a routine task. As editor-in-chief at Film Culture, he had compiled texts and images for the magazine for decades.

His diary resembles a work journal, the kind of literary montage we know from Brecht, pieced together from contemporary notes and documents. In the first chapters, when he launches Film Culture together with Adolfas and the two of them try their hand at filmmaking, he cuts together unpublished diary entries written by his younger brother, which we have permission to print here for the first time with the consent of Adolfas's widow Pola Chapelle Mekas. The cluster of material comprises newspaper articles, published and unpublished pieces for "Movie Journal," the column he penned for The Village Voice from 1958 on, letters, photos, film stills, and notes on napkins and envelopes—a bunch of scraps in other words that now read as a moving and subjectively concentrated chronology of the New York underground. Jonas is a New American Cinema maniac, who scrimps and saves for everything: the printing costs for the magazine, film equipment for his colleagues,

the rent for movie theaters, which he tirelessly trawls the city looking for. He negotiates with greedy landlords and with the Mafioso authorities in New York. He is desperately looking for a place where he can plant the tender seedling he is cultivating, the Film Makers' Cinematheque, founded in 1964. He goes to jail for screening his colleague Jack Smith's Flaming Creatures, which has been banned. He supports Andy Warhol, who shoots his first films with Jonas's help. He is sometimes at his wits' end when faced with the grueling task of obtaining money to produce and distribute new films in the world. On December 7, 1968, he moans, "Oh movies, I don't know how I got into them." But Jonas was tough and not easily thrown off track. On June 16, 1968, after radical feminist author Valerie Solanas had shot Andy Warhol, severely injuring his spleen, liver, and esophagus, he wrote, "The day he was shot I went to the Hospital, and there, in the waiting room, everybody was crying and being

pretty low, and I said, what the hell is this, a funeral? Don't you know that people of weak and hungry constitution like me or Andy do not die that easily, you just can't kill them that easily, he'll pull thru... He'll be O.K." Jonas was amazingly healthy despite his poor diet, the result of not having enough money for food. He had an endless supply of energy and the gift of being able to do many things at once, although he was not always sure he was on the right path. His private and professional life merged inextricably. At times, the FilmMakers' Coop was in his loft in Manhattan, and he had to find somewhere to sleep at night. In the 1960s, he fought doggedly for a while to make his own movies. He produced idealistic schedules, which he presented to his colleagues at the Co-op, but which were repeatedly thwarted by the incursions of everyday life. Despite the many tasks he set himself, he found the time to keep a record of his life. His diary was the place where he bore witness to himself, where he attempted to put his thoughts and ideas in order. The first volume of I Seem to Live concludes with the entry written on September 16, 1969: "It's the new artist that needs assistance. We end our session, and I run to the Jewish Museum, to project films—and you look at me as if I were crazy! Yes, I am crazy. And I hope I will always remain so."

While Jonas was still alive, we barely discussed the genesis of his diaries because we were busy publishing five other books: Scrapbook of the Sixties (2015), the second edition of I Had Nowhere to Go (2017) and the first translation of it into German, Ich hatte keinen Ort, 1944-1953 (2017), Conversations with Film-Makers (2018), and Film Culture 80: The Legend of Barbara Rubin (2018). In 2011, Christoph Gnädig—who like so many young European enthusiasts of New American Cinema conducted research for his master's thesis at Anthology Film Archives in New York—stayed with Jonas for several months in Brooklyn. He looked over Jonas's shoulder while he was working on his diaries and reported that Jonas, who was almost ninety at the time, was still typing out his handwritten texts using two fingers—he is said to have been a very quick typist—before transferring them to computer. In the process of editing the texts, he would comment on events that had happened decades before. On May 20, 2013, he annotated an entry dated October 2, 1967: "A note re. the SHOOT YOUR WAY OUT WITH THE CAMERA project. Regretfully, this idealistic, almost utopian project, as described in the above Manifesto, presented by Shirley Clarke and myself at the Citizen Initiative Conference, organized by Lindsay, Mayor of New York City, in early December 1966, never got off the ground. Despite all the good will of many friendly organizations and individuals, Shirley's and my efforts to raise monies for the project, and our attempts to persuade Kodak to contribute cameras and stock to the project, ended all in a lot of wasted time and frustration. But it was a beautiful idea, I still think so." Jonas worked with his long-time ally Shirley Clarke to develop the project, which involved giving 8mm and 16 mm cameras to over two hundred teenagers, most of them black, who were to capture their daily lives on film. Clarke, one of the few female filmmakers on the underground scene, was often targeted by her white male colleagues. Jonas frequently pitched in to help mediate the cock fights in this fragile social milieu, and his defense of Clarke was heroic. His unpublished 1962 "Movie Journal" column about her film The Connection should be regarded as a satirical piece. The text was "prefaced" by a slugfest in The New York Times and The Village Voice, where Jonas defended her film as the best of the year and trampled all over the deaf and insensitive film critics of one of the city's biggest newspapers.

This entry and the fictional secret interview he recorded with himself on April 3, 1968, in which he ranted about the inefficiency of the US Army in the Vietnam War, are pastiches. In these texts, he adopts the attitude of his opponents, lampooning them with their own arguments.

In the editorial work on the diaries, in which I was supported by Christoph Gnädig, Charity Coleman, and Sebastian Mekas, no changes were made to the text. It was not shortened, rewritten, or supplemented, and the chronological sequences, of the kind that occur in chapters Twenty Five and Twenty Six, where there are slight shifts in the ordering of events, were not corrected retrospectively. These sections are more revealing of Jonas's own editorial process. He must have

been working on it to the last, arranging, assembling, and moving events, notes, and images until he was happy with the dramaturgy of the text as a whole, amounting to more than two thousand pages—or sixty-one years, to put it another way. His own spellings of words— like "thru" and the many variations of the key terms such as "film-maker," "avant-garde," "FilmMakers' Co-op," or "Coop" for short—have remained in the text as he probably often jotted them down when time was pressing. The different spellings are not simply a reflection of his mood, they also shed light on changes in the way that American English is used. Misspelled names and minor orthographical mistakes, on the other hand, have been silently corrected. Meanwhile, the neologisms that came out of his process of language acquisition have not been touched, nor have the quotations written by the author from memory, which

do not always correspond to the original. Montaged quotations like those by the medieval mystic Agrippa von Nettesheim, where several passages are nested in a single quotation, have not been re-edited. Sometimes surnames appear in square brackets after a first name. These additions were inserted by the author himself, although this practice is not consistent throughout the diaries. The second volume, covering the period from 1969 to 2011, will contain an index of persons to help navigate this two-thousand-page diary. It is without question Jonas Mekas's literary masterpiece and will henceforth rank on a par with his cinematic work, rounding out our image of this important author, filmmaker, and underground organizer. <>

THE TORTURE DOCTORS: HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES AND THE ROAD TO JUSTICE by Steven H. Miles MD [Georgetown University Press, 9781626167520]

Torture doctors administer and invent techniques to inflict pain and suffering without leaving scars. Their knowledge of the body and its breaking points and their credible authority over death certificates and medical records make them powerful and elusive perpetrators of the crime of torture. In **THE TORTURE DOCTORS**, Steven H. Miles fearlessly explores who these physicians are, what they do, how they escape justice, and what can be done to hold them accountable.

At least one hundred countries employ torture doctors, including both dictatorships and democracies. While torture doctors mostly act with impunity — protected by governments, medical associations, and licensing boards — Miles shows that a movement has begun to hold these doctors accountable and to return them to their proper role as promoters of health and human rights. Miles's groundbreaking portrayal exposes the thinking and psychology of these doctors, and his investigation points to how the international human rights community and the medical community can come together to end these atrocities.

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Excerpt: This book excavates a widespread, yet barely explored, medical specialty: the torture doctor. This is a work of medical anthropology. It describes how physicians collaborate with governments to create, inflict, and conceal practices that are intended to inflict severe pain and suffering. It recounts how human rights activists have pushed reluctant governments and medical associations to bring torture doctors to imperfect and rarely imposed forms of justice.

I am a recently retired professor of internal medicine. I practiced medicine and taught medical ethics for thirty-five years. The American Society of Bioethics and Humanities gave me its Lifetime Achievement Award. Work with refugees took me to places ripped apart by war and torture. I have met many torture survivors. They are even among the professors and students of my teaching hospital in Minnesota. They work in grocery stores, as journalists, or as taxi drivers. The US Office of Refugee Resettlement estimates that 500,000 torture survivors live in the United States, a total roughly equal to the number of persons with Parkinson's disease. Think about that number; every adult knows someone with Parkinson's disease. Stigma makes torture survivors invisible. Many are ashamed to tell their histories. Many people, even doctors, do not inquire about the cause of a person's nightmares or scars. Silence pushes torture below its rightful place on the national agenda, inhibiting survivors' rehabilitation and delaying reform of governmental and medical community policies.

People often ask those of us who rehabilitate survivors or who study torture, Why on earth would you do that? The question usually means that the topic is too distasteful or painful to contemplate. Ironically, many people who ask this question relax at home by watching torture for entertainment on a crime procedural or spy drama. For six years I served on the Board of the Center for Victims of Torture in Minneapolis. The center staff are as skilled as they are gracious and profound. I do not know of any who consume torture for entertainment.

In May 2004 I saw photographs of US soldiers abusing prisoners in Iraq. Questions came to mind: Where were the doctors of Abu Ghraib prison? Why had they not intervened when they saw the injuries? I sought the answer by reading tens of thousands of government pages that had been declassified by the American Civil Liberties Union's relentless barrage of Freedom of Information Act requests. I expected to learn how the United States had suppressed doctors' protests. The truth was much more disheartening. Physicians and psychologists did not protest; rather, they assumed central roles in abusive interrogations. They designed and monitored torture. Pathologists falsified death certificates to prevent public discovery of torture. I wrote many articles and finally a book, Oath Betrayed: America's Torture Doctors. I indexed the declassified documents and posted them on a website at the University of Minnesota's Human Rights Library, where they were heavily used by lawyers and scholars.

My interests then went global. I tracked the practices of torture doctors and the efforts to punish them around the world. I set up a website, The Doctors Who Torture Accountability Project. I am deeply grateful to Jay Lieberman, Mike Engelstad, and Laurie Walker, who designed the website. In 2015 I wrote an ebook, Doctors Who Torture: The Pursuit of Justice, which drew from some of the material on the website as I continued to compile information. The website was decommissioned at the end of 2017. Its files and many more are transferred to this book. My global study conformed with my experience in the United States; torture doctors rarely face accountability.

This book builds on two pathbreaking books that are now decades old. The American Association for the Advancement of Science published The Breaking of Bodies and Minds: Torture, Psychiatric Abuse, and the Health Professions in 1985. The British Medical Association published Medicine Betrayed: The Participation of Doctors in Human Rights Abuses in 1992.3 These books built on the anecdotes of their time and pointed to the need for study and reform. Faustino Blanco Cabrera did not set out to be a torture doctor, but when his government turned to torture, that is what he became.

In 1976 Lieutenant Dr. Cabrera worked in the prisons of Argentina's military junta during its Dirty War. His job was to assess prisoners undergoing torture and tell the guards when to ease up on those who were supposed to live. He provided minor medical care to prisoners under torture who were supposed to live for a bit longer. He created and signed death certificates falsely asserting that imprisoned men or women who had been murdered by the state had died of natural causes. In 1983 the military junta fell from power and Cabrera slipped into private practice as a psychiatrist.

Twenty-three years later, in 2006, Cabrera's work as a torture doctor was discovered. He was tried and sent to prison. He was soon mysteriously freed and abandoned his family to move to another part of Argentina, where he practiced for six more years. In 2013 his background was again discovered during a medical license renewal. The horrified medical staff revoked his hospital privileges on the grounds that he had misrepresented his past. The provincial government accepted a petition declaring him persona non grata for "notorious moral unworthiness." As the petition put it, "his bad faith is shown by the fact that he has a medical license, hiding within the very healthcare system the abuse of which justifies this petition to expel him."

An Argentine court tried Cabrera for torture, falsification of death certificates, and crimes against humanity. At the time his second trial began, one of Cabrera's psychiatry patients was a man with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from being tortured by the same junta that had employed Cabrera. The man's daughter was also one of Cabrera's patients. Her mental illness had resulted from the terror of living in hiding during her father's imprisonment. Until Cabrera's arrest, neither father nor daughter knew that their own physician had worked for the torturing regime that had traumatized them. In 2013 the daughter sat quietly in court watching her psychiatrist being sentenced to seven years in prison for being an accomplice to the terror that caused such suffering to her and her father.

I learned of this story from an Argentine friend. A week after Cabrera had been sentenced, I began to compile materials for a book describing the practices of torture doctors and the efforts to bring them to justice.

Many people know that some Nazi doctors were tried after World War II for atrocities and vicious "experiments" on persons held in concentration camps. A few physicians were executed; a few were imprisoned; a few were acquitted. The vast majority of the Nazi doctors who were apprentices to the Holocaust were never brought before the bar of justice. Some people think that the trial of Nazi doctors at Nuremberg was the precedent for punishing Dr. Cabrera. The truth is not that straightforward. For thirty years after World War II, doctors had complete impunity as they

collaborated with torture regimes around the world. In the mid-1970s an invigorated human rights movement began bringing government officials who violated human rights to justice in domestic tribunals in the countries where they had committed their crimes. It was the expanding reach of that development, and not the Nuremberg precedent, that snared Dr. Cabrera.

It is appalling but accurate to assert that many more physicians oversee torture than work to rehabilitate torture survivors. Torture doctors work for democracies such as the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom. They assist sadistic practices in states like North Korea or Saudi Arabia. They devise techniques to minimize scars that might someday serve as evidence. They falsify medical records and death certificates to camouflage torture as the cause of an injury or of death.

This book tells how human rights advocates are trying to drive the threatening wedge of accountability between physicians and torturing regimes. This effort seeks to mobilize at least a few more physicians to refrain from lending their knowledge, skills, and medical privileges to the work of torture. Human rights advocates hope that some government official might pause in the midst of the ferocity and wonder, Will doctors betray our dirty work, if not out of a sense of justice, perhaps out of fear that their medical community or a court might call them to account for complicity?

This book describes an unexplored wreck. I have excavated only shards of the immense ruin of torture doctoring. Hundreds of anecdotes are described in these pages. But many more are missing. Documents have been destroyed or are hidden in sealed government archives. Witnesses, victims, and perpetrators have silently died. I have tried to avoid being gratuitously graphic. There are no photographs. The first half of this book is necessarily explicit, as it tells of the work and reasoning of torture doctors. Some readers might experience secondary trauma, especially if descriptions awaken memories of earlier assaults. Read in sips. The book lifts as it proceeds.

This collection of story fragments is not amenable to statistical analysis, solid causal inferences, or extrapolations. Yet a reader may fairly expect me to venture some opinions and working hypotheses for future scholars to explore. In meeting that expectation, I will be cautious to point out my limits, and I expect to live with future judgments on my efforts. The book compiles examples of what courts and medical licensing boards and medical associations have done to hold torture doctors accountable. I will build from that material to focus on what the medical profession can do to more effectively address the problem of the impunity of physicians who abet torture. I am not qualified to write a treatise on how domestic or international law might remedy this problem. My aim is to better equip civil society and the medical community to mobilize against torture doctors and thereby advance the cause of preventing torture.

This book's four parts unfold from describing the problem to describing the emerging solutions and finally to proposing further reforms.

Part 1, "Meet the Torture Doctors," summarizes what is known about doctors who torture. The first chapter, "Dr. Chand Sees a Burned Boy," tells the story of a doctor in Guyana whom the police summoned to see a boy they had brutally burned. Dr. Chand gave minimal treatment and left the boy in police custody without reporting the injuries. Chapter 2, "Who Are the Torture Doctors?" describes what is known about the attitudes and motivations of doctors who assist torture. The next chapter, "What Is Torture?" surveys the definitions of torture in a human rights context and summarizes research about the utility of torture for interrogation. Part I's closing chapter, "What Is a Torture Doctor?" takes on the surprisingly complex task of defining a torture doctor.

Part 2, "A Time of Impunity," shows physician complicity with torture to be a global practice. Although few physicians abet torture, all torturing regimes rely on physicians to assist with or conceal torture. Chapter 5, "Judging the Nazi Doctors," recounts how the post—World War II

Nuremberg vow to hold torture doctors accountable instantly gave way to the priorities of the Cold War. Chapter 6, "A Global Map of Torture Doctors," surveys worldwide practices of torture doctoring, including some regional or cultural variants. Chapter 7, "The Paradox of the United Kingdom," shows how the leading nation against physician complicity with torture has given impunity to its own torture doctors and how it disseminated the practice of medical monitoring of flogging throughout its former colonies, protectorates, and the Commonwealth.

Part 3, "Humanists and Healers," describes how an insurgent human rights movement took on the impunity of torture doctors. Chapter 8, "Humanists for Human Rights," sketches how nonphysician articulated the right to be free of torture and, through fiction, introduced the reality of torture doctors to the public. Chapter 9, "Healers for Human Rights," is the story of how the antitorture human rights movement collaborated with clinical experts to create science-based forensic methods to bring torturers to justice. The final chapter of this section, "Organized Medicine's Condemn and Abide," surveys decades of post—World War II medical ethics codes that condemned physician complicity with torture, all the while carefully evading the task of how to hold torture doctors accountable.

Part 4, "The Dawn of Accountability," looks at the post—WorldWar II record of instances where medical associations, licensing boards, or courts have undertaken to hold doctors accountable for complicity with torture. Chapter 11, "Innovations,"

looks at the initial wave of challenges to medicalized torture in the former Soviet Union and South Africa and then at a modest but remarkable cluster of cases in which torture doctors were held accountable as military juntas in Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil collapsed. Chapter 12, "Globalization," traces the spread of accountability to encompass greater numbers of nations and physicians. It shows that despite the headlines, few torture doctors are ever called to account. A separate chapter is spent on "Impunity and the US War on Terror." In the United States medically supervised torture and complete impunity went hand in hand. The last chapter of this book, "Promoting Accountability," proposes how to evaluate progress in holding torture doctors accountable and how to better foster this process. Perhaps most important, it discusses why it is important to do so.

We can be firm in calling torture "evil" even as we recognize that torture doctors are largely banal careerists. Physicians' insights, motivations, and courage vary. Although it is not true that every physician can become a torturer, it is true that any regime can find the few doctors it requires to serve in its torture prisons. The integrity of the many physicians who will not serve in those prisons illuminates the baselessness of the excuses "I was afraid" or "I was under orders" that torture doctors offer after their regime has fallen and they are facing justice in public squares. Many torture doctors, such as those of the United States or Spain, have no legitimate fear of being tortured at all. Even in the most fascist regimes, there are always doctors who take enormous risks to expose torture and heal the survivors. Their brave and clinically expert witness illuminates maliciousness that was supposed to be beyond prosecution. Were it not for their professionalism, this book would not have been possible. <>

CHILDREN OF THE LAND by Marcelo Hernandez Castillo [Harper, 9780062825599]

This unforgettable memoir from a prize-winning poet about growing up undocumented in the United States recounts the sorrows and joys of a family torn apart by draconian policies and chronicles one young man's attempt to build a future in a nation that denies his existence.

"You were not a ghost even though an entire country was scared of you. No one in this story was a ghost. This was not a story."

When Marcelo Hernandez Castillo was five years old and his family was preparing to cross the border between Mexico and the United States, he suffered temporary, stress-induced blindness. Castillo regained his vision, but quickly understood that he had to move into a threshold of invisibility before settling in California with his parents and siblings. Thus began a new life of hiding in plain sight and of paying extraordinarily careful attention at all times for fear of being truly seen. Before Castillo was one of the most celebrated poets of a generation, he was a boy who perfected his English in the hopes that he might never seem extraordinary.

With beauty, grace, and honesty, Castillo recounts his and his family's encounters with a system that treats them as criminals for seeking safe, ordinary lives. He writes of the Sunday afternoon when he opened the door to an ICE officer who had one hand on his holster, of the hours he spent making a fake social security card so that he could work to support his family, of his father's deportation and the decade that he spent waiting to return to his wife and children only to be denied reentry, and of his mother's heartbreaking decision to leave her children and grandchildren so that she could be reunited with her estranged husband and retire from a life of hard labor.

CHILDREN OF THE LAND distills the trauma of displacement, illuminates the human lives behind the headlines and serves as a stunning meditation on what it means to be a man and a citizen.

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SECOND MOVEMENT: Interview on Allegiance
THIRD MOVEMENT: Sentence Served
FOURTH MOVEMENT: Glass
FIFTH MOVEMENT: Asylum
FURTHER NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
NOTES
FURTHER NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS

Excerpt: They found Apá blindfolded and tied up by the side of a road. He lived. That is all I have to say about it.

At night, I press a flashlight against my stomach—the ring around it is like a small eclipse. It is no accident I am named after my father. I love you, Daisy.

I am now six months sober, after filling in many boxes on forms with a blue pen. I want someone to take my picture, for it to feel like being touched.

I believe most in my body in the precise moment of pain, not in the reflection afterward. Memories lie to me, and this is why my body can never be a map.

I'm happiest locking myself in my room in the middle of the day and lying on the floor while playing Lana Del Rey as loud as my speaker will go, and pouring a little dirt from my houseplants into my belly button. There is always dog shit everywhere because we never bothered to house-train our two-year-old shih tzu—poodle mix. I can never keep up with anything in the house. "He hit me but it felt like a kiss," Lana sings, and I think of the first time my father hit me, as if I owed him money.

I thought things would be better by now; now that all the family is reunited.

I am starving myself. I consider the shame of letting myself go hungry, as if it's something I'm trying on, like a new sweater in the fluorescent light of a department store. "Chíngate pues," I hear people tell me. I go from 180 to 110 pounds in a year. This is called "learned helplessness," my therapist tells me.

I am slowly depriving myself of everything that gives me pleasure. Meat, alcohol, sugar, sex. I have isolated myself from the world and refuse to come out.

I consider how much I hate myself for my hunger. How I wish to disappear into nothing like my father.

Sometimes I don't realize what I am saying, say too much, and lose friends. Or I don't say anything for months and lose them as well. I want to know the perfect amount of myself to give to someone else.

In the morning, I make myself an espresso in a stovetop metal cup and watch the coffee pour from the little fountain on the top. I open the fridge and eat a pepper. I place the seeds under my tongue.

Standing alone in my kitchen, I think of the different ways I've ruined my life. Maybe I was meant to be taken in the field when Amá buried the seed, pregnant with me. Only when I lie underwater do I feel as I did before my mother left for Mexico. Even though she's back, it is different. It is only in that underwater solitude that I can learn to blame someone else for the person I've become since.

In that moment I hope that rising is like a baptism, and that I will be washed clean.

I imagine that being loved is like holding my breath underwater, temporary, something I can't hold for long. When I fell in love with Rubi, she said she loved me too, but then she left.

Though I know it will come, the feeling of rising to the surface still startles me—it's in that moment when I'm slowly starting to realize that although I still blame myself for many things that aren't my fault, I am still capable of being loved. She and I eventually got back together.

But I want to experience love the way I experience drowning—never coming back to the surface, never finding relief. Always just a click away from dying, which I admit is selfish, because it's easier to be desired than to go on with the work of desiring.

I know I can swim toward tenderness, but so many times I refuse.

I refuse because I imagine that stillness is part of tenderness, and if I reach that place of tenderness, I won't know what to do with the serenity.

I open the hot container of espresso, pour it into a small cup, and raise the cup to my mouth. I burn my tongue, yell, and wake up Rubi, who is sleeping in the next room, now pregnant with our child, who we will name Julián after my Amá Julia.

My child will know his grandparents by touch and not through a screen, or through my yelling as I push the phone to his ear.

I am always looking ten seconds into the future—looking for the nearest door to run through. Always needing to move.

Rubi is in the hospital maternity ward. Rubi is wheeled away. Rubi is lying unconscious on a surgery bed, with the doctor's hands inside her. No one expected a cesarean. They split her open and are taking things out and placing them in bags like shoes on a door rack. It doesn't look like they will be putting them back into her. The doctor reaches in and pulls out a small pink thing covered in blood, taking his first breath of this world.

He is screaming as if he has seen the future already and knows the past. They toss him around with towels to clean him, and though milky and gray, his eyes are already open. I am probably just a blurry shape and shadow to him, softening into the empty space around me, an interchangeable thing, just as my parents were to me in Tijuana. If I, too, am like the birds packed tightly together on a tree, and if a loud noise startles me, what would be left behind on the branches?

The nurse swaddles him tight and places him in my arms while the doctor staples Rubi's abdomen back together.

"Mijo, mijo, can you see me?" I say, and we are both shaking, as if we have either just finished, or are just getting ready to run. <>

AMOUR; HOW THE FRENCH TALK ABOUT LOVE PHOTOGRAPHS AND STORIES by Stefania Rousselle [Viking, 9780143134534]

From award-winning journalist and filmmaker Stefania Rousselle, a stunning collection of photographs and essays that seek to understand the universality of love

Journalist and filmmaker Stefania Rousselle found herself overwhelmed and dejected with the horrors of the news after covering terrorist attacks, human trafficking, and the rise of extremism. To renew her faith in humanity, she took off on a solo road trip across France, determined to see if love still exists. Traveling from village to village, farming towns to industrial cities, heart to heart, Rousselle sought out ordinary women and men, all to ask them one question, What is love?

Collecting more than 90 personal testimonies, each one moving and beautiful in its own way, alongside over 100 intimate photographs, Rousselle reveals the many facets of love, and discovers that love can still be found even in the darkest of places. From a baker in Normandy to a shepherd in the Pyrenees, from a tree trimmer in Martinique to a mail woman in the Alps, Amour is a visual testament to love in all its many forms.

Stefania Rousselle is an independent French-American video journalist and documentary film-maker based in Paris. Her work includes short documentaries on terrorism, the European debt crisis, the rise of extremism and immigration. In 2016 she was part of a team of New York Times journalists who were finalists for the Pulitzer Prize for international reporting. That same year, she was on the team of journalists who were awarded the Overseas Press Club's David Kaplan Award for their coverage of the ISIS-led terrorist attacks in Paris. She was a Visiting Scholar at the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism and holds an MA in history from Paris-Sorbonne University.

Excerpt: It was Friday night. I was at home, in my pj's, on my couch, watching a documentary, Reporters, by Raymond Depardon. But then an alert popped up on my phone: "Hostages taken at the Bataclan in Paris." In a second, I was out in the street. And I saw it: the fear, the police, the ambulances.

It was November 13, 2015. A massacre was taking place right down my street at the Bataclan concert hall. Terrorists were blowing themselves up and shooting people all over Paris.

I ran back up to my apartment, grabbed my camera gear, and started recording.

My editor at the New York Times called.

"Are you on it?"

"Yes."

I hadn't even had time to change out of my pj's.

I had been working as a freelance video journalist for the New York Times for the past five years.

I covered sex slavery in Spain. The European debt crisis and families' despair. Pain and sadness.

I also covered fashion in Paris, Milan, and London. Trauma versus glitter. Always on deadline. Always working in a rush. Film, edit, leave. Film, edit, leave. Pain, sadness, despair, repeat.

Back at home, I needed comfort. But I would never get it: "What you did is not enough," my partner would say. I was never good enough. Ever. He injected his poison. Constantly. And I let it in; I was too in love with him. When I was at my lowest, he left me. His job was done. I was dead inside.

But I had to focus. I had work to do. I didn't want to let anyone _down. "I am strong." I could do this. "Go Stefania, go. Work."

But then the Paris attacks happened. That terrible night in November 2015. 130 dead and 413 wounded. A man I knew died at the concert hall. I remembered dancing with him that very summer at a friend's wedding. But he was gone now. Shot by a terrorist. The sadness overwhelmed me.

For weeks, whenever I heard sirens in the middle of the night, I would jump out of bed and start packing my camera gear, thinking I needed to go out and report. I couldn't stop. I had to work. "I am strong."

The stories kept piling up. I embedded with France's far-right party—the National Front. The party was very close to winning the regional elections, and I was there to witness it. Cover the hate. The racism. More poison. But I couldn't blink; I was a journalist.

Truth is, I was broken. I was suffocating. My heart was crushed. I had stopped believing in love. I wanted to die.

I would stay in the dark. In my room. For months.

But I decided to give myself one last chance. Because deep inside of me, there was hope. I told myself that I was going to go look for this so-called love. I was going to see for myself if people really cared for each other. Or if love was just a lie.

So I got in my car and hit the road.

I had no idea where to start. Then I thought of my grandmother, Maria, who was born in Hungary. Her stepfather ran a hospital there. Toward the end of World War II, the Soviet Army invaded her country and killed everyone in its way. She had to escape. Her family finally found refuge in a garage close to Nuremberg. But they had nothing, and her grandmother starved to death so everyone else could eat. But they were still hungry, so my grandmother was sent to get provisions. She went to the American base. And there was Henry, my grandfather, an intelligence officer with the Office of Strategic Services. They fell in love. Before long, my mother was born.

The north of France. That's where I was going to head. To the refugee camps in Calais. But when I got there, nothing was left of them. The president had decided to tear them down to stop migrants from settling. So they had to hide in the woods. Sleep in the mud. Hoping to reach the United Kingdom. I arrived on a day when the police refused to let nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) do their lunch distribution. Not even water. I remember hundreds of hungry people, with loads of food right in front of them. Not being able to touch it. A few hours later, the police finally allowed the NGOs to serve dinner. Refugees crawled out of the forest like zombies and got in line. I walked up to Salam Salar, a thirty-one-year-old man from Pakistan. I told him about my grandmother and the journey I was starting in search of love. What he said boggled me: "Love is my mother. Love is in

trees and flowers. Love is good. I have a wife and four children, but they weren't able to come to France with me. I miss them." He was seeing love around him, even in the worst conditions possible.

I didn't have a plan. No structure. No meetings. No agenda. I just wanted to wander. Get lost. Reconnect with people. The same day I met Salam, I sat down with Edith, a fifty-four-year-old accountant, in her impeccable white house in Sangatte, near Calais. She sighed: "I am in love with the idea of love. I think it is a noble feeling. But when will I actually feel it? I have been with a man for a couple of years now, and I break up with him every day. But then, every night, he comes back. I am too much of a coward to leave him. I am so scared of solitude." It was brutal. People were pure. They were raw. There was no pathos. No bullshit. I remember Marcel, a sixty-three-year-old shepherd I met in the Pyrenees. We got so drunk together. When I told the people in the village I was going to look for him up in the valley, they all told me: "Get some pastis," a delicious anise-flavored liqueur. And I did. I poured it into a plastic bottle so it wouldn't be heavy in my backpack and hiked up to find him. And when I did, we shared the bottle. He had named his cabin the Villa of Those Deprived of Love because he was the least favorite child in his family. When he started talking about his wife, Katia, there was no romanticism. "Do I love her? I don't know. Love is a weird word. I care about Katia. That must be love. She cares about me too—a bit too much."

Marie-Elisabeth. Pierre. Andrée. Annick. Michel. Claire. Patrick. For each beautiful and consoling moment, there was one of abandonment. Of loss or rejection. Of despair. Like Lucien, an eighty-two-year-old retired mason, whom I met in a little town in the southwest of France. His wife, Marie-Jeanne, had just died: "In the winter, we would watch television, then sit near the fire and fall asleep in our respective chairs. We were happy. I always hoped it would last forever. It didn't."

I felt the extreme solitude of people. The extreme anxiety to make ends meet. We are unbearably fragile. Incredibly complex. We fear others, we doubt our ability to be loved. Still, there was resilience. Love kept them going.

And they gave me a lot. I slept under the roof of nearly all the people I met. I wanted to feel surrounded and to be with people. So I decided to rent rooms in people's homes. Not only did they open their homes to me but also their hearts. Their most intimate space. Their cocoon. The place where they grow old, laugh, cry, raise kids. We cooked food and drank wine. We cried and laughed together. They introduced me to their friends and their family. We watched TV. Walked the dogs. They taught me how to milk goats. How they grew their vegetables. How they raised their bulls. I went fishing and got seasick. I even spent Christmas with them. I loved waking up in the morning in my pj's and walking into their kitchens, with the smell of coffee. The pain au chocolat on the table. The cats jumping on the counter. The kids screaming because they didn't want to go to school.

The power of connecting. The lightness of being. The mundanity of life.

After a few days, it was time to go. I would get back in my car. Put the radio on and hit the road. Suburbs. Towns. Beaches. Plains. Villages. Moissac. Ernestviller. Andel. Le Vauclin. Blaceret.

And I would go from heart to heart. Yann. Alexandre. Charlotte. Gérard. Christian. Suzy. Amélie. Noé. Nicolas. Lucile.

What follows is their gift to us. <>

Sheets

Mézidon-Canon, Calvados

I was a widow. I was lonely. I was starting to feel tired. I didn't speak to anyone. I was alone with my TV. I'd had enough.

On a Wednesday, I took my car and went to the restaurant. Claude was there, sad, eating in a corner. I went up to him and asked: "Are you okay?" He said yes. I asked him: "Can I sit with you?" He said yes. I paid for his meal. I told him: "You're going to come to my house, and I'll make you some coffee."

I waited for him. He had a meeting with his insurance company, so he couldn't come right away. I couldn't wait to see him. I was standing by the window. I saw cars coming. I was thinking: "No, not this one. Not this one."

Suddenly, there he was. My heart was beating.

I was happy. He came in, I took him in my arms, and I kissed him. He had kept his word.

I told him: "Come for lunch tomorrow at noon."

On Thursdays, my daughter comes to clean my house. I said: "We need to change the sheets, and we are going to put on my satin sheets." I have blue and pink ones. I chose the pink ones.

That day, we made love for the first time. He never left. We have been together for three years now. My first husband hit me. The second died of an epilepsy attack.

I love this fool. <>

ROLANDE MIGNOT (FEBRUARY 13, 1944 JUNE 5, 2018), CLEANING LADY AND COOK, AND CLAUDE VINANDY, 78, RETIRED DAIRY DRIVER

Rib Eye

Bedous, Pyrénées-Atlantiques

I was a seasonal worker so I dated lots of women. But one night, I was at a dinner party, and Edith and I sat across from each other. It was love at first sight. Back at the camp, I woke my friend up and said: "I was against marriage, but I've changed my mind!" She was eighteen. I was twenty-five.

We only saw each other again a year later. I was working as a cook in her uncle's restaurant. We would talk in the kitchen, and I would bring her home on my bicycle. We were like magnets.

But I had planned to do a transatlantic sailing race with a friend, so I left.

A few weeks in, there were violent storms. We had no more food. We were in the middle of the ocean, but we might as well have been on the moon—fifteen days away from the shore. I thought I would never make it back.

On the boat, I imagined myself eating a rib-eye steak in the mountains in front of a fire. I also had this recurring dream where I was about to take a train. Edith was there. The train wasn't stopping so I had to throw my bags into the wagon without saying good-bye to her. But then I would think: "What are you doing?" And I would get off the train and stay with Edith.

That's when I realized I was on the wrong path. When we made it to shore, I immediately went to her. Edith and I met again at a train station at Christmas. We have been together for fourteen years. We've built two houses and have had three children.

Now, we are buying an old train station in our village to turn it into a hotel and a restaurant, where I will cook rib-eye steaks on a firepit in the middle of the mountains.

Everything is linked. <>

FABRICE MOUTENGOU-DUBUC, 39, COOK, AND EDITH MOUTENGOU-DUBUC, 33, SCHOOLTEACHER

ROUGH IDEAS: REFLECTIONS ON MUSIC AND MORE by Stephen Hough [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 9780374252540]

A collection of essays on music and life by the famed classical pianist and composer

Stephen Hough is one of the world's leading pianists, winning global acclaim and numerous awards, both for his concerts and his recordings. He is also a writer, composer, and painter, and has been described by *The Economist* as one of "Twenty Living Polymaths."

Hough writes informally and engagingly about music and the life of a musician, from the broader aspects of what it is to walk out onto a stage or to make a recording, to specialist tips from deep inside the practice room: how to trill, how to pedal, how to practice. He also writes vividly about people he's known, places he's traveled to, books he's read, paintings he's seen; and he touches on more controversial subjects, such as assisted suicide and abortion. Even religion is there—the possibility of the existence of God, problems with some biblical texts, and the challenges involved in being a gay Catholic.

ROUGH IDEAS is an illuminating, constantly surprising introduction to the life and mind of one of our great cultural figures.

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

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Give me a rough idea ... not as in a deliberately coarse or unformed one, rather one that has a beginning but not yet an end.

I spend a lot of my life sitting around — at airports, on planes, in hotel rooms — and most of this book expands notes I have made during that dead time on the road. Many of these jottings found their way into print, on paper or online, but others remained unfinished musings on scraps of paper or saved as files on the go on my iPhone: seeds, saplings, waiting to be planted or repotted or pruned.

Mostly I've written about music and the life of a musician (not always the same thing), from exploring the broader aspects of what it is to walk out onto a stage or to make a recording to specialist tips from deep inside the practice room: how to trill, how to pedal, how to practise. Other subjects appear too, people I've known, places I've travelled to, books I've read, paintings I've seen. Even religion is there: the possibility of the existence of God, problems with some biblical texts and the challenge involved in being a gay Catholic, and abortion. I've placed these reflections in a separate section so that readers allergic to such matters can avoid them and we can remain friends. <>

THE RUMI PRESCRIPTION: HOW AN ANCIENT MYSTIC POET CHANGED MY MODERN MANIC LIFE by Melody Moezzi [TarcherPerigee, 9780525537762]

A powerful personal journey to find meaning and life lessons in the words of a wildly popular 13th century poet.

Rumi's inspiring and deceptively simple poems have been called ecstatic, mystical, and devotional. To writer and activist Melody Moezzi, they became a lifeline. In **THE RUMI PRESCRIPTION**, we follow her path of discovery as she translates Rumi's works for herself - to gain wisdom and insight in the face of a creative and spiritual roadblock. With the help of her father, who is a lifelong fan of Rumi's poetry, she immerses herself in this rich body of work, and discovers a 13th-century prescription for modern life.

Addressing isolation, distraction, depression, fear, and other everyday challenges we face, the book offers a roadmap for living with intention and ease, and embracing love at every turn--despite our deeply divided and chaotic times. Most of all, it presents a vivid reminder that we already have the answers we seek, if we can just slow down to honor them.

- *You went out in search of gold far and wide, but all along you were gold on the inside.*
- *Become the sky and the clouds that create the rain, not the gutter that carries it to the drain.*
- *You already own all the sustenance you seek. If only you'd wake up and take a peek.*
- *Quit being a drop. Make yourself an ocean.*

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BETTER TO BE OF THE SAME HEART THAN OF THE SAME TONGUE. —RUMI

Excerpt: My mother named me Melody after a song by Bobby Vinton. It's called "My Melody of Love," and it's bad. Really bad. But my Persian mother was a big fan of "the Polish Prince," and the bilingual popmeets-polka chorus is so admittedly catchy that unless you're aching for an earworm, I highly advise you not to Google it. Still, in 1979, my mom loved that song just as much as she loved the fact that "Melody" means the same thing in both Persian and English.

My father, on the other hand, wanted to name me Maryam, in honor of the Virgin Mary. But he was still in Tehran, working as an obstetrician delivering other people's babies, while my mom had already fled on account of Iran's brewing so-called Islamic Revolution. After her cushy job as a pathologist peering through microscopes in the hospital basement morphed into a decidedly more dangerous one as a makeshift trauma surgeon tending to bullet wounds in the emergency room, my parents got scared. Six months pregnant, my mom swiftly embarked on an American "vacation," so that I could be born here. My father stayed behind to gauge whether we might still have a future in Iran. I, ever impatient and perhaps taking a cue from my mother, proceeded to flee the womb shortly after we arrived in the States—nearly two months early, fully developed, and sporting a plush Persian head of hair. So it was that halfway across the world, my mother easily won the name debate, and I became Melody, not Maryam.

Ever since, I've been blessed with an intense appreciation for music and cursed with a staggering lack of talent for it. Years of violin and piano lessons proved this definitively. But neither my atrocious sight-reading nor my dreadful recital performances did anything to curtail my love of music—for you need not compose, create, or even read a melody to revel in it. That's the magic of music. It needs no translation. Words, however, do.

While musicians can transcend language, writers are bound by it. Think of all the cheesy lyrics we tolerate and even enjoy in love songs that would induce vomiting if they ever appeared in a book of poetry minus the music. I expect that even the brilliant Beyoncé and Jay-Z know that the real genius behind a song like "Crazy in Love" isn't in the bizarre bridge (Uh oh, uh oh, uh oh, oh, no, no ...) or the captivating chorus (Got me lookin' so crazy right now ...), but in the notes.

Eight centuries ago and thousands of miles away, the great Persian mystic poet and Islamic scholar Molana Jalaloddin Muhammad Balkhi Rumi knew this too. For while Rumi's verse is made up entirely of words, it's more than that. In Persian, also known as Farsi, the word for poem—"shehr"—means "song" as well. By no coincidence, Rumi's classical Persian verse isn't meant to be read while sitting, but rather sung while spinning. For this is how Rumi composed

his mystical poetry, whirling and rhyming ecstatically. The miracle here is that this verse isn't just good; it's extraordinary—which is why it has been translated into every major language on earth. It's also why Rumi has become so wildly popular around the world today—especially in America,' where he is often identified as the bestselling poet in the country and has arguably earned the highest seal of approval from American pop culture, as Bey and Jay have now named a daughter after him.

There is a reason Rumi's poetry has survived so long and reached so far. His rhymes honor the sublime power of music, begging to be sung, despite and because of the fact that his verse is so exquisite that it stands alone. Even without music and in translation, Rumi's words resonate across time and space, speaking to the unifying force within all of us that transcends language, culture, race, and religion. Herein rests Rumi's notion of "the Beloved," known by countless different names—God, Truth, Light, Nature, Beauty, and the Universe, to name just a few—but sharing a common essence inextricably rooted in love. As such, the Beloved is not a passion we ought to pursue, but a sacred inheritance that lives within each of us, that connects us, and that—if we let it—wakes us up.

This book is the story of how—with the help of my father and Rumi—I woke up. Along the way, I faced all of the diagnoses and applied all of the prescriptions that follow, which is why I've organized the chapters largely chronologically and in the order of every diagnosis (Dx) and prescription (Rx) that propelled my journey forward. I still encounter each of these diagnoses daily, for wanting, isolation, haste, depression, distraction, anxiety, anger, fear, disappointment, and pride are all inherent to the human condition. But thanks to Rumi's poetic prescriptions and my father's patience in dispensing them, I finally feel up to the task. In fact, I welcome it. My hope is that this book will help you do the same. Not in the same way or through the same path, but in your way and through your path.

Whether you are a Rumi expert or never heard of him before picking up this book doesn't matter. The only prerequisite here is love. That said, because Rumi and I are writers, we are both enamored of and limited by words—and therefore subject to all the wonders and dangers of translation. Rumi wrote almost exclusively in Persian, while I write almost exclusively in English. Worse yet, the classical Persian of Rumi's verse is to contemporary Persian roughly what the Elizabethan English of Shakespeare's verse is to contemporary English. In other words, it's way different.

And though Farsi was my first language, it's not the one I know best. Growing up in Dayton, Ohio, I spoke predominantly Fanglish at home and English at school. And lest anyone dis Dayton as some backward provincial town, you should know that we had a sizable Iranian-American community, ensuring that I was never the only Iranian kid at school. So please set any "flyover state" stereotypes aside, because the problem with flying over us is that you never get to know us. And for the record, this applies equally to Ohio (go Buckeyes!) as to Iran (go Team Melli!).

All this to say, thanks to my parents, Dayton's tight-knit Iranian-American community, weekly Persian lessons, and plenty of summers in Tehran, I speak Farsi—just not nearly as well as I'd like. While I can read and write the language, I do so abysmally and at a glacial pace. And even after five years of intentional study for this book and a lifetime of inadvertent study as the daughter of two proud Persian parents—including a relentless Rumi reciter as a father and a persistent Persian-lesson planner as a mother—my language skills remain deeply lacking.

My father, by contrast, is fluent in both modern Farsi and Ru-mi's medieval variety, which he has been singing to me since I was a kid. Translating whenever necessary, he raised me on a steady diet of Rumi. All the while, I knew these verses were my inheritance. Yet it took me more than thirty years to claim it. Rumi's poetry is epic and untranslatable: full of allegory, commentary, wordplay, and copious literary and Quranic allusions that routinely went over my head growing up and often still do. For most of my life, the idea that someone like me—with my fourth-grade Farsi reading level—could even begin to translate Rumi seemed laughable, not to mention irresponsible. But two visionaries inspired me to approach the task with all the love, courage, humor, and humility it demanded.

First and foremost, there was my father. He believed in me and promised to help, and he did—a lot. The short translations sprinkled throughout this book represent a tiny sliver of Rumi's voluminous rhyming couplets, quatrains, and ghazals. Still, translating them was exacting. Some verses took me days, weeks, months, or even years to translate to my relative satisfaction. But I was never alone. Rumi was always there, and more often than not, so was my dad. In fact, all of the translations in this book are by my father, Ahmad Moezzi, and me. He patiently guided me through the Persian of every verse, and I carefully chose which words to use in English. In doing so, I tried to preserve the meaning and musicality of Rumi's poetry. At times, however, I sacrificed some of the former for the latter or vice versa. While I have undoubtedly failed to do Rumi justice here, please know that any such failures are neither Rumi's nor my father's, but mine alone.

The second sage who emboldened me to begin translating this poetry was Coleman Barks. If you've ever encountered Rumi in English before this, then it was likely through Barks' translations. Both my father and I agree that no one has better captured or spread the spirit of Rumi's poetry in English than Coleman Barks. What's more, he doesn't speak Farsi. Barks' more soulful and less literal interpretations,,,

Dx: Wanting
Rx: Go to the Source

> Seek the tonic nectar in the bitter sting.
> Go to the source of the source of your spring.

I grew up dodging dead Persian poets. Like stubborn evangelists, they knocked on every door and window of my childhood. My father forever let them in, ensuring their safe trespass on nearly every major and minor life event.

Were they alive, he would have cleared each entryway upon their arrival, guiding them inside, treating them like royalty, showering them with effusive Persian idioms, equally bizarre and typical expressions evolved over thousands of years of civilization: asking them to step on his eyes upon their arrival, insisting that he was their servant and the dirt beneath their feet during their visit, and bowing profusely with his hands held to his heart while offering to sacrifice himself for them upon their departure.

Were they solid bones and beating hearts in place of tattered books and ancient rhymes, my father would have happily offered our lyrical ancestors far more than these peculiar perennial pledges of love, esteem, and welcome. Were they still susceptible to hunger, thirst,

Dx: Pride 4. Rx: Return to the Source

Ego is the soul's worst affliction. No one lives outside its jurisdiction.
The same glorious feathers that spark the peacock's pride Attract hunters from every side.
All those severed from their source
Yearn to return as a matter of course.
Quit being a drop. Make yourself an ocean.
Abandon your ego and reap the Beloved's devotion.
Worse than all the lies that plague humanity
Is the ego lurking inside of me.
You're like a pearl asking where the ocean lies,
All the while soaking in its tides.
When you dedicate each breath to yourself,
You ache with every labored gasp.
When you surrender each breath to the Beloved,
Nothing is beyond your grasp.
Your homeland flows in every direction.
Why pray facing one minuscule section?
Seek the tonic nectar in the bitter sting.
Go to the source of the source of your spring.
Why seek pilgrimage at some distant shore,
When the Beloved is right next door?
To write is to have read.
More: to speak is to have
Listened, a conversation
With others and with the
Past, reflections frozen into
Words about things which
Flow beyond words.
Seeds flying across my
Garden across many seasons;
Ideas received, embraced,
Rejected, changed...
Always changing.
Seeds which Drift away
or which settle Deep down, which grow then
Scatter, branches shaken, down
Driven across the next fence.
Art's stage whisper; the perennial
Communication of music and more. <>

RUMI: UNSEEN POEMS Translated and Edited by Brad Gooch and Maryam Mortaz [Everyman's Library Pocket Poets Series, Everyman's Library, Alfred A Knopf, 9781101908105]

A collection of never-before-translated poems by the widely beloved medieval Persian poet Rumi.

Rumi (1207-1273) was trained in Sufism--a mystic tradition within Islam--and founded the Sufi order known to us as the Whirling Dervishes, who use dance and music as part of their spiritual devotion. Rumi's poetry has long been popular with contemporary Western audiences because of the way it combines the sacred and the sensual, describing divine love in rapturously human terms.

However, a number of Rumi's English translators over the past century were not speakers of Persian and they based their sometimes very free interpretations on earlier translations. With Western audiences in mind, translators also tended to tone down or leave out elements of Persian culture and of Islam in Rumi's work, and hundreds of the prolific poet's works were never made available to English speakers at all. In this new translation -- composed almost entirely of untranslated gems from Rumi's vast ouevre -- Brad Gooch and Maryam Mortaz aim to achieve greater fidelity to the originals while still allowing Rumi's lyric exuberance to shine.

"Love speaks a hundred different languages," exulted Rumi. He might well have said the same of his own ardently recited and ecstatically translated poems of love, which have found their way around the world like "a hundred thousand flames" — to use a favorite Rumi image — since his death in the Turkish city of Konya in 1321. A Persian-speaking poet, displaced from Central Asia during the Mongol terrors and winding up with his family in the Seljuk Empire in Asia Minor, after years of traveling through such thriving Muslim cities as Baghdad, Damascus, and Aleppo, Rumi expressed a polyglot civilization in poetry that segues easily among Persian, Arabic (especially the Arabic of the Quran), Turkish, and Greek. Over seven centuries he has been translated into dozens of languages and claimed as a "national" poet by Afghans, Iranians, and Turks alike.

The heartbeats of American and English poets and translators have often quickened to Rumi as well, beginning with Ralph Waldo Emerson, who translated an exquisitely mystical poem from the German of Rückert: "Of Paradise am I the Peacock, / Who has escaped from his nest." The Cambridge University professor R. A. Nicholson devoted his life to translating Rumi's six-volume spiritual epic, The Masnavi, often while dressed in Sufi robes and a tall round hat. At a poetry workshop in the United States in the 1970s, Robert Bly presented the young poet Coleman Barks with a volume of the decidedly literal translations of another Cambridge scholar, A. J. Arberry. "These poems need to be released from their cages," said Bly, and the ensuing flutter of free-verse — almost beat — renditions led to Rumi's status as the "best-selling poet in America."

Yet in the decade since I started seeking writings left behind by Rumi, as I researched my biography of his life and times, Rumi's Secret, I discovered that wide swathes of the poetry were still lying dormant, mostly unseen and unheard by the English reading public. Crucial to this realization has been my collaborator in the translations in this collection, Maryam Mortaz. An Iranian poet and writer living in New York City, Maryam began as my tutor in her native tongue — Persian, or Farsi — even helping long-distance when I studied in Persian immersion programs at University of Texas at Austin and University of Wisconsin at Madison. As the book expanded so did Maryam's role, and we jointly translated all the prose and poetry in the biography. When we were stumped by swerves in Rumi's thought, she would call her friend Qhasem Hasheminejad, a poet, novelist, and scholar in Iran; when I was in Tehran, he visited me in my hotel lobby and fixed me with his wise gaze while edgily wearing a Sufi skullcap in public. (The mystical practices of Sufism are discouraged by conservative and religious leaders, as they were in Rumi's day.)

Rumi's Masnavi has been thoroughly translated into English, first by Nicholson in England and now in an ongoing project by Jawid Mojaddedi at Rutgers. Indeed, many current translations of Rumi's poetry are excerpts from this epic, with titles added. (Rumi never titled any of his poems.) Yet there remain the lyric ghazals, similar to sonnets in length and impact, often with radii, or repeating phrases punctuating line ends. Dizzyingly creative, Rumi wrote more than 3,000 ghazals; of these, only about half have been translated into English directly from Persian. He also wrote about 2,000 robaiyat, the pithy quatrain form made famous in Edward Fitzgerald's Victorian renditions of Ornar Khayyam — an earlier poet whose chill blasts of skepticism likely did not move Rumi. A scholarly translation of all of Rumi's robaiyat exists, but those in popular circulation number only about 400, leaving the majority of these short haiku-like poems underappreciated.

An obvious question is why so many poems by a celebrated poet have been overlooked. In part it's an accident of history. Much translation in the past half-century has consisted of standing on the shoulders of Nicholson or Arberry, whose cumulative two-volume edition included about 500 ghazals. Poets have sprung these cages either by infusing them with more spirit or tracing back to the originals in Persian and producing new versions. Yet Arberry, a formidable scholar of Arabic, Persian, and Islamic studies, had his own preferences. We feel he left out some of the poet's poet works of lilting beauty —lacking any special messages of wisdom — that gave us pleasure. At the other extreme, many popular recent translations avoid references to Islam or allusions to Persian literature and culture that were perhaps judged too foreign or off-putting. I've met fans of Rumi — who had his poems read at their wedding — who were surprised to find out he was not a Buddhist.

A number of the poems in the quarry we mined have been understandably bypassed over the years: Rumi repeats himself, and some of his uses of the stock imagery of Persian poetry — stars and moons, nightingales and roses — are fresher than others. A few are impossibly mind-bending as Rumi leads us on travels into the ineffable with only broken language and twisting syntax as our guide. (He broke the rules more than any other classical Persian poet.) We tried to include as many of these puzzles as could be solved, as well as a few favorite poems previously translated by others that we could not resist including. We were transported when we found some of our repeating lines faintly evoking the music of the originals or, most certainly, when we came across gleaming works that were as beautiful or philosophically compelling as anything we had ever read of Rumi's. Our intention was to find a middle way between academic loyalty and wildly inventive freedom, a medium that might articulate both the personal poems of aching human love, to Rumi's beloved companion and teacher, Shams of Tabriz, and those of divine love, in his hymns to God that soar like Mohammad's winged horse Buraq.

Rumi cast himself as a reluctant poet. His attitude was a bit like that of Marianne Moore in her poem "Poetry," which begins, "I, too, dislike it." Yet his motives were different. Rumi was a religious leader, composing verses as he whirled himself into trances to annihilate ordinary reality and language in a mystical union with love itself. This urgent and sincere spirit is perhaps responsible for the way the voice of this medieval poet shines through all manner of translations, making him, as a publisher once said to me, "translation-proof." Persian poets often put their signature, or takhallos, like a tag in last lines. Rumi occasionally used "Silence" as his tag. For him, the most successful poems were failures, breaking apart in silence. "Rip this poem apart like an old piece of cloth," he wrote, "To set meaning free from words, wind, and air." We hope this collection will provide fresh glimpses into Rumi's sublime "world of silence ... like a bird's wing." —BRAD GOOCH

Sun, riding atop the sky
Sun, riding atop the sky,
Cleverly turning yourself into a star,
Sometimes like a heart in the chest,

Sometimes sitting off to the side,
Sometimes standing far, far away,
Like a stranger looking on,
Sometimes a cure burning away sorrow,
Sometimes asking, "What is the cure for this sorrow?"
You tear me apart and sew me together.
The heart is better in pieces, in pieces.
Sometimes my heart cries like a baby.
You say to me, "Rock the cradle."
Sometimes you hold me like a nurse.
Sometimes you mount me like a rider,
Sometimes you appear with white hair, sometimes
gray,
Sometimes as a child and sometimes an infant.
Am I spent? Or did you grab my tongue? Quickly and strongly and cleverly!
I learned about love from your perfection
I learned about love from your perfection.
I learned about poetry and song from your beauty.
Through the curtain of my heart,
I saw you dancing.
I learned how to dance from thinking about you.

THE FIRST FREE WOMEN: POEMS OF THE EARLY BUDDHIST NUNS

edited by Matty Weingast, Foreword by Bhikkhuni Anandabodhi
[Shambhala Publications, 9781611807769]

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A radical and vivid rendering of poetry from the first Buddhist nuns that brings a new immediacy to their voices.

The Therigatha ("Verses of the Elder Nuns") is the oldest collection of known writings from Buddhist women and one of the earliest collections of women's literature in India. Composed during the life of the Buddha, the collection contains verses by early Buddhist nuns detailing everything from their disenchantment with their prescribed roles in society to their struggles on the path to enlightenment to their spiritual realizations. Among the nuns, a range of voices are represented, including former wives, women who lost children, women who gave up their wealth, and a former prostitute.

In **THE FIRST FREE WOMEN**, Matty Weingast revives this ancient collection with a contemporary and radical adaptation. In this poetic re-envisioning that remains true to the original essence of each poem, he infuses each verse with vivid language that is not found in other translations. Simple yet profound, the nuance of language highlights the beauty in each poem and resonates with modern readers exploring the struggles, grief, failures, doubts, and ultimately, moments of profound insight of each woman. Weingast breathes fresh life into this ancient collection of poetry, offering readers a rare glimpse of Buddhism through the spiritual literature and poetry of the first female disciples of the Buddha.

Here you'll find the incomparably beautiful.
The incomparably sad.
Those born into abject poverty.
And those born into limitless wealth.
The tired wives of arranged marriages.
And the desperately in love.
Young women who sell their bodies.
Daughters left orphaned or abandoned.
Grandmothers who spend a lifetime caring for others.
Mothers who watch their children die—and wonder
how they can possibly go on.
The warriors.
The sages.
The earth mothers.
Those who refuse to do as they're told.
Those who refuse to remain silent.
Those who refuse to give up.

Their voices are all here.

Though these poems differ in subject and tone, they are all ultimately triumphant because they are all pointing to the true possibility of awakening that is available to all of us. These women were doing much more than creating beautiful poetry—they were changing the world. Shaving their heads and putting on robes was not simply a sign of spiritual dedication. It was an act of revolution.

Women who put on robes today continue to face inequalities almost everywhere they go. Buddhist nuns don't receive the same level of respect or support as monks. Full ordination for women has yet to be widely recognized as legitimate, and in some places it is even illegal.

This book requires no prior knowledge of Buddhism or meditation.

Come inside.

Make yourself at home.

A sampling of The Poems

Patachara Wandering Robe

Farmers turn up the soil, plant seeds, and wait.
All by itself,
water pours down from the sky
and turns earth into food.
After all these years
sleeping on the ground,
waking before dawn,
and begging for every meal—
where's my harvest?
Late one evening,
I was washing my feet
after another long day
of sitting and walking.
The water
poured
over
my feet
and onto

the ground.
I let my mind go,
and it flowed downhill with the water—
towards my little hut.
I went inside,
sat on the bed,
and lowered the wick of the lamp.
All by itself,
the flame
went
out.

Sama Song

Like a dog
forever
getting ready
to sit,
all day
and
all night
I circled
my cushion.

These days,
body and mind
sit together
like old friends.

Since we aren't getting anywhere,
they eventually decided,
why not have a seat
and try to relax?
There are many paths.

Another Sama

After twenty-five years on the Path,
I'd experienced almost everything—except peace.

When I was young,
my mother told me
that I would find true happiness
only in marriage.

Remembering her words all those years
later,
something in me began to tremble.
I gave myself to the trembling—and it showed me
all the pain
this little heart
had ever known.

And how countless lives of searching
had brought me

at last
to the present moment,
which I happily married.

Can you imagine?
We've been living together ever since,
without a single argument.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS: NOTES OF A CHRONIC RE-READER by Vivian Gornick [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 97803742821 58]

One of our most beloved writers reassess the electrifying works of literature that have shaped her life

I sometimes think I was born reading . . . I can't remember the time when I didn't have a book in my hands, my head lost to the world around me.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS: NOTES OF A CHRONIC RE-READER is Vivian Gornick's celebration of passionate reading, of returning again and again to the books that have shaped her at crucial points in her life. In nine essays that traverse literary criticism, memoir, and biography, one of our most celebrated critics writes about the importance of reading—and re-reading—as life progresses. Gornick finds herself in contradictory characters within D. H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers*, assesses womanhood in Colette's *The Vagabond* and *The Shackle*, and considers the veracity of memory in Marguerite Duras's *The Lover*. She revisits Great War novels by J. L. Carr and Pat Barker, uncovers the psychological complexity of Elizabeth Bowen's prose, and soaks in Natalia Ginzburg, "a writer whose work has often made me love life more." After adopting two cats, whose erratic behavior she finds vexing, she discovers Doris Lessing's *Particularly Cats*.

Guided by Gornick's trademark verve and insight, *Unfinished Business* is a masterful appreciation of literature's power to illuminate our lives from a peerless writer and thinker who "still read[s] to feel the power of Life with a capital L."

Excerpt: It has often been my experience that re-reading a book that was important to me at earlier times in my life is something like lying on the analyst's couch. The narrative I have had by heart for years is suddenly being called into alarming question. It seems that I've misremembered quite a lot about this or that character or this or that plot turn they met here in New York, I was so sure it was Rome; the time was 1870, I thought it was 1900; and the mother did what to the protagonist? Yet the world still drops away while I'm reading and I can't help marveling, If I got this wrong, and this and this wrong, how come the book still has me in its grip?

Like most readers, I sometimes think I was born reading. I can't remember the time when I didn't have a book in my hands, my head lost to the world around me. On vacation with family or friends, I am quite capable of settling myself, book in hand, on the living-room couch in a beautiful country house and hardly stirring out into the glorious green for which we have all come. Once, on a train going through the Peruvian Andes, with everyone else ooh-ing and aah-ing out the window, I couldn't lift my eyes from The Woman in White. On a Caribbean beach I sat in the blazing sun, Diane Johnson's Lesser Lives (an imagined biography of George Meredith's first wife) propped on my knees, and was surprised when I looked up to see that I wasn't surrounded by the fog and cold of 1840s England. The companionateness of those books! Of all books. Nothing can match it. It's the longing for coherence inscribed in the work that extraordinary attempt at shaping the inchoate through words it brings peace and excitement, comfort and consolation. But above all, it's the sheer

relief from the chaos in the head that reading delivers. Sometimes I think it alone provides me with courage for life, and has from earliest childhood.

We lived in an immigrant working-class neighborhood in the Bronx where all needs were met through the patronage of one of the many stores that ran the length of a single shopping street. The butcher, the baker, the grocer, the bank, the drugstore, the shoe repair: all storefront operations. One day, when I was quite small, seven or eight, my mother, holding my hand, walked us into a store I'd never before noticed: it was the local branch of the New York Public Library. The room was long, the floorboards bare, and the walls lined, floor to ceiling, with books. In the middle of the room was planted a desk at which sat Eleanor Roosevelt (in those days, all librarians looked like Eleanor Roosevelt): a tall, bosomy woman with a mass of grey hair piled belle epoque—style on the top of her head, rimless glasses perched high on her incredibly straight nose, and a look of calm interest in her eyes. My mother approached the desk, pointed at my head, and said to Eleanor Roosevelt, "She likes to read." The librarian stood up, said "Come," and walked me back to the front of the store where the children's books were sectioned. "Start here," she said, and I did. Between then and the time I graduated from high school, I read my way around the room. If I'm asked now to remember what I read in that storefront library, I can only recall that I went from Grimm's fairy tales to Little Women to Of Time and the River. Then I entered college where I discovered that all these years I'd been reading literature. It was at that moment, I think, that I began rereading, because from then on it was to the books that had become my intimates that I would turn and turn again, not only for the transporting pleasure of the story itself but also to understand what I was living through, and what I was to make of it.

I'd grown up in a noisy left-wing household where Karl Marx and the international working class were articles of faith: feeling strongly about social injustice was a given.

So from the start, the politicalness of life colored almost all tangible experience, which of course included reading. I read ever and only to feel the power of Life with a capital L as it manifested itself (thrillingly) through the protagonist's engagement with those external forces beyond his or her control. In this way I felt, acutely but equally, the work of Dickens, Dreiser, and Hardy, as well as Mike Gold, John Dos Passos, and Agnes Smedley. I had to laugh when, a few years ago, I came across an essay by Delmore Schwartz in which he (Schwartz) takes Edmund Wilson to task for Wilson's shocking lack of interest in literary form. For Schwartz, form was integral to the meaning of a literary work; for Wilson, what mattered was not how books were written but what they were talking about, and how they affected the culture at large. His habit, always, was to place a book in its social and political context. This perspective allowed him to pursue a line of thought that let him speak of Proust and Dorothy Parker in the same sentence, or compare Max Eastman favorably with André Gide. For Schwartz, this was pure pain. For me, it was inexpressibly rewarding. And what could have been more natural than that the way I read was the way I would begin to write.

I still read to feel the power of Life with a capital L. I still see the protagonist in thrall to forces beyond his or her control. And when I write I still hope to put my readers behind my eyes, experience the subject as I have experienced it, feel it viscerally as I have felt it. What follows is a collection of pieces written in appreciation of the literary enterprise as I have encountered it through the reading and re-reading of books that made me feel anew all of the above. <>

IN THE LAND OF MEN: A MEMOIR by Adrienne Miller [Ecco, 9780062682413]

One of the Most Anticipated Books of the Year: Vogue, Parade, Esquire, Bitch, and Maclean's

A New York Times and Washington Post Book to Watch

A fiercely personal memoir about coming of age in the male-dominated literary world of the nineties, becoming the first female literary editor of Esquire, and Miller's personal and working relationship with David Foster Wallace

A naive and idealistic twenty-two-year-old from the Midwest, Adrienne Miller got her lucky break when she was hired as an editorial assistant at *GQ* magazine in the mid-nineties. Even if its sensibilities were manifestly mid-century—the martinis, powerful male egos, and unquestioned authority of kings—*GQ* still seemed the red-hot center of the literary world. It was there that Miller began learning how to survive in a man's world. Three years later, she forged her own path, becoming the first woman to take on the role of literary editor of *Esquire*, home to the male writers who had defined manhood itself— Hemingway, Mailer, and Carver. Up against this old world, she would soon discover that it wanted nothing to do with a "mere girl."

But this was also a unique moment in history that saw the rise of a new literary movement, as exemplified by *McSweeney*'s and the work of David Foster Wallace. A decade older than Miller, the mercurial Wallace would become the defining voice of a generation and the fiction writer she would work with most. He was her closest friend, confidant—and antagonist. Their intellectual and artistic exchange grew into a highly charged professional and personal relationship between the most prominent male writer of the era and a young woman still finding her voice.

This memoir—a rich, dazzling story of power, ambition, and identity—ultimately asks the question "How does a young woman fit into this male culture and at what cost?" With great wit and deep intelligence, Miller presents an inspiring and moving portrayal of a young woman's education in a land of men.



Excerpt: At twenty-five, I became the first female literary and fiction editor of Esquire. It was 1997 and Esquire had for decades been one of the country's most significant magazines; home to the writers who defined "masculinity" (if you will excuse the term) for the twentieth century: Ernest Hemingway, Norman Mailer, Raymond Carver, and the practitioners of New Journalism

My mission was to help the magazine find its new voice. And I understood that I was following in the footsteps of two legendary editors, Gordon Lish and Rust Hills, men of extraordinary vision and taste. Of course, I knew that I was, in every way, a baffling choice for the job: I was a woman, I was notably young, and I had had no sparkling editorial career behind me. But I was passionate about writers and writing, I was eager-eyed, and, I believed, I had taste.

During my tenure, I discovered many new writers, I worked with many giants. But it was with the formally audacious David Foster Wallace story "Adult World," that, as David said, every other

magazine had rejected, when my journey—professional, personal, artistic—really began. David and I met in 1998. I was twenty-six and he was thirty-six. I had been at Esquire only a few months and was doing what I could to refurbish the magazine's moribund literary section. Infinite Jest had been published two years before and David was on his way to becoming the most influential and imitated American fiction writer since Hemingway.

I would acquire and edit four of David's stories for Esquire. I read his manuscripts, we were friends, we dated. After his suicide, my private approach to him, already well-honed during his lifetime, became ever more entrenched; my preferred modes: "avoid," "shut down," and "avoid" some more. I couldn't talk about him, I couldn't read anything about him, and I couldn't read his work. I certainly couldn't write about him. God knows I never planned to, and couldn't have imagined a world in which I ever would.

What has changed in my thinking? So much has been bothering me in the eleven years since David's death. It's nothing new to suggest that as his persona has been processed by the culture industry he so loathed, the living man has faded from sight. Nearly everyone gets him wrong—but that's beside the point. Whether he's presented as a hero or a monster, he's been reduced to a darkly glamorous suicide doll. There are also significant lacunae in the public record of David's life and in the public record of his evolving thinking about his own work during the period of time we were friends.

With these thoughts in mind, I started writing about what it was like for me to know him, but also, crucially, about my own personal odyssey: a young woman trying to do good work and trying to get herself taken seriously in a world of men.

During my career, I would learn about the profoundly compromised men who make the art we venerate, and I would learn about protecting the egos of these men. I would learn about power. That was the world I lived in. Little did we know then that we were in the last days of a dying order. All empires collapse eventually, of course. –AM, August 2019 <>

Samuel Beckett: Anatomy of a Literary Revolution by Pascale Casanova, translated by Gregory Elliott [Verso, 9781844671120]

In this fascinating new exploration of Samuel Beckett's work, Pascale Casanova argues that Beckett's reputation rests on a pervasive misreading of his oeuvre, which neglects entirely the literary revolution he instigated. Reintroducing the historical into the heart of this body of work, Casanova provides an arresting portrait of Beckett as radically subversive—doing for writing what Kandinsky did for art—and in the process presents the key to some of the most profound enigmas of Beckett's writing.

Ill Seen Ill Read

As depicted in the fearsome, hieratic photographs imposed by official portraiture, Beckett has come to embody, at least in France, the prophetic, sacred mission assigned the writer by devotees of literature. Accordingly, he has been assimilated to a vague metaphysics, in a strange, solitary place,

where suffering permits only a well-nigh inarticulate, shapeless language, a kind of pure cry of pain, cast just as it comes on to paper.

As if he alone represented a kind of poetic beyond, Beckett has only ever been read as the messenger or oracle of the truth of `being'. The Unnamable, writes Maurice Blanchot, is 'a being without being, who can neither live nor die, stop or start, the empty space in which the idleness of an empty speech speaks'. This representation of poetic tragedy, which is but one of the countless forms of literature's annexation by philosophers, reduces the poet to the passive, archaic function of inspired mediator, charged with `unveiling being'. (`Ah, the old questions, the old answers, there's nothing like them'2, says Beckett who, in irony at least, surpasses his commentators.) Even though the jargon of `authenticity' was alien to him, the obscurity and strangeness of his texts had to be reduced to the only legitimate form of profundity. As early as the 1950s, Blanchot's view became in France the sole authorized commentary, helping to `fabricate' a tailor-made Beckett, hero of `pure' criticism. Lacking a history, a past, an inheritance or a project, Beckett disappeared under the flashy garb of poetic canonization.

This heroic imagery has proved one of the surest ways to obscure the specificity of literary form, to refuse Beckett any aesthetic impulse, the search for a form therewith being reduced to an artifice unworthy of the quest for `authenticity'. Thus, apropos of The Unnamable, Blanchot writes of a book `without cheating or subterfuge ... in which aesthetic sentiments are no longer apposite'. The (apparent) obscurity of Beckett's texts has served the obscurantist designs of Blanchot-style criticism.

A reconstruction of Beckett's trajectory, and of the history of his oeuvre, leads to the conclusion that such hermeneutic glaciation has not simply masked the meaning of his literary project, but inverted it. Thus he has been celebrated and consecrated in the name of an idea of poetry he always fought against. His refusal of the presuppositions underlying realism, representation, and credence in literary `truth' can only be understood if we hypothesize that he spent his whole life working on a radical aesthetic revolution: literary abstraction. Yet it is in the name of what he called such `outdated conventions', and above all in the name of the pathos of `being', that he became one of the twentieth century's most famous and established writers.

Was his oeuvre so prejudicial to the very idea of poetry that it had to be dissolved in the imposing machinery for the normalization of literature?

Obliged to write after Joyce and, so as not to imitate him, beyond Joyce, Beckett embarked on the road of a different modernity at the level of form. The literary abstraction he invented, at the cost of a lifetime's enormous effort, in order to put literature on a par with all the major artistic revolutions of the twentieth century — especially pictorial abstraction — was to be based on an unprecedented literary combinatory. The art of logic was placed in the service of `abstractivation', a dynamic peculiar to each text, which proceeds from words to the withdrawal of meaning — that is, from meaning to delivering realist representation its quietus. In order to break with signification and the referent, inherent in language, Beckett does not work on the sonorous materiality of the word. Instead, he is led to question, one after the other, all the ordinary conditions of possibility of literature — the subject, memory, imagination, narration, character, psychology, space and time, and so forth — on which, without our being aware of it, the whole historical edifice of literature rests, so as to achieve the gradual erasure of its images in 'the dim and void'.

Together with Joyce, Beckett is one of the contemporary writers who has prompted the most commentaries and analyses — something compounded in his case by the bilingualism that has entailed the construction of a dual critical tradition, in English and French.

Everything — or virtually everything — there is to say about him has already been said. But it suffices to switch critical standpoints, and to extend to literature the principle of `historical inquiry' proposed by Spinoza in order to restore to sacred texts their meaning, to discover multiple traces of the formalist intention of his project — traces that have usually gone unnoticed, because they did not form part of explanation via miracles. It is therefore a question of engaging in a kind of meticulous examination — and setting out in search of minor indices that in isolation might seem insignificant and even over-interpreted, but which, when brought together, end up forming a consistent pattern. These indices illuminate the oeuvre by rendering the principles of its genesis visible. Better, they make the problems Beckett posed himself— that is, the set of literary possibilities he had to operate with in order to `invent' his own solution — intelligible. Beckett would work for thirty years to bring literature into modernity, to develop an aesthetic answer to personal questions that are also literary investigations: those of defeat, failure, the `worst'.

Thus, `historical inquiry' will enable us to discover that the project governing Beckett's writing is not, as official criticism would have it, radically strange in kind — a meteorite abruptly and as if miraculously fallen from the sky, without precedents, referents or descendants. On the contrary, his greatness consists in his confrontation with the set of aesthetic issues and debates that were contemporaneous with him. Far from being frozen in the bombast consubstantial with the rhetoric of Being, Beckett more than anyone else was concerned with aesthetic modernity. From the Second World War onwards, he deliberately situated himself in relation to the whole literary and pictorial avant-garde he mixed with in Paris — and definitely not Existentialism or the Theatre of the Absurd, whose presuppositions were alien to him.

However, in order to advance exegesis of Beckett's intention, and understand why he made such an enormous effort to tear himself away from the commonest presuppositions of literature, we must also understand the desperate impasse he was trapped in, which he could only escape from through abstraction. In other words, it is necessary to go further back in his history and the history of his original literary space: Ireland. His project is inseparable from the itinerary, seemingly utterly contingent and external, that led him from Dublin to Paris.

From one book to the next, this search became increasingly systematic, as if Beckett gradually discovered the stylistic constraints and forms required for the coherence of his project. In the end, it would be Worstward Ho that radicalized, and took furthest, the formal combinatory whereby he carried out one of the greatest literary revolutions of the twentieth century. <>

Virginia Woolf: And the Women Who Shaped Her World by Gillian Gill [Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 9781328683953]

An insightful, witty look at Virginia Woolf through the lens of the extraordinary women closest to her.

How did Adeline Virginia Stephen become the great writer Virginia Woolf? Acclaimed biographer Gillian Gill tells the stories of the women whose legacies—of strength, style, and creativity—shaped Woolf's path to the radical writing that inspires so many today.

Gill casts back to Woolf's French-Anglo-Indian maternal great-grandmother Thérèse de L'Etang, an outsider to English culture whose beauty passed powerfully down the female line; and to Woolf's aunt Anne Thackeray Ritchie, who gave Woolf her first vision of a successful female writer. Yet it was the women in her own family circle who had the most complex and lasting effect on Woolf. Her mother, Julia, and sisters Stella, Laura, and Vanessa were all, like Woolf herself, but in markedly different ways, warped by the male-dominated household they lived in. Finally, Gill shifts the lens onto the famous Bloomsbury group. This, Gill convinces, is where Woolf called upon the

legacy of the women who shaped her to transform a group of men--united in their love for one another and their disregard for women--into a society in which Woolf ultimately found her freedom and her voice.

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Excerpt: Virginia Woolf matters to us. She speaks to our lives, inspires our polemic, lodges in our collective memory, and shapes our prose. For an English man who lived, as Woolf did, before most of us in today's world were born, that would be no small trick. For an early-twentieth-century English woman it is perhaps unique.

Woolf had an original mind, lived at an important point in history, read everything she could put her hand on, and labored every day, well or ill, mad or sane, to write novels, meet her book review deadlines, scrawl a pile of letters, work up bits of dialogue and thumbnail sketches, and record in her diary the things her mind was busy with. You learn to forge by hammering, goes the old French saying, and as she scribbled and typed, Woolf was forging a style. Elegantly personal. Unpretentiously authoritative. Chattily erudite. Eminently readable. Today, the name Virginia Woolf is a meme, and she is even more read, more quoted, and more influential than she was in her lifetime.

Her letters show that, by the time Virginia Woolf was in her late teens, she was an isolated and largely silent autodidact, excluded from participation in the communal aspects of learning, thinking, and writing. She was at ease only within the circle of family and in the company of young women who, to a greater or lesser extent, suffered from the same limitations she did. At twentytwo, Virginia Stephen was intellectually primed to start on the career of a professional writer, but she could not. Her father — deaf, depressed, dependent, cancer-ridden — blocked her path.

Only after Leslie Stephen died, in 1904, and she had recovered from the double psychic shock of missing him terribly and remembering how she had wished him dead, could Virginia Stephen spread her wings and start to soar. Beginning with modest contributions to the women's section of a religious periodical, she quickly moved on to the Times Literary Supplement, a rare achievement for a woman of her generation. By 1910 her reviews and essays were earning her enough to pay off her doctor's bills and acquire not just a room but a vacation home of her own in the Sussex countryside.

Virginia Woolf was eager to compete in the literary marketplace of her time and ready to be judged by its standards. In this she was like her contemporaries Vita Sackville West, Rebecca West, Agatha Christie, Dorothy L. Sayers, and Katherine Mansfield. These writers, whose names clearly marked them as female, nonetheless did not relish the label "feminist." What made Virginia Woolf different, what makes her relevant today, is that she not only saw but also pointed out, publicly, and in print, that whatever you did, it always mattered if you were marked as female or male. Gender was one part of life's grand equation, Woolf argued, and if there was no female Shakespeare or Dante or Goethe, this was because the literary game, like all of society's games, had been rigged. To use a contemporary metaphor, the rules had been set by Team M to ensure the victory of Team M, the referee and linesmen all sported the phallic insignia, so what wonder if Team W rarely scored a goal, much less a win?

From the beginning of her professional career, Virginia Woolf took that hackneyed phrase "Cherchez la femme» as a reading mantra in the review and essay assignments she accepted. This, not her encyclopedic knowledge of English literature and her familiarity with French and ancient Greek, set her apart from her fellow reviewers. To take one famous example from the first volume of The Common Reader, in her essay "The Pastons and Chaucer" Woolf singles out the letters written by the mother of the family, Margaret Paston. Yes, Woolf tells her readers, this woman's letters are tedious and repetitive, even more so, perhaps, than those of her husband and sons, but they matter because Margaret's is one of the rare instances of a woman's voice coming down to us from the fifteenth century. At that time, very few women could read, much less write; books were precious possessions to be locked away, and literary models for women were almost unknown.

In another essay, Woolf celebrated Jane Austen as that rare woman who had been accepted into the canon of English literature. By the age of fifteen, Woolf points out, Austen was already writing not for her family and schoolroom friends but "for everybody, for nobody, for our age, for her own, in other words, even at that early age, Jane Austen was writing." Woolf mourns Jane Austen, dead at forty-two when she was just becoming a literary presence, her letters ceremonially burned by her sister to preserve her respectability. In another essay, this time on George Eliot, simply by judicious quotation Woolf suggests how much the savagely rapid decline in that great woman novelist's reputation after her death was due not just to her sex but to her physical appearance. In the eyes of male critics, the woman Mary Ann Evans was too plain for "George Eliot," the pen name she chose, to be part of the Great Tradition of English fiction.

When Virginia Woolf wrote things like that, Leonard Woolf, her husband and partner at the Hogarth Press, published them without enthusiasm. Her intimate friend Vita Sackville-West and her sister Vanessa Bell, who agreed about little else but who both felt threatened in their precarious versions of unconventionality, thought she was losing her mind — again! When Woolf's feminist call to arms first appeared in the tense interim between two world wars, people were busy debating the rise of fascism and the appeal of Stalinist Russia, and Woolf's arguments fell largely on deaf ears. For some twenty-five years after her death, Virginia Woolf did not have a big voice in the cultural conversation.

But all that changed with the rise of the new feminism. In the 1960s, my generation rediscovered Virginia Woolf, and her two short polemical essays A Room of One's Own (1929) and Three

Guineas (1931) became inspirational texts. Women teaching women's history and feminist theory in the new women's studies departments found in Virginia Woolf a writer who two generations earlier had analyzed, clearly and elegantly, what was confusing and unfair about our lives. We applied what she had said about the barriers facing an imagined English writer called Judith Shakespeare and saw how much greater the barriers were for would-be painters and sculptors and composers and dramatists and film directors born female.

As Woolf had shone light on Sappho, on Margaret Cavendish, and on Aphra Behn, we took Scheherezade as our founding mother, savored the writing of Lady Murasaki and the nameless woman author of The Pillow Book, and rediscovered the artists Artemisia Gentileschi, Elisabeth Vigée Le Brun, and Rosa Bonheur. The idea of a woman needing a room of her own became an article of faith, and today almost any issue of the New York Times Book Review — to name just one major publication — that touches on the question of women and writing contains some reference to or quotation from Virginia Woolf.

As Woolf's essays and novels entered the new feminist canon, superbly edited collections of Woolf's diaries and letters also started to appear, and we discovered the woman behind the text. We found that, in equal partnership with her husband, Woolf not only chose and edited books for her private publishing company, the Hogarth Press, but in the early years got her fingers inky from setting type and gluey from attaching book covers made of wallpaper. From Woolf's letters and diary, we were able to follow from day to day how she mixed work and fun, town and country, solitude and society, men and women. We could follow her as she chronicled, documented, analyzed, criticized, and shaped the famous Bloomsbury group in her dual capacity as founding member and permanent outsider. We could watch her painfully striving to define a core self that was both/and, not either/or, female and male, straight and queer, sensual and pure, proudly independent and happily partnered.

And then there was the fact that, in a diary she carefully designed to hone her craft and record her world, Woolf never says that each morning she woke up to see if she was sane or mad. Would this be the day when once again she dropped off the edge of reason and crashed into the suicidal abyss where loved ones became demons and death was the only escape?

Madness is knit into the fabric of Virginia Woolf's greatness. From the age of thirteen, she suffered from a severe mental illness that was misunderstood by her doctors and exacerbated by the medical treatments they offered. But, and this is the key point, Woolf refused to define herself as a patient, much less a victim. She worked, she produced, she had fun, she found happiness. "Gather ye rosebuds while ye may," urged the poet Robert Herrick, and Woolf did, and when they pricked her fingers, she licked off the blood and picked some more.

Given the societal constraints she lived under and the chronic mental illness that afflicted her, how did Adeline Virginia Stephen become the great writer Virginia Woolf ? Part of the answer, I shall argue in this book, is that Woolf from earliest childhood had known powerful women and had reason to believe she could have power in her turn. Such a belief, in her generation and in ours, has a power of its own.

A rare combination of hyper-receptivity and icy critique, Woolf got her sense of female greatness from her books and from her family. She descended from a line of affluent, ambitious, enterprising women, and stories about them were passed along the generations. Different female definitions of success came down to the young Virginia Stephen as she heard about women like Thérèse Blin de Grincourt de l'Etang, her Franco-Bengali great-great-grandmother, or Adeline de l'Etang Pattle, her Anglo-Indian great-grandmother, or her mother's cousin Lady Isabella Somerset. Most important of all, Woolf knew, or knew of, two women who, despite everything her mother taught her, had

managed to succeed as professional artists as well as wives — Julia Margaret Cameron and Anne Thackeray Ritchie.

The acclaimed Victorian photographer Julia Margaret Cameron, née Pattie, was Julia Stephen's aunt and namesake, and the young Woolf could get a sense of her great-aunt's artistic achievement because some of Cameron's exquisite portraits of Woolf's mother as a young woman were hung in her Kensington home. That those photographs made their mark is attested by the fact that they would find a place of honor in the various houses Virginia and her sister Vanessa later occupied in Bloomsbury. Julia Cameron, unlike several of her sisters, died before her great-niece Virginia was born, but in 1926 the Hogarth Press issued a volume of Cameron's photographs, with a brilliant and affectionate essay on Cameron herself by Virginia. And Cameron, in all her exuberant, eccentric creativity, was in a sense reincarnate for the young Virginia Stephen in the person of her adoptive aunt Anne Thackeray Ritchie.

Anne Thackeray Ritchie, a successful novelist, memoirist, and literary historian, was an occasional but important presence in Stephen family life. The older daughter of William Makepeace Thackeray, Anne was born into the upper reaches of the Anglo-Indian community that had resettled in the south of England in the mid-nineteenth century. As a young woman she became a denizen of what Woolf liked to call Pattledom — the company of writers, painters, scientists, politicians, and industrialists that the Pattle sisters (among them Julia Cameron and Woolf's maternal grandmother, Maria Pattle Jackson) gathered around them.

Into the damp, narrow house where Virginia Woolf grew up, Anne Thackeray Ritchie brought a breath of air scented with frangipani, sandalwood, and cardamom, the air of India once breathed by Julia Margaret Cameron and her Pattie sisters. Julia Stephen, Virginia's mother, had savored that scent as a girl, but by the time Virginia was born, Julia found it too painful to talk about her ancestral Eden, with its nabobs and its artists. This is where Aunt Anny stepped in.

Like Thackeray Ritchie, Virginia would be not only a writer but a loving and loyal wife, a trusted family member, and a gifted social connector at the heart of England's cultural world. Like Thackeray Ritchie, Woolf would write essays and reviews that delved deep into the work of women writers of the past, even as she connected to creative, unconventional women in the present, such as the writer Vita Sackville West, the composer Ethel Smyth, and the theater director Edy Craig. Unlike Thackeray Ritchie, who lost her beloved sister, Minny, at age thirty, Virginia always had Vanessa, and as writer and painter the Stephen sisters cross-pollinated throughout their lives. And if Thackeray Ritchie was a mere echo of the Great Tradition of English fiction, Virginia Woolf, with her novels Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse, became part of it. Behind every great woman we can name is a long line of able, energetic, talented women for whom greatness was not an option. For most of history and still today in many parts of the world, the names and achievements of these outstanding women die with them. In this book we see Virginia Woolf as a gleaming link in "a chain of women who, whether willingly or not, had learnt certain traits, certain attitudes from one another through the years," as her niece Angelica Garnett put it. Because of her fame, because of her achievement, Woolf is that rare woman who allows the women who went before her and stood about her to enter the historical record.

Legacy and inheritance — the passing on of cultural and financial assets as well as physiological traits from one generation to another — will be a central theme in this book. As a student of the female condition living in the first half of the twentieth century, Woolf was aware that in traditional societies around the world, women had been able to pass to their daughters little more than their given names and their social traditions. It took centuries for Western civilization even to accept that the ovum played an equal role with the sperm, that the womb was more than an inert medium in which the sperm-generated homunculus could develop. Well into the nineteenth century, a woman's

property, inherited and earned, became the property of her husband when she married. Even in Woolf's generation, women's earning power was still under severe legal and economic constraints. Given this grim financial reality, as Woolf famously proclaims in A Room of One's Own, even a small inheritance — say, five hundred pounds a year, in 1920s English pounds — could make the difference between success and failure, fulfillment and frustration. A small inheritance could buy a woman the independence, the freedom of movement, and the opportunities for personal development that free men of all classes have traditionally enjoyed.

As we shall see, the women in Woolf's family line, starting with Woolf's great-great-grandmother Thérèse de l'Etang, born in the eighteenth century, and on to her Garnett great-nieces, born in the twentieth, had the lucky combination of talent and money. These were unusually beautiful, stylish, energetic, enterprising women, and, almost despite their male partners, they reliably passed these traits down to their daughters and their nieces, along with their names—Julia, Adeline, Virginia. Woolf's women, like Woolf herself, were fortunate enough to inherit the financial resources that enabled them to thrive and make their mark in the cultural ledger.

Each of the women we will meet in this book is a window onto Virginia Woolf's landscape. Her ancestors Thérèse and Adeline are small windows thick with bull's-eyes. Her surrogate aunt Anny Thackeray Ritchie is a high casement opened wide to the winds. One half-sister, Stella Duckworth, has panes blurred with tears; the other half-sister, Laura Stephen, is a basement window largely bricked up. Her mother, Julia, and her sister, Vanessa, are tall French doors giving onto the garden and thence out to the Cornish sea and the South Downs of Sussex, where Woolf summered and pleasured, read and wrote. Each of these women bequeathed something to Virginia Woolf. To her abiding sorrow, Woolf had no children of the body, but she passed that legacy on to the children and grandchildren of her mind — to us.

By looking at Woolf's womenfolk I hope we will better see our own, biological or chosen. Some we have known. Some we seem to have forgotten. Some, out of the blue, emerge from a diary or a little packet of letters hidden in a suitcase. Some are encoded in our genome. All do something to make us what we are. Following in Woolf's footsteps, using all our modern sources of information, we can go looking for them. <>

THE IMAGINED, THE IMAGINARY AND THE SYMBOLIC by Maurice Godelier, translated by Nora Scott [Verso, 9781786637703]

Exploring the close relationship between the real and the symbolic and imaginary

What you imagined is not always imaginary, but everything that is imaginary is imagined. It is by imagining that people make the impossible become possible. In mythology or religion, however, those things that are imagined are never experienced as being imaginary by believers. The realm of the imagined is even more real than the real; it is super-real, surreal.

Lévi-Strauss held that "the real, the symbolic and the imaginary" are three separate orders. Maurice Godelier demonstrates the contrary: that the real is not separate from the symbolic and the imaginary. For instance, for a portion of humanity, rituals and sacred objects and places attest to the reality and therefore the truth that God, gods or spirits exist. The symbolic enables people to signify what they think and do, encompassing thought, spilling over into the whole body, but also pervading temples, palaces, tools, foods, mountains, the sea, the sky and the earth. It is real.
Godelier's book goes to the strategic heart of the social sciences, for to examine the nature and role of the imaginary and the symbolic is also to attempt to account for the basic components of all societies and ultimately of human existence. And these aspects in turn shape our social and personal identity.

Societies and Places

Why this book, and why this title? In the first place, because not everything that is imagined is imaginary. And since everything that is imagined is done so by the mind, we must analyse how and why, in certain domains, the mind produces imagined content that is imaginary and, in other domains, imagined content that is not. In his two books The Imagination and The Imaginary, Jean-Paul Sartre did not make this distinction, yet it is a strategic one.'

We all know, from daily experience, that we can be at the same time present in the moment by our consciousness but absent by our mind, even though consciousness is also mind. And we also know that when our mind projects itself beyond the present, it is not the same thing to represent to ourselves facts that no longer exist but did exist at one time, such as scenes from our childhood, as it is facts that do not yet exist but will exist in the future, such as a planned vacation to Istanbul; or facts that can never exist but which we can imagine, such as the invasion of the earth by giant spiders from a planet billions of light years away.

There are several kinds of imaginaries, and our relations with each of them, therefore, cannot be the same. To obtain a clearer picture, let us make a very short - all too short - inventory; as we will see, the distinctions between these imaginaries always seem to emerge from the singular relationship each entertains with the `real. Which raises the inevitable question: What is the real?

Take play, keeping in mind that all children the world over have played, and that once they are adults many continue to play in other forms. The child playing cowboys and brandishing noisy revolvers that cannot kill knows that he (is and) is not a `real' cowboy. And, when he was younger and scolded his teddy bear for having wet on the carpet, he already knew that Teddy was not a `real' bear and had not `really' wet on the carpet.

Or take the arts, and the example of the Iliad and the Odyssey, which since antiquity have been attributed to the great poet Homer. Perhaps Homer was not the only author of these masterworks, but neither was he Achilles or Ulysses, whose feats he sang. And perhaps neither Ulysses nor Achilles ever `really' existed, either, but we thrill to the tale of the many dangers Ulysses faced,

threatened with the deadly grip of the Cyclops or the loving embrace of Circe as, after the fall of Troy, he sailed towards Ithaca where his faithful wife, Penelope, had been waiting for years.

We do not expect poets or their work to depict historical events as they happened. Furthermore, are not historical events perhaps also a mixture of the real and the imaginary? When inscriptions or monuments dating back several thousands of years tell us that the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar II (605-552 BCE), after conquering the Egyptians and subjugating the kings of all the major cities of Syria and Arabia, as well as the king of Judah after taking Jerusalem (597), proclaimed himself King of Kings and decreed that the god Marduk, with whom he had made a pact and who had led him from victory to victory, was the paramount god, what is a professional historian to do with these real events that rest on belief in the existence of imaginary beings and worlds?

Here we have a paradox. If Nebuchadnezzar II really believed that the god Marduk had led him from victory to victory, we find ourselves in the domain of religious beliefs and forms of political power associated, or even fused with, one religion or another. The paradox, then, is that the imaginary that underpins and informs these religions and forms of power is never conceived or experienced as imaginary by those who believe. On the contrary, this imaginary is conceived and experienced as even more real than the realities people experience in their daily lives. That particular imaginary, more real than the real, is superreal, surreal. But once again, what is the real? And could we espouse Lévi-Strauss's threefold affirmation that in myth, 'the real, the symbolic and the imaginary' are `three separate categories'? This may be true of myths - and we will return to the question - but it is no longer true when it comes to ritual, sacred objects, temples, et cetera, which clearly attest to the reality, and therefore to the truth, that gods or God exist, not to mention spirits and ancestors. And everything that attests to this truth is at the same time the symbol of this truth. Once again, we find ourselves in the realms of belief and of the symbolic, which plays a paramount role in believing. How, then, are we to distinguish the real from the symbolic, or the imaginary from the symbolic? Might symbols be more real than what they symbolise? But what is the symbolic, and can it help us distinguish the real from the imaginary? Perhaps not, if the symbolic function is a prior condition for any form of activity and thought that has meaning for people. This is because the symbolic function is the wellspring of all possible forms of signifiers, which enable humans to signify as much what they think and do as what they are unwilling or unable to think or do.

The symbolic thus extends beyond thought and the mind to fill and mobilise the entire body, its gaze, gestures, postures, as well as everything that projects outside individuals the meanings they have given to the world — temples, palaces, tools, foods, mountains, the sea, the sky and the earth — as they think and feel them.

Of course, language is at the heart of the symbolic function since words are symbols and designate that which is not themselves. But language is not the whole of the symbolic and does not exhaust it. If the symbolic is present in every form of activity or thought, then symbols cannot have the same content or play the same role in mathematics, art and religion. And, it seems that when symbols are invented for the purposes of religious beliefs, some of them change their nature and undergo a veritable transmutation. Once masks, icons, sacramental formulae, and so on have become sacred objects, they seem also to contain in themselves the invisible beings they designate. It is as though these invisible beings appropriate for their own purposes the symbols people have made in order to communicate with them and to bid their presence. These are the areas we will attempt to explore and steps we will follow to do so.

A final word: it should be remembered that, as an anthropologist, I will be analysing primarily imaginaries that are `shared' by the members of a given society or the followers of a religion. <>

THE ASSEMBLED HUMAN, DER MONTIERTE MENSCH by Sabine Breitwieser, Bernd Stiegler, Olaf Möller, Antje Krause-Wahl, Maren Butte, Nadine Engel, Anna Fricke, Lena Trüper, Nissar Ulama [Kerber, 9783735606372] English, German

A century of art exploring the ambivalent relationship between humans and machines

From the age of the conveyor belt to today's digital revolution, **THE ASSEMBLED HUMAN** explores human beings as hybrid creatures merging with the technology they have created. This cultural-historical survey encompasses key works of painting and graphic design, early experiments in photography, installation and film, along with recent works of post-internet art.

Artists include: Gerd Arntz, Otto Neurath, Ed Atkins, Giacomo Balla, Thomas Bayrle, Umberto Boccioni, John Cage, Helen Chadwick, Bruce Conner, Marcel Duchamp, Charles & Ray Eames, Öyvind Fahlström, Harun Farocki, Richard Hamilton, Barbara Hammer, John Heartfield, Lynn Hershman-Leeson, Eva Hesse, Gary Hill, Rebecca Horn, Fritz Kahn, Alexander Kluge, Kiki Kogelnik, Maria Lassnig, Mark Leckey, Fernand Léger, El Lissitzky, Hilary Lloyd, Goshka Macuga, René Magritte, Man Ray, Etienne-Jules Marey, Caroline Mesquita, László Moholy-Nagy, Eadweard Muybridge, Orlan, Tony Oursler, Trevor Paglen, Nam June Paik, Eduardo Paolozzi, Antoine Pevsner, Seth Price, Jon Rafman, Robert Rauschenberg, Thomas Ruff, Walter Ruttmann, Xanti Schawinsky, Oskar Schlemmer, Avery Singer, Stelarc, Thayaht, Paul Thek, Jean Tinguely and George Widener.

The exhibition THE ASSEMBLED HUMAN about the interface of humans and machines could not take place at a better location than here in the Ruhr region and at the Museum Folkwang. The RAG-Stiftung and the Brost Foundation have thus contributed to making this exhibition possible. The main mission of the RAG-Stiftung is to finance the perpetual obligations that the German coal-mining sector has left behind in the former coal districts in the Ruhr and Saar regions and in Ibbenbüren, thus ensuring that they remain liveable regions. In addition to this rather technical aspect of our work, our social mission is increasingly gaining in importance with the promotion of education, science, and culture. We therefore put particular emphasis on supporting disadvantaged children and young people in the Ruhr and Saar regions and in Ibbenbüren.

The Brost Foundation likewise acts for the common good of the Ruhr region. Its social mission focuses on broadly promoting the art and cultural sector and supporting underprivileged young people and senior citizens in their efforts to live a self-determined, socially secure life.

The aim is to create new perspectives for the people in the Ruhr region following the decline of the coal and steel industry. One of these perspectives consists in transforming the previous industrial centres into a Ruhr cultural metropolis. The exhibition The Assembled Human at the Museum Folkwang thus has twofold social relevance: on the one hand, the confrontation between art and the previously mechanized and now electronic world of work; on the other, the exhibition, with its international stature, positively supporting the transition in the region.

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

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Excerpt: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe formulated an observation that later prefaced the catalogue accompanying the Kunst and Technik (Art and Technology) exhibition in Essen in 1928: in his novel

Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman Years, the writer remarked that 'art and technology always balance one another, and, closely related as they are, always incline toward each other'.

The symbiosis between art and technology and/or science is firmly anchored in the history of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia. During industrialization, sponsors such as Karl Ernst Osthaus already created places, such as the Museum Folkwang, that were intended to enrich the lives of the working population through encounters with beauty in ari and craft. It is very fortunate that it was possible to continue the Folkwang idea in Essen in the 1920s. The structural trans formation of the Ruhr region would have been inconceivable without the link to this tradition and the contemplation of research and education, culture and nature. In an era of industry 4.0, we are, however, confronted with the question of how our life and work, as well as our cultural activity, will change against the backdrop of the growing importance of artificial intelligence.

This is why I am pleased that the Museum Folkwang is taking a look at the relationship between human beings and machines since the end of the nineteenth century with the exhibition The Assembled Human. Artworks by Marcel Duchamp, El Lissitzky, Otto Dix, Fernand Léger, Eva Hesse, Rebecca Horn, Maria Lassnig, along with many other equally outstanding artistic positions, impressively document the interplay between humans and machines. The exhibition succeeds in presenting historical references for current discourse on the merging of technology, life, and work. It also makes viewers aware that the points of contact between humans and machines always have to be sounded out anew again and again.



For more than two centuries, we have been expanding our abilities and even our bodies with a wide range of devices and apparatuses, but the apocalyptic visions that humans could be replaced by machines have still not materialized. I wish you all an exciting journey through the history of the `assembled human', in which each one of us can recognize a piece of ourselves.

The Museum Folkwang is once again demonstrating its special position in our cultural landscape. The Assembled Human is a noteworthy exhibition, in which art becomes a mirror for great instances of social upheaval, such as industrialization, mechanization, and digitization. The emphasis is therefore on the interrelationship between human beings and machines. It was indeed technological progress that made advancement and prosperity possible in the first place. But what do the new options imply for freedom and individuality? The scope ranges from promises for the future to fears: since the onset of industrialization, artists have examined this ambivalence again and again—and the topic is more relevant today than ever before.

The Assembled Human presents the diverse fusing of humans and machines since the end of the nineteenth century. Important works of art and graphic design, early photographic experiments,

installations, films, and contemporary works by the post-Internet generation provide a cultural historical overview. Loans from around the world and works from the Museum Folkwang's own collection thus promise critical reflection.

Digitization is one of the focuses of the exhibition. With its advancement, the way we humans work, move around, and communicate with one another is rapidly changing. This transformation, in connection with the desire for a sustainable and carbon-neutral life, is the great challenge of our time. As a result, not only individual behaviours are changing, but also our industrial structures. This affects both individuals and companies. RWE is also changing in a fundamental way. We have become one of the biggest producers of electricity from renewables, thus making the company viable for the future. Electricity remains the driving force of our industrial society, but it must also be clean, rather than merely reliable. Designing this change in a sustainable and socially acceptable manner without jeopardizing security of supply is our objective. <>

André Butzer: Works on Paper 2001–2019 André Butzer: Werke auf Papier 2001-2019 by André Butzer, essays by Kay Heymer, Gwen Allen, Hannah Eckstein [Kerber, 9783735605948] English and German

This volume collects 139 never-before-seen works on paper by German painter André Butzer (born 1973) produced between 2001 and 2019. The book includes new scholarship that examines the predominant themes and motifs in Butzer's colorful, cartoonish and abstract works.

André Butzer: Untitled, 2017, Acrylic, Tempera, and Watercolor on Paper 58 1/3 x 87 4/5 in.

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Nino Mier: Verve and Intimacy
Gwen Allen: Postexpression
Hannah Eckstein: Frocks and Frills And Colors
Kay Heymer: Try A Little Tenderness
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André Butzer's works on paper provide an intriguing counterpart to the expressionistic, pigment-slathered canvases for which he is best known. A number of his drawings—including studies of googly-eyed and goblin-like heads set upon distorted bodies with stumps for limbs—relate thematically to these paintings in which existential battles between good / evil, life / death, creation / destruction, and representation / abstraction play out in a dystopian, mythical place called NASAHEIM.

As a draftsman, Butzer is as fiercely uninhibited as he is a painter, employing a vast repertoire of linear expression, from aggressively gestural scrawled marks to softer, sketchy stabs. Rendered in pencil, his studies allude more directly to the animation industry that inspired him, reminding us that Walt Disney's mass-produced cartoons were, after all, originally hand-drawn. Numerous crayon drawings

and watercolors, some quite large, of a woman wearing a colorful patterned frock (a recurring figure of birth / life in Butzer's personal symbolism) parallel both his explorations on canvas, yet simultaneously transform them into something more lyrical and light-filled. Other works, such as a 2011 series of delicate, abstract watercolors in soft-hued palettes reminiscent of fields of wildflowers, reveal novel investigations of color and form, unprecedented elsewhere in his oeuvre.

Butzer's drawings challenge conventional notions of artistic skill and mastery, a strategy reinforced by the association of his chosen media—especially crayon and watercolor—with the art of children and amateurs. Butzer seems to go out of his way to emphasize such connections with his crude yet playful scribbles and blotchy brushwork, which call to mind the lack of motor coordination as well as the unbridled creativity of young children. As Meyer Schapiro observed, nearly a century ago:

> If today an abstract painter seems to draw like a child ora madman, it is not because he is childish or mad. He has come to value as qualities related to his own goals of imaginative freedom the passionless spontaneity and technical insouciance of the child, who creates for himself alone, without the pressure of adult responsibility and practical adjustments.

If, at the dawn of modernist abstraction, such expressive license served as a foil to the mechanization of the industrial age, Butzer's drawings prompt us to consider what such properties might signify today, in our own post-industrial—and increasingly post-human—era. <>

André Butzer: Untitled, 2017, Acrylic, Tempera, and Watercolor on Paper 63 7/8 x 101 1/4 in.

War Fever: Boston, Baseball, and America in the Shadow of the Great War by Randy Roberts and Johnny Smith [Basic Books, 9781541672666]

Only the dead have seen the end of war. —George Santayana, 1922

A "richly detailed" portrait of the three men whose lives were forever changed by WWI-era Boston (Michael S. Neiberg): baseball star Babe Ruth, symphony conductor Karl Muck, and Harvard Law student Charles Whittlesey.

In the fall of 1918, a fever gripped Boston. The streets emptied as paranoia about the deadly Spanish flu spread. Newspapermen and vigilante investigators aggressively sought to discredit anyone who looked or sounded German. And as the war raged on, the enemy seemed to be lurking everywhere: prowling in submarines off the coast of Cape Cod, arriving on passenger ships in the harbor, or disguised as the radical lecturing workers about the injustice of a sixty-hour workweek.

WAR FEVER explores this delirious moment in American history through the stories of three men: Karl Muck, the German conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, accused of being an enemy spy; Charles Whittlesey, a Harvard law graduate who became an unlikely hero in Europe; and the most famous baseball player of all time, Babe Ruth, poised to revolutionize the game he loved. Together, they offer a gripping narrative of America at war and American culture in upheaval.

In 1918, a fever gripped Boston. Not since the revolutionary War had a passion this hot consumed the city. It lurked palpably, appearing in various forms in every neighborhood. It was present in the half-filled class forms and quiet streets in Cambridge, where students huddled in groups and discussed the conflict raging in France. Bostonians heard it in Symphony Hall, where careful listeners noticed a marked decline in the Boston Symphony Orchestra's performances since its German

conductor, Karl Muck, had been accused of spying for Germany. And they saw it at Fenway Park, where the Red Sox honored wounded soldiers and military bands played "The Star-Spangled Banner" The draft had robbed the team of much of its hitting talent, forcing Babe Ruth, a star left-handed pitcher, to play the outfield and bat as a regular. Through it all -as the feverish crowds cheered at ballgames and decried invisible enemies—another fever, a deadly pandemic, was circling the globe, moving toward Boston.

The year created and destroyed celebrities, a process that reveals much about the values, desires, and fears of the country during the war. In War Fever we explore the impact of the global conflict on three men—how it changed their lives, how it gave them purpose, and how it dictated their legacy. Like celebrities before and since, they were as complex and contradictory as the images they projected were elemental and flat. They were as much a product of the war as fames Montgomery Flagg's propaganda poster of Uncle Sam declaring, "I Want You for U.S. Army"

The men we selected, each connected to Boston in some way—Charles Whittlesey, Karl Muck, and Babe Ruth—became, in 1918, the most famous war hero, war villain, and war athlete. Nearly everything they did was interpreted through the lens of the war. In that sense, they became a product of wartime propaganda, each serving a larger political purpose. Once they had been identified and cast in the Great War Production, they were all but powerless to undo it, pawns in the hands of proselytizers and the press.

At the beginning of 1918, Karl Muck reigned supreme as the world-renowned maestro of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, one of the most prestigious ensembles in the United States. With an imperious manner and unshakeable confidence, the acclaimed German conductor, a friend of the Kaiser's, mesmerized wealthy elites in Boston and cities throughout the country. The year before, the Victor Talking Machine Company had recorded him and the BSO, and rushed out several 78 RPM records, including selections from Tchaikovsky and Wagner. By the spring, however, Muck's career had completely unraveled. Accused of espionage for the Imperial German government, exposed as a wanton libertine, he became a victim of the anti-German hysteria whipped up by the administration of Woodrow Wilson.'

The Justice Department first began investigating him in October 1917, after jingoists from Providence, Rhode Island, charged that he had refused to lead the orchestra in "The Star-Spangled Banner" during a concert at Infantry Hall. Many at the time were insisting that the anthem be played at every public occasion—during military parades, before sporting events, and certainly when symphony orchestras performed. Playing or singing the anthem not only demonstrated patriotism and loyalty it expressed a wartime consensus, the "Gospel of Americanism:

During the hysteria over German spies and saboteurs, and under the cloud of suspicion cast by Muck's supposed refusal to conduct "The Star-Spangled Banner," the BSO's performances provoked violent protests in numerous cities. Patriotic groups demanded the maestro's expulsion from the country. In the darkness of war, the BSO—with about half of its musicians from Germany and Austria—came to be seen not just as a Teutonic institution but as a threat to " 100% Americanism." Muck feared the rising current of anti-German extremism. He heard rumors about violent Boston thugs rounding up his countrymen and read stories about Germans who were publicly flogged or tarred and feathered. He could imagine a day when a mob would come knocking on his door.

The mob never showed up at his home, but in late March 1918 federal agents did. Investigators questioned his associates and fellow musicians, and seized his private papers. From his correspondence, they learned that his closest friends included prominent German musicians, professors, and, most notably, Germany's chief of espionage, Count Johan von Bernstorff, who had ordered attacks on American supply depots during the war. Yet they could not tie the conductor to

any nefarious activity against the United States. When federal agents arrested him on March 25, the public had no idea that the government's entire case rested on "obscene" letters between Muck and his young mistress—missives that divulged his deepest secrets and desires. Armed with what the government considered incriminating evidence, US Marshals delivered him to Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, an internment camp for German prisoners.

While muck languished behind A barbed-wire fence, George Herman "Babe" Ruth, the son of a German-American saloonkeeper, gave little consideration to how he could help win the war or how it might change his life. Baseball, booze, and brothels occupied his thoughts. For the irrepressible young ballplayer, the Great War was something happening somewhere else, and it involved other people. It was therefore of little interest to him. By the time the Red Sox completed spring training in 1918, Babe had discovered the thrill he felt—and the joy he brought spectators—swinging a bat. He found a new purpose entertaining crowds of soldiers with his mighty "war club:' launching baseballs into the ether. In the past, pitching well had reliably brought him applause—but hitting hone runs, he found, made the crowd roar.

It was the Great War that made possible his eventual transformation from the game's dominant left-handed pitcher to the sport's greatest slugger. Ruth filled a need for both the Red Sox and America. "The Colossus" redefined the dimensions of the game, displaying a kind of awesome power that portended a new era to come, one where the home run proved integral. After 1918, he was no longer just a ballplayer. With a bat in his hand, he became a showman unlike any other in the history of the sport.

In the context of America's deadly attacks on the Western Front, Ruth's power took on a new meaning. Where once informed spectators viewed baseball as a scientific game of slashing singles and strategic bunts, now the violent, full-bodied swings of Ruth's bat resonated with the country's glorification of unrestrained force. During the summer of 1918, as the Babe assailed American League fences, the American Expeditionary Force assaulted German positions in France. The US offensives at Cantigny, Chateau-Thierry, the Marne, and especially the Meuse-Argonne, were artless frontal attacks, depending more on deadly straightforward drives in which lives were sacrificed for inches of ground than any sort of imaginative tactical planning.

In Boston, war fever turned Fenway Park, a stadium built for the masses, into a stage for "preparedness." During the sport's first major political crisis, Major League Baseball became more than a diversion; it offered a template for Americanism. The national pastime took on a new meaning in the lives of citizens who viewed sports as critical to making good soldiers and promoting the nation's ideals. Babe Ruth and his teammates, wearing full baseball uniforms, substituted bats for rifles as they conducted military maneuvers under the instruction of a drill sergeant, a demonstration of patriotism that linked the national pastime to the country's war effort. Yet all the marching and posing was for show. Like the other owners in professional baseball, Harry Frazee understood the value of draping his squad in the American flag and did everything he could to convince the public that baseball was, in the words of columnist Hugh Fullerton, "the greatest single force for Americanization."

In the summer of 1918, sportswriters hardly mentioned Ruth's German heritage. Writers, fans, and ballplayers called him "Babe" almost exclusively because "George Herman" sounded too German. During the last two years of the war, when any Teutonic-sounding name provoked suspicions of disloyalty, and the phrase "German-American" became a pejorative, "the Babe" served him well. It Americanized his last name and advertised his nonthreatening personality. Privately, he spoke German on occasion among friends or at his father's Baltimore saloon, but he never said anything publicly about his ancestors. Besides, he was not German-American. He was the Babe.

Karl Muck and Babe Ruth were the most visible personages of Boston's highbrow and popular cultures. Newspaper editors splashed their names across the city's papers, and Bostonians closely followed their exploits. Yet, it was a Harvard Law graduate who would become the most widely publicized figure of the war. Before enlisting, Charles Whittlesey, a tall, gangling, bookish lawyer hardly cast a shadow. He seemed to have an aptitude for distinction, but not an iota of interest in fame. In truth, he desired a comfortable anonymity—he had no wife and no children, just a business partner and a few friends who did not know him very well.

Whittlesey and his younger brother Elisha, an idealistic, sickly undergraduate who also studied at Harvard, heard the bugle call early and immediately fell into line. They were products of an elite New England culture and an ethos of voluntarism that echoed throughout the halls of Harvard and other Ivy League institutions. The brothers lived by a code instilled in New England's sons to believe that defending their country was not only a sacred duty but also an ennobling one. Elisha drove camion trucks on the French Soissons Front even before American troops went overseas, and Charles traveled across the Atlantic as an officer in the famed 77th "Statue of Liberty" Division, a melting pot of soldiers. In the language of the day, both men "did their part"—and then some. As the personification of the most noble ideals of the war, Charles captured the imagination of Americans when he led a strike force, dubbed the Lost Battalion, behind enemy lines and held it together against overwhelming numbers.

The "Lost Battalion"—a piece of inspired newspaper hyperbole—altered everything. A tiny part of an immense offensive became the story. Journalists transfigured Whittlesey into the Peter Pan of the Great War, the leader of a plucky flesh-and-blood band of Lost Boys—surrounded, battling against insurmountable odds, and refusing to surrender. The tale was truly compelling. Like a story about a child trapped in a well, it dripped human interest. Whittlesey's pedigree was spotless, and the fact that his second in command, millionaire George McMurtry, was a former Theodore Roosevelt Rough Rider added a soupçon to the equation. It was as if overnight America decided that Whittlesey had to be saved, and though most early attempts bordered on suicidal, the rescue mission transfixed the nation.

Whittlesey and his men epitomized their country's iron resolve in the bloodiest campaign in American history. He returned to America determined to find meaning in all the bloodshed, but instead found himself locked in yet another conflict, fighting against intractable leaders and an apathetic public. The first Great War veteran to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor, he became an American hero. His nine and face appeared on the front page of every major newspaper in the country. He had achieved the impossible, surviving the worst hell of battle and coming out with hardly a scratch. None that you could see anyway. Hollywood wanted to sell his story. Novelists wanted to write his story. And the government wanted to use his story—and him—for its own ends. Everyone wanted something from him, some piece, something that they could hold on to and share when they talked about all the men who never came home. But Whittlesey wanted none of it. All he wanted was peace. He could not bear living the war over and over again. Not for one more day.

This is the story of the disruptive forces of an epoch and a war that permanently altered Boston, America, and the lives of three public figures. In the turbulent year of 1918, Boston stood as a microcosm of America: a locus of urban strife, ethnic conflict, and fundamental, lasting change. The stories of Muck, Ruth, and Whittlesey reveal how a city and a nation confronted the havoc of a new world order, the struggle to endure the war and all its unforeseen consequences. Reading accounts from Boston's newspapers from that year, it's impossible to separate the war from popular culture. The citizens of Boston followed the war intently—reading stories about baseball players serving in Europe or evading the service; published accounts about accusations against the BSO's German

conductor; tales about a heroic Harvard Law grad who refused to surrender in the Argonne Forest; and frightening reports about Boston's invisible enemy—the grippe—an unrelenting scourge that overwhelmed the city that summer and fall, killing thousands in the Hub and millions around the world.

The war's influence could be seen everywhere in Boston. The city became the military and naval headquarters for all of New England, and the main shipping port in the region. While workers at the Boston Navy Yard prepared war ships and cargo vessels, New England's men and women manufactured munitions, rifles, uniforms, boots, and supplies for the American and Allied armies. United in patriotism, every senator and congressman from New England voted in favor of the war, signaling the region's commitment to fighting the Germans no matter the cost.

The Great War changed the lives of virtually every citizen in the Hub. Nowhere was that more evident than on the Boston Common. The vast green park became a theater of war, a battleground where anarchists, socialists, suffragists, soldiers, and sailors climbed onto soapboxes, proselytizing to crowds until their voices became hoarse. The tree-lined mall hummed with activity. One could hear the sharp notes of bugles, pounding drums, and the tramp of soldiers' boots drilling. The Salvation Army and the Knights of Columbus erected huts along Tremont Street while recruiting tents housed clean-shaven soldiers in olive drab and khaki uniforms. Conservationists planted Victory Gardens and Red Cross volunteers trolled for donations. And police patrolmen intergraded anyone who seemed suspicious, especially men with dark features who looked stereotypically German, warning the public that the Kaiser's agents had infiltrated the city's factories and shipyards.'

That sense of fear pervaded the city and the country. The enemy seemed everywhere—prowling in submarines off the coast of Cape Cod, arriving on passenger ships at Boston Harbor, or disguised as the friend of workers, lecturing men at the munitions factories, saloons, and shipyards about the injustice of a sixty-hour workweek. Like a contagion, the pro-German conspirators, spies, and union radicals hiding in plain sight had to be contained, with force if necessary. Anyone who expressed dissent or un-American opinions could find himself jailed, beaten, or hanged. For the sake of victory, Americans tolerated suppression, censorship, and deprivation. In a nation at war with Germany—and itself—no sacrifice seemed too great. <>

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rediscovering the Islamic Classics: How Editors and Print Culture Transformed an Intellectual Tradition *by Ahmed El Shamsy [Princeton University Press, 9780691174563]*
The story of how Arab editors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries revolutionized Islamic literature

Islamic book culture dates back to late antiquity, when Muslim scholars began to write down their doctrines on parchment, papyrus, and paper and then to compose increasingly elaborate analyses of, and commentaries on, these ideas. Movable type was adopted in the Middle East only in the early nineteenth century, and it wasn't until the second half of the century that the first works of classical Islamic religious scholarship were printed there. But from that moment on, Ahmed El Shamsy reveals, the technology of print transformed Islamic scholarship and Arabic literature.

Esoteric Images: Decoding the Late Herat School of Painting by Tawfiq Daʿadli [Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture, Brill, Hardback: 9789004398009; E-Book: 9789004398412]

In **Esoteric Images: Decoding the Late Herat School of Painting** Tawfiq Daʿadli decodes the pictorial language which flourished in the city of Herat, modern Afghanistan, under the rule of the last Timurid ruler, Sultan Husayn Bayqara (r.1469-1506). This study focuses on one illustrated manuscript of a poem entitled Khamsa by the Persian poet Nizami Ganjavi, kept in the British Library under code Or.6810. Tawfiq Daʿadli decodes the paintings, reveals the syntax behind them and thus deciphers the message of the whole manuscript. The book combines scholarly efforts to interpret theological-political lessons embedded in one of the foremost Persian schools of art against the background of the court dynamic of an influential medieval power in its final years.

Sainthood and Authority in Early Islam: Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī's Theory of wilāya and the Reenvisioning of the Sunnī Caliphate by Aiyub Palmer [Studies on Sufism, Brill, Hardback: 9789004408302; E-Book: 9789004416550]

In **Sainthood and Authority in Early Islam** Aiyub Palmer recasts wilāya in terms of Islamic authority and traces its development in both political and religious spheres up through the 3rd and 4th Islamic centuries. This book pivots around the ideas of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, the first Muslim theologian and mystic to write on the topic of wilāya.

By looking at its structural roots in Arab and Islamic social organization, Aiyub Palmer has reframed the discussion about sainthood in early Islam to show how it relates more broadly to other forms of authority in Islam. This book not only looks anew at the influential ideas of al-Tirmidhī but also challenges current modes of thought around the nature of authority in Islamicate societies.

Re-Making the World: Christianity and Categories: Essays in Honor of Karen L. King edited by Taylor G. Petrey, Carly Daniel-Hughes, Benjamin H. Dunning, Anne-Marie Luijendijk, Laura S. Nasrallah [Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament, Mohr Siebrek, 9783161565816]

This edited volume brings together important scholars of religion in the ancient world to honor the impact of Karen L. King's scholarship in this field. Her work shows that Christianity was diverse from its first moments - even before the word "Christian" was coined - and insists that scholars must engage both in deep historical work and in ethical reflection. These essays honor King's intellectual impact by further investigating the categories that scholars have used in their reconstructions of religion, by reflecting on the place of women and gender in the analysis of ancient texts, and by providing historiographical interventions that illuminate both the ancient world and the modern scholarship that has shaped our field. Contributors:Carlin Barton, Giovanni B. Bazzana, Daniel Boyarin, Bernadette Brooten, Margaret Butterfield, Carly Daniel-Hughes, Benjamin H. Dunning, Judith Hartenstein, T. Christopher Hoklotubbe, Ronit Irshai, Denise Kimber Buell, Marcie Lenk, AnneMarie Luijendijk, Laura S. Nasrallah, Elaine Pagels, Silke Petersen, Taylor G. Petrey, Adele Reinhartz, Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Sarah Sentilles, Angela Standhartinger, Stanley Stowers.

Nothingness in the Heart of Empire: The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Kyoto School in Imperial Japan by Harumi Osaki [SUNY Press, 9781438473093]

Reveals the complicity between the Kyoto School's moral and political philosophy, based on the school's founder Nishida Kitarō's metaphysics of nothingness, and Japanese imperialism.

In the field of philosophy, the common view of philosophy as an essentially Western discipline persists even today, while non-Western philosophy tends to be undervalued and not investigated seriously. In the field of Japanese studies, in turn, research on Japanese philosophy tends to be

reduced to a matter of projecting existing stereotypes of alleged Japanese cultural uniqueness through the reading of texts. In **Nothingness in the Heart of Empire**, Harumi Osaki resists both these tendencies. She closely interprets the wartime discourses of the Kyoto School, a group of modern Japanese philosophers who drew upon East Asian traditions as well as Western philosophy. Her book lucidly delves into the non-Western forms of rationality articulated in such discourses, and reveals the problems inherent in them as the result of these philosophers' engagements in Japan's wartime situation, without cloaking these problems under the pretense of "Japanese cultural uniqueness." In addition, in a manner reminiscent of the controversy surrounding Martin Heidegger's involvement with Nazi Germany, the book elucidates the political implications of the morality upheld by the Kyoto School and its underlying metaphysics. As such, this book urges dialogue beyond the divide between Western and non-Western philosophies, and beyond the separation between "lofty" philosophy and "common" politics.

The Dream and Its Amplification edited by Erel Shalit and Nancy Swift Furlotti [Fisher King Press, 9781926715896]

The Dream and Its Amplification *unveils the language of the psyche that speaks to us in our dreams.*

We all dream at least 4-6 times each night yet remember very few. Those that rise to the surface of our conscious awareness beckon to be understood, like a letter addressed to us that arrives by post. Why would we not open it? The difficulty is in understanding what the dream symbols and images mean. Through amplification, C. G. Jung formulated a method of unveiling the deeper meaning of symbolic images. This becomes particularly important when the image does not carry a personal meaning or significance and is not part of a person's everyday life.

Fourteen Jungian Analysts from around the world have contributed chapters to this book on areas of special interest to them in their work with dreams. This offers the seasoned dream worker as well as the novice great insight into the meaning of the dream and its amplification.

Contributors to this edition of the Fisher King Review include: Erel Shalit, Nancy Swift Furlotti, Thomas Singer, Michael Conforti, Ken Kimmel, Gotthilf Isler, Nancy Qualls-Corbett, Henry Abramovitch, Kathryn Madden, Ron Schenk, Naomi Ruth Lowinsky, Christian Gaillard, Monika Wikman, and Gilda Frantz.

The Interpretation of Dreams by Artemidorus edited by Peter Thonemann, translated by Martin Hammond [Oxford World's Classics, Oxford University Press, 9780198797951]

Artemidorus' **The Interpretation of Dreams** **(Oneirocritica)** is the richest and most vivid pre-Freudian account of dream interpretation, and the only dream-book to have survived complete from Greco-Roman times. Written in Greek around AD 200, when dreams were believed by many to offer insight into future events, the work is a compendium of interpretations of dreams on a wide range of subjects relating to the natural, human, and divine worlds. It includes the meanings of dreams about the body, sex, eating and drinking, dress, the weather, animals, the gods, and much else.

Artemidorus' technique of dream interpretation stresses the need to know the background of the dreamer, such as occupation, health, status, habits, and age, and the work is a fascinating social history, revealing much about ancient life, culture, and beliefs, and attitudes to the dominant power of Imperial Rome.

Martin Hammond's fine translation is accompanied by a lucid introduction and explanatory notes by

Peter Thonemann, which assist the reader in understanding this important work, which was an influence on both Sigmund Freud and Michel Foucault.

An Ancient Dream Manual: Artemidorus' The Interpretation of Dreams by Peter Thonemann [Oxford University Press, 9780198843825]

Artemidorus' *Oneirocritica* ('The Interpretation of Dreams') is the only dream-book which has been preserved from Graeco-Roman antiquity. Composed around AD 200, it comprises a treatise and manual on dreams, their classification, and the various analytical tools which should be applied to their interpretation, making Artemidorus both one of the earliest documented and arguably the single most important predecessor and precursor of Freud.
Artemidorus travelled widely through Greece, Asia, and Italy to collect people's dreams and record their outcomes, in the process casting a vivid light on social mores and religious beliefs in the Severan age: this volume, published as a companion to the new translation of **The Interpretation of Dreams** by Martin Hammond in the Oxford World's Classics series, aims to provide the non-specialist reader with a readable and engaging road-map to this vast and complex text. It offers a detailed analysis of Artemidorus' theory of dreams and the social function of ancient dream-interpretation, while also aiming to foster an understanding of the ways in which Artemidorus might be of interest to the cultural or social historian of the Graeco-Roman world. Alongside chapters on Artemidorus' life, career, and world-view, it also provides valuable insights into his conceptions of the human body, sexuality, the natural world, and the gods; his attitudes towards Rome, the contemporary Greek *polis*, and the social order; and his knowledge of Greek literature, myth, and history. In addition, its accessible exploration of the differences and similarities between ancient traditions of dream-analysis and modern psychoanalytic approaches will make this volume of interest to anybody with an interest in the history of dreams and dream interpretation.

The World of Greek Religion and Mythology Collected Essays II by Jan N. Bremmer [Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament, Mohr Siebeck, 9783161544514]

In this wide-ranging work on Greek religion and mythology, Jan N. Bremmer brings together his stimulating and innovative articles, which have all been updated and revised where necessary. In three thematic sections, he analyses central aspects of Greek religion, beginning with the gods and heroes and paying special attention to the unity of the divine nature and the emergence of the category 'hero'. The second section begins with a discussion of the nature of polis religion, continues with various facets, such as seers, secrecy and the soul, and concludes with the influence of the Ancient Near East. The third section studies human sacrifice and offers the most recent analysis of the ideal animal sacrifice, combining literature, epigraphy, iconography, and zooarchaeology. Regarding human sacrifice, it concentrates on the famous cases of Iphigeneia and the werewolves of Mount Lykaion. The fourth and final section investigates key elements of Greek mythology, such as the definition of myth and its relationship to ritual, and ends with a brief history of the study of Greek mythology. The multi-disciplinary approach and rich footnotes make this work a must for anybody interested in Greek religion and mythology.

The Hermeneutic Spiral and Interpretation in Literature and the Visual Arts by Michael O'Toole [Routledge Studies in Multimodality, Routledge, 9781138503779]

This collection brings together eighteen of the author's original papers, previously published in a variety of academic journals and edited collections over the last three decades, on the process of interpretation in literature and the visual arts in one comprehensive volume. The volume highlights the centrality of artistic texts to the study of multimodality, organized into six sections each representing a different modality or semiotic system, including literature, television, film, painting, sculpture, and architecture. A new introduction lays the foundation for the theoretically based

method of analysis running through each of the chapters, one that emphasizes the interplay of textual details and larger thematic purposes to create an open-ended and continuous approach to the interpretation of artistic texts, otherwise known as the "hermeneutic spiral". Showcasing Michael O'Toole's extensive contributions to the field of multimodality and in his research on interpretation in literature and the visual arts, this book is essential reading for students and scholars in multimodality, visual arts, art history, film studies, and comparative literature.

Arts of Connection: Poetry, History, Epochality by Karen S. Feldman [Paradigms, De Gruyter, 9783110630589]

This new series presents original scholarly and essayistic work addressing the central status of literature in and for the human sciences. At stake in the monographs and essay collections are paradigms of literary forms for thinking the human sciences: the knowledge involved in a literary work; how modes of reading and writing shape and depend on an epoch or area of thinking; literature's affinities and points of resistance to what we call the humanities and the sciences. In other words, the series examines how literature works with and upon philosophy, rhetoric, technology, anthropology, sociology, statistics, economics, history, experimental science, mathematics etc. *Paradigms* is primarily concerned with German letters, but also includes its European and comparative literary contexts.
All volumes will be published in English and are first reviewed by the series editors followed by a peer review from two academics in the particular area of specialization. Two to four volumes are planned annually.

Life as Insinuation: George Santayana's Hermeneutics of Finite Life and Human Self by Katarzyna Kremplewska [Suny Series in American Philosophy and Cultural Thought, State University of New York Press, 9781438473949]

In this book, Katarzyna Kremplewska offers a thorough analysis of Santayana's conception of human self, viewed as part of his larger philosophy of life. Santayana emerges as an author of a provocative philosophy of drama, in which human life is acted out. Kremplewska demonstrates how his thought addresses the dynamics of human self in this context and the possibility of sustaining self-integrity while coping with the limitations of finite life. Focusing on particular aspects of Santayana's thought such as his conception of the tragic aspect of existence, and the role of the doctrine of spirit in his philosophical anthropology and critique of culture, this book also sets Santayana's thought in substantial dialogue with other thinkers, such as Heidegger, Bergson, and Nietzsche. Like Santayana's philosophy, this book seeks to build passages between theoretical reflection and practical life with the possibility of a good life in view.

More than Meets the Eye: What Blindness Brings to Art by Georgina Kleege [Oxford University Press, 9780190604356]

In the quarter century following the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, art museums, along with other public institutions, were tasked with making their facilities and collections more accessible to people with disabilities. Although blind and other disabled people have become marginally more visible in recent years, the vast majority of blind Americans remain undereducated and unemployed. In **More Than Meets the Eye**, Georgina Kleege shows how the scrutiny of one cultural issue-access to arts institutions-in relation to one subset of the disabled population- blind people-can lead us to larger and more general implications.

Kleege begins by examining representations of blindness, arguing that traditional theories of blindness often fail to take into account the presence of other senses, or the ability of blind people to draw analogies from non-visual experience to develop concepts about visual phenomena.

Following this, the book shifts its focus from the tactile to the verbal, describing Denis Diderot's remarkable range of techniques to describe art works for readers who were not able to view them. Diderot's writing not only provided a model for describing art, Kleege says, but proof that the experience of art is inextricably tied to language and thus not entirely dependent on sight.

By intertwining her personal experience with scientific study and historical literary analysis, Kleege challenges traditional conceptions of blindness and overturns the assumption that the ideal art viewer must have perfect vision. **More Than Meets the Eye** seeks to establish a dialogue between blind people and the philosophers, scientists, and educators that study blindness, in order to create new aesthetic possibilities and a more genuinely inclusive society.

I Had Nowhere to Go (1944–1955) by Jonas Mekas [Spector Books, 9783959051460]

"Jonas Mekas' diaries have an aching honesty, puckish humor and quiet nobility of character. Many readers curious about the early years of this seminal avant-garde filmmaker will discover here a much more universal story: that of the emigrant who can never go back, and whose solitariness in the New World is emblematic of the human condition." -Phillip Lopate

"I was enormously moved by it." -Allen Ginsberg

Legendary filmmaker Jonas Mekas actually came to filmmaking relatively late in life, and his path to New York was a difficult one. In 1944, Mekas and his younger brother Adolfas had to flee Lithuania. They were interned for eight months in a labor camp in Elmshorn. Even after the war ended, Mekas was prevented from returning to his native Lithuania by the Soviet occupation. Classed as a "displaced person," he lived in DP camps in Wiesbaden and Kassel for years. It was only at the end of 1949 that Jonas and Aldolfas Mekas finally found their way to New York City.

A new edition of Mekas' acclaimed memoir, first published by Black Thistle Press in 1991, *I Had Nowhere to Go* tells the story of the artist's survival in the camps and his first years as a young Lithuanian immigrant in New York City. Mekas' memoir—the inspiration for a 2016 biopic by Douglas Gordon—tells the story of how an individual life can move through the larger 20th-century narratives of war and exile and tentatively put down new roots. In the words of Phillip Lopate, "This is a lyrical, essential spiritual anthropology."

I Seem to Live: The New York Diaries 1950–1969, Volume 1 by Anne König and Jonas Mekas [Spector Books, 9783959052887]

I Seem to Live *chronicles the beginnings of New York's avant-garde film world and the emergence of a counterculture*

Jonas Mekas' **I Seem to Live** picks up in the 1950s, where his extraordinary and popular memoir *I Had Nowhere to Go* left off. These were crucial years for the artist: Jonas Mekas and his brother Adolfas, having arrived in New York, shot their first experimental films, and Jonas began to develop the essayistic film diary format that he would use to record his day-to-day observations for the rest of his life. In 1954 the two brothers founded *Film Culture* magazine, and in 1958 Jonas began writing a weekly column for the *Village Voice*. It was in this period that Mekas' writing, films and unflagging commitment to art began to establish him as a pioneer of American avant-garde cinema and the barometer of the New York art scene.

Assembling Mekas' diaries from this exciting period, enriched with his own personal visual material, *I Seem to Live* offers an intimate, unparalleled view of the postwar New York underground scene from one of its most beloved fixtures.

The first installment of Mekas' diaries, **I Had Nowhere to Go (1944–1955),** was published by Spector Books in 2017. **I Seem to Live**, the sequel to that work, will appear in two volumes: the present volume, covering the years 1950 to 1968, and a second, forthcoming volume, covering 1969 to 2004.

Jonas Mekas (1922–2019) was born in Lithuania and arrived in New York in 1949 via a wartime displaced-persons camp. Cofounder of the Anthology Film Archives, Mekas was a filmmaker, writer, poet, tireless advocate for experimental art and a New York City legend.

The Torture Doctors: Human Rights Crimes and the Road to Justice by Steven H. Miles MD [Georgetown University Press, 9781626167520]

Torture doctors administer and invent techniques to inflict pain and suffering without leaving scars. Their knowledge of the body and its breaking points and their credible authority over death certificates and medical records make them powerful and elusive perpetrators of the crime of torture. In **The Torture Doctors**, Steven H. Miles fearlessly explores who these physicians are, what they do, how they escape justice, and what can be done to hold them accountable.

At least one hundred countries employ torture doctors, including both dictatorships and democracies. While torture doctors mostly act with impunity — protected by governments, medical associations, and licensing boards — Miles shows that a movement has begun to hold these doctors accountable and to return them to their proper role as promoters of health and human rights. Miles's groundbreaking portrayal exposes the thinking and psychology of these doctors, and his investigation points to how the international human rights community and the medical community can come together to end these atrocities.

Children of the Land by Marcelo Hernandez Castillo [Harper, 9780062825599]

This unforgettable memoir from a prize-winning poet about growing up undocumented in the United States recounts the sorrows and joys of a family torn apart by draconian policies and chronicles one young man's attempt to build a future in a nation that denies his existence.

"You were not a ghost even though an entire country was scared of you. No one in this story was a ghost. This was not a story."

When Marcelo Hernandez Castillo was five years old and his family was preparing to cross the border between Mexico and the United States, he suffered temporary, stress-induced blindness. Castillo regained his vision, but quickly understood that he had to move into a threshold of invisibility before settling in California with his parents and siblings. Thus began a new life of hiding in plain sight and of paying extraordinarily careful attention at all times for fear of being truly seen. Before Castillo was one of the most celebrated poets of a generation, he was a boy who perfected his English in the hopes that he might never seem extraordinary.

With beauty, grace, and honesty, Castillo recounts his and his family's encounters with a system that treats them as criminals for seeking safe, ordinary lives. He writes of the Sunday afternoon when he opened the door to an ICE officer who had one hand on his holster, of the hours he spent making a fake social security card so that he could work to support his family, of his father's deportation and the decade that he spent waiting to return to his wife and children only to be denied reentry, and of his mother's heartbreaking decision to leave her children and grandchildren so that she could be reunited with her estranged husband and retire from a life of hard labor.

Children of the Land distills the trauma of displacement, illuminates the human lives behind the headlines and serves as a stunning meditation on what it means to be a man and a citizen.

Amour; How the French Talk about Love Photographs and Stories by Stefania Rousselle [Viking, 9780143134534]

From award-winning journalist and filmmaker Stefania Rousselle, a stunning collection of photographs and essays that seek to understand the universality of love

Journalist and filmmaker Stefania Rousselle found herself overwhelmed and dejected with the horrors of the news after covering terrorist attacks, human trafficking, and the rise of extremism. To renew her faith in humanity, she took off on a solo road trip across France, determined to see if love still exists. Traveling from village to village, farming towns to industrial cities, heart to heart, Rousselle sought out ordinary women and men, all to ask them one question, What is love?

Collecting more than 90 personal testimonies, each one moving and beautiful in its own way, alongside over 100 intimate photographs, Rousselle reveals the many facets of love, and discovers that love can still be found even in the darkest of places. From a baker in Normandy to a shepherd in the Pyrenees, from a tree trimmer in Martinique to a mail woman in the Alps, Amour is a visual testament to love in all its many forms.

Stefania Rousselle is an independent French-American video journalist and documentary film-maker based in Paris. Her work includes short documentaries on terrorism, the European debt crisis, the rise of extremism and immigration. In 2016 she was part of a team of New York Times journalists who were finalists for the Pulitzer Prize for international reporting. That same year, she was on the team of journalists who were awarded the Overseas Press Club's David Kaplan Award for their coverage of the ISIS-led terrorist attacks in Paris. She was a Visiting Scholar at the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism and holds an MA in history from Paris-Sorbonne University.

Rough Ideas: Reflections on Music and More by Stephen Hough [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 9780374252540]

A collection of essays on music and life by the famed classical pianist and composer

Stephen Hough is one of the world's leading pianists, winning global acclaim and numerous awards, both for his concerts and his recordings. He is also a writer, composer, and painter, and has been described by *The Economist* as one of "Twenty Living Polymaths."

Hough writes informally and engagingly about music and the life of a musician, from the broader aspects of what it is to walk out onto a stage or to make a recording, to specialist tips from deep inside the practice room: how to trill, how to pedal, how to practice. He also writes vividly about people he's known, places he's traveled to, books he's read, paintings he's seen; and he touches on more controversial subjects, such as assisted suicide and abortion. Even religion is there—the possibility of the existence of God, problems with some biblical texts, and the challenges involved in being a gay Catholic.

Rough Ideas is an illuminating, constantly surprising introduction to the life and mind of one of our great cultural figures.

The Rumi Prescription: How an Ancient Mystic Poet Changed My Modern Manic Life by Melody Moezzi [TarcherPerigee, 9780525537762]

A powerful personal journey to find meaning and life lessons in the words of a wildly popular 13th century poet.

Rumi's inspiring and deceptively simple poems have been called ecstatic, mystical, and devotional. To writer and activist Melody Moezzi, they became a lifeline. In **The Rumi Prescription**, we follow her path of discovery as she translates Rumi's works for herself - to gain wisdom and insight in the face of a creative and spiritual roadblock. With the help of her father, who is a lifelong fan of Rumi's poetry, she immerses herself in this rich body of work, and discovers a 13th-century prescription for modern life.

Addressing isolation, distraction, depression, fear, and other everyday challenges we face, the book offers a roadmap for living with intention and ease, and embracing love at every turn--despite our deeply divided and chaotic times. Most of all, it presents a vivid reminder that we already have the answers we seek, if we can just slow down to honor them.

- *You went out in search of gold far and wide, but all along you were gold on the inside.*
- *Become the sky and the clouds that create the rain, not the gutter that carries it to the drain.*
- *You already own all the sustenance you seek. If only you'd wake up and take a peek.*
- *Quit being a drop. Make yourself an ocean.*

Rumi: Unseen Poems Translated and Edited by Brad Gooch and Maryam Mortaz [Everyman's Library Pocket Poets Series, Everyman's Library, Alfred A Knopf, 9781101908105]

A collection of never-before-translated poems by the widely beloved medieval Persian poet Rumi.

Rumi (1207-1273) was trained in Sufism--a mystic tradition within Islam--and founded the Sufi order known to us as the Whirling Dervishes, who use dance and music as part of their spiritual devotion. Rumi's poetry has long been popular with contemporary Western audiences because of the way it combines the sacred and the sensual, describing divine love in rapturously human terms.

However, a number of Rumi's English translators over the past century were not speakers of Persian and they based their sometimes very free interpretations on earlier translations. With Western audiences in mind, translators also tended to tone down or leave out elements of Persian culture and of Islam in Rumi's work, and hundreds of the prolific poet's works were never made available to English speakers at all. In this new translation -- composed almost entirely of untranslated gems from Rumi's vast ouevre -- Brad Gooch and Maryam Mortaz aim to achieve greater fidelity to the originals while still allowing Rumi's lyric exuberance to shine.

The First Free Women: Poems of the Early Buddhist Nuns edited by Matty Weingast, Foreword by Bhikkhuni Anandabodhi [Shambhala Publications, 9781611807769]

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Index of Poems by First Line

A radical and vivid rendering of poetry from the first Buddhist nuns that brings a new immediacy to their voices.

The Therigatha ("Verses of the Elder Nuns") is the oldest collection of known writings from Buddhist women and one of the earliest collections of women's literature in India. Composed during the life of the Buddha, the collection contains verses by early Buddhist nuns detailing everything from their disenchantment with their prescribed roles in society to their struggles on the path to enlightenment to their spiritual realizations. Among the nuns, a range of voices are represented, including former wives, women who lost children, women who gave up their wealth, and a former prostitute.

In **The First Free Women**, Matty Weingast revives this ancient collection with a contemporary and radical adaptation. In this poetic re-envisioning that remains true to the original essence of each poem, he infuses each verse with vivid language that is not found in other translations. Simple yet profound, the nuance of language highlights the beauty in each poem and resonates with modern readers exploring the struggles, grief, failures, doubts, and ultimately, moments of profound insight of each woman. Weingast breathes fresh life into this ancient collection of poetry, offering readers a rare glimpse of Buddhism through the spiritual literature and poetry of the first female disciples of the Buddha.

Unfinished Business: Notes of a Chronic Re-reader by Vivian Gornick [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 9780374282158]

One of our most beloved writers reassess the electrifying works of literature that have shaped her life

I sometimes think I was born reading . . . I can't remember the time when I didn't have a book in my hands, my head lost to the world around me.

Unfinished Business: Notes of a Chronic Re-reader is Vivian Gornick's celebration of passionate reading, of returning again and again to the books that have shaped her at crucial points in her life. In nine essays that traverse literary criticism, memoir, and biography, one of our most celebrated critics writes about the importance of reading—and re-reading—as life progresses. Gornick finds herself in contradictory characters within D. H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers*, assesses womanhood in Colette's *The Vagabond* and *The Shackle*, and considers the veracity of memory in Marguerite Duras's *The Lover*. She revisits Great War novels by J. L. Carr and Pat Barker, uncovers the psychological complexity of Elizabeth Bowen's prose, and soaks in Natalia Ginzburg, "a writer whose work has often made me love life more." After adopting two cats, whose erratic behavior she finds vexing, she discovers Doris Lessing's *Particularly Cats*.

Guided by Gornick's trademark verve and insight, *Unfinished Business* is a masterful appreciation of literature's power to illuminate our lives from a peerless writer and thinker who "still read[s] to feel the power of Life with a capital L."

In the Land of Men: A Memoir by Adrienne Miller [Ecco, 9780062682413]

One of the Most Anticipated Books of the Year: Vogue, Parade, Esquire, Bitch, and Maclean's

A New York Times and Washington Post Book to Watch

A fiercely personal memoir about coming of age in the male-dominated literary world of the nineties, becoming the first female literary editor of Esquire, and Miller's personal and working relationship with David Foster Wallace

A naive and idealistic twenty-two-year-old from the Midwest, Adrienne Miller got her lucky break when she was hired as an editorial assistant at *GQ* magazine in the mid-nineties. Even if its sensibilities were manifestly mid-century—the martinis, powerful male egos, and unquestioned authority of kings—*GQ* still seemed the red-hot center of the literary world. It was there that Miller began learning how to survive in a man's world. Three years later, she forged her own path, becoming the first woman to take on the role of literary editor of *Esquire*, home to the male writers who had defined manhood itself— Hemingway, Mailer, and Carver. Up against this old world, she would soon discover that it wanted nothing to do with a "mere girl."

But this was also a unique moment in history that saw the rise of a new literary movement, as exemplified by *McSweeney*'s and the work of David Foster Wallace. A decade older than Miller, the mercurial Wallace would become the defining voice of a generation and the fiction writer she would work with most. He was her closest friend, confidant—and antagonist. Their intellectual and artistic exchange grew into a highly charged professional and personal relationship between the most prominent male writer of the era and a young woman still finding her voice.

This memoir—a rich, dazzling story of power, ambition, and identity—ultimately asks the question "How does a young woman fit into this male culture and at what cost?" With great wit and deep intelligence, Miller presents an inspiring and moving portrayal of a young woman's education in a land of men.

Samuel Beckett: Anatomy of a Literary Revolution by Pascale Casanova, translated by Gregory Elliott [Verso, 9781844671120]

In this fascinating new exploration of Samuel Beckett's work, Pascale Casanova argues that Beckett's reputation rests on a pervasive misreading of his oeuvre, which neglects entirely the literary revolution he instigated. Reintroducing the historical into the heart of this body of work, Casanova provides an arresting portrait of Beckett as radically subversive—doing for writing what Kandinsky did for art—and in the process presents the key to some of the most profound enigmas of Beckett's writing.

Virginia Woolf: And the Women Who Shaped Her World by Gillian Gill [Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 9781328683953]

An insightful, witty look at Virginia Woolf through the lens of the extraordinary women closest to her.

How did Adeline Virginia Stephen become the great writer Virginia Woolf? Acclaimed biographer Gillian Gill tells the stories of the women whose legacies—of strength, style, and creativity—shaped Woolf's path to the radical writing that inspires so many today.

Gill casts back to Woolf's French-Anglo-Indian maternal great-grandmother Thérèse de L'Etang, an outsider to English culture whose beauty passed powerfully down the female line; and to Woolf's aunt Anne Thackeray Ritchie, who gave Woolf her first vision of a successful female writer. Yet it was the women in her own family circle who had the most complex and lasting effect on Woolf. Her mother, Julia, and sisters Stella, Laura, and Vanessa were all, like Woolf herself, but in markedly different ways, warped by the male-dominated household they lived in. Finally, Gill shifts the lens onto the famous Bloomsbury group. This, Gill convinces, is where Woolf called upon the legacy of the women who shaped her to transform a group of men--united in their love for one another and their disregard for women--into a society in which Woolf ultimately found her freedom and her voice.

The Imagined, the Imaginary and the Symbolic by Maurice Godelier, translated by Nora Scott [Verso, 9781786637703]

Exploring the close relationship between the real and the symbolic and imaginary

What you imagined is not always imaginary, but everything that is imaginary is imagined. It is by imagining that people make the impossible become possible. In mythology or religion, however, those things that are imagined are never experienced as being imaginary by believers. The realm of the imagined is even more real than the real; it is super-real, surreal.

Lévi-Strauss held that "the real, the symbolic and the imaginary" are three separate orders. Maurice Godelier demonstrates the contrary: that the real is not separate from the symbolic and the imaginary. For instance, for a portion of humanity, rituals and sacred objects and places attest to the reality and therefore the truth that God, gods or spirits exist. The symbolic enables people to signify what they think and do, encompassing thought, spilling over into the whole body, but also pervading temples, palaces, tools, foods, mountains, the sea, the sky and the earth. It is real.
Godelier's book goes to the strategic heart of the social sciences, for to examine the nature and role of the imaginary and the symbolic is also to attempt to account for the basic components of all societies and ultimately of human existence. And these aspects in turn shape our social and personal identity.

The Assembled Human, Der montierte Mensch by Sabine Breitwieser, Bernd Stiegler, Olaf Möller, Antje Krause-Wahl, Maren Butte, Nadine Engel, Anna Fricke, Lena Trüper, Nissar Ulama [Kerber, 9783735606372] English, German

A century of art exploring the ambivalent relationship between humans and machines

From the age of the conveyor belt to today's digital revolution, **The Assembled Human** explores human beings as hybrid creatures merging with the technology they have created. This cultural-historical survey encompasses key works of painting and graphic design, early experiments in photography, installation and film, along with recent works of post-internet art.

Artists include: Gerd Arntz, Otto Neurath, Ed Atkins, Giacomo Balla, Thomas Bayrle, Umberto Boccioni, John Cage, Helen Chadwick, Bruce Conner, Marcel Duchamp, Charles & Ray Eames, Öyvind Fahlström, Harun Farocki, Richard Hamilton, Barbara Hammer, John Heartfield, Lynn Hershman-Leeson, Eva Hesse, Gary Hill, Rebecca Horn, Fritz Kahn, Alexander Kluge, Kiki Kogelnik, Maria Lassnig, Mark Leckey, Fernand Léger, El Lissitzky, Hilary Lloyd, Goshka Macuga, René Magritte, Man Ray, Etienne-Jules Marey, Caroline Mesquita, László Moholy-Nagy, Eadweard Muybridge, Orlan, Tony Oursler, Trevor Paglen, Nam June Paik, Eduardo Paolozzi, Antoine Pevsner, Seth Price, Jon Rafman, Robert Rauschenberg, Thomas Ruff, Walter Ruttmann, Xanti Schawinsky, Oskar Schlemmer, Avery Singer, Stelarc, Thayaht, Paul Thek, Jean Tinguely and George Widener.

André Butzer: Works on Paper 2001–2019 André Butzer: Werke auf Papier 2001-2019 by André Butzer, essays by Kay Heymer, Gwen Allen, Hannah Eckstein [Kerber, 9783735605948] English and German

This volume collects 139 never-before-seen works on paper by German painter André Butzer (born 1973) produced between 2001 and 2019. The book includes new scholarship that examines the predominant themes and motifs in Butzer's colorful, cartoonish and abstract works.

War Fever: Boston, Baseball, and America in the Shadow of the Great War by Randy Roberts and Johnny Smith [Basic Books, 9781541672666]

Only the dead have seen the end of war. —George Santayana, 1922

A "richly detailed" portrait of the three men whose lives were forever changed by WWI-era Boston (Michael S. Neiberg): baseball star Babe Ruth, symphony conductor Karl Muck, and Harvard Law student Charles Whittlesey.

In the fall of 1918, a fever gripped Boston. The streets emptied as paranoia about the deadly Spanish flu spread. Newspapermen and vigilante investigators aggressively sought to discredit anyone who looked or sounded German. And as the war raged on, the enemy seemed to be lurking everywhere: prowling in submarines off the coast of Cape Cod, arriving on passenger ships in the harbor, or disguised as the radical lecturing workers about the injustice of a sixty-hour workweek.

War Fever explores this delirious moment in American history through the stories of three men: Karl Muck, the German conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, accused of being an enemy spy; Charles Whittlesey, a Harvard law graduate who became an unlikely hero in Europe; and the most famous baseball player of all time, Babe Ruth, poised to revolutionize the game he loved. Together, they offer a gripping narrative of America at war and American culture in upheaval.