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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

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
New Series Number 73

EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. Our Annotated Bibliography will review, list and link the titles under discussion, providing a faithful summary of its content and audience.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

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THIRD DISPLACEMENT: COSMOBIOLOGY, COSMOLOCALITY, COSMOSOCIOECOLOGY by John Hart, foreword by Jacques F. Vallée, afterword by John F. Haught [Cosmos Contact: Close Encounters of the Otherkind, Cascade Books, 97815326-33102

The question, "Are we alone in the cosmos?" has been answered. We are *not* alone. Geologist-paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, SJ, stated, as early as the mid-1920s, that intelligent life likely exists elsewhere and distinguished scientists of today, including Harvard biologist, E. O. Wilson; Cambridge cosmologist, Stephen Hawking; astrophysicist and noted UAP researcher, Jacques Vallee; astronomer, Allen Hynek; and many others concur. The oral traditions of Native American elders teach that they have interacted periodically with Star People who are respected ancestors. Credible witness-participants today describe abductions by benevolent and malevolent Others. Discoveries by the Kepler, Hubble, and Gaia space telescopes, ground-based arrays of radio telescopes, and TESS (Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite) suggest that in the Milky Way, twenty-five *billion* planets are in the life-friendly Goldilocks Zone.

In **THIRD DISPLACEMENT: COSMOBIOLOGY, COSMOLOCALITY, COSMOSOCIOECOLOGY***, author John Hart links experiences with research in science-based and Spirit-focused books and articles--including narratives about close encounters with Visitors from elsewhere in space (ETI) or Others from other cosmos dimensions (IDI)--in examination of the claim that Intelligent ExoEarth life exists, that Otherkind has visited humankind.

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THIRD DISPLACEMENT follows **COSMIC COMMONS** and **ENCOUNTERING ETI** in the trilogy Cosmos Contact: Close Encounters of the Otherkind.

COSMIC COMMONS: SPIRIT, SCIENCE, AND SPACE by John Hart explores terrestrial-extraterrestrial intelligent life Contact. It uses a thought experiment to consider the ecological-economic-ethical-ecclesial impacts of Contact, analyzing incidents around the world described by credible witnesses (two of whom are interviewed for the book), including Roswell and the Hudson River Valley. It discusses government and academic efforts to use ridicule and coercion to suppress Contact investigations, supports a scientific method to research ETI reports in a field that should excite scientists, and calls on academics to publicly disclose their Contact experiences. It traces Earth ecological and economic injustices to the European Enlightenment and the Discovery Doctrine by which European nations rationalized invasion of distant continents, genocide, and seizure of the territories and natural goods of native peoples. It advocates a change in humans' Earth conduct to avoid replicating in space the policies and practices that wrought economic injustice and ecological devastation on Earth, provides an innovative cosmosociological praxis ethics theory and practice toward that end, and develops a Cosmic Charter, based on UN documents, to guide humankind in space and in ETI encounters. Permeated by a profound sense of the sacred, Cosmic Commons explores a positive relationship between religion and science as humankind ventures into space.

ENCOUNTERING ETI: ALIENS IN AVATAR AND THE AMERICAS by John Hart weaves together scientific knowledge and spiritual faith in a cosmic context. It explores consequences of Contact between terrestrial intelligent life (TI) and extraterrestrial intelligent life (ETI). Humans will face cosmic displacement if there are other complex, technologically advanced intelligent beings in the universe; our economic structures and religious beliefs might need substantial revision. On Earth or in space, humans could encounter benevolent ETI (solicitous of our striving for maturity as a species) or malevolent ETI (seeking our land and goods to benefit themselves, claiming that their ""superior civilization"" gives them the right)--or meet both types of species. Earth Encounters of the Third Kind described by credible witnesses (including American Indian elders) suggest that both have arrived already: some shut down U.S. and U.S.S.R. ICBM missiles to promote peace; others mutilated cattle or abducted people, perhaps to acquire physiological data on biota for scientific study or for other, unknown purposes. Sci-fi movies such as Avatar and novels like The Martian Chronicles describe humans as malevolent ETI aliens: we do to others what we fear others will do to us. A shared and evolving spiritual materiality could enable humanity to overcome cosmic displacement, and guide TI and ETI in a common quest for meaning and wellbeing on cosmic common ground. ""We do not yet have any scientific evidence for or against extraterrestrial life. The 'not yet' here is important since the scientific search is becoming increasingly more sophisticated and the anticipation more intense. Encountering ETI manages to raise the level of anticipation significantly while respecting the need for good science, a need not always respected in the public domain."" --George V. Coyne, Director Emeritus, Vatican Observatory; author of Wayfarers in the Cosmos (with Alessandro Omizzolo) ""Encountering ETI goes beyond the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence. John Hart presents compelling evidence that humans have already encountered an ETI presence and explores scenarios and considerations for future encounters. He reminds us of our own history of human exploitation and concludes that we must undergo a transformation as we explore extraterrestrial intelligences. I highly recommend this book for serious consideration to questions of universal ethics and behaviors as we begin a new phase in our evolution."" --Robert Salas, USAF (ret.); author of Unidentified: The UFO Phenomenon ""Fasten your seatbelts! John Hart will take us for a ride above the stratosphere into the outer cosmos. In the rearview mirror we'll re-examine and re-evaluate our current conduct on our home planet. We'll re-evaluate terrestrial poverty, pollution, and political strife. Holding up the rearview mirror will be UFO experiencers, those who

believe they have been contacted by an extraterrestrial civilization. I am delighted to see academic colleagues recognizing the potential value of analyzing the UFO phenomenon for political, moral, and spiritual purposes."" --Ted Peters, Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary; author of UFOs--God's Chariots? ""Encountering ETI, together with its predecessor, Cosmic Commons, will bring you right back to Earth and Homo sapiens. Sometimes it takes the exocentric perspective to clear the eyes, see our own habitat, and know ourselves for the first time. John Hart is a good fellow traveler and guide."" --Larry Rasmussen, Reinhold Niebuhr Professor Emeritus of Social Ethics, Union Theological Seminary; author of Earth-Honoring Faith ""I have read hundreds of UFO books since reading my first in 1958. But this is the first one that not only reveals detailed knowledge of the UFO scene, but provides a great deal of food for thought concerning interactions between aliens and earthlings. Hart makes it clear that there are a number of different approaches taken by religious and other leaders.

Excerpt: **THIRD DISPLACEMENT** is the third volume of the trilogy **COSMOS CONTACT: CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF THE OTHERKIND**. The volumes explore possible ecological, ethical, economic, and ecclesial implications of Earth-ExoEarth intelligent life Contact that would occur when scientists discover either simple or complex forms of life in the universe. Among the latter is the likelihood that a third contextual-conceptual and psychological-spiritual-philosophical shift in human consciousness and humans' sense of cosmic place will occur, complementary to the aftermath of the First Displacement (Copernican Revolution) and the Second Displacement (Darwinian Evolution). **THIRD DISPLACEMENT** follows **ENCOUNTERING ETI: ALIENS IN AVATAR AND THE AMERICAS**, and **COSMIC COMMONS: SPIRIT, SCIENCE, AND SPACE**. The latter books focused on Contact using a "thought experiment" to consider that intelligent life Contact has occurred already; credible witnesses' reports contribute to the respective books' analyses. This book explores concrete data from scientists, social scientists, and other credible witnesses. The data has been acquired in part through personal interviews, and from journals, books, and newspaper articles. It examines more in-depth the impacts of Contact when it is accepted as a fact, and explores confirming that Contact is a fact. Humans' current understanding of their present and future cosmos locus (humankind as the sole intelligent life—and therefore central in cosmos importance) in thought and in physical place (cosmolocality) will be ever-more disoriented at Contact when new types of living beings (cosmobiology) are engaged among near and distant stars. The disorientation would be significant for some people, and minimal for others (depending on whether they are hostile toward or fearful of, or engage with and adapt to, Contact).

The trilogy title—**COSMOS CONTACT: CLOSE ENCOUNTER OF THE OTHERKIND**—suggests that when Contact occurs between terrestrial intelligent beings and extraterrestrial intelligent beings or interdimensional intelligent beings, this encounter will prompt an enhanced cosmos consciousness on the part of humankind. The reality that "we are not alone" will stimulate human thinking to go "outside the box" of its previous Earth-bound and human-centered way of viewing the cosmos and all that might be "out there." (Humans are, of course, "out there" in the perspective of inhabitants of other worlds, to whose environs they journey.) Humankind and Otherkind—the Others or Visitors with whom humankind makes Contact—have the potential, as time passes and they come to know and understand each other better, to recognize that all living beings are members of a relational cosmos community. As expressed in Indian traditions of the Americas, "we are all related"; "all my relations" includes all biota and abiota; and, in the words of Francis of Assisi, all beings are "sisters" and "brothers."

New understandings of socioecological praxis ethics (originating in Earth settings) would have to be developed that might adapt to and adopt from distinct and diverse cosmos contexts, and transition, over time, into cosmosocioecological praxis ethics. This would guide human consciousness and conduct while humankind explores space, establishes bases on Earth's moon and other places, and

colonizes (and possibly, terraforms) habitable planets that have or do not have microbial life. Humans should, through sustained Contact, develop an understanding of cosmic relatedness (cosmosociality, to parallel cosmobiology), and awareness that other evolutionarily advanced beings, too, have an intraspecies consciousness of caring for their progeny (eusociality). A shared consciousness of eusociality might be extended, as a consequence of Contact, to a shared interspecies intergenerational concern (cosmoeusociality). In all of the preceding considerations of other worlds, humanity should bear in mind the interrelationship of social justice and ecological wellbeing (cosmosocioecology).

The exploration of human place(s) in the cosmos helps to recall and elaborate impacts of past major displacements, and to imagine how Contact would be similar to and distinct from them in its consequences. This new displacement might be closer in time than currently conceived, because of NASA's ongoing discoveries in and projections about the existence of Milky Way Galaxy planets in the "Goldilocks Zone": they orbit neither too close to (too hot) nor too far from (too cold) their star to support life as we know it.

The discovery of microbial life or intelligent life is not assumed or asserted to be a catalytic event that will cause a major consciousness shift, as did past displacements. Previous displacements were, for most people, abrupt and astounding. At the time of the new Displacement, almost one-half of humans have already been considering that possibility of being displaced, having been stimulated to these considerations by news reports, credible witness narratives, space telescope discoveries, and scientists' speculations about all of the preceding occurrences. Much of humanity has long been considering Contact (especially in native cultures, as described in the traditions and experiences of indigenous populations, for whom it is already considered a past, present, and future reality). When a shift occurs in the extent to which people understand the reality of ETI/IDI impacts, since they have already explored them proactively a priori and projected their possible adverse consequences, they would not have to address them urgently and reactively at Contact.

Social Justice Integrated with Ecological Wellbeing

Social issues and social ethics relate to and are integrated with ecological wellbeing. When people reach for the stars, human consciousness should be aware of and creative about ethical principles, elaborated in context, for justice within and among human communities, and among humankind, Earth, Earth's biota, other worlds, and other–than–Earthlike life. Complementary principles should be creatively developed for human conduct on ExoEarth worlds, especially if people anticipate interaction with biota already inhabiting them. In preparation for a diversity of encounters with otherworld beings, explorers should consider the ideas and principles discussed in the Earth Charter and in the Hague Principles for a Universal Declaration on Responsibilities for Human Rights and Earth Trusteeship including as currently being expanded and expressed more universally in a complementary Cosmos Charter, now in a seminal stage of development.

The Cosmos Charter aspires to effect efficaciously an integration of cosmolocality, cosmobiology, cosmocommunity, and cosmosocioecology for cosmos commons and cosmos relational community wellbeing. The envisioned cosmocommunity, currently an ideal, would be a cosmos relational community, characterized by beneficial relationships between humankind on Earth and humankind dispersed among settlements on distant worlds; among humankind in all places, with other living beings (including ETI and IDI) encountered in them; and with living beings' shared abiotic contexts. The intelligent beings would be engaged, in diverse near and distant places, in dialogic discourse. The resolution of a Third Displacement, then, might well come about through a shift from an Earth-bound locus and thinking to a cosmos relational consciousness in a common cosmos relational community, as humankind comes to inhabit worlds other than its Earth home.

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Science-Religion Complementarity

Third Displacement originates and elaborates: social, psychological, and spiritual meanings of "displacement"; the concept of a "third displacement" in human history; integration of social justice and ecology on Earth and in cosmos contexts; consideration of spiritual and ecological insights from native peoples' elders, and teachings from centuries-old indigenous traditions, and from Christianity; recognition of science-religion complementarity, mutuality, and relationality; cosmosocioecology and cosmosocioecological praxis ethics developed in particular contexts and adaptive to other places; an evolving Cosmos Charter; interviews with credible UFO witnesses; presentation of the findings of the official US government UFO "debunker," astrophysicist Allen Hynek, his categories of Close Encounters, and their relevance; use of a "thought experiment" to describe and discuss credible witnesses' reports of ETI and IDI encounters positively, rather than questioningly or disparagingly; acceptance of the reality of ETI and IDI; integrated discussion of ExoEarth intelligent life; ETI, IDI, and TDI (extraterrestrial, interdimensional, and transdimensional intelligent life), as theorized by astrophysicist and computer scientist Jacques Vallée et al.); and discussion of the most recent scientific data on space explorations and planetary investigations that NASA, ESA, and CNES-GEIPAN have gathered (and the latest scientific theories related to them) and continue to accumulate and release to the scientific community and the general public.

Concepts of "cosmos commons," "Cosmos Charter," and "praxis ethics" are interwoven to elaborate innovative considerations of time (the relationship of present and future); space (human exploration of the cosmos); human-other intelligent being relations (TI-ETI and TI-IDI biota interaction); and place (Earth-ExoEarth, TI-ETI and TI-IDI); ecological and economic impacts of human colonization of other worlds (extraction, or extraction and exploitation, of natural goods; alteration of abiotic places; and intrusion in biotic evolution). Projected socioecological impacts of terrestrial-extraterrestrial and terrestrial-interdimensional engagement are related to suggestions for a present-future-present dynamic that would promote ecological responsibility in extraterrestrial and terrestrial contexts; a dynamic praxis ethics, originating on Earth but eventually adapting to and adopting from ExoEarth contexts; collaboration of humanist scientists, members of faith traditions, sociologists, environmentalists, and ethicists to process impacts of space exploration and Contact; and proposed dynamic ethical principles and practices to minimize or mitigate harm.

In order to consider in a holistic manner these diverse issues, ecology and social ethics in both Earth—including from native peoples' traditions—and other world settings, and TI-ETI / TI-IDI Contact and relationships, are integrated in these pages.

In THIRD DISPLACEMENT, I continue to explore the existence of intelligently controlled UAP that originate on Earth, in ExoEarth locales, or in other dimensions. I have added considerations of intelligent beings' interdimensional travel in UAP that originate in or at least voyage through a dimension other than that in which Earth is located; the origins and attributes of robots who might be piloting them; and living beings who might be controlling them—from within or from afar. Both ETI and IDI are being studied. When humans encounter either type of intelligent being, and their origin is not yet known, ETI/IDI will be used collectively to indicate either one separately, or both conjointly.

In order to stimulate people's openness to the idea and reality of Contact, the book provides (and has a focus on) the personal narratives and professional insights of scientists who once rejected the ideas of exploratory spacecraft in Earth environs and of intelligent other-than-human beings operating such vehicles in their voyages. Then, scientists came to reason, as new evidence became available or as they examined existing evidence with a new scientific openness, that Earth visits by space voyagers or interdimensional voyagers have in fact been taking place for millennia.

The pages that follow provide new understandings about inter-intelligent species engagements, and expand socioecological praxis ethics (developed in Earth settings) into an innovative cosmosocioecological praxis ethics adapted to, adopted from, or integrated with ethical consciousness and conduct originating from diverse cosmos contexts. A draft Cosmos Charter (modeled on the Earth Charter and United Nations space documents, in particular) is included as Appendix 2 to promote integration of cosmolocality, cosmobiology, cosmoeusociality, and cosmosocioecology for cosmos community wellbeing. <>

JET AGE AESTHETIC: TIME GLAMOUR OF MEDIA IN MOTION by Vanessa R. Schwartz [Yale University Press, 9780300247466]

A stunning look at the profound impact of the jet plane on the mid-century aesthetic, from Disneyland to Life magazine

Vanessa R. Schwartz engagingly presents the jet plane's power to define a new age at a critical moment in the mid-20th century, arguing that the craft's speed and smooth ride allowed people to imagine themselves living in the future. Exploring realms as diverse as airport architecture, theme park design, film, and photography, Schwartz argues that the jet created an aesthetic that circulated on the ground below.

Visual and media culture, including Eero Saarinen's airports, David Bailey's photographs of the jet set, and Ernst Haas's experiments in color photojournalism glamorized the imagery of motion. Drawing on unprecedented access to the archives of The Walt Disney Studios, Schwartz also examines the period's most successful example of fluid motion meeting media culture: Disneyland. The park's dedication to "people-moving" defined Walt Disney's vision, shaping the very identity of the place. The jet age aesthetic laid the groundwork for our contemporary media culture, in which motion is so fluid that we can surf the internet while going nowhere at all.

"*Jet Age Aesthetic* is a landmark achievement, laying the foundation for a new kind of critical history of the present."—W. J. T. Mitchell, author of **WHAT DO PICTURES WANT?**

"Decades before the Internet, there was the Jet Age. In this visually delicious study, Vanessa Schwartz returns to a time just before our own, when all that was solid took to the air and the future became as weightless as a cloud out the window. Just sit back and enjoy the ride. You'll be amazed at what you see."—Fred Turner, author of **THE DEMOCRATIC SURROUND: MULTIMEDIA AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE PSYCHEDELIC SIXTIES**

"Gracefully written, engagingly narrated, and accompanied by brilliantly selected images, this is a book that anyone interested in the post-WWII world can read with pleasure and profit."—Edward Dimendberg, University of California, Irvine

"A dazzling and stylish journey through the art and culture of the jet age. Beautifully illustrated, this important book offers a new way of understanding the modernity of the 1950s and 1960s."—Lynda Nead, author of **THE TIGER IN THE SMOKE: ART AND CULTURE IN POST-WAR BRITAIN**

"*Jet Age Aesthetics* is an exhilarating, timely call for new ways of thinking about media and mass culture. From airport design and Disneyland to movies and newsmagazines, Schwartz traces

throughlines of aspiration and experience in the visual culture of the jet age."—Britt Salvesen, Los Angeles County Museum of Art

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Excerpt: Writing well after the arrival of the jet, during the period when even the jumbo 747 had already become banal and the Concorde had taken flight, Andy Warhol remarked, "Airplanes and airports have my favorite kind of food service, my favorite kind of bathrooms ... my favorite kinds of entertainment ... my favorite conveyor belts, my favorite graphics and colors, the best security checks, the best views ... the best optimism."' Warhol, the great artist of the everyday, described air travel as having a total design aesthetic, but with this book] have attempted to dig more deeply into describing why it could come to define a moment and what it really meant.

It was not a foregone conclusion that Warhol would have such a positive association with the jet or think of it as optimistic, or, for that matter, that anyone else would. We may have begun this book by observing the stuttering takeoff of the jet with BOAC's Comet, but the Boeing 707 had its challenges as well. In fact, even Warhol depicted it as a deathtrap. In 1962, Warhol began his `death and disaster series" with 129 Die in Jet! using the headline from the worst crash the 707 had experienced since 1958, On board Air France flight 007 was the entire board of the Atlanta Art Museum and many other cultural luminaries of that city. It was to depart Orly for the United States on June 3, 1962, after a tour of European cities. The plane crashed on takeoff, killing all on board except for two crew members. [t was the first time that more than one hundred passengers had died in one crash, and it occurred in full view at the sparkling new airport. Why, despite the catastrophic deaths of these high-profile passengers, and the crash's memorialization in haunting and caustic art by the likes of Warhol, did people still fly? Is this the "truer" picture of the jet age than the optimistic visions of sailing above the weather and a life of fluid motion and constant circulation that has been depicted in this book?

Let me answer by turning to another Ernst Haas image, an ad for Delco-Remy from the 1960s. The company had little to do with the jet business. As a division of General Motors, it made alternators and motor parts (and still does). In the Haas photo, we see mostly an open blue sky, and tucked into the bottom left corner four tiny jets (not passenger 7075, but military jets) leaving beautiful smoke trails of "wake" naturalized into looking like clouds. They offer an elegant and sleek image of fluid motion, while also reminding us that the photo will record this trail of motion that will soon dissipate into the sky, leaving no trace. It isa pretty picture indeed.

The decade of the jet age came to an end, but no form of transport has outpaced the jet. Simultaneously, the jet age aesthetic changed us and helped prepare us for the world we currently inhabit. If seen as a story of optimism and excitement in a vision of air travel as pure flow, we know the jet age is long gone. In fact, one could see Arthur Hailey's best-selling novel of 1961, Airport and

its runaway hit film version of 1970, as signs that in only the few short years since The VIPs the public image of flying had changed remarkably. Rather than an assembly of elites, the people on this plane are a geriatric stowaway, a bomb-carrying maniac, and a pilot and stewardess engaging in an extramarital affair. Danger erupts in the skies. The weather—a huge snowstorm—has hobbled the airport team's ability to clear a runway of a banked plane so that a crippled 707 can land safely. Community activists, in the meantime, complaining about the "jet whine" caused by the takeoff and landing of the planes, had already forced the closure of the airport's only other runway. At the end of the clay only the crazy passenger dies, and the ground crew saves the day, and the film could use Frank Sinatras song "Come Fly with Me" only as a sick joke. There did not seem to be anything glamorous or fluid about this ride.

The success of jet travel and its mass expansion presented material challenges as public expectations regarding the easy Inability of the early jet age years were dashed by airports that failed to keep up with the demands of people-moving on the ground.' At the same time, such freedom of movement also led to the era of skyjacking, which itself shows how symbolically meaningful such freedom was in the first place. Although the first plane was taken in 1961, the period 1967 to 1972. became the heyday of skyjackings, and terror in the sky remains one of the greatest forms of political and social violence used today. The new security-controlled airport is, without doubt, a concrete response to the limits of jet age visions of fluid motion and experiments in people-moving in real space.

But to focus on airports or to say that the jet age failed or to think only about whether jet travel is still glamorous misses the larger achievement of the jet age aesthetic, which was never simply about moving people through airports. The history of this new aesthetic, wrapped in the dawn of a transport age and recounted hem, shows that such transport was part of a communications network of spaces, experiences, and images. What the jet created was a kind of motion that it and other media of the period glamorized and celebrated: that you could go fast and have a sense of actually not moving at all—fluid motion. This aesthetic created "jet age people" who could better mediate between the material and image worlds, saw less antagonism between the human and the technological spheres, and were comfortable rather than distressed at seeing themselves as spectators of their changing world. The jet age may not have invented or created these qualities, as they have also been associated with the longer history of "modem life." But the jet came to define an "age" in its own time because its impact on consciousness made a significant contribution not only through the reality of people taking to the air and traveling as never before but also by changing how people experienced life on the ground in new spaces and visual representations.

By the 1960s, the "network society" had begun to emerge as a commonplace concept or phrase among sociologists and has since been incorporated into most fields in the qualitative social sciences and the humanities. Although derived from the work of such turn-of-the-twentieth-century sociologists of modernity as Georg Simnel, more recent work by Manuel Castells has identified not just the fact of connectedness but also certain connections such as those made by technology, especially mass media and telecommunications, as the basis for contemporary social interaction and organization.' The concept of the network society deemphasizes the centrality of physical co-presence. In Castells' rendition, virtuality stands in for materiality, The technological mediation of form is an initial step toward the condition that media theorists describe as "intermediality" and "convergence culture"—in which content flows across media platforms, This study has shown the emergence of the network society from the jet age aesthetic.

The period of the jet age also reorganized how intellectuals thought about and approached the study of technology, media, and aesthetics. In the decade before the jet, the Iwo cultures" debate notoriously emerged in intellectual discourse; it opposed art, on the one hand, with science and

technology, on the other. By the mid-1960s, astute observers such as Susan Sontag had pointed to the Jinks between new transport technology and other media, as well as to the creation of a new sensorium. She identified the centrality of speed, giving examples about the physical speed of airplane travel and also remarking on the speed of film images and the "pan-cultural perspective on the arts that is possible through the mass reproduction of art objects," which can be thought of as a description of the globalization of culture through its reproducibility and circulation. Sontag's essay "One Culture and the New Sensibility" spoke of a new unitary culture in order to dispute C. P. Snows model on the development of two cultures, one of science and the other of the arts. She rightly grasped that an older literary culture and the cultural hierarchies it conveyed were being replaced by vibrant visual and performing arts cultures `which draw' on science and technology" Whereas art had once served a ritual function, religious and then secular (on behalf of the Bate) art, Sontag included a much broader swath of culture than people such as Snow would have allowed, and it would organize a new sensory regime.

Sontag was of a generation for whom questions about the role of technology and culture had become central. Slightly earlier, in the mid- to late 1950s, Lawrence Alloway, dubbed by art critic Clement Greenberg as a "sectarian champion of most things American" and who as a young man became a key figure in the Independent Group at London's Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA), articulated such an approach to culture before Sontag did. Alloway's intellectual agenda emerged from the technological climate of his moment, especially the advent of the jet. He refused such binary distinctions long before anyone was really talking about network theory, because his experience living as a part of jet culture changed the way he thought. Alloway eradicated forma] hierarchies in favor of intermedial connections and trained a keen and even favorable eye on the way technology shaped aesthetic experience.' In 1959, Alloway advocated that something like techno-aesthetics would be entirely -salutary: "One reason for the failure of the humanists to keep their grip on public values ... is their failure to handle technology, which is both transforming our environment and, through its product the mass media, our ideas about the world and about ourselves."

The Pop critics, including Alloway and others at the think-tank-like environment at the ICA, grasped the heterogeneity of a newly abundant material culture as well as the relation between technology and culture. They were thinkers and producers young enough to enjoy the excitement of contemporary culture, which they envisioned as emphasizing novelty, disposability, movement, and America. They owed the existence of the ICA to an earlier generation of artists and critics, such as Roland Penrose and Herbert Read, who had been bathed in Surrealism, Paris, and the values of the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA). Their interest in technology, technologically mediated images, and things as well as expendability was not entirely unprecedented. The Futurists in the early decades of the twentieth century had shared such preoccupations, as had MoMA, which, influenced by the Bauhaus, held an exhibition in 1934 called "Machine Art, in dialogue with such important historical works as Lewis Mumford's TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION and Read's ART AND INDUSTRY: THE PRINCIPLES OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN.

Unlike the earlier generation, the Pop critics wanted to know how art related to their own time rather than to all time. To legitimate such an orientation, critics such as Alloway sought to redefine culture toward an anthropological sense of the term, as a "complex of human activity." Alloway turned to the popular arts rather than to folk culture, which many anthropologists sought to describe as having timeless and eternal qualities. British intellectuals such as Richard Haggart and the Birmingham School (founded in 1964) also had an anthropological orientation, but they fit into the nostalgic, anti—mass culture camp that fretted over the loss of traditional folk culture in the face of rapid change, The Pop critics, on the other hand, had something very different to say.

Alloway was interested in the ephemeral. "Everything that in our culture changes is the material of the popular arts,' he posited, which led him to advocate for the study of such cultural forms as film not as an artform manqué but rather as a modern popular art." He also embraced culture that moved fast: he saw culture as a continuum or "flat-bed visual field" and an "expendable multitude of slgns." Alloway believed the mass arts were one of the most remarkable and characteristic achievements of industrial society, and he celebrated their emphasis on anticlassicism." Mass culture moved as fast as the jet.

If the mass arts for Alloway concerned that which changed, he also insisted in a later essay, 'The Long Front of Culture," that to understand culture, the critic needed to concentrate not on production, but on reception and consumption. What was the 'long front" of culture? AsJacob Bronowski put it, when he spoke at the Ica in 1951 of the relation of art and science, scholars had "come to the stage in structure where [they thought] it more interesting to look for the relations between objects than [at] the objects themselves." The continuum that Alloway envisioned was a network.

Art, for Alloway, could not be separated from other visual means of communication; instead, it became part of a nonhierarchical system of public information. Although Alloway is well known to those who study the origins of Pop Art, his views are as important to twentieth-century media theories as those of the Frankfurt School, French semiotics, the Birmingham School, and American cultural studies because of his particular concerns regarding networks of media culture. His views are also of great importance in understanding the link between the origins of the network society and the jet age aesthetic.

Alloway wrote during a period of remarkable geographic mobility, due in no small measure to the expansion of air travel facilitated by the arrival of the jet. In fact, he met the dawn of the jet age by hopping a jet and visiting the United States for the first time in 1958; he would visit several times before moving there in 1961. Alloway redefined culture across space, beyond national borders, and as traversing media forms because he was literally more mobile by virtue of living in the jet age. This development, I suggest, made it easier to reimagine the operations of visual media as part of a global network, and this moment has shaped not only mass media but also our study of it ever since. He envisioned a system of hubs with resonant points of connection that characterize what we think of today as global culture by embracing his experience of his visits to America not as particular and provincial but as the harbinger of a new universal—and not necessarily homogeneous—culture.

Throughout this study, jet age theorists such as Alloway and Daniel Boorstin, whose own life experiences motivated their devotion and insights into the remaking of aesthetic experience through technology, allow us to locate the emergence of a jet age aesthetic in the period under examination and, at the same time, to understand that period in genealogical relation to our own. They offer excellent theoretical guidance as we move from terrains to networks, out of national media cultures and into the circulation of a global visual and environmental culture, where connections and systems rather than national distinction and competition underlie our principal frameworks of interrogation.

This book has recovered a rich period of the history of the relation of technology to culture and experience. But it has one more ambition, which is to locate the history of the interdisciplinary field of visual studies in which the project is grounded. I suggest that the emergence of the field of visual studies hinges upon the very changes—material, technological, and intellectual—of the jet age itself, rather than the critiques of the commodity form associated with the Frankfurt School to which so many studies of mass-mediated visual culture are traced. [n that way, I hope to contribute to how scholars can study not only what I have studied but why I have studied it the way I have. It offers a

framework for moving beyond how theorists in the nineteenth century asked questions, defined fields of study, and chose objects deemed worthy of intellectual scrutiny.

This study is a cultural history of a moment's popular aesthetic and has continuing implications for our own present media culture and how to study it. It takes a flat-bed visual field not as a modernist picture plane but as a cultural continuum, which is what Alloway describes, "It engages with a host of fields of study but does not rest comfortably in any. This approach does not `flatten," as art historians might fret, or study something "epiphenomenal" (treating culture as a reflection of something more real, like economics or politics, the way historians often treat representation), nor do I believe it approaches its objects without the skill, knowledge, or expertise to handle them, but that will have to be left to the readers to judge.

Neither the subject of motion nor the mediation of experience is unique to the jet age. These are elements of human social organization that have taken particular shape and importance in modern capitalist societies. Yet the jet named an 'age" because of something much more than the increase in air travel or even the speed that made it possible to travel long distances. The jet defined its moment and ushered in our own. The jet age aesthetic created globalization at the level of subjective experience. It was only a matter of time before we could go to Disneyland on the other side of the continent or go to the other side of the world or go somewhere in our heads guided by external images without physically going anywhere at all. The jet age produced the individuals who would create the internet and immersive virtual media, not only those people who are now stuck in airports. The glamour of media in motion continues as we develop a twenty-first-century techno-aesthetics in which we seem to be extending human life on earth, while planetary changes that used to happen very slowly seem to be happening very fast. The news cycle is now constant, as are workdays and working hours, store hours and shopping hours. The jet age may have altered our sense of time for good. We are moving so fast that time may appear to have telescoped into an eternal present.' But it would be a shame indeed if, as a result, we have produced a world with no future. That is why I wanted to give this story a past. <>

RICHARD HOFSTADTER: ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS, UNCOLLECTED ESSAYS 1956-1965 edited by Sean Wilentz [Library of America (LOA #330), 9781598536591]

Together for the first time: two masterworks on the undercurrents of the American mind by one of our greatest historians

Richard Hofstadter's **ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE** and **THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS** are two essential works that lay bare the worrying trends of irrationalism, demagoguery, destructive populism, and conspiratorial thinking that have long influenced American politics and culture. Whether underground or—as in our present moment—out in the open, these currents of resentment, suspicion, and conspiratorial delusion received their authoritative treatment from Hofstadter, among the greatest of twentieth-century American historians, at a time when many public intellectuals and scholars did not take them seriously enough. These two masterworks are joined here by Sean Wilentz's selection of Hofstadter's most trenchant uncollected writings of the postwar period: discussions of the

Constitution's framers, the personality and legacy of FDR, higher education and its discontents, the relationship of fundamentalism to right-wing politics, and the advent of the modern conservative movement.

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ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE

Winner of the 1964 Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction

ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE is a book which throws light on many features of the American character. Its concern is not merely to portray the scorners of intellect in American life, but to say something about what the intellectual is, and can be, as a force in a democratic society.

"As Mr. Hofstadter unfolds the fascinating story, it is no crude battle of eggheads and fatheads. It is a rich, complex, shifting picture of the life of the mind in a society dominated by the ideal of practical success." —Robert Peel in the Christian Science Monitor

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Excerpt: To avoid some hazards to understanding, it is perhaps necessary to say that a work given single-mindedly to the exploration of such a theme as this must inevitably have the effect of highlighting its importance in a way that would not be warranted in a comprehensive history of American culture. I can only say that I do not suffer from the delusion that the complexities of American history can be satisfactorily reduced to a running battle between the eggheads and the fatheads. Moreover, to the extent that our history can be considered one of cultural and intellectual conflicts, the public is not simply divided into intellectual and anti-intellectual factions. The greater part of the public, and a great part even of the intelligent and alert public, is simply non-intellectual; it is infused with enough ambivalence about intellect and intellectuals to be swayed now this way and now that on current cultural issues. It has an ingrained distrust of eggheads, but also a gen¬uine yearning for enlightenment and culture. Moreover, a book on anti-intellectualism in America can hardly be taken as though it were meant to be a balanced assessment of our culture, any more than a history of bankruptcies could be taken as a full history of our business life. Although I am convinced that anti-intellectualism is pervasive in our culture, I believe that it can rarely be called dominant. Again and again I have noticed, as I hope readers will, that the more mild and benign forms of anti-intellectualism prove to be the most widespread, whereas the most malign forms are found mainly among small if vociferous minority groups. Again, this is not, as it perhaps should be, a comparative study: my concentration on anti-intellectualism in the United States is no more than the result of a special, and possibly parochial, interest in American society. I do not assume that anti-intellectualism does not exist elsewhere. I think that it is a problem of more than ordinary acuteness here, but I believe it has been present in some form and degree in most societies; in one it takes the form of the administering of hemlock, in another of town-and-gown riots, in another of censorship and regimentation, in still another of Congressional investigations. I am disposed to believe that anti-intellectualism, though it has its own universality, may be considered a part of our English cultural inheritance, and that it is notably strong in Anglo-American experience. A few years ago, Leonard Woolf remarked that "no people has ever despised and distrusted the intellect and intellectuals more than the British." Perhaps Mr. Woolf had not given sufficient thought to the claims of the Americans to supremacy in this respect (which is understandable, since the British have been tired for more than a century of American boasting); but that a British intellectual so long seasoned and so well informed on the cultural life of his own country could have made such a remark may well give us pause. Although the situation of American intellectuals poses problems of special urgency and poignancy, many of their woes are the common experiences of intellectuals elsewhere, and there are some compensating circumstances in American life.

This book is a critical inquiry, not a legal brief for the intellectuals against the American community. I have no desire to encourage the self-pity to which intellectuals are sometimes prone by suggesting that they have been vessels of pure virtue set down in Babylon. One does not need to assert this, or to assert that intellectuals should get sweeping indulgence or exercise great power, in order to insist that respect for intellect and its functions is important to the culture and the health of any society,

and that in ours this respect has often been notably lacking. No one who lives among intellectuals is likely to idealize them unduly; but their relation as fallible persons to the vital function of intellect should remind us of the wisdom of the Church, which holds that although the priesthood is vulnerable to the errors and sins of the flesh, the Church itself remains holy. Even here, however, I do not forget that intellect itself can be overvalued, and that reasonable attempts to set it in its proper place in human affairs should not be called anti-intellectual. One does not care to dissent when T. S. Eliot observes that "intellectual ability without the more human attributes is admirable only in the same way as the brilliance of anti-intellectualism, though it has its own universality, may be considered a part of our English cultural inheritance, and that it is notably strong in Anglo-American experience. A few years ago, Leonard Woolf remarked that "no people has ever despised and distrusted the intellect and intellectuals more than the British." Perhaps Mr. Woolf had not given sufficient thought to the claims of the Americans to supremacy in this respect (which is understandable, since the British have been tired for more than a century of American boasting); but that a British intellectual so long seasoned and so well informed on the cultural life of his own country could have made such a remark may well give us pause. Although the situation of American intellectuals poses problems of special urgency and poignancy, many of their woes are the common experiences of intellectuals elsewhere, and there are some compensating circumstances in American life.

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Possibly the greatest hazard of this venture is that of encouraging the notion that anti-intellectualism is commonly found in a pure or unmixed state. It seems clear that those who have some quarrel with intellect are almost always ambivalent about the mix respect and awe with suspicion and resentment; and this has been true in many societies and phases of human history. In any case, anti-intellectualism is not the creation of people who are categorically hostile to ideas. Quite the contrary: just as the most effective enemy of the educated man may be the half-educated man, so the leading anti-intellectuals are usually men deeply engaged with ideas, often obsessively engaged with this or that outworn or rejected idea. Few intellectuals are without moments of anti-intellectualism, few anti-intellectuals without single-minded intellectual passions. In so far as anti-intellectualism becomes articulate enough to be traced historically or widespread enough to make itself felt in contemporary controversy, it has to have spokesmen who are at least to some degree competent. These spokesmen are in the main neither the uneducated nor the unintellectual, but rather the marginal intellectuals, would-be intellectuals, unfrocked or embittered intellectuals, the literate leaders of the semi-literate, full of seriousness and high purpose about the causes that bring

them to the attention of the world. I have found anti-intellectual leaders who were evangelical ministers, many of them highly intelligent and some even learned; fundamentalists, articulate about their theology; politicians, including some of the shrewdest; businessmen or other spokesmen of the practical demands of American culture; right-wing editors of strong intellectual pretensions and convictions; various marginal writers (Fide the anti-intellectualism of the Beatniks); anti-Communist pundits, offended by the past heresies of a large segment of the intellectual community; and, for that matter, Communist leaders, who had much use for intellectuals when they could use them, but the utmost contempt for what intellectuals are concerned with. The hostility so prominent in the temper of these men is not directed against ideas as such, not even in every case against intellectuals as such. The spokesmen of anti-intellectualism are almost always devoted to some ideas, and much as they may hate the regnant intellectuals among their living contemporaries, they may be devotees of some intellectuals long dead—Adam Smith perhaps, or Thomas Aquinas, or John Calvin, or even Karl Marx.

It would also be mistaken, as well as uncharitable, to imagine that the men and women who from time to time carry the banners of anti-intellectualism are of necessity committed to it as though it were a positive creed or a kind of principle. In fact, anti-intellectualism is usually the incidental consequence of some other intention, often some justifiable intention. Hardly anyone believes himself to be against thought and culture. Men do not rise in the morning, grin at themselves in their mirrors, and say: "Ah, today I shall torment an intellectual and strangle an idea!" Only rarely, and with the gravest of misgivings, then, can we designate an individual as being constitutionally anti-intellectual. In any case, it would be of little value in this enterprise—and certainly it is no concern of mine—to classify or stigmatize individuals; what is important is to estimate the historical tendency of certain attitudes, movements, and ideas. With respect to these, some individuals will appear now on one side and now on another. In fact, anti-intellectualism is often characteristic of forces diametrically opposed to each other. Businessmen and labor leaders may have views of the intellectual class which are surprisingly similar. Again, progressive education has had its own strong anti-intellectual element, and yet its harshest and most determined foes, who are rightwing vigilantes, manifest their own anti-intellectualism, which is, though different in style, less equivocal and more militant.

To be confronted with a simple and unqualified evil is no doubt a kind of luxury; but such is not the case here; and if anti-intellectualism has become, as I believe it has, a broadly diffused quality in our civilization, it has become so because it has often been linked to good, or at least defensible, causes. It first got its strong grip on our ways of thinking because it was fostered by an evangelical religion that also purveyed many humane and democratic sentiments. It made its way into our politics because it became associated with our passion for equality. It has become formidable in our education partly because our educational beliefs are evangelically egalitarian. Hence, as far as possible, our anti-intellectualism must be excised from the benevolent impulses upon which it lives by constant and delicate acts of intellectual surgery which spare these impulses themselves. Only in this way can anti-intellectualism be checked and contained; I do not say eliminated altogether, for I believe not only that this is beyond our powers but also that an unbridled passion for the total elimination of this or that evil can be as dangerous as any of the delusions of our time.

THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS

This timely reissue of Richard Hofstadter's classic work on the fringe groups that influence American electoral politics offers an invaluable perspective on contemporary domestic affairs. In THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS, acclaimed historian Richard Hofstadter examines

the competing forces in American political discourse and how fringe groups can influence — and derail — the larger agendas of a political party. He investigates the politics of the irrational, shedding light on how the behavior of individuals can seem out of proportion with actual political issues, and how such behavior impacts larger groups. With such other classic essays as "Free Silver and the Mind of 'Coin' Harvey" and "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, " **THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS** remains both a seminal text of political history and a vital analysis of the ways in which political groups function in the United States.

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Acknowledgments

Excerpt: The most difficult and delicate task that faces the author of a book of essays is that of writing an introduction that makes his various pieces seem considerably more unified, in theme and argument, than they were in fact when they were written. The best case for gathering essays in a book is simply that it makes them more accessible and more permanent. The best case that can be made for the unity of any such collection is a personal and informal one, and perhaps for that reason is rarely resorted to: it is that the several parts, as the product of a single mind, have a certain stamp upon them; they must be, at least in their style of thought and their concerns, unified by some underlying intellectual intent.

The pieces in this book were written over a span of fourteen years, and during that time I have not always been of the same mind about historical and political matters in general or about some of the particulars dealt with here. Some unresolved tensions undoubtedly remain. It is not, then, a single consistent argument but a set of related concerns and methods that unites these essays. They fall into two groups: one deals with conditions that have given rise to the extreme right of the 1950's and the 1960's, the other with the origins of certain characteristic problems of the earlier modern era when the American mind was beginning to respond to the facts of industrialism and world power. All deal with public responses to a critical situation or an enduring dilemma, whether it is the sudden threat posed by giant business to competition, the panic of the 1890's and the long-standing monetary disputes and sectional animosities it brought to a head, the moral shock of our nascent imperialism, the effects of resurgent fundamentalism on secular politics, the impact of the cold war on the public consciousness.

Since these studies have to do with the style of our political culture as a whole, and with certain special styles of thought and rhetoric that have prevailed within it, they tell more about the milieu of our politics than about its structure. They are more centrally concerned with the symbolic aspect of politics than with the formation of institutions and the distribution of power. They focus on the way large segments of the public respond to civic issues, make them their own, put them to work on national problems, and express their response to these problems in distinctive rhetorical styles. Because my concern is in this sense a bit one-sided, it is necessary to be clear—it is here that the intent of these essays is most likely to be misunderstood—that my reasons for emphasizing milieu

rather than structure do not stem from the belief that, of the two, milieu is more important. My case is a more moderate one: it rests—quite aside from the pleasure I take in analyzing styles of thought—on two convictions: first, that our political and historical writing, until recently, has tended to emphasize structure at the cost of substantially neglecting milieu; and second, that an understanding of political styles and of the symbolic aspect of politics is a valuable way of locating ourselves and others in relation to public issues.

The older conception of politics was that it deals with the question: Who gets what, when, how? Politics was taken as an arena in which people define their interests as rationally as possible and behave in a way calculated to realize them as fully as possible. But Harold Lasswell, who made this monosyllabic question the title of a well-known book on the substance of politics, was one of the first in this country to be dissatisfied with the rationalistic assumptions which it implied and to turn to the study of the emotional and symbolic side of political life. It became important to add a new conception to the older one: Who perceives what public issues, in what way, and why? To the present generation of historical and political writers it has become increasingly clear that people not only seek their interests but also express and even in a measure define themselves in politics; that political life acts as a sounding board for identities, values, fears, and aspirations. In a study of the political milieu these things are brought to the surface.

No doubt it is, more than anything else, the events of our time, and among these some of the most ominous and appalling, that have launched students of society upon a restless search for new methods of understanding. But the work of other intellectual disciplines has also made the present generation of historians more conscious of important aspects of behavior which our predecessors left largely in the background. An increasing interest of philosophers, anthropologists, and literary critics in the symbolic and myth-making aspects of the human mind has found its way into historical writing, and with it has come a growing sensitivity to the possibilities of textual analysis. The application of depth psychology to politics, chancy though it is, has at least made us acutely aware that politics can be a projective arena for feelings and impulses that are only marginally related to the manifest issues. The findings of public-opinion polls have made us far less confident than we used to be that the public responds to the issues as they are debated, and more aware that it reacts to them chiefly when they become the object of striking symbolic acts or memorable statements, or are taken up by public figures who themselves have a symbolic appeal. Our enhanced feeling for the non-rational side of politics has thrown into question a whole series of once confidently asserted propositions about the behavior of voters in the past.

People respond, in short, to the great drama of the public scene. But this drama, as it is set before them and as they perceive it, is not identical with questions involving material interests and the possession of power. Even those who exercise power are not immune to the content of the drama. In any case, they are forced to deal, as an element in their calculations, with the emotional life of the masses, which is not something that they can altogether create or manipulate, but something that they must cope with. The political contest itself is deeply affected by the way in which it is perceived and felt.

This does not mean that the material interests of politics can be psychologized away or reduced to episodes in intellectual history. It means only that historians and political scientists have always worked, implicitly or explicitly, with psychological assumptions; that these ought to be made as conscious as possible; and that they should be sophisticated enough to take ample account of the complexity of political action. I have no interest in denying the reality, or even the primacy, of the problems of money and power, but only in helping to define their reality by turning attention to the human context in which they arise and in which they have to be settled.

To accept all this is not to abandon whatever was of value in the old conception of political history; it suggests that this conception ought to be supplemented by another which amplifies our sense of political life and does justice to the variety of political activity. The intellectual currents stirred by such minds as Freud and Weber, Cassirer and Mannheim, have begun to move American historical writing in exploratory directions. The work of analyzing the significance of intellectual and rhetorical styles, of symbolic gestures, and of the specialized ethos of various subgroups within the population has already produced some remarkable studies. Henry Nash Smith has applied such techniques to the role of the frontier as myth and symbol, Oscar Handlin to the dashing ethos of native and immigrant groups, David Potter to the cultural effects of American wealth, Lee Benson, Marvin Meyers, and John William Ward to the issues of Jacksonian democracy, David B. Davis to the social politics of the middle period, David Donald and Stanley Elkins to the slavery question, Eric McKitrick to Reconstruction, C. Vann Woodward and W. J. Cash to the problems of Southern identity, and Irwin Unger to the contrasting mentalities of money reformers and their opponents.

This volume embodies comparable preoccupations of my own. For many years I have been interested in the conspiratorial mind portrayed in the essay on the paranoid style. Today this mentality is of particular interest as it is manifest on the extreme right wing, among those I have called pseudo-conservatives, who believe that we have lived for a generation in the grip of a vast conspiracy. But this is not a style of mind confined to the right wing. With modulations and differences, it exists today, as it has in the past, on the left, and it has recurred at times in democratic movements from anti-Masonry to populism. "Coin" Harvey's interpretation of American history, for example, sets forth a conspiratorial view of events which has much in common with that of the founder of the John Birch Society, though the first of these men spoke in the interests of the oppressed and downtrodden, while the other is enthralled by rugged individualism.

The mind of "Coin" Harvey illustrates another tendency of our politics which runs through these pieces—the tendency to secularize a religiously derived view of the world, to deal with political issues in Christian imagery, and to color them with the dark symbology of a certain side of Christian tradition. "Coin" Harvey's expectations of this profane world were based on a faith, stated quite explicitly in his later years, that social issues could be reduced rather simply to a battle between a Good and an Evil influence. His almost superstitious Manicheanism, his belief that the Evil influence, if not soon curbed, would bring about a terrible social apocalypse, were not unlike the conceptions prevalent on the extreme right today. (Unfortunately, in our time the views of the extreme right have greater capacity for becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.) Of course, the power of world communism, which has taken the place of the international bankers' syndicate as the central embodiment of evil, is a far more imposing reality. But my point is that the model on which the world is interpreted contains the same exaggerations, the same crusading mentality, the same sense that all our ills can be traced to a single center and hence can be eliminated by some kind of final act of victory over the evil source. If the warnings of those who diagnose the central treachery are not heeded soon enough, it is argued, we are finished: the world confronts an apocalypse of a sort prefigured in the Book of Revelation.

It is not only in its Manichean and apocalyptic carryovers that the evangelical spirit has entered our thinking about politics. Modern "conservatism" is still pervaded by the spirit of ascetic Protestantism—by the old conviction that economic life, quite as much as religious life, ought to provide a machinery for the disciplining of character. As I have tried to show in my studies of the antitrust movement and of pseudo-conservatism and the Goldwater movement, much of our national anxiety can be traced to the fear that the decline of entrepreneurial competition will destroy our national character, or that the same effect will be brought about by our hedonistic mass

culture and by the moral laxity that has grown up with and is charged to our liberal and relativistic intellectual climate.

A further concern which underlies several of the essays is the history of our ethnic animosities, which in America have been at times almost a substitute for the class struggle and in any case have always affected its character. Today we are acutely aware once again of the pressing issue of racial justice. But the especially poignant problem of the American Negro is only the largest and most difficult of a number of ethnic problems arising out of our polyglot population. Our ethnic mixture has imposed upon our class structure a peculiar, complex status system, and has made the achievement of a full American identity a recurrent difficulty which has had profound political effects. The curse of what we call "second-class citizenship" is perennial in American politics.

Finally, one of these essays deals with the way in which public preoccupations with feelings of outraged humanity and with aggressive desires have influenced a foreign-policy decision. The public debates over our policy toward Cuba and the Philippines in the 1890's showed in rapid sequence how the American sense of mission had its aggressive as well as its benign content. Again, in discussing the Goldwater campaign, I have tried to show how the contemporary craving for finality in our foreign policy is related to our national experience, especially to our singular transition from a continental power with more or less complete hegemony in the Western Hemisphere to a world power whose aspirations now outrun its reach.

Since so many of these pages deal with the contemporary right wing and its backgrounds, a word of clarification may be necessary. The prominence of the right wing reflects a certain recurrent interest on my part in writing about the historical background of contemporary events. It does not result from any disposition to exaggerate the numbers or the representativeness of our right-wing enthusiasts. As I hope I have made dear in more than one of these studies, the American right wing represents only a small portion of the American public. Anyone whose own observations of our political life still leave him in doubt about this judgment can put it to the test by drawing up a list of typical right-wing attitudes and policies on public questions and comparing them with the responses of the general public to relevant questions in opinion polls. The polls, of course, are not infallible, but their findings here, as in many other situations, can be verified in other ways—for example, by examining the lengthening list of right-wing senators and other politicians of similar persuasion whose recent careers have been cut short by the electorate. Nonetheless, the right wing, from McCarthyism to Goldwaterism, has made itself acutely felt in our time. Its effectiveness rests in part, no doubt, on plenty of enthusiasm, money, and zealous activity and on increasingly adequate organization. But it rests as well, I believe, on certain points of contact with real problems of domestic life and foreign policy and with widespread and deeply rooted American ideas and impulses. It is against this larger background that I have tried to illuminate some of its themes.

From "The Great Depression and American History: A Personal Footnote"

I should like to begin by speaking about my work in very personal and biographical terms. Behind every writer there is an individual, a personal history, a series of shaping experiences. I will try to develop those aspects of my own experiences which seem relevant to my historical writing.

There are four basic facts which will help to explain all that I have done:

1. First, I came of age politically during the Great Depression. I was born in 1916. The first political campaign that I can really remember was that of 1928, the first that engaged my feelings that of 1932. Moreover, I came of age in a great industrial center, Buffalo, New York, which was fast in the grip of the Depression. My mind, in common with others of my

generation, was formed on the politics of the Depression and the New Deal. It was also shaped by an uncomfortable awareness of the advance of fascism in Europe, and by the threat of a great world war.

2. Second, all of my books have been, in a certain sense, topical in their inspiration. That is to say, I have always begun with a concern with some present reality and have been led to see the past in the Light of current problems and controversies. Naturally, there are certain questions that may be raised about the value or the legitimacy of such procedures. It may be enough to say that my first two books—**SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT**, which was written from 1940 to 1942 and published in 1944, and **THE AMERICAN. POLITICAL TRADITION,** published in 1948, refract the experiences of the Depression era and the New Deal. And that my later books, **THE AGE OF REFORM**, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States (written in collaboration with Walter P. Metzger) and my most recent book, **ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE**, all refract the concerns of the post-war era, of the cold war, and our experience with McCarthyism. All of these later books were conceived in the 1950s, and the first two appeared in 1955.

3. Third, it is important that the basic interest of my work has not been in the machinery of politics, or in the structure of political or economic power, but in ideas, moods, and atmosphere. No doubt my disposition to push the fundamental realities of power somewhat into the background is one of the weaknesses of my writing. As time goes on, however, my interest in political machinery and fundamental questions of power has grown. While I have often been referred to as an intellectual historian, or an historian of ideas, I do not think of myself in this way. I think of myself as a political historian whose chief contribution has been to try to tell what people thought they were doing in their political activity—that is, what they thought they were either conserving or reforming or constructing.

4. Fourth, my work has always been shaped by a very considerable interest in the fields adjacent to history. In the first instance, it was by philosophy, but I have found my historical writing shaped very much by my reading in literary criticism, sociology, and psychology—to a lesser degree by political science and economics. A catalogue of names may be only intermittently meaningful or helpful; but it seems only right to give some credit. I have been influenced in history by Charles A. Beard and V. L. Parrington; and some of what I have done has been in reaction against them. In literary criticism by Edmund Wilson, Van Wyck Brooks, and F. O. Mathiessen. In sociology and political science by Roberto Michels, Karl Mannheim, Thorstein Veblen, Harold Lasswell, and Thurman Arnold. I have always enjoyed and responded to a kind of sociological satire, and on this count should add to such names as those of Veblen and Arnold that of H. L. Mencken. Of course, a list like this might be misleading: for example, I share almost none of the political, social, or literary views of Mencken. Much of the influence of men like Beard and Parrington has been exerted chiefly in what I have had to unlearn. The work of Parrington, which once excited me, now seems laughably simple. Of course, my list is incomplete: somewhere in the background hover the great names of Marx and Freud and an intangible residue drawn from American thinkers like John Adams and Jefferson, Dewey and James and no doubt many others. But if you were to ask me what great historians of Europe have had a formative influence where is Gibbon or Mommsen or Macauley or Ranke or any one of a number of distinguished equivalents—I would have to plead that they have not affected me and that much of the world's great historical literature I have not read, not even sampled. Undoubtedly this is a failing and has led to a certain American parochialism in my work. It is, I must add, a failing unlikely to be very much remedied: I do not read history for pleasure, ordinarily, and I find that I retain

almost nothing that I read if the reading is not done in connection with something I am writing. Some years ago, for example, when I had occasion to spend ten days in hospital, I took with me and read through all seven volumes of Eli Halevy's **HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE.** I enjoyed it and was left with an abiding sense of Halevy's great quality as an historian. But I could not remember a thing I had read, and I knew no more English history a few weeks afterward than I had known before. No doubt there are several conclusions that might be drawn from this experience, but the one I am most sure of is this: if you want to be generally educated, read voluminously when you are very young; nothing you do when you are older will be nearly so effective.

Now let me go back again to the Great Depression, which started me thinking about the world, and without which my entire generation is unintelligible. But how can anyone convey to the young student of this day and age any sense of the reality of the Depression? They are quite ready to believe that the Protestant Reformation took place, or the Crusades, or the fall of Rome, but the Depression seems altogether mythical. You can tell them that by 1933 there were, conservatively, close to 13 million unemployed in America, and that this was almost one man out of every four in the labor force. You can tell them that there was never any time from 1931 to 1940—almost a whole decade—when less than 14% of the labor force was out of work. And that there was no system of national unemployment insurance, no adequate mechanism to sustain them, during several years of this experience. The Depression remains a set of statistics, without flesh and blood reality. No one will believe anymore that people really went hungry, that they were brought by malnutrition to the brink of dreadful disease, that their morale was sapped by years of discovering in the marketplace that they were not wanted. But this was the reality faced by my generation—a reality so pervasive that it shaped all our thinking about history and all our experience of literature.

In order to get a little closer to the emotional life of the Depression generation, let me quote an article on Chicago in 1932, written by Edmund Wilson, and reprinted in his book **THE AMERICAN EARTHQUAKE: A CHRONICLE OF THE ROARING TWENTIES, THE GREAT DEPRESSION, AND THE DAWN OF THE NEW DEAL**

> There is not a garbage-dump in Chicago which is not diligently haunted by the hungry. Last summer in the hot weather, when the smell was sickening and the flies were thick, there were a hundred people a day coming to one of the dumps, falling on the heap of refuse as soon as the truck had pulled out and digging in it with sticks and hands. They would devour all the pulp that was left on the old slices of watermelon and cantaloupe till the rinds were as thin as paper; and they would take away and wash and cook discarded turnips, onions and potatoes. Meat is a more difficult matter, but they salvage a good deal of that, too. The best is the butcher's meat which has been frozen and has not spoiled. If they can find only meat that is spoiled, they can sometimes cut out the worst parts, or they scale it and sprinkle it with soda to neutralize the taste and smell. Fish spoils too quickly, so it is likely to be impossible—though some people have made fish-head soup. Soup has also been made out of chicken claws.
> A private incinerator at Thirty-fifth and La Salle Streets which disposes of the garbage from restaurants and hotels, has been regularly visited by people, in groups of as many as twenty at a time, who pounce upon anything that looks edible before it is thrown into the furnace. The women complained to investigators that the men took an unfair advantage by jumping on the track before it was unloaded; but a code was eventually established which provided that different sets of people should come at different times every day, so that everybody would be given a chance. Another dump at Thirty-first Street and Cicero Avenue has been the center of a Hooverville of three hundred people.

The family of a laid-off dishwasher lived on food from the dump for two years. They had to cook it on the gas of the people downstairs, since their own had been shut off. Their little girl got ptomaine poisoning. Two veterans of the war, who had been expelled from Washington with the bonus army and had made their homes in the fireboxes of an old kiln, were dependent on the dump for some time, though a buddy of theirs found he could do better by panhandling at people's doors.

One widow with a child of nine, who had formerly made $18 a week in a factory and who has since been living on $4 a week relief and two or three hours' work a day at fifty cents an hour, has tried to get along without garbage but has had to fall back on it frequently during a period of three years. Another widow, who used to do housework and laundry but who was finally left without any work, fed herself and her fourteen-year-old son on garbage. Before she picked up the meat, she would always take off her glasses so that she would not be able to see the maggots; but it sometimes made the boy so sick to look at this offal and smell it that he could not bring himself to eat. He weighed only eighty-two pounds.

In a world in which such things could happen, it was as clear as day that something had to change. In the 1930s you had to decide, if you were a thoughtful and humane person, not whether anything should be done about it, but along what lines action should be taken. You had to decide, in the first instance, whether you were a Marxist or an American liberal. When I was an undergraduate, I thought I was a Marxist, and I learned a great deal from the study of Marxism. But the development in the Soviet Union, starting with their terrible purges and culminating in the Nazi-Soviet pact, put me off completely. By the time I was a graduate student and beginning to do what might be called professional work in history, I knew that I was, after all, in some sense an American liberal. But it was perfectly clear that, as the world had changed, the American liberal-progressive tradition would have to change too. Our progressivism could not be any longer the progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson. Even the liberalism of the New Deal seemed insufficient. It seemed necessary to rethink American liberalism. And all my books have been affected by this impulse to reevaluate American liberalism, as well as to understand the failure of the older American individualism.

I cannot recall ever having made a conscious decision as to the kind of history that I wanted to write, but the drift of my work now moved in a fairly distinct direction. I consider that there are basically three kinds of history writing, though any one historical work may contain them in some combination. One, which is in the classical tradition of historiography, is simply narrative history: it seeks to tell or retell what happened and does not blush at containing a great deal of the familiar. Often enough it has no new ideas to offer; its strength lies in the quality of its prose. It derives from the ideal of history as art. The second kind of writing derives from the scientific ideal and is dominant in academic historiography. It is what one encounters in the typical academic monograph, the typical doctoral dissertation. Above all it rests upon the careful accumulation of detailed evidence, very often from untapped or little-used sources. If it is at all successful, it has a great deal of new information to offer us, skillfully marshalled and well presented. Sometimes it offers new ideas, in so far as its carefully gathered evidence yields new conclusions or upsets old ones. Sometimes it opens up whole new areas of awareness.

Whereas these two kinds of history derive respectively from art and science, the kind of history I have increasingly aspired to write derives from philosophy and criticism. It proceeds by examining critically the existing literature on historical events and attempts to study the consistency of their structure of ideas, and to see if their perspectives cannot be widened by looking into new relationships. In short, it attempts to develop and state new ways of looking at historical events. Since its task is analytical, it tries to dispense with as much as possible of the apparatus of narrative history: it presumes to be written for readers who already have some grasp, so to speak, of the

story. It sacrifices—at least it does in the work I have attempted —the accumulation of verifying detail also, using only enough historical detail to illustrate rather than to prove its points. Its weakness lies in its reliance upon a speculative tissue to hold it together. Its strength lies in its novelty and provocative effect, and in the play, it gives to an essayistic style. Increasingly my work has been dominated by this conception of analytical history. There was some of it in my first book, and a great deal of it in THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION, THE AGE OF REFORM, and my latest book on ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE, are wholly products of analytical history. ca. 1962. <>

RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION edited by Rolf Becker [Research Handbooks in Sociology, Edward Elgar Publications, 9781788110419]

Presenting original contributions from the key experts in the field, the RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION explores the major theoretical, methodological, empirical and political challenges and pressing social questions facing education in current times.

This Research Handbook covers the theoretical foundations of the discipline; methodological problems; the effects of modernisation; educational systems; benefits of continued education; migration and social integration; and wider policy implications. Chapters discuss education as a life-long process as well as adults returning to education. Schools, families and other social contexts and influences are also considered, as well as skills formation and ways to measure achievement. Offering an analysis of policy outcomes from an empirical social-scientific perspective and emphasising the impact of social and ethnic inequality in educational opportunity, this influential Research Handbook defines the discipline and its agenda for future research.

Researchers and students interested in education, sociology and social policy including the effects of inequality will find this Research Handbook a highly relevant reference tool. It also offers an important message for policy makers and other stakeholders in the field of educational policy and training.

'With bridges to psychology and economics, this Research Handbook presents a rich collection of outstanding studies on the present state of knowledge in core areas of the sociology of education. Leading experts discuss theoretical and methodological advances and challenges and integrate a wealth of research results especially on the generation and consequences of educational inequality.' —Walter Müller, University of Mannheim, Germany

'This Research Handbook provides a comprehensive state of the art on the contemporary challenges addressed by sociology of education, based on up-to-date empirical findings as well as diverse theoretical and methodological approaches. The internationally renowned contributors analyse the key interactions between educational processes and social inequalities, and particularly within the life course.' —Jake Murdoch, Université de Bourgogne, France

'In this Research Handbook top authors deliver cutting-edge contributions on both the state of the art and open issues in theory, measurement, methods and empirical findings in the sociology of education. It is an invaluable resource for researchers planning new projects, instructors interested in the cumulative state of knowledge and students who want the very best introduction to key problems.' —Karl Ulrich Mayer, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Germany

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What is Sociology of Education?

In the last 25 years, interest in the sociology of education has increased tremendously in social sciences research, but also in the politically interested public spheres. This is indicated by the flood of research projects and publications dealing with topics in sociology of education as well as the increased demand of politicians for scientific reports on education as a social question. Additionally, research institutes have been founded and professorships have been established which focus on research questions typical of modern sociology of education. Furthermore, it is obvious that researchers in educational science, psychology, economics and political science are increasingly interested in research questions belonging to the domain of sociology of education. Examples are educational trajectories, individual decisions on investment in education, development of skills in an individual's life course, policies regarding the educational system, and social inequality of educational opportunities. However, it has to be emphasized that sociology of education is not a novel science which analyses education educational systems from a sociological perspective. It has a long tradition which began around the end of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth century along with the establishment of sociology as an autonomous science. The establishment of the discipline also coincided with the institutionalization of the public educational system and mass education as a pivotal characteristic of the occidental project of modernization.

Therefore, one could assume that sociology of education is a sociological discipline —maybe a special field of sociology — providing a clearly defined subject and a well-established programmatic core of questions, theories and methods. Obviously, this is not the case. In sociology of education, we actually find a rich collection of different theoretical, methodological and empirical approaches. Today, modern sociology of education is not monolithic but a broad research area with loosely defined boundaries, embedded in sociology with relations to other social sciences. We find neither a coherent paradigm nor a unique research programme. Like sociology itself, sociology of education is characterized by pluralism of different theoretical approaches or scientific programmes existing side by side as well as by different methods and empirical procedures used for the analysis of different subjects. It is a part of sociology and the interdisciplinary research in education. Sociology of education belongs to the empirical social sciences and, providing fertile research activities, it is one of the most innovative areas in sociology.

However, what is sociology of education? How can we define this social science discipline? The answer `sociology of education is what sociologists do in sociology of education' is tautological and

therefore rather useless. On the one hand, it is true that a number of studies in sociology of education do not deal directly with questions of education but are related to research problems stemming from the sociological research in social stratification and mobility. On the other hand, we have to take into account that each of the definitions is arbitrary. Definitions are neither wrong nor true, but they can be useful or less pragmatic.

Considering the most recent research in sociology of education, we prefer the following definition of sociology of education as an empirical and social science discipline: sociology of education should mean the sociological research of economic, cultural, political and social-structural frameworks of formal and informal educational processes (e.g. educating, schooling, opportunities for learning, enrolment in the educational system, attainment of certificates, educational trajectories) as well as their individual and societal preconditions and consequences. It should also include research on the significance and development of educational systems, with special attention to social inequality and societal differentiation. The aim of sociology of education is to achieve a systematic description and explanation of (1) educational processes and their institutionalization in societal contexts including their consequences for individuals (e.g. skills) and for their life courses (e.g. returns of education); (2) educational institutions and their legitimating functions (e.g. credentials and ideologies of achievement); and (3) correlations between education and the social order (e.g. social stratification, social and system integration). Therefore, modern sociology of education involves the theoretical and empirical investigation of educational processes at different levels of a society. Attainment of education as a process and distribution of education as a state, as well as education as events and education as institutions, can be analysed regarding intended and unintended consequences. Furthermore, the direct and indirect consequences of social action related to education under specific societal conditions, including institutionalization in historically specific societal settings, belong to the domain of sociology of education.

Accordingly, education has a societal character, implying that each subject is socially constructed and defined in relation to education. The suggested definition of sociology of education includes the analysis of education from a social science point of view, which focuses on social action as well as the related social processes and mechanisms. This is why the societal framework of educational processes needs to be included in the analyses. These frameworks include the organization of education and the institutions of educational systems, the reciprocal relations of educational systems and the social order (such as the economy, the political system and culture), and the impact of the educational system and other entities such as family, companies or political parties on an individual's education. In contrast to educational sociology, sociology of education is not limited to the theoretical and empirical investigation of the educational practice and the system of education.

Such a broadly defined self-conception of sociology of education leads to a fuzzy distinction between other sociologies such as sociology of culture, sociology of economy, sociology of science, research in social stratification and mobility, sociology of childhood and youth or sociology of family. However, modern sociology of education is — similar to the research in social stratification and the life course — one of the broadest research areas in sociology. It overlaps with almost all of the research areas within sociology. Due to the importance of education and school and their role in regard to many social areas, it is difficult to separate sociology of education and its many paradigms from other sociologies. The use of education as an explanatory or dependent variable in other sociologies — including research on social inequality, stratification, mobility, deviant and criminal behaviour, organization and employment, demography and life course and so on — shows the importance of education as both a causal variable and an outcome (achievement, success, performance etc.). On the one hand, this stresses the interdisciplinary character of modern

sociology of education. On the other hand, it becomes obvious that current sociology of education (in practice) has neither a consistent research programme (e.g. topics, issues, data sets and methods) nor a single theoretical paradigm. De facto, this discipline is characterized by a pluralism of different theoretical approaches, methodological premises and avenues as well as scientific programmes.

However, from this point of view, the current sociology of education is not just a `hyphenated sociology' among other special fields within sociology. In our understanding, it has strategic significance for sociological theory and model building as well as for the empirical analysis of social and societal facts. Therefore, in light of the question of which type of sociology of education we want, it has to be stressed that the suggested definition is related to the scientific programme of methodological individualism or structural individualism. According to this paradigm, every social fact can be understood as an intended or unintended consequence of purposive social actions which are influenced or modified by structural constraints on different societal levels. Actors can be individuals, groups of people, organizations (corporative actors) or the state. In this respect, modern sociology of education corresponds with sociology defined by one of the founding fathers of sociology, Max Weber (1922, p. 1):

> Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used here) is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects. In `action' is included all human behaviour when and insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may be either overt or purely inward or subjective; it may consist of positive intervention in a situation, or of deliberately refraining from such intervention or passively acquiescing in the situation. Action is social insofar as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course. (Translated by Blunden 1998)

Social action is action of social characters shaped by interests, ideas and social institutions. Social structures and orders form the contexts of action; that means that action takes place in a social context, in a social space and against the backdrop of social experiences. Such societal units (`society') are — just as other social facts — the result of choices and actions of social actors. In contrast to other (supposed `hard') sciences, sociological explanations deal with social action and its consequences. Since their `objects' are 'subjects' capable of acting and who have a subjective sense of their actions, the sociological explanation becomes an extraordinarily difficult endeavour. In contrast to the natural sciences, the social sciences are faced with an `interpretative dimension' (i.e. subjective expectations and valuations).

Leading Question and Research Topic

Beginning with the leading question by Max Weber, namely, 'how do the institutions and orders of the modern welfare state impact the social character of individuals?', additional questions arise: Which issues should the modern sociology of education pursue? What are its core research areas? It is not easy to answer these questions. As observed by Max Weber (1921) in his speech on science as a vocation, and this is true for sociology in general and, in particular, for sociology of education, science is a difficult endeavour and an ambitious undertaking. Study and research in sociology requires passion and discipline, persistence and a sense of distance. Oriented towards this understanding of sociology, the sociology of education is an important pioneer in the theoretical and methodological development of modern sociology. Assuming that educational processes, understood as social action, are the main research object of the empirical sociology of education, then the sociologically relevant aspects of educational processes are either an intended or an unintended outcome of the purposive social action of individual or corporate actors. This way, in line with Coleman, individual actors are defined as human beings in specific social contexts while cooperate

actors are entities such as the state, educational institutions or firms. This definition is advantageous since it defines sociology of education as not only a special sociology. Modern sociology of education is general sociology which mainly investigates education, educational processes and educational institutions.' Provided that social action and its societal consequences are the main research object of modern empirical sociology, it is taken for granted that social actors need a certain degree of education (in the sense of skills, knowledge and experience).

When we investigate educational processes and their consequences for individuals and the social order, it might be useful to consider the main Weberian issue for the following research topics: How do societal conditions result in specific educational processes? How and why do institutions of modern societies — such as education or the educational system — shape the social character of human beings? Related to this paradigmatic problem, the following questions are relevant: What relations exist between education and the process of human civilization? Why is there a relation between education and societal change? How do societal conditions and social institutions shape educational processes, and what consequences do they have for individuals and the social order such as the economy, culture and the political system? Why are there correlations between education and the social structures of a society? How is education correlated with social inequality? And why is education correlated with social stratification and mobility?

For serious and complete sociological explanations of different social facts, we also consider education as a societal condition: What is the role of education in a society and the existing ideas, interests and institutions? What are the social mechanisms behind the reproduction of or change of societal structures through education? What are the important social mechanisms inside the educational system? How do we explain the way individuals perceive the educational system or the social interactions between teachers and students?

In this respect, sociology of education is interested in the scientific research on social facts such as education, educational processes, and educational institutions. This endeavour comprises the description and explanation of societally relevant structures as the product of social action. If one looks upon sociological educational research, it becomes obvious that the previous interest in a `pure' analysis of institutions and organizations has shifted to the analysis of educational attainment and its impact on status attainment and social mobility, from the perspective of structural or methodological individualism. In this approach, the focus of the research is on the educational actions of individuals and their embeddedness in social structures as well as the consequences for individuals, groups, organizations and the social order. In the last 25 years, seminal studies in the context of historical and international comparative analysis on education and educational systems have analysed the interaction of institutions and social action. In line with Weber (1922), the institutions of the educational system provide the opportunities and restrictions of individual action related to education. Therefore, in the formation of theories and for empirical analyses, it is central to account for the interdependencies of institutions and individual actions.

Analytical Levels of Research in Sociology of Education

In the empirical research in contemporary sociology of education different research problems — such as educational processes in the educational system and educational trajectories from kindergarten to general and vocational schools as well as to universities and institutions of continued education — are pursued on different societal levels, for the formation of theoretical explanations and the construction of analytical models, it is useful to start with the premise that the social facts to be explained (aggregate characteristic) are the aggregated consequences of social actions of social

actors (individual characteristic). The individuals are themselves influenced by social contexts (collective characteristic) and the individual situation (actor).

On the one hand, there is no collective hypothesis in the social sciences which explains the causal link between collective characteristics and aggregate characteristics on the macro level (without any recourse to the individual or meso levels). Individual characteristics need to be considered by context and both individual-level hypotheses. Analytical levels of research in sociology of education transformational hypotheses need to be considered in order to find conclusive answers to research questions in sociology of education. On the other hand, we need substantial theories which allow for the derivation of contextual hypotheses, individual-level hypotheses and transformational hypotheses including empirical information on social mechanisms.

(1) On the macro level, the significance of education is analysed in the context of societal developments — for example regarding economic, political, cultural and social development. On this level, we are also interested in the effects of the social origin, the determinants and the implications of educational ideas, theories and policies: What is the role of education in the process of civilization? Is education a precondition or a consequence of modernization? Closely related to this perspective of modernization theory is the functional perspective: What is the aim of education? Who should be educated by which means for which ends? Additionally, to the integrative role of the educational system, education as a civic right shall also be discussed. These discussions include the different functions of education as either a collection of instrumental skills or a cultural good which fosters the emancipation of human beings. Alternatively, by being crucial for the distribution of goods and positions in a society, education can be understood as a precondition for the attainment of welfare entitlements and social integration. According to this view, the social closure of higher education, the social legitimation of socially unequal access to higher education and the principles of the allocation of educational returns remain key challenges of modern sociology of education.

These issues raise questions about the social definitions of achievement and their role regarding social inequality of educational opportunities and attainments. These moral values and ideologies concerning education (access to education, distribution of credentials, returns to education), which contribute to the structure and organization of the educational system, might be the consequences of ideas, interests and institutions derived from the cultural system. The cultural system itself is interrelated with the political system; it shapes the moral values (e.g. on human rights or democracy) of the political system and thus contributes to the ideological basis for the economic system (e.g. principles of free enterprise). Furthermore, there are different consequences of education for the social structure (e.g. a population's educational level or the impact of education on demographic processes regarding fertility, mortality and migration; Becker and Jann 2017) and the scale of social inequality of educational opportunity. This provokes the question of the role of education for changing life courses. The introduction of compulsory schooling, mass education and the prohibition of child labour as well as the connection between achieved credentials and life chances has contributed to the rise of modern standards of living. These developments were related to (1) an increase of overall life expectancy and individuals' anticipation of life time; (2) the status passages defined by the welfare state (such as childhood and) and individuals' sense of their biography; and (3) the highly institutionalized transitions in the life course and the planning of individual life courses.

Finally, the process of societal development is addressed from the point of view of the ideological basis of the structure and the institutionalization of education and the educational system. What exchanges are there between the economic, political and cultural systems, one the one hand, and the structures and tasks of the educational system and its output in terms of skills and credentials,

on the other hand? What role does the internationalization or supra-nationalization of educational systems play for countries with mass education?

(2) On the meso level, we mainly focus on the exchange between the educational system and the economic system (e.g. labour markets) as well as on the definition of the function of schools and their role in the political system (e.g. ministry of education and research). On the one hand, this means that the empirical analysis of social stratification (e.g. inequality of education and educational returns), mobility across work life and generations (e.g. intergenerational and intragenerational mobility) and returns to education (e.g. class position, income, earnings, status, prestige) are meaningful contributions to the research in sociology of education (see Kogan, Chapter 18 in this volume). On the other hand, educational policy is also an interesting issue for the modern sociology of education (see Müller-Benedict, Chapter 29 in this volume). Furthermore, the exchanges between the cultural and educational system have to be investigated intensively. The educational system contributes to cultural reproduction (see in this volume: Erikson, Chapter 3; Skopek et al., Chapter 12; and Holtmann and Bernardi, Chapter 14). The educational system facilitates the preservation of language, writing and moral values; it contributes to individuals' personal development and social identification as well as to the development of rationality and the sciences in modern societies (e.g. Weinert and Artelt, Chapter 7, or Kristen, Chapter 27, both in this volume). On the other hand, it socializes individuals and promotes individual competences and the ability to make decisions and judgements.

Through the exchange with the cultural system, the educational system contributes to the social integration of individuals as well as the system integration of the social order. This results in additional questions which have been neglected in traditional sociology of education. An example is the question of what happens when educational systems have conflicting principles? Three such principles are especially noteworthy: the achievement principle (meritocracy; Hadjar and Becker 2016; see Bills, Chapter 6 in this volume), the principle of equality of opportunity and the principle of promotion. Furthermore, we ask: What is talent? What is effort? What is achievement? What is merit? Who defines the quality of an achievement? What is a `good' and wishful result that should be rewarded in contrast to a 'bad' and undesired achievement? Who decides who is talented? Who defines which talents and skills are necessary for society in terms of social and system integration or for labour markets or for societal development? Who defines which type of educational system (including the elaboration of curricula and qualification of teachers) is efficient in the realization of such aims?

Furthermore, on an analytical level, other questions are raised: How do (formal and `hidden') curricula or different types of instruction emerge and how do they change? Why are these structures so different across societies? How does the educational system work as a labour market for teachers, professors and administrative employees? What exchanges exist between schools and families? What happens at schools on a social level? What social interactions exist between teachers and their students? What impact do the resources of a school have on the teaching in school classes and the educational opportunities of young students?

(3) On the micro level, we analyse the societal conditions of individual educational behaviour: How, why and when do individuals make decisions on different transitions in their educational trajectory? What are the benefits of their investment in education and how are returns of education distributed among social groups? What educational aspirations do they have? What is the role of education for the personal development of individuals and their life chances? How does individual achievement develop over the life span? How are opportunities of skill formation distributed across the life course and the social classes? How does education shape the social structure of life courses? How

does education affect events in the life course, such as marriage, family formation and divorce, and their timing? In addition to the analysis of structure and duration of the education of individuals across their life course, these research questions deal with the individual consequences of education and achievement. On the one hand, social-structural descriptions of lifestyle differences across educational groups are dominant. The correlation of education and life expectancy is a prominent empirical example. On the other hand, it is assumed that education is a main causal factor for specific events and states in the life course resulting in unequal distributions of life chances. There are several examples for this claim: cumulative education and training across the life course or cognitive effects of education on political socialization, attitudes and participation.

(4) To connect these different, ideal-typically distinct, analytical levels is an additional key challenge for the sociology of education. We assume that the processes on each of the societal levels are interrelated and that it is a task of sociology of education to describe and to explain the structural regularities of these interrelations in a systematic way. Historical and international comparison is one of the most promising ways for realizing this task. Another way is the longitudinal analysis of the educational trajectories of individuals in different birth cohorts. This implies that each of the research questions and the empirical projects have to consider all analytical levels. The following questions emphasize this claim: What are the expected and unexpected consequences of the educational expansion in different historical periods and across different societies? Did the successive upgrading of the educational level of individuals and the population as a whole lead to a devaluation of educational certificates? Do we observe a fading relationship between education, earnings and social status? What are the effects of educational policy and the social openness of the educational system?

At this point, we are able to deliver some answers on why sociology of education should be treated as an empirical science and why it is an interesting field of study as well as a sophisticated area of sociological research. The answers result from social facts such as that education and the attainment of certificates are prerequisites for access to scarce goods and positions in a society. Education and educational certificates are individual and collective preconditions for participation in different social areas. The social inequality of educational opportunity and success is not primarily a result of individual talent, effects and luck. Participation in education takes place throughout the life course and life courses are shaped by education and educational systems. The supply of and the demand for education constitute a significant mechanism of social exchange in modern societies. Education is a highly valued institution and educational systems are important organizational units in modern societies. Therefore, we have to analyse empirically why there are such institutions and organizations in modern societies at all.

Key Challenges for Modern Sociology of Education

Additionally, there are three key challenges for the sociology of education as a social science discipline:

1) Enlightenment (scientific clarification by sociological description and sophisticated analysis of societal conditions)
2) Gain of knowledge (knowledge acquisition by sociological explanation of social facts by the systematic formation of theories and models)
3) Problem solutions (application in terms of sociological prediction, social technology, policy counselling).

(1) Enlightenment from the perspective of sociology of education means the delivering of knowledge on societal conditions and the change of social structures (with an emphasis on the role of

education) from a social science point of view. It is the task of describing interesting phenomena precisely using objective (longitudinal) data: What is the educational expansion and what does it look like? The precise description of educational policies or the enrolment in the educational system over the past periods delivers information on whether the educational expansion is an empirically objective fact or a product of wishful thinking, a myth or an `alternative fact'. If the empirical data provides information on realized reforms of the educational system (e.g. extension of educational opportunities) or increased participation in higher education, then we are able to show that the educational expansion is an empirically based fact. However, per se, descriptions of social facts are not sufficient, although they are necessary. Descriptions are not sufficient for explanations but they do contribute to the explanation of social facts.

However, in sociology we sometimes witness that descriptions are equated with diagnoses. Given that relevant life chances depend on attained certificates, societies are often labelled `achieving societies' or `credential societies'. However, it has to be taken into account that a diagnosis of the time is not a scientific explanation. Making such diagnoses is not the task of sociology of education since they are misleading classifications of no service to scientific enlightenment (see the debate on the so-called risk society and process of individualization).

(2) By scientific explanation of social facts, we mean a systematic gain of knowledge on societal correlations. In sociology of education, we are mainly interested in the sophisticated explanation of social facts — that is, attaining a substantiated sociologically interesting answer to a question about the reason for these phenomena. Why does social inequality of educational opportunity still exist in spite of a significant educational expansion? Why do most migrants have fewer opportunities in the educational system than natives? Why are there persistent class-related disparities in school achievement? However, we are also interested in revealing the processes and mechanisms that result in the facts we seek to explain. What factors of the educational expansion contribute to declining or increasing inequality of educational opportunity? How and why do families and schools affect students' achievements and educational attainments?

A sociologically relevant explanation is an empirically based answer to a 'why' question. An explanation is not only an answer that is logically derived from arguments; it must correspond to a social reality that could be measured objectively. This procedure is not equal to the search for final truths in a teleological sense. According to Popper (1973), in sociology of education, we look for interesting and illuminating truths, that is, for theories that deliver solutions to interesting research problems. Sociological research needs conclusive theories, which is why we need `good' data, and `good' statistics. If we assume that schools are one of the causes of social disparities in achievements, then we need a consistent system of theoretical arguments providing information on the causes, consequences and mechanisms that lead to the social fact being explained.

(3) The socio-political relevance of sociological knowledge reflects the relations between scientific analysis and prognosis, political counselling, the development of social technologies or the planning of solutions in regard to social problems. For example, if social disparities in achievements are revealed by empirical analysis, it is possible to take adequate actions as long as the finding is defined as a problem to be solved by social policy. When we are aware of a causal relationship and its social preconditions, it allows us to modify the causes in order to avoid the undesired consequences (see Zangger and Becker, Chapter 9 in this volume). To enable rational policy counselling, the development of social technologies or the making of prognoses, we need realistic descriptions and empirically based explanations of the problems to be solved.

The Future of Sociology of Education

Modern sociology of education is confronted with several key challenges. First, in their practice, researchers in the field of sociology of education analyse the societal — that is, the economic, cultural, political and social-structural — frameworks of educational processes, the institutions of the educational system, and the individual and social consequences of education. Researchers in sociology of education focus on the formation of profound theories, the construction of useful empirical models and the empirical investigation of educational processes on different societal levels. It is the aim of sociology of education to describe educational processes and their institutionalization in social contexts systematically as well as to explain them exhaustively by identifying causalities and mechanisms. Empirical evidence could be used as a rational basis for educational policy or social policy. However, policy planning is not the task of sociology of education.

A look at the history of this discipline involving the metamorphosis from educational sociology to a modern interdisciplinary sociology of education can be taken as a sign that this discipline may well be aware of key challenges in future research. The turn in both the formation of theoretical explanations and the empirical analysis —that is, the shift from normative questions about economic development and societal reforms in the direction of a non-normative analysis of social facts in regard to the education of individuals, the educational system and educational ideologies — is particularly indicative for this assumption. However, it is evident that the problem of educational inequalities — particularly the inequality of educational opportunities (inequality of educational outcomes seems to be attracting less interest recently) — has traditionally been the key issue of research in sociology of education. This key issue has dominated or modified other research areas in sociology of education. Undoubtedly, mechanism-based explanations for educational inequalities are still an interesting issue, but it is just one of many others. Therefore, it will be another key challenge to recreate the pluralism of research questions in the future of sociology of education.

In our view, this volume on sociology of education might be a starting point for researchers and students in sociology of education to accept the key challenges. Regarding analytical levels, recent research in sociology of education has several gaps. For example, to strengthen the macro-sociological view, the analysis of educational policy and educational institutions and their correlation with social stratification, the stratification of the educational system and the allocation of graduates in the hierarchy of firms has to be fuelled beyond the OED model suggested by Blau and Duncan (1967). Another interesting issue is the impact of evidence based empirical analysis in sociology of education on both educational policy and individuals' common knowledge. On the meso level, there are gaps in research on school organization and teachers. Finally, on the micro level, we know less about skill formation and life-long learning across the entire life course (see Weiss or Lechner et al. in this volume). In order to accept the key challenges, some efforts have to be made for the integration of social science theories and research paradigms regarding education. A number of sophisticated theories and models, innovative empirical studies as well as historically and internationally comparative publications are available. They motivate us to continue with the development of modern sociology of education. This current research handbook on sociology of education could be a valuable starting point. <>

Derrida on Being as Presence: Questions and Quests by David A. White, Managing Editor: Anna Michalska [Sciendo, 9783110540130]

Jacques Derrida's extensive early writings devoted considerable attention to "being as presence," the reality underlying the history of metaphysics. In **Derrida on Being as Presence Questions and Quests**, David A. White develops the intricate conceptual structure of this notion by close exegetical readings drawn from these writings. White discusses cardinal concepts in Derrida's revamping of theoretical considerations pertaining to language-signification, context, negation, iterability-as these considerations depend on the structure of being as presence and also as they ground "deconstructive" reading.

White's appraisal raises questions invoking a range of problems. He deploys these questions in conjunction with thematically related quests that arise given Derrida's conviction that the history of metaphysics, as variations on being as presence, has concealed and skewed vital elements of reality. White inflects this critical apparatus concerning being as presence with texts drawn from that history-e.g., by Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Hume, Kant, Whitehead. The essay concludes with a speculative ensemble of provisional categories, or zones of specificity. Implementing these categories will ground the possibility that philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular can be pursued in ways which acknowledge the relevance of Derrida's thought when integrated with the philosophical enterprise as traditionally understood.

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Presence. Being as presence.

Metaphysics as a play of presence. These references appear in many of Derrida's writings and almost all his earlier work. They embody a notion of singular importance for deconstruction and, when deconstruction is considered as a narrative whole, they stand as a locus of intersection for all other major concepts of that narrative.

Invoking the phrase "being as presence" rings with privileged authority for many advocates of deconstruction as an epitome of the foundational vision that underlies and guides its practice. The implication is that in some uniquely incisive way, Derrida discerned a feature permeating the history of western thought, a feature heretofore unrecognized in its full implications by any of the great figures defining that tradition-including Martin Heidegger, who made the presence of being a cardinal point of ontological identification.

In this essay, I examine in detail a series of pivotal passages showing how Derrida introduces and develops his notion of being as presence. If we then approach Derrida's position by questioning the structure and implications of being as presence, basing this inquiry on certain traditional concepts and distinctions, it becomes possible, if not essential, to surround the phrase in question with an aura of incisive critical concern. The ramifications of such investigation will challenge the scope and effects of Derrida's proposed insight and, along with coordinated argument, disrupt the foundational elements of deconstruction. John Dewey's elegant trope, "eulogistic predicate," underscores an approach to a philosopher's basic vocabulary which justifies this procedure. Without the kind of scrutiny and critical attention argued in this essay, being as presence remains a prime candidate for Dewey's tersely elitist description, regardless how often "being as presence" animates deconstructive inquiries and regardless of the extent to which advocates of deconstruction believe that it displays self-evident and decisive relevance in a myriad of theoretical contexts.

The essay proceeds as follows: the exposition and critical analysis draw primarily on key passages from Derrida's early work. There are two reasons for this limited approach. First, these texts lay the foundation for his position on being as presence. Second, the texts are often pitched recognizably as

arguments, i.e., in the classic deployment of premisses yielding asserted conclusions, this in contrast to much of Derrida's later work which tends toward the oracular in tone and presentation. This is not to maintain, as some readers have done on occasion (e.g., Jürgen Habermas), that Derrida does not argue his positions but it is to emphasize the advantage for the student of Derrida to confront texts arranged according to such classic protocols. These discursive contexts, tautly interpreted, facilitate recognizing the kinds of evidence Derrida employed in formulating this seminal principle as well as the sequence of reasons introduced to elicit its effects.

Derrida cast his philosophical net wide. It may therefore be observed from the standpoint of interpretive practicality that this essay presupposes general familiarity with Derrida's projects concerning language as such and deconstruction as a programmatic "gesture" for interpreting linguistic events. I also have assumed that the reader has some experience interacting with the various stylistic modalities Derrida employed to verbalize those projects. In addition, spare consideration has been given to secondary work on Derrida. As far as I am aware, writers on Derrida have either not pursued this topic with much critical interest or, when they have mentioned being as presence, analyzed it with the depth and interpretive rigor which I have applied in this essay.

In an earlier work, Derrida on Formal Logic An Interpretive Essay (see Bibliography), I discussed Derrida's various treatments of certain basic concepts and principles in formal logic. This interpretive approach, both expository and critical, concluded with a series of speculative suggestions regarding the deconstructive thrust of Derrida's thinking in relation to the regulative stance typically ascribed to formal logic. In basic structure, that work and this essay complement one another, especially in contexts marked by high conceptual generality. I want to emphasize, however, that other than a series of correlated themes referenced in footnotes, the present essay stands by itself in content and as a prospective contribution to the secondary literature on Derrida—especially with regard to the seminal importance of being as presence—and may be so judged by the reader.

The essay is in three parts. In Part I, the discussions primarily pursue Derrida's various configurations of being as presence, with critical analysis typically generated from the areas in philosophy traditionally referred to as metaphysics. Part I concludes with a set of conclusions and questions, tentatively posed, intended to sketch ways to evaluate the cogency of Derrida's texts on being as presence and to outline areas of problematic concern, especially given that Derrida's inquiry encompasses the entirety of western metaphysics.

In Part II, I have integrated inferences drawn from the analyses of Part I into a series of contexts which focus on an intersection between metaphysics in a broad sense and metaphysically controlled inquiries into language. The analyses concentrate on more circumscribed and purely theoretical description of structural components traditionally associated with language. Derrida had much to say concerning this intersection and Part II raises questions about a set of his most important investigations—reference, context, negation, iterability—all of which include abstract considerations which animate their structure.

The final section, Part III, brings together the far-ranging themes of Parts I and II by showing how Derrida's approach to the history of metaphysics played into the formulation—seriously problematic to its core—of concepts and principles now typically referred to collectively as deconstruction, a name for a methodology advanced for a disclosive reading of texts. The essay concludes with a set of speculative developments—quests, in a word—concentrating on a series of basic concepts often appearing in metaphysical accounts, but concepts redrawn with the intention of incorporating the general movement of Derrida's thinking within these more traditional frameworks. The footnotes

cite and discuss selected commentary on themes advanced in the essay and also include parallel and contrasting passages on these themes drawn from Derrida's later work.

The essay's conclusions are established by argument in the usual sense, i.e., premises yielding conclusions. This may seem an odd feature of the essay to emphasize in a Preface, since presumably such reasoning is hardly an atypical procedure for a work intended to be philosophical. I wish to call attention to it, however, for the sake of readers who may be committed advocates of deconstruction in general and Derrida in particular. That there are many individuals so inspired is evident from the extensive secondary work on Derrida. But also noteworthy, I believe, is the hagiographical aura surrounding much (but not all) of this commentary. For those readers of Derrida and prospective students of deconstruction, the conclusions in this essay may appear distressingly antithetical to their understanding of Derrida's teaching—or if this word exudes programmatic mustiness, to the textual interpretations he set as examples. If so, then one possible response to the lines of argument developed below is to adopt the same procedure as that of the essay—that is, producing counter positions by embodying reasons and arguments, ordered into recognizable premises and conclusions. Response so developed will allow discussion of Derrida's thought to proceed in a manner promising greater clarification for the benefit of the philosophical community at large as well as for all who, whatever their ideological bent in philosophy and related disciplines, have taken the time and effort to read him. If this essay contributes a measured advancement of such discussion, it will have achieved its end. <>

MERLEAU-PONTY AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
edited by Emmanuel Alloa, Frank Chouraqui, and Rajiv Kaushik [SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental philosophy, State University of New York, 9781438476919 (hardcover) 9781438476926 (ebook)]
Assesses the importance of Merleau-Ponty to current and ongoing concerns in contemporary philosophy.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty is widely recognized as one of the major figures of twentieth-century philosophy. The recent publication of his lecture courses and posthumous working notes has opened new avenues for both the interpretation of his thought and philosophy in general. These works confirm that, with a surprising premonition, Merleau-Ponty addressed many of the issues that concern philosophy today. With the benefit of this fuller picture of his thought, MERLEAU-PONTY AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY undertakes an assessment of the philosopher's relevance for contemporary thinking. Covering a diverse range of topics, including ontology, epistemology, anthropology, embodiment, animality, politics, language, aesthetics, and art, the editors gather representative voices from North America and Europe, including both Merleau-Ponty specialists and thinkers who have come to the philosopher's work through their own thematic interest.

"MERLEAU-PONTY AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY offers a rich set of writings by central and rising scholars, spanning various languages and traditions, who together show Merleau-Ponty's continuing relevance for contemporary thinking on phenomenology, mind and nature, politics and power, and art and creation. This book will advance scholarship and also open new

doors for those seeking to find their way into Merleau-Ponty's ways of thinking." — David Morris, author of **THE SENSE OF SPACE**

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Excerpt: The first thing that must be noted, when reappraising Merleau-Ponty's legacy for the current century, is that the situation is significantly different from the time when, in the 1960s and 1970s, his thinking was by and large either ignored or thought to be hopelessly dated. In the last two or three decades, the interest in Merleau-Ponty has been continuously growing, both within philosophical scholarship and in other fields of research. Besides, intellectual history has made significant progress, and the often-polemical rejections of Merleau-Ponty by authors such as Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, or Derrida are now taken with a pinch of salt, as it has now become evident how influential he has been for the subsequent generation of French thinkers. Uncontestably, the richer notion of phenomenology which Merleau-Ponty's thought points to offers potent perspectives when placed against the backdrop of the current "ontological turn" that can be witnessed in anthropology and the social sciences. But other aspects of this thinking are being reconsidered too. With the publication of many of Merleau-Ponty's lecture courses and posthumous working notes over the last few years, researchers have gained access to completely new materials that clarify the ways Merleau-Ponty breathed new life into metaphysics and ontology, even before the generation of thinkers that followed him, and the uncanny way that his thinking prefigured theirs.

Just as in the 1960s readers were left with the fragmentary yet fascinating working notes from The Visible and the Invisible collected by Claude Lefort, today the scripts from the courses at the Collège de France as well as other archival materials or interviews released in the last decade or two have provided an ever more detailed picture of the manifold aspect of Merleau-Ponty's intellectual forays. When we scan the bounty of the current secondary literature on such posthumous materials, we are struck by the fact that it is rarely just philological or historical and that Merleau-Ponty's posthumous writing always gestures to new and different kinds of thought that may not be so explicit in his published work. Whether it be the lectures on institution and passivity, nature, the sensible world and the world of expression, or on the literary uses of language, Merleau-Ponty's lecture notes are continuously—and rightfully—being mined for new insights pertaining to everything from history, to psychoanalysis, aesthetics, and evolutionary biology.

Such historical and bibliographical facts count as an invitation to consider anew the possibility that Merleau-Ponty's work still speaks to us and that the sound of his thought still rings in our ears. Not only does the criticism that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is merely a naturalistic worldview seem ludicrous; the recently reappraised reflections on historical dialectics show that processes of emancipation, political organization, and revolutionary events were never out of his sight. However, although the Merleau-Ponty scholarship has recently unearthed such underexplored venues, the connections to current debates still need to be made. This is what this volume aims to do. Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy cuts across the different loci of contemporary continental philosophy and provides an assessment of the innovative research of today. The purpose of this book is to show how Merleau-Ponty offers hitherto unexplored resources to address some of the pressing questions of our time and to acknowledge how some of our current concerns can find unexpected resources in his work. This book aims at clarifying some of the unfinished, loose, or simply hitherto unheard aspects of the philosopher's thought, and an exploration of their less visible relevance to contemporary philosophy.

Thus, this volume chronicles the continuities that connect our current intellectual world to Merleau-Ponty's thinking without reducing one to the other. In order to gain a better understanding of Merleau-Ponty's intellectual legacy, it is necessary to draw different perspectives on his oeuvre. The present volume gathers fifteen representative voices from continental philosophy today, some from Merleau-Ponty scholars and some from others who come to his work through their own thematic interests. The point is not to propose a unified "new Merleau-Ponty," but rather to remain sensitive both to the gaps and the crossings, to the chasms and chiasms, at work between seemingly disconnected fields. Some of the key themes with which the book is concerned, as evidenced by the table of contents, include: ontology, epistemology, anthropology, embodiment, animality, politics, language, aesthetics, and art. These are but a few areas for which Merleau-Ponty's writings have opened up new and different approaches. While our attempt cannot claim to be an exhaustive resource on the work of Merleau-Ponty, it offers a selection of some of the most creative current analyses of his thought.

The Texts

This book is organized along four main sections: "Legacies," "Mind and Nature," "Politics, Power, Institution," and "Art and Creation," each of which attempts to document Merleau-Ponty's legacy for some of our present philosophical concerns. These sections are rounded off by an epilogue by Jean-Luc Nancy ("Merleau-Ponty, an Attempt at a Response").

Legacies

What are Merleau-Ponty's legacies for contemporary thinking? The contributions contained in this section do much to support what we described above as our central thesis, namely, that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology serves to reinvigorate a set of philosophical concerns that we continue to have. To start with, due to his incessant efforts to locate our bodily condition at the heart of any sense-experience, Merleau-Ponty has most obviously contributed to rehabilitating corporeality. The body, he asserts, is our "general medium" for having a world. The world is itself, first and foremost, what we perceive through the means of our bodily condition. Merleau-Ponty's idea of embodiment already cuts through the dualisms of mind and matter, insofar as it implies a form of oriented movement which locates the birth of intentionality on a prelinguistic, bodily level.

To Merleau-Ponty, the life of consciousness is inseparable from an embodied, situated, and desiring being. The motility of the body points toward a motor intentionality (intentionnalité motrice) which is the primordial way to relate to a world of objects and beings. As a result, issues of cognition can never be ultimately separated from drives and other living forces, since there is a permanent interplay between life and desire, perception and action, movement and expression, depth and meaning. While Edmund Husserl stressed the necessity for the subject to "return to the things themselves," Merleau-Ponty wanted to highlight the many situations where the subject is called upon by the things themselves. The contributions of this section focus on some central concepts contemporary philosophy inherits from Merleau-Ponty, such as that of "flesh" (la chair), as well as his analysis of temporality; it also indicates how new insights can be gained from Merleau-Ponty's accounts of how experiences come about, both in terms of how things come into view and how correlatively subjects come into being.

Merleau-Ponty's arguably most widely known conceptual invention is arguably "the flesh" (la chair), which has generated many critical discussions in contemporary philosophy. As Renaud Barbaras argues in "The Three Senses of Flesh," Merleau-Ponty's own ambiguity concerning the meaning of "flesh" has led to two opposing interpretations. The first one reads la chair as a faithful retranslation of the Husserlian idea of Leib as the experiential body, but then we find ourselves with the strange concept of a "flesh of the world": the reversible structure of embodiment (my own body is both sentient and sensed) cannot be extended to the world at large without turning the world itself into a sentient being (some aspects of this hypothesis are discussed in this volume by McWeeny). The other reading takes "flesh" to be distinct from the "personal body," and to be the name for a generalized account of the texture of the world in its sensible (yet not sentient) condition. However, Barbaras states, these two senses (the ontic one and the ontological one) can only be explained through a third, transcendental one. Flesh belongs neither to the subject nor to the world alone, it is rather a dynamic of life, which shares a same structure with the dynamic of desire. Indeed, the specificity of desire is that it only ever tends to something insofar as this thing is not yet present, to desire means to project oneself toward something that evades givenness. The very notion of the world should be thought as dynamic: beyond the flesh of the subject and the subject of the world, flesh should be thought as world.

Barbaras's plea for a dynamic reading of flesh generally raises the question of Merleau-Ponty's idea of temporality and of becoming. In "The Vortex of Time," Bernhard Waldenfels and Regula Giuliani ponder what Merleau-Ponty's legacy can be for a radical reconception of time. Cutting into the modern opposition between objective and subjective time, the question is how to make space for both the unity and the paradoxical character of temporal structures. Against linear accounts of time, which are to be found both in the externalist and in the psychological accounts, Waldenfels and Giuliani elicit the many resources that Merleau-Ponty offers throughout his work for an alternative

picture of time. From the radical ontological meditation of the late writings one can follow the temporal thread backward, into the early works: what emerges in this comprehensive reading is the idea of time as a swirling vortex. Taking into consideration insights from psychoanalysis, structuralism, and psychopathology, they show what it might entail to proceed to a thoroughly temporal rethinking of embodied experience. Merleau-Ponty's critique of traditional conceptions of time remains faithful to a certain idea of phenomenology: neither object nor fact, time is neither a form nor a content of experience; from a phenomenological perspective, one must say that time is what appears in passing. In "Undergoing an Experience. Sensing, Bodily Affordances, and the Institution of the Self," Emmanuel Alloa aims at showing why Merleau-Ponty's critique of sensation cannot be disentangled from a radical redefinition of subjectivity. Connecting the early criticism of sense data with the later explorations around the notion of "institution," the point is to show how a self is not a mere receptacle for sensory contents but is instituted as a self through the very experiences it undergoes. Experience is not a thing we "do" or "have," but something we go through and something through which we become what we are. From a recapitulation of Merleau-Ponty's account of sense-emergence as a Gestaltist process and the analysis of the negative, diacritical structure of the experiential field, the argument moves to the mute demands of sensible environments ("affordances") and the types of embodied responsivity they call for. As Alloa argues, affective, "pathic" events that touch the subject are also what brings the subject into existence. Consequently, subjectivity appears as the field of becoming, a becoming shaped through sensible requests and instituted by means of the creative responses given to the requests put forward by other beings, things, and subjects.

Among the questions left open by Merleau-Ponty's writings is how philosophical language may adequately express the reality of experience. In his chapter "Between Sense and Non-Sense: Merleau-Ponty and 'The Silence of the Absolute Language,' " Stephen Watson takes up the claim that philosophy in fact requires an orientation not only to its language but to the fact that its language fails to express its meaning. In that case, Watson writes, a "transcendence of the sensible becomes as much lure as caesura." It becomes both that which language means as well as that which it cannot possibly express. But this excess does not precede language so much as it is gathered within and by language. This would be a limit or break within linguistic meaning that shows up or is produced only in language, and which thus has many points of access. If philosophy is supposed to highlight its production of its own caesura, as we learn from Watson's chapter, this entails an undermining of philosophy seen as the pursuit of some preexisting absolute.

Mind and Nature

Merleau-Ponty is often credited with having ventured into a topic that has since become ever more timely: the concept of nature. Lately, his lecture courses at the Collège de France from 1956-1960, his in-depth forays into biology and animal behavior, along with his more general interrogations on a new concept of nature, have been reappraised. These lectures have set the scene for a thorough reconsideration of what life, materiality, and consciousness mean. In this second section, three authors assess Merleau-Ponty's legacy for current debates about the naturalization of the mind, the extent to which matter itself is animated (the so-called question of "panpsychism") and, finally, the debate about animal communication.

While the phenomenological idea of intentionality has often been taken as a rebuke of the ambitions of reductionist naturalistic accounts, Jocelyn Benoist suggests that Merleau-Ponty's work may be naturalized to a certain extent. In "The Truth of Naturalism," Benoist suggests that, while it would be hard to deny some truth to the thesis of the mental—i.e., "there is some intentional region in the world"—this does not exclude the possibility that there might be some ontological truth to

naturalism. One does not need to wait for the late, explicitly ontological ponderings for this: already in the early book Structure of Behaviour, Benoist explains, we find the idea that any embodied meaning sustains a being and is sustained by it all at once. By choosing behavior as a starting point, the cards are reshuffled between naturalism and a philosophy of consciousness: behavior is nothing but consciousness in nature, mind in the world. If intentionality is an emergent phenomenon that has its origin in nature itself, it means intentionality cannot exhaust nature. Nature should then be taken as the name for that which escapes full intentional grasp, while also being that in which any meaning is steeped.

In her contribution, "The Panpsychism Question in Merleau-Ponty's Ontology," Jennifer McWeeny explores one way of saving Merleau-Ponty's ontology from the criticisms leveled at it by Barbaras by arguing that the notion of "flesh" points toward a panpsychic conception of Being. With respect to the possibility of using his philosophy for a holistic understanding of nature, much indeed hinges on whether mindlike qualities are restricted to the human realm or whether they should be extended to matter at large. In the wake of recent philosophical trends such as new materialisms, speculative realism, feminist phenomenology, and environmentalism, McWeeny discusses the available ways to give a panpsychist reading of the notion of flesh and outlines the ontological, ethical, and political consequences of such an interpretation. Showing continuities and ruptures with authors from Descartes and Leibniz, James, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze, the chapter also locates the point at which an interrogation of mindlike structures must impose itself in classical and phenomenological philosophies of consciousness.

In "Merleau-Ponty and Biosemiotics. From the Issue of Meaning in Living Beings to a New Deal between Science and Metaphysics," Annabelle Dufourcq confronts Merleau-Ponty's forays into animal life with the advances in biosemiotics, opening up fruitful reconceptualizations of what signification means in the domain of life at large. In a movement that reverses the traditional tendency to refer everything back to the human, Dufourcq points out that one might just as well wish to regard the human as a sign of the natural. In so doing, her contribution echoes Benoist's plea for a renaturalized phenomenology as well as McWeeny's suggestion that panpsychism need not mean anthropomorphism. This involves taking seriously the claims made by biosemioticians such as Adolf Portmann or Jakob von Uexküll, who were able to show the extent to which animals live in a world of meaning and signs, which undercuts any mechanistic understanding of their form of life. Merleau-Ponty's claim that the world is meaning, as Dufourcq shows, can be understood reductively as a statement of defiance toward any talk of the "thing-in-itself"; but conversely it could be seen to expand the world of meaning to all existing entities, including animals, and plants too.

Politics, Power, Institution

After decades in which scholarship has by and large ignored Merleau-Ponty's explicitly political writings, we can currently witness a return to these matters. As some commentators have stressed, beyond his topical articles that dealing with the pressing matters of his time, Merleau-Ponty also devised an ambitious ontology of power, the implications of which still need to be fully unfolded. "There is no power which has an absolute basis," writes Merleau-Ponty in his "Note on Macchiavelli." This constitutes the starting point for an entire line of postfoundational thinking, of which Merleau-Ponty's disciple Claude Lefort was the first representative.

In "The Institution of the Law. Merleau-Ponty and Lefort," Bernard Flynn returns to the ominous question that has haunted the tradition for so long, namely, the relationship between nature (physis) and convention (nomos). Any law is faced with the constitutive paradox that it cannot legitimate its own inaugural institution but needs to resort to an "outside" to justify itself. If the paradigm of

political theology, so minutely analyzed by Lefort, is to be rejected, then the only possible "outside" available is nature. But this would be a misunderstanding of nature, one in which nature is reduced to a self-identical, static object facing human conventions. On the contrary, and echoing a theme that runs through all the previous contributions, a conception of nature as life contains the resources for an internal form of transcendence: human laws are not added on top of nature but it is by nature that humans are political. This chiasm forces us to rethink the very notion of institution as cutting across the nature-culture divide: to live is to establish, violate, contest, and abide by laws. It is the illusion that we could find an ultimately secured ground that severs us from life itself, not the reverse.

In his contribution "Post-Truth Politics and the Paradox of Power," Frank Chouraqui wonders what kind of responses philosophy has to offer to the apparent irrationality of manmade decisions (both individual and collective). For there is a form of rationalism that is refuted by the mere existence of irrationality. One such fact is the phenomenon of post-truth, in which the presumed correspondence between credibility and support is shattered. On the contrary, such phenomena demonstrate that adhesion is not indexed on trust or belief: power is not truth-sensitive. For Chouraqui, Merleau-Ponty provides the tools to contend with such radically unsettling phenomena, for his engagement with political irrationality has led him to challenge the widely accepted view that truth-recognition precedes reality-constitution and that political adhesion follows from truth-attribution. On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty shows that recognition and constitution are equiprimordial moments unified in the most fundamental structure of being called "perceptual faith." The world as it appears to us, even as it presents recognition in contradistinction to constitution, is only derived from their originary unity. The political sphere is organized by their unity and by its interactions with the illusion of their disunity.

A central, yet still insufficiently theorized notion in Merleau-Ponty's writings is that of "institution" (Stiftung or Ur-Stiung). Merleau-Ponty understands institution in a broad and elementary way, as both the instituted form and the instituting process. Situating herself within an ongoing current discussion about the uses of Merleau-Ponty's notion of "institution," Sara Ahmed suggests connecting it with habit and its normalizing effects. In her contribution "Institutional Habits. About Bodies and Orientations that Don't Fit," Ahmed proposes a practical phenomenology of habituation, with direct reference to diversity work. By stressing all the moments where bodies do not fit into the places intended for them, a contingent moment of the emergence and shaping of an institution becomes visible. The encounter with de-oriented, queer bodies not only highlights implicit normativity; it also opens up a space for reorientation, inspiring ways of critically coming up against institutions.

Art and Creation

It is frequently pointed out that Merleau-Ponty's work yields precious resources for a better understanding of the phenomenon of expression. Just when Jean-Paul Sartre proposed his essentialist account of literature, Merleau-Ponty refused Sartre's alternative between (direct) prose and (indirect) poetry, and rather sought to interrogate the genesis of meaning, returning to the creative and expressive moments beneath the surface of discourse. Expression would thus not so much amount to the transference of an internal state into an outside form (ex-pressio). It is, rather, an occurrence wherein something already in view but overlooked is presented as if for the first time. Such a task is of course not limited to literature: besides the close attention he pays to literary expression, painting, cinema, and the visual arts in general are incontestably among Merleau-Ponty's most privileged objects of attention. He suggests in "Eye and Mind," for example: "in paintings themselves we could seek a figured philosophy."' Since their publication, Merleau-Ponty's writings on visual arts have always stirred keen interest, inspiring generations of viewers and theorists. The last

section of the volume presents some of the latest advances in aesthetics concerning, among other things, the status of the work of art in a museological context, Merleau-Ponty's rediscovered theory of cinema, and aesthetics as a space for dissensus.

In "Art after the Sublime in Merleau-Ponty and André Breton: Aesthetics and the Politics of Mad Love," Galen Johnson provides an exegesis of the critical role that surrealism plays in Merleau-Ponty's thought, and more specifically André Breton's semiautobiographical novel Mad Love (L'amour fou). As a recently published volume of interviews with Merleau-Ponty confirms, surrealist aesthetics were an inspirational resource for him, both in the larger context of his project of elucidating the "prose of truth" and for the sake of his reconceptualisation of dialogic philosophy. Johnson manages to explain that, against all expectations, surrealist aesthetics, so often associated with the écriture automatique, does not lead to soliloquy but is conceived of as dialogic from the outset ("the forms of Surrealist language adapt themselves best to dialogue," as Breton claims in the Surrealist Manifesto). Along these lines, Johnson stresses how, against skepticism, authoritarianism, and moralism, the confrontation with surrealism was an important step toward Merleau-Ponty's reconception of intersubjectivity, coexistence, and the "flesh of the political."

In the chapter "Institution and Critique of the Museum in `Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,' " Rajiv Kaushik discusses Merleau-Ponty's critique of "the museum" as a hegemonic force. Recalling the discussion of André Malraux's project of a Museum without Walls, Kaushik examines Merleau-Ponty's critique of decontextualization and dehistoricization. Although this critique was formulated with respect to its time, Kaushik points out, Merleau-Ponty's arguments remain valid, and contemporary curators would do well to reckon with it. However, without having to defend some sort of historicist contextualization of artworks, the point is to stress the lateral connections between objects and experiences. For the ontology at stake in Merleau-Ponty's various treatments of art is one that is inseparable from his hermeneutics and politics, since this being is in fact opened up by all kinds of difference (linguistic, symbolic, ethical, political) without those differences having to conform to one another.

For Mauro Carbone, the time has come to confront one of the most celebrated theories of cinema—Gilles Deleuze's—with the lesser-known developments in Merleau-Ponty's thought on the artform. As Carbone suggests in "Deleuze's 'Philosophy-Cinema': A Variation on Merleau-Ponty's 'A-Philosophy'?" Merleau-Ponty stands as something of a "dark precursor" to Deleuze's ambitious ontology of cinema. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty's lecture delivered in 1945, alongside other text fragments, lays the ground for understanding what Merleau-Ponty calls an "implicit philosophy" at work in cinematic oeuvres. This perspective not only offers precious hints for understanding the specificity of film, it also gestures towards a more general fact: against the backdrop of his own "screen philosophy," Carbone highlights that ideas can only be experienced by encountering them in one of their sensible manifestations, on some kind of "screen" or "veil." Screens are not just hindrances, then, but conditions of possibility of thinking.

In the fourth and last chapter of this section, Veronique Fóti offers some suggestions on the connections between ethics and aesthetics. In her contribution, "Strong Beauty: In Face of Structures of Exclusion," Fóti begins with asking what we are to do with the notion of beauty today. If this notion is to mean anything, she argues, it has to be understood as a radically unanticipable, event-like experience one is seized by. Although Merleau-Ponty has not made beauty a central category of his aesthetics, the confrontative dimension associated with this definition of "strong beauty" can easily be reconnected with his analyses of Paul Cézanne, while echoing the work of Agnes Martin, Ellsworth Kelly, or Natvar Bhaysar. Such experience of strong beauty is the experience of extreme strength and fragility at once, thereby opening up a space for resilience. According to Fóti, art has an

ethical dimension where it produces a consciousness for "refraction," that is, that totality is shattered, leaving us with the necessity of permanently recomposing ourselves. Sensus has dissensus as its precondition.

These four sections are finally punctuated by an epilogue by Jean-Luc Nancy titled "Merleau-Ponty: An Attempt at a Response," in which, for the first time, Nancy takes the opportunity to address an often-discussed issue: how and in what way his own thinking is related to the thought of Merleau-Ponty. <>

CICERO ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: ON THE NATURE OF THE GODS AND ON DIVINATION by J. P. F. Wynne [Cambridge University Press, 9781107070486]

Examining Cicero's engagement with Hellenistic (Stoic, Epicurean, and sceptical) philosophy of religion (the 'science and religion debate') in his two dialogues, On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination, this book makes a major contribution towards a new, higher estimation of the Roman statesman Cicero's philosophical writings.

During the months before and after he saw Julius Caesar assassinated on the Ides of March, 44 BC, Cicero wrote two philosophical dialogues about religion and theology: On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination. This book brings to life his portraits of Stoic and Epicurean theology, as well as the scepticism of the new Academy, his own school. We meet the Epicurean gods who live a life of pleasure and care nothing for us, the determinism and beauty of the Stoic universe, itself our benevolent creator, and the reply to both that traditional religion is better served by a lack of dogma. Cicero hoped that these reflections would renew the traditional religion at Rome, with its prayers and sacrifices, temples and statues, myths and poets, and all forms of divination. This volume is the first to fully investigate Cicero's dialogues as the work of a careful philosophical author.

Review:

'The burgeoning interest in Cicero's writings on philosophy takes a different turn in this pioneering treatment of his works on religion. J. P. F. Wynne provides a lucid, accessible, and attractively written introduction to Cicero's distinctive brand of sceptical dialogue in general, before turning to his markedly contrasting treatments of theology and of divination. His new book makes a powerful case for taking them to constitute a single extended and sophisticated project: 'moderating' religion, to secure it from the extremes of impiety and superstition.' —Malcolm Schofield, University of Cambridge

Contents

Cicero and the Translation of Philosophy from Greece to Rome

The Romans did not understand their own religion. They were the heirs to immemorial practices in honor of their gods. But when they paid the gods cult, they did not know the meaning of what they did, nor the nature of the gods they worshipped. The result was that they moved like strangers through their own city, looking for a way to feel at home.

Or that is how Cicero paints it. The problem was one for intellectuals, perhaps a small class, who wanted not only to practice their religion, but also to understand it in a rigorous way. One remedy was the antiquarianism of Varro, who aimed by historical study to recover the intentions of the religion's founders. But Cicero's suggestion was to apply a new resource to the problem: Greek philosophy.

In the event, Cicero carried through this project in two dialogues, On the nature of the gods and On divination (De natura deorum and De divinatione). In this book, I aim to interpret the whole and some parts of these texts themselves, not the Hellenistic philosophy for which they are excellent sources, nor what Cicero's own sources might have been. Now I do not argue that in these dialogues Cicero wrote, or aimed to write, as an "original philosopher." But I do think that he shaped the drama, the characters, their speeches, and his own authorial comments, as parts of literary and philosophical wholes. I think that he thus suggested a unique and interesting answer to the dialogues' questions.

My goals are first, to interpret that answer, and second, to show by example that Cicero's philosophical dialogues may fruitfully be read in this way.

A century ago, when philological science held Cicero's philosophical writing in low esteem, it would have looked silly to write this book. The best scholars, and what seemed the best evidence, suggested that Cicero's philosophical dialogues would not reward a reader who looked for unity of literary form and a fertile intellectual project. It was even said that Cicero was unable or unwilling fully to understand the philosophy he wrote about. My book is one attempt to make good on a slow rise in scholarly opinion of Cicero since then. In this introduction I shall collect some reasons to allow the assumption that Cicero's dialogues might sustain my sort of treatment.

Cicero's philosophical dialogues fall into two kinds. One kind includes dialogues in which Cicero's skepticism, and the Hellenistic philosophers whom he treats, are rarely drawn to the reader's attention (Republic, Laws, On old age, On friendship). The second kind includes dialogues in which Cicero points to his skeptical agenda and to his Hellenistic material. These are the sequence of dialogues marked out by Cicero at De divinatione 2.4: Hortensius, Academica, On ends, Tusculans, De natura deorum, De divinatione, and On fate. I shall call the latter set of dialogues the "Late Sequence" because these works were written in sequence towards the end of Cicero's life. I shall draw on evidence from and about the other dialogues when I explore Cicero's approach to the dialogue form in general. But the arguments of this introduction are intended to apply principally to the Late Sequence.

I note one further convention here. Cicero puts "himself" into his dialogues as a character, but I think we should not simply assume that these characters reflect accurately the historical Marcus Tullius Cicero. Rather than labor these distinctions, I shall from now on call Cicero the historical

person, or his authorial voice, "Cicero," but his avatar in each respective dialogue "Marcus." His brother's avatar, who appears in De divinatione, is "Quintus."

A Positive View of Cicero's Dialogues

Since the last quarter of the twentieth century there has been a revival in the understanding of Hellenistic philosophy. This revival owes a large debt to the philologists I have mentioned, and to others like them, who flourished a century earlier. For it has shared one part of their approach, the thought that, to quote Long and Sedley, "Hellenistic philosophy is a jigsaw." So it is, if we define Hellenistic philosophy more strictly as the philosophy of the Greek schools after the death of Aristotle and before Cicero began to write. For, with the exception of some texts from Epicurus, no complete piece of Greek philosophical writing from that time survives. Yet the thought that was contained in the lost texts is recoverable. If we cut up Cicero, and many other sources, into jigsaw pieces, we can rearrange them by school, thinker, and topic, so as to make pictures of the Hellenistic period. "So far as I could," wrote von Arnim, "I projected in [Stocorum veterum fragmenta] a full and accurate image of Chrysippus' philosophy." When we open volumes II and III of Stocorum veterum fragmenta, we see that this "image" is made of small jigsaw pieces cut from many texts. Painstaking collection by scholars like von Arnim ultimately bore fruit in today's Hellenistic revival, because it turned out to be true that the "images" they made could yield coherent and fertile reconstructions of Hellenistic thought. We should keep cutting up Cicero for such purposes. I hope that work like mine can make the pieces more useful still.

But we have seen that the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars matched their care for the philosophy to which Cicero is a witness with a negative view of Cicero's own philosophical acumen. By and large, historians of philosophy do not share that negative view today. When scholars have built reconstructions of Hellenistic philosophy in large part on Cicero's reports, those reconstructions have seemed to be well founded. It would be implausible now to think that Cicero was stupid or mendacious in writing about philosophy. That has suggested to many that Cicero's texts might be worth a look not only as sources, but also as objects of study in themselves. We may see Hellenistic philosophy, defined more loosely as the whole life of the Hellenistic schools in antiquity, not in fragments, but available to us in rich and continuous texts. Sure enough, for decades there have been rallying-cries to the study of Cicero's dialogues on their own merits. A number of scholars have taken up the challenge, explicitly or implicitly. The jigsaw approach to Cicero has remained dominant, but in interpreting De natura deorum and De divinatione as I do I am not doing anything unheralded or unprecedented — despite Mommsen's warning.

One positive view of the Late Sequence I shall call the encyclopedia view. The encyclopedia view takes its cue from Cicero's success as a philosophical source. It supposes Cicero's dominant goal in the Late Sequence to be the opening up of philosophy to a new Roman audience by the composition of a philosophical "encyclopedia." On this reading, the topics covered in the dialogues form a curriculum that covers a representative selection of Hellenistic philosophical topics. A given speech represents Cicero's version of the Stoic view on the dialogue's topic, or the Epicurean view, or the skeptic's reply, while a given speaker is cast to represent some particular, or an ideal, member of a school.

There are good reasons to think that to make his dialogues useful as an encyclopedia was one goal to which Cicero gave thought. For one sort of audience whom the dialogues seem to envisage is unlearned Romans who could not get their philosophy from the Greeks. These Romans, before Cicero, could read only works of Epicurean authors in Latin whom Cicero thought incompetent. Of

Cicero's Late Sequence writings, the work most obviously intended to address this need was the Hortensius, for it was meant to turn new readers to philosophy.

To further strengthen the conclusion that one purpose of the Late Sequence was as an encyclopedia, we find that the Sequence appears to have a curricular order and completeness. Cicero lists the Sequence at De divinatione 2.1-3. When we read this list, we see that it begins with the call to philosophy in Hortensius, before turning to Cicero's favored school (Academica) and the ethical foundation that philosophy offers (On ends). Next, the Tusculans offer doses of philosophical medicine to soothe common sources of distress — the fear of death, for example — in a way that should appeal to the beginner at philosophy at least as much as to the savant. Further, the Sequence overall is probably meant to cover some of each of the three conventional parts of Hellenistic thought: logic (Academica), ethics (Tusculans, On ends), and physics (De natura deorum, De divinatione, On fate). Indeed, it was Cicero's declared hope in De divinatione 2.4 that he would have time to treat every topic of philosophy in Latin. In sum, the Late Sequence seems designed with one eye to new philosophical readers who wanted to use it as something like a comprehensive curriculum. Thus the encyclopedia view contains truth to the extent that making a philosophical encyclopedia was one of Cicero's goals for the Late Sequence.

But Cicero had other goals, which were often more important to him than the encyclopedia view alone would suggest. There is another part of the audience that the dialogues envisage: the learned. These are Romans who already have some, or much, philosophy from the Greeks. To see who these Romans might be, it helps to remember how Cicero's texts were disseminated. We know from his letters that Cicero sent off manuscripts for the copyists whom Atticus retained. Thus there was a system of production and distribution not entirely within Cicero's control. But this was little like modern publication and distribution of books. The immediate audience for the dialogues would be people who were part of Cicero and Atticus' intellectual and social circle. Such people very often had some degree of Greek education and philosophical learning. Among these were readers like Atticus himself, Varro, or Brutus, whose knowledge of philosophy was probably comparable to Cicero's own. In other words, Cicero writes in the dialogues in part for people who already know about the material he is presenting, or who at least could look it up, or ask a philosopher, in Greek. For these readers, a Latin encyclopedia of philosophy would be of little use.

This philosophically learned readership is important to bear in mind when we try to understand the Late Sequence. For it explains a common phenomenon faced by philosophical interpreters. Often Cicero, or a character, will merely mention or allude to some argument or philosophical position, or give a very spare account of it, so that modern interpreters need to turn to other Hellenistic sources to understand what Cicero, or the character, is talking about. I often follow that procedure in this book. The trick makes dramatic sense: inside the fictional world of the drama, both the character and his interlocutors are supposed to know their philosophy. But as to why Cicero does this for his readers, if you took only the encyclopedia view of the dialogues, you would face a puzzle. Why would Cicero refer to ideas in a way that will confuse his readers who would be, ex hypothesi, ignorant of those ideas? But once we have in mind the learned readers, we may suppose that Cicero sometimes merely mentions arguments or views because there is a part of his readership, on whom he is often focused, who will get the reference, or who can easily follow it up.

But then we might wonder, if Cicero wrote in part for readers to whom it is not his purpose to teach the material, what were they supposed to get out of the Late Sequence? And, if there is more to the Sequence than a philosophical encyclopedia, are even unlearned readers given more than just an introduction to the material? Let us look at some of Cicero's answers to these questions.

In his preface to On ends, Cicero distinguishes four types of his critics (I. I): (a) people who dislike philosophy entirely, (b) people who think it should not be done too much, (c) people who are educated in Greek and who would prefer to read philosophy in that language, and (d) people who think he should write about something else. It is to people of type (c) that he gives by far his most detailed reply. (On ends 1.4—10) But these are not people who are hostile to, nor necessarily ignorant of, the philosophical content of the Late Sequence...

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Cicero's Project in On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination

I shall argue that Cicero tells us the point of De natura deorum in the dialogue's first sentence:

> *cum multae res in philosophia nequaquam satis adhuc explicatae sint, turn perdifficilis, Brute, quad to minime ignoras, et perobscura quaestio est de natura deorum, quae et ad cognitionem animi pulcherrima est' et ad moderandam religionem necessaria.*

> While many matters in philosophy have not at all had sufficient treatment yet, inquiry into the nature of the gods—as hardly escapes you, Brutus—is particularly difficult and thoroughly opaque. This inquiry is both most beautiful for the mind to grasp, and necessary for the moderation of religion. (De natura deorum 1.1)

Cicero tells Brutus and the reader that inquiry into the nature of the gods is attractive in two ways. First comes beauty. Beauty will matter in the end but it is not what Cicero takes up in the rest of his preface.' Instead he elaborates the second point: moderation of religion. Staging a philosophical inquiry into the nature of the gods in the hope of moderating religion is, I shall argue, Cicero's project in De natura deorum and De divinatione.

That a preface should tell you the point of the work to follow might sound unsurprising. But with Cicero's philosophical works it can be doubted. The doubts stem from a letter to Atticus, who oversaw copying of Cicero's works. In the letter Cicero confessed that he attached to a manuscript of his On glory the preface he had already used for Book 3 of the Academica. "This happened because I have a volume of prefaces from which I am in the habit of selecting when I have put a work in hand." (Letters to Atticus 16.6.4 = SB 414) The letter suggests that Cicero is careless about his prefaces and that any of them could easily be cut from one work and pasted into another. If so then perhaps the prefaces are rhetorical exercises, standing free from the work to which they are glued.

But there can be no such doubts about the preface to De natura deorum. It is plain that a large part, if not all, of it was written specifically for a philosophical work on the nature of the gods. For half of it is directly and explicitly concerned with the significance of the question of the gods' nature and the import of philosophers' views in the matter. (De natura deorum 1.1-5, 1.13-14)

The remainder of the preface takes up the defense of philosophical writing and of Cicero's Academic skepticism in particular (De natura deorum 1.6-12). Now Cicero could have taken this passage from a prewritten preface and fitted it into De natura deorum. But it melds seamlessly with its surroundings. For, Cicero's opening points with which we began (De natura deorum 1.1), that the question of the nature of the gods is difficult and important, are also useful to him in this defence of skepticism. In the nature of the gods, he suggests, we find a particularly important question, on which philosophers are particularly prone to disagreement, because it is particularly difficult. This should help us to see why skepticism, the withholding of assent to any dogmatic answer about a question, can be due caution: on the nature of the gods, no one can (yet) be confident of her

answer, and a wrong answer would be a disaster. Thus the conceit of Cicero's quaestio, his "inquiry."

In the preface to DE NATURA DEORUM Cicero presents this inquiry not only as the philosophical investigation about which his characters are to dispute, but also as a quaestio in the sense of a session of a court: "on this topic (quo guidon loco) it seems I should summon all people to judge what of these <philosophical views> is true.'" (DE NATURA DEORUM 1.13) We the audience are to hear the speakers Cicero brings before the inquiry. The preface concludes that we should see

> *... quid de religione pietate sanctitate caerimoniis fide Iure iurando, quid de templis delubris sacrificiisque sollemnibus, quid de ipsis auspiciis, quibus nos praesumus, existimandum sit (haec enim omnia ad hanc de dis inmortalibus quaestionem referenda sunt): profecto eos ipsos, qui se aliquid certi habere arbitrantur, addubitare coget doctissimorum hominum de maxuma re tanta dissensio.*

> ...what we should reckon about religion, piety, holiness, rites, good faith, and oaths, about temples, shrines, and solemn sacrifices, about the auspices that I myself oversee (for we must relate all these things to our inquiry about the immortal gods); certainly such great disagreement among the most learned, about a matter of the greatest importance, will compel those who judge that they themselves have some certainty, to hesitate. (De natura deorum 1.14)

Thus even if part of the preface to De natura deorum were drawn from a roll of prefabricated paragraphs, all of it is fitted to the dialogue it introduces, either directly, or indirectly by recommending that skepticism is an appropriate response to this inquiry in particular. The preface tells us the point of the dialogue and also, as I shall argue, the point of De divinatione

If I am right about Cicero's project, it poses a puzzle. For in Cicero's Rome religio, what I have innocently called "religion," was in important respects unlike what we tend to call "religion" today. For example, theological beliefi do not seem to have played much part in how a Roman and an augur like Cicero, who "oversaw the auspices," regulated his religio. But on the face of it beliefs are all that a philosophical inquiry could change, or at least all that it could change directly. So what could Cicero mean when he says that his quaestio will moderate religio? We turn first to that puzzle.

How the Project Shapes the Dialogues

The last plank in my argument that Cicero pursues the project I have suggested is a brief examination of the dialogues themselves. For it is not just that the preface to De natura deorum piques the reader's interest with the questions I have examined. Rather, Cicero chooses and shapes the arguments portrayed throughout De natura deorum and De divinatione in order to pursue the debate on the Central Question.

It is hard to know which Cicero thought were the "main" philosophical views of the gods at Rome in the 40s BC. To us, perhaps, the Epicureans and the Stoics seem the salient contenders. But that might be an accident, the result of their portrayal in De natura deorum and the survival of Epicurean texts at Herculaneum. Cicero knew a number of Antiocheans, including Varro the author of the Antiquities and Brutus the addressee of De natura deorum, so their theological views, where distinct from the Stoic view, could also have been options for inclusion in De natura deorum (see p. 5 n. 2). Indeed Cicero reminds the reader of this when Marcus observes that a representative of Antiochus is the only significant omission from the scene. (De natura deorum 1.16) Meanwhile, in De divinatione Quintus will reveal that he is most sympathetic to the Peripatetic view of divination. (2.100) The Peripatetic Strato's view was the foil for Stoic theology in the Academica, and from the

sketch of a dialogue on physics which we call the Timaeus it appears that the Peripatetic Cratippus was iintended to contribute. In the Timaeus Nigidius was also to appear, described as a Pythagorean, and probably to deliver the translated excerpt from Plato's Timaeus that makes up the rest of that text. That excerpt contains plenty of theology. So even if there had not been an obvious alternative to Stoic and Epicurean theology in the views of Antiochus, nevertheless Peripatetic, Platonic, and "Pythagorean" theologies were also current for Cicero. Of the dogmatic options available to him, why did Cicero choose to examine the Epicurean and Stoic views, and only those views, in detail?

If you took the "encyclopedia" view of Cicero's later philosophica, you might insist that, since Cicero's dominant aim was to provide a philosophical encyclopedia, Cicero presumably did choose the Stoic and Epicurean views just because they struck him as the main views that readers needed to know about. But my position is that although Cicero had some thought for an encyclopedia, he was more interested in shaping his dialogues as works each with unity and an aim. My position can make good sense of his choice of the Epicureans and the Stoics. For consider that the Central Question of Cicero's project, as I interpret it, is whether the gods care about us and act in our lives. But the Stoics and Epicureans are polar and rich opposites on this question.

The two schools are polar opposites in that the Stoics hold that god fated every last detail about our world, to include everything about us, and did so for our benefit, while the Epicureans hold that the gods have never had anything to do with us or our world, cannot do anything to or for us, and would not if they could.

Cicero could have got a similar polar contrast from other schools. In particular, we already have seen that in the Academica he drew the same contrast but with Aristotle or Strato representing the view that no divine mind created or acts in the world. But, by opposing the Epicureans in particular to the Stoics, Cicero also achieves a particularly rich contrast. Both Stoics and Epicureans see the gods as like us in important respects. The Stoics see gods and humans in a community of the rational with duties to one another. The Epicureans see the gods' perfect happiness as implying precisely that the gods are not part of any community with us, and rather that they are above any involvement in the business of the cosmos or of our lives, so that their life of pleasure is assured. Further, both schools think we should imitate the gods in these respects so far as we can. For Cicero's Epicureans, our community with one another is regrettable, merely a remedy for our weakness. Thus these two answers to Cicero's question lead to very different visions not merely of right religion, but also of happy and virtuous human life in general. By way of comparison, the Aristotelian god also does not care for us. But Aristotelians do not draw the conclusion that we should all seek to imitate god in that respect. The choice of exactly the two schools he chooses, then, makes most clear what is at stake in Cicero's Central Question.

Moving to De divinatione, Cicero there includes speeches only for a specific Stoic view of divination (Quintus' speech in Book 1) and Academic arguments targeted at that view of divination in particular (Marcus' speech in Book 1). The Epicureans rejected divination entirely, and thus could have spoken in opposition to the Stoics, or could have been given their own speech and counter-argument. But in De divinatione, unlike in De natura deorum, Epicurus is summarily dismissed, "babbling about the nature of the gods." (balbutientem de natura deorum, De divinatione 1.5) Why? Cicero does not seem to have rated Epicurean arguments against the Stoics very high: unless Carneades had come along, Marcus says at the end of De divinatione, the Stoics might have been judged "the only philosophers" by Marcus' day. (soli... philosophi, De divinatione 2.1 5o) But I suspect there is more to it than that. The Epicurean view of divination was purely negative. The positive Epicurean theology and physics on which the negative view rested was covered by De natura deorum (and would be expanded on in On fate, if Cicero got around to it). Now if Cicero's main concern were to

be encyclopedic he might still have included the Epicurean arguments and a reply. But if I am right, he left them out because there was no positive and fertile Epicurean view to engage with. A Stoic argument for divination is therefore picked out as the richest representative of the view that the gods give us helpful information, a view which implies a positive answer to the Central Question of De natura deorum.

The choice of schools and speakers is not the only element of the structure of the dialogues shaped by the Central Question and its vital role in the moderation of religion. In the chapters ahead, I shall argue that Cicero the author often reminds the reader of the Question at significant junctures. Now, so far as the speakers of De natura deorum are aware, their topic of discussion is the nature of the gods in general, and neither the Central Question nor religion specifically. (De natura deorum 1.17) Yet Cicero shapes their conversation so that the Central Question and religion receive emphasis. Both Velleius' speech and Cotta's response to Velleius culminate in drawing the consequences for religion from the Epicurean answer to the Central Question. (De natura deorum 1.45-56, 1.115-124, see Chapter 2 section 2.3) Cicero has Cotta specifically request that Balbus give us the Stoic arguments that the gods run the world and care about us, that is to say, his answer to the Central Question. (De natura deorum 2.3) Balbus does so at enormous length. (De natura deorum 2.73-167) But by a dramatic trick Cicero also emphasizes that part of Balbus' speech that deals with religion, and makes this a key bone of contention in Cotta's response (see below, pp. 113-117). Meanwhile, De divinatione is set in train by a conversation about just these disagreements in De natura deorum and features a conclusion that revisits the Central Question. (De divinatione 1.8-11, cf. Chapter 4 section 4.1) In any case, Cicero's choice of divination as a topic for further elaboration is well explained by the Central inquiry. As Quintus points out in opening the conversation of De divinatione, if the gods give us divination, then it follows that they do indeed care for us. (De divinatione 1.10) <>

Epictetus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance edited by Dane R. Gordon and David B. Suits [Philosophy Series, RIT Press 9781933360904]

Epictetus (c. 50-c. 120 CE) was born a slave. His master, Epaphroditus, allowed him to attend the lectures of the Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus and later gave him his freedom. From numerous references in his Discourses it is clear that Epictetus valued freedom as a precious possession. He would have been on the side of the many people living now who, while not actually enslaved, are denied true freedom by the harsh circumstances of their lives. Epictetus's teachings about freedom and human dignity have echoed through the millennia-in the writings of Spinoza, Thomas Paine and Martin Luther King, Jr., to name a few. He was much concerned with human behavior. His advice to not worry about what is not in our control is pointedly relevant to our busy modern society-which is often fraught with anxiety. Some people might argue that what Epictetus taught is not serious philosophy, more like self-help. But the range of topics addressed by the essays in this book clearly indicates that the teachings of Epictetus provide strong incentive to present day philosophical thinking. **"Epictetus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance"** is the title of a conference on Epictetus held at Rochester Institute of Technology in April 2012, when many of the ideas in these essays were first presented.

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In our initial discussions about whether or not to hold a conference on Epictetus, we wondered how much interest there was. Epictetus (c. 50-120 CE) is less well-known than other Stoics, and his teaching is not regarded by all scholars with unqualified esteem. W. A. Oldfather observes that because so many passages in Epictetus can be paralleled from remaining fragments of Musonius Rufus, his teacher, "there can be no doubt but the system of thought of the pupil is little more than an echo, with changes of emphasis due to the personal equation, of that of the master" ("Introduction", viii, n2).

A. A. Long, in his study of Epictetus, published many years later, does not agree. He discusses the issue of originality and concludes, "much of Epictetus' philosophy appears to be fresh in formulation and distinctive in emphasis" (Epictetus, 32). Long provides strong affirmation: "Epictetus is a thinker we cannot forget, once we have encountered him, because he gets under our skin. [...] [N]o one who knows his work can simply dismiss it as theoretically invalid or practically useless. In times of stress, as modern Epictetans have attested, his recommendations make their presence felt" (Epictetus, 1).

Epictetus's mother was a slave, and he himself was a slave in the early part of his life. Epaphroditus, Epictetus's master, allowed him to attend the lectures of Musonius Rufus, a distinguished Stoic teacher, and later gave him his freedom.

Throughout his life freedom was of greatest importance to him. Oldfather writes, "I know no man upon whose lips the idea more frequently occurs. The words `free' (adjective and verb) and 'freedom' appear some 130 times in Epictetus, that is, with a relative frequency about six times that of their occurrence in the New Testament L...]" ("Introduction, xvii).

Epictetus did not write for publication. What he taught was taken down in stenographic form by Flavius Arrian, one of Epictetus's pupils, and published in eight books of Diatribai, or Discourses, of which four survive; and a brief selection of his work, known as Encheiridion (Manual or Handbook) was published for those of the general public who could not take time to read the Discourses.

They are remarkable in ancient philosophic work as providing the ipsissima verba of the lecturer, following the twists and turns, the abrupt changes and sometimes contradictions of his thought. They reveal the personality of a teacher absolutely committed to what he taught.

Cynthia King remarks that according to Musonius Rufus, "philosophy, done properly, should affect us personally and profoundly. [...] [O]ne of the primary objectives of philosophy [is] to reveal to us our shortcomings so we can overcome them and thereby live a good life" ("Editor's Preface", 11). Reading the Discourses, it is clear that Epictetus fully agreed with that.

Perhaps the most important of Epictetus's beliefs is the distinction between what is in a person's power and what is not. From the opening passage of the Encheiridion we find this:

> Under our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing; not under our control are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not our own doing. Furthermore, the things under our control are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; while the things not under our control are weak, servile, subject to hindrance, and not our own. Remember, therefore, that if what is naturally slavish you think to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be hampered, will grieve, will be in turmoil, and will blame both gods and men; while if you think only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your own to be, as it really is, not your own, then no one will ever be able to exert compulsion upon you, no one will hinder you, you will blame no one, you will find fault with no one, will do absolutely nothing against your will, you will have no personal enemy, no one will harm you, for neither is there any harm that can touch you. [Encheiridion 1]

The moral of life for Epictetus was to accept what God had determined one should be and do. "Remember", he declares, "that you are an actor in a play, the character of which is determined by the Playwrite [...]. For this is your business, to play admirably the rôle assigned you; but the selection of that rôle is Another's" (Encheiridion 18.17).

Epictetus had a high level of personal responsibility that stemmed first of all from the fact that we are citizens of the world and are expected to be concerned for one another, and then from the fact that we all have a portion of the same God. We carry him within us and must take care not to defile him by what we say or by our behavior.

Understandably, a number of early Christians regarded Epictetus's teaching as strongly evocative of the New Testament. The Epistle of James has numerous suggestive parallels. Such apparent similarities continued to be attractive. The seventeenth-century scholar Thomas Gataker wrote that "it may be boldly asserted, there are no remaining monuments of the ancient strangers, which come nearer to the doctrine of CHRIST, than the writings and admonition of these two: Epictetus and [Marcus Aurelius] Antoninus". The quote is taken from a review by Noel Malcolm of Christopher Brooke's 2012 book, Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau. Malcolm notes that Stoicism "was an omnipresent yet problematical factor in early modern intellectual life". We believe that it remains a potent factor still, in particular in the teaching of Epictetus. Consider Long's comment, quoted earlier: "Epictetus is a thinker we cannot forget [...]. In times of stress, as modern Epictetans have attested, his recommendations make their presence felt" In 2013, we live in times of stress. It might seem that almost everyone who can afford it, at least in North America, has a personal counselor to find relief from stress. In that respect Epictetus's teaching is pointedly relevant to the anxieties of contemporary life. His basic advice is good: take life as it comes, don't worry about what is not in our control; do be concerned with what is in our control—with how we think, with what we choose and how we behave toward other people. "Hardly philosophy", some people may object; "no more than self-help" But to others Epictetus's

teaching is profoundly philosophic. Self-help and helping others were motivating factors for the earlier philosopher Epicurus, and before him Aristotle, and before him Socrates. Epictetus, who was not widely familiar with other philosophers, would nevertheless most likely have known Socrates's maxim "know thyself". These philosophers shared the belief that life requires the exercise of reason, not excluding emotion, to guide us in how we behave, and in our concern for one another.

We went ahead with the conference in April of 2012. Attendees came from different parts of the United States, from Poland, and from the United Kingdom. The conference itself was lively, discussion after the papers at times animated. One of those who came told us that in twenty years of teaching and scholarly interest in Epictetus, this was the first conference he had known that dealt specifically with that philosopher.

Eleven papers are included in this book. (For reasons of time constraints, only nine of them were presented at the conference itself.) What follows are brief sketches of salient ideas and questions to be found in each one. The reader may notice the range of topics the authors address, an indication to us that what Epictetus taught provides strong incentive to contemporary philosophical thinking.

Brian Earl Johnson discusses the implication of a passage in the Encheiridion: "We are actors in a play". According to this, each person has a divinely given role and is responsible for playing it well. But a person has other roles: husband, wife, senator, soldier, or cobbler. Do these roles have value of their own or do they simply "deflate" into the larger cosmic role that we are given?

Christopher Davidson considers Epictetus from the point of view of Foucault. "Foucault's work on the Ancients", he writes, "is better understood as a challenge or interrogation of current understanding of freedom." This is especially true of askesis—"the self adjusting the self". Foucault's understanding of askesis, as seen in his reading of Epictetus, unsettles what has become obvious. He prompts us "to think of a different kind of self: a self which, if internally compelled and constituted by techniques of askesis, is determined to become free':

Katja Maria Vogt suggests we should ask "whether the seemingly antithetical attitudes of taking the same things seriously and not seriously are rational modes of valuing" In the conclusion of her essay she writes: "Stoic ethics is the only major ethical theory that focuses on what I take to be a pervasive task in ordinary life: taking the same thing seriously and not seriously. [...] The Stoics [...] address the challenge of taking the same things seriously and not seriously as a fundamental component of their ethical theorizing. As I see it, it is a virtue of a philosophical theory to acknowledge how widely this challenge figures in ordinary life, and to try to account for the rationality of the relevant attitudes:'

Jeffrey Fisher explains that the goal of his paper is to explain "why exactly Epictetus's episteme of life should be understood as an epistēmē in the orthodox Stoic sense [...] as a system of cognitions". Fisher points out that according to Epictetus we can have cognitions of general ethical truths and their application. To Epictetus, therefore, the episteme of life is comprised of cognitions. In sum, the episteme of life as Epictetus understands it is "an epistēmē in the orthodox Stoic sense".

Matthew Pianalto offers "an account of the defense of patience that places it at the center of the moral life': He shows how the significance of patience is reflected in Seneca and Epictetus. He writes in his abstract (not included in this book): "understanding the value and scope of patience, and the vices and emotions it opposes, also provides a way of understanding and defending the Stoic ideals of fortitude, detachment and tranquility of mind because patience itself is a central virtue for the Stoics, even if not often or explicitly named:'

Eleni Tsalla notes that according to Epictetus, the examination or observance of names is "foundational for the philosophical endeavor': But deciphering the meaning of names reveals the nature and function of things only when they are understood with reference to the nature of the whole, i.e., the cosmos. In similar manner, a comprehensive impression is "one by means of which the observer entertains an immediate impression of a thing while at the same time positioning the thing securely in the structure of the cosmos". To a contemporary reader reflecting on Tsalla's paper, this may capture the feeling of insignificance that people have in the face of great events, such as death, and the encouragement to be drawn from belief that we live in an ordered universe in which there are reasons for what happens.

Matthias Rothe claims that of all Stoic philosophers, "Epictetus appears to be the one who resonates most with Kant's thinking': Both Kant and the Stoics grounded their ethics on "the dignity of man in freedom': This freedom, Rothe writes, "is realized or guaranteed in Kant through the categorical imperative. And there is indeed a concept in Stoic philosophy" used most systematically by Epictetus "that can be understood as a functional equivalent of the categorical imperative: the circle of familiarities': In these ways Kant and Epictetus are similar in their ethical teaching. But Rothe also calls our attention to an important difference between them.

Carrie L. Bates writes on behalf of the equal status of women. She argues that, according to Epictetus, a person's true status is that of a child of God. Our bodies belong to the category of "not up to us". Our sex, man or woman, is accidental and plays no part in who we really are. Gender difference, therefore, is irrelevant.

Pavle Stojanovic writes about apprehensive impressions, "the only type of impression whose propositional content is such that it could not turn out to be false and which, because of this, unmistakably represents the thing that caused the impression': He asks whether the Stoics thought that the moral and practical perfection of the Sage is based on apprehensive impressions, and if so, whether they consider that apprehensive impressions ensure that the Sage's actions are always morally right. He introduces a "Discrimination Requirement" that provides the basis for morally perfect action.

Scott Aikin considers the "curious case" of Encheiridion 33.11-15, in which Epictetus appears to argue that whether or not others are pleased by what we say and do is morally irrelevant, yet criticizes certain kinds of talk because it is liable to "lessen your neighbor's respect for you". That appears to be a contradiction. Aikin argues that if, in specific circumstances, we see the opinions of others as being a feedback mechanism that enables us to evaluate our own virtue, then the two views are consistent.

According to William O. Stephens, Epictetus's views on Naminals (as Stephens calls nonhuman animals) have not been scrutinized by philosophers because, to the Stoics, Naminals lack the ability to reason; their behavior is irrelevant to the art of living. Yet for Epictetus, Naminals have a beauty when they behave in accord with their own nature. In that respect humans can take them as their model. But it is natural for lions to be vicious, pigs to wallow in the mud, characteristics which humans should avoid. How do we resolve that? <>

Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking Logic: Heraclitus's Doctrine of the Logos by Martin Heidegger, translated by Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen [Athlone Contemporary European Thinkers, Bloomsbury Academic, 9780826462404]

HERACLITUS is the first English translation of Volume 55 of Martin Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. This important volume consists of two lecture courses given by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg over the Summers of 1943 and 1944 on the thought of Heraclitus. These lectures shed important light on Heidegger's understanding of Greek thinking, as well as his understanding of Germany, the history of philosophy, the Western world, and their shared destinies.

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"This long awaited translation was worth the wait. J. Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen have provided us with a fluid and faithful translation of two of Heidegger's most sustained and important lecture courses on early Greek thinking. These manuscripts were written in 1943 and 1944, a pivotal time in Heidegger's development. They enable one to witness up close Heidegger's attempt to work out, by way of radically original translations and interpretations of Heraclitus's fragments, his understanding of the inception of the history of Occidental philosophy. At the same time, readers are invited to follow Heidegger in his attempt, by way of recovering and rethinking the deepest insights of Heraclitus and other early Greek thinkers, to think out beyond the end of the history of metaphysics that devolved from their greatness." —Bret W. Davis, Professor of Philosophy, Loyola University Maryland, USA

"The translation of Heidegger's most sustained engagement with Heraclitus represents a significant contribution to Heidegger studies. These two lecture courses richly fill in Heidegger's engagement with early Greek thinking and include provocative – often politically revelatory - discussions of Nietzsche, technology, friendship and history. The translators have succeeded in capturing Heidegger's challenging wordplay in a manner that opens up the Greek original in new and unexpected ways while remaining accessible and lucid in English." —Julia Ireland, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Whitman College, USA

"These two lecture courses on Heraclitus are Heidegger at his most provocative. More than a commentary, here Heidegger attempts to think through Heraclitus, with wonderfully startling results for our appreciation of each. The sustained attention to the pre-Socratic sense of both physis and logos is unmatched in his oeuvre. With this long awaited translation of a central volume in Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe, the translators have done the English reader a great service – not just the reader of Heidegger, but of Heraclitus as well." —Andrew J. Mitchell, Winship Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy, Emory University, USA

"These two lecture courses, devoted to what Heidegger called the "first [but incomplete] inception" of Western philosophy, provide his most extended treatment of Heraclitean physis and logos as accounting for how things emerge into meaningful presence. Scholars Assaiante and Ewegen are to be highly commended for their meticulous rendering of this important text into eminently

readable English." —Thomas Sheehan, Professor of Religious Studies and, by courtesy, of Philosophy, Stanford University, USA

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German to English Glossary
English to German Glossary

The following is the first complete English translation of Volume 55 of Martin Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe, published by Vittorio Klostermann in 1979 (three years after Heidegger's death) and revised in 1987. Edited by Manfred Frings, GA 55 contains two lecture-courses offered by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg: the first, The Inception of Occidental Thinking (given in the Summer semester of 1943); the second, Heraclitus's Doctrine of the Logos (given in the Summer semester of 1944). Taken together, these two lecture-courses offer Heidegger's most sustained and focused engagement with the early-Greek thinker Heraclitus, whom Heidegger considered to be one of only three thinkers (the others being Anaximander and Parmenides) who thought within the region of the inception of Occidental thinking, and who

"In the realm of transportive translation, all translations are poor, only more or less so."
—Martin Heidegger

thought something of that inception itself.

Heidegger's playfulness with the German language is at its best in GA 55—a play that is a joy to read, but is often difficult (and occasionally impossible) to translate adequately into English. As anybody who has read Heidegger in German knows, the path and trajectory of his thinking is much more visible in the German language than it is in English, as the connections between words (and therefore concepts) are more conspicuous in the former. While many of our word choices in the translation that follows were governed by a desire to maintain and display Heidegger's wordplay, the chasm between the English and German languages often made this impossible (or, at the very least, insufferably awkward). In light of this, we have done our best to preserve the spirit (and spiritedness) of Heidegger's text, while simultaneously rendering an enjoyable and mellifluous translation. To aid the reader in getting underway, a few words should be said regarding some of the more prominent terms that appear within the lecture courses. (For a more extensive list of German words and our translations of them, please see the Glossary provided at the end of this volume.)

Two of the most fundamental German words at play within the volume—and certainly of the first lecture course—are Aufgehen and Untergehen. For reasons that we hope will become quickly obvious, we elected to translate these terms as `emerging' and `submerging' respectively, a rendering that allowed us to capture the directionality of these German terms (auf- and unter-), while still employing a common root (as is the case with the German). This latter consideration is important given the manner in which Heidegger thinks these terms (and the processes they name) as inseparable, and as being grounded in a more fundamental process of Gehen. Still, even while 'emerging' and `submerging' are, in our view, the best-suited English terms available to make manifest

the process that Heidegger is describing, they are nonetheless inadequate to capture every nuance of Aufgehen and Untergehen of which Heidegger makes use within this volume, as would be any other rigid pair of English terms. The ability to catch all of these nuances demands a patience and flexibility of thinking that we encourage all readers of this volume to practice.

Throughout the volume, and especially in the first lecture course, Heidegger makes great use of a cluster of related terms all sharing a common etymological (and, for Heidegger, conceptual) history: fügen, Fuge, Fügung, verfügen, etc. Following precedent, and in order to capture the linguistic play forever at work in Heidegger's thinking, we have translated these terms as `join, `joint; `joinedness; `jointure, etc. The related term Gefüge, which is of special importance within the text, we most often render as `conjoined, in order to denote the sense of gathering that Heidegger often intends with his use of the ge- prefix. However, on occasion, Gefüge is used to refer specifically to the structure of something, or the combination of multiple things, or the articulation of a thing. In these instances, we have rendered it accordingly.

The German word Edel plays an important part in the culminating sections of each lecture course, though its meaning differs somewhat between the two. Within the context of the first lecture course, we have favored the word `precious; whereas we have used `noble' to capture the various nuances at play in the second lecture course. (With the latter term, one should think, for example, of the `noble' gases.) In both cases, one should think of what, in being unique and rare, is distinguished from all others, and therefore preeminent among them.

In the second lecture course, Heidegger favors the German word Versammlung to refer to the originary operation of gathering (Sammeln) or harvesting (Lesen) whereby the Aóyoç sets beings forth into unconcealment. In order to distinguish Versammlung from (mere) gathering (Sammeln), we have translated it as `forgathering: When encountering this term, the reader should be aware that the prefix `for-' denotes more of an operation of placing-forth or setting-forth than it does any kind of anteriority (though, on several occasions, Heidegger emphasizes the manner in which the forgathering of Aóyoç precedes and makes possible any subsequent gathering). If anything, the `for-' should be read as adding emphasis, though perhaps such emphasis in-and-of-itself already implies a certain priority (or even apriority) at play in the term.

During the latter-half of the second lecture course, Heidegger delineates the operation of the Xóyoç belonging to the human soul (yruxij) as consisting of reciprocal and interrelated movements of Ausholen and Einholen, which we have translated as 'drawing-out' and `drawing-in: The German words are meant to be able to explain 1) the reaching-out-toward and bringing-back-in of the Aóyoç that characterizes the very essence of the human, 2) the reaching-out and gathering-in that takes place in harvesting (such as, for example, the harvesting of grapes), and 3) the fundamental operation of breathing, properly understood. It is our hope that the dyad `drawing-in and 'drawing-out' is sufficient to capture these many nuances.

In the final section of the second lecture course, Heidegger employs a play on various words related to schweigen (i.e.,`to keep silent'). In setting out the nature of the relationship between the human being (and its Xóyoç) to the originary Aóyoç (i.e., being), Heidegger speaks of the silent word of Aóyoç that, in its stilling of beings for the human being, makes language possible. To capture this rich and important play of words, we have used the related words `quiet (schweigen); `acquieting (Erschweigen); `quiescence (Schweigen), `requiesence (Verschweigung); and `acquiescence (Beschewigen): In all cases, what is pointed to is the manner in which the Aóyoç (i.e., being) silently gathers beings together in such a way as to make them graspable by the human being and articulable through her Xóyoç.

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Throughout both lecture courses, Heidegger often employs the archaic verb wesen and the much more common corresponding nominal form Wesen. We have translated the verb as 'to unfold; and the noun as `essence; `essencing' (when a more verbal sense is clearly intended), or `unfolding: On one or two occasions we have translated the noun Wesen as `being; owing to context.

Translators of Heidegger must be punctilious in their attention to the many different variants of sein and its cognates, as must readers of an English translation be fastidious in their attentiveness to the many different formulations of being, beings, the being, etc. In what follows we have translated Seiende as `beings; though on one occasion (for purposes of euphony) we rendered it as 'that which is: Sein, of course, we have rendered as `being'; however, despite the convenience of doing so, we have avoided the custom of capitalizing the word, as such a practice risks losing the verbal sense of Sein that Heidegger goes to such great lengths to retrieve. The more archaic word Seyn has been rendered as beyng [in-between-ing]

To make this volume as readable as possible, we have included only a few bracketed German words, and have done so only when it is absolutely instrumental to deciphering the meaning of the passage. All footnotes are Heidegger's own, unless otherwise indicated as belonging to the translators or to the German editor. We have provided the German pagination in brackets embedded within the body of the text.

With the exception of omitting quotation marks that either Heidegger or Frings introduced into the Greek quotations, we have reproduced the Greek script exactly as it appears in the German volume, including the avoidance of capitalizing the first letter of a Greek word that appears at the beginning of a sentence. The reason we have done so is that Heidegger occasionally capitalizes the first letter of a Greek term in order to give it special emphasis. This practice is extremely important in the second lecture-course in particular, where Heidegger uses capital letters to differentiate between Χόγος in a general sense, and the Αόγος in a much more specific and ontologically rich sense (i.e., as being itself). Standard English rules governing capitalization would have been fatal to preserving this difference and would have resulted in intolerable confusion. We have also allowed our English renderings of Heidegger's German translations of Heraclitus's Greek to follow Heidegger's sometimes peculiar grammatical constructions, all for the sake of fidelity to Heidegger's engagement with Heraclitus 'The Obscure:

Although we have done our best to leave as many interpretive decisions as possible up to the reader, we have surely allowed our own understanding of Heidegger's text to guide our interpretation of certain terms, and ineluctably. As Heidegger himself writes in this very volume: "every translation is in itself already an interpretation [...] Interpretation and translation are, in the core of their essence, the same". Though we hope readers will find this translation eloquent and smooth, as well as faithful to the original, we have no doubt that some of our decisions will be questioned, challenged, and perhaps even outright refused. We welcome such criticisms and look forward to the conversation. Above all we look forward to a new generation of scholarly work on the Heraclitus lectures: work which, we hope, we will have been aided by, or at the very least instigated by, our translation.

Out of deference to Heidegger, but also in a manner that is shamefully self-serving, we give him the final word of this foreword: "... one can easily criticize any translation, but can only rarely replace it with a `better' one". <>

ROMAN REPUBLICAN AUGURY: FREEDOM AND CONTROL by Lindsay G. Driediger-Murphy [Oxford Classical Monographs, Oxford University Press, 9780198834434]

ROMAN REPUBLICAN AUGURY: FREEDOM AND CONTROL proposes a new way of understanding augury, a form of Roman state divination designed to consult the god Jupiter. Previous scholarly studies of augury have tended to focus either upon its legal-constitutional aspects (especially its place in defining, structuring, and circumscribing the precise constitutional powers of magistrates), or upon its role in maintaining and perpetuating Roman social and political structures (primarily as a tool of the elite). This volume makes a new and original contribution to the study of Roman religion, theology, politics, and cultural history by challenging the prevailing view that official divination was organized to produce only the results its users wanted, and focusing instead upon what it can tell us about how the Romans understood their relationship with their gods. Rather than supposing that augury, like other forms of Roman public divination, told Romans what they wanted to hear, it argues that augury in both theory and practice left space for perceived expressions of divine will which contradicted human wishes, and that its rules and precepts did not allow human beings simply to create or ignore signs at will. Analysis of the historical evidence for Romans receiving, and heeding, signs which would seem to have conflicted with their own desires allows the Jupiter whom they approached in augury to emerge as not simply a source of power to be tapped and channelled to human ends, but as a person with his own interests and desires, which did not always overlap with those of his human enquirers. When human and divine will clashed, it was the will of Jupiter, not that of the man consulting him, which was supposed to prevail. In theory as in practice, it was the Romans, not their supreme god, who were 'bound' by the auguries and auspices.

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Why Now?

This is a propitious time to re-evaluate how we think about augury. Recent developments in anthropology and in the study of ancient Greek divination, Roman cultural history, and Greek and Roman religions have already begun to outline some new approaches which could profitably be applied to Roman state divination. Recent findings in these fields are also suggesting, more and more strongly, that the picture of Roman religion and divination outlined in the previous section is in need of revision.

Let us begin with anthropology. Many anthropologists are now moving away from functionalism in the study of divination. The key weakness of functionalist theories, these scholars argue, is that `regardless of whether divination is conceived of as a means for providing emotional reassurance, a tool for restoring and sustaining a social structure, an instrument for making decisions, building consensus, and establishing political legitimacy, or an aid for maintaining a cognitive order', exclusive recourse to such explanations reduces `divination [to] a derivation from, and representation of, some underlying processes which it serves to control'. The point is not that divination cannot perform many of the various functions which we have assigned to it, in Roman culture as in many others. These effects have been well documented for Rome, as well as in ancient China and amongst many ethnic groups in contemporary Africa. It is appropriate and illuminating to consider the ways in which divination expresses and negotiates the relations and anxieties present within a given society. The problem is that, as Curry puts it, functionalist theories `allow the observer-theorist to distance him- or herself from the subject matter and its human subjects, and then to

inform them what they are "really" doing. You believe; we know.' Such explanations thus run the risk of obscuring from our view the very people, ideologies, and experiences we seek to understand. As Emily Kearns notes with respect to ancient Greek ritual: 'the performance of religious acts creates a presumption that they are directed somewhere, that through them the visible community is linked with something beyond it'. Ritual is therefore `conceived [by its performers] as a two-way process in which deity responds to human communication'. Esther Eidinow has demonstrated the same point convincingly with respect to Greek divination at the Oracle of Dodona, observing that many documented consultations at this oracle were less about persuading others or building consensus than they were about accessing the superior knowledge of which the gods were supposed to be possessed. From the enquirer's point of view, then, the goal of these consultations was to obtain answers to questions about which s/he was genuinely worried, answers which were seen as unobtainable without divine involvement and assistance. Users of Greek divination thus experienced

themselves as having 'a crucial interdependence with the divine', perceiving their lives as subject to, and profoundly affected by, the judgements of the gods. The same can be said of Roman divination, as we shall see. When we remove the posited supernatural from the divinatory interaction, therefore, we miss something vital, and fascinating, about the way Greeks, Romans, and many other peoples around the world perceive and experience religion. By viewing Roman divination primarily as a tool for achieving social ends, therefore, we may miss what Romans, at least sometimes, thought they were doing through divination. And in doing so we achieve the opposite of our aim: instead of recovering Roman ideas and beliefs, we overwrite them with our own.

The factual basis behind functionalist claims has also been called into question in recent years, as studies of a range of ancient and modern cultures have revealed that divination can cause conflict, stress, and anxiety, rather than relieving it. That this was also true at Rome has been demonstrated for the Imperial period by Annie Vigourt. Views of augury which see it (and other forms of state divination at Rome) simply as functioning to build social cohesion and consensus, or as a way of removing religious fear, have not kept pace with these developments. The notion that Roman religious punctiliousness worked as a form of `therapy' is also suspect from the psychological point of view. Many psychologists in fact hold that a fixation on ritual correctness is the sign not of a healthy psyche but of one in the grip of anxiety: the more value a subject places on ritual precision (`scrupulosity'), the greater the anxiety and compulsion s/he feels. No one would deny to Republican Romans the ritual precision part of this equation: theirs was a religion pervaded with religiones, religious obligations and restraints, a religion characterized (as Prescendi has recently put it) by a sense of distance, of scruple, of precaution. Yet we have tended to shy away from the second part of the psychologists' formula. Might all this exactness, all this ritual, all this orthopraxy, betray as much fear as confidence? If so, the modern assumption that Romans saw the purpose of augury as being to dictate to their god begins to seem less plausible.

Anthropology has also shed light on the mechanisms by which divination works. Of particular interest are those cases where we can detect flexibility in the use of divinatory rituals, procedures, and interpretations. Examples from many cultures demonstrate that divinatory systems often feature opportunities for their users (whether that be the practitioner/expert/diviner, the enquirer/recipient of a divinatory result, or the family/friends/broader community of the enquirer/recipient) to guide or shape the interpretations produced. In the event of an unexpected interpretation or result, specific divinatory tools and techniques may be tested or modified, or the result may not be accepted the first time and the question posed again, whereas users may decide to stop asking further questions when a satisfactory interpretation or result is reached. It seems reasonable to suppose that such mechanisms also existed in Greek and Roman forms of divination, and we will see some possible examples from the Roman side in the chapters to come. But do these observations support the current view of Roman augury as being under its users' control?

From an etic perspective, it is evident that each of the manoeuvres just described represents a form of human control over the outcomes of divination. Functionalist studies therefore tended to see them as means by which individual participants could ensure that the results of divination supported their own interests. More recent work, however, sees these strategies as helping to make divination what, in many cultures, it is: a process, a negotiation, an interaction, and/or a collaborative discussion. For divination to work this way, anthropologists note, tactics such as pausing, testing, switching or modifying techniques, continuing to ask, or refraining from asking cannot be seen merely as instruments of controlling divinatory results. Instead, they will typically be understood by their users as methods of clarifying or making sense of the valued and useful information produced

by divination. Shaw's observations for the Temne of Sierra Leone apply to many of the cultures under consideration:

> [The] process of the construction of 'the reality of the situation' via strategy and interaction is ... central to divination. It should not, however, be assumed that the participants in divination who negotiate interpretations which serve their interests do not experience these interpretations as `reality' .... While conscious manipulation certainly occurs, it cannot realistically be said to characterize most instances of social interaction.

This insight also applies to ancient Greek divination, as Lisa Maurizio has shown. She demonstrates that even the technique of reinterpret-ing/reformulating oracular utterances over time, which we have tended to understand as a kind of manipulation or post eventum fabrication, can more fruitfully be seen as resulting from the Greeks' interest in accessing a `divine word' which was conceived of as immutable and true. The methods they used, arguing in favour of different interpretations and applications, and creating and exploring ambiguity, thus reveal not so much a human desire to control divination, as a characteristically Greek way of seeking truth in it.

It is generally agreed that in order for divination to be taken seriously in a given culture, it must be perceived to be objective, and its results untainted by personal or factional interests (even if, as the same culture may acknowledge, this is not always the case in practice).52 Thus systems of divination will tend to include an empirical component, in the form of specific signs produced by specific divinatory techniques, and perceived as having specific meanings. The exact details of these signs and their meanings will vary from culture to culture, from the way leaves are arranged in a pot (in Mambila spider divination) to the colour, shape, and condition of animal intestines (in East African extispicy no less than Greek and Roman), from the pattern formed by cowrie shells falling on a mat (in Senegal and the Gambia) to the direction from which a bird flies into the field of vision of a Roman augur. Nor will the empirical aspect necessarily be the dominant factor in arriving at a given interpretation of a divinatory result, even within the same divinatory system: it will be weighed in the balance with contingent factors such as the specific circumstances relevant to the enquirer or her/his community, pragmatic considerations, the diviner's prior knowledge of the enquirer's desires or interests, the diviner's personal expertise in deciding which indications matter most (in techniques which produce more than one clue at a time), and so on. However, the empirical component will still tend to play some role in the process. What this means is that neither the individual enquirer, nor the individual diviner, will have an entirely free and unconstrained choice in arriving at their interpretation of the signs received. There will be negotiated interplay between diviners and those consulting them. As recently recognized in studies of Greek divination, it is therefore more accurate to see all parties as responding to, but not always supporting, each other's (sometimes conflicting) needs.

In short, studies of divination in many other cultures suggest that it is misleading to speak of it as being controlled by the client/enquirer. These considerations raise doubts about modern reconstructions of Roman augural techniques which suppose that they routinely gave users the opportunity simply to reject the results of augural and auspicial rituals, or to `create' such results merely by announcing them. Rules like these are unlikely to have sustained the necessary degree of trust in the divinatory system. The belief that augury was, as Rüpke puts it, devoid of an empirical element by the Late Republican period is incompatible with what we know of how divination works in other cultures.

Finally, it is worth thinking harder about how we might categorize the kind of divinatory system the Romans developed, and how this compares to the systems attested in other cultures. Recent work suggests that divination in some societies is more systematized than in others: ancient

Mesopotamian, ancient Chinese, and Roman forms of divination have been seen as displaying greater systematization and regulation, and as leaving less room for arbitrary interpretation, than ancient Greek forms do.59 Systematization may be valued especially in highly structured and hierarchical societies where divination has significant political effects and involves the use of writing. In such societies, divinatory interpretation cannot be a free-for-all left to the discretion of the individual enquirer or diviner, because specific interpretations must be defended publicly, can be compared with previous records or textual knowledge, and will be seen as having serious political and military consequences. Republican Rome fits this profile, which suggests that we should expect to see more systematization, logic, and consistency than we usually look for in its divinatory techniques. There is also an important difference between societies which begin a divinatory ritual without knowing the precise issue at hand, using the process to explore the enquirer's past and circumstances so as to arrive at an identification of the problem (the case in many African forms of divination, for example), and societies which use divination to answer specific questions about actions already under consideration (`Is it better and more good for me to go to war now?', as a Greek might address an oracle, or 'Do you, Jupiter, support the law about to be passed?', as a Roman magistrate might ask through augury). In the former, divination will be especially likely to proceed primarily through process, interaction, and negotiation, since the enquirer and other witnesses are required and expected to contribute new information to the process. In the case of questions about whether or not to perform specific actions, however, the enquirer may have less freedom to guide interpretation in this way. Divinatory systems of this kind tend to impose limits on the extent to which enquirers can dodge undesired answers. In Chinese divination of the first centuries BC and AD, for example, diviners were discouraged from putting the same question more than three times, and if one divinatory technique (turtle shells in this case) gave an unfavourable answer, it was considered unacceptable to try again with a different technique (yarrow stalks). In Babylonian extispicy, similarly, diviners were expected to stop sacrificing if they had received unfavourable signs three times in a row, because it was impious to repeat questions once the gods had been seen to give their verdict.' I have argued elsewhere that similar limits pertained in Roman sacrificial divination. In this sense, the Roman practice of asking exact questions and waiting for exact answers may actually have given its users less freedom of divinatory interpretation than we see in those cultures which use divination as a way to uncover previously unarticulated grievances and concerns.

The augural procedure of choosing which questions to ask, and deciding which answers were relevant, is thus more than just another way in which Romans attempted to control the results of divination. Looking beyond divination specifically, we tend to forget that such choices are required in any form of information-gathering, from essay-writing to Googling, journalism to meteorology. It is only through such choices that the vast amount of potential information we confront can be sorted and recognized as either useful or irrelevant (as Cicero observes with respect to what should count as a divinatory sign at De divinatione 2.83-4, 148-9). There is therefore nothing unusual, and nothing characteristic of a uniquely Roman pragmatism or realism, in the fact that Romans developed their own system for obtaining signs and for deciding what would and would not count as a sign. The same may be said of the fact that Romans approached Jupiter with a prepared request, a plan already in mind. The use of a prepared request may be read as control in one sense, in that it is the person making the request who has decided what to ask, how to ask it, and whom to ask. (Though it is worth noting that the ancients recognized dangers even in this degree of control, with the latitude it gave to human beings to ask the wrong questions, and thereby to receive misleading answers: Herodotus' Croesus and Xenophon on the eve of his anabasis are two of the most famous examples.) More importantly, the presentation of a prepared request does not entail control of the divinatory process in its entirety. Many an employee approaches her boss with a carefully crafted

speech to ask for a rise, but we do not make the mistake of assuming that it is the employee who is in control of the interaction, or its results.68 The fact that Romans came to Jupiter with specific proposals in mind need not imply that they were not influenced by what he had to say.

To turn to cultural history, there are mounting reasons to explore anew the effects we think augury had on the Roman elite. Roman state religion was centred on the elite, especially in the Republican period. Members of the elite were also the primary users of augury, and will therefore receive much of our attention in this book. However, the elite did not have free reign in Roman life. Whether or not we choose to see Republican Rome as a `democracy', it is evident now that particular families and factions did not exercise direct or unproblematic control over public processes such as elections and debates in the senate. The people also took an interest in politics, and constructed ideology. A single misstep could ruin a man's career, be his blood ever so blue. In the same way, public religion addressed a wider audience, and was performed by a wider range of participants, than elite men alone: all social levels had a part to play in perpetuating belief in the divinatory system and in policing its use. Importantly, as Pauline Ripat has shown, elite and common people seem to have shared many of the same assumptions about the value of divination, and about how it should work. Divination was everywhere in Rome, and everyone had to deal with it. Indeed, perceived communications from the gods were so frequent as to form, in Ripat's words, 'the white background noise of the city' (hence the importance of being able to tell which occurrences constituted signs and which did not, as already discussed). It follows that, as Federico Santangelo observes, 'it would be misleading to depict a neat dualism between a disenchanted, cynical and sophisticated elite, and a credulous and superstitious populace. On the contrary, pluralism and complexity were the rules of the game. A range of different attitudes must have coexisted at all levels'. Most recently, Craige Champion has assembled clear theoretical reasons to doubt the view that the Roman elite used religion to control the non-elite (what he calls the `elite-instrumentalist' model of Roman religion).

These observations open up new possibilities for thinking about augury and the effects it had on its users. Firstly, they suggest that it is too simplistic, and indeed out of date, to see augury only as a tool of elite control over the populace, or as a means by which elite individuals steered the political process in the direction they desired. It may well have had these effects at times, but they would always have been open to contest by other parties. To remain credible, auguries and auspices needed to mean more than whatever one individual practitioner of augury said they meant. They needed to be taken seriously (and, as in divination in other cultures, to be verified and argued about) by his contemporaries, elite and non-elite, and this would not have been possible if either of these groups thought that augury was under direct human control. This is why it makes sense to read augury as a testament not just to the power of the elite, but also to a Roman belief, at both elite and non-elite levels, in the superior power of Jupiter.

Secondly, once we recognize that the elite were driven by religious emotions just as strong as those of the populace, we can begin to look for evidence of those feelings. This encourages us to look for those respects in which Roman augury was driven by more than self-interest and pragmatism. We can draw inspiration from the protest lodged by John North over thirty years ago, that 'a great deal of Roman political/religious history has been written on the assumption that the agents can be treated as hardened sceptics, for want of explicit statements of their religious emotions'. North was objecting to the assumption that the Romans were therefore insincere in their use of religion, a claim to which no one would explicitly subscribe nowadays. What has not changed since North wrote is, as we have seen, the assumption that Romans were able to use divination to get whatever they wanted. But this leads us to the same dead end. There is an unreflecting secularism in current views of augury, in the assumption that religion, for its participants, is not really about religion but

about something (anything?) else; in the premise that the elite Roman had as little real fear of the gods as the average secularized Westerner today. (Which is not even to take into account the number of people today who still see themselves as motivated by fear of divine displeasure.) For all their sophistication, the Romans were not 'just like us', as recent work on Roman constructions of gender, emotion, and violence, to take but a few examples, makes clear. We should not expect them to be just like us in the realm of religion, either. Theirs was a world where openly avowed atheism was rare, and where the gods were said to be involved in every aspect of life. To overlook the religious convictions and emotions of the elite, by regarding Roman divination as if it were divorced from concern about what the gods were supposed to want, is therefore to commit an anachronism.

Like their social inferiors, elite Romans felt awe in the presence of the gods, fear at signs of their anger, respect for their wisdom, need for their counsel. So much is evident in Polybius' celebrated discussion (6.56.6-15) of the importance of fear of the gods (deisidaimonia) in Roman public life, for so long cited as evidence for the elite's manipulation of religion to bolster its own power, but better read as evidence for the depth of that elite's own religious convictions. The same emerges from Cicero's equally famous declaration (in Nat. D. 1.3-4) that `piety towards the gods' (pietas adversus deos) is necessary for the maintenance of order in human society. So far, so functionalist: what is less often noted is Cicero's insistence immediately following that such pietas must be sincere and not feigned (In specie autem fictae simulationis ... pietas finesse non potest). One thinks of Aemilius Paulus, overwhelmed by emotion at the feet of Pheidias' statue of Zeus at Olympia; or Scipio Africanus, communing every morning with Jupiter in his temple on the Capitoline. Such gestures doubtless bolstered the prestige of the men who made them; but they also directed human eyes higher, from the man to the god.

Taken together, the findings just surveyed suggest that the currently dominant picture of augury as a method of human control over the gods is incomplete. There is space for new hues: for seeing Romans as constrained by divination, as well as liberated by it; for suggesting that they saw divination as a meaningful interaction with divine powers; and for asking anew what role Jupiter was thought to play in the form of divination over which he presided.

What Is Needed?

To accomplish these goals, we need to do more than identify the a priori reasons for looking at augury in new ways. To make real progress, we must evaluate the accuracy of the fundamental tenets on which current reconstructions rest. Those tenets are two:

1) Our evidence for augural theory reveals that it gave human beings the decisive role in deciding what divinatory signs to produce, to accept, and to reject. The rules of augury gave its human users ultimate control over its results by permitting them both to fabricate signs that aligned with their desires and to evade signs that did not align with those desires.
2) Our evidence for augury in practice reveals that the results of augural techniques were either made to conform to what their recipients wanted or were only respected when they did so conform. The results of this kind of divination thus almost always cohered with its users' pre-existing interests, desires, and plans. The number of cases where auguries and auspices clashed with what their recipients would have wanted otherwise is negligible.

In order to offer a new perspective on Roman augury, then, we need to establish both that divinatory results did not always align with human desires in practice and that divinatory rules were not necessarily designed to promote such alignment in theory. The chapters that follow seek to demonstrate these points. My aim in this book is thus not to offer a comprehensive account of Roman augury, but to show how we can move past these two fundamental modern assumptions,

towards new ways of understanding the significance of augury in Roman life. Above all, we must come fully to grips with the ancient evidence for the precise workings of augury, a task which is too often neglected in current work. It may come as a surprise to readers that many of the reconstructions of the details of Roman divinatory techniques, reconstructions upon which we still rely, have not been seriously queried in decades. For the details of haruspicy, we still go back to Blecher and Thulin, writing at the turn of the twentieth century; for augury, the most diligent turn to Mommsen and Valeton, both writing at the end of the nineteenth century. All, rightly, depend on Linderski, especially his masterly 1986 synthesis in Aufstieg and Niedergang der römischen Welt. The modern study of augury would not be possible without Linderski's peerless contributions. So great is his pre-eminence, however, that his is often the only work to which non-specialists appear to refer. What has been lost is the recognition that many of the rules and details of augury we so confidently cite are actually up for debate. What we need now, therefore, is a thorough reexamination of our Roman sources for how augury actually worked. It is only by doing this groundwork that we can clear the ground for new understandings of this form of divination, and of its significance for Roman religion and history.

How? Four Guiding Principles

My view of augury is guided by four general principles, which it may be helpful to outline before we sink our teeth into the details in the chapters to come. Those principles are as follows:

1) The purpose of augury was to obtain information from Jupiter about how and when to act.
2) Augury included some consistent rules and sign-interpretations, with which most of its users were familiar.
3) Augury worked by consensus, as specific rules, precedents, and customs were balanced against contingent circumstances. This consensus compelled elite compliance with the divinatory system and acceptance of its results.
4) Religion at Rome was `embedded', but also meaningful in its own right. <>

ANCIENT DIVINATION AND EXPERIENCE edited by Lindsay G. Driediger-Murphy and Esther Eidinow [Oxford University Press, 9780198844549]

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

This volume sets out to re-examine what ancient people - primarily those in ancient Greek and Roman communities, but also Mesopotamian and Chinese cultures - thought they were doing through divination, and what this can tell us about the religions and cultures in which divination was practised. The chapters, authored by a range of established experts and upcoming early-career scholars, engage with four shared questions: What kinds of gods do ancient forms of divination presuppose? What beliefs, anxieties, and hopes did divination seek to address? What were the limits of human 'control' of divination? What kinds of human-divine relationships did divination create/sustain? The volume as a whole seeks to move beyond functionalist approaches to divination in order to identify and elucidate previously understudied aspects of ancient divinatory experience and practice. Special attention is paid to the experiences of non-elites, the perception of divine presence, the ways in which divinatory techniques could surprise their users by yielding unexpected or unwanted results, the difficulties of interpretation with which divinatory experts were thought to

contend, and the possibility that divination could not just ease, but also exacerbate, anxiety in practitioners and consultants.

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'You Believe; We Know'

This volume is the result of a conference held in London, in July 2015, on the topic of divination in ancient cultures, with particular focus on Greece and Rome.' The conference itself arose from the desire to explore approaches that diverged from the prevailing scholarly functionalist analyses of ancient divination. A recent summary of the state of anthropological research in this area will come as no surprise to classicists: `regardless of whether divination is conceived of as a means for providing emotional reassurance, a tool for restoring and sustaining a social structure, an instrument for making decisions, building consensus, and establishing political legitimacy, or an aid for maintaining a cognitive order', the assumption in most studies has been that `divination [is] a derivation from, and representation of, some underlying processes which it serves to control'.

In scholarship on the ancient world, there is no doubt that such explanations reveal important socio-political dimensions of divinatory practice, but they also run the risk of obscuring from view the very people, ideologies, and experiences that scholars seek to understand. The problems raised by this approach have recently been summarized by the religious studies and anthropology scholar Patrick Curry: it `allows the observer-theorist to distance him- or herself from the subject matter and its human subjects, and then to inform them what they are "really" doing. You believe; we know.' In contrast, the papers at this conference sought to re-examine what ancient people—primarily those in ancient Greek and Roman communities, but also Mesopotamian and Chinese cultures—thought they were doing through divination, and what this could tell us about the religions and cultures in

which divination was practised. Contributors to the 2015 conference were asked to engage with one or more of a set of shared questions:

- • What kinds of gods do ancient forms of divination presuppose?
- • What beliefs, anxieties, and hopes did divination seek to address?
- • What were the limits of human `control' of divination?
- • What kinds of human-divine relationships did divination create/sustain?

Beyond Functionalism

Previous scholarship on divinatory practices of course comprises many, differentiated fields: the approaches taken by the two disciplines of Greek and Roman history, just as an example, have been intriguingly dissimilar. In research on ancient Greek divination or mantiké, scholars, moving beyond the earlier, more descriptive or documentary approaches to ancient divination, have drawn on the resources of anthropology to explore the ways in which a practice that at first sight seems to make little sense, can be viewed as quite `rational' within the cognitive constraints of its own culture.' Although the binary categories of rationality/irrationality are no longer deemed relevant in these discussions,' scholars have, in general pursued a functionalist line of analysis, seeking the socio-political implications of divination.' Thus, it has generally been agreed that communities consulted oracles because they sought to resolve their internal differences via an unbiased authority, usually located outside the city.' Divination provided a mode of achieving consensus, and, as such it 'also serves for the scholar, as an indication of where legitimation is most necessary'." In turn, scholars have argued that individuals sought and found in divination a heightened sense of personal control.' In contrast, although studies of Roman divination have typically engaged less explicitly with the anthropological literature, they too have tended to focus on the social and political functions served by divination. The various forms of public divination at Rome (augury, state-sanctioned haruspicy, and prodigy-interpretation) have attracted particular attention. Such forms of divination are said to have enhanced magisterial, senatorial, or imperial authority; to have calmed panic and validated decisions taken by officials and senate; to have enforced magisterial submission to the senate and priestly bodies (particularly in the Republic); to have strengthened claims to political legitimacy (a phenomenon especially well documented in the Imperial period); to have helped Romans to cope with situations of uncertainty and helplessness; and to have created delay in order to buy `breathing-space' for calmer and more reasoned discussion and/or the application of 'peer-pressure'. Forms of public divination have also tended to be seen above all as a tool of the elite, employed by the political authorities to bolster their power over the lower orders, by the senate majority to compel individual politicians' adherence to an emerging consensus, by the individual magistrate to alter the behaviour of his rivals and opponents, or by the individual claimant to power to bolster his own case.

Our intention is not to dismiss these insights, but to highlight other aspects of ancient divination which such functionalist approaches have tended to overlook. Recent developments in Classics, anthropology, and cognitive science encourage progress in several new aspects of exploration. In the discipline of anthropology, several scholars have offered productive critiques of an excessive reliance on functionalist interpretations of divination," criticism with which Classics has not yet fully engaged. In the discipline of cognitive science, studies of brain activity during perceived religious experiences suggest that these can be understood without assuming manipulation, hypocrisy, or deception on the subject's part. Research into ancient Greek and Roman divination is also exploring more and different dimensions than before. For example, scholars of ancient Greek divinatory practices have begun to examine divinatory activities, or discourse concerned with these activities, as ways for human beings to express particular aspects of their relationship and interactions with their

environment—an environment that, of course, included the divine. On the Roman side, there is a growing recognition, drawing on critiques of the polis-religion model," that even public religion was not simply the preserve of the elite. For divination to fulfil the functions we typically ascribe to it, it must have dealt in symbols, concerns, and ideas which resonated both with those in power and those (of lower social status) whose support kept them there. There has also been a burst of interest in the diversity of religious experiences and actors in both Greek and Roman contexts: in the religion of families and individuals, in the kinds of emotions produced by religion, and in beliefs and activities which our elite sources may depict as `fringe' or `deviant', but which may have played a larger role in the life of the ancients than this characterization suggests (and we have recognized). The essays in this volume engage with these advances to identify and elucidate previously understudied aspects of ancient divinatory experience and practice. Special attention is paid to the experiences of non-elites, the theological content of divination, the ways in which divinatory techniques could surprise their users by yielding unexpected or unwanted results, the difficulties of interpretation with which divinatory experts were thought to contend, and the possibility that divination could not just ease, but also exacerbate, anxiety in practitioners and consultants. By analysing these aspects, we suggest, it is possible to examine how ancient divination worked, and explore what this can tell us about what mattered to the individuals and cultures that used it, without adopting uncritically the `emic' perspective of our subjects, or simply describing the experiences of individual users of divination."

Similarities and Differences

The essays in this volume cover a range of times and places: those on ancient Greek culture examine Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic evidence; those on Roman cultures encompass the Republican to the Imperial periods. The editors elected not to extend into Late Antiquity, since it seems to us that divinatory rituals of that period begin to raise markedly different theological questions. We have, however, included here three essays that are intended to provide productive comparative insights. The coverage of cultures in the volume reflects the expertise of the conference participants. Comparative data from other ancient cultures (e.g. Jewish, Egyptian) would enrich the picture further, and we hope that this volume will inspire further work in all of these areas. Our goal here is not to provide comprehensive treatment of divination in all ancient cultures but to show how new approaches to divination can yield new insights in the study of many ancient peoples. The essays reflect on a broad range of divinatory practices, including not only oracles (Eidinow, Deeley, Maurizio, and Raphals), but also dreams (Davies and Bowden), epiphanies (Flower), omens, prodigies and portents (Noegel, Santangelo, and Stiles), and sacrifice (Driediger-Murphy). This is a reminder of the variety of mechanisms available for individuals and communities to gain access to (what was perceived as divine) revelation, but it is not intended to be an implicit assertion that these practices are simply the same. Each study acknowledges the specifics of these different activities, in terms of not only the activities involved, but also the contexts in which they occurred and the implications they conveyed in and for those contexts. Indeed, acknowledging that these essays could have been organised in a number of different ways, we have arranged them so as to draw attention to some of these specifics and the resulting questions that they raise for modern scholarship. However, we hope our readers will find other themes across the essays that may suggest different commonalities.

Thus, the four essays in Part I: Expertise and Authority, examine the ways in which ancient societies attributed authority and claimed expertise, in the field of divination. Scott Noegel and Hugh Bowden both seek the diviners' perspectives, elucidating some of the difficulties of interpretation with which divinatory experts were thought to contend. Noegel's chapter takes us to the Near East, examining augury from the practitioner's own social, economic, and cosmological perspectives, and exploring how diviners negotiated two major sources of anxiety—scepticism from others and their own

theological principles. Bowden brings us from the Near East to Classical Athens, and the case of Euxenippos, who was sent by the Athenians to consult the oracle of Amphiaraos at Oropos to help to resolve a land dispute—and was prosecuted for his interpretation of his divinatory dream. Bowden challenges the idea that Euxenippos was regarded simply as a private citizen and, with the aid of modern studies of dreams and dreaming, suggests instead that he may have been an `expert dreamer', challenging categories commonly used in studies of Greek divination.

In turn, Eidinow and Davies focus on the ways in which, on the one hand, trust in authority, and on the other hand, locating (the right) expertise, were challenges for those who consulted divinatory experts. In part, the aim of Eidinow's chapter is to rehabilitate the Lydian king, Kroisos, so often accused of un-Greek behaviour because of his so-called 'test of the oracles'. She does this by exploring the role of uncertainty in oracular consultations, and examining the ways in which the Greeks sought to resolve it through the practice of posing multiple questions (serially at one oracle, or simultaneously and successively at different oracles). Davies argues that what has long been seen as ancient debate about whether (all) dreams did or did not count as messages from the gods, can be better understood as an attempt by each individual, in their specific context and circumstances, to determine which dreams were significant, by deploying widely shared strategies of interpretation. Returning to themes raised in, for example, Bowden's chapter, Davies draws attention to the ways in which dreams, while appearing 'to be a private event' were, in terms of their reception, interpretation and response, 'a public transaction, and how one responded to them was emphatically a social, religious and political act'.

These essays raise questions about the meanings attributed to signs, and the control of those interpretations, and this is the theme of the essays in Part II: Signs and Control. Maurizio interrogates the evidence for the argument that the Pythia at Delphi used sortition—and finds it wanting. She explores how anthropological studies suggest that divinatory pronouncements `extend the reflection instigated by the consultation', a process which is unlikely to lead to a swift resolution of a problem—and which continues the consultant's process of reflection and interpretation, as well as their state of uncertainty. We move from Greece to Rome for the next three essays: first, Stiles explores how the Roman reception and interpretation of signs reported in the past (in this case, omina imperil, signs pertaining to the rule of individual emperors) could change over time in response to changing anxieties about the future and the gods' perceived plans for the Roman Empire. He places special emphasis on the often-overlooked role and experiences of non-elites as they created their own interpretations of signs pertaining to those in power. Second, Santangelo explores the fate of prodigy-interpretation under the Empire, challenging the long-held view that Roman emperors discouraged reports of unfavourable signs. He argues instead that the prodigy-system (and its attendant questions about the gods' intentions towards the state) remained a vital part of Rome's negotiation with the divine. Finally, Driediger-Murphy queries the current consensus that Roman divinatory sacrifices generally proceeded until a favourable sign was obtained (usque ad litationem). She argues that Roman magistrates took signs from failed sacrifices more seriously than we have often thought, and that this behaviour can be read as evidence that they were anxious about their relationship with their gods. These essays draw attention not only to the importance but also to the diversity of sign-interpretation in the ancient world, stressing the evidence in the ancient sources for the felt need to respond to perceived divine communications, and the anxieties these might provoke.

The essays in Part III build on this question of the nature of interactions with the divine, and focus on evidence for the perception of Divine Presence. Flower uses divination as a case study for an investigation of ancient religious experience and the idea that the Greeks took for granted 'the real presence of the divine'. He focuses on the paean of Isyllos, which describes that poet's experience of

a divinatory epiphany by the god Asklepios. Using comparative anthropological studies, he argues that 'a belief in the real presence of the divine and in the certain efficacy of supernatural power is undoubtedly a cross-cultural phenomenon'. The next two chapters explore this idea: Deeley's chapter (commissioned for this volume) draws on his work as a consultant psychiatrist to examine experiences in which the sense of control, ownership, and awareness of thoughts, speech, and action are reattributed to another agent. He shows how these phenomena are likely to be commoner and more diverse than scholarship once assumed, and he argues that understanding the forms of experience, attributed significance, and causal processes involved in Apollo's communication through the Pythia, may transform our approach to the Pythia's possession by Apollo. Finally, Raphals' inquiry explores both Chinese and Greek evidence: first, she explores the nature of Chinese `mantic questions', then, the use of Greek oracular responses. Through these inquiries, she examines whether, in each case, divination sought human consensus or divine sanction, and to what extent practitioners sought to keep away from, or to influence, their supernatural informants.

Across the volume, rather than claiming to identify and describe the religious experiences of individuals, each chapter sets out to examine the evidence for the cognitive states of those engaged with these activities—the beliefs, anxieties and hopes of consultants. But they also move beyond consideration of divination as a mechanism, to acknowledge and explore the kinds of human-divine relationships that divination created and sustained: what kinds of supernatural entities did these practices presuppose, what variety of forms of interaction took place with those entities, and how were those interactions structured? As the essays demonstrate, different cultures and contexts adopted different approaches to attempting to communicate with the supernatural forces they saw as being at work in their environment. While Greeks and Romans tended to see divination as made possible by gods, these processes also created room for chance and for uncertainty, both on the level of the divine communication itself, as Eidinow argues, and through practical strategies such as casting lots, as Lisa Maurizio explores in her chapter. In ancient Chinese divination, by contrast, Lisa Raphals argues that the putative role of the divine was less pronounced than the quest for human consensus. The structuring of relationships between human and divine was also shaped by each culture's and context's understanding of the role of human beings in the divinatory process. From Athens to the ancient Near East (as shown in Hugh Bowden's and Scott Noegel's chapters, respectively), societies that practised divination, especially in public decision-making processes, were forced to ask where the ultimate authority in interpreting divinatory results should lie. Although the exact social status and influence of users of divination may differ from culture to culture, these essays highlight the importance of understanding divination not just in pragmatic or functionalist terms as a tool for building social cohesion and spreading calm, but also as a potential source of anxiety and pressure for those who used it.

Divine and Divinatory Interventions

One of the most interesting themes that emerged during the conference discussions, across a wide range of papers, was the extent to which ancient people used divination genuinely to seek information about the future or from the divine. In some ways, this can be seen as one aspect of the puzzling question of the nature of `religious belief' in ancient cultures, which has relatively recently (re-)emerged as a pressing question in scholarship in Classics. In our conference discussions, the questions that were raised centred on whether ancient users understood the primary aim of divination as making contact with the divine, or, more specifically gathering information from the gods, in contrast to the socio-political functions on which scholars have typically focused.

That Greek and Roman texts identify contact with the divine in order to gain information as an ostensible aim of divination is not in doubt: one thinks, for example, of Xenophon's description of

divination (`[The gods] know all things, and warn whomsoever they will in sacrifices, in omens, in voices, and in dreams. And we may suppose that they are more ready to counsel those who not only ask what they ought to do in the hour of need,

but also serve the gods in the days of their prosperity with all their might'); or Cicero's description of the `prediction and knowledge of future events' made possible by some forms of divination as 'a splendid and helpful thing — if only it exists — since by it mortal nature may approach very near to the power of the gods'. The question is how much weight this stated aim actually held in the balance of factors that drove instances of divinatory consultation. Quinton Deeley's chapter reveals how the questions surrounding a sense of divine presence have remained a source of fascination, and, as a result, a focus of scientific study. His conclusions support the other chapters in this volume, which suggest that we should allocate more weight to this factor in our reconstructions of what ancient people thought when performing divination, than we have done heretofore.

On the Greek side, Michael Flower's chapter, for example, reminds us that one goal of divination may have been to experience more intensely the presence of the gods, even if our evidence makes it difficult to reconstruct exactly how that presence was perceived. Esther Eidinow argues that repeated consultations of oracles, or posing the same question to multiple oracles, can be seen not as an attempt to rig the result of the enquiry, but as an attempt to gain more accurate intelligence from the gods in the face of inherent uncertainty. In the field of Roman divination, Federico Santangelo's chapter re-examines the evidence for prodigy-interpretation in the Early Principate, arguing against the traditional assumption that the emperors moved away from this practice when it did not tell them what they wanted to hear. Andrew Stiles approaches the issue from the other side, showing that even sign-stories which look like straightforward attempts at legitimation by aspiring emperors can also be understood as the efforts of those emperors' subjects (both elite and non-elite) to identify and explain the gods' putative role in bringing such men to power.

If there is one overarching conclusion we might draw from the essays in this volume, it seems to us to lie in the emerging fact that Greeks, Romans, Babylonians, and ancient Chinese practitioners were using divination to seek some kind of truth. We may think we `know' how and why they found or failed to find it; we hope that the chapters in this volume may contribute to further debate about what the ancients themselves thought they were doing. <>

THE MAKING OF POETRY: COLERIDGE, THE WORDSWORTHS, AND THEIR YEAR OF MARVELS by Adam Nicolson, with Woodcuts and Paintings by Tom Hammick [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 9780374200213]

Brimming with poetry, art, and nature writing—Wordsworth and Coleridge as you've never seen them before

June 1797 to September 1798 is the most famous year in English poetry. Out of it came Samuel Taylor Coleridge's *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* and "Kubla Khan," as well as his unmatched hymns to friendship and fatherhood, and William Wordsworth's revolutionary songs in *Lyrical Ballads* along with "Tintern Abbey," Wordsworth's paean to the unity of soul and cosmos, love and understanding.

In THE MAKING OF POETRY, Adam Nicolson embeds himself in the reality of this unique moment, exploring the idea that these poems came from this particular place and time, and that only

by experiencing the physical circumstances of the year, in all weathers and all seasons, at night and at dawn, in sunlit reverie and moonlit walks, can the genesis of the poetry start to be understood.

The poetry Wordsworth and Coleridge made was not from settled conclusions but from the adventure on which they embarked, thinking of poetry as a challenge to all received ideas, stripping away the dead matter, looking to shed consciousness and so change the world. What emerges is a portrait of these great figures seen not as literary monuments but as young men, troubled, ambitious, dreaming of a vision of wholeness, knowing they had greatness in them but still in urgent search of the paths toward it.

The artist Tom Hammick accompanied Nicolson for much of the year, making woodcuts from the fallen timber in the park at Alfoxden where the Wordsworths lived. Interspersed throughout the book, his images bridge the centuries, depicting lives at the source of our modern sensibility: a psychic landscape of doubt and possibility, full of beauty and thick with desire for a kind of connectedness that seems permanently at hand and yet always out of reach.

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Following

The year, or slightly more than a year, from June 1797 until the early autumn of 1798 has a claim to being the most famous moment in the history of English poetry. In the course of it, two young men of genius, living for a while on the edge of the Quantock Hills in Somerset, began to find their way towards a new understanding of the world, of nature and of themselves.

These months have always been portrayed — by Wordsworth and Coleridge and by Wordsworth's sister Dorothy as much as by anyone else — as a time of unbridled delight and wellbeing, of overabundant creativity, with a singularity of conviction and purpose from which extraordinary poetry emerged.

Certainly, what they wrote adds up to an astonishing catalogue: 'This Lime Tree Bower My Prison', 'Kubla Khan', The Ancient Mariner, `Christabel', `Frost at Midnight', 'The Nightingale', all Wordsworth's strange and troubling poems in Lyrical Ballads, 'The Idiot Boy', 'The Thorn', the grandeur and beauty of `Tintern Abbey', and, in his notebooks, the first suggestions of what would become passages in The Prelude.

The grip of this poetry is undeniable, but its origins are not in comfort or delight, or, at least until Wordsworth's walk up the Wye valley in July 1798, any sense of arrival. The psychic motor of the year is something of the opposite: a time of adventure and perplexity, of Wordsworth and Coleridge both ricocheting away from the revolutionary politics of the 1790s in which both had been involved

and both to different degrees disappointed. Wordsworth was unheard of, and Coleridge was still under attack in the conservative press. Both were in retreat: from cities; from politics; from gentlemanliness and propriety; from the expected; towards nature; and — in a way that makes this year foundational for modernity — towards the self, its roots, its forms of self-understanding, its fantasies, longings, dreads and ideals. For both, the Quantocks were a refuge-cum-laboratory, one in which every suggestion of an arrival was to be seen merely as a stepping stone.

The path was far from certain. One of Wordsworth's criteria for pleasure in poetry was 'the sense of difficulty overcome', and that is a central theme of this year: their poetry was not a culmination or a summation, but had its life at the beginning of things, at a time of what Seamus Heaney called

`historical crisis and personal dismay', emergent, unsummoned, encountered in the midst of difficulty, arriving as unexpectedly as a figure on a night road, or a vision in mid-ocean, or the wisdom and understanding of a child.

It was not about powerful feelings recollected in tranquillity. Wordsworth's famous and oracular definition would not come to him until more than two years after he had left Somerset. This was different, a poetry of approaches, journeys out and journeys in, leading to the gates of understanding but not yet over the threshold. Even now, 250 years after Wordsworth's birth, it still carries a sense of discovery, drawing its vitality from awkwardness and discomfort, from a lack of definition and from the power that emanates from what is still only half-there.

This book explores the sources of this effusion. `I wish to keep my Reader in the company of flesh and blood,' Wordsworth would write a couple of years later, and that has been my guiding principle too. The place in which these poets lived, the people they were, the people they were with, the lives they led, the conversations they had: how did all of that shape the words they wrote?

The received idea of these poets puts its focus on the immaterial, the floatingly high-minded. But here, in 1797, that is at least partly the opposite of the case. Thought for them, as the young Coleridge had written in excitement to his friend Robert Southey, was `corporeal'. He would later coin both `neuropathology' and `psychosomatic' as terms to describe aspects of this new interpresence of body and mind. The full life was not the enjoyment of a view, nor any kind of elegant gazing at a landscape, let alone sitting reading, but a kind of embodiment, plunging in, a full absorption in the encompassing world, providing the verbal life and `nervous energy' that came from what Heaney would call `touching territory that I know'.

Here, then, was the invitation to which this book is an answer. If this was one of the great moments of poetic consciousness, it could best be understood as physical experience. By feeling it on the skin I could hope to know what had happened in the course of it. This was the subject that drew me: poetry-in-life, poetry-in-place, the body in the world as the instrument through which poetry comes into being.

The implication of that idea is that all currents must flow together. The way to approach this moment, its involutions and complexities, was to do, as far as possible, what the poets had done, to be in the Quantocks in all the moods and variations of the year at its different moments, to look for what happened and what emerged from what happened, to see how they were with each other, to feel the ebb and flow of their power relations and their affections. The timings and geography are closely known, often day by day, almost always week by week: what they were discussing, who they were meeting, how they were behaving, who their enemies and friends were, how poetry came from life-in-place.

Richard Holmes, the biographer of Shelley and Coleridge, has, unknown to him, long been my guide. When I was a young writer in the early 1980s he sent me a postcard out of the blue, encouraging me to keep going. So I have, and I think of this book as a tributary to the great Holmesian stream. Its method is his: to follow in the footsteps of the great, looking to gather the fragments they left on the path, much as Dorothy Wordsworth was seen by an old man as she was accompanying her brother on a walk in the Lake District, keeping `close behint him, and she picked up the bits as he let 'em fall, and tak 'em down, and put 'em on paper for him'.

So I went to live in the Quantocks. I started to imagine the poets' lives. I bought the maps, I read what they had been reading, I immersed myself in their notebooks and the facsimiles of their rough drafts, starting to lower myself into the pool of their minds. Slowly I began to see these poets — and

Dorothy Wordsworth should be included in that term — not as literary monuments but as living people, young, troubled, ambitious, dreaming of a vision of wholeness, knowing they had greatness in them but confronted again and again by the uncertain and contradictory nature of what they understood of the world, of each other and themselves.

It was a year focused on writing, on the search for forms of language that could, as Wordsworth later wrote of his own poetry, be `enduring and creative', with `A power like one of Nature's'. But it was not a sequence of solitudes. Coleridge's profoundly lonely need for others guaranteed that they were not alone. It was a busy, social, talkative time. The two great poets were almost constantly surrounded by friends, acolytes, followers, patrons and relations; Wordsworth's sister, Coleridge's wife Sara, and the children they had with them. All provided the frame in which they lived. It is striking how often the poetry appears at the edges of that sociability, when the others have just gone, or their arrival is just expected, another of the margins at which this margin-entranced sensibility dwelt.

What emerges is something more nuanced than a straightforward tale of miraculous productivity. Everywhere there are eddies in the stream: an interfolding of love and worry, ambition and doubt, a sense of possibility and of guilt, the patterns of human friendship oscillating between admiration and the recognition that the person you admire may not be entirely admirable, and may have the same hesitations about you.

The poets' differences pulled and rubbed against each other. Their friendship, with its intermingling of affection and doubt, was a mutual shaping. Each became a source for the other, and each moulded himself in opposition to the other. It was intriguingly gendered. Coleridge could detect in himself elements of the female, but 'Of all the men I ever knew,' he wrote, `Wordsworth has the least femineity in his mind. He is all man. He is a man of whom it might have been said, — "It is good for him to be alone."

The driving and revolutionary force of this year was the recognition that poetry was not an aspect of civilisation but a challenge to it; not decorative but subversive, a pleasure beyond politeness. This was not the stuff of drawing rooms. Its purpose was to give a voice to the voiceless, whatever form that voicelessness might have taken: sometimes speaking for the sufferings of the unacknowledged poor; sometimes enshrining the quiet murmuring of a man alone; sometimes reaching for the life of the child in his 'time of unrememberable being', beyond the grasp of adult consciousness; sometimes roaming in the magnificent and strange disturbedness of Coleridge's imagined worlds.

Wordsworth called poetry 'the first and last of all knowledge', using those words precisely: poetry comes both before and after everything that might be said. Its spirit and goal is to exfoliate consciousness, to rescue understanding from the noise and entropy of habit, to find richness and beauty in the hidden or neglected actualities. The strange, unlikely and unfashionable claim of this year stems from that recognition: poetry can remake assumptions, reconfigure the mind and change the world.

A Note on Tom Hammick's Pictures

Many of the woodcuts in this book are made with fallen timber taken from Alfoxden in the Quantocks. The eighteenth-century house and park where the Wordsworths lived for a year is not what it was. The ancient oaks, chestnuts, ash, beech and cherries have all dropped limbs, and that broken timber now lies beneath the trees like the fragments of cast skeletons.

In August 2018, with the permission of Mark Drysdale of Quantock Mariner Ltd, the development company that now owns the house and park, Tom Hammick and Adam Nicolson spent a day there cutting sections from the fallen logs. The timber was planked and pieces butted together for Hammick to make the woodcuts. The grain and growth of the trees remains visible in the finished images, all of which draw their inspiration from what the poets wrote in the Quantocks and from the story of their lives there.

The troubled nature of our connections to each other and to the natural world have long been the artist's concern. Here in the visions of the poets, in the luminous shadowed trees, in Coleridge's dream worlds and Wordsworth's sense of winter loneliness and springtime gaiety, Hammick summons a visual vocabulary that reconnects the present to those foundations of modern sensibility. Fusion of scale and intimacy is his subject as much as it was the Romantic poets'. Connectedness was all for them, and these woodcuts, made from the trees under which Wordsworth and Coleridge, their friends and families, sat, talked and read, embody some of that understanding. <>

WHEN NOVELS WERE BOOKS by Jordan Alexander Stein [Harvard University Press, 9780674987043]

A literary scholar explains how eighteenth-century novels were manufactured, sold, bought, owned, collected, and read alongside Protestant religious texts. As the novel developed into a mature genre, it had to distinguish itself from these similar-looking books and become what we now call "literature."

Literary scholars have explained the rise of the Anglophone novel using a range of tools, from Ian Watt's theories to James Watt's inventions. Contrary to established narratives, *When Novels Were Books* reveals that the genre beloved of so many readers today was not born secular, national, middle-class, or female.

For the first three centuries of their history, novels came into readers' hands primarily as printed sheets ordered into a codex bound along one edge between boards or paper wrappers. Consequently, they shared some formal features of other codices, such as almanacs and Protestant religious books produced by the same printers. Novels are often mistakenly credited for developing a formal feature ("character") that was in fact incubated in religious books.

The novel did not emerge all at once: it had to differentiate itself from the goods with which it was in competition. Though it was written for sequential reading, the early novel's main technology for dissemination was the codex, a platform designed for random access. This peculiar circumstance led to the genre's insistence on continuous, cover-to-cover reading even as the "media platform" it used encouraged readers to dip in and out at will and read discontinuously. Jordan Alexander Stein traces this tangled history, showing how the physical format of the book shaped the stories that were fit to print.

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WHEN NOVELS WERE BOOKS advances three theses. The first thesis concerns literary form. If novels, in a historically significant way, are also books, it follows that the formal features by which the development of the novel have been studied should also pertain in some meaningful way to the development of the book. Subsequent chapters test this idea by focusing on the literary figure most thoroughly associated with the novel: character, or the figural representation of persons. These chapters demonstrate that in the seventeenth century, character was not proprietary to the novel or its prototypes, and that indeed the figural techniques for representing persons that became most associated with early novels—representing persons in terms of their vulnerability—developed previously in Protestant confessional and soteriological writings. The circulation (in both manuscript and printed books) of these Protestant writings worked gradually to conventionalize this figure, which later found articulation in the early novelistic fictions of the 1740s and after. Subsequently, novels became a major flashpoint in the dissemination of character, and changes in Anglophone book publishing in the last quarter of the eighteenth century helped to create conditions where novels and

other kinds of Protestant narratives were increasingly printed, circulated, marketed, and recognized as distinct from one another. Nonetheless, I argue that the long-standing formalist association between novels and character mistakenly credits novels with developing a figure that in fact incubated elsewhere.

The second thesis concerns reading. If novels and books share a history, and if character gradually came to be understood as a proprietary feature of eighteenth-century novels, it would follow that this formal evolution coincided with an evolution in the ways that readers used books. The subsequent chapters register that evolution in two related historical changes. On the one hand, prior to the eighteenth century, readers often engaged the random-access feature of the codex (the fact that, unlike a scroll or a website, a reader need not start at the beginning of a book and can instead instantly open it to any page). Early Anglophone printed books were often collections of ideas and information, organized into some order, but designed to be read discontinuously, to be "dipped into at need," rather than read from cover to cover. The increasing reliance on character in the design of Protestant-inflected Anglophone texts toward the end of the seventeenth century coincides with a gradual increase in continuous, or cover-to-cover, reading. On the other hand, as the eighteenth century progresses, this tendency toward continuous reading seems also to generate an upswing in reading for identification—the process by which readers relate their experiences of the world with those of characters, and vice versa. I argue that character, figuring both fictional and biographical persons, becomes increasingly central to the ways that eighteenth-century readers read all kinds of texts, including but not limited to novels.

The third thesis concerns secularization. If novels, historically speaking, were also books, then they presumably coexisted with other books that were not novels. Several of the following chapters accordingly pair Protestant writings in a range of subgenres with texts that are indisputably now recognized to be novels. One aim in doing so is to demonstrate throughout the formal and material similarities among these texts. Another aim is to show how frequently historical readers could have found these (now) generically diverse books in the same bookshops, libraries, piles, shelves, and armloads. However, these pairings make historical sense only until about the last quarter of the eighteenth century. By that point, with the efficacy of print for disseminating ideas well established, many Protestant organizations (including voluntary associations, outlying religious factions, missionary societies, and emergent tract societies) begin to control their own printing presses, circulating printed materials at lower cost to their producers and often at no cost to their consumers, thus effectively subtracting themselves from the economics of the London print market (which remains the largest print market in the Anglophone world for the entire two centuries under discussion). This economic subtraction branches Protestant writings off from novels by about the 1790s, around which point the creators of these two types of printed materials recognize one another—for the first time in their history—as real competitors. Put differently, novels were not historically secular, and the fact that they came to be so has more to do with changes in religious publishing than in novel publishing. It has long been presumed that the history of the novel was part and parcel of a history of secularization—that the novel, in Georg Lukács's apocalyptic phrase, was "the epic of a world that has been abandoned by God."

Over four chapters, When Novels Were Books braids these three theses together into a roughly chronological narrative. Chapter 1, "Paper Selves," examines the confessional narratives that Reformed Protestants developed as a criterion for church membership, first in New England in the 1630s, and later in England after the deposition of Charles I. These narratives assumed an idiomatic consistency, whereby speakers figure themselves negatively: as weak, impure, vile, corrupted, or otherwise vulnerable before God's judgment. Such figuration draws on the model of Augustine's

fourth-century Confessions, but achieves rapid conventionalization through circulation of testimonial narratives in the form of manuscript books, two of which survive from Thomas Shepard's Cambridge, Massachusetts, congregation. This chapter identifies the formal features of this characterological figuration and details how, a century before the emergence of the Anglophone novel, and without entirely relying on printing, ancient Christian strategies for pious self-representation find new life among Reformed Protestants in both England and New England.

Moving from manuscript to print, Chapter 2, "The Character of Steady Sellers," examines the class of Protestant devotional books that, in addition to Bibles, were among the few books that Anglophone common readers might have owned in the seventeenth century. Designed like Bibles to be read discontinuously, "steady sellers" were predominantly nonnarrative works. Though they were, thereby, not character-driven texts, many steady sellers nonetheless did figure characters, describing piety in the same negative idiom as confessional writings, including humility, self-effacement, and subjective vulnerability before God. While retaining this negative figuration of character, toward the end of the seventeenth century steady sellers begin to assume a deliberately narrative shape. The final section of the chapter turns to The Pilgrim's Progress and Robinson Crusoe, two enduring Anglophone narratives usually taken to be early novels, and demonstrates their debts to, and significant formal and material continuities with, the steady sellers of the seventeenth century.

Chapter 3, "The Rise of the Text-Network," follows the emergent textual pairing of negatively figured characters and continuous narratives as they migrate around the Atlantic world. Considering the multiple texts of, and responses to, Pamela (first published in London in late 1740, but revived with immense popularity in New England in the 1780s) and the many different editions of the missionary diaries of David Brainerd (first published in Philadelphia in 1746, but reedited by Jonathan Edwards in 1749, and widely circulated and reprinted in England and Scotland through the 1760s and 1770s), this chapter demonstrates the abundant similarities between the figurations of the fictional Pamela and the nonfictional Brainerd in their respective stories. These texts share not only a similarly negative means of figuring characters, but also similar material processes of dissemination (including abridgment, anthologization, translation, and reprinting). Their mirrored transatlantic receptions indicate that as late as the mid-eighteenth century both early novels and Protestant autobiographies could achieve the kinds of high volume, short-term sales that book historians have otherwise argued distinguish the novel from the reliable returns of the steady seller.

The material similarities between eighteenth-century novels and Protestant narratives break down toward the end of the eighteenth century, a story detailed in Chapter 4, "Printers, Libraries, and Lyrics." One overwhelming force in the ultimate generic differentiation of novels and Protestant narratives is the series of changes, described in the third thesis above, by which the printing of "books of piety" effectively subtracts itself from the London print market. Consequent upon this subtraction, the 1790s mark a burst of religious antinovelism in the Anglophone Atlantic, not because novels were new in this decade, but because for the first time novels and Protestant narratives were recognized as being in competition. Though a predominant force in the secularization of the novel, these economic circumstances are by no means the only cause. Accordingly, this chapter pays attention to some of the emergent ways that books were being used in the last quarter of the eighteenth century: in the context of voluntary associations, circulating libraries, and in the increasingly divergent cultural values of prose and poetry. Chapter 4 concludes with an analysis of the ways that early nineteenth-century editions of The Pilgrim's Progress materially repackage this text as a novel, whereas late seventeenth-century editions had published it like a steady seller.

Finally, the brief Conclusion, subtitled "The Retroactive Rise of the Novel," attempts to answer the difficult question that all revisionist histories face: If the history of the novel and the history of the book are indeed related, as the previous chapters say, why don't scholars already know this story? My answer is located in the retrospective critical judgments of nineteenth-century critics (and their twentieth-century inheritors), who emphasized the formal properties of the novel over its material manifestations. The Conclusion summarizes some of the ways that the appearance of literary criticism in nineteenth century begins to invent traditions for the British and American novel by collecting eighteenth-century prose narratives into a prehistory of the novel.

For better or for worse, the four central chapters of this study are not independent essays, and each does not readily stand on its own. Still, readers with particular interest in the development of the novel as such should focus on Chapter 3, which provides the core of the argument and the most extended engagement with a novel this study has to offer. Chapters 2 and 4 position novels more explicitly in relation to the books of piety with which they were most often associated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively, and readers eager to think about religious print and attendant practices of reading should focus here. Chapter 1, meanwhile, takes the widest step away from printed books, considering instead other media (such as manuscript and performance) in order to situate the concerns of the subsequent chapters—novels, print, Protestantism, and character—in a wide historical and cultural context.

When Novels Were Books aims to synthesize the history of the book and the history of the novel, but, as the above narrative outline already suggests, there is some asymmetry to the way the story is being told. This study's emphasis falls on demonstrating the force of the material history of the book as it bears on the generic history of the novel, rather than the other way around. The implications of the study accordingly push toward an intervention into novel studies, and it certainly has been readers, colleagues, and students working in this field whom I have most often imagined to be the addressees of these pages. Precisely for this reason, however, outside of Chapter 3, readers will find only passing engagements with novels in recognizably literary critical modes, as this study seeks instead to demonstrate its interpretations with recourse to some of the bibliographic, archival, and empirical evidence that books yield. If the result is a history of the novel without close readings of very many novels, the reader will hopefully recognize aspects of my argument reflected in my method. <>

WEEPING FOR DIDO: THE CLASSICS IN THE MEDIEVAL CLASSROOM by Marjorie Curry Woods [E. H. Gombrich Lecture Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691170800]

Saint Augustine famously "wept for Dido, who killed herself by the sword," and many later medieval schoolboys were taught to respond in similarly emotional ways to the pain of female characters in Virgil's *Aeneid* and other classical texts. In **WEEPING FOR DIDO**, Marjorie Curry Woods takes readers into the medieval classroom, where boys identified with Dido, where teachers turned an unfinished classical poem into a bildungsroman about young Achilles, and where students not only studied but performed classical works.

Woods opens the classroom door by examining teachers' notes and marginal commentary in manuscripts of the *Aeneid* and two short verse narratives: the *Achilleid* of Statius and the *Ilias latina*, a Latin epitome of Homer's *Iliad*. She focuses on interlinear glosses—individual words and short phrases written above lines of text that elucidate grammar, syntax, and vocabulary, but that also

indicate how students engaged with the feelings and motivations of characters. Interlinear and marginal glosses, which were the foundation of the medieval classroom study of classical literature, reveal that in learning the *Aeneid*, boys studied and empathized with the feelings of female characters; that the unfinished *Achilleid* was restructured into a complete narrative showing young Achilles mirroring his mentors, including his mother, Thetis; and that the *Ilias latina* offered boys a condensed version of the *Iliad* focusing on the deaths of young men. Manuscript evidence even indicates how specific passages could be performed.

The result is a groundbreaking study that provides a surprising new picture of medieval education and writes a new chapter in the reception history of classical literature.

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A Short Introduction

We all learned stories in school. As I work on the history of teaching, or rather learning, both during the Middle Ages and now, I often ask myself, "What stories was I taught?" "Which do I remember most and why?" "What were the characters like?" "What did they make me feel—and see?" When I look at medieval school manuscripts for answers to the same questions, I find evidence that emotions, genders, and actions mattered then, as they did in my childhood and adolescence. Often the stories I remember most vividly focused on characters very different from me.

I first read in graduate school St. Augustine's description of weeping for the death of Queen Dido in the *Aeneid*, the source of my title and the first example in this book. My graduate studies at the Centre for Medieval Studies directed me toward medieval Latin manuscripts, and the twenty-five

years I spent working on the commentaries on a popular rhetorical treatise, the Poetria nova of Geoffrey of Vinsauf, reinforced my sense of the importance of the glosses (annotations) written above the words of a text and in the margins.

The project discussed in the three chapters that follow, based on the E. H. Gombrich Lectures given at the Warburg Institute in 2014, has been a labor of love. I had become fascinated with the tradition of boys performing emotional speeches in women's voices in schools and the evidence from manuscripts indicating that this tradition persisted during the Middle Ages, as well as before and after. I returned to the Aeneid, and in the meantime I had developed an admiration for two other texts much used in medieval schools but not well known now: the unfinished Achilleid of Statius, which in medieval manuscripts is treated as a complete work about an adolescent hero who pretends to be a girl (while proving himself to be a man); and the Ilias latina or Latin Homer, a condensation of the Iliad influenced by Virgil, that tells a version of the story foregrounding the pathos of the deaths of soldiers. What follows is based on an examination of more than 60 manuscripts of the Aeneid, 50 of the Achilleid, and 30 of the Ilias latina, each statistic but a fraction of the number extant. The manuscripts quoted date from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries and were copied and/or glossed in Germany, Italy, England, and France. Because these chapters draw almost entirely from unedited manuscripts, they demand a great deal of readers, who are asked to pay close attention to very specific, sometimes cryptic comments of teachers and to take seriously the almost completely unfamiliar practice in which such teachers were engaged. A knowledge of Latin or of the works themselves is not necessary, however. The major emphasis is on what appears to have made the works attractive to the students, whether they were feeling Dido's pain, or mentally dressing in Achilles's women's clothes, or hamming it up while reciting a variety of scenes.

Boys were the primary medieval audience of the glossed manuscripts of these texts, which they read in school. Each of the chapters that follow begins with a boy: the historical Augustine who weeps for the suicide of a fictional queen; young Achilles waking up in a strange new land where he will be asked to pretend to be a young woman; and an anonymous boy in a medieval lyric poem who performs a woman's lament for her dead lover. Each provides a different window into three interrelated aspects of medieval teaching: emotion, gender, and performance, with special emphasis on emotion.

The history of emotion continues to be a powerful focus of scholarly energy, and this book contributes to the ongoing scholarly conversation.1 Emotions were not taught in medieval schools for their own sake, but as effective and cogent aspects of the acquisition of the Latin language and the cultural capital of shared texts. This teaching took place in a single-sex environment: while the classical tradition does not appear to have been a significant part of medieval women's or girls' education, for many boys classical and pseudo-classical texts comprised a good portion of their pedagogical experience. Since medieval teaching was relentlessly practical, and what had worked earlier continued to be utilized, pagan Latin texts and works based on them remained one of the most fundamental learning experiences of those who became litterati until very, very late in the tradition. Even when texts of a more overtly (if superficially) Christian context appear to have overtaken the educational system, manuscripts show us that texts like those described in this volume were still copied and studied intensively.

This approach to teaching is characterized by total concentration on the texts themselves: on the Latin words in which they were written. As a result, manuscripts of classical texts used in medieval schools rarely contain allegorizing commentary or other kinds of glosses that would draw attention away from the texts. Instead, glosses and comments (the terms are used interchangeably in this study) on school texts reveal how almost every single word of a school text could be taken

seriously. Interlinear glosses (written above the words of the text) explain grammatical relationships, build vocabulary, and create emphasis. Glosses written in the margin, which are typically longer, ensure comprehension of the narrative by providing summaries and paraphrases, identifications of speakers including authorial comments, and background information with which to understand action. The chapters that follow focus on these small pieces of evidence and various kinds of highlighting to try to capture a record of how and how closely medieval teachers and students engaged with these classical literary texts.

In Introduction Image A and Introduction Image B reproduced here, you can see this kind of cooperation in the glosses on the first four lines of Dido's most famous speech in the Aeneid: her outburst to Aeneas after finding out that he is about to leave her. Introduction Image A reproduces folio 59r of a latefourteenth-century Italian manuscript in Rome, Biblioteca Casanatense 685. At the top of this image, the first four lines of Dido's speech (the third through the seventh lines on the manuscript page) are highlighted by a framing squiggle with a curlicue at texts, their emotions permeated and sometimes dominated the classroom experience.

The pain and suicide of Queen Dido when her lover leaves her often remain a student's most powerful memory of the text, even today. Accordingly, I begin with the Aeneid since it is the work most likely to be known by the modern reader and scholar, moving next to the less familiar Achilleid of Statius and Ilias latina. In some parts of the chapters that follow, I return to passages that I have examined elsewhere but with new insights; in others, I analyze material to which I had not given much previous thought—but which the glosses taught me that medieval teachers considered important.

The first chapter allows us to spend more time with the attractive and doomed Dido as medieval manuscripts reveal their emphasis on her emotions, a focus illuminated by modern research on memory. Chapter 2 examines two short classical works read by students at a lower level, and the interlinear glosses are more basic. It is easy to become impatient with them, but they imprint on us, too, the intimate, detailed knowledge of the words of the texts that the students imbibed. Both poems focus on issues of masculinity. In the Achilleid, the protagonist's mentors mirror his transitions from wild child to female impersonator to warrior in training, and his time pretending to be his own sister is framed by the fears first of his mother and then his lover (later wife). In the Ilias latina the increasing focus on death in battle evokes relentlessly the pathos of male characters, dying themselves or killing others. Yet the narrative ends with the grief of Hector's wife, Andromache, at his funeral. The third and final chapter looks at passages that beg for performance and at evidence for the recitation by boys of emotional scenes, often with female characters. The manuscripts discussed here fit squarely into an already established pedagogical tradition that begins long before and continues long after the "middle" ages.

I address the medieval teaching of literature from a transhistorical as well as historical perspective and in ways that I hope encourage comparison with other periods. This study is not meant to replace those of individual manuscripts or specific geographical areas or other interests of commentators, but rather to suggest that some commonalities exist among the often quite disparate pedagogical traditions of the Latin Middle Ages. Most generalizations about medieval schooling are pejorative with isolated examples of insight offered as counterpoints. I present instead recurring, interrelated threads of medieval pedagogy that can enable us to begin to see a broader picture. I hope that this study will be attractive and useful to all kinds of readers, from those for whom the medieval period is uncharted territory to those with prior expertise who may be trying to determine whether similar manuscript material they have found is generic or idiosyncratic. Fuller attention than one often finds is paid here to late manuscripts; more of these survive than

manuscripts from any earlier period, and they provide compelling evidence of continuity in pedagogical approaches to classical texts that, I believe, can help us make more educated sense of the Western tradition as a whole. <>

TOWARD THE CHARACTERIZATION OF HELEN IN HOMER: APPELLATIVES, PERIPHRASTIC DENOMINATIONS, AND NOUN-EPITHET FORMULAS by Lowell Edmunds [Trends in Classics - Supplementary Volumes, De Gruyter, 9783110626025]

This monograph lays the groundwork for a new approach of the characterization of the Homeric Helen, focusing on how she is addressed and named in the Iliad and the Odyssey and especially on her epithets. Her social identity in Troy and in Sparta emerges in the words used to address and name her. Her epithets, most of them referring to her beauty or her kinship with Zeus and coming mainly from the narrator, make her the counterpart of the heroes.

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Helen with an epithet in the first half of the hexameter

In Epistles 1.2 Horace writes from Praeneste to Maximus Lollius, a young man practicing oratory in Rome. Themes drawn from Homer are apparently Lollius' subject matter.' At the same time, Horace is rereading Homer, who provides more useful moral lessons, he says, than do the philosophers Chrysippus and Crantor. The lesson of the Iliad is negative:

> Fabula, qua Paridis propter narratur amorem
> Graecia barbariae lento conlisa duello,
> stultorum regum et populorum continet aestum.
> Antenor censet belli praecidere causam:
> quid Paris? ut saluus regnet uivatque beatus
> cogi posse negat. Nestor componere lites
> inter Pelidem festinat et inter Atriden;
> hunc amor, ira quidem communiter urit utrumque.
> quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achiui.
> seditione, dolts, scelere atque libidine et ira
> Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.
> Epist. 1.2.6-16

> The story in which, on account of Paris's love, it is told that Greece is wasted in a tedious war with the barbarians, contains the tumult of foolish kings and peoples. Antenor gives his opinion for cutting off the cause of the war. What does Paris do? He cannot be brought to comply, even if he may reign safely and live happily. Nestor strives to bring to an end the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon. Love inflames the first, anger both of them equally. Whatever the derangement of their kings, the Achaeans take the punishment. Because of sedition, guile, wickedness and lust and anger—inside and outside the walls of Troy wrong is done.

To the Iliad so conceived Horace opposes the positive moral teaching of the Odyssey (17-31). Helen is not mentioned but the war is taking place Paridis propter amorem (1) and Helen is the reason for Paris' refusal to end it (7.362-64; ch.1§5).

No doubt libido refers to the passion that Aphrodite inspired in her and that she inspired in Paris.

The Iliad, in the figure of Thersites, contains its own awareness of the possibility of a Horatian reception and, in Odysseus' chastisement of him, a defense of the leaders, especially Agamemnon, Achilles, and Odysseus himself, against his blame (2.212-77).4 It is unlikely, further, that a Greek audience of the Iliad would agree with Horace that both sides in the conflict were equally reprehensible. Menelaus expects divine sanction. As he faces Paris in combat in Book 3, he prays to Zeus for vengeance: it would be an example to men in the future of what happens to those who violate guest-friendship (3.351-54). Again, Menelaus rebukes the Trojans for their defiance of Zeus Xenios in their stealing of his wedded wife and many possessions (13.622-27). Even in his version of the Trojan War (Helen not at Troy) Herodotus finds that the destruction of Troy (in spite of the fact that the Trojans did not have Helen) was a lesson for mankind that great punishments come from the gods for great crimes (such as the violation of hospitality) (2.120.5). The Achaean cause is also principled. Achilles says that the Achaeans are at Troy to oblige Agamemnon and "to win honor

for you and Menelaus" (Tiprl, 1.159). Menelaus says that Patroclus died for his honor (Ttµrl, 17.92; cf. 5.550-53).

Helen, too, is the object of blame and again the Iliad countenances, but does not grant, a Horatian interpretation of the action. She says that all the Trojans shudder at her (24.775) and it is clear that vilification is what she means (cf. 767-71). When Aphrodite summons her to return from the wall of Troy to Paris, she fears blame (Tpwai St µ' órtíoow / nãoat p oµrloovTat, "all the Trojan women will blame me hereafter," 3.411-12). The self-blame heard in her speeches can be interpreted as a pre-emption of the blame that she fears and suffers from the Trojans (ch. 2 init.).' She also expects blame from the Achaeans. When she does not see her brothers, the Dioscouroi, from the wall of Troy, she imagines that they have not entered the battle because they fear (to hear) the vilification and reproaches that are hers (araxca SctStótcç Kai óvet6ea 3ó1U' á µoí kurtv, 3.242). In fact the only Achaean who uses a term of opprobrium of her is Achilles (ptyt8avrt, 19.325; ch. 2§3).

Against Helen as an object of blame must be set the narrator's epithets for her. The narrator is the source of almost all of her epithets of beauty and her kinship epithets. They often occur in places in which they contrast his and the characters' points of view. Theirs often originate in various familial, social, or pragmatic conceptions of her. The narrator knows more than the characters do and in effect corrects them. While Parry evoked the "principle that the epithet adorns all epic poetry rather than a single line," Helen's epithets have particular functions in the places in which they occur.' Parry's words seem to anticipate "traditional referentiality" (Introduction, p. 11), a concept that blurs these functions.

Helen in the narrator's, and thus the audience's, perspective is a worthy object of the struggles of the heroes. She herself looks forward to fame in the future when she says to Hector that Zeus has sent an evil destiny upon her and Paris in order that they might be sung of by men in the future (Il. 6.344-58). She has something like this stature already in her lifetime, as can be seen in Telemachus' report to his mother concerning his visit to Sparta (Od. 17.118) and in Penelope's reflections on Helen (Od. 23.218-221; ch. 10§5). Hélène Monsacré concluded a survey of the subordinate position of women in the Iliad with a speculation on the special status of Helen:

> While it is fair to suggest that the close relationship and consubstantial status of Andromache and Penelope with their husbands allow for a certain circulation of masculine values, Helen is the only heroine who does not owe her renown to her husband. In the Iliad, Helen is situated beyond the conjugal relationship, and this is, perhaps, what makes her a heroic figure.

While Helen in the narratives of the two epics is at any moment pragmatically a wife and nothing else (ch. 1), she has twice been able to leave and enter (or in the case of Menelaus reenter) the marital relationship and to this extent is "beyond" it. Paris' name is amplified by the formula "husband of fair-haired Helen" (ch.7§1); his prestige is increased by his marriage to her. Her special status is seen also in her motherhood. She has no child by Paris. Further, her relationship with her only child, Hermione, fails to characterize her as mother. In the Iliad Helen refers to her once (3.175; but cf. 139-40, where Hermione could have been mentioned but is not). In the Odyssey, at the beginning of Book 4, Menelaus is holding a feast to celebrate the marriages of his daughter and his bastard son Megapenthes. It is explained that Helen had no children after Hermione, who is named for the first and last time (4.12b-14). The wedding feast is then forgotten in the account of the arrival of Telemachus and Peisistratus and replaced by a feast in their honor. Hermione is forgotten, except that Helen refers to her, without naming her, at the end of her speech about Odysseus in Troy (4.263). Although in the Odyssey they have been living under the same roof, the relationship

between Helen and Hermione is a blank. Helen stands outside both the marital and the parental relationships. Monsacré's speculation applies to both.

While Helen, unlike Penelope (Od. 24.196-97), cannot expect kleos and to this extent cannot be a "heroic figure," to use Monsacré's term, she can expect that she and Paris will be remembered in song in the future, as she says to Hector (6.357-58). She is right, as we know, and as the original audiences knew, whose hearing these lines was an immediate and indeed simultaneous confirmation of the truth of what she says. The Helen of this song, of the Iliad, or of the Odyssey, is not only the Helen who has begun her speech to Hector in the mode of lament and with self-reproach, but also the Helen of the narrator's epithets. Coming from the narrator they are authoritative and they counter the self-presentation of Helen (which has its own reasons, as this monograph has argued) and they elevate her above her familial and social identities. They make her a worthy counterpart of the heroes. <>

THE ANCIENT GREEK HERO IN 24 HOURS A New Edition by Gregory Nagy [Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 9780674241688]

THE ANCIENT GREEK HERO IN 24 HOURS by Gregory Nagy Online First Edition

The readings

THE ANCIENT GREEK HERO IN 24 HOURS is based on a course that I have taught at Harvard University ever since the late 1970s. This course, "Concepts of the Hero in Greek Civilization," eventually renamed "The Ancient Greek Hero," centers on selected readings of texts, all translated from the original Greek into English. The texts include the Homeric Iliad and Odyssey; the Hesiodic Theogony and Works and Days; selected songs of Sappho and Pindar; selections from the Histories of Herodotus; the Agamemnon, Libation Bearers, and Eumenides of Aeschylus; the Oedipus Tyrannus and Oedipus at Colonus of Sophocles; the Hippolytus and Bacchae of Euripides; and the Apology and Phaedo of Plato. Also included are selections from Pausanias and Philostratus. These texts are supplemented by pictures, taken mostly from Athenian vase paintings. Copies of those pictures will be shown in Hour 7.

The texts I have just listed are available free of charge in an online Sourcebook of original Greek texts translated into English (http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS_NagyG_ed.Sourcebook_H24H.2013-), which I have edited with the help of fellow teachers and researchers. The process of editing this Sourcebook is an ongoing project that I hope will outlast my own lifetime. All the translations in this online Sourcebook are free from copyright restrictions. That is because the translations belong either to me or to other authors who have waived copyright or to authors who died in a time that precedes any further application of copyright. The texts of these translations in the Sourcebook are periodically reviewed and modified, and the modifications are indicated by way of special formatting designed to show the differences between the original translator's version and the modified version.

THE ANCIENT GREEK HERO IN 24 HOURS is divided into five parts. The number of hours dedicated to each part is tightened up as the argumentation intensifies, and the hours themselves get shorter. Part I, taking up Hours 1 through 12, is primarily about heroes as reflected in the oldest surviving forms of ancient Greek epic and lyric poetry. Part II, Hours 13 through 15, is about heroes

as reflected in a variety of prose media. Part III, Hours 16 through 21, is about heroes in {1|2} ancient Greek tragedy. Part IV, Hours 22-23, is about heroes as reflected in two dialogues of Plato. And Part V, confined to Hour 24, is about the hero as a transcendent concept. In two of the Hours, there are additional sections. Hour 7 is followed by sections numbered Hour 7a, Hour 7b, Hour 7c, and so on; similarly, Hour 8 is followed by sections numbered Hour 8a, Hour 8b, Hour 8c, and so on. These sections will add more hours of reading, and the reader may choose to postpone them in the course of a first reading.

About the dating of the texts quoted in the selected readings

The time span for most of these texts extends from the eighth through the fourth centuries BCE ("Before the Common Era"). Some of the texts, however, date from later periods: for example, Pausanias is dated to the second century CE ("Common Era"). When I say "ancient Greek history," the term *ancient* includes three periods:

> *archaic* (from the eighth century down to roughly the middle of the fifth)
> *classical* (roughly, the second half of the fifth century)
> *post-classical* (fourth century and beyond).

A convenient point for dividing *classical* and *post-classical* is the death of Socrates in 399 BCE.

About the historical setting for the primary sources: "ancient Greece"

There is no place where one really feels at home anymore. So, the thing that one longs to get back to, before anything else, is whatever place there may be where one could feel at home, and that is because it is in that place - and in that place alone - where one would really like to feel at home. That place is the world of the Greeks.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values* (1885)

> In the ancient world of the classical period, "Greece" was not really a "country" or a "nation," as we ordinarily think of these terms. Rather, it was a cultural {2|3} constellation of competing city-states that had a single language in common, Greek. In the classical period, speakers of the Greek language called themselves *Hellēnes* or 'Hellenes'.

Among the most prominent of the ancient Greek city-states were *Athens*, *Sparta*, *Corinth*, *Argos*, and *Thebes*, all of them located in the part of the Mediterranean region that we know today as "modern Greece." There were also other prominent ancient Greek city-states in other parts of the Mediterranean region. To the East, on the coast of Asia Minor, which is now part of the modern state of Turkey, were Greek cities like *Miletus* and *Smyrna* (now *Izmir*); facing the coast of Asia Minor were Greek island states like *Samos* and *Chios*. Further to the North was a federation of Greek cities located both on the island of *Lesbos* and on the facing mainland of Asia Minor. Still further to the North, guarding the entrance to the Black Sea, was the Greek city of *Byzantium*, later to be called *Constantinople* (now *Istanbul*). Far to the South, in African Libya, was the Greek city of *Cyrene*. Further to the East in Northern Africa, in Egypt, was the arguably greatest of all Greek cities in the ancient world, *Alexandria*, founded by Alexander the Great in the fourth century BCE. To the West were other great Greek cities like *Syracuse* in the island of Sicily as well as *Tarentum* and *Neapolis* (now *Napoli* or *Naples*) in what is now the modern state of Italy. Still further to the West, in what is now the modern state of France, was the Greek (formerly Phoenician) city of *Massalia* (now *Marseille*).

The ancient Greeks would agree that they shared the same language, despite the staggering variety of local dialects. They would even agree that they shared a civilization, though they would be intensely contentious about what exactly their shared civilization would be. Each city-state had its own institutions, that is, its own government, constitution, laws, calendars, religious practices, and so

on. Both the sharing and the contentiousness lie at the root of the very essence of the city-state. What I am translating here as 'city-state' is the Greek word *polis*. This is the word from which our words *political* and *politics* are derived.

In the fourth century BCE, the Greek philosopher Aristotle made a basic observation about the ancient Greek *polis* in a treatise known today as the *Politics*. Here is the original Greek wording, *ho anthrōpos phusei politikon zōion* (Aristotle *Politics* I 1253a2–3), which can be translated literally this way: 'A human [*anthrōpos*] is by nature an organism of the *polis* [*politikon zōion*]'. We see in {3|4} this wording the basis for a distinctly Greek concept of civilization. What Aristotle is really saying here is that humans achieve their ultimate potential within a society that is the *polis*. From this point of view, the ultimate in human potential is achieved politically. The original Greek wording of this observation by Aristotle is frequently rendered this way into English: 'Man is a political animal'. Such a rendering does not do justice to the original formulation, since current uses of the word *political* do not convey accurately the historical realities of the ancient Greek *polis*.

Here are some basic aspects of Greek civilization that most ancient Greeks in the classical period could agree about:

1. **interpolitical festivals**. Two primary examples are the Olympic festival (= "Olympics") at Olympia and the Pythian festival at Delphi.
2. **interpolitical repositories of shared knowledge**. A primary example is Delphi.
3. **interpolitical poetry**. Two primary examples are a set of monumental poems known as the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, attributed to a prehistoric figure named Homer, and another set of poems known as the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, attributed to a prehistoric figure named Hesiod.

I have used the term *interpolitical* here instead of *international* because I do not want to imply that each *polis* was a nation. In most of my published work, however, I use the term *Panhellenic* instead of *interpolitical*. The term *Panhellenic* or *pan-Hellenic* is derived from the ancient Greek compound noun *pan-Hellēnes*, 'all Greeks', which is attested in the Hesiodic *Works and Days* (528) in the sense of referring to 'all Greeks under the sun' [(526-528). [This use of the compound noun *pan-Hellēnes* in the absolutizing sense of 'all Greeks' helps explain the later use of the non-compound noun *Hellēnes*, 'Hellenes', to mean 'Greeks' in the classical period; earlier, that noun *Hellēnes* had been used to designate a sub-set of Greeks dwelling in a region known as Thessaly rather than any full complement of Greeks. As the linguistic evidence shows, the non-compound noun *Hellēnes* acquired the meaning of 'Greeks' from the built-in politics of the compound noun *pan-Hellēnes*, the basic meaning of which can be {4|5} paraphrased this way: *Hellenes (as a subset of Greeks) and all other Greeks (as a notionally complete set of Greeks)*.

I understand the concept of *Panhellenic* or *Panhellenism* as a cultural as well as political impulse that became the least common denominator of ancient Greek civilization in the classical period. And the impulse of Panhellenism was already at work in Homeric and Hesiodic poetry. In the Homeric *Iliad*, for example, the names *Achaeans* and *Danaans* and *Argives* are used synonymously in the universalizing sense of Panhellenes or 'all Hellenes' or 'all Greeks'.

In the classical period, an authoritative source goes on record to say that Homer and Hesiod are the foundation for all civilization. That source is the historian Herodotus, who lived in the fifth century BCE. According to Herodotus (2.53.1-3), Homer and Hesiod are the repository of knowledge that provides the basics of education for all Hellenes. And such basics, as we will see in this book, are

conceived primarily in terms of religion, which requires an overall knowledge of the forms and the functions of the gods.

Here I make two points about the historical realities of ancient Greek religion:

1. When we apply the term *religion* to such traditional practices as the worship of gods in the classical period of Greek civilization as also in earlier periods, we need to think of such practices in terms of an interaction between *myth* and *ritual*. Here is a quick working definition of *myth* and *ritual* together. Ritual is doing things and saying things in a way that is considered *sacred*. Myth is saying things in a way that is also considered *sacred*. **So, ritual frames myth**.

2. Not only were the gods worshipped in ancient Greek religion. Heroes too were worshipped. Besides the word *worship*, we may use the word *cult*, as in the term *hero cult*. Other relevant concepts are *cultivate* and *culture*. The concepts of (1) a *hero cult* and (2) the *cult hero* who is worshipped in hero cult will figure prominently in the readings ahead.

Our readings will start with Homer. This prehistoric figure, who is credited with the composition of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, represents an inter- {5|6} political or Panhellenic perspective on the Greeks. Homeric poetry is not tied down to any one *polis*. It presents the least common denominator in the cultural education of the elite of all city-states.

But how can a narrative or "story" like the *Iliad* become an instrument of education? This book offers answers to that question. {6|7}

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THE ANCIENT GREEK HERO IN 24 HOURS SOURCEBOOK: SOURCEBOOK OF ORIGINAL GREEK TEXTS TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH [DIGITAL EDITION]

Sourcebook of Ancient Greek Texts in English Translation: for 'The Ancient Greek Hero' General Editor: Gregory Nagy

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2017-08-02

HANDBOOK OF GREEK SCULPTURE edited by Olga Patagia [De Gruyter Reference, De Gruyter, 9781614515401]

THE HANDBOOK OF GREEK SCULPTURE aims to provide a detailed examination of current research and directions in the field. Bringing together an international cast of contributors from Greece, Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States, the volume incorporates new areas of research, such as the sculptures of Messene and Macedonia, sculpture in Roman Greece, and the contribution of Greek sculptors in Rome, as well as important aspects of Greek sculpture

like techniques and patronage. The written sources (literary and epigraphical) are explored in dedicated chapters, as are function and iconography and the reception of Greek sculpture in modern Europe. Inspired by recent exhibitions on Lysippos and Praxiteles,the book also revisits the style and the personal contributions of the great masters.

The study of Greek monumental sculpture has evolved through a number of phases,' and has reached a watershed, calling out for a fresh approach aimed at new generations of students and scholars. The field is now past traditional methods like copy criticism and more recent approaches like social history and abstract theory. The scope of this volume is not to talk around Greek sculpture but about it, exploring key aspects in its development. The issues of collecting, looting, conservation, display and social contexts are not addressed here. Chronologically, this volume includes material from the seventh century B.C. to the second century A.D. as the distinction between Greek and Roman sculpture is now blurred at the edges, especially as regards sculpture produced in Greece under Roman occupation. Sculptures created in the Roman Empire are not seen automatically as Roman "originals." And sculpture in ancient Greece is no longer defined as "an anonymous product of an impersonal craft", an approach that sought to minimize the contribution of individual artists in the teeth of the evidence.

There is no linear development, and the tools for understanding Greek sculpture belong not only to the art historian but also to the archaeologist. Stylistic assessment may be supplemented with scientific analysis of bronze alloys and the source of marbles. Even though the great masters have been reinstated, mainly thanks to exhibitions devoted to individual artists like Praxiteles, the study of techniques, contexts and literary and epigraphical sources remain pivotal for the elucidation of the function and chronology of the sculptures. Polychromy is now understood to have played an important role in the final appearance of Greek sculpture. Regional schools and itinerant sculptors have acquired a new significance.

Handbooks of Greek sculpture published in the 21st century consist either of chronological overviews or lexica. The vast amount of data accumulated after nearly three centuries of research entails the collaboration of experts representing different perspectives. The book in hand is a collective effort by scholars chosen for their expertise in particular areas, combining their resources to illuminate problems arising from the study of Greek sculpture in the contemporary world. The emphasis is on material culture rather than theoretical approaches.

Although far from comprehensive, this compendium highlights themes that have been under discussion for some time. It resumes the debate on the nature of the evidence. The perennial question of how to co-ordinate the evidence of the sources with the archaeological remains is at the core of this enquiry.

This handbook consists of 23 Chapters distributed thematically in eight sections. Chapters 2-4 in Part I deal primarily with the epigraphical and literary sources, though the starting point of Chapter 11 in Part IV is also firmly grounded in what the ancient sources have to say about the emergence of the Classical style. In Chapter 2 Dimitris Plantzos offers an overview of Pliny's and Pausanias'

accounts of Greek sculptors and their works, filtered through the sensibilities of two authors active in the Roman Empire. Chapter 3, by Alan Johnston and Olga Palagia, discusses a selection of sculptors' signatures from the sixth to the first century B.C., tracing the sculptors' movements, use of local alphabets and raising issues of collaboration and repair. Andrew Stewart in Chapter 4 charts the cost of sculptures, the artists' social status and issues of patronage by sifting building accounts and literary sources.

Part II is mainly concerned with the function of sculpture. Peter Schultz discusses architectural sculptures from the Archaic to the Hellenistic periods in Chapter 5, while Katia Margariti explores Attic grave reliefs to the end of the fourth century B.C. in Chapter 6.

Portraiture is the subject of Part III. Sheila Dillon focuses on non-royal honorary portraits in Chapter 7, with special emphasis on the Hellenistic period. Royal portraiture is represented by the Ptolemies, discussed by François Queyrel in Chapter 8. Greek portraiture made in Greece during the Roman Empire is confined to the portraits commissioned by Herodes Atticus in the Antonine period, a distinct body of material studied by Hans Goette in Chapter 9.

The question of styles in Greek sculpture has always been the subject of controversy, particularly as regards the personal contribution of the great masters and the value of stylistic assessment in determining chronological sequences. Part IV on styles assembles contributions by scholars of different viewpoints. In Chapter 10 Mary Sturgeon discusses the development and typology of Archaic sculpture. She is mainly concerned with the archaeological material, whereas Gianfranco Adornato in Chapter 11 traces the emergence of the Classical style by citing the verdict of the ancient sources on successive generations of sculptors leading from the Archaic to the High Classical. The chryselephantine statues of Pheidias, considered the greatest sculptural achievements of the ancient world by the Greeks and Romans themselves, are discussed by Olga Palagia in Chapter 12. As the actual statues are lost, the evidence of the ancient sources, both epigraphical and literary, and material remains like the debris of the sculptor's workshop in Olympia, blocks from the statue bases and reduced copies and variants of later periods serve to reconstruct an approximate appearance of the originals. The knotty problem of the contribution of Roman copies and variants towards understanding the styles of the great masters is also tackled in Chapter 13, where Iphigeneia Leventi offers a survey of the careers of the famous sculptors of the fourth century. The sculptural styles of the Hellenistic period, based almost exclusively on original works, are treated by Marion Meyer in Chapter 14. Her method privileges style above scientific analysis and other external considerations.

In the antipodes of the issues of style and the assessment of Roman copies, Part V offers a different standpoint, concentrating on excavated sculptures found in particular regions regardless of the origin of the sculptors who created them. Clemente Marconi in Chapter 15 offers a survey of Archaic and Classical Greek sculptures found in Sicily. The sculptures of Melos, from Archaic to Roman, are presented by Panagiotis Konstantinidis in Chapter 16. No regional workshop can be detected on the island, the sculptures are therefore attributed to travelling artists. The sculptures of Macedonia, a subject hitherto neglected, are discussed by Dimitris Damaskos in Chapter 17, which concentrates on the periods between the sixth and the first centuries B.C. As becomes clear in this chapter, the sculptures produced in Macedonia after the Roman conquest of 168 B.C. are still to all intents and purposes Greek. The excavator of Messene, Petros Themelis, offers an overview of the Hellenistic and Roman sculptures that he brought to light in the city, in Chapter 18.

Part VI is concerned with the interaction between Greeks and Romans from the second century B.C. onwards. Chapter 19 by Eugenio La Rocca is the first survey in English of the statuary created in

Rome by Greek sculptors commissioned by the victorious generals of the Roman Republic. In Chapter 20 Stylianos Katakis focuses on the production in Greece of Roman imperial copies of classical masterpieces; it is remarkable that some copies were dedicated in the actual sanctuaries that held the originals.

Part VII is devoted to technical matters." Chapter 21 by Raphael Jacob offers an overview of metal attachments to marble sculptures, piecing and repairs. The question of polychromy is treated by Thomas Katsaros and Constantinos Vasiliadis in Chapter 22, which deals with literary sources and pigments, marshalling an array of painted sculptures mainly in the Acropolis Museum and the Athens National Museum.

The reception of Greek sculpture is addressed in Part VIII, where Michael Squire discusses attitudes towards Classical sculpture through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and early modern Europe in Chapter 23. <>

REIMAGINING SPIRIT: WIND, BREATH, AND VIBRATION by Grace Ji-Sun Kim [Cascade Books, 9781532689253]

The Spirit presents itself to many as an enigma. Its existence is mysterious and complex, generating misunderstandings and unawareness of its true purpose. The Spirit's ambiguous nature opens the opportunity for study to unearth the exciting truths that it holds. The Spirit is present in our world in various forms. This book aims to examine the Spirit as experienced in light, wind, breath, and vibration to help us uncover some of its aspects that invite us to work for climate justice, racial justice, and gender justice. The Holy Spirit has always been a mover and shaker of ideas and action. The Spirit's presence moves, stirs, and changes us to become aware of the social ills in our world. The different ways in which we reimagine the Holy Spirit can challenge some traditional assumptions in Christianity and provide a liberative vision that allows us to work for social justice. The work of the Holy Spirit stirs us to work toward new kinships with God that are sustainable, just, and whole.

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Excerpt: I am captivated by mystery. I have always confronted the unsolved problem, the unrevealed truth, and that thrilling uncertainty with a kind of confidence that was at times unprecedented or credulous. Yet the subject that has loomed over my unwavering nerve is also that of the greatest significance; it is the most enigmatic piece of the puzzle within my own spirituality: the Holy Spirit.

Like many others, I experience the Holy Spirit as a mystery. While it has been referenced routinely in historical texts and modern discourse, this entity is seldom understood. I have come a long way in my relationship to an understanding of the Holy Spirit, moving from a place of blind acknowledgment to a place of informed passion.

In my religious practice, I return time and time again to a position of investigation when studying the Spirit. In doing so, I try to make sense of the problems we face in the present day while also elucidating troubles in the past. It is a daunting task. However, this experience evokes challenging, powerful, and deeply personal insights that induce rare chances to recall lost memories and embrace new risks. Here, I am able to confront my whole past while continuing to embrace the future.

This book offers a distinct approach to the Holy Spirit. As you explore new territories, reach new communities, and travel the vastness of our Earth, you will recognize that the Spirit's presence transcends time, place, culture, and religion. It is completely free; it is important to be open to this notion as we explore together and create a pneumatology that speaks inclusively, on a local, global, and universal level.

Spirit's World

The world is filled with the Spirit. One can feel the presence of the Spirit everywhere. As the rate of globalization expands and travel becomes increasingly accessible, we will become witnesses to how the Spirit works in different communities other than our own. We can begin to see and experience the work of the Spirit in our churches, our communities, and our families as the world continues to largen and diversify. The Spirit lives in this ever-adapting world through its constant, unbroken presence in our lives.

As we see the work of the Spirit around the globe, some questions arise: Does the Spirit belong to Christianity or does it belong to the world?

Does such a question offer a better understanding of the Holy Spirit within and around us? Would this, in turn, inform our global comprehension of the Holy Spirit as a Christian vision of a universal human perception? The Spirit is God, and no one community can hold it or possess it. It is an unbound entity that is free to move as it wishes in the world. The gift of life and the struggle for equality in the ecosystem of life is sustained by the Spirit's power, and this cannot simply be contained in the church or within Christianity.

The Spirit manifests itself in the world. The Spirit comes to the whole world as it manifests itself in nature. 1 Most Christians tend to see it in relation to the Trinity, while other faiths might see it in relation to the cosmos or the body. Our lives are enhanced when we are aware of this presence and when we make room for its participation, allowing it to permeate our lives, moving and working within us.

Whenever we welcome and embrace the Spirit within our lives, we draw closer to God. God is in all things because all things are in God. God is ubiquitous: God is wherever creation is.2 God is all around us. The Spirit empowers us and possesses us to act, taking care of each other and creation. It begs us to deepen our knowledge of God and challenges us to search the world for more ways of speaking about the divine.

The Spirit is not owned by anyone, and we certainly cannot say that it is in the sole possession of Christians. People of different faiths also experience and articulate the Spirit in their lives. We know this because people have shared their stories and practices that involve the Spirit. The Spirit cannot be contained as the Spirit is free and moves where it will. Christianity cannot put a lock on how God is experienced by us or revealed to others. God says, "I Am Who I Am" (Exod 3:14), which shows the movement of God, unconstrained by human dictates or doings.

Christianity has tried to monopolize the divine Spirit for far too long through European colonization and cultural assimilation. The church has tried to teach the false sentiment that it is only Christianity

that has the Spirit and that all other "spirits" or experiences of the "spirit'" are untrue. As Christianity colonized different parts of the world, it spread its own version of God and the Spirit to overcome Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Christianity presented itself as the superior religion—the only "real" belief system—which understood and had a hold on the divine Spirit. The message was and is: "Only Christianity can provide understanding and comprehension of the Spirit." To experience and understand the Spirit (they said), one had to follow Christianity. In this modern world, where information and technology disseminate ever more rapidly throughout a diversifying world, is it not time to rethink, re-examine, and challenge these long-held beliefs and attitudes?

Whenever Christianity plays an imperialistic role, it tends to view itself as superior to belief systems where the culture's traditions are passed on orally rather than textually. As a result, the stranger becomes the other, an estranged being who is somehow deemed less worthy. However, those who maintain this perception fail to see the beauty that can only be discovered once they begin to recognize the stranger within themselves.

We understand that this Spirit cannot be constrained and withheld by Christianity. We cannot imprison the Spirit within Christianity and present it to the world as if only Christians can encounter the Spirit. Christians are not the center by any overwhelming margin, and we cannot hold onto something that "hovers over the surface of the water" (Gen 1:2) and that declares, "I will be what I will be" (Exod 3:14). The Spirit is boundless, and it is both naïve and ignorant for Christians to claim that it is only their Spirit that is holy. In so many ways, the Spirit opens rather than closes the door for us to be in conversation with the world's religions. Thus, the presence of the Spirit creates an "open space" wherein we encounter the other—in fact all others—in full dignity and uniqueness.

The Christian doctrine of the Spirit's freedom is vital as we hope to open dialogue among different faith traditions. As the Spirit moves in our lives and gives us breath, life, and sustenance, we become open to all the movements of the Spirit in all parts of the world, in all traditions, all cultures, and all religions. This is a movement of the Spirit that no one person, doctrine, or church can stop.

Hybrid Pneumatology

Contextual theology sees religious pluralism as an exception rather than the norm. Liberation is not imposing a new idea; it is a response to voices within and outside of the biblical tradition. A hybrid pneumatology is not bound within the limits of Christianity when it searches for contextual methods of understanding the Spirit. Hybrid pneumatology is Christianity remaining bound to the Spirit itself rather than to the Spirit of a philosophical ideology. It can open other religious sources to illuminate our understanding of the Spirit. As we talk about God and Spirit, it is crucial to contemporary theological discourse that we are not just open to other religious views and understandings but also respect these beliefs within the landscape of our own.

Many people live in the in-between space of different groups: different generations, different social networks, and different cultures. This is of course not a set space but rather an unbounded, porous setting that allows its residents to move freely. In respect to religious differences, we must understand that despite different belief systems, there can never be a wholly monolithic framework. These things exist dynamically in reaction and relation to the conditions they are set in. It is in this in-between space that we find divine existence. The reign of God is built in the areas between us; therefore, that space becomes sacred ground. The Divine exists in a space beyond our imagination. We can begin to theologize and encounter the Divine in this space, which is open, vibrant, and infinite.

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This re-envisioned pneumatology works toward eliminating destructive habits, such as racism and sexism, both of which are heavily ingrained within all dominant modern societies. In turn, the understanding of Chi vibration, breath, light, and Spirit will empower all people to live holistic lives while working towards making this world a better place for all those who inhabit it.

Book Outline

The Spirit is not part of the observable world, and because we cannot see it or touch it, we will never fully uncover its mysteries. However, we can uncover the ways that the Spirit is present in our world by examining our experiences with light, wind, and vibration. This book will examine these ways of experiencing the Spirit in the world, and in connecting the Spirit with creation, it will ultimately emphasize the great importance of creation care. Environmental justice has not been a priority in many of our lives. This book invites us to participate in taking care of all of God's creation.

The same Spirit who was present at creation reminds us of God's continued presence in creation today. Though we are collectively ignoring the cries of the Earth, the Spirit is begging us to take care of the Earth, for in doing so, we are taking care of each other and God. Climate change is the monumental issue of our time, and in order to work towards improving the state of our Earth, we need to take a closer look at our theology and pneumatology, because how we view God has a direct impact on how we take care of the planet.

This book will follow three movements: light, wind, and vibration. These three movements will work toward deepening the understanding of God as Spirit, which I hope will inspire all of us to become involved in creation care and sustainable practices. The book will begin with contextual pneumatology and will subsequently explore Spirit as light, wind, and vibration. The chapters will be a biblical/theological study of the work of the Spirit—the overall "work of the Spirit"—illustrated from Scripture, history, culture, and doctrine. These chapters will each be tied to social justice issues, such as climate change, racism, and sexism. Adopting the living expression of the Spirit's actions as light, wind, and vibration will inspire us to work for change and move towards greater equity and good.

This book challenges an assumption some Christians make that the Holy Spirit is only available to baptized Christians, promoting the view that the Spirit exists in all cultures and faiths. God's affirmation, "I will be who I will be," (Exod 3:14) illustrates that the Spirit cannot be restricted by one religious group and is present in all creation and among all people, including "the other."

We live in a global world, and therefore, it is crucial that we talk about the Spirit in ways that are and can be experienced globally. We live in a world where divergent cultures and religions feud over legitimacy; the need to coexist compassionately becomes essential as we seek environmental and social aid.

This book is biblically and theologically grounded, tackling one of the most important topics of our day. The environmental path that society has chosen is a clear path to destruction. Therefore, it is necessary that we take actions that are informed by faith and beliefs. It is crucial that corrective measures are initiated immediately. We have been taught that the Spirit is gentle, that it is the comforter that Jesus sends to us, but it is important to recognize that for all the Spirit's kindness, its power is unimaginable. The power of the Spirit will transform our lives, our ways of thinking, and our experiences of God. These transformative experiences will offer us the tools we need to live sustainably in nature as God's creation and God's love.

This book will provoke readers into higher consciousness and push them to think of experiencing and referring to the Holy Spirit in deeper and more innovative ways. It will awaken readers to the Spirit's presence in their lives, helping all to recognize the power it holds—reinvigorating and surprising us with newfound knowledge, opportunities, power, and passion. <>

CHRISTIAN METAPHYSICS AND NEOPLATONISM by Albert Camus, Epilogue by Rémi Brague, Translated with a Preface and Introduction by Ronald D. Srigley [The Eric Voegelin Society, St. Augustine's Press, 9781587311147]

Contemporary scholarship tends to view Albert Camus as a modern, but he himself was conscious of the past and called the transition from Hellenism to Christianity the true and only turning point in history. For Camus, modernity was not fully comprehensible without an examination of the aspirations that were first articulated in antiquity and that later received their clearest expression in Christianity. These aspirations amounted to a fundamental reorientation of human life in politics, religion, science, and philosophy. Understanding the nature and achievement of that reorientation became the central task of Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism. Primarily known through its inclusion in a French omnibus edition, it has remained one of Camus' least-read works, yet it marks his first attempt to understand the relationship between Greek philosophy and Christianity as he charted the movement from the Gospels through Gnosticism and Plotinus to what he calls Augustine's second revelation of the Christian faith. Ronald Srigley's translation of this seminal document helps illuminate these aspects of Camus' work. His freestanding English edition exposes readers to an important part of Camus' thought that is often overlooked by those concerned primarily with the book's literary value and supersedes the extant McBride translation by retaining a greater degree of literalness. Srigley has fully annotated Christian Metaphysics to include nearly all of Camus' original citations and has tracked down many poorly identified sources. When Camus cites an ancient primary source, whether in French translation or in the original language, Srigley substitutes a standard English translation in the interest of making his edition accessible to a wider range of readers. His introduction places the text in the context of Camus' better-known later work, explicating its relationship to those mature writings and exploring how its themes were reworked in subsequent books. Arguing that Camus was one of the great critics of modernity through his attempt to disentangle the Greeks from the Christians, Srigley clearly demonstrates the place of Christian Metaphysics in Camus' oeuvre. As the only stand-alone English version of this important work--and a long-overdue critical edition--his fluent translation is an essential benchmark in our understanding of Camus and his place in modern thought.

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Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism examines the transition in the West from classical Greek civilization to Christianity. It is Camus' most extended discussion of the period and his first attempt to explain the novelty of the Christian religion in comparison to the religion and philosophy of the ancients, a subject that would occupy him for the remainder of his career. His argument is essentially Nietzsche's in The Birth of Tragedy, though with reservations. Christianity reintroduces into the West the tragic seriousness of the ancient Greeks and thus serves as a corrective to the "womanish flight from seriousness and terror" introduced by Socrates' rationalism, Attic comedy, and Euripides' drama.' Like Nietzsche, Camus praises Christianity's achievement while remaining skeptical about its claim to have initiated an unprecedented change in or revelation of our relationship to the divine. Christianity's profound truth lies not in this assertion but in its unacknowledged return to the ancients.

Camus had reservations about the argument. Despite his notion of a Hellenized Christianity and his highly approbative account of Christianity's political importance (it remains "the only effective shield against the calamity of the Western world," he tells us), at the conclusion of Christian Metaphysics, he wonders whether he has captured the "profound novelty" of the religion. "But we are also aware that, were it dismantled entirely into foreign elements, we would still recognize it as original because of a more subdued resonance than the world has yet heard." Christianity may have borrowed extensively from the classical traditions of the Eastern Mediterranean basin in order to articulate its central doctrines; and it may have employed Greek formulas in particular to clarify its emotional aspirations; yet despite this "agreement" with the thinking of ancients, there was something in the Christian teaching to which figures such as Plotinus, Celsus, and Porphyry simply could not assent, and with them the entire ancient world.

Camus' explanation of Christianity's novelty in Christian Metaphysics is complex and nuanced. However, there is one feature of that explanation that runs throughout the analysis and forms the center around which the other features cluster. This is Christianity's notion of an apocalyptic history and a final redemption in the afterlife. Camus sets aside more common explanations of Christian novelty, such as faith, because faith, with its subordination of reason, is a subsidiary phenomenon devised only to shelter Christianity's primary ambitions from unfettered critical appraisal. These primary ambitions are the real source of its novelty and the true object of Camus' analysis.

Camus' assessment of Christian redemption in Christian Metaphysics is mixed. Sometimes he argues that Christianity's apocalypticism is a faithful articulation of its tragic sensibility. Christianity's profound attachment to life (an essential condition of tragedy) is best measured by the imperiousness of its demand that life be continued. Unlike Pascal, who teaches us that being unable to cure death it is best we do not think about it, Camus claims that " [t]he whole effort of Christianity is to oppose itself to this slowness of heart." However, Camus also argues that Christian redemption entails the abandonment of the classical pursuit of the good in favor of a salvation in which nature is escaped rather than perfected. In this reading, the motivation of Christian apocalypticism is not attachment but fear, a fear that is willing to forego attachment in favor of self-interest and is therefore anything but tragic. In a notebook entry from 1940, some three years after the completion of Christian Metaphysics, Camus chooses between these interpretations and thus sets the groundwork for his mature assessment of the tradition: "If we tear out the last pages of the New Testament, then what we see set forth is a religion of loneliness and human grandeur. Certainly, its bitterness makes it unbearable. But that is its truth, and the all the rest is a lie."

* * *

Camus never retracted his criticism of the apocalyptic aspirations of the Christian religion. That criticism later became central to The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel, as well as to novels like The Stranger and The Plague. However, it did not entail for Camus the further denial of God or the sacred. The climate of opinion in which Camus was working was largely unamenable to this type of argument. Christians and their critics alike tended to identify the notion of divinity with the affirmation of an afterlife. In order to articulate his more nuanced account, Camus referred increasingly to paradoxical formulations of the following type: "Secret of my universe: imagine God without the immortality of the soul." "The Greeks made allowances for the divine. But the divine was not everything." "I often read that I am atheistic; I hear people speak of my atheism. Yet these words say nothing to me; for me they have no meaning. I do not believe in God and I am not an atheist."

There are a number of important things being said here, all of which require interpretation. Although the Christian account retained the notion of a "spiritual nature" and therefore offered some ground of resistance to the violence of the age, there was for Camus something about its notion of divinity and its apocalyptic ambitions that not only proved ineffective in resisting that violence, but may also have abetted it, however unwittingly. There are several ways in which Camus makes the argument, some of which are familiar to scholars. One of the more powerful is his claim that Christianity's emphasis on transcendence as the most important index of divinity and redemption contributed in a decisive way to emptying the world of its substance. There is nothing wrong with transcendence per se. As early as The Myth of Sisyphus Camus had argued that the existential confrontation he aimed to describe was with a "reality that transcends [him] (une réalité qui le dépasse)" in various ways. Rather what concerned him was the narrowing and elevating of the term to such a degree that it had the reverse effect of siphoning from the world virtually every last trace of its mystery and meaning. That is why in The Rebel Camus agrees with Nietzsche's "paradoxical but significant conclusion that God has been killed by Christianity, in that Christianity has secularized the sacred." The rational, systematic murder of human beings would soon follow this murder of the sacred and holy.

In his 1958 Preface to The Wrong Side and the Right Side, Camus wrote, "I wanted to change lives, yes, but not the world which I worshipped as divine.'" For Camus the mystery or sacred is not an occasional experience of transcendence but something that exists in everything we experience in an essential way. His best art, for instance, lyrical essays like "Return to Tipasa," are extraordinary evocations of that mystery that both enrich our desire and calm our worst fears and fanaticisms. "The secret I am looking for is buried in a valley of olive trees, beneath the grass and cold violets, around an old house that smells of vines." This is not poetic affectation. The secret — the mystery — is in such things. There is no adequate name for that mystery. It is not a place, still less an ethic or law. As Camus says earlier in the essay, we live for something that transcends ethics and its nagging complaint against the world. Yet it is present everywhere and to all and the experience of it for Camus provides the wisdom necessary to guide our actions and to teach us that our actions are not everything. By learning to see once again the sacred in everything around us we may find relief from both the elsewhereness of our religious hopes and our modern, willful attempts to realize them.

Christian Metaphysics was the first step of a remarkable intellectual adventure that would lead Camus to redefine and reinvigorate a sense of the sacred for an entire generation. <>

Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity edited by Panagiotis G. Pavios, Lars Fredrik Janby, Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, and Torstein Theodor Tollefsen [Studies in Philosophy and Theology in Late Antiquity, Routledge, 9781138340954]

PLATONISM AND CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IN LATE ANTIQUITY examines the various ways in which Christian intellectuals engaged with Platonism both as a pagan competitor and as a source of philosophical material useful to the Christian faith. The chapters are united in their goal to explore transformations that took place in the reception and interaction process between Platonism and Christianity in this period.

The contributions in this volume explore the reception of Platonic material in Christian thought, showing that the transmission of cultural content is always mediated, and ought to be studied as a transformative process by way of selection and interpretation. Some chapters also deal with various aspects of the wider discussion on how Platonic, and Hellenic, philosophy and early Christian thought related to each other, examining the differences and common ground between these traditions.

PLATONISM AND CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IN LATE ANTIQUITY offers an insightful and broad ranging study on the subject, which will be of interest to students of both philosophy and theology in the Late Antique period, as well as anyone working on the reception and history of Platonic thought, and the development of Christian thought.

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Some observations on Christian intellectuals' own methodologies might also be in order here. First, there was no lack of endorsements of Platonic philosophy among early Christians, including acknowledgements that the Platonists had come close to the truth. Even the mature Augustine, for example, could claim that no other philosophical school had come closer to the Christian doctrine than the Platonists. With such statements, the usefulness of Platonic doctrines and concepts were given an explicit endorsement. Based on the perceived similarities between Platonism and Christianity, Christian intellectuals also willingly appropriated Platonic material for their own purposes. But which methodological principles did they themselves use when engaging with the Platonic material; how did they reason about their appropriation of material from Platonic philosophers? This is the subject of Part I of this volume, which deals with Christian methodologies and rhetorical strategies in the encounters with Platonic material.

There was a long-standing Christian discourse on Hellenic culture that had established some methodological principles for how Christians rightfully could engage with pagan material and use it for their own ends. The arguably most famous expression of this methodology is found in the application of the verse in Exod 12:35-36, in which the Israelites were asked to plunder the silver, gold, and clothing of the Egyptians on their way to the promised land. According to these methodological principles, the truth necessarily belonged to Christianity, and therefore all truth rightfully had to be considered Christian truth. From the viewpoint of Christian intellectuals, the use of Platonic material was therefore not seen as appropriation, but was justified and explained as re-appropriation. Based on the principle of "fair use" (usus iustus), the intellectual heritage of Hellenic culture could be integrated into Christian culture with only small modifications. From this perspective, Hellenic philosophy was still considered as lacking or false, but nonetheless, it justified the practice of using in their own rational inquiries elements from Hellenic philosophy that was perceived to be in agreement with Christian teachings. If something true was found in Plato or in the later Platonic tradition, then it had to be reckoned as a truth belonging to Christianity. Acknowledgement of Platonism was thus not an acknowledgement of intellectual debt, but a purification of truth from the falsehood of paganism. To appropriate material from a pagan context to a Christian one, was equal to removing any disturbing or false elements from the truth; to engage with Plato was to purify the unclean and put it into its appropriate context. In the first chapter of this volume, Sébastien Morlet inquires into this methodology of early Christian intellectuals, examining how key figures like Origen, Clement of Alexandria and Eusebius viewed the agreements and disagreements between Platonism and Christianity. This reveals the rich discourse established in

early Christianity for how to deal with the apparent truths, which could be found in Platonic writings.

Another methodological strategy was that of casting Plato and his philosophy, which arguably had anteceded Christianity in the chronological order, as a "preparation" for the Gospels. Clement of Alexandria was one of the first writers to view Hellenic philosophy as preparation for Christianity — the Greek philosophers has anteceded the Gospels, but only with Christ, the incarnated Word, did the truths of Hellenic philosophy find their fulfillment. This methodology effectively offered an intellectual resolution to the dual relationship toward the philosophical tradition: by being assigned a preparatory role, Hellenic philosophy was conceded a certain part in the truth, while at the same time being kept at a distance from the truth itself because it did not take part in Revelation. As preparation, Hellenic philosophy was never sufficient in itself, but would need Christianity for its partial truths to find their fulfillment. Christians could in this way acknowledge the achievements of rational analysis and the relative merits of Plato and the later Platonic tradition without conceding to Platonism knowledge of the essential truths, which only had been communicated to human beings with Revelation. In accordance with this strategy, Hellenic philosophy was incorporated within history, and Platonism could be given a position in preparing the ground for the Christian faith. Relegated to preparation and introduction, Hellenic philosophy would always remain outside of salvific knowledge. This methodology was suitable to justify the appropriation of philosophical material in a selective way, whenever something was found that was in accordance with the faith. In her chapter, Christina Hoenig explores the strategy employed by Augustine in using Plato as a pseudo-prophet against later Platonists. By reference to metaphysical and epistemological language from the Timaeus, Augustine argues that Plato anticipated the human-divine relationship that was revealed through the Gospel — a strategy by which, as Hoenig shows, Augustine pits Plato against the current-day Platonists who refuse to acknowledge the incarnated Word. Plato had perhaps not grasped the role of the mediator, but he evidently understood a lot more than his arrogant inheritors, Augustine argues.

We ought not to forget that there existed a relationship of competition between Platonism and Christianity in Late Antiquity — Platonism was not only perceived as a rival in intellectual matters that sometimes erred in its rational inquiries, but as a movement that itself had religious qualities (or at any rate was perceived to have such qualities in the religious landscape of the period). Platonic philosophy was committed to inquire by rational means into the principles of reality, but it also held these highest principles to be divine. Plotinus added an element of spiritual mysticism to his interpretation of Plato's philosophy, and later Neoplatonists only reinforced this vein of spiritual or religious sentiment to the Platonic tradition in Late Antiquity. Any modern bifurcation between philosophy and religion was non-existent, and hence Christians naturally perceived Platonism as a religious competitor. The Platonism of Late Antiquity must have been seen by Christians as a religion on its own, committed to a philosophy that offered salvation. Platonism might even have competed with Christianity on the universal salvation of human beings, as seen for example in the works of Porphyry. The philosopher from Tyre remained a perennial foe to the Christian faith. In her chapter, Christine Hecht explores Eusebius' reception of Porphyry's daemonology. The daemons were a part of the inventory of the classical world that caused much distress to the Christian system — Christ had of course come to break the chains of the daemons and free human beings from their evil influence. Hecht shows the rhetorical aims involved in Eusebius' representation of Porphyry's daemonology, which often distorted what seem to have been the philosopher's original claims about the daemons.

What did Christians find useful in Platonism?

In general terms, Platonism had an enabling effect on the early Christian tradition. It was enabling in the sense that it provided Christians with an intellectual apparatus that allowed for new and advanced interpretations of beliefs and doctrines, providing a philosophical system consisting of terms and conceptions that could be integrated as means to interpretations and problem-solving within the faith. This claim is of course, to some degree or another, valid for all ancient schools of philosophy, and there were certainly also other philosophical traditions that made their influence on early Christian thought, such as Stoicism, for example. However, it is likely correct to say that among the philosophical schools of Antiquity, it was with the Platonic tradition that Christian intellectuals enjoyed the most creative and enduring relationship. A correspondence between Plato's philosophy and the Christian religion was observed by several Christian thinkers in Late Antiquity. Augustine could even claim that the extent of agreement between two movements was so large that the difference mainly was a matter of words.' Sympathetic reading of Plato's writings could extend further than expected, surprisingly even into areas of Christian doctrine in which there was widespread acknowledgement that Platonic philosophy diverged from the faith: in his Stromateis, for example, Clement of Alexandria speculated that the myth of Er in Plato's The Republic is an allusion to the resurrection of the body; Justin Martyr was even willing to believe that the letter chi (X) which Plato in the Timaeus held to be the shape of the world soul, was a reference to the cross of Christ.

Within which areas of philosophy were early Christians most likely to perceive common ground with the Platonists? It seems that the observation of a widespread appropriation of Platonic philosophy in Christian thought requires an explanation. How do we explain the relative appeal of Platonism to Christian thought? What was it about Platonic philosophy — in comparison to other philosophical schools in antiquity — that made it seem so useful to Christians in their intellectual inquiries? Evidence suggests that metaphysics is the area in which early Christians tended to find the most extensive agreements between the faith and Platonic philosophy. What the two movements have in common is the belief that the world depends on the absolute reality of a divine being, since also Christians could think of the principles of the cosmos as keeping place in an invisible realm unavailable to the senses. The Platonic doctrine that there is a primary reality that exists prior to the physical world that we can apprehend with our senses, was easily integrated into the Christian distinction between God the creator and the created world, although there were differences in how they saw generation or creation to have taken place. Adopting Platonic discourse, Christians acquired a way to articulate the chasm between Creator and creation by using distinctions such as invisible/visible, permanence/becoming, and the novel uncreated/created, essence/activity.

More broadly, Christianity did find much common ground with the metaphysical inquiries of ancient philosophy. Ancient philosophy had always been committed to inquire into the principles of reality, and this was a philosophical discourse into which Christian intellectuals willingly entered. One of the main objections against Hellenic philosophy was the status of the cosmos, which Christians held to have been created from nothing (creatio ex nihilo) with a temporal beginning. In their arguments against the Hellenic philosophers, Christian intellectuals attempted to show that the principle of reality that the philosophers had been searching for is the Christian God, who is the ultimate cause that has generated the cosmos. Here, however, Christian interpreters could find a philosophical ally in Plato. Christian engagement with Platonist metaphysics had Plato's Timaeus as its main text — the work had a formidable history of reception in Christian literature, which was anticipated by Philo of Alexandria, who already had made use of the Timaeus in his interpretation of Genesis. For later Christian writers too, the cosmogonic explanation given in the Timaeus largely agreed with the creation account in Genesis. In the cosmogonic account presented in the Timaeus, the demiurge is

held to be the superior principle of generation, shaping the cosmos after the Forms. Its goodness is not inherent to the cosmos itself, but arranged from the outside. In the Christian perception, the Timaeus story nicely fitted with the key doctrine that the cosmos is created — and not eternal, as ancient philosophy otherwise would have it to be. While there were various interpretations of the demiurge within the Platonic tradition, Christians agreed with the idea that the cosmos is generated by a divine principle, that is, an active principle of generation, which otherwise could not be found in the other philosophical schools. According to this interpretation of the cosmogony in the Timaeus, Christians could establish common ground with Platonism with regard to the generation of the world.

Part II of the volume is focused on cosmology. Beside philosophical inquiries into the fundamental principles of reality, cosmology in the Platonic tradition also dealt with matter. Being either a preexisting something or the last phase of emanation void of form, matter remained somewhat of an "embarrassment" to the spiritual and moral aspirations of the Platonic philosopher, but none the less a subject worthy of analysis. Moreover, it held an indisputable position within the Platonic movement, since Plato had dealt with matter in the Timaeus — although in a way that left much room for interpretations by the later tradition. Matter was also subject to reception in early Christian thought, as shown by Enrico Moro in "Patristic reflections on formless matter." The doctrine of creation had a prominent standing within Christian theology. Christians did of course take a positive view on creation, which they held to be the product of the creator God in Genesis. But where did matter fit in this picture? Moro analyses the Platonic concept of prime matter in early Christian thought, showing how this concept could be employed in inquiries into Genesis and the creation of the world, enabling new interpretations of Scripture. However, reception can differ from the original: in his chapter "Plotinus' doctrine of badness as matter in Ennead I 8 (51),"

Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson examines Plotinus' claim that matter is absolute badness. Plotinus held that matter, since it is devoid of form, being and goodness, must be responsible for bad things for living bodies, such as illness, poverty, and vice in souls. The chapter discusses Plotinus' explanation as to how badness is related to matter, and moreover puts into perspective the receptions that Moro analyses in the preceding chapter (as well as other aspects of Christian reception of Plotinus).

One of the fundamental divergences between Platonism and Christian thought is the question about the provenance of the world. For the Platonist, the cosmos is eternal, and any notion of creation would amount to nothing other than the formation of a preexisting material. In other words, for the Platonists the basic principle of cosmology is "order out of chaos." For the Christian, though, the cosmos was not always there. It has been created out of nothing. Implicit at the beginnings of Christianity, or explicit after the contributions of the Cappadocians, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo established one of the central distinctions between Platonic and Christian thought. This issue is treated by Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, who compares the cosmological doctrines of the Neoplatonist Proclus with the Christian doctrine of John Philoponus and Maximus the Confessor. For the Neoplatonists the world has always existed, since the paradigm, according to which it is created, is eternal. Against this view, the Christians claimed that the world has a beginning a defmite number of time-units ago. The world is created from nothing, by the will of God, and it is created "recently," as said by Maximus. Tollefsen's chapter has two foci: The author treats first the Alexandrine Christian philosopher John Philoponus' critique of the Neoplatonist Proclus' cosmology. Then he focuses on Maximus the Confessor's doctrine of creation and asks whether one may detect any influence on Maximus from Philoponus.

Part III of the volume contains chapters addressing Christian receptions of Platonic metaphysics. Lars Fredrik Janby examines the philosophy of number in Augustine's early works. The chapter argues

that this aspect of Augustine's philosophy must be read in context with the intellectual problems that occupied him at the beginning of his career as a writer. To that effect, the chapter considers the conceptual pair sensible and intelligible number, and its relation to the idea that the transient physical world reflects immutable, eternal unity. The chapter also investigates the fortunes of Augustine's philosophy of number in later writings, inquiring into how his perceptions about cognition of number changed. In his chapter, Daniel J. Tolan examines the role of the doctrine of the divine ideas in Christian and Platonic orthodoxy. Tolan shows how divine exemplarism was useful in defending divine simplicity, allowing Christian intellectuals to consider the created world as a temporal image of divine ideas, which are outside of time. Tolan's chapter draws on a number of sources to investigate the development of this doctrine and the various intellectual issues it confronted, including Plato's Timaeus, Philo of Alexandria, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Plotinus and, finally, Athanasius.

Panagiotis G. Pavlos' chapter aims at offering insights on Dionysius the Areopagite's notion of theurgy. Pavlos takes over the remark that despite the linguistic affinities and terminological appropriations — whether Iamblichean or Procline — Dionysius' premises on the matter remain radically different from that of Neoplatonism, both in terms of the sacramental tradition he recapitulates and the wider Christian metaphysical contours he adheres to. He examines Dionysian theurgy both with respect to the metaphysical principles that connect with Θεουργία and the particular sacramental reality that emerges from it. Dimitrios A. Vasilakis examines the notion of hierarchy in Dionysius the Areopagite. In contrast to its modern usage, Dionysian hierarchy does not primarily refer to stratification or rank of power. Vasilakis focuses on the definition of hierarchy from Dionysius' Celestial Hierarchy with the aid of relevant passages from the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. He explains how hierarchy relates to order, i.e. in what way hierarchy is a well-ordered system of entities, where one can indeed detect stratification. Through this ordering the higher entities (in the case of the Church: the hierarchs, the priests and their deacons) help the lower ones (the laity) to reach God, i.e. deification, as far as possible to each of them, through the sacraments of the Church. Hierarchy's last trait is understanding, which should not be understood merely intellectually, but erotically, as Vasilakis shows.

The Neoplatonist reception and development of Aristotelian logic had a great impact on Christian thought. Sebastian Mateiescu's chapter focuses on how this kind of logic served the theologians especially in the Christological controversy. Theological inquiries into the philosophical problem of the universals grew after the Council of Chalcedon (451). Maximus the Confessor presented an alternative to nominalism with respect to the species that the Miaphysite/anti-Chalcedonian theologians shared with several philosophers. As Mateiescu argues, this alternative can be labelled immanent realism. Influenced by Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus innovatively combines principles within logic and metaphysics in elaborating this doctrine. It is well known that participation is a central concept in Neoplatonist as well as in Christian systems of thought. However, in his chapter Jordan Daniel Wood shows that the Christians, in case Maximus the Confessor, needed to develop this notion of how entities relate to one another with the idea of perichōrēsis or mutual interpenetration. This topic is especially relevant for issues in Christology and the Christian doctrine of deification. On the background of Cappadocian trinitarian theology and Christology, Maximus elaborates a perichoretic logic that pertains to the relation between God and the world in eschatology (i.e. deification), effectuating an identity that goes beyond the Neoplatonic participation.

While receptions of metaphysics and cosmology perhaps were more frequent, there are interesting issues related to the field of moral theory as well when studying the intersection between Platonism and Christian thought. Any Platonic proclivity to value the sensible world lower than the higher

realm could moreover be paired with Christian moralists' call to contempt for the pleasures of this world, since both valued the physical world lower than the eternal, invisible source on which it depends. Part IV of the volume covers aspects of Christian moral theory in relation to Platonism. E. Brown Dewhurst compares notions of knowledge of the divine in the works of Maximus the Confessor and Proclus. Contrasting different aspects of their thought such as nature, providence, and apophaticism in relation to knowledge, the chapter concludes that knowledge for Maximus always is rooted in relationality — a notion which is rather absent in the Neoplatonic philosopher. A fundamental difference between Proclus and Maximus in this respect is found to be notable in the way that divine disclosure of knowledge bridges the gap between God and human beings in Maximus' theology. It is above all the union of Christ's humanity and divinity, the chapter argues, which makes the quest for knowledge into a relationship of love with the divine that is incompatible with Proclus' metaphysics. Adrian Pirtea examines the formation of passions in Porphyry and Evagrius, exploring some possible connections between the philosophical treatises of Plotinus' illustrious student and the ascetic writings of the Christian ascetic author. Porphyry has rarely been considered as a source of Christian ethics, but through a close reading of key passages in their works, Pirtea argues that Evagrius' theory of passions has much in common with the philosopher from Tyre — more so than with the Stoics, which often have been held to be the source of this theory. As Pirtea shows, both Porphyry and Evagrius show an interest in explaining how the passions originate from the soul's involvement with the sensible realm by using Platonic and Aristotelic psychology. Even Evagrius' concept of apatheia, the chapter argues, seems to be closer to the Neoplatonic understanding of freedom from passions than that of the Stoics. In the final chapter of the volume, Tomas Ekenberg discusses whether Augustine's notion of the happy life in fact agrees with that of the Epicureans. Augustine is one of the Christian intellectuals that frequently is cast as a "Christian Platonist" in scholarly literature, but despite all his appropriations and explicit endorsement of Platonism, he sometimes departs from their philosophy in ways that can be unexpected. Defending his claim, Ekenberg contends that the many positive valuations of pleasure in Augustine ought to be accounted for, and argues that his position is more similar to the Epicureans' than any other philosophical school in Antiquity.

Irreconcilable differences

How far did Christian receptions of Platonism extend? Let us first consider the expression "Christian Platonism," which frequently occurs in scholarship, and which suggests something like a synthesis forged between Christianity and Platonism in Late Antiquity. As a historical claim, it seems to be supported by the widespread appropriation of Platonic material that one finds in Christian writings. We submit, however, that any such claim about a historical fusion or synthesis between the two movements is misguiding. Despite the extent of these appropriations, we need as historians of philosophy to acknowledge that Christian integration of Platonism had its limitations. Unconditional approval of Platonism is after all not possible to find in any Christian writer from this period. On the contrary, evidence indicates that even the most sympathetic Christians always had some reservations about Platonism — including Christian writers who were inclined to integrate larger portions of Platonic philosophy in their thought. Augustine for example, despite all his enthusiasm for the discovery of the Platonic treatises that prompted his conversion, always dissociated himself from those of the Neoplatonist claims that went contrary to the faith, even in the fledgling years of his career, when he had but an elementary understanding of Christian doctrines."

In this regard, Dorrie has claimed that any historical analysis of Christian receptions of Platonism should recognize the differences and boundaries which Christians perceived between their own views and those of the Platonists. According to Dörrie's argument, the essential doctrines of the Platonic movement were all rejected by Christians. To take one of Dörrie's examples, Nicene

Christians could impossibly accept any doctrine which stratified the divinity — such a doctrine was however essential to Neoplatonic metaphysics. Christian reception was therefore never substantial; it was limited to fragments and pieces that were incorporated into Christian thought. The observation of such irreconcilable differences between Platonism and Christianity led Dörrie to the conclusion that not only was there never such a thing as Christian Platonism in this period — according to him, there was only a Christian "anti-Platonism." While the latter may be a somewhat exaggerated claim, we think Dörrie is correct to the extent that despite widespread sympathy, no Christian writer from this period gave their full endorsement to the Platonists or completely adopted Platonic philosophy. From the Christian view, there was always a chasm separating the faith from paganism, and wherever there was endorsement, there was only conditional endorsement — which made any hypothetical "Christian Platonism" impossible. Christian intellectuals were understandably wary of endorsing Platonism — and, in cases of endorsement aply did so by adding cautious disclaimers. Notwithstanding the truths it was held to communicate, Platonism was always held at a distance from the truth itself. From this perspective, there always remained a basic flaw about the Platonic system in the eyes of Christians since, despite their achievements within rational inquiries, the Platonists had been ignorant of or neglected Revelation.

The history of philosophy in Late Antiquity cannot exclusively be described in terms of continuities. Cracks and ruptures in the transitions of the Greco-Roman world in this period are as much part of this history as the continuities, if we are to give a correct representation of the period. The editors of this volume do not believe that the many observations of appropriation of Platonic material justify any claim that early Christianity forged a synthesis with Platonism. Further studies into Christian receptions of Platonism in Late Antiquity will bring more knowledge about how Christian writers mediated that material by way of selections and interpretations. These cracks have their rightful place in the history as well — late ancient history is not to be regarded as an intellectual relay in which Christians transmitted what the genius of the Greeks had invented. Such cracks and ruptures cannot only be studied in the polemics of Christian writers against paganism — they can also be observed and studied in any reception of pagan material by inquiring into how that material was transformed when transported into Christian contexts. What we study when we study the receptions of Platonism is necessarily excerpts that were taken from one context and placed into another. In Christian contexts, the philosophical material was interpreted from new perspectives, with new meaning being added. <>

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS READ SCRIPTURE edited by Jacob L. Goodson [Lexington Books, 9781498537957]

This collection introduces readers to the philosophical interpretation of Scripture, specifically within American Philosophy. The purpose of the collection concerns starting a conversation about the practice and task of the philosophical interpretation of Scripture. Reflections on the philosophical interpretation of Scripture have been treated more as a "conversation-stopper" than a conversation-starter within the American academy. To start such a conversation, this collection offers substantive accounts of the role of Scripture in the philosophical thought of fifteen American philosophers: Jane Addams, Henry Bugbee, Stanley Cavell, John Dewey, Jonathan Edwards, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, William James, Martin Luther King, Jr., Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce, Richard Rorty, George Santayana, Henry David Thoreau, and Cornel West.

Reviews

This collection of explorations into the manner and purpose of American philosophers' reading of Scripture pushes back against trends in academic philosophy that seek to block this path of inquiry. The authors investigate the question with acuity, inventiveness, and care, such that the reader wants to learn more about the philosophers, previously known or unknown, whose use of Scripture has gone unnoticed or ignored. The book is a welcome invitation to a rich and longer conversation. (Seth Vannatta, professor and chair, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Morgan State University)

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS READ SCRIPTURE breaks down the old reason versus revelation debate surrounding scriptural interpretation by showing how American philosophers—regardless of theological tradition or religious orientation—used scripture as evidence for arguments or as inspirational starting-points of musement and action. It also highlights the critical role that reading plays in the life of those who write, be it Biblical texts or not. It also works at a meta-level, as astute philosophy and religion scholars read scripture along with those classic American scholars who read scripture. The book reminds us that the philosophical life extends into whatever text we read. (Brad Elliott Stone, Loyola Marymount University)

Surprising—I am delighted but surprised by the subject of this book. I had agreed to blurb the book because I think so highly of its editor, but I confess I thought the topic to be "one off." But these are wonderful essays that not only through light on largely ignored American philosophers (Bugbee) but just as important we learn how scripture can be read in constructive manner. I cannot recommend this book highly enough because it turns out the subject is not only interesting but significant for how to go on philosophically. (Stanley Hauerwas, Duke University Divinity School)

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The What, The How, The Why

There are three components to thinking about the place of Scripture within American philosophy, and each of the components was hinted at in the previous discussion. The what signals the question of what philosophers actually say about biblical passages, and the majority of chapters in this collection aim to answer this question. This is a content question. I have found that the majority of American philosophers—who write in the traditions of naturalism, pragmatism, transcendentalism, and so on—actually have some thoughts on the content and meaning of at least one biblical passage. Within biblical interpretation, however, it becomes difficult to articulate the what without the how: how does an American philosopher address, interpret, and use a particular biblical passage? Because of the difficulty of articulating the what without the how, a majority of chapters in this collection offer either substantive or suggestive reflections on the how. The final two chapters in this collection address the how but take the question in a significantly different direction: how does the attentiveness to Scripture, which we find in the work of both Jonathan Edwards and Charles Sanders Peirce, offer a "how-to" for the task of scriptural interpretation within a particular religious tradition? In the two cases of the final chapters of this collection, the religious traditions are Christianity and Islam.

Why would philosophers interpret, read, and use Scripture in the first place? The chapters in this collection do not address this question as much as they do the questions of the how and the what. The why for philosophers who are religious themselves might be quite simple: they take the Bible as authoritative and seek to make particular biblical passages more philosophically interesting and relevant. This list of philosophers includes Jonathan Edwards, Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Comel West.

And what about those philosophers who are not religious? One interesting answer to the why comes to us in the writings of a philosopher who does not have a chapter dedicated to his thinking in this collection, but nonetheless ought to be mentioned in these pages: Paul Weiss. In 1948, Weiss published an essay entitled "God, Job, and Evil" where he attempts an atheistic interpretation of the Book of Job. Weiss claims that we "may call ourselves atheists," but this "in no way prevent[s] us from being radically informed and perhaps transformed by the book of Job". How can this be? The

Book of Job, according to Weiss, "depends for its power on no prior commitment to any particular religion—or to religion at all". This means that Weiss thinks we ought to read the Book of Job because it transforms its readers. He connects the why with the how by arguing that transformation becomes a possibility only when we read it with two hermeneutical virtues. Hermeneutical virtues, not a religious commitment, are required for reading the Book of Job—in particular, the virtues of "sympathetic objectivity" and "resolute courage". With these two hermeneutical virtues, all readers can be "transformed by the book of Job". The transformation that Weiss reports, for himself, concerns the connection between goodness and suffering. According to Weiss, the Book of Job teaches us the following: "Why do bad men prosper? They do not... Why do good men suffer? Suffering and goodness have quite dissimilar causes". In the Book of Job, Weiss sees ancient wisdom for the disconnection between goodness and suffering. Suffering can happen to anyone, and Western society is mistaken to connect suffering either as a consequence for evil or as a result of being virtuous. Job's character suffers because certain events happen to him, neither because he was deserving of it nor because his virtue was tested. In this way, Weiss' s atheistic interpretation of the Book of Job counters any and all moralistic interpretations—more than it counters theological interpretations—of the Book of Job. As I suggest later, readers will benefit from reading Weiss's essay alongside Edward Mooney' s chapter in this volume.

Previews of The Chapters

This collection is divided into seven parts, and the parts are determined by biblical authors/books of which philosophers have offered their interpretations. I could have arranged the book chronologically, by either the birth or death of the philosophers—or even the time of publication that includes their respective reflections on Scripture. I thought the book would be more dialogical if the chapters were not grouped together chronologically but, rather, based on the biblical author/book actually being interpreted. The final part differs from the other parts in that it seeks to take the work of American philosophers as a guide for interpreting Scripture within one' s own religious tradition. In the two cases of the final chapters of this collection, the religious traditions are Christianity and Islam.

In part 1, we have two chapters on what scholars consider the two oldest books within the Bible: The Books of Genesis and Job. Ann Duncan and I explain the character of Eve, found in Genesis 1-3, within Margaret Fuller's of 1 Corinthians 11, we conclude that while James does not explicitly talk about or think of 1 Corinthians 11, he offers a philosophical interpretation of 1 Corinthians 11 in the sense of mediating between Aquinas' s and Emerson's contradictory and extreme interpretations of Paul's theology of the Eucharist.

In a chapter on Stanley Cavell's thought and work, Peter Dula claims that 1 Corinthians 13 becomes key for reading and understanding Cavell's memoir: Little Did I Know. I recommend readers enjoy Dula's chapter, in this collection, and then take on the major task of reading Cavell's lengthy memoir. Dula's arguments and insights will deepen and shape any and every serious reading of Cavell' s Little Did I Know. In a chapter on Richard Rorty's pragmatism, I link Rorty's treatment of the Christian Scriptures with his own self-labels of "atheist" and "anti-clerical." I demonstrate that his shift from dismissing the New Testament wholesale to his embrace of 1 Corinthians 13 accompanies his shift from "atheist" to "anti-clerical."

I have referenced the final part a few times in this chapter, and I need only to add to those other references the claim that this part brings the whole collection to a climatic and significant close. Roger Ward and Isra Yazicioglu guide readers in how Jonathan Edwards' s and Charles Sanders Peirce's philosophies impact the task of interpreting traditionally sacred texts in Christianity and

Islam, respectively. If this collection were a baseball game—America's favorite pastime—these two chapters represent ending the game on two home runs: one home run that ties the score and a walk-off home run for the win.

What's Next?

This collection is intended to be introductory, and I use this word for three reasons. First, this collection attempts to start a conversation about the practice and task of the philosophical interpretation of Scripture. While it builds on the work of Peter Ochs—and, of course, on insights about biblical passages found in the writings of every philosopher treated in this collection—I contend that philosophical interpretation of Scripture has been treated more as a "conversation-stopper" than a conversation starter within the American academy. This book makes another attempt to start such a conversation.

Second, this collection is introductory in the sense that there are more philosophers, politicians, and theologians to treat in terms of how and why they interpret traditionally sacred texts—which ought to include the Tanakh, New Testament, and Qur'an. The Scriptural Reasoning Academic Network, for instance, spent a day of study together on the interpretation and use of biblical passages found in presidential speeches by Thomas Jefferson,

Abraham Lincoln, Ronald Reagan, and Barack Obama. I imagine that such a scholarly investigation might deserve its own volume at some point—which would involve a unique interdisciplinary collaboration between presidential historians, philosophers, and theologians. Philosophers and theologians that were not covered in this volume but their interpretation and use of a biblical passage could be discussed in a later collection include Edward Scribner Ames, W. E. B. Du Bois, Bordon Parker Bowne, Edgar Brightman, Frederick Douglas, Charles Hartshorne, Stanley Hauerwas, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Alain Locke, Malcolm X, George Herbert Mead, Charles W. Morris, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Robert Neville, Reinhold Niebuhr, Martha Nussbaum, Hilary Putnam, Paul Ramsey, John Rawls, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, James Tufts, and several others.

Third, this collection is introductory in the sense that there is much more to think through and write on in terms of the role of Scripture in the work of the philosophers included in this volume. In terms of the philosophers that I treat in this collection—Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, William James, Richard Rorty, and George Santayana—all of them reference more passages than I was able to discuss. There are four volumes of Emerson's sermons published, and most of the sermons are based explicitly on a particular passage. In addition to studying Emerson's sermons, Alan Hodder makes the compelling case that Emerson's Nature is modeled on the Book of Revelation—which deserves further study. Fuller references Mary, the mother of Jesus of Nazareth, throughout Woman in the Nineteenth Century—which -also deserves further study.

William James makes two references to Genesis 1-3 that merit attention. In Principles of Psychology, he implements the image of Adam's "navel" as an analogy for how the brain perceives time. Additionally, every time that I teach James's Pragmatism, undergraduate students connect James's claim—"the trail of the human serpent is ... over everything"—with the "serpent" depicted in the third chapter of Genesis. While this sentence from James's Pragmatism has become well known, an earlier use of "serpent" matches up better with the plain sense of Genesis 3: "If you are lovers of facts, ... you find the trail of the serpent of rationalism [and] intellectualism over everything that lies on that side of the line". Is James alluding to intellectualism and rationalism as the modern versions of the forbidden fruit of the knowledge of good and evil? Is James suggesting that the problem with intellectualism and rationalism is that it claims to know more than human beings are intended to know? Is James's adjective for intellectualism, "vicious," his way to talk about sin?

Although I briefly mention in my chapter how much Rorty despises the Book of Leviticus, his critique and dismissal of Levitical Law deserve more attention. Perhaps his claim that religion is a "conversation-stopper" escapes potential fallacies if and only if it is understood as a very specific critique of how verses from Leviticus are cited as authoritative in American public debates. This interpretation might be strengthened when we remember that Rorty never dismisses the Tanakh or Hebrew Bible wholesale as he does the New Testament.

When reading Santayana's The Idea of Christ, there is no doubt that Santayana allowed his imagination and thinking to be shaped by the traditionally sacred texts of all three Abrahamic traditions. Initially, for this collection, I set out to write a chapter on Santayana's interpretation of Surah 7. His interpretation of Satan' s character in Surah 7, however, led me to his overall interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount. Psalm 22 also plays an interesting role in Santayana's understanding of suffering in The Idea of Christ.

This collection offers a strong beginning point for what awaits scholarly investigation, research, and writing in terms of the role of Scripture in the writings of American philosophers. <>

LIFE AS INSINUATION: GEORGE SANTAYANA'S HERMENEUTICS OF FINITE LIFE AND HUMAN SELF by Katarzyna Kremplewska [SUNY series in American Philosophy and Cultural Thought, SUNY Press, 9781438473932]

A holistic reinterpretation of Santayana's thought in terms of a dramatic philosophy of life.
In this book, Katarzyna Kremplewska offers a thorough analysis of Santayana's conception of human self, viewed as part of his larger philosophy of life. Santayana emerges as an author of a provocative philosophy of drama, in which human life is acted out. Kremplewska demonstrates how his thought addresses the dynamics of human self in this context and the possibility of sustaining self-integrity while coping with the limitations of finite life. Focusing on particular aspects of Santayana's thought such as his conception of the tragic aspect of existence, and the role of the doctrine of spirit in his philosophical anthropology and critique of culture, this book also sets Santayana's thought in substantial dialogue with other thinkers, such as Heidegger, Bergson, and Nietzsche. Like Santayana's philosophy, this book seeks to build passages between theoretical reflection and practical life with the possibility of a good life in view.

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Excerpt: I draw the reader's attention to two research problems, namely, Santayana's possible affinities with continental philosophy of the twentieth century and his conception of human self as part of his overall project of philosophy of life. I also signal that the main aim of this study is an inquiry into the latter in the context of the former. At this point let me introduce another issue tackled in this book, namely, the idea of the tragic. As I will show, there is an interesting connection between Santayana's conception of the self and his understanding of the tragic. Putting this relation into scrutiny allows for shifting the whole discussion into the context of Santayana's critical philosophy of culture and politics. Finally, in reference to the analysis of the tragic, I employ the idea of (tragic) necessity, ananke, as one of the interpretive keys—next to the ideas of governing the living and rationality—helpful in a preliminary and sketchy attempt at "unlocking" and rethinking Santayana's philosophy of politics. This final part will allow us to go beyond the individual perspective into the common world and, thus, complete the task of unveiling Santayana's philosophy of life.

The structure of the book, its division into sections, is thematic and problem-centered. Each section addresses a specific question, some provide an overview or merely a digression supporting a thesis or illuminating some additional aspects of the issue. The first and the sixth chapters stand out in that they are largely devoted to tracing the history of an idea and offer critical, selective overviews meant to articulate and develop key philosophical questions relevant for the discussion that follows. The method of my inquiry is predominantly hermeneutic, at some points enriched with phenomenological and speculative elements. In more technical parts of the book, I reconstruct and/or reinterpret parts of Santayana's thought on the basis of the analysis of his texts with respect to the basic philosophical concepts in their mutual relations as well as in comparative contexts with other thinkers and in reference to the existing secondary literature. Hermeneutic approach seems especially helpful in comparative sections, in particular whenever two non-analytical thinkers, coming from different cultural backgrounds and using a different set of philosophical concepts each, are compared. In line with the hermeneutic tradition, possible shifts, tensions, and ambiguities within meanings of particularly problematic concepts are treated—within reasonable boundaries—as an evidence of the vividness of philosophical language. When tracing Santayana's conception of human self so vaguely and fragmentarily treated by the thinker himself, I was initially inspired by Derrida's method of inquiry into the unsayable and his investigations into the "missing" concepts in other philosophers' work, as exemplified by his well-known book Of Spirit.

For the sake of clarity and due to the large thematic scope of the book, let me summarize the above introductory remarks in points. After providing a brief, selective overview of the history of the idea of the self in the first chapter (1), in the second (2) and the third one (3) I analyze the basic concepts of Santayana's philosophy and trace the passage from naturalistic philosophy of action toward mature ontology with particular attention given to the impact this ontological turn must have had on his conception of the self I argue that the setting of Santayana's ontology makes his conception of the self inescapably aporetic. Placing the categories of Santayana's nonreductive materialism in a phenomenological and existential-hermeneutic context allows me to uncover and elucidate a number of aporias, which I later address with reference to, among others, the Aristotelian distinctions zoe-bios (as reinterpreted by some contemporary thinkers) and process-activity. This interpretive strategy promises a possible solution to the controversy around psyche-spirit connection and allows to see a creative potential resting in the aporias, particularly if set within the

holistic framework of Santayana's philosophy of life, which I call contemplative vitalism. What emerges out of this interpretive endeavor is a multidimensional (triadic), non-egological conception of the self, which combines a naturalistic anchoring with an idealistic/transcendental bent.

In the third chapter I also address the problem of the integrity and freedom of human beings within the framework of hermeneutic unity of life. With references to Paul Ricoeur's idea of authorship of life, as well as some conceptions coming from contemporary philosophy of mind, I hope to offer a novel perspective of looking at the controversial problem of freedom and free will in Santayana's thought. The analysis of the recurrent motives of masks and theatre as well as the concept of authenticity helps to illuminate Santayana's peculiar, dramatic hermeneia of life. Finally, in this section I suggest yet another interpretive venue for the idea of a hermeneutic self. Guided by hints provided by Santayana, I translate the triadic structure of the self into the categories of the Holy Trinity, with reference to Paul Ricoeur's interpretation of the biblical concept of kerygma.

In the fourth chapter (4), entitled "Life as Insinuation;' I analyze certain aspects of Henri Bergson's philosophy of life, with particular attention given to the metaphysical make up of his dramatist vision of human life and freedom. I point to interesting affinities within these two—Santayana's and Bergson's—apparently utterly dissimilar philosophies.

In chapter five (5), on the basis of archival materials, namely Santayana's marginalia in his private copy of Heidegger's Sein and Zeit, with the support of other primary sources, including Santayana's letters, I raise the question of possible similarities between both thinkers. The discussion is centered around (although not limited to) the core matter of Santayana's "negotiations" with Heidegger's text and the guiding problem of this book—the issue of the self and the way it is embedded in a philosophy of life. My thesis is that one may speak here of a number of similarities, some of which stem from a common source of inspiration being Aristotle. The return to ancient sources and the choice of ontological language within a major endeavor to reconcile finitude with freedom emerge as the main strategic affinities between both thinkers. The wager of the very preoccupation with the self in the case of both thinkers is, as I suggest, a "worldly salvation; or—in other words—working out such a strategy of entering into the relation with one's own finitude, where this finitude becomes voluntary. It is possible to say that both thinkers' anti-subjectivist sympathies do not serve to dissolve the self, but rather to strengthen it by redefining and exorcising the demons of an isolated "ego." The redefinition of selfhood inescapably involves winning back time, the world, and finitude for the self—a task which arises as one of the main issues in the subsequent discussion of the tragic.

In the sixth chapter (6), I focus on the idea of the tragic, which, besides being a problem on its own, may serve as a heuristic tool which:

a) allows to shed a different light on the aporetic nature of the self and b) allows for a meaningful passage from the technical analysis of concepts and the "structure" of the self into the context of Santayana's critique of culture, which—as I argue—is of high relevance for the whole discussion. An overview of a broad spectrum of other philosophical conceptions of the tragic—from Aristotle, through Hegel, to Nietzsche, provides a background for the articulation of the specificity of Santayana's approach. Next, I discuss Santayana's critique of Nietzsche, which I interpret in terms of a polemic on the possibility and the necessity of spirituality. Yet another comparative perspective— Harold Bloom's and Santayana's interpretations of Hamlet—illuminates the fact that understanding Santayana's conception of the self is incomplete without regard to his critique of culture (in particular his critique of egotism and instrumentality in thinking). References are made to the well-known idea of instrumental reason developed by the members of Frankfurt School, which I connect

to the temporal perspective called by me "immobilizing fallacy" and elucidate with the support of Northrop Frye's analysis of tragedy and his idea of fatalistic reduction.

The final, seventh chapter (7), being the shortest one, goes beyond the individual perspective to the common world, while keeping in mind and developing the findings and theses of the previous sections. It offers a preliminary, synthetic look at Santayana's philosophy of politics and a very brief reconstruction of its conceptual apparatus by employing the idea of managing necessity as the main interpretive key.

What follows is a highly selective overview of the evolution of the idea of selfhood and subjectivity. I largely rely on the work of those thinkers who have already accomplished this task—Charles Taylor and Dan Zahavi in particular. Martin Heidegger's critique of Cartesian and transcendental models is also of help. My aim is to select, articulate, and associate certain ideas so as to prepare a mental setting that will subsequently serve as a source of concepts, ideas, and criteria helpful in reconstructing Santayana's conception of the self. Throughout the review I also gradually formulate a side thesis, or a major digression, namely that certain philosophical strategies of weakening the "ego" may be viewed as serving the strengthening of the self rather than its dissolution. <>

THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT: AMERICA SINCE THE SIXTIES by Christopher Caldwell [Simon & Schuster, 9781501106897]

A major American intellectual makes the historical case that the reforms of the 1960s, reforms intended to make the nation more just and humane, instead left many Americans feeling alienated, despised, misled—and ready to put an adventurer in the White House. Christopher Caldwell has spent years studying the liberal uprising of the 1960s and its unforeseen consequences. Even the reforms that Americans love best have come with costs that are staggeringly high—in wealth, freedom, and social stability—and that have been spread unevenly among classes and generations.

Caldwell reveals the real political turning points of the past half century, taking readers on a roller-coaster ride through *Playboy* magazine, affirmative action, CB radio, leveraged buyouts, iPhones, Oxycontin, Black Lives Matter, and internet cookies. In doing so, he shows that attempts to redress the injustices of the past have left Americans living under two different ideas of what it means to play by the rules.

Essential, timely, hard to put down, THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT is a brilliant and ambitious argument about how the reforms of the past fifty years gave the country two incompatible political systems—and drove it toward conflict.

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In the mid-1960s, at a moment of deceptively permanent-looking prosperity, the country's most energetic and ideological leaders made a bid to reform the United States along lines more just and humane. They rallied to various loosely linked moral crusades, of which the civil rights movement, culminating in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, provided the model. Women entered jobs and roles that had been male preserves. Sex came untethered from both tradition and prudery. Immigrants previously unwanted in the United States were welcomed and even recruited. On both sides of the clash over the Vietnam War, thinkers and politicians formulated ambitious plans for the use of American power.

Most people who came of age after the 1960s, if asked what that decade was "about," will respond with an account of these crusades, structured in such a way as to highlight the moral heroism of the time. That is only natural. For two generations, "the sixties" has given order to every aspect of the national life of the United States—its partisan politics, its public etiquette, its official morality.

This is a book about the crises out of which the 1960s order arose, the means by which it was maintained, and the contradictions at its heart that, by the time of the presidential election of 2016, had led a working majority of Americans to view it not as a gift but as an oppression.

The assassination of Kennedy

The era we think of as the sixties began with relative suddenness around the time of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963.

Americans are right to say that nothing was ever the same after Kennedy was shot. You can hear the change in popular music over a matter of months. A year-and-a-half before Kennedy was killed, "Stranger on the Shore," a drowsy instrumental by the British clarinetist Acker Bilk, had hit number one. A year-and-a-half after the assassination, the musicians who would form Jefferson Airplane, the Grateful Dead, Big Brother and the Holding Company, and various other druggie blues and folk-rock bands were playing their first gigs together in San Francisco.

This does not mean that the assassination "caused" the decade's cultural upheaval. The months before Kennedy's death had already seen the publication of Thomas Kuhn's book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (August 1962), which upended notions about science's solidity and a lot of social and political assumptions built on it; Rachel Carson's exposé of pesticides, Silent Spring (September 1962); and The Feminine Mystique (February 1963), Betty Friedan's attack on what she saw as the vapidity of well-to-do housewives' existence. Something was going to happen.

The two conflicts that did most to define the American 1960s—those over racial integration and the war in Vietnam—were already visible. In October 1962, rioting greeted attempts to enforce a Supreme Court decision requiring the segregated University of Mississippi to enroll its first black student, James Meredith. The last summer of Kennedy's life ended with an unprecedented March on Washington by 200,000 civil rights activists. Three weeks before Kennedy was killed in Dallas, Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem was ousted and then murdered in a coup that Kennedy had authorized.

Kennedy's death, though, gave a tremendous impetus to changes already under way. Often peoples react to a political assassination, as if by collective instinct, with a massive posthumous retaliation. They memorialize a martyred leader by insisting on (or assenting to) a radicalized version, a sympathetic caricature, of the views they attribute to him. The example most familiar to Americans came in the wake of Abraham Lincoln's assassination in 1865, when the country passed constitutional reforms far broader than those Lincoln himself had sought: not only a Thirteenth Amendment to abolish slavery but also a broad Fourteenth Amendment, with its more general and highly malleable guarantees of equal protection and due process.

Something similar happened in the 1960s. A welfare state expanded by Medicare and Medicaid, the vast mobilization of young men to fight the Vietnam War, but, above all, the Civil Rights and Voting Rights acts—these were all memorials to a slain ruler, resolved in haste over a few months in 1964 and 1965 by a people undergoing a delirium of national grief. Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, was able to take ideas for civil rights legislation, languishing in the months before Kennedy's death, and cast them in a form more uncompromising than Kennedy could have imagined.

Civil rights ideology, especially when it hardened into a body of legislation, became, most unexpectedly, the model for an entire new system of constantly churning political reform. Definitions of what was required in the name of justice and humanity broadened. Racial integration turned into the all-embracing ideology of diversity. Women's liberation moved on to a reconsideration of what it meant to be a woman (and, eventually, a man). Immigration became grounds for reconsidering whether an American owed his primary allegiance to his country or whether other forms of belonging were more important.

Anti-communist military adventures gave way, once communism began to collapse in 1989, to a role for the United States as the keeper of the

whole world's peace, the guarantor of the whole world's prosperity, and the promulgator and enforcer of ethical codes for a new international order, which was sometimes called the "global economy."

There was something irresistible about this movement. The moral prestige and practical resources available to the American governing elite as it went about reordering society were almost limitless. Leaders

could draw not just on the rage and resolve that followed Kennedy's death but also on the military and economic empire the United States had built up after World War II; on the organizational know-how accumulated in its corporations and foundations; on the Baby Boom, which, as the end of the twentieth century approached, released into American society a surge of manpower unprecedented in peacetime; and, finally, on the self-assurance that arose from all of these things.

The reforms of the sixties, however, even the ones Americans loved best and came to draw part of their national identity from, came with costs that proved staggeringly high—in money, freedom, rights, and social stability. Those costs were spread most unevenly among social classes and generations. Many Americans were left worse off by the changes. Economic inequality reached levels not seen since the age of the nineteenth-century monopolists. The scope for action conferred on society's leaders allowed elite power to multiply steadily and, we now see, dangerously, sweeping aside not just obstacles but also dissent.

At some point in the course of the decades, what had seemed in 1964 to be merely an ambitious reform revealed itself to have been something more. The changes of the 1960s, with civil rights at

their core, were not just a major new element in the Constitution. They were a rival constitution, with which the original one was frequently incompatible—and the incompatibility would worsen as the civil rights regime was built out. Much of what we have called "polarization" or "incivility" in recent years is something more grave—it is the disagreement over which of the two constitutions shall prevail: the de jure constitution of 1788, with all the traditional forms of jurisprudential legitimacy and centuries of American culture behind it; or the de facto constitution of 1964, which lacks this traditional kind of legitimacy but commands the near-unanimous endorsement of judicial elites and civic educators and the passionate allegiance of those who received it as a liberation. The increasing necessity that citizens choose between these two orders, and the poisonous conflict into which it ultimately drove the country, is what this book describes.

Race

The Civil Rights Act—Freedom of association—What did whites think they were getting?—What did blacks think they were getting?—Not civil rights but human rights—Origins of affirmative action and political correctness

The very first days of the 1960s saw the publication of a scholarly landmark. In January 1960, Harvard University's Belknap Press brought out a new edition of the Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass (1845), edited by the historian Benjamin Quarles, a professor at Morgan State University in Maryland.

Today, with the figure of Douglass towering over American culture, in high school curricula and museum exhibits, on postage stamps and television specials, we might assume that what made the publication important was Quarles's new interpretation of a classic American autobiography. We would be wrong. Far from being thought a classic in 1960, Douglass's earliest memoir, covering his years as a slave, had been out of print for more than a century and almost unmentioned in print since the Civil War. Douglass's career as an abolitionist orator, newspaper publisher, and diplomat was important to historians of the nineteenth century. But his struggles as a slave were not of obvious relevance to mid—twentieth century Americans.

Sex

The GI generation and its failures—The Feminine Mystique and male sexism—Playboy and male sexuality—Gloria Steinem, capitalism, and class—Roe v. Wade and the Supreme Court—Our Bodies, Ourselves—The Equal Rights Amendment

Second-wave feminism began in 1963. Betty Friedan published The Feminine Mystique a few months before President Kennedy was shot. Her preoccupations were not those of the "first wave" of nineteenth-century abolitionists, prohibitionists, and suffragists. She did not philosophize about the inequalities, incompatibilities, and quarrels that the feminist Robin Morgan called "a five-thousand-year-buried anger." Friedan was describing something more modest: the ground women had lost since she herself had gone to all-female Smith College in western Massachusetts in the late 1930s.

War

The Vietnam War as an establishment undertaking—America's weak rear—The Vietnam War generation and class—The counterculture— Sources of Baby Boom power—Renaissance or decay?

The war in Vietnam began in an act of presidential deceit. Lyndon Johnson hustled the country into the conflict at the height of the 1964 presidential campaign, winning congressional consent to bomb Vietnam in retaliation for a naval confrontation with North Vietnamese vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. That confrontation had been provoked, as Congress would discover only years later, by U.S. and

South Vietnamese naval incursions into the North. The bombing, rationalized as an alternative to sending ground troops, made ground troops necessary, once the elections were over, in order to protect the perimeter of the South Vietnamese airbases from which the bombers left. But then those troops were attacked. The "perimeter" was gradually extended to most of South Vietnam, which over the next decade became the temporary home of 2.7 million mostly non-college-enrolled American youths.

The sudden victory of Ho Chi Minh's troops over the French in 1954 had led to a UN partition of the country into a communist North and a pro-American South. But Vietnam was never as divided as it looked. Ho's Communists would likely have won the national election that the peace accords called for, had the United States permitted one. Ho drew on broad nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments, however big the eventual role of the Soviet Union in supplying weaponry (especially MiG fighters and anti-aircraft systems) and of China in supplying personnel (including troops after 1965) might have been. The South Vietnamese government, by contrast, would have crumbled without U.S. support. Its troops were battle-shy, outnumbered, and outgunned by a domestic (i.e., South Vietnamese) guerrilla insurgency, the so-called Viet Cong, which drew on local discontent as well as imported materiel. Eighty percent of the 5 or 6 million tons of American bombs dropped in the war fell on the South, not the North. The United States, in fact, would drop more bombs on the territory of its putative ally than it had dropped on all its World War II enemies. And then it would go on to do something from which American culture has still not recovered: It would lose the war.

Debt

The counterculture in middle age—Reaganism: a generational truce—Reaganomics: a political strategy—What did the debt buy?—Immigration, inequality, and debt—Immigration and the failure of democracy—The changing spirit of civil rights—"People of color" and `African-Americans"—Immigration and ínequality—The quest for a new elite

The victory of Ronald Reagan in the presidential election of 1980 was not just the reaction of an older America against Baby Boom enthusiasms. On the contrary, it brought almost the whole of the Baby Boom generation into the electorate. It was the first major political event that everyone born in the 1940s and 1950s took part in as an adult. It was partly an answer by non-elite Boomers to the zeal of their activist contemporaries, partly an expression of elite Boomers' own changed priorities as the oldest of them entered middle age. "The cultural and Reagan revolutions," the historian Mark Lilla later wrote, "have proved to be complementary, not contradictory, events." The novelist Kurt Andersen shared this view of the relationship between the two eras. "`Do your own thing," he wrote, "is not so different than `every man for himself." The 1980s are what the 1960s turned into.

Diversity

Computers: homogenization, dehumanization, atomization—The truce with technology—Postmodernism: the authenticity of Banana Republic—Bakke: Diversity begins—The Martin Luther King holiday—The exemplary destruction of Al Campanis—Political correctness—Diversity and the Pax Americana—The war for the soul of America—Heather Has Two Mommies: Diversity spreads

The decades after Ronald Reagan's arrival in power were a time of globalization and globalism. Globalization means the internationalization of the division of labor. Globalism means the political promotion of globalization, and the breaking and remaking of institutions to facilitate it. Starting in the 1980s, American businessmen freed themselves from the customs that had bound them to their country's labor force. They established a new and more profitable symbiosis with immigrants and less empowered, less well-compensated workers overseas.

Winners

Outsourcing and global value chains—Politicized lending and the finance crisis—Civil rights as a ruling-class cause—Google and Amazon as governments in embryo—Eliot Spitzer, Edward Snowden, and surveillance—The culture of Internet moguls—The affinity between high tech and civil rights—The rise of philanthropy—Obama: governing without government—Nudge and behavioral economics—From gay rights to gay marriage—Windsor: the convergence of elites—Obergefell: triumph of the de facto constitution It took a long time for Americans to realize that the New Economy was a new economy. They were accustomed to marketing hype.

When politicians used the term "New Economy," it was easy for voters to assume it was only a jazzed-up way of describing the process, familiar for centuries, by which mechanization was introduced into certain industrial tasks, creating limited short-term sectorial disruptions but offering rewards to those trained in the new technology.

Losers

The rise of the Tea Party—The decline of white America—Race as the entirety of culture—"Nigger" and "white supremacy"—Margaret Seltzer and Rachel Dolezal—Manliness and crime—The Ferguson uprising—Black Lives Matter—The Yale uprising— "Who we are as Americans"

The Tea Party movement emerged in Barack Obama's first month in office. The Americans who belonged to it had come to believe that they had been hoodwinked out of their country. They never came to an explicit consensus on how or by whom. Sometimes their complaints concerned health care, sometimes states' rights, sometimes political correctness. This was not, however, a reason to dismiss them.

THE US ANTIFASCISM READER edited by Bill V. Mullen and Christopher Vials [Verso, 9781788736954]

How anti-fascism is as American as apple pie

Since the birth of fascism in the 1920s, well before the global renaissance of "white nationalism," the United States has been home to its own distinct fascist movements, some of which decisively influenced the course of US history. Yet long before "antifa" became a household word in the United States, they were met, time and again, by an equally deep antifascist current. Many on the left are unaware that the United States has a rich antifascist tradition, because it has rarely been discussed as such, nor has it been accessible in one place. This reader reconstructs the history of US antifascism into the twenty-first century, showing how generations of writers, organizers, and fighters spoke to each other over time.

Spanning the 1930s to the present, this chronologically-arranged, primary source reader is made up of antifascist writings by Americans and by exiles in the US, some instantly recognizable, others long-forgotten. It also includes a sampling of influential writings from the US fascist, white nationalist, and proto-fascist traditions. Its contents, mostly written by people embedded in antifascist movements, include a number of pieces produced abroad that deeply influenced the US left. The collection thus places US antifascism in a global context.

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We assembled this collection because of fascism's loud return to the world stage as an animating political idea and an aspirant mode of political rule. Its return results from a complex weave of epochal shifts: the global economic slump of the 1970s and the attendant rise of neoliberal market ideologies; wide-scale attacks by elites and global financial institutions on working-class lives and social welfare; continuing deracination of workers' organizations, including trade unions; the collapse of "official" state communism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries; 9/11, myriad "Wars on Terror" and Islamophobic panics generated across the capitalist West; population displacement from Middle Eastern, predominantly Muslim countries like Syria into Western Europe precipitated by the US invasion of Iraq and subsequent rise of ISIS into the resultant political vacuums; and the second global financial collapse of 2007-2008. In many traditionally democratic and capitalist Western states, these events have combined to erode lateral affiliations necessary for left-democratic politics and helped actuate a political third space, beyond conservativism and social democracy, a predominantly white, racist, nationalist, middle-class "backlash" that finds expression in a politics of resentment, victimhood, xenophobia and anti-leftism traditionally associated with classical fascism. In the United States, the return of fascist appeals relies on foundations much deeper in scope: namely, a history of white racial identification and settler colonial militarism, centuries in the making, without which the specter of an American fascism would be nearly unthinkable.

These historical coordinates are more durable in significance than the individual far-right figures and movements they have so far produced: individuals like Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen in France, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, or movements such as CasaPound in Italy and Golden Dawn in Greece. They overwhelm in importance the "dog whistle" US politician of aspirant fascists—Donald Trump—whose election in 2016 was a tenuous constellation of the global currents enumerated above: a candidate who unconsciously rediscovered a fascist rhetorical style, rather than building a fascist-like movement. Yet Trump's election to the highest office of the world's most powerful militarized and capitalist state did demand reflection. Trump used classical-fascist tropes—an apocalyptic and hypermasculine language of nation, race, action, strength, power, authority, and violence—as calling cards for his campaign. A small portion of Trump's political base did and does perceive his political orientation as fascist. Even prior to his election, a hard-right populist turn was visible within the Tea Party movement, some of which evolved into Trumpism. Here, classical questions facing students of fascism were, for perhaps the first time in recent US history, practical ones—is fascism an independent right-wing movement from below, an extension of capitalist political authority at a moment of crisis, or an idea summoned by a singular political figure seeking to build power?—Yet is has become clear that even if Trump were a fascist, he lacks the political skill to be an effective one. His political rhetoric often uses a fascist grammar, but it lacks a properly fascist party or a fascist state.

However, Trump's election should also have the effect of forcing historical reflection on the role of the United States in relationship to global fascist movements of the past century, as well as its "native" traditions of fascism and the fight against them. The present volume might be seen as such a reflection. It is designed both as a response to the current conjuncture of global fascist renaissance, and as an intervention to help us understand why the United States has been integral to the historical formation of fascism and antifascist resistance while never realizing or sustaining a fascist state of its own.

In a general sense, we are motivated to compile this volume by our own political orientation to an antifascist tradition rooted primarily in Marxism, socialism, and anti-racism, but also in anticolonial, and (more recently) anarchist and "antifa;' political practices. We find compelling the arguments by

left-intellectual figures like Enzo Traverso in the United States (included here) and G. M. Tamás in Hungary that, particularly since the collapse of the bipolar Cold War order, "post-fascist;' "neofascist" "savage capitalist" and other recognizably protofascist formations have emerged globally as a condition of neoliberal, hypercapitalist, neocolonial global development.' The severe, violent resurgence of anti-Semitism (and conspiratorial anti-cosmopolitanism) in advanced capitalist Western states; the hardening of economic and racial nationalisms wedded to apartheid-style xenophobias ("border walls;' "Fortress Europe" and otherwise); the viral Islamophobia that sutures together so many disparate forms of far-right political theory and practice today; these trends recall the contours of a modernity still beholden to Aimé Césaire's conception in his 1950 masterwork Discourse on Colonialism—excerpted here—that Occidental capitalism has yet to shed the violent, racist, authoritarian practices that helped constitute it: from the Muslim and Jewish purges of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries foundational to European "civilization;' to King Leopold II's severing of human hands in the Belgian Congo, to the gas chambers of the Nazi Holocaust. In the US context, the resurgence of antiblack, antiimmigrant racism in contemporary national fascist movements like the Traditionalist Worker Party, Patriot Front, and Identity Evropa rekindles the specters of white supremacy, eugenics and xenophobia that are as co-constitutive of American political culture as John Winthrop's designation of the New World as a "city on a hill."

The political mandate for this volume, if there is one, also lies in the creative theoretical and practical flowering of antifascist organizing that has marked the epochal shifts noted above. It is an important moment of historical remembrance when a small group of antifascists in Midwestern America in 2017—Indianapolis, Indiana, to be exact—launch a group called "Rock Against Racism." Specters of the Clash, Steel Pulse, X-Ray Spex, and other bands that stood down the renascent fascist National Front in 1976 London are welcome "images of the past," as Walter Benjamin might say, returning to confront a new fascist emergency. The march of more than 50,000 against fascism in Boston in August 2018; the street fights against white supremacists in East Lansing, Michigan, in March of the same year; the enduring viral meme of neo-Nazi Richard Spencer getting punched in the face: all of these flash points stem from political roots at least as strong as those fueling white nationalism. These include anti-racist discourses and even institutions (ethnic studies education and cultural centers, for instance) that emerged from black freedom struggles and people of color movements throughout the twentieth century, feminist and LGBTQ mobilizations with their own histories of institution building, especially since the late 1960s, labor struggles for union power, and socialist and anarchist efforts to create alternative economies. Antifascists have persistently emerged from the ranks of these movements of democratic leveling. More fundamentally, these mobilizations also deeply influenced the political "common sense" (in Gramscian terms) of many millions of Americans —a common sense that has survived decades of neoliberal erosion and provided the basis for antifascism's public legibility.

This volume seeks to offer a backstory to this present: a history and historiography of popular engagement with the theory and practice of antifascism. The book is thus both a scholarly apparatus and a political handbook—a précis and a brick—meant for a wide range of readers and activists, and useful for courses on fascism and the antifascist tradition, as well as for study groups on campuses and in workplaces where fascism continues to try to penetrate. In this, the book seeks to build a textual consensus about the meaning of fascism, especially in the US context, inspired mainly by the historical materialist tradition on the subject and the socialist tradition of fighting against it.

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The Historical Arc of This Collection

The pieces we have included in this volume fall into three main categories: (a) analyses of fascist currents and their political potential; (b) tactics and strategies for fighting fascism and their moral justification; and (c) writings from American fascists and protofascists.

Most of the writers and organizations included here are American by nationality, but not all. We have also included writings by individuals publishing in the United States, sometimes in exile, and a few pieces written outside this country that were deeply influential on American and global antifascist thought: namely, the entries from Dimitrov and Césaire.

We have organized this material chronologically, and our largest section is Part I, entitled "Can It Happen Here? US Antifascism in the Time of Dictators, 1932-1941." The 1930s and 1940s were the era of the fascist states: consequently, it was a time when the word "fascism" appeared constantly in political discourse, producing rich and extensive debates over its nature and manifestations. As the reader will note, these decades were also a time when the US left was deeply suffused with Marxism, hence class questions come to the fore in discussions of fascism. Yet, as the selections reveal, it was not merely the left that focused on class when approaching fascism: in fact, an emphasis on the class dimensions of fascism was ubiquitous across the political field. Such a focus was the spirit of an age in which economic collapse and an organized workers' movement kept class frames at the center of public debate.

Well into the 1960s, those on the left often argued that capitalists were the true power behind the thrones of Hitler and Mussolini, an inadequate interpretation that we have labeled elsewhere the "puppet master theory." But historians of fascism have also overlooked the various ways in which the pre-1968 left produced more layered analyses of their archenemy—ones that did not always make race, gender, or ideology epiphenomenal. Even before 1945, they focused on the dynamics of fascist racism, militarism, empire, and nationalism far more than has been acknowledged, and other theories of fascism's class politics quite frequently contended with the "puppet master theory;' especially by the late 1930s. Represented by pieces in this volume by Vincenzo Vacirca, Sinclair Lewis, and Avedis Derounian, these other views ascribed far more agency to fascism's middle-class base; or, like the entries from Harry Ward, W. E. B. Du Bois, George Padmore, and Franz Neumann, they placed far more formative power on its racial and nationalist dimensions.

Part II, "Antifascism and the State, 1941-1945," offers artifacts that help to shed light on the question: To what extent did the United States become an antifascist state during the war? After the United States entered World War II following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, US anti-fascists had a much wider arena in which to make their case. This was also the period when the US government employed members of the Frankfurt School, then in exile mainly in New York and California, as intelligence analysts and propaganda experts, as the entry from Neumann illustrates. Yet, even if we were to limit ourselves to political rhetoric, the US state and American civil society were inconsistent and contradictory in this period: in this milieu, one can find the bona fide antifascisms of Henry Wallace and Neumann alongside the Yellow Peril imagery of race war directed against the Japanese, with its tragic and well-known consequences at home and abroad. W. E. B. Du Bois makes a tally of these contending forces in his short piece, "Negro's War Gains and Losses" (1945).

Part III, "Antifascism, Anticolonialism, and the Cold War, 1946-1962;' documents the left's continuing use of antifascist frames as it fought the domestic battles of the Cold War era. During the early part of the Cold War, there was a rich debate on the left as to whether or not McCarthy and McCarthyism represented a new face of American fascism. In the 1950s, what alarmed the veterans of earlier antifascist struggles was the emergent rhetoric of conspiracy and racism within

investigative bodies like the House Un-American Activities Committee and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, along with their very real erosion of civil liberties in the name of anticommunism. They read this repression in the context of a larger postwar social transformation that bore uncanny similarities to the very regimes they recently fought against in World War II: the permanent militarization of society necessitated by the Cold War; a growing anti-intellectualism, cultural homogenization and conformity; a violent, racial reaction against the nascent civil rights movement; and, perhaps most dramatically, the rehabilitation of Germany, Spain, and Japan as "bulwarks against communism:' coupled with a disturbing silence about their recent victims (most notably, the millions who perished during the Holocaust). Readers will notice a shift in discussions of fascism in this period: to wit, an increasing readiness to discuss its noneconomic dimensions, especially its racial politics.

Anti-racism definitively moved to the center of antifascist politics by the late 1960s, as is visible in Part IV, "The Politics of Backlash and a New United Front, 1968-1971." In the earlier part of that decade, and for the first time, Americans began to discuss the Holocaust consistently as the most salient truth of fascism. While the televising of the Eichmann trial in 1961 by Israel was a catalyst, there were also deeper structures fueling this shift of focus: namely, the US civil rights movement and global anticolonial ferments abroad, which worked together to make "racism" legible as a determinant of history. Following the Holocaust "memory boom;' fascism was much more relevant to activists of color and their allies, who began to access terms like "concentration camps" and "genocide" frequently when discussing the ultimate stakes of white supremacy.

In the late 1960s, antifascism became central to US left-wing politics for the second time in the twentieth century. In July 1969, the Black Panther Party hosted its "United Front against Fascism" conference in Oakland, which led to the formation of the National Committees to Combat Fascism (NCCFs) across the United States. The BPP's adoption of antifascism was important because the party exercised symbolic leadership over younger American leftists during that period. Conscious of the Popular Front of the 1930s, Bobby Seale and other Panther leaders intended the NCCFs to be a multiracial coalition of radical whites, Latinos, and Asian Americans, united in a common front to combat an emergent racial backlash. This return to antifascism emerged in the context of white political reaction against the black freedom struggle in the late 1960s. This reaction was embodied not only by the election of Richard Nixon, but also by the rise to the national political stage of George Wallace, a segregationist strongman acknowledged by commentators across the political spectrum as the heir apparent to American fascism.

In Part V, "Anti/Fascism in the Age of Neoliberalism," we return to the themes we raised at the beginning of this introduction. Neoliberalism, while ostensibly "colorblind" and yoked to multiculturalism, nonetheless opened the door to right-wing extremism in various forms. First, given that arguments about restoring wealth to corporations and the rich have never been popular, even in the United States, neoliberalism's most blatant proponents in the Republican Party relied on "dog whistle" politics (appeals to white racial anxiety) and the anti-LGBTQ Christian right to forge the coalitions necessary to push through their politics of austerity. Overall, neoliberalism worked to hollow out lateral modes of political identification—faith in labor unions, cross-racial solidarity, the New Deal state—that so many antifascists in the 1930s and 1940s saw as crucial to any democratic ethos capable of resisting fascist appeals. At the same time, neoliberalism's assault on middle- and working-class living standards increased economic anxiety; its "neocon" implementation in the United States, moreover, maintained and even intensified American militarism and its attendant hypermasculinity. Rampant economic precarity, a highly militarized domestic culture, a retreat in official commitment to genuine racial justice, and the lack of a viable social democratic alternative

combined to erode faith in the "demos," throwing open the door to deeply hierarchical and undemocratic politics. Out of this matrix emerged an exponential rise of militia and "hate groups," a new form of homophobic extremism in the form of the Christian right, and more recently, the alt-right, Steve Bannon, and Donald Trump.

Antifascism continued the fight within this hostile environment, though the memory of fascism became increasingly obscure to so many Americans living in amnesiac, strip mall landscapes further and further removed from Mussolini's March on Rome. As Stuart Marshall's piece reveals, LGBTQ activism took a distinctly antifascist turn in light of the AIDS crisis and the rise of the Christian right. At the same time, Americans developed their own "antifa" movement through organizations like the Anti-Klan Network, the Sojourner Truth Organization, Anti-Racist Action, and the post-Trump mobilizations that Mark Bray discusses in his piece. Indeed, Trump, as the first president to name "antifa" in public, made the term a household word in the United States for the first time. "Antifascist" sounded too foreign to be of any use to anti-racist activists of ARA in 1988, yet it is now a term known to virtually everyone in the United States, a flashpoint of debate from television screens to dinner tables across the country. To be clear, the state of affairs that made it so is an urgent one.

Indeed, "Who will get organized first?" is still an open question. <>

CLIMATE LEVIATHAN: A POLITICAL THEORY OF OUR PLANETARY FUTURE by Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann [Verso, 9781786634290]

How climate change will affect our political theory—for better and worse

Despite the science and the summits, leading capitalist states have not achieved anything close to an adequate level of carbon mitigation. There is now simply no way to prevent the planet breaching the threshold of two degrees Celsius set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. What are the likely political and economic outcomes of this? Where is the overheating world heading?

To further the struggle for climate justice, we need to have some idea how the existing global order is likely to adjust to a rapidly changing environment. CLIMATE LEVIATHAN provides a radical way of thinking about the intensifying challenges to the global order. Drawing on a wide range of political thought, Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann argue that rapid climate change will transform the world's political economy and the fundamental political arrangements most people take for granted. The result will be a capitalist planetary sovereignty, a terrifying eventuality that makes the construction of viable, radical alternatives truly imperative.

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6. Planetary Sovereignty

PART THREE

For most of our lives, we have thought of climate change as a threat looming on the horizon, a challenge that would, perhaps soon, need to be faced. Those days are past. Today, all around the world, the menace we worried about is no longer merely potential, but has rapidly materialized. Record-breaking temperatures on every continent. Rates of extinction so high that the only relevant comparisons are to planetary cataclysms far beyond human memory. Species and ecosystems scrambling to change their geographical range and—where they cannot move quickly, as with coral reefs—perishing altogether. Rising seas, forests ablaze, glaciers disappearing, superstorms. The underlying cause is well known. The increasing proportion of certain trace gases in the Earth's atmosphere (in round numbers, carbon dioxide [CO_2] has risen from 250 to 400 parts per million, methane [CH_4] from 700 to 1700 parts per billion) means a larger proportion of the sun's energy remains in the Earth's seas, land masses, and atmosphere, changing the movement of heat energy through the world's climatic system.' As global temperatures rise, the weather changes too. Not just the unbearable summer days that now plague cities across the planet, but highly variable precipitation bringing flood or drought, volatile temperature changes, and more intense storms. This is already taking a toll on everyone, but the heaviest weight of all has fallen on relatively poor and powerless people, as well as the other living things with whom we share this planet. The troubles caused by climate change are accelerating so quickly that we have no ledger capable of measuring them.

We have long known what we need to do to tackle climate change: stop taking carbon (the "C" in CO_2 and CH_4) from the Earth's crust and pumping it into the atmosphere. This means no more extracting and burning coal, oil, and gas. We need to leave fossil fuels in the Earth's crust, where they were formed. It would also make a big difference if we stocked far fewer cows and stopped cutting forests. Had such measures been taken by those who had the capacity to do so, we probably could have averted the terrible implications of climate change. But they were not. The vast proportion of historical greenhouse gases have been emitted as byproducts of the choices and activities, not of the masses of ordinary people, but rather of a wealthy minority of the world's people. Why that wealthy minority did nothing, and what that means for our political futures, are crucial questions we address in this book.

Though we contend with climate change now, its most significant ecological and political consequences are still to come. The challenge of analyzing and anticipating those consequences is enormous. This is partly because both the planet's ecologies and its politics are extraordinarily complex and subject to an almost infinite variety of influences, and partly because climate change is changing what it means to be human on Earth.' In this sense the term "Anthropocene" is a useful marker for where we stand: at a transition or break within and into a new era of natural history in which human actions are the decisive force ecologically and geologically.' But, in another sense, the term Anthropocene" is unhelpful, because climate change also makes it clear that there is no such thing as a universal "human" agent that precipitated this new era in planetary history, and no such thing as a common vantage point from which "we all" understand and experience it. There are, rather, only different human communities and ways of reasoning our way through our time.

This book offers a political theory of our planetary future. Our work on these ideas began in the heady days before the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit, a time when we each spoke publicly on these matters. This project emerged as an attempt at self-critique and clarification from within the

climate justice movement. We draw upon a robust tradition of political philosophy and critique of capitalist political economy to explain why capitalist societies created our planetary emergency and have failed to mitigate climate change. It is not, however, just another Marxist critique of capitalism's ecological consequences (valuable as those contributions have been). Rather, we are interested in the political effects of these consequences. Rapid climate change will transform global political economy and alter our world's basic political arrangements, processes we call the "adaptation of the political." Our point is not that global warming will simply cause everything to change or collapse. Instead, we argue that under pressure from climate change, the intensification of existing challenges to the extant global order will push existing forms of sovereignty toward one we call "planetary." To advance these arguments, we engage with a wide range of both "classical" sources and more "recent" philosophical attempts to grasp nature, political economy, and sovereignty. The result is a contribution to a political philosophy of planetary climate change, one we hope is adequate to our conjuncture. In Part I, we survey the horizon of our project, outlining the potential political-economic paths we anticipate unfolding in a rapidly warming world. In Part II, we examine in closer detail the path we regard as most likely, which we call "Climate Leviathan." In Part III, we sketch the outlines of a radical alternative.

While this is fundamentally a theoretical project, we hope its underlying political stakes are clear and concrete. To date, there has been little substantive carbon mitigation by the leading capitalist states. Global carbon emissions continued to climb each year we worked on this book, and show little sign of slowing down. We are not even close to the scale of change needed to realize the 1.5°C mean temperature increase limit to which the world's leading states agreed at Paris in December 2015. Indeed, the Paris Agreement does not place any substantive limits on the carbon emissions that drive warming (and, of course, Trump pulled the US "out of Paris", weakening the agreement's prospects). The world is getting hotter fast, and the rapid, large-scale carbon mitigation the world needs is impossible without radical change in the existing political-economic structure.

While we struggle, as we must, to limit rapid climate change by mitigations great and small, we also have to think carefully about its likely political consequences, because a world environment as radically changed as climate science suggests will have massive impacts on the way human life on Earth is organized. These questions are on the minds of many, from novelists to physical scientists, from military strategists to organic intellectuals of subaltern social groups. Yet political theory on these questions lags far behind atmospheric chemistry and the physics of ocean heat. This is a major gap. A stable concept of the political can only hold in a relatively stable world environment; when the world is in upheaval, so too are the definition and content of the realm of human life we call "political." Political theory thus has a place in natural history and finds its meaning through critical reflection upon it. Whether we know it or not, all our thinking is environmental, even when it rebels against nature.

Unfortunately, the prospect of rapid environmental change has generally produced an insufficient theoretical response among mainstream "progressive" thinkers. Most of it is pious utopianism ("ten simple ways to save the planet"), an appeal to market solutions ("cap and trade"), or nihilism ("we're fucked"). These are false solutions. Lamentably, the Left has rarely done much better, too often treating the climate as peripheral to struggles for democracy, liberty, equality, and justice, when it is precisely these ideals that make the climate struggle so fundamental. They are the core goals of the struggle for justice in a world that will be radically transformed by climate change. Consequently, our goal is to make climate more political. That requires a theory—a way to conceptualize our conjuncture and understand the relationship between the categories we use to make sense of it— that can help us navigate a hotter planet and the inevitable political-economic changes it will elicit.

That kind of theory should embrace science's analysis of environmental change but not expect too much of it politically; it should try to understand the world's possible political-ecological futures without lapsing into environmental determinism; and it should anticipate the coming socio-ecological transformations as a moment of transition in natural history. We offer this book as a contribution toward that theory and the struggles it might inform. Even if our theory turns out to be wrong, it will be worthwhile if it offers a vision of alternatives without appealing to false hopes. <>

POLITICS IS FOR POWER: HOW TO MOVE BEYOND POLITICAL HOBBYISM, TAKE ACTION, AND MAKE REAL CHANGE by Eitan Hersh [Scribner, 9781982116781]

A brilliant condemnation of political hobbyism—treating politics like entertainment—and a call to arms for well-meaning, well-informed citizens who consume political news, but do not take political action.

Who is to blame for our broken politics? The uncomfortable answer to this question starts with ordinary citizens with good intentions. We vote (sometimes) and occasionally sign a petition or attend a rally. But we mainly "engage" by consuming politics as if it's a sport or a hobby. We soak in daily political gossip and eat up statistics about who's up and who's down. We tweet and post and share. We crave outrage. The hours we spend on politics are used mainly as pastime.

Instead, we should be spending the same number of hours building political organizations, implementing a long-term vision for our city or town, and getting to know our neighbors, whose votes will be needed for solving hard problems. We could be accumulating power so that when there are opportunities to make a difference—to lobby, to advocate, to mobilize—we will be ready. But most of us who are spending time on politics today are focused inward, choosing roles and activities designed for our short-term pleasure. We are repelled by the slow-and-steady activities that characterize service to the common good.

In **POLITICS IS FOR POWER,** pioneering and brilliant data analyst Eitan Hersh shows us a way toward more effective political participation. Aided by political theory, history, cutting-edge social science, as well as remarkable stories of ordinary citizens who got off their couches and took political power seriously, this book shows us how to channel our energy away from political hobbyism and toward empowering our values.

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As a political scientist, I study the ways that ordinary people participate in politics. The political behavior of ordinary people is hard to understand. We don't often reflect deeply on why we engage in politics. However, when we step back and investigate our political lives, we can paint a general picture of what motivates us. Summing up the time we spend on politics, it would be hard to describe our behavior as seeking to influence our communities or country. Most of us are engaging to satisfy our own emotional needs and intellectual curiosities. That's political hobbyism.

This book explores the problem of political hobbyism. Voraciously consuming politics or tinkering online seems harmless, but it's a problem for two main reasons. First, we are making politics worse. Our collective treatment of politics as if it were a sport affects how politicians behave. They increasingly believe they benefit from feeding the red meat of outrage to their respective bases, constantly grandstanding for the chance that a video of themselves will go viral. In treating politics like a hobby, we have demanded they act that way.

Second, hobbyism takes us away from spending time working with others to acquire power. While we sit at home, people who seek political control are out winning over voters. In 2018, for instance, the Ku Klux Klan in North Carolina went around offering to help opioid addicts, telling addicts that their addiction wasn't their fault and that the white knights of the KKK were there to offer a helping hand. This image haunts me not just because in it I see an organization I fear that is serious about power, that recognizes how service to one person at a time aggregates into power. The image haunts me juxtaposed to how most of the rest of us are doing politics.

When the KKK is out in the streets offering opioid addicts help at the same time as most of us who are supposedly interested in politics are spending hours a day on social media, and at the same time as the mainstream political parties are unleashing a deluge of clickbait ads to raise money that will mostly pay for more ads, we should understand what is happening here: we are ceding political power to people who want it more than we do. Hobbyism is a serious threat to democracy because it is taking well-meaning citizens away from pursuing power. The power vacuum will be filled. <>

HARVEST THE VOTE: HOW DEMOCRATS CAN WIN AGAIN IN RURAL AMERICA by Jane Kleeb [Ecco, 9780062960900]

From Democratic Party rising star Jane Kleeb, an urgent and stirring road map showing how the Democratic Party can, and should, engage rural America

The Democratic Party has lost an entire generation of rural voters. By focusing the majority of their message and resources on urban and coastal voters, Democrats have sacrificed entire regions of the country where there is more common ground and shared values than what appears on the surface.

In *Harvest the Vote,* Jane Kleeb, chair of Nebraska's Democratic Party and founder of Bold Nebraska, brings us a lively and sweeping argument for why the Democrats shouldn't turn away from rural America. As a party leader and longtime activist, Kleeb speaks from experience. She's been fighting the national party for more resources and building a grassroots movement to flex the power of a voting bloc that has long been ignored and forgotten.

Kleeb persuasively argues that the hottest issues of the day can be solved hand in hand with rural people. On climate change, Kleeb shows that the vast spaces of rural America can be used to enact clean energy innovations. And issues of eminent domain and corporate overreach will galvanize unlikely alliances of family farmers, ranchers, small business owners, progressives, and tribal leaders, much as they did when she helped fight the Keystone XL pipeline. The hot-button issues of guns and abortion that the Republican Party uses to wedge voters against one another can be bridged by putting a megaphone next to issues critical to rural communities.

Written with a fiery voice and commonsense solutions, **HARVEST THE VOTE** is both a call to action and a much-needed balm for a highly divided nation.

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Some Things You Should Know When You Visit Rural America

Now that you are ready to connect and stand with rural communities across America to build power together for our families, let me leave you with a few last words.

I am including both a glossary of sayings and other tips for urban folks so you don't make the same mistakes I did—although it is okay to make mistakes, too; it's how we learn and laugh with one another to build relationships ... you're welcome ahead of time.

I end the book with a list of organizations working every day in rural towns that could use your support as well as some reading and listening you can do to keep learning about rural America.

Never ask how many cattle someone owns or how much land they own.

When you do this, you are essentially asking how much money a person has in his or her bank account. A rancher might be polite and answer, but you will probably get some variation of "We have enough grass for the cows and enough cows for the grass."

Wave when a car passes you on the two-lane road (mostly gravel and dirt roads).

Some prefer a full flip of the entire hand. Most of the old-timers keep their hands on the wheel and just lift a finger. Not that finger. The pointer finger. You should always do it. Be nice. It will make you smile.

Supper is dinner. Dinner is lunch.

Rural folks eat their noon meal and call it dinner. The evening meal is supper. Get it right and don't be late.

Most gas stations in rural towns are also the grocery store and the gallery for local art. They are also where old-timers have coffee.

Walk in and say hello or give a nod. Buy some of the local pottery. You might have to pump your gas and then come in and tell the shopkeeper how much you pumped. We trust people.

If you park your car on someone's farm or ranch, leave your keys on the dashboard.

Your car might have to be moved in order to get a tractor out or to perform some other chore. We promise we won't steal your car.

Respect the land.

Most work their entire lives to own a piece of land. Or the land has been passed down through the generations. Don't make comments about some of the outbuildings. The person's great-grandpa probably built it with his own hands.

GPS may not work in rural communities. Ask for directions. Be prepared to listen.

Directions will be something like this: "Turn right on the oil road, go east three miles, turn north by the red barn, and watch out for deer." Definitely watch out for deer. You can make hash out of them and they can total your car. Also, an oil road is how old-timers describe a paved road. I once looked for a street sign that said "oil road." I was lost for an hour until the rancher came and found me. He was laughing.

Close the gate behind you.

When you have to open a gate to enter the next section of someone's farm or ranch, you need to close the gate behind you. Super critical. Otherwise cows or other critters they are raising will get out. Chasing down a cow that wanders off is no fun for anyone.

If you get stuck, ask for help.

I have been stuck in snowstorms and on muddy shoulders and have had flat tires all in the middle of "nowhere." Every single time a local farmer, rancher, or town sheriff came to my rescue. Sometimes

it involved my walking up to the closest ranch and other times I simply stopped on the side of the road and folks immediately stopped to help. The great thing about small towns is people want to help each other. You might even leave with a dozen fresh eggs or some pretty good life lessons from an old-timer.

Sale barns have good cafés, but you will not find clothes.
Sale barns are where people in the community bring their livestock for auction. They usually have a really yummy café that makes the best grilled ham and cheese and fried chicken. You can sit in and watch the auctions. Always fun. Especially if the local 4-H club is selling cattle that day—nothing like the face of an eight-year-old who's selling her first calf.

Speaking of clothes: forget about the mall or Target. Farm stores are where it's at.
Farm stores like Orscheln Farm & Home sell Wranglers for $20 (a bit lower than Free People and Urban Outfitters). The same plaid shirt I have seen in Urban Outfitters for $100, you can find at Orschelns for $25. Yes, you can get a Carhartt jacket also. Really, you can get just about anything for yourself, the cows, or your dog.

Branding is not an exercise for a communications plan.
Ranch families still get together and help each other brand the calves and give them shots. Animal cruelty? No. I promise you. The calf is down for maybe a minute and they get right back up and usually run right to their mama. It's all okay. It's not harsh. It's how we track cattle. The food is always amazing. Don't fall for the "Oysters" trick. Unless you want to try fresh or breaded bull balls. Rocky Mountain Oysters are breaded testicles, not some midwest twist on Oysters Rockefeller. Oh, and "Calf Fries" are the same thing, just smaller. <>

BRAIN CHANGERS: MAJOR ADVANCES IN CHILDREN'S LEARNING AND INTELLIGENCE by David P. Sortino [Brain Smart, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 9781475831795]

Educating parents and children about the multiple intelligence is always a worthwhile endeavor. This book translates Multiple Intelligence theory into very practical and illuminating activities in everyday life. Following this guidance would be a powerful experience for readers of all ages. (Branton Shearer, PhD, creator and director, MIDAS (Multiple Intelligence Developmental Achievement Scales); author of 10 books including "Your Amazing Brain!" and "One Family: Many Remarkable Brains!")

In this engaging and insightful book, Dr. Sortino takes us deeper into how the brain works and how parents and teachers can be effective "brain changers" in a child's life. The excellent chapter on moral intelligence and how to help kids through the stages of moral reasoning is especially welcome at a time when poor moral reasoning is all too common among both adults and kids. The concluding chapter on neurofeedback and how to help children reduce anxiety and gain self-control by observing how their own brain is working offers a hopeful, much-needed option to the rush to medication. (Thomas Lickona, PhD, author, "How to Raise Kind Kids: And Get Respect, Gratitude, and a Happier Family in the Bargain")

In order to create a better learning brain, students must be organized, adaptive, passionate, and

secure about learning. Research and follow-up studies of these traits with theoretical knowledge may suggest why multiple intelligence, child development theory, moral development, cognitive development, neuroscience should be included in every parent and/or teacher's playbook. Dr. Sortino's excellent book **BRAIN CHANGERS: THE MOST IMPORTANT ADVANCES IN CHILDREN'S LEARNING AND INTELLIGENCE** introduces readers to those individuals who have made major contributions in the fields of education, psychology, neuroscience and child development. (Mark Steinbrg, PhD, author, "ADD The 20-Hour Solution: Training Minds to Concentrate and Self-regulate Naturally Without Medication")

BRAIN CHANGERS: HE MOST IMPORTANT ADVANCES IN CHILDREN'S LEARNING AND INTELLIGENCE is Dr. Sortino's second book in his Brain Smart Trilogy. Dr. Sortino's book is well supported by up-to-date research, field studies and publications by notable learning theorists that include Dr. Jean Piaget, Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg, Dr. Eric Erikson and Dr. Howard Gardner to name but a few. Moreover, as a neurofeedback professional and neuroscientist, Dr. Sortino's book describes brain changing successes with clients of all ages. I highly recommend this book for teachers, therapists and/or anyone interested in ground breaking theories about how children learn more effectively. (Dagmar Hoheneck-Smith, Child & Adolescent Psychiatrist)

BRAIN CHANGERS: THE MOST IMPORTANT ADVANCES IN CHILDREN'S LEARNING AND INTELLIGENCE represents my second book of The Brain Smart Trilogy. This book presents an in-depth look at successful learning techniques and current brain research about how to increase children's learning potential at all age levels. In my opinion, the words brain changing supports an often-ignored, yet obvious concept that children learn best when they are interested or passionate about learning. Our brain's limbic system knows this when it forms emotional connections or attachment (bonding) to learning. For example, a major area of our brain associated with the brain changing concept is called the hippocampus. In fact, the hippocampus is the only part of your child's learning brain where neurons regenerate or make more neurons. The medical world connects this positive brain changing experience and calls it *brain plasticity* or the brain's ability to modify its connections or rewire itself. Studies show that without this ability, any brain, not just the human brain, would be unable to develop from infancy to adulthood. In my opinion, this book's information provides readers with up-to-date brain research and proven learning techniques to support my brain changing thesis for all individuals interested in helping children reach high levels of learning.

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Brain Changing Quotes

Chapter 1: Cognition: Understanding How Children Learn and Express their Intelligence

"Educators are not neuroscientists, but they are members of the only profession in which their job is to change the human brain every day"—Dr. David A. Sousa

Chapter 2: Multiple Intelligence: Identifying Your Child's True Intelligence

"I saw the angel in the marble and carved until I set him free"—Michelangelo

Chapter 3: Psychosocial Development: Tapping into Your Child's Social Intelligence

"You see a child play, and it is so close to seeing an artist paint, for in play a child says things without uttering a word. You can see how he solves his problems. You can also see what's wrong. Young children, especially, have enormous creativity, and whatever's in them rises to the surface in free play."—Dr. Erik Erikson

Chapter 4: Moral Development: The Development of the Moral Child

"Because power corrupts, society's demands for moral authority and character increase as the importance of the position increases."—John Adams

Chapter 5: Vocational Intelligence: It Is Never Too Early to Attach a Child's Passion to Their True Intelligence

"But when you're in front of an audience and you make them laugh at a new idea, you're guiding the whole being for the moment. No one is ever more him/herself than when they really laugh. Their defenses are down. It's very Zen-like, that moment. They are completely open, completely themselves when that message hits the brain and the laugh begins. That's when new ideas can be implanted. If a new idea slips in at that moment, it has a chance to grow."—George Carlin

Chapter 6: Thinking: Raising Children's Thinking Skills Increases Intelligence and Learning

"Thinking is like walking or breathing. There is nothing we need to do about it. There is nothing we can do about it. Any interference with it will only make it awkward and artificial and inhibited by self-consciousness. If you are intelligent you are a good thinker. If you are not intelligent that's too bad and you should listen to someone who is."—Dr. Edward de Bono

Chapter 7: Neurofeedback: How Brain Training Can Increase Your Child's Learning and Intelligence

"The literature, which lacks any negative study of substance, suggests that EEG biofeedback [neurofeedback] therapy should play a major therapeutic role in many difficult areas. In my opinion, if any medication had demonstrated such a wide spectrum of efficacy, it would be universally accepted and widely used."—Dr. Frank Duffy, neurologist, Harvard Medical School

Brain Changers: Major Advances in Children's Learning and Intelligence is the second book of the Brain Smart series. The first book, A Guide to How Your Child Learns: Understanding the Brain from Infancy to Early Adulthood, presents information on how children learn at different stages of brain development. Brain Changers, however, gives an in-depth examination of brain changing techniques for children at all stages of brain development. In fact, the words brain changing reflect an often ignored concept: that every learning experience requires brain change, or what neuroscientists refer to as brain plasticity, which is the brain's ability to modify its connections or rewire itself. Studies show that without this ability, any brain, not just the human brain, would be unable to develop from infancy to adulthood.

For this reason, I dedicate this book to every individual who is or has been in a position to be a (so-called) brain changer. Teachers, parents, psychologists, learning specialists, school counselors the list is endless. All participate in this challenge on a daily basis, yet in my view, recognition of their importance is limited. Again, borrowing a phrase from noted psychologist and learning specialist Dr. David Sousa: educators are not neuroscientists, but they are members of the only profession in which their job is to change the human brain every day.

The phrase brain changing supports the obvious concept that when learners are interested or passionate about the learning process, they usually learn best. In fact, our brain's limbic system understands this when it forms emotional connections or attachments (bonding) to an important part of our brain called the hippocampus. According to some neuroscientists, the reason the brain's hippocampus is so important to brain changing is because the hippocampus is considered the only part of the learning brain where neurons regenerate or make new neurons.

In my many years as a learning specialist, almost every successful student's or client's learning experience was the result of the learner having had an emotional brain changing experience. For instance, an examination of how children learn to read could tell us how the physiology of the brain reacts during a positive or negative brain changing experience.

Specifically, if one area of the child's brain exhibits problems recognizing letters and knowing which sounds the letters make, they may have a learning condition called dyslexia. As a result, the child could then view learning to read as a negative experience, and the child's thalamus, located in the brain's limbic system, could interpret the experience as negative and send an impulse to the amygdala, which releases the chemical cortisol, causing a fightor-flight response. In short, this response could short-circuit the left linguistic area of the child's brain, which is responsible for reading, language development, and the like.

However, if the reading experience is positive , the hippocampus, located on the left side of the brain, bonds with the experience and connects with the brain's executive areas, and a potential positive reading experience can occur. Again, the medical world understands this positive learning experience and describes the function as brain plasticity, or the brain's ability to modify its connections or rewire itself.

The recognition of brain changers not only acknowledges individuals such as teachers, parents, and counselors but also points to the innovative techniques used by them to support this difficult task, what I, again, call brain changing.

For example, brain changing techniques have been around for years. Dr. Maria Montessori, a noted brain changer, used specific brain changing techniques with orphaned children by connecting the child's lack of maternal touch and bonding to the child's ability to learn how to read. With the help

of "sandpaper letters," Montessori's children could simultaneously say or sing the alphabet or phonemes while touching the letters.

In other words, Montessori smartly connected the need for touch (kinesthetic intelligence) in orphaned children with their ability to bond (hippocampus) with letters, words, and reading in general.

Rudolf Steiner of Waldorf Education developed a brain changing curriculum that integrated the arts with education, including dance, music, drama, calligraphy, and more, within a general school curriculum. Both educational philosophies are excellent examples of the brain changing concept, or neuroplasticity, which I will present in this book.

Moreover, Swiss developmental psychologist Dr. Jean Piaget studied and established brain changing theories on how children process information at every age and stage of life. Interestingly, much of Piaget's cognitive development theories laid the foundation for school curriculums and learning paradigms currently in use throughout the world.

Brain changing research did not occur just in our schools. Neuroscientist Eleanor Maguire demonstrated larger hippocampi in the brains of London cabdrivers. This was because London cabdrivers spent two to three years memorizing London's intricate street grids, including the shortest distance between two points. Using a magnetic resonance imagining (MRI) scanner, Maguire found that the cabbies' right posterior hippocampi, a region devoted to spatial navigation, measured 7 percent larger than the norm. Evidently, neuroplasticity had shaped the cabbies' brains as they learned more and more about navigating through London.

In addition, even the school schedule can produce brain changing effects with student learning. For instance, the first twenty minutes of each school day is a most impactful learning time, and an understanding of the importance of this open period is the reason why teachers should not waste this critical period of the school day on such mundane tasks as taking attendance or lunch count. Studies describe this impact as the primacy—recency effect, or the conundrum that the brain remembers best what comes first and last and retains less of what is in the middle.

Therefore, it makes sense for teachers to begin the school day by connecting the day's most important information to the previous day's lessons, a practice shown to activate higher learning for students. (This procedure is also referred to as the "anticipatory set.")

Additionally, the primacy—recency effect points to the last twenty minutes as a critical time as well. Teachers should consider organizing the school day's last twenty minutes accordingly. You can test out this concept by asking your students or child what they remembered from the previous school day.

Another important concept that adds critical information to the brain changing repertoire is Dr. Howard Gardner's eight multiple intelligence types. Specifically, when you can define a child's particular or preferred intelligence, you are in essence attaching an emotional component to the brain's hippocampus (bonding), which creates a road map to your child's executive learning centers. In addition, integrating multiple intelligence theory into a school curriculum creates an interdisciplinary approach and has been shown to be successful in many school programs, such as Montessori, Steiner, and other methods.

A major contributor to the brain changing concept is Erik Erikson's psychosocial theory. Erik Erikson (1902-1994) was a stage theorist who modified Freud's psychosexual theory to create eight stages of psychosocial development (trust vs. mistrust, autonomy vs. shame/doubt, initiative vs. guilt, industry

vs. inferiority, identity vs. role confusion, intimacy vs. isolation, generativity vs. stagnation, and integrity vs. despair). (Google Freud's psychosexual theory for additional information.) Erikson's eight stages defines two opposing ideas that individuals need to resolve successfully to become a so-called positive contributor to society. In truth, an inability to accomplish this can lead to a lack of accomplishment in other areas of human development.

John Holland's theory of vocational development made a significant contribution to this book. Holland's theory supports psychology and vocational development with an easy-to-apply assessment by identifying six career types or themes, helpfully summarized as RIASEC (realistic, investigative, artistic, social, enterprising, and conventional).

Another crucial brain changing concept in this book is called thinking. That is, do we really provide children with opportunities to improve their thinking abilities or skills? We teach children about learning, rules and consequences in the home and school, but do we really address how children can improve their ability to think?

Borrowing insightful thinking techniques from distinguish scholar Dr. Edward de Bono's famous book The Thinking Course, we delve into various techniques to improve children's thinking abilities at all grade levels.

Moral development could be the most important concept in this book for the simple reason that moral judgment is seriously being challenged for today's youth from so many directions. Whether it is the proliferation of electronics and social media or the effects of peer groups, parents, teachers, and others who teach children are being put to the test and looking for real answers on how to cope with these challenges.

Above all, I have included a chapter about moral development principally because of my many years conducting moral development groups with atrisk youth, and also because of my studies with Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg and associates at Harvard's Center for Moral Development. In short, these experiences helped solidify a greater understating of my relationships to students, clients, and others in need.

In closing, I believe the chapter on moral development could serve as the glue holding together this book's other chapters, covering topics such as cognitive development and multiple intelligence, offering well-rounded approaches to brain changing for children of all ages.

I conclude this book with a chapter on neurofeedback. This chapter describes how neurofeedback (brain changing) can successfully work together to stimulate higher learning potential with individuals at all levels. From the ADHD child's inability to focus and function in the classroom to the professional athlete who strives to find his or her competitive zone, neurofeedback can help individuals in all walks of life. (Note that the American Academy of Pediatrics has defined neurofeedback as the number one alternative to medication for ADHD children.) <>

PHYSICAL INTELLIGENCE: THE SCIENCE OF HOW THE BODY AND THE MIND GUIDE EACH OTHER THROUGH LIFE by Scott Grafton [Pantheon, 9781524747329]

Elegantly written and deeply grounded in personal experience—works by Oliver Sacks come to mind—PHYSICAL INTELLIGENCE gives us a clear, illuminating examination of the intricate, mutually responsive relationship between the mind and the body as they engage (or don't engage) in

all manner of physical action.

Ever wonder why you don't walk into walls or off cliffs? How you decide if you can drive through a snowstorm? How high you are willing to climb up a ladder to change a lightbulb? Through the prisms of behavioral neurology and cognitive neuroscience, Scott Grafton brilliantly accounts for the design and workings of the action-oriented brain in synchronicity with the body in the natural world, and he shows how physical intelligence is inherent in all of us—and always in problem-solving mode. Drawing on insights gleaned from discoveries by engineers who have learned to emulate the sophisticated solutions Mother Nature has created for managing complex behavior, Grafton also demonstrates the relevance of physical intelligence with examples that each of us might face—whether the situation is mundane, exceptional, extreme, or compromised.

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4 The Hidden Hand
5 Pulling Strings

DANGER KEEPS YOU ON YOUR TOES.
—JIM BRIDWELL

Excerpt: How do you decide if you can drive through a snowstorm? How high are you willing to climb up a ladder to change a lightbulb? Can you prepare a dinner party for eight? When was the last time you discovered a shortcut through a forest?

For all these challenges, there is only one way to find out. A person needs to devote some time, energy, and physical engagement. Smart talk, texting, virtual goggles, reading, and rationalizing won't get the job done. The hands have to be on the wheel of the car to learn the feel of slipping tires. The feet need to be balanced on the ladder rungs to detect the tipsiness. The cook has to already know how to chop, fry, and combine four complicated recipes so they are all finished by a certain time. Best of all, finding a shortcut through the forest demands vigilance, courage, and the ability to keep one's wits, particularly at that moment of self-doubt when the journey seems more like a longcut than a shortcut.

Skills such as these are informed by "physical intelligence": the components of the mind that allow anyone to engage with and change the world. Inside the brain there is no single module or bit of tissue that makes this possible. Instead, the action-prone mind draws on a multiplicity of capabilities. This book is about these amazing mental operations, how they were discovered, and how they continue to be studied today. Some are almost primordial in their simplicity. How come you don't walk into walls or off of cliff edges? Others are quite subtle. When you take on a new do-it-yourself project, how much of your problem-solving relies on old habits, winging it, or careful reasoning?

Our psychological intuition about how the brain works inevitably places verbal thought and all the stuff we can talk about, such as our emotions, at the top of the heap. Physical intelligence, which is largely inaccessible to conscious introspection, is treated as a lower form of intelligence, something

to be tucked beneath the verbal and largely ignored. This book makes the case that physical intelligence is much more. It is foundational, a kind of knowing that frames much of what the mind spends its time engaged in.' Indeed, the very fact that so much of physical intelligence can be performed beyond consciousness is the very design feature that frees ã person's thoughts so he can spend his day thinking about social affairs, work, and the world of ideas. Under all the verbal chatter of the mind, much if not most of what the brain is actually dealing with is the raw physicality of being alive.

For many of my colleagues who study the mind, the very notion that physical action also requires some intelligence draws a blank stare. They focus on thinking and perceiving. Other than ears and eyeballs, the body is largely irrelevant for their kind of science. However, to study a mind without a body ignores some of the greatest pleasures of being alive: experiencing the world directly, as we perform and create. My patients point this out to me time and again. As they lose various physical capacities they also lose bits of their deepest sense of self. One of my patients was a farmer in south Georgia with advancing Parkinson's disease. There came a sad day when I had to take his driver's license away. Driving has a way of projecting a person into the physical world, providing a dizzying sense of freedom. For good reason, then, the farmer was severely depressed when he lost his privilege. However, he was not to be deterred. Denied one of his greatest joys, he found an intimidating but satisfactory substitute: he could still drive his oversized bulldozer around his farm. For him, thinking, philosophizing, and reasoning would never offset the sheer joy of getting out and about in his vehicle. Even Stephen Hawking yearned for action. He once commented, "Obviously, because of my disability, I need assistance. But I have always tried to overcome the limitations of my condition and lead as full a life as possible. I have traveled the world, from the Antarctic to zero gravity."

The hidden nature of physical intelligence poses a problem for the scientist. How can these capacities be exposed for what they are? To a certain degree, all of us are constantly searching for them. We are drawn like moths to a flame whenever we witness physical brilliance, when brain, mind, and body operate together with singular grace, as is sometimes evident in sports, dance, craft, or music. However, a scientist focusing only on superb physical talent can be led astray. It would be as if she were trying to understand language by only studying winners of spelling bees. All of our physical intelligence, not just that of outliers, needs to be explained. Look closely at the barista, the kid playing hopscotch, or the floor mopper and you will soon begin to notice physical brilliance everywhere. To show how and why this brilliance exists, I will dwell on some of my favorite experiments across a wide range of scientific disciplines, including the study of normal infant development, intracranial neurophysiology, robotics, brain scanning, and clinical neurology.

Long ago I discovered that some of the most important components of physical intelligence, the ones that are generalizable and relevant for all of us, are laid bare when one is alone in the natural world, particularly in the wilderness. Venturing into wild places requires enormous ingenuity and resolve. It is the primordial world we originated from as a species, and thus it makes sense that the cognitive capacities that are of greatest value for goal-oriented behavior should come to the forefront there. I make a yearly trip into the wilderness alone. I go to the Sierra Nevada, but one could imagine a similar trip in Alaska, the Rockies, the Cascades, the Okefenokee Swamp, or the great deciduous forests of Appalachia. This book is motivated by one of my trips and some of the capacities of physical intelligence that determined my fate along the way.

A good wilderness trip needs three things for the properties of physical intelligence to be evident. The first is obscurity. Although I had left a map and a detailed itinerary with my wife, I changed my route on the second day of my trip. If anyone went looking for me using the map I had given her, she

would probably scour an area that was more than twenty miles away, beyond two glacial divides. Mobile phones don't work in these parts. And the Park Service is so understaffed, the likelihood of being rescued in a crisis is abysmally low. Without any of these lifelines, a relatively simple hiking trip can suddenly become a profoundly intense and complex experience. The second feature is solitude. On such a trip, there is none of the wonderful chatter and distraction that dominates the closeness and pleasure of an outing with family and friends. Without these entertaining social connections, a solo trip results in an utterly different kind of experience. It is not a lonely one. Rather, the solitude provides time for reflection and an opportunity to examine the kind of intelligence that informed human action as our species evolved. In addition, a trip alone completely changes the stakes and perceived risk. There is no confusion about responsibility. The traveler owns all his or her decisions. Roughness is the third feature. The familiar world is stripped bare; the setting is primordial. The landscape is open and stretches forever, with barely a trace of human influence. For more than 1.3 million years of evolutionary history, this was the ordinary world. There were no level sidewalks, warm houses, or high-rise luxuries. Nothing mitigated risk, eliminated hazards, or minimized effort. Our ancestors evolved in a world that was nothing but wilderness. This landscape endowed our species with remarkable ways of seeing, interpreting, and acting in challenging environs. With that in mind, when I take what are relatively hazardous and unknown explorations into the mountains, I get to experience a very crude simulation of what being alive was like long ago. Survival is paramount and one is ever mindful of it.

We didn't emerge as a species sitting around. We wandered far and wide, into locales that are almost unimaginable. To really understand physical intelligence, you need to wander. On a previous trip, I climbed one of the southernmost fourteen-thousand-foot peaks of the range I have spent my life roaming in. It was a very long, steep, ten-mile ascent requiring a windswept traverse far above the shelter of trees and running water. Just before the summit, I was surprised to find an obsidian arrowhead. The setting was desolate, remote, and cold. For many scientists, the arrowhead itself would have been critical. The object reveals something about the cultural intelligence of the hunter, his best technology, available resources, and trading network. The object could have been left there two hundred or nine thousand years ago. What interests me is not the specific manufacturing advances revealed by the arrowhead or how big the trading network must have been for it to show up in the region. Rather, it's the ridiculous location where I found it. The owner probably would have been a Paiute Indian who stalked a deer or mountain goat all the way to the summit, the far side of which ended in cliffs, effectively forming a trap. The hunter had readily climbed through this massive, unforgiving landscape at will, with stunning competence. To me he is amazing not for his technology (a stone-tipped arrow) but for his sustained confidence in stalking, tracking, and climbing over increasingly rough terrain while intensely exposed to sun, wind, or snow. All for dinner. When I roam through the middle of nowhere, the kind of intelligence he and countless generations of ancestors drew on becomes easier to appreciate. The point of my trips, then, is to wander through an environment that makes the natural relationships between thinking and acting obvious to anyone.

To get a good glimpse of what people were like when physical intelligence was honed, one has only to look to the "Iceman," Ötzi, a mummified hunter who died five thousand years ago just below a high mountain pass on the current Austrian-Italian border. Ötzi's remains are on display at the Südtiroler Archäologiemuseum in Bolzano, Italy, along with his fur-covered bearskin hat, goatskin clothing, copper-tipped axe, backpack, food scraps, medicine, fire-starting tools, and longbow. Only five feet three inches tall and with an entirely ordinary albeit fit physique, he readily traveled alone and self-sufficiently through the middle of the Alps. He could smelt copper. Take down a large elk. Fabricate Neolithic blades. Travel over glaciers without getting frostbite. He yields a startling view of our past. What we consider to be extraordinary—living in an Alpine wilderness—was entirely

ordinary at the time. Ötzi relied on a complex of mental capacities that allowed him to adapt his behavior constantly to meet the demands of an extreme and highly varied environment.

The chapters that follow are a sampling of a few of these capacities—basic properties of the mind that not only kept ancestors like Ötzi alive but continue to manifest themselves in all of us. A common thread running through the chapters is the special role that learning plays in forming this kind of intelligence. The mental capacities that are used for action are, more than anything, different kinds of learning machines that the brain has available for acquiring and maintaining physically derived knowledge. Physical intelligence is absolutely ruthless in requiring that knowledge be gained from direct physical experience. This is profoundly different from, say, the instantaneous remembrance of a face, name, or phone number. Rather, physical intelligence reflects learning processes that constantly tinker with a person's performance. One never stops learning to cook, to drive, or even to walk, for that matter. It is also a knowledge that is lost from disuse: without practice you will fall on ice or off ladders.

The world Ötzi navigated was physically challenging and complex, characterized by palpable tension arising from an inability to predict what might happen and few means for maintaining control. Here were perfect conditions for improvising, inventing, and enduring some of the most rigorous demands of the wilderness, which lay at the heart of what shaped physical intelligence for eons. Although the wild is uncontrolled, physical intelligence provides the means to establish a sense of control. Humans acquire their skills and learn to solve problems through constant physical experimentation. That was as true for Ötzi as it is for us. There is no end to the sensing, adapting, anticipating, and accommodating that must take place for a person to act intelligently. It takes practice and know-how to do even the little things in life: to stay upright on a slippery sidewalk in front of your home or to know whether you can still climb a ladder without falling off. And most of all, physical intelligence provides the means for experiencing the pure joy of figuring out how to do something for the first time, whether it is building your first campfire or catching your first fish. <>

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Third Displacement: Cosmobiology, Cosmolocality, Cosmosocioecology by John Hart, foreword by Jacques F. Vallée, afterword by John F. Haught [Cosmos Contact: Close Encounters of the Otherkind, Cascade Books, 97815326-33102]

The question, "Are we alone in the cosmos?" has been answered. We are *not* alone. Geologist-paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, SJ, stated, as early as the mid-1920s, that intelligent life likely exists elsewhere and distinguished scientists of today, including Harvard biologist, E. O. Wilson; Cambridge cosmologist, Stephen Hawking; astrophysicist and noted UAP researcher, Jacques Vallee; astronomer, Allen Hynek; and many others concur. The oral traditions of Native American elders teach that they have interacted periodically with Star People who are respected ancestors. Credible witness-participants today describe abductions by benevolent and malevolent Others. Discoveries by the Kepler, Hubble, and Gaia space telescopes, ground-based arrays of radio telescopes, and TESS (Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite) suggest that in the Milky Way, twenty-five *billion* planets are in the life-friendly Goldilocks Zone.

In **Third Displacement: Cosmobiology, Cosmolocality, Cosmosocioecology**, author John Hart links experiences with research in science-based and Spirit-focused books and articles--including narratives about close encounters with Visitors from elsewhere in space (ETI) or Others from other cosmos dimensions (IDI)--in examination of the claim that Intelligent ExoEarth life exists, that Otherkind has visited humankind. <>

Jet Age Aesthetic: Time Glamour of Media in Motion by Vanessa R. Schwartz [Yale University Press, 9780300247466]

A stunning look at the profound impact of the jet plane on the mid-century aesthetic, from Disneyland to *Life* magazine
Vanessa R. Schwartz engagingly presents the jet plane's power to define a new age at a critical moment in the mid-20th century, arguing that the craft's speed and smooth ride allowed people to imagine themselves living in the future. Exploring realms as diverse as airport architecture, theme park design, film, and photography, Schwartz argues that the jet created an aesthetic that circulated on the ground below. <>

Richard Hofstadter: Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, Uncollected Essays 1956-1965 edited by Sean Wilentz [Library of America (LOA #330), 9781598536591]

Together for the first time: two masterworks on the undercurrents of the American mind by one of our greatest historians
Richard Hofstadter's **Anti-Intellectualism in American Life** and **The Paranoid Style in American Politics** are two essential works that lay bare the worrying trends of irrationalism, demagoguery, destructive populism, and conspiratorial thinking that have long influenced American politics and culture. Whether underground or—as in our present moment—out in the open, these currents of resentment, suspicion, and conspiratorial delusion received their authoritative treatment from Hofstadter, among the greatest of twentieth-century American historians, at a time when many public intellectuals and scholars did not take them seriously enough. These two masterworks are joined here by Sean Wilentz's selection of Hofstadter's most trenchant uncollected writings of the postwar period: discussions of the Constitution's framers, the personality and legacy of FDR, higher

education and its discontents, the relationship of fundamentalism to right-wing politics, and the advent of the modern conservative movement. <>

Research Handbook on the Sociology of Education edited by Rolf Becker [Research Handbooks in Sociology, Edward Elgar Publications, 9781788110419]

Presenting original contributions from the key experts in the field, the **Research Handbook on the Sociology of Education** explores the major theoretical, methodological, empirical and political challenges and pressing social questions facing education in current times.

This Research Handbook covers the theoretical foundations of the discipline; methodological problems; the effects of modernisation; educational systems; benefits of continued education; migration and social integration; and wider policy implications. Chapters discuss education as a life-long process as well as adults returning to education. Schools, families and other social contexts and influences are also considered, as well as skills formation and ways to measure achievement. Offering an analysis of policy outcomes from an empirical social-scientific perspective and emphasising the impact of social and ethnic inequality in educational opportunity, this influential Research Handbook defines the discipline and its agenda for future research.

Researchers and students interested in education, sociology and social policy including the effects of inequality will find this Research Handbook a highly relevant reference tool. It also offers an important message for policy makers and other stakeholders in the field of educational policy and training. <>

Derrida on Being as Presence: Questions and Quests by David A. White, Managing Editor: Anna Michalska [Sciendo, 9783110540130]

Jacques Derrida's extensive early writings devoted considerable attention to "being as presence," the reality underlying the history of metaphysics. In **Derrida on Being as Presence Questions and Quests**, David A. White develops the intricate conceptual structure of this notion by close exegetical readings drawn from these writings. White discusses cardinal concepts in Derrida's revamping of theoretical considerations pertaining to language-signification, context, negation, iterability-as these considerations depend on the structure of being as presence and also as they ground "deconstructive" reading.

White's appraisal raises questions invoking a range of problems. He deploys these questions in conjunction with thematically related quests that arise given Derrida's conviction that the history of metaphysics, as variations on being as presence, has concealed and skewed vital elements of reality. White inflects this critical apparatus concerning being as presence with texts drawn from that history-e.g., by Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Hume, Kant, Whitehead. The essay concludes with a speculative ensemble of provisional categories, or zones of specificity. Implementing these categories will ground the possibility that philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular can be pursued in ways which acknowledge the relevance of Derrida's thought when integrated with the philosophical enterprise as traditionally understood. <>

Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy edited by Emmanuel Alloa, Frank Chouraqui, and Rajiv Kaushik [SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental philosophy, State University of New York, 9781438476919 (hardcover) 9781438476926 (ebook)]

Assesses the importance of Merleau-Ponty to current and ongoing concerns in contemporary philosophy.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty is widely recognized as one of the major figures of twentieth-century philosophy. The recent publication of his lecture courses and posthumous working notes has opened new avenues for both the interpretation of his thought and philosophy in general. These works confirm that, with a surprising premonition, Merleau-Ponty addressed many of the issues that concern philosophy today. With the benefit of this fuller picture of his thought, **Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy** undertakes an assessment of the philosopher's relevance for contemporary thinking. Covering a diverse range of topics, including ontology, epistemology, anthropology, embodiment, animality, politics, language, aesthetics, and art, the editors gather representative voices from North America and Europe, including both Merleau-Ponty specialists and thinkers who have come to the philosopher's work through their own thematic interest. <>

Cicero on the Philosophy of Religion: On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination by J. P. F. Wynne [Cambridge University Press, 9781107070486]

Examining Cicero's engagement with Hellenistic (Stoic, Epicurean, and sceptical) philosophy of religion (the 'science and religion debate') in his two dialogues, On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination, this book makes a major contribution towards a new, higher estimation of the Roman statesman Cicero's philosophical writings.

During the months before and after he saw Julius Caesar assassinated on the Ides of March, 44 BC, Cicero wrote two philosophical dialogues about religion and theology: On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination. This book brings to life his portraits of Stoic and Epicurean theology, as well as the scepticism of the new Academy, his own school. We meet the Epicurean gods who live a life of pleasure and care nothing for us, the determinism and beauty of the Stoic universe, itself our benevolent creator, and the reply to both that traditional religion is better served by a lack of dogma. Cicero hoped that these reflections would renew the traditional religion at Rome, with its prayers and sacrifices, temples and statues, myths and poets, and all forms of divination. This volume is the first to fully investigate Cicero's dialogues as the work of a careful philosophical author. <>

Epictetus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance edited by Dane R. Gordon and David B. Suits [Philosophy Series, RIT Press 9781933360904]

Epictetus (c. 50-c. 120 CE) was born a slave. His master, Epaphroditus, allowed him to attend the lectures of the Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus and later gave him his freedom. From numerous references in his Discourses it is clear that Epictetus valued freedom as a precious possession. He would have been on the side of the many people living now who, while not actually enslaved, are denied true freedom by the harsh circumstances of their lives. Epictetus's teachings about freedom and human dignity have echoed through the millennia-in the writings of Spinoza, Thomas Paine and Martin Luther King, Jr., to name a few. He was much concerned with human behavior. His advice to not worry about what is not in our control is pointedly relevant to our busy modern society-which is often fraught with anxiety. Some people might argue that what Epictetus taught is not serious philosophy, more like self-help. But the range of topics addressed by the essays in this book clearly indicates that the teachings of Epictetus provide strong incentive to present day philosophical thinking. **"Epictetus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance"** is the title of a conference on Epictetus held at Rochester Institute of Technology in April 2012, when many of the ideas in these essays were first presented. <>

Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking Logic: Heraclitus's Doctrine of the Logos by Martin Heidegger, translated by Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen [Athlone Contemporary European Thinkers, Bloomsbury Academic, 9780826462404]

Heraclitus is the first English translation of Volume 55 of Martin Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. This important volume consists of two lecture courses given by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg over the Summers of 1943 and 1944 on the thought of Heraclitus. These lectures shed important light on Heidegger's understanding of Greek thinking, as well as his understanding of Germany, the history of philosophy, the Western world, and their shared destinies. <>

Roman Republican Augury: Freedom and Control by Lindsay G. Driediger-Murphy [Oxford Classical Monographs, Oxford University Press, 9780198834434]

Roman Republican Augury: Freedom and Control proposes a new way of understanding augury, a form of Roman state divination designed to consult the god Jupiter. Previous scholarly studies of augury have tended to focus either upon its legal-constitutional aspects (especially its place in defining, structuring, and circumscribing the precise constitutional powers of magistrates), or upon its role in maintaining and perpetuating Roman social and political structures (primarily as a tool of the elite). This volume makes a new and original contribution to the study of Roman religion, theology, politics, and cultural history by challenging the prevailing view that official divination was organized to produce only the results its users wanted, and focusing instead upon what it can tell us about how the Romans understood their relationship with their gods. Rather than supposing that augury, like other forms of Roman public divination, told Romans what they wanted to hear, it argues that augury in both theory and practice left space for perceived expressions of divine will which contradicted human wishes, and that its rules and precepts did not allow human beings simply to create or ignore signs at will. Analysis of the historical evidence for Romans receiving, and heeding, signs which would seem to have conflicted with their own desires allows the Jupiter whom they approached in augury to emerge as not simply a source of power to be tapped and channelled to human ends, but as a person with his own interests and desires, which did not always overlap with those of his human enquirers. When human and divine will clashed, it was the will of Jupiter, not that of the man consulting him, which was supposed to prevail. In theory as in practice, it was the Romans, not their supreme god, who were 'bound' by the auguries and auspices. <>

Ancient Divination and Experience edited by Lindsay G. Driediger-Murphy and Esther Eidinow [Oxford University Press, 9780198844549]

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

This volume sets out to re-examine what ancient people - primarily those in ancient Greek and Roman communities, but also Mesopotamian and Chinese cultures - thought they were doing through divination, and what this can tell us about the religions and cultures in which divination was practised. The chapters, authored by a range of established experts and upcoming early-career scholars, engage with four shared questions: What kinds of gods do ancient forms of divination presuppose? What beliefs, anxieties, and hopes did divination seek to address? What were the limits of human 'control' of divination? What kinds of human-divine relationships did divination create/sustain? The volume as a whole seeks to move beyond functionalist approaches to divination in order to identify and elucidate previously understudied aspects of ancient divinatory experience and practice. Special attention is paid to the experiences of non-elites, the perception of divine presence, the ways in which divinatory techniques could surprise their users by yielding unexpected

or unwanted results, the difficulties of interpretation with which divinatory experts were thought to contend, and the possibility that divination could not just ease, but also exacerbate, anxiety in practitioners and consultants. <>

The Making of Poetry: Coleridge, the Wordsworths, and Their Year of Marvels by Adam Nicolson, with Woodcuts and Paintings by Tom Hammick [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 9780374200213]

Brimming with poetry, art, and nature writing—Wordsworth and Coleridge as you've never seen them before

June 1797 to September 1798 is the most famous year in English poetry. Out of it came Samuel Taylor Coleridge's *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* and "Kubla Khan," as well as his unmatched hymns to friendship and fatherhood, and William Wordsworth's revolutionary songs in *Lyrical Ballads* along with "Tintern Abbey," Wordsworth's paean to the unity of soul and cosmos, love and understanding.

In **The Making of Poetry**, Adam Nicolson embeds himself in the reality of this unique moment, exploring the idea that these poems came from this particular place and time, and that only by experiencing the physical circumstances of the year, in all weathers and all seasons, at night and at dawn, in sunlit reverie and moonlit walks, can the genesis of the poetry start to be understood.

The poetry Wordsworth and Coleridge made was not from settled conclusions but from the adventure on which they embarked, thinking of poetry as a challenge to all received ideas, stripping away the dead matter, looking to shed consciousness and so change the world. What emerges is a portrait of these great figures seen not as literary monuments but as young men, troubled, ambitious, dreaming of a vision of wholeness, knowing they had greatness in them but still in urgent search of the paths toward it. <>

When Novels Were Books by Jordan Alexander Stein [Harvard University Press, 9780674987043]

A literary scholar explains how eighteenth-century novels were manufactured, sold, bought, owned, collected, and read alongside Protestant religious texts. As the novel developed into a mature genre, it had to distinguish itself from these similar-looking books and become what we now call "literature."

Literary scholars have explained the rise of the Anglophone novel using a range of tools, from Ian Watt's theories to James Watt's inventions. Contrary to established narratives, *When Novels Were Books* reveals that the genre beloved of so many readers today was not born secular, national, middle-class, or female.

For the first three centuries of their history, novels came into readers' hands primarily as printed sheets ordered into a codex bound along one edge between boards or paper wrappers. Consequently, they shared some formal features of other codices, such as almanacs and Protestant religious books produced by the same printers. Novels are often mistakenly credited for developing a formal feature ("character") that was in fact incubated in religious books.

The novel did not emerge all at once: it had to differentiate itself from the goods with which it was in competition. Though it was written for sequential reading, the early novel's main technology for dissemination was the codex, a platform designed for random access. This peculiar circumstance led to the genre's insistence on continuous, cover-to-cover reading even as the "media platform" it used

encouraged readers to dip in and out at will and read discontinuously. Jordan Alexander Stein traces this tangled history, showing how the physical format of the book shaped the stories that were fit to print. <>

Weeping for Dido: The Classics in the Medieval Classroom by Marjorie Curry Woods [E. H. Gombrich Lecture Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691170800]

Saint Augustine famously "wept for Dido, who killed herself by the sword," and many later medieval schoolboys were taught to respond in similarly emotional ways to the pain of female characters in Virgil's *Aeneid* and other classical texts. In **Weeping for Dido**, Marjorie Curry Woods takes readers into the medieval classroom, where boys identified with Dido, where teachers turned an unfinished classical poem into a bildungsroman about young Achilles, and where students not only studied but performed classical works.

Woods opens the classroom door by examining teachers' notes and marginal commentary in manuscripts of the *Aeneid* and two short verse narratives: the *Achilleid* of Statius and the *Ilias latina*, a Latin epitome of Homer's *Iliad*. She focuses on interlinear glosses—individual words and short phrases written above lines of text that elucidate grammar, syntax, and vocabulary, but that also indicate how students engaged with the feelings and motivations of characters. Interlinear and marginal glosses, which were the foundation of the medieval classroom study of classical literature, reveal that in learning the *Aeneid*, boys studied and empathized with the feelings of female characters; that the unfinished *Achilleid* was restructured into a complete narrative showing young Achilles mirroring his mentors, including his mother, Thetis; and that the *Ilias latina* offered boys a condensed version of the *Iliad* focusing on the deaths of young men. Manuscript evidence even indicates how specific passages could be performed. <>

Toward the Characterization of Helen in Homer: Appellatives, Periphrastic Denominations, and Noun-Epithet Formulas by Lowell Edmunds [Trends in Classics - Supplementary Volumes, De Gruyter, 9783110626025]

This monograph lays the groundwork for a new approach of the characterization of the Homeric Helen, focusing on how she is addressed and named in the Iliad and the Odyssey and especially on her epithets. Her social identity in Troy and in Sparta emerges in the words used to address and name her. Her epithets, most of them referring to her beauty or her kinship with Zeus and coming mainly from the narrator, make her the counterpart of the heroes. <>

The Ancient Greek Hero in 24 Hours A New Edition by Gregory Nagy [Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 9780674241688]

The Ancient Greek Hero In 24 Hours by Gregory Nagy Online First Edition, Gratis

The readings
The Ancient Greek Hero in 24 Hours is based on a course that I have taught at Harvard University ever since the late 1970s. This course, "Concepts of the Hero in Greek Civilization," eventually renamed "The Ancient Greek Hero," centers on selected readings of texts, all translated from the original Greek into English. The texts include the Homeric Iliad and Odyssey; the Hesiodic Theogony and Works and Days; selected songs of Sappho and Pindar; selections from the Histories of Herodotus; the Agamemnon, Libation Bearers, and Eumenides of Aeschylus; the Oedipus Tyrannus and Oedipus at Colonus of Sophocles; the Hippolytus and Bacchae of Euripides; and the Apology and Phaedo of Plato. Also included are selections from Pausanias and Philostratus. These

texts are supplemented by pictures, taken mostly from Athenian vase paintings. Copies of those pictures will be shown in Hour 7.

The texts I have just listed are available free of charge in an online Sourcebook of original Greek texts translated into English (http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS_NagyG_ed.Sourcebook_H24H.2013-), which I have edited with the help of fellow teachers and researchers. The process of editing this Sourcebook is an ongoing project that I hope will outlast my own lifetime. All the translations in this online Sourcebook are free from copyright restrictions. That is because the translations belong either to me or to other authors who have waived copyright or to authors who died in a time that precedes any further application of copyright. The texts of these translations in the Sourcebook are periodically reviewed and modified, and the modifications are indicated by way of special formatting designed to show the differences between the original translator's version and the modified version. <>

The Ancient Greek Hero in 24 Hours Sourcebook: Sourcebook of Original Greek Texts Translated into English [Digital edition]

Sourcebook of Ancient Greek Texts in English Translation: for 'The Ancient Greek Hero' General Editor: Gregory Nagy <>

Handbook of Greek Sculpture edited by Olga Patagia [De Gruyter Reference, De Gruyter, 9781614515401]

The Handbook of Greek Sculpture aims to provide a detailed examination of current research and directions in the field. Bringing together an international cast of contributors from Greece, Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States, the volume incorporates new areas of research, such as the sculptures of Messene and Macedonia, sculpture in Roman Greece, and the contribution of Greek sculptors in Rome, as well as important aspects of Greek sculpture like techniques and patronage. The written sources (literary and epigraphical) are explored in dedicated chapters, as are function and iconography and the reception of Greek sculpture in modern Europe. Inspired by recent exhibitions on Lysippos and Praxiteles,the book also revisits the style and the personal contributions of the great masters. <>

Reimagining Spirit: Wind, Breath, and Vibration by Grace Ji-Sun Kim [Cascade Books, 9781532689253]

The Spirit presents itself to many as an enigma. Its existence is mysterious and complex, generating misunderstandings and unawareness of its true purpose. The Spirit's ambiguous nature opens the opportunity for study to unearth the exciting truths that it holds. The Spirit is present in our world in various forms. This book aims to examine the Spirit as experienced in light, wind, breath, and vibration to help us uncover some of its aspects that invite us to work for climate justice, racial justice, and gender justice. The Holy Spirit has always been a mover and shaker of ideas and action. The Spirit's presence moves, stirs, and changes us to become aware of the social ills in our world. The different ways in which we reimagine the Holy Spirit can challenge some traditional assumptions in Christianity and provide a liberative vision that allows us to work for social justice. The work of the Holy Spirit stirs us to work toward new kinships with God that are sustainable, just, and whole. <>

CHRISTIAN METAPHYSICS AND NEOPLATONISM by Albert Camus, Epilogue by Rémi Brague, Translated with a Preface and Introduction by Ronald D. Srigley [The Eric Voegelin Society, St. Augustine's Press, 9781587311147]

Contemporary scholarship tends to view Albert Camus as a modern, but he himself was conscious of the past and called the transition from Hellenism to Christianity the true and only turning point in history. For Camus, modernity was not fully comprehensible without an examination of the aspirations that were first articulated in antiquity and that later received their clearest expression in Christianity. These aspirations amounted to a fundamental reorientation of human life in politics, religion, science, and philosophy. Understanding the nature and achievement of that reorientation became the central task of Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism. Primarily known through its inclusion in a French omnibus edition, it has remained one of Camus' least-read works, yet it marks his first attempt to understand the relationship between Greek philosophy and Christianity as he charted the movement from the Gospels through Gnosticism and Plotinus to what he calls Augustine's second revelation of the Christian faith. Ronald Srigley's translation of this seminal document helps illuminate these aspects of Camus' work. His freestanding English edition exposes readers to an important part of Camus' thought that is often overlooked by those concerned primarily with the book's literary value and supersedes the extant McBride translation by retaining a greater degree of literalness. Srigley has fully annotated Christian Metaphysics to include nearly all of Camus' original citations and has tracked down many poorly identified sources. When Camus cites an ancient primary source, whether in French translation or in the original language, Srigley substitutes a standard English translation in the interest of making his edition accessible to a wider range of readers. His introduction places the text in the context of Camus' better-known later work, explicating its relationship to those mature writings and exploring how its themes were reworked in subsequent books. Arguing that Camus was one of the great critics of modernity through his attempt to disentangle the Greeks from the Christians, Srigley clearly demonstrates the place of Christian Metaphysics in Camus' oeuvre. As the only stand-alone English version of this important work--and a long-overdue critical edition--his fluent translation is an essential benchmark in our understanding of Camus and his place in modern thought. <>

Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity edited by Panagiotis G. Pavlos, Lars Fredrik Janby, Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, and Torstein Theodor Tollefsen [Studies in Philosophy and Theology in Late Antiquity, Routledge, 9781138340954]

Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity examines the various ways in which Christian intellectuals engaged with Platonism both as a pagan competitor and as a source of philosophical material useful to the Christian faith. The chapters are united in their goal to explore transformations that took place in the reception and interaction process between Platonism and Christianity in this period.

The contributions in this volume explore the reception of Platonic material in Christian thought, showing that the transmission of cultural content is always mediated, and ought to be studied as a transformative process by way of selection and interpretation. Some chapters also deal with various aspects of the wider discussion on how Platonic, and Hellenic, philosophy and early Christian thought related to each other, examining the differences and common ground between these traditions.

Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity offers an insightful and broad ranging study on the subject, which will be of interest to students of both philosophy and theology in the Late Antique period, as well as anyone working on the reception and history of Platonic thought, and the development of Christian thought. <>

The Age of Entitlement: America Since the Sixties by Christopher Caldwell [Simon & Schuster, 9781501106897]

A major American intellectual makes the historical case that the reforms of the 1960s, reforms intended to make the nation more just and humane, instead left many Americans feeling alienated, despised, misled—and ready to put an adventurer in the White House.
Christopher Caldwell has spent years studying the liberal uprising of the 1960s and its unforeseen consequences. Even the reforms that Americans love best have come with costs that are staggeringly high—in wealth, freedom, and social stability—and that have been spread unevenly among classes and generations.

Caldwell reveals the real political turning points of the past half century, taking readers on a roller-coaster ride through *Playboy* magazine, affirmative action, CB radio, leveraged buyouts, iPhones, Oxycontin, Black Lives Matter, and internet cookies. In doing so, he shows that attempts to redress the injustices of the past have left Americans living under two different ideas of what it means to play by the rules.

Essential, timely, hard to put down, **The Age of Entitlement** is a brilliant and ambitious argument about how the reforms of the past fifty years gave the country two incompatible political systems—and drove it toward conflict. <>

The US Antifascism Reader edited by Bill V. Mullen and Christopher Vials [Verso, 9781788736954]

How anti-fascism is as American as apple pie
Since the birth of fascism in the 1920s, well before the global renaissance of "white nationalism," the United States has been home to its own distinct fascist movements, some of which decisively influenced the course of US history. Yet long before "antifa" became a household word in the United States, they were met, time and again, by an equally deep antifascist current. Many on the left are unaware that the United States has a rich antifascist tradition, because it has rarely been discussed as such, nor has it been accessible in one place. This reader reconstructs the history of US antifascism into the twenty-first century, showing how generations of writers, organizers, and fighters spoke to each other over time.

Spanning the 1930s to the present, this chronologically-arranged, primary source reader is made up of antifascist writings by Americans and by exiles in the US, some instantly recognizable, others long-forgotten. It also includes a sampling of influential writings from the US fascist, white nationalist, and proto-fascist traditions. Its contents, mostly written by people embedded in antifascist movements, include a number of pieces produced abroad that deeply influenced the US left. The collection thus places US antifascism in a global context. <>

Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future by Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann [Verso, 9781786634290]

How climate change will affect our political theory—for better and worse
Despite the science and the summits, leading capitalist states have not achieved anything close to an adequate level of carbon mitigation. There is now simply no way to prevent the planet breaching the threshold of two degrees Celsius set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. What are the likely political and economic outcomes of this? Where is the overheating world heading?

To further the struggle for climate justice, we need to have some idea how the existing global order is likely to adjust to a rapidly changing environment. **Climate Leviathan** provides a radical way of

thinking about the intensifying challenges to the global order. Drawing on a wide range of political thought, Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann argue that rapid climate change will transform the world's political economy and the fundamental political arrangements most people take for granted. The result will be a capitalist planetary sovereignty, a terrifying eventuality that makes the construction of viable, radical alternatives truly imperative. <>

Harvest The Vote: How Democrats Can Win Again In Rural America by Jane Kleeb [Ecco, 9780062960900]

From Democratic Party rising star Jane Kleeb, an urgent and stirring road map showing how the Democratic Party can, and should, engage rural America
The Democratic Party has lost an entire generation of rural voters. By focusing the majority of their message and resources on urban and coastal voters, Democrats have sacrificed entire regions of the country where there is more common ground and shared values than what appears on the surface.

In *Harvest the Vote,* Jane Kleeb, chair of Nebraska's Democratic Party and founder of Bold Nebraska, brings us a lively and sweeping argument for why the Democrats shouldn't turn away from rural America. As a party leader and longtime activist, Kleeb speaks from experience. She's been fighting the national party for more resources and building a grassroots movement to flex the power of a voting bloc that has long been ignored and forgotten. <>

Brain Changers: Major Advances in Children's Learning and Intelligence by David P. Sortino [Brain Smart, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 9781475831795]

Brain Changers: The Most Important Advances in Children's Learning and Intelligence
represents my second book of The Brain Smart Trilogy. This book presents an in-depth look at successful learning techniques and current brain research about how to increase children's learning potential at all age levels. In my opinion, the words brain changing supports an often-ignored, yet obvious concept that children learn best when they are interested or passionate about learning. Our brain's limbic system knows this when it forms emotional connections or attachment (bonding) to learning. For example, a major area of our brain associated with the brain changing concept is called the hippocampus. In fact, the hippocampus is the only part of your child's learning brain where neurons regenerate or make more neurons. The medical world connects this positive brain changing experience and calls it *brain plasticity* or the brain's ability to modify its connections or rewire itself. Studies show that without this ability, any brain, not just the human brain, would be unable to develop from infancy to adulthood. In my opinion, this book's information provides readers with up-to-date brain research and proven learning techniques to support my brain changing thesis for all individuals interested in helping children reach high levels of learning. <>

Physical Intelligence: The Science of How the Body and the Mind Guide Each Other Through Life by Scott Grafton [Pantheon, 9781524747329]

*Elegantly written and deeply grounded in personal experience—works by Oliver Sacks come to mind—***Physical Intelligence** *gives us a clear, illuminating examination of the intricate, mutually responsive relationship between the mind and the body as they engage (or don't engage) in all manner of physical action.*

Ever wonder why you don't walk into walls or off cliffs? How you decide if you can drive through a snowstorm? How high you are willing to climb up a ladder to change a lightbulb? Through the prisms of behavioral neurology and cognitive neuroscience, Scott Grafton brilliantly accounts for the design and workings of the action-oriented brain in synchronicity with the body in the natural world, and he

shows how physical intelligence is inherent in all of us—and always in problem-solving mode. Drawing on insights gleaned from discoveries by engineers who have learned to emulate the sophisticated solutions Mother Nature has created for managing complex behavior, Grafton also demonstrates the relevance of physical intelligence with examples that each of us might face—whether the situation is mundane, exceptional, extreme, or compromised. <>

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