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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books



Robert Tenor, editor
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EDITORIAL

[Scriptable](#) is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for “the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies” derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. Our [Annotated Bibliography](#) will review, list and link the titles under discussion, providing a faithful summary of its content and audience.

Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.

Each issue should surprise.



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CONTINGENCY AND NORMATIVITY. THE CHALLENGES OF RICHARD RORTY by Rosa M. Calcaterra [Value Inquiry Book Series, Brill/Rodopi, 9789004387973]

Richard Rorty's "neo-pragmatism" launched a powerful challenge to entrenched philosophical certainties of modernity, articulating a powerful picture of normativity as a distinctive activity of human beings. This "contingentism," with its emphasis on indeterminacy, ambiguity, uncertainty, and chance, depicts normativity as a practical human possibility rather than a metaphysical bottleneck which we must overcome at the cost of repudiating the concrete ways we grant epistemic and ethical meaning to our activities. The book is a critical survey of Rorty's philosophy, in light of contemporary theoretical debates around language, truth, justification, and naturalism, as well as his own resourceful attempts to renew philosophy from within by using the conceptual tools and argumentative techniques of both analytic philosophy and pragmatism.

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Lines of a New Pragmatic Anthropology

Excerpt: The common thread of the subjects discussed in the following pages is the question of epistemic and moral normativity: it is, obviously, a classic theme in our philosophical history, but it has nowadays become much more crucial and complicated after the massive twentieth-century critique of traditional foundationalism. In the continuous seesaw of radical deletions and partial restorations of the foundationalist claim in new guises, especially in the fields of language and action, normativity has played and keeps playing the role of a trigger for the difficulties – theoretical or psychic-existential or socio-ethical – which derive from our renunciation of solidly-instituted polestars. So, despite traditional foundationalism, contingency has gained much attention, thanks to the spreading conviction that it may be the defining trait of human reality. Such a conviction, of course, finds eminent support in Darwinian biology and in its positivistic interpretations, but also in the physics of relativity, and represents very well the strong interest in the relationships between science and philosophy in Western culture. Through philosophical and scientific arguments, contingentism puts to work a conceptual net tied to the criteria of indeterminacy, ambiguity, uncertainty and randomness, which has inevitable effects on the conception of normativity. The point is, then, to inquire if and how we can draw a picture of human being that could be free from the narrowness of traditional metaphysics without being committed to a radical skepticism on both epistemic and ethical levels.

Among the different answers to this fundamental question, that cuts through our contemporary thought, the following pages will endorse those provided by pragmatism, in order to shape a conception that can adjust, beyond the notion of 'final ground,' the meaning and the actual function of some fundamental notions for the question of normativity, such as the concepts of epistemic and moral responsibility. Such an adjustment implies, firstly, an emphasis on the pragmatist exclusion of univocal definitions of normativity, and its adhesion to the composite concreteness of the practices and the potentialities typical of the human intelligence. The work of Richard Rorty lets us articulate critically this philosophical proposal. His contingentism is deeply imbued with the question of

normativity; better, according to my interpretative hypothesis, it draws together in remarkable fashion the big challenges resulting from the long process of dismantling of the philosophical systems of Western culture.

This book is not an apology for Rorty, but an invitation to accept the provocations that he threw into two different but somehow symmetrical fields: on one hand, a provocation to those driven by the anxiety of amending human contingency with conceptual tools which inevitably end up in dogmatism and oppression; on the other hand, the challenge to opt for a philosophical approach that searches within contingency itself for a chance to give concreteness to the distinctively human exercise of normativity. That means, as Rorty says, avoiding both absolutistic closures and skeptical drifting, and constantly maintaining philosophical reflection: "Philosophy resembles space and time: it is hard to imagine what an 'end' to any of the three would look like." These words always seemed to me not only very fascinating, but also explanatory of his deep passion for developing, and inviting development of, his neo-pragmatism.

In the last few years, the interpretations of Richard Rorty's thought have become more measured than before. Earlier, the international community of philosophers had showed him more hostility than acceptance, so much so that in an 'annotated bibliography' of the secondary literature on this author, up to 2002, there is an exiguous number of positive items in a total of 1200. It would be hasty, if not impossible, to do an adequate account of the present state of scholarship; however, we can surely say that there is now a prevalent tendency to deal with Rorty's work looking more to its thematic richness than just arguing with its most clamorous expressions. This book intends to promote such a tendency too, making detailed studies and elaborations on the epistemological and moral topics sustaining this major twentieth-century thinker's philosophical argumentation. Therefore, I have chosen to follow a suggestion from William James, which was formulated originally to answer harsh critiques from Bradley and other peers: when we decide to criticize the succession of theories on the philosophical scene, we need first of all a sympathetic attitude, because it is the fundamental way for understanding them. In other words, I have tried to mark a theoretical path into Rorty's work which will – this is my hope – allow us to gather his most fruitful suggestions, rather than focusing on the philological-historiographic side: I have tried, actually, to suggest similarities between different authors and mutual possibilities of integration, instead of exhibiting interpretative 'mistakes' of any author with regard to others – for example, Rorty's 'mistakes' in reading Peirce, James, Dewey, Wittgenstein and all the other philosophers to whom he refers.

On the other hand, I would like to endorse the pluralistic and at the same time holistic style expressed in Peirce's famous sentence that stigmatizes the nomologic-deductive style proper to traditional foundationalism, using the metaphors of the chain and the rope: "Philosophy ought [...] to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected."

It is too early to say if, and possibly how, or in respect to which discipline – epistemology, literary criticism, ethics or political philosophy – Rorty has acquired the cultural influence of an 'American Nietzsche' which he hoped for himself, especially since he denounced the distortions caused by the millennial philosophical attempts to define for all time what are the true, the good, beauty and the rest of the philosophical vocabulary. In other words, it is too early to realize whether Rorty's philosophy has been successful in its repeatedly declared intent to set the philosophical environment finally free from absoluteness, particularly renouncing the logical-epistemological quest for 'truth,' 'objectivity,' and the 'good.' We cannot ignore the impact that this intention had both on twentieth-century academic American and European philosophy and, more specifically, on the analytic and pragmatist fields with which Rorty dealt more directly. We can say that on both sides there have been very animated reactions: the most interesting consequence is that most of current debate

about paramount epistemological and ethical questions includes, more or less explicitly, the salient themes of Rortyan philosophy; at times accepting and constructively reshaping them, at times resolutely rejecting them – even with an ill-concealed contempt, although the animus toward him is now, as we said, generally softer.

It would be interesting to carry out an inquiry into sociology or psychology of knowledge, in order to see if and how the various reactions depend rather on personal or academic identity exigencies than on exclusively theoretical questions; Rorty himself would recommend that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a sharp line between these impetuses, apart from in episodes of real deceitfulness. This would be the right place to invoke his concept of ‘semantic authority,’ which he uses to assign a precise cultural-historical value to the personal or collective capacity of supporting one’s own languages and discourses, in order to make them understandable and acceptable in their wider historical-cultural environment. But it is likewise important that he assigns a specific ethical tonality to his own famous description of philosophy as a voice in the ‘conversation of mankind.’ The entire complex development of individual and social history depends on this conversation and, for the sake of its advancement, Rorty advocates respect for other people’s positions rather than the definitive and absolutistic claims of truth spread by the *forma mentis* of philosophical essentialism. This, of course, without surrendering to a hypocritical rhetoric of do-goodism: to the contrary, there is in Rorty a silent invitation to distrust the idea, promoted everywhere, that interpersonal and intercultural relationships should be inspired by ‘authentic’ feelings of affinity and approval. His contingentism, instead, incites a clear epistemic awareness of the concrete difficulties involved in breaching the dividing walls that stand between human beings because of the logical-semantic systems (what he calls ‘final vocabularies’) on which their specific forms of life rely and whose impenetrability to dialogue is greater the more we hide its historical-cultural nature, and take shelter in philosophical convictions of truth and moral or political values supposed to be timeless, necessary and self-evident.

These Rortyan reflections on ethically-qualifying concepts such as dialogue, the conversation of mankind and solidarity, let us see something quite different from the mere optimism of good intentions. Instead, they reflect Donald Davidson’s precise epistemological thesis that human communication is a process irremediably involved in the contingencies in which it takes place and so it is never guaranteed both in its dynamics and in its consequences. More precisely, these concepts embrace Davidson’s radicalization of the ‘principle of charity’ (as famously described by Quine for its theory of translation): namely, Davidson considers this principle the *conditio sine qua non* of every kind of communication, and not only a normative criterion for the translation of remote communities’ idioms, as Quine claimed. I will try to clarify that the Rortyan use of the principle of charity goes beyond the romantic and vaguely philanthropic perspective under which it is generally seen, and actually represents both an epistemic and an ethical criterion that gives its deepest sense to Socratic irony in a renewed contingentist philosophical approach.

Rorty’s often challenging style is an essential part of his commitment to a cultural environment free from the theoretical-methodological canon of the Western philosophical tradition: an environment where, most of all, we manage to renounce the classificatory mentality characterizing the origins and the most important developments of our history of ideas. But we also need to realize that Rorty himself frequently warns us that his remarks on some canonical philosophers are free attempts at developing autonomously their most inspiring suggestions, in order to enfold them into his own neo-pragmatist project.⁷ However, a challenging style (although it inevitably risks forcing the interlocutors into an unfruitful stubbornness regarding their own theoretical positions) has a significant function of incitement to academic debate; for Rorty, this was also a playful provocation, since he had a personal inclination for cheerfulness and jokes. The effectiveness of Rorty’s style is, for example, authoritatively attested by Richard Bernstein, his colleague during their studies at the University of Chicago and long-life friend: “No other contemporary philosopher has influenced me in

such a creative manner [...] Some of our philosophic disagreements were quite sharp, but they were always productive [...] Over the years I found myself defending Dick as frequently as I criticized him, especially when I felt that attacks on him were grossly unfair.”

As much as any philosophical work, Rorty's includes deeply ambiguous passages, but what seemed most problematic to many is the sometimes excessively unilateral perspective under which some authors and subjects are presented. For example, many philosophers committed to following the path of classical pragmatism did not accept his critiques of Dewey directed towards repositioning the center of philosophical researches from experience to language. The 'linguistic pragmatism' he started more than thirty years ago aims, indeed, to liberate both theoretical and practical reflection from the notion of experience. Through Rorty's remarkable blending of pragmatism and analytic philosophy, there is an invitation to abandon the term 'experience' because it is seemingly too vague, and in any case too compromised by its connection to the transcendental/subjectivist logic that supports the consciousness-focused philosophies. Nevertheless, the opposition between 'experience' and 'language' is revealing itself as weak and specious in the recent developments of pragmatism; it is possible to find in Peirce, James and Dewey some intuitions which are particularly important in bringing together the two logical-semantic fields to which those terms refer. Many philological doubts have been pointed out in his interpretations of Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Davidson, whose works give to Rorty's contingentism some fundamental suggestions. So, it is easily possible, exercising historiographic or philological meticulousness on various Rortyan exegetic sentences, to disparage the Rortyan project, but I am convinced that this way is not appropriate for judging the theoretical and ethic-political challenges which emerge from the researches carried out by a philosopher often placed side by side with the most important personalities of the second half of the twentieth century in American philosophy: Quine, Putnam, Davidson.

For his part, Rorty claimed that his and Putnam's contributions to the post-positivistic philosophy have been less important than Quine's, Sellars', Davidson's and Brandom's (the latter the most renowned continuer of his 'linguistic pragmatism'); to be sure Rorty considered these four the greatest philosophers of recent American culture. However, he shared with Putnam, with whom he continued a lifelong debate, a paramount role in the still unfolding process of blending pragmatism and analytic philosophy: this process implies much more than a philologically accurate reiteration of classical American philosophy, since what is at stake is a peculiarly meta-philosophical issue. After all, Putnam himself declares his alliance with Rorty about the opportunity to analyze the work of Peirce, James and Dewey in order to distill 'creatively' its most useful aspects for the articulation of our contemporary philosophical problems, instead of giving a more accurate philological interpretation of them: "I am sure pragmatism has a future provided it does not degenerate into the idea that some group of past thinkers has all the answers. It is dangerous to say 'The best is behind us, you just have to go back to Dewey, to James, or to Peirce.' That's not the way to keep pragmatism alive. I believe both Rorty and I agreed on that."

These words represent at best the spirit of this book which, in fact, presents an interpretation of Rorty's work that puts some aspects deliberately aside, especially the political, in order to focus on the development of the question of the relationship between contingentism and normativity, as I stated at the beginning. Also deliberately omitted will be a sufficient account of the huge number of critiques of Rorty, and the accurate answers that the founder of neo-pragmatism never missed an opportunity to give. Knowing that both such aspects of his oeuvre would have deserved a far larger space than they have been given, I have preferred to include a limited comparison of Rorty with his predecessors, always having as polestar a meta-philosophical or theoretical reflection.

I have hesitated for a long time before deciding to assemble for this book the reflections on various aspects of Rorty's thought that I have previously entrusted to the severe critical inspection of PhD and undergraduate students and, for a little part, of reviews and miscellanies. My hesitation was also

occasioned by the sense that there was no need to add another voice to an already massive quantity of texts on Rortyan neo-pragmatism, but eventually some motives overcame this reluctance. Among them there have been, on one hand, the solicitations of esteemed colleagues and co-workers to finally prepare a monograph by an Italian scholar on one of the most discussed thinkers of our time; on the other hand, the continuous confirmation, especially during academic debates, that he has generally been misunderstood both for his innovative expressions and for his characteristic intention to put into connection different philosophical traditions. I am specifically thinking of those who accuse him of vacuous eclecticism that, in truth, is counterbalanced by the acknowledgement – even from some of his harshest critics – of his exceptional skill in understanding apparently different philosophical languages and finding common terms of discussion. I am also thinking of the trivializations of the conceptual triad in the title of his renowned book of 1989, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*: a triad outmoded to the eyes of many people, including some excellent scholars and defenders of Peirce – he who (what a coincidence!) used an even more compromised triad in claiming that ‘faith, hope and charity’ described the sense of his cognitive semiotic. <>

SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST edited by Sandra L. Faulkner and Andrea England [Series: Personal/Public Scholarship, Volume: 5, Brill, 9789004418813]

SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST is a collection of creative nonfiction, personal narrative, and poetry. This volume is a conversation between poets and scientists and a dialogue between art and science. The authors are poets, scientists, and poet-scientists who use the seven words—“vulnerable,” “entitlement,” “diversity,” “transgender,” “fetus,” “evidence-based” and “science-based”—banned by the Trump administration in official Health and Human Service documents in December 2017 in their contributions. The contributors use the seven words to discuss their work, reactions to their work, and the creative environment in which they work. The resulting collection is an act of resistance, a political commentary, a conversation between scientists and poets, and a dialogue of collective voices using banned words as a rallying cry— **SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST**—a warning that censorship is an issue connecting us all, an issue requiring a collective aesthetic response. This book can be read for pleasure, is a great choice for book clubs, and can be used as a springboard for reflection and discussion in a range of courses in the social sciences, education, and creative writing.

Readership

Students, teachers, scientists, poets, academic and public libraries, and the general public interested in literary art as resistance to oppression and censorship, and the connection between science and art, and in particular, poetry.

Advance Praise for Scientists and Poets #Resist

“This collection of high quality creative nonfiction, poetry, and personal narrative is not only an act of resistance, but an act of hope. Reading the dialogue between scientists and poets centered on seven words banned by the Trump administration in official Health and Human Service documents gave me a deeper understanding of the effect of censorship and tyranny on the work, personal lives, and identities of scientists, poets, and scientist-poets and how they are engaged in resistance. The book made me feel more empowered in my own resistance through engagement in social scientific research. I’m sure I will turn back to this book again and again for inspiration.” – **Pamela J.**

Lannutti, PhD, author of *Experiencing Same-Sex Marriage: Individuals, Couples, Social Networks*

“SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST is an act of emboldened literary and intellectual rebellion against the overt censorship and banning of seven words by the dystopian dictator in chief in the reality TV show of our current America—**vulnerable, entitlement, diversity, transgender, fetus, evidence-based, and science-based**. This anthology is an impassioned cry against this censorship, a defensive strike for the protection of language, rallying together non-fiction and poetry, anecdotal personal wailings and scientific study. It is an amalgamation of written resistance with the seven words scattered in **boldface** defiance throughout, like embers of separate flames joining together into one fire. With sparks that provoke self-and societal-reflection like, ‘If I watch it, is it a vigil? An illusion? An obsession disguised as an act of prevention?’ by Sweeney, and ‘We’ve been advised to swap words/for lies so reality will disappear,’ by Cohen, this collection answers what all resistance poets and thinkers thought when someone attempted to ban our words—let’s write them over and over and over again.” – **Kai Coggin, author of *Periscope Heart, Wingspan, and INCANDESCENT***

“In the new anthology, *Scientists and Poets #Resist*, editors Sandra L. Faulkner and Andrea England, have created a text that is by turns lament, manifesto and blueprint for how to live a life of compassion and integrity. The prompt? Take the seven words banned by the Trump Administration in 2017 (‘vulnerable,’ ‘entitlement,’ ‘diversity,’ ‘transgender,’ ‘fetus,’ ‘evidence-based’ and ‘science-based’) and not only *say* them, not only *write* them, but *use* them—to theorize, hypothesize, narrate and imagine. To #Resist the forces that would separate us from each other’s knowledge, expertise and understanding. The richly textured work in these pages, written by poets and scientists, sometimes collaboratively, evokes a painful moment in our national story, but creates within that moment a space of possibility. They remind us that we need to start somewhere in order to get anywhere. In ‘Notes from Indiana: The Crossroads of America, 2018,’ Charnell Peters writes: ‘I will start here / with the grit under my fingernails / the eyelash on my friend’s cheek / the beads in my cousins’ hair / the pale silks of July’s sweet corn / my god what shall I make?’ A charge within a charge: where will *you* start, and what will *you* make? This is an important book and I’m glad we have it.” – **Sheila Squillante, Director, MFA Program in Creative Writing and assistant professor of English at Chatham University**

“When the Trump administration banned the use of seven words in HHS documents—words pointedly related to gender, abortion access, and science—they went beyond merely trying to frame a public discussion according to their own agenda: it is one thing to identify preferred language, and quite another to forbid, legally, the use of words with which one doesn’t agree. But Truth, as Flannery O’Connor once put it, ‘does not change according to our ability to stomach it.’ The poems, stories, and essays in this anthology demonstrate, openly and often painfully, the day-to-day necessity of the words this administration seeks to suppress. This is a crucial, courageous book.” – **Philip Memmer, author of *Pantheon***

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Science-Based Vulnerability

This volume of creative nonfiction, personal narrative, and poetry is a conversation between poets and scientists and a dialogue between art and science. The authors are poets, scientists, and poet-scientists who use the seven words—“vulnerable,” “entitlement,” “diversity,” “transgender,” “fetus,” “evidence-based” and “science-based”—banned by the Trump administration in official Health and Human Service documents in December 2017 in their contributions. The contributors use the seven words to discuss their work, reactions to their work, and the creative environment in which they work. The resulting collection is an act of resistance, a political commentary, a conversation between scientists and poets, and a dialogue of collective voices using banned words as a rallying cry—**SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST**—a warning that censorship is an issue connecting us all, an issue requiring a collective aesthetic response.

The editors and contributors approached this project from a place of **vulnerability**, using their experiences as poets and scientists in a time of censorship and attack to speak from a place of susceptibility to harm. The speaking of those experiences turned **vulnerable** into a show of strength and solidarity.

Andrea England: I first met Sandra during a writing residency at SAFTA ([Sundress Academy for the Arts](#);) in late Winter 2017. Little did either of us expect to make such a strong personal and political connection, or imagine that shortly before we met Donald Trump would become our next President. Later that year, we met again in residency at SAFTA. This was soon after the CDC (Centers for Disease Control) received a list of words from the Trump administration that they were not to use in communications and/or official documents. These words were: *entitlement, evidence-based, transgender, fetus, diversity, vulnerable, and science-based*. I immediately wrote a sestina utilizing six of these, and it was then that Sandra and I decided that these words deserved a larger context in which to evolve and be understood.

Banned Sestina

I remember you when you were just a fetus
 All fibula and forehead, turned to **diversity**,
 keeping your sex a secret part of in utero **entitlement**.
 Now you've got Serenity, once Samuel, **transgendered**.
 She's got your back on the bus with her **vulnerable**
 weave. Even my freshmen know research is **evidence-based**
 Where do I find it? How do I cite **science-based**
 examples? Doctors weren't worried when you were a **fetus**
 They said you'd either sink or swim. I was the **vulnerable**
 one. My students appropriate, misuse **diversity**
 in sentences about Jesus and race, the T in **Transgender**.
Transvestite one laughs in her slim jeaned **entitlement**.
 Online students give it up, this sixth sense of **entitlement**!
 SHTSTE. Please keep to the five; they're **evidence-based**
 like the anatomy of experience or natal **transgender**.
 Oh how I waxed and took baths when you were a **fetus**,
 the sweat running swell in my wild-life **diversity**:
 endangered white rhino, sandwich—**vulnerable**
 to Papa John's teeth. Papa don't preach **vulnerable**
 because men are told their born to **entitlement**
 my father, your father, don't marry into **diversity**.
 Therapists assign books that are **evidence-based**.
 Divorce rates don't help the plight of the **fetus**.
 Would you rather your baby be gay or **transgender**?
 Which of these matter, which syntax, **transgender**?

Regardless the period, the colon, our end wanes **vulnerable**
 as the torn labrum, labia, ice packs for that **fetus**.
 Graduate? Two pair of shoes? Please admit your **entitlement**
 like a tree admits its roots. Math is **science-based**
 a day added or subtracted. It admits its **diversity**;
 the story problem of conception: that **diversity**.
 My doctor misbelieved your sex. **Transgendered?**
 No, head circumference, weight...**evidence-based**
 or mystery? Choice or genes, as **vulnerable**
 as the next, except for a parent's **entitlement**.
 I've made many choices. I too, was a **fetus**,
 an **evidence-based**, fraternal, twin: **vulnerable**
 and fated to **diversity** and loss. Even hope is **transgender**—
 Tricky, **entitled**. Our (your) very freedom, a hothouse **fetus**.

Sandra L. Faulkner: When I first met Andrea at SAFTA in February 2017, we fell into dialogue about life and work as if we had known one another for years, as if we had been roommates in college, as if we were long time collaborators and friends. I talked about being a social scientist who uses poetry in her work as feminist practice and research methodology. Andrea talked about the creation of poems as reflective of personal experience and connection to tradition, how teaching was the distillation of creative practice. We sat at SAFTA's kitchen table writing, talking, grading, and eating fresh eggs we gathered mornings from the chickens and ducks up the hill from our perches on either side of the table. Because of our connection, we arranged to be at SAFTA the same week the following December.

At the beginning of that week, we took a drive in Andrea's car in the neighborhood surrounding SAFTA and ended up finding the put-in dock for a local lake. We conceived this project there in Andrea's parked car, the heated seats a bougie comfort as we ate chocolate truffles, talked about poetry and politics, relationships and language, Andrea writing with pen in a notebook, me pecking out ideas in my MacBook, looking into and past the water outside of the car. I started a sestina that didn't work out. Andrea started and finished one that did work as you see above.

When we returned to our everyday lives, I saw a call for book proposals that dealt with resisting the CDC banned words in some manner. The post-script from series editor, Patricia Leavy, resonated with me and mirrored the conversations that Andrea and I had been having about the power of poetry:

Fascists always go after our words. Words are powerful. Words are disruptive. Words are dangerous. Let's show them just how powerful our words are. Let's use these words and others words to create an intellectual and artistic militia. Let's out-create the destruction around us.

This outlet seemed the right venue for realizing the ideas we had been discussing. We wanted to honor my identity as a social scientist AND a poet and Andrea's appreciation for science AND poetry. We wanted to use the power of poetry and science, the lenses of logos and pathos.

Andrea and I were happy to receive a contract for **SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST** and thrilled with the array of work that poets and scientists sent us, how they engaged with language as poets do, how poet-scientists used the process of creativity and **vulnerability** to resist censorship, rescue, and reimagine the words. Mark Kerstetter speaks of the importance of being vulnerable in "While the Offering Stales in the Calm." "The very possibility of becoming someone viable requires **vulnerability**. Yours. Mine." Franklin K. R. Cline also speaks of the strength of being **vulnerable** in "The Ease and Difficulty of Hating and Loving Oneself."

//maybe instead of morose I mean **vulnerable**
 not sure what the difference is or

if they inform each other
 if they talk to each other the way the fly
 talks to the screen as it yearns to talk to the trees

Other contributors note the importance of speaking out and acting for those most **vulnerable** in our society. Kris Harrington writes in “Bubbles,” “And like so many of my peers, I mostly direct my energy outward into saying what I have to say, into raising awareness through words and demonstrations, into speaking up for the **vulnerable** among us.” And Lee Beavington writes of being triggered by Rachel Maddox’s tears when she reported on immigration policies and separating children from their parents in tender-age facilities in the essay, “Kidnapping Children and Calves of a Tender Age.” Beavington makes an explicit connection between teaching biology labs that use fetal bovine serum (FBS), which is extracted from the hearts of fetal calves in slaughterhouses, and separating small children from their parents in detention centers in the US.

Without relationship, there is less capacity for empathy. Remember Rachel Maddow’s on-air tears: she inspires our path toward compassion. And so I cry for each child kidnapped from their parents. I cry for each fetal calf whose heart is sucked dry every 20 seconds of every day to fulfill our scientific duty. I cry for the fetal calf whose heart I gave away to my students.

Our work expands the scope of other art resistance projects, such as [The CDC Poetry Project](#), which is an online space for poetry using the seven banned words, and the edited collection [Poetic Inquiry as Social Justice and Political Response](#) (Faulkner & Cloud, 2019). We expand such work by focusing on the connections between artists and scientists. For instance, Elizabyth A. Hiscox sent us, “The Double Helix,” wherein she discusses her upbringing as focused on BOTH science and religion.

My mother: the daughter of a Methodist minister, the daughter of a nuclear physicist.//
 My childhood was of her grand design: angels and angles were both important.
 Hypotenuse and Gabriel sat on equal footing: bringing different, good news.

Daniela Elza opens her essay, “It Begins with Our Words,” with the **evidence-based** statement:

It’s not surprising that when fundamentalist and totalitarian regimes come into power the first thing they go after is language. Our poets, scientists, journalists, artists, and intellectuals have always been in danger under such governments, often dying for their words alone. These regimes can only work if they control the narrative.

This anthology is a way for artists *and* scientists to control the narrative, because as Norma Wilson pleads: “Help! A ban on the right to choose one’s words/ blocks health, human services and a poet’s work.” Wilson reclaims the banned words in the lines of a sestina. “The less we think for ourselves, the more he’ll gain.” The poets and scientists we present in this collection all reclaim the words, many with a sense of anger and urgency, showing that art and science are precisely the tools we need in repressive times. Pearl Jam reminds us in their song, “I Am Mine,” that “I only own my mind.” The contributors in this collection embody this as they ask important questions like Sarah Brown Weitzman in *America, My America*:

America, I will always love you
 but who are you? the land?
 the people? the government?
 the leaders? the laws?
 If I had to choose I would say
 the land and the laws
 though I once thought thunder
 a thing of wonder until I heard
 the **scientific explanation**.

I have been asking myself similar questions the past two years as I react to headlines, each one more outrageous than the previous one. I started a series of resistance poems that I call, *Trigger Warning*,

that enact and reflect my feminist rage, and let me work through my feelings about the politics of privilege and a Trump presidency these past few years like Jennifer K. Sweeney does in “Four Years.”

The first acts are of negation. Policies, people, empty offices that will never be full. Words can be sheared away. *Diversity* and *vulnerable*. Gone are the facts, the **evidence**, **science** swept from sites with a silent click. Entitled in his Palm Beach White House, he erases *entitlement*.

Trigger Warning

“If there were an armed guard inside the temple, they would have been able to stop them,” the President suggested. “Maybe there would have been nobody killed except for him, frankly.”—After the Tree of Life Synagogue Massacre, Pittsburgh, October 27, 2018

Sisters, lock your truck
and the hunting weapon of feminist rage,
find the bullets in the kitchen drawer:
A fear of guns is symbolic of what?
I do not own any guns own (m)any guns
not even a gun
being stolen right in your driveway:
If Abortion stops a beating **fetus**
what does a gun stop?
The moment my brother loaded an air-gun with rock salt,
not bothering to refer to me by name,
and shot my bare summer:
When did this begin?
My **entitled** student once called me *commie snowflake feminazi*
and then **vulnerable**, repeated, *shot gun*.
Treat them with much respect:
Did this begin?
Their dead names morphed into prayers
and purses with gun holders,
glove boxes with thoughts:
Why can't you see me?
A loaded gun in your driveway
bullets in the kitchen drawer.
You see me?
I dream of AK57s in a line around the bathroom stall
in my daughter's school, bodies tossed over playground fences-
evidence based on a shot through your stall door:
If someone shoots, will there be **Science** class?
I remember this on a loop for years:
Repeated shot gun
being stolen right in your driveway.
What if I buy a lifetime membership in the NRA?
We love our guns. Your guns.
This shoots on a loop for years.

Poets and scientists are not binary in their pursuits; however, they both occupy spaces that have been interrogated and misunderstood for centuries. Allison Hawthorne Deming speaks to the historical and traditional stance of the public concerning scientists and poets, “We are made to embody the mythic split in western civilization between the head and the heart.” Yet both poetry and science seek to contain chaos through form, and through experimentation and manipulation, to

arrive at new (and often complex) understandings or solutions to the conundrums and idiosyncrasies that plague our ever-evolving environment. This “environment” spans the physical, chemical, and sociopolitical landscape, and encourages, if not demands, an interdiscourse between poets and scientists. The result of this interdiscourse and the hope of this anthology, which mingles the words of poets and scientists, is to locate a communal voice in which to address the current and worrisome ideologies that are the product of our current governing body.

To bodies then! The poet Alberto Rios poses, “Science may be our best way of understanding the world, / But it may not be our best way of living in it.” If we can collectively commit to the idea that the mind and the body not only require each other to survive and evolve, but complement each other in ways that can improve our daily politics and personal interactions, we might arrive at something like this:

Remember photosynthesis?
Soon, some will insist we
just call it magic so we forget
how life depends on light.

These lines from Susan Cohen’s poem, “Photosynthesis,” illustrate the danger of binaries in our current political makeup and highlight this dilemma in terms of censorship. This poem forces us to choose between “photosynthesis” and “magic,” “life” and light.” What happens when words become extinct? In the context of this poem, life ceases to exist. A profound moment also occurs earlier in the poem, when the reader encounters the catch and release of what it means to define and/or ignore the spectrum of human discovery and being as, “This poem is **transgender**, meaning, / surface is one thing, but essence / another.” In our age of technological advancement, where marriages and leaders can rise or fall on the drop of an emoji or a few misplaced words, we must come to acknowledge that both “surface” and “essence” are needed to sustain our relationships, our economy, and our country.

Both scientists and poets use a creative process in their work. The idea that there is a scientific method divorced from the creative process or that writing poetry does not ever mean the use of logic is a false binary. Sandy Feinstein and Bryan Wang demonstrate how this is a false dialectic in their essay “In Field Notes and Marginalia.” Feinstein and Wang interweave how understandings of science help one understand and experience literature and vice versa.

If science provides the surface, it is surely the poet who eeks out and communicates its essence. Scott Bade, in his poem, “The Capital of Failure,” admits the condition of blame that is deep seeded in our culture, “Surely there is more than one ailment bound up in failure.” The speaker goes on to confess, “When I play the guitar, failure sings / its greatest hits.” No more than any other time in history do we need to address, resist and re-address the ways in which we see, speak, and define our failures towards progress. This is the work and the spoils of true resistance, an interdiscourse where we can entertain both science, and the music it insists upon. <>

Essay: Refuting the Whole System? Hume's Attack on Popular Religion in *The Natural History of Religion* by Jennifer Smalligan Marušić

There is reason for genuine puzzlement about Hume's aim in 'The Natural History of Religion'. Some commentators take the work to be merely a causal investigation into the psychological processes and environmental conditions that are likely to give rise to the first religions, an investigation that has no significant or straightforward implications for the rationality or justification' of religious belief Others take the work to constitute an attack on the rationality and justification of religious belief in

general. In contrast to these views, I argue that Hume aims to establish two important claims in 'The Natural History of Religion'. First, almost all popular religions,

including popular monotheism, are deeply superstitious. Second, superstitious monotheism is incompatible with the variety of theism supported by the argument from design. This compatibility puts significant pressure on the rational acceptability of popular religions.

In *The Natural History of Religion* (NHR), Hume describes Cicero's argumentative strategy in *De Natura Deorum*. He claims that the skeptical *dotta* 'refutes the whole system of mythology by leading the orthodox gradually, from the more momentous stories, which were believed, to the more frivolous, which everyone ridiculed: From the gods to the goddesses; from the goddesses to the nymphs; from the nymphs to the fawns and satyrs' (NHR 12.25 75).¹ The similarity between this description of *De Natura Deorum* and the general trajectory of the history of religion sketched in the NHR is hard to overlook: Hume seems to lead the reader on a journey that is the mirror image of the one he finds in Cicero.² Hume begins with an explanation of the development of the first religious beliefs, which he claims are almost invariably polytheistic, and leads the reader through the causal processes that transform polytheistic religions gradually into monotheistic ones. The conclusion suggested—though not explicitly drawn—is that Hume seeks to refute the whole system of religion by a method similar to that employed by Cicero.

Yet there are features of the text that seem to rule out this reading of Hume's argumentative strategy. Hume begins the work by distinguishing two questions about religion, 'that concerning its foundation in reason' and 'that concerning its origin in human nature.' The latter question is declared the subject of the NHR. Moreover, Hume immediately assures the reader that, 'the first question, which is the most important, admits of the most obvious, at least, the clearest solution. The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion' (NHR Introduction I 33). And this answer to the first question seems to be maintained through the very end of the work. In the final section, Hume reiterates, 'A purpose, an intention, a design is evident in every thing; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author' (NHR 15.I 85). It is hard to see how Hume could seek to refute the whole system of religion while also maintaining that 'genuine Theism and Religion' have such an impeccable foundation in reason. (I use 'genuine theism' as shorthand for the kind of religious belief that Hume claims has its foundation in reason.) One possibility, of course, is that he is simply being ironic or insincere. Although there is good reason to hold that at least some of Hume's remarks about religion do not express his real views, we should be reluctant to add remarks like these to the list without careful consideration, since they occur in numerous and prominent places in the NHR, and because, if we read Hume as attempting to refute the whole system of religion, the insincere remarks would seem to obscure the very point of the work. Indeed, I shall argue that the contrast between genuine theism and the popular religions whose origins Hume seeks to explain plays an essential role in Hume's argument. One of the main advantages of the reading I propose is that the claim that religious belief has a solid foundation in reason can play this argumentative role, whether or not Hume is sincere.

There is reason for genuine puzzlement about Hume's aim in the NHR. Is the work simply a 'conjectural history' of religious belief; that is, an exploration of the psychological processes and environmental conditions that likely gave rise to the first religions, an exploration that has no significant implications for the rationality of religious belief? Or does Hume's conjectural history constitute an attack on the rationality of religious belief in general? There are, of course, intermediate positions available, and I shall develop and defend one such position in this paper. In the first part of the paper, I consider the explanation Hume gives of the origins of religious belief and

present textual evidence that shows Hume intends the causal explanation of the origins of religious belief to have some implication for the rationality of religious belief. In the second part, I argue, however, that the causal explanation cannot be taken as an attack on religious belief in general. In the third part, I develop and defend an intermediate position, that takes the NHR to make serious epistemological claims, but not claims that purport to undermine the rationality of all religious belief. I argue that Hume aims to establish two important claims in the NHR. First, almost all popular religions, including popular monotheism, are deeply superstitious. Second, superstitious monotheism is incompatible with genuine theism. I argue that this incompatibility puts significant pressure on the rational acceptability of popular monotheism.

Hume's Conjectural History

Consideration of the explanation Hume gives for the rise of the first polytheistic beliefs and his explanation of how polytheism is transformed into monotheism strongly suggests that Hume takes these causal explanations to have epistemic significance. There is something amiss with the processes by which the first polytheistic religions arise and by which they are transformed into monotheistic religions. At the same time, some commentators have been too quick to conclude that Hume's explanation of the first polytheistic beliefs reveals that they are thoroughly irrational, pathological, or demonstrably false.⁶ In this part of the paper, I'll consider Hume's explanation in some detail and try to pinpoint exactly what Hume thinks goes wrong in the processes by which the first religious beliefs are formed.

Hume begins by describing widespread circumstances that give rise to the first polytheistic beliefs. These circumstances include our great dependence on natural phenomena, the causes of which we are ignorant, and which, as a result, we are unable to predict or control: 'We hang in perpetual suspense between life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want; which are distributed among the human species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is oft unexpected, and always unaccountable' (NHR 3.1 40). The causes of these events, on which our survival and prosperity so completely depends, become the objects of hope and fear. These passions lead us to seek 'ideas of those powers, on which we have so entire a dependence.' Yet, '[t]he more [the ignorant multitude] consider these causes themselves, and the uncertainty of their operation, the less satisfaction do they meet with in their researches; and, however unwilling, they must at last have abandoned so arduous an attempt, were it not for a propensity in human nature, which leads into a system, that gives them some satisfaction' (NHR 3.1 40).

This propensity in human nature is then described as the 'universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object, those qualities, with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious' (NHR 3.2 40). As evidence of the existence and universality of this propensity to anthropomorphise, Hume cites our tendency to 'find human faces in the moon, armies in the clouds' and the 'frequency and beauty' of anthropomorphising natural objects in poetry by attributing to them human sentiments and passions (NHR 3.2 40). Yet there is an important difference between these effects of the propensity to anthropomorphise and polytheism. For the most part, these other effects 'gain not on the belief.' But the tendency to anthropomorphise the causes of unpredictable events 'enter[s] into the real creed of the ignorant vulgar' (NHR 3.2 41). As a result, 'we ascribe to [these causes] thought and reason and passion, and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order to bring them nearer to a resemblance with ourselves' (NHR 3.2 41). The result is polytheism.

Where exactly does Hume think one goes wrong in forming beliefs in this way? It would be wrong to assume that polytheistic beliefs are unjustified simply because the passions of hope and, especially, fear play an important role in their formation.⁷ Similarly, we should exercise care in moving from Hume's claim that an imaginative propensity plays an important role in the acquisition of the belief, to the conclusion that the beliefs are therefore irrational. The epistemological significance of the

contrast between reason and the imagination in Hume's other works, especially in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, is notoriously difficult. Many commentators deny that Hume's attributing a belief to the imagination as opposed to reason is intended to entail that the belief is irrational or unjustified. This should at least make us pause before jumping to the conclusion that Hume thinks polytheistic beliefs are irrational simply because they are the result of propensities of the imagination. Thus, Paul Russell seems to me too hasty in concluding that Hume holds that religious beliefs are irrational from the claim that reason 'has little or no influence over [the] process' by which religious beliefs are acquired.

Let's consider in more detail the role the passions play in the explanation. The prominent role that the passions of hope and fear play in the explanation calls to mind Hume's discussion of these passions in *A Dissertation on the Passions*, originally published together with the NHR as two of the Four Dissertations. One possibility I explore in this paper is that Hume uses the juxtaposition of the NHR with the Dissertation to mutually support the claims of each work. One way he intends to do this is by encouraging the reader to bring to bear his claims about the nature of hope and fear in the Dissertation to his account of the origins of polytheism. Indeed, one of the striking changes between the discussion of the passions in Book 2 of the *Treatise* and the abridged discussion in the later work is the much greater prominence of the discussion of the direct passions, including hope and fear.

Hope and fear are categorised in the Dissertation as 'mixed passions' (Dissertation 1.7 3). They are mixed because they involve a mixture of despair and joy. Hope and fear come in degrees, with despair and joy at the extremes. Hume claims that there is a close relationship between these passions and particular kinds of beliefs. Despair arises from a certain or very probable expectation of evil. A belief that something evil has or will very likely occur causes despair. Conversely, joy is caused by the belief that something good has or will very likely occur. Events that are considered good or evil are those that immediately produce an agreeable or disagreeable sensation (Dissertation 1.1 3). The passions of fear and hope differ from the passions of despair and joy because they involve only a probable belief that an evil or good event will occur. A probable belief that a good or evil event will occur not only causes the feeling of hope or fear, but also determines the intentional object of the passion. The fear is of an evil event and the hope is for a good event because these events are the objects of the probable beliefs that cause the feelings.

Moreover, the strength of the feeling is partly determined by the probability of the event. However, Hume does admit numerous exceptions to the rule that the strength of the feeling is correlated with the probability of the event. The mere possibility of a very great evil can cause fear, even if it is not believed to be probable, as when one stands on the edge of a precipice. Even an evil that is believed to be impossible but is very salient can cause fear. An evil that is very probable, and should therefore produce despair, produces fear instead if we are unable to 'fix' on the evil, as the prisoner sentenced to the rack lacks the courage to 'fix' on the certainty of his fate and so feels fear rather than despair. An evil event that is very probable, but where there is uncertainty about the kind of evil, can produce fear, as when a father learns that one of his sons has been killed but not which one. And, indeed, any kind of uncertainty can sometimes cause fear, as the 'virgin on her bridal-night goes to bed full of fears and apprehensions though she expects nothing but pleasure' (Dissertation 1.1 5-20 5-6).

The conjectural history in the NHR applies Hume's theory of the mixed passions, since it is our uncertainty about whether good or evil events will occur that leads us to be fearful (and hopeful) of their causes. Yet it is still not clear whether the role the passions play renders the resulting beliefs defective. Hume seems to suggest in the text that the passions motivate one to investigate unknown causes. It is because of the uncertainty of good and evil events that we feel fear and hope and it is because of these passions that we are led to try to form more concrete conceptions of the causes. Hume claims, [to lead individuals to] any inference concerning invisible intelligent power, they must

be actuated by some passion, which prompts their thought and reflection; some motive, which urges their first enquiry. But what passions shall we here have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty consequence? Not speculative curiosity surely, or the pure love of truth.... (NHR 2.5 38-39)

Instead, our hopes and especially our fears are the actuating passions. However, it is not plausible to read Hume as claiming that only enquiry motivated by pure love of truth yields reasonable beliefs, even if he thinks that pure love of truth is a particularly admirable motive. Surely, there is nothing irrational or unreasonable about being motivated by hope or fear to engage in some enquiry.

The next step of the explanation appeals to the tendency of the imagination to anthropomorphise. It is at least not obvious that this tendency, though clearly a product of the imagination and not a faculty of reason, is in itself irrational or pathological. The tendency to see something that resembles a human face in the moon is in itself unproblematic. And the personification of nature in poetry can indeed be both beautiful and natural. The real problem, then, comes not from our tendency to anthropomorphise, but from our forming beliefs on the basis of these imaginative tendencies. Surprisingly, Hume doesn't say exactly how or why people move from the innocuous tendency to anthropomorphise to the formation of full-blown beliefs in the existence of human-like beings that are the causes of good and evil events. One possibility is that we come to believe in such beings because it helps alleviate our fear and uncertainty: It helps us understand why otherwise unpredictable events occur, it gives us some basis (though perhaps not a very accurate one) for predicting the occurrence of good and evil events, and it suggests ways that we can influence the occurrence of such events, by trying to gain the favour of the gods.

Hume then goes on to explain how polytheism gives rise to monotheism. Hume begins by observing that communities of polytheistic religious believers may make one deity the particular object of their worship, because they believe that they fall under his particular jurisdiction or because they come to regard one god as the ruler of the rest. Under these circumstances, 'his votaries will endeavour, by every art, to insinuate themselves into his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which will be spared in their addresses to him.... Thus they proceed; till at last they arrive at infinity itself....' (NHR 6.5 53). In this way, God comes to be regarded as a perfect Being and the Creator of the world.

Thus, fear also plays an important role in the rise of monotheism. It is the fear of a particular god and the desire to gain his favour that motivates one to worship by assailing him with flattery and praise. Fear, in this case, seems to motivate not a particular kind of enquiry, but a particular kind of behaviour: to do whatever one can to flatter and praise the object of one's fear. Once again, however, there is nothing obviously irrational or inappropriate about trying to placate someone one fears through flattery. One can imagine lots of situations where this is quite prudent. This striving to flatter a particular deity then motivates one to invent ever greater and 'more pompous epithets of praise' (NHR 6.5 53). This process naturally culminates in declaring this deity the one God and Creator of the universe, a perfect and infinite Being.

Again we might wonder how such declarations come to be believed. Somewhat surprisingly, Hume suggests that the vulgar, for the most part, do not really believe the praises they invent. Rather, 'the assent of the vulgar is, in this case, merely verbal, ... [because] they are incapable of conceiving those sublime qualities, which they seemingly attribute to the Deity' (NHR 7.1 56). The explanation of the origins of monotheism, then, seems not to show that the beliefs of the popular monotheist are unjustified, since he doesn't really believe what he professes.¹⁰ Rather, Hume seems to hold that there is something wrong with the claims that the monotheist makes: His claims are not expressions of belief but the result of attempts to flatter a particular god.

Hume's conjectural history suggests that the processes that give rise to the religious beliefs of the first polytheists are defective insofar as the imaginative tendency to anthropomorphise and the

desire to alleviate fear and uncertainty cause the beliefs. Similarly, the processes that lead the first monotheists to profess what they do are defective insofar as they profess things that they do not believe. But should this conjectural history give any contemporary religious people reason to doubt their own beliefs? Did Hume think it did? I'll argue in part III that the answer to both questions is yes. But first let's consider a different interpretation, which gives the same answers, but not, I'll argue, for the right reasons.

Refuting the Whole System?

In **PROJECTION AND REALISM IN HUME'S PHILOSOPHY** [Clarendon Press, 9780199229505] P.J.E. Kail takes the NHR to present a challenge to the epistemic status of all religious belief." Kail argues that Hume's target is the justification of the 'core content' of all religious belief, namely the belief in the existence of invisible intelligent power, and that Hume's argument is 'destabilising' in the sense that coming to understand the causal basis of religious belief normatively requires us to suspend all religious belief, at least until other potentially justificatory reasons for these beliefs can be examined. On this reading of the NHR, Hume's goal is to challenge all religious belief by showing that a certain kind of rational fideism is untenable. The kind of rational fideism in question is the view that religious belief may be rationally acceptable even in the absence of supporting arguments or evidence. Kail takes the 'reformed epistemology' of Alvin Plantinga to be a contemporary version of the kind of rational fideism under attack, though he notes that Plantinga refuses the label 'fideism' for his view ('Understanding Hume's Natural History', pp. 195-7). I'll follow Kail in taking Plantinga's position to exemplify rational fideism. On Kail's reading, the destabilising explanation purports to show that the causal processes that give rise to the core content of invisible, intelligent power and the belief in the existence of such powers are in some way defective, and recognition of this normatively requires believers to examine evidence for their belief, after all.

I'll argue that there are significant textual and philosophical obstacles to this reading of the NHR. There is reason to doubt that Hume aims to destabilise all belief in invisible, intelligent power. First, there is a difference, as Kail recognises, between the causal processes that may have given rise to the first religious beliefs and the causal processes that are responsible for the beliefs of later religious people. Giving a destabilising explanation of the first religious beliefs does not suffice to destabilise the beliefs of later religious people. Second, I'll argue that Hume's claim that religious belief does have a solid foundation in reason poses an insurmountable obstacle to the success of any destabilising explanation. Before turning to these objections, however, let me briefly consider how destabilising explanations work.

A destabilising explanation is one that purports to show that a belief is unjustified by showing that the causal process by which it is formed is one that is in some way defective. Kail refrains from giving a theory of what such defects consist in, claiming that this will vary from case to case

(**PROJECTION AND REALISM IN HUME'S PHILOSOPHY**, pp. 3-6). Nevertheless, we can distinguish two different ways of characterising such defects, both of which seem to be compatible with Kail's view. First, we might treat the defect as a belief-forming process's failure to track the truth, with the result that a belief formed by such a process is not sensitive, in the sense that one would have the belief even if it were false. A different way of characterising the defect is in terms of the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties: A defective process involves some kind of cognitive malfunction, particularly a malfunction in some faculty that aims at the production of true beliefs (Warrant and Proper Function, p. 19). In addition to beliefs, Kail claims that destabilising explanations can be given of ideas or concepts. A process by which one acquires a new concept can fail to be properly responsive to what the idea purports to represent (**PROJECTION AND REALISM IN HUME'S PHILOSOPHY**, pp. 31-7).

In the basic case, a destabilising explanation will show that a belief-forming process is defective and so show that individuals who acquire and sustain the belief by that process are not warranted in

holding the belief. Here we have to distinguish warrant from justification. A warranted belief is, very roughly, one produced by a reliable, properly functioning cognitive process in a normal environment. In contrast, a belief is justified if one is epistemically responsible in having it, in the sense that one has evidence for it or at least doesn't have evidence against it. Evidence that a belief is the result of a defective process will constitute defeating evidence for the belief. Thus, Kail suggests that awareness that the process by which a belief is acquired is defective gives one reason to suspend belief. If one maintained the belief in light of the defeating evidence one's belief would be unjustified, in the sense of epistemically irresponsible. This explains why giving a destabilising explanation challenges rational fideism. The rational fideist holds that beliefs can be rationally acceptable even in the absence of evidence or argument, but they cannot be justified in light of evidence that they are the result of defective processes. In short, a belief isn't justified if one has (undefeated) evidence that it is unwarranted. This gives us a way of understanding the epistemic implications of Hume's conjectural history.

However, the destabilising explanation alone won't show that someone who forms the same belief in some different way is unwarranted: Her belief may be formed by a truth-tracking, properly functioning process. Indeed, the destabilising explanation may not even show that someone who acquires the belief by the defective process is unjustified, if the belief is later sustained and justified by some other means. For example, Kahane points to speculation that Karl Marx's views about alienation can be explained by his suffering from hidradenitis suppurativa, a particularly severe form of acne ('Evolutionary Debunking Arguments', pp. 105-7). Of course, it is possible that Marx's skin condition was partly the cause of his views in a perfectly appropriate, truth-tracking way; for example, the skin condition could create a sense of alienation that led Marx to think particularly hard about the nature and causes of alienation. On the other hand, if the skin condition caused a sense of alienation that somehow distorted or shaped his reasoning, then his views would seem to be the result of a defective process. But even if Marx's skin condition did play some inappropriate role in his acquiring his views, they may well have been justified by the reasons given for them. Moreover, even if these reasons were never causally efficacious in his acquiring or sustaining his views about alienation, it does not obviously follow that his views were unjustified, much less that anyone who adopts the same views is unjustified, since one could hold that a belief is justified simply if one has suitable evidence, even if the evidence is not causally efficacious in one's acquiring the belief.

Hume's conjectural history cannot be intended as an account of how any particular individual acquires religious beliefs, nor can it be intended as an account of how any of Hume's contemporaries acquire religious beliefs. As Kail notes, the NHR says nothing about the role of religious education, testimony, sacred texts, revelatory experiences, etc. in explaining how individuals come to hold religious beliefs. Rather, Hume's primary aim is to explain how religious belief gets started in the first place.

In claiming that Hume seeks to explain the 'emergence' of the core content of religious belief, namely the belief in intelligent, invisible power, Kail thinks that Hume's aim is both to explain how the idea of intelligent, invisible power is first formed and how this idea comes to figure in one's acquiring the existential belief in intelligent, invisible power. Thus, Hume, on this view, provides destabilising explanations of both the core content of religion and what I'll call the 'core belief', the belief in invisible, intelligent power. Let's distinguish, then, two questions. First, can a destabilising explanation of how the first religious people acquire the core belief destabilise the core belief of all religious people? Second, can a destabilising explanation of how the first religious people acquire the core content destabilise the core belief of all religious people? I'll argue that the answer to both questions is no.

The variety of ways of acquiring the core belief makes Hume's destabilising strategy more complicated than the basic case. One might attempt to show that the processes by which other

religious believers, including contemporary religious people, acquire the core belief are no better at tracking the truth than the processes by which the first religious people come to acquire the core belief are. The processes by which contemporary individuals acquire the core belief might somehow be dependent on the processes Hume sketches. By claiming that one process is dependent on another, I mean that the latter is only truth-tracking if the former is. (One could alternatively explain the dependence of one process on another in terms of proper functioning.) For example, one might think that contemporary individuals frequently rely on the testimony of others to acquire the core belief, and that testimony only tracks the truth if the process by which the belief is originally formed does. Yet whether contemporary religious believers form religious beliefs by such a process is an empirical question that is left entirely unaddressed by the text. Furthermore, even if one acquires the core belief by testimony, say as a young child, it might be later sustained by other processes—like revelatory experiences—and these processes might not be dependent on the original process. The destabilising explanation would only show that the core belief of all religious people is unwarranted if one assumes, contentiously, that all religious believers both acquire and sustain the core belief either by the processes explained or by processes dependent on those. Moreover, the destabilising explanation would only normatively require religious people to suspend belief if it provides evidence that the core belief of all religious people is unwarranted, evidence in light of which it would be epistemically impermissible to maintain the core belief. However, I find no such evidence in the text.

Kail might here respond that Hume need not show that the processes by which any contemporary religious believers acquire or sustain religious belief are defective. Evidence that some religious people are unwarranted in holding the core belief suffices to require all religious people to reexamine their reasons for holding the core belief. I don't think this response will work. At the very least, it needs explicit defense. This reply assumes that, even if it is rationally acceptable to hold a belief with no argument or evidence, coming to see that some process of acquiring the belief is defective requires one to suspend belief until one can reexamine the evidence and arguments for the belief, even if one has no reason to think that one's own belief was acquired by that process. But why should that be?

Kail's answer is that Hume's destabilising explanation applies to the core content as well as the core belief. Yet we concluded in Part I that the defect in the process by which polytheistic beliefs are formed occurs in our coming to believe in the ideas resulting from the anthropomorphising tendency of the imagination, and not in our merely having the ideas. Indeed, Kail seems to agree with this reading of the text, claiming that the imagination can freely combine ideas to produce new ones, so long as they are consistent, but that the core belief is originally the result of motivated irrationality, by which he means that the belief arises in order to relieve fear and anxiety ('Understanding Hume's Natural History', pp. 193, 199). Nevertheless, in response to a version of the problem raised above, Kail claims, 'the reason to suspend belief applies to such states [i.e. the core belief of contemporary religious people] because they deploy essentially the core content which is ultimately sourced in motivated irrationality' ('Understanding Hume's Natural History', p. 200). But we've just seen that the core content is not the result of motivated irrationality, only the core belief is. What's going on here? The next sentence provides clarification: Kail claims, 'For the content comes into circulation because of the formation of an original form of belief, namely, superstitious polytheism' (p. 200). So, the view seems to be that the core content is only widely disseminated because of the core belief of the first polytheists, and this belief is the result of motivated irrationality. Awareness of this, in turn, gives contemporary religious people reason to suspend the core belief.

Kail's response assumes that one has reason to suspend a belief if one has evidence that the content of the belief was widely disseminated because of someone else's belief involving the same content, and that the latter belief is the result of a defective process. Kail does not defend this assumption, and I find it far from intuitively obvious. First, it can't be that the beliefs in question must have

exactly the same content, since, of course, religious people believe in many kinds of invisible, intelligent power. But it also can't be right to claim that any belief involving the core content must be suspended. This would include the beliefs of atheists, who believe that there is no invisible, intelligent power, and the theological belief that belief in invisible, intelligent power is necessary and sufficient for religious belief. Exactly what kind of similarity of content is required? Why think that all the varieties of religious belief really have the right kind of similarity with the original polytheistic beliefs? Second, must one's own belief causally depend on the widespread dissemination of the content? If one has the belief independently of the widespread dissemination, it is hard to see why one would have reason to suspend belief. But if one's belief must causally depend on the widespread dissemination, then Hume would have to show that the beliefs of contemporary people really do depend on the dissemination of the first polytheistic beliefs, and this too requires considering the causes of contemporary religious belief, which Hume does not do.

Finally, suppose that one's belief does depend on the widespread dissemination of a defective belief. Does awareness of this really give one reason to suspend belief? Consider a 19th century atomist who believes in the existence of atoms that cannot be subdivided, created, or destroyed. Call this the core content of atomism. Now, suppose that the core content of atomism is widely disseminated because of the ancient atomists, and our atomist acquires evidence that their belief in the core content is the result of a defective process. Does this give him reason to suspend his belief? If he has evidence for the belief, say by doing chemistry experiments or reading the work of contemporary chemists, then it seems he clearly does not have any good reason to suspend belief, or at least the reason is clearly outweighed by the evidence in favour of the belief. Suppose, then, he doesn't really have arguments or evidence in favour of the belief; it might just be 'in the air' in the educated, scientific circles he frequents. In that case, does he have reason to suspend the belief? It does not seem to me that he does.

As a final defense, Kail might claim that it is those religious people who believe in the absence of evidence or argument who are normatively required to suspend belief in light of evidence that the beliefs of the first polytheists are defective and that the widespread dissemination of the core content depends on their beliefs. The effectiveness of this defense, however, is challenged by my second major objection to Kail's interpretation. I turn to this now.

There is a problem reconciling the destabilising explanation with Hume's claim that religious belief does have a secure foundation in reason. On Kail's reading, Hume's beginning the work by assuring the reader that there is impeccable evidence for the existence of a Deity is that much more puzzling. Why go to great lengths to destabilise a belief when one has already assured the reader that there are other, good reasons to hold it? Hasn't Hume just provided different, better reasons to sustain the belief even in the case where the destabilising strategy is successful?

Kail is fully aware of this problem, and his response is that Hume is not giving an argument when he claims that religious belief has a solid foundation in reason. On Kail's view, Hume merely claims that there are good reasons, but he doesn't give them in any detail ('Understanding Hume's Natural History', p. 197). Thus, one can still be required to suspend belief until one examines the arguments and evidence in sufficient detail, and this requires a much more thorough consideration of the merits of the argument from design than Hume provides in the NHR. Yet, why shouldn't the mere reassurance that there are good reasons, especially accompanied with some indication of what those reasons are and why they support genuine theism, be enough to justify reinstating the core belief? Kail thinks that Hume's strategy requires religious people to suspend the core belief until they examine the evidence in its favour. Here, though, there is a question about how thorough an examination of the evidence could be required. Kail assumes that the normative requirement is more robust than I find plausible. Surely, Hume's own testimony that there is a good argument could count as evidence in favour of the core belief. Moreover, an informed reader would certainly be

familiar with the sorts of arguments that Hume is sketching, and the testimony of numerous authorities surely could count as evidence in favour of the core belief. Indeed, it is easy to imagine cases where inquiring for oneself would be practically impossible, if, say, understanding the evidence requires sophisticated technical knowledge or involves data collected by scientists.

Consider another analogy. Some global warming skeptics give destabilising explanations of scientists' conclusions about warming: Their views are really caused by their politics, ambition, etc. Suppose I become convinced that some prominent scientists—maybe even the first scientists to claim that greenhouse gases cause global warming—reached this conclusion in defective ways, but at the same time I am reassured that the evidence really does support the scientific consensus. Am I required to suspend my belief that greenhouse gas emissions cause warming until I can consider the evidence for myself? Is it enough to read the relevant scientific studies or do I have to gather and analyse my own data? It seems clear to me that there is no normative requirement to do either.

One might reply that Hume's apparent avowals of the design argument and his claim that religion has a solid foundation in reason are insincere, and this defeats the testimonial evidence that the apparent avowals provide. Yet would it be reasonable for Hume to expect the reader to realise that he is insincere? It seems to me quite possible that Hume is indeed insincere in his apparent avowals of the design argument. The most plausible reason for his making such remarks, if they are insincere, is to disguise his real views, either because they are dangerously controversial or simply so as not to drive away religious readers. Yet this would be futile if the argumentative strategy of the work requires the reader to recognise that its author is insincere at key points. Hume's argumentative strategy would either be ineffective or the attempt to disguise his own views would fail.

The Incoherence of Popular Monotheism

Reading the NHR as an attack on all religious belief obscures, I'll argue, the role that the contrast between genuine theism and popular, superstitious monotheism plays in the argument of the text. Hume's argumentative strategy does purport to give many contemporary religious people reason to doubt some of their basic religious beliefs, but it does this by exploiting fundamental differences between genuine theism and popular religion, not by trying to destabilize all belief in invisible, intelligent power. I'll argue that one of Hume's aims in the NHR is to show that popular, superstitious monotheism is inconsistent with genuine theism, and that this implies that if genuine theism really does have a foundation in reason, popular, superstitious monotheism is false. This strategy, if successful, does give many contemporary religious people reason to doubt. At the beginning of Section 6, 'Origin of Theism from Polytheism', Hume writes,

Even at this day, and in Europe, ask any of the vulgar, why he believes in an omnipotent creator of the world; he will never mention the beauty of final causes, of which he is wholly ignorant: He will not hold out his hand, and bid you contemplate the suppleness and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all one way, the counterpoise which they receive from the thumb, the softness and fleshy parts of the inside of his hand, with all the other circumstances, which render that member fit for the use, to which it was destined. To these he has been long accustomed; and he beholds them with listlessness and unconcern. He will tell you of the sudden and unexpected death of such a one: The fall and bruise of such another: The excessive drought of this season: The cold and rains of another. These he ascribes to the immediate operation of providence: And such events, as, with good reasoners, are the chief difficulties in admitting a supreme intelligence, are with him the sole arguments for it. (NHR 6.1 52)

The passage suggests that the ordinary person and the genuine theist are in a curious evidential situation. The vulgar, Hume tells us, are indifferent to the evidence of order and design on which the arguments supporting genuine theism are based. Instead, if prompted, the vulgar will cite as reasons for religious belief events that are unpredictable, seem inexplicable, and which look to be evidence of disorder, rather than order, in the world (NHR 6.2 52). The vulgar attribute these events to 'the

immediate operation of providence' (my italics). Such events, however, rather than supporting the argument from design actually constitute evidence against it.

Moreover, Hume claims that the vulgar generally fail to notice evidence of order in the universe, but if they do come to 'discover, by a little reflection, that the course of nature is regular and uniform, their whole faith totters, and falls to ruin' (NHR 6.2 53). Thus, evidence that does support the claim that the universe is orderly is, at least at first, taken by the vulgar to undermine religious belief, when this is precisely the evidence that grounds the genuine theist's religious belief.

This curious situation is explained by a conflict between the beliefs of the genuine theist and the beliefs of the vulgar monotheist. Hume says fairly little about what comprises the genuine theism. However, the little he does say suggests two things. First, the genuine theist believes in 'one single being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all its parts, according to one regular plan or connected system' (NHR 2.2 37). Thus, true religion involves conceiving of God as the being who created the world according to a regular plan or connected system of general laws. Second, the genuine theist believes that particular events are caused by other natural events (or objects) according to these general laws. That the world is orderly and law-governed is, thus, both part of the evidential basis for genuine theism, since it constitutes evidence of design, and one of the commitments of genuine theism.

Part of what Hume is trying to show at the start of Section 6 is that the vulgar do not appreciate the order of nature; they fail to believe that there is a regular plan or connected system at all. Evidence of order in the universe is dismissed by the vulgar 'with listlessness and unconcern' (NHR 6.1 53). At the same time, the popular monotheist does believe that God causes at least some events that are good or evil by immediate providence or divine volition. There is, at least, a tension between believing that all events are caused according to fixed general laws and believing that some events are caused by immediate providence or divine volition. But is there an outright incompatibility here? I will argue that there is.

In the second paragraph of Section 6, Hume observes 'Many theists, even the most zealous and refined, have denied a particular providence, and have asserted, that the Sovereign mind or first principle of all things, having fixed general laws, by which nature is governed, gives free and uninterrupted course to these laws, and disturbs not, at every turn, the settled order of events by particular volitions' (NHR 6.2 52). The denial of particular providence seems to be incompatible with the vulgar acceptance of immediate providence. However, particular providence is not quite the same as immediate providence. By 'the immediate operation of providence' Hume means that God's will is the immediate cause of something. By 'particular providence' Hume seems to mean that God causes events that are good or bad for a particular individual in a way that is outside, or in violation of, the regular causal laws according to which the universe otherwise operates. One might deny particular providence, yet accept immediate providence, if one held that God's will immediately causes some events, though not in a way that is outside or in violation of regular causal laws. I'll consider this possibility below. First, consider a theist who denies that God's will is the immediate cause of any events. This kind of theism is clearly incompatible with the vulgar's beliefs, since the vulgar, Hume claims, do hold that some events are immediately caused by divine volition. Indeed, it is precisely because the vulgar take some events to be caused immediately by divine volition that they take those events in particular to constitute evidence for the existence of God. Thus, there is a clear incompatibility between the beliefs of the vulgar and the beliefs of theists who deny immediate providence.

However, there are two complications: First, it isn't clear whether Hume thinks that the denial of particular providence is part of genuine theism; second, it isn't clear whether the denial of particular providence entails the denial of immediate providence. Hume merely claims that many theists,

including 'the most zealous and refined' deny particular providence, but not that this is part of genuine theism or follows from the argument from design. Nevertheless, I think a case can be made that, according to Hume, the argument from design rules out particular providence. Hume claims that the 'contemplation of the works of nature' supports the conclusion that there is 'one single being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all its parts, according to one regular plan or connected system... All things in the universe are evidently of a piece. Every thing is adjusted to everything. One design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author...' (NHR 2.2 37). In the General Corollary, Hume claims, 'The uniform maxims too, which prevail throughout the whole frame of the universe, naturally, if not necessarily, lead us to conceive this intelligence as single and undivided' (NHR 15.1 85, my italics). Elsewhere, Hume claims that the vulgar never contemplate nature 'so far as to discover a supreme mind or original providence, which bestowed order on every part of nature' (NHR 8.1 58, my italics). Thus, Hume repeatedly emphasises that genuine theism involves the belief that the universe is created by God according to one regular plan or connected system, and that this plan or system encompasses everything in the universe, not just most things. Indeed, he suggests that it is the all-encompassing nature of the plan that provides evidence for monotheism rather than polytheism. Thus, particular providence is ruled out by the design argument, since it involves God's causing events in a way that is outside or in violation of the regular causal laws governing the universe.

But, does the design argument rule out immediate providence? Is it possible for some events to be caused immediately by divine volition, and yet not fall outside the all-encompassing divine plan or system? The genuine theist could only accept that an event is caused by immediate divine volition if it does not disrupt the causal order or plan of the universe, or, to be more precise, if that event would occur in accordance with general causal laws even in the absence of divine volition. One might hold that all events are immediately caused by God, but in accordance with a divine plan, but the vulgar only attribute some events to God's will, namely unpredictable, sudden and otherwise inexplicable goods and evils. But this would be a very peculiar thing to think: that some events, but not all, are caused by divine volition even though they'd occur naturally anyway. How could we ever have any reason to believe that some event should be ascribed to divine volition rather than merely to natural causes?

More importantly, the genuine theist could not consistently hold both that sudden, unexpected, and otherwise inexplicable events in particular are to be ascribed to the operation of immediate providence and that these very events actually would occur in accordance with the causal order or plan of the universe in the absence of divine volition. But the former is precisely what Hume thinks the vulgar do believe and this, then, really is incompatible with genuine theism.

We can arrive at the same incompatibility by a different route. On Hume's view, the vulgar fear God, and this fear is substantial evidence—though, as we'll see, not conclusive proof—that their beliefs conflict with genuine theism. At the very core of Hume's conjectural history is the claim that all religious belief is originally motivated by fear of the unknown causes of unpredictable evil events. Lorne Falkenstein nicely captures this thought with the slogan, 'The natural history of religion' is really just a natural history of superstition' (p. 7). Fear of these causes, Hume seems to hold, just is fear of God, since God is conceived of as the immediate cause of such events. In the Dissertation, Hume claims that fear is usually caused by a probable belief that some evil event will occur. This evil event, then, is the primary object of one's fear, but the fear also naturally extends to the causes of the event. Thus, one fears God because one has a probable belief that He will cause some evil event. Indeed, it is in virtue of this belief that one's fear is fear of God. But the probable belief that God will cause some evil event is incompatible with genuine theism. Fear of God, then, is powerful evidence that one's beliefs conflict with genuine theism.

Powerful, but perhaps not conclusive. This depends on whether a genuine theist might also fear God, not because she believes God to be the immediate cause of some evil events, but because she believes God to be the immediate or mediate cause of all events, in accordance with a regular plan. This belief, combined with a probable belief that an evil event will occur, might be enough to cause fear of God. In this case, fear is not caused by a belief incompatible with genuine theism. To a large extent, this turns out to be an empirical question, which Hume's account of the passions doesn't provide an adequate answer to. It isn't the case that our fear extends to everything that would be either immediately or mediately causally responsible for some probable evil event. A prisoner on death row may fear the lethal injection but not the person who'll deliver it, much less the person who synthesised the drugs in a lab. Yet, it seems safe to assume that the genuine theist will fear God much less than someone who believes that God's will is the immediate cause of some evil events outside or in violation of the regular causal order. And this is enough to conclude that fear of God is at least powerful evidence that one's beliefs conflict with genuine theism.

The argument for the incompatibility between popular monotheism and genuine theism, if sound, puts the religious apologist in a tough position. Moreover, it is worth noticing that the argument's success does not depend on establishing that the argument from design is actually successful. To see this, assume the following, fairly plausible principle, which is a cousin of closure under known implication:

If there is a sound argument for p and p is shown to be incompatible with q, then there is a sound argument against q.

Assume, for the moment, that Hume does succeed in showing that genuine theism is incompatible with superstitious, popular monotheism. By applying this principle, we can conclude that if the design argument is a sound argument for genuine theism, then there is a sound argument against superstitious, popular monotheism. In other words, Hume purports to show that the design argument makes readily available a conclusive argument against superstitious popular monotheism. Any way you cut it, this argument, if successful, puts the religious apologist in an awkward position. If the design argument really is successful, then popular monotheism is shown to be false. On the other hand, if the religious apologist denies that the design argument is a successful argument for genuine theism, she seems to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater.

One advantage of the reading I propose is that it takes the pressure off the question of whether Hume is sincere in his avowal of the design argument in the NHR. This reading of Hume's strategy does not require that he is insincere, nor does understanding the argument of the text assume that the reader recognises that he is insincere, if indeed he is. Hume's aim is to divorce superstitious, popular monotheism from the kind of religion supported by the argument from design, and he can succeed in this aim whether or not he really thinks that the design argument is ultimately successful.

Conclusion

How exactly does Hume's strategy give contemporary religious people reason to doubt their beliefs? If one accepts that the argument from design is a good argument for genuine theism, and if, upon reflection, one realises that one believes that God is the immediate cause of some events or that one fears God, one should conclude that some of one's religious beliefs are unjustified. This should lead one to consider how much of one's religious practice is motivated by fear and the belief that God is the immediate cause of some events. If, however, one doesn't have any such beliefs or any such fears, then this argument won't provide one reason to doubt.

The NHR, on this reading, might strike some as faint-hearted: Why didn't Hume go further and attempt to refute the whole system of religion? Moreover, Hume claims in earlier work that superstition is a false corruption of true religion, and the NHR, on this reading, may seem merely to confirm this. This complaint overlooks, however, the significance of the rift Hume attempts to create

between genuine theism and popular religion. Hume's conjectural history purports to show that the first religions were deeply superstitious and that superstition remains at the core of popular monotheism. It is not just superstition that Hume tries to show is incompatible with genuine theism, but popular monotheism in general. Thus, the NHR does not attempt to refute the whole system of religion from without, but it does attempt to incite a schism from within. <>

SCHOLARLY MILTON edited by Thomas Festa and Kevin J. Donovan [Clemson University Press, 9781942954811]

Following the editors' introduction to the collection, the essays in **SCHOLARLY MILTON** examine the nature of Milton's own formidable scholarship and its implications for his prose and poetry - "scholarly Milton" the writer; as well as subsequent scholars' historical and theoretical framing of Milton studies as an object of scholarly attention - "scholarly Milton" as at first an emergent and later an established academic discipline. The essays are particularly concerned with the topics of the ethical ends of learning, of Milton's attention to the trivium within the Renaissance humanist educational system, and the development of scholarly commentary on Milton's writings. Originally selected from the best essays presented at the 2015 Conference on John Milton in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the essays have been considerably revised and expanded for publication.

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Milton and the Ethical Ends

Excerpt: Milton's conception of the ethical ends of learning is a primary concern of several of the chapters that begin this collection. Sharon Achinstein, in "High Enterprise: Milton and the Genres of Scholarship in the Divorce Tracts," argues that in the course of his research for the divorce tracts "Milton became a modern sort of scholar;" as his scholarship changed and developed, showing an increasing use of secondary scholarship beyond the Bible and the Church Fathers. Milton "resisted the typical seventeenth-century confessionalization of scholarship" that constrained English learning

in his time and likewise resisted the increasing professionalization of philology. Achinstein shows that Milton was "ambivalent about the role of scholarship in his biblical work for the divorce tracts," particularly regarding the question of philological threats to the authority of scripture and the use of non-sacred materials. While "carrying on a humanistic philological tradition bequeathed from Erasmus; Milton "came to a position where he could both use the tools of philology and disavow the textualism on which philology depended by his notion of 'inner scripture.'" The notes which Milton amassed in his commonplace book while researching for the divorce tracts were focused toward argumentative ends, specifically the goal of "adjudication by historical precedent" Although in the divorce tracts themselves "Milton adheres mostly to biblical and legal interpretation," his scholarship "took the model of testimony rather than scientific inquiry." The fruits of that scholarship, Achinstein asserts, never left Milton.

Shifting from Milton's scholarship to the pedagogy of his epic poetry, Sam Hushagen's "Typology and Milton's Masterplot" argues that typology in *Paradise Lost* not only constitutes "the poem's principal form of organization" but also serves pedagogical ends, supporting Milton's "concern throughout with how reason might be restored to its position as principal legislator and how history might be understood as the process through which autonomy is secured" Drawing on theorists of typology ranging from Coleridge to Auerbach, to Gordon Teskey and Jacques Monod, Hushagen finds Miltonic typology to be "historical and teleonomic rather than transcendent or anagogic: his figures exhibit 'a purpose or project' but without a final cause or ultimate fulfillment that would supersede them For Milton "the end of history is not transcendent," and "the desire to leap outside the historical process the poem describes is Satanic" Ultimately, 'the typological ecology of *Paradise Lost* is anti-anagogic and anti-idealizing because its telos is not apocalyptic but directed towards the kind of self-guidance that Milton defined as the essence of reason, and that Kant defines as the essence of Enlightenment. Accordingly, "in *Paradise Lost* the typological view of history yields progressive politics."

Satan's perversion of rational education in *Paradise Lost* is also a concern of James Ross Macdonald's "The Devil as Teacher in *Paradise Lost*," though Macdonald's conclusions are more pessimistic_ He argues that a consideration of Satan as a kind of teacher reveals Milton's increasing pessimism regarding the function of education_ The optimism about the value of experience in education and the confidence in the inevitable victory of truth over falsehood expressed in *Of Education* and *Areopagitica*, as well as the "inductive and incremental model of truth-seeking" found there, are undercut in *Paradise Lost*. Macdonald finds that Milton follows the sixth-century biblical poem *De spiritalis historiae gestis* by Alcimus Ecdicius Avitus in "presenting the temptation of Eve as a diabolic parody of heavenly pedagogy." The temptation of Eve thereby exhibits an important "shift in Milton's own thinking about the place of inductive inquiry and empirical evidence in the search after truth" Ironically, Eve falls "through a rigorous yet erroneous logical analysis of her situation.' Macdonald relates this more pessimistic view of education's potential to Milton's translation of the Ramist *Art of Logic* (1672) and to his disillusionment following the failure of the commonwealth and the restoration of the monarchy. Transcendent general principles rather than inductive particular data become the basis of knowledge.

Milton's interest in recuperating authentic thinking is a particular concern of J. Antonio Templanza's "'The First and Wisest of Them All': *Paradise Regained* and the Beginning of Thinking" Templanza focuses on the famous (or notorious) episode in book 4 of the brief epic in which Satan tempts Jesus with the glories of the classical tradition of learning symbolized by Athens. Jesus' dismissive rejection of classical learning as false or merely fanciful has sometimes embarrassed or scandalized commentators. Templanza argues that the Athens temptation should be distinguished from the temptation of "The Kingdoms of the world," which it follows: "to interpret Athens as just another self-contained episode where the 'kingdom' of Christianity is defined through the negation of its 'other'" is, he argues, "a particularly satanic analytic," one which "reifies the very distinction between Christianity and philosophy that the temptation implicitly posits" The rejection of Athens should be

seen as "an ironic response to the question of what true and redemptive knowledge if the poem implicitly rejects a "hermeneutics of validity" for authentic thinking; instead, "Paradise Regained demands that its readers interpret the Son's response to Athens not in terms of its validity or correctness, but in such a way that lets Jesus' thinking become their own." By presenting the Son's knowledge as inseparable from its expression, *Paradise Regained* implies that knowledge does not somehow exist in a separate ontological realm from matter and thereby reiterates the authentically Socratic ground of Milton's monism, in contrast to Satan's (and the modern scientific) conception of knowledge as an object that the mind contains.

Milton's poetic adumbration of a fuller and more authentic awareness of learning is likewise a concern of Gardner Campbell in "Learning, Love, and the Freedom of the Double Bind" In contrast to the common view of Milton as dour and humorless, Campbell finds instances of "a certain unusual playfulness" in *Paradise Lost* when, Milton takes "what appear to be direct philosophical propositions" and expresses them "in a piquant oxymoron." Viewing the poem through the lens of the cultural anthropologist Gregory Bateson's double bind theory, Campbell argues that some of the poem's "odd or striking moments" produce the "paradoxical effect of a meta-liberation into a fuller awareness of the dissociative elements within the very discipline of freedom itself," Sometimes a person experiencing the double bind, involving "mutually incompatible injunctions," suppresses meta-communicational symbols in order "to escape the possibility of a higher learning that cannot be experienced without confronting something surprising, something genuinely new—not least of which are possibilities for freedom and love that have not yet entered the person's experience: Campbell finds Satan claiming to experience such a bind in his soliloquy on Mount Niphates in book 4. Concerning the paradox of required voluntary service enunciated by Raphael in book 5, Campbell concludes that "perhaps God's creation, like the poet's, inextricably involves the strict necessity of appointed bounds and ordained freedom, without which the meaning of love, the most vital, disjunctive, and trans-contextual creation of all, cannot emerge into experience."

The chapters discussed thus far in this introduction have all been primarily concerned with the ethical ends of scholarship and learning. Ethical concerns are inescapable in discussions of Milton, but a second group of essays focuses more precisely on Milton's lifelong engagement with the educational curriculum of his age, specifically with the trivium, the study of grammar, logic, and rhetoric that provided the basis for higher education. Emma Wilson's 'Re-Visiting Milton's (Logical) God: Empson 2018" draws on "Milton's own evaluative writing methods from his *Artis plerique logicae* (1672) to read the logic of his God,' arguing that "the poem is good not primarily because it makes God either good or bad, pace Empson, "but because it lays bare the cosmic structure to which we are all subject." In this structure, "God will be justified, because [the cosmic structure] is his own creation; yet that justification does not have to make him good or kind within human definitions of those terms. Ultimately "Paradise Lost is good because God is bad and justified at the same time." Wilson concludes that "Paradise Lost is an epic founded on identifying and exploring personal logical accountability in a divine system which is harsh and intolerant"; it is "Milton's unflinching willingness to explore and lay bare that system which makes the poem terrifying and tragic. However, read as a product of Milton both as scholar and as teacher of the art of arts, it is the ubiquitous individual logical accountability which argues that Empson's position bears elaboration: according to Milton's logic, *Paradise Lost* is good because God is bad and justified at the same time."

Russell Hugh McConnell's "God's Grammar: Milton's Parsing of the Divine' grounds close reading of passages in Milton's poetry in the context of contemporary grammatical education, drawing on Lily's widely influential *Short Introduction of Grammar*, endorsed by church and state, and on Milton's own simplified and streamlined *Accedence Commenc't Grammar*. He begins with Addison's observation that Milton's confidence in his powers of poetic sublimity seemingly falters when rendering divine speech. McConnell focuses specifically on Milton's "poetical use of grammar, arguing that when Milton's poetry "encounters the divine it does not precisely founder, but it does run up

against the limits of worldly, fallen language." Apparently, "in order to adequately discuss the transcendent quality of divinity, Milton's grammar must become strange or go (artfully and deliberately) awry." Accordingly, "speech by and about God in *Paradise Lost* features a range of grammatical manipulations that are important to characterizing his divine nature," including seeming inconsistencies in verb tense. McConnell also discusses the *Nativity Ode*, whose unusual manipulations of grammatical tense seem to belie the simple and straightforward account of verb tenses provided in *Accedence Commend*. For Milton, to be a grammarian is not to be a pedant, but to be a writer who understands the rules and when to break them—and breaking the rules is what you need to do when you need to flexibly adapt your fallen and imperfect language in taking on the role of the prophet-poet, striving adequately to convey the nature of the divine.'

We shift from grammar to rhetoric with Joshua Held's "Raphael's Peroratio in *Paradise Lost*: Balancing Rhetorical Passion in Virgil and Paul." Heid focuses on "'Raphael's peroratio, his concluding speech to Adam in *Paradise Lost* 8.633-43," which "brings together the wisdom of classical rhetorical scholarship, classical epic, and the Christian scriptures to help Adam maintain the perfect pre-fall balance of 'passions.'" Quintilian, Aristotle, and Cicero all comment on the peroration as an appropriate place to appeal most strongly to the passions or emotions of an audience. Mercury's peroration in book 4 of the *Aeneid*, which chiefly excites the passion of fear, and Paul's in *Ephesians*, which chiefly emphasizes fortitude and steadfastness, as well as Paul's peroration in *I Corinthians*, with its emphasis on love, all serve Milton as models. According to Held, "whereas Virgil's Mercury in his peroratio elicits the passions of shame and fear from Aeneas, and whereas Paul elicits the passions of confidence and love in epistolary perorations to his Ephesian and Corinthian audiences respectively, Raphael balances all these passions against one another" Raphael "understands the great power of the passions and adapts his final message to balance them,"

A third and final set of essays collected here is concerned with the scholarship of Milton's reception and the commentary and editorial apparatus surrounding his texts.

Emily E. Stelzer's "Euphrasy, Rue, Polysemy, and Repairing the Ruins" examines "those modest ingredients" of ocular purgation, "euphrasy (also known as eyebright) and rue, which Michael applies to Adam's eyes in book II of *Paradise Lost*, and which have been variously glossed by editors of the poem. In medieval and early modern herbals euphrasy was associated with joy or cheerfulness in contrast to rue's association with sorrow, reinforcing the poem's "ethical message of tempering joy with sorrow," which "accords with other exhortations toward moderation" in *Paradise Lost*. Euphrasy was also, thanks to false etymology, associated with pleasing eloquence and poetry, allowing Milton an occasion for wordplay. Noting that Adam "does not always judge or interpret the visions [shown to him in books II and I2] successfully," Stelzer suggests that 'the remedy Michael administers in book II is temporary and imperfect. albeit extraordinary.'

Nicholas Allred, in "Paradise Finding Aids," discusses early verbal indices or concordances to *Paradise Lost*, especially the expanding series in the editions printed by Jacob Tonson from 1695 to 1711, frequently reprinted in later eighteenth-century editions, and Alexander Cruden's concordance published in 1741. Examining these indexes not only illuminates 'the habits of reading involved in making and using them' but also "can disclose structures in the poem that we have perhaps forgotten how to see, and even throw our contemporary critical practices into relief." Allred notes that "the 'Table of the most remarkable Parts' that Jacob Tonson appended to the poem's sixth edition in 1695" is organized around "Descriptions, Similes, and Speeches" as rhetorical markers or generic features of the epic genre. Tonson's 1695 "Table" of generic ingredients, expanded into the subject "Index" of 1711, was composed mainly of descriptions (which disappear as a separate heading), "underscore[ing] how a finding aid can enlist the print codex to circumvent the epic's basic ordering principle; the story; instead, the index "processes epic into something like lyric," Alexander Cruden's 1741 Verbal Index to Milton's *Paradise Lost* "played a key role in making

Milton's language part of the lexicon, and anticipates twentieth- and twenty-first-century critical approaches to the poem as well. Employing book and line numbers rather than page numbers, the verbal index assumes that *Paradise Lost*, like the Bible, had achieved enormous market penetration: the verbal index was designed for readers already equipped with copies in scores of different editions." Thus "the verbal index helped *Paradise Lost* not only enter the lexicon," as it "allowed readers to make the poem's language their own," but also helped to "define the lexicon through its pivotal role in Samuel Johnson's Dictionary." Cruden's verbal index "leads Johnson into the sort of close attention to Milton's diction that would rock *Paradise Lost* criticism like a depth charge some two hundred years later. In addition, "the verbal index can illuminate the wide and intricate patterns that often escape the naked eye: it enables close reading at a distance"

Finally, Edward Jones's "Political Diplomacy, Personal Conviction, and the Fraught Nature of Milton's Letters of State" discusses the considerable challenges facing the editors of the Letters of state for the Oxford University Press Complete Works (OCW), which 'remain among the least read, consulted, or understood of all his writing.' These include the difficulty of ascertaining the degree of Milton's authorship of state letters which were subject to revision by other agents of the Commonwealth, a problem only partially remedied by scholars' ability to distinguish Milton's Latin from that of other government employees. The discovery of additional manuscript collections unknown to earlier editors provides additional challenges. as does the fact that the final published versions of the letters often revise and alter Milton's Latin. Jones shows that it is dangerous to assume that Milton's own political convictions are substantially reflected in the state letters, as can be seen by comparing the letters issued by the Commonwealth on the Waldensian massacre with Milton's sonnet on the topic.

Taken together, the chapters in this collection enrich our understanding of Milton's self-conscious commitments to scholarship and his engagements with the learned traditions that influenced him the most —of 'scholarly Milton' as a formidably learned writer of poetry and prose. They also demonstrate the continuing rewards and challenges facing readers and interpreters of his work from the seventeenth to the twenty-first centuries—"scholarly Milton" as an ongoing enterprise, an ever-evolving academic discipline. Engaging with a writer both learned and knowing and a scholarly enterprise both theorized and historicized, Scholarly Milton promises to stimulate further scholarship on Milton and his scholarly reception. <>

SHAKESPEARE AND PROTESTANT POETICS by Jason Gleckman [Palgrave Macmillan, 9789813295988]

This book explores the impact of the sixteenth-century Reformation on the plays of William Shakespeare. Taking three fundamental Protestant concerns of the era – (double) predestination, conversion, and free will – it demonstrates how Protestant theologians, in England and elsewhere, re-imagined these longstanding Christian concepts from a specifically Protestant perspective. Shakespeare utilizes these insights to generate his distinctive view of human nature and the relationship between humans and God. Through in-depth readings of the Shakespeare comedies 'The Merry Wives of Windsor', 'Much Ado About Nothing', 'A Midsummer Night's Dream', and 'Twelfth Night', the romance 'A Winter's Tale', and the tragedies of 'Macbeth' and 'Hamlet', this book examines the results of almost a century of Protestant thought upon literary art.

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This study of Protestant ideas in Shakespeare's plays begins with two controversial premises about the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation. The first is that, in relation to Europe, at least in terms of theology, the Reformation can be viewed as a single intellectual movement encompassing both German Lutheran thought and that of the Reformed Churches, particularly those in Switzerland, but also in France, Scotland, the Netherlands, and, for the purposes of this book, England. All of these theologies, as I see them, defined themselves in opposition to the Roman Catholic Church to a much greater extent than they saw themselves in conflict with each other. The second premise relates to the history of sixteenth-century England and offers a similar argument, that from an early stage of the Reformation, there were those who, like Martin Luther (1483–1546), strongly criticized the Roman Catholic Church not, as English Catholics did, on the basis of its domination by a foreign power or its unwillingness to promote the vernacular Bible or even because of the corruption of some of its clergy, but rather because the Church's theology could not accommodate the new ideas that Luther had brought into Christian thinking. These ideas, largely inspired by Luther's readings of the late, anti-Pelagian works of Augustine (354–430), affected the ways in which people viewed themselves (as utterly sinful), their relationship to God (as entirely helpless), and their purpose in life (fulfilling a calling in the world and rejecting the monastic life as an ideal). The concept of double predestination, which Luther introduced, at least to an extent, into Protestantism, could not be accommodated by previous Christian thinking and therefore could not be assimilated into the theology of sixteenth-century Roman Catholicism.

In addition to arguing for this agenda, this book aims to show the effects of these revolutionary Protestant ideas on William Shakespeare, a writer who read his Bible, was aware of Christian history, and who, I argue, was fascinated by the transformations in human psychology implied by the Reformation. Rather than asking themselves how they could be saved, Protestants tended to ask how they could know they were already saved. Rather than seeing the process of justification (God's bestowal of grace upon the elect) in the usual Christian way, derived from Augustine, as inseparable from the ensuing process of sanctification or regeneration, Protestants distinguished the two, creating a sense that justification was applied by God in a forensic manner, saving a person with no

regard for his or her good ‘works.’ This meant, in effect, that elect humans were seen as bifurcated, to use Luther’s terms, simultaneously justified and sinful (*simul juste et peccator*); they led their lives attempting to be sanctified but, at every moment (or at least, as I will argue, during some rare privileged moments), they led a parallel life in the company of God. This life was referred to as the life of faith, and the connection between the two lives is such an abstract concept that it required creative artists, such as Shakespeare, to convey.

Before exploring in more detail the nature of these Protestant innovations and their effects on literary history, it must be noted that neither of the positions stated in the first paragraph of this Introduction are mainstream views; indeed, much can be said against them. There can be no doubt, for instance, that relations between the Reformed and Lutheran Churches became increasingly tense as the sixteenth century continued; this was largely due to Luther’s intransigence as an individual, but there were many other factors. The most significant of these, historians concur, related to the Eucharist. Lutherans believed in the real presence of Christ in the mass, even utilizing, as Diarmaid MacCulloch notes, “the elevation of the host” as part of the ceremony, which would have been seen by Reformers as distressingly close to Catholic practice. In contrast, the Reformed position, often termed ‘*sacramentarian*,’ viewed the Eucharist as a symbolic or spiritual or memorial participation in Christ’s Last Supper. This issue, historians concur, was at the root of Lutheran and Reformed division, and I would suggest it was also the primary trait distinguishing the two groups. This huge fissure occurred, moreover, early in the Reformation; at the Colloquy of Marburg in 1529, Luther and (Huldrych/ Ulrich) Zwingli (1484–1531), the father of the Reformation in Zurich, agreed on 14 points of doctrine, but could not agree on this one, and supposedly Luther would not shake Zwingli’s hand.

Over the centuries, numerous additional qualities beyond the issue of the mass have been proposed to further distinguish sixteenth-century Lutheran theology from Reformed. One of the most significant boundary markers is the use of images in the church, which Reformers aggressively opposed but Lutherans considered *adiaphora*, or an optional element of worship. This distaste of images, it is often argued, leads to a second distinction between the theology of the Reformers and the Lutherans, namely, the greater austerity often attributed to the former. This is seen in relation to the practices of worship, wherein the Reformed were more determined than Lutherans to rid their services of what were termed Catholic excesses and adhere more closely to what was considered Biblical guidance. Such austerity is also seen, for example, in relation to later Puritanism in England, to indicate an ‘austerity’ of lifestyle in contrast to a supposedly more sensuous Lutheranism. A third, often cited, distinction between Lutheran and Reformed theology is the greater emphasis placed by the latter upon the law. It is sometimes argued that Luther distinguished law from gospel more severely than did the Reformers, presenting obedience to the law as a crucial sign of a good person but nonetheless a form of works or civic righteousness only, and not relevant to the spiritual relationship between God and humans. In contrast, it is argued that the Reformed theologians worked harder to introduce law into the church— structuring the Church in line with Biblical directives, disciplining members of congregations, elucidating in more detail the proper relationships between Church and State, and generally feeling more comfortable in relation to the law than Luther did. For example, David C. Fink has suggested that, over the course of the sixteenth-century Reformation, the idea of the imputation of righteousness in the elect was gradually added to the initial Lutheran premise that election meant the non-imputation of sin. This later view (evident, as Fink points out, in “The Second Helvetic Confession” of 1566) would provide additional confidence to Protestants that, armed with Christ’s righteousness, they could more fully comply with the law.

The belief that the Reformation and Lutheran components of sixteenth-century Protestantism are usefully separated is a frequently presented one. Philip Benedict’s extensive and careful survey of sixteenth-century European religion, *Christ’s Churches Purely Reformed*, assumes that the two

Churches can be easily distinguished. The book opens with the assertion that “Although Martin Luther towered over the initial decades of the Reformation, Calvinism superseded Lutheranism within a generation as the most dynamic and widely established form of European Protestantism.” But I would argue that, with the exception of the mass, none of the points noted above mark a sufficiently strong theological dividing line between Lutheran and Reformed. Lutherans certainly did not think their tolerance of imagery turned them into Protestants. At the Colloquy of Montbéliard in 1586, when arguing about iconoclasm with Theodor Beza (1519–1605),

The Lutheran theologian Jakob Andreae (1528–1590) said that, despite the presence of images in Lutheran Churches, Lutherans were not prone to the “horrors, superstitions and idolatry” of Catholicism. A commitment to austerity is even less useful as a dividing line between Lutheran and Reformed thinking. In the sixteenth century, many upstanding members of the Church of England considered themselves Protestant and yet felt comfortable with the liturgical practices of their Church in opposition to more severe Continental approaches. They did not consider themselves to be Lutherans, which shows that a reluctance to embrace austerity as a Church principle cannot be restricted to Lutheran thought. The same, by the way, would be true for the matter of Church discipline which many fully Protestant English people opposed despite its prevalence in the Swiss Reformed Churches. When it came to the law, Lutherans also valued it and had strong views on the nature of the proper relationship between pastors and the communities they served. Lutherans also wrote about the law; it was the Lutheran Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) who developed the ‘third use of the law’ as a way to further integrate spiritual and civic life.

If the central issue of the sacrament of the Eucharist is put aside, a review of sixteenth-century confessional statements shows great similarities between Reformed and Lutheran approaches, in tone as well as content. David C. Fink has suggested, following Ernst Walter Zeeden, that “each confessional church quickly came to view itself as a universal *confessio catholica*, vested with divine authority as the exclusive mouthpiece of revealed truth.” But this is misleading; sixteenth-century Protestant confessions were largely written to show the close affinities between these Churches and the ways they could build upon each other’s achievements in further consolidating, fine-tuning, and developing the essential Protestant worldview. For example, the French Confession of Faith of 1559 (*Confessio Gallica*) included material on how the ‘natural law’ was an important way for Protestants to perceive God. However, I fully concur with Fink’s approach to studying the Reformation by examining the various Reformed Confessions of the sixteenth century. Fink concludes from such a review that “a remarkable convergence appears between the Lutheran and Reformed confessions ... a convergence centering on a two-stage model of justification in sharp distinction from regeneration.”

This was not the only issue that joined Lutherans and Reformers, theologically. Both groups aggressively rejected both the practices of the Roman Catholic Church and its view of Church history as a legitimately apostolic succession. Both groups insisted on the Bible as the sole means of determining religious truth, and both stressed the extent to which human sin had incapacitated humans, making them incapable of even beginning the work of salvation without divine aid. Luther had praised the Reformed “First Helvetic Confession of 1536,” and John Calvin (1509–1564) supported the 1540 *Variata* of the 1530 Augsburg Confession (composed by Melanchthon, among other reasons, to allow sufficient ambiguity in relationship to the real presence in the mass).

We can look at the culminating document of sixteenth-century Lutheran thought, the 1577 “Formula of Concord” and the huge Book of Concord of which it was part, as an example to show the large degree of theological overlap between Lutherans and Reformed. Although the “Formula” was opposed by Reformed churches (including in England) as well as by some Lutherans, it still reads very much like a Reformed Confession. Its ‘Summary Epitome’ refers to original sin not as “a slight corruption in human nature” but as one so “deep that there is nothing sound or uncorrupted left in

the human body or soul.” The power of the free will to turn to God is disallowed, rejecting the beliefs of the ‘Pactum’ theologians who had preceded Luther and whose views form much of the basis of the humanist Christianity of Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536). The Pactum motto ‘the Lord helps those who help themselves’ and all its variants such as “God draws, but he draws those who are willing” were explicitly rejected.¹⁹ The ‘Epitome’ also rejected the blurring of justification with sanctification and privileged the former, implicitly endorsing Luther’s theory regarding the forensic imputation of righteousness. It is true that the “Formula of Concord” strongly rejected the idea of ‘limited atonement’ (primarily on pastoral grounds) and it used language of single rather than double predestination. But the Reformers too (as we shall see in Section I of this book, and including Calvin and Beza) were likewise reluctant to use a fully double predestination terminology. In short, the Lutheran “Formula of Concord” reads much like a Reformed Confession such as those from Geneva or France; the Articles of the Church of England expressed similar views. All of this suggests the contiguity of Lutheran and Reformed theology during the later sixteenth century, in vigorous opposition to Roman Catholicism.

Reading between Lutherans and Reformers

A reader might, at this point, question why relationships between sixteenth-century Lutherans and Reformers are relevant in investigating Protestant thought in Shakespeare. The answer I would give is that if Elizabethan England is seen as a society that rejected Lutheran ideas in favor of Protestant ones, certain significant Lutheran contributions to English Protestant thought might be overlooked or marginalized. For example, the ‘Reformed’ strand of English Protestantism (associated with Switzerland—Zwingli, Calvin, and Beza) might have been seen, in Shakespeare’s time, to have especially contributed to artists exploring such topics as the role of magistrates and the nature of idols. But the Lutheran perspective would also have generated its own foci, many of which relate to Luther’s role as probably the earliest, and certainly the most high-profile, proponent of Protestant ideas.

This was the view promoted by the very influential work of John Foxe (1516/17–1587) in his *Acts and Monuments* (first printing 1563); to Foxe, Luther was the person who led Europe out of the dark ages of Roman Catholicism and into a greater communion with the spirit of the primitive church, a spirit that joined all Protestant churches and also promised great things for England’s Protestant future. In addition to his role as a spokesperson, there was also the sense of Luther as the first person to ‘convert’ into the new Protestant faith. This last point is muted in Foxe since he, like other Reformers, wanted to stress how Protestants felt themselves to be returning to the sources of Christian doctrine in the Bible (in a manner akin to the Erasmian humanist goal of ‘ad fontes’) rather than promoting new doctrine. But the publication of Luther material (by a printer associated with Foxe) in the late 1570s provided commentary (possibly written by Foxe) comparing Luther to Saint Paul; as James Kearney summarizes, this text “suggests that Luther’s battle with the text of Romans forces him to his bed without food, drink, or sleep, for three days and three nights” in a manner echoing Saul’s conversion in Acts 9. The idea Luther generated following his supposed conversion experience was ‘justification by faith,’ the sort of terse and dramatic phrase that could launch a revolution.

And while this revolutionary component of Luther was at times understated in Foxe, it was central to how sixteenth-century Catholics saw Luther. They denied Foxe’s Protestant narrative that there was a ‘true church,’ hidden by centuries of misguidance and waiting to be uncovered; instead they argued that Luther had invented the Reformation. “Who are they” asked Thomas Harding (1516–1572) of Bishop John Jewel (1522–1571), another proponent of Foxe’s belief in the ‘true church’—“What are their names? When or where lived they? ... he can name none before Luther.” It is this view of the Protestant as a lone visionary fighting a battle against conventional Christian thinking,

that might be lost if scholars approach late sixteenth-century Protestantism, in England, for example, as a religious belief system that was disinterested in its Lutheran roots.

It is in this context that the Elizabethan rejection of Lutheranism needs to be considered. For example, in assessing the influence of Lutheranism in England during this time, Basil Hall writes that, there were “few Lutherans ... and not much interest on the part of the English in the nature of worship in the Lutheran churches”; he continues, “it would be difficult to find an Elizabethan writer approving of Lutheran teaching and methods of worship and advocating them apart from those subjects which had become common to Protestants.” Carl A. Trueman similarly notes that while Calvin’s *Institutes* and Bullinger’s *Decades* were both very popular in England during the reign of Elizabeth, Luther “functioned increasingly as little more than a nostalgic symbol, with his writings having little significance and then mainly with the more moderate Anglicans such as Lancelot Andrewes.” I would read these statements as evidence not of the irrelevance of Lutheranism to the spiritual life of English Protestants, but of the extent to which Lutheranism had penetrated into the Elizabethan consciousness; there was less need for English people to read Luther’s writings since works such as Bullinger’s *Decades* and Calvin’s *Institutes* were already heavily influenced by Luther’s thinking, used his terminology, and furthered his efforts to distinguish Protestant modes of thinking from Catholicism. From this perspective, the aim of writers such as Bullinger and Calvin would be to refine, not replace, the insights of Luther. And from the perspective of a literary artist such as Shakespeare, imagining this continuity of Protestant thought, starting from Luther and marking a sharp break with pre-Reformation Catholic authority, could provide a useful context for exploring the nature of religious change over the course of the sixteenth century, as England moved from a Catholic to a Protestant nation.

Integrating Reformed and Lutheran theologies in contrast Catholic theology

In turning to the history of early modern England, here too my approach, aiming to integrate Reformed and Lutheran theology and distinguishing this Protestant approach from a Catholic one, seems to be a difficult position to argue. Lucy E.C. Wooding has shown that, given certain definitions of the Reformation, it is not possible to distinguish early modern English Catholicism and Protestantism from one another. As Wooding writes, in the first half of the sixteenth century in England, people may have used these two terms to describe their faith, but the words cannot yet be associated with a “distinct set of beliefs.” Instead, the era was characterized by a “single reformist impulse” that, inspired by Erasmian humanism, strove for such aims as using the vernacular as a mode of teaching Christianity, reading and disseminating the Bible more widely, reforming the clergy (perhaps more along the lines of the primitive church), and reducing the influence of the Papacy in England. Wooding suggests that the term “evangelical” is an appropriate one to describe this group of reformers.

Yet it might be possible to argue for a different reading of the first decades of the sixteenth century if alternative qualities of Protestantism are emphasized. If concepts such as double presentation, forensic justification, and the pervasiveness of human sin are seen as the key components of Protestant thought, earlier distinctions between Protestants and Catholics might be more articulable. For example, although Wooding does not consider Thomas More (1478–1535) to be a typical Catholic in his extreme reactions to Luther, More’s 1530 *A Dialogue Concerning Heresies* certainly identifies some key elements of Luther’s thinking that were completely at odds with Christian thought as he knew it. More identifies some of Luther’s most challenging ideas: “it is sacrilege to go about to please God with any works,” “the good and righteous man always sinneth in doing well,” “no man hath free will,” and that “God is as verily the author and cause of the evil will of Judas ... as of the good will of Christ.” In his criticisms, More recognized that Luther, deriving many of his views from late Augustine, believed that the works of people who lack prevenient grace are completely

sinful, that humans have no input into determining their spiritual status, and even that God is the ‘author of sin,’ a premise even Protestants found it challenging to accept.

Whatever the precise contours of the earliest English Protestant beliefs might be, Wooding and other concur that, by the middle of the century, distinctions between Protestant and Catholic theology were quite visible, a trend exacerbated by the relatively aggressive anti-Protestant conclusions reached at the Catholic Council of Trent (1545–1563). In terms of England, Alister McGrath writes that “the first clear and unambiguous statement of the concept of the imputation of righteousness” in English is to be found in the writings of the Lutheran Robert Barnes (c. 1495–1540) in 1534.³³ But more studies could be done to determine the ways in which early Protestant thought moved closer to Augustine and away from Erasmus in the wake of Luther and other early reformation writers. For example, Carl Trueman cites a passage from *An Answer to Sir Thomas More’s Dialogue* (1531) written by William Tyndale (c. 1494–1536), where Tyndale writes “faith justifieth in the heart and before God; and the deeds before the world only, and maketh the other seen.” In Trueman’s reading, Tyndale either rejected or did not yet comprehend the Lutheran idea of separating justification from sanctification rather than, in the earlier Augustinian approach, blurring the two; Trueman writes “It is clear from this passage that Tyndale is not referring to true double justification but is emphasizing that works are derived from, and declare before the world, the prior justification of the sinner by faith before God.” Yet Tyndale’s language pits “heart and before God” against the “world only” rather than seeing them (as in the earlier Christian model) as part of a single process of being saved and then demonstrating it.

Shakespeare's synthesis

By the time of Shakespeare, a strong Protestant–Catholic divide surely existed; it is no exaggeration to say that, after Regnans in Excelsis, the papal bull of 1570 which excommunicated Elizabeth, and the St. Bartholomew Day’s Massacre of 1572, it was unsafe to be a Catholic in England. This state of affairs reflects the developments I have outlined so far, the growing sense of a distinctively Protestant England with close ties to other reformed territories, theologically constructed out of ideas originating in Luther and developed by other reformers, and very anti-Catholic. As we have seen, John Foxe and John Jewel were largely responsible for this development in their theorization of a ‘true church’ that bypassed the Roman Catholic one. Wooding has written that “the Catholic and Protestant traditions existed side by side in England through the formative years of Reformation, and to see them as polarities in a single conflict is to parody their relationship.” Yet, in this case, the parodic narrative apparently became the accepted one—with Luther, as Foxe put it, being the “principal organ and minister” of the new Protestant age, and (starting in the second, 1570, edition of Foxe’s work), William Tyndale (c. 1494–1536) labeled as the first “Apostle of England”—implying he was the first significant English disciple of Luther.

I don’t believe Shakespeare would have fully endorsed all elements of Foxe’s Protestant vision. Shakespeare did not seem to have shared Foxe’s abhorrence of the Roman Catholic Church or Foxe’s analogies of persecutions in the Marian regime to those of Christians during the Roman Empire; even Foxe himself might have lacked confidence in the optimistic idea that Elizabeth was sent to England by God to further the cause of international Protestantism. But I believe Shakespeare shared Foxe’s sense that Protestantism was a distinctive faith—even despite assertions of its antiquity, a revolutionary one—and the purpose of this book is to articulate some of the ways in which that was so.

Alister McGrath takes a useful stance in relation to such a project. In his important work, *Iustitia Dei*, McGrath suggests that the Lutheran conflux of terms *simul iustus et peccator*, the imputation of righteousness (alien righteousness), and forensic justification (in contrast to the ensuing sanctification or regeneration) are a crucial entryway into Protestant thought. All of these phrases (which did not develop all at once) convey the view of Luther that humans are not to be thought of as a

combination of good and evil impulses striving for supremacy, but as creatures who, if they are fortunate, are simultaneously good and evil all of the time. From the human point of view, humans can only commit sins and therefore merit the punishments they receive. But from the divine perspective, some people are different; they are the elect and are simultaneously sinful and saved. The sense that a person could have two distinct identities was eventually developed by Luther into a sense of the justified self almost at odds with the sanctified one; the justified component of the self was saved repeatedly, at every given moment when an elect person's heart was filled with faith for God. The sanctified component of the self lived more in a temporal manner, going through life doing good deeds to honor God. As Luther stresses, such good deeds were valuable but only part of the human world and not as closely tied to God whose incredible power appeared primarily in justification of the elect despite their sin.

In this book I take a somewhat different starting point from that of McGrath, and begin with an examination of double predestination thinking. Clearly, the question of whether one would go to heaven or hell or purgatory following death would be a crucial one in a Christian culture where God is felt to punish sin and reward virtue. In prior Christian thinking, as will be seen in the first section of this book, God generally was seen to determine one's fate based on one's deeds in life. Augustine, in his late works, had argued for an alternative view that was more difficult to assimilate: that human deeds were not the origin of human virtue and that virtue originated in the divine spark of prevenient grace. For Protestants, however, a new possibility, only rarely seen in previous Christian history, of double predestination, began to emerge, along with a large number of challenging consequences for those who maintained this belief. While it had the advantage of fitting in beautifully with one of Protestantism's priorities, namely stressing the total power of God over creation, God's use of that power to determine all individual human fates as either elect or reprobate (there was no purgatory) was potentially terrifying. It was a situation made even worse by the fact that God made this choice before the world began (or after the Fall) and there was no petitioning for a review. If it were possible to make the situation more tense, a belief in double predestination thinking also challenged Protestant's views of their own God. For if people were damned before they sinned, it was very difficult to avoid concluding that God was the 'author of sin,' a view no Christian, Protestant or Catholic, would hold in the sixteenth century. There was at least one possible way out of this dilemma, which was to assume that sin was not the cause of reprobation, a position that led to the further stance that there was no meaningful difference, in actions and even in thoughts, between the nature of the reprobate and the elect; both categories of people sin all the time and with equal intensity. What then distinguishes elect from reprobate? And how is God to be acquitted of the accusation of being the author of sin?

Clearly working out such ideas would not be easy. In a fascinating passage from his "On the Bondage of the Will" ("De Servo Arbitrio") (1525), wherein Luther first explored the implications of double predestination thinking, he pleaded with his humanist opponents to help him discern the workings of a God who must be totally good but who nonetheless damns people to hell before they are born: "But if God pleases you when he crowns the unworthy [i.e., in single predestination thinking], he ought not to displease you when he damns the undeserving. If he is just in the former case, why not in the latter?" Discerning the mercy and justice within the law was a lifetime Lutheran project; he began his career thinking that the law (and all its manifestations, such as conscience) were a torment to humans and needed to be transcended. But Luther later developed ideas, as did other Protestants, about how the law, since it emerges from God, must be good, even as it condemns people yet unborn to hell.

In the first section of this book, after outlining the idea of double predestination thinking as it appeared sporadically throughout Christian history, I discuss its appearance as one of the foundational revolutionary principles of Protestantism in the writings of Luther, Calvin, and other reformers. I then show the first appearances of this doctrine in English medieval drama, and

demonstrate its significance in later plays such as *The Conflict of Conscience* (1581) by Nathaniel Woodes (c. 1550–after 1594), and *Doctor Faustus* (c. 1588–1592) by Christopher Marlowe (1564–1593). The final section chapters show how Shakespeare utilized the idea of double predestination both in relation to tragedy, where it propels Macbeth into musing on the nature of both fate and sin, and also in comedy, where, in *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, Shakespeare cleverly demonstrates how making God the author of sin is not necessarily a bad thing for humans. This section concludes with a discussion of the comedy *Twelfth Night* to show Shakespeare’s reaction to the development of a specifically ‘hot Protestant’ or Puritan idea, that of attaining ‘assurance’ in one’s elected status, as demonstrated by Malvolio.

The second section of this book explores what it would have meant, in the sixteenth century, to convert into a Protestant belief system in contrast to a Catholic one. This meant adopting a set of doctrines, for instance a complex of ideas emanating from the principles of double predestination, forensic justification, and prevenient grace (i.e. faith); yet such conversion also involved, I will argue, having a different sense of one’s body than Christians had possessed in the past. For Protestants, the converted body found its purpose not in becoming purified or consecrated but rather by submitting to the irresistible desires of the flesh through marriage. One of the most immediately visible effects of the first years of the Reformation was the large number of clerical marriages; and this section of this book argues that such marriages signified an entry into the specifically Protestant way of life—a calling as it were. Moreover, this was a calling that, in the hands of artists such as Spenser and Shakespeare, that ennobled the faculty of physical lust to an extent that most Protestants would not have accepted, but which occurs in a manner appropriate to the Protestant worldview. In Shakespeare’s comedies, *Much Ado About Nothing*, *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, and in the tragedy *A Winter’s Tale*, as well as in Spenser’s *The Faerie Queene*, we can see the role played by physical passion in generating religious conversion to the Protestant faith.

The final section of this book is about free will, a topic that predates Christianity and involves reconstructing the history of the issue by looking at Plato’s and Aristotle’s views, views utilized by later Christian thinkers, especially in the thirteenth century when ‘free will’ became a high-profile topic. Indeed the ‘free will’ was, arguably, one of the few topics appearing in the New Testament whose development could be traced more to classical Greek traditions than Old Testament ones. This circumstance provided Renaissance thinkers with an opportunity to use the concept as a bridge between Christian and non-Christian cultures and consequently to imagine how God operated in such ‘natural law’ environments. Moreover, since many Protestants (such as Luther) believed that when the spirit of faith was not actually operative, there was, in effect, no difference between the elect and the non-elect. This placed most elect Christians, most of the time, in the ranks of reprobates, Catholics, and pagans. These groups of people had to rely on their own free will to make wise and ethical choices; they were armed with centuries of advice and in possession of a will that, even as early as Augustine, had incorporated the qualities of strength, freedom, reason, and conscience. Nonetheless, Protestants believed that this free will could only produce sin; this belief was an explicit rejection of the Erasmian humanist approach to free will based on the ‘pactum theology’ principles of late medieval nominalism (the *via moderna*). In *Hamlet*, the focus of this book’s final chapters, we can see this fallen free will in action—for even as Hamlet prays for a regenerated will, one that will be filled with faith and act instinctively on behalf of God, he finds himself in a more tragic world where those prayers are not readily answered. In the end, Hamlet asks its audience to imagine how the Protestant God functions, and how this God can turn inevitable human sin into something properly deserving of the term ‘elect.’

In all three sections of this book, the goal is threefold: to identify a clear element of Protestant thinking, unshared by Catholics, to explain its history in Christian thinking, and to show how Shakespeare, as an artist, utilized the given idea in his plays in order to generate his distinctive views of human nature and its relationship with the divine.

GOETHE'S FAUST AND THE DIVAN OF ḤĀFĪZ: BODY AND SOUL IN PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE AND BEAUTY

by Hiwa Michaeli [[De Gruyter](#), 9783110661569]

This book explores the poetic articulations of a shift from a transcendent to an immanent worldview, as reflected in the manner of evaluation of body and soul in Goethe's Faust and Ḥāfīz' Divan. Focusing on two lifeworks that illustrate their authors' respective intellectual histories, this cross-genre study goes beyond the textual confines of the two poets' Divans to compare important building blocks of their intellectual worlds.

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Excerpt: In the first chapter, I explored Faust's wish to attain knowledge. At first glance, this wish takes the form of the desire to grasp the immanence of the divine forces that hold the world (universe) together. Yet the immanence of the transcendent divine truth in nature appears not to have deep roots in Faust's view of the world. The constant presence of the heavenly bodies in Faust's speculative fantasies provides the first clues about the roots of Faust's Neoplatonic wish for ascension beyond the realm of matter. The wish for ascent —the wish to fly directly toward the heavenly bodies, as in verses 391—397, 418 and 702—705 —clearly indicates Faust's desire to leave the earthly realm behind. The heavenly bodies are metaphors for Faust's Neoplatonic approach to the transcendent, which prescribes 'cleansing' the soul and the senses of all that is mundane and material. But Faust's excluding world-view in the early part of the drama is not shared by Goethe, whose poetic translation of the Ennead I. 6. 9 conspicuously omits one of the central elements of Plotinus's philosophy —the process of purification. After failing to grasp the 'Erdegeist', Faust finds the fault in his human condition. His Platonic conception of the human condition reveals the deep roots of a negative, excluding method of attainment of knowledge. Faust's body —the material component of his being — is the greatest obstacle on his path of ascent to knowledge. Vividly articulated near the end of the scene Vor dem Tor, when Faust (famously) describes himself as possessing two souls, this view of the body accords with Plotinus's notion of 'secondary evil', which states that the body hinders the divine nucleus of the human being from separating itself from its corporeal component. In the scene Vor dem Tor, the sight of the setting sun kindles Faust's desire for ascent, which Faust justifies in reference to the doctrine of anamnesis, according to which the sight of the elevated and the sublime activates an inborn memory of a home, to which one can ascend only by separating the soul from the corporeal sphere.

In the Divan, I discussed gazals 334 and 478 as examples of the dominance of the ascending, negative view of approaching the transcendent truth. In contrast to the pašān style of many of 'afī's poems, these two poems, written without irony or sarcasm, are characterized by the linear development of

a single theme. Both poems describe the body and its desires as impediments on the ascending path toward truth, and prescribe negation and purification of the soul. Like Faust, Hafiz's *Divan* describes the heavenly bodies as the destination of ascent, and the sight of the heavenly bodies as the impetus to ascend. Anamnesis appears to be a component of this view in the *Divan*; Hafiz describes his soul as a bird (a nightingale or a falcon) trapped in the cage of the body with a memory of its homeland, the source of goodness and truth. In both texts, the journey of the descended individuated soul back to its place of origin ultimately entails the elimination of the individual. But neither Faust nor the narrator of the *Divan* takes this radical step: in Faust, the song of the angels and childhood memories of feeling close to the divine pull Faust back from the ledge; and in the *Divan*, the poet conveys that he does not consider his life to be at his disposal. I argued that Hafiz's arguments in this case resemble those of Socrates in *Phaedo*. In addition, Hafiz argues that offering one's life to the unchanging origin of being is pointless; by definition, the unchanging realm is unaffected by the sacrifice. Thus, the human being does not ascend to the transcendent realm on the basis of merit; he does so only through mercy, which is best exemplified by Christ, who is purified from the mundane by the grace of the divine —only Masiha and whomever else the divine chooses can ascend to the most transcendent truth. In the section 'Masiha (Christ) and the Sun', I explained the role of mercy through the poet's use of the sun as a metaphor for the purest extramundane object of pursuit.

In the scene *Nacht*, we find Faust trapped in a vicious cycle: pain leads him to seek escape in speculative fantasy, which quickly turns to disillusionment — and more pain. Eventually, Faust attempts to escape this cycle once and for all through suicide. In the *Divan*, this dramatic illustration of the state before change cannot be expected.

In the *Divan*, Hafiz uses sarcasm and irony to refute ascetic abstraction of the sublime from the mundane. Expressions of acceptance and appreciation of the human condition in the *Divan* mark Hafiz's rejection of an excluding approach to the bodily realm. In *ghazal* 399, we find the poetic narrator — a mouthpiece for Hafiz himself —critique the hypocrisy of asceticism and glorify the human condition. In *ghazal* 351, the *parsayan* are differentiated from the *tazyan* through their sympathy for the human condition and ability to introduce joy into Hafiz's pursuit of truth. The *parsayan* bear a strong resemblance to the magi, and specifically the *Pir-i Mugan*, who appears as the mediating figure in the *Divan*, as I discussed in the second chapter of this study.

In chapter two, I explored the shift from an excluding approach to the bodily and the natural sphere toward an embrace of life and nature. I demonstrated that the institution of knowledge that Faust criticizes in the scene *Nacht* is based on the practice of exclusion in accordance with the negative view of transcendence. I argued that Faust's study excludes him from the outside world; in place of the living natural phenomena outside its walls, Faust's study contains lifeless representations of nature as never-changing objects of exploration. Faust's academic degrees exclude him from the realm of nature and act as subjective extensions of the walls of his study; thus, even when Faust leaves his study in the scene *Vor dem Tor*, he is still metaphorically trapped within it. In contrast to his descriptions of his study in the scene *Nacht*, Faust describes his study in *Studierzimmer* as a hermitage in which the inner light of the extramundane source of life can be appreciated. This scene opens a window to Faust's past. While Faust suppresses his experiences of pain, on the theatrical level, the struggling poodle casts light on the excluding function of Faust's study.

To show Hafiz's turn from an excluding world-view toward life and natural beauty, I discussed the respective representations of nature in Persian literature before and after the dominance of Sufism by comparing the poetry of Rudaki and Manucihri to Sa'di's *ghazals* and several poems in Hafiz's *Divan*. Whereas the works of the earlier poets contain vivid illustrations of natural phenomena, the latter poets juxtapose the space of *'alvat* (solitude) to the perishable beauty of nature. This space is described as a refuge for the ideal forms of ephemeral beauty, where the wise can enjoy their liberation from the pain of perishable beauty of the world. After demonstrating the relevance of Sufi

views to the concept of *ʔalvat*, I briefly explained several of the elements and terms of ascetic Sufism: the subjective elements of *tauba* (repentance) and *ʔaharat* (purification); and the objective elements of *ʔanaqah* (convent) and *ʔirqa* (the Sufi tattered frock). With respect to the Divan, I demonstrated that the experience of nature —and specifically, spring —leads the poet to recognize an immanent, invigorating force present in all beings. I argued that Hafiz articulates his integration into the natural sphere through an anthropomorphic analogy; he defends his inclination to enjoy natural beauty on ground that this inclination is universal. Having experienced nature, the poet uses irony to express his skepticism toward the excluding elements of the ascetic Sufi method, specifically the notion of repentance. Alluding to the poetry of Rudaki, Hafiz refers to the 'repentance-shattering spring', whose cosmic display of immanence refutes the logic of exclusion; the poet finds it irrational to prefer solitude over celebrating the beauty of spring. Spring provides the backdrop for *gazel* 338, in which Hafiz places his human condition above the heavenly sun; instead of wishing to ascend to the sun, Hafiz describes descending into a bottomless sea, which he compares to a wine-house, in pursuit of the pearl of love. Again, in *gazel* 414, Hafiz struggles to decide between inclusion and exclusion in a bizarre setting — in front of a pleasure house. He reminds the 'youthful vintner', who plays the role of the reproachful ascetic, that spring itself is an argument against a negative approach to truth.

In *Faust*, too, the arrival of spring has a significant role. *Faust's* monologue in verses 903—940 extends the uninterrupted immanence of the divine to the natural and the human realms. I argued that, in this monologue, *Faust* modifies his view of the relation between the colors and the light of the sun in accordance with the immanent world that he envisions; he no longer views color as polluted light. It is also in the spring that *Faust* recognizes that his knowledge fails to grasp the dark unknown of the excluded natural realm. Based on Blumenberg's theory of the experience of horizon, I explained *Faust's* self-description of his state in verses 1064—1065 as one in which he is submerged in a sea of errors; his entire accumulated knowledge is cast into doubt.

In the Divan of Hafiz, I showed how the poet's inner struggles emerge from his rejection of the values that had shaped his world previously —namely, the values of ascetic Sufism and Platonism. Unable to ignore the beauty of spring, Hafiz sarcastically attacks the theory of purification and exclusion of the natural realm; he describes the *ʔanaqah* as a snare and a trap, rather than a fortress of spiritual and intellectual safety. Symbolically, he wishes to wash with wine the parchments filled with false knowledge. He discredits the Sufi mentors, *faqih*s and *mufti*s as agents of the *ʔanaqah* and *madrasa*, corrupt institutions in which charlatanism and hypocrisy masquerade as knowledge and self-development.

Regarding the rejection of negative world-views, another important topic of this study has been the role of mediating figures, which appear in both texts. Whereas in *Faust*, *Faust's* process of reevaluation of his conception of mediation is dramatized in several steps, the Divan does not contain a linear representation of Hafiz's changing approach to mediation. On many occasions, the Divan emphasizes the role of mediation in the process of turning toward an inclusive approach to the natural realm. In the case of *Faust*, I argued that it is necessary to differentiate between Mephisto's deeds and intentions. Mephisto's evil traits, I argued, must be understood in reference to the negative views of *Faust's* old world and the anxieties that arose from them. This connection becomes clear when we compare Mephisto's speeches directed to the audience (in *Faust's* absence) to Wagner's cautionary monologue at the end of the scene *Vor dem Tor*. I also discussed Mephisto's acts of mediation, which lead *Faust* to leave the house that symbolizes his old way of life. Mephisto's conflict with *Faust's* house dramatizes the symbolic opposition between the mediator (Mephisto, both as poodle and person) and the excluding space (the house). Finally, *Faust* and Mephisto's departure from *Faust's* study at the end of *Studierzimmer* (II) marks Mephisto's success as a mediator and his victory over the excluding elements of *Faust's* world. In case of the Divan, Hafiz's mediating figure takes the form of *Pir-i Mugan*, an eclectic fictive mentor based on theological,

philosophical and Sufi views known to Hafiz. The mediating figure in the Divan of Hafiz contrasts to the mediating figures of both Sufis and philosophers: Hafiz's mediating figure is neither the personal mentor envisioned by the Sufis nor the anthropomorphic representation of the Active Intelligence envisioned by philosophers such as Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi. In both Faust and the Divan of Hafiz, the mediating figures use paradox and oxymora to nullify the binary logic that is the basis of the process of purification. In Faust, this process begins in Studierzimmer (I) with Mephisto's paradoxical self-presentation. In Studierzimmer (II), Mephisto actively leads Faust to partake in life and accept both pain and pleasure. Mephisto also leads Faust to abandon his self-deifying wish for death and to accept his human condition as the combination of the spiritual and material spheres ('Tag und Nacht') in accordance with divine will. In the Divan, Hafiz's mentor helps him transcend the duality of purification and pollution. He teaches Hafiz that the human notions of good and evil are not valid from the perspective of the divine (?inayat). Hence, one cannot achieve ascension by means of ascetic purification and self-mortification, since these are practices grounded in human values. In light of Horramšahi's discussion of Igi's remarks on the issue of the presence of evil in the sublunary realm, I further explained that Hafiz's mentor argues that evil contributes to the totality of phenomena; as contributing parts, evil and goodness coexist in particular phenomena—but the evil part never outweighs the good part. Aided by his mentor, Hafiz attests to the beauty of nature (which also contains pain) and thus abandons his excluding views.

A conspicuous difference between Faust and the Divan is that Faust challenges his mediating figure, whereas the narrator of the Divan does not. This difference can be explained in light of different genres of the two works. Faust's struggle with Mephisto dramatizes his critique of his old world-views and his difficulty leaving his old world. In the Divan, on the other hand, the relation between Hafiz and his mentor, Pir-i Mugan, is nurturing, rather than hostile. Pir-i Mugan educates Hafiz intellectually and spiritually. As a pupil of Pir-i Mugan, Hafiz articulates his critiques of ascetic exclusion through ironic self-criticism and sarcastic attacks on the institutions of the madrasa, ?anaqah and the intolerant morality police (mu'tasib).

In the third chapter, I explored the immanent world-views that, in both texts, replace the exclusive world views discussed above. The first consequence of the turn from an exclusive to an inclusive world-view is the increased importance of the beauty as the object of pursuit. The first decisive event in Faust's new 'Lebenslauf' is his experience of beauty in the magic mirror of the Hexenküche—this is the moment in which Faust becomes a lover. In the Divan of Hafiz, we find the poet's praise of beauty constantly intertwined with his sarcastic critiques of ascetic Sufi views. Moreover, Hafiz's poems on love and beauty justify the significance of beauty and explain the relation between the divine and the one who appreciates beauty. In Goethe's Faust, the sublime aspect of that which is aesthetically moving is inseparable from its worldly aspect. In his pursuit of beauty and love, Faust constantly explains why the beautiful appears beautiful to him; how it affects him; and how love and beauty have their ground in the immanence of the divine. The investigations of the third chapter yield the following result: in both works, love and the appreciation of beauty are informed by an organic immanent world-view based on the constellation of (a) the world, (b) humans and (c) the divine. By repeatedly revisiting this theme from various perspectives, Goethe and Hafiz are able to articulate different aspects of the connection among these three components of the immanent world-view. In the Divan, Hafiz employs numerous metaphors and allegories in order to illustrate and justify the appreciation of beauty. But his use of different sets of metaphors and allegories, often in an interwoven manner, presents a challenge for the reader. I discussed gazals in which Hafiz brings one set of metaphors (and one component of his world-view) to the foreground, while leaving others in the background. By analyzing these gazals, as well as others in which more than one set of metaphors (and more than one component of Hafiz's world-view) are present, I was able to illuminate the immanent world-view that finds articulation in the Divan; understanding the Divan's intertextual relations with other relevant texts also advanced that goal. In Goethe's Faust, Faust's

soliloquies, disputations with Mephisto and conversations with Gretchen reveal Goethe's own theories of love and beauty. Furthermore, the theme of the pursuit of love is dramatized twice in Faust – first in the case of Gretchen, and second in the Helena act. Gretchen's love is further alluded to in the scenes Hochgebirg and Bergschluchten.

The core principle of the immanent world-views in the Divan of Hafiz and Goethe's Faust rests in the recognition that the One contains two aspects. The first aspect, the absolute essence of uniqueness, is in itself and for itself; the second aspect is oriented toward multiplicity and diversification. This second aspect is the basis of the One's uninterrupted active immanence, which operates on two levels in both the Divan and Faust: (a) the active, mediated immanence of the One in the world as its self-diversifications and self-disclosures through its numerous attributes, images and reflections that instantiate beauty; and (b) the active, mediated immanence of the communicative aspect of the One in humans.

The non-communicative aspect of the divine lies beyond the reach of the intellect and aesthetic appreciation. In the Divan, this non-communicative aspect of the One is referred to as *ʔat* ('the essence'). In the metaphorical imagery of love, the non-communicative aspect is represented by the mole of the Beloved, and the communicative aspect is represented by the face of the Beloved. The face of the Beloved is compared to the sun as the source of emanation. Like the sun, the face cannot be seen directly, but its mediated immanence can be appreciated in the world. I elaborated on this point in the Divan in reference to A. Gazzali's distinction between the beauty (*ʔusn*) and belovedness (*malaʔat*) of the Beloved; I showed that this distinction appears in Hafiz's work. Regarding the essence of the One, I showed that Faust's admission of the ineffability of the source of his love for Gretchen accords with Goethe's view, expressed in Prooemion, that the essence of the Infinite, too, is ineffable. In his monologue praising the arrival of spring, Faust expresses the sun's willingness to diversify its light in colors and to extend its being into the multiplicity of nature. On another level, the sun's influence also extends to human beings. The communicative act of the sun illustrates Goethe's universal conception of *ʔAnmut*, according to which the quality of *ʔAnmut* applies (universally) to nature, humans and art. The scene *Anmutige Gegend* dramatizes the influence of *ʔAnmut* (immanent in nature) on Faust's body and mind; in the scene *Rittersaal* we observe the influence of *ʔAnmut* working within the work of art; and, finally, in Chiron's description of Helena, the human form of *ʔAnmut* is described as having an effect on Faust.

One of the corollaries of the communicative aspect of the One is the mediated immanence that is communicated from the One to the world and that unites the One with its many reflections and images.²⁰ Both texts consider the image of the One in a given phenomenon to be the ontological ground of that phenomenon. I argued that the *ʔdisclosure of the ray of beauty of the Beloved* in *ʔIraqi's* poetry modifies the Neoplatonic view of the emanation of the Intellect; I also showed that *ʔafiʔ* in *gazal 148* uses the *ʔdisclosure of the ray of beauty* in the same sense as *ʔIraqi* does in his poem. In *gazals 87 and 148*, I explained the diversification of the One in instantiations of its attributes using *ʔIraqi's* definition of *gayrat*. *ʔIraqi* does not define the phenomena as entities other (*gayr*) than the One (a definition that belongs to the exclusive Sufi doctrine). Rather, he defines them as many likenesses (*aʔyan*) of the One, each of which instantiates an attribute or several attributes of the One. Thus, whereas in ascetic Sufism *gayrat* is a force of exclusion, in *ʔIraqi's* *Lamaʔat* it becomes a formative force that diversifies the One in the multiplicity of its attributes. I then showed that *ʔafiʔ* grasps perceivable qualities of phenomena —the fragrance and colors of flowers, the straight growth of a cypress tree, the light of a candle — as instantiations of the attributes of the One, whose likeness (*ʔayn*) in a given phenomenon constitutes its ontological ground. In Faust, each entity that Faust recognizes as beautiful is conceived by Faust as an image of one indeterminate entity. Furthermore, Faust defines the influence of beauty of each image as an extension of the influence of that indeterminate entity. In the scene *Marthens Garten*, Faust frames his view of the divine in terms

of Its inclusion of the multiplicity; the divine is the 'Allumfasser' and 'Allerhalter', whose immanence constitutes the qualities of phenomena and enables humans to recognize the All in everything.

The immanence of the One is the ontological ground of finite phenomena; this is true of human beings as well. The image of the One that is the ontological ground of humans is at the same time the human faculty that recognizes the diversifications of the Indeterminate in Its determinate instantiations.

Both Goethe's letter to Auguste zu Stolberg of 1775 and the scene *Wald und Höhle* describe recognizing natural phenomena as one's own brethren. Through comparing these two texts, I argued that this epistemological aspect of immanence is extended from being limited to recognizing the likeness in other humans (Goethe's letter) to an all-inclusive faculty of recognition of the likeness of the One in natural phenomena (*Wald und Höhle*). Faust recognizes nature as his brethren, since natural phenomena also contain an image of the divine—similar to the image that he contains. This image constitutes humanity and actively appreciates and loves the beauty of similar images. I located this epistemological immanent world-view in Herder's *Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele* and argued that Herder also viewed the image of the divine as the ontological ground of the human being.²⁴ The active immanence of the One in human beings has another articulation in *Faust*—one that can be appreciated in reference to Goethe's view, expressed in his *Farbenlehre*, of the inner activity of the eye in the context of physiological colors. I showed this active immanence in *Faust*'s inner activity in front of the magic mirror and in his inclusion of the darkness and absolute emptiness of the abode of Mothers. The physiological component of Goethe's immanent world-view has no direct parallel in the *Divan* of 'afi'. Yet, as I have argued, this component is an extension of the ontological and epistemological components of Goethe's immanent world-view, which do find parallels in the *Divan*.

In my discussion of the *Divan*, I explained the metaphor of the worldrevealing cup, and I introduced the active immanence of the One in the human heart as the faculty of recognizing the Beloved in all the beauties (beloveds) in the world. I explained this active immanence in reference to Sawani?, *Lama'at* and *gazel* 178 of the *Divan*. I then demonstrated that the eye and the heart are intimately connected in the *Divan*; in many cases they appear to be almost identical. The image of the Beloved that resides in the human heart is actively present in the eye, which recognizes the likeness of the Beloved in the multiplicity of phenomena. In my explanation of the phrase 'mardum-i dida,' a calque of the Arabic 'insan ul-'ayn' (pupil of the eye), I argued that the image of the Beloved reflected in the pupil of the eye is a metaphor for the immanence of the One in human beings. This notion is conveyed through the word 'ayn, meaning 'essence', 'likeness', and 'the eye'. On the basis of this analysis, I clarified the poet's anthropomorphic illustration of the *insan ul-'ayn* (pupil) in the sixth couplet of *gazel* 385 in the *Divan*. Using anthropomorphism, 'afi' tersely depicts the connection between the eye and the heart, which is the space where the Beloved is active in the lover (the human being) and recognizes Her own diversifications in the beloveds of the world.

Whereas anamnestic epistemology defines the body as an obstacle to attaining truth, the immanent world-views that find articulation in both texts view the body as the field in which the transcendent extends its active immanence by way of images and reflections. Unlike the anamnestic wish to ascend beyond the phenomenal world, the immanent epistemology in our two texts is based on the mediated activity of the One in humans, which recognizes particulars as instantiations of the attributes of the One.

Based on the communicative aspect of the One and Its will to disclose Itself in the multiplicity of phenomena, I showed that the two texts offer similar assessments of veils. In the *Divan*, I explained the extension of the communicative aspect of the One in reference to 'Iraqi's argument in *Lama'at*: the One, 'Iraqi argues, cannot be limited by the finite; rather, It limits Itself, as an artist does, in the

veils of the finite in order to communicate particular aspects of its Indeterminate Self. Thus, the world is a work of art, and humans are its spectators. In this context, Love is depicted as a minstrel; as a painter, constantly painting self-portraits from countless different perspectives; and as a beautifier that conveys Itself in phenomena and appreciates Itself through Its active immanence in humans (lovers). In the *Divan*, human art is praised in reference to the works of the divine artist. Extolling his mastery in minstrelsy and poetry in hyperbolic terms, 'afi' describes the influence of his work on humans, heavenly bodies and angels.

In the scene *Anmutige Gegend*, Faust describes the landscape before him as the realm of 'the most youthful veils'. I explained this phrase in reference to Goethe's aphorism: the Indefinite willingly limits Itself in order to render finite beings in Its likeness. I also pointed to another instance of grasping the veil as a medium of unveiling in *West-östlicher Divan* —namely, in Suleika's ability to recognize 'das Allgegenwärtige' behind its 'magical veils'.

In both works, I argued, the pursuit of unity with the transcendent that necessitates self-annihilation is replaced by the pursuit of the mediated presence of the One in the multiplicity of phenomena, and particularly in humans themselves. The emergence of this new, immanent world-view represents a compromise, which is articulated in both texts through oxymora: 'Wechsel-Dauer' (in Faust) and the 'assembly of dispersion' (in the *Divan*). 'Wechsel-Dauer' represents Faust's self-knowledge in his realization that he is an image of the sun — a quality that he shares with other phenomena. Referring to the realm of multiplicity as the colorful reflections of the sun is a clear instance of the modification of light metaphors in accordance with the immanent world-views explained thus far. Faust's integration in the 'Wechsel-Dauer' resembles Hafiz's conception of the world as the multiplicity of likenesses of the Beloved in the *Divan*. In chapter three, I showed the modifications made to the light metaphors in Faust, in which Gretchen and Helena are elevated above the sun and the heavenly bodies; I demonstrated that this representation of the beloved is similar to the sun analogies in the *Divan*, specifically in Purgstall's translation, which Goethe read.

In this study, I limited my comparison between Goethe's Faust and the *Divan* of Hafiz to the parts of Faust relevant to the turn from a transcendent to an immanent world-view —namely, Faust's quests for knowledge, beauty and love. Acts four and five of Faust, which dramatize his colonialist reincarnation, did not fall within the scope of this study. Furthermore, my study was limited to a comparison between the two texts, rather than the two authors. In light of the lack of information about Hafiz's life, generalizing the findings of this comparative study to the two authors themselves would be purely speculative.

The detailed findings of this study provide a basis for critically evaluating Goethe's attempts to understand the intellectual world of Hafiz in the *Noten und Abhandlungen zum besseren Verständnis des West-östlichen Divans*; they also provide a basis for further analysis of Hafiz's reception in the writings of the nineteenth-century orientalists and philosophers.

Throughout this study of Faust, we encountered the concept of God-likeness ('Gottesebenbildlichkeit') on multiple occasions and in various forms — being the equal of gods; being a god; and being an image of the divine. This notion appears frequently in the *Divan*; it relates to the image of the Beloved in the mirror of the lover's heart and the image of the Wine-Bringer in the cup. Furthermore, the frequently used metaphor of the pupil of the eye (*insan ul-'ayn*) in the *Divan* also alludes to the concept of God-likeness.

In this study, I mentioned the importance of the concept of God-likeness to the immanent world-views of the two works. But a thorough comparison of the concept of God-likeness in the two works is a project for a future study. This future study should be carried out in reference to the two cultural contexts in question and should take into account, the theological and intellectual extensions

of this Judeo-Christian notion and its Neoplatonic parallel, both of which are actively present in Sufism and thus in the cultural space of the Divan. <>

PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION WITHIN AN IDEOLOGICAL SURROUND by Paul J. Watson [Brill Research Perspectives, Brill, 9789004411203]

For over three decades, an Ideological Surround Model (ISM) has pursued theoretical and methodological innovations designed to enhance the ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ of research into psychology and religion. The foundational argument of the ISM is that psychology as well as religion unavoidably operates within the limits of an ideological surround. Methodological theism, therefore, needs to supplement the methodological atheism that dominates the contemporary social sciences. Methodological theism should operationalize the meaningfulness of religious traditions and demonstrate empirically that the influences of ideology cannot be ignored. The ISM more generally suggests that contemporary social scientific rationalities need to be supplemented by more complex dialogical rationalities. Beliefs in secularization should also be supplemented by beliefs in trans-rationality.

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In Memoriam: Paul J. Watson (June 23, 1948–March 10, 2019)

Psychology and Religion within an Ideological Surround

Excerpt: More than ever, I am convinced that history has meaning and that its meaning is terrifying. —René Girard

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This monograph synthesizes over three decades of research using an Ideological Surround Model (ISM) of the relationship between psychology and religion. Acts of imagination usefully describe the kinds of challenges that led to this model. Imagine you are an adolescent living in London during World War I (WWI), and your father dies at the Battle of the Somme in 1916. This single battle led to more deaths than the previous century of European warfare. You might take some comfort from the idea that WWI was at least supposed to be “the war to end all wars.” But then imagine your son dies on D-Day almost three decades later during the exponentially greater bloodshed of World War II (WWII). Finally, imagine you live long enough through the 20th Century to witness more and more death and destruction. The spectacle of Pol Pot in Cambodia, for instance, occurs toward the end of your life. Such experiences will eventually lead to a question, “How can violence cast out violence?”

Almost everyone will have at least an implicit answer to this question. Most will probably presume that violence used rationally is the only option for casting out violence. But where is the evidence that rational violence can ultimately eliminate violence? Recent Western incursions into Iraq supply only one data point among many that argues against the claim. Other, mostly religious answers will assume that violence cannot cast out violence, which must be resisted through some form of pacifism. But where is the evidence that pacifism can ultimately cast out violence? Especially nonreligious skeptics will point out that refusals to use violence in a violent world will likely result in your own or in someone else’s death.

Neither type of answer seems fully defensible empirically, nor are logical arguments alone likely to convince advocates of rational violence to embrace pacifism or vice versa. Moreover, all this occurs in a world that creates increasingly efficient technologies of death. Nuclear warfare, for example, can now exterminate all humans on the planet in an alarmingly short period of time. Girard essentially argues that religions in the long history of humanity sought to control this potentially all-consuming

violence but that the efficacy of those controls have long been under progressive decline. In the absence of an appropriate response to this problem, humanity seems doomed to battle to the end. The meaning of history and of violence within it turns out to be terrifying.

Complexity of Rationalities

As interpreted through the ISM, the issue of violence only begins to capture a central cultural problem that is also at the heart of the relationship between psychology and religion. This relationship more generally and importantly reveals that the rationalities of social life are unavoidably limited. Section 2 will make this argument by explaining why social rationalities necessarily operate within a surround of different ideological assumptions about ultimate standards and about their normative and sociological implications. Relativism across social rationalities is an undeniable empirical reality, as daily interactions among individuals of different genders, races, religions, educational levels, and occupations will, for example, make clear. The ISM maintains, however, that relativism is not and cannot be a normative reality. Instead, rationalities of religion and psychology should unite in dialogues to defend ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ in the face of relativism. The ISM presents a conceptual framework that explains how this could be possible.

Several points about the writing style of this monograph deserve emphasis here because they first appear in Section 2. This section will argue that three ultimate standards are especially influential in contemporary social life: God, Nature, and Power. Capitalization of those terms will designate their status as ideologically ultimate. The lack of capitals elsewhere will reflect their more straightforward usage in other contexts. In addition, words like ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ will sometimes be placed in quotation marks to indicate that these terms will roughly reflect common parlance but that their exact meanings will require dialogical negotiations across ideological perspectives.

Admission that the rationalities of psychology are limited in a manner similar to those of religion has important implications for the study of psychology and religion. As explained in Section 3, this realization requires a social science of methodological and metaphysical theism. Research programs dedicated to that goal will operationalize religious traditions in a way that demonstrates how they make sense empirically. Methodological theism can and also should be brought into dialogue with the methodological atheism that dominates the contemporary social sciences. Those dialogues can profoundly enhance thinking within both religious and psychological ideological surrounds.

Section 4 suggests that social scientific resistances to methodological theism may prevent beneficial dialogues from occurring. The ISM attempts to overcome such resistances through innovations that can be described as a theist methodological dialogism. The data analytic procedures of this dialogism operate as a psychometric deconstruction of psychometrics that seeks to demonstrate that the influences of ideology cannot be eliminated from research into psychology and religion. Attention to those influences can enhance the ‘objectivity’ of both psychology and religion.

Methodological theism makes it possible to view religion and psychology from previously underrepresented perspectives and as a consequence to discover previously unsuspected relationships. Claims that conservative religious commitments are psychologically and socially narrow-minded are well-established within the broader research literature (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992, 2004). Attention to ideological factors, nevertheless, can make it clear that conservative religiousness also has potentials for psychosocial openness. Section 5 reviews evidence for a Religious Openness Hypothesis that supports this conclusion cross-culturally. More generally, this line of research further illustrates the benefits of bringing theist and non-theist psychological perspectives into dialogue.

The central argument of the Section 6 will be that intersections between psychology and religion reveal a need for more complex understandings of social rationality. Rather than individualistic philosophical moorings in the ‘I’ of Descartes cogito, the contemporary social sciences and social life

should find more productive foundations in the development of dialogical rationalities. Dialogical rationalities turn out to be private, communal, and public. All three are important and deserve to be understood in their own right. Public rationalities, in particular, require defense and development, or at least that is the diagnosis of the ISM. This perspective also implies that social scientific models of rationality as a process of secularization need to be supplemented by something else. That something else would be a 'trans-rationality' model.

Tentativeness

Ultimately, the ISM contends that social rationalities should engage in a never-ending process of dialogue in which 'truth' and 'objectivity' are approached but never finally reached. The present description of the ISM may eventually prove to be inadequate and require further development through dialogue. More problematic may be the responses of some who will simply find the ISM theist framework to be worthy of reactions ranging nonchalance to contempt. Such resistances will mean that its arguments will never be read. The claim of the ISM is that all arguments deserve to be read and submitted to thoughtful dialogical consideration. Many truly crucial dialogues remain. This monograph concludes with examples of only a few of the possibilities. <>

MAKING THE MEDIEVAL RELEVANT: HOW MEDIEVAL STUDIES CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRESENT edited by Chris Jones, Conor Kostick and Klaus Oschema [Das Mittelalter. Perspektiven mediävistischer Forschung. Beihefte, De Gruyter, 9783110545302] Open Source

When scholars discuss the medieval past, the temptation is to become immersed there, to deepen our appreciation of the nuances of the medieval sources through debate about their meaning. But the past informs the present in a myriad of ways and medievalists can, and should, use their research to address the concerns and interests of contemporary society. This volume presents a number of carefully commissioned essays that demonstrate the fertility and originality of recent work in Medieval Studies. Above all, they have been selected for relevance. Most contributors are in the earlier stages of their careers and their approaches clearly reflect how interdisciplinary methodologies applied to Medieval Studies have potential repercussions and value far beyond the boundaries of the Middle Ages. These chapters are powerful demonstrations of the value of medieval research to our own times, both in terms of providing answers to some of the specific questions facing humanity today and in terms of much broader considerations. Taken together, the research presented here also provides readers with confidence in the fact that Medieval Studies cannot be neglected without a great loss to the understanding of what it means to be human.

Why study the Middle Ages? The answers this question yields concern more than simply medievalists: they generate reflections regarding the usefulness of science or intellectual engagement in any given society. Answering the question includes critical reflection on periodization in general and, in particular, on the public's understanding of what is termed (for better or worse) 'the Middle Ages'. The relevance of studying the period has been justified in many ways. It allows, for example, a comparison of social dynamics and the gathering of insights into the role of religion. Equally, it enables investigation of modes of rule and the organization of communities. Ultimately, it enables us to better understand modernity itself. Yet while many arguments concern a better understanding of the contemporary world, they do not necessarily justify the necessity of incorporating medieval comparisons. The current consensus (at least in French medieval studies) is to study the Middle Ages

as a society in its own right. There is an additional understanding that the specific problems raised by this period should be placed in a broader chronological and spatial context. These critical reflections invite deeper considerations, which are, in turn, useful in developing our sense of democracy, our understanding of society, and in the development of a historical science that is conscious of the current tendencies to 're-politicize' history. This volume argues that this leads to invaluable insights into the workings of any discipline concerned with the perception of time and change.

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Excerpt:

Turning back – and broadening the question

To raise the question of the interest and relevance of studying and teaching the Middle Ages means, first, to presuppose that there should be debate on the matter and, secondly, that what we call 'the Middle Ages' constitutes a well-defined and clearly conceptualized subject. The simple affirmation that the Middle Ages 'exist' at all needs to be the starting point for any reflection that seeks to answer the question of whether studying the period constitutes either a 'useful' or 'useless' endeavour. Each of our initial assumptions, however, must be considered to be problematic. The difficulties they raise are closely intertwined. The twofold nature of the initial question, which appears to be simple only at the most superficial first glance, presupposes two assumptions that might in turn have dangerous or undesirable side-effects: firstly, that the Middle Ages 'exist' and,

secondly, that the fact of their existence enables us to ask, in a meaningful way, whether studying them is either 'useful' or 'useless'.

The underlying logic of these initial assumptions and their consequences demand explicit elucidation, not least because the very label 'Middle Ages' derives from a specific understanding. Introduced by humanists in the sixteenth century, its inventors sought to discredit the entire period that came between the fall of Roman civilization and their own. The term has been repeated continually ever since. Its success and persistent use up to our own day should in fact be considered surprising: it is a persistence that has survived shifts in chronology as well as the arrival of new chrononyms that flank the so-called 'Middle Ages' such as 'Renaissance' and 'Late Antiquity'.

My argument will focus first and foremost on phenomena that concern 'history' as an institutionalized academic discipline. There are two principle reasons that might lead scholars of the 'Middle Ages', a particular unit in the system of academic periodization of history, to try and justify the usefulness of studying the object of their specialization (and sometimes even to justify its very existence). In the first place, there is an intellectual and heuristic benefit: scrutinizing the very motivations that lead individuals to doubt either a period's existence or the usefulness of studying it helps us to clarify, in an interesting way, the relationship between modern and pre-modern periods and cultures. The so-called 'exoticism', 'strangeness', 'alterity', 'barbarism', 'intolerance', and 'violence' of the Middle Ages — to mention but a few of the highly charged notions that frequently appear and which are often invoked in trying the case of this allegedly dismal and backwards period — are more revealing about the prejudices and fantasies of our own times than about any specific moment of the past. And for this reason alone, the prejudice of the judges would suffice to legitimize studying the Middle Ages: study enables us to get a clearer idea of the distortions. In the second place, the arguments that are and can be mobilized in order to 'explain' the Middle Ages come under the heading of a reflexive epistemology that is always beneficial.

The Problems of Time and Periodization

We can agree that for the above two reasons the medievalists' Middle Ages has no more need than any other period to defend itself; yet, by the same token, nor do specialists in this period have any more reason to evade the question than those working in other periods. The question raised at the beginning of this chapter is therefore directed to all periods and other demarcations of historical time which are fixed and rationalized a posteriori for academic, ideological, and institutional purposes. The question either has merit for all fields or for none. The simple explanation for this is that the relationship of our societies to time and history has changed. This is because the social need of history, as a discipline, has evolved. History itself — as science, practice, and writing — has changed (for starters, as a result of the internet). To make the 'non-present present', comprehensible, and in certain respects necessary, functions that both collide and coincide with the contemporaneity of the non-contemporary, is something that properly concerns the whole field of history or, to echo Marc Bloch, all processes of historical reflection and understanding that are connected to the modes of functioning and of the transformation of structures of a society. Applying this perspective actually makes History nothing less than the science of social change over time. And, as such, History can claim to be part of a broad range of 'pure' scientific endeavour, that is scientific activity that is not driven by the goal of obtaining profit. In this, as part of the Humanities and the Social Sciences, History is a science precisely because it is historical and thus focusses first and foremost on human actors, individual and collective. Taking into account a certain form of nostalgia and attachment to the past and the approaches imposed by certain media and the seductive nature of everything 'medieval' (real and imagined) for a wide range of different modern ideologies, we can understand why the Middle Ages, more than any other period, seem, at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, to be particularly vulnerable to dangerous ideological exploitation. The increasing importance of this exploitation is highlighted dramatically by

the way in which the Middle Ages has recently changed its status from being a 'showcase' period to become a pleasantly exotic world. As such, it has been 're-imported' into the present day, where it has become part of political strategies that seek to use it as an ideological tool. This phenomenon is particularly apparent in situations where the Middle Ages are introduced as the matrix of a western, Christian civilization, which is purportedly simultaneously 'under attack' by Muslim fundamentalism while at the same time endangered by processes of globalization. The latter are in turn interpreted as the death of the nation-state and the end of Europe's special character and exceptional nature. In this sense, the prominent exploitation of the Middle Ages as an ideological resource - a practice that can conveniently be called 'medievalism' - reveals that the problems that might induce a critical debate of medieval history's value and the status of medieval studies, are part and parcel of a democratic crisis, a crisis that affects the loss of our contemporary sense of political meaning. The methods and research principles of medievalists themselves, on the other hand, have less to do with current issues.

Specialists of this period, historians whose chronological framework has become very flexible and might in fact be considered to cover the entire time between the end of Antiquity and the turn of the nineteenth century, are confronted with a series of dramatic developments: the globalization of history and the new subjects it introduces (including prominent and ubiquitous calls to 'de-Europeanize' history), the overwhelming domination of contemporary history (which goes hand in hand with a regime of historicity marked by the domination of presentism), an increasing social demand —something, as I noted above, that is increasingly exploited and used as a political instrument —addressed to the entire body of historians in the context of public and patrimonial debates over sites of memory, and, no less significantly, the major thematic and methodologic reorientations in the study of medieval society that have occurred in recent decades. Like it or not, specialists have recently engaged in, voluntarily or involuntarily, a self-reflective exercise concerning their approach to, and the object of, their knowledge. This is obviously a development that should be welcomed.

How to use a Social Science

From the guild of medievalists themselves came a series of rather cautious reassessments. These remained strictly historiographical and methodological, and were primarily addressed to other professional or academic historians. Beyond these, several attempts have been made to respond to the question of the necessity and relevance of the study of the Middle Ages — or, at the very least, a certain understanding of the medieval —not only in academia but in society in general. Many of these latter, with a readership that stretches beyond a narrow circle of colleagues and specialists in mind, have tried consciously to demonstrate the usefulness of the Middle Ages by underlining their contemporary relevance.

Numerous other attempts have tried to locate an argument for relevance on the general scientific and cultural specificity of the subject or the terrain called the Middle Ages. In this regard, one might cite Johannes Fried's book, which justifies the relevance of the Middle Ages for the present by highlighting the existence of a medieval 'knowledge society' that cultivated the intrinsic unity of all fields of knowledge. According to Fried, it was this particular structure, which represents the complete opposite of the present day with its fragmentation of the sciences, different fields of knowledge, and perspectives, that actually gave birth to modern 'knowledge' and science. Jérôme Baschet's study of the global social dynamic of the Middle Ages within the paradigm of the ecclesio-feudal order -that is, a style of domination characterized by a logic of service and salvation which controls and dominates through a new combination of the spiritual and the corporeal -proceeds in a different mode but in a similar spirit. Baschet analyses the cultural techniques that were deployed to command nature, the historicization of time, and Christian universalism. In so doing, he underlines

how all these elements combine and simultaneously become the condition and the legacy of the West in its initiatives of colonial conquest.

In both the above instances we might note that the exposition is not placed under any heading that involves the 'usefulness' of the Middle Ages as defined by the period's capacity to explain the present day. This distinguishes both approaches from the multitude of other works which usually do just that. One example of the latter done in a particularly bad way concerns the 'crusades' and 'holy war' in cases where authors assess both in the context of a supposed clash of civilizations and religion between the Christian West and Islam. Instead of proposing analogies that are as easy to draw as they are erroneous, Fried and Baschet underline the necessity of taking into account the specificities and dynamics of the Middle Ages in order to understand with precision, by comparison or imitation -and in Baschet's case by creation and rupture -why our present has become what it is and why it maintains a troubled relationship with the Middle Ages in particular. This is a relationship that the late Otto Gerhard Oexle described as a cleft or a split. More recently, a collection of essays has attempted to move beyond the simple justification of studying the Middle Ages by way of underlining their relationship to the present.

Here the period is understood as the 'object' of scientific scrutiny. These scholars have tried to rehabilitate the Middle Ages' epistemological and heuristic status as an indispensable link in a long-term social dynamic in the West, one which cannot be ignored if we want to understand the latter's development. This allows us to speak of the study of this period in terms of real 'necessity'. In the course of a long-term development that unfolds from the fifth to the eighteenth century, the relationships between individuals, family/kin, space, and religion were fundamentally restructured in comparison with what preceded and what followed. In this sense the authors of this collective work respond to the question of 'why study the Middle Ages' not primarily by exploring 'how' (practices, writing, sources, etc.) or with a 'because' answer. Rather, they claim, and wholeheartedly embrace, the idea that 'medieval history' should have the status of an Historical Science. Its practice can tell us much about the relationship between History and the Social Sciences, between past and present, and about the fundamental structural elements of a complex human society. On the basis of this approach, the term 'Middle Ages' can be replaced by 'medieval society'.

If one wanted to summarize a 'French' voice — if such a thing even exists (and it has to legitimize itself by way of comparison with other historiographical traditions in Europe) — in a debate that seeks to elucidate the reasons one might put forward in order to argue in favour of the legitimacy and necessity of the study of the Middle Ages, we might identify a set of characteristics. Since this chapter seeks to retain the experimental nature that underlies the entire present volume, I will briefly discuss these reasons in an approach that combines critique and comparison.

Some Suggestions

These characteristics notably include:

1. the persistent but nevertheless not always accepted recognition that we still do not really know how to work in a comparative way, that is between countries, periods, etc.,
2. the belief that history remains an entity that consists of a chronological unit, of a fixed set of concepts, and tools,
3. the precocious integration, by the Annales School, of anthropological and sociological issues (analysing and understanding 'the social' by all available methods, in other words: treating the Middle Ages as a 'laboratory'),
4. the status of historical science (including the medieval period), which is secured through the structures that ensure the training of elites for the (French) Republic and which, in turn, stress the study of history as a project of national identity and as an instrument of democratic acculturation, and

5. the general integration of History as a discipline and as a general way of thinking in an ideological field that can be characterized as progressive rather than conservative.

This leads, to put it briefly, to an interpretation of the long-term process that some have chosen to call 'European exceptionalism' or 'divergence' as the original model. It would thus constitute a non-replicable and nonreproducible model of the organization of parental, spatial, and economic links in the service of a specific social and cultural constellation that was, from an anthropological perspective, based on domination over people and land. The links in question would include the types of resource use, remunerated labour, levies on a free but controlled peasantry, household autonomy, urbanization, organization of the monotheist sacred in the dimension of space, monetization of the economy without monetarization of economic decision-making, articulation of body and spirit based on a specific relationship between culture and nature, and the historicization of time.

'De-medievalizing' the Problem

In order to answer the question of whether a historical science devoted to the Middle Ages is relevant we should avoid arguing on a purely ontological level, even if this dimension can still play a role, by affirming that 'the study of the Middle Ages is essential because the Middle Ages exist'. Nor can the answer be teleological; Marc Bloch would have spoken of the "idol of origins", meaning either a period for which one feels nostalgia for a lost time or an era from which Europe did well to free itself though rejection. Finally, we cannot rely exclusively on the argument that studying the Middle Ages contributes to a better understanding of our own present and its phenomena of stratification, its relationship to the religious, or its specific construction of politics and identity. After all, one suspects it is not so much the content of each of these positions that is important today, but rather their combination, their public and academic implications, and their integration into a scientific project that is conscious of the triple specificity and the triple historicity of its objects, its methodology, and its subjects. This project must be attentive to the profound changes that affect the study of history and that arise from the questions that historians choose to ask, but also to history's uses, its techniques (notably the widespread electronic access to sources and the online publication of research results), and its public. For there exist multiple 'Middle Ages', not only in the sense of an historiography, of a period, of a professional discipline, of a specific critical methodology that governs the handling and interpretation of the sources, and of a narrative, but also in the sense of concepts, of a teaching method, and of the uses of the past. These plural, parallel, and competing definitions, carry within themselves one or more contradictions whose very unmasking is actually part and parcel of the definition of the subject and therefore its legitimacy. Politicians and the media, to the contrary, would rather that we seek the best ways to essentialize history and to arrange it in a streamlined narrative.

How should we react to these multiple and ideologically motivated expectations? On a very first level, our argument should be based on the assumption that historical knowledge is indivisible (if not unique). Otherwise, we risk reviving internal divisions between the different periods and the academics who represent them, and thereby elevating the importance of one period over another. If we take the initial assertion seriously, it will inevitably lead to the conviction that medievalists possess a wide and open field of enquiry that they can cultivate at the crossroads of Anthropology, the Humanities, and Social Sciences, while their work remains organized around the fundamental need to understand the social production of change in a given period. In order to plead in favour of the relevance of the Middle Ages, a second argument might be added, which fundamentally relies on the unity of the problems that are raised by the observation of history or asked by historians. This unity exists no matter what the individual research question is, whether we work on the history of women, of the individual, of power, of coercion, of rituals, and so on. In all these cases, serious

research can never focus exclusively on the Middle Ages, yet it cannot afford to ignore the period either!

Once this preliminary framework is established, the problem of the relevance of medieval studies encourages us to revisit the question of what we might call 'secondary' characteristics of the period. Which elements make the Middle Ages specific and unique, so that the period can neither be merged with another nor exchanged with it, whether that other is its predecessor or successor? In addition, we might ask which mental and structural patterns were characteristic of the Middle Ages and its organization of the social field.

Changing the Vocabulary

Asking these questions and discussing the answers can have two results. Firstly, it might lead us to rename the 'Middle Ages'. Rather, we might start to talk about 'medieval society', as, for example, Joseph Morsel has proposed. Morsel systematically argues for a label that invites attention to a double orientation, temporal and social. Secondly, we might begin to realize that what we collectively refer to as the 'Middle Ages' represents nothing more (but also nothing less) than the only period in history that is complete, (more or less clearly) delimited, and documented, and which enables us to observe the beginning and the end of a unique and original social process. This process is characterized by specific parameters that involve the place of religious institutions, the mode of production and work, and the organization of political powers, to name but the most obvious. Thus, the real question is, whether the Middle Ages are 'relevant' because of the specific way in which medievalists analyse medieval society —and because of the relationship between this approach to (or its integration into) a broader practice of understanding change that emanates from the Social Sciences.

In other words, if the 'house of the Middle Ages' is on fire and medievalists are 'firefighters' who may either save it or bury its remains, the cause of the flames themselves lies in reasons that far surpass any intrinsic quality ascribed to the period. Instead, their true origins concern our more general relationship to the past: they include the social demands which confront historians in the twenty-first century, demands that differ from those that faced their nineteenth-century counterparts at a time when History was first constituted as an academic and scientific discipline. The status of the humanities —and more broadly, of the intellectual —has changed in a society that has become addicted to the instant and to technology. Finally, global systems of values and representations have changed.

A Central Question: What do we Lose and What do we Gain?

In view of all of these points, the relevance of the Middle Ages must be reconsidered not despite but because of these new factors and the environment they create. That relevance must be rethought as part of an intellectual exercise and therefore of an activity that wholeheartedly acknowledges its ideological character. In fact, from this perspective, nothing could be worse than a renewal of scholarly demand for autonomy and learned isolation. The meaning of this exercise is not at its core attached to a chronology composed of dates (for example 410—1492, from the 'fall' of Rome to the 'discovery' of America). Instead, it is rather generated by the questions it brings forth and by the problems it focusses on. The questions concern a subject that occupies a specific place in space and time and whose development was characterized by accidents. This latter should be underlined against all attempts to create erroneous continuities and teleological interpretations. The problems cannot be boiled down to the deadly triptych of 'altérité, identité, européanité' —alterity, identity, and 'Europeanness'. From this perspective the real focus of our reflections about the relevance of the Middle Ages should lie in considering the question of the added scientific value of medieval studies in relation to other historical and social projects: What do we lose and what do we gain if we either ignore or try to understand ten to fifteen centuries of history? How do the processes of identification and separation between the Middle Ages and ourselves play out today? How can we

argue for the usefulness and relevance of the Middle Ages without falling into the tyranny of a utilitarian discourse that unconsciously condemns medievalists to navigate exclusively between the poles of continuity and alterity?

On the whole, there is obviously no inherent or overarching obligation to study the Middle Ages. The only exception to that statement might be professional medievalists themselves, who do have an immediate (and very material) interest in saving either jobs that are threatened by budget-cuts or certain budgetary elements in specific contexts and institutions. Today, medievalists are in fact confronted with criticism or at least with questions that are addressed to their community as a whole and that concern their subject of study. The very existence of this criticism and of these questions should be reason enough to pause and to listen — we should neither challenge nor dismiss the concerns raised and the underlying motivations connected with them out of hand. Instead, our real concern should be to try and find, together, the reasons why the observation of a world that has disappeared furnishes helpful 'food for thought' in our present. We should work this out in cooperation, while practising history as a Social Science and as a Cultural Science. The world of the Middle Ages has all but disappeared entirely. Yet the period actually imposes itself on us because it represents at least ten centuries of spatial and social transformation that spans an entire continent. And it furnishes 'food for thought' because it strengthens our sense of history, our sense of democracy, our understanding of society, which is inevitably multiple and complex in nature. But all of this is only true as long we continue to approach the Middle Ages as an historical science that is conscious of the repoliticization of history, of its imperative for self-reflection, of the common interests it shares with other disciplines and of approaches to the perception of time and change.

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A COMPANION TO THE GLOBAL EARLY MIDDLE AGES by Erik Hermans [Arc Companions, ARC Humanities Press, 9781942401759, e-ISBN: 9781942401766]

This companion introduces the connections between early medieval societies that have previously been studied in isolation. By bringing together nineteen experts on different regions across the globe, from Oceania to Europe and beyond, it transcends conventional disciplinary boundaries and synthesizes parallel historiographical narratives. The period 600-900 CE witnessed important historical developments, such as the establishment of a Southeast Asian thalassocracy by the Shailendra dynasty and the expansion of the Frankish polity under Charlemagne on the far ends of Eurasia and the consolidation of the Abbasid and Tang empires in between. A Companion to the Global Early Middle Ages integrates these contemporaneous processes and presents new insights into a neglected phase of world history.

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Excerpt: Local experiences of human beings have always been influenced by large-scale processes. In pre- modern societies, the ripple effects of distant events were in general not as immediate and clearly palpable as in today's world, but they were no less present. This companion aims to lay bare the extent to which societies across the globe were connected during one phase of the pre- modern era: the Early Middle Ages, which are defined here as approximately the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries. This period witnessed important historical developments, such as the establishment of the Srivijaya, a Southeast Asian thalassocracy; the expansion of the Frankish polity under Charlemagne on the far ends of Afro- Eurasia; and the consolidation of the 'Abbāsid and Tang empires in between. Historical developments such as those have not yet been integrated into a global perspective. In some cases, the historical record has left clear evidence of long-distance connectivity, such as Persian artefacts stored in an imperial storehouse in Japan during the eighth century or coins from the 'Abbāsid caliphate found in northern Europe and East Africa. However, structural connectivity across different regions is often not immediately visible and has to be deduced from a deep understanding of multiple societies. The purpose of this companion is therefore first and foremost to expand the knowledge of anyone interested in the history of the period in question. While most professional historians have expertise in the history of one or a few regions of the globe, the following nineteen chapters provide a panorama of the early medieval world from the Pacific Islands via the major regions of Afro- Eurasia to Mesoamerica. The individual chapters aim thus to satisfy the curiosity of early medieval historians who want to know more about regions that influence the ones that they specialize in. The panorama of all chapters taken together, moreover, aims to contribute to a more inclusive narrative of early medieval history.

Macrohistorical Narratives

Every narrative of the past is shaped in part by the experiences of its historiographers. The interest in a global context of historical developments, the so- called "global turn" that many historiographical fields have experienced in recent decades, is an example of this phenomenon, since the latest generations of historians grew up in a world where global connectivity permeates their everyday lives more so than ever before. This companion is no exception to that rule, and if the editor had lived half a century earlier, he might not have conceived of a global panorama of early medieval history. This work is thus part of the ongoing global turn of medieval studies, which is itself a historically conditioned phenomenon. However, aside from these accidental circumstances, there is also a deeply held theoretical stance: the premise that macrohistorical narratives matter. This premise does not oppose or contradict the micronarratives that abound in medieval scholarship today. Rather, it aims to complement and integrate them.

For scholars of the Early Middle Ages, the local context of historical individuals is arguably the most important one. The vast majority of people living in this period, including members of the educated elite, were either bound by or gave meaning to their lives inside local or regional contexts. Let us

take an example from the best studied region of the globe: western Europe. The ninth-century monk Hrabanus Maurus cared about fellow monks in other monasteries in northwestern Europe and about the civilizational sphere where Latin literature and Christianity played an important role.

Contemporaneous events in distant places like Tang China were both unknown and seemingly irrelevant to him. To be able to understand someone like Hrabanus well, modern historians have focused mostly on his immediate context: where he lived and travelled to, the monastery where he wrote, whom he was in touch with, what texts he had read, which of the debates circulating in Latin Christendom interested him, etc. However, as historians, we also have the option to take a bird's-eye view and look at the larger processes that may have indirectly affected the life and work of this monk. Such an approach reveals a plethora of processes which are all correlated: our monk lived and worked in a climate of cultural efflorescence; the underpinning of this efflorescence was the monetary wealth and economic activity of the Carolingian realm, which had increased since the middle of the eighth century; that economic intensification partly depended on a demographic upswing, which was itself dependent on the fact that epidemic outbreaks of the bubonic plague subsided in the middle of the eighth century for the first time since the sixth century (see Chapter 18); Carolingian economic activity was also dependent on trade with the caliphate (see Chapter 14), the economy of which had started to flourish in the middle of the eighth century as well; Finally, one of the factors behind the economic upswing of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate was trade with Tang China (see Chapter 16). Albeit very indirectly, large-scale processes in a faraway place like Tang China thus influenced the historical conditions in which a Carolingian monk lived and worked. Moreover, a global approach can also put historical evidence in different perspective. For example, a historian who contrasts the production of culture by ninth-century Carolingian monks with the scarcity of sources from previous centuries in western Europe observes an astounding intensification of intellectual output. On the other hand, a historian who compares the Carolingian world with the wealth of sources from the contemporaneous manuscript cultures of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate and Tang China realizes that most of the intellectual output of this period actually did not take place in western Europe. In short, macrohistorical narratives provide a frame of reference in which the relative significance of micronarratives can be ascertained.

Macrohistorical narratives are not merely a product of the current global turn in historical studies. Already Enlightenment historians developed notions that can be seen as antecedents to such narratives. In the twentieth century, scholars like Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee developed philosophical models to which they adapted their own macrohistorical narratives. From the 1960s onwards, a more objective approach of historical narratives that encompass the whole globe was developed, which became known as the discipline of world history. In the past several decades similar fields have emerged under the names of global history, transnational history, connected history, entangled history, comparative history, big history, and others. The exact methodologies of these new fields have not been fully crystallized. The chapters of this companion do not claim to follow any of these fields-in-particular. What unites them is an exploration of macrohistorical contexts of regions across the globe. For the purposes of this companion, that exploration will be referred to with the umbrella term "global history," without implying any specific methodology.

Eurocentrism

Modern historiography oscillates. The global turn that historical disciplines have experienced in recent decades started partly as a response to the local turn in which individual and local sources were considered to be the only knowable subjects in history. The local turn itself was a response to the metanarratives of history that had prevailed since the nineteenth century. These metanarratives assumed that Europe was the standard of all historical development and historians that followed these narratives viewed all regions of the globe through the prism of analytical standards that were derived from European history. The appreciation of macrohistorical narratives throughout this

companion does not in any way imply that the authors or the editor try to oscillate back to such Eurocentric metanarratives. On the contrary, the ultimate aim of this work is to create a narrative of the early medieval globe that integrates the knowledge of those who have received a traditional training of “European” medieval history and those who specialize in one of the “non- Western areas” of the world.

Nevertheless, in the attempt to transcend a Eurocentric approach lies an inevitable shortcoming. The following nineteen chapters are written by nineteen different scholars who were each educated in an academic world where institutional boundaries have not caught up with intellectual debates. While Eurocentrism has been condemned for at least half a century, academic degrees, departments, conferences, and journals still follow the boundaries as they were set in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While not all those boundaries are hindrances to open historical debates, many of them are. The division of the globe into different “areas,” for example, is often more related to twentieth- century agendas than historical realities. Similarly, the only periodization that is commonly known across disciplines and institutions is the tripartite one of ancient– medieval– modern. Yet for the history of Tibet, for instance, the whole notion of Middle Ages is meaningless. However, as misleading or outdated as some terminology might be, making newly introduced terms widely accepted is hard, if not impossible. The editor of this companion has chosen not to fight that battle. Instead, “European” categories of time and space are adopted throughout this book, including the title of the companion itself. In some cases, such as the title of Chapter 9, a more neutral designation of a certain regions is used: “West Asia” instead of “the Middle East.” Nevertheless, dividing the Afro- Eurasian land mass into discrete, and conventionally modern, territories runs the risk of reifying modern constructs and may seem to suggest a series of parallel worlds which coexist but are not really connected. However, the semantics of the conventional terms are not strictly followed: after introducing the reader to rudimentary knowledge that has been accumulated within a conventional “area study,” all the chapters take the reader to aspects and themes that do not fit the mould of Eurocentric narratives. If even only one reader feels inspired to devise better geographic and chronological categories for this period of history, then this companion will have been a useful catalyst.

Chronology

Any chronological division of the past is inherently a flawed construct imposed on a continuous course of events. However, looking at the globe from the perspective of human connectivity, the most compelling chronological boundaries of the early medieval period are probably the eruption of the Ilopango volcano in Mesoamerica in 536 CE (see Chapter 18) and the landing of Norse Vikings in Newfoundland around the year 1000 CE. 10 The former event had long- term climatic ripple effects across Afro- Eurasia and thus had an indirect but fundamental influence on the history of large parts of the early medieval globe. The latter event is the first instance of archaeologically attested human contact between the continents of the eastern and western hemisphere since the Palaeolithic era. 11 However, the danger of covering 500 years of global history in one companion is that the scholarly analyses become thin and superficial, especially for regions with much historical evidence. Therefore, this companion focuses on a core period of 300 years, from 600 to 900 CE, with some chapters (such as Chapters 4 and 18) venturing into the sixth and tenth centuries. The seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries have been chosen as a core period due to a substantive reason and due to a practical reason. This period roughly coincides with two relatively cohesive phases in the political history of the two largest polities of that world at that time: the Chinese empire (Tang dynasty, 618– 904 CE; see Chapter 7) and the caliphate (from the Arab conquests in the seventh century to the political disintegration in the second half of the ninth century; see Chapter 10). The practical reason is the fact that this companion has grown out of a symposium that discussed the global history of the eighth century.

The fact that the Early Middle Ages are approached as a phase in global history does not imply that all societies around the world were either united or characterized by distinctively early medieval patterns or phenomena. ¹² There definitely were regional patterns and large cultural zones that only become clear if one adopts a global perspective, such as the cultural sphere of Sinitic and Confucian traditions stretching from Southeast Asia to Japan (see Chapters 3 , 5 , 6 , 7 , and 8), or the simultaneous end of the Justinianic Plague in western Eurasia in the middle of the eighth century and the subsequent demographic upswing and political consolidation in the Frankish, Byzantine, and Caliphal polities (see Chapter 18). One can also list superlatives of human achievements that date from this period, such as the largest wooden structure ever built (the Tōdaiji in Japan) or the largest Buddhist temple ever constructed (Borobudur in modern Indonesia). However, the wider the spatial reach of one's historical inquiry becomes, the harder any meaningful generalizations become. Like in all other eras after the Neolithic Revolution, some parts of the world contained sedentary and complex societies, while others were inhabited by nomads or hunter- gatherers. The disparity of societal complexity was as large as it could be across the early medieval globe: while the Chinese civilization had already been stratified, institutionalized, and literate for so long that its educated elite could draw on millennium- old intellectual tradition, some islands of the Pacific Ocean were settled by humans for the first time in the tenth century. Europe, India, and Japan were part an interconnected web of trade, migration, and diseases, but these regions did not follow a similar pattern during the early medieval centuries. Demographic patterns in Japan, for example, are in many ways opposite to those in Europe in this period. Similarly, while much of political history can be summarized as an oscillation between imperial conquest and integration on the one hand and fragmentation and disintegration on the other, all pre- modern centuries are characterized by the fact that there was not one polity or civilization that conquered or influence the whole globe. As a result, during the seventh century, West Asia experienced a period of imperial integration and expansion under the new caliphate, while Europe and India experienced a period of fragmentation. In other words, these examples show that the notion of global Early Middle Ages does not fit the mould of a particular phase in the grand sweep of human history since there is not one specifically early medieval cultural, political, or socio- economic pattern that applies to all regions of the globe. Nevertheless, such disparity and pluriformity did not prevent human communities from being connected over long distances. The one phenomenon that thus did take nearly global proportions was connectivity.

Connectivity

Connectivity is a fluid concept, and the level of integration of different human communities can vary greatly. In discussions of the globalization of today's world, the notions of connectivity and integration are widely used. In those contexts, two factors are often seen as important indicators of connectivity that are actually irrelevant for the Early Middle Ages, as they are for the whole pre- modern era. The first factor is global awareness. Although some early medieval merchants, travellers and members of the intelligentsia had some knowledge about neighbouring societies, hardly anyone had more than legendary knowledge of far- flung regions, and nobody had knowledge of the geography and civilizations of the entire globe (see Chapter 19). This was a result of the second irrelevant factor: the distant places visited by individual humans. In the modern world, the more people travel between, say, China and western Europe, the more these places are seen to be connected. In the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries, few people travelled such long distances. Instead, most long- distance exchange happened through local or regional trade circuits, which linked up with adjacent circuits (see Chapter 16). If many regional trade circuits are connected to each other, then an exchange network emerges in which objects travel much farther than people.

There needs to be more than a sporadic attestation of objects from a distant region to be able to speak of connectivity. For example, a single find of cloves originating in the Maluku Island of eastern

Indonesia found in a house in Mesopotamia from 1700 BCE does not constitute enough evidence to assert that these two places were truly integrated with each other or that there was pan- Eurasian connectivity in that period. From the early medieval period, however, there is abundant evidence for such long- distance connectivity (see Chapter 16). The countless regional trade circuits all taken together created a network of exchange of truly global proportions, ultimately connecting the large empires in the centre of Afro-Eurasia with western European monasteries, oases on the southern edge of the Sahara, harbours on the Swahili coast of East Africa, nomadic communities in the Central Asia steppes, local kingdoms on the Indian subcontinent, polities on the Malay and the Korean peninsulas, and merchants from the Indonesian and Japanese archipelagos. While the origins of this vast network of exchange were commercial, it also facilitated the exchange of soldiers, of diplomats, missionaries, intellectuals, and the texts and ideas that they brought, and, finally, of germs. The Justinianic Plague, which emerged in the sixth century and did not truly subside for two centuries afterward, was able to affect people from East Africa to eastern Europe and beyond because the early medieval world was so connected (see Chapter 18).

Early medieval connectivity also had its limits. While the Afro-Eurasian network of exchange included areas as far apart as the Sahel in West Africa and the Mataram of Central Java, it did not extend beyond them. The most important regions that had already been inhabited by humans for centuries or even millennia, but which were excluded from the global exchange of this period were large parts of Oceania, central and southern Africa, and northern Siberia. That exclusion did not entail a sudden end of trade routes. Connectivity is a gradual process, and a trade network does not end abruptly. Compared to, for example, Baghdad, oasis settlements like Agadem (in modern Niger) were plugged into global trade only to a limited extent, via the trans- Saharan trade routes and the Mediterranean hinterland. The routes that connected West Africa with the wider world of Afro-Eurasia did not go further south than Agadem. At least, there is no archaeological evidence for regular interactions with communities to the south (see Chapter 13). Absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence, especially when parts of Central Africa, such as the Central African Republic, are largely terra incognita for archaeologists. But it is unlikely that future research will unearth not just sporadic finds but enough evidence to be able to speak of connectivity. The same is true for interactions with communities north of the central Eurasian steppes and south and east of the Indonesian archipelago.

The primary explanation for the limits of long- distance connectivity is probably a combination of geography and human demand. Crossing the Siberian tundras, the central African mountainous jungle, or the Timor Sea towards Australia was difficult and dangerous. Merchants and travellers needed a specific reason to regularly make such journeys, like the West African gold that drew them to cross the Sahara. Apparently, such reasons did not exist for central and southern Africa. The lack of (knowledge of) valuable resources and products was probably compounded by a third factor: relative underpopulation of the distant regions in question, which entailed a more limited production of goods and knowledge and thus fewer pull factors that might attract foreign merchants. Finally, technological difficulties for transporting people across difficult terrains and waters must also have been a contributing factor. Such difficulties are particularly clear for maritime connections on the West Africa coast, which are remarkably absent in early medieval and other pre-modern centuries— a stark contrast with the vibrant communities on the East African coast (see Chapter 1). Only in the fifteenth century, with the Iberian innovations in naval technology, did it become possible to regularly navigate the strong currents on the West African coast and to integrate its hinterland into a global trading network.

Not merely the West African coast but the whole Atlantic Ocean forms the largest limitation of global connections in the Early Middle Ages. There is no evidence that any human crossed this ocean in this period, and the Atlantic coasts of Europe, Africa, South America, and North America were

not integrated into any global network. The continents of eastern and western hemispheres were thus not connected. However, although the climatic ripple effects of the volcanic eruption of the Ilopango in Mesoamerica did not follow the pathways of human trade networks, they did influence the course of history across Afro- Eurasia to some extent and thus constitute a form of hemispheric integration. Finally, the Americas as a continent, from Alaska in the north to the Magallanes of modern Chile in the south, did not develop the same kind of long- distance connectivity as Afro- Eurasia between the sixth and the tenth centuries. The trade network of the Mayas did span large parts of Mesoamerica, as did less complex societies in North and South America on a smaller scale, but these networks never added up to a pan- American web of early medieval exchange.

Global History vs Globalization

It is tempting to see all of human history since the last Ice Age as a slow process of macro- social integration in which humans and their communities have become increasingly connected over the course of 10,000 years. If one looks at intervals of millennia, such a process seems to emerge from archaeological and historical records, but when the intervals are narrowed to centuries, this approach turns out to be problematic. The Afro-Eurasian world of the ninth century was definitely less integrated than it would be in the thirteenth century after the Mongol conquests, and it also was more integrated than around the year 600 CE. However, it is difficult to argue that Afro- Eurasia was more integrated by the year 600 than by the year 100 CE. More importantly, looking at global history as a slow process of integration and connectivity makes it tempting to see every epoch in history as part of the process of globalization. Herein lies the danger of a modernocentric bias by overemphasizing the exceptional instances of imperial integration and long- distance exchange in the pre- modern centuries, when local and regional connections were actually much more pervasive. While this companion can be grouped together with other works on pre- modern global history, it is not another history of globalization. The synchronic connections that the following chapters will elucidate do not imply that they are yet another chain in the linear process that ultimately leads to the globalized world of the twentieth and twenty- first centuries. As Jürgen Osterhammel has argued, it makes sense to talk about globalization only after all three main oceans of the world were integrated into one trading network, a convenient starting date for which would be the year 1571, when Manila was founded as a Spanish entrepôt. During the Early Middle Ages, only the Indian Ocean had already been integrated into a wider trading network for several millennia. The Pacific Ocean was probably crossed for the first time in the ninth century, and the Atlantic was not crossed at all: both oceans were thus effectively excluded from any process of global integration. In short, this companion aims to reveal the web of connections across the globe during the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries, but it does not support the teleological retrojection of globalization.

Organization of Chapters

The areas of the globe that the following nineteen chapters discuss reflect the historical connectivity of the early medieval world. Regions that are excluded are those that were hardly or not at all plugged into global networks of exchange: central and southern Africa, northern Siberia, Australia, North America, and South America. The first fifteen chapters each discuss a region that was in one way or another connected to such networks. Starting from East Africa, these chapters take the reader around the globe eastward via Southeast Asia to Japan and then westward via Inner Asia to the Sahara and western Europe. Although the oceanic world was not connected on a regular basis with Southeast Asia and thus to the Afro- Eurasian world, Chapter 4 discusses the various archipelagos of Oceania, since it not only provides a panorama of connectivity between communities that are scattered across far-flung islands but it also includes the first instance of interaction between Eastern Polynesia and South America. Finally, Mesoamerica is the only region from the Americas to which a chapter is devoted since the Mayas created the largest regional network in that continent and since the eruption of the Ilopango in modern Mexico is the only connection of the

early medieval Americas with Afro- Eurasia. The final four chapters incorporate material from all previous chapters and provide integrated and thematic investigations that transcend any particular region.

Complex, sedentary societies with social stratification and written traditions receive more attention than non- sedentary societies: only the chapters on Oceania (Chapter 4) and Inner Asia (Chapter 9) discuss nomadic communities in detail. Each chapter discusses the region in question over a period of approximately 300 years, but within that framework the authors have made certain selections. Since this companion has grown out of a symposium on the global eighth century, some scholars have chosen to focus on that century; others have made different selections based on case studies that represent this period best. Similarly, within the regions that each chapter discusses certain selections have been made. As a result, some parts of the world receive little attention, such as northern Europe, the Iberian Peninsula, the southern littoral of the Mediterranean, and the Gangetic plain in northern India. However, despite such lacunae, all the chapters give an extensive overview of the regions in question. Each chapter is written with two aims in mind: to introduce non-specialist readers to the most important developments of the region in question and to provide an overview of the current state of scholarly research. For some regions, like western Europe or China, these overviews provide new approaches to earlier synopses. The chapters on East Africa (Chapter 1) and Oceania (Chapter 4), however, include the first syntheses that have ever been written of the archaeological research on the early medieval period of these regions.

Any overview of global history inherently invites the reader to connect and to compare different phenomena and cultures. While this companion does both, the explicit emphasis is on connectivity. Similarities between the power struggles of the aristocracies in Silla Korea and in the 'Abbāsid caliphate, for example, can be drawn after reading Chapters 6 and 10, but they are not discussed in the text. Both chapters do discuss the connections that the Silla state and the caliphate had with other cultures and how those connections shaped their own polity and culture. In doing so, all the chapters of this companion aim first to inspire medievalists to look beyond their own intellectual horizons. More importantly, they also aim to demonstrate to anyone interested in pre- modern history that the early medieval phase of nearly every region of the world was part of a web of human connections that had global proportions.

Intellectual Connectivity by Erik Hermans

The historical panorama of the this volume demonstrates that all the regions of the early medieval globe were connected through trade, diplomacy, and war. Although they were not aware of this, merchants, diplomats, and soldiers interacted with each other in a framework that was partly influenced by the global processes of climate change and trade cycles. One aspect of human societies that has not come to the fore in the previous discussions of these processes is the history of intellectual discourse; and with good reason. At first glance, the texts and ideas of the educated elites are hardly the tissue that connected distant societies. Nevertheless, although they pale in comparison to the exchange of material goods, there were instances of the transmission of higher learning across cultural and linguistic boundaries. I will therefore complete this companion's exploration of early medieval connectivity by briefly presenting these remarkable cases of intellectual exchange. Before I do so, however, I will explain why higher learning did not diffuse as widely as material goods.

The Limited Diffusion of Higher Learning

In the early medieval period, like in any other period of human history, ideas travelled wherever people travelled. Since there were very few places of the globe that had not yet been settled by humans by the seventh century, it is fair to say that the early medieval dissemination of ideas was a global phenomenon. The same is true to a lesser extent for intellectual discourse, which is here

broadly defined as a discourse of ideas that transcended immediate practical needs, such as for economic, administrative, or liturgical purposes. No clear-cut separation between different types of human knowledge exists, but they can all be placed on a spectrum that runs from the intuitive and practitioner's knowledge via technological knowledge to scientific and higher-order knowledge. I Here, I focus on the latter end of that spectrum. This chapter therefore does not include technological treatises and ideas, but it does discuss medical texts, since those were more closely related to philosophical debates in this period.

Intellectual discussions occur in every human community, including illiterate or nomadic ones. In the early medieval world, tribal societies in regions like Oceania, sub-Saharan Africa, or North America must have known some kind of intellectual discourse, in particular as part of literary oral traditions. However, intellectual debates tend to be more elaborate and institutionalized in complex, sedentary societies that have written traditions and educated elites. Between the sixth and the ninth centuries, such societies were located in Mesoamerica and in a geographical area that runs across Afro-Eurasia: between the Sahara Desert and Scandinavia at the western end, through Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent in the middle, and to the Japanese and Indonesian archipelagos at the eastern end. It is this latter region that contained centres of political or religious power where intellectual discourse was so elaborate that we can call them actual centres of learning. Moreover, as opposed to Mesoamerica, we are able to study some of the knowledge that Afro-Eurasian polities produced, because it has been transmitted to the modern era through manuscript copies in subsequent centuries.

As in other historical epochs, the most distinct differences between early medieval civilizations are not socio-economic or political in nature. Phenomena such as social stratification, the power struggle between elites, armies, and ruling families or the mercantile practices at urban markets, for instance, all show large degrees of similarities between Silla Korea, Carolingian Europe, Tang China, the 'Abbāsid caliphate, and other societies. While environmental and other exogenous factors may cause different social patterns to prevail across space and time, the most fundamental differences between groups of humans are found in the diachronic transmission of culture. Especially in the cultural and intellectual production of educated elites—traditionally known under the normative terms “high culture” or “higher learning”—are the most distinct attainments of a civilization to be found. Since higher learning is so tied to particular traditions, it is not readily transferrable across cultural boundaries. Generally speaking, there needs to be a conscious interest in another civilization for such knowledge to be imported across cultural and linguistic boundaries. Yet there were very few authors in the period 600–900 CE who had an objective interest in foreign civilizations. If any of the surviving historiographers describe distant cultures, they only do so whenever it is relevant to their own. The Early Middle Ages did not bring forth someone like the thirteenth-century Rashīd al-Dīn, who encompassed much of Afro-Eurasia in his writings, nor any equivalent of modern scholars who learn a foreign language out of ethnographic interests. As a result, even most members of the educated elite had only hazy conceptions of distant cultures. There never was anything that amounted to global awareness.

In short, the kind of demand that existed across the early medieval world for the import of material goods and commodities from distant civilizations did not exist for the import of learned texts and ideas. In early medieval Baghdad, there were, to put it simply, Chinese ceramic jars but no Chinese poems. Moreover, there currently are hardly any studies that discuss the intellectual history of the Early Middle Ages—or of any other pre-modern period—from a global point of view. A new field of global intellectual history has emerged in recent years, but most of its inquiries focus on the globalization of knowledge during the past few hundred years. Yet there are definitely traces of the global exchange of higher learning in the early medieval period as well.

Religious Epistemic Networks

Early medieval texts were never produced in a vacuum but always in so-called epistemic networks. Intellectuals in such networks normally shared a similar education that was based on traditional canons of knowledge, and they generally communicated with each other in the same lingua franca. One could say that these epistemic networks are what defines a civilization, and, as such, they transcend political boundaries and defy strict geographical demarcation. Yet if one adopts the bird's-eye view of a global historian, then the largest epistemic networks that are discernable in Afro-Eurasia are the ecumenes of world religions, in particular Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. Due to the scriptural nature of these religions, there was always a certain level of intellectual connectivity within these ecumenes, since foundational texts of the religions in question circulated widely and were often studied and commented upon in the same language. The Analects and other texts of Confucius were studied in Chinese, the Sutras of Buddha in Sanskrit, the Qur'ān and the Hadith of Muhammad in Arabic and the Gospels of Jesus in Syriac, Greek, and Latin among other languages. By the seventh century, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity had already had a wide geographic spread for centuries, and they were still expanding. For example, Confucianism and Buddhism took root in Japan, while Nestorian Christians spread into China. Islam, on the other hand, witnessed both its genesis and its largest expansion between the seventh and ninth centuries. By the year 900, scholars of the Qur'ān could be found in cities as far apart as Cordoba and Kabul, which made the Islamic ecumene not less impressive than the Buddhist one, which stretched from Afghanistan to Java and Japan or the Christian one between China and Ireland.

The intellectual connectivity within these global epistemic networks also transcended linguistic boundaries. In Islam, the connection with the holy language of Arabic is strongest, and hence the presence of Islamic learning almost always entailed the presence of knowledge of Arabic. In Christianity, the association with a holy language has always been least uniform, and the early medieval Christian ecumene was therefore polyglottic, with different communities using different liturgical languages, including Latin, Greek, Armenian, Syriac, Coptic, and Ethiopic. Buddhist texts had been translated from Sanskrit into Chinese since ancient times, and this process continued into the eighth century, when they were translated into Tibetan. However, as the journey of Xuanzang and subsequent Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese scholars to the Sanskrit university of Nalanda in northern India indicate, the desire to go back to the original source language of Buddhist texts remained present. Furthermore, the circulation of texts within these ecumenes could be impressive. One Buddhist monk, Genbō (d. 746), is said to have brought 5,000 manuscripts with him from China to Japan. While that number may be an exaggeration, the surviving book catalogues from the ninth and tenth centuries do give testament to the incredible amount of imported texts available in early medieval Japan.

Early medieval Eurasia can, in short, be considered an intellectual continuum due to the extensive diffusion of religious scholars within the largest religious ecumenes. Nevertheless, as remarkable as the circulation of a Buddhist knowledge between Nalanda and Nara or the simultaneous study of the Book of Psalms in Chang'an and Iona in Scotland is, this kind of connectivity is strictly speaking not cross-cultural. It is even more noteworthy when knowledge that was produced by the literate elite of one epistemic network reached the intelligentsia of another. Such instances were much rarer, but they did occur. For that we have to look at knowledge that was not religious in nature. Although the majority of texts that survive from the early medieval world contain or discuss religious scriptures, the history of early medieval learning is not identical to the history of early medieval religions. Sometimes the intellectual climate in religious institutions such as monasteries allowed for the production of knowledge that transcended the immediate needs of interpreting scriptures and organizing ceremonies and rituals for worship. Some secular histories written by ecclesiastical authors in Byzantium are an example of this. The production of "secular" knowledge could also emerge under favourable circumstances of political institutions. The centres of power in complex

societies were often also centres of learning, such as the itinerant courts of the Carolingian kings and Japanese emperors, or those in the cities of Constantinople, Baghdad, and Chang'an. Courts, chanceries, and other bureaucratic institutions often facilitated the education of officials to fulfill the state's administrative needs, such as the large group secretaries (*kuttāb*) in 'Abbāsīd Baghdad. These institutional impulses gave rise to an educated elite who would then also produce texts on their own accord. "Urban" elites produced most of belletristic and scientific texts of this period, sometimes sponsored by political leaders who used the patronage of higher learning as a form of legitimization. The two largest polities, the Tang empire and the 'Abbāsīd caliphate, produced the largest amount of knowledge and texts. Among the various scriptoria and libraries of Chang'an was the Institute for the Advancement of Literature (Chinese: *hongwenguan*), which is said to have included more than 200,000 manuscript scrolls in the seventh century. 'Abbāsīd bibliomania is illustrated well by anecdotes that were deemed to be credible by contemporaries, such as the one about the historian al-Waqīdī, who is told to have owned 600 trunks of books, each hoisted by a pair of men. 24 Generally speaking, these elites wrote in the lingua franca of the religious ecumene that they were a part of. While most of this knowledge only circulated within one ecumene— often only within a small number of urban and religious centres— we know of a small number of remarkable instances of their cross- cultural transmission.

Cross-Cultural Transmission of Knowledge

Texts and ideas were transmitted across civilizational boundaries in regions where the religious ecumenes bordered and overlapped. Knowledge produced on the outer fringes of Eurasia, like western Europe and Japan, never crossed such boundaries, but some of the texts produced in South Asia and West Asia did. There were, in particular, two pathways along which knowledge was transmitted cross- culturally: one leading from South Asia westward and the other from the eastern Mediterranean and West Asia eastward.

From the Gangetic Plain of northern India, Buddhism had spread in Antiquity to places like Bamiyan and Balkh in what is now Afghanistan, which were by the seventh century lively centres of learning. Possibly by this route, south Asian knowledge reached the Iranian plateau and the Mesopotamian plain of modern Iraq. Two ancient collections of stories followed this path. The first one is the *Panchatantra*, a collection of animal fables, which was originally composed in Sanskrit in the fourth century BCE. In the second half of the sixth century, it was translated in the Sassanian empire into Middle Persian, and in the middle of the eighth century that version was translated into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffa', who was connected to the court of the Al-Mansur, the second 'Abbāsīd caliph. The Arabic version, known under the title *Kalīla wa Dimna*, was soon considered a masterpiece of Arabic prose. After the early medieval period, the diffusion of these stories would become even more extensive, and between the tenth and the fifteenth century, they were translated into Syriac, Greek, Latin, Spanish, Italian, German, English, Old Slavonic, and Czech, reaching an audience that stretched from Iceland to Java.

Sometime between 750 and 900 CE, another story was translated into Arabic as the *Kitāb Bilawhar wa Būdasf*. Whether this text was translated from Middle Persian or Sanskrit and through what route it reached the caliphate is unknown, but what is certain is that these stories ultimately go back to ancient stories of the life of Buddha. 28 Before the end of the ninth century and possibly in Jerusalem, the Arabic text was translated into Georgian, which would be the basis of numerous translations in subsequent centuries. In the later medieval period, it would be translated into Greek (previously attributed incorrectly to the eighth- century scholar John of Damascus), Hebrew, New Persian, Yiddish, Judaeo-Persian, and also into Latin, Castilian, and other European vernaculars. In the Christian tradition, this story became known as "Barlaam and Josaphat" and would have a very lively reception throughout Europe.

The city of Balkh continued to be an active centre of Buddhist learning long after the Arab armies had conquered it in the seventh century. From this city hailed the family of the Barmakids, who would produce a number of influential secretaries and governors under the early `Abbāsid dynasty in Baghdad in the second half of the eighth century. The `Abbāsid dynasty actively sponsored the translation of foreign texts into Arabic, and, due to the influence of the Barmakids, some of the first medical treatises to be translated were Sanskrit works, including the *Suśruta* of Vagbhata and the *Siddhasāra* of Ravigputa. Astronomical works were also translated, most notably the *Sindhind*, which would become an example for many subsequent astronomical handbooks in the Arabic tradition. More scientific works may have made their way from Sanskrit into Arabic, possibly via Middle Persian intermediary texts, but almost all of this material is lost, because after 800 CE the translators and their political sponsors became more interested in texts from the lands to west of Baghdad.

The largest transmission of knowledge across a linguistic boundary during the Early Middle Ages was the Graeco- Arabic translation movement. After the `Abbāsid dynasty took over the caliphate in the middle of the eighth century and had Baghdad built as their new capital, they also adopted certain Sasanian imperial ideologies to appease non- Arab factions of political subjects and supporters. These ideologies included the translations of ancient texts into Arabic, the new language of intellectual discourse. While translations from Sanskrit and Middle Persian were sponsored at first, the vast majority of texts were from Syriac and Greek. Most of these texts were late- antique treatises and commentaries of scientific nature, dealing primarily with Galenic medicine, Ptolemaic astronomy, Aristotelian logic, and Euclidean mathematics. During its formative phase, the Islamic civilization thus absorbed certain bodies of knowledge that had been studied by the intelligentsia of the Christian ecumene for centuries. Indeed, most of the population within the caliphate was probably Christian until the ninth century, and, more importantly, Syriac- speaking Nestorian Christians in Baghdad were the cultural brokers who made most of the Arabic translations. As a result, the scientific traditions of the caliphate and Byzantium showed many similarities, which has caused modern scholars to speculate about the exchange of manuscripts between Baghdad and Constantinople. The study of Aristotelian logic, moreover, was something that `Abbāsid intellectuals had in common with not only contemporary scholars in Constantinople but also those in Carolingian Europe. This remarkable similarity is not an indication of exchange of texts but of the fact that the Latin, Greek, Syriac, and Arabic intellectual traditions had each inherited the same intellectual tradition from the late- antique Roman empire. The historiographic genre of world chronicles is another example of a Graeco- Roman intellectual tradition (going back to Eusebius in the third century) that was continued by Latin, Greek, Syriac, and Arabic speaking intellectuals in the early medieval period.

While the belletristic and the religious traditions of the Islamic civilization had their origin in Arab and Persian conventions and were thus different from those in the Christian world, the Graeco- Arabic Translation Movement enabled the transmission of scientific texts and ideas from one ecumene to the other. In some cases, stories were also transmitted, such as those about Alexander the Great. Alexander legends had already circulated for centuries in multiple languages throughout the Mediterranean region. In the seventh century, they found their way into Syriac, into the *Qur'ān* itself, and during the eighth century, a version of the Greek novel *The Alexander Romance* was translated into Arabic. Many Graeco- Roman texts and ideas were not only translated into Arabic but also had a very lively reception in the Islamic ecumene. Both the Alexander legends and Aristotelian dialectical notions, for example, continued to circulate in Arabic for many centuries after the Graeco- Arabic translation movement had ended. However, some texts were transmitted even further eastward as early as the ninth century. Certain Galenic texts were translated into Tibetan, possibly in the eighth century, although a later date has also been proposed. The most remarkable case concerns the transmission of astrology. As any form of divination, astrological knowledge had a

special role for political leaders in practically all pre- modern societies since it provided an elaborate way of generating auspiciousness for specific undertakings and a sophisticated form of legitimization of dynastic rule. As a result, astrologers were employed in nearly every court across early medieval Eurasia, most importantly at those in Baghdad and Chang'an. In the eighth century, Buddhist astronomy was in vogue at both these courts, but so was one Graeco- Roman text. Among astrological texts that were translated into Arabic in the eighth century was Dorotheus' *Carmen Astrologicum* (first century). Parts of this text reached Chang'an in the ninth century— possibly through an intermediary translation that was transported by Manichean or Nestorian migrants— where they were incorporated into a Chinese horoscopic treatise known as the *Duliyusi jing* . Probably within the same century, Buddhist monks brought a manuscript of the *Yusi Jing* to Japan, where it would continue to be studied until the thirteenth century.

The eastward transmission of Dorotheus' *Carmen Astrologicum* is an exceptional case, but it does illustrate the fact that intellectual connectivity existed on a Eurasian scale. In other cases, such as the westward transmission of the *Panchatantra* or the eastward transmission of Aristotelian logic, the early medieval period formed a crucial translation moment that made it possible for these texts and ideas to be studied in a neighbouring ecumene for hundreds of years afterward. A scholar around the year 900 CE could, hypothetically speaking, travel across Eurasia from Nara to Aachen and conclude that all the epistemic networks he traversed were in some ways integrated with one another and that early medieval Eurasia was on some levels an intellectual continuum, just as it was a true continuum on every other level of human experience. <>

THE DALAI LAMA: AN EXTRAORDINARY LIFE by Alexander Norm [Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 9780544416581]

The first authoritative biography of the Dalai Lama—a story by turns inspiring and shocking—from an acclaimed Tibetan scholar with exceptional access to his subject.

The Dalai Lama's message of peace and compassion resonates with people of all faiths and none. Yet, for all his worldwide fame, he remains personally elusive. At last Alexander Norman—acclaimed Oxford-trained scholar of the history of Tibet—delivers the definitive, unique, unforgettable biography.

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A revelatory life story of one of today's most radical, charismatic, and beloved world leaders.

Review

Editor's Choice, *The New York Times* Bestsellers List

"Impressive in its clarity...this biography [is] the most detailed and accurate to date...the book,

written in an engaging prose, ends with an insightful prediction of the legacy of the fourteenth Dalai Lama, and a clear-eyed assessment of the challenges that the fifteenth will face.” —**New York Times Book Review**

“The subtitle of Mr. Norman's book, 'An Extraordinary Life,' is an understatement...Mr. Norman knows the Dalai Lama better than most, having helped him to write his autobiography. His new book is rich...with detail; his supple prose, often beautiful, is as adept at explaining Tibet's theology as it is at describing its spiritual world...Mr. Norman's book, while respectful, is not adoring: He doesn't flinch from offering examples of his subject's behavior that are awkward.” —**Wall Street Journal**

“[Norman's] writing is understated, occasionally wry, and respectful...[while the] passages explaining meditation, debate, and monastic life in the Tibetan tradition are exquisite.” —**American Interest**

“This is the first authoritative biography of the Dalai Lama, and his life story reads like an adventure! Travel with him ... An amazing read!” —**Buzzfeed**

“Alexander Norman's book is a revelation, placing the Dalai Lama in a vividly-told historical context while giving the reader an intimate glimpse of the man himself.” —**Jim Kelly, Air Mail**

“Brilliant: the writing is a compelling blend of formal and informal styles covering events terrifying and wonderful (and many bits in between). Deserves a wide readership” —**Charles Taliaferro, Oscar and Gertrude Boe Distinguished Chair and Professor of Philosophy, St. Olaf College. Editor-in-Chief of Open Theology**

“Alexander Norman is uniquely qualified among western observers to deliver a definitive account of one of the most remarkable lives of the past century. His thoughtful and insightful biography is unlikely to be surpassed any time soon.” —**Dr. Solomon George FitzHerbert, Departmental Lecturer in Tibetan and Himalayan Studies, University of Oxford**

“A compelling portrait . . . definitive book, which is sure to attract anyone seeking more insight into this enduring leader.” —**Library Journal**

“A thorough catalogue of the Dalai Lama's thinking and worldview . . . anyone interested in the Dalai Lama's spiritual influence will enjoy this insider biography.” —**Publishers Weekly**

“[Norman] brings well-grounded authority to his portrayal of a figure revered throughout the world for his joyfulness, generosity, and compassion . . . a sturdy, comprehensive look at the Dalai Lama and his tumultuous world.” —**Kirkus Reviews**

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Excerpt: Having said this, given that I have had the enormous privilege of working with the Dalai Lama on three of his most important books, including his (second) autobiography, I should at least attempt an answer to the question of what he is like as a person.* The best way I can think of doing so is by recounting the beginning of a conversation I had with him some years ago. I told him how my wife had recently chided me that it was a disgrace how, after knowing His Holiness for then more than a quarter century, I still could not hold a proper conversation with him in his own language. I had to admit she was right, I said, and for that, I told him, I ought to apologize.

"Well, if it comes to that," he replied in his familiar heavily accented English, "it is me who should apologize. I have been learning your language since nineteen forty-seven!"

In those few words are summed up the grace, the humility, and the kindness of the man.

I first met the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, his exile home in India, during March 1988, when I went to interview him on behalf of the London Spectator. There was one thing about that first encounter that struck me at the time as slightly strange and has since come to seem prophetic. When I was shown into his audience chamber, I had just enough time to register that the room was empty before I realized the Dalai Lama was standing almost directly in front of me. It was not as if he had been there all along and I suddenly noticed him; rather my impression was that he literally appeared out of nowhere.

Something similar occurred a year or so later — but this is supposed to be a biography, not autobiography. Suffice it instead to say that quite a lot of our work that followed over the years since then was undertaken while the Dalai Lama was away from his exile home and on the road — in the United States, Denmark, Italy, Germany, France, the UK, and elsewhere in India. This has allowed me to see him in a variety of different settings, from which I have gleaned some observations perhaps worth relating.

I know him, for example, to be fastidious — his nails are always neatly trimmed — though he is not the least showy as to dress. His clothing is of good quality but not the finest. His shoes are sturdy

and well-polished, but of respectable and not high-end provenance. Rupert Murdoch — a media tycoon and not a moralist — once called the Dalai Lama a "canny old monk in Gucci loafers." He was wrong. The Dalai Lama wears Hush Puppies as a rule, never Gucci. At home he wears flip-flops.

It is true that the Dalai Lama has a fondness for good timepieces, but he does not have a collection. He wears an unornamented gold Rolex. Invariably he gives away any he no longer has use for. In fact, I have one of them (gifted by him first to someone else). It is a plain stainless steel Jaeger-LeCoultre Memovox with a mechanical alarm (which would no doubt have appealed to him) that he wore for a time during the 1960s.

Although quite the opposite of extravagant in terms of possessions, the Dalai Lama has admitted to having a somewhat "free-spending" nature. When he was a child, he would buy as many animals destined for slaughter as he could — to the point where his officials ran out of room to keep them. As an adult, on more than one occasion he visited shopping malls during his first trip to the United States in 1979. His tutor Ling Rinpoché cautioned him against making unnecessary purchases, however, and so far as I know, he has rarely been seen in any sort of retail outlet since. He does not use a computer, so he is not an online shopper. Instead his extravagance — if such it is — is limited nowadays to giving away money, mainly to humanitarian causes. When he won the Templeton Prize in 2012, he immediately donated the great majority of its almost \$2 million award to the Save the Children Fund. This was in honor of the charity's generosity to Tibetan refugees in the early days of exile.

In private, the Dalai Lama is attentive to others' needs and will, for example, ask if you prefer coffee if only tea has been served. He will ensure that there are nuts or cookies available alongside the *dri churra* (a molar-cracking dried cheese from Tibet) of which he is fond. He will adjust the blinds so the sun is not in your eyes. He may ask whether you find it too hot or too cold and have the heating or air-conditioning adjusted. If it seems to him that the room layout for an audience could be improved, he will have his staff move furniture around until he finds it satisfactory. I recall one occasion during the early days of our acquaintance when I came across him moving chairs in his hotel room in preparation for a press conference.

The Dalai Lama is a hearty eater, though this is in part because, as an ordained monk, he may eat only twice a day, and never after noon — though he might choose to do so if he is a guest at a luncheon while abroad, and he may also take a cookie or two during the course of the afternoon if he has had a particularly arduous day. As to diet, he is not fussy. He leans toward vegetarianism in principle but, on account of illness and doctors' advice, he eats meat without scruple — though one need have no doubt he prays for the postmortem well-being of each creature that he consumes.

As for looking after his own needs, he sometimes jokes that he would not know how to make a cup of tea. Nor does he cook and, aside from helping make *khapse* (New Year's cookies) in the kitchens of the Potala Palace when very young, he has rarely seen the inside of a kitchen. At least when younger, however, he would happily build a fire. But he has always been restricted in what he has done for himself, having been surrounded with staff and attendants since very early childhood. Of these he retains a small community. Within his household, there are around ten, including cooks and orderlies. He has four or five personal attendants, all of them monks, as well as a number of retainers who, because of their age, have only the lightest duties and who remain with him simply as friends. It is to this little community that he turns for conversation and respite at the end of the day. In terms of office staff, they are divided into Tibetan and English sections, most, though not all, of whom are laymen. He employs four (up from only two until comparatively recently) principal private secretaries, who are in turn supported by a small number of subordinates. Although the Dalai Lama appoints these men himself (and, out of consideration for his monastic state, they are all men), their names are submitted to him by the Central Tibetan Administration. Together they constitute his

eyes and ears beyond the confines of the Ganden Phodrang, as his home headquarters is known (much as the administration in Washington is known as "the White House"). To be sure, he also listens carefully to what visitors tell him, and he has family and friends from whom he gains intelligence.

If he is less well informed than he should be on a given topic, it will be because the people surrounding him have failed, for whatever reason, to brief him as fully as they ought. Perhaps inevitably, given the small pool of people on whom he has to rely, this does sometimes happen.

Besides his permanent staff, there are larger numbers of bodyguards. At home, the Dalai Lama is watched over by a contingent from the Indian army in addition to his Tibetan security. As to his relations with these, he maintains a certain formality except with the most senior of them, but he is considerate of their needs too. He always has a friendly word for those who keep watch at night when he goes for his early morning walk. (He is in the habit of strolling outside, or along hotel corridors, as soon as he has completed his first prayers.) And when traveling, he invariably takes time out to talk to those who serve him.

Much is made of the Dalai Lama's sense of humor. I have often thought that Tibetan humor generally is quite similar to the English: ready, often earthy, and with a love of irony and absurdity. The best success I have had with a joke was a very innocent one about a mouse. I would not tell him a vulgar story, however. He would likely think it odd that anyone other than his closest family or colleagues would do such a thing. But he is no spoilsport. He once asked me about the wedding of a young Tibetan official that I had attended — whether anyone had gotten tipsy? When I said yes, he was not at all disapproving. When I learned that, besides nature programs, he would sometimes watch an episode of the perennial English comedy series *Dad's Army*, I once sent him a box set, but I do not know whether he ever saw it. I also included a *Mr. Bean* film, as I thought this would appeal to him.

Although he does not stand on ceremony — he actively dislikes formality and any sort of pretense — the Dalai Lama is conscious of the dignity of his office. On one occasion when I failed to produce a *kathag*, the silk offering scarf it is customary to present on meeting, he did not hesitate to reprimand me. On another occasion, I committed one of those faux pas that seemed innocuous to me as a foreigner but which must have caused serious offense. Again, he made me aware of my mistake, but kindly. I do not believe he would have done so if he had not known me as well as he does, however. He is sensitive to others' feelings. That said, he does sometimes make an artless remark that takes people aback. I recall hearing that he laughingly scolded a fellow writer for having fingernails "that looked like claws."

The Dalai Lama is also both affectionate by nature and often tactile. He will pretend to give friends a playful slap on the back of the head. He may clasp your hand and hold it, or nuzzle his cheek against yours, or stroke your beard. Being tactile is a characteristic he shares with his predecessor the Great Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who, having evaded a pursuing Chinese army by fleeing over the mountains into neighboring Sikkim, was rapturously received by the people each according to his or her custom. Some bowed, some offered salaams, some prostrated themselves, but there were three little Scottish girls on ponies — their father was a local missionary — who insinuated themselves into the procession right behind him. When he slowed to acknowledge the crowd, they jumped down and ran ahead to await the Dalai Lama at the government guesthouse where he would be staying. As he walked up to it, the Great Thirteenth paused unspeaking to run his fingers through Isa Graham's flaxen locks, "feeling it between finger and thumb, as one feels silken threads to test their quality and texture." Disappearing into the building, he came out only a few moments later to feel her hair again while the crowd gasped.

In considering these personal characteristics, it is vital we do not lose sight of the fact that the Dalai Lama is a monk before he is anything else — and a monk with enormous ritual responsibilities. A

weakness of a biography like this is that it cannot avoid giving the impression that the subject's life is all about his public deeds. In the case of the Dalai Lama, however, it is actually his interior life that is the more important. It is therefore essential that the reader bear in mind the Dalai Lama's total commitment to his monastic calling. Every day on rising, without fail, he begins with at least three hours of prayer and meditation. Every evening, without fail, he concludes with an hour or more of the same. And during the day, he will pray and study to the extent his schedule allows, very often including when eating. When on retreat, which he undertakes for extended periods of up to three weeks at least once a year, but also for shorter periods of a few days multiple times during the course of the year, he increases his commitment (by rising at 3 a.m. instead of 4:30) and limits his involvement with worldly affairs to an hour or two per day whenever possible.

I have already mentioned my deficiency in spoken Tibetan. Though functionally literate in the language, I am also reliant on a dictionary or the good offices of some kind person save for the shortest and most basic texts. In some ways, though, this has been a blessing. It has meant that I have come closer to a number of Tibetan friends than might have been the case if I were more self-sufficient. It has also been a constant reminder that I write as an outsider, as an observer, looking in.

It is arguably less of a failing that I am not a Buddhist. It has enabled me to ask questions and think thoughts that would otherwise have been more difficult, if not impossible. But for this same reason, I have no doubt that some of what I say here will seem to some impertinent and possibly even disrespectful, even though I mean neither impertinence nor disrespect. It is also possible that some of the material may be painful to some of my readers. With respect to this, I take encouragement from the Dalai Lama himself, who, on many occasions, has spoken of the need for fair and balanced assessment of the facts. I trust that I have succeeded; certainly this has been my aim at all times. <>

THE EMANATED SCRIPTURE OF MANJUSHRI: SHABKAR'S ESSENTIAL MEDITATION INSTRUCTIONS by Shabkar Tsogdruk Rangdrol Translated by Sean Price Foreword by The Seventh Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche Introduction by Matthieu Ricard [Tsadra, Snow Lion, 9781559394611]

Instructions for traversing the entire Vajrayana path to enlightenment from one of Tibet's most famous wandering yogis.

Composed by Shabkar at the Cave of Miracles close to Mount Kailash around 1815, this compendium of spiritual instructions is written in the form of questions and answers, alternating verse and prose, between Shabkar and his disciples. It presents the essence of the entire graded path to enlightenment, using Tsongkhapa's Great Graded Path (*Lam rim chen mo*) as its model. In twenty-three pieces of advice, he explains the need to renounce the world, how to develop genuine compassion, and methods for achieving an undistracted mind that can unite meditation on emptiness with compassion. His nonsectarian approach is evident in his teachings on the nature of mind according to the Mahamudra tradition of Milarepa, his practical explanations of Saraha's songs of realization, and the attainment of buddhahood without meditation, which draws on the teachings of the Great Perfection, Dzogchen. Shabkar's style is direct and fresh; his realization infuses his instructions with an authenticity that will continue to inspire Buddhist practitioners for years to come.

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Excerpt: When, in the early spring of 1814, Shabkar arrived at one of the most sacred mountains of Tibet, Mount Kailash, the "Silver Mountain," he had made up his mind—nothing else mattered but to engage in one-pointed spiritual practice. He wasted no time and within a few days, he collected some provisions and settled in a cave near the Cave of Miracles, where Milarepa had stayed seven centuries earlier. After singing some verses in praise of the holy mountain and of the great Lake Manasarovar, he sealed the entrance to his cave with mud and vowed to practice with complete dedication.

This cave lies a few minutes' walk slightly above and on the side of Milarepa's cave. To enter the cave, which is below the ground level, one has to descend a few steps. Since this cave is not as famous as Milarepa's dwelling (upon which a small temple has now been built), only a few pilgrims know about its location. Consequently, it has been left as it is, and it seems as if Shabkar had just left. The hearth where he used to boil his tea is still there, and an atmosphere of utter simplicity reigns in this secluded retreat place.

This cave is also located near the famous White Footprint, one of the four footprints said to have been left by Buddha Shakyamuni when he traveled miraculously to Mount Kailash. In fact, Tsogdruk Rangdrol ("Self-Liberation of the Six Senses," the name given to Shabkar by his root master Chogyal Ngakyi Wangpo, became known as "Shabkar," or "White Foot," in part because he spent many years near the Buddha's footprint, but also because wherever he would set his feet, the land would

become "white with virtue," meaning that through his teachings, the minds of the people would be turned toward the Dharma.

While the great yogi was in strict retreat in this cave, not seeing or speaking to anyone, one of his heart-sons, Jimba Norbu, as well as quite a few other disciples, settled in the vicinity to practice near their beloved teacher. One day, through the curtain that was covering the small window made in the mud door sealing the entrance of the cave, Jimba Norbu fervently requested Shabkar to grant all of them some teaching.

The hermit asked himself, "Should I strive to reach perfection myself, or to help others?" With this question in mind, he prayed intensely to his masters and all the wisdom deities. One night soon thereafter, Simhamukha, The Wisdom Dakini with the Face of a Lion, appeared to him slightly before dawn and uttered a prophecy: "Indeed, it would be wonderful if through spending your whole life in practice you attained the body of rainbow light, but in doing so you'll be of little help to others in this lifetime. Now, is the time for you to bring many fortunate beings onto the path of liberation from samsara!"

Accordingly, Shabkar began to give teachings through the little window in the door of his cave, and continued to do so daily.

Later, after Shabkar had come out of retreat, hundreds of disciples—renunciates as well as faithful men and women—came from various places to hear his teachings, and for several years Shabkar turned the Wheel of the Dharma for their benefit.

At Mount Kailash, Shabkar wrote two of his major treatises, *The Emanated Scripture of the Kadampas*, which expounds the essence of the Buddha's teachings, as well as *The Emanated Scripture of Manjushri*. The latter, which has been translated in this volume thanks to the dedication and skills of Gelong Tenzin Jamchen (Sean Price), documents some of the requests made over time by various disciples and is written in the form of question and answer. Shabkar says in his autobiography that when he gave the reading transmission and some explanation of these two texts over several days, rainbows appeared in the sky, flower-shaped raindrops fell, and the atmosphere was filled with extraordinary fragrances. He felt "that the sky was filled with celestial beings who had come to attend the teachings."

THE EMANATED SCRIPTURE OF MANJUSHRI: SHABKAR'S ESSENTIAL MEDITATION

INSTRUCTIONS is quite unique in Tibetan literature, not only because of its being written in the form of questions and answers, alternating verse and prose, but because it is a compendium of short teachings that presents a limpid, concise, and yet profound instruction on the entire graded path to enlightenment. It does so in a nonsectarian manner typical of Shabkar's approach. This graded path takes us first through a thorough presentation of the "mind training" (Lojong) teachings, based on Je Tsongkhapa's Great Graded Path (Lam rim chen mo), to pith instructions, essential teachings on the nature of mind according to the Mahamudra tradition of Milarepa, practical explanations on the songs of realization, or dohas, of Saraha, and culminates with the ultimate teachings of the Great Perfection, Dzogchen, the pinnacle of the Nine Vehicles.

Thus, in twenty-three pieces of advice, Shabkar elucidates the essentials of spiritual practice: the need to renounce the world, to rely on a spiritual master, and to unite meditation on emptiness with compassion. He explains how to meditate, how to apply in daily life the insights thus gained, and how to mingle one's mind with the guru's mind and liberate thoughts as they arise. Shabkar's style is crisp and effective, as if he had intended to define each step of the contemplative life in the briefest yet most complete and inspiring way for practitioners.

THE EMANATED SCRIPTURE OF MANJUSHRI: SHABKAR'S ESSENTIAL MEDITATION

INSTRUCTIONS opens with verses of praise to Lord Buddha, Padmasambhava, Atisha, and

Tsongkhapa. Bringing together these four objects of devotion reflects Shabkar's whole life of practice.

Shabkar was born in 1781 among the Nyingmapa yogis of the Rekong (Reb gong) region in Amdo, the remote northeast province of Greater Tibet. At the age of fifteen, he recited Padmasambhava's mantra, "Om Vajra Guru Padma Siddhi Hung," one million times and had auspicious dreams, such as of flying through the air, seeing the sun and moon rising simultaneously, finding jewel-treasures, and so forth. "From then on," he wrote, "by the grace of Guru Rinpoche, I became filled with intense devotion to the guru, affection toward my Dharma friends, compassion for sentient beings, and pure perception toward the teachings. I had the good fortune to accomplish without obstacles whatever Dharma practice I undertook."

He then met Jamyang Gyatso, a most respected Gelukpa master, whom he venerated greatly and of whom he later had visions and dreams. At the age of twenty, he received full monastic ordination and went into a prolonged meditation retreat, during which he let his hair grow long again, as was customary for retreatants. As a sign of having accomplished various yogic practices, he wore a white shawl rather than the traditional red shawl, although he continued to wear the patched lower robe characteristic of a fully ordained monk.

Shabkar then left his native land behind and traveled south of Rekong to an area called "Little Mongolia," a district in Amdo where a small Mongolian population had settled. Here he met his main teacher, the dharma king Ngakyi Wangpo, a learned and accomplished Mongolian king, said to be an incarnation of Marpa the Translator.

Having received complete instructions from his master, Shabkar practiced for many years in various hermitages and caves, including three years on the island of Tsonying, the "Heart of the Lake," in the Kokonor, the Blue Lake of Amdo. There, among other signs of accomplishment, he had a visionary encounter with Je Tsongkhapa.

Later, toward the end of his life, Shabkar had a vision of Padmasambhava. During the vision, Shabkar told Guru Padmasambhava that he had prayed to him throughout his life and had been blessed by visions of many other deities and spiritual masters. So why would Padmasambhava appear to him only now? Guru Padmasambhava replied, "Do you remember when, on the island of the Heart of the Lake, you had a vision of Tsongkhapa, who gave you the teaching on the Graded Path? That was I." In another of his writings, *The Emanated Scriptures of Orgyen*, Shabkar recounts this vision, and he expresses his faith in the inseparability of Guru Padmasambhava, Atisha, and Tsongkhapa.

While the core of Shabkar's practice was the Great Perfection, this practice was firmly grounded in the precepts of the Kadampa masters, which inspire practitioners to have few needs and desires; authentic feelings of renunciation, humility, and inner calm; loving-kindness; compassion; and, above all, the precious bodhichitta—the altruistic resolve to free all sentient beings from suffering and bring them to enlightenment.

Shabkar did not mince his words for practitioners who fool themselves by bypassing some steps of the path, out of childish impatience or arrogance:

These days, some people say, "There is no need to expend great effort on the preliminary practices. What's the point of so much complication? It's enough just to practice Mahamudra, devoid of all elaboration." Don't listen to such nonsense. How can someone who hasn't even reached the shore talk about the sea?

In this spirit, **THE EMANATED SCRIPTURE OF MANJUSHRI: SHABKAR'S ESSENTIAL MEDITATION INSTRUCTIONS** is a perfect companion for those who understand the need to progress step by step, rather than jumping all over the place at the risk of falling apart whenever confronted with outer, inner, and secret obstacles.

In thus uniting the teachings of the great Kadampa masters with those of the quintessential Nyingma tradition, Shabkar was a noble embodiment of the nonsectarian tradition that flourished in the nineteenth century, under the inspiration of other great luminaries such as Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo, Jamgon Kongtrul, Patrul Rinpoche, and Lama Mipham Gyatso.

Shabkar did not merely receive teachings from all the traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, he actively taught pure perception and open-mindedness. Moreover, he eloquently elucidated how all the many different Dharma teachings of the various *yanas* (vehicles) form one coherent whole. My root teacher, Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche, used to say that understanding the teachings of all Buddhist traditions to be noncontradictory is the sign of true knowledge.

The distinctive characteristics of Shabkar's works include directness, simplicity, profundity, and the power to encourage the reader to engage in spiritual practice. He does not write to flaunt his knowledge or to gain fame as a philosopher, but rather to turn readers' minds toward the Dharma, sustain their enthusiasm, and prevent them from becoming sidetracked or falling into the pitfalls that lie along the path to liberation.

After Mount Kailash, Shabkar went on pilgrimage to Nepal, where he gilded the pinnacle of the Jarung Khashor Stupa in Boudhanath and practiced in retreat in the secluded place of Lapchi, at the Nepal-Tibet border. Then he spent some time in Lhasa and Central Tibet, and, finally, in 1828, at the age of forty-seven, he returned to Amdo, where he tirelessly helped others through his extraordinary compassion. He spent the last twenty years of his life teaching disciples, promoting peace in the area, and practicing meditation in retreat at various sacred places, primarily at his hermitage in Tashikhyil.

The story of Shabkar's life as well as his teachings thus illustrates the complete path of Buddhist practice. He demonstrates the exemplary path of a perfect practitioner: having become disillusioned with worldly activities, he seeks a spiritual master, develops confidence in him, and follows his instructions. By practicing with complete dedication, in the end he himself becomes an enlightened master capable of contributing immensely to the welfare of other beings.

Shabkar left numerous writings, which I have humbly attempted to catalog, under the guidance of learned scholars.' In the present extent of our knowledge, no less than 180 compositions have been accounted for. As a result of the collaboration between the holders of Shabkar's lineage and our team at Shechen Monastery, almost all have been gathered. We found them chiefly in the valley of Rekong in Amdo as well as in various locations in

Central Tibet and Nepal. A complete edition of Shabkar's collected writings was input at Shechen Monastery in Nepal and printed as a fourteen-volume set by Shechen Publications in India. A twelve-volume edition, prepared by Shabkar's fourth and present incarnation, Urgyen Jigme Tenpa'i Gyaltsen (born in 1980, was published in Qinghai.

Among his main writings, Shabkar composed three Dharma Discourses (*Chos bshad*) and three Excellent Discourses (*Legs bshad*), three Spiritual Instructions (*gDams nag gsum*), three Songs on the View (*ITa ba'i mgur*), which include one of Shabkar's most renowned compositions, *The Flight of the Garuda* (*mKha' ldinggshog rlabs*), composed on Tsonying Island when Shabkar was twenty years old, and nine *Emanated Scriptures* (*sPrulpa'iglegs barn*). The earliest of these is *The Emanated Scripture of Manjushri* (*Jam dbyangs sprul pa'i glegs barn*), SH 55 in our catalog, composed around 1815, and the last one, composed around 1846, is also Shabkar's last major work, *The Emanated Scriptures of Compassion* (*sNying rje sprul pa'i glegs bam*), which opens with a beautiful hymn in praise of compassion, and continues with two sections in which Shabkar—a fervent defender of the "other" sentient beings, animals—condemns uncompromisingly the consumption of meat by Buddhist practitioners. To this, one should add a large autobiography, a shorter one that covers the last years

of Shabkar's life (which mostly includes songs and teachings), and three large volumes of spiritual songs (mGur 'bum), as well as numerous miscellaneous writings.

As Shabkar reminds us in this volume, "If your practice of emptiness is devoid of compassion, you have not found the supreme path." The great yogi's life story as well as the teachings presented in *The Emanated Scripture of Manjushri* are constant reminders that what is not accomplished for the sake of others is not worth undertaking. All the while that we dedicate ourselves to free others from suffering and bring them to inner freedom, we should continually act within the understanding that, in the words of Shabkar, "Mind is the source or origin of all phenomena, both animate and inanimate, that are included within samsara and nirvana; failure to recognize this is called ignorance." <>

NAROPA'S WISDOM: HIS LIFE AND TEACHINGS ON MAHAMUDRA by Khenchen Thrangu, From Oral Teachings translated by Erik Perna Kunsang [Snow Lion, 9781559394901]

Accessible and practical teachings on the life of Naropa, with verse-by-verse commentary on his two most important Mahamudra songs by a contemporary Karma Kagyu master.

Naropa is one of the accomplished lineage holders of the Mahamudra tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. In this book, Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche, a beloved Mahamudra teacher, first tells the extraordinary story of Naropa's life and explains its profound lessons. He follows this with lucid and practical commentaries on two of Naropa's songs of realization, explaining their precious instructions for realizing Mahamudra, the nature of one's mind. Throughout, Thrangu Rinpoche speaks plainly and directly to Westerners eager to receive the essence of Mahamudra instructions from an accomplished teacher.

Review

"The Indian mahasiddha Naropa is one of the most influential figures in the history of Vajrayana Buddhism. . . . The Very Venerable Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche, our great treasure of wisdom and compassion, holds Naropa's unbroken lineage. There is no one more qualified than Rinpoche to present this wisdom tradition. Those who haven't met Naropa can meet the heart essence of his insights and deeds through this book."—Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, author of *Wild Awakening: The Heart of Mahamudra and Dzogchen*

"A great book from a consummate teacher. It includes translations of two critically important texts by the great Indian adept Naropa with a masterful oral commentary. Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche reaches the heights of Buddhist philosophy and the profound depths of Mahamudra meditation, all the while providing practical advice and reminding us that 'while training in a high view, please conduct yourself in accordance with the Dharma.'"—Sarah Harding, translator of *Chöd: The Sacred Teachings on Severance*

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Excerpt: Traditionally, the Buddhist teachings are presented as beginning with the enlightenment of the Buddha under the Bodhi tree. For the next forty years of his life, the Buddha gave the teachings that we now call the "first turning of the wheel of Dharma." The most important of these teachings were, of course, the Four Noble Truths and the selflessness, or insubstantiality, of persons. The numerous discourses he gave to his students were later called the "Foundation" teachings. About five hundred years after the Buddha entered parinirvana, there was a great blossoming of Buddhist teachings in India that emphasized compassion for all beings (bodhichitta) and the extraordinary work of Nagarjuna on the emptiness of outer phenomena. These teachings were important because in order to help sentient beings achieve enlightenment—awakening from samsara—one must understand both conventional and ultimate truth. These Mahayana teachings became known as the "second turning of the wheel of Dharma," and they then spread across Asia to China and Japan. Finally, a few hundred years later, there developed the profound teachings of Asanga that emphasized buddha nature and luminous clarity, which later became known as the "third turning of the wheel of Dharma." With this third turning also came the development of tantric teachings that emphasized nonconceptual meditation and interacting with a vast variety of deities through practices called "sadhanas."

By the time of Naropa, almost 1500 years after the passing away of the Buddha, almost all the teachings of the Buddha had been written down, categorized, and formulated as definite tenets. His teachings were also accompanied by many great commentaries written by famous Buddhist scholars. Large monasteries in India had been established that contained monks from many different countries and from all three turnings of the wheel of Dharma. Some of these monasteries were also universities where there were Hindu scholars studying the Vedas and classes in Sanskrit literature and grammar, rhetoric, composition, and so on. These monastic universities were centers of academic Buddhism, where the subtle points of the meaning of emptiness and other philosophical concepts were taught, discussed, and debated.

When we examine the life of Naropa, who lived in India during the eleventh century, we find that he began his Buddhist practice as an ordained monk, following the rules of the Vinaya laid down by the sutra teachings of the Buddha in the Foundation path. He then went to the largest monastic university of the time, Nalanda, and mastered the Mahayana with such proficiency that he became one of Nalanda's four abbots (who were called the "gatekeepers"). There he engaged in learning and debating the vast academic literature of the second turning of the wheel of Dharma. One day, he was approached by a dakini, or wisdom being, who told him that to reach full enlightenment, he must go into the Indian jungle, search out a guru named Tilopa, and practice the tantric path. He did so, and after reaching the highest level of realization transmitted by Tilopa, he gave many important teachings to his Tibetan disciple Marpa, who in turn also practiced each sadhana until he had completely mastered it, and then brought them to Tibet, where he translated them into Tibetan.

Naropa and Mahamudra Practice

When Naropa took mahasiddha Tilopa as his root guru, he began to practice Mahamudra meditation. Mahamudra is the principal meditation of the Kagyu lineage of Tibetan Buddhism. These teachings went contrary to current Buddhist practice at the time because Mahamudra does not

involve performing elaborate sadhanas or studying the teachings on emptiness. Rather, in Mahamudra, one must simply look directly into one's mind. The first written teachings on Mahamudra that we have are attributed to Saraha, who lived approximately two hundred years before Tilopa. Tilopa then passed these teachings on to Naropa on the banks of the Ganges River via the Ganges Mahamudra. Naropa then expanded on these Mahamudra teachings in the two dohas discussed in this book, which he then passed on to Marpa, who took them to Tibet and helped found the Kagyu lineage. These two dohas—The View, Concisely Put and The Summary of Mahamudra—criticize the approach of academic Buddhism because it relies on the intellectual mind instead of looking directly at the mind's nature; he also criticizes the sadhana approach for much the same reasons. This is why Naropa, who was, after all, an outstanding scholar of academic Buddhism, states in the first few verses of The Summary of Mahamudra, which is found in part 3 of this book, that mere conceptual understanding of Buddhism will not lead to full enlightenment.

The Six Dharmas of Naropa

Besides transmitting the Mahamudra and deity practices, Naropa also transmitted the Six Dharmas of Naropa? Naropa received these Six Dharmas in a very brief form from Tilopa, who transmitted the text Instructions on the Six Dharmas (Skt. Saddharmo-padesha). The Six Dharmas consist of six yogic practices that involve manipulating the subtle energies of the body into various subtle channels. Naropa expanded on these in the Six Dharmas of Naropa. These six practices are (1) inner heat (Tib. tummo), (2) illusory body, (3) clear light, (4) dream yoga, (5) the intermediate state (Tib. bardo), and (6) transfer of consciousness to a pure buddha field at death (Tib. phowa).

The Life of Naropa

In this teaching on Naropa, Thrangu Rinpoche had only a limited time to teach and so he decided not to give any details of Naropa's life before the time Naropa began looking for Tilopa. Also these accounts are difficult to present because the different accounts of Naropa's life often don't agree with each other. Since it may be useful, I will present some of the details about Naropa's early life here, based mostly on Herbert Guenther's translation of Lhatsun Rinchen Namgyal's Biography of Naropa.

Naropa was born in 956 in Bengal, an area in eastern India, which was also the home of Saraha and Tilopa. He came from the upper Brahmin class,¹ and at the age of eleven he went to study Buddhism in Kashmir (an area of great learning in northern India). Naropa spent three years with many great scholars studying the five branches of learning—arts, medicine, grammar, epistemology, and rhetoric—absorbing Buddhist philosophy and practices.

Naropa then married a woman named Vimala (Tib. Dri-med-ma) or Vimaladipe, but after eight years of marriage, they decided to divorce.

Naropa wanted to become a celibate monk, and he gave Vimala the choice of marrying someone else or of entering the Dharma. She decided to enter the Dharma and become a nun. At the age of twenty-five, Naropa became a novice monk and then returned to Kashmir, where he studied the Kalachakra, among other texts, and excelled at academic learning. He then went to Pullahari, where he became a fully ordained monk and wrote several commentaries on the Guhyasamaja, the Chakrasamvara, and the Hevajra tantras, which Guenther reports have all been lost. We do not know exactly where Pullahari was located except that it was close to Nalanda University (the remains of which can be visited today). Pullahari became famous because it was the place where later on Naropa transmitted a number of important teachings to Marpa, who then took them to Tibet.

At the age of thirty-three, Naropa entered Nalanda University, which had at least one thousand students, who came from many parts of the Buddhist world. At Nalanda, there were monks who practiced Hinduism, as well as Buddhist monks from all three turnings of the wheel of Dharma who

studied and practiced the teachings. Monks could also engage in tantric studies as well as general topics such as rhetoric, debate, and Sanskrit grammar. Naropa excelled in these studies and became one of four abbots of Nalanda, being the protector of the northern gate.

While Naropa was at Nalanda, he carefully followed all the Buddhist precepts and was a brilliant scholar. When he was forty-one, he was studying a religious text outside when an ugly hag who was a manifestation of Vajrayogini came to him and asked if he understood the "meaning" as well as the "words" of the text. This oft-quoted story illustrates the difference between reaching enlightenment via the sutra way of logical reasoning and the tantric way of nonconceptual meditation. This dakini persuaded Naropa to give up everything and go in search of the mahasiddha Tilopa. Naropa then left Nalanda University and went to Metog Nambu cemetery, where he built a grass hut and repeated the mantra of his personal deity (Tib. yidam) Chakrasamvara seven hundred thousand times. He then heard a voice that told him to seek Tilopa in the east.

It is at this point that Thrangu Rinpoche picks up the story of Naropa's life in chapter 2., describing the twelve minor trials that Naropa encountered before he actually met Tilopa in person. Then Rinpoche discusses Naropa's twelve greater trials with Tilopa, which took place over the next twelve years. Finally, after all these years with Tilopa, Naropa reached realization and Tilopa said,

Naropa who remembered all he heard
Was with me for twelve years.
To him I gave my intuitive understanding of the ultimate.
All future generations must rely on him
If they are to realize the ultimate nature of reality.

The various biographies agree that Naropa did reach enlightenment, which was proven by the fact that at his death he vanished into thin air, a practice that is now called achieving the "rainbow body." This sounds like a fantastical story made up by his devotees over a thousand years ago. The body's disappearing immediately upon a person's dying, however, seems less improbable now because in the last hundred years, dozens of Tibetan Buddhist practitioners who were practicing these same tantras have also achieved the rainbow body. So we should think of Naropa as being a real person who practiced all three wheels of Dharma and achieved a high realization that we can call enlightenment.

Biographies of Naropa

Surprisingly, there are few biographies of Naropa that have appeared in English.' Peter Alan Roberts reports that the earliest biographies that we have were written by Gampopa and by Lama Shang. A translation of the brief biography of Naropa by Gampopa can be found in Sangyes Nyenpa, Tilopa's Mahamudra Upadesha. The most thorough biography of Naropa is Herbert Guenther's translation of the sixteenth-century Tibetan writer Lhasun Rinpoche's Biography of Naropa. There is also a commentary by Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche on Naropa called Illusion's Game, which uses Guenther's translation of the Biography of Naropa for its root text, and a fairly long chapter on the life of Naropa by the Tibetan author Dorje Dze Od in The Great Kagyu Masters. Finally, there are two magazine articles on the life of Naropa, one by Khenpo Chodrak Rinpoche and one by Khenpo Karthar. The website of the Seventeenth Karmapa's also has a detailed article on Naropa's life.

There are also a number of works that are exclusively about the Six Dharmas of Naropa. These texts give detailed directions on the Six Dharmas, but they do not include the oral instructions from one's lama or guru. Typically one has to receive the empowerment, which must be given by a person who has practiced and realized the practice, and complete a three-year retreat to receive the full set of instructions on these practices. The reason for this is that the advanced deity practices and the practices of the Six Dharmas of Naropa involve manipulating the subtle, or vajra, body, which can alter very strong energies in the physical body, and if this is done improperly, it can result in serious mental and spiritual problems. The outer practices, however, have been described by Garma C. C. Chang in his Six Yogas of Naropa and Teachings on Mahamudra.' Glen Mullin has an excellent book

that provides a translation of Tilopa's Instructions on the Six Dharmas and several commentaries on this practice.¹⁸ Tilopa transmitted these instructions to Naropa, who then expanded and organized these into the Six Dharmas of Naropa. <>

TILOPA'S WISDOM: HIS LIFE AND TEACHINGS ON THE GANGES MAHAMUDRA by Khenchen Thrangu Based on Translations from Oral Teachings by Lama Yeshe Gyamtso, Jules Levinson, and Jerry Morrell [Snow Lion, 9781559394871]

Accessible and practical teachings on both the life of Tilopa, who founded the Kagyu tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, and one of his most important texts on the practice of Mahamudra.

Most traditions of Mahamudra meditation can be traced back to the mahasiddha Tilopa and his Ganges Mahamudra, a “song of realization” that he sang to his disciple Naropa on the banks of the Ganges River more than a thousand years ago. In this book, Khenchen Thrangu, a beloved Mahamudra teacher, tells the extraordinary story of Tilopa’s life and explains its profound lessons. He follows this story with a limpid and practical verse-by-verse commentary on the Ganges Mahamudra, explaining its precious instructions for realizing Mahamudra, the nature of one’s mind. Throughout, Thrangu Rinpoche speaks plainly and directly to Westerners eager to receive the essence of Mahamudra instructions from an accomplished teacher.

Review

“As one of the greatest living teachers of the Kagyu lineage, Yongzin Khenchen Thrangu is eminently qualified to describe the life of the mahasiddha Tilopa, who founded that same lineage. Thrangu Rinpoche’s clear exposition of Tilopa’s magical life and deeply spiritual poetry will make it possible for more people to be inspired by these precious stories and Mahamudra teachings.”—The Twelfth Tai Situpa

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Excerpt: When the Buddha passed away 2,500 years ago, he left a vast collection of teachings from his forty years of guiding laypeople and monastics. There were several main teachings of the Buddha that were quite radical given the religious beliefs and practices dominant in India during his lifetime. First, the Buddha denied the existence of any creator(s) of the world, a god, or gods, who must be worshipped. He taught that everything in this world came about because of cause and effect—much

like way that modern scientists describe the evolution of living creatures on earth. This contrasted greatly with the prevalent Hindu culture that posited that the world and everything that happened to the people and animals in it were due to the actions of the gods. Second, he taught that all men and women regardless of their nationality, race, or caste could practice what he taught and eventually reach complete enlightenment or awakening. This also differed greatly from Hinduism in which only the men of the highest Brahmin caste could learn Sanskrit and then perform religious ceremonies and achieve awakening. That only some people could learn Sanskrit was significant because people believed that while conducting a religious ceremony one had to pronounce each Sanskrit syllable absolutely correctly or the whole ceremony, or puja, would be defiled and become ineffective. Third, he taught that people should live in harmony with their environment, which means that animals should not be needlessly killed. This was in conflict with the prevalence of animal sacrifices at the time. Finally, the Buddha did not designate a person to head the Buddhist "church," and he did not give any instructions on how they should set up a hierarchical religion after his passing away. Rather, the Buddha laid down a set of rules for the ordained Buddhist sangha and suggested a fairly democratic way of making decisions and handling disputes based on respect, love, and compassion.

As the number of Buddhists grew and the Buddhist teachings spread to many different countries, Buddhism began slowly to develop two different methods for achieving awakening. On the one hand, monastic universities developed where a large number of monks from different traditions including Hindu specialists in the Vedas, rhetoric, medicine, and so on congregated and studied together, sharing the culture of India. Many pilgrims from Tibet and China visited these universities and brought back descriptions of these universities and what was taught in them, and actually brought back many of the texts that were taught there. As a result, we know who many of the great teachers were and what they taught. This immense learning, however, was totally unavailable to the ordinary person in India who spoke only their local language and therefore did not know Sanskrit, which was the language that most of the Buddhist Dharma was taught in. These monastic universities were mostly sponsored by rich patrons or the ruling kings, and they were mainly organized as feudal organizations.

On the other hand, there were also the yogi mendicants who were said to live "in the forest" (but more likely lived outside towns and larger cities) and who followed the siddha tradition of India; they taught ordinary people in their own local language. The siddha tradition in India goes back to before the time of the Buddha. Siddhas were wandering religious men who mainly engaged in various ascetic practices. Even today we can see these siddhas all across India doing ascetic practices such as not wearing any clothing, standing on only one leg for great lengths of time, rubbing themselves with ashes, and so on. Since the Buddha had actually engaged in these practices himself for six years and found that they did not lead to awakening, Buddhist siddhas do not particularly practice asceticism. Instead they attempt to reach awakening by breaking all their conventional conditioning and conceptual thinking and by acting in unconventional ways such as eating meat, intermarrying with members of the lowest castes, insulting officials and important people, and the like. The Buddhist siddhas that are best known are called mahasiddhas, and they were made famous by a compilation of short biographies about them called the Eighty-Four Mahasiddhas (composed by Abhayadatta, who lived in the early twelfth century). Tilopa and his main disciple Naropa are both considered to be part of this group of eighty-four mahasiddhas.

Tilopa (988-1069) was born in Bengal, India. Peter Alan Roberts gives a rare physical description of Tilopa as "a solitary dark-skinned wanderer with bulging eyes and long, matted hair." Tilopa received his name from til, which means "sesame seed" in Sanskrit. Because the great scholars, or panditas, worked and practiced in monastic universities with great libraries, their lives and works were much better documented than those of the mahasiddhas who often lived away from civilization; no one followed them into the jungles and small towns where they taught and wrote down any details about their lives. Also this was a time when dates were not considered important. In fact, the official

calendar of Tibet began in 1067, just two years before the death of Tilopa. Because we don't have a documented history of Tilopa's life, we have many conflicting stories about him. For example, the most important event of his life—when he attained enlightenment after pounding sesame seeds for many years—is told differently in several of his biographies: Several accounts state that Tilopa went to a town and asked to be chained there. He then remained there for twelve years before reaching realization. The biographies of Marpa and Wangchuk Gyaltsen tell the story that Tilopa was told by his guru Matangi to go to a town and pound sesame seeds during the day and to be a procurer for the prostitute Dharima at night without telling anyone that he was a mahasiddha. In a version told by the Seventeenth Karmapa, based on Taranatha's account, Tilopa was living in a monastery as a celibate monk and left the monastery and began living with the prostitute Dharima. There he pounded sesame seeds during the day and at night practiced Mahamudra with Dharima and thus reached enlightenment?

In India, the tenth century was a time when many people told elaborate stories about the powers of siddhas, and therefore many Western scholars have dismissed these stories outright. However, some of the stories about the powers of siddhas are true and others are intended to be merely symbolic. For example, in modern times, there are a number of great practitioners who have "traveled" to another dimension and received teachings from a famous but long-dead siddha (or accomplished one). Upon returning, they furiously write down these teachings and then give them to their students. Or realized teachers will sometimes know exactly what is going on somewhere out of their sight, even as far away as in a distant country. For example, when Lama Norlha, who lives in New York State, was visiting the young Seventeenth Karmapa in Tibet and describing his center, the Karmapa suddenly said, "What is that hole in your backyard?" The lama was taken aback and said that the hole was to be a swimming pool that he was building. Other lamas such as Adzom Rinpoche and the Seventeenth Karmapa have placed their hands on rocks and melted the surface enough to form a fingerprint or a handprint. Finally, many Buddhist practitioners have witnessed the practice of thukdam, in which a lama tells his students that he is going to die and then adopts a perfect meditation posture and remains there for days after his heart and breathing have stopped. In normal persons, the body slumps to the floor at death and the body becomes cold, but for the practitioner of thukdam, the heart area (where it is believed the mind resides) remains warm for days and the body doesn't lose its upright meditation posture. These siddhis or "powers," which are based on meditation practice, may not be as great as Tilopa's being able to conjure up a huge army (as one story about him has it), but they are powers not presently explainable by modern science.

Sometimes the story about a siddha's powers is intended to be merely symbolic; for example, a story about a siddha being burned alive and yet being unscathed by the fire. This is a symbolic way of saying that they had mastered the element of fire. Or a story that a siddha was drowned and yet survived may be a way of saying that they had mastered the element of water. It's even possible that a story of a siddha creating the illusion of a great army symbolically indicates that they had mastered the practice of the illusory body (Tib. *gyü lü*).

When Thrangu Rinpoche was asked about these miracles, he said that in a sacred biography (Tib. *namtar*), it really doesn't matter where the persons were born, where they traveled, and so on, because the stories are presented to explain how that siddha achieved enlightenment and that is what is really important. If we study these biographies, we can learn in a very interesting and nonacademic way what the path to enlightenment can be like and how extraordinary practitioners attained realization. This is why I have included Thrangu Rinpoche's teachings on Tilopa's life in the first part of this book.

The first biography of Tilopa was written by Marpa (1012-1097), who received the information from Tilopa's only major pupil, Naropa. This text has been translated by Fabrizio Torricelli and Sangye Naga and published as *The Life of Mahasiddha Tilopa*. A second major biography of Tilopa was

written by Wangchuk Gyaltsen (1317-1405), who was a student of Tsangpa Heruka. Wangchuk Gyaltsen collected ten different Tibetan biographies of Tilopa and assembled them into a single coherent story. This biography has been translated into English by Ives Waldo. A third significant biography of Tilopa was composed by Pema Karpo (1527-1592.) in his *Pekar Chöjung* (History of the Dharma), which is the text that Thrangu Rinpoche used in his oral teachings on Tilopa's life, which form the basis for some of the chapters in this book. This book has been translated by both Helmut Hoffman and the Nālandā Translation Committee. Finally, Khenpo Kön-chog Gyaltsen translated Dorje Dze Öd's *The Great Kagyu Masters*, which recounts the lives of the masters of the Drikung Kagyu lineage (Thrangu Rinpoche is of the Karma Kagyu lineage) and that has a fairly long retelling of Tilopa's life and also of his main pupil, Naropa.

The second part of this book includes the twenty-nine stanzas of Tilopa's Ganges Mahamudra, followed by Thrangu Rinpoche's commentary on it in eight chapters. The Ganges Mahamudra is a doha (song), a form of poetry written in rhyming couplets. Since the mahasiddhas taught in the language spoken by the people they lived among, and Tilopa was from Bengal, India, where people spoke the Apabhramsha language, this doha was originally written in Apabhramsha. Dohas were not ordinary songs or poetry, however. They were sung spontaneously by siddhas as an expression of their spiritual realization. So a more accurate translation of doha would be "spiritual song" or "a song of realization." They were not like a poem that you might write down, then come back to later in order to edit and improve it. The initial composition was final. However, since these dohas were passed on orally from teacher to student, several different versions of a doha may exist.

The term doha comes from Sanskrit where *do* comes from the word meaning "two," which refers to the two lines forming the rhyming couplets. When these couplets were translated into Tibetan, however, they were often transformed into four-line verses that did not rhyme. The Tibetan translations usually have the same number of syllables per line so they can be sung to many different melodies.

Saraha, who most likely lived in Bengal, which is in the eastern part of India, at least a century before Tilopa, is credited with giving the first recorded teachings on Mahamudra in his *Three Cycles of Doha*. Saraha was the king's main Brahmin and led an exemplary life. However, one day he met a lower-caste woman who was making arrows in the marketplace, and she ended up teaching Mahamudra to Saraha. He began living with her and started to act more like a mahasiddha than the king's head religious leader. Some citizens of the kingdom then came to Saraha and asked him to return to the palace; Saraha's reply was *The Citizen's Doha*, which described Mahamudra meditation. Then the queen came to ask him to return, and he replied with *The Queen's Doha*. Finally, the king himself came and made the same request, and Saraha replied with *The King's Doha*, again describing Mahamudra.

The next important Mahamudra texts that we know of were taught by Tilopa, who was also born in Bengal, where there were several monastic universities such as Somapuri. Some of the biographies say that Tilopa visited, and may have studied at, one of these monasteries. He most likely also spent a great deal of time teaching in small towns and forests and cremation grounds. As already mentioned, the several accounts of Tilopa's life do not always agree with each other.

According to James Robinson, Tilopa has eight different teachings in the Tengyur. This volume includes translations of two of his most famous dohas on Mahamudra along with Thrangu Rinpoche commentaries on them. The first is a four-verse teaching that Tilopa gave at the Pancapana marketplace where he attained enlightenment. The second is the Ganges Mahamudra that Tilopa taught to his most prominent student, Naropa, on the banks of the Ganges. The Ganges Mahamudra is by far his most famous teaching, and it has been translated at least a dozen times. Tilopa's third most important work was the teachings that he gave Naropa called *Instructions of the Six Yogas*

(Skt. Saddharmo-padesha, Tib. Chos druggi man ngag). These teachings were systematized and expanded by his student Naropa and are now popularly known as The Six Dharmas of Naropa (Tib. Na ro'i chos drug), or The Six Yogas of Naropa. While Thrangu Rinpoche has not publicly given teachings on The Six Dharmas of Naropa, he does teach them in his threeyear retreat programs.

What is so remarkable about the Ganges Mahamudra is that a thousand years ago it laid out the practice of Mahamudra in just twenty-nine verses. Moreover, Tilopa's description of how to engage in Mahamudra is almost identical to the descriptions of Mahamudra practice that have been given by contemporary Tibetan masters, including Thrangu Rinpoche. The Mahamudra tradition's ability to keep its practice free from adulteration for ten centuries is quite remarkable especially if we compare, for example, how the Christian church changed its doctrine and practice radically in its first one thousand years.

The reason why Mahamudra has remained unchanged is that it was transmitted in a special way. The persons who mastered it found it to be real and profound because it was not based on conceptual thought or cultural conditioning but on carefully examining the mind. Since all humans have a mind that is readily accessible and this mind is much deeper than its superficial thoughts and cultural concepts, it is available to anyone interested in examining it. The transmission began by encouraging people to practice Mahamudra. If a practitioner fully realized Mahamudra, then the teacher would allow that person to become a teacher. Moreover, the many students who practiced Mahamudra but did not reach full awakening did not lose anything thereby because the blessings of doing the practice helped them along the path of full enlightenment.

The Origins of this Book

In 1988 the Nālandā Translation Committee asked Thrangu Rinpoche to teach on Tilopa because they were translating an independent biography on him. Thrangu Rinpoche gave these teachings in Boulder, Colorado, that year, with Jerry Morrell doing the oral translating. Namu Buddha Publications was fortunate to receive an audio copy of these teachings, and the audio copy was transcribed and edited by Gaby Hollmann in 1990.

Thrangu Rinpoche also gave teachings on Tilopa in Nepal in 1991 while doing a pilgrimage to Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha, with Jules Levinson translating.

In 1994 Thrangu Rinpoche also gave teachings at Thrangu Tashi Chöling in Nepal on The Song of Tilopa, which was the teaching on Mahamudra that Tilopa gave at the Pancapana marketplace. These teachings were translated by Lama Yeshe Gyamtso.

Then in 1998 Thrangu Rinpoche gave a series of teachings in Vancouver, with Lama Yeshe Gyamtso translating, on the Ganges Mahamudra. For this volume, I have used Lama Yeshe Gyamtso's translation of the root verses, as well as his oral translations of Thrangu Rinpoche's commentary.

Finally, I have included Tilopa's famous six-line teaching on Mahamudra meditation in appendix A, which includes Thrangu Rinpoche's commentary on it that was orally translated by Jules Levinson and the full spiritual song from which the six-line teaching was taken.

Since Thrangu Rinpoche emphasized certain points in one teaching and other points in others, I decided to compose a single volume of these teachings on Tilopa that would make them more useful to the practitioner who desires to learn more about Mahamudra meditation and where it comes from. <>

ZURCHUNGPA'S TESTAMENT: A COMMENTARY ON ZURCHUNG SHERAB TRAKPA'S EIGHTY CHAPTERS OF PERSONAL ADVICE by Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche, based on Shechen Gyaltsap's Annotated Edition, translated by the Padmakara Translation Group [Shambhala, 9781559394925]

ZURCHUNGPA'S EIGHTY CHAPTERS OF PERSONAL ADVICE was the final teaching given by the great Nyingma master Zurchung Sherab Trakpa before he passed away. His counsels are the distillation of a lifetime's experience and comprise the practical instructions of a master who had made the teachings of the Great Perfection truly part of himself. The original text consists of almost 580 maxims, organized into eighty chapters covering the entire path of Dzogchen, from fundamental teachings on devotion and renunciation, through to a whole series of pith instructions that bring the Dzogchen view to life. Much of the meaning of these pithy, often cryptic, instructions could be lost on the reader without the help of the notes Shechen Gyaltsap Rinpoche provided in his annotated edition, which he based on the explanations he received from his own teacher, Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo.

This book contains a complete detailed teaching on Zurchungpa's text by Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche, based on Shechen Gyaltsap's notes. Originally intended as essential instructions for a group of practitioners in three-year retreat, it will undoubtedly serve as an indispensable guide to anyone who seriously wishes to practice the Great Perfection.

Zurchung Sherab Trakpa (1014-1074) was a key teacher in the Zur tradition, one of the handful of kama lineages through which the teachings of the Ancient Tradition were transmitted from master to disciple, beginning with Guru Padmasambhava and Vimalamitra, right down to the Nyingma masters of the present day. He was a learned scholar and accomplished meditation master who spent many years in retreat, practicing the teachings of the Great Perfection.

Shechen Gyaltsap Rinpoche (1871-1926) was an important disciple of Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo the Great and one of Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche's root teachers. An accomplished meditator, he was also one of the most respected scholars of his day, whose writings fill thirteen volumes.

Review

"When I think of Zurchungpa for his great scholarship, years of practice in solitary retreats, and for his great wisdom, compassion, and charisma to lead countless students of all levels, my mind naturally goes to Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche. He must have been someone like him. This book enshrines the living experience and heart of two truly realized masters, translated by people who not only understand but also practice the teachings."—Ringu Tulku

"An extraordinary guide to authentic spiritual practice, combining the wisdom of three of the greatest masters of the Tibetan tradition."—Matthieu Ricard

"Among the senior Tibetan teachers in our generation, it is well known that Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche's commentaries are not merely scholarly explanations but interpretations coming directly from the depth of his own personal experience. This wonderful text by Zurchungpa is further enriched by his remarkable commentary."—Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche "It is impossible to read this work with an open mind and heart without being deeply affected by the realized wisdom found on its pages. If we do not yet possess the deep trust or faith that makes our encounter with the

Dharma fruitful, this book has all the qualities necessary to ripen our mind to the point where it can readily 'mingle' with the Dharma, as Dilgo Rinpoche put it."—Georg Feuerstein, PhD

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DILGO KHYENTSE RINPOCHE'S COMMENTARY ON THE EIGHTY CHAPTERS OF PERSONAL ADVICE

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Excerpt: A notable feature of Tibetan Buddhist literature is the number of pithy and easily memorized texts that condense the classical teachings into practical instruction manuals. Often cryptic in style, they provide the practitioner with keys that serve as reminders opening up a complete range of teachings to be put into practice. Garab Dorje's *Hitting the Essence in Three Points*, Atisha's *Seven-Point Mind Training*, Gyalse Thogme's *Thirty-seven Practices of the Bodhisattva*, and Padampa Sangye's *Hundred Verses of Advice* are just a few examples of such works that have become important classics in their own right.

Less well known is **ZURCHUNG SHERAB TRAKPA'S EIGHTY CHAPTERS OF PERSONAL ADVICE** (zhäl gdams brgyad bcu pa)—personal not only because they represent the distillation of a

lifetime's experience of practice by a highly accomplished master, but also because they answer the needs of individual practitioners at different stages of the path. Each chapter deals with a particular topic and contains between three and thirty-four single-sentence instructions.

The Vajrayana teachings brought to Tibet by Padmasambhava, Vimalamitra, and other masters in the eighth century AD have come down to us by means of two kinds of lineal transmission: the short lineage of the treasures (terma), which were hidden by these great teachers and later rediscovered by the emanations of their disciples; and the long lineage of oral transmission (kama), in which the teachings have been transmitted from master to disciple until the present day. The early masters of this kama lineage belonged principally to four families, namely the So, Zur, Nub, and Nyak clans, and of these, the Zur family is noted for three outstanding masters: Zurpoche Shakya Jungne (the Great Zur), his uncle's grandson Zurchung Sherab Trakpa (the Little Zur), and Zurchungpa's own son, Zur Dropukpa Sakya Senge. These three masters of the Zur lineage had such mastery over mind and matter that, to judge from His Holiness Dudjom

Rinpoche's account in his *History of the Nyingma School*,¹ there was no distinction in their lives between the miraculous and the everyday. We read of them levitating, walking on water, flying through the air on the rays of the sun, passing through rock, lengthening a temple pillar that was too short, and performing numerous other feats. When, after a year-long retreat, Zurpoche performed a tantric dance, his foot sank up to the ankle in a rock. Zurchungpa, prostrating to the footprint of his guru, left the imprint of his own topknot and dangling earrings.

Nowadays, with the abundant use of special effects in cinema and television playing to our fascination with the supernatural, it is all too easy for us to be dazzled by the Zur masters' superhuman lifestyles and to forget that their miraculous displays resulted from years of genuine spiritual endeavor. They were fully enlightened beings who had completely transcended the feats they displayed. Their stories are intended to serve as inspirational models, and from reading them we can learn how to follow in their footsteps. In particular Zurchungpa's life story teaches us two things: that he earned his extraordinary degree of spiritual attainment by carrying out every one of his teacher's instructions to the letter; and that everything he did, however spectacular, was simply a manifestation of his enlightened activity for the sake of beings. His flying through the air, for example, enabled him to travel long distances swiftly and thus give three sessions of teaching in one day, each in a remote location many tens of miles from the last. His sole purpose in this was to benefit beings and spread the teachings more expeditiously. And although such impressive feats undoubtedly inspired devotion in his disciples, enabling them to receive blessings and progress on the path, he never used them in order to become famous.

The History of This Teaching

In the summer of 1986, Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche made one of his regular visits to the Dordogne in France, during which he gave a series of teachings to the three-year retreatants at Chanteloube, who had just completed the preliminary practices and were starting the "main" practice of the sadhanas and mantra recitations. The teachings he gave therefore included numerous empowerments, along with the oral transmission of a number of important texts, including some by his root teacher, Shechen Gyalsap Rinpoche. In particular he gave a detailed teaching on the latter's annotated edition of Zurchungpa's *Eighty Chapters of Personal Advice*, which he began by telling us, "While it is very important to receive empowerments to mature one's being, as we are engaged in practice it is also crucial to have the liberating instructions—the explanations on the practice. I will therefore give an explanation of these few pieces of spiritual advice."

We mention the background of this teaching not merely for historical interest but because it is important for readers to understand Khyentse Rinpoche's teaching within the context in which it was given. Zurchungpa's text contains profound instructions that will be difficult to put into practice effectively without first having received the necessary empowerments and blessings from a qualified teacher. Although times have changed and the Dzogchen teachings are given more openly than they were a thousand, or even fifty, years ago, it is certainly no less true that progress in the practice of Dzogchen depends exclusively on the blessings of the lama. Readers who wish to get the most out of Zurchungpa's advice need to use it hand-in-hand with the guidance of their own teacher.

Khyentse Rinpoche's manner of teaching consisted of reading the text—that is, Zurchungpa's root text and Shechen Gyaltsap's notes—interspersed with his own oral commentary. In some of the later chapters especially, he gave little or no commentary and read out the text on its own. Many of these sections consist of so-called pith instructions, seemingly simple phrases used by the enlightened masters of the Great Perfection to convey their profound realization to individual disciples, in quite specific situations. The words they used, often in relatively nontechnical language, were tools used as a support for transmitting ideas that completely transcended the literal meaning of the words themselves. The impact of these oral instructions is naturally lessened when they are confined to the printed page. And they are diluted even further in the process of being translated into English (with the syntactical constraints that translation implies and the possibility of errors in the interpretation of their stylistic peculiarities) by individuals whose spiritual realization could never begin to match that of the original authors.

Khyentse Rinpoche gave this teaching in Tibetan, and it was from recorded tapes that Matthieu Ricard subsequently made an oral translation for the benefit of the Chanteloube retreatants. The recording of this translation was then transcribed. Later the transcription was edited and a fresh translation was made of Shechen Gyaltsap's original text. Two editions were used. One was published by Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche at Shechen Monastery in Nepal and was the edition he taught from. The other was a photocopy made by Matthieu Ricard of an original woodblock edition brought back in 1989 from Shechen Monastery in Tibet. Both editions contain mistakes, but since the Nepalese edition omits some words and even whole sentences present in the woodblock edition, we have generally taken the latter as the more reliable and have done our best to incorporate the corrections into our translation.

A text of this sort contains much repetition of technical terms such as "absolute nature" and "unborn." For stylistic reasons we have occasionally used synonyms for some of these words. These and other technical terms are briefly explained in the Glossary. A deeper understanding of many of them may be obtained by reading books dealing with the graded path (lam rim), in particular Jigme Lingpa's *Treasury of Precious Qualities*, Patrul Rinpoche's *The Words of My Perfect Teacher*, and Gampopa's *Jewel Ornament of Liberation*.

Many of the points that Khyentse Rinpoche mentions in his teaching would have been impossible to index satisfactorily, and we have therefore attempted to summarize them thematically in the Table of Contents. <>

DHARMA MATTERS: WOMEN, RACE, AND TANTRA COLLECTED ESSAYS by Jan Willis Forewords by Charles Johnson and Janet Gyatso [Wisdom Publications, 9781614295686]

A powerful collection of essays on race and gender in contemporary Buddhist practice, a hot-button topic in the West right now, by one of the leading thinkers in the area.

Jan Willis was among the first Westerners to encounter exiled Tibetan teachers abroad in the late sixties, instantly finding her spiritual and academic home. *TIME* Magazine named her one of six “spiritual innovators for the new millennium,” both for her considerable academic accomplishments and for her cultural relevance. Her writing engages head-on with issues current to Buddhist practitioners in America, including dual-faith practitioners and those from marginalized groups.

This collection of eighteen scholarly and popular essays spans a lifetime of reflection and teaching by Willis. Grouped in four sections—Women and Buddhism, Buddhism and Race, Tantric Buddhism and Saints’ Lives, and Buddhist-Christian Reflections—the essays provide timeless wisdom for all who are interested in contemporary Buddhism and its interface with ancient tradition.

Reviews

“This collection of essays by Jan Willis, penned over thirty years of study, teaching, and practice, is destined to become an authoritative resource in Buddhist scholarship and thought. Willis challenges many of our preconceptions, but asks no more and no less than what the Buddha asked: come, see, and experience for yourselves.” —Sharon Salzberg, author of *Lovingkindness* and *Real Happiness*

“From Birmingham to Bodhgaya, Jan bridges worlds like no other. Her essays are treasures of wisdom born from a remarkable life richly lived.” —Matthew T. Kapstein, author of *Reason’s Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought*

“This book is a blessing for us all—across cultures, across genders, across traditions.” —Larry Yang, author of *Awakening Together: The Spiritual Practice of Inclusivity and Community*

Notices

“For half a century this wise professor-scholar, conscious feminist, deeply dedicated practitioner, and icon of genuine diversity has taught Buddha Dharma. The beautiful fruit of her work is visible here.” (Jack Kornfield, PhD, author of *A Path with Heart*)

“Jan Willis has practiced, reflected, and taught at one of the most important crossroads of American Buddhist life—the intersection of the activism of the Civil Rights movement and feminism, of Buddhist meditation with authentic Tibetan masters, and of the academic translation of Buddhism. This collection of her pioneering essays reveals her at once as a brilliant visionary, a pristine scholar, a heartfelt Vajrayana practitioner, and an incisive social commentator in the twenty-first century. What ties these together is her wise heart.” (Judith Simmer-Brown, Distinguished Professor of Contemplative and Religious Studies, Naropa University, and author of *Dakini’s Warm Breath: The Feminine Principle in Tibetan Buddhism*)

“Wisdom flows from every page of Jan Willis’s *Dharma Matters*. Her clarity of thought and insight remarkably expands the academic discourse of Buddhism into sacred conversations about gender, Buddhism, and race. Her art of storytelling and her voice bring Buddhism to life in a new way that offers hope for the present day and keeps the tradition alive for practitioners across the planet. Her

scholarship sings with a deep resonance that rocks the soul and awakens the heart-mind. This powerful collection of essays is a cherished gift reflective of an incredible life of scholarship, spiritual activism, and devoted practice.” (Melanie L. Harris, American Council of Education Fellow and Professor of Religion and Ethics at Texas Christian University, author of *Gifts of Virtue*, *Alice Walker*, and *Womanist Ethics*)

“Jan Willis—beloved teacher, learned scholar, pioneering practitioner-translator, cultural activist—is a national living treasure. With magisterial grace, wit, insight, wisdom, and compassion, she ranges in these eighteen diverse essays over vitally important topics of gender, Dharma, race, tantra, and liberation. In a rare yet inclusive achievement, she has kept faith with all her ancestors.” (Gaylon Ferguson, PhD, Acharya and Core Faculty in Religious Studies, Naropa University)

“This wonderful collection of essays and studies testifies not only to Professor Willis’s achievements as a scholar with multiple interests but also, in the more personal essays, to her dedication to teaching and her role as a pioneering African American Buddhist whose call for greater inclusiveness in American Buddhism is always enfolded in love, compassion, and plain human decency.” (Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi, translator and scholar)

“In **DHARMA MATTERS: WOMEN, RACE, AND TANTRA COLLECTED ESSAYS**, Dr. Willis weaves together personal, historical, cultural, religious, and universal wisdom, eloquently and tenderly offering a textured tapestry of intelligence and transformation. In this heartwarming and sagacious book, we are invited to recognize the green and golden threads of women and race wrapped in the warmth and timeless wisdom of the Dharma.” (Ruth King, author of *Mindful of Race: Transforming Racism from the Inside Out*)

“It is rare for a professor’s mastery of teaching to shine through their scholarship so vividly as in this welcome collection of Jan Willis’s work. Accessible, insightful, and warmly engaging, this volume demonstrates the range of her unique academic contributions while exemplifying her commitments to teaching, self-exploration, and self-discovery, which brightened the minds of countless students and inspired a whole new crop of professional Buddhologists to emerge from among them.” (Daniel A. Hirshberg, PhD, University of Mary Washington)

“For longtime fans of Jan Willis such as myself, it is a treat to have these essays gathered in one place. Her style of fine scholarship coupled with her unique personal touch and lifelong experiences will also delight new readers. There are important and even urgent issues discussed in these pages; the section on Buddhism and race is a rare contribution to a field with far too few resources for concerned practitioners and researchers. I would definitely assign the whole book if I still taught at a university. I hope others will.” (Sarah Harding, Tibetan translator and author of *Machik’s Complete Explanation*)

“Few Western Buddhist scholar-teachers of the past half-century have bridged so many worlds, and so successfully, as Jan Willis. She has helped pioneer the study of such key topics as Indian Buddhist understandings of reality, the nature of Tibetan biography, and Vajrayana meditation. She also has delved deeply into current conversations surrounding such difficult issues as Buddhism’s relation to race, gender, and interreligious relations. *Dharma Matters* brings together some of Willis’s most notable essays on all these topics, and whether written thirty years ago or just recently, each one sparkles with her inimitable voice—full of clarity, passion, intelligence, and self-awareness. No one interested in contemporary Buddhism—or its interface with older traditions—should be without this fine collection.” (Roger R. Jackson, author of *Mind Seeing Mind: Mahamudra and the Geluk Tradition of Tibetan Buddhism*)

“This collection of essays reflects the extraordinary range of Jan Willis’s scholarly voice and her authentic quest to make studies of Buddhism significant to students and a variety of academic audiences. She writes to underline the large, often neglected role of women in Buddhist history and to bring the Dharma into discussions of the original American sin of racism. Her scholarship on biographical literature highlights an important popular genre in Tibetan tradition, using prominent examples, and the discussions of Buddhist-Christian dialogue are rich in pedagogical and autobiographical insights. Hers is an authentic personal voice informed by scholarly acumen, lifelong meditative praxis, and deep engagement with her subjects. Jan Willis’s essays unfailingly invite creative (re)thinking of why Buddhism matters, from scholars to practitioners.” (Todd T. Lewis, Distinguished Professor of Arts and Humanities, College of the Holy Cross)

“This new book by Dr. Jan Willis is not only a must-read for all Buddhists interested in an unbiased inside look at gender issues in Buddhism; it is a delightful read that jumps off the page. It is a clear window into the many great contributions to the legacy of enlightenment made by Buddhist women in India and Tibet over the centuries, as well as some of the challenges that these women faced because of their gender. Put ten copies on your shopping list, and share the gentle wisdom of this African American female sage.” (Glenn Mullin, author of 25 books on Tibetan Buddhism)

“A dip-into book that reveals gems of erudition and fascination in the historical development of Buddhism. Whether your interest is gender, race, tantra, or insight into Dr. Jan Willis’s own spiritual journey from a black Southern Baptist to a Tibetan Buddhist, you will be greeted by a rich fare of well-researched information.” (Vicki Mackenzie, author of *Cave in the Snow*, *The Revolutionary Life of Freda Bedi*, and other titles)

“People (mainly professors) write books about philosophy, religion, race, and feminism. The best of them impart knowledge, but in a book by Jan Willis, she shares herself and her wisdom as well as her knowledge. It is a rare and rewarding experience.” (Allen Wood, Indiana University Bloomington)

“This volume of essays exemplifies the life and work of Prof. Jan Willis, a scholar-practitioner and teacher extraordinaire. The essays express her heartfelt and insightful reflections on a lifelong journey from the Jim Crow South of her childhood, into the contemporary and historical worlds of Buddhist South Asia, and back to an emerging American Buddhism. Though based on intrepid and innovative research, it is Willis’s gift for storytelling that transports the reader into the ‘lived worlds,’ the human dimensions, of her varied subjects—be they contemporary African American Buddhists (or ‘Baptist-Buddhists’ such as herself), Buddhist women both ancient and modern, or Tantric Buddhist practitioners whose contemporary or exemplary lives (*nam thar*) she has illuminated with empathic understanding.” (William Waldron, Middlebury College)

“In *Dharma Matters*, beloved teacher Jan Willis blends warm, masterful storytelling with rigorous research and deep wisdom. The result is an educational, inspirational book that gives voice to a unique, academic-practitioner, Buddhist-Baptist perspective on the pressing cultural and spiritual issues of our time—women, gender, race, truth, freedom, and love.” (Pamela Weiss, author of *A Bigger Sky: Awakening a Fierce Feminine Buddhism*)

“*Dharma Matters* offers us the depth and breadth of Jan Willis’s work in over thirty-five years in the academy. With forewords by the African American Buddhist and National Book Award–winning writer Charles Johnson and by the renowned Buddhist studies scholar Janet Gyatso, this volume includes Willis’s essays on Buddhist nuns, on African American and American Buddhism, on the role

of love as a Baptist-Buddhist, and on teaching Buddhism. This collection is incredibly valuable for Buddhist studies, African American studies, and Religious studies.” (Carolyn Jones Medine, University of Georgia)

“In Tibet it is customary to gather together the collected works of prominent lamas. It is fitting that we should do something similar to honor Jan Willis, one of our own great teachers whose work has benefited so many. This volume is a testament to the depth and breadth of Willis’s engagement with Tibetan Buddhism and with issues of race, gender, and identity.” (Brandon Dotson, McKenna Chair of Buddhist Studies, Georgetown University)

“Dr. Jan Willis is a remarkable practitioner-academic whose work is easily accessible and responsive to both practitioners and academics. This collection allows us to join her inquiry of Buddhist practice and faith and the various intersections that have often been ignored. It is a treasure reflecting a deep knowledge and respect for the fact that without faith, practice, and study, Buddhism would cease to exist.” (Bishop Myokei Caine-Barrett, Nichiren Shu Order of North America)

“Insightful and reflective, covering not only her personal journey into Buddhist studies over the past fifty years but also topics central to the field as a whole, Willis’s collection of essays are as relevant and engaging today as they were when she first composed them, speaking with a voice that inspires readers to reflect on a wide range of issues in both society and their own personal lives.” (Paul G. Hackett, Columbia University)

“Dr. Jan Willis is a pioneering voice gently cutting through superficiality in both traditional and popular notions of scholarship. In this collection, you will find each essay to be a precious jewel shining light on the engaging topics of women and Buddhism, Buddhism and race, Tantric Buddhism and Buddhist saints’ lives, and Buddhist-Christian comparative reflections. This book is a compelling, socially grounded witness to embodied and engaged spirituality, to the intersectionality of human suffering, and to the transcendent healing power of looking deeply into topics that matter.

“Dr. Willis first came to my attention while completing my doctorate in Religious studies with an emphasis on Buddhism. As both a Baptist minister and Buddhist Dharma teacher, I yearn for such essays as these offered by Dr. Willis, which are offered with joyful wisdom. If you desire an uplifting companion on your life journey, *Dharma Matters* is a worthy guide. Do not miss this book.” (Larry Ward, PhD, director of the Lotus Institute, coauthor of *Love’s Garden: A Guide to Mindful Relationships*)

“As a black feminist scholar-practitioner, Jan Willis has been a unique voice in American Buddhism. This collection provides a welcome overview of her important contributions in many different areas.” (David R. Loy, author of *Ecodharma: Buddhist Teachings for the Ecological Crisis*)

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Excerpt: Jan Willis is one of our outstanding American pioneers of Buddhist studies. By that I mean both the field of Buddhist studies in America and what might be called "American Buddhist studies." On the first, she was already influential back in the 1970s, when she served as one of the critical advocates for the field to be recognized and allowed panels at the American Academy of Religion annual conventions. Jan Willis had in any case begun to demonstrate in her own work what the range of that field could and should be, starting with traditional doctrinal/ philological study of Yogācāra Buddhism but quickly moving into things like the study of women in Buddhism, the concurrent use of secular and normative sources to complement each other, an interest in vernacular genres like biography, and even the importance of material culture to the study of Buddhism before that became a thing. In all of this work, Jan Willis evinces a fine and nuanced sense of the issues, raised widely in the social sciences, around the impossibility of pure objectivity in academic scholarship, not to mention the complexities around identity and advocacy, especially in the study of religion.

Just as much, Jan Willis's work has been a model for what we might call "American Buddhist studies." By that I mean learned and careful work that can speak to contemporary issues of importance to people in America, not only specialist scholars—issues especially related to race, class, and gender, all of which continue to trouble both theory and practice in religion today. It is amazing how much this side of Jan Willis's work remains at the current cutting edge of American Buddhist studies. She is not only one of the first to deploy feminist criticism in her study

of Buddhism. She is also one of the first to explore openly the problems around race and the discomfort of people of color in American Buddhist communities. The latter writings, some of which are included in this volume, are still fresh and relevant around a problem that one would think could have been, and would have been, eliminated long ago! But in fact the problem is very much still with us today—Buddhist inclusiveness and compassion notwithstanding. We all have very much to learn from Willis's judicious reporting on this discouraging state of affairs and her accompanying thoughtful and balanced insights. Her work has, moreover, a great relevance for the recent womanist intersectionality with Buddhism. But again, Willis was writing about these things before they were named as such in larger academic circles.

This is also to say that Jan Willis's scholarship can readily be said in particular to instantiate what we might call 'African-American Buddhist studies:' even if the precise meaning of such category has yet to be defined. It may still be early in the development of any such orientation to pinpoint exactly what it is in Willis's ways of thinking about Buddhism past and present—what she notices, what she highlights, how she tells her stories—that can be connected specifically to the traumatic social memory, on the one hand, and the rich intellectual and cultural heritage, on the other, that she is heir to from her family and upbringing in Alabama in the 1950s. This question will best be left to those who have expertise in the history and nature of that memory and that heritage. But for starters we can propose that Willis's distinctive take on her work in Buddhist studies has everything to do with her own unflagging concern for social justice and her insistence on placing that concern on the moral horizon of all of her writing and research.

What we have in the present volume is a full range of Willis's expansive perspectives and concerns. With the exception of her scholarship in Yogācāra doctrine, which is not included here, the reader will be treated to important samples of her thinking on topics from Buddhist sociology, history, scripture, and doctrine to candid reflections on a slew of intractable matters around race, gender, religious identity, and the conundrums of being simultaneously a scholar, teacher, and practitioner, including her own personal investment therein. In the essays reproduced here Jan Willis gives us extremely useful historical studies and overviews of the situation of nuns in a religion that has not always been egalitarian with respect to gender, itself still a very live issue in the Buddhist community worldwide. She provides us with an overview both of the transition of Buddhist scriptures out of misogyny into inclusivity and what can be gleaned of the social facts on the ground about Buddhist female patrons and practitioners. We get a wonderful essay filled with astounding stories about the playfully brilliant figure of the *dākinī*, that famous Buddhist female angel/trickster/teacher. We get broad insights and information about the practice of telling and writing life stories of Buddhist masters in Tibet. But despite their erudition and scholarly gravity, in these essays we can also always tell that Jan Willis is pursuing such topics in light of questions close to her own heart.

For me, there is something about Jan's writing voice that perhaps is most impressive of all. Jan Willis does not stint on critique where it is called for, but she also finds creative ways forward with a generous hermeneutic that has at least one eye on the future. Her voice is kind. It is kind to her readers, providing accessible explanations and food for thought, patient and methodical, but without ever pandering or going light. Many of the essays in the volume deal specifically with Willis's own personal experiences. This includes her interviews with living examples of whatever concerns her in the essay at hand, from the nuns of Ladakh, to fellow African Americans feeling adrift or uncomfortable in a range of Buddhist contexts, to inspiring and highly accomplished African American teachers in that same American Buddhist world. And while the interview mode already opens up the personal and real-life dimensions of the topic under discussion for both author and reader, Jan Willis is never shy to go even further and use her own self as an example too, and to write candidly, for example, out of her own experience of the perils of the Western Buddhist sarigha for a person of color.

Many of the essays reference Willis's struggles with issues around her identity, including most of all the question of being Baptist and Buddhist at the same time, as well as all the complexity around being African American in Buddhist settings. Yet another issue for Willis, and I dare say many other scholars, especially the younger generation in the academic field of Buddhist studies, is the conundrum around being not only a scholar and practitioner at the same time but also feeling frustrated at the potentials of teaching from a Buddhist perspective while being constrained from so doing in a liberal arts setting. Such a question about engaged scholarship and pedagogy is in fact resonant with some of the central issues raised in womanist thought. Willis may not solve all of these conundrums, but she has many ideas to share and the courage to lay them out. In this she is

continuing on a path she first opened up for herself when she came out as a Buddhist practitioner in her earlier book *Dreaming Me*. But perhaps most inspiring for me in all of this is simply the tenor of an authorial voice that is comfortable with hyphens. Jan Willis has never shied at crossing boundaries, be these intellectual or spiritual.

I would add that these essays have been really useful to me myself as a reader, both in thinking through the hyphens in my own identity and my own experiences of negotiating boundaries between history and normative discourse as a scholar and teacher. Willis finds a way to inch us forward in resolving some of these tensions, even providing in one of the chapters here a veritable manual, with bibliographical detail, of how to teach Buddhism in the academy in a way that does justice to the richness of the tradition for both the study of religion and for religious life going forward.

I would personally also like to mention with considerable gratitude that it was Jan Willis who got me started on my own academic path. When I was floundering after finishing my doctoral dissertation, Jan offered me a chance to teach twice for her in the wonderful Religion Department at Wesleyan University when she went on sabbatical. It was an honor to step briefly into her shoes, and I think my sense of her greatness of spirit and vision helped shaped my own trajectory and sense of what is possible, and desirable, in being a teacher and scholar of Tibetan Buddhism.

Let me close with my gratitude for this lovely new collection, and for its many rich and delightful passages. For example, it is highly interesting—and I dare say, useful and instructive—to read her accounts of several near-death experiences and how she just spontaneously—and very naturally—burst into both Buddhist and Christian songs and prayers in her moments of panic and confusion. And why not? Look out too for an astonishing, if not entirely anguish-free, vignette in this book, where you will find Jan Willis staring down a black Buddha in Bang-kok, Thailand, in 1981. And then there is a great account of the eminent Lama Yeshe hearing Angela Davis speak and then expressing his high admiration for her. Talk about beautiful intersectionality! And just one more—you will meet in these pages a wonderful Buddhist nun who tells Jan Willis, "If I could practice higher thoughts and teachings, that would be better, but just saying *Om mani padme hūm* is enough for me."

Well this book, with its panoply of knowledge, experience, wisdom, and kindness, is more than enough for me—not to mention chanting the mantra of compassion, *Om mani padme hūm*, as much as I can. <>

THE LOTUS SUTRA: A CONTEMPORARY TRANSLATION OF A BUDDHIST CLASSIC translation and introduction by Gene Reeves [Wisdom Publications, 9780861715718]

The Lotus Sutra is regarded as one of the world's great religious scriptures and most influential texts. It's a seminal work in the development of Buddhism throughout East Asia and, by extension, in the development of Mahayana Buddhism throughout the world. Taking place in a vast and fantastical cosmic setting, the Lotus Sutra places emphasis on skillfully doing whatever is needed to serve and compassionately care for others, on breaking down distinctions between the fully enlightened buddha and the bodhisattva who vows to postpone salvation until all beings may share it, and especially on each and every being's innate capacity to become a buddha.

Gene Reeves's new translation appeals to readers with little or no familiarity with technical Buddhist vocabulary, as well as long-time practitioners and students. In addition, this remarkable volume includes the full "threefold" text of this classic.

Review

"Difficult as it may be to interpret ancient Tibetan Buddhist imagery for contemporary meditators, it is perhaps even more challenging to make historical Buddhist texts accessible. In a new translation of *The Lotus Sutra*, Gene Reeves aims to do just this. Reeves uses everyday language wherever possible, translating into English many words that previous works have left in Sanskrit. This approach is particularly appropriate for the Lotus Sutra, which emphasizes that enlightenment is attainable for everyone.", *Tricycle*

"This translation is immediately the new standard, expressing the Lotus Sutra with accuracy, clarity, and fresh readability. The text's genius and subtle spiritual teachings are skillfully captured for a wide audience." -- Taigen Dan Leighton, Loyola University, author of *Visions of Awakening Space and Time: Dogen and the Lotus Sutra*

"A highly readable new translation of the great Lotus Sutra, Gene Reeves skillfully renders the complexity of the text from a scholarly standpoint while delivering its flavor for practitioners. An invaluable resource for students in the classroom as well as in the meditation hall." -- Mark Unno, University of Oregon, author of *Shingon Refractions*

"For readers who are not familiar with the Lotus Sutra, this is an excellent opportunity to acquaint oneself with a bedrock Mahayana text. Dr. Reeves brings a welcome perspective of both scholarship and sympathy to the text, which is extremely multifaceted and requires flexibility to fully represent its fascinating-and at times somewhat frustrating-elements. This new version is also particularly important because it includes the rarely translated Sutra of Innumerable Meanings and the Sutra of Samantabhadra Bodhisattva, which are traditionally considered to be the preface and appendix of the main text and hold an important place in the liturgy and study of the Lotus Sutra. And Dr. Reeves has made a strong effort to make the text truly accessible to anyone, including non-Buddhists and non-specialists.", *Tricycle Editors' Blog*

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Lotus Sutra does not correspond to anything in Chinese or Japanese. The full title in Chinese is Miao fa-lian-hua jing, and Myō-hō-rence-kyō in Japanese. Literally these characters mean "wonderful Dharma lotus flower sutra." Although sometimes it is found, the usual shortened title in the text itself is Fa-hua jing in Chinese and Hoke-kyō in Japanese. In English this would be Dharma Flower Sutra. I'm uncertain about how or why this text came to be called the "Lotus Sutra" in English. I suspect it is because the first Western translation of it, in 1852 by Eugene Burnouf into French, was titled *Le lotus de la bonne loi*.

Often used as the base of statues of buddhas and bodhisattvas or held in the hands of bodhisattvas, the lotus flower may be the most common of Buddhist symbols. It is especially important in Mahayana Buddhism, where it symbolizes the bodhisattva as one who is firmly rooted in the mud of the earth and flowering toward the sky. It is a symbol of working in the world to help others to awaken while finding inspiration in a sense of the cosmos.

Thus the lotus flower and the lotus plant are important in the sutra. But more important than the plant itself, it seems to me, is its flowering. The sutra wants us to understand it as a blossoming of Buddha-dharma. Its own short title, "Dharma Flower Sutra," or even "Dharma Flowering Sutra," would thus be more appropriate than "Lotus Sutra" for the short title of this text, except, of course, for the fact that it is already well known as the "Lotus Sutra."

Key Teachings

Traditionally, following Zhiyi, the sixth-century founder of the Chinese Tiantai School of Buddhism, the Dharma Flower Sutra was understood to be composed of two halves. The first, ending with chapter 14 and centered on chapter 2, the Skillful Means chapter, is called the opening half and has to do with the idea of the one vehicle of many skillful means. The second half, centered on chapter 16, the chapter on the length of the Buddha's life, has to do with how the Buddha is both everlasting and embodied in a great many forms. This twofold division is still a useful one, as it provides a convenient way of understanding key teachings of the sutra and unifying diverse parts of the text.

One Vehicle of Many Means

Often the model of the one vehicle of many means is the famous parable of the burning house found in chapter 3 of the Lotus Sutra. A father manages to get his children to abandon their play and escape from a burning house by telling them that the playthings they had long wanted—carriages

drawn by goats, deer, and oxen—are waiting for them just outside the gate. But after everyone is safely outside, the father decides that he is rich enough to give each of the children a much larger and nicer carriage drawn by a great white ox. And this he does to the children's great delight.

The parable can be taken to indicate that there are four vehicles in all and that the three lesser ones are replaced by the great one. More commonly, however, the one vehicle is understood to be inclusive of the three. "Shariputra," the Buddha says in chapter 2, "with their powers of skillful means, the Buddhas have distinguished three ways within the One Buddha—Vehicle." The three carriages represent three different approaches to practicing Buddha-dharma—the shravaka, the pratyekabuddha, and the bodhisattva ways. Very little is said about the second of these three, that of monks who pursue awakening by and for themselves deep in forests in isolation from others. The first, the shravaka way, is a portrayal of traditional monks who pursue awakening in monastic communities, primarily by listening. "Shravaka" means hearer. Quite often in the text these first two ways are assimilated into a single way, such that there is a contrast between this pair, exemplified by monks who pursue the fundamentally negative goals of nirvana, putting out of passions, and such, and the third way, the way of the bodhisattva, which is basically understood to be the pursuit of awakening in interaction with others in the world.

Here there is also a basic contrast between the goal of the shravaka, which is to become an arhat, one who is worthy of offerings, and the goal of the bodhisattva, which is to become a buddha. Bodhisattvas are often called children of the Buddha because they are formed by the teachings of the Buddha. Who and what they are is more importantly a function of what they have learned from the Buddha than it is of their birth. In a sense, the Dharma they have inherited from the Buddha is more important than the genes and culture they have inherited from their parents. Much of the Lotus Sutra is a championing of this bodhisattva way, which is also the way to supreme or complete awakening. The goal of nirvana should, according to this text, be understood as a limited and inadequate goal, but nevertheless one that can lead to the bodhisattva way and thus to supreme awakening.

While the three ways can be understood as two, they can also be understood as representative of many ways. "Ever since I became a buddha," Shakyamuni says at the beginning of chapter 2, "I have used a variety of causal explanations and a variety of parables to teach and preach, and countless skillful means to lead living beings." The reason the Dharma is so difficult to understand and accept is that a great many teaching devices have been used, among them both the metaphor of the three vehicles and the reality underlying the metaphor, the three different approaches themselves. What makes everything clear, says the Buddha, is an understanding of the one vehicle of many skillful means now being revealed.

While the Lotus Sutra rejects the extreme of pure diversity and the consequent danger of nihilism through use of the one vehicle as the unity in purpose of the many skillful means, it also clearly rejects the opposite extreme of complete unity in which diversity disappears or is relegated to mere illusion. Here diversity is not lamented but regarded as a necessary consequence of the fact that living beings and their situations are diverse. And it is celebrated as the way in which a diversity of people can share the Dharma. Even when the sutra describes a future paradise, it includes shravakas as well as bodhisattvas; the diversity of approaches never disappears. In this sense, as in many others, this sutra teaches a "middle way," here a middle way between utter diversity and sheer unity.

The infinite variety of ways of teaching have the one purpose of leading all living beings to pursue the goal of becoming a buddha, a goal that everyone without exception can reach, though the time may be very long and the way far from smooth or easy. "Shariputra," Shakyamuni says in chapter 2, "buddhas of the past, through an innumerable variety of skillful means, causal explanations, parables, and other kinds of expression, have preached the Dharma for the sake of living beings. These

teachings have all been for the sake of the One Buddha—Vehicle, so that all living things, having heard the Dharma from a buddha, might finally gain complete wisdom."

As in the case of the carriages in the parable of the burning house, the great vehicle can be understood as replacing the other vehicles, or as making skillful means unnecessary. There are passages in the sutra that suggest this interpretation. We might call this the narrow interpretation of the Lotus Sutra, a perspective taken by some followers of Nichiren. They insist that in the Lotus Sutra they have found the one truth in light of which all other claims, and all other forms of religion including all other forms of Buddhism, are to be rejected as false and misleading. Most of those who study the Lotus Sutra, however, understand the teaching of the one vehicle in a much more generous, inclusive way.

The one vehicle itself can be understood as nothing but skillful means. That is, without a great variety of skillful means there can be no one vehicle, since it is through skillful means that living beings are led toward the goal of being a buddha. Without skillful means the one vehicle would be an empty, useless vehicle. Furthermore, the one vehicle itself is a teaching device, a skillful means of teaching that the many means have a common purpose.

When speaking of skillful means, some contemporary interpreters of Buddhism choose to use phrases such as "mere skillful means" or "only skillful means" to indicate that teaching by skillful means is an inferior practice, something used only when one does not have something better. But this is never, I think, the perspective of the sutra itself. There, when some action is said to be a skillful means it is always taken to be something wonderful, a way by which someone, typically the Buddha or a stand-in for the Buddha, is able to save people, converting them into bodhisattvas.

Though I think this image of the one vehicle of many skillful means is the primary model for the reality of the one and the many, throughout the text a variety of other images express the theme of the reality and importance of the one and the many. On more than one occasion, for example, the many worlds of the universe are brought together into a unity. In a related image, Shakyamuni Buddha is said to have countless embodiments in other worlds, buddhas who are real in their own right yet closely tied to Shakyamuni Buddha. Similarly, buddhas of the past, present, and future are many and different, yet are somehow one in that they teach the same thing and their lives follow the pattern of Shakyamuni's. All of these images serve to affirm the inseparability of the one and the many.

One Buddha of Many Embodiments

The second half of the sutra, centering on chapter 16, can be understood as involving another one-and-many, the one Buddha of many embodiments. Throughout the sutra, but especially in the second half, there is an expressed concern over the question as to who is going to carry on Shakyamuni Buddha's teachings after his complete nirvana, his death. Various bodhisattvas promise to do so, often with an expectation that they will face strong opposition and humiliation. The most dramatic affirmation of the role of bodhisattvas in continuing to spread Buddhadharma is the story in chapters 15 and 16. Some of the bodhisattvas who have come to this world along with their buddhas in order to see Abundant Treasures Buddha in his stupa offer to remain in this world to help Shakyamuni Buddha, the buddha of this world, in his especially difficult task of teaching and demonstrating the Dharma. Shakyamuni basically responds by saying, "Thanks, but no thanks. We already have plenty of bodhisattvas of our own." Then a great host of bodhisattvas springs out of the earth. Everyone is shocked and wants to know who could have led and taught such an incredibly large number of bodhisattvas. And Shakyamuni Buddha responds that he taught them all. How such a thing could be possible, when Shakyamuni had been alive and teaching for only a relatively few years, is taken up in chapter 16.

I agree with those who understand that this great hoard of bodhisattvas includes bodhisattvas of ages to come; that is, bodhisattvas who will carry on in place of the Buddha when he is no longer available, at least no longer available as the historical Shakyamuni Buddha. Because the Buddha and his Dharma are alive in such bodhisattvas, he himself continues to be alive. The fantastically long life of the Buddha, in other words, is at least partly a function of and dependent on his being embodied in others. With the exception of the now deceased Abundant Treasures Buddha, while many different buddhas appear in the Lotus Sutra, not one is unaccompanied by bodhisattvas, suggesting that buddhas need bodhisattvas. Those who do the work of the Buddha are bodhisattvas, even when they don't know they are doing the work of the Buddha.

Thus the bodhisattvas found in the final chapters, including Guan-yin, can quite appropriately be regarded as buddhas. It is no accident that both Wonderful Voice Bodhisattva and Guan-yin, the Regarder of the Cries of the World Bodhisattva, can take on the form of a buddha when that is what is needed. Scholars may very well say that Guan-yin is not a buddha, but any devout Chinese layperson can tell you that Guan-yin is a fully awakened buddha who has chosen to continue to work in this world as a bodhisattva. Such a view is consistent with the Lotus Sutra.

Embodying the Buddha is not something limited to bodhisattvas, at least not to bodhisattvas who are recognized as such. In some ways chapter 10, "Teachers of the Dharma," is the most surprising and unconventional chapter in the sutra. There the Buddha points to a huge congregation, one that includes not only monks, nuns, laypeople, shravakas, and bodhisattvas but also a large assortment of nonhuman creatures, dragon kings, centaurs, and such, and he tells Medicine King Bodhisattva that if anyone asks what sorts of beings will become buddhas in ages to come, Medicine King should tell them that these are the ones who will do so. This chapter insists not only that all living beings have the potential to become buddhas eventually but that anyone can be a Dharma teacher now.

The idea in this sutra that everyone has the ability to become a buddha gave rise to the association of the sutra with the notion of Buddha-nature as found in somewhat later Mahayana sutras. The term "Buddha-nature" is another powerful expression of the reality and importance of the one Buddha in many embodiments. One's Buddha-nature is both the Buddha's and one's own. Consequently, anyone can develop an ability to see the Buddha in others, their Buddha-nature. Thus, to awaken is to see, to see the Buddha, or as the text often says, to see countless buddhas.

It would be a great mistake, I think, to reify this notion, turning it into some sort of substantial reality underlying ordinary realities, something that is easy to do and is often done. In the text itself, it seems to me, Buddha-nature has no such ontological status. It is mainly a skillful way of indicating a potential, a potential with real power, to move in the direction of being a buddha by taking up the bodhisattva way.

It is also a very clever way to answer the question of how it is possible for one to overcome obstacles, however conceived, along the path of becoming a buddha. If ordinary human beings are completely under the sway of passions and delusions, by what power can they break through such a net of limitations? Some say that it is only by one's own strength; one can be saved only by oneself. Others say that it is only by the power of Amida Buddha or perhaps Guan-yin that one can be led to awakening. The Lotus Sutra says that it is by a power that is at once one's own and Shakyamuni Buddha's. The Buddha really is embodied in the lives of ordinary people. He himself is both a one and a many.

Wisdom, Compassion, and Practice

While the ideas of one vehicle of many skillful means and one Buddha of many embodiments can be seen as the central teachings of the two halves of the sutra, a great many other things are, of course, taught in the Lotus Sutra, some implicitly, some explicitly. There is, for example, the important notion that the Dharma rains on all equally, nourishing all in accord with their needs. Combined with

the ideas that Buddha-nature can be found in all people, that anyone can be a Dharma teacher, that all are equally children of the Buddha, and that following the bodhisattva way is not limited to those identified as bodhisattvas, one finds a powerful counter to the prevailing Indian ideas of rank and status as purely a function of birth and stage of life.

In addition to the extremely important but relatively abstract notion of following the bodhisattva way, the Lotus Sutra frequently advocates concrete practices, which are often related to the sutra itself. They are often given as sets of four to six practices, but include receiving and embracing the sutra, hearing it, reading and reciting it, remembering it correctly, copying it, explaining it, understanding its meaning, pondering it, proclaiming it, practicing as it teaches, honoring it, protecting it, making offerings to it, preaching it and teaching it to others, and leading others to do any of these things. The six transcendental practices taught especially for bodhisattvas also play a prominent and important role. But in the first chapter we find a story about a previous life of Maitreya Bodhisattva in which, as the disciple of another bodhisattva, he was called "Fame Seeker" because he was especially attracted to lucrative offerings. He read and memorized many sutras but forgot all of them and gained nothing from his reading. But, having "planted roots of goodness," he was able to meet countless buddhas and later became Maitreya Bodhisattva, the future buddha. Even more influential is the story of Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva in chapter 20. This bodhi-sattva did not read and recite sutras but simply went around telling everyone he met that they would become buddhas. Often despised for this, he persisted in refusing to be disrespectful to anyone. Later, after hearing the Lotus Sutra from the sky, he was able to enjoy a large following and eventually became Shakyamuni Buddha. What's most important, these stories seem to say, is not which religious practices you use but how you treat others. To do good, in other words, is to follow the bodhisattva way.

The Lotus Sutra itself ends with a chapter on the bodhisattva Universal Sage and is traditionally followed by a sutra on the contemplative methods of Universal Sage Bodhisattva. Universal Sage has widely been taken to symbolize Buddhist practice, putting Buddhist teachings to use in everyday life, making them a foundation of one's life. Manjushri and Maitreya are the two bodhisattvas who appear repeatedly in the sutra. Manjushri symbolizes Buddhist wisdom: both practical wisdom, the wisdom that solves or overcomes problems through knowledge and rational analysis, and creative wisdom, the imaginative wisdom that leads to fresh solutions to practical problems—difficulties such as helping one's son to overcome a depressing sense of inadequacy, or getting one's children to take an antidote for poison. Maitreya, along with Guan-yin, symbolizes compassion—not as just a state of mind but as the energy and drive, the inner motivation, that make it possible to work for the benefit of others as well as oneself. Universal Sage can be said, then, to symbolize the coming together in everyday life of wisdom and compassion, which can be taken perhaps as one way of expressing the heart of the Lotus Sutra.

Peace

Throughout the sutra many traditional Buddhist doctrines are mentioned and sometimes discussed, especially the four holy truths, the eightfold path, the twelve-link chain of causes and conditions, and the six transcendental practices. Thus it is possible to interpret the sutra as having the purpose of overcoming suffering. Such basically negative goals as overcoming suffering, getting rid of attachments, becoming free of faults, dispelling illusion, and so on are not to be disparaged. They do describe very important Buddhist goals. But at least for the Lotus Sutra they are not enough. Beyond them there is always a positive goal.

The positive goal of the Dharma Flower Sutra is described in several different ways. Here I have used the idea of becoming a buddha as the highest goal. Of course being a buddha is also called "supreme awakening," often translated as "enlightenment." So it might rightly be said to be the highest goal. Another very prominent term in the sutra is "joy." Over and over we are told that a

result of hearing even a small part of the sutra is joy. And we are allowed to witness the great joy that comes to Shariputra when he realizes that he too is a bodhisattva on the way to becoming a buddha. Joy can be said to be the goal of the Lotus Sutra. Another equally important term is "peace." "It is not my intent," the Buddha says in chapter 3, to lead people to extinction. "I am the king of the Dharma, free to teach the Dharma, appearing in the world to bring peace and comfort to all the living." Peace can also be said to be the goal of the Lotus Sutra.

The goal of peace has inspired many people to work not just for inner peace but for peace in families, communities, nations, and the world. Peace is not the mere absence of conflict. It brings joy and happiness to living beings and gives them the strength to share their joy and happiness with others, so that all can work together to transform the world into a pure land of peace. <>

THE COMPLETE COLD MOUNTAIN POEMS OF THE LEGENDARY HERMIT HANSHAN translated by Kazuaki Tanahashi and Peter Levitt [Shambhala, 9781611804263]

Welcome to the magical, windswept world of Cold Mountain. These poems from the literary riches of China have long been celebrated by cultures of both East and West—and continue to be revered as among the most inspiring and enduring works of poetry worldwide. This groundbreaking new translation presents the full corpus of poetry traditionally associated with Hanshan (“Cold Mountain”) and sheds light on its origins and authorship like never before. Kazuaki Tanahashi and Peter Levitt honor the contemplative Buddhist elements of this classic collection of poems while revealing Hanshan’s famously jubilant humor, deep love of solitude in nature, and overwhelming warmth of heart. In addition, this translation features the full Chinese text of the original poems and a wealth of fascinating supplements, including traditional historical records, an in-depth study of the Cold Mountain poets (here presented as three distinct authors), and more.

Review

“A deep, inspiring, inclusive study of the mysterious poet Hanshan. This book includes all his poems with a beautiful introduction by Levitt and a thorough historical analysis by Tanahashi. The reader can feel the joy, care, and reverence both translators experienced and share in creating this book about the wild hermit poet. Just read a few of these ancient poems and you’ll want to take off for the mountains and open your arms to all of life, including the pain and suffering. Read more and you will find your own true heart right here in the present. This book should be read by everyone.”—Natalie Goldberg, author of *The Great Spring* and *Writing Down the Bones*

“This comprehensive work of original scholarship and incisively translated verses expands our knowledge of an iconic poet. Here is the Hanshan of social fabric and family as well as of monastery and mountain; the poet of parable, rebuke, and opinion as well as of dharma and icy stream. A sharp-tongued observer of society’s failures describes inequality’s effects on the spirit; a rapt solitary shares cliff-edge mind with tigers, free-drifting boats, and clouds. Kaz Tanahashi’s and Peter Levitt’s **THE COMPLETE COLD MOUNTAIN** joins the shelf of indispensable translations, confirming and extending Hanshan’s abiding relevance, presence, history, and range.”—Jane Hirshfield, author of *The Beauty and Ten Windows: How Great Poems Transform the World*

“Hanshan may be legendary or he may have been three people, but these poems, wherever they came from, are more real than real. They are living Tao and Chan artifacts, well over one thousand years old, brought to life and framed in the most amazing ways with the deepest appreciation for and direct transmission of their down-to-earth, embodied, non-dual, poetic elegance and existential poignancy by Kaz Tanahashi and Peter Levitt. This work—the poems themselves coupled with the

authors' probing commentaries about their puzzling origins, structure, and essence—is a jewel, with the wondrous property that you can live inside it and let it live inside you for a long, long time.”—Jon Kabat-Zinn, author of *Full Catastrophe Living* and *Meditation Is Not What You Think*

“**THE COMPLETE COLD MOUNTAIN** is an extraordinary collection of the complete works of Hanshan; brilliantly translated by Kazuaki Tanahashi and Peter Levitt, it lifts the spirit in the great mountains and beyond.”—Joan Halifax, abbot of Upaya Zen Center and author of *Standing at the Edge*

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Excerpt: In a most beautiful poem, where pines sway in the wind and bamboo stalks rustle beneath a moon that rises above the solitary magnificence of Tiantai Peak, the legendary hermit poet Hanshan ("Cold Mountain"), who had left behind what he called "the dusty world" of delusion to live a life of wandering and solitude among the mountains he loved, makes a confession I find quite moving:

Scanning the green slopes below,
I discuss the profound principle with the white cloud.
Though the feeling of the wild is in mountains and waters,
truly, I long for a companion of the way.

His statement, like so many others in his extant body of work, is as characteristically unguarded, wise, and tender as it is true, and not for the poet alone. My sense is that all people long for a true companion as we move through the switchback twists and turns of our given lives, climbing the literal and figurative mountains we come upon or descending into some of life's more treacherous or mysterious valleys. On occasion, we might even find ourselves saying, as Hanshan does,

Lost now on my path,
Shadow, tell me, which way should I go?

Sometimes we may have the good fortune to meet that companion in the comings and goings of our daily life, and at other times we may meet that person, who seems to know us in ways we have always longed to be known, through the lines of a poem. Though the poems in this collection were written more than twelve hundred years ago, poetry that expresses our common human experience with the unflinching wisdom and truth found in Hanshan's writing has a way of collapsing time and distance, and even cultural differences, because it speaks from the deeply understood heart of life itself.

Because of the compassionate discernment, profound tranquility, unexpected insight, and the occasional outrageous humor of his poetry, Kaz Tanahashi and I have gratefully considered Hanshan one of life's treasured companions for fifty years. As a result of the kinship we feel with him, we

gathered together, translated, and now offer readers the most complete version of the poet's work to date in the English language. And, I must say at the outset, as we worked with a great and joyous dedication to enter the original spirit and meaning of each poem, while remaining as faithful as possible to Hanshan's choice of language, we discovered that the poet who had traveled with and within us for so many years had a depth and diversity of expression far greater than even the Hanshan legend and lore portrays or than we had imagined before undertaking the serious task of translation.

There appear to be no accurate, official records that document the life of the poet who took the name Hanshan to express both the place that he lived (in the Tiantai mountain range of southern China) and the nature of his heart and mind. It was the poet's way of saying, Who I am and where I am and what I am are just one thing. I do believe, however, that the open, straightforward speech of Hanshan's poems meaningfully serves as a reliable biographical source of this poet who spent decades in virtual solitude in his mountain retreat and yet showed the care he still felt for his fellow human beings by offering to guide them, through the poems he was given to make, in various and sometimes unpredictable and provocative ways.

But, there is more. Kaz has done an extensive study of the poet's life and legend (found on page 2.17 of this book) and, based on a textual study of the poems, has developed a well-grounded theory that he refers to as the "three Hanshan poets theory." According to Kaz's considerable research into reliable sources, the poet traditionally called Hanshan may actually have been at least three people who wrote under the same name.

In part, this theory is based on the time span when the Hanshan poems were written, which is likely more than two hundred years. In addition, there are the poetic and linguistic patterns and historical references found in the poems. These three elements taken together provide convincing evidence for our theory. I encourage you to read Kaz's fascinating chapter called "A Study of the Poet" to find out more.

Based on this groundbreaking discovery, we have organized our book into three parts that highlight the time periods when we believe the poems were written. Nonetheless, because of the consistency of heart and mind found in the poems, I have chosen to speak of Hanshan as just one person. Perhaps it is the shared quality of mind that the collective Hanshan poets possess that allows me to speak in this way. After all, the poems also speak to the Hanshan in us as readers, and so this Hanshan heart and mind do not even belong solely to the writers of these poems.

The act of translation is mysterious to most people, sometimes even to translators themselves. So that we might translate Hanshan as faithfully as possible, Kaz and I dedicated ourselves to following a process that might be considered a modest kind of alchemy. We knew that in order to bring Hanshan's poems across as wholly as possible to readers, we would have to meet this hard-to-find hermit poet not only in the Chinese ideographs in which he wrote his poems, which gave us great pleasure to read, but in that place before the poems were written, the source that caused him to write in the first place—namely, what he experienced in his body, heart, and mind.

To accomplish this subtle and difficult task, we would have to do our best to make the journey to Cold Mountain, as he did, so that we might have as genuine a grasp as possible of Hanshan's life. Perhaps it might be considered the kind of transmission, or intuitive knowing, that many poets and artists in all media speak about receiving from the things of the world just as they are:

You ask the way to Cold Mountain,
but the road does not go through.
In summer, the ice is not yet melted,

the morning sun remains hidden in mist.
 How can you get here, like I did?
 Our minds are not the same.
 When your mind becomes like mine,
 you will get here, too.

As you can see, to bring Hanshan's poems to readers, we could not simply translate Chinese ideographs into what might be considered their equivalent English words; true translation does not come about in that way. Our journey to Cold Mountain, then, asked us to travel with great respect and care through the ideographs, almost as a lifeline, to that most intimate place from which the words came out: the place that exists outside of language, including the ineffable realms of feelings, perceptions, physical sensations, and moments such as the one that caused Hanshan to end another one of his poems:

With a bed made of thin grass
 and the blue sky for my cover,
 I rest my head happily on a stone pillow
 and follow the changes of heaven and earth.

Without setting out to make such a journey to that inmost place, how else could we ask our words to convey the nature of Hanshan's direct experience and understanding so that our readers might know his world in a way that is as vivid and alive in their own bodies and minds as it was in his? This was our endeavor, and it was a humbling journey to be sure.

The Hanshan we met "before words" was not just the idealized, eccentric, wild-man hermit living in the mountains, speaking in a manner that was insensible to most people, as has often been described in the Hanshan lore, though certainly the poems make clear that he must have been some of what the legend portrays. But, as the poem and excerpts I've quoted above reveal, and as you will see throughout this collection, he was also a man of deep human and humane feeling, and a person of yearning. He was someone with an insightful societal concern and critique, as well as a devoted spiritual seeker, meditator, and Zen practitioner. And overall, as a lover of the natural world, he was a poet who retreated to the mountains from a society he found extremely disheartening so that, in the fertile quiet of his mountain cave and the surrounding environment of this abode, he might come to experience and know the true nature of life itself.

Indeed, his choice to live "like a lone flying crane," where he would sometimes find himself "grasping [his] knees against a howling wind" or, conversely, find that his life of joyous rambling was "just so good" did not preclude him from experiencing all of the other emotions and states of mind that, in part, reveal the inner truths of what a human life is.

Many of the poems alternately express an almost impossible-to-imagine tranquility as he spends his time "pure and relaxed ... free from the stain of worldly things ... mind serene as a white lotus," but there are also poems that express anger or condemn selfishness, greed, and willful ignorance, in a voice that at one moment may be scathing and in the next exposes a genuine wish to help people avoid the hellish results of living in such a way.

In addition, some of Hanshan's poems reveal a profound sense of loss due to the unavoidable truth of impermanence and death as he remembers family and friends from the years before he went off into the mountains, where he had to face his solitary shadow on the wall of his cave. As he expresses it, "before I knew it, two threads of tears came streaming down." But we also hear him expressing periods of true clarity, discernment, and, one might even venture to say, enlightenment, where he experiences his daily life as one of extraordinary peace and joy, lazily playing his lute, reading Laozi or other ancients beneath a tree, or just wandering in the mountains as "a person of nondoing."

And then there is the great compassion and tenderness the poet feels for all living beings. In these poems, Hanshan makes it clear that though we may choose to leave the world behind, a departure that is a fantasy many people entertain from time to time, we should not be surprised that the world finds a way to pack itself among our few belongings. We might even write, as Hanshan did, "Who would think I could leave the dusty world, / just charging up Cold Mountain from the south?"

Some poems reveal his insight into human ignorance and voice the compassion he felt for those who suffer, as when he wonders about a scene he came upon that touched him deeply:

Rich people meet at a tall building
decorated with shining lamps.
When a woman without even a candle
wants to draw near,
they quickly push her away,
back into the shadows.
How does adding someone diminish the light?
I wonder, can't they spare it?

Elsewhere, he reaches out through his poetry to encourage others to honor their own nature:

If you look for it, you can't see it,
it goes in and out without a gate.
If you shrink it, it exists in one square inch.
If you stretch it, it is everywhere.
If you don't trust and treasure it,
you cannot encounter it.

Throughout, it is clear that the world of Hanshan, who "chose to live in obscurity, / [his] home beyond the noise and dust of the world," is large; one might even say that it is all-inclusive.

By honoring his own nature and moving to Cold Mountain, Hanshan found a way to live that allowed him to put an end to what he called "useless mixed-up thinking," so that everything could be at rest, and he could live his life as he felt it was meant to be lived, saying:

In idleness, I write my poems on stone walls,
accepting whatever happens like an untied boat.

As he went about his daily life, he gathered roots and vegetables in the wild, sometimes wandered twisting paths deep in the mountains to visit venerable monks or friends; he offered medicine to those who might be ill and wrote his poems to track the movement of his mind. And many times he would meditate in his cave through the night or simply sit on the precipice of a cliff, which led him to understand

my mind is like a solitary cloud, completely free.
Vast and unhindered, why would I search for worldly things?

It was a realization he was to have again and again, one that inspired his most deeply held desire that all people and all forms of life would also know the freedom of living. <>

THE ART OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY: EIGHT CLASSICAL TEXTS AND HOW TO READ THEM by Paul R. Goldin [Princeton University Press, 9780691200781]

A smart and accessible introduction to the most important works of ancient Chinese philosophy—the *Analects* of Confucius, *Mozi*, *Mencius*, *Laozi*, *Zhuangzi*, *Sunzi*, *Xunzi*, and *Han Feizi*

This book provides an unmatched introduction to eight of the most important works of classical Chinese philosophy—the *Analects* of Confucius, *Mozi*, *Mencius*, *Laozi*, *Zhuangzi*, *Sunzi*, *Xunzi*, and *Han Feizi*. Combining accessibility with the latest scholarship, Paul Goldin, one of the world's leading authorities on the history of Chinese philosophy, places these works in rich context as he explains the origin and meaning of their compelling ideas.

Because none of these classics was written in its current form by the author to whom it is attributed, the book begins by asking "What are we reading?" and showing that understanding the textual history of the works enriches our appreciation of them. A chapter is devoted to each of the eight works, and the chapters are organized into three sections: "Philosophy of Heaven," which looks at how the *Analects*, *Mozi*, and *Mencius* discuss, often skeptically, Heaven (*tian*) as a source of philosophical values; "Philosophy of the Way," which addresses how *Laozi*, *Zhuangzi*, and *Sunzi* introduce the new concept of the Way (*dao*) to transcend the older paradigms; and "Two Titans at the End of an Age," which examines how *Xunzi* and *Han Feizi* adapt the best ideas of the earlier thinkers for a coming imperial age.

In addition, the book presents clear and insightful explanations of the protean and frequently misunderstood concept of *qi*—and of a crucial characteristic of Chinese philosophy, nondeductive reasoning. The result is an invaluable account of an endlessly fascinating and influential philosophical tradition.

Review

"An outstanding introduction to eight of the most important and influential texts of classical Chinese philosophy. Goldin forefronts the question of what these texts are and how we should read them, demonstrating in practice that philosophical analysis is only enhanced when it is combined with textual history. This is a wonderful work, fully accessible and filled with invaluable insights."—**Michael Puett, author of *The Path: What Chinese Philosophers Can Teach Us about the Good Life***

"*The Art of Chinese Philosophy* is a masterpiece. It raises the discussion of these texts to a new level by combining incisive readings with new understandings inspired by linguistic analysis and advances in textual criticism. Goldin combines a mastery of the secondary literature, lucid prose, excellent translations, and an ability to indicate the texts' modern relevance when appropriate. The major advantage of this book over manifold others is its incomparably better understanding of the complexity of these works."—**Yuri Pines, author of *The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy***

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What Are We Reading?

This book presents interpretations of the eight most important classical Chinese philosophical texts: Analects (Lunyu), Mozi, Mencius (Mengzi), Laozi, Zhuangzi, Sunzi, Xunzi, and Han Feizi. These eight have been chosen both because they continually respond to each other's arguments and because they have exerted outsize influence on subsequent generations. Except for the Analects, which purports to record conversations between Confucius (551-479 BC) and his disciples, each text is named after a supposed author, honored by the term Master. (Mencius is merely Mengzi, Latinized by Jesuits.) The very titles have fostered considerable misunderstanding.

Although the positions taken in these texts are never identical—the diversity of Chinese philosophy rarely fails to impress—they do address a number of central questions: What obligations do human beings have toward one another, and why? How do we construct an ideal government? What is a life well lived? Hovering over all of these is a rationalist metaquestion that reflects the crisis of the waning of the Bronze Age: How do we answer such questions for ourselves, seeing that gods and spirits, despite our richest devotions, have failed to do so? And with Bronze Age rituals and diplomatic conventions no longer being recognized, at unprecedented cost of human life, what measures can states take to secure their survival? The anxiety of a collapsing society, and the awareness that it will have to be replaced, are palpable throughout. It is no coincidence that the historical period has long been called the Warring States (Zhangu). It ended with the unification of China under the First Emperor in 221 BC.

One traditional approach to this material has been to divide it into "schools" (jia): the Confucians said this; the Daoists said that; the Legalists said something else entirely.' Sometimes one encounters the cliché "the contending voices of a hundred schools" (baijia zhengming). This conception of Warring States philosophy as a landscape of warring philosophical factions has a long history in China, where the term jia has been used to group philosophers into a handful of categories,

sometimes in a sincere attempt to understand the complex intellectual history, but all too often as a device to caricature opposing viewpoints. In fact, the latter seems to have been the original purpose.

The historical problem with this practice is that only two of these postulated schools, namely Confucians (Ruzhe) and Mohists (Mozhe), identified themselves (and each other) as such, and can be said to have established any institutions. All the others have been reconstructed purely on the basis of their supposed stances, raising a concomitant philosophical problem: the division of texts into "schools" has served to obscure important differences among their supposed members. As I have argued elsewhere,¹ "Legalism" is the most pernicious label of the bunch, but "Daoism" illustrates similar weaknesses: Laozi and Zhuangzi, the two most prominent "Daoist" sources, differ profoundly on the value of government and usefulness, while *dao* is also one of the most important concepts in Xunzi, a Confucian text. Does this mean that Xunzi was a Daoist too? And if not, why not?

The sources are simply too rich, and the overall discourse exhibits too much intertextuality, for the "schools" approach to offer more than a crude sketch. At its worst, it tends toward reductionism. Hence I prefer to read each text as a text: not necessarily as the manifesto of a school, nor even necessarily as the work of a single brilliant mind. The modern world has developed some good methods of reading texts, and they can help with Chinese philosophy too.

One of the first questions that readers must ask themselves, regardless of their hermeneutic framework, is what they are reading. In Chinese philosophy, the question is not often raised, in part because of the longstanding but specious assumption that the eight classic philosophical texts were written by the great masters whose names they bear. This approach is congruent with a cardinal tenet of traditional Chinese aesthetics: works of art and literature are produced by talented human beings as a way of channeling their responses to poignant events. It follows that a great work must have been composed by a great author—and since the texts are undeniably great, each one must have been produced by a magnificently talented human being.

Far from denigrating Chinese philosophy, liberating it from these mythic suppositions only improves our understanding and appreciation of it. As we shall see, not one of the eight texts was written in its present form by the philosopher to whom it is attributed. In some cases, the attribution would not be helpful even if it were valid, since we know virtually nothing about the person who bore the name. This is clearest in the case of Laozi, the mysterious sage whose identity has been disputed since antiquity; but the supposed biography of Sunzi, that is, the great military strategist Sun Wu, also contains so few credible elements that there remains little reason to assume that he was a real person—other than that traditionalists have long believed it.

More details will be presented in each chapter below; for now, the important point is that such claims do not impugn the stature of Laozi or Sunzi because it is untrue that great texts must be written by solitary geniuses. Widespread acceptance of the composite authorship of the Bible, for example, has not led anyone to doubt that it is one of the most important texts in Western civilization. By contrast, sustaining the fiction that each classical Chinese philosophical text is the product of a great mind comes with serious interpretive costs. Most patently, it encourages a presumption of philosophical coherence where there may be scant historical warrant for it. More insidiously, it disregards the extent to which transmitters, redactors, and commentators shaped the text for their own audiences and purposes, whether by engineering new implications through new juxtapositions or by foregrounding the passages that appealed to them and mitigating—if not simply excising—those that did not. (Lest there be any doubt about the last possibility, consider that Mencius comes down to us in seven chapters because its redactor, Zhao Qi [d. AD 201], excised four others that he deemed unworthy.) A modern reader of classical Chinese texts must strike a fundamental balance: paying due attention to the historical circumstances of each text's transmission

without losing sight of its animating ideas—for the ideas are the reason why the texts were transmitted in the first place. It is all too easy for academic interpreters to veer too far in either direction.

Laozi presents yet more ramifications, because no single redaction ever reigned supreme. Hence we speak today of the Wang Bi (AD 226-49) edition, the Heshanggong, edition, the Xiang'er edition, and so on, not to mention the two manuscript editions from Mawangdui and related smaller anthologies from Guodian. The differences among these versions—both textual and philosophical—are often substantial.

The associated interpretive pitfalls are sometimes underestimated. A text like Laozi, by its nature, can hardly be read without "commentary" (zhu). Many commentaries were supplied by the earliest transmitters of a text, such as Zhao Qi and Guo Xiang. Far more of them existed in antiquity than are extant today, because the commentaries of a small number of transmitters were typically singled out by posterity as authoritative. Editions of the text would thenceforth be published only with the canonical commentaries; other commentaries would survive in fragments, if at all. But ancient commentaries were not neutral. Commentators expressed their personal understanding of the text, which was often idiosyncratic and creative. The commentary could come to represent an entire tradition, with its own glosses and, not infrequently, its own version of the text itself, as one quickly discovers by perusing the spectrum of Laozi commentaries—among which Xiang'er, which was used by the Celestial Master sect (tianshi dao), is apt to strike modern readers as the most outlandish (p. 77).

Furthermore, the mechanisms of manuscript transmission help explain why received texts were furnished with commentaries. Because early manuscripts were usually produced for audiences that were already familiar with the material and its characteristic formulas, they were written with economical and underdetermined graphs. Insiders, who perhaps learned the texts under the guidance of an authoritative teacher, knew when their community read the graph *dui* as *shuolshui* it and not, say, *tuo* (to cite a typical example of graphic underdetermination), but to outsiders, such codicological conventions naturally left the text open to a multiplicity of interpretations. Redactors did their best to eliminate this type of ambiguity by adding, regularizing, or modernizing semantic classifiers (such as *Ti*; in the graph *shuo/shui*). In this manner, they made the text intelligible to a larger number of readers, but it also inevitably narrowed the range of possible interpretations. As texts circulated ever more widely among readers who, unlike the ancients, had no specialized knowledge or authoritative teacher to guide them orally, explanatory commentaries came to be regarded as indispensable.

Only by ignoring this gnarled background would one dare to distinguish confidently between "the text" of Laozi and its "commentaries." A related methodological misstep, when encountering a difficult passage, is to rummage through attested commentaries for a reading that happens to suit one's predilections. A traditional Chinese commentary is a network of interpretations undergirding a discrete worldview; extracted from its context, a commentarial opinion loses its very logic. In the same vein, it makes little sense to speak of "the philosophy" of a constellation of texts like Laozi without specifying a particular perspective (or, less honestly, without stating which perspectives one is privileging—and why). Laozi has thrived for over two millennia precisely because generations of readers continued to find new meaning in its lapidary verses.

The purpose of highlighting such interpretive challenges is not to diminish the philosophical value of early Chinese texts or to deny that they can be read rigorously and profitably. By no means does a text require single and undisputed authorship to be meaningful: for a quotidian example, consider an ordinary Wikipedia article, but more venerated ones abound, such as the Constitution, the Old Testament, the Mahābhārata, or virtually any Mahayana sūtra. Conflicting recensions often arise in

Western literature as well, particularly in cases where the author died before securing publication. Nor is historicism the only legitimate hermeneutic stance. In the pages that follow, the emphasis will be on ideas, both because this puts the texts in their best light, and because an interest in ideas is probably what prompted anyone to open this book. But philosophical readers accustomed to books unproblematically attributed to Hume or Kant need to be mindful that they are reading works from a different time and place, with radically different conceptions of authorship. Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Sunzi are texts, not people.

The next chapter will take up a hallmark of Chinese philosophy that demands a Western reader's cognizance: its preference for nondeductive argumentation. Then comes the core of the book, eight chapters devoted to the eight philosophical texts; and lastly an explanation of the versatile concept of *qi*, which can be confusing because of its wide range of connotations. <>

THE DAODE JING: A GUIDE by Livia Kohn [Guides to Sacred Texts, Oxford University Press, 9780190689810]

The *Daode jing* ("Book of the Dao and Its Virtue") is an essential work in both traditional Chinese culture and world philosophy. The oldest text of philosophical Daoism, and widely venerated among religious Daoist practitioners, it was composed around the middle of the 4th century BCE. Ascribed to a thinker named Laozi, a contemporary of Confucius, the work is based on a set of aphorisms designed to help local lords improve their techniques of government. The most translated book after the Bible, the *Daode jing* appears in numerous variants and remains highly relevant in the modern world. This guide provides an overview of the text, presenting its historical unfolding, its major concepts, and its contemporary use. It also gives some indication of its essence by citing relevant passages and linking them to the religious practices of traditional Daoism.

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Excerpt: The Daode jing or Tao Te Ching is the oldest and most venerated scripture of Daoism and a classic of world philosophy. Often hailed as representing the core of ancient Chinese mysticism, it is in fact a multifaceted work that can, and has been, interpreted in many different ways: a manual of strategy, a political treatise on the recovery of the Golden Age, a guide to underlying principles, and a metalinguistic inquiry into forms of prescriptive discourse. Fundamentally it can be read in different ways: as a document of early Chinese culture or as a scripture of universal significance, cosmologically or practically, as a general statement or an expression of an esoteric teaching.

Looked at in terms of Chinese culture, concepts of statesmanship, political principles, military strategy, and royal virtues become essential—the focus is on understanding the text in the context of contemporaneous works and the social and political situation of the time. Seen as a scripture of universal significance, ideas of personal cultivation, freedom of mind, and the attainment of spontaneity and naturalness take center stage—the text's main appeal is its timeless characterization and alleviation of the human condition. Both approaches are equally important and have been proposed by readers and scholars over the centuries; both are also evident in numerous traditional commentaries and the uses of the text throughout Chinese history and particularly the Daoist tradition.

Also known in the West as "Taoism"—using an older mode of transliterating Chinese—it is famous for its philosophy and health practices. Its philosophy centers on the concept of "Dao" or "Way;" and presents notions of naturalness and spontaneity, nonaction and going with the flow. Its health practices often take the form of taiji quan and qigong, utilizing deep breathing, slow motion, gentle stretches, and meditation. While both philosophy and health practices constitute major aspects of Daoism, they form only a part of the entire complex, which also includes an organized, communal religion of social and political dimensions, with formal rituals and ordination hierarchies, potent talismans and magical spells, as well as visualizations and ecstatic excursions to the stars.

Daoism was not always seen as consisting of these three dimensions. When Western missionaries first encountered it, they followed the dominant Confucian perception and focused entirely on its ancient classics such as the Daode jing, ignoring its cultivation practices and condemning its popular rituals as "heathen." The texts, on the other hand, they admired and interpreted in a Christian light, trying to find God and Western values in them. This attitude has led to the widespread adoption of the age-old distinction between daoia, the "Daoist school;" originally a bibliographical classification that goes back to the first century BCE, and daojiao or the "Daoist teaching;" a term applied to

organized groups in the early middle ages and found in texts from the fifth century onward. In Western terms, the two are called "philosophical" and "religious" Daoism, a cleft that has prevented a proper understanding of the tradition as a whole. Recently, a more appropriate and integrated understanding has come to the fore that sees the ancient "thinkers" as informed and infused by practices, especially meditation and other forms of self-cultivation, as well as often living in communities that presage later organizations.

Today scholars see the Daoist tradition as consisting of three major branches: literati, organized, and self-cultivation. More specifically, literati Daoists belong to the educated elite and focus on Daoist ideas as found in the ancient texts, applying them to their lives and expanding them to influence the political and social situation of their time. Their goal is to align themselves with Dao and enhance universal harmony, legitimizing their ideas on the basis of a deep dedication to the classical texts. They are often writers, compiling interpretations, commentaries, and exegeses, and also integrating Daoist concepts into literature, poetry, and art. Working in different areas of society, in some cases retiring to their landed estates to lead a life of leisure, they derive their self-identity from ideas centered on Dao, shaping the tradition as textual commentators, religious patriarchs, and modern intellectuals.

The second branch of the religion, what used to be "religious" Daoism, we now call "organized." Its members similarly appear in various functions and levels of society but their distinguishing mark is that they belong to one or the other communal group that practices organized religion. These groups have priestly hierarchies and monastic orders, and they support formal ordinations, regular rituals, and prayers to the gods. Some are close-knit fraternities with esoteric practices that actively separate from the rest of society; others form part of ordinary society, often furnishing neighborhood temples that serve to create a spiritual dimension to the life cycle by celebrating weddings, graduations, business ventures, and funerals as well as offering services of healing, protection, and exorcism. These groups have extensive codices of scriptures, hagiographies, and manuals, now collected in the Daoist canon, which in its present form goes back to 1445. Historically, there are traces of early groups, notably centering on the vision of the Daode jing, but as a strong social force they appear only in the second century CE. Since then, they have vacillated between marginal, even rebellious, positions and times of great political influence, overall forming a firm part of mainstream culture since the fifth century.

The third group of Daoists focus on personal self-cultivation, practices known summarily "nurturing life" (yangsheng). From an early time linked with the personal adaptation and intentional activation of virtues and subtle states described by the ancient thinkers, these practices include breathing techniques, physical exercises, dietary and sexual moderation, as well as—most importantly—forms of meditation described in terms of quiet sitting, concentration, and clarity and stillness. By the second century BCE, detailed manuals appear in excavated manuscripts, showing that these techniques also played an important role in traditional Chinese medicine, where they constituted its preventative and healthenhancing aspects. Around the same time, stories describe semi-divine figures known as immortals (xian), who use these practices to attain more than harmony in life, reaching for high spiritual states of transcendence. Rather than philosophical ideals or communal rites, the main concern of self-cultivation Daoists is the attainment of physical health, longevity, peace of mind, and mystical oneness with Dao. They tend to stay away from political involvement and complex organizations, working instead with close relationships of master and disciple.

While anyone participating in either of these dimensions may call himself a Daoist, the overarching trend for serious devotees is to engage in all three: think of life in terms of the ancient classics and their later and modern interpretations, practice some form of self-cultivation, and connect to society through communal organizations. The Daode jing as the first and most venerated classic of the tradition accordingly plays an important role in all three. Its format and outlook being on the more

"philosophical" side, for most of its history it has invited literati engagement, discussions, commentaries, and interpretations. However, even from the earliest times, its teachings were associated with self-cultivation and meditation practices, and even before the inception of the Daoist religion in the second century CE, it was venerated and recited as a sacred scripture, believed to contain supernatural powers and to bring blessings and good fortune to its devotees. The text is, therefore, a multifaceted phenomenon, with both a long history and a continuing active presence in the world today. <>

Essay: Time and Eternity in Buddhism by Shoson Miyamoto

This essay consists of three segments: linguistic, historical, and textual.

Of Languages

To introduce the theory of time in Buddhism, let us refer to the Sanskrit and Pāli words signifying "time." There are four of these : samaya, kāla, ksana (khana) and adhvan (addhan). Samaya means a coming together, meeting, contract, agreement, opportunity, appointed time or proper time. Kāla means time in general, being employed in the term kāla-doctrine or kala-vada, which holds that time ripens or matures all things. In its special meaning, kāla signifies appointed or suitable time. It may also mean meal-time or the time of death, since both of these are most critical and serious times in our lives. Death is expressed as kāla-kata in Pāli, that is, "one has passed his late hour." Ksana also means a moment, opportunity, or the moment of fulfillment of purpose. Finally, adhvan refers to a stretch or length of space or time. It may mean a road or journey in space and time past, present or future.

Thus, with the exception of adhvan, these terms signify the moment of time as something appointed or expected. They are to be compared with kairós, the time of purpose measured by quality.

is committed which causes one to fall into damnation, but it can also mean the rare moment of one's emergence from hell after expiation and purification. A parable says:

If there were a yoke with one hole in it floating in the ocean and borne about by the four winds, it would be easier for a one-eyed turtle rising to the surface once in a hundred years to put its head through the hole than for such a being to attain man's estate.

It is clear that this concept of ksana-moment has been accentuated in Buddhist theories of time. Moreover, this has led to the "theory of momentariness" (ksanika-vāda) and also to the idea of continuity (santāna). The synthetic unification of ksana-momentariness and santāna-continuity has been accelerated by the philosophical studies of Abhidharma, completed by the Vijñānavāda, the School of Buddhist Idealism, and further developed in the time theory of Fatsang (643-712) in the Hua-yen school in China, synthesizing sūnyatā (emptiness) thought with the constructive idealist position.

Of History

The Buddhist view that all things are in a state of flux is well known. But few realize that there were two basically different schools of thought. On the one hand, Theravāda, representing the elders and conservative disciples, tended to be moralistic in practice and analytic in theory. They were called "Abhidharmists," which means scholars of the analytic study of Dharma. They contributed many psychological studies of the body, the mind, and of things and their relationships. But their observations of the details of structures, attributes and relationships were always bound up with a fundamental ethical viewpoint. Among the Abhidharmists, the Theravādins of the Pāli tradition and the Sarvāstivādins of the Sanskrit tradition were the most influential. The Sarvāstivādins' role was especially important from the broader viewpoint of the history of Buddhist thought, because they carried out their scholarly achievements amid the attacks and counterattacks not only of many

Buddhist schools, but also of several schools of Brahmanic and Non-Brahmanic thought on the continent of India. Moreover, being the largest and most widespread school, it split into many smaller currents of thought. At their headquarters in North India, they were called "orthodox" and "traditional," because the mountainous surroundings of Kashmir tended to keep them conservative. On the contrary, the Gandhāra group, situated along the East-West international highway, became more progressive and their way of thought was naturally quite tolerant and inclusive, as has been shown, for instance, by the examples of Greco-Gandhāra art of that area. The famous systematizers of the Vijnāna Idealist school of Mahayana Buddhism, the brothers Asanga and Vasubandhu, were reared and educated in this atmosphere and environment of Gandhāra.

The other main school, the Mahāsaṅghikas, representing a young and miscellaneous multitude, avowed claims of religious faith and devotion. To them Buddha was simply a supernatural figure and the Dharma was the Logos of cosmic unity. The Mahāyāna doctrines of Buddha-kāya and Dharmatā had a close connection with these notions. These, then, were the two main opposing schools. The one centered upon the humanity of Buddha and the ethical and psychological analysis of Dharma, while the other tended to worship the mystical figure of Buddha in the way of faith.

One cannot fail to perceive this deep gulf which existed from the earliest phase. The Mahāsaṅghikas simply emphasized the "present" or "now" in life and ignored the past and future, but the conservative analysis evaluated every functional aspect of past, present and future while at the same time substantiating continuity. The contrast was that of direct, intuitive knowledge on the one hand and of discursive analysis on the other.

Now I should like to trace briefly the highlights of the various theories concerning time. First of all, Buddhists opposed the eternalist school, the Kālavādins, who insisted upon absolute time as the first cause and creation of everything, and they also opposed the ideological theories of permanence (nitya) and self (ātman) of ego-centric Aryan nationalism along with the upper-class ritualistic formalism of the Brahmins. The Buddhist situation can be likened to that of a certain critic who emphasizes the opposing notions, since they hinted at the new ideas of impermanence (anitya) and egolessness (anātman). This kind of negativistic innovation can be seen as an outgrowth of the times, for with the deeper penetration of Aryan colonization into the heart of India the needs of an ever expanding frontier had to be met. These negative but novel theories shattered the ideology of a closed society and opened the vista of religious truth to the oppressed and underprivileged multitudes. Thus arose a new Aryan universalism including all classes of men and becoming the solid basis of Buddhism as a universal religion. It was out of this same need that the Middle Way principle appeared for the first time in Buddhism.

The time theory of early or primitive Buddhism is identical with that of the Mahāsaṅghikas noted earlier, that is, "the past and future are without existence; the present is the real existent." The analytic Sarvāstivādins (everything-exists-school), however, developed also a realism which held that the self exists (svabhāva). Subsequently, they elaborated a theory of the simultaneous formation of past, present and future. Even among the Sarvāstivādins, scholars are found to differ with each other on the discrimination of the present, past and future. Traditionally, it has been said that among the different theories, Vasumitra's condition or situation theory (avasthā) is correct. He likens the three kinds of time to three straws in a lottery or drawing (vartika, gulika). The difference is merely one of position or situation, as being put in the "situation of one, of ten, or of a hundred." Vasubandhu, the most representative scholar of Vijñānavāda, enumerated four theories of time. 1) Dharmatrāta says that past, present and future are differentiated by their appearance or existing nature (bhāva-anyathātva). But their substance (dravya) remains the same, just as a golden vase may change its form through the process of melting and remolding. Their shapes or appearances may differ from each other, but the substance of goldness is always kept as gold. 2) Ghosaka says that past, present and

future are differentiated by their character (laksana-anyathātva). When a thing is united with the character of the past, it is the past, and in like manner, that which is united with the character of the present is present, and of the future, future. 3) Vasumitra's theory was given above. 4) Buddhadeva says times are differentiated according to their relationships (anyonyathātva, apeksā) just as a woman is called "mother" by her child and "daughter" by her parent.

Nāgārjuna, the most representative thinker of early Mahāyana Buddhism and the author of the famous "Verses on the Middle" or Madhyamaka-kārikā, synthesizing two opposing theories by the Middle Way principle, wrote in the nineteenth chapter of his Criticism on Time (K(lapariksā) as follows:

If because of the past
 There are future and present,
 Then future and present
 Must be in the past.
 If within the past
 There were neither future nor present
 Then future and present—How are they caused by the past?
 Independent of the past
 There is no future
 Nor any present,
 Therefore these two periods are not.
 Because such is the case,
 We know that the two other periods
 And above, between, below, unity, difference—
 All such states as these have no existence.
 Time standing still cannot be had,
 And time cannot be had.
 If time cannot be had
 How can one teach time's qualities ?
 Because of things there is time,
 Apart from things how can time be?
 Even things do not exist,
 How much less can time exist?

Nāgārjuna agreed with the Sarvāstivādins' denial of existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism (svabhāvavāda). He drew the conclusion of the non-existence of time from the Madhyamaka standpoint of non-substantiality (nihsvabhāvavāda), which was a restatement of the original Buddhist teaching of non-self.

In the course of time a reaction arose to offset the non-subjectivity among the traditional schools in North India. Diverging streams of thought gradually took shape and even opposing ideas and theories were integrated into a system. The full flowering of this tendency is found in the Vijñāna-vāda, the school of so-called Buddhist Idealism. Its adherents were quite proud of their new theory of the "Vijñāna Middle Way." They criticized the Mādhyamika view of non-substantiality and the Prajñāpāramitā teaching on emptiness as the other extreme of the Abhidharma concept of entity-realism. This was a most interesting situation, but a most subtle and delicate affair. First of all, we recall that the Gautama's enlightenment was based upon the Middle Way principle. Thus it has been said that whatever Buddha taught was always in the light of this principle. With the rise of Mahāyāna, there appeared the Middle Way school (Mādhyamika) of Nāgārjuna, and now, as the final culmination of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Vijñāna-vāda arises, stating: "Ours is the latest theory, the third sermon, supplementing not only the Buddha's first sermon, but also the second sermon of the Prajñā-pāramitā-sutra and that of Nāgārjuna." While these claims may appear to be antagonistic

to each other, one thing is quite clear : all of these schools claim to be based upon the Middle Way principle.

The Vijnānavādins, setting up time as a category, and adapting the causation theory of bija or seed, differentiate the present from the past and future. It was really they who conceived of time not only in its momentariness (ksanika), but also in its continuity (santāna). Fa-tsang, the systematizer of Hua-yen philosophy, synthesized Mādhyamika's Fourfold propositions or catuhkotikas and Eight Noes or astavisesana-pratisedhāh: fourfold non-duality, and the Vijnāna-vādins' six qualities of seed: 1) momentariness, 2) simultaneous existence with the effect, 3) continuity in flux, 4) determined transmission of moral characteristics, 5) dependence on multiple conditions, 6) fruition of its own effect, in the doctrine of "six qualities of interdependent causation."^o Hua-yen philosophy centered upon the actuality of a singleness of mind in which the cosmic and creative structure of being and non-being are integrated, and also elaborated on the conventional time divisions by making past, present and future each a threefold category, thus making nine. Since each one of these nine is interdependent with each of the others and since all of them interpenetrate, these nine functions are generalized into one single instant of actuality, resulting in the composition of ten kinds of time altogether. Fa-tsang proposed this so-called "Doctrine of the ten mysteries of harmonious interdependence," expounding thereby his time concept in the theory of "simultaneous appearance in completeness" and in that of "differential formation in the multiple dimensions of ten ages," on the basis of interdependent causation and cosmic unity?

Of Scripture

Now let us turn to a very old passage which reveals the Buddha's insight into time. It is found in a text called The Sage of Time, or Bhaddekaratta (literally, the night of the sage), in the Middle Discourses of the Buddha (Nos. 131-134, M.N.), with equivalents in both Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas:

Do not chase after the past; do not seek for the future.
 The past is already no more; the future is not yet.
 And see the elements of present in every place,
 Without attachment, without moving—yet clearly see and strive in the present.
 Do earnestly the task for today; who knows the nearness of death on the morrow?
 Truly who can say he will not meet the great army of death?
 Such a man of realization, earnestly striving day and night without indolence,
 He, surely, is the sage of time, the peaceful one, the steady one.

This Time of the Sage is the realization of the oneness of man with the absolute or Dharma in which one brings his entire being into the instant of the real present and strives toward utter selflessness and consequent gratefulness to all of life. It is the basis of religious practice and leads to wisdom, enlightenment, and Nirvāna.

In one of the scriptures of Jātaka (Hatthipāla, Jātaka, No. 509), there is related the incident of Gopāla, who aspired to become a disciple of the Buddha. But the King would not hear of this, and urged him to succeed to the crown. Gopāla answers the King: Oh King, do not speak of tomorrow of things that can be done today. The good must be performed this very day." Gopāla continues, reciting some verses from The Time of the Sage:

People idly pass the days, saying:
 Tomorrow I will, the next time I will.
 But alas, these thoughts never come again.
 Knowing that they fail to come again,
 When good thoughts arise,
 Who among the sages would throw them away?

Shinran (1173-1262), founder of the Shin sect, when ready to take the vow of celibacy at the age of nine, was asked to postpone his initiation ceremony until the following day. He answered:

Like cherry blossoms are the hearts
That tomorrow think they might
For who can tell but there might be
A tempest in the night?

A Japanese Zen master, Shōju-Rōjin, in his poetic saying, *The One-Day Living of the Sage*, wrote:

Just think of present things,
The past cannot return,
Tomorrow is hidden from us.

Expanding this in his diary, he wrote: "The Most Important Fact refers to the heart of the now on this very day. There is no tomorrow for him who neglects this fact. People usually think of the future and make plans, but are unaware of the exact stroke of the present (literally, 'hit-target-now')." Not to lose the "exact stroke of the present" means to live without being shackled to the present, possessing steadiness and equilibrium.

The Mahā-sāropama-sutta (29, M.N.), which includes the Bhaddekaratta, or Time of the Sage, explains the famous parable of the Pith of the Tree. This parable relates how man, originally seeking the pith or core (sāra) of the tree, loses sight of his primary objective and becomes attached to the branches and leaves and becomes wrongly shackled to the bark. This is used to trace the path of the disciple who enters the Buddhist Sangha with a fervent aspiration for truth, but after practicing the disciplines and gaining some recognition, drifts into indolence, saying, "I have gained merit, I have become famous, the other disciples are not famous and their powers are insignificant." The Buddha says:

Monks, it is like a man walking about aiming at the pith, seeking for the pith, looking about for the pith of a great, stable and pithy tree, who passes by the pith itself, passes by the softwood, passes by the bark, passes by the young shoots, and who, having cut down the branches and foliage, might go away taking them with him and thinking they were the pith.'

Even those who are not taken by worldly recognition are equally to be censured. They are proud of their observance of the precepts, saying, "I have observed the precepts. I am a good man. Those priests violated the precepts. They are bad men." This is like mistaking the bark for the pith of the tree. It is only a little better than those who mistake the branches for the pith. The gist of this parable applied to time is the essence of the sutta, *The Night of the Sage*. It says, "Do not be taken by frivolities, but grasp the heart of the matter."

Why is this analysis of time stressed? The Pali scriptures teach that one must realize enlightenment in the real and immediate present by selflessness and non-attachment. In the suttas it states:

And what is the reason (for the analysis of time) ? The verses of Bhaddekaratta say : there is meaning, there is truth, and these become the basis for religious practice. This leads to wisdom, to enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa.

The reason for the stress on the analysis of time is identical with the reason for the stress on the Middle Way theory in the first sermon of Buddha, the Sutta on the Turning of the Wheel of Dharma, and the Ten or Fourteen Indefinites (avyākata).

In a sutta in the Anguttara Nikāya there is an explanation to the effect that the past is one extreme, the future is another extreme and the present is the "middle" (majjhe, vemajjhe). In the Suttanipāṭa, also, this "middle" is applied to the present.

The present is the "middle" between the end-limit (pubbe ante) of the past and the beginning-limit (pacchā) of the future. The analysis of time is to be free of attachments to these two extremes and yet remain free from attachment to the present.

The two negations of the past and future comprise the analytic method of the Middle Way. It denies the two extremes. The steadiness in the present is the Middle Way analysis applied to itself. Thus, in the analysis of time the spirit of the Middle Way operates. Analysis analyzes the extremes and also itself. Analysis must be "analysis of non-analysis" to be true analysis, and this is identical with the idea that the true middle is a non-middle. The theory of the Middle applied spatially is Nirvana, and applied in terms of time is timeless time.

It is interesting to note that although Sakyamuni Buddha was said to have been cognizant of past and future existences, he gave the following advice to Sakuludayi, who was attached to past and future:

However, Sakuludayi, set aside thoughts of the past; set aside thoughts of the future. I will teach you the truth: this being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not becoming, that does not become; from the ceasing of this, that ceases.

Thus he stresses the importance of the standpoint of dharma based upon conditional origination and the insight into the present. Sakyamuni constantly taught the clear and right view of life based upon conditional origination and the necessity of practice based upon this insight. He taught:

Dharma is a reality of the present, a timeless reality, a reality which openly says "come and see"; it leads to Nirvana, it is self-evident to the wise.

This same passage is repeated with reference to Nirvana.

The Buddha, being identified with the Dharma and Nirvana, is non-composite (asamkhata), beyond time (akāliko), timeless), transcends the aeons (kappātito .. . vippamutto) and is not a man of aeons (akka-piyo). He is to be in time and samsāra, yet goes beyond time and samsāra.

From the hedonistic standpoint sensual pleasures are the most immediate reality, and such things as ideals and self-improvements are time-consuming. But for those who are intent upon self-improvement and whose thoughts are upon the transiency of life, the standpoint of Dharma is the immediate reality and the pursuit of sensual pleasures is the pursuit of evanescent time.

These two extremes apply to the priesthood and the layman; in the case of Sakyamuni he realized a new guiding spirit in the ideal of a Middle Way between the extremes of courtly luxury and ascetic self-mortification. In the Agamas the priesthood is considered the second extreme and is related to the third which is the Middle Way principle, and in Mahāyāna the two extremes are negated and the new ideal of Middle Way is advocated.

These two standpoints are interestingly contrasted in a sutta in the Samyutta Nikāya. When the disciple Samiddhi had finished bathing in the hot spring of Rājagaha and was drying himself, a deva illuminated the grove of the spring with brilliant light and approached Samiddhi. He spoke in verse to him:

O bhikkhu, you beg for alms without enjoying life,
And while enjoying life you do not beg for alms.
O bhikkhu, beg for alms while enjoying life.
Do not let time pass you by.

And then Samiddhi answers:
I do not know about your time.
Time is hidden and it does not appear.
Therefore I beg for alms without enjoying life.
Time will not pass me by.

At that time the deva came down to earth and said:

Bhikkhu, you renounced the world when very young,
 When possessing virility, black hair and youth filled with happiness,
 You did not enjoy the pleasures in the first period of life.
 O bhikkhu, enjoy the pleasures of life,
 Do not pursue that which extends over time
 By throwing away the immediate reality.

And Samiddhi answers:

O friend, I do not throw away the immediate real-ity and pursue that which extends over time.
 friend, I throw away that which extends over time and pursue the immediate reality. For, O friend, 'Pleasures extend over time, There is much suffering, much pain, and torments increase evermore, But this Dharma is immediate reality, not extending over time. It invites you to come and see; it leads to Nirvāna, self-evident to the wise man."
 Thus the Lord teaches.

The two standpoints in this Samiddhi-sutta are contrasted in another sutta in the Samyutta by the voice of Māra, the Tempter, enticing a bhikkhu on the one hand and the figure of a bhikkhu practicing asceticism on the other.

The following selections from the Suttanipāta all express the immediate reality which transcends time:

The "Saint" has washed away all evil, inly bred or from without; no more he'll enter time—like gods and men, the brood of time (3.6.521).

...

Who outgrows time—to come or past—by purity and insight, with Release from all that springs from sense (2.13.373)....

Grasping not, grudging not, the saint unmoved to "high" or "low" or "equal" lays no claim; timeless, he whirls down grooves of time no more (4.10.860).

Thus it is clear that he who does not chase after the past, pursue the future, or who is not captured by the present, and yet perceives clearly the Dharma in the present truly sees the Buddha.

To perceive the Dharma in the immediate present and to see the Buddha means to live in the Eternal Now, the Timeless Time. It is what the Zen people refer to as "the ordinary mind is the Way." In the writings of Shinshu this is expressed as: "In Buddhism there is no such thing called tomorrow. You must hurry, hurry the matters concerning the teachings of the Buddha."

Dogen (1200-1253), the founder of Sōtō Zen, refers to the "present now" in his Essay on Time (Uji): "Time is not merely transitory. It dwells in its own situation. Time itself does not flow. It looks as if it is over there, but it is now.... This is continuity." "Working freely in a manner proper to your own situation—that is your personal time."

In conclusion I would like to say just a few words about my quite obvious omission of any discussion of the subject of eternity in this paper. In Buddhist thought the concept of eternity is closely associated with Nirvana. Moreover, the Buddha declared that silence is more appropriate to the subject of eternity than much talking. One cannot speak of eternity as being relative to time, nor can it be discussed as a subject-in-itself. Eternity is neither a prolongation of time nor a quantitative concept, but one which is qualitative. It is approached through Nirvāna or through the doctrine of Buddha-kāya. While these are central concepts in Buddhism, they would require much more space for adequate treatment than the scope of this paper allows.

I have also omitted for some of the same reasons a discussion of time in the sense of "chronos"—historical time. History in Buddhist thought is to be conceived as a life history, and the model for this kind of time is the Buddha's own life, including his birth, enlightenment, preaching and death. These four events are commemorated in sacred monuments and by pilgrimages of Buddhists everywhere. It is in relation to the Buddha's life history that each individual sees the importance of his own life history. In like manner, as Buddha went from his ascetic life out into the world to preach and teach, so the individual finds his own life meaningful by associating with others in ethical and religious practices. The stupas, inscriptions, sculptured images, and many historical and geographical records of pilgrimages serve to remind him of the one whom he follows and also serve as our clues to the events in the Buddha's own life.

As for the measurement of time—as western time is based upon the units of the second, minute, hour, etc.—Buddhist time has for its basic unit the ksana, which equals one-seventy-fifth of a second, but I am glad to leave this to the scientists to explain. <>

ADVAITA: A CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE by Srinivasa Rao [[Oxford University Press](#), 9780198079811]

Advaita has been extensively studied by various schools of philosophy in classical India. In contemporary times, however, it has only been compared to the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and F.H. Bradley. This book offers a comprehensive critique of Advaita, which is very contemporary in its outlook, analysis, and technique. It raises several new and fundamental questions while answering old and classical questions from a contemporary perspective. Srinivasa Rao supplements the classical Indian analysis with many special concepts and techniques extensively used in contemporary Western logic and analytic philosophy. The book discusses whether what classical Advaita had maintained centuries ago can still be maintained, and if at all it is possible, in exactly which way.

This book will be of considerable interest to scholars, teachers, and students of Indian philosophy.

The book proposes a contemporary framework for critiquing Advaita and formulating its basic thesis in a more logical and convincing way. Any proper theory in philosophy and science has to follow from accepted assumptions. Hence the book begins by identifying basic presuppositions required for Advaita and determining the different cognitive possibilities arising out of them. After thus determining what is logically and conceptually possible and impossible in Advaita, the new framework is used to assess whether or not the traditionally held Advaitic concepts and theories are satisfactory and acceptable. This is done in many chapters covering discussions of the notions of not-Self (anātman), cosmic ignorance (māyā), individual ignorance (avidyā), illusoriness (mithyātva), sublation (bādhā), entities that are different from the real and the unreal (sadasadvilaksana) and so on. The book argues that all these concepts, as specifically formulated and defended in traditional Advaita for centuries after Śāṅkara, are simply faulty and untenable both individually and as related clusters of concepts. Traditional Advaita has also defended an elaborate ontology of experiences like mistaking a rope-for a snake. It has also heavily defended the metaphysical thesis of the empirical world of our experience being a total illusion. The logical faults and conceptual inadequacies of this ontology and metaphysics are also discussed in great detail, offering absolutely new criticisms of them. Despite this almost totally negative portrayal of traditional Advaita, the book is also quite positive in showing that any belief in non-duality is still very much philosophically possible and also necessary.

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Excerpt: This will probably be regarded as a strange book on Advaita written by a very strange thinker by some readers who may find them both to be very much out of the way. A few among them who believe very firmly in traditional Advaita may also be shocked by most of the discussions and criticisms found here. They might genuinely feel that both the book and its author are not at all in keeping with—or even as being totally hostile to—the classical Advaita tradition.

Hence I begin by setting up a sharp distinction between lifeless, rigid orthodoxies on the one hand and real, living traditions on the other. I do this because in India no such sharp distinction between these two is made and consequently totally dead orthodoxies take the full benefit of the situation and parade themselves as living traditions. When this happens in the field of philosophy which must always be an open-ended inquiry, it always becomes an essentially closed endeavour thus resulting in severe stultification of all creative thinking.

While there has still been a certain bit of creative thinking regularly manifesting itself even within the rigidified environment of all Indian philosophical systems, it has been all too easy for the Western indologists and philosophers to miss the creative dimension completely. Consequently they have too readily depicted Indian schools of philosophy as based on very rigid acceptance of authority. Their characterization of Śaṅkara as a theologian who blindly accepts the authority of the Vedic “scriptures” is an outcome, on their part, of such deep seated misunderstanding.

The harmful effects of orthodoxy have actually multiplied manifold in the Indian environment and especially within Advaita Vedānta because of very subtle, but also very profound misunderstandings of the words and works of an outstanding original thinker like Śaṅkara by almost all his commentators. One of the chief purposes of this contemporary critique of Advaita is to precisely expose, examine and correct some of the most basic misunderstandings. In the past one hundred years alone, there have been several attempts in my own state Karnataka in India by eminent Vedāntins like Sivarama Sastri, V. Subrahmanya Iyer, K. A. Krishnaswami Iyer, Vedantam Subbiah Sastri, Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati and Swami Paramananda Bharati to oppose the orthodox misinterpretation of Śaṅkara's teachings. This work by me is exactly along the same lines, and therefore I hope that I am in good company. My work very substantially differs from theirs in that it is written by supplementing the classical Indian analysis with many special concepts and techniques extensively used only in contemporary Western logic and analytic philosophy which I had the good

fortune of studying completely on my own exactly like the classical Advaita original texts. Therefore if there any faults in my approach and techniques, I alone am completely responsible.

The book remains entirely in what I regard as the twilight region where a large number of philosophers simply refuse to explore, usually preferring only the well-lit regions for their investigations. Hence I will not be surprised if the traditionalists very viciously attack the book as totally contrary to Advaita paramparā besides leveling many false charges against Advaita and containing many misrepresentations of its position. Of course, the reactions of the Western-turned-Indian experts cannot be predicted at all and hence I do not speculate about it. Only those who are not already fully committed to some specific form of Advaita but are still philosophically curious and open-minded may find this book interesting. It is also largely written with them in mind as its prospective readers. Despite whatever any person may feel and think after going through this book, I very much want to assert that this is definitely a book on Advaita in the Advaita tradition though it may never at all be recognized as one such by many of the adherents and admirers of that great tradition of thought.

Since my expectations are at the barest minimum, any good reception this book might receive will justifiably be viewed by me as its success rather than as its merit. If some fresh critical thinking is generated about Advaita as a result of this work, the purpose of writing it would be regarded as more than fulfilled.

I am personally very thankful to Professor Godabarisha Mishra, Member-Secretary, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi for his support and the very intensely involved editorial team of Oxford University Press in New Delhi for neatly executing the publication of this work.

The nature and relationship of tradition to orthodoxy is explored here. A living tradition becoming static, resistant to changes and insensitive to challenges, turns into an orthodoxy. Therefore if a philosophical tradition has to remain truly philosophical, open-ended, and creative, it must resist becoming an orthodoxy. In the course of its development, Advaita has very gradually morphed into an orthodoxy and this has been made a lot easier by its being treated as a religion by most of its followers. Consequently, all sorts of dualistic theories and notions have been smuggled into the tradition and have been mindlessly defended as genuine parts of the tradition or paramparā of non-duality. Some illustrations of such degradation are given.

We will now be beginning with the very important topic of orthodoxy and tradition since there is something extremely important to be said about it, which may also turn out to be somewhat unpleasant to very devoted and rigid followers of just any tradition. I hold that it is always possible to have misconceptions about traditions themselves and all the followers of traditions or I or both of us may be totally, equally guilty of them. Again, something may also be wrong with the traditions themselves because at some very specific point of time they might have stopped growing and actually started atrophying because of very excessive prominence given to orthodoxy. Therefore it always does a world of good to all followers of any tradition including Advaita to ponder periodically and ask whether or not they are still truly part of a really living tradition, especially in the midst of an always changing and vibrating world which relentlessly moves on in time, never being static under any circumstances.

Gauḍapāda had made a very illuminating remark that non-duality had no quarrel at all with other philosophies (*Kārikā*, 3.17–18), and Śaṅkara had said—while introducing the idea of *adhyāsa*—that though many different schools had held different theories of perceptual error, they were all still essentially non-different and also unanimous in not deviating from the fact that in any erroneous cognition whatever, a given thing always appears to be possessing the characteristics of another object, thus showing general, common acceptance of the basic idea of *adhyāsa* (*sarvathā'pi tu anyasya*

anyadharmāvabhāsatām na vyabhicarati). Therefore Śaṅkara never refutes the theory of perceptual error of other schools in any of his works while he refutes only the metaphysics of other schools since they all go against non-duality. But, sadly most of the later followers of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara did not always think in a similar way. For example, we see Śaṅkara's commentators deviating from his view in offering very diverse, extensive refutations of the theories of perceptual error of all schools though such refutation was not at all thought to be necessary by Śaṅkara himself.

In India, thinking differently is very much looked upon as a part of a tradition or *sampradāya* only if whole lots of people can be persuaded to think in that way, but a very solitary thinker choosing to think differently from all the others may be seen as breaking away from tradition. Such breaking away is always looked upon as completely unwelcome, inauspicious and also evil. In other words, very scrupulously “following” the tradition is considered a very great and essential virtue on the part of all philosophers besides the virtues of creativity and originality.

Therefore, every follower scrupulously follows the tradition which, sooner or later, most certainly results in that tradition morphing into a very rigid orthodoxy. When a follower truly deviates from tradition, to avoid the charge of going against tradition, such deviation is very heavily camouflaged so as to appear to be in complete conformity with the tradition. If such camouflaging needs twisting of even otherwise noticeably clear statements in any of the original texts, it is always done quite promptly. In this manner, even shockingly deep deviations from tradition are made to look as though they are a hitherto unknown aspect and a very normal aspect of the tradition.

As a result of this most widespread and widely accepted practice among the classical philosophers in India, only those who openly deviate from the accepted line of interpretation are singled out for any criticism and condemnation. Thus, while all those who conceal their deviations may become venerable teachers, those who do not choose to conceal may be criticized and ostracized. Very often, misinterpretations are generated within a tradition simply by offering fresh, new interpretations which, besides being not needed at all, also often twist the meaning of even extremely straightforward statements in several original texts. There are indeed highly standardized canons of interpretation evolved by Mīmāṃsakas which were accepted across the board in classical India, but these canons can also be cleverly manipulated by skilled interpreters to arrive at their own desired and preferred interpretations.

One most glowing instance of interpretative manipulation exists in the case of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara himself. If we read his *bhāṣya* without using any commentary just accepting the most straightforward meanings of the interpreted sentences, anyone can very clearly and easily see that Śaṅkara is strongly rejecting the thesis that the material cause of the world is the unconscious *prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhyans and is instead maintaining that only *Brahman*, the only conscious entity that ever exists, is the “non-different material as well as the efficient cause of the world” (*abhinna nimittopādāna kāraṇa*). But what have Vācaspati and other commentators done while commenting on this work of Śaṅkara? They have held that *māyā*, the power of *Brahman*, that is unconscious in nature exactly like the *prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhyans, is the material cause of the world. Thus, what was very summarily rejected by Śaṅkara—an unconscious or an *acetana* material cause of the world—was quietly brought back into Advaita by his followers as Śaṅkara's own idea and not as a Sāṅkhyan one, and it coolly became an integral part of the classical Advaita tradition. Equally quietly, *Brahman* simply ceased to be the *cetana* cause of the world—which it always was for Śaṅkara, and it is now made into a mere ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for *māyā* to manifest its varied appearances.

Such subtle manipulation of Śaṅkara's clear opposition to a completely unconscious (*jaḍa*) material cause of the world by inventing “a completely unconscious power of the purely conscious *Brahman*” in Śaṅkara's own *bhāṣya* has its most clearly fatal consequences. Any attempt by anyone to

reject *acetana māyā* as the material cause of the world as Śaṅkara himself manifestly did would now be treated as a very serious breach of Advaita *sampradāya* and hence would surely attract extremely strong condemnation. Thus, very strangely, while the deviation from Śaṅkara's most fundamental views by Vācaspati and many others have come to be accepted as very surely legitimate and also respectable parts of tradition, any criticism by anyone to the effect that Vācaspati and others have deviated from the original views of Śaṅkara would be looked upon as clearly amounting to a truly very serious breach of the Advaita *sampradāya*! This is undoubtedly a very clear, big philosophical absurdity. But the resolution of this absurdity lies not at all in the rejection of the very validity of the notion of *sampradāya* itself but in a proper understanding of its nature and role.

The notion of *sampradāya* is indeed a very great and also a powerful idea and over the centuries it has helped shape all Indian schools of thought in many unique ways. There has been a very creative *nāstika sampradāya* also on the Indian philosophical scene by the side of an equally creative *āstika sampradāya*, and their many interactions and debates have always proved to be highly productive as well as progressive. But still, when a *sampradāya* stops being forward looking and shows no great enthusiasm in meeting fresh challenges of the current times and starts finding satisfaction in simply defending the existing *sampradāya* to even the smallest of details, there has probably already come about in it a very definite but also invisible transformation of a living tradition into a nearly dead or irrevocably decadent orthodoxy.

Such death or decay is what the followers of any living tradition have to be very consciously guarding against. The moment the followers become off guard, they will lose all their capacity to act as the real owners of that tradition who may very freely modify and creatively add to it; they simply turn into mere *custodians* of a tradition, refusing to take any liberties with it in any way, and start severely criticizing and condemning anyone taking any such creative liberties. Such a tradition soon becomes dead and mostly turns into a rigid orthodoxy but its followers will continue to strongly believe that they are still subscribing to a very living tradition since they themselves are living persons avidly following that tradition.

I apologize in advance to my readers for using a very harsh but illuminating analogy here to make my point in a very clear but also an extremely forceful fashion. Just as people who are really mentally ill are hardly aware of the fact that they are not at all normal persons, the followers of a very dead orthodoxy are also hardly aware of the sad fact that they are no more upholding and following a living tradition. In an orthodoxy, living minds from the past always come to be adored and worshiped by totally closed minds of the current era. If we find that the authorities from the past are being quoted at length to answer any fresh queries raised in the present, it is an almost sure indication that the tradition is no more alive and orthodoxy has already taken extremely deep roots. This may happen very naturally and quite imperceptibly in any very heavily institutionalized structure that slowly becomes very rigid and no more open to subtle changes and reforms. Closed institutional structures are always the most readily available shelters for orthodoxy to take very quick, deep and permanent roots.

Any generation that heavily and exclusively glorifies the thinkers of the past can be looked upon with very reasonable suspicion as a subtle victim of very orthodox ways of thinking because when people become too busy or too lazy to think for themselves, orthodoxy jumps in and takes the driver's seat. Orthodoxy always has a stranglehold on the minds of people and therefore it allows changes and progress in thinking in only very small bursts of fits and starts. Even such changes are most of the times resisted and refused outright. While the power of orthodoxy as a rule still reigns most supreme in the field of religious thought, it also rules equally well in the field of classical Indian philosophy largely because of the fact that religion and philosophy are never sharply separated in Indian tradition. When the two do not stand very clearly separated, as a rule, the religious aspects

usually exert far greater control on people's minds than the philosophical aspects of a way of thinking. In such a situation, the philosophers viewing themselves as very faithful, strict followers of a *sampradāya* can never be an exception to the above rule and thus they also invariably fall in line with every demand of orthodoxy.

There is also this special characteristic attributed to just any philosophical school developed in classical India that it alone is the most correct and perfect world-view and any other school, even if it deviates in the most minor detail, is totally wrong. We may note here that all schools of philosophy in India mostly choose the term “*siddhānta*” to designate their own schools as well as those of all their opponents and hence the use of expressions like “*Bauddha siddhānta*” and “*Advaita siddhānta*” are very common. In fact, the literal meaning of the Sanskrit term *siddhānta* happens to be “well proven, settled or final conclusion”. The very commonly used method of defending one's own school and also of fully refuting other rival schools is usually called *pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta prakriyā*. The method aims at precisely achieving this end of establishing the sole rightness of one's own and also the total satisfactoriness of every other rival school. The method is used to demonstrate not only the unsound character of the actual positions of the rival schools but also of the basic unsoundness of any possible variations that the rival schools may choose to adopt to defend themselves. With this variety of “my school alone is right” attitude built into the very method of defending philosophical schools, it is no wonder if classical Indian philosophers are seen defending their schools as if they are some kind of a Semitic religious world-view. If philosophies have gradually morphed into different varieties of religious orthodoxies in India and they are all quite mindlessly getting defended simply at whatever cost, the above method of philosophizing and the outlook adopted by those who use it should alone be held responsible for such an extremely regrettable and sorry state of affairs.

There can be no doubt at all that the reasoning done by philosophical schools in India is of very high quality and the nuances and subtleties embedded in them are many times absolutely unmatched in quality. Sometimes such exercises in reasoning have led to irreconcilable differences and a totally negative attitude of intolerance towards each other among the very rabid followers of rival schools as is readily seen even today in some followers of some of the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava sects, particularly in some parts of South India. These followers do not know that it is no more possible to convince the modern world today that there is just one single world-view which is absolutely perfect in just every respect. One religion or one philosophy which suits everyone in this world may be just as impossible as a single size shirt that perfectly fits all different human beings everywhere and at all times.

Since I have criticized in this book what is usually accepted as Advaita *sampradāya*, I would surely be taken to be a full-blooded *viṇāḍavādin* if I fail to offer my own view of what *sampradāya* consists or should consist in. Most obviously, my view completely and very decisively rejects all possible types of orthodoxy as a genuine *sampradāya*. While all orthodoxies are extremely rigid and inflexible, a *sampradāya* is flexible, dynamic and very living. Just take a look at the vast creative transformation which the Nyāya *sampradāya* has very regularly undergone from its founder Gautama up to the time of one of its greatest exponents like Gaṅgeśa. Throughout this development and transformation, we may very clearly see that the most basic character of that school, viz., its pluralism, has been fully preserved and nothing whatever threatening this basic nature has ever been allowed to creep into the system.

Since the Indian philosophical *sampradāyas* are peculiarly structured around a series of successive commentaries on original works upholding the basic tenets of most schools, it is indeed very reasonable to allow freedom to commentators to innovate and bring into the system newer ideas and views. A pulsating and living philosophical outlook should always embody the most basic

freedoms to create, to innovate, to de-emphasize what was emphasized earlier, re-emphasize very important tenets, bring out all hidden implications wherever they help strengthening the system, clarify unclear ideas so as to help bring out the underlying harmony, remove apparent contradictions, try to eliminate all unnecessary concepts which always clutter the system and so on. Such freedoms are the very essence of just any robust philosophical outlook and all living *darśana paramparās* of classical India have always unhesitatingly embodied them to the fullest possible extent.

Just as pluralism is the essence of Nyāya *darśana*, non-duality is the essence of Advaita *darśana*. Hence the Advaita *paramparā* consists in developing any kind of theories and views, conceptual structures and doctrines that help justifying and fortifying its basic notion of non-duality. Therefore any person justifying the thesis of non-duality simply in any way whatever is still very much a creative thinker of the Advaita tradition or *paramparā* whatever may be the sub-doctrines and views that person may choose to subscribe to as long as the basic notion of non-duality is not consciously contradicted and nothing ultimately detrimental to or is in any way violative of non-duality is advocated. If the idea of Advaita *paramparā* is not understood in this broad way of standing for the basic idea of non-duality, and strict adherence to doctrinal details is demanded as central to *paramparā*, then Advaita very much turns into a rigid orthodoxy, not anymore remaining a very living *paramparā*.

Paramparā is a process of fully progressive preservation and elaboration of a very basic idea and a large number of individuals take part in it. While some individuals may play a very major role, several others may play only minor ones. But this should not really matter in a tradition and it will not be very fair to identify any tradition with just one individual or even a small group of individuals. It is not the thinkers *as persons* but it is only their *ideas* which matter in philosophy. Therefore, encouraging any kind of person-centricity may lead to cults developing within philosophy which is not a very healthy development. All thinkers of a tradition are equally important, and no hierarchies should be created out of them.

Many times thinkers of a school are also found to be in sympathy with different ideas of rival schools and in all such cases it is very unfair to classify them on grounds of their so called personal loyalties to those schools. There will always be several transitional stages in the development of every school which makes the assignment of thinkers to specific schools and *paramparās* both very difficult and quite tricky. For example, is Gauḍapāda a rebellious and revolutionary Buddhist thinker who had the highly rare but yet an extraordinarily creative courage to postulate consciousness as basically eternal and unchanging but very much *only appearing* to be eternally changing in our empirical experiences, as was thought all along in all forms of Buddhist doctrines, or was he really only a pure, pioneering Advaitin with absolutely no connections at all to Buddhism in any form?

I am upholding the above extremely broad stand about a philosophical tradition because it would otherwise become totally intractable to decide whether any particular thinker is to be located within the *paramparā* or totally outside of it. Take for example the famous case of Maṇḍana, the Advaitin (or Mīmāṃsaka?), who also advocated the existence of negative realities (like the complete destruction of the world after Brahman-realization) alongside the sole positive reality of *Brahman*. He firmly held that the acceptance of such negative realities does not obstruct the truth of non-duality being the sole truth (*tatra abhāvarūpā advaitam na vighnanti*). If negative realities also rank as realities of a certain kind as Maṇḍana firmly holds, then the very notion of non-duality is exposed to very great risk since Maṇḍana's position would not ultimately result in *Brahman* being the “*only reality [of any kind]*,” which is the true import of the Upaniṣadic view of non-duality. Instead, *Brahman* would just be “*the only [positive and eternal] reality [of just its own kind]*” by the side of a few other equally eternal realities, but all of a negative kind. Thus, even after *Brahman*-realization which is the final attainment of the highest state of liberation, there will still be two types of eternal realities—one

positive reality (*Brahman*) and other negative realities like the destruction of ignorance (*avidyā nivṛtti*) and destruction of the world (*prapañca pravilaya*). Hence, if there are really two very different types of realities eventually, how is it true non-duality?

Such a position will have to be called “Type Non-dualism” and it is really a form of dualism and not strict non-dualism. Now, since type non-dualism always undermines strict non-dualism, should we therefore move Maṇḍana out of Advaita *paramparā*? No, because insofar as he does uphold the most basic thesis of non-duality in whatever strange way while protesting that “negative realities do not at all harm Advaita (*advaitam na vighnanti*)”, he must be allowed within Advaita *paramparā*, but he must also be regarded as a very inconsistent thinker for accepting negative realities that will always be in conflict with the sole reality *Brahman*. *Brahman* will no more be “one without a second [of any kind whatever]” but will be one of its own kind which very clearly and also logically allows for the existence of realities of just any other kind.

If we apply the same logic, we must hold that Advaitins who accept an eternal *acetana māyā* and the *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* world are in the same boat as Maṇḍana because both *māyā* and *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* are very positive realities (*bhāvarūpa sattā*) existing by the side of *Brahman* exactly as the destruction of the world (*prapañca pravilaya*) is a real negative reality (*abhāvarūpa sattā*) existing alongside *Brahman*. The case of all *māyāvādins* is even a bit worse because they posit *māyā* as a positive reality which is also the *acetana śakti* of *Brahman*. This *māyā* is *anādi* and is also *ananta* (endless) as it is a *śakti* of eternal *Brahman*. *Māyā* is also very different in nature from *Brahman* which is pure *sat* and *cit*, as it is *acetana* and possesses a distinct nature of its own (*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*). If such *māyā* is accepted, there will be two eternal realities, *Brahman* and *māyā*, which are also of two very different natures. Then, where is non-duality? Hence the *māyāvādins* in Advaita are simply as much deeply inconsistent as Maṇḍana is, if not really a lot more. All *māyāvādins* indeed very much belong to Advaita *paramparā*, but they are all also very hopelessly inconsistent Advaitins.

Because of the logical and conceptual problems inherent in accepting any kind of positive, *anādi* and *acetana māyā* or *avidyā* in Advaita doctrine where *no other kind of entity* is logically admissible as that harms non-duality (*advaita hāni*), at least when the dualists criticized the *māyāvādins*, they should have read the very clear writing on the wall in those criticisms. But, instead of really seeing the danger in accepting *bhāvarūpa avidyā*, all the traditional Advaitins started not only stoutly defending such *avidyā* but also went on even refining and perfecting that doctrine. That is perhaps when quite imperceptibly Advaita totally ceased to be a fully living tradition and started morphing into a very rigid orthodoxy and it has virtually remained so even to this day.

In short, a *paramparā* can accommodate just any system of ideas, concepts and theories provided they are not inconsistent with the most basic idea running all through that *paramparā*. Therefore any follower of just any *paramparā* in India is at complete liberty to advocate any view of one's choice, but taking care to see that it does not go against the internal consistency of that system or school. In summary, upholding the basic idea of the school without in any way violating logical consistency of the school's position is all that is required of any follower of a *paramparā* and subscribing to very specific doctrinal details or following any of the earlier masters can never be advocated as a necessary part of it.

It should be perfectly possible to be a good follower of a *paramparā* while rejecting a theory or a view that has been accepted for centuries by the other followers provided one is able to show that the theory is in conflict with the basic idea of that school. This degree of freedom and openness is very minimal and also absolutely essential to just any *paramparā*. It is only such total freedom and openness that operates as a protective coating and keeps a tradition fully alive, always preventing it

from degenerating into a deadly orthodoxy. But orthodoxies never grant such freedom to any of its followers except interpreters who cleverly camouflage all their deviant views and just parade them all as conforming to tradition, consequently rendering that tradition lifeless. As pointed out before, it will be only thought to be a very living tradition by its ardent, orthodox followers although it is no more truly living.

My limited reading of the Advaita classics, especially of many of the later post-Śaṅkara works, has convinced me that somewhere along the way very subtle misunderstandings of even the most clear, straightforward passages of Śaṅkara (on error, causation, ignorance, *anātman* and many other related topics) developed in the minds of even the most outstanding scholar-commentators. Concepts created and developed by Śaṅkara exclusively only to resolve pedagogic problems of making the subtle truth of Advaita understandable to an unenlightened seeker subjected to the onslaught of dualistic ideas were quite mistakenly and very stubbornly reified.

As such reification led to absurd conferring of an illogical ontological status even on absolutely non-existent entities, most serious questions were naturally asked about them by theistic Vedāntins of the rival camps. This made the Advaitic thinkers turn totally obstinate and dialectical in their efforts of rebutting those criticisms. Once caught in the quicksand of dialectics, the very dynamic and living Advaitic vision soon turned into a very static, unalterable snapshot view—truly a hopeless orthodoxy—and it has largely remained so over the centuries right up to our own days.

Moreover, there is a commonly held opinion among the lay and the learned that Advaita is the most logically formulated system and none can logically refute it or any of its famous doctrines and notions. This idea, even if quite true, is philosophically disastrous to hold. Suppose a philosopher is convinced that he possesses the most perfect system of philosophy. He cannot enter into an open debate with others who disagree with him because the philosopher already believes very firmly that all others are completely mistaken in their beliefs. Such a prior conviction closes the door firmly on all philosophizing efforts and abilities and it is also completely self-destructive.

In fact, the traditional Indian philosopher seems to possess the unique distinction of being greatly blessed with a very rich and matchless *paramparā*, the unique institution of the teacher (*guru*) and the disciple (*śiṣya*) to assist in proper learning and also the incomparable *pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta* method of doing philosophy. But what he might be achieving today with all that equipment utterly fails to fairly compare with what some of his ancestors achieved in the past. The idea of *paramparā* today is blurred; the *guru-śiṣya* relation is almost non-existent; there is only a very degenerated version of the *pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta* method, if it ever exists at all. This is what most of Indian philosophy has come to at the hands of many of its very rigid and orthodox proponents and practitioners.

Indian philosophy is faring no better at the hands of some experts who have studied Western philosophy extensively for decades and have later on turned to critically appraising Indian philosophy. Even risking severe and bitter rebuke, I would say that there is a certain way of understanding the Indian systems which is not automatically or readily accessible to anyone quite submerged in the totally Western paradigm of philosophy and the damage some of these Western philosophy experts have already done and are still engaged in doing to Indian philosophy is immense. The fact that most of our local experts of Western thought have never been clearly recognized anywhere in the West for their contributions to its tradition of philosophy is also to be reckoned with. Classical Indian philosophy today seems to be located between one group which has nearly missed the elephant except for its tail and the other group that has not been able to find even this tail. Therefore, much of the discussion of classical Indian philosophy done these days appears to have a ghostly character which people seem to be gradually accepting as its true character and the danger lies precisely in this very fatal acceptance.

There are some points which the readers may kindly keep in mind while reading this book. Quite a few of my readers may have already read almost all the available standard secondary writings on Advaita and hence I am sure that they will approach this work with what they know about them. The first surprising thing for them would be that none of these writings will be specifically quoted although they may readily recognize many of those views criticized by me. This is quite in keeping with the classical Indian tradition of philosophizing in which almost no author is cited by his personal name or even the name of his work, but only the views of those authors are summarized and then criticized. In these days of copyright and first authorship claims, the practice of not citing names may look quaint, but I see it as being perfectly in keeping with the view that it is not the author that matters but the views that he stands for. The correctness or untenability of the views is what matters most in philosophy. The other point I want to draw attention to is that attempt to compare any Indian thinkers with Western thinkers which many of my predecessors have done, is avoided here. This is also because philosophy is essentially about ideas and ways of arguing, and not about specific people.

In conclusion, I wish to point out that there are two major groups of thinkers showing interest in Indian philosophy. The first group consists of the dedicated votaries of the Indian tradition, mostly its orthodox champions. The other group is the Western oriented scholars mostly criticizing Indian philosophy from a typically Western viewpoint. I do not basically agree with either of these groups. I share neither the confidence and the certainties of the first group which is largely traditional in its persuasion and predominantly orthodox in its outlook, nor do I share the very radical doubts of the second group which is completely Western in orientation in its criticism of Indian philosophy, periodically adopting the current outlooks of the West—be it Logical Positivism, Marxism, Analytic Philosophy, Post-Modernism, post Post-Modernism or anything else.

Hence it may turn out that neither of the above two groups also will find any of my thoughts and criticisms convincing enough, let alone even thinking of them as worthy of being given at least a careful look. If this thinking of mine turns out to be wrong, that would most certainly be the biggest welcome and happy surprise for me as an Indian philosopher and in particular an Advaitic thinker.

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THE REALITY SUTRAS: SEEKING THE HEART OF TRIKA SHAIVISM by Shambhavi Sarasvati [Jaya Kula Press, 978-1732218307]

The Reality Sutras is a handbook of teachings about the nature of the self and reality from the perspective of Trika Shaivism. Trika Shaivism, also known as Shaiva Tantra and Kashmir Shaivism, is a direct realization tradition from Northwest India. It shares with Dzogchen, Daoism, and Chan Buddhism an emphasis on direct, embodied experience and on uncontrived naturalness as the fruit of spiritual practice.

Shambhavi Sarasvati offers students of direct realization spiritual traditions a traditionally structured handbook with short, sutra-style teachings followed by commentary. The sutras are intended to inform, to guide, and to serve as a source of contemplative material for practitioners.

Review

THE REALITY SUTRAS: SEEKING THE HEART OF TRIKA SHAIVISM is more than a deep and illuminating read; it also opens one to simultaneously experiencing these direct wisdom teachings that Shambhavi has presented so eloquently. I often found myself picking it up for guidance and opening to the clarity and insight I most needed in that moment.

Shambhavi Sarasvati makes these teachings accessible, applicable, immediate, and inviting. Each chapter is an opportunity for direct recognition whether you are new to Trika Shaivism and classical Tantric traditions or if you are a dedicated practitioner. It is an essential guide and source book for those wanting to understand and fully embody the nature of reality & consciousness. —Laura Amazzone, Teacher and Author of *Goddess Durga and Sacred Female Power*.

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Two Handfuls of Rice

I am writing this book as a small offering to my students and to all those who desire to better understand the View of Trika Shaivism, also known as Shaiva Tantra. Students of other direct realization traditions, such as Dzogchen and Chan Buddhism, will find much resonance here.

The Sanskrit word for View is darshan. In Tibetan, View is tawa. View has a few special meanings in direct realization traditions. It means both to see and what we see as a result of doing spiritual practice. It also means the instruments through which we see and a way of living that embodies the wisdom we directly encounter through spiritual practice.

View teachings let us know what our traditions have to say about existence, cosmology, the self, God, consciousness, and realization. In the direct realization traditions, we say: Learn the View, practice with the View, embody the View. When we have recognized our real nature and, through practice, come to embody the teachings in our perceptions and activities, we are said to be living the View.

Studying the View of your tradition is critical to practicing correctly. This is easy to understand. If I go for a walk in the woods, and my orientation is that I am trying to catch a glimpse of a certain rare bird, I may find that bird. If my orientation is that I am simply walking along and enjoying being outside, I will likely achieve that, but I probably will not find the bird.

Likewise, some people perform rituals with the View that they are propitiating great beings in order to accumulate merit. In direct realization traditions, we are more likely to perform ritual with the View that we are trying to recognize our own, already perfect wisdom nature through the medium of the ritual. To a great extent, the View with which you practice determines the result. For this reason, it is important to understand the View of any tradition in which you are participating so that you can practice correctly and move without undue delay toward realizing what that tradition has to offer.

View and the role of textual study

In direct realization traditions, the teacher, the teachings, and the practices you do all help you to directly recognize or encounter your primordially enlightened nature. You directly realize the nature of your self, of reality, through a process of opening the gates of the senses, including the mind.

The word in Sanskrit for direct realization is pratyakshadarshana. Pratyaksha means "direct." So pratyakshadarshana means directly experiencing or having the darshan of the ultimate nature of reality with your own senses. Direct realization is not primarily an intellectual understanding; it is 100% embodied, useable, experiential wisdom about how you and life actually are.

Despite popular and erroneous notions that direct realization traditions are all about effortless, "sudden enlightenment," both sadhana (spiritual practice) and textual study are emphasized. In combination with oral instruction and practice, studying the texts of a tradition helps us to clarify, enlarge, and guide our understanding of View.

Some students approach text study in a more intellectual way as if they were reading philosophy or theory. But for a student who is ripe, reading about the View can act as a potent catalyst for directly relaxing constricting patterns of body, energy, and mind. For this reason, students are advised to read and also to meditate on key teaching texts.

What kind of book is this?

The Reality Sutras is a handbook of View teachings. I am doing my best to make essential aspects of the View of my Indian tradition accessible to contemporary students. For the most part, I am reporting on what I have discovered for myself through engaging in spiritual practice. My hope is that The Reality Sutras will inform, but foremost that it will serve as a source of contemplative material for practitioners. Occasionally I enrich a passage with a quote from my root Guru, Anandamayi Ma. She was not a teacher of Trika Shaivism, but her teachings were always about directly realizing the nature of the Self.

You won't find many footnotes here. I am not making a conventional effort to convince you that I know what I'm talking about or that my tradition's View of reality is one you should adopt. More than proving something to your intellect, I would prefer to move you. From my perspective, the only desirable proof of my little offering is whatever response of "yes" you discover within yourself and then whatever unfolds after that.

Reality is knowable

The nature of reality, your own nature, is an open secret announcing itself everywhere and always available to be directly known and more fully embodied.

Many spiritual traditions hold the View that reality is unknowable or a mystery. This makes sense only if what you mean by "knowable" is "explainable." Of course, we cannot capture and explain every aspect of reality with words or even with numbers.

Let's say you take a workshop describing all of the different styles of meditation, their histories, and how people have practiced in different spiritual traditions. You even read some scientific studies about the effects of meditation. But after a long period of gathering descriptions, explanations, and information, you still do not have much understanding of meditation. In order to have real knowledge of meditation, you have to meditate!

Meditation and other spiritual practices require you to engage your body, your energy, and your mind. They are embodied, experiential, and immersive. Knowing in the direct realization spiritual traditions means that by doing spiritual practices such as meditation, you can directly discover the real nature of the Self and existence. Using your five senses and your mind, you can find out who and what you are and how things work.

The discovery of your real nature is not just information. It is embodied knowledge. By practicing just with your body, energy, and mind, you transform your moment-to-moment experience. You begin to have spontaneous insights into fundamental processes of reality. You enter into a rich conversation with our alive, aware world. You ultimately discover the capacity to interact directly with the subtlest aspects of nature, including space and time.

The knowledge, or more properly wisdom, one gains by doing consistent spiritual practice is instantly usable. It is much more thoroughgoing than an explanation, and yet it cannot be explained by ordinary means. It can be pointed toward, experientially revealed, and demonstrated. The goal of spiritual practice is not to comprehensively describe or neatly explain reality, or to dominate it, but to be able to respond to life with unrestrained compassion, clarity, intelligence, creativity, and spontaneity. Enlightened, embodied wisdom is always in action. Ultimately it is action that emerges from and expresses the wisdom of the heart.

We call that which we discover through sadhana by many names: God, Self, reality, Shiva Nature, nature of mind, Buddha Nature, Christ consciousness, Krishna consciousness, aware livingness, instant presence, flowing presence, essence nature, or the natural state. My Guru, Anandamayi Ma, simply called it that.

The View expires

The ultimate instruction, beyond which there is no need for instruction, is hold no View.

In the key Trika text, the Vijnana Bhairava Tantra, Shakti asks Shiva for clarification of a variety of complex View teachings. At the end of her extensive list of questions, Lord Shiva replies:

All this is nothing but a phantom for frightening children, or a sweet given by the mother (to attract the child). These descriptions are only meant for the spiritual advancement of the unenlightened.

Since nearly all of us are unenlightened, Lord Shiva goes on to address Shakti Devi's questions and to offer 117 practical methods for "children." But the message is clear: the View teachings that are for so long our ground must eventually become the cliff that we jump from.

The Trika tradition is so far from dogmatism that it builds in its own obsolescence. Knowing this is wonderful for students. You can use the View. You should even become attached to View. But if you follow the practice through to its conclusion, you will not get stuck with anything other than the intimacy and immediacy of immersion in primordial livingness, your own Self.

We have many tools and words to get us there. We have our teachers. But once we have remembered, once we have relaxed the boundaries of body, energy, and mind, we don't need the View anymore. The View becomes the direct experience we are always living in, and whatever that is cannot be held by the View.

Swami Lakshmanjoo describes the letting go of the intricacies of View and, in essence, all of the accoutrements of spiritual tradition, as a bitter medicine. But it is only bitter when we are attached to limited knowing and the security of believing that we have "gotten it" and that "it" is of supreme importance.

Nature unfolds and refolds itself with both utter simplicity and dazzling variety. Our destiny is to relax, immersed in presence while enjoying our reclaimed ability to play freely in the field of infinite arisings. Eventually, we can happily reconcile ourselves to the fact that all View teachings, even absolute teachings, come with an expiration date.

TRIKA: THE KASHMÍR ŚAÍVA ESSENCE by Tej Raina [CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 9781479306046]

Lofty philosophical subtleties of Trika school of Kashmir Shaiva wisdom shrouded in intricate Sūtras, have been unfolded in rational investigative manner for a modern thinker, in a captivating conversational language, by the author Tej Raina in Trika, the Kashmir Shaiva Essence. Beginning with the perceptive experiences each one of us has, he develops a coherent, thought-provoking argument that helps to visualize the profound Trika communication, handed down from centuries to us in the form of Sūtras by the seers of profound truth. He uses Sūtras as lighthouses to authenticate the perspective he provides for understanding, contemplating upon, and practicing Trika truth. The book can certainly enlighten any serious reader.

Tej Raina, (born 2 February 1942), a college teacher by profession, taught Physics in various government colleges of the Jammu and Kashmir state and at the same time remained associated with literary pursuits, T.V. script-writing, news-reading and ETV program presentation. He also worked as Educational Media Generalist in AIIMS, New Delhi. At present he lives in Jammu busy with his writing and study.

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(original Sutras of Vijāna-Bhairava)

Excerpt: And the greater still enigma is: what is it which perceives and discerns all these objective phenomena? What is the subject, that perceives all this objectivity? If the subject is also objective in nature, then all perceptions become an object-object interaction, and then, no perception would be a true perception but a variable, perpetually differing, indistinct statement of a phenomenon, and then, a subject as a pure witness only, wouldn't exist. But, as we believe, if it is consciousness that discerns, then the question arises about its location and the process of its functioning. Is consciousness every individual's separate personal reality, occurring as multitudes of consciousness aspects, (in which case perceptions would again be variable), or a singular and uniform reality that provides similar perception of an event to all individuals, (only individual responses depending upon their mental approaches would then vary), thus giving consciousness the recognition of a pure witness. Then again, the location and nature of consciousness is a problem staring in our face. Looking at a tender (colorful) flower, or a charming beautiful face, that presents many aspects of its being in color, texture, curvatures and charm, with an overall balance and symmetry, relating to our vision, and also to our feelings and responses, initiates very many activities in several different centers of our brain, in terms of specific neurobiological manifestations. What coordinates all these processed inputs, and to what is this entire perception presented for the final discernment and response? If it is brain itself, then the subject is an aspect of brain, and the consciousness only a neurobiological activity, and all of it actually an objective phenomenon. This raises a question whether 'brain, the material' is conscious, and also, whether 'consciousness is material'. The fact is that any object, whatever, presents information, say through visual signals, which is received by various optical receptors and coordinated by various neurobiological processes in the brain into a coordinated and comprehensive report which is presented to the subject. 'What' is that subject? And where? There are channels between the things 'out there' and the brain, all various objective entities, gross or subtle, that connect the phenomenon out there, to the brain. But how does the brain then connect to the subject that has not to be an objective entity. Or is it, that there is no need for that connection at all? Does subject, the consciousness, in fact not accessible to brain, itself look through the brain(s), at the objective phenomenon (that registers similarly and uniformly to all). If so, why does it not then look directly (rather than through the brain) at the phenomenon, whatever, that occurs in the domain of objective, out there. Why does it need the brain to process all that information in a specific way for its perception that way, or does consciousness need to look at it all, through the brain to perceive it that way? Why does consciousness need to subject itself to all these conditions and confinements of perceiving through the material entities, when it is not a material entity itself? Is it that, if the consciousness looks directly at the objective phenomenon, it will not see what we see, (as we see through our perceptive faculties aided by the brain). Is it because the consciousness wants to see the material phenomenon as we the material existents perceive it, or is it because our material being will not perceive anything at all, in spite of all the neurobiological processing by the brain unless the consciousness gets linked to it. We are, in fact, actually confronted with the most subtle question of all: What is consciousness? And 'how' does the perception of the 'objective' and its attributes happen to it? Also, has it any bearing on the reality of our true being?

We all know that the perception of any objective entity needs the presence of the subject with that. The event has to be in the present, with the subject, the consciousness. Even a memory or a thought, only when linked in the present to the consciousness is discerned, or else it has no existence. This means that the objective finds its existence only when consciousness discerns it, recognizes it. The question is: are the two, the objective and the consciousness, two different entities? If so, then, how does the consciousness know the objective? (And why is the objective unable to know the consciousness?) In fact how can any one actually know the other? Or is it that the two are basically one, and differ only in the state of their being, their presentation? In other words, one being a different expression of the other consciousness a purely attribute-less, unconfined, witnessing-existence aspect of the infinitely attributefull existence of the form and structure of the same reality. In that case, consciousness is 'the always witnessing' reality and the objective the witnessed reality, in whatever perspective, of the single existence! The witness simply links with the event by giving attention to it. Unless the attention links, the experience doesn't happen. The consciousness is there, ever there, (it has to be ever there, or else no experience can ever occur, no objectivity ever register). It may link itself or remain in abeyance, it may be attentive or not attentive, but it is never absent (else, no call to attention could ever commission it). On its being directed to the objective, the attributes of the objective become its focus, therefore, if directed to itself, it should be only itself. Witness, witnessing Itself! Awareness aware of the pure being of itself!

Scientific postulation or experimental investigation may not reveal except up to the material, the objective borders, limited by its own boundary conditions. What we are left with then, is tapping for all the answers about the consciousness from the consciousness itself, by penetrating into it, consciously, attentively!

This is what trika approach is all about. Trika holds that an ineffable reality with unrestricted potency manifests out of itself everything that is manifest, remaining itself ever, the foundation and the faculty inherent within, and providing the means for continuance, change, or adaptability for all that is manifest! Trika is the triad of Siva, Sakti, and nara (97). Siva, is the being aspect of the reality, ever in the transcendental (para) plane as a completely nondifferentiated (abheda) and indeterminate reality ; Sakti, the unrestricted and infinite potency of Siva (the means, mode, and material, for the manifestation as everything, its maintenance as also the withdrawal), and therefore both the transcendental and the immanent (parapara), or in other words differentiated and non-differentiated (bhedabheda) reality, thus both indeterminate as well as determinate in its aspects; and nara, the empirical existence, representing the manifested objectivity, the entirely differentiated (bheda) and therefore determinate, and thus an immanent (apara) reality. In essence, Siva is pure Consciousness, absolute and un-altering, while Sakti is the Dynamic-Consciousness (the consciousness 'in action') both in the transcendental as well the immanent domains of existence, and nara is ultimate terminal in the immanent existence of that Sakti, the Dynamic-Consciousness'. All the three aspects exist in absolutely undifferentiated state in the totally ineffable point (bindu) of Maha-satta), the absolute reality of Cinmaya-purusa-sattatva, which is sarvaga (all knowing), Sarvakrtatva (capable of doing everything), and therefore entirely autonomous and sovereign (swatantra). Termed therefore as vimarsamaya-prakāsa), it is an all-knowing, all-doing will para-Bhairava, or parama-Siva.

This approach is unlike the Vedantic that holds that the ultimate brahm is only prakāsa of existence, which to a Saive, a trika, means only an inert entity that leaves doubts and question about the validity of creation and other several allied aspects, unexplained. For a trika, Vimarsa, the awareness of the potency of its being, provides Siva the aspects of sarvagata, (all knowingness) and sarvakrtatva (all doing-ness), and thereby the complete swatantrya, the greatest bliss of complete autonomy and sovereignty. This lands the ineffable Siva in a state of absolute indeterminacy. What can be known about that infinite and unsurpassable by the limited means of knowledge and understanding that we

posses. No qualities or attributes can be associated with it, because, each of such knowns, would put a catch in it, define it, and thus put a finite limit to it. As an indeterminate, it can present itself as anything in any way, being itself, the source and the sustenance of everything conceivable. And that is what provides an empirical being a means of touching that truth beyond all the borders and reaches. Since that forms our reality, the reality of everything, the penetration into our own being may provide to us the recognition of ourselves and our source the Parama-Siva. And that is what Saiva approach into the trika reality is all about. It is not an armchair philosophy conceived in mind and presented on paper or in a discourse. It is an approach to experience the reality in all its multidimensional perspectives and in essence too. It is about a true recognition of one's reality and a complete, consequent transformation of the concepts and pursuits, rather an actual enjoying of the sovereignty and freedom of being. <>

THE BUDDHIST ROOTS OF ZHU XI'S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT by John Makeham [[Oxford University Press](#), 9780190878559]

Zhu Xi (1130–1200) is the most influential Neo-Confucian philosopher, and arguably the most important Chinese philosopher, of the past millennium, both in terms of his legacy and for the sophistication of his systematic philosophy. **THE BUDDHIST ROOTS OF ZHU XI'S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT** combines in a single study two major areas of Chinese philosophy that are rarely tackled together Chinese Buddhist philosophy and Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucian philosophy. Despite Zhu Xi's importance as a philosopher, the role of Buddhist thought and philosophy in the construction of his systematic philosophy remains poorly understood. What aspects of Buddhism did he criticize and why? Was his engagement limited to criticism (informed or otherwise), or did Zhu also appropriate and repurpose Buddhist ideas to develop his own thought? If Zhu's philosophical repertoire incorporated conceptual structures and problematics that are marked by a distinct Buddhist pedigree, what implications does this have for our understanding of his philosophical project? The five chapters that make up this volume present a rich and complex portrait of the Buddhist roots of Zhu Xi's philosophical thought. The scholarship is meticulous, the analysis is rigorous, and the philosophical insights are fresh. Collectively, the chapters illuminate a greatly expanded range of the intellectual resources Zhu incorporated into his philosophical thought, demonstrating the vital role that models derived from Buddhism played in his philosophical repertoire. In doing so, they provide new perspectives on what Zhu Xi was trying to achieve as a philosopher by repurposing ideas from Buddhism.

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Excerpt: “Learning of the Way”, Tiantai, Chan, Huayan

“Neo-Confucianism” refers to an intellectual movement that reinvented Confucian thought during the Song dynasty (960–1279). The term also describes a set of family resemblances discerned across

clusters of philosophical ideas, technical terms, arguments, and writings associated with particular figures from the Song to Qing (1644–1911) periods in China. Having become the orthodox ideology of the political and social elite in late imperial China, for seven hundred years it formed the ideological basis of the Chinese civil service examination system and constituted the core of educational training. It was also a theory of how to learn and how to apply learning and was the arbiter of moral norms. Neo-Confucian philosophy is the most influential body of Chinese philosophical discourse of the past millennium. It not only extended to and was further developed in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, profoundly shaping intellectual, institutional and social practices,³ but its intellectual legacy also continues today in Greater China to animate New Confucian philosophy, the most vibrant form of contemporary Chinese philosophy.

One group of eleventh-century Neo-Confucian pioneers began to distinguish themselves from other *ru* 儒 (Confucians) by claiming to have rediscovered the Learning of the Way (*daoxue* 道學). Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) claimed that he had been the first since the classical period to take up the mantle of transmitting the *dao*—the learning of the sages—and to rediscover its significance. Elsewhere, he also included his elder brother, Cheng Hao 程灝 (1032–1085), as a transmitter. Unlike Tang-dynasty Confucian thinker and essayist Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824)—who in his essay “Yuan dao” 原道 (Tracing the Way to its Source) also described how the transmission of the way of the sages had been disrupted after Mencius—Daoxue thinkers emphasized it was the learning of the sages that had been rediscovered. It was the lost teachings of the sages that provided profound insights into the workings of a morally inflected cosmos and the place of humans and human society within that cosmos. This theme of rupture and recovery found in the writings of eleventh-century Daoxue thinkers more generally highlights a self-conscious awareness of new beginnings.

These thinkers saw themselves as engaged in recovering the true and deep-seated roots of Sinitic culture—the teachings of the sages of antiquity as “transmitted” by Confucius and Mencius—which had been eclipsed since the Han dynasty (206 BC–AD 220) by foreign (Buddhist) and subversive (Daoist) ideologies resulting in political chaos and social dislocation. They maintained that reunifications begun in the Sui-Tang (581–907) periods, which suffered violent disruptions, were now to be cemented with the recovery of Confucian stability. They were also critical of traditional commentators for failing to apprehend the intentions behind the sages’ words and so breach the profound historical distance separating contemporary students from the learning of the sages. In the Daoxue self-narrative, they were returning to the roots, the sources, not creating something new.

By the late twelfth century, the influence of Daoxue thinkers was such that they “were defining the vocabulary and the issues of intellectual culture to such an extent that men with little interest in moral philosophy chose to argue for their positions within the framework of *Tao-hsueh*.” As a self-styled heir to this movement, Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) identified a group of Daoxue thinkers whose authority rested on their claim to have apprehended the intentions behind the sages’ words. Zhu’s first attempt to write a history of the Daoxue school, *Yi-Luo yuanyuan lu* 伊洛淵源錄 (Records of the Yi-Luo School, 1173), identified himself as heir to a lineage of Five Masters of the (Northern) Song period: Cheng Yi, Cheng Hao, Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1016–1073), Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077), and Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011–1077). In affiliating himself with these seminal figures, Zhu was able to appropriate this authority and so identify himself as a knower rather than a seeker.

Zhu Xi is arguably the most important Chinese philosopher of the past millennium, both in terms of his influence and legacy and for the sophistication of the systematic philosophy he developed. Many of the resources he drew upon to do this—the Four Books, the *Book of Change*, the writings of Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers, Shao Yong, and thinkers associated with the Daoxue tradition more generally—have been well studied. Despite his importance as a philosopher, the role

of Buddhist thought and philosophy in the construction of Zhu's systematic philosophy remains poorly understood.

One widely shared view of the Buddhist influence on Neo-Confucian thought more generally is Charles Wei-hsun Fu's stimulus-response thesis: "[I]t was mainly through the challenge and stimulation of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought . . . that the orthodox Neo-Confucianists began to realize the necessity of rediscovering the metaphysico-religious significance of the fundamental principles existent in early Confucian classics, and reestablished these principles as the chief philosophical weapon to launch forceful attacks against (Mahāyāna) Buddhism in China."

The historian Peter K. Bol regards the closely related view that Neo-Confucians were able to provide a better ethical foundation for their philosophy by borrowing philosophical concepts such as *li* 理 (pattern, principle) from Buddhism and *qi* 氣 (vital stuff) from Daoism, as having been developed in response to the critiques made by Qing scholars "who sought to supplant the intellectual authority of Neo-Confucians by arguing that Song and Ming Neo-Confucians did not have a correct understanding of the Classics and antiquity because they had been influenced by Buddhism and Daoism." Similar developments also occurred in Japan. For example, the Ming-dynasty Chan monk Konggu Jinglong 空谷景隆 (1387–1466) blithely asserted—providing no evidence whatsoever—that a key concept introduced in Cheng Yi's preface to his commentary on the *Book of Change* ("Yi zhuan xu" 易傳序) was actually derived from Huayan master Chengguan's 澄觀 (557–640) *Huayan jing shu* 華嚴經疏 (Commentary to the Flower Garland Sutra). This view was subsequently propagated by the Edo-period evidential scholar Ōta Kinjō 太田錦城 (1765–1825) in his attempts to discredit "Zhu Xi learning." Ōta also attributes the origin of Zhang Zai's and Zhu Xi's *qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性 (psychophysical nature) and *tian di zhi xing* 天地之性 (heaven-and-earth bestowed nature) distinction to the *Śūramgama-sūtra* (*Shoulengyan jing* 首楞嚴經).

Given that scholars have long debated the relationship between Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, just what do we know about Zhu Xi's philosophical engagement with and responses to Buddhism? What aspects of Buddhism did he criticize and why? Was his engagement limited to criticism (informed or otherwise), or did Zhu also appropriate and repurpose Buddhist ideas to develop his own thought? If Zhu's philosophical repertoire incorporated conceptual structures and problematics that are marked by a distinct Buddhist pedigree, what implications does this have for our understanding of his philosophical project? These were questions that contributors to this volume were asked to consider when they first began to formulate their individual contributions in 2012. The five studies in this volume present a rich and complex portrait of the Buddhist roots of Zhu Xi's philosophical thought. Collectively, they illuminate a greatly expanded range of the intellectual resources Zhu incorporated into his philosophical thought, explaining how and why he did so, to provide new perspectives on what he achieved as a philosopher.,,

Chapter Synopses

Between 1144 and 1152, Zhu had studied with Kaishan Daoqian 開善道謙 (d. ca. 1150), a leading disciple of Dahui Zonggao. John Jorgensen sets the scene for his chapter, "The Radiant Mind: Zhu Xi and the Chan Doctrine of *Tathāgatagarbha*," by claiming that Zhu actually spent over a third of his life exposed to, and at times practicing, the Chan of Dahui Zonggao and his students, and only when he met Li Yanping 李延平 (1093–1163) in 1153 did he begin to have doubts about Buddhism and Chan, and only a decade after that did he begin to criticize Buddhism and vigorously repudiate Dahui's style of Chan. He argues that even though Zhu Xi vigorously rejected Dahui's Chan, he still retained or adapted certain key themes and motifs from Chan, which brought him closer to the positions of so-called Northern Chan masters Hongren 弘忍 (601–674) and his heir, Shenxiu 神秀 (d. 706), in particular to the idea of a radiant buddha-nature. Jorgensen prosecutes the strong case

that Zhu Xi “ended up mirroring many of his opponents’ doctrines as he responded to agendas already well established in Buddhist circles, central to which were interpretations of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine.”

The focus of the chapter is Zhu Xi’s choice of the term “lucid radiance” (*xuming* 虛明) to describe the nature of the mind. Jorgensen maintains that Zhu was indebted to the term’s use in seventh- and eighth-century Northern Chan circles to describe the *tathāgatagarbha* (variously also identified with “One Mind,” suchness, buddha-nature or the nature of the mind). “Just as buddha-nature or *tathāgatagarbha* is not non-existent, so too Zhu conceives of the nature as filled with pattern. And just as pattern in the nature awaits to be discerned, so too the *tathāgatagarbha* has a *tathāgata*, a Thus Come One or buddha, waiting to be discovered. In both cases, that content—be it pattern, buddha or suchness—is to be preserved or protected. This is a major feature of Northern Chan practice as well as in Zhu’s practice.” Jorgensen also emphasises the similarities between Zhu Xi’s appropriation of Mencius’ “preserving the mind” (*cun xin* 存心) and Northern Chan’s “maintaining the One Mind” (*shou yixin* 守一心), both of which are directed at stopping the mind losing its innate characteristic of pure radiance as it succumbs to the pursuit of things out of selfish desire.

He finds another connection between Zhu and Northern Chan is the shared notion that there is only one mind but it has two aspects. For Zhu these are the mind of the way (*daoxin* 道心) and the human mind (*renxin* 人心). For Northern Chan (following the *Dasheng qixin lun*), these are the mind as suchness and the arising and ceasing mind. Both agree that the latter aspect in each case—for Zhu, the human mind, for Northern Chan, the mind of arising and ceasing—obscures our perception of the “lucid radiance,” which is mind of the way or the mind as suchness.

Jorgensen’s principal thesis is that Zhu Xi’s description of the nature in terms of a “lucid radiance” obscured by *qi* (vital stuff), actually drew on popular Northern Chan metaphors such as a pearl in muddy water or a mirror covered by dust, used to characterize the state of our inherent buddha-nature, which, by being gradually purified of misleading desires, could lead to sainthood or, in Zhu’s case, to a state approximating sagehood. (In maintaining that not every person is able to become a sage, Zhu effectively rejected the *tathāgatagarbha* and Chan article of faith that all could become saints, or indeed, all will become buddhas.) He maintains that this Northern Chan view in turn drew on the Tathāgatagarbha tradition’s motif of a “radiant” but obscured mind or *tathāgatagarbha* innate in all sentient beings. He also identifies Zhu’s use of the image of a dust-covered mirror as evidencing that Zhu appropriated more from the *tathāgatagarbha* theory than just the concept of lucid radiance (*xuming*). For Jorgensen, the evidence suggests that Zhu Xi was “influenced, possibly indirectly or unconsciously, by this aspect of Northern Chan thought, probably as a result of criticizing the Chan of Mazu and Dahui that was important in Zhu Xi’s time,” provocatively concluding that Zhu Xi formulated what was in effect a kind of Confucian “Northern Chan,” as evidenced by the common belief in an empty, radiant mind, obscured by habituation and *qi*, which could be realized by gradual practice.

Although Zhu is well-known for his harsh criticisms of Buddhism, in “Zhu Xi’s Critique of Buddhism: Selfishness, Salvation, and Self-Cultivation,” Justin Tiwald finds that “much of the contemporary scholarship on Zhu Xi’s critique of Buddhism has called attention to various respects in which Zhu seems to misrepresent the explicit views of his Buddhist opponents, noting cases where Zhu’s characterization seems to lack nuance, ignores exceptions, or mischaracterizes Buddhist doctrines in a rather flatfooted way.” He finds that these attempts to reconstruct Zhu’s critique have largely mischaracterized it by treating it as a critique of the Buddhists’ explicit views. The success or failure of Zhu’s critique is accordingly judged to depend in large part on simply whether he got the Buddhist views right—that is, whether he correctly describes them.

Tiwald instead develops a tightly knit set of arguments to show that Zhu tended to think that regardless of how subtle and defensible the Buddhists' explicit views may have been in principle, in practice these views amount to something very different. For example, in principle, Buddhists endorse an ethics of other-directed concern, and promote the cultivation of loving kindness and the "great compassion" of a bodhisattva. Zhu Xi, however, accused the Buddhists of being selfish—not because he believed that they actually endorsed selfishness or ethical egoism but because he believed that the Buddhists' own practices made it nearly impossible to cultivate genuine other-directed concern. For Buddhists, all routes to great compassion go through radical non-attachment, such that Buddhist monks have to jettison all special attachments even to their own families. In contrast, Confucian methods of moral cultivation build on the sort of other-directed concern that we learn in the family, which comes naturally and is more easily expanded to include others. The Confucian method is realistic, and through it other-directed care is realizable within the space of a single lifetime. The Buddhist methods are very unlikely to succeed, requiring heroic feats of self-transformation, and depending for their justification on highly speculative views about rebirth.

Tiwald approaches the question of Zhu Xi's relationship with Buddhism by examining three sets of criticisms Zhu developed in opposition to Buddhist views. He argues that the above sort of reframing of those criticisms makes them both more powerful and more faithful to Zhu's own understanding of them, as recorded in his letters, essays, and discussions with students. The first set of criticisms has to do with Buddhist soteriology, the fundamental priority of Buddhist salvation, which Zhu believed lent itself to egoism and perverted the more relationship-oriented nature of ethics itself. The second set of criticisms concerns Buddhist meditation, which in Zhu's view leaves Buddhists ill-equipped to take independent standards of right and wrong into account. Confucian "reverential attention" (*jing* 敬), he argued, is the better means by which to reshape one's intentions and emotions in light of objective standards. The final criticisms are of the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. Here Zhu seems to be an uncharitable critic, suggesting that Buddhists treat all things as illusory and without any meaningful relationship to the larger world. Once again, however, Tiwald argues, a closer examination of the evidence shows that he was both aware of more defensible notions of Buddhist emptiness and, at the end of the day, unconvinced that Buddhist practices were conducive to realizing them.

Tiwald concludes that Zhu was not engaged merely with a fictional notion of Buddhism. Rather, the views and the arguments Zhu advanced in support of them were developed in direct response to Buddhist thought, revealing that Zhu participated in a genuine, shared dialogue with his Buddhist adversaries. And perhaps most importantly, "this dialogue took place at multiple levels, probing the connections between doctrines, presuppositions, and day-to-day practices in ways that stand apart from the more conceptual and scholastic disputes we associate with philosophy in medieval Europe and beyond."

In "Buddhism and Zhu Xi's Epistemology of Discernment," Stephen Angle focuses on the case of Zhu's theory of knowing to show how Zhu consciously repurposed Buddhist ideas to develop his own thought. Angle develops two parallel lines of argument. The first and more general argument is that despite Zhu's extended personal encounter with Buddhism, that is not the main reason key aspects of his thought resemble Buddhist ideas and modes of thought. Rather, the resemblance is due to the deep-rooted cultural embeddedness of Buddhist ideas and modes of thought. We are, however, exhorted to assess such resemblances, and indeed, influences, on a case-by-case basis, because they vary widely in nature and scope, and, crucially, in the means by which Zhu appropriated and repurposed them.

These more deep-rooted elements are associated with the first three of the four layers of Buddhist-Confucian interaction Angle identifies as having collectively shaped the ways in which Zhu was influenced by and reacted to Buddhism. The first layer consists of early developments within Sinitic

Buddhism—such as the “buddha-nature” doctrine, a metaphysical “mind” (or heartmind), and the attention paid to holism and intersubjectivity, all of which became key conceptual resources in the process of cross-fertilization between Sinitic Buddhist and native Chinese traditions. The second layer is the gradual articulation of a shared Confucian-Buddhist-Daoist intellectual repertoire consisting of terms, phrases, and texts, which become common property of Tang-dynasty thinkers. The third layer consists of the varying attitudes towards and engagements with Buddhism on the part of first- and second-generation Daoxue figures. The fourth layer is Zhu Xi’s own experience with Buddhism.

The second and more specific line of argument is despite the fact that Zhu’s “epistemic theorizing is replete with terms and phrases that are strongly associated with, and in some cases originate from, Buddhist writing” and that “there are respects in which his theories appear to be structurally parallel with Buddhist theories,” the similarities in terminology or structure actually mask deep differences. In order to understand how epistemic terms and categories that feature in earlier Buddhist sources eventually became important to Zhu Xi, Angle identifies three different attitudes to knowing presented in three influential Buddhist sources: a pragmatic approach (*Foxing lun* 佛性論 [Buddha-nature Treatise]), an approach emphasizing a deep and genuine knowing (Zongmi), and an approach that validates everyday perceptual experience (Mazu). While acknowledging that Zhu had studied a version of Mazu’s approach (under Daoqian), and later had also developed a criticism of that approach consistent with Zongmi’s critical views, Angle argues that such similarities mask important differences.

To that end, he sets out a schematic overview of Zhu’s understanding of knowing, distinguishing three distinct types of knowing: (1) knowing a rule to which things should conform; (2) seeing an isolated instance of how things should be and being compelled to follow it; and (3) awakening to the underlying reason for why things are as they are. Against this background, he argues the case that Zhu repurposed the Buddhist term “*zhijue* 知覺” (perceptual awareness) to become a general term for the mind’s (or heartmind’s) various kinds of knowing activity, concluding that Zhu’s epistemology was a conscious rejection of Dahui’s radical Chan approach, and moreover was also responding to a discourse context, which, while deriving some of its underlying shape from the discourse shared with Zongmi, had quite distinct concerns and goals from those of Zongmi. In particular, the third type of knowing is characterized as being explicitly about seeing interconnections, about “unimpeded interconnecting” (*huoran guantong* 豁然貫通). “The key point about these holistic states of awakening and unimpeded interconnection, which distinguishes Zhu from Huayan and Chan descriptions of holistic states of enlightenment, is that for the Neo-Confucians, ‘unimpeded interconnection’ is still structured or centered in ways that we can at least partly articulate.”

Finally, integrating the above two lines of argument, Angle concludes: “The ultimate picture will surely be one in which Zhu has strong, substantive connections to Buddhist teachings in some areas and not in others, all of this built on a foundation of deep, layered interactions over many centuries.” As he cogently recommends, other chapters in this volume—as well as other scholarship on the Buddhist roots of Zhu Xi’s thought—will, accordingly, need to be judged on a case-by-case basis.

In “The *Ti-Yong* 體用 Model and Its Discontents: Models of Ambiguous Priority in Chinese Buddhism and Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism,” Brook A. Ziporyn continues to examine how Zhu repurposed Buddhist ideas to develop his own thought.

Ziporyn shows that although Tiantai, Huayan, and Zhu Xi all deploy the *ti-yong* model as a crucial component of their metaphysics, in certain key places they deploy it for different ends, “leading to subtle structural differences, which for them amounted to large philosophical consequences.” To this end, he first develops a detailed comparison of these models in the Huayan and Tiantai schools, and

then sets out to show how analogous structures to each of these are adapted to form parts of Zhu Xi's metaphysics.

Ziporyn distinguishes three different *ti-yong* models:

(1) The “classic *ti-yong* model” is associated in particular with early Chinese Buddhist sources and also non-Buddhist thinkers such as Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249). Like the root and branches of a tree, this model implies both strong contrast and strong continuity between *ti* and *yong*. Thus *ti* is one and unseen; *yong* is many and seen. *Ti* is prioritized over *yong*, *ti* is independent, and *yong* is always dependent on *ti* but not vice versa. *Ti* is the source or basis of *yong*. An important variation of this classic model is the “Huayan model,” which Ziporyn characterizes as a radicalization of the classic *ti-yong* model and developed by representative figures such as (p.27) Dushun, Zhiyan, Fazang, Chengguan, and Zongmi. Strongly influenced by the *Dasheng qixin lun*, this model is often exemplified by the relation between the brightness of a mirror and the images appearing in the mirror, or between the wetness of water and the waves of the water. Here *ti* and the *yong* are coextensive—wherever there is *ti* there is *yong*. There is no *ti* outside *yong*, and no *yong* outside *ti*. They are, however, always distinct conceptually, and a one-way relation of dependence pertains to them: *yong* depends on *ti* but *ti* does not depend on *yong*. Crucially, however, the *ti* would not be apparent as *ti* if it were not functioning fully as the diverse *yong*, which are conceptually contrasted to it. This model applies both at the level of the mind or consciousness and its conceptual objects and at the metaphysical level, expressed in the relation between *Li* 理 and *shi* 事, between the sole ultimate reality and its multiple manifestations.

(2) The Tiantai model. Early Tiantai figures such as Zhiyi used the category of Center—a key category in the Tiantai doctrine of the Three Truths—rather than *ti-yong*, to describe the relation between *Li* and *shi*. As Ziporyn teases out in considerable detail, for Zhiyi, real particulars are assumed to be portions of the whole, their determinacy being nothing but a function of limitation and relationship to their opposites (i.e., a particular is determined relative to what it is not). The ground of reality is the Center, which is a part of *both* halves of any dyad—sameness and difference, ignorance and enlightenment, one and many, presence and absence, inside and outside, this and that, and so on—and yet also transcends both. Thus the Center is another term for the transcendent and yet also for the whole, the complete, the unbiased. This way of thinking allows Zhiyi to speak of the relation between *Li* and *shi* in terms of a relation between whole and part, center and periphery, biased and complete. In Zhanran, the *ti-yong* model derived from Huayan is adopted but modified to accord with the Center-periphery model of Zhiyi.

The Huayan view is that all *yong* are functions of, and coextensive with, the one same *ti*—all waves are coextensive with the same wetness—but where there is unity in the wetness there is multiplicity in the waves. In contrast, the Tiantai view of the relation between *ti* and *yong* is not that of one-many but of whole and part. Each part (*yong*) is also intersubsumptive with all other parts, and is thus itself inseparably the whole (*ti*). Moreover, gone is any sense of priority or one-way dependence. Thus each *yong* is a *ti*, and because *ti* and *yong* are coextensive, any particular *ti* is also the *yong* of any and all other *ti*. (Wetness is coextensive with wave but it is no less coextensive with color, happiness, third-world poverty, movement, space, Donald Trump, and so on.) *Ti* is both *ti* and *yong*, and *yong* is both *yong* and *ti*.

This ambiguity or bi-valence—being neither the same as nor different from—is a function of the Tiantai doctrine of Three Truths. Because *yong* (or *ti*) is both *ti* and *yong*, it is indeterminate: Viewed from one aspect it is *ti* and from the other it is *yong*; it is both and neither. To be indeterminate is to be empty, to lack a determinate identity; but to be empty is, in fact, to be determinate (i.e., “empty” as distinct from “non-empty”), and this determinacy is to be provisionally posited. Why is it merely provisional? It is provisional because the boundaries that demarcate it as distinct amount to an

interface, and an interface is both and neither. An interface links two bounded things yet simultaneously separates them—to be provisional is to be both and to be neither. Yet precisely because it is both and neither it is also the Center. If viewed from the perspective of its being a whole that contains all opposed determinations, it is determinate (the whole as distinct from partial determinations), and to be determinate is to be provisionally posited. Conversely, if viewed from the aspect of its transcendence, its standing beyond all determinations, the Center is also emptiness, because to be indeterminate is to be empty.

(3) Zhu Xi's model. Drawing on this rich, if complex, theoretical background, Ziporyn proceeds to argue that around the age of forty Zhu Xi significantly changed his views about *li* and *qi*, no longer subscribing to a straightforward *ti-yong* relationship, instead seeming to mimic a move from the Huayan *ti-yong* model to the Tiantai *ti-yong* model. While retaining much of the still serviceable *ti-yong* language, Ziporyn finds that Zhu Xi specifically supplements the Huayan model with something structurally close to the Tiantai focus on Center-periphery relations and the relations between opposites. He argues that the mode of transcendence and pre-existence is also affected by this shift: Zhu Xi seems to want the kind of transcendence that pertains to the Center's transcendent-immanence with the peripheral opposites it unifies rather than the transcendent-immanence of wetness in waves or brightness in images. The second half of his chapter is an intricate and challenging argument to work out the philosophical and comparative significance of these points. In doing so, he presents us with an entirely new way to understand Zhu Xi's philosophical inventiveness and its profound correspondences with Buddhist thought.

Just as in Tiantai, where the Center as a whole is conceptually prior to and transcends its two parts (emptiness and the provisionally posited, indeterminate and determinate) yet is temporally simultaneous, so too for Zhu Xi, Taiji 太極 (Supreme Pivot) (= *li*) is the functional equivalent of the Center—a union of opposites (*yin* and *yang*) that contains them but also transcends them. *Li* is conceptually prior to *qi*, yet also always coexistent with *qi*, immanent in *qi*.

At the same time, however, as with the relationship between *li* and *shi* in Huayan, for Zhu Xi any particular configuration of *qi* depends on its *li* in a way that is not reversible. As expressed by Ziporyn, in Zhu Xi's case, "any particular *li* is prior temporally to its manifestation as a particular configuration of *qi*." This is because any particular *li* is inherently present in the unity that is *li*, that is Taiji, and the entire *li* is fully present in each particular (*shi*). Where Zhu and Huayan radically part company is that in Huayan there is only one *li*, and because it lacks any determinate nature it is equated with emptiness—a quality that enables it to interpenetrate with all phenomena.

For both Tiantai and Zhu Xi, the realm of *li/li* is itself internally structured and articulated, while remaining unified and transcendental. Unlike the brightness of a mirror, it inherently possesses specific content. In the Tiantai case, the articulated differences, contrasts, and inter-nestings are referred to with the term "3000." In Zhu Xi's case, they are referred to as many individual principles/patterns of all things.

In the final chapter, "Monism and the Problem of the Ignorance and Badness in Chinese Buddhism and Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucianism," I also argue that key aspects of Zhu's metaphysics and philosophy of mind draw preponderantly on conceptual structures and problematics that evidence an unequivocal Buddhist pedigree, but which he adapted for his own philosophical ends. I advance two main theses, both of which link Zhu Xi to the *Dasheng qixin lun*. The first thesis again concerns the *ti-yong* polarity. The second and main thesis concerns the problem of the origin of ignorance. These theses are interwoven and developed concurrently.

Although the *ti-yong* polarity is generally still regarded as an endogenous Chinese philosophical construct, its philosophical development owes more to late Six Dynasties and Sui-Tang traditions of Sinitic Buddhist thought than to Wei-Jin Profound Learning (*xuanxue*). The *Dasheng qixin lun* presents

the relationship between the two gateways as a *ti-yong* relationship, in which the unconditioned (suchness, *tathāgatabarbha*) pervades or is coextensive with the conditioned (*ālayavijñāna* or store consciousness, the locus of phenomenal experience). Moreover, suchness exists in the gateway of the mind of arising and ceasing (the adaption of *tathāgatabarbha* to phenomenal conditions, as *ālayavijñāna*) while *simultaneously extending beyond* the gateway of the mind of arising and ceasing (suchness *qua* the unconditioned), just as wetness exists in all waves but simultaneously extends beyond any particular wave.

What is distinctive about this particular conception of the *ti-yong* relationship is that it is used as a vehicle to convey the idea that the relationship between the unconditioned and the conditioned is one of immanent transcendence. Immanent transcendence is a realist metaphysical view (i.e., not a nominalism). It describes how, on the one hand, the referent wholly lies within the boundaries of a specifiable domain yet, on the other hand, it simultaneously extends beyond the boundaries of that domain.

Just as Huayan master Fazang and various Northern Song Tiantai theorists describe the relationship between *li* and phenomena (*shi*) also in terms of *ti-yong*, so too Zhu subsequently presented the relationship between Taiji/*li* and *qi* as a *ti-yong* relationship. More pertinently, his understanding of *ti-yong* is consistent with the model found in the *Dasheng qixin lun* and as described by various Huayan thinkers. According to this model, even though *ti* (the unconditioned) is coextensive with *yong* (the conditioned), *ti* remains unitary, and only *yong* are multiple. For Zhu Xi, viewed from the perspective its transcendent aspect, Taiji is inherently imbued with the *li* of all phenomena, even before any particular phenomenon yet exists. Intrinsic reality does not exist without function—even if a particular function is yet to be activated—otherwise it would not be intrinsic reality. Conversely, any determinate phenomenon exists by virtue of being endowed with *li*. This is *li* or Taiji in its immanent aspect. The immanent and transcendent are aspects of a single whole that is Taiji. They refer to the two polar perspectives of that whole.

Zhu Xi did not stop there. His account of the mind of the way (*daoxin* 道心) and the human mind (*renxin* 人心); Taiji and *yin-yang*; and the “heaven-and-earth-bestowed nature” (*tiandi zhi xing* 天地之性) and the psychophysical nature (*qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性) is, in each case, presented as a relationship of immanent transcendence of the *ti-yong* type. Each pair is used to affirm a consistent response to the following problem: “How can the unconditioned (the mind of the way, Taiji, the heaven-and-earth bestowed nature) be realized if our cognitive awareness is circumscribed by the conditioned nature of human existence?” Zhu’s constant refrain, that the unconditioned is never apart from the conditioned yet its unconditioned nature is not in any way compromised by that relationship, bears a distinct family resemblance to a cognate formulation in the *Dasheng qixin lun*, where the ocean water is never separated from the wind, but whether the wind blows or not, the wet nature of the water remains unchanged. In both cases, the unconditioned (suchness, *tathāgatabarbha*, Taiji, *li*, the heaven-and-earth-bestowed nature, the mind of the way) is somehow able to be coextensive with the conditioned (the *ālayavijñāna*, *qi*, the psychophysical nature [*qizhi zhi xing*], the mind of humans) yet simultaneously also extend beyond the conditioned; and the relation between the unconditioned and the conditioned is expressed in terms of the *ti-yong* polarity.

Whether Zhu’s understanding of “pattern” and “*qi*” and the *Dasheng qixin lun*’s account of “the gateway of the mind as suchness” and “the gateway of the mind as arising and ceasing” are merely isomorphic or whether this correspondence can also be linked to more specific agencies of influence and appropriation, is a question that lies beyond the scope of my chapter. Of greater significance to our understanding of Zhu Xi’s thought is that the research introduced in that chapter—as in other chapters in this volume—reveals the vital role that Buddhist resources played in Zhu Xi’s

philosophical repertoire, and in doing so, opens up new ways of understanding what Zhu Xi was trying to achieve as a philosopher.

The second and main thesis of my chapter concerns the problem of the origin of ignorance. Robert Gimello maintains that the problem of the origin of ignorance was an issue that Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, and Tathāgatagarbha thinkers all failed to resolve, be it in India or in China. The Mādhyamika's apophatic focus on emptiness effectively dismisses the functional role that conventional reality can play in identifying those agencies that perpetuate ignorance. The Yogācāras make ignorance seem a natural state of the mind but have difficulty in showing how that state of mind can lead to the generation of enlightenment through the external agency of "permeation by hearing" (*śruta-vāsanā*; residual impression left by listening [to the correct exposition of the truth]). The Tathāgatagarbha tradition was confronted with the problem of how to reconcile the doctrine of the mind's inherent state of enlightenment with the doctrine that ignorance is present since beginningless time. Given the fundamental role that ignorance plays in the second of the Four Noble Truths and as the first link in the Twelve Links of Conditioned Origination, the import of this issue was not trifling.

The *Dasheng qixin lun* is significant for its discussion of why it is so difficult to attain buddhahood and why so few are aware of their inherent buddha-nature. Specifically, it explores why most beings are enmeshed in delusion, given that the mind is inherently awoken (*benjue* 本覺). The text provides a concise restatement of the complexities of the ten-stage path of bodhisattva (enlightened being) practice in Mahāyāna Buddhism, which enables deluded beings to free themselves from their false perceptions and suffering. The title, *Giving Rise to Faith in the Great Vehicle*, refers to the arousing of an aspiration to enter that path. The text attempts to guide the novice towards its soteriological goal by means of a number of strategies. One key strategy is via a monism, which is deployed to show the pernicious effects of, but also the illusory nature of, ignorance. By drawing on analogies that present ignorance as external to suchness, however, the text leaves itself vulnerable to the charge that it introduces a dualist analogy into a monistic ontology.

As introduced in the first part of my chapter, in failing to provide a consistent account of the origin of ignorance, the *Dasheng qixin lun* was construed as also failing to provide a satisfactory account of how badness, evil and suffering arise, thus undermining its own soteriological goal. Beginning with early commentators such as the Huayan master Fazang in the early Tang and continuing through to Tiantai masters of the Northern Song, a rich diversity of arguments was developed to preserve a monistic ontology yet also account for the origin of ignorance. Many such accounts were framed in terms of the relationship between Li 理 and phenomena (*shi* 事), with Li representing suchness, and phenomena representing dharmas.

The second part analyzes attempts by two groups of Tiantai thinkers—the Home Mountain and Off Mountain masters—to reconcile the origin of badness with a monistic ontology. As with Huayan theorists, their arguments were framed in terms of the relationship between Li and *shi*. One of the main philosophical issues separating the Home Mountain and Off Mountain masters concerned this relationship. The Home Mountain masters deconstruct the problem of ontological dualism and the attendant issue of the origin of ignorance by arguing that ignorance is not an external condition, separate from intrinsic reality. Li is phenomena and phenomena (including ignorance) are Li. The Off Mountain masters also deconstruct the problem, but do so by denying that ignorance (*qua* phenomena) has a self-nature. Only Li has self-nature, not phenomena.

The third part argues that Zhu Xi was able to reconcile the origin of badness with a monistic ontology in such a way that it provided a more compelling case for affirming the phenomenal world, the life-world, as the ground for ethical practice. I endeavor to show that Zhu Xi's understanding of the *li-qi* relationship, posited as one of immanent transcendence, is a further development of the rich

and complex body of Buddhist discourse that arose in the Tang and Northern Song about *li* 理 and *shi* 事, which had attempted to reconcile the origin of ignorance and badness with a monistic ontology. Zhu's solution was to develop a monistic ontology in which the conditions that make badness possible are not associated with pattern (*li* 理) but rather are associated with *qi*, but with the crucial stipulation that there can be no pattern without *qi*. In doing so, I maintain, he also provided a new solution to the problem of badness—one that avoided the radical proposals entailed in Buddhist attempts to deal with the issue for over half a millennium. This example underscores why an understanding of the Buddhist models Zhu had at his disposal can yield new insights into how he constructed and defended the monistic ontology that is the centerpiece of his metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of mind.

Concluding Remarks

On the question of Neo-Confucianism's philosophical borrowings from Buddhism, Peter Bol maintains that these borrowings "were more accidental than purposeful. Ideas about all things sharing the same principle and, above all, the importance given to the 'mind' in moral cultivation were in origin Buddhist but by Song times had become current in literati society." He further relates that even though certain ideas were Buddhist in origin they had become shared assumptions by the Song era. The evidence garnered in this volume suggests, rather, it is only by analyzing precisely how key concepts such as *li* and *qi*, mind and the nature, *ti* and *yong* and so forth were understood and used by individual thinkers such as Zhu Xi that their significance as components of a specific body of philosophical thought can be determined. In turn, that determination can be achieved only by understanding the Buddhist contributions to the development of these and related concepts and to the theoretical debates that informed that development over the course of centuries.

This volume presents a range of "case studies" to show just how Zhu Xi both engaged with and also drew upon a diverse repertoire of Buddhist ideas and conceptual structures, repurposing them for his philosophical project. Stephen Angle maintains that the main reason key aspects of Zhu Xi's thought resemble Buddhist ideas and modes of thought is due to their deep-rooted cultural embeddedness. Despite these resemblances, he argues that the theoretical differences between Zhu's epistemology and various Buddhist positions "are real, deep, and were well understood by Zhu himself." As with Justin Tiwald, he finds that Zhu's concerns were primarily motivated by principled, philosophical reasons for insisting that key aspects of Buddhist teachings are wrong and pernicious. At the same time, however, Angle's focus on Zhu's theory of knowing also highlights how Zhu consciously repurposed the Buddhist term "*zhijue* 知覺" (perceptual awareness) to develop his epistemology. Such repurposing attests to sustained, focused, and conscious engagement rather than accidental borrowing.

John Jorgensen similarly sets out a rich body of evidence to show that it was in reaction to doctrines associated with the Mazu-Linji-Dahui lineage of Chan that the mature Zhu actually embraced key aspects of Tathāgatarbha thought as the theoretical underpinning of his philosophy of mind and the nature, albeit now repurposed for Zhu's own Confucian project.

The *ti-yong* polarity—which by Song times certainly had already become a shared conceptual resource—provides another prominent example of philosophical repurposing. Brook A. Ziporyn advances a detailed series of arguments to show that Zhu Xi made the *ti-yong* model a crucial component of his metaphysics by modifying it to align with the Tiantai doctrine of the Three Truths. In doing so, he presents an entirely new interpretation of Zhu Xi's philosophical appropriation of Zhou Dunyi's Taiji Diagram and its essay, and key concepts such as Taiji, *li*, and *yin-yang*.

My chapter shows that Zhu's conception of immanent transcendence is based on a series of theoretical refinements and elaborations of the *ti-yong* polarity made by Buddhist theorists, but appropriated by Zhu for his own philosophical ends. I argue that this Buddhist theoretical

background is essential to understanding why Zhu framed the relationship between *li* and *qi* within a monism, which in turn underpins his philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. <>

ZHU XI SELECTED WRITINGS by Philip J. Ivanhoe [Oxford Chinese Thought, [Oxford University Press](#), 9780190861254]

This volume contains nine chapters of translation focusing on the philosophy of Zhu Xi (1130–1200), one of the most influential Chinese thinkers of the later Confucian tradition. Zhu Xi's philosophy offers the most systematic and comprehensive expression of the Confucian tradition; he sought to demonstrate the connections between the classics, relate them to a range of contemporary philosophical issues, and defend Confucianism against competing traditions such as Daoism and Buddhism. He elevated the Four Books—i.e., the Analects, Mengzi, Great Learning, and Doctrine of the Mean—to a new and preeminent position within the Confucian canon, and his edition and interpretation was adopted as the basis for the Imperial Examination System, the pathway to officialdom in traditional Chinese society. Zhu Xi's interpretation remained the orthodox tradition until the collapse of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) and exerted a profound and enduring influence on how Confucianism was understood in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.

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Series Editors' Preface by Eric L. Hutton and Justin Tiwald

Chinese writings from pre-modern times constitute a vast body of texts stretching back over 2,500 years, and while Western studies of China have been growing, many riches from the Chinese tradition have remained untranslated or have been given only partial translations, sometimes scattered across multiple publication venues. This situation obviously poses a problem for those who want to learn about Chinese thought but lack the ability to read Chinese. However, it also poses a problem even for scholars who specialize in Chinese thought and can read Chinese, because it is not easy to read across all the time periods and genres in the Chinese corpus. Not only did the Chinese language change over time, but in some genres particular vocabularies are developed and familiarity with certain earlier texts—sometimes quite a large number of texts—is presumed. For this reason, scholars who focus on one tradition of Chinese thought from a given era cannot simply pick up and immediately understand texts from a different tradition of thought in another era. The lack of

translations is thus an impediment even to specialists who can read Chinese but wish to learn about aspects of Chinese thought outside their normal purview. Furthermore, scholars are often hampered in their teaching by the lack of translations that they can assign to students, which then becomes a barrier to promoting greater understanding of Chinese history and culture among the general public.

By offering English translations of Chinese texts with philosophical and religious significance, *Oxford Chinese Thought* aims to remedy these problems and make available to the general public, university students, and scholars a treasure trove of materials that has previously been largely inaccessible. The series focuses on works that are historically important or stand to make significant contributions to contemporary discussions, and the translations seek to strike a reasonable balance between the interests of specialists and the needs of general readers and students with no skills in Chinese. Translators for the series are leading scholars and experts in the traditions and texts that they render, and the volumes are meant to be suitable for classroom use while meeting the highest standards of scholarship.

This first volume in the series, on Zhu Xi (1130–1200), well exemplifies our aim to give readers greater access to Chinese texts that have not been represented or have been inadequately represented among existing translations to date. Zhu Xi is without a doubt one of the most important and influential thinkers in history, having established what became Confucian orthodoxy and the educational requirements for nearly all government officials for several centuries, not just in China but throughout much of East Asia. He left behind a massive body of writings and recorded conversations that, as of a recent printing from 2002, comprises twenty-seven volumes, each of which is several hundred pages long. While a small portion of this material has been translated, the vast majority of it has not. Furthermore, previous translations of Zhu Xi's work, though undeniably valuable, have tended to adopt a very specific focus, such as his views on learning or his commentarial work. As a result, it has been difficult for readers lacking knowledge of Chinese to gain an understanding of Zhu's thought that encompasses the incredibly broad variety of topics covered in his writings. The present volume constitutes an important step toward filling this gap left by previous translations. We hope that it will serve to spur greater interest in Zhu Xi and may eventually lead to a complete translation of all his works.

This volume, **ZHU XI: SELECTED WRITINGS**, is the first in a new series of translations of Chinese philosophical texts, *Oxford Chinese Thought*, edited by Eric L. Hutton and Justin Tiwald, aimed at providing English-speaking readers access to a range of China's most interesting and influential traditional philosophical writings. While parts of Zhu Xi's works are available in English, this volume offers the first selection of Zhu's writings across a broad spectrum of his core concerns that is designed to be attractive to students and scholars from a wide range of disciplines. It contains lightly annotated, accurate, and readable translations that represent much more of his work than is currently available and includes thoughtful introductions to the full range of his concerns. Our primary audience is scholars and students of East Asian Confucianism, broadly construed, to whom we offer an essential resource for gaining a comprehensive understanding of Zhu Xi's thought. The complete Chinese text for the translated passages, compiled and meticulously edited by Eric L. Hutton, is available on the [Oxford University Press website](#)

Excerpt: This collection of selected translations of Zhu Xi's works, by leading scholars from around the world, presents a representative range of his and our interests and concerns. Each chapter begins with a short description by the translator aimed at introducing the topic and relating it to some of Zhu Xi's larger concerns. Taken together, the aim of the volume is to present an accurate and comprehensive introduction to Zhu Xi's philosophy that can be used not only to understand its historical expression and place within the Confucian tradition but also some of its potential value as a resource for contemporary ethical, political, and social thought. The volume includes a brief chronology of important events in Zhu Xi's life, included in the front matter, and a list of key terms

of art, along with their standard translations and common alternatives. Each chapter includes a list of works cited as well as suggestions for further readings on the topics that it features.

Chapter I consists of selected passages concerning Zhu Xi's metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Since these three topics provide much of the foundation and inform almost everything Zhu Xi wrote about, this introduction offers a concise description of each of these central features of Zhu's philosophy and explores some of the most important relationships among them.

Under the influence of Daoist and Buddhist metaphysical beliefs, neo-Confucians developed a dramatically more robust sense of connection—a belief in a kind of identity or oneness between self and world—that provided the foundation for a more extensive and demanding imperative to care for the world *as oneself* (1:20, 22). Rather than seeing the world as an interconnected system or web, as earlier Chinese thinkers tended to do, they believed each and every thing in the world contained within itself all the pattern-principles (*li* 理)—a term we will discuss in more detail later in this Introduction—in the universe (1:1). This idea, which we might identify as “all in each,” came most directly from certain teachings within Huayan 華嚴 Buddhism. One can see this idea illustrated in many Buddhist temples around the world by displays in which the figure of the Buddha—representing our original nature and containing all the pattern-principle in the universe—is placed within a circle of mutually reflecting mirrors. The effect is that the image of the Buddha is projected and appears everywhere, with the pattern recurring in infinitely expanding repetitions.

The translation “pattern-principle” is more a gesture toward the meaning of *li* 理 than a fully adequate translation. Like *qi* 氣 and certain other terms of art, there is no wholly adequate English word in the same semantic neighborhood that can be used to translate *li* 理; this should not come as a great surprise, for these are terms that serve as the core of the distinctive metaphysics of neo-Confucianism. In a number of passages, Zhu Xi identifies two interrelated, characteristic aspects of *li* 理: pattern-principle is what makes a thing the kind of thing it is and, at the same time, provides a standard, norm, or paradigm for the thing in question.

As for the things under heaven, each has that which makes it what it is (*suoyi ran zhi gu* 所以然之故) and a standard to which it ought to accord (*suo dangran zhi ze* 所當然之則). This is called its pattern-principle.

The pattern-principle of a thing conveys what a thing is in itself (*ti* 體) and for neo-Confucians what a thing is in itself is inextricably linked to how that thing naturally functions (*yong* 用) or operates in the world (1:9, 13, 18). When Zhu Xi is pressed to explain the meaning of pattern-principle, he tends to describe both the form and function of a thing or type of thing. For example, the pattern-principle of boats is that they “can only travel upon water” (1:7); the pattern-principle of carts is that they “can only travel upon land” (1:7); the pattern-principle of bricks is that they lend themselves to building things like steps (1:6); the pattern-principle of chairs is “having four legs and so being something one can sit upon” (1:53). If one removes one of the legs of a chair, “one can no longer sit in it; it has lost the pattern-principle of a chair” (1:53). Folding fans are what they are because they are “made in this particular way and should be used in this particular way” (1:53): this is their pattern-principle. Pattern-principles should not be thought of as fundamental building blocks out of which different things are constructed; they are closer to blueprints than atoms, but closer still to paradigmatic ideals or images that capture and convey not only the structure and form of a thing or type of thing but also its characteristic function or activity in the world.

Throughout his writings, Zhu uses the term *li* 理 in two distinct but related senses: individuated pattern-principle and unified pattern-principle. Individuated pattern-principle is explained earlier in this Introduction; this is the aspect of *li* 理 that makes an individual thing or type of thing the thing or type of thing it is. At the same time, though, each and every individuated pattern-principle is a

manifestation of the single, unified pattern-principle. The dual aspects of pattern-principle are captured in a famous teaching of Cheng Yi's—"Pattern-principle is one but its manifestations are many" (*li yi fen shu* 理一分殊). At times Zhu speaks as if unified pattern-principle is the sum or aggregate of all individuated pattern-principle, but he more often speaks as though the former somehow contains within itself all the latter and the latter are in some sense reflections or manifestations of the former; there is a multifaceted and complex relationship between the unity of pattern-principle and its various manifestations that Zhu Xi himself admits is difficult to explain fully. He at times equates the single, unified pattern-principle with the "Supreme Ultimate" (*taiji* 太極) (1:1). Zhu suggests that the relationship between the supreme ultimate and its myriad manifestations is like that between the moon and its innumerable reflections in various bodies of water, large and small, and makes clear that the supreme ultimate fixes and regulates the form and function of the myriad things. All of this makes clear that the relationship between the supreme ultimate and its myriad manifestations is something much stronger and more mysterious than mere aggregation.

Another way in which Zhu Xi talked about this set of ideas concerning the unity underlying the vast diversity in the universe is by saying that each thing contains within it a shared "original nature" (*ben xing* 本性 or *benti zhi xing* 本體之性), which consists of all the pattern-principles of the world (1:3). This shared "original nature" is manifested in the phenomenal world of individual things as discrete expressions of "physical nature" (*qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性). Individual things and types of things are what they are not because of a difference in their original natures or stock of pattern-principles but because their endowment of *qi*, which differs in quality and balance, only allows certain pattern-principles to manifest themselves. *Qi* naturally occurs in different mixtures and various grades and qualities; some things have more *yin* than *yang*; some *qi* is slow, dull, heavy, turbid, and dark; some is quick, bright, light, lively, and clear. The more imbalanced and impure one's *qi* the less pattern-principle is able to be manifested and it is only such manifested *li* that contributes to how a thing appears and functions and determines whether and what it can think or feel. Humans are unique among all things in being endowed with the most perfectly balanced or purest form of *qi* and hence they are the most intelligent and sensitive creatures on earth. Moreover, they alone have the capacity to refine their individual endowment of *qi*, their "talent" (*cai* 才) (1:18), and thereby increase their understanding and character even to the point where they attain a form of enlightenment and become sages. Non-human animals show more limited levels of and constricted capacities for intelligence and feeling, while plants and inanimate things complete a spectrum that passes into lower states of consciousness and eventually fades into unknowing and unfeeling things (1:2, 4). This prepares the way to discuss some of Zhu Xi's core epistemological views.

As noted earlier, not only are human beings endowed with the purest and most well-balanced *qi*; they are unique among creatures in having the ability to refine and balance the particular endowment they receive at birth. If they work to refine and balance the *qi* that blocks the *li* within to the point where the pattern-principle of their heart-minds can shine forth and illuminate the things they encounter or bring to mind, then at that point they achieve proper understanding and appreciation of these phenomena. Such a view allowed Zhu Xi and other neo-Confucians to provide an account of how it is that human beings, when properly cultivated through learning, ritual practice, meditation, and reflection, can understand the myriad phenomena of the world. Roughly, the idea is that the pattern-principle in our heart-minds can join or meet the pattern-principle in things or events and attain "understanding" (*lihui* 理會, literally "pattern-principle meeting"). It is only because of the pernicious influence of imbalanced or unrefined *qi* that some of the pattern-principle endowed within us is obscured; we can't "see" our way to understanding, and we remain either wholly ignorant or lost in partial or distorted understanding. In order to improve and advance along the Way, one must cultivate oneself, eliminating the self-centered desires that generate and sustain imbalanced or

unrefined *qi* and allowing the pattern-principle within the heart-mind to gradually come into play and guide understanding and action.

Zhu Xi described a complex and systematic process to facilitate the refining of *qi* and thereby gaining a full understanding and appreciation of pattern-principle. He distinguished two primary stages in this process of learning: Lesser Learning and Greater Learning (1:23–26). Lesser Learning was designed to shape young people to accord with pattern-principle in the course of carrying out actual affairs such as practicing rituals, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and mathematics. The idea is to inculcate proper habits that would on the one hand refine the *qi* while on the other resonate with the pattern-principle of a child's heart-mind. Such learning often occurred at a preconscious level (1:25) but in every case helped prepare the young for the more explicitly theoretical lessons to come. Greater Learning “concerns explaining the pattern-principle underlying such affairs” (1:24). Broadly speaking, such learning concerned grasping the pattern-principle of things and affairs and seeing how they all fit together to form the grand scheme of the Way.

Greater Learning consisted in investigating the things (*gewu* 格物) one encountered in life with an aim to grasp their underlying pattern-principles, but it also consisted in and was tightly linked to a systematic study of the classics. Study of such works gave one access to the thoughts of the sages and worthies, who wrote in order to pass on their insights and experiences (1:39). This enables one to make rapid progress in the effort to extend one's knowledge (*zhizhi* 致知) (1:37–38). In order for such study to prove effective in refining *qi* and leading to enhanced understanding it had to be experienced directly by students and properly influence and help cultivate their feelings as well as their thoughts. A distinctive feature of Zhu Xi's approach to learning is that he rejected the idea of relying on untutored emotional intuitions as one's guide. Even though his highest virtue was humaneness and his goal was to care for all the world, he insisted that emotions themselves are originally and inextricably connected to *qi* and tend to mislead; we should instead, as we have discussed, shape ourselves early in life through correct practice and then study and master a set of lessons that explain the pattern-principles underlying proper conduct. As we make progress along the Way, though, we must work in the corresponding and appropriate feelings to inform and motivate our practice of the Way. We must see and feel the significance of the Way by studying for “our own sake” (1:32), i.e., with an aim to improve ourselves morally.

Zhu Xi insisted that learning must bring together and combine proper emotional and theoretical understanding; appealing to an idea first seen in the *Mengzi*, he taught that students must “get it for themselves” (*zide* 自得). They must “taste” the lessons they work at and learn to savor their “flavor” for themselves (1:29, 35). Only such embodied understanding can effectively shape the moral self in the required ways. In order to achieve this goal, students must assiduously maintain an attitude of reverential attention (*jing* 敬) throughout their studies. For Zhu, reverential attention described a serious, focused, and steadfast attitude and state of attentiveness—a Confucian version of Buddhist mindfulness—that functioned to both guard and guide the self in the process of moral cultivation. It guards one from losing one's focus and letting one's attention drift onto ideas, issues, or interests that hinder or distract from moral improvement; it guides one by keeping one's attention focused on those things that advance moral understanding. Reverential attention is the psychological state that keeps us focused on the pattern-principle that leads us to a full and proper understanding and appreciation of the Way. As we progress in learning and advance along the path of moral cultivation, we come to see and appreciate not only how to act but also the larger and grander patterns and processes of the Way. We gain a clearer and more vivid understanding and sense of our relationship, proper function, and fundamental oneness with other people, creatures, and things. We now begin to see how intimately Zhu's metaphysics and epistemology are related to his ethical views and the imperative to care for the world as one's self.

Given the general picture we have described, Zhu Xi and neo-Confucians in general developed and embraced a new and powerful justification for universal care: our shared pattern-principle supplies a deep and intricate connection between ourselves and other people, creatures, and things. Such a view provided an explanation for *why* people are emotionally affected not only by the suffering of other people, but also by the suffering of non-human animals, the harming of plants, and even the wanton destruction of inanimate objects. For example, Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073) famously refused to cut the grass growing in front of his window saying, “I regard it in the same way as I regard myself.” Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077) expressed the same sentiment when he heard the braying of a donkey and declined to eat young bamboo shoots because he could not bear to violate the shared pattern-principle of incipient growth he felt they manifested. Like other neo-Confucians, these men experienced a profound feeling of oneness not only with other human beings but with the entire universe. The self was in some deep sense not only connected or intermingled with other people, creatures, and things but coextensive with the universe, and this provided a clear and powerful justification to care for all the world. If, fundamentally, we are one body (*yiti* 一體) with all the world, we naturally should care for it in the same way that we care for ourselves (1:22).

Daoists, in general, rely upon a distinctive style of reasoning, which, roughly, proceeds from claims about how all phenomena, including the self, arise from and at the most basic level remain nothing (*wu* 無) to claims about the radical equality of things and an imperative to feel and show parental care (*ci* 慈) for all; Buddhists employ a similar style, arguing that all things arise from emptiness (*kong* 空) and fundamentally remain empty, and those who understand this fact about the world and the self will therefore embrace a stance and attitude of great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) and loving kindness (*maitrī*). While Zhu and other neo-Confucians were moved by their long association with Daoism and Buddhism, they insisted that neither the world nor the self is fundamentally nothing or empty; instead all things are abundantly full of pattern-principle, which itself has proclivities toward life or a ceaseless system of life-production (*sheng sheng* 生生). As we have seen, each and every person shares with all other people, creatures, and things a complete and perfect endowment of pattern-principle; it is shared pattern-principle—not “nothing” or “emptiness”—that serves as the foundation for the deep interpenetration and identity among things, which gives rise to and supports their core virtue of humaneness (*ren* 仁), expressed in terms of an imperative to care for other people, creatures, and things as oneself. For neo-Confucians, to be inhumane or unfeeling (*buren* 不仁) was to be in the grip of a delusion about the true nature of the world and the self. Those who do not feel the suffering of the world or fail to seek its flourishing simply do not understand and fully appreciate that they and the world are “one body” (*yiti* 一體); they are like a person with a paralyzed (*buren* 不仁) arm who is insensitive to and ignores someone injuring his afflicted limb. Their moral failing is the result of ignorance, a failure to see the true nature of themselves and the world of which they are a part. <>

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Contingency and Normativity. The Challenges of Richard Rorty by Rosa M. Calcaterra
[Value Inquiry Book Series, Brill/Rodopi, 9789004387973]

Richard Rorty’s “neo-pragmatism” launched a powerful challenge to entrenched philosophical certainties of modernity, articulating a powerful picture of normativity as a distinctive activity of human beings. This “contingentism,” with its emphasis on indeterminacy, ambiguity, uncertainty, and chance, depicts normativity as a practical human possibility rather than a metaphysical bottleneck

which we must overcome at the cost of repudiating the concrete ways we grant epistemic and ethical meaning to our activities. The book is a critical survey of Rorty's philosophy, in light of contemporary theoretical debates around language, truth, justification, and naturalism, as well as his own resourceful attempts to renew philosophy from within by using the conceptual tools and argumentative techniques of both analytic philosophy and pragmatism. <>

Scientists and Poets #Resist edited by Sandra L. Faulkner and Andrea England [Series: Personal/Public Scholarship, Volume: 5, Brill, 9789004418813]

Scientists and Poets #Resist is a collection of creative nonfiction, personal narrative, and poetry. This volume is a conversation between poets and scientists and a dialogue between art and science. The authors are poets, scientists, and poet-scientists who use the seven words—"vulnerable," "entitlement," "diversity," "transgender," "fetus," "evidence-based" and "science-based"—banned by the Trump administration in official Health and Human Service documents in December 2017 in their contributions. The contributors use the seven words to discuss their work, reactions to their work, and the creative environment in which they work. The resulting collection is an act of resistance, a political commentary, a conversation between scientists and poets, and a dialogue of collective voices using banned words as a rallying cry— **Scientists and Poets #Resist**—a warning that censorship is an issue connecting us all, an issue requiring a collective aesthetic response. This book can be read for pleasure, is a great choice for book clubs, and can be used as a springboard for reflection and discussion in a range of courses in the social sciences, education, and creative writing.

Shakespeare and Protestant Poetics by Jason Gleckman [Palgrave Macmillan, 9789813295988]

This book explores the impact of the sixteenth-century Reformation on the plays of William Shakespeare. Taking three fundamental Protestant concerns of the era – (double) predestination, conversion, and free will – it demonstrates how Protestant theologians, in England and elsewhere, re-imagined these longstanding Christian concepts from a specifically Protestant perspective. Shakespeare utilizes these insights to generate his distinctive view of human nature and the relationship between humans and God. Through in-depth readings of the Shakespeare comedies 'The Merry Wives of Windsor', 'Much Ado About Nothing', 'A Midsummer Night's Dream', and 'Twelfth Night', the romance 'A Winter's Tale', and the tragedies of 'Macbeth' and 'Hamlet', this book examines the results of almost a century of Protestant thought upon literary art. <>

Scholarly Milton edited by Thomas Festa and Kevin J. Donovan [Clemson University Press, 9781942954811]

Following the editors' introduction to the collection, the essays in **Scholarly Milton** examine the nature of Milton's own formidable scholarship and its implications for his prose and poetry - "scholarly Milton" the writer; as well as subsequent scholars' historical and theoretical framing of Milton studies as an object of scholarly attention - "scholarly Milton" as at first an emergent and later an established academic discipline. The essays are particularly concerned with the topics of the ethical ends of learning, of Milton's attention to the trivium within the Renaissance humanist educational system, and the development of scholarly commentary on Milton's writings. Originally selected from the best essays presented at the 2015 Conference on John Milton in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the essays have been considerably revised and expanded for publication. <>

Goethe's Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ: Body and Soul in Pursuit of Knowledge and Beauty by Hiwa Michaeli [De Gruyter, 9783110661569]

This book explores the poetic articulations of a shift from a transcendent to an immanent worldview, as reflected in the manner of evaluation of body and soul in Goethe's Faust and Ḥāfiẓ' Divan. Focusing on two lifeworlds that illustrate their authors' respective intellectual histories, this

cross-genre study goes beyond the textual confines of the two poets' Divans to compare important building blocks of their intellectual worlds. <>

Psychology and Religion within an Ideological Surround by Paul J. Watson [Brill Research Perspectives, Brill, 9789004411203]

For over three decades, an Ideological Surround Model (ISM) has pursued theoretical and methodological innovations designed to enhance the 'truth' and 'objectivity' of research into psychology and religion. The foundational argument of the ISM is that psychology as well as religion unavoidably operates within the limits of an ideological surround. Methodological theism, therefore, needs to supplement the methodological atheism that dominates the contemporary social sciences. Methodological theism should operationalize the meaningfulness of religious traditions and demonstrate empirically that the influences of ideology cannot be ignored. The ISM more generally suggests that contemporary social scientific rationalities need to be supplemented by more complex dialogical rationalities. Beliefs in secularization should also be supplemented by beliefs in trans-rationality. <>

Making the Medieval Relevant: How Medieval Studies Contribute to Improving our Understanding of the Present edited by Chris Jones, Conor Kostick and Klaus Oschema [Das Mittelalter. Perspektiven mediävistischer Forschung. Beihefte, De Gruyter, 9783110545302] Open Source

When scholars discuss the medieval past, the temptation is to become immersed there, to deepen our appreciation of the nuances of the medieval sources through debate about their meaning. But the past informs the present in a myriad of ways and medievalists can, and should, use their research to address the concerns and interests of contemporary society. This volume presents a number of carefully commissioned essays that demonstrate the fertility and originality of recent work in Medieval Studies. Above all, they have been selected for relevance. Most contributors are in the earlier stages of their careers and their approaches clearly reflect how interdisciplinary methodologies applied to Medieval Studies have potential repercussions and value far beyond the boundaries of the Middle Ages. These chapters are powerful demonstrations of the value of medieval research to our own times, both in terms of providing answers to some of the specific questions facing humanity today and in terms of much broader considerations. Taken together, the research presented here also provides readers with confidence in the fact that Medieval Studies cannot be neglected without a great loss to the understanding of what it means to be human. <>

A Companion to the Global Early Middle Ages by Erik Hermans [Arc Companions, ARC Humanities Press, 9781942401759, e-ISBN: 9781942401766]

This companion introduces the connections between early medieval societies that have previously been studied in isolation. By bringing together nineteen experts on different regions across the globe, from Oceania to Europe and beyond, it transcends conventional disciplinary boundaries and synthesizes parallel historiographical narratives. The period 600-900 CE witnessed important historical developments, such as the establishment of a Southeast Asian thalassocracy by the Shailendra dynasty and the expansion of the Frankish polity under Charlemagne on the far ends of Eurasia and the consolidation of the Abbasid and Tang empires in between. A Companion to the Global Early Middle Ages integrates these contemporaneous processes and presents new insights into a neglected phase of world history. <>

The Dalai Lama: An Extraordinary Life by Alexander Norm [Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 9780544416581]

The first authoritative biography of the Dalai Lama—a story by turns inspiring and shocking—from an acclaimed Tibetan scholar with exceptional access to his subject.

The Dalai Lama's message of peace and compassion resonates with people of all faiths and none. Yet, for all his worldwide fame, he remains personally elusive. At last Alexander Norman—acclaimed Oxford-trained scholar of the history of Tibet—delivers the definitive, unique, unforgettable biography.

The Dalai Lama: An Extraordinary Life recounts an astonishing odyssey from isolated Tibetan village to worldwide standing as spiritual and political leader of one of the world's most profound and complex cultural traditions. Norman reveals that, while the Dalai Lama has never been comfortable with his political position, he has been a canny player—at one time CIA-backed—who has maneuvered amidst pervasive violence, including placing himself at the center of a dangerous Buddhist schism. Yet even more surprising than the political, Norman convinces, is the Dalai Lama's astonishing spiritual practice, rooted in magic, vision, and prophecy—details of which are illuminated in this book for the first time.

A revelatory life story of one of today's most radical, charismatic, and beloved world leaders. <>

The Emanated Scripture of Manjushri: Shabkar's Essential Meditation Instructions by Shabkar Tsogdruk Rangdrol Translated by Sean Price Foreword by The Seventh Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche Introduction by Matthieu Ricard [Tsadra, Snow Lion, 9781559394611]

Instructions for traversing the entire Vajrayana path to enlightenment from one of Tibet's most famous wandering yogis.

Composed by Shabkar at the Cave of Miracles close to Mount Kailash around 1815, this compendium of spiritual instructions is written in the form of questions and answers, alternating verse and prose, between Shabkar and his disciples. It presents the essence of the entire graded path to enlightenment, using Tsongkhapa's Great Graded Path (*Lam rim chen mo*) as its model. In twenty-three pieces of advice, he explains the need to renounce the world, how to develop genuine compassion, and methods for achieving an undistracted mind that can unite meditation on emptiness with compassion. His nonsectarian approach is evident in his teachings on the nature of mind according to the Mahamudra tradition of Milarepa, his practical explanations of Saraha's songs of realization, and the attainment of buddhahood without meditation, which draws on the teachings of the Great Perfection, Dzogchen. Shabkar's style is direct and fresh; his realization infuses his instructions with an authenticity that will continue to inspire Buddhist practitioners for years to come. <>

Naropa's Wisdom: His Life and Teachings on Mahamudra by Khenchen Thrangu, From Oral Teachings translated by Erik Perna Kunsang [Snow Lion, 9781559394901]

Accessible and practical teachings on the life of Naropa, with verse-by-verse commentary on his two most important Mahamudra songs by a contemporary Karma Kagyu master.

Naropa is one of the accomplished lineage holders of the Mahamudra tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. In this book, Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche, a beloved Mahamudra teacher, first tells the extraordinary story of Naropa's life and explains its profound lessons. He follows this with lucid and practical commentaries on two of Naropa's songs of realization, explaining their precious instructions for realizing Mahamudra, the nature of one's mind. Throughout, Thrangu Rinpoche speaks plainly and directly to Westerners eager to receive the essence of Mahamudra instructions from an accomplished teacher. <>

Tilopa's Wisdom: His Life and Teachings on the Ganges Mahamudra by Khenchen Thrangu Based on Translations from Oral Teachings by Lama Yeshe Gyamtso, Jules Levinson, and Jerry Morrell [Snow Lion, 9781559394871]

Accessible and practical teachings on both the life of Tilopa, who founded the Kagyu tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, and one of his most important texts on the practice of Mahamudra.

Most traditions of Mahamudra meditation can be traced back to the mahasiddha Tilopa and his Ganges Mahamudra, a “song of realization” that he sang to his disciple Naropa on the banks of the Ganges River more than a thousand years ago. In this book, Khenchen Thrangu, a beloved Mahamudra teacher, tells the extraordinary story of Tilopa’s life and explains its profound lessons. He follows this story with a limpid and practical verse-by-verse commentary on the Ganges Mahamudra, explaining its precious instructions for realizing Mahamudra, the nature of one’s mind. Throughout, Thrangu Rinpoche speaks plainly and directly to Westerners eager to receive the essence of Mahamudra instructions from an accomplished teacher. <>

Dharma Matters: Women, Race, and Tantra Collected Essays by Jan Willis Forewords by Charles Johnson and Janet Gyatso [Wisdom Publications, 9781614295686]

A powerful collection of essays on race and gender in contemporary Buddhist practice, a hot-button topic in the West right now, by one of the leading thinkers in the area.

Jan Willis was among the first Westerners to encounter exiled Tibetan teachers abroad in the late sixties, instantly finding her spiritual and academic home. *TIME* Magazine named her one of six “spiritual innovators for the new millennium,” both for her considerable academic accomplishments and for her cultural relevance. Her writing engages head-on with issues current to Buddhist practitioners in America, including dual-faith practitioners and those from marginalized groups.

This collection of eighteen scholarly and popular essays spans a lifetime of reflection and teaching by Willis. Grouped in four sections—Women and Buddhism, Buddhism and Race, Tantric Buddhism and Saints’ Lives, and Buddhist-Christian Reflections—the essays provide timeless wisdom for all who are interested in contemporary Buddhism and its interface with ancient tradition. <>

Zurchungpa's Testament: A Commentary on Zurchung Sherab Trakpa's Eighty Chapters of Personal Advice by Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche, based on Shechen Gyaltsap's Annotated Edition, translated by the Padmakara Translation Group [Shambhala, 9781559394925]

Zurchungpa's Eighty Chapters of Personal Advice was the final teaching given by the great Nyingma master Zurchung Sherab Trakpa before he passed away. His counsels are the distillation of a lifetime's experience and comprise the practical instructions of a master who had made the teachings of the Great Perfection truly part of himself. The original text consists of almost 580 maxims, organized into eighty chapters covering the entire path of Dzogchen, from fundamental teachings on devotion and renunciation, through to a whole series of pith instructions that bring the Dzogchen view to life. Much of the meaning of these pithy, often cryptic, instructions could be lost on the reader without the help of the notes Shechen Gyaltsap Rinpoche provided in his annotated edition, which he based on the explanations he received from his own teacher, Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo. <>

The Lotus Sutra: A Contemporary Translation of a Buddhist Classic translation and introduction by Gene Reeves [Wisdom Publications, 9780861715718]

The Lotus Sutra is regarded as one of the world's great religious scriptures and most influential texts. It's a seminal work in the development of Buddhism throughout East Asia and, by extension, in the development of Mahayana Buddhism throughout the world. Taking place in a vast and fantastical

cosmic setting, the Lotus Sutra places emphasis on skillfully doing whatever is needed to serve and compassionately care for others, on breaking down distinctions between the fully enlightened buddha and the bodhisattva who vows to postpone salvation until all beings may share it, and especially on each and every being's innate capacity to become a buddha.

Gene Reeves's new translation appeals to readers with little or no familiarity with technical Buddhist vocabulary, as well as long-time practitioners and students. In addition, this remarkable volume includes the full "threefold" text of this classic. <>

The Complete Cold Mountain Poems of the Legendary Hermit Hanshan translated by Kazuaki Tanahashi and Peter Levitt [Shambhala, 9781611804263]

Welcome to the magical, windswept world of Cold Mountain. These poems from the literary riches of China have long been celebrated by cultures of both East and West—and continue to be revered as among the most inspiring and enduring works of poetry worldwide. This groundbreaking new translation presents the full corpus of poetry traditionally associated with Hanshan ("Cold Mountain") and sheds light on its origins and authorship like never before. Kazuaki Tanahashi and Peter Levitt honor the contemplative Buddhist elements of this classic collection of poems while revealing Hanshan's famously jubilant humor, deep love of solitude in nature, and overwhelming warmth of heart. In addition, this translation features the full Chinese text of the original poems and a wealth of fascinating supplements, including traditional historical records, an in-depth study of the Cold Mountain poets (here presented as three distinct authors), and more. <>

The Art of Chinese Philosophy: Eight Classical Texts and How to Read Them by Paul R. Goldin [Princeton University Press, 9780691200781]

A smart and accessible introduction to the most important works of ancient Chinese philosophy—the *Analects of Confucius*, *Mozi*, *Mencius*, *Laozi*, *Zhuangzi*, *Sunzi*, *Xunzi*, and *Han Feizi*

This book provides an unmatched introduction to eight of the most important works of classical Chinese philosophy—the *Analects of Confucius*, *Mozi*, *Mencius*, *Laozi*, *Zhuangzi*, *Sunzi*, *Xunzi*, and *Han Feizi*. Combining accessibility with the latest scholarship, Paul Goldin, one of the world's leading authorities on the history of Chinese philosophy, places these works in rich context as he explains the origin and meaning of their compelling ideas.

Because none of these classics was written in its current form by the author to whom it is attributed, the book begins by asking "What are we reading?" and showing that understanding the textual history of the works enriches our appreciation of them. A chapter is devoted to each of the eight works, and the chapters are organized into three sections: "Philosophy of Heaven," which looks at how the *Analects*, *Mozi*, and *Mencius* discuss, often skeptically, Heaven (*tian*) as a source of philosophical values; "Philosophy of the Way," which addresses how *Laozi*, *Zhuangzi*, and *Sunzi* introduce the new concept of the Way (*dao*) to transcend the older paradigms; and "Two Titans at the End of an Age," which examines how *Xunzi* and *Han Feizi* adapt the best ideas of the earlier thinkers for a coming imperial age.

In addition, the book presents clear and insightful explanations of the protean and frequently misunderstood concept of *qi*—and of a crucial characteristic of Chinese philosophy, nondeductive reasoning. The result is an invaluable account of an endlessly fascinating and influential philosophical tradition. <>

The Daode Jing: A Guide by Livia Kohn [Guides to Sacred Texts, Oxford University Press, 9780190689810]

The *Daode jing* ("Book of the Dao and Its Virtue") is an essential work in both traditional Chinese culture and world philosophy. The oldest text of philosophical Daoism, and widely venerated among religious Daoist practitioners, it was composed around the middle of the 4th century BCE. Ascribed to a thinker named Laozi, a contemporary of Confucius, the work is based on a set of aphorisms designed to help local lords improve their techniques of government. The most translated book after the Bible, the *Daode jing* appears in numerous variants and remains highly relevant in the modern world. This guide provides an overview of the text, presenting its historical unfolding, its major concepts, and its contemporary use. It also gives some indication of its essence by citing relevant passages and linking them to the religious practices of traditional Daoism. <>

Advaita: A Contemporary Critique by Srinivasa Rao [[Oxford University Press](#), 9780198079811]

Advaita has been extensively studied by various schools of philosophy in classical India. In contemporary times, however, it has only been compared to the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and F.H. Bradley. This book offers a comprehensive critique of Advaita, which is very contemporary in its outlook, analysis, and technique. It raises several new and fundamental questions while answering old and classical questions from a contemporary perspective. Srinivasa Rao supplements the classical Indian analysis with many special concepts and techniques extensively used in contemporary Western logic and analytic philosophy. The book discusses whether what classical Advaita had maintained centuries ago can still be maintained, and if at all it is possible, in exactly which way. <>

The Reality Sutras: Seeking the Heart of Trika Shaivism by Shambhavi Sarasvati [Jaya Kula Press, 978-1732218307]

The Reality Sutras is a handbook of teachings about the nature of the self and reality from the perspective of Trika Shaivism. Trika Shaivism, also known as Shaiva Tantra and Kashmir Shaivism, is a direct realization tradition from Northwest India. It shares with Dzogchen, Daoism, and Chan Buddhism an emphasis on direct, embodied experience and on uncontrived naturalness as the fruit of spiritual practice.

Shambhavi Sarasvati offers students of direct realization spiritual traditions a traditionally structured handbook with short, sutra-style teachings followed by commentary. The sutras are intended to inform, to guide, and to serve as a source of contemplative material for practitioners. <>

Trika: The Kashmir Śaiva Essence by Tej Raina [CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 9781479306046]

Lofty philosophical subtleties of Trika school of Kashmir Shaiva wisdom shrouded in intricate Sūtras, have been unfolded in rational investigative manner for a modern thinker, in a captivating conversational language, by the author Tej Raina in Trika, the Kashmir Shaiva Essence. Beginning with the perceptive experiences each one of us has, he develops a coherent, thought-provoking argument that helps to visualize the profound Trika communication, handed down from centuries to us in the form of Sūtras by the seers of profound truth. He uses Sūtras as lighthouses to authenticate the perspective he provides for understanding, contemplating upon, and practicing Trika truth. The book can certainly enlighten any serious reader.

The Buddhist Roots of Zhu Xi's Philosophical Thought by John Makeham [[Oxford University Press](#), 9780190878559]

Zhu Xi (1130–1200) is the most influential Neo-Confucian philosopher, and arguably the most important Chinese philosopher, of the past millennium, both in terms of his legacy and for the sophistication of his systematic philosophy. **The Buddhist Roots of Zhu Xi's Philosophical Thought** combines in a single study two major areas of Chinese philosophy that are rarely tackled together Chinese Buddhist philosophy and Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucian philosophy. Despite Zhu Xi's

importance as a philosopher, the role of Buddhist thought and philosophy in the construction of his systematic philosophy remains poorly understood. What aspects of Buddhism did he criticize and why? Was his engagement limited to criticism (informed or otherwise), or did Zhu also appropriate and repurpose Buddhist ideas to develop his own thought? If Zhu's philosophical repertoire incorporated conceptual structures and problematics that are marked by a distinct Buddhist pedigree, what implications does this have for our understanding of his philosophical project? The five chapters that make up this volume present a rich and complex portrait of the Buddhist roots of Zhu Xi's philosophical thought. The scholarship is meticulous, the analysis is rigorous, and the philosophical insights are fresh. Collectively, the chapters illuminate a greatly expanded range of the intellectual resources Zhu incorporated into his philosophical thought, demonstrating the vital role that models derived from Buddhism played in his philosophical repertoire. In doing so, they provide new perspectives on what Zhu Xi was trying to achieve as a philosopher by repurposing ideas from Buddhism. <>

Zhu Xi Selected Writings by Philip J. Ivanhoe [Oxford Chinese Thought, [Oxford University Press](#), 9780190861254]

This volume contains nine chapters of translation focusing on the philosophy of Zhu Xi (1130–1200), one of the most influential Chinese thinkers of the later Confucian tradition. Zhu Xi's philosophy offers the most systematic and comprehensive expression of the Confucian tradition; he sought to demonstrate the connections between the classics, relate them to a range of contemporary philosophical issues, and defend Confucianism against competing traditions such as Daoism and Buddhism. He elevated the Four Books—i.e., the Analects, Mengzi, Great Learning, and Doctrine of the Mean—to a new and preeminent position within the Confucian canon, and his edition and interpretation was adopted as the basis for the Imperial Examination System, the pathway to officialdom in traditional Chinese society. Zhu Xi's interpretation remained the orthodox tradition until the collapse of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) and exerted a profound and enduring influence on how Confucianism was understood in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. <>

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