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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books



Robert Tenor, editor
1-15-2021

New Series Number 81

EDITORIAL

[Scriptable](#) is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for “the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies” derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. Our [Annotated Bibliography](#) will review, list and link the titles under discussion, providing a faithful summary of its content and audience.

Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.

Each issue should surprise.



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PHILOLOGY IN THE MAKING: ANALOG/DIGITAL CULTURES OF SCHOLARLY WRITING AND READING

edited by Pál Kelemen, Nicolas Pethes [Transcript Verlag, 9783837647709, PDF: 9783839447703]

Philological practices have served to secure and transmit textual sources for centuries. However – this volume contends –, it is only in the light of the current radical media change labeled ›digital turn‹ that the material and technological prerequisites of the theory and practice of philology become fully visible. The seventeen studies by scholars from the universities of Budapest and Cologne assembled here investigate these recent transformations of our techniques of writing and reading by critically examining core approaches to the history and epistemology of the humanities. Thus, a broad praxeological overview of basic cultural techniques of collective memory is unfolded.

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On the authors

Excerpt: How do we know what we do? For a long time, this question has been a subordinate one in the history of the sciences in general and within the self-concept of philology in particular, because both seemed to be focused on the objects of this knowledge and not on the processes of its production. In the natural sciences, the discipline of Science Studies began to question this hierarchy between knowledge and practice and to ask about the tacit knowledge of the materially conditioned processes of research, social rituals of scientific communication, and media technologies used for the distribution of results. Science Studies are based on the “practical turn” because they consider knowledge to emerge from technically and institutionally embedded practices rather than from ‘rational’ and ‘goal oriented’ accounts that are given in retrospect once a project is completed. Contrary to such accounts, contemporary Science Studies consider contingencies, accidents, and involuntary findings as well as social hierarchies, technical equipment, and personal interaction equally relevant for the process of establishing valid facts, standards, and formats within a field. Science, as Bruno Latour famously put it, is not “readymade” but “science in the making”, and scientific facts are constructions by an isolated professional community rather than representations of the world out there or empirical manifestations of theoretical ideas.

In the light of the success of Science Studies it is surprising that analyses of knowledge making practices within the humanities are still rare. One of the reasons for this delay could be that philological research has been carried out methodically and technologically almost unchanged for over two centuries – so the knowledge of philological practices has actually remained tacit due to their assumed self-evidence. For this reason, it is no coincidence that the interest in “philology in the making” arises at a time when this methodological and technological continuity faces a challenge: the challenge of digitization. As we witness the growing impact of e-books, full text-databases, hypertext editions, distant reading projects, and open access publications, our awareness that these technological changes may have fundamental consequences for our understanding not only of literature and culture but also of scholarship in the humanities is raised. While new media often claim to simply enhance, accelerate, or expand the spatial and temporal range of previous communication devices and the cultural concepts that derive from them, the suspicion grows that they actually establish new modes of collecting, storing, editing, interpreting, and teaching literary history and philological theory. And if it is true that philology is “the fundamental science of human memory”, then the transfer of the praxeological approach from Science Studies to the study of philological practices is not only one possible extension of this methodological approach among many, but a crucial precondition for a fundamental understanding of the current consequences of the ‘digital turn’ for managing our cultural tradition as well as of the influence of our media technological competences on our self-understanding as a culture.

This awareness for the significance of media in philological scholarship also means to account for the actual materiality of objects and documents within the process of tradition. Contrary to an abstract notion of ‘text’ and the interpolation of its content or meaning, a praxeology of philological scholarship has to examine “the sociology of texts” with respect to material specificities, medial differences, and everyday practices such as browsing, skimming, scrolling, and scanning. Thus, the concept of “material philology” is extended far beyond the realm of book history and methodologies of editing.

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The following articles will raise the question whether new media support or modify concepts of culture and tradition by examining philological practices such as collecting and comparing, archiving and editing, commenting and interpreting, quoting and referencing etc. with respect to the changes they underwent during the past two decades due to the introduction of digital media. They result from a two-year cooperation between the Departments of Literary Studies at the Universities of Budapest and Cologne, in the course of which the historical, methodological and theoretical prerequisites for such a philological praxeology were developed and discussed. Two research questions were at the center of this cooperation:

1. What are the medial technologies and material appearances of what we will refer to as 'texts' in a digitized future? Does it change our notion of the literary artwork whether we read it on paper or on an electronic reader? Do new technologies of marking, referencing, quoting, and excerpting texts change the way we understand, interpret, use, and functionalize our textual heritage? Does it change our notion of a scholarly edition whether we have to look up numerous heavy volumes in a library or search for references online? And, through this simplified access: will digital media also transgress the border between academic and non-academic practices of reading and writing? It seems likely that computer technology will not replace 'paper culture' entirely but create an awareness of the historical role and ongoing function of using paper inside and outside the academia. But how do we avoid merely repeating the myths and fetishes of 'paper authenticity' and 'close reading'? Maybe the future for paper based media such as the book and paper based practices such as collecting will migrate into new contexts and forms of use that seem irritating only from a traditional point of view.
2. Which changes of practices connected to working with texts can be observed in the light of the digital turn in the Humanities? Since new media technologies never simply continue the *modus operandi* of old ones but rather implement fundamental changes in structures of communication as well as concepts of culture, knowledge, and art, new methods (e.g. quantitative analysis), formats (e.g. the digital catalogues), and institutions (e.g. divisions for Digital Humanities) have to be analyzed with respect to the transformation of practices, theories, and concepts within our routines of editing, analyzing, and teaching historical texts: What are the standards that scholars have to meet in order to successfully produce valid statements within a digitized scholarly community? How are authorities, categories, and methods implemented and canonized (or replaced) in the field? Will qualitative rereadings of selected texts still be a viable option for scholarship and teaching or will we have to contextualize these readings with the large data pools digital archives provide? Can we (and should we at all) maintain our understanding of humanities scholarship as a mode of aiming for the exemplary instead of for totality?

It may well be that computers will simply transfer the material sources, textual formats, and routines of reading from the paper realm into the digital one, so that eventually the formats of cultural tradition and philological communication are going to be similar on and off paper (as can already be observed on the e-book market). But it is also possible that entirely new arrangements of texts and reading may emerge (as some smart phone applications already suggest). Either way, this is the right time to take stock of both sides: Will cultural competences that evolved by using paper still be relevant in a computer age? Or will they become more and more obsolete once historical material will be available at all times to everybody? Is our notion of culture memory going to change once

scholars realize it is not only based on great minds and ideas but rather on algorithms? How will the implementation of computer technologies (if not ubiquitous computing) recontextualize and maybe even change traditional paper-based practices of writing and reading, reconstructing and interpreting, or cross-referencing and applying knowledge?

Within the methodological framework of Science Studies, Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) seems especially useful for this approach because of its focus on semiotic structures: Latour is interested in the variety of scientific “inscriptions” and “paperwork” when he analyses the modes of “Drawing Things Together” from various sources of information onto the two-dimensional sphere of the written page. That is to say, literary studies use paper and books not only as (historical) objects but also as tools of scholarly writing when they reconstruct and interpret written material of the past. Therefore, besides the Laboratory Life that Latour/Woolgar analyzed as a system of various types of “literature” in their study from 1979, there is a Library Life to be discovered as paper based institutions of knowledge undergo fundamental media changes, i.e.: fundamental changes within their network of materialities and agents.

To be sure: the debate about philology has been dominated by an ongoing diagnosis of changes, turns, and crises long before the advent of digitized text analysis (and probably ever since philology was introduced at Universities in the late eighteenth century). But the following articles will neither focus on the history of various philological disciplines nor on the constitution of what has been recently labeled “metaphilology”, i.e. a philological analysis of historical positions within literary studies. Neither is it going to contribute to the impressive number of manifestos on the “Return to Philology”, on its redefinitions as “New”, “Post”, or “Future Philology”, or to the debate on “Rephilologisierung” in Germany. And they will not follow sociological approaches that reconstruct the process of scholarly knowledge making, but in doing so are focused on hierarchies and economic interests within institutionalized humanities and only reluctantly extended to the analysis of practices. Considering the practices of Digital Humanities as a challenge for philological knowledge is still an open field of research today: Computational Philology has been almost exclusively promoted programmatically and hardly ever contextualized historically, let alone praxeologically.

On the basis of these considerations, the following essays deal with four overarching topics: With regard to the theory of philology, HANJO BERRESSEM proposes to reflect on the changing media environments of reading within the framework of an ecology of philology and to ask about the respective technical framings of producing meaning. MARCUS KRAUSE pursues the way in which the concept of ‘philology’ has become a label for the appropriate handling of texts, even though there is no stable theory of philology in the history of philology, but merely changing relations between theory and philology. Finally, BJÖRN SONNENBERG-SCHRANK asks how the establishment of Digital Humanities as a promising label was able to assert itself against this background by alluding to the old myths of totality and completeness, which can be evaluated negatively as a pathological hoarding as well as positively as a dissolution of boundaries in shape of ‘cyborg philology’.

With regard to the concept of materiality, Ádam RUNG reminds us that classical philology never disposed of original autographs anyway and instead followed the ideal of ‘pure text’ – a dematerialization that is currently drawn into question by Digital Humanities and their ability to visually depict the materiality of texts. NICOLAS PETHES refers to the fundamental material basis of philological research before textual structures or digital storage media, paper, which in

contemporary cultural studies becomes the focus of interest at the very moment when it threatens to transfer to a paperless culture. As LIVIA KLEIN WÄCHTER shows, the next genetic stage corresponding to paper is manuscripts, which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became both a reference point for the invention of authorship as for the historicist fetishization of authentic documents, and whose materiality still represents a boundary point for philological interpretation today. CHARLOTTE JAEKEL reconstructs how, in the 19th century, this knowledge of the materiality of culture was made more and more invisible, thus preparing the ground for methods in Science Studies that aim at revealing the inscription apparatuses of knowledge by way of 'reverse blackboxing'. In closing, JÚLIA TÓTH-CZIFRA asks what significance traditional paper technologies still have in today's digitally supported editing practices and discusses practices archiving preliminary stages of the edited texts in digital databases.

With regard to the practices of philology, MATTHIAS BICKENBACH points to the practice of browsing as an approach to books that does not simply aim at decoding meaning and that cannot simply be reproduced digitally. It is therefore not the status of the text itself that changes through digitalization, but only the way in which it is used, i.e. the media differentiated body techniques of reading, which reconstitute the text anew in every reading event. CHARLOTTE COCH reconstructs technically supported reading and memorizing techniques using the example of the slip box that Hegel still uses as an encyclopaedia of the mind but is reconceptualized by Niklas Luhmann as an active communication partner. GÁBOR MEZEI deals with the complementary question of the operation of writing and analogizes it with the spatial design of maps, insofar as writing not only sketches a topography of signs, but is also structured by the gaps between them and can thus be revealed as a grid of interruptions. JULIA NANTKE concludes the section with a description of the mutual relationship between traditional philological practices and new digital technologies.

The last section is devoted to this interrelationship with a view to the new possibilities, but also to the implicit limitations of philological practice through digital technologies: In the sense of blackboxing, GABOR PAL KÓ argues that the computer also generates a blind spot of research, especially since computer surfaces simulate old media practices. DANIEL KOZÁK, on the other hand, shows how Digital Humanities in the field of editorial philology allows a broader commentary on ancient sources – without drawing the consequence that digital results necessarily have to be more objective than the analog ones, which they still supplement today. AMÁLIA KERÉKES identifies the daily press since the 19th century as the most obvious modern corpus for DH, which even in predigital times could only be viewed as big data and raises the question of the relationship between macroanalysis (with respect to knowledge about journals) and microreading (with respect to understanding their contents). Conversely, GÁBOR VADERNA shows for historical research that computers must not only be understood as tools that change concepts of history by macroperspective analyses, but that microhistory can also be digitized. MELINDA VÁSÁRI concludes the volume by showing that the relationship between philology and computer not only concerns digital text structures, but also the question of archiving and analyzing computers and hard disks of writers and scholars, so that philology approaches the practice of autopsy from forensics – an examination of dead bodies of data that once again underscores the vitality of philology in the digital age. <>

GRANDE GRAMMAIRE HISTORIQUE DU FRANÇAIS (GGHF) (Great Historical Grammar of French) edited by Christiane Marchello-Nizia, Bernard Combettes, Sophie Prévost, and Tobias Scheer [De Gruyter Mouton, 9783110345537] in French

The existing major works on the history of the French language were published more than fifty years ago and are characterized by a largely a-theoretical approach. More than a hundred years after Ferdinand Brunot began to publish his monumental work, the ambition of the **GRANDE GRAMMAIRE HISTORIQUE DU FRANÇAIS (GGHF)** is to present the evolution of the French language in its totality, building on the contributions achieved by descriptive and theoretical research in recent decades. It also offers several innovative aspects.

The GGHF is a grammar organized by themes rather than by periods, and it reflects all major areas currently under debate in linguistics (phonetics / phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, etc.). In addition, it is based on a balanced corpus of several million words that has been designed especially for the GGHF (with a selection of representative texts for each century). The consideration of this corpus and the quantification of facts enable the authors to establish a close relationship between variation and change: we believe that the interaction of these two aspects is the cornerstone for the interpretation of the evolution of French and of language in general. In addition to the description of the evolution of French, the analysis of language change thus also aims to contribute to the study of the evolution of language as such.

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Une Grammaire historique de l'an 2020

1. Equiper la langue

C'est autour de 1400 qu'ont commencé à apparaître des ouvrages en français destinés à décrire et à enseigner la langue française : le *Donait françois* de John Barton (1408) ou les *Manieres de langage* (1396, 1399). Un peu plus tard, au 16^e s., il y eut une véritable explosion de grammaires et de dictionnaires, de Palsgrave à Robert Estienne. Et depuis plus de six siècles s'est établie une longue tradition d'ouvrages qui ont contribué à « reéquipement » de la langue française : consciemment ou non, on savait déjà qu'une langue dépourvue de tels outils est à terme une langue menacée.

La Grande Grammaire Historique du Français de ce début du 21^e s. (desormais GGHF 2020) se situe dans la continuité des grands ouvrages du début du 20^e s. : c'était une démarche novatrice alors de vouloir faire une histoire globale de révolution du français. C'est Ferdinand Brunot, avec sa vaste *Histoire de la langue française, des origines à nos jours*, qui a initié cette démarche. Il y a un siècle (9 tomes parus de son vivant entre 1905 et 1938 et deux tomes posthumes couvrant la période allant des origines à 1815 ; Ch. Bruneau puis un collectif ont assuré la suite, entre 1945 et 2000, et republié l'ensemble en 24 volumes au total).

La GGHF n'est pas seulement destinée à s'ancrer dans une tradition. Depuis quelques décennies, il se manifeste un indéniable intérêt pour l'histoire des langues et leur évolution, et c'est également pour répondre à cette demande qu'il nous a paru utile de réaliser cet ouvrage. Nous avons réuni pour cela une trentaine de contributeurs, parmi les meilleurs spécialistes internationaux dans leur domaine.

Concernant révolution du français, il manquait en effet en ce 21^e s. un nouvel ouvrage qui en donne une vision d'ensemble mise à jour, et qui en décrive dans sa globalité la diversité et les variations. Bien des avancées théoriques sont désormais acquises concernant les processus à l'œuvre dans révolution des langues (grammaticalisation, reanalyse, analogie, etc., + chap 2, chap. 12.5 pour la phonétique). En outre, la constitution depuis un demi-siècle de très vastes corpus (Frantext, Base de Français Médiéval-BFM, etc.) ainsi que de dictionnaires informatisés (FEW, TLFi, DMF, Tobler-Lommatzsch, AND, Godefroy, etc.) et le développement parallèle de la linguistique de corpus fournissent des outils inconnus jusqu' alors.

Les dix points que nous développons brièvement ci-dessous exposent les principes essentiels qui ont guidé notre entreprise.

2. Une grammaire sur corpus

L'histoire du français couvre douze siècles de textes écrits, soit une bonne trentaine de générations, et bien davantage si l'on prend en compte le proto-français (langue qui n'est plus le Latin et non encore l'AF), uniquement oral, qui est essentiel en particulier pour le développement du phonétisme du français (Partie 3).

Mais sa description souffre d'un double manque sans remède : d'une part il est impossible d'avoir recours à des locuteurs natifs pour prononcer un jugement sur les énoncés étudiés pour les siècles passés ; d'autre part il est impossible d'avoir un accès direct à de l'oral : toute parole prononcée nous est parvenue à travers de l'écrit. Le linguiste « diachronicien » est ainsi confronté à une double limitation : d'une part il a pour source essentielle, et parfois exclusive avant l'enregistrement de la voix (dernier quart du 19^e s.), les textes, écrits ; et pour reconstruire ou du moins formuler des

hypothèses sur cet oral inaccessible directement, il doit recourir à des biais complexes (* chap. 11 et chap. 37). D'autre part, en l'absence du jugement autorisé d'un locuteur natif, il est contraint de rester dans l'hypothèse — une ascèse parfois frustrante.

Mais cette situation est partiellement compensée par une richesse de données inconnue jusqu'ici, grâce à l'existence de nouveaux moyens techniques et au développement de très vastes corpus historiques et dictionnaires informatisés, qui se sont ajoutés à l'accumulation des informations fournies par les grammaires depuis le 19^e s. Dès à présent, des outils permettent de les exploiter d'une manière sans équivalent antérieurement. L'analyse de ces corpus et la théorisation de l'approche quantitative ont conduit à mettre au jour des phénomènes qui jusqu'alors étaient ignorés ou inaccessibles, en particulier en morphologie, syntaxe et lexique, et à proposer pour la langue de ces époques anciennes des analyses approfondies.

Ces avancées dans la documentation nous ont permis, non seulement d'enrichir nos données et nos descriptions, mais aussi d'affiner et de préciser la chronologie traditionnellement retenue, en la fondant sur les grandes étapes de l'évolution de la langue (voir ci-dessous, et chap. 4). Ainsi, outre la prise en compte explicite de la longue étape du protofrançais pour la phonétique (4 Partie 3), nous avons été conduits d'une part à élargir encore la vaste période médiévale, en la faisant alterner du 9^e s. jusqu'au milieu du 16^e s., et d'autre part nous avons segmenté cette longue période en trois sous-périodes, le très ancien français (TAF : 9^e-11^e s.), l'ancien français (AF : 12^e-13^e s.), et le moyen français (MF : 14^e-s.). Pour la période suivante, la notion de Renaissance étant plus historique et littéraire que linguistique, les linguistes spécialistes de cette période ont proposé de spécifier une nouvelle étape, le français préclassique (FPreclass), qui, allant du milieu du 16^e s. au milieu du 17^e s., précède le français classique (FClass), ce dernier couvrant la période comprise entre le milieu du 17^e et la fin du 18^e s. Enfin, le français moderne (FMod : 19^e-20^e s.) est suivi du français contemporain (FContemporain, 21^e s.), chacun ayant ses spécificités.

3. Nouveaux domaines de la grammaire historique : graphématique, sémantique grammaticale, énonciation et pragmatique

Les avancées dans la réflexion et la théorisation menées sur la langue au cours des cinquante dernières années ont permis de poser l'existence de domaines linguistiques spécifiques, définissables par des phénomènes ressortissant à une même problématique.

Ainsi, aux quatre champs habituels de la phonétique historique (Partie 3 : Phonétique historique), de la morphologie (Partie 5 : Morphologie et morphosyntaxe), de la syntaxe (Partie 6 : Syntaxe) et du lexique (Partie 9 : Lexique et sémantique lexicale), qui ont nécessairement été influencés eux aussi par les découvertes récentes, nous avons adjoint trois nouveaux domaines d'étude, consacrés à la « graphématique » (Partie 4 : Codes de l'écrit, graphies et ponctuation), à la Sémantique grammaticale (Partie 7), et à l'énonciation et à la pragmatique (Partie 8 : Énonciation et textualité, pragmatique).

Enfin, après une rapide présentation des principes de l'ouvrage, deux vues d'ensemble ouvrent la GGHF 2020 : une synthèse sur les développements théoriques et méthodologiques structurant la pensée contemporaine sur la diachronie (Partie 1 : Fondements théoriques et méthodologie), et une vue d'ensemble sur l'histoire externe de la langue française (Partie 2), permettant de situer par la suite les étapes du développement du système du français, que décrit le cœur de l'ouvrage. Une Conclusion (Partie 10) synthétisera les acquis de l'ouvrage.

4. Incompletudes, et souhaits

Dans ce vaste ouvrage, il apparaît que certains points n'ont pas été abordés, ou à peine évoqués, ou traités de façon marginale. Certaines absences sont le résultat d'un choix, afin de privilégier une analyse plus poussée de certains aspects, mieux à même d'éclairer les résultats d'une approche novatrice dans sa dimension diachronique. Ainsi, concernant les relations anaphoriques, n'a été traité que le cas particulier de la cataphore ; ou encore, pour ce qui est de l'énonciation, l'accent a été mis sur le seul discours rapporté.

Dans d'autres cas, seuls certains aspects d'un thème ont été abordés. Ainsi, l'attribut de l'objet direct n'apparaît que dans ses différences avec l'attribut du sujet (d'une fréquence d'emploi, il est vrai, bien supérieure), sans être traité en tant que tel. De même, les constructions avec complément à l'infinitif, les auxiliaires, les verbes supports, ou encore la subordonnée participiale ou la subordonnée consecutive, auraient mérité une analyse spécifique.

Il est par ailleurs des points de difficultés qui, en français contemporain ou dans les siècles passés, font ou ont fait l'objet d'hésitations ou d'erreurs : l'accord du participe passé aux formes composées du verbe en est un. Ils auraient pu être analysés en tant que tels, pour mesurer l'ampleur du phénomène et tenter de l'expliquer.

Enfin, la grammaire d'une langue est aussi, ou d'abord, la description et l'analyse des usages pluriels qu'en font ses locuteurs, mais également celle des variétés régionales et nonhexagonales. Or, la GGHF a, très majoritairement et souvent presque exclusivement, centré son analyse sur le français « central », sans donner leur place méritée aux autres variétés. La prise de conscience de ces imperfections par les responsables de la GGHF invitera peut-être des collègues à combler ces manques.

5. Une histoire en longue durée : focus sur la partie ancienne

L'histoire du français couvre douze siècles pour sa tradition écrite, de 842 à 2020, et bien davantage si l'on prend en compte sa proto-histoire.

La langue française, comme les autres langues romanes, se situe dans la continuité de sa source essentielle, le latin, qui lui-même a une histoire documentée depuis une plus longue période encore. Peu de langues au monde bénéficient d'une telle profondeur chronologique, tant pour la source essentielle qu'est le latin, que pour les sources d'emprunts ou d'influence au cours des siècles, ainsi que d'une pratique aussi continue de l'écrit, et d'une présence aussi régulière du témoignage de grammairiens, en particulier à partir du 16^e S.

Les avancées cumulées de plus de deux siècles de descriptions historiques de toutes les périodes passées ont puissamment contribué à procurer une analyse en longue période de notre langue, grâce aussi au développement parallèle de théories linguistiques qui ont permis d'en éclairer l'évolution d'une façon innovante. Ces théories, bien que majoritairement destinées à l'analyse synchronique des langues, se sont en effet révélées partiellement utilisables pour une exploration diachronique (chap. 2, chap. 12 pour la phonétique).

Cependant, dans les grandes descriptions diachroniques du français réalisées jusqu'ici, les premiers siècles du français ont toujours été un peu moins bien décrits dans une visée évolutive que les suivants — sauf peut-être en phonétique où l'effort principal a depuis le 19^e s. toujours porté sur les événements antérieurs à l'AF. Il fallait combler cette lacune et mieux intégrer les périodes très

anciennes a la diachronie generale du francais ; nous nous y sommes efforces, grace en particulier aux remarquables monographies dont beneficie l'AF depuis quelques decennies.

Une premiere decision a donc ete de placer le focus diachronique vers la periode la plus ancienne, ce qui nous a permis de mettre en evidence l'existence d'une etape transitoire entre le Latin tardif et l'ancien francais, le « tres ancien francais », que revelent les quelques textes ecrits entre le milieu du 9e et le milieu du 11e s.

Une seconde decision a ete de tenter, au cours de nos avancees, de proposer lorsque c'etait necessaire des periodisations fondees sur une chronologie affinee des phenomenes de changement.

6. Une grammaire du changement

Une des caracteristiques de cette grammaire est de se presenter non comme la juxtaposition de tranches synchroniques successives, mais comme une grammaire du changement, l'accent etant mis sur les facteurs de l' evolution et sur la prise en compte de la variation. Cette volonte a des consequences dans la construction meme de l'ouvrage.

Une premiere consequence est celle de la *iodisation : le fait de mettre l'accent sur la continuite de revolution conduit parfois, dans l'analyse des phenomenes, a supprimer, ou au moins a gommer, la distinction a priori en periodes successives auxquelles les etudes historiques renvoient ordinairement. Ce decoupage s'appuie le plus souvent sur un melange de criteres d'ordre non linguistique (litteraires, culturels, historiques : ? chap. 4), souvent inadéquats pour la langue. Si l'on s'en tient a des faits relevant purement du systeme de la langue — ce que nous nous sommes efforces de faire l'analyse des divers domaines et sous-domaines montre que tout n'evolue pas au meme rythme : ainsi les changements syntaxiques sont-ils loin d'aller du meme pas que les changements phonetiques ou que les changements lexicaux. Et a l'interieur d'un meme domaine, par exemple la syntaxe, il est difficile de parler d'une homogeneite de revolution ; par exemple, la regularisation des deux categories du determinatif et du pronom ne s'accomplit pas aussi rapidement pour les demonstratifs, pour les possessifs ou pour les indefinis.

Il nous a semble toutefois possible de reunir suffisamment d'indices pour determiner des moments de rupture (innovation, puis changement), et des moments sinon de stabilite, du moins de variabilite moins active. Pour cela, nous mettons en evidence la facon dont se realisent, dans les divers sous-systemes de la grammaire concernant les unites de premiere articulation (unissant une forme et un sens : Martinet 1961), les principales tendances de revolution du francais : evolution vers une langue plus analytique, hierarchisation progressive des syntagmes, resserrement des liens de dependance, specialisation des categories morphosyntaxiques. C'est ainsi par exemple que l'on a pu rassembler plusieurs arguments qui, dans l'histoire du francais, plaident en faveur de la reconnaissance d'une periode de francais preclassique (mi-16e s. a mi-17e s.), durant laquelle arrivent a leur terme bon nombre d'evolutions morphosyntaxiques importantes (+ chap. 4).

7. « Tout changement est une variante qui a reussi » : penser la variation

Presque toujours, un changement linguistique etait au depart une simple variante synchronique. Des lors, une question importante est celle du role que jouent les facteurs externes dans l'apparition, le maintien ou la transformation d'une variante, qui soit devient un changement permanent, soit subsiste etat de variante, soit disparait. Ces facteurs ne relevent pas tous, proprement parler, du systeme de la langue, mais ils ne peuvent etre ignores.

Ainsi, pour analyser la variation dans le système d'une langue, doivent être pris en compte la typologie textuelle, les diverses situations d'écrit et d'oral, ainsi que les jugements normatifs portés sur les énoncés, et les changements liés à des modifications dans la conception de la cohérence discursive et de la textualité. Il serait nécessaire aussi, dans la même optique, de prendre en compte, d'un point de vue historique et psycholinguistique, les changements qui ont eu lieu dans les pratiques de la lecture et de la rédaction, de recriture, c'est-à-dire d'explorer une manière de « tectonique », d'archéologie des pratiques intellectuelles qui conditionnent l'usage de la langue.

Tout cela rejoint, d'une manière ou d'une autre, l'architecture différenciée proposée par E. Coseriu il y a un demi-siècle (1966, 1973) pour penser la variation dans les langues. Il a distingué quatre facteurs essentiels qui jouent un rôle dans ce processus d'incessant changement qui produit la variation, les quatre angles d'attaque qui en rendent possible l'analyse : la diachronie (variation dans le temps), la diatopie (variation dans l'espace : variantes dialectales par exemple), la diastratie (variation liée à la dimension sociale des usages de la langue) et la diaphasie (variation liée au style personnel du locuteur). S'est ajoutée par la suite le facteur de la diamesie (variation de médium, entre langue écrite et langue orale : Zolli 1974, Mioni 1983).

Plus récemment, P. Koch et W. Oesterreicher (2001 en particulier) ont élaboré un type d'analyse différent mais complémentaire, transversal en quelque sorte, fondé sur le concept de « médiation communicative », vs. « immédiateté communicative » : chaque production langagière peut ainsi être située sur une échelle, ou un axe, allant de la proximité communicative maximale à la distance communicative maximale, grâce à la prise en compte d'une dizaine de paramètres (ancrage référentiel vs. détachement référentiel, émotionnalité forte vs. émotionnalité faible, communication spontanée vs. préparée, etc.).

Toutes ces notions permettent de comparer la variation entre les énoncés suivant des critères constants, ou en tout cas communs, et d'éviter des jugements purement aléatoires ou subjectifs. On peut ainsi par exemple mieux situer l'apparition d'une « innovation » (variante) dont l'évolution ultérieure montre qu'elle était destinée à devenir un changement permanent, et en expliquer le développement par sa situation régionale, ou par le type de texte où elle apparaît, ou par le fait qu'elle apparaît surtout dans des discours directs, etc.

8. La langue comme système dynamique, le signe linguistique comme muable

Une approche diachronique implique une réflexion préalable sur la notion de langue comme système synchronique actif chez chaque locuteur. Depuis Saussure, cette conception a été reprise par les grammairiens structurales, y compris la grammaire universelle. Saussure conçoit que synchronie et diachronie ont partie liée, leur différence résultant du regard que porte le linguiste sur la langue : la langue est potentiellement synchronique et diachronique en même temps, système et signe linguistique en mouvement.

Mais déjà au 19^e s. quelques linguistes avaient posé les prémices d'une conception dynamique du langage, ainsi Whitney et les néogrammairiens (Paul 1975 [1880]), ou auparavant déjà Humboldt, pour qui le langage « est non pas un ouvrage fait [ergon] mais une activité en train de se faire [energeia] » (1974 [1836] : 183). Saussure par la suite a étendu cette réflexion à sa conception du signe, consacrant un chapitre de son Cours (chap. II) à « l'immutabilité et la mutabilité du signe linguistique ».

Les grandes theories du 20e s., structurales et génératives, sont certes fondées sur une analyse synchronique, mais elles ont presque toutes tenté une approche de la diachronie et ont, chacune avec ses moyens, cherché à apprécier les phénomènes de changement. Et depuis, Bien des propositions ont été élaborées (par exemple * chap. 2, chap. 45 et chap. 12.5 pour la phonétique), qui permettent de mieux penser la complexe evolution des langues.

La GGHF se situe dans cette ligne de pensée, concevant la langue, dans sa complexité et son evolution continue, comme un « système dynamique », et le signe comme une entité non figée.

9. Les types de changement

Chaque fois que possible, nous avons désigné le type ou les types de changement, simple(s) ou complexe(s) à l'oeuvre dans les phénomènes étudiés. On en dénombre d'ores et déjà plusieurs, suffisamment pour que soit couverte une bonne partie des faits, depuis l'analogie mise en evidence des le 19e s., jusqu'à l'exaptation, ou à la rémanence en cours de description, en passant par la reanalyse (et la recatégorisation qui lui est souvent subsequente), les changements phonétiques, l'emprunt (lexical mais pas uniquement), la grammaticalisation, la lexicalisation, la disparition et ses avatars éventuels.

Parallèlement, les modalités et les aspects des changements font eux aussi l'objet d'analyses et de modélisations : leur plus ou moins grande rapidité de realisation, ou leurs modes de déroulement, ou encore leurs enchaînement, ont généré des modeles qui sont en cours d'évaluation (par ex. la S-curve, mise en evidence dans le champ linguistique par A. Kroch (1989), après quelques autres, + chap. 2 ; ou encore les « changements liés »).

Le but de la GGHF n'est cependant pas d'approfondir d'un point de vue théorique les divers types de changements, mais de permettre, à terme, d'établir des comparaisons et donc de situer leur importance relative dans l'ensemble de l'evolution des langues. On a ainsi pu mettre en evidence le role considerable qu'a joué tel ou tel type de changement dans l'evolution de tel ou tel paradigme ou construction : par exemple, le système des possessifs I français apparaît comme le champion de l'analogie (+chap. 30.5) : il n'a pas fallu moins

de Sept modifications analogiques pour passer du simple paradigme du latin classique au double paradigme du français contemporain, via des étapes fort complexes. Quant au paradigme des adverbes, il offre une synthese sur l'utilisation particulièrement inventive des différents sous-types de grammaticalisation. Et l'on sait déjà que, dans l'evolution de la morphologie du français, la grammaticalisation est à l'oeuvre dans plus d'un tiers des changements. Le lexique, lui, est Bien entendu le lieu privilegie des emprunts de toute sorte.

10. Metalangage et categories

Les categories à travers lesquelles on nomme les unites, et donc grace auxquelles on pense la langue, changent elles aussi. Si certaines categories majeures comme le verbe ou le nom ne posent guere de probleme majeur depuis la grammaire antique, il n'en va pas de même pour des categories comme celles des determinants et des pronoms ; le latin en effet ne presente pas ce type de distinction pour des formes comme ille ('ce' determinant vs. 'celui' pronom), ou meus (equivalent de 'mon' ou 'le mien') ; or le français distingue progressive-ment les series cel- / cet-, mon / mien, etc. Des Tors, à partir de quel moment n'est-on plus devant une structure de type « adjectif + nom » (qui serait identique à celle dominante en latin) mais devant une hiérarchisation du groupe nominal rendant pertinente la denomination de « determinant » nominal ?

Ces changements dans la structuration et donc dans la catégorisation rendent obligatoire dans cet ouvrage l'emploi de termes designant des types de morphèmes qui ont existé à certaines périodes et ont disparu par la suite, tels que « particules », « preverbes séparables », ou d'autres termes encore, qui pourraient sembler relativement vagues mais qui permettent toutefois de ne pas biaiser l'observation et la description des états de langue anciens par le recours à des catégories peu adaptées, qui en faussent la compréhension. Il y a donc eu perte de catégories anciennes (preverbes séparables, adverbes polyvalents portant sur divers niveaux), mais aussi apparition de catégories nouvelles (déterminants, connecteurs), et nous mettrons ces changements systématiquement en évidence.

Nous rencontrons dans l'analyse des unités de l'énoncé et du texte, toutes proportions gardées, une difficulté identique à celle qui vient d'être évoquée à propos des catégories. L'emploi d'une expression comme « phrase complexe », par exemple, laisse entendre que des propositions sont organisées dans des relations de dépendance. Or on sait que ce type de relations s'ancre progressivement sur un continuum qui va de la parataxe à la relation la plus étroite, et aux faits d'enchassement. Ici encore, l'emploi de la terminologie destinée à la description du français moderne (ou du moins du français moderne &fit) peut empêcher de rendre compte de façon pertinente des évolutions qui se sont produites dans ce domaine.

On constate en effet, en MF ou en FPreclass, une moins grande autonomie de la « phrase » par rapport à la dimension textuelle : bon nombre de faits syntaxiques se règlent au niveau d'une séquence de propositions (on rappellera ici la notion de « période », qui a été trop vite renvoyée au champ de la rhétorique et de la stylistique). Et la question ne se pose pas seulement pour l'unité « phrase », mais également pour la « proposition » : ce noyau minimal, cette cellule construite autour du verbe, est, elle aussi, en évolution. Parler de proposition (ou de « phrase noyau », ou de « phrase de base ») laisse penser que seules des différences de position entre les constituants séparent les énoncés d'époques successives

(OVS vs. SVO, par exemple). Or c'est l'organisation même de la proposition qui se modifie, en particulier par la formation d'un syntagme verbal hiérarchisé, l'ordre des éléments n'étant qu'une conséquence de cette restructuration. Tout ceci conduit à utiliser des expressions plus prudentes, telles que, par exemple, celle de « zones (preverbale, postverbale) » de énoncé.

11. Une longue et dense tradition

La GGHF 2020 se situe, on l'a dit en commençant, dans la tradition des grammaires historiques du français, dont plusieurs ont accompagné l'ouvrage initial de Brunot ou lui ont succédé, et leur apport a été capital : la Grammaire historique de la langue française de K. Nyrop (1899-1930), le Cours de grammaire historique de la langue française d'A. Darmesteter (posthume, avec E. Muret et L. Sudre, 1889-1891, reimpr. 4 vol., 1930) ; et la Grammaire historique de la langue française de L. Kukenheim (2 vol., 1967-1968), ouvrages qui seront évoqués ponctuellement.

On y ajoutera des ouvrages exemplaires en syntaxe ou phonétique historiques tels que la Syntaxe historique du français de C. Sneyders de Vogel (1919), la Historische französische Syntax d'E. Lerch (1925-1934), et la Historische französische Syntax d'E. Gamillscheg (1957), ou encore les Éléments de linguistique romane d'E. Bourciez (1967/1956/1930 [1910]) ; en phonétique historique, on évoquera, parmi bien d'autres (? chap. 11, §1), le Précis de phonétique française, publié en 1889 par Edouard Bourciez (et ensuite décliné dans diverses éditions), la Grammaire Historique de la Langue

Francaise de W. Meyer-Lake publiee en 1908, ou la Phonetique Historique du Francais de Pierre Fouche publiee entre 1952 et 1961.

Par ailleurs, dans la seconde partie du 20e s., plusieurs ouvrages de synthese plus concis ont ete publies, à la suite du Précis de Grammaire historique de la langue francaise de F. Brunot et Ch. Bruneau (1937) ; entre autres ceux de J. Picoche et C. Marchello-Nizia, Histoire de la langue francaise (1989 — acces en ligne), ou de J. Chaurand, Nouvelle histoire de la langue francaise (1999). Et surtout, un grand nombre de descriptions synchroniques d'etats anciens du français, consacrees à des periodes particulieres, ont pare des le 19e s., et specialement depuis une cinquantaine d'annees. Tous ces ouvrages ont ete extrêmement precieux dans l'elaboration de la GGHF 2020.

Mais ces realisations, immenses pour les premieres, plus modestes pour les autres, ne representent pas seulement pour nous une « tradition ».

En effet, si nous avons pour note part fortement souligne, dans les pages qui precedent, les points sur lesquels note volonte d'innovation est intervenue, ce n'etait pas une maniere de nous opposer ou de nous demarquer fondamentalement de ces grands predecesseurs. Au contraire. Par là aussi, nous nous situons dans la lignee de nos predecesseurs, nous suivions sinon leurs traces, du moins leur ambition : car tous, et chacun à sa maniere, à sa place et dans son époque, ont modifie, inflchi — et parfois fortement, definitivement — notre maniere moderne de penser le changement, non seulement en linguistique, mais plus largement dans les sciences humaines.

Une derniere chose, en conclusion, à propos de cet ouvrage : nous avons voulu rendre le plus lisibles possible ces chapitres ou sous-chapitres parfois tres denses et fort techniques. Chacune de ces monographies, de la plus breve (les huit pages des Numeraux en 30.7) à la plus longue (les 71 pages traitant de la Syntaxe du sujet en 34.1), constituent des recits en soi. Notre effort a tendu à faire que ces petites histoires — dont on ne connaît pas la fin — generent au total les elements pour une theorie du changement. Pour nous, au terme de ce travail, quelques visions se sont formees ou consolidees, des perspectives se sont dessinees, que resume la Conclusion. Nous esperons qu'il en sera de même pour les lecteurs.

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Barton 1408 ; Bourciez 1889, 1910 ; Brunot 1905-2000 ; Brunot et Bruneau 1937 ; Chaurand 1999 ; Coseriu 1966, 1973 ; Darmesteter 1891-1897-1930 ; Poncho 1952-1961 ; Gamillscheg 1957 ; Humboldt 1836 ; Koch et Oesterreicher 2001 ; Kroch 1898 ; Kukenheim 1967-1968 ; Lerch 1925-1934 ; Martinet 1961 ; Meyer-Lilbke 1908 ; Mioni 1983 ; Nyrop 1899-1930 ; Picoche et Marchello-Nizia 1989 ; Saussure 1972 [1906-1911] ; Sneyders de Vogel 1927 ; Zöll 1974.

Christiane Marchello-Nizia, Bernard Combettes, Tobias Scheer et Sophie Prevost

English Translation

A Historic Grammar for the Year 2020

1. Equipping the language

Around 1400, French works began to appear, intended to describe and teach the French language: John Barton's *Donait Francois* (1408) or the *Langaige Manieres* (1396, 1399). A little later, at 16C s., there was a veritable explosion of grammars and dictionaries, from Palsgrave to Robert Estienne. And for more than six centuries, a long tradition of books has been established that has contributed

to the "equipment" of the French language: consciously or not, it was already known that a language devoid of such tools is ultimately a threatening language.

The Great Historical Grammar of The Frenchman at the beginning of the 21st century (now GGHF 2020) is in the continuity of the great works of the beginning of the 20th century: it was an innovative approach then to want to make a global history of the revolution of French. It was Ferdinand Brunot, with his vast History of the French language, from the origins to our ovens, who initiated this *dernarche* a century ago (9 volumes pants during his lifetime between 1905 and 1938 and two posthumous volumes covered the period ranging from the origins to 1815; Ch. Bruneau and then a collective took over, between 1945 and 2000, and republished the ensemble in 24 volumes in total).

The GGHF is not only intended to be anchored in the tradition. For the past few decades, there has been an undeniable interest in the history of languages and their evolution, and it is also to respond to this request that he has made it useful for us to realize this book. We have brought together some thirty contributors, among the best international specialists in their field.

Regarding the revolution of French, it was indeed missing in this 21st century a new work that gives an overview of it updated, and which describes in its globality the diversity and variations. Many theoretic advances are now acquired concerning the processes of the work in language revolution (grammaticalization, reanalysis, analogy, etc., chap 2, chap. 12.5 for telephonetics). In addition, the constitution for half a century of vast corpus ties (Frantext, Medieval-BFM French Base, etc.) as well as infonunise dictionaries (FEW, TLFi, DMF, Tobler-Lommatzsch, AND, Godefroy, etc.) and the parallel development of corpus linguistics provide previously unknown tools.

The ten points that we develop briefly below set out the essential principles that have guided note business.

2. A grammar on corpus

The history of French covers twelve centuries of written texts, soft about thirty generations, and much more if we take into account the proto-French (language that is no longer Latin and not yet AF), only oral, which is essential especially for the development of French phonetism (Part 3).

But his description suffers from a double lack without re-edited: on the one hand it is impossible to use native speakers to pronounce a judgment on the enonces studied for the centuries passes; on the other hand it is impossible to have direct access to the oral: every word spoken has reached us through the writing. The "diachronician" linguist is thus confronts a double limitation: on the one hand it has as an essential source, and sometimes exclusive before the recording of the voice (last quarter of the 19th century), the texts, written; and to reconstruct or at least formulate hypotheses on this oral inaccessible directly, it must resort to complex biases (chapter 11 and chap. 37). On the other hand, in the absence of the authorized judgment of a native speaker, it is forced to remain in the hypothese — a sometimes frustrating ascese.

But this situation is partially compensated by a wealth of data unknown until now, thanks to the existence of new technical means and the development of very large historical corpuses and computer dictionaries, which have been added to the accumulation of information provided by grammars since the 19th s. Now, tools can be used in a way that is not equivalent. The analysis of these corpuses and the theorization of the quantitative approach led to the uncovering of

phenomena that were previously unreachable or inaccessible, especially in morphology, syntax and lexicon, and to propose in-depth analyses for the language of these ancient epochs.

These advances in the documentation have allowed us not only to enrich our sleeps and descriptions, but also to refine and clarify the chronology traditionally chosen, by basing it stir the great stapes of the evolution of the language (see below, and chap. 4). Thus, in addition to explicitly taking into account the long stage of the proto-French for the telephonic (4 Part 3), we were led on the one hand to further expand the vast medieval period, alternating it from the 9th century to the middle of the 16th century, and on the other hand we segmented this long period into three sub-periods, the very old French (TAF: 9th-11th s.), the former Frenchman (AF: 12th-13th s.), and the French middle (MF: 14th-s.). For the following period, the notion of Renaissance being more historical and literal than linguistic, the linguists specialists of this period proposed to specify a new stage, the preclassical French (FPreclass), which, ranging from the middle of the 16C s. to the middle of the 17th century, precedes the classic French (FClass), the latter covering the period between the middle of the era and the fm. Finally, modern French (FMod: 19th-20th s.) is followed by contemporary French (FContemporain, 21st century), each with its own specificities.

3. New areas of historical grammar: graphmatics, grammatical semantics, enunciation and pragmatic

The advances clans reflection and theorization menses on the language during the last fifty amides have made it possible to lay the existence of specific linguistic domains, defmissable by phenomena abroad a meme problematic.

Thus, in the four usual fields of historical telephonetics (Part 3: Historical Phonetics), morphology (Part 5: Morphology and morphosyntaxe), syntax (Part 6: Syntax) and lexicon (Part 9: Lexicon and lexical semantics), which have neassiously and also inflesed by recent discoveries, we have added three new areas of study, dedicated to "graphmatics" (Part 4: Codes of Writing, spellings and punctuation), has grammatical Semantics (Part 7), and has enonciation and pragmatism (Part 8: Enonciation and textuality, pragmatic).

Enfm, after a quick presentation of the book's principles, two overviews open the GGHF 2020: a synthese on theoretic and methodology developments structuring the thinking and contemporary on diachrony (Part 1: Theoretic foundations and methodology), and an overview of the history of the French language (Part 2), allowing to situate the steps of the development of the French system, as described by the cceur of the book. A Conclusion (Part 10) will synthesize the work's achievements.

4. Incomplete studies, and wishes

In this vast work, it appears that certain points have not been addressed, or barely mentioned, or dealt with in a marginal way. Some absences are the result of a choice, afm to privilege a more extensive analysis of certain aspects, better even to illuminate the results of an innovative approach in its diachronic dimension. Thus, with regard to anaphoric relations, only the particular case of the cataphore has been dealt with; or, in terms of enonciation, the emphasis has been on the only discourse that pays off.

In other cases, only certain aspects of a theme have been addressed. Thus, the attribute of the direct object appears only in its differences with the attribute of the subject (of a frequency of use, it is true, much greater), without being treated as such. From mane, constructions with complement to

the infinitive, auxiliaries, support verbs, or even the participant subordonnée or the consecutive subordinate, would have merited a specific analysis.

They are also points of difficulty which, in contemporary French or in the centuries passes, are or have been the subject of hesitations or errors: the agreement of the participant passed to the composed forms of the verb is one. It could have been analyzed as such, to measure the magnitude of the phenomenon and try to explain it.

Enfin, the grammar of a language is also, or first of all, the description and analysis of the plural uses made by its speakers, but also that of regional and nonhexagonal varieties. However, the GGHF has, very mostly and often almost exclusively, centered its analysis stir the "central" French, without giving the place merit and other varieties. The awareness of these imperfections by the GGHF officials may invite colleagues to fill these gaps.

5. A long-lasting story: focus on the ancient part

The history of French spans twelve centuries for its tradition, from 842 to 2020, and much more if one takes into account its proto-history.

The French language, like other Romanesque languages, is in the continuity of its essential source, Latin, which itself has a documented history for an even longer period. Few languages in the world benefit from such chronological depth, both for the essential source of Latin, as well as for the sources of borrowing or influence over the centuries, as well as such a continuous practice of writing, and such a regular presence of the testimony of grammarians, especially from the 16th century.

The cumulative advances of more than two centuries of historical descriptions of all the periods passed have powerfully contributed to provide a long-term analysis of our language, thanks also to the parallel development of linguistic theories that have made it possible to illuminate revolution in an innovative way. These theories, although mostly intended for synchronic analysis of languages, have indeed proved to be partially usable for a diachronic-chap exploration. 2, chap. 12 for phonetics).

However, in the great diachronic descriptions of French realized so far, the first centuries of French have always been a little less well described in an evolving sight than the following — except perhaps in telephonic or the main effort has since the 19th century. always deals with the events outside the AF. It was necessary to fill this gap and better integrate the very old periods to the general diachrony of French; we have tried to do this, thanks in particular to the remarkable monographs that the AF has been enjoying for a few decades.

A first decision was made to place the diachronic focus towards the earliest period, which allowed us to establish the existence of a transitional stage between the late Latin and the old French, the "very old French", which reveal the few texts written between the middle of the 9th and the middle of the 11th century.

A second decision was to try, during our advances, to propose when it was necessary periodizations based on an affmée chronology of phenomena of change.

6. A Grammar of Change

One of the characteristics of this grammar is to present itself not as the juxtaposition of successive synchronic slices, but as a grammar of change, the emphasis being placed on the factors of evolution and on the consideration of variation. This will have consequences in the very construction of the work.

A first consequence is that of 'iodization': the emphasis on the continuity of revolution sometimes leads, in the analysis of phenomena, to remove, or at least erase, the distinction in successive periods to which historical studies usually refer. This decoupling is most often based on a mixture of non-linguistic criteria (littéraires, cultural, historical: ? chap. 4), often inodorous for the language. If we stick to facts purely within the language system — what we have tried to do is analyze the various domains and sub-domains shows that turn are not evolving at the same pace: so syntactic changes are far from the same as phonetic changes or lexical changes. And inside the same domain, for example syntax, it is difficult to speak of a homogeneity of revolution; for example, the regularization of the two categories of the determiner and the pronoun is not done as quickly for the demonstratives, for the possessive or for the enclitic.

However, it seemed possible to gather enough clues to determine moments of rupture (innovation, then change), and moments if not stability, at least less active variability. To this end, we highlight the way in which the various subsystems of grammar concerning first articulation units (uniting a form and a meaning: Martinet 1961) are realized: the main evolution trends of the French: evolution towards a more analytical language, progressive hierarchy of syntagms, tightening of the links of dependence, specialization of morphosyntactic categories. For example, several arguments have been put together which, in the history of French, argue in favour of the recognition of a preclassical period of French (mid-16th century to mid-17th century), during which many important morphosyntactic developments come to an end (plus chap. 4).

7. "Any change is a successful variant": thinking about the variation

Almost always, a linguistic change was at the beginning a simple synchronic variant. Of the Tors, an important question is that of the role that external factors play in the appearance, maintenance or transformation of a variant, which either becomes a permanent change, or remains a state of variant or disappears. Not all of these factors are, strictly speaking, part of the language system, but they cannot be ignored.

Thus, to analyze the variation in the system of a language, must be taken into account textual typology, the various situations of writing and oral, as well as the normative judgments doors on the enonces, and the changes related to changes in the design of discursive coherence and textuality. It would also be necessary, from the same perspective, to take into account, from a historical and psycholinguistic point of view, the changes that have taken place in the practices of reading and redaction, of recriture, that is to say to explore a way of "tectonics", of the archeology of intellectual practices that condition the use of language.

All this joins, in one way or another, the differentent architecture proposed by E. Coseriu it half a century ago (1966, 1973) to think of variation in languages. He distinguished four essential factors that play a role in this process of incessant change that produces variation, the four angles of attack that make it possible to analyze: diachrony (variation in time), diatopia (variation in space: dialectal variants for example), diastatia (Bee variation has the social dimension of language uses) and

diaphasia (variation in personal style). Later, the factor of diamesis (variation of medium, between language and oral language: ZOI 1974, Mioni 1983) was added.

More recently, P. Koch and W. Oesterreicher (2001 in particular) have developed a different but complementary type of analysis, cross-sectional in a way, based on the concept of "communicative mediatete" vs. "immediate communicative": each language production can thus be situated on a scale, or axis, ranging from the maximum communicative proximity to the maximum communicative distance, thanks to the consideration of a dozen parameters (referential anchorage vs. referential detachment, strong emotionality vs. low emotionality, spontane vs. prepared communication, etc.).

All these concepts make it possible to compare the variation between the enonces following constant, or at least common, criteria, and to avoid purely aleatory or subjective judgments. For example, we can better situate the emergence of an "innovation" (variant) whose revolution ultérieure shows that it was intended to become a perenne change, and explain its development by its regional situation, or by the type of text it appears, or by the fact that it appears mainly in direct speeches, etc.

8. Language as a dynamic system, the linguistic sign as muable

A diachronic approach involves prior reflection on the notion of language as an active synchronic system in each speaker. Since Saussure, this conception has been taken up by structural grammars, including universal grammar. Saussure conceives that synchrony and diachrony are linked, their difference between the linguist's view of language: the language is potentially synchronous and diachrony at the same time, system and linguistic sign in motion.

But already in the 19th. some linguists had laid the groundwork for a dynamic conception of language, such as Whitney and the Neogrammairians (Paul 1975 [1880]), or previously Humboldt, for whom language "is not a work made [ergon] but an activity being done [energeia]" (1974 [1836]: 183). Saussure later extended this reflection to his conception of the sign, devoting a chapter of his Course (Chapter II) to "the immutability and mutability of the linguistic sign."

The great theories of the 20th century, structural and generative, are certainly based on a synchronic analysis, but they have almost all attempted an approach to diachrony and have, each with its means, sought to appreciate the phenomena of change. And since then, many proposals have been developed (e.g. Chap. 2, Chap. 45 and Chap. 12.5 for phonetics), which allow us to better think about the complex evolution of languages.

The GGHF is in this line of thought, conceiving the language, in its complexity and continuous evolution, as a "dynamic system", and sign it as an unfrozen entity.

9. Types of change

Whenever possible, we have identified the type or types of change, simple or complex,⁵⁰ in the phenomena studied. There are already several, enough that soft covered a good part of the facts, from the analogy of the 19th s., to exaptation, or remanence being described, through reanalysis (and the subsequent recategorization), phonetic changes, borrowing (lexical but not only), grammaticalization, laxicalization, the disappearance and its possible avatars.

At the same time, the modalities and aspects of the changes are also the subject of analysis and modelling: their greater or lesser speed of realisation, or their modes of unfolding, or their

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sequences, have generated models that are being evaluated (e.g. the S-curve, highlighted in the linguistic field by A. Kroch (1989), after a few others, chap. 2; or even the "changes").

The aim of the GGHF, however, is not to delve theoretically into the various types of changes, but to allow comparisons to be made in the long run and thus to situate their relative importance in the whole of language revolutions. We have thus been able to highlight the considerable role that a particular type of change has played in a particular paradigm or construction: for example, the french possessive system *il* appears as the champion of analogy (chapter 30.5): it took no less

seven analog modifications to move from the simple paradigm of classical Latin to the double paradigm of contemporary French, via very complex "acts". As for the paradigm of adverbs, it offers a synthese on the particularly inventive use of different subtypes of grammaticalization. And we already know that, in the evolution of the morphology of French, grammaticalization is at work in more than a third of the changes. The lexicon, on the other hand, is of course the privileged place of borrowing of all kinds.

10. Metalanguage and categories

The categories through which unites are called, and through which we think of language, also change. While some major categories such as verb or name do not pose a major problem since ancient grammar, it is not the same for categories such as those of determinants and pronouns; Latin does not present this type of distinction for forms such as *ille* ('ce' determinant vs. 'he' pronoun), or *meus* (equivalent of 'my' or 'mine'); or French gradually distinguishes the *cel-/this-*, *my/mine*, etc. Tors, at what point are we no longer in front of a structure of type "assistant -name" (which would be identical to the dominant one in Latin) but before a hierarchization of the nominal group making relevant the denomination of "determinant" nominal?

These changes in structuring and done in categorization make the use of terms designing morphemes types that have existed at certain times and subsequently disappeared in this book, such as 'particles', 'separable preverbs', or other terms, which might seem relatively vague but which, however, allow the observation and description of ancient language states to be not biased by the use of unsuitable categories, which distort its understanding. There has been a loss of old categories (separable preverbs, versatile adverbs covering various levels), but also the appearance of new categories (determinants, connectors), and we will put these changes in order.

We encounter in the analysis of the units of the enonce and the text, all proportions guards, a difficulty identical to that which has just been mentioned about categories. The use of a term such as a "complex phrase," for example, suggests that proposals are organized in relationships of depending. However, we know that this type of relationship is gradually anchored on a continuum that goes from parataxis to the most obvious rection, and to the facts of enteveration. Here again, the use of terminology to describe modern French (or at least modern French) may prevent a relevant account of the developments that have occurred in this area.

Indeed, in MF or FPreclass, we see a great autonomy of the "sentence" in relation to the textual dimension: many syntactic facts are settled at the level of a sequence of proposals (we will recall here the notion of "periode", which was too quickly referred to the field of rhetoric and stylistic). And the question arises not only for the "sentence" unit, but also for the "proposal": this minimal nucleus, this cell built around the verb, is also in evolution. Talking about a proposal (or "core

phrase," or "basic phrase") suggests that only differences in position between the constituents separate the enounces of successive epochs.

(OVS vs. SVO, for example). However, it is the very organization of the proposal that changes, in particular by the formation of a verbal syntagma hierarchises, the order of the elements being only a consequence of this restructuring. All this leads to the use of more cautious expressions, such as, for example, that of "preverbale, postverbale) of enonce.

11. A long and dense tradition

The GGHF 2020 is, it was said, beginning, in the tradition of the historical grammars of French, many of which accompanied or succeeded Brunot's original work, and their contribution was crucial: the Historical Grammar of the French Language by K. Nyrop (1899-1930), the Historical Grammar Course of the French Language of A. Darmesteter (posthumous, with E. Muret and L. Sudre, 1889-1891, reimpr. 4 vol., 1930); and the Historical Grammar of the French Language by L. Kukenheim (2 vol., 1967-1968), works that will be evoked occasionally.

Examples of historical syntax or phonetic works such as the historical Syntax of Vogel's Frangais (1919), E's Historische französische Syntax will be added. Lerch (1925-1934), and the Historische französische Syntax of E. Gamillscheg (1957), or E.S. Linguistic Elements. Bourciez (1967/1956/1930 [1910]); in historical phonetics, among many others (? chap. 11, 1), the *Precis de telephonetique Francaise*, published in 1889 by Edouard Bourciez (and then declined in various editions), W. Meyer-Lake's Historical Grammar of the French Language published in 1908, or Pierre Fouche's Historical Phonetics of the French published between 1952 and 1961.

Moreover, in the second part of the 20th century, several more concise synthese works were published, following the *Precise Historical Grammar of the French Language* by F. Brunot and Ch. Bruneau (1937); among others those of J. Picoche and C. Marchello-Nizia, *History of the French Language* (1989 — online access), or J. Chaurand, *New History of the French Language* (1999). And above all, a large number of synchronic descriptions of ancient French states, devoted to particular periods, have been adorned with the 19th century, and especially for some fifty years. All these works were extremely valuable in the development of the GGHF 2020.

But these realizations, immense for the former, more modest for others, do not only represent for us a "tradition".

Indeed, if we have a strong note, in the pages that preceded, the points on which the voluntarist note of innovation has intervened, it was not a way of opposing us or of distinguishing ourselves fundamentally from these great predecessors. On the contrary. By this too, we were in the line of our predecessors, we followed their traces, if not their traces, of the moths their ambition: for all, and each in his own way, in his place and in his time, have changed, infichid — and sometimes strongly, definitively — our modern way of thinking about change, not only in linguistics, but more broadly in the human sciences.

One last thing, in conclusion, about this book: we wanted to make these chapters or sub-chapters as readable as possible, sometimes very dense and technical. Each of these monographs, from the most breve (the eight pages of the *Numeraux* in 30.7) to the longest (the 71 pages dealing with the Syntax of the subject in 34.1), constitute recits in themselves. Our effort has tended to make these little stories — the end of which we do not know — completely generate the elements for a theory of

change. For us, at the end of this work, some visions have been formed or consolidated, perspectives have emerged, which the Conclusion summarizes. We hope that the same will be true for readers. <>

THE ILLUSTRATED LOTUS SUTRA translation and introduction by Gene Reeves, Illustrations by Demi [Wisdom Publications, 9781614295327]

Renowned and beloved the world over, a peerless contemporary translation of one of Buddhism's most important texts comes alive with over 110 full-page line illustrations by a multiple award-winning artist.

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 25: The Universal Gateway of the Bodhisattva Regarder
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Excerpt: *Lotus Sutra* does not correspond to anything in Chinese or Japanese. The full title in Chinese is, pronounced *Miao-fa-lian-huajing*, and *Myo-ho-rence-kyo* in Japanese. Literally these characters mean “wonderful Dharma lotus flower sutra.” Although just is some- times found, the usual shortened title in the text itself is, pronounced *Fa-hua jing* in Chinese and *Hoke-kyo* in Japanese. In English this would be Dharma Flower Sutra. I’m uncertain about how or why this text came to be called the “Lotus Sutra” in English. I suspect it is because the first Western translation of it, in 1852 by Eugene Burnouf into French, was titled *Le lotus de la bonne loi*.

Often used as the base of statues of buddhas and bodhisattvas or held in the hands of bodhisattvas, the lotus flower may be the most common of Buddhist symbols. It is especially important in Mahayana Buddhism, where it symbolizes the bodhisattva as one who is firmly rooted in the mud of the earth and flowering toward the sky. It is a symbol of working in the world to help others to awaken while finding inspiration in a sense of the cosmos.

Thus, the lotus flower and the lotus plant are important in the sutra. But more important than the plant itself, it seems to me, is its flowering. The sutra wants us to understand it as a blossoming of Buddha- dharma. Its own short title, “Dharma Flower Sutra,” or even “Dharma Flowering Sutra,” would thus be more appropriate than “Lotus Sutra” for the short title of this text, except, of course, for the fact that it is already well known as the “Lotus Sutra.”

The Text

The sutra is thought to have been translated into Chinese at least six times, the first being by Dharmaraksha in 286 CE. He gave it the title *Zheng-fa-hua jing*, or True Dharma Flower Sutra. While

this translation has received some attention from scholars, it has had very little influence on East Asian Buddhism or culture, as it was surpassed by the translation of Kumarajiva in 406, to which the title *Miao-fa-lian-huajing* was given. The only other existing translation is actually a revision of Kumarajiva's version. An additional three translations found in some catalogs are no longer known to exist.

Save for a translation from Sanskrit by H. Kern, originally published in 1884 as a volume of *The Sacred Books of the East*, edited by Max Müller, all East Asian and almost all Western versions of the sutra are based on the translation by Kumarajiva, as are almost all commentaries. In fact, existing Sanskrit manuscripts are much more recent than the Chinese translations. Unfortunately, as I think is true of all translations of Buddhist texts into Chinese, the Sanskrit versions from which they were translated are lost.

There are significant differences among the existing versions, summarized well by Yoshiro Tamura in his introduction to *The Threefold Lotus Sutra*. We do not know how to explain these differences. Perhaps Kumarajiva translated very freely or had a Sanskrit version quite different from those we now possess.

The Chinese versions are usually said to be translations from the Sanskrit *Saddharmapudarika-sutra*. But while many Sanskrit texts and especially fragments of texts of this sutra have been found all over the northern part of the Indian subcontinent, they are all much more recent than existing Chinese versions.

The version in this book, like virtually all contemporary Chinese and Japanese versions, has twenty-eight chapters, though Kumarajiva's version had only twenty-seven. Sometime, probably in the fifth or sixth century, the text of what is now the Devadatta chapter was moved from the end of chapter 11 to form a separate chapter 12.



Formation of the Lotus Sutra

Traditionally the *Dharma Flower Sutra* has been divided into two parts. In recent times some scholars have proposed a threefold division that compliments rather than supplants the traditional division. A change of focus after chapter 9, and the fact that making copies of the sutra becomes important after chapter 9 but is not mentioned at all in chapters 2–9, have led to the conclusion that chapters 2–9, with their focus on shravakas, constitute an earlier version of the text, and that chapters 10–21, focusing on bodhisattvas and the practice of the bodhisattva way, were added

later. Chapter 1 is seen as having been created along with this second group as an introduction to the whole in an attempt to make the two groups coherent. Finally, the last six chapters are regarded as another group, stressing the practice of bodhisattvas. Some of the chapters in this group evidently were circulated as separate sutras, perhaps before the Lotus Sutra itself was created. Though we do not know how far back such practice extends, chapter 25, “Regarder of the Cries of the World” (the *Guanyin jing* or *Kannon-gyo*), is used as a separate sutra to this day. Some regard chapter 12 as part of this third group. Compilation of the sutra probably took place within the first century of the common era. In the *Mahaprajñāparamita-upadesa-sastra*, attributed to Nagarjuna and supposedly written around 200 CE, there are citations from Lotus Sutra chapters up to the last. If the dating of this text is correct, it would indicate that by the end of the second century the contents of the Lotus Sutra were pretty much what we have now.

This division of the sutra into three parts can also be understood doctrinally. The first part elucidates a unifying truth of the universe (the One Vehicle of the Wonderful Dharma); the second part sheds light on the everlasting personal life of the Buddha (Everlasting Original Buddha); and the third part emphasizes the actual activities of human beings (the bodhisattva way).

While the traditional division of the sutra into two halves is useful for understanding its teachings, the division into three groups of chapters is useful for understanding the historical development of the sutra and some of the various inconsistencies in it, both doctrinal and stylistic.

Opening and Closing Sutras

For centuries the Lotus Sutra has been closely associated in East Asia with the Sutra of Innumerable Meanings and the Sutra of Contemplation on the Dharma Practice of Universal Sage Bodhisattva, typically referred to as the “opening” and “closing” sutras, the three together being referred to as the “three- part Dharma flower sutra” and published as The Threefold Lotus Sutra. In chapter I of the Dharma Flower Sutra it is said that for the sake of all bodhisattvas the Buddha taught the Great Vehicle sutra called Innumerable Meanings (Wuliangyi jing). Tradition has it that a sutra with this name was received by the monk Hui-piao from the translator Dharma-jatayasas toward the end of the fifth century. It has been taken to be a translation from a Sanskrit Amitartha Sutra, which has been lost. There may have been an earlier translation, also now lost. Although a passage in this sutra, mentioning a truth not yet revealed after more than forty years of teaching, has been taken to be a reference to the Lotus Sutra, in fact the Lotus Sutra is not explicitly mentioned in this sutra. Virtually nothing is known of its origins or connection to the Lotus Sutra. Some believe that it may have been originally composed in Chinese.



The existing Sutra of Contemplation on the Dharma Practice of Universal Sage Bodhisattva in Chinese, *Guan-puxian-pusa-xingfajing*—often shortened to *Puxian-guanjing* and in Japan often termed the *Zange-kyo*, also pronounced *Sange-kyo*, “the repentance sutra”—is traditionally believed to have been translated by Dharmamitra in the middle of the fifth century, following two earlier translations, including one by Kumarajiva, which are now lost. In it the Lotus Sutra is explicitly mentioned, clearly indicating an intended connection. In this case, too, no Sanskrit version has been found.

A Religious Inspirational Text

There are many ways to read any important text. The Lotus Sutra has been taken to be a polemical document reflecting a conflict between conservative, classical monks and Mahayana upstarts. Its

purpose would be to assert the superiority of the Great Vehicle, the Mahayana, over more conservative traditions while disparaging the smaller vehicle.

While it certainly is possible to read the Lotus Sutra this way, we know too little about the beginnings of Mahayana Buddhism and the formation of this sutra to speak confidently about that history. In any case, it certainly is not as a record of Indian Buddhist history that this sutra has been read over many centuries by the peoples of East Asia, where it has almost universally been regarded as a religious text, recited as a devotional practice, and esteemed as a source of protection from forces both natural and human, real and imagined, and where it has inspired a range of Buddhist and secular arts and served as a spiritual basis and resource for political rebellion or reform.

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In short, this text has become one of the world's great religious scriptures and most influential books. It did not acquire that renown as a polemic against people or schools largely unknown to East Asian readers.

I believe we will understand this text better if we treat it as an inspirational text, rather than assuming its purpose was to give its readers ammunition against other Buddhists. Its main thrust is to encourage readers to understand themselves in certain ways. It seeks, in other words, to change human behavior by influencing the religious orientation and values of its auditors or readers.

It teaches, for example, that everyone without exception has the potential to be a buddha. This simple teaching would later develop into doctrines and theories about Buddhahood. But in this text what we actually have is not so much a doctrine as a series of stories, narratives that appeal to the human imagination as well as to the rational mind. The story of Devadatta, for example, tells us nothing at all about the historical Devadatta, but it encourages us to understand that just as Devadatta, everywhere known to be evil, is told that he is to become a buddha, so we too, no matter how imperfect, have the potential to become a buddha. We also need to understand that this story teaches us that a buddha is one who sees the potential for good in others, even in enemies. It encourages us to realize our own capacity to be a buddha for someone else. Many other stories in this sutra are designed to move us to behave in accord with the sutra, primarily by helping others by sharing its teachings with them.

The Devadatta story is followed immediately by the very interesting story of the dragon princess, a little girl whom Manjushri Bodhisattva proclaims to be capable of becoming a buddha immediately. This story was obviously intended to persuade monks, who would have been its only early auditors and readers, that women as well as men have the potential of being buddhas, common prejudice and informed opinion to the contrary. At the climax of the story, the girl tells her two male critics, a shravaka monk and a bodhisattva, that if they look—if they really look using their spiritual eyes—they too will see her as a buddha. In other words, this story is not designed merely to criticize male assumptions, though it does do that; it also affirms the positive potential to be a buddha in the very men it also criticizes. This also means, of course, that it affirms the positive potential of both its female and its male auditors or readers.

All readers of the Lotus Sutra would be well advised to ask what the story is saying about themselves.

The sutra certainly is, however, a Mahayana text, one that champions a Mahayana Buddhist understanding of Buddha-dharma. But its claim to superiority should not be seen as opposing or excluding anyone. Quite the opposite, it affirms the equality of everyone and seeks to provide an understanding of Buddha-dharma that excludes no one.

Though we can make conjectures based on what we find in the text, virtually nothing is known about the origins of the Dharma Flower Sutra in India, as we know very little about the early centuries of the Mahayana movement of which it was an important part. It's even quite likely that it is inappropriate to think of Sanskrit as the original language of this sutra. Sanskrit was a bit like the Latin language in medieval Europe: texts originally written in a vernacular were translated into Latin or Sanskrit to give them higher status and wider appeal. While it is possible that some of the Lotus Sutra was originally composed in Sanskrit, it is very unlikely that much of it was.

Thus while it is possible, even likely, that this sutra once existed in some other Indian language or languages, there is no hard evidence for this. It's also very likely that before being committed to any written form, most if not all of the text existed in oral versions. It also seems obvious that some parts of the sutra, especially the final six chapters, and possibly chapter 12 or at least the Devadatta and dragon princess stories in chapter 12, circulated separately at least in oral form. Chapter 25, the Guanyin chapter, has circulated separately for several centuries down to the present and is sometimes confused with the whole sutra.

Historical Significance

While the Lotus Sutra has had a fair share of critics, ranging from those who regard it as nothing more than snake oil to those who consider its influence pernicious, there can be no doubt that it has been enormously influential in East Asia from the time of its translation by Kumarajiva down to the present. In recent times it has served as a foundation for numerous Buddhist reform movements, especially in Taiwan and Japan. Today, with a revival of Buddhism in China, the sutra is widely studied and recited there as well, both by monastics and by laypeople. In Japan, where Buddhism is more sectarian than in other East Asian countries, well over fifty new Buddhist religious organizations claim to be based on the Lotus Sutra, most notably Soka Gakkai, now one of the largest Buddhist organizations in the world; Rissho Kosei-kai, which has pioneered Japanese involvement in international interfaith encounter and cooperation; and Reiyu-kai, the mother of the vast majority of new Japanese Buddhist movements and organizations.


The influence of the Lotus Sutra has not been limited to religious organizations. For many centuries it has had a major impact on East Asian culture, especially on art and politics. In the Chinese section of any major art museum one will find that a great many images are based solely on the Lotus Sutra, images such as the two buddhas sitting side by side in the stupa of Abundant Treasures Buddha, or Universal Sage Bodhisattva mounted on a white elephant with six tusks, or the burning house from the parable in chapter 3 of the sutra.

After reading it at an early age in his father's study, Japan's greatest twentieth-century storyteller and poet, Kenji Miyazawa, became devoted to the Lotus Sutra, writing to his father on his own deathbed that all he ever wanted to do was share the teachings of this sutra with others. Yet in writings published during his lifetime Miyazawa seldom if ever mentions the Lotus Sutra. He sought, rather, to display or illuminate its teachings implicitly, without explicit reference to the sutra. He wanted to embody the sutra quietly, both in his writing and in his life. This was no secret, however, in his impoverished native Iwate prefecture in the northeastern region of Japan's main island, where he was widely known as "Kenji Bodhisattva."

Much of the influence of the *Dharma Flower Sutra* can be attributed to its being championed by the Tiantai/Tendai and Nichiren schools and denominations. Founded by the monk Zhiyi in the sixth century, Tiantai attempted to order the huge variety of Buddhist sutras by treating the Lotus Sutra as the summation of the Buddha's teaching. This understanding of the sutra was enormously influential for many centuries, even after Tiantai as a school had largely died out. Brought to Japan among the earliest Buddhist texts to come from Korea and China, the Dharma Flower Sutra was soon established as the major spiritual protector of the nation, with monasteries and nunneries built in every province primarily for the purpose of reciting the Lotus Sutra. Mount Hiei, outside of Kyoto, soon became the headquarters of the growing Tendai denomination of Buddhism. There all the major figures in the development of new denominations of Buddhism studied the Lotus Sutra,

including Dogen (1200–53), the much-revered founder of the Soto branch of Zen, who made extensive use of the Lotus Sutra in developing his own approach to Zen ideas and practice.

Among these founders of new streams of Buddhism was Nichiren (1222–82), founder of what has been called both the Dharma Flower School and the Nichiren School. Nichiren was fanatically devoted to the Lotus Sutra, at different times in his life urging study of it, extolling devotion to it, and even proclaiming the adequacy of reciting only its title. In Japan it is mainly Nichiren and related schools that carried the Lotus Sutra into modern times, giving it such a prominent place in twentieth-century Japanese culture and politics.



The sutra has also continued to attract devotees in countries of Chinese culture and language. In Taiwan, for example, it is the initial inspiration behind the nun Dharma Master Cheng Yen, the founder and head the Tsu-chi Foundation, the largest Buddhist charitable organization in the world. It is recited regularly at temples both in Taiwan and in Singapore. And in China itself it is now a prominent part of the resurgence of Buddhism, both monastic and lay. Although this sutra is not the main text for any organization, as it is for many in Japan, it is widely studied and recited regularly in temples and lay Buddhist organizations.

Though often unrecognized, the relation of the Lotus Sutra to popular East Asian devotion to

Guan- yin (Kannon in Japanese pronunciation) is also an important part of this story. This bodhisattva, who embodies compassion, is easily the most popular and important Buddhist figure in East Asia, found not only in Buddhist temples of all kinds and sizes but also in Daoist and popular Chinese temples, in Shinto shrines, in ordinary homes, and increasingly in mammoth outdoor statues. The Lotus Sutra is not the only sutra in which Guan- yin appears, but it is the oldest, and more than any other it has provided a textual basis for the remarkable growth of Guan-yin devotion in China beginning in the tenth century. Consistent with the Guan- yin chapter of the sutra, “The Universal Gateway of the Bodhisattva Regarder of the Cries of the World,” though certainly not always based on it, devotion to Guan-yin embodies fundamental themes of the sutra, particularly its emphasis on skillfully doing whatever is needed to help or save others, on breaking down sharp distinction between the buddha and bodhisattva ideals, on the importance of leadership by women, and especially on having Buddha- dharma infuse everyday life and popular culture, in part by fostering compassionate care for the poor.

The Fantasy Setting

Whatever else it may be, the Lotus Sutra is a storybook containing a great variety of parables and other stories, and stories- within- stories. Some of the characters are ordinary human beings, typically monks and nuns, some of them regarded as historical, such as Shariputra and his colleagues, some as fictional actors in a parable, typically a father figure, as is the physician- father who gets his dying children to take an antidote to a poison by leading them to believe he has died. Several major characters in these stories are human but not only human beings, such as the bodhisattvas Manjushri, Maitreya, and Medicine King. Other major figures who clearly are not only human also appear in these stories include Abundant Treasures Buddha and Universal Sage Bodhisattva. A large variety of gods, goddesses, and mythical creatures are also part of the setting for several stories.

The central figure in much of the text is the Buddha—Shakyamuni Buddha. Here he has supernatural powers; for example, he illuminates the infinite worlds of the universe with a light that emerges from a tuft of hair between his eyebrows. Yet the text frequently reminds the reader of the human, historical life of Shakyamuni, reminding us of key events in his life on earth: having a son and stepmother, becoming awakened under a tree, teaching ascetics at Varanasi, and so on.

Often these stories are given a vast, probably infinite cosmic setting. Almost always in the background is the idea of vast reaches of time, divided into periods in which a buddha's teachings are alive and effective and periods in which they are merely formal, followed without enthusiasm to very little effect. Just as time is fantastically extended, so too is space. Shakyamuni lights up all the worlds on more than one occasion, in one case using that light to invite buddhas from all over the universe to come to this world to witness the presence of Abundant Treasures Buddha in his magnificent stupa, which has arrived from the distant past. Bodhisattvas travel to visit this world from other very distant worlds, and on such occasions extremely rare flowers rain down from the heavens, drums and other musical instruments make music by themselves, and the worlds, including this one, shake and tremble in the six ways that a world can shake and tremble.

To be sure, some of these fireworks have entertainment value, livening up stories. But that is not their only function.



In Kenji Miyazawa's most famous story, "The Night of the Milky Way Railroad," a young boy falls asleep and has a fantastic dream in which he and his best friend ride a very special train through the starry night, encountering a variety of strange and interesting characters and events. Eventually he realizes that the train is actually carrying souls of the dead to another world and discovers that he is the only one on the train with a round-trip ticket. He wakes up from the dream to learn that his best friend has drowned in the river that runs through their town, where a festival has been going on. And in that river he sees reflected the river that is the Milky Way, through which he has been traveling. It's a kind of epiphany, a moment in which the earthly river and the heavenly river, each with the stories of life and death associated with it, are

envisioned as one. Then the boy finishes what he set out to do before falling asleep—going to the store to get some milk to take home to his mother.

That, in part, is what the Lotus Sutra tries to achieve through fantasy—moments of cosmic connectedness that enable us to carry milk home to our mothers. It seeks, in other words, to have us be inspired by a cosmic vision, one that puts our lives into a cosmic perspective and encourages us to live better, perhaps like the lotus plant itself whose roots sink deeply into the mud of the earth while its blossom is caressed by the sun.

Key Teachings


Traditionally, following Zhiyi, the sixth-century founder of the Chinese Tiantai School of Buddhism, the Dharma Flower Sutra was understood to be composed of two halves. The first, ending with chapter 14 and centered on chapter 2, the Skillful Means chapter, is called the opening half and has to do with the idea of the one vehicle of many skillful means. The second half, centered on chapter 16, the chapter on the length of the Buddha's life, has to do with how the Buddha is both everlasting and embodied in a great many forms. This twofold division is still a useful one, as it provides a convenient way of understanding key teachings of the sutra and unifying diverse parts of the text.

One Vehicle of Many Means

Often the model of the one vehicle of many means is the famous parable of the burning house found in chapter 3 of the Lotus Sutra. A father manages to get his children to abandon their play and escape from a burning house by telling them that the playthings they had long wanted—carriages drawn by goats, deer, and oxen—are waiting for them just outside the gate. But after everyone is

safely outside, the father decides that he is rich enough to give each of the children a much larger and nicer carriage drawn by a great white ox. And this he does to the children's great delight.

The parable can be taken to indicate that there are four vehicles in all and that the three lesser ones are replaced by the great one. More commonly, however, the one vehicle is understood to be inclusive of the three. "Shariputra," the Buddha says in chapter 2, "with their powers of skillful means, the buddhas have distinguished three ways within the One Buddha-Vehicle." The three carriages represent three different approaches to practicing Buddha- dharma—the shravaka, the *pratyekabuddha*, and the bodhisattva ways. Very little is said about the second of these three, that of monks who pursue awakening by and for themselves deep in forests in isolation from others. The first, the shravaka way, is a portrayal of traditional monks who pursue awakening in monastic communities, primarily by listening. "Shravaka" means hearer. Quite often in the text these first two ways are assimilated into a single way, such that there is a contrast between this pair, exemplified by monks who pursue the fundamentally negative goals of nirvana, putting out of passions, and such, and the third way, the way of the bodhisattva, which is basically understood to be the pursuit of awakening in interaction with others in the world.



Here there is also a basic contrast between the goal of the shravaka, which is to become an arhat, one who is worthy of offerings, and the goal of the bodhisattva, which is to become a buddha. Bodhisattvas are often called children of the Buddha because they are formed by the teachings of the Buddha. Who and what they are is more importantly a function of what they have learned from the Buddha than it is of their birth. In a sense, the Dharma they have inherited from the Buddha is more important than the genes and culture they have inherited from their parents. Much of the Lotus Sutra is a championing of this bodhisattva way, which is also the way to supreme or complete awakening. The goal of nirvana should, according to this text, be

understood as a limited and inadequate goal, but nevertheless one that can lead to the bodhisattva way and thus to supreme awakening.

While the three ways can be understood as two, they can also be understood as representative of many ways. "Ever since I became a buddha," Shakyamuni says at the beginning of chapter 2, "I have used a variety of causal explanations and a variety of parables to teach and preach, and countless skillful means to lead living beings." The reason the Dharma is so difficult to understand and accept is that a great many teaching devices have been used, among them both the metaphor of the three vehicles and the reality underlying the metaphor, the three different approaches themselves. What

makes everything clear, says the Buddha, is an understanding of the one vehicle of many skillful means now being revealed.

While the Lotus Sutra rejects the extreme of pure diversity and the consequent danger of nihilism through use of the one vehicle as the unity in purpose of the many skillful means, it also clearly rejects the opposite extreme of complete unity in which diversity disappears or is relegated to mere illusion. Here diversity is not lamented but regarded as a necessary consequence of the fact that living beings and their situations are diverse. And it is celebrated as the way in which a diversity of people can share the Dharma. Even when the sutra describes a future paradise, it includes shravakas as well as bodhisattvas; the diversity of approaches never disappears. In this sense, as in many others, this sutra teaches a “middle way,” here a middle way between utter diversity and sheer unity.

The infinite variety of ways of teaching have the one purpose of leading all living beings to pursue the goal of becoming a buddha, a goal that everyone without exception can reach, though the time may be very long and the way far from smooth or easy. “Shariputra,” Sakyamuni says in chapter 2, “buddhas of the past, through an innumerable variety of skillful means, causal explanations, parables, and other kinds of expression, have preached the Dharma for the sake of living beings. These teachings have all been for the sake of the One Buddha–Vehicle, so that all living things, having heard the Dharma from a buddha, might finally gain complete wisdom.”

As in the case of the carriages in the parable of the burning house, the great vehicle can be understood as replacing the other vehicles, or as making skillful means unnecessary. There are passages in the sutra that suggest this interpretation. We might call this the narrow interpretation of the Lotus Sutra, a perspective taken by some followers of Nichiren. They insist that in the Lotus Sutra they have found the one truth in light of which all other claims, and all other forms of religion including all other forms of Buddhism, are to be rejected as false and misleading. Most of those who study the Lotus Sutra, however, understand the teaching of the one vehicle in a much more generous, inclusive way.

The one vehicle itself can be understood as nothing but skillful means. That is, without a great variety of skillful means there can be no one vehicle, since it is through skillful means that living beings are led toward the goal of being a buddha. Without skillful means the one vehicle would be an empty, useless vehicle. Furthermore, the one vehicle itself is a teaching device, a skillful means of teaching that the many means have a common purpose.

When speaking of skillful means, some contemporary interpreters of Buddhism choose to use phrases such as “mere skillful means” or “only skillful means” to indicate that teaching by skillful means is an inferior practice, something used only when one does not have something better. But this is never, I think, the perspective of the sutra itself. There, when some action is said to be a skillful means it is always taken to be something wonderful, a way by which someone, typically the Buddha or a stand-in for the Buddha, is able to save people, converting them into bodhisattvas.

Though I think this image of the one vehicle of many skillful means is the primary model for the reality of the one and the many, throughout the text a variety of other images express the theme of the reality and importance of the one and the many. On more than one occasion, for example, the many worlds of the universe are brought together into a unity. In a related image, Shakyamuni Buddha is said to have countless embodiments in other worlds, buddhas who are real in their own right yet closely tied to Shakyamuni Buddha. Similarly, buddhas of the past, present, and future are

many and different, yet are somehow one in that they teach the same thing and their lives follow the pattern of Shakyamuni's. All of these images serve to affirm the inseparability of the one and the many.

One Buddha of Many Embodiments

The second half of the sutra, centering on chapter 16, can be understood as involving another one-and-many, the one Buddha of many embodiments. Throughout the sutra, but especially in the second half, there is an expressed concern over the question as to who is going to carry on Shakyamuni Buddha's teachings after his complete nirvana, his death. Various bodhisattvas promise to do so, often with an expectation that they will face strong opposition and humiliation. The most dramatic affirmation of the role of bodhisattvas in continuing to spread Buddha-dharma is the story in chapters 15 and 16. Some of the bodhisattvas who have come to this world along with their buddhas in order to see Abundant Treasures Buddha in his stupa offer to remain in this world to help Shakyamuni Buddha, the buddha of this world, in his especially difficult task of teaching and demonstrating the Dharma. Shakyamuni basically responds by saying, "Thanks, but no thanks. We already have plenty of bodhisattvas of our own." Then a great host of bodhisattvas springs out of the earth. Everyone is shocked and wants to know who could have led and taught such an incredibly large number of bodhisattvas. And Shakyamuni Buddha responds that he taught them all. How such a thing could be possible, when Shakyamuni had been alive and teaching for only a relatively few years, is taken up in chapter 16.

I agree with those who understand that this great hoard of bodhisattvas includes bodhisattvas of ages to come; that is, bodhisattvas who will carry on in place of the Buddha when he is no longer available, at least no longer available as the historical Shakyamuni Buddha. Because the Buddha and his Dharma are alive in such bodhisattvas, he himself continues to be alive. The fantastically long life of the Buddha, in other words, is at least partly a function of and dependent on his being embodied in others. With the exception of the now deceased Abundant Treasures Buddha, while many different buddhas appear in the Lotus Sutra, not one is unaccompanied by bodhisattvas, suggesting that buddhas need bodhisattvas. Those who do the work of the Buddha are bodhisattvas, even when they don't know they are doing the work of the Buddha.

Thus the bodhisattvas found in the final chapters, including Guan- yin, can quite appropriately be regarded as buddhas. It is no accident that both Wonderful Voice Bodhisattva and Guan- yin, the Regarder of the Cries of the World Bodhisattva, can take on the form of a buddha when that is what is needed. Scholars may very well say that Guan- yin is not a buddha, but any devout Chinese layperson can tell you that Guan- yin is a fully awakened buddha who has chosen to continue to work in this world as a bodhisattva. Such a view is consistent with the Lotus Sutra.

Embodying the Buddha is not something limited to bodhisattvas, at least not to bodhisattvas who are recognized as such. In some ways chapter 10, "Teachers of the Dharma," is the most surprising and unconventional chapter in the sutra. There the Buddha points to a huge congregation, one that includes not only monks, nuns, laypeople, shravakas, and bodhisattvas but also a large assortment of nonhuman creatures, dragon kings, centaurs, and such, and he tells Medicine King Bodhisattva that if anyone asks what sorts of beings will become buddhas in ages to come, Medicine King should tell them that these are the ones who will do so. This chapter insists not only that all living beings have the potential to become buddhas eventually but that anyone can be a Dharma teacher now.

The idea in this sutra that everyone has the ability to become a buddha gave rise to the association of the sutra with the notion of Buddha- nature as found in somewhat later Mahayana sutras. The term “Buddha- nature” is another powerful expression of the reality and importance of the one Buddha in many embodiments. One’s Buddha- nature is both the Buddha’s and one’s own. Consequently, anyone can develop an ability to see the Buddha in others, their Buddha- nature. Thus, to awaken is to see, to see the Buddha, or as the text often says, to see countless buddhas.


It would be a great mistake, I think, to reify this notion, turning it into some sort of substantial reality underlying ordinary realities, something that is easy to do and is often done. In the text itself, it seems to me, Buddha- nature has no such ontological status. It is mainly a skillful way of indicating a potential, a potential with real power, to move in the direction of being a buddha by taking up the bodhisattva way.

It is also a very clever way to answer the question of how it is possible for one to overcome obstacles, however conceived, along the path of becoming a buddha. If ordinary human beings are completely under the sway of passions and delusions, by what power can they break through such a net of limitations? Some say that it is only by one’s own strength; one can be saved only by oneself. Others say that it is only by the power of Amida Buddha or perhaps Guan- yin that one can be led to awakening. The Lotus Sutra says that it is by a power that is at once one’s own and Shakyamuni Buddha’s. The Buddha really is embodied in the lives of ordinary people. He himself is both a one and a many.

Wisdom, Compassion, and Practice

While the ideas of one vehicle of many skillful means and one Buddha of many embodiments can be seen as the central teachings of the two halves of the sutra, a great many other things are, of course, taught in the Lotus Sutra, some implicitly, some explicitly. There is, for example, the important notion that the Dharma rains on all equally, nourishing all in accord with their needs. Combined with the ideas that Buddha- nature can be found in all people, that anyone can be a Dharma teacher, that all are equally children of the Buddha, and that following the bodhisattva way is not limited to those identified as bodhisattvas, one finds a powerful counter to the prevailing Indian ideas of rank and status as purely a function of birth and stage of life.

In addition to the extremely important but relatively abstract notion of following the bodhisattva way, the Lotus Sutra frequently advocates concrete practices, which are often related to the sutra itself. They are often given as sets of four to six practices, but include receiving and embracing the sutra, hearing it, reading and reciting it, remembering it correctly, copying it, explaining it, understanding its meaning, pondering it, proclaiming it, practicing as it teaches, honoring it, protecting it, making offerings to it, preaching it and teaching it to others, and leading others to do any of these things. The six transcendental practices taught especially for bodhisattvas also play a prominent and important role. But in the first chapter we find a story about a previous life of Maitreya Bodhisattva in which, as the disciple of another bodhisattva, he was called “Fame Seeker” because he was especially attracted to lucrative offerings. He read and memorized many sutras but forgot all of them and gained nothing from his reading. But, having “planted roots of goodness,” he was able to meet countless buddhas and later became Maitreya Bodhisattva, the future buddha. Even



more influential is the story of Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva in chapter 20. This bodhisattva did not read and recite sutras but simply went around telling everyone he met that they would become buddhas. Often despised for this, he persisted in refusing to be disrespectful to anyone. Later, after hearing the Lotus Sutra from the sky, he was able to enjoy a large following and eventually became Shakyamuni Buddha. What's most important, these stories seem to say, is not which religious practices you use but how you treat others. To do good, in other words, is to follow the bodhisattva way.

The Lotus Sutra itself ends with a chapter on the bodhisattva Universal Sage and is traditionally followed by a sutra on the contemplative methods of Universal Sage Bodhisattva. Universal Sage has widely been

taken to symbolize Buddhist practice, putting Buddhist teachings to use in everyday life, making them a foundation of one's life. Manjushri and Maitreya are the two bodhisattvas who appear repeatedly in the sutra. Manjushri symbolizes Buddhist wisdom: both practical wisdom, the wisdom that solves or overcomes problems through knowledge and rational analysis, and creative wisdom, the imaginative wisdom that leads to fresh solutions to practical problems—difficulties such as helping one's son to overcome a depressing sense of inadequacy, or getting one's children to take an antidote for poison. Maitreya, along with Guan- yin, symbolizes compassion—not as just a state of mind but as the energy

and drive, the inner motivation, that make it possible to work for the benefit of others as well as oneself. Universal Sage can be said, then, to symbolize the coming together in everyday life of wisdom and compassion, which can be taken perhaps as one way of expressing the heart of the Lotus Sutra.

Peace

Throughout the sutra many traditional Buddhist doctrines are mentioned and sometimes discussed, especially the four holy truths, the eightfold path, the twelve-link chain of causes and conditions, and the six transcendental practices. Thus it is possible to interpret the sutra as having the purpose of overcoming suffering. Such basically negative goals as overcoming suffering, getting rid of attachments, becoming free of faults, dispelling illusion, and so on are not to be disparaged. They do describe very important Buddhist goals. But at least for the Lotus Sutra they are not enough. Beyond them there is always a positive goal.

The positive goal of the Dharma Flower Sutra is described in several different ways. Here I have used the idea of becoming a buddha as the highest goal. Of course, being a buddha is also called “supreme awakening,” often translated as “enlightenment.” So, it might rightly be said to be the highest goal. Another very prominent term in the sutra is “joy.” Over and over we are told that a result of hearing even a small part of the sutra is joy. And we are allowed to witness the great joy that comes to Shariputra when he realizes that he too is a bodhisattva on the way to becoming a buddha. Joy can be said to be the goal of the Lotus Sutra. Another equally important term is “peace.” “It is not my intent,” the Buddha says in chapter 3, “to lead people to extinction. I am the king of the Dharma, free to teach the Dharma, appearing in the world to bring peace and comfort to all the living.” Peace can also be said to be the goal of the Lotus Sutra.

The goal of peace has inspired many people to work not just for inner peace but for peace in families, communities, nations, and the world. Peace is not the mere absence of conflict. It brings joy and happiness to living beings and gives them the strength to share their joy and happiness with others, so that all can work together to transform the world into a pure land of peace. <>

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE REFORMATION LEGACY

edited by Mark J. Cartledge and Mark A. Jumper [Pickwick Publications, 9781532695445]

This collection of essays explores the legacy of the Reformation with regard to the person and work of the Holy Spirit. Following the five-hundredth anniversary of Luther's posting of his ninety-five theses, these essays consider this legacy with particular reference to the work of Martin Luther and John Calvin, as well as broader Reformation themes as they are related to pneumatology and the life of the church today. The contribution of this collection is to tease out and reflect on pneumatology historically but also to relate these findings to contemporary discussions, especially among scholars of pentecostal and charismatic Christianity. Together these essays invite readers to appreciate the contribution that the Protestant Reformation makes to life in the Holy Spirit today, as well as offering critical and constructive reflection on this theme. It is a timely and significant contribution to the discussions of the person and work of the Holy Spirit and the church.

Review

"A compelling and creative pentecostal contribution to the celebration and recovery of the Protestant Reformation. It investigates Luther's and Calvin's legacy in select areas of theology, hermeneutics, spirituality, worship, and women in ministry. It brings Protestant Reformation theology into conversation with key areas of contemporary charismatic theology--gifts and renewal, justification and the transformation of life, and participation in social change. A pneumatological and pentecostal perspective grounds its historical and contemporary dialogue with Luther, Calvin, and Reformation theology." --Steven M. Studebaker, Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology, Howard and Shirley Bentall Chair in Evangelical Thought, McMaster Divinity College

"Those who view the Reformation as word rather than Spirit dominated will find this intriguing collection of essays edited by Mark Cartledge and Mark Jumper to be especially enlightening. Offered in celebration of the five-hundredth anniversary of Luther's ninety-five theses, these essays show us the varied contributions of the Reformation to pneumatology and trace their influence into the modern era. Tremendously informative and creative." --Frank D. Macchia, Professor of Systematic Theology, Vanguard University

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The Protestant Reformation represented a revolution in the religious affairs of the West that reverberates to the present. The East–West Schism in Christendom (1054) between Roman Catholic and Orthodox had reflected formal actions of the bodies, Rome and Constantinople, that

had long been recognized as definitive leaders of the Church. The Protestant Reformation (1517), in contrast, sprang from the soil, as it were: if not *ex nihilo* (progenitors included such as Huss and Wycliff, among other persons and movements), certainly not *ex cathedra*. The formation of two leading movements, Lutheran and Reformed, as well as Anglicans, Anabaptists, and others proceeded unplanned and piecemeal with many diversions and dispersions in the process. In the meantime, the Roman Catholic Church experienced many reformations of its own, including the forming of the innovatively modern Society of Jesus.¹ Years of struggle and battle followed theological, ecclesial, political, and military- that remade not just the face of Europe, but its religious configuration, by the time of Westfalia's peace of 1648.

We note that the European discovery, exploration, and expropriation of the New World predated the Reformation by only twenty-five years, reaching its floodtide even as Reformation conflicts tore the explorers' homelands. The New World's melee of new boundaries and rulers reflected much of Europe's conflicts, eventuating in North America generally aligning Protestant and South America, Roman Catholic. The dynamics occurring in both Europe and the New World were thus not isolated, but mutually interactive in myriads of unpredictable and sometimes unrecognized ways.

Technical, economic, and social change also claimed roles in the times' convulsions. New technology, most notably the movable type printing press, had a primary role. The Gutenberg Bible was completed by 1455, when the future Pope Pius II spoke of it sixty-two years before Luther's handwritten 95 Theses were posted. However, it was Luther and the Protestants who made mass pamphlet printing and distribution their trademark method of propagation and teaching. That teaching implicitly depended upon the Holy Spirit's illumination of those lesser-trained individuals who read it in private and public. New social developments included travel, trade, infusions of New World gold, spice, and crops, and new uses of capital. These brought significant changes to a continent not so far removed from feudalism. To generalize, Protestant places tended to be more open to these changes, embracing them with enthusiasm in some contexts. Max Weber later named The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as the mutually reinforcing winners of that war.

We also remember that Europe, after centuries of loss to Muslim conquerors from the south, had only recently put a definite close to Christendom's near-death threat at Islam's hands. Spain's 700-year self-deliverance from Islamic rule, the Reconquista, was only completed in 1492, with the victorious Ferdinand and Isabella promptly sending Columbus on his momentous voyage (as well as exiling Jews who took their prosperous practices elsewhere).³ The gates of Vienna only survived the climactic Ottoman assault in 1529, finally leaving central and western Europe to stew in their internecine conflicts rather than have their weakened pieces consumed by Islam's cumulative victories. Islam's retreat from high tide, Spain in 1492 and Vienna in 1529, thus overlapped the Reformation's early years, along with the New World dynamics.

Finally, we note the Renaissance as another of the Reformation's overlays, starting as it did in the 1300s and continuing through the 1700s. This movement of academic and cultural recovery of ancient literature and philosophy combined with an energetic flowering of art and new philosophies, and the rise of humanism and science, to undermine many of the assumptions and underpinnings of Christendom's ancien regime.

It may thus be seen that the Reformation does not stand alone in its revolutionary role. If the Renaissance weakened the ancien regime, perhaps the Reformation administered a coup de grace of sorts. However, the conjunctions of the New World's opening horizon, Islam's ebttide, and

paradigmatic changes in technological, social, scientific, and economic developments were certainly of momentous import. These factors, each in itself of defining consequence, joined to birth a new world that is yet with us as our formative heritage: “No Westerner can ever hope to know him or herself, or the world he or she lives in, without first understanding this crucial turning point in history. And the same goes for any non-Westerner who wants to understand Western civilization.”

The question then arises: as Christians who affirm the providence and sovereignty of God, do we dare to discern the role of the Holy Spirit amid such momentous events? This question lay at the root of the conference from which these chapters sprang. We should remember that while the above-mentioned movements and influences provided the context for the several reformations that occurred, the center stage of the era was religious. We dare to suggest that church, theology, and faith with its experience were the prime drivers of the era’s events. In other words, the living out of belief in God lay at the core of it all. It is this claimed nexus of this definitive era that gives us pause to ask how God’s Spirit, who hovered over the earth’s waters in Genesis 1:1, was active amid the Reformation’s human striving and strife.

Martin Luther linked his revolution, recognizing faith as primary over works, to the Holy Spirit:

Faith is God’s work in us, that changes us and gives new birth from God. (John 1:13). It kills the Old Adam and makes us completely different people. It changes our hearts, our spirits, our thoughts and all our powers. It brings the Holy Spirit with it. Yes, it is a living, creative, active and powerful thing, this faith. Faith is a living, bold trust in God’s grace, so certain of God’s favor that it would risk death a thousand times trusting in it. Such confidence and knowledge of God’s grace makes you happy, joyful and bold in your relationship to God and all creatures. The Holy Spirit makes this happen through faith. Because of it, you freely, willingly and joyfully do good to everyone, serve everyone, suffer all kinds of things, love and praise the God who has shown you such grace.

It is significant, too, that Luther emphasized this infusion of the Spirit’s presence and illumination in personal terms, rather than primarily in corporate (ecclesial) or communitarian (sacramental) terms. This emphasis on the private person’s relationship to God through the Holy Spirit became central, for good and ill, in individualized Western society, even if, in our context, we are now recovering the importance of communal approaches to theological reflection.

Calvin, too, attributed high of place to the Holy Spirit. He was even given the sobriquet, “Theologian of the Holy Spirit,” by various theologians including B. B. Warfield:

In the same sense in which we may say that the doctrine of sin and grace dates from Augustine, the doctrine of satisfaction from Anselm, the doctrine of justification by faith from Luther—we must say that the doctrine of the work of the Holy Spirit is a gift from Calvin to the church.

[And] above everything else, it is the sense of the sovereign working of salvation by the almighty power of the Holy Spirit which characterizes all Calvin’s thought of God.

Calvin went to great lengths in his Institutes to expand upon the Holy Spirit’s significant role, in both personal and theological terms:

The Scriptures obtain full authority among believers only when men regard them as having sprung from heaven, as if there the living words of God were heard . . . The testimony of the Spirit is more excellent than all reason. For as God alone is a fit witness of himself in his Word, so also the Word will not find acceptance in men’s hearts before it is sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit . . . Those whom the Holy Spirit has inwardly taught truly rest

upon Scripture, and that Scripture indeed is self-authenticated . . . Let us, then, know that the only true faith is that which the Spirit of God seals in our hearts.

It is thus safe to say, of Calvin as well as Luther, that the Reformation represented recovery and reemphasis of the person and work of the Holy Spirit. Indeed neither would have maintained his path apart from “popery,” as Calvin called it, were he not convinced that such a drastic move was not only justified but required as a faithful act in response to the move and leading of the Holy Spirit of God.

G. W. F. Hegel later sought to explain history in terms of a (capitalized but impersonal) World Spirit that “consists in what is produced by man”:

The realm of Spirit is all-comprehensive; it includes everything that ever has interested or ever will interest man. Man is active in it; whatever he does, he is the creature within which the Spirit works. Hence it is of interest, in the course of history, to learn to know spiritual nature in its existence, that is, the point where Spirit and Nature unite, namely, human nature.

We Christians, while resonating with Hegel’s wish to learn the spiritual nature of history, take a different tack that seeks to discern the winds of the person of God’s Spirit moving through time, space, place, and people’s lives. We believe that God’s divine, personal, providential plan and presence, mediated by his Spirit’s activity through all time, ultimately achieve his will to bring about his Kingdom, ruled by Christ.

Exploring the degree to which the Reformation represented and reflected that rule is one aim of the conference that we convened on the Reformation’s 500th anniversary. We took our specific task from the conference’s title, “The Holy Spirit and the Reformation Legacy.” This title entailed three emphases that were required of each presentation as we examined but a few of the Reformation’s facets: first, the presence and role of the Holy Spirit in a given area of interest; second, awareness and placement of the Spirit’s role in the historical locus of the Reformation; and third, ways in which those Reformation beliefs and actions, regarding the Holy Spirit, left lasting legacies that still live today.

Regent University, the host of the conference through its School of Divinity’s Center for Renewal Studies, has, from its start, been part of the Holy Spirit renewal movement that swept the world from the twentieth century on. This movement includes Pentecostal, Charismatic, and Third Wave streams, as well as a vigorous stream in the Roman Catholic Church. Our Reformation 500 conference thus sought to take its distinction from other Reformation celebrations and explorations by giving primary attention to the Holy Spirit. We pray that this conference may thus make a unique contribution to the scholarship of those Reformation events that continue to echo through time.

As you consider each conference paper chapter, we also pray that you will find fresh insight, not only into what happened and what has come about but into the activity of the Holy Spirit in this earthly veil—including in your life.

It now remains to offer a brief outline of the chapters in this book. We have divided the book into three parts. The first part clusters chapters that consider the influence of Martin Luther and includes chapters 1–6. Chapter 1 by Michael M.C. Reardon discusses Luther and his influence on Melancthon’s pneumatology in relation to the doctrines of the Trinity and justification. This legacy is then brought into conversation with the idealism of Hegel and its traces in Rahner, suggesting that Luther’s legacy has impacted a wide variety of thought beyond the confessionalism of the Lutheran

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tradition. Chapter 2 by Samuel W. Muindi takes a hermeneutical turn. It considers the legacy of Luther concerning biblical hermeneutics and in particular canonical criticism. It does this by analyzing Luther's hermeneutical approach before attending to the post-Reformation trajectories from the Enlightenment. He continues by discussing the similarities of Luther's hermeneutics with the canonical criticism of Brevard Childs before concluding with a discussion of pneumatic hermeneutics. Chapter 3 by Donald W. Kammer takes an entirely different approach as it reviews the early Pentecostal devotional literature in America and Britain from 1907 and how these early Pentecostals conceived of themselves as inheritors of the Lutheran legacy through their devotional practices. In particular, they regarded Martin Luther as a spiritual exemplar and incorporated him into their view of church history, thus adding an interesting ecumenical perspective.

Chapter 4 by Mara Lief Crabtree brings the legacy of Martin Luther into conversation with the issue of spirituality and, in particular, the nature of spiritual formation. Crabtree first discusses key elements in Luther's spirituality before tracing his influence via the printing press, visio divina and lectio divina, and diverse theologies of the Eucharist. Then follows a description of Luther's understanding of suffering in the Christian life, including his view on purgatory, before a brief discussion of joy and priestly formation. The chapter concludes by identifying aspects of the Reformation legacy that can be seen in spiritual "re-formation" today. Lance Bacon writes chapter 5. In this chapter, the author investigates the influence of Luther on the Pentecostal appreciation of the cross and Pentecostals' appropriation of John Wesley's approach to Christian perfection. Having identified the plurality of Pentecostalism, Bacon then considers Luther's theology of the cross in some detail before bringing it into conversation with Wesley's theology. The discussion is then brought back to how American Wesleyan Pentecostalism has appropriated both justification and sanctification in its theology. He then concludes with a discussion of pneumatology and ethics in the light of the legacy of Luther and Wesley. Chapter 6, written by Barbara Elkjer, concludes the section investigating the legacy of Luther. She takes a look at Luther's theology of marriage and in particular, his marriage to his wife Katharina von Bora. She places this discussion within an historical context, both ancient and medieval, before considering ideas of virginity and marriage that Katharina developed during her marriage to Luther. Thus, this chapter brings an essential perspective on Luther's legacy, often missed, which relates to the Pentecostal empowerment of women through a pneumatic spirituality.

The second part brings together chapters that discuss the legacy of John Calvin and includes chapters 7–10. Chapter 7 by Andrew Snyder investigates Calvin's pneumatology in relation to soteriology and in particular, the believer's union with Christ by means of the Holy Spirit. He traces the influence of Augustine on Calvin's theology more generally before focusing on Calvin's pneumatology and soteriology. He then considers implications of this discussion in relation to sacramental theology, especially Calvin's eucharistic pneumatology. Chapter 8 by David M. Barbee explores the influence of Calvin's pneumatology on Karl Barth. He begins by noting Calvin's pneumatology and its reception by Schleiermacher and via Schleiermacher to Barth. Given this pneumatological trajectory, the author then discusses the theme of revelation in Barth before noting some similarities between Calvin and Barth and the impact of Calvin's pneumatology on Barth. Chapter 9, by Fitzroy John Willis, is a review of Calvin's criteria for the use of the charismata and their possible use within contemporary worship. The author begins by elucidating Calvin's understanding of the proper employment of prophecy within a worship service before considering how contemporary theology has considered the application of these criteria to today's worshipping

communities. He discusses the relationship between prophecy and preaching and the nature and use of speaking in tongues and interpretation, as well as the issue of the cessation of the charismata. Finally, there is a discussion of charismata, gender, and the *mulier taceat*. Chapter 10, written by Daniel B. Gilbert, provides a second study of John Calvin and the charismata, with a particular emphasis on the gift of prophecy. He begins with a general description of Calvin's view of the charismata before a discussion of soteriological gifts, the charismata, and the gift of prophecy. He discusses the nature of the temporary-permanent distinction before applying this understanding to its use in the church today.

Part three gathers three papers that reflect on several Reformation themes and are not as focused on a discussion of either Luther or Calvin. It contains chapters 11–13. Chapter 11 picks up the theme of cessationism and addresses it in relation to the Reformation and renewal of the Holy Spirit. It is written by Christopher J. Wilson. It begins with a short historical sketch of cessationism in the Patristic era before considering the Reformation period. He then discusses anti-supernaturalism and the rise of historical criticism. Finally, he addresses the position of David Hume in relation to the Pentecostal and Charismatic Renewal movements from the twentieth century. Chapter 12, by James M. Henderson, investigates the relationship of justification to the idea of the *theōsis*. He begins with an analysis of justification as *theōsis* in recent Pentecostal theology and literature before considering whether *theōsis* could be understood as part of the process of justification. He then develops a discussion engaging the work of Finnish Lutheran theology in particular before considering the critique of this school of thought by German theologian, Eberhard Jüngel. Carl R. Trueman is also brought into the conversation as another critical dialogue partner with regard to the Finnish Lutheran school of thought, before a discussion of justification and transformation in the Reformed theology of Jonathan Edwards. Finally, the essay concludes by addressing the issue of how justification with transformation may be regarded as a better model than *theōsis*. Chapter 13 is the final chapter of the book, and it is written by Jan B. Drayer. It reviews the impact of the Reformation heritage in dialogue with the cultural change theory of James Davidson Hunter. On this account, the social change initiated by the Reformation is seen as still significant for our understanding of the contemporary religious landscape. He notes Hunter's critique of the common understanding of culture in American society, his alternative suggestions for understanding culture, and in particular, his analysis of the Reformation, before providing an overall analysis of the Reformation, social change, and the Holy Spirit. Finally, he observes the limited role that Pentecostals have played in the field of social change, being more concerned with evangelism rather than social transformation. <>

POST-HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT FROM THE STOICS TO ORIGEN by G. R. Boys-Stones [Oxford University Press, 9780198152644]

This book traces, for the first time, a revolution in philosophy which took place during the early centuries of our era. It reconstructs the philosophical basis of the Stoics' theory that fragments of an ancient and divine wisdom could be reconstructed from mythological traditions, and shows that Platonism was founded on an argument that Plato had himself achieved a full reconstruction of this wisdom, and that subsequent philosophies had only regressed once again in their attempts to "improve" on his achievement.

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General Index

The centuries immediately following the end of the Hellenistic age remain a murky area in the history of philosophy. While a great deal of work has been done in recent years to rehabilitate Hellenistic thought itself from the generally negative assessment of the nineteenth century, the thesis that later philosophy traces a decline into 'eclecticism' (cf. not least Zeller 1892: vol. iv/1) retains a programmatic hold over studies of the period. Three centuries of intellectual activity are held to mark out a kind of philosophical no man's land between the earlier systems from which they are taken to derive their material, and the glories of 'Neoplatonism' to which they look forward. Even John Dillon, who has done so much to map out the territory (esp. Dillon 1996) and to question the term 'eclecticism' itself (Dillon 1988), found the period interesting 'chiefly as a prologue to Plotinus' (Dillon 1996: p. xiv). However, if scholarship has managed to bring the post-Aristotelian schools within the pale, the possibility must exist that post-Hellenistic philosophy can be brought inside as well—perhaps, ultimately, that the no man's land it marks out at the doorstep of Plotinus can be reclaimed and the pale brought down altogether. It is the aim of the present study to explore that possibility. It looks at post-Hellenistic philosophy, in particular at the one distinctive and influential movement it produced, namely Platonism, and argues that, in this movement, philosophy changed for ever, and changed in a manner perhaps less visible for its very depth. For this change, I shall argue, was not one marked as such—in the first place, at least—by a radical departure from engagement with the doctrines of the Hellenistic schools; it was rather marked by a shift in the theoretical understanding of how philosophy itself should be done. The distinction between 'Neo-' and 'Middle' Platonism is based on superficialities: the real philosophical revolution had taken place by the end of the second century ad, and it is this revolution that the study traces.

Platonism, it hardly needs arguing, was about a return to the philosophy of Plato. But this return was the consequence, not the basis, of a theory: the consequence, as I argue, of a theory developed from work originally done in the Hellenistic Stoa on the nature of mythological and theological traditions. In Part I of the study I examine the Stoics' suggestion that these traditions might preserve fragments of the philosophical outlook which obtained among the very first generations of mankind, an outlook whose truth could be independently established. In Chapters 1–2 I examine the basis for this belief in the early Stoa, and in Chapter 3, the increasingly sophisticated methods developed by the later Stoics for isolating 'original' philosophical material from the traditions which preserved it. One of the most important of these methods was the cross-cultural comparison of theological traditions—an

approach which called for further investigation into the purity and antiquity of the traditions with which it worked. As evidence for the development of interest in these questions, I look in Chapters 4 and 5 at the way it is reflected in the Hellenistic debate between Greek and Jewish intellectuals over the age and status of Jewish culture, and argue that the issue of Jewish antiquity arose as a theme in the polemic it involves only in the light of the work of the later Stoics.

In Part II I turn to the Platonists themselves. They, I argue in Chapter 6, adopted the Stoics' beliefs concerning the survival of ancient, privileged wisdom, and their methods for extracting it as well. But what made the Platonists Platonists was their additional belief that Plato had already made use of just this kind of approach himself. Plato's philosophy represented, they believed, a full and successful reconstruction and articulation of the primitive, privileged wisdom of early man—and that is why Plato came to stand as an authority for them. But if Plato's authority is explained on the basis of his sources and method, the truth of his philosophy is also made plausible by the Platonists through an account of postPlatonic history. In Chapter 7 I show that, working from the explosion of philosophical disagreement and debate after Plato's death, institutionalized in the foundation of a number of different philosophical schools, the Platonists argued that we should not (with the Sceptics) suspend judgement over where the truth lay at all, but rather conclude that a return to the study of Plato might provide the most promising route to discovering it. The difficulties and disagreements among schools which had diverged from the teaching of Plato only made it more plausible that Plato had been right in the first place.

Finally, I argue that the models which defined the Platonist approach to philosophy were adopted by Christian thinkers of the later first and early second centuries ad, and shaped the emergence of Christianity as a force in Western philosophy. Needing to respond to Platonist claims that the dissension within Christianity could be explained by their own divergence from the ancient tradition inherited through Plato, the Christians used the Platonists' own tools to develop the notions of 'orthodoxy' and 'heresy' by which a 'true' and unified Christian tradition could be distinguished from the dissension it later attracted. Furthermore, by arguing that Christianity was in philosophical continuity with Hebrew thought (as the apologists of the second century started to do), 'orthodox' Christians were able to lay claim to a Hebraeo-Christian tradition which was older in its turn than any pagan tradition. Indeed, they argued that the traditional theologies of the pagans themselves must now be viewed as later and decadent offshoots of their own. But all of this leaves the Christians one further question, explored in Chapter 9: if traditional pagan theology is to be explained as a corrupt divergence from Hebraeo-Christian thought, how did it come to give rise to the more positive tradition of Classical Greek philosophy? Since it was axiomatic to the argument used by the Christians that divergent traditions could only tend to the worse, the improvements apparent in the work of the philosophers were in need of explanation. The answer offered by the Christians was that, one way or another, pagan philosophy also depended for its existence on the prior existence and superior truth of the Christian tradition: that it was, for example, sparked into being by contact during the Classical period with Hebrew Scripture. This explains the muchmaligned 'dependency theme' (as one commentator has called it); but, crucially, it explains why one should not allow the positive developments within pagan philosophy to blind one to the essential weakness of its approach. The same traits which had led the pagans to diverge from the original tradition led their philosophers to dispute all over again the insights they had gained from the Hebrews, and to fall once again into a disagreement which showed that, if the truth was discernible at all, it must lie within orthodox Christianity.

Having described what is contained in this study, I should say a word about what is omitted. I do not, on the whole, discuss evidence later than the late third century ad—or, more specifically, later than the Platonist Porphyry, or Origen in the chapters on Christianity. These two thinkers seem to me convenient resting-points in their respective traditions; and the theory I discuss has been sufficiently established by this point for it to be neither necessary nor profitable to extend the investigation further. But a word is needed on the scope of my discussion of earlier Platonism as well, from which several familiar names will be found to be absent. It is part of my argument that Platonism should not be defined primarily by its doctrines, but rather by its methodology (in the context of which its doctrinal development can then be understood). For this reason, I concentrate away from Platonists who are only known to us through doxographical fragments or works: this is the excuse I offer for the absence here of figures such as Albinus, Alcinous, Gaius, and Apuleius. I am encouraged in focusing my attention elsewhere (in particular on Celsus, Plutarch, Atticus, and Numenius, as well as, to a lesser extent, on Plotinus and Porphyry) not just by this theoretical consideration, but also by the failure of doxographical approaches to Platonism which have deployed these thinkers on the front line of their evidence—one thinks in particular of the now discredited theory which traced Platonism from Antiochus of Ascalon, through Arius Didymus, to Gaius and the school attributed to him (cf. Chapter 6 below, esp. n. 2). Quite generally, in fact, this study does not aim to be comprehensive; but it does aim to start uncovering the kinds of structure in terms of which a comprehensive investigation might operate. <>

GOD'S JUDGMENT THROUGH THE DAVIDIC MESSIAH BY MYONGIL KIM [WIPF & STOCK PUBLISHERS, 9781725280915]

This dissertation examines the role of the Davidic Messiah, who is the agent of God's judgment in Romans 1:18--4:25. It may be summarized in two theses: First of all, the Davidic Messiah was expected in the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings, which establish the foundation for Paul's Davidic Messiah Christology in Romans. Second, the language in the role of the agent of God's judgment cannot be identified with the term faithfulness.

Review

""Myongil Kim navigates intersecting, swirling, controversial streams in Paul's Letter to the Romans: the Davidic Messiah, covenant faithfulness, and faith/faithfulness in/of the Messiah. He navigates these waters with bold strokes. The key is to understand the expectations in the Scriptures and Second Temple Judaism of a Davidic Messiah who would be an agent of God's judgment, not covenantal fulfillment. We are indebted to Professor Kim for advancing our understanding in new and fresh directions." --A. Andrew Das, Professor of Religious Studies and Assistant Dean of the Faculty, Elmhurst University

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Paul writes, “but now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the Law, although the Law and the Prophets bear witness to it— the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe” (Rom 3:21–22). In these verses, Paul highlights a key theme in Romans— the righteousness of God, which is linked to faith in Jesus, the Messiah. Paul introduces the Messiah as one born from the seed of David, and utilizes quotations about the Messiah from the Old Testament to emphasize the significance of his arguments (Rom 11:26–27; 15:12).

The relationship between the Messiah of Romans and the tradition of the Davidic Messiah is an ongoing source of controversy in New Testament scholarship. The conventional Jewish messianism identified by some in Paul’s letters has been denied or modified by others. The debate about the Davidic Messiah is not merely a debate about the Messiah Christology itself in Romans because it is intertwined with the key themes in Romans. If the righteousness of God has been revealed through faith in the Messiah, Jesus, for all believers (Rom 3:22), what then is the connection between the righteousness of God and the Davidic Messiah in Romans? How does Paul’s conception of the Messiah in Romans inform his understanding of the righteousness of God, a key theme in this book, as the faithfulness of God in the role of the faithful Messiah, the deliverance of God through the redeemer, or justifying righteousness through the agent of God’s judgment? If Paul specifically references justification as being through the Messiah, Jesus (Rom 5:1), is justification based on union with the Messianic king, on incorporation into the messianic community, or on the forensic feature of Christ’s role in Romans? With such possibilities, it is clear that Paul centers his argument on the Davidic Messiah in his gospel for the believers in Rome since the role of the Davidic Messiah influences the key themes in Romans.

Thesis

This book investigates the Davidic messianic elements of Romans. The characteristics of the Davidic Messiah in Romans provide evidence for a coherent and distinct role of the Davidic Messiah in relation to the primary themes in Romans. For Paul, the Davidic Messiah is the agent of God’s judgment, demarcated by his kingly and priestly features. The Davidic Messiah features in Romans are influential for justification and the righteousness of God, both of which are closely related to the judgment of God. In Romans 1:18–4:25, Paul argues that believers can be justified through faith in the Messiah, who is the agent of God’s judgment. Paul depicts Jesus as the Davidic Messiah (1:3–4; 15:12), especially referencing his enthronement as such (4:25; 8:34–35). Jesus Christ is the agent of God’s judgment (2:16; 8:34; 15:1–12), and all who believe are justified through faith in the Messiah Jesus (3:22). This divine judicial activity pertains directly to the Davidic Messiah, and is accomplished in light of his tandem roles as king and high priest. Acting as God’s judgment is the role of the Davidic Messiah, which is accomplished in his kingship and high priesthood. Romans quotes and alludes to other Old Testament messianic texts that are based on God’s judgment through the Messiah, and propagate the messianic expectation for the Davidic Messiah. The Davidic Messiah acts to save and govern as both redeemer and ruler (11:26; 15:12), through the justification enacted by that same Messiah.

The thesis of this book is that in his arguments about justification and the righteousness of God in Romans 1:18–4:25, Paul depicts the Davidic Messiah exclusively as the agent of God’s judgment

without reference to the Messiah's fulfillment of the covenant. In Romans, the Davidic Messiah—Jesus—is affirmed as the agent of God's judgment, rather than as the faithful Messiah through and in whom God has fulfilled his covenant. In other words, although the Davidic Messiah has fulfilled the covenant of God, the focus on the Davidic Messiah in Romans is not the faithfulness of the Davidic Messiah, but the agency of the Davidic Messiah in executing God's judgment on sinners (Rom 2:16).

The majority of this work will be conducted through careful exegesis of selected passages concerning the Davidic Messiah in Romans, and by an investigation of relevant background material related to the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings. The exegetical approach is mainly performed following arguments regarding the Davidic messianic Christology in Romans 1:18–4:25 to examine the function of the Davidic Messiah and the Messiah's faithfulness in Paul's discourse in Romans. This study investigates Paul's understanding of the Davidic Messiah in Romans by analyzing the allusions and citations to it in other parts of Romans, as well.

This chapter introduces the thesis and a history of research within the literature related to the thesis. I will survey the major works about Messiah Christology in Paul and the faithfulness of the Messiah in Romans. In addition, I will briefly evaluate the present state of research and present my thesis as a contribution to Davidic Messiah Christology and the Messiah's faithfulness.

In chapter 2, I observe the characteristics of the Davidic Messiah in the Old Testament as the foundation for discussing the Davidic Messiah in Romans. The judgment function of the Davidic Messiah, who is the agent of the judgment of God, will be examined. I then cross-examine the judgment and atonement of the Suffering Servant in Isaiah 53, which is closely related to the faithfulness of Jesus Christ in Romans.

In chapter 3, I observe the characteristics of the Davidic Messiah, particularly the judgment function of the Davidic Messiah in the Second Temple Literature. In the course of this observation, I evaluate whether the Messiah's faithfulness is unfamiliar in God's judgment through the Davidic Messiah.

In chapter 4, I study the evidence for the gospel concerning the Davidic Messiah, which is the context for God's judgment, asking in what sense Paul announces the gospel and the Sonship of the Davidic Messiah in Romans 1:3–4. Additionally, with an exegetical study of the messianic oracle and Romans 15:12 related to 1:3–4, I offer an analysis of the immediate context in light of the discussion about the Davidic Messiah's role as the agent of God's judgment. The relationship between the saving and ruling of the Davidic Messiah, which is based on God's judgment, is displayed in the exegesis of the Davidic Messiah in the Isaiah oracle and Romans 15:12. Paul's treatment of the Davidic Messiah in Romans 15:12 clearly shows that the role of the Davidic Messiah is the execution of God's judgment and that the Davidic Messiah's faithfulness is not a significant theme in Paul's discussion.

In chapter 5, I concentrate on the judgment function of the Davidic Messiah described in the judgment theme in Romans 1:18–4:25 to support faith in the Messiah, rather than the Messiah's faithfulness in terms of the judgment function of the Davidic Messiah. This chapter's main emphasis is the solution for God's wrath. The function of the agent of God's judgment is resolving this problem through the Davidic Messiah's atonement. My analysis focuses on the question of the function of the Davidic Messiah's atonement in terms of God's judgment. I then identify elements of the exalted Messiah that seem to be related to the justification of believers in Romans 4:25. The present study concentrates particularly on the justification and enthronement of the Davidic Messiah, with a

background in the Old Testament and Jewish tradition that demonstrates the authority of the Davidic Messiah for sinners' judgment. The atonement for God's judgment is the basis for faith in the Messiah. The exaltation of the suffering Messiah, alluded to in 4:25, is the basis of the faith (4:24). Finally, chapter 6 will include a summary of my conclusion.

History of Research

A history of research on the Davidic Messiah in Romans must begin with the History of Religions School, with its focus on *kyrios* Christology in Paul's letters because New Testament scholarship has vacillated between Messiah Christology and *kyrios* Christology ever since then. Some scholars who have stressed *kyrios* Christology have denied the Davidic Messiahship in Paul's Christology. The vacillation originated from the division presupposed between Hellenistic Christians and Palestinian Christians according to the thought of the History of Religions School. The Jewish messiahship in Paul's ministry to Hellenistic Christians has been denied, based on the differences between the religious thoughts of the two groups—Jewish and Gentile Christians. However, it is impossible to determine the Messiah Christology in early Christianity based on a distinction between Jewish and Hellenistic Christians and to insist that there was no Jewish messianism in the Hellenistic Christians' belief concerning Jesus. Later, the *kyrios* Christology and Messiah Christology have been understood as intertwined in Paul's letter because there is no evidence of a sharp division between them in his time. Several scholars assert that Paul clearly holds to a *kyrios* Christology, which is merged with Jesus' Jewish messianism. Here I present briefly a few key figures who provide interpretations of a significant section of Paul's letter, especially concerning the *kyrios* Christology and the Messiah Christology.

Wilhelm Bousset

Wilhelm Bousset, who represents the History of Religions School, approaches early Christianity through the lens of liturgy and Christology in his book, *Kyrios Christos*. According to Bousset, the earliest Palestinian Christian movement is sharply separated from Hellenistic Christians, and he locates Paul in Hellenistic Christianity. Bousset explains that the *Kyrios* cult had been developed from Hellenistic churches, saying, "What the *κ υ ρ ι ος* signified for the first Hellenistic Christian congregation thus stands before us in bright and living colors. It is the Lord who holds sway over the Christian life of fellowship, in particular as it is unfolded in the community's worship, thus in the cultus." The Palestinian Christians prohibited application of the title *kyrios* to Jesus because of Jewish monotheism. The Palestinian community understood the resurrected and exalted Jesus as "the Son of Man."

In Romans 1:3–4, the Son of God is synonymous with the *kyrios* idea for Paul. Bousset observes, "It is always this exalted son of God upon whom Paul focuses." And, he argues,

We have already given reason for our doubting whether the title "Son of God" at all stems from Jewish messianology and accordingly from Palestinian primitive Christianity. If the doubts are valid, then the possibility must be reckoned with that here we have to do with an independent creation of Paul.

While Paul focuses on the Son of God in his writing to the Hellenistic group, he does suggest the title "Son of David," but it is less important in Paul's *kyrios* Christology. Although Paul emphasizes "Jesus' descent from David's tribe," he is simply "following the community's tradition which had come down to him." In Bousset's thought, the title "Christ" was understood as a proper name in

Paul's era because Paul did not hold to the Jewish messianic expectation. Instead, he followed the Hellenistic piety of the mysticism of Christ.

Albert Schweitzer

Critics from among Bousset's contemporaries criticized his explanation. Albert Schweitzer contends that Paul's thought "cannot be reconstructed out of a patchwork of Hellenistic ideas but only becomes intelligible in the light of eschatology." Schweitzer supports the idea that Paul's Davidic Messianism was based on Jewish eschatology, and did not represent the belief of the Hellenistic community. Schweitzer maintains that the *kyrios* Christology Bousset emphasized has no evidence in the earliest church. Schweitzer relates Paul's conception of Christ-mysticism to the mystical concept of "being in Christ" in the late Second Temple apocalypses, rather than to Hellenism. He writes, "The problems of Pauline eschatology all go back to the two circumstances that it is, in the first place, like the Apocalypses of Baruch and Ezra, a synthesis of the eschatology of Daniel; and, in the second place, that it has to reckon with the facts, wholly unforeseen to Jewish eschatology, that the Messiah has already appeared as a man, has died, and is risen again." In the Second Temple apocalypses, the Davidic Sonship was applied to the "Son-of-Man Messiah," and this concept of the Messiah of the Messianic Kingdom was applied to Jesus in Paul's writings.

Rudolf Bultmann

Rudolf Bultmann, who stands in the History of Religions School, attests that the title, the Son of David, is not important to Paul.¹⁵ The Davidic Messiah, the Son of David, did not have great significance to Paul. This term—the Son of David in Romans 1:3—is just a handed-down, pre-Pauline formula, and cannot reflect Pauline theology.¹⁶ Bultmann explains, "For though the title is of no importance to him, he refers to it in Rom 1:3, a sentence which is evidently due to a handed-down formula." The narrow concept of the Messiah had been changed to the apocalyptic heavenly salvation-bringer, which Paul applied to Christ. He goes on to say, "The ancient title 'Messiah,' once expressing Israelitic national hope, was no longer confined to this narrower meaning but could just as well be transferred to the heavenly salvation-bringer awaited by the apocalyptists." Bultmann argues with the division placed between Hellenistic thought and Palestinian Jewish thought, based on Bousset's thesis. He is skeptical of the messianic understanding in Paul because he denies the possibility of confirming an understanding about the historical Jesus.

Oscar Cullmann

Oscar Cullman criticizes Bousset's scheme in his book, *The Christology of the New Testament*, opposing the "Christ cult" in Hellenistic Christianity. He opposes Bousset's thesis that the *kyrios* for Jesus originated from the cultic setting of the Hellenistic community in Syria. The Maranatha passage (1 Cor 16:22) of Aramaic-speaking Palestinian Christians was used in a liturgical context, and "[in] his Greek letters Paul preserves in the Aramaic precisely the oldest characteristic prayers of the first Church." He additionally mentions that the Jewish communities in Palestine also used *kyrios* to designate Christ because *kyrios* was the word the Septuagint utilized to translate the divine name Adonai.

Cullmann insists that there was no question of Jesus' Davidic descent. In Cullmann's understanding, though, the early church did not accept "the terminology relative to the Messiah," and Christ will execute his Messiah-ship over the whole world "at the end." He writes, "The kingship of the Son of David was now primarily a kingship over the church. . . . The early church believed that the kingship of Jesus would become visible only in the future. . . . Paul does expect a final event in which Christ

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will visibly appear, but he never allows Christ's eschatological work to take a political form." Cullmann notes that "Christ" is a proper name in early Christianity,²⁵ which signifies the receding of Jewish messianic ideas.

W. D. Davies

In *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology*, W. D. Davies suggests that there is not any difference in the Palestinian Judaism and Diaspora Judaism because of the strong Hellenizing influences in Palestine. Within this view, Paul's main ideas were derived from early rabbinic Judaism. He comments, "In the present work we shall not seek to deny all Hellenistic influence on him; we shall merely attempt to prove that Paul belonged to the main stream of first-century Judaism, and that elements in his thought, which are often labeled as Hellenistic, might well be derived from Judaism." Palestinian Judaism had been influenced "with all parts of the Hellenistic world."

The Jewish Messiahship of Jesus is apparent in Paul because he was plainly a Jew. According to Davies,

Both in his life and thought, therefore, Paul's close relation to Rabbinic Judaism has become clear, and we cannot too strongly insist again that for him the acceptance of the Gospel was not so much the rejection of the old Judaism and the discovery of a new religion wholly antithetical to it, as his polemics might sometimes pardonably lead us to assume, but the recognition of the advent of the Messianic Age of Jewish expectation. . . . It was at this one point that Paul parted company with Judaism, at the valuation of Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah with all that this implied.

He points out that the suffering Messiah and the resurrection of the Messiah are connected to Rabbinic literature. Paul placed the emphasis on Jesus as the Messiah of Jewish expectation.

Ernst Käsemann

Similar to Bultmann, Ernst Käsemann focuses on *kyrios* Christology in his Romans commentary. He sides with those who understand Paul's use of *Christos* as a proper name. In Romans 1:3, Paul does not concentrate on the messianic significance and "allows it to be overshadowed by the *Kyrios* title." The Jewish expectation of the Messiah is denied in Romans. In Romans 11:26, the returning of the Redeemer is not a reference to "the historical Jesus, nor to the christological event as a whole, nor indeed to the *parousia* in Jerusalem, but to the return of the exalted Christ from the heavenly Jerusalem of Gal 4:26." The quotation of Isaiah 11:1 in Romans 15:12 is also applied by Paul "to him who has been raised again and exalted."³³ He declares, "Christ has not just come to win the Gentiles for the community. He intends to rule over the cosmos and for this reason, as in 8:20, he is an object of hope for all creation, which is represented by the peoples." Käse-mann stresses the universal lordship of Christ.³⁵ He comprehends that Paul proclaims the eschatological fulfillment through Christ's rule (15:12). He focuses on the *kyrios* Christology, rather than on the Jewish Messiah, based on the sovereign eschatological rule of Christ in Paul.

Martin Hengel

In *Judaism and Hellenism*, Martin Hengel shows that Hellenistic culture had affected Palestine. By the third century BC, the upper classes of Palestine had already been influenced by Hellenization, and the lower classes were affected in the next two centuries. Therefore, Hengel challenges the History

of Religions School with his historical analysis that contrasts with the thought of the History of Religions School. He states that “the putative pre-Pauline, Christologically productive ‘Gentile-Christian community,’ is a fiction.” The Christian communities in Syria were “at best ‘mixed communities,’ and the element of Jewish Christianity was predominant for years.” The missionaries of the earliest Christians were Jewish Christians. Hengel, supporting the *kyrios* Christology from a Jewish background, remarks,

The conception of the sending of the Son does not come from a pre-Christian gnostic myth—which in fact never existed— but has its roots in Jewish wisdom speculation; the confession is not borrowed from the cult of Attis, Serapis, or Isis, but is a necessary consequence of the exaltation Christology in which Ps 110:1 in particular played a part; the Jerusalem Maranatha formula represented a preliminary stage in which the exalted Christ was called upon to return soon.

Additionally, Hengel understands Paul to fully acknowledge the conceptions of the within the Old Testament, and he employed this title for Jesus in Romans 1:3–4. He says,

That Paul was perfectly acquainted with the Old Testament Jewish conceptions bound up with the messianic name can be seen from any number of texts. Thus the reference to Jesus’ descent (Rom 1:3f). The appointment to “Son of God in power . . . by his resurrection from the dead” which follows, means nothing other than the effective, powerful installation of the resurrected Jesus in the fullness of his messianic power. . . . The Davidic descent of Jesus—which Paul, in an ancient formula, presupposes to be well known as a matter of course even by the Roman Christians—probably derives from a tradition in the family of Jesus attested by Hegesippus and Julius Africanus.

The salvific work of Christ, who is the promised Messiah, has universal significance. Hengel insists on “the ‘Gentiles’ access to salvation in Christ,” who is the Messiah promised to Israel.

Hengel and Davies contest Bousset’s thought that there was a difference between the confessions concerning the Messiah in Palestinian and Hellenistic Diaspora communities. The dominance of Hellenism influenced Palestinian Judaism. The dichotomy in early Christians’ Christology between Messiah Christology and *kyrios* Christology needs to be abandoned because there is no evidence of a separation between Palestinian Judaism and Diaspora Judaism. Hengel emphasizes that historical analysis, based strictly on chronological development of early Christianity, does not provide evidence for such boundaries.

Larry W. Hurtado

Larry W. Hurtado understands early Christianity to have the characteristic of “high” Christology, which stresses the divinity of Christ. He demonstrates that Jewish monotheism was applied to Jesus-devotion. The exclusive Jewish monotheism could not allow cultic worship for “revered agents of God (whether angelic or human).” The devotion granted to Jesus in early Christianity has historical significance because Jesus represents a unique agent of God “the Father.” In addition, it is still more important to note that the Jews resisted worshiping any figure. This means that Jewish monotheism was taken over in early Christianity as “the Christian mutation.” He writes, “The accommodation of Jesus as recipient of cultic worship with God is unparalleled and signals a major development in monotheistic cultic practice and belief.” Moreover, like Bousset, Hurtado realizes that the earliest Christians had the sense and experience of the presence of the exalted Jesus and worshiped him. Hurtado proposes that the divinity of Jesus as the object of worship was recognized in early Christianity. Pauline letters illustrate that early Christians “took over and perpetuated from previous

circles of Christians a devotional pattern in which Jesus functioned with God as subject matter and recipient of worship.” Hurtado’s understanding is vital for understanding N. T. Wright’s “divine identity” of Christ in relation to worship and cultic devotion of Christ.

Richard Bauckham

In Jewish monotheism, the God of Israel had been identified as YHWH in the covenant relationship. God’s identity is additionally characterized by the reference to “God’s relationship to the whole of reality.” The only true God, YHWH, is “sole Creator of all things and sole Ruler of all things.” The exclusive worship of YHWH is a clear signal of the division “between God and all other realities.” Richard Bauckham shows three characteristics of the divine identity in Jewish monotheism: creational, eschatological, and cultic. These features are applied to Christ in Paul’s Christology: “They include Jesus in the unique divine sovereignty over all things, they include him in the unique divine creation of all things, they identify him by the divine name which names the unique divine identity, and they portray him as accorded the worship which, for Jewish monotheists, is recognition of the unique divine identity.” In Bauckham’s understanding, Christ has a unique divine identity because Christ is sovereign ruler over the world, and he participated in God’s creation. The whole New Testament is identified as having the highest Christology—one that espouses Christ’s divine identity.

James D. G. Dunn

James D. G. Dunn describes his view of Christology as a “high” or moderately “high” Christology,⁵⁸ but his Christology starts from a low Christology. He proposes that Paul begins with the particular form of monotheism that he received from his Jewish upbringing. This is manifested in the idea of the subordination of Christ to God (1 Cor 15:27–28). In opposition to Hurtado’s idea, the worship of Jesus, Dunn explains that the worship language and words for praise and thanksgiving were never offered to Christ. Although Christ has significance in Christian worship, worship was offered to God through Christ, as well, because “Christ is both sacrificing High Priest and sacrificial victim.” He writes, “Christ was never understood as the one to whom sacrifice was offered.” Furthermore, against the term of divine identity, Dunn warns his readers of “the danger of confusing.” He emphasizes, “An identification of Jesus with and as Yahweh was an early attempt to resolve the tensions indicated above; it was labelled as ‘Modalism,’ a form of ‘Monarchianism’ (the one God operating first as Father and then as Son), and accounted a heresy.” In his view, Paul’s interpretation is that of an interaction between his Jewish monotheism and his beliefs about Jesus within God’s purpose. The influx of Gentiles influenced Paul’s developing Christology, resulting in Pauline Christology being elevated higher to the “highest” moment.

Dunn insinuates that to understand Davidic Messiahship, the particularity of situations within the Hellenistic communities and the Palestinian church must be considered. He notes,

Why the identification of Jesus as Son of David was so treated in the Hellenistic church is not entirely clear—most probably because it was too peculiarly Jewish to permit its easy translation into the wider world. The Jewish hope of a messianic son of David was expressed in strongly political and so nationalistic terms: the son of David was expected to introduce a political kingdom and effect a this-worldly salvation. However amenable this was to the gospel of the Palestinian church it cannot but have been an embarrassment outside Palestine. . . . Paul does not affirm the Davidic sonship of Jesus without qualification. He does not deny it either, but he makes it clear that to describe Jesus as “born of the seed of David” is a dangerously defective and misleading half-truth.

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The Davidic Messiahship in Romans 1:3–4 reflects the embarrassment of the Hellenistic communities “over Jesus’ Davidic sonship.” In Dunn’s view, while Jewish messianic expectations are political and nationalistic,

Paul uses the formula in 1:3–4 to present a balanced portrayal of the Davidic Messiah for the Hellenistic Christians that does not emphasize the nationalistic kingship of the Messiah.⁶⁶ In addition, Dunn observes in terms of Romans 15:12, “The final scripture, from Paul’s favorite prophet (Isa 11:10), fittingly ties together again the thought of the Jewishness of Jesus (the Davidic Messiah) and of the risen Christ, hope of the nations—an effective recall of the themes of the letter’s paragraph (1:2–5).” Paul elaborates on “the messianic promise” as the vindication of Israel that includes “the destruction of the Gentiles.” However, it “has been reversed in the outreach of the gentile mission.” Paul doubtlessly would not want to endanger the acceptance of his letter in Rome “by imposing a different sense” of nationalistic and political messiahship held by the Jews. In Dunn’s understanding, the Davidic Messiah, as such, has been enlarged to embrace a gospel message, which includes the Jewish Messiah’s becoming the Son of God.

New Testament scholars question the chronological schemes of the development of *kyrios* Christology in the History of Religions School, and the School’s denial of the Messiah Christology. An accurate definition of the boundary between Jewish and Gentile Christianity was not given. Additionally, scholars still debate Jewish monotheists’ worship of Christ.⁷² Some scholars have questioned the “exclusive” Jewish monotheism in the Messiah Christology. They insist that the characteristics of Jewish monotheism in Second Temple Judaism are “inclusive,” although some scholars assert that the conventional messianism of Judaism was denied by or changed in Pauline high Christology, and that the entrance of Gentile Christians in early Christianity resulted in outstanding christological developments.

The Messiah’s Faithfulness in the Messiah Christology

In his letters, especially in Romans, Paul focuses on the Messiah Christology, which is clearly presented in several verses: 1:3–4; 3:21–25; 4:25; 15:12. Several scholars maintain that these verses in Romans emphasize the Messiah’s faithfulness. This is the most controversial issue in New Testament scholarship.

Richard B. Hays

Richard B. Hays opposes the claim that there was a radical division between Jewish and Gentile factions within early Christian communities. There is commonality of faith among Christians groups. Some German scholars assume that Paul uses Jewish-Christian confessional traditions (e.g., Rom 3:24–26) and that he does rebut or correct them for his Gentile communities. However, Hays emphasizes that Paul quotes narrative kerygmatic traditions and argues from them to make the conclusions that he wishes to draw.

Hays suggests the Messiah’s faithfulness as the meaning of $\pi \iota \sigma \tau \iota \varsigma \chi \rho \iota \sigma \tau \omicron \upsilon$ in the narrative structure in Paul’s letter. Hays contends,

Paul’s theology must be understood as the explication and defense of a story. The narrative structure of the gospel story depicts Jesus as the divinely commissioned protagonist who gives himself up to death on a cross in order to liberate humanity from bondage (Gal 1:4; 2:20; 3:13–14; 4:4–7). His death, in obedience to the will of God is simultaneously a loving act of faithfulness to God and the decisive manifestation of God’s faithfulness to his covenant promise to Abraham.

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Faithfulness in the messianic interpretation is applied in Romans, too. The allusion of Habakkuk 2:4 in Romans 1:17 supports the Messiah's faithfulness. God's righteousness is revealed through the of the Righteous One, who is the Messiah Jesus as in Habakkuk 2:4. In Romans 3:22, Hays additionally attests that does not means "through believing in Jesus Christ." Rather, Paul's intention in this phrase is that "through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ," God's righteousness is manifested. The obedience of the Messiah in the cross is Paul's point with. As some scholars support the subjective genitive with the perfect tense of "manifested)," Hays proposes the meaning of Romans 3:22 is that the righteousness of God has been manifested "in the faith/obedience of the crucified one." This corresponds with Paul's fundamental concern in Romans 3. He continues,

In the early part of the chapter, God's faithfulness (, 3:3) and righteousness/justice, 3:5) are called into question, at least for rhetorical purposes. After a crushing indictment of humanity's injustice (vv. 9–20), Paul sets forth his positive affirmation of the faithfulness and righteousness of God; God, he asserts, has now revealed his righteousness in a new way, overcoming human unfaithfulness by his own power and proving himself faithful and just. We discover, furthermore, that this demonstration of God's righteousness , 3:25) has something to do with Jesus, that this righteousness is manifested (3:22). . . . Through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ, the one who "became a servant of circumcision for the sake of the truthfulness of God in order to confirm the promises given to the fathers. . . ." (Rom 15:8). Jesus' faithful endurance and obedience to death on the cross are a "righteous act" of "obedience"; Rom 5:18–19). The representative faithfulness of Christ overcomes the unfaithfulness of human beings.

Douglas Campbell

Douglas Campbell suggests that the kingship discourse in Romans is linked to Christ in Romans in a significant interplay. Because he espouses high Christology related to the messiahship of Christ, he says, "Christ's messiahship and lordship are here affirmed by his resurrection from the dead, which functions, furthermore, as a heavenly enthronement." He additionally asserts, "We seem to be in touch here, then with an explanation of the resurrection—as the heavenly enthronement and glorification of Jesus, and his consequent affirmation as Messiah and the Lord, who will rule the cosmos on behalf of his divine father." In Douglas Campbell's view, his messiah-ship is portrayed as divine kingship in the divine sonship. According to him, "He is the Son of God because, as for any divinely appointed king, God has now become his Father." So he is the Davidic king not only by descent, but by royal enthronement.

This kingship discourse governs Paul's arguments in Romans. He adds, "We can see in each of these other places a narrative of Jesus' heavenly enthronement informing Paul's argument—a narrative that describes Jesus as Son, Christ, 'firstborn,' and Lord, because of the enthronement by the resurrection." Campbell holds that God's deliverance is one that God "has just undertaken on behalf of his messianic agent, Christ—the act of resurrection, empowerment, and heavenly enthronement." Campbell thinks the ancient discourse of kingship "seems to be traditional theology that the Roman Christians share with both Paul and the Jerusalem church—an integrated, Jewish, and perhaps surprisingly 'high' christological narrative that smoothly links Jesus' messiahship, sonship, resurrection, and exalted heavenly lordship." The particularity of his point regarding Jesus' messiahship is that God's deliverance first occurs on behalf of Christ by using 'righteousness' language from the Old Testament.

Campbell stresses God's deliverance, which is a liberating and eschatological act of God that has taken place in Christ, "in particular Christ's heavenly enthronement by God after his faithful death." God "delivers" Christ and "vindicates" him. He describes, "They are merely meant to understand what he is talking about in more general terms, and they should be able to do so insofar as they inhabit this Jewish Christian discourse concerning Jesus' resurrection and kingship. Paul is merely using the words of Psalm :2–3 to say here what he wants to say (and presumably in a way that other Christians have already formulated and so can recognize)—that God the King has acted to save his messianic Son." Paul implements a christological reading of Habakkuk 2:4 in Romans 1:17 and 3:22 to reveal God's deliverance. In Romans, Paul presents God's delivering based on the faithful Messiah, and this comes to focus in Paul's christological reading of Habakkuk 2:4 in Romans 1:17.¹⁰⁰ The righteous one is Christ. Because of his "faithfulness to the point of death he will live in the sense of being vindicated and resurrected." Habakkuk 2:4 predicts the passion of the Messiah, to which Paul's gospel attests. He continues,

A messianic reading of Habakkuk 2:4 directly fulfills the expectations that Paul set in motion in Romans 1:2–4. There he broke into his address—amounting to a breach of ancient epistolary etiquette—to affirm that his gospel concerned God's Son who was descended from David and declared the Son of God by his resurrection in fulfillment of God's prophets in the Scriptures. Paul's explicit indications, then, would dispose the letter's auditors to read prophetic texts from the Scriptures in Romans as witnesses to the Son of God, Christ, and in particular to either his Davidic lineage or, probably more importantly, his resurrection.

Romans 3:21–22 presents God's deliverance through the faithful Christ for those who are faithful (leaving the precise nuance of this expression for discussion later), a set of claims that establishes the argument of 3:27–4:22. He argues,

So a single motif can denote the presence of the narrative—or of one of its broad trajectories—within the apostle's developing arguments: "obedience," "blood," "death," "cross/crucifixion," and so on. . . . So the claim that the phrase "the fidelity of Christ" could denote Jesus' entire passion more broadly is quite consistent with Paul's usual practice as that is attested elsewhere.

In addition, the faithfulness of the Messiah fits a martyrological trajectory. He says,

Indeed, the notion of fidelity fits smoothly into the downward martyrological trajectory in the story of Jesus' passion. It is largely self-evident that fidelity is an ingredient within any essentially martyrological story. Martyrs faithfully endure suffering and death (if not a horrible execution); the story of martyrdom thus encodes its heroes with the quality of fidelity, even if only implicitly in view of their endurance and steadfastness within those unfolding stories. But numerous martyrologies mention fidelity explicitly as well (see 2 Macc 7:40; 4 Macc 7:21–22; 15:24; 16:22; 17:2; see also 2 Macc 6:30; 4 Macc 17:10). So it seems entirely appropriate in terms of Paul's background to suggest that his account of Jesus' death—an essentially martyrological story—could include the element of faithfulness.

Paul explicates Christ's faithfulness in a particular connection to the story of the Messiah's death, which fits the martyrology in 2 and 4 Maccabees. The faithfulness of the Messiah functions to reveal or disclose God's righteousness to vindicate his Son (3:21–22).¹⁰⁶ God delivers those who are faithful through the faithful Messiah, which continues in the argument of Romans 3:27–4:22. Campbell delineates that *pistis* is basically identified as "fidelity," and the fidelity of Christians is closely related to Christ's own fidelity. A Christian's fidelity functions as a mark of belonging to Christ. So because *pistis* does mean fidelity, rather than faith, Christ is not the object of faith in

Romans. God's deliverance is accomplished through Christ's pistis, which is the Messiah's faithfulness.

N. T. Wright

N. T. Wright applies exclusive Jewish monotheism to Jesus in his treatment of the Messianism of Jesus in the Pauline letters.¹⁰⁸ Paul followed the Jewish monotheism of the Second Temple period with the worldview of a zealous Pharisee.¹⁰⁹ The main idea implied in Jewish monotheism is that Israel's God is the Creator over all the creation; God will eventually judge all the people who worship other gods; and, finally, God will rescue his people of Israel from continued exile. Wright reads Paul's Christology through the lens of Jewish monotheism because early Christians understood the divine identity of Jesus to be incontrovertible already before the New Testament (1 Cor 8:6). Jewish monotheism is revised to conceive of Jesus as God over all (Rom 9:5). Following Richard Bauckham and Larry Hurtado, Wright insists on applying the divine identity to the Messiah Jesus, who faithfully fulfilled promises in the Old Testament. Wright links the concept of Jesus' divine identity to the returning of YHWH to Zion through Jesus death and resurrection, which fulfills the Old Testament promises of YHWH's return to Zion.

The meaning of "God's gospel" is God's announcement of "the royal enthronement of the Messiah, Israel's anointed king." The anointing of the Messiahship is closely connected to the resurrection of the Messiah in Lord Christology in Wright's understanding. Romans 1:3–4 echoes Psalm 2:7 and 2 Samuel 7:12–14, which manifests the Davidic "Son of God." The Davidic Son is declared "through his resurrection from the dead, echoing the Septuagint, in particular 2 Samuel 7:12."¹¹³ Additionally, he posits,

The Gentiles will come to hope in the Davidic Messiah, the "root of Jesse" (for 'root of Jesse' as a title for the Messiah, see Rev 5:5; 22:16); he is the one who "rises to rule the nations." The echo of 1:4 should leave us in no doubt that Paul intends a reference to Jesus' resurrection. This is what constituted him as Messiah and Lord of the whole world.

In other words, the Davidic Messiah in Romans incorporates the notion of monotheism. He comments,

Paul speaks of the Davidic Messiah who "rises to rule the nations, and in [whom] the nations shall hope" (15:12). Again it is the resurrection that unveils the messianic identity, and with it the summons to worship, to "hope in him." This is deeply monotheistic language, of the second-temple creational, covenantal, cultic and especially eschatological variety.

Wright's "divine identity" originates from the Davidic Messianism in Romans.

In his book, *Paul and the Faithfulness of God*, Wright discusses God's righteousness and the Messiah Jesus in Romans 3:21 ff.: "In 'the gospel,' that is, the message about Jesus the Messiah and his death and resurrection as the fulfillment of God's scriptural promises, 'God's righteousness' is revealed." He indicates that God's righteousness, which is closely connected with the Messiah Christology, is the faithfulness of the Messiah to God's covenant with the people of God within the "big picture" of God's covenant in the history of Israel. In this "big picture," God has been faithful to his covenant with his people through the Messiah Jesus in these significant ways. One, God's righteousness is revealed through the faithfulness of the Messiah who has fulfilled the covenant and rescued his people from their "exile." Two, God has accomplished his covenantal faithfulness, which is his righteousness through the Messiah; those who are the true Israel are incorporated into Jesus the Messiah, the crucified and risen Lord, and Israel has been justified in this Messiah.

Wright's Messiah Christology manifests the incorporated Christology and the faithfulness of the Messiah linked with significant arguments of Paul in Romans. God is faithful to covenant promises in terms of Jesus' faithfulness. According to Wright,

Working from the beginning (3.21–23) and the end (3.26) of this short paragraph into the dense statement in 3.24–25, we discover that the faithful death of Jesus (which Paul sees in 5.6–10 as an act of divine agape and in 5.15–19 as the act of the Messiah's hypakoe, 'obedience') is more specifically an act of Exodus.

The Messiah is "faithful" to God's covenant plan, which is that "Abraham's seed would bless the world." The Messiah's faithfulness is presented by "obedience" in his death on the cross. Wright connects the faithful Messiah to the "righteous one" and the opening of Romans. He continues,

And of course, for Paul, what this means in concrete terms is his death on the cross. The Messiah himself, in some versions of this narrative, is referred to as *ho dikaios*, "the righteous one." Whether or not we press that point, we see here the main thrust of Romans 1.3–4, and we understand more fully why Paul has used that opening precisely for that letter.

Moreover, he relates the Messiah's death on the cross to martyrology. He states, "The answer seems to lie in Paul's retrieval of certain themes available at the time in which the sacrificial overtones already there in the fourth servant song were being reused in connection with martyrs whose deaths were thought to be in some sense redemptive." The redemption of the world, which is God's saving plan, was Israel's vocation. The saving was that "Israel's vocation would always involve Israel (or righteous martyrs within Israel) becoming a kind of sacrifice through which not only Israel itself but also the whole world would be rescued from its sinful, rebellious state." It is fulfilled through the sacrifice offered by Israel's representative Messiah, Jesus. The Messiah is faithful to God's gracious plan, which is expressed in God's promises to Abraham.

In Romans, several scholars stress the faithfulness of Christ based on God's righteousness, which is his covenantal faithfulness, rather than faith in Christ. In God's covenantal relationship with his people, God's righteousness is fulfilled in the faithful Messiah. The suffering and death of the faithful Christ, who is the Suffering Servant in Isaiah 53, fits a martyrological trajectory and is applied to Paul's Messiah Christology in Romans 1:18–4:25.

However, the Messiah Christology should be understood in the concept of the role of the Davidic Messiah, who is presented in the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings. The faithfulness of the Davidic Messiah does not suit his role in God's judgment. He is the agent of God's judgment, in which the covenantal faithfulness is unfamiliar. In Romans, Paul cannot emphasize the faithfulness of Christ for the faith of Christ because of discontinuity with the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings. Instead, faith in Christ, who is the Davidic Messiah and the executor of righteous judgment, is consonant with Paul's Messiah Christology in Romans 1:18–4:25. The faith of Christ does not have a meaning of the faithfulness of Christ, investigating Davidic Messiah, who is the agent of God's judgment.

Conclusion

The emphasis of the History of Religions School, which focused on high Christology, was the *kyrios* Christology of the Hellenistic group in early Christianity and the influence it had on Paul's Christology. New Testament scholarship has both continued and criticized the sharp division between messianic Christology and *kyrios* Christology. The Jewish and Hellenistic background in

early Christianity had no strict distinction between them because Hellenism greatly influenced Palestine during Paul's era. Some have argued against the Davidic Messiahship in Paul's Christology because Paul would have known that anti-Semitic Gentile readers of his letters would have reacted against this Jewish portrayal of the Messiah. However, the recipients of Romans, with a recognizable Jewish background, clearly were able to accept the Jewish background inherent in the Davidic Messiah in Paul's letter. Rather, messianic Christology was axiomatically reconstructed in Paul's Christology, and this messianic Christology was not differentiated from the kyrios Christology.

In addition, some scholars have emphasized the Messiah's faithfulness in their argument for the key themes in Romans, usually when they focus on the Messiah Christology. The Messiah's faithfulness accomplishes God's covenant promises, in which God's faithfulness—which is his righteousness—is clearly presented in Paul's discourse. The faithful Messiah's endurance, obedience, and death on the cross play a key role in the deliverance of God. The Messiah's endurance, obedience, and death of the Messiah seem to correspond to the martyrology in 2 and 4 Maccabees. This is the flow of Paul's thought in his argument in Romans, which is that God's covenantal faithfulness is revealed through the Messiah's faithfulness.

The Davidic Messiahship cannot be denied in Romans, even though some scholars support the kyrios Christology, instead of the Messiah Christology. The History of Religions School and some scholars have denied the Davidic Messiahship in Paul's Christology, especially in Romans. Yet, in the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings, the Davidic Messiah—an eschatological figure who executes God's judgment—clearly appears. Paul continuously employs the concept of the eschatological Davidic Messiah in the flow of his argument in Romans. The Davidic Messiah is main content of the gospel of God in Romans 1:3–4. Paul definitely maintains that, “according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men through the Messiah Jesus” (2:16). God's judgment is accomplished in the death of the Davidic Messiah (3:25) and, through the death and resurrection of the Davidic Messiah, the sinners are justified (4:25).

Lastly, in his argument concerning the Davidic Messiah's role, the agent of God's judgment, the focus of Paul is not the Messiah's faithfulness. Paul points to faith in the Messiah, rather than to the faithfulness of the Messiah. Contrary to the interpretation as “the Messiah's faith/faithfulness,” Paul's statements concerning the Davidic Messiah in Romans (1:3–4; 2:16; 3:21–25; 4:25; 15:12) clearly involve the Messiah's role as the executor of God's judgment and faith in the Messiah. In this role, the Messiah's faithfulness is unfamiliar. God's salvation is accomplished through faith in the Messiah, whose role is that of executor of God's judgment. The theme of the covenantal faithfulness of the Messiah does not fit in this discourse of Paul in Romans. <>

AMERICAN COSMIC: UFOs, RELIGION, TECHNOLOGY by D. W. Pasulka [Oxford University Press, 9780190692889]

More than half of American adults and more than seventy-five percent of young Americans believe in intelligent extraterrestrial life. This level of belief rivals that of belief in God. **AMERICAN COSMIC: UFOs, RELIGION, TECHNOLOGY** examines the mechanisms at work behind the thriving belief system in extraterrestrial life, a system that is changing and even supplanting traditional religions.

Over the course of a six-year ethnographic study, D.W. Pasulka interviewed successful and

influential scientists, professionals, and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs who believe in extraterrestrial intelligence, thereby disproving the common misconception that only fringe members of society believe in UFOs. She argues that widespread belief in aliens is due to a number of factors including their ubiquity in modern media like *The X-Files*, which can influence memory, and the believability lent to that media by the search for planets that might support life. *American Cosmic* explores the intriguing question of how people interpret unexplainable experiences, and argues that the media is replacing religion as a cultural authority that offers believers answers about non-human intelligent life.

Review

"Pasulka's book is nothing short of spectacular and intriguing—a mind-blowing read with fascinating insight. Her research and knowledge present a whole new truth, some of which is very scary, and we don't scare easily." -- Chad and Carey Hayes, writers of *The Conjuring* and *The Conjuring II*

"From a solid base of scholarship Dr. Pasulka introduces us to the players at the frontier of biological and physical research. Her sharp insight is drawn from her research into spiritual phenomena, updated by her travels from the purported UFO crash sites of New Mexico to the archives of the Vatican. The result is a timely introduction to the revelations in our collective future." -- Jacques F. Valle, author of *Wonders in the Sky*

"UFOs are a remarkable phenomenon that both believers and skeptics initially have a hard time connecting to religion. *American Cosmic* is a vivid and even moving account of the way this strange world works as a kind of sacred mystery for those within it." -- T.M. Luhrmann, author of *When God Talks Back*

"[Pasulka] approaches UFO believers with an open mind in her irresistible debut . . . lively character sketches bring the story to life . . . Pasulka gives wonderful, entertaining insight into the curious study of UFOs." -- *Publishers Weekly*

"Pasulka makes a reasonable case that the spirits, angels, divine messengers, manifestations of God, aliens or their spaceships that humans have been reporting since the dawn of history are too numerous to be entirely delusional, so they deserve serious investigation." -- *Kirkus Reviews*

"A thought-provoking book about religion today." — *Booklist*

"*American Cosmic* is a superb investigation into the birth and rise of a new religion." -- *Foreword Reviews*

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A Tour of Silicon Valley with Jacques Vallee

"These are the hills of Silicon Valley. There are many secrets in this valley."

Jacques Vallee maneuvers his car expertly through the daunting San Francisco Bay Area traffic, darting this way and that. Large trucks and small cars barrel toward us on the winding roads, and crashes are narrowly evaded. Every twenty minutes I lift my shoulders, which are stuck to the back of the car seat, and try to shake out the tension.

Jacques, father of the modern study of UFOs and an early visionary of the Internet, is giving me and my colleague, Robbie Graham, a personal tour of his favorite geolocation, Silicon Valley. We drive by places that loom large in the history of "the Valley." He recalls the early days of the technology revolution: "They were on fire and purely democratic. Pure scientists, fueled by discovery." Jacques's credentials are intimidating. As an astronomer, he helped NASA create the first detailed map of Mars. As a computer scientist with a PhD from Northwestern University, he was one of the early engineers of ARPANET, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, a precursor of the internet. He is also a successful venture capitalist, funding startups of innovative technologies that have changed the daily lives of millions of people. He is a prolific author. He is probably most famous for being a consultant to Steven Spielberg on the movie *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* (1977). The scientist character in the movie, played by French actor Francois Truffaut, is based on Jacques. Jacques has perhaps done more for the field of ufology than anyone else in its short history, and yet he calls the study of UFOs his hobby.

This is the orthodox history of Jacques's life and work. His unorthodox history is equally interesting. He worked with scientists affiliated with the Stanford Research Institute, now SRI International, an independent, nonprofit research institute in Menlo Park. The group's activities are largely unknown to the public, but declassified documents from the 1970s and 1980s indicate that it was a research site for the extraordinary. Jacques did his early work on the internet under a program that, as Jeffrey Kripal writes, was probably called "Augmentation of the Human Intellect."

This research was happening at the same time and in the same place as studies of remote viewing, precognition, and extrasensory perception. These esoteric skills were studied under a classified program called The Stargate Project, funded by the US military in partnership with the SRI. The hope was that the skills and talents of people who were naturally psychic could be developed and harnessed for the purposes of gathering intelligence. In the course of this research, the psychic viewers reportedly uncovered unintended and surprising targets, like UFOs. The participants in the program also reported that they could travel through space, to the moon, and to other planets, like Mars. In other words, the program allegedly developed, intentionally or not, psychic cosmonauts.

Perhaps unknown to Jacques and the researchers of the SRI, psychic travel had long been reported. Psychic cosmonauts like the eighteenth-century philosopher/theologian Emanuel Swedenborg crop up throughout the history of religions. Swedenborg claimed that, with the assistance of an angel, he

had visited Mercury, Mars, Venus, and the moon. He claimed to have spoken to beings on those planets and he published his experiences in a book, *Life on Other Planets* (1758). The activities of the cosmonauts of the SRI may have resembled the interstellar adventures of Swedenborg, but their goals could not have been more different. They hoped to operationalize the knowledge they acquired about terrestrial targets; remote viewing was one of many methods of attempted data collection. These efforts to create human portals to other planets were taking place under the same auspices and at the same time as technologies of connectivity like the internet.

As we spun down the highway, I recognized the neighborhoods of my childhood, but I saw them now through Jacques's eyes. The streets, the smell of the eucalyptus trees, parks, schools, cafes—all looked new to me, shining with the allure of mystery. As much as I wanted to, I never got up the nerve to ask Jacques exactly what he meant by the secrets of Silicon Valley. But on that drive I caught a glimpse into the exciting ideology and philosophy behind the revolution—its zeitgeist.

If Jacques were an essay, he would be "The Question Concerning Technology" by the philosopher Martin Heidegger. This essay, dubbed impenetrable by many readers, nevertheless offers several intriguing observations about the relationship between humans and technology. As Heidegger saw it, humans do not understand the essence of technology. Instead, they are blinded by it and view it simply as an instrument. The interpretation of technology as pure instrumentality was wrong, he said. The Greek temple, for the Greeks, housed the gods, and as such it was a sacred "frame." Similarly, the medieval cathedral embodied and housed the presence of God for medieval Europeans. Heidegger suggested that the human relationship with technology is religious like, that it is possible for us to have a noninstrumental relationship with technology and engage fully with what it really is: a saving power. Jacques Vallee is fully aware of the revolution that is technology. Although he most likely never read Heidegger's essay, Jacques's depiction of Silicon Valley as the home of the new resonates with Heidegger's vision of technology as bringing to birth a new era of human experience, a new epoch.

The symbol for this new epoch is the UFO. Carl Jung called the UFO a technological angel. This is a book about UFOs and technology, but also about a group of people who believe anomalous technology functions as creative inspiration. I found these people. In the 1970s, when Jacques consulted on *Close Encounters*, he encouraged Spielberg to portray the more complex version of the story, that is, that the phenomenon is complex and might not be extraterrestrial at all. But Spielberg went with the simple story, the one everybody would understand. He said, "This is Hollywood." This book does not tell the simple story, but I believe it is a story anyone can understand.

When you gaze long into the abyss, the abyss gazes also into you. -FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

As I finish writing this introduction, the television series *60 Minutes* has just aired an interview with billionaire Robert Bigelow, of Bigelow Aerospace. Bigelow founded his company, which specializes in manufactured space equipment, mostly with his own funding in 1998. Due to the reliability and safety of Bigelow Aerospace's equipment, NASA and other space companies use Bigelow's space habitats and other equipment in their explorations and experiments in space. In the interview, Bigelow boldly claimed that aliens, or nonhuman intelligences, are interacting with humans, and have been for a long time.

"Is it risky for you to say in public that you believe in UFOs and aliens?" asked interviewer Lara Logan. "You don't worry that some people will say, 'Did you hear that guy? He sounds like he's crazy'?"

"I don't give a damn. I don't care Bigelow replied. "It's not going to make a difference. It's not going to change the reality of what I know."

I was not surprised by Bigelow's statements. They are typical of the many scientist-believers I have met since I began my research in 2012. Since that time, I have come to know millionaires and billionaires and successful innovative scientists who believe in and study the phenomenon. This was the first of several surprising revelations about the UFO phenomenon. People like Stephen Hawking are wrong when they state, as Hawking did in his 2008 TED Talk, "I am discounting reports of UFOs. Why would they appear to only cranks and weirdos?" The lie has been that belief in UFOs is associated with those on the "fringe"—"cranks and weirdos," in Hawking's words. The truth is just the opposite.

This book is about contemporary religion, using as a case study the phenomenon known as the UFO. It is also about technology. These may seem like completely unrelated topics, but they are intimately connected. They are connected because social and economic infrastructures shape the ways in which people practice religions. A historical and uncontroversial example is the impact of the printing press on the Christian tradition. The mass production of Bibles in the common languages of the people soon gave rise to the doctrine of Sola Scriptura, or Scripture Alone, according to which scripture is the only reliable and necessary guide for Christian faith and practice—a foundational principle of the Protestant Reformation. As technologies shift infrastructures, religious practices and habits are changed.

Beyond documenting how technological infrastructure shapes religious practices and beliefs, the UFO is considered by believers to be advanced technology. Like the Spiritualists of the nineteenth century, believers see technology as a portal or a frequency shift that allows humans to connect to other minds, human or extraterrestrial, as well as to places outside of the current understanding of space-time.¹ Therefore, not only is the technological infrastructure the basis for widespread belief in UFOs, through media technologies and other mechanisms, but also technology itself is a sacred medium, as well as the sacred object, of this new religiosity. Conversely, within certain theological circles, technology, especially the internet, has been characterized as "the Beast," the anti-Christ. Technology in these contexts is not secular but infused with theological meaning.

A Unique Experience for an Academic

This book is about how technology informs a widespread and growing religiosity focused on UFOs, but it is also a story. It is partly the story of my own participation in a group of scientists and academics who study the phenomenon anonymously (except for me, of course). The participants are anonymous because of the stigma that is often associated with UFOs and belief in them, but also because there were classified government programs in which the phenomenon was studied, necessitating secrecy among the participants. To offset any conspiratorial interpretations of this book, I will clarify that I am not "read in" to any government program to study the phenomenon, I was never privy to any classified information of which I am aware, nor am I part of an official or nonofficial disclosure of UFOs to the American public.

I began my study of UFO cultures in January 2012. I proceeded in the conventional way in that I conducted an ethnography of a variety of believers and delved into research into UFOs and ufology, a branch of research devoted to the topic. I was lucky to inherit an extensive library of resources about UFOs and reports of contactees/experiencers from Dr. Brenda Denzler, whose own book, *The Lure of the Edge*, informed my study. The library included her own research, as well as the research of ufologists and organizations like MUFON (the Mutual UFO Network) and CUFOS (Center for UFO Studies) and the works of other academics and researchers studying the phenomenon. I read the works of Allen Hynek, Jacques Vallee, John Keel, Budd Hopkins, and John Mack, as well as those of people who theorize the phenomenon academically, such as Jeffrey Kripal, Whitley Strieber, Debora Battaglia, Greg Eghigian, Carole Cusack, Susan Lepsetter, and David Halperin.

Not long after I began, I quickly surmised that there is a parallel research tradition within the field of the study of the phenomenon, and that there always has been. There are public ufologists who are known for their work, there are a few academics who write about the topic, and then there is an "Invisible College," as Allen Hynek called it and of which Jacques Vallee wrote—a group of scientists, academics, and others who will never make their work public, or at least not for a long time, although the results of their investigations impact society in many ways. Halfway through my research I made the decision to write about this group, for a couple of reasons. First, they receive no recognition or press, yet rumors about them spawn folklore and traditions that constitute the UFO narrative. Second, frankly, this was the group whose work and members I became best acquainted with, and whose stories I found most fascinating. I had to muster courage to write about this group because its members are anonymous, and what I observed of their work places me in the odd position of almost confirming a myth. This is not the preferred position of the academic author of books about religion. It is usually the place occupied by authors of theology. In the end, however, I chose the path of writing a book that conveys what I consider the most interesting, and challenging, aspects about the topic.

The parallel tradition of ufology is not known to the uninitiated, but it is well known within the culture of ufologists. Some scientists, such as astronomer Massimo Teodorani and physicist Eric Davis, have confirmed its existence. Teodorani writes:

I have been quite heavily involved in the so called "ufo" stuff for at least 25 years, in research that is parallel to more canonic studies of physics and astronomy. I know that some anomalies do exist and I stress the importance of studying this problem scientifically, especially when measurement instruments are used. For many years I have been studying the problem behind totally closed doors.'

Davis has also noted this aspect of the study of UFOs. "UFOs are real phenomena," he writes. "They are artificial objects under intelligent control. They're definitely craft of a supremely advanced technology." He goes on to say that most of what academics and scientists know about the phenomenon is secret, and will probably remain so. "There are scientists who are aware of evidence and observational data that is not refutable. It is absolutely corroborated, using forensic techniques and methodology. But they won't come out and publicize that because they fear it. Not the subject—they fear the backlash from their professional colleagues." He notes that one tradition of study requires secrecy, as it is related to the military: "It's the domain of military science. The fact that [unknown] craft are flying around Earth is not a subject for science—it is a subject for intelligence gathering collection and analysis."

There are a number of players in this story. For the most part, they fall into one of two categories: there are those who engage with and interact with what they believe are nonhuman intelligences, perhaps extraterrestrial or even interdimensional. The people in this category who are featured in this book are the scientists to whom Davis refers. They agreed to be included on condition that they remain anonymous. The second category consists of those who interpret, spin, produce, and market the story of UFO events to the general public. Members of the first category are silent about their research, while members of the second category are very vocal about information, they have received second-, third-, or even fourth-hand. Often, they even make up stories or derive their information from hoaxes.

The second of the surprising revelations is that even as some respected scientists believe in the phenomenon associated with UFOs and make discoveries about it, what is ultimately marketed to the public about the phenomenon barely resembles these scientists' findings. Belief in the phenomenon is at an all-time high—even among successful, high-profile people like Bigelow. Among those who report sightings are former US president Jimmy Carter and legions of other credible witnesses, including the trained observers of the US Air Force, pilots, commercial pilots, police officers, US Army personnel, and millions of civilians who were certainly not out looking for UFOs. Different polls record varying levels of belief in UFOs, but all indicate that it is pervasive. A 2008 Scripps poll showed that more than 50 percent of Americans believe in extraterrestrial life. Seventy-four percent of people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four are believers.' In 2012, in connection with marketing their UFO-themed programming, National Geographic conducted an informal poll of Americans about their belief in UFOs. They randomly sampled 1,114 individuals over the age of eighteen and found that 36 percent believed UFOs exist and, more significantly, 77 percent believed that there are signs suggesting that aliens have been to Earth in the past. Although not a formal poll, the results concur with professional polls such as the Harris Poll conducted in 2009, which found that 32 percent of Americans believe in UFOs.

I began my own research into aerial phenomena after I finished a book on the Catholic doctrine of purgatory. The project was a multiyear study in which I examined many primary sources of European Catholic history, found mostly in obscure archives, of anecdotes about souls from purgatory. These sources dated from 1300 to 1880. In them I found a lot of other unexpected things, such as reports of orbs of light, flames that penetrated walls, luminous beings, forms of conscious light, spinning suns, and disclike aerial objects. I wasn't sure how to theorize these reports, and I left them out of my book. Yet I wondered about them. I wondered aloud one morning while drinking coffee with a friend.

"These reports remind me of a Steven Spielberg film. You know, lots of shining aerial phenomena, luminous beings, transformed lives," he said.

I summarily dismissed his comparison. The next day, he found an ad for a local conference about UFOs and extraterrestrials taking place the following weekend. He suggested that I attend.

The conference featured speakers who were experiencers, people who have sighted UFOs or believe they have seen extraterrestrials. They described some of the same things I had observed in my research in Catholic history—shining aerial discs, flames, and orbs—and especially how these experiences transformed their lives. The experiencers interpreted these as spiritual or religious events. They either fractured their traditional religious belief systems or, more commonly, caused them to reinterpret their traditions through a biblical-UFO framework in which they viewed biblical

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and historical religious events as UFO events. Ezekiel's wheel is the prime example of how scripture is used in this context. Many religious practitioners view the strange spinning aerial contraption witnessed by the biblical prophet Ezekiel as a UFO. The television show *Ancient Aliens* offers a similar interpretive slant. This way of looking at anomalous ancient aerial phenomena is not restricted to experiencers but is common, especially among youth such as my students.

Could the orbs of the past, once interpreted as souls from purgatory, still be around? Are they currently being interpreted as UFOs? This question was not so mindbending. I could still fit this data into my academic training, interpreting orbs as social constructions based on an externally generated unknown event, or some type of perennial mystical experience interpreted through each era's reigning cultural framework.

The challenge began when I met the meta-experiencers, the scientists who studied the experiencers and the phenomenon. It confounded the academic categories I had been using thus far in my work. The new research compelled me to think in novel ways to understand this group and their research. Additionally, the charisma and conviction of the scientist-believers were difficult to discount—at least for me. As a scholar of religion I am trained not to weigh in, one way or the other, on the truth or falseness of believers' claims. When looking at the documentation of the proliferation of a belief, there is no need to consider whether the belief is justified or not if one is just analyzing its social effects and influence. My association with the scientists brought about something that Harvard UFO researcher John Mack called an "epistemological shock," that is, a shock to my fundamental understanding of the world and the universe.

The shock to my epistemological frameworks, or to what I believed to be true, occurred on two levels. The first is obvious. Several of the most well-regarded scientists in the world believe in nonhuman intelligence that originated in space. The second level of epistemological shock was galling. Rumors of the findings of these scientists inspired hoaxes, disinformation, media, and documentaries based on bogus information that purported to inform the public about UFO events and created UFO narratives and mythologies. I watched several of these unfold in real time. It was hard to remain aloof when confronted by what I knew to be misinformation, some created as disinformation, some created for the sole reason that it sells. I was so embedded in the research, on the one level of observing the scientists and on another level of being involved with the producers of media content, that it was impossible to be neutral. It was at this point that I felt myself fall headlong into Nietzsche's abyss, stare into it, and see it grin mockingly back at me.

Method

In one sense, I feel as if I have been studying this phenomenon my whole life, but I didn't call it UFO research; I called it religious studies. Scholars of religion are well suited to study this topic because religious studies is not a religion, but a set of methods for studying religious phenomena. With a few exceptions, scholars of religion do not assess the truth claims of religious practitioners. The metaphysical truth and the objective truth of the phenomena are bracketed so that one can focus on the social effects, which are incontestably very real. This strategy is helpful in the study of the phenomenon of UFOs and was advocated by Jacques Vallee in a 1979 address to the special political committee of the United Nations organization. He told the committee that "the belief in space visitors is independent of the physical reality of the UFO phenomenon." Significantly, Vallee himself believes in the reality of the UFO phenomenon but understands that the formation of mass belief in it does not depend on its objective reality.

A New Religious Form

It is an understatement to say that in 2012, as soon as my research focus shifted, so did my life. When I began to focus on modern reports of UFO sightings and events, I was immediately immersed in a world where the religious impulse was alive and the formation of a new, unique form of religion was in process. I was observing it as it happened. Carl Jung put it well. Referring to the modern phenomenon of flying saucers, he wrote, "We have here a golden opportunity of seeing how a legend is formed."

The cast of characters who showed up, unannounced and unexpected, surprised me. They included television producers, experiencers and their entourages of agents affiliated with the government, and even actors whose names are known in every household. After my initial shock, I began to understand these individuals from the perspective of the history of religions. In a sense, they were the same cast of characters who appear at the birth of every major religious tradition, although today they have different names and job descriptions. In the first century CE they would be called scribes and redactors, but today they are agents of information, like screenwriters, television producers, and authors. I observed the dynamic genesis of a global belief system. I began to record the mechanisms by which people believe and practice, and how they believe and practice. The producers, actors, government agents, and even myself were all part of the process of the formation of belief, and perhaps even pawns in this process.

How is it Religious? The Contact Event

One of the scientists with whom I worked, whose methodology is primarily "nuts and bolts" in that he uses scientific analysis on what he believes to be artifacts or physical parts of potential "crafts," asked me why UFO events are often linked to religion. This is a fair question. One answer lies in the fact that the history of religion is, among other things, a record of perceived contact with supernatural beings, many of which descend from the skies as beings of light, or on light, or amid light. This is one of the reasons scholars of religion are comfortable examining modern reports of UFO events. Jeffrey Kripal, working with author Whitely Strieber, articulates this well. In his work he has sought to reveal "how the modern experience of the alien coming down from the sky can be compared to the ancient experience of the god descending from the heavens."

These "contact events," the perceived interface between the human and the intelligent nonhuman being from the sky, spawn beliefs and interpretations. These beliefs and interpretations develop into communities of belief, or faith communities. Kripal notes, "Some of the remembered effects of these fantastic states of mind have been taken up by extremely elaborate social, political, and artistic processes and have been fashioned by communities into mythical, ritual, and institutional complexes that have fundamentally changed human history. We call these "religions."

Similar to religions, institutions appropriate, cultivate, and sometimes intervene in the interpretations of a UFO event. These institutions vary and range from religious institutions to governments to clubs or groups, and, today, to social media groups.

The Formation of Belief Communities

In the history of religions, a contact event is followed by a series of interpretations, and these are usually followed by the creation of institutions. Such interpretive communities are often called religions or religious denominations. Institutions have a stake in how the original contact event is

interpreted. A familiar example is the communities of interpretation that surround the religion of Christianity, of which there are thousands.

A recent example of how a contact event spawns a community of belief, and how institutions monitor belief, is the American-based religion of the Nation of Islam. One of the Nation's early leaders was Elijah Robert Poole, who adopted the name Elijah Muhammad. Poole believed that UFOs would come to Earth and bring salvation to his community of believers and punish others who were not believers. The US government was interested in Poole and his followers, and the FBI established a file on him and his community. Within the history of many traditional religions, institutions, including governments, have been involved in monitoring and often forming and shaping the interpretations of the contact event. This fact is becoming less controversial and suggestive of conspiracy to UFO believers, and the focus is shifting now to how institutions monitor, and sometimes actively shape, the interpretations of contact events. Perceived contacts with nonhuman intelligences are powerful events with unpredictable social effects.

The Creation of Belief and Practices: A Tenuous Relationship to the Contact Event

In analyzing the contact event and the subsequent interpretations of it, one needs to keep a few things in mind. First, a contact event is not automatically a religious event, and the spotting of an unidentified aerial object is not automatically a UFO event. These experiences become religious events, or UFO events, through an interpretive process. The interpretative process goes through stages of shaping and sometimes active intervention before it is solidified as a religious event, a UFO event, or both. The various types of belief in UFOs can be traced as cultural processes that develop both spontaneously and intentionally within layers of popular culture and through purposive institutional involvement.

Technology and New Forms of Religious Belief

Scholars of religion were not the first to suggest that the flying saucer was the symbol of a new, global belief system. Carl Jung announced it in his little book, published in the 1950s, *Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies*. Writing in the late 1960s, Jacques Vallee argued, in *Passport to Magonia*, that similar patterns could be observed in folklore, religious traditions, and modern UFO events. Scholars of the history of the flying saucer usually date its emergence to the beginning of the Cold War and pilot Kenneth Arnold's sighting of nine, flat, saucerlike discs over Mount Rainier in 1947. Vallee argues, however, that the phenomenon has been around for thousands of years, perhaps more. He is right. Yet the ubiquitous cultural framework for understanding them as the modern UFO did indeed begin around 1947.

Since the 1960s, scholars of religion have made significant progress in identifying the mechanisms of religious belief, including how social infrastructures inspire new religious movements. Interpretation of UFOs as connected to religion or religious traditions constitutes a significant cultural development. New religious movements such as the Nation of Islam, Scientology, and Jediism incorporate the UFO narrative into older religious traditions and scriptures." Popular television programs like *Ancient Aliens* provide viewers with interpretive strategies that encourage them to view religious visions of the past through the lens

of the modern UFO narrative, turning medieval angels into aliens, for example. What was once a belief localized within small pockets or groups of believers under the umbrella term "UFO religions"

is now a widespread worldview that is supercharged by the digital infrastructure that spreads messages and beliefs "virally" The infrastructure of technology has spawned new forms of religion and religiosity, and belief in UFOs has emerged as one such new form of religious belief.

Real or Imaginary?

The media's representation of the phenomenon often adds some violence to the original event that motivated the belief. Some may understandably ask, "Is it real, or is it imaginary?" It is important to remember that the events themselves pale in comparison to the reality of the social effects. This is a shame. The closer one gets to those engaged in the study of the phenomenon, the more one begins to fathom the complex nature of these events that come to be interpreted as religious, mystical, sacred, or pertaining to UFOs, and the deep commitments of the people who experience them. Each of the scientists with whom I engaged was passionately obsessed with his research, but none of them would ever offer conclusions as to what the phenomenon was or where it came from. The suggestion that the phenomenon is the basis for a new form of religion elicited sneers and disgust. To them, the phenomenon was too sacred to become religious dogma.

It was also, in their opinion, too sacred to be entrusted to the media. Because of my dual research focus, on occasion I became a reluctant bridge between the scientists and media professionals. On one occasion a videographer, working for a well-known production company, contacted one of the scientists and asked him for a two-sentence quote. At first the scientist was confused, wondering how the videographer had acquired his contact information. He then correctly traced it back to me. In a phone call to me he registered his disgust.

"There is a lot of arrogance in the assumption that I am supposed to condense twenty years of research into the most profound topic in human history into a two-sentence sound bite to be broadcast out to the public so they can consume it with their TV dinner. No thanks," he said.

Interchanges like this, which I witnessed often, reveal the chasm between those engaged in studying the phenomenon and the media representations of it. Ironically, however, it is precisely media representations that create and sustain UFO belief. Is it real, or is it imaginary? What follows suggests that it is both. <>

ARISTOTLE AND HIS COMMENTATORS: STUDIES IN MEMORY OF PARASKEVI KOTZIA edited by Pantelis Golitsis and Katerina Ierodiakonou [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Et Byzantina, De Gruyter, 9783110601831]

Paraskevi (Voula) Kotzia died on 13 July 2013 at the age of 62. By some kind of meaningful coincidence, she died at the same age as Aristotle, to whom she devoted a great deal of her scholarly life. Voula Kotzia studied Classics at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (BA 1975) and continued her postgraduate studies in Classics, Philosophy and Palaeography at the Freie Universität Berlin (1980–1982) under the tutelage of Paul Moraux. With her PhD dissertation (Ο σκοπός των "Κατηγοριῶν" του Αριστοτέλη. Συμβολή στην ιστορία των αριστοτελικών σπουδών ως τον 6ο αιώνα, Thessaloniki 1992), she introduced the study of the Aristotelian commentators and the

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Neoplatonic exegetical tradition to the academic life of Greece. Voula was a marvellous teacher, with a broad knowledge of antiquity and an exemplary knowledge of Ancient Greek. In her classes, she combined the rigour of classical philology with a strong interest in the history of Aristotle's philosophy and writings, which shaped a younger generation of modern Greek scholars. Her research interests did not only include philosophy but also ancient theories of language, ancient grammar and medicine. The cancer did not let her finish a work she was long working on about the status of women in Greek philosophy (for a first publication of hers in this field of study see below, "List of publications" no 25). The Departments of Classics and Philosophy of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, at which Voula Kotzia taught from 1976 until her death (and where she was the scientific coordinator of the Centre for Aristotelian Studies), celebrated her memory by organizing on 25–27 September 2014 an international conference (organized by Evanthia Tsitsibakou-Vassalos, Maria Mike, Stephanos Matthaïos, Georgios Zografidis, Katerina Ierodiakonou and Pantelis Golitsis). According to Voula's own research interests, the papers held at the conference of Thessaloniki had a thematic variety that could not meet the minimum of unity that is necessary for a scientific publication. In the present volume, we have gathered the papers dedicated to philosophy, in particular those that dealt with Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. To the papers presented at the conference (Agiotis and Ierodiakonou, Balla, Chriti, Golitsis, Kalligas, Lisi, Nikitas, Papachristou, Wildberg), three further studies have been added by Sten Ebbesen, Stavros Kouloumentas and Christof Rapp.¹ They are all papers of philosophical and historical interest, dealing with issues from Aristotle's political philosophy to twentieth-century Aristotelian scholarship through various interpretive problems in the Aristotelian tradition in Late Antiquity and Byzantium.

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The explanatory value of developmental hypotheses as exemplified by the interpretation of Aristotle

Introduction

That a philosopher who has been active as an author for several decades should continue to develop his viewpoint or sometimes even change his stance on key philosophical issues is hardly surprising. To the contrary, it would be remarkable if this were not the case. One is rather inclined to view it as evidence of an author's philosophical potential when he advocates more than one approach or applies it to more than one field in his lifetime. Of course, the extent of these changes may vary greatly. At times one speaks only of a continuous development, while at other times of a fundamental change of course, as in the transition from the "pre-critical" to the "critical" works of Immanuel Kant or in the turn that Ludwig Wittgenstein seems to have taken between writing his *Tractatus* and working on the *Philosophical Investigations*. Consequently, philosophy deals quite often with the phenomenon of development, and the question remains what value should be accorded to this phenomenon and what approach should be taken with regard to it.

Developmental hypotheses and the notion of development in philosophy

In general one might wonder to what extent the notion of development can legitimately be taken into consideration in philosophy. For, when assessing a philosophical argument, it is hardly relevant at what stage in the life of a philosopher the argument was developed. For example, as a philosopher one would like to know whether Kant's categorical imperative actually constitutes the basis of all morality, whereas the question of how old Kant was and in what circumstances he found himself when he began to view the categorical imperative as an important moral principle is of secondary importance. A distinction drawn by Gottlob Frege regarding the relevance of the origin and development of philosophical propositions is well worth citing here: if we follow Frege in consistently distinguishing between laws of being-true and laws of taking-to-be-true, then the latter, which concern how someone came to take something to be true, can hardly play a decisive role in the former, in assessing the truth or validity of a conception. For, it is just as possible in principle to arrive at a correct notion via random or irrational factors as it is to come to false or even absurd conclusions by taking a systematic approach. However, if our primary concern is to determine whether or not other philosophers' conceptions are tenable, then philosophy can only take a secondary interest in the question how and under what circumstances a given philosopher came to hold a thesis as true. On this view, it would be easy to quickly dismiss questions regarding philosophical development. But the matter is not quite so simple - in part, for the following reasons:

- (1) Not all philosophical theses reveal themselves readily and - so to speak - "of their own accord." The main theses of the Hegelian philosophy, for example, can hardly be understood without at least basic knowledge of the philosophical debates that took place prior to Hegel, including those involving Kant and Fichte. And it is precisely here that the history of philosophy comes into play. In order to clarify the sense or significance of a philosophical thesis alone, the historian of philosophy often has to examine how an idea came about, which in turn frequently requires exploring larger coherences that are relevant to the emergence of an idea; this may include the political sphere, along with general, social or personal circumstances, but it applies in particular to school memberships, discussion contexts and critical references to the thinker's own philosophical premises. It is therefore only natural that this effort should include an inquiry into an author's development, insofar as this is important for the understanding of a philosophical thesis. For, it may be the case that earlier assumptions and earlier theories are just as much a part of the background of a thesis as the views of contemporaries, teachers or critics.
- (2) The object of philosophy is to penetrate through to those assumptions that we presuppose when we make a particular assertion or make use of a particular term. What do we assume, for example, when we speak of "things" or when we allege that there exist "things that remain identical"? In order to answer these types of questions, a philosopher often has to begin by clarifying his own assumptions, so as to be able to subject them to critical scrutiny. Consequently, progress in philosophy often takes the form of disengagement from premises that a given philosopher may himself have shared up to a certain point in time - regardless of whether he learned to accept these assumptions as part of a specific tradition or by virtue of belonging to a certain school, or whether he explicitly defended them himself. When a development from one philosophical position to another occurs by means of a well-founded critique of the premises underlying the former position, then the reasons for this development partially coincide with the reasons that can be cited in favor of the new position. For example, the arguments that Wittgenstein ultimately began to invoke against the "ideal language" premises of the *Tractatus* are an important part of the justification for his later "ordinary language" position. When development is understood in this sense, in other words, as the result of a critical examination of one's own theoretical assumptions, then the philosophical relevance of the notion of development should remain beyond dispute. However, it is also possible to imagine developments that are motivated in a different manner; we cannot rule out the possibility that, for example, an unsuccessful journey to Sicily, frustration over being held in low esteem by one's colleagues, or a novel sexual experience could influence the tenor of one's philosophical thought. But because such factors can hardly serve to justify a philosophical thesis, they should be distinguished from the previously mentioned type of reasons for development.¹ In keeping with the terminology introduced above, the latter are solely psychological factors relevant to taking-to-be-true and have nothing to do with the being-true or the justification of a philosophical thesis.
- (3) An old maxim, commonly referred to as the 'hermeneutic circle', states that individual parts can only be understood if the whole is grasped, while the whole can only be understood in reference to many individual parts. Assuming it were our task to comment on an unedited collection of notes by Wittgenstein, we would no doubt often be reminded of the first part of this maxim. For, if we didn't know whether an individual note belongs in the context of Wittgenstein's early, middle or late period, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine its meaning. Let us further assume we knew nothing of Wittgenstein's

philosophical development, had none of his edited works at our disposal, and were constantly confronted with notes that seemed to contradict each other. How then could we draw conclusions about the whole from the individual parts? We would be prevented again and again from arriving at a consistent whole by individual statements that do not fit within the whole or require an entirely different whole. We would probably be forced to sort the notes into different stacks and postulate distinct theoretical backgrounds for different stacks. However, if the juxtaposition of different theoretical backgrounds were to prove confusing due to the appearance of inconsistency, we could ask ourselves whether this troublesome juxtaposition of incompatible theories might not be resolved into a more favorable succession (step 1). But in this case we would not yet be dealing with a developmental hypothesis, because we only speak of a "development" when something has developed out of something else. In order to demonstrate this, we would also have to supplement the claim of temporal succession by postulating a development motive (step 2) capable of showing not only that the theories in question are different, but that one of them could actually have developed out of the other (step 3).

Consequently, the notion of development is not philosophically significant as such, but it does appear that there are at least three respects in which possible developments should not be dismissed when examining past authors. The thought experiment outlined above has further shown that developmental hypotheses may be introduced as an explanation for the phenomenon of inconsistency; this entails not only assigning the mutually incompatible theory fragments to different theoretical frameworks, but also establishing relationships between these frameworks through the assumption of a development motive.

That's the theory. In point of fact, however, the history of the developmental paradigm - at least in the case of Aristotle interpretation - has taken a somewhat different course.

Werner Jaeger's developmental interpretation of Aristotle

In 1923 Werner Jaeger (1888 —1961) published a study entitled *Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*,² in which he sought to supersede the hitherto predominant scholastic conception of the Aristotelian philosophy as "a static system of conceptions". According to Jaeger, the scholastic interpretation neglects the forces that drive Aristotle's approach to research; it does not take into account "his characteristic interplay of keen and abstract apodictic with a vivid and organic sense of form". In the jargon of his time, which was heavily influenced by the so-called philosophy of life, Jaeger contrasts the "purely conceptual" scholasticism with a "living understanding of Aristotle", which views Aristotle's philosophy as "the product of his special genius working on the problems set him by his age." He carried out this program by representing Aristotle's philosophy as a developmenttcontinuous debate with his teacher. Jaeger tied the stages in question to familiar biographical events (Aristotle's stay at Plato's Academy, his years of travel, his second stay in Athens, i. e. his years as a master) and postulated that Aristotle underwent a development from being a Platonist to being a metaphysician critical of Plato, only to end up an empiricist. Jaeger then applied philological methods in attempting to assign various works to these three phases and in seeking to identify various strata of development in several works. In the first, Platonic phase Aristotle is alleged to have composed the (mostly lost) exoteric writings, such as the *Protrepticus*, which were intended for a wider audience; in so doing, he is supposed to have largely appropriated the philosophical standpoint of Plato's Academy. The middle phase, which corresponds to his years of travel, is characterized by a disengagement from Plato. This is expressed, among

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other things, in his criticism of Plato's theory of forms. By distinguishing what he called "several strata of composition", Jaeger ascertains the emergence of an original *Metaphysics* (Metaph. A, a, E I, K, A, M 9 — N), an original *Politics* (Pol. II, III, VII, VIII) and an original *Ethics* (EE) together with the foundation for a speculative physics and cosmology (Phys. I-II, Cael.). In his last phase, his "master period", he not only expanded the *Metaphysics* by writing the presumably empirically oriented Books Z, H, 0 and A 8, but also composed works such as *Parva Naturalia* and *De Anima*.

Jaeger's development-oriented approach played a major role in the interpretation of Aristotle in the twentieth century.' Several authors have attempted to apply these ideas concerning Aristotle's biographical development to subsections of his works.

Jaeger's student Friedrich Solmsen (1904-1989) reconstructed the development of Aristotelian logic based on the *Analytics*, the *Topics* and the *Rhetoric*.' Franciscus Nuyens (1908 — 1982) distinguished three phases of Aristotelian psychology, in the course of which Aristotle is supposed to have distanced himself step by step from the theses of his teacher. Other authors, for example Hans von Arnim (1859 — 1931), adopted Jaeger's approach on the one hand, while on the other hand becoming embroiled in controversies with him over the ordering of individual writings and purported levels. Then there were authors who explicitly sought to refute Jaeger's history of development, for example Franz Dirlmeier (1904-1977), who attempted to show on the basis of the ethical writings that in a certain sense Aristotle remained a Platonist at all times." Finally, there were interpreters who rejected or consciously dismissed Jaeger's biographical scenario, while nonetheless speaking of a development in which Plato remained the most important reference point.

The extraordinary success of Jaeger's developmental Aristotle interpretation can no doubt be attributed to more than one cause. For example, Jaeger himself points out that the idea of development had already been applied successfully to the interpretation of Plato. Furthermore, Jaeger understood how to give development a philosophical dimension, and his insistence on taking Aristotle's personality into consideration — thus imbuing the interpretation with life — was very much in the style of his era. It may also be that many researchers in this period viewed the paradigm of systematic interpretation, which Jaeger termed "scholastic", as obsolete. At the same time, it should also be emphasized that Jaeger's approach didn't simply fall from the sky but was already being prepared in a certain sense by the historicist style of philology in 19th-century Germany; it can be shown that different compositional and editorial measures were already being implemented in relation to certain aspects of Aristotle's works." Therefore, a better understanding of Jaeger's success can perhaps be achieved by viewing his works as the provisional climax of an already existing tendency.

Criticism of Jaeger's developmental approach

In Plato scholarship, the treatment of questions of chronology and development has led to a relatively uncontroversial, rough classification of the works into early, middle and late dialogues. With Aristotle, however, the kind of developmental research pursued by Jaeger has not managed to produce a verified chronology of works; hardly any of Jaeger's attempts to assign particular parts of works to certain developmental stages have avoided (justified) opposition. The end result of this has been to considerably weaken faith in the effectiveness of the developmental approach. This outcome, which is rather disappointing when compared to the state of Plato scholarship, is no doubt partially a product of the editorial status of the Aristotelian corpus. After all, Aristotle left several manuscripts in an editorially unfinished condition; in a few cases, it is clear that the texts were not compiled into

works until after his death," while other cases involve an editorial process consisting of several steps and subsequent additions. This often makes it difficult to determine whether, for example, one is dealing with an earlier text with later additions, or an altogether later text." Furthermore, given the difficulty of the initial situation, the assumption of several strata of composition led to a strange increase in the number of strata. Whereas, for example, the pioneers of this procedure were able to manage with only two strata, later interpreters discovered four or more strata, which obviously could no longer be brought in line with the three phases assumed by Jaeger.

In general, the three-phase model seems to be the decisive weak point in Jaeger's theory. On the one hand, it has the advantage of being the only way to link Aristotle's presumed philosophical development (Platonist - metaphysician critical of Plato empiricist) to his external living conditions (Academy period - years of travel - second stay in Athens), while on the other hand it contains several problematic assumptions. In principle, the practice of deriving philosophical development from biographical factors is questionable." Even without dramatic events occurring in his external life, a philosopher can arrive at the conclusion that the assumptions he made in the past are in need of correction or differentiation. For, even assuming that a philosophical development took place, this need not be interpreted as a psychological reaction to specific living conditions; sometimes such a development can simply and plainly be attributed to the fact that certain theoretical accomplishments take time. Thus, in the case of Aristotle one can hardly expect that the main features of syllogistic logic simply occurred to him overnight.

Even if one were to concede that biographical factors played such a prominent role, why should the relationship with Plato be the only factor worth mentioning? Might not other material circumstances - his flight from Athens, his relationship with Alexander, his natural-scientific observations on Lesbos, etc. - be just as important? One begins to suspect that the preferential treatment of the biographically conditioned teacher-pupil relationship is already accompanied by a preliminary decision in favor of a specific model of philosophical development, namely that of a progressive distancing from the viewpoint of the teacher.

And even if one wanted to view the teacher-pupil relationship as the decisive developmental motif, why should one then assume that it has necessarily taken the form of a progressive distancing? Isn't there also the phenomenon of the rebellious pupil, who throughout his youth revolts against everything that comes from his teacher,' and only later recognizes that the differences were not nearly as large as he had supposed? Finally, even if one were to admit that Aristotle was a Platonist in his youth," why should his further development necessarily proceed along the romantic course of "years of travel/master years?" Why shouldn't it follow any number of other models, for example, that of the young genius and his subsequent decline?

All of these objections have to be considered as well, if one fundamentally shares Jaeger's conviction that Aristotle's development is important to an understanding of his works. However, many critics do not share even this premise; either they deny that anything like a significant development occurred, or they object that questions of development have no bearing on questions of interpretation, or that an excessive interest in development pushes the really interesting philosophical questions into the background. This is why every kind of developmental hypothesis has met with increasingly strong objections, especially among schools that are primarily interested in an objective analysis of Aristotle.' The fact that for Aristotle in general, as well as for individual works, the developmental approach had yielded few uncontroversial results was pointed to with increasing

frequency as evidence of the impracticality of the method as a whole. The result was that the heyday of the developmental interpretation was followed by diverse projects that emphatically defended the unity of individual works, general areas of his thought, or even the Aristotelian oeuvre as a whole.

Developmental approaches in the post-Jaeger era

Was the application of the developmental method in Aristotle scholarship therefore only a temporary, fashionable phenomenon? In point of fact it would be questionable — in light of the critique outlined above — for someone today to attempt to reintroduce a history of development in the style of Jaeger. However, it would be rash to bid farewell to the use of developmental hypotheses along with Jaeger's project. We have seen that there are sometimes good philosophical reasons for considering an author's development and formulating developmental hypotheses. The question is therefore not whether developmental hypotheses should be ruled out in general; the question is rather what we can learn from criticism of Jaeger's developmental method and what form a more suitable treatment of such hypotheses would have to take.

Developmental hypotheses without biographism

In Jaeger's theory proved to be his three-phase model. His commitment to this model was clearly connected with the desire that the philosophically relevant stages of development should find parallels in biographical events; and since the first stage was characterized by spatial proximity to Plato, while subsequent stages involved an increasing temporal distance, the thesis of a progressive philosophical distancing is therefore assumed.

Fixating on the biography in this way leads us to forget what is really at issue when we attempt to investigate a philosopher's development: we are searching for the arguments that led a philosopher to change his position on an issue and that could be used as a justification for the modified position. While biographical findings can suggest such arguments or make the assumption of a development generally plausible," they cannot replace what we are actually searching for: the philosophical grounds for development. In addition, one has to decide whether such biographical factors are known and generally recognized as relevant to a subject's philosophical development,' or whether they first have to be postulated in attempting to explain a philosophical problem. Only in the first case do they have any sort of explanatory value. In the second case we are dealing rather with tales that could potentially help us imagine that the development in question took place; hence, they should be classified primarily as a rhetorical device. Moreover, since very few substantial details are verified in Aristotle's case apart from the familiar three phases, and since the three-phase model is far too crude to help explain nuances," the biographical interpreter more often finds himself in the situation corresponding to the second case: he must interpret biographical events as relevant that are known to us only accidentally or deduce unknown events; because this process primarily taxes the imagination of the interpreter, it has a marked tendency to spiral out of control" and cannot under any circumstances serve as a serious basis for a developmental hypothesis.

Developmental hypotheses that wish to avoid losing themselves in the abyss of biographism, by contrast, understand themselves as proposed solutions for specific problems of consistency,' and these types of problems initially require a much more regulated treatment than references to biographical turning points can provide. In Aristotle's case, they typically arise in connection with the following phenomena:

- (1) Aristotle wrote on various subjects more than once, and his findings differed to some extent. For example, there are two works on ethics, the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics,' and two treatises on pleasure that make no reference to one another."
- (2) In some cases, the same terms are used quite differently or defined differently in various works,' and at times they even seem to necessitate a completely different background theory."
- (2) Terms that appear frequently in some works are entirely absent in others, as if they had only been discovered later.²⁸
- (3) Some of Aristotle's works contain additions that thematically fit the context in one way or another, yet their background theory seems to differ from that of the main text.

These phenomena require some kind of explanation, if the philosophical theses in question are to be adequately understood. When other approaches fail, developmental hypotheses come into consideration as possible explanations. However, these hypotheses can remain entirely neutral with respect to biographical conjectures; it seems unlikely that biographical factors could help explain the terminological variations mentioned above.

Internal and external developmental factors

Thus far we have distinguished between biographical and philosophical development factors; the latter can now be further subdivided into external and internal factors. One can speak of purely internal development factors when a problem that has existed for a philosopher up to a certain point in time can be overcome at a later time by a newly developed method or approach. By contrast, external factors come into play when a development is initiated from without by encounters with colleagues and rivals, by becoming acquainted with a new theory, or due to other intellectual influences. If we are interested in making transparent use of developmental hypotheses, then in light of this differentiation the following points seem to be of importance:

- (1) The four problems posed in Section 4.1 above can often be explained only in terms of internal development factors. An explanation based on internal factors
 1. has the undeniable advantage of not being dependent on any non-philosophical assumptions.
- (2) External factors, such as the influence of a specific doctrine or thesis, are typically connected with biographical events, but should not be confused with the biographical event itself or with its psychological effect. We can assume such an external factor without possessing knowledge of the corresponding biographical details; a connection exists only insofar as the biographical facts can prove that a specific influence is possible or probable.
- (3) External factors seem to have a particularly close connection to personal circumstances, as has already been shown in the previous point. However, individual facts from the life of a philosopher do not yet justify assuming a particular external development factor if the facts are not demonstrably reflected in the works in question. For example, the fact that Aristotle's father was a physician has been used and exploited in various ways; but proving that Aristotle was influenced by the medicine of his day is a much more difficult project that cannot be managed through biographical evidence alone.

Sectoral rather than global developmental hypotheses

In advancing a global thesis on Aristotle's philosophical development, Werner Jaeger wanted to supply a schema that could be applied to different groups of work and disciplines. This is why his development schema had to operate with very general concepts, such as "metaphysician" and

"empiricist." These categories are most likely justified for the disciplines of metaphysics, physics, political philosophy and ethics; however, if one takes into account that the aspect of development also comes into play for other subdisciplines represented in Aristotle's works, then it is clear from the outset that these categories at any rate are no longer helpful. Assuming that a development took place in the field of logic, it would hardly be helpful, for example, to pit a metaphysical phase against an empirical one. By the same token, the schema of nearness-to-Plato vs. distance-from-Plato can hardly contribute to research areas for which there is not any Platonic precedent. It therefore appears that in principle there are difficulties for which the comprehensive character of Jaeger's development schema was to blame. To put it another way: if one wishes to follow Jaeger in relying on a global developmental hypothesis, then one has to take into account at the very least that the explanatory value of this hypothesis is not equally high for all subareas.

The fact that global assessments of this kind meet with resistance today is also primarily a result of the general development that Aristotle scholarship has undergone; in many areas, the degree of specialization has increased sharply, and focused analysis of individual arguments is generally treated more seriously than speculations about the works as a whole. Nonetheless, if one wishes to apply the developmental hypotheses primarily in connection with the types of inconsistencies outlined above, it is only reasonable to point out that different sub-areas such as logic, ethics, and natural philosophy face different problems, and that in order to solve these problems, different types of development processes have to be taken into consideration. Consequently, if any progress is to be expected regarding questions of development in Aristotle's philosophy, then it is surely to be made only for those developmental hypotheses that are based on thematic sectors of Aristotle's work. And in point of fact, the discussion that followed the publication of Jaeger's book on Aristotle quickly applied itself to just such a sectoral developmental account. Even the most important early attempt to formulate a comprehensive history of development takes the form of multiple sectoral approaches.

From the outset, the sectoral approach is clearly demarcated from the approach based on global development history. Areas such as ethics/politics, metaphysics, logic/dialectic, philosophy of science, physics, astronomy, biology, and psychology, at the very least, receive differentiated treatment. This does not rule out the possibility of parallel developments being attested on the conceptual level in different sectors. For example, the term *energeia* appears in very different sectors, and may be among the terms that are assigned entirely different definitions in the course of Aristotle's creative activity; however, corresponding observations concerning the use of concepts of a transsectoral character should still clearly be distinguished from claims in favor of a global developmental hypothesis.

Because in Aristotle's case fundamental philosophical disciplines such as metaphysics or ethics are composed of completely different subprojects in which relatively independent developments can occur, it may be sensible to apply the sectoral developmental approach not only to fundamental disciplines, but also to these subprojects; thus, when discussing metaphysics one has good reason to ask, for example, whether Aristotle's concept of an unmoved mover changed, or, when discussing ethics, whether the conception of pleasure underwent development. Even if one disregards the general distrust associated with broad theories, this fine-grained developmental approach still seems to have the advantage of dealing with consistency problems "on the spot", as it were, without drawing speculative conclusions regarding larger units of meaning. However, this tendency towards finer-grained developmental hypotheses has its limits too. In the first place, developmental postulates

for particular problems also have to be assessed in terms of their respective theoretical framework; conformity with the theoretical development of the thematic framework is possibly the most important verification criterion for a specific development hypothesis. However, if the developmental hypotheses are so highly specialized that factual correlation to the respective thematic area is no longer possible, then this ultimately boils down to immunization of the hypothesis. Secondly, the use of developmental hypotheses for smaller units of meaning carries the risk that the number of supposed "developments" might increase drastically; and the higher the number of developmental hypotheses, the lower their individual explanatory value.

Chronological uncertainty

A chronology of works can be based on purely philological indications or on the content of philosophical discussions. But the methodologically sounder chronology is no doubt one capable of remaining neutral in philosophical controversies over interpretation. This kind of philological dating makes use of dateable sources (if available) from other authors that refer to the work to be dated, references to historical events or personalities in the work in question, cross-references to other works, and analysis of stylistic changes (stylometry). Because Aristotle's writings were not fully edited in some cases and were clearly reworked again and again, these philological methods are not truly effective. References to historical events in the political writings, and even there they are not reliable. The *Rhetoric* contains numerous examples from the period of Aristotle's second stay in Athens, yet researchers agree that the book could not have been written in this period. Nor are cross-references to other works a reliable guideline; oftentimes they are even misleading. Cross-references like this may have been added later by editors or by Aristotle himself; and a reference to, for example, the *Politics* need not necessarily mean the work that has come down to us, and certainly not the entire work known to us. Finally, stylometry too has not yielded any uncontroversial results.

Let us assume that we know of two treatments of the same subject, one an early work and the other a later work. This already places considerable limits on the options for interpretation. For, if the treatises exhibit differences that are to be explained by a development, then it is no doubt already clear which one must be the point of departure and which the endpoint of the development; the interpreter would then still have to name developmental factors that could explain the transition from the former position to the latter. However, if the background knowledge assumed above concerning the relative chronology of the two treatises were lacking, we would find ourselves in a completely different initial situation. We would not know, for example, whether the time that elapsed between the writing of the first and second treatise played a role in the differences we observed, much less whether the first treatise was actually written before the second. In this situation, we could only arrive at a conclusion regarding which came first by examining the texts in question; in other words, the postulated development would have to be such that one of the cor

Alternatives to developmental hypotheses

Developmental hypotheses can help deal with inconsistencies that arise; but not every inconsistency has to be explained in terms of a development. When Aristotle comes to different conclusions on the same question or uses the same term in different ways in two different treatises, his reasons for doing so may often have nothing to do with a development. Upon closer examination it may turn out that he stated the problem in a slightly different manner in different places, that he chose a different methodological approach to answering the question, that the different answers are aimed at different target groups or are adapted for different opponents; individual concepts may sometimes

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be used in a terminological sense other times in an unterminological sense and still other times in a terminological sense with an alternative definition. Finally, Aristotle refers time and again to a didactic order in which the knowledge contained in his works should be presented; obvious inconsistencies can therefore be attributed at times to this didactic arrangement. For example, one treatise may present the solution to a problem, while the other may only formulate the problem or work out premises for solving it. A critical review of various prominent developmental hypotheses in the light of these alternative types of explanations is able to show that (a) it is possible to avoid resorting to a developmental hypothesis in many cases, and (b) even when two treatises were written at different periods, the aspect of development has no additional explanatory value. This can be illustrated by three concluding examples:

(1) A familiar, if controversial, example of how supposedly incompatible positions can be "reconciled" through evidence relating to different issues is provided related viewpoints could be shown to have necessarily preceded the other. In the absence of a clear chronology of works, the developmental hypothesis would therefore have to help bear the burden of proof for the relative chronology.

The problem described above is characteristic of the situation that Aristotle scholars face when debating about development. Because hopes of arriving at a chronology of works by purely philological means have largely been disappointed, the dating process has to be supported by textual comparisons; this results in developmental hypotheses that are twice as hazardous and can easily become circular. The risk of circularity is especially high when a purported development assumes a specific chronology and this chronology was originally established by means of the selfsame development thesis. Consequently, the initial situation that one faces when employing developmental hypotheses is admittedly difficult; much has already been achieved, however, if this problem is recognized and questionable ad-hoc datings are abandoned.

He explains that one of the treatises describes the objects of pleasure, while the other delineates the pleasure-sensation process.

(2) In *Politics* III, Aristotle distinguishes three good and three bad types of constitutions and adds that no other constitutions are possible. In *Book IV* of the *Politics*, however, he speaks of other constitutions that were not mentioned in *Book III*. One common explanation of this difference is to claim that *Book IV* was written later. The decisive factor, however, is that *Book IV* pursues a different project: it seeks to define the elements of the polis based on different duties so that various subspecies of constitutions can be delineated in terms of the characteristics of different functionally defined groups. In *Book III*, by contrast, the only relevant point is whether the government is in the hands of one person, a few people, or the masses. *Book IV* may well have been written later, but the actual explanation does not hinge upon this fact.

(4) Aristotle's concept of substance (*ousia*) is a classic dispute. In the *Categories* Aristotle says that the "first *ousia*" is the individual things, while the "second *ousia*" is the *eidos*, the type or species. In *book Z* of the *Metaphysics*, by contrast, he says that the *eidos* is the "first *ousia*", and no mention is made of a "second *ousia*". The contradiction seems obvious; this has even led some interpreters to conclude that the *Categories* is a spurious work. A much more common view, however, is that the *Categories* is an early work, while *Metaphysics Z* represents a later Aristotelian treatise. That the latter treatise, which seems far more difficult and complex, represents Aristotle's "mature position" is one of the most commonly cited stereotypes concerning Aristotle's philosophical development. But even here the claim that they were written at different periods does not explain the differences. The following observations are more helpful: firstly, the *eidos* that is referred to in *Metaphysics Z* as "first

ousia" signifies not the type or species but the form; secondly, in recent years various interpreters have emphasized that concrete, individual things are indeed defined as "ousia" in the *Metaphysics* as well, and that Book Z in no way attempts to call this into question, but rather asks what the ousia of ordinary substances (taken in the sense of the *Categories*' first ousia) is.' It is therefore entirely unnecessary to assume a development; and even if one does assume a development, the contradiction is nonetheless resolved not by the development, but by differences in the question being posed. <>

HUSSERL AND THE IDEA OF EUROPE by Timo Miettinen [Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Northwestern University Press, 9780810141490]

HUSSERL AND THE IDEA OF EUROPE argues that Edmund Husserl's late reflections on Europe should not be read either as departures from his early transcendental phenomenology or as simple exercises of cultural criticism but rather as systematic phenomenological reflections on generativity and historicity. Timo Miettinen shows that Husserl's deliberations on Europe contain his most compelling and radical interpretation of the intersubjective, communal, and historical dimensions of phenomenology.

Husserl and his generation worked in the aftermath of World War I, as Europe struggled to redefine itself, and he penned his late writings as the clouds of World War II gathered. Decades later, the fall of the Soviet Union again altered the continent's identity and its political and economic divisions. Miettinen writes as a European involved in the question of Europe, and many of the recent authors and critics he addresses in this work—such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben—likewise deeply engaged with this new problem of European identity. The book illuminates the multifaceted problem of the idea of European rationality, and it defends novel conceptions of universalism and teleology as necessary components of radical philosophical reflection.

Review

"Miettinen's book is a masterful exposition and defense of Husserl's idea of Europe. He follows Husserl's reflections on the classical sources of Europe's identity and considers its past, its present, and its future. In the end, Miettinen's book is a deeply erudite reflection not only on Husserl but on the idea of Europe itself. At a moment when Europe's identity and self-understanding are in crisis, as they were in Husserl's time, this book is timely indeed." —David Carr, author of *Phenomenology and the Problem of History*

"In **HUSSERL AND THE IDEA OF EUROPE**, Timo Miettinen develops an insightful, erudite, and nuanced account of the complexities and challenges of Husserl's evolving understanding of history, politics, and social existence through the prism of his idea of Europe. Miettinen's study will prove indispensable for revising an established image of Husserl as an 'apolitical' and 'ahistorical' thinker while also delineating a political and social phenomenology along Husserlian lines in critical dialogue with other European thinkers." —Nicolas De Warren, author of *A Momentary Breathlessness in the Sadness of Time and Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology*.

"What obviously makes Miettinen's study stand apart, is its unique position at the crossroads of traditional Husserl scholarship, history of ideas, and contemporary political philosophy. It not only shows how Husserl's ideas about historicity, situatedness, and teleology emerged out of the interplay of his phenomenological endeavor and the cultural context saturated with crisis-consciousness; it also seeks to bring these ideas to fruition in the contemporary political and philosophical setting." —Tommi Hjelt, *Phenomenological Reviews*

"Meticulous and ultimately fascinating, Miettinen's hermeneutic approach introduces a new way to look into Husserl's views on European universalism." —L. A. Wilkinson, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, *CHOICE*

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There is a peculiar restlessness that marks the historical development of Europe's borders. Historically speaking, Europe has defined itself with regard to numerous frontiers, beginning with Anaximander's (ca. 610-546 B.C.) and Hecataeus's (ca. 550-ca. 476 B.C.) respective identification of the rivers Nile and Phasis as separating Europe from the continents of Libya and Asia. As a territorial entity Europe has never been unequivocal; its history is that of an ambiguous, even chameleonic figure. In classical mythology, we are familiar with the story of the Phoenician princess Europa, who was abducted by Zeus and taken to Crete—transgression and unfamiliarity are the basic characteristics of this figure. Although we are accustomed to consider mainland Attica of the classical period as the heart of Europe, Aristotle, for one, situated the Greeks between the peoples of Asia and Europe, the first being slavish by nature while the latter were "full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill ... lacking in political organization and capacity to rule their neighbors."

All in all, it is an inherent characteristic of European history that it is constantly undergoing the transgression and reorganization of its national, ethnic, and cultural limits. In terms of political agendas, the rapid expansion of the European Union since the mid-1990s has raised new questions

about the extent of Europe—for instance, are countries such as Turkey or Ukraine really a part of Europe—and this has given a new geopolitical relevance to the territorial definition of Europe.' On different cultural, historical, and even economic grounds, many critics have given up on the idea of Europe as a fixed territorial area and have instead tried to define it in terms of "fuzzy borders" or "concentric circles," describing the fluctuating and overlapping character of its boundaries.

In contemporary debates, we are of course familiar with this specific transitivity of limits under the title of "globalization." From the Great Commission of early Christianity to the different forms of European imperialism, it seems that the history of European nations has not been one of "sacred limits" (as Marx put it in the *Grundrisse*) but of "barriers" to be overcome. In this regard, the history of Europe is inseparable from the motif of universalism, announcing itself in the intellectual, social, and geopolitical developments of the past 2,500 years. The history of universalism, however, is not one of dialogue but of force. Universal principles and values have not been negotiated, but exported; moreover, they have been accompanied by culturally specific practices and doctrines, unique political institutions, and particular economic imperatives. Not all borders have vanished, however, and new kinds of borders have been and are in the making. Instead of the threefold division between capitalism, state socialism, and the nonaligned countries of the Third World, we are now dividing cultural and geopolitical space according to the "old but new" polarities of the West vs. the Islamic world, Europe vs. the rising economies, and so on. Despite the successful project of European political integration since the 1950s, we have also witnessed growing disparities within Europe itself—which announce themselves in new divisions between the "fiscally responsible" North and the austerity-ridden South, the liberal-democratic West and the growingly autocratic East.

Consequently, the idea of universalism has fallen between two competing strains of interpretation. On the one hand, universalism is acknowledged ever more firmly as the basic principle of the liberal order—both on the national level as well as on the global scale. Modern nation-states derive their legitimacy from egalitarian principles and practices, such as the universal right to vote. In the field of international law, universal human rights are seen as the best way to enhance the voices of the less heard. A revealing example of the indisputability of universalism is the United Nations' Vienna Declaration of 1993, which firmly states that "the universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question." On the other hand, during the last few decades universalism has also been disparaged to the point that, at least in academic discourse, it has found little unconditional support. Following the works of theoreticians such as Edward Said and Immanuel Wallerstein, universalism—as a typically European or Western phenomenon—has been associated with colonialism, imperialism, and even totalitarianism; furthermore, it has become common to treat this universalism as a product of the Eurocentric and "instrumental" rationality of the Enlightenment period. Thus, it is often stressed that, for instance, the discourse on a new European identity should take its point of departure from concepts and categories that are explicitly non-universalistic, or, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has put it, simply provincial? For our contemporary theoretical framework, cultural particularism seems to be the only serious alternative to universalism.

In the preface to his work *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936), Edmund Husserl posed the question of the nature of this universalizing development with the expression "spectacle of Europeanization" (*Schauspiel der Europäisierung*). Leaving aside its precise historical character, Husserl asked whether this process could be understood according to an "absolute sense," as distinct from what he called its "historical nonsense." What this distinction seemed to imply was that for Husserl, despite the unjust history of European-Occidental

universalism—which was founded on the "naive and (if carefully thought through) even absurd rationalism [of the eighteenth century]"—the dissolution of cultural limits hid within itself a more fundamental sense, one that perhaps resisted the inextricably unilateral and violent realization of this idea. The reader, however, finds no further evidence for this claim in the *Crisis*: in the published Biemel edition (1954) of the work, Husserl never really explicitly returned to the question of the absolute or proper sense of Europeanization. Instead, the vagueness of Husserl's remarks has enhanced his reputation as an uncritically Eurocentric philosopher.

This book deals with the idea of Europe in Husserl's phenomenology. It is the key argument of this work that Husserl's late reflections on Europe should not be read either as departures from his early transcendental phenomenology or as simple exercises of cultural criticism, but as systematic phenomenological reflections on the particular topics of generativity and historicity. Through his reflections on Europe, I will argue, Husserl presented the most compelling and radical interpretation of the intersubjective, communal, and historical dimensions of phenomenology, announcing itself in a novel understanding of philosophy as an essentially normative undertaking.

The theoretical aim of this book is twofold. First, I aim at articulating a novel understanding of the idea of universalism on the basis of Husserl's late transcendental phenomenology. It is my conviction that Husserl's late reflections provide us with an idea of philosophy that based its claim of theoretical universality not on a Cartesian-Kantian idea of self-reflecting subjectivity, but on a plurality of historical traditions and cultural worlds. This entailed that philosophy, in its pretension to universality, was to be conceived in terms of a geo-social-historical movement that always articulates itself from within a particular tradition, but which also stands in a critical relation towards that tradition. Instead of a final and absolute standpoint, the universal could only be thought of in terms of an infinite task, that is, as constant reflexivity and perpetual renewal that has its infinitely open horizon over the course of generations. Secondly, by discussing the idea of teleological-historical reflection from the perspective of Husserl's work, I aim at articulating a novel understanding of the ideas of historical teleology and progress. These ideas—usually interpreted as the watershed between the project of modern philosophy and its critical renditions in the postmodern tradition—were mainly discussed by Husserl in his unpublished works; however, I believe that his somewhat heterogeneous and scattershot remarks provide a new understanding of these ideas as phenomenological concepts. For Husserl's phenomenology, I argue, teleology and progress are to be understood as categories of historical reflection that are guided by the idea of phenomenological epoché (i.e., "rendering inoperative"), and thus they are to be conceived (1) as critical towards all particular accounts of historical development and (2) as something which emerges in the present moment. Instead of a Kantian-Hegelian concept of historical teleology as a narrative of progress, or its renditions in the Nietzschean-Spenglerian formulations of inevitable decline, the historical thinking of phenomenology ought to be understood in terms of the "bracketing" of all particular accounts or narratives of historical development.⁹ Instead of a pre-given theodicy, the phenomenological idea of teleology is best understood as a post-theological or post-metaphysical-but not post-modern—concept, which takes its point of departure from the peculiar "questioning-back" of inherited validities and meanings. By doing so, this idea of teleology provides us with a notion of progress not as a category of being, but of practical reason: progress is not something we must simply believe in, but it can and must be willed on the basis of the present moment.

On the basis of these reflections, my aim is to show that Husserl's idea of Europe was not to be understood either as the herald of progress or as the end of history, but as the latent possibility of a

universal idea of communality and communal critique, announcing itself in the different forms of cultural, territorial, and historical universality. For Husserl, this idea of Europe was as much a promise as it was an existing history, unfolding only in the partial and perhaps even fundamentally skewed forms of this universality. As a normative ideal of culture and generative development, however, this idea was to remain fundamentally inexhaustible, calling for its constant rearticulation within the horizon of the infinite task of philosophical undertaking.

On a more general level, this book aims at reinstituting the philosophical sense of the concept of Europe, not in order to repeat the modern conviction of its unwavering universality, but for the purpose of responding to the general crisis of universalism that we are witnessing through the crisis of the international liberal order: the failure of transnational agreements, growing ethnic and religious conflicts, and the new rise of nationalism. This is not to say, however, that we ought to conceive of Europe as the sole framework for the realization of universal reason, nor should we consider it as the indispensable title for future forms of universalism. We should, I believe, treat the history of European universalism primarily as a lesson to be learned—a lesson which points both to the idea of a radical responsiveness towards the alien as well as the unjust and unilateral process of expansionism.

The Structure of This Book

This book is divided into four parts. In the first part of the work, I focus on the historical and intellectual background of Husserl's thinking about Europe. I explore the idea of crisis as a key experience of the post—World War I period and a central theme of Husserl's late phenomenology. In chapter 1, I argue that the post—World War I debate on crisis was not simply about the devastating destruction caused by the war, but was linked to a series of philosophical ideas that were constitutive of European modernity. In particular, the crisis questioned the universalistic character of European culture and challenged some of the key presuppositions concerning modern ideas of communality and the teleological view of history. This debate, I argue in chapter 2, constituted the key background for Husserl's reflections on Europe and his rethinking of the scope of phenomenology. Husserl did not invent the theme of crisis, but he did aim at articulating some of its most fundamental presuppositions anew. The crisis was to be interpreted against the background of modern science, and its key source was to be found in the dispersion of scientific rationality, including the loss of a normative task for science.

The second part of this book focuses on some of the key methodological ideas of Husserl's late works. By describing Husserl's methodological transition from static to genetic phenomenology in chapter 3, I will show how Husserl was able to open up the domains of temporality and historicity as transcendental-phenomenological categories. This led to a new theory of the transcendental person as a historically situated and temporally developing being. The concept of finitude, in particular, enabled Husserl to develop a phenomenological theory of generativity, that is, an analysis of those forms of meaning-constitution that make possible our participation in different traditions. In chapter 4, I focus on another fundamental transition in Husserl's understanding of the transcendental: the domain of sociality. Especially from the 1910s onward, Husserl began to develop a new theory of "social ontology" that concerned the very foundations of the objective world and its specific normative (e.g., cultural, historical) demarcations. I argue that Husserl's ambiguous concept of the lifeworld ought to be understood on the basis of this normative demarcation: the lifeworld is the fundamental transcendental correlate of experience, but it is constantly specified and singularized

through cultural accomplishments. Husserl analyzed this normative demarcation and the experience of familiarity further with his concepts of the homeworld and the alienworld.

The third part of this book constitutes the core argument of the work. In this part, I provide an interpretation of Husserl's account of Greek philosophy from the viewpoints of generativity and historicity. It is my argument that Husserl's idea of Europe was ultimately about the principle of cultural development that emerged through the birth of philosophy. Following Husserl, we will identify this idea with the concept of universalism. In chapter 5, I begin by discussing Husserl's idea of "spiritual Europe" and its specific spiritual geography. Contrary to Derrida's influential analysis, I argue that Husserl's emphasis on spirituality did not entail a break from the material world but, on the contrary, was used to describe the specific intertwining of ideal meanings and the world. This provided the central point of departure for Husserl's understanding of philosophy as a sociocultural practice that defines itself with regard to the shared lifeworld. Here, Plato's work turned out to be of central importance. In chapter 6, I focus on the specific character of philosophical reason and its relation to territoriality. Philosophy, besides evolving within a novel attitude of the individual—the theoretical—was itself founded on a unique generative transformation, which had its foundation in the specific relativization of the Greek city-states. Instead of accepting the relativities of different mythical worldviews (as in the case of skepticism), philosophy aimed at discovering their common foundation in the idea of a shared world. Philosophy, for Husserl, appeared as a twofold overcoming of limits: it aimed at overcoming the seemingly natural territoriality of particular homeworlds, but it was also willing to transcend the teleological limits of the pre-philosophical attitude. This is what Husserl implied with his notion of the "infinite task": philosophy articulates itself in relation to cultural accomplishments that are only partially attainable in concrete action. In chapter 7, I will discuss this transition from the viewpoint of the best-known instantiation of this universal attitude: political universalism. On the basis of Husserl's reflections, I will show how the theoretical motif of *epoche* was transferred into the sphere of political community, and what implications this transfer had from the perspective of political institutions. While the motif of cosmopolitanism is often regarded as a later theme of Hellenistic or Christian political philosophy, it is also possible to see it as a latent theme in the Classical period. However, by showing how this idealism was constrained by the specific modes of governance that were characteristic of Greek political thought, I argue that Husserl's idea of perpetual renewal cannot be ultimately acknowledged within this framework.

In the fourth part of this book, I will turn my attention to the philosophical implications of Husserl's reflections on Europe. I argue that these reflections had two main purposes. First, they aimed at rearticulating the modern concept of teleology as a critical device of philosophical reflection. Secondly, they constituted the central point of departure for the rethinking of universalism as a fundamentally open and pluralistic category of philosophical reflection. In chapter 8, I begin by discussing the implications of Europe-thinking for Husserl's phenomenology. I argue that the introduction of the genetic method and the teleological/historical standpoint challenged the demand of radicalism that was characteristic of the phenomenological method. Phenomenology, Husserl argued, could execute its task only through a critical reflection on past presuppositions, particularly those related to the idea of philosophy. This led Husserl to a rearticulation of teleology as a fundamentally critical and open device of philosophical reflection. In chapter 9, I continue on this theme by discussing Derrida's famous critique of Husserl's Eurocentrism. As I show, this interpretation is based on a clear misreading of Husserl's concept of "immanent teleology," which was not intended as a purely Europe-specific concept. In line with his critical understanding of the

concept of teleology, Husserl ended up distinguishing between two types of ideals of perfection: the absolute and the relative. By doing so, he was able to reconcile an idealistic understanding of cultural development with the idea of renewal. This renewal, however, was to be understood with regard to the philosophical horizon of infinity. This meant a radical break from the strictly individualistic understanding of modern moral philosophy: it was exactly the community that was able to surpass the finite life of the individual and realize the principle of renewal in line with the idea of infinite development. In chapter 10, I discuss the political consequences of ideas. I begin with Husserl's description of himself as a fundamentally "apolitical" thinker. This did not mean, however, that Husserl would have completely turned his back on ideas of state and political community. Instead, the phenomenological reflection was to be directed at the conditions of a responsible political community, the "community of will" and the principle of communal renewal. By taking my point of departure from his idea of social ethics as a dynamic-genetic notion, I hope to show that the political potential of phenomenology resides in a novel understanding of political idealism as a form of dynamic utopianism, the twofold creation and renewal of the normative ideals of humanity on the basis of historical teleology. Lastly, in chapter 11, I will discuss one of Husserl's most radical solutions to the problematic of ethical communality and universalism: the "community of love". It was exactly with the help of the notion of love that Husserl was able to overcome the fundamentally individualistic view of the human person and to rethink the phenomenological role of responsibility. The community of love, I argue, can be understood as Husserl's most elaborate answer to the problem of ethical universalism. <>

THE SENSIBLE WORLD AND THE WORLD OF EXPRESSION: COURSE NOTES FROM THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1953 by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Translated from the French with an introduction and notes by Bryan Smyth [Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Northwestern University Press, 9780810141438]

THE SENSIBLE WORLD AND THE WORLD OF EXPRESSION was a course of lectures that Merleau-Ponty gave at the Collège de France after his election to the chair of philosophy in 1952. The publication and translation of Merleau-Ponty's notes from this course provide an exceptional view into the evolution of his thought at an important point in his career.

In these notes, we see that Merleau-Ponty's consideration of the problem of the perception of movement leads him to make a self-critical return to *Phenomenology of Perception* in order to rethink the perceptual encounter with the sensible world as essentially expressive, and hence to revise his understanding of the body schema accordingly in terms of praxical motor possibilities. Sketching out an embodied dialectic of expressive praxis that would link perception with art, language, and other cultural and intersubjective phenomena, up to and including truth, Merleau-Ponty's notes for these lectures thus afford an exciting glimpse of how he aspired to overcome the impasse of ontological dualism.

Situated midway between *Phenomenology of Perception* and *The Visible and the Invisible*, these notes

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mark a juncture of crucial importance with regard to Merleau-Ponty's later efforts to work out the ontological underpinnings of phenomenology in terms of a new dialectical conception of nature and history.

Review

"THE SENSIBLE WORLD AND THE WORLD OF EXPRESSION" reveals Merleau-Ponty at the pivot point of his entire philosophy, where his phenomenology of movement, expression, and the body schema begins deepening into his later themes of language, art, institutions, and history—and leading him toward an ontology that would grasp meaning at work in the visible world, nature, and being itself. Bryan Smyth's careful translation, introduction, and notes provide an invaluable entry into a key moment of Merleau-Ponty's thought." —David Morris, author of *Merleau-Ponty's Developmental Ontology*

"To Merleau-Ponty, lecturing at the Collège de France represented a remarkable opportunity to pursue philosophical research. And yet, given his sudden death, this research never developed into a polished manuscript, transforming these lecture courses into the traces of his nascent phenomenological ontology. Thanks to this lucid and scholarly translation of the first course, Bryan Smyth has made a lasting contribution to Merleau-Ponty scholarship that provides new insights into Merleau-Ponty's unfinished work on perception and expression." —Donald A. Landes, author of *Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression* and translator of Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*

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Phenomenology of Imperception?

Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of Expression

Presented in this volume is a translation of the notes that Merleau-Ponty produced while preparing his Thursday lecture course—titled "Le monde sensible et le monde de l'expression"—during his inaugural year (1952-53) as chair of philosophy at the College de France,' along with a translation of a selection of related working notes. Until the publication of these notes, little was actually known about the content of this course other than what is conveyed through the fairly brief (approximately two thousand words) official course summary that Merleau-Ponty composed after the end of the course.? Indeed, something similar is true for all the courses Merleau-Ponty gave at the College, and for a long time this situation presented serious obstacles to a genuinely insightful—rather than a more or less speculative—understanding of the development of his thought during the last decade of his life. In recent years, however, lecture notes from several of these courses have been transcribed and published, with many more potentially yet to come, and this has proven enormously valuable

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with regard to tracing out the philosophical trajectory that led from Merleau-Ponty's early published works—*The Structure of Behavior* and *Phenomenology of Perception*—through *The Adventures of the Dialectic* to the unfinished manuscript of *The Visible and the Invisible*. Although often and in many ways textually problematic, owing to their status as personal notes, these previously unpublished materials now represent crucial elements that must be taken into account when engaged in the tasks of reading, interpreting, and assessing the Merleau-Pontian project. And as an initial step in the reinvigoration of his research agenda that followed his release from the academic responsibilities that he had had at l'Université de Lyon (1945-49) and l'Université de Paris (1949-52), while also incorporating some of the sources that he had dealt with in his lectures at both those institutions, this is certainly true of the course in question here. Situated midway between *Phenomenology of Perception* and *The Visible and the Invisible*, "The Sensible World and the World of Expression" offers insights which—as the conjunctive title of the course itself.

General Introduction

The first three lectures presented a general introduction in which Merleau-Ponty laid out his objectives in relation to outstanding problems in his earlier work (as elaborated in the previous section) and presented his working definition of expression—or, more precisely, of expressivity—as "the property that a phenomenon has through its internal arrangement to disclose another [phenomenon] that is not or even never was given." With this, Merleau-Ponty's philosophical concern is less with the disclosure of phenomena that happen to be nongiven at some particular moment, which is basically what goes on in the phenomenological analysis of intentional horizontality, than with forms of totality that, as such, can in principle never be given. And his primary concern is with human existence—"man" in Merleau-Ponty's terminology—as a form of totality that encompasses body and mind, or perception and intellection. Products of human labor, for example, broadly construed, would express this totality directly. Human perception, however, is more akin to "intellectual work or painting," in that these activities give expression to human existence indirectly "by talking about things or about the world as well, such that here it is not only man expressing himself in [a] product, but moreover [a] product that expresses the world." There is an orientation toward truth in art no less than in science, he thought, and this can also be found in perception. Indeed, it is ultimately rooted there. Although perception is characterized by a kind of "mutism" that excludes any actual or literal "talking about things or about the world," there is nonetheless an implicitly understood "natural language" through which the body is able to act as an "organ of mimicry." This "mimicry" of the sensible is expressive, however, in that it takes up the sensible in worldly terms; that is, as the sensible world, in virtue of the body's own *Unrweltintentionalität*. It is as a mimetically expressive encounter with the sensible that perception lies at the origin of truth, that it is the birthplace, so to speak, of "a truth of the world?" The relation between the sensed and the perceived is ambiguous in this expressive mimicry, but it is a "good" ambiguity rather than a "bad" one because, as a form of expressivity, perception involves a "reversal" that meets the upsurge of the sensible and ensures its unity with the perceived on an equiprimordial basis. This reversal is not yet the "retrograde movement of the true," which, adapting it from Bergson, Merleau-Ponty associated with higher levels of expression. But it is the anticipation of this movement, and as such it is the dialectical element that was insufficiently elaborated in the account of the sensible laid out in *Phenomenology of Perception*.

This already says a lot, and in many ways this initial presentation of the notion of expression—and of "natural expression" in particular—prefigured the outcome of some of the more detailed discussions

yet to come in later lectures. But to judge from his notes, Merleau-Ponty devoted much more time within his three introductory lectures to working out and presenting the implications that this rethinking of perception would have with regard to perceptual consciousness, and by extension to consciousness in general. The main thrust here is to sketch out a radically different understanding of consciousness from the idealist view of it as constituting its objects as discursive signification or values, and as possessing them in an absolutely clear and immediate presence that is at the same time, owing to the complete asymmetry of the relation, an absolute distance. In contrast to this, Merleau-Ponty portrayed perceptual consciousness as embedded or situated in the thick of the world, and thus as a perspectival opening to concretely existing beings. The proximity of the latter is not a matter of an ideal presence before consciousness but rather of their encroachment (empiement) on perceptual consciousness, the fact that they affect me from within, while their distance stems from the fact that in encroaching on me, they do so from without; that is, they remain beyond and thus always exceed me in this way.

The reversal involved in the mimetic expressivity of perception has to do especially with this distance of the sensible. As Merleau-Ponty describes it here with the language of *écart*, which he was using for the first time, there is a certain normativity inherent in perception, in that what is given in perceptual consciousness are (only) "divergences" from implicit or nonthematic "levels"; that is, differences or deviations from typical norms that are located in the contextual background of perception, where most of the time they pass unnoticed and are simply taken for granted." It is primarily in making this diacritical reference back to levels" that perception is expressive. For these levels are, as Merleau-Ponty put it more than once in his notes, sites of imperception? They may be integral to perception and to perceptual sense, but they are never given in perception. Here we might note that Merleau-Ponty fully subscribed to the basic Gestalt-theoretic account of perception, taking as axiomatic that it involves the experience of a figure on a background, in which the sense of the former is never apprehended in isolation but is rather conditioned by the latter, which thus forms an integral part of perception? But inspired by the likes of Freud and Marx, who recognized that, because of psychological and ideological factors of repression and projection, conscious experience is much less straightforward than is generally assumed, Merleau-Ponty saw fit to describe perceptual consciousness as "inverted"—or even "mystified"—because it "does not make its background explicit: Merleau-Ponty was more precise when, along these same lines, he characterized consciousness as "cross-eyed"—it has one eye, so to speak, on the figure and the other on the background, but it is essentially unable to focus on both at once—implying that, in a certain strict sense, perception occurs rarely, if at all!" Merleau-Ponty may have been suggesting this when he claimed—surprisingly, perhaps, but quite matter-of-factly—that his earlier (otherwise flawed) phenomenological approach to perception did at least show "that there are very few perceptions, and that most of the time perceptual life is movement slipping from one to another." As he provocatively suggested in a working note, "consciousness is, if you like, synonymous with imperception: "There is a lacuna introduced into the picture of perception when the naively assumed determinacy of the background drops out, and filling in this lacuna will be the main philosophical job of perceptual expressivity.

It is also in terms of this expressivity that Merleau-Ponty will be able to settle accounts with Gestalt theory. Although at the descriptive level Merleau-Ponty fully embraced Gestalt theory's structural view of perceptual experience in terms of figure and background, he had long held that as inductive empirical science, Gestalt theory had failed to adequately pursue (let alone answer) the philosophical

questions that this description raised. In his view, Gestalt theory had sought to explain phenomenal variations on the basis of objective causal processes and structural laws supposedly discovered in artificial experimental settings—Merleau-Ponty probably had this in mind (and Wertheimer's phi phenomenon in particular) when, taking a jab at Gestalt theory, he characterized it as reducing the phenomena of movement, for example, to cases of the kind of "flickering" observed in stroboscopy. His point was that on account of its realist assumptions, Gestalt theory had a tendency to draw conclusions about perception that controverted its phenomenality. So while according to Merleau-Ponty there may be, strictly speaking, "very few perceptions," it is also the case that "there are far fewer illusions than Gestalt [theory] would have us believe." It is by rethinking perception in terms of expression—or more specifically of expressive imperception—that he wanted to navigate an empirically and phenomenologically sound middle way between the naive poles of realism and idealism.

Merleau-Ponty had long felt the need to redress the philosophical shortcomings of Gestalt theory by rejecting the realism and the corresponding conception of consciousness that it uncritically presupposed. But the operative split between nature and culture in his earlier thinking had prevented him from pushing through consistently toward the radical conceptual overhaul of consciousness that he undertakes here in "The Sensible World and the World of Expression." Freed from that constraint, he had come to recognize that the proper philosophical task was to unpack the context of perceptual experience genetically—that is, in terms of the mutual responsiveness of subject and world—and to do so in terms of the body's mimetic expressivity understood as a form of praxis. This turn to bodily praxis in perception marks Merleau-Ponty's decisive break with Gestalt-theoretic realism. But in making it, he does veer closer, perhaps uncomfortably so, to transcendental idealism. Philosophical proximity to the latter is, of course, a familiar worry for Merleau-Ponty, one that he already tarried over at length in *The Structure of Behavior*. But even in 1952, he still reiterated the main claim underlying that discussion—namely, that such idealism is less false than merely superficial? For in concrete terms, there is something like a *Sinngabung* in perception, even if it is a mimetic one that somehow "predates itself in the [sensible] manifold. It does not stem from the constitutive activity of consciousness, however, but rather from the praxical activity of the body when, in returning to the world through the reversal that it enacts, it establishes or projects "existential signification." As Merleau-Ponty put it, mimetic expression "has to do with a perception that is more and more 'intelligent; less and less 'sensory' ... In short, it has to do with a praxis." And as involving a kind of "projective preadaptation" to the sensibly given, Merleau-Ponty recognized that this is what his previous approach to perception had discounted. "It's of all this work of praxis, far more extensive than I had thought, that we must develop an understanding." And inasmuch as this understanding of the praxis of perception would bear upon questions concerning the subject of perception, pursuing it would be a (if not the) fundamental part of working out the "philosophical foundations" of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological project. And with the exception of the final lecture, this is basically what occupied him for the remainder of the course.

Merleau-Ponty's Plan for the Course

Merleau-Ponty had originally intended to devote his final two lectures to matters of higher-level cultural expression (language, history, truth, etc.), and these were to serve as a transition to the follow-up courses he anticipated. And these final two were to be preceded by four lectures concerning nonlinguistic expression in painting and cinema. This would have left a core of five lectures devoted to working out a praxical understanding of perceptual expression in more general

terms, which was to be done on the basis of the experience of space and, especially, of movement. As noted above, however, the course did not unfold as envisioned in that original plan. At least to judge by his notes, all of those final six lectures were squeezed into the very last one, and the number of lectures devoted to the core discussion more or less doubled (to ten). While at least one possible reason for this may be gleaned from Merleau-Ponty's notes (which will be noted presently), there may well be other factors about which, at least for the time being, we cannot even speculate.

The ten lectures that followed the three introductory ones reflected, albeit informally, the structure of *Phenomenology of Perception*, in the sense that they first laid out phenomenological description and analysis of perception and then turned to consider the subjectivity that is thereby implied. But with perception now being understood in expressive terms, the difference is that the first part now already involves the kind of self-referential concern with expression that characterized Merleau-Ponty's earlier phenomenology of phenomenology, with the result that the second part turns more directly to an account of perceptual expressivity in practical—or, better, praxical—terms. It is as if the line within *Phenomenology of Perception* between the phenomenology of perception proper and the phenomenology of the phenomenology of perception lay not at the beginning of part 3 but rather at its end, at the very culmination of the book; namely, the deference to "heroic" action and the enigmatic insinuation that that is what actually accomplishes philosophy, and as if Merleau-Ponty were now finally undertaking to clarify just what exactly that would mean.

In this course, the concern with praxical subjectivity was cashed out in terms of the body schema. The latter was certainly not a new idea for Merleau-Ponty, but it was one whose sense had changed significantly along with that of perception, inasmuch as its role therein is now understood in a much more active (or enactive)—because expressive—way. It is noteworthy, however, that in his original plan for the course, Merleau-Ponty did not allot any time at all for an explicit discussion of the body schema. This is almost certainly one of the main reasons, if not the main reason, for the unexpected way that the course unfolded. It is not clear why this is so, nor why he decided midcourse to include it as the basis for his account of the praxis of perceptual expression. To be sure, it makes excellent philosophical sense. But it would seem to be the case that going into the course Merleau-Ponty saw no need for it—there is no mention at all of the body schema in the detailed notes for the general overview provided by the first three lectures, even while these notes do broach all the further issues of linguistic and higher-order cultural expression. It may be the case that while in the process of elaborating his new expressive understanding of perception he came to see—possibly prompted by questions from his auditors—that this understanding, shorn as it was of any "natural" basis, would be on thin ice without addressing the corporeal basis of the expressive function, and that without doing that first he could not properly advance to the further discussions that he had planned. In any case, it is worth noting that the official course summary deftly conceals through a retrospective illusion this aspect of how the course took shape.

Concluding Avertissement

There is an obvious parallel that might be drawn between the tide of this course, "The Sensible World and the World of Expression," and that of Merleau-Ponty's last published article, "Eye and Mind," or his final, posthumously published work, *The Visible and the Invisible*. And there is surely some substantive basis to this, which, with the publication of these notes, could now be explored in some detail. But even though this course occupies a special position in the development of Merleau-Ponty's thought, these notes reflect a thinking that is very much a work in progress. We should therefore be cautious about reading and interpreting them in the retrospective light of what we

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think we know about Merleau-Ponty's final work, or in isolation from his other courses at the College de France. Indeed, we should be cautious about drawing any firm conclusions from them at all. As Merleau-Ponty wrote in concluding the official course summary, and as alluded to above, he will be in a position "to determine definitively the philosophical meaning of the above analyses" only by examining linguistic expression. That is, only then would he "be able to decide whether the dialectic of expression implies that a mind is already present in nature, or that nature is immanent to our mind, or [else] to search instead for a third philosophy beyond this dilemma." Now, it is definitely this latter tack—which resonates with his recurrent metaphor of awakening as heightened existential integration that issues in expressive speech—that Merleau-Ponty pursued and that ultimately led to his later work. But although it is clearly germinal, we cannot ascertain directly from these pages alone whether the radical rethinking of phenomenology as a philosophy of expression—and in this specific sense, as a phenomenology of imperception—that we see sketched out here is in fact an integral part of how Merleau-Ponty sought to overcome that dilemma. From history and institution to dialectic and nature, there is, even beyond language, much more that must be taken into account. So just as our understanding of Merleau-Ponty's final work is due for potential revision in the light of newly published (and as yet still unpublished) materials, the broader significance of these lectures likewise remains to be worked out. <>

JEANNE GUYON'S MYSTICAL PERFECTION THROUGH EUCHARISTIC SUFFERING: HER BIBLICAL COMMENTARY ON SAINT JOHN'S GOSPEL by Jeanne de la Mothe Guyon, edited and Translated by *Nancy Carol James*, Foreword by *William Bradley Roberts* [Pickwick Publications, 9781532684234]

Madame Jeanne Guyon (1648-1717), a woman of great wisdom and worship, was filled with the richness of God's grace as she endured hardships and abuse in her married life. Blessed with children and great earthly wealth, she suffered physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually at the hands of her spiritual leaders, imprisoned unjustly for her simple yet solid faith in Christ, her Divine Confidant. Trusting in her Lord, she expressed her insights in commentaries concerning the Scriptures, seeing in them the mysteries of the holy Eucharist, the sacrificial presence of her merciful Savior. Through her intercession, we are inspired to adore the Lord, uniting our suffering to his as she did.

Review

"Madame Guyon provides a living example of a simple yet profound message, that anyone can establish a close relationship with God through contemplative meditation." — Peter C. Phan, Georgetown University

"This translation of Jeanne Guyon's commentary on John is key to Guyon studies. Was this seventeenth-century mystic really a closet Protestant? We now have the answer. She was not; her deep sacramental theology comes shining through this commentary. Nancy James has done remarkable work: she locates, understands, and interprets this remarkable mystic. This is not just an important text for the academy but it is important for every faithful Christian. Madam Guyon is a

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person to admire and learn from. This is a vitally important text that every person serious about the mystical tradition should have in their library." —Ian S. Markham, Virginia Theological Seminary "

"I warmly and heartily commend Rev. Professor Nancy James' latest work, her translation and commentary on Jeanne Guyon's *Mystical Perfection through Eucharistic Suffering*. James' scholarly yet accessible approach to Guyon's eucharistic spirituality should be enriching for all who seek to follow a profound Christian pathway in these complex times. Nancy James has become the key and leading expert on Guyon and her invitation to understand the Guyon spirituality better is to be greatly welcomed and appreciated." — Paul Haffner, Duquesne University Italian Campus, Seton Hall University, and Pontifical Gregorian University

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Foreword by The Rev. William Bradley Roberts, D.M.A.

'Tis folly all—let me no more be told
Of Parian¹ porticos, and roofs of gold;
Delightful views of nature, dressed by art,
Enchant no longer this indifferent heart;
The Lord of all things, in his humble birth,
Makes mean the proud magnificence of earth;
The straw, the manger, and the mouldering wall,
Eclipse its lustre; and I scorn it all.

(Madame Jeanne Guyon, trans. William Cowper, English, 1731–1800)

Above is the first verse of the English translation of an extended poem by Guyon. The translator William Cowper (pronounced “Cooper”) was the foremost English poet of the generation between Alexander Pope and William Wordsworth.² With precision and yet with tender care, he translates Guyon’s poem into English verse that has its own integrity, while still reflecting the mystical piety and devotion of the original.

Such personal piety is emblematic of the writings of Madame Jeanne Guyon. She portrays a humble Jesus, whom she greatly prefers to the opulence of either natural beauty or beauty created by humans. In this poem, as well as in her commentary on the book of John, she places a relationship with Jesus above everything else. (“I scorn it all.”)

Though Guyon didn’t greatly concern herself with issues of authorship, provenance, or textual analysis, it is interesting to discover what modern scholarship uncovers in the fourth Gospel, which stands in contradistinction to the Synoptic (“seeing with the same eye”) Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, which are similar in content, form, and statement. Despite Guyon’s apparent lack of interest in such scholarly investigation, she would surely not have disapproved of those scholars and contemporary readers who are drawn to scholarly analysis.

Scholars disagree about the authorship of the Gospel of John, arguing persuasively for this theory or that. Perhaps Bruce Vawter CM (1921–86), writing in *The Jerome Biblical Commentary*, is most certain

of his position. He holds out the alluring possibility that the earliest witness to authorship is Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, (A.D. 120/124–200/203), who studied with Polycarp of Smyrna (A.D. 69–155), who knew John personally! Both these bishops were persuaded that John was the anonymous “disciple whom Jesus loved,” who “reclined on his breast at the Last Supper” and the author of the fourth Gospel.

Fr. Vawter goes on to support Johannine authorship by pointing out that John was a Jew who was familiar with Palestinian culture and geography. The fourth Gospel mentions places that don’t appear in the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke), such as the Pool of Bethesda and Lithostrotos (*Gabbatha* in Aramaic). He further states that the language in John is that of a Palestinian Jew. Additionally, the persistence of detail in the text strongly suggests a firsthand witness. Though the Gospel writer’s Greek is not the best in the New Testament, it correctly reproduces the common language of the time. Fr. Vawter finds evidence that John employed a disciple-scribe whose Greek was superior to his own. He goes on to say that the Gospel of John presupposes the Synoptic Gospels, and that John, in some respects, would be difficult to understand, were we not already familiar with the story as found in the Synoptic Gospels.

Jerome H. Neyrey SJ cites contemporary scholarship that distinguishes between a “writer” of this Gospel and an “author.” A writer might merely take dictation, but an author imagines and organizes the project and establishes an editorial point of view. Unlike Vawter, Neyrey believes that we are still uncertain who the author is or where and when the document was written and revised. (Its provenance is debated, but traditionally assumed to be Ephesus.) Neyrey takes the position that we may learn a lot about the author by asking “what does he know.”

Neyrey finds, for example, like Vawter, that the author of the Gospel has intimate knowledge of the geography attested in the writing. In fact, this Gospel writer displays a unique knowledge, superior to that of the Synoptic writers. Likewise, he has keen insight into practices of Temple Feasts and Sabbath. The Synoptics know, for instance, of only one Passover in the career of Jesus, whereas this author knows of three.

As Neyrey continues to investigate the relationship between John and Synoptics, he posits that, even though no proof exists that John drew upon the Synoptics, most scholars believe that the author frequently draws on traditions shared with the Synoptics. Setting aside the question of dependency on the Synoptics, perhaps it is more important that the author knows a great deal about the Jesus tradition.

Scholar Johannes Beutler SJ says that when readers read John they enter a new world, hear a new language. The Divine Logos (Word) brings “light” (mentioned in sixteen verses) and “life” (in thirty-eight verses). Even when standing before Pilate, Jesus claims to be the king who came to “bear witness to the truth.” The tone of this Gospel is not heard in the Synoptics.

Whereas in the Synoptics dualistic language is temporal, in John it is spatial. Jesus comes “from above,” his opponents “from below.” While they are “of this world,” he is “not of this world.” Interestingly, the sequence of events in Jesus’ life do not always correspond to that of the Synoptics. The Gospel of Mark is selective in the miracles included, and so is John. In the fourth Gospel there is no exorcism or healing of a leper, and the number of Jesus’ miracles is considerably smaller. On the other hand, the account of the miracle at the wedding in Cana, changing water into wine, appears only in John. The Parables of the Kingdom, characteristic of the Synoptics, are missing from John. A

striking feature of the fourth Gospel is its language about Jesus' identity, the so-called "I Am Sayings:" "I am the bread of life." (6:35) "I am the light of the world." (8:12), as well as extended metaphors of his identity: the Good Shepherd (10:1–5) and the True Vine (15:1–8).

Strikingly, John has no account of the birth and infancy of Jesus, but begins instead with Jesus' identity as the eternally existent Divine Logos (Word). John's Gospel intends to lead to faith in Jesus, the Messiah and Son of God, and to strengthen the faith of those who already believe. Some scholars (especially German ones) find this to be its *only* aim. John is concerned with *following* Jesus.

Small wonder, then, that Madame Guyon, the deeply devoted mystic, was drawn to write a commentary on John. She would have naturally been attracted to the message of faith, belief, and, above all, the call to follow Jesus.

Unlike scholarly theological works, Guyon's commentary is intentionally devotional. Theologian Katherine Sonderegger in her recent book *The Doctrine of God*, speaks with a similar devotion that one of her students describes as, "a love letter to God." Guyon possessed a love for Jesus that, from our vantage, seems a consuming passion, redolent of modern-day evangelicals. In fact, however, she was a committed Roman Catholic (see Preface), one who unashamedly spoke of her "Master Jesus Christ" in language that at times sounded unapologetically romantic.

As insightful as Guyon's commentary is in some respects, what we may gain from it is not so much a scholarly understanding as a portrait of Jesus, drawn tenderly by someone who loved him with her whole heart. Elsewhere among Nancy Carol James' prolific writings on Guyon, we may discover this mystic's struggles with the Church, despite her love for it. Nevertheless, she persisted and declared her commitment to the Roman Catholic Church throughout her life.

Nancy Carol James, PhD, has devoted years of study to Guyon. Prior to this translation of Guyon's commentary on the Gospel of John, James had published fourteen books about the Catholic mystic. Her rich history of research into Guyon's life and work allows James to speak with wise and eloquent insight. James is able to give voice to Guyon's inner-most thoughts and prayers. Indeed she can describe the very faith of Guyon.

What we may say with a certainty about Madame Guyon is that her deep faith was authentic. When she shared her faith with others in her writing, she showed marks of a true Catholic, allowing the Holy Spirit to bring people to faith in Jesus. The witness of her life and her writing are compelling—so compelling in fact that the reader's interest is piqued, a new curiosity aroused, and one is motivated to learn more about the faith she professed. Her unwavering faith in Jesus, her deep desire to follow him, are everywhere in evidence in this volume. Encountering her, the reader is strengthened in the faith.

Preface by Nancy Carol James

Throughout history, the writings of Jeanne Guyon have attracted some of the greatest thinkers and faithful ministers of the Christian gospel. Among those who admire her Christian testimony include Archbishop Fénelon, William Cowper, Sir Isaac Newton, John Wesley, and John Newton, author of the hymn "Amazing Grace." The list continues to grow, revealing how her quiet but powerful voice continues to influence the Christian faith.

After years of research and translating Jeanne Guyon, I have found her commentary on the Gospel of John to be her most powerful document declaring her profound Christian beliefs. In this

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commentary, Jeanne Guyon reveals her deepest devotion and thought about the Christian faith. She describes her love and commitment to the Roman Catholic Church, her lifelong church. We read of her devotion to Mary. Guyon writes, “Although there is one mediator between God and human beings, Mary is a mediator between sinners and her son. O Mary, full of pain and love! Who is the sinner who will not hope from your protection given by your Son?” Guyon describes her fervent belief in Transubstantiation; in the Eucharist, she says, the believer receives the very Body and Blood of Jesus Christ. She affirms that we receive mystical perfection, called theosis, as we participate in the holy sacrament of the Eucharist.

Jeanne Guyon’s faith and testimony, filled with joy and praise, continue to help guide human souls to the one she knew as Master Lord Jesus Christ. Her commentary on St. John’s Gospel, so filled with joy and ecstasy, offers wisdom and heart-felt love to all those seeking to imitate the life and faith of Jesus Christ.

Introduction by Nancy Carol James, Ph.D.

Since the seventeenth century, the writing of Jeanne Guyon (1648–1717) has spread throughout the globe, encouraging those in spiritual need and providing enthusiastic nourishment for those living the Christian faith. Because Madame Guyon was accused of heresy by the Inquisition of the Roman Catholic Church instigated by Bishop Bossuet, a powerful archbishop well connected with the King of France and the Vatican Hierarchy, she bears heroic witness to her Catholic Faith. Guyon spoke continually words of love for her church despite her incarceration for nearly ten years, including nearly five years in the Bastille. In her heroic witness, she lived spiritually free for she knew in her mystical relationship with Jesus Christ, that he, and he alone, sets us free. The paradox of Jeanne Guyon’s life is that she had every right to condemn and even hate her Catholic faith and those clergy representing clerical abuse, yet her kind voice of love and mercy spoke words telling others of a living, loving, and forgiving Christian way. In the image of Jesus Christ, she portrayed a true Christian witness praying for and instructing her persecutors. Jeanne Guyon testifies to the way, the truth, and the life of Jesus Christ in her suffering and in her prayers and so her testimony continues to be received and revered as a Christian martyr to the scandals and abuses we constantly experience throughout history, either from within the church in her case, or from outside the church in other cases.

A brief summary of Jeanne Guyon’s life shows the dramatic and still debated arrest, incarceration and release of Jeanne Guyon. (For a more detailed account of her life, please read my introduction in **THE COMPLETE MADAME GUYON.**)

From an early age, Jeanne Guyon lived a life of suffering. Born into an aristocratic family in 1648, when she was fifteen, her parents forced her into an arranged marriage with a man she had not met, the thirty-eight-year-old Philippe Guyon. This unhappy marriage led to the nineteen-year-old Jeanne’s serious crisis about how to endure such desolation and following this, her profound spiritual conversion. She committed herself to Jesus Christ, saying she loved him as Mary Magdalen had loved him. Soon Jeanne became actively and passionately involved with caring for the peasants, founding hospitals, and raising her five children, two of whom died of smallpox. In her late twenties, her husband also died, leaving Jeanne as a young, attractive, wealthy widow who was widely sought after.

With the recognition of her spiritual gifts, Jeanne was welcomed at King Louis XIV’s royal court at Versailles. She joined a prayer group with Madame de Maintenon, the third wife of Louis XIV, and Archbishop Francois Fénelon, the royal tutor to the son expected to become king. Sadly, later

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Madame de Maintenon withdrew her support of Jeanne, which led to the Roman Catholic Inquisition led by Bishop Bossuet arresting Jeanne and keeping her incarcerated for a total of nearly ten years, while the church hierarchy searched for ways to remove her influence over Archbishop Fénelon. Guyon was imprisoned, suffered psychological and physical abuse, and threatened with death by burning, as the French hierarchy had done with St Joan of Arc.

Throughout this time, however, Archbishop Fénelon defended Jeanne continually and passionately, which led to King Louis XIV banishing him from Versailles and sending him to the front-lines in the War of Spanish Succession. Years of debate ensued at the Vatican by the cardinals and the pope, leading to a papal censure of some points of Fénelon's book, *The Maxims of the Saints*, which he wrote to defend Guyon. Eventually Guyon was exonerated and lived in a cottage near her daughter. Fénelon and Guyon remained in close correspondence for the rest of their lives, including personal visits with one another. Jeanne Guyon's works are still revered by Christians internationally.

In this controversy over Jeanne Guyon's life and works, she was considered a semi-quietist: a heresy that denied the need for the development of personal virtues and relied solely on God's grace being annihilated by divine love. Her works, though, are still revered by Christians and non-Christians internationally. She is considered by many as a mystic who influenced others with her charm and charisma being a warm and enthusiastic woman who brought joy to others with her vibrant spirit.

One of the great joys of being a Jeanne Guyon scholar is talking with others who share my respect and passion for her mystical theology. A natural and profound intimacy exists between those who desire mystical perfection and those who have read and benefitted from her ideas and interpretation of the Christian faith. Guyon's thought creates a heart-felt commitment to our relationship with our Master Jesus Christ, as she called him. We share the belief that abandonment to Jesus Christ and imitating him with our very lives begins the beautiful process of being transformed by grace and being united with God through divine love. This transformation is known as theosis, an early Christian teaching of the Eastern Patristic Fathers. We love Jesus Christ, who in his great mercy to us, offers us his perfection and carries us into the heart of God the Father.

Lost in the infinite beauty of God, we praise God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in expressible words of adoration and love that echo the beauty, majesty, and glory of his transforming love dwelling in our souls. We devotees of mysticism not only share Guyon's insights with others, but, in reality we share Christ with others who is the source of these insights.

This book, the first English translation of Guyon's Commentary on the Gospel of John, came out of a conversation I had with another who also treasures Jeanne Guyon. I still remember when he said to me, "We need a translation of Jeanne Guyon's Commentary on the Gospel of John." I had recently finished translations of Guyon's commentaries on Ephesians, Colossians, Galatians, Luke, and Revelation, but still I knew I had missed something valuable. His words poured in my heart and within a week, I began translating the Guyon commentary on John.

I have found in Guyon's Commentary of John a pearl of great price and the resolution of many problems still existing in Guyon scholarship. One of the great debates about Guyon has been and still is whether she was an orthodox, faithful Catholic believer or whether she secretly harbored Protestant ideas and sensibilities. From the historical perspective, Guyon as a secret Protestant might appear a reasonable conclusion because of the strong support she early on received from Anglicans and Protestants in Europe, the United Kingdom, and the New World.

Yet, her greatest supporter and advocate was the powerful and mysterious Roman Catholic Archbishop Francois Fénelon, who wrote a book about her theology called *The Maxims of the Saints*. He saw her as a faithful Catholic woman, in love with Jesus Christ, and defended her even though his support of her and her writing led to the destruction of his powerful ministry both in France and at the Vatican.

Was Jeanne Guyon a faithful Catholic? I can say definitively after translating her commentary on John's Gospel that indeed she sought to be a good Catholic, spending her very life-force to purify and expand the Catholic faith. She speaks words of wonder and love about her faith, but also ones of challenge and correction. She remained committed to the Roman Catholic Church, which had incarcerated her—its reasons for doing so are many and the decision may have been influenced by her wealth, beauty, and charisma rather than any actual unorthodoxy.

In her writings, Madame Guyon describes her intense and brutal sufferings not in terms of the physical and emotional anguish that anyone feels being locked up in prison. We know her sufferings were real, but she describes her greatest suffering in terms of the spiritual loss. She could not participate in the Roman Catholic Church's most sacred Liturgy, commonly called today the Mass, and receive the Eucharist daily.

Even after her exoneration and return to life on the Loire River, she wrote no angry or critical words to or about the Roman Catholic hierarchy who had interrogated and incarcerated her. Instead, continually and frequently, Jeanne Guyon professed the Christian faith as believed and practiced by the Roman Catholic Church. In her commentary on John, Guyon's love for the Roman Catholic Church shines clearly.

Jeanne Guyon's Roman Catholic Beliefs

Jeanne Guyon testified to the truth of the Roman Catholic Church in this commentary on John. She explains and defends the real presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist, the most sublime of the seven sacraments of the Catholic Faith and defends the other six sacraments of the church.

Not only did she believe in the sacramental life of the church, she also believe in the Catholic Church's ecclesiology, which upholds and promotes the communion of the saints. The Catholic Church believes that the saints are in heaven and are examples of holiness and intercessors for us, still seeking that transforming grace to become perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect. She developed a deep and profound devotion to two saints, Francis de Sales and Teresa of Avila, who were influential in her life, for both of them suffered much in their earthly lives.

Through many pages in this commentary, Jeanne Guyon makes a passionate defense of transubstantiation: the real presence of the body and blood (soul and divinity) of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist as a living and everlasting offering. She writes, "St. John testifies to the truth of the Eucharist, regarding Jesus Christ being immolated not only on the cross, but again on the altar until the end of the centuries. O divine Lamb, you take away the sins of the world!" (19–20) Guyon states that Jesus Christ will be present in the world through his presence on Roman Catholic altars, writing, "Jesus Christ also dwells on the earth until the consummation of the centuries through means of the Holy Eucharist. He cannot remain in another way. His glory will never end and never be consummated." (178)

Guyon describes her Roman Catholic belief in the Eucharist through which Jesus Christ joins himself with the faithful. She writes the following.

The institution of the Sacrament . . . perpetuates his glorious sacrifice to his Father and his ministry to human beings. As he was made man to give himself entirely to human beings and God, so he finds a way of giving himself in the most particular way possible. No union equals that of food, which becomes the substance and sustenance of the person who takes it. And what better way to make human beings God than to have them live as God? All human beings could not have hypostatic union, so he married human nature by his same union. To do this he made a real and sacramental union, so that each human being may be united with him in a way which closely approaches hypostatic union. (197)

Guyon gives strong warnings to those who did not believe in his real presence in the Eucharist. She writes,

Jesus Christ tells us, *My flesh will be given for you*. He clearly promised this without any intention to deceive. To say that he could not do this is clearly blasphemy since he is God and all-powerful. To doubt his power is to doubt his divinity. Does he not say that all power on heaven and earth has been given to him? If all power has been given to him, he is able. Not willing to deceive us, he acts in good faith and did this for us. If he gives his own flesh to death, I must conclude that he gives his own flesh to eat. When he says he gives his flesh to eat, this is not a figure of speech. (99–100)

Guyon also emphasizes the need for the confession of sins in the Sacrament of Reconciliation. Catholics believe that Jesus gave power not only to the apostles in the upper room when he reveals to them his resurrected body, but also empowers them with the Holy Spirit to forgive sins. Catholics believe that this power was not given solely to the apostles, but was given to their office, that is the priesthood itself and the successors to the apostles (apostolic succession) receive this grace to forgive sins, as did the eleven in the upper room. Guyon quotes John 20:23, “If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained.” Guyon interprets this, writing, “Jesus Christ gives them the Holy Spirit and the apostolic mission with the power to deliver *from sins*. This passage supports the priest hearing confession.” (263)

Guyon supports the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on sacraments throughout her commentary on the Gospel of John, the Evangelist.

John’s Gospel uses seven signs as a format (paradigm) for his Gospel that some modern authors, such as John Bergsma, would claim are the teachings concerning the seven sacraments. For example, Jesus’ first miracle, The Wedding Feast of Cana, is obviously about the sacrament of marriage.

Guyon fervently supports these sacraments throughout this commentary.

She does all of this in her most passionate way of writing with cries of love and even ecstasy. In other documents, Guyon at times has defended Catholic theology in prosaic terms in awkward sentences, as if written for the inquisitors, or even by the inquisitors, who were interrogating her. Her terminology and almost tormented writing style raised questions about the authenticity of her words. Yet, when Guyon speaks of words of truth, her sentences flow with joy and she uses more and more exclamation points and cries of “Oh!” That is one reason Guyon fans adore her intimate and mystical insights and ideas. We do not need to interpret and suck meaning out of her theology through a narrow straw of thinking. Instead, she pours her meaning into us with ecstatic joy. In this commentary on John, Guyon articulates her impassioned and beautiful love for her Roman Catholic Church and her mystical love for Jesus in a way not present in other writings.

Jeanne Guyon's Christian Mysticism

So why did Bishop Bossuet and others in the Roman Catholic hierarchy raise doubts about Jeanne Guyon's faithfulness and orthodoxy? Jeanne Guyon was a Christian mystic who believed that Jesus Christ still desires intimacy and seeks to join spiritually with those who follow him. Her written words are not detailed and deliberate, as a scholar and theologian's words, but ones of passionate love and intimacy, describing her growing union with Jesus Christ. As she says repeatedly, she had no theological training but felt that the Holy Spirit inspired her reflections on the scriptures. Ironically, in some of her responses to her inquisitors, she shows more theological understanding and insight than they did.

In this commentary, Jeanne Guyon discusses the intimacy present between Jesus Christ and Mary. She says that Mary had knit together Jesus Christ's body in her womb and shared complete intimacy with him in her life. Yet at the wedding in Cana, there seemed to be a change between them.

Guyon writes about the wedding described in John 2:3–4.

The words of Jesus Christ to his holy mother appear to be rebukes but they are very mysterious. First, if we look at the natural miracle, Jesus Christ says, *Woman, what concern is that to you and to me?* The union between us is so close, do not you have all you want? You can do everything through me. (25)

Guyon continues,

In the mystical sense, Jesus Christ says to his mother, I have made a union with you so close that I cannot do the same with any other. *What concern is that to you and to me?* Is not my body formed in your blood? In you I was married with human nature in a hypostatic union that will never happen in any other creature. (26)

Guyon emphasizes the holy and exalted role of Mary, a core belief that continues to be held strong still in the Roman Catholic Church though it is also a point of great discussion. As another French saint, St Louis Marie de Montfort, would later write, Jesus came to us through Mary, we go to Jesus through Mary. In the context of intimacy and a wondrous closeness between Jesus and Mary, Guyon invites us, the faithful, to share in the great wedding feast of Jesus Christ intimate and present with his church, in a way similar to that of Jesus Christ and Mary. Guyon calls this the mystical incarnation.

In this commentary, Guyon describes clearly how Jesus Christ himself unites with the follower in a mystical incarnation. Guyon describes this in the following way. When a person through the actions of the Holy Spirit repents and accepts the motion of grace, the believer lives the faith imitating the life of Jesus Christ. In this imitation of his life, the believer also experiences within his or her interior life the same or similar heart-felt feelings, ideas, and convictions that Jesus Christ experienced in his suffering and sacrifice, his joy and faith. Guyon called this bearing the states of being of Jesus Christ. Guyon reveals that mystical perfection comes from suffering as Jesus did when he instituted the sacrament of the Eucharist in three parts: Holy Thursday, the institution of the Eucharistic ritual; Good Friday, his suffering and death on the cross; and Easter Sunday, his risen presence revealed to his disciples. Out of this imitation, the believer will also have some form of spiritual, emotional, social, or physical crucifixion. Through this, Jesus Christ enters the believer's heart and becomes formed within the heart. When this formation is strong, Jesus Christ gently leads the follower out of the human heart and guides the soul into the very heart and bosom of God the Father. There the soul lives intimately with Jesus Christ lost in the infinite beauty and majesty of God the Father.

Guyon's clearest exposition of this comes in the following passage, based on John 14:3. Jesus said, "And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and will take you to myself, so that where I am, there you may be also." Guyon writes the following about John 14:3.

I am leaving, Jesus Christ said, to prepare the place and to open the entrance to my Father's bosom. Then *I will come again and take you to myself*. Oh, what admirable words! Will Jesus Christ be incarnated once again and have we seen him come to seek his apostles? However, these words are true! It is true that Jesus Christ goes first as an example and model to prepare the place. We need to follow Jesus Christ and bear his states until we are crucified with him. O then he truly becomes incarnate in the soul in a mystical way. Then he takes the soul into himself. After hiding the soul within him, he is formed within her, born there, and believes until to the perfect day of eternal glory. Then he then leads her to himself and she remains with him eternally where he is himself and not in another place. (200–201)

According to her understanding of the Bread of Life discourse in John's famous passage (John 6), she along with all believing Christians see Jesus Christ's unconditional love displayed perfectly, though mystically upon the cross. In Guyon's commentary, we see she believed in transubstantiation, that is the bread and wine become the body and blood of Jesus and when she received this Eucharist, she is in him and he is in her: the mystical perfection that so many seek.

In her sufferings, which echoed Jesus Christ's sufferings, she sensed his real presence and her need for his divine provision. She expressed our human yearning for a real union with the physical Jesus providing us with a transformative union in his divine love. This unconditional love is solidified by his promise to give us the Advocate, who becomes ours through our adoration and reception of the Eucharist. Jesus Christ promised the Holy Spirit later in the Passover Discourse, and if we hold fast to our crucifixion, we too receive Jesus Christ's pure Spirit through his sacrificial love as did his followers and anyone who still seeks him.

I offer this first English translation of Jeanne Guyon's commentary on John in a spirit of thanksgiving that her voice was not successfully silenced by the powers of the Inquisition. The aggressive and antagonistic tactics of the Inquisition were more humanistic rather Christocentric, which led to many abuses and scandals. Guyon in her response to the Inquisition reveals a spiritual maturity that, despite her lack of theological training, reveals a deep spiritual theology, even a mystical love and understanding of her Lord Jesus. Her meditation on John displays a mystical perfection through her Eucharistic sufferings, though obviously too exuberant for the Catholic hierarchy at that time.

As the Inquisition tried to squash her more exuberant and emotional expression of the Catholic faith, due to their more objective and orthodox/stoic demands to keep Catholicism free from theological error, a Catholic proverb of the twentieth century may shed light on silenced the French mindset of the seventeenth century: *Charity without orthodoxy is heterodox; Orthodoxy without charity is heterodox too*.

The greatest lesson we learn from Guyon may not be her exuberant and even ecstatic expressions of her mystical love for Jesus, but her virtuous embrace of her sufferings caused by those whose sole focus was orthodoxy without true charity. As her divine Master did the will of the Father in silence, like a lamb led to the slaughter, so too Guyon was silent about her sufferings despite her many poems, commentaries, and letters.

The accusations riled against her by the inquisitors for being interiorly passive and seeking annihilation of the self and not demanding an active and positive response through virtue and moral

integrity to the demands of the Christian life, may be false, for perhaps, she just lived a virtuous and moral life inspired by her deep love of Jesus: the work of her spiritual writings displayed her interior faith.

In this light, recalling the other great French mystic of the thirteenth century, St Joan of Arc, who also was condemned as a false prophet, history may ultimately reveal that Guyon was a true mystic, whereas, heaven already knows.

And so to those who read Jeanne Guyon's commentaries, I say thank you. This is one of her crucial documents for by her words, she intimately, passionately, and mystically shares with us her love of Jesus Christ. Once again, in Jeanne Guyon's words on the Gospel of John, we experience the anointing of the Holy Spirit and intimacy with the one Jeanne Guyon called Master, the Lord Jesus Christ. <>

THE BLACK BOOKS 1913-1932: NOTEBOOKS OF TRANSFORMATION Seven-Volume Set Slip-Cased Boxed, 1648 pages by C G Jung, edited and introduced by Sonu Shamdasani, translated by Martin Liebscher, John Peck and Sonu Shamdasani [Philemon Series: W. W. Norton & Company, 9780393088649]

Until now, the single most important unpublished work by C.G. Jung—**The Black Books**. In 1913, C.G. Jung started a unique self-experiment that he called his “confrontation with the unconscious”: an engagement with his fantasies in a waking state, which he charted in a series of notebooks referred to as **THE BLACK BOOKS**. These intimate writings shed light on the further elaboration of Jung's personal cosmology and his attempts to embody insights from his self-investigation into his life and personal relationships. **THE RED BOOK** drew on material recorded from 1913 to 1916, but Jung actively kept the notebooks for many more decades.


Presented in a magnificent, seven-volume boxed collection featuring a revelatory essay by noted Jung scholar Sonu Shamdasani—illuminated by a selection of Jung's vibrant visual works—and both translated and facsimile versions of each notebook, **THE BLACK BOOKS** offer a unique portal into Jung's mind and the origins of analytical psychology.

Facsimile reproductions throughout.

The publication in 2009 of *Liber Novus*, C. G. Jung's **THE RED BOOK**, has justly been regarded as a cultural event of historical significance. The publication enabled a new reading of Jung that is just beginning, based for the first time on primary documentation of the most critical creative phase in Jung's life. To continue this, the Philemon Foundation is pleased to announce the editing for publication of C. G. Jung's **THE BLACK BOOKS**, from 1913 to 1932, in a facsimile edition, accompanied by translation, introduction and notes, in collaboration with the Foundation of the Works of C. G. Jung. The edition is edited by Sonu Shamdasani, translated by Martin Liebscher, John Peck and Sonu Shamdasani and will be published by W. W. Norton.

The text of **THE RED BOOK** draws on material from **THE BLACK BOOKS** between 1913 and 1916. Approximately fifty percent of the text of **THE RED BOOK** derives directly from **THE BLACK BOOKS**, with very light editing and reworking. **THE BLACK BOOKS** are not personal diaries but the records of the unique self-experimentation that Jung called his 'confrontation with the unconscious.' He did not record day-to-day happenings or outer events but his active imaginations and depictions of his mental states together with his reflections on these.

The material that Jung did not include in **THE RED BOOK** is of equal interest to the material that he did include. **THE BLACK BOOKS** shed light on Jung's 'confrontation with the unconscious,' for which they are the prime documentation, as well as the genesis of **THE RED BOOK**, the further elaboration of Jung's personal cosmology, and the making of analytical psychology.



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Book 6: January 30, 1916—May 21, 1917

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Toward a Visionary Science: Jung's Notebooks of Transformation by Sonu Shamdasani

Prelude

In 1935, Jung said: "A point exists at about the thirty-fifth year when things begin to change, it is the first moment of the shadow side of life, of the going down to death. It is clear that Dante found this point and those who have read *Zarathustra* will know that Nietzsche also discovered it. When this turning point comes people meet it in several ways: some turn away from it; others plunge into it; and something important happens to yet others from the outside. If we do not see a thing Fate does it to us." By 1913, he had established himself as one of the leading lights in European psychiatry and was president of the burgeoning International Psychoanalytical Association. As he recounted in *Liber Novus*, "I had achieved everything that I had wished for myself. I had achieved honor, power, wealth, knowledge, and every human happiness. Then my desire for the increase of these trappings ceased, the desire ebbed from me and horror came over me." He had reached a turning point that was to transform his life and work: through this, Jung *became* Jung, and analytical psychology emerged as a general psychology and as a school of psychotherapy.

This transformation took place through the exploration of the visionary imagination, charted in **THE BLACK BOOKS**, from 1913 to 1932. These are not personal diaries but the records of a unique self-experimentation that Jung called his "confrontation with his soul" and his "confrontation with the unconscious." He didn't record day-to-day happenings or outer events in them but rather his active imaginations, depictions of his mental states, and reflections on these. From the fantasies therein, between 1913 and 1916 he composed the *Draft of Liber Novus*, **THE RED BOOK**, which he then transcribed in a calligraphic volume, illustrated with paintings. The paintings from 1916 onward in the *Red Book* relate to Jung's continued explorations in the later **THE BLACK BOOKS**. *Liber Novus* and the *Black Books* are thus closely intertwined. **THE BLACK BOOKS**, cover the period before, during, and after *Liber Novus*.

Liber Novus was born from **THE BLACK BOOKS**. It includes Jung's meditation on his fantasies between 1913 and 1916, and his understanding of the significance of his experiences up to that point. In Jung's view, his undertaking pertained not just to himself but to others as well; he had come to view his fantasies as stemming from a general mythopoeic layer of the psyche, which he named the collective unconscious. From the notebooks of a self-experimentation, a psychological work in a literary and theogonic form was created. Jung's continued explorations of the visionary imagination in the *Black Books* from 1916 chart his evolving understanding and demonstrate how he sought to develop and extend the insights he had gained and embody them in life. At the same time, they enable his paintings from 1916 onward to be understood in the context of the evolution of the iconography of his personal cosmology.

Given the intersection of **THE BLACK BOOKS**, and *Liber Novus*, particularly between 1913 and 1916, this introduction of necessity reprises in a reworked and expanded form sections from the introduction to *Liber Novus*, now taken up from a different angle, as both works arise from one context and shared chronology. The introduction at hand focuses more on the unfolding of Jung's visionary self-experimentation, and provides a fuller contextualization of the later period, 1916 to 1932. Similarly, a share of the notes from the 2009 Norton edition of *Liber Novus* have been carried over in the first part of this edition. In the early twentieth century, it was not uncommon for a work

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to be expanded and recast through several editions. A number of Jung's pivotal publications, such as *The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes*, are prime examples of this. This introduction is part of that genre.

The Intoxication of Mythology

Vocatus atque vocatus, dens aderit: Called or not, God will be present. In 1908, Jung had this proverb carved on the portal of the house he had built in Küsnacht, on the upper shore of Lake Zurich. The statement was from the Delphic oracle, reproduced in the Dutch Renaissance humanist Erasmus's *Collectanea adagiorum*, proverbs from classical authors. Jung closely worked on the plans for the house. The following year, he resigned his post as senior physician at Burgholzi hospital to devote himself to his growing practice and his research interests. He kept his position as a lecturer in the medical school, where he continued to give courses on the psychology of the unconscious and psychoanalysis.'

His retreat from the Burgholzi coincided with a shift in his research interests to the study of mythology, folklore, and religion, and he assembled a vast private library of scholarly works. These researches culminated in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, published in two installments in 1911 and 1912. It marked a return to Jung's intellectual roots and to his cultural and religious preoccupations. He found the mythological work exciting and intoxicating. "It seemed to me I was living in an insane asylum of my own making," he recalled in 1925. "I went about with all these fantastic figures: centaurs, nymphs, satyrs, gods and goddesses, as though they were patients and I was analyzing them. I read a Greek or a Negro myth as if a lunatic were telling me his anamnesis." The end of the nineteenth century saw an explosion of scholarship in the newly founded disciplines of comparative religion and ethnopsychology. Primary texts were collected and translated for the first time and subjected to historical scholarship in collections such as Max Müller's *Sacred Books of the East*.' For many, these works represented an important relativization of the Christian worldview.

In *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Jung differentiated two kinds of thinking. Taking his cue from William James, among others, he contrasted directed thinking and fantasy thinking. The former was verbal and logical. The latter was passive, associative, and imagistic. The former was exemplified by science and the latter by mythology. Jung claimed that the ancients lacked a capacity for directed thinking, which was a modern acquisition. Fantasy thinking took place when directed thinking ceased. *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* was an extended study of fantasy thinking, and of the continued presence of mythological themes in the dreams and fantasies of contemporary individuals. Jung reiterated the anthropological equation between the prehistoric, the primitive, and the child. He held that the elucidation of current-day fantasy thinking in adults would concurrently shed light on the thought of children, savages, and prehistoric peoples.

In this work, Jung synthesized nineteenth-century theories of memory, heredity, and the unconscious and posited a phylogenetic layer to the unconscious, still present in everyone, and consisting of mythological images. For Jung, myths were symbols of the libido and they depicted its typical movements. He used the comparative method of anthropology to draw together a vast panoply of myths, and then subjected them to analytic interpretation. He later termed his use of the comparative method "amplification." He claimed that there had to be typical myths, which corresponded to the ethnopsychological development of complexes. Following Jacob Burckhardt, he termed such typical myths "primordial images" (*Urbilder*). One particular myth was given a central role: that of the hero. For Jung, this represented the life of the individual, attempting to become

independent and to free himself from the mother. He interpreted the incest motif as an attempt to return to the mother to be reborn. He was later to herald this work as marking the discovery of the collective unconscious, though the term itself was of a later date.

In his preface to the 1952 revision of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Jung noted that the work was written in 1911, his thirty-sixth year: "The time is a critical one, for it marks the beginning of the second half of life, when a metanoia, a mental transformation, not infrequently occurs." He was conscious of the loss of his collaboration with Freud and was indebted to his wife for her support. After completing the work, he realized the significance of what it meant to live without a myth. One without a myth "is like one uprooted, having no true link either with the past, or with the ancestral life which continues within him, or yet with contemporary human society.

I was driven to ask myself in all seriousness: "what is the myth you are living?" I found no answer to this question, and had to admit that I was not living with a myth, or even in a myth, but rather in an uncertain cloud of theoretical possibilities which I was beginning to regard with increasing distrust. . . . So in the most natural way, I took it upon myself to get to know "my" myth, and I regarded this as the task of tasks, for—so I told myself—how could I, when treating my patients, make due allowance for the personal factor, for my personal equation, which is yet so necessary for a knowledge of the other person, if I was unconscious of it?

The study of myth had revealed to Jung his mythlessness. He then undertook to get to know his myth, his "personal equation." Thus we see that the self-experimentation that he undertook through exploring his own fantasy thinking was in part a direct response to theoretical questions raised by research that culminated in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*.

In conclusion, **THE BLACK BOOKS**, provide a unique window into the creative process of a major psychologist. At a textual level, they enable one to follow how Jung's scholarly reading provided resources that inspired his fantasy, moving him to imagine in a mythic way. By reflecting on these resources, he attempted to divine broad insights from them, first cast in a lyrical form in *Liber Novus* and subsequently in conceptual and theoretical forms in his scholarly writings. As a *document humain* and psychological record, **THE BLACK BOOKS**, chart Jung's attempt to resolve the twentieth-century crisis of meaning in his own person, and distill from this a means through psychotherapy for others to do likewise. In short, **THE BLACK BOOKS**, and *Liber Novus* together form the core of analytical psychology, and enable its historical genesis to be studied from its inception. Jung's work may now be seen in the round, and the intimate connections between the esoteric visionary cycles and the exoteric psychology may be grasped. Jung later recalled that his "entire life consisted in elaborating what had burst forth from the unconscious like an enigmatic stream and threatened to break me. . . . Everything later was merely the outer classification, the scientific elaboration, the integration into life. But the numinous beginning, which contained everything, was then." Thus **THE BLACK BOOKS**, enable one to enter the private laboratory of analytical psychology and follow the genesis of a visionary science: that is, how a psychology was born of the visionary imagination, which in turn could form a science of visions. <>

THE FIFTH CORNER OF FOUR: AN ESSAY ON BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS AND THE CATUSKOTI by Graham Priest [Oxford University Press, 9780198758716]

The book charts the development of Buddhist metaphysics, drawing on texts which include those of Nagarjuna and Dogen. The development is viewed through the lens of the Catuskoṭi. At its simplest, and as it appears in the earliest texts, this is a logical/metaphysical principle which says that every claim is true, false, both, or neither; but the principle itself evolves, assuming new forms as the metaphysics develops. An important step in the evolution incorporates ineffability. Such things make no sense from the perspective of a logic which endorses the principles of excluded middle and non-contradiction, which are standard fare in Western logic. However, the book shows how one can make sense of them by applying the techniques of contemporary non-classical logic, such as those of First Degree Entailment, and plurivalent logic. An important issue that emerges as the book develops is the notion of non-duality and its transcendence. This allows many of the threads of the book to be drawn together at its end. All matters are explained, as far as possible, in a way that is accessible to those with no knowledge of Buddhist philosophy or contemporary non-classical logic.

Review

"This book is simply beautiful. With its elegant cover art and comfortable size, it is a pleasure to look at, to hold, and to read. Moreover, Priest ... does a lovely job of tracing the evolution of Buddhism ... Highly recommended." -- G. Wrisley, *CHOICE*

"*The Fifth Corner of Four* may be most suitable for an audience trained in the field of Philosophy rather than Buddhist Studies." -- Ronald S. Green, Coastal Carolina University, *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*

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General Index

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way. — Charles Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, opening lines

There is not the slightest difference
Between cyclical existence and nirvāṇa.
There is not the slightest difference
Between nirvāṇa and cyclical existence.
Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, XXV: 19

Background

This is a book about certain aspects of Buddhist philosophy, notably its metaphysics and related matters. Buddhism, however, is no more one thing than is Christianity. Its thinking evolves over some two and a half thousand years in India, China, and other countries. In the process, several quite different metaphysical pictures emerge. This book tells a story of this evolution.

The evolution is seen through a certain lens, however: that of the *catuskoṭi*. At its simplest, this is a view to the effect that claims can be true, false, both, or neither. Of course, this makes little sense in logics which endorse the principle of non-contradiction or the principle of excluded middle—logics of the kind that the West (and some in the East) have tended to endorse. It makes perfectly good sense, however, from the perspective of some kinds of contemporary non-classical logic, as the book shows.

The *catuskoṭi* itself evolves, however, much of this in tandem with the evolution of the metaphysical views with which it is intertwined. So the book tells the story of this evolution too. We will see how contemporary non-classical logic can make sense of these developments as well.

The book proceeds, then, by charting the evolution of Buddhist metaphysics through appropriate texts, and analysing the role of the *catuskoṭi* in the process, explaining and developing the appropriate techniques of formal logic along the way. The interaction is to the benefit of both the metaphysics and the logic. The Buddhist metaphysical ideas show how the logical ideas are no mere formalism. Perhaps more importantly: on the other side, the logic shows how the metaphysical ideas can be made precise and so shown to be coherent.

Truth is, of course, another matter. The point of this book is not to argue for a particular view, but to tell a story of the engagement of certain views in metaphysics and logic. However, this does not imply that I will adopt a neutral attitude towards these views. I will often comment on how plausible they are, to what extent arguments used are sound, and so on. And as will be clear, I have more sympathy with some views than others.

Overview

I have divided the story up into three parts. The first part deals with matters as they pertain to the older form of Buddhism, which developed after the teachings of the historical Buddha until about the

turn of the Common Era. After a general background to Buddhist philosophy and its historical and geographical development in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 presents the *catuṣkoṭi* in its earliest form. Chapter 3 then describes the metaphysical picture that developed in that period. Later Buddhist thought was a reaction against this, and cannot be understood without it.

The second part of the book concerns these later developments in Indian Buddhism; in particular, aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Chapter 4 starts with the rise of this newer form of Buddhism in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*, a new class of sūtras that arose around the turn of the Common Era. It then shows how these ideas are developed in the metaphysical thought of Nāgārjuna—arguably the most important and influential Buddhist philosopher after the Buddha himself. The *catuṣkoṭi* is central to his thought; and in the process it evolves to take on a new form, as this chapter shows. By this time in the historical development, the notion of ineffability has become of central importance to Buddhist thought. This can be handed by a further development of the *catuṣkoṭi*.

Chapter 5 shows how. But texts that talk of the ineffable obviously court paradox. Chapter 6 shows how this can be handled by yet another development of the *catuṣkoṭi*.

For the third part of the book, to witness further developments, we move to East Asia, and some of the Sino-Japanese forms of Buddhism. In Chapter 7, we see how, at the hands of Jizang and the Sanlun School, the *catuṣkoṭi* morphs into a dialectical progress of Hegelian proportion.

Chapter 8 takes us into the metaphysics of the Huayan School, and further into the relationship between the conventional and the ultimate aspects of reality, a sticky talking-point of Buddhist philosophy ever since Nāgārjuna. Finally, Chapter 9 looks at the relation of all this to the Buddhist notion of enlightenment. We look, in particular, at the very distinctive form this takes in a third school of Chinese Buddhism, Chan (Zen). Much of this chapter deals with aspects of the thought of one of the most notable Zen philosophers, Dōgen.

In Chapter 4, we will meet the central philosophical notion of transcending duality. It will come fully into focus in Chapter 6. Much of the third part of the book deals with the notion in one way or another. The topic will allow many of the threads of the book to be tied together at its end.

A brief coda to the book takes the opportunity to reflect on the methodology employed in it, and some doubts one might have about this.

Clarificatory Comments

Let me now make some clarificatory comments on a few matters.

First, what the book is not. It is not a comprehensive history of the development of Buddhist metaphysics. There is much on that matter that does not feature significantly in the book, perhaps, most notably, the ideas of Indian Yogācāra Buddhism and Chinese Tiantai Buddhism.

More importantly, the book is not a scholarly work. I have neither the languages nor the patience to be a scholar. I am not trying to give an authoritative textual and historical interpretation of the texts we shall meet. The main aim of the book is to show how some ideas drawn from Buddhist texts and some ideas in contemporary non-classical logic can profitably inform each other. In the process, it is true, I do give interpretations of texts. (One cannot discuss texts without interpreting them; this is just Hermeneutics 100.) Many of the interpretations are not particularly contentious. Where this is not the case, I claim no more than that they hang together and make sense to me; and of course I hope that these are plausible—or at least interesting! And perhaps, where the interpretations are

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not standard, they may assume more plausibility when set within the framework I provide. I note that we are dealing with difficult historical texts, and there is much disagreement about how to interpret them, both in the Asian commentarial traditions themselves, and in the hands of Western scholars. So, let me emphasize again: I am happy to leave discussions of the correct interpretations of these texts (assuming such a notion to make sense) to those with the scholarly credentials to do so. That is *not* what I am engaged in here.

Further on texts: the classical Indian texts are written in two languages, the vernacular Pāli and the more scholarly Sanskrit. Rather than mix these up, I have opted to use the Sanskrit version of the Indian words we will meet. All the classical Chinese texts are written in the same language, but there are two conventions about how to transliterate the characters: the older Wade-Giles convention, and the newer Pin Yin convention. Again, rather than mix these up, I have decided to use Pin Yin. I have italicized the first occurrence of Sanskrit and Chinese words in the text, but not, generally, thereafter; and words that have become familiar English, like 'Mahāyāna', I have not italicized at all. A glossary of Chinese and Japanese characters is given before the Bibliography.

Which brings us to the texts themselves. Since I am in no position to translate them myself, I have used the translations of others. These texts are not at all easy to translate into English, and there can be significant differences between different translations. I hope that I have chosen ones that are reasonably authoritative. Translators' interpolations into the texts are marked by square brackets. On the rare occasions that I make an interpolation myself, I indicate that with my initials [GP: thus]. Italics, note, are always in the original quotations, unless I say otherwise.

Next, a word on dialetheism. A dialetheia is a true contradiction—that is, something of the form $A \wedge \neg A$ which is true; and dialetheism is the view that there are such things. This is a strongly unorthodox view in Western philosophy, though at least the coherence of the view is now coming to be accepted. The truth of dialetheism is not at issue in this book. However, as will be clear, I will be interpreting many thinkers and texts as dialetheic. This, it seems to me, is the natural way to read them. One of the virtues of the coherence of dialetheism is that when texts such as those we will be dealing with appear to endorse contradictions, we can, under appropriate conditions, take what is before our eyes literally, and so respect the integrity of the texts. We are not forced to misapply the principle of charity, and suppose their authors did not mean what they say.

In this context, it is worth quoting Tom Tillemans:

... it's fair to say that, in Buddhist studies at least, attributing contradictions to Nāgārjuna has increasingly fallen out of vogue, such an attribution being considered, by those of a philosophical bent, as tantamount to trivialisation of Madhyamaka's approach as exclusively mystical or even irrational. Some argue, more or less intuitively, that contradictions are rationally unthinkable. Others invoke a more sophisticated formal problem that anything and everything would follow from a contradiction, so that all reasoning would become indiscriminate; contradictions thus could supposedly never be tolerated by rational individuals on pain of "logical anarchy". In any case, the underlying idea is that, if the Madhyamaka is not to be trivialised—and I agree that it should not be so trivialised—it would have to rigorously respect the law of non-contradiction.

It should be noted that Tillemans himself is not against a dialetheic interpretation of early Mahāyāna texts, as his essay goes on to explain. And it must be said that many of 'those of a philosophical bent'

as Tillemans puts it—unlike Tillemans himself—knew nothing of developments in contemporary philosophical and formal logic (especially those concerning paraconsistency).

Finally, logic. Given what I am engaged in here, I cannot but use the techniques and symbolism of modern logic at many places in the book. In the chapters of the book, I have explained the logical matters in as informal a way as possible. The exposition does presuppose a very basic knowledge of contemporary logic, though not much. A familiarity with truth tables will suffice. I am aware, however,~that some readers of the book may not have the requisite background (particularly those coming from a background in Asian philosophy), so I have inserted an interlude in Chapter 2 which briefly presents ‘classical’ propositional logic. For those who wish to see how the technical details developed in the book can be spelled out with rigour, I have put these into technical appendices and the occasional footnote, which can be omitted without loss by those with no taste for such matters.

A Methodological Coda

The book has an unusual methodology, applying techniques of contemporary formal logic to ideas drawn from ancient and medieval Buddhist philosophical texts. This chapter comments on some reservations one might have about this methodology: that it ignores relevant religious, and especially experiential, aspects of Buddhism; that it is objectionably anachronistic; that it is Orientalist. The objections are found to be without substance.

This book tells a story. It is the story about Buddhist metaphysics, the *catuṣkoṭi*, and the interlaced evolution of the two. As for Dōgen’s vines, these twine around each other. The point is not to advocate any particular view—though views are certainly interrogated along the way. It is to show the integrity of the process. The techniques of contemporary non-classical logic are employed to help do so. Philosophical ideas are slippery; mathematical ideas much less so.

So as will be clear to anyone who reads this book, the methodology is somewhat unusual. I am working with ancient and medieval Buddhist texts, not from a religious, textual, or philological point view, but as part of a live contemporary philosophical discussion. Moreover, I am applying techniques of contemporary formal logic in the process. One might have some reservations about this methodology. The point of this coda is to address some such concerns.

First, Buddhism is a religion.¹ I have been concerned with but one aspect of it: its philosophy. It might be suggested that one cannot do justice to this if one is not a Buddhist, or at least, without taking other aspects of the religion into account. Now, it is absurd to suppose that one cannot engage with the philosophical basis of a religion if one is not a believer. That is like saying that one cannot engage with the philosophy of Plato, Aquinas, or Kant if one is not a Platonist, Thomist, or Kantian: you do not have to believe to understand. Nor does it do violence to the philosophy if one disengages it from its rituals, practices, power structures. The philosophical views have to stand on their own two feet. Indeed, it is not at all clear that these things could be germane in any way to an analysis of the philosophical basis of Buddhism.

There is one aspect of Buddhism that might give one pause here, though. In most Buddhisms, meditation—in some form or forms—is an important practice. Indeed, most Buddhists hold that it is only with this that one can come face to face with ultimate reality (whatever that is supposed to be

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in the form of Buddhism in question). Now, I do not want to deny that meditative experience may be an important part of Buddhist *religion*. Perhaps it might even be used as an argument for the existence of ultimate reality.² However, what I would contest is that it is necessary to have such an experience to understand Buddhist *philosophy*.³ You do not have to have an experience of something to understand that there might be such a thing, or to appreciate the arguments for there being such a thing, or the consequences of there being such a thing. Thus, I have never been a woman or an Australian Aboriginal. So perhaps I cannot really know how it *feels* to be marginalized by a white male society; but I understand patriarchy and racism very well: how they work, and their effects. Or again, I have never experienced a Christian miracle; but I understand very well what such things are supposed to be, the arguments for their existence, and their supposed consequences. Nor does this lack of experience imply that I cannot judge that there are no such things. That belief, if rational, can be formed on quite other bases.

Let us turn to a more substantial matter: my philosophical methodology itself. One might hold that the use of contemporary formal methods is temporally incongruous. Of course it is, in one sense. These techniques are far beyond the conceptual horizon of the actors in our drama. But the question is whether the use is objectionably so. I think not. Philosophy is a dynamically evolving enterprise, and we are just a lot clearer nowadays about a number of things than historical philosophers were. This is not because we are smarter, but because we have had longer to think about these things. We have also developed new and useful tools—such as those of contemporary formal logic. These can be helpful in analysing philosophical views and arguments, both to help articulate them more clearly, and to analyse their pros and cons. Refusing to use these insights and tools when they are available is perverse. It's like refusing to use DNA analysis when analysing some historical situation, just because those involved in it had no knowledge of DNA. Neither is there anything special about Asian philosophy in this regard. Philosophers can, and frequently do, use contemporary ideas and techniques in the investigation of Plato, Aquinas, Kant, and a whole host of other Western philosophers and philosophical traditions.

Would the actors in the drama of this book have used those insights and tools had they been available to them? I see no reason why not. They were all thoughtful people, and were certainly not averse to novelty. Indeed, many of them were responsible for developing novelties of their own. I might add, also, that the benefit of the engagement here is not unidirectional. The issues that our historical philosophers were dealing with can certainly benefit from engagement with the novel. But the novel also benefits by engagement with history. We can and do come to see new aspects of contemporary ideas and tools—in formal logic and elsewhere—in the process.

Recall that my project here is not simply one of describing what is in texts—though the book clearly engages in this. I am taking ideas arguably to be found in the texts, and articulating, analysing, and evaluating them, employing all the resources of modern logic and philosophy at my disposal.

This brings us to the third concern one might have. I am taking ideas in Asian philosophy and treating them as a contemporary Western philosopher does. One might be concerned that I am committing the sin of what Edward Said called Orientalism. Orientalism is an attitude of paternalism and systematic misrepresentation of Asia, in the cause of privileging things Western over things Eastern. It is often connected with colonial and imperialistic attitudes. Am I doing this? Not at all.

First, I do not want to deny for a moment that European powers have a grim history when it comes to other cultures (and many other things for that matter). It is clear to anyone who has a knowledge

of some basic facts of history that the European countries have often invaded, subjugated, and colonized other parts of the world. They have committed genocide; they have used its peoples; they have taken its wealth; they have appropriated whatever they wished to help themselves to. The attitude that the oppressors had a superior culture was certainly an integral part of the legitimization of this.

But that is no part of what is going on here. I am certainly engaging with Asian ideas, and from the perspective of a contemporary Western philosopher. I cannot do otherwise. I cannot change the facts concerning the place in which I was born, the culture in which I grew up, the education I received. And in some sense, I suppose, one might say that I am appropriating Asian ideas:⁴ I am certainly deploying them, discussing them, sometimes criticizing them. But my attitude is anything *but* one of devaluation and patronization. I am engaging with these views precisely because I find them important, interesting, and worthy of thought and investigation. I would hardly write a book about them otherwise.

Naturally, being a philosopher, I am critical of some of these views. Does this show a lack of respect? Not at all. The way one shows respect in philosophy is precisely by engaging with ideas: not by ignoring them; not by mothballing them; but by treating them as part of an ongoing philosophical investigation and dialogue. That is how philosophy, both East and West, has always been done. I might point out that this is exactly how I (and many other philosophers) treat ideas from the history of Western philosophy too. And the culture, language, social institutions, etc., of ancient Greece and medieval Europe are just as alien to me as those of ancient India and China. In no way does that show a lack of respect for the philosophy that comes from *those* times and places. On the contrary, it shows that I value its importance.

After many decades, if not centuries, when Western philosophers had a somewhat lamentable knowledge of the Asian philosophical traditions—if any at all—and it was common to hear Western philosophers declaim (largely out of ignorance) that such things were not philosophy at all, but religion, mysticism, simply oracular pronouncements, things are slowly changing. Western philosophers are starting to engage with Asian texts, learn the languages in which they are written, and integrate the ideas contained into their philosophical thinking. (Such, of course, is a commonplace with respect to ancient and medieval Western philosophy.) This is a development highly to be welcomed. It does not privilege Western ideas. On the contrary: both Eastern and Western ideas are developed in a conversation of equal respect and mutual benefit. (Asian philosophers themselves have been engaged in this inter-cultural process for at least a century.) This book is part of that process.

Notes:

(¹) Though I have heard this denied by some Western thinkers who (parochially) cannot believe that a religion can have no god. However, Buddhism, like all religions, has its world view, ethics, sacred texts, sacred places, practices, rituals, priesthoods, hierarchies, soteriology. I defy anyone to engage with Buddhist institutions, rituals, and practices and still claim that this is not a religion.

(²) Though I am dubious of this. No religious experience is self-certifying. Believers may interpret it in certain ways, but there is always a question of the correctness of their interpretation.

(3) And it can hardly be claimed that an understanding of philosophy is irrelevant to Buddhist religion. After all, *right view* is the first of the octet of the Fourth Noble Truth; and all schools of Buddhism—even Zen—study texts and their meanings.

(4) The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines *to appropriate* as follows: ‘to take something for one’s own use, typically without the owner’s permission’. There is no way, of course, I can seek the permission of those who came up with the ideas I have been discussing: they are long since dead. In my work I have frequently appropriated the ideas of many Western philosophers in exactly the same way. <>

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE INDIAN BUDDHIST CLASSICS, VOLUME. I: *THE PHYSICAL WORLD* compiled and Introduction by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, edited by Thupten Jinpa, translated by Ian Coghlan Wisdom Publications, 9781614294726]

Explore the nature of our material world in a unique sourcebook, conceived by the Dalai Lama, collecting the scientific observations found in classical Buddhist treatises.

Under the visionary supervision of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, **SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE INDIAN BUDDHIST CLASSICS** brings together classical Buddhist explorations of the nature of our material world and the human mind and puts them into context for the modern reader. It is the Dalai Lama’s view that the explorations by the great masters of northern India in the first millennium CE still have much that is of interest today, whether we are Buddhist or not.

VOLUME I, THE PHYSICAL WORLD, explores the nature of our material world—from the macroscopic to the microscopic. It begins with an overview of the many frameworks, such as the so-called five aggregates, that Buddhist thinkers have used to examine the nature and scope of reality. Topics include sources of knowledge, the scope of reason, the nature and constituents of the material world, theories of the atom, the nature of time, the formation of the universe, and the evolution of life, including a detailed explanation of the early Buddhist theories on fetal development. The volume even contains a brief presentation on early theories about the structure and function of the brain and the role of microorganisms inside the human body. The book weaves together passages from the works of great Buddhist thinkers such as Asanga, Vasubandhu, Nagarjuna, Dignaga, and Dharmakirti. Each of the major topics is introduced by Thupten Jinpa, the Dalai Lama’s principal English-language translator and founder of the Institute of Tibetan Classics.

Review

“**SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE INDIAN BUDDHIST CLASSICS, VOLUME. I: THE PHYSICAL WORLD** offers a rare gift of wisdom from the ancient world to the modern reader. The editors have curated a rich treasure of the philosophy and maps of the mind that have their origins in the early centuries of Indian thought, were preserved in translation for centuries in Tibet, and now are brought to all of us in this translation.” -- Daniel Goleman, author of *Emotional Intelligence*

“This remarkable set of volumes will be of great interest to any student, scholar, or scientist who wishes to better understand the depth and complexity of the Indian Buddhist tradition. Surprising in

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their detailed consideration of the senses, particles, time, cosmology, fetal development, and the brain, these volumes are destined to become the resource for cross-disciplinary dialogue between Buddhism and science for many years to come.” -- Richard J. Davidson, Founder, Center for Healthy Minds, University of Wisconsin-Madison

“SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE INDIAN BUDDHIST CLASSICS, VOLUME. I: *THE PHYSICAL WORLD* will quickly become an invaluable resource for all those interested in a cross-cultural understanding of science and the history of ideas. Volume I offers a comprehensive treatment of the physical world drawn from the writings of India’s greatest Buddhist philosophers, with an introduction by the Dalai Lama and contextual essays by the eminent scholar Thupten Jinpa. As we seek a multicultural and global perspective on the nature of reality, this volume and those to follow will certainly make a crucial contribution.” -- Arthur Zajonc, emeritus professor of physics, Amherst College

“The genesis of science that took place in South Asia was just as demanding in terms of empirical accuracy, explanatory standards, and theoretical ingenuity as science in the West. Unlike modern science, however, it included the experience of meditation among its basic sources of knowledge. This broadening of the empirical horizon promises to trigger a new Renaissance. We are fortunate that the editors here have offered us such a clear presentation of this exceptional resource.” -- Michel Bitbol, CNRS (The National Center for Scientific Research), Paris

“Situated in their rich contexts by a superb set of introductory essays, these classic texts reveal a breadth of original thought and observation that presents the modern reader with challenging concepts but rewards them with novel insights.” -- Kevan A. C. Martin, Director, Institute of Neuroinformatics, University of Zurich

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE INDIAN BUDDHIST CLASSICS: VOLUME 2 *THE MIND*

Conceived and Introduced by His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
Developed by the Compendium Compilation Committee,
edited by Thupten Jinpa, translated by Dechen Rochard and
John D. Dunne, contextual essays by John D. Dunne
[Wisdom Publications, 9781614294740]

The second volume in a prominent new series on Buddhism and science, directed by the Dalai Lama and previously covered by the BBC.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE INDIAN BUDDHIST CLASSICS: VOLUME 2 *THE MIND* compiles classical Buddhist explorations of the nature of our material world, the human mind, logic, and phenomenology and puts them into context for the modern reader.

This ambitious four-volume series—a major resource for the history of ideas and especially the history of science and philosophy—has been conceived by and compiled under the visionary

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supervision of His Holiness the Dalai Lama himself. It is his view that the exploratory thinking of great Indian masters in the first millennium CE still has much that is of interest to us today, whether we are Buddhist or not. These volumes make those insights accessible.

This, the second volume in the series, focuses on the science of the mind. Readers are first introduced to Buddhist conceptions of mind and consciousness and then led through traditional presentations of mental phenomena to reveal a Buddhist vision of the inner world with fascinating implications for the contemporary disciplines of cognitive science, psychology, emotion research, and philosophy of mind. Major topics include:

- The distinction between sensory and conceptual processes and the pan-Indian notion of mental consciousness
- Mental factors—specific mental states such as attention, mindfulness, and compassion—and how they relate to one another
- The unique tantric theory of subtle levels of consciousness, their connection to the subtle energies, or “winds,” that flow through channels in the human body, and what happens to each when the body and mind dissolve at the time of death
- The seven types of mental states and how they impact the process of perception
- Styles of reasoning, which Buddhists understand as a valid avenue for acquiring sound knowledge

In the final section, the volume offers what might be called Buddhist contemplative science, a presentation of the classical Buddhist understanding of the psychology behind meditation and other forms of mental training.

To present these specific ideas and their rationale, the volume weaves together passages from the works of great Buddhist thinkers like Asanga, Vasubandhu, Nagarjuna, Dignaga, and Dharmakirti. His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s introduction outlines scientific and philosophical thinking in the history of the Buddhist tradition. To provide additional context for Western readers, each of the six major topics is introduced with an essay by John D. Dunne, distinguished professor of Buddhist philosophy and contemplative practice at the University of Wisconsin. These essays connect the traditional material to contemporary debates and Western parallels, and provide helpful suggestions for further reading.

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MY ENCOUNTER WITH SCIENCE

by the Buddhist monk Tenzin Gyatso, the Dalai Lama, Introduction translated into English by Thupten Jinpa

In my childhood I had a keen interest in playing with mechanical toys. After reaching India in 1959, I developed a strong wish to engage with scientists to help expand my own knowledge of science as well as to explore the question of the relationship between science and religion. The main reason for my confidence in engaging with scientists rested in the Buddha's following statement:

Monks and scholars, just as you test gold
by burning, cutting, and polishing it,
so too well examine my speech.

Do not accept it merely out of respect.

The Buddha advises his disciples to carefully analyze when they engage with the meaning of his words, just as a goldsmith tests the purity of gold through burning, cutting, and rubbing. Only after we have gained conviction through such inquiry, the Buddha explains, is it appropriate to accept the validity of his words. It is not appropriate to believe something simply because one's teacher has taught it. Even with regard to what he himself taught, the Buddha says, we must test its validity for ourselves through experimentation and the use of reason. The testimony of scriptures alone is not sufficient. This profound advice demonstrates the centrality of sound reasoning when it comes to exploring the question of reality.

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In Buddhism in general, and for the Nālandā masters of classical India in particular, when it comes to examining the nature of reality, the evidence of direct perception is accorded greater authority than both reason-based inference and scripture. For if one takes a scripture to be an authority in describing the nature of reality, then that scripture too must first be verified as authoritative by relying on another scriptural testimony, which in turn must be verified by another scripture, and so on, leading to an infinite regress. Furthermore, a scripture-based approach can offer no proof or rebuttals against alternative standpoints proposed by opponents who do not accept the validity of that scripture. Even among scriptures, some can be accepted as literal while some cannot, giving us no reliable standpoints on the nature of reality. It is said that to cite scripture as an authority in the context of inquiring into the nature of reality indicates a misguided intelligence. To do so precludes us from the ranks of those who uphold reason.

In science we find a similar approach. Scientists take experimentation and the logic of mathematics as arbiters of truth when it comes to evaluating the conclusions of their research; they do not ground validity in the authority of some other person. This method of critical inquiry, one that draws inferences about the unobservable, such as atomic particles, based on observed facts that are evident to our direct perception, is shared by both Buddhism and contemporary science. Once I saw this shared commitment, it greatly increased my confidence in engaging with modern scientists.

With instruments like microscopes and telescopes and with mathematical calculations, scientists have been able to carefully analyze phenomena from atomic particles to distant planets. What can be observed by the senses is enhanced by means of these instruments, allowing scientists to gain new inferences about various facts. Whatever hypothesis science puts forth must be verified by observation-based experiments, and similarly Buddhism asserts that the evidence of direct perception must ultimately underpin critical inquiry. Thus with respect to the way conclusions are drawn from evidence and reasoning, Buddhism and science share an important similarity. In Buddhism, however, empirical observation is not confined to the five senses alone; it has a wider meaning, since it includes observations derived from meditation. This meditation-based empirical observation grounded in study and contemplation is also recognized as part of the means of investigating reality, akin to the role scientific method plays in scientific inquiry.

Since my first visit to the West, a trip to Europe in 1973, I have had the opportunity to engage in conversations with great scientists, including the noted twentieth-century philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper, the quantum physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, who was the brother of the last West German president and also a colleague of the famed quantum physicists Werner Heisenberg and David Bohm. Over many years I have had the chance to engage in dialogues with scientists on a range of topics, such as cosmology, neurobiology, evolution, and physics, especially subatomic-particle physics. This latter discipline of particle physics shares methods strikingly similar to those found in Buddhism, such as the Mind Only school's critique of the external material world that reveals that nothing can be found when matter is deconstructed into its constitutive elements, and similarly the statements found in the Middle Way school treatises that nothing can be found when one searches for the real referents behind our concepts and their associated terms. I have also on numerous occasions had dialogues with scientists from the fields of psychology and the science of mind, sharing the perspectives of the Indian tradition in general, which contains techniques of cultivating calm abiding and insight, and the Buddhist sources in particular, with its detailed presentations on mind science.

Today we live in an age when the power of science is so pervasive that no culture or society can escape its impact. In a way, there was no choice but for me to learn about science and embrace it with a sense of urgency. I also saw the potential for an emerging discourse on the science of mind. Recognizing this, and wishing to explore how science and its fruits can become a constructive force in the world and serve the basic human drive for happiness, I have engaged in dialogue with scientists for many years. My sincere hope is that these dialogues across cultures and disciplines will inspire new ways to promote both physical and mental well-being and thus serve humanity through a unique interface of contemporary science and mind science. Thus, when I engage in conversations with scientists, such as in the ongoing Mind and Life Dialogues, I have the following two aims.

The first concerns expanding the scope of science. Not only is the breadth of the world's knowledge vast, advances are being made year by year that expand human knowledge. Science, however, right from its inception and especially once it began to develop quickly, has been concerned primarily with the world of matter. Unsurprisingly, then, contemporary science focuses on the physical world. Because of this, not much inquiry in science has been made into the nature of the person—the inquirer—as well as into how memory arises, the nature of happiness and suffering, and the workings of emotion. Science's advances in the domain of the physical world have been truly impressive. From the perspective of human experience, however, there are dimensions of reality that undoubtedly lie outside the current domain of scientific knowledge. It is of vital importance that the science of mind takes its place among the current fields of human investigation. The brain-based explanations in contemporary science about the different classes of sensory experience will be enriched by incorporating a more expanded and detailed understanding of the mind. So my first goal in my dialogues with scientists is to help make the current field of psychology or mind science more complete.

Not only do Buddhism and science have much to learn from each other, but there is also a great need for a way of knowing that encompasses both body and mind. For as human beings we experience happiness and suffering not only physically but mentally as well. If our goal is to promote human happiness, we have a real opportunity to pursue a new kind of science that explores methods to enhance happiness through the interface of contemporary science with contemplative mind science. It is my belief that, while acknowledging the great contribution that science has made in advancing human knowledge, our ultimate aim should always be to help create a comprehensive approach to understanding our world.

This takes us to the second goal behind my dialogues with scientists— how best to ensure that science serves humanity. As humans, we face two kinds of problems, those that are essentially our own creation and those owing to natural forces. Since the first kind is created by we humans ourselves, its solution must also be within our human capacity. In contemporary human society, we do not lack knowledge, but the persistence of problems that are our own creation clearly demonstrates that we lack effective solutions to these problems. The obstacle to solving these problems is the presence in the human mind of excessive self-centeredness, attachment, anger, greed, discrimination, envy, competitiveness, and so on. Such problems also stem from deficits in our consideration of others, compassion, tolerance, conscientiousness, insight, and so on. Since many of the world's great religions carry extensive teachings on these values, I have no doubt that such teachings can serve humanity through helping to overcome the human-made problems we face.

The primary purpose of science is also to benefit and serve humanity. Discoveries in science have brought concrete benefits in medicine, the environment, commerce, travel, working conditions, and human relationships. There is no doubt that science has brought great benefits when it comes to alleviating suffering at the physical level. However, since mental suffering is connected with our perception and attitude, material progress is not enough. Even in countries where science has flourished greatly, problems like theft and violent disputes persist. As long as the mind remains filled with greed, anger, conceit, envy, and so on, no matter how perfect our material facilities, a life of genuine happiness is not possible. In contrast, if we possess qualities like contentment and loving kindness, we can enjoy a life of happiness even without great material facilities. Happiness in life is primarily a function of the state of the mind.

If contemporary society were to pay more attention to the science of mind, and more importantly, if science were to engage more with societal concerns, including fundamental human values, I believe that this could lead to great advancement and novel outcomes. Although science has not concerned itself with the enhancement of ethics and the cultivation of basic human values such as kindness, since science has emerged as a means to serve humanity, it should never be completely divorced from the values that are of great importance to the flourishing of human society.

In Indian philosophical traditions in general, and in Buddhism in particular, one finds many techniques for training the mind, such as the cultivation of calm abiding (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipassanā*). These definitely have the potential to make important contributions to contemporary psychology as well as to the field of education. The mental-training techniques developed in these traditions are uniquely potent for alleviating mental suffering and promoting greater inner peace. So my second goal for my dialogues with contemporary scientists is to see how these techniques, as well as their underlying insights, can be best harnessed to the task of transforming our contemporary education system so that our society does not suffer from a deficit in basic ethics.

Today no aspect of human life is not impacted by science and technology. Science occupies a central place in both our personal and our professional lives. It is critically important that we reflect on the ultimate purpose of science, on what larger consequences and impact science can have in our world. In the early part of the twentieth century, many believed that the spread of science would erode faith in religion. Yet today, in the beginning of this twenty-first century, there seems to be a renewed interest in ethics in general and, in particular, the insights of those ancient traditions that contain systematic presentations of mind science and philosophy.

Three Domains in the Subject Matter of Buddhist Texts

In our society, all sorts of immoral acts are committed on a regular basis. We observe murder, theft, cheating, violence against others, exploitation of the weak, misuse of public goods, abuse of alcohol and other addictive substances, and disregard for societal responsibility. We also see people suffer from social isolation, from vengefulness, envy, extreme competitiveness, and anxiety. I see all these as consequences primarily of our neglect of ethics and basic human qualities such as kindness. It is essential for us to pay attention to the means that would help promote basic ethics. The profound interdependence of today's world calls us to create a society permeated by kindness.

What kind of foundation is necessary for this? Since religion-based ethical teachings are grounded in the philosophical views of their respective faith traditions, an ethics contingent on religion alone will exclude those who are not religious. If ethics is contingent on religion, it will be ignored by those

who adhere to no religious faith. We do not need to be religious to see the value of kindness; we can discern it by observing our everyday life. Even animals survive by relying on the care of others.

Furthermore, impulses for empathy, kindness, helpfulness, and tolerance seem naturally present in small infants, well before the influence of religious faith begins. Looking to these innate qualities and their associated behaviors as a foundation, I have striven to promote an approach to ethics and basic human values that does not rely on the perspectives of a specific religious tradition. My reason is simply this: we can enjoy a life of peace and happiness without religion. In contrast, if we are divorced from human love and kindness, our very survival is at risk; even if we do survive, our life becomes devoid of joy and trapped in loneliness.

We can promote ethics on the basis of a specific religion, but prioritizing the perspective of one religion over others is problematic in today's deeply interconnected and global society, which is characterized by a multiplicity of religions and cultures. For an approach to the promotion of ethics to be universal, it must appeal to the fundamental values we share as human beings. If we neglect these basic human values, who can we blame for the negative consequences? Thus, when I speak of secular ethics, I am speaking of these fundamental values that are inherent to human nature, and that are in fact the very foundation of the ethical teachings of the world's religious traditions.

Historically, there have been societies where respect was accorded to the perspectives of both believers and nonbelievers. For example, although the materialist Cārvāka school was the object of vehement critiques from other schools in ancient India, it was a custom to refer to the upholders of that viewpoint in honorific terms. Consonant with this ancient tradition, when India gained its independence in the twentieth century, the country adopted a secular constitution independent of any specific religious faith. This establishment of a secular constitution was not to show disrespect for religion; it was to promote peaceful coexistence among all religious faiths. One of the major forces behind the adoption of this secular constitution was Mahatma Gandhi, himself a deeply religious person. Conscious of this important historical precedent, I feel no apprehension in promoting a secular universal approach to ethics.

My own personal view is that, in general, people should remain within their own traditional religions. Changing faith can lead to difficulties for oneself, and it can also undermine the basis of interreligious harmony. With this belief I have never harbored any intention to make converts or convince followers of other religions to become Buddhists. What is appropriate for believers is to contribute to the common good by practicing those aspects of the teachings that can serve humanity as a whole. Such teachings are definitely present in all the world's main religions.

Within Buddhism, for example, I see two things with the greatest potential to serve everyone, regardless of their faith. One is the presentation on the nature of reality, or "science," as found in the Buddhist treatises, and the second encompasses the methods or techniques for training the mind to alleviate mental suffering and promote greater inner peace. In this regard it is important to differentiate among three distinct domains within the subject matter of the Buddhist sources: the presentations (1) on the natural world, or science, (2) on philosophy, and (3) on religious beliefs and practice. In general, when one speaks of religion or religious practice, it is linked with faith in a source of refuge. In this religious sense, Buddhism, too, is relevant only to Buddhists and has no particular connection to those who follow other religions and those who have no religious faith. Clearly presentations rooted in religious faith are not universally applicable, especially when we

recall that among today's world population, as many as a billion human beings identify themselves as nonbelievers.

Buddhist philosophy contains aspects, such as the principle of dependent arising, that can be relevant and beneficial even to those outside the Buddhist faith. This philosophy of dependent arising can of course conflict with standpoints that espouse a belief in a self-arisen absolute being or an eternal soul, but for others, this philosophy can help expand their outlook and enable them to see things in life from multiple angles, which prevents the narrow fixation that blames everything on a single cause or condition. I see great benefit in extracting the scientific and philosophical explorations found in Buddhist texts and presenting them independently of the strictly religious teachings. This allows someone who is not Buddhist to learn about the Buddhist scientific explorations of reality as well as Buddhist philosophical insights. It also gives many people the opportunity to learn how Buddhist traditions have developed their worldview and their philosophical outlook on the ultimate nature of reality.

Take, for example, the Buddha's first teaching, the four noble truths, which is common to all Buddhist traditions. In this teaching, we can observe a clear differentiation among the "ground" (the nature of reality), the path, and the result. The statements on the nature of the four truths, e.g., "This is the noble truth of suffering," present the ground; the statements on the function of the truths, e.g., "Suffering is to be known," present the path; and the statements pertaining to the agent and the fruits of the path, e.g., "Suffering is to be known, yet there is nothing to be known," explain how the result of the path comes to be actualized. My point is that, whether the presentation is of philosophy or of ethical precepts, the fundamental approach in the Buddhist texts is to ground them in an understanding of the nature of reality.

In what is called the Mahāyāna, or Great Vehicle, too, the presentation on the two truths (conventional and ultimate) is the ground, the presentation of the two aspects (method and wisdom) is the path, and the presentation of the two buddha bodies (the form and truth bodies) is the result. All of these are grounded in an understanding of the nature of reality. Even in the case of the highest aim in Buddhism—the attainment of the two buddha bodies, or the buddhahood that is the embodiment of the four buddha bodies—the potency to actualize these aims can be found in the innate mind of clear light that resides naturally within us. The presentations found in the Buddhist sources are developed on the basis of an understanding of the nature of reality. If we look at the way the words of the Buddha were interpreted in the treatises composed by the great Buddhist thinkers of the past, such as the masters of Nālandā University, there too the subject matter of the entire corpus of Buddhist texts, including those that were translated into Tibetan running into more than three hundred volumes, fall into the threefold classification of the ground, the path, and the result.

As stated, the content of the Buddhist texts can be grouped within the three domains of (1) the nature of reality, or science, (2) philosophical tenets or views, and (3) religious practice, namely the presentation of the path and the way in which the results of the path are actualized. I see great benefits if we engage with the works in the Kangyur (the scriptures) and Tengyur (the treatises) on the basis of critically examining whether their contents present science, philosophy, or religious practice.

Buddhist Presentations on Reality or Buddhist Science

In brief, the presentation of the nature of reality or science in the classical Buddhist texts can be summarized in the following four major topics: (1) the nature of the physical world, (2) the presentation of the mind, the cognizing subject, (3) how the mind engages its object, and (4) the science of logical reasoning by means of which the mind understands its object. The first topic, the nature of the physical world, as well as the presentation of the philosophical outlook and methods of inquiry underlying Buddhist science, were covered in volume I of the series. So in this introduction I will focus my discussion on the remaining three topics, which are the topics covered in the present volume.

The Mind, the Cognizing Subject

In general, the word *science* refers to a body of knowledge about the world obtained through a method that is verifiable by anyone who repeats the same experiment. The term can thus refer both to the body of knowledge acquired and to the method used to acquire it. In other words, *science* can refer to a specific systematic method of inquiry. For example, when a scientist investigates a particular question, he or she first develops a hypothesis. Through experiments certain results are revealed, and these findings are then subjected to confirmation by a second or a third party, such as one's colleagues. When the findings of different scientists converge, these findings come to be accepted as part of the canon of scientific knowledge. The way such discoveries are made is characterized as the scientific method. This basic feature of the scientific method seems to accord with two of the three criteria of existence proposed in the Buddhist Madhyamaka texts: that it is (1) known by a conventional valid cognition and that it is (2) not contravened by some other conventional valid cognition.

Discussions of the nature of cognition or the science of mind in Buddhist sources define what is cognition, categorize the types of mind, and explore those categorized minds in detail. For example, when cognitions are differentiated, we find such twofold classifications as the division into sensory and mental cognition, which is made on the basis of whether a cognition is dependent on a physical sense faculty. There is also the twofold classification of valid versus nonvalid cognition, based on whether a given cognition is veridical. A distinction is drawn also between conceptual and nonconceptual processes, based on whether a cognition engages with its object through applying a conceptual category, such as "This is so and so," and on whether a universal image is involved in the cognition. A distinction is also drawn between the mind, which is primary, and its concomitant mental factors on the basis of whether it cognizes its object as a whole or whether it apprehends specific attributes of its object. A differentiation is made between mistaken and nonmistaken cognition based on whether the object of that awareness exists in the way that it appears to that cognition. Also, in terms of its object, a distinction is made between reflexive awareness and objective awareness. Finally, based on the ways they engage their objects, there is the sevenfold taxonomy of cognition—(1) distorted cognition, (2) doubt, (3) correct assumption, (4) indeterminate perception, (5) direct perception, (6) inferential understanding, and (7) subsequent cognition (part 4).

The Buddhist sources on mind science also explore in great detail such topics as the nature of the mental factors and their divisions, their specific functions, the process by which they arise, and their inter-relations (part 2). They also explore the nature of ignorance, and the question of how ignorance that is a distorted cognition gives rise to inappropriate attention, which in turn gives rise to afflictions like attachment and aversion, and how attachment and aversion give rise to other

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destructive emotions like pride, jealousy, and so on, which disturb one's mental equilibrium. Likewise, they address how attachment gives rise to mental excitation and distraction to external stimuli, and how mental laxity leads to the loss of alert awareness of the chosen object. The sources also deal with the question of how mental dullness arises, which makes the mind unserviceable and brings unclarity to the mind, as if darkness has come to settle. These sources also present ways to cultivate their counteragents, such as wisdom that helps differentiate the specific characteristics of phenomena, love, empathy, forbearance, confidence, mindfulness, and meta-awareness. In short, these texts present the techniques for enhancing qualities such as those cited and also for cultivating concentration that is characterized by single-pointedness of mind, which enhances one's capacity to sustain single-pointed attention for prolonged periods (part 6).

In brief, these Buddhist sources identify over a hundred distinct mental factors and explain how certain types of mental factors act as antidotes to other factors, and how this law of contradiction within the mental world facilitates the possibility of eliminating certain types of afflictions through enhancing the power of their counteragents. Thus this science of mind found in the Buddhist sources is something meaningful with a potential to benefit the more than seven billion human beings on Earth.

The Buddhist sources also present various levels of subtlety of consciousness. For example, consciousness during the waking state is considered grosser, consciousness in dream state comparatively subtler, and compared to that, consciousness during deep sleep is subtler still. There is also the differentiation of consciousness into the threefold category of gross, subtle, and very subtle. Within this classification, the first encompasses the five sense perceptions, the second includes the six root afflictions as well as the eighty indicative conceptions, while the third, very subtle level of consciousness, includes the minds of the four empty states. Even among the minds of the four empty states, differentiations of subtlety can still be drawn. For example, compared to the innate mind of clear light, the three minds of luminosity are grosser, while the innate mind of clear light is understood to be the most subtle level of consciousness. This innate mind is characterized as energy-wind from the point of view of its movement toward an object, and as consciousness from the point of view of awareness (part 3).

An important set of topics within the Buddhist science of mind include how, given that the adventitious stains do not reside in the mind's essential nature, the essential nature of mind is that of clear light; how the continuum of this luminous and knowing reality is stable since it has no beginning; and how the qualities of the mind have the potential for limitless enhancement, for once perfected they do not require exertion of new efforts.⁸ These above points are so critical that anyone who lacks deeper knowledge of these will only have partial understanding of the great Buddhist treatises.

Similarly, there are ideas and insights in Buddhist epistemological treatises, such as those of Dig nāga and Dharmakīrti, that can enrich contemporary cognitive science. These include, among others, the presentations on the nature of sensory cognitions, the logical reasoning establishing how sensory cognitions are devoid of conceptualization, how thoughts engage actual reality via the medium of universals, the characteristics of universals, how general terms and cognition of universals apply to the plurality of particulars, and the various arguments put forth to demonstrate the unreality of general characteristics.

How the Mind Engages Its Object

Based on how a given object appears to the mind, a distinction is drawn between negatively characterized phenomena and positive phenomena. Similarly, based on whether the given cognition engages its object due to the object casting its form to it, there is the distinction between cognitions that engage by way of exclusion and those that engage by way of affirmation. There is also the distinction between identity and difference based on how thoughts conceive their objects, because when the object universal of a thing appears to a thought, it does so either as singular or plural. Similarly, what is essentially a single entity can be understood to possess conceptually distinct attributes, with one serving as the basis for inferring the other; for instance, being a *product* can help infer something to be *impermanent*, although that which is a product and that which is impermanent are one and the same entity. Also when a single cognition takes something as an object, one can distinguish two aspects of such cognition, the way it appears and the way it is apprehended, so a distinction can be drawn between the mind's appearing object and its object as cognized. The latter is known also as the engaged object, for when the person engages with that object just as apprehended by that cognition, he or she is not deceived. Similarly, a thing can be characterized as the object or focus of a given cognition because it serves as the basis for the mind to eliminate false conceptualizations (part 4).

These Buddhist sources also contain debates on whether sensory cognitions perceive their objects by assuming an image of the object being perceived. Those who advocate this notion of the object image state that when sensory cognitions perceive their objects, they do so by having a likeness of the object appear to the mind. If this is not the case, they argue, one will not be able to account for the diversity of perceptions that one can experience in relation to even a single object. Those who reject the notion of images argue that if sensory cognitions perceive via the medium of such images, this would mean that they do not directly perceive their objects, and furthermore, there is no evidence for the existence of external objects that are not perceptible by the senses (part 4).

The Science of Logical Reason by Means of Which the Mind Understands Its Object

The science of reasoning represents the means by which the mind engages its object, and it is like a key that helps open the doors to the secrets of reality that remain hidden from our senses. The science of logical reasoning is therefore extremely important. The basis for the application of logical reason lies in the four principles of reason, which we discussed in volume I (pages 10–12). The important topics covered in the Buddhist sources on logical reasoning include the characteristics necessary for a valid proof, the logical relationship between the evidence and the thesis being proven, and so on. Although, in general, one can infer the presence of something related on the basis of its relationship to something else, not all specific characteristics of that related thing can be inferred. For example, one can infer a cause from the presence of its effect, and similarly, one can draw inferences based on a shared essential nature; however, not all features of the cause or the thing can be inferred through such types of reasoning (part 5).

Also, based on the logical relationship that exists between the evidence and the thesis within a given syllogism, correct evidence is classified into three categories (effect evidence, nature evidence, and evidence consisting in nonperception). Within the category of effect evidence, depending on how the syllogism is presented in line with the intention of the person to whom it is directed, five types of effect evidence are distinguished in Buddhist sources. As for nature evidence, a differentiation is made into two types, based on whether the term that states the evidence indicates an activity of a person. Within the class of evidence consisting in nonperception also, two types are identified based

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on whether the nonperception takes the form of the nonperception of a fact that is logically related to what is being negated or whether the nonperception is being proven on the basis of the perception of an incompatible fact. In general, in the case of something that exists but lies beyond our perception, mere nonperception cannot prove its nonexistence. Nonetheless, even here, one can demonstrate the inappropriateness of a claim on the basis of the absence of its knowledge. In contexts where a fact under discussion is something that would be perceivable were it present, here nonperception can lead to correct knowledge of its nonexistence. Thus there are two general classes of evidence consisting in nonperception (part 5).

With this second category of evidence consisting in nonperception —namely, where what is being negated is in general perceivable—there is the nonperception of something related whose presence is necessarily dependent upon the presence of its correlate. An example of this type of reasoning is where the absence of fire, on which the existence of smoke depends, is used as a basis to infer the absence of smoke. Within this type of reasoning, through the nonperception of something related, the related thing might be its cause, its universal, or its essential nature. Thus there are three kinds. In the case of evidence consisting in nonperception based on the perception of something contradictory, there is the one where the evidence is effected by the perception of something contradictory in the sense of being contrary. There is also a second type where the evidence is effected by the perception of something contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive without any possible alternative, as in the law of excluded middle. The Buddhist reasoning of dependent origination used to negate self-existence, for example, belongs to this second type of reasoning. Within the first kind, the perception of something contradictory in the sense of being contrary, again there are three kinds: that of essential nature, that of effects, and that of pervading universal. Within each of these three, one can further distinguish among the opposing fact itself, its effect, and its pervading universal; thus twelve distinct forms of reasoning can be differentiated. In fact, there can be many different ways in which this type of reasoning can be further distinguished (part 5).

Further, there is the reasoning in the form of a consequence that reveals a contradiction within the opponent's position. Although this type of consequence- revealing reasoning on the whole negates viewpoints primarily through demonstrating a logical contradiction within the opponent's position, there are some that also implicitly present correct logical syllogisms to establish a given thesis. Those that do not imply such a correct syllogism negate their opponent's viewpoint by leveling objections.

In brief, the science of logical reasoning offers a multiplicity of avenues to critically analyze reality, and through these diverse avenues, insight into the ultimate nature of reality can be discerned. When one engages with reality repeatedly through these avenues of inquiry, the cognitive power of one's mind will come to be enhanced, leading to the development of a balanced view when it comes to understanding the ultimate nature of reality.

Buddhist Philosophy

Philosophy represents the summation of the conclusions about the nature of reality developed through critical inquiry. In *Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics*, philosophy will be treated in volumes 3 and 4, but I will touch on it briefly here. In Buddhism, works explicitly presenting philosophical views evolved early. We see this with the appearance of the *Questions of King Menander* before the Common Era, the Abhidharma treatises starting around the first century

CE, the six philosophical treatises of Nāgārjuna shortly thereafter,¹² and so on. There also appeared, in Buddhism's classical era, treatises in which the principal views of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian schools were presented together in a single work and critically examined. For example, Bhāvaviveka composed his *Blaze of Reasoning* in the fifth century, and in the eighth century Śāntarakṣita authored his *Compendium of Reality*.

Buddhism's basic philosophy is encapsulated in what are known as the view of the four "seals," or axioms: all conditioned things are impermanent, all contaminated things are characterized by suffering, all phenomena are empty and devoid of selfhood, and nirvāṇa is peace. *Impermanence* refers to the fact that things, right from their birth, do not remain static even for a single moment. This is because things do not depend on some third condition for their disintegration; the very causes that produce them also make them susceptible to disintegration. We can see this truth of impermanence for ourselves if we contemplate deeply the gross changes we observe in things. The statement that "all contaminated things are characterized by suffering" indicates how our existence is bound to a causal nexus of undisciplined states of mind that keeps it under their power. As for the statement "nirvāṇa is peace," Dharmakīrti identifies this with the possibility of eliminating pollutants from the mind. He establishes the existence of such a state of freedom through reasoning so that we do not need to rely on faith alone to explain it. The teaching on no-self relates principally to the ultimate nature of reality, namely that things do not exist the way they appear to.

All Buddhist schools reject the existence of a self that is eternal, unitary, and autonomous. Yet many Buddhist schools assume that what we call "self" or "person" must nonetheless exist in some form. We find the assertion that the self exists on the basis of the aggregates, with some proposing that all five aggregates constitute that person and others positing the mind alone to be the person. Some, recognizing that the six types of consciousness are unstable like bubbles in water, assert eight classes of consciousness and posit foundational consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) to be the real person. Others, seeing faults in identifying the person with the aggregates, assert a self (or person) that is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates.

As we can see, there is a divergence of interpretations and subtleties among the various Buddhist schools with respect to the meaning of no-self. The Tibetan tradition relies chiefly on the interpretation of the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras by Nāgārjuna and his disciples. In this view, the meaning of no-self is understood by way of dependent origination. Two types of selflessness are differentiated from the perspective of their bases (persons and phenomena), but there is no difference in subtlety in what is negated; in both contexts, it is independent existence. The very fact that things are dependently originated establishes that they are devoid of self-existence. When we think, for example, in terms of the designator and the designated, the knower and the known, the agent and the act, and so on, we can see the utter mutuality and contingency of these things. If the table in front of us, for example, were to exist objectively without depending on conceptual designation, the table itself could provide the criteria of what constitutes a table from its own side. This is not the case. We have no choice but to accept that what we call "table" is posited by the mind.

What we see is a mutual dependence. The objective world exerts constraints on the mind, and the mind in turn exerts constraints on the objective world. Take the simple example of a handwritten letter *a*. So many factors converge that are part of its dependent reality. There is, for example, the shape of the letter, the pen that wrote it, the ink used to write it, the paper on which it is written,

the person who wrote it, the intention of the writer, the convention that established this letter, those who accept this as a letter, and the cultural environment in which this letter has a meaningful usage. Without these, its existence as a letter is simply impossible. The nature of all things is exactly like this. Therefore things are explained as having a nature of dependence requiring so many other factors for their existence. This is why Madhyamaka thinkers such as Candrakīrti speak of how things are unfindable when subjected to ultimate analysis and of how their existence can only be posited as designated by the mind. This view is strikingly similar to explanations found in contemporary physics about how nothing can be found to possess reality when analyzed at the subatomic level.

Another important philosophical view in Buddhist texts is that of the two truths. We find the language of “two truths” in the non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools as well. In Buddhism, all four schools of thought equally accept the notion of two truths, but what constitutes these two varies from school to school. Between the two Mahāyāna schools, for example, there is not much difference in the way the Cittamātra (Mind Only) and Madhyamaka (Middle Way) schools define the two truths. Nonetheless there is a substantial difference in the specific examples they give for those two truths.

In brief, *ultimate truth* pertains to the ultimate nature of things while *conventional truth* relates to perspectives rooted in the apparent world. Both the Madhyamaka and Cittamātra schools explain ultimate truth in terms of emptiness. Cittamātra speaks of the emptiness of external reality or the emptiness of subject-object duality, while Madhyamaka speaks of the emptiness of real existence of everything, even the minutest particles of matter. Conventional truth encompasses the entirety of the everyday reality we perceive—the natural world, the beings who inhabit it, arising and disintegration, progress and decline, cause and effect, happiness and suffering, good and bad, and so on. In short, the flowerpot we see in front of us is conventional truth, while its absence of objective existence—that this pot cannot be found when sought through ultimate analysis—is its ultimate truth.

That pot is empty at the very moment it is perceived, and it can be perceived while simultaneously being empty. Madhyamaka thinkers explain this by saying that the two truths have the same nature but are conceptually distinct. When the Buddhists speak of the way things exist, they maintain that we need to transcend both extremes—the extreme of reification and the extreme of denial—and view things simply as they are.

Buddhist Religion

Generally speaking, although aspects of the Buddhist tradition that fall under religion are connected with faith, the basic framework of Buddhist religious practice is grounded in the principle of causality, which is part of the laws of nature. For example, the impulse to shun pain is part of our natural disposition, and our existence as conditioned beings is the basis for the arising of suffering. Therefore Buddha taught the reality of *suffering* as the first truth of our existence. Since suffering necessarily arises from a cause, he identified the second truth as the *origin* of suffering. These two truths pertain to the cause and effect of suffering. What is the cause of suffering? Its ultimate source is explained as ignorance, and since this ignorance can be brought to an end, the Buddha taught the third truth, the *cessation* of suffering and its origin. Since such a cessation must also have a cause, the Buddha taught the truth of the *path*, the means of attaining such a cessation. There is thus a cause-and-effect pair of truths pertaining to the attainment of freedom. Clearly the foundation of Buddhist practice described in the four noble truths is the natural law of cause and effect.

When Dharmakīrti introduces the truth of cessation, he demonstrates the possibility of bringing an end to ignorance, the cause of suffering. Nowhere does he speak of the need to demonstrate the truth of cessation by relying on scriptural authority. Furthermore, Dharma kīrti offers a profound explanation of suffering and its origin in terms of the sequence of the twelve links of dependent origination, and cessation and the path in terms of the reverse order of the twelve links. Since happiness and suffering are characteristics of sentient experience, no account of them can be divorced from sentient experience. Therefore Dharma kīrti also offers an extensive account of cause and effect as it relates to the inner world of experience. Furthermore, when one speaks of Dharma (religion) in Buddhism, its true meaning must be understood in terms of the attainment of nirvāṇa. The term *Dharma* refers to the means and the path that lead to nirvāṇa as well as the scriptures taught by the teacher, the Buddha, that present this path.

Having now distinguished three domains of subject matter in the Buddhist sources—(1) scientific presentations about the natural world, (2) philosophy, and (3) religious practice—we might ask from what sources the presentations in this series on the first two dimensions, science and philosophy, are developed. Among the Buddhist classics available in Tibetan, we have the two canonical collections introduced above. The precious collection of the Kangyur contains translations of the Buddha's words as embodied in the "three baskets" (Tripiṭaka), containing both sūtra and tantra teachings. The precious collection of the Tengyur contains the treatises of great masters such as the seventeen Nālandā masters that include Nāgārjuna and Asa ṅga, the two trailblazers prophesized by the Buddha.

The Tibetan translations that comprise the Kangyur and the Tengyur are the largest body of Indian Buddhist texts extant today anywhere. Today modern scholars who engage in objective studies of Indian Buddhist sources state that these Tibetan collections not only contain the largest number of texts but also represent the best translations and most comprehensive Buddhist canon. Many of these works composed in classical Indian languages, especially Sanskrit, were entirely lost in their original language through changes of history and environmental conditions. Only a few of the great works remain in original Sanskrit. In the Pali canon, we find scriptures associated with the Theravāda tradition but not of other Buddhist schools, such as the Mahāyāna sūtras and tantras. Although a great number of Buddhist texts were translated into Chinese, modern researchers say that because of the character of the Chinese language, those translations tend to be looser and do not match the rigorous correspondence, both in terms and meaning, found in the Tibetan translations. Today, therefore, the Tibetan language is the storehouse for the Buddha's scriptural teachings in their entirety. By offering access to the complete system of the Indian Buddhist tradition encompassing all three vehicles—the shared teachings, the Mahāyāna, and the Vajrayāna—there is simply no alternative to the literary heritage of the Tibetan language.

On This Compendium of Buddhist Science and Philosophy

Unlike the world's other major religions, the Buddhist tradition's canons contain an extremely large number of texts. Even in the case of the part translated into Tibetan, there are more than five thousand individual texts in over 320 large volumes. The size of the collection means that it would be difficult for a person to read the entire collection even once. So a tradition emerged, from the period of the trailblazers, to extract the essential points from this vast body of scripture and present them in accord with the interests and capacities of the aspirants, in accessible formats such as compendiums and manuals. For example, Nāgārjuna composed the *Compendium of Sūtras*; Śāntideva

too composed a compendium of sūtras¹⁶ as well as the *Compendium of Training*; the glorious Atiśa composed the *Extensive Compendium of Sūtras* (*Mahāsūtrasamuccaya*); and the trailblazer Asaṅga composed his *Compendium of Knowledge*. Similarly, Dig nāga wrote his *Compendium of Valid Cognition* (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*), bringing together the essential points of numerous works he had authored previously, such as his *Analyses* and his short verse texts. All of these various compendiums proved to be of tremendous benefit to subsequent students of Buddhism.

Taking these precedents as our inspiration, I recognize that in today's time, too, presentations based on the words of the excellent teacher, the Buddha, pertaining to the basic nature of reality as well as associated philosophical concepts can be a source of benefit to humanity, irrespective of whether one is Buddhist or non-Buddhist, religious or not religious. My aspiration has been to see the creation of these compendiums in a format consistent with the approach of contemporary academic scholarship. This way these presentations can benefit many people. So several years ago I discussed this vision with others and tasked a group of scholars to initiate the project. Today, this group has completed the work of creating compendiums on the presentations on the nature of reality and on philosophy, the first two domains within the threefold division of the subject matter of Buddhist texts. With great efforts the compilers have gathered a vast number of citations from authoritative sources relevant to these two domains. Thus my wish to see such compendiums on science and philosophy from the Buddhist classics—wherein the presentations on these two domains are explained separately in their own rights—has today become a reality. I offer my appreciation to the compendium editors as well as to those senior scholars who have advised the editors. I also thank the translators who have rendered these volumes into other languages.

Given that the scriptures and their commentarial treatises in the Buddhist classics are so vast and profound in their meaning, it is conceivable that there are shortcomings in these volumes in the form of omission, overreading, or even error. At the very least, what the editors have achieved is a series that demonstrates with clarity that there exists within the subject matter of the Buddhist texts three distinct domains of science, philosophy, and religious practice. If, in the future, there should be a need for additional material or deletion of some elements, the structure is now in place so that such modifications can be made easily.

In conclusion, I would like to share my hope that these volumes on the presentations on the nature of reality and their associated philosophical concepts from the Buddhist sources will make an important contribution to our collective human knowledge by offering the gift of a new set of insights. I pray that these volumes become a source of great benefit to many people. <>

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Philology in the Making: Analog/Digital Cultures of Scholarly Writing and Reading edited by Pál Kelemen, Nicolas Pethes [Transcript Verlag, 9783837647709, PDF: 9783839447703]

Philological practices have served to secure and transmit textual sources for centuries. However – this volume contends –, it is only in the light of the current radical media change labeled ›digital turn‹ that the material and technological prerequisites of the theory and practice of philology become fully visible. The seventeen studies by scholars from the universities of Budapest and Cologne assembled here investigate these recent transformations of our techniques of writing and reading by critically examining core approaches to the history and epistemology of the humanities. Thus, a broad praxeological overview of basic cultural techniques of collective memory is unfolded. <>

The Illustrated Lotus Sutra translation and introduction by Gene Reeves, Illustrations by Demi [Wisdom Publications, 9781614295327]

Renowned and beloved the world over, a peerless contemporary translation of one of Buddhism's most important texts comes alive with over 110 full-page line illustrations by a multiple award-winning artist.

The Lotus Sutra is regarded as one of the world's great religious scriptures and most influential texts. It's a seminal work in the development of Buddhism throughout East Asia and, by extension, in the development of Mahayana Buddhism throughout the world. Taking place in a vast and fantastical cosmic setting, the Lotus Sutra places emphasis on skillfully doing whatever is needed to serve and compassionately care for others, on breaking down distinctions between the fully enlightened buddha and the bodhisattva who vows to postpone salvation until all beings may share it, and especially on each and every being's innate capacity to become a buddha. <>

The Holy Spirit and the Reformation Legacy edited by Mark J. Cartledge and Mark A. Jumper [Pickwick Publications, 9781532695445]

This collection of essays explores the legacy of the Reformation with regard to the person and work of the Holy Spirit. Following the five-hundredth anniversary of Luther's posting of his ninety-five theses, these essays consider this legacy with particular reference to the work of Martin Luther and John Calvin, as well as broader Reformation themes as they are related to pneumatology and the life of the church today. The contribution of this collection is to tease out and reflect on pneumatology historically but also to relate these findings to contemporary discussions, especially among scholars of pentecostal and charismatic Christianity. Together these essays invite readers to appreciate the contribution that the Protestant Reformation makes to life in the Holy Spirit today, as well as offering critical and constructive reflection on this theme. It is a timely and significant contribution to the discussions of the person and work of the Holy Spirit and the church. <>

Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen by G. R. Boys-Stones [Oxford University Press, 9780198152644]

This book traces, for the first time, a revolution in philosophy which took place during the early centuries of our era. It reconstructs the philosophical basis of the Stoics' theory that fragments of an ancient and divine wisdom could be reconstructed from mythological traditions, and shows that Platonism was founded on an argument that Plato had himself achieved a full reconstruction of this wisdom, and that subsequent philosophies had only regressed once again in their attempts to "improve" on his achievement. <>

GOD'S JUDGMENT THROUGH THE DAVIDIC MESSIAH by Myongil Kim [Wipf & Stock Publishers, 9781725280915]

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This dissertation examines the role of the Davidic Messiah, who is the agent of God's judgment in Romans 1:18--4:25. It may be summarized in two theses: First of all, the Davidic Messiah was expected in the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings, which establish the foundation for Paul's Davidic Messiah Christology in Romans. Second, the language in the role of the agent of God's judgment cannot be identified with the term faithfulness. <>

American Cosmic: UFOs, Religion, Technology by D. W. Pasulka [Oxford University Press, 9780190692889]

More than half of American adults and more than seventy-five percent of young Americans believe in intelligent extraterrestrial life. This level of belief rivals that of belief in God. **American Cosmic: UFOs, Religion, Technology** examines the mechanisms at work behind the thriving belief system in extraterrestrial life, a system that is changing and even supplanting traditional religions.

Over the course of a six-year ethnographic study, D.W. Pasulka interviewed successful and influential scientists, professionals, and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs who believe in extraterrestrial intelligence, thereby disproving the common misconception that only fringe members of society believe in UFOs. She argues that widespread belief in aliens is due to a number of factors including their ubiquity in modern media like *The X-Files*, which can influence memory, and the believability lent to that media by the search for planets that might support life. *American Cosmic* explores the intriguing question of how people interpret unexplainable experiences, and argues that the media is replacing religion as a cultural authority that offers believers answers about non-human intelligent life. <>

Husserl and The Idea of Europe by Timo Miettinen [Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Northwestern University Press, 9780810141490]

Husserl and The Idea of Europe argues that Edmund Husserl's late reflections on Europe should not be read either as departures from his early transcendental phenomenology or as simple exercises of cultural criticism but rather as systematic phenomenological reflections on generativity and historicity. Timo Miettinen shows that Husserl's deliberations on Europe contain his most compelling and radical interpretation of the intersubjective, communal, and historical dimensions of phenomenology.

Husserl and his generation worked in the aftermath of World War I, as Europe struggled to redefine itself, and he penned his late writings as the clouds of World War II gathered. Decades later, the fall of the Soviet Union again altered the continent's identity and its political and economic divisions. Miettinen writes as a European involved in the question of Europe, and many of the recent authors and critics he addresses in this work—such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben—likewise deeply engaged with this new problem of European identity. The book illuminates the multifaceted problem of the idea of European rationality, and it defends novel conceptions of universalism and teleology as necessary components of radical philosophical reflection. <>

The Sensible World and The World of Expression: Course Notes from the College de France, 1953 by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Translated from the French with an introduction and notes by Bryan Smyth [Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Northwestern University Press, 9780810141438]

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The Sensible World and the World of Expression was a course of lectures that Merleau-Ponty gave at the Collège de France after his election to the chair of philosophy in 1952. The publication and translation of Merleau-Ponty's notes from this course provide an exceptional view into the evolution of his thought at an important point in his career.

In these notes, we see that Merleau-Ponty's consideration of the problem of the perception of movement leads him to make a self-critical return to *Phenomenology of Perception* in order to rethink the perceptual encounter with the sensible world as essentially expressive, and hence to revise his understanding of the body schema accordingly in terms of praxical motor possibilities. Sketching out an embodied dialectic of expressive praxis that would link perception with art, language, and other cultural and intersubjective phenomena, up to and including truth, Merleau-Ponty's notes for these lectures thus afford an exciting glimpse of how he aspired to overcome the impasse of ontological dualism. <>

Jeanne Guyon's Mystical Perfection through Eucharistic Suffering: Her Biblical Commentary on Saint John's Gospel by Jeanne de la Mothe Guyon, edited and Translated by Nancy Carol James, Foreword by William Bradley Roberts [Pickwick Publications, 9781532684234]

Madame Jeanne Guyon (1648-1717), a woman of great wisdom and worship, was filled with the richness of God's grace as she endured hardships and abuse in her married life. Blessed with children and great earthly wealth, she suffered physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually at the hands of her spiritual leaders, imprisoned unjustly for her simple yet solid faith in Christ, her Divine Confidant. Trusting in her Lord, she expressed her insights in commentaries concerning the Scriptures, seeing in them the mysteries of the holy Eucharist, the sacrificial presence of her merciful Savior. Through her intercession, we are inspired to adore the Lord, uniting our suffering to his as she did. <>

The Black Books 1913-1932: Notebooks of Transformation Seven-Volume Set Slip-Cased Boxed, 1648 pages by C G Jung, edited and introduced by Sonu Shamdasani, translated by Martin Liebscher, John Peck and Sonu Shamdasani [Philemon Series: W. W. Norton & Company, 9780393088649]

Until now, the single most important unpublished work by C.G. Jung—The Black Books.

In 1913, C.G. Jung started a unique self- experiment that he called his “confrontation with the unconscious”: an engagement with his fantasies in a waking state, which he charted in a series of notebooks referred to as **The Black Books**. These intimate writings shed light on the further elaboration of Jung's personal cosmology and his attempts to embody insights from his self-investigation into his life and personal relationships. **The Red Book** drew on material recorded from 1913 to 1916, but Jung actively kept the notebooks for many more decades.

Presented in a magnificent, seven-volume boxed collection featuring a revelatory essay by noted Jung scholar Sonu Shamdasani—illuminated by a selection of Jung's vibrant visual works—and both translated and facsimile versions of each notebook, **The Black Books** offer a unique portal into Jung's mind and the origins of analytical psychology. <>

The Fifth Corner of Four: An Essay on Buddhist Metaphysics and the Catuskoti by Graham Priest [Oxford University Press, 9780198758716]

The book charts the development of Buddhist metaphysics, drawing on texts which include those of Nagarjuna and Dogen. The development is viewed through the lens of the *Catuṣkoṭi*. At its simplest, and as it appears in the earliest texts, this is a logical/metaphysical principle which says that every claim is true, false, both, or neither; but the principle itself evolves, assuming new forms as the metaphysics develops. An important step in the evolution incorporates ineffability. Such things make no sense from the perspective of a logic which endorses the principles of excluded middle and non-contradiction, which are standard fare in Western logic. However, the book shows how one can make sense of them by applying the techniques of contemporary non-classical logic, such as those of First Degree Entailment, and plurivalent logic. An important issue that emerges as the book develops is the notion of non-duality and its transcendence. This allows many of the threads of the book to be drawn together at its end. All matters are explained, as far as possible, in a way that is accessible to those with no knowledge of Buddhist philosophy or contemporary non-classical logic. <>

Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics, Volume. 1: The Physical World compiled and Introduction by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, edited by Thupten Jinpa, translated by Ian Coghlan [Wisdom Publications, 9781614294726]

Explore the nature of our material world in a unique sourcebook, conceived by the Dalai Lama, collecting the scientific observations found in classical Buddhist treatises.

Under the visionary supervision of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, **Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics** brings together classical Buddhist explorations of the nature of our material world and the human mind and puts them into context for the modern reader. It is the Dalai Lama's view that the explorations by the great masters of northern India in the first millennium CE still have much that is of interest today, whether we are Buddhist or not.

Volume 1, The Physical World, explores the nature of our material world—from the macroscopic to the microscopic. It begins with an overview of the many frameworks, such as the so-called five aggregates, that Buddhist thinkers have used to examine the nature and scope of reality. Topics include sources of knowledge, the scope of reason, the nature and constituents of the material world, theories of the atom, the nature of time, the formation of the universe, and the evolution of life, including a detailed explanation of the early Buddhist theories on fetal development. The volume even contains a brief presentation on early theories about the structure and function of the brain and the role of microorganisms inside the human body. The book weaves together passages from the works of great Buddhist thinkers such as Asanga, Vasubandhu, Nagarjuna, Dignaga, and Dharmakirti. Each of the major topics is introduced by Thupten Jinpa, the Dalai Lama's principal English-language translator and founder of the Institute of Tibetan Classics. <>

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE INDIAN BUDDHIST CLASSICS: VOLUME 2

The Mind Conceived and Introduced by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Developed by the Compendium Compilation Committee, edited by Thupten Jinpa, translated by Dechen Rochard and John D. Dunne, contextual essays by John D. Dunne [Wisdom Publications, 9781614294740]

The second volume in a prominent new series on Buddhism and science, directed by the Dalai Lama and previously covered by the BBC.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE INDIAN BUDDHIST CLASSICS: VOLUME 2

The Mind compiles classical Buddhist explorations of the nature of our material world, the human mind, logic, and phenomenology and puts them into context for the modern reader.

This ambitious four-volume series—a major resource for the history of ideas and especially the history of science and philosophy—has been conceived by and compiled under the visionary supervision of His Holiness the Dalai Lama himself. It is his view that the exploratory thinking of great Indian masters in the first millennium CE still has much that is of interest to us today, whether we are Buddhist or not. These volumes make those insights accessible. <>

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