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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

Robert Tenor, editor
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EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. Our Annotated Bibliography will review, list and link the titles under discussion, providing a faithful summary of its content and audience.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

Contents

KRACAUER: A BIOGRAPHY by Jörg Später, translated by Daniel Steuer [Polity, 9781509533015]

Siegfried Kracauer was one of the most important German thinkers of the twentieth century. His writings on Weimar culture, mass society, photography and film were groundbreaking and they anticipated many of the themes later developed members of the Frankfurt School and other cultural theorists.

No less remarkable were the circumstances under which he made these contributions. After his early years as a journalist in Germany, the rise of the Nazis forced Kracauer into exile – first in Paris and then, after a protracted flight via Marseilles and Lisbon, to the United States. The existential challenges, personal losses and unrelenting hardship Kracauer faced during these years of exile formed the backdrop against which he offered his acute observations of modern life.

Jörg Später provides the first comprehensive biography of this extraordinary man. Based on extensive archival research, Später's biography expertly traces the key influences on Kracauer's intellectual development and presents his most important works and ideas with great clarity. At the same time, Später ably documents the intensity of Kracauer's personal relationships, the trauma of his flight and exile, and his embrace of his new homeland, where, finally, the 'groundlessness' of refugee existence gave way to a more stable life and, with it, some of the intellectually most fruitful years of Kracauer's career.

The result is a vivid portrait of a man driven both by an urge to capture reality – to attend to the things that are 'overlooked or misjudged', that still 'lack a name', as he put it – and by a need to find his place in a hostile, threatening world.

Review

"An impressive biography: accurate, fluent, displaying thorough knowledge and independent judgement, this is the first book to do justice to Kracauer."
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

"Später avoids simple description and banal interpretations and surprises the reader with careful, considered judgements, thus demonstrating what a biographer should fundamentally be: a courageous historian."
Thomas Meyer, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*

"With his gorgeously written social biography of an allegedly marginal figure of Critical Theory, Siegfried Kracauer, historian Jörg Später delivers an epistemological perspective that allows the reader to grasp the world through its minutiae."
Dan Diner, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

"It is a refreshing sign of modesty that Jörg Später calls his study on the life and work of Siegfried Kracauer only a biography. What Später instead does in this masterfully written book is to

reconstruct the intellectual trajectory of a thinker who, despite all personal and historical difficulties, was able to create by combining observational skills, sociological knowledge and philosophical profundity one of the most original oeuvres within the tradition of Critical Theory. Thanks to the author of this intellectual biography, Kracauer steps out of the long shadow of the Frankfurt School and becomes a critical theorist in his own right."
Axel Honneth, Columbia University

"Später's book . . . will be the definitive biography of Kracauer for many years to come."
The Jewish Chronicle

"magnificent"
Jewish Currents

The story of Kracauer's life is unusually fascinating and impressive, and it is therefore difficult to understand why no biography of him has been written before. There is only the small Rowohlt volume by Momme Brodersen and the indispensable chronicle of the Marbacher Magazin (1988), edited by Ingrid Belke and Irina Renz. This is all the more surprising given that there are now two editions of his collected works, each with a carefully prepared editorial apparatus, as well as countless interpretations of him in the fields of German studies and cultural studies. The reason for the absence of a biography is most likely that biographies of literary authors are written by literary scholars, those of social philosophers by sociologists or philosophers, and biographies of theorists of film by film scholars — but Kracauer did not belong to a single academic discipline, and he thus always falls between two stools. When historians write biographies (which are mostly of politicians), they are quick to claim that their protagonist is a representative of a whole age, or that the crisis of modernity is reflected in his or her works, or something of a similar magnitude. I would like to be a little bit more cautious. Kracauer, of course, did not live his life in order to become a symbol for this or that. And yet even a cursory glance at his life reveals that we are dealing with an extraordinary individual, someone about whom much more is to be related than just the details of his private life.

Kracauer was born in 1889 and grew up in Frankfurt am Main in an assimilated Jewish household he experienced as petit bourgeois and bleak. As an adolescent he felt lonely and ugly. He had a stammer, and an academic career therefore seemed unlikely. Once he had gained his university degree in architecture (during which he also studied a little sociology and philosophy under, among others, Georg Simmel), his family urged him to work as an architect to make a living, and for a short while he obeyed. But he saw himself as a writer of cultural philosophy, and in the years immediately after the First World War he went from job to job before finally becoming the literary editor of the Frankfurter Zeitung and a well-respected figure of the Weimar cultural scene. It was mainly because of him that film criticism came to be accepted as an intellectually respectable genre. He was a prolific writer — essays, reviews, articles on questions of philosophy and religion, of sociology and literature, on the newly formed Soviet Union, on the Bauhaus, on the Jewish renaissance, texts on his travels, on streets in Berlin, Frankfurt and Paris, on the detective novel, on hotel foyers and entertainment halls. He came to understand his times by paying attention to the things that were overlooked. In addition, he wrote two novels and an original 'ethnological' study of the social environment of Berlin employees. During this period, discussions with his peers Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch were particularly fruitful and formative for his thinking; all three, like him, had Jewish roots."

When the National Socialists came to power, Kracauer had to leave Germany. He fled overnight to Paris, where he worked as a correspondent for his newspaper. But the Frankfurter Zeitung then dropped him. This was the beginning of a dark period in Kracauer's life. Although he spoke fluent French and was relatively well connected, his financial situation was precarious. He kept aloof from friends and other emigrants, did not participate in antifascist activities, and did not even communicate with Benjamin, despite the affinities between the two, who knew each other from the Weimar period and now again found themselves in the same place, working on similar projects.

They were both studying the irruption of modernity in the 'capital of the nineteenth century'". as a way of understanding the catastrophe that was unfolding in the present — Kracauer using Jacques Offenbach and operetta to this end, Benjamin using Charles Baudelaire and the Paris arcades. After a planned collaboration with the Institute for Social Research (ISR) on a study of Nazi propaganda fell through, Kracauer also almost fell out with his friends from Frankfurt, Adorno-Wiesengrund and Leo Lowenthal. After the French capitulation in 1940, however, these two helped him emigrate to the United States.

In the United States, Kracauer was revitalized. From the very beginning, he wrote only in English. Supported by various grants, he wrote From Hitler to Caligari, a history of German film which was, in fact, a history of mind and soul during the Weimar Republic. After a period of working as a freelancer, with little success, he became a research advisor at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University and a sought-after referee for American foundations. There were new intellectual and social networks emerging, in particular around eminent authorities in visual culture such as Rudolf Arnheim, Erwin Panofsky and Meyer Schapiro (again all intellectuals of Jewish descent). Finally, Kracauer received grants that allowed him to complete two more important books, a theory of film and a theory of history. Although he did not want to return to Germany permanently, he was, towards the end of his life, drawn back to his old — lost, or perhaps never possessed — home. In the 1960s, various publishers, especially Suhrkamp, released new editions of his old texts and translations of his American books. He cultivated his precarious friendships with Adorno and Bloch, and he was a popular guest at two of the colloquia of the legendary research group `Poetik and Hermeneutik' [poetics and hermeneutics] connected to Hans Robert Jaub and Hans Blumenberg. Kracauer died suddenly and unexpectedly in November 1966.

As we follow the life of this subtle observer, we shall travel through some important intellectual environments: we shall visit the Jewish renaissance in Frankfurt and see the workings of the editorial offices of the Frankfurter Zeitung; we shall stand next to the cradle of Western Marxism and come across the activities of the early Frankfurt School; we shall trace the rise and fall of film in Berlin, the capital of 1920s Europe; we shall observe the political battles of the end of the Weimar Republic and witness the catastrophe of the Nazis' persecution, expulsion and extermination of the Jews; we will see Kracauer fall on hard times while in exile in Paris, and we shall look at his attempts to explain National Socialism; we shall gain an insight into the social and psychological warfare of the Second World War, and into the social sciences in the United States during the Cold War; and we shall witness the surprisingly successful acculturation of Kracauer, then in his fifties, to America, his homesickness for Europe, as well as his perpetual ambivalence towards Germany.

This book on Kracauer is a conventional biography insofar as it deals with his 'life and work' — his work because he was a philosophical writer whose work makes his life more significant; and his life because without it his work would be unintelligible and far less meaningful. Both 'life and work' were informed by the fundamental need to cope with existence, that is, by the philosophical search for meaning; by the will to capture social reality; by the naked material and physical fight for survival; and finally, by the joy of aesthetically pleasing work.

If I had to add an adjective to the book's subtitle, it would be 'social'. This is a social biography because it tries to illuminate the social and historical contexts within which Kracauer acted. It thus traces a kind of parallel progression between these contexts and his life, in particular his intellectual life. The relationships between what would otherwise appear disparate areas should become apparent in virtue of the way in which they are linked by Kracauer, the man, himself, not as a matter of causal connection but of correspondences. The book seeks to bring objective facts, the hard facts and the less solid, porous ones, into relation with the way Kracauer grappled subjectively with these

facts, a grappling sedimented in his 'experiences'. In this way, the book follows Kracauer's own advice for presenting history: the dominant perspective is at ground level, the close-ups, complemented occasionally by aerial views or the camera panning into long shots.

The 'social' aspect also relates to Kracauer's 'lifeworld'. Husserl's notion, incidentally, is at the centre of Kracauer's work in social philosophy and aesthetics, because, as the sphere that precedes actual thinking, the lifeworld' is what underlies philosophy. Part of the profane lifeworld I want to illuminate here is the need to secure one's livelihood, something that continually preyed on Kracauer's mind, because over long stretches of his life his material situation was precarious. Kracauer's social life is another focus of the book: his origins; family; teachers and pupils; friendships and enemies; his symbiotic relationship with his partner, `Lili'; his professional relationships; those who shared the same fate of escape and exile; the new academic world in the US. I try to describe Kracauer in all these contexts and to reconstruct how others might have viewed him. I am particularly interested in his friendships with Adorno, Benjamin and Bloch: the book paints a portrait of a group that, around 1930, was attempting to create an avant-garde philosophy and, together, managed it — a 'revue form of philosophy', as Bloch called it, based on thought images and images of space, characterized by a broader view of the dialectic of enlightened thinking and the simultaneity of culture and barbarism, and motivated by aesthetic interests as well as by social criticism. Even after the group's erosion and diffusion, the former members remained important points of reference in one another's work, whether in agreement or disagreement.

In the final analysis, what is at stake in Kracauer's biography is our access to the world. On the one hand, this refers to Kracauer's fundamental urge to capture reality, an urge to which his 'supple thinking' and his longing for the concrete and living reality of 'this Earth which is our habitat' bear witness." On the other hand, access to the world refers to the search for one's place in a world that is often hostile and even demonic and life-threatening. In this sense, Kracauer's life encapsulates the human predicament. The second guiding theme of this social biography — after the way Kracauer coped with the demands of material existence — is thus his own analysis of his times.

This book stands in an extraterritorial relationship to research in the disciplines of German studies, literary studies, sociology and film studies. It does not ask which gaps need to be closed, which pictures need to be corrected or completed. At the same time, it stands on the shoulders of such research, especially in literary studies. Without the philological work that made Kracauer's posthumous papers available, the book would not have been possible. Thorough scholarly analysis of Kracauer's work has also left little space for new insights. The book is indebted to many ideas, but not to any single interpretive approach; rather, it follows its protagonist along his multifarious paths. Emphasis is put on those biographical elements, episodes and events which, I feel, are best suited to describing and explaining Kracauer's life. The biographical account proceeds chronologically but episodically, and thus there are numerous spaces that can be taken up by aspects from Kracauer's lifeworld and social environment. An episode is essentially a fragment: the aim is not to present a coherent (a successful or unsuccessful) life; no thesis will be attacked or defended, no puzzle deciphered:4 Concentrated analysis and narrative passage, macro- and micro-perspectives, and close-ups and long shots all stand next to each other. Several narrative strands are intertwined, and the rope itself is held together by Kracauer, as he moves through and analyses his times, as he finds ways of coping with existence.

In writing this book, I have consulted Kracauer's complete correspondence in his posthumous papers at the German Literature Archive Marbach. With the exception of a few letters, his correspondence only begins in 1930, when the Kracauers moved to Berlin, because in 1939 Kracauer asked his mother to destroy the letters that he had left behind in Frankfurt:5 Where

copies of his letters exist in the published correspondence of other authors — Adorno, Benjamin, Bloch, Lowenthal, Panofsky, etc. — I have followed these. The correspondence with Margarete Susman is part of Susman's posthumous papers, which are also in Marbach. In addition to the correspondence, I consulted the thematic collections of papers and other materials that form part of Kracauer's posthumous papers. I spent long hours in the catacombs of the Marbach archive, which house Kracauer's library. As the biographical sources relating to the time before 1930 are fewer and further between than are those for the years thereafter, I have also drawn on the autobiographical novels Ginster and Georg in writing about the earlier period —keeping in mind, of course, that these are fictionalized. It seemed natural to make use of these fictional documents because of their obvious autobiographical nature: among men, we are told, there lived one of them who explored them subterraneously Ginster. Whenever such an italicized sentence or clause appears, it communicates Ginster's or Georg's experience. His [i.e. Georg's] consciousness of being stared at like a stranger was deeply disturbing ... Even before Kracauer was driven from his homeland, Minster and Georg were strangers in Frankfurt. This alienness was a burden for Kracauer as a private person, but it also opened up possibilities for him as an observer of his environment. Kracauer later said, in a remark about Alfred Schutz, that the stranger and exile is able to be more objective than his or her contemporaries back home because exiles are not locked into cultural patterns; they take less for granted. Further, they have had the bitter experience of having been catapulted out of their habitual orbit. As a stranger in a world that had denied him entry into its community, Kracauer discovered the possibility 'of penetrating its outward appearances, so that he may learn to understand that world from within'. It was the fulfilment of this task that helped Kracauer to deal with the exigencies of his existence.

Elisabeth Kracauer never really recovered after her husband's sudden death. The only thing that gave her some strength was her absolute determination to continue his work, especially to rescue the unfinished book on history. After an event for which 'no solace' was truly possible, this mission kept her going: 'One thing, however, can help to diminish the great pain of the experience: the possibility of doing something for the beloved man.' Rainer Koehne, a former student of Adorno's, was entrusted with the editorial work on Kracauer's theory of history. Koehne had lived in New York since 1954 and been in fairly close contact with Kracauer. The basis for the book was the finalized 'syllabus' and the two more or less completed chapters on historical time and on the relation between history and aesthetics. Koehne's task was thus first of all to get to grips with Kracauer's ideas and to find adequate ways of formulating them — neither a mean feat. Lili Kracauer supported him by providing notes from conversations with Adorno and Blumenberg, and by pointing him towards preparatory works and earlier texts. On certain questions, Werner Kaegi was consulted. someone with whom Koehne, however, did not get on. Hans Jonas and Hermann Schweppenhauser also helped to answer specific questions. Towards the end of the editorial work, however, an irresolvable dispute between the ghostwriter and the widow broke out. Koehne withdrew from the project; he even demanded not to be mentioned in the book as an editor. Paul Oskar Kristeller stepped in, resolving, with Lili, the final remaining questions, giving the final version his blessing, and writing a preface. The book finally appeared with Oxford University Press in 1969. A German edition followed soon after: Jacob Taubes recommended Karsten Witte as a translator, and introduced him to Lili, who was immediately taken with the young man. She praised his 'great empathy, knowledge, and sense of responsibility' in all matters to do with Kracauer, and with his help Geschichte: Vor den letzten Dingen appeared in 1971 with Suhrkamp. The conflict with Koehne apparently concerned the placement of Kracauer's 'autobiographical note' and the 'Epilogue', which

in Kracauer's manuscript consisted of no more than one sentence and a quotation from Kierkegaard. Koehne wanted to place the autobiographical note at the end of the book and add the epilogue as an 'Author's Addendum'. Lili Kracauer insisted that the book should begin with the 'autobiographical

note' and that the epilogue not be treated as a mere addendum, because it contained in a nutshell everything Kracauer would have wanted to say in the ninth chapter." In this case, she was right. The last lines Kracauer had written towards the History project were about genuineness: 'Focus on the "genuine" hidden in the interstices between dogmatized beliefs of the world, thus establishing tradition of lost causes; giving names to the hitherto unnamed.' That was the programme which the last chapter of History was meant to realize. The `Kierkegaard quotation' was actually a long passage from Max Brod's biography of Kafka, in which Brod quotes Kafka quoting, in turn, Soren Kierkegaard:

> But as soon as a man with originality comes along, and consequently does not say: one must take the world as it is, but saying: whatever the world may be, I remain true to a simplicity which I do not intend to change according to the good pleasure of the world; the moment that word is heard, there is as it were a transformation in the whole of existence, as in the fairy story — when the word is said the magic castle, which has been under a spell for a hundred years, opens again and everything comes to life: in the same way existence becomes all eyes. The Angels grow busy, look about with curiosity to see what is going to happen, for that is what interests them. On the other side: dark and sinister demons who have sat idle for a long while gnawing their fingers — jump up, stretch their limbs: for, they say, 'this is something for us.'

Shortly before his death, Kracauer played Chinese whispers with this convoluted chain of quotations. The message he received from Kierkegaard via Kafka, and now passed on to posterity, was: Stick to your unique self. Insist on your idiosyncrasy. Be odd, grumpy, whimsical, no matter what the world expects of you. Then, maybe, things will begin to shift, and a door to the castle might open up. What could be better than existence becoming 'all eyes'? Kracauer's epilogue amounts to an attitude in between the extremes of wanting to improve the world and adapting to the world: another intermediary realm of human possibility. Just what the angels and demons will do with it is beyond Kierkegaard's, Kafka's, Kracauer's or anyone else's influence.

The older he got, the more pronounced became Kracauer's inclination to speak in similes. In his theory of history, in fact, he deployed two metaphors to get his point across: the historical figure of Erasmus of Rotterdam and the literary figure of Sancho Panza. Erasmus, Kracauer thought, 'came as close as was possible in his situation to delineating a way of living free from ideological constraints; that in effect all that he did and was had a bearing on the humane'.19 His 'outspokenness' was accompanied by his 'fear of all that is definitely fixed', the driving force of his intellectual endeavour. Kracauer presented Erasmus as a man of conscience fighting a war of resistance against dogmatism, against those who believed they possessed the one and only truth, and as someone who did not mind, therefore, if the steadfastness of his beliefs was questioned. With this attitude, Erasmus embodied, in Kracauer's mind, true humanism. Kracauer recognized a parallel here with his own thinking as a philosopher, citizen and human being. After his experiences of dictatorship, expulsion, war and genocide, he saw himself as a representative of a left humanism — a left that set itself off politically from communism and other radical movements. Academically, this group, he held, should adopt Leszek Kolakowski's definition of a humanistic left:

> By an intellectual left in the humanities I understand an attitude characterized by a radical rationalism of thinking, by a decisive rejection of all mythology in academic work, by an uncompromisingly secular world view, by strict criticism, by distrust of closed systems and doctrines, by a commitment to openness in its thinking — that is, preparedness to revise established theses, theories, and methods and to respect novel scholarly developments.

Kracauer's references to Sancho Panza are also suggestive of a kind of self-portrait. In his theory of history, these references originally served as arguments against synthesizing, 'quixotic' macro-histories. those histories that are often informed by a philosophy of history. We should remind

ourselves, too, that Kracauer, in 1965, sent Kafka's characterization of Sancho Panza as a free man, together with a text on Erasmus, to Ernst Bloch on the occasion of his birthday. These presents were ways in which Kracauer sought to explain his restraint to his friend, who harboured a life-long hope for the end of repression and fought, against all odds, to bring about the communist utopia: 'My attitude is not unlike that of the figure Kafka identified as Sancho Panza.'23 Sancho Panza only appeared to be Don Quixote's servant, mindlessly following his master on his horse. In reality, he was, if the circumstances allowed for it, an active and autonomous human being.

Kracauer's self-stylization as an Erasmus and a Sancho Panza retrospectively legitimated his own path through life. The 'discovery' that all his activities as a writer had served the same purpose. namely 'to bring out the significance of areas whose claim to be acknowledged in their own right has not yet been recognized', served the same function. Kracauer's sole interest, the argument goes, was 'the rehabilitation of objectives and modes of being which still lack a name and hence are overlooked or misjudged'. Was this 'discovery' a trick in order to establish the meaning and unity of a lived life ex post facto? Had Kracauer, like Proust's Marcel, `regained' time and reconstituted a continuity in his life of which he had known nothing while he had actually lived it?

Kracauer's thesis about 'anteroom thinking' ignores the fact that his intellectual life proceeded through qualitatively different phases. One need only read the dedications to his monographs and books to conclude as much. The text on Georg Simmel was dedicated to Margarete Susman, a symbol of a yearning for religiosity in the aftermath of war. During that phase of his life, Kracauer, under the influence of Lebensphilosophie, shared a sense of the suffering caused by capitalist and scientific modernity without, however, being able to develop a positive religiosity for himself. Soziologie als Wissenschaft [Sociology as a Science] made do without a dedication, because Kracauer wrote it alone, in his quiet chamber. Der Detektiv-Roman [The Detective Novel] is dedicated to his friend Theodor Wiesengrund-Adorno, with whom he read Kant, and then Kierkegaard; Kierkegaard was the great critic of idealism and, in particular, of Hegel who, to both Wiesengrund-Adorno and Kracauer, had not, in fact, succeeded in truly leaving idealism behind. Wiesengrund-Adorno would later argue this point in his book on Kierkegaard. During their time of `symphilosophizing' they worked through Kierkegaard's writings, until, in 1925, they entered a new phase in which Karl Marx and ideology critique, as well as Kafka's obscure and opaque world, played important roles. The metaphysical pain eased; materialism and an attention to profane things came to the fore. In The Salaried Masses, Kracauer thanked Benno Reifenberg, his mentor at the Frankfurter Zeitung and no friend of Marxism by any stretch of the imagination; still, he provided the space for Kracauer to publish pieces expressing left-wing political views and his unusual features for the culture pages. The protagonist of Ginter was his alter ego, and the novel was dedicated to L., with whom Kracauer had found a new joie de vivre in Marseille. Jacques Offenbach and the Paris of His Time was not associated with anyone in particular — unsurprisingly, given the years of groundless existence and isolation during which it was written. Instead of a dedication, the 'biography of society' was preceded by a quotation from Charles Baudelaire: one of the first to make the fleetingness, transience and contingency of modern life a theme of his poetry. That leaves us with the 'American books': From Caligari to Hitler was written to combat the Germans; in the Theory of Film, in some ways his life's work, it says 'for my wife' and History: The Last Things Before the Last was, of course, not completed by Kracauer and so remained without dedication —fitting, in a way, for a book that may be considered his legacy.

In stylistic terms, too, we may distinguish different phases of his life. In his para-religious phase, which lasted until 1925, Kracauer imitated the style of his role models Simmel and Scheler. The texts conform to a tradition of cultural criticism that belongs to the educated middle classes; they talk of 'essences and manifolds', of `personalities and their psychological life [Seelenleben]', etc., and they

are neither original nor in any way refined. The exact opposite is true of the numerous articles and books of his para-Marxist phase, which lasted until 1933. These are essayistic, at times aggressive and ironic, at other times allegorical and imagistic: they reveal Kracauer at the height of his powers and at his most significant. One might say that, during those years, Sancho Panza adventured with Don Quixote; the result was entertaining texts which are as intelligent as they are critically engaged, and which possess a unique tone. This forceful, witty and polemical style then paled, as a consequence of Kracauer's traumatic experience of emigration and war, but it did not disappear altogether. Kracauer's critique of society no longer pursued a positive goal; material security and making a new start were his preoccupations. After 1950, finally, Kracauer worked for many years on two academic and systematic treatises, and these sang a new and more measured melody. These two texts met with little interest. Quite a few people found Kracauer's contemplative style pedantic and boring. His theories of film and of history were subtly worked up, and their muted tone signalled a departure from his earlier writings, which were the preferred and more sought-after choices of Adorno's children, nephews and nieces. In the words of Dieter Henrich, the later Kracauer offered 'a lively conversation in a minor key'.

There is plenty of diversity in Kracauer's creative output, even if he himself might not have wanted to see this. And yet it would be wrong to assume that there were no moments of unity in Kracauer's intellectual biography. They are clearly visible. Kracauer was extremely idiosyncratic, never allowed himself to be pinned down, always said 'maybe' when others demanded or pronounced a loud and clear 'yes' or 'no'. Even during his Berlin days, when he was more outspoken in his political views, he once referred to himself as the 'derriere-garde of the avant-garde'. He always moved at the margins of particular fields of knowledge, and at times was ahead of the zeitgeist. What he thought and how he wrote would often find recognition and imitators only much later. In Isaiah Berlin's terms, Kracauer was not a 'hedgehog', who knows one big thing, but a 'fox', who is familiar with many different things. His philosophy of the anteroom is not a grand design like Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*. Neither is it as full of determination as Bloch's The Principle of Hope or Benjamin's theses on the philosophy of history. But Kracauer had many irons in the fire. He 'did not belong to any one discipline or profession' but was 'well trained in more than one academic discipline', as Paul Oskar Kristeller emphasizes in his foreword to History.

Kracauer had an almost libidinal need to make contact with `reality' and to understand it; it was as though his life — or at least his shot at a good life — depended on it. He had an 'urge to capture reality' [Elan zur Realiät], as he himself once put it. He was a materialist in the literal sense, an enemy of all systematic philosophies of the subject, who — at the same time — emphasized the subjective element in all knowledge. He could never agree with a theory that contradicted his experience. Kracauer called his method a 'construction out of the material', a phrase he used explicitly for the first time in his pioneering study The Salaried Masses. In his academic books from around 1960, he is clearly still pursuing this method. In these works, he is revealed as a constructivist with a tendency towards realism, or a constructivist realist.

Kracauer's search for the intermediary areas between philosophy, science and the arts, a search which usually led him to areas of the lifeworld' far from the large intellectual edifices and positivist sciences, was, indeed, a peculiar driving force behind his intellectual activity during all phases of his development. Twenty-five years ago, Michael Schröter explained that the meaning of the term 'reality' may undergo a shift in Kracauer's work, but the emphasis placed on it remains constant:

> It is always the identical movement of thought and experience which lends Kracauer's work its dynamic: separation from reality — the experience of chaos — the need for a comprehensive, undeniable order — the recognition that such an order is impossible (because of historical contingency) — the critique of weak or violent systematic orders — a

> provisional occupation with dispersed but concrete individual elements and their cautious combination into unities at a medium level.

This 'provisional occupation' grew into a permanent occupation with the provisional.

Kracauer's anteroom philosophy is empathetic-mimetic rather than critical. It neither aims at resistance, nor seeks adaptation. It does not actively aim at resistance, nor at adaptation. But it draws its power from the struggle against the existing conditions; it is a declaration of love for the world in which we live, yet one permeated by the experiences that taught Kracauer that this world is a threatening, brutal place. For Kracauer, the rift between self and

world cannot be healed. But, precisely because of that, the relation with the world, the way in which subjects concern themselves with the world, has particular importance. Whether a life is a good life, that is, whether it is 'real', was for Kracauer crucially dependent on the question of whether a person's relation to reality, to things and humans, was 'resonant' (in Hartmut Rosa's sense): whether it made possible vivid experience and a life that is not alienated."

What Kracauer had to say concerned concrete life. In Kracauer's peculiar face, alongside the traces of a hard life, it is still possible to discern little Friedel. But there is also present no small amount of alertness, wisdom; there is a whiff of contentedness, but also a serene melancholy. Theodor W Adorno called him a 'curious realist', and many others have tinkered with this description, often because they were irked by the adjective 'curious' [wunderlich]. Thus, Kracauer became a 'boundless realist' (Rolf Wiggershaus), a 'critical realist' (Dagmar Barnouw) or even a 'destructive realist' (Axel Honneth).

But Kracauer certainly was a 'curious realist'. It cannot be denied that he was strange, solitary and peculiar. That was also Ernst Bloch's view. In a letter to Lili Kracauer, Adolphe Lowe quoted him as saying about his recently deceased friend: 'The word "Krac" already onomatopoetically conveys something crackling-growling very well, and this is how he wanted to be understood. ... "Ginster's nightgown had a tear [RiB]" — who else was able thus to end the chapter of a novel without closing it? <>

Theodor W. Adorno and Siegfried Kracauer Correspondence 1923-1966 edited by Wolfgang Schopf, translated by Susan Reynolds and Michael Winkler [Polity, 9780745649238]

Theodor W. Adorno and Siegfried Kracauer were two of the most influential philosophers and cultural critics of the 20th century. While Adorno became the leading intellectual figure of the Frankfurt School, Kracauer's writings on film, photography, literature and the lifestyle of the middle classes opened up a new and distinctive approach to the study of culture and everyday life in modern societies.

This volume brings together for the first time the long-running correspondence between these two major figures of German intellectual culture. As left-wing German Jews who were forced into exile with the rise of Nazism, Adorno and Kracauer shared much in common, but their worldviews were in many ways markedly different. These differences become clear in a correspondence that ranges over a great diversity of topics, from the nature of criticism and the meaning of utopia to the work of their contemporaries, including Bloch, Brecht and Benjamin. Where Kracauer embraced the study of new mass media, above all film, Adorno was much more sceptical. This is borne out in his sharp

criticism of Kracauer's study of the composer Offenbach, which Adorno derided as musically illiterate, as well as his later criticism of Kracauer's *Theory of Film*. Exposing the very different ways that both men were grappling intellectually with the massive transformations of the 20th century, these letters shed fresh light on the principles shaping their work at the same time as they reveal something of the intellectual brilliance and human frailties of these two towering figures of 20th century thought.

This unique volume will be of great value to anyone interested in critical theory and in 20th century intellectual and cultural history.

Review

"Spanning four decades and two continents, these letters are key documents in the annals of twentieth-century thought. Bound by an intimacy that abides even during phases of terse estrangement, Teddie and Friedel gossip about their encounters with the century's literati at one moment – and spar over questions of utopia and ideology, language and style, critique and theory at the next." —**Johannes von Moltke, University of Michigan**

"This remarkable correspondence documents one of the most important intellectual friendships of the twentieth century. The seemingly antinomic relationship between their modes of thought—Kracauer's sounding of popular culture for societal truth versus Adorno's insistence that high culture alone offered a refuge for philosophical truth—made for pointed, and often barbed, exchanges of ideas. Yet the correspondence is much more than an abstract protocol; it is repeatedly illumined by lighting flashes emanating from the changing erotic and power relationships that determined the nature of the friendship." —**Michael Jennings, Princeton University**

Editorial Procedure

The documents which make up the correspondence between Theodor W. Adorno and Siegfried Kracauer are to be found in the Theodor W. Adorno Archiv, Frankfurt am Main, and the Kracauer papers in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach am Neckar; one letter comes from the Leo Löwenthal papers in the Archivzentrum der Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg, Frankfurt am Main.

Significant numbers of Kracauer's letters are lost; no information about the reason for this survives. If carbon copies or drafts of letters have survived, these have been included as equivalents; in one case we decided against this, as the draft bears the note 'not mailed' and was replaced by Kracauer with an almost identical letter, and in another case two drafts sketched out one day apart were combined.

The letters are reproduced, pursuant to the status of their extent at copy deadline, in their entirety, unabridged and, in the diplomatic sense, faithfully. In one case, protection of third parties' personal rights necessitated the omission of half a sentence, indicated by ellipses in square brackets; in addition, two personal names of third parties were encrypted. Ellipses in the text of a letter do not indicate an omission made by the editor but were made by the writer of the letter. Umlauts and the use of ss for ß have been standardized. Obvious typing errors have been unobtrusively corrected; on the other hand, orthographic peculiarities have been retained. Editorial additions in cases of lost

pieces of text or missing endings are indicated by square brackets, and crossings-out missed by the author after correction of the text by parentheses; otherwise, conjectural readings are given in the notes. The transcription of Adorno's handwriting was carried out by Christoph Gödde and Henri Lonitz; that of Kracauer's handwriting was provided in the first version by Elisabeth Matthias, after which Ingrid Belke took over the final editing and Sabine Biebl resolved individual questions. Alois Schmidmeier contributed to the deciphering of a stenographic draft and a similar note by Kracauer. Readings which are open to question are indicated. This collaboration notwithstanding, responsibility for the compilation of the text rests with the editor.

As a new edition of Kracauer's feuilletons has been published as part of the edition of the complete works of Siegfried Kracauer, the relevant articles are indicated by the date on which they appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung, together with their numbers in Kracauer, Werke 5.

The notes serve to enhance the readability of the letters and in certain instances to facilitate a reconstruction of their context; they are intended less to represent a critical commentary than to initiate a dialogue with research-based literature. In the case of quotations in the notes, omissions are indicated by ellipses.

Sample letter

54 Adorno to Kracauer
Bellagio, 14.9.1929
A N B R U C H Bellagio, Hotel Genazzini et Metropole.

MONATSSCHRIFT 14 SEPTEMBER 1929.

FUR NEUE MUSIK

KARLSPLATZ 6

WIEN I.

Dear Friedel,

I was really pleased with your letter, which I received yesterday — not only because you view our last talk as a kind of caesura and have some hopes of it, as I do, but above all because its tone, which I picked up very precisely, actually has something about it which has been missing from sour remarks for a long time — something which is difficult to identify, but which I can sense very clearly. It is as if for the first time you had once more relaxed that wretched attitude of humane neutrality which afflicted our relationship for so long, and instead you were at last behaving more openly and spontaneously towards me again. What makes me especially glad about this, and really gives me hope, is that the process is neither programmed nor pointed; it doesn't read as if it were following a resolve but much more as if you were once again taking the risk of using a language in front of yourself and me which is as dear to you as to me, as it is the one appropriate to our relationship. I don't want to go on about it, but just want to tell you that I sensed this with a joy which I have not known to exist between us for years. By the way, there is still something between us that we need to talk about — first and foremost, my actions with Ullstein. You are certainly right in your appraisal of the facts of the matter, and I greeted its failure with the same reaction as you did, but psychologically the situation is quite different from what you think; you were ready to put it down to ambition, whereas quite different motives came into play. Of course, one can retort that it wasn't about psychology but about what actually occurred, but I think that, sceptical as we are, we

shouldn't be too ready to discard psychology altogether. In any case I do need to discuss the Ullstein business with you too.

As for your theory about the ages in Kierkegaard, I am very much inclined to accept it; incidentally, Theodor H[a]ecker once wrote something similar — I believe it was in an essay about Newman. The only thing is that this theory is very un-Kierkegaardian — Kierkegaard would have rejected it violently as a 'mediation' of the ethical and as Hegelry. That is not to imply anything in factual terms, but it does indicate yet again that the Kierkegaard—Hegel dispute cannot be settled in such a clear-cut way as we once thought. As for Comte, I believe that I am acting in the same way as you when I bequeath the whole business of the theory of stages to your Daniloff.

Incidentally, I had an especially distinct feeling of growing older on my 26th birthday.

My life here will not be too different from yours. I can't escape from work this time, either; I have to do the Anbruch (almost entirely alone this time) and have to reorganize Heinz Simon's studio, etc. We spend every morning on the boat to shelter from the sun and, although the sun here is more moderate than that on the ocean, I am also using io crème and with good results; I too am getting a tan, and I also don't think that it will last. Bellagio, however, is not a sophisticated place; people don't even put on dinner jackets in the evenings. There is little to be seen of the jeunesse dorée here — almost nothing but sedate elderly English people, who have something agreeable about them. The mini-car generation here contents itself with racing noisily over the lake in tiny motorboats that soar high above the water — they are triumphant here too, but at least dust-free. By the way, I must make a formal declaration — i.e., that Hans Lothar, whom I had taken for something better, is one of that type to his very core. His articles on cars in the F. Z. were indescribably disgusting.

We ramble very peacefully around the lake and its environs and sleep a lot; our intellectual exertions are modest. We have done a bit of mathematics together (Gretel knows a lot more than I do) and are now reading Kant together (the Critique of Pure Reason), as you and I did eight years ago. It is remarkable in this respect how greatly modern natural science has changed our awareness in real terms; Gretel finds it most difficult to relate to a theory of knowledge which assumes Euclidean geometry and Newton's physics as natural givens. Incidentally, we do it in such a way that I always try to progress from textual exposition to interpretation in terms of the philosophy of history. I am now reading in quite a different I way from how I used to do and often find the most remarkable approaches in quite obscure places — even the one to a materialist dialectic in a polemic against Plato whose ideas 'find no support in experience'. It continues to be a mighty business.

I envy you your Spanish enterprises a little — I have long had a hankering in that direction. Is the work on the Angestellten finished?

I have a new catchphrase for Benjamin: The Heavenly Delusion'. The worst thing about this is that he himself would be sure to be very proud of it.

Reading The Spanish Farm by Mottram, very interesting as a documentary, better than Remarque, Renn and Glaeser, in fact, who is now being published by the Nouvelle Revue for which Proust once was not good enough. Then the Surrealist Bible: Breton's Nadja — he is not an artist but a very poor abstract man. His tendency results from a lack of substance.

Many thanks in advance for the Cocteau. Gabi wrote to me at the same time as you, highly delighted with it.

In the meantime, you will have had a card which I wrote to you. I was crafty enough, though, to send it to your home address, so that you won't be annoyed that it appears without an envelope. Or had

you perhaps already received it when you wrote me the letter? That would be an amazing achievement on the part of the Italian, German and French postal services.

Carry on enjoying the chance to relax and come home looking thoroughly negroid. I shall be back in Frankfurt as early as the 22nd.

Give Lili my very best wishes and also Gretel's — she sends her best to you too, of course.

Ever yours.

Teddie.

Notes to Letter

Original: typescript with printed letterhead, handwritten additions and corrections; Siegfried Kracauer papers, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach am Neckar.
Bellagio, Hotel Genazzini: holiday residence on Lake Como which Adorno visited with Gretel Karplus.
H[a]ecker... Newman: spelt 'Hecker' in the letter; this refers to Theodor Haecker (1879-1945), an author and cultural critic influenced by Soren Kierkegaard; besides the latter's writings he also translated, in the 1920s, those of the English theologian John Henry Newman (1801-1890). No information is available about what afterword or similar piece of writing Adorno is referring to here.
Kierkegaard—Hegel: Adorno would go on to elaborate on connections and differences between Soren Kierkegaard and Georg Wilhelm Hegel, including those referring to the theory of stages, in the fifth chapter of Kierkegaard: Konstruktion P des Asthethischen (see Adorno, GS 2, pp. 124-50).
your Daniloff. no information available.
Heinz Simon's studio: 'The Frankfurter Musikstudio was established several years ago in the context of the local Frankfurt group of the "Verband der konzertierenden Künstler" on the initiative of Dr Heinrich Simon' (see Adorno, *Musikstudio', Anbruch, January 1931, GS 19, pp. 520-4, here pp. 521, 653.)
Lothar: Hans Lothar (1900-1944), editor and member of the board of directors of the Frankfurter Zeitung; he went into exile in England in 1936.
his articles on cars: Hans Lothar was among the `automobilists' on the Frankfurter Zeitung whose articles in the main section or supplements such as the Bäderblatt and Reiseblatt contributed to the idealization of motor vehicles — in Lothar's case, through writings such as `Fahrt mit dem Frühling' [Travelling with the spring], `Nach Rom in 3 Tagen' [To Rome in 3 days] or 'Im Auto unterwegs: Von Frankfurt nach Strabburg' [On the road by car: from Frankfurt to Strassburg' (Frankfurter Zeitung, 18 April 1926, 5 May 1929 and 26 August 1929; all details from Andrea Wetterauer, Lust an der Distanz: Die Kunst der Autoreise in der 'Frankfurter Zeitung', Tubingen: Verein für Volkskunde, 2007, pp. 205-8).
Plato, whose ideas find no support in experience': 'In just such a way did Plato abandon the world of the senses as it imposes such narrow limits on intellect and dare to venture beyond this on the wings of ideas into the empty space of pure intellect. He did not notice that he was making no progress by his efforts, as at the
same time he had no support as a foundation against which he could brace him and to which he could apply his forces to remove the intellect from its place (See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 2nd edn 1787, edn. Königlich Preubischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911, p. 32).
work on the Angestellten: Kracauer finished the manuscript in October 1929 (see Marbacher Magazin 47, p. 51). See The Salaried Masses: Duty and Distraction in Weimar Germany, trans. Quintin Hoare, London: Verso, 1998.
The Heavenly Delusion': Adorno's preceding account of his reading of Immanuel Kant draws the eye towards a possible model for the catchphrase: in Kant it is `illusion of freedom'

(Blendwerk von Freiheit; see Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 2nd edn 1787, p. 311); Adorno proves his knowledge of this passage by later quoting it in Negative Dialektik (see Adorno, GS 6, p. 249); see Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, London: Routledge, 1973. Alternatively, a choice of models might be provided by a misappropriation of the title of Karl Kraus's gloss Blendwerk der Mlle (Die Fackel, January 1913); and finally an adaptation of Don Cesar's exclamation (Act III, scene iv): `Blendwerk der Hone! Was? In seinen Armen!' ['Vision of hell! What is this? In his arms!'] in Friedrich Schiller's Die Braut von Messina (ed. Matthias Luserke, Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1996, p. 354); see The Bride of Messina, trans. F. J. Lamport, Cambridge: Modern Humanities Research Association, 2018.
Mottram: Ralph Hale Mottram (1883-1971), author of The Spanish Farm, trilogy of novels about the First World War.
Remarque: Erich Maria Remarque (1898-1970), author of All Quiet on the Weste Front, trans. A. W. Wheen, London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929.

Renn: Ludwig Renn (1889-1979), author; he achieved national and internation success with Krieg [War], published in book form in 1929.
Proust once was not good enough: in 1912 the publisher Gaston Gallimard (1881 1975) had rejected the first volume of A la recherche du temps perdu, which was why the book was published in 1913 by Grasset; in 1916, however, Proust received a offer to publish his future works in the Nouvelle Revue Franfaise.
Nadja: the story by Andre Breton (1896-1966) was published in 1928 by Editio Gallimard, Paris.
wrote ... highly delighted with it: no letter from Gabriele Oppenheim which corr sponds to this description is preserved in the Theodor W. Adorn Archiv.
a card: not preserved. <>

How Not to Write a Thesis or Dissertation: A Guide to Success through Failure by Mikael Sundström [Edward Elgar Publishers, 9781789900521]

If you thought a book about thesis writing would make for wearisome reading, think again! In seven entertaining and enlightening chapters, Mikael Sundström sheds light on the trials and tribulations of academic writing, offering guidance on how to become a doyen of academic disaster - and, more importantly, how to avoid that fate.

Prepare to consider your academic writing in a whole new way. Guiding readers through the many stages of thesis writing, this dynamic book provides a comprehensive and rigorous methodology that encompasses the crucial aspects of the dreaded dissertation. It follows the writing process, from drafting the research question and composing the first line, to constructing an impressive argument and finishing a thesis with finesse. Featuring concrete tips on academic penmanship and regular 'How Not to Fail' boxes, Sundström identifies the potential pitfalls that lead to dissertation disaster - and expertly lays out a path to success.

This useful guide will be crucial reading for postgraduate students preparing to write theses and dissertations, as well as undergraduate students undertaking longer academic papers for the first time. It will also be a convenient reference guide for course leaders in need of a bank of ideas to assist their students.

Contents

I have something to say! It's better to burn out than to fade away! —The Kurgan, quote from movie Highlander (1986)

Most of us secretly yearn to make a mark on this world; to be lastingly remembered for some extraordinary feat. If you are reading this book you are presumably a would-be, soon-to-be or even actual academic thesis writer, and a possibly dispiriting aspect of academia is that fame, not to mention fortune, is far from the norm in this field of endeavour. It is, in short, highly unlikely that your thesis will make waves of a kind and amplitude that will allow you to surf into genuine and enduring stardom. Additionally, sparkling academic success not only requires unusually well-aligned stars, but also a lot of plain hard toil, often years of it, which sort of precludes instant bursts of fame based on a single slender thesis. But just as the midichlorians in a galaxy far far away offer not one but two very different routes to celebrity, so you too can opt for a dark side. If you cannot see a way to thesis-writing Jedi-hood, then consider becoming a Sith. Awe-tinged recognition, in this case in the form of concentrated infamy, is still within reach. Read on, and may the Force be with you.

THE ART OF WRITING A TRULY TERRIBLE THESIS OR DISSERTATION . . .

Flosi was so stirred at this, that sometimes he was bloodred in the face, and sometimes ashy pale as withered grass, and sometimes blue as death. The Story of Burnt Njal (Icelandic Sage translated by George W. DaSent, 1861)

The above is a characteristically severe Icelandic saga illustration of where you will want your thesis reader to end up emotionally; if you can prompt that kind of reaction, you can be relatively sure that you, and your thesis, will indeed be remembered for a very long time to come. Now, Flosi's hue-shifting indignation was in fact understandable — even reasonable. His rather daunting niece Hildigunna had just hurled a blood-soaked cloak at him so that "the gore rattled down all over him", in order to remind him to get his skates on and murder someone she thought could do with a bit of being dead. As a thesis writer, you will hopefully not have access to any blood-soaked cloaks, but need to resort to other, more gradual but persistent, techniques to stoke the necessary fire.

The overarching aim of this book is to provide solid and effective guidance when your aim is to write a thesis sure to fail so spectacularly that you will earn the respect and awe you lust for. It is divided into seven different chapters, excluding this one, that together offer hundreds of tips on how to turn your thesis into a toxic academic wasteland.

The first four deal with aspects related to content: how the thesis is organised and how core arguments are mooted, developed and supported. Chapter 5, "Making an Argument", the single longest chapter in the book, rounds this out with plenty of advice contravening "theology and

geometry, taste and decency", as Ignatius J. Reilly, protagonist and self-styled medievalist scholar in A Confederacy of Dunces (Toole, 1980), might have put it.

Chapters 6 and 7 home in on the form or "look and feel" of your thesis: Chapter 6 dealing with language and style, and Chapter 7 with graphical aspects. The final chapter, "Odds and Sods", mops up lingering matters that have found no obvious home in the six preceding ones.

... AND HOW TO AVOID THAT FATE

Book purveyors work in mysterious ways. It is for that reason entirely possible that some readers of this book are not looking for everlasting thesis notoriety. When I approached this esteemed publishing house with the proposed manuscript, this was pointed out to me, with the added rider that I might want to consider and cater to this slightly larger customer demographic. The right thing to do was obviously to stand up to the suggested perversion of purpose. Making use of subtle facial expressions, I did indeed signal my fiercely principled discontent as I emailed back the signed contract (the editor-type was, it turned out, empowered to adjust remuneration levels, or even to rebuff "difficult" authors). I realise that it will enrage purist readers, and rightly so, but this means that each chapter will include several boxes where the aim is momentarily reversed. Tips will therein focus on how not to fail (which is also how the boxes are labelled). Heeding that advice will dramatically increase your chances to write a far from notorious, maybe even a half-decent, thesis. Watch out: there might be a Jedi lurking in you somewhere. <>

THE FAILURES OF PHILOSOPHY: A HISTORICAL ESSAY by Stephen Gaukroger [Princeton University Press, 9780691207506]

The first book to address the historical failures of philosophy—and what we can learn from them

Philosophers are generally unaware of the failures of philosophy, recognizing only the failures of particular theories, which are then remedied with other theories. But, taking the long view, philosophy has actually collapsed several times, been abandoned, sometimes for centuries, and been replaced by something quite different. When it has been revived it has been with new aims that are often accompanied by implausible attempts to establish continuity with a perennial philosophical tradition. What do these failures tell us?

THE FAILURES OF PHILOSOPHY: A HISTORICAL ESSAY presents a historical investigation of philosophy in the West, from the perspective of its most significant failures: attempts to provide an account of the good life, to establish philosophy as a discipline that can stand in judgment over other forms of thought, to set up philosophy as a theory of everything, and to construe it as a discipline that rationalizes the empirical and mathematical sciences. Stephen Gaukroger argues that these failures reveal more about philosophical enquiry and its ultimate point than its successes ever could. These failures illustrate how and why philosophical inquiry has been conceived and reconceived, why philosophy has been thought to bring distinctive skills to certain questions, and much more.

An important and original account of philosophy's serial breakdowns, **THE FAILURES OF PHILOSOPHY: A HISTORICAL ESSAY** ultimately shows how these shortcomings paradoxically reveal what matters most about the field.

Review

"Philosophy in the present, Stephen Gaukroger shows, cannot be understood without history—not just its own history, but also that of other disciplines, which at various moments provided answers to questions that philosophy failed to resolve. This enormously important and illuminating book has significant implications for our understanding of intellectual change over time. The breadth and erudition of Gaukroger's account, which begins in classical antiquity and ends in the late twentieth century, are simply extraordinary."**—Thomas Ahnert, University of Edinburgh**

"With great clarity and verve, Stephen Gaukroger presents not only a catalog of philosophy's ambitions and defeats, but also reveals how these vicissitudes came to pass. Successive and devastating failures have left us with a discipline that is now merely a metatheory of science and 'a shadow of its former self.' Gaukroger leaves us with the conviction that by recognizing these ultimately unhappy stories, we may be able to learn from them. Through its stunning sweep and erudition, this book is itself one source of hope in philosophy's currently constricted times."**—Michael Della Rocca, Yale University**

"In this audacious and ambitious book, Stephen Gaukroger offers an overview of Western philosophy, from its very beginnings to its current state, emphasizing not its successes, but the failures that have led to its successive transformations. *The Failures of Philosophy* is a great deal more than a history of philosophy: it is an inquiry into what philosophy was, is, and could be, executed by a distinguished scholar who has spent his long career immersed in these questions."**—Daniel Garber, Princeton University**

"Most histories of philosophy are stories of progress. This book is a story of failures, not of ideas or theories that are corrected at a later stage, but of the very practices and self-conceptions of philosophy which result in its replacement by something else, such as theology or science. Elegantly written, philosophically insightful, and historically well-informed, this work offers a much-needed challenge to dominant conceptions of philosophy today."**—Michael Beaney, University of Aberdeen and Humboldt University, Berlin**

CONTENTS

The history of philosophy has typically been written as the history of its achievements. Philosophy is not an unqualified success story, however, and its failures—not the failures of particular philosophical theories or programmes, but the failures of philosophy itself—reveal as much to us as do its successes. Examination of these failures prompts us to ask what the alternatives to philosophy have been, whether these proved more satisfactory than philosophy, and if so why. This in turn allows us to gain some insight not only into the limits of philosophical enquiry, but, more importantly, into whether there are basic features of philosophy that hinder its treatment of many of the questions to which it has directed its attention.

As histories of philosophy go, the present treatment is both compact and selective. Compact, because a compact account is better able to bring an urgency and sharp focus to the issues. Selective, because the narrative has been shaped by historiographical considerations, and these have yielded a different story from the usual one. Many developments that figure in histories of the discipline are absent here, while others that appear only rarely if at all will be explored. As regards the degree of novelty of the approach that I am taking, the influence of Hume's reflections on the limits and limitations of philosophy, at least as I read them, will be evident: philosophy is indispensable if we are to subject the things we believe to critical reflection, but at the same time we need to exercise judgement on its capacities, since it is a resource that can fall out of control and become self-perpetuating, leading us up blind alleys.

***

It is an important element in what follows that the contextualization I shall be pursuing is one that is designed to bring to the surface the non-philosophical factors that lie behind particular intellectual positions. In particular, whereas histories of philosophy set out what might be termed the doctrines of philosophers, we shall be equally concerned with what, at different times, shapes the discipline of philosophy: with the question of what it is to think philosophically about a question. The project can also be described in another way. Many philosophers have construed the history of Western philosophy as making a gradual progress towards current concerns. By contrast, many historians of philosophy have now largely abandoned such a genealogical approach. This prompts the question as to just what kind of historical development philosophy exhibits. Hegel, one of most committed defenders of the intrinsic progress view, brought sophisticated historiographical considerations to bear, enhanced by his ability to draw on a deep understanding of historical and cultural questions. There is no such level of sophistication in modern advocates of this approach, who typically see the development of philosophy on purely internal lines, very much on the model of how they think that science develops. The most cursory investigation of the linear progress view reveals its inadequacy, but such investigation does not tell us what an adequate account might look like; still less does it offer a historiographical understanding.

It is such an understanding that I am proposing to offer, and there are three core questions on which everything else hinges. These are the question of the nature of philosophy, that of how to identify and assess both its successes and its failures, and the question of the appropriate periodization of philosophy for this project.

The first topic is that of what philosophy is. This is a pressing question for us, because a core part of the project is to argue that the goals of philosophy, goals that shape the direction of philosophical enquiry, change so significantly that tracing a continuous philosophical heritage becomes fraught. We cannot assume from the outset that there is a perennial philosophical tradition that stretches from antiquity to the present in any substantive sense. More specifically, we cannot assume that there is a form of activity beginning with the Presocratics which, by being continuously reworked—having the weeds removed, as it were, and the new shoots gradually cultivated—has led to current forms of philosophical enquiry. On the other hand, this in itself should not incline us in favour of a Hegelian account of the history of philosophy, despite Hegel's emphasis on the successive rise and decline of philosophical systems. What marks his teleological approach out from ours is that it is central to Hegel's conception that there is an overall philosophical goal that regulates the succession of systems, and the new developments that follow a decline are thought of as a rebirth or renewal of the broader project. Once we abandon Hegelian teleology, the main motivation for seeking some overarching, supra-historical form of philosophical enterprise disappears. We can treat the rise and fall of particular projects in their own terms. And, importantly, although these projects may use some of the resources of older ones, such as particular styles of reasoning, and may trace a genealogy to older projects, we are not obliged thereby to proceed as if these were part of the same continuous enterprise. Nevertheless, deciding between continuity and discontinuity is not an end in itself.

The point is rather that, if it turns out that the projects are significantly discontinuous, this has consequences for our understanding of the nature of philosophical thought, and we will need to enquire to what degree philosophical thought is not something that embodies perennial concerns, but rather is subject to historical contextualization.

What is at issue here are the aims of philosophy, and the task is to identify fault lines that generate fundamental changes in these aims. Classical, Hellenistic, and Roman philosophers, for example, had considered the ultimate aims of knowledge to be wisdom, happiness, and well-being. But Christianity

transferred such aims into a purely spiritual realm, so that they could only be attained in a union with God, with the result that, in incorporating it into Christian teaching, they believed philosophy finally realized its true standing. When an autonomous form of philosophy re-emerged, from the thirteenth century onwards, this required a major realignment of the goals of philosophical enquiry. Despite an attempt to revive the original conception of philosophical understanding by Renaissance humanists, knowledge had been transformed in the process of Christianization, and the notion that, in pursuing philosophy, one was pursuing wisdom and happiness now had a decidedly naive and unworldly ring to it. Indeed, in the wake of Francis Bacon's criticism of a purely contemplative conception of philosophy, this came to be seen as the result of a profoundly mistaken understanding of what philosophy should be doing. Philosophy could no more produce wisdom and happiness than could mathematics or medicine. It was not that wisdom and happiness were not worthwhile goals, nor even that they were not the ultimate human goals, but rather that they were not to be realized through philosophy.

There is a crucial, if largely unappreciated, point here. These philosophical aims, and changes in philosophical aims, do not in themselves take the form of philosophical doctrines. In a crucial respect, they are extra-philosophical: they work at the level of shaping what one does with philosophy, how one pursues it, and how one conceives of what it is to be a philosopher. Investigating them tells us something about the discipline, about the point of the exercise. Particularly in an era in which philosophy has become subservient to science in many respects, there is a pressing need to stand back in order to understand the point of the exercise.

On the second question, that of success and failure of philosophy, it is absolutely crucial that we distinguish between the questions that motivate a philosophical programme on the one hand, and, on the other, the philosophical arguments used to realize the aims of that programme. Analytic philosophy in the twentieth century increasingly became a matter of resolving self-generated problems, so that motivation collapsed into the philosophical programme itself, as the exercise became increasingly remote and fruitless, and increasingly removed from effective engagement with concerns outside its own quasi-Platonic realm. But this is not how philosophy had traditionally proceeded. Throughout its history, it has dealt with pressing problems generated outside philosophy and subjected them to philosophical enquiry as a means of clarifying, reformulating, and resolving them. Coming to terms with the issues this raises is a distinctive feature of the approach we shall be taking. These issues are complex, but without addressing them, we cannot begin to identify the successes and failures of philosophical programmes, for these are successes and failures in achieving goals, which means that we must identify the goals, and this will only make complete sense if we understand what they derive from and why they arise in the first place.

The crucial point here is that success can be a matter of meeting extra-philosophical goals and imperatives. The most pressing problem is how we decide what resources we draw on in order to identify such extra-philosophical goals, and under what conditions we can rely on them. It is rare to find any recognition of these questions in histories of philosophy, and without this one proceeds as if it were simply a question of whether, taking goals as given, the premises and arguments based on them can successfully deliver these goals. On the other hand, to explore the extra-philosophical goals that motivate such arguments—and in the process determine what kinds of answers are going to be satisfying and compelling, something that philosophical questioning is not necessarily able to circumscribe—cannot involve bypassing the arguments entirely and substituting new questions. To the extent that we are dealing with philosophical projects, what gives these projects their philosophical identity is the nature of the arguments deployed. This leaves two questions. First, what resources do we have for exploring the extra-philosophical goals of philosophical programmes? Second, can we deploy these in a way that preserves the philosophical character of the programmes?

A good example of the difficulties is provided by the work of Pierre Hadot on 'ways of life' and 'spiritual exercises' in Hellenistic and Neoplatonist philosophy. Hadot developed these ideas from Wittgenstein's idea of 'forms of life, and construed different philosophical programmes on the model of different forms of life. Rather than looking at the doctrines of the philosophical programmes in antiquity, he examined what can broadly be considered the training of the philosopher in these different programmes, under the rubric of 'spiritual exercises': what it was that one had to do to be a philosopher,

how one had to behave. One valuable aspect of this approach Is the elaboration of a conception of philosophy according to which there is a way of engaging intellectual, cultural, moral, scientific, and aesthetic problems which is not only distinctive, marking out the philosophical treatment of these problems from that of the theologian or statesman or the artist, for example, but one whereby the philosopher is someone who has a particular standing, a particular claim to be heard. Although he scientist has now usurped much of this role from the philosopher, in historical terms such questions were shaped around the philosopher, and questions can still be asked of the philosopher. The overriding issue here is: on what does the ~landing of the philosopher depend? Hadot's approach provides us with a crucial resource in understanding the shifting personae of the philosopher, for these correlate directly with the shifting nature of the philosophical enterprise. At the same time, it allows us to think through the way in which initially non-philosophical goals are translated into a philosophical form, especially in those cases where there remains something that cannot be accommodated in the philosophical formulation, but where the success of the enquiry depends on its ability to provide a comprehensive account. We shall see that ancient philosophy becomes wholly eclipsed by Christianity, liar example, due to the inability of the philosophical notion of the 'good life' to provide something sufficiently meaningful, as we move from classical into Hellenistic and Roman culture. Hadot's approach is useful here, but it quickly becomes less secure as we move away from its original Neoplatonist context. Analysing philosophical movements in terms of 'spiritual exercises, he brings them under the rubric of communities with shared values. This something that is characteristic of philosophy in the late Hellenistic period, in the theological nature of the Neoplatonist doctrines that flourished then and the form that adherence to those doctrines took. But it was certainly not typical of philosophy after that period, or even before it, and the danger lies in treating the philosopher in terms of a culturally or socially defined group which has no philosophical identity as such. The distortion that such an approach engenders means that the value of Hadot's work does not lie in trying to think through various philosophical enterprises in terms of `spiritual exercises. Its contribution is more modest, though none the less instructive for that. It opens up a window on some of the ways in which extra-philosophical concerns shape what philosophers do, and how they conceive of themselves, and I shall be taking such considerations seriously in what follows.

The third feature of our approach derives from the first two. It concerns periodization. The standard periodization of the history of philosophy, one immediately familiar to every student of the subject, derives from the nineteenth-century neo-Kantian/neo-Hegelian philosopher Kuno Fisher. Fisher identified what he considered to be a change in the concerns of philosophy, from metaphysics to epistemology, in the seventeenth century. On his reading, the metaphysical dichotomy between Platonism and Aristotelianism was replaced by an epistemological one, between advocates of the idea that all knowledge derived from the exercise of reason, the 'rationalists, and advocates of the idea that all knowledge derived from sensation, the 'empiricists'. The distinctions have proved problematic to serious scholars working on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. Spinoza, Leibniz, and arguably Berkeley, were as much metaphysicians as any of their predecessors. The founding figure of rationalism, Descartes, was about as empirical a philosopher as one is likely to find in the history of the discipline, devoting large amounts of his time to lens-grinding and to

anatomical dissection. Moreover, the idea that there is a continuity of fundamental approach between Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz is belied by the rejection by the latter two of what has usually been identified as Descartes's distinctively rationalist procedure, scepticism. The rationalism/empiricism model was devised in the context of the belief that Kant had identified and solved the major problems that rationalism and empiricism encountered, a claim that Kant himself had encouraged, even though he did not formulate it in quite those terms. And indeed philosophy from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards does have a Kantian tenor, including the idea that the form of purely conceptual investigation that it offers provides the only path for philosophical enquiry.

The historiographical schema that I shall be following is not that which identifies as distinct stages Greek, medieval, modern, Kantian, and post-Kantian/contemporary philosophy. Despite its serious defects, I am not advocating a general model to replace this, because I doubt that there is any adequate all-purpose model. Periodization is relative to questions. What I shall be trying to offer is something that grows, organically as it were, out of the developments distinguished as we proceed, mirroring what I identify as the points at which philosophy collapses and is replaced by something else. Three such points are identified. The first comes at the end of the Hellenistic period, and it derives from the failure of classical and Hellenistic philosophy to provide a satisfactory account of the good life, which with the Hellenistic schools becomes tantamount to an undisturbed life. Building on Neoplatonism, Christian theologians offered something that seemed to satisfy what the philosophers had been seeking, and they were then able to incorporate selected elements of earlier philosophies into a wholly theological account, philosophy losing any autonomy in the process.

The second episode comes with the emergence of an autonomous role for philosophy with Aquinas, who envisages a form of metaphysics, subject only to the dictates of reason, as a means of reconciling discordant claims of natural philosophy (science) and Christian teaching. Such a model, as we shall see, is that which dominates much early modern philosophy, above all that of the immensely influential work of Descartes. This idea of metaphysics, now pursued via epistemology, as the epitome of reason, was subsequently discarded on three independent but simultaneous fronts: with Hume, with the replacement of philosophy by medicine in France, and with the rise of a broadly-based form of intellectual enquiry replacing metaphysics in Germany. Here philosophy collapsed for a second time, losing all authority as the highest form of reflection, as something that could stand over and judge all claims to understanding.

The third episode comes with Kant, at the end of the eighteenth century. Hume had set out the limits of metaphysics, and philosophy more generally, showing why it could not possibly achieve what it claimed. Following Hume, Kant argued that the failure of philosophy resulted from a failure to grasp its limits, but he proposed that a philosophical understanding of these limits was possible. Philosophical enquiry could not only be kept within strict limits, but could also provide insight into what lay beyond those limits, for example on matters of morality and religion. Kant offered what was in effect an attempt to provide a theory of everything, in the process defining what a successful philosophy would be like. This was reinforced in the 'all or nothing' approach of Kant's idealist successors, and the problem was that the failure of this programme led to the second option: nothing. In spite of, and in many respects because of, the efforts of Kant's idealist successors, the idea of philosophy as the theory of everything crumpled under its own weight. This paved the way for the third collapse of philosophy, as its aspirations were taken over by something that deployed completely different resources from the second-order conceptual enquiry characteristic of philosophy.

Philosophy was replaced by empirical science, with the claim that if there was anything that could not be grasped scientically then it could not be known by any discipline, and was permanently

unknowable. Science now became the theory of everything, not so much because of some internal trajectorly within science itself, but because philosophy had built up expectations about what comprehensive understanding consisted in, and science was the only (non-religious) alternative when the philosophical theory of everything collapsed.

The Kantian and German idealist 'all or nothing' claims for philosophy were now transferred to science, and this opened the door to the fourth episode in our story, the emergence of new forms of philosophy whose primary aim was accommodation to science. Among the forms this took was a series of attempts to pursue philosophy on the model of science, to translate its concerns and procedures into as scientific a form as possible. Here, philosophy loses autonomy in crucial respects, and has little if anything in common with the historical philosophical projects from which it seeks legitimacy as the paradigm form of enquiry. <>

Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information (Volume I) by Gilbert Simondon, translated by Taylor Adkins, [Posthumanities, University of Minnesota Press, 9780816680023]

Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information, Supplement edition (Volume II) by Gilbert Simondon, translated by Taylor Adkins, [Posthumanities, University of Minnesota Press, 9781517909529

A long-awaited translation on the philosophical relation between technology, the individual, and milieu of the living

From Democritus's atomism to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, from Aristotle's reflections on the individual to Husserl's call for a focused return to things, from the philosophical advent of the Cartesian ego and the Leibnizian monad to Heidegger's notion of Dasein, the question concerning the constitution of the individual has continued to loom large over the preoccupations of philosophers and scholars of scientific disciplines for thousands of years.

Through conceptions in modern scientific areas of research such as thermodynamics, the fabrication of technical objects, gestalt theory, cybernetics, and the dynamic formation at work in the creation of crystals, Gilbert Simondon's unique multifaceted philosophical and scholarly research will eventually lead to an astounding reevaluation and questioning of the historical methods for posing the very question and notion of the individual. More than fifty years after its original publication in French, this groundbreaking work of philosophical theory is now available in its first complete English language translation.

The second volume of **Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information** presents archival documents detailing both the preliminary research conducted by Gilbert Simondon as well as sketches of early drafts and presentations of his work throughout the intellectual era of his eventual magnum opus. Volume II provides an erudite and important overview of a unique history of both the role the individual has played throughout history in philosophy,

religion, and society as well as insight into the contemporary machinations and exciting milieu in which Simondon dared to tread as an interdisciplinary thinker in philosophy and psychology, as well as the new burgeoning fields of computer science and cybernetics.

This companion volume provides insight into Simondon's primary thesis, for which he is renowned by scholars in a wide range of academic disciplines. Readers across the humanities and the sciences, information theory, philosophy of technology, and many other fields now have a vital resource for intellectual exploration into the human's ongoing relationship with the technological universe.

Principles toward a Study of the Individuation of the Living Being
- Information and Vital Individuation; Levels of Organization; Vital Activity and Psychical Activity
- Successive Levels of Individuation: Vital, Psychical, Transindividual

Specific Form and Living Substance
- Insufficiency of the Notion of Specific Form; Notion of the Pure Individual; Non-univocal Nature of the Notion of the Individual
- The Individual as Polarity; Functions of Internal Genesis and of External Genesis
- Individuation and Reproduction
- Undifferentiation and Dedifferentation as Conditions of Reproductive Individuality

Information and Vital Individuation
- Individuation and Regimes of Information
- Regimes of Information and Rapports between Individuals
- Individuation, Information, and the Structure of the Individual

Information and Ontogenesis
- Notion of an Ontogenetic Problematic
- Individuation and Adaptation
- Limits of the Individual ion of the Living. Central Characteristic of die Nature of the Collective
- From Information to Signification
- 'Topology and Ontogenesis

2. Psychical Individuation

Signification and the Individuation of Perceptive Units
- Segregation of Perceptive Units; the Genetic Theory and the Theory of Holistic Grasping; Determinism of Good Form
- Psychical Tension and Degrees of Metastability. Good Form and Geometrical Form; the Different Types of Equilibrium
- Relation between the Segregation of Perceptive Units and the Other Types of Individuation. Metastability and Information Theory in Technology and Psychology
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- Insufficiency of the Notion of Adaptation to Explain Psychical Individuation
- The Problematic of Reflexivity in Individuation
- The Necessity of Psychical Ontogenesis

3. Collective Individuation and the Foundations of the Transindividual

The Individual and the Social, Group Individuation
- Social Time and Individual Time
- Interiority Groups and Exteriority Groups
- Social Reality as a System of Relations

This study is founded on the following conception of being: being does not have a unity of identity, which is that of a stable state wherein no transformation is possible; being has a transductive unity, i.e. it can phase-shift with respect to itself, it can overflow itself on both sides from its center. What is taken as a relation or duality of principles is in fact this overflowing expanse of a being, insofar as a being is more than unity and more than identity; becoming is a dimension of a being, not what comes to it according to a succession undergone by an initially given and substantial being. Individuation must be grasped as the being's becoming and not as a model of the being that would exhaust its signification. The individuated being is neither the whole being nor the first being; instead of grasping individuation on the basis of the individuated being the individuated being must be grasped on the basis of individuation and individuation on the basis of pre-individual being, which is distributed according to several orders of magnitude.

The intention of this study is therefore to examine the forms, modes, and degrees of individuation in order to put the individual back into being according to the three levels of the physical, the vital, and the psycho-social. Instead of supposing substances so as to account for individuation, we have chosen to take the different regimes of individuation as the basis of various domains, such as matter, life, mind, and society. The separation, layering, and relations of these domains appear as aspects of

individuation according to its different modalities; the more fundamental notions of first information, metastability, internal resonance, energetic potential, and orders of magnitude are substituted for the notions of substance, form, and matter.

Yet, in order for this modification of notions to be possible, it is necessary to introduce both a new method and a new notion. The method consists in not trying to compose the essence of a reality via a conceptual relation between two preexisting extreme terms, and it also consists in considering every veritable relation as having the status of being. Relation is a modality of being; it is simultaneous with respect to the terms whose existence it guarantees. A relation must be grasped as a relation in being, a relation of being, a manner of being, and not a simple rapport between two terms that could be adequately known via concepts because they would have an effectively prior, separate existence. It is because terms are conceived as substances that relation is a rapport of terms and that being is separated into terms,

since being is initially, before any examination of individuation, conceived as substance. Conversely, if substance is no longer the model of being, it is possible to conceive relation as the being's non-identity vis-à-vis itself, the inclusion in the being of a reality which is not merely identical with it, such that being qua being, before any individuation, can be comprehended as more than unity and more than identity. This kind of method supposes an ontological type of postulate: at the level of being grasped before any individuation, the principle of the excluded middle and the principle of identity are no longer applicable; these principles only apply to the already individuated being, and they define an impoverished being that is separated into milieu and individual; consequently, they do not apply to the being's whole, to the ensemble formed later on by the milieu and the individual, but merely to what of pre-individual being has become individual. In this sense, classical logic cannot be used to think individuation, for it forces us to think the operation of individuation with concepts and rapports among concepts that merely apply to the results of the operation of individuation considered partially.

The usage of this method, which considers the principle of identity and the principle of the excluded middle as too narrow, unlocks a notion that has a multitude of aspects and domains of application: that of transduction. By transduction we mean a physical, biological, mental, or social operation through which an activity propagates incrementally within a domain by basing this propagation on a structuration of the domain operated from one region to another: each structural region serves as a principle and model, as an initiator for constituting the following region, such that a modification thereby extends progressively throughout this structuring operation. The simplest image of the transductive operation is provided by the crystal, which, starting from a tiny germ, increases and extends following all the directions in its supersaturated mother liquor: each previously constituted molecular layer serves as the structuring basis for the layer in the process of forming; the result is an amplifying reticular structure. The transductive operation is an individuation in progress; within the physical domain, it can be effectuated in the simplest way via progressive iteration; but within more complex domains, like the domains of vital metastability or of the psychical problematic, it can advance with a constantly variable pace and extend into a domain of heterogeneity; there is transduction when there is an activity that starts from a being's structural and functional center and extends in various directions based on its center, as if multiple dimensions of the being appeared around this center; transduction is the correlative appearance of dimensions and structures within a being in a state of pre-individual tension, i.e. in a being which is more than unity and more than identity and which has not yet phase-shifted with respect to itself in multiple dimensions. The extreme terms attained by the transductive operation do not exist before this operation; its dynamism stems from the initial tension of the system of the heterogeneous being that phase-shifts and develops dimensions according to which it will be structured; it does not come from a tension

between terms that will be attained and deposited at the extreme limits of transduction. Transduction can be a vital operation; in particular, it expresses the orientation of organic individuation; it can be a psychical operation and an effective logical procedure, although it is not at all limited to logical thought. In the domain of knowledge, it defines the veritable measure of invention, which is neither inductive nor deductive, but transductive, i.e. corresponds to a discovery of the dimensions according to which a problematic can be defined; it is an analogical operation, at least based on what is valid about this kind of operation. This notion can be used to think the different domains of individuation: it applies to all cases wherein an individuation is realized, manifesting the genesis of a web of rapports founded on the being. The possibility of using an analogical transduction to think a domain of reality indicates that this domain is effectively the groundwork of a transductive structuration. 'I'ransduction corresponds to this existence of rapports that takes hold when pre- individual being individuates; it expresses individuation and allows for individuation to be thought; it is therefore a notion that is both metaphysical and logical; it applies to ontogenesis and is ontogenesis itself Objectively, it makes it possible to understand the systematic conditions of individuation, internal resonance, and the psychical problematic. Logically, it can be used as the basis of a new type of analogical paradigmatism in order to pass from physical individuation to organic individuation, from organic individuation to psychical individuation, and from psychical individuation to the subjective and objective transindividual, all of which defines the plan of this research.

We could certainly assert that transduction would not be presented as a logical procedure having a proof value; furthermore, we don't mean to say that transduction is a logical procedure in the current sense of the term; it is a mental procedure, and even much more than a procedure, it is the mind's way of discovering. This way of discovering consists in following the being in its genesis, in accomplishing the genesis of thought at the same time as the genesis of the object is accomplished. In this research, it is called upon to play a role that dialectics could not play, for the study of the operation of individuation does not seem to correspond to the appearance of the some negative as a second stage, but to an immanence of the some negative. within the initial condition through the ambivalent form of tension and incompatibility; this is what is most positive in the state of pre-individual being, namely the existence of potentials, which is also the cause of the incompatibility and non-stability of this state; the negative appears initially as an ontogenetic incompatibility, but it is in actuality merely the other side of a wealth of potentials; therefore, it is not a substantial negative; it is never a stage or phase, and individuation not a synthesis or return to unity but the phase-shift of the being based on Its pre-individual center of potentialized incompatibility. From this ontogenetlc perspective, time itself is considered as an expression of the dimensionality of the being that is individuating.

'transduction is therefore not merely the reasoning of the mind; it is also Intuition, because it is that through which a structure appears in a domain AI, a problematic as providing the resolution to the problems posed. But contrary to deduction, transduction does not go elsewhere to seek a principle to resolve the problem of a domain: it extracts the resolving structure from the very tensions of this domain, just as the supersaturated solution crystallizs due to its own potentials and according to the chemical species that it holds, not with the contribution of some foreign form. It is also not compatable to induction, for induction truly conserves the characteristics of the terms (if reality included in the studied domain, drawing the structures of lie analysis from these terms themselves, but it only conserves what is positive in these terms, i.e. what is common to all terms, thereby eliminating what is singular from them; on the contrary, transduction is a discovery of (lint elisions whose system makes the dimensions of each of the terms communicative of the terms of the domain can become organized into newly discovered structures without loss or reduction; resolving transduction operates the inversion of the negative into the positive: that through which the terms

are not identical to one another, that through which they are disparate (in the sense that this term assumes within the theory of three-dimensional vision) is integrated into the system resolution and becomes a condition of signification; there is no impoverment of information contained in the terms; transduction is charactertized by the fact that the result of this operation is a concrete fabric including all the Initial terms; the resulting system is made of that which has become concrete and includes the whole concrete; the transductive order conserves the concrete and is characterized by the consecration of information, whereas India lion requires a loss of information; Just like dialectics, transduction conserves and integrates the opposed aspects; unlike dialectics, transduction does not suppose the existence of a preliminary time as the framework in which the genesis unfurls, since time itself is a solution, a dimension of the discovered systematic: time emerges from the pre-individual just like the other dimensions according to which individuation effectuates itself.

However, in order to think the transductive operation, which is the basis of individuation in its various levels, the notion of form is insufficient. The notion of hylomorphic form is part of the same system of thought as that of substance, or that of rapport as a relation posterior to the existence of terms: these notions have been elaborated based on the results of individuation; they can only grasp an impoverished real without potentials, and consequently one that is incapable of individuating.

The notion of form must be replaced with that of information, which supposes the existence of a system in a state of metastable equilibrium that can individuate; unlike form, information is never a single term but the signification that emerges from a desperation. The ancient notion of form, such as the hylomorphic schema upholds, is too independent from any notion of system and metastability. The notion of form provided by Gestalt theory on the contrary conveys the notion of system and is defined as the state toward which the system tends when it finds its equilibrium: it is a resolution of tension. Sadly, an overly superficial physical paradigmatism has led to a theory to consider that the only state of equilibrium of a system that cannot resolve tensions is the state of stable equilibrium: Gestalt theory has ignored metastability. We would like to take up Gestalt theory again and, with the introduction of a quantum condition, show that the problems posed by Gestalt theory cannot be directly resolved via the notion of stable equilibrium but only via the notion of metastable equilibrium; good form is therefore no longer simple form, pregnant geometrical form, but significative form, i.e. that which establishes a transductive order within a system of reality bearing potentials. This good form is what maintains the energetic level of the system, conserves its potentials by making them compatible: it is the structure of compatibility and viability, it is the invented dimensionality according to which there is compatibility without degradation." The notion of form consequently deserves to be replaced by that of information. During this replacement, the notion of information must never be reduced to signals or supports or vehicles of information, as the technological theory of information tends to do when it is siphoned by abstraction from the technology of transmissions. The pure notion of the form be saved twice from an overly superficial technological paradigmatism: first, relative to ancient culture due to the reductive usage of the notion in the hylomorphic schema; second, relative to the state of the notion of information in modern culture, to save information as signification from the technological theory of information conceived by way of the experience of transmissions through a channel. For we actually uncover the same goal at work in the successive theories of hylomorphism, good form, and then information: the goal that seeks to discover the inherence of significations to being; and it is precisely this inherence that we would like to discover in the operation of individuation.

Thus, a study of individuation can tend toward a reform of fundamental philosophical notions, for it is possible to consider individuation as what must be known beforehand about being. Even before wondering how it is legitimate or illegitimate to bear judgments on beings, it can be considered that being is said in two senses: in a first, fundamental sense, being is insofar as it is; but in a second sense,

always superposed on the first sense in logical theory, being is being insofar as it is individuated. If it were true that logic bears on statements relative to being only after individuation, a theory of being anterior to all logic would have to be established; this theory could serve as the foundation to logic, for nothing proves in advance that being is individuated in a single possible way; if several types of individuation existed, several logics would also have to exist, each corresponding to a definite type the individuation. The classification of ontogenesis would make it possible to pluralize logic with a valid foundation of plurality. As for the axiomatization of the knowledge of pre-individual being, it cannot be contained in a preliminary logic, for no norm or system detached from its content can be defined: by, being accomplished, only the individuation of thought can accompany the individuation of beings other than thought; we therefore cannot have an immediate knowledge or a mediated knowledge of individuation, but we can have a knowledge that is an operation parallel to the operation known; we cannot know individuation in the ordinary sense of the term; we can only individuate, be individuated, and individuate within ourselves; this apprehension is therefore, in the margin of knowledge properly speaking, an analogy between two operations, an analogy that is a certain mode of communicative individuation of the real, exterior to the subject, is grasped by the subject due to the analogical individual ion of knowledge within the subject; but it is through individuation of knowledge and not through knowledge alone that the individuation of non-subject brings is grasped. Beings can be known through the knowledge of the subject, but the individuation of beings can only lie grasped through the individuation of the subject's knowledge. <>

Digital Methods in the Humanities: Challenges, Ideas, Perspectives edited by Silke Schwandt [Digital Humanities Research, Bielefeld University Press, an Imprint of transcript Verlag (http://www.bielefeld-university-press.de), 9783837654196]

Digital Humanities is a transformational endeavor that not only changes the perception, storage, and interpretation of information but also of research processes and questions. It also prompts new ways of interdisciplinary communication between humanities scholars and computer scientists. This volume offers a unique perspective on digital methods for and in the humanities. It comprises case studies from various fields to illustrate the challenge of matching existing textual research practices and digital tools. Problems and solutions with and for training tools as well as the adjustment of research practices are presented and discussed with an interdisciplinary focus.

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Digital Humanities in Practice

Digital methods for humanities research: chances and challenges

Digital Humanities (DH) is a growing field within the Humanities dealing with the application of digital methods to humanities research on the one hand as well as addressing questions about the influence of digital practices on research practices within the different humanities disciplines on the other. Edward Vanhoutte differentiates between computing methods being used "for and in the humanities". In his view the field of Digital Humanities, which was referred to as Humanities Computing before 2004, profited from the fact that the development of the first electronic computers were well underway during the Second World War, but were only fully operational after the war was over. This meant that their original military purpose, primarily in the field of ballistics and cryptanalysis, became obsolete, and the developers involved started looking for new operational scenarios in which the computers could be put to use. This failure, as Vanhoutte puts it, allowed the computers to be used in the field of the humanities, especially in machine translation, from the 1950s onwards.3 Clearly, this marks the beginning of the use of computing for the humanities, rather than in the humanities. Although Vanhoutte argues that both aspects can never be fully separated from each other, most digital practices can usually be attributed more to the one than to the other. At first glance, automatic word-by-word translations seem to be the attempt to use the computer in a clearly framed environment where the researchers trusted that its abilities would do exactly what they expected. It was only when the automatic translations started to provide unexpected results that the researchers started to think about their perception and understanding of the – in this case English – language while looking for explanations for the mistakes the computer made. Vanhoutte refers to Roberto Busa who "identified the major problem with research in Machine Translation not as the inadequacy of computers to deal with human language, but as man's insufficient comprehension of human languages". Busa himself is one of the earliest and most important pioneers in Humanities Computing, or Digital Humanities, since he started a cooperation with IBM in order to create a concordance of the works of St. Thomas Aquinas in the 1940s. His relatively early assessment demonstrates the impact that the use of computational, or digital, methods can have on our understanding of the humanities as a research field and on the objects of that research. Busa hints at the necessity to alter our conceptions of language rather than looking for computational miscalculations. It is this impact that substantiates the apprehension that the field of Digital Humanities (or Humanities Computing as it was called during his time) is not only an advanced methodology but a research field in its own right. The vastness of such a field that might encompass

any digital practices in the humanities – from communication practices to data management and data mining – accounts for the lack of a formal definition of what Digital Humanities actually is. The website "What is Digital Humanities" alone offers 817 different definitions collected by the project "Day of DH" from 2009 to 2014. Helene Schlicht and Anna Maria Neubert offer more insight into the definitions, workings, and self-determinations of Digital Humanities in their respective contributions to this volume.

The historical account of Edward Vanhoutte shows one thing for sure that is also present in most Digital Humanities definitions: DH is a genuinely interdisciplinary endeavor. It brings together two very distinct research areas, Computer Science and the humanities, as well as many diverse research disciplines, methods and questions. The productive interaction between computer scientists and humanities researchers is one of the biggest chances and at the same time the biggest challenge in DH. As shown in the example from the early days of automated text analysis, the use of computational methods can inspire new research in the humanities. Unfortunately, their implementation is also often seen as an unnecessary and time consuming undertaking that only reproduces results that could have been generated by 'traditional' methods as well. This impression leads to the assumption that DH is merely about methodology and focuses too much on the digital side of things, highlighting the results rendered by the application of digital tools to (mostly) text material. The innovative potential of interdisciplinary research of this kind is easily overlooked and downplayed. While it is absolutely necessary that research projects in DH offer interesting perspectives for both Computer Science and the humanities, the tendency to overemphasize the value of the new and advanced computer technologies belittles the importance of the humanities. Regardless of the alleged progress that comes with digitalization or the supposedly higher objectivity inherent in empirical data, it is still necessary and will remain essential to interpret the results produced by computational methods to arrive at reliable propositions.

Doing DH in Bielefeld: data infrastructure and Digital Humanities

In 2017, the German Research Foundation (DFG) granted funding to the Collaborative Research Center (SFB) "Practices of Comparing. Ordering and Changing the World". The Research Center consists of fourteen individual subprojects led by researchers from many different humanities disciplines, such as History, Literary Studies, Art History, Political Science, and Law. Situated at the heart of the center is the infrastructural project INF "Data Infrastructure and Digital Humanities" which is "responsible for supervising all data- and information-related activities by providing a collaborative digital work and research environment for the whole SFB." The project comprises expertise from the field of computer and information science as well as from the humanities, thus being well positioned to advise the other subprojects and to further the development of digital methods for the humanities. The main trajectories of the INF project include the implementation of a communication and project management tool for the Research Center as well as a data publication platform, where all historical source material is made available in digital formats. These aspects belong to the field of Research Data Management. Additionally, INF also supports the researchers in all questions regarding the use of digital methods for their subprojects. After developing a workflow for the digitization of documents with the help of OCR tools, we advised six projects in total on how to tackle their research interests by using digital methods. They come from a variety of humanities disciplines and used different tools and analytical methods.

At the core of our work lies the task of modeling. The practice of modeling may not be totally unknown to humanities scholars, although it has not yet been extensively discussed as such. Modeling seems to belong to the Sciences and has long been described as one of their core scholarly practices – especially in Physics. The need to implement the practice of modeling into the humanities comes from the wish to productively interact with computational methods. Digital tools need a

model to work with, an explicit and consistent representation of the world. Humanities researchers may have such representations at hand for the time periods, societies, etc., which they regard as their research objects. But they seldom frame them as a model. Willard McCarty defines such models as "either a representation of something for purposes of study, or a design for realizing something new." In our work at the Research Center we learned that modeling in order to build a representation for purposes of study is essentially a process of translation and transformation. It requires a great deal of communication and mutual understanding. Working in the humanities calls for adaptable interpretations that form, for example, our narrations of the past. Computer scientists, on the other hand, are trained to solve problems by finding one answer to any question. Therefore, the process of modeling does pose a challenge, especially to the humanities researcher. But it also opens up new ways of interacting with our knowledge about our research material and questions. McCarty points out two effects of computing to that end: "first, the computational demand for tractability, i. e. for complete explicitness and absolute consistency; second, the manipulability that a digital representation provides". In my opinion, it is the second effect, the manipulability of digital representations that offers the most interesting possibilities for the humanities. After using one distinct, explicit, and consistent model to arrive at that representation, the interpreter can always go back and change his or her presuppositions. Often, the digital representation that offers ways of manipulation is realized through visualizations. These can be graphs, diagrams, trees, or network visualizations. Martyn Jessop sees the strength of digital tools of visualization in "[...] the ability of these tools to allow visual perception to be used in the creation or discovery of new knowledge." He stresses that in using visualization tools knowledge is not only "transferred, revealed, or perceived, but is created through a dynamic process." He also claims that "[digital visualization] allows manipulation of both the graphical representation and the data it is derived from." Therefore, each visualization represents a certain interpretation of the source data, which depends on a manipulated version of that data. Bettina Heintz, a German sociologist working on the epistemological challenges posed by scientific visualizations, discusses the practice of such manipulations as one of the central practices in working with digital tools. The information behind the visualization is "altered, filtered, smoothed, and adjusted, until there is a relation between the expected and the presented". This practice does not only happen at the beginning of the research process but also over and over again during the research process. Interacting with digital tools in this way is a "genuinely experimental process". As McCarty says, "modelling problematizes". Hence, through visualization, the process of modeling can be continuously reevaluated. Modeling, as well as visualizing, enables humanities researchers to explore their digitalized source material in new ways. "As a tool of research, then, modelling succeeds intellectually when it results in failure, either directly within the model itself or indirectly through ideas it shows to be inadequate." What McCarty calls 'failure' could also be framed as 'productive irritation' – something that irritates the expectations of the researchers, which differs from their previous knowledge in such a way that it inspires new ideas about the allegedly well-known material.

Six of the individual research projects in the Research Center at Bielefeld University have taken up this challenge and decided to evaluate digital methods for their humanities research. They joined the team of project INF in modeling their research ideas so that we could find digital tools that would help to answer those questions. In line with the overall research interests of the SFB 1288, these research questions all focus on practices of comparing while addressing such practices in different times, different genres or media, and performed by different historical actors. Practices of comparing seem to be ubiquitous – even today. What makes them historically interesting are the situational contexts in which they are being used, where they either stabilize certain ideas and structures or re-organize and change them. Comparing the modern West to the rest of the world, generating narratives of supremacy or eurocentrism, seems almost natural. The analysis of the emergence and

the development of this specific comparison as well as the careful scrutiny of the situations in which this comparison is being made offer new insights into the development of nation states, of racism, and much more. Digital tools of annotation and text analysis have proven to be especially useful in supporting research into practices of comparing since they allow, for example, simultaneous viewing of results as well as the detection of speech patterns representing specific modes of comparing. At the same time, DH methods are themselves often comparative and, therefore, implementing them makes it imperative to reflect on our own practices of comparing.

Matching research practices and digital tools

The research projects, which serve as the basis for the contributions to this volume, all deal with textual material. It was therefore necessary to find tools for automatic textual analysis that would match the different underlying research questions. As text analysis tools we decided to work with Voyant Tools and AntConc. They both offer ample possibilities to calculate word frequencies, compile concordances, among other things, as well as provide visualizations of patterns within text documents or corpora.

Voyant Tools is a web platform containing several open access text analysis tools. It was developed by Geoffrey Rockwell and Stéfan Sinclair and is freely accessible on the web. The tools available operate mainly on word frequencies as well as the calculations of word distances. They span from well-known applications such as word cloud visualizations (Cirrus) to more elaborate tools focusing on the calculation of word repetitions throughout a text (Knots). For the purposes of the projects in this volume the scope of tools provided by Rockwell and Sinclair is enough. In practice, it seems to be especially appealing to literary scholars and their interests in the use, frequency, and distribution of words and phrases throughout a text. Malte Lorenzen makes use of Voyant Tools in his article "Testing Hypotheses with Dirty OCR and Web-Based Tools in Periodical Studies". One of the tools he uses is Cirrus, the world cloud tool. Although the developers claim that word clouds "are limited in their interactivity [...] [and] do not allow exploration and experimentation", Lorenzen uses a series of these clouds to achieve just that. Confronting the different clouds with each other renders them exploratory after all through the practice of comparing. At the center of this comparison lies data that can be viewed as a representation of text, or rather as information about text. Rockwell and Sinclair claim that, in general, "[v] isualizations are transformations of text that tend to reduce the amount of information presented, but in service of drawing attention to some significant aspect." In the case of the word cloud the 'significant aspect' is the frequency of words in relation to each other represented by the relative size of their visualization. Hence, using digital text analysis tools often does not give us concrete or direct information about texts as a whole but about words, or character combinations, that need to be related to textual documents as superordinated, larger units before they can be interpreted. As Rockwell and Sinclair put it, "the magic of digital texts is that they are composed of discrete units of information – such as the character unit – that can be infinitely reorganized and rearranged on algorithmic whims". Whether it is magical or not, analyzing small, linguistic units of information instead of reading texts as indivisible entities offers new insights for researchers working on textual material as is being proven by the contributions in this volume. Joris C. Heyder and Christine Peters made use of a tool called AntConc for the same purpose. Developed by Laurence Anthony, AntConc "is a freeware, multiplatform tool for carrying out corpus linguistics research and datadriven learning". Other than Voyant Tools, it is a stand-alone tool that can be downloaded and installed locally on a computer. The tool comprises a Concordance Tool, a Concordance Plot Tool, which offers a barcode visualization of a keyword in context results, a File View Tool, N-Grams and Collocates Tools as well as Word List and Keyword List Tools. This range of tools is especially useful for studies interested in the word use present in certain documents

or corpora. It offers the possibility to look for words surrounding specific keywords that offer insight into the concepts represented by words.

The contributors to this volume used digital text analysis tools such as Voyant Tools and AntConc in order to explore new ways to analyze the material they were researching. Rockwell and Sinclair describe two principles that they deem important when engaging with automatic text analysis: "Don't expect too much from the tools [and] [t]ry things out". The first is about perspective. "Most tools at our disposal have weak or nonexistent semantic capabilities; they count, compare, track, and represent words, but they do not produce meaning – we do." While it seems obvious that the count of words does not carry semantic meaning, it is necessary to keep it in mind while looking for hooks for interpretation. This is also what makes working in DH a challenge. It is imperative to learn how to read visualizations and data as well as we read text. "Visualizations make use of a visual grammar, just as language requires a linguistic grammar, and we need to be able to parse what we see before attempting to analyze and understand it [...]." This is exactly why DH is a genuinely interdisciplinary endeavor making use of two things: digitization, or technologization, and hermeneutic interpretation. New digital technology transforms how we perceive and store information. It changes the ways of (social) interaction and communication. It allows access to vast amounts of information that need new ways of organization. And although these new technologies seem to be constantly evolving and becoming more and more important, it is equally important to make sense of these changes, to gain a new perspective, and to stay in touch with these developments in order to maintain a grip on them. In short: "[A]s digital technologies become increasingly pervasive, the work and skills of Digital Humanists become increasingly important."

Digital research perspectives in the humanities

While it seems to be almost impossible to separate computing for the humanities from computing in the humanities, the contributions in this volume focus on the implementation of digital methods in different humanities disciplines. By discussing the chances and challenges posed by this methodological endeavor, the contributors also touch on questions of the impact that working with digital tools has on the research practices of their respective fields. Their contributions are accompanied by three articles written by members of the project team INF trying to frame the setting of our collaborative work at Bielefeld University.

Helene Schlicht and Anna Maria Neubert deal with two important aspects of the general setup of our collaborative work within the Research Center in their respective articles. Helene Schlicht focuses on questions of "Open Source, Open Data, and Open Software". She analyzes the "role of Open Science in the research landscape of the humanities in general and DH in particular". At present, questions of open access play a prominent role in political discussions about and within the humanities. In DH the implementation of open science solutions is much farther along. Schlicht argues that the contention of the two fields might help the advancement of both them. One of the problems she points out is the possible conflict between disciplines in DH. Anna Maria Neubert also discusses chances and challenges of interdisciplinary work in her contribution explicitly focusing on "Navigating Disciplinary Differences [...] Through Project Management". While it is not specific to DH projects, project management certainly helps with their organization and execution. It is especially important to take into account the possibly different research interests of the disciplinary groups participating in the projects as well as the different pace in research and publication. Neubert also discusses most of the software tools we used for the organizational side of our collaboration.

In their contribution on "From Text to Data. Digitization, Text Analysis, and Corpus Linguistics", Patrick Jentsch and Stephan Porada describe the technical workflows that we implemented for the collaboration. The main piece of the article deals with the digitization pipeline that was used to

render the historic source material machine readable. Including this article into the volume demonstrates how important it is to include computer scientists into DH teams and also to take their research interests seriously. Only then does the collaboration rise to its full potential. It is also elementary to a volume focusing on digital methods to be transparent about every part of those methods and give credit where credit is due.

The contributions in this volume come from the fields of Computer Science, History, Literary Studies, and Art History. They represent the different approaches to research, different views and takes on text and interpretation.

One of the biggest challenges for the implementation of digital methods is the availability of digital source material – especially for historically oriented projects. Malte Lorenzen's contribution deals with the chances offered and challenges posed by dirty OCR as a means to test the efficiency of digital methods for periodical studies from a Literary Studies' point of view. In his own words, his article has "experimental character" and shows how exploring digital tools can further humanities research. He argues for a combination of close and distant reading that is necessary to integrate both quantitative digital methods and hermeneutic methods in the humanities, which is a position that can be found in many of the articles. Similar in the general trajectory of his interest in the chances and challenges posed by methods of Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and its use for historically oriented research is Joris C. Heyder's article on "Challenging the Copia". He, also, wants to analyze great amounts of data, which is why a well-functioning OCR is crucial. While Malte Lorenzen uses the digital toolkit Voyant Tools to look for single terms and their usage in his material, Joris C. Heyder uses AntConc and its Concordance Tool to sort through the available material in search for the most interesting texts, building a corpus for his analysis from there. Both articles use what we would call big data, but with different research questions and assumptions. Both explore the data with the help of digital tools arriving at different conclusions since they address the data on different levels – Lorenzen looks at the lexical level, whereas Heyder concentrates on the document level. Comparing the two articles demonstrates the manifold applications of digital methods in the humanities. What they have in common is the interest in "quick and dirty" digitization as a means to sort through large amounts of data. They go about this task by testing the hypotheses they already have in mind after using traditional hermeneutic methods in designing their projects. Christine Peters follows a similar approach in her article on Alexander von Humboldt and his travel writings. Alexander von Humboldt is probably one of the most well-known historical figures in world literature, and beyond. Christine Peters takes on the task of trying to find new perspectives on his travel writings in her contribution.

She combines methods of distant and close reading and develops new techniques for keyword in context searches that render visible what has not yet been seen in Humboldt's travelogue. In doing so the contribution stresses the necessary combination of both digital and humanities methods in text mining. Peters also addresses the question of our own practices of comparing as humanities researchers and sees new opportunities for these in working with digital methods. She applies this combination of methods not only to test them against her own hypotheses but finds new insights into Humboldt's travel writings along the way.

Anna Dönecke focuses more directly on the question of data modeling in historical research. In her contribution she assumes that data modeling as a basic operation in Digital Humanities can alter the perspective of historians on their sources. Creating a relational database with information from eighteenth-century court records requires a different understanding of their contents, shifting the focus from content information to features and patterns. Her examples show that implementing methods from computer science such as data modeling produces a genuine surplus for historical

research. This is especially true when implementing methods of pattern recognition, Dönecke argues, because this explicitly changes the perspective of the researcher towards his or her source material. Using data models and relational databases forces us to dissect the documents we are interested in into tiny bits of information and to attribute meaning to the common features that can be detected by looking at this information rather than by reading the documents as text. It is this way of interacting with textual sources that poses the biggest challenge to our daily work of interpretation as humanities researchers. The contribution by Marcus Hartner, Ralf Schneider, and Anne Lappert demonstrates this nicely. Representing the field of British Literary Studies, the authors went about their project with a clear question in mind. They are interested in the way that the emerging middle class in eighteenth-century Britain represented itself through their morality in contemporary novels. Using Voyant Tools, Hartner et al. look for textual evidence of their hypotheses, but find only little. Their discussion of this alleged failure is very enlightening for the relationship of digital and traditional methods. Since their research interest rested with a concept instead of a certain term or phrase in the beginning, the authors test several search strategies to find textual evidence matching their presuppositions. They engage with what has been called "screw meneutics" diving into the digital tools as a means of explorative hermeneutics.

Digitally enhanced text analysis does not only get more difficult the more complex the task of interpretation is but also the more complex the linguistic structures are that one is looking for. In order to teach sentence structure and the meaning of temporal comparisons to the computer, the tasks of annotating, parsing, and tagging must be applied. The contribution by Willibald Steinmetz, Kirill Postoutenko, Olga Sabelfeld, and Michael Götzelmann discusses the results achieved through tagging in different corpora processed with different taggers, and poses the question whether or not the task of preprocessing is worthwhile when reading and interpreting would do the job at least as fast as the tested taggers did. What takes time is building the models that serve as a basis for (semantic) tagging. And while it is necessary and reasonable to think about the ratio of effort and gain in every project design, the contributions in this volume show that engaging with the digital is worthwhile for the humanities. <>

The Shadow Drawing: How Science Taught Leonardo How to Paint by Francesca Fiorani [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 9780374261962]

An entirely new account of Leonardo the artist and Leonardo the scientist, and why they were one and the same man

Leonardo da Vinci has long been celebrated for his consummate genius. He was the painter who gave us the *Mona Lisa* and *The Last Supper*, and the inventor who anticipated the advent of airplanes, hot air balloons, and other technological marvels. But what was the connection between Leonardo the painter and Leonardo the scientist? Historians of Renaissance art have long supposed that Leonardo became increasingly interested in science as he grew older and turned his insatiable curiosity in new directions. They have argued that there are, in effect, two Leonardos—an artist and an inventor.

In this pathbreaking new interpretation, the art historian Francesca Fiorani offers a different view. Taking a fresh look at Leonardo's celebrated but challenging notebooks, as well as other sources, Fiorani argues that Leonardo became familiar with advanced thinking about human vision when he was still an apprentice in a Florence studio—and used his understanding of optical science to develop and perfect his painting techniques. For Leonardo, the task of the painter was to capture the

interior life of a human subject, to paint the soul. And even at the outset of his career, he believed that mastering the scientific study of light, shadow, and the atmosphere was essential to doing so. Eventually, he set down these ideas in a book—*A Treatise on Painting*—that he considered his greatest achievement, though it would be disfigured, ignored, and lost in subsequent centuries.

Ranging from the teeming streets of Florence to the most delicate brushstrokes on the surface of the *Mona Lisa*, **THE SHADOW DRAWING: HOW SCIENCE TAUGHT LEONARDO HOW TO PAINT** vividly reconstructs Leonardo's life while teaching us to look anew at his greatest paintings. The result is both stirring biography and a bold reconsideration of how the Renaissance understood science and art—and of what was lost when that understanding was forgotten.

Review

"[Fiorani] makes [her argument] with fresh force and pitches it against the misconception that Leonardo abandoned painting for science in his later years . . . when she loses herself in looking, the book achieves fluency and power. She notes the traces of the azure paint on the throat of the "Mona Lisa" and wonders if it is responsible for giving us the sense of seeing her pulse. Or take the bravura section on "The Last Supper," in which she explains how the painting exists in two time frames, with several characters making gestures that will mark them in the future . . . The book reorients our perspective, distills a life and brings it into focus — the very work of revision and refining that its subject loved best." **—Parul Sehgal, *The New York Times***

"Through a series of close studies of paintings, Ms. Fiorani demonstrates how Leonardo explored light and shadow in a range of challenging subjects. She builds up the reader's knowledge of what can be an abstruse and highly mathematical field through detailed and lively considerations of individual art works. Her study of the unfinished "Adoration of the Magi" (1481), is particularly compelling . . . Far from undercutting Leonardo's achievements, Ms. Fiorani's emphasis on the artist's limitations offers a refreshing counterpoint to our tendency to see his every scribble as a mark of genius . . . It will take more than this book to dislodge the fixation on Leonardo as a scientist and inventor. However, a well-researched, lively book by a scholar, expert and art historian goes a long way toward correcting that misconception." **—Cammy Brothers, *The Wall Street Journal***

"[Francesca Fiorani] provides new insight into the work of Renaissance master Leonardo da Vinci in this fresh assessment . . . This beautifully written work is underpinned by immense scholarship; art lovers and historians will not be able to put it down." ***—Publishers Weekly***

"University of Virginia art historian Fiorani's sparkling second book explores how Leonardo's love of science informed his art. Intimately capturing the artistic, religious, and cultural landscape of Leonardo's world, the author traces his development as an artist from his early apprenticeship days to the lessons he learned as he painted his greatest works and up to his posthumous legacy . . . Fiorani effectively describes Leonardo's experiments with paints that allowed him to 'achieve an astounding variety of optical effects'." ***—Kirkus Reviews***

"In this insightful and beautiful book, the great Leonardo scholar Francesca Fiorani connects his studies of optics with his painting. It's a wonderful study of how Leonardo's art and science were interwoven—which should be an inspiration to us all." **—Walter Isaacson, author of *Leonardo da Vinci***

"Francesca Fiorani's lively intellectual adventure gives us a new understanding and appreciation of Leonardo's ingenious cross-fertilization of art and science. It is a perceptive biography of Leonardo

exploring the frontiers of science, but also a brilliantly informative guide to his paintings—many of which I will now enjoy seeing again with Fiorani's fresh insights in mind." **—Ross King, author of *Brunelleschi's Dome*, *Leonardo and the Last Supper*, and *Mad Enchantment***

"Francesca Fiorani's book makes an effective contribution towards demolishing the false notion of two Leonardos—one the artist , the other the scientist. Fiorani masterfully shows how science enabled the young Leonardo to take Renaissance painting to an unprecedented level of perfection. No matter how many books about Leonardo you might have read, this one is not to be missed. It will shape your understanding of his beautiful mind's all-encompassing vision of art, nature, and man." **—Paolo Galluzzi, director, Museo Galileo, Florence**

We know why the candle was on Leonardo's desk—to bring light into the darkness. But why a ball and a small screen, perhaps made of thick paper, or of simple wood?

The "shadow drawings" suggest an answer.

When darkness fell and there was no other source of light in the room, Leonardo lit the candle and lined up the three—candle, ball, and screen. The small portion of the ball's surface that directly faced the candle was brightly lit. But, moving outward in any direction, he could see that the remainder of the ball was left in varying degrees of shadow, as if the light never quite came its way. Where, then, did that light go instead?

Depicting the light not as we see it—as one solid beam—but rather as a set of discrete rays, he charted the individual destination of each and every one, line by line. Clearly, he knew something about the science of optics—or at least how light behaves when it hits an opaque object—because with exquisite precision he identified which rays would hit the ball in a straight line and be reflected straight back to the viewer (providing that brightness) and which, because of a more acute angle of incident (or impact), would hit it diagonally, leaving the edges of the ball in deeper and deeper shadow.

Again and again, he repeated the experiment, moving the ball closer to the light and then farther away, sometimes to the left and then to the right. He added a second source of light and examined the effect as the light from one source intersected with the light from the other. And he looked at the color of the ball and saw that it changed just as the shadows and light changed. And then there came the day he moved outside, ready to tackle the most difficult question of all—how the rays of the sun behave when they, too, meet an opaque object, such as a ball. Or, one must imagine, a human form.

For "nothing was more important to him than the rules of optics," as one of his contemporaries noted. But in fact this obsession appears to have been very narrowly focused on just one aspect of optics: when and where light produces shadow. Every one of his notes beneath these sketches makes this point:

Every shadow made by an opaque body smaller than the source of light casts derivative shadows tinged by the color of their original shadow.

An opaque body will make two derivative shadows of equal darkness.

Just as the thing touched by a greater mass of luminous rays becomes brighter, so that will become darker which is struck by a greater mass of shadow rays.

Why this obsession with shadows? Because of some new invention or experiment he was considering? No. His goal was a different one: to learn how to paint.

As a young boy, when he was taken by his father to apprentice at the most important bottega (or workshop) of the early Renaissance, Leonardo had learned how to draw. Given a piece of charcoal or a quill pen dipped in ink, he could sketch a complex set of figures striking poses that were simultaneously true to life and emotionally evocative. Not surprisingly, while other new apprentices were sent to wash brushes or work on the mass-produced objects meant for the middle class, Leonardo quickly joined his master, Andrea del Verrocchio, at the easel, where the most important work of the bottega was done—the paintings meant for the Church or other important patrons.

But that same young man who could draw almost anything had yet to learn how to paint. And by "how to paint," I am not referring to how to mix colors or apply them to the panel. I am referring to the sensibility of an artist who instinctively reaches for what makes a painting a great painting.

At the time, a quiet revolution was just starting to take hold in the world of Renaissance art, especially in the bottega of Verrocchio, one that would be based upon a new kind of revelation. This revolution was not the sort achieved through faith, which is what the Church wanted its paintings to convey. Nor would it be based upon the fixed truths rulers expected artists to use their talents to reinforce—that each of us must know our place in the larger scheme of things, deferring to the supposedly inherent nobility of those above us. Rather, this revolution in art was founded on the notion that a new and different kind of truth was waiting to be identified by our senses and made sense of by our minds—the truth that came from careful observation.

Just how this revolution would lead Leonardo to a new kind of art—one that would move viewers much more deeply, and one that speaks to us today in a way that most Renaissance painting does not— is the story this book tells. Crucial to that story, however, is the unraveling of a myth—a myth propagated, as my book will explain, by a renowned authority in the decades after his death. I am referring to the notion of Leonardo as the iconic representative of two very different forms of genius.

Leonardo, it is commonly believed, is the artist who painted masterpieces such as the Ginevra de' Benci, the Mona Lisa, and the Last Supper and drew the iconic Vitruvian Man and then underwent a metamorphosis of sorts. Somewhere in his late thirties and early forties, there is the emergence of a second Leonardo, the one who imagined inventions that would not come to exist until centuries later, from the parachute to the flying machine—the one who became fascinated by science and philosophy.

The artist and the scientist. Each exceptional in his own way, but representing different parts of the same man. The traditional characterization of this "dual Leonardo" is that the natural philosopher in him decided to work out scientifically what the artist had somehow vaguely intuited decades earlier.

Many of us who inadvertently helped perpetuate this dual-genius thesis had good reason to do so: scholars relied, after all, on documents Leonardo himself left us, in particular his "folios," or notebooks. Many of the folios are dated, and based on those dates (with the exception of a few outliers, which were somehow ignored), it seemed that the vast majority of his shadow drawings, for instance, were done when Leonardo was well into his late thirties or early forties—in other words, long after he knew how to paint, and contemporaneous with his shift toward his philosophical investigation of nature. Science was called natural philosophy back then.

But do the dates written on the folios indicate what we have long assumed they indicate?

Let me explain.

It always surprises my students when I tell them that Leonardo was one of the least prolific painters of his time. Over a period of about four decades, he left us only between twelve and fifteen paintings (the number changes depending on the attribution of a handful of controversial works), and a number of these he never fully completed, including, it might surprise many to learn, the Mona Lisa. If he was not busy painting, then how did Leonardo spend most of his time?

He spent it writing.

Leonardo was an inveterate notetaker. He got into the habit of never going out without a little notebook, just in case something caught his eye. When it did, it could be how a flock of birds seemed to hang in midair, or how water moved through a canal, or something as simple as a cat playing in the street. He would take out his notebook and write about or sketch what he had seen, or he would make a note to himself to pursue a question he could not resolve on the spot.

A staggering 4,100 or so pages of sketches and notes, many supplemented with technical drawings in the style of the shadow drawings, have come down to us. But most scholars believe that what has survived represents no more than half of what Leonardo likely produced, which would mean he wrote around 8,000 pages. A more liberal estimate would place the number at 16,000. No other artist from the Renaissance left a written record of this size behind.

And here is the important point: there eventually came a time— when, exactly, we do not know, but certainly by 1490—when Leonardo believed that by organizing and expanding the notes and drawings he had made over the years, he could eventually produce a book, a book with the aim of teaching artists that "painting is philosophy." He was aware that "few painters make a profession of writing since their life is too short for its cultivation" and that, in general, they "have not described and codified their art as science." Determined to do something about this, he started to take notes on what we would now call "scrap paper," and in Leonardo's time, scrap paper would quickly succumb to the elements.

To preserve the most important of his writings and drawings, he copied each into a new folio and assembled these reorganized sheets of paper into sets of "folios" (which we now refer to as Leonardo's "notebooks"). The shadow drawings he transferred to the largest folio set, suggesting that they were among his most important sketches.

These writings, both the reorganized folio sets and the scrap-paper writings that survived, could more accurately be described as a mass of rambling, fragmented, repetitious, and mostly undated notes that needed (and to this day need) thorough editing. For example, Leonardo thought nothing of writing about one topic one day on one sheet of paper and then continuing the discussion, months later, on another piece of paper. Or he would add notes on a new topic to a piece of paper that already contained notes on a different topic altogether. And everything he wrote, he wrote backward, so you need a mirror to read it. It

is neither surprising nor unrealistic that some scholars threw up their hands when it came to these folios, describing Leonardo's writings as nothing more than a "vast accumulation of words" and an unfortunate distraction from his paintings.

But other scholars, starting as far back as two centuries ago, began what can only be described as the painstaking detective work of putting these notes in chronological order. Over time, they learned to date even the flimsiest scrap of paper, sometimes by examining the spelling conventions Leonardo used—were they Florentine or Milanese? They studied the quality and size of the paper itself: Was it cheap or high quality? Large or small? Did it have a watermark? And did Leonardo prepare the paper with colors before writing or sketching on it? They also studied the tools he used—metal point or silverpoint? Chalk or pencil? Gall ink or just dark, diluted pigment?—and even the look of his handwriting: Was it firm or trembling? Above all, they looked to the layout of each of his folios for clues, paying particularly close attention to how he arranged drawings and words on the page.

Two conclusions emerged from this detective work—conclusions that have shaped our understanding of the life and work of Leonardo. First, based largely on the only reliably dated folios, scholars concluded that Leonardo started to write in earnest only around 1490, when he was in his late thirties. (There are a few folios from earlier—between 1478 and 1480, when he was in his late twenties—but these were seen as exceptional.) Second, since everything he preserved in these folios was of a philosophical or scientific nature—even when they discussed painting, which a great deal of the material did—scholars concluded that these writings document Leonardo's increasing distance from the world of art and his turn toward science and philosophy.

As this scholarly consensus formed, no one explicitly intended to dismiss the possibility that science played a role in shaping young Leonardo as an artist. It was just that Leonardo's writings about the science of art from his mature years were so numerous in comparison to the surviving writings from his youth—and so few scholars considered the possibility that the stunning paintings produced by a young Leonardo might be the result of early exposure to science and philosophy. Nor did anyone challenge the notion that much of the material in the folios was likely a carefully copied version of discarded scrap-paper notes that could have been made years, if not decades, earlier. Rather, the details of young Leonardo's possible engagement with science were neglected as attention was focused on his later writings and scientific pursuits.

This focus, however, has obscured as much as it has revealed. I am part of a group of art scholars who believe that the stress on answering the question of when and how Leonardo became a scientist has inadvertently prevented us from understanding something much more interesting: the possibility that Leonardo did not suddenly "become" a scientist at all. At the heart of the scientific

mindset is curiosity—the need to understand and explain the seemingly inexplicable—and Leonardo showed a great deal of curiosity in his early work.

If science meant so much to the young Leonardo, why, you might ask, did he not, like Galileo Galilei, devote himself to science from the start? Why, of all things, painting? That question is easy to answer. It was the only outlet available to him. As an illegitimate son, he was denied the right to a higher education by the laws of the time. He was lucky to have learned how to read and write and to do elementary math. Had he not shown such a strong desire at an early age to observe and record nature in drawings, suggesting he might succeed as an artist's apprentice, he would likely have been turned over by his father to the Church, to spend the rest of his days contemplating the divine.

Fortunately, while the law may have constrained the options available to illegitimate children, the arts themselves did not. To the contrary, an artist's studio was the ideal setting for a childlike Leonardo, who would be not only exposed to philosophical and scientific ideas but encouraged to seek them out—and to use them in the service of the arts. Of course, it is not just Leonardo who has come down to us as an example of "dual genius." The Renaissance is still most often described as a time when art and science both thrived—but separately.

That is how I, too, saw the Renaissance until my undergraduate days at the University of Rome, when I attended a lecture by Professor Corrado Maltese. That day, he pointed out that we have lost sight of the true Renaissance. It was, he argued, a time when artists were deeply interested in science not apart from their art but because of it. Renaissance artists, the professor insisted, had enormous respect for what science could teach them, because Renaissance artists were taught that artists could make visible for society "what we know" only after science explained "how we know it," an inversion of the artist-to-scientist hypothesis often applied to Leonardo. Artists and artisans followed science closely. From science, they learned how to be better painters, better sculptors, better metallurgists, better architects—better everything—and watched their art and that of others deepen as science explained more and more. Maltese taught us how to decode Renaissance art and to look for evidence of the scientific principles artists used to create their works.

Indeed, as my book will show, shortly after his arrival at the workshop of Andrea del Verrocchio, Leonardo would be given a fascinating opportunity. He would witness (and perhaps assist with) the painstaking experiments that his master conducted in order to design the golden orb that sits atop Brunelleschi's dome of the Cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence. He learned early on that there were philosophical and scientific truths that could help him make art, and that those truths could teach him what he desperately wanted to know—how to paint.

Most often, those truths were the truths of optics. Long before the Renaissance, artists understood that how a person holds his face and body unconsciously reveals a great deal about how that person sees himself—or wishes to be seen by others. The smirking smile needs no further explanation. Nor do drooping shoulders. But artists also understood that much of what we really feel is revealed by almost imperceptible details.

Here is where the science of optics enters the picture. A figure striking a pose creates countless shadows—in the folds of a garment as well as in the lines and creases of a forehead or around the lips. Every tilt of the body or head casts its own subtle pattern of shadows against a floor or wall. By paying attention to these shadows, an artist with some knowledge of optics could work backward from the interplay of light and dark to more accurately render the human form—and to better convey the emotions it expressed.

But if optics informed Leonardo's art almost from the start, how might he have acquired this knowledge?

There were books in Latin, a language Leonardo never mastered, that taught the science of optics. And there was an eleventh-century manuscript titled Book of Optics by the Arab philosopher known in the Renaissance as Alhacen—his real name was Abu Ali al-Hasan Ibn al-Hay tham—that Renaissance artists knew about, because it had been translated into the vernacular. A copy of this Italian translation was in the hands of an artist Leonardo knew.

We know that Leonardo would take notes whenever he read a book. Not surprisingly, written on scraps of paper and in his notebooks are thoughts that are so deeply aligned with Alhacen's book that they seem, at times, nearly direct quotes from it—such as Alhacen's belief in the truthfulness of sensory experience, which Leonardo rephrased as "experience does not err, but rather your judgements err when they hope to exact effects that are not within her power." Even the way Leonardo described painting—as an activity that "embraces all the ten functions of the eye; that is to say darkness, light, body and color, shape and location, distance and closeness, motion and rest"—is a rephrasing of Alhacen's description of the eight conditions that make proper human vision possible: "distance between eye and object, a facing orientation, light, size, opacity, transparency in the air, time, and a healthy eye."

Leonardo also declared that his "little work [piccola opera]"—the book on painting he planned to assemble from his notes—"will comprise an interweaving of these functions," stressing the connection between optics and art. Even his description of painting as being "grounded in optics [prospettiva]," which was nothing else than "a rational demonstration [ragione dimostrativa] by which experience confirms that all things send their semblance to the eye by pyramidal lines," reads like a sentence from an optical text. When Leonardo wrote that experience was "the mother of every certainty," and that "true sciences are those which have penetrated through the senses as a result of experience," he seemed to be echoing scientific studies of optics in general, and Alhacen's in particular.

But why are these thoughts and quotations so important to the argument I am trying to make?

When I began to think about writing this book, I made myself a promise. Instead of standing at a remove, I would try to imagine myself standing behind Leonardo in an attempt to see the world through his eyes—as he stopped to sketch something that caught his attention, or as he sat struggling to write his unfinished book, which would affirm that "painting is philosophy." And here is what this practice has made clear to me: Earlier, I suggested that as a child, Leonardo had an insatiable need to make sense of the world. To do so, he employed the only tools then available to him—his senses, in particular his eyes. And then he recorded that sensory data in the only way he knew how: by making little drawings. Recalling what my professor Corrado Maltese told me many years ago—how Renaissance artists saw art as expression of what science revealed—I began to ask myself a question I had never asked before. Did Leonardo see each of his paintings as an experiment that would give him a novel opportunity to refine his understanding of optics and its ability to help him capture human emotions in paint?

The recent emergence of a new shadow drawing lends support to this hypothesis. Carmen Bambach, an expert on Leonardo who is the curator of Italian and Spanish Drawings at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, has dated it convincingly to Leonardo's twenties. What this means is that Leonardo was starting to consider scientific questions—especially those posed by the science of optics—from his earliest days as a painter.

My own readings of Leonardo's work offer further evidence in support of this argument. Consider his first solo painting, Annunciation. Leonardo placed Mary outside rather than indoors; at the heart

of this painting is the "divine shadow" that will come over her and make her pregnant. That shadow is like no other shadow I have ever seen in Renaissance art. Optics can explain why.

I have also tried to understand what must have gone through Leonardo's mind when he chose to abandon the Adoration of the Magi and the Mona Lisa. Was the reason, in the case of the former, that he failed to achieve the optical rigor he had come to expect of himself? And could the latter no longer hold his attention once he had accomplished (or failed to accomplish) a demonstration of the scientific principles he had set out to understand?

And then there was the book on painting that Leonardo spent much of his life planning but that he never completed. He intended for it to explain why "painting is grounded in optics" and why the illusion of depth created by light and shadow is "the soul of painting." But why was it so difficult, for so many scholars, to make sense of what Leonardo was trying to accomplish? Because everyone who tried to do so approached it as a book about painting, when in fact it was to be a book about science for painters. It is really a chronicle of scientific discoveries—a subject typically written about in a language that Leonardo himself did not speak.

Leonardo's use of art to investigate science also goes against conventions of patronage during the Renaissance. The church still largely maintained a stranglehold on art: yes, paintings could generate emotional responses, but only certain ones—most often a sense of rapture with the aim of inspiring devotion. Alternatively, for the Medici and other families in the upper echelons of society, the desired message was one of strength, dignity, and power. In a preliterate society, where even sermons were still delivered in Latin, the best way the church could tell its stories and leaders could address the public was through art. There is a reason many paintings from this era seem to have no center, no main focus, but rather a thread that needs to be followed from character to character. In this respect, Leonardo was being asked to play a role for which he was never quite suited. There was no space for his art to find its own grammar and its own voice, or to express its own sensibility. When forced to choose between his own comfort and security and using painting for his own ends, Leonardo invariably chose the latter.

Who was the man who gave us this legacy? By all accounts, Leonardo was fun to be around, a great talker and a fabulous dinner companion. He knew how to tell jokes and "sang beautifully to his own accompaniment on the lyre to the delight of the entire court." He even knew how to entertain a crowd with witty debates on lofty topics—in one famous debate, he defended the superiority of painting over mathematics. His taste was impeccable, and he won fame as an "arbiter and inventor of all matters pertaining to beauty and elegance, especially spectacles and performances."

In old age, he stood out for his long beard that "came to the middle of his breast and was well combed and curled." He resembled an ancient philosopher, which is how his longtime assistant and companion Francesco Melzi portrayed him in a drawing that has since become Leonardo's "official" image.

But when working he went into a kind of trance, forgetting food, time, friends, and everything else. He was volatile, alternating between sociability and social withdrawal. He was a compulsive draftsman and sketched constantly, scribbling on any piece of paper that crossed his desk, sometimes even on the panels of his paintings. Always, he carried "a little notebook" in his pocket to draw whatever attracted his attention.

He did not build close relationships, he did not have children, and he never married. But he was close to his apprentices, even though none of his disciples was "of great fame." Two of them, who joined his workshop in their teens, remained with him until his death.

He was well aware of his talent. “Read me, reader, if in my words you find delight, for rarely in the world will one such as I be born again,” he jotted down in one of his notebooks when he was in his early forties, at the pinnacle of his fame at the court of Milan.

He had great difficulty finishing the things he set out to do, however. His soul “was never quieted.” He would delve into a specific topic and write frantically for months on end, and then abruptly abandon it. He never published a single page of the thousands he wrote. He was hypercritical of his own work, and urged other artists to be the same way, as perfect works “will bestow upon you more honor than money would do.” An eyewitness reported how for days he stood in front of his Last Supper without touching “the work with his hand,” staying “for one or two hours of the day only to contemplate, consider, and examine his figures in solitude, in order to judge them.” He did finish that painting, but there were many others that he did not.

Some say that he left his projects incomplete because “he knew so much and this did not allow him to work,” or because he was always in search of “new means and refined artistic techniques.” One of Leonardo’s acquaintances who was a physician thought the reason was “his volubility of character and his natural impatience,” a trait that caused him “always to discard his early ideas.” The fact is that there was no way to get Leonardo to do something he did not want to do. Kings and princes, even a pope, begged him for work and promised wonderful rewards, but he would do nothing if he did not have the right motivation. Money did not move him to action, even though he needed plenty to afford the lavish lifestyle he became accustomed to; nor did fame, and he acquired much during his lifetime.

For Leonardo, the focus was on the inner emotional lives of the people he portrayed, including how they reacted in the face of the divine. It is his emphasis on the human, on how human beings instinctually react to others and to the world, that gives his paintings such a modern feel. <>

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Figurations and Sensations of the Unseen in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: Contested Desires edited by Birgit Meyer and Terje Stordalen [Bloomsbury Studies in Material Religion, Bloomsbury Academic, 9781350078635] Bloomsbury Open Access: Read online or download free chapter PDFs.

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Judaism, Christianity and Islam are known to privilege words over images. This book shows, however, that the reality is more complex. **Figurations and Sensations of the Unseen in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: Contested Desires** explores the complex procedures used to render the invisible as visible and the elusive as tangible in these three traditions. Working from different disciplinary angles, contributors reflect on figuration and sensation in biblical culture, medieval Jewish culture, the imagination of the unseen in Islamic settings, Christian assaults on 'idolatry' in Africa, baroque and modern Church art, contemporary Eastern Orthodox tradition, photography on the East African coast, European opera and literature, and more.

FIGURATIONS AND SENSATIONS OF THE UNSEEN IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM: CONTESTED DESIRES shows that the three religious traditions have formed sensorial regimes embodied habits, traditions and standards for seeing, sensing, displaying, and figuring that which could not, or should not, be seen. So, the desire for seeing the invisible and experiencing the beyond are paradoxically confirmed, contested and controlled, by the sensorial regimes in vogue. This carries over even into secularized use of religious figurations in arts and literature.

FIGURATIONS AND SENSATIONS OF THE UNSEEN IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM: CONTESTED DESIRES Is important reading for scholars of anthropology, religious studies, Jewish studies, Christian studies, Islamic studies, art history, cultural studies, biblical studies and archaeology

Review

"This is a bold and ambitious volume, not only in its conceptual scope, but also for its range of disciplinary perspectives and comparative focus. Taken together, the essays convey the vibrancy of religious studies today, as well as the centrality of approaches that take account of materiality and the senses. A must-have book for all serious students of the role of images within Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions." *—MATTHEW ENGELKE, Professor of Religion, Columbia University, USA*

"Combining theoretical sophistication with a vital awareness of historical diversity, this book provides a series of refreshing studies of the broad repertoire of mediations of, and contentions over, the unseen realm. It moves beyond the normative preference for the word as the singular canonical medium of Judaism, Christianity and religion and pictorial media." *—LIV INGEBORG LIED, Professor of Religious Studies, MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society, Norway*

"In the study of visual culture, it is hard to imagine a subject of investigation more important and telling than the tension between invisibility and visibility. For the visual cultures of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, this book explores that tension with sophistication, precision, and aplomb. It is essential reading." *—SIMON O'MEARA, Lecturer in the History of Architecture & Archaeology of the Islamic Middle East, SOAS, University of London, UK*

The excellence of divine things does not allow them to be offered to us uncovered, but they are hidden beneath sensible figures.—Meister Eckhart

Judaism, Christianity and Islam are commonly perceived to have more or less uneasy relations to images, especially images representing the divine. They all tend, at least nominally, to privilege verbal over pictorial media, preferring the spoken, sung or written word, and have often been understood to embrace a more-or-less rigid aniconism. However, when inspecting actual practices in these religious traditions across history, a more nuanced and complex picture emerges. Different trajectories within Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions appear to embrace specific regimes that mould and direct the senses: embodied habits, standards for figuring, seeing, displaying and sensing the professed unseen through what we could call, with Meister Eckhart, 'sensible figures' (1936 : 649, n745). Such regimes are not everywhere the same, and they are rarely explicitly formulated as such. But they are nevertheless there, silently bearing witness to the utter inadequacy of the convention to single out word and text as the canonical media of the so-called Abrahamic religious traditions. And yet, a lingering aniconism has so far been the conceptual and normative backdrop and common denominator also in academic study of these three traditions. Intended as a corrective of such bias, this volume calls for new analytical perspectives and for studying specific figurations and sensations of the unseen across various strands of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

The fact that this volume assembles scholarship on Judaism, Christianity and Islam does not rest on a claim of an underlying similarity with regard to monotheism and a presumed aniconism under the label of the Abrahamic traditions (see Uehlinger, 102). On the contrary, we seek to problematize that claim – and its politics of use in various scholarly, religious and societal arenas – by confronting it through detailed case studies. Our intention is to open up scholarly inquiry towards the perplexing variety of practices of imagining and picturing the unseen – via internal and external, figural and non-

figural images as well as words and sounds – within and across these traditions. Assembling cases from different strands in Judaism, Christianity and Islam and from the afterlives of Christian images in the spheres of art and literature allows us to get varieties into the picture, while certain general issues with regard to the question of how to study the complexities of imagining and accessing the unseen also come into view. Our intention is decidedly non-normative on the issue of whether and how legitimately to represent the divine, in that the contributions explore debates about the representability of God but refrain from stating whether the positions taken are defendable or not.

The unseen is marked as unavailable to direct sight. Subject to manifold restrictions, its representation is a complicated and contested matter. Desires to render the invisible as visible and tangible, for sensing the unseen, are paradoxically confirmed as well as contested and controlled by the various visual regimes in vogue, which are entangled with broader sensational or aesthetic regimes. This yields a wide spectrum of stances and habitual attitudes, from appraisals of iconic images that represent the divine, to their dismissal as 'idols', from the embracing of visual signs alluding to the divine without suggesting likeness, to an indifferent attitude towards visual forms. Practices within Judaism, Christianity and Islam offer intriguing cases for a rethinking of the complex nexus of religion and pictorial media. Such a conceptual reconfiguration needs to be multidisciplinary and must move beyond taking unqualified notions of aniconism as the normative and conceptual default in these religions.

Beyond aniconism

As pointed out by Milette Gaifman (2017) in her introduction to a recent special issue on aniconism, the term itself is of relatively recent origin. It was coined by classical archaeologist J. W. Overbeck in 1864 in relation to primordial Greek art, which he presumed to lack anthropomorphic representations of the gods. For Overbeck, aniconism implied a non-existence of images – imagelessness (Bildlosigkeit) – which was due to the prevailing idea that 'unseen forces could not be envisioned as anthropomorphic and hence could not be represented in images' (Gaifman 2017 : 337). They could, however, be represented through natural symbols. Interestingly, Gaifman suggests to 'deploy "aniconic" to describe a physical object, monument, image or visual scheme that denotes the presence of a divine power without a figural representation of the deity (or deities) involved' (ibid., see also Uehlinger, 122). In this understanding, aniconic representations are part of a religious visual and material culture and are to be analysed as such.

However, especially in relation to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the term aniconism has been mainly employed by theologians and other scholars of religion, echoing the standpoints of religious elites, to denote a normative interdiction to represent divinity in any material or visual form. In this sense, it is part of theological and ideological apologies that reject the use of images as a fundamental feature of these three traditions. It is mobilized, for instance, by Calvinists, Puritans or Pentecostals against the use of images in the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox traditions, as well as in other religious traditions outside of the Abrahamic spectrum. And so aniconism means de facto anti-iconism and is employed as a synonym of the so-called Second Commandment that is evoked in a normative manner so as to insist on a historical and normative image ban (Bilderverbot) with regard to images of God, and even of all living beings, and to legitimate the fight against 'idolatry'. Notwithstanding fundamental critiques and the pioneering works in the study of religious images and material culture by scholars as David Morgan (e.g. 1998 , 2012 , 2015 , 2018), Brent Plate (2015) and Sally Promey (2014),2 the use of aniconism along these rather crude and extreme lines also extends into contemporary research on Judaism, Christianity and Islam and other fields, as many instances – for instance, the strategic references to the Second Commandment in the work of W. J. T. Mitchell and Bruno Latour (see the chapters by Sherwood and Meyer) – testify.

Our volume takes issue with this stance and seeks to open up broader perspectives. Three key points stand out. One , a normative view of Judaism, Christianity and Islam as being radically aniconic does not live up to historical evidence. It overlooks that the so-called aniconic passages in biblical literature are surrounded by less restrictive passages, and situated in archaeologically documented practices of rich use of pictorial media for cultic purposes (see the chapters by Stordalen, Uehlinger, Sherwood). Catholic and Orthodox traditions negotiate and employ images for making the invisible visible (see the chapters by Luehrmann, Norderval, Kruse), while in Judaism and Islam there have been and still are practices of depicting the divine (Bland) or the Prophet Muhammad and other motifs (Gruber, Khosronejad). This being so, scholars of religion should be wary to reproduce (in part partisan) normative theological claims as factual descriptions, and rather ground their analysis in historical, archaeological, art historical and anthropological records.

Second , our volume is up against the narrowness of an 'epistemic regime' (Uehlinger, 121) grounded in a presumed aniconism and image ban. The transmission of these arguably theological or emic concerns into the study of religion limits the scope of questions to be asked about the use and value of images, focusing all attention on the issue of the legitimacy of images employed to represent divinity. Once we are prepared to move beyond the conceptual deadlock of the Second Commandment, try to 'escape the straitjacket of modern preconceptions' (Bland, 128) with regard to Judaism and Christianity (see the chapters by Sherwood, Bland, Meyer) and discard the assumption of a timeless overarching image ban pertaining to Islam (Shaw and Gruber, see also Flood 2013), many more facets of the ways through which the unseen is imagined, imaged, sensed and experienced emerge, foregrounding multiple sensations in a multisensory and even synaesthetic manner, rather than focusing on visuality and seeing alone. Doing so requires a critical reflection on the implications of the long dominant mentalistic bias that ensued a problematic indifference towards other than verbal media and a strong focus on signification and hermeneutics in the study of religion as well as in post-Enlightenment conceptualizations of culture and society.

Third, a refutation of the notion of aniconism in the sense of anti-iconism as inappropriate may ensue a too narrow take on images as mere material representations or on images as the sole possibilities through which the presence of the unseen can be evoked. While several authors explore the use of images in the three traditions, it is not our concern to stubbornly spotlight a lingering 'iconism'. As argued, for instance, by Wendy Shaw, in the Islamic tradition an elaborate concern with images and visuality only emerged in the thirteenth century, whereas before that time Islamic scholars were above all interested in musical aesthetics as the prime form of mimetic representation. This indicates that in trying to understand how the unseen becomes tangible and experienced, it is advisable to acknowledge that there is more than 'the image question' alone (even though contemporary commotions around images of the Prophet Muhammad evoke strong negative responses by certain Islamist strands). Moreover, our volume seeks to complicate a simplistic, common-sense take on images as merely 'giving something to see' (Behrend, 185). The contributors do so by attending to the ways in which images are employed to conceal as much as they show, depicting the 'real absence' of an unseen God (Gruber) and producing 'iconoclastic icons' of forbidden photographic portraits via an 'aesthetics of withdrawal' (Behrend) or an 'aesthetics of the non-representable' according to which the empty seat in Solomon's Temple remains in the dark (Stordalen), or invoking a sense of a sublime via abstract forms and light (Bukdahl).

In sum, the basic idea of this volume is that a focus on figurations and sensations of the unseen allows to expand the rather narrow scope of questions arising around the legitimate use of images and the so-called Bilderverbot, towards a broader exploration of sets of practices through which humans mediate and sense the unseen, and struggle over legitimate ways in doing so. These struggles occur among learned elites in these traditions, as well as between clergy and common people (as in

Kreinath's chapter on struggles about the recognition of Marian apparitions, or in Khosronejad's chapter about the existence of popular murals of Saints in Qajar Iran that clash with Sunni and Shiite theologians' interdictions of depicting human beings) or in colonial settings in which Western missionaries dismiss African worship of (non-figural) gods and spirits as idolatry, analysed by Meyer. Once scholars do not take aniconism as the conceptual and normative default in the study of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, more complex and productive questions arise. Grounded in Jewish studies, biblical studies, Islamic studies, religious studies, anthropology and art history, the contributors to this volume address these questions through detailed explorations that seek to complicate facile ideas about a presumed prevailing image ban.

Religion and the unseen

'Were one asked to characterize the life of religion in the broadest and most general terms possible, one might say that it consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto' (James 1917 : 53). We agree with William James that the dimension of an unseen order – imagined in whatever ways – is at the core of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and arguably of other religious traditions as well. Religion involves an awareness of a professed unseen that is taken to be existent and yet requires special forms to become manifest to common human sensation. Religion is about human attempts to render the invisible as somehow visible and the elusive as somehow tangible through forming and promoting embodied practices that shape what and how people see and sense. We stress 'somehow' in order to highlight that the recognition of a trace or representation of a religious unseen that cannot be seen as such is subject to intense negotiation and deliberation, and involves contested desires and anxieties. As the unseen is never congruent with its presumed representation, there arises a sense of a 'rest-of-what-is' (Port 2010) that indexes traces of an unrepresentable excess in the slipstream of any attempt to represent the unseen.

As pointed out in earlier work, it is productive to approach religion as a practice of mediation between humans and a – professed, imagined, construed – unseen. The notion of the unseen allows us to take into account a larger array of possibilities for visualization than the notion of the invisible. Images may be employed to depict and represent a professed unseen. Medieval painters developed sophisticated image-theologies in legitimating their works as alternative media to convey a sense of the unseen next to the biblical (Kruse 2003 , this volume) or Qur'anic text (Gruber). There is a constant perceived danger that images, by virtue of their capacity to become what they represent, are taken as real, yet illicit, simulacra (Boehm 1997). This plays out markedly in the sphere of the Abrahamic trajectories that stand central in this volume. Pictorial representations of God and holy figures as well as of 'pagan' gods and spirits are, according to certain iconophobic beholders, dismissed as potentially idolatrous (Meyer). But images may also be employed to show that something cannot be seen (or not in full), to depict something as being withdrawn from the view of beholders – in short, to visualize an unseen as unseen. Paradoxically, the unseen depends on mundane means and human acts in order to be rendered present. These means include images, through which a sense of 'iconic presence' is generated for beholders.

Obviously, circumscribing religion as mediation along these lines necessarily involves a twist that accommodates an inner, emic perspective according to which that unseen does exist, whereas it does not exist as such from the standpoint of critical social–cultural analysis. For a serious exploration, religion is not reducible to being a mere one-dimensional, mundane and 'flat' phenomenon – nothing but an illusion. A deeper understanding requires that scholars pay due attention to the practices and ideas through which the unseen becomes real and tangible for religious practitioners. This drives the contributions to this volume, whose authors explore the authorization of images, words or other forms to mediate the unseen with regard to various

moments in Abrahamic trajectories and, as in the chapters by Brunotte and Kruse, their resilient revenants in modern post-Christian settings.

The condition of the visibility – or more broadly: presence – of the unseen is its mediation (Behrend, Dreschke, Zillinger 2014 ; Stolow 2005 , 2012 ; Vries 2001). Paradoxically, the mediations employed to express an unseen depend on the use of means and media available to regular human sensation. A professed invisibility is part and parcel of a regime of showing via images and other forms that authorizes these forms as conveying viable traces, revelations or negations. The mediation of the unseen is not simply a question of making an invisible visible, by dragging it into the light of the immanent. Such processes of visualization are subject to long-standing metaphysical and theological deliberations in Judaism, Christianity and Islam and depend on established procedures and an authorized 'apparatus' to figure the unseen and make it sense-able (Gruber, see also Geimer 2018 : 140–69). With regard to the

divine which is understood to exist and yet not to show itself directly, the possibility of its representation rests on authoritative theological propositions, habitual practices and beliefs. Stordalen articulates the difficult-to-resolve question as follows: 'How does one represent that which is conceived to be non-representable or not suitable for exposure?' (21). Representing the divine in a too human manner may be taken as being equally problematic as fully negating its representation and thus being left with (almost) nothing. Gruber's summary of a mediatory position in Islamic scholarship as contending 'that there must exist visible or traceable evidence of God's presence on earth, otherwise He would be confined to man's intellect rather than existing in Reality' (133) captures the crux of the matter not only for Islam but also for Judaism and Christianity.

Obviously, the multiple theological deliberations about this issue yield divergent arguments and stances towards mediation in general, and the suitability of images as opposed to other media in particular. If Byzantine, Calvinist and modern Pentecostal iconoclasts refute the use of images in the name of salient passages in the Hebrew Bible that stress the Mosaic command against the production and worship of images (Sherwood, Meyer, Uehlinger), the Eastern Orthodox churches as well as the Catholic and Lutheran churches negotiate the possibility for their use in the light of the same command (Luehrmann, Kreinath, Norderval, Bukdahl). While anti-iconists would reject the cultic use of any graven image as idolatry, for the Eastern Orthodox tradition studied by Luehrmann the problem of idolatry would lie 'in mentally creating a human image of God', that could only be countered by feeding believers' imagination with authorized icons (199). The recognition of a likeness between an image of the divine and the divine itself is subject to accepted conventions and embodied experiences. At stake here are varying visual and sensational regimes, with different stances towards the value and use of images and towards the role of the imagination in conveying a sense of the unseen.

Figuration and sensation

The basic idea of this volume is that a focus on figurations and sensations of the unseen offers a productive entry point for investigating the complex practices of mediation to convey the unseen that are authorized – and contested – in and across various traditions in the Abrahamic spectrum. We opt for the term figuration so as to indicate the importance of moving beyond a focus on the acceptability of material images in the light of a presumed image ban. Our attention is directed to the operation of the senses and the imagination in shaping figurations of the unseen in an encompassing manner that includes external, physical, material images as well as inner visions. We place emphasis on sensations so as to highlight that the production, use and appraisal of figurations is shaped and transmitted through embodied visual and sensational regimes that modulate how and what people see and sense.

While it is our concern to move beyond a conceptual and normative aniconism, we do not, as noted, wish to limit our focus to the issue of the acceptability of material images in the Abrahamic trajectories. This would exclude the cultivation and harnessing of inner images in the religious imagination that may or may not be expressed in material form, and yet populate the imagination and are vested with value and meaning. And it would equally neglect the significance of figurative language and music. Why this is problematic is forcefully argued by Wendy Shaw, who calls attention to the antique concept of mimetic representation 'using any artistic intermediary – words, sounds, physical images – to signify and communicate realities beyond our physical experience' (42). Hence she cautions against the strategic, modern invocation of a normative idea of the image in relation to the presumed reservations regarding visual representations of the Prophet in Islam (which is ironic in itself, given that the image is all but taken for granted in the context of the study of Christianity). At stake here is an understanding of figuration as operating in the interface of images, words and sounds, understood as a process of imaging and shaping an unseen dimension and rendering it tangible through pictorial, written, spoken and sounding figures (see also Weigel 2015: 20–6).

This understanding resonates with and is informed by Niklaus Largier's reading of Erich Auerbach's notion of 'figura' as 'an expressive form' or 'sensory Gestalt' that is activated in the imagination and induces a realistic experience. While Auerbach developed figura in relation to practices of reading in classical biblical literature, Largier (2012, 2018 , see also Meyer 2015 : 156) extends it to a broader medieval mode of apprehension. Moving beyond a focus on the representation and signification achieved by pictorial, textual and aural signs, this mode involves a composite of perception, affects and concepts and takes figures as reality-producing, performative forms. Figures do not merely represent, but enable perception, sensation and understanding, and in so doing take part in effecting reality. This dimension is illustrated poignantly in Christiane Kruse's elaboration on incarnation as a meta-pictorial metaphor, through which the word was shown to become flesh in painting, rendering an image as a real human figure with a living soul in medieval and early modern painting. The break with this realistic embodiment in the art theory of the seventeenth century, as she shows, yielded ever more realistic, physiological representations of flesh, yet banished the soul; this disenchantment triggered a desire for a revival of religion as articulated by Joris-Karl Huysmans and Michel Houellebecq.

In our view, this take on figuration resonates with current critiques of a modernist, arguably Protestant overemphasis on representation and signification as the core of religion, and fits in well with attempts to recapture the material and corporeal dimensions of religion so as to grasp how imaginations of a religious unseen are vested with reality and truth (e.g. Meyer 2012 ; Orsi 2016 ; V á squez 2011 ; Grieser and Johnston 2017 ; see also Belting 2001). Here is, in a nutshell, how we would operationalize figuration. We take as a starting point an understanding of images as involving an internal and external dimension. As Hans Belting put it succinctly, 'The picture is the image with a medium' (2011 : 10; see also Mitchell 2008 : 16–18). In German, both picture and image would be called Bild , and in our use of the term image we retain this understanding of it being constituted by a material, external and a mental, inner image. Material images invite their beholders to lift the mental image from its material carrier in the act of looking, and in this way an image seen in the world is incorporated and becomes part of and stored in a person's imagination. People may thus recognize God, Mary, Jesus, Muhammad or the devil in a painting or poster representing them, and beholders may even – to their delight or dismay – sense these pictorial figures to become real in and via that representation (Morgan 1998). The image they see is, as it were, lifted from the medium of the painting or poster in the act of looking, and incorporated, feeding the imagination (and possibly hijacking it and leading it astray). Inner, mental images may be externalized as and recognized in not only material images but also via other media such as words and sounds. We refer to this spiralling process in which material images and other media trigger inner images, and inner images are

expressed via various material media, as figuration. Or more precisely, as transfiguration, in that inner images may be rendered via non-pictorial external media and vice versa. Religions shape the figuration of the unseen, by identifying key tropes or what Meister Eckhart appropriately called 'sensible figures', governing their representation via particular media – in short, by embedding such a figuration in a sensational regime.

The various chapters in this volume situate the use of inner and/or external images and other media in different sensational regimes, through which the unseen becomes imaginable and experienceable. For instance, through a study of historical mural paintings in Iran, Pedram Khosronejad identifies a complex Shiite visual aesthetic in which 'visualization and seeing are central to the recollection of holiness and saintly power' (184). Sonja Luehrmann describes how in Eastern Orthodox Christianity, in order to prevent the imagination from going astray, strict aesthetic and liturgical conventions were followed for the production and use of particular icons. While here recurrent material images are employed to ensure an asceticism of the imagination, Ignatius of Loyola, as Norderval shows, developed a technique of 'spiritual exercise' that aimed at achieving a plastic experience of 'being in spiritual contemporaneity with the locus where everything happened in the story of Jesus' (213) that became central to Jesuit piety. The spiritual exercises, in sync with baroque architecture and painting, were to overpower the imagination, to revel 'in the imagining of the unimaginable' (Wölffl in quoted in Norderval, 215). And while Brunotte points at the role of the imagination to fill the 'narrative "blanks" and uncertainties in the canonical biblical stories and in ancient historical documents' (245) by religious commentators and artists – yielding the iconic figure of Salome – Bukdahl notes that 'artists from Leonardo da Vinci to Wassily Kandinsky have always been aware that the language of form can communicate experiences and knowledge that the written and spoken word are either unable to express adequately, or simply cannot capture' (229). By contrast Christiane Gruber points at the elaborate 'visual "figures of speech"' with regard to an ineffable divine that Safavid artists struggled to evoke in their paintings. Metaphorical representations of God as light abound and are transfigured into art. All these examples point at processes of (trans-)figuration at work, in which material images are attributed with different values and shift into different figural forms. Religious traditions mould and shape the imagination of their adherents via multiple, intersecting media, and differ with regard to the trust they put in the imagination and the usefulness or danger of material images.

Importantly, the use of such intersecting media and their sensible figures in deploying authorized figurations of the unseen depends on incorporated sensational regimes that become part of people's habitus and part of a shared tradition. Such regimes involve particular 'sensational forms' through which the unseen is rendered available for common sensation, and through which the transcendent becomes available in the immanent (Meyer 2012 , see also Kreinath). Sensational forms are sets of authorized practices that shape the perception by cultivating the inner and outer senses and shaping certain sensibilities. The regimes employed around the veneration of icons in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, Loyola's spiritual exercises or Sufi mystic imaginations of God yield distinctive, shared experiences and sensibilities through which the unseen becomes real for beholders, but may also be subject to contestations. This becomes especially marked in Kreinath's exploration of marked differences between the aesthetic regimes and related bodily sensations for Orthodox clergy and lay Christian and Alawite women in Hatay, Turkey, who experience Marian apparitions as real – much to the dismay of the clergy. Across the contributions, yet marked more or less explicitly, we find an understanding of sensation as an experiential embodied practice that yields a sense of attachment and commonality and is central to religious modes of perceiving the world and rendering the unseen as somehow visible and tangible. Religious sensational regimes produce the reality effects of religious figurations (see also Largier 2017, 2018). These figures, as the chapters by Brunotte and Kruse show evocatively, do not respect the boundaries set by the presumed vanishing of religion in the

slipstream of secularization, but populate secular imaginaries and long for vesting them with new life and truth.

Contested desires

Scholarly research on aniconism and iconoclashes were occasioned, in the first place, by a series of events bearing witness to strong emotional forces triggered by conflicting regimes of depicting (or de-picturing) what should remain unseen (or seen in another way). Brunotte (247) aptly observes how Oscar Wilde recognized the potential of literary eroticism to stage a fusion between metaphysical longing and sexual desire, a staging that Brunotte pursues into opera performances of Salome. Several contributions in this volume explore elements of desire both in attempts to render the unseen to be seen and sensed, and in desires to direct and restrict such sensation. Strikingly, in the material explored by Luehrmann, a strong argument for the legitimacy in producing representations of the divine is carefully paired with an equally strong restriction on how to produce these representations and how (not) to use them. This volume originated under the premonition that the contrastive desires to portray and to avoid portraying that which is counted as unseen are fundamentally drawing from the same source of energy: the power generated by a sense of similarity and simultaneous difference between sensing representations of the unseen and interacting with that which these representations are held to represent. In other words, the field circumscribed in this volume is a field of perennially contested desires.

Several chapters in this volume reflect on a desire to display what cannot, or should not, be represented, and a simultaneous anxiety to mark a sense of distance between the representation and that which it represents. As we show above (and below), in some cases, this tension is explicitly verbalized, as in Bukdahl's analysis of the application of Kant's category of the sublime in production and analyses of European art. Correspondingly, several authors in the volume identify artistic strategies like the employment of light, darkness or emptiness in attempts at formulating artistic conventions to capture that which professedly can be figured, but not pictured with material images (Stordalen, 33–5; Gruber, 133; Norderval, 225–7; Brunotte, 246–7; and for popular regimes, cf. Kreinath, 168). In other contributions, configurations of the same tension are expressed much more subversively, as in the 'aniconic' gist of ornamentalizing photography in the Islamic East African coast (Behrend, 194–6), or in the staging of an exchange between the invisible (but audible) prophet and the very visible (and sensual) Salome in Strauss's opera (Brunotte, 245). Meyer (89–90) records how the missionary attempts at repressing material aspects of indigenous religion actually produced the reality of idols that the missionaries thought they had come to dismantle – yet another pointer to the paradoxical forces of hiding and showing at work under the surface discourse even in one of the most anti-iconic arguments produced in Christian religion.

Perhaps the most fundamental insight on the contested desires of figurations of the unseen emerges in the contributions of Sherwood and Uehlinger. Sherwood traces the paradoxically ambivalent reception of the icon of the destruction of the golden calf. It occurs as a negative image (one to be defined against) and a positive one (to be defined with). In subtle ways, Sherwood claims, this reflects that in the trajectories supporting this narrative it is always difficult to know at what point latreia (legitimate adoration using material objects) becomes eidolatreia (illegitimate adoration of idols). She then makes the point that these conflicting biblical traditions of figuring out the materiality of the divine silently transferred into European philosophy, and still haunt attempts at dealing with material representations of deity. These contested desires for divine transcendence and materiality are still very much in vogue also in contemporary scholarship (cf. also Meyer, 80–4). Uehlinger's chapter details how this is very much the case in intellectual traditions like biblical scholarship or archaeology of early Israel, both of which have contributed to producing a more nuanced primary

record into impressions of dominantly aniconic texts, aniconic ('Israelite') environments and a vindictive image ban in biblical literature and material culture.

Similar critique of blind spots in scholarly reproductions of desirable past 'aniconism' is launched for instance in Stordalen (21–3), Shaw (38–43). Bland (131), Gruber (132–3) or Luehrmann (210), and Kruse (272–4) chronicles a corresponding longing for a desired past in which the balance of the seen and unseen was stable and productive. In sum, the volume represents a collective archaeology of knowledge (Foucault 1969) into the various academic disciplines that have dealt with figurations and sensations of the unseen in monotheistic and scripturalizing religions. The result is a view of how one of the professedly most characteristic features of this object of research – its perennial tendency to desire and contest figurations of the professedly unseen – came to influence also the research itself, as it depended upon analytical categories, theological concepts and philosophical reflections that were ultimately formulated under the regime of these same contested desires. We regard this as one of the more fundamental insights of this volume, and perhaps the one that most needs to be explicated, since it is likely to be subject to the same discourse of collective neglect and forgetfulness that has allowed the crude simplification of aniconic Abrahamic religion to live on, despite solid historical and conceptual refutation.

Overview of the volume

Part One: Reconfiguring the image question

The first part of the volume holds contributions that identify gaps in conventional analysis of pictorial media in the three monotheistic religions. Based on these gaps the chapters in this part present new analytical strategies for re-interpreting religious strategies for figuration and sensation.

In Chapter 1, Terje Stordalen first recounts how recent scholarship on the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament generally agrees that early Hebrew religion was not aniconic in the sense of absence of all pictorial media. Still, certain trajectories of biblical literature unquestionably do promote worship without pictorial representations of the deity, and Stordalen takes on one of the most central passages: the narrative of the Solomonic Temple in 1 Kings 6–8. The chapter pursues the question of whether the view that there existed an imageless cult reflects a general preference for verbal over non-verbal media (what Stordalen calls 'a logocentric ideology'). The story of the temple invites the reader to imagine traversing a long-lost temple of the past. This imagined itinerary is expected to activate all forms of human sensation, including seeing iconic representations, smelling incense and sensing spatial dimensions. However, when it comes to the focal point of the plot, all sensation comes to a halt, including the hearing of words. Rather than indicating a general distrust of pictorial media, this narrative reflects a regime of sensation that relied on the interplay of verbal and non-verbal media but did not trust any medium when it came to representing the deity. For that purpose, this regime resorted to emptiness and void in all registers of sensation, a strategy that reflects a particular aesthetics of the non-representable. So, this essay opens to the call for a more nuanced consideration of the roles and interplay of different media in religious sensation, and for seeing such interplay as part of larger strategies and regimes of sensation.

In Chapter 2 Wendy Shaw sets off registering the rich representations of secular and religious visual representations in Islam throughout the centuries. She points out that the framework of 'prohibition' that is currently employed should not be taken as indicative of an overarching image ban. Almost no aniconic discussion is recorded until the thirteenth century; in the first centuries of Islam there was simply a disinterest in pictorial media for displaying the sacred. Shaw then sets out to explore a neglected interaction between arts and music in Islamic tradition, examining a late-sixteenth-century Mughal illustration in a manuscript of Nizami of Ganj's twelfth century Book of Alexander. Nizami's description of Plato playing the organ before Alexander represents and consolidates a vast literature

on religious musical aesthetics. Shaw argues that the modern emphasis on the visual over musical arts reflects different receptions of the late-antique concept of mimesis, which laid the groundwork for both European and Islamic artistic practice. She points out the inadequacy of modernist ontologies of sensation for perceiving the roles of pictorial and other non-verbal media in traditional Islam.

Modern Muslim and non-Muslim scholars alike risk missing the key role of sound in strategies for apprehending the divine in premodern Islamic philosophies and cultures – a role, we might add, that is still echoed in traditional Islamic recitation and prayer.

Adding further to that critique, Yvonne Sherwood, in Chapter 3, takes on the one item that most of all has become the topic for aniconism in the modern world: the golden calf, known first from the biblical story of Moses (Exodus 32) and then from innumerable receptions in art, religion and philosophy throughout the ages. According to Sherwood this figure has served as a 'hyperaniconic hypericon': an icon of the destruction of an icon, encapsulating an assemblage of knowledge, aesthetics, ethics and politics. It also became the figurative representation of the victory of the text over all pictorial media. That victory was, however, ambiguous. European modernism read the story of the destruction of the golden calf both positively and negatively: as an image to identify with and as an image against which to be identified. According to Sherwood, this double response mirrors the split function of the Bible in modernist stories about European foundations and values. On the one hand, the Bible stands as an ancient contrast to secular modernity. In this reading the destruction of the calf supports a modernist indictment of a jealous monotheistic deity with a very vindictive attitude to images. On the other hand, the smashing of the calf emerges as an early sign of the triumph of Geistigkeit over sensuality. For instance, to Kant and Freud the destruction of the calf represents the higher (proto-Christian, proto-universal) strand of the Old Testament: 'the heights of sublime abstraction'. We would argue that the continued preoccupation with the golden calf in European cultural history also echoes the perennial desire to figure the unseen out, also in terms of materiality, and the contesting impulse that such figuring will never represent the reality it professes to reflect.

Rounding off this part's reflection on the interactions between religion and programmes for sensing pictorial media, Chapter 4 holds Birgit Meyer's call for re-conceptualizing these interactions from a position 'beyond the Second Commandment'. The chapter makes a call for analytical scholarship to leave behind the idea that the interdiction of representational images of the divine is the normative default in the Abrahamic traditions. Meyer finds that this radical idea originated in Calvinist religion and critiques the apparently unwitting lingering of this legacy in Western secular scholarship. As a replacement for this idea, Meyer argues to open up towards a broader analysis of a range of strategies and visual regimes devoted to figurations of the unseen. The first part of the chapter offers a critique of Bruno Latour's dependence upon Calvinist interpretation of this commandment, echoed also in the work of W. J. T. Mitchell. The second part turns to the German strand of art history known as Bildwissenschaft, which is seen to offer important alternative takes on images and the theologies in which they are embedded. This helps understand how religion generates a sense of presence through images. Taking these approaches as a point of departure, the third part studies clashing figurations of the unseen in the export of the notion of idolatry produced by German Protestant missionaries to the Ewe in West Africa. The indigenous deities of the Ewe, which traditionally became tangible through other objects than images, were recast in Protestant religion as idols, and so dismissed as demonic. Having been produced through charges of idolatry, these recast indigenous figures continuously require to be pictured. Meyer claims that even the study of rejections of images requires a sound understanding of the use and appeal of pictorial items – a claim that should be taken seriously also by current-day scholarship addressing the presence of figurations

in trajectories of the three monotheistic religions, and the various regimes of sensation they become subject to.

Part Two: Genealogies of figuration

The chapters in this part of the volume portray moments in the early and subsequent history of pictorial media and aniconic ideologies in the three (nominally) monotheistic and scripturally oriented traditions. Not only do each of these traditions include strands that explicitly endorse the use of images (see Parts Three and Four). Also, in their historical past Judaism, Christianity and Islam were more tolerant towards the use of images than is commonly known. Theologians representing various periods and traditions in these religions engaged with and reflected about images in ways that point to the fundamental inadequacy of simple modernist dichotomies between verbal and pictorial media. For this reason, these chapters all extend beyond simply historically recording past figurations and sensations; they also all substantiate the claim that new analytical approaches are needed in order to do justice to these complex histories.

That claim is particularly explicit in Chapter 5, holding Christoph Uehlinger's plea for reconsidering ancient Israelite and early Jewish figurations in a visual and material religion perspective. Combining a religio-historical and critical theoretical perspective, the chapter starts by recognizing a powerful conceptual matrix that has directed most modern reflection on these issues, namely, the assumption of the nexus between the rejection of cultic images, the practising of 'aniconic' service and belief in the deity's invisibility. This matrix, Uehlinger argues, became part and parcel not only of theologies in the three religious traditions but also of Western (now secular) thought. The chapter goes on to demonstrate that early Hebrew religion was never uniformly an imageless cult for a single deity – certainly not in local and probably also not in official practices. This portrayal, which seems fairly clear in the primary historical records, has been blurred by biblical and other scholarship relying too much on the heavily ideological representations of the past rendered in biblical literature. The vision of imageless cult now dominating a large strata of biblical literature came into being only in the Persian and later times, as elite strategies for generating religious distinctions and identity in the Persian (and Hellenistic) province(s) of Yehud. Uehlinger details seven stages that produced the matrix related at the opening of the chapter, a process developing from ancient distinction to identification, via Protestant iconoclasm and scripturalism, into modernist biblical scholarship and present-day archaeology. The chapter concludes with six theses sketching the changes necessary for analytical studies to move from the iconism/aniconism paradigm into studies of aesthetic formations in the perspective of visual and material culture. Thus, taking the discussion on 'biblical aniconism' as its example, this chapter amply discloses the complex intertwining not only between historical source records and religious ideologies but also between scholarly exploration of those source records and modernist ideologies unwittingly relying on the reception history of those very religious ideologies.

Departing from the medieval illustrated Sarajevo Haggadah – a manuscript possibly commissioned by a Jewish patron in Spain for the purpose of Haggadah celebration – our late and deeply missed colleague Kalman Bland, in Chapter 6, invites his readers into a fascinating comparison of three inherently dissimilar perspectives on the reality and validity of visual art in premodern Jewish culture. The first is that of Franz Kafka, a quintessential modernist, who denies the facticity of the visual arts in Judaism. Kafka's notion of an aniconic Judaism fails to account for a phenomenon like the Sarajevo Haggadah – and many more examples of the kind. The second perspective is that of the tenth-century Islamic Brethren of Purity, who open-mindedly affirmed the universal distribution of visual arts in all cultures, including Judaism, and who saw visual arts as forms of magic. The third perspective is that of medieval Jewish philosophy (Maimonides, Judah al-Zarizi and Profiat Duran) and rabbinic law (Rabbi Meir of Rothenberg and Maimonides). These all affirm the validity of Jewish

visual art, highlighting its pedagogic, aesthetic and psychological benefits while underscoring its neutralization of magical or metaphysical implications. The Sarajevo illuminations reveal a medieval Jewish method for tickling the fancy, refreshing the sensorium and taking delight in the surprises of visual experience. Evidently, this practice of figuration and sensation disproves common expectations of a general Jewish 'artlessness', and of crude interpretations of the so-called biblical image ban.

Chapter 7 holds Christiane Gruber's analysis of the attempts of Persian and Turkish artists in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries ce to represent God, or at least to convey a sense of the divine – thus challenging common assumptions about the totalist aniconism of Islamic traditions. Depending upon a rich variety of traditional Islamic exegetical, theological and poetical texts that describe God as theophanous, radiant, fragrant, cloud-like and transcendent, painters developed their own lexicon of forms to contribute to the broader discourse on God's nature. Gruber is able to demonstrate that painters used calculated devices and visual cues, such as light, veil and olfactory metaphors as well as colour symbolism, to convey the deistic sum (tawhid) of God in pictorial terms. One might say these painters articulated a medieval Islamic regime for representing the deity, and for piously seeing these figurations and employing them as religious items. In so doing, artists underscored and reaffirmed the apparent paradox that a numinous presence can be marked as much by its omnipresent reality as by its ostensible absence, what Gruber calls 'real absence'. Both strategies illustrate the interplay of art images and human imagination in the never-ending struggle to represent the unseen.

Part Three: Figurations and sensations – lives and regimes

Part Three is dedicated to anthropological explorations of the actual use of pictorial media in different trajectories of the Abrahamic traditions. The four studies document a fascinating variety and creativity in religious involvement with images, with local and temporal variations. They also spotlight how images may be used to subvert or challenge modes of religious authority that are primarily based on verbal media and conceptual reasoning. In so doing these chapters add weight and urgency to the call made in the previous parts: to develop more many-faceted analyses of the roles of pictorial media in actual practices in these monotheistic traditions.

In Chapter 8 Jens Kreinath offers an anthropological study of the aesthetics of representations of St. Mary in Muslim–Christian coexistence and exchange in the region of Antakya (Turkey), which holds remains of Jewish culture and religious belief as well. Kreinath argues that a key for understanding the dynamics of Christian–Muslim relations in specific localities of this region are the aesthetic sensations of St. Mary's appearances in dreams and healings. These are experienced by Christian and Muslim women alike after they have made vows at Marian sanctuaries. Kreinath's argument makes a distinction between the clergy and common believers in their ritual interactions with Marian icons. While the interactions of the Orthodox Christian clergy at first seem very similar to those of lay Christian women, the aesthetics of bodily sensations in Marian apparitions distinguish between lay and learned members of religion. The aesthetic regime regulating the sensations of these women is common also to Arab Alawite women, as seen in their practice of vows and wishes at Marian shrines and the experience of Marian apparitions and healings. In this case, a popular regime of sensation connects individuals across religious denominations, and it serves to distinguish within one and the same religion. This testifies not only to the need to study aesthetic regimes but also to the potential power of collective experience in such regimes.

In Chapter 9 Pedram Khosronejad reflects on Iranian folk narration and popular literature of the story of Twelver Shiism. This story appeared for the first time as illustrations in royal books of the Timurid Dynasty (1370–1506), but one particularly important testimony of the justification of the role of figurative art in Iran are religious mural paintings. It was only during the late nineteenth

century that Qajar painters depicted figures of the Prophet Muhammad and other Shiite saints on a massive scale intended to be seen and used by the public. Khosronejad documents and illustrates this history and also demonstrates visual strategies and religious roles of these Persian Shiite figurations. The mural paintings illustrated in the chapter show the representations of holy figures in Persian Shiite visual culture, and the importance of their roles in devotion – topics which have until recently received little attention. In so doing, the chapter adds to the argument promoted throughout this volume.

Heike Behrend offers an analysis of restrictive and affirmative practices of photography on the East African coast (Chapter 10). The medium of photography was from the beginning contested among Muslims on the coast, because photography practices of the colonial state became associated with 'unveiling'. Thereby it collided with the aesthetic regime of the veil, yielding an aesthetics of withdrawal that was at the time dominant. So the original discontent with photography came from its being understood to violate traditional boundaries of public/private, male/female and of inside/outside. This perceived violation notwithstanding, many Muslim women and men eventually did make use of photography, albeit with caution, as a mode of self-representation to enhance their visibility and as a medium of exchange. It was only following the rise of reformist Islam in the 1980s that Muslim scholars increasingly invoked the 'Islamic interdiction of images' extended towards practices of using visual media such as photography and video. This dismissal was paired with a gendered concept of purity and seclusion. However, the use of photography continued, being particularly sensitive to one aspect of the aesthetics of withdrawal, namely, that by the very act of showing, photography also hides something else. At the end of her chapter Behrend explores ornamentalization of photography that play with regimes of aesthetic withdrawal, yielding 'iconoclastic icons' (cf. Sherwood, above). In this East African case, the prompt for such iconic aniconism comes from the similarities and differences associated with the aesthetics of the veil and the camera, respectively.

Sonja Luehrmann (Chapter 11) taps into the apparent paradox in Eastern Orthodox Christianity that sustains an elaborate theology of the icon and a simultaneous suspicion against imaginative evocation of mental imagery of the divine. The debate about the boundaries between icon veneration and idolatry is explored through nineteenth-century Russian Orthodox polemics against Roman Catholic spiritual exercises as these are echoed among post-Soviet Russian iconographers and lay believers. Luehrmann interprets religious art and worship environments as sensory regimes helping believers experience their faith as grounded in sense perception. The desire to distinguish iconography from other forms of visual representation becomes especially evident when iconographers create new motifs, such as depictions of newly canonized victims of Soviet anti-religious repressions. By tracing the choices iconographers make in creating new images within an existing visual canon, Luehrmann argues that religious image practices are always about constraining and guiding the imagination as much as enabling it. Displaying this double concern in the one Abrahamic trajectory that is most explicitly embracing the use of pictorial media for veneration, Luehrmann is able to give a lucid demonstration of the necessity to study these traditions taking full account of their internal complexities.

Part Four: Desires for the unseen – art and religion

The chapters in this part study aesthetic programmes in European arts, either in the use of art for religious purposes or in the recurrence of religious motives in secular European art and literature. These examinations demonstrate how European art discourse is often very sensitive to the complex roles of figurations, sensations and pictorial media in religious experience and imagination. They also document instances of multifaceted interplays between religion and art, based specifically in human sensation of the artwork. As such, they verify and illustrate the call produced throughout this

volume for reconfiguring the intellectual analysis of the roles of pictorial media within strands of religion that are so often branded as 'aniconic'.

In Chapter 12 Øyvind Norderval explores the aesthetic regimes of baroque religion by reading Gian Lorenzo Bernini's architectural plan for the pilgrim's entry to the Vatican City alongside Ignatius Loyola's Exercitia Spiritualia. The goal of Loyola's spiritual exercises was to lead the believer to have a sense of being imaginatively situated onto the very locus where the sacred story took place. Bernini's design of the route to the Vatican followed an overall scheme founded on that programme, developed from the idea of the basilica over St. Peter's grave as the goal of pilgrimage to Rome. The route starts at the bridgehead of Ponte Sant'Angelo and ends up in the high choir of St. Peter's basilica, at the cathedra. Jesuit theology played a key role in the Roman baroque, in which Bernini worked. Norderval asks whether it is also possible to find a close relationship between Jesuit mysticism and Bernini's art. Engaging in an in-depth analysis of interaction between Loyola's text and artistic forms of expression in Bernini's project of the pilgrimage route, Norderval argues to see the pilgrimage route as a materialization of Ignatius's Exercitia. The route employs sculpture and architecture so as to evoke spiritual sensation and emotion, thus offering an excellent example of the possible roles of figurations and sensations in Roman Catholic religion.

Chapter 13 holds Else Marie Bukdahl's reflections on strategies across centuries of European art for representing that which ultimately is held to be non-representable. Artists of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the baroque often portrayed the divine by using abstract artistic effects. At the end of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant connected Edmund Burke's definition of 'the sublime' with the Second Commandment, taking this interdiction to express the highest insight on the matter of representing the deity. Further interpretations of Burke's and Kant's definitions of the sublime appeared in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Precisely because the sublime is associated with depictions of the sacred, and hence with a central problem in art for religious purposes, its reappearance in modern art gives rise to some of the most extreme innovations in visual art, as illustrated in recent Danish art for ecclesial use. In this line of strategies, the sublime is often represented by non-figural art where light plays a central role.

In her contribution in Chapter 14 Ulrike Brunotte considers the reception of the biblical figure of Salome in art and especially in opera. As it turns out, the very name Salome is not mentioned in the biblical stories of the death of John the Baptist; her dance lacks a narrative description and is oblivious of the 'seven veils'. These narrative 'blanks' provided spaces for the imaginative involvement of later recipients of the story, first, by religious commentators and, then, by artists. The figure of the 'dancing Salome' became an icon in Renaissance/baroque art. In the nineteenth century she was revived through narrative folk stories and literature. Since the fin de siècle dance, Oscar Wilde's play and Richard Strauss's opera, Salome is so centrally embedded in modern visual regimes that she can be defined as 'a sign of the visual as such'. Wilde's play started the production of an aesthetic spectacle of symbolist and biblical metaphors. In an opening scene of Strauss's opera, Salome's visual-bodily attraction is contrasted with the fascination of the disembodied 'holy' voice of the prophet who announces the message of God from the depths of the cistern. This dramatic configuration incorporates the interplays between words, figurations and sensations thematized in this volume. Brunotte explores the sensual mediations of the sacred in this interplay between the embodied and the disembodied voice, the visible and the invisible (but audible).

In the last contribution of the volume Christiane Kruse takes inducement from Michel Houellebecq's novel Soumission (Submission), which deals with the search for cultural identity in the aftermath of modernist secularization. The novel depicts an Islamic government taking over France in 2022, a shift substantiated by the claim that the atheist humanist thesis 'there is no God' would be utterly

presumptuous, rendering the human to serve as the divine. This professedly arrogant humanism is in the novel paired with the Christian creed, that God did, indeed, become human, incarnated into human flesh. Kruse explores the role of European art in comprehending painting as, precisely, 'incarnation'. The Italian humanist painter Cennini used the term incarnazione to denote the coming-into-being of a bodily image. Flesh is seen as the interphase of body and soul, and the painting of the flesh thus explicitly echoes the dogma of God becoming human. With the rise of positivism and the epoch of naturalism in the arts in the nineteenth century, spirit and soul are driven out, as it were, from painted flesh. Now the human skin is perceived merely as a membrane between outer appearance and inner physiology. The protagonist of Soumission, François, follows in the footsteps of Zola's contemporary Karl Joris Huysmans (author of the Décadence and subsequently a convert to Catholicism) into a monastery in Rocamadour, home of a black Madonna statue. Facing the sculpture, he feels reduced to his sheer physical existence, abandoned by his spirit. Fran ç ois loses his faith, according to Kruse an indication that the moderate Islam unfolded in the novel is equally devoid of metaphysical depth, having made the natural sciences their prime witness for the existence of God. <>

Jews and Protestants: From the Reformation to the Present edited by Irene Aue-Ben-David, Aya Elyada, Moshe Sluhovsky and Christian Wiese [De Gruyter, 9783110661088]

The book sheds light on various chapters in the long history of Protestant-Jewish relations, from the Reformation to the present.

Going beyond questions of antisemitism and religious animosity, it aims to disentangle some of the intricate perceptions, interpretations, and emotions that have characterized contacts between Protestantism and Judaism, and between Jews and Protestants. While some papers in the book address Luther's antisemitism and the NS-Zeit, most papers broaden the scope of the investigation: Protestant-Jewish theological encounters shaped not only antisemitism but also the Jewish Reform movement and Protestant philosemitic post-Holocaust theology; interactions between Jews and Protestants took place not only in the German lands but also in the wider Protestant universe; theology was crucial for the articulation of attitudes toward Jews, but music and philosophy were additional spheres of creativity that enabled the process of thinking through the relations between Judaism and Protestantism. By bringing together various contributions on these and other aspects, the book opens up directions for future research on this intricate topic, which bears both historical significance and evident relevance to our own time.

Contents

The year 2017 marked the five-hundredth anniversary of the eruption of the Protestant Reformation. Among the thousands of events commemorating the occasion was a conference that took place in Jerusalem, dedicated to 500 years of interactions between Protestants and Jews. The conference was organized by the Leo Baeck Institute Jerusalem, together with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Martin Buber Chair in Jewish Thought and Philosophy at the Goethe University in Frankfurt as well as the Frankfurt research hub "Religious Positioning: Modalities and Constellations in Jewish, Christian and Islamic Contexts," the Evangelical Church in Germany, the Center for the Study of Christianity at the Hebrew University, the Institute for the History of the German Jews in Hamburg, the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Tel Aviv University, and the Minerva Institute for German History, Tel Aviv University. Some of the papers that were first presented at the conference comprise the core of this volume.

Since 1996, discussions of Protestant-Jewish relations, the impact of the Reformation on the history of Germany, Jews, and German-Jews, and, in fact, European historytout court, have been shaped by DanielJonah Goldhagen's best-selling and controversialHitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. 1 While many, if not most, historians reject the book's main thesis, that, in its own way, revived the Sonderweg explanation of German history, in public opinion and the media Goldhagen's book reaffirmed the alleged persistence, in German history, of an eliminationist German type of antisemitism. Martin Luther stands at the beginning of this uniquely German and German-Protestant trajectory, a straight historical path that led from Luther's call to destroy the material presence of Jews in the Holy Roman Empire to Hitler's actual destruction of the Jews in modern Germany. In tracking the spread of modern antisemitism in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany, Goldhagen reminds his readers of the reluctance of some segments of the Catholic Church under Nazism to adopt racist theories while positioning Protestant churches, the Protestant media, and especially the Protestant Sonntagsblätter, the weekly Sunday newspapers, as active agents in shaping antisemitic public opinion.

There is no denying Luther's own antisemitism, nor the immense influence of his antisemitic writings on Protestant theology and theologians in later periods. Lutheran theology concerning Jews and Judaism was, in its turn, molded by the Pauline theology of supersession, and by Luther's own trajectory from hoping to bring about a mass conversion of theJews following his purported purification of Christianity of foreign pagan elements, to the vicious and even exterminatory theology of his later years. It is equally self-evident that Luther's personal struggle with the Jewish refusal to

accept his purified theology had an inestimable impact on later generations of Lutheran theologians. This was true throughout the past halfa millennium and even more so since 1945. In fact, as Thomas Kaufmann rightly observes,"[Luther's] attitude to the Jews has become a sort of pivotal issue in understanding his character and theology."

Just as Luther's own virulent antisemitism should not be whitewashed, one ought never to dismiss or forgive the brutal, racist, and in many cases eliminationist antisemitism of large segments of the Protestant hierarchy in the modern period. Nonetheless, the articles in this volume posit that there was no direct line leading from Luther to Hitler. And while some papers in the collection address Luther's antisemitism as well as the Glaubensbewegung Deutsche Christen, we have sought to broaden the scope of the investigation. Protestant-Jewish theological encounters shaped not only antisemitism but also the Jewish Reform movement and Protestant philosemitic post-Holocaust theology; interactions between Jews and Protestants took place not only in the German-speaking sphere but also in the wider Protestant universe– in Poland, Bohemia, the Low Countries, England, and the United States; theology was crucial for the articulation of attitudes toward Jews, but music and philosophy were additional spheres of creativity that enabled the process of thinking through the relations between Judaism and Protestantism. Generally speaking, Luther and Lutheranism spelled trouble for the Jews, but there were times that they constituted an attractive model of 'purified' Christianity that could potentially lead to a rapprochement between the faith communities. For a few generations of secularized Jews in Germany, conversion to Protestantism was a means of acculturation into Deutschtum, Protestantism's essence as a belief system brushed aside. Thus, rather thana single history of Protestant-Jewish relations anda single history of the theological mis/understandings between the two religions, it is, in fact, multiple histories and engagements that have helped to fashion both the religions and their peoples over the past 500 years. The collection aims to disentangle some of the intricate perceptions, interpretations, and emotions that have characterized contacts between Protestantism and Judaism, and between Jews and Protestants. As the presence of Dr. Martin Hauger, the Referent für Glaube und Dialog of the Evangelical Church in Germany, at the conference in Jerusalem, and some of the articles below make clear, Jewish-Protestant relations are an on-going project, a project to which this collection hopes to contribute.

In 1523, Martin Luther published his first major tract on the 'Jewish Question' under the title That Jesus Christ was Born A Jew. Considering the anti-Jewish stance advocated byLuther in earlier theological writings, and particularly in light of the deeply rooted anti-Jewishness that characterized medieval society and culture, the new treatise of the young reformer was marked by a surprisingly tolerant tenor, and even evinced a certain congenial tone toward the Jews. To be sure, Luther did not promote any tolerance toward the Jewish religion itself, nor did he call to accept Jews as Jews. The explicit aim of this work was to encourage mission among the Jews, with the goal of bringing about their conversion to the new Protestant Church. Yet, some of the main notions Luther presented in the text clearly broke from the hitherto prevalent attitudes toward the Jewish minority. To begin with, Luther laid the blame for the Jews' persistent refusal to convert to Christianity squarely at the feet of the Catholic Church. Itwas the centuries old Catholic perversion of Christianity that had kept the Jews from joining this corrupt, half-pagan religion, he maintained. Moreover, the Catholic Church had treated the Jews so badly, persecuted and exploited them, "that anyone who wished to bea good Christian would almost have had to become a Jew. If I had been a Jew and had seen such dolts and blockheads govern and teach the Christian faith," Luther admonished, "I would sooner have become a hog than a Christian."

Recommending the termination of the harsh and obviously futile traditional methods used by the Catholic Church to achieve Jewish conversion, Luther endorsed a fresh, twofold strategy. Christians would instruct the Jews kindly and carefully in Scripture, according to its 'true Christian' (namely,

Lutheran) understanding, and allow the Jewish minority to integrate into Christian society, as a means of exposing them to Christian belief and way of life. Luther was certain that, when offered the option of converting toa pure, correct, and unadulterated form of Christianity, and after existing barriers and obstacles had been removed, many Jews, if not all, would chooseto convert to the new confession.

Yet Luther's hopes for Jewish conversion did not materialize, and from the late 1530s we witness the publication of several anti-Jewish tracts from the pen of the aging reformer, the most notorious of which was On the Jews and Their Lies from 1543, three years before Luther's death. In this work, which became a hallmark of Luther's – and Lutheran – antisemitism, Luther warns his Christian readers of their most dangerous, indeed devilish, eternal enemy– the Jews residing among them. "Therefore, dear Christian," Luther writes, "be advised and do not doubt that next to the devil, you have no more bitter, venomous, and vehement foe than a real Jew who earnestly seeks to be a Jew." And elsewhere he writes,

> They are real liars and blood hounds who have [...] continually perverted and falsified all of Scripture with their mendacious glosses [...] The sun has never shone on a more bloodthirsty and vengeful people than they are who imagine that they are God's people who have been commissioned and commanded to murder and to slay the Gentiles.

Fortunately, Luther states, they lack the power to do so.Yet the threat posed to Christian society by the Jewish minority is no less real: since the Jews habitually lie and blaspheme, they might implicate the entire society – both Jews and Christians– in their depravity. If we tolerate the Jews and their calumnies, Luther exhorts his readers, the wrath of God shall be upon us all.

What do we do then, asksLuther, with theJews? We are unableto convert them,yet we cannot tolerate their presence among us. The solution he now suggests to the Christianauthorities is themirror opposite of the one he offered twenty years before. Instead of integrating the Jews into Christian society and approaching them with compassion, Luther advocates applying to them "sharp mercy": burning their synagogues and schools, destroying their homes, confiscating their books and forbidding their rabbis to teach, denying them safe conduct, prohibiting their dealing with finance and putting them to hard labor. But the best solution, Luther advises, would be to follow in the footsteps of other European countries and expel the Jews from the German lands altogether.

Scholars have long attempted to account for what seems to be Luther's dramatic change of heart regarding the Jews and the 'Jewish Question.' First and foremost, Luther's disappointment concerning the continued refusal of the Jews to convert to his new confession clearly drove him to the conclusion that they were entirely under the wrath of God. Thus, as he makes explicit at the beginning of On the Jews and Their Lies, it is impossible– and therefore useless– to try and convert them. Indeed, considering the anti-Jewish stance he advocated already in his early writings, the 1523 text would seem to be the exception, as though Luther had 'suspended' his animosity toward the Jews in order to give their conversion a chance. Once this opportunity was not partaken of, the old animus could make a horrifying comeback.

But the rancor of Luther's attacks from the 1540s, which were considered exceptionally severe even in the anti-Jewish atmosphere of the sixteenth century, also merits inquiry. Here scholars have proposed, alongside Luther's conversionary letdown, his increasing decrepitude; his bitterness in the face of Reformation setbacks; his apocalyptic set of mind; and the fact that during those years Luther spoke ruthlessly about all his enemies– the 'papists,' the Anabaptists, the Turks, and basically anyone who did not affirm his theology as the one and only true understanding of Christianity. Specifically, with regard to the Jews, it has been suggested that what Luther perceived as 'Judaizing' tendencies within the Protestant camp(Sabbath-observing sects, certain circles within Protestant Hebraism, etc.)

sharpened his view of the 'Jewish danger' that he perceived as placing his Reformation in peril. Finally, it is important to note the influence of the book Der gantz Jüdisch glaub (The Entire Jewish Faith, first published in Augsburg, 1530) on the stance taken by the older Luther toward the Jews. Written by Antonius Margaritha, the son of a rabbi and a convert from Judaism, the book claimed, among other things, to expose the Jewish blasphemies and anti-Christian sentiments allegedly contained in their religious books and daily prayers. Luther referred to Margaritha's influential and highly popular book on several occasions as a crucial source of knowledge for contemporary Judaism. It appears that the work contributed to the reformer's view of the hostility of the Jews toward the Christians and of their outrageous blasphemies against God and the Christian religion– two prominent motifs in his 1543 antisemitic tract.

While the aforementioned factors may well have contributed to Luther's antisemitic attacks, one thing is certain: his existential fear of the Jews, and his profound conviction that they must be converted or otherwise banished entirely from Christian Germany, persisted up to his very final days. On February7,1546, less than two weeks before his death, Luther added to one of his last sermons, preached at St. Andrew's Church in his hometown of Eisleben, An Admonition against the Jews. As he noted in two letters to his wife from February 1 and 7,15 Luther was quite upset by the presence of a small Jewish community in Eisleben and in a small town close by. He decided to encourage Count Albrecht in their expulsion– by advocating it from the pulpit. "More than others, you still have Jews in your land who do great harm," he warned his listeners, emphasizing again the great sin of tolerating Jewish slander and blasphemy, as well as the eternal enmity of the Jew toward the Christian religion and its adherents. In conclusion to his final will with regard to the Jews Luther wrote:

> This is the final warning I wanted to give you, as your countryman: [...] If the Jews will be converted to us [...] we will gladly forgive them. But if not, then neither should we tolerate or endure them among us.

Luther died in 1546, leaving his newly founded Church with a Janus-faced legacy concerning the Jews and their prospective conversion. The legacy of the younger Luther, advocated most clearly by the Pietist movement of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, emphasized the responsibility of Christians to convert Jews via friendly engagement. The legacy of the older Luther, by contrast, which characterized Lutheran Orthodox circles from the mid-sixteenth until the early eighteenth century, denied the possibility of converting the Jews through human efforts and stressed the need for Christians to defend themselves in the face of the Jewish threat.

As the eighteenth century drew to a close and the nineteenth century opened, the anti-Jewish part of Luther's legacy seems to have fallen into oblivion. The Pietistic roots of German Enlightenment contributed considerably to the diffusion of a relatively pro-Jewish stance among German theologians of the time, and to the image of Luther as a proponent of tolerance toward the Jews. Anti-Jewish writings from this period and throughout the nineteenth century tended to cite the sinister work of the Calvinist scholar Johann Eisenmenger, Entdecktes Judentum (Judaism Unmasked, 1700) as their source of inspiration and authority, rather than Luther's later works. Only in the 1830s, following the first modern edition of Luther's writings, did Luther's anti-Jewish writings gain renewed attention. While some Lutheran scholars condemned the reformer's hostility to the Jews, others utilized his work to propagate antisemitic notions. This was especially the case toward the end of the nineteenth century, when the formation of the Second Reich propagated a new image of Luther as a German national hero who mobilized his people against external enemies. Soon enough, and under the influence of racially based ideologies, Luther was also mobilized against internal enemies. His antisemitic writings enjoyed a growing popularity in the last quarter of the nineteenth

century and, usually stripped of their theological message, were often integrated into a new völkisch-racist understanding of German-ness.

By the early twentieth century, the later Luther, the author of vitriolic antisemitic sermons and treatises, came to dominate scholarship on Luther. The impact of this antisemitic reading of Luther's theology was such that even the Munich edition of Luther's writings, which was closely linked to the Confessing Church (Bekennende Kirche), sang the praises of Luther's On the Jews and their Lies 's antisemitism. By the 1930s, Luther's writings were used to justify the exclusion of Jews from public life, the burning of synagogues, and the promotion of ethnic and racist notions of German-ness. After Kristallnacht , the publication and circulation of Luther's antisemitic writings increased dramatically, the most popular compendium of the genre being Martin Sasse's Martin Luther *über die Juden: Weg mit ihnen*! (Martin Luther on the Jews: Away with Them!). Sasse was a leading Lutheran theologian who merged world Jewry, Catholicism, liberal Protestants abroad, and western democracies into a vast conspiracy against the Fuhrer's sacred struggle. He also did not fail to point out the expiatory symbolism of Kristallnacht taking place on Luther's birthday.

This being said, one ought to bear in mind that Luther's antisemitism was rather akin to the antisemitism of his contemporaries, Catholics and Protestant alike. Luther did not call for an annihilation of the Jews, and while he talked about the degeneration of Jews since Jesus' time, he– unlike the Nazis– never denied Jesus' Jewish ethnicity. Nor should one forget that German Lutherans' engagement with Luther's antisemitic writings and with Jews did not end in 1945. In fact, Lutheran theology of the second half of the twentieth century became the core of a reckoning and a fundamental departure from stained past. Already in 1950, the synod of the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) in Berlin Weissensee declared that God's selection of the Jews was not revoked with the crucifixion of Christ, a theological novelty without precedent that abrogated 1700 years of supersessionist theology. Since then, the covenant with Israel has become a crucial component of German and non-German Lutheran theology. In 1983, as is well known, on the 500th anniversary of Luther's birth, the council of the EKD pronounced Luther's late texts on the Jews "calamitous," and a few years later the EKD recognized the implication of the Protestant Church in the crimes of the Nazi state against the Jews. In 2017, in conjunction with the 500th anniversary of the Reformation, the synod published a new declaration concerning the EKD's relations to Jews. Recognizing the mistakes made by reformers and by the Reformation churches, the EKD expressed its regrets that the Reformation failed to put an end to medieval antisemitism, and that Luther's antisemitism, in fact, contributed to Nazi antisemitism. Furthermore, unlike previous discourse on Luther's theology, which emphasized the break between the early and the late Luther, the EKD stated that "Luther's early statements and his late writings from 1538, with their undisguised hatred of Jews, show continuity in his theological judgment." The declaration attributed to the founding father irrational fear of and stereotypical thinking about Jews and draws a direct line between his writings and the justification of hatred and persecution of Jews, in particular with the emergence of racist antisemitism and at the time of National Socialism. Itis not possible to draw simple continuous lines. Nevertheless, in the 19th and20th century, Luther was a source for theological and ecclesial anti-Judaism, as well as for political antisemitism.

Last, but not least, the EKD declared that "Luther's judgment upon Israel therefore does not correspond to the biblical statements on God's covenant faithfulness to his people and the lasting election of Israel."

DEAN PHILLIP BELL's article looks at the impact of the Reformation on German Jewry and the development of Jewish historiography of the topic. Bell warns against a teleological perspective that ignores Lutheran-Jewish moments of interaction and collaboration. He recalls the role of Jews in the

development of Lutheran Hebraism, the growing interest of theologians in Hebrew texts and traditions, and the Jewish support of the idea of a godly community. Using the concept of Confessionalization, which denotes the early modern processes that reshaped relations between state and church after the Reformation, Bell demonstrates how these processes also influenced Jewish communities in the Holy Roman Empire. Bell concludes that even if German Jews totally rejected the theological message of the Reformation, its organizational and political transformations of society still had a significant impact on Jewish communities. MARKÉTA KABURKOVÁ explores the large and diverse body of Jewish views on Luther, and on the Reformation as it unfolded. She shows that the Jewish reaction to the religious upheavals in Christianity was far from monochromatic: while some Jewish authors saw the Reformation as a purification of Christianity and its return to Jewish roots, others were more apprehensive, fearing the impact of Luther's Reformation on the fate of the Jews in the German lands. Still other Jewish authors, especially those of Sephardi origin, viewed Lutheranism as the Catholic Church's comeuppance for its mistreatment of the Jews. All agreed, however, that the reformers misunderstood Scripture.

Moving chronologically, the next papers examine various aspects of Protestant-Jewish relations during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. ALEXANDER VAN DER HAVEN investigates the changing relations between notions of conversion and eschatological expectations in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War. While eschatological thinking typically prompts exclusivist notions of conversion, insisting that there is only one true religion, Van der Haven suggests that early modern eschatology also had the potential to bring different religious groups together. To support this claim, he analyzes two letters written by a convert to Judaism in Amsterdam in 1682, in which the author presented a scenario of an imminent eschaton that assigned positive roles to more than one religious' group. This was done, however, without relinquishing a clear line of demarcation between the forces of light and darkness. LARS FISCHER's discussion

of the antisemitic nature of Bach's sacred cantatas brings us back to the theme of anti-Jewish inclinations within GermanLutheranism. Arguing that this attitude was to be expected in light of Bach's adherence to Lutheran orthodoxy and his position as cantor in the Lutheran Church of the early eighteenth century, Fischer asks how, and to what extent, did the anti-Jewish sentiment of the time find expression in Bach's oeuvre. With Cantata 42 as a central case-study, he wishes to raise awareness of these troubling aspects in Bach's music awareness that he finds to be lacking among Bach scholars and fans of our time.

Questions of mission and conversion, especially in the context of the Pietist and the Evangelical movements within Lutheranism, come to the fore in the next two papers. YAAKOV ARIEL discusses the rise of the Pietist mission to the Jews, its underlying assumptions, and the way it was carried out at the Institutum Judaicum, the great Pietist missionary center founded in 1728 in the Prussian city of Halle. Ariel highlights the use of Yiddish in the missionary endeavors of the Halle Pietists, first and foremost for the missionary publications produced in Halle. He also shows how eighteenth-century Pietism helped shape the agenda and methods of Evangelical missions to the Jews which emerged in English-speaking countries at the beginning of the nineteenth century. AYA ELYADA tackles the project undertaken by the Halle Pietists during the first half of the eighteenth century, of publishing missionary works in Yiddish for distribution among the Jews. In particular, Elyada attempts to explain why the Pietists found it important to publish Yiddish versions of biblical books despite the centuries-long availability of such translations among Ashkenazi Jews. Elyada raises the possibility that the Pietist missionaries, like earlier Lutheran theologians from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, rejected the existing Jewish, Yiddish versions of the Bible on the basis of both style and content. These publications, she suggests, were then to be replaced by 'decent' – that is, Protestant and Germanized – versions of the holy text.

The vagaries of Protestant-Jewish relations in the modern period are the second focus of the collection. From the eighteenth century on, these relations were often also related to different configurations of the nation and the Volk. OFRI ILANY traces the trajectory of the notion of the 'Hebrew Republic' in legal theory and theology in the German-speaking lands. This concept was central to numerous authors, among them the most prominent theologian of the German Enlightenment, Johann David Michaelis. In Michaelis' writings, Moses the Lawgiver is portrayed as the man who, in his republican-theocratic innovations, overcame the division of the Hebrews into tribes, thus enabling the creation of a nation. The Hebrew Republic could thus serve as a model fora hopeful unification of the German people. JOHANNES GLEIXNER probes the position of Jews and Protestants in relation to the political changes in the Czech-speaking parts of the Habsburg Empire at the turn of the twentieth century. During that time, Gleixner argues, the two communities were pressured in a similar manner to assimilate into mainstream, Catholic society, and there are strong parallels in the ways in which both of these minorities responded to the challenge, while struggling to maintain their own religious and cultural identity. Gleixner also signals the political achievements of the Czech Jewish-Protestant alignment and its impact on the discourse surrounding the foundation of the new Czechoslovak republic in 1918. CHRISTIAN WIESE analyses the way Jewish historians and philosophers in Germany interpreted Luther's significance for contemporary debates on Jewish emancipation and integration, either praising him as a forerunner of freedom of thought and Enlightenment or criticizing his contribution to Protestantism's submissiveness towards the authoritarian state. Those who referred to the reformer's Judenschriften between 1917 and 1933, he argues, insisted on a strong discontinuity between the early and the later writings, in a desperate attempt to counter nationalist orvölkisch readings and to convince non-Jewish Germans to embrace the attitude of the– idealized– young Luther and, as a consequence, reject antisemitism. Wiese demonstrates that, unfortunately, this narrative of a 'tolerant' creator of Germanness remained without an echo among the majority of Protestant theologians of the time.

Entering deeper into the twentieth century, DIRK SCHUSTER and KYLE JANTZEN both address Lutherans' responses to Aryan racism during the period of National Socialism. Schuster considers how ideas of racial purity influenced the theological as well as practical stance of certain movements in the German Protestant Church towards Jews, Judaism, and Jewish converts to Christianity. He shows how these movements perceived Protestantism as an exclusive Aryan religion, and how racial considerations became for their adherents a precondition to belonging to the Protestant Church. Thus, they not only aimed to 'de-Judaize' Christianity, but also denied the Jews the only possibility, in their eyes, to reach salvation. Turning our gaze to the other side of the Atlantic, Kyle Jantzen's paper examines how U.S. Protestants perceived Hitler, Nazism, and the persecution of Germany's Jews in the prewar era, and what kinds of responses they proposed. Analyzing a sample of Protestant publications and journals, he contends that prior to the Second World War, American Lutherans did not ignore the danger of Nazism, but were primarily concerned with the Nazi persecution of Christians. Above all, Jantzen claims, they identified Nazism as an enemy of religion. As far as the Jews were concerned, American Protestants both condemned and perpetuated forms of antisemitism in the United States. Over time, they developed an anti-antisemitic attitude, which did not prevent them from adhering to supersessionist and conversional attitudes toward Jews.

Post-Holocaust reckoning is crucial for Lutheran theology of the second half of the twentieth century, and it is the main concern of the last pair of articles. URSULA RUDNICK addresses the impact of the Holocaust in her discussion of the process undertaken by the Lutheran church in condemning the antisemitic writings of Martin Luther, while at the same time renewing theological dialogue between Jews and Lutherans after the Shoah. She offers a detailed chronology of the activities and pronouncements of the Lutheran Commission on Church and Judaism over the 40-year period which led to the Declaration of Driebergen in the year 1990. The article scrutinizes pan-

European and pan-Lutheran developments and declarations, reminding us that the process of reckoning and rethinking Jewish-Lutheran relations after the Holocaust took place across the globe. Finally, JOHANNES BECKE analyzes contemporary attitudes of Lutherans toward Judaism and the reconfigurations of theology in the shadow of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Studying the history of Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste (ASF) in Israel from the 1960s onwards, Becke presents both theological and sociological evidence for shifting notions of guilt, responsibility, and atonement among different generations of German Lutheran youth. After situating the history of the organization within the conceptual frameworks of Philosemitism and Philozionism, Becke spotlights the rupture in the long history of Protestant-Jewish relations brought about by the foundation of a Jewish state.

As can be seen from this brief overview, the present volume aims to shed light on various chapters in the long history of Protestant-Jewish relations, from the Reformation to the present day. five centuries and a vast geographical area, it demonstrates the manifold manifestations of these complex relations in ever-shifting historical contexts. The volume brings together the work of scholars who differ not only with respect to religious, national, and institutional backgrounds, but also in their methodological approaches and fields of expertise. By this, we hope to showcase current trends in present-day scholarship on Protestant-Jewish relations, and to open up directions for future research on this intricate topic, which bears both historical significance and evident relevance to our own time. <>

MEMORY, METAPHOR AND MYSTICISM IN KALIDASA'S ABHIJNANSAKUNTALAM edited by Namrata Chaturvedi [Anthem Press, 9781785273209]

As an ancient Indian poet-dramatist, Kālidāsa cannot be absorbed into the homogenizing tendencies of Hindu hagiography, as has often been attempted, especially in the period after independence. From being projected as a Brahmin by birth in legends, a Vedāntist and Vaishnavite in darsana (theology), and more recently, owing to Western theoretical perspectives being applied to texts separated in time and contexts, Kalidasa is critiqued for a patriarchal and casteist outlook. These various readings have privileged personal theories and validated them by reading literary texts in certain ways. '**MEMORY, METAPHOR AND MYSTICISM IN KALIDASA'S ABHIJNANSAKUNTALAM**' brings together scholars from both sides of the globe who offer possibilities for reviewing this text, not as an Oriental discovery or a cultural property, but as an ancient literary text that can be read in multiple philosophical contexts. Further, the translations of 'AbhijñānaŚākuntalam' into South Asian languages like Urdu and Nepali and a classical language like Persian are also included for detailed study for understanding the impact of this text in the respective literary traditions of these languages, and to assess the actual cross-literary dialogue that this text made, without hyperboles and generalizations, given the fact that many of these translation happened just before and after independence when literary historiography and nation writing project went hand in hand in India.

Review

'**MEMORY, METAPHOR AND MYSTICISM IN KALIDASA'S ABHIJNANSAKUNTALAM** offers a striking account of the continued power of Kālidāsa's work. In addition to literary studies of the Sanskrit drama, its attention to the afterlives of the Śākuntalam in vernacular languages from Nepali

to Persian opens up new ways of understanding this classic.' --Luther Obrock, Assistant Professor, University of Toronto, Canada

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Ramyani vlkshya madhuranshca nishamya shabdan
Paryutsukibhavati yatsukhitopi jantuh
Tacchetasa smarati nunamabodhapurvam
Bhavasthirani jananantarasauhradani
(Abhijnansakuntalam, V2)

[Why do I feel a sense of anxiety even though I haven't suffered separation from my loved one? On seeing beautiful things, on hearing melodious music, there is a sukkha that is pervaded by past memories.]

In the opening of the fifth act, just before the arrival of Sakuntala to his court, Dusyanta attributes his anxiety on hearing Hansapadika's song to memories that are passed on through births. He also points out that engagement with art makes the stirring of these memories possible.

Sri M, a living *nath* yogi, in one of his *satsangas* (assembly of truth) describes, `All experience is [as] a memory' The need to store memory to be accessed again through sensorial forms is the consequence of the inability of human consciousness to realize truth. While one clings to the belief in the eternality of images, one is bound by the cycle of coming and going, living and dying. While a sensorial or pneumonic token is needed to prove existence, an individual is merely looking at appearance and denying herself the possibility of real witnessing. When Dusyanta gives his ring to his beloved after a haunting episode of sensual love between the two, their relationship reaches a stage of spiritual deadlock. From this point, until they can be fully liberated, Dusyanta and Sakuntala will find themselves playing a game of hide-and-seek with the token (ring) evading them. Dusyanta has to undergo a test through emotional cleansing as he has to experience remorse and guilt, while Sakuntala has to undergo the heartbreaking experience of birthing and raising a son without his father. In his remorse, Dusyanta tries to apprehend the form of Sakuntala again and again by recreating her picture and invoking the *brhamar* and Malati vine. He is still caught in the web of form, and he will next see Sakuntala only when she has passed through another stage of life, that is, child birth. It had to fall upon *Rshi* Durvasas, an embodiment of Siva's anger, to bless the two (sleeping) lovers with real awakening While Sakuntala was unaware of herself by being lost in desire and doubt, the sage brings about a state of *smriti aarodh,* or obstruction of memory, in Dusyanta's *citta* (consciousness). Dusyanta, on seeing Sakuntala in his court, is neither able to reject her, nor can he completely deny ever knowing her. Naturally, the token, as an objective correlative of their love, goes missing at this point. From manifestation to disappearance to manifestation again, this play follows the *advaita* structure of one to two, two to one.

AbhijnanSakuntalam is a sublime text within a living tradition. This tradition is the world of *dhoti* that explores and absorbs resonances in Kava (literature). It has survived through 'historicist, traditionalist and formalist' hermeneutics to demonstrate the power of *Kavya* for the moral-imaginative universe of humankind. The aesthetic universe of *Kavya* is beyond the worldly dimension, and the *sahrdaya* (sensitive reader/viewer) is able to experience the non-worldly dimension of Kavya *jnana* through a process of expansion of consciousness as *sadharanikarana* (generalization). Engagement with a text like Kalidasa's *AbhijnanSakuntalam*or Dante's *Dialyze Comedy* reiterates the power of *dhvani* (suggestion) as an enriching mode of engagement. The resonances thus experienced on reading texts like these stir the memory of collective unconscious enabling the reader(s) to experience inspiration in its essence.

This study, while recognizing the valuable contributions of Oriental, nativist, formalist, philological and cultural materialist positions on *AbhijnanSakuntalam,* proposes that an aesthetic approach that keeps resonance in the centre can lead to paradigmatic synthesis of various modes of thought. The inspiration that a splendid *shayar* in Urdu, Saghar Nizami, recognizes in *AbhijnanSakuntalam* when he says that a text like this cannot be composed, but is a work of pure inspiration, is an expression of universal human resonance that he experiences on reading (viewing) it. When the exquisite and prolific Nepali writer Laxmi Prasada Devakota is inspired to render *AbhijnanSakuntalam* into three different translations in two languages, a creative genius is responding to aesthetic resonances the text offers him.

The Mainstay Poet of the Hindus: Orientalist Orientation

The reading of literature as documents in theorizing on nation was an Orientalist project from the eighteenth century onwards, as Vinay Dharwadker points out in his essay 'Orientalism and the Study of Indian Literatures'.[3] In the records of Europeans in the nineteenth century, a study of Hindoostan was never complete without a cataloguing of literature in Sanskrit. This language was reported to be a dead language by the nineteenth century, an ancient sacred language ritualistically employable for religious practices of the Hindoos. In these records, Kalidasa's works occupied a prime place in the

entry on 'literature'. The earliest view created a binary in which to look at Sanskrit language and literature as language for the gods and therefore sacred, and literature as secular. Kalidasa was therefore understood as a favourite poet of the Hindoos, and his works were immediately covered in a discourse of Romanticism. *AbhijnanSakuntalam* was read as a romantic love story, titled as *The Fatal Ring*— a misplaced and misleading title. Goethe was in a spell over Sakuntala, and William Jones found in it layers of dramatic techniques unparalleled in English. Kalidasa became the poetic ideal for German Romanticism. Herder had this to say:

> Do you not wish with me, that instead of these endless religious books of the Vedas, Upvedas and Upangas, they would give us the more useful and agreeable works of the Indians, and esperially their best poetry of every kind? It is here the mind and character of a nation is best brought to life before us, and I gladly admit, that I have received a truer and more real notion of the manner of thinking among the ancient Indians from this one *Sakutala,* than from all their Upnekats and Bagvedam.

In the nineteenth century, Indian critics began to actively look for the moral quotient of *AbhijnanSakuntalam,* incorporating it into an already existing discourse of *swadheenata (self-rule)* through self-determination. Nationalist thinkers like Rabindranath Tagore and Hazariprasad Dwivedi read the narrative within the framework of universal morality. The reformist spirit of Hindu culture revealed for the thinkers a spine of moral strength that was to hold the Indian civilization together in the face of a cultural opponent, namely the West. The mode of reading the text was still informed by the Oriental hermeneutic and led to a blend of the moral and civilizational worldview.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Sri Aurobindo's readings of Indian classics introduced a spiritual dimension to the reading of *Kavya.* This vision worked on a blending of the civilizational and the spiritual, creating grounds for a discourse of modern spirituality in Hinduism, as reflected in the writings of yogis like Swami Vivekananda and Paramhamsa Yogananda and lifestyle spiritualists like Sri Ravi Shankar. Sri Aurobindo writes with a self-consciousness natural to a Hindu spiritualist in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:

> It is enough that we find in Kalidasa's poetry the richest bloom and perfect expression of the long classical afternoon of Indian civilization.

Instead of receiving further development, the Hindu drama rapidly declined, and a considerable part of this fascinating literature was for ever lost.' Sanskrit literary history writing in the twentieth century focused on creating a monochromatic picture of Indian literature prior to Islamic and British (Christian) invasion, embedding literary historiography in theological (and political) crises."

From the second half of the twentieth century onwards, ***Abhijnansakuntalam*** was translated into many modern Indian languages including Manipuri, Oriya and Malayalam dialects, and many intertextual adaptations appeared, as, for instance, Surendra Mohan's ***Shakuntala ki Angoothi (Shakuntala's Ring)*** that looks at the world of classical drama with a tone of subversive irony and Namita Gokhale's ***Shakunlala*** where the eponymous heroine is shown traversing a world of emotional and spiritual crises. The ***Amar Chitra Kathas*** made Dusyanta and Shakunlala household names, like Satyawan and Savitri, Nala and Damayanti." They acquired the status of mythological figures about whom children read and from whom they learn of myths and legends of India. The 1961 cinematic adaptation of ***Sakuntala*** was titled ***Stree,*** directed by V. Shantaram. This film portrayed the generic 'woman' as an embodiment of inner strength, a victim who overcomes the toughest challenges of life through a quality unique to womankind. In terms of ***darsana,*** Kalidasa's works have been read for the names of Vedic gods and goddesses as evoked in his plays and poetry. Some scholars have strained hard to establish Vedantic influences on Kalidasa's thought, subsuming

his evocation of Siva to an all-encompassing Vaishnavism. The relationship between Kalidasa's Saivism and poetics has hardly been explored at length,' as, for instance, ***pratyabhijna darsana,*** even though it lends itself to the philosophical make-up of the text.

There are readings of ***Abhijnansakuntalam that locate*** the relationship between Dusyanta and Sakuntala as one of unequal power, of the structure of consumer and object of consumption? Thus, the ***gandharva vivaha*** between Dusyanta and Sakuntala is seen as a euphemism for Dusyanta's sexual exploitation of Sakuntala — the powerful male exploiting the naive female. While this perspective overlooks the fact that Sakuntala's emotional investment in the relationship is expressed clearly by the poet right from the beginning, it also does not take into account the mention of Dusyanta-Sakuntala's ***gandharva vivah as*** a form of securing love marriage between two consenting adults as mentioned in various ***Kamasastras.*** There is also the presupposition that the sexual act is separated from the spiritual so that the profane act cannot have any sacred dimensions. The relationship between Dusyanta and Sakuntala is not of standalone sexual encounter but can be seen as one that brings the eternal lovers together on a physical plane. When pining for Sakuntala, Dusyanta draws her portrait in fine details, trying to approximate her body in memory. The word *smara* for remembrance and love validates the epistemological importance of love in Kashmir Saivism *(pratyabhijna)* and subtly connects the memory and obstruction of it to recognition of love."

The journey of a literary text is shaped by the cultural and intellectual terrain it negotiates. *Abhijnansakuntalam* has travelled through archival, nativist, neo-Orientalist and historical materialist as well as formalist critical schools. While the Oriental imagination saw unparalleled unified sensibility in the relationship of the heroine and the natural world, especially in Act Four, which swept the European imagination, literary criticism has searched for social and intellectual history in the text.

At this point in literary scholarship, when the questions of cultural determinism and historical materialism have outlived their significance, and the concept of 'World Literature' in the Goethian and Tagorean sense has come to be realized, if only partially, *Abhijnansakuntalam* must not be limited by any predominant mode of reading. A spiritual quotient that refuses to be cultist, culturally limited or historical because of its very nature of Oneness can be ascertained naturally in *Abhijnansakuntalam* lending a vibrancy to the various modes of reading by highlighting their specific contexts of origin and play. This study, with chapters, each unique and vital, that approach the text from different perspectives, has as its point of origin the recognition of the resonances. Through symbols that evoke *prabandha dhvani* (unified suggestion) to transcreations in other cultural and philosophical grammars, these chapters start from an appreciation of possibilities of resonances lying in the texture of Kalidasa's sublime play.

The spiritual Centre of *Abhijnansakuntalam*

The spiritual centre of *Abhijnansakuntalam is* a living traditional idiom that has been touched upon at times but can be explored more. The division of the narrative into seven acts that thematically rise, plateau and rise again suggests the paradigm of yogic knowledge rising slowly and steadily through the subtle channels." The marked presence of three *rshis* in the narrative — Visvamitra, Durvasas and Kasyapa — indicates yogic symbolic order of narrative imagination. *Rshi Visvamitra is* Sakuntala's father, *Rshi* Durvasas curses her and *Rshi* Kasyapa provides shelter to her. Sakuntala is the daughter of a *rshi* who did yogic penance for years to attain the title of *brahmarshi. Rshi* Durvasas's presence is much more than a plot tool; he is the son of *Rshi* Atri, one of the seven *rshis (saptarshis),* along with *Rshi* Visvamitra and *Rshi* Kasyapa, recognized in Vedic literature. The *karma* cycle of Sakuntala-Dusyanta's life appears to be governed by the three *rshis* who *bring forth, separate and witness* the union of the two eternal lovers.

Kalidasa's work has been read for symbols of tantra in presenting a theology of union of Siva-Sakti. In the tantric and yogic system, the seven chakras of the subtle body *(sukshms sharira)* mark and nurture the growth of the human consciousness cutting through the seven stages of ignorance *(avidya).* The guru leads one through the seven chakras in a manner that is conducive to the seeker. The journey is steady but with a pace that the seeker is capable of fully absorbing. The narrative of *AbhijnanSakuntalam* begins with symbols of divine communication, in the first scene when Dusyanta feels a throbbing in his right arm and he takes off the coverings *(mala)* of his kingly (worldly) identity before entering Sakuntala's hermitage. Through Act Two, he pines and pursues his love through doubts, fears and hope. In the third act, the two lovers unite temporarily with a sensual energy that is sublime and transmissive. In the next act, Sakuntala is beset with misgivings and fears as she sets out from her protected surroundings. In the fifth act, she encounters fear and ignominy, while Dusyanta experiences confusion and doubt. The sixth act reveals to us a stage of self-examination where Dusyanta tries to come to terms with the *avidya* of his worldly self; something Sakuntala too experienced in the beginning of Act Four. This introspection is made possible by *Rshi* Durvasas, who, like a guru, imparts knowledge in a manner decipherable only to him. His curse makes this stage possible when two mortals are given the opportunity to rise above their love in a singular dimension to reach a multidimensional cosmic level of consciousness. The meeting space between the earth and the sky is symbolic of the higher plane, the highest, perhaps, to which the human consciousness can reach. At that point, Rshi Marica describes the union of Dusyanta, Sakuntala and Sarvadamana as the union of *sraddha, dhan* and *vidhi.*' These terms are central to spiritual practices in the yogic tradition. The balance of *sraddha and vidhi,* or goal and practice, is the right spiritual path that leads to fulfilment *(dhan).* The balance of *purusha* and *prakrili* in the form of Dusyanta and Sakuntala leads to creation (Sarvadamana).' The structural as well as poetic idioms throughout the play gently and consistently suggest *(dhvanit)* spiritual meanings for the human soul.

This universal *dhvani* of the text could explain why this text has fascinated readers, writers, scholars and performers across literary, cultural as well as religious traditions. Different cultural contexts have contributed to reading the text through specific epistemologies. It is possible to closely read the poetic of the narrative to understand those human centres of experience that it touches upon and consistently finds reverberations in multiple readings, analyses and adaptations and translations across space and time.

Metre, Structure and **Dhvani**

An exploration of suggestion must naturally begin with a focus on poetic life force. Sri Aurobindo stresses the inherent relationship between metre and the spirit, rescuing metre from a clinical assessment. He observes,

The importance of metre arises from the fact that different arrangements of sound have different spiritual and emotional values, tend to produce that is to say by virtue of the fixed succession of sounds a fixed spiritual atmosphere and a given type of emotional exaltation and the mere creative power of sound though a material thing is yet near to spirit, is very great; great on the material and ascending in force through the moral and intellectual, culminating on the emotional plane. It is a factor of the first importance in music and poetry. In these different arrangements of syllabic sound metre forms the most important, at least the most tangible element. Every poet who has sounded his own consciousness must be aware that management of metre is the gate of his inspiration and the law of his success. There is a double process, his state of mind and spirit suggesting its own syllabic measure, and the metre again confirming, prolonging and recreating the original state of mind and spirit.

The first chapter of this collection, titled *Upama Kaidasaya::* What Makes Kalidasa the King of Metaphor' by Ramkishor Maholiya, takes us through the poetic foundation of the text by closely studying the use Kalidasa makes of particular *chhand* and *alankar.* The questions of why certain *alankar* are found suitable for certain structural meanings and the philosophical and/or spiritual meanings they convey inform this chapter. It attempts to go beyond the Orientalist philological and nativist cultural approaches in engaging with the soul of poetry with a clear awareness of the *darsana* of Kalidasa's *kavya.*

Sheldon Pollock argues against reductive readings of the text by locating the textual structure in symmetries of both form and theme. By closely highlighting thematic patterns through the seven acts, and by drawing mythical parallels between *AbhijnanSakuntalam* and *Kumarasambhava,* this chapter underscores the importance of identifying and absorbing resonances in the play. Prof. Pollock critiques the reductive Orientalist methodology of engaging with Sanskrit literature, as he also highlights the limitations of moral readings of the text through the categories of fate and chastity. The conviction of Kalidasa, as Prof. Pollock argues, in the divine *(daiva)* investment in the mortal order is neither without purpose nor without a carefully considered design. To him, the parallels between the union of Siva and Parvati and Dusyanta and Sakuntala are striking and integral to understanding the suprahuman status of the king and sage Viivamitra's daughter for the theological and historical resonances and not prescriptive or moral lessons to be propagated by the playwright.

A text in the *krama* tradition of tantric Saivism, *Chidgaganachandrika,* is rattributed to Kalidasa. Scholars have varying views on the authorship of this text, finding structural similarities but chronological incongruities to be able to ascertain Mahakavi Kalidasa's association with it Whether it was the poet Kalidasa, the composer of *AbhijnanSakuntalam,* or a devotee of Kali falling in a tradition to which the poet Kalidasa too may have belonged, it is highly suggestive from the poetry of Kalidasa, and from literature being discovered in this name, that symbols of tantra and Kashmir Saivism have an intrinsic link with his thought. **H. S. Shivaprakash and Namrala Chaturvedi** have based their study titled 'From Separation to Unity: Resonances of Kashmir Saivism in *AbhijnanSakuntalam*' on the poetic and theological resonances from Kashmir Saiva tradition that Kalidasa's text presents. The structure of differentiation as manifestation and integration through re-cognition *(pratyabhijna)* of unity is found to be suggested throughout the play.

While some scholars seek to identify *AbhijnanSakuntalam* as a religious text, almost a moral prescriptive text for Hindu culture, in another tradition, contemporary hermeneutics seek to read the Bible for its poetic quotient, thereby making enrichment and enlivening possible, as **Felix Wilfred** argues in his chapter titled *Sakuntala* and the Bible: Parallels and Resonances'. Father Wilfred's study shares resonances with the observation of Lacchmidhar Shastri Kalla, who proposed that a comparative study of Kashmir Saivism and Christianity with respect to *AbhijnanSakuntalam* would lead to promising conclusions." In his chapter, Father Wilfred offers freedom from religious hermeneutic that often stifles the breath of a text. He takes *AbhijnanSakuntalam* to another theological tradition by finding thematic parallels with the Bible in the story of Hagar (Genesis) and poetic parallels in the aesthetically magnificent Song of Songs. Such a reading rescues *AbhijnanSakuntalam* from the clutches of doctrinal reductionism and offers the Bible scope for being relived and recontextualized as a text of diverse, rich and breathtaking beauty. His chapter directs us to the possibilities of meaning for the human experience that Kalidasa's play offers and then takes those resonances to the profound biblical tradition of understanding the relationship between the limited and the infinite.

Commentaries and Criticism

Dusyanta and Sakuntala have become synonymous with a particular form of social union, that is, marriage by mutual consent without the role of elders. In *Manusmriti* (III.32), *gandharva vivaha* is stated as follows:

> *Icchayanyonyasanyogah kanyayashrcha varasya cha*
> *Gandhatvah sa to vigyeyo maithunyah kamasambhavah*
>
> [The union that is made by the will of the woman *(kanft)* and man *(aura)* in order to realize *kinna* through *maidnaga* (sexual union) is termed *gandharva vivahal*

In *Manusmriti* (III.25), in the eightfold classification of union, *gdndharva* is accepted as conforming to *dharma,* with *asura* and *paisaca* being declared unacceptable.

Wagish Shulda, in his chapter titled 'Love on One's Terms: Perspectives on *Gdndharva Vivaha in AbhormSakuntalane,* explores the classification of Hindu marriages and the need and purpose of the *gandharva vivaha* in the tradition of *Dharmasdsiras in* ancient India. Through a close study of Srimad Ananta Bhatta's *Vidhana Partjat,* Prof. Shukla explores the codification and changes in the institution of marriage from ancient to contemporary India. He locates the Dusyanta-Sakuntala union in this social context and relates it to other such unions in ancient literature like the *Mahabharata.* This chapter goes beyond the well-known positions on the codification of marriage laws in ancient India in stating textual evidences and implications for the narrative of *Abhifultzakikuntalam in* particular, and the narrative of *via*& (marriage) in general.

The *Abhijndnagdkuntalam* of Kalidasa has lent itself to various *tikas* (commentaries) by poets as well as acaryas in Sanskrit. **Radhavallabh Tripathi** states in his chapter titled *`AbhOiana.gdkuntalam* in Indian Hermeneutics' that about 26 commentaries on this play can be identified between the twelfth to nineteenth centuries. He also points out the analyses of acaryas like Anandavardhana, Kuntaka and Abhinavagupta, who minutely assess *AbhinianSakuntalam* in the light of their own poetic theories. In the *tikas,* the names of *tikakdra* (commentator) like Raghavbhatta, Sankarmisra, Katayavema, Abhirama and Srinivasa are well known. Prof. Tripathi's chapter takes the reader through the highlights of the various commentaries so that a clear understanding emerges with respect to the reception of *Abhijndnagakuntalam* in Sanskrit poetical and philosophical worldview.

In Kerala, about eight commentaries on *AbhijndnSdkuntalam* are known. These *includeDinmatradarsanhof Abhirama,Sararlhadipikaof* PariksiittuTampuran and Ramapisaroti, *§-ikandziiyavyaddrydna* of Srilcanthavaria· r, *Gozindabraluniarawcya* of Kuccugovindavariar, *Abhinianasakuntalacarcd, Abhijndnasakuntalatippanii, Abhijnan aiakuntalatikd* and *Anvayabodhini.*'
Godabarisha Mishra, in his chapter 'The Seeker Finds His Self: Reading *Sararthadifyika,* the Advaita Commentary on *Abhjndnagdkuntalam*', discusses *Sararthadipika,* composed in the twentieth century. This commentary on *AbhjndnSdkuntalam* presents the paradigm of a king looking at another king, Pariksfittu Tampuran, the king of Cochin, looking at Dusyanta, the king of Hastinapura, from the paradigm of advaita Vedanta. In this commentary, the journey of Dusyanta is seen as the journey of a spiritual seeker where the experiences of desire, attachment, indulgence, separation and remorse are seen as steps leading to awakening. Prof. Mishra's chapter explores the commentary in detail and relates it to specific symbols and structural resonances in the play to locate it within a tradition of advaita *darsana.*

Varied Grammars of Love

The Mughal court patronized translations of Indian classical works, especially for cultural and imperial interests. In the court of the sixteenth-century king Akbar, a Persian translation of the *Mahabharata* appeared as *Razmnama* (Book of War) in 1582. **Snail Sharma,** in his chapter titled

"Not a Tale, but a Lesson": Persian Translations of Kalidasa's *AbhijnanSakuntalam*% draws our attention to these and other literary relationships between two classical languages, Sanskrit and Persian. He identifies four translations of Kalidasa's play into Persian, brought out in the twentieth century by two Indian writers, one Afghan writer and one Iranian writer. The four translators are Hadi Hasan and Indu Shekhar from India, Ali Asghar Hikmat from Iran and Muhammad Usman Sidqi from Afghanistan (in Dari). Prof. Sharma's comparative study of the four Persian translations looks for intercultural resonances and poetic nuances like the portrayal of Rshi Durvasas as a peer, Rshi Marica as a Sufi master and adding verses of legendary Persian poets like Hafiz and Amir Khusrao. As a journey into a golden world of poetry from another golden world of *kavya,* this paper balances criticism with poetic finesse.

From the colonial period to the mid-twentieth century, *AbhijnanSakuntalam* found itself translated and adapted in the language of Hindustan in poetry, prose and sometimes dramatic forms. Saghar Nizami brought the aesthetic and emotional intensity of Kalidasa in Urdu by presenting a stunning translation in the poetic mode. In his recognition of the civilizational resonances of Kalidasa's nataka in the cultural imaginary of the people of Hindustan, Nizami was able to recreate many of these resonances in a language marked by the exquisite beauty of its verse. The progressive ideology also sought to explore the classic mode, and Akhtar Husain Raipuri and Qudsia Zaidi read *Abhijnansakuntalam* to recreate it with persistent questions of justice, honour and the process of social marginalization. Begum Zaidi in Hindustani theatre merged poetry and drama and prepared *Abhijnansakuntalam* for the audience of modern India. **Khalid Alvi's** chapter, 'Sakuntala in Hindustani: Reading Select Urdu Translations of *Abhijnansakuntalam*% delves into the life of *AbhijnanSakuntalam in* the Hindustani tradition by following through the nineteenth-century to mid-twentieth-century poetic and dramatic translations of this masterpiece in Urdu. His analysis of metre, diction and thematic nuances in the context of the history and evolution of the Urdu ***zaban*** (language) opens up directions for further research in the field, especially in the state of interfaith stalemate and religious straitjacketing of Hindi and Urdu in contemporary India.

Coming from the same poetic tradition, the Nepali language has a history of close association with Sanskrit literature, both sacred and poetic. In Nepali, the name of Mahakavi Laxmi Prasad Devakota is legendary, with a lore and aura surrounding him much like Kalidasa in ancient India. Devakota was an exceptional mind, fluent in many Indian and European languages, with the capability of reciting poetry instantly on request. In his prolific oeuvre, Devakota made remarkable use of Sanskrit ***chhand*** like ***mandakranta (in Nepali Meghadita), bhujangprayat (in Anandashataka)*** and folk ***chhanda*** like ***jhyaure (in Sriamata,*** based on the myth of Persephone, and ***Kunjini,*** a short poem). Devakota's ***Shakunalmahakavya*** in Nepali is an epic poem of ***24 sarga*** (sections). Devakota makes use of ***chhanda*** in his magnum opus, including breathtaking verses in ***bhujangprayaat*** (IV.8) and ***mandakranta chhand*** (XVII.24). Devakota has deployed the well-known Sanskrit ***chhanda,*** alomg milik3-1.2 (e)-1.3

Devakota recreates the ***smriti avarodha*** of Dusyanta in his state of wondering if the woman standing before him is a *svapna* (dream) or *vipana* (waking dream). The 23rd ***sarga*** is outstanding in the detailed presentation of the war between ***daiyas*** and ***devas,*** with Dusyanta releasing his ***sangitashastra*** (weapon-releasing music) at the last moment to win the war. In his chapter on the three different translations by this exceptional writer, 'Dialogue between Two ***Mahakavis:*** Kalidasa and Laxmi Prasad Devkota's Three ***Sakutala' ,Gokul* Sinha** explores the question of what made the genius poetic of Laxmi Prasad Devakota offer three kinds of translations of the same text — two in Nepali and one in English. His chapter is a probe into two rare minds, Kalidasa and Devakota.

On the Stage: Personal Engagements with a Lived Tradition

A play is primarily meant for the stage. *AbhijnanSakuntalam* has found itself being adapted, referred to and translated on the stage — Indian **as** well as European — from the nineteenth century to the present day. From opera, yakshagana and kudiyattam to Parsi theatre and realism, this play has been staged many times for audiences of varying interests. Mohan Rakesh's iconic play A*sadh ka Ek-Din* and Surendra Verma's *.akuntala hi gathi* and *Athvan Singe*' reorient Kalidasa's poetic time and persona in contemporary realistic mode.

In the last section, memoirs and critical reflections on engagement with Kalidasa's play on the modern Indian stage by two veteran actor-scholars, Prof Kamlesh Dutt Tripathi anti Prof. Sreenivas Murthy provide an opportunity for understanding the life of the play on the actual stage. The personal memoir of **Kamlesh Dutt Tripathi, 'Staging** *gcbt-unta* in India: Observations and Reflections', relates the experiences of bringing to the modern stage a classical text. The former president of Kalidasa Academy, Prof Tripathi offers us a glimpse into his lifelong engagement with: akuntala and the challenges and opportunities he faced while recreating it on the Indian stage for a modern audience.

Sreenivas Murthy's chapter, From the Stage to the Classroom: Engagement with *gakuntalr 71,* is an essay reflecting on the veteran theatre artist and teacher's journey with Kalidasa's play on two different but linked platforms for drama the stage and the classroom. Interspersed with personal experience, this rich essay is an exploration of the relationship between a written text and its performance, as well as the pedagogical challenges and innovations necessary for the teaching of drama.

As Kalidasa's masterpiece resists singular interpretation, the essays in the present volume offer us possibilities for exploration and contemplation with the texture and scope of its dramatic narrative. This volume hopes to orient contemporary research on the text towards more engagement with narrate-lagical, parallel psychological, spiritual as well as dramatic dimensions that metaphors, mysticism and the play of memory offer.

Shastri Kalla's claim that Kalidasa's philosophical foundation is that of Kashmir Saivism by saying that Kashmir Saivism is actually another form of gankara's ***advaita Vedanta*** with `Sadagiva, Siva and Sakti' in place of 'Brahman, Purusha and Prakriti'. He also argues that Kalidasa was most influenced by the philosophy of the ***Bhaguadgitir.***

Notes

For the politics of Dravidian nationalism and Shiva siddhanta as theological basis for this, see Timothy Brook and Andre Schmid, ***Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities*** (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 54: 'The major impulse in much of the missionary support for a distinctly Dravidian religion, again, was their antipathy toward Brahmanism and what was considered to be its latest manifestation, neo-Vedantism. Neo-Vedantism by the late nineteenth century in

South India had come to be considered by many Christian missionaries and Dravidian ideologues as the new liberal face of a resurgent Brahmanism in India.'

See Saswati Scngupta and Sharmila Purkayastha, 'When the King Is the Subject: The Play of Power in Kalidasa's ***Abhijilanagakuntalam';*** and Decpika Tandon, The Many Mothers of ***AbhOlanagabmialain:*** Constructing, Celebrating and Confining Motherhood', in Saswati Sengupta and Deepika Tandon (eds), ***Revisiting Abharzagakuntalam: Loae, Lineage and Language in Kididizsa's Nataka*** (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2011). In ***The Ring of Truth: Myths of Sex and jeurby*** (New Delhi: Speaking Tiger Books, 2018), Wendy Doniger argues that Kalidasa offered the excuse of a 'magic ring' in order to cover up the erotic and exploitative nature of the king (emphasis added).

Another name of Siva is***.smarahara,*** 'destroyer of ***smam*** (Kamadeva)'. The destruction of ***smara*** for Dusyanta works as a blessing by Siva as only by destroying the impressions of the mortal world can a seeker awaken to truth which is love in its purest essence.

> `tasya saptadha prantabhumih pragya', ***Yogasutra,*** 11.27 (Swami Vivekananda, ***Patanjali Yoga Sutras).***

'To the Tantric, the whole universe is the child of the Mother-Father. As the great Kalidasa wrote, "Everything that exists runs with the golden love juices of Shiva and Shakti, and is bathed in the perfumes that stream from their naked glory"' Andrew Harvey and Karuna Erickson, ***Heart Yoga: The Sacred Marriage of Yoga and Mysticism*** (North Atlantic Books, 2010), 141. The authors make a strong claim for tantric epistemology in Kalidasa's worldvicw but do not give the source for this quote. Surcsh Banerjee in A ***Brief History of Tantra literature*** (Koukata: Naya Prokash, 1988) says, Tantra is sometimes used to denote governance. Kalidasa uses the expression prajah tantrayitva (having governed the subjects) in the Abhijiianagakuntalam (V5)', accessed at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tantra (See below for adapted entries) <>

`There cannot be one road to the heart of so great a mystery.' These were the words spoken by the Roman senator Symmachus when pagan temples were being mercilessly pulled down by early Christians. These words come to mind when writing about Kalidasa's *AbhijnanSakuntalam,* a multifaceted masterpiece lending itself to diverse and diametrically opposite interpretations as a literary text and to a whole variety of theatrical uses ranging from Yakshagana to Russian ballet.

T S. Eliot (in 'What Is a Classic') identifies two important characteristics of a classic: the maturity of manners and the maturity of idiom. In the whole of Western literary tradition, he could discover just one work that could fit this definition: Virgil's *Aeneid.* Even Homer and Shakespeare were denied the status of a classic. Frank Kermode (in T. *S. Eliot Memorial Lectures on The Classic)* found Eliot's definition too imperialistic and gave a more liberalist definition. According to him, a classic is characterized by patience with respect to time. Put another way, classics endure the changes of time. We can add that classics also endure the change of space for they travel freely from culture to culture. Neither time nor space can fade their infinite beauty. Whichever of the above definitions of the classic we choose, *AbhijnanSakuntalam fits* it. Among other things, this play is about patience — about how the heroine endures the hard blows of the man-made world.

In the two classical traditions of India, neither ancient Tamil nor Sanskrit poetics consider art to be the vehicle of any philosophy. Both of them agree that art experience is non-ideological. *Dhvani,* the heart of poetry, is anything but philosophy — something which, according to Abhinavagupta, flashes forth in the mind of the *sahrdaya. It* is also described as *anuranana* or resonance.

Sakunialarn is an echo chamber of innumerable resonances resonating with each other and with something much more fundamental.

This chapter attempts to follow some of these resonances through Saiva symbols and ***prayabhijnadarsana.*** Let us begin with *nandiskka* as a convention of dramatic poetry.

When transmuted by the touch of a master, conventions transcend their conventionality. For example, many Jaina kavyas in Prakrit apply the technique of ***bhavavali*** or tracing the story through several incarnations of the characters. However, the great Kannada poet Pampa uses the same technique in his ***AdiPurana as a*** means of exploring different nuances of man-woman relationship, redeeming the convention of its mechanical nature. Though coming from a totally different culture, the Japanese novelist Yukio Mishima employs the same technique equally adeptly in his most ambitious novel ***The Sea of Fertility. Nandisloka*** too is a convention in traditional playwriting. In Kalidasa's hands, it becomes profoundly meaningful.

All the extant plays by Kalidasa begin with invocations to Siva. This is how he describes and prays to Siva at the beginning of ***Malavikagnimitram:***

> *Ekaishwarye sthitopi prantabahuphale yah swayamkrittivasah*
> *Kantasammishradehopyavishayamanasam yah purastada yatmam Ashtabhiryasya kritsanam*
> *jagadapi tanubhirvibhrato nabhimanah Sanmargaalokanaya vyapanayatu sa vastamaseem*
> *vrittimeeshah*
>
> [May the lord who, though enjoying absolute sovereignty from which result many blessings to his votaries, yet himself wears an elephant hide who, although united in body with his beloved, yet excels the ascetics whose minds are free from (the pleasure of) senses, in whom there is no pride, although with his eightfold forms he sustains the universe - may he remove your state of ignorance that you may behold the right way]

Here, the poet is focusing on the overt contradictions in the nature of the deity. The description, though interesting, does not express any deep insight into Siva's nature. It concludes with a very simple prayer for wisdom. This sets the tone of *Makulkagnimitrant,* which, though a well-written play in the context of Sanskrit romantic comedy, provides no penetrating insight into the working of the soul or nature. Agnimitra, the protagonist, is more like the Dusyanta of the first three acts of ***AbhjanSakuntalam.*** He is driven by one goal to capture one beloved. The action is directed towards this denouement, but it has few resonances.

The ***nanelisloka*** of ***Vikramovarsheeya*** strikes a different note:

> *Vedanteshu yamahurekapurusham vyapya sthitam rodasi Yasminishvara ityananyavishayahah*
> *shabdo yatharthaksharah*
> *Antaryaschch mumukshubhirniyamitapranadibhirinrigyate Sa sthanuh sthirabhaktiyog-asulabho nih*
> *shreyayasayastu vah*
>
> [May the eternal one who is attainable by firm faith and meditation; who is hailed as the supreme spirit in the Vedanta, who pervades and is present in the whole of heaven and earth; to whom alone the name of the lord, not signifying any other being, is properly applied; and who is sought within themselves by those desirous of salvation by restraining the vital breath pram and others, bestow upon you the highest bliss.]

The emphasis here is on the immanence of the deity. It is interesting that Kalidasa invokes the philosophy of Vedanta at this point, for, according to Vedanta, the supreme spirit has only the principle of *prakasha* (self-illumination) but not the principle of *vimarsha* (self-awareness). This precisely is the substance of Sankara's *advaita,* which is now projected as the high hallmark of Indian spiritual thought. But this theory was criticized by the exponents of the Sivadvaita school of Kashmir,

for, as they argued, *param Siva,* who is only *prakasha* and not *vimarsha, is jada* (lifeless). The first sloka of *Saundagalahari* says,

Sivah shaktyayukto yadi bhavati shaktah prabhavitum.

[Siva can influence things only when accompanied by Sakti, that *is, Vimarsha.]*

In the opening *sloka, Siva* is described in the sense of `sthanu', which suggests stillness, when devoid of Sakti. The most memorable poetry in this play is an expression of *vipralamba sringara* — Pururava's longing for Urvasi. The echoes of this intense love poetry are heard centuries later in the Vachanas of a littleknown great twelfth-century Kannada saint poet, Gajesha Masanaiah, and in *Nam:a Italia, a* magnificent work of spiritual love poetry by the early twentiethcentury Kannada poet Madhurachenna. *Prakasha* devoid of *vimarsha is Siva* separated from Sakti — something appositional to the hero pulled apart from his beloved. This state corresponds to the situation of Dusyanta in the middle of *Saur:141am,* which also centres on *vipralamba sringara.*

Let us now look at the Nandit loka of AbhijnanSakuntalam:

> *Ya srishtih srashturadhya vahati vidhihutam ya havirya cha hotri Ye dve kalam viddhattah srutivishayaguna yasthita vyapya vishvain Yamahuh sarvabeejaprakritiriti yaya praninah pranavantah Pratyakshabhih prapannastanubhiravatu vastabhirashtaabhirtshah*
>
> [That which is the first creation of the creator; that which bears the offering made according to due rites; that which is the offerer; those two which make time; that which pervades all space, having for its quality what is perceived by the ear; that which is the womb of all seeds; that by which all living beings breathe; endowed with these eight visible forms, may the supreme lord protect you!]

From the *dvaita* view of Siva at the beginning of the first play through the incomplete advaitic view of the second, Kalidasa has now moved towards the Saivadvaitic understanding of the deity. There is again a recounting of the eight bodies of Siva, but the Siva described here is neither a bundle of opposites nor still and self-absorbed, but a principle that permeates all life forms and elements. The *slaka* begins with *srishli* and concludes with the invocation of protection. Siva, the meaning of meanings here, is not just still and hidden but manifest and active in *Pratyaksha,* the directly perceivable. The poet's understanding of the deity has deepened. So has his understanding of love and human condition in the last and conclusive expression of his art.

Let us trace the resonances of the *nandilloka* through different parts of the play. The sea change that Kalidasa effected in the character of Dunranta when compared to the depiction in his source, the `Shalcuntalopalchyanam' of the *Mahaharata,* has often been pointed out. However, the sea change is effected not in the beginning but in the course of the play. Du§yanta's initial association with the hunter and Sakuntala's frequent association with the deer are also conspicuous. But the hunter-king is pulled through Pururavalike pangs of separation until he bows down in shame to his one-time quarry Sakuntala in the last act. Du§yanta's final capitulation is the capitulation of all the male values that he and his society represent. In the first act, when Dunranta first sees Sakuntala he sees her as a warrior and then as an observer, but at the end of the play he is an involved and chastened participant in love. Aakuntala is no more the quarry but the nurturer of Sarvadamana who sports with lions — another replica of what his father was at the beginning of the play.

Purusha, according to Sankhya and Vedanta positions, is the observing witness—consciousness, but *Siva Sutra, a* Sivadvaita text, reverses these roles. It says that the *nartakabna— the* soul, that is, Purusha — is the dancer. It adds that the Indriya — that is, the senses — are the observers. Senses are associated by Vedanta and Sankhya with Prakriti (which is feminine). This dance of Purusha, the scripture says, takes place in the theatre of the heart — *chlitamrangam.*

As Dusyanta evolves from a robust he-man into a complete male human being reunited with Sakuntala, she has also progressed from the passive, vegetative, deer-like girl of Kativashrama into a full-fledged woman receiving her beloved husband back. She is no more the observed; by forgiving Du§yanta, she has transcended the dualism of the observer and the observed and become a participant in love. The background of the hero and heroine also keeps changing in keeping with their successive stages of growth. Kanva's ashram is headed by *a brahmacluiri.* The palace and the city where the rejection takes place is its opposite. It is a world presided over by a polygamous king and his quixotic subjects — the bribe-seeking policemen, for instance. But the play culminates in the ashram of Kasyapa, where man and woman,yoga and *bhoga,* are reconciled. The reconciliation takes place after Dusyanta has returned from the heavenly world of Indra and before he reaches back to his palace and city. Bharata has laid down that *naya* is the expression of *Triloka.* The concluding part of *Sakuntalam* is located right at the heart of the three worlds between heaven and earth. Though the lost ring is recovered, it is of no use anymore. Unceremoniously but politely, Sakuntala returns the symbol *(Abhijikina)* to Dusyanta.

It is when Sarvadamana confuses the reference to *Shakunta Pakshi* — the peacock — for Sakuntala that Dusyanta recognizes him as his son. The word *Shakunta* is important in this context. This brings to mind the very important metaphor for creation found in Sivadvaita texts. It is called *Mayurandanyaya.* Just as the glorious plumes of the peacock are contained in a peacock egg, the most splendid physical universe is contained in Siva, the substratum and the substance of both being and becoming. Interestingly enough, the same image recurs in the cosmogenic concepts of the nomadic tribe of Sind Madigas of Karnataka and Andhra. Sakuntala is like nature, not just the peacock egg representing the potential, but the active dynamic participant in becoming —exactly like Siva involved in the *nandisloka.*

Let us now follow these resonances to what appears as the basic resonance. The myth and legends about some of the Vedic sages express an intense conflict between *yoga* and *bhoga.* This is re-enacted in many ways in Buddhism and Jainism. According to *Mahaparinibbanasutta,* the Blessed One — he is the blessed one because he has shunned all pleasures — points out poetry and performances in particular. But immediately after his passing away, the Malla kings of Kushinara organize a fortnight-long *mela* of shows and performances in honour of the departed sage. This irony is echoed in the play by Yukio Mishima centring on the building of the temple at Angkor Vat in Cambodia. The king intends the temple to be the symbol of his spiritual essence, but the spirit vanishes. Only the immortal body of the temple survives jeering at the mortal soul. The polarity between excesses associated with the usual practice of *tantra* and the masochistic excesses of different brands of asceticism in Indian culture is the reflection of the same conflict.

In Kalidasa's world, at least in the world of *AbkinanSakuntalam,* to quote a line from Yeats, 'the body is not bruised to pleasure the soul'. It is a perception that is suggested in *nandisloka* and resonating in every part of the play. The body and the soul, the manifest and the hidden, *yoga* and *bhoga, Prakriti* and *Purusha,* male and female, the play of these opposites, which is the dance of Siva, is contained in *AbhjnanSakuntalam,* like the cosmos in the egg of *Shakunta* doned child fathered by Vigvamitra, whose life is an arena of intense conflict between the flesh and the spirit. He is the one who built ***Trishanku Swarga,*** a precarious paradise between earth and sky. When Sakuntala first sees

Dusyanta, she is shocked by the feelings aroused in her. Durvasas's curse is occasioned by anger, which is also an expression of the dualism of ***yoga*** and ***bhoga,*** but the conflict is perceived now from the vantage point of complementarities. After their reunion, Dusyanta and Sakuntala come across a great ascetic in whose long matted hair birds have laid their eggs as a reminder of the inescapable interdependence between asceticism on the one hand and fertility of nature and life on the other. The famous Kannada critic Keertinatha Kurtakoti ventures the guess that this hoary ascetic is none other than Sakuntala's father Visvamitra, whose asceticism is again culminating in birth suggested by eggs.

The reconciliation attained through ***Sakuntalam*** is akin to the experience of Siva-hood described in Sivadvaita. The Sivadvaitic understanding of spirituality is very different from that of Saiva or Vaishnava Bhakti schools of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, which dominated the medieval period. It is not the absorption in Siva to the exclusion of the world. A great deal of Bhakti poetry of Basavanna, Tukaram and Kabir is about the conflicting pulls of flesh and spirit, also a leitmotif in many Jaina kavyas. But Sivadvaita ideal is the awareness that one moves from Siva, through Siva, towards Siva — a unity which does not conflict with but complements multiplicity. The unity accommodating and embracing diversity perceived in Sivadvaita philosophy and expressed aesthetically by Kalidasa is perhaps the most glorious moment in the history of Indian culture where exception to this reconciliation is the rule. Yet another classic, which effected a similar reconciliation, is Jayadeva's ***Gilagovinda,*** which also depicts how the polygamous hero Kt-stia ultimately acquiesces to Radha, who is monogamously attached to him. Another point of similarity is that in both these works, the hero and the heroine are not married in the formal sense. However, ***Gitagovinda*** has more overt religious symbolism, whereas ***Abhijnrmagakuntalam*** expresses the same content in a more universal and human way. In ***Abhijnana.qnkuntalam,*** a deep spiritual awareness flows like an invisible undercurrent. In other words, the spiritual substratum is the ***dhvani*** of the whole text. Therefore, spirituality is hardly ever expressly indicated in the play. To illustrate this point, let us consider the first meeting of Dusyanta and Sakuntala.

In the first act of ***AbhinianSakuntalam,*** Sakuntala is being followed by ***a brhamar*** (bumblebee) and Dusyanta uses this opportunity to offer his chivalry in rescuing her from the incessant humming in an evocative build-up to ***Iringara.*** The reference to ***brhamar*** also occurs in the context of Kamadeva in ***ICunzarasambhava, as*** indicative of the centredness of the bee in sucking honey.

In Surdas's *brahamargeet,* when Uddhava brings the message of *nirguna brahma* and tries to explain the metaphor of Krsna's multifaceted love in terms of formless love, the *gopis* sarcastically address *a brhamar* and question his sense of love. They say,

> Rahu re madhukar madhumatware
> Kaun kaajyanirgun, chirjeevhamare
>
> [Oh, you bee, filled with the stupor of honey, what use have we of this nirguna, may our /Kanha live long]

The evocation of the bee finds resonance in spiritual literature and love poetry in various ways. In Indian devotional literature, the metaphor of the guru/ deity's feet as a lotus and the lover/devotee as *a brhamar* is recurrent. This metaphor can be appreciated in the light of seeing the *brhamar as* a symbol of the human mind, which is restless and inconstant by nature. The *brhamar* that sucks from many flowers (as the *gopis* chastise) when centred on the lotus becomes a symbol of love and devotion. In the above lines, the conflict between *saguna* and *nirguna,* form and formless, bodily love and soul love, is highlighted through the metaphor of the bee. The bee is *matwara,* drunk in love of honey; he is the symbol for complete devotion. At the same time in the following lines, the *gopis* admonish the bee for sucking honey from various flowers while they have remained only dedicated

to one man, Kma. The tension and eventual reconciliation between form and the formless, and polygamous and monogamous love, are carried forth poetically by this charged metaphor.

In this image, it is also possible to find the resonance of *brhamari pranayama* in yoga. In *Hathayogapradipika, brhamari* is delineated as a yogic practice that emits the humming of the male bee in inhalation and that of the female bee in exhalation.

> athabhramart
> *veghadghoshamporakarpbh?nggha-nadarri*
> *bh?ngght-nadarrirechakarrunanda-mandam*
> *yoghtndrakiamevamabliyasa-yoghach*
> *chittejatakachidananda-hla*
>
> [By filling the air with force, making noise like *Bhringi* (wasp), and expelling it slowly, making noise in the same way; this practice causes a sort of ecstasy in the minds of Yogindras.]

In meditation, the humming or buzzing sound of ***pram*** emanates from the heart chakra. The rhythmic pattern of male and female humming energy is paralleled in the ***purusha/ prakriti*** paradigm in ***AbhijnanSakuntalam.*** Dusyanta and Sakuntala complement and complete each other, and together they reach a state of yogic centredness. The disruption of the union between Dusyanta and Sakuntala due to the curse is therefore extremely disturbing because it indicates the disruption of the natural harmony between ***purusha*** and ***prakriti,*** the body and soul, without which the human consciousness is bound to drown. The ***brhamar's*** humming follows Sakuntala, who, at this stage, is unaware of her own potential. Dusyanta, too, is caught in false bravado and has not yet undergone the spiritual test by fire that is made possible by Durvasas's curse. As a yogic breathing exercise, the ***brhamar*** is indicating the disciplining that is needed to be undertaken by Sakuntala and Du§yanta in order to attain the state of harmony that is nothing but love. Akkamahadevi, a twelfth-century mystic, describes this state of disruption as ***Vingadavikalavasthe'*** (disharmony with linga). Linga here means the cosmic One, and this disruption is a phase that lovers have to pass through. Akkamahadevi has another evocative term, ***Thennamallikarjunana agalikooduvasukha'*** (the joy of separating from and uniting with Chennamallikarjuna). This is the state between ***vipralamba*** (separation) and ***sambhog*** (union), and it is not a purely negative state. In this light, let us deliberate on the role of the curse and curser in ***AbhijnanSakuntalam.***

Wagish Shukla has pointed out how Matsyendranath follows in the lineage of Durvasas as a proponent of the ***pratyabhijaadarsana.***[5] In the play, Matsyendranath's presence can be registered in the story of the fish which swallows the ring. Matsyendranath's birth is associated with the legend of his being swallowed by a fish in whose belly he overheard the yogic *gyan* (knowledge) that Siva imparted to Parvati, and he emerged out of the fish's belly as ***a siddha*** (enlightened one). In the play, it is he who completes his master's call by making the token (the ring) available later for Dusyanta's Self to contemplate on himself and his Oneness with ***param*** Siva.

In some readings, the curse becomes a subplot,' necessary for highlighting ***vipralamba*** (separation) and ***sambhog*** (union), necessary aspects of ***rati*** (love). It is unclear how in the light of the following elements can one relegate the curse and the ring to a subplot ***(if*** *maa* is subplot at all, as in Gerow): the fate of Sakuntala that has been mentioned at the beginning of the play, the throbbing in the arms of Dusyanta as ***a vibhava*** of ***adbhuta rasa*** before he meets Sakuntala, the lineage of Durvasas and ***tagambakas,*** Durvasas's cursing of Rama and Sita to suffer ***vipralamba (in Uttararamcharita),*** the anxiety felt by Dusyanta on hearing Hamsavati's song of separation and forgetting, the *pratyabhijna* (recognition) of eternal love through the ring and the divine union of the lovers. The effects of *aipralarnba* are evident enough in Sakuntala's forgetfulness on Durvasas's arrival, and *sambhog* could

have easily followed in the plot, had the intention of the poet been merely to depict these two stages in love.

Similarly, Oldenberg could not see the relationship between R*shi* Durvasas as the principal sage of *pratyabhijnadarsana* and the central philosophy' in the play. He considered his entry into the play as that of an outsider who is in no way connected to the actual plot.

What is it then that hurls the lovers in any possible sorrow? A fault of Sakuntala's, who had forgotten her duty in her love? The gentle hint of such a fault is indeed there; the poet as a matter of fact precisely repeats, without making it more intense, the old motive employed by the epic poetry for innumerable times. The one chosen to suffer (lit. for sorrow) has given himself a vanishing little scope and the curse of an angered sage hits him. Now this sage has his stand fully outside the drama. He comes — one does not know from where. He disappears —one does not know where. The effect of the curse settles itself on Dusyanta also, the faultless and unsuspecting who had no idea (of the same): what he does, is no more his action, does not come out of his soul. *The blind accident then is added to the curse as* [...] The most charming tale flatters the phantasy of the hearers. [emphasis added]

`The blind accident' that involves the loss of the ring and its discovery in the belly of the fish - when seen in the light of Saivism, *tanira,* and the lineage and legends around Durvasas and Matsyendranath — appears as a careful and subtle interweaving of philosophy and narrative. For a critic who does not know of the living tradition," these incidents will be merely 'accidents' because they do not fit in with a certain notion of plot and narrative. The understanding of plot, as pointed out by D. R. Nagaraj, is an extension of an individual's perception of reality and phenomena around him. When Oldenberg makes his statement, or when Walter Ruben points to his disease with the curse and fate in the text:

> Durvasas is the mythical incarnation of the troublesome begging Brahman. He distributes curses immediately if he is not suitably received as a guest. Religious beggars were at that time a curse upon the land. Wise Bralunans should be calm, self controlled. But this hasty fellow is introduced by the poet in order not to allow Sakuntala's fault to appear too great. She is to blame in not welcoming Dusyanta in a fitting manner on account of her shyness, and Durvasas on account of her preoccupation with her love. King Dusyanta is at the same time excused for forgetting his beloved, since he was fated to forget.

These opinions betray a different perception of reality, one that follows principles of causality and logic. From a Christian theistic world view, this relationship between *a rshi, param Siva* and two lovers must seem odd. Therefore, Durvasas's entry appears to be random and without a proper cause to a critic like Ruben. However, what these critics have failed to note is the ancestry of Sage Durvasas, his relationship to *,qaiva siddlianta* and the resonances of *prayabhOla* in the play. The visit of a sage to a hermitage seems the most natural thing, and his lineage that goes down to the *tryambakas* makes his role in the play's text integral and important. The sage Durvasas is believed to be an incarnation of Siva, and his anger is representative of the power of *raudra,* an integral aspect of Siva. From Durvasas, the line comes down to Matsyendranath, who then passes his knowledge to Gorakhnatha as *a siddha.* In the theology of the *nalha samprada9Pa,* Durvasas is mentioned as the *adiguru* of Matsyendranath." In *AbhinianSakuntalam,* Kalidasa added the episode of the fish and the rediscovery of the ring, not to merely not allow `Sakuntala's fault to appear too great', or as a subplot to highlight the dual aspects of *rati,* but with a definite philosophical structure in mind. Sage Durvasas's anger with Sakuntala's forgetfulness is an important reminder of the excesses of mortal love." His curse comes just in time to bring Sakuntala back on the path of eternal love, as her *cilia* (consciousness) was overcome with mortal longing, thereby reducing the power and possibilities in their mutual love. His curse leads to a suppression of mortal memory and it is through the psycho-

emotional state which the curse creates in Dusyanta and Sakuntala that the lovers are able to overcome mortal limitations and realize eternal love. Durvasas's curse is completed by his disciple Matsyendranath, who emerges as the fish that swallows the token of *pralyabhifila.* He makes it available to the seeker (Dusyanta) and through the curse and the ring, an eternal memory is evoked that leads to the ultimate union for the lovers. In *prayabkdia* theology, a token often in the form of an external object (or impression) leads to evocation of timeless memory and thereby the desired state of re-cognition with *parani Siva.* It is not too difficult to see how Kalidasa has involved the tokenistic ring with this intent in the text, wherein the discovery of the ring leads to the disappearance of the curse and evocation of timeless memory for Dusyanta, who re-cognizes his devotion to Sakuntala, and together they complete the divine principle of Oneness. The legend of Vidyottama showing one finger to which Kalidasa replies with two fingers in a theological interpretation gains much meaning in the context of *Abhi,nlana.gnkuntalam.* From one to two and then back to one is the spiritual structure of this text. Dusyanta and Sakuntala, who are essentially one (as Siva-Sakti), are manifested in this phenomenal world as two separate individuals; when their individual subjectivities are surrendered, they re-cognize each other as being essentially one. Thus the curse, the token and the ultimate union of the lovers on the meeting point of earth and sky (worldly and divine) are not merely plots (or subplots) but integral elements of Kalidasa's theology.

Legends proclaim that Kalidasa was the *dasa* of Kali and a devout Saivite." There are legends about him and Vidyottama that establish their combined devotion to Ma Kali and Kalidasa's benediction by Ma Sarasvati. Legend says that it was Vidyottama's humiliation of Kalidasa that led to his devotion to scholarship. What is interesting in this structure is the possibility that it was out of a relationship with a powerful woman that the man was able to overcome the limitations of masculinity that bound him to workaday concerns of the mortal world.' The rebuke by a woman in the narrative of Kalidasa becomes his initiation into the immortal world of wisdom and devotion." The role of Vidyottama in the poetics and theology of Kalidasa has often been ignored. She is normally portrayed as a conceited woman whose pride needed to be tamed. Her role is also limited to merely insulting Kalidasa and showing him the door. However, her involvement with Kalidasa's poetry is profound and inseparable. It has not often been mentioned that Vidyottama and Kalidasa together prayed to Ma Kali and, satisfied with their devotion, the goddess blessed her husband by marking his tongue with the wisdom of the *bijaskshara mantra* of Sarasvati." Kalidasa continued his prayers and reached the state of receiving the benediction of Ma Kali. Kalidasa's return to his wife is also marked with the beginning verses of his three great *kavyas: Kunzarasambhava, Meghaduta* and *Raghuvamsha.* Vidyottama is believed to have edited Kalidasa's works (especially *Kunzarasambhava),* and as a devotee, she undertook a pilgrimage to Mount Kailash after the completion of this work."

Of importance in these legendary aspects of their relationship, one can identify the paradigm of male/female as Siva/Sakti and the incompleteness of one without the other. It is Vidyottama's inherent spiritual energy that uncovers the veil of foolishness, a symbol of entrapment in the limited, mortal world that hung over Kalidasa till he met her. The *purusha* is freed of all constraints, symbolically represented by him leaving home (and marital domesticity), only to be joined by a woman, who is the preserver and initiator (as *prakrih).* When the two are united, the benediction of Ma Kali follows and *auidya* (limited knowledge) is replaced by *vidya* (knowledge). In the Sivapuranic tradition, the legend of Bhringi is evocative of the same principle of Oneness. Bhringi, being devoted only to Siva, rejected the female principle by refusing to bow down to Parvati. This resulted in him being cursed so that he was left with only a leg. When he still refused to accept Ma Parvati, he was cursed further so that only his bones and nerves remained while his flesh and bones disappeared. In tantric tradition, the solid parts of the body, that is, bones and nerves, are identified with the male principle while the soft parts of the body, that is, flesh and blood, are identified with the female principle.

Bhringi realized his mistake, repented and was then blessed with three legs. The knowledge of Oneness came to him after his experience of the absence of one half of the cosmic principle through the curse. In ***Abhijnanagathuntalemz,*** through the curse, the knowledge of Oneness and essential wholeness come to both Dusyanta and Sakuntala. In this process, both the man and the woman have to undergo suffering, as is normal in the paradigm of mystic journey. From a suppression of apparent reality, an eternal reality awakens, as also happens due to the curse in ***AbhijnanSakuntalam.*** It is therefore important that we bear in mind Kalidasa's theology that does not ignore the power of the feminine principle in his conception of Oneness with the Supreme Reality. In ***Abhcarmagakuntalam*** one sees this mysticism and vision of Oneness of Kalidasa being represented in the story of Du§yanta and Sakuntala.

Following this realization and reconciliation, it is no wonder that Kalidasa prayed to Siva to put an end to his rebirth:

> *Pravartatarn prakrdhitaya parthivah saraswati shrutimahato mahryatarn*
> *Mamapi cha kshapayatu nilalohitah punarbhavam parigata saktiratmabhuh*
>
> [Let kings work for the welfare of the world, let Sarasvau, the goddess of wisdom, be adored in the world. As for me, O Neelalohitah (Siva), destroy my rebirths. 0 self born, free though surrounded by Saltti.]

In the ***nandisloka*** of ***AbhijnanSakuntalam,*** Kalidasa invokes the eight ***murtis*** (deity forms) of Siva. It is to be noted that he uses the word `hotrf (instead of `hotra') in the feminine gender. In the beginning is a prayer for benediction and protection to Siva immanent in eight deity forms. By the end, the poet's surrender is complete in praying for freedom from the cycle of birth and death. This is a prayer to end further desire and consequent prayer. The play concludes with invocation to Siva, who is free in spite of being embraced by all Saktis. Sivadvaita says that after the attainment of Siva-hood even if one is in the physical body and in the world, alive and active, one is already free. Aldcamahadevi says, 'If you can pull out the serpent's fangs and play with it, the serpent's company is good. If you can understand the construction of the body, the body's company is good. Like the mother turned into a she-monster, is the body's deformation. Do not say, Oh! Chennamallikarjuna! Those loved by you have a body.' After all, the ascetic and the lover contained in each other as in the cosmos are contained in the peacock egg after which the heroine is named. <>

AËTIANA (1996–2020) THE 5 PART SERIES:

Aetius, the 1st–2nd-century CE philosopher is now restored as the doxographer and Eclectic philosopher of note. This meticulous effort of painstaking scholarship will server future generations of historians of classical ancient philosophy for much of the rest of this century. The work of reconstruction and text of the *Placita* of Aëtius to move it from a secondary corrupted source to an primary source of the content and arguments of the presocratics through middle Platonism with enough assured evaluation as to significantly alter the textbooks about philosophical opinions and development.

The present edition reviewed here is Part V includes reconstruction and commentary of the text of the *Placita* of Aëtius has been a very long time in the making. In the case of Jaap Mansfeld, its origins go as far back as the research he did on ps.Hippocrates De hebdomadibus in the late 1960's. David Runia first came into contact with doxographical texts when analysing Philo of Alexandria's puzzling work De aeternitate mundi in the late 1970's. We made the decision to work together on the Aëtian Placita in 1989 and the project entitled Aëtiana: the Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer' was born. The present volume consisting of four parts is the project's culmination.

Four preparatory volumes (in five parts) have preceded it and are noted below with contents. Go to main review and evaluation for Aetius V.

Aëtiana: I (ISBN: 9789004105805, 1996),
Aëtius: II (Parts 1 & 2; set ISBN 9789004172067; 2008),
Aëtius: III (ISBN 9789004180413; 2009),
Aëtius: IV (ISBN: 9789004361454, 2018),
Aëtius: V (Parts 1-4)(ISBN: 9789004428386 set)
See review below for Aetius V below

An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita with a Commentary and a Collection of Related Texts edited by Jaap Mansfeld and Douwe (David) Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Brill]

Aëtiana The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, Volume I, The Sources by Jaap Mansfeld and Douwe (David) Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 73, Brill, 9789004105805]

In 1879 the young German scholar Hermann Diels published his celebrated *Doxographi Graeci*, (in which the major doxographical works of antiquity are collected and analysed). Diels' results have been foundational for the study of ancient philosophy ever since.
In their ground-breaking study the authors focus on the doxographer Aëtius, whose work Diels reconstructed from various later sources. First they examine the antecedents of Diels' Aëtian hypothesis. Then Diels' theory and especially the philological techniques used in its formulation are subjected to detailed analysis. The remainder of the volume offers a fresh examination of the sources for our knowledge for Aëtius. Diels' theory is revised and improved at significant points. Subsequent volumes will examine the contents and methods of the doxographer and his antecedents in earlier Greek philosophy.
No scholar concerned with the history of ancient philosophy can afford to ignore this study.

Contents
Preliminary material
The Aëtius Hypothesis Before and Up to Diels
The Theory of Diels' Doxographi Graeci
The Sources for Aëtius: Ps.Plutarch And His Tradition
The Sources for Aëtius: Johannes Stobaeus
The Sources for Aëtius: Theodoret

Aëtiana II (2 vols.) Volume One: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer. Volume Two: The Compendium by Jaap Mansfeld and Douwe (David) Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 114, Brill, Hardback: 9789004172067; E-Book (PDF): 9789047425373]

The theme of this study is the Doxography of problems in physics from the Presocratics to the early first century BCE attributed to Aëtius. Part I focuses on the argument of the compendium as a whole, of its books, of its sequences of chapters, and of individual chapters, against the background of Peripatetic and Stoic methodology. Part II offers the first full reconstruction in a single unified text of Book II, which deals with the cosmos and the heavenly bodies. It is based on extensive analysis of the relevant witnesses and includes listings of numerous doxographical-dialectical parallels in other ancient writings. This new treatment of the evidence supersedes Diels' still dominant source-critical approach, and will prove indispensable for scholars in ancient philosophy.

Aëtiana III: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, Volume 3, Studies in the Doxographical Traditions of Ancient Philosophy by Jaap Mansfeld and Douwe (David) Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 118, Brill, Hardback: 9789004180413; E-Book (PDF): 9789004193239]

Ancient doxography, particularly as distilled in the work on problems of physics by Aëtius, is a vital source for our knowledge of early Greek philosophy up to the first century BCE. But its purpose and method, and also its wider intellectual context, are by no means easy to understand. The present volume contains 19 essays written between 1989 and 2009 in which the authors grapple with various aspects of the doxographical tradition and its main representatives. The essays examine the origins of the doxographical method in the work of Aristotle and Theophrastus and also provide valuable insights into the works of other authors such as Epicurus, Chrysippus, Lucretius, Cicero, Philo of Alexandria and Seneca. The collection can be read as a companion collection to the two earlier volumes of Aëtiana published by the two authors in this series.

Aëtiana IV Papers of the Melbourne Colloquium on Ancient Doxography edited: Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 148, Brill, Hardback: 789004361454; E-Book (PDF): 97890043614 61]

The articles collected here are based for the most part on papers read at the Colloquium "The *Placita* of Aëtius: Foundations for the Study of Ancient Philosophy," held in Melbourne in December 2015. The *Placita*, a first century CE collection of systematically organised tenets in natural philosophy ranging from first principles to human physiology is incompletely extant in several later sources. Its laborious reconstruction and the identity of its author are discussed from various angles. The text of the treatise is further elucidated by a novel statistical exploration of what is extant and what is missing. Its relation to various currents in the history of Greek philosophy and its reliability are also examined in some detail.

Aëtiana V (4 vols.) An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita with a Commentary and a Collection of Related Texts edited by Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia

[Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 153, Brill, Hardcover: 9789004428386 E-Book (PDF): 9789004428409]

A new reconstruction and text of the *Placita* of Aëtius (ca. 50 CE), accompanied by a full commentary and an extensive collection of related texts. This compendium, arguably the most important doxographical text to survive from antiquity, is known through the intensive use made of it by authors in later antiquity and beyond. Covering the entire field of natural philosophy, it has long been mined as a source of information about ancient philosophers and their views. It now receives a thorough analysis as a remarkable work in its own right. This volume is the culmination of a five-volume set of studies on Aëtius (1996–2020): Aëtiana I (ISBN: 9789004105805, 1996), II (Parts 1&2; set ISBN 9789004172067; 2008), III (ISBN 9789004180413; 2009), IV (ISBN: 9789004361454, 2018), and V (Parts 1-4). It uses an innovative methodology to replace the seminal edition of Hermann Diels (1879).

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Appendix List of Chapter Headings in the Translation of Qus ibn L'q in: **A'TIANA V (4 VOLS.)** translated from German into English

The oldest of the three mss. of Q used by Daiber in his edition, Ẓāhirīya (Damascus) 4871, dated to 1161 CE, contains a translation of the indices of the five books. Unlike in the Greek mss. all the headings have been assembled together in a single list and are not distributed at the beginning of the individual books. Daiber did not include this initial list in his edition and translation of Q, but he has kindly provided the editors with a translation, which we print in this Appendix.

This is the book of Plutarchos on the scientific views that the philosophers represented.
There are five treatises.
The first treatise. 30 chapters.
What is nature?
What is the difference between the principle and the element?
About the principles and what they are?
How did the strength of the world emerge?
Is the whole thing one?
How does the existence of God enter into people's thoughts (consciousness)?
What is the Godhead?
About the high forces that the Greeks call "Daimones" and "Heroes".
About matter.
About the shape.
About the causes.
About the bodies.
About the smallest things.
About the figures.
About the colors.
About the division of bodies.

About the concentration and the mixture.
About the empty space.
About the place.
About the room.
Over time.
About the essence of time.
About the movement.
About becoming and passing away.
About the shape.
About the essence of form.
About skill.
About the essence of skill.
About chance.
About nature.
The second treatise. 31 chapter.
About the world.
About the shape of the world.
Is the world animated and guided by the leadership?
Is the world imperishable?
What is the world fed on?
From what first element did God begin—he is sublime and powerful—the creation of the world?
About the arrangement of the world.
What is the cause why the world is tilting?
Is there a vacuum outside?
What is the right and left sides of the world?
About the substance of the sky.
About the division of the sky.
What is the substance of the stars?
About the shapes of the stars.
About the arrangement of the stars.
About the movement of the stars.
Where are the stars illuminated?
About what is called "Dioskoroi".
About the (weather) constellations of the seasons.
About the substance of the sun.
About the size of the sun.
About the shape of the sun.
About the solstice.
About the solar eclipse.
About the substance of the moon.
About the size of the moon.
About the shape and enlightenment of the moon.
About the lunar eclipse.
About the appearance of the moon and why ⟨er⟩ appears earthy ⟨⟩.
About the distances of the moon.
Over the years, how long each of them lasts from the planets.
The third treatise. 18 chapter.
About the light-filled celestial sphere.
About the bemused stars.
About the lightning, the thunder, the lightning strikes and what is called "Prester" and "Typhon".
Above the clouds, rain, snow and hail.

Over the rainbow.
About what appears in the light called "Roden".
Over the winds.
Over winter and summer.
About the Earth.
About the shape of the earth.
About the position of the earth.
About the inclination of the earth.
About the movement of the earth.
About the division of the earth.
About the earthquakes.
About the sea, how its condition is and how it is bitter.
How do floods and ebbs arise?
How does the farm around the moon come into being?
The fourth treatise. 23 chapters.
About the increase of the Nile.
What is the definition of the soul?
Is the soul a body and what is its essence?
About the parts of the soul.
About the leading part among the soul parts.
About the movement of the soul.
About the survival of the soul.
About sensory sensations and sensory objects.
Are the sensations and the conceit true?
How many senses are there?
How do the sensory sensations, thought and logic of thought become?
What is the difference between the conceit and the conceited?
What does the sense of face look like?
About the pictures that are seen in the mirrors.
Is the eclipse visible?
About hearing.
About smelling.
About the taste.
About the sound.
Is the sound a body and how does the echo come about?
How does the soul perceive and what is its leading part?
About breathing.
About the physical infections and whether the soul knows them?
The fifth treatise. 30 chapters.
About the art of fortune telling.
How does the dream come about?
What is the essence of the seed?
Is the seed a body?
Is a seed sent out of the females?
How does conception happen?
How does the production of the male and female happen?
How do the (birth) victims arise?
Why does the woman not get pregnant despite frequent sleep?
How do the twins and the triplets come into being?
How does the resemblance to fathers and ancestors come about?
How do many of those born become like other people and not their fathers?
How do women become infertile and men sterile?
Why are the mules infertile?

Is the embryo a living being?
How do the Embrya feed?
What is the first thing created in the womb?
Why can they be raised in seven months, but not reared in eight months (born)?
About the becoming and passing of living beings.
About the species of living beings, are they all sensitive and reasonable?
At what time are the living beings formed when they are in the womb?
What elements do each of the genus parts that are in us consist of?
How does man begin with completion?
How does sleep come about and does it mean a death for the soul and the body?
Is sleep a death for the soul or for the body?
How are the plants grown up and are they living beings?
About nutrition and growth.
How do the desires and joys arise in the living beings?
How does the fever develop and is it a production?
On health, disease and age.

<>

Review

Aetius, the 1st–2nd-century CE philosopher is now restored as the doxographer and Eclectic philosopher of note. This meticulous effort of painstaking scholarship will server future generations of historians of classical ancient philosophy for much of the rest of this century. The work of reconstruction and text of the *Placita* of Aëtius to move it from a secondary corrupted source to an primary source of the content and arguments of the presocratics through middle Platonism with enough assured evaluation as to significantly alter the textbooks about philosophical opinions and development.

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The Aim and Scope of this Edition

Ever since the German scholar Hermann Diels published his landmark text edition entitled Doxographi Graeci in 1879, the compendium of the Placita and its author Aëtius have been a familiar presence in the study of ancient philosophy. If the truth be told, however, the majority of scholars when using or referring to the Placita will have little idea about the nature of the work or the identity of its author. The main purpose of Diels' edition was to provide a foundation for the study of early Greek philosophy and he made copious use of its results for another great work of scholarship, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, first published in 1903. It is no exaggeration to say that for many years afterwards, there was little progress in the understanding of the tradition to which the work belongs. During the past three decades or so, this situation has altered markedly. There have undeniably been considerable advances in the field of doxographical studies. But Diels' great works themselves have remained largely unchallenged.

The present study takes as its starting-point Diels' reconstruction and edition of the Placita. It undertakes to investigate that text anew and to replace the edition that he made of it. In so doing, it has two chief aims.

Firstly, it adopts a revised methodology, and on that basis aims to present a more accurate and serviceable version of the Placita. Its main innovation is that it reconstructs the no longer extant original of the work in a single column. It also includes the complete evidence available for that reconstruction, including important material not accessible to Diels, together with an English translation of the finalised text.

Secondly, it aims to place the contents of the compendium in the broader perspective of the long history of ancient philosophy. This includes the early period of Greek philosophy from Thales onwards, for which it is such an important source. It also includes the period from the Peripatos in the fourth century to the first century of the Common Era when the method of doxography on which the compendium relies was developed and the work itself received its final form. It then ends with the period stretching to the end of antiquity (and beyond), when the work in its various and often derivative forms was extensively utilized and thereby transmitted, albeit imperfectly, to us in the present. To achieve this second purpose, we furnish the text with a detailed commentary. Its aim is not only to elucidate the basis and method of our reconstruction, but also to cast a flood of light on its sources, witnesses and general content. And to broaden the context even further, we also add a collection of additional texts which illustrate parallel traditions and demonstrate the place of the work even more fully within the development of ancient philosophy as a whole.

Through the totality of our scholarly labours, we wish to show that the Placita, often patronizingly regarded as a jejune introductory handbook, is in fact a seminal work for the study of ancient philosophy. It is the only reasonably complete extant example of a highly significant strand of doxographical literature. Its predominantly dialectical method goes back to Aristotle and his school and enables the incorporation of important material from the Hellenistic period and the beginnings of Imperial philosophy. It provides a comprehensive and remarkably compact presentation of the key questions and topics of natural philosophy, from its first principles to the physiology of the human body. With the aid of a recently developed detailed statistical analysis we can be confident that we possess about six-sevenths of the original work. It will now be possible to read and study it by means of a text and translation that is the closest approximation to the work when it was still available in its complete and original form.

The present General Introduction to our edition will proceed in five steps. In section 2 we introduce the compendium and its author, starting with an outline of the main features of its transmission and its contents. We also locate the present work in the context of earlier volumes that we have published in the course of our research. Next in section 3, we discuss the question of how the work should be reconstructed, first reviewing the method used by Diels, then explaining and justifying the method that we ourselves have chosen to adopt. In section 4 the witnesses to the text of the compendium, both primary and secondary, are more fully introduced, including information about the editions of their works that we have used. Section 5 analyses the doxographical context of the Placita, both the proximate tradition in which it stands, and the earlier tradition initiated by Aristotle and his collaborator Theophrastus. Finally, in section 6 we give a detailed explanation of the edition's contents, method and layout. It serves as a user's guide for all those who wish to make full use of the scholarly resource that we are offering.

The Compendium and Its Transmission

The No Longer Extant Original Work

It is deeply to be regretted that the compendium is no longer extant in its original form. We know that it was available to three writers in later antiquity: the author of the Epitome attributed to Plutarch, the anthologist Ioannes Stobaeuss (John of Stobi, in today's North Macedonia), and the Church Father Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus (in Northern Syria). The most likely date for the production of the abridged version is in the second half of the second century. Stobaeus and Theodoret composed their works much later in the first half of the fifth. Due to the popularity of the abridged version, the original work disappeared from view. Based on the information that we now have Theodoret—who informs us about the author's name and the title of his work—may have been the last known author to have had the compendium in his possession.

The Three Chief Witnesses

In our edition and commentary we make the crucial distinction between sources and witnesses. Sources are the authors and works that Aëtius used to compile his compendium, whether at first or, as will more often have been the case, at second or third hand. Witnesses are the ancient authors who through their extant texts inform us about the contents of the compendium' The witnesses, which for every chapter are listed before the Greek text, differ in their proximity to the original. The three primary witnesses are, as mentioned above, ps.Plutarch, Stobaeus and Theodoret. Each of these three differs in turn in how they themselves have been preserved and in the scope of what they preserve.

Ps.Plutarch and His Tradition

The practically complete Greek text of ps.Plutarch's 'On the Physical Doctrines Accepted by the Philosophers, Abridged Version', is extant in several Byzantine manuscripts dating to the twelfth century and a little later, and also in a complete ninth century translation into Arabic. The final pages of the Greek archetype were damaged. Fortunately the translation has preserved lemmata that were later lost. In accordance with the law of the least effort, the abridged edition preserves the compendium's original structure in books and chapters with little change.

On the basis of our reconstructed edition we are in a position to say that ps.Plutarch's 133 chapters and 563 lemmata preserve about 75% of the extant remains and about 63% of the estimated total contents of the work.5 Therefore, though it seems that a little under 4o % of the text was edited out, the macro-sequence of the chapters must have remained the same with only minor variations.

The crucial fact that the Epitome preserves the basic structure of the original work is proved by the corroborative evidence of Stobaeus. As we will note below in section 2.4, the order of themes from Aëtius in Stobaeus is basically the same as the chapter order of ps.Plutarch, although there are a few noteworthy differences. Even more remarkably, the order of the lemmata in the individual chapters he copied out in various ways, that is, either without interpolating other material, or with such material interspersed among the Action lemmata, or again by coalescing these lemmata with selected lemmata from other chapters (which means disturbing the lemma order of these other chapters), is quite often the same as the order of the lemmata in ps.Plutarch. This also holds for the interior order of clusters of chapters that have been located elsewhere, as for example chs. 1.25-29 from the end of Placita Book 1 to the beginning of Eclogae Book 1. This shows that the chapter order as well as the lemma order of ps.Plutarch are a calque of those of in Aëtius.

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The Extent of the Original Work

We have seen above that Aëtius' original compendium has survived in an incomplete condition, since its main witnesses have sustained losses, either deliberately through epitomization, as in ps.Plutarch, or through small-scale abstraction, as in Theodoret, or by unfortunate subsequent redaction, as in Stobaeus. Using advanced statistical techniques Edward Jeremiah has demonstrated that nevertheless we still possess approximately 86 % of the original work.57 Most of the missing lemmata derive from chapters where ps.Plutarch is our only witness. For chapters where apart from ps.Plutarch the complete testimony of Stobaeus is still extant, we can be reasonably certain that very few if any lemmata are missing. Almost every ps.Plutarchean lemma has a match in Stobaeus. When Stobaeus copied out an Aëtian chapter he took over almost all there was. If it occurred often that he copied out less than the entire chapter, there would be many more ps.Plutarchean lemmata without a match in Stobaeus. This argument can also be extrapolated to the chapters for which Stobaeus is lost, for it is wholly unlikely that the relation would suddenly be different and that for the chapters thrown out by the Byzantine editors considerably more ps.Plutarchean lemmata would have lacked a match in Stobaeus than for those we still have. Consequently, for those 87 chapters for which we have multiple witnesses there probably are only about 42 lemmata missing. For the remaining chapters, for which we have only the evidence of ps.Plutarch, the missing number is expected to be around a further 81. Thus the grand total amounts to 123 missing lemmata yielding a total of 892 lemmata for the complete original work. Furthermore, taken individually, all the chapters for which we have the testimony of S in addition to P (apart from those in which the transmission of S has been affected) are most likely complete. These are a remarkable and highly important results.

In its 135 chapters in five Books the Placita extend over the history of physical philosophy from the early sixth century BCE, beginning with Thales (named fifteen times) and Pythagoras (named twenty-six times), and ending with the Peripatetic Xenarchus of Seleucia in the second half of the first century BCE (named once at ch. 4.3.10). There are no chapters specifically devoted to individuals, or to schools, or to Successions. The focus is wholly on topics presented n a systematic order and on points of view in physical philosophy, not on persons. In the majority of chapters the topic is presented as an issue to be dicussed, by means of a listing of more or less different or conflicting views of different persons or (sometimes) schools. The method is thus basically dialectical. not historical or purely descriptive.

The opening words of the prooemium of Book I define the purpose, later commonly called of the work: our objective is to teach the physical theory, or alternatively `to hand down the account of nature. The Latin translation of the substantive that belongs with the verb is traditio. The purpose of the treatise is to contribute to the continuation of the tradition of the study of nature by keeping this tradition alive.

As part of the Introduction to the treatise Book 1. continues with a discussion ot the parts of philosophy and the nature of physics. It presents a selection of experts from Thales to Strato with their dissimilar views on the principles of physics, provides a brief account of the genesis of the single cosmos to be discussed in detail in Books z and 3, and in a slight detour touches on various vlews concerning the number of kosmoi that can be assumed. The remainder of Book 1 is a detailed presentation of foundational concepts of theoretical physics such as matter, body, motion, time, and necessity, all considered dialectically. Book 2 deals with cosmology, from the cosmos in general to the duration of the year via the heaven, the stars, the sun, and the moon, according to their nature and quantitative, qualitative and other categorical properties. Book 3 treats meteorology in the ancient sense of the word, i.e. the phenomena in the atmosphere above the earth, and then the earth itself and the sea. Book 4 begins with a chapter on the summer flooding of the Nile, but for the rest deals with psychology, that is the soul and the senses, including sensation and cognition

insofar as appropriate in the context of physics, and ends with a chapter on psychosomatic issues. Book 5 first contains a couple of chapters on divination and dreams, and then continues with a detailed presentation of spermatology and problems of heredity and embryology. It also presents a number of particular and more general issues concerned with living beings, concluding with some medical topics: fever, health, disease and—rather appropriately—old age.

By and large the movement from Books 1 to 5 is from periphery to centre and from macrocosm to microcosm, and there is a clear division between Books 1-3, dealing with the macrocosm, and 4-5, dealing with the microcosm. The pivotal procemium of Book 4, which states, 'The parts of the cosmos having now been treated systematically, I shall continue in the direction of the particular phenomena, explicitly both separates and unites the two main parts.

Looking in somewhat more detail at the relations between these Books and between the sub-disciplines of physics displayed in them, we note that the brief final chapter of Book 1,1.30 'On nature, is an appendix ('mantissa', Diels DG 57) to ch. 1.1 'What is nature'. It has the same function for the Book as a whole, for as we leave the last of the theoretical chapters and return, at least formally, to nature qua process, this chapter forms a transition to the next Book on cosmology. This structural feature thus aims to demonstrate the unity of the Book, but also of the compendium as a whole. A similar transitional purpose may be attributed to the first chapter, 'On the Milky Way', of the meteorological Book 3 in relation to the cosmological Book 2, while the misplaced final chapter at ps.Plutarch ch. 3.18 may be seen as an attempt, however unfortunate, to emphasize the unity of the Book. The first chapter of Book 4, 'On the flooding of the Nile, links up with the penultimate chapter of Book 3 'On the tides, which shows that the final position of ps.Plutarch ch. 3.18, however well intended, indeed creates a problem. (In fact we have moved ch. 3.18 in Diels to its rightful place earlier in the Book and renumbered it as ch. 3.5a.) That the first chapters of Book 5 could also have been be the last of Book 4 (see the Introductions to Books 4 and 5) demonstrates that these Books, dealing not with nature in general like the first three but with (mostly) human nature, in a certain sense belong together.

To be sure, all five Books appear to be rigorously separated from each other by chapter numbers and Book numbers. But their contents are in fact more fluid and to some extent tend to mesh with each other. The cumulative effect of these janus-faced endings and beginnings is to underline the unity of the treatise, and correspondingly of our world. For a comparison we may for instance recall that the precise point where one book of an epic ends and another begins can be problematical—the tale goes on, as ancient commentaries attest. Divisions between Books and allocation of contents will also have been imposed by the length of the papyrus scrolls on which they were written.

A Retrospective Glance at Aëtiana Volumes 1-2

In Aëtiana vol. 1 our first purpose was the critical evaluation of Diels' famous Aëtius hypothesis against the backdrop of nineteenth-century classical scholarship, exemplified in the stemmatology, or cladistic analysis of manuscripts, linked with the name of Karl Lachmann, and the source criticism linked with that of Diels' Doktorvater Hermann Usenet This helped to situate and even to improve upon Diels' overview of the doxographical traditions, as pictured by means of a chronological and genealogical stemma, or tree diagram, with several paths and lateral branches, illustrating the relations at successive stages between the most important manuscripts and/or sources or witnesses involved. We have reproduced these two diagrams, one representing the Dielsian schema, the other our own, as appendices to this Introduction, in the latter case making one or two small improvements.

In order to provide the necessary background, we also looked at forgotten earlier scholarship from the Renaissance onwards concerned with the relations between ps.Plutarch and ps.Galen and Stobaeus, for it had long been noted that these witnesses present similar or even largely identical material. Another philological method, very popular in the nineteenth century and beyond, but with a venerable history going back as far as antiquity, is the presentation of parallel texts side by side in two or more columns for comparative purposes. This comparison may lead to the conclusion that a common source has to be posited, and thus to the construction of a genealogical stemma. For these techniques, classical scholarship proved to be indebted to the philological study of the Gospels inaugurated by the eighteenth-century German theologian Johann Jacob Griesbach. Their combined and successful application to what till then had looked like a rough and unordered mass of data gave Diels' hypothesis its aura of quasi-mathematical and unassailable certainty.

However, Diels' approach to the sources for his tabular reconstruction of Aëtius in two columns, with some extra evidence in an apparatus parallellorum, was oddly prejudiced. He saw the development, from his postulated pure and unsullied Urquell Theophrastus—on whom see below, section 5.2.2—in the fourth/third century BCE, to Aëtius in the first century CE and the even later ps.Plutarch and his tradition, as one of progressive deterioration, increasing corruption and continuous decline. In his view later in time was equivalent to worse in quality. The Ciceronian motto that he placed at the very beginning of his Doxographi Graeci was telling: *tardi ingenii est rivulos consectari, fontes rerum non videre*, which we might render 'it is the hallmark of a dull disposition to pursue the little streams and not to see the sources of things, the former by implication being muddied and of minor importance, the latter limpid and pure. The focus of his interest was on the thought of the largely lost early Greek philosophers. So in Aëtius he looked in the first place for reliable evidence on the Presocratics, and he found what he sought. He was convinced of its reliability because he believed that, ultimately, it derived more or less unscathed from Theophrastus.

We disagreed with this evaluation then, and we still do. We chose to differ from Diels because we had a different understanding of the tradition. In our view it was a tradition that was essentially open, responding to changing times and circumstances, receiving the necessary updates from time to time, subject to rearrangement, catering to a variety of publics, and therefore losing material as well as regularly acquiring new content. The Placita belongs to the genre of functional literature (if genre is what it may be called), comparable to lexica and compendia of all kinds. In fact, as pointed out at section 2.6 above, a sort of vademecum or handbook is what it really is. Accordingly we presented an unprejudiced and full analysis of the three main witnesses (including, in the case of ps.Plutarch, his complicated tradition), and tried to understand their respective aims and to work out their methodologies before gauging their worth and setting out their respective contributions to the reconstruction of their common source. In the course of this analysis we came to the conclusion that Diels' brilliant hypothesis regarding the role of the three chief witness and a few others was in general correct, but had to be revised in several important respects. In his critical review of Aëtiana vol. i Michael Frede showed that Diels' (and our) analysis of Theodoret's contribution had its vulnerable side. This lacuna in our analysis has since been closed.

The purpose of Aëtiana vol. 2 was to prepare the ground for the present edition of the Greek text of the Placita accompanied by a translation, commentary and apparatus of parallel passages. In vol. 2.1 we provided a full analysis of the treatise's macrostructure and the dialectical microstructure of its pters, the results of which, occasionally updated, constitute the main rationale of today's edition and commentary. It also emerged that this macrostructure to a significant extent reflects the order of the principal themes and sub-themes in Aristotle's physics (including psychology) on the one hand, and on the sequence of topics according to the Stoic division of the physikos logos physical theory,

'account of physics, the term prominent as we saw in the opening line of the Placita), beginning with theoretical physics and ending with psychology and spermatology, on the other. The fused reverberations of these Aristotelian and Stoic examples comprise practically the entire extent of the Placita, from Book 1 to Book 5.72 Let us look at this feature in some more detail.

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The fact should never be lost from view that the Placita merely provides material for instruction, discussion and reflection, possibly also for making one's choice if that is what one wants to do (cf. section 2.6 above). Neither a suspension of judgement, more sceptico, nor a positive outcome, more aristotelico or stoico, is ever formulated, no explicit advice ever given either way. Only very rarely is there a critical note."

As a systematic overview of the methodology of the Placita this volume of Aëtiana is still recommended. Further issues that are discussed are the authenticity and role of chapter headings and their numbering, and the use and function of verbatim quotations." In addition, a substantial section was devoted to ch. 1.3 in the context of the role of Successions and Sects and the absolute and relative chronology of name-labels. Note however that the structural analysis now proposed at ch. 1.3 as a blend of arrangement according to number of principles and an ordering according to Successions (Diadochai) represents a noteworthy advance compared with that of eleven years ago. What is more, our understanding of the role of relative and absolute chronological ordering in relation to arrangement via diaeresis and diaphonia has now profited from the detailed inquiries of Edward Jeremiah. On the basis of a statistical analysis of the differences in this respect between the individual books he has argued that `the balance tipped towards dialectic as time went on, likely indicating the systematic importance of dialectical practice in the Hellenistic era'. We return to the subject of dialectic in Aristotle and Theophrastus below at section 5.2.

Aëtiana vol. 2.2 offered a detailed specimen reconstructionis of Book 2 of the treatise. Book 2 lends itself better to this exercise than the other Books, because our witnesses have preserved its chapters in an almost complete state. For each of its 32 numbered chapters and the three we saw fit to add (numbering them as 2a, 5a and 17a) we printed and patiently analyzed the evidence of the individual witnesses in sequence. First the doxai of the Greek text of ps.Plutarch are numbered and printed, followed by an account of its structure and the differences of completeness and *variae lectiones* present in members of the traditio ps.Plutarchi. The text of Stobaeus came next. Its doxai, as a rule more numerous, were also numbered, and compared in respect of structure, completeness and v*ariae lectiones* with those of ps.Plutarch. The text of Theodoret, as a rule much shorter, came third and was scrutinized in the same way. The results were analyzed in relation to evidence elsewhere in Aëtius. We also took care to compare parallels from the wider dialectical-doxographical tradition, both earlier and later, a selection from which was printed at the end of each chapter. These parallels did not as a rule pertain to the individual doxai but rather to the topic of the chapter as a whole and the interrelations of its lemmata. They often yielded important supportive evidence on the diaeretic and diaphonic structures of the Aëtian chapters as determined in our analysis and illustrated by a variety of diagrams.

Each chapter of our specimen reconstruction is ended with a preliminary reconstructed text, accompanied by a negative critical apparatus and English translation. The entire procedure demonstrated, to our conviction, that our chosen method of reducing the two columns (and further material in the apparatus) of Diels' edition to a single text was viable and superior. It should be emphasized that the edited text was provisional and is now superseded by a text which is far superior again. Not only is it based on all the available evidence, fully accounted for in the list of witnesses and in a positive critical apparatus. It also benefits from increased insight, developed as our

research progressed, into the respective value of the direct and indirect tradition of our main witnesses.

The analysis of the structure of each chapter, carried out by means of a step-by-step approach which is repeated in detail for each Placita chapter, required considerable time and space. Its study is still recommended because of its meticulous and detailed analysis. It has meant that we are in a much better position to present the cumulative evidence for the entire compendium, but now in a manner that is both more compact and more complete. The general analysis of Aëtiana vol. 2.1 has therefore been fully integrated into the present edition and commentary, and the same can be said, mutatis mutandis, for the results of the partial and preliminary analysis, text and translation published in Aëtiana vol. 2.2. It goes without saying that in the intervening eleven years that have been spent preparing the present edition, our understanding and insights have developed and progressed, aided by contributions and critiques of other scholars. Accordingly it not seldom occurs that on (mostly minor) points we have revised our views. Such changes and developments are noted wherever relevant. <>

Svartkonstböcker: A Compendium of the Swedish Black Art Book Tradition by Dr Thomas K Johnson [Folk Necromancy in Transmission, Revelore Press, 9781947544222]

Svartkonstböcker: A Compendium of the Swedish Black Art Book Tradition is a fully revised edition of Dr Johnson's 2010 PhD Thesis *Tidebast och Vändelrot: Magical Representations in the Swedish Black Art Book Tradition*, featuring a thorough, path-breaking study of the black art book tradition in Sweden, as well as English translations of 35 Swedish black art books ranging from the 1690s to the 1940s, including over 1900 spells and a robust index.

The late Dr Johnson always wished that his work would see print publication in its entirety. Other publishers have offered to produce this work in two volumes, prioritizing the spells in the black art books over the scholarly apparatus that contextualizes them. Here Revelore presents the work in full, comprising over 650 pages of material. Minor errors from the PhD manuscript have been rectified, and archival images of the characters, sigils, and illustrations have been restored in high fidelity. This is *the* definitive source work for the Swedish magical corpus of black art books.

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MS31 (ULMA 36365) – "Salomoniska magiska konster"
MS32 (in private ownership) – "Supriania, Fru Alstads socken"
MS33 (in private ownership) – "Troll-Marksens Svartkonstbok"
MS34 (Collectio Lengertziana, Scania, LUB) – "Zimpartier wettenskap"
MS35 (LUF, unnumbered) – "C.O.Swahns Svartkonstbok"

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Doctor Tom Johnson's journey to give voice to the voices of his ancestors began with a most fortuitous question. Tom was in a PhD program at UC Berkeley and was feeling uncertain as to which way to go with his dissertation. One of the women who was a part of his dissertation committee when he expressed his uncertainty asked him simply, if he could do whatever he wanted to do what would he wish to do most? He immediately answered without a thought that he would gather as many of the Black Art books that were still left in the libraries and farmsteads in Sweden

and translate them for the preservation of his ancestral knowledge. He got a necessary grant to go to Sweden and gather the remaining Black Art Books. Which he did for many months in 1992 to 1993.

After coming back from Sweden, the pressures of everyday life, and lack of academic funding necessitated that he got a full-time job. So, he had to put finishing his dissertation off for around twenty years. However, a friend of ours finished her dissertation after an absence of 20 years. She encouraged Tom that it was still possible to finish his PhD. After talking about it and my encouragement he decided to apply to the University of Washington, which has one of the best Swedish departments in the world outside of Sweden.

Working at the University of Washington as a teacher's assistant, a teacher of Swedish and filling in for other teachers in classes in the Sagas, Old Norse, and the Mythology and Religion of the ancient Scandinavians while writing his dissertation was quite a challenge. He often had to translate archaic Swedish from hand written notes. He rose to the occasion, receiving praise from his academic superiors. I was given permission to sit at the table during the defense of his dissertation. All the leading Scandinavian scholars of this country at the table deferred to Tom as the expert in his field. The worst criticism was only that one examiner said she would have used a different modern word to translate a few archaic Swedish words. His dissertation was completed on February 22, 2010.

Dr. Johnson's first and until now only published work *Graveyard Wanderers: The Wise Ones and the Dead in Sweden* (Caduceus Books, 2012) is a compilation of the spells in his dissertation concerning the use of bones for spell casting and the gaining of magical power. —Michael Tarplee <>

<>

Job: A New Translation by Edward L. Greenstein [Yale University Press, 9780300162349]

This "bold new English translation" (Adam Kirsch, *Wall Street Journal*) of Job by one of the world's leading biblical scholars will reshape the way we read this canonical text "A work of erudition with . . . a revolutionary twist."—James Parker, *Atlantic*

The book of Job has often been called the greatest poem ever written. The book, in Edward Greenstein's characterization, is "a Wunderkind, a genius emerging out of the confluence of two literary streams" which "dazzles like Shakespeare with unrivaled vocabulary and a penchant for linguistic innovation." Despite the text's literary prestige and cultural prominence, no English translation has come close to conveying the proper sense of the original. The book has consequently been misunderstood in innumerable details and in its main themes.

Edward Greenstein's new translation of Job is the culmination of decades of intensive research and painstaking philological and literary analysis, offering a major reinterpretation of this canonical text. Through his beautifully rendered translation and insightful introduction and commentary, Greenstein presents a new perspective: Job, he shows, was defiant of God until the end. The book is more about speaking truth to power than the problem of unjust suffering.

Review

"A bold new English translation"—Adam Kirsch, *Wall Street Journal*

"Provocative . . . intriguing . . . Taken as a work of literature in its own right, Greenstein's translation is engaging and unusual, at times even strangely sublime."—Nathan Goldman, *Bookforum*

“[An] excellent, accessible translation . . . For both scholars and general readers of the Bible, Greenstein’s novel interpretation of Job’s significance and keen analysis of the Bible’s own discussion of theodicy will be eye-opening.”—*Publishers Weekly* (starred review)

“Edward L. Greenstein’s new translation of the Book of Job is a work of erudition with . . . a revolutionary twist.”—James Parker, *Atlantic*

“Careful readers who want to explore the mined depths of this Hebrew work will have to make choices. Greenstein's version should be among those considered for many reasons . . . As for me, I find Greenstein's Job more appealing than the traditional Job.”—Bill Tammeus, *Faith Matters* blog

“[A] diligent and elegant translation”—C. Christopher Smith, *Englewood Review of Books*

“A major reinterpretation of one of the greatest, most challenging poems ever written . . . A beautifully rendered translation.”—John R. Barker, *The Bible Today*

“Masterful”—Ed Simon, *The Millions*

“Greenstein provides a distilled magnum opus that should serve as an exemplar of a neglected school of thought in biblical interpretation.”—*Library Journal*

“Reading Greenstein’s rendering of Job is like encountering a powerful text for the first time all over again, at once familiar and fresh. . . . An invaluable resource for the study and enjoyment of the Book of Job.”—Bradley C. Gregory, *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*

”Greenstein gives us an original rendering of the book with many unusual turns. . . . In conclusion, Greenstein, through his prodigious knowledge of Job, of the Hebrew language, and of cognate languages and cultures, has challenged many previous notions about the meaning of the book.”—David Penchansky, *Review of Biblical Literature*

“A vibrant and flowing translation . . . a pleasure to read.”—David M. Stec, *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*

Winner of the 2020 EMET Prize in the Humanities, in the area of Biblical research, sponsored by the A.M.N. Foundation for the Advancement of Science, Art, and Culture in Israel

"Greenstein's *Job* offers the rarest combination of talents: a philologist's determination to hunt down the meaning of every word and a poetic delight in language and making the text sing."—James Kugel

“A masterful translation, new, bold, and often startling, by one of the great masters of this masterpiece of world literature. Greenstein's *Job* offers authoritative guidance to a book whose profundities and conundrums continue to challenge.”—Peter Machinist, Harvard University

“Grounded in deep literary sensitivity and decades of meticulous philological scholarship, Greenstein’s translation of *Job* brings us closer to the sublime text and uncompromising spirit of this great and challenging biblical book than anyone has previously done.”—Everett Fox, Clark University

“A singular achievement by one of the foremost Biblical linguists, who deftly renders the rhetorical and verbal genius of 'Job'. The translation speaks to the contemporary ear while retaining the original's sinewy structure.”—Michael Fishbane, University of Chicago

“An immense pleasure for the reader, this novel translation recreates the flavor of the ancient Hebrew poetical text in its original setting. It is perhaps the first Job translation to free itself from

traditional interpretations and it reflects the author's decades of thorough research."—Emanuel Tov, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Excerpt: Why a new translation? I have two motives. The first is personal. I have been deeply engaged by the challenges of the book of Job—its themes, literary affiliations, language, and poetics—for over four decades. During this period I have struggled to set the text in the best Hebraic form that I can and to understand it as authentically as I can in as many layers of sense as I can reasonably construe. It has been said that "translation is the most intimate act of reading." My translation project has demanded that I try to find meaning in every detail and nuance of the text. My efforts in this intimate endeavor have been profoundly rewarding, even though I know one could continue this pursuit for many lifetimes.

The second reason for producing a new translation is on the face of it altruistic—to set the record straight. The book of Job is sometimes touted as the world's greatest poem. I would hardly challenge that assessment. It is nonetheless a remarkable claim, considering that virtually no reader of the

original Hebrew has ever felt satisfied at having understood the poem at the core of the book verse by verse; and that virtually no translator has got a satisfactory amount of it right.

The earliest translations of Job. into Aramaic and Greek, already exhibit diverse interpretations, often reading a Hebrew word or phrase that is different from the one we have received. The dassical rabbis were conflicted about whether the story of Job was historical or fictitious and whether Job was fundamentally pious or blasphemous. Early Christian sources immortalized the patient Job of the prologue, seeing in him, as in the "suffering servant" of Isaiah 53, a prefiguration of Jesus, who, though innocent, suffered greatly and ultimately became a paragon of righteousness and model of divine blessing. Medieval Hebrew scholars made many original suggestions toward the elucidation of this or that word; but they were almost entirely wedded to the traditional text, and they virtually all interpreted the book in line with theologies and philosophies that comported with their own or those of their contemporaries. Early modern and modern translations tend to canonize these traditional understandings, assuming the book has been more or less correctly interpreted.

However, the meanings of many words and expressions in Job are based on guesswork. One is often hard-pressed to reconcile the language of the translations with the traditional Hebrew text. There is no delicate way to put it: much of what has passed as translation of Job is facile and fudged. Translators have for the most part recycled interpretations that had been adopted earlier, dispensing with the painstaking work of original philological investigation that might lead to new and proper understandings. Modern commentators have made use of the ancient translations, but these were themselves all too often in a quandary. Accordingly, traditional interpretations have often held sway, and translators have usually followed suit, imposing their notions of what the book of Job is presumed to be saying on their largely unsuspecting audiences. They have, for example, blunted Job's attack on the deity's justice and presupposed that Job—who has failed to receive the explanation of his suffering that is revealed to the audience in the book's prologue and has repeatedly expressed his determination to speak his mind—acquiesces to the deity's browbeating in the end. In this and in many less significant instances a less prejudiced, or different minded, approach produces the very opposite sense.

Job's response to the deity's lengthy lecture on his prowess as creator and sustainer of the world—and on Job's total lack of power and esoteric knowledge—is routinely interpreted as surrender. The verse (Job 42:6) has always stymied translators. The earliest translation, an Aramaic version found among the Dead Sea Scrolls at Qumran, interprets: "Therefore I am poured out and boiled up, and I will become dust."= The two verbs are parsed entirely differently from the way they are most often understood today. A typical modern translation of Job 42:6 is: "Therefore I despise myself (or: recant), / and repent in dust and ashes."

The first part of this translation is a stretch, and the second part turns out, after advanced investigation, to be highly improbable. The verb in the first clause *(main)* is assumed to be transitive, in need of an object, and the translators supply that object, either explicitly or by implication. Concerning the widespread interpretation as "recant," it is an invention of the translator—no such usage is attested in ancient Hebrew. It assumes an implicit object, "words" or the like, but no such expression occurs with this sense? Concerning the rendering "despise (myself); the closest phrase one can find occurs in Job 9:22: "I'm fed up with (despise) my life." However, the verb in question does not need an object. It occurs intransitively in the sense of "I am fed up" in Job 7:16, where it is often rendered correctly. In other words, there is a very weak foundation in biblical parlance for the common rendering. It stems from the presumption of the translator that Job is repentant.

The second verb phrase, ordinarily rendered "I repent," has other well-known usages. An often overlooked one is "to take pity, have compassion" (for example, in Psalm 90:13). Those who translate "I repent" tend to render the following words literally: "on dust and ashes." They assume

that in Biblical Hebrew one can say, "I am doing such and such (in the present case, repenting) in / on dust and ashes" The assumption is false. An extensive examination of all phrases relating to performing an act in the dust, on the earth, and the like shows that another verb is required: if Job were "repenting" or "regretting," he would have to be "sitting in / standing on / lying in / being in (and so forth) dust and ashes." No such complementary verb is found here. We ought therefore to adopt the same meaning for the phrase "dust and ashes" here that we find in its two other occurrences, one in the haggling between Abraham and God concerning the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis 18:27), where the patriarch humbly presents himself as no more than "dust and ashes," and the other in Job's characterization of his abasement: "making me seem like dust and ashes" (Job 3o:19). The phrase is used figuratively of the wretched human condition.

In this light, Job, in 42:6, is expressing defiance, not capitulation: "That is why I am fed up;/ I take pity on 'dust and ashes!' (= humanity)." I note as well that in the preceding verses Job is mimicking the deity's addresses to him from the storm (see there). Mimicry is the quintessence of parody.' Parodic as well is Job's assertion in 42:2: "you cannot be blocked from any scheme.' Job is unmistakably alluding to the disdainful remark the deity makes about the builders of the Tower of Babel in Genesis 11:6: "they will not be blocked from anything they scheme to do." Consequently, Job is parodying God, not showing him respect. If God is all about power and not morality and justice, Job will not condone it through acceptance. This response may not accord with the image of a pious, Bontshe the Silent-type Job that most interpreters have wanted to find in this biblical book. However, Job's defiance, a product of his absolute integrity, is not the only radical or surprising feature of the book in the reading presented and defended here.

What Is the Book of Job?

The book of Job is a *Wunderkind,* a genius emerging out of the confluence of two literary streams. One is a tradition of ancient Near Eastern texts that deal with the plight and appeal of a pious—but not entirely innocent—sufferer. While several motifs and images are shared between these Near Eastern texts and the poem of Job, two works in particular display a structural similarity to the Hebrew masterpiece. The Babylonian "Theodicy" comprises an argument back and forth between a suffering man and his friend, who urges him to eschew a critique of divine justice and acknowledge the positive signs of providence all about him. The form of debate and the theme of theodicy (justifying the deity) certainly evoke a family resemblance to Job. A more piquant parallel to the structure of Job is the Egyptian tale "The Eloquent Peasant." A poor farmer is railroaded by a landowner who seeks to steal his pack animal and the meager goods he is transporting. The peasant defends his honor before a magistrate. The magistrate is so taken with the simple man's rhetoric that he selfishly defers giving him justice in order to hear the man speak again and again. Eventually, with the help of the gods, it seems, the case receives a favorable disposition. The fact that the peasant's poetic speeches are framed by a prose narrative makes this Egyptian work a close parallel to Job, even though the former deals with human injustice and the latter with God's.

The second literary tradition of which Job partakes is the classical Hebrew corpus, not only the so-called wisdom texts of the Bible, like Proverbs and some of the psalms, but works of narrative and prophecy as well. Of the Hebrew Bible's three wisdom books, Proverbs, Job, and Qohelet (Ecclesiastes), the latter two shake the pillars of conventional theology. The doctrine of just retribution (the good are rewarded, the bad are punished), which predominates in most biblical literature and is trumpeted in many formulations in Proverbs and some of the psalms is challenged and contradicted in Job and Qohelet. The most obvious way to illustrate this phenomenon is to cite the following verse from Proverbs 13:9: "The light of the righteous shines, /but the lamp of the wicked wanes" This traditional dogma is quoted almost verbatim and elaborated by one of Job's companions, Bildad (18:5-6): "The light of the wicked really does wane, / and the flame of his fire fails to glows;/ the light goes dark in his habitation, / and his lamp goes out on him.' Job directly

undermines this dogma by asking rhetorically (21:17): "How often does the lamp of the wicked wane? / And their ruin overcome them?"

The Joban poet's reliance on the Hebrew literary tradition goes well beyond this sort of citation, however. The annotations to the translation below indicate many of the allusions and sources, but for the sake of an impression consider the following few examples. The portrayal of Job as a Transjordanian figure of the generations of Israel's earliest ancestors is drawn through allusions to the narratives and nomenclature of Genesis. The idea that Job could mount a lawsuit against the deity is entertained by Jeremiah (12:1). Job's railing against what he perceives to be the deity's indulgence of the wicked finds precedents in Jeremiah (for example, 12:1-2) and Habakkuk (chapter 1). The prophecies of Isaiah son of Amoz (Isaiah chapters 1-39) and the "Second Isaiah" (an anonymous prophet of the Babylonian exile, in Isaiah chapters 40-66) as well as those of Jeremiah, Hosea, Amos, and others provide the poet with a rich reservoir of vocabulary and phraseology.

The character Job is legendary, not an invention of the poet. Job is mentioned together with Noah and a certain Danel in Ezekiel 14 (verses 14, 10) as three righteous heroes who, when the imminent catastrophe arrives, will be able to save themselves alone and not their families with them—as Noah had done in the great flood (Genesis 6-9). Considering the nexus among Job, Noah, and Danel, some aspects of an earlier legend of Job can be reconstructed.' Noah we know. Danel we have known since the 1930s, when a north Canaanite epic called "Aqhat," for Dana's son, was discovered at the ancient site of Ugarit, on the north Syrian coast. The epic, written down around 130o BCE, tells of a righteous judge, Danel, who is granted a son by the gods. A somewhat impudent young man, Aqhat is slain by a petulant goddess. There is reason to believe that in a final, missing part of the epic the son is revived for at least part of the year (perhaps the part when the Hunter constellation appears in the sky). The son's restoration would have resulted from the gods' sympathy for the righteous Danel's grief over losing him. Which brings us to Job. Like Noah and Danel, he is a righteous man among the gentiles. In the biblical book Job's ten children are killed at the outset and another ten children are given him when his ordeal is over. In line with the legendary pattern, the return of Job's children would have been predicated on the righteousness of their father.

The biblical book of Job has a distinctive structure. It opens and doses with a story, which, like all biblical narratives, is written in prose. The prologue relates the circumstances under which Job, a uniquely perfect individual, is afflicted by God, and the epilogue relates a rapprochement between the deity and Job upon which he receives another estate and family. In the prologue Job maintains his devotion to God in spite of a sudden turn in his fortunes: "Can we accept the good from Elohim and not accept the bad?" (2:10). But when three old friends come to console him on the loss of his children, it becomes dear that the conventional wisdom, by which God would do nothing unjust, is not up to the task. They have nothing to say. It would seem that Job has begun to reconsider his commitment to blind piety. He shatters the silence by cursing his birth and excoriating the deity for ushering people into a life of pain.

Job's discourse, formulated like all the speeches in Job and most in the Bible in verse, triggers well-intentioned responses from his companions, each of whom Job answers in turn. The pattern of disputation is cyclic: the companions speak in order, and Job's replies are for the most part lengthier. Job conducts two arguments in tandem: one with his friends, the other against God. In the second cycle Job's friends abandon their sympathy as they become convinced that the erstwhile paragon of piety has turned blasphemous. Job has meanwhile initiated a lawsuit against the deity as his only recourse for discovering the reasons for his afflictions—to compel the deity to testify. <>

Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China edited by John Makeham [Oxford University Press, 9780199358120]

Yogacara is one of the most influential philosophical systems of Indian Buddhism. Competing traditions of Yogacara thought were first introduced into China during the sixth century. By the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), however, key commentaries of this school had ceased being transmitted in China, and it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that a number of them were re-introduced from Japan where their transmission had been uninterrupted. Within a few short years Yogacara was being touted as a rival to the New Learning from the West, boasting not only organized, systematized thought and concepts, but also a superior means to establish verification. This book accomplishes three goals. The first is to explain why this Indian philosophical system proved to be so attractive to influential Chinese intellectuals at a particular moment in history. The second is to demonstrate how the revival of Yogacara thought informed Chinese responses to the challenges of modernity, in particular modern science and logic. The third goal is to highlight how Yogacara thought shaped a major current in modern Chinese philosophy: New Confucianism. Transforming Consciousness illustrates that an adequate understanding of New Confucian philosophy must include a proper grasp of Yogacara thought.

Review

"This volume offers a wide-ranging and deeply sourced argument that Yogacara Buddhism played a much more important role in the development of modern Chinese thought (including philosophy, religion, scientific thinking, social thought, and more) than previously has been recognized. This is a crucial intervention. Any scholar with an interest in modern China will be greatly informed by this volume, which offers a goldmine of detailed exposition and argument." --Stephen C. Angle, Professor of Philosophy and East Asian Studies, Wesleyan University.

Essay: Equality as Reification: Zhang Taiyan's Yogācāra Reading of Zhuangzi in the Context of Global Modernity by Viren Murthy

This essay concerns Zhang Taiyan's 章太炎 (1869–1936) Yogācāra-based interpretation of the second chapter of *Zhuangzi,* "Discourse on Making All Things Equal." It argues that we can understand the wider significance of Zhang's "An Interpretation of 'Discourse on Making All Things Equal' " by placing his ideas in the context of modern European philosophy and in turn historicizing modern philosophy in relation to global capitalism. The chapter proposes that Zhang's use of Yogācāra places him in opposition to capitalist modernity, here associated with the relationship between the commodity form and abstract equality (citizenship, universal principle). Zhang moved beyond explaining "equality" in the usual sense, instead explaining it in terms of epistemological detachment, attempting to escape the dichotomy between universal and particular. The chapter further proposes an *epistemological shift related to capitalism* to explain *the equation of Yogācāra with science and modern philosophy.*

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Essay: Although best known in the late Qing for his nationalism and his scholarship, Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (Taiyan 太炎) (1869–1936) also promoted a unique vision of equality in his *Qi wu lun shi* 齊物論釋 (An Interpretation of "Discourse on Making All Things Equal"; 1910; hereafter *An Interpretation*). Zhang was extremely proud of this piece, in which he presents a Yogācāra Buddhist interpretation of the second chapter of the *Zhuangzi* 莊子. Zhang believed that he had constructed a

unique reading and exclaimed that in his interpretation of this text, "each character is worth one thousand gold pieces."[2] One of the reasons he was so content with this text is that he believed he had analyzed passages in the second Inner Chapter of *Zhuangzi* that had befuddled interpreters ever since the time of Zhuangzi (*ca*. 300 BC). Moreover, he claimed that he was able to do this precisely because he drew on Yogācāra thought.

Although scholars have recently turned their attention to Zhang's interpretation of *Zhuangzi*, they have generally remained focused on the Chinese intellectual context and have hence overlooked the wider significance of Zhang's work. I argue that we can understand the wider significance of *An Interpretation* by placing these ideas in the context of modern European philosophy and in turn (p.124) historicizing modern philosophy in relation to global capitalism. My theoretical position goes against a current trend of invoking the notion of "alternative modernities," which we see in the subtitle of Kobayashi Takeshi's well-known book on Zhang Taiyan, *Zhang Taiyan and Meiji Thought: Another Modernity*.[3] I contend that rather than focusing on national or regional particularity, we should see the antinomies of modern philosophy as expressing contradictions involved in a capitalist world imbricated in commodity exchange, bureaucracy, and a world system of nation-states. In particular, in a society where each day people must deal with commodities, money, or bureaucracy, the concept of formal equality, which is indifferent to particularity, becomes increasingly salient. In this environment, people begin to perceive an antinomy between impersonal forces and their particular subjective experience. We should hence not be surprised that modern German philosophy, from Hegel onward, has been constantly attempting to overcome such antinomies, and specifically, the antinomy between subject and object.

In late-Qing China, although his exposure to German idealism was limited, Zhang's interpretation of Yogācāra goes beyond German idealism by affirming a type of particularity that philosophically transcends the above-mentioned opposition between various modern antinomies of philosophy, such as subject and object and universality and particularity. We shall see Zhang explain the significance of his thought by explicitly placing Zhuangzi and Hegel in opposition. The significance of Zhang's reading of *Zhuangzi* in light of Yogācāra is not merely that he brought two distinct traditions together or that he was a comparative philosopher before his time. Rather, we must understand Zhang's work in relation to a larger global problematic of equality and also in relation to a trend toward criticizing modernity. From this perspective, I shall argue that Zhang's approach dovetails with that of recent post-Hegelian philosophers in France, such as Gilles Deleuze.

The various figures discussed in this volume can be divided roughly into those who attempted to mobilize Yogācāra to promote a particular political vision and those who were interested in scholarship. Although Zhang is famous as a scholar, I would place him in the former camp, along Taixu, Tan Sitong, and others. As with Germany and Japan, because China was a late-comer to the global capitalist system, a number of intellectuals attempted at the same time to join and then overcome this system. In *An Interpretation*, Zhang makes this gesture toward overcoming at an abstract level, but does not quite grasp its conditions of possibility in capitalism.

The Epistemology of Equality in the late Qing: Gongli and the unification of subject and object

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in response to domestic and international crises along with defeats in numerous wars, late-Qing officials and intellectuals took the Meiji reforms as a model to transform the Chinese empire into a strong nation-state. The domestic side of this transformation involved the emergence of a new category of people inextricably connected to equality: "citizens." Citizens were formally equal, required recognition by the state, and would be schooled to identify with the nation. The concept of equality is made possible and promulgated

through two interrelated structures of capitalist society, the modern bureaucratic state and an economy of commodity exchange on the market.

The intellectual historian Wang Hui describes the social and political transformations that gave birth to the new category of the citizen and the aggregate "the people" in a manner that brings out its philosophical significance:

> The formation of the people must legally abstract and separate each individual from various communal, local place, and kinship relations and then construct formally equal national citizens. The latter can participate in the activities of the sovereign nation either as a unit or as a group. This political process simultaneously follows the development of industry, the expansion of the city and increase in the power of money, the formation of professional society, the establishment of a market system, and so on.

The above passage describes what Jacques Bidet calls the dual structures of modernity, namely market and organization, both of which entail abstraction and equality. This abstraction is mediated by relations of domination and subordination in a global capitalist system of nation-states. In late-Qing China, the idea of human equality and equality in general were inextricably linked to the global processes of territorialization, nation-building, and the spread of capitalism. All of these processes involve a degree of formal rationality associated with the development of large bureaucracies, a modern legal system, and a world of commodities created for exchange. The processes associated with formalization and rationalization occurred at both global and national levels, and as a result, late-Qing thinkers, and Zhang Taiyan, in particular, confronted these two interrelated realms as they constructed their political thought. Consequently, late-Qing intellectuals used equality and other related concepts to make sense of their world and to conceive of political ideals at global and local, as well as at collective and individual, levels.

The interconnection between local groups, society, and the state in the theoretical realm corresponded to an institutional process that entailed the expansion of state power through local organizations or groups. The Qing government was initially hostile to the reformers' proposals of 1898, which emphasized giving more power to the localities. During the early 1900s, however, the government implemented the so-called New Government Policies through which the Qing state penetrated various dimensions of society. Prasenjit Duara describes the New Government Policies of the late Qing as a "Chinese pattern of state strengthening—closely interwoven with modernizing and nation-building goals." He notes that "all regimes, whether central or regional, appeared to respect the administrative extensions of state power in local society . . . whatever their goals, they assumed that these new administrative arrangements were the most convenient means of reaching rural communities."

In the context of the abstraction associated with the above state-building process, late Qing intellectuals began to propose the idea of the universal principle (*gongli* 公理), which was in some sense the metaphysical ground that justified many of the social and political transformations associated with this period. This principle mimics the rationalizing tendency of the state, but it represents a logic that transcends the boundaries of the state.

The universal principle was scientific and also had direct implications for moral and political philosophy. It can form numerous compounds, such as "the universal principle of science," and the "the universal principle of evolution," but in general it resembles Georg Lukács's description of modern rationalism as the equation "of formal, mathematical and rational knowledge with knowledge in general and 'our' knowledge." From the perspective of science, all things were equal before the universal principle; it was a type of abstract standard to which all things conform. Hence, reformist proponents of the universal principle faced an aporia between the broad scope of the

universal principle and the more limited nature of the nation-state. Zhang would to some extent exploit this aporia using Yogācāra.

Moreover, although the universal principle does include some type of moral imperative, late-Qing intellectuals began to perceive a gap between *gongli* as scientific principle and *gongli* as moral principle, and hence they had to reinscribe moral categories into the scientific side of the universal principle or the seemingly amoral movement of the material world. This gap between the scientific and the moral is once again related to the difference between subject and object, and gongli had to unite the two. Among reformers, Kang Youwei (1858–1927) perhaps went the farthest to couch scientific concepts in Confucian terminology. As early as 1886, Kang linked the Confucian ideals to a type of scientific principle of the universe: "All things have humanity, righteousness and rituals, not only humans" and spoke of rituals as "the necessity of things". However, this necessity implied a world beyond Confucius. Kang Youwei's follower, Fan Zhui 樊錐 (1872–1905), explicitly linked the universal principle to equality in a way that develops the above paradigm:

> With respect to heaven's producing things, all things are one. That which is one is the universal principle and the universal principle is equality. . . . Since all things come from heaven, all things are heaven. Moreover, the infinite heaven is also equal. If everything is equal, then everything is the same.

The above passage brings all things under one principle and subsumes the myriad things in the world under the umbrella of sameness. We should not think of this sameness merely as spatial but also as temporal. The idea of evolution extends this idea of the repetition of the same in the context of history and temporal difference. As Liang Qichao 梁 (1873–1929) explained at around the same time: "In the past one thousand years, there has been no time without change and no event that has not changed. This is the way of the universal principle and is not caused by human action." Here Liang posits a principle of change outside of human action. But change is not random. A number of late-Qing intellectuals conceived of the combination of the universal principle and change as the equivalent of social evolution. For example, Yan Fu (1854–1921) spoke of "the universal principle of evolution."

As I mentioned above, because the universal principle was sufficiently abstract, people drew on it to make different political conclusions. Yan Fu and Liang Qichao used the universal principle and the idea of evolution to legitimize the state; however, Kang went a step further and contended that the universal principle is only realized when the world evolves to a perfectly egalitarian society without national divisions:

> The age of heavenly peace is the great community; human equality and the great community of the human race themselves are definitely the universal principle. However, the inequality of things is their condition. If the conditions are not correct, even if one forces people with national laws, and oppresses people with monarchical power to make people follow the universal principle, one will not be able to put it into practice successfully.

Kang Youwei, of course, combines Confucian and evolutionary theories to develop his political vision, but later reform-oriented intellectuals would more directly invoke theorists such as Hegel to make the above-mentioned link between abstract universal principles, equality, and history. For example, in a 1905 volume of the journal *Qingyi bao* 清議報 (The China Discussion), which Liang Qichao edited in Japan, Guan Yun 觀雲 wrote an essay titled "The Conflict between Equality and China's Old Morality" that repeated some of Kang's points in an explicitly Hegelian framework:

> From Hegel's discussion of ethics and according to the principle that his philosophy establishes, the world is an expression of a great spirit and the individual is just a small part of this great spirit . . . Hence all things such as states, families, societies, and countries do not

> have the goal of developing the individual, but only that of developing the great spirit of the world. According to Hegel's theory, the myriad things of the world are equal as one. It appears that there are differences, but in actuality there are none . . . Socialism and cosmopolitanism both take equality as their moral foundation and thus they both can be deduced from Hegel's theory.

Although part of Guan Yun's purpose in this essay is to extol equality, like Kang and to some extent Hegel, Guan also uses the concept of equality in order to legitimate partial inequality by making distinctions between the civilized and the barbarian and the intelligent and the stupid. He explicitly links equality to civilization. "The more civilized a country is, the more it strives for equality and barbarian countries do the opposite."[15] As we have seen in the above quotation, equality is a result of evolution, and hence to attain equality, one must support evolution, which might involve inequality. "If one wants to attain equality, the situation is such that one must take from the wise and hard-working and give to the stupid and lazy. As a result all will be stupid and lazy and the world will regress. Thus those who speak of equality must separate people into two classes."[16] In other words, according to Guan, to attain the equality that corresponds to the evolution of the world, one must ensure that the wise and hardworking are richer than the stupid and lazy, since in this case, the stupid and lazy have an incentive to change, which will eventually promote overall evolution. Although Guan does not directly use racial categories, he produces a logic that obliterates difference, since ultimately equality can only be reached when all people become the same, that is, "wise and hardworking."

One of Zhang Taiyan's aims in his interpretation of Yogācāra and *Zhuangzi* was precisely to criticize the above two characteristics of the universal principle, which we have seen in the writings of Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei, and their followers. Zhang had two fundamental problems with the universal principle. The first is the way in which the universal principle is linked to state-and-society building and thus demands sacrifice to a collective. Second, the universal principle legitimates the eradication of difference through some type of evolutionary paradigm. Yogācāra Buddhism and Zhuangzi allowed Zhang to deal with such problems at the level of epistemology. Zhang conceives of this eradication of difference as the inevitable outcome of the distinction between civilization and barbarism, which is in turn linked to the scientific worldview associated with the universal principle. This latter point is crucial. If Zhang were merely interested in undermining the distinction between civilized and barbarian, he would perhaps have had little use for Yogācāra. Zhang, however, sought to go beyond criticizing value judgments in (p.130) order to delve into the epistemological conditions for the possibility of these judgments, so that one could eventually go beyond them.

Zhang's critique of the universal principle from the standpoint of equalization

From 1900 Zhang actively propagated anti-Manchu nationalism, and his revolutionary writings eventually led to his incarceration in Shanghai from 1903 to 1906. In jail, Zhang avidly read the Buddhist scriptures, especially the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* (Yuqie shidi lun; Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice). Reading these scriptures helped him to endure his difficult years in jail, and the experience left an indelible mark on his writings between 1906 and 1910. After his release from jail, he fled to Tokyo, where he edited Minbao R 報 (The People's Journal) and often wrote essays that inflected critical politics with Buddhist epistemology. In short, Zhang argued that most religions, including "science," overlooked the role of human activity or karma (ye 業) in creating the phenomenal world.

Zhang claims that the universal principle and evolution, which echo Hegel's philosophy, are both variations on a basic structure of confusion, alienation, and domination; in short, such phenomena

emerge from consciousness. His goal is to overcome the confusion at the source of such phenomena. Hence Zhang contrasts Zhuangzi with Hegel and notes that according to Zhuangzi's philosophy of the equalization of things:

> There is no correct place, no correct taste, no correct color; it lets each things be what it wants. The understanding cannot grasp the extent to which this surpasses the universal principle.

As Zhuangzi says, "All things are so and all things are permissible (wu wu bu ran, wu wu bu ke.) The literal meaning of this phrase is the same as Hegel's "all events are in accord with principle and all things are virtuous and beautiful (shi shi jie heli, wu wu jie shanmei) .The former, however, takes people's hearts and minds to be different and difficult to even out, while the latter posits a final end, which is the process by which things are realized. This is a fundamental and huge difference.

Zhang notes the formal similarity between his own ideal and Hegel's theory of spirit, some version of which late-Qing thinkers used in discussions of equality. But this formal similarity overlooks a more fundamental difference. This difference concerns Hegel's propensity to subsume the particular under a larger structure in contrast to Zhuangzi's/Zhang Taiyan's attempt to think the unique particular. In Zhang's view, the political implications of such a distinction are clear. The Hegelian model promotes transforming the different or the other into the same, and we have seen examples of this practice in the writings of Kang Youwei and his disciples. According to Zhang one cannot evaluate the particular using some external standard. There a quasi-existential overtone to his work, in that existence merely is. The difference, however, is that, in Zhang's view, existence in its immediacy is always already mediated by confused consciousness, and hence one requires practice and discipline before a deeper realm of singularities reveals itself. Zhang's *An Interpretation* is largely concerned with uncovering this more fundamental experience.

An interpretation of "Discourse on Making All Things Equal"

Scholars have shifted between arguing that "An Interpretation" affirms particularity or individualism and claiming that it extols community and universality. In fact, Zhang's interpretation of the *Zhuangzi* is complex because by combining Zhuangzi's idea of equalization, Yogācāra Buddhism, and elements of German idealism, Zhang aims to criticize both the universality of the universal principle and the particularisms embodied in individualism and nationalism. One way in which he does this is by claiming that both universality and particularity are produced by the processes of karmic consciousness. If we follow Moishe Postone in thinking of the opposition between particularity and universality as being at the center of modern thought conditioned by capitalism, we can interpret Zhang as struggling to think of a way to escape this opposition, even though he does not theorize this opposition in relation to history. We have already seen him negate the universal as principle, and throughout his writings on Buddhism he negates the individual or particular self.

But more specifically, Zhang constantly gropes for a way to express something beyond mundane concepts, such as universality and particularity. Thus Zhang begins his interpretation by showing that we must understand Zhuangzi's idea of "equalizing things" from a perspective that is different from how we usually grasp such terms:

> "Equalizing things" refers to absolute equality. If we look at its meaning carefully, it does not refer only to equality between sentient beings, such that there is no inferior and superior. It is only when [dharmas] "are detached from the characteristics of speech; detached from the characteristics of naming cognition; and detached from of them as objects," that one understands absolute equality. This is compatible with the "equalization of things."

Zhang asks how Zhuangzi's notion of "*qi wu*" in "Qi wu lun 齊"(Discourse on Making All Things Equal) should be understood and, in so doing, brings Zhuangzi, modern Western philosophy, and

Yogācāra together. *Qi* is an important concept in *Zhuangzi*, which Zhang connects to *pingdeng* (equal; equality), and this term, *pingdeng* refers to both Western concepts of equality and to that used in *Dasheng qixin lun* (Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith). The initial response he considers is that it is similar to the Western concept of equality in that it gets rid of hierarchical distinctions between high and low. This might entail that it represents a transition from feudal hierarchical relations to relations of modern citizenship and capitalism. Zhang does not completely reject this view, but he draws on Yogācāra to point to something more fundamental. He invokes the notion of absolute equality drawn from *Dasheng qixin lun,* which shifts one's subjective stance from seeing things as equal—that is, without high and low—to an epistemological position in which one is detached from the words and concepts that make one's world possible.

Zhang attempts to go beyond both the empty universality of abstract equality and the isolating particularity of confused experience by focusing on language. He cites the following sentence of the *Laozi* as he brings Zhuangzi and Yogācāra into dialogue: "'Is it only the human mind that is wild and cannot be fixed?' The human mind only arises because of names, images, and discrimination. Names reflect everything. By appropriating them transformations grow deeper. Hence the most sublime way is to use names to get rid of names." From this perspective, the point of *An Interpretation* is to go beyond names and discrimination, even though one must do this through the use of names. In order to describe this dialectic of detachment from names, images, and the mind, Zhang draws on a passage from the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* to show how to make distinctions that point beyond mundane ideas of sameness and difference:

> What are the four thorough investigations? They are the investigation of the name, the investigation of the given thing, the investigation of designations for essential nature, and the investigation of the designations for particularity. With respect to these, investigation of the name means that the bodhisattva sees with regard to the name that it is just a name. Likewise, with regard to a given thing, seeing that it is just a given thing is the investigation of the given thing. With respect to designations for essential nature, clearly seeing those as just designations for essential nature is investigation of designations for essential nature; and with regard to designations for particularity, seeing those as just designations for particularity.

> [*Dasheng qixin lun*,: "Therefore all the dharmas since the very beginning transcend characteristics of discourse, transcend the characteristics of naming, and transcend the characteristics of cognitive objects. They are absolutely undifferentiated, changeless, and indestructible. There is nothing but this One Mind and for this reason it is nominally called Suchness." 是故 一切法從本已 來,離言說相、離名字相、離心**緣相**, 畢竟平等、無有變異、 不可破壞。唯是 一心故名真如,以 一切言說假名無實。 (Translation by John Makeham, John Powers, and Mark Strange.)

> As both John Jorgensen and Scott Pacey point out in chapters 2 and 3, a number of scholars in the late-Qing and early Republican periods regarded *Dasheng qixin lun* as closely aligned with Yogācāra, if not an actual Yogācāra text. Doctrinally, this is a problematic position, the roots of which can be traced to developments in sixth-century China, and complicated by the fact that traditionally its translation was attributed (again problematically) to Paramārtha (499–569), a scholar-monk closely associated not only with Yogācāra, but also with *tathāgatagarbha* thought. Zhang himself believed that *Dasheng qixin lun* was a Yogācāra text written by Aśvaghoṣa. See Zhang Taiyan, "*Dasheng qixin lun* bian" (Disputing the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*), *Minbao RN* 19 (1908), reprinted in *Xiandai fojiao xueshu congkan* 佛教學術叢刊 (Collectanea of Modern Buddhist Scholarship) (Taipei: Dasheng wenhua chubanshe, 1978), vol. 35, pp. 9–12. With respect to the text I am discussing, *An Interpretation*, it is also

> clear that Zhang cites *Dasheng qixin lun* with other texts that are uncontroversially considered to be Yogācāran, such as the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*.]

The chapter from which this passage is drawn describes certain meditative practices that enable one to separate the name, the thing, designations of essential nature, and particularity. By pointing out that names are just names, Zhang (invoking the authority of Asaṅga, the putative author of the text) separates particular names from various attachments that one associates with those names in daily life. By distinguishing between the word and experiences in which words are coupled with other designations of things, one begins to see other possibilities in these words and things. Zhang is already practicing this with words such as *qi* (equalization) and *pingdeng* (equality), since he is causing us to think about equality differently. Similarly, by stressing that designations of essential nature and particularity are just designations (*jiali* 假立), Asaṅga/Zhang underscores the active dimension or positing. In other words, it is the human subject who posits these designations. Zhang goes on to cite a passage that explains how such meditative separation can lead to knowledge:

> What is knowing precisely, in detail, the investigated name? You should know that the bodhisattva, having investigated the name as name only, knows that name precisely; to wit, he determines that "This name is the linguistic unit (*yi* 義; [*artha*]) for a given thing"; likewise "the linguistic unit for conceptualizing, the linguistic unit for viewing, and the linguistic unit for attributing (*jiali* 假立; [*upcāra*])." If, for a given thing originally conceived as form, a name is not decided upon, no one would thus conceive of that given thing as form; and not conceiving it, he would not exaggerate or cling to it. And not clinging to it, there would be no expression in discourse. Thus he knows it precisely, in detail. This is said to be knowing the investigated name precisely in detail.

The point of this passage concerns the idea that names are what enable desire to have an object, and thus the first step in liberating oneself from attachment is to understand what a name is. If the form is not decided upon, there will be no clinging. Here we see the agency of the subject again insofar as the emphasis is placed on positing or designating (*jiali* and *jia jian* 假建). However, this is also a reflex clinging, connected to our grasping, which is in turn is connected to our karmic past. Asaṅga seeks to break this structure by pointing to the indeterminacy of language, which becomes determinate through clinging. At this point, there is a phenomenological moment in which one moves toward the things themselves.

> What is knowing precisely, in detail, the investigated thing? For any given thing, the bodhisattva, having investigated it as a given thing only sees that given thing, while conceived of as "form," etc., and while associated with all the expressions [for it], is in itself inexpressible. This is the second knowing in detail, namely, knowing precisely, in detail, the investigated given thing.

Here Asaṅga discusses a type of knowing that is separate from discursive thought and names. Because, at this point, one realizes that the thing is inexpressible, it is difficult to grasp what the object of such knowledge would be or even whether we are dealing with objects. After all, without names the bodhisattva would appear to face a nonreified world, which Zhang would call the world of equalization. Part of what Zhang wants to show is how reification emerges, and this is the first step toward overcoming it.

Janice Dean Willis translates *satkāyadrsti* as the "reifying" view, which suggests that Asaṅga's project, and by extension Zhang's, is one of dereification. In a section of the *Yogācārabhūmi* just before the one Zhang cites, Asaṅga connects reification to the perspective of the self:

> The discursive thought concerning "I" and the discursive thought concerning "mine" engender the reifying view (*satkāyadrsti*; *sajiaye jian* 薩 or *shen jian*), and the root of all other

> views, namely the root of pride (*māna*) and egoism (*asmi-māna*), and the root of all other self-centered views.

Reification here refers to when people see their self as real, but this originary reification leads to a number of derivative reifications. These derivative reifications emerge because people bring things together with names as a whole. Therefore, the process of separation—that is, seeing names as only names, and so on—is the beginning of a process of dereification. Zhang mobilized Yogācāra in order to combat and counter the reification that was increasingly pervading China as it entered the global capitalist world and that intellectuals promoted using concepts such as the universal principle. Placing the emphasis on reification would support Dan Lusthaus's reading of Yogācāra as anti-idealism. The reified view takes as independently existing the view of objects that the subject perceives. The meditative practices outlined by Asaṅga are meant to deconstruct this view to facilitate the appearance of that which lies concealed. Zhang cites another passage from Asaṅga that expresses the complexity of this process:

> What is knowing precisely in detail, the investigated designations for essential nature? It is that knowing whereby the bodhisattva, with regard to a given thing conceived of as "form," etc., after having investigated its designations for essential nature as designations only, knows and well knows in detail that in designations relating to that given thing there is only the mere semblance of essential nature, and that in truth essential nature is lacking there. For him, seeing that "essential nature" as but a magical creation, a reflected image, an echo, a hallucination, the moon's reflection in the waters, a dream and an illusion, he knows that this semblance is not made up of that essential nature. This is the third knowing precisely, in detail, which is the sphere of most profound knowledge.

Asaṅga criticizes the reified or idealized object. One posits essential nature in places where it is lacking just as one immediately takes the reflected image for the real or believes in hallucinations. From this perspective, de-reification requires a different type of mediation, the mediation of meditative practice, which will allow one to disaggregate and dissolve the object of immediate unreflective experience. Through the practice of investigating the designations for essential nature, one sees that the essential nature of things is produced by one's own activity and does not exist independently.

Zhang, however, cites one more step in the above meditative practice, which is knowing in detail the investigated designations of particularity:

> That knowing by the bodhisattva, after having investigated the designations for particularity as designations only attached to the given things called "form" etc., sees designations for particularity as having non-dual meaning. The given thing neither completely has a nature nor lacks a nature (*bhāvo nā-bhāvah*; *fei youxing fei wuxing*). It is not present, since it is not "perfected," owing to its having an expressible "self." And it is not altogether absent, since in fact it is determined to have an inexpressible essence. Thus from the stance of absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*; *shengyidi* 勝義), it does not have form (*rūpī*), yet from the stance of relative truth (*samvrtisatya*; *shisudi*) it is not formless, since form is attributed to it. As with presence and absence, or formed and formless, just so is whatever is shown or not shown, and so forth. All enumerations of designations for particularity should be understood in just the same manner.

Zhang has still not explained what remains when one removes names, but again opposes the inexpressible to the expressible in order to stress indeterminacy. Things paradoxically have nature and are present when they are inexpressible, and thus his position anticipates contemporary neo-Heideggerians, such as Graham Harman, who speaks of objects as receding from consciousness:"[T]he world is constantly torn between the being of things and the oversimplified surfaces through which they appear to us."[34] From Asaṅga's perspective, the oversimplified surfaces

can be seen as such when one separates names from things themselves. Zhang invokes Asaṅga to stress the difference between the reified view of particularity and the essence in a world free from reification. If we associate ordinary visions of equality as sameness with the world of reification, we can say that Zhang uses Yogācāra and Zhuangzi's views of equalization (*qi*) to go against the reified world.

Zhang explains how the above passages from Asaṅga relate to the *Zhuangzi* by claiming that they serve to illuminate a number of key passages. Specifically, he claims that the idea that "words are not the mere chirping of birds, but they have something to say," is the same as Asaṅga's seeing that the name is only a name. "Using a horse to point out that a horse is not a horse" is the same as Asaṅga's "not clinging to it, one cannot express it." He then contends that "If everything is one, then is there language?" is the same as Asaṅga's "with respect to the given thing, one sees that it is only a thing" and "essential nature is separate from language." Zhang then compares "If one follows a completed mind and takes it as a teacher, who is without a teacher," to Asaṅga's "seeing designations for essential nature only as designations for essential nature." He juxtaposes Zhuangzi's "If one affirms and negates before something is complete in the heart-mind, this is like taking nothing for something" to Asaṅga's "there is only a semblance of essential nature and in truth essential nature is lacking."

These various examples return to a single issue: the relationship between names, reification, and reality. In the first citation, Zhuangzi separates words from the chirping of birds, in that they have meaning, but it is not fixed. Because the meaning of words is not fixed, words can be separated from things, as in Asaṅga's paradigm. The famous passage, "using a horse to show that a horse is not a horse is not as good as using a non-horse to show that a horse is not a horse" has a number of interpretations, but most relate it to the problem of naming. As A. C. Graham explains, this passage is basically saying that one need only name something else "a horse" and then what we used to refer to as horse is no longer a horse. Chad Hansen connects name to perspective and contends that from another perspective a horse could be described as something else, such as a group of bones and skin, or, to use a more modern example, a conglomeration of atoms. Such an interpretation also overlaps with the idea that any interpretation is always incomplete and that names and language are indeterminate.

Zhang himself proposes an interpretation that anticipates that of Hansen when he discusses Zhuangzi's critique of Gongsun Long. Gongsun Long tried to show that a "white horse" was not a horse, because "horse" names form and "white" names color. In Zhang's view, Gongsun Long does not go far enough because he does not go beyond cognitive objects: "Zhuangzi says that to use cognitive objects (*jing* 境) to show that consciousness is not a cognitive object is not as good as to use that which is not a cognitive object to show that consciousness is not a cognitive object." He then provides the following example, when discussing the passage about the horse:

> This living horse is originally an agglomeration of the various elements such as earth, water, fire, and wind. How can one say that it belongs to the living? If one says that earth, water, fire and wind are also living things, then when a number of living things become one living thing, even though one says "horse" this is just a posited name (*jiaming*).

By comparing this to Asaṅga, Zhang reads Zhuangzi's statement about a horse as part of larger practice associated with self-negation and dereification. He explicitly makes the same point immediately before the above citation.

> If one speaks broadly, heaven and earth originally have no substance and the myriad things do not arise. If one thinks of them from the perspective of attachment to (the reality of) dharmas (*fazhi*), then *qian* and *kun* do not perish. Because one thinks from the perspective of

> attachment to self (*wozhi Rik*), things appear. Both of these are confusions of the cognitive faculty and the understanding. Some use language to refute the idea of signification or meaning, but they do not use argument to refute the idea of a horse, and fall into the cracks of Gongsun Long's words.

In the next two comparisons, Zhang shows how we pre-reflectively take things as real and compares this point that we have seen Asaṅga make with Zhuangzi's example of those people who do not have a complete mind (*cheng xin bulb*) and then take what is not there as something that is there. Zhuangzi's point that everyone has a teacher in the completed mind, refers to the fact that everyone can break free of the reifying tendencies of consciousness by following practices that begin with the mind, namely the disaggregation meditations mentioned above.

> [Here again, the similarity to Hegel's discussion is intriguing. In particular, Hegel contends that everyone can use their understanding to gain conceptual knowledge. Of course, here Zhang attempts to describe a nonconceptual practice that Hegel would label esoteric. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.]

Zhang then continues his exploration of language and reality through Asaṅga and Zhuangzi and moves closer to describing a realm separate from language. Indeed, if it is the case that without language there are no distinctions, then Zhang's knowledge of other things would be what Hegel describes as "naïveté of emptiness," which depicts a "night in which all cows are black." This would lead to a politics of the same, which was exactly the position that Zhang hoped to mobilize Asaṅga and Zhuangzi to attack. In the following passages, however, Zhang inscribes difference and negativity in the realm separate from conventional language and perception. This would be something like writing under erasure, a new use of vocabulary, precisely the type of redescription to which he refers above. He explains:

> One only uses traces to guide transformations. Without words nothing can appear and words have the nature of returning. Thus one uses words to signify things. This is what is said in the following passage [from *Zhuangzi*]: "In speaking there are no words. One speaks one's whole life and has never spoken. One does not speak throughout one's life and has never stopped speaking (*wei chang bu yan*)."

Scholars have remarked about the way in which the radical changes taking place during the late Qing required scholars to develop new terms in order to make sense of their world and translate new concepts. Before standardized Japanese translations became hegemonic, late-Qing intellectuals such as Yan Fu borrowed creatively from classical texts in order to create new meanings. Zhang goes beyond this general practice, since he is not just mining the myriad characters in classical Chinese to come up with hypothetical equivalents to Western terms. Rather, he is more reflexive about the incompleteness of the process in which language signifies, but he simultaneously tries to lead language beyond itself. He formulates a radical critique of what he considers to be distinctions and value judgments that have become hegemonic, and so he must not only use arcane terms but also constantly invoke paradoxes that push language and signification to its limits. Perhaps nowhere are these paradoxes more forceful than when he is discussing his use of language in this text:

> To refute a theory with a theory is not a theory of equalization. Why? This is because one establishes the refutation. When we say something is equalization, it already goes against equalization. Why? This is because one excludes the unequalized. That is why the "Yu Yan 寓言" chapter[of *Zhuangzi*] says, "Without words there is equalization. Equalization and words are not equal. Words and equalization are not equal."

Reading the above passages together suggests that Zhang's "equalization" does not refer merely to an ineffable state. To name something as equalization would already fix and reify it, which is why one

is not interested in refuting a theory. Rather, one uses language to go beyond language. Zhang is precisely trying to affirm the tension between words and equalization, which points to things from the standpoint of dereification or enlightenment, in which things do not have a clear identity, but at the same time, they do have a certain singularity. He makes this point in a key passage in this text: "To equalize the unequal is the position of the lowly scholar, but to see the equal in the unequal is the theory of the elevated philosopher."[46] The above passages may seem opaque, but given the above discussion, we can infer that the latter position, in which equal and unequal exist together, refers to a deeper level beyond mundane language, which Zhang sees both Asaṅga and Zhuangzi portraying.

Although Zhang draws on premodern thinkers to make his point, it is interesting that his argument overlaps with certain trends in post-Hegelian philosophy in France and Germany. Zhang explicitly opposes his philosophy of equalization to Hegel's teleological vision of history, and so a comparison with Hegel could be instructive. To some extent, Zhang's discussion of going beyond refutation echoes Hegel's criticism of one-sided theories in the *Phenomenology*, when he berates positions that seek either "agreement" (*Beistimmung) or "contradiction" (Widerspruch) and argues that one must comprehend the way in which a given position is connected to its opposite in an overarching unity. Hegel explains his position in an oft-cited beautiful metaphor:*

> The bud disappears with the emergence of the flower and one could say that each of these are refuted (*widerlegt*). Likewise, the fruit of the flower is explained as a false being of the plant as the truth of the former replaces that of the latter. These forms do not merely separate from one another; rather, they suppress each other as irreconcilable. However, their flowing nature makes them moments of an organic unity, where they not only do not contradict one another, but each is as necessary as the other and this same necessity constitutes first the life of the whole (*das Leben des Ganzen*).

Here as well, we have an attempt to overcome one-sidedness, but Hegel stresses a type of necessity that is greater than any of the particulars. Notice that it is the same necessity (*gleiche Notwendingkeit*) that governs all of the various particulars. Here we see the epistemological function of equality working in Hegel's text. Zhang would contend, like post-Hegelian philosophers, that both the parts and the overarching unity are reifications and one needs to penetrate to a more fundamental phenomenological level to grasp a different type of reality. Indeed, the meditative practices of the detachment found in Asaṅga are supposed to break us free from such types of false necessity. It is possible to interpret Zhang as groping for a concept of difference free from conceptualization, beyond or before reifications of subject and object. Although their respective methods of going beyond reification differ from Zhang and from each other, ever since Nietzsche and Heidegger, philosophers have searched for a realm before the distinctions and logics that envelop our world.

To some extent, we find this gesture expressed clearly in Henri Bergson and more recently in Gilles Deleuze. In particular, in Deleuze's interpretation of Bergson, he distinguishes "difference" from "determination." According to Deleuze, Hegel's dialectic represents a linear movement because his idea of difference is exterior to the thing itself and hence inevitably involves both determination and contradiction. We see this in a number of the antinomies that pervade his thought, such as the opposition between being and nothing, or between particularity and universality. Deleuze is clearly attempting to draw on Bergson to think his way outside such oppositions and claims that in Bergson's view, "not only will vital difference not be a determination, but it will rather be the opposite—given a choice (*au choix*) it would select indetermination itself." Of course, were it merely indetermination, Hegel could retort that in essence Bergson is simply unable to think difference and thus the phrase "given a choice" is crucial. In other words, it would be best not to choose between the determinate/indeterminate opposition, but from our usual conceptual grid, this type of "vital

difference" can only appear as indeterminate. In later works, such as *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* Deleuze continues this idea and speaks of philosophy in relation to a lived transcendental (*un vécu transcendental*), which plays with the paradox of being both lived and transcendental, at the same time particular and universal. In these ways, Deleuze attempts to point to a realm beyond hegemony, false necessity, and reification. In other words, although the role of phenomenology is to grasp the lived separate from conceptual confusion, the separation between phenomenon and self is itself problematic and hence the actual thing itself can only be expressed through specific paradoxes. Indeed, in the Buddhist context, the self itself is the root of confusion and reification. To express something like the above paradoxical determinations, Zhang cannot stop at leaving words, concepts, and mind. He affirms some type of mark made in this nonconceptual space.

Similar to Bergson and Deleuze, Zhang attempts to avoid the contradiction between the universal and the particular, or the antinomies between the equal and the unequal, which he sees in Kant and Hegel and the various theorists of the universal principle. Of course, Zhang contends that it is not just because of Hegel that we are stuck in more mundane antinomies related to language and concepts; rather our whole conceptual framework, generated by attachments to the self and to objects, confronts us as a type of inescapable logic. Zhang claims that such a Yogācāra analysis of the production of categories actually anticipates Kant's idea of categories as the conditions for the possibility of experience. However, unlike Kant, Zhang repeatedly points out that these categories are not eternal but produced contingently by our desire. Like post-Hegelian philosophers, Zhang decenters the world of subjects and objects and positions a more primordial phenomenological realm. Access to such a realm, however, is premised on various practices leading to self-negation.

Conclusion: Situating Zhang Taiyan's reading of Yogācāra and Zhuangzi historically

If the above analysis is correct, we are left with the question of how to explain the convergence between Zhang Taiyan and post-Hegelian philosophy. One approach would be to conclude that Yogācāra Buddhists and Zhuangzi spoke to universal philosophical issues and in some way anticipated issues in modern French and German philosophy. Zhang Taiyan then discovered their hidden meaning. Such an interpretation, however, overlooks the selective nature of Zhang's reading of Yogācāra and indeed the selective nature of philosophical interpretations of Yogācāra. There is no doubt that such epistemological discourses existed, but during the time of Asaṅga, such abstract Buddhist epistemologies coexisted with a number of other theories, such as those about heaven and hell or reincarnation. In other words, Zhang brings Yogācāra Buddhists and Zhuangzi closer to the epistemological space of modern philosophy and modern scholarship, by extracting Yogācāra epistemology from its larger original context. From this perspective, when making the comparison to Western philosophy, we are dealing with Zhang's Yogācāra, rather than with some transhistorical body of doctrines. Given Zhang's active role in interpreting Buddhist texts, we should probably call Zhang a "post-Hegelian" philosopher. Indeed, he is closer to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson in both time and in thought than he was to Hegel. However, we cannot explain this confluence of ideas merely on the basis of texts. Although Zhang was somewhat familiar with Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, his knowledge of these texts was limited to what he read in translation. So rather than merely understanding the texts of Zhang and Yogācāra, one needs to understand the social contexts that encouraged doctrines to be read one way rather than another.

One must thus ask how this epistemological space, which entailed concepts of subject, object, abstraction, and equality, and their potential overcoming, came to be. Clearly at this point, in the Chinese case we could point to the growing popularity of science and the mingling of science and Yogācāra, which Erik J. Hammerstrom examines in his contribution to this volume. I am in some

sense adding a footnote to Hammerstrom's argument, by contending that the conditions for the possibility of the equation of Yogācāra with science and modern philosophy, concerns a larger epistemological shift related to global capitalism and the various structures that it entailed. In the first section of this essay, we have seen the ways in which capitalism entered China during the late Qing, and I suggest that this contributed to changing epistemologies in late-Qing China.

Perhaps the most important presupposition of modern philosophy and epistemology concerns the opposition between the subject and object, and behind this opposition lies the negation of previous categories of hierarchy. One of the essential elements of a scientific worldview is reification, in that objects are supposed to exist independently of subjects. In modern philosophy, subject and object are thought of in the abstract, separated from their various particular relationships. Reification, seeing the world as populated by things, brings with it notions of equality, namely that all objects are the same insofar as they are things.

Politically this change has been both liberating and oppressive. The history of political movements is replete with examples of minorities using the concept of equality to claim rights qua humans, thus negating their particularity. On the flipside, this negation of particularity implies that minorities cease to be minorities. Indeed Marx has been reproached for negating the identity of Jews as Jews in his famous essay "On the Jewish Question," where he argued for an emancipation from religion rather than for religious freedom. Zhang Taiyan himself could be seen as juggling with some of these same contradictions. On the one hand, one can hardly find a stronger proponent of the nation-state, and we have seen how the concept of equality is embedded in modern bureaucracy and concepts of national citizenship. Such concepts of identity and difference pervade Zhang's work as he underscored the difference between Han and Manchu identity, which presupposed the self-same identity of both the Han and the Manchu ethnicities. This has led some scholars to think of Zhang as a multiculturalist.

On the other hand, Zhang's philosophical works pose the question of identity, equality, and sameness at a deeper level. Rather than working with pre-established reified categories of Manchu and Han, in *An Interpretation*, Zhang looks at the formation of identity and equality in general. We can locate the emergence of the dominance of identity and equality in a tripartite structure associated with the capitalist world, namely the commodity form or commodity exchange, bureaucratic organization, and global capitalist world system. In other words, with the abolition of particular and naturalized privilege, status, and rank, the concept of equality emerges; however, the price one pays for this concept is the obliteration of particularity—a new type of domination.

Zhang Taiyan spent his early career in late-Qing China and then wrote his famous essays on Buddhism and Daoism in Meiji Japan at a time when both countries were in the midst of being incorporated into this world of capitalist domination. Early twentieth-century China experienced increasing bureaucratization with only limited market exchange, while Meiji Japan, especially the late Meiji, represented a place where the processes of both bureaucratization and commodification were further developed than in China. Once Zhang went to Japan, he came in contact with a number of Japan scholars and activists, many of whom were critical of the modernization processes taking place in Japan at the time.

In this context, Zhang mobilizes *Yogācāra to attack* the origins of the concept of abstraction at the heart of much of modernity, but does not simply posit an unchanging concrete identity as the site of resistance. Rather, Zhang invokes the equalization of things, which goes beyond conventional ideas of identity and difference. The ideal that Zhang proposed appears to us today as a utopia, one that has yet to find institutional form. It is a world in which the concrete is not separated from the abstract universal, where individuals are not alienated from the structures that govern them, and

where equality does not imply the denuding of particularity, as it does in abstract models of citizenship. The above analysis suggests that like post-Hegelians, such as Schopenhauer, Zhang uses transhistorical categories to analyze and combat the above reification and alienation. To this extent, his project could not understand its own conditions of possibility in historically specific concepts, such as commodity and capital. However, his critique of reification remains important in light of the modernizing paradigm that came to dominate much of twentieth-century Chinese intellectual history. The task that remains, of course, is how to transform the social conditions that constantly reproduce reification. This would be the social analog to the Buddhist idea of overcoming attachments (zhi 執). <>

Chinese Character Manipulation in Literature and Divination: The Zichu by Zhou Lianggong (1612–1672) edited and translated by Anne Kathrin Schmiedl [Prognostication in History, Brill, 9789004422360]

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In **Chinese Character Manipulation in Literature and Divination: The Zichu by Zhou Lianggong (1612–1672)**, Anne Schmiedl analyses the little-studied method of Chinese character manipulation as found in imperial sources. Focusing on one of the most famous and important works on this subject, the Zichu by Zhou Lianggong (1612–1672), Schmiedl traces and discusses the historical development and linguistic properties of this method. This book represents the first thorough study of the Zichu and the reader is invited to explore how, on the one hand, the educated elite leveraged character manipulation as a literary play form. On the other hand, as detailed exhaustively by Schmiedl, practitioners of divination also used and altered the visual, phonetic, and semantic structure of Chinese characters to gain insights into events and objects in the material world.

Script and Divination Intertwined

In 2014, the twentieth FIFA World Cup took place in Brazil from the 12th of June to the 13th of July. As is the case for any great football tournament, fans and pundits enthusiastically discussed the prospective outcome of the event. One Chinese observer posted a picture online, commenting "I know the result of this year's World Cup". This post gained widespread attention among users on Weibo and WeChat. It predicted the outcome of the World Cup by analysing the Chinese denominations of four different countries participating in the tournament. The picture showed the four denominations for Germany (*Deguo* 德国), Argentina (*Agenting* 阿根廷), Holland (*Helan* 荷兰), and Brazil (*Baxi* 巴西). Within these characters, red strokes were singled out. These red strokes revealed four Chinese numerals: one (*yi* 一) in the character *de* 德, two (*er* 二) in the character *ting* 廷, three (*san* 三) in the character *lan* 兰, and four (*si* 四) in the character *xi* 西. Through this picture, the author suggested the results of the World Cup would see Germany win, with Argentina, Holland, and Brazil in second, third, and fourth place, respectively.

The content of this post shows a fusion between playfulness and seriousness. On the one hand, the author seems to have meant this post as an entertaining comment. She inserted a laughing emoticon after the line "I know the result of this year's World Cup", clearly transmitting a humorous tone through this pictogram. Furthermore, the author describes herself as a young woman interested in "having fun with character games" (玩文字游戏) in her account description, which also implies a certain playfulness. On the other hand, this post also proffers a more serious connotation, since the prediction turned out to be correct: Germany won the World Cup and Argentina was placed second, followed by Holland, and then Brazil. On the day the author posted this picture—27th of June 2014—she could not have known the results yet, since the third-place play-off was only held on the 12th of July and the final on the 13th of July. At the time of the post, the group stage had just wrapped up, and the round of sixteen was about to start on the day following the prediction, the 28th of June. Therefore, the post's prediction was surprisingly accurate given how early in the proceedings it was made.

In this post, Chinese characters are taken apart according to their graphical structure to obtain insights into the future. The knowledge gained from this analysis is then used as a basis to judge a specific situation in the material world—in this case, the outcome of the World Cup. This method is not a new invention, but has its roots earlier in Chinese history, in imperial China. It is denominated—among other terms—as the fathoming of Chinese characters, *cezi* 测字, the dissection of Chinese characters, *chaizi* 拆字, the physiognomising of Chinese characters, *xiangzi* 相字, the separation of Chinese characters, *biezi* 别字, or the breaking of Chinese characters, *pozi* 破字. All terms refer to the same method.

There is, and was, a preference for particular terms in different historical periods. Contemporary sources, for example, tend to refer to the method as *cezi* or, more rarely, as *chaizi*. *Chaizi* was the more common designation for the method in the Ming 明 (1368–1644) and Qing 清 (1644–1911)

dynasties. *Xiangzi*, *biezi*, and *pozi* were all used before the Ming dynasty, and are only rarely used today. Other terms for this method exist or have existed as well.

All these designations describe the act of manipulating one or more Chinese characters. While these designations all refer to the same method, their meaning is linked to different senses and concepts, ranging from visual to tangible observation of Chinese characters. The physiognomising of Chinese characters, a term fashioned after the divinatory method of reading facial features, physiognomy (*xiangshu* 相術), calls to mind the visual analysis of characters. By contrast, the breaking of Chinese characters conveys the idea of a rather physical approach to writing. These designations express different layers of understanding Chinese writing, ranging from optical, but bodily detached forms of analysis to actively engaged, "hands-on" perspectives towards characters.

Contemporary Chinese sources mostly refer to the method as the fathoming of Chinese characters, *cezi*, projecting the notion of carefully estimating, appraising, interpreting, and finally understanding a written character. For reasons of uniformity, the contemporary term *cezi* will be exclusively applied to designate the method of character manipulation in this study. Independent of its designation, character manipulation incorporates a wide variety of different techniques to analyse the structure of Chinese characters: it includes examination of their graphic shape—as seen in the example above—, but also of their semantic or phonetic value. Even if this is not clear from some of the designations, character manipulation incorporates graphic, phonetic, and semantic elements of writing.

Character manipulation is grounded in two different, yet intersecting worlds: the fields of writing and divination. Both of these domains are critically important for the study and understanding of imperial and modern China. Chinese script, language, and its structure have been, and are, the topic of many academic works—scholars discuss the origin and development of Chinese writing, the linguistic properties of the Chinese language, its application in different socio-historic settings, and other topics. These works often describe the rules and regulations of the Chinese language. At the same time, however, the Chinese language has a reputation of not adhering to any rules or regulations, of "being without grammar". Christoph Harbsmeier summarises this rift between regularity and an absence of regularity, or flexibility:

> Grammatical suppleness and flexibility should not be confused with (mechanical) grammatical looseness or lack of precision. Classical Chinese grammar is certainly much more precise than would appear from current descriptions. Organisms are precisely structured subtle things. They are more highly structured than a very advanced rigid device. What I am suggesting is that Chinese is highly structured in supple and subtle ways analogous to those of organisms.

One example of this tension between regularity and flexibility of literary Chinese grammar, he argues, can be found in a form of patterned poetry, the Chinese palindrome (*huiwen* 回文). Chinese palindromes may be read forwards or backwards, but still convey the same meaning. Many of them can be parsed in different ways. In these cases, it does not matter from which character one begins to decipher the text; the resulting reading is broadly the same. Chinese palindromes often function like puzzles: they might be read in any number of directions (for example horizontally, vertically, circularly) and the reader has to determine where to begin reading. Palindromes, thus, prove the flexibility of literary Chinese grammar, while still adhering to certain regulations like prosodic patterns.

This tension between regulations and an absence of regulations facilitates creativity, playfulness, and, thus, invention. Palindromes, as well as other forms of patterned poetry and some rhetorical devices, can be considered as a form of literary entertainment from two different perspectives. On

the one hand, the author proves his talent for constructing skilful poetry. On the other hand, readers challenge their intellect when attempting to find the correct way(s) of understanding a palindrome. Members of the educated elite amused themselves by creating and solving these literary riddles. Franke underlines this quality by calling them "a literary play-form of the *homo ludens* among the literati." Thus, palindromes and other literary games negotiate the tension between a highly structured but very flexible grammar in a creative, playful style. This premise ultimately facilitates invention.

Beyond being a playful pastime, there is a more serious side to writing and its application. Mastery of script was an important skill for any imperial official and it could decide over his career and future. From the Song 宋 dynasty (960–1279) to the end of the imperial period, imperial examinations were the most important step towards entering officialdom, and, therefore, to an economically secure life. These examinations tested a candidate's knowledge of the orthodox canon of books and his skill in composing texts in specific literary forms. Similarly, the style and quality of written documents, such as petitions, could decide over their success or failure and a poem could lead to favour or disapproval of a superior. Thus, the preface of the poem "Tall Gate Palace Rhapsody" ("Changmen fu 長門賦") recounts how the estranged Empress Chen 陳皇后 (around 140 BCE) allegedly commissioned this poem to regain the Emperor's favour.

As well as the field of writing, character manipulation is furthermore grounded in the field of divination, which is also of great importance in imperial and modern China. The Chinese have created a broad repertoire of methods to predict the future; there is a long history of divination playing an important role in Chinese society. Throughout Chinese imperial history, people from all walks of life trusted in these methods: emperors, statesmen, and commoners used them, to resolve their doubts and fears in a wide variety of different situations in their public functions and private lives. Divination has to be understood as a means of dealing with uncertainties about the course of current and future developments. The invention and application of divinatory methods serves as a way to dispel doubts about the future and to gain security when making important decisions in life. This notion is not unique to China—to understand the course of future events and the will of the gods, the Romans practiced divinatory observation of birds, augury, and the Greeks referred to the Oracle of Delphi to navigate insecurities in life. Indeed, examples are numerous and could be continued *ad infinitum*.

Most Chinese methods of divination have a long-standing history of a thousand or more years and are still in use today. The most famous example is prediction based on the Classic of divination, the *Zhouyi* 周易 (*Changes of the Zhou*). This text dates back to the 9th century BCE and found its way into the canon of the Confucian classics as early as the Han 漢 dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). It has since been read and interpreted in many different ways and its popularity continues today: multiple publications for interested laypeople appear each year and institutes such as the "Centre for Zhouyi and Ancient Chinese Philosophy" (*Yixue yu zhongguo gudai zhexue yanjiu zhongxin* 易学与中国古代哲学研究中心) at Shandong University (*Shandong daxue* 山东大学) in Jinan 济南 study its content and reception in an academic context. Apart from divination based on the *Zhouyi*, many other Chinese divinatory methods exist. Some of the more popular methods, like geomancy (*fengshui* 風水), which includes the auspicious arrangement of buildings and selection of gravesites, have found their way to the West in different configurations. Others are less known to observers outside China. One such example is divination on the basis of Chinese characters, *cezi*.

Chinese character manipulation as a divinatory method utilises the properties of characters at the margin between regulations and an absence of regulations in the same way as observed above in the discussion of literary styles. It adheres to the regulations and conventions of the construction of

Chinese characters, but it also disregards them to allow for a more flexible way of dealing with characters. Similar to Chinese palindromes, Chinese character manipulation also entails playfulness. Its operations involve creativity and Chinese characters are handled in unconventional ways, thereby generating innovative approaches towards those characters.

There is also a serious side to divination. In the eyes of a practitioner, divination reveals the truth about the past, present, and future; it offers significant information on all aspects of an individual's destiny or the course of history. Numerous examples from imperial China bear witness to this gravitas; information gained through a divinatory act often shows not only the course of an individual's future, but also of whole dynasties. In the gravest of senses, divination might reveal the death of the querent or the end of a ruling house. Practitioners and clients therefore never understood divination exclusively as a playful pastime, but were always at least tacitly aware of its serious implications.

The method of character manipulation is not only grounded in the two fields of writing and divination, it is situated at their intersection and shows the interplay and fusion between these two fields. It offers insights into both fields from a unique angle, as it negotiates between aspects of playfulness and seriousness, as well as creativity and regularity. It furthermore provides understanding of Chinese ways of thinking about language—in particular, about the Chinese writing system.

This study approaches the method of Chinese character manipulation in its literary as well as divinatory application. It examines the tension between regularity and flexibility with regard to the construction of Chinese characters and, consequently, illuminates the creativity inherent in these manipulations. The study describes the playfulness involved in such a process, but, at the same time, emphasises the seriousness of character manipulation. The distinction between these two opposing elements is often blurred. Playfulness and seriousness can overlap with, and complement, each other: a story about the fate of an important historical figure might therefore be presented in a playful, entertaining manner, but also solemnly foreshadow the protagonist's demise.

Studying the manipulation of Chinese characters can enhance collective knowledge and understanding about writing and divination. Nonetheless, hitherto, the topic of Chinese character manipulation, especially in a divinatory context, has been largely neglected in academic research. Indeed, to this date, no monographic study on the subject exists and only a small number of essays focus on it. None of these sources address questions posed by the tension between regularity and flexibility or the seriousness and playfulness inherent in character manipulation. However, these few sources do underline the lasting importance of the method by highlighting that divination by the manipulation of Chinese characters is still actively practiced in the modern Chinese-speaking world. This fact is further supported by an abundance of modern Chinese popular publications on the subject. Moreover, practices with respect to name selection (*qiming* 起名 or *quming* 取名) and name changing (*gaiming* 改名), are also connected to the method of character manipulation. These practices are popular in contemporary Chinese speaking countries. Finding and using an auspicious name is of great importance to many people today as it was in the past: in imperial China, great consideration was given to selecting the title for reign periods, so-called era names (*nianhao* 年號), while today the same care goes into selecting names for individuals or companies. An auspicious name is often deemed the basis for success in life. The manipulation of Chinese characters, therefore, is a living tradition. Consequently, an academic study on this topic is long overdue.

To address the issues introduced above, the present study analyses a Ming dynasty work entitled *Zichu* 字觸 (*Realising a Character's True Meaning*) in detail and takes it as a basis to examine

connections between the spheres of writing and divination, as well as playfulness and seriousness. The *Zichu* is one of the most famous, if not *the* most famous, work on character manipulation. It was written by Zhou Lianggong 周亮工 (1612–1672) and offers accounts of character manipulation from a wealth of different sources and dynasties. The lasting importance of the *Zichu* for character manipulation can be appreciated by noting that it is still reprinted in its entirety or in parts in numerous popular publications. While the *Zichu*encompasses examples of anecdotes from different sources and dynasties, the selection and presentation of entries is based on Zhou Lianggong's choices. The analysis, therefore, shows the specific approach to character manipulation of an official during the late Ming and early Qing dynasties. Zhou's world-view influenced certain aspects of the book, such as its arrangement, and which texts are included therein.

In the first chapter of this study, I define the method of Chinese character manipulation by observing it from linguistic and historical perspectives. I compare and contrast the manipulation of Chinese characters to the rules and conventions of Chinese character composition as elucidated through Ledderose's module theory. A first overview shows that character manipulation builds on these regulations, but also deviates from them significantly by breaking them in different manners ("An Introduction to *Cezi* Vis-à-vis the Chinese Writing System"). In addition to this ahistorical linguistic analysis of character manipulation, I also put the method into a historical context through observing influences on its development. The method was mostly shaped by different notions and texts connected to the fields of script theory and divination. While no exact date for the evolution of character manipulation into a separate method can be given, the main influences on its development all lie before the end of the Han dynasty ("A Chronological Overview of Historical Influences on *Cezi*"). The recognition and description of character manipulation as an independent divinatory method only happens much later. Particularly from the Song until the Qing dynasty, works focusing on character manipulation appeared ("A History of the Study of *Cezi*"). One of the most important sources on character manipulation in existence is the *Zichu* by Ming dynasty literatus Zhou Lianggong. Zhou's life as an official during the transitory period from the late Ming to the early Qing dynasty and his *Zichu* are introduced to the reader to situate the following analysis of the *Zichu* into a historical context ("The *Zichu* by Zhou Lianggong"). In the *Zichu*, knowledge is collected and classified. It thus belongs to the genre of categorised compendia (*leishu* 類書). During the Ming dynasty, a wealth of these categorised compendia appeared. Similar to the *Zichu*, some other categorised compendia also deal with divinatory topics. For example, three works discussing the topic of dream prognostication stem from the same period. The *Zichu* has to be understood in this context.

In the second and third chapters of this study, I examine the *Zichu* in detail and the way in which it presents the method of character manipulation. More specifically, in the second chapter, I focus on the five texts accompanying the body of the work. Following Gérard Genette's definition of paratexts, I consider the two prefaces (*xu* 序), the two postfaces (*ba* 跋), and the guide on how to use the *Zichu* ("*Zichu* Fanli 字觸凡例") as important sources, shaping the reader's way of understanding the main text. Zhou Lianggong only wrote the "Fanli" himself, the other texts are attributable to various of Zhou's acquaintances. Each of these five authors (including Zhou) sets out a framework for the *Zichu* by situating it in the context of character manipulation ("Visualising Character Theory", "Comprehending Characters by Observing the World", "Exhausting and Embracing the 'Hidden' and the 'Humorous' ", "Divining with Characters on the Grounds of Encrypted Words", and "Instructions on How to Use the *Zichu*"). While they mostly advance similar insights on Chinese character theory and character manipulation as a literary as well as divinatory method, they do not concur on all points discussed. Even if most of these five authors view the entity of a Chinese character in a similar way, there are slight differences in their understanding

("Meaningful Designations: Linguistic Theory in the Paratexts"). All five texts adhere to the same world-view of a cosmos permeated by meaning as a context for character manipulation. The treatment of divination in this setting is quite heterogeneous. One author does not refer to it at all; others do, but see it as a leisure pursuit subordinate to scholarly endeavours. Interestingly, though, some of them also emphasise Zhou Lianggong's talent for understanding Chinese characters in this context ("A Scholar's Leisure Time Activity: Divination in the Paratexts").

In the third chapter, I analyse the six chapters of the main text of the *Zichu*. Zhou Lianggong accumulated nearly four hundred anecdotes on character manipulation from different sources in the body of the *Zichu*. He classifies them according to six different approaches to character manipulation ("Hidden Messages and Prophetic Songs and Poems", "Temporal, Individual, and Morphological Coincidences", "Heterogeneous Examples of Character Manipulation", "Prophetic Dreams and Misinterpretations of Characters", "Witty Banter and Orthography Riddles", and "Etymological Character Explanations"). These approaches are very similar in that they all rely on the same understanding of character manipulation. Manipulations in a literary as well as divinatory context operate on the premise of a cosmos in which everything is interrelated. Chinese characters are connected to, and expressions of, events and objects in the material world. Character manipulation serves as a tool to unveil these connections, but only in the hands of a person with an innate talent for the method. Fate is understood as determined ("Meaningful Correlations: Divination and Fate in the *Zichu*"). Character manipulation as a script-method relies on conventions of Chinese character composition. Its techniques work according to the graphical structure, the phonetic value, or the semantic value of Chinese characters. Additionally, other divinatory methods and outside influences are drawn upon during character manipulations. However, most of the manipulations, as presented in the *Zichu*, rely on the graphical form of a character. Even if the Chinese script expresses language and cannot be understood distinctly from it, the *Zichu* exhibits a world-view primarily based on writing. Here, thinking always starts from the written character, never from the spoken word ("Thought Based on Writing: Script-Understanding as Apparent in the *Zichu*").

Character Manipulation, Then and Now

Herein, Zhou Lianggong's *Zichu*, which offers a broad collection of entries on Chinese character manipulation from different sources and dynasties, was taken as a corpus for analysing the manipulation of Chinese characters. The findings provide a detailed picture of the method of character manipulation in respect to divinatory and literary considerations, as seen through the lens of a Ming dynasty categorised compendium.

The *Zichu* entails examples of character manipulation in a divinatory context as well as examples of the utilisation of *cezi* as a rhetorical device in a literary setting. These contents mirror the deep embeddedness of character manipulation in the two fields of writing and divination.

On the one hand, character manipulation exhibits an understanding of Chinese characters based on traditional notions of, and works on, script theory. In this capacity, the six categories of writing as exemplified by Xu Shen in his *Shuowen jiezi*, the mythical scribe Cang Jie as the creator of Chinese writing, Li Si and the script unification of the Qin dynasty, as well as works on calligraphy and famous calligraphers are alluded to. However, while traditional notions of script understanding and the theory of the six categories of writing serve as a basis for theoretical discussions on *cezi*, these foundations are adapted in the actual application of the method. The examples in the paratexts and the six chapters of the *Zichu* show that *cezi* does partly rely on conventions of character construction, but not entirely. Indeed, *cezi* deviates regularly from script conventions and often breaks its regulations, proving its flexibility. Character manipulation is, thus, positioned as convergent

with, but not rigidly aligned to, orthodox script conventions. Most authors of the paratexts and the anecdotes in the *Zichu* embrace this openly.

On the other hand, the study of *cezi* shows that its development relies on notions and texts connected to divination in the same way that it depends on concepts and works of script theory. In this context, the *Yijing*, the myth of the invention of the trigrams by Fu Xi, different methods of divination, and famous diviners are alluded to. Numerous examples show the application of *cezi* in a divinatory sense, and they bear witness to the serious nature of these divinatory acts. In these examples, fate tends to be presented as determined. Even if protagonists try to alter their destiny, they ultimately fail. Only one manipulation of a Chinese character is deemed accurate in each situation, as there is only one potential outcome of events. All other possibilities, even if plausible according to character theory, are spurious. At the same time, these examples also entail a certain playfulness: anecdotes are often presented in a humorous manner, even if they discuss a bleak topic.

Cezi as a method at the intersection of the fields of writing and divination provides insights into both fields as well as their connection. This unique interplay shows, that in the application of character manipulation, the boundaries between seriousness and playfulness, creativity and regularity are often blurred.

Regardless of whether anecdotes are embedded in a literary or divinatory context, all examples of *cezi* rely on the same world-view. The entries of the *Zichu* present a cosmos permeated by meaning, in which every character manipulation accurately refers to events in the material world. The paratexts further emphasise this world-view through the citation of sources on the development of *cezi*. These sources all follow a similar process in their argumentation: after an observation of nature, written patterns are created. These sources as well as anecdotes on character manipulation stress the link between material world and written character—be it in a divinatory or literary setting. In both settings, *cezi* starts from the same basis and offers the same significant act of manipulation, because it is related to and represents events and objects in the real world in each form of application. Thus, the paratexts and entries on character manipulation in the *Zichu* deal with both applications of *cezi* as the same process.

Character manipulation has a long-standing history. Even before the formation of an independent divinatory method, its techniques were applied in a literary capacity since as early as the *Zuozhuan*. From then on, the employment of character manipulation can be observed in many different genres of literature and as a divinatory method throughout all of imperial China. This fact bears witness to the method's importance in the official as well as the private sphere: as a rhetorical tool, character manipulation was used in official petitions as well as private letters and as a divinatory method, it was applied to matters of state and individuals.

Chinese character manipulation remains important nowadays; *cezi* is a living tradition. It is still used in rhetorical and divinatory capacities in contemporary Chinese-speaking countries. Popular publications on the subject of character divination keep appearing as well. Furthermore, the widely spread modern practices of name selection and name changing also rely on techniques of *cezi* to a certain degree. Thus, the study of Chinese character manipulation is meaningful from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective—it offers insights into the unique way in which practitioners past and present regard their own writing system.

An interesting example of the continued importance of character manipulation can be found online. In July 2016, independent journalist and columnist Gao Yu 高瑜 (born 1944) posted a newly created Chinese character on her Twitter account. The character consisted of the upper part of the character for "party" (*dang* 党) without the two strokes at the bottom and, underneath it, the

character for "country" (*guo* 国). In the accompanying text, Gao, who has multiple times been imprisoned as a dissident in China, states she found the character in a group in the messaging software WeChat. She also explains the character's reading, which consists of four syllables: "*dang zai guo shang* 党在国上", translating to "the party is on top of the country". This reading is inspired by the character's composition: the upper part of the character "party" is written on top of the character "country". At the same time, the reading is not just a description of the character's graphical structure, it also communicates a specific opinion about the contemporary state of politics and the role of the Chinese Communist Party.

The example above could easily be seen as another creative approach to playfully dealing with Chinese script. However, this example also underlines the seriousness inherent in these character manipulations, even today. As Victor Mair aptly stated in an online comment shortly after Gao's initial post in 2016 "It is particularly poignant that this new character has been circulating at the very moment when the Chinese Communist Party is celebrating the 95th anniversary of its founding." At the border between playfulness and seriousness, creativity and regularity, character manipulation continues to have a significant role in the contemporary Chinese-speaking world, as it did in imperial China. <>

MURASAKI SHIKIBU'S THE TALE OF GENJI PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES edited by James McMullen [Oxford Studies in Philosophy and Literature, Oxford Studies in Philosophy and Literature Oxford University Press, 9780190654979]

Murasaki Shikibu's THE TALE OF GENJI is variously read as a work of feminist protest, the world's first psychological novel and even as a post-modern masterpiece. Commonly seen as Japan's greatest literary work, its literary, cultural, and historical significance has been thoroughly acknowledged. As a work focused on the complexities of Japanese court life in the Heian period, however, THE TALE OF GENJI has never before been the subject of philosophical investigation. The essays in this volume address this oversight, arguing that the work contains much that lends itself to philosophical analysis.

The authors of this volume demonstrate that THE TALE OF GENJI confronts universal themes such as the nature and exercise of political power, freedom, individual autonomy and agency, renunciation, gender, and self-expression; it raises deep concerns about aesthetics and the role of art, causality, the relation of man to nature, memory, and death itself. Although Murasaki Shikibu may not express these themes in the text as explicitly philosophical problems, the complex psychological tensions she describes and her observations about human conduct reveal an underlying framework of philosophical assumptions about the world of the novel that have implications for how we understand these concerns beyond the world of Genji. Each essay in this collection reveals a part of this framework, situating individual themes within larger philosophical and historical contexts. In doing so, the essays both challenge prevailing views of the novel and each other, offering a range of philosophical interpretations of the text and emphasizing the THE TALE OF GENJI's place as a masterful work of literature with broad philosophical significance.

The **THE TALE OF GENJI**, written by a Murasaki Shikibu, a female courtier commonly celebrated as a genius, is the greatest work of Japanese literature and has fascinated readers for more than a millennium. It depicts a court life of great sophistication over four generations, concentrating on the ascendancy of a gifted son of an emperor and his relationships with numerous women. Its psychological depth and brilliant narrative technique have astounded critics and general readers alike. Outside Japan, however, little attention has been paid to the philosophical assumptions underpinning this compelling masterpiece. The present volume contains eight essays by scholars of classical Japanese literature, which explore the assumptions and beliefs concerning human experience and its literary presentation that inform the narrative. An introduction sets the historical scene. Successive chapters analyze aspects of the work that are fundamental to its understanding of its own world and, at the same time, resonate with preoccupations of the twenty-first century reading public. The first group of three essays addresses the nature of political power and its relationship with mythology, the concept of time and space and the influence of China, and the construction of moral personhood that enables men to engage in multiple love affairs. Three essays describe the important cultural practices of poetry, calligraphy, and garden- making. Two concluding essays explore the concept of gender that facilitated the creation of the work by a female author in a society which disprivileged women and the pervasive influence of Buddhism on both the work itself and how it has been understood in Japan.

Oxford Studies in Philosophy and Literature

At least since Plato had Socrates criticize the poets and attempt to displace Homer as the authoritative articulator and transmitter of human experience and values, philosophy and literature have developed as partly competing, partly complementary enterprises. Both literary writers and philosophers have frequently studied and commented on each other's texts and ideas, sometimes with approval, sometimes with disapproval, in their efforts to become clearer about human life and about valuable commitments—moral, artistic, political, epistemic, metaphysical, and religious, as may be. Plato's texts themselves register the complexity and importance of these interactions in being dialogues in which both deductive argumentation and dramatic narration do central work in furthering a complex body of views.

While these relations have been widely recognized, they have also frequently been ignored or misunderstood, as academic disciplines have gone their separate ways within their modern institutional settings. Philosophy has often turned to science or mathematics as providing models of knowledge; in doing so it has often explicitly set itself against cultural entanglements and literary devices, rejecting, at least officially, the importance of plot, figuration, and imagery in favor of supposedly plain speech about the truth. Literary study has moved variously through formalism, structuralism, post-structuralism, and cultural studies, among other movements, as modes of approach to a literary text. In doing so it has understood literary texts as sample instances of images, structures, personal styles, or failures of consciousness, or it has seen the literary text as a largely fungible product, fundamentally shaped by wider pressures and patterns of consumption and expectation that affect and figure in non-literary textual production as well. It has thus set itself against the idea that major literary texts productively and originally address philosophical problems of value and commitment precisely through their form, diction, imagery, and development, even while these works also resist claiming conclusively to solve the problems that occupy them.

These distinct academic traditions have yielded important perspectives and insights. But in the end none of them has been kind to the idea of major literary works as achievements in thinking about values and human life, often in distinctive, open, self-revising, self-critical ways. At the same time readers outside institutional settings, and often enough philosophers and literary scholars too, have turned to major literary texts precisely in order to engage with their productive, materially and medially specific patterns and processes of thinking. These turns to literature have, however, not so far been systematically encouraged within disciplines, and they have generally occurred independently of each other.

The aim of this series is to make manifest the multiple, complex engagements with philosophical ideas and problems that lie at the hearts of major literary texts. In doing so, its volumes aim not only to help philosophers and literary scholars of various kinds to find rich affinities and provocations to further thought and work, they also aim to bridge various gaps between academic disciplines and between those disciplines and the experiences of extra-institutional readers.

Each volume focuses on a single, undisputedly major literary text. Both philosophers with training and experience in literary study and literary scholars with training and experience in philosophy are invited to engage with themes, details, images, and incidents in the focal text, through which philosophical problems are held in view, worried at, and reformulated. Decidedly not a project simply to formulate A's philosophy of X as a finished product, merely illustrated in the text, and decidedly not a project to explain the literary work entirely by reference to external social configurations and forces, the effort is instead to track the work of open thinking in literary forms, as they lie both neighbor to and aslant from philosophy. As Walter Benjamin once wrote, "new centers of reflection are continually forming," as problems of commitment and value of all kinds take on new shapes for human agents in relation to changing historical circumstances, where reflective address remains possible. By considering how such centers of reflection are formed and expressed in and through literary works, as they engage with philosophical problems of agency, knowledge, commitment, and value, these volumes undertake to present both literature and philosophy as, at times, productive forms of reflective, medial work in relation both to each other and to social circumstances and to show how this work is specifically undertaken and developed in distinctive and original ways in exemplary works of literary art. by Richard Eldridge

Set within Japan's Heian court intrigue and Sino-Japanese cultural relations, Murasaki Shikibu's masterpiece Tale of Genji explores the position of women and the manners and rituals of Shinto's spirit possession, Japanese mythology blended with Buddhism.

The introduction describes the supreme position of Murasaki Shikibu's **THE TALE OF GENJI** in the Japanese literary and cultural tradition and the general character of the work as the story of Genji, the son of an emperor, and those around him. It addresses the role of philosophy in this extended and episodic narrative, maintaining that it rests on assumptions concerning human experience and its literary representation that can be explored in philosophical terms. It introduces what is known of the author and the creation of her work in the early-eleventh-century Heian period imperial court, together with the intellectual and religious traditions, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shinto, that informed attitudes to life in the contemporary world.

THE TALE OF GENJI is described by Kawabata Yasunari (1899–1972), Japan's first winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, as "the highest pinnacle of Japanese literature" and "a miracle." Seldom has a work of literature so deeply and permanently colored its nation's cultural and aesthetic heritage. Since its creation in the early eleventh century, the *Genji* has cast a spell on its readers. Some two centuries after its completion, the Juntoku Emperor (r. 1210–21) referred to it as "the supreme treasure of Japan." Estimated to be twice as long as *War and Peace*, it has the capacity to subvert the reader's sense of reality. A seventeenth-century samurai described what he called "*Genji* people": "Their whole lives they study nothing else but remain concerned exclusively with the *Genji.* When they do study something different, they treat it as ancillary to the *Genji.* . . . So what is fiction has become real."

The eight essays of this book offer a fresh exploration of the *Genji* from a philosophical point of view. The author, known to posterity as Murasaki Shikibu, was a lady-in-waiting to the Imperial Consort Shōshi (988–1074), in the reign of the Emperor Ichijō (r. 986–1011). As a woman, she was denied formal education and did not know philosophy as a discrete discipline. Yet her writing depicts a community of sophisticated men and women, and she had a grasp of the contemporary East Asian literary and intellectual tradition and of East Asian history. She was deeply influenced by many of the metaphysical assumptions of Buddhism, but also seems to have accepted a world of spirits and spirit possession. Her compellingly realistic narrative is informed by implicit but coherent assumptions about, and insights into, matters of both universal and historical interest, such as the exercise of power; space and time; morality in human relationships; freedom and causality; the nature of the cultural skills so important in her society; nature itself; gender roles; the nature of reality; and the role of literature. As Wiebke Denecke argues in her essay, these assumptions, often different from those of the modern West, and are amenable to philosophical exploration. With the rare exception of Genji's "defense of fiction" analyzed in Melissa McCormick's essay, they are "narrativized" in the *Genji*, that is, articulated implicitly through the narrative rather than raised as discrete or abstract philosophical problems. They are presented as lived experience, subject to success or failure and to the reaction of characters within the narrative and from time to time also to the narrator's comment.

Murasaki Shikibu was born around 973 into the middle rank of aristocracy qualified to serve the imperial family in person. Her father, Fujiwara no Tametoki (dates uncertain), served as a provincial governor, but won a reputation for learning and as a poet. In 996, Murasaki accompanied him to his appointment as governor of the northwestern province of Echizen, where he participated in poetry exchanges with Chinese immigrants. It has been speculated that Murasaki Shikibu herself might have

had some contact with representatives of a land not "bookish [and] foreign. . . but "living." It is certain that she developed a facility with written Chinese and knowledge of Chinese literature and history rare among women of her period.

From around 1006 she was back in the capital and in service to Shōshi. Some details of her life at court and a sense of her watchful and sometimes seemingly depressive temperament can be gathered from her fragmentarily preserved diary. She became known for her storytelling. Parts of The Tale of Genji were read to the Emperor. Her vast and panoramic work was written with care; she refers to a revised copy, which she evidently felt to be an improvement over an earlier version. Within the Japanese tradition, the *Genji* has been seen as a repository of cultural and aesthetic wisdom, depicting a society of great elegance and sophistication. For most readers, it is a creation of dazzling and sustained narrative skill and compelling characterization. Yet the work has also posed difficulties both in Japan and in the West and continues to do so for modern readers. As is touched upon in several essays here, some have considered it a repetitious and salacious story of seduction and even rape, a response still encountered even among sophisticated readers.

One preliminary question concerns genre. The Japanese term *monogatari* is normally understood to refer to a narrative of indeterminate length, whether historical or fictional. "Tale," established as the title of the work in English, seems too redolent of fireside coziness to categorize this panoramic, often unsettling or even subversive work. "Novel," *faut de mieux*, seems preferable. It was as a "novel" comparable to the *À la recerche du temps perdu of* Marcel Proust (1871–1922) that the work was greeted by Arthur Waley (1889–1966), the first translator of the whole work into English, and his contemporary, the critic Raymond Mortimer (1895–1980). Another methodological difficulty arises from the status of the novel as the most extensive witness to its own time and society. This raises the danger of circularity: to what extent are the tensions and questions raised in the novel characteristic of the world that produced it and to what extent do they reflect Murasaki's own insight and skill in challenging or even protesting the usages of her own society? The text is also linguistically difficult, and few, beyond specialists, can claim to have read it all closely in the original. Fortunately, several good modern translations into English and other languages, most recently in Dutch, are available.

Historical Background

A more serious challenge is posed by the historical and geographical remoteness of the society reflected in the novel. Since the seventh century, the archipelago had been affected by the expansion of Chinese influence across the East Asian region that accompanied the reunification of China following the disunion of the Six Dynasties (229–589). The period marked an interlude in Japanese history during which, starting from a decentralized tribal society based on kinship, a centralized bureaucratic state and court under a hereditary emperor developed on the Chinese pattern.

The major physical manifestation of this state-building in Murasaki Shikibu's time was the metropolitan capital city of Heiankyō, the scene of Genji's exploits and residence of the elite society depicted in the novel. Most of the action of the narrative takes place here and in its immediate environs. Central was the palace, residence of the reigning emperor and the location of his court and the national administration, replete with ministries and offices and a system of official Confucian-style state education. This was the site of a highly sophisticated civilization advanced in the fields of urban planning, architecture, dress, literature, writing, art, and music. This community was dominated by an elite of aristocratic lineages and their entourages, numbering some thousands. Within it, status was determined by genealogical and physical proximity to the emperor and the palace.

Outside the capital, the provincial Japanese world was negatively viewed in proportion to its distance from the capital as generally uncivilized and dangerous. Closest at varying distances are special sites that are associated with alternative histories and values. These are exploited by the novelist to interrogate the emperor-centered order of prestige. Such sites are the Northern Hills, where in a monastery Genji encounters the girl-child who is to be the love of his life; Suma and Akashi, the scene of his exile but also associated with alternatives to secular metropolitan values. Kyūshū, the southwest island, is depicted as the home of rough, uncivilized men. In the final sequence of the novel, in the following generation, the scene shifts to Uji, a private world deeply associated with Buddhism, a day's journey from the capital but distanced from the public rituals and cultural splendor of the emperor's court.

Beyond the archipelago lay the foreign land of China and further still India, the source of the Buddhism that colored the world of the novel. By the end of the tenth century, official relations with China had been suspended for a century, and opportunities for direct encounters with representatives of foreign cultures had become rare. The early eleventh century was a complex time in Japanese history. In the broadest terms, this was the period in which, across many fields, sociopolitical, cultural, religious, and linguistic resolutions were negotiated between indigenous insular and continental or peninsular influences. Ostensibly Japan possessed a Chinese-style public polity. And indeed, as Denecke shows, Chinese culture and values still exerted magnetism among the elite. However, behind the Chinese-style facade, Japanese society retained its earlier kin-based organization. Though bearing the titles of Chinese-style bureaucratic offices, court society coalesced into an oligarchic structure of elite kindreds. At its apex a limited coterie of aristocratic families enjoyed marital relations with the imperial lineage. Access to office tended to be based on hereditary status rather than a merit-based system determined by examinations, as was becoming established in China. So was created a relatively small, inward-looking community, highly conscious of hereditary status, rank, and privilege, many members of which were mutually well acquainted. The courtly society of Heian Japan was characterized by a sharp distinction between those within the court and others, overwhelming importance attached to rank and parentage, and elaborate ritual and etiquette. In these respects, even though it did not share their feudal origins, it had much in common with the medieval and Renaissance courts of Europe. This sophisticated and leisured elite occupied itself with such cultural practices as verse composition, calligraphy, and garden construction, of which the philosophical aspects are explored in this volume in the respective essays by Edward Kamens, Tomoko Sakomura, and Ivo Smits. The upper echelons of the court community that feature in the *Genji* derived their considerable wealth from complex landholding and fiscal arrangements. Wealth was channeled to them by taxation, which by the eleventh century had devolved into a part private patronage, part residual Chinese-style public fiscal system. Genji himself commanded great wealth.

Religion and Thought

Like the institutional structure, the intellectual and social climate in which Murasaki Shikibu wrote the *Genji* owed much to foreign influences. An overwhelming influence was Buddhism, filtered through its Chinese interpretation. In many ways, eleventh-century Japan was a client culture of China and drew on the pluralist intellectual world of the continent. In China, popular belief in spirits merged into a range of world-denying and world-affirming systems of thought and political philosophies. There existed well-defined schools, such as Daoism, Legalism, Confucianism, and Mohism. Much of this world of belief and thought had been transmitted to Japan by the time of Murasaki Shikibu, but did not form separate philosophical schools. One systematic category of learning with some kinship to philosophy, however, was Onmyōdō (Yinyang studies), really a kind of astrology, geomancy, and divination of Chinese origin, whose influence is apparent in the novel

mainly in the form of taboos against moving in certain directions at certain times and, as Ivo Smit's essay shows, in the construction of gardens.

Formally, the Heian state was founded on a Chinese Confucian order, its institutional and legal structures modeled after those of the Tang Dynasty (618–907). Education, based on the Chinese language needed for the operation of the Chinese-style institutions of government, was provided in the Chinese manner by the state, at a state institution of learning, the Academy (*Daigakuryō*). The curriculum was based on Confucianism, and access to office was, formally, allocated on the basis of examination on a Confucian curriculum. Confucius was worshipped in a twice-annual ceremony at a shrine in the Academy. By the eleventh century, however, a social distance had opened between the Academy and the elite social world of the court itself. The meritocratic functioning of the Academy had been subverted by hereditary privilege. The Academy community was regarded with disdain by the higher aristocracy; it commanded respect only in nostalgic retrospect; to the courtly elite in Genji's world, it was a "rabble". Outside the formal structures of the bureaucratic state, Confucian influence was also thin, though some Confucian practices were adopted as law in the eighth century, for instance aspects of family law and, in modified form, of mourning. Law itself, let alone courts or judicial procedures, however, is rarely mentioned in the novel.

Though China was a pervasive presence, specifically Confucian influence appears to have obtruded little. Confucianism is referred to teasingly by a grandee as "the teachings of what's his name" or "so and so" (*nanigashi*). Japanese elite society, however, found some support in Confucianism for its disprivileging of women. For instance, the Confucian "three subordinations" of women to men (successively father, husband, and son) are endorsed by an otherwise sometimes more liberal Genji. Yet, though high status and nubile woman were secluded, gender roles were complex and to some extent flexible, as Rajyashree Pandey argues in her essay.

The Ritual State

In one respect, however, there was a major congruence between eleventh-century elite society and Confucianism: Heian court society conformed with Confucian principles in respect of the fundamental importance of ritual. Rituals absorbed much of the energy of the court society of the time. Ancestral, apotropaic, petitionary, purificatory, or Buddhistic, they drew on various traditions, many of continental origin. Yet it was an indication of growing cultural self-confidence that many ritual practices legitimated indigenous tradition and mythology. A century before Murasaki Shikibu began writing her novel, a committee of scholars began to compile the *Engishiki* (Procedures of the Engi era), the last of a series of ritual compendia. This text brings together some five hundred rituals and a larger number of protocols prescribing a vast spectrum of activities ranging from enthronements through state-sponsored Buddhist rites to rituals concerned with other matters. The rich pomp, ceremony, and etiquette of the Heian court were its own end. In the words of the historical sociologist Norbert Elias (1897–1990) describing the comparable court societies of Europe, they constituted the "exhibition of court society to itself." It has been claimed that "Japan existed predominantly in a ritual mode." The Japanese state has been described as a "liturgical community" in which "ritual [was] soteriological in and of itself." James McMullen's essay argues that ritual performance was a key element also in the formation of personhood in the world of the *Genji*.

Buddhism

Coexisting with these features and contributing to the rich ritual life of the Heian court was the powerful religious influence of Buddhism. The teaching offered the deepest analysis of human experience in East Asia. Introduced to Japan from the sixth century, it had taken root institutionally with organization into sects, physically with dignified temples, socially through rituals and through medical activities, and intellectually through elaborate metaphysical, often mystical, doctrines.

Buddhism has a profound and pervasive, but also complex and ambivalent, impact on **THE TALE OF GENJI**. The teaching offered a basically negative view of the world and of human sensory experience. It provided a metaphysical framework, epistemology, and method for achieving liberation from the world and its attachments; it also offered individuals a path to salvation through renunciation. Its grand metaphysical speculations and logical discipline were, in theory, available through Chinese translations of Sanskrit Buddhist writings. Its doctrine that the world is ephemeral and illusory combines with its view that the Heian period coincided with an era of cosmic decline to promote an atmosphere of melancholy that intensifies over the course of the narrative. This pessimism contrasts oddly with the celebration of cultural grandeur of Part I. The Buddhist doctrine of transgenerational karma, a form of predestination, however, is used ambivalently. It is invoked to explain Genji's extraordinary gifts and the glories of his age. At the same time, it exonerates the characters of the novel from inappropriate conduct, misjudgments, unhappy outcomes, and suffering.

For most people, the Buddhist tradition, its ultimate postulates inexpressible in language, was known largely through devolved Mahayana interpretations or "conventional truths" and through petitionary and other forms of ritual, chiefly apotropaic or in quest of favorable rebirth. This tradition is reflected throughout the novel; it was also associated with a pantheon of anthropomorphic and other beings. Increasingly, Buddhist practice took the form of invoking the name of Amida, a divinity associated with granting rebirth in paradise. There is a strain of misogyny in Buddhism. The influence of the tradition on the construction of gender in the novel is among the themes explored in Pandey's wide-ranging essay on gender roles. Its influence both on the *Genji* itself and on how it was read in the centuries after its creation is analyzed in the essay by Melissa McCormick.

Supernatural Agencies and Spirit Possession

These Buddhistic traditions coexisted and often merged with belief in an animistic, occult world of spirits, both human and associated with natural phenomena. Much of this was of continental or Korean peninsula origin. One such belief saw Heaven or "the sky" as an all-seeing monitor of human activity that intruded into the human realm with judgments and warnings against improper conduct. The supernatural world was also populated by animistic nature spirits, ancestral spirits, and other supernatural agents. This seething, sometimes anarchic-seeming occult world intruded destructively into the human realm, causing adversities in the form of spirit possession emanating from the living or dead. In a society in which women lived much of their lives passively in seclusion and restricted mobility, the activity of spirits formed an unseen but dynamic force field in which wronged or jealous persons or disprized lovers could inflict vengeance on the object of their resentment. In the *Genji*, dramatic spirit possessions are an important mode for articulating relationships, particularly affecting women. Ritual exorcism administered by Buddhist monks, in which spirits were transferred to shamanic mediums, offered a means to propitiate such interventions. In contrast to karmic influence, spirit possession sometimes explicitly identified its cause through these mediums, who could articulate grievances. Whether Murasaki Shikibu believed literally in this phenomenon has been questioned, but retributive spirit possession is a major feature of her work and essential to its plot. This theme is explored in McMullen's essay.

The *Genji* Narrative

Such were the forms and pressures of the courtly world of Murasaki Shikibu. The community that she depicts, however, was not immediately contemporary. She shared the common East Asian reflex that looked to the past as an authority for a better society. Her mise-en-scène was informed by nostalgia among her contemporaries for the reign of the Daigo Emperor (r. 897–930) of about a century before her time, a historical distance that enabled her to idealize her fictional world and its central figure in some respects.

The Tale of Genji consists of fifty-four chapters of uneven length and covers four generations of a family associated with the imperial lineage. It is usually divided into three parts, the first two of which focus on the career of the eponymous hero, Genji, a son of the reigning emperor by a much loved, but hierarchically junior, consort. In Part I (Chapters 1–33 "Kiritsubo" to "Fuji no uraba"), the child Genji is made a commoner for political reasons, but an illustrious future is foretold of him by a Korean soothsayer. His career is traced through his love affairs, including his most transgressive relationship with his father's consort, his abduction of the girl Murasaki, who will become his most loved, but secondary wife, exile, his triumphal return, and subsequent ascendancy in court. In Part II (Chapters 34–41 "Wakana I" to "Maboroshi"), Genji's world comes under strain. He maintains his dominance, but his personal life begins to unravel. He marries his half-brother's daughter and deeply offends Murasaki. His own cuckolding of his father is revisited on Genji himself. An angry spirit surviving like mycelium from Genji's youthful injury to its long-dead owner afflicts Murasaki, and she eventually dies.

In Part III (Chapters 42–54 "Niou Miya" to "Yume no ukihashi"), after a gap of eight years following Genji's death, the public world of Genji and his great rituals recedes, the narrative contracts, and the scene shifts from the capital to the Buddhist-centered community of Uji and to two secluded but nubile princesses, later joined by a newly discovered third half-sister. This part pursues many of the themes of Parts I and II, but the tone is different, and it has been regarded by some as a discrete work and even by a different author. The main themes are summarized in the first essay, Royall Tyler's overview of the novel.

The Present Book

Murasaki Shikibu's long narrative confronts human behavior in all its complexity, contradictions, and ambiguities. Its dazzling literary skill deploys interior monologue, subtle and oblique dialogue, close description and evocative scene setting, exploitation of Chinese and indigenous topoi, and compelling characterization. Like all literary masterpieces, her work has been read in many ways, among them: as a picaresque novel of gallantry; a protest on behalf of women; a quest for Buddhist salvation; a Confucian record of high aesthetic culture and ritual; a plea for achievement rather than ascription as the basis of prestige; an evocation of intense human affect; a historical novel; a sustained love story between two fallible human beings. It has been seen as comparable to Proust's magnum opus; as a multivocal postmodern production, an intertextual masterpiece, and a narrative laced with Freudian significance. The eight essays of this volume both describe the *Genji* and interrogate the text to identify some of its philosophical challenges. They reflect contemporary intellectual movements such as postmodern views on authorship, intertextualism, deconstruction, and cultural history. The focus is mainly on Parts I and II. Many also refer to Part III. This section of the *Genji* has, however, already been the subject of a collection of essays; limits of space preclude more thorough treatment here.

The sequence of the essays is designed both to introduce the novel descriptively and to analyze its philosophical assumptions. The first two are concerned with the coordinates of time and place. The first essay (Tyler) outlines the story, its scope, and the dynamic that impels it; the second (Denecke) sets the stage for the main spatial and temporal aspects of the narrative. The third essay (McMullen) glances at the construction of the self and moral personhood. Three further essays examine the distinctive cultural practices of poetry (Kamens), calligraphy (Sakomura), and garden-making (Smits) that reveal many of the assumptions concerning art and human life. Finally, two essays revisit two salient but paradoxical features of the *Genji* that have emerged in the preceding essays and are distinctive in world literature: its female authorship in a society in which women were virtually imprisoned in the court harem (Pandey) and its emanation from a society deeply imbued with the fundamentally world-denying philosophy of Buddhism (McCormick).

"The Structure of Genji's Career: Myth, Politics, and Pride" (Tyler)

The *Genji* is frequently represented as a narrative of courtly philandering. This reading is common in the reception history in Japan and reflected also in the critical response in the West. Already, W. G. Aston's *A History of Japanese literature* (1899) found it "mainly an account of [Genji's] numerous love affairs." Virginia Woolf (1882–1941), in her turn, saw in *Genji* a world in which "the interests of men did not centre upon politics." Most recently, Ian Buruma, reviewing Dennis Washburn's new translation for the *New Yorker* under the title of "The Sensualist," focuses on Genji as "a typical Don Juan" and "the great seducer, as vain as a diva." Royall Tyler's essay must be read as a corrective to these reductive views, but it also serves the introductory function of familiarizing the reader with the *Genji* narrative. Tyler draws on a gifted translator's intimate knowledge of the text to expose motivations in its central character far more complex than mere philandering. Genji has two main projects, sometimes in mutual tension: political ambition and gallantry. His amorous adventures themselves do not disqualify him from political advancement, though it is important that his public liaisons should be with women qualified by birth to enhance his proximity to the Emperor. But love affairs can be dangerous. Little immediate damage need result if they remain secret, but over time the resentment of disprized or jealous lovers, projected in spirit form, can inflict sickness and even death.

However, Genji's interests extend beyond libidinal gratification. His purpose, supported by cosmic powers that protect him through to his middle age, is to correct the wrong of his father's preferment of his elder half-brother to succeed to the throne. Parts I and II are built around the rivalry with this brother, later the Suzaku Emperor. Tyler documents indigenous mythical authority behind this fraternal political struggle. In the medium term, Genji wins, not least by marriage politics; by Chapter 33 "Fuji no Uraba" he has attained quasi-imperial status. Yet he is unsatisfied. His most loved partner, Murasaki, is not of a rank appropriate to consolidate his political ascendancy. As the polygamy of the court allowed, Genji looks elsewhere and chooses as his main wife the Third Princess, the higher-status favorite daughter of the Retired Emperor Suzaku. Politically, this might potentially work, but personally it proves to be a blunder. Genji's neglect of her precipitates a decline in his fortunes, damages those close to him, and leads to his own despair. Tyler points to Genji's vanity and overreaching ambition as the cause.

Genji is remembered in the world of the novel as a paragon and his ascendancy as a golden age of rituals, high culture, and political achievement. Tyler quotes his half-brother's description of a man of "so commanding a presence that one hardly dares to approach him". Yet the insubstantial nature of his authority raises questions. The narrative does not provide much material for philosophical analysis here. The narrator is unconcerned with Genji's exercise of political authority in the wider world. There is no trace of any preoccupation with the moral function of sovereignty, a major concern of Chinese political thought. His power does not conform to any theory of legitimacy, justice, or concern for popular welfare, let alone the expectations or rights of the governed. Nor is it expressed through law, though a Chinese-style legal system was formally in place in the Japan of the period. No coercive mode of enforcement is invoked. There is no mention of delegation or the bureaucratic councils that historically made decisions at the time. If Genji's dominance over his world is to be associated with any East Asian model, it must be with the soft, almost Daoistic notion of charismatic sovereignty found in some Confucian texts. This theory does not require the ruler to engage hands-on with control over his realm. His personal virtue suffices to secure order in the realm. This suggests an idealized representation of the primarily sacerdotal role that historians attribute to emperors in the Heian period. But perhaps the truth is that the author of the novel simply did not engage with the question of political control beyond the limited world of the court she knew.

Genji's professed spiritual aspirations are Buddhist; he studies Buddhist texts and even goes on retreat. Serious asceticism, however, is not his style, or not at least until the final years of his life. True, he has empathy, even for his paramours, though, as Tyler notes, he **(p.17)** is possessively unwilling to let them pursue their own liberation through the tonsure. He is, however, tactful when necessary, as Tyler shows with a subtle analysis of the elaborate and indirect negotiations leading to Genji's late marriage to the Third Princess.

After Genji's death, the narrative centers on the Buddhist community in Uji. Tyler surveys the final chapters of Part III, touching on the main controversies surrounding this part of the novel.

"The Epistemology of Space in The Tale of Genji" (Denecke)

The spatial world of the *Genji* has two main centers. Wiebke Denecke shows that the Japanese center was formed concentrically around the emperor and his palace; thence it extends to aristocratic residences, to the capital and its environs, and beyond that to the provinces. The second center is formed by China, and to a lesser extent Korea and even to India, the source of Buddhism. By the end of the tenth century, China and the Korean peninsula have become unreachable in person, yet close enough through cultural memory, physical artifacts, and literary tradition to impinge pervasively on the consciousness of the novelist and her characters. Denecke points out that the role of China in the novel tended to be underestimated during the decades when nationalism intensified, from the late nineteenth century until the end of the Pacific War. Her essay redresses that distortion. It is concerned chiefly with how Heian period Japanese experienced space and in particular explores the philosophical and literary function of China in the novel.

China is represented in the *Genji* in several different modes serving various literary purposes. Materially, treasured foreign artifacts, silk, paper, ceramics, confer dignity or symbolic significance on the occasions when they are presented or used, as do Chinese and Korean music and dance. In nonmaterial culture, the Chinese world was the source of wisdom, admonitory experience, and much in the world of art. In the intellectual and literary realms, China supplies many of the topoi and archetypes of the novel. Denecke describes how references to Chinese historical experience recorded in famous works of literature add depth to the narrative. Closer to hand, Genji's brilliant mastery of Chinese poetry and prose competition enhance his stature. Yet changing fashion also operates: rigid attachment to the China of the past could signify a deplorable outdatedness, as with the pilloried lowly scholars of the Academy, or the comical red-nosed Suetsumuhana.

The copious, various, and mutating influences stemming from the Japan–China spatial dualities lead Denecke to take issue with the practice of analyzing the China–Japan duality as binary, for this practice leads to difficulty with exceptions and the danger of essentialization. Rather, spatial duality and difference should be seen "operationally" as aesthetic "juxtapositions" through which their complexity better emerges. In this way, what a binary scheme represents as intractable "exceptions" "disappear into the pleasure of ever new combinations, recombinations, permutations with variations" into which "any Japanese or Chinese 'essence' disappears." One example is the famous *shinasadame* (identifying categories [of women]) scene of Chapter 2 "Hahakigi," which invites juxtaposition with a scene in Chapter 21 "Otome" describing mockery of the Confucian scholars of the Academy. Such juxtaposition, Denecke argues, yields appreciation of "Murasaki Shikibu's narrative crafting" that "play in more complex ways [than the binary approach] with spatial duality."

In an important coda to her essay, Denecke addresses a concern fundamental to this volume: the relationship of her inquiry (and those of other contributors) to what is regarded as "philosophy" in the Anglo-American tradition. She is particularly concerned with the "epistemology" of her title and admits that "thetical, conceptual, and systematic inquiry" is not to be found in East Asia, at least until the Neo-Confucianism of the Song Dynasty (960–1279). Any fruitless search for this makes the

Japanese cultural tradition look "deficient." Rather, Denecke links "juxtaposition" with what she refers to as "philosophizability," an obvious potential justification of the project of this book. With reference to the concept of space, she finds that this concept resonates with the "rich and complex concept of 'place' " of the well-known post-Restoration Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), which draws on the concept of "nondualism" of Daoism and Buddhist metaphysics. In turn, this opens up the "possibility" of a "nondualistic but also not subjectivist philosophy in a world that has grown challengingly multicultural and pluralistic." For the *Genji*, she concludes, this new "epistemology of space" would allow for "an ever more complex aestheticizing play with spatial dualities in Heian social reality and its artistic representation." Thus Murasaki Shikibu's use of "juxtaposition" in the novel and its understanding as a heuristic device facilitate philosophical analysis of how China figures not only as "a foreign realm or exotic ornament," but, more significantly, is also situated at "the heart of *Genji*'s brilliant narrative art and psychological depth."

"Ritual, Moral Personhood, and Spirit Possession in THE TALE OF GENJI" (McMullen)

Over the long reception history of the *Genji*, many in Japan and beyond have found Genji's persistently libidinal behavior offensive or difficult to reconcile with his reputation in his world. In the West, the British diplomat and student of Japanese culture W.G. Aston (1841–1911) early indicted its "laxity of morals" as "indefensible." James McMullen's essay adapts the philosophical analysis of early Confucian thought by the American philosopher Herbert Fingarette (b. 1921) and others to explore the moral personhood implicit in the world of the *Genji*. McMullen argues that this moral world is centered on ritual, is pluralistic and evolving, but ultimately coherent. Genji himself, he argues, goes on a moral journey.

First, particularly in Part I but persisting through the entire narrative, the society of the Heian court is based on an "aesthetic order." Conduct is evaluated not against universal or transcendent laws, or as the expression of a particular view of human nature, as found in later Chinese philosophy. Rather, as is typical of courtly communities, men and women are judged by external criteria—by others' perception of their discrete acts and their appearance. Basic to this view is the role of ritual in the *Genji*. Mastery of ritual is the principal mode of person formation, and its effective performance establishes the person in society. Ritual addresses both society and the interface with the occult worlds. It includes the conventions governing civilized social intercourse, courtship, and the usages that articulate hierarchical distinctions in this highly status-conscious society. But it also extends to religious, petitionary, and apotropaic rites, many of which are Buddhist.

Ritual can assume a moral dimension, so that egregious sexual misconduct such as Genji's toward his father and half-brother may be thought of as both immoral and an offense against ritual propriety. Most important, however, an "aesthetic order" is oriented to the external world, and the sense of an inner core of moral personhood subsisting through time is weak. Genji's personhood suffers little tainting from his offenses. The main sanction against offense is shame; it incurs resentment, mockery, or censure and associated loss of self-estimation. Shame is privileged over internally oriented guilt. Concomitantly, secrecy is highly valued and is an important theme in the narrative. McMullen argues that this feature of the *Genji* affects the moral vocabulary when the text is translated into Western languages. The use of such English terms as "guilt" and "sin" may distort the nuance of the original Japanese. In the sense that conduct and reputation are molded through external social sanctions and shame, this process of person formation also resonates with Ruth Benedict's influential analysis of more recent Japanese society in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* and with modern behaviorist models of socialization.

But the "aesthetic order" and its concomitant shame, though a permanent feature of the world of the *Genji*, are not the only influences informing its moral field. Buddhism exerts a powerful but ambivalent influence over the minds and aspirations of its characters. In one direction, Buddhist deterministic karma can be invoked to exonerate offenses. In another, however, Buddhist pessimism and its ascetic and renunciatory imperatives address behavior at the individual rather than the social level, creating the possibility of individual responsibility and thus guilt rather than shame. As Genji grows older, Buddhism exerts a stronger influence, inclining him to compunction and even an internal sense of penitence, self-accusation, or guilt over his youthful indiscretions. This syndrome exists uneasily with the outward-looking fear of social opprobrium and the secrecy associated with the "aesthetic order," a tension that Genji is unable to resolve. In Part III, the main character, Kaoru, who seems to inherit an intensification of Genji's middle-aged Buddhist inclinations, is crippled by a sense of guilt.

Other influences contribute in important ways to the moral field around Genji's behavior. He himself enjoys supernatural protection from rather nebulously characterized powers that seemingly forestall retribution for his offenses. However, as he approaches middle age, this protection weakens and he and those closest to him are exposed to the vulnerabilities of less privileged mortals. McMullen argues that spirit possession intervenes in Genji's life to administer retribution, damage his fortune, and confer moral coherence on the novel.

The second half of McMullen's essay pursues the playing out of these themes through analysis of three episodes from Parts I and II of the novel. These episodes show that, while the "aesthetic order" persists, Buddhist sensibilities intensify and spirit possession remains an important means of articulating the moral world of the novel. It is argued that, despite his laudable concern for his paramours, Genji's self-indulgent exploitation of women comes home in the spirit possession and death of his most loved partner and his own despair.

"Flares in the Garden, Darkness in the Heart: Exteriority, Interiority, and the Role of Poems in THE TALE OF GENJI" (Kamens)

From the underlying considerations of time, space, and human nature, the focus of the next three essays turns to three important cultural practices that preoccupy the characters, determine their standing, and illustrate their assumptions concerning value. Of these practices, verse composition is probably most prominent in the *Genji*, and the main subject of Edward Kamens's essay.

Like Denecke, Edward Kamens is concerned with dualities. He calls them "dyads" and claims that they are pervasive in the world of the novel. Like Denecke, he is wary of their function; insufficiently understood, they may "short-circuit our perception of nuance, subtlety, shades of difference, and the shifting, slippery character and significance of all things that are not fixed." Kamens's principal dyad here is interiority and exteriority. He explores this from the perspective of the subjectivity of readers, whose relationship with it is dynamic and changeable; he writes of "oscillation" between exteriority and interiority and readers' continuing development in reading the text. Another theme of his essay is the intertextual and paratextual nature of *Genji* as modern readers encounter it. He approaches these topics through a preliminary excursion into a pictorial analogue to *Genji* provided by the multi-panel pictorial "Kyoto screens" produced in Japan from the sixteenth century. These well-known screens, which incidentally also depict the erstwhile scene of Genji's exploits, convey an all-embracing vision "composed of disparate, noncontiguous but carefully chosen elements," including both interiors and exteriors. Another pair of screens from the Yale museum, he finds, illustrate selected scenes from the *Genji* itself in a similar way; the viewer is "simultaneously held outside the world that they create, yet drawn . . . into that world and beyond . . . into the imaginary that the *Tale, as a whole*, creates and opens up to us."

In a different direction, Kamens next takes up another instance of interiority and exteriority that usefully addresses an aspect of the *Genji* that many readers find confusing: the different ways by which the characters are named in the original and in modern Japanese- and Western-language translations. Basic to modern naming is a view of the *Genji* as a continuing, permeable, and multivocal project. Some names of characters are interior to the text from its original formation. Others, however, are exterior or paratextual, like that applied retrospectively by readers, commentators, and translators to Genji's doppelganger, Tō no Chūjō; they are the product of later readers' search for clarity. Nonetheless, they have become an established feature of the *Genji* as now read.

Kamens's principal declared chief topic is the use of verse in the novel. This is another dyad; he is concerned both internally with the nearly eight hundred poems original to the text, composed as exchanges between characters, and externally with quotations or echoes of the vast body of verse both Chinese and Japanese that is an inheritance of Heian courtly culture. These are "a huge presence in the text, demanding an alteration of readerly attention as they slow or halt or divert its forward movement . . . that bring narrative sub-arcs to emotional peaks . . . or . . . conclude certain phases of action, interaction, or contemplation." He describes this use of verse as to "reach out . . . to the vast intertextual matrices of the entirety of the rest of the text and to the whole of Japanese poesy, Chinese poesy, Buddhist lore and more." In a striking phrase he describes a multivocal *Genji* as a "housing for verse." Drawing on a deep knowledge of the *waka* corpus, he cites the figure of "darkness of the heart" to refer to parental attachment, particularly to daughters, from a poem by Murasaki Shikibu's great grandfather. Kamens traces its mutations, passing through the Kiritsubo Emperor's troubled parenthood of Genji himself to the "misogynist hypocrisy and egotism" of Prince Hachi in the final Uji chapters.

The essay ends with an example of interiority and exteriority that encapsulates Kamens's breadth of reference and view of reading *Genji* as an open-ended evolving project. The final chapter of the novel bears the evocative title "Yume no ukihashi," an expression that does not occur in the text and is of uncertain origin. Kamens quotes its use in a poem by the noted poet and *Genji* scholar Fujiwara no Teika (1162–1241); he describes this as "outside of and exterior to the *Tale*, yet deeply engaged with and *of* it." Used for the title of its last chapter, the poem "absorbs [the novel], reproduces it, and, . . . propels [it], and itself, once more out into the world."

"Calligraphy, Aesthetics, and Character in THE TALE OF GENJI" (Sakomura)

Rivaling poetry in importance as an expressive cultural practice in the world of the *Genji*, but set apart by its materiality, is the art of calligraphy. For Raymond Mortimer, indeed, the "accomplishment" of calligraphy in the novel is important "above all." Exemplary calligraphy by earlier emperors and others is treasured, deemed suitable as dowry gifts. Its prominence in the narrative justifies the treatment of calligraphy as a separate topic. It is the subject of the essay by the cultural historian Tomoko Sakomura.

TomokoSakomura identifies a dual function: calligraphy functions as a vehicle of semantic content, but it is also much more, an expressive art and visible evidence of the writer's moral status, aesthetic discrimination, and social standing. Like speech, calligraphy is the medium in which much poetry is communicated. Its particular importance as self-expression for women is intensified by the convention that elite nubile women lived in seclusion; for the physical person to be seen by a man was tantamount to being sexually possessed. In the physical absence of its author, calligraphy, as Sakomura indicates, stood as "proxy." Thus for women, it was a vital but oblique form of presentation of the self. For Genji himself, in his constant quest for satisfactory amatory partners, a woman's calligraphy has an erotic interest; it is an important indication of her character, standing, and desirability.

Sakomura provides helpful background information on the Japanese calligraphic tradition in the lifetime of Murasaki. This complicated system had evolved from Chinese characters over the fifth to ninth centuries. It featured several styles, differentiated by their degree of cursiveness and to some extent by gendered usage and function: formal, square writing of Chinese characters was used by men for official purposes; a graphically simpler cursive script derived from the square style was used to represent syllables rather than for its original Chinese logographic purpose; this was employed by women and by men for personal communication and writing Japanese verse. An important aspect of calligraphy was the choice of paper; Chinese, Japanese, and Korean papers in various colors were available, and each carried subtle associations.

The property of calligraphy as a vehicle for self-expression not necessarily directly connected to its semantic content led to an intense connoisseurship. An extended passage in Chapter 32 "Ume ga e" is devoted to this activity, in which Genji, the supreme arbiter of taste and himself a distinguished calligrapher and practitioner of the related art of painting, comments on past and contemporary examples. Sakomura offers an extended analysis of this key passage. For her, the practice of calligraphy is an example of the "aestheticiziation of everyday life" in the world of the novel. She is undoubtedly correct. Yet she also points out that despite this intense interest and attention, the criteria applied by Genji and others to individual cases do not yield a consistent or objective scheme of value. Genji's judgments are personal, inconsistent, and particularistic. What is surprising, perhaps, is that the rank of the writer is deemed an essential aspect of the value of any given example, apparently transcending artistic merit. It is tempting to see here a cross-binding between Sakomura's artistic use of the term and its extension beyond artistic value to the "aesthetic order" in the sense identified in McMullen's essay; not only artistic merit, but conduct more widely is judged not by transcendent or universal norms, but particularistically, as a discrete aspect of the behavior of individuals.

"Genji's Gardens: Negotiating Nature at the Heian Court" (Smits)

The Japanese garden of the Heian period was important for the cultural and affective life of the aristocracy. The residences of aristocratic families opened directly onto their gardens; space flowed between house and garden. For many, the garden represented their most intimate contact with the natural world. But as the cultural historian Ivor Smits shows, the relationship, though often personalized, was of a highly codified, self-conscious, and literary kind.

Smits's essay starts from his observation that unmediated Nature was not an object of contemplation in the *Genji.* True, there is a nebulous conception of natural forces, including storms, and of an all-seeing Heaven that intervenes in the human realm, but this is only sporadically featured in the narrative and is viewed solely with reference to its impact on human affairs, particularly Genji's. Geomancy, Chinese in origin and associated with directional taboos, is also predicated on natural forces but is used in the novel not least to justify wayward behavior. There is no sense of Nature as a realm ontologically separate from the human order, let alone as a productive source sustaining human society. No doubt this reflects the prevailing horizons of sensibility in the courtly and urbanized elite society of the period. Smits quotes a revealing Chinese-language poem by Renzen, a descendent of the onetime Minister of the Left Fujiwara no Saneyori (900–70), writing perhaps a century after Murasaki's time. The poet refers to *zōka* 造化, a Chinese locution commonly translated as "creation," which, the poem runs, brings into being such beautiful natural phenomena as "light through catalpa and mulberry tree" and "a line of geese bonding with clouds." In Chinese canonical sources, *zōka* refers broadly to the creative processes by which Heaven and Earth produce the phenomenal world, and the concept had political significance; it was the function of the ideal moral person to "assist" creation through his moral perfection and insight and thus to benefit the human order. Renzen's poem, however, ends with the couplet

The beauty of this place is all because of Creation
Any human effort to add something is pointless here.

Just so, natural phenomena in the Heian courtly world are the object of detached aesthetic appreciation rather than the responsibility of human "assistance" or management. Smits shows how natural phenomena in the *Genji* are viewed through the lens of prosodic convention. This operated dialectically in two ways: the mood of a character, for instance Yūgiri, on his way through wild country to court Ochiba no Miya and troubled over infidelity to his main wife, can be intensified by symbols in the background such as the belling of a stag; alternatively, phenomena already present in the scene could arouse feelings in characters. In either case, however, the natural phenomena are broadly prescribed by prosodic practice established in influential Chinese and Japanese anthologies and handbooks. This view of nature informs the attitude to gardens in The Tale of Genji. Murasaki Shikibu's characters lavish care and expense on their gardens and spend time contemplating them for their aesthetic quality and literary associations. For her the garden was in effect a reordered improvement on nature at its most aesthetically and affectively resonant. Gardens are human constructs that arrange nature to form a sort of sounding board to give vibrancy and depth to the narrative. This perception of gardens is borne out by authorial praise comparing gardens to paintings.

How this intimate relationship between garden and sophisticated society works out in practice is illustrated in Smits's masterly analysis of Genji's great Rokujō garden. This elaborate project is more a symbolic recapitulation of Genji's personal ascendancy than a project of horticulture. The plan follows several separate schemes: its four sections house the womenfolk with whom Genji has had romantic relationships or to whom he has shown compassion. Spatially, the sections were dedicated to the four seasons. The planting was redolent of special symbolism; individual species of trees and flowers consciously marked the poetically ordered progression of the seasons, but also had symbolic meaning for the individual female residents of each section. But that was not all; the buildings, Smits shows, were also arranged auspiciously according to notions from Chinese geomancy. Finally, the garden evoked a famous historical precedent in which the arrangement of rocks, streams, and a lake gave a glimpse of a sublunary paradise, evoking associations with long life and good fortune. Appropriately, Genji's lake is on occasion host to extravagant revels that transport participants by boat to a paradise, neither purely Daoist nor Buddhist. Water, potentially a dangerous element in Japan, is tamed to form a scene of aesthetic delight. In this sense, there is a fugitive atmosphere to this great garden, not inappropriate to the rarefied, courtly consciousness of its residents. Thus the garden, in the words of Smits's conclusion, serves "as a fundamental means to unlock the world that The Tale of Genji represents.

"Rethinking Gender in THE TALE OF GENJI" (Pandey)

The structure of this volume requires that two motifs recurrently featured in the foregoing analyses be explored further. They are the female authorship of the *Genji* within a society that severely restricted the role of women and the intrusion of the beliefs and practices of Buddhism. These encompassing aspects of the *Genji* define its uniqueness in world literary history; they challenge expectation and present paradoxes. The final two essays step back from the more highly focused preceding discussions to explore these themes. First, given the restrictions as a woman to which she was subjected, how could Murasaki Shikibu have created a literary masterpiece of such broad scope and transcendent merit? An established culture of storytelling in the Heian court and Murasaki Shikibu's own superordinate talent are partial explanations. Rajyashree Pandey, who has written insightfully and extensively on gender in classical Japanese literature, approaches this apparent paradox philosophically through an original deconstruction of gender in ancient Japan with special reference to *Genji*.

Pandey, like Denecke and Kamens, argues against binary categorizations; she, too, wishes to "defamiliarize" "the way we read the *Genji*." She starts from a useful survey of the relationship between biological sex and gender in West and East. Overall, her argument is that in the East Asian tradition but in the *Genji* in particular, the relationship between biological sex and culturally constructed gender is unstable; markers of gendered behavior are less fixed than in the Western tradition. Through careful analysis, Pandey exposes the loose, blurred, and situationally determined nature of gender distinctions in the novel. As she puts it, "How gender comes to be coded depends on the context in which it is performed."

One area concerns the relationship between status, gender, and sexuality. Pandey compares two different male reactions to *désahabillé* women: Genji's critical view of the low-ranking Nokiba no Ogi and Kaoru's positive response of the exalted First Princess. It is not so much gender as status that determines the difference between the two responses and creates the "asymmetries that are constitutive of all relationships in the text." Other circumstances offer parallel cases in which gender markers are blurred. One is that of dress, where cross-dressing occurs and "lovers often exchange and wear each other's robes." In *waka* verse, poetic voices are distinguished by gender, but, she argues, this is a stylized "persona" rather than the projection of a real person; gendered distinctions do not reflect actual situations; the relation between prosodic persona and the sex of the poet is loose. For instance, a female persona connotes waiting and pining, and "a poet, regardless of his or her biological sex, . . . can slip seamlessly into the persona of the waiting female or the male who visits."

Cross-gender use of language provides another example. In a discussion that cross-binds with Denecke's use of "juxtaposition" in analyzing the same *shinasadame* scene from "Hahakigi," Pandey describes the vivid account of a young man whose ladylove, the daughter of a Chinese scholar, speaks in a highly sinicized language, criticized in the gathering as unattractive in a woman. Pandey comments, "By bringing to life women such as herself . . . learned in Chinese," Murasaki exposes "the fictive nature of the assumed isomorphism of gender and language."

Pandey's most arresting questioning of received interpretations of gender concerns the Buddhist tonsure. In the novel, entering Buddhist orders is more common among women than men. It has been a subject of controversy, interpreted by scholars "in terms of a binary framework of domination and subordination." Some have seen it as a gendered response to subjection, a positive expression of female agency gaining a "space of freedom." Others have taken an opposing view; the tonsure is "a form of death in life," symptomatic of women's helplessness. Pandey argues cogently that the worldview and understanding of suffering in Heian Japan do not warrant such a gendered view of tonsure. Suffering was metaphysically ordained, built into the Buddhist teaching that infuses the novel; the tonsure should not be seen simply in monochromatic terms of individual submission or resistance, or on a gendered axis. These views "eviscerate the text of the Buddhist worldview." She points, rather, to "multiple significations" behind men as well as women taking this step. Buddhism, moreover, has a positive side as instanced by the celebratory nature of the rituals that Murasaki organizes for Genji's fortieth birthday and the exemplary Buddhist nature of Murasaki's own death in the novel.

Women in *Genji* emerge from her analysis as often empowered personalities capable of engagement with society and of cultural practices that overlap with and sometimes challenge those of men. Gender, she contends, is a matter of performance rather than of existential or biological constraints. Her analysis supports the view of performance as constitutive of personhood and of the "aesthetic order" as the social context of The Tale of Genji. It is also relevant to feminist discourse today.

(p.32) "Murasaki's 'Mind Ground': A Buddhist Theory of the Novel" (McCormick)

A priori, the creation of a large-scale panoramic and compelling fictional world such as the *Genji* presumes a coherent view of the world and of humanity. The concept of personhood in that context has already been addressed, but what of more radical metaphysical assumptions concerning the nature of experience and of reality? As will be apparent from references in the preceding essays, Buddhism provided a pervasive interpretation of the world among Japanese of the eleventh century. But herein lay a problem for the author of a fiction concerning the relations between men and women. How did Murasaki Shikibu justify her great work in the context of the basically world-denying and ascetic system of beliefs that dominated her world? This question troubled the author herself; in Chapter 25 "Hotaru" she uses Genji as a spokesman to mount a famous justification for fiction, in which she attempts to establish the value of realistic fiction to those committed to Buddhism and its quest for liberation. Melissa McCormick's essay, appropriately for the last in this volume, starts from this fundamental problem and proceeds to the larger questions both of the influence of Buddhism on the novel and of the Buddhist reading of the novel by Japanese posterity.

Murasaki Shikibu, as her diary attests, was deeply familiar with Buddhism. Her hero himself is drawn to the teaching. Already, by Chapter 10 "Sakakigi," Genji, still in his early twenties, is on retreat at a temple, the Urin'in, studying Tendai Buddhist texts. More germane, Genji's defense of fiction to his ward Tamakazura draws on the teachings of the Tendai sect of Buddhism to claim that good and evil, as depicted in the Mahayana sutras, are not metaphysically distinct. Evil acts, in McCormick's exegesis, "cannot exist apart from Bodhi-wisdom; both are constitutive of each other." Evil, properly understood, acts as an "expedient means" in the pursuit of enlightenment. This nonduality of good and evil can be extended to other fictional narratives such as, implicitly, the *Genji* itself.

The nondualist approach to the literary treatment of evil, the essay continues, informs a major tradition of *Genji* exegesis in premodern Japan. It becomes linked to a view of Murasaki Shikibu as possessing a state of mind termed *shikan* (cessation [of attachment] and insight [into nondualistic reality]). This image was reflected in a tradition of portrait icons of Murasaki Shikibu illustrated and analyzed in McCormick's essay: Murasaki is depicted under a cartouche inscribed with a tetralemma associated with the Indian Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 150 – c. 250 CE) that explained non-duality as a mental state that negated all predications about reality: all things "exist; do not exist; both exist and do not exist; neither exist nor do not exist." Also inscribed on the icon are two poems by Murasaki Shikibu that are "repurposed" to show the "negation of the conventional self" and the "mutability of existence." In the Buddhist view, these enlightened states of mind enabled the author to create a work chronicling these truths "through an entire arc of human life."

From these essentially Buddhological principles associated with traditions concerning Murasaki Shikibu's authorship, McCormick turns back in a final section to the Buddhist reading of the *Genji* text. Legend had it that Murasaki Shikibu conceived and started writing the work while staying near the capital in the Tendai temple of Ishiyama on the fifteenth day of the eighth month, a day associated with the fullest moon of the year and with Buddhist enlightenment. She was in a meditative state as she began her work with a description of Genji, in exile at Suma, gazing at the moon and fully conscious of the Buddhist significance of this day. The moon inspires Buddhist-style empathy in him, first for his nearest and dearest in the distant capital, but extending to his servants and others of low estate.

McCormick's arguments are cogent in respect of the place of Buddhism in the *Genji* itself and Genji's own moral journey. They also reflect the reception history of the novel by a medieval Japanese

posterity deeply influenced by Buddhism. However, McCormick does not beatify Genji but accepts that he continues to "struggle with his own self-professed sexual proclivities." The depth and multilayered complexity of Murasaki Shikibu's literary skill, it may also be pointed out, are illustrated by the allusive resonance of this same episode of exile with indigenous mythical tradition, with the historical Ariwara no Yukihira and his brother Narihira, Sugawara no Michizane. Further, as both McCormick and Denecke indicate, they resonate also with influential Chinese literary exemplars of exile such as Qu Yuan, Bai Juyi, and others.

Conclusion

The essays in this volume extend the ways in which The Tale of Genji can be read. No effort has been made to impose a uniform methodology or point of view; the interpretations offered here may not always be mutually consistent. Variations differ across a spectrum from points of detail to wider issues. The typhoon of Chapter 28 "Nowaki," for instance, which toward the end of Part I damages Genji's great Rokujō garden, is interpreted both as an opportunity for his son Yūgiri to see his stepmother improperly and as a hint of Genji's own approaching misfortunes. More substantially, views of women taking the Buddhist tonsure and indeed of Buddhism itself have different nuances; these views are seen either as an acceptance of helplessness and as an escape or as an assertion of autonomy and claim to liberation. Similarly, the role and status of women are differently interpreted; misogyny is strong, but women may also be empowered. Such various interpretations are, of course, not necessarily mutually exclusive. All have cogency, and attentive readers should find a continuing dialogue among scholars of the novel here. Above all, in their **(p.35)** variety, more than a millennium after its creation, these essays pay tribute to the depth and continued relevance of Murasaki Shikibu's extraordinary work.

Essay: Murasaki's "Mind Ground": A Buddhist Theory of the Novel by Melissa McCormick

Over the course of its reception history, The Tale of Genji was viewed by many readers and commentators as a Buddhist text relevant to issues of morality and ethics, but also metaphysical questions about the nature of truth, perception of the phenomenal world, and the phenomenal world's relationship to language. Numerous *Genji* commentaries promoted the idea that the Tendai Buddhist notion of nonduality formed an underlying structural component of the tale. Writers based this idea on the belief that the *Genji*'s author, Murasaki Shikibu, had mastered a system of meditation put forth in *The Great Calming and Contemplation* (Ch. *Mohe zhiguan*, J. *Makashikan*) by the sixth-century founder of Tien-t'ai in China, Zhiyi (538–597). This essay examines the commentaries as well as a group of paintings produced alongside them as crucial evidence for the existence of a nascent philosophical theory of the novel. Taking seriously the ideas of historical readers who attempted to understand *Genji* holistically through the lens of Tendai philosophy may bring us closer to the intellectual foundations of the tale than previously imagined, adding another dimension to our understanding of the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and literature.

Over the course of its roughly millennium-long reception, **THE TALE OF GENJI** was viewed by many readers as a text that was profoundly Buddhist in nature, one that was best understood through the interpretive tools of Tendai Buddhist thought in particular. This means that **THE TALE OF GENJI** was deemed a philosophical text to which one could turn to think through not only issues of morality and ethics, but fundamental metaphysical questions about the nature of truth, our perception of the phenomenal world, and the phenomenal world's relationship to language. Some of the most explicit evidence that readers approached and understood the tale through a Buddhistic framework comes by way of *Genji* commentaries, a cumulative tradition of exegesis that

continued for more than five hundred years. This might surprise those accustomed to seeing **THE TALE OF GENJI** examined primarily in secular aesthetic terms and categorized as a courtly romance centered around the amorous exploits of an imperial prince. A Buddhist view of the tale may also seem to be at odds with some of the work's qualities considered most appealing—its compelling plot and affective poetry, its wealth of detail concerning Heian life and court customs, and its vividly drawn characters of all moral persuasions, with their accessible humanity and seemingly lucid psychological interiority. Most of all, instances in the tale of ironic distance, humor, and even anti-Buddhist sentiment suggest an author who scrupulously avoided overt didacticism of any kind, as though the tale were written from a familiar secular humanist perspective. In this way, **THE TALE OF GENJI** satisfies the demands of readers of modern novels, and surely for this reason its Buddhist elements may seem placed there only to "add a dash of melancholy" to the work.

In fact, a backlash against a Buddhist interpretation of the tale started to gain momentum in the early modern period with the distinctive voices of commentators such as Kumazawa Banzan (1619–91). Armed with the philosophical tools of Neo-Confucianism and its inherent pragmatism and clear-cut morality, Banzan made a forceful case against the long tradition of Buddhist-oriented *Genji* commentaries in his own treatise on the tale. As James McMullen has shown, Banzan was concerned above all with the implications of Buddhist notions of karma, transmigration, and any hint of predeterminism that might contradict the self-motivated morality at the core of his Confucian ethics. No writer was more influential in denying the validity of a Buddhist view of *Genji*, however, than Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), whose treatise, *"***THE TALE OF GENJI***": A Little Jeweled Comb* (*Genji monogatari Tama no ogushi*, 1799), incited a tenaciously secular approach to *Genji* criticism for generations to come. Norinaga rightly bristled at the idea that such a sublimely complex work of literature could be reduced to having a single Buddhist aim, a view that he believed the medieval commentaries promoted. He took note of the marked difference between the tale and Buddhist or Confucian moral texts that were intended to "encourage virtue and castigate vice" and criticized theories of the work that did not account for the fullness of its presentation of the human condition and emotion. Norinaga arrived at his own theory of *mono no aware* (a sensitivity to the nature of things), which in essence gave him a framework for elaborating upon the tale's internal logic, in the process allowing him to create one of Japan's first sustained works of literary criticism. His interpretation took hold, and Norinaga's characterization of medieval commentaries as steeped in superstition and arcane allegoresis was taken largely at face value from that point forward. On the other hand, annotators of **THE TALE OF GENJI**, including the editors of modern editions of the tale, have always kept the medieval commentaries close at hand. Aside from their Buddhist framing, they constitute the most authoritative sources for understanding the difficult original text and Heian period culture and history and provide interlinear glosses on etymology, word definitions, debates on the meaning of passages, and lengthy citations of the sources of Murasaki's allusions from classical Japanese poetry and Chinese classics to official histories.

Given the level of erudition found in the medieval commentaries and the clear awareness of the text's complexity that they demonstrate, this essay questions whether the Buddhist foundations of the tale that they espoused should not be examined more closely. It suggests, moreover, that these texts in some ways prefigure modern theories of the novel that champion its capacity to elicit from the reader a unique form of empathic understanding. In this regard, it is worth examining one of the main claims of these commentaries: that the Buddhist discourse on attaining insight into the nonduality of phenomena could be used as a means to illuminate the nature of the tale and to explain its value. The premodern *Genji* commentaries do not elaborate in great detail how the principles they espouse may be applied to the narrative, which may have been reserved for the oral

teachings of which the written commentaries are often simply remnants. The analysis that follows therefore will pay close attention to the passages that do treat the topic in the commentaries, but it will also examine a number of largely unstudied pictorial artifacts produced in tandem with those texts for the crucial evidence they provide about how certain readers understood *Genji* as a philosophical text into the early modern period. This volume is, however, concerned with the *Genji* text itself, not its long history of reception and exegesis, which might take us far afield from the Heian period literary and philosophical interests of its author. To be sure there are sections in the *Genji* commentaries that approach the kind of allegorizing and numerological allegoresis so carefully studied by Susan Klein in the context of medieval commentaries on the *Tales of Ise*, which accord with medieval "revelatory" modes of reading and interpretation that are anachronistic to Murasaki Shikibu's era. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the commentators under discussion had religious and political ties to Tendai institutions whose strength post-dates **THE TALE OF GENJI**. But on balance the essence of the Tendai worldview, or "Tendai paradigm," advocated by the medieval texts and artifacts to be examined here, would have been familiar to the *Genji* author. Within her tale, which, to be sure, exemplifies the nonsectarian and ecumenical approach to religion characteristic of Heian courtiers, there are prominent references to Tendai texts. As Haruo Shirane and others have pointed out, meditative Tendai Buddhism and its promotion of salvation through one's own efforts, derived from the belief that the buddha nature is inherent in the individual, was one influential form of Buddhism in **THE TALE OF GENJI**. Examining the ideas of subsequent readers who attempted to understand the novel holistically through the lens of Tendai philosophy may thus bring us closer to the intellectual heart of the tale than previously imagined, adding another dimension to our understanding of the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and literature.

Buddhism and the Defense of Fiction

More fundamental than Murasaki Shikibu's own affinities to Buddhist ideas, however, is the fact that she did not conceive of her tale from the perspective of a secular, postnaturalist writer. She inevitably sought to connect her characters, their actions, and their lives to the patterns of the universe as they were understood in Heian Japan, whether by Confucian, Buddhist, *kami*-centered, or other beliefs.[10] These were integral components of Murasaki Shikibu's endeavor; indeed it would be impossible to imagine a writer of her time period creating a narrative of this scale and ambition in which characters were merely representations of the particular or the self in a modern novelistic sense. Although *Genji* meets many of the criteria associated with the modern novel—irony, subversion, multivocality—it is fundamentally concerned with what Lukács terms "essences" that structure the tale. Literature, and poetry in particular, were understood as more than the personal expression of an individual—rather, in its highest form, as a process by which latent patterns of the universe become manifest, filtered through human consciousness. The author of **THE TALE OF GENJI** could not have attempted to elevate the *monogatari* as a genre, which she certainly was doing, by presenting the struggles and triumphs of her characters as unconnected to a larger, unseen order of things. Without the sense of a latent force motivating her characters and events, her *monogatari* would never rise above the pejorative stereotype of tales that circulated in the Heian period. The locus classicus for the belittlement of tales is the preface to a work of true Buddhist didacticism contemporary with *Genji, The Three Jewels* (*Sanbōe*, ca. 984). It warns against the frivolous depiction of relations between men and women in *monogatari* and admonishes the reader to "not let your heart get caught up even briefly in these tangled roots of evil, these forests of words." But as a preface to a compilation of Buddhist didactic tales with one goal in mind, it also takes issue with the lack of purpose of *monogatari* and the way they are written, describing them as nothing more than

"meaningless phrases like so much flotsam in the sea, with no two words together that have any more solid basis than does swamp grass growing by a river bank."[14] In many ways, **THE TALE OF GENJI** can be seen as one long rebuttal to this notion of the meaningless episodic nature of tales in the way it sustains its plot, which has its own internal consistency, across so many chapters. In other words, there are unifying principles at the heart of Murasaki's tale that many commentators over the centuries chose to articulate in Buddhist terms.

Later commentators felt justified in proclaiming the Buddhist intent of **THE TALE OF GENJI** because of specific references to Tendai. A scene in Chapter 10 "Sakaki" for example shows Genji studying the foundational texts of Tendai, among them *The Great Calming and Contemplation* (Ch. *Mohe zhiguan*, J. *Makashikan*) by Zhiyi (538–97), the meditation text in which the practice and doctrine of Tendai were most fully explained. There are also the metanarrative references to Buddhist ideas in the famous "theory of tales" (*monogatari ron*), or "defense of tales," embedded in Chapter 25 "Hotaru." There Genji enters into a debate about the value of fiction with the character Tamakazura, the secret daughter of Genji's rival Tō no Chūjō. Genji has been harboring Tamakazura in his Rokujō mansion under the false pretense that she is his long-lost daughter, thus establishing an ersatz parent and child relationship taken as truth by those around them. The middle-aged Genji finds the young woman Tamakazura alluring, reminiscent as she is of her mother, his deceased lover Yūgao, and Genji's sexual overtures toward her are relentless. The scenario creates an interesting tension in which Genji's desire can be viewed as incestuous if interpreted according to the pair's false projected reality, as opposed to their private truth, of which the reader is aware. The author thus establishes an ingenious and highly charged context for a discussion about the merits of fictional tales, as a conversation between two characters whose situation forces the reader into a heightened awareness of truth, falsity, and representation. This mise-en-abyme thus functions as a correlative to the dialogue, which develops into a statement on the link between the perceived reality of fiction and the nature of truth in the Mahayana Buddhist understanding of phenomenal experience.

The passage begins when Genji enters a room in which he sees Tamakazura immersed in reading illustrated stories and he begins criticizing her for allowing her heart to be moved by pointless tales, in which "the truth would be very rare" (*makoto wa ito sukunakaramu*). His observation echoes the language of previous criticisms of tales, as in the *Sanbōe* preface, as potentially deleterious to women, who tend to be easily swayed by their romantic content. But the passage is constructed to lead to a defense of *monogatari*, and it does so gradually by next having Genji begin to concede the positive aspects of the affective power of fiction: "even among this mass of falsehoods we find some stories that are properly written and exhibit enough sensitivity to make us imagine what really happened". Yet he still labels fictional tales "falsehoods" (*soragoto*), until Tamakazura rebukes him, calling attention to Genji's own spinning of lies. After this, Genji's rhetoric shifts once more and he begins to praise *monogatari*, claiming that tales are in fact better than official histories: "Tales have provided a record of events in the world since the age of the gods, whereas histories of Japan like the *Nihongi* give only partial accounts of the facts. The type of tales you are reading provide detailed descriptions that make more sense and follow the way of history". Finally, Genji describes how tales are written and the importance of including both good and bad examples in fiction. This allows for an analogy to be drawn between tales and the teachings found in Buddhist sutras:

"For that reason, the narrow-minded conclusion that all tales are falsehoods misses the heart of the matter. Even the Dharma, which was explicated for us through Sakyamuni's splendidly pure heart, contains 'expedient means' (*hōben* 方便), those parables that he told to illustrate the truth of the Law. They may seem contradictory to parts in the sutras and will raise doubts in the mind of an

unenlightened person. However, if you carefully consider the matter, you realize that all have a single aim. The distinction between enlightenment and delusion is really no different from the distinction between the good and the bad in tales such as these. In the end, the correct view of the matter is that nothing is empty."

Because of the self-reflexive nature of this paragraph, it was long perceived as the author of *Genji* using Genji the character to mount a Buddhist argument for the relevance of fiction. The claim goes so far as to analogize the use of negative examples, or evildoing characters, with the expedient means found in the teachings of the Buddha. Only the unenlightened would take the expedient means of the sutra, or of the tale, at face value, unable to perceive the single aim of the Dharma, whatever expedient form it may take. The passage paved the way for an understanding of the tale as infused with an awareness of Buddhist nondualism. The final phrase is the most evocative in this regard, for here Murasaki Shikibu invokes the notion that enlightenment, or "Bodhi-wisdom" (*bodai*), is indistinguishable from delusion, or "passionate attachments" (*bonnō*). The seeming paradox comes from the belief that all phenomena are interpenetrating and interdependent. According to this doctrine then, even what one may perceive to be evil acts found in the tale are expedient means to Buddhist liberation, and like everything else, they cannot exist apart from Bodhi-wisdom; both are constitutive of each other.

This may seem to be nothing more than a convenient rationale for depicting as many illicit scenes of romance as possible, or at least enough for Murasaki to keep her readers interested with "the strange and wondrous details of bad behavior," as Genji also mentions in the defense of fiction. In the lines immediately following the passage cited above, when Tamakazura rejects his advances, Genji presses her further, accusing of her of being unfilial in a way that contradicts the Buddhist Law. This seems to prefigure works of later medieval literature that put to sardonic use the trope "the passionate attachments are indistinguishable from Bodhi-wisdom" (*bonnō soku bodai*). The "defense of tales" passage is thus complex and contradictory and entertaining, and as Richard Okada argued, it is therefore important that we not "universalize either the 'critique' or the 'defense' and turn them into self-standing 'arguments' or controlling metaphors of the tale. They form arguments, but the intertextual forces keep them pulled in specific directions related to class, gender, and genealogical concerns."[17] Many of the medieval *Genji* commentary authors, although their multifaceted texts covering all aspects of the tale and its intertexts were far from reductive, continued to promote the Buddhist philosophical framework precisely as a controlling metaphor. Rather than reducing the tale to a pedantic work of overt religious didacticism, as Norinaga and others believed it did, however, the approach had the potential to allow for a holistic appreciation of the tale in all of its multivocality, subversiveness, and self-aware intertextuality, the very techniques and qualities that allow it to transcend the didactic and the straightforward.

Entering the Four Gates toward Prajñā-Wisdom

In the mid-seventeenth century, for example, when the scholar and poet Matsunaga Teitoku (1571–1653) recounted what he had learned about **THE TALE OF GENJI** from his teacher Kujō Tanemichi (1507–94), he began by explaining the tale's relationship to Tendai Buddhist thought. In the course of his verbal teachings, Tanemichi had explicated *Genji* according to the idea that it contains "profound insights beyond discourse," a notion that he summed up as the "theory of cessation and insight" (止観の説 *shikan no setsu*), taken from Zhiyi's treatise and its exegetical legacy. He explained that, "as a story written according to the Buddhist Dharma, it differs from usual tales, with profound insights in its every poem and every word." According to Tanemichi, *The Tale of Genji* is suffused with insights based on nondualistic thinking, a theory that was significantly premised on the idea that Murasaki Shikibu had mastered Tendai meditative practice.

Nothing crystallizes this Tendai theory of the author and her tale better than a group of portrait icons of Murasaki Shikibu that began to appear by the late sixteenth century and continued into the eighteenth century. The genre represents a type of image that was hung as a Buddhist icon in the so-called Genji Room at Ishiyamadera temple, where legend had it that Murasaki Shikibu had conceived of the idea for **THE TALE OF GENJI**. Such paintings depict Murasaki Shikibu with brush in hand, usually with ink and paper on her writing desk, and include three square cartouches at the top of the composition. These cartouches, called *shikishi*, bear striking calligraphic inscriptions beginning on the far right with the so-called four gates ("four stages of contemplation," *shimon* 四) of Tendai, followed by two *waka* poems from Murasaki Shikibu's personal poetry collection in the central cartouche and one in the cartouche on the far left. The four gates correspond to four stages of contemplating phenomena, and their inclusion here in a position that amounts to a preface for the painting announces the work's allegiance to the *shikan* theory of *Genji*. As Katagiri Yayoi pointed out in her study of these images, numerous medieval *Genji* commentaries present Murasaki Shikibu as a figure within the Dharma lineage of Tendai, as someone who had mastered the "three discernments in one mind" (*isshin sangan*). The "three discernments" (*sankan* 三観) are methods of contemplation from within phenomenal experience. Thus, these texts assert that the *Genji* author had contemplated phenomena from the perspective of "emptiness" (nothingness, or the void, *kū* 空), "conventional existence" (a temporary acceptance of provisional reality, *kari*), and ultimately "the middle" (*chū* 中). To arrive at the middle is to understand simultaneously phenomena as both empty and provisionally existing and thus interdependent and nondual. Thus having calmed her mind to a state of cessation (*shi* 止), fixated on Prajñā-wisdom and free from delusional thinking, Murasaki achieved transcendent insight (*kan* 観) into an ultimate nondualism between subject and object, self and other, and all phenomena.

The calligraphy inscription of the four gates on the painting cites a further parsing of the three truths and the three discernments, presenting the methods of contemplation as a tetralemma:

a) existence (有門)
b) nothingness (emptiness 空門)
c) both existence and nothingness (亦有亦空門)
d) neither existence nor nothingness (非有非空門)

In this scheme, the extremes of existence and nothingness, (a) and (b), are similar to the three discernments and the three truths, but the middle, the ultimate synthesis, is broken down more precisely, as (c) and (d), to convey the state when "existence and emptiness are 'simultaneously illumined and simultaneously eradicated'. When all vestiges of dualism (that is, root nescience) vanish, the transcendent and unalloyed middle—the third and absolute truth—is revealed." Virtually all of the medieval *Genji* commentaries mention the four gates, with the most detailed explication of the philosophy found in the opening section of *Genji monogatari teiyō* (1432). The painting of Murasaki Shikibu at work writing her masterpiece paired with a textual expression of what is achieved through "cessation and insight" thus posits for **THE TALE OF GENJI** a philosophical origin story that goes well beyond the general trope of divine inspiration.



Figure 8.2 Detail of Figure.

If **THE TALE OF GENJI** was to be posited by later commentators as an embodiment of the principle of nondualism, that means its words had to be understood as functioning symbolically, as a manifestation of the ultimate truth. The first person to theorize this notion in relation to Japanese literature was the twelfth-century figure Fujiwara no Shunzei (1114–1204), who explicitly linked Zhiyi's "cessation and insight" to poetic composition. In his poetic treatise *Korai fūteishō* (Poetic styles from antiquity the present, 1197), Shunzei cites the opening passage of the *Makashikan* and goes on to draw an analogy between the ineffable state of *shikan* and the "deep mind" (*fukaki kokoro*) of poetry. As Esperanza Ramirez-Christensen has argued, Shunzei implies that the "poetic experience is essentially similar to the religious state of meditation and that the ontological existence of the poem is best conceived in terms of Tendai's three-dimensional view of reality." Although space limitations do not allow for elaboration here, commentators like Tanemichi, quoted above, were very much the inheritors of Shunzei's rhetoric.

The tetralemma on the painting of Murasaki Shikibu is best seen as providing a means of understanding Murasaki Shikibu's writing, like Shunzei's use of *Makashikan* in articulating a method for composing and evaluating Japanese poetry. It does this by asking the viewer metaphorically to pass through the four gates on the right cartouche and then, with the mind prepared, to read the subsequent two *waka* poems by the author to the left. Both *waka* come from the collection of Murasaki Shikibu's verse where they are presented with headnotes and between other verses that contextualize them to a certain extent as grief poems, the first said to have been written sometime after the death of her husband:

Kokoro dani	Is there a fate
Ikanaru mi ni ka	That could at very least
Kanau ramu	Bring satisfaction?
Omoishiredomo	The truth I realize
Omoishirarezu	But cannot yet accept.

The second poem follows a headnote that explains how Murasaki composed upon reading through the old letters of a recently deceased female friend, also a serving lady at court:

Tare ka yo ni	Who will read it?
Nagaraete mimu	Who will live forever
Kakitomeshi	In this world
Ato wa kiesenu	A letter left behind
Katami naredomo	In her undying memory.

Within the narrativized frame of the anthologized collection, which presents the poems in chronological order, the two verses can be interpreted as personal reactions to specific circumstances. But as poems that reflect upon the nature and limited temporality of human existence, one can see how they would be selected and repurposed for use on Murasaki Shikibu portrait icons, the ultimate goal of which was to link **THE TALE OF GENJI** to Tendai Buddhist beliefs. The poems are decontextualized from the facts of Shikibu's life as presented in the poetry collection, but the preface cartouche of the four gates gives them a new context, asking that they be read as metaphors for the Tendai approach to understanding reality.

When viewed through the frame of the four gates, which asks that one attempt to see an ultimate reality beyond the phenomenal world, each word in the first poem may be perceived as Buddhist in meaning. Rather than questioning her worldly "fate" and whether it will bring "satisfaction," the poet in the first poem may therefore be asking more abstractly if there is no "body" (*mi*) that can be brought into alignment (*kanau*) with "mind" (*kokoro*). The second half of the first poem shows that the verse focuses entirely on a perceiving subject who paradoxically states that, though she may "contemplate and reach understanding" (*omoishiredomo*), she "cannot contemplate and reach understanding" (*omoishirarezu*). The repetition of the compound verb "to contemplate and know" (*omoishiru*) in positive and negative form recalls the affirmative–negative dialectic between existence and nonexistence (or nothingness) in the four gates. Read this way, the first poem could be taken to describe contemplative practice and the process of moving through the different levels of discernment. Or more abstractly, the poem's implied thinking subject cancels itself out through the parallelism of the phrasing, poetically rehearsing the negation of the conventional self that must precede a discernment of the middle.

The second poem on the painting relates to *mujōkan*, the awareness of the impermanence of existence, through the voice of a poet who notes the irony of the written word enduring beyond the evanescent life of the writer. Although this poem has been interpreted as expressing the author's anxiety over making a mark in the world and leaving a name for herself as a writer, the application of the Tendai filter to the verse can produce a very different interpretation. The poem also calls attention to the lack of inherent meaning of the written word and its dependency on the perceiving subject to imbue it with value. The poem asks if "anyone will live on in this world to read" (literally "see," *mimu*) these letters, these "traces that do not disappear" (*ato wa kiesenu*), thus imagining a future in which the letters have become empty signifiers, meaningless until they are interpreted by a reader. The idea that the written word is contingent accords with notions about the provisional nature of language, as found in the preface to the *Makashikan*:

> Through great compassion [the Buddha] has pity on all who have not heard [the Dharma, and therefore expounds the Dharma with provisional indicators such as words]. It is as if by

> raising a [round] fan you replicate [the image of] the moon that is hidden behind a range of mountains, or by [artificially] shaking a tree you can teach about [the nature of] air when the wind has stopped.

The passage goes on to warn about becoming trapped and too reliant upon texts, and calls for reading with insight, to see beyond the literal. By using the image of the round fan that stands in for the hidden moon, it shows the central place of metaphor as a mechanism for perceiving the ultimate reality of which the written word can be a manifestation.

This second poem by Murasaki, by envisioning a future world from which the poet and the poem's readers have also departed, emphasizes the mutability of existence, which was an integral part of Buddhist philosophy and which some commentators considered to be the central point of *The Tale of Genji*. It is this awareness of impermanence (*mujōkan*) that allows an individual to emulate the compassion of the Buddha, the radical empathy that comes from understanding the indivisibility of self and other. And it was the ability of **THE TALE OF GENJI** to spark a profound understanding of impermanence in its readers through a narrative that traces an entire arc of a human life that made it essential to those who posited the author's enlightened mind. Kujō Tanemichi, whose belief in a "*shikan* theory" of reading *Genji* was described above, wrote elsewhere that "to understand the principle (*kotowari* 理) [that all that flourishes must fade] in the most profound way, nothing compares to reading **THE TALE OF GENJI**." For Tanemichi and others, Buddhism and literature were thus mutually reinforcing; fiction could be an effective and worthy vehicle for conveying Buddhist truth, but to understand the deeper meanings of the text one needed to grasp the philosophical apparatus of *shikan*. The portrait icon of Murasaki thus provides a model for understanding how to use *shikan* to understand her fiction as well, modeling a mode of reading and interpretation beneath the surface level of the text.

Moonlight and Metaphysics: Suma and Akashi

The question remains as to how Buddhist philosophy could be used to interpret specific narrative moments in **THE TALE OF GENJI** itself. Some hints in the commentaries appear in sections devoted to explaining the mysterious absent chapter, "Kumogakure," blank for all but its title. The chapter comes after Genji's final appearance in the tale in Chapter 41 "Maboroshi" and is thought to have stood in for a depiction of Genji's death, which many believed would have been beyond expression in words. Medieval commentators used this chapter as an opportunity to expound upon the Tendai paradigm, and in the process, a nascent theory of fiction based on the "three truths" began to emerge. The author of the *Genji monogtari teiyō* for example explains how reading the fictional tale (*tsukuri monogatari*) relates to the three truths: to consider the deaths of characters is to contemplate phenomena through "emptiness"; understanding the character of the Kiritsubo Emperor as a symbol for, or analogous to, the historical figure of the Daigo Emperor (r. 897–930) is said to be akin to contemplating "provisional" reality; and finally, the wordless "Kumogakure" chapter is a perfect expression of the ultimate truth of "the middle," an expression of the void that encompasses both emptiness and contingent reality. The scheme of the three truths could thus facilitate an understanding of the tale as a whole, and its details, while enriching the experience of literary symbolism—essentially holding two things in one's mind at once. The experience of reading literature could therefore be linked to the so-called provisional gate, one that Tendai teachings enjoined disciples to undertake as one step on the path to enlightenment.

While elaboration of a Buddhist theory of the tale in the commentaries is minimal, another type of Murasaki portrait icon showing the author at the temple of Ishiyamadera composing her tale is useful in this regard because of its citation of a passage from Chapter 12 "Suma". The painting depicts the popular genesis story for **THE TALE OF GENJI** in which Murasaki's initial writing of her tale

occurs not within the environs of the imperial court, but at the Buddhist temple just outside the capital:

Charged by her highness the Imperial Consort with the task of writing **THE TALE OF GENJI**, Lady Murasaki travelled to the temple of Ishiyamadera to pray for inspiration. On the fifteenth night of the eighth month she looked out over Lake Biwa, calmed her mind and gazed upon the moon's glowing orb reflected on the surface of the water, and suddenly the idea was born. She picked up her brush, but with no paper at hand, she reached for the scrolls of the *Great Perfection of Transcendent Wisdom Sutra* (S. *Prajñāpāramitā*, J. *Daihannyakyō*) resting on the Buddhist altar, and turning them over wrote the Suma and Akashi chapters.

Figure 8.3 Tosa Mitsuoki (1617–91). *Murasaki Shikibu at Ishiyamadera*. Edo period, seventeenth century. Hanging scroll, ink and color on silk, 86.0 × 46.5 cm. Ishiyamadera Collection, Shiga.

Such passages claim for *Genji* an originary moment rooted in meditative practice and further wrap the tale's authorship in spiritual imagery, by among other things depicting it as having been inscribed upon the back of a Buddhist sutra. Other versions of the legend suggested that Murasaki Shikibu was herself an incarnation of the bodhisattva Kannon sent into the world to set her readers on the righteous path of Buddhist devotion. In much the same way that Murasaki and Kannon are two and yet one, the temple of Ishiyamadera was said to be indistinguishable from the bodhisattva realm of Potalaka. The artist has composed a painting that on the surface appears to depict a straightforward image of a court lady writing at her desk, but for the initiated it functions as a visual metaphor for an enlightened being, at the moment of achieving stillness and insight by clearing her mind and meditating on the reflection of the moon.

The legendary date of the tale's creation is also important, as the increasing illumination in the course of the lunar cycle is a simile in the *Makashikan* for gradual enlightenment, which achieves perfection on the night when the moon is at its fullest, the fifteenth of the eighth month. It is on that night, which Zhiyi likened to an expression of complete and perfect Buddhahood, that Murasaki Shikibu meditates on the moon and is enlightened. According to a *shikan* theory of the novel, that achievement of Buddhist insight merges with the writing of the tale, which is said to begin with a scene from "Suma." That scene describes Genji seeing the brilliant moon shining over the sea at Suma, where he has been living in self-imposed exile, and he recalls that it is the fifteenth of the

eighth month. The painting explicitly connects the full moon that Murasaki gazed upon at Ishiyamadera to the moon gazed upon by her protagonist through the inscription that floats above the temple to the left of the moon in the upper register of the painting. It cites several lines and verse from the "Suma" chapter:

> The full moon rose vivid and bright, bringing back memories to Genji. "That's right . . . tonight is the fifteenth." Staring up at the face of the moon, he lovingly imagined the music that would be playing on a night like this at the palace, with all the ladies gazing out at the night sky. When he murmured a line from Bai Juyi—"Feelings for acquaintances of old, now two thousand leagues distant"—his attendants could not restrain their tears. With indescribable yearning he recalled the poem Fujitsubo sent him complaining about how the "ninefold mists" kept her from the palace. As memories of this and other moments came to him, he wept aloud. He heard a voice saying, "The hour is late." However, he could not bring himself to retire.

Miru hodo zo	Only while I watch
Shibashi nagusamu	For that moment, comes solace,
Meguriawan	But round to meeting
Tsuki no Miyako wa	With the Moon Capital—how far
Haruka naredo mo	Is that circle's joining still.

Genji longs for the music at the palace and imagines those in the capital gazing up at the same moon. He recites a line by Bai Juyi (772–846) also composed on the fifteenth night of the eighth month in which the poet longs for his friend far away and remembers those he has left behind. The moon at Suma functions as a pivot mentally transporting Genji and the reader back to the capital and emphasizing his isolation on the coast. It is at once a melancholic and a beautiful device that allows the reader to briefly embody the perspective of Genji, of Fujitsubo and others in the capital, and of Murasaki the author—all sharing this vision of the moon.

The invocation of the "Suma" chapter in the *Genji* origin myth thus creates the perfect meditation on the Buddhist notion of nonduality. The moon is of course everywhere at once, and thus functions as a master metaphor for the way the buddha nature infuses every particle in the universe. The motif of the moon in the narrative creates a focal point for the switching of subject positions and enables a narrativized example of intersubjectivity between fictional characters and between the author and her protagonist contemplating the same moon on the same night. The *shikan* theory of the novel seems to say that the flash of insight that poetry has the capacity to engender may also arise from such moments in fiction like **THE TALE OF GENJI**. The theory hinges upon a sensitivity to language and seeing within the figural moon (or in other characters such as the word for sky/void) the potential for metaphysical meaning. It allows for a reading of the tale in which a moon is never merely a moon, but might always be a metaphor for enlightenment, and in which nothing should ever be taken too literally.

When such intersubjectivity is linked with empathy, literary allusion can be tinged with Buddhist morality. The citation of a poem by Bai Juyi in the "Suma" passage, for example, composed on the same night of the year and thus beneath the same full moon, seems to collapse time and space in a way that accords with the nondualistic ideal. It frames Genji's own sorrow as a sentiment that had been felt in the past by the ancient poet and that would be felt again in the future, suggesting the

continuous mind and delusional notion of short-term temporal divisions. Intertextuality thus becomes an expression of Buddhist belief and its attendant morality. What therefore might be taken as a lyrical expression of personal loneliness and longing in fact recalls Shunzei's comments on how poetic grace or beauty (*yūgen*) should reflect an achieved state of "insight into the profoundly moving character of things (*aware no fukaki koto*)," rooted in "human feeling" (*hito no nasake*). Esperanza Ramirez-Christensen has explained Shunzei's understanding of "human feeling" as not "feeling as individual subjective emotion, but rather invoked in the context of an interpersonal, or dialogical, reciprocal relation—of a compassion extended by the one eliciting a profound response in the other," which he linked to an awareness of and sorrow for the human condition (*mujōkan*). That the image of the moon on the water in the "Suma" passage becomes an emblem for the eradication of dualist thinking and the fixation point for the luminous quiescence of cessation and contemplation of *shikan* was undoubtedly grasped by certain readers. When the artist Tosa Mitsusada illustrated the scene of Genji contemplating the moon in exile, for example, he chose to depict nothing but a softly glowing orb merging with the blue waves and the white clouds, a ghostly image that comes in and out of focus, at once a moon above the clouds and a shimmering reflection on the water, casting the light of a metaphysical moon on the shores of Suma.



Figure 8.4 Tosa Mitsusada (1738–1806). *Scenes from the Suma Chapter of* THE TALE OF GENJI. Edo period, eighteenth century. Handscroll, ink and light colors on paper, 38.1 × 949.9 cm. Harvard Art Museums, Cambridge, MA.

While the words of Shunzei noted above referred specifically to poetry, a fictional work like *Genji* could have evoked the existential intersubjectivity of Zhiyi's philosophy through its mode of narration. THE TALE OF GENJI has long been characterized as a psychological novel, earning its title because of the preponderance of characters who are "always thinking about what other characters are thinking." A few paragraphs before the passage from "Suma" quoted on the paintings, for example, Genji's actions toward his men stem from an attempt to show that he understands their thoughts. Genji speaks a verse out loud to himself that reflects upon the sadness of those dependent on him and lamenting his absence in the capital:

Koiwabite	Weary with yearning,
Naku ne ni magau	Weeping, now the cries that come

Uranami wa	Mingle with the waves . . .
Omou kata yori	Waves that break before the wind
Kaze ya fukuran	That blows for the longed-for land?

Hearing his poem, his attendants were startled awake. Seeing how splendid Genji looked, they were overcome by emotion, and as they arose unsteadily they were quietly wiping their noses to disguise their tears.

Genji wondered, *How must my attendants feel? For my sake alone they have come wandering with me to this sorry existence, having left behind their comfortable, familiar homes and parted with parents and siblings from whom even the briefest absence would be hard to bear.*

Such musings made him miserable, but then he realized that it must make his attendants feel forlorn to see him so downhearted like this. And so, during the days that followed, he diverted them with playful banter, and in moments of idle leisure he would make scrolls with poems. He also drew remarkable-looking sketches and paintings. . . . Before coming to Suma he had heard about the views of the sea and mountains here . . . he depicted those rocky shores—their incomparable beauty truly surpassed anything he had imagined—in charcoal sketches of unrivalled skill.

Certainly, the poems in the *Genji* can reflect the tropes of post-language thinking prized in Tendai Buddhist aesthetics, but they are also situated within an established narrative world that enables a reader to see the morality of nonduality in practice. Genji's experience of exile as a nadir in his personal and political trajectory functions in many ways in the novel, but from a spiritual point of view, it creates an isolated meditative environment for the character in which he can be shown to exhibit a new awareness for the pain and suffering of others. And the author makes sure to show that he does not wallow in his grief but, as in the passage above, understands that he must ease the suffering of his loyal men. He subsequently distracts them with banter and marvelous paintings and drawings that capture the awesome physical landscape around them. Genji thus acts dutifully, engaging in moral behavior (easing the pain of his men) derived from a projection of thought that is itself a simulation of nondualistic thinking. Genji's morality is not derived from a higher power, but from an autonomous self that uses the power of the mind to determine proper action. In this particular example Genji's morality accords with the Middle Way of emptiness. Moreover, Genji comforts his men by aesthetic means: recognizing the sublimity of the landscape around him, he captures its beauty in images to uplift them. In so doing he becomes an artist whose creations are motivated by human feeling, showing the moral dimension of beauty. The paintings, because of their inherent affective power, will help Genji to emerge victorious in the overall trajectory of the novel; these are the very paintings created in Suma and Akashi that in the famous "picture contest" of Chapter 17 "Eawase" help his team win Emperor Reizei's favor, and later they symbolically affirm the ascendancy of Genji's daughter as empress. This daughter, whose mother is the woman Genji meets in Akashi, will in time make Genji the grandfather of an emperor, and it is her rise and that of her family that stands as the most important subplot of the tale. The author thus links her protagonist's moral actions to a plot structured with the force of Buddhist causality.

This essay has attempted to explore how figures in history who engendered the notion of a Buddhist philosophical foundation for **THE TALE OF GENJI** might have actually applied a "theory of *shikan*" to reading the tale. Two different types of Murasaki Shikibu portrait icons produced in the milieu of Tendai *Genji* commentaries were used as models for reading and interpretation. With explicit references to Buddhist philosophy in their inscriptions in one type, and a key passage from

the "Suma" chapter of the narrative in the other, the paintings provide an impetus for thinking about how essential ideas about nonduality, and by extension the morality of empathy, were applied to the *Genji*. The commentaries and paintings, although dating from the medieval to the early modern period, represent a strain of thought and a Buddhist relationship to language that was familiar to the *Genji* author herself. The commentaries were never solely Buddhist in focus, and even the patrons of the Murasaki Shikibu portrait icons were not single-minded in their approach to the tale. When Genji empathizes with his men in Suma and gazes out at the moon over the water, he does not achieve Buddhist insight, but goes on to struggle with his own self-professed sexual proclivities and lapses in judgement and morality. **THE TALE OF GENJI** contains no perfectly virtuous Buddhist exemplars, and even the question of whether Genji successfully manages to renounce the world in the Buddhist manner after he apparently determines to do so remains ambiguous at the end of the chapter in which he makes his last appearance. In fact, the author of *Genji* often makes a point of matching seemingly serious Buddhist references with subsequent passages that appear to undercut any possibility of a didactic message. The *shikan* or Buddhist theory of the tale, however, accommodates these contradictions, even embraces them. And while the theory was constructed upon the idea of the perfect Buddha mind ground of Murasaki Shikibu, in actuality it hinges upon the response of the reader, who is given the power to envision her text as more than words. <>

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kracauer: A Biography by Jörg Später, translated by Daniel Steuer [Polity, 9781509533015]

Siegfried Kracauer was one of the most important German thinkers of the twentieth century. His writings on Weimar culture, mass society, photography and film were groundbreaking and they anticipated many of the themes later developed members of the Frankfurt School and other cultural theorists.

No less remarkable were the circumstances under which he made these contributions. After his early years as a journalist in Germany, the rise of the Nazis forced Kracauer into exile – first in Paris and then, after a protracted flight via Marseilles and Lisbon, to the United States. The existential challenges, personal losses and unrelenting hardship Kracauer faced during these years of exile formed the backdrop against which he offered his acute observations of modern life.

Jörg Später provides the first comprehensive biography of this extraordinary man. Based on extensive archival research, Später's biography expertly traces the key influences on Kracauer's intellectual development and presents his most important works and ideas with great clarity. At the same time, Später ably documents the intensity of Kracauer's personal relationships, the trauma of his flight and exile, and his embrace of his new homeland, where, finally, the 'groundlessness' of refugee existence gave way to a more stable life and, with it, some of the intellectually most fruitful years of Kracauer's career. <>

Theodor W. Adorno and Siegfried Kracauer Correspondence 1923-1966 edited by Wolfgang Schopf, translated by Susan Reynolds and Michael Winkler [Polity, 9780745649238]

Theodor W. Adorno and Siegfried Kracauer were two of the most influential philosophers and cultural critics of the 20th century. While Adorno became the leading intellectual figure of the Frankfurt School, Kracauer's writings on film, photography, literature and the lifestyle of the middle

classes opened up a new and distinctive approach to the study of culture and everyday life in modern societies.

This volume brings together for the first time the long-running correspondence between these two major figures of German intellectual culture. As left-wing German Jews who were forced into exile with the rise of Nazism, Adorno and Kracauer shared much in common, but their worldviews were in many ways markedly different. These differences become clear in a correspondence that ranges over a great diversity of topics, from the nature of criticism and the meaning of utopia to the work of their contemporaries, including Bloch, Brecht and Benjamin. Where Kracauer embraced the study of new mass media, above all film, Adorno was much more sceptical. This is borne out in his sharp criticism of Kracauer's study of the composer Offenbach, which Adorno derided as musically illiterate, as well as his later criticism of Kracauer's *Theory of Film*. Exposing the very different ways that both men were grappling intellectually with the massive transformations of the 20th century, these letters shed fresh light on the principles shaping their work at the same time as they reveal something of the intellectual brilliance and human frailties of these two towering figures of 20th century thought. <>

How Not to Write a Thesis or Dissertation: A Guide to Success through Failure by Mikael Sundström [Edward Elgar Publishers, 9781789900521]

If you thought a book about thesis writing would make for wearisome reading, think again! In seven entertaining and enlightening chapters, Mikael Sundström sheds light on the trials and tribulations of academic writing, offering guidance on how to become a doyen of academic disaster - and, more importantly, how to avoid that fate.

Prepare to consider your academic writing in a whole new way. Guiding readers through the many stages of thesis writing, this dynamic book provides a comprehensive and rigorous methodology that encompasses the crucial aspects of the dreaded dissertation. It follows the writing process, from drafting the research question and composing the first line, to constructing an impressive argument and finishing a thesis with finesse. Featuring concrete tips on academic penmanship and regular 'How Not to Fail' boxes, Sundström identifies the potential pitfalls that lead to dissertation disaster - and expertly lays out a path to success. <>

The Failures of Philosophy: A Historical Essay by Stephen Gaukroger [Princeton University Press, 9780691207506]

The first book to address the historical failures of philosophy—and what we can learn from them

Philosophers are generally unaware of the failures of philosophy, recognizing only the failures of particular theories, which are then remedied with other theories. But, taking the long view, philosophy has actually collapsed several times, been abandoned, sometimes for centuries, and been replaced by something quite different. When it has been revived it has been with new aims that are often accompanied by implausible attempts to establish continuity with a perennial philosophical tradition. What do these failures tell us?

The Failures of Philosophy: A Historical Essay presents a historical investigation of philosophy in the West, from the perspective of its most significant failures: attempts to provide an account of the good life, to establish philosophy as a discipline that can stand in judgment over other forms of thought, to set up philosophy as a theory of everything, and to construe it as a discipline that rationalizes the empirical and mathematical sciences. Stephen Gaukroger argues that these failures reveal more about philosophical enquiry and its ultimate point than its successes ever could. These

failures illustrate how and why philosophical inquiry has been conceived and reconceived, why philosophy has been thought to bring distinctive skills to certain questions, and much more. <>

Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information (Volume1) by Gilbert Simondon, translated by Taylor Adkins, [Posthumanities, University of Minnesota Press, 9780816680023]
Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information, Supplement edition (Volume11) by Gilbert Simondon, translated by Taylor Adkins, [Posthumanities, University of Minnesota Press, 9781517909529

A long-awaited translation on the philosophical relation between technology, the individual, and milieu of the living

From Democritus's atomism to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, from Aristotle's reflections on the individual to Husserl's call for a focused return to things, from the philosophical advent of the Cartesian ego and the Leibnizian monad to Heidegger's notion of Dasein, the question concerning the constitution of the individual has continued to loom large over the preoccupations of philosophers and scholars of scientific disciplines for thousands of years.

Through conceptions in modern scientific areas of research such as thermodynamics, the fabrication of technical objects, gestalt theory, cybernetics, and the dynamic formation at work in the creation of crystals, Gilbert Simondon's unique multifaceted philosophical and scholarly research will eventually lead to an astounding reevaluation and questioning of the historical methods for posing the very question and notion of the individual. More than fifty years after its original publication in French, this groundbreaking work of philosophical theory is now available in its first complete English language translation.

The second volume of **Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information** presents archival documents detailing both the preliminary research conducted by Gilbert Simondon as well as sketches of early drafts and presentations of his work throughout the intellectual era of his eventual magnum opus. Volume II provides an erudite and important overview of a unique history of both the role the individual has played throughout history in philosophy, religion, and society as well as insight into the contemporary machinations and exciting milieu in which Simondon dared to tread as an interdisciplinary thinker in philosophy and psychology, as well as the new burgeoning fields of computer science and cybernetics. <>

Digital Methods in the Humanities: Challenges, Ideas, Perspectives edited by Silke Schwandt [Digital Humanities Research, Bielefeld University Press, an Imprint of transcript Verlag (http://www.bielefeld-university-press.de), 9783837654196]

Digital Humanities is a transformational endeavor that not only changes the perception, storage, and interpretation of information but also of research processes and questions. It also prompts new ways of interdisciplinary communication between humanities scholars and computer scientists. This volume offers a unique perspective on digital methods for and in the humanities. It comprises case studies from various fields to illustrate the challenge of matching existing textual research practices and digital tools. Problems and solutions with and for training tools as well as the adjustment of research practices are presented and discussed with an interdisciplinary focus. <>

The Shadow Drawing: How Science Taught Leonardo How to Paint by Francesca Fiorani [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 9780374261962]

An entirely new account of Leonardo the artist and Leonardo the scientist, and why they were one and the same man

Leonardo da Vinci has long been celebrated for his consummate genius. He was the painter who gave us the *Mona Lisa* and *The Last Supper*, and the inventor who anticipated the advent of airplanes, hot air balloons, and other technological marvels. But what was the connection between Leonardo the painter and Leonardo the scientist? Historians of Renaissance art have long supposed that Leonardo became increasingly interested in science as he grew older and turned his insatiable curiosity in new directions. They have argued that there are, in effect, two Leonardos—an artist and an inventor. <>

Figurations and Sensations of the Unseen in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: Contested Desires edited by Birgit Meyer and Terje Stordalen [Bloomsbury Studies in Material Religion, Bloomsbury Academic, 9781350078635] Bloomsbury Open Access: Read online or download free chapter PDFs.

This book is open access and available on www.bloomsburycollections.com. It is funded by the University of Oslo and Utrecht University.

Judaism, Christianity and Islam are known to privilege words over images. This book shows, however, that the reality is more complex. **Figurations and Sensations of the Unseen in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: Contested Desires** explores the complex procedures used to render the invisible as visible and the elusive as tangible in these three traditions. Working from different disciplinary angles, contributors reflect on figuration and sensation in biblical culture, medieval Jewish culture, the imagination of the unseen in Islamic settings, Christian assaults on 'idolatry' in Africa, baroque and modern Church art, contemporary Eastern Orthodox tradition, photography on the East African coast, European opera and literature, and more. <>

Jews and Protestants: From the Reformation to the Present edited by Irene Aue-Ben-David, Aya Elyada, Moshe Sluhovsky and Christian Wiese [De Gruyter, 9783110661088]

The book sheds light on various chapters in the long history of Protestant-Jewish relations, from the Reformation to the present.

Going beyond questions of antisemitism and religious animosity, it aims to disentangle some of the intricate perceptions, interpretations, and emotions that have characterized contacts between Protestantism and Judaism, and between Jews and Protestants. While some papers in the book address Luther's antisemitism and the NS-Zeit, most papers broaden the scope of the investigation: Protestant-Jewish theological encounters shaped not only antisemitism but also the Jewish Reform movement and Protestant philosemitic post-Holocaust theology; interactions between Jews and Protestants took place not only in the German lands but also in the wider Protestant universe; theology was crucial for the articulation of attitudes toward Jews, but music and philosophy were additional spheres of creativity that enabled the process of thinking through the relations between Judaism and Protestantism. By bringing together various contributions on these and other aspects, the book opens up directions for future research on this intricate topic, which bears both historical significance and evident relevance to our own time. <>

Memory, Metaphor and Mysticism in Kalidasa's AbhijnanSakuntalam edited by Namrata Chaturvedi [Anthem Press, 9781785273209]

As an ancient Indian poet-dramatist, Kālidāsa cannot be absorbed into the homogenizing tendencies of Hindu hagiography, as has often been attempted, especially in the period after independence. From being projected as a Brahmin by birth in legends, a Vedāntist and Vaishnavite in darsana

(theology), and more recently, owing to Western theoretical perspectives being applied to texts separated in time and contexts, Kalidasa is critiqued for a patriarchal and casteist outlook. These various readings have privileged personal theories and validated them by reading literary texts in certain ways. '**Memory, Metaphor and Mysticism in Kalidasa's AbhijnanSakuntalam**' brings together scholars from both sides of the globe who offer possibilities for reviewing this text, not as an Oriental discovery or a cultural property, but as an ancient literary text that can be read in multiple philosophical contexts. Further, the translations of 'AbhijñānaŚākuntalam' into South Asian languages like Urdu and Nepali and a classical language like Persian are also included for detailed study for understanding the impact of this text in the respective literary traditions of these languages, and to assess the actual cross-literary dialogue that this text made, without hyperboles and generalizations, given the fact that many of these translation happened just before and after independence when literary historiography and nation writing project went hand in hand in India. <>

Aëtiana (1996–2020) The 5 Part Series:

Aetius, the 1st–2nd-century CE philosopher is now restored as the doxographer and Eclectic philosopher of note. This meticulous effort of painstaking scholarship will server future generations of historians of classical ancient philosophy for much of the rest of this century. The work of reconstruction and text of the *Placita* of Aëtius to move it from a secondary corrupted source to an primary source of the content and arguments of the presocratics through middle Platonism with enough assured evaluation as to significantly alter the textbooks about philosophical opinions and development.

The present edition reviewed here is Part V includes reconstruction and commentary of the text of the *Placita* of Aëtius has been a very long time in the making. In the case of Jaap Mansfeld, its origins go as far back as the research he did on ps.Hippocrates De hebdomadibus in the late 1960's. David Runia first came into contact with doxographical texts when analysing Philo of Alexandria's puzzling work De aeternitate mundi in the late 1970's. We made the decision to work together on the Aëtian Placita in 1989 and the project entitled Aëtiana: the Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer' was born. The present volume consisting of four parts is the project's culmination. Four preparatory volumes (in five parts) have preceded it and are noted below with contents. Go to main review and evaluation for Aetius V.

Aëtiana V (4 vols.) An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita with a Commentary and a Collection of Related Texts edited by Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 153, Brill, Hardcover: 9789004428386 E-Book (PDF): 9789004428409]

A new reconstruction and text of the *Placita* of Aëtius (ca. 50 CE), accompanied by a full commentary and an extensive collection of related texts. This compendium, arguably the most important doxographical text to survive from antiquity, is known through the intensive use made of it by authors in later antiquity and beyond. Covering the entire field of natural philosophy, it has long been mined as a source of information about ancient philosophers and their views. It now receives a thorough analysis as a remarkable work in its own right. This volume is the culmination of a five-volume set of studies on Aëtius (1996–2020): Aëtiana I (ISBN: 9789004105805, 1996), II (Parts 1&2; set ISBN 9789004172067; 2008), III (ISBN 9789004180413; 2009), IV (ISBN: 9789004361454, 2018), and V (Parts 1-4). It uses an innovative methodology to replace the seminal edition of Hermann Diels (1879). <>

Svartkonstböcker: A Compendium of the Swedish Black Art Book Tradition by Dr Thomas K Johnson [Folk Necromancy in Transmission, Revelore Press, 9781947544222]

Svartkonstböcker: A Compendium of the Swedish Black Art Book Tradition is a fully revised edition of Dr Johnson's 2010 PhD Thesis *Tidebast och Vändelrot: Magical Representations in the Swedish Black Art Book Tradition*, featuring a thorough, path-breaking study of the black art book tradition in Sweden, as well as English translations of 35 Swedish black art books ranging from the 1690s to the 1940s, including over 1900 spells and a robust index.

The late Dr Johnson always wished that his work would see print publication in its entirety. Other publishers have offered to produce this work in two volumes, prioritizing the spells in the black art books over the scholarly apparatus that contextualizes them. Here Revelore presents the work in full, comprising over 650 pages of material. Minor errors from the PhD manuscript have been rectified, and archival images of the characters, sigils, and illustrations have been restored in high fidelity. This is *the* definitive source work for the Swedish magical corpus of black art books. <>

Job: A New Translation by Edward L. Greenstein [Yale University Press, 9780300162349]

This "bold new English translation" (Adam Kirsch, *Wall Street Journal*) of Job by one of the world's leading biblical scholars will reshape the way we read this canonical text "A work of erudition with . . . a revolutionary twist."—James Parker, *Atlantic*

The book of Job has often been called the greatest poem ever written. The book, in Edward Greenstein's characterization, is "a Wunderkind, a genius emerging out of the confluence of two literary streams" which "dazzles like Shakespeare with unrivaled vocabulary and a penchant for linguistic innovation." Despite the text's literary prestige and cultural prominence, no English translation has come close to conveying the proper sense of the original. The book has consequently been misunderstood in innumerable details and in its main themes.

Edward Greenstein's new translation of Job is the culmination of decades of intensive research and painstaking philological and literary analysis, offering a major reinterpretation of this canonical text. Through his beautifully rendered translation and insightful introduction and commentary, Greenstein presents a new perspective: Job, he shows, was defiant of God until the end. The book is more about speaking truth to power than the problem of unjust suffering. <>

Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China edited by John Makeham [Oxford University Press, 97801993581 20]

Yogacara is one of the most influential philosophical systems of Indian Buddhism. Competing traditions of Yogacara thought were first introduced into China during the sixth century. By the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), however, key commentaries of this school had ceased being transmitted in China, and it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that a number of them were re-introduced from Japan where their transmission had been uninterrupted. Within a few short years Yogacara was being touted as a rival to the New Learning from the West, boasting not only organized, systematized thought and concepts, but also a superior means to establish verification. This book accomplishes three goals. The first is to explain why this Indian philosophical system proved to be so attractive to influential Chinese intellectuals at a particular moment in history. The second is to demonstrate how the revival of Yogacara thought informed Chinese responses to the challenges of modernity, in particular modern science and logic. The third goal is to highlight how Yogacara thought shaped a major current in modern Chinese philosophy: New Confucianism. Transforming Consciousness illustrates that an adequate understanding of New Confucian philosophy must include a proper grasp of Yogacara thought. <>

Chinese Character Manipulation in Literature and Divination: The Zichu by Zhou Lianggong (1612–1672) edited and translated by Anne Kathrin Schmiedl [Prognostication in History, Brill, 9789004422360]

In **Chinese Character Manipulation in Literature and Divination: The Zichu by Zhou Lianggong (1612–1672)**, Anne Schmiedl analyses the little-studied method of Chinese character manipulation as found in imperial sources. Focusing on one of the most famous and important works on this subject, the Zichu by Zhou Lianggong (1612–1672), Schmiedl traces and discusses the historical development and linguistic properties of this method. This book represents the first thorough study of the Zichu and the reader is invited to explore how, on the one hand, the educated elite leveraged character manipulation as a literary play form. On the other hand, as detailed exhaustively by Schmiedl, practitioners of divination also used and altered the visual, phonetic, and semantic structure of Chinese characters to gain insights into events and objects in the material world. <>

Murasaki Shikibu's The Tale of Genji Philosophical Perspectives edited by James McMullen [Oxford Studies in Philosophy and Literature, Oxford Studies in Philosophy and Literature Oxford University Press, 9780190654979]

Murasaki Shikibu's **The Tale of Genji** is variously read as a work of feminist protest, the world's first psychological novel and even as a post-modern masterpiece. Commonly seen as Japan's greatest literary work, its literary, cultural, and historical significance has been thoroughly acknowledged. As a work focused on the complexities of Japanese court life in the Heian period, however, **The Tale of Genji** has never before been the subject of philosophical investigation. The essays in this volume address this oversight, arguing that the work contains much that lends itself to philosophical analysis. <>