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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

Robert Tenor, editor
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EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. Our Annotated Bibliography will review, list and link the titles under discussion, providing a faithful summary of its content and audience.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

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THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EGYPTOLOGY edited by Ian Shaw and Elizabeth Bloxam [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780199271870]

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EGYPTOLOGY presents a series of articles by colleagues working across the many archaeological, philological and cultural subdisciplines within the study of ancient Egypt from prehistory through to the end of the Roman Period. The volume seeks to place Egyptology within its theoretical, methodological, and historical contexts, both indicating how the subject has evolved and discussing its distinctive contemporary problems, issues and potential. Transcending conventional boundaries between archaeological and ancient textual analysis, it stresses the need for Egyptology to seek multidisciplinary methods and broader collaborations if it is to remain contemporary and relevant. It therefore serves as a reference work not only for those working within the discipline, but also as a gateway into Egyptology for archaeologists, anthropologists, sociologists and linguists. The book is organized into ten parts, the first of which examines the many different historical and geographical perspectives that have influenced the development and current characteristics of the discipline. Part II addresses the various environmental aspects of the subject: landscapes, climate, flora, fauna and the mineral world. Part III considers a variety of practical aspects of the ways in which Egyptologists survey, characterize and manage landscapes. Part IV discusses materials and technology, from domestic architecture and artefacts through to religious and funerary items. Part V deals with Egypt's relations with neighbouring regions and peoples, while Part VI explores the sources and interpretive frameworks that characterize different phases of ancient Egyptian history. Part VII is concerned with textual and iconographic approaches to Egyptian culture, and Part VIII comprises discussions of the key aspects of ancient Egyptian scripts and philology. Part IX presents summaries of the current state of the subject in relation to a variety of textual genres, from letters and autobiographies to socio-economic, magical and mathematical texts. The final section covers different aspects of museology and conservation.

This volume discusses a range of current debates into the ways in which Egyptologists are engaging with the problems and demands of moving towards greater collaborations across the social sciences if it is to remain a relevant discipline in its own right. Viewpoints from contributing authors are synthesized into a discussion of recent developments in the field from fresh research across both the archaeological and textual arms of the discipline. The volume considers the extent to which scholars need to be revising and re-thinking their research questions and moving towards greater collaborations within the discipline, and crucially outside of it. Moving the discipline forward is also about including voices outside of western discourses and into volumes such as this. The contributions from Chinese and Egyptian scholars therefore bring a fresh perspective to some current problems in Egyptological research particularly in cultural heritage management, museum curation, and investigating archaeological landscapes.

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Does Egyptology have an identity crisis? If we look back to the last decade, then the answer would probably be 'yes'. Over the last few years there has been a gathering consensus that the discipline needs to seriously search for its identity and relevance within the social sciences if it is to survive as an academic field in its own right. The main criticism levelled at Egyptology is that it remains stuck within its core narratives focused on religion, art, kingship, temples, and tombs. Recent conferences addressing these and other problems that Egyptology faces often turn to the founding of the subject for answers.1 Moreno Garciá2 for instance suggests that Egyptologists are the problem, not the subject, because they continue to play the role of 'zealous keepers and unique interpreters of pharaoh's achievements', and because of the way in which the myth of "'eternal Egypt" and its by-products continue to hamper our comprehension of the pharaonic world'.

We think, however, that survival and relevance of Egyptology lies not so much in navel-gazing about the past, but rather getting to grips with some of the more fundamental aspects of what original research should look like. First, what questions are we asking of material culture? Secondly, what practical and theoretical methods are we going to use to interpret these datasets? Thirdly, what role can multi-disciplinary collaborations play in taking Egyptological study in new research directions? And finally, is the next generation of Egyptologists ready to embrace these changes and challenge the orthodoxy of the subject? To fully engage with all four questions, much more needs to be done. For instance, our attendance at a 'Young Egyptologists' conference in 2015 made for uneasy listening given the general lack of fresh questions and new methods of interpreting material culture outside the rigid boundaries of traditional Egyptological discourse. There were little or no signs of any comparative and multi-disciplinary approaches to developing original research questions and methods, and in some instances, a rather dismissive reaction to taking on agendas that might threaten the orthodoxy. Although similar critiques have already been levelled at the rather dull and repetitive dialogues that remain threaded into the majority of international Egyptological

conferences, apart from those looking at largely Predynastic material, it is certainly more alarming to learn that the next generation of Egyptologists is not significantly engaged in revitalizing our understanding of ancient Egyptian civilization.

In our view, this situation lies in a general under-appreciation and misunderstanding about what interdisciplinary research actually means in practice. Collaboration and designing research methods in an interdisciplinary framework is not unidirectional. Expanding our methods of interpretation in which we ask questions of material culture is also about allowing those outside Egyptology to have a voice. There are certainly cases where some scholars, particularly in the textual areas of the discipline, show a reluctance to allow any intrusion into these domains by non-Egyptologists. This volume is therefore an attempt to move the subject into more progressive comparative and multi-disciplinary agendas in terms of research and the questions we are asking. But, before we do that, we need to acknowledge the patience of all the contributors to this Handbook given its long history of gestation, initially commissioned in 2003 (and at first co-edited by Ian Shaw and Jim Allen) and its appearance now in hardcopy (some chapters having already been available online), which required all authors to significantly update their chapters. We therefore extend enormous thanks for these efforts in bringing this volume, at last, to fruition.

The long development of this volume however, far from being a negative, has enabled us to significantly broaden the canvas on which we can interrogate the discipline of Egyptology as it currently stands. Egyptology, probably more than any other discipline in the humanities, drowns in 'compendia' of one sort or another that aim to provide historical overviews of ancient Egyptian civilization through largely western, 'top-down' discourses. Our aim has therefore been to re-model the way in which we present Egyptology as a discipline outside of the orthodoxy, which as David Wengrow remarks, 'evaluates claims of Egypt's uniqueness' (Chapter 2). Rather, we are aiming to address the imperative of re-thinking the ways in which we introduce comparative frameworks into our interpretative models and bring together the often polarizing textual and archaeological arms of the discipline, which, despite fighting talk, remain entrenched in their various camps. Universities, whether intentionally or not, further exacerbate this divide by usually prioritizing the need for 'textual' scholarship over the 'archaeological'. Therefore, our objective has been to integrate approaches to studying ranges of divergent material culture through ten broadly-based themes that aim to stimulate fresh debates, as a necessity, if the discipline is to remain relevant to future generations of students as well as scholars.

Moving the volume forward most significantly into both multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural arenas has been the inclusion of non-western perspectives on some key topics, such as in our opening theme, 'Egyptology: perspectives on a discipline', which examines the subject of Egyptology not only as a curiosity in its own right through its history within western Orientalist discourses, but as a cognate discipline in the social sciences. The story of the 'reception' of ancient Egypt which began in the 1960s, as Florian Ebeling (Chapter 4) remarks 'ends with the beginning of modern Egyptology in the nineteenth century…ancient Egypt was always a second-hand image in western culture handed down by the accounts of the Bible or classical literature'. The emergence of the term 'Egyptomania' in the nineteenth century is further remarked upon as a powerful conceptualization of anything that adopted forms of Egyptian art, yet, as Ebeling notes, this implies a rather 'irrational' interest in ancient Egypt which today is being heavily critiqued. For instance, 'Egyptomania' and ancient 'Egyptianizing' or 'Orientalizing' all need to be scrutinized, as Wengrow (Chapter 2) addresses, given that these views posit 'a timeless cultural dichotomy between East and West'.

Several authors note the impact of the series of books titled Encounters with Ancient Egypt, which emerged from a conference held at the Institute of Archaeology (UCL) in 2000. These eight volumes are still considered by many to be the most insightful series of English language works that address the status of Egyptology at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Although new publications addressing the problems that the discipline face have superseded this,6 Andrew Bednarski (Chapter 1) still stresses the need for us to look back into the foundations of discipline if we are to move it forward. In many ways, it is Wengrow's chapter that sets the agenda for the scope of this volume and our aims in terms of grappling with the problems that the discipline has in remaining relevant. He aptly remarks that the way forward for the discipline is to make greater efforts to find a common language between 'the Arabic-speaking world and the European discourses out of which modern Egyptology arises'. The situating of Egyptology within the social sciences, as he argues, is therefore an important consideration in terms of developing more comparative, multi-disciplinary frameworks, and in particular placing Egypt within the diverse trajectories of social life in other ancient civilizations, such as Mesopotamia, India, China, South America, and Mesoamerica.

Stretching Egyptology beyond European and American perspectives

Comparative work by Chinese Egyptologists brings into the volume a whole new arena of research that not only touches on the need for voices outside of European discourses, but as the chapter by Li Xiaodong (Chapter 3) implies, a strand of study in which comparing the evolution of Chinese written characters with Egyptian hieroglyphs can open up significant new ways of pairing nationhood with writing. Yet, Egyptology as a discipline in Chinese universities is still evolving since its true integration into studies of Ancient World History, which only happened in the mid-1980s. There is a breathtaking enthusiasm for Egyptology in China, both in academic scholarship and throughout popular culture, which as Maher Eissa and Ashraf el-Senussi remark in their chapter on Egyptian museums (Chapter 61), has unfolded in Chinese tourism now making up one of the largest groups of visitors coming to Egypt since the 2011 revolution.

The establishment of the Institute for History of Ancient Civilizations (IHAC) at Northeast Normal University in 1985 made it one of the first university departments in China to run undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in Egyptology. This has been a milestone in terms of bringing non-western voices into debates about ancient Egyptian civilization. Yet, Chinese students still have to grapple with western biases not only through the dominance of Eurocentric ideas, but also because of a lack of publications in Mandarin. Currently, universities in China are still reliant on academic exchanges from Europe and the USA to move the study of Egyptology forward. Yet, as the discipline matures with now at least two doctoral students a year graduating and joining archaeological teams in Egypt, the future looks promising for the emergence of new 'non-western' approaches to the discipline.

In further developing discourses outside of Eurocentric ideas, several new additions to the volume have been made by Egyptian Egyptologists and archaeologists, who may often be side-lined when it comes to publications of this type. We can find numerous parallels with our Chinese colleagues in terms of the still poor number of Arabic publications in Egyptology, and of course, English remains the discourse of practically all conferences in Egypt. Western approaches to archaeological practice and conservation naturally loom large in post-colonial regions such as Africa, and recent critiques by indigenous archaeologists in Australia have steered attention towards the embeddedness of western ideas, particularly in cultural heritage management. Termed 'authorized heritage discourse' (AHD) the suggestion is that the western model is the only effective route to heritage management, yet, as numerous examples in Egypt indicate, the failure rate is high—(see Chapter 11). Never has it been so essential to seek fresh ideas about the ways in which we can finesse working relationships with

local communities in managing Egypt's antique heritage. Campbell Price (Chapter 60), in his fascinating, in-depth analysis of the ways in which ancient Egypt is 'presented' in western museums, sheds some valuable insights into the ways in which Orientalist discourses have lain behind attitudes of 'western' archaeological missions towards local communities. As Price points out, there has been an 'assumed moral mandate of westerners to "save" pharaonic antiquities from the modern inhabitants of Egypt', whereby 'Concerned (western) experts were contrasted with native Egyptians—depicted as (at best) ignorant bystanders or (at worst) destructive peasants.'

Issues concerning cultural heritage

The publicity surrounding the 2011 revolution and the subsequent sporadic looting, which in our opinion was vastly overplayed by the media, is a particularly good example of a tendency to perpetuate the myth that Egyptians do not value their own heritage sufficiently. In fact, as Maher and El-Senussi tell us in their chapter on Egyptian museums and storehouses (Chapter 61), there was little reporting of the instances in which some storehouses of artefacts were actually protected by local people, and in others, considerable amounts of looted items were eventually returned. The illegal antiquities market is of course greatly profiting from the political and social fragility in countries such as Egypt, and its neighbours, and although we would like to have included a chapter on this topic, we were not able to commission it in time for the volume to appear this year. However, as Deborah Schorsch reminds us in her chapter concerning object conservation (Chapter 62) 'conservators have an obligation to apply their specialized knowledge to recognize newly excavated artefacts and debunk false attributions intended to disguise illegal traffic'.

If we turn our attention to perhaps the biggest threat to Egypt's cultural heritage, which comes largely from infrastructure development, then we tread a perilous path in terms of deciding who sets the agenda in balancing the social and economic needs of growing populations with those of archaeological conservation. Several archaeologists working in the field in Egypt have highlighted where these dangers lie, such as David Jeffreys (Chapter 9), in regard to the site of Memphis, and Egyptian archaeologist Adel Kelany together with Elizabeth Bloxam (see Chapter 11), in the more forgotten archaeological landscapes in the Eastern Desert and in the region surrounding Aswan (see Chapter 10). Through a series of case studies in the Wadi Hammamat and Aswan, the prevailing consensus lies with finding imaginative ways in which local people can be engaged in setting the agenda. This may sound like nothing particularly new, certainly in relation to the innovative methods of community engagement used to protect Egypt's Islamic heritage where there are numerous success stories. For instance, in Cairo the 'Hammam Project' and Al-Azhar Park have exemplified what can be achieved through steering inclusive 'bottom-up' initiatives that work together with local people who live directly among historic buildings, thus giving them a stake in the future of their community. Yet, when it comes to Egypt's antique heritage we step into a range of competing interests and ideas of managing sites that largely follow the western model (AHD), often supported by international funding agencies and other organizations such as the World Bank, European Union (EU), USAID, and UNESCO. In other words, 'top-down' solutions that largely disengage local custodians from decision making, to the extent that the whole machinery of heritage funding and allocation of resources ends up marginalizing those whom it is seeking to empower (see Chapter 11).

The tension that exists between 'top-down' bureaucratic, 'expert-based' perspectives, and those who actively have knowledge of local people's viewpoints both of values and of the significance of places near to them is thus the framework surrounding the two case studies in the Wadi Hammamat and Aswan. What both studies incorporate are ideas that do not involve the deploying of large

amounts of financial resources, or teams of 'foreign' experts, but more simply are finding ways of stewarding local initiatives that are already in existence. Successes are being made with this form of engagement by Egyptians working in the field in Aswan (see Chapters 10 and 11) as members of the Ministry of Antiquities Ancient Quarries and Mines Department (AQMD). What they have managed to do is to protect endangered sites through 'bottom-up' engagement with local people and contractors working in the area. Not only have they alerted local people to the significance of archaeological sites, that often contain a wealth of prehistoric rock art, but in return, contractors have provided the team with vehicles to travel to often quite remote sites. Steering contractors away from some of these sites and providing other locations to quarry has been a major success story in Aswan. We often assume that effective cultural heritage management in countries such as Egypt needs western money and experts to make it happen, but what these new approaches are proposing is the need for dialogues outside such alienating processes. And (p. 6) perhaps most importantly, this kind of dialogue should involve Egyptians who are already successfully integrating sustainable managing of Egypt's Islamic heritage.

Another forgotten strand of debate in terms of museum curation, museums in general, and also the future of the ongoing mega-museum project 'The Grand Egyptian Museum' (GEM) is, who will the visitors be? Efforts to guide the sector into adapting to the significant downturn in tourism from 'western' countries, such as Europe and America, have meant re-thinking and prioritizing relevance first to Egyptian tourists, and also to markets in Asia. As Maher and El-Senussi inform us (Chapter 61), such moves are already underway and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) now play a significant role in steering young curators towards prioritizing initiatives to attract local people. The Egyptian National Committee of International Council of Museums (ICOM Egypt), established in 2014, has been at the forefront of organizing lectures, workshops, conferences, and museum day events for museum curators, graduate students, researchers, and the public as well. Perhaps most important was the publication in 2016 of a museum booklet in Arabic 'Krasat Muthafia', which aims to 'raise awareness of the importance of museums for the Egyptian, and to spread the knowledge of Egyptian history and civilization'. Success stories in increasing Egyptian visitor numbers are notable at the self-directed 'Bibliotheca Alexandrina Museum' in which over 60 per cent of visitors are from local communities, and also the 'Nubia Museum' in Aswan, given its particular focus on displaying local Nubian traditions through time.

The drop-off in foreign tourists has therefore had some unexpected and positive outcomes in terms of driving cultural heritage initiatives and education more towards Egyptians themselves—the way forward in terms of sustaining Egypt's heritage. So where does this leave the foreign tourist market and museums such as the GEM? With foreign visitors from Asian countries, such as China, India, and Indonesia, as well as Arab tourists from the Gulf, far outnumbering those from other countries, some interesting challenges have been created to the ways in which 'ancient Egypt' is curated and displayed to these increasingly non-western audiences.

Investigating archaeological landscapes

Other challenges that we face, in terms of recent geo-political events in the Middle East and north Africa, are the problems of advancing archaeological research 'in the field' in Egypt given the many security restrictions in accessing sites. With our own site in the Wadi Hammamat (Eastern Desert), for the last two years state security has not been forthcoming in giving us the permits we need to work there (see Chapter 8), and a case study of work on the settlement site of Gurob (Chapter 14) highlights a variety of practical problems encountered in another research project. Of course we are not alone: like others, we suffer the knock-on consequences of being low on the list in terms of

research funding and are therefore unable to confidently set out any long-term field-based research agendas. Consequently, in terms of field methods, we are having to continually adapt and focus more on survey and the use of technologies that can speed up our documenting and mapping of sites. Also, as several authors point out in this volume, much more emphasis is now being placed on the education and training of Egyptian Egyptologists and archaeologists, who will ultimately be the new generation of field directors as foreign missions gradually withdraw. Adel Kelany and his team at the AQMD in Aswan are well aware of these responsibilities and challenges and are already running their own training of local Egyptologists, without the involvement of foreign missions. As he explains in his chapter (Chapter 10), the ways in which they are adapting techniques in epigraphy to document rock art and inscriptions in the face of increasing destruction of remote sites in the numerous wadis north and south of Aswan, has been an internal development.

In turning our attention to surveying 'archaeological landscapes' rather than individual sites, we can therefore significantly enhance our ability to characterize and map large areas that would otherwise either be ignored or considered too time-consuming to document. Remote sensing using satellite imagery and aerial photography (including drone technology) has revolutionized the ways in which we can survey large archaeological landscapes, and importantly, monitor and track threats. Use of these technologies is of course a far cry from the early days of cartography and topographical mapping of Egypt's archaeology and environment. David Jeffreys (Chapter 9) delves into the history of mapping Egypt's landscapes and, using Memphis as a case study, discusses the ways in which new technologies such as remote sensing and free access to high resolution satellite images (e.g. Google Earth) provide the local detail of an ever-changing environment. These innovative methods can be used to model such phenomena as the movement of the Nile over millennia. The project at Avaris in the Delta, for instance, combines these new kinds of mapping with sediment coring and resistivity survey, demonstrating a relatively cheap and rapid way of mapping buried deposits without intrusive excavation.

Surveying of extensive procurement landscapes has truly been made possible with remote sensing techniques, using high resolution satellite images as a base map in combination with on-the-ground GPS technology to record features (see Chapter 8). These techniques have been particularly used to document ancient mining and quarrying regions, which are not only some of our most neglected archaeological landscapes in Egypt but also perhaps the most prone to the pitfalls of polarizing research between philology and archaeology—nevertheless, we have been able to make essential holistic studies of diverse ranges of material culture that have changed the ways in which we can map out transformations to these landscapes within broader social and cultural change. As Elizabeth Bloxam explains (Chapter 8), the study of procurement strategies and the social organization of these exploits has been dogged by assumptions drawn largely from textual data that regard these as primarily state-sanctioned activities that are supposedly largely unskilled and hierarchical. Two case studies in the major quarrying regions of Aswan and in the Eastern Desert (Wadi Hammamat), in which epigraphic and archaeological remains have never been contextualized together into the landscape, give us fresh insights into the role of skilled mobile craftspeople operating locally and regionally, creating arenas for technological transmission and knowledge exchange. There needs to be more emphasis on seeing that dynamic interactions can occur in a range of settings. Therefore, instead of sidelining the study of quarries and mines (on the basis that they only provide information about 'technologies' and state-run expeditions), we now need to pay much more attention to what (p. 8) these landscapes can reveal about non-elites, social life, and relationships, an area of Egyptology where we have the least amount of data.

Of course, remote sensing has its limitations and cannot be the only method of mapping and characterizing features, or monitoring threats to cultural heritage, without feet on the ground. As Ana Tavares informs us in her discussion of archaeological practice in Egypt (Chapter 12) we need to make sure that micro-level practice in survey and excavation in the field contains all the elements of sound stratigraphic recording. She further reminds us that archaeological field methods are often neglected in Egyptology degree courses and, some would argue, not seen as necessary to scholarship in the discipline. Unless Egyptological study is part of a wider degree course that has options for practical methods in archaeology, students are missing out on this extremely important part of the discipline, particularly as opportunities for gaining practical skills in the field in Egypt are becoming more difficult. Addressing this situation is key if Egyptologists are to hone their holistic approaches to studies of Egyptian material culture.

Science in Egyptology

Western archaeologists have remained highly influential players in terms of fieldwork in Egypt even in the twenty-first century, and this is surely primarily because of a combination of financial resources and scientific expertise. However, in the introductory chapter to a recent book dealing with the applications of science in Egyptian archaeology, the authors argue that Egyptology has not engaged sufficiently with the kinds of scientific analysis that have become commonplace in archaeology across the globe. Additionally, Paul Nicholson (Chapter 13) points out that Egyptian archaeology is still lacking in the kind of overarching theoretical frameworks that allow scientific results to be better understood in the context of other areas of material-based research such as ethnoarchaeology and experimental work.

Nevertheless, the use of science in Egyptology, particularly in the field of analytical studies relating to northeast African material culture, has increased enormously in the last few decades, culminating in 2017 with an Egyptian-organized international conference in Cairo dealing with scientific studies of ancient Egyptian materials and technologies. It might be argued that this area of Egyptology is the most multi-disciplinary and outward-looking of all, but, just as technology cannot be properly understood without contextualizing, so scientific analysis is more likely to be productive if it takes place in a context of rigorous problem-oriented enquiry. It is therefore with some justification that Nicholson draws attention to the frequent lack of real direction and purpose in the application of science to Egyptian data. A British Academy analysis of the current state of British archaeology points out that 'The best projects investigate large questions through a complex integration of techniques, which often involve developing new modes of analysis with applications outside archaeology'.

Specific challenges do of course exist with certain categories of artefact—hence Picton et al (Chapter 16) argue that the earliest proper scientific analyses of Egyptian textiles enabled this area of material culture both to be taken more seriously and to begin to contribute to broader research questions, because the study of clothing was no longer seen as purely 'women's work'. Bettina Bader (Chapter 15) stresses that the analysis of pottery, clearly the most ubiquitous form of artefact at any Egyptian archaeological site from the Predynastic onwards, should not take place in isolation, but in relation to other forms of evidence, in order to allow it to shed light on broader issues (beyond pure manufacture or uses of ceramics), such as exchange of commodities, socio-economic systems, and the holistic interpretation of specific features in the archaeological record. Salima Ikram (Chapter 7) notes that the study of animal remains from excavations in Egypt, once conducted

primarily in order to determine the nature of the specific remains, is now routinely used to explore diachronic aspects of the climate and environment of the Nile valley and surrounding deserts.

There is a further obstacle to the development of scientific analysis of Egyptian artefacts and materials, and this is the practical difficulty encountered by many archaeologists in gaining permission to take samples out of Egypt for analysis in laboratories elsewhere in the world, as Ikram (Chapter 19) points out, in relation to access to freshly excavated samples of human and animal tissue from Egyptian sites. Indeed, this general issue of sample accessibility was highlighted in a keynote paper at the 2017 Cairo conference mentioned earlier. Clearly there are many projects that can utilize material in museum collections outside Egypt (such as the chronological projects led by the Oxford University Radiocarbon Accelerator unit), but these artefacts are mostly either unprovenanced or from archaeological contexts that are only vaguely recorded since, by definition, they tend to derive from nineteenth- or early twentieth-century excavations, before the time that official partage (or 'division') of finds took place.

Archaeological practice and multi-disciplinarity

Rounded, multi-disciplinary approaches to field projects are of course where we need to focus our efforts and in Clare Malleson's comprehensive chapter on Egypt's flora and the role of archaeobotanists (Chapter 6), she paints a picture of the ways in which we can combine micro-level analysis of botanical remains within larger archaeological contexts. She provides us with case studies from the AERA project directed by Mark Lehner at the Old Kingdom settlement of Heit el-Gurab (pyramid builders' town) at Giza and from current research led by Johanna Sigl of the German Archaeological Institute on Elephantine island, examining a Middle Kingdom house. In practising holistic techniques that combine ranges of organic and inorganic remains, it has been possible to truly analyse social life and differentiation through diet in relation to settlements. The goal, as Malleson points out, 'is to reveal the "realities" of living in typical Egyptian village—the sights, sounds, and smells of daily life'.

If we turn to other specialisms in the study of micro-level data, such as the role of archaeozoologists, Ikram (Chapter 7) argues that these experts need to play a much bigger role than they currently do in archaeological investigations. She stresses that the recovery of faunal remains needs more rigorous collection methods and better dialogues between specialists and archaeologists, if they are to provide a more complete view of Egypt's past. This is particularly because faunal data can answer significant questions about ancient climate, diet, veterinary practices, and cultural beliefs, which, together with the use of DNA analysis, can provide exciting information about the origins of numerous domestic species. Yet, as Ikram tells us, 'one of the major concerns in archaeozoology in Egypt is the limited number of excavated settlement sites, in part due to the continued use of these sites through the modern era'. Therefore, we are always struggling with these biases in the archaeological record, which can often result in highly flawed interpretations. As Ian Shaw discusses in his assessment of settlement archaeology (Chapter 14), our understanding of social life in ancient Egypt remains woefully inadequate compared with our knowledge of royalty, death, and the afterlife. He points out, for instance, that major developments in settlement studies and social studies within mainstream archaeology across the globe, as documented by Sharon Steadman in 2015,23 have so far only been partially replicated in Egyptian settlement archaeology. There have been some encouraging developments both in the increasing use of ethnographic data to contextualize ancient Egyptian settlements (e.g. fieldwork comparing modern and ancient mud-brick villages) and in the study of particularly neglected types of settlements, such as the ephemeral encampments of nomadic pastoralists. Overall, however, this feels like an area of Egyptology that is

still in its infancy, with many of the most pressing aspects of social archaeology in Egypt (e.g. the roles played by gender, ethnicity, social hierarchy, and religion in the creation and development of urban neighbourhoods) still requiring not only more relevant data but also more theoretical frameworks that are specific to the northeast African context.

Debates in ethnicity, human mobility, and cross-cultural contact

In a recent discussion of bioarchaeological perspectives on Egyptian ethnicity, Sonia Zakrzewski26 draws attention to the fluidity of ancient Egyptian ethnic types, and the sheer complexity of the relationships between social identity and 'biological affinities'. The importance of establishing clear definitions of ethnicities in order to try to understand the nuances of social and political change in the Nile valley and surrounding regions is repeatedly stressed by a number of different authors. These debates occur not only in the chapters in Part V of this volume that explicitly deal with such issues, but also in many of the chapters dealing with material culture, history, and language. While it is no surprise for Stan Hendrickx (Chapter 27) to note the paucity of contemporary scholars supporting the idea of mass immigrations as sources of cultural change in the Predynastic, it is perhaps more intriguing to see that new debates have emerged concerning contact between sedentary and pastoralist groups in the Nile Valley and the surrounding deserts, which are now much more central to our understanding of many developments from the sixth millennium BC onwards. Thus Linda Hulin's discussion of Libyan cultural and ethnographic data (Chapter 24) stresses the problems that are encountered in understanding what is meant by nomadism or pastoralism in different geographical and chronological contexts, while Hendrickx argues that attempts by some scholars to suggest that pharaonic culture was directly underpinned and presaged by rock art deriving from semi-nomadic groups are flawed by neglect of archaeozoological data and lack of chronological precision.

Ludwig Morenz (Chapter 28) emphasizes the particular ambiguities that existed in early historical Egypt, in that attributes of 'otherness' and foreignness appear to have been assigned to indigenous inhabitants of Egypt who had been conquered and assimilated in the process of cultural and political unification of Egypt. In a much later twist on this paradox, Tony Leahy (Chapter 33) points out the irony of an Egyptian-style statue of Darius I found at Susa, in which Egypt itself features among the 'foreign' lands crushed under the 'pharaoh' Darius' feet. Still later on in Egypt's history as a vassal state, ethnicity remains a 'difficult' aspect of cultural studies; thus Khaled Essam Ismail (Chapter 34) notes that many cultural differences between individual Egyptians and communities in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods were not related to ethnic backgrounds, and in many cases were socially constructed, according to scholars such as Koen Goudriaan. Ian Moyer (Chapter 59) also discusses the huge importance of the emergence of greater numbers of 'bilingual' researchers, competent in both Greek and demotic, in order to produce more holistic historical accounts by combining numerous Ptolemaic and Roman documents that had previously been erroneously assigned to separate ethnic or cultural spheres.

Scales of human mobility and the transmission of ideas in the emerging states of the Bronze Age Eastern Mediterranean, near East and North Africa, have also long been topics of debate in archaeology and anthropology. In terms of discourses about ancient Egypt's relations with its near neighbours, the movement of people, and the presence of 'foreigners' in the Nile valley, there still remains a reluctance to embrace other viewpoints that might critique the dominant cultural-historical paradigms of the last century. In particular there is insufficient discussion of the ways in which migration, invasion, trade (and economics), colonization, or diffusion are deployed to interpret similarities and differences in material culture of sites or regions. Carl Knappett and Evangelia Kiriatzi

perhaps best sum this up by asserting that 'we can be lulled into thinking that an interconnected world was achieved by mobility solely in the domain of chiefly elites, set against a background of immobility at the household level'. Current debates in post-processual archaeology are therefore asking questions about the ways in which we look at human mobility outside the idea of mass or macro-level migrations, which seem to have been infrequent in most places and cultures, and more towards ideas that stress the movement of people as continual flows at a range of scales and for a variety of reasons. For instance, quarrying and mining are activities that are often framed in terms of the mass movement of labour orchestrated by elites, but this is not actually reflected in the archaeological record. Strong arguments are currently emerging that centre around small-scale mobility of skilled craftspeople and stonemasons, perhaps as kin-groups, operating locally and regionally. Contact between people in this more nuanced way creates contexts where technological know-how and other cultural characteristics could be transmitted (Chapter 8).

If we look at the excavations in Aswan (Elephantine) in the south of Egypt and sites in the Delta (i.e. the north), research into these permanent settlements reveals that populations were much more heterogenous than previously thought. These debates are obviously permeating our ideas about the ways in which we view 'foreigners' such as 'Libyans', 'Asiatics', and 'Nubians' in Egypt, and indeed influencing our views concerning cross-border relationships outside ideas of dominance and empire-building. Carolyn Routledge (Chapter 25) particularly challenges orthodox perspectives such as diffusion, empire, trade, and core-periphery studies, in shaping our ideas about the relationship between Egypt and its neighbours in western Asia. As she aptly remarks 'Current models have a tendency to privilege economic explanation and elite society above many other forms of interpretation'. She demonstrates the problems of these past viewpoints by re-visiting two important questions in Egyptology relating to Egypt's relations with western Asia: first, the nature of the impact of western Asian culture on the development of the state in ancient Egypt, and secondly, the distinctive features of Egypt's impact on Late Bronze Age Canaan. This latter point treads into the thorny question of 'empire' and the degree to which it may or may not be visible in the archaeological record. Although no consensus has yet been reached, Routledge tells us that multi-disciplinary symposia and cross-disciplinary co-authorships are beginning to shift ideas away from 'top-down' inferences and towards ideas that forefront, as mentioned earlier, the nuances and complexities of interactions across regions through which social and cultural transformations occur.

Questions of identity and ethnicity also generate other contentious areas of discussion in Egyptology, particularly since so many assumptions about 'foreigners' such as 'Asiatics', 'Libyans', and 'Nubians' have been characterized largely from the textual and iconographic sources. Theorizing notions of ethnicity and identity through paradigms such as agency theory, social archaeology, and anthropology have not been truly adopted as frameworks to get at the nuances of cross-cultural relationships in ancient Egypt. Linda Hulin (Chapter 24) tackles this issue in the light of our perceptions about 'Libyans' and the Libyan dynasties in New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period Egypt. In particular, she focuses on the ways in which new archaeological evidence from north Africa, west of the Nile valley, is re-shaping some previously entrenched viewpoints which assume that Libyan culture was 'persistently nomadic…but also rather simple'. As Hulin points out, we are constantly having to review the sense of Egyptian identity as 'monolithic' and therefore, given the paucity of archaeological data in Libyan contexts, scholars are having to produce arguments to identify 'un-Egyptian traits' to characterize 'Libyan' identities. On a more positive note, Hulin suggests that the current trend towards refining studies of the archaeology of nomads suggests that these models are allowing us to realize the degrees of 'social complexity and adaptability across the nomadic-settled continuum' that need to be more utilized in our research agendas. This is particularly important to our understanding of the extent to which the Libyan peoples were assimilated into Egyptian society.

Even more contentious than perceptions of Libyans in Egypt are those of Nubians, and questions about the nature of relationships between Egyptians and their southern neighbours. Our understanding of Nubian/Egyptian relations has of course significantly improved with the expansion of multi-disciplinary excavations in north Sudan, as Egyptian archaeologists move their research interests away from the challenges, as mentioned earlier, of working in Egypt, given the unpredictable security situation. Sites between the Second and Third Cataract regions, such as the New Kingdom 'temple-towns' at Saï Island, Amara West, Sesebi, and Tombos, have had a particular focus in recent years, the findings from which are challenging the numerous assumptions that have been made about Egyptian/Nubian relations in the Bronze Age. Even the notion of the 'temple-town' may need to be revised in light of such work, given that this characterization conquers up imperialist and colonialist definitions of a dominant, highly bureaucratized Egyptian presence based largely on economic motives. Rather, we need to look at these sites in their larger landscape settings, and to think more about these centres as the loci of various cultural entanglements that have an essentially Nubian character.

With these projects focusing more on settlements than ever before, we now have significant new perspectives in terms of the ways in which we understand the more nuanced interplay between local populations and Egyptians during the New Kingdom. We also see that procurement and working of materials, such as gold, were major influences on the character of these places, and we can observe the extent to which craft-working activities seem to have been controlled by local elites. Julia Budka and Florence Doyen's excavations of the settlement and burials on Saï Island suggest that there was a much greater social complexity within local populations than previously thought, with local elites forming the major group of officials in the town, as well as others who were certainly involved with gold working. As with other excavations of 'temple-towns' in the region, these projects show numerous parallels suggestive of microcosms of Egyptian town planning but with multiple building phases, thus underlying the changing dynamics of these settlements from the early New Kingdom phases of occupation. At Amara West, Neal Spencer's excavations reveal an even greater sense of comparatively unplanned settlement, and copious evidence of production places (workshops) and Nubian pottery.

(The ongoing work of the Sudan Archaeological Research Society has also been pivotal in providing, through its annual bulletin, the latest findings from these and other excavations, in particular the long-standing work of Derek Welsby at Kawa and the Dongola Reach. As Robert Morkot explains (Chapter 23) in his historical overview of Egyptian/Nubian relationships, older interpretations of the political geography even further south in Upper Nubia need to be revised. He suggests that evidence from more recent excavations in the region between the Third and Fourth Cataracts, such as Stuart Tyson Smith's excavations at Tombos, show that New Kingdom material is limited in quantity and specific in type. Morkot also points out that few artefacts of Egyptian origin have been found south or east of the limits of Kerma, Egyptian New Kingdom, or Meroitic control. He goes on to suggest that 'whether archaeological material will ever be found to indicate ancient Egyptian contacts (direct or indirect) with sub-Saharan Africa matters little, as Egypt was, and will always be, a significant African culture'.

If we turn our attention to the question of contact and interplay between Egypt and its northern neighbours in the Aegean, studies of maritime trade and the movement of materials have of course played a major part in determining the scope of these interactions. Luxury items such as stone and pottery vessels, gemstones, gold, and other exotic materials, particularly those found in the Uluburun shipwreck, have provided us with a sense of the numerous opportunities for contact that

existed through the movement of materials both as 'exotic' gift-giving at the elite end of the spectrum, and in the form of the more utilitarian logistics of raw material transportation to places of production. Pottery, probably more than any other class of object (in particular 'Mycenaean' vessels found in settlement sites in Egypt at Kahun, Gurob, and Amarna) has been studied as a means of synchronizing Egyptian and Aegean chronologies. Yet, as Jacke Phillips (Chapter 26) points out, it has been Aegeanists rather than Egyptologists who have led the way in furthering our knowledge of broader questions surrounding interactions across the Aegean. Andrew Bevan's study of the movement of a single class of material culture such as stone vessels, not only as finished products but down to the origins of their material source and manufacture, can give the real detail about regimes of value and contact across the Aegean; Bevan's work has been a key advance in the way in which we use such studies to formulate comparative ideas about social life and the variability of relationships, as well as the movement of people in the region. But as Phillips discusses in her in-depth look at the range of other datasets that have been the focus of investigating Egypto-Aegean relations in the Bronze Age, there is a pressing need for much greater collaboration between the two disciplines if we are to address important current research debates concerning cross-cultural chronology and dating, as well as considerations about imported goods and the tangible/intangible influence of one civilization upon the other.

The general current absence of cultural interdisciplinarity, if we look back at the development of Egyptology as a discipline, is actually much more of a post-war phenomenon when we consider that archaeologists such as Arthur Evans, John Pendlebury, and Henri Frankfort regularly worked across the region of the eastern Mediterranean and near East in the 1930s. The sense of isolation that came from ideas about the 'uniqueness' of Egypt as a civilization apart from its neighbours can arguably be linked to the greater focus being placed on studies of texts, rather than archaeology—a situation that is even more apparent today. As mentioned in the opening pages of this chapter, the divide between the two arms of Egyptology is ever broadening and littered with wasted opportunities because we are not formulating analytical frameworks through which we study all classes of material culture equally. Attempts to address this have come from some multi-disciplinary quarters, working with Egyptologists (from both the philological and archaeological arms of discipline) who have been contextualizing epigraphic data within broader landscape contexts. However, when we delve into the holy grails of temple and tomb inscriptions and papyrus documents, there is an undeniable breach between the textual and archaeological sectors of the discipline.

Society and culture: viewpoints from texts and iconography

Issues that can raise significant barriers between the textual and archaeological spheres respectively are stressed in the chapters in Part VII Society and culture: textual and iconographic approaches, which consider the more orthodox analytical approaches to text and iconography that have dominated our understanding of social and cultural life in ancient Egypt for several decades. Administration, genealogies, religion, gods, theology, and symbolism are all topics that have mostly lain in the domain of philological study. But as these chapters address, it is the depth of the research questions we are asking that we need to work on, and then also the extent to which we challenge the problem of data bias, which, as Christopher Eyre (Chapter 36) tells us, 'is often contradictory, not simply as a consequence of incomplete evidence but reflecting structural factors in the ecology and political order of a state that was never as monolithic as ancient ideology or modern historiography presents it'. Wolfram Grajetzki (Chapter 35), for instance, takes us through a range of archaeological contexts in which we can encounter epigraphic evidence relating to the emergence of titles and social hierarchies from the Early Dynastic through to the Late Period. In grappling with

the notion of a 'national administration' he presents us with a detailed account of the research problems that we encounter in approaching such ideas from a single data source and context, such as elite burials, and reminds us that we need to be careful in avoiding the assumption that a title reflects an actual role in practice: 'A high percentage of ancient Egyptians identify themselves on objects and documents with administrative titles. However, even if the translation of a title is possible, the function of it remains most often obscure.'

Eyre (Chapter 36) takes this idea even further, and argues, through the formulation of seven important research questions, that the idea of 'administration' as a fixed and structured mode of state control has been vastly overplayed by Egyptologists. By examining the environment and settlement patterns in Egypt, as well as giving us an in-depth look at the range of contexts in which we find documents and inscriptions relating to social hierarchies, he suggests that we need to think again about the ways in which we assume the existence of a 'bureaucratic regime'. Rather, we need to re-think roles at local levels, such as 'headmen' who mediated and represented their communities, proposing therefore that we should define local government 'according to degrees of alienation between peasant communities and state government, and the enforcement of revenue demands through local intermediaries'. As in Egypt today, it seems that settling of local disputes and other matters tended to fall on community 'leaders', and allegiances were much more based on identity and kinship ties to specific village locales.

Yet, when we try to turn our gaze onto ideas of social life, kinship, and relationships at lower social levels through the textual record, of course we come up against the still-powerful doctrines of 'kingship' as an ideology that masks the role of individuals under its orthodoxy. Egyptology still struggles to move very far from these constraints, particularly when it comes to understanding private, more secular rituals and religious practices outside of this sense of state religion. There is however a growing consensus amongst Egyptologists who work with the textual record that our approaches to these themes do need revitalizing if we are to move away from repeating the same ideas. Morris Bierbrier (Chapter 38), Susanne Bickel (Chapter 39), Richard Wilkinson (Chapter 40), and Alexandra von Lieven (Chapter 41) take us on insightful journeys into some of these better-studied arenas of textual and iconographic aspects of core Egyptological research such as genealogies, gods, myths, religion, theology, and symbolism. They discuss the extent to which we need to revise our research questions and to concentrate much more on the context of the textual and iconographic record or, in other words, to take more holistic approaches. Wilkinson (Chapter 40), for instance, points out that future research into symbolism needs to pay much more attention to the origins of symbolism, as well as connections between the visual and verbal use of symbols. He urges us to move away from single object studies to broader contexts of landscape. Bickel (Chapter 39) similarly argues for more holistic approaches to our research questions if we are to get at the nuances of the ways in which people interacted with theological ideas about the divine in religious practice. As she succinctly states: 'The extremely codified and conventionalized forms with which religious matters were treated in writing and iconography are a major barrier to our knowledge of individual and community belief and practice.' As Abbas (Chapter 42) stresses in his discussion of funerary beliefs, even the fundamental corpora of myths relating to death and the afterlife in the pharaonic period only became codified into coherent continuous narratives at a much later date, in the work of Classical authors. For much of the pharaonic period, our sense of the crucial narratives that underpinned funerary beliefs and practices is highly fragmentary and elusive, comprising hints and sometimes obscure symbolism, rather than the straightforward full-scale 'stories of the gods' that provide the framework of Greek and Roman religion.

Theological speculation is another fundamental component of text-based research, which, as Alexandra von Lieven (Chapter 41) points out, needs to be properly defined away from our modern Christian notion of theology, and towards ideas that people had across the social spectrum, with regard to gods, myths, and the cosmos. The paucity of data is of course a problem in getting at the nature of these concepts through time, given that cultural contexts of the evidence are mostly funerary and temple domains. Problems of context and quality of evidence have clearly hampered efforts to extrapolate ideas about religious practices, particularly at individual household levels. We are still reliant, perhaps overly so, on sites such as Deir el-Medina for our insights into practices such as ancestor worship, given that this settlement presents us with both archaeological and textual evidence for family cult practices in the New Kingdom.

It is the sense that texts are themselves very much artefacts, embedded within material culture as a whole, that has been stressed by many of those dealing with the philology of ancient Egypt. In Jim Allen's text book on the Middle Egyptian language, he points out that he is providing an introduction to the language and crucially also the culture of hieroglyphs. He therefore includes numerous essays on aspects of Egyptian society and thought, with the explicit intention of enabling students not only to translate Middle Egyptian texts but also to 'understand what they have to say'. This distinction between literal translation and real cultural understanding has probably been one of the most distinctive characteristics of the study of ancient Egyptian texts in the twenty-first century. Andréas Stauder (Chapter 43) sees this cultural dimension operating even at the level of scripts when he discusses the 'complex, historically shifting, cultural code' comprising values attached to the various different script types. Jacqueline Jay (Chapter 47), on the other hand, emphasizes the almost stratigraphic process by which the textual output of ancient Egypt can be forensically examined to determine surviving traces of the oral or non-literate culture that both preceded and then also co-existed with the elite text-based 'high' culture. She argues that the change from orality to literacy is a gradual one, with no dramatic specific turning point yet discerned, and indeed the wealth of recent work on non-textual marking systems (noted by Stauder at the beginning of Chapter 43) indicates that diverse forms of communication existed within the conventionally defined illiterate non-elite throughout the pharaonic, Ptolemaic, and Roman periods, thus suggesting that orality only recedes into the background in historical times, rather than being superseded or suppressed.

The widespread appearance of such things as pot marks, quarrying/stone marks, and soldiers' identity marks in ancient Egypt shows that non-textual systems effectively created a kind of 'grey area' of graphic communication that was neither oral nor fully literate but spanned the activities of a wide range of artisans and professionals. This undoubtedly complicates the picture presented by anthropologists such as Jack Goody,58 who appear to have generally worked on the assumption that there are only two modes of communication: oral and literate, whereas it is clear that there are a plethora of scenarios in which ostensibly illiterate ancient Egyptians could choose to communicate through non-textual signing. This is not merely a case of marks on pottery vessels, textiles, masonry, and ostraca as part of complex relationships that have usually been placed solely in the domain of Bronze Age 'economics'—what we also need to include are marking systems documented on rock-faces in or near mines and quarries (see Bloxam, Chapter 8), and on the living rock at hilltop sites in the desert.59 In other words, these phenomena are widespread throughout Egyptian culture, regardless of geographical place or social stratum. There are of course many other (p. 18) neglected categories even among the conventional writing scripts, such as the many demotic inscriptions on small artefacts, which are discussed by Richard Jasnow (Chapter 55). A few years ago graffiti of all kinds, whether on monumental architecture or on natural desert surfaces, might have also been regarded as neglected and under-appreciated as a resource, but, as various chapters, particularly that of John Darnell (Chapter 57), demonstrate, there has been a real growth of work in this area in the

last decade or so, fuelled perhaps partly by growing interest in different forms of self-representation in the visual and textual records. Darnell also points out that the emergence of the 'lapidary' form of hieratic, from the Old Kingdom onwards, is an indication of a hybrid form of script that seems to have specifically evolved in order to facilitate the production of rock inscriptions and graffiti on an unprecedented scale in the Middle Kingdom.

Allen's 'historical study' of the diachronic nature of ancient Egyptian language takes a general, all-encompassing view of the sequence of linguistic changes and innovations. Yet, as Sami Uljas (Chapter 45) correctly stresses, there has been a tendency in recent years towards a wider diversity of individual views and approaches to all phases of the language. This change may, as much as anything, represent a reaction against the long-term rigid conformity to the so-called Standard Theory that was introduced by Jakob Polotsky in the 1940s, and gained general acceptance in the 1970s and 1980s. The question therefore of whether to seek a wide, global solution, as opposed to specialized 'local' endeavours has also characterized the history of ancient Egyptian lexicography, according to Julie Stauder-Porchet (Chapter 44). Thus, a subject undoubtedly dominated for much of its development by the attempt to create an overarching solution in the form of the Wörterbuch project (initiated in Berlin in 1897 by Adolf Erman and Hermann Grapow) and its modern digital equivalents (the Digitaler Zettelarchiv, which is accessible through the Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae database), has become increasingly characterized by smaller projects, often geared towards phases of the language (such as Leonard and Barbara Lesko's Late Egyptian dictionary) or specific corpora of texts (such as van der Molen's dictionary of the Coffin Texts).

Problems in the construction of historical narratives

As Stauder points out in his discussion of the history of the ancient Egyptian language (Chapter 46), the traditional subdivision of the language into different diachronic phases 'is inherently problematic as it projects historical periodization onto linguistic history', so that 'the boundaries between discrete stages as traditionally defined are also getting blurred'. In a more general cultural sense, the construction of chronologies and the writing of narrative history have both been integral elements of Egyptology since the nineteenth century, when Sir John Gardner Wilkinson, for instance, began his Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians with 'a brief account of the general history and early advancement of that ancient state'. It is characteristic of the historical branch of the subject, however, that Wilkinson was already drawing attention to the 'many doubts and discrepancies' that divided researchers, even at this early date. Not surprisingly, the chapters dealing with Egyptian history in this Handbook confirm that, for some periods, there are still major lacunae and points of controversy.

For many periods of ancient Egyptian history, there is a clear consensus on most of the basic chronological aspects, such as sequences and lengths of reigns, although huge numbers of specific names and dates are still contested, as a recent co-authored history clearly indicates. There is still significant debate, for instance, around the existence and nature of 'coregencies' (periods of deliberate overlap between reigns, usually assumed to be designed to ensure smooth succession), which Wolfram Grajetzki (Chapter 30) discusses in the context of the Middle Kingdom. Most labyrinthine of all, most would argue, is the Third Intermediate Period, and David Aston (Chapter 32) makes the point that, frustratingly, the apparent chronological resolution for this period provided by Ken Kitchen in the late 1990s, has been slowly but surely unpicked and stirred around by the work of the last two decades. On the positive side, our understanding of the material culture of the Third Intermediate Period has greatly benefitted from a real plethora of studies undertaken and published in recent years. In the case of some other historical periods, there are specific

problems in relation to material culture studies: thus Nigel Strudwick (Chapter 29), for instance, stresses that Old Kingdom material is very much dominated by artefacts from tombs and temples, as opposed to domestic data from settlements of this date, which are still not being excavated and/or adequately published in sufficient numbers or diversity. Grajetzki (Chapter 30), on the other hand, emphasizes the lack of precision in dating of some aspects of late Middle Kingdom typologies of artefacts, such that difficulties are sometimes encountered in distinguishing between Twelfth-Dynasty, Thirteenth-Dynasty, and Second Intermediate Period material. Not only do we need to understand the interplay between processes of change in material culture and the traditional framework of 'dynasties' and 'kingdoms', but we also need to be able to locate intricate local geneaological studies within the broader picture of national political and social change. As Bierbrier (Chapter 38) tells us, studies of genealogies can bring fresh insights into the depth of family linkages with chronology, which has remained a rather shadowy area of research. He stresses the need to look back at our already accumulated archive of documentation from the last two centuries and to draw these together with new archaeological material to refine our knowledge, yet he cautions that 'genealogy in ancient Egypt often can be considered more of an art than a science'.

Advances in scientific dating, particularly radiocarbon dating, have affected all periods, but inevitably prehistory in particular, as Stan Hendrickx (Chapter 27) stresses. He notes, for instance, that radiocarbon dates have revealed a chronological overlap between the Badarian and Naqada I cultures, but of course opinions differ as to whether this simply implies a slower transition in the Badarian heartland, or, more radically, a need to regard Badarian culture as a geographical rather than chronological phenomenon. It is also as a result of radiocarbon dating that it is now suggested that cereal farming appeared first in Egypt at Neolithic sites such as Kom W in the northern Faiyum region, by the mid-fifth millennium BC. One of the most recent radiocarbon dating projects that specifically targeted the Predynastic and Early Dynastic periods reached the conclusion that the Predynastic as a whole was actually shorter by six or seven centuries, compared with previous estimates of length. On a more theoretical level, Hendrickx throws out, once and for all, Jean Capart's attempt to consign Predynastic iconography to the realm of the 'primitive' through ethnographic parallels.

The question of how we define what constitutes an actual historical record, in the modern evidential sense (as opposed to a piece of ritual, myth, or ideology) is discussed by several authors in this Handbook. Morenz (Chapter 28) uses the phrase 'iconems of power' to refer to the fascinating iconographic system that was developing in Egypt in the late Predynastic and Early Dynastic periods, as the country moved towards a unified state that seems to have required (and brought into existence) a repertoire of so-called semiophors to justify and culturally embed the emerging political system. From an aesthetic point of view, Brett McClain (Chapter 22) points to the way in which the transition from relief-carved mobiliary art, such as the Protodynastic Narmer Palette, to architecturally embedded stelae took place at the same time as the rapid development of a set of new canonical principles and iconography. The latter coincided with the process of cultural and political unification, and McClain therefore uses the term 'state-sponsored' to refer to these early royal reliefs. This is a reminder that the many genres of texts that provide the backbone of our accepted political and social historical narratives for Egypt derive from texts that, according to Ronald Leprohon (Chapter 48), were often written primarily in order to define the state's role as conscious and explicit controller of the people. Grajetzki (Chapter 35), Chris Eyre (Chapter 36) and John Gee (Chapter 51), on the other hand, stress the danger of simply assuming the centrality of the state, in their analyses of the administrative and socio-economic data, when in fact there are indications that a confused plethora of local concerns often lie beneath the thin shell of national governmental control.

The recurrent question of the extent to which most Egyptian elite texts and images might be regarded as pure expressions of state control is also taken up by John Darnell in his discussion of rock art and graffiti (Chapter 57). Darnell addresses the issue of early combinations of art and proto-writing, and the extent to which any of these 'early tableaux' (such as the 'Scorpion tableau' at Gebel Tjauti and the Gebel Sheikh Suleiman inscription) can be regarded as records of actual historical events—he stresses the extent to which these Dynasty 0 rock inscriptions appear to ritualize events, transforming and celebrating the cosmic significance of happenings by incorporating them into timeless royal imagery. Both Regine Schulz (Chapter 18) and Colleen Manassa Darnell (Chapter 31) stress the importance of much later unconventional historical sources (from a western viewpoint), in the form of the so-called 'commemorative scarabs', which provide glimpses of events and individuals from the reign of Amenhotep III, but in the context of what might be described as 'verbal tableaux'. Like the Dynasty 0 tableaux, these scarabs intertwine the static celebration of royal ritual and ceremony with some sense of dynamic historical narrative.

Both Denise Doxey and Bill Manley (Chapters 49 and 50 respectively) discuss the extent to which the historical or factual information that we seek to glean from texts may be restricted by the mixing and overlapping of genres. Doxey points out that elite individuals' 'autobiographies', primarily inscribed in tombs from the Old Kingdom onwards, overlap in aims and content not only with royal texts of various types but also with literary texts. The suggestion is that borrowing from the latter genre (particularly the so-called 'lamentations') adds pessimism to these supposedly historical accounts of individuals' careers, thus producing modern historical views, particularly of the First Intermediate Period, that have sometimes been unduly negative in terms of the view presented of social and economic conditions. Strudwick's overview of the sources for this period (Chapter 29), including the plethora of theories concerning the decline of the Old Kingdom, argues against the automatic assumption of 'historicity' of data deriving from funerary biographies, and cautions particularly against monocausal explanations.

What we demonstrably lack, however, are historical narratives that primarily draw on the surviving vestiges of material culture rather than textual data. In relation to the administrative and socio-economic aspects of historical change in Egypt there have been few real attempts to use archaeological data to approach these kinds of issues. From the 1970s onwards, there have been some instances in which the mud-brick buildings associated with administrative control and storage have been studied, but it is still rare to see diachronic studies of the impacts on materials and artefacts within the archaeological record, as indicators of changing patterns of production, consumption, and control. Yet, these are all well-worn paradigms in which we tend to automatically search for answers and insights into social and cultural change. If we are to move Egyptology into fresh debates we must re-think our research questions away from monolithic concepts such as administration, economy, and state control, and seek to generate enquiries into the complex nature social interactions across a range of situations through which cultural and social change occurs.

Contexts and problem-oriented approaches

In recent years, ideas derived from the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) movement, which originally developed among sociologists in the 1980s, have been increasingly applied to the study of archaeological material across the globe. However, this view of ancient technologies as embedded and reactive components of complex social systems, exemplified by such studies as Andrew Welton's metallurgical analysis of Anglo-Saxon weaponry and Elizabeth Murphy and Jeroen Poblome's work on pottery production at Sagalassos, has still not been particularly widely applied in

Egyptian archaeology. As Nicholson (Chapter 13) underlines in Part IV: Material culture, the study of ancient Egyptian materials and technology will always tend to be hugely flawed and restricted if the all-important cultural and archaeological contexts are neglected or ignored.

The importance of context is a recurrent theme, not only in the Handbook (see, for instance, Chapters 14, 15, 21, and 22) but in many other Egyptological publications from the last decade or so. Aidan Dodson (Chapter 17) stresses the enormous importance of such contextualization with regard to the chronology and typologies of funerary material, particularly coffins and sarcophagi. Thus, it was the actual excavation of the coffin of Sethnakhte (c.1186–1184 BC) in tomb KV35 and the coffin of Psusennes II Pasebakhaenniut I (c.959–945 BC) at Tanis, among others, that demonstrated that the so-called 'rishi' coffin continued to be used for royal burials into the Third Intermediate Period, despite the fact that it had fallen out of use for non-royal individuals by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. Cultural context can also be crucial to the process of extracting maximum meaning from texts, therefore Terry Wilfong (Chapter 56) notes the importance of the survival of large numbers of Manichaean Coptic texts at the well-preserved settlement site of Kellis in Dakhla Oasis, where their value is enhanced by the fact that they have been found in secure archaeological contexts, embedded among the artefacts and urban landscape that can give them crucial added meaning.

The network of links between Greek and Roman temple texts and their surrounding architecture and reliefs are discussed by Olaf Kaper (Chapter 58), particularly in relation to the 'library' of hieroglyphic, hieratic, and demotic papyri (dating mostly to the second century AD) discovered in a cellar below the temple at Tebtunis in 1931. He points out that these can be seen to have clear and intriguing links with the texts and images carved on the walls of the temple itself, including two papyri specifically relating to the processes and nature of temple decoration.88 In her chapter on architecture, Corinna Rossi (Chapter 20) emphasizes the importance of the location and orientation of religious and funerary architecture within the landscape as highly influential contextual features, especially in the case of the Old and Middle Kingdom pyramid complexes and New Kingdom temples such as those at Abu Simbel and Deir el-Bahri. In discussing the wide diversity of attempts by scholars over the last three centuries to understand the underlying principles of ancient Egyptian architecture, she also stresses the importance of properly recognizing cognitive contexts. First, she points out that it is generally incorrect to base modern architectural theories primarily on ground-plans, when all the evidence suggests that Egyptians designed their buildings three-dimensionally. Secondly, she notes that many hypotheses rely on mathematical concepts or language that had not yet been formulated in the third and second millennia BC. A similar point is made by Rune Nyord (Chapter 53) in relation to texts relating to healing and protection—he underlines the need for 'adequate conceptual frameworks' to replace the dangerous, but very widespread, tendency to look at such texts explicitly within the parameters of modern medicine. As he further notes, there are distinct parallels with challenges in medical anthropology, where standard modern western concepts such as mind, medicine, and magic are clearly recognized as inappropriate to non-western contexts. The cognitive context is also crucial for study of ancient Egyptian mathematical texts, as Annette Imhausen (Chapter 52) indicates in her discussion of the social and cultural settings of such texts. She underlines the point that, even before the Middle Kingdom, when the first specifically mathematical manuscripts started to appear, the funerary 'biographies' of individuals (e.g. that of Weni in the Sixth Dynasty) already began to hint at the need for access to some kind of mathematical ability in order to be successful as an administrator or builder.

Egyptology's anthropological and sociological contexts are frequently neglected, despite a sprinkling of ground-breaking attempts to establish a role for the discipline as a genuine social science.

Egyptologists have often struggled to come to grips with the full complexity of issues relating to social identities, and in particular the key area of gender studies, whether in textual or archaeological terms. There are some small indications of advances in this area in the Handbook. Thus Deborah Sweeney's discussion of letter writing (Chapter 54) not only deals with the evidence for female literacy but also addresses the issue of female letter contents as indications of aspects of social behaviour and communication that were regarded as appropriate to women. Although women's social roles and rights are particularly thinly attested in the Old and Middle Kingdoms, there are increasing amounts of archaeological and textual evidence from the New Kingdom. Picton et al (Chapter 16) discuss the centrality of gender in the analysis and interpretation of textiles, and note the important role played by women in the New Kingdom community at Deir el-Medina as producers and traders of cloth. Shaw's brief examination of the syntax of domestic architecture in Egypt (Chapter 14) highlights the contributions of Barry Kemp and Lynn Meskell to gender-oriented study of New Kingdom houses and use of domestic space. At a more abstract level, Sandra Lippert's presentation of textual evidence for the legal position of women in the New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period (Chapter 37) indicates that a greater diversity of documentary sources now exist, many indicating the rights of women and children in relation to property.

We can finally return to our opening question: does Egyptology have an identity crisis? It is probably now up to the readers of this volume to make their own minds up about this. Although we have argued that a lot more needs to be done to forge new paths into multi-disciplinary collaborations, and also methods, it is clear from some of these chapters that a number of fresh approaches have already begun to appear and thus there is reason for optimism. This is particularly the case when we consider the greater number of voices coming into debates outside of traditional western discourses. So, what we need to think about now are the ways in which we collectively shake off the stale image and perception of Egyptology and shout more about the interesting changes of direction that are happening, particularly in the archaeological side of the discipline. To do this we need to publish more widely across the spectrum of archaeological and anthropological journals, participate more actively in forums across disciplines, and work more rigorously towards finding common research agendas that generate opportunities for cross-disciplinary collaboration, both within and outside Egyptology.

There is no perfect way to compile a multi-authored volume that covers all topic areas of a discipline and therefore we are aware of omissions such as more comment from prehistorians, from those working in interesting cross-border regions in Sudan, and of course, from anthropology. But perhaps the next volume of articles should not be another batch framed within Egyptology, but one that is much more inclusive of cross-cultural debates across the archaeological and historical spectrum. In other words, a 'world' perspective in which we seek new ways of working together to find that common ground that unites us, rather than those things that potentially isolate us from our fellow researchers in the other humanities and social sciences. —Elizabeth Bloxam is Visiting Professor in Egyptology at the Northeast Normal University in Changchun, China and an Honorary Research Associate at University College London.

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LES PHILOSOPHER FACE AU VICE, DE SOCRATE A AUGUSTIN Sous la direction de Christelle Veillard, Olivier Renaut, Dimitri El Murr [Philosophia Antigua, Brill, ISBN 9789004432383 (hardback) ISBN 9789004432390 (e-book)] [French edition, 3 chapitres in English]

LES PHILOSOPHER FACE AU VICE, DE SOCRATE A AUGUSTIN explore la manière dont les philosophes de lAntiquité ont tracé une cartographie des vices, analysé leurs causes et leurs effets, et se sont interrogés sur leurs usages. Les philosophes face au vice, de Socrate à Augustin explores how ancient philosophers described the vices, delineated their various kinds, accounted for their causes and effects, and reflected on how to use them.

[Philosophizing in the face of vice with Socrates and Augustine explores how the philosophers of Antiquity have mapped the vices, analyzed their causes and effects, and questioned their uses. Philosophers confronting vice, from Socrates to Augustine explores how ancient philosophers described the vices, delineated their various kinds, accounted for their causes and effects, and reflected on how they are used.]

The interest of ancient philosophers in virtue is no longer to be demonstrated. A considerable literature is proof of this: that one thinks, to limit itself to only a few examples, of Plato's Mennon, which deals with the definition of virtue, or of the Protagoras which examines its unity beyond the multiplicity of particular virtues, of the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise on virtues and vices, which proposes a synthesis of the theory of Stagirite on the subject , to the treatise Des Passions de

Chrysippe, which offers a classificatory and defining picture of the virtues and their opposing vices, to Book 19 on the virtues of Plotinus ... In all the cases, it is the philosophical life that is the truly virtuous life, the difficult and arduous path of human perfection, in the face of the relaxation that constitutes a life devoted to vices.

The dividing line between vice and virtue thus is quite clear: virtue is balance, order, harmony, self-agreement, science and wisdom; vice, imbalance, disorder, discordance, internal conflict, and ignorance in all its forms. Like diseases that are heralded by the fever symptom, vice must be combated and eradicated, so that the body can regain its original balance and its appropriate temperature. The vice is then only the disorder caused by an internal imbalance: the simple opposite of virtue, that is, of order and balance — or its opposite. So perhaps there is no need to reflect on vice, because once virtue is clearly defined, will we not have, by contraposition, an equally clear definition of vice?

Virtue, it is true, is not so easily circumscribe. One of the clearest definitions of virtue is that of stoics, forged in Plato's wake: virtue, harmonious disposition (homologoumened diathesis), is science. Each particular virtue will be expressed as the possession in the soul of a correct definition: courage is for example "the science of things to endure". Symmetrically, vice is ignorance of such things. The most effect, if virtue-science is the acquisition of a provision relating to the possession of a right intellectual content (which is cause of order and require), vice-ignorance is its exact contraire: a provision relating to the possession of erroneous content (which is cause of disorder and imbalance). No brsoin, therefore, to seek to produce truthfully accurate deletions of particular vices, This is how in Vent calcsilicates recovery of Chrysippe, hi (161init ion of the vicids ('Si contentl in cotelapidary" and vice is thetra.

This first definition (lu vice, all bis, in itself contains the seeds of its questioning: is vice ignorance of good principles, or "application of bad principles?' Moreover, is the defect the disharmonious disposition produced by the false judgment, or is it that false judgment itself? Any Pastuce of the Stoic definition is precisely to articulate these two levels, as Plato himself had dep. Done. The latter, after first having dance defined vice as ignorance, sought to complete this in the Republic and other later dialogues, showing that ignorance alone is not enough to explain vice and that it is therefore necessary to examine vice for itself, as a specific object, and not as the mere opposite of virtue. Vice is no longer conceived as mere ignorance, or as a deprivation of virtue, it possesses a specific causal power and a particular economy, which should be described if one can fight it.

If so, of course, it must be fought. Described as deprivation, order, disease, deformities or stupidity, vice is obviously a quality to avoid. But if this description is false, we are founded to ask the question of its usefulness: is there not an inventively, a freedom mere, specific to the behavior said "vicious", quir preservation, and non-eradication? What, for example, can we make good use of these sudden swellings of the heart that Pon calls "acces de anger?" Is it not useful to be carried by the wish of a beautiful and elegant life, of a life worthy because lavish, which would be the visible mark of the philosopher aware of his greatness lady? Is it so easy after all to distinguish between these righteous behaviors that we call virtues, and those deviations to which we give the name of vice?

The purpose of this book is to show how the philosophizing of Antiquate, when they were the subject of a direct investigation, took the question of vice seriously. Nothing surprising about this, because confronting directly with vice, with the question of its nature, even that of its ethical or anthropological usefulness, allows us to elucidate its specific characteristics and to light us, backwards, on virtue.

The ancient philosophical landscape is structure by "opposition between two main figures: the king (basileus) and the tyrant (turannos). The tyrant is the paradigm of the life of softness (truphe) and sensuality, the life of luxury (poluteleia) to which opposes the rigor and austerity of philosophical life. The first slip makes is therefore to place the philosopher on the king's throne: because he is called by his function to enforce the balances, and has prevented discord dance his kingdom, the king is forced to reform himself, applying himself, to md6ration, justice slips there as a complement of self, commie the mown, I'm tick by Venus royal and vices tyrannies among the Socratics): it esi assumed by Alitist hem., who idles the tyrant the sick and insatiable man, and then by Hilton, who makes it the model of Phomine isolates and incoherent. The tyrant possesses a characteristic quite precise, according to Platonic analyses: he is the one who does not keep his promises. Because of this radical inconsistency, it becomes incapable of participating the human community, especially in the specific community instituted by philosophical discourse, refractaire has all discourse of truth and even common sense, since refractory has any speech worthy of the name. This diagnosis, however, is not shared by all Socratics. Aristippe de Cyrene denies the legitimity of the division between king and tyrant: for him, 'The radical inconsequence of the latter is simply not one, but on the contrary manifests its absolute freedom. The tyrant is the one who dares to pass the posture affected pansterite, to place his desirs on the front of the stage, without brake: the true greatness is accompanied by a lavish life, unconstrained, and the vice to avoid is not the pretendue softness or sensuality (truphe) but the philarguria that consists of being dominated by the things we enjoy , without having any more control over them. It is therefore a question of fully enjoying all that we have power over: 'the lavish elegance and the life of pleasures are only visible manifestations, the accessories of the philosopher, if he is ready to live his greatness in an appropriate way.

It is precisely to the softness (truphe, or malakia) that Petude de Pierre PONTIER (Laziness and softness in Xenophon and Plato"), inviting us to question his status even: is it indeed a vice? How, the most effect, would the ness of immediately enjoying bodily comfort be a problem? The softness, in the end, is not akin to the softness of the character, to the tranquillity of an optimistic soul, who enjoys the present comfort of his cozy bed without worrying about what is out of his grip? PONTIER thus distinguishes the placidity of "no reaction (or lachete), the circumspection of procrastination, by studying in particular the texts of Xenophon. If resistance and "endurance(karteria) have been sustainedly propelled by him to the rank of major virtues, it is first because they were the sign of an acceptance of effort and punishment (ponoi) that this effort engenders, that they were the sign of the strength of a soul ready to suffer to know and to do good, to do justice, as a sign of the strength of body capable of committing to defend these values and the political space that makes it possible. The sloth hides dance last bed therefore cannot serve as a model, since he is a parasite in the making, someone who wants to continue sleeping on the prom sells as in the figure. The xenophonian analysis of the ponos provides the framework for his treatment of softness and reveals one of his deepest moral convictions: softness is the vice par excellence. At Plato, on the other hand, the analysis of softness occupies a more circumscribed place, an email whose importance grows as Plato integrates the idea of self-control into his ethical reflection.

Self-control, in Platonic context, is first control of one's soul, and secondary control of one's body, the absence of self-control (or acrasia) is therefore primarily a psychological issue. In the context of hippocratic medicine, it is a little different, and in particular in the hippocratic treatise Des Humeurs o11 the lack of mastery (acrasiè) of 'soul is analysis in relation to the bodily echoes it produces. The article by Paul DEMONT and Robert ALESSI (": notes on [Hippocrates], Moods 9 (v 488, 15-490, 8 Lime, 168, 3-13 Overwien") looks at the descriptions and possible recommendations of the doctor of the hippocratic treatise Des Humeurs regarding this acrasicness. If a moral axiology comparable

to that which philosopher proponent is absent from the doctor's description of this acrasia, the interest of the medical approach is to recall the benefits of diets and exercises in the context of a "soul-body interactionism" that does not leave to remind us of how the vice is analyzed in the Timée: the balance, the moderation, the consistency of the mix must be achieved by a certain attention to a life regime , which combines both mental states and bodily states.

The following three articles focus on tracing the strictly Platonic coordinates of the question of vice. Olivier RENAUT's article ("A theory of vices in the Republic of Plato") shows that if, for Plato, vice is ignorance and can be described as deprivation of virtue, it is also a lack of perfection or excellence, thus derogation from the proper function of being, either because the latter fails to exercise his function, or because he simultaneously exercises several. But vice is above all a clean power of corruption, analogous to physical illness. It is the insertion into the individual of a disorganized structure, a corrupting evil, caused by the fact that a malignant power is at work. For Plato, this malignant power is the perfect choice: it is the desirable part, as it takes up more space than it should and manifests itself more violently than necessary. Whether we are talking about the balance of an individual or a community, the diagnosis is the same: the functional balance is broken, when we move from a temporarily unbalanced structure to a permanently unstable structure, which becomes deleterious to the organism it is supposed to structures. From the model of vice-ignorance, we are therefore moving on to that of vice-disease, a passage ('evolution of Plato's moral psychology clue its deepening, and its inscription in a political anthropology on the virtue of non-philosophers becomes the central problem, as revealed by platonic analysis of vices.

The two models of vice, ignorance and disease, are also analyzed by Christopher ROWE ("Plato on Kakia in some later dialogues"). His contribution first examines a passage from the Sophist o11 Plato distinguishes two forms of vice relative to the soul: one is analogous to disease for the body, while the other resembles ugliness. The first, ROWE argues, is the same one that is analyzed in detail in the Republic and Phaedra, the vice is the result of a conflict (stasis) between different bodies within us. It is the counterpart of the virtue which Plato himself recognizes clans the Sophist that it is second-rate, the virtue that The Phedon, or even the Republic, calls "It; demotic." The second form of vice, the analog of ugliness for the body, is the counterpart of the true virtue that derives from knowledge, in short the virtue of the philosopher. This second form makes vice an ignorance, whether it is a simple ignorance or this particular form of ignorance that is stupidity (amathia), consisting of believing to know even if one does not know. In this sense, any vice, because it is based on ignorance, is involuntary. In the Timaeus, however, Plato seems to develop a completely different approach to vice, rejecting the difference between these two forms of vice in favor of a unified conception one all vice is a disease of 'soul and any disease of the soul a form of ania, including both stupidity (amathia) and madness (mania). Is there any incoherence on Plato's part? Or an evolution dance his understanding of the nature of vice? Far from it, shows ROWE, who sees in this re-amendment of the distinction of the Sophist Plato's effort to account for the pathological conditions of vice, while maintaining his fundamental position making ignorance the very principle at the origin of tones the vices. As proof, the fact that in the Timaeus, vices do not come so much from the inability of the rational part of 'soul to control its irrational movements, as was the case in the Republic and the Phaedra, as from the radical influence exerted on the soul by its incarnation in a body.

The articles of RENAUT and ROWE, each in their own way, raise the question of the coexistence of two models of vice within Platonic moral psychology, and note that Plato's interest in vice is intimately linked to his reflection on the conditions of the acquisition and exercise of virtue for the greatest number, of this virtue which is not identified purely and simply with knowledge. (Plato's

attention also paid to the anthropological and political conditions of vice, and in particular to the conditions of one of them, the lie. Dance last study on Plato's condemnation of lies" Jerome LAURENT seeks to remove Plato from the opposition, in which he is often locked, between condemning lying in the name of this love of the true that philosophy would be, and its rehabilitation in the form of a Noble Lie, in the name of this concern for the good that would be politics. LAURENT thus explains why lies must be understood in dialogues in a polyphonic way: if the demand for truth presents itself as the natural bulwark to the increase of vice in the soul of Socrates' interlocutors, especially in the face of sophists capable of overthrowing the order of truth and falsehood, a certain use of lies, concealment, deception or trickery. , authorized by a legislative rationality also attentive to the bodies, remains possible in order to eradicate vice. This apparent paradox of using lies for a good educational purpose, especially among future guardians of the city, reflects the difficulty for Plato in confining vice to a form of ignorance, while legislative and political activity is necessarily inclined to consider also those who will have in the quoting only a derivative access to knowledge.

Because Aristotle's ethics is based on a radical critique of the Socratic identification of virtue with a form of knowledge, and takes into account, far more than Plato's, the "dispositional" dimension of virtue and the importance of character and habit, it leads to a place of choice, analysis of vice in general, as well as that of certain particular vices. It is at the first of these articles by Laetitia MONTEILS-LAENG, the articles by David KONSTAN and Douglas CAIRNS examining respectively these particular vices of ingratitude and hubris.

We aim for the good dance all our activities according to Aristotle, but we are wrong in particular because pleasure replaces the real good. As the article by Laetitia MONTEILS-LAENG, ("Excess without passion: the problem of vice in Aristotle" shows, Aristotle's reflection aims to make the departure between our transient wanderings and a genuine disposition to do evil, or to always be mistaken, which could be called vice. The vicious is thus an enthusiast who has stiffened in a certain type of wrong or bad behavior, until he is no longer able to extract himself from it. The vice is the complete corruption of the soul, a diastrophic, a total reversal such that the vicious not only can no longer act or think otherwise than he does, but above all, as he does not even see the need: he does not regret any of his actions, convinced that it is the merits of its choice. Aristotle's contribution is in this case to propose another description of the vicious that is found in Hawn (el of which the commentators believe that it is re-elected to the book ix, chap.., (the Ethics in Nicomaque): not one who is torn apart by an inner con II it, who feels shame and remorse because he has failed to control his desires, but one who has deliberately chosen a flight and who feels , having reversed values to the point of taking evil for good, the first (referred to in Book VII of Ethics in Nicomaque) may well appear as the degenerate version of the second (referred to in Book IX). According to MONTEILS-LAENG, the vicious is not carried away by violent affects that force him to act, because in a way he is leading a stable life, taking Tors decisions of a peaceful deliberation, led by a rational faculty with intact power. He is constant dance sound decisions and in his choices, except that his rule of life is wrong, since it consists in constantly satisfying changing and unstable appetites, sometimes even contradictory.

One of the major vices in this sense is the hubris, defined by Douglas CAIRNS ("Aristotle on Hybris and Injustice") as a certain way of first reporting to oneself: this provision is born when one possesses a puffy conception of oneself, backed by a misconception of one's place in the world. The hubris is thus close to the contrary virtue called megalopsuchia (soul size) in the sense that the megalopsuched possesses, for its part, a correct vision of its own superiority, and that its greatness of soul is elevation and not contempt of the other men. The only difference is, again, the misreading

of the description of an object of the world. In the same way, David KONSTAN wonders about the couple form by virtue of gratitude and vice of ingratitude, establishing in particular that it is very difficult to make one the opposite of the other: ingratitude is a kind of insensitivity, or structural inability to experience adequate emotion; gratitude, on the other hand, is the feeling of a benefactor. Ingratitude is therefore not the feeling contrary to gratitude, as hatred is of love, but quite another: it is an absence of shame (shamelessness), which would be the opposite of the virtuous disposition that is restraint (aids) but not the opposite of emotion, 'of shame (aeschne). This reflection on the opposites therefore encourages us to return to the supposed virtue of restraint: in essence, it is a proto-virtue, in the sense that this affect acts as a motive for children, but cannot constitute one for an adult constituted, who will give himself the good, precisely, as a motive. Any kat of cause, if one maintains the ingratitude and the absence of shame of the vices, it is for the following reason: just as the tyrant shamelessly exercises his causal power, without consideration of others, so the ungrateful and impudent do little to the sociability demanded of them, and exclude themselves, if not from the philosophical synopsis, at least of the community hum innate in common sense more. Following one's own pleasures and pleasures, and considerations of others, this seems to be the common point of all the figures of the vicious encounters until now.

But what is ultimately the vicious life, the life that underlies these typical figures of the vicious that are the tyrant or the proud, the deprave or the impudent, the soft or the ungrateful? Not simply a life through spleen moments, not an imperfect, unstable life that would be vicious as if by accident, because of the inability of rational Fame to behave in a straight manner, to reach truthful contents, or to curb the impact of irrational parts; but a life voluntarily commands vice, resolved as such. This is the richness and difficulty of designing vice as a disease of 'soul: first we have bouts of fever, which Von can treat with the utterness; then we develop real diseases, from which it is more difficult to recover; finally we are prone to chronic diseases, which can be identified with traits. This is why it is necessary to deal with the problem as soon as it appears, from its first symptom, or risk allowing habits to settle that will become stable provisions.

Epicurian and Stokian philosophies reactivated the purely cognitive approach to vice, which was seen to have originated in Socratic intellectualism, and was the subject of a profound review by Plato and a critical severe in Aristotle.

Although the term vice (kakia) is ultimately very rarely present in the Epicurian corpus, it appears in the treatation Of the vices and contrary virtues of Philodema of Gadara, which is, together with the epicurians Carneiscos and Philostrate, our main witness on the subject. As Francesco VERDE's article shows ("li. saggio epicureo e il controllo delle passioni"), these authors repeat that pleasure is achieved only at the cost of "sober reasoning", at odds with the manifestation of the orders of illimited desirs and the multiplication of varer pleasures Epicurians therefore join the Platonic diagnosis: vice, here equates to passion, is the cause of a miscalculation, thus a form of ignorance. Evils arise from the empty opinions we form about things, letting them reach us when they are nothing terrible. The tranquility of Fame (ataraxia) and the ab don't you think pain in the body (aponia), which must be our watchwords, are achieved only by a precise intellectual effort, which requires the mastery, first of all, of the correct classification of the eyes. What to pursue as natural and needy information is our primary means; reduce all passionate dance 'soul as in the body, such is our victory. Our pains as well as our tranquillizes are thus all brought back to mistakes of. He's so! which, from an Alec (iventuelleant to an empty opinion. Stoic the vinylidenes parde (will help clans his Peryites (Darleen.), Il n'yvice in the related nal impulses, to the extent one elks remains I in the states of nature. it distinguishes by therefore the natural anger the (phirsihi my(?) from the empty anger (keno urgê), which is born when empty judgment comes to co-fold or distort the raw (and

just) information transmitted by the first affectivitis. The affectivities transmitted by natural meaning is blurred by reason, which superimposes on this raw data empty judgments and opinions. In order to return to the raw data of nature, which contain in itself their own limit, the therapeutic proposes is: to put before the eyes the deleter effects of passionate comports, to make the elegant manifestation of their inappropriateness and danseur and danseur. Philodemus then makes anger a paradigmatic affect: it is at the same time inevitable, consubstantial to humanity, and dangerous, as it is the obstacle par excellence to any pedagogic. From Plotinus we see that the epicureans cannot be blamed for "living in hiding" and lying in the soft grass with their friends, who are concerned only about their virtue, while others are agitated by taking care of the affairs of the city. For pleasure is not understood in the sense of Aristippus, which forbids precisely to lie down like a parasite: one must be a man, all the same, so find salvation in physiologic and aetiologia which alone can allow us to fight the empty opinions and the vicious orders that they propound in us.

If passion or vice are errors of judgment in epicureism as in stoicism, then what difference between the Portico and the Garden? Remember that for epicureans, sensitivity and affectivities remain sub-rational and prelogic, that they are heterogenous to rationality. That's why pleasure and sorrow can be reliable criteria for action. Because the affectivity escapes the rational, the epicurian must decide on the role that fails this sensibility which possesses its own economic and its internal justification: pleasure being the sign of the functioning of the atomic aggregate, it must therefore serve as a criterion and guide. However, all pleasure is not to be chosen, and it is necessary to reorder this first level using the calculation of pleasures and sorrows. For the stoic, on the other hand, nothing escapes the rational, which makes the order a state particularly difficult to fight: it is the sign of a reversal of reason against herself, when she can no longer see the true and the good.

Also what to do with vice if you're stoic? The article by Teun TIELEMAN (Stoic Vices) specifies the question addressed to the Stociis by showing that in reality, this question is twofold: how is it that vice exists clans the providential and perfectly ordained world of Stoicism? and how is it that vice exists in my soul, if it is enough for me to control my rational representations, by definition independent of any emotional and bodily contamination? The Stolcian response, as was already mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, is first of all in the assertion of opposites: cosmological evil exists as a logical opposite of the good. The second question is more complex: 'individual soul sometimes misbehaves, because it makes a mistake on the world, meat it makes mistakes because it is misled, either by the very appearance of things or by the false opinions that have been transmitted to it from an early age by the frequentation of other men. But TIELEMAN offers an additional explanation of the wandering of the soul: the soul wanders from the fact that it is intimately mixed with a body. The stoics are then Plato’s direct inheritors and good readers of the Timaeus the Stoian god could not help but place 'rational soul in a body, and that is why our natural ability to virtue is false from the beginning by our status of being material. The interpenetration of the body and soul is what would prevent the second from forming straight representations. Here, then, we find the two models of vice present in Plato: vice-ignorance and vice disease, binds to the body. The first model summons, that of vice-ignorance, promises us in a way an easier success: it is enough to know things in a straight way, to strengthen our rational parts and make it owned authority over the other parties. Bringing the true into the soul, and definitively driving out the false, is the goal proposed by the Stoicisms, and all passion must be eradicated, as it is the Berme of vice, that is to say of falsehood. To let go once to the side and to the instability, to believe in what is wrong, is to take the risk of not being able to do back machine, like the rider of Chrysippe who is carried in his race by the speed of his legs, combines with the tilt of the slope. One cannot be both in the true and in the false, and science radically drives out ignorance, as virtue drives away vice. However, the very possibility of applying this first model assumes that we have answered another

question, raised by the second model: can we reach the true, as soon as Tors we are engulfed in matter? Or, like the finally TIELEMAN formula, are we condemned to wander in vice, because of our connection with the body?

Plotinus's philosophy provides a strong answer to this question. Plotin enters the perspective move, already initiated by Plato and even more so in the stoicians, which makes vice an ontolo-gic and cosmological problem, before being an ethical problem. But Plotin herite hi mile before MI el en pH cuFler of the transitinisal platonico-aristotelician theses by the plstonic of the first parts of the era impel i; I le, no in in men t Apulia and Alcinous, to which Is Dedicated Petude by Mauro BONAZZI ("II vizio nei medioplatonici e in Plotinus"). Their classification of virtues and vices is born in them from the combination of Platonic tripartite psychology and the Aristotelian theory of virtue as a middle ground between the two vices of excess and defect. Here we find vices already encountered: the main vice that tackles the rational part of evil, and which finds last opposes in wisdom, is the interest to learn (apaideusia) or the empty pretention to know (which would correspond to a kind of fatigue); placidity is the vice that threatens the fiery part, devotes to courage, analogous in this to the softness critical by Xenophon; prodigality and taste for splendor (alocasia) is the vice rebalancing to fashion, clean of the desirante part. The problem here is well within the first model, since it describes vice as involuntary, the result of ignorance or the inability of the rational party to govern the other two. As Mauro BONAZZI notes, Plotinus's book 19 places the problem towards metaphysics, dwarfing itself from the ethical framework of vices: the main virtue being wisdom, and the true being identifies with the part of 'soul not descended in the body, it is necessary to reduce the effort to the intellectual life, that is to say to the contemplation of our divine nature. The Socratic thesis of vice-ignorance thus takes a completely unexpected direction: there is no longer any sense in talking about vice, since the latter is de facto suppressed in the effort we make to escape the matter.

It thus appears that vice is not only the problem of good or misuse of will, but that it must be addressed more radically in the context of its origin and its metaphysical nature. The vice in 'soul is finally, as Laurent LAVAUD points out ("Evil in itself and total vice in Plotinus' Book 57 (I. 8) than the manifestation derives, secondary and incidental, from what will be called "evil in itself (autokakon)", the principle of evil. If 'individual soul is not the cause of vice, it is no longer so much because it is not responsible for it, in the sense that vice would be unwittingly produced by its ignorance, that because it is neither the principle nor the source, it participates only in it because it is contaminated by the presence of matter. The Plotinian walk seals in a certain way the fate of vice: while Plato described it as a mere deprivation of virtue, a lack of knowledge, or rather a lack of structure that should be reduced by circumscribing the effects and desires of the body on the rational soul, Plotinus completes to defuse the .final of the vice by attributing to it a derivative existence , second, and naked vices as of our particular virtues of second-line events: they find their place sill. etiquette plan, and concern done 'soul as it is in contact with (the material; they do not really concern us, as far as oil we are not really existing on this plane: we are our rational soul, 'unaltered soul as it was before being forced by the body to turn its eyes towards the sensitive, 'intelligible soul descended into matter. Paradoxically, therefore, vice begins to take an ontological thickness from the moment oil ii loses its ethical importance. For Plotinus, as Laurent LAVAUD shows, the defect is the result of the principle that is evil in itself, in other words of this negative causality that is matter, as it is deprivation of all form and determination: in this sense, Plotinus completes the movement initiated by Plato, who identified matter with indetermination, the absence of measurement, informs and informs it. The Plotinian jump consists, according to LAVAUD, of dance "the absolutization of these negativities", that is, in the paradox of the attribution of a positive causal efficacy to a non-being without form. If evil is absolute deprivation of good, and no longer

transient and relative deprivation, the contamination of 'soul' is radical, it occurs even before the alt soul begins to begin its movement: the shadow of matter extends to obscure all work of 'soul. Vice is therefore not only the accident that occurs when a soul reasons wrongly: it is the consequence of the absolute deprivation of the good which is the lot of every sunken soul. To the opposites that are vices and virtues are then replaced by the opposites that are matter and good.

This completion has, however, a price, because by identifying matter as the principle of vice, Plotinus relegates ethical virtues to the inessential and signs the principle of their failure. The soul is not the principle of evil, nor is it the source of it: it cannot be alone either, and by its own strengths, source good. It is of impinge by evil, it participates in it because of the presence of matter, or rather, because the soul necessarily turns to matter, and is prevented by this movement from fully exercising its intelligible power. It is full of indetermination, radically, and it is not out of weakness of will or attention that it is mistaken, but because of its descended nature — Augustine will say, because of the incarnation and the Fall. One solution then is to take care only of our unshed soul, of this intelligible part intended to join the Good and the One, beyond matter.

This is, in a way, Augustine's uncomplicated solution, as the articles of Isabelle Koch and Dominique DEMANGE show. Vice takes on Augustine's importance even more, as he turns down to sin. Isabelle Koch's article. In Augustinian tripartition of the biers and In place of will. The finishinge frame, is designed by a misdirection of the comfort, which turns out of God (averso a Deo). This misdirection, analogous to the Plotinian descent of fame, is basically much more enigmatic than it is, since it is not founded either psychologically, cosmologically or metaphysically. KOCH proposes to understand that it refers to an imitation of God described as perverse and that this perverse imitation is the fundamental pattern that Augustine applies to every sin and which allows him to explain any vice. Dance this conception of vice, virtue is no more than the horizon, unattainable here on earth, of an irretrievably lost perfection, which can no longer be recovered by our own strengths. For, as Dominique DEMANGE ("False virtues and true vices: Augustine and the end of ancient morality") shows, only God's help, through the granting of Grace, can make us rediscover virtue, which we do not know and must not even identify by ourselves, or else fall back into these vices that are presumption, pride, and self-satisfaction. Whatever efforts we can make to avoid temptations, to settle our own, to identify the right principles that need to be followed, the perfection that is virtue will not be our doing: we are not responsible for our vices or our virtues, since some are imposed upon us by the Fall and the fishing, the others are granted to us eventually by the Grace of God. The heretic may therefore have all the quality that one would expect from a virtuous man, but he lives in the fishery because he does not live in the truth of Christ. Thus Augustine in his struggle against Pelagianism signs, according to DEMANGE, the act of deceit of ancient morality and his effort to see in the virtues of real qualities and in the vices of the provisions that man, by his upbringing and his reason, can fight. <>

The Structures of Virtue and Vice by Daniel J. Daly [Moral Traditions, Georgetown University Press, 9781647120399]

A new ethics for understanding the social forces that shape moral character.

It is easy to be vicious and difficult to be virtuous in today's world, especially given that many of the social structures that connect and sustain us enable exploitation and disincentivize justice. There are

others, though, that encourage virtue.

In his book Daniel J. Daly uses the lens of virtue and vice to reimagine from the ground up a Catholic ethics that can better scrutinize the social forces that both affect our moral character and contribute to human well-being or human suffering.

Daly's approach uses both traditional and contemporary sources, drawing on the works of Thomas Aquinas as well as incorporating theories such as critical realist social theory, to illustrate the nature and function of social structures and the factors that transform them. Daly's ethics focus on the relationship between structure and agency and the different structures that enable and constrain an individual's pursuit of the virtuous life. His approach defines with unique clarity the virtuous structures that facilitate a love of God, self, neighbor, and creation, and the vicious structures that cultivate hatred, intemperance, and indifference to suffering. In doing so, Daly creates a Catholic ethical framework for responding virtuously to the problems caused by global social systems, from poverty to climate change.

CONTENTS

Why is it so difficult to be virtuous and so easy to be vicious? Why is it that most of us lack temperance, ecological virtue, and solidarity with the poor? The Catholic theological tradition has rightly identified original sin as that fallen state of human existence which inclines us to choose against what is good and right. In addition to this ontological reality; we can identify social factors (themselves by-products of original sin) that causally influence our freely willed actions. Experience suggests that social structures and cultural realities often impede virtue while facilitating vice. However, Catholic ethics has been less than precise regarding the inner workings of the relationship of these social realities and moral agency.

This book emerges from the realization that Catholic ethics does many things well—but analyzing sociostructural problems is not one of them. The concept "structures of sin" has served its purpose over the past fifty years in conceptualizing the fact that structures, in an analogous manner, can be morally categorized. It remains, however, a limited concept. This book is an attempt to forge a new ethical approach to issues of social structures—an approach that reimagines, from the ground up, how Catholic ethics might best analyze how social structures both shape the character of persons and influence the well-being of individuals and communities.

The moment one confronts a sociostructural problem—say, global warming—one quickly encounters two areas of Catholic ethics that require development. The first area is the nature of a social structure. What does it mean to say that global warming is a sociostructural problem, as so many have claimed? Is it woven into physical structures, is it in the minds of individual agents, or does it bubble up from the isolated actions of individuals? Often ethicists employ the term "structure" in an ambiguous and equivocal manner. This is the case because in Catholic ethics, "concepts are frequently pressed into service ... without even the most cursory attempt to establish what their real referents are." This quotation is from Dave Elder-Vass, regarding conceptual deficits in the social sciences. It is equally valid in aspects of Catholic ethics. Nowhere is lack of precision more evident than in the use of the concept of a "social structure." Like the common good and human dignity, it falls into the category of "often used, rarely defined?' Daniel Finn has noted that "Catholic social thought has no coherent account of what a structure is. This lack of specificity is problematic for an ethics that regularly identifies and condemns structures of sin and unjust structures.

This first problem leads to another, what social theorists call the "structure-agency problem." The structure-agency problem exists because it is difficult to describe what a social structure is, how structures influence human agency, and how agency influences social structures. Again, consider global warming. To what degree has it been caused by individual agents making decisions that warm the globe, and to what degree has it been caused by social structures that smooth the paths to a lifestyle that entails high carbon consumption? Further, who created the structures? Individuals? Corporations? The governments of the Global North? Moreover, do those structures then shape what people do, and who people become?

Social theorists have grappled with such questions for decades, and many schools of thought abound, each offering its own solution to the questions and "problem" identified above. The solution ultimately will be found in an accurate account of the relationship between social structures and human agency. Of course, a solution to the structure-agency problem is only as true as the account of social structure that explains the "structure" end of the relationship. Catholic ethics, then, requires solutions to both issues—regarding what a structure is and how structures and human agency relate—if the field is to address moral reality today. In the absence of such solutions, Catholic ethics remains open to the charge that it is more inspirational than analytical. Put differently, too often Catholic social thought is "not an exercise in social analysis, but a sermon.

Mindful of these problems, this book concerns itself primarily with structure and only secondarily with culture. Why? Theological ethicists write often and well about culture. Take, for instance, H. Richard Niebuhr's classic Christ and Culture. In the first chapter of the text, Niebuhr defines culture. There, he writes that "culture is the 'artificial, secondary environment,' which man superimposes on the natural. It comprises language, habits, ideas, beliefs, customs, social organization, inherited artifacts, technical processes, and values?' He dedicates the next six pages to further explaining his definition. This kind of developed account is nearly absent in theological work on social structures.' The first goal of this book endeavors to remedy this situation.

However, this is a book of Catholic theological ethics, which turns to social theory in order to understand how to live a Christian life today. The solution to the structure agency problem must be integrated into an ethical framework if it is to guide action. Thus, in addition to finding a solution to the structure-agency problem, "it is necessary to choose one form of ethics" in order to make sense out of the Christian moral life.' Ethicists have typically leaned on manualist era principles to make sense of the Christian moral life concerning social structures. The principles of double effect and

cooperation, for example, have been used to make normative claims about structural evils and injustices. These concepts have their value and deserve a place in the conversation regarding the morality of social structures. However, as chapter 1 argues, they have their limits.

Like many other contemporary Christian ethicists, I contend that virtue ethics offers the best account of the moral life. Chapter 5 argues this point. That chapter also argues that contemporary Catholic virtue ethics has deficiencies that need to be redressed. After a period of retrieval and growth, aspects of virtue ethics have plateaued due to a reliance on a small canon of scholars and a dated theological anthropology. The maturation of the field, I argue, will emerge from two movements. First, it needs to more fully integrate the "growing ends of the tradition" into virtue theory. That is, virtue theory needs to be more explicitly theocentric and personalist. Specifically, Catholic virtue theory needs a theocentric and personalist architecture. Second, Catholic virtue theory needs to draw more deeply on contemporary work in philosophical virtue theory. That body of literature recently has produced helpful descriptions of virtue and virtue formation. The result of such an integration is the second goal of the book: a synthesis of the best of the Thomistic tradition with a contemporary theological anthropology and an enhanced philosophy of virtue.

These two proximate goals—an understanding of the relation of social structure and moral agency, and an updated Catholic virtue theory—are at the service of the book's ultimate goal: the development of concepts capable of ethically categorizing and scrutinizing social structures. Specifically, I develop concepts that explain how structures shape moral development and agency, as well as how structures causally contribute to or impede the wellbeing of people and groups.

There is an obvious critique of what follows. Some will find it too ambitious. I not only argue that Christian ethics should turn to social theory in order to understand structures and the structure-agency problem; I also proceed to develop a theory of virtue that is based on a personalist theological anthropology. Either one of these tasks could be the focus of a monograph on Christian ethics. I have decided to take up both here because (1) the lack of sophistication regarding social structures has prevented the discipline from producing accurate claims regarding sociostructural issues and (2) virtue ethics requires a revised virtue theory if it is to reflect how theologians view the person today. Both these issues are pressing. Thus, I decided against merely analyzing the relationship of structures and agency through the lens of traditional Thomistic virtue theory.

This is decidedly a work in Catholic theological ethics. Although it is not limited to Catholic theological sources, the theological sections of the text draw principally on the works of Thomas Aquinas, magisterial writings, and the work of late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century Catholic ethicists. A word is in order regarding what I mean by "Catholic ethics." Catholic ethics, as a whole, is that tradition that has emerged from within the interplay of the lived moral practice of the faith, which has been scrutinized, understood, and challenged in the work of theologians and has been codified in magisterial teaching. Each of these arenas is engaged with and influenced by the others. For this reason it is meaningful to write of Catholic ethics as a whole—as a conversation among the laity, theologians, and the Magisterium within the universal Catholic community.

This book follows the insight of liberation theology that contends that theological ethics and magisterial teaching can be enriched by greater encounter with, attention to, and reflection on the lives of the poor. As Alexandre Martins puts it, a true preferential option for the poor changes the practice of theology. This option begins with "an existential commitment that leads us to live in solidarity with [the poor]" and leads to "a new way to do theology, that is, from below" (emphasis in the original). The point of departure of this book is the experience of structural injustice that afflicts

the global poor in the twenty-first century. The book then attempts to understand, judge, and offer provisional solutions to the sociostructural issues that devastate the lives of the poor.

In addition to Catholic ethics, both social theory and philosophical ethics figure prominently in what follows. In order to address the structure-agency problem, which has plagued Catholic ethics, I turn to critical realist social theory. Critical realism offers an account of social structure that profits both Catholic social thought and Catholic virtue theory. The book also demonstrates to social theorists that their theorizing benefits the work of ethicists and those interested in questions of moral development and social justice.

There are two notable exclusions from the scope of the project. I have chosen to draw on only critical realist social theory and not on other modes of social analysis, such as ethnography or critical race theory. I have done this for two reasons. The first is for the sake of clarity. The primary readership for the hook is ethicists and theologians. New are scholars who typically lack academic preparation in social theory. Showing the scope to critical realist social theory, I hope to impart to the reader a clear portrait of how this theory contributes to contemporary theological ethics. Second, as far as I can tell, neither ethnography nor critical race theory offers a developed account of what constitutes a social structure. As I have already suggested, contemporary theological ethics requires such an account. However, this is not to claim that critical realism is the only insightful sociological approach. Critical realism is not sufficient, but it is necessary. Certainly, what follows could be enhanced through an encounter with both ethnography and critical race theory.

In addition, the reader should know that the cases presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7 are illustrative of the core concepts and are not themselves the focus of these chapters. Although the structural ethical analysis that I develop is useful in applied ethics, the current project does not attempt to exhaustively scrutinize the moral problems of sweatshop labor and global warming. Such work will need to wait until a later date.

Progression of Chapters

The book is made up of three parts. Part I is diagnostic. Chapter 1 finds that the contemporary theoethical resources and approaches for evaluating structural evils are deficient. Specifically, manualist era principles are inadequate for evaluating structural issues. This is due, in part, to the fact that these manualist principles, such as double effect and cooperation, reflect a "liability approach" to ethics. That is, agents incur moral guilt when their intentional action causes harm to another person or group. Although a liability approach suggests that purchasing sweatshop-made clothing is not morally wrong, our moral intuitions indicate that such an act is unjust. Thus, chapter 1 closes by calling Christian ethics to fulfill its task of being able to make accurate claims about how to live the Gospel in this highly structured age. In order to do so, ethicists will need to discover a new moral nomenclature.

Chapter 2 diagnoses still another problem in contemporary theoethical approaches to structural issues: the lack of understanding of what a structure is and how structures and moral agency are related. Thus, a sociologically acceptable notion of social structure and a solution to the structure-agency problem are needed.

With these lacunae exposed, part II marshals the constructive resources needed to patch the tradition. Chapter 3 addresses an issue presented in chapter 2. Namely, it provides a sociologically sophisticated account of social structure as well as an account of how structures emerge and how social structures shape persons. The chapter argues that critical realist social theory solves these problems for Catholic ethics. Chapter 4 identifies three key developments in post—Vatican II

theology and ethics that should be the growing ends of the theoethical tradition: theocentrism, personalism, and virtue ethics. This chapter shows that the tradition has moved beyond manualist era concepts, and it provides ethicists with an updated and fuller account of the moral life than given in the earlier concepts.

Synthesis and applications are the goals of part III. Chapter 5 draws on the insights of chapter 4 by developing a virtue theory that is architecturally theocentric and personalist. In doing so, the chapter moves away from the tradition of powers-based accounts of virtue and toward a relational account. Chapter 6 continues the synthesis by defining, and then demonstrating, the explanatory capacity of the structures of virtue and vice. There, the concepts of the structures of virtue and vice emerge from the relation of the above-mentioned critical realist account of social structure and the theocentric, personalist account of virtue.

Because critical realism maintains that social structures can enable or constrain moral agency and action, moral character is likewise enabled or constrained in and through an agent's participation in social structures. In addition, the chapter argues that the enablements and constraints within social structures causally contribute to, or undermine, human and ecological well-being.

The applicative aspect of part III is contained in chapter 7, which begins by arguing that the structures of virtue and vice are a conceptual improvement over previous modes of sociostructural ethical analysis. The chapter demonstrates the value of moving away from a liability approach of assigning guilt and toward a character approach that assesses the quality of an agent's relationality with others. The chapter then employs the structures of virtue and vice to render normative claims regarding examples presented in the previous six chapters. <>

Mystifying Kabbalah: Academic Scholarship, National Theology, and New Age Spirituality

by Boaz Huss [Oxford Studies in Western Esotericism Series, Oxford University Press, 9780190086961]

Most scholars of Judaism take the term "Jewish mysticism" for granted, and do not engage in a critical discussion of the essentialist perceptions that underlie it. Mystifying Kabbalah studies the evolution of the concept of Jewish mysticism. It examines the major developments in the academic study of Jewish mysticism and its impact on modern Kabbalistic movements in the contexts of Jewish nationalism and New Age spirituality.

Boaz Huss argues that Jewish mysticism is a modern discursive construct and that the identification of Kabbalah and Hasidism as forms of mysticism, which appeared for the first time in the nineteenth century and has become prevalent since the early twentieth, shaped the way in which Kabbalah and Hasidism are perceived and studied today. The notion of Jewish mysticism was established when western scholars accepted the modern idea that mysticism is a universal religious phenomenon of a direct experience of a divine or transcendent reality and applied it to Kabbalah and Hasidism. "Jewish mysticism" gradually became the defining category in the modern academic research of these topics. This book clarifies the historical, cultural, and political contexts that led to the identification of Kabbalah and Hasidism as Jewish mysticism, exposing the underlying ideological and theological presuppositions and revealing the impact of this "mystification" on contemporary forms of Kabbalah and Hasidism.

The book offers a study of the genealogy of the concept of "Jewish mysticism." It examines the major developments in the academic study of Jewish mysticism and its impact on modern Kabbalistic movements in the contexts of Jewish nationalism and New Age spirituality. Its central argument is that Jewish mysticism is a modern discursive construct and that the identification of Kabbalah and Hasidism as forms of mysticism, which appeared for the first time in the nineteenth century and became prevalent since the early twentieth, shaped the way in which Kabbalah and Hasidism are perceived and studied today. The notion of Jewish mysticism was established when Western scholars accepted the modern idea that mysticism is a universal religious phenomenon of a direct experience of a divine or transcendent reality and applied it to Kabbalah and Hasidism. The term Jewish mysticism gradually became the defining category in the modern academic research of these topics. Mystifying Kabbalah examines the emergence of the category of Jewish mysticism and of the ensuing perception that Kabbalah and Hasidism are Jewish manifestations of a universal mystical phenomenon. It investigates the establishment of the academic field devoted to the research of Jewish mysticism, and it delineates the major developments in this field. The book clarifies the historical, cultural, and political contexts that led to the identification of Kabbalah and Hasidism as Jewish mysticism, exposing the underlying ideological and theological presuppositions and revealing the impact of this "mystification" on contemporary forms of Kabbalah and Hasidism.

Jewish Mysticism

Excerpt: The introduction presents Martin Buber's early 20th century attempt to expose the existence of "Jewish mysticism," and the later establishment of the academic study of Jewish mysticism by Geshom Scholem, and the revolution that occurred in the study of Jewish mysticsm in the 1980's. The introduction outlines the genealogical study and critical examination of the concept and research field of Jewish mysticism that will be presented in the book, and explains that it seeks to expose the deep-rooted factors that have guided (and continue to guide) the identification of Kabbalah and Hasidism as mysticism, and how these influence the ways in which these movements are interpreted and studied. It discussed that two central claims that guide the discussion in this book. The first is that mysticism, in general, and Jewish mysticism, in particular, are not natural and universal phenomena that were discovered by researchers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Rather, these are discursive constructs which served to catalogue, compare, and explain a broad range of cultural products and social structures not necessarily related to one another. The second claim that guides the discussion of the study of Jewish mysticism involves the theological assumptions that underpin the category of mysticism.

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In 1906, the young Jewish philosopher and Zionist activist Martin Buber (1878–1965) sent a copy of his newly published book *The Tales of Rabbi Nachman* to his friend, the renowned German publisher Eugen Diederichs (1867–1930), with these words:

> I am sending you a book, *The Tales of Rabbi Nachman*, which you may find interesting. Do you perhaps recall that once—a few years ago—we discussed the question of the existence of Jewish mysticism? You didn't want to believe it. With this book on Nachman I have opened up a series of documents that will expose its existence.

"Mysticism" had become a popular concept by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. At that time (and still today), mysticism was defined as a direct and unmediated experience of a divine or transcendent reality, which constitutes the essence or apex of religion. Similar to many other thinkers of his generation, Diederichs, a central figure in the neo-Romantic movement, denied the existence of mysticism in Judaism. He believed that Judaism was a rational and legalistic religion, essentially alien to mysticism. Buber sought to prove not only that mysticism exists in Judaism, but also that it is Judaism's vital and central foundation.

Buber viewed the publication of *The Tales of Rabbi Nachman* as the first step in the exposure of the existence of Jewish forms of mysticism. But what was the significance of such an exposure? In his preface, entitled "Jewish Mysticism," Buber did not discuss unfamiliar texts or new and unknown trends in Judaism. Rather, he wished to demonstrate to the German-speaking public (Jews and non-Jews alike) that well-known Jewish texts are Jewish expressions of mysticism. Buber argued that classical Jewish sources, such as *Sefer Yetzira* and *Sefer ha-Zohar*, were written under the inspiration of ecstatic experiences and that central Jewish movements, Kabbalah and Hasidism, in particular, were created under the universal aspiration for achieving mystical rapport with the supreme, transcendent reality.

Other Jewish thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shared Buber's contention that Kabbalah and Hasidism are Jewish expressions of mysticism. Outstanding among them was Gershom Scholem (1882–1897). As a young boy in Germany, Scholem became an enthusiastic Zionist. The writings of Martin Buber greatly impressed him, and later, he acknowledged that "Buber was the first Jewish thinker who saw in mysticism a basic feature and continuously operating tendency of Judaism" (Scholem 1976b, 145). At a young age, Scholem decided to abandon the study of mathematics and pursue research on Kabbalah. After submitting his dissertation on the early Kabbalist text *Sefer ha-Bahir* to Munich University in 1922, he immigrated to Paletstine and joined the staff of the Hebrew University, then in its early stages of establishment. He began as a librarian and later became a lecturer.

Scholem espoused the category "Jewish mysticism," basing an entire field of academic scholarship on it. Scholem accepted the modern neo-Romantic definition of mysticism and adopted Buber's assumptions about the continuous presence of mysticism in Judaism. Scholem and his students devoted enormous efforts to the historical and philological investigation of the movements through texts and doctrines they deemed to constitute Jewish mysticism. They described the development of Jewish mysticism and the influence it had on Jewish history from the late Middle Ages to the beginning of the modern age. The main purpose of Scholem's research was to reveal the centrality of the mystical element in Jewish history, which he believed enabled the national existence of the Jewish people during their exile from their homeland. According to Scholem, the study of Kabbalah had an important role in Jewish national revival. Furthermore, Scholem believed that academic research was the only means by which modern people could have contact with the transcendent

reality that inspired Jewish mystical texts. Hence, in Scholem's view, academic research on Kabbalah was the continuation of Jewish mysticism in the modern period.

In the 1980s, following Scholem's death, a revolution occurred in the academic field that he founded. Young researchers led by Moshe Idel, Yehuda Liebes, Elliot Wolfson, and others proposed new perspectives and directions for research. They disagreed with many of Scholem's basic theoretical and methodological assumptions. The new scholars rejected Scholem's assumptions regarding the source of Jewish mysticism and its historical development. They questioned the exclusivity of the historical-philological methodology and suggested the inclusion of other research methods, primarily the phenomenological comparative study prevalent in religious studies.

Nevertheless, the new research did not abandon the fundamental category of the field—identifying Kabbalah and Hasidism as Jewish mysticism. Not only did researchers, led by Idel, not object to this identification, but they criticized Scholem and his followers for not sufficiently studying the mystical aspects of the Kabbalah. Following Idel, many contemporary scholars emphasized experiential and ecstatic aspects of Kabbalah and Hasidism. Through phenomenological and comparative research, they strove to understand the deep structures and basic models of the universal mystical experience, which, in their opinion, lay beneath Kabbalistic and Hasidic literature. Thus, the fundamental assumption of the research field, that is, the identification of Kabbalah and Hasidism as mysticism, continues to govern the academic study of Kabbalah and to determine its research practices.

This book offers a genealogical study and critical examination of the concept and research field of Jewish mysticism. It seeks to expose the deep-rooted factors that have guided (and continue to guide) the identification of Kabbalah and Hasidism as mysticism, and how these influence the ways in which these movements are interpreted and studied. The book examines the identification of Kabbalah and Hasidism (and some other movements) as Jewish manifestations of a universal, mystical phenomenon, and the establishment of the academic field devoted to the study of Jewish mysticism. It reveals the historical processes that led to the structuring of the category of Jewish mysticism and turned it into the key concept that governs the perception of Kabbalah and Hasidism not only in academia but also among the broader public, including contemporary Kabbalistic and Hasidic movements. The book exposes the theological assumptions embedded in the concept of Jewish mysticism and how the revolutions that transpired in the field of study were, in fact, shaped according to the logic of these theological presuppositions.

Two central claims that guide my discussion deserve clarification at the outset. The first is that mysticism is not a natural and transhistorical, universal phenomena that exists in all human cultures. Rather, it is a modern category that originated in Western Europe and the United States in the modern period, in specific theological and political contexts, and which served to organize and interpret a broad range of doctrines, practices, and social groups. The cultural practices and artifacts defined as mystical do not share common traits or characteristics that set them aside from other things not labeled as such. Scholars of comparative mysticism assert that mystical phenomena across cultures share some common traits. Yet I am not aware of any factor, or factors, that are common only to these phenomena, and I do not think that they resemble one another more than other phenomena that are not perceived as mystical. Notwithstanding the attempts of scholars to capture the shared elements common to different mystical traditions, the only common denominator that most scholars agree on is that mystical cultural phenomena have been inspired by mystical experiences; that is, they were the result of a direct encounter with God or the transcendent reality.

I would like to emphasize that I do not deny the historical significance of texts and practices included in the category "mysticism," nor do I oppose their research. I do not deny the fact that people put

their heads between their knees, whispered songs and praises, memorized the names of angels, secluded themselves, and prostrated on the graves of the righteous. I do not doubt that people who employed these practices claimed to have had visions, to hear voices, or reported extraordinary events that they described as "descending to the chariot," ascension into the garden of Eden, prophecy, or cleaving (*dvekut*) to nothingness. Nor do I deny the importance of the studies that examine these reports in their social and historic contexts.

My claim is directed against the prevalent assumption, according to which one must catalogue and explain these reports as expressions of a universal mystical experience. I doubt that for all the phenomena labeled "mystical" in various cultures there is a factor or factors—common only to them—that justify their being labeled as such, and I do not think that they resemble one another more than other phenomena that are not perceived as "mystical." In short, I do not accept the assumption that they belong to one category and require unique academic disciplines, theories, and methodologies for researching and teaching them.[1] The various historical phenomena defined today as "mystical" can be studied according to research methods and theories of the humanities and social sciences, similar to other cultural practices and products that were formed in specific historical, political, economic, and social frameworks. The use of the category "mysticism" tends to disconnect phenomena from these social contexts. Despite the fact that most researchers of mysticism will agree that phenomena labeled "mystical" transpire in specific social and historical frameworks, the use of the category "mysticism" and the attempt to study it through phenomenological and comparative methods contribute to a severing of phenomena from their historical contexts and blur their social and political nature.

This brings me to the second claim that guides my discussion of the study of Jewish mysticism. The modern concept of mysticism, as well as its use as an analytic category, entails theological assumptions that govern the way scholars study and interpret the social and cultural phenomena labeled as mysticism. Although modern definitions of mysticism do not assume an active and personal God who intervenes in history, they do assume that mystics across cultures experience an encounter with a divine or transcendent reality. Scholars of mysticism assume that the encounter with this metaphysical reality has an influence on the mystic and his or her creativity and, therefore, on human culture, society, and history. Hence, inherent within the use of the term *mysticism* as an analytical category is an implicit assumption that the divine or transcendent reality can be a causal factor that explains cultural products and social practices.

The theological logic implied by the use of the category of mysticism, I will claim, dictates and shapes the research practices of the academic field devoted to Jewish mysticism. As I will demonstrate in the various chapters of the book, the formation of the academic field, the theories and research methods used in it, and the historiographies offered by scholars of Jewish mysticism are largely determined by the field's inherent theological logic.

Guided by these two central claims, the following chapters seek to reveal the processes that led to the establishment of the category of Jewish mysticism. They aim to clarify the factors that led to the building of a research field defined by this category and show how theological assumptions and national ideology shaped the theory and practice of the study of Jewish mysticism.

The first chapter deals with the genealogy of the modern category of mysticism as it was shaped in the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The chapter examines the theological context of the modern definitions of mysticism. It shows that theological assumptions underlie the perennialist perception of mysticism, which claims that cross-cultural mystical experiences are basically identical. It further argues that theological assumptions also have a bearing on the

contextual approach to mysticism, according to which mystical experiences are shaped according to their cultural context. The chapter demonstrates that mysticism is a modern discursive construct and points out difficulties in applying it as an analytical category.

The following two chapters of the book deal with the processes of formation and reproduction of the category of Jewish mysticism and its associated academic field. Chapter 2 examines the "exposure" of Jewish mysticism by Martin Buber and the establishment of the research field of Jewish mysticism by Gershom Scholem and his pupils. It examines the relevant nineteenth-century ideological and theological contexts, especially the modern Jewish national-theological discourses associated with the Zionist nation-building undertaking, that shaped Scholem's historiography of Jewish mysticism.

Chapter 3 examines the new directions and perspectives that emerged in the research of Jewish mysticism in the late twentieth century. It discusses the theoretical and methodological changes that challenged many of Scholem's basic assumptions but also the perseverance—and even intensification—of the use of the term *mysticism* as a fundamental category in the study of Kabbalah and Hasidism. The chapter demonstrates that the changes that occurred within the field were delineated by the theological logic of the research field. The chapter identifies the modern theological suppositions of contemporary scholars of Jewish mysticism and their affinity to contemporary New Age spirituality.

The next two chapters examine the ways in which the category of mysticism, and its theological underpinnings, directed and governed the production of scientific knowledge about Kabbalah and Hasidism. Chapter 4 examines how the concept of Jewish mysticism excluded from the academic discourse Kabbalistic movements that were not considered to be part of authentic Jewish mysticism. The chapter examines the claim of Buber, Scholem, and many of their followers that the Hasidism of the eighteenth century was the final stage of Jewish mysticism. It reveals why later forms of Kabbalah and Hasidism were not regarded as authentic expressions of Jewish mysticism and why they did not, therefore, receive any scholarly attention but were the object of contempt. In this chapter, I show that the disregard of Scholem and his pupils toward the Kabbalistic formations of their times derived from a national-theological position that viewed Jewish mysticism as a vital force of the Jewish nation during the exile, but which concluded its role with the return of the Jewish people to its homeland. The national-mystical vitality of the Jewish people was, in their opinion, expressed in the modern era in the Zionist project and not in modern Kabbalistic and Hasidic movements, which were perceived as deteriorated and irrelevant. This stance expressed a typically Orientalist ambivalence that emphasized a supposed Eastern origin of Jewish mysticism and which glorified its glorious past but viewed its modern expressions (in the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Europe) as faltering and degenerated. Scholars of Jewish mysticism—who viewed themselves as the authorized guardians of the Kabbalah—believed that the continuation of the Jewish mystical tradition is to be found in academic research that exposes the historical significance of Kabbalah and Hasidism, and reveals their mystical, transhistorical source.

The fifth and final chapter of the book examines the ways that the application of the category of mysticism directed the research interests of scholars of Kabbalah and Hasidism and shaped the image and practice of Kabbalah among the broader public. Subjugation of the Kabbalah to the category of mysticism led to an emphasis on Kabbalistic doctrines and practices that were compatible with the modern image of mysticism, such as reports of visions, ascension to other worlds, and union with God. Furthermore, scholars assumed that ecstatic visions and extraordinary experiences underlay Kabbalistic texts, even when the Kabbalists did not report such events. The

chapter focuses on analyzing how the perception of Kabbalah as "Jewish mysticism" led to a growing interest in the writings of thirteenth-century Kabbalist Abraham Abulafia and to his description as the Jewish "mystic" par excellence. In the chapter, I discuss also the impact of the scholarship of Jewish mysticism on the image and practice of contemporary Kabbalah and on the reception of Abulafia's, who was rejected from the traditional Kabbalistic canon, as a current cultural hero of Kabbalah.

My analysis is indebted to studies written in recent decades that discuss the genealogy of the concept of religion and which offer critical examination of the field of religious studies. Talal Asad's *Genealogies of Religion* was especially influential, particularly his claim "that there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes". I was also inspired by the studies of Russell McCutcheon, Timothy Fitzgerald, and others who, following Asad, explored the formation of the modern category "religion" and the theological assumptions underlying it. The comparative and phenomenological research of Mircea Eliade and his pupils was singled out in particular, which is significant because Eliade's school greatly influenced research into Jewish mysticism. Fitzgerald claimed the phenomenology of religions is a kind of contemporary ecumenical theologization, whose main belief is that there are many religions in the world that are all equal (more or less) in that they constitute responses to one transcendent God. In Fitzgerald's words:

> Ecumenical liberal theology has been disguised (though not very well) in the so-called scientific study of religion, which denies that it is a form of theology and at the same time claims that it is irreducible to sociology either. In this context, an essentially theological enterprise has been repackaged as an academic analysis of things that can be found in the world, objects called variously religions, religious systems, faith communities and so on.

As I will explain in the chapters of this book, similar theological paradigms lie behind the category of mysticism and guide academic research of Kabbalah and Hasidism.

I was also inspired by various studies that show how the Western labeling of Oriental cultural phenomena as spiritual and mystical was accepted by political leaders and philosophers of those cultures (mainly in India and Japan) and was developed by them as part of an aspiration to construct non-Western national collective identities. As Partha Chatterjee argued, Indian nationalism launched its most creative and significant projects of structuring a modern national Indian culture in a so-called spiritual domain. Within the various contexts in which Jewish national identity developed, similar processes shaped the formation of Jewish mysticism as a category and a research field.

The genealogical and critical discussions proposed in this book progress in the opposite direction that research of Jewish mysticism has taken from the beginning of the century and up to the present. While research of Jewish mysticism assumes the existence of common essential and universal traits for doctrines and social practices defined as Jewish mysticism and strives to reveal and clarify these traits and show how they shaped Jewish history and culture, the present volume claims that the assumption that these phenomena have common traits originated in the late nineteenth century. The book seeks to reveal and clarify how this assumption was formed and how it shaped the ways in which the variety of social movements, literary texts, and cultural practices catalogued and subordinated under the category of Jewish mysticism were researched and understood. <>

MARMADUKE PICKTHALL: ISLAM AND THE MODERN WORLD edited by Geoffrey P. Nash [Muslim Minorities, Brill, 9789004327580]

This recent volume of essays marks eighty years since the death of Marmaduke Pickthall. His various roles as translator of the Qur'an, traveller to the Near East, political journalist writing on behalf of Muslim Turkey, and creator of the Muslim novel are discussed.
In later life Pickthall became a prominent member of the British Muslim community in London and Woking, co-worker with Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, supporter of the Khilafat movement, and editor of the journal *Islamic Culture* under the patronage of the Nizam of Hyderabad.
MARMADUKE PICKTHALL: ISLAM AND THE MODERN WORLD makes an important contribution to the field of Muslims in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century.

Contributors are: Humayun Ansari, Adnan Ashraf, James Canton, Peter Clark, Ron Geaves, A.R. Kidwai, Faruk Kokoglu, Andrew C. Long, Geoffrey P. Nash, M. A. Sherif and Mohammad Siddique Seddon.

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Pickthall after 1936 by Peter Clark

Marmaduke Pickthall died on 19 May 1936 at the age of sixty-one. His widow, Muriel, invited Mrs Anne Fremantle, to write a biography.

Anne Fremantle was born Anne Huth Jackson, the daughter of a wealthy banker and his wife, a daughter of the some time Liberal Member of Parliament, junior Minister and proconsul, the grandly named Sir Elphinstone Mountstuart Grant Duff. The Huth Jacksons had a London house and a massive country estate at Possingworth near Uckfield in Sussex. Mrs Huth Jackson was well-connected socially, and familiar with the political and literary elite of the capital. Anne, born in 1909, was a precocious child. At the end of the First World War the Pickthalls lived at Pond House, a cottage on the Possingworth estate. The young Anne and Marmaduke, then in his early forties, got to know each other and became great friends. We have only Anne's account of the friendship, but it seems Pickthall treated her as a young adult, and played the role of substitute father. Her own father had been busy and distant, and died in 1921, by which time the Pickthalls had moved to India. She was enchanted by his memories of his early travels in Palestine and Syria and the stories and legends he had picked up. She claimed to have become a Muslim as a young girl. When he went to India, it appears he regularly wrote to her with news of his life and encounters. She saw him on his periodic visits to Britain. He attended her marriage in London (conducted by the Archbishop of Canterbury), and during the last year of his life they saw each other after he had returned to England after ten years in Hyderabad.

Anne Fremantle was widely read and had already written a book on George Eliot at the age of twenty-three. She was active politically and stood as Labour candidate against Duff Cooper in a parliamentary election. She also, in 1961, wrote a history of the Fabian Society.

Although Muriel had asked Anne Fremantle to write the biography, Anne did not have a high opinion of Muriel. "She shared neither his faith nor his talents – he was a gifted and successful novelist – and seemed a meowing person, not happy in Sussex or later in India", she wrote uncharitably in her own autobiography. It was as if Anne wanted to have exclusive possession of Marmaduke and was the only woman to understand him.

Anne Fremantle destroyed many of the most personal and most interesting of the letters Pickthall wrote to her, on the insistence of her husband. She had difficulties in gathering further material. She wrote to a relation of Pickthall that "Marmaduke is a most elusive person to get facts or material about".

Her book, Loyal Enemy, was published by Hutchinson in January 1939. It was widely reviewed. Harold Nicolson did not agree with most of Pickthall's public views but recognised that Anne Fremantle's "girlish hero-worship" was not misplaced. Pickthall, in spite of alienation from Britain and Christianity, " remained sweet, selfless and unassuming to the end". A G MacDonell reviewed the book in The Observer, acknowledging Pickthall's "extraordinary character". But the significance of the book and the memory of Pickthall were probably smothered by the more pressing concerns of the war. A more sensational review in The Sunday Dispatch, opened with the words, "He was a small, mild, moustached, quietly-spoken Englishman, but Mr Marmaduke Pickthall had a cause which made him a lion among men". None of these reviews reflected on the significance of an Englishman throwing himself so unreservedly into the world of Islam.

The book was long – 441 pages – and is an intimate personal portrait of a modest, shy man who was able to communicate with a bright child who, in turn, hero-worshipped him. However it seems to have been hastily written. It sprawls and, although letters and articles are quoted – sometimes at length – there are no references. The book is poorly edited and proofread. Jaffa and Jedda are mixed up. The transliterations of Arabic are sometimes erroneous, sometimes eccentric.

Anne Fremantle mentions that she was given the original manuscript of The Meaning of the Glorious Koran. Indeed he had translated some of its verses for her when she was a child. Anne Fremantle lived for another sixty years after Loyal Enemy, much of the time in the United States. When in the early 1980s I was preparing my book on Pickthall, I wrote to her asking about any letters and papers. She replied to me in October 1983 saying she had sent them to "Hyderabad because I thought they may be included in a collection of his works". She was unable to help about the location of other personal papers of the man she described to me as "my greatest friend from my father's death when I was 12 until his own death".

In 1992, six years after the publication of my own book, I was in Hyderabad. One of Pickthall's Hyderabad friends had been a historian, Farouk Sherwani. When Pickthall finally left Hyderabad in 1935 Farouk went with Pickthall to the station, accompanied by his young son, Mustafa. It was Mustafa who was my guide in Hyderabad and we called on other elderly gentlemen who had known Pickthall. I asked about personal papers. "Pickthall had no interest in personal possessions", Mustafa told me. "He would have arrived in Hyderabad with one suitcase; he would have left with one suitcase".

Pickthall is rightly best remembered as the author of The Meaning of the Glorious Koran. First published by Knopf in New York in 1930 it has gone through many reprints in various countries. In 1938 the Government Central Press, Hyderabad, brought out an edition with the Arabic text and the English alongside each other. This is how Pickthall wanted his work to appear. In 1970 a Delhi publisher produced a three language version with Urdu, Arabic and English. Ten years later, under the patronage of the Ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, a series of cassettes was made of Pickthall's translation, recited by Gai Eaton (Hasan Abdul Hakim).

The lectures on Islam that Pickthall delivered in Madras (Chennai) in 1925 have also been reprinted periodically in both India and Pakistan.

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I first became fascinated in the life and work of Marmaduke Pickthall in the late 1970s. I had lived in Jordan and Lebanon and knew Damascus; when I read Sai'd the Fisherman I was bowled over by it. I could not put it down. Every page scintillated with insight. I liked the way he used dialogue, translating colloquial Syrian Arabic literally into English. I appreciated the way he seemed to create a distinctive language in which he described the lives of unspectacular Syrians and Palestinians, without sentimentality or romance. His realistic and sympathetic word-portraits of ordinary people reminded me of the writings of Sir Walter Scott and Thomas Hardy. I read Edward Said's Orientalism when it was published in 1978 and was appalled that Pickthall's work was dismissed alongside that of Pierre Loti as "exotic fiction of minor writers". I wondered whether Edward Said had actually read any of Pickthall's Middle Eastern fiction.

I looked out for more of his novels and soon came across The Children of the Nile, Oriental Encounters and The Valley of the Kings. They all had a similar quality of empathetic realism. I then made a determined effort to find the rest of his work, including those novels of his that were located in England. One book-seller told me that they were unsellable and some dealers just pulped them as they blocked up valuable shelf-space. I succeeded in collecting them all and read them. I had been lucky in my introduction to Pickthall's novels for the first four I bought and read were also his best. I also acquired Loyal Enemy and although a vivid and loving personal portrait of the man comes through, I thought Anne Fremantle had missed Pickthall's literary and political significance. I thought there was something gushing and jejune about her approach. Here was a man whose work was

celebrated by such a varied range of demanding critics as H G Wells, D H Lawrence and E M Forster, had a best-seller with Sa?d the Fisherman, but was overlooked in the standard works of twentieth century literary history. I also thought Anne Fremantle did not appreciate Pickthall's significance as a twentieth century Muslim intellectual. So I decided to write my own book about him.

I wrote it while working as a Director of the British Council in Yemen and Tunisia. I advertised for information on any personal papers, wrote to the Osmania University and the Andhra Pradesh State Archives in Hyderabad, but drew a blank. I also wrote to the Karachi (Pakistan) newspaper, Dawn. (I knew many old Hyderabadis had migrated to Karachi after the "Police Action" that absorbed the Nizamate into independent India.) I had several answers which I used in my own book. Anne Fremantle told me that she did not think Marmaduke's brother Rudolph had any descendants. In this she was wrong. In 1983 I did write out of the blue to a Pickthall in London but never had a reply. The letter was, however – I learned thirty-two years later – passed on to a granddaughter in law of Rudolph. She never replied to me and her daughter, Sarah Pickthall, showed me the letter in 2015. Of the twelve children begotten by Pickthall's father, only three had children of their own. Apart from Rudolph's only son, there were two grand-daughters, both of whom were childless. One was Marjorie Pickthall, whose father had emigrated to Canada: Marjorie became a well-known Canadian novelist. The other was a historian of Lincolnshire, Mrs Dorothy Rudkin, who died in 1984. She had kept some family photographs and, by the kindness of her executor, Dr Robert Pacey, I was able to use three of these in my book. The other major source I used – which Anne Fremantle did not to the same degree – was Pickthall's own journalism, especially articles he wrote for Islamic Review, New Age and Islamic Culture. There were many autobiographical allusions in these articles, and many links with his fiction. Sometimes an event in the journalism was transposed into one of his novels.

In many ways my book complemented Loyal Enemy. When I reread it I think the terse style reflects the kind of extended writing that was part of my training. It has the flavour of both a PhD thesis and a civil service minute. There is a terseness in style, a shunning of ornamental or superfluous prose. My aim was to draw attention to an outstanding (but neglected) twentieth century writer. Pickthall was a man I hugely admired, though I shared none of his intellectual positions. I did however appreciate his insight into the Arab Middle East and knew of no other English writer to match him. He lacked the self-centredness of Burton and Blunt; he was more accessible than Lane. I did not have the resources of university support or academic networks. I was either too busy, too idle or too impatient to pursue lines that may have led to greater information. If anyone was interested in Pickthall they would read both Anne Fremantle's book and mine.

As well as publishing my book, Quartet Books also reissued Pickthall's best novel, Sa?d the Fisherman. Both were published in May 1986 on the fiftieth anniversary of his death. On the same day I inserted an In Memoriam notice in The Times.

There were some reviews in the London papers. W B Hepburn, in The Daily Telegraph, thought the book "too laconic" though I showed an "infectious partiality" for Pickthall. Malise Ruthven in the Times Literary Supplement noted that in "his Eastern novels he weaves Arabic words and sentence-constructions into a language which is stylized, though less mannered than Doughty's. Drawing on a vast repertoire of folklore and anthropological observation, he seems to enter effortlessly into an Eastern vernacular and into the skins of his Eastern characters without sentimentality or condescension".

There was more notice of the book in specialist journalism, relating to Islam or the Middle East. Michael Adams, in Middle East International, thought Marmaduke Pickthall had "disappeared into undeserved oblivion" and hoped my book would "put him back on the literary map". Asaf Hussain in The Crescent, in a long and generally appreciative article, was critical of Pickthall's views on the Prophet Muhammad and war, and also thought that I – apparently – believed "like all westerners...that man is born out of sin and that no good can come out of him without some ulterior motive". It was wrong to think that Pickthall's fascination with the Middle East and his ultimate conversion was the result of personal failure. There were also reviews in the English language newspapers of the Gulf and Israel.

Three years after the publication of Marmaduke Pickthall: British Muslim in 1986, Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses was published. If my book had been published that year it might have added to an informed discussion about the ethics of the Muslim as novelist or the novelist as Muslim. But my book was already being remaindered.

My book was occasionally quoted, and Pickthall's significance was recognised in works such as "The Infidel Within": Muslims in Britain since 7800 by Humayun Ansari and the work of Geoffrey Nash. The former acknowledges him as a Muslim intellectual, the latter as a writer.

But it has been in the last ten years that there has been a steady acceleration of interest in the life and work of Marmaduke Pickthall; this volume is a climax of that growing interest. He is now getting into reference works. Muhammad Shaheen contributed an article for the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, (ODNB) published in 2007. ODNB is now published on-line. Pickthall has many references on the worldwide web. He is celebrated in the British Muslim community and there is a Pickthall Academy in Camden in London.

In 2012 the bbc made a film about Pickthall and two of his contemporaries who also embraced Islam – Lord Headley and Abdullah Quilliam. Marmaduke's great great niece, Sarah Pickthall, took part in that film (as I did). Her family had regarded the man with a mixture of pride and reticence, but Sarah is doing what she can to celebrate his name. The film was shown late at night during Ramadan and there were 700,000 viewers. It was later transmitted on bbc international channels. Friends in Dubai and Vancouver told me they had seen it. In 2014 two books had extended chapters on Pickthall. Andrew C Long in Reading Arabia: British Orientalism in the Age of Mass Publication 7880–7939 places Pickthall as a travel writer in the context of his contemporaries. Jamie Gilham in Loyal Enemies: British Converts to Islam, 7850–7950 has worked through papers at the Public Records Office and letters Pickthall wrote to Aubrey Herbert to give a good account of Pickthall's First World War activities.

In 2010 the Muslim Academic Trust reissued The Early Hours, the Turkey novel, first published in 1921, with a thirty page biographical sketch by Abdal Hakim Murad, the imam of the University of Cambridge. (As Tim Winter he had helped me with my book.)

The Saudi scholar, Ahmad al-Ghamari, wrote a thesis on Pickthall for a United States university and is currently translating my book into Arabic. The thesis assesses him as a novelist and was registered in a Literature faculty.

The British publisher, Beacon Books, is reprinting some of Pickthall's Middle Eastern novels and also, in one volume, the twenty-eight Middle Eastern short stories. The same publisher is reprinting Marmaduke Pickthall: British Muslim.

The revived interest in Pickthall has been stimulated by a new twenty-first century identity politics. The terrorist events of 11 September 2001 in New York and of 7 July 2005 in London, committed in the name of Islam, have challenged Muslims. It has been regrettably easy to demonise Islam, to the anger and distress of most Muslims. Islam is presented in some of the British press as a violent alien creed. But Pickthall was quintessentially English, conservative in behaviour as well as in politics. He was passionate in his commitment, an intellectual leader. His story challenges the negative stereotypes of much popular press comment. Although rooted in Britain he was a man of a global perspective. Moreover in his writings he was liberal, seeing Islam as open, tolerant and progressive – again in contrast to many of the stereotypes. And as the reviewers of Anne Fremantle's book in 1939 observed, he had an extraordinary life. In his 1923 essay, "Salute to the Orient", E M Forster wrote in praise of Pickthall's Near Eastern fiction. He was, Forster said, "a writer of much merit who has not yet come into his own." It may be that Pickthall's time at last has arrived. — Dr Peter Clark OBE, June 2016

Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall's English Translation of the Quran (1930): An Assessment by A.R. Kidwai

In the "Foreword" to his English translation of the Quran, The Meaning of the Glorious Quran (1930),1 partly out of the innate modesty of a scholar and partly in deference to the truism that the Quran being literally the Word of God is untranslatable, Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall (1875–1936) laments his inability to capture and articulate in his English version "that inimitable symphony [of the Quran], the very sounds of which move men to tears and ecstasy".2 Nonetheless, his work published eighty-five years ago has been remarkably successful to this day in moving its numerous readers to tears and ecstasy, and in inspiring scores of later Muslim scholars to embark upon their own Quran translations. In the domain of the English translations of the Quran by Muslims, which number more than fifty,3 Pickthall's holds pride of place a) for being the first worthy translation, and b) for serving all along as the touchstone against which all later ventures have usually been measured for their faithfulness to the original Arabic/Quranic text and for gauging their mastery or otherwise over the English idiom and usage. For Pickthall's work excels all others on, at least, these two counts. The present assessment aims at bringing out these and other hallmarks, and strengths as well as weaknesses of his translation.

Although his translation saw the light of day in 1930, as the fruit of a project sponsored by the Nizam of Hyderabad, the ruler of a princely state in British India, he had this project in mind soon after his internal acceptance of Islam in 1914. The genesis of his venture may be traced back to his article, "The Quran" published in The Islamic Review (1919), which apart from being a stout vindication of the divine origin of the Quran, carries his own translation of a few Quranic verses, of which a vastly improved and more elegant version appears in his complete translation of the Quran in 1930. Equally significant are his following observations in the same article of 1919 on the Orientalist perspective on the Quran, and on the poor quality of the English translations of the day: "translations of the Sacred Book are prosy, and seem discursive and garrulous, whereas the Quran in Arabic is terse, majestic, and poetical. So bad are some of the translations, and so foolish many of the notes which choke the text". Thus even in 1919 he realized the need for a quality translation which might help readers "feel the power of inspiration in it". Prior to Pickthall's, three types of English translation existed: (1) Those by Orientalists namely, Alexander Ross (1649), George Sale (1734), J.M. Rodwell (1861), and E.H. Palmer (1880). (2) Those by another group, Ahmadi translators, namely, Muhammad Abdul Hakim Khan (1905) and Muhammad Ali (1917), and by Ghulam Sarwar (1920) who had Ahmadi leanings. (3) Those by some well meaning but very poorly

equipped and incompetent Muslims of British India namely, Abul Fadl (1911) and Hairat Dihlawi (1916).

So Pickthall's criticism was neither misplaced nor exaggerated. Regrettably, the seemingly innocuous and academic field of English translations of the Quran looks like, so to say, a battleground, teeming with hysterical polemics, sectarian conflicts, and ideological presuppositions, including the missionary agenda. The unfortunate religious divide between Christendom and the West and Islam and the Muslim world, deepened by the Crusades, and exacerbated by colonialism and Islamophobia of our time against the backdrop of the deplorable events of 9/11 and other ghastly incidents of mindless killings in the name of Islam, have cast their dark shadow on the Orientalist discourse on Islam and the Quran. Among the Orientalist translators, Alexander Ross (1592–1654) did not know any Arabic yet he produced the first English translation of the Quran!10 George Sale (1697–1736), J.M. Rodwell (1808–1900) and Richard Bell (1876–1952) all were church ministers.11 To Orientalists, as Pickthall ruefully observes, the Quran seemed "a mere parody of the Bible", "an imposture", containing "hardly anything original".12 In the early twentieth century, which was the heyday of both colonialism and Christian missionary onslaughts directed against Islam/the Quran in British India, some Muslim writers of the Indian subcontinent took up the translation of the Quran as a defensive move. So this field which was dominated by Orientalists until 1920 underwent a dramatic reverse. The steep increase of translations by Muslims, numbering now more than fifty, has corresponded to the decline in the Orientalist forays. After A.J. Arberry's translation in 1955,13 after a gap of some fifty years, Alan Jones's appeared in 2007.14 In contrast, since 1980 new translations by Muslim writers have been appearing regularly, particularly in the last two decades.

As already indicated, the two earliest translations by Muslims namely, Abul Fadl (1911) and Hairat Dihlawi (1916) had the ambitious plan of countering the Orientalists'/missionaries' charges against the Quran in their commentary. However, these deliver very little. Neither of them had academic credentials or any grounding in English idiom and presentation skills.16 At best, they recorded for the first time the Muslim presence in the field.

With Pickthall's majestic translation, this enterprise blossomed into a highly rewarding and rich scholarly tradition. His work enabled the ever-growing English-speaking Muslims to gain some understanding of the meaning and message of the Quran in English. Apart from the Orientalists, the other group active in the field in Pickthall's day was the Ahmadis, followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) of Qadian, a small town in the Punjab province of British India, hence known as Qadianis. They take Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a Prophet, a belief contrary to the Islamic article of faith on the finality of Prophet Muhammad's Messengership, and they are not recognized as Muslims.

Besides parading the Mirza as a Prophet, Ahmadi translators namely, Muhammad Abdul Hakim Khan (1905) and Muhammad Ali (1917) present a strange, rather bizarre belief about the Prophet Jesus. According to Khan, Jesus was crucified yet he did not die on the cross. Rather, he walked away, thousands of miles to Kashmir, India, had his natural death there and lies buried at Khan Yar, Srinagar, Kashmir, India. Both Khan and Ali reject the Islamic/Quranic doctrines of miracles, angelology, jinn, bounties of Paradise, and all that lies beyond the realm of the unseen (al-ghayb). Swayed by his Ahmadi doctrines Muhammad Ali at times presented a twisted rendering of the Quranic text which could mislead unsuspecting English speaking readers who did not know any Arabic to grasp the Quranic text. An instance in point is his rendering of Surah Al-Fil which relates that God had sent swarms of birds, as a miracle, for pelting stones in order to thwart the invading army of the Abyssinian ruler Abraha's army from demolishing God's house, Kabah in Makkah, in the

year of Prophet Muhammad's birth. Muhammad Ali's following translation and explanatory note point to his peculiar understanding:

> Have you not considered how your Lord dealt with the possessors of the elephant [Abraha's army]? Did He not cause their war to end in confusion, and send down (to prey) upon them birds in flocks, casting them against hard stones? So He rendered them like straw eaten up. — AL-FIL 105, 1–5

In a more pronounced vein is his comment:

> The commentators [classical Muslim scholars] relate some curious sto ries as to how Abraha's army was destroyed [...] The mention of birds is merely intended to show that they were destroyed, the birds feasted on their corpses, tearing off flesh from the dead bodies and casting it on stones.

In his version, however, Pickthall faithfully conveys the import of the Quranic verses:

> Has thou not seen how thy Lord dealt with the owners of the Elephant? Did He not bring their stratagem to naught, and send against them swarms of flying creatures, which pelted them with stones of baked clay, and made them like green crops devoured (by cattle)?

His explanatory note is more forthright in reporting this miraculous happening:

> The allusion is to the campaign of Abraha, the Abyssinian ruler of Al-Yaman, against Mecca, with the purpose of destroying the Kabah in the year of the Prophet's birth. Tradition says that the elephant refused to advance on the last stage of the march, and that swarms of flying creatures pelted the Abyssinians with stones.

Pickthall's conformity to the authentic Muslim tradition endeared him to the Muslim readers and stands out as a testament to his impeccable scholarship.

It was against this backdrop that Pickthall produced his translation of the Quran. It was warmly, nay rapturously received by Muslims for being elegant in presentation, and free from the errors of perspective and trappings peculiar to the Orientalist and Ahmadi translators. Within two years of its publication, its four editions were issued from the UK and USA. Its publication was most gratifying for English-speaking Muslims. At long last they had an English translation befitting the majesty of their Scripture, and that too by a British convert to Islam and a native speaker of English who had already made a mark as an accomplished British man of letters. For some naïve Muslims, then reeling under the seemingly invincible British colonialism, it vindicated the abiding truth of Islam and the Quran.

Pickthall's translation won acclaim soon after its publication; it has retained its popularity to this day in view of its many merits. Until now its more than one hundred and sixty editions are on record. It must be, however, at once added that Abdullah Yusuf Ali's translation (1934–1937) surpasses Pickthall's, with more than two hundred editions. The global outreach of Pickthall's translation is evident from its publication from such diverse places as the USA, UK, India, Pakistan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia and Jordan. Notwithstanding the availability of many translations by Muslim writers, the regular re-issue of Pickthall's translation, including the release of its Kindle edition on 23 July 2014, is a pointer to its special and outstanding place amid other translations.

Furthermore, Pickthall's work inspired scores of later Muslim writers to produce their versions in their own varied ways. Many of them stand indebted to him for having provided them with apt English equivalents for a range of Arabic/Quranic terminology. Some, however, went to the extreme, transgressing all limits, by unabashedly plagiarizing his work, and passed it off as their own. Although this cannot be condoned as a tribute to Pickthall, it underlines the abiding influence of his work on later writers. (These deplorable instances of unacknowledged borrowings from Pickthall are: S.V. Mir Ahmad Ali's The Holy Quran with English Translation of the Arabic Text and Commentary

According to the version of the Holy Ahlul Bait (1964); Ali Ozek et al., The Holy Quran (1992); and Translation Committee, The Majestic Quran (2002). A fairly recent addition to this unenviable series is Daoud William S. Peachy and Maneh H. Al-Johani's The Quran: The Final Book of God-A Clear Translation of the Glorious Quran (2012)).

Let us now focus on Pickthall's translation. His "Foreword" (xix–xx) presses home the following points which underscore his piety and assiduity: (1) His is a faithful translation, as close as possible to the Arabic/Quranic text. (2) His, like any other Quran translation in any language, presents only "the meaning of the Quran in English [...] It can never take the place of the Quran in Arabic, nor is it meant to do". (3) While drafting his translation he consulted several shaykhs (Muslim/Arabic scholars) at Jamia Al-Azhar, Cairo, the oldest Islamic seminary in the Muslim world in order to avoid "unwarrantable renderings" and to ensure the inclusion of only "the traditional rendering" of the Quran in English. However, his "Foreword" is too brief, skipping some important relevant details. For example, he only alludes to "some of the translations" which " include commentation offensive to Muslims", without specifying these translations or the thrust of their offensive comments. What is more intriguing is his passing in silence over such objectionable material, for he tackles some of the objections raised against the Quran in his above mentioned article of 1919. It is a pity that his full length work on the Quran does not contain any refutation of the offensive comments of which he was well aware. Since such a rejoinder was the need of the hour and he had the competence

to undertake it, his indifference seems somewhat inexplicable. Equally enigmatic, rather confusing is the opening sentence of his "Foreword" about his target readership: "The aim of this work is to present to English readers what the Muslims world over hold to be the meaning of the words of the Quran [...] with a view to the requirements of English Muslims" (italics mine). "English readers" evidently include non-Muslim readers, most of whom being ignorant of the Quran constitute a readership, which is markedly different from "English Muslims" possessing a distinct mindset, belief system and responsiveness to the Quran. Moreover, his allusion to "English Muslims" is far from clear. Did he intend his work for the few Muslim English converts to Islam in 1930? His main constituency, however, was the English-speaking Muslim readership that had been swelling by the day on account of their constant contact with English language and the West in major parts of the Muslim world, the then colonies of the West. Since Pickthall's work is almost devoid of explanatory notes, which could otherwise determine his target readership, the above questions remain unanswered. Pickthall does mention the classical Muslim Quran commentators "Beydawi and Zamakhshari" as his sources. However, in the absence of explanatory notes in his work, their influence on his understanding of the Quran cannot be measured. Notwithstanding the lack of any gloss over the persons, places, events, history and geography mentioned in the Quran, he prefaces each of one hundred and fourteen Quranic Surahs with a note, mostly a brief one, on the circumstantial setting of each Surah. Therefore his reference to Wahidi's Asbab Al-Nuzul (Causes of the Revelation of the Quranic Verses) as a source seems in order. It is an altogether different point that he does not cite even Wahidi once. His reliance on Bukhari's collection of Hadith is manifest only in his "Introduction". Since he does not elucidate any Quranic verse or allusion, no Hadith features in the main body of his work.

Pickthall's extensive "Introduction" (xxi–xxxix) at once brings to mind George Sale's much more comprehensive "Preliminary Discourse", prefaced to his Quran translation (1734). Notwithstanding this similarity in format, the two stand poles apart in their approach to things Islamic. Pickthall's aim is to acquaint readers with the articles of Islamic faith, the Prophet Muhammad's illustrious life and achievements and early Islamic history. His description is essentially a chronological narrative, focused on the Prophet's career. Occasionally does he dispel some popular misperceptions about

the Quran. Illustrative of this is his defence of the divinely ordained arrangement of the Quranic text, which does not follow the usual chronological order: "[It is] not haphazard, as some have hastily supposed. Closer study will reveal a sequence and significance". This aside, his "Introduction" contains precious little about the Quran itself. He does not explain at the outset that the Quran is not to be taken in the conventional sense of a book. Nor are its Surahs akin to chapters in a book. It is the note of divine guidance which binds the whole Book together and that the Quran should be approached as God's address to mankind of every time and place. He does not place the Quran in the broader context of other Scriptures, highlighting their common grounds and points of departure. Such reader friendly background information could enlighten both his "English readers" and "English Muslims", and facilitate their understanding of its contents and context. Studded with this useful feature are some later English translations by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1934–1937), Syed Maududi (1967–1988), and most effectively in the version by Ahmad Zaki Hammad (2007).

As already stated, prefaced to all one hundred and fourteen Quranic Surahs are Pickthall's introductory notes. Disappointingly these are too brief, and marred further by an unhelpful drift. Instead of preparing readers mentally for grasping better the theme and subject matter of each Surah, his notes are generally restricted to discussing the dating of these Surahs and the event/s which might have occasioned their revelation by Allah. Moreover, he makes it a point to define painstakingly the title of each Surah. Since these are no more than labels or reference tags, without any bearing on the contents, his exercise is largely tangential. Take the title of Surah two of the Quran as illustrative. This two hundred and eighty-six verses long Surah which contains scores of Quranic commandments and the exposition of the Islamic belief system is entitled Al-Baqarah (cow) in view of its allusion to a cow. The background information about the titles and dates so assiduously provided by Pickthall, though valuable in its own right, is of not much help to those new to the Quran. Those studying the Quran in English should be better instructed first in the subject matter of the Quran and what guidance they could derive from its study. Pickthall was capable of imparting such instruction in view of his decades long Muslim activist career. It is a pity that he did not make most of this opportunity. His translation is supplemented with a few explanatory notes. Some of these are strikingly original and cogent, underscoring his sound, nuanced understanding of things Islamic. Some gems of his Quranic scholarship are:

a. His definition of the Quranic appellation, 'abd (a slave of Allah) encapsulates the spirit of the God-man relationship in Islam.
b. He draws attention to the fact that Surah Al-Nisa "deals with women's rights". However, he stops at that point, without elaborating how the Quran ushered in gender justice in the seventh century Arabia in which woman was a non-entity. Today it might sound downright outrageous but the grim reality is that she then used to be an item of inheritance, to be possessed by male heirs of the deceased.
c. His interpretation of Prophet Muhammad being an ummi (an unlettered person) reflects the consensus view of Muslims. So doing, he refutes the divergent opinion of "some modern critics". However, he refrains from identifying the dissenting voices.
d. His clarification that "Satan is of the jinn, and not of the angels" is another shining example of his endorsing the orthodox, consensus Muslim view on this subject. Taking Satan as an angel is discordant with the Quranic angelology.
e. His pithy elucidation of the rite of animal slaughter, as part of the Islamic pilgrimage, brings out the underlying spirit of this Islamic command. Had he inserted more explanatory notes of this import, his work would have served more admirably the cause of understanding the Quran better.
f. His gloss over the Quranic figure of Luqman reflects his insights into comparative religion. One wishes the quantum of such scholarly and perceptive notes had been more.

g. What is said above about his grounding in history of religions is to the fore also in his explication of the Quranic allusion to Tubba, the kings of Himyar of south Arabia.

h. In his exceptional relatively extensive prefatory note to Surah Al- Tahrim, both his piety and persuasive power are on display, as he vindicates Prophet Muhammad's character and conduct, with a pointed reference to the latter's polygamy. In so doing, he takes up the cudgels against with those "non-Muslim writers" who seek to discredit the Prophet on this count.

As a committed Muslim he is found exalting logically Prophet Muhammad in his introduction to Surahs Al-Duha and Al-Sharh, as he highlights the Prophet's "most wonderful record of success in human history". However, some of Pickthall's observations mark his departure from the orthodox Muslim viewpoint. Since these are few, they have gone largely unnoticed, without diminishing his credentials as an outstanding Muslim scholar. Streaks of pseudo-rationalism, apologia or sheer carelessness account for the following unconventional notes of his:

i) He cites the Ahmadi translator Muhammad Ali's outlandish misconstruing of the intent of verse seventy-three of Surah Al-Baqarah, without refuting him or without branding him as an Ahmadi writer, which could alert readers.

ii) His comment on verse ninety of Surah Al-Nahl that this verse is " recited at the end of every weekly sermon in all Sunni congregations" is marred by two factual inaccuracies: (A) It is recited as part of the Friday noon prayer sermon, and hence his branding it as a "weekly sermon" is non-specific and confounding for readers. (B) It features in the Friday sermon of not only Sunni but also Shiah congregations.

iii) His note on verse eleven of Surah Al-Naml that "Moses had been guilty of a crime in Egypt", being too curt, tends to present Prophet Moses in a poor light. He should have clarified that Prophet Moses had inadvertently killed a Copt and as the Quran adds, he soon repented and that God had accepted his repentance.

iv) Equally gratuitous is his citation of the views of "some commentators objecting to the miraculous" speech of the ant, recounted in verse 18 of Surah Al-Naml. His quotation of an unorthodox view, without any contradiction on his part, could be misconstrued as his endorsement.

v) Notwithstanding his overflowing love for and glowing tributes to Prophet Muhammad, of which we have already taken note, Pickthall is off the mark in insinuating that the Prophet "had shown but little consideration for Zeynab" in arranging her marriage with Zayd. It was in accordance with the divine directive contained in verse thirty-six of Surah Al-Ahzab that Zeynab and her family had unhesitatingly agreed on this marriage.

vi) Recklessly he quotes "some commentators that these jinn [referred to in verse 30 of Surah Al-Ahqaf] were foreign (i.e. non-Arabian) Jews". Pickthall should have better refuted this pseudo- rationalistic interpretation. Or he could simply have avoided quoting it.

vii) His proclivity for brevity precludes him from spelling out the comprehensive code of social conduct outlined in Surah Al-Hujurat. He rests content with only this remark: "The whole Surah deals with manners". His elucidation could introduce readers to the Islamic value system.

viii) Verses 46–76 of Surah Al-Rahman describe the four gardens in Paradise. While mentioning "some", without saying a word about their identity or credentials, he interpolates into his work their whimsical notion that these verses "refer, not to the paradise hereafter, but to the later conquests, of the Muslims, the four gardens being Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia and Persia". Such lackadaisical attitude, though in very few instances, reflects poorly on a pious Muslim scholar of Pickthall's stature.

ix) In his prefatory note to Surah Al-Buruj, he rightly notes: "Verses 4 to 7 are generally taken to refer to the massacre of Christians of Najran in Al-Yaman by a Jewish king Dhu Nawas, an event of great historical importance". Intriguingly enough, he then tends to

contest the historicity of this "event of great historical importance" by citing the Jewish German Orientalist, Josef Horovitz's opinion that the Quranic "words refer not to any historical event". Such contradictory statements in the same explanatory note could be very disconcerting for readers new to the Quran.

x) Equally incautious is his quotation of the view of some "late Dr Sidqi" that the Quranic expression, Al-Tariq (a star) stands for "the fertilizing germ penetrating the ovary". This interpolation is all the more confounding in the face of Pickthall's own definition of Al-Tariq as a star in the opening part of the same note.

xi) His observation that "the meaning of the first five verses [of Surah Al- Adiyat] is by no means clear" seems somewhat unbecoming of Pickthall, a life-long student of the Quran.

For his translation Pickthall chose Jacobean English used in the King James version of the Bible, which is characterized by the use of archaic pronouns and verb endings. One comes across the following obsolete words, for example, in his translation of three Surahs Muhammad, Al-Fath and Al-Hujurat: rendereth, riddeth, improveth, coineth, maketh, relieth, changeth, teareth, thy, addeth, knoweth, seest, curseth, deafeneth, giveth, angereth, keepeth, believeth, forgiveth, obeyeth, turneth, promiseth, wilt, knoweth, sufficeth, sendeth, strengtheneth, riseth, ye, thou, camest, hath, doeth, loveth, doth ad infinitum.

Moreover, at places, his predilection for closeness to the text in his rendering seems to be at the expense of articulating the meaning in a readily comprehensible, even intelligible way. For example, his overly literal translation of verses 1–4 of Surah Al-Balad reads thus:

Nay, I swear by this city-
And thou art an indweller of this city-
And the begetter and that which he begat
We verily have created man in an atmosphere.

In the absence of any elucidation of "I", "this city", "thou", "indweller ", "begetter", "begat", "We" and "atmosphere", readers cannot make much sense of his rendering which is, no doubt, faithful. Ahmad Zaki Hammad's following paraphrasing of the same passage clarifying the elliptical and pronominal expressions, underscores the inadequacy of Pickthall's excessively literal translation in this particular instance:

No, indeed I swear by this sacred city of Makkah, while you, O Prophet, are a free dweller in this city of Makkah. Moreover, I swear by all that beget and all that is begotten! Very truly We created man in a life of travail.

Such blemishes are bound to creep into a work of such vast magnitude as Pickthall's is. These do not detract from his substantial, nay sterling contribution to the field – of being the first English translation by a Muslim scholar in elegant English and being remarkably faithful to the original. His translation, unlike many other Muslim translators' such as those by Abul Fadl (1911), Hairat Dihlawi (1916), Khadim Rahman Nuri (1964), Salahuddin Pir (1971), Hashim Amir Ali (1974), Rashad Khalifa (1978), Muhammad Ahmad Mufassir (1979), Muhammad Asad (1980), Ahmed Ali (1984), M.A.K. Pathan (1993), Laleh Bakhtiar (2007) and Edip Yuksel et al. (2007), does not bristle with unpardonable liberties with and intrusion of some whimsical, even pugnacious notions into their translations and passing these off as the intended meaning of the Quran itself.

Moreover, unlike his contemporary translator of the Quran, Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1934–1937), he adheres close to the Quranic text in his rendering and succeeds largely in avoiding the pitfall of offering a literal, soulless version. Pickthall's distinction as an excellent translator consists in his concise rendering which faithfully conveys the sense of the original. In comparison, his contemporary, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, and many later ones, offer only a loose paraphrase, at the

expense of moving too far away from the original. This inimitable feature of Pickthall's rendering comes out, for example, in his translation of verse fourteen of Surah Ali Imran, in a condensed way in only forty-eight words while the same is rendered in fifty-seven words by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, and without capturing the essence of the original. The latter is not only verbose but also inarticulate, unable to guide readers to the real intent of the original. Pickthall's precise, eloquent rendering is as follows:

> Beautified for mankind is love of the joys (that come) from women and offspring, and stored-up heaps of gold and silver, and horses branded (with their mark), and cattle and land. That is comfort of the life of the world. Allah! With Him is more excellent abode.

Contrast this with Abdullah Yusuf Ali's following rendering which fails to convey effectively and energetically the Quranic observation on the ephemeral joys of this world coveted by man:

> Fair in the eyes of men is the love of the things they covet: Women and sons; heaped up hoards of gold and silver; horses branded (for blood and excellence); and wealth of cattle and well-tilled land. Such are the possessions of this world's life. But in the nearness to God is the best of goals (to return to).

Abdullah Yusuf Ali's last sentence is nothing short of being convoluted. Nonetheless the cumbersome and archaic usage in Pickthall's translation impelled an Arab scholar, Arafat K. El-Ashi to bring out in 1996 its thoroughly revised version, with the aim "to simplify Pickthall's style, for example, by replacing the poetic, pronouns and verbs like 'thou, thy, thine and hast' with their more ordinary and common counterparts". This objective is writ large over El-Ashi's subtitle, M.M. Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Quran: Revised and Edited in Modern Standard English. (1996). This a masterly job of revision, reflecting El-Ashi's thorough, discerning and reader friendly editing of Pickthall's translation. It gave Pickthall's work a new lease of life.

Notwithstanding the wide acclaim enjoyed by Pickthall's venture among Muslims some dissenting voices were occasionally raised against his work. In 1991 a Pakistani writer Iqbal Husain Ansari, published a twenty-four page booklet with a somewhat pompous and sensationalist title, Corrections of Errors in Pickthall's English Translation of the Glorious Quran. Despite its tall claim this work has little substance. On close examination of Ansari's critique it cannot be held by any stretch of imagination that Pickthall's work is a mass of errors. Pickthall missed, at places, translating each and every word of the Quranic text accurately, particularly the pronominals, the bane of almost every translator of the Quran. T.B. Irving, an American convert to Islam, in the "Introduction" to his translation of the Quran in 1985 is uncharitably dismissive of Pickthall's venture on this rather silly ground: "Marmaduke Pickthall accomplished his labor in the East, and therefore his translation is [...] laid upon a superstructure of Eastern preoccupations". It is beyond one to figure out the meaning and implications of "the superstructure of Eastern preoccupations". Nor is there any substance in his charge that Pickthall's stint in the East in any way adversely affected his work. Pickthall's credentials as an accomplished writer were recognized much before his sojourn in India. In his biography of Pickthall, Marmaduke Pickthall: British Muslim,79 Peter Clark makes almost no attempt to analyze Pickthall's Quran translation. His brief account of Pickthall's venture also contains some factual mistakes. He states: "Pickthall's ally in the Khilafat movement, Muhammad Ali had already produced a translation". The Khilafat movement leader was Maulana Muhammad Ali (Mohamed Ali) Jawhar (1878–1931) who never tried his hand at translating the Quran. It was his namesake, a Ahmadi writer, Muhammad Ali (1874–1951) who had produced his Quran translation in 1917 which is vitiated by his attempt to superimpose his typical Ahmadi doctrines on the Quran. Peter Clark is again off the mark in observing: "The translation [Pickthall's] itself has been translated [...] in 1970 a trilingual edition – English, Arabic and Urdu – appeared in Delhi". Such trilingual editions are regularly issued in the Indian subcontinent for catering to the needs of a wider readership. However,

these editions always carry the Urdu translation by some famous Urdu translators of the Quran. So this 1970 edition contains the Arabic text of the Quran, English translation by Pickthall and the independent Urdu one by Fateh Muhammad Khan Jallandhari. This is not a case of Pickthall's translation "being itself translated". We have already taken note of Pickthall's occasional deviations from the mainstream Muslim understanding of the Quran. However, in his assessment of Pickthall's translation, Khaleel Mohammed goes too far in discrediting him thus: "He adopted Muhammad Ali's bias against descriptions of miracles". First, Pickthall's work, being bereft of explanatory notes, does not discuss miracles. In his approach to the Quran he stands poles apart from the Ahmadi Muhammad Ali who presents a garbled and tendentious view of things Quranic, especially miracles. Mohammed's other observation is more devastating: "Perhaps the death knell for Pickthall translation's use has been the Saudi government's decision to distribute other translations free of charge". Irrespective of the distribution of free copies of the English translation of the Quran by Saudi embassies across the world, Pickthall's version has been consistently popular, and reprinted regularly, as is evident from the appearance of more than one hundred and sixty editions of his work, on the average two editions every year since its first appearance in 1930.

A laudable feature of Pickthall's work is that besides its "General Index" (446–447) listing the main topics of the Quran, it also carries a subject-specific "Index of Legislation" (448), identifying around one hundred Quranic commands encompassing all aspects of individual and collective life. So doing, Pickthall appears to be pointing to the all-embracing Islamic worldview and the Islamic/Quranic way of life. Once again, it is regrettable that notwithstanding his discerning knowledge of the meaning and message of the Quran he did not dilate upon any of these Quranic commands by way of critically examining their rationale, their underlying spirit, and their efficacy and relevance or otherwise in his day. His exposition, stemming from his cross-cultural interactions could be a worthy contribution to Quranic scholarship. Certainly it would have enhanced further the value of his otherwise excellent work.

Pickthall's wide and deep familiarity with the main contours of the Quranic scholarship, particularly the Orientalist critique on the Quran, is evident from his above mentioned article on the Quran, written as early as in 1919. However, his shying away from engaging himself more actively with Quranic scholarship and restricting himself to producing only a first-rate translation of the Quran has been a serious loss to it. His article of 1919 contains his translation of verses two of Surahs Al-Baqarah and thirty-six to thirty-seven of Ya Sin. On examining their final version in his Meaning of the Glorious Quran, it is gratifying to note that it is vastly improved, concise and majestic. It indicates that he must have been all along, from 1919 to 1930, working hard on this project. Little wonder then that his translation stands out above many of those of his predecessors and contemporaries. His sincerity of purpose accounts for the everlasting popularity and appeal of his Quran translation and his other remarkable writings on Islam which rank as a native English speaker Muslim's valuable gift which has superbly served the cause of Islam for almost a century. <>

Islam at 250: Studies in Memory of G.H.A. Juynboll edited by Petra M. Sijpesteijn, Camilla Adang [Leiden Studies in Islam and Society, Brill, 9789004427945]

Islam at 250: Studies in Memory of G.H.A. Juynboll is a collection of original articles on the state of Islamic sciences and Arabic culture in the early phases of their crystallization. It covers a wide range of intellectual activity in the first three centuries of Islam, such as the study

of *ḥadīth*, the Qurʾān, Arabic language and literature, and history. Individually and taken together, the articles provide important new insights and make an important contribution to scholarship on early Islam. The authors, whose work reflects an affinity with Juynboll's research interests, are all experts in their fields. Pointing to the importance of interdisciplinary approaches and signalling lacunae, their contributions show how scholarship has advanced since Juynboll's days.

Contributors: Camilla Adang, Monique Bernards, Léon Buskens, Ahmed El Shamsy, Maribel Fierro, Aisha Geissinger, Geert Jan van Gelder, Claude Gilliot, Robert Gleave, Asma Hilali, Michael Lecker, Scott Lucas, Christopher Melchert, Pavel Pavlovitch, Petra M. Sijpesteijn, Roberto Tottoli, and Peter Webb.

Islamic Studies as a Legacy: Remembering Gautier Juynboll by Léon Buskens

During the night of Sunday 19 December 2010 Dr Gualtherus Hendrik Albert Juynboll, known to his friends as Gual (in the Netherlands) or Gautier (abroad), died in his bed in Leiden.1 His colleagues and friends lost one of the outstanding islamicist and arabists of his generation, and a most lovable man. For Gautier himself his death was a deliverance from protracted physical and mental suffering.

A Family of Orientalists

The death of Gautier Juynboll also marked the end of a dynasty of scholars going back to the beginnings of modern oriental studies in the Netherlands in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Juynboll lineage belonged to the patrician families of the Netherlands, going back to the seventeenth century. Their coat of arms displays three onions, depicting the family name: Juynboll means 'onion bulb' in ancient Dutch. The family did not just excel in academia; they paired scholarly commitment, resulting in academic dissertations, with public administration, entrepreneurship, and, at times, martial valour. Gautier cherished in his sitting room a silver goblet (currently kept at Leiden University Library as part of the Juynboll bequest) one of his ancestors had received in 1628 from a Spanish admiral after he had taken his ship loaded with silver from the Americas, although the well-known commander Piet Heyn took credit for the victory. Previously this ancestor had already sailed to Morocco and later on he would again confront Barbary corsairs.

The family entered oriental studies with Theodorus Willem Johannes Juynboll (1802–1861). This specialist in Semitic languages studied in Leiden with Hamaker and Van der Palm and was a professor in Franeker and Groningen. In 1843, he returned to Leiden to succeed Weijers as professor of Hebrew and Arabic (cf. Brugman & Schröder 1979:36). His son Abraham Willem Theodorus Juynboll (1834–1887) specialized in Islam and Islamic law. He lectured at the training institute for civil servants for the Indies in Delft and was known for his gentleness (cf. Buskens 2006: 166). Two of Abraham Willem Theodorus Juynboll's sons would follow in his footsteps.

His eldest son Theodorus Willem Juynboll (1866–1948) studied law and oriental languages and became a specialist in Islamic law in his turn. In 1903 he published a manual on Islamic law, Handleiding tot de kennis van de Mohammedaansche Wet, which several generations of colonial civil servants had to learn by heart as a preparation for their career in the Indies. 'Uncle Thé' would later move to Utrecht to take up the chair of Hebrew. His older colleague and mentor Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje would never pardon him for this move, because of the rivalry between the "ethical" approach of Leiden and the "petrol" orientation of Utrecht University. Gautier hardly had any memories of this forerunner. Family lore had it that he peed in his strict great-uncle's lap as a baby boy. Theodorus' only daughter, Wilhelmina Maria Cornelia Juynboll (born in 1898 in Malang, Indonesia—died in 1982), defended a dissertation on the history of Arabic studies in the seventeenth-century Netherlands at Utrecht University in 1931. Later on Gautier would inherit a considerable part of the Juynboll orientalist library from "Aunt Min", albeit not without some difficulties.

A.W.Th. Juynboll's younger son was Hendrik Herman Juynboll (1867–1945), a specialist in Javanese studies, lovingly known to his children and grandchildren as 'Pieka'. Hendrik Juynboll wrote extensively about Javanese literature and culture and compiled an impressive series of catalogues of the Indonesian collections for the Ethnographic Museum in Leiden, of which he was a director from

1909 until 1932. He was married to Berta Kern, a daughter of the famous Leiden indologist Jan Hendrik Kern. As a younger brother Hendrik Juynboll suffered because of Theodorus' sarcasm and disdain, according to Gautier.

H.H. Juynboll's son Willem Rudolf Juynboll (1903–1977) married Maria Susanna van Ysselstein. The village of Ysselstein in Limburg is named after her father, Minister H.A. van Ysselstein. Willem and Maria had two sons, the youngest of whom was born on 20 October 1935 as Gualtherus Hendrik Albert. His father was an art historian with an unruly passion for books. Gautier detested his father's bibliomania and enjoyed voicing his disapproval of a habit that had caused considerable trouble to the family in his youth. With his mother, who enjoyed a reputation as a writer and a journalist, he shared a passionate love of animals.

His father's sister Annette Maria Thérèse Juynboll or 'Aunt Net' married Theodoor Scheltema and moved to the United States with their three sons. Her parents would join them there before the Second World War. Gautier's elder brother Floris Nicolaas Marinus Juynboll (1933–1997) never had any children, nor did Gautier. He regretted deeply that with him the Juynboll family would come to an end.

Gautier Juynboll was born into a venerable lineage of orientalists with a strong interest in philology, who considered texts as their main object of study. Only his great-uncle Th.W. Juynboll did spend some time in the field: in Indonesia, where his daughter Wilhelmina was born. Gautier's forefathers showed little interest in theory or fieldwork, focused as they were on editing texts and "factual" descriptions. Gautier's continuation of this tradition resulted in groundbreaking work concerning the first three centuries of Islam, devoting himself to the development of new concepts and research methods.

A Leiden Youth

Gautier grew up in a stately mansion on Nieuwsteeg 2 in the old centre of Leiden before, during, and after the Second World War. The elementary school reports found in the Juynboll archives do not yet indicate any particular talent or diligence, nor do Gautier's own recollections of his grammar school years. His hobbies were typical for boys of that time: collecting stamps and constructing with his Meccano box. He also enjoyed pike fishing with H.J. Witkam, the Leiden legal scholar and historian, whose son Jan Just Witkam would become Gautier's host at the Oriental Reading Room in later years. In Gautier's memory, his elder brother Floris claimed a lot of their parents' attention, and he often felt as though he lived in his brother's shadow.

Gautier started his studies of Arabic, Hebrew and Persian in 1956, after fulfilling his military service. He banteringly explained that the family library contained all relevant books on Arabic and Indonesian studies, hence he had to opt for either of these fields. However, his ancestral legacy was not only an advantage. His fellow students were required to learn 'Juynboll,' the handbook of Islamic law, by heart, while his teachers were also aware of his illustrous forebears. Gautier enjoyed his student days by playing the cello and acting, drinking royally, and editing the Leiden University newspaper for a year. Sadder and wiser, he looked back with distaste on the arrogance that went with membership of his fraternity.

His fellow student J.T.P. de Bruijn, who would later become a professor of Persian, recalls that Joseph Schacht was not much impressed by Gautier's achievements as a student. Little did he know that four decades later Gautier would consider his own work as a continuation of Schacht's The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (1950). At the Joseph Schacht Conference on Islamic Law and Society in Leiden in 1994 Gautier stressed that he owed to Schacht the crucial notion of the

'common link,' a person responsible for putting utterances and deeds ascribed to the prophet Mu?ammad into circulation in a certain wording. His continuation of Schacht's work places Gautier Juynboll in the intellectual tradition of historical-critical research into the rise of Islam, started by Ignaz Goldziher and his younger colleague and friend Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje. Gautier held Goldziher in high esteem: he considered him as the founder of the scholarly study of early Islam. He was far less impressed by his former teacher G.W.J. Drewes, a student and later successor of Snouck Hurgronje, and a specialist on Islam in Indonesia.

When Schacht left for Columbia University, Jan Brugman took over as professor of Arabic in Leiden. This chair came with the responsibility to complete a project on hadith literature that Arent Jan Wensinck had started around 1922, the Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane. Brugman offered a number of students, including Gautier Juynboll, positions as assistants to analyse the canonical hadith collections. The job sparked Gautier's interest in hadith literature, which determined the course of his life and future scholarly career.

Another important event was Gautier's appointment in 1961 to replace his friend A.J.W. (Guus) Huisman as a keeper of the Oriental Reading Room at Leiden University Library for six months. Gautier tremendously enjoyed his unlimited access to the library holdings and bloomed intellectually. The post was the beginning of a lifelong love affair with the University Library, which can be traced through many of his works. In the sixth and final thesis attached to his doctoral dissertation Juynboll argued that each author should be obliged to donate to the library a copy of the work produced on the basis of its holdings, failing which the author would henceforth be denied access. In almost all of the introductions to his books, Gautier acknowledged the excellent research facilities of the library. His collection of essays published in 1996 by Variorum was dedicated to the Oriental Department of the University Library, and towards the end of his life, in 2007, he published an autobiographical essay, My Days in the Oriental Reading Room.

After obtaining his doctorandus ('MA') degree in 1964, Juynboll started preparing a dissertation, inspired by his work on the Concordance and his conversations with Brugman. He went to Cairo in 1965–1966 to study contemporary Egyptian debates on the authenticity of traditions ascribed to the prophet Mu?ammad. In 1969 he defended his dissertation, entitled The Authenticity of the Tradition Literature. Discussions in Modern Egypt, under the supervision of Jan Brugman. The end of his studies and of his appointment as a lecturer of Arabic in Leiden marked the beginning of a quest for knowledge and work. The love of his life, Lydia Chaillet, whom he had married in the meantime, would accompany him for many years. Gautier first spent some time working with Gustave von Grunebaum at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) until his position was made redundant because of budget cuts imposed by then-governor Ronald Reagan.

To Exeter, and Back Again to Leiden

The period of unemployment following his departure from Los Angeles gravely affected Gautier. To his relief, in 1974 he obtained a position as a lecturer at the University of Exeter. After several years of research on early Islamic history, he decided in 1975 to fully devote himself to the study of the development of hadith literature. Besides being a devoted lecturer and thesis supervisor, he was in close contact with prominent British scholars of early Islam: Martin Hinds, Patricia Crone and Michael Cook. The year he spent at the Institute for Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1979–1980, at the invitation of by M.J. Kister and S. Shaked, was important to further sharpen his focus. In 1985 a few inheritances allowed him to trade his life as an academic migrant labourer in Exeter for academic freedom in Leiden. From that moment, he spent his mornings fervently researching the early hadith literature in his beloved 'Leeszaal Oosterse Letteren en

Geschiedenis' of Leiden University Library as a 'gentleman of independent means.' Gautier described his work in the moving essay My Days in the Oriental Reading Room (2007).

Both academically and personally these Leiden years were arguably Gau-tier's golden age. He could devote himself entirely to his study of the genesis of Islam, while he also had ample time to foster his social contacts, be they workrelated or friendly. Juynboll chaired the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants from 1986 to 1990. He maintained a learned and friendly correspondence with German colleagues he held in high esteem, such as Albecht Noth, Heinz Halm, Josef van Ess and Manfred Ullman. He particularly enjoyed his invitations to the Arabic department of the Consejo Superior de Invest-igaciones Científicas in Madrid, where he basked in the company of 'las tres sultanas' and of Jorge Aguadé. The department's fondness of Juynboll was expressed by Maribel Fierro, who gave a loving speech at the Leiden University memorial for Juynboll in February 2011. In the Netherlands, Juynboll was a frequent guest speaker in Utrecht and Leiden, and he derived great pleasure from being in contact with students and beginning scholars, generously helping them with their projects.

An early riser, Gautier was usually the first guest to arrive at the Oriental Reading Room of Leiden University Library. He made a habit of signing the registry with all kinds of invented names, which became increasingly silly over time. He would then wheel a cart containing his heavily annotated personal copy of al-Mizzi's Tu?fat al-ashraf, his Apple computer, a card index and a box of tissues over to 'his' spot. There, he compiled 'bundles,' his analyses of isnads, the strings of names relating a tradition's early transmission. The diagrams he drew of these bundles were appreciated not just for their analytical quality; some colleagues cherished the print-outs that Gautier happily offered them as works of abstract art.

The lively exchanges with professor Jan Just Witkam, head of the Oriental collections, and Reading Room administrator Hans van de Velde played an important role in Gautier's everyday life. He enjoyed drawing students' attention with his loud and eccentric behaviour. It was his way to start a chat, and he was happy to assist them in any of their queries concerning Arabic grammar or Islamic sources. One particular student finally managed to pass her MA exam due to the extra Arabic lessons which Gautier taught her for several months. He gallantly provided advice to Indonesian students visiting Leiden through the Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS) program. During these years Gautier established long-lasting friendships with library habitués of all ages. I had the privilege to be one of these friends who met Gual in the reading room, and greatly enjoyed his learning, his generous encouragement and his good company full of banter and infinite jest.

Gautier spent his afternoons at home as a Privatgelehrter, processing in his computer his findings of the mornings. A homemade meal, accompanied by drinks aplenty, at which guests were most welcome, kicked off the evenings. After dinner, he enjoyed watching wildlife documentaries or films about other professional sleuths like Maigret or Inspector Morse. Gautier adored listening to recordings of classical music, having a deep appreciation for both traditional and contemporary composers. Weekends were filled with trips to art exhibitions in the Netherlands or abroad, preferably in female company. The sight of some artworks, such as paintings by Mark Rothko, might at times move him to tears.

In 1997, private circumstances necessitated him to move house from the Frankenslag in The Hague to the Burggravenlaan in Leiden, which at first Gautier took badly. Once he had managed to find a place for the ancestral library and over thirty family portraits, he adapted to his new situation and made the city his home once more. He loved his garden, especially when the hedgehog living nearby

would visit, enjoyed shopping with his usual merchants at the Leiden open air market and imitating the local accent.

However, the dismantlement of the Oriental Reading Room and Witkam and Van de Velde leaving the library meant that Gautier lost his privileges. This loss was embodied by the cart he was no longer allowed to stow at the reception every day, which made his research routine at the library no longer possible. Parting from the library was not only a severe blow to both his intellectual and social life, but also heightened his fear that he would not be able to complete his life's work. Gautier grew increasingly sullen, and his low spirits ushered in a period of social isolation. He felt there was a lack of interest in and appreciation for his work. It was difficult for him to deal with the indifference or criticism of some colleagues. They accused him of being too skeptical of the authenticity of hadith literature and of dating the texts incorrectly. Gautier felt their criticism to be naïve and unfounded and refused to engage in direct debate, vowing instead to silence his critics in devastating footnotes of his opus magnum. Friends proposed to appoint Gautier to a special chair for early Islamic history in Leiden, which would both have delighted him and been a major asset for the university. Unfortunately, these pleas met with petty jealousies and blunt refusal of colleagues fearing to dwell in the shadow of a first-class scholar.

Many Books

Dr Juynboll's lifelong dedication to research has resulted in the publication of an impressive amount of books, articles, contributions to reference works, and reviews. He was far from being a 'one-book-scholar,' the designation he used scathingly for colleagues less prolific. In 1982 he edited the collection Papers on Islamic History. Studies on the First Century of Islamic Society, to which he contributed an essay about the beginnings of Arabic prose. A year later, Cambridge University Press published what may be his best-known work: Muslim Tradition. Studies in Chronology, Provenance and Authorship of Early Hadith, a compilation of studies written between 1976 and 1981. The subtitle contains the scholarly project to which Dr Juynboll dedicated his life: Who put which traditions about Mu?ammad's life into circulation, and where and when did they do so? Juynboll formulated his answers by analyzing the chains of transmitters, derived from meticulously indexing the isnads, developing concepts and methods that continued the approach of Goldziher and Schacht. A second volume of collected studies, consisting of articles previously published in renowned journals, in which he further refined his instruments and understandings, was published in 1996 as Studies on the Origins and Uses of Islamic Hadith in the prestigious Variorum series. Gautier's introduction to the volume offers an enlightening overview of his intellectual journey. His compilation of isnad bundles brought him to the conviction that pious storytellers and hadith collectors, so-called 'common links', were responsible for circulating a large part of the traditions ascribed to the prophet Mu?ammad. A lack of dependable data made it impossible to adequately hypothesize about the period before these narrators entered the stage, from the beginning of the second century A.H. In the meantime he also contributed an English version of the part about ?Umar's government (A.H. 15–21) to the translation project of the notoriously difficult Ta?rikh of al-?abari (1989).

Dr Juynboll formulated a considerable part of his insights in contributions to the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, in entries such as mu?ammar, mursal, Nafi?, ridjal, sahih, sunna, and tawatur. Other reference works such as the Encyclopaedia of the Qur?an and the Dictionary of the Middle Ages also bene-fitted from his pithily formulated overviews. He also generously offered his studies to Dutch-language journals at the request of younger colleagues whom he enthusiastically encouraged in their undertakings. The numerous reviews Juynboll published in international scholarly

journals are detailed and conscientious, and demonstrate how seriously he took his work and his colleagues.

Opus Magnum

In 1993 Gautier Juynboll set out to arrange all the data from his card-index and his computer into an all-encompassing monograph about the origins of hadith literature. Finding the suitable format took years, and eventually he opted for an encyclopedic approach, ordering the book according to the main persons whom he considered responsible for the wording of the prophetic traditions, the so called common links. In the introduction to his Encyclopaedia of Canonical Hadith, Gautier summarized his main methods and concepts. He also compiled a detailed index. In an interview conducted upon the Encyclopaedia's release, Juynboll stated that "This book is the culmination of everything I know." (Kaptein & Mottier 2008). Gautier cared about all the details in order to achieve the best possible result. His attention to detail went as far as the book's cover, for which he chose a shade of green inspired by the colour of a leaf in his garden. For the book launch, Brill Publishers threw a grand reception and invited Mohammed Arkoun to provide a laudatory speech.

As a historian, Gautier Juynboll's approach to Islam was critical. According to his criteria few ?adiths were traceable to the period before 100 A.H. The few traditions for which he managed to establish a chain of transmitters going back to the prophet Mu?ammad himself filled him with excitement. He strove to produce reliable knowledge and in no way did he intend to offend or hurt the sensibilities of pious Muslims. In later years Gautier Juynboll eschewed public attention out of fear for angry reactions to his work from certain Muslim radicals, as had happened to E.J. van Donzel, the editor-in-chief of the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam. He highly esteemed the scholarly exchanges with Nasr Abu Zayd, a liberal Islamic theologian who had found refuge in the Netherlands after his publications had led to death threats and made his life in Egypt impossible.

Farewell

The publication of the Encyclopaedia of Canonical Hadith meant for Gautier the completion of his life's work, and hence also his life. Gradually resignation and melancholy replaced the vigour and enthusiasm that he used to radiate. He retreated more and more to his home, where he spent most of his time reading books from the ancestral library. Gautier occasionally entertained the idea to write a monograph on Malik b. Anas, but he could not bring himself to resume the joys of research. Feelings of dejection got the upper hand, while his physical health also declined. In the summer of 2009 a severe illness required long months of hospitalization. With the return to his beloved home began a period of waiting for the end to come. His passing away on 19 December 2010 was a deliverance from suffering.

Gautier enjoyed drawing attention with his eccentric behaviour, but unwittingly and unintentionally it also turned some people off. Sadly, towards the end of his life his quirkiness became less of a play, but rather a sign of his declining health. Still, those who ventured to get to know him would meet a man honest and kind, full of compassion and humanity. He was committed to his friends, socially engaged and respecting of all living beings. His hospitality and readiness to help were heartwarming. I cherish the image of his tender care for a hedgehog hibernating in the garden of the house at the Frankenslag in the Hague.

In the spirit of his scholarly resolve, Dr Juynboll donated his body to science. After his passing, friends and colleagues gathered at his home to share memories. A memorial session took place at Leiden University in February 2011, and an international conference about early Islam was held in his honour in December of the same year, followed by another scholarly meeting in December 2015.

Gautier Juynboll assigned his entire estate to the establishment of the Juynboll Foundation, which aims to promote the study of Arabic and Islam, especially during the classical period. Gautier expressly stipulated that the foundation should enable young scholars to do their research. He bequeathed the entire collection of family portraits to the Dutch Cultural Heritage Agency. Leiden University Library received the Juynboll family archive, the collection of Islamic manuscripts, annotated printed and rare books. Burgersdijk & Niermans sold most of the remaining part of the Juynboll library at auction at Templum Salomonis, opposite the house in which Gautier spent his Leiden boyhood, in 2011. The catalogue offers an idea of the wealth of books that generations of orientalist scholars had brought together.

Gautier Juynboll devoted his life to the study of early Islam and has left future generations a treasure trove of materials and ideas to work with. The last of his kin, his life is a worthy end to a lineage of scholars dedicated to knowledge of the Orient.

Gautier Juynboll was one of the foremost scholars on Islam and Arabic of his generation, as well as a dear friend. We remember him with great appreciation and fondness.

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How did early Muslim scholars go about mining information from the oral and written sources at their disposal, what methods did they devise, how did they assess the reliability or otherwise of the information extracted, and to what extent can modern scholars rely on their findings? These are some of the themes that were central to the scholarship of Gautier H.A. Juynboll, to whose memory the present volume is dedicated. Although Juynboll is mainly known for his seminal publications on hadith, in which he provided elaborate reconstructions of how traditions ascribed to the prophet Mu?ammad ("the P." as he would usually refer to him in conversation) could have come into existence, his research in fact touched upon the entire spectrum of early Islam, its history and cultural production. At the two conferences that were organised at Leiden University in 2011 and 2015 in commemoration of Juynboll's lengthy and fruitful academic career as well as in the present collection that resulted from these meetings, we have aimed to bring together a group of scholars whose work reflects an affinity with Juynboll's research interests and in some cases also with his methodology. The title chosen for the book indicates this ambition, consciously going beyond the confines of hadith scholarship to cover a wider range of scholarly activity in the first three centuries of Islam. The various contributions clearly reveal the impact of Juynboll's work and methods across the breadth of scholarship on early Islam.

Although the articles in this book are roughly ordered according to the main subdivisions in the field of Arabic and Islamic studies—while drawing upon interdisciplinary approaches—we should like to highlight some of the themes that shine through the volume as a whole. This survey does not aim to be exhaustive.

Searching for the Sitz im Leben

The concern to establish the historical background of certain texts and traditions is prevalent in several of the contributions. Thus Claude Gilliot studies the possible roots of the enigmatic term ?anif, which occurs several times in the Qur?an, and emphasises the fact that this scripture originated in a syncretistic environment. He discusses early variant readings of the relevant passages and their reception in later Islamic scholarship and provides a survey of mod-

ern western theories concerning the term Hanif. Robert Gleave is interested in assessing the process whereby legal doctrines of Twelver Sh!`ism emerged. As a case study, he examines a

number of apparently contradictory statements from the Twelver Shi`i hadith corpus that are attributed to Imam Ja`far al-hadiq (d. 148/765) concerning the legality of selling and, by implication, buying excrement, which can be used as a fertiliser or as fuel. These dicta bear a striking similarity to what is found in Sunni hadith. A comparison with statements by Malik b. Anas (d. 179/795) and al-Shafi`! (d. 204/820) in al-Mudawwana and Kitab al-Umm respectively shows that the issue was much debated among Sunnis as well, and suggests that the Imam! material reflects the debates in the Sunni realm. The concern to establish the Sitz im Leben of the texts discussed is noticeable also in the contribution by Ahmed El Shamsy, which discusses a series of hadiths on male hair dyeing, a topic to which Juynboll himself devoted an article. El Shamsy shows how the Muslim conquerors of the seventh century CE wanted to distinguish themselves from the people they had conquered by dyeing their beards in a conspicuous and unnatural colour. He demonstrates that the elaborate corpus of traditions recommending the dyeing of hair and beards by Muslims was rooted in very specific historical circumstances, and that the custom soon fell into desuetude. Revisiting another article by Juynboll, Peter Webb studies the origins of the negative attitude among Muslim hadith scholars and jurists towards niya?a, a mourning practice involving loud wailing which was depicted as a quintessentially pre-Islamic, and therefore reprehensible Arabian practice, this in spite of the fact that in Arabia on the eve of Islam and in Muhammad's days niyaha was apparently a relatively uncommon phenomenon. He finds that one of the reasons that motivated scholars to brand niya?a as an objectionable Jahil! practice was the strengthening of the Sh!`ite community in Iraq, which engaged in mourning rituals for their imams, in particular al-Husayn. Webb explains that in Arabic non-religious sources, the image of the Jahiliyya is on the whole not all that negative. Aisha Geissinger studies a hadith according to which Mu?ammad found his wife ?af?a bint `Umar (d. 45/665) in the presence of a woman—tellingly called al-Shifah—who performed an incantation for her (ruqyat al-namla). He asked the woman to teach it to hafha. In another version of this tradition, the woman, this time not identified by name, is asked by the Prophet not only to teach her this incantation, but also writing. Geissinger argues that the hadith in question was primarily designed to stress that certain healing practices, having been endorsed by the Prophet, were compatible with Islam and thus permissible, which in the second/eighth and third/ninth century was much disputed. The author does not find that the version including Muhammad's instructions to teach his wife to write (or to teach her the Book) proves that hafha was literate, although it has regularly been adduced by Muslims in modern times to argue in favour of teaching women to write.

Establishing Reliability

A number of the articles included here discuss the different ways in which early Muslim scholars were already concerned with the questions of how to establish a reliable evidence base, how to judge an oral statement or a written text and how to determine authority on the basis of the means of transmission or the identity of the transmitter. Several studies in this book examine the historical development of these criteria, which differed in the various branches of learning. The well-known observation that a continuous chain of transmitters guarantees the reliability of an account is, it turns out, only one among various different methods of ascertaining authenticity that existed (and exist) in Muslim scholarship, as is borne out in Christopher Melchert's contribution, which deals with the theory and practice of hadith criticism. Whereas Melchert focuses on works produced in the mid-ninth century CE by Sunni and Mu?tazili authors, including al-Shafi?i, Muslim b. al-hajjaj, Abu Yusuf and al-Ja?i?, to name but the most famous ones, Asma Hilali continues her analysis of theoretical works on prophetic tradition into the eleventh century CE. She argues that there is a marked discrepancy between definitions of hadith terminology in works of theory on the one hand, and the actual understanding and use of these terms by hadith scholars on the other. Melchert proves that there was not one traditionalist and one rationalist approach, but rather an entire spectrum of views

as to how to sift hadith. While some scholars were mostly concerned with establishing consensus with regard to the contents of a tradition, others focused on the probity of the mu?addith when deciding whether the information passed on by him (or, occasionally, her) was reliable. A transmitter's reputation in this early period was often based on the appreciation of his moral standing among his peers. Geert Jan van Gelder presents a series of anecdotes from a work by the man of letters and religious scholar Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) that deal with hadith or its transmitters. The purpose of some of these anecdotes is apparently to take aim at careless or unreliable mu?addithun. Interestingly, each of the anecdotes from Ibn Qutayba's work is provided with an isnad, though none of the statements quoted is traced back to the Prophet. This indicates that models of authentication associated with hadith scholarship could easily be used in adab literature. Similarly, Roberto Tottoli analyses the use of devices primarily identified with hadith in other types of sources, the so-called akhbar (sg. khabar), often translated as historical accounts, which may or may not deal

with the Prophet. He traces the various ways in which Juynboll used terms like hadith and khabar/akhbar throughout his voluminous oeuvre, comparing it with the understanding of such terms in Muslim sources as well in western scholarship. While the terms often appear to be near-synonymous, the meaning of khabar is not always clear and a more sophisticated distinction needs to be made.

One domain that has contributed greatly to a more sophisticated and varied understanding of how Muslim scholars judged transmitted accounts is the debate on orality versus written transmission and the role of memory. Scott Lucas draws our attention to a set of hadiths transmitted by `Amr b. Shu`ayb and his ancestors and going back to the Prophet that is included in the Musnad of the famous hadith scholar A?mad b. ?anbal (d. 241/855). The fact that `Amr did not receive these traditions orally, but "merely" found in them in a written collection or ?a?ifa was a cause for concern, as oral transmission was still regarded as being more reliable. In time the reliance on books and written texts in the transmission of knowledge increased, and notebooks of teachers were soon being combed for hadiths. Based on a saying attributed to the mu?addith al-Zuhri (d. 124/742) scholars have come to the conclusion that it was the Umayyad rulers who first enforced the writing down (kitab) of knowledge—generally taken to mean hadith—marking the transition from oral to written transmission. Pavel Pavlovitch discusses the contents and chains of transmitters of a number of variants of this statement, and concludes that al-Zuhri's original saying, which is quite ambiguous, does not warrant this conclusion. He argues that the re-interpretation of al-Zuhri's alleged dislike of kitab in the sense of scripture caused a rewording of the hadith in question. However, even in an age when certain scholars explicitly preferred oral transmission and spoken teacher-to-pupil interaction to the conveyance of fully written and completely composed texts—accepting written lecture notes only as aide-mémoires— there were others who produced and used proper books. As Michael Lecker explains, books could be rearranged and recomposed to fit an author's shifting insights or allegiances. Ibn Is?aq's (d. in or after 150/767) "un-doing" his Sira of the prophet Mu?ammad refers to his revising his earlier recensions of the book, which resulted in the text that he transmitted to his student Ibrahim. Different categories of reliability for transmission existed side by side and depended on the scholarly discipline; in history different criteria were used from those applied in law. Thus when quoting traditions about the life of the prophet Mu?ammad, his biographer Ibn Is?aq was not concerned with the authority of the transmitter as a hadith scholar, Lecker argues.

New Approaches to Scholarship on Early Islam

Several papers build directly on Juynboll's concern with the historicity of prophetic traditions, offering important novel approaches from other disciplines and adjacent fields of research which

have penetrated the field, leading to new insights that are already having an impact by greatly advancing our understanding of earliest Muslim society. Ahmed El Shamsy, for example, uses nonMuslim sources to re-examine the discussion of the permissibility of dyeing hair and beards. Incorporating Syriac Christian and other sources, El Shamsy shows how Late Antique practices and ideas indirectly influenced Muslim morals and legal thought. This indicates that the booming field of Late Antique studies, which has now been accepted as extending into the Islamic period, has impacted our field and how insightful the use of contemporary non-Muslim sources in the study of the early Islamic tradition has been. Advocating a holistic approach in his article, Peter Webb demonstrates how materials culled from literary and philological materials on the one hand and hadiths on the other can complement each other and make for a more balanced picture. He cautions against reading hadiths referring to the pre-Islamic period through the distorted lens of the scholarship of previous centuries about the Jahiliyya, suggesting instead to examine the texts carefully on their own terms and within their own historical context. And as Van Gelder reminds us in his contribution, hadith and hadith scholars can even be a topic of entertaining literary prose or poetry. The traditional division of labour in the field of Arabic and Islamic studies has of course kept the various disciplines separate, but Van Gelder shows what interesting nuggets of information can be retrieved from the literary sources if sufficient ingenuity is displayed. To this observation should be added an important point made by Maribel Fierro, namely that while scholars—and in particular historians—are mostly looking for bits of positive information in the texts, what the sources leave out also constitutes an important source of information. Pavel Pavlovitch appeals to scholars to apply methods from other disciplines, especially literary studies, and to use form-critical methodologies to trace information from the matn of the hadiths back to the earliest period. Monique Bernards' successful application of Social Network Analysis to the study of interactions among scholarly groups and 'ulama' has already proven its importance. She not only uncovers how integrated webs of hadith scholars developed across time and space and how this contributed to the expansion of hadith scholarship as a discipline and the building of its infrastructure, but also how it intersected with the development of other scholarly domains. Bernards shows how increasing complexity and specialisation of scholarly disciplines impacted the organisation of the Muslim scholarly landscape. While in the earlier period scholars practiced various disciplines, later on specialisation led to a more rigorous distinction between them. Many early grammarians for example were also hadith scholars, while later ones, after the establishment of na?w (systematised grammar) were subsumed under the category of adab. This affected the character, readership and methods used in and organisation and materiality of their works.

Another example of how scholarship has moved on since Juynboll developed the field of critical hadith studies, building on the work of venerable predecessors such as Ignaz Goldziher and Joseph Schacht, is the more critical posture applied nowadays towards these other towering authorities in the field. El Shamsy's call to move beyond Schacht in tracing the role of hadith in the development of legal thought echoes similar calls in neighbouring fields but constitutes a clear break with the attitude prevalent in Juynboll's days. That much remains to be done is argued by Gleave, who signals a glaring lacuna in scholarship on Shi?i hadith, which still lacks a sophisticated isnad analysis. Another area that is relatively underrepresented in modern research is the intellectual and literary production of scholars in the medieval Islamic West: al-Andalus and North Africa. Although, as Fierro makes clear, their output was by no means negligible, it was initially almost completely ignored in the Mashriq, and this ultimately also affected modern scholarship.

This short overview of some of the themes raised by the contributions in this book shows the wide range of scholarship directly or indirectly impacted by Juynboll's work. The diversity and high quality of the contributions are a fitting tribute to this magnificent scholar and human. <>

LOCATING HELL IN ISLAMIC TRADITIONS edited by Christian Lange [Islamic History and Civilization, Brill, 9789004301214] Open Access

Islam is often seen as a religious tradition in which hell does not play a particularly prominent role. This volume challenges this hackneyed view. **LOCATING HELL IN ISLAMIC TRADITIONS** is the first book-length analytic study of the Muslim hell. It maps out a broad spectrum of Islamic attitudes toward hell, from the Quranic vision(s) of hell to the pious cultivation of the fear of the afterlife, theological speculations, metaphorical and psychological understandings, and the modern transformations of hell.

Contributors: Frederick Colby, Daniel de Smet, Christiane Gruber, Jon Hoover, Mohammad Hassan Khalil, Christian Lange, Christopher Melchert, Simon O'Meara, Samuela Pagani, Tommaso Tesei, Roberto Tottoli, Wim Raven, and Richard van Leeuwen.

Introducing Hell in Islamic Studies by Christian Lange

In regard to the afterlife, scholars of Islam in the West have demonstrated a remarkably irenic temper, preferring to give far more attention to paradise than to hell. The Islamic hell, for the most part, has been viewed as no more than the mirror image of paradise, an ugly reflection of the beauties and the joys in heaven. Consequently, it has been considered a phenomenon of secondary logical and ontological order, as well as interest. The few general overviews of Islamic eschatology largely bypass the infernal regions, and the dedicated studies of the Islamic paradise, of which there are a fair number, cannot be said to be paralleled by the same number of scholarly forays into the Islamic hell. While the entry on paradise in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam (1954–2005) counts eleven columns in the printed edition, its entry on hell is awarded less than one column. The more recent Encyclopaedia of the Qur?an (2001–6) shows a more balanced approach, but still favors paradise (sixteen columns) over hell (twelve columns). Scholarly symposia and museum exhibits in the area of Islamic eschatology likewise gravitate toward the upper regions of the otherworld.

Why (Not) Hell?

There are two reasons, in my view, for this neglect of hell in Western Islamic Studies. The first is quite simply that hell is not a particularly comfortable space to inhabit, whether for sinners or scholars. The stigma of bad religion adheres to it, as if it were a subject not worthy of the academy's quest for truth and beauty. In fact, unless the subject is sublimated into philosophical, ethical and psychological discourse, any kind of eschatology is regularly met with suspicion by scholars of Islam. "The whole basic view of ultimate origins and the hereafter," wrote Fritz Meier, "is hidden in Islamic literature behind a decorative structure of baroque traditions." One recognizes in such statements a preference for "profound" rather than "decorative" structures, for taxonomy and categorization, for theological rationalization of the "ultimate." When the literature is found to be internally diverse, or even contradictory (as is the case with much of the eschatological literature in Islam), it is dismissed as "baroque" or even, to quote Meier again, "bizarre." Hell only seems to compound the problem. Lacking the esthetic appeal of paradise, as well as the lofty promise of spiritual ascent, hell is a supremely messy and ugly place. Islamic literary traditions about hell, its inhabitants and their punishments are convoluted, often shockingly violent, and frequently obscene.

There are good reasons for scholars, however, to pay serious attention to religious discourses of pain and violence. Robert Orsi has underscored "the importance of studying and thinking about despised religious idioms, practices that make us uncomfortable, unhappy, frightened—and not just to study them but to bring ourselves into close proximity to them, and not to resolve the discomfort they occasion by imposing a normative grid." Such an approach may in fact reveal that representations that, at first sight, one may find distasteful or even repugnant follow a certain logic of representing human suffering, and projecting it on others. To quote Orsi again, "to work toward some understanding(s) of troubling religious phenomena is not to endorse or sanction them ... but we cannot dismiss them as inhuman, so alien to us that they cannot be understood or approached, only contained or obliterated." The discourse on hell in Islam is no exception in this regard. As is amply demonstrated by the contributions to this volume, hell occupies an important place in the Muslim religious imagination. As such, the function and the meaning of hell in a variety of Muslim discourses deserve to be studied, not in order to sanction phantasies of violence and pain but to understand the conditions and consequences of their flourishing.

The second reason why hell has been largely absent from the map of Islamic Studies is the common perception among scholars that Islam is a religion of mercy; put differently, that it is a religion in

which salvation is easily obtained, a religion in which hell, therefore, has no place. According to Gustav von Grunebaum's classic formulation, Islam does away with the idea of original sin and reduces salvation to obedience to an all-powerful God, thus making salvation "a door that is easily unlocked." Earlier, Ignaz Goldziher wrote about the "pure optimism" of Muslim soteriology, a view that one finds repeated in the recent scholarly literature. Such perceptions, of course, are not without basis. The absence of original sin, and the minimal requirements for faith stipulated in mainstream Islamic theology, have often been noted by scholars. It bears pointing out, however, that characterizations of Islam as a religion of mercy and ready access to paradise have the unfortunate corollary of reinforcing a stereotypical dichotomy between "difficult" and "easy" religions. In this dichotomy, Christianity is presented as a difficult religion, the line from Matthew 7:14, "for the gate is narrow and the way is hard that leads to life, and those who find it are few," being used in support of this claim. Conversely, Islam is characterized as a religion that encourages an attitude of self-indulgence. Islam, wrote Riccoldo of Monte Croce (d. 1320 CE), one of the most influential European late-medieval polemicists against Islam, is the "easy and wide road" (lata et spatiosa via), quoting Matthew 7:13, "the gate is wide and the way is easy that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many."

The precise degree to which the certainty of salvation characterizes the Islamic tradition remains a subject of debate, despite all generalizations to the contrary. As scholars of Islam gradually discover hell to be a topic worthy of their attention, a more nuanced picture will begin to emerge. This volume is conceived as a contribution to this process of putting hell on the map of Islamic Studies and of locating it in a variety of Islamic traditions. In the remainder of this introduction, I aim to provide a brief reassessment of the assumption of absolute salvific certainty in Islam, followed by a general overview of the hell imagery in Islamic traditions. Though covering a broad spectrum of intellectual and literary history in Islam (Sunni and Shi?i, Quranic, traditionist, mystical, philosophical, modernist, etc.), the contributions in this volume cannot address all aspects of the Islamic hell that deserve study, and they do on occasion presuppose familiarity with some basic givens of the tradition. This introduction, therefore, aims to sketch out this background. In the pages that follow, I shall also highlight certain areas in the infernology of Islam that I consider worthy of further investigation. Along the way, I shall weave in references to the contributions in this volume, even though I will refrain from offering a pre´cis of each of them.

Hell and Salvation Anxiety

The Quran stresses both God's heavenly reward and punishment in hell. As Navid Kermani remarks, "in the Quran God is represented in many facets of mercy; however, as in the Bible, these facets are inextricably linked with His violence, His malice and His terror."18 Opinions are divided among scholars as to how much space exactly hell claims in the Quran in comparison to paradise. One scholar counts 92 "significant passages" about hell and 62 about paradise; another identifies about 400 verses relating, in a meaningful way, to hell and about 320 relating to paradise. Others, however, claim that paradise occupies "significantly more space" in the Quran than hell.

Be that as it may, the imagery of hell is relatively well developed in the Quran.22 It is noteworthy, as Tommaso Tesei shows in his contribution to this volume, that hell in the Quran, like paradise, is conceived to lie immediately ahead; it is now, or almost there already. This explains the apparent lack of interest that the Quran shows in the state of souls between death and resurrection. In the Quran there is the notion that souls fall asleep at death, an idea that Tesei traces to a multitude of late-antique, Christian precedents. Indeed, the picture of hell in the Quran is the result of a confluence of several traditions of eschatological thought of Late Antiquity. There is also, as some scholars contend, a gradual development toward a more Bibilicized version of hell in the Quran.

Thomas O'Shaughnessy, for example, has suggested that in the middle Meccan period, the Quran largely abandons the term ja?im to designate hell, from now on using more frequently the more Biblical term jahannam (the "valley of Hinnom", Hebr. ge-hinnom, see Joshua 15:8, Jeremiah 7:31, 32:35). Christian Lange, in his contribution to this volume, traces a similar pattern, testing the Nöldekian hypothesis of a gradual development of the Quranic hell discourse in four phases, based on an analysis of the terms and ideas used in connection to the punisher-angels in hell. Also Simon O'Meara's chapter in this volume can be read this way, describing as it does a gradual infernalization of the pre-Islamic jinn in the Quran, a process which results in a reconfigured (and appropriately monotheistic) hierarchy of spiritual beings.

In the centuries that followed its proclamation, the Quranic image of hell was greatly elaborated in scores of short narratives traced back to the Prophet or his Companions. These hadiths, from the third/ninth century onwards, were compiled into special eschatological handbooks, from the works of Sa`id b. Jana? (Shi`i, fl. early 3rd/9th c.) and Ibn Abi l-Dunya (Sunni, d. 281/894) to those of al-Ghazali (Sunni, d. 505/1111), al-Qur?ubi (Sunni, d. 671/1272), al-Suyu?i (Sunni, d. 911/1505), al-Ba?rani (Shi`i, d. 1107/1695–6), al-Saffarini (Sunni, d. 1189/1774), ?iddiq ?asan Khan (Sunni, d. 1307/1890) and Mu?ammad b. Yusuf A?fayyish (Iba?i, d. 1332/1917), among others. Some of these compilations are devoted exclusively to hell; most, however, combine traditions about hell with descriptions of paradise. Mention should also be made of a number of anonymous, popular compilations, in particular the Daqa'iq al-akhbar fi dhikr al-janna wa-l-nar and the text known as Qurrat al-'uyun. It is typical of these popular manuals that they were later posthumously connected to (usually) famous authors. Thus, the Daqa'iq al-akhbar is variously attributed to Abu l-Layth al-Samarqandi (d. 373/983), Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210), or a certain, otherwise unknown `Abd al-Ra?im al-Qa?i (fl. before 11th/17th c.); the Qurrat al-5uyun is often (and equally mistakenly) said to be the work of al-Samarqandi. Noteworthy about the Daqa'iq al-akhbar and the Qurrat al-5uyun is that they both have a lot more to say about hell than about paradise. For example, ten chapters in the Daqa'iq al-akhbar deal with the former, only five with the latter. The series of articles of John MacDonald on Islamic eschatology, a translation of the Daqa'iq al-akhbar with some added commentary, completely misses out on this important aspect. This is because MacDonald used a manuscript that happened to lack the hell section of the text. As for the Qurrat al-?uyun, all ten of its chapters offer discussions of mortal sins and their punishments in hell. Only in the last chapter does one find a vision of paradise, which connects awkwardly to the rest of the text and may be a later addition.

For those reading or listening to the Quran and the hadiths on the afterlife, therefore, fear of hell was rather difficult to avoid. Of course, many Quranic verses and certain hadiths strike a more optimistic tone. One should also note that theologians of the formative and classical period developed an arsenal of concepts that were apt to mitigate the anxiety the believers may have felt. This included a broad, belief-based definition of faith (iman), the affirmation of the possibility of repentance (tawba) for sins, and the doctrine of the intercession (shafa?a) of the Prophet. Nonetheless, salvation anxiety was hardly absent in Islamic theology, as one realizes when studying Muslim doctrines of sin and salvation. Here, much depends on the definition of the major sins, the kaba'ir, which are opposed to the ?agha'ir, or minor sins (cf. Q 18:49). As in the Christian tradition, these major sins were held to constitute a ticket to hell, whereas the Haghahir, according to the majority position, would be of no consequence. However, how many major sins should one reckon with? Traditions counting three, four, or seven major sins could not prevent the emergence of longer lists, a process that culminated in the discussion by al-Dhahabi (d. 748/1348) of seventy-five, and by Ibn ?ajar al-Haythami (d. 974/1567) of 467 major sins. The often-quoted definition attributed to the Companion, Ibn ?Abbas (d. 68/ 686–8), that a major sin is "everything for which God has

prescribed a fixed punishment (?add) in this world and the Fire in the hereafter" was hardly apt to restrict the scope of the major sins. One should note that there was a near consensus among Muslim theologians of the later periods that punishment for Muslim grave sinners would only be temporary; eventually, after a purgatory sojourn in hell's top layer, they would be admitted into paradise. But hell was where they were destined. Over the course of the centuries, the discussion came to center not on whether there would be punishment of Muslims, but on how long and how violent this punishment would be.

There was also the question whether God could forgive unrepented grave sins, and whether in practice He would do so. Theologians, particularly those belonging to the Ash`arite school of theology, tended to assert that God's mercy, as one could read in a hadith, would overcome the wrath He directs at human sinfulness, even in the absence of repentance. In contrast, Kharijite and Mu`tazilite theologians of the early centuries generally insisted on the punishment of sinful, unrepentant believers. As noted above, the dominant narrative in scholarship on Islamic theology has been that the Kharijite and Mu`tazilite position was lastingly defeated and erased by the salvific optimism of the mainstream. However, also in later centuries theologians reached different conclusions as to whether God could "renege on the threat" (khulf al-wa?id) that is leveled at Muslim sinners in the Islamic revelation. For example, the Meccan Maturidi scholar, al-Qari al-Harawi (d. 1014/1605), who dedicated an epistle to the question of khulf al-wa?id, affirmed the general necessity for God to punish Muslim sinners, although he also granted that God did not have to punish them in each case (thereby parting ways with the more rigorous stance of many Mu`tazilites).34 At the other end of the theological spectrum one comes across notions of universal salvation even for non-Muslims. Mohammad Hassan Khalil and Jon Hoover, both of whom are contributors to this volume, are to be credited for recently having brought these strands of universalist thinking to the attention of a broader audience. In his chapter, Khalil revisits the eighth/fourteenth-century debate about Ibn Taymiyya's (d. 728/1328) doctrine of the "demise of hell" (fana? al-nar). Hoover pursues the doctrine's reception in later centuries, particularly in the work of the Yemenite Ibn al-Wazir (d. 840/1436).

The fear of hell is also integral to the renunciant and ascetic strands of Muslim religiosity. According to a tradition reported by Abu ?alib al-Makki (d. 386/998), after a thousand years of punishment, only those Muslim sinners who are "more highly esteemed in the eyes of God" are let out of hell. The pious exemplar of the early second/eighth century, al-?asan al-Ba?ri (d. 110/728), supposedly commented: "O, that I might be among these men!" Other renunciants (zuhhad, sg. zahid) of the early centuries are on record for expressing what Christopher Melchert has characterized as "exaggerated fear." In his contribution to this volume, Melchert collects traditions that showcase instances in which the renunciants focused their fear on hell in particular.

As one learns from Melchert's piece, several of the zuhhad allegedly wept, fainted, or even died on the spot when passing blacksmiths working a forge, overwhelmed by the thought of hell-fire. Such behavior resonated closely with a Quranic motif. "Have you not considered the fire that you light?" the Quran rhetorically asks, and then exclaims: "We have made it a reminder (tadhkira)!" (Q 56:71–3). There are also cases reported of zuhhad who passed away upon hearing the Quran's hell verses (ayat al-wa?id) recited to them.

Zuhd motifs of the fear of hell also survive in later Sufi works. "Your coming unto it [hell] is certain, while your salvation therefrom is no more than conjecture", thunders al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) in his I?ya? ?ulum al-din, urging the believer to "fill up your heart, therefore, with the dread of that destination." Others voiced a certain disregard for hell. Like paradise, they considered hell a

distraction from the only valid object of their devotion, that is, God. This explains how a Sufi like Bayazid Bas?ami (d 234/848 or 261/875) could assert that God's fire of love burns a thousand times more intensely than the fire of hell, and that God will take the foot of the hell-monster and dip it into the fire of His love, which will obliterate it. Bas?ami is also said to have claimed that he would be able to smother hell with the tip of his frock, thereby saving the rest of humankind from punishment. The idea of universal redemption from punishment in hell also appears in the thought of a later Sufi, Ibn al-`Arabi of Murcia (d. 638/1240). As Samuela Pagani's contribution to this volume shows, on the one hand Ibn al-`Arabi makes room for hell as the manifestation of God's attribute of "majesty" (jalal), which complements His "kindness" (jamal). On the other hand, Ibn al-`Arabi predicts that punishment in hell will eventually come to an end. However, instead of moving on to paradise, hell's inhabitants will remain in hell, attached to it, and in a certain way enjoying it, like natives prospering in their homeland (maw?in), albeit in a state considered abject by all others.

Yet other Sufis developed strategies of internalizing hell. The Persian mystic Hujwiri (d. 465/1073 or 469/1077), for example, wrote that man's lower soul (nafs), the seat of carnal appetites, corresponds to hell, "of which it is a type in this world." The Khurasani `Aziz-i Nasafi (fl. middle of 7th/13th c.), a follower and interpreter of Ibn al-`Arabi, describes an ethical hell, in which "all the disapproved words and deeds and all the blameworthy manners are the gates of hell", a notion that one also encounters in the writings of al-Ghazali and Mumi, among others. In addition, Nasafi outlines an intellectual, or noetic hell: this comes about when the human faculties of perception and understanding (the outer and inner senses) are, as it were, out of balance. If reason (`aql), one of the inner senses, controls the five outer senses, as well as the two inner senses of imagination (khayal) and phantasy (wahm), together they are the eight gates of paradise; if however reason is absent, the remaining seven faculties equal the seven gates of hell.

It should not surprise us that this kind of interiorization and intellectualization of paradise and hell also goes on in Islamic philosophy. Na?ir al-Din ?usi's (d. 672/1274) al-Mabda? wa-l-ma`ad, for example, echoes Nasafi's scheme closely. ?usi, in the beginning of his career, was an Isma`ili; the Isma`ilis, as is well known, were particularly drawn to Neoplatonic thought. Isma`ili authors such as Abu Ya`qub al-Sijistani (d. after 361/971) deny the resurrection of bodies; paradise and hell, for them, is a purely spiritual affair. "Impure" and "dark" souls, in al-Sijistani's language, those that are not enlightened by the teaching of the Isma`ili Imam, suffer the torments of hell already during their earthly lives. They may also undergo metempsychosis, that is, rebirth in another body or lower material form, a controversial motif in Isma`ili thought that is explored in Daniel de Smet's contribution to this volume, a study that provides a useful overview of Isma`ili speculations about hell and the punishments suffered therein. As de Smet writes, Isma`ili thinkers such as ?amid al-Din al-Kirmani (d. after 411/1020) believed that the literal (?ahir) sense of the descriptions of paradise and hell in the Quran and the hadith was "absurd and contrary to reason", and that one should at all times seek to understand their allegorical (ba?in) meaning.

However, few mystics or philosophers in the Islamic tradition, though often latently critical of the traditional imagery of the afterlife, categorically and outspokenly rejected this imagery. In literary circles, it was on occasion ridiculed, but such satire was patently fictional, and functioned within contexts characterized by their relative distance to institutionalized religion. Not only was the mass of details in the Quran and hadith about the material and sensual nature of the afterlife rather difficult to ignore. There was a theological consensus that one should accept the "reality" (?aqq) of the phenomena in paradise and hell without inquiring into what kind of reality, exactly, these phenomena possessed.

In the popular religious literature of the Middle Period and Late Middle Period hell is prominently on display. Roberto Tottoli's chapter in this volume provides insights into several of these narratives, albeit in a somewhat unexpected context, that of Spanish Morisco literature. A community under siege in its Christian environment, the Moriscos transmitted several texts about hell. This, as Tottoli shows, is not so much due to a certain Morisco pessimism in the face of their Christian persecutors; it is characteristic, rather, of late-medieval Islamic literature in general. One can also think in this context of the stories about the Prophet Mu?ammad's Ascension (mi?raj), in which, over the course of the centuries, hell (but also paradise) is given more and more space. Frederick Colby, in his chapter in this volume, traces a curious development in this body of texts, whereby hell is gradually moved up toward the higher heavenly spheres. Rather than seeing in this the attempt to remove the otherworldly realms from earth, that is, to make them more transcendental, one should probably interpret this phenomenon as the result of a process of literary elaboration of the narrative: the Prophet's visit to paradise and hell comes at the end of his otherworldly journey because it heightens the dramatic effect and fits more neatly into the chronology of events. In fact, perhaps one should regard the kind of narratives discussed by Tottoli and Colby as skeletal versions that story-tellers performed in public, enriching them with other traditions. It is not difficult to imagine that hell in particular would have offered ample opportunities to do so. In the following two sections of this introduction, I provide an overview of the wide and varied pool of traditions from which storytellers could draw.

The Topography of Hell

The common belief was that hell, like paradise, coexists in time with the temporal world. Q 3:131, which states that "hell has been prepared (u`iddat) for the unbelievers," was generally taken to mean that, rather than coming into being at the end of time, hell was "already created." The fact that the prophet Mu?ammad, during his Ascension, had seen the punishment of Muslim sinners in hell was also taken to be proof for hell's coexistence. While, as noted above, some theologians held that only paradise was eternal, while hell would eventually perish (fana? al-nar), the majority agreed that hell too was eternal unto eternity, that is, a parte post (abad) (cf. Q 4:169, 5:119, passim).

Given the temporal coexistence of hell, there was some speculation as to where in the cosmos hell is located. The "seven earths" mentioned in Q 65:12 were interpreted to be the seven levels (?abaqat) of hell. The Quranic sijjin ("a written record," Q 83:7–9), was commonly thought to be a rock in the lowest earth on which the whole universe rests. If, then, hell was (in) the lower part of the globe, it made sense to picture it as a vast subterranean funnel, spanned by the Bridge (hirah, which the resurrected pass on their way to paradise, with a brim (shafir) and concentric circles leading down into a central pit at the bottom (qa`r). Eschatologists also debated the location of the entry to this subterranean structure. Some related that the sea is the top level of hell.62 Others believed that the sulphurous well in the Wadi Barhut in ha?ramawt (modern-day Yemen), haunted by the souls of infidels, was the gate to the nether regions. Still others located the entry to hell in Gehinnom, the Biblical valley of Hinnom, between the eastern wall of the Jerusalem temple precinct and the Mount of Olives. Further east, a Persian work of the mirabilia genre from the sixth/twelfth century locates the entry to hell in a gorge, appropriately called Wadi Jahannam, in the neighbourhood of Balkh in

Afghanistan. The author says of this sinister venue that it "sinks steeply into the ground, and the fearless and ruthless joke that it goes down so deeply that if one throws a stone into the cavity one cannot see it reaching the bottom." He also notes that "in this cavity, strange birds have countless nests", an observation that accords with the notion that the souls of infidels and sinners haunt the gate to hell in the bellies of black birds. In this account, one also hears echoes of eschatological

hadiths which describe the extreme depth of the hell funnel, where a stone thrown from the Bridge falls for seventy years before hitting the ground. In sum, there is a general trend in the tradition to think of this world and hell as being temporally and spatially coterminous.

Q 15:44 states that hell has seven gates (abwab), which were equated with hell's seven levels (?abaqat), mirroring the seven levels of paradise. At times, a terminological distinction was made between the levels of paradise, called darajat (stairs upwards), and the levels of hell, called darakat (stairs downwards; cf. Q 4:144).68 The name for hell that is most often used in the Quran (some 125 times) is simply "the Fire" (al-nar). In the exegetical literature, seven of the other names for hell in the Quran were singled out and correlated with the seven levels of hell. According to the most common model, the descending order of these levels is as follows:69 (1) jahannam "Gehenna", a cognate of Hebrew gehinnom (Q 2:206, 3:12, passim in 109 places); (2) al-sa?cr "the blaze" (Q 4:10, 4:55, passim in fourteen places); (3) al-?u?ama "the crusher" (?) (Q 104:4–5); (4) la?a "blazing fire" (Q 70:15); (5) saqar "extreme heat" (?) (Q 54:48, 74:26–7, 74:42); (6) al-ja?cm "the furnace" (Q 2:119, 5:10, passim in twenty-four places); and (7) hawiya "pit, abyss" (Q 101:9). Various similar models exist with a slightly differing order of names. Al-Qur?ubi warns against other, less sound divisions, possibly referring to models such as that recorded by al-Tha`labi (d. 427/1035), in which the seven layers of hell appear to merge with the seven earths of medieval Islamic cosmology and are called adcm (surface), basc? (plain), thaqcl (heavy, onerous), bahch (swamp), mutathaqila (oppressor), masika (holder), and thara (moist earth). One may also refer to the concept of Ibn al-`Arabi and other Sufis of hell as a meganthropos, in which the seven body parts with which man sins (eyes, ears, tongue, hands, stomach, genitals, and feet) are equated with the seven levels of hell.

As noted above, hell's uppermost level, called jahannam, was seen as a temporary place of punishment reserved for Muslim sinners. In later tradition, one finds the notion that hell has only two levels (baban), an inner one (al-jawaniyya), from which nobody ever escapes, and an outer one (al-barraniyya), in which Muslims are kept. However, this place of temporary punishment never crystallised into a "third place" between paradise and hell as in the Christian tradition of purgatory. In common parlance, the term jahannam continued to be used pars pro toto, and it remained a place not outside or above hell, but part of it; it was not to be confounded with al-a?raf (cf. Q 7:46), a residual place or limbo situated between paradise and hell, in which there is neither reward nor punishment.

Hell is so large that one must travel for five hundred years in order to get from one level to the next. Hell's pitch-black darkness is only faintly illumined by the flames of the infernal fire. Extreme heat predominates, but, according to some traditions, the bottom level of hell is freezing cold (zamharir, cf. Q 76:13). According to a well-known tradition, the extreme heat in summer and the extreme cold in winter are the two breaths of hell that God grants it as a means to relieve the pressure at work in it, its parts "eating each other." Mountains, valleys, rivers, and even oceans (filled with fire, blood, and pus) are thought to form the landscape of hell. The Quranic terms mamud (74:17), ya?mum (56:43), and ?aqaba (90:11) were interpreted as names referring to mountains in hell. Traditions that improvise on multiples of seven are common: hell has seventy thousand valleys, each with seventy thousand ravines, inhabited each by seventy thousand serpents and scorpions. In hell, there are dry and thorny shrubs, the hari? (Q 88:6) and ghislin (Q 69:36). According to Q 37:62–6 and 44:43–6, the tree of zaqqum, commonly identified with the "cursed tree" (al-shajara al-mal?una) of Q 17:60, grows at the bottom of hell (fi a?l al-ja?im), sprouting fruit "like the heads of demons" (ka-annahu ru?us al-shaya?in), which the inhabitants are forced to eat as one of their tortures. When the inhabitants of hell eat from it, zaqqum snaps back at them. Commentators debated whether zaqqum is "from this world" (min al-dunya) or whether it is exclusively an

otherworldly phenomenon. According to al-Tha?labi, the majority position was that zaqqum is a desert tree known to the Arabs. All in all, the learned tradition of Islam embraced the notion of a geomorphic hell, as is also attested by the postulation of cities, palaces, houses, wells, and prisons in hell.

On the one hand, then, hell appears as a rather mundane setting; on the other, the traditionist literature on hell continuously seeks to push the human imagination to its limits. One might say that in this literature the unimaginable is approximated asymptotically. Infinite space, for example, is gauged in terms of distance measured in very large units of travel time. The popular eschatological literature pushes this idea to its extreme, resulting in traditions in which the imagination is "unbound." In this volume, Wim Raven provides an impression of just such a popular narrative, an anonymous fantastic cosmology known under the title of K. al-?A?ama ("The Book of Majesty"), which has been ascribed, wrongly it seems, to Ibn Abi l-Dunya. It is striking how in the K. al-?A?ama the hundreds and thousands of years one encounters in the learned traditionist literature on hell are exponentially increased to multiples of thousands and millions. For example, each tooth of the hell-monster, one learns, "has a length of a billion years, a year being four thousand months; a month being four thousand days; a day being four thousand hours, and one hour lasts as long as seventy of our years."

Hell as a Punitive Institution

The hell-monster Jahannam, which "raises its neck out of the Fire on the Day of Resurrection," is just the most prominent among the array of animal punishers in hell. Snakes and scorpions figure prominently, but the damned also have to do with vermin and "all flying insects, to the exception of bees," as in fact all animals that inflict pain on earth, according to one tradition, continue to do so in the next. (By a process of punitive transformation [maskh], the sinners also turn into animals themselves, a punishment that serves to dehumanise them.) The staff of hell, however, is formed first and foremost by an army of fearsome punisher-angels. In a strictly monotheistic system like Islam, there is no place for Satan as the lord of hell; a relatively peripheral figure in Islamic eschatology, he is simply counted among the inmates of hell. According to Q 74:30, there are nineteen guardian angels of hell, who guard the gates of hell (Q 39:71) and are charged with punishing its detainees under the supervision of their chief, called Malik (Q 43:77). In the exegetical literature and in popular eschatology, these guardian angels (khazana) are identified with the "repellers" (zabaniya) mentioned in Q 96:18, and their number is expanded ad infinitum. The zabaniya have repulsive faces, eyes like flashing lightning, teeth white like cows' horns, lips hanging down to their feet, and rotten-smelling breath, and they dress in black clothes. Evil demons, the followers of Satan, are punished in hell, along with humans (Q 26:95). The punisher-angels in hell, on the other hand, are on God's side, as agents of His terrifying but ultimately just use of punishment.

Almost every punishment found in the catalogue of medieval Islamic punishments is also found in the imagined realm of hell. Fire is by no means the only source of suffering. There are executions by decapitation, gibbeting, stoning, throwing down from heights, drowning, and trampling by animals. Corporal punishments, in addition to flogging, appear in all forms, of which a ninth/fifteenth-century Uighur mi?raj manuscript offers vivid depictions. Sinners are tied up in torturous positions, left hand chained to neck. They are hung up with ropes, dangling from their feet, calves, Achilles tendons, breasts, hair, and tongues. Lips are cut with scissors, corners of the mouth slit all the way back to the neck. Another important punishment incurred by the sinners is shaming. Already in the Quran it is stressed that the inhabitants of hell will suffer exposure and humiliation (6:124, 25:69, 40:60). The most obvious illustration of this is the fact that sinners in hell are naked, but the face, as the seat of honour, is singled out for punishment. Faces are beaten (Q 8:50, 47:27) and "blackened" by the heat

(Q 23:104; cf. 3:106). Sinners "will be dragged on their faces into the Fire" (Q 54:48). The hadith elaborates with grotesque detail: The zabaniya trample the sinners' tongues. Hellfire is so fierce that the upper lip of the sinner "is rolled up until it reaches the middle of his head, and his lower lip will hang down until it beats on his navel." On the basis of Q 3:180 ("That which they held on to will be tied to their necks on the Day of Resurrection"), hadith traditions conjecture that sinners will be carrying visible signs of their sins into hell with them. Spurred by the fact that the Quran speaks of the many chains with which the sinners will be bound (40:71–2; 73:12), many exegetes conceived of hell as a place of imprisonment. Al-Ghazali imagined hell as a house with narrow walls and dark passageways in which the prisoner (asir) dwells forever. Some exegetes were of the opinion that sijjin was the name of a prison in hell. Finally, hell could also be seen as a place of banishment (that is, from paradise), "the worst punishment of the people of hell."

Assigning certain sinners to hell reinforced a parallel moral hierarchy in the lower world. It is therefore not surprising to see the basic social classes and other divisions of medieval Muslim society reflected in the social stratification of hell, which is populated by common people, members of the learned religious elite, and rulers and their representatives. Traditions enumerating the punishments that await them in hell may well have served the lower classes as a kind of moral catechism. Along with their general condemnation of those who engage in wine-drinking, fornication, sodomy, suicide, and so forth, eschatologists also include among the damned those "who speak of worldly matters in the mosque" or sleep during prayer. A tradition allocates seven types of mischievous scholars (?ulama?) to the seven different levels of hell. Corrupt judges and hypocritical Quran readers are likewise assigned to hell. Other traditions seem, often in oblique ways, to allude to policemen, tax-collectors, and market inspectors, as well as a number of other state officials. The ruler himself is not exempted from such threats. Al-Ghazali cites a report from the Prophet that those rulers who punished their subjects beyond what God commands "will be shown the corners of hell." Such traditions suggest that the popular discourse on hell could have the double function of promoting an attitude of quietism and at the same time subverting the social status quo.

There is no shortage in the traditionist literature of patriarchal, at times overtly misogynist statements about women. At its most blunt, this is clothed in the tradition attributed to the Prophet that "most people in hell are women." Descriptions of the punishment of female sinners in hell do not make for pleasant reading.113 As Jane Idleman Smith and Yvonne Haddad have noted, these description, however, should not be seen as "the considered conclusion of Muslim theologians ... but rather [as] the attempt to legitimate forms of social control over women." A similar dynamic is at work in hell traditions about non-orthodox Muslim and other minority groups. The apostle Paul (Bawlus), according to a Shi?i tradition, is in hell; the atheists (dahriyya) and anti-predestinarian Qadarites keep him company there. Christiane Gruber's analysis in this volume of a Safavid hell painting demonstrates how, in her words, "hell played a key role in sectarian politics." In sum, eschatologists identified and classified sinners in hell in accordance with how they understood and—by reproducing traditions that underpinned them—perpetuated the genderbased, moral, social, political and sectarian hierarchies of medieval Islam.

The Islamic Hell and Modernity

The various ways in which modern and postmodern Muslim thinkers of the late nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries have reacted to the modern onslaught on traditional eschatology deserves separate, detailed study. Jane Idleman Smith and Yvonne Haddad are pioneers in this field of inquiry. In conclusion to this introduction, I shall limit myself to some general observations, while seeking to highlight aspects of modern Muslim theology that relate to hell in particular.

Muslim modernists, in the words of Smith and Haddad, experience a "kind of embarrassment with the elaborate traditional detail concerning life in the grave and in the abodes of recompense, called into question by modern rationalists." According to Smith and Haddad, "the great majority" of modern Muslim theologians, therefore, silence the issue, or content themselves with reaffirming the traditional position that the reality of the afterlife must not be denied, but that its exact nature remains unfathomable. More radical, skeptical reactions can also be found, however, including ironic reversals of traditionalist eschatology such as one encounters in Jamil Hidqi al-Zahawi's (Iraq, d. 1936) remarkable poem, Thawra fi ja?im ("Revolution in hell"), which is discussed in Richard van Leeuwen's contribution to this volume. In al-Zahawi's visionary tale, which is clothed in the form of a dream of his own death that the poet has after eating a dish seasoned with watercress, hell is where the philosophers and rationalists are, that is to say all the forward-thinking, revolutionary spirits that traditionalist Islam condemns to eternal damnation: Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, and ?usi, but also Socrates, Epicurus, Voltaire, and Spinoza, to name just a few. Fired up by the passionate address of a young male revolutionary, and with the aid of infernal weaponry developed by a group of empirical scientists, the inhabitants of hell storm heaven and threaten to topple God's Throne—but then the poet wakes up. Al-Zahawi's poem unmistakably gestures back to earlier literary tours of the otherworld, in particular al-Ma?arri's (d. 449/1058) Risalat al-ghufran ('Epistle of Forgiveness'), but updates it and frames it in modern terms.

Others have preferred to continue in the vein of Sufi spiritual and interiorized interpretations of hell. An important contributor to this line of thought is the Pakistani reformer Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938). Just as al-Zahawi updates al-Ma`arri with modern science, so Iqbal combines the eschatological thought of Ibn al-`Arabi and Rumi with the thought of 20th-century Western philosophers such as Henri Bergson (d. 1941). Iqbal sees paradise and hell primarily as metaphors for the inner psychic and intellectual developments of the individual. In Iqbal's take, when the Quran announces that "the fire of God, kindled, ... rises over the hearts [of people]" (Q 104:6–7), this refers to none other than the painful realization of one's failure as a human being. Paradise and hell, in Iqbal's phrase, are "states, not localities."

Muslim theologians seeking a closer alignment with traditional Islamic theology have tended to find Iqbal's proposals insufficiently grounded in the tradition. As Fazlur Rahman criticizes, "the structural elements of [Iqbal's] thought are too contemporary to be an adequate basis for an ongoing Islamic metaphysical endeavor." Rahman is more sympathetic to Mu?ammad `Abduh's (Egypt, d. 1905) attempt to "resurrect ... rationalism", such as he finds it in the example of the Mu`tazilites of the early centuries of Islam. `Abduh, in his seminal Risalat al-taw?id ("Epistle of Unity"), judged that Muslims are not required to believe in the corporeal particulars of the afterlife, even if these are recorded in "clear" (?ahir) traditions; a general affirmation of the doctrine of life after death, including postmortem rewards and punishment, was enough, in his view, to qualify someone a "true believer" (mu?min ?aqq). In `Abduh's wake, also Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's "universalist" notion of fana? al-nar has found important advocates among Muslim intellectuals and theologians, including the likes of Rashid Ri?a (Egypt, d. 1935), Izmirli Ismail Hakki (Turkey, d. 1946), and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Egypt/Qatar, b. 1926).

In spite of these developments, modern and contemporary eschatologists in the Muslim world often follow the traditional path of collecting hadith, though this endeavor is frequently clothed in modern Arabic and engages, albeit superficially, issues of modernity. The late `Umar Sulayman al-Ashqar (d. 2012) can serve as an example of this trend. A prolific neo-Salafi writer and long-time professor of Islamic law at various universities in Kuwait and Jordan, al-Ashqar is the author-compiler of a work in three volumes entitled al-Yawm al-akhir ("Endtime"), the last volume of which deals with paradise

and hell. Strikingly, though he looks up to Ibn al-Qayyim as a forefather of Salafism, al-Ashqar rejects the doctrine of fana' al-nar. In his discussion of the hadith that "most of the inhabitants of hell are women", al-Ashqar first quotes a long passage from al-Qur?ubi, in which he rehearses the stock repertoire of arguments why women are less likely to enter paradise: they suffer from a deficiency in intellectual ability (nuq?an al-?uqul), are too attached to the ephemeral world of the here-and-now, subject to uncontrollable passions, etc. Al-Ashqar then adds that "in spite of this, many women are good and pious (?ali?at) ... and a great number of them enter paradise, including those who are superior to many a man in terms of the soundness of their belief and their pious actions." Such statements only thinly veil the chauvinism that is typical of neo-Salafism. Contemporary traditionist works like al-Yawm al-akhir, therefore, do not represent a great advance over the medieval manuals, except perhaps in the sense that they are presented in such a way as to make traditional teachings more easily digestible for a broad audience. At the same time, medieval works like the Daqa'iq al-akhbar or the Tadhkira of al-Qur?ubi are reissued frequently in Arabic lands and beyond, and are widely on sale in bookshops and street corners all over the Islamic world.

In conclusion, this introduction has put into relief the many aspects that make the investigation of the Islamic hell a worthwhile scholarly endeavor. There is no shortage of monographs written about the history of the afterlife in the West. Also hell has been subject of numerous studies, not to mention the spate of biographies of Satan in the Christian tradition. As noted at the beginning of this introduction, very few comparable works exist in scholarship on Islam. It is hoped that this volume can be a first step toward filling this lacuna.

Essay: Ibn 'Arabi, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, and the Political Functions of Punishment in the Islamic Hell by Samuela Pagani

> Who is the man here below who has never committed a sin, tell me? He who had never committed one, how could he have lived, tell me? If, because I do evil, you punish me with evil, what difference is there between you and me, tell me? — `UMAR KHAYYAM

The eternity of hell is among those issues on which Ibn Taymiyya (d. 723/1328) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) opted for an original theory, one that is in contrast to established Sunni doctrine. From the perspective of the latter, hell is eternal for infidels, while the faithful dwell there only temporarily. The two ?anbali theologians, instead, argued in favour of the eventual annihilation of hell. Numerous recent studies that have analysed this theory have also examined its relationship with that of Ibn `Arabi (d. 638/1240), for whom the punishment, but not hell, is finite, thus prompting interesting cues for comparison.

The comparison is legitimate, given that the stance taken by the two Hanbali authors can, in part, be explained as a reaction to Ibn `Arabi's theory. Ibn al-Qayyim refers to it explicitly, clearly distancing himself while at the same time implicitly acknowledging his debt. Here, I would like to return to the issue, focusing on an aspect of Ibn `Arabi's eschatology which may prove useful in comparing the two theories further: the concept of punishment that lies at the root of Ibn `Arabi's theory. What does infernal punishment actually involve? And which legal model of punishment does it match?

Ibn `Arabi's own speculations on the nature of eschatological castigation are part and parcel of his reflections about the notion of punishment, which are in turn a recurring motif in his legal thought. For the topic to be covered suitably, a thorough catalogue and correlation of the many relevant passages scattered throughout Ibn `Arabi's entire works would be necessary. The task would be all

the more difficult because Ibn `Arabi's writing is more akin to hermeneutics than to philosophy or theology. His aim, in the field of eschatology as elsewhere, is to disclose the multiple aspects (wujuh, lit. "faces") of the Revelation rather than giving a systematic presentation of doctrine. Moreover, without having to subscribe to any schools, Ibn `Arabi is able to find a wajh ?a?i? (an aspect that is real and true) in the disparate opinions voiced in Islamic systematic theology (kalam), philosophy (falsafa) and Sufism, including those distrusted by the heresiographers.

My own knowledge does not extend far enough for such an undertaking; I will, however, endeavour to determine major themes. The positions taken by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, following the principle that things can be discerned through their opposites, will help identify these themes, that is to say those sensitive points in Ibn `Arabi's outlook that may have triggered a creative response in the two ?anbalis. Among these issues, the notion of punishment appears to me to be of particular relevance.

Thus, prior to illustrating some of Ibn `Arabi's ideas on the topic (sections 3 and 4), Ibn al-Qayyim's position will be covered, dwelling primarily on the jurisdictional-political element (section 2). We cannot proceed, however, without first of all covering the essential features of the ongoing debate on the eternity of hell in the realm of Islam before the seventh/thirteenth century (section 1). I make no pretence of exhausting the topic, but doing so will allow me to clarify the approach taken in this paper.

Universal Salvations

Quranic exegesis (tafsir), the hadith and the kalam tradition offered a vast and varied arsenal of arguments in favour of the end of hell; Ibn ?Arabi, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim take advantage of all of these arguments in different degrees. The underlying idea is that, in God, mercy prevails over wrath and that it will triumph at the end of time. Going into specifics, these can be listed as follows: God will most certainly honour His promise of reward but is not obliged to fulfil His threats; when the Quran refers to the "eternity" of hell, the term can be taken to mean a "long period"; an eternal penance would not be rightful, as it would be inconsistent with the offence, which was committed in a limited time-span; penance has a purifying function and therefore has a finite duration; the intercession of the faithful and the Prophet, or God's own direct intervention, can save sinners. There are also isolated traditions that announce the final emptying and annihilation of hell.

According to Sunni authors, these arguments apply only in the case of sinning believers, not in that of unbelievers, but nevertheless, they appear to offer an opening for universal salvation. All of these arguments are actually echoed by Christian supporters of universal salvation, a position rejected by Augustine in book 21 of City of God. Augustine's well-known rejection helps us hone in on the various nuances this concept can take on. The targets of his criticism are on the one hand Origen, whose position had been condemned by the church, and, on the other, "tender-hearted" Christians whom Augustine does not regard as heretics, but as misguided by a misplaced compassion for the damned (De Civ. Dei 21.17). These two tendencies have distinctive features. Origen's doctrine of apocatastasis (restoration) fits into a framework of optimistic theodicy, sharpened by the dispute with dualists: evil is accidental and transitory and is, in the end, removed. The trials of hell have a purgative and therapeutic function whose duration is limited. Ultimately leading to the total destruction of evil, they help to restore the original harmony and unity of creation.

The "tender-hearted," in turn, split into two distinct groups. The first are universalists who envisage the salvation of unbelievers through the intercession of the saints (De Civ. Dei 21.18). This act of mercy, rather than a necessary return to a primordial state, is the outcome of a salvation history in which the saints' mediation plays an essential role. In this context, much is made of the conflict

between justice and mercy, and castigation in hell is seen more as retributive punishment that can be revoked by virtue of the victim's forgiveness than as a necessary corrective penalty. The source of this view may have been the Apocalypse of Peter, where the legal paradigm underlying the unlimited possibility of forgiveness may have been retaliation. In Muslim eschatology this chance of salvation is foreseen, but it is limited to believers. Al-Nasafi (d. 508/1114), for example, suggests that the Quranic verses on retaliation allow believers to hope for salvation. Here, private justice, which helps to right wrongs, only applies to the believing "brothers," and not to the unbelievers, whose irreparable wrongdoing is punished in eternity. This two-tiered justice brings to mind Plato's afterlife where the punishment of "curable" sinners comes to an end when their victims have been contented and appears principally to regard private offences, while the exemplary punishment of the "incurable," which is eternal, is inflicted mainly on tyrants, whose wrongdoing afflicts the polis.

The second category of "tender-hearted" refuted by Augustine are those who wish to extend the scope of salvation to people who profess Christian faith, but who have lived wicked lives (De Civ. Dei 21.19–21). This last tendency, which we can call confessional universal salvation, and which is echoed in the 'catholic' tendency voiced by Jerome "at his most generous," finds an exact match in the position that the traditionalists succeeded in enforcing at the end of a long struggle by basing themselves on the authority of the Sunna. Feras Hamza has given us a clear sketch of the polemic atmosphere of the early centuries of Islam in which the "People of the Sunna and the Community" (ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama?a) developed their doctrine of temporary hell while simultaneously defining the boundaries of the faith group. This doctrine hinged upon bestowing the status of believers on Muslims guilty of grave sins, saving them from eternal hell-fire (in contrast with the Kharijis and Mu`tazilis), although not sparing them all forms of punishment (a position attributed to the "corrupt" Murji?is).

Yet eternal hell-fire in the Sunni tradition is a poorly guarded realm, open to attack on many sides. Here are but four of them. Firstly, some theological arguments could lend themselves to universalist outcomes. This is especially the case for the khulf al-wa?id (renege on the threat of punishment): if God is free to recant on His threats then why should He not forgive unbelievers, too? The Ash`aris are, in fact, forced into conceding this possibility, in theory at least. These snags caused Maturidi theologians to discard the argument. Secondly, Islam has kept many of those concepts that precede purgatory in Catholic theology, but without confining the temporary castigation to a well-defined location. This lack of a clearly-defined purgatory results in a pervious frontier between paradise and hell, offering the damned a chance of escape, the opposite of what took place in the Latin Middle Ages, when the precise location of purgatory acts as the final bolt on the portal of hell, that is to say, the creation of eternal hell-fire. Alongside the uncertainties as to its whereabouts, there are those regarding the nature of the punishment, which the eschatological traditions illustrate as both purgative and retributive. Thirdly, the idea of intercession, despite its confessional limitations, may have provided an opening for the hope of universal salvation. The Prophet's negotiations with God, which feature so prominently in the narratives of his Ascension (mi?raj), highlight the oppositeness of promise and threat and raise hopes in the delay or annulment of the sentence.

Lastly, on a wider scale, eternal hell-fire turns out to be a stumbling block for Islam as universalist monotheism. The heated overtones with which the Quran spells out the eternity of hell suggest that this concept has been the object of inter-religious debate from the beginning and may even have taken on an intra-religious dimension. The gaps in our knowledge of the history of nascent Islam prevent us from establishing whether the Quran's tirades are directed at other religious groups or at "believers"; particularly as we have no way of knowing who the "believers" actually were at this point in religious history. The Quran censures the Jews for believing that the punishment lasts for a

limited number of days; however "Jews" may actually mean "misguided judaizing believers." The Quran's polemic against intercession, in any case, fits in well with the rejection of the Jewish and Christian exclusivist claim that "no one will enter paradise unless he [or she] is a Jew or Christian" (Q 2:111). On the other side, the idea of fi?ra (original constitution) and the emphasis on God's mercy and the return of all things unto him do actually share some points with the philosophical concept of apocatastasis.

Leaving the Quran aside, it is clear that the issue of eternal hell is a problem shared by Islam and Christianity alike, two universalist monotheisms that went on to become the official creed of empires, in which ties with political power required religious legitimization of the use of force by the state. The imposition of the dogma of eternal hell (a development that did not arise in either Zoroastrianism or Judaism), in this light, takes on a significant political function. Hannah Arendt, reflecting on the profound political implications of Augustine's espousal of the doctrine of eternal hell, suggested that, through it, "an element of violence was permitted to insinuate itself into both the very structure of Western religious thought and the hierarchy of the Church." Arendt compared Augustine's use of the belief in hell to that of Plato, in so far as the Church Father, like the Greek philosopher before him, "understood to what an extent these doctrines could be used as threats in this world, quite apart from their speculative value about a future life." The ?anbali judge Ibn al-?Aqil (d. 513/1119) is startlingly forthright on the point: whoever plays down the dread of hell, as do Murji?is who deny the punishment of believers and Sufis who claim to be able to quell the Fire, weaken the coercive power of law (siyasat al-shar?) and are therefore to be condemned as infidels and, if possible, eliminated by the sword. As a judge, Ibn al-`Aqil compared his sentencing to death of an Isma`ili to God's sentencing sinners to hell. Ghazali's crusade against esoteric and philosophical interpretations of eschatology was prompted by similar concerns for public order. Both cases illustrate the particularly important role hell played in legitimizing the violence of the state during the Seljuq period. Ibn al-`Aqil's argument ties the success of the religion to coercion through fear. But this point was highly problematic for Muslim religious scholars, who shared in many respects the deep ambivalence of their Christian counterparts towards the political sphere. Moreover, it can be argued that the failure to recognize the humanity of one's opponent, which the recourse to violence entails, jeopardizes the very foundations of the universal mission of a religion that claims to be destined for all men created equally according to the fihra or in the likeness of God.

As a consequence of these various factors, both in Islam and in Christianity, critiques of the eternity of hell follow on the heels of the dogma of eternal hell. Despite official condemnation, they badger and hound it from within, so hell is not solely vulnerable to attacks from without by dualists and zindiqs (free-thinkers), but also from religious key figures in the community, even though the orthodoxy of these figures may be contentious. In fact, it was primarily the mystics, both Muslim and Christian, who voiced criticism of hell from within. It is in the area of mysticism that cross-pollination between Islam and Christianity appears most clearly.

Isaac of Nineveh (d. ca. 80/700), who lived in Iraq in the first Islamic century, criticised the eternity of hell with arguments that combined the theological-philosophical theory of apocatastasis and the eschatological hope of the "tender-hearted." His case is particularly significant because it proves that this trend survived in eastern Christianity, despite official hostility, especially in monastic spheres and more specifically in Syriac monasticism. Isaac of Nineveh's tract on hell was translated into Arabic by the monk ?anun b. Yu?anna Ibn al-?alt (d. after 286/900) at the end of the third/ninth century, and the spread of thinking similar to his own among Persian Christians in the following century is reported by ?Abd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1025). Both Isaac's name and ideas were known to al-Shahrastani (d. 548/1153), who calls him Mar Is?aq (Saint Isaac) and sums up his stance on hell in terms that would

have sounded familiar to the Muslim supporters of salvation for all: the universality of mercy, the incompatibility of divine benevolence with the eternity of castigation, the possibility of khulf al-wa?id.

Ibn al-Halt opens his translation with a very interesting remark: at his time the works of Isaac were kept and studied yet their diffusion was discouraged. The translator, nevertheless, appears to feel that making them more accessible was useful. It has been suggested that his aim was to make use of them in the debate with Islam. This remark by Ibn al-Halt illustrates the delicate position that the criticism of eternal hell occupied when put forward by a saint within the context of a religion that officially condemned this attitude. Although questionable and marginal, this opinion would continue to be transmitted privately and informally, and could be tolerated as long as it remained an intellectual hypothesis and an aspiration, without turning into a dogma, that is to say "heresy."

Tolerance shown towards such doctrines obviously depended on whether or not there was a willingness to allow for mystical approaches to religion within the community. In Islam, as we know, the delicate balance between mystics and theologians was upset whenever the formers' more dubious 'secret doctrines' surfaced in the public domain through writings or preaching.

Among the Muslim mystics of the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, the case of al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi (d. between 295/905 and 300/910) deserves greater attention. Al-Tirmidhi, who was temporarily banished from his hometown, Tirmidh, for having "spoken of love," was particularly concerned with the notion of fi?ra and the question of the salvation of infants, and his description of the purifying function of hell-fire shares some features with the Christian doctrine of apocatastasis. The most open testimony to the criticism of hell in Sufism at this time are the ecstatic utterances (sha?a?at) attributed to al-Bis?ami (d. 261/874) and al-Shibli (d. 334/945): they voice the universal mercy characteristic of the friends of God, with overtones of a protest against the doctrine which restricts the intercession (shafa?a) of the Prophet to his own community. Insolence that, as we have seen, was harshly checked by Ibn al-`Aqil.

The spread of this defiant criticism of hell is one of the issues that brought Sufism and the political and religious orthodoxy into open conflict. In the case of the mystics, their criticism of eschatology was quite distinct from that of the philosophers (falasifa) as it sprang from a religious impetus of charity and was accompanied by a claim to sainthood. Moreover, the allegorical interpretation of hell typical of the philosophical tradition does not necessarily question the usefulness of its political function for the masses.

This background information demonstrates that Ibn `Arabi, illustrating comprehensively in writing his own "compassionate" interpretation of eschatology, performed an act of great moment, perfectly in line with his very high conception of his own function as "seal of the saints" (khatam al-awliya?). Indeed, the issue of the cessation of infernal castigation occupies a key role in Ibn `Arabi as it is the destination of his line of thinking on the encompassing universality of divine mercy (?umum and shumul al-rahma). For him, this thread running through his work is not merely a theory deriving from his metaphysical vision but "glad tidings" (bushra) which he himself brings to humankind. Ibn `Arabi shares this expectancy with the ecstatic mystics who came before him, yet differs from them because he does not challenge the Shari`a and the Sunna, but claims to be their inspired interpreter. Universal salvation is neither against the Law nor in competition with Muhammad's intercession, rather, it is the deepest meaning of the universality of the Shari`a and the telos of Muhammad's mission. This meaning and this telos are as yet unaccomplished, and the saint, who is both commentator and intercessor, provides decisive aid in bringing them about. For this very reason the "seal of the saints" considers himself to be the "heir of Muhammad" and not an ecstatic mystic or the *maître à penser* of a particular school.

The link between universal salvation and the doctrine of sainthood, as well as the implicit claims to authority, could not have escaped Ibn Taymiyya, who channelled much of his dialectic skill into dismantling Ibn `Arabi's hagiology. It may even have provided the Hanbali scholar and his disciple Ibn al-Qayyim with a cue for radically rethinking eschatology, thus safeguarding the universalist tendency of Islam without following Ibn `Arabi in his more dangerous ideas.

Ibn al-Qayyim's Reform of Political Hell

Ibn al-Qayyim resolutely disentangles the disorderly and contradictory mesh of the Sunni hell, putting forward a coherent and rational reform within the framework of a strict theodicy. Castigation, in so far as it entails infliction of pain, constitutes an evil; however, within the cosmos created and governed by God, evil, in itself, cannot exist. It is therefore a relative evil justified by a wise purpose (Hikma). It is not retributive, as retribution brings nothing of benefit to either the evildoer or God, who has no need for revenge. It has, hence, a purifying function and as such cannot but have a limited duration. This is because once the sinner is healed and reformed the castigation has fulfilled its purpose. Even when this requires a long lapse of time, the punishment restores man's original constitution (fi?ra) to its primary state much in the same way as drastic medical treatments, such as cauterization or amputation "remove alien matter that has accidentally corrupted the sound nature (?abi ?a mustaqima) of an invalid". By way of its beneficial, although painful, character, punishment is an expression of mercy, an attribute of the divine essence that prevails over the incidental attribute of wrath.

This therapeutic model of punishment is located inside a providentialist outlook in which evil lacks an ontological standing of its own and will, ultimately, be completely eliminated, so much so that even Iblis will probably be redeemed. As Hoover remarks "[Ibn al-Qayyim's] aim is apologetic. He is trying to explain why God creates evil and to defend God's wise purpose against detractors." One is tempted to add that Ibn al-Qayyim is also a political writer who defends state power; not an arbitrary power that indifferently shows clemency or inflicts punishment but a rational and wise power.

Ibn al-Qayyim employs legal terms to describe the punishment of hell, associating it with the ?udud (divinely ordained punishments), and by doing so setting it within the framework of public criminal law, in which the ?udud are generally characterized as "rights of God" (?uquq Allah):

> God does not quench his thirst for revenge by punishing His servants, as does he who has suffered wrongdoing when he takes revenge on the offender. He does not harrow His servant with this purpose, but with the aim of redeeming him and because of His mercy towards him. His punishment is, in fact, a benefit (ma?la?a) to him, despite the infliction of great pain; likewise the application of the ?udud in this world is of benefit to whoever is subjected to them.

The analogy of the Hudud appears to be even more effective than that of medicine in describing infernal castigation. Indeed, Ibn al-Qayyim foresees the objection that the treatment that causes the sick person suffering, differently from the torment of the damned, is not referred to as "punishment" as the physician cares for his patient and feels no anger towards him. This is true, replies Ibn al-Qayyim, "but this does not mean that the punishment cannot be mercy towards them, as the Hudud in this world are simultaneously punishment, mercy and purgation."

In one of his legal works, Ibn al-Qayyim explains that the Hudud have a purifying and reforming function: in the case of capital punishment, these penalties rehabilitate the sinner's soul, though not his body, because they exempt him from hell. Like the Hudud, infernal castigation, by virtue of its being gainful, is inevitable, even though mercy is dearer to God than punishment, and even though

the suffering experienced by those who are punished evokes pity in others. Indeed, "tribulation is mercy" (al-ibtila' ra?ma), and for this reason, God answers those who pray for mercy for those who suffer great tribulation: "How can I be merciful towards him by depriving him of the very same thing through which I show him mercy?" (kayfa ar?amuhu min shay' ar?amuhu bihi). The ?ikma and the ma?la?a (utility, common good) justifying the punishments and the sufferings borne in this world and the next are one and the same: following careful contemplation one can discover the perfect correspondence (tanasub) and harmony (tawafuq) between earthly and otherworldly rewards and punishments, all similarly serving the purpose of healing and purification.

In conclusion, the temporary hell, which is described by Ibn al-Qayyim either as a hospital (maristan) or as a prison, is a political hell: a place where violence is employed in the name of the common good, within the limits of reason. Hence, unlike the mystics' protests against hell censured by Ibn al-?Aqil, Ibn al-Qayyim's 'reform' of hell does not undermine the coercive power of the

law (siyasat al-shar`), but instead rationalizes it. In this regard, Ibn al-Qayyim's understanding of justice in the netherworld, while reminiscent of ancient precedents, anticipates the critique of eternal hell that would affirm itself in Modern Europe along with the adoption of a penal theory founded on the ideas of reform and deterrence rather than retribution. It hardly comes as a surprise, therefore, that Ibn al-Qayyim has been favourably received among Islamic modernists.

The Hell of Wrath and the Hell of Mercy

Ibn `Arabi's conception of hell is much less easy to circumscribe than that of Ibn al-Qayyim. If we approach it from the angle of its legal implications, we are confronted with two major questions. The first concerns the relationship between the legal function of hell and the other roles it fulfils through its continued existence. The second concerns the model of justice to which its legal function is related. We will deal with the first question in this section, and with the second in the next one.

According to Ibn `Arabi, once a term of infernal punishment has come to an end, hell ceases to be "painful," although it does not cease to exist altogether. As is done in the mainstream Sunni tradition, Ibn `Arabi makes a distinction between sinful believers whose stay in hell is only temporary and "the people of the Fire, those who are its inhabitants" (ahl al-nar alladhina hum ahluha), and will stay there eternally. However, according to him, the eternity of the stay does not necessarily imply that the punishment (`adhab) will be eternal, too.

The term `adhab raises some issues as Ibn `Arabi uses it both in its primary meaning of "castigation," as in the Quran, and also in the broader sense of "suffering." Thus, certain passages may lead us to think that the cessation of `adhab is solely the end of suffering but not of the punishment in the legal sense. As an example, describing the way in which the ahl al-nar ("the people of the Fire") lose their sensitivity to the pain (al-i?sas bi-l-alam) of burning, Ibn `Arabi compares their situation to that of sinful believers who, according to a hadith, God lets die (amatahum Allahu fiha imatatan) so as to spare them the suffering of their temporary stay in hell.60 In this case, the absence of pain can be considered simply as an easing, but not a discontinuation, of the punishment.

However, further passages clarify that, for Ibn `Arabi, what draws to a close is the punishment in its legal sense: "When the fixed penalty (?add) against ahl al-nar comes to its end, they dwell in hell-fire because they are suited to it (bi-l-ahliyya) and not as recompense (bi-l-jaza')." Indeed, the duration of the castigation in hell stands as a "proportional recompense" (jaza' wifaq, Q 78:26), corresponding exactly to what is merited (isti?qaq) on account of one's evil deeds in this world. It is, therefore, limited, insomuch as limited sin could not warrant unlimited punishment. At the same time, while in the Quran the expression jaza' wifaq (proportional recompense) appears solely in reference to

infernal punishment, Ibn `Arabi also applies it to the reward that the faithful receive through merit, in a special paradise called the "paradise of deeds" (jannat al-a?mal). In the case also of the blessed, the reward earned through deeds is bestowed over a limited period of time.

Thus, limited duration pertains to the function of the two abodes in so far as they are loci of reward and punishment. Once the spell is over, both the eternal extension of the pleasures of paradise and the transformation of infernal misery into bliss depend on divine grace (minna), as opposed to deserts (isti?qaq). Indeed, both perpetual reward and perpetual punishment are beyond equity. Going beyond equity in reward is generosity (fa?l), while it would be blameworthy in the case of punishment. Once the period of reward or punishment has ended, divine mercy embraces the people of the two abodes, notwithstanding the fact these are separate and that different forms of bliss (na?im) are found in each.

Although some critics, from the time of Ibn Taymiyya onwards, have drawn parallels between Ibn `Arabi and the Jahmiyya, this idea does not imply the annihilation of paradise and hell, rather, it amounts to a downgrading of the retributive concept of the afterlife in a spirit akin to Rabi`a al-`Adawiyya (d. 185/801), who wished to burn paradise and put out hell as places of reward and punishment. So, despite having fulfilled its legal function, hell continues onto eternity.

The reason for hell's eternity is both theological and anthropological. Theologically, it fulfils the economy of the Divine Names: hell is the eternal manifestation of wrath, even when its ?ukm (rule) comes to an end, in contrast to that of divine satisfaction (yantahi ?ukmuhu wa-la yantahi ?ukm al-ri?a). That Divine Names of wrath manifest themselves without exercising their ?ukm is a key concept that deserves attention. In linguistic terms, this means that the names lose their referential, but not their significative function. In legal terms, this means that penal law ceases to be operative, without being declared invalid. Ibn `Arabi compares God's giving preponderance (tarji?) to mercy over wrath to the choice of the judge between two equally legitimate decisions: "When God weighs mercy against wrath, mercy preponderates and is heavier, and wrath is lifted; that something is lifted has no other meaning that it ceases to be in operation; therefore, in the outcome, divine wrath has no enforcement power." Notwithstanding this, the Divine Names of wrath do not lose the "right" to be fulfilled, which is implemented through the manifestation of their properties in the imaginative realm. In other words, the outward show of punishment is eternal in its exemplarity. It is a pure spectacle, hiding the reality of divine mercy.

Anthropologically, eternal hell, as a "veil" or "separation" (?ijab) from God, is made necessary by the inability of certain natures to sustain the vision of God and bear the climate of paradise. The ?ijab, being deprivation, is a form of suffering, but as hell is not punishment in the legal sense of the term, it does not qualify as a poena damni, but is the inevitable consequence of a lack of knowledge. This is close to Ibn Sina's intellectualist conception, where imperfect souls cannot aspire to absolute beatitude, but also to the mystical vision of Emanuel Swedenborg, where the souls that lack charity were seized by such anguish of heart from the approach of heavenly heat, which is the love in which angels are, and from the influx of heavenly light, which is Divine truth, that they perceived in themselves infernal torment instead of heavenly joy, and being struck with dismay, they cast themselves down headlong.

Ibn `Arabi imagines 'infernal pleasure' both as the cessation of pain and as an actual "independent bliss" (na`im mustaqill) alongside it. He remarks on a number of occasions that `adhab comes from the same root as `udhuba (sweetness), and this shows that the torment of hell-fire will turn into pleasure. Before him al-Zamakhshari (d. 538/1144) had dwelt on the link between the two meanings, putting forward an explanation based on the meaning of `adhab as deterrent penalty: as freshwater

(`adhb) quenches thirst, the deterrent penalty (`adhab) quells the desire to commit a crime. The double meaning of the root `-dh-b, exploited in erotic poetry (being tortured by your beloved is sweet), is further expanded in the mysticism of amorous martyrdom. This is the case of ?allaj, who calls forth and pursues "la suave extase dans le supplice" (maldhudh wajdi bi-l-`adhab). The idea seems even to have captivated Ibn al-Qayyim, who states that the punishment turns into bliss (inqalaba na`iman) for those who accept it as rightful and healing.

However, Ibn `Arabi is far from extolling suffering. Na`im in his hell has nothing sublime about it: in contrast with `adhab, it is whatever is appropriate (mula?im) to the "nature" (?ab`) or "temperament" (mizaj) of each man. `Adhab thus becomes sweet when it is no longer against nature. The ahl al-nar relish hell like natives love their homeland (maw?in) and are drawn to it like iron to a magnet.

Occasionally, Ibn `Arabi appears to emphasize the redeeming properties of the ahl al-nar's happiness, as when he compares them to Abraham, who found "coolness and safety" (bardan wa-salaman) in the furnace. Elsewhere their pleasure is described as relish in wretchedness, quite simply "natural perversion": something more akin to Fourier's utopia, where everyone follows his inclinations, than to the "virtuous city" of the falasifa. To all appearances, given Ibn `Arabi's definition of the notions of pleasure and pain, there is a variety of natural pleasures which, though being peculiar, should not be considered as diseases. Such an outlook is foreign to Ibn al-Qayyim for whom medicine restores us to "sound nature" (?abi?a mustaqima) in the same way as infernal punishment restores our "original constitution" (fi?ra) to health. But the natural aversion of certain souls from paradise is problematic also in connection with what Ibn `Arabi himself says of the fi?ra. In fact, the fi?ra is for him a key argument in favour of universal salvation, in so far as he considers it as the original and unalterable disposition to know God, which is common to every human being. Thanks to this, hell cannot be the "home" (maw?in) of the rational soul, and if it were to alight there the flame would be smothered. But fi?ra has for Ibn `Arabi a great variety of meanings. So, while adhering to a universalist conception of fi?ra, he does not dismiss altogether the alternative interpretation of this notion which prevailed in Sunni tradition, and according to which God gives men different "original constitutions" ordaining them ab aeterno either to hell or paradise. However, Ibn `Arabi curbs this idea from its predestinarian outlook towards a universal determinism: God's decree does not damn people but only establishes their dwelling-place.

We have here a major difficulty: if the "people of the Fire" are not restored to the fullness of the original disposition, because it was pre-determined that their individual natures would not attain the felicity of human perfection, in what sense can we say that Ibn `Arabi maintains "universal salvation"? In order to answer this question, we have to go back to Ibn `Arabi's original use of the theological distinction between God's ontological and moral will, or His "creation" and His "command." The paradoxes of determinism are a recurring motif in Ibn `Arabi's writings. The real meaning of the "decree" (qadar) is a "secret" that revelation jealously veils, because it betrays the fact that disobedience to God's "command" is morally evil but ontologically good. God's creative mercy lets everything subsist conforming with its "fixed entities" (a`yan thabita), the concrete determinations of singular beings that since pre-eternity are established as potentialities in God's knowledge, and which, in themselves, are neither good nor evil, but "indifferent". God's "command," instead, is what confers their legal-moral qualifications to the actualized manifestations of the "fixed entities," through the revelation of the Law. The injunctions and prohibitions of the Law can be disobeyed: they are a verbal imperative through which God commands what He lacks the power to impose, unlike God's creative imperative, the kun, which is necessarily fulfilled. Hell as a temporary legal

institution where moral evil is punished is under the sway of God's wrath, but as an eternal dwelling-place it is the object of God's creative will and mercy, which encompasses and "precedes" wrath.

Precisely this aspect of Ibn `Arabi's eschatology is the target of Ibn Taymiyya's criticism: according to the latter, the emphasis on God's ontological mercy leads to disregard His moral will, and actually paves the way for the antinomian tendencies of some of Ibn `Arabi's followers. Ibn `Arabi's distinction between the two dimensions of hell, the legal and the existential, is obviously incompatible with the view held by the majority, for whom eternal hell is the fulfilment of an irrevocable sentence against unbelievers. Yet it is also incompatible with Ibn al-Qayyim's hell as this too, as long as it lasts, has a penal function. Ibn al-Qayyim is without doubt unfair when he states that according to Ibn `Arabi "nobody at all is punished in hell" (`indahu la yu`adhdhabu biha a?ad a?lan), as he does not take account either of the temporary punishment or of the deprivation of the vision of God that Ibn `Arabi foresees. Yet the accusation is not entirely unfounded in so far as the driving force behind Ibn `Arabi's hermeneutics is the desire to dispense with punishment altogether:

> We have experienced in ourselves and in those God made benevolent by nature that they have compassion for all men, to such an extent that if God were to give them authority over creation they would erase punishment completely from the world.

Ibn `Arabi's desire, however, is reined in by adab, the proper manner of behaving with God, which is a consequence of the receptivity to His Word.

As we will see in the next section, Ibn `Arabi considers the end of punishment not only as the necessary consequence of God's ontological mercy, but also as the deepest intention of His revealed Law. This intention, however, can only be fulfilled if man understands it and freely chooses to put it into practice. In this sense, God's moral command plays a key role in Ibn `Arabi's scheme of salvation, a scheme where man is an active participant and not only the passive recipient of mercy. But salvation, which is "universal" from the point of view of God's ontological mercy, can only be individual in so far as it results from man's answer to God's personal revelation.

"Rights of God" and "Rights of Men"

We have seen that Ibn al-Qayyim plainly affirms the "correspondence" between earthly and otherworldly punishment in so far as both aim at the restoration of the common good. Isla?, which has the meaning of "making wholesome," or "restoration," and is thus very close to "apocatastasis," is also a key-term of Ibn `Arabi's eschatology. The latter, however, uses it in reference to two different processes: reparation in the afterlife is brought about both by a purifying and inescapable punishment, and by reconciliation and forgiveness. We will now attempt to show how these two different processes are related to each other and to their respective legal counterparts in earthly justice.

As we have seen, hell is the place of proportional recompense (jaza' wifaq), where one can only receive what one deserves. This requital is inevitable as it is literally the product of deeds: one is punished (or rewarded) by the personification of one's actions. It is, therefore, the individual who "creates" and "builds" the hell of punishment (as with the paradise of reward). Nevertheless, Ibn `Arabi also describes this penalty as imposed by God, attributing to it a purifying function: "Divine mercy involves punishment solely as a purifying recompense (jaza' li-l-ta?hir): were it not for the purification, the punishment would not take place." God, like a doctor, makes his patient suffer for his wellbeing:

> The punishment inflicted by God is an act of mercy towards he who undergoes it and a purification, like medicine for an invalid made to suffer by a doctor because of mercy towards him, and not to exact revenge.

While being merciful, punishment is not, however, absolute mercy (ra?ma): for this reason, when God punishes He is not defined as "the Merciful" (al-ra?man), but as "Lord of the Worlds" (rabb al-?alamin). The title rabb ("Lord") encompasses mercy as it implicates reform (i?la?) and education (tarbiya). Intrinsic to the rabb is being a teacher (murabbi) [...]: that is he who has the task of reforming the status (i?la? ?al) of those educated—and education can be a source of pain, as when a person beats his son to teach him a lesson. [...] Similarly, God's ?udud are a lesson to His servants.

Ibn `Arabi thus justifies punishment in the netherworld by making use of both therapeutic and pedagogic models, as well as legal ones that liken infernal punishment to Hudud. Much like Ibn al-Qayyim after him, he compares the healing properties of the Fire with cauterization and ?udud punishments, which in this world serve as atonements, exempting sinners from punishment in the afterlife. In this way, Ibn `Arabi deals with the issue from a theodicean perspective: a relative evil is justified by its wise purpose, in this world as in the next. This approach also safeguards God's transcendence (tanzih), which literally indicates "exempting" God from all that does not become His perfection. Defending God as a transcendent principle implicates defending the cosmic order and the political order as well.

This perspective does not however decide the issue. Another point of view is that of immanence (tashbih), the idea that there is a "resemblance" between the Creator and the creature, a personal relationship between God and man created in His image. From this angle, Ibn `Arabi does not speak as a theologian justifying divine castigation but as an advocate-intercessor eager to spare each individual suffering, and for this reason cannot sidestep the issue of pain with a rational line of reasoning. While it is true that many Sufis describe evil as a trial to endure and a chance to reform, there are notable exceptions, as for example in `A??ar's (d. 627/1230) Mu?ibat-name, where nameless "madmen" and "paupers" argue with God with overtones that recall those of the zindiqs, yet in intimate and personal conversation with Him. Ibn `Arabi, for his part, in commenting on the case of Job, approves his complaint (shakwa), countering the position of those Sufis who preach total resignation: "Not to complain to God when you feel an ill contrary to His desire, is to want to resist the divine constraint [...]. Adab, all adab, is in that complaint addressed to God and to Him alone without losing by that the virtue of patience."

As we have seen, Ibn `Arabi is a "well-mannered" intercessor, who does not challenge the Shari`a, but seeks to unfold its potentialities. In this case, like a skilful lawyer, he homes in on the "rights of men" (?uquq al-?ibad) rather than the "rights of God" (?uquq Allah). From this viewpoint, the cornerstone of his discourse on the justice of hell is retaliation (qi?a?). The lex talionis is suitable to his purpose precisely because it corresponds to a relational model of justice, where the focus of the law is the harm done to a person, requiring compensation, rather than the transgression of a norm, requiring punishment. Unlike public penal law, qi?a? is based on the principle of private prosecution: man has the "right" to forfeit his right to retaliation, and is even encouraged to do so. The recommendation to pardon is a strong ethical component of Islamic law, which, however, does not abrogate qi?a? as a law, revoking the right to retaliation or compensation.

Ibn `Arabi's reflections on qi?a? apply equally to this world and to the next. In the chapter of the Fu?u? on the prophet Jonah, he gives special attention to the following Quranic verse: "The recompense of one evil is an evil like it (wa-jaza'u sayyi'a sayyi'a mithluha), but whoever pardons and makes reconciliation (a?la?a), his reward is with God" (Q 42:40). In his commentary, Ibn `Arabi emphasizes the fact that God Himself calls retaliation an "evil," "even though it is legal," and that He

promises to reward the person who forfeits his right to kill another man, "because he is in His image." In the final part of the chapter, Ibn `Arabi argues against the eternality of hell, clearly establishing an analogy between killing in retaliation and eternal damnation. This analogy is made stronger by the fact that a Quranic verse from the sura of Jonah describes eternal castigation in terms very close to retaliation: "And for those who have earned evil deeds the recompense of an evil deed shall be the like of it (wa-alladhina kasabu sayyi'at jaza'u sayyi'a bi-mithliha) [...]. Those are the companions of the Fire. They will abide therein eternally" (Q 10:27).

The institution of retaliation has an important place in Ibn `Arabi's reflections about the relationship between law and spirituality. Talionic punishment is an evil for the receiver because suffering is an evil by definition. Yet it is also an evil for he who inflicts it as it negates the makarim al-akhlaq (noble character traits), by virtue of which man becomes like God and achieves his own happiness (sa`ada). Even though retaliation cannot be defined as an "evil" from a legal point of view, according to the Law it is better not to claim it. There is in fact a difference between "good" and "better" rulings of the Law, just as there is a hierarchy of Divine Names, and the noble character traits which correspond to the "most beautiful names" (such as the Generous or the Merciful) can only be acquired by practising the best part of the Law.

Sa`ada is thus attained enacting the Law in its entirety, not only obeying what it enjoins, but also preferring what it recommends. Ibn `Arabi pays particular attention to the ethical value of not exerting violence when one is given the choice (takhyir), which is the case of qi?a?, but not of ?udud. The happiness attained by freely choosing what God most desires is clearly distinguished from "natural" happiness. The choice not to repay evil with evil is actually a way to go beyond man's nature (?abi `a), the amor sui naturalis that man shares with other living beings and that drives him to seek pleasure—and revenge is a pleasure, too. In this sense, the moral law acts to bridge the abyss of one's nature, as the ?irat over hell. By overcoming the inborn yearnings in their animal soul, humans become truly human; becoming truly human, human beings become divine, actualizing in themselves the image of God. Spiritual happiness is also distinguished from the common good, because it is not justified by utilitarian considerations, but is an end in itself. Forgiveness grants an immediate spiritual benefit to the one who pardons the offender, to such an extent that "if God removed the veil, and we were to see with our own eyes what great good is there for us in the next world in consequence of that offence, we would say that nobody benefited us more than that so-called wrongdoer." The "love of one's enemy," therefore, is not a sacrifice: the point is not to substitute oneself for the enemy, to die or condemn oneself to damnation in his place, but rather, to actualize in oneself the image of God and, at the same time, to leave the other alive in order not to preclude him from the possibility of achieving the same goal.

The implication that what is "evil" for man is equally "evil" for God is articulated by Ibn `Arabi when he argues for the possibility that God may not carry out His threat. God can only be praised by saying of Him what is praiseworthy per se (al-ma?mud bi-l-dhat), but this only applies to pardon (tajawuz) and not to "sincerity in menace" (?idq al-wa?id), and God Himself says that He "overlooks their misdeeds" (yatajawazu ?an sayyi?atihim) (cf. Q 46:16). In this passage, as in the chapter on Jonah, where he hints at the parallelism between killing in retaliation and eternal damnation, Ibn `Arabi argues against the eternality of punishment, equating it with a blameworthy form of retribution.

Thus, one could think that the plea for the annulment of punishment in the hereafter cannot be extended to the case of the 'therapeutic' ?udud. However, in actual fact it is possible to intercede also for the annulment of temporary punishment:

> In intercession, a servant, through his role of advisor (na?i?), upon seeing that God wishes to punish a man for his misdeed, says to Him: Oh Lord, You have urged us to forgive and made forgiveness a noble trait, preferable to taking revenge on the wrongdoer [...], You are more worthy of such ways [...]. Punishing evil is gainful only in this world, as the fulfilment of the ?udud wards off public harm (ma?arra ?amma). Just as God is praised in this world (dunya) for the institution of the Hudud [...], so is He praised in the next (akhira) for His forgiveness. For ?udud in this world no intercession is possible, as they are God's rights; in the next, however, the common good (ma?la?a) that here below wanted the application of the rights of God, no longer holds sway. In the case of men's rights, on the other hand, God Himself urged forgiveness.

This passage is noteworthy as it sets out an asymmetry between dunya and akhira: in the hereafter, the common good (ma?la?a) that calls for public criminal law no longer applies. Consequently, the legal principle upholding punishment in this world cannot be extended by analogy to the hereafter. Another passage hints that in the afterlife God punishes only the wrongs done to other creatures:

> As the Lord (rabb) is He who restores (al-mu?li?), on Resurrection Day God will reconcile (yu?li?) His servants with each other. Indeed, the Prophetic tradition tells of two men, one of whom has a claim to make against the other: they appear in front of God, and when the victim says: "Avenge me for the wrong he did to me," God answers: "Look heavenward!" The man sees there great goodness and says: "Whose is this, Lord?" And God answers: "It belongs to whoever can give me its price." So the man says: "Who could ever have that much?." So God says to him: "You will have that much if you forgive your brother." And he says: "I forgive him!" and takes him by the hand and they both enter paradise together. The Prophet, having told this story, said "Fear God and seek reconciliation between you as God will bring together His servants on the Day of Resurrection." But if God is so generous as to bring about reconciliation between His servants in such a way that the victim renounces his right, it goes without saying that He too will renounce the rights He has in their regard. Indeed, God punishes whom He wills for wrongs done to others, but not for His own right (bi-?aqqihi al-mukhta?? bi-hi). Associationism (shirk) is punished in as much as it is a wrong done to others. God does not stand up for Himself, but for others (ma yanta?ir li-nafsihi wa-innama yanta?ir li-ghayrihi). On the Day of Resurrection the "associates" will disown their followers [cf. Q 2:166].

In other words, idolatry, the ultimate crime against God, is not punished in order to safeguard a right of God, but because those who have been associated with God have been "wronged" by their followers, who attributed to them something they did not claim.

The benefit of forgiveness, which is "veiled" in this world, becomes evident in the next. Nevertheless, the victim is given the choice. In the tradition on righting wrongs in the afterlife reported by Ibn ?Arabi, God is not a forgiver but a conciliator (mu?li?): He does not annul the punishment by unilaterally bestowing grace. Rather, He reconciles the victim and the offender by paying the blood-money himself. A well-known version of this theme features David and Uriah: David is already on the pulpit at the gate of heaven reciting Psalms when Uriah grabs his robes claiming his right to retaliation. God, however, ransoms David by compensating Uriah with a number of castles in paradise. According to Ibn Is?aq (d. 150/767), this story answers a problem raised by the "People of the Book": if God pardons David, must one not deduce that his victim will have no justice? Al-Qur?ubi (d. 671/1272), in reporting this story, stresses that the likelihood of God stepping forward as a conciliator comes about only for penitent wrongdoers, as David was, otherwise no one would go to hell (wa-law kana dhalika fi jami? al-nas ma dakhala a?ad al-nar). In the same way, nobody would go to hell were one to take the following report attributed to the Prophet seriously: "On the

Day of Resurrection, a herald will proclaim from beneath the Throne: Oh community of Mu?ammad, I forgive you whatever I could claim from you; as for the injuries which remain, forgive each other for them (fa-tawahabuha) and enter the Garden for My mercy."

By suggesting that only crimes against other creatures, and not those against God, are punished in hell, Ibn `Arabi exempts hell entirely from the reach of public penal law where the common good justifies state violence. Even where the sin does not appear to be transitive it impinges on the rights of "others": the rational soul, entrusted with "governing" one's animal soul (nafs) and the limbs of one's body, breaches their rights when it disobeys divine command, acting as a tyrant (wali ja?ir) who forces his subjects to commit crimes. For Ibn `Arabi, among sins, haughtiness (takabbur) is the first in line to be punished eternally in hell, Pharaoh being the archetype of this class of sin in the macrocosm. But every iniquitous soul is a "tyrant" in the microcosm, the focus of Ibn `Arabi's interest, who shifts politics from the administration of others to the administration of oneself, from the common good to individual happiness.

Even if punishment relates to the "rights of men" and not to the "rights of God," any wrongs committed against men are at the same time a wrong against God:

> [In hell] there is hunger as God created it from the manifestation (tajalli) of His word [reported] in the hadith of Muslim: "I was hungry and you did not feed Me, I was thirsty and you did not quench My thirst, I was sick and you did not come to visit Me." This is the most awe-inspiring personal revelation through which God has descended among His servants in His gentleness towards them. Hell has been created from this reality. May God protect me and you all from it.

Precisely because He is immanent, God 'suffers' sin and takes revenge—a reprisal not vitiated by mercy—but only for a limited spell: as long as it takes for Him to free Himself from His pain. <>

KEATS'S A LOVER'S DISCOURSE by Anahid Nersessian [University of Chicago Press, 9780226762678]

When I say this book is a love story, I mean it is about things that cannot be gotten over—like this world, and some of the people in it."

In 1819, the poet John Keats wrote six poems that would become known as the Great Odes. Some of them—"Ode to a Nightingale," "To Autumn"—are among the most celebrated poems in the English language. Anahid Nersessian here collects and elucidates each of the odes and offers a meditative, personal essay in response to each, revealing why these poems still have so much to say to us, especially in a time of ongoing political crisis. Her Keats is an unflinching antagonist of modern life—of capitalism, of the British Empire, of the destruction of the planet—as well as a passionate idealist for whom every poem is a love poem.

The book emerges from Nersessian's lifelong attachment to Keats's poetry; but more, it "is a love story: between me and Keats, and not just Keats." Drawing on experiences from her own life, Nersessian celebrates Keats even as she grieves him and counts her own losses—and Nersessian, like Keats, has a passionate awareness of the reality of human suffering, but also a willingness to explore the possibility that the world, at least, could still be saved. Intimate and speculative, this

brilliant mix of the poetic and the personal will find its home among the numerous fans of Keats's enduring work.

Review

"Intense emotion abounds in this literary blend of analysis and autobiography. . . . In six essays that examine each of Keats's Great Odes, Nersessian tells a 'kind of love story' between herself and the poems." — *Publishers Weekly*

"Nersessian's knack for tapping into the emotional center of the odes comes from the third part of her book's approach: including a personal narrative. She isn't afraid of bringing her educated, loving, and damaged self (or at least the persona of one) into the discussion." — Allen Michie — *Arts Fuse*

"Two-hundred years after his death, Keats' Great Odes are still among the most-praised poems in the English language. Nersessian taps her lifelong attachment to Keats to illuminate each of the pieces with a personal and meditative essay." — *The Bookseller*

"The book's intimacy, vulnerability and determination to provoke is true to Keats, and Nersessian's genuine feeling for his work is never in doubt. One can't help but be pleased that two centuries on, Keats's odes still inspire engagement and love." — *Washington Post*

"[*Keats's Odes*] appears freed by the sensuousness of Keats's own verse, standing on the verge of becoming something more than literary criticism. While not an imitation of Keatsian style, Nersessian shares his willingness for vulnerability and for writing that enfleshes the experience of being subject to the world because you are a subject in it." — *Los Angeles Review of Books*

"Nersessian weaponizes her searing prose—and Keats's verse—for a very personal and yet deeply political mission. This short book is highly conscious of the world's evils, but makes a passionate case for humanity in the face of modern capitalism and the climate emergency. It is all the more powerful a reading of Keats because it rejects the simplistic contortionism that political readings often adopt." — *Camden New Journal*

"*Keats's Odes: A Lover's Discourse* by Anahid Nersessian is a deep and accessible delve into the poetry of one of the great Romantic poets. It is the perfect antidote to the way most of us had his poetry foisted on us in school as it's a wonderful combination of reverence for Keats' sublime writing and reality-based analysis." — *Blog Critics*

"In previous books, Nersessian has shown herself an excellent scholar of Romanticism. With *Keats's Odes: A Lover's Discourse*, she proves that her criticism can have memoiristic range, too. . . . What most impresses about *Keats's Odes* is how deftly Nersessian moves from Keats's vulnerability to her own." — *Commonweal*

"This is an intense, often dazzling, original, illuminating, idiosyncratic, but also welcoming and welcome book. Offering trenchant, astute, often polemical and sometimes breathtaking readings of

Keats's Odes—and simultaneously of love, politics, worldmaking, and self—Nersessian has written a propelled, impelled, impassioned work, truly in Keats's spirit." — Maureen N. McLane

"This book claims to be 'about' Keats's odes. And it is. But it is also about beauty and sadness and love and revolution and how the odes can help us to better understand these things. It is nothing short of a perfect book, one that understands how poetry can transform one's life. Nersessian is on track to be the Harold Bloom of her generation, but a Bloom with politics." — Juliana Spahr

The Grit of Odes

If you've never read anything on Keats's odes before, this book should not be your first stop. It is a collection of essays based on intimate, often idiosyncratic responses to the poems. In fact it is probably better to call them meditations instead of essays. The literary critics who've taught me the most about Keats are rarely if ever cited in what follows, as this is a book designed for non-specialists. For those who would like to read further, I recommend starting with WalterJackson Bate, The Stylistic Development of Keats; James Chandler, chapter 7 of England in 1819: The Politics of Literary Culture and the Case of Romantic Historicism; Paul H. Fry, "History, Existence, and 'To Autumn"; Marjorie Levinson, Keats's Life of Allegory; Jerome J. McGann, The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation; Christopher Ricks, Keats and Embarrassment: Nicholas Roe, John Keats and the Culture of Dissent, plus Roe's excellent biography; Helen Vendler, *The Odes of John Keats*; and Susan Wolfson, *Formal Charges: The Shaping of Poetry in British Romanticism* along with various essays.

While I was writing, Jonathan Kramnick pointed me toward Dorothy Van Ghent's unfinished Keats: The Myth of the Hero, edited and revised by Jeffrey Cane Robinson. It is out of print but well worth tracking down. The best biography is probably Bate's J*ohn Keats*, but Aileen Ward's J*ohn Keats: The Making of the Poet* is my favorite. As the book makes clear, I think any serious appreciation of Keats's poetry begins with the section on "Private Property and Communism" from Karl Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and the first volume of Capital, too.

John Keats was born on October 31,1795, and he died of tuberculosis on February 23,1821, aged twenty-five. In that narrow patch of existence he composed some of the most unrepentingly alive poems in the English language. It is possible that, had he survived, he would have written no more; quitting had always been an option, and he needed real money to support himself and his fiancée, Fanny Brawne. It is also possible that he would have kept writing, and possible too that he would have burrowed even deeper into the broken heart of his century, which, he knew, was reordering time and space in answer to the demands of a new and rapacious economic system. George Bernard Shaw saw in Keats the makings of "a full-blooded modern revolutionist," and if he didn't reach the barricades he did belong on them, because there was nothing Keats loved more than us: those who

know this is not all we are meant to be. His poetry is a record of that love and its wild, inconvenient expression. It is a lover's discourse, at once compassionate, exacting, indecent, and pure.

This book collects six of Keats's poems, known together as the Great Odes. I follow each ode with a short essay that is both critical and autobiographical, although the autobiographical dimension will not always be obvious. In that sense, the essays work like the odes. Odes, roughly speaking, are poems meant to celebrate something or someone, but because they are written from a place of emotional excess or ferment it's easy for them to tip over into more private preoccupations: thus Percy Bysshe Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind," which connects the cycle of the seasons to the here today, gone tomorrow movement of revolutionary struggle, also erupts into the furiously personal cri de coeur" I fall upon the thorns of life—I bleed!" In writing about Keats's odes, I have tried to prop myself open to this same uneven traffic of literary and intimate concerns. This book, then, is a love story: between me and Keats, and not just Keats.

Keats himself was famously lovable, despite having been born (he said) into an "unpromising moming." That sense of bleakness, of having failed before he had begun, dogged him. He was poor. He was short, six inches below average, and in ill health. Once he began publishing his work was almost universally panned. He was temperamental, obsessive, and thinskinned, and his childhood, which was traumatic, left him "nervous, morbid," in the words of his brother George. All the same, he amassed a small army of devoted friends, one of whom called him "the most lovable associate ...'that ever lived in the tide of times." Of his death, or perhaps their relationship, Brawne wrote, "I have not got over it, and never shall."

When I say this book is a love story, I mean it is about things that cannot be gotten over—like this world, and some of the people in it.

The word that gets used most often in conjunction with Keats is sensuous. He is fascinated by how things feel, and by the capacity of metaphor to register the dizzying strangeness of being a body among others. Only Keats could come up with "the thrilling liquidity of dewy piping" or"a breathless honey-feel of bliss," and not always to his credit. The early poetry, like the soupy epic Endymion, expels an unfortunate phrase every couple of lines: "well-wooing sun," "night-swollen mushrooms;' "fire-tailed exhalations," and so on. This kind of writing disgusted contemporary reviewers, who called it "puerile" and "effeminate;' "unhealthy" and "unclean"; "In Wordsworth," one sniffed, "there is no such unhealthy lusciousness." Lord Byron agreed: "Such poetry," he declared, "is a sort of mental masturbation," and elsewhere he snickers about "Johnny Keats's piss-a-bed-poetry. "A century later William Butler Yeats slides into the same vein:

> I see a schoolboy when I think of him
> With face and nose pressed to a sweet-shop window,
> For certainly he sank into his grave
> His senses and his heart unsatisfied,
> And made—being poor, ailing and ignorant,
> Shut out from all the luxury of the world,
> The coarse-bred son of a livery stable-keeper—
> Luxuriant song.

Yeats makes explicit what Byron doesn't have to: not only is Keats's poetry sexually deviant, its indecency (or "luxuriance") is amplified by his lower-middle-class status. The Romantic period had a taste for so-called peasant poets like Stephen Duck, Ann Yearsley, and John Clare, but Keats was not a peasant. Worse, he skimmed the proletarian perimeter while being aspirationally "shabby-genteel," "a fanciful dreaming tea-drinker" with a false claim on respectability. In the alchemy of nineteenth-

century social prejudice, this rendered him at once oversexed and insufficiently masculine. He was an outcast and a striver and out of genital control, "f-gg-g his Imagination" (Byron again) instead of a nice warm body. It's a singularly nasty assessment, and it sticks.

It sticks, in part, because when he died, Keats's friends played up elements of this picture, and the Victorian era (which Keats missed by just nine years) ate it up. He was a special favorite of the Pre-Raphaelites, who mined his work for inspiration; in their poems and canvases, colorless young men repine in the arms of no-good women with hairlike candy floss. He became then what he still is to many people now: an escapist, rolling around in visions of fairies and butterflies, deliriously aroused but somehow still chaste. In the big-box bookstores of my youth,you could always find cheap editions of his poems, squat volumes with gold paint sprayed along their edges. The checkout line held stacks of blank notebooks with Frank Dicksee's 1901 painting La Belle Dante sans Merci spilled across the front and Keats's more notable quotables—"I am certain of nothing but of the holiness of the heart's affections and the truth of the imagination"—printed in the margins. The poetry, it seemed, was safe, commercial, decorative. Above all, it was apolitical.

This would have stuck painfully in Keats's craw. The reason he got so much negative attention in the press is because he hung out with well-known radicals, and was a radical himself. When one reviewer dubbed Keats and his friends "the Cockney School of Poetry," he didn't just mean that they were, as the Brits say, N.O.C.D. (not our class, dear), he meant they were left-wingers, even revolutionaries. This is a view of Keats most academics now share, thanks in large measure to the legendary Walter Jackson Bate—who went from busing tables in campus dining halls to Harvard professor—whose 1963 biography turned Yeats's picture of the schoolboy randy for candy on its head. Bate's Keats was a bruiser, his Jacobin sympathies hung in plain sight. Today, if you suggest to a room full of Keats scholars that their man is apolitical, you might be asked to step outside.

The trouble with this view of Keats is that it rests heavily on his biography and not much, if at all, on his poetry. Although that poetry was written in dark times—in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and in the middle of the catastrophic economic downtown they engendered; during the breakneck acceleration of the Industrial Revolution, with its unspeakable dependence on human slavery in the Caribbean and elsewhere; in the wake of the Peterloo Massacre, when armed cavalry maimed or killed a still-unknown number of peaceful protestors—it says close to nothing about them. Keats's radicalism lies elsewhere, in his style.

It is true that Keats is a sensualist, that he is obsessed with capturing the heady particularities of taste and touch. It is also true that these tendencies can make his work seem anti-intellectual and even immoral—a gaudy retreat from the world's horrors. He did once claim that "with a great Poet the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration" and, according to his friend Benjamin Robert Haydon, "once covered his tongue and throat as far as he could reach with Cayenne pepper, in order to appreciate the delicious coldness of claret in all its glory? In 1880, Matthew Arnold raised these points by way of complaining about Keats's "sensuous strain," and also by way of complaining about his fans, "admirers whose pawing and fondness does not good but harm to the fame of Keats" by concentrating" attention upon what in him is least wholesome and most questionable? He is thinking of lines like these:

> Light feet, dark violet eyes, and parted hair;
> Soft dimpled hands, white neck, and creamy breast,
> Are things on which the dazzled senses rest
> Till the fond, fixed eyes forget they stare.

Arnold was more right than he knew. Keats's senses always strain, are always under stress. Dazzled does not just mean impressed but stricken, brought low, obliterated by beauty as by a blow to the head; it chimes with both fond and fixed, since the former means loving to the point of stupidity and the latter sounds a syllable out of "crucifixion." This is desire as duress, embodiment as ordeal.

The person who's really onto him is Shaw, who makes the surprising suggestion that passages of Keats would not be out of place in Das Kapital and that Karl Marx, had he written poetry, would have written it like Keats.' In Isabella; or, the Pot of Basil, Keats anticipates Marx's claim that industrial production requires an especially brutal "expenditure of human brain, nerves, muscles, and sense organs," and the poem, much like Das Kapital, is downright ghoulish (the action revolves around a severed head). Keats's poetry is chock full of viscera, and if his grislier images owe much to his stint as a medical student, they are also signs that Keats grasps something deep about capital's cannibal logic. For every set of soft dimpled hands, there are weary ones that "swelt / In torched mines and noisy factories," and for every creamy breast,"many once proud-quiver'd loins / In blood from stinging whip."

Early on Marx decided that "the forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present." Any attempt to understand the way things are had to be rigorously carnal: it could not operate "solely within the orbit of thought ... devoid of eyes, of teeth, of ears, of everything? Note the allusion to Jaques's "All the world's a stage" speech in As You Like It, where old age is the state of being "Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything." Keats had the same idea. His poetry concentrates on the effortful, even agonizing work of shaping the body's response to the world. He loved the lines from Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis that describe the goddess recoiling from the sight of her dead lover like a snail "whose tender horns being hit, / Shrinks backwards in his Shelly cave with pain, "eventually drafting them to describe the "innumerable compositions and decompositions which take place between the intellect and its thousand materials before it arrives at that trembling delicate and snail-horn perception of Beauty." To perceive is to hurt—sometimes a little, sometimes a lot. If the task of Marx's critique of political economy is to locate the cause of that pain, the task of Keats's poetry is to make it unforgettable.

The best poets, Keats says, are "chameleon": they change to match their surroundings, sometimes entering fully into the psychic and sensational orbit of other beings. Keats gave this talent a name: it was Negative Capability, and he had it to spare. "When I am in a room with people," he confided, "the identity of every one in the room begins to press upon me, so that I am in a very little time annihilated—not only among men; it would be the same in a nursery of Children."

This is empathy of an especially extravagant kind: it involves "filling some other body," to the point of knowing everything about how it thinks, feels, moves, and affects the bodies around it. In The Eve of St. Agnes, a girl getting ready for bed "unclasps her warmed jewels one by one;' the offhand adjective warmed cradling a remnant of her blood's own heat; the sonnet "To Mrs. Reynolds's Cat" describes a "gentle mew" as "upraise[d]," lifted through the air from the floor. It's a poetics of the 360° view and the fourth dimension. It makes language thick and extends its reach through time, until it becomes capable of preserving what William Blake calls "every little act" of existence—kinetic exchange and thermal transfer, stimulus and response—in an undaunted assertion that, even amid the waste and savagery of history,"not one sigh, nor smile, nor tear, / One hair, nor particle of dust, not one can pass away?

Love makes a good subject for this kind of writing. For one thing, it is a paradigmatic case of Negative Capability. "You have absorb'd me," Keats wrote to Brawne, "I have a sensation at the present moment as though I was dissolving? For another, it is as good a name as any for the wish not

to lose what the conditions of our lives demand be lost to us. You could call that our humanity if, like Marx, you were willing to define "human nature" as "communal nature. "You could call it freedom if, like Keats, you were willing to define freedom as vulnerability, an absolute openness to the annihilation of self. When Keats writes about love, which is almost all the time, he offers it to us in exactly this light, as the feeling of knowing, for once, what we are truly capable of—the widening circle of pleasure and joy, the depth of a loss that is also a gift and relic, unable to pass away.

The Great Odes record loves complementary processes of absorption and dissolution. They are, in Keats's phrase, "havens of intenseness" where the most unsparing expressions of desire can be at once sheltered and laid bare. Sexually engrossed though never explicit, they make intimacy into a form of endurance, difficult but necessary. This is an erotic sublime in which, as Keats says, we are pressed upon by those to whom we come close, and those to whom we never seem to get dose enough. Again and again, trials of longing, needing, having, caring, giving in, breaking down, leaving and failing to leave behind are met with candor and a fearless enthusiasm, for this poetry is honest—not in any limited moral sense, but because it is obstinate in its commitment to loving without shame or reservation. An ode by Keats is just that: an anchorage for big feelings that, in their sheer ungovernability, test what it might be like to be really free. It's an imperfect approximation, to be sure. Poetry is the art of taking what you can get.

*

Keats was, as Yeats says, the son of a stable-keeper. He left school at fifteen to train as an apothecary, and earned his license—which allowed him to work as a pharmacist, physician, and surgeon—in 1816. When he gave up medicine for poetry, it was much to the surprise of his childhood friends, who remembered him as "not litertny." "His penchant," one testified, "was for fighting":

He would fight any one—morning, noon, and night, his brother among the rest. It was meat and drink to him.... His sensibility was as remarkable as his indifference to be thought well of by the master as a 'good boy and to his tasks in general.... He was in every way the creature of passion.... The generosity and daring of his characterwith the extreme beauty and animation of his face made I remember an impression on me—and being some years his junior I was obliged to woo his friendship—in which I succeeded, but not till had fought several battles. This violence and vehemence—this pugnacity and generosity of disposition—in passions of tears or outrageous fits of laughter—always in extremes—will help to paint Keats in his boyhood. Associated as they were with an extraordinary beauty of person and expression, these qualities captivated the boys, and no one was more popular.

For Bate and Keats's other, almost exclusively male biographers, these testaments of physical bravado and sterling science—he once knocked the sauce out of an older boy he found torturing a kitten—prove that Keats was a healthy, red-blooded kid. They prove, in other words, that he was not the sissy Byron and the Victorians made him out to be. I could go on at length about the gender politics couched in these nervous assertions that Keats really was one of the guys, but there's something else that bothers me, too. I know it's a modern, not at all nineteenth-century thought, and yet I wonder: Did anyone ever take aside this little boy, always in extremes, and ask, "is something going on at home?"

In fact there was. When Keats was eight, his father was killed in a riding accident; his mother, née Frances Jennings, remarried almost instantly, and then she disappeared. When she returned five years later, she was dying. Although the source is suspect—he is Richard Abbey, guardian of the

Keats children and a character right out of Dickens—Keats's mother was evidently "addicted to drinking," her alcoholism "a temporary Gratification to those inordinate Appetites which seem to have been in one stage or another constantly soliciting her." You will hear the echoes of Byron's critique: mother and son, immoderate in appetite, degraded by pleasure, solicited and soliciting. "Her passions were so ardent," Abbey sniped, "it was dangerous to be alone with her."

"It's true what they say," writes Rivka Galchen,"that a baby gives you reason to live. But also, a baby is a reason that it is not permissible to die. There are days when this does not feel good." Frances Jennings didn't know she wasn't allowed to die, or it was a responsibility that choked her. As a young woman, she liked how she looked; when the streets were muddy, she would lift her skirts high to show off her legs. In eight years she gave birth to five children, one of whom died in infancy. John, her oldest, did not like her to leave the house; he had a dependent's instinct to get between Frances and herself and thus to save his own life, too. Haydon reports that "at 5 years of age or there abouts, he got hold of a naked sword ... His mother wanted to go out, but he threatened her so furiously that she burst into tears." When she came home to die, Keats, now fourteen, "sat up whole nights [with her] in a great chair, would suffer nobody to give her medicine but himself, or even cook her food." At school, he "gave way to such impassioned and prolonged grief (hiding himself in a nook under the master's desk) as awakened the liveliest pity and sympathy in all who saw him."

Keats would eventually stop fighting, but he remained on the hunt for nooks where impassioned and prolonged feelings of all kinds could linger and intensify, private worlds that are not really private and whose borders bleed out. Some of these worlds became poems, and some of them became the letters he would write to Brawne. These are often praised as some of the best love letters ever written, and they are. They can also be paranoid, swinging from helpless infatuation—"I never knew before, what such a love as you have made me feel, was; I did not believe in it; my Fancy was afraid of it, lest it should burn me up"—to dictatorial command: "If you could really what is call'd enjoy yourself at a Party—if you can smile in peoples faces, and wish them to admire you now, you never have nor ever will love me—I see life in nothing but the ce[r]tainty of your Love—convince me of it my sweetest. If I am not somehow convinc'd I shall die of agony." It doesn't take a great leap of psychoanalytic faith to imagine where this insecurity came from, nor why it so often discharged itself in runaway-train fantasies where the only possible termination of love is death. "You must be mine," he told Brawne, "to die upon the rack if I want you."

I tell these stories about Keats not to put him on the couch, and anyway he was his own most relentless self-excavator.

He worried that he didn't have "a right feeling toward women," and was disappointed in himself for struggling to square the reality that they were his "equal[s]" with the illusion that they were all goddesses, "ethereal above men." I tell these stories about Keats because they helped me love him, since it is hard not to love other people's damage, or at least it has been hard forme.

*

In the thick of a colossal heartbreak or else teetering on the lip of one, I went to see a witch. Someone had brandished forgiveness in front of me like baby Keats's sword, and I wanted to know how to answer. The question, I could tell, bored her. Frankly it bored me, and we had bigger fish to fry. One of the first things she said was, "you spend a lot of time with dead people."

I had never thought of it that way, but she's exactly right. I told her that, yes, I think about dead people all day. I read what they've written and try to understand what they've meant; then I stand in front of teenagers and offer up intimate details about their lives—their exercise routines and

puerperal fevers, the children and ideals they tried to hold onto and those they cast aside. I explain how dose they came to imagining communism, mostly as an excuse to drill into my students what communism is ("the land belongs to no one" and "the fruits belong to all"—Sylvain Maréchal, 1796). If I'm being completely honest, I do feel sometimes that they are in the room with me, and I tell the witch that lately one of them has a presence that feels very angry, as if he has taken a side in the matter of the heartbreak, and it is not mine. The witch is skeptical. "I don't know what to tell you about that," she says, "but you need to be more careful with spirits."

Keats, too, spent a lot of time with dead people, as a medical student dissecting cadavers and, like me, in his head. He had a feeling he was being watched—by Shakespeare. To Haydon he copped to having "notions of a good Genius presiding over" him, then asked, with his usual blend of diffidence and bra-vado,"Is it too Daring to Fancy Shakespeare this Presider?" If I've had similar notions of Keats, I have no idea why he might preside over me. I've never had literary ambitions. In college the only people who called themselves poets were wealthy, freckled New Englanders who dressed as puns for Halloween. I threw in my lot with the art majors, soft-spoken lefties, and kids in bands, was stoned all day and spent weekend mornings in a friend's attic room, where we tried to wrap our heads around Althusser and Fanon. There was a group of us who identified, though we'd never say so out loud, as critics: people who know what words mean. To this day I don't like being called a writer, even in the indirect context of a compliment like "You're a good writer." I don't like the compliment either; in grad school I learned that good writer was a synonym for con artist.

If Keats is presiding over me, I guess he has his reasons; he's been doing it for a long time. One day, when I must have been around eleven, I pulled a book called Love's Aspects down from my parents' shelf. Edited by Jean Garrigue, it promised to be a collection of the world's great love poems, but inside were also Keats's letters to Brawne —not poems at all but, in their naked sense of direction, irreducibly epistolary documents. Once I learned what happened to these two young people, I felt personally cheated by the tragedy. I wanted more of them both, including or maybe especially Brawne, whose voice is almost absent from the historical record. I promptly read all the Keats I could, including die great mid-century biographies—by Aileen Ward, Robert Gittings, Bate—and from here it was an easy glide to Shelley, Byron, Coleridge, even Wordsworth, the awful man who had insulted Keats at a dinner party by calling Endymion "a very pretty piece of Paganism."

It's hard to overstate what a lifeline this literature, which I didn't yet know to call the Western canon, was for me, or how unambivalent about it I was. My father was born and raised in Tehran, and my mother, whose family is Welsh, in a depressed former mining town that used to be called Lake City, Tennessee, site of the Coal Creek War and a stone's throw from the Fraterville Mine Disaster. Eastern Armenian, with its chic cargo of loan words from Farsi and French, was the first language I spoke and the whole of my identity—with a name as conspicuous as mine, I didn't have much choice—but in the 1980s and '90s, spun on a loop of hostage crises, arms deals, burning flags and burning oil fields, commercial airplanes shot out of the sky, it was the Iranian bit that caused the most trouble.

Like many kids who don't look like their classmates, who cart around odd names and are told, loudly and sternly, by the teacher that when they choose construction paper on which to draw a self-portrait they had better not choose white, since anyone can see their skin is much darker than that, I figured out early that WASPs couldn't be trusted with their own culture. I aligned myself with the literary past not to be like them but as a higher order of civilization, a bulwark against the barbarian hordes of saddle-shoe blondes who didn't know the difference between Iran and Iraq but took the Gulf War as their latest provocation to kick me literally in the teeth. Besides, being "good at it" was

praised and rewarded. When I got in trouble, which was often, it was the English teachers who had my bath.

Among the dead, I was anonymous and nearly blank, a disembodied competence. That felt good, was a relief, and as I read more, got smarter and more skilled, I began to hope that the past might need me as much as I needed it. It wasn't until later that a certain disharmony began creeping into my alliance with my books. I don't mean the propitious analytic friction that discovering feminism and, around the same time, Marxism generated between us. I mean the smaller, sadder recognition that this literature could not imagine me—that if it had helped give me a place in the world there was still no place for me in it. Even "my blankness," as Renee Gladman says, had no shape there, and yet it seemed there was no place else it could have been born: "When I looked for it—reaching into myself for it—it was only the page that I found. I didn't know whether at some point in my past, perhaps at the very first moment I set out to write, the page had fallen out of me or I had risen out of it."

What I mean is this. As far as the past is concerned, we exceptionally modern people—the immigrant, the feminist, the communist, the differently desiring—will always be unsubstantiated, a possibility no one thought to put a frame around. By contrast there are those in possession of identities, or aspects of identities, that guarantee they will always be included in the tiny circle Wordsworth draws when he defines the poet as "a man speaking to men;' even if they would rather not be. You could describe this state of being unimaginable as a kind of unrequited love but even that implies a relationship, or at least a relation. What I have in mind is a more absolute sense of not mattering.

I love Keats not because I belong in his poetry, but because his poetry wants so much to belong to us—to those who know intimately why a relentless self-exposure to the world has to be made, somehow, into a virtue because otherwise it is just abuse. I use the word virtue without irony; it could be replaced with tactic. To say that his poetry is a lover's discourse is to acknowledge that, in love, the line between a strength and a liability can be hard to determine. The dream of Marx's communism is that the basic agony of having a body might be expropriated or stolen away from all unnecessary and debilitating uses of human life and remade into the condition of shared freedom. Keats is not far off, and when he told Brawne that "all my unhappiest days and nights have I find not at all cured me of my love of Beauty, but made it so intense that I am miserable when you are not with me," he didn't just mean Brawne but, I believe, the very chance of other people: their dream, their freedom. He took his own history of not mattering and turned it into a poetry that voids all the lethal systems and prejudices that decide who lives and who dies, and he did it by insisting that what we love is sacred, as is the act of loving it. He may not have been speaking to me but this, in Sean Bonney's ineradicable words, is what I've heard: "for 'love / of beauty' say fuck the police."

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"The distinguishing character of an ode," according to one eighteenth-century commentator, "is sweetness." Really it's sweetness in the sense of sweet talk: ulterior and quietly demanding. Because odes are poems of praise or commemoration, they typically talk to or at something or someone. This is why odes so often make use of a rhetorical device called apostrophe, an address to an entity who won't or cannot answer back: the wind, a corpse, a concept, a god. Not coincidentally, Roland Barthes, in his *Fragments d'un Discours Amoureux* — translated as A Lover's Discourse—suggests that love is marked by a strange compulsion to speak to those who aren't there. This is a "preposterous situation": "You have gone (which I lament), you are here (since I am addressing you.)"

For Barthes, this apostrophic "discourse of absence" is

> a version of what Freud describes as the game of fort/da, in which the child faced with his mother leaving for work uses a toy to control his anxiety, throwing it away from him and then pulling it close in imitation of the absolute authority he wants over his parent, and in which the adult falls dysfunctionally back on a grown-up version of the same strategy, using not a toy but the discredited person herself: "All right, then, go away! I don't need you," and so forth, in Freud's ventriloquism. But if love is an invitation to act out—to drift into habits of ambivalent attachment left over from childhood—it is also an invitation to refine language *ad in finitum*. "Absence persists," and if we have to endure it we might as well "manipulate it: transform the distortion of time into an oscillation, produce rhythm," delaying "as long as possible the moment when the other might topple sharply from absence into death;' might cross the line between not there now and never here again.

Part of what makes A Lover's Discourse so compelling is the way each of its chapters focuses on a single word from love's vocabulary, polishing and proliferating its meaning in an effort to defer the inevitable. From that single word, the entire history of a relationship unspools only to be wound back up again, circling the memory of an experience at once utterly specific and humblingly universal. Regardless of whom you last loved, or when, or for how long, we've all been using the same pocket dictionary:

Every contact, for the lover, raises the question of an answer:

> the skin is asked to reply.... A squeeze of the hand—enormous documentation—a tiny gesture within the palm, a knee which doesn't move away, an arm extended, as if quite naturally, along the back of a sofa and against which the other's head gradually comes to rest—this is the paradisiac realm of subtle

and clandestine signs: a kind of festival not of the senses but of meaning.

As Barthes makes clear, you do not need another person to help you interpret these signs, least of all the person you love. They are best studied in isolation, and that too is the condition of the ode which, like any lyric poem, understands solitude as the prerequisite for entertaining a problem.

The problem, in Barthes's phrasing, is this: "not ... make it stop! but: /want to understand (what is happening to me)!" Each of Keats's odes plumbs states of feeling that accompany the drama of this inquiry. In terms of their structure, they are all more or less modified (Keats said "better") sonnets, rearrangements and dilations of the fourteen-line form. His models were Petrarch and Shakespeare, but ultimately he decided that Italian sonnets worked only in Italian and that the English variant, with its tidy final couplet, was too poised and selfassured. By contrast, the stanzas Keats invented for his odes are messy and meandering, their rhymes often partial and often forgettable. They describe the soul's encounter with something hard—a thought, an event, a feeling, a pleasure or an undiluted pain—and that process of description is slow, difficult, erratic. It is also open-ended. The odes are love poems: it is hard to tell when they're over.

Somebody once told me love is the best word to write but also the hardest. Keats uses it all the time, with a kind of originary fervor like he's Adam naming the animals: this is love, and this is love, and this too, this is also love. I'm more of a stickler, so it's hard for me to saywhat I must,that I wrote to understand what was happening to me, and I couldn't get to the end of it. Although this book is not a memoir but a work of literary criticism, the whole of a particular love is folded inside it.

The first and last essays in the book are fairly conventional pieces of scholarship, while the second, on "Ode on a Grecian Urn," introduces an autobiographical element to help consider the poem in

light of recent debates around the political function of the Western literary canon. The three essays in the middle, on the three least famous odes, tell a story—indirectly, in fits and starts, through words I borrowed when I couldn't use my own. It is, as I've said, a love story, but like everything else in this book it is also about the forming of the five senses in this place, at this time, about what is happening to us now that we have collectively reached yet another set of prospects to call unendurable. For me, these stories will always belong to each other, and maybe that's what Dorothy Van Ghent had in mind when, in a discarded draft of a never-finished book on Keats, she admits that Keats's poems were "somehow entangled with my own psychic processes,

> disorders, discontents, fleeting fantasies and promises, "ideals" crippled in the course of life and swallowed by the unconscious because they didn't seem to work in the pressing actualities of existence, were in fact a hindrance and a source of anxiety in meeting economic problems and all those difficulties which make it so doubtful whether one shall sink or swim. Apparently Keats's poems represented buried elements of myself, killed off by the terrible rigors of existence, and insistently hammering for recognition, showing that they were still there. I had a notion that there lay in this phenomenon a general description of the "serious meaning" of poetry[.]

When he was dying, Keats said of Brawne,"I see her as a figure eternally vanishing." These words are for the love I still see that way, and for the love that is still here, and ours. <>

The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology and Religion edited by James R. Liddle, Todd K. Shackelford [Oxford Library of Psychology, Oxford University Press, 9780199397747]

Critical Assessment

The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology and Religion provides some emerging critical perspectives on the nature of religion viewed within the spectrum of an evolutionary psychology grounded in cognitive and behavioral research studies. The authors mostly eschew academic abstraction, except for the introduction crucial operational concepts. An authoritative introduction to the field.

The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology and Religion offers a comprehensive and compelling review of research in religious beliefs and practices from an evolutionary perspective on human psychology. The chapters, written by renowned experts on human behavior and religion, explore a number of subtopics within one of three themes: (1) the psychological mechanisms of religion, (2) evolutionary perspectives on the functionality of religion, and (3) evolutionary perspectives on religion and group living.

The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology and Religion unites the theoretical and empirical work of leading scholars in the evolutionary, cognitive, and anthropological sciences to produce an extensive and authoritative review of this literature. Its interdisciplinary approach makes it an important resource for a broad spectrum of researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates who are interested in studying the factors and mechanisms that underlie and/or affect religious beliefs and behaviors.

An Introduction to Evolutionary Perspectives on Religion by James R. Liddle and Todd K. Shackelford

Given that religious beliefs and behaviors are so pervasive and have such a powerful influence, it is vital to try to understand the psychological underpinnings of religiosity. This chapter introduces the topic of evolutionary perspectives on religion, beginning with an attempt to define "religion," followed by a primer on evolutionary psychology and the concept of evolved psychological mechanisms. With this framework in place, the chapter then provides an overview of key adaptationist and byproduct hypotheses of various components of religion, highlighting the complementary nature of these hypotheses and their roles in forming a cohesive understanding of the evolution of religion. Concepts introduced in this chapter include hyperactive agency detection, minimally counterintuitive concepts, in-group cooperation, costly signaling theory, gods as moralizing agents, and cultural evolution.

KEY WORDS: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, RELIGION, RELIGIOSITY, EVOLVED PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISM, ADAPTATION, BYPRODUCT, CULTURAL EVOLUTION

Religion has been and continues to be a powerful force throughout the world, having a substantive influence on individuals, communities, and even nations. Because religious beliefs and behaviors are so pervasive and have such a powerful influence, it is vital to try to understand the psychological underpinnings of religiosity. Psychologists have spent over a century examining religiosity (e.g., James, 2008/1902), but given the variety and complexity of religious beliefs and behaviors, there is still much that we do not understand. In recent years, an evolutionary psychological approach to religion has begun to add to our understanding, specifically by addressing the origins and functions of religion. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce much of the evolutionary psychological research on religion, setting the stage for the chapters that follow. By doing so, this chapter attempts to provide a coherent view of what we know about the origin and function of religious beliefs and behaviors, discuss what we do not know, and highlight directions for future research. However, before discussing these details, it is necessary to briefly discuss what is meant by "religion."

What Is Religion?

Religion consists of a complex suite of beliefs and behaviors, with much variability within and between particular religious worldviews. Slone (2008) illustrates this concept well, while only scratching the surface of religious diversity:

> Nearly 2.5 billion of the world's people belong to an institution that regularly serves its members a small meal of baked dough and fruit juice. The members are told that the meal is the flesh and blood of a dead-but-living fatherless god-man who has the superpowers to grant utopian immortality to those who eat him. Nearly 1.5 billion of the world's people belong to a different institution that requires that five times a day members wash parts of their bodies with water, get down on their knees, bend over, and put their heads on the ground while repeating prescribed words. Members of this institution are also required to starve and parch themselves all day every day for a full lunar month. Some believe that taking even a sip of water during this time can result in eternal hellish punishment after death. (p. 181)

This description, while informative of the variability between two of the world's major organized religions, leaves out an even greater degree of variability that can be found when one includes tribal religions, in which adherents often believe in several gods, ghosts, and/or spirits with various abilities, personalities, and motivations, and have elaborate rituals and rules about how to interact with these agents (see Boyer, 2001, this volume; Moro & Myers, 2010).

Given the complexity of religious behavior and the degree to which religions can vary, generating a single definition of "religion" is extremely difficult. Indeed, there is no general consensus among those researching religion on how it should be defined (see Gervais, this volume; Cragun & Sumerau, this volume). Nevertheless, Atran (2002, p. 13) has provided a definition of religion that serves as a useful starting point for the purposes of this chapter and is echoed throughout several chapters of this volume. Atran defines religion by providing a list of components that he argues converge in all societies to become what we refer to as religion. The four components are:

1. widespread counterfactual belief in supernatural agents (gods, ghosts, goblins, etc.);
2. hard-to-fake public expressions of costly material commitments to supernatural agents—that is, sacrifice (offerings of goods, time, other lives, one's own life, etc.);
3. a central focus of supernatural agents on dealing with people's existential anxieties (death, disease, catastrophe, pain, loneliness, injustice, want, loss, etc.); and

4. ritualized and often rhythmic coordination of 1, 2, and 3—that is, communion (congregation, intimate fellowship, etc.).

This definition strikes a balance between specificity and generality, such that it likely captures almost all worldviews that we would intuitively consider to be "religions" while excluding phenomena that should not be considered religions (e.g., political ideologies, devotion to one's favorite sports team, empiricism, etc.).

Atran's definition also above provides a useful roadmap for analyzing religion. Rather than attempting to analyze and explain religion as a whole, we can attempt to analyze and explain the individual components he identifies. The following sections of this chapter introduce how an evolutionary psychological perspective can aid in our understanding of these components of religion. But first it is worth clarifying what an evolutionary psychological perspective entails.

Applying an Evolutionary Psychological Perspective to Religion

Evolutionary psychology is not a subdiscipline of psychology, such as social psychology or personality psychology, but rather an approach to psychology that applies evolutionary theory (Buss, 2019). Evolutionary psychology is founded on the premise that the brain, like every other organ, has evolved and is therefore open to analysis from an evolutionary perspective, which means that the products of the brain (i.e., thoughts, feelings, behaviors, psychology) are open to evolutionary analysis as well. For example, an evolutionary psychological approach has proven useful in examining social behavior (Cosmides, 1989), learning (MacDonald, 2007; Weber & Depew, 2003), memory (McBurney, Gaulin, Devineni, & Adams, 1997), and perception (Rhodes, 2006), to name only a few topics. In short, all aspects of human cognition can be better understood by applying an evolutionary analysis, and religious beliefs and behaviors are no exception.

More specifically, evolutionary psychologists posit that the mind is composed of domain-specific (and possibly a smaller number of domain-general) modules, or "evolved psychological mechanisms," which evolved as solutions to specific and recurrent adaptive problems throughout our evolutionary history (Buss, 2019; see also Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). This is a particularly useful concept when attempting to understand religion. Given the complexity of religion, it makes sense that rather than attempting to understand religion as the result of the mind in general, we should expect that religion results from the activity of several domain-specific psychological mechanisms that evolved as a consequence of specific adaptive problems. However, an important question to consider is whether religious beliefs and behaviors themselves are the adaptive solutions that these mechanisms evolved to produce, or if they are better understood as byproducts of these or other mechanisms.

Despite what some critics of evolutionary psychology have suggested (e.g., Gould, 2000), evolutionary psychologists do not operate under the assumption that all behaviors are the product of specialized adaptations. In addition to adaptations, evolution by natural selection is capable of producing what are known as byproducts (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998), and evolutionary psychologists acknowledge and apply this concept to the study of the mind. In terms of evolutionary biology, an often-cited example of a byproduct is the whiteness of bones (Buss et al., 1998). This trait has no impact on survival or reproduction, but it inevitably results from increased calcium concentrations in bones, which is an adaptation to increase bone strength. In terms of evolutionary psychology, examples of byproduct hypotheses include the possibility that music and art are byproducts of language acquisition and habitat preference, respectively (Pinker, 1997).

This leads us to the question of whether religion is an adaptation or a byproduct. However, not only is this question difficult to answer, it may be unanswerable because it is overly simplistic. As Shariff (2008) notes:

> Religions are complex. More than that, they are complexes, stitched together from many elements that have evolved at different times for different reasons. Some aspects of religion may be, or may have been, individually or culturally adaptive, whereas others may be more analogous to viruses. Asking whether religion, as a whole, is adaptive is a misleading question. (p. 119)

Therefore, instead of asking whether religion in general is an adaptation or a byproduct, a better approach is to ask whether particular components of religion are adaptations or byproducts. As the next two sections will show, approaching the problem from this perspective results in byproduct and adaptation arguments that are not mutually exclusive (see, e.g., Stagnaro & Rand, this volume), despite the fact that these different accounts of religiosity are often discussed as if they are pitted against each other (Kirkpatrick, 2008; Schloss, 2008). But even if byproduct and adaptationist accounts are not in competition, it is still useful to examine the arguments and evidence for each separately, and then one can attempt to unify them into a coherent account of religion.

Byproduct Accounts of Religion

As Atran (2002) notes in his definition of religion, belief in supernatural agents is a universal component of religious worldviews. Therefore, a vital component of any thorough account of religion must explain why humans are predisposed to believing in supernatural agents. From an evolutionary perspective, the leading accounts of why people believe in supernatural agents suggest that these beliefs emerged as a byproduct of evolved psychological mechanisms designed for other purposes. This section discusses what some of those mechanisms may be, what their evolved functions may be, and how they contribute to religious beliefs.

Arguably the most important evolved psychological mechanism involved in the belief in supernatural agents is what Barrett (2000, 2004) has labeled the hyperactive agent-detection device, or HADD. Although not necessarily the first to recognize the human proclivity for detecting agency in the environment, this concept and the rationale behind it was developed by Guthrie (1980), who has since elaborated the idea. Guthrie's argument rests on three assumptions: "perception is interpretation, interpretation aims at significance, and significance generally corresponds to the degree of organization perceived". These assumptions are explained in detail in what follows.

All stimuli that we perceive are necessarily ambiguous, in that they can be interpreted in an indefinite number of ways. This ambiguity is rarely noticed, though, because we have evolved predispositions to interpret stimuli in ways that were most beneficial to our ancestors. In other words, we have evolved mental heuristics that resulted, on average, in interpretations that were the least costly for our ancestors relative to other interpretations. One such heuristic is to assume that agency is involved whenever this is a possibility, because agents are often the most significant interpretations possible, generating the greatest amount of inferential potential. Even if we are wrong, a false-positive identification of agency is less costly than a false-negative. For our ancestors, assuming that a particular stimulus was not an agent (or the result of an agent) could have resulted in the loss of a meal (if the stimulus was prey) or even severe injury or death (if the stimulus was a predator). These possibilities, while rare, would have been far costlier than the potential waste of time resulting from a false-positive detection of agency. As explained by error management theory, such asymmetrical costs should result in evolved psychological mechanisms biased toward the less costly output. Therefore, we have likely inherited from our ancestors a mechanism best described as the

hyperactive agent-detection device, a perceptual system that is designed to assume the presence of agency when faced with ambiguous stimuli.

There are many sources of evidence that support the existence of the hyperactive agent-detection device. For example, the logic behind the functionality of the hyperactive agent-detection device (i.e., that false-positives are less costly than false-negatives) can be observed in species other than humans. Guthrie (1993) notes that frogs respond to small moving objects with flicks of the tongue and large moving objects with leaps into the water, interpreting the stimuli as prey or predator, respectively. These interpretations are the best bets a frog can make, resulting in the greatest potential payoff and the smallest potential cost. Other animals are also predisposed to detect agency even when it is not necessarily there, as Darwin (2006/1871) observed while watching his dog:

> [M]y dog . . . was lying on the lawn during a hot and still day; but at a little distance a slight breeze occasionally moved an open parasol, which would have been wholly disregarded by the dog, had any one stood near it. As it was, every time that parasol slightly moved, the dog growled fiercely and barked. He must, I think, have reasoned to himself in a rapid and unconscious manner, that movement without any apparent cause indicated the presence of some strange living agent, and no stranger had a right to be on his territory.

Darwin's account of the cognitive process resulting in the dog interpreting the stimuli as an indication of agency is impressively prescient with respect to Guthrie's account of agency detection: The dog was presented with an ambiguous stimulus that could be interpreted as the result of agency or natural causes, but ultimately interpreted it as an agent because this represents the most significant, potentially useful, interpretation.

While these examples provide support for hyperactive agency detection in other species, substantial evidence exists for humans as well. Not only are human infants capable of detecting agency but also this detection appears to be hypersensitive. A study by Gergely and Csibra indicates that stimuli as simple as dots on a computer screen can activate perceptions of agency in infants. When a dot is shown moving in a particular direction on a screen and continually appears to bump into a wall, infants appear to be surprised when the wall is removed and the dot continues to perform the same motion. As Bering describes it:

> It's as if the baby is staring at the dot trying to figure out why the dot is acting as though it "thinks" the barrier is still there. By contrast, the infants are not especially interested . . . when the dot stops in front of the block, or when the dot continues along its path in the absence of the barrier.

Several other studies have also shown that both children and adults tend to view the movement of simple dots and geometric shapes as interacting agents with their own goals and motivations. Infants are even capable of inferring moral behavior in geometric shapes. When shown a vignette of one shape moving up a hill, another shape "blocking" the first shape from reaching the top, and a third shape "helping" the first shape by pushing it up the hill from behind, infants prefer to play with the "helper" shape rather than the "hinderer" shape, suggesting that they perceive these as good and bad agents, respectively. Importantly, when adults are shown the same vignette, they easily can describe the events as if these shapes are agents with individual goals and moral attitudes. In summary, the ability to detect agency and apply it to inanimate objects (given that these objects exhibit simple signs of agency, such as seemingly voluntary movement) emerges very early in life and persists into adulthood, supporting the idea that humans possess a hyperactive agent-detection device. However, there are still several questions that need to be addressed before the hyperactive agent-detection device can be invoked to help explain religious beliefs.

Even if we have a predisposition for detecting agency, how would this lead to us believing in agents that are invisible or immaterial (i.e., supernatural)? For starters, it is important to note that not all gods throughout history have had the qualities of invisibility and/or immateriality (e.g., the Greek gods; Guthrie, 2008). Furthermore, Guthrie (2008) notes that invisibility and immateriality are not as unusual as one may initially think as characteristics of agents. For example, several animals have the ability to use camouflage that makes them, for all intents and purposes, invisible when in the proper environments or until they move. Intangibility can also be achieved, to a certain extent, in certain animals, such as those who travel in schools, flocks, and so forth, making it difficult to differentiate individual agents.

It is also important to emphasize that detecting agency does not always involve detecting the agent directly; agency can often be inferred by detecting the effects of agents. The hyperactive agent-detection device not only predisposes us to view certain ambiguous stimuli as agents, but it also predisposes us to view certain ambiguous stimuli as the results of agents, because the same rules of false-positives and false-negatives apply: If it is possible that a certain event was caused by an agent, it is potentially more costly to assume it was not caused by an agent than to assume that it was.

Therefore, it is not necessary to actually perceive agents in order to infer their existence, leaving open the possibility that certain stimuli are the products of agents that cannot be seen, leading to belief in supernatural agents.

Although the hyperactive agent-detection device provides a possible explanation for why humans are capable of believing in supernatural agents, the explanation provided so far offers little understanding of the particular characteristics of these agents. For example, why are supernatural agents almost always perceived as having human traits (e.g., human emotions, desires, motivations, etc.; see Boyer, 2001)? Guthrie (1993) notes that when interpreting ambiguous stimuli, "The most significant possibilities are usually organisms, especially humans. Practically, humans are most significant because their organization makes them most powerful and able to generate the widest range of effects" (p. 241, italics added). Furthermore, humans seem to be naturally inclined to believe in mind-body dualism, or the belief that the mind can exist independently of the body. Bering argues that this belief is "an inevitable by-product of our theory of mind". More specifically, we are unable to imagine what it is like to not have consciousness, such as after we die, and are thus unable to "turn off" our theory of mind when imagining our own death or the deaths of others. This results in the universal belief in an afterlife of some kind (with the specific characteristics of the afterlife varying across cultures), and therefore the belief that the mind can exist independently of the body.

Studies by Bering and Bjorklund and Bering, Blasi, and Bjorklund indicate that the belief that certain mental states exist after death emerges in childhood and continues into adulthood. When asked questions following a puppet show of an anthropomorphized mouse being eaten by an alligator, most children 11–12 years old understand that biological, psychobiological, and perceptual abilities cease to function, but are less inclined to state that emotions, desires, and epistemic beliefs cease to function. This same trend is even stronger in adults, who are operating on the basis of afterlife beliefs that have been instilled in them for a greater length of time than for children. Even adults who explicitly deny believing in an afterlife demonstrate a tendency (albeit weaker than other adults) to believe that these mental functions survive death (Bering, 2002). In summary, because humans are predisposed to believing that the mind can persist without a body, they are capable of perceiving human agents without bodies (i.e., supernatural agents).

Finally, to further explain how belief in supernatural agents emerged in our ancestors, it is necessary to invoke another byproduct account advanced by Boyer, who argues that our memory systems are

susceptible to minimally counterintuitive concepts (MCIs), and that a byproduct of this susceptibility is belief in supernatural agents. This concept fits nicely with Guthrie's account of agency detection, in that it builds on the premise that we are likely to detect supernatural agents that possess human minds. Boyer argues that when humans perceive a stimulus, the ontological category to which that stimulus belongs is automatically activated, and with it several assumptions are made about that stimulus. For example, when we detect human agents, that agent is automatically endowed with all the physical and mental capabilities that are typical to the category of "human" (e.g., our theory of mind is activated). Concepts of supernatural human agents are particularly memorable because they keep most of these characteristics intact, but violate a minimal number of our ontological expectations, making them minimally counterintuitive concepts.

The idea that minimally counterintuitive concepts are more memorable than other concepts has been supported empirically. Boyer and Ramble (2001) performed a series of experiments to determine the recall rates of concepts that varied in terms of their counter-intuitiveness. They found that minimally counterintuitive concepts elicited greater recall rates than both intuitive concepts that did not violate any ontological assumptions and concepts that violated several ontological assumptions. These findings were replicated by Barrett and Nyhof, and they were also replicated cross-culturally.

Also, it is important to note that not just any minimally counterintuitive concept will be easily remembered and transmitted; this is only likely to occur when the minimally counterintuitive concept has a high degree of inferential potential. For example, a rock that turns invisible when you look at it is technically an minimally counterintuitive concept, but this concept is not useful at all for explaining or predicting events. Human minimally counterintuitive concepts, on the other hand, have the potential to be extremely useful, because humans are known to have beliefs, desires, motivations, and so forth, that can be used to predict their actions.

With the byproduct accounts described so far in this section, we can begin to assemble a hypothetical account of how belief in supernatural agents may have arisen in humans. Our ancestors were almost certainly exposed to many types of ambiguous stimuli that could have activated their predisposition for detecting agency. As Rossano notes, "Natural processes with no obvious explanation—storms, illness, animal behavior, and so forth—were all prime candidates for the actions of a supernatural agent". The best bet for attempting to explain such phenomena would be human-like agents, as humans were (and continue to be) viewed as the most capable agents for affecting the world. Even if these human-like agents could not be perceived directly, it would not have been difficult for our ancestors to assume their existence, because they most likely held the implicit belief that the human mind can exist independently of the body. Furthermore, beliefs in human-like agents who violated a minimal number of ontological assumptions, such as being able to control processes that normal humans have no control over, would have had a selective advantage over other interpretations, because our ancestors' memories were most susceptible to these kinds of beliefs. Therefore, beliefs in supernatural agents with human qualities who interact with the world were likely to be remembered and transmitted to others, laying a foundation for what would eventually become the supernatural agents found in tribal and organized religions today.

An additional byproduct account that has received comparatively little attention from those researching the evolution of religion has the potential to explain the emergence of ritualized behaviors, which Atran considers to be an important component of religion. Once our ancestors held the belief that supernatural agents were responsible for certain events, it is likely that they would have attempted to interact with these agents to attempt to influence their actions. This

possibility was noted by Darwin, who reasoned that "The same high mental faculties which first led man to believe in unseen spiritual agencies . . . would infallibly lead him . . . to various strange superstitions and customs". However, if these supernatural agents did not actually exist, how could any behavior geared toward interacting with them persist? Would it not eventually be obvious that these attempts at interaction were futile? Not necessarily, due to the human predisposition to infer causation and the nature of reinforcement learning.

Much like our hypersensitivity to cues of agency, it appears that we are hypersensitive to cues of causation. It is reasonable to assume that this hypersensitivity exists for a similar reason that the hyperactive agent-detection device exists: Causal events provide a more significant, and therefore more useful, interpretation of events compared to randomness. Michotte was the first to demonstrate the ease with which individuals can be led to infer causation. For example, when shown a simple geometric shape on a screen moving toward another shape and touching it, followed by the touched shape moving, people assume that the first object caused the movement of the second. However, if there is a slight delay between the first shape touching the second and the second shape's movement, causation is no longer inferred. Therefore, the human perception of causation alone seems insufficient to explain the origin of ritualized behavior directed toward supernatural agents. Although it is possible that the occasional pairing of behavior and desired outcomes (e.g., a rain dance paired with the ending of a drought) would elicit a causal interpretation, the many instances in which the two events are not paired would seemingly deter a causal interpretation. However, even rare pairings of behavior and reward can result in ritualized behavior because of the way our brains are designed to facilitate reinforcement learning.

Given that any behaviors aimed at influencing supernatural agents would have fallen on deaf ears, our ancestors would have been exposed to a random schedule of reinforcement, in which their actions would occasionally, but only rarely, correspond to desired outcomes, suggesting that their attempt at "communication" had been successful. The possibility for random reinforcement to elicit ritualized behavior was initially illustrated by Skinner (1948, as cited in Dennett, 2006) and his "superstitious" pigeons. Dennett (2006) provides an informative and entertaining interpretation of the series of events:

> Every so often, no matter what the pigeon was doing at the moment, a click and a food-pellet reward were delivered. Soon the pigeons put on this random schedule were doing elaborate "dances," bobbing and whirling and craning their necks. It's hard to resist putting a soliloquy into these birds' brains: "Now, let's see: the last time I got the reward, I'd just spun around once and craned my neck. Let's try it again. . . . Nope, no reward. Perhaps I didn't spin enough. . . . Nope. Perhaps I should bob once before spinning and craning. . . . YESSS! OK, now what did I just do?"

Recent work in neuroscience provides an explanation for this phenomenon, which applies to humans as well as to pigeons and any organism capable of learning through conditioning. Studies by Niv and colleagues have documented that dopaminergic spikes are an important component for the establishment of classical and operant conditioning. Without reviewing the details, the key is that this release of dopamine plays an important role in synaptic plasticity and learning, namely by strengthening the neural connections associated with whatever neural activity preceded the reward, whether it was the perception of a stimulus (in classical conditioning) or the initiation of behavior (in operant conditioning). The latter effect is of particular importance in explaining the emergence of ritualized behaviors. When our ancestors engaged in behaviors designed to influence supernatural agents, they were occasionally "rewarded" with desirable outcomes. When this happened, the neural connections associated with whatever behaviors they were engaging in at the time were strengthened, thereby increasing the likelihood of performing those behaviors in the future. Any

elaborations added to the initial behaviors would be subsequently strengthened as well if they were initiated at a time when the reward was obtained again. In short, it seems feasible that reinforcement learning predisposed humans to develop rituals associated with attempting to communicate or otherwise interact with supernatural agents.

Adaptationist Accounts of Religion

The psychological mechanisms described thus far—the hyperactive agent-detection device, susceptibility to minimally counterintuitive concepts, afterlife reasoning (i.e., belief in mind-body dualism), the perception of causality, and reinforcement learning—are the best candidates so far for explaining the origin of what would eventually become the complex religious beliefs and behaviors that exist today. More specifically, these mechanisms provide an explanation for how our ancestors originally developed a belief in supernatural agents and ritualized behaviors aimed at interacting with these agents. However, the complexity of supernatural agents and rituals as they exist in tribal and organized religions today cannot be adequately explained by these mechanisms alone. The adaptationist accounts that follow in this section complement—rather than disprove—these byproduct accounts for explaining how religious beliefs and behaviors reached the level of complexity observed today.

Arguably the most compelling adaptationist account of religiosity is that certain religious beliefs and behaviors (i.e., belief in omniscient and omnipresent supernatural agents that are concerned with human moral behavior, and hard-to-fake religious behaviors) are adaptive solutions to the problem of potential free-riding in large groups, facilitating in-group cooperation. For the majority of our evolutionary history, humans lived in small tribes of hunter-gatherers (Diamond, 1992). During this time, cooperation between humans within these small groups could be maintained via kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971). Because the members of these small tribes consisted mostly of genetically related individuals, cooperation could be maintained as a function of benefiting shared genes. In other words, although altruistic behavior toward another can be costly (i.e., resources that could have been invested in one's own fitness are invested elsewhere), these costs can be canceled if applied to a genetic relative, because improving their fitness means benefiting their genes, and because you share a certain proportion of genes with this individual, your fitness is ultimately improved as well.

Furthermore, with small groups, even if not all members are not genetically related, it is unlikely that any of the members are strangers to each other. Therefore, cooperation can be maintained based on the premise that if you help an individual at some point, you can count on them to help you later. Because nobody in the group is a stranger and repeated interactions are the norm, the ability to freeride (i.e., receive benefits from others in the group, or from group living in general, without paying the same costs as other members) is unlikely, because a free-rider will be discovered as such and will be punished (e.g., by being ostracized and no longer bestowed benefits by the other group members).

With the advent of agriculture roughly 11,000 years ago, some groups of humans could afford to give up their nomadic lifestyles and settle in one area. More importantly, they could sustain larger and larger populations. As group sizes increased, kin selection and reciprocal altruism became less sufficient for ensuring prosocial behavior within the group. The chances of everyone in the group being related or knowing each other quickly decreased, and with anonymity came a greater potential for free-riding. This problem needed to be solved to prevent large groups from crumbling due to a lack of cooperation. In fact, Dunbar (2003) has estimated that if a group cannot solve this problem, it will divide or collapse when the population exceeds 150 individuals. Whether this estimate is too

conservative, several societal populations exceed this number by many magnitudes, and have done so for thousands of years. Humans have clearly managed to at least partially deal with the problem of free-riding, and religion may have been a key phenomenon in allowing this to happen (see Shaver et al., this volume).

Given that the belief in supernatural agents and rituals designed to interact with these agents were almost certainly already in place as a result of the psychological mechanisms described earlier in this chapter (i.e., the psychological mechanisms involved will have evolved prior to human group sizes increasing), these beliefs and behaviors could have been gradually molded via cultural evolution in such a way as to make them more suitable for reducing the possibility of free-riding. As Bering, Mcleod, and Shackelford (2005) put it:

> The psychological foundations of some religious behaviors . . . may be co-opted spandrels (Andrews, Gangestad, & Matthews, 2002; Buss et al., 1998). They may be side effects of other design features that, quite by chance, had salutary effects of their own on the organism's ability to pass on its genes and, over time, were independently subjected to natural selection. (p. 361, italics in original)

In other words, religious beliefs and behaviors that originally served no adaptive purpose were "exploited" to solve adaptive problems that did not exist when these beliefs and behaviors originally came into existence. Once this process began, cultural evolution molded these beliefs and behaviors into versions that were better suited to solve these new adaptive problems (see Shariff & Mercier, this volume). Adaptationist accounts of religiosity describe the end results of this process.

In smaller groups, free-riding can be eliminated (or greatly reduced) because one's reputation will determine whether others are willing to cooperate. If an individual has a reputation as a cheater or free-rider, other members of the group will know this and be less likely to provide benefits to that individual. With increased group size and anonymity, an individual's reputation is less likely to be tarnished by acts of free-riding. Nevertheless, free-riders still need to be vigilant about avoiding a negative reputation and therefore should be sensitive to cues that their anonymity has been compromised. For example, the feeling of "being watched" should reduce one's willingness to free-ride and increase their prosocial behavior. Indeed, a study by Haley and Fessler confirmed this prediction. When strictly anonymous participants participated in a dictator game, exposure to stylized eye-like shapes on a computer desktop resulted in participants allocating a significantly greater amount of money to the other (unseen) participant, compared to those who were not exposed to the eye drawings.

The simple stimulus just described was apparently enough to invoke the feeling of being watched, but another stimulus that can be much stronger is the belief in a supernatural agent, because this belief will not be tied to any one location or time. However, it is first necessary to determine whether exposure to a supernatural agent concept, without any perceptual cues to that agent's existence or presence, can reduce cheating or antisocial behavior just as perceptual cues can (e.g., "eyes" that are "watching you"). A study by Bering confirms this possibility. Each participant was instructed to complete a difficult test of spatial intelligence on a computer while alone in the testing room, and they were told that the person with the highest score would receive $50. They were also told that this test was newly developed and occasionally might display the answer to a question by mistake, and that they should press the space bar when this occurs to clear the screen and solve the problem honestly. In reality, the test was designed to display this "opportunity for cheating" at five random and counterbalanced times, and cheating behavior was measured as the length of time taken to press the space bar.

The key manipulation in this study was that some participants, before beginning the test, were asked to read a brief statement indicating that Paul J. Kellogg, a graduate student who had helped design this test, died recently and unexpectedly. Of those participants who were given this statement to read, some were also told by the experimenter, prior to beginning the test, that the ghost of this graduate student had recently been seen in the very room in which the test was occurring. A third group of participants was not given any such statements prior to testing.

The results of this study indicated that participants primed with the ghost concept performed significantly worse than the control group and exhibited significantly shorter latencies for pressing the space bar during opportunities for cheating. According to Bering, "These findings appear to show, therefore, that supernatural primes dealing with dead agents genuinely reduce people's willingness to intentionally cheat on a competitive task where the risk of social detection appears low." In summary, it appears that the concept of a supernatural agency is enough to affect one's behavior, even if there are no cues to suggest the agent's presence. However, it is important to note that participants in the ghost condition were told that the supernatural agent had been previously detected in that testing room. In other words, it may not be enough to simply believe in a supernatural agent, but rather the agent must have the capability of watching you at the exact time you are tempted to behave antisocially. Therefore, for religious supernatural agents to be effective deterrents of cheating or free-riding, there are particular characteristics that they should possess, which are described in what follows.

When groups are too large to ensure proper social monitoring by members to reduce feelings of anonymity, supernatural agents can act as a powerful substitute, provided that these supernatural agents have particular qualities. For instance, belief in an omniscient and omnipresent agent could lead individuals to believe that they are being watched at any time and that any instances of cheating or freeriding could be detected. Furthermore, this agent should not only be interested in the moral behavior of humans, but also be able and willing to punish humans for moral transgressions. The God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam meets these criteria, and as Sanderson notes:

> in 2250 BCE there were [estimated] only 8 cities in the world with a population of about 30,000, or a total urban population of about 240,000. By 650 BCE, there may have been some 20 cities ranging in population from 30,000 to 120,000, with a total urban population of approximately 1 million. . . . And 62 percent of the population of these cities in 650 BCE lived in or around the very small region that produced both Judaism and Christianity.

Further support for the notion that supernatural agents with particular qualities are selected for to combat free-riding is provided by Roes and Raymond, who analyzed 167 societies from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCC) in terms of whether they adhered to a belief in "a spiritual being who is believed to have created all reality and/or to be its ultimate governor," and whether this being is "present, active, and specifically supportive of human morality". Roes and Raymond refer to a being with these qualities as a moralizing god, and they found a significant positive correlation between society size and belief in such a god.

Given the logical relationship between society size and the potential for free-riding, these results are consistent with the idea that, ultimately, moralizing gods serve the adaptive purpose of minimizing the threat of free-riding. Snarey (1996, as cited in Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008) provides additional support for this conclusion by demonstrating that when controlling for society size, moralizing gods are more common in societies with high water scarcity, which is a factor that would increase the potential societal costs associated with free-riding. Norenzayan and Shariff (2008) summarize the results of this study and the study by Roes and Raymond (2003) by stating that "The cross-cultural

evidence suggests that moralizing gods are culturally stabilized when freeloading is more prevalent or particularly detrimental to group stability" (p. 62).

Finally, although the studies by Snarey, and Roes and Raymond demonstrate the importance of belief in moralizing gods for deterring free-riding by relying on results obtained at the societal level, a recent study by Atkinson and Bourrat (2011) provides additional cross-cultural support for this hypothesis at the individual level. Using the World Values Survey—specifically, responses to questions about belief in God and the justifiability of 14 moral transgressions—they showed that belief in God uniquely and significantly predicts the unjustifiability of moral transgressions, with stronger belief in God associated with stronger belief in the unjustifiability of all 14 moral transgressions. Furthermore, they found that among those who believe in God, those who believe in a personal God (who is even more likely to be viewed as a moralizing agent) have an even stronger belief in the unjustifiability of all 14 moral transgressions. Finally, they found that belief in a personal God significantly predicted belief in the unjustifiability of 11 of the 14 moral transgressions when controlling for religious participation, religious denomination, country, and level of education.

Taken together, the results of this and previous studies mentioned here suggest that the emergence of supernatural agents with particular qualities, especially an interest in the moral behavior of humans and the ability to keep a watchful eye over them, served the adaptive purpose of facilitating cooperation in groups that have the potential for free-riding, even if beliefs in supernatural agents in general did not originate to solve any adaptive problem (for further discussion of the evolution of religion and morality). However, it is not just religious beliefs that researchers argue have been under selective pressure, but religious behaviors as well.

As described earlier, it seems plausible that at least some forms of religious ritualized behavior emerged as a byproduct of reinforcement learning. With some religious rituals likely already established before group sizes began to expand, another opportunity to reduce the possibility of free-riding and facilitate in-group prosocial behavior existed, as these rituals could be shaped into reliable signals of commitment to the group, thereby indicating that one is not likely to be a free-rider. In order for religious behaviors to be reliable signals of commitment, they must be hard to fake, and one way to achieve this is to make the behaviors costly.

The idea of religious rituals as costly signals of commitment was originally proposed by Irons and expanded on by Sosis. The logic behind this idea is that if someone is willing to perform costly behaviors (e.g., elaborate, time-consuming, and energy-consuming religious rituals) to be part of a group, the other members of the group can safely assume this person is not a free-rider, since they are already paying costs to be a member. A more specific proximate mechanism through which this process may work is cognitive dissonance. Religious rituals not only signal that one is willing to pay the costs necessary to be a part of the group, but also that they share the same beliefs and values of other group members. If one does not share these beliefs, but nevertheless engages in costly behaviors associated with the particular religion, they will likely experience cognitive dissonance because their thoughts and actions are incongruent. One option would be to stop engaging in the behaviors, but this is not an option if one still wants to be part of the group. Therefore, cognitive dissonance will be reduced by changing one's thoughts to be in line with one's behaviors; in other words, costly religious rituals signal that one has the same religious beliefs as others, and as such should be trusted as a fellow member of the group (Sosis, 2003). Of course, group members need not be aware of any of the logic underlying costly signals but should simply be more likely to accept someone as a member of their group if they display such signals.

In recent years, empirical support for the idea of religious behaviors serving as a costly signal of commitment has begun to accumulate. For example, a study by Soler examined followers of Candomblé, a religion in Brazil that arose out of a mix of faiths introduced by African slaves in the 19th century. The participants in the study came from 13 different terreiros, or houses of worship. Most important for the purposes of this study is the fact that costly displays are an important component of Candomblé. As Soler (2008) describes:

> Communication with the supernatural occurs through various rituals, including elaborate feasts during which the orixás [deities that are directly involved in human affairs] possess the faithful in a music-induced trance. Feasts consume a large proportion of the terreiro's income and require the coordination and cooperation of all members. . . . A devotee of Candomblé must also follow an exacting regime that includes proscriptions on food, dress, and codes of behavior related to terreiro hierarchy. (p. 168, italics in original)

Using a 14-item 7-point Likert scale survey of religious commitment and participation in a publicgoods economic game, Soler (2008) investigated how much of an initial $10 participants were willing to invest in the group. The more money that is donated, the more money everyone in the group receives, but individuals who do not donate can benefit the most by free-riding. The results of this experiment indicated that religious commitment was a significant predictor of donation amount, with those who scored higher on the commitment scale (e.g., those who participated the most often in terreiro feasts) donating significantly more money than those with lower commitment scores. Furthermore, when a factor analysis performed on the results of the commitment scale indicated a "group commitment subscale" (e.g., "I have never missed a feast in my terreiro") and a "personal commitment subscale" (e.g., "There are certain foods I do not eat because of my orixá"), a regression analysis indicated that only group commitment predicted donation amounts. This is consistent with the costly signaling hypothesis, because group commitment behaviors are those that can be more easily monitored by others, thereby serving as more reliable signals than personal commitment behaviors.

Additional support for the costly signaling hypothesis can be found in a study by Ruffle and Sosis (2007). This study examined religious rituals and in-group cooperative behavior in several Israeli kibbutzim, which are essentially modern communes that were originally conceived as "small collective farming settlement[s] in which members based their social and cultural lives on the collective ownership of property and wealth" (Ruffle & Sosis, 2007, p. 3). Although kibbutzim have changed from focusing on farming to being involved in a wide range of industries, religious kibbutzim have maintained an equal distribution of income among all members regardless of their profession, which generates a "tragedy of the commons" problem that must be avoided by a high degree of cooperation and self-restraint. Most secular kibbutzim, on the other hand, have abandoned the practice of equally distributing wealth among their members.

By using a matched-pairs design, in which seven religious kibbutzim were each matched with one or more secular kibbutzim in terms of population size, year of establishment, degree of economic success, and degree of privatization, Ruffle and Sosis (2007) were able to compare cooperative behavior between religious and secular kibbutzim. They developed a two-player economic game in which anonymous participants are asked how much of a shared pot of 100 shekels they want to keep for themselves. They are told that if the amount chosen by both participants is greater than 100, they both will receive nothing, but whatever money, if any, is left over after they have made their choices will be multiplied by 1.5 and equally distributed to both of them. Therefore, greater cooperative behavior is demonstrated by taking fewer shekels initially. As predicted, members of

religious kibbutzim demonstrated significantly greater cooperative behavior than members of secular kibbutzim, claiming on average 10 shekels fewer than secularists.

In addition to comparing members of religious and secular kibbutzim, Ruffle and Sosis (2007) also compared the cooperative behavior of men and women within religious kibbutzim. In religious kibbutzim, even though both men and women engage in many costly religious behaviors, the costly behaviors required of men are generally more publicly oriented. For example, men must engage in public prayer three times daily, which requires roughly two hours every day (and up to 3.5 hours on the Sabbath). Women are not required to engage in this behavior, and even women who do wish to participate are separated from the men during the prayer and are not viewed as being a part of the ritual. Conversely, the rituals that women are exclusively required to engage in, namely the "laws of family purity", are not performed publicly. Ruffle and Sosis therefore predicted, and found, that religious men were significantly more cooperative in the economic game than religious women, claiming 29.9 shekels on average, while women claimed 33.7 shekels. Furthermore, among religious men, those who attend synagogue daily claimed an average of 27.2 shekels, while those who do not attend daily claimed 33.1 shekels, indicating that the more frequently men engage in public rituals, the more cooperative they are likely to behave.

Finally, another study that supports the costly signaling hypothesis—but also suggests an important caveat—was conducted by Sosis and Bressler (2003). They analyzed the longevity of 83 (30 religious and 53 secular) 19th-century US communes and determined the degree of costly signaling in each by gathering data on the presence or absence of 22 costly requirements or constraints (e.g., constraints on certain foods and beverages, constraints on technology use or other material items, particular clothing or hairstyle requirements, fasting requirements, etc.). They found that secular communes were three times more likely to dissolve in a given year than religious communes, and that religious communes imposed twice as many constraints or requirements on their members compared to secular communes. In general, the number of costly requirements was found to be strongly positively correlated with commune longevity. However, this effect was found to be produced exclusively by religious communes. In other words, the number of costly requirements imposed on secular communes did not have any impact on their longevity. This is partially explained by the fact that secular communes had fewer costly requirements on average than religious communes, but even secular communes with a greater number of costly requirements than most reaped no benefit to their longevity as a result of this. This suggests, as Sosis and Bressler (2003) note, that "costliness is not the only feature of rituals that enable them to promote solidarity" (p. 227). They suggest that "the shortcoming of the costly signaling theory of religion . . . is [the] failure to capture some critical elements of religious belief that distinguish it from belief in a secular ideology" (p. 227). But what might this element—or elements—be?

One possible answer to this question requires a revision to the costly signaling hypothesis by acknowledging that what matters most is not whether a signal of commitment is costly, but whether it is hard to fake. Costly behaviors are certainly an important category of hard-to-fake signals of commitment, but another reliable signal may be emotional displays. Emotions are processed outside of the neocortex and are, therefore, largely outside of conscious control (Ramachandran, 1997), making it difficult to generate false emotions or to hide genuine emotions. Other important qualities of emotions are that they are easy to perceive in others and often provide accurate information about an individual's motivational state. Emotional signals may not be perfect and can be faked to some extent, but as Bulbulia reminds us, "we have seen that selection can work with imperfect materials, if their average benefits exceed their average costs".

Even if emotions represent hard-to-fake signals, how does this help to explain the results of Sosis and Bressler? Shouldn't members of secular communes have the same ability to express emotions as members of religious communes? Certainly, but the key difference, or "critical element" that Sosis and Bressler eluded to, may be that religions have the ability to elicit strong emotional states. According to Bulbulia, some examples of emotions elicited by religious beliefs include, but are not limited to, "hard to fake expressions of gratitude, shrinking before great authority, maternal and filial piety, fear of reprisal, hopeful expectation, [and] sibling love for co-religionists". Furthermore, religious rituals in particular are often capable of eliciting high physiological arousal . Although this specific hypothesis has yet to be tested directly, it may be that religious societies are successful because both costly rituals and strongly elicited emotional displays interact synergistically to create even stronger signals of commitment than either type of signal in isolation, thereby explaining why the religious communes analyzed by Sosis and Bressler were more successful than secular communes.

Another adaptationist account that some researchers have recently proffered is that certain religious beliefs serve an adaptive purpose as a result of being molded by sexual selection. This idea is based primarily on the handicap principle, which can be viewed as a more specific version of costly-signaling theory. The handicap principle states that traits that are costly to develop and maintain can be used as signals of high mate quality, because one must be of high quality to survive and thrive in spite of these "handicaps." A common example is the peacock's tail, which requires a large store of biological resources to develop and maintain while making it easier to be spotted by predators and more difficult to escape predators due to its burdensome size and extravagant color. In short, if a peacock can develop and maintain a large tail and still survive, this indicates the peacock has "good genes," and as such peahens have evolved a preference for peacocks with the largest tails.

Applying the handicap principle to religious beliefs, Pyysiäinen argues that ritual behaviors, which may have emerged for other reasons (as discussed earlier in this chapter), were "seized" by sexual selection as signals of mate quality. For example, "Men who could dance longer than others, who sacrificed more than their competitors, or who could memorize longer and more elaborate narratives, excited the interest of females, which meant a better reproductive success for these males.

Slone (2008) focuses less on religious beliefs and behaviors that may be "handicaps" and more on how they might signal qualities that are desired in potential mates. Based on research conducted by Buss and colleagues (see Buss, 2003, for a review), women tend to be particularly interested in long-term mates who can be relied on and display a willingness to provide for them and their offspring. Slone argues that:

> By being committed to a religious system (as evidenced by being willing to engage in its costly and apparently useless behaviors) and its ethical demands, which typically includes prohibitions against selfish, anti-social behavior, a man signals that he possesses the types of characteristics that a woman would find desirable. (p. 183)

In other words, in addition to costly religious displays signaling mate quality via the handicap principle (i.e., signaling good genes), the specific costly displays often expressed in a religion may offer additional information about whether one has desired mate qualities. These sexual selection hypotheses of religion represent another example of how specific religious beliefs and behaviors may have been shaped into their present forms because of selection pressures to solve particular adaptive problems.

Finally, another component of religion—as defined by Atran (2002)—that has yet to be discussed but may be explained with an adaptationist account is "a central focus of supernatural agents on dealing with people's existential anxieties (death, disease, catastrophe, pain, loneliness, injustice, want, loss, etc.)" (p. 13). In attempting to understand how and why this component of religion emerged, it is useful to begin by determining what most, if not all, of the phenomena labeled as "existential anxieties" have in common. One possibility is that they refer to events or states that can be characterized by a lack of personal control, and religious beliefs may serve the adaptive function of reducing the anxiety associated with lack of control (see Liddle, this volume).

Several studies, using a variety of methodologies and addressing different levels of analysis, have provided empirical support for the compensatory effect religiosity has on an individual's perceived lack of control. For example, a series of studies by Kay and colleagues indicate that when an individual's feeling of personal control is decreased through experimental manipulations (e.g., asking participants to remember events from their life that they had no control over), the reported strength of belief in a personal God increases. Additionally, a study by Norenzayan and Atran (2004) demonstrated that inducing mortality salience—death being an inevitability that we have no control over—resulted in higher self-reported religiosity, particular belief in a personal God and supernatural intervention (i.e., external sources of control). Finally, societal level support for the idea that religiosity serves as compensation against the feeling of lack of control comes from a series of analyses by Norris and Inglehart (2004), as well as studies by Paul and Rees, which have documented that as indicators of societal insecurity (e.g., economic inequality, lack of access to healthcare and education, crime, high infant mortality rates—all factors that could increase an individual's feeling of lack of control) increase, religiosity increases (see Liddle, this volume). Importantly, these results also indicate that societies with the lowest levels of societal insecurity are also the most secular, a conclusion further supported by a series of informal interviews conducted by Zuckerman (2008), who found that many people in Denmark and Sweden (i.e., nations with very low levels of societal insecurity) apparently have little interest in or need for religion. This suggests that compensatory control is an adaptive function of religious beliefs, because these beliefs seem to lose their appeal when this function is no longer required.

Religious Beliefs as Memes

The byproduct and adaptationist accounts discussed thus far provide a great deal of information for explaining some of the fundamental components of religion, but they do not explain why some religious worldviews are restricted to a small part of the world while others have spread to many societies. One controversial, but potentially useful, concept for explaining this is memetics. The term "meme" was coined by Dawkins (1976), who suggested that "units" of cultural transmission could be thought of as subject to the same rules of natural selection as genes. In other words, "Ideas can be thought of as competing with one another for residence in the minds of people, and those ideas that are most successful at being remembered will survive, get passed on and possibly change (i.e., evolve) over time". This concept has been expanded by several authors for a discussion of memetics in reference to religion) but remains controversial due to the speculative nature of memetics.

Importantly, the theory of memetics moves the focus of fitness from the individuals holding the ideas to the ideas themselves. In terms of religion, this suggests that particular religious beliefs may survive and evolve independently of their effects on the fitness of humans, even if they are ultimately detrimental to human fitness. Memes are capable of being either symbiotic, parasitic, or neutral with respect to the fitness of their "hosts." However, as with the byproduct and adaptationist arguments of religion discussed earlier, it is best not to apply this logic to religion as a whole. In other words, rather than saying, for example, that religion in general is a parasitic meme, flourishing at the

expense of human fitness, it makes more sense to discuss whether particular religious beliefs and behaviors are parasitic (or symbiotic or neutral). For example, the adaptationist arguments discussed earlier suggest that belief in a moralizing god may be a symbiotic meme, because it benefits its hosts by facilitating in-group cooperative behavior, and one can look to Christianity and Islam to see how successful this meme has been at spreading around the world. However, this does not mean that all of the beliefs and behaviors associated with Christianity and Islam are symbiotic memes. Therefore, applying memetics to religion would require an examination of specific beliefs and behaviors, rather than examining the transmission of an organized religion as a whole.

Research by Fincher and Thornhill (2008) provides an interesting account of religious diversity that can be interpreted within a memetic perspective. Using data on the total number of religions in each of 219 countries/territories, and the pathogen prevalence of these regions, they predicted and found that religious diversity was strongly positively associated with pathogen prevalence. This is presumably because pathogen-rich environments increase the potential costs associated with interacting with neighboring societies (e.g., exposure to pathogens to which one has not evolved immunity), and so humans living in such environments have evolved predispositions that minimize intergroup contact (e.g., collectivist attitudes and xenophobia). Liddle et al. (2011) describe how these findings may be understood in terms of memetics:

> If high pathogen stress limits contact between groups, there is less direct competition between different religious beliefs, which means that these different beliefs will continue to survive. Conversely, low pathogen stress translates into greater cultural transmission, which leads to competition between beliefs, and only the "fittest" beliefs survive. (p. 187)

Despite its speculative nature, memetics provides a unique evolutionary perspective on religion that may be useful in explaining the spread of particular religious beliefs and behaviors around the world. More specifically, the "pathogen-stress" model mentioned earlier (see Terrizzi & Shook, this volume, for further discussion) provides a compelling account of differing levels of religiosity internationally and a key factor that may have influenced the spread of religious beliefs throughout history.

Conclusion

The usefulness of applying evolutionary theory to explaining religion was noted by Darwin (2006/1871) himself, who reasoned that:

> As soon as the important faculties of the imagination, wonder, and curiosity, together with some power of reasoning, had become partially developed, man would naturally have craved to understand what was passing around him, and have vaguely speculated on his own existence. (p. 815)

In recent years, evolutionary psychologists have begun to demonstrate how evolutionary theory can aid in our understanding of both the origin of religious beliefs and behaviors and the possible functions that they may have evolved to serve. A coherent picture of religion begins to emerge when several byproduct and adaptationist accounts are integrated together.

Beginning with a reasonable definition of religion provided by Atran (2002), an evolutionary perspective can provide explanations for what are arguably important components of nearly all religions. Belief in supernatural agency may have emerged as a result of hyperactive agency detection, the belief in mind-body dualism, and susceptibility to minimally counterintuitive concepts. These supernatural agent concepts then evolved to include certain characteristics that made them suitable for partially solving the adaptive problem of free-riding in large groups. Religious rituals may have emerged as a result of human perceptions of causality and the neurological nature of reinforcement learning, as well as their impact on group cohesion via synchronized activities (see Rossano &

Vandewalle, this volume). These rituals then evolved to become more elaborate, more difficult to fake, in some cases costly, and in some cases capable of eliciting strong emotional reactions. All of these qualities serve the adaptive purpose of signaling commitment to the group, thereby reducing the possibility that an individual who engages in these behaviors is a free-rider. Costly displays in particular may also have been sexually selected, in that they satisfy the handicap principle (see Weeden et al., this volume, for further consideration of sexual selection's role in religiosity). Finally, religious beliefs may function to reduce existential anxiety by serving as a potent source of compensatory control, such that when an individual's feeling of personal control is reduced, whether by events in life, insecurity in the environment, or mortality salience, the resulting anxiety is diminished by adhering to particular religious beliefs, such as belief in a personal god.

The description and explanation of religion provided here is by no means complete. Such a complex topic needs to continue to be analyzed from a variety of perspectives. This chapter has hopefully provided a convincing argument that an evolutionary psychological perspective has much to offer to the study of religion and will likely continue to aid in our understanding of religion in the years to come—an argument further strengthened by the remainder of this handbook. <>

The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology and Religion Chapter Abstracts

CHAPTER 1 An Introduction to Evolutionary Perspectives on Religion by James R. Liddle and Todd K. Shackelford

Given that religious beliefs and behaviors are so pervasive and have such a powerful influence, it is vital to try to understand the psychological underpinnings of religiosity. This chapter introduces the topic of evolutionary perspectives on religion, beginning with an attempt to define "religion," followed by a primer on evolutionary psychology and the concept of evolved psychological mechanisms. With this framework in place, the chapter then provides an overview of key adaptationist and byproduct hypotheses of various components of religion, highlighting the complementary nature of these hypotheses and their roles in forming a cohesive understanding of the evolution of religion. Concepts introduced in this chapter include hyperactive agency detection, minimally counterintuitive concepts, in-group cooperation, costly signaling theory, gods as moralizing agents, and cultural evolution.

KEY WORDS: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, RELIGION, RELIGIOSITY, EVOLVED PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISM, ADAPTATION, BYPRODUCT, CULTURAL EVOLUTION

CHAPTER 2 Mickey, Yahweh, and Zeus: Why Cultural Learning Is Essential for the Evolutionary Study of Religion by Will M. Gervais

Religions are complex and multifaceted. People engaged in the scientific study of religion may explore a diverse range of topics, ranging from supernatural agent beliefs to ritual practices to rites of passage to notions of eschatology and the afterlife. Recent decades have seen a flourishing of evolutionary theorizing on religion. This chapter poses six key questions for emerging theories, focusing on (1) the ubiquity of supernatural agent concepts across cultures, (2) the cross-cultural recurrence of common supernatural agent themes, (3) the fact that most people believe in only a select few mentally representable supernatural agents, (4) the fact that people tend to only believe in a subset of the gods currently worshiped worldwide, (5) the existence of atheists, and (6) the cultural success of some specific religions. I argue that modern approach es to cultural transmission

and gene-culture coevolution are necessary components of any comprehensive evolutionary account of religion.

KEY WORDS: RELIGION, ATHEISM, CULTURAL TRANSMISSION, EVOLUTION, GENE-CULTURE COEVOLUTION, COGNITION

CHAPTER 3 The Diversity of Religious Systems Across History: An Evolutionary Cognitive Approach by Pascal Boyer and Nicolas Baumard

The mental representations and behaviors we commonly call "religious"—everyday supernatural imagination, tribal cults, archaic religions, modern world religions—are amenable to explanation both in terms of computational, information-processing systems and in terms of adaptations that emerged during human evolution. These two research programs, focused on proximate and ultimate aspects of cultural representations respectively, have been particularly fruitful in the last 30 years. Early developments in cognitive approaches ushered in a whole new field in the study of religion. More recently, evolutionary psychology has provided new tools for explaining the emergence and transmission of religious ideas. This chapter aims to show how this cognitive and evolutionary approach can provide a better understanding of the historical diversity of religious systems.

KEY WORDS: RELIGION, EVOLUTION, COOPERATION, MORALITY, AXIAL AGE

CHAPTER 4 A Cognitive Theory Religion as Anthropomorphism by Stewart Elliott Guthrie

This chapter reviews and advances a theory the author has long advocated, namely that religion may best be understood as anthropomorphism and that the latter is largely the byproduct of an evolved cognitive strategy. The strategy is to resolve uncertainty, which pervades cognition, with the logic of Pascal's Wager: When in doubt about the nature of a phenomenon, bet on the most relevant possibility. For humans, that possibility usually is that the phenomenon is personal or has personal features or traces. From earliest infancy, we are preoccupied with persons, and our prototype of intentional agency evidently is our concept of the human mind. We interpret phenomena as personal involuntarily, automatically, and mostly unconsciously.

KEY WORDS: RELIGION, COGNITION, EVOLUTION, ANTHROPOMORPHISM, THEORY

CHAPTER 5 Evolutionary Developmental Psychology of Children's Religious Beliefs by Tyler S. Greenway and Justin L. Barrett

The pancultural presence of religious beliefs suggests that children's ordinary development may incline them toward such beliefs. Various cognitive processes that mature during this time period may enable and encourage religion. Such processes include the ability to distinguish agents from objects, think about the mental states of other agents, see purpose in the world, and view agents dualistically. The generation and persistence of religious beliefs may also be a product of their violation of certain intuitive ontologies, as such violations are more memorable for younger individuals. The naturalness of religion is discussed, and evolutionary accounts of religion as an adaptation and byproduct are presented.

KEY WORDS: BELIEF, NATURALNESS, RELIGION, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER 6 Belief, Ritual, and the Evolution of Religion by Matt J. Rossano and Benjamin Vandewalle

This chapter outlines an evolutionary scenario for the emergence of religion. From cognitive science, four mental prerequisites of religious cognition are discussed: (1) hyperactive agency detection, (2) theory of mind, (3) imagination, and (4) altered states of consciousness. Evidence for these prerequisites in nonhuman primates suggests their presence in our early hominin ancestors. From comparative psychology, evidence of ritual behavior in nonhuman primates and other species is reviewed. Archeological evidence of ritual behavior is also discussed. Collectively, these data indicate that the first step toward religion was an elaboration of primate social rituals to include group synchronized activities such as dancing, chanting, and singing. Control of fire, pigment use, and increasing brain size would have intensified group synchronized rituals over time, which, in the context of increased intergroup interactions, eventually led to the first evidence of supernatural ritual at about 70,000 years before present.

KEY WORDS: AGENCY DETECTION, BURIAL, CAVE ART, COSTLY SIGNALS, EVOLUTION, RELIGION, RITUAL, SYNCHRONIZED MOVEMENT, THEORY OF MIND

CHAPTER 7 Adolescence and Religion: An Evolutionary Perspective by Candace S. Alcorta

Throughout the world adolescence is deemed the appropriate life stage to "learn religion." Nearly three-quarters of societies conduct adolescent rites of passage transmitting sacred rituals and beliefs. Neurophysiological changes that occur during adolescence render this an "experience-expectant" period for the transmission of religious schema and values. Brain regions critical to emotional, social, and symbolic processing mature, creating a plastic neural substrate for imbuing social and symbolic schema with emotional meaning and reward value. Religion in general, and adolescent rites of passage in particular, are optimally adapted for this task. Music-based ritual and emotionally evocative elements of religion optimize reinforcement learning. The costly and autonomically arousing ordeals of many rites ensure fear conditioning. Such learning shapes maturing neural networks, impacting choices and behaviors. Evolutionary anthropologists view religion as a costly signal of group commitment. Adolescent rites of passage are a powerful proximate mechanism for creating and maintaining cooperative, cohesive groups.

KEY WORDS: ADOLESCENCE, RELIGION, RITE OF PASSAGE, BRAIN PLASTICITY, EXPERIENCE, EXPECTANT, COSTLY, SIGNAL

CHAPTER 8 Religion and Morality: The Evolution of the Cognitive Nexus by John Teehan

The relationship between religion and morality is a subject of widespread interest and intense debate: Is morality a product of religion? Can one be moral without religion? Can moral claims be justified outside of a religious context? These are important questions that have been subject to much investigation by theologians and philosophers, among others. Evolutionary studies provide a different way into this topic. Morality has long been a subject for evolutionary research, but an evolutionary approach to religion, based on research into the evolution of the brain, is a recent development, and one that is developing a substantial empirical grounding. Drawing on the insights from both of these fields, this chapter sets out the evolved cognitive mechanisms that constitute the nexus of religion and morality. In addition to providing insight into the nature of religious morality, this model may also help clarify the role religion played in human evolution.

KEY WORDS: RELIGION, MORALITY, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, EVOLUTION, COGNITION

CHAPTER 9 The Kin Selection of Religion by Bernard Crespi

This chapter describes an integrative hypothesis for the origin and evolution of human religious cognition and behavior. The hypothesis is based on kin selection, which leads to reduced competition and increased cooperation within family and small-scale groups and generates novel forms of psychological kinship that foster cooperation in larger scale groups. The "concept of God" is represented by one's circle of kin and one's ancestors, such that serving God and serving these individuals become synonymous. Kinship pervades, motivates and supports all of the major manifestations of religiosity. The primary selective pressures favoring religious phenotypes are social and ecological selective pressures within and between groups. Religiosity represents group-specific adaptations that mediate cultural-group survival and reproduction. The kinship theory of religion is consistent with diverse data from anthropology, evolutionary biology, psychology, psychiatry, endocrinology, and genetics.

KEY WORDS: RELIGIOUS, BEHAVIOUR, INCLUSIVE FITNESS, KINSHIP, ANCESTOR

CHAPTER 10 The Coevolution of Religious Belief and Intuitive Cognitive Style via Individual-Level Selection by Michael N. Stagnaro and David G. Rand

This chapter introduces a novel theory for the coevolution of religious belief and intuitive cognition. The theory bridges the byproduct and functionalist perspectives on the evolution of religion, without requiring selection at the level of the group. It starts with the byproduct position that cognitive mechanisms yielding advantages unrelated to belief gave rise to early protoreligious beliefs, and associated empirical evidence that intuition supports belief while deliberation breeds skepticism. It argues that once byproduct-induced early beliefs became prevalent within a community, those who questioned would face sanctions from committed believers (for example, out of fear that those who questioned belief would anger the gods/ancestors, bringing harm to the community). This sanctioning of belief questioning creates individual-level selection pressure to believe and, thus, individual-level selection pressure for intuitive cognition and against deliberative cognition. In this way, religious belief and intuitive cognition can be maintained by natural selection, without creating group-level benefits.

KEY WORDS: EVOLUTION, RELIGION, DUAL-PROCESS MODEL, COGNITIVE STYLE, INTUITION, DELIBERATION

CHAPTER 11 The Early Origin of Religion: Its Role as a Survival Kit by Kenneth V. Kardong

Natural selection works to cull features from a population, if those features are negative and return no biological advantages, Yet religion pervades. Human culture so reasonably plays a positive, supportive role in biological survival; looking to primitive religions to discover these biological roles of religion has the advantage of viewing religion at its most fundamental, before becoming embellished and encrusted with secondary social roles. Successful traditions and cultural customs persist because they improve the survival of individuals practicing them. Celestial punishments may await the mortal sinner, but in this world, biological sins matter most because they can send an individual to an early grave without passing along genes or adaptive customs to offspring. Religion

functions as a survival kit; in its beliefs, ceremonies, and myths are bundled basic knowledge that directs one to meet the challenges posed by the environment.

KEY WORDS: PROXIMATE, ULTIMATE, BIOLOGICAL ROLE, UNCONSCIOUS INTENT, TABOO, DOGMA, PIG, SURVIVAL KIT

CHAPTER 12 The Elephant in the Pews: Reproductive Strategy and Religiosity by Jason Weeden, Robert Kurzban, and Douglas T. Kenrick

When it comes to religiosity and its lifestyle correlates, the typical assumption is that the causal arrows run primarily from religiosity to morals to one's own behavior. In contrast, this chapter argues that differences in sexual and reproductive lifestyles can substantially influence individual choices regarding religious involvement and related beliefs. Religious groups provide attractive benefits to high- commitment, high-fertility strategists, but are simultaneously less helpful or harmful to low-commitment, low-fertility strategists. The chapter reviews evidence showing not only that sexual and reproductive variables have relatively large statistical relationships with religiosity in modern, developed societies but also that the causal role of these sexual and reproductive variables helps to account for various longitudinal and correlational patterns involving religiosity. Human life is driven by concrete, fitness-relevant concerns, and contemporary differences in religiosity are no exception.

KEY WORDS: RELIGIOSITY, CHURCH, ATTENDANCE, REPRODUCTIVE, STRATEGY, SOCIOSEXUALITY, SEXUAL, MORAL, CAUSALITY

CHAPTER 13 Religion: An Evolutionary Evoked Disease-Avoidance Strategy by John A. Terrizzi Jr. and Natalie J. Shook

This chapter argues that religion is, in part, an evolved disease-avoidance strategy. That is, many of the major world religions are a consequence of a system of psychological mechanisms that has evolved to promote disease avoidance. As person-to-person contact is a significant route of contamination, the behavioral immune system encourages avoidance of other people, especially individuals who may be sick or harboring pathogens. Consequently, the behavioral immune system promotes the adoption of socially conservative cultural value systems, which support avoidance of and prejudice toward out-group members. Indeed, the evidence indicates that religiosity is stronger in areas of the world that have a higher pathogen load. Additionally, individuals who are more sensitive to disgust and are more concerned with contamination exhibit more religious conservatism. Viewing religion from a disease-avoidance perspective helps explain why many religions are rife with purity rituals and often promote out-group avoidance.

KEY WORDS: RELIGION, BEHAVIORAL IMMUNE SYSTEM, DISGUST, PREJUDICE, CONTAMINATION, CONSERVATIVE

CHAPTER 14 Religion as a Means of Perceived Security: Testing the Secure Society Theory by James R. Liddle

Despite the ubiquity of religion, religiosity varies substantially at the individual and societal levels. This chapter presents a study that sought set to replicate and extend previous findings regarding Norris and Inglehart's (2004) secure society theory of religiosity, which states that religiosity varies with the extent to which one feels secure in one's environment. The relationship between individual perceptions of societal security—as opposed to national indicators of societal security—and

religiosity has not previously been investigated. The study analyzed data from the General Social Survey, supplemented by Federal Bureau of Investigation and US Census data. The results indicated that the extent to which one feels safe walking around one's neighborhood at night predicts religiosity, even when crime rate, poverty rate, age, sex, and race are controlled statistically. Additionally, time series analyses of data from 1980 to 2012 provided partial support for the secure society theory, with neighborhood fear and poverty predicting future religiosity.

KEY WORDS: RELIGIOSITY, SECULARIZATION, SECURE SOCIETY THEORY, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 15 Charismatic Signaling: How Religion Stabilizes Cooperation and Entrenches Inequality by John H. Shaver, Gloria Fraser, and Joseph Bulbulia

This chapter describes an evolutionary model of religion called "charismatic signaling." The theory focuses on features of religion that express automated within-group cooperation—that is, cooperation that does not rely on strategic reasoning or explicit social prediction. The model is interesting because it explains otherwise puzzling features of religious systems. Such puzzles range from intrinsic religious motivations to ritual human sacrifice as evolved adaptations for social coordination. An additional virtue of the model is that it explains the reliability of cooperation with strangers who cannot observe or assess cooperative intentions directly or by reputation. The chapter describes the intellectual motivations for charismatic signaling theory and outlines ethnographic and historical puzzles the theory solves.

KEY WORDS: EVOLUTION, COOPERATION, COSTLY SIGNALING, CHARISMATIC SIGNALING, APOSEMATIC SIGNALING, RELIGION, SYNCRETISM, RITUAL

CHAPTER 16 The Evolution of Religion and Morality by Azim F. Shariff and Brett Mercier

Modern world religions are steeped in moralizing. This chapter argues that this conspicuous feature of religion can be explained by the common functions of both religion and morality to regulate individuals' behavior in the ultimate service of the group. Cultural evolution selected for religious elements that synergistically work together to morally compel individuals to (1) engage in prosocial behavior toward in-group members, and (2) form large and monogamous families. The chapter reviews the psychological and anthropological literature on how religion contributes to generosity, trust, prejudice, fertility, and monogamy. Finally, it discusses how this religiously entwined morality differs from that of the nonreligious.

KEY WORDS: RELIGION, MORALITY, EVOLUTION, CULTURAL EVOLUTION, SACRED VALUES

CHAPTER 17 The Roots of Intergroup Conflict and the Co-optation of the Religious System: An Evolutionary Perspective on Religious Terrorism by Jordan Kiper and Richard Sosis

This chapter reviews the cultural evolution of religious terrorism since the late nineteenth century and explores how terrorists have effectively exploited religious systems to pursue their political goals. Religious systems are adaptive complexes that efficiently respond to rapidly changing socioenvironmental conditions and successfully motivate prosocial and sacrificial behavior by engaging evolved psychological capacities. Ongoing religious terrorism differs from previous waves of terror by manipulating religious systems in order to frame political conflicts, organize combatants,

and render collective violence as sacred. By taking an evolutionary perspective of religious terrorism, scholars can begin to shed light on the ultimate and proximate mechanisms of collective violence and the manner in which religion contributes to contemporary terrorist activity.

KEY WORDS: COALITIONAL AGGRESSION, COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE, INTERGROUP CONFLICT, MORAL DISENGAGEMENT, PAROCHIAL ALTRUISM, RELIGIOUS SYSTEM, RELIGIOUS TERRORISM, REVENGE

CHAPTER 18 Selected to Kill in His Name: Evolutionary Perspectives on Religiously Motivated Violence by Yael Sela and Nicole Barbaro

Religion motivates, exacerbates, and even justifies violence. In this chapter, we argue that religious beliefs regarding violence—particularly those of monotheistic, Abrahamic faiths—are shaped by evolved psychological mechanisms. Further, we argue that religiously motivated violence is most likely to occur in evolutionarily relevant contexts. Guided by sexual selection theory and parental-investment theory, we first provide an overview of human sexual selection from an evolutionary perspective. We discuss how and why an evolutionary perspective—and principles of sexual selection and parental investment in particular—may provide a richer understanding of religiously motivated violence. Next follows an overview of research addressing several types of religiously motivated violence such as mate guarding and controlling behaviors, wife beating and uxoricide, honor killing, child abuse and filicide, male and female genital mutilation, war, and terrorism. Finally, we highlight the parallels between religiously motivated violence and evolved psychological mechanisms for violence, concluding with suggestions for future research.

KEY WORDS: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, RELIGION, VIOLENCE, SEXUAL SELECTION, PARENTAL INVESTMENT

CHAPTER 19 Supernatural Beliefs and the Evolution of Cooperation by Pierrick Bourrat and Hugo Viciana

Studies have found an association between the content of beliefs in the supernatural and increased cooperation in social groups. “High Moralizing Gods”, “fear of supernatural punishment”, and “supernatural monitoring” have been claimed to permit greater social cohesion through the specific epistemic engagement they produce in the minds of those who hold certain religious beliefs. However, the evolutionary pathways linking these religious features with cooperation remain unclear. Focusing on the example of belief in supernatural sanctioning, this chapter delineates different mechanisms by which beliefs in supernatural entities could, in principle, lead to greater cohesion and emphasizes the different predictions each evolutionary mechanism affords. It thus reassesses several studies that have been interpreted as supporting or as failing to support one or some of these cultural evolutionary processes. Finally, it proposes several avenues by which research addressing the link between cooperation and specific forms of belief in supernatural entities could be strengthened.

KEY WORDS: PROSOCIALITY SUPERNATURAL PUNISHMENT, RELIGIOUS, BELIEF, VIGILANCE, ADAPTATIONISM, COOPERATION, BIG GOD, HIGH GOD

CHAPTER 20 A Socioevolutionary Approach to Religious Change by Ryan T. Cragun and J. E. Sumerau

A number of scholars have suggested that religion may be explained using evolutionary theory and, in particular, natural selection. Much of this research suggests that behaviors encouraged by religions are beneficial while failing to illustrate a causal relationship between religiosity and these behaviors. This chapter challenges these approaches, arguing that religion is primarily a social phenomenon and that any health or evolutionary benefits that might indirectly derive from religions are actually attributable to the behaviors themselves: Religions have simply co-opted those behaviors. Additionally, it argues that natural selection alone is a problematic approach to understanding religion and suggests that Darwin's notion of artificial selection be integrated into any attempts to use evolution to explain religion. We use examples from a variety of religions to illustrate how a socioevolutionary theory of religion that incorporates natural and artificial selection is preferable to approaches that rely exclusively on natural selection.

KEY WORDS: SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, SECULARIZATION, SOCIAL THEORY, SOCIOEVOLUTIONARY THEORY, ARTIFICIAL SELECTION

CHAPTER 21 The Evolution and Exploitation of Transcendence by Gregory Gorelik

This chapter discusses the transcendent experience, which is defined as an ego-dissolving encounter with something greater than one's self. The transcendent experience is cross-cultural and panhistorical. This chapter presents a model describing the evolution and function of various evolved modes of transcendence, such as group-directed transcendence, theory of mind (ToM) transcendence, aesthetic transcendence, and epistemic transcendence. It then discusses the susceptibility of these modes of transcendence to costly exploitation by selfish individuals. The ensuing sections discuss the relationship between transcendence and human development across the lifespan, and concludes with some thoughts on the epistemic and ethical utility of transcendence.

KEY WORDS: TRANSCENDENCE, EVOLUTION, SPIRITUALITY, MYSTICISM, EXPLOITATION, RELIGION

CHAPTER 22 Challenges to an Evolutionary Perspective on Religion by Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi

The evolutionary perspective on religion proposes that religious ideation is natural and plausible because of innate mechanisms, the product of evolution, that lead humans to imagine reality through egocentric, anthropocentric, animistic, or teleological processes and to interpret events through intentionality and design. If these mechanisms operate in all human brains, the level of religiosity in individual and social lives is likely to remain stable and uniform, regardless of time and place. Challenges to this perspective include that the expression of religious ideation is contingent on numerous conditions, contexts, and circumstances. Manifest individual differences in religiosity, and instability in collective religiosity, lead to consideration of the gap between "deep structure" and "phenotypic" manifestations. The most serious test of this perspective is the recent appearance of secularization, which entails a massive reduction in the resources devoted to religion. The chapter analyzes the challenges and provides an integration of historical and psychological data.

KEY WORDS: RELIGIOSITY, DEEP STRUCTURE, PHENOTYPE, HISTORY, SECULARIZATION
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THE TAROT OF LEONORA CARRINGTON commentary by Susan Aberth & Tere Arcq, introduced by Gabriel Weisz Carrington [Fulgur Press, 9781527258693]

An oracular Surrealism: the debut presentation of Leonora Carrington's recently discovered tarot deck

The British-born artist Leonora Carrington is one of the more fascinating figures to emerge from the Surrealist movement. As both a writer and painter, she was championed early by André Breton and joined the exiled Surrealists in New York, before settling in Mexico in 1943. The magical themes of Carrington's otherworldly paintings are well known, but the recent discovery of a suite of tarot designs she created for the Major Arcana was a revelation for scholars and fans of Carrington alike. Drawing inspiration from the Tarot of Marseille and the popular Waite-Smith deck, Carrington brings her own approach and style to this timeless subject, creating a series of iconic images. Executed on thick board, brightly colored and squarish in format, Carrington's Major Arcana shines with gold and silver leaf, exploring tarot themes through what Gabriel Weisz Carrington describes as a "surrealist object." This tantalizing discovery, made by the curator Tere Arcq and scholar Susan

Aberth, has placed greater emphasis upon the role of the tarot in Carrington's creative life and has led to fresh research in this area.

THE TAROT OF LEONORA CARRINGTON is the first book dedicated to this important aspect of the artist's work. It includes a full-size facsimile of her newly discovered Major Arcana; an introduction from her son, Gabriel Weisz Carrington; and a richly illustrated essay from Tere Arcq and Susan Aberth that offers new insights—exploring the significance of tarot imagery within Carrington's wider work, her many inspirations and mysterious occult sources.

Leonora Carrington (1917–2011) was born in Lancashire, England. In 1936, she saw Max Ernst's work at the *International Surrealist Exhibition* in London, and met the artist the following year. They became a couple almost immediately. When the outbreak of World War II separated them, Carrington fled to Spain, then Lisbon, where she married Renato Leduc, a Mexican diplomat, and escaped to Mexico, where she became close with Remedios Varo and other expat Surrealists.



Leonora Carrington, Mexico City, 1960
IMAGE: © INGE MORATH

Contents

Leonora's Inner Compass by Gabriel Weisz Carrington

Leonora was a restless voyager through deep journeys, always in quest of mythic revelations. Her aim was to repair a shattered world and a means to live in it, unearthing the many images that came her way. Guided by her intuitive meanderings she came upon the I Ching or Book of Changes, carving beautiful wooden tokens and dwelling on the secret language of hexagrams to reach her own patterns of change. She also took other paths like divination, magic and meditation, since all developed into components for a complex mental vehicle that became articulated into her own navigational devices, launching her towards a wilderness of mind. However, she chose the tarot and all the exotic legends surrounding the Bohemians or gypsies; close companions to her imaginal self. During one of those conversations we use to have, she mentioned how the gypsies intervened to help her flee from her captors once she left the mental hospital in Santander bound to Portugal; then adding in a proud demeanor, 'Gaby, we come from the tinkers, an *lucht siúil* or the walking people'. Leonora fantasized living and traveling in a gypsy caravan pulled by Vanner horses through the roads of the Irish countryside.

My mother had a permanent inquiring mind, 'The tarot is the most important device in cartomancy'. From one of the bookshelves in her room she pulls out *Le tarot des imagiers du Moyen Age* by the

Swiss occultist Oswald Wirth. Leonora dreamily enumerates the cards or tarots, 'The Magician, the High Priestess, the Empress, the Hierophant, the Lovers...'. 'You know, I might design my own deck'. 'That is a splendid idea'. Pointing to another book, she goes on, 'The Chariot, and look what Edward Waite has to say'. 'This princely figure (...) led captivity captive, he is conquest on all plains – in the mind, in science (...), in certain trials of initiation. The chariot is drawn by two sphinxes'. I can feel her enthusiasm, surely this state will lead her next project.

The following morning, we walk to a nearby artist's supply shop and purchase a couple of thick paperboard sheets. A few days go by, I enter her studio, on the table I find an open tarot book. It's The Tarot of the Bohemians by Papus. I can see the VIIIth card, Justice. Not only a symbol of justice but also 'an equilibrium, between the destruction of the works of man accomplished by Nature'. As Leonora enters the studio, I ask about this card; she always considered that people had no respect for Nature. 'I agree, but don't you think it also refers to a denial of inner nature?' 'Well, you cannot separate one from the other, your mind blends with nature'. During the next months she prepares the twenty-two cards, carefully cutting to size each one of them, after which each card was given a coat of 'Blanco de España'. While working, Leonora explains, 'This white paint will even out any porosity of the paper, I want a smooth surface, so we will just let these dry out, then I will be ready to paint each one'.

A lot of research went into the tarot, I saw her pouring over Oswald Wirth's tarot; The Pictorial Key to the Tarot by Arthur Edward Waite; The Tarot of the Bohemians by Papus among many others. However, Leonora's rendition mirrored her own creative individuality. A case in hand is the Hanged Man, the XIIth card, differing from Waite's in that hers, instead of the nimbus about the head, the figure dons a golden helmet. This card of the Arcana, as Papus reveals, represents 'anything that stretches, that raises, that unfolds like an arm, and has become the sign of expansive movement'. The IVth the Emperor, the Xth Wheel of Fortune, the XIIth the Hanged Man, the XIVth Temperance, the XVIIth the Star, the XVIIIth the Moon and the XXIst the World, underwent a well-known medieval gold and silver gilding procedure. A thin gold or silver metal leaf was delicately cut and then set over each of these cards. With a fine brush she dropped the gold or silver leaf over a surface previously prepared with fresh glue. 'Come nearer, the gold leaf is slightly wrinkled'. 'What are you going to do about it?' 'Well, see this?' Leonora pulls out from some drawers a tool. 'This is known as a "wolves' tooth". I use it to burnish the gold or the silver leaf, the hooked tip is made out of agate'. Her timing was crucial for a perfect result. Now we can admire the mastery of each of these cards and the rest of the deck. While preparations are made for the Major Arcana or the set of twenty-two cards, Leonora mentions that the earliest known reference to these cards was when Alfonse XI banned them in 1332.

I later found this information in Bill Butler's **DICTIONARY OF THE TAROT**.

'Why don't you throw it for me'. After a moment's silence she brings the twenty-two cards. I drew twenty-two cards randomly and placed them on the dining room table in front of her. Then the cards were spread in a semi-circle. 'I will arrange them in seven piles, from right to left, you have to choose any number under twenty-three'. After which she picked the fifth card. The tarots are now placed to make a cross. This one will go on my left, it represents what can be affirmed or what is favorable. This other is what is denied, hostile and unfavorable. She places a card in the middle, this is what shall be discussed, what will turn convenient for you. And finally, we come upon a solution or a result by comparing the affirmation to the negation.

Leonora seemed to play with a deep-rooted collage, where the Tarot of Marseille was recreated into a new narrative and illusionistic game of personal search. Upon this path a unique myth was

born, along with the discovery of her own innermost tarot. This was how she trod between her conscious inquiry that encompassed multiple tarot books, and the releasing of her unconscious creative persona. She contacted what Breton might once have called 'convulsive beauty' — a means to dwell in the veiled life of each character associated to that explosivity of creative forces. For Leonora, all this meant a quest toward a personal Surrealist object with a similar profile to a subliminal object, one loosely associated to the symbolic manifestations behind the tarot. Leonora's approach turned each card into an inmost subversive narrative, concocting the traditional sagas from the Major Arcana with her subliminal characters. This might place us in the midst of exploring perception to reach that place of psychological differences, turned into the unknown underworld where images are found. It seems we better follow Leonora's voice.

> I don't paint dreams,
> as far as I know.
> Dreams are in a different space.
> There must be
> Many, many different spaces.
> Everything is interrelated.
> Everything in the phenomenal world
> Would be entirely related.
> They are vehicles
> moving from one liminal place
> to another —
> one subliminal place
> to another.

The tarot is not meant solely for divination purposes. Each suggest navigation devices where a poetics of the unconscious is available for immediate exploration. These cards may be consulted as subliminal objects, separate from rationality; they give access to magical environments. Because the subliminal body might be conceived as an out-of-the-body experience, it also entails a liberation from the rational corporeal form. This body is able to travel through unconscious domains. Ultimately it is endowed with a projective capacity that enables an exploration of the visionary world.

As I open **Dictionary of the Tarot**, what Butler states about the Fool is that it is appended to the trickster, 'one of the most important symbols of the unconscious mind'. Interestingly, he associates this tarot to the 'self at the beginning of the journey'. A trickster, one might surmise, is an experiment with a magical self — also found as the court jester, or court dwarf. Leonora follows the conventional numbering, so it appears as the zero card. The trickster is bitten by a ferocious cat or lynx. This character is unaware of the cat biting his leg, he is the incarnation of the unconscious and is oblivious to where he is heading. Obviously, he relates, as many other characters do, to the hidden aspects of the self in each of us. An interesting conversation with Leonora took place regarding another book she was consulting. Joan P. Couliano, who wrote about desire as 'The pursuit of a phantasm and the phantasm itself belongs to a world, the imaginary world — the *mundus imaginalis* whose loftiness Henri Corbin described as "dealing with its penumbra"'. No sooner had she quoted this to me she exclaimed, 'The Fool is the shadow of knowledge, he is the enigmatic other!' I responded, 'The Ghost in the psyche'. 'Indeed...' she answered slowly drifting away from the conversation to retire into a private domain. I suppose

Leonora was drawn to this card because she was fascinated by the trickster. Since I had the Paul Radin book in my bedroom, I came back with it. 'Do you want me to read what I found?' Wakdjunkaga, or the Winnebago trickster in Siouan language, stems from tricky. 'The myth of the trickster is found among North American Indians [sic]. They inhabited an area which extended from South Carolina and the lower Mississippi River northward and westward (...) to Wisconsin, North and South Dakota [and it even reached Canada]'." She took special interest in an essay by Jung on the trickster, where we are told about his 'sly jokes and malicious pranks, his powers as a shape-shifter, his dual nature, half animal, half divine...'. 'Like most of characters in my paintings', remarked Leonora; then she recalls something said by Wirth. 'The Fool belongs to a domain of the intelligible'. We also find the trickster as an archetype, Jung calls attention to these traits, 'He is so unconscious of himself that his body is not a unity...'. One would contest that the unity of a rational body does not correspond to a subliminal one. Jung discusses the trickster as an archetype and frames this character as a manifestation of an early development of consciousness. Leonora and I exchange views on how Jung hints at a kind of trickster mood in masquerades, probably modelled from the Cervula or Cervulus. Since all this was so motivating for Leonora, I managed to find that the trickster originated from the Roman Saturnalia and kalends feasts, including other festivities to celebrate the Christmas period. Many events enacted the Old and the New. 'Skin clad mummers led by Cervulus or hobbyhorse and other symbolic figures'. The trickster undergoes multiple shape modifications, according to Jung the archetype brings forth a 'transformation of the meaningless to the meaningful'. So even though the zero card of the Fool depicts him as incapable of discernment, he can manifest the meaningfulness of a quest directed to self-knowledge. With this view the tarot is a navigational device, enabling us to visit a mostly muted domain in which perceptions and sensations are silenced. The strategies of a coercive force against a free psyche set upon enslaving our inner trickster, to inhibit and render it powerless. Wirth warns us about the fool who 'carries a treasury of stupidities and insanities', and adds that 'we have to be reasonable so as not to leave the limited domain of reason'. Jung joins in this deprecatory mode when he remarks that the trickster 'preserves the shadow in its pristine mythological form, and thus points back to a much earlier stage of consciousness which existed before the birth of the myth when the Indian was still groping about in a similar mental darkness'." I often challenged these views while exchanging ideas with Leonora. Who gave him the right to personify the alleged archeologist of 'primitive mentalities'? Be that as it may, both Wirth, under his mask of reasonability, and Jung, with his racist babblings, are blinded by reductionist and rationalistic views.

Leonora's approach to the tarot was an imaginal affair. The game reached a realm of inner images that took a life of their own. It brought a liberation of subjectivity, often entrapped by our own lifelong training in a repressive objectification. The game opened a subjective territory or playing ground where the keys to the individual's psychic forces are made to work. Since each card engages emotions that connect to the images, these may become emotional personifications. Leonora's VIIth card, or the Chariot, is interpreted as talent, understanding of oneself, Grand Architect. However, it might also be read as disorder, a possible accident, bad news. This version seems to narrate the two sphinxes drawing the chariot. The charioteer answered the riddle of the sphinx, so in Waite's interpretation, the card represents 'a triumph in the mind'. A different elucidation is that the victorious one 'leads a gentle white beast and a savage dark one...'. However, for Leonora the male charioteer is to be guarded by two watchful and enigmatic female figures; such an addition doesn't appear in any of the tarot books that I consulted. Leonora wants to disclose the mystery of the inner animal. Could we envision a game of emotions and fantastic beasts who know the answer to the permanent question, 'Who am I?', while the white 'emotional' sphinx and the savage dark sphinx haul us into a complex state of being? We know that in the tarot game the person always asks something, and a reply is furnished through the symbolic workings of the cards, but in the end, we are the ones that provide an answer. Returning to the sphinxes, a hybrid constellation combining half a woman and half a lion, who addressed enigmatic questions to the passerby, such that could only be dealt by the power of mind; additionally, this creature stands for enigmas and the ineluctable. The sphinx as a riddle-maker is an interesting player in this story. Leonora was seduced by the symbolism attached to this entity, which Jung identified with 'the feminine instinct', but we could add also, informed with a deep-rooted intelligence. At this point let us not forget those two enigmatic female figures 'balancing and flanking the male force'. In Leonora's tarot we encounter an imaginal player who has traditionally been excluded from any participation in the domain of mind. A place guarded by those who discourage any form of play, except when justified by a limited and impoverished domain complicit with a restrained and rationalized set of rules, where power games thrive.

Earlier I mentioned a poetics of the unconscious, connected to a Surrealist creative underground which at some point relates to Leonora's tarot. All of a sudden, I'm struck by the idea that the trickster returns — a revenant — as a figure of automatism. An instigator of an unconscious revolt, an automatism envisioned as 'a language (within the hypnotic dream) or that which dissipates the control of reason (...) there is a questioning of the subject by itself and the meaning of all language, of all human communication'. The question arises to suggest a dwelling associated with such poetics, in what Breton portrays as the hazard object if; also aligned to a definition of this figure. In addition to Leonora's objective chance — availability to the exploration of an imaginary region in her tarot —

Breton plunged into a hazard objectif or objective chance in a specific frame of mind. 'Today once more, he declares, I expect nothing else but my availability, a thirst to wander, to encounter everything, assured that it will keep a mysterious communication with other available beings, as if we were summoned to a sudden reunion'. Objective chance, he admits 'is the confluence of phenomena which manifests the invasion of the marvelous in everyday life'. A state of mind not exclusively accepting this availability but also a disposition to allow the invasion of the marvelous, is conducive to this poetics of the unconscious omnipresent in Leonora's tarot. The player's imaginal nature assimilates 'the magical power of the hazard object if, retaining the force of a conjuration, that creature [of sublimity] and truth', as was so beautifully put by Carrouges. Leonora's tarot is endowed with a subliminal iconography, a window opening to a performance of the marvelous. What retains such a seductive allure is that whenever we get the opportunity to play with these cards, each one of us is invited to daydream; the cards also guiding players and observers through an adventure into an unknown domain of feeling and subliminal transformation. A cautionary note might well be heeded, 'In the Surrealist universe, an automatic set of symbols or voluntary ones abound, plastic expression by itself or the object for the object's self is no longer valid...'. Nacenta's words suggest an insight into subliminal transformations associated to 'automatic symbols' as I understand them; emerging from an internal voice which becomes materialized in objects or written materials — this provided me with a thematic background to read Leonora's tarot beyond the conventional meanings attached to the original game, along with the figure of a poetics of the unconscious associated to both automatism and objective chance. GABRIEL WEISZ CARRINGTON, México City, 2020 <>

Duchamp Is My Lawyer: The Polemics, Pragmatics, and Poetics of UbuWeb by Kenneth Goldsmith [Columbia University Press,

In 1996, during the relatively early days of the web, Kenneth Goldsmith created UbuWeb to post hard-to-find works of concrete poetry. What started out as a site to share works from a relatively obscure literary movement grew into an essential archive of twentieth- and twenty-first-century avant-garde and experimental literature, film, and music. Visitors around the world now have access to both obscure and canonical works, from artists such as Kara Walker, Yoko Ono, Pauline Oliveros, Samuel Beckett, Marcel Duchamp, Cecil Taylor, Glenn Ligon, William Burroughs, and Jean-Luc Godard.

In **Duchamp Is My Lawyer**, Goldsmith tells the history of UbuWeb, explaining the motivations behind its creation and how artistic works are archived, consumed, and distributed online. Based on his own experiences and interviews with a variety of experts, Goldsmith describes how the site navigates issues of copyright and the ways that UbuWeb challenges familiar configurations and histories of the avant-garde. The book also portrays the growth of other "shadow libraries" and includes a section on the artists whose works reflect the aims, aesthetics, and ethos of UbuWeb. Goldsmith concludes by contrasting UbuWeb's commitment to the free-culture movement and giving access to a wide range of artistic works with today's gatekeepers of algorithmic culture, such as Netflix, Amazon, and Spotify.

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There's a back door to the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York City that few know about. Invisible to the bustling crowds at the main entrance on Fifty-Third Street, it's desolate except for the occasional noisy school group or quiet academic researcher entering and exiting. There're no admission fees or snaking queues, only a lonely intern sitting at a desk. If you sign in and take the elevator to the top floor, you'll find the MoMA Library. It was there in the late 1970s that a librarian named Clive Phillpot created a policy unlike any other in the history of the museum. Without asking permission, he decreed that anybody could mail anything to the MoMA Library, and it would be accepted and become part of the official collection. There was no limit to what could be sent, nor were there specifications of size, medium, or provenance. No judgments were made about quality either. The artist could be world famous or completely unknown—it made no difference. Once something was sent, no questions were ever asked. Whatever was received was accepted. Phillpot estimates that between 1977 and 1994 he got anywhere from 100,000 to 200,000 artists into the MoMA collection this way.' Bob Dylan once said, "I had gotten in the door when no one was looking. I was in there now and, there was nothing anybody from then on could do ever about it." Similarly, Philpot's gesture was so under the radar that the front door—the museum administration and curatorial wing—paid no attention to it. And once they did, it was too late; nobody was going to return all those crates and boxes that had piled up over the years, never mind remove hundreds of thousands of artists from the database. While some artifacts from those acquisitions are quite valuable and are often on display in the galleries, most of them languish in MoMA's remote storage facility out in Queens, stacked up in the boxes they were originally sent in. And they're all still part of MoMA's collection.

Sometimes the back door was used to get artworks into the museum. In 1991, Chuck Close was asked to curate an *Artist's Choice* exhibition. Close decided to choose a selection of portraits from MoMA's collection, and he wanted to include Ray Johnson, who at the time was—unbelievably enough—still not actually in the MoMA collection. So to get himself in, Johnson stuffed a funky photocopied cartoon of Willem de Kooning into an envelope and mailed it off to Phillpot, courtesy of the library. Sure enough, the cartoon was entered into the MoMA collection with the credit line "Gift of the artist. The Museum of Modern Art Library, Special Collections"—therefore eligible to be included in Close's show.

The back door is a powerful tool. While all eyes are elsewhere, magical things can happen in the margins. Andy Warhol once said that if you want to collect something in New York, you have to find out what it is that nobody else wants and collect that. Before long, everyone will want it. He was right—once he began collecting ugly ceramic cookie jars, everyone started collecting them. By the time he died, his cookie jar collection, which he paid pennies for, sold at auction for a quarter of a million dollars. Warhol was a back-door collector. Out of the watchful eye of the front door and free to write its own ticket, the back door plays by its own rules. Unburdened by official policy, it can quietly reshuffle the deck according to intuition, whim, and desire. While the front sparkles with glamour and sexy commodities, the back door favors that which is economically worthless but historically priceless. Trading in ephemera and ideas, the back door is unlocked and unguarded, for it's assumed that there's not much worth stealing inside that rear door—often a correct hunch. Yet because the back door is always open, its ideas are infinitely democratic, transferrable, and replicable as well as free to all. At once playful—even prankish—and deadly serious, the back door is perverse, embracing contradiction and impurity. It's also wildly utopian, proposing to make the impossible possible. What begins as a hunch or proposition over time becomes serious. If you do something wrong for long enough, it eventually becomes right—paradoxically transforming the back door into the new front door.

Marcel Duchamp once made a door hinged between two frames that was always open and always shut. The door closed one entrance when it opened the other, thereby contradicting the French proverb "*Il faut qu'une Porte soit ouverte ou fermee* [A door must be either open or closed]." It is both and neither at the same time. Writing to Andre Breton, Duchamp said, "*Pour moi it y a autre chose que oui, non et indfferent—C'est par example l'absence d'investigations de ce genre* [For me there is something other than yes, no, and indifferent—there is for example the absence of investigations of this kind]." Open and closed, pirate and legitimate, serious and playful, UbuWeb has attempted to model itself on Phillpot's back door and Duchamp's pendulous door, resulting in a decades-long investigation into the absence of an investigation.

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Founded in 1996, UbuWeb is a pirate shadow library consisting of hundreds of thousands of freely downloadable avant-garde artifacts. By the letter of the law, the site is illegal; we openly violate copyright norms and almost never ask for permission. Most everything on the site is pilfered, ripped, and swiped from other places, then reposted. We've never been sued—never even come close. UbuWeb functions on no money—we don't take it, we don't pay it, we don't touch it; you'll never find an advertisement, a logo, or a donation box. We've never applied for a grant or accepted a sponsorship; we remain happily unaffiliated, keeping us free and clean, allowing us to do what we want to do, the way we want to do it. Most important, UbuWeb has always been and will always be free and open to all: there are no memberships or passwords required. All labor is volunteered; our server space and bandwidth are donated by a likeminded group of intellectual custodians who believe in free access to knowledge. A gift economy of plentitude with a strong emphasis on global education, UbuWeb is visited daily by tens of thousands of people from every continent. We're on numerous syllabuses, ranging from those for kindergarteners studying pattern poetry to those for postgraduates listening to hours of Jacques Lacan's *Seminaires.* When the site goes down from time to time, as most sites do, we're inundated by emails from panicked faculty wondering how they are going to teach their courses that week.

The site is filled with the detritus and ephemera of great artists better known for other things—the music of Jean Dubuffet, the poetry of Dan Graham, the hip-hop of Jean-Michel Basquiat, the punk

rock of Martin Kippenberger, the films of John Lennon, the radio plays of Ulrike Meinhof, the symphonies of Hanne Darboven, the country music of Julian Schnabel—most of which were originally put out in tiny editions, were critically ignored, and quickly vanished. However, the web provides the perfect place to restage these works. With video, sound, and text remaining more faithful to the original experience than, say, painting or sculpture, Ubu proposes a different sort of revisionist art history based on the peripheries of artistic production rather than on the perceived, hyped, or market-based center.

For example, although famous for his megalithic metal sculptures, Richard Serra has made a lot of important video art. The museum narrative enforces this invisibility. In Serra's retrospective at the MoMA in New York in 2007, there was no sign of his essential videos *Television Delivers People* (1973) and *Boomerang* (1974), both frequently visited resources on UbuWeb. Similarly, Salvador Dali's obscure psychedelic film *Impressions de la Haute Mongolie—hommage d Raymond Roussel* (1976) is the only film besides *Un chien Andalou* (1929) that he completed in his lifetime. It's also the only movie you'll ever watch about Upper Mongolia, giant hallucinogenic mushrooms, and a urine-soaked pen.[4] Nearly impossible to see in theaters or museums, it's playing every day and every night on Ubu. And although you won't find any of Dali's paintings on UbuWeb, you will find a recording of an advertisement he made for a bank in 1967. Not everything at the site is offbeat: there are, in all fairness, lots of artists' works that perfectly port to the web, such as Hollis Frampton's structuralist films, Kathy Acker's collaborations with punk bands, Samuel Beckett's radio plays, Mary Ellen Solt's concrete poems, Maurice Blanchot's mystery novels, and Aleister Crowley's magical wax-cylinder recordings.

Named for Alfred Jarry's mischievous, foul-mouthed, Dadaist protagonist Ubu Roi, UbuWeb began as a site focusing on visual and concrete poetry. With the advent of the graphical web browser in the mid-1990s, I began scanning old concrete poems and posting them on the web. I was astonished by how fresh those dusty old paperbound pieces looked when backlit by the computer screen. When I emailed the link to a few friends, they seemed to agree; they emailed the link to a few of their friends, and in a short time I found myself surrounded by a group of concrete-poetry fans. Encouraged, I scanned a few more poems before setting out to convert whole important anthologies of the genre to the web. Shortly thereafter, when streaming audio became available, it made sense to extend Ubu's scope to sound poetry, a historical movement similar to concrete poetry, but instead of words and letters published on the page, words and letters are intoned or spoken. I began transferring old sound-poetry LPs to MP3s and posting them alongside the concrete poems.

Unbeknownst to me at the time, sound poetry—a broad and varied genre that often includes instruments and electronic treatments—posed some challenging questions. For instance, certain of John Cage's readings of his texts could be termed "sound poetry," so I included them. But just as often Cage accompanied those readings with an orchestral piece, which I included as well. I soon found myself unable to distinguish the difference between "sound poetry" and "music." I encountered this dilemma time and again, whether it was with the compositions of Maurico Kagel or of Joan La Barbara or of Henri Chopin, all of whom were as well known as "composers" as they were as "sound poets" or "audio artists." Finally, after a while I gave up trying to name things; I dropped the term *sound poetry* and began referring to the section under which they were filed simply as "Sound."

A similar thing happened with concrete poetry. For many years, I had been collecting outsider writings scrawled on scraps of paper affixed to New York City walls that expressed highly emotional narratives, conspiracy theories, and political sentiments. They often employed beautiful and innovative graphical letter forms that appeared to me to be a sort of handmade concrete poetry but

with an entirely different history and agenda. I scanned and uploaded these scraps but began to question where they should be filed. Could they easily fit alongside the classical modernist concrete poems, or should they be in a category of their own? I ultimately decided that although they resembled visual poems, they were something else, so I created a new section simply called "Outsiders"—named after the genre known as "outsider art"—which grew to become a large repository of audio and visual material created by street poets and visionaries.

One of the collections housed in the Outsiders section is *The 365 Days Project,* which had its inception as a blog where hundreds of people over the course of a year posted one song or album a day of outrageous novelty music, all of which was donated to Ubu when the blog went offline. The range is vast, including a panoply of weird stuff, such as celebrity crooners, offbeat children's records, amateur song-poems, hammy ventriloquism, and homemade tape recordings. The collection is studded with bizarre gems such as Louis Farrakhan singing calypso and a high school choir's rendition of the Sweet's AM radio hit "Fox on the Run." Buried deep within are rare recordings by the legendary avant-garde conductor-composer Nicolas Slonimsky, inexplicably yowling out copy from old newspaper ads for cod liver oil and toothpaste, accompanied by a detuned piano. Written in 1925, the compositions were a sort of predecessor to pop art, exploring the expressive possibilities of found text. While many listeners to *7he 365 Days Project* might've written off these recordings as little more than "weird-old-man-who-can't-carry-a-tune" novelty records, when these recordings collided with UbuWeb, the backstory (which I recount later in this book) became complicated. For several years previously, we had been hosting a series of world-premiere recordings of modernist composers such as Charles Ives, Carl Ruggles, and Edgard Varese that Slonimsky conducted during the 193os. Zooming out and viewing Slonimsky's career in retrospective, we could connect the dots to the two different personas represented, but the initial shock that both of them live together under the same roof, so to speak, was profound. Ultimately, the files were cross-referenced, once in the Outsiders section under *The 365 Days Project* and once in the Sound section under "Nicolas Slonimsky," the consummate inside outsider.

Jerome Rothenberg, a scholar, approached Ubu with an idea to build a wing on the site that would focus on sound, visual art, poetry, and essays related to his specialty, ethnopoetics. Rothenberg's ethnopoetics focused on how the avant-garde dovetailed with the world's ancient cultures, both those surviving in situ as well as those that had vanished except for transcriptions in books or recordings from earlier decades. It was a perfect match for Ubu. Rothenberg's sound offerings included everything from the jazz singer Slim Gaillard to Inuit throat singing, each making formal connections to modernist strains of Dada or sound poetry. Examples of ethnopoetic visual poetry ranged from Chippewa song pictures to Guillaume Apollinaire's graphical arrangements of letters in his *Calligrammes.* Rothenberg edited a subsection containing dozens of scholarly papers reflecting on ethnopoet-ics, such as Brent Hayes Edwards's "Louis Armstrong and the Syntax of Scat" and Kenneth Rexroth's writings on American Indian song. He also put together a selection of plain-text poetry, including Cecilia Vicuna's contemporary shamanistic poems, Vietnamese *ca dao* folk poems, and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's proto—sound poem "Song of the Owl" (1856).

There is a precedent for such an eclectic approach to bringing together varied works of art and writing: *Aspen* magazine, which was published between 1965 and 1971. Though *Aspen* is long out of print, UbuWeb was fortunate to be given a digitized version of the entire run. Its ten issues attempted to bring together several disciplines under a single curator; any given issue contained poetry, music, film, art criticism, reproductions of paintings, and critical essays. Each issue came in a customized box filled with booklets, flexi-disc phonograph recordings, posters, sketches for sculptures, and postcards; some issues even included spools of Super 8 movie film. The publisher,

Phyllis Johnson, claimed that *Aspen* should be a "time capsule" of a certain period, point of view, or person; hence, whole issues were devoted to subjects such as pop art, conceptual art, swinging mod London, and the psychedelic scene.

They were edited by the likes of Andy Warhol and Dan Graham and designed by people such as George Maciunas and Quentin Fiore. Contributors included a who's who of the period, Lou Reed with notes on rock 'n' roll; Tony Smith with a make-it-yourself cardboard sculpture kit; Susan Sontag with "The Aesthetics of Silence"; Eva Marie Saint with a statement about painting and film; Roland Barthes with "The Death of the Author"; and Yoko Ono with stark, unaccompanied vocal pieces--in total amounting to several hundred works of art. After absorbing *Aspen,* UbuWeb was flooded with the work of dozens of artists spanning various genres, timeframes, and practices; the jazzmen Yank Lawson and Peanuts Hucko playing "St. James Infirmary Blues" snuggled up against Richard Hulsenbeck intoning Dada poems. The eclecticism was thrilling and unpredictable. *Aspen* created an unorthodox environment, one in which a democratic art—an art that functioned outside of galleries and museums—was available to everyone at an affordable price. Its utopian purview was everything UbuWeb strived to be.

The Super 8 films from *Aspen* formed the basis of UbuWeb's Film & Video section, where more than 5,000 avant-garde films are both streamable and downloadable, from the gritty blackand-white videos of Vito Acconci to the glittery filmic oeuvre of Jack Smith. There are countless filmed biographies and interviews with authors such as Jorge Luis Borges, J. G. Ballard, Allen Ginsberg, and Louis-Ferdinand Celine. The scope is international: there are dozens of obscure Yugoslav Black Wave Cinema films (1962-1972), a four-decade survey of German video art (1964-2004), and a number of samizdat Soviet films from the 1980s. Experimental music films—both documentary and performance—are abundant. UbuWeb hosts Robert Ashley's epic fourteen-hour *Music with Roots in the Aether,* a series of composer portraits made in the mid-pros and featuring artists such as Pauline Oliveros, Terry Riley, and Philip Glass. There's a lot of contemporary work as well, such as *Her Noise* (2007), a documentary about women and experimental music; Kara Walker's difficult-to-see video *Fall Frum Grace, Miss Pipi's Blue Tale* (2011); as well as the chaotic MTV-gone-wrong videos of Ryan Trecartin. There are also hours of vintage performance-art documentation by artists such as Marina Abramovi6 and Ulay, a bootleg version of Robert Smithson's *Hotel Palenque* (1969), and an astonishing twenty-one-minute clip of Abbie Hoffman making gefilte fish on Christmas Eve of 1973.

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UbuWeb's large, boundary-blurring archive of the avant-garde necessarily alters what is meant by *avant-garde,* a term saddled with the legacies of patriarchy, hegemony, imperialism, colonization, and militarization. Giving voice to these concerns, the poet and critic Dick Higgins wrote, "The very concept of an avant-garde, which relates to the military metaphor of advance troops coming before the main body, is masculine."' The avant-garde theater scholar Kimberly Jannarone concurs: "The term 'avant-garde'—coming to us from the military and first applied to the arts around World War I—is heavily weighted by historical and political critical baggage. . . . Indeed, the historical avant-garde often relied on sexist, racist, primitivist, and imperialist notions."' And it's true even today: witness how Italy's farright-wing party Casa Pound named itself after Ezra Pound, emblazing images of him across their posters, or how one of Vladimir Putin's main ideologists, Vladislav Surkov, reputedly took techniques from his days as an avant-garde theater director and used them to sow confusion, discord, and chaos—exactly what the avant-garde excelled at—into rightist political situations. When you assemble a collection of the avant-garde, you run the risk of replicating everything wrong that is associated with it. I deployed impurity as a way of muddying, *detourning,* and playfully

reimagining the avant-garde, twisting and warping the rigorous, hard-baked grids of modernism into something more fluid, organic, incorrect, and unpredictable.

Think of the many artists who dissembled received notions of avant-garde as part and parcel of their avant-garde practices, such as Cornelius Cardew, Amiri Baraka, Musica Elettronica Viva, and Henry Flynt, or of others who took the idea of avant-garde in directions previously excluded from the canon. My midcentury avant-garde pantheon and inspiration comprise artists such as Moondog, Marie Menken, Harry Partch, Daphne Oram, Conlon Nancarrow, Alice B. Toklas, and Sun Ra. Driven by outsiders and visionaries, my avant-garde revels in eccentricity, impurity, and innovative formal experimentation. And at the same time I still love the denizens of the old-school canon, James Joyce, William Carlos Williams, and Pablo Picasso. But most of all I love it when they all get jumbled together on UbuWeb. Sparks fly when Henry Miller collides with Ana Mendieta, Karlheinz Stockhausen with Hito Steyerl, Fatboy Slim with the Situationist International, Weegee with Carrie Mae Weems, or F. T. Marinetti with Trinh T. Minh-ha, each nudging, reflecting, and shading their neighbors in unpredictable and destabilizing ways.

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What follows is a Duchampian door, at once open and closed, logical and whimsical, focused and drifty, academic and anecdotal. Part explanation, part justification, part reification, and part provocation, it's a memoir of sorts, an attempt to answer a question I often ask myself regarding UbuWeb: "What have I done here?" Is it a serendipitous collection of artists and works I personally happen to be interested in, or is it a resource for the avant-garde, making available obscure works to anyone in the world with access to the web? Is it an outlaw activity, or has it over time evolved into a textbook example of how fair use can ideally work? Will the weightlessness and freedom of never touching money or asking permission continue indefinitely, or at some point will the proverbial other shoe drop, when finances become a concern? The answer to these questions is both "yes" and "no." It's the sense of not knowing—the imbalance—that keeps this project alive for me. Once a project veers too strongly toward either one thing or the other, a deadness and predictability sets in, and it ceases to be dynamic.

Although there's a substantial user base around UbuWeb, it's hard to say exactly who these users are since we don't keep tabs on them. Once in a while when UbuWeb materializes in a physical space—if, for instance, there's an exhibition of the site in a gallery or when I give a talk about it—I get to meet some folks. Generally speaking, they don't skew toward any single demographic; rather, reflecting the site's eclectic offerings, a variety of musicians, poets, academics, artists, dancers, and theory heads show up. I've never done much to encourage an online community.' Instead, I preferred the quieter model of the public library, a large repository of cultural artifacts waiting to be browsed, borrowed, and shared. If there is a UbuWeb community, it's more at the level of our shadow-library peers, a like-minded circle of individuals and institutions across the globe who are dedicated to the free dissemination of cultural artifacts and intellectual materials. The people who use those resources (which I discuss in depth in chapter 4, "Shadow Libraries and Preserving the Memory of the World") overlap with the people who use UbuWeb.

This book is broken into three parts: "Polemics," "Pragmatics," and "Poetics." The "Polemics" section is just that—a short manifesto to explain UbuWeb. Even though it may be hard to swallow, it's important to how UbuWeb has evolved over the years. The section is called "Polemics" for a reason. UbuWeb is at its best when it's at its most assertive.

"Pragmatics" comprises a series of essays focusing on the legal, curatorial, distributive, economic, communitarian, and aesthetic issues that have defined the site and the free-culture movement from its inception and that continue to flavor it today. I discussed these concerns with experts in several fields—legal, curatorial, distribution, artistic, and academic—in order to find out how my views hold up. While the answers often confirmed my instincts, they sometimes surprised me; I got some things right, but I also got some wrong. I invoke terms such as *folk archiving* and *folk law* to describe the amateur mantles UbuWeb adopted when assembling and protecting its collection. I discuss UbuWeb in relation to the status of the cultural artifact in the digital age and how our presence has nudged that discourse in terms of such artifacts' legal, economic, distributive, and artistic reception. I also survey the various shadow libraries that constitute UbuWeb's peer group,

The next section, "Poetics," is a series of six essays focusing on specific genres and artworks that are foundational to the site. I examine various works—historically, philosophically, and aesthetically—through a series of close readings, focusing specifically on boundary-blurring, genre-crossing artists who define expanded notions of the avant-garde. I also delve into several historical publications and anthologies that have served as precedents for UbuWeb, discussing how their curatorial philosophies and distribution models influenced our thinking, ultimately giving us permission to do what we do.

After a brief coda, which critiques the nefarious role algorithms and surveillance capitalism play today in the distribution and reception of cultural artifacts, the book's appendix is an annotated list, "to' Things on UbuWeb That You Don't Know About but Should." It's a guide to some of the hidden treasures on Ubu. UbuWeb comprises hundreds of thousands of cultural artifacts, so this short selection is little more than a trail of breadcrumbs, encouraging you to hack your own path through the thickets contained therein.

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UbuWeb can be construed as the Robin Hood of the avantgarde, but instead of taking from one and giving to another, we're giving to all. UbuWeb is as much about the legal and social ramifications of its self-created distribution and archiving system as it is about the content it hosts. In a sense, the content takes care of itself, but keeping it there at the site has proved to be a trickier proposition. The sociopolitical maintenance of free server space with unlimited bandwidth is a complicated dance, often involving the dodging of darts thrown by individuals who call foul play on copyright infringement.

Acquisition by a larger entity is impossible: nothing is for sale. You might remember the denouement of the film *24 Hour Party People* (2002), where a large record conglomerate swoops in to buy the stubbornly independent Factory Records for millions of pounds. When asked to show evidence of his contracts with his artists, Factory head Tony Wilson can only produce a funky, DIY document signed in blood stating that the bands own the rights to all their material—nothing can be sold. The record execs grin madly as they walk away with the lucrative Factory catalogue for free. Wilson muses in the coda that although Factory Records was financially worthless, it was a great success, a fantastic conceptual-art project, full of integrity, one that never had to make a single compromise. UbuWeb is similar, except what we host, unlike pop music, has never made money.

These days there's a lot of support for the way we go about things. Many think of UbuWeb as an institution. Artists both well established and lesser known write us asking to be on the site. But it wasn't always this way; for a long time many people despised UbuWeb, fearing that it was contributing to the erosion of long-standing hierarchies in the avant-garde world, fearing that it was

leading to the decimation of certain art forms, fearing that it would tank entire art-based economies. Of course, none of that happened. We just happened to be there at the beginning of the web and had to ride the choppy currents of change as each successive wave washed over. Whereas we once used to receive daily cease-and-desist letters, today we rarely get any. It's not that we're doing anything different; it's just that people's attitudes toward copyright and distribution have evolved as the web has evolved.

By the time you read this, UbuWeb may be gone. Never meant to be a permanent archive, Ubu could vanish for any number of reasons: our Internet service provider (ISP) pulls the plug, we get sued, or I simply grow tired of it. Beggars can't be choosers, and we gladly take whatever is offered to us. We don't run on the most stable of servers or on the swiftest of machines; crashes eat into the archive on a periodic basis; sometimes the site as a whole goes down for days; more often than not, the already small group of volunteers dwindles to a team of one. But that's the beauty of it: UbuWeb is vociferously anti-institutional, eminently fluid, refusing to bow to demands other than what we happen to be moved by at a specific moment, allowing us flexibility and the ability to continually surprise even ourselves.

Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain. I designed UbuWeb to make it seem like an official, well-funded enterprise. With its clean design and its vast content, it feels, for lack of better words, "official" or "real." I figured that if UbuWeb appeared to be a legit entity, then people would be forced to acknowledge the importance of the difficult and obscure materials we championed. This approach seems to have worked; people have told me that they thought that there was a huge team of well-paid people toiling day and night behind screens, building the internet's largest archive of avant-garde art. Sounds good to me. If only it were true. Sometimes people come over to my apartment and ask to see UbuWeb. They're disappointed when I show them an old MacBook Pro hooked up to a wheezing four-terabyte hard drive in a drab room overlooking a gray alleyway in midtown Manhattan. Many assume UbuWeb to be a fortress of bricks and mortar, when in reality it's just a pile of pixels held together by tissue paper and spit.

Throughout this book, the pronouns I and we are interchangeable—because UbuWeb is mostly just me. Over the years, although there have been editors and volunteers, for the past two decades I've pretty much been on my own, designing, coding, archiving, and assembling the site. I am completely unqualified for the job. I have a BFA in sculpture that I got from the Rhode Island School of Design in 1984. I took one art history class in college, and it was on baroque art. As a result, everything about UbuWeb is sort of skewed and idiosyncratic, if not entirely wrong: the taxonomies are vague, the collections are incomplete, and why certain things are there and others aren't is unclear. UbuWeb was assembled in the way artists create their works: by following hunches, trusting intuitions, and blindly following them wherever they may lead—even when they lead to dead ends. This approach is both Ubu's blessing and its tragic flaw; it's what makes the site so exciting and dynamic but what makes it a flop when it comes to rigorous academic research. Throughout this book, the examples I use tend to skew toward my own tastes. While UbuWeb is a vast and diverse enterprise, it is still riddled with my subjectivity. Had someone else writ ten this book, it would've undoubtedly been a more objective endeavor. The fact that I not only built and curated the site but also am writing its history speaks to an obvious bias, one that is replicated time and again through this book and through the site as a whole. I have toiled for the past quarter of a century putting in, as Mike Kelley once said, "more love hours than can ever be repaid," building a utopia of avant-garde art, mixing the obscure and the canonical, and making the mix purposely invisible to most web denizens. In the end, UbuWeb remains closest to the spirit of its namesake, an elaborate—and at times obnoxious—

exhaustive and illogical endeavor, a pataphysical schoolboy prank illuminated and sanctioned by the bright green candle of Pere Ubu himself. Pshite!

THE MAN OF JASMINE AND OTHER TEXTS by Unica Zürn translated and introduced by Malcolm Green [Atlas Press, 9781900565820]

Anagram play meets psychic crisis in Unica Zürn's acclaimed Surrealist document of mental precarity.

In the 25 years since Atlas Press first published this account by Unica Zürn (1916–70) of her long history of mental crises, she has come to be recognized as a great artist at least the equal of her partner, the Surrealist Hans Bellmer. Yet her work is barely comprehensible without the texts printed here—now revised by translator Malcolm Green—in which she demonstrates how Surrealist conceptions of the psyche allowed her to welcome the most alarming experiences as offering access to an inner existence that was the vital source for her artistic output. Green's introduction to this volume was the first study to consider her life and work from this perspective.

Zürn's first mental collapse was initiated when she encountered her fantasy figure, "the Man of Jasmine," in the person of the writer and artist Henri Michaux. This meeting plunged her into a hallucinatory world in which visions of her desires, anxieties and events from her unresolved past overwhelmed her present life. Her greatest works were produced during times of mental crisis, often when confined in asylums, and she tended to encourage the onset of these crises in order to provoke intense creativity. Her description of these episodes reveals how language itself was part of the divinatory method that could aid her recovery or predict a new crisis. Her compulsion for composing anagrams allowed her to release from everyday language an astonishing flood of messages, threats and evocations. This method, and Zürn's eloquent yet direct style, make this book a literary masterpiece, while providing a rare insight into extreme psychological states.

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The House of Illnesses

Unica Zurn's biography is inextricably interwoven with her work, and above all with the present book. Her texts are largely autobiographical or semi-autobiographical, and move between her fantasies, and later on her hallucinations, and the concrete events surrounding a series of serious mental crises, which in turn are catalysed by her writing. An attempt to convey her life story cannot avoid switching between these two levels almost as associatively as she herself does in **THE MAN OF JASMINE AND OTHER TEXTS**.

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Various writers have offered valuable interpretations of Unica **Zürn**'s life in light by her work, showing that it is open to different readings. But rather than paraphrase their arguments (based in

part on texts not included in this edition)," I would like to like to consider her work in the light of her partner's writings, those of Hans Bellmer.

Bellmer receives few mentions in these interpretations, which generally confine themselves to underlining his "difficult" character (and thus suggest that he was to some extent responsible for her crises), and with establishing him as one of a series of father figures in aim's life, along with tacitly disapproving asides. Even though Zurn was sometimes critical of Bellmer, there is no overlooking the emotional support he provided, and the curious intertwining of his intellectual world with Zurn's artistic explorations and imaginings. In this way, he fitted into her life in an extraordinary manner, as if holding the key to her many mysteries. Meeting her through a series of chance events, he stepped directly into an old fantasy of hers, of meeting a doppelganger of the other sex (the theme of a short story, "The Green Lady in the Theatre Box", written several years before), and his theoretical texts also anticipated several important themes that later appeared in her writing.

The Anatomy of the Image, begun in 1942 and completed shortly after he met **Zürn**, opens with a quote from Paracelsus "the scorpion heals the scorpion" (an animal that she experiences differently in her visions later on). The text contains passages that have a singular correspondence with Zurn's experiences of her splitting personality; her birth as a poet and her search for the "other", her desire to overcome her perceived limitations as a woman, and even her death. In this complex text, Bellmer argues that the transference of pain or physical stimulation from one body part to another (such as by clenching ones fist during toothache) is the underlying reflex for liberating expression: one creates a "virtual source of arousal" which, in extreme cases, can lead to the doubling of the entire individual, designated by psychiatry as the "splitting of the ego." From this simultaneous division and multiplication a new form of ego can emerge as a synthesis of the opposites thus created. As early as 1937 Bellmer had connected this virtual source of arousal with ludic forms of experimental poetry in the text *The Games of the Doll:* "The best sort of game does not aim so much at a specific goal but draws its excitement from the thought of its own unforeseeable sequels — as if spurred on by an enticing promise. The best toy would therefore be one... which approaches its surroundings provocatively like a divining rod in order to discern, here and there, the feverish responses to what is always awaited and [which] everyone can repeat: The sudden images of the 'YOU'." Bellmer expands on this notion in 1954 in his essay on anagrams, in which he writes that these are born of "a violent, paradoxical conflict" between "the will to shape while simultaneously excluding all prior intention because it will prove sterile. The result appears, somewhat uncannily, to be due less to one's own consciousness than to the intervention of an 'other'."

Zurn, as a medium, "the only state of which she is worthy", is entranced by her anagrams and her own automatic drawings. The sense of promise, and the excitement at their predictive qualities, like those of a divining rod, to be found in the line that is to be used for an anagram poem, are clearly expressed in the pages of the present book. Words are her oracles, and the drawings look back at her from the page with the first eye that she executes. This gaze allows her to continue because she can create something that is not bound by her own contingency, which she identifies as her womanly feelings, and by what restricts her as a woman: "She finds them painful, the boundaries, limitations and monotony that are sometimes entailed simply by being a woman." More importantly, the drawing or the poem gives access to the "other" and offers her a new sense of self. Her increasing involvement with anagrams also tends, however, to cut her off from her surroundings, while filling her with a sense of courage and strength sufficient to lead a life on her own, a sensation which heralds her feelings of "megalomania". Sin is drawn into crises, the player becomes the "plaything", caught in the interlocking loops of word and self; she splits words into anagrams and this activity also splits her self: "splitting ... the personality into an ego that *experiences* arousal and an ego that

produces arousal." Bellmer also notes this link between the word and the bodily self: "The body resembles a sentence that seems to invite us to dismantle it into its component letters, so that its true meanings may be revealed anew through an endless stream of anagrams." But an element is missing in the equation as applied to Unica **Zürn**'s real "counterpart", for as Bellmer underlines in his essay on the image, "opposites are necessary for things to exist and for a third reality to ensue." **Zürn**'s counterpart is still only a megalomaniac extension of herself, not the complement she longed for as a child, and which she described in *Dark Spring*. She remains simply split, doubled, and can only imagine a counterpart who is visibly similar to herself, a projection of herself into a white void.

Bellmer, in his essay on the image, illustrates the phenomenon of splitting and the displacement of the source of arousal, or of elements of the self; to other parts of the body by examining a case cited by Cesare Lombroso of a fourteen-year-old "hysteric" who went blind but developed the ability to see with the tip of her nose and the lobe of her left ear, and to smell with her heels. Several years later **Zürn** hears "From the depths of her belly (...) the voice of a poet, whom she knows and admires, reciting an anagram that she had composed from a sentence she had found in one of his books." In a similar fashion, she displaces her own inner voices to Michaux, and believes that he is communicating telepathically with her.[18] A rash on her own skin — the starting point for her image in *The Whiteness with the Red Spot*

- is likewise displaced to the "other", and becomes an external point she can clutch at in her crises: "Like someone on the verge of drowning, she seeks out a point in the room to which she can cling. This point is a small red artificial flower on top of the radio on the other side of the room. By staring at this red spot she can hold her head above the sea of torture in which she feels she is swimming. Whenever she releases her eyes from the red point, she `drowns'."

The apparent difference between the hysteric who displaces a part of herself within her own body and Zurn, who displaces it to an outside voice, is resolved in the later chapters of Bellmer's essay, where he discusses the way in which a man and a woman can project themselves on to one another, thus "assuming the form" of the other to produce a hermaphroditic interlocking of the male and female principles through a fundamental reversibility of images and, ultimately, of the sexes. Furthermore, this text suggests the missing factor in Zurn's equation: desire (her femininity, killed by her mother, or by her father, depending on whose reading one choses), when Bellmer notes that the "object or person only becomes real when desire permits it be other than it is." The self requires the other in order to be real but **Zürn**, the medium who awaits encounters and oracles, overhears her own desires and looks for an extension in others, while rejecting her own femininity (as she writes on numerous occasions). Her recurring fantasies about transsexuality and androgyny, and her wish to be relieved of the mystery of the sexes ("How good I would feel if I could be something that called itself neither man nor woman") do not take her so far as the daring hermaphroditism proposed by Bellmer. For **Zürn** the reversibility of the sexes and of images, remains unidirectional. She waits passively, responds to signs in her surroundings (the ever-recurring "HM" Hermann Melville, Henri Michaux, the initials of the
Hotel Minerve on a towel, her chance meetings with Bellmer even), but still the "reversibility" of the image, of the alter ego with self, lacks the "third reality". She is unable to make of it something resembling the "objective chance" advocated by Breton, it remains simply hallucination and delusion.

Unable to take part in the defining of situations by means of desire, because she lacks a real counterpart with whom to interact, and addicted to the shimmering "other" she found in her anagrams, a part from her own ego splits off ("the kobold behind the ego" — Bellmer), so that she remains merely a *virtual* existence: "After forty-three years this life has not become "*my* life" (my

italics). It might just as well be someone else's life." Even her suicide seems to have been dictated from outside, to have been overdetermined: her father's first wife, a writer with whom Zürn identified, killed herself by jumping out of the window of a psychiatric hospital, in common with her Uncle Falada, with whom she likewise idenitifies in a passage in *The Man of Jasmine.* The only suicides or suicide attempts mentioned in *The Man of Jasmine* are by defenestration. Indeed, Bellmer described precisely such a death as an example of an aspect of the reversibility of the image in *The Doll.* Zürn, for her own part, had described this method of suicide in *Dark Spring* three years earlier. As Inge Morgenroth points out, the link between her means of death and the window has a deeper significance. In *Dark Spring,* Zurn wrote: "When she lies in her room in order to sleep, she studies the cross formed by the window panes. The vertical line is the man, the horizontal the woman. The point where the two lines meet is a mystery." Later, she looks at the cross after masturbating on her bed and longs for a male complement. At the tragic end of w story, the girl's plunge to her death from the window concludes with the family (log approaching her and licking her genitals, repeating the one happy, innocent sexual encounter she had experienced.

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Zürn's texts suck us deep into her world; it is as difficult to free oneself as it was liar the writer herself. In spite, or perhaps because of, her use of the third person (**Zürn**'s original manuscript of *The Man of Jasmine* even attributed the book to "the wife of Hans Bellmer"). Her agency is thus removed, like that of the central character, almost as if she has become a medium to her own self. Occasionally she rebels, however. *The Whiteness with the Red Spot,* written in the first person, is an angry condemnation of her contingency, her "training", of the illusions of hope and happiness she had projected onto the other, the "white man". Two shorter texts, *The House of Illnesses* (see the final page of this book for information on the A t las Press edition) and *Les Jeux a Deux (Games for Two)* employ a laconic humour to similarr effect. Her anagrams also reveal an overt aggression; the German words for "*The Whiteness with the Red Spot*' became transformed into: "the chamber of wounds, plague-raging-murder. If it stinks to you, spit it out." In the lines of the anagram poems she incorporates into *In Ambush* we read, among others:

"Thunderously igniting lusts with hissing church-oil thunder." And if the main texts seem strangely subdued and obedient by comparison, it should not be forgotten that they were written under a strong inner compulsion, against the advice of others (her assertion that Dr. Rabain encouraged her to write *The Man of Jasmine* was strongly denied by him), that it jeopardised her "normal" state. The importance she attached to the work is evident from the efforts she took to have it published. Her use of the third person voice allowed her to she neutralise her subjectivity, which, far from being an expression of "passivity," conveys the violence and destitution she experienced in mental institutions with disarming objectivity. Even if the formal quality of her syntax sometimes seems like a mechanism of self-preservation, a means of maintaining control or of avoiding direct answers to the question "why?", it should be noted that the only other possibility, writing in the first person, would be no less limiting. In one of the few comparable works available to us, Gerard de Nerval's *Aurelia,* although the author writes in the first person, he frequently resorts to the passive tense in order to convey his madness; Nerval, we would do well to remember, was an established writer who was not in danger of sounding like an "irrational *woman,*" which was the initial reception accorded *The Man of Jasmine* in Germany.

Zürn is the medium of her experiences in an active sense; an apparent coolness frees her from the hackneyed language of the self, grants coincidences, encounters and miracles what she considers to be their correct weight and value, and allows her to document her experiences without censorship

or judgement. In the end we are forced to the conclusion that Zürn's acumen and artistry, and her virtuosity as a writer, were able to withstand her mental crises and depressions, allowing her to add a further masterpiece to that small, precious row of unclassifiable works that includes Breton's *Nadja,* Nerval's *Aurelia* and Leonora Carrington's Down *Below.* <>

In Which Something Happens All Over Again For The Very First Time by Cerith Wyn Evans, commentary by Molly Nesbit, Susanne Gaensheimer, Helmut Friedel, Susanne Page [Musée d'Art modern de la Ville de Paris / ARC, June 9 — September 17, 2006, Städtische Galerie im Lenbachhaus und Kunstbau, Munich November 25, 2006 — February 25, 2007 9783886451647

In Which Something Happens All Over Again For The Very First Time is the first comprehensive publication to deal with the sculptural installations, film projections, neon texts and sound productions of the Welsh artist, Cerith Wyn Evans. Evans began as an assistant to the American underground filmmaker Derek Jarman, concentrating on his own short experimental films throughout the 1980s. In the 1990s he began to produce installations that explored the phenomenology of language, time and perception. In recent years, he has expanded his arsenal of materials to include fireworks, neon, texts, film, photography and sculpture. Of his work shown at Tate Modern's 2006 Triennial, the Tate described his work: "Cerith Wyn Evans approaches knowledge like a magpie, borrowing from authors of the past to invigorate the viewer's perceptions of the present. Though comprising few elements, his work is decadent and intense, both with its use of references as well as in its magical and dramatic effect."

You Got to Burn to Shine (John Giorno) by *Suzanne Page, Director of the Musée d'Art moderne de la Ville de Paris, and Helmut Friedel, Director of Stadtische Galerie im Lenbachhaus, Munich*

Cerith Wyn Evans is a Welsh-born British artist with a broad exposure on the international art scene. The artist has chosen to exhibit, for the first time, in Paris and later in Munich, seventeen chandeliers from a series that began in 2003.

Cerith Wyn Evans is a deeply sensitive and learned artist with the panache of a dandy. Since the early 1990s, his work has focused on language — its content, interactions, and interpretations, its ambiguities, how it resists and betrays. His works simultaneously probe the mechanisms of perception and the question of identity. Paradoxically, although Cerith Wyn Evans takes it upon himself to appropriate the texts of great writers, he does so by encrypting them, translating them into sculptures or images, and thus imposes a confirmed subjectivity. Via a cross-disciplinary approach that draws from cinema, video, architecture, design and the stage, Cerith Wyn Evans creates pieces that entice the viewer through a sophisticated strategy of destabilization, and by superimposing multiple, disorienting meanings into which doubt, and even danger, are introduced.

In Paris, the artist has once again occupied the curved space of the ARC (as during the 1996 group exhibition "Life/Live") presenting a composition that brings together the almost anachronistic magnificence of stylish chandeliers with contemporary flat screens. The space vibrates to the rhythm

of the chandeliers, which blink out texts by various authors that have been transcribed in Morse code.

Preceded and followed by two older pieces, this piece forms the heart of the exhibition; it diffracts into a contemporary ensemble that blends sculpture, photography, slide shows, and neon.

As a reflection of the context, using a process familiar to the artist, Cerith Wyn Evans has associated a selection of drawings by Brion Gysin, taken from the museum's collections. Cerith Wyn Evans met Gysin —a painter, poet, polyglot music-lover and a friend of William Burroughs— in the 1980s, and their intellectual partnership led Cerith Wyn Evans to analyze and develop the principle of Gysin's *Dreamachine.* At the same time, the museum is hosting a large retrospective of the work of Dan Flavin. This "coincidence" creates resonances between two radical groups of work that invite the viewer to experience light as language.

For Munich, Cerith Wyn Evans has developed a choreography of the chandeliers particularly for the Kunstbau of the Lenbachhaus, an extraordinary underground space that reflects both the form and the dynamic of the subway station located just beneath. For many years, the Lenbachhaus' collection and exhibition program have addressed the significance of light in art. *Cubs di Luce,* the only luminous sculpture by the Italian artist Lucio Fontana, which still exists as original, is at the center of a constellation of light-related works in the museum's collections. Two exciting moments in this respect were Dan Flavin's large installation of fluorescent tubes in 1994, and the 2003 installation of *Sonne statt Regen* by Olafur Eliasson (an artist also shown at the Arc in 2002) — both works specially commissioned for the Kuristbau. The Cerith Wyn Evans exhibition, as well as his works already present in the museum's collections, represents another climax.

This year, Cerith Wyn Evans was awarded the "Internationaler Kunstpreis der Kulturstiftung der Stadtsparkasse Miinchen", which will be presented on the occasion of the opening of the exhibition. We would like to thank both Harald Strotgen, president of the Board of Trustees of the Stadtsparkasse Munich, and the collegues of the Kulturstiftung, for their outstanding support for contemporary art — which includes not only the prize itself, but also support for the publication of the catalogue. We also want to thank the jury who selected Cerith Wyn Evans this year.

This exhibition was organized in close partnership between the Muse d'Art modern de la Ville de Paris and the Stadtische Galerie im Lenbachhaus in Munich, thanks to the collaboration of Laurence Bosse, Angeline Scherf, Anne Dressen and Hans Ulrich Obrist in Paris, and Susanne Gaensheimer and Matthias Millhing in Munich.

We are particularly grateful to the many public institutions and private individuals whose loans made this exhibition possible, and we extend our thanks to White Cube in London and its director Jay Jopling for their constant and generous support. We would also like to thank the British Council and Francesca von Habsburg of the Thyssen-Bornemisza Contemporary Art Foundation in Vienna for their generous support. We thank Douglas Gordon for his help, as well as Susanne Gaensheimer and Molly Nesbit for their informed contribution to the catalogue. Finally, we extend very warm thanks to the artist himself for his crucial support throughout the creation of this project.

The Birds Have to Constitute the Music this Conversation between Cerith Wyn Evans and Susanne Gaensheimer, Munich, Friday 7 April 2006

Susanne Gaensheimer: The common part of your exhibitions in Paris and in Munich is the body of work that you call the "chandeliers".

Cerith Wyn Evans: Well, that's how they appear, because this is what they physically look like, but I think it's probably fair **to** state right now that this whole body of work is really dealing with the subject of encryption. This series of works is about encryption and these chandeliers stand in as a cipher, or they stand in somehow as a kind of vehicle for the virus, which is language. That's how I see it. And because people are very often so literally minded, they even have the impression that **I** actually make chandeliers as sculptures. But for me they represent many things, which suggests bad pictures. So I chose the figure of the chandelier on purpose as a conduit or vehicle to carry language.

SG: And the virus? Is the virus the particular text you are using?

CWE: Language is a virus, or can be perceived as operating like one. But I don't want to get too pedantic about it (laughs)... Often people overlook the idea when something is solid -they think of it as an object. But in my experience it's more profoundly interesting to think or "act" as an object; an experience can be an object, for instance. Then you really negotiate the notion of the object, and ultimately the plan is to re-negotiate the notion of the subject. Subjectivity is what I'm interested in re-negotiating, and that as far as I can go.

SG: **I** find it interesting that you mention subjectivity, because in your work you use text written by other authors, text from "third persons"...

CWE: Yes, often.

SG: ...in the form of quotations...

CWE: Yes.

SG: ...so this raises the question as to why you use texts by other authors and do not write your own texts. How do you understand the relationship between quotation or citation on the one hand, and subjectivity on the other?

CWE, ...the found object... I find objects. or. rather. objects find me. After the whole history of the idea of the death of the author. I "double-author- them back to a certain extent, in the sense of Marcel Duchamp's idea of the objet trouve. He chose an object and then he reflected back on it. saying,"No. the object found me". which resonates with a whole wave of nominally French psychoanalytical thought. When an object attracts you, then you are in a kind of -humour position-. a strange position of authorship towards that object. because you mediate that object differently. So the selected texts, to a certain extent, become **my own, they are not** everyone else's texts, but texts out in the world. I was on the telephone to someone today in Japan and I said: "You should read this poem by Robert Frost", and within seconds it was there. So what **I** do is also a response to the way in which language and text are processed and in what kind of time they can be played out. You know, I can read in speed, I can choose to read in bed at night I love this, it's one of my favourite things to do. **I** read in the bath every day, I can just do all the ordinary things people think of when they read. There are a myriad of ways in which we can read. I was interested in the idea of encryption just to question all those different modes of reading.

SG: Those texts *become* your text when you use them together with other objects you select as well.

CWE: Well, you make a composition.

SG: Yes, exactly. So, what are the decisions behind your bringing together two elements, for example a particular chandelier and a particular text?

CWE: That's entirely subjective. It's entirely intuitive. This is the point. I'm making some kind of "superexpressionist" decisions, because I just want to get it absolutely... There's a Scottish friend of mine who is an architect. he said- -I know what your work is about. Cerith. It's about things being 'spot off" ." That was really such a nice thing to hear, because he had understood. His idiomatic -spot off" means exactly, abso-lulutely the correct place, the precisely "wrong" place. I am looking for the absolutely correct incorrect place. which is dialectical and problematic, but I want to hurt the world into consciousness. I want to hurt the world into blame and further responsibilities, so that people can be more in love with each other and extend the possible articulation of being in the world.

SG: A very beautiful image. And, love is communication?

CWE: Somewhere between communication and desire.

SG: That seems to be what your work is about. It wavers between communication and desire. There is always this moment of not-understanding while looking at your work. As a viewer you will never reach a point of complete understanding, you will always be left with this feeling of lack...

CWE: I hope so.

SG: ...and the moment of fulfilment does not transpire...

CWE: Good.

SG: ...because at the end you are technically not *able* to understand.

CWE: No, you need to find that for yourself. I just want to open up the space for that experience, or as Maurice Merleau-Ponty says, "occasion" itself. I want to create an occasion, a scenario. Something like lack, something like doubt, something like a place in which a "viewer" — an "experiencer" — makes it up for herself. She can complete it, she can worry about how she needs to complete or does not need to complete it, or she can go home in tears on the bus or go to see a film, etc.

SG: Then this is also the reason why you use Morse code as an abstract language. as a literally not-readable. not-understandable code. into which you transform the original text? Probably only a very limited number of people would be able to understand that code, today perhaps even nobody.

CWE: Yes, it is wilful to use this kind of encrypted language. I have spoken previously about how it came about that I was interested in the spectra of encryption and specifically Morse code. It is associated with many different and very particular scenarios. Coded messages across borders through enemy field. So it is loaded with this idea of spies and espionage... I was always interested in this idea, and it honestly came about when I was first in Japan. From my skyscraper hotel I saw the lights blinking on and off at night across the Tokyo skyline and it was an epiphany tome. I felt alienated by the experience and I just thought, it's saying something, if only I could read it. It was about this pre-lingual thing for me, to a certain extent, abusing the properly known and being bilingual and taking you into a space that causes problems. What I'm not trying to do in my work is to solve anything. I want to somehow complicate things rather than solve anything, and complicate them in a way which is partially, or at least severely, elegant. It's quite a hard admission, but I am really prepared to say that now.

SG: Earlier today we were also talking about Jacques Lacan and psychoanalysis. This field,this prelinguistic field in your work, could it in Lacanian terms also be called the "pre-symbolic" field?

CWE: Yes.

SG: Is this particular Lacanian idea something you relate to?

CWE: There is always a danger when you call into question someone who is a great dogmatist and doctrinarian. And so I am nervous about associating myself with this. There are certain things I do not understand, that I have gained from the writings of Lacan in translation. One that I have fetishised is his concept of the "objet petit a".

SG: Which is extremely difficult or maybe not even possible to entirely understand.

CWE: This is going to be embarrassing now, but hell, I don't care, I really don't care. It is also important to say that I somehow stole this seized cone of the "objet petit a". And where do I place it as a proper noun, because it is one of the things which resist that ultimately? The naming of the name is something that bothers me into activity.

SG: So you end up with this something that you cannot name, with this area that you cannot really grasp in words.

CWE: You could track down the sources and find out what the page numbers are and become academic, become "proper"...

SG: Then you could read the text, but that would be only one part of the work and you would still have the light, the object, its form...

CWE: The text message just flows through it. The text is just another scene. The text is like the subtitle in the movie.

SG: Yes, and the text is overlaid by another text, the chandelier for example, which is a text itself in a way.

CWE:Yes. Completely, completely, completely. The chandelier is more of a text than a "text".

SG: So what emerges then from this overlaying of different texts is - to remain in the field of psychoanalysis - a palimpsest.

CWE: Placing one text on top of another text, which erases the previous text, creates probably the most valuable idea in this conversation. What I am trying to stage is *intertextuality*. Text that refers to another text, text that is not singular and doesn't imagine itself as being absolutely on its own right in the world. I mean dictionaries, libraries, the whole polyphony of how language can exist in the world and is used, of how it is even possible on a very basic level for me and you to just agree on the fact that this is the colour blue and not red. That's a different issue; it is based on mutual recognition.

SG: It seems to me that you are moving between those two options: mutual and complete "*Erkennen*" and "Verkennen.

CWE: Cognition for missrecognition. There is an ironic short circuit in that.

SG: There is one point ***I would*** like to come back to. Earlier today and also at the dinner at Andreas Hofer's opening in London, we were talking about translation and you said that you are interested in that certain moment where language no longer works in logical terms anymore where meaning falls apart.

CWE: Yes. Language sometimes becomes solipsistic in my **playing** If you look at this extraordinarily beautiful text by Judith Butler in "Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity". for instance. The way the language works here. It convolutes, **it is** folding back, right back back into this

strange crystal chandelier slaving her voice in a way The voice is also absorbed is a process, it is mediated **through** print technology, creating as much hermeneutic variety **as it** possibly can withstand. **That** things - the chandeliers – look like singular objects that blin**k on** and off, but in fact they are a form of "sonification", something like white noise. There is the voice there is the accreditation, **there is** the citation, there is the stealing, there is the encryption, there is the historical notion of **the** encryption code, there are **the** light bulbs and their replacements, there is Adrian on a **step** ladder putting it up on **the** ceiling, there is Juliette questioning the programmed spell check on the laptop, there is the private view card and the reviews. I am trying to be aware of what this **all** means, to look at another picture.

SG: It seems that you totally believe and at the same time disbelieve in language.

CWE: I am addicted to language and I totally don't believe it. I am maybe, understandably confused. I had many arguments with **lin**guists, because it is so precis dense and complicated, what lsnguage can involve. When my friend Martin Prinzhorn from the University of Vienna wrote **a** short text for me I was illuminated. "Illuminated" is not such a bad word, because it means being lit up by something. Illustration, illumination, all these words are significant for the way I think about the world. So if language then does separate, which I suppose it somehow needs to be thought of as doing, then you could make distinctions. Now one of the snake-tail-eating things about this process is the way in which we do distinguish. I'm really more excited by the idea of the cipher, something like that. And cipher against metaphor. This is really it. Something standing in for something that doesn't stand in for something else. This sounds really abstract, but psychobabble is also not nothing. You know, the loss of meaning, the loss of touch? What do you mean to communicate to me? I want to interrogate those borders, those thresholds.

SG: That reminds me of how children learn language.

CWE: I was obsessed with and still have a hangover from reading Jean Piaget on the recognition of death in early childhood. This is an astonishing and beautiful book, an amazing text, very clinical and at the same time some" thing that transverses. "Trans" is also a really powerful prefix for me, it is unspeakable. The Unspeakable for me is mutable, terminal. <>

This study seeks to build on existing spirituality research by reflecting how people understand spirituality and live spiritual lives in their own words, and exploring the relationship—and perceptions of the relationship—between spirituality and public engagement.

The Process

We designed the research process to listen for and reflect what spirituality means to people of many walks of life. The qualitative research comprised 16 focus groups in five cities and 26 in-depth interviews with people of a range of spiritual and religious backgrounds. Insights from that research informed a nationally representative survey administered to more than 3,600 people in the U.S. in January-February 2020. We worked closely with a diverse group of academics and practitioners throughout the process, from refining the research question and developing research guides to analyzing the findings. Learn more about the research process here.

What We Learned

It's human to be spiritual. Like laughing with a loved one, like telling stories about where we come from, like confronting a long-held fear, spirituality is an essential element of existence that can bring beauty to our lives and animate us in powerful ways.

Spirituality is often hidden within us. For some, it's a private practice to connect with the divine. For others, it is a quiet presence, lacking language or form. And for others, it's the current beneath religious devotion—an experience of deep peace and profound love.



As we heard from thousands of people across the United States, it became clear that one truth unites these experiences: Spirituality is the foundation for a loving world.

People described feeling spiritual when they knelt to pray to God. When they looked up at the stars in awe. When they faced an uncertain future or difficult loss. When they listened closely to someone unlike themselves. We have found spirituality in the tradition of our grandparents, in traditions that we did not inherit, and in no tradition at all.

We found a strong thread weaving together individuals and communities around the world—a common thread with the ability to fashion a vibrant view of spirituality today. <>

Journey to the Imaginal Realm: A Reader's Guide to J. R. R. Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings*

by Becca Tarnas [Revelore, 9781947544215]

This reader's guide to J. R. R. Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings* offers a journey into the world of Middle-earth, exploring the grand themes and hidden nuances of Tolkien's epic story, connecting *The Lord of the Rings* to the larger mythology of Middle-earth, and situating Tolkien's process of writing within his own powerful experiences of the imaginal realm. *The Lord of the Rings* has been a beloved

story to several generations since its publication in the mid-1950s. The story has a timeless quality to it, and engages with a complex struggle between good and evil, death and immortality, power and freedom. *The Lord of the Rings* is a book treated by many as a sacred text, one to be returned to year after year, or read aloud with loved ones. *The Lord of the Rings* has become a myth for our time.

JOURNEY TO THE IMAGINAL REALM: A READER'S GUIDE TO J. R. R. TOLKIEN'S THE LORD OF THE RINGS guides the reader through each chapter of J. R. R. Tolkien's magnum opus, drawing attention to the subtle details, recalling moments of foreshadowing, and illuminating underlying patterns and narrative threads throughout the story. The close reading of the text is paired with relevant biographical information from Tolkien's life, including the loss of both his parents at a young age, the central role of friendship in his life, his participation in the First World War, and his exquisite romance with his wife Edith. Tolkien was a lover of language and a philologist by profession, and his invented languages form the heart of his tales. In some of his letters, Tolkien described his process of writing as one of discovery, in which he waited to find out "what really happened," feeling as though he was "recording what was already 'there,' somewhere." This reader's guide seeks to understand the imaginal experiences Tolkien may have encountered that led to the writing of his stories. The guide explores Tolkien's theory of sub-creation, the immersive experience of Faërian Dramas, and most importantly, his notion of the realm of Faërie. **JOURNEY TO THE IMAGINAL REALM** is a celebration of Tolkien's work, and an inquiry into the profound nature of imagination, which is capable of bringing forth a world as vast as Middle-earth.

The world of Middle-Earth is a place I have been wandering in my imagination for over two decades. I intend never to leave for long its hidden pathways, the secret roads that run under starlight, passing through forest and field, over mountains and across great rivers. Indeed, I have al¬ways wanted to share those journeys with others, passing back and forth across the threshold of the imagination in the company of fellows. Thus, when the opportunity arose to guide a class of students upon a journey through J. R. R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings, I knew I had many years of reflections, insights, research, and discoveries to share, as well as a desire for ongoing inquiry and communal contemplation. This reader's guide was born of those class lectures, and is designed both for newcomers to Tolkien's narrative and for veteran travelers through Middle-earth's many vales. This book explores the grand themes and quiet nuances of Tolkien's epic story, connecting The Lord of the Rings to the larger mythology of Middle-earth, and situating Tolkien's process of writing within his own powerful experiences of the imaginal realm.

This reader's guide is meant to be read in conjunction with The Lord of the Rings, as a companion book to Tolkien's text. The guide is divided into chapters according to the six books of The Lord of the Rings, and I would recommend reading each book of Tolkien's first, before turning to the relevant chapter in the reader's guide. In this reader's guide, I walk through each chapter of Tolkien's tale, highlighting certain key aspects of the narrative, sharing relevant backstory from the broader legendarium of Middle-earth, and offering translations of passages and some of the names composed in Tolkien's invented languages. Every chapter title of The Lord of the Rings is noted in bold typeface in the guide, so that each chapter can also be referenced easily.

Throughout the reader's guide I have included interludes that reflect on a variety of themes connected to Tolkien's biography and process of writing, with particular emphasis on the imagination. These interludes are drawn from the research I conducted for my doctoral dissertation, and are connected to the larger thesis presented in my work The Back of Beyond: The Red Books of C. G. Jung and J. R. R. Tolkien. Thus, both implicitly and explicitly throughout this text I draw on certain key concepts from Jungian analytical psychology, and from my own scholarly background which is greatly informed by depth psychology and archetypal studies.

I use the term "imaginal" throughout the guide to refer to activities of the imagination that express a certain quality of truth and reality. The particular definition of this word comes from Henry Corbin, who distinguished between the "imaginary," or that which is just "made up," and the "imaginal," which can be understood as "the object of imaginative or imagining perception."' The imaginal realm, based upon this definition, is a world that is not simply made up or invented, but rather discovered through imagining perception or active imagination.

The imaginal realm can be understood as being essentially synonymous with the realm Tolkien called Faërie. Tolkien wrote about the land of Faërie many times, perhaps most prominently in his essay "On Fairy -Stories," and in his short story, Smith of Wootton Major. In a passage cut from the original publication of "On Fairy-Stories," Tolkien offers the following illustration of Faërie:

> The Land of Fairy Story is wide and deep and high ... its seas are shoreless and its stars uncounted, its beauty an enchantment and its peril ever-present; both joy and sorrow are

> poignant as a sword. In that land a man may (perhaps) count himself fortunate to have wandered, but its very mystery and wealth make dumb the traveller who would report. And while he is there it is dangerous for him to ask too many questions, lest the gates be shut and the keys be lost. The fairy gold (too often) turns to withered leaves when it is brought away. All that I can ask is that you, knowing all these things, will receive my withered leaves, as a token at least that my hand once held a little of the gold.

Faërie, or the imaginal realm, is a domain that does not exist in a physical location, but that does not mean it is a place that does not exist at all, or is only made up or unreal. When you close your eyes, or when you read a story, images naturally arise. Where do these images come from? They exist in the imaginal realm, and we access them through the faculty of the imagination. Sometimes these images are fleeting, blurry, or ephemeral, and they are hard to grasp. But sometimes they can be fully immersive, what some call visions or visionary experiences. We can even actively participate in them if we cultivate the practice or the discipline. This is what C. G. Jung called "active imagination": a meditation with images that arise from the unconscious.

The book you hold in your hands is centered upon the imagination of the reader, with the intention of I focusing upon and celebrating the images that arise Internally when one reads The Lord of the Rings. J.R.R. Tolkien was a master at the craft of shaping the images and stories that arise through the imagination, and he is a skilled yet humble guide through the regions of the imaginal realm that he called Middle-earth. Included in this guide are several exquisite images drawn by the artist Arik Roper, who has made illustrations that seek to coax forward your own visions of Tolkien's story, rather than overlaying them with his own concrete arististic interpretations. I believe this is how Tolkien would have wanted such illustrations to be: fading into ephemerality at the edges, leading one's own imagination hither to unseen vistas and scenes.

If you have never read The Lord of the Rings before, let me say this to you: you are so lucky because now an extraordinary new adventure awaits you. If this is your first time entering the world of Middle-earth, I have two pieces of advice. First, if you have not read The Hobbit, I would suggest that you consider reading it, although it is not absolutely essential reading before undertaking The Lord of the Rings. The Hobbit is a book written for children, while The Lord of the Rings is intended for an adult audience. Some find it difficult to start The Hobbit because it is a children's story, and if reading this book is hindering you starting The Lord of the rings then I would suggest skipping it for now (you may find yourself called to read it afterwards, and may be surprised at the joy of the experience). The most essential chapter of The Hobbit is chapter five, "Riddles in the Dark." That chapter contains the most important information for the unfolding of The Lord of the Rings.

The second piece of advice regards beginning reading The Lord of the Rings itself: Tolkien wrote a "Foreword to the Second Edition" and a "Prologue," and if this is your first time reading this book I would suggest skipping these two sections until after you have finished the tale. Tolkien makes references to events that unfold in the narrative itself, which can make reading these sections a somewhat confusing experience. I would not want you to get bogged down in names and details before they hold any essential meaning for you. These two sections are deliciously interesting once you have finished the full story, and want to know more about Middle-earth and how this hook came to be in your hands. So if this is your first time stepping across the threshold into the imaginal realm of Middle-earth, I would suggest not lingering the doorstep but plunging directly into the first chapter, "A Long-Expected Party."

I can recall as clearly as if it were yesterday what it was like to finish reading The Lord of the Rings for the first time. I was sitting at my desk, holding the pages open with both hands. I remember how the light fell across the pages of the book. I could barely see the words, because tears were falling in

heavy droplets from my eyes. I made sure to lean back, so the splashing teardrops would not stain the pages of this precious book. I had never been so touched by a story before, and I honestly have not been to the same degree since. From that moment, I have been trying to understand why I was so deeply affected by these words penned by J. R. R. Tolkien.

Not everyone has such a profound experience of this book, although I have now had the joy of meeting many who have. One has a feeling of recognition when encountering such an individual. There is a mutual feeling, a sense that we both have "been there" before. Perhaps such a feeling is not dissimilar from meeting someone who has traveled to the same unique part of the world as you, or been at the same meaningful event, but you only happen to meet years later. The feeling is: "Oh—you know, too, don't you?"

I had that first experience of reading The Lord of the Rings at age thirteen, and I continued to reread it each year until the beginning of my twenties. I have since learned many individuals do this, almost like a ritual, returning to a sacred text again and again. I have also met numerous people who first heard this tale spoken aloud, read to them by a parent, a friend, or a lover. The text comes alive when spoken, and it continues an oral tradition of story-telling within which I believe Tolkien would have wanted to situate his story. After all, The Lord of the Rings was read aloud in draft to the Inklings, and commented upon by Tolkien's close friends and children as it was being composed. It is only fitting that the story should continue to be shared through spoken voice, giving lilt and song to the dialogue and the breath of life to the exquisite narrative descriptions.

I did reach an age when I thought I had to set The Lord of the Rings and other such fairy-stories aside. I figured I had to grow out of such childish things eventually. But even when I tried, Middle-earth stayed with me. I found I could not leave this land that I could access through my imagination. Thus, I was given a tremendous gift when a professor of mine in graduate school assigned Tolkien's essay "On Fairy-Stories," and I realized I could study this material as an adult. Suddenly a vast world opened up before me, and I was driven by an intense curiosity to understand what the imagination is and how it is possible to have such immersive internal experiences. The more I have delved into this material the more I have come to see the imagination as a source of knowledge, wisdom, and even truth, and the imaginal realm as a real place. Affirming the imaginal experiences of others, experiences that often mirrored those I had when reading The Lord of the Rings, has been one of my greatest joys since engaging with this work. I have learned that the imagination, far from being something unreal or simply made up, is a powerful, animating source, permeating the physical world and connecting it to the spiritual world. Gaston Bachelard writes:

> The imagination is a tree. It has the integrative virtues of a tree. It is root and boughs. It lives between earth and sky. It lives in the earth and in the wind. The imagined tree becomes imperceptibly the cosmological tree, the tree which epitomizes the universe, which makes a universe .... Gaston Bachelard, *On Poetic Imagination and Reverie* (Putnam, CT: Spring, 2005),

The imagination connects us to the whole cosmos, linking matter, psyche, and spirit. There is no age at which we are meant to set this aside. Imagination comes innately to children, but that does not mean it is only for children. The time has come for us to trust the imaginal once more, to reclaim that child-like wonder as mature adults. Such experiences are our birthright as human beings, as denizens of this living cosmos. The path is always there for us, if we choose to seek it. As Bilbo says, there is only one Road, but every path is its tributary. All we need to do is step out our front doorway and cross that threshold, and there is no knowing where it may take us. <>

Buddhist Encounters and Identities Across East Asia edited by Ann Heirman, Carmen Meinert, Christoph Anderl [Dynamics in the History of Religions, Brill, ISBN 978-90-04-36600-8 (hardback), ISBN 978-90-04-36615-2 (e-book)]

Encounters, networks, identities and diversity are at the core of the history of Buddhism. They are also the focus of **Buddhist Encounters and Identities Across East Asia**, edited by Ann Heirman, Carmen Meinert and Christoph Anderl. While long-distance networks allowed Buddhist ideas to travel to all parts of East Asia, it was through local and trans-local networks and encounters, and a diversity of people and societies, that identities were made and negotiated. This book undertakes a detailed examination of discrete Buddhist identities rooted in unique cultural practices, beliefs and indigenous socio-political conditions. Moreover, it presents a fascinating picture of the intricacies of the regional and cross-regional networks that connected South and East Asia.

Networks and Identities in the Buddhist World by Tansen Sen

By the first and second centuries CE, when objects and teachings associated with Buddhism started entering the ports and urban centres of Han China, several regions of Asia were already connected through networks of cross-regional commercial activity. People from diverse ethnic backgrounds operated these networks that linked the overland roads and pathways, rivers channels, and sea routes. The length and reach of these networks depended on various factors, including the nature of the terrain, the mode of transportation, profitability as well as the political relationship among the various regimes involved. These networks facilitated the transmissions and circulations of commodities, ritual objects and ideas as well as the movement of craftsmen, artisans, and diplomats from one region of Asia to another. The long-distance spread of Buddhism took place through such networks. As Buddhist images, texts, and ideas spread across the Asian continent, they acquired new forms and interpretations, and subsequently entered re-circulation. For example, Indic texts were rendered into Chinese; later, commentaries explaining the teachings contained in these translated texts were composed by Chinese Buddhists. These translations and commentaries were then passed on to the clergy living in Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Tibet, and other places. Modifications took place with each rendition and movement, creating diverse forms of Buddhist practices, images, and philosophical traditions. Over time, these movements and modifications resulted in the emergence of distinct identities, often imposed by others, among Buddhist communities that are important for understanding the diversity and multiplicity of the Buddhist world that spanned from present-day Iran to Japan.

This collection of essays underscores the connections and the diversities within the Buddhist world. It becomes apparent from these essays that the history of Buddhism in premodern Asia was also the history of connectivities, circulations, conversions, and transformations that took place within the Asian continent prior to the colonial period. While the connectivities and circulations were intimately associated with the long-distance networks that linked far-flung regions of Asia, the processes of conversions and transformations highlight the diversity of the people and societies inhabiting the continent. Thus, although the core teaching of karma and retribution may have been the common thread that linked the vast Buddhist world, a detailed examination of local practices suggests the existence of distinct identities rooted in unique cultural practices, beliefs, and indigenous socio-political conditions. Before proceeding to summarise the essays included in this volume and their contributions to comprehending the diverse Buddhist world, this Introduction outlines the issues of network and identity as can be discerned from the Buddhist connections between India/South Asia and China.

The Networks of Buddhist Exchanges

The evidence for the presence of Buddhism in China during the first three centuries of the Common Era suggests a complicated and haphazard influx of Buddhist images and ideas. These images and ideas arrived through multiple routes, from different parts of South Asia, and were carried by people of diverse ethnic background engaged in varied professions and long-distance activities. A key factor facilitating the spread of Buddhist artefacts and ideas during this period may have been the commercial linkages formed by trading communities and the transportation networks of caravan and ship operators. Indeed, by the beginning of the first millennium CE, intra-Asian commerce and transportation, through both overland and maritime routes, had witnessed significant growth. Itinerant traders were travelling across the Asian continent more frequently than in the previous periods. The spread of Buddhism to Han China should be understood within this context of

unprecedented connectivity and interactions taking place within Asia. The linking of distant markets, ports, and urban centres contributed not only to the circulations of commodities and the movement of traders, but also triggered the flow of objects and people who were not necessarily part of the commercial activities. Such objects ranged from mundane personal items associated with food intake to those that were connected to the faith of the itinerant individuals. Missionaries, technicians, and diplomats travelled with their own agendas on ships or caravans. With sustained demands, improvements in modes of transportation and navigational skills, and the formation of regular supply chain for commodities, the long-distance commercial ventures became a routine. Travel between sites of export and import became frequent arid continued until changes in economic, political, or climatic factors interrupted these connections. The sustained movement back and forth between markets, ports, and urban centres formed the basis of networks that were operated by one or several groups of people who, in turn, interacted/negotiated with different polities across these networks. Given the interdependencies between traders, transport providers, and suppliers at ports and overland halting places, the long-distance networks were unlikely to have been exclusive to one group of people or monopolized by one faith. A 'Buddhist network', if there were one, therefore, had to be a part of or dependent upon other networks, with pilgrims and missionaries sharing transportation space with members of other faiths. Indeed, insisting on the existence of an exclusive Buddhist network, especially in the cross-regional context, fails to convey the complexity of the long-distance connections across Asia. Likewise, traders who supported the Buddhist cause did not solely deal with objects that were in demand for Buddhist rituals and construction activities. In both cases, the Buddhist clergy and traders engaged with a variety of people, faiths, and objects. Additionally, the contraction of a mercantile network or the decline of Buddhism in a region did not imply the corresponding termination of the other. The decline of Buddhist sites in the Gangetic plains of India in the thirteenth century did not, for example, result in the collapse of long-distance commercial networks in the region. In other words, it is Important to separate the commercial networks that connected distant regions and the movement of Buddhist images and ideas that were facilitated by the existence of these networks.

Scholars have already examined the relationship between merchant communities and the spread of Buddhist ideas and monastic institutions in South Asia. James Heitzman, for example, has demonstrated the association between mercantile activity, political power, and the spread of early Buddhist institutions along the major trade routes in the hinterland regions of India. Similarly, Himanshu Prabha Ray has outlined the intimate bond between sea-faring traders, Buddhist monasteries in the coastal regions of India, and the maritime transmission of the doctrine. Liu Xinru, on the other hand, has applied the conceptual framework of an intertwined relationship between long-distance trade and the transmission of Buddhist ideas to examine the early exchanges between South Asia and China.? More recently, Jason Neelis has studied the relationship between trade networks and the transmission of Buddhism through the 'northern routes' in Gandhära and Upper Indus regions into Central Asia.

Many aspects of the Buddhist networking, essentially the interactions between Buddhist institutions, monks, and lay members frequently using the mercantile networks between South Asia and China, are evident in the travelogues of Chinese Buddhist monks Faxian (337?-422?), Xuanzang (600?-664), and Yijing (635-713). These are the main textual sources that reveal the association between Buddhism and the long-distance networks of traders and sailors. Also evident in these travel records are the relationships between Buddhist monks (as well as institutions) and rulers, officials, and various political elites. Individual monks and institutions formed their unique relationship with these members of the society, which often advanced personal objectives, benefited specific monastic institutions, or served the Buddhist cause in general. Additionally, the travel records demonstrate

the existence of several hubs that were sites of interactions along the networks that connected South Asia, China, and several other regions of the Buddhist world. These hubs included Dunhuang (in present-day Gansu Province of China), Khotan (in present-day Xinjiang Province of China), Nälandä (in the present-day state of Bihar), Palembang (in the island of Sumatra in Indonesia), and Changan (present-day Xian in China). These places were centres of knowledge production and circulation, as well sites for cross-regional trading activity. They were vital for the spread of Buddhism across Asia.The circulations of goods, donations, and information through the networks of traders, urban settlements, and monastic institutions are reported in Faxian's work, entitled Foguoji (Records of the Buddhist Polities, T. 875). Faxian was among the first Chinese monks who travelled to South Asia. During his journey to South Asia, embarking in 399 CE, Faxian does not mention any contact with merchant caravans or groups as he passed through the oasis towns of Dunhuang, Gaochang (present-day Turfan), and Khotan. Rather, as discussed below, Faxian's travels through the overland routes of Central Asia seem to have been facilitated by the networks of garrison towns, urban settlements, and monastic institutions. It is only when the monk started his return trip from Tāmralipta in Eastern India that he became depended on the network of seafaring traders. Indeed, his writing indicates a highly connected world of itinerant traders, monks, sailors, and circulating ritual and donative objects in the fifth century. One of the first indications of the existence of networks connecting the urban centres in the Gobi-Taklamakan desert region comes from Faxian's passing reference to a 'messenger' with whom the monk and his companions journeyed from Dunhuang to the polity of Shanshan. Although no detail about this 'messenger' is given in the text, it is clear that such persons frequently moved between the oasis towns of the Taklamakan desert. They were most likely part of the communication network between the governors or rulers of these towns, who either had their own modes of transportation or travelled with merchant caravans. Faxian, and later Xuanzang, suggests that information regularly circulated among the oasis towns through such messengers and their networks, in addition to the networks belonging to traders and caravan operators. All these networks facilitated the movement of Buddhist monks and objects across the reacherous routes traversing the Gobi and Taklamakan deserts.

There were several other aspects to these, what appear to be, intertwined or parallel networks of traders and itinerant officials/messengers. Elite monks, such as Faxian and Xuanzang, may have attracted the attention of local officials/rulers, who then supported their journeys and provided housing in their homes or palaces. Other monks travelling through the oasis towns lived in Buddhist monasteries. These monasteries formed important resting places not only for Buddhist monks, but also traders and perhaps the court messengers/diplomats. However, not all monasteries were receptive to travellers or accepting of monks from different regions. Faxian, for example, mentions that a monastery in Agni did not accept Chinese monks as members of the sangha.

Faxian's implication seems to be that the Buddhist tradition practiced in Agni ('Hinayana' according to him) and China were different and divisions existed among various Buddhist groups in the spaces between South Asia and China. This antagonistic, or at least complex, relationship between groups corroborates the likelihood that exclusive Buddhist networks, if they existed, may not have been easy to establish or operate in reality. Crucial to the networks that connected South Asia and China were roads, mountainous paths and stairways, bridges (including the rope suspension bridge that Faxian used to cross the Indus River) and ports, as well as boats and ships. Buddhist monuments and temples, sites embodying Buddhist legends, and places that held relics of the Buddha in South Asia were important nodes on these networks for itinerant monks to—as in the abovementioned hubs—congregate, share information, and exchange goods. Many of these places housed objects that came from faraway places, donated by monks and merchants. Faxian, for instance, reports seeing a

'Chinese white fan' in Sri Lanka, which he says was offered by a merchant to the famous footprint of the Buddha at Adam's Peak.

Faxian's narrative of the maritime connections, first from Tãmralipta to Sri Lanka, then from Sri Lanka to Southeast Asia, and eventually to the coastal region of China from Southeast Asia, is one of the earliest accounts of the sailing networks that existed within and across the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea regions. The Chinese monk boarded a 'large trade ship' from Tamralipta to Sri Lanka, which took fourteen days to reach the island with favourable winds. After staying in Sri Lanka for two years, Faxian took another 'large merchant ship' to a place called Yavadvipa (Java?) located in South China Sea. This journey needed ninety days of travel. From Yavadvipa he sailed on a third 'large merchant ship' going to China. During these latter two occasions, the ships encountered rough weather and deviated significantly from their intended course. When sailing from Yavadvipa to China, fellow Brahmin travellers signalled out Faxian as the cause for the 'unlucky' encounter with treacherous 'black cyclone. 'It is because we have a Buddhist monk on board our ship, one of them argued, 'that we have been so unlucky and suffered such great trouble. We should drop the monk on an island. We should not risk our lives because of one man'. This proposition by the Brahmins is not only indicative of the rivalries that existed among those travelling long-distance to proselytize their faiths, but also of the use of maritime networks by several different groups of missionaries between South Asia and China. Other Chinese Buddhist sources also mention instances when Brahmins and Buddhist monks journeyed together between South Asia and China.

By the time Xuanzang, in c. 629, embarked on his travel to India from Tang China, the networks of travel, communication, and material exchanges between the two regions had become significantly more vibrant. At the same time, the spread of Buddhism to Southeast Asia, Korea, and Japan brought new regions and groups of peoples into the networks of exchange and interactions. The movement of Buddhist clergy, objects, and ideas peaked in the eighth and ninth centuries. Within this context, the travels of Xuanzang, in addition to corroborating the existence of many of the networks alluded to in Faxian's work, contributed to the creation of what could be called the 'network of imagination' that bonded the Buddhist world. In their recent collection of essays, John Kieschnick and Meir Shahar have noted the Indian impact on the Chinese creative imagination and the Chinese imagining of India. This impact extended to other Buddhist communities in Asia. The Japanese, for example, imagined I lie Buddhist holy land from the writings of Xuanzang, representing his travels in drawings and mapping the Indian subcontinent. As Fabio Rambelli has demonstrated, the imagining of India, mediated through the Chinese texts, had a profound impact on the Japanese views on their place in the larger Buddhist world. It augmented the network of Buddhist exchanges between Japan and China, which, similar to that between China and South Asia, was intertwined with the networks of commercial specialists and official envoys.

Erik Zürcher has noted that the expansion of networks of monastic institutions was the 'driving force behind the spread of Buddhism all over Asia'. Xuanzang's writings provide important clues to the developing connections between Buddhist monks/institutions and the long-distance diplomatic networks. The Tang period witnessed frequent exchange of diplomatic missions between polities in South Asia and the Tang court. Especially noteworthy were the missions led by the Tang diplomat Wang Xuance to the court of the South Asian ruler Harsa. The Da Tang da Ci'ensi sanzang fashi zhuan Biography of the Master of the Tripitaka of the Great Ci'en Monastery) suggests an intimate relationship between the Chinese monk and the ruler in Kanauj, Harsa's capital city." Additionally, the Xin Tang shu credits Xuanzang for initiating the diplomatic exchanges between the Tang court and Harsa. These records are no doubt exaggerations, intended to underscore the importance of Xuanzang who had a close relationship with the Tang rulers Taizong and Gaozong, during whose

reigns these diplomatic exchanges took place. Through either Wang Xuance or one of the other members of the diplomatic entourage, Xuanzang communicated and exchanged gifts with his acquaintances at Nãlandã. In one of the letters he wrote to the monk named Prajnadeva, for instance, Xuanzang expressed his gratitude for the gifts that he had received from India and requested copies of Buddhist texts that he needed. These, he suggested, could be sent through a 'returning messenger'. In another letter Xuanzang notes that a Tang envoy returning from India had informed him of the passing of his teacher at Nãlandã.

Similar connections between Tang diplomats and Buddhist monks are also reported in the works of the monk Yijing (635-713), who embarked on his trip to India in 671 and returned in 695. Yijing mentions the Chinese monk Xuanzhao, who interacted with the Tang princess Wenchang in Tibet, received help from the king of Nepal, and had audience with the Emperor Gaozong. The Tang emperor asked him to return to India and bring to Tang China a Brahmin named Lujiayiduo (Lokãditya?) from Kashmir. On his way Xuanzhao met a Tang envoy who requested the monk to instead go to Luocha (Lãta) to fetch medicinal plants for longevity for the Tang emperor. After procuring the plants, however, Xuanzhao fell sick and died in Middle India. The writings of Xuanzang and Yijing indicate that the relationship between itinerant monks and official envoys (and the courts), similar to that between the traders and itinerant monks, was reciprocal and the networks they used to travel between China and South Asia were intertwined.

Yijing mentions that he met the monk Xuanzhao in Nãlandã, where the former had gone to study the practice of vinaya (monastic rules). As a centre for learning and missionary activity Nãlandã played a key role in connecting several regions of the Buddhist world. From its founding in the middle of the fifth century through to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the institution functioned as a repository of knowledge, a site of interactions, and a place which accumulated and dispersed a variety of ritual objects and images. Indeed, from Yijing's writings (as well as that of Xuanzang before him) it becomes evident that Nãlandã was at the centre of the cosmopolitan world of Buddhism in the seventh century. In his Da Tang Xiyu qiufa gaoseng zhuan, Yijing mentions several monks from Tang China as well as from the Korean peninsula who had travelled to Nãlandã to study Buddhist texts. Some of these monks lived at the renowned monastic institution for couple of years; others, according to Yijing, decided not to return to their homeland. Monks from Sri Lanka, Sumatra, and Tibet are also reported to have studied at Nãlandã by Yijing and other sources. Yijing also alludes to connections between Nãlandã and other similar learning centres across the Buddhist world. These centres included Changan, the capital of Tang China, Palembang in Sumatra, and Tãmralipta in eastern India. In fact, at one point Yijing recommends that Chinese monks planning to visit South Asia should first learn Sanskrit in Palembang.

In sum, the records of the above three Chinese monks who travelled to South Asia reveal the existence of several intertwined networks that connected the Buddhist world in the first millennium c E. The networks of traders and sailors were clearly the most crucial for those travelling long distances. These networks not only facilitated missionary and pilgrimage activities, but also sustained the circulation of ritual objects and other goods associated with the practice of Buddhism. The networks of messengers and diplomats also facilitated these movements of people and objects. These different types of networks connected pilgrimage centres, sites housing important relics, and learning centres. Even the imagination of the Buddhist heartland created networks of connections that extended from Japan to India. It must be noted that the movements across these networks were not unidirectional. People and objects moved in various directions, some limited to specific regions and others across vast distances. These movements were often coordinated between the members of the Buddhist communities and the operators of the networks. But there were also

instances when the connections took place in arbitrary and unplanned fashion. In other words, the networks of connections across the Buddhist world were neither neatly organized nor part of a coordinated effort on part of the Buddhist communities or the operators of the networks. These haphazard and muddled movements, as well as the lack of an emphasis on universal ideology, seem to have defined the long-distance Buddhist networking. Indeed, the unsystematic spread of Buddhist ideas through the various networks of traders and transporters gives credence to Erik Zurcher's questioning of Central Asian oasis states as the staging ground for the initial transmission of Buddhism to Han China. Thus Zürcher contends that the spread of Buddhism from southern Asia to China was through 'long distance' transmission rather than a result of 'contact expansion'. However, it is possible that during the course of such 'long-distance' transmissions some Buddhist artefacts and ideas entered the in-between halting places and relay centres. The unsystematic spread of Buddhism may have also contributed to the development of localized forms of Buddhist practices, images, and teachings across this Buddhist world. The awareness of sectarian differences, the cognizance of the centre-periphery gap, and the distinctions made between the local and foreign led to the formation of unique and multifaceted identities among the advocates and followers of Buddhism.

Changing Connections, Changing Identities

Many of the abovementioned networks that facilitated Buddhist connections persisted into the second millennium CE. Itinerant Buddhist monks continued to use the networks of traders and sailors, rulers and court officials offered support to the members of the clergy embarking on long-distance travel, and pilgrimage sites, old and new, drew Buddhist patrons from different regions of Asia. The circulation of Buddhist paraphernalia also endured through these networks. However, a noteworthy development during this period was the fragmentation of the Buddhist world into smaller circuits of connections. These circuits had their own doctrinal emphases, pilgrimage sites, linguistic coherence, and exclusive commercial and diplomatic networking. Thus, the East Asian circuit that linked the monastic institutions in China, Korea, Japan, as well as those in the Khitan and Tangut territories; the Southeast Asia—Sri Lanka circuit that was integrated through doctrinal, commercial, and diplomatic linkages; and the Tibet—South Asia circuit united through missionary and pilgrimage networks emerged as the three main subregions of the Buddhist world by the twelfth century.

The origins of these distinct circuits lay in the earlier phases of Buddhist connections, especially in the seventh and eighth centuries, when the monastic communities, itinerant monks, and polities started encountering the notions of the 'self' and the 'other'. Distinct identities were either imposed or gradually taken throughout the Buddhist world. In the case of the Buddhist tradition labelled as 'Theravãda, Peter Skilling has pointed that the term did not exist in pre-twentieth century European writings, nor did it appear in indigenous sources of Southeast Asia. The category and the identity `Theravãda' was clearly imposed after the nineteenth century. However, the realization of distinctiveness, the recognition of sectarian differences, and the awareness of the ways in which Buddhism could be used for political purposes existed among the Buddhist clergy at an early date. Distinctions were made between the `Hinayãna' and 'Mahãyãna' practitioners (as is evident in the works of the three Chinese travellers mentioned above), between the sacred Buddhist heartland in South Asia and the peripheral regions of China, between native monks and foreign missionaries, and between Buddhists and non-Buddhists.

The chapter by Max Deeg in this volume explains the ways in which Chinese monks visiting South Asia perceived themselves and were, in turn, seen by others in the broader context of the Buddhist world, in which China was situated in the peripheral region. The feelings of belonging and not belonging, of being present in a foreign land even though among fellow Buddhists, and the creation

and propagation of unique forms of doctrine led to the formation of dual and often times multiple identities. A Chinese monk, for example, was different from practitioners of other religious traditions; he was also unlike the foreign monks residing in China; his specific doctrinal pursuit gave him a distinct identity, and his status within the monastic community also created a discrete identification. The distinctiveness became more complex if the Chinese monk travelled to foreign regions, including to the pilgrimage sites or learning centres in South Asia.

During the early phases of the spread of Buddhism the specific identities of Buddhist groups, icons, and teachings were most likely undistinguishable. Thus the early evidence of Buddhism in China, for example, indicates a mixture with local traditions, especially those related to funerary traditions. The cross-regional interactions and exchanges of the first millennium CE, especially during the second half, were an important factor in the recognition of distinctiveness and difference within the Buddhist world. This paralleled the creation of new spaces of pilgrimage, new doctrinal explanations and preferences, and new practices stemming from local cultural and social needs. The decline of Buddhism in several regions of India by the end of the millennium contributed to the strengthening of localized identities and eventually the segmentation of the Buddhist world into the self-contained circuits. As a result, the 'borderland complex' (see the chapter by Deeg), which was prevalent prior to the eighth century, abated and each circuit assumed its own distinct identity.

The Buddhist connections between South Asia and China witnessed dramatic changes due to the abovementioned segmentation. Contacts between the clergies of the two regions became limited, as those in China were content to pursue their own doctrinal interests. Arguments were even put forth by some members of the Chinese Buddhist community, such as the famous Song monk Zanning (919-1001), for the reverse transmission of doctrines to India. This feeling of a need to re-transmit Buddhist doctrines to India was apparent again in 1940, when the monk Taixu (1890-1947) visited India as part of a Goodwill Mission sent by the Guomindang regime in China.

Taixu was one of the many monk-intellectuals in the early twentieth century who were wrestling with the issues of colonialism and modernity. Already in the late nineteenth century the Sri Lankan Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933) had spearheaded a revival movement in India with his attempt to restore the Mahabodhi Temple in Bodhgayã as a key pilgrimage site for Buddhist followers. He established the Maha Bodhi Society in Colombo in 1891, which subsequently relocated to Calcutta (now Kolkata), to accomplish this goal. While Dharmapala's efforts to establish Buddhist control over the Temple site succeeded only after his death, eventually attracting a large number of pilgrims, it was the Maha Bodhi Society in Calcutta which became the centre for discourse among Buddhist monks and lay followers from around the world in the early twentieth century. These monks and lay followers tried to formulate a common agenda for Buddhism in the context of European and, subsequently, Japanese imperialisms. Several Chinese monks, officials, and scholars visited the Society, donated funds, and served on the governing committees of the organization. Taixu was one of the most prominent visitors to the Society, in both Calcutta and Sarnath.

The aim of the Goodwill Mission led by Taixu was to seek the support of the Indian Buddhist community and the political leaders in the war against the Japanese. Taixu met with people such as the future Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, delivered lectures at Buddhist gatherings, and visited the sacred pilgrimage sites in present-day Bihar state. During his public speeches, Taixu was introduced as a modern-day Xuanzang making pilgrimage in India. However, Taixu had his own agenda. From the moment Taixu disembarked in Calcutta, he was struck by the decline of Buddhism in India. He stressed in I its writings and speeches, similar to the Song monk Zanning, albeit in a more melancholy tone, the need to re-transmit Buddhist doctrines from China to India. He even

donated money to the Maha Bodhi Society to undertake this task. Taixu's feelings about his presence in India were clearly very different from those of the Chinese monks in the first millennium CE. Instead of sensing a 'borderland complex, Taixu felt that China had emerged as a centre for Buddhism with the responsibility to restore the doctrine in the Buddhist holy land. The sacred Buddhist sites in India no longer generated a sense of peripheral existence among the Chinese monks. Rather, they had attained an identity of their own as a central realm of Buddhism.

Another aspect that also needs to be stressed here is the use of Buddhism to create a distinctive identity for political regimes, communities, or groups. Prior to the colonial period, several polities, such as the Sui dynasty, Srivijaya In Southeast Asia, the Khitans and Tanguts in the northern steppe regions, and the Mongols in Persia used Buddhism to establish a unique identity and distinguish themselves from contending regimes, rival polities, or unify the subjects within a common ideology. The same was true for some of the Chinese migrant groups settled in Southeast Asia and Calcutta. Among many of these migrant groups, Guanyin was one of the most ubiquitous Buddhist deities. Other figures associated with popular practice of Buddhism, such as the monk Jigong

and the monkey god Sun Wukong, also appeared in the temples and shrines belonging to the Chinese overseas. However, the Buddhist identities of many of these deities are not always evident as they are often worshiped alongside Taoist divinities, deified individuals from local regions, and Confucian figures. Within this context, the veneration of two so-called buddhas, Ruan Ziyu jinn (1079-1102) and Liang Cineng (1098-1116), by migrants from the Sihui County in Guangdong province, is remarkable. Beyond the Sihui region, temples dedicated to the two buddhas can be found in Singapore, Malaysia, and Calcutta.

During the Song period, Ruan Ziyu and Liang Cineng, two commoners, lived near Shaoguan, where the mummified body of the Sixth Chan Patriarch Huineng (638-713) was preserved. Ruan Ziyu is supposed to have one day-dreamt of Huineng and suddenly attained enlightenment. Liang, on the other hand, had a dream about Ruan and also instantaneously became enlightened.

Two temples, Baolin (built in 1271) and Baosheng (built in 1290), dedicated to the two figures respectively, were erected in the Sihui region soon after the deaths of the two individuals. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the Cantonese-speaking people from the region started migrating to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Calcutta, they established temples and shrines dedicated to these two buddhas. The two buddhas served as the protective deities of the Sihui community as they moved from one region to another. More importantly, the Ruan and Liang buddhas and the temples dedicated to them became important markers of Sihui identity as the migrant group tried to differentiate themselves from other Chinese migrants living in Southeast Asia and Calcutta. These days, the Sihui migrants often travel to the original temples in Guangdong province. For those who are unable to do so, photographs of the original temples and the images of the idols of Ruan and Liang from these temples are displayed at the temples in Southeast Asia and Calcutta. These temples served a similar purpose as the earlier transplanted pilgrimage sites in foreign regions, such as Mt. Wutai in China, giving a sense of belonging and a common identity to people living in foreign regions.

Encounters and Identities

Translocal cultural encounters and the diversity of Buddhist identities are the focus of the twelve chapters that appear in this volume. Connections between several regions of the Buddhist world, from South Asia to Japan, are examined to explain the intricacies of regional and cross regional networks and the complexities of identities. Subjects covered in these chapters range from artistic connections and notions of belonging to the movement of ritual objects. Together these essays illustrate the nature of the vibrant and multilayered Buddhist world prior to the colonial era. The

chapters contribute to the understanding of the networks that facilitated Buddhist connections, and the transformations of Buddhist ideas and objects as they moved through these networks. They also detail the unique identities of Buddhism as the teachings of the Buddha were accepted, transformed, and re-transmitted within the Buddhist world.

The first section of the book, `Translocal Cultural Encounters, examines the Buddhist connections that were fostered through the various commercial and diplomatic networks. They focus on the transmission of ideas, objects, texts, and people from one region of the Buddhist world to another. Claudine Bautze-Picron explores the art-historical impact of Bagan's connections to Yuan China. Using unpublished aspects of the late thirteenth-century murals Round in several temples at Sagan, Bautze-Picron examines the ways in which specific iconographic motifs, such as the representation of Mongols, the depiction of dreadful door-keepers, or the image of the short-necked Buddha from Yuan China, entered Burma (now Myanmar).

Rob Linrothe's essay focuses on a partial set of eight Ming dynasty textiles still in use at a shrine in the Western Himalaya that was never in contact with any Chinese state, and was in fact founded long after the Ming dynasty ended. Yet the group of relatively well-preserved embroidered textiles, at least one of which has a Chinese inscription on the back, are hung during the monastery's annual masked dance festival (Tib. 'cham), treasures displayed on an auspicious pair of days. How and when they were acquired by a monastery in southeastern Ladakh on the far Western border of Tibet is not known, though other objects in the same monastery can be shown to have been sent by the nineteenth-century 14th Karmapa. These objects, Linrothe asserts, are potent, physical reminders of the circulation and flow of people, ideas, practices, texts, and objects within Buddhist networks crossing linguistic, state, ethnic and cultural borders. Spectacular objects created at or by the Ming court were prized at the major Tibetan Buddhist monasteries supported directly by the Ming court—reminders of the monastery's participation in wider networks of Buddhist teachings and support, helping to define their identities.

Megan Bryson's essay deals with the Nanzhao (649-903) and Dali (937-1253) polities centred in the Dali region of what is now southwest China's Yunnan province. Bryson demonstrates that the ruling elites in the Nanzhao and Dali polities relied more heavily on networks linking Dali to Chinese territory for their Buddhist material, especially their texts, than to other Buddhist sites in Tibet or South Asia with which the region also maintained close connections. Despite this, Bryson argues, the ruling elites emphasized their links to India and downplayed the China connection. Employing texts and images related to the "border-crossing" Bodhisattva Guanyin (Skt. Avalokitesvara), the essay shows how the documented and represented networks related to each other in the Nanzhao and Dali polities.

The basic characteristics and historical formation of the combination of Fudo and Aizen, two important esoteric Buddhist deities, in medieval Shingon esoteric Buddhism in Japan, are discussed in the essay by Steven Trenson. Looking at the issue from the standpoint of two different intersecting networks, a 'translocal' human network stretching between China and Japan and a 'local' conceptual network of ideas and practices developed in Shingon, Trenson highlights the belief that marked the identity of medieval Shingon, in particular of the Onobranch of that school. It contends that the Fudo-Aizen belief came to occupy a special place in the Ono branch as the result of ideas passing from China to Japan through certain human networks which were adopted at one time into the conceptual network of rainmaking.

Bryan Levman's contribution studies the transmission of the Buddha's teachings from India to China through the lens of the dharanis of the Lotus Sutra. Kumãrajiva was the first Chinese translator to

undertake a transliteration of the dharanis that attempted to retain their ritual efficacy for Chinese Buddhists. His source text was Prakritic in nature and shown to be centuries earlier than the Sanskrit manuscripts that have survived. The transmission of the buddhadharma from India to China, Levman argues, was a highly complex process with dozens of human, temporal, spatial, dialectal, scribal, psychological and phonological variables, making it impossible to transmit the teachings error free. Levman's study of the dharanis opens a unique window on the networks of exchange of information between India and China in the early centuries of the Common Era and the interaction of two very different cultural and linguistic environments.

In the final chapter of this section Kaiqi Hua scrutinises the life of the last Song Emperor Zhao Xian (1271-1323), who travelled extensively across China and Tibet, and became a Tibetan Buddhist monk with the name Lhatsün (Tib. Lha btsun). Using various sources in different languages and literary forms, Hua not only reconstructs Zhao's travel routes, but also explains the motives and processes of Buddhist exile for the royals during the Mongol Yuan dynasty through physical migration in space and textual reproduction in time. The essay demonstrates the role Buddhism played in cross-cultural and cross-regional contacts in the lives of individual migrants.

The second section of the hook, 'Negotiating and Constructing Identities', consists of six chapters that explore the attempts by the clergynti find, create, or assert their identities in different regions of the Buddhist world. Max Deeg's contribution draws on Antonino Forte's notion of a borderland complex and on the concept of the 'double belonging' of Chinese Buddhists in the medieval period. This was caused by the fact that China, the so-called Middle Kingdom, was not the centre of Buddhist cosmology Indeed, it was not part of the Buddhist sacred realm at all, as Deeg argues. Nowhere can one observe this struggle better than in the records of Chinese pilgrims to South Asia, as noted above. In this regard, Deeg contends, the protagonists are, quite often, negotiating a dual cultural identity; they are both part of greater Chinese culture and express a sense of religious belonging to—and presence in—a Sacred Land that lays claim to cosmological and soteriological superiority over all the other regions in the world. The conflict that arose from this conflict of identities is expressed in the texts in the form of poems and narratives reflecting either homesickness or determination to stay in India (or both), as examined in the essay. The essay also addresses the different forms of expression of these identities and analyses them in the wider context of Chinese and Indian Buddhism.

The essay by Sem Vermeersch studies the way Chinese Buddhist monks fooked at their Korean counterparts, and how this perception of a Buddhist 'other' changed over time from the beginning of the sixth to the late tenth centuries. This was the period when Buddhist exchanges between China and Korea were the most intensive. Throughout this period, a vast number of monks from peninsular kingdoms travelled to China and beyond; some eventually returned to their home country, but many stayed, and some left their marks on Chinese Buddhism. Given the lack of early Korean sources, much of our information about the biographies of these intrepid monks stems from Chinese biographic collections. So far, however, insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that these biographies were shaped by the ideals and motivations of their authors. Notably, Daoxuan, the author of a seminal collection of monastic biographies, projected his own ideals of the observance of the vinaya and doctrinal learning upon the biographies of Wongwang and Chajang. The way he creatively reimagined these biographies has been accepted in Korean scholarship and continues to influence even present-day perceptions. While later biographies In not show such a strong auctorial hand, they equally tend to ascribe Chinese monastic ideals or other motivations to the Korean material.

Henrik H. Sorensen devotes his chapter to the study of a specific phenomenon in the history of East Asian Buddhism, namely the quest for the Buddhist teaching {quifa) undertaken by Buddhist monks in regions other than their own. Based primarily on the analysis of epigraphical writings, Sorensen explains the experience associated with Korean Son (Ch. Chan) Buddhist monks journeying to Tang China dining the eighth and ninth centuries.

The cult of Shötoku Taishi (Prince Shötoku, 573-621) was a farreaching movement across Japan throughout several centuries, and the belief that he was Huisi's (515-577) reincarnation was an important element in his extensive cult in the Buddhist world. Pei-Ying Lin in her essay examines the connection between the Japanese prince and the legend cycles of the Chinese patriarch Huisi from the eighth century onwards. In particular, the essay discusses the networks of authors of this reincarnation story; namely Du Fei (c. 710-720), Jianzhen (688-763), Situo (722-809), Saicho (767-822) and Kojo (779-858). This self-identification involved Buddhist monks who located themselves in a broader context of East Asian Buddhism. Lin argues that the reincarnation legend reveals the authors' motives of rearranging the association between China and Japan. Their self-identification, Lin contends, matured as the reincarnation story developed into complete form.

Bart Dessein's chapter argues that one's Buddhist identity is not a monolithic singularity, but a layered construct, consisting of the acceptance of the Buddha-word (Buddhavacana) as one's core Buddhist identity, then one's particular monastic school and code as a first layer around this Buddhist 'nucleus', and finally philosophical interpretations of the Buddha-word as the outer layer of one's Buddhist identity. These three layers, Dessein points out, are represented in the traditional three collections of Buddhist literature (tripitaka): sutra, vinaya, and abhidharma. The 'canonical' status of the abhidharma collection is the least stable of these three. The 'Abhidharmic' layer is, according to Dessein, therefore, the layer that enables 'networking, as the acceptance of the Buddha-word and one's monastic affiliation are beyond negotiation. It is this intricate connection between identity formation, canonization, and networking in the Indian and Chinese political spheres that form the core of this chapter.

The final chapter of the volume by Ann Heirman examines the monastic life as a major factor in the creation of Buddhist identity. In several types of Buddhist texts, and particularly in disciplinary texts, monastic life received a great deal of attention, with monks representing the Buddhist community as well as the Dharma. This is also the case with respect to bodily care. Although bodily care practices might seem trivial, they reveal what the community stood for, at least normatively. Heirman explains how this normative ideal was transferred from India to China, taking into account the role of Buddhist monastics in the social networks to which they belonged. Heirman further explores the ways in which the threshold for becoming a monk advanced over time, with purity attaining an ever more central position in Buddhist discourse on bodily care. <>

The Esoteric Community Tantra, The All-Tathagata Body-Speech-Mind Secret, The Great Tantra King (Sarvatathagatakayavakcittarahasya-guhyasamaja-nama-mahatantraraja) by Great Vajradhara with **The Illuminating Lamp: An Extensive Six-Parameter Explanation (Patkotivyakhya-Pradipoddyotana-nama-ika)** by Master Chandrakirti Volume I: Chapters 1–12. Introduction and Translation by John R.B. Campbell and Robert A.F. Thurman, with the AIBS Translation Team (Editor-in-Chief: Robert A.F. Thurman • Executive Editor: Thomas F. Yarnall, Main Sanskrit Critical Editors: Shrikant Bahulkar, David Mellins, Main Tibetan Editor: Paul G. Hackett) [Treasury of the Buddhist Sciences Series: Tengyur Translation Initiative CK 465 (N 404); CT 690 (TOH. 7785) Co-published by the American Institute of Buddhist Studies and Wisdom Publications in Association with the Columbia University Center for Buddhist Studies and Tibet House, US; Wisdom Publications, hardcover 9781949163162, ebook 9781949163179]

A new presentation of Tantra with its most renowned commentary by one of the foremost translator/scholar teams of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism.

This volume is a translation of the first twelve chapters of **The Glorious Esoteric Community Great King of Tantras (Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-tantra-raja)**, along with the commentary called **The Illuminating Lamp (Pradipoddyotana-nama-tika)**, a commentary in Sanskrit on this tantra by the seventh-century Buddhist intellectual and tantric scholar-adept Chandrakirti. Regarded by Indo-Tibetan tradition as the esoteric scripture wherein the Buddha revealed in greatest detail the actual psycho-physical process of his enlightenment, **The Esoteric Community Tantra** is a preeminent text of the class of scriptures known to Indian Buddhist scholar-adepts as great yoga tantra, and later to their Tibetan successors as unexcelled yoga tantra. **The Illuminating Lamp** presents a system of interpretive guidelines according to which the cryptic meanings of all tantras might be extracted in order to engage the ritual and yogic practices taught therein. Applying its interpretive strategies to the text of **The Esoteric Community Tantra, The Illuminating Lamp** articulates a synthetic, "vajra vehicle" (*vajrayana*) discourse that locates tantric practices and ideals squarely within the cosmological and institutional frameworks of exoteric Mahayana Buddhism.

The Vajra Hermeneutics of the Tradition of Arya Nagarjuna and Aryadeva by John R.B. Campbell

This volume is a translation of the first twelve chapters of the **Great King of Tantras, The Glorious Esoteric Community Tantra** (Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja), along with the commentary called **The Illuminating Lamp** (Pradipoddyotana-nama-?ika), a commentary in Sanskrit on the former by the Buddhist intellectual and tantric scholar- practitioner Chandra kirti in the second half of the first millennium ce. Regarded by Indo- Tibetan tradition as the esoteric scripture wherein the Buddha revealed the very psycho- physical process of his enlightenment, the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja is a preeminent text of the class of scriptures known to late first millennium ce Indian Buddhist writers as great yoga tantra (mahayogatantra), and later to their Tibetan successors as unexcelled yoga tantra (*anuttarayoga-tantra). The Pradipoddyotana-nama-?ika presents a system of interpretive guidelines according to which the obscure meanings of the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja might be extracted in order to engage its ritual and yogic practices taught therein. Applying its interpretive strategies to the text of the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja, the Pradipoddyotana-nama-?ika articulates a synthetic, "vajra vehicle" (vajrayana) discourse that locates tantric practices and ideals squarely within the cosmological and institutional frameworks of Mahayana Buddhism.

From the time Prince Siddhartha went forth into homelessness and founded the monastic community, the ideal of "giving it all up for nirvana" was not only central to Indian Buddhist institutional structure but also a hallmark of its literary self- expression. From accounts of the Buddha's former lives of austerity and self- sacrifice in avadana and jataka literature to the epic wanderings of the bodhisattvas in Mahayana sutras, the heroic tropes of worldly renunciation and emotional dispassion served to articulate core values of the monastic community in its canonical literature. However, the Buddhist mahayoga tantras expanded the iconographic and literary representation of an increasingly crowded Buddhist pantheon to include celestial buddhas and bodhisattvas in erotic embrace, demonstrating the "great bliss" (mahasukha) of their awakening (bodhi), while apparently advocating the transgressing of virtually all the most basic moral precepts of monastic and lay Buddhism as necessary on the accelerated path to complete awakening. In dramatic contrast to the abstinent mendicant and the tough- as- nails bodhisattva, the champions of these new scriptures and practice systems are represented in later hagiographic accounts as freewheeling and generally non- monastic adepts (siddha), the most celebrated among them having dropped out and gone forth (niryana) from monastic life to seek enlightenment outside its supposedly rigid institutions and dry scholastic curricula.

The unexcelled yoga tantras thus represent a remarkable and startling addition to an ongoing—and apparently ever- expanding—process of Indian Buddhist text production in the second half of the first millennium CE. Over the past two decades, there has been an increasing scholarly interest in the great rise of Buddhist esotericism, long neglected in Buddhist studies. Matthew Kapstein has aptly observed how its radical and "dynamic vision of the Buddhist enlightenment . . . must be regarded as the last great creative movement within Indian Buddhism."8 Indeed, the growing acceptance within segments of late first millennium Buddhist monasticism of practices foregrounding the indispensable role of the tantric master, initiation into a mandala, and the homologizing of sexual bliss with the bliss of awakening are among the most astonishing and poorly understood developments in post- Gupta Indian Buddhism.

A detailed commentary on the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja—itself regarded by the Indo-Tibetan tradition, it bears repeating, as a scripture revealing the psycho- physical process by which the Buddha attained enlightenment—the PU presents a system of interpretive guidelines of "seven ornaments" (saptala?kara), interconnected strategies for extracting multivalent meaning from the "root" (mula) scripture. In the concise style typical of classical Indian scientific treatise commentary, the Pradipoddyotana-nama-?ika begins with a highly technical yet lucid presentation of Chandrakirti's interpretive system, citing as doctrinal authority a set of revelatory "explanatory tantras" (vyakhya/akhyana-tantra) delivered by the Buddha himself. The commentary goes on to assign to the statements of the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja multiple layers of simultaneous meaning appropriate to tantric practitioners at different levels of ritual and yogic expertise.

The Pradipoddyotana-nama-ika seems to presuppose and even codify the acceptance within segments of the Buddhist educated community a complex set of advanced practices and symbolic systems seemingly at odds with normative Buddhist values and monastic codes of conduct. To judge by the pervasiveness of its distinctive terminology among tantric treatises in the Tibetan Tengyur, including six complete or nearly complete sub- commentaries of its own, undoubtedly it was widely known within learned circles in Buddhist India. From the time of its translation into Tibetan in the eleventh century, the Pradipoddyotana-nama-?ika had come to be regarded by many as a definitive presentation of hermeneutics for the unexcelled yoga tantras and as the foundation for studying and teaching the esoteric practice of "deity yoga" (devata-yoga), through which a practitioner is said to be able not only to achieve liberation from suffering but also to actualize the "form bodies" (rupa-

kaya) of a fully enlightened buddha in a single lifetime. Its synthesis of Vajrayana theories and aspirations within an exoteric Mahayana Buddhist path- structure is certainly characteristic of mainstream Buddhist orthopraxy by the time of such famous eleventh-century Indian monastic figures as Atisha Dipa?karashrijñana (c. 982,–1054), Ratnakarashanti (fl. early eleventh century), and Abhayakaragupta (c.1084–112,6/1077–1119). As such, the Pradipoddyotana-nama-ika is an exemplary work of Vajrayana scholasticism and a key source- text for studying the momentous refashioning of North Indian monastic universities into centers of tantric practice and teaching, a trans- regional tantric Mahayana that came to typify much of Indian Buddhism from the second half of the first millennium until its institutional destruction in the early thirteenth century, and all Buddhism within the Tibetan cultural sphere afterward.

The Arya Nagarjuna School of the Guhyasamaja Interpretation

The author of the Pradipoddyotana-nama-?ika identifies himself with what has been called in English translation "the Nagarjuna system" (Tib. 'phags lugs) of tantric exegesis and practice associated with Nalanda Monastery. The Tibetan shorthand is a coinage of early eleventh- century Tibetan intellectuals such as Gö Khugpa Hlaytsay ('gos khug pa blhas brtsas) and not attested in Indic sources. It reflects this Tibetan tantric tradition's self- identification with the Centrist (madhyamaka) philosophical school of Arya Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, whom the Tibetan scholar- practitioners considered the same persons as the tantric scholar- practitioners, authors of the Five Stages (Pañcakrama) and Lamp that Integrates the Practices (Caryamelapakapradipa). This completely opposes the modern dating schemes, which consider that there must be two Arya Nagarjunas, two Aryadevas, two Chandra kirtis, etc. The Tibetans call the two "Arya" individuals "the noble (arya) father and son" ('phags pa yab sras), considering the philosophical and tantric personages as very much the same, the Centrist philosophy being the basis of the tantric practice. By his claimed direct affiliation with them, Chandrakirti aligns himself with this lineage of the famous Centrists/tantrics Arya Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, and he himself also is understood by all Tibetan scholars to be the same author who wrote the seventh- century Lucid Exposition commentary on Nagarjuna's Wisdom: Centrist Root Verses. If the Tibetans are correct, this puts the date of the Pradipoddyotana-nama-ika in the seventh century CE, centuries earlier than modern scholars assert. Since we cannot decide this here, we must bracket the dating controversies for the moment. However, we will refer to this particular tantric tradition as simply "the Nagarjuna system" or "tradition" in order to dispel the implication that there is anything "ignoble" about any other system of interpretation.

The earliest writings on the Nagarjuna system in Tibet are those of Gö Khugpa Hlaytsay in the eleventh century, presumably around the same time as he revised the Tibetan translation done in the tenth century. The famous Tibetan translator Marpa Chökyi Lodrö (1012–1097) received lineages of Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja practice from his teachers in Nepal but apparently not with the explicit nomenclature of the Noble (Nagarjuna) system, although its content was definitely known to him. The Sakyapa hierarch Sönam Tsemo (1142–1182) wrote on the Pradipoddyotana-nama-?ika as part of his broader scholarship on "methods for explaining the tantras" (bshad thabs). The master scholar and editor of the Tibetan Tengyur, Butön Rinchendrup (1290–1364) wrote extensively on the Nagarjuna system as well as the seven- ornament system.

Strongly influenced by Butön's writing, Tsong Khapa (1357–1419) would by the end of his life position the literature and doctrines of the Nagarjuna tradition of the GST alongside those of Dialecticist Centrism (prasa?gikamadhyamaka) as the centerpiece of his distinctive interpretation of Buddhist philosophy and practice, forming the doctrinal foundation for the Gelukpa order. Tsong Khapa himself oversaw the production of the first books printed in Tibet at Ganden Monastery,

none other than the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja and its Pradipoddyotana-nama-?ika commentary with his own extensive Annotations (ca. 1414) to the latter. According to the biography of Tsong Khapa by one of his chief disciples, Khedrup Jey, this printing project began late in the dog year (1418) and was completed in the pig year (1419), the year of the master's passing. Tsong Khapa's immediate successors in the early to mid- fifteenth century institutionalized the Pradipoddyotana-nama-?ika as the curricular foundation for esoteric studies in "tantric colleges" (sngags pa'i gwra tshang) of the monastic "seats" (gdan sa), the monastic universities of the Gelukpa order, with a curriculum modelled on what they understood to be that of the Indian monastic universities.

The Seven Ornaments

The system of seven ornaments assigns to the statements of the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja multiple layers of simultaneous meaning appropriate to tantric practitioners at different levels of ritual and yogic expertise, aligning the entire tantric practice with non- tantric, Mahayana Buddhist practice and cosmology. In the concise style typical of classical Indian shastric commentary, the Pradïpoddyotana-nãma-^ïkã? outlines hermeneutic categories that enable a tantric specialist to extract the root tantra's encrypted, or "sealed" (mudrita) meanings, to align those with the esoteric practices detailed in the supplementary explanatory tantras and to apply these to the liturgical performances (sidhana) and psychophysical yogas of the Nagarjuna system. The seven ornaments thus describe both the ways in which the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja safeguards its meaning from inappropriate audiences as well as requires the hermeneutic system with which a qualified expert of the Nagarjuna system can decode the meaning and practices of the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja as they have been purposefully distributed among the explanatory tantras, themselves also supposedly authored by Vajradhara Buddha.

Tsong Khapa wrote extensively on the Nagarjuna system of interpretation and implementation of the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja. In his Annotations he provides an overview of the function and components of the famous seven- ornament system at the center of the Pradïpoddyotana-nãma-^ïkã? and of the Nagarjuna system exegesis. Tsong Khapa elucidates Chandrakirti's statement that the root tantra was deliberately encrypted by means of different types of linguistic expression alongside multiple levels of meaning for each statement of the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja. The rules of interpretation and implementation of the seven ornaments, mainly drawn from the Intuition Vajra Compendium explanatory tantra (JVS), are applicable also to all unexcelled yoga tantras other than the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja and can serve to disclose their inner meanings.

The ornaments themselves as presented in the first chapter of the Pradipoddyotana-nama-?ika are as follows:

1. Preliminaries (upodgh ita): for locating the source context of the root and explanatory tantras.
2. Methods (nyiya): for engaging in both the exoteric and esoteric Buddhist paths of practice, modeled on the process by which the Buddha came to embody enlightenment. This ornament juxtaposes the narrative of Shakyamuni's exoteric biography with the distinctive narrative of the practitioner's esoteric enlightenment biography, aligning the dispassionate practice (virigadharma) of the bodhisattva and the passionate practice (rigadharma) of the vajrasattva as complementary procedures.
3. Parameters (ko?i) of explanation (upadesa): refer to different kinds of speech used in the root tantra. These semantic levels are familiar from non- tantric Buddhist hermeneutics and

general Indian theories of language, including interpretable meaning (neyirtha) and definitive meaning (nitirtha) statements.

4. Programs (naya) of interpretation (vyikhyi): systematize the gradual decoding of successively more profound levels of meaning encoded in the text (literal, symbolic, implicit, ultimate) corresponding to the needs of students at progressively more advanced stages of study and practice.
5. Teaching Environment: specifies which modes of exposition and levels of interpretation are appropriate to public (satravyikhyina) versus individual instruction (si?yikhyina). This ornament limits the teaching of the advanced perfection stage practices to confidential, contractual relationships between preceptor and student, ritualized by consecrations.
6. Typology of Five Types of Person (pañca pudgala): to be taught, progressing from barely competent but nonetheless entitled, up to the perfect disciple. The typology lines up with the context of instruction (whether or not someone needs to be restricted to public teachings) and therefore to the semantic level of the explanation and the nature of the practice appropriate to each.
7. The Ornament of the Performance (sidhana) and fulfillment of the Nagarjuna system's highest practices of the Perfection Stage. This ornament describes the perfect union (yuganaddha) of the two realities (satyadvaya) of the clear light mind (cittaprabh isvara) and the magic body (miyideha).

Yoga of the Nagarjuna Tradition

Tsong Khapa explains the Šrï Guhyasamãja Mahã-Tantra-rãja as distinct among tantric scriptures due to its unique emphasis on facilitating the cultivation of the magic body (maya deha) of the advanced-stage practitioner. Rejecting an earlier Tibetan threefold categorization into father, mother, and nondual unexcelled yoga tantras, he writes:

> I explain following the explanation of the well- established opinion on the distinction of the unexcelled yoga tantras as wisdom (shes rab, prajña) and art (thabs, upaya) of such scriptures as the Vajra Tent. . . . Although some distinguish based on the creation stage practice, the difference is actually in the perfection stage [of the various tantras.] If we take bliss and emptiness (bde stong) as art and wisdom (thabs shes, upaya- prajña) respectively, individual scriptures cannot be differentiated; they all must be "nondual." . . . This distinction is unsupportable. . . . When you distinguish between art tantras and wisdom tantras with respect to the emphasis of their perfection stages, then wisdom must mean "intuition of ultimate reality- great bliss" (paramartha-mahasukha-jñana), while art must mean "conventional [reality] magic body" (sa?vti [satya] mayadeha.) The first of these points about the mother tantras is found in the thirteenth chapter of the Vajra Tent, which says, "prajñaparamita as means is called yogini; entry into union with reality is mahamudra; that is called yogini tantra.

The gendered symbolism he invokes is a familiar feature of Vajrayana scholastic commentary in India and is consistent with a similar alignment in exoteric Mahayana of ultimate reality voidness (sunyata) with "the mother of all buddhas," with compassion (karu?a) and art (upaya) of the bodhisattva and buddhas identified as her male counterpart. In the Nagarjuna system, the preeminent compassionate art taught in the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja is cultivation of this "magic body" (maya-deha), the achievement of which is essential for collapsing the three incalculable eons of rebirth normally required on the bodhisattva path into a single lifespan. This energetic "wind- energy body" (pra?avayu- kaya) is symbolized by the iconic vajra, the diamond- hard thunderbolt weapon of Indra, the ritual counterpart of the pristine subtle mind symbolized by the bell. The Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja with its auto- commentarial explanatory tantras is thus distinctive and even unique from the point of view of the Nagarjuna system in its emphasis on facilitating the practice of the magic

body, the ultimate art revealed by the Buddha, contrasted with the mother tantras' facilitation of the merging with the clear light mind.

Embedded within the seven ornaments are the interpretive categories "interpretable meaning" (neyartha) and "definitive meaning" (nitartha), familiar from exoteric Buddhist hermeneutics. For the Madhyamika, following the Teaching of Akhayamati Sutra, the neyartha/nitartha dyad always pertains to the content of a statement, with only statements concerning the voidness of intrinsic reality of phenomena being considered definitive; a single statement can only be one or the other.16 Within the seven ornaments scheme, however, a single statement can carry both interpretable and definitive readings that refer each to the two yogic practice stages— the imaginative process of self- creation in a divine form while maintaining awareness of all forms as emptiness, and the process of perfecting the realization of a supersubtle magic body made of sheer energy with a mind of great bliss and merging it with the ultimate clear light reality again and again until there is a perfect communion (yuganadha) of bliss body and clear light mind in the great adept's (mahasiddha) tantric form of buddhahood.

The hallmark of the Nagarjuna system is its use of Centrist metaphysics and appropriation of the latter's terminology. Its most significant transvaluation of Centrist metaphysics and terminology is the aligning of the two realities (satyadvaya) of Centrist philosophy with, on one hand, the creation and perfection developmental stages referenced above and, on the other, the third and fourth of the five yogic stages of the perfection process. For the Centrist philosopher, it is only on the basis of conventional, superficial truth (vyavahara-sa?v?ti-satya) that ultimate reality (paramartha-satya) can be approached and realized. Creation stage practice of the Nagarjuna system involves rehearsal and imitation of the multi- dimensional subjectivity of buddhahood by means of visualizing oneself as a perfected being and engaging in enlightened acts in the tantric mandala for the benefit of all suffering beings. Like a speech act that instantiates a new subjectivity, the creation stage is entirely conventional and relational. Through its repeated familiarization over time, however, one's conventional reality is manifested in the ultimate reality realization of "union" or "communion" (yuganaddha), or tantric enlightenment.

The Logic of Commentary

The extraordinary interpretive ingenuity with which Chandra kirti followed the writings of the Noble Nagarjuna's Five Stages has persuaded some modern scholars to assume a radical discontinuity between the community of practitioners who originally produced the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja and other mahayoga tantras and the tantric treatises. On this reading, monastic and scholastic authors have engaged in hermeneutical backflips to dull the dangerous edge of the mahayoga tantras and to domesticate their transgressive message. The Buddhist master Atisha, for example, was famously invited to Tibet by the princely rulers of Gugé in the early eleventh century in order to clear up deviant practices, particularly among members of the monastic community, resulting from misunderstanding of tantras such as the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja. It is not surprising, therefore, that as the esoteric systems increasingly made their way across cultural and linguistic borders, the Pradïpoddyotana-nãma-^ïkã and the seven ornaments received a great deal of commentarial attention due to a perceived need to correctly interpret the tantric literature and to organize the bewildering variety of esoteric practice systems for pedagogical purposes. Remarking on a commentary on the seven ornaments by the Kashmiri Shraddhakaravarman (fl. mid- eleventh century), Arenes suggests that such texts reflect the "double souci" of Indian Buddhist scholastic authors both to interpret the tantric literature and to organize the bewildering variety of esoteric practice systems for pedagogical purposes.

But to assume such a total rift separating the unexcelled yoga tantras and their scholastic commentaries is to drive an artificial wedge between the dichotomies—arguably false dichotomies—of original revelation and exegetical innovation. Semantic explanation is co- extensive with and intimately bound to the very representation of revelation in classical South Asian knowledge systems. This is not just a post- structuralist's fancy: in very real ways, Sanskrit commentary not only mediates but in fact creates meaning in a dynamic engagement with the text on which it comments. It is not an isolated oddity that the Manusm?ti (12.112) prescribes an etymologist and a ritual specialist to be present at any Vedic sacrificial assembly, suggesting a deep structural affinity between the execution of ritual and its analysis in Vedic practice. This sort of structural interdependence of transcendent revelation and local, semantic analysis is indeed the norm for Sanskrit scientific treatise traditions, including those of scholastic Buddhist Vajrayana. It is most clearly demonstrated in the dialectic operating between the seven- ornament hermeneutic of the Praḍïpoddyotana-nãma-^ïkã and the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja: explanatory tantras are decrypted and extracted by the tantric preceptor applying the seven ornaments, who then presents this as personal instructions (upadesa) to the initiated practitioner, making possible the personal realization, which is none other than the sum total of the meaning and practices of the initial revelation.

A shared assumption among traditional Sanskrit commentators in India is that the proper role of commentary is to make manifest what is latent in the authoritative scripture under consideration. According to the grammarians, what is found in a vtti or varttika must be considered to be present in the sutras themselves, and an explanation that is judged to go beyond the limit of the sutra (utsutra) is normally condemned as unjustifiable and unacceptable. Deutsch has argued that by the time of the redaction of the first philosophical (darsana) commentaries of the early first millennium, when this commentarial approach had become standard practice, any opposition between "legitimate explication" and "creative innovation" was "basically nonexistent in Indian thought." He writes about how central to traditional Indian understanding of philosophical text is the idea of philosophy as the "recovery"—rather than the "discovery"—of the fundamentals of a given tradition that were always established at the very outset of the founding of the discipline. It is the task of the tradition through history, then, to restate and explicate these fundamentals to successive generations in successive commentaries on the basic sutra and its assumed correctness.

Crucial to this Sanskrit commentarial logic, the recovery of meaning, is the notion of "indicating, hinting, intending" (jñapaka and abhipraya). Since a commentary must expose what is already available in the original, the operative hermeneutic is to extrapolate from what is being hinted at. Only a qualified master of a given system, a guru, having the requisite training and insight is able to tease out the meanings buried away in the root verses and sutras. In other words, the authenticity of a commentary derives from the fact that it lies dormant in the original revelation. And if meaning is always intended meaning (vivakitartha), then interpretation is always an act of recovering what was originally meant. This presupposes that the Buddha (or whoever) was fully aware of the full range of possible implications, so there cannot be an authentic interpretation that was not anticipated in the revelation. If this sounds "esoteric," it is because the esoteric traditions we know something about, like the Nagarjuna tradition, operate upon precisely this dialectic of occultation and revelation, encryption and disclosure, hinting and discovering. Such a process was therefore by no means unique to tantric commentaries; rather, such discursive practices are the norm for traditional South Asian text communities, and esoteric systems had often internalized Sanskritic culture.

In the methodological imperative to find an "ur-text" that has guided Indology and Buddhist studies for most of the past two hundred years, this slippage is often discounted and the "validity" of individual interpretive streams is similarly blocked. The result has been, for the most part, an inability

to grasp—or indifference toward—the discrete knowledge systems, texts, and institutions that actually make up human history. If the influence of tantric systems in South, Central, and East Asian histories is difficult to track and study, it is because their very terms—their vocabulary, iconography, cosmologies, and semiotics—are highly technical, idiosyncratic, and specific to individual systems. To make sense of the Vajrayana literature in general and the Nagarjuna tradition's hermeneutic system in particular, it will be similarly necessary to consider such "local" factors that made viable the esoteric Mahayana discourse of the Pradïpoddyotana-nãma-^ïkã, through which mahayoga tantric scriptures such as the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja could become not only tolerated but championed by Indian and Tibetan Buddhists of the late first millennium as the crowning glory of Shakyamuni Buddha's teaching of the Dharma. Guided by these considerations, the translation team has undertaken this new translation of the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja as received by the Pradïpoddyotana-nãma-^ïkã.

State of the Field

The study of Buddhist tantra in South and Central Asia has only very recently begun to consider how such forms and literature were coherent to the people enacting and producing them. It has become an almost commonplace observation that the study of tantric Buddhism remains a neglected area in the field of Indian Buddhist studies generally. The great Belgian scholar Louis de La Val lée Poussin peevishly remarked how "most of the historians of Buddhism deliberately ignore this 'annoying' aspect of the Indian tradition; but this omission does not go without any serious inconveniences." More recently, Davidson observed that historians of Indian political and social histories have characteristically neglected the study of early medieval India, considering it a messy and unruly period, untypical of the "classical" Indian imperial models of its "great empires" (Mauryan, Gandharan, Gupta, and Vaka?aka) while embracing the language of degeneration and decay for latter periods.

There remain very few edited editions of the great number of extant Sanskrit manuscripts of tantric Buddhist texts. The vast collection of tantric works translated into Chinese and Tibetan remains largely untapped, and only a handful of modern language translations of tantric Buddhist works from any period have been published. The existent work has mainly been in the important area of editing some of the more famous works, but investigation into the historical, social, and intellectual environments in which these texts functioned has lagged behind.

Scholarly efforts have tended to focus on articulating broad, defining characteristics of Buddhist tantra. Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblances"—in which a network of features contributes to a cohesive whole but no single feature is necessary or sufficient to constitute that whole—is often invoked to help organize an enormous variety of ritual media, practices, and theories. Such helpful works represent a huge advancement in the state of modern scholarship on tantric religion in general and its Buddhist form in particular, but they also by necessity fail to emphasize the important differentiation in specific traditions with respect to ritual practice, theory, and hermeneutics. This has frequently resulted in a homogenous response to "the tantric."

While preparation of editions and translations of Indian Vajrayana scriptures and their commentarial literatures is a necessary first step in the study of Indian Buddhist tantra, it is not at all clear that exclusive attention to text- critical work can much improve the understanding of esoteric Buddhism in South Asia without also placing them in the context of the traditions of study and practice that center on them. Nearly thirty years ago, Michael Broido commented that "the weakness of current Western work on the tantras is the almost complete neglect of the methods of interpretation which were used by the commentators and their teachers who interpreted them." This translation seeks,

precisely, to capture the reception of the **ESOTERIC COMMUNITY TANTRA** as mediated through Chandrakirti's commentary.

Just as the study of schools of Buddhism in India has become considerably advanced by painstaking examination of the hermeneutic principles critically outlined in commentarial traditions that guide the interpretation of their philosophical schools and the clashes between them, it is logical that a similar effort is anticipated in the context of the study and interpretation of tantric texts, rituals, and social practices. If Buddhist tantra is to be mapped, its legend is very likely to be available in the tantric commentaries of the Indo- Tibetan Buddhist traditions themselves. The picture of Buddhist practice that can be gleaned from a study of the Pradïpoddyotana-nãma-^ïkã is one of bodhisattva-oriented, monastic Mahayana alongside hallmark Vajrayana rituals and theories, including esoteric initiation, performance (sadhana) of the self- creation (atmotpatti) as a tantric buddha- deity, and the assurance that transformation of one's normally defiled body, speech, and mind into those of a fully enlightened being is possible in a single lifetime. It effectively presents the case for the broadest range of Buddhist Studies scholars to recognize the seminal importance of the Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-Tantra-raja in the development of the tantric era of late first millennium Indic religions, and for Buddhist practitioners to recognize the practice of the **ESOTERIC COMMUNITY TANTRA** as clearly among the crowning glories of Shakyamuni Buddha's teaching of the Dharma. <>

HISTORY OF ART IN JAPAN by Tsuji Nobuo, Translated by Nicole Coolidge Rousmaniere [Columbia University Press, 9780231193412]

The leading authority on Japanese art history, from earthenware figurines in 13,000 B.C. to manga and modern subcultures, tells the story of how the country has nurtured unique aesthetics, prominent artists, and distinctive movements. Discussing Japanese art in various contexts, including interactions with the outside world, Tsuji Nobuo sheds light on works ranging from the Jōmon period to modern and contemporary art. Tsuji's perspective, using newly discovered facts, depicts critical aspects of paintings, *ukiyo*-e, ceramics, sculpture, armor, gardens, and architecture, covering thousands of years. This book, the first translation into English of Japan's most updated, reliable, and comprehensive book on the history of Japanese art, is an indispensable resource for all those interested in this multifaceted history.

Review

Tsuji Nobuo's encyclopedic, authoritative, and insightful survey of the history of Japanese art—informed by over six decades of groundbreaking research—is presented in a lively and eminently readable translation by Nicole Coolidge Rousmaniere, his trusted colleague and an expert on Japanese culture in her own right. -- John T. Carpenter, Mary Griggs Burke Curator of Japanese Art, Metropolitan Museum of Art

The appearance of Professor Tsuji Nobuo's history of Japanese art in an English edition is a watershed moment both for the field and for the discipline of art history as a whole. The most important Japanese art historian of his generation, Tsuji weaves a narrative covering millennia of art in the archipelago by intertwining themes and concepts he has long championed, such as the roles of the decorative, playfulness, and eccentricity, all of which serve to liberate the arts of Japan from standard tropes of style, form, and iconography that have dominated western art historical discourse. Balanced, extensive attention devoted both to the prehistoric Jōmon, Yayoi, and Kofun

periods as well as to the modern era take his book far beyond the parameters of previous survey texts, and highlights the dynamism, imagination, and visual spectacle of Japanese art. In this beautifully illustrated volume Professor Tsuji brings home the point that from wooden Buddhist sculptures to "Superflat," it is in the startling visual impact of Japanese art that its greatest pleasures can be discovered. -- Matthew McKelway, Columbia University

Tsuji has earned recognition for combining authority and accuracy with interesting and imaginative insights. In every chapter, **HISTORY OF ART IN JAPAN** provides a thorough and engaging account of individual works in their social context while maintaining an international frame of reference. It is an immense gift to readers of all levels. -- Chelsea Foxwell, University of Chicago

Readers will likely close this book satisfied and inspired to search out monographs on certain artists and periods. — *Alexanderadamsart*

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From the Preface to the English Edition

HISTORY OF ART IN JAPAN was originally published in Japanese by University of Tokyo Press in 2005. It was commissioned by the press as a text for students and also for a general audience, to be written in an accessible manner. To survey the vast sweep of Japanese art history was a great challenge and a daunting task; I nonetheless relished the project, because not only did no such book exist, but I needed one myself!

The Japanese word bijutsu first appeared in the late nineteenth century as a translation of the Western term "art." Subsequently, other new Japanese words were coined, including kaiga (painting), chokoku (sculpture), kogei (craft), and kenchiku (architecture), as well as sho (calligraphy), an art form somewhat neglected in the West. These terms formed the semantic foundation for the modern discipline of art history in Japan.

Since then, many excellent research projects have resulted in new discoveries in various areas, leading to further subdivision and specialization in the discipline. The effect has been to make a definitive overview of Japanese art, capturing its dynamism and diversity, ever more difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, after many years of focused work, we were able to produce a comprehensive book with full-color illustrations, which not long ago would have seemed impossible.

HISTORY OF ART IN JAPAN describes artistic expression in the Japanese archipelago from 15,000 BCE to 2005, referencing the works of art themselves. As I am relatively unfamiliar with the history of Western art and not proficient in the English language, I focused my attention in the original edition on the native Japanese reader. Publishing this work in an English translation thus presented a significant challenge.

Fortunately, I remembered Professor Nicole Coolidge Rousmaniere, a friend as well as an expert on Japanese decorative arts. She kindly offered to translate the original text into English. A former student of John Rosenfield at Harvard University, Dr. Rousmaniere holds to exceptionally high standards in her work. I appreciate how difficult it was for her to convey some of these concepts to a Western audience. Now, after ten years in development, it is a great joy to see my book published in English. I am grateful that I have lived to see its publication.

From the Translator's Preface

It has been a great honor and an education to translate Professor Tsuji Nobuo's magnum opus, History of Art in Japan, from Japanese to English. It has been a heavy responsibility, calling for full appreciation of the author's voice, attention to the nuances between the lines, and awareness of the author's tremendous background knowledge. In places, the text of the original 2005 edition has been interpreted and expanded upon, particularly where it assumes knowledge that readers of the original Japanese might have been expected to know but may be unfamiliar to English-language readers. In addition, the content has been revised and expanded since the publication of the original Japanese edition. This work has taken many years, and I am grateful for the much more profound understanding of Japanese art, its aesthetics, and its cultural roots that I have achieved as a result of working on Professor Tsuji's book. I am grateful too, for Professor Tsuji's patience over the long years it has taken to complete this project.

The translation was made possible with the help and support of many gifted scholars, editors, and students of Japanese arts and archaeology. First and foremost, I thank Sadamura Koto, who has stayed with this project from start to finish, checking the translations and working closely with the University of Tokyo Press and me to ensure that Professor Tsuji's insights were accurately recorded and compellingly expressed. I owe her a major debt of gratitude.

From the Introduction

We are about to embark on a journey that will take us from the origins of Japanese art in the prehistoric Jomon period through to the art of the present day. In the process, we will cover multiple disciplines that include painting, sculpture, decorative arts, craft, archaeology, architecture, gardens, calligraphy, photography, printmaking, and design. If this program seems an ambitious one to set for a reader, it was even more so for this writer, an octogenarian scholar who has spent most of his career focusing on a rather narrow slice of time: 1400-1900. It was precisely this challenge and opportunity that appealed to me, for it seemed to be a chance to relearn and to grow. In undertaking the task of singlehandedly writing a history of Japanese art, I sought to overcome my habitual conceptions, to expand my scholarly horizons, to view the world of art from a broader perspective, and, in sum, to witness the history of Japanese art as a whole.

It may be useful to begin by asking a basic question: What is "art"? More precisely, what is bijutsu, the Japanese term now conventionally used to refer to art? It turns out that bijutsu is the Japanese equivalent of the English "fine arts," the French beaux-arts, and the German schone kunst, and implies an art of purity and beauty. The term appeared during the Meiji era (1868-1912), meaning that until then in Japan the concept "art" effectively did not exist. Instead, priority was given to gigei, or "skill." In premodern times, the practices of painting, sculpture, and the decorative arts and crafts could all be captured by the general concept ko, referring either to the act of making or to an artisan—for example, Wo (potter), oriko or shokko (weaver), shikko (lacquerer), gako (painter), and choko (engraver, carver, or sculptor). Painting and calligraphy could also be grouped together under the single heading shoga. The term chokoku (now "sculpture") was by contrast rarely used, and even then not necessarily in the same sense as today. Kenchiku (architecture) and teien (gardens) were two further Meiji neologisms.

Without due consideration, then, Meiji officials used the Western import bijutsu to define a body of works created in Japan, and they did so in a selective manner that has had a long-term, adverse effect on the study of Japanese art history. Certain forms of artistic production, such as calligraphy, still find themselves battling for recognition. Others, such as the greatly admired realistic statues known as "living dolls" (iki ningyo), produced by Matsumoto Kisaburo (1825-1891) in the later part of the Edo

period, have been almost entirely overlooked, to the point of their near disappearance. For these reasons, the invention of bijutsu and the modern discipline of Japanese art history have emerged as contentious topics in the last few decades.

Yet the term bijutsu is now so widely familiar that to devise a substitute, such as "plastic arts" (zokei), seems no less artificial. My solution has been to continue using bijutsu while extending the term's range to be more inclusive. How then can we understand the meaning of the term "art?" To quote the Oxford English Dictionary, "[Art is] the expression or application of creative skill and imagination, especially through a visual medium such as painting, sculpture, and works produced in this way."

To this I would only add that a work of art transcends its creator's awareness and original intention, to be continually rediscovered and recreated by others. If art can be understood in relation to these two characteristics, inclusiveness and constant renewal, then the title of this book, History of Art in Japan, will I hope come to seem considerably less banal, indeed considerably richer, than it may at first appear.

Patriotism has no place in my view of Japanese art. Rather, I concur with East Asian art historian Ernest Fenollosa (1853-1908), who wrote: "No national or racial art is quite an isolated phenomenon."' The arts are neither isolated nor immutable, but like currents of air that know no national boundaries, move through transmission and cultural exchange, and along the way acquire local qualities, as artists infuse them with their own forms of expression.

With the exception of the prehistoric Jomon period, artistic production Japan can be seen as an orchard irrigated by several nutrient-rich streams I lowing from across the Asian subcontinent as well as down through the pipeline of the Korean peninsula. The resulting harvest has depended on the quality and volume of the water supply. Does this mean there were no autonomous developments in the history of Japanese art? When considering this question, I often return to one of my favorite books, The Enduring Art of Japan, by Langdon Warner (1881-1955), where the author writes: 'The enduring tendencies of Japan, disappearing to crop up again in some fresh but recognizable fashion, always leaving one sure that they have been there before in some other mood—elegant or angry, gay or somber."

I have long been interested in trying to locate this "core of Japanese art" and, over time, have identified what seem to me three distinguishing concepts. Firstly, there is adornment(kazari). Nowadays kazari is treated as equivalent to "decoration" (soshoku), another Meiji newcomer. However, kazari is quite different, a concept long woven into the daily lives of the Japanese people, pervasive since well before the arrival of Western influence. Its deep roots mean that kazari is fundamental to considering Japanese culture overall and of course decorative art in particular. Secondly, there is "playfulness" (asobi), a theme to which the writings of Johan Huizinga (1872-1945), particularly his Homo Ludens (1938), have made me more attuned. Playfulness may be hidden from view, but it is ever-present, even within the seemingly regimented lives that Japanese people on average lead today. Thirdly, there is "animism," where every object is thought to house a sacred spirit. Linked to the type of nature worship still practiced in Buddhist mountain asceticism (Shugendo), animist beliefs can be identified in both the sacred and the secular arts of Japan.

We will encounter these three concepts—wondrous adornment (kazari), playfulness (asobi), and animism—throughout this book. In fact, I see them as keys to unlocking the world of Japanese art history. And so, now that we are equipped, let us begin our journey. <>

DOMINUS MUNDI: POLITICAL SUBLIME AND THE WORLD ORDER by Pier Giuseppe Monateri [HART 9781509911752]

This monograph makes a seminal contribution to existing literature on the importance of Roman law in the development of political thought in Europe. In particular it examines the expression 'dominus mundi', following it through the texts of the medieval jurists – the Glossators and Post-Glossators – up to the political thought of Hobbes. Understanding the concept of dominus mundi sheds light on how medieval jurists understood ownership of individual things; it is more complex than it might seem; and this book investigates these complexities. The book also offers important new insights into Thomas Hobbes, especially with regard to the end of dominus mundi and the replacement by Leviathan. Finally, the book has important relevance for contemporary political theory. With fading of political diversity Monateri argues "that the actual setting of globalisation represents the reappearance of the Ghost of the Dominus Mundi, a political refoulé – repressed – a reappearance of its sublime nature, and a struggle to restore its universal legitimacy, and take its place." In making this argument, the book adds an important original vision to current debates in legal and political philosophy.

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Master of the World and the Law of the Sea

The Dominus, Carl Schmitt and Beyond ...

Apocalyptic Politics and the Parable of the Dominus

In his theory on the nomos of the earth, Carl Schmitt declared that our times will witness the last round of the terrible struggle for a law of the planet, and the winner will become the master of the world.

The winner will take possession of the whole globe—land, air and sea—dividing and assigning it according to his will and pleasure. But the sea, vast and void, will not last in the new order. Schmitt himself links his theory to the theology of the Revelation (21:1):

> Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and there was no longer any sea.

According to this vision, then, as long as the Leviathan is the Sire of the Sea, the definitive unit of the globe under its Lord will be eventually reached through its taming. And since the domain of Satan—Schmitt adds—is a unitary empire, as Jesus acknowledged speaking of the 'Lord of Flies, the new master will take in hands a globe already assembled by the Enemy.

In this way, Schmitt's embarrassing theory of law is strictly connected to his theory of political theology, which in turn is directly linked to his conception of sovereignty and exception. If the 'sovereign' is he who decides on the state of exception, the latter represents in political theory the same thing as the miracle does in theology. At this point, the concept of the 'political' as a decision between friend and foe also assumes a theological and ontological trait, and we face a number of nested conceptions evoking the dark side of political philosophy.

But, we must question, are these ideas right or wrong? Where did they come from? What, indeed, were their origins? What is their genealogy? And where do they lead us to? What is, for instance, the sense in the insistence on the concepts of 'Empire' and the 'state of exception' rebooted by some of Schmitt's contemporary epigones like Hardt and Negri, or Agamben? And if this narrative is a form of knowledge about political and juridical forms, what kind of knowledge is it?

It is in the text of Justinian's Digest (14.2.9)—never cited by Schmitt—that we find the 'revelation' of the existence of a Dominus Mundi. The original of this passage is in Greek, here followed by its traditional Latin version:

> *Ego quidem mundi dominus, lex autem marls.*

This can be translated into English in two rather different ways, as 'I am the lord of the world, and the law of the sea, or alternatively as am the owner of the earth (lands), but the sea is governed by the law'. This striking difference is due to the ambiguity of the original wording, the difference between the Greek term `kurios' and its Latin translation 'dominus, and by the more than astonishing variance between the Greek `kosmos' and the Latin `mundus'.

What is at stake here is, of course, the ideal of a single, and legitimate, world rule. The everlasting nature of this ideal was well witnessed by Kissinger when he recently stated that our age is insistently—at times almost desperately—in pursuit of a concept of 'world order, and, as in the apocalyptic scenario envisaged by Schmitt, 'chaos threatens side by side with unprecedented interdependence'.

This grandiose prose marks an enduring paradigm of Western political thought, constituting a form of philosophical occultism that was cultivated by such different and influential authors as Schmitt, Kantorowicz and Bloch, and which is still haunting our political models. Their works point unequivocally to the mystical nature of sovereignty, the magic of monarchs, and the 'miracle' of exception. The comprehensive paradigm centred on this mystical idea is often referred to as 'Political Theology'—a rather vague, and somewhat elusive and multifarious label constantly being reshaped, and quite certainly at the root of the 'Italian Theory' based on the emergence of terms as 'bare life' or 'uses of bodies', and other intriguing investigations on the emblematic nature of the flesh of political entities; a theory rendering the political discourse decisively theological in its own linguistic premises and practices. It is hard not to see at work in this paradigm a 'fascination for the extraordinary' leading to prophetic-like questions such as [a] re we facing a period in which forces beyond the restraints of any order determine the future?'.

This attitude has been perfectly captured by critical author Koskenniemi in describing our time as one in which even international lawyers are 'losing faith in the secular, and in which the ideal of the world order can always be described in the 'messianic' language of present imperfection merely highlighting the brightness of law's promise: an international law as a self-correcting, secular project whose meaning would nonetheless be given by a horizon of transcendence.

Our standpoint, here, lies on the need to investigate the origins of this paradigm, starting from its beginnings in the imperial Roman revelation of the presence of a universal 'Master of the World' that strongly influenced the exotic and heterodox evolution of political modernity. Our main theory is that, to a large extent, the intellectual and political history of the West has been seasoned with magic and occultism, which contributed to defining and developing the concept of sovereignty as we know it today. From the narratives of ancient Roman law to the specific emblems of the English Renaissance, and the famous frontispiece of Hobbes's Leviathan, our investigation will unveil the occult prerogatives of the 'political. As far as the origins of theological and political modes of thought are concerned, it is precisely in the historical and ideological vicissitudes of the passage of the Digest on the Dominus Mundi that we may encounter the two most impressive icons of our political conceptions: on one side the continental land based emperor, and on the other side the English sea monster, the Leviathan. On I he one hand we face a Dominus that could also be an Antichrist—a sovereign who could be at the same time within and without the law—and on the other hand we meet the Old Serpent, that could become a Saviour.

The double nature of the Dominus Mundi produced many romanticisations of the global power. The awing duplicity and ambiguity of the English Leviathan has never ceased to be at the heart of its spell, as the most influential and powerful i in age of the political. Our task will be to investigate these exotic ambiguities of the modern political discourse, starting from the very possibility of a legitimate world (let, to eventually dismantle the Schmittian paradigm at its root.

I 'he aim of this book is, then, to investigate the parable of the Dominus Mundi, from its beginning to its contemporary remnants. Now, the basic point in building a model of world order and universal rule is to investigate the hegemonic devices by which the world is divided into spaces and jurisdictions.'? As it has brilliantly shown, the neoliberal paradigm is not purely an economic order or based on rational choice theory, but has many geopolitical aspects governing spaces through exception and exclusion. This contributes to defining a new, mutable experience of law that challenges traditional territorial boundaries and self-defined political entities in global times. As a consequence, a concept of a world order, making sense of global and anti-global movements, must cope with three basic elements: space, transcendence, and exception.

Accordingly, the plan of the book can be summarised as follows.

In the Digest we find stated that the Roman Emperor is the Master of the World and the Law of the Sea. This passage, though contested and in need of philological investigations, would imply that there is a single legitimate universal authority. Our first aim, then, would be that of investigating this proclamation, its problematic origins, its contested formulation, and the different and incompatible meanings that it acquired through the ages.

A pure model of the Dominus Mundi would, in theory, allow no fracture, resulting in a strong and compact spatial construct where there is no possible distinction between an inside and an outside, and the world is conceived of as a unique spatial entity whose government is concentrated in a single locus of authority. This model would be the icon of the frightening and sublime ideal of a united government extended to the whole cosmos. Undoubtedly the European world order became

eventually fractured after the outburst of the Thirty Years' War (1618) and its end at the Peace of Westphalia (1648), a compromise inaugurating varieties of 'world order conceptions: Modern sovereignty became grounded upon a widespread acknowledgement of the impossibility of world dominance by a single entity and imagined the kings as Leviathans who did not recognise any legitimate superior authority. This normative inversion founded the legal theory upon which the sovereign territorial state of early modern times later developed. The main feature of Westphalia, according to many, including Kissinger, was the acceptance of `political diversity' and the formal coexistence and equality of different sovereign powers. In this sense, with the rise of the new Westphalian order, the parable of the Dominus Mundi came to an end. But what is the most striking for us is the contemporary transformation of the Leviathan from a symbol of the Old Serpent into the emblem of the modern political savior. As the Roman emperor, after the conversion to Christianity, changed from a figure of Satan into that of a representative of God, assuming a proper theological dimension, so conversely the modern sovereign assumed the form of a demonic monster incarnating the ideal of political salvation. From this standpoint Westphalia was a meeting of Leviathans, of heterodox monsters. These new creatures, so different from ancient empires, free cities, bishoprics, princedoms, and so on, started to share the common traits of all the Westphalian creatures: they came to possess a flag, an anthem, an army, a treasury, a police force, and a well-defined territory. They accepted the existence of other similar monsters on the earth, having the same right to legitimate jurisdiction and power, no matter how different they were, protestant, catholic, socialist, hberal or despotic. This was a peculiar and exotic European adventure, which universalised itself through the—now trembling—categories of international law and international politics. From this perspective, we can see this parable of the Dominus Mundi in its entirety, because we are experiencing the dissolution of its dissolution, in other words, the end of the Westphalian world order.

First of all, the world is becoming populated with non-Westphalian creatures: the European bloc is not purely Westphalian, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank are not at all Westphalian, and certainly Isis and other terror networks are completely different from the Westphalian state, whatever name they may claim for themselves.

Secondly and most importantly, the acceptance of political diversity is fading away. Both the theory of universal human rights and conceptions of a universal caliphate can no longer accept the idea of the legitimacy of political diversity, and so they are producing a global clash of ideas and a disruption of the formal legal categories of international law, causing a strong reaction and resistance. Humanitarian intervention is certainly the most striking example of a departure from the purely Westphalian international law, though it operates within its framework.

Our theory is, then, that the current context of globalisation represents the reappearance of the ghost of the Dominus Mundi, which lies dormant as a repressed political figure, a refoulé. The spectral reappearance brings with it the sublime and, t the same time, rotten nature of the Master of the World. From this standpoint, he clash that we are currently experiencing between populism and globalism could ultimately be seen as two sides of the same spectral form, since the Dominus was both a national sovereign and a global Lord. But what is more important is that the sublime-kitsch-rotten nature of the political has been left to wander about and must be 'recaptured' in its proper significance, superseding the neoliberal dream of a totally depoliticised world.

The Locus Absconditus of Change

Our investigation has been centred on the dark side of the modern political which was denied by rationalism. It fell into latency, but persisted as a sublime remnant, exceeding our capacity to govern it. Our enquiry brought us to underline the role played by the politicisation of the 'dark arts' in unfolding modern conceptions of sovereignty, deeply marked by the sublimity of its hidden prerogatives. As such, these observations led us to cope with the place of heterodoxy within the transformations that shaped European rationalism, presented as a standard for global orthodox governance, in the appraisal of the political and legal domain.

From this angle, we tried to undermine political theology as an account of the transcendent dimension of law and legitimacy, to the extent that this account is based on the 'Plot of the Fall'. According to this account, there once were theological concepts rendering our understanding of the world and the law meaningful. These concepts decayed into pure political and legal conceptions, and, as a consequence, modern political orders are but broken pieces of a fallen theology. As we may perceive, these accounts are themselves a form of self-improving theological understanding of our political tradition, implying a sense of nostalgia or melancholy for the pre-political world. From this standpoint, they can be labelled orthodox as they prolong the faith in a lost paradise of theological ontology surviving under the surface of modernity.

On the contrary, we think that the birth of the modern political represented a major fracture in the history of the West, and that its origins were much more heterodox than expected. Our main claim is, indeed, that of a demonological origin of modernity, which reverses Schmitt's paradigm and its denial of the sublime.

What is at stake here is that all along the history of the parable of the Dominus Mundi and its reversal into the demonic figure of the Leviathan—via the transformation of witchcraft into a political crime of high treason—we have witnessed a legal and political history of the West which is even more abysmal than any political-theological account: a history whose internal devices of meaning production and influence are yet to be investigated in depth.

What we have tried to reconstruct here is a lineage which tries to overcome the denial of one of the most important features of romanticism, and that lies in the theory of the sublime. What we mean, by reference to sublime, is, indeed, that political reactions are never predetermined by what is happening. Facts do not determine politics, because of the excess embedded in them which is reflected in their sublimity. One of the major problems affecting the Schmittian paradigm lies precisely in its inner inconsistencies. It promises to disclose the abyss of the occult origins of modernity while hiding their real features. Condemning political romanticism for contingent reasons, Schmitt precluded himself and his followers a deeper understanding of the occult exoticism and heterodoxy at the root of modern sovereignty. This preclusion became structural in Schmitt's paradigm, creating an intrinsic inconsistency at its centre.

For all these reasons, this book has been an investigation on the too-muchness of legitimacy and hegemony. It tells us something about the mysterious spell of modern power and its sublimity. It tells us that there is something in political ideas that governs us more than we can govern them.

We need, then, to confront two different but interrelated questions. What does it mean that there is a sublime side of the political? And, what does it mean to interpret our current global reality in terms of the haunting presence of the ghost of the Dominus?

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If the model of the Dominus Mundi represented a compact model of world sovereignty, both legitimate and universal, enlightened by the metaphor of a manifest god and the liturgy of his presence in the world order, we must acknowledge that this metaphor was fragmented and inverted, and that a dark side emanated from the disjunctures created by modernity. The dark side of a haunting ghost still governs our political imagination, inscribed, as it is, between the melancholy of a return to an equilibrium between great continental blocs, and a utopian desire for salvation, either in the form of a pastoral and peaceful neoliberal order,11° or in that of a revolutionary messianism from below.' Irenic dreams and a sort of dreadful realism alternate on the stage, together with mixed feelings of melancholy and condemnation of the political and the sovereign.

Now if a ghost is a remnant of what has been, we think that we must acknowledge that we are at the same time haunted by a memory and unaware of the deep disjuncture from which it sprang. Haunting is irreducible to the apparition." The spectral or uncanny effect is not simply a matter of seeing a ghost. There is as much the experience of an absence in the loss that the ghost introduces or causes to return. There is something summoned to come back, to dwell again in the places haunted by its absence.

This surplus of immanence that we try to capture via the sublime in political, artistic and legal discourse can be multifarious. For example, Fredric Jameson has suggested a reformulated vision of the sublime focused on technology rather than nature.'" As we have seen, Kant defined nature as sublime because it consistently exceeds the capacity of human concepts to grasp either its particularity or its generality. Such a definition singles out both what we have called a surplus of immanence as well as the too-muchness, or the excessiveness that we are prone to perceive in facts and our surrounding world. This too-muchness is normally expressed in the metaphorical use of language employed both in poetical and political expressions. It is in this way that we may see the daylight dying as a dolphin or describe the King of England as a mortal god. Jameson's theory is important not only to grasp our attitude toward technology and its eventual dominium mundi, but also to grasp the core mechanics of the Marxian approach to economy, intended as the great process by which nature is captured and transformed through the magic of commodities creating their own value. The pretension of the Marxian discourse to be scientific always prevented, indeed, a full appreciation of its metaphors and its romanticisation of the economic process.

The overarching admiration for nature and the desire to tame its forces easily displays this surplus of immanence intrinsic in our relationship with nature and technology, possessing a clear excess residing in the cultural and political reactions that accompanied modern human achievements, beyond our capacity to divine in advance what these reactions could be: on an extreme side, their positive appreciation in a modernist aesthetic of speed, skyscrapers, cables and factories; on another extreme side, the fearsome and terrific mightmare of domain of technique that could obscure everything which is truely human.

As Jameson suggested, the actual advent of digital technology put on centre stage a new type of machine or artefact that proved difficult to respond to cognitively. The image of a global matrix of interlocked machines may imply the emergence of a new form of the sublime because technology is presented as exceeding human capacities and categories. The awesome capabilities of computers are beyond our capacity to grasp them as physical objects. As such, they are rather unimpressive, and we get no sense of what they are capable of by simply looking at them. All of this raises, nevertheless, the same question that Jameson pointed out, namely, the existence of a persistent representational problem. But the point for us here is not so much the magic quality of objects, but rather our unpredictable political reactions to their emergence. In other words, it represents the

excessive nature of the political. What are, then, the consequences of the sublime nature of the political? What kind of a change should we imagine?

What is really at stake in these terms and in relation to our specific matter, is the image that we have of the world order. This image shapes our attitudes toward change, as change depends on the perceived image of the locus of power. If we imagine that this locus of power is the Winter Palace, a single symbolic place of command and control where the Dominus dwells, we could try to seize it. Only this act could provoke a change. If we imagine that the locus of power is an impersonal and widespread network of interlocked machines or of different agencies we probably should try more decentralised strategies of multiplying struggles and confrontations. If we think that the locus of power lies now in the boardroom of public companies we should try to collect enough shares to vote in corporate meetings. In this sense, the kind of mobilisation that is required by a desire for change, as well as the tasks that we must formulate to reach it, is highly imaginary.

The icon of the Winter Palace leads to a concentrated action focused on a single point. The opposite icon of a soft and diffused but oppressive power quite naturally germinates local, multifarious and probably unexpected strategies of resistance. If we locate the locus of virtue in the compact communities of a lost communal life we would easily fight against new intruders, whether in the form of poor migrants or rich venture capitalists. Hegemony is control over the imagination, and imagination is sublime. Imagery is shaping the sort of action to be triggered, a concentred power inspires occupation, and a diffused power incites more resistance than occupation. Imagery is unfathomable, but it is not arbitrary in terms of its consequences. A revolution succeeds only if its imagery is 'right. When it is wrong a false attack would be launched against false targets, determining its failure.

To the extent that our attempt has been to supersede conventional and unsound theories, their rejection may have important consequences for the historical consciousness of the Western political tradition. The Western political tradition should perhaps no longer be viewed as a continuous uninterrupted tradition from its Greek origins on. A demonological turn created a fracture in the tradition. This implies that the projects of governance based on the conventional picture are untenable and must be abandoned.

We have to create a new outlook on our past, blurring and possibly reversing received ideas. In particular, we need a completely different consciousness of the locus of sovereignty. It is not so much that it ceased to be a royal palace, a fortress, or a factory, or that it eventually became a network of interlocked agencies of a more liquid character. Rather, sovereignty has been, from modernity onwards, a hidden and contrived locus of authority: a locus absconditus.

We should take consciousness of the demonological political sublime and its fascination that pervaded the West, whether embedded in economic or public institutions, yet which has been denied. What we need, in these terms, is a new consciousness. Only then can a new and unpredictable form of change start targeting this hidden and mysterious locus absconditus: the spectral space where the Ghost of the deceased Dominus sits yet, crowned upon his grave. <>

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADE IN THE PACIFIC RIM by Matthew Rimmer [Edward Elgar, 978178897331 1]

This authoritative book explores copyright and trade in the Pacific Rim under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a mega-regional trade deal. Offering a perceptive critique of the TPP, Matthew Rimmer highlights the dissonance between Barack Obama's ideals that the agreement would be progressive and comprehensive and the substance of the trade deal.

Rimmer considers the intellectual property chapter of the TPP, focusing on the debate over copyright terms, copyright exceptions, intermediary liability, and technological protection measures. He analyses the negotiations over trademark law, cybersquatting, geographical indications, and the plain packaging of tobacco products. The book also considers the debate over patent law and access to essential medicines, data protection and biologics, access to genetic resources, and the treatment of Indigenous intellectual property. Examining globalization and its discontents, the book concludes with policy solutions and recommendations for a truly progressive approach to intellectual property and trade.

This book will be a valuable resource for scholars and students of intellectual property law, international economic law, and trade law. Its practical recommendations will also be beneficial for practitioners and policy makers working in the fields of intellectual property, investment, and trade.

Review

'In this comprehensive volume, Professor Matthew Rimmer takes a deep dive into the intellectual property chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, now rebranded as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. He covers a wide range of controversial matters including access to essential medicines, cybersquatting, and Indigenous intellectual property. The book is a must read for intellectual property enthusiasts as well as those interested in the significance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for the future of international trade law.' --Tania Voon, University of Melbourne, Australia

'The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the definitive account of a trade agreement that spans the globe with enormous implications for the digital economy, the environment, and climate change. Professor Matthew Rimmer masterfully recounts policy critiques and analysis from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States in crafting a convincing case that after years of closed door negotiations, the agreement fails to deliver a progressive vision for trade, intellectual property, and sustainable development.' --Michael Geist, University of Ottawa, Canada

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INTRODUCTION

The *Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)* is a mega-regional agreement, spanning the Pacific Rim, involving a dozen nations, and cutting across a score of regulatory fields.' In a speech to the Australian Parliament in 2011, the charismatic and eloquent President Barack Obama outlined his ambition to create a regional trade agreement for the Asia-Pacific:

Building on our historic trade agreement with South Korea, we're working with Australia and our other APEC partners to create a seamless regional economy. And with Australia and other partners, we're on track to achieve our most ambitious trade agreement yet, and a potential model for the entire region — the *TPP.* The United States remains the world's largest and most dynamic economy. But in an interconnected world, we all rise and fall together.

Obama imagined a new era of stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific: 'We need growth that is fair, where every nation plays by the rules; where workers rights are respected, and our businesses can compete on a level playing field; where the intellectual property and new technologies that fuel innovation are protected; and where currencies are market driven so no nation has an unfair advantage.'

Obama added: 'We also need growth that is broad — not just for the few, but for the many — with reforms that protect consumers from abuse and a global commitment to end the corruption that

stifles growth. He also called for sustainable growth — including 'the clean energy that creates green jobs and combats climate change, which cannot be denied'. Obama noted the challenges of climate change: 'We see it in the stronger fires, the devastating floods, the Pacific islands confronting rising seas.' He insisted: 'And as countries with large carbon footprints, the United States and Australia have a special responsibility to lead. The decade-long negotiations over the *TPP* proved to be tortuous. While the United States was to depart the *TPP* under Obama's successor President Donald Trump, the remaining countries passed the *Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11)*.

This text is intended to provide a commentary and a critique of the *TPP* and its revised supplement of the *TPP-11,* particularly focusing upon the intellectual property chapter of the agreement. The focus of this book is President Barack Obama's desire to create an Asia-Pacific mega-regional agreement 'where the intellectual property and new technologies that fuel innovation are protected'. This account is not merely a summary or a treatise on the *TPP*. This book offers a critique of the *TPP,* highlighting the dissonance between Obama's high ideals that the agreement would be progressive and comprehensive, and the substance of the text. This book focuses upon globalisation and its discontents. The *TPP* expands the intellectual property rights and the investment powers of transnational companies. The *TPP* is a 'Mickey Mouse' trade agreement designed to provide longer and stronger copyright protection in the Pacific Rim, particularly for transnational entertainment companies. The *TPP* seeks to reinforce the power of trade mark holders such as Nike. Although Obama was keen to expand access to health care in the United States, the *TPP* is very much focused upon expanding the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical drug-makers, the developers of medical diagnostics and biotechnology companies. The secretive trade agreement also provides for stronger remedies and offences in respect of trade secrets. In spite of Obama's rhetoric about the importance of workers and jobs, the *TPP* undermines labour rights. The *TPP* engages in greenwashing, doing little to improve environmental standards and norms in the Pacific Rim. Far from providing leadership on clean energy, the *TPP* is silent on the topic of climate change, for expedient political reasons. Among the main beneficiaries of the *TPP* are fossil fuel companies, which are keen to accelerate the deregulation of the protection of the environment. Obama promised to empower democracies in the Asia-Pacific. The agreement, though, provides special investor rights for foreign companies to challenge the regulations of national governments in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) matters.

There has been an expanding universe of scholarship on the intersection of intellectual property and international trade. This book on the *TPP* and the *TPP-11* contributes to that literature on the integration of intellectual property and trade. This Preface provides an outline of the legal and political history of intellectual property and trade in order to put the recent developments in respect of the *TPP* in their proper context. Section 1 focuses upon the *North American Free Trade Agreement* 1993. Section 2 recounts the development of the *TRIPS Agreement* 1994. Section 3 considers the evolution of bilateral TRIPS-Plus agreements, such as the *Australia—United States Free Trade Agreement* 2004. Section 4 focuses upon the failed *Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement* 2011. Section 5 charts the development of the *Trans-Pacific Partnership* 2015, particularly considering questions of intellectual property. Section 6 focuses upon the *Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership* 2018 —better known as *TPP-11*. Section 7 provides a brief literature review of academic scholarship on the topic of the *TPP* and the *TPP-11*. Section 8 outlines the methodology of this book, which relies upon the theoretical framework provided by Nobel Laureate Professor Joseph Stiglitz. Finally, this Preface provides an outline of the chapters of this book.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

An important precursor to the ***TPP*** is the *North American Free Trade Agreement* 1993, involving the United States, Mexico and Canada.

Although Bill Clinton was lukewarm about *NAFTA* while running for President, he became a committed supporter of the regional trade deal as President. Overcoming disquiet in the United States, President Bill Clinton signed the *NAFTA* bill in December 1993. In an earlier speech, Bill Clinton was optimistic about the impact of *NAFTA* upon the United States economy: 'Ours is now an era in which commerce is global and in which money, management, technology are highly mobile.' Clinton maintained that the agreement would create jobs: 'I believe that *NAFTA* will create 200,000 American jobs in the first two years of its effect."' Clinton argued: 'The environmental agreement will, for the first time ever, apply trade sanctions against any of the countries that fails to enforce its own environmental laws.' Clinton also sought to justify the adoption of the trade agreement as a response to technological change: 'Nothing can change the fact that technology can be adopted once created by people all across the world, and then rapidly adapted in new and different ways by people who have a little different take on the way the technology works.' He contended: 'This debate about *NAFTA is* a debate about whether we will embrace these changes and create the jobs of tomorrow, or try to resist these changes, hoping we can preserve the economic structures of yesterday.'

Clinton sought to counter the critics of *NAFTA* who warned that the agreement would be a destroyer of jobs. He maintained that such opposition was rooted in 'fears and insecurities that are legitimately gripping the great American middle class'. Clinton insisted: 'The only way we can recover the fortunes of the middle class in this country so that people who work harder and smarter can at least prosper more, the only way we can pass on the American Dream of the last 40 years to our children and their children for the next 40 is to adapt to the changes which are occurring.'

Vice President Al Gore added that 'the United States of America has promoted freer trade and bigger markets for our products and those of other nations throughout the world. NAFTA is such an issue.'

The TRIPS Agreement 1994

There has been much discussion about the linkage of trade and intellectual property under the *TRIPS Agreement* 1994 in the multilateral regime for world trade.

Frustrated by a lack of perceived progress in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on intellectual property standards and norms, the United States government sought to tie together intellectual property and trade in the development of the World Trade Organization (WTO)

The *TRIPS Agreement* 1994 was the product of negotiations, compromises and revisions. Article 7 of the *TRIPS Agreement* 1994 gives a good sense of the various objectives of the agreement: 'The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."' Article 8 lays down further important principles guiding the agreement. Article 8 (1) provides: 'Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.' Article 8 (2) provides: 'Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property

rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.'

Part I of the agreement deals with general provisions and basic principles. Part II of the agreement considers standards concerning the availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights. There are detailed provisions on copyright law and related rights; trade marks; geographical indications; industrial designs; patents; circuit layouts; and the protection of undisclosed information. There are also provisions on the control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licences. Part III deals with the enforcement of intellectual property rights. There are provisions on general obligations; civil and administrative procedures and remedies; provisional measures; special requirements related to border measures; and criminal procedures. Part IV deals with acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights and related inter-partes procedures. Part V relates to dispute prevention and settlement. Part VI focuses on transitional arrangements. Part VII deals with institutional arrangements and final provisions.

TRIPS + Agreements

Frustrated by a lack of consensus on the World Trade Organization on intellectual property norms and standards, the United States government then pursued a raft of *TRIPS + Agreements* — bilateral agreements which sought to build upon the foundation of the *TRIPS Agreement* 1994. The *Singapore—United States Free Trade Agreement* 2003 was a blueprint for such agreements."

The *Australia—United States Free Trade Agreement* 2004 has a *TRIPS* + intellectual property chapter." The agreement provides a useful case study of bilateral agreements with the United States from this era.

The *AUSFTA* required sweeping changes to Australian copyright law. As a result of the agreement, Australia had to lengthen the term of copyright protection from a standard of life plus 50 years to life plus 70 years. There was much criticism at the time about the costs of the copyright term extension to Australian copyright users. Moreover, Australia had to also adopt the prescriptive rules of the *Digital Millennium Copyright Act* 1998 (US) in respect of technological protection measures and electronic rights management information. Furthermore, Australia also had to adopt a safe harbours intermediary liability regime, like the United States. In addition to questions of copyright law, there was worry about how *AUSFTA* would affect local content rules.

There was much concern about the impact of *AUSFTA* on patent law, pharmaceutical drugs and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. Conservative Prime Minister John Howard denied that Australia was susceptible to the evergreening of pharmaceutical drugs — in spite of cases in the courts about that exact problem[1] In response, opposition leader Mark Latham, of the Australian Labor Party, agreed to pass *AUSFTA,* with the provision of some anti-evergreening measures. In retrospect, such anti-evergreening measures have proven to have little efficacy in addressing the problems around access to affordable medicines.

Notably, John Howard resisted the inclusion of an ISDS regime in the investment chapter.

There was significant criticism of the overall package *ofAUSFTA* at the time by critics such as Linda Weiss, Elizabeth Thurbon and Jon Mathews, who argued that the agreement would undermine Australian sovereignty.

In 2015, Professor Shiro Armstrong reflected upon the economic impact of *AUSFTA.* He noted: 'Ten years after *A USFTA* came into force, there is enough data to estimate the effects of the agreement on trade flows and their economic impact.' Armstrong suggested: 'The evidence from a large panel

dataset using the gravity model of trade deployed by the Productivity Commission suggests that Australian and US trade with the rest of the world fell — that there was trade diversion — due to *AUSFTA* after controlling for country-specific factors.' He commented: 'Estimates also suggest trade between Australia and the United States fell in association with the implementation of *AUSFTA* — also after controlling for country-specific factors.'[66] In his view, 'The existence of trade diversion suggests that trade between Australia and the United States could well have fallen even further without *A USFTA*'

The *Korea—United States Free Trade Agreement* 2007 also has a comprehensive agreement on intellectual property.[68] There was also an effort to develop regional agreements — such as the *Dominican Republic—Central America Free Trade Agreement* 2004 — but that was ultimately unsuccessful."

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)

The United States government pressed for the introduction of a *TRIPS++* agreement in the form of the plurilateral *Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement* 2011 *(ACTA).*" The United States Trade Representative (USTR) boasted of the agreement:

ACTA is a groundbreaking initiative by key trading partners to strengthen the international legal framework for effectively combating global proliferation of commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy. In addition to calling for strong legal frameworks, the agreement also includes innovative provisions to deepen international cooperation and to promote strong intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement practices. Together, these provisions will help to support American jobs in innovative and creative industries against intellectual property theft.

This plurilateral agreement involved negotiations with a range of countries — including the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, the European Union and Switzerland.

There was fierce resistance to this agreement — particularly in the European Parliament. A concerted campaign by civil society organisations led to the collapse of the agreement.

After holding hearings and taking note of the position of the European Parliament and the controversy in the United States, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament recommended the deferral of ratification of *ACTA.*" There was an unusual consensus between the representatives of all the main parties. The Hon. Kelvin Thomson and the Hon. Melissa Parke from the Australian Labor Party, Senator Scott Ludlam from the Australian Greens, and even Simon Birmingham from the Liberal Party were particularly critical of the agreement. The Committee was concerned about the lack of transparency, due process, public participation and substantive analysis of the treaty. There were also reservations about the ambiguity of the text of the treaty, and its potential implications for the digital economy, innovation and competition, plain packaging of tobacco products and access to essential medicines.

The treaty has led to much debate as to whether the *Trick or Treaty* reforms on the international treaty-making process in Australia had been compromised or undermined." Reflecting upon the controversy, the Australian economist Peter Martin asked plaintively: 'Why do we negotiate free trade agreements in secret?'" He highlighted a need to reform our international treaty-making process.

In spite of the profound defeat of the agreement, many of the key concepts in *ACTA* would re-emerge in the new agreement of the *TPP*. Indeed, a number of the doctrines articulated in *ACTA* were further elaborated upon and expanded upon in the *TPP* and *TPP-11*.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership

The *Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)* is a sweeping trade agreement, covering a dozen countries across the Pacific Rim, including Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand and a bevy of Latin American and Asia-Pacific countries." The agreement covers scores of topics — including market access, intellectual property, investment, agriculture, the environment, tobacco control, drug pricing, labour rights and financial regulation. The negotiations for the *TPP* were shrouded in secrecy. A stream of freedom of information requests about the agreement came about in various jurisdictions." Legislators, stakeholders and civil society were initially dependent upon leaked texts published by WikiLeaks to obtain a better idea of the substance of the negotiations prior to the release of the fmal texts.

As Professor Jeffrey Sachs has observed, the *TPP* is a protean agreement: 'The agreement, with its 30 chapters, is really four complex deals in one.' He noted: 'The first is a free-trade deal among the signatories.' The intent of this part is that 'Tariff rates would come down to zero; quotas would drop; trade would expand; and protectionism would be held at bay'. Sachs says: 'The second is a set of regulatory standards for trade.' In his view, 'Most of these are useful, requiring that regulations that limit trade should be based on evidence, not on political whims or hidden protectionism.'" Sachs notes: 'The third is a set of regulations governing investor rights, intellectual property and regulations in key service sectors, including fmancial services, telecommunications, e-commerce and pharmaceuticals.' He reflects: `Their common denominator is that they enshrine the power of corporate capital above all other parts of society, including labor and even governments.' Sachs observes: 'The fourth is a set of standards on labor and environment that purport to advance the cause of social fairness and environmental sustainability.' He observes that 'the agreements are thin, unenforceable and generally unimaginative'.

The *TPP* has a selection of chapters, dealing with traditional matters of trade. Chapter 2 of the *TPP* deals with national treatment and market access. Chapter 3 of the *TPP* concerns rules of origin and origin procedures.[99] Chapter 4 of the *TPP* concerns textiles and apparel. Chapter 5 of the *TPP* looks at customs administration and trade facilitation. Chapter 6 of the *TPP* relates to trade remedies.'" Chapter 7 of the *TPP* concerns sanitary and phytosanitary measures,'" and Chapter 8 focuses upon technical barriers to trade.

Chapter 18 of the *TPP* promises to be transformative in terms of the intellectual property chapter. The agreement contains a suite of copyright obligations relating to copyright term extension, online intermediary liability, technological protection measures and civil and criminal copyright enforcement. The *TPP* also contains significant provisions in respect of trade mark law — covering counterfeiting, cybersquatting, well known trade marks, geographical indications and internet domain names. Concern has been raised about how the *TPP* will affect tobacco control measures, such as graphic health warnings and plain packaging of tobacco products.

The agreement also provides for significant obligations in respect of patent law, and related rights such as data protection and biologics. There has been much concern about how such measures will impact upon drug pricing and access to essential medicines. There is also text on access to genetic resources, traditional knowledge and the environment. The *TPP* also proposes criminal procedures and penalties in respect of the disclosure of trade secrets.

In addition, the *TPP* has an investment chapter — Chapter 9 of the *TPP* — with an ISDS regime. This has been perhaps the most controversial of all chapters in the *TPP*. There has been much debate as to whether it is desirable or appropriate that foreign investors be given special rights. There has been discussion as to whether there are appropriate safeguards to allow for the autonomy of nation states to engage in regulation. In addition, there has been debate over whether intellectual property owners should be able to deploy investor clauses in respect of intellectual property rights. There has been much controversy in the Pacific Rim over investor disputes — such as Big Tobacco's challenge to Australia's regime for plain packaging of tobacco products, and Eli Lilly's action against Canada over drug patents. There is also a traditional regime in respect of state versus state dispute settlement.

The *TPP* has a chapter on electronic commerce, which is designed to boost digital trade. There is a chapter on telecommunications. The *TPP* has a chapter on matters of financial regulation. There was a concern among some policy-makers and commentators that the agreement promoted a vision of financial deregulation.'" There was a concern as to whether this was an appropriate framework — especially in the wake of the global fmancial crisis. There is also a chapter dealing with cross border trade in services."'

Several chapters deal with matters of commercial law, competition policy and consumer rights. Chapter 15 deals with government procurement. Chapter 16 concerns competition policy.'" Chapter 17 focuses on state-owned enterprises and designated monopolies.

Methodology

In terms of its methodology, this book draws upon the work of Professor Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Laureate in Economics and Sydney Peace Winner. In his body of work, Stiglitz provides a useful framework to consider the intersection between intellectual property, trade, and sustainable development. His classic book *Globalization and Its Discontents* considered the impact of international trade frameworks upon government decision making.'" For the Roosevelt Institute, Stiglitz consolidated his critique of the *TPP*. He argues that the *TPP* lacks democratic legitimacy because of the lack of transparency, accountability and public participation in the negotiations. Stiglitz contends that the *TPP* will have an adverse impact upon labour rights, public health and the environment and climate. He warns that investor-state dispute settlement will impact regulatory decision-making and domestic court decisions. Stiglitz doubts that the *TPP* will help curb the rise of China (as Obama had intended).

In a 2005 book with Andrew Charlton, Joseph Stiglitz explored how to achieve fair trade for all and bring trade into harmony with sustainable development.'" The work, among other things, calls for a reform of intellectual property law, policy and practice.

In his book *Globalization and Its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the Era of Trump,* Stiglitz reconsiders his past work on globalisation in light of recent developments. He contends that the benefits of globalisation have been less than its advocates claimed, and its costs have been more significant than anticipated. Stiglitz was critical of the 'Washington Consensus' on free trade:

> The notion was that by freeing markets — stripping away the regulations that constrained the economy — and incentivizing individuals and firms, through lower tax rates, the power of markets would be unleashed. Economies would grow, and even if those at the top got a larger share of the pie, everyone, even those at the bottom, would prosper. Better to have a smaller share of a much bigger pie than a larger share of a small pie. The results of this experiment, tried in countries around the world, are now in: it has been a dismal failure.

Stiglitz observed that Trump sought to capitalise on anger over the uneven distribution of the benefits and costs of globalisation. He contends, though, that the protectionism of Trump will only exacerbate problems further. Criticising Trump's 'America First' policy, Stiglitz seeks to articulate a progressive vision of trade and globalisation.

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Outline of Parts and Chapters

The introduction will provide an outline of the history and the evolution of the *TPP.* In particular, it will explore the positions of key political leaders in the late stages of the debate — President Barack Obama and his successor President Donald Trump, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada and Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull of Australia. The introduction will consider the relationship between intellectual property, trade and investment in the agreement. It will outline the various elements of intellectual property considered in the Pacific Rim trade agreement and consider the rise of the *TPP,* particularly during the Presidency of Barack Obama. It will chart the divisions among the Democrats over the *TPP* and the fall of the agreement, with the United States leaving the negotiations under the leadership of President Donald Trump. The introduction will examine the revival and resurrection of the *TPP-11:* It will critically analyse the suspensions and the side-letters which are part of this compromise deal and will chart the ratification of the *TPP-11* by a number of member states, leading to the agreement coming into force in 2019.

Part I of the book considers the *TPP,* copyright law, the creative industries, and internet freedom.

Chapter 1 considers the debate on the *TPP,* copyright law and the public domain. Drawing upon research into intellectual property and trade, this piece of work provides a critical evaluation of the copyright regime proposed by the *TPP.* In particular, this study focuses upon four key participants in the trade negotiations the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The argument is that the regime will have a negative impact upon creativity, innovation and competition in the Pacific Rim. The chapter considers the objectives of copyright law and policy under the *TPP.* It contends that traditional objectives of copyright law have been supplanted in the *TPP* by the corporatist push to protect the foreign investments of multinational corporations engaged in the distribution of copyright works. The chapter focuses upon the impact of the copyright term extension in the *TPP* and the treatment of orphan works. This measure has been suspended as a result of the demands of Canada in the *TPP-11*.

Chapter 2 examines the nature and scope of copyright exceptions under the *TPP.* This debate takes place against the background of a larger international debate over copyright limitations and exceptions. It explores the possibilities of the defence of fair dealing, the extended defence of fair dealing in Canada and the defence of fair use in the United States. It also considers the recognition of particular, purpose-specific copyright exceptions — for instance, relating to disability rights. The conclusion considers the fate of the copyright proposals in the *TPP* under the Trump Administration.

Chapter 3 considers the text on the *TPP* relating to technological protection measures and internet service providers. The *TPP* was an effort by the United States government under President Barack Obama to export key features of the *Digital Millennium Copyright Act* 1998 (US) *(DMCA).* Drawing upon the work of Joseph Stiglitz, this chapter expresses concern that the *TPP* would entrench *DMCA* measures in the laws of a dozen Pacific Rim countries. The chapter focuses upon intermediary liability under the *TPP.* Elements of the safe harbours regime in the *DMCA* — with its takedown and notice scheme — have been embedded into the international agreement. The chapter examines technological protection measures — especially in light of a constitutional challenge to the *DMCA.* It

also looks at electronic rights management. In passing, this chapter mentions the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences and border measures introduced under the *TPP*. It concludes that the model of the *DMCA* is unsuitable for a template for copyright protection in the Pacific Rim. It contends that our future copyright laws need to be responsive to new technological developments in the digital age.

Part II of the book concerns electronic commerce. Chapter 4 considers the *TPP,* privacy, electronic commerce, and digital trade. The electronic commerce chapter is an important element of the *TPP*. For their part, multinational information technology companies are attracted to the electronic commerce chapter of the *TPP*. The Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) has supported the *Trans-Pacific Partnership*. Its members include a broad section of the information technology industry, including Amazon, eBay, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Netflix, PayPal, Pinterest, Samsung, TiVo and Yahoo! The Internet Association has expressed support for the *TPP*. While harbouring some reservations about the intellectual property measures in the agreement, the Big Information Technology companies in the Internet Association were attracted by the electronic commerce chapter. Somewhat even more surprisingly, the Consumer Electronics Association has lent its support to the *TPP*. However, critics of the electronic commerce chapter have been concerned about how the agreement will impact data sovereignty, privacy, consumer rights, open source software and network neutrality. Such provisions remained intact even after the renegotiation of the *TPP-11*.

Part III of this book considers the *TPP,* trade mark law and related rights. In particular, it considers the treatment of trade marks, counterfeiting, cybersquatting, internet domain names and geographical indications. There is also a brief mention of the growing tensions between trade mark holders and public health advocates — particularly around tobacco control and plain packaging of tobacco products, alcohol regulation and food nutrition.

Chapter 5 provides a critical analysis of the *TPP* and its treatment of trade mark law. It analyses draft texts of the trade agreement, as well as the fmal version of the international trade agreement. This chapter considers President Barack Obama's pitch for the *TPP* at Nike headquarters. It examines the criticism of his position by fair trade activists, unions and culture-jammers. The chapter evaluates the provisions on trade mark law in the *TPP*. Special attention is paid to the treatment of well-known marks. The chapter considers the provisions on counterfeiting in the *TPP*. There are certainly echoes of the provisions in *ACTA*. The chapter examines the text on internet domain names and cybersquatting. The conclusion considers the contradictions and paradoxes of President Donald Trump on the *TPP* — on the one hand, withdrawing from the agreement; on the other hand, supporting an expansive approach to the protection of trade mark law.

Chapter 6 explores how the *TPP* deals with intellectual property, investor-state dispute settlement, graphic health warnings and the plain packaging of tobacco products. Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) poses significant challenges in respect of tobacco control, public health, human rights and sustainable development. Two landmark ISDS rulings provide procedural and substantive guidance on the interaction between ISDS and tobacco control. The ISDS action by Philip Morris against Uruguay in respect of graphic health warnings raised important procedural and substantive issues. The ISDS matter between Philip Morris and Australia over the plain packaging of tobacco products highlighted matters in respect of abuse of process. In the *TPP,* there was a special exclusion for tobacco control measures in respect of ISDS. There was also a larger discussion about the role of general public health exceptions. In the *Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),* there was a debate about the application of ISDS to intellectual property rights. In the European Union,

there has been discussion of the creation of an international investment court. In the renegotiation *of NAFTA,* there have even been calls to abolish ISDS clauses altogether, from both Republicans and Democrats. This chapter concludes that there is a need to protect tobacco control measures implementing the *WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control* 2003 from further investor and trade challenges.

Chapter 7 focuses on geographical indications and trade mark law. In particular, it examines the tensions between the United States and the European Union in respect of geographical indications. The text of the *TPP* represented an effort by the United States to subject geographical indications to higher levels of oversight and regulation.

Part IV considers the *TPP,* patent law and related rights, such as biologics, data protection and trade secrets.

Chapter 8 considers the *TPP* and agriculture. In particular, it explores plant intellectual property rights and food labelling. Agriculture has been a sensitive issue during the *TPP* negotiations. In Canada, there were dramatic protests by dairy farmers over the *TPP,* with tractors and cows encircling the Canadian Parliament. Stephen Harper's Conservative government promised a large compensation package to dairy farmers. Justin Trudeau's Liberal government engaged in consultations over the *TPP.* Obviously agriculture will be a sensitive issue. There are a large number of parts of the *TPP* dealing with agriculture, food security, farming and plant intellectual property. As a result, assessing the benefits and costs for the sector under the *TPP* is a complex equation. This chapter considers the nexus between intellectual property, trade and agriculture. It considers plant breeders' rights, agricultural patents and trade mark law and food labelling. The chapter also examines ISDS in the context of agriculture, food labelling and farming.

Chapter 9 examines the *TPP* and the intersection of intellectual property, public health, and access to essential medicines. The *TPP* put forward a radical model for the regulation of intellectual property and access to medicines across the Pacific Rim. The trade agreement makes reference to the framework established by the *TRIPS Agreement* 1994, the *Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health* 2001 and the *WTO General Council Decision* 2003 (which was incorporated into the *TRIPS Agreement* 1994 as an amendment in 2017). Nonetheless, it does little to positively advance public health and access to medicines. The *TPP* seeks to maximise the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical drug companies. The agreement had extensive provisions on patentable subject matter, patent standards, patent term extensions and evergreening, patent registration linkages and border measures. As a result of public outcry, a number of key provisions were suspended as part of the *TPP-11*. The World Health Organization and the United Nations Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Access to Medicines have highlighted the need to ensure that public health and access to medicines are not undercut by regional trade agreements such as the *TPP*.

Chapter 10 considers the treatment of intellectual property and biotechnology under the *TPP*. The biotechnology industry was an influential lobbyist during the *TPP* negotiations. There was a significant debate over the scope of patentable subject matter. Meanwhile, domestic courts in United States and Australia took a narrow interpretation of patentable subject matter in litigation over genetic testing for breast cancer and ovarian cancer. There has also been controversy over measures related to data protection, the protection of biologics and trade secrets. President Barack Obama had vigorous debates with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull over the treatment of biologics. As a result of pressure from Canada, the provisions on biologics have been suspended in the *TPP-11*. However, there will no doubt be future debate over the protection of biologics. The Trump Administration has demanded special protection of biologics as part of the *USMCA*.

Part V focuses on trade secrets. Chapter 11 explores how the *TPP* has sought to strengthen the protection of trade secrets throughout the Pacific Rim. The United States Congress has passed the *Defend Trade Secrets Act* 2016 (US). The United States Trade Representative has pushed for the inclusion of criminal penalties and procedures in international trade agreements such as the *TPP*. Nonetheless, concern has been raised that the closed model of trade secrets protection in the *TPP* could have a chilling effect upon innovation, knowledge diffusion and entrepreneurship. In light of the case of Aaron Swartz, there is particular concern about how the language about computer crimes in the *TPP* will be interpreted. Moreover, there is concern about how the trade secrets provisions of the *TPP* will impact upon journalism, whistleblowing and freedom of speech. There is a lack of adequate defences and safeguards in the text in respect of freedom of the press, whistleblowing and public policy in the *TPP*. Given the United States' departure from the *TPP* under President Donald Trump, there was an opportunity to revise — or even abandon altogether — the text on trade secrets in the *TPP*. However, controversially, such provisions were not among those suspended, at the behest of Canada. The Trump Administration has pushed for the protection of trade secrets — particularly as part of its trade conflict with China. Indeed, in 2020 the Trump Administration obtained further guarantees from China with respect to the protection of trade secrets. Moreover, the Trump Administration has demanded heightened protection of trade secrets under the *USMCA*.

Part VI of the book considers how the *TPP* will impact upon access to genetic resources, traditional knowledge and Indigenous intellectual property. This Part considers the impact of the *TPP* upon biodiversity, the environment, sustainable development and climate change.

Chapter 12 contends that the *TPP* fails to meet the expectations created by President Barack Obama, the White House and the US Trade Representative about the environmental value of the agreement. First, it considers the relationship of the *TPP* to multilateral environmental treaties. Second, it explores whether the provisions in respect of the environment are enforceable. Third, it examines the treatment of trade and biodiversity in the *TPP*. Fourth, it considers the question of marine capture fisheries. Fifth, there is an evaluation of the cursory text in the *TPP* on conservation. Sixth, the chapter considers trade in environmental services under the *TPP*. The conclusion laments the overall weak environment chapter of the *TPP*. It also highlights that a number of other chapters of the *TPP* will also have a negative impact upon the protection of the environment — including the investment chapter, the intellectual property chapter, the technical barriers to trade chapter, and the text on public procurement. Such areas deserve further academic study to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the *TPP*.

Chapter 13 highlights the tensions between the *TPP* and substantive international climate action. It is submitted that the *TPP* undermines effective and meaningful government action and regulation in respect of climate change. The intellectual property chapter provides little in the way of flexibility to allow for access to clean energy to combat climate change. The investment chapter empowers fossil fuel companies to take action against government regulations. The environment chapter does not even mention the phrase 'climate change'. The palimpsest of the negotiations reveals that the text on climate change was erased during the discussions.

This chapter maintains that there is a need for trade agreements to boost and support climate action.

Chapter 14 examines whether the *TPP* provides sufficient recognition of traditional knowledge, Indigenous intellectual property and, more broadly, Indigenous rights, as recognised by the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights Of Indigenous Peoples* 2007 *(UNDRIP)*. This chapter considers key chapters of the *TPP* relating to access to Indigenous intellectual property genetic resources, informed

consent, and benefit-sharing. It examines the chapter on intellectual property and focuses upon access to genetic resources, informed consent and benefit sharing. It investigates developments on Indigenous intellectual property in jurisdictions in the Pacific Rim such as the United States, Canada and Australia. It considers the developments in respect of Indigenous intellectual property in New Zealand under the *Treaty of Waitangi*. It focuses upon the international norms and standards established by *UNDRIP*.

In light of the analysis of the *TPP* and the *TPP-11*, the conclusion makes recommendations for a truly progressive approach to intellectual property, trade and globalisation. Drawing upon theoretical insights from the work of Joseph Stiglitz, the conclusion offers policy solutions in respect of improving the transparency, accountability and democratic participation involved in the trade-making process. Moreover, the conclusion also provides a series of recommendations in respect of the various disciplines of intellectual property law — copyright law and electronic commerce; trade mark law, plain packaging of tobacco products and geographical indications; patent law, biologics and trade secrets; and access to genetic resources, clean technology and Indigenous intellectual property. There is also a discussion of the intersection of intellectual property and ISDS. The conclusion highlights the need for intellectual property reform in the Pacific Rim in light of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. <>

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Oxford Handbook of Egyptology edited by Ian Shaw and Elizabeth Bloxam [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780199271870]

The Oxford Handbook of Egyptology presents a series of articles by colleagues working across the many archaeological, philological and cultural subdisciplines within the study of ancient Egypt from prehistory through to the end of the Roman Period. The volume seeks to place Egyptology within its theoretical, methodological, and historical contexts, both indicating how the subject has evolved and discussing its distinctive contemporary problems, issues and potential. Transcending conventional boundaries between archaeological and ancient textual analysis, it stresses the need for Egyptology to seek multidisciplinary methods and broader collaborations if it is to remain contemporary and relevant. It therefore serves as a reference work not only for those working within the discipline, but also as a gateway into Egyptology for archaeologists, anthropologists, sociologists and linguists. The book is organized into ten parts, the first of which examines the many different historical and geographical perspectives that have influenced the development and current characteristics of the discipline. Part II addresses the various environmental aspects of the subject: landscapes, climate, flora, fauna and the mineral world. Part III considers a variety of practical aspects of the ways in which Egyptologists survey, characterize and manage landscapes. Part IV discusses materials and technology, from domestic architecture and artefacts through to religious and funerary items. Part V deals with Egypt's relations with neighbouring regions and peoples, while Part VI explores the sources and interpretive frameworks that characterize different phases of ancient Egyptian history. Part VII is concerned with textual and iconographic approaches to Egyptian culture, and Part VIII comprises discussions of the key aspects of ancient Egyptian scripts and philology. Part IX presents summaries of the current state of the

subject in relation to a variety of textual genres, from letters and autobiographies to socio-economic, magical and mathematical texts. The final section covers different aspects of museology and conservation. <>

LES PHILOSOPHER FACE AU VICE, DE SOCRATE A AUGUSTIN Sous la direction de Christelle Veillard, Olivier Renaut, Dimitri El Murr [Philosophia Antigua, Brill, ISBN 9789004432383 (hardback) ISBN 9789004432390 (e-book)] [French edition, 3 chapitres in English]

LES PHILOSOPHER FACE AU VICE, DE SOCRATE A AUGUSTIN explore la manière dont les philosophes de lAntiquité ont tracé une cartographie des vices, analysé leurs causes et leurs effets, et se sont interrogés sur leurs usages. Les philosophes face au vice, de Socrate à Augustin explores how ancient philosophers described the vices, delineated their various kinds, accounted for their causes and effects, and reflected on how to use them.

[Philosophizing in the face of vice with Socrates and Augustine explores how the philosophers of Antiquity have mapped the vices, analyzed their causes and effects, and questioned their uses. Philosophers confronting vice, from Socrates to Augustine explores how ancient philosophers described the vices, delineated their various kinds, accounted for their causes and effects, and reflected on how they are used.] <>

The Structures of Virtue and Vice by Daniel J. Daly [Moral Traditions, Georgetown University Press, 9781647120399]

A new ethics for understanding the social forces that shape moral character.

It is easy to be vicious and difficult to be virtuous in today's world, especially given that many of the social structures that connect and sustain us enable exploitation and disincentivize justice. There are others, though, that encourage virtue.

In his book Daniel J. Daly uses the lens of virtue and vice to reimagine from the ground up a Catholic ethics that can better scrutinize the social forces that both affect our moral character and contribute to human well-being or human suffering. <>

Mystifying Kabbalah: Academic Scholarship, National Theology, and New Age Spirituality by Boaz Huss [Oxford Studies in Western Esotericism Series, Oxford University Press, 9780190086961]

Most scholars of Judaism take the term "Jewish mysticism" for granted, and do not engage in a critical discussion of the essentialist perceptions that underlie it. Mystifying Kabbalah studies the evolution of the concept of Jewish mysticism. It examines the major developments in the academic study of Jewish mysticism and its impact on modern Kabbalistic movements in the contexts of Jewish nationalism and New Age spirituality.

Boaz Huss argues that Jewish mysticism is a modern discursive construct and that the identification of Kabbalah and Hasidism as forms of mysticism, which appeared for the first time in the nineteenth century and has become prevalent since the early twentieth, shaped the way in which Kabbalah and Hasidism are perceived and studied today. The notion of Jewish mysticism was established when western scholars accepted the modern idea that mysticism is a universal religious phenomenon of a direct experience of a divine or transcendent reality and applied it to Kabbalah and Hasidism. "Jewish mysticism" gradually became the defining category in the modern academic research of these topics. This book clarifies the historical, cultural, and political contexts that led to the identification of Kabbalah and Hasidism as Jewish mysticism, exposing the underlying ideological and theological

presuppositions and revealing the impact of this "mystification" on contemporary forms of Kabbalah and Hasidism. <>

Marmaduke Pickthall: Islam and the Modern World edited by Geoffrey P. Nash [Muslim Minorities, Brill, 9789004327580]

This recent volume of essays marks eighty years since the death of Marmaduke Pickthall. His various roles as translator of the Qurʾan, traveller to the Near East, political journalist writing on behalf of Muslim Turkey, and creator of the Muslim novel are discussed.
In later life Pickthall became a prominent member of the British Muslim community in London and Woking, co-worker with Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, supporter of the Khilafat movement, and editor of the journal *Islamic Culture* under the patronage of the Nizam of Hyderabad.
Marmaduke Pickthall: Islam and the Modern World makes an important contribution to the field of Muslims in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. <>

Islam at 250: Studies in Memory of G.H.A. Juynboll edited by Petra M. Sijpesteijn, Camilla Adang [Leiden Studies in Islam and Society, Brill, 9789004427945]

Islam at 250: Studies in Memory of G.H.A. Juynboll is a collection of original articles on the state of Islamic sciences and Arabic culture in the early phases of their crystallization. It covers a wide range of intellectual activity in the first three centuries of Islam, such as the study of *ḥadīth*, the Qurʾān, Arabic language and literature, and history. Individually and taken together, the articles provide important new insights and make an important contribution to scholarship on early Islam. The authors, whose work reflects an affinity with Juynboll's research interests, are all experts in their fields. Pointing to the importance of interdisciplinary approaches and signalling lacunae, their contributions show how scholarship has advanced since Juynboll's days. <>

Locating Hell in Islamic Traditions edited by Christian Lange [Islamic History and Civilization, Brill, 9789004301214] Open Access

Islam is often seen as a religious tradition in which hell does not play a particularly prominent role. This volume challenges this hackneyed view. **Locating Hell in Islamic Traditions** is the first book-length analytic study of the Muslim hell. It maps out a broad spectrum of Islamic attitudes toward hell, from the Quranic vision(s) of hell to the pious cultivation of the fear of the afterlife, theological speculations, metaphorical and psychological understandings, and the modern transformations of hell. <>

Keats's A Lover's Discourse by Anahid Nersessian [University of Chicago Press, 9780226762678]

When I say this book is a love story, I mean it is about things that cannot be gotten over—like this world, and some of the people in it."

In 1819, the poet John Keats wrote six poems that would become known as the Great Odes. Some of them —"Ode to a Nightingale," "To Autumn"—are among the most celebrated poems in the English language. Anahid Nersessian here collects and elucidates each of the odes and offers a meditative, personal essay in response to each, revealing why these poems still have so much to say to us, especially in a time of ongoing political crisis. Her Keats is an unflinching antagonist of modern life—of capitalism, of the British Empire, of the destruction of the planet—as well as a passionate idealist for whom every poem is a love poem. <>

The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology and Religion edited by James R. Liddle, Todd K. Shackelford [Oxford Library of Psychology, Oxford University Press, 9780199397747]

Critical Assessment

The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology and Religion provides some emerging critical perspectives on the nature of religion viewed within the spectrum of an evolutionary psychology grounded in cognitive and behavioral research studies. The authors mostly eschew academic abstraction, except for the introduction crucial operational concepts. An authoritative introduction to the field.

The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology and Religion offers a comprehensive and compelling review of research in religious beliefs and practices from an evolutionary perspective on human psychology. The chapters, written by renowned experts on human behavior and religion, explore a number of subtopics within one of three themes: (1) the psychological mechanisms of religion, (2) evolutionary perspectives on the functionality of religion, and (3) evolutionary perspectives on religion and group living. <>

The Tarot of Leonora Carrington commentary by Susan Aberth & Tere Arcq, introduced by Gabriel Weisz Carrington [Fulgur Press, 9781527258693]

An oracular Surrealism: the debut presentation of Leonora Carrington's recently discovered tarot deck

The British-born artist Leonora Carrington is one of the more fascinating figures to emerge from the Surrealist movement. As both a writer and painter, she was championed early by André Breton and joined the exiled Surrealists in New York, before settling in Mexico in 1943. The magical themes of Carrington's otherworldly paintings are well known, but the recent discovery of a suite of tarot designs she created for the Major Arcana was a revelation for scholars and fans of Carrington alike. Drawing inspiration from the Tarot of Marseille and the popular Waite-Smith deck, Carrington brings her own approach and style to this timeless subject, creating a series of iconic images. Executed on thick board, brightly colored and squarish in format, Carrington's Major Arcana shines with gold and silver leaf, exploring tarot themes through what Gabriel Weisz Carrington describes as a "surrealist object." This tantalizing discovery, made by the curator Tere Arcq and scholar Susan Aberth, has placed greater emphasis upon the role of the tarot in Carrington's creative life and has led to fresh research in this area. <>

Duchamp Is My Lawyer: The Polemics, Pragmatics, and Poetics of UbuWeb by Kenneth Goldsmith [Columbia University Press,

In 1996, during the relatively early days of the web, Kenneth Goldsmith created UbuWeb to post hard-to-find works of concrete poetry. What started out as a site to share works from a relatively obscure literary movement grew into an essential archive of twentieth- and twenty-first-century avant-garde and experimental literature, film, and music. Visitors around the world now have access to both obscure and canonical works, from artists such as Kara Walker, Yoko Ono, Pauline Oliveros, Samuel Beckett, Marcel Duchamp, Cecil Taylor, Glenn Ligon, William Burroughs, and Jean-Luc Godard.

In **Duchamp Is My Lawyer**, Goldsmith tells the history of UbuWeb, explaining the motivations behind its creation and how artistic works are archived, consumed, and distributed online. Based on his own experiences and interviews with a variety of experts, Goldsmith describes how the site

navigates issues of copyright and the ways that UbuWeb challenges familiar configurations and histories of the avant-garde. The book also portrays the growth of other "shadow libraries" and includes a section on the artists whose works reflect the aims, aesthetics, and ethos of UbuWeb. Goldsmith concludes by contrasting UbuWeb's commitment to the free-culture movement and giving access to a wide range of artistic works with today's gatekeepers of algorithmic culture, such as Netflix, Amazon, and Spotify. <>

The Man of Jasmine and Other Texts by Unica Zürn translated and introduced by Malcolm Green [Atlas Press, 9781900565820]

Anagram play meets psychic crisis in Unica Zürn's acclaimed Surrealist document of mental precarity.

In the 25 years since Atlas Press first published this account by Unica Zürn (1916–70) of her long history of mental crises, she has come to be recognized as a great artist at least the equal of her partner, the Surrealist Hans Bellmer. Yet her work is barely comprehensible without the texts printed here—now revised by translator Malcolm Green—in which she demonstrates how Surrealist conceptions of the psyche allowed her to welcome the most alarming experiences as offering access to an inner existence that was the vital source for her artistic output. Green's introduction to this volume was the first study to consider her life and work from this perspective. <>

In Which Something Happens All Over Again For The Very First Time by Cerith Wyn Evans, commentary by Molly Nesbit, Susanne Gaensheimer, Helmut Friedel, Susanne Page [Musée d'Art modern de la Ville de Paris / ARC, June 9 — September 17, 2006, Städtische Galerie im Lenbachhaus und Kunstbau, Munich November 25, 2006 — February 25, 2007 9783886451647

In Which Something Happens All Over Again For The Very First Time is the first comprehensive publication to deal with the sculptural installations, film projections, neon texts and sound productions of the Welsh artist, Cerith Wyn Evans. Evans began as an assistant to the American underground filmmaker Derek Jarman, concentrating on his own short experimental films throughout the 1980s. In the 1990s he began to produce installations that explored the phenomenology of language, time and perception. In recent years, he has expanded his arsenal of materials to include fireworks, neon, texts, film, photography and sculpture. Of his work shown at Tate Modern's 2006 Triennial, the Tate described his work: "Cerith Wyn Evans approaches knowledge like a magpie, borrowing from authors of the past to invigorate the viewer's perceptions of the present. Though comprising few elements, his work is decadent and intense, both with its use of references as well as in its magical and dramatic effect." <>

Study of Spirituality in the United States by the Fetzer Institute is an opensource publication.

An Inquiry into the Spiritual and Civic Dimensions of Our Nature

The **Study of Spirituality in the United States** is a qualitative and quantitative inquiry into what spirituality looks like for people of all spiritual and religious backgrounds across the country. Through illuminating personal stories and survey data, the study reveals how the spiritual dimension of our nature informs our understanding of ourselves and each other, inspires us to take action in our communities, and implores us to find love everywhere we turn. <>

Journey to the Imaginal Realm: A Reader's Guide to J. R. R. Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings* by Becca Tarnas [Revelore, 9781947544215]

This reader's guide to J. R. R. Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings* offers a journey into the world of Middle-earth, exploring the grand themes and hidden nuances of Tolkien's epic story, connecting *The Lord of the Rings* to the larger mythology of Middle-earth, and situating Tolkien's process of writing within his own powerful experiences of the imaginal realm. *The Lord of the Rings* has been a beloved story to several generations since its publication in the mid-1950s. The story has a timeless quality to it, and engages with a complex struggle between good and evil, death and immortality, power and freedom. *The Lord of the Rings* is a book treated by many as a sacred text, one to be returned to year after year, or read aloud with loved ones. *The Lord of the Rings* has become a myth for our time. <>

Buddhist Encounters and Identities Across East Asia edited by Ann Heirman, Carmen Meinert, Christoph Anderl [Dynamics in the History of Religions, Brill, ISBN 978-90-04-36600-8 (hardback), ISBN 978-90-04-36615-2 (e-book)]

Encounters, networks, identities and diversity are at the core of the history of Buddhism. They are also the focus of **Buddhist Encounters and Identities Across East Asia**, edited by Ann Heirman, Carmen Meinert and Christoph Anderl. While long-distance networks allowed Buddhist ideas to travel to all parts of East Asia, it was through local and trans-local networks and encounters, and a diversity of people and societies, that identities were made and negotiated. This book undertakes a detailed examination of discrete Buddhist identities rooted in unique cultural practices, beliefs and indigenous socio-political conditions. Moreover, it presents a fascinating picture of the intricacies of the regional and cross-regional networks that connected South and East Asia. <>

The Esoteric Community Tantra, The All-Tathagata Body-Speech-Mind Secret, The Great Tantra King (Sarvatathagatakayavakcittarahasya-guhyasamaja-nama-mahatantraraja) by Great Vajradhara with **The Illuminating Lamp: An Extensive Six-Parameter Explanation (Patkotivyakhya-Pradipoddyotana-nama-ika)** by Master Chandrakirti Volume I: Chapters 1–12. Introduction and Translation by John R.B. Campbell and Robert A.F. Thurman, with the AIBS Translation Team (Editor-in-Chief: Robert A.F. Thurman • Executive Editor: Thomas F. Yarnall, Main Sanskrit Critical Editors: Shrikant Bahulkar, David Mellins, Main Tibetan Editor: Paul G. Hackett) [Treasury of the Buddhist Sciences Series: Tengyur Translation Initiative CK 465 (N 404); CT 690 (TOH. 7785) Co-published by the American Institute of Buddhist Studies and Wisdom Publications in Association with the Columbia University Center for Buddhist Studies and Tibet House, US; Wisdom Publications, hardcover 9781949163162, ebook 9781949163179]

A new presentation of Tantra with its most renowned commentary by one of the foremost translator/scholar teams of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism.

This volume is a translation of the first twelve chapters of **The Glorious Esoteric Community Great King of Tantras (Sri Guhyasamaja Maha-tantra-raja)**, along with the commentary called **The Illuminating Lamp (Pradipoddyotana-nama-tika)**, a commentary in Sanskrit on this tantra by the seventh-century Buddhist intellectual and tantric scholar-adept Chandrakirti. Regarded by Indo-Tibetan tradition as the esoteric scripture wherein the Buddha revealed in greatest detail the actual psycho-physical process of his enlightenment, **The Esoteric Community Tantra** is a preeminent text of the class of scriptures known to Indian Buddhist scholar-adepts as great yoga tantra, and later to their Tibetan successors as unexcelled yoga tantra. **The Illuminating Lamp** presents a system of interpretive guidelines according to which the cryptic meanings of all tantras might be extracted in order to engage the ritual and yogic practices taught therein. Applying its interpretive strategies to the text of **The Esoteric Community Tantra, The Illuminating**

Lamp articulates a synthetic, "vajra vehicle" (*vajrayana*) discourse that locates tantric practices and ideals squarely within the cosmological and institutional frameworks of exoteric Mahayana Buddhism. <>

History of Art in Japan by Tsuji Nobuo, Translated by Nicole Coolidge Rousmaniere [Columbia University Press, 9780231193412]

The leading authority on Japanese art history, from earthenware figurines in 13,000 B.C. to manga and modern subcultures, tells the story of how the country has nurtured unique aesthetics, prominent artists, and distinctive movements. Discussing Japanese art in various contexts, including interactions with the outside world, Tsuji Nobuo sheds light on works ranging from the Jōmon period to modern and contemporary art. Tsuji's perspective, using newly discovered facts, depicts critical aspects of paintings, *ukiyo*-e, ceramics, sculpture, armor, gardens, and architecture, covering thousands of years. This book, the first translation into English of Japan's most updated, reliable, and comprehensive book on the history of Japanese art, is an indispensable resource for all those interested in this multifaceted history. <>

DOMINUS MUNDI: POLITICAL SUBLIME AND THE WORLD ORDER by Pier Giuseppe Monateri [HART 9781509911752]

This monograph makes a seminal contribution to existing literature on the importance of Roman law in the development of political thought in Europe. In particular it examines the expression 'dominus mundi', following it through the texts of the medieval jurists – the Glossators and Post-Glossators – up to the political thought of Hobbes. Understanding the concept of dominus mundi sheds light on how medieval jurists understood ownership of individual things; it is more complex than it might seem; and this book investigates these complexities. The book also offers important new insights into Thomas Hobbes, especially with regard to the end of dominus mundi and the replacement by Leviathan. Finally, the book has important relevance for contemporary political theory. With fading of political diversity Monateri argues "that the actual setting of globalisation represents the reappearance of the Ghost of the Dominus Mundi, a political refoulé – repressed – a reappearance of its sublime nature, and a struggle to restore its universal legitimacy, and take its place." In making this argument, the book adds an important original vision to current debates in legal and political philosophy. <>

The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Intellectual Property and Trade in the Pacific Rim by Matthew Rimmer [Edward Elgar, 9781788973311]

This authoritative book explores copyright and trade in the Pacific Rim under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a mega-regional trade deal. Offering a perceptive critique of the TPP, Matthew Rimmer highlights the dissonance between Barack Obama's ideals that the agreement would be progressive and comprehensive and the substance of the trade deal.

Rimmer considers the intellectual property chapter of the TPP, focusing on the debate over copyright terms, copyright exceptions, intermediary liability, and technological protection measures. He analyses the negotiations over trademark law, cybersquatting, geographical indications, and the plain packaging of tobacco products. The book also considers the debate over patent law and access to essential medicines, data protection and biologics, access to genetic resources, and the treatment of Indigenous intellectual property. Examining globalization and its discontents, the book concludes with policy solutions and recommendations for a truly progressive approach to intellectual property and trade. <>