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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

Robert Tenor, editor
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EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. Our Annotated Bibliography will review, list and link the titles under discussion, providing a faithful summary of its content and audience.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

Contents

Book Wars: The Digital Revolution in Publishing by John B. Thompson [Polity, 9781509546787]

This book tells the story of the turbulent decade when the book publishing industry collided with the great technological revolution of our time. From the surge of ebooks to the self-publishing explosion and the growing popularity of audiobooks, this book provides a comprehensive and fine-grained account of technological disruption in one of our most important and successful creative industries.

Like other sectors, publishing has been thrown into disarray by the digital revolution. The foundation on which this industry had been based for 500 years – the control, packaging and sale of words and images in the form of printed books – was called into question by a technological revolution that enabled symbolic content to be stored, manipulated and transmitted quickly and cheaply. Publishers and retailers found themselves facing a proliferation of new players who were offering new products and services and challenging some of their most deeply-held principles. The old industry was suddenly thrust into the limelight as bitter conflicts erupted between publishers and new entrants, including powerful new tech giants who saw the world in very different ways. The book wars had begun.

While ebooks were at the heart of many of these conflicts, Thompson argues that the most fundamental consequences lie elsewhere. The print-on-paper book has proven to be a remarkably resilient cultural form but the digital revolution has transformed the industry in other ways, spawning new players which now wield unprecedented power and giving rise to an array of new publishing forms. Most important of all, it has transformed the broader information and communication environment, creating new challenges and new opportunities for publishers as they seek to redefine their role in the digital age.

This unrivalled account of the book publishing industry as it faces its greatest challenge since Gutenberg will be essential reading for anyone interested in books and their future.

Review

"**Book Wars** is as comprehensive, wide-ranging and deeply considered appraisal of the book publishing world as one can imagine – and a sober consideration of what the digital age has meant to a print-centred business. This masterful work should be the foundation for all future thinking about book publishing and much future thinking about how new technologies change, and don't change, societies." **Michael Schudson, Columbia University**

"Thompson weaves together a remarkable account of how and why one of the oldest forms of media has persisted through the challenges posed by digital disruption. Extraordinary in its breadth and depth, *Book Wars* unpacks the complex implications of digital production and distribution and draws crucial lessons that are relevant well beyond the world of books, providing a valuable lens for examining the profound changes that internet communication has brought to nearly every sector of the economy, and especially media industries." **Amanda Lotz, Queensland University of Technology**



"John Thompson was there when the digital-driven changes were in full swing, and he uses his bird's eye view and thoroughly-researched analysis to give the reader the story behind the stories. And it's a great read too." **John Sargent, CEO of Macmillan Publishers USA**

During the last few decades, we have been living through a technological revolution that is as radical and far-reaching as any that came before in the long history of the human species. Among other things, this new revolution is transforming our information and communication environment and disrupting many of the industries that played a central role in shaping this environment for most of the twentieth century and before. The traditional media industries —newspapers, radio, television, music, cinema — have all been hurled into a whirlpool of change as old analogue technologies were pushed aside by new technologies based on the digital codification and transmission of symbolic content. Many of the media institutions that were key players in the analogue age have found themselves threatened by the digital transition, their revenues collapsing and their once-dominant positions undermined, while powerful new players have emerged and begun to reshape the contours of our information space. Today we live in a world which, in terms of the forms and channels of information and communication, is fundamentally different from the world that existed just half a century ago.

The book publishing industry is no exception — it too has been caught up in the turmoil brought about by the digital revolution. And, in some ways, there is more at stake here than with other media industries: not only is the book publishing industry the oldest of the media industries, it is also an industry that has played a pivotal role in the shaping of modern culture, from the scientific revolution in early modern Europe to the profusion of literatures and forms of knowledge that have become such an important pan of our lives and societies today. So what happens when the oldest of our media industries collides with the great technological revolution of our time?

What happens when a media industry that has been with us for more than 500 years and is deeply embedded in our history and culture finds itself confronted by, and threatened by, a new set of technologies that are radically different from those that have underpinned its practices and business models for centuries? If you were working in the book publishing industry during the first decade of the twenty-first century, you wouldn't have had to look far to find reasons to feel anxious about your future: the music industry was in freefall, the newspaper industry was experiencing a sharp decline in revenue and some of the big tech companies were becoming seriously interested in the digitization of books. Why wouldn't the book industry be swept up in the maelstrom unleashed by the digital revolution? No hard-headed manager or disinterested analyst would have been sanguine about the chances of the book publishing industry surviving its encounter with the digital revolution unscathed.

But what form would the digital disruption of the book publishing industry assume, exactly? Would the industry undergo a rootand-branch transformation like the music industry, where physical formats morphed into digital downloads and the major record labels that had controlled the production and distribution of music experienced a dramatic collapse in revenues? Would ebooks take off and become the new medium of choice for readers, consigning the printon-paper book to the dustbin of history? Would bookshops disappear and publishers be disintermediated by a technological revolution that would enable readers and writers to communicate directly via the internet, unhindered by the traditional gatekeepers of the book publishing industry? In the early 2000s, all of these possibilities — and more — were being seriously contemplated, both by senior managers within the industry and by the many commentators and consultants who were happy to offer their views on the future of an industry that seemed to be on the cusp of disruption.

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Books are pan of culture and book wars could be seen as culture wars, but they are not the kind of culture war that is normally referred to by this term. The term 'culture war' is commonly used to refer to social and political conflicts based on diverging and deeply held values and beliefs, such as those concerning abortion, affirmative action, sexual orientation, religion, morality and family life. These are conflicts rooted in values and value systems to which many people are deeply attached. They tap into identities as well as interests, into different senses of who we are as individuals and collectivities and of what does and should matter to us — hence the passion with which these culture wars have so often been fought in the public domain. The book wars are a very different kind of conflict. They don't arouse the passions as the culture wars do, no one has marched in the streets or burned books in protest. By the standards of the culture wars, the book wars are distinctly low-key. Indeed, 'book wars' might seem like a rather dramatic term for a state of affairs that involves no oven displays of violence, no demonstrations and no shouting in the streets. But the absence of oven displays of violence should not mislead us into thinking that the conflicts are not real or that they don't really matter. On the contrary, the struggles that have broken out over the last couple of decades in the normally placid world of publishing are very real; they have been fought with a determination and conviction that attests to the fact that, for those involved, these are hugely important struggles that touch on vital interests and in which matters of principle are at stake. At the same time, they are symptoms of the fact that the book industry is undergoing a profound transformation which is disrupting the field, calling into question accepted ways of doing things and thrusting established players into conflict both with new entrants and with old hands who have

spotted new opportunities opened up by technological change and seized them, sometimes at the expense of others.

My aim in this book is to examine what actually happened, and what continues to happen, when the digital revolution takes hold in the world of book publishing. Not surprisingly, this is a complicated story with many different players and developments, as established organizations sought to defend and advance their positions while many new players sought to enter the field, or to experiment with new ways of creating and disseminating what we have come to think of as 'the book'. Given that the world of book publishing is itself immensely complex, consisting of many different worlds with their own players and practices, I have not tried to be comprehensive: I have reduced the complexity and narrowed the scope by focusing on the world of Anglo-American trade publishing — the same world that was the focus of Merchants of Culture. By 'trade publishing', I mean that sector of the industry that publishes books, both fiction and nonfiction, that are aimed at general readers and sold through bookstores like Barnes & Noble, Waterstones and other retail outlets, including online booksellers like Amazon. By 'Anglo-American' trade publishing, I mean English-language trade publishing that is based in the US and the UK, and for various historical reasons the publishing industries based in the US and the UK have long had a dominant role in the international field of English-language trade publishing. To understand the impact of the digital revolution on other sectors of publishing, such as academic publishing or reference publishing, or on publishing industries operating in other languages and other countries, would require different studies, as the processes and players would not be the same. While my focus here is on the world of Anglo-American trade publishing, I have not restricted myself to the traditional players in this field. The traditional players are important — no question about it. But a key pan of the disruption caused by the digital revolution is that it is a shake-up that opens the door for other players to enter the field. These include some of the large tech companies with their own agendas and their own battles to fight, equipped with resources on a scale that dwarfs even the largest of the traditional publishers. But they also include a myriad of small players and enterprising individuals who are located on the margins of the field or in separate spaces altogether, in some cases impinging directly on the publishing field and in other cases subsisting in a parallel universe that connects only indirectly, if at all, with what we might think of as the world of the book.

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With varying degrees of understanding and commitment, publishers have come to realize that their best chance of securing their own future in this brave new world is to jettison the old model of the publisher as a bookseller-focused business and rethink their role as a service provider whose job it is to connect content creators (authors) with content consumers (readers) through the particular form of the book. That this should require them to remain agnostic about the medium in which readers might prefer to read, and indeed to be proactive about making content available in new media which might appeal to readers, is only the most obvious first step — one that was recognized long ago by publishers. Much more challenging for publishers is to re-orient their businesses in such a way that readers are not an afterthought, but rather a central focus of their concern — to become organizations that are both author-centric and reader-centric, and to build into their DNA the idea that they will flourish as an organization only to the extent that they are providing an excellent service to both. This does not mean that booksellers are no longer important for publishers — they are. Indeed, they are more important than ever, precisely because so many other places where books were made visible in the past (the book review pages of newspapers, the TV shows dedicated

to books, etc.) have declined or disappeared. But the focus on booksellers has for too long served as a proxy for the relationship that ultimately matters much more and that publishers have long neglected: the relationship with readers.

Fortunately, just as the digital revolution has forced publishers to recognize the importance of the relationship with readers, so too it gave them the tools to develop this relationship at scale. With commitment and creative thinking, publishers could take advantage of the new forms of communication and information flow brought into being by the digital revolution and build direct relationships with readers, not simply in order to market directly to them but, more importantly, to interact with them and listen to them, to learn about what interests them, and to use the resources at their disposal to facilitate dialogue between writers and readers. While the traditional model of publishing was rooted in a unilinear model of communication, publishers now have the opportunity to restructure their businesses in a way that is more in keeping with the new dialogical forms of information and communication flow that have been created by the digital revolution, reconceiving themselves as service providers who are able to use their accumulated skills, resources and expertise to help bring books into existence and to connect writers and readers who wish to communicate through and around the form of the book.

Despite the disruptive potential of the digital revolution and the turbulence that has characterized the book publishing industry since the dawn of the third millennium, this industry has fared remarkably well — and much better than many other sectors of the media and creative industries. Book revenues have not collapsed, print books have not disappeared and even brick-and-mortar bookstores have begun to make a modest comeback: counter to the predictions of many prophets of doom, the book publishing apocalypse has not come to pass (or, at least, not yet). Books, including old-fashioned print-on-paper books, appear to have a place in our lives that is not easily dislodged, even by a technological revolution as radical and far-reaching as the digital revolution. But there are no grounds for complacency. The digital revolution has brought into being an organization that now wields unprecedented power in the publishing field, while many other organizations survive on revenues so small and margins so thin that a small downtown in the economy, let alone a major lockdown or prolonged recession, could push them into insolvency. Ebook sales may have levelled off but ebooks were never the essence of the digital revolution in the publishing industry: they were just one manifestation of a much deeper and more profound transformation that was taking place in our societies. Thanks to the digital revolution, the information and communication structures of our world are in flux. People are communicating differently and spending their time differently, old practices that worked well in an earlier era may no longer be so effective in this new world of digitized information and communication flows. In contrast to those who fear that screen culture is destroying our capacity to concentrate, I suspect that long-form reading will continue to play a vital role in our social, political and cultural life for many years and decades to come: we will not easily give up the rich exploration of imaginary worlds, and the sustained analysis of actual worlds, that long-form reading both encourages and makes possible. But whether publishers will continue to be part of the communication chain through which long-form reading takes place, what kind of publishers they will he and what role they will play, will ultimately depend on how effectively and imaginatively they are able to adapt themselves to the new information and communication environment that is being forged by the great technological revolution of our time. <>

YOU ARE WHAT YOU READ: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO READING WELL by Robert DiYanni [Skills for Scholars, Princeton University Press, 9780691206783]

We are what we read, according to Robert DiYanni. Reading may delight us or move us; we may read for instruction or inspiration. But more than this, in reading we discover ourselves. We gain access to the lives of others, explore the limitless possibilities of human existence, develop our understanding of the world around us, and find respite from the hectic demands of everyday life. In **YOU ARE WHAT YOU READ**, DiYanni provides a practical guide that shows how we can increase the benefits and pleasures of reading literature by becoming more skillful and engaged readers.

DiYanni suggests that we attend first to what authors say and the way in which they say it, rather than rushing to decide what they mean. He considers the various forms of literature, from the essay to the novel, the short story to the poem, demonstrating rewarding approaches to each in sample readings of classic works. Through a series of illuminating oppositions, he explores the paradoxical pleasures of reading: solitary versus social reading, submitting to or resisting the author, reading inwardly or outwardly, and more. DiYanni closes with nine recommended reading practices, thoughts on the different experiences of print and digital reading, and advice on what to read and why.

Written in a clear, inviting, and natural style, **YOU ARE WHAT YOU READ** is an essential guide for all who want to enrich their reading—and their life.

Review

"**YOU ARE WHAT YOU READ** is simply a joy. The book enlarges our imaginations, yields moments of deepest pleasure, and helps us fathom the complexities of our own lives. DiYanni provides practical strategies that guide readers to a sustained, significant appreciation of literary works. The elegant applications of reading principles combined with engaging instructional approaches make this work required reading for all current and future English instructors."**—Linda Costanzo Cahir, Kean University**

"Robert DiYanni's **YOU ARE WHAT YOU READ** is an ardent, well-conceived guide to how readers can improve their experience of a diverse range of literary texts. At a time when skepticism about the humanities abounds, DiYanni offers a valuable window into the ways our inner lives flourish and expand under the influence of poetry, fiction, and nonfiction prose."**—David Haven Blake, author of *Walt Whitman and the Culture of American Celebrity***

"Ours is a time when reading books as an art of joyful self-expansion and self-liberation is in decline—and, among many of us, in danger of being lost. This book is a lifeline thrown to us all. DiYanni calls, enables, and even inspires us to retrieve a precious spiritual resource."**—Thomas L. Pangle and Lorraine Smith Pangle, University of Texas at Austin**

"As we follow DiYanni through the world's vast labyrinth of books, we are in the company of a seasoned, talented reader and an alert mind motivated by a heartfelt passion for reading and

grounded in a genuine sense of humanity."**—William V. Costanzo, SUNY Teaching Professor of English and Film**

"DiYanni's skillful, nuanced, and stimulating analyses will open windows into books familiar and unfamiliar, offering all the satisfactions of a conversation with an intelligent guide."**—Maria Carrig, Carthage College**

The title of this book can be taken literally. We *are* what we read. While every individual is unique, all of us possess unlimited potential. Eat well and you will be healthier. Exercise well and you will be stronger. Read well and you will be . . . what? Smarter? Maybe. More informed? Surely. But this book is not about those things. This book suggests that in reading well you will be more alive.

Reading well awakens and broadens the mind. It provides a vast realm of inner experience that extends far beyond everyday life. Reading well, you will still be you. But you will be a better and more interesting version of yourself.

My aim in this book is to present varied approaches to the deeply gratifying experience of reading, especially reading literature. These strategies can lead to thought-provoking and emotionally resonant textual encounters. **YOU ARE WHAT YOU READ** celebrates reading's value for learning and for living. It presents ways to enrich your reading practices and enhance your reading pleasure.

This is not a theoretical book, but a practical one, its aim to improve a reader's understanding and appreciation of literature. It's intended for anyone interested in getting more out of reading and more out of life. The brief discussions of theory in the book's later chapters illuminate the benefits of reading. I present just enough theory to enhance literary discernment, deepen literary understanding, and increase literary pleasure.

My major claim is that learning to read confidently and skillfully enhances our lives and helps us enjoy life more completely. This enjoyment stems from honing our powers of observation and enhancing our capacity for thinking well. I believe, in short, that we can attain better lives through reading.

We read with multiple goals—for information, enjoyment, self-gratification, self-advancement; to be instructed, entertained, moved, inspired. We read to understand and appreciate, to grow and develop. *You Are What You Read* attempts to help readers achieve these goals.

The rewards of reading are especially important today, a time of complex challenges we are all confronting. Economic turbulence has combined with frightening uncertainties and inexorable ambiguities. These disturbing realities are inflected across a spectrum of recent and ongoing catastrophes, from the Covid-19 pandemic to climate change, with extreme forms of weather cascading in ever-longer droughts along with wilder and more destructive fires and floods; from the global political and economic crises of mass migration and unemployment to individual and social problems—crippling addictions, surges in stress and anxiety, dramatic upheavals in education and social services—all exacerbated by the Covid-19 crisis and the inescapable changes that accompany it.

Reading well—with skill and confidence, even expertise—matters now more than ever. Reading literature with understanding and pleasure can help us navigate the myriad disruptions we are living through. Reading won't solve life's increasingly intractable problems, but it can provide perspective on them and relief from them. Reading well can help us better understand the challenges we face together and help ameliorate the pain and suffering we endure. It can also take our minds off them for a while.

The value of learning to read well lies in the manifold pleasures it brings, the knowledge it affords, and the imaginative enlargement of life it yields. Learning to read well and to enjoy better reading is not as hard as most people think. Each of the book's chapters recommends ways to achieve this seemingly ambitious goal. Each illustrates how reading heightens our appreciation of living.

Taken together, the six chapters present a suite of interrelated, mutually reinforcing strategies for reading well.

- Chapter 1 focuses on listening. It argues that seeking textual meaning first *and foremost* yields far less value than what happens when we resist pouncing on "meaning" and, instead, begin by asking what texts *say* and *suggest,* what they *show* and *do.*
- Chapter 2 poses and answers two questions: "What truths do texts tell?" "How might we read for those textual truths"?
- Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate how we can engage works of nonfiction and fiction productively and pleasurably.
- Chapter 5 contextualizes practical applications of reading with a bit of theory. It considers reading's paradoxical pleasures via the dialectical energies that impel and enliven the reading of literature.
- Chapter 6 draws out the implications reading literature can have for living life more rewardingly. In tandem with chapter 5, it recapitulates the book's major themes and underscores the entwining of reading and living.

I've included a short coda that recommends nine reading practices that can enhance the experience of any reader. Appendixes A and B identify benefits and drawbacks of print and digital reading, and propose recommendations for what to read and why.

YOU ARE WHAT YOU READ participates in a long-standing conversation with writers and readers past and present. Reading literature gives us access to the multitude of voices that constitute

that conversation. You can banter in the trenches under fire in a world war, fall in love for the first time again (and get it right this time), experience the brutality of slavery, voyage to the moon or the center of the earth, dive deep into the human mind and heart.

This life-affirming and life-enhancing conversation has been going on for millennia. I invite you, as a singular reader, to join in. Bring your thoughts and feelings, your ideas and personal values. Take your place in the conversation so that reading well can, indeed, help you attain a fuller and more rewarding life.

Recommended Reading Practices

How should we read to best absorb the benefits reading can offer? The following guidelines should get us going in the right direction. They constitute a reading credo.

Read actively.
Read deliberatively.
Read predictively.
Read retrospectively.
Read interpretively.
Read evaluatively.
Read purposefully.
Read habitually.
Read pleasurably.

Active reading involves close, thoughtful reading in which we make observations, connections, and inferences—reading in which we ask questions about the text. A form of responsive, responsible reading, active reading is serious, even strenuous, requiring, as Thoreau suggests, in *Walden,* the stamina of athletes preparing for Olympic competition.

Deliberative reading is slow, careful reading. As a noun, "deliberation" suggests patient consideration. As a verb, "deliberate" implies the act of thinking, pondering, weighing. As an adjective, "deliberative" connotes purpose, intentionality, leisurely thoughtfulness. In that same chapter on reading in *Walden,* Thoreau advises that "books should be read as deliberately and reservedly as they were written".

Predictive reading highlights our expectations about what's coming based on what we have already encountered in a text. Predictive reading requires imagination; it envisions textual possibilities. In making anticipatory projections as we read, we create expectations the text will gratify or frustrate; in the latter case we revise our predictions or make new ones.

Retrospective reading involves reading backward as well as forward, highlighting reading's essential circularity and spiraling repetition. In tracking back while moving ahead in a text, we make new connections while reevaluating earlier parts of the text in light of later ones. Reading is a cyclical and not a linear experience. It is also recursive. Our expectations are modified, and our memories transformed as we move forward and backward, simultaneously, through a text.

Interpretive reading is analytical reading. In reading interpretively, we seek to understand, construe, and explain a text, first to ourselves and then to others. Interpretation involves actively making meaning, not merely passively absorbing it. Interpretation depends on inference. Requiring both intellectual comprehension and emotional apprehension, interpretation is built on inferences, without which there is no interpretation.

Evaluative reading requires a consideration of both a work's *value—how* highly we esteem it—and its *values,* particularly its social, cultural, and moral dispositions. A work's value will be in direct proportion to how much it invites our attention, how strongly it affects our feelings, how effectively it instructs us, and how powerfully it engages us. We value different works for different reasons. And we value the same work differently at different times in our lives.

Purposeful reading requires reading intentionally—for engagement, intellectual development, solace, and companionship. We are social creatures at our core, and reading provides ways into the profound pleasures and value this kind of human connection affords. Purposeful reading can sharpen our powers of discernment, increase our literary tact, deepen our judgment, and lead us to wisdom.

Habitual reading. Reading well—both confidently and competently—is best accomplished through regular, daily reading. Making reading a regular part of our day testifies to its importance for our intellectual, emotional, and psychic well-being. Through habitual reading we develop a level of reading comfort essential for long-term reading success and pleasure.

Pleasurable reading. We should seek and take pleasure from our reading. We should read books and articles we like to read and that we look forward to reading. When we read books that interest us we learn from them and we allow them to work their magic on us. Reading for pleasure solidifies and intensifies the habit of reading.

To read well we need to read with intellectual and emotional engagement—actively and deliberatively; predictively and retrospectively; interpretively and evaluatively; purposefully, habitually and pleasurably. These reading practices pay countless dividends and offer multiple, lifelong reading pleasures. They can change our lives. <>

Mythos Lesen: Buchkultur und Geisteswissenschaften im Informationszeitalter von Klaus Benesch [Transcript Verlag, 9783837656558]

Die Gründe für den rasanten Prestigeverlust von Buchkultur und Geisteswissenschaften sind vielfältig. Niemand weiß, wie die Zukunft des Lesens tatsächlich aussehen wird. Dennoch lassen sich einige Antworten aus den Entwicklungen seit der Jahrtausendwende extrapolieren. Um ein breites Spektrum unterschiedlicher Positionen zu Wort kommen zu lassen, nimmt Klaus Benesch das Thema nicht nur aus Sicht der Leseforschung und der Literaturwissenschaften in den Blick. Das Fragen nach der sich wandelnden Rolle des Lesens und der Geisteswissenschaften im Informationszeitalter verlangt auch nach der Ausweitung der Perspektive in den Bereich der Gesellschafts- und Wissenschaftspolitik. Neue Selbstbilder der Geisteswissenschaften sind nötig, die die Kulturtechnik des Lesens in Zeiten der Digitalisierung auf neuartige Weise zeitgemäß und nachhaltig erschließen.

Translation

MYTH READING: BOOK CULTURE AND HUMANITIES IN THE INFORMATION AGE by Klaus Benesch [Transcript Verlag, 9783837656558]

The reasons for the rapid loss of prestige of book culture and the humanities are manifold. No one knows what the future of reading will actually look like. Nevertheless, some answers from developments since the turn of the millennium can be extrapolated. In order to allow a wide range of different positions to be heard, Klaus Benesch does not only look at the topic from the point of view of reading research and literary studies. The question of the changing role of reading and the humanities in the information age also calls for the broadening of the perspective in the field of social and scientific policy. New self-images of the humanities are needed, which open up the cultural technology of reading in a new way in a new way and sustainably.

excerpt: The following essay owes its transcript – as well as the series in which it appears – to a conference entitled "How we read: On the History, Practice and Future of a Cultural Technique", which took place in June 2018 at the Literaturhaus in Munich. A few months earlier, I had given a lecture at the University of Venice on Ezra Pound's *article How To Read,* which appeared in the *New York Herald Tribune* in 1929. Pound's comments about the state of book reading at the beginning of modernity seemed to me to raise similar questions in many respects, as can be heard in current discussions on book and reading culture on the threshold of the digital age. What to read? What about the appreciation of the book? Who can, who should and, above all, what is worth reading, at a time when people are beginning to turn away from the book and increasingly deny him respect? For Pound, these questions were closely related to the writer's situation. Who would still bother to read difficult, allusive texts? Who to write for? And who still has the competence to distinguish between good and bad books in such a time? As important as these questions may be – at least from the point of view of authors – they also show that the reading of books has not been a matter of course for some time, and that the much-vaunted crisis of the book has in fact already been spread massively in the second half of the 19th century. It began in the late 19th century. This seemed to

me reason enough to launch the above-mentioned conference together with my colleague Dr. Manlio Della Marca from the Eva Hesse Research Archive for Modernism and Literary Translation at the University of Munich (LMU). In addition to the questions already raised by Pound, we also wanted to take a look at the (pre-)history of reading, as a not yet read almost all of them and the consumption of books had not yet become the *conditio sine qua non* of bourgeois self-perception. And we wanted to broaden the perspective, to religion, sociology, art history, architecture and other disciplines in which reading was also relevant for the scientists working in their environment. Finally, we had tried to let the "practitioners" of reading – publishers, editors of print media and online platter, form freelance authors – have their say. The success and the great media response to this conference led to the idea of a small series of books, the individual volumes of which were to be divided into succinctly formulated "position essays" with different aspects of the topic, aimed at a wider audience. It was a happy coincidence that Dr. Cathrin Klingsöhr-Leroy, the director of the Franz Marc Museum in Kochel am See and today's co-editor of the series »Wie wir lese» (How we read), had planned a large-scale anniversary exhibition in Kochel with the theme »Pictures from reading – From reading the pictures" around the same time as the conference in the Literaturhaus. The result of our collaboration – in addition to an evening event in which Cathrin Klingsöhr-Leroy presented selected paintings to the exhibition in Kochel and my colleague Barba- Out Vinken (LMU) and I had a conversation about the view of authors on reading – is the series now taking shape with this second volume, for which we were able to win the friendly support of the transcript publishing house in Bielefeld.

An area in which we also read professionally, which we the conference is not spared, but it was only marginally touched by the various participants, the intellectualities are. Reading takes place under its auspices both as science and as technology. After a thorough reading of primary literature, new secondary literature emerges here, which in turn – at best – should be read by both students and teachers; and in seminars and reading courses, practical examples are used to guide "correct" reading, it is read *before*- and *with*- how - *the*-and *deeply*. It is hardly surprising that book culture and humanities are closely linked, and that one thing often cannot be thought of without the other: without a humanities-scientific preoccupation with linguistic art, these would hardly be possible to enforce on the market if there were neither competent reviewers nor readers. At least that's how the mythos, who has been around the book and its moral-moral power since the beginnings of the humanities in the early 19th century. So it is high time to take a critical stock of this myth and its significance for the humanities at the beginning of a new era – the digital information age. This is exactly what the following essay aims to achieve.

Following the maxim of our series, which was initially based on ten volumes, he does not want to be a "scientific" discussion of reading, which has become a problem for the humanities. It remains, this is also due to the limited amount of contributions, in the poin-t-t argument and rhetorically pointed essay. The volume sees itself as a contribution to the ongoing debate about the future of both books and humanities in the information age, and it tries to take into account and present internal and external positions. Written under the impression of the urgency of opening outwards and structural changes inward, he describes a bleak scenario in case everything remains as it is. There is no need to share this perspective; but to speak of a crisis and the increasing insignificance of the humanities disciplines must seem appropriate to anyone who looks unbiasedly at the situation at the universities– on both sides of the Atlantic. As an Americanist and literary scientist, my position on these issues is naturally shaped by years of engagement with and by the American high school system. Nevertheless, where structural differences forbid general statements, I have tried to take

into account geographical, cultural and historical peculiarities. Finally, I would like to say a few words. Whenever of the present or of general aspects of reading, writing and thinking, I have used generic female nominal results. This may occasionally make the flow of the essay a little more supple, order one or the other seem unnecessarily outed. However, I believe that the concern that is connected to this is far outweighed by this disadvantage. Where positions from earlier times are concerned or where – mostly male – authors either directly or indirectly take the floor themselves, I have dispensed with this means.

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Reading Proust on My Cellphone

So what can be done to stop the rampant lack of reading and with it the threatening loss of identity and prestige of the humanities? What measures are conceivable and promising? And what contribution must the humanities themselves make if they want to find their way back into social debates in the future and secure their place among academic disciplines in the information age? An article I came across some time ago in *The Atlantic* may shed light on this. Founded in Boston in 1857, the cultural magazine, roughly comparable to the German monthly magazine the *Mercury* is a popular playground for New English intellectuals and – beyond the academic market – the last bastion of liberal socio-political discourse in the USA. The story told in that article is still astonishing, even considering that The *Atlan-tic* has been largely funded since 2017 by Lauren Powell Jobs, the widow of Apple founder Steve Jobs. Under the heading "Reading Proust on My Cellphone", the writer and former employee of the New York *Times*, Sarah Boxer, reports on how, after many years of work-related *interruptions,* she resumed reading Proust's seven-volume search for lost time and this time actually finished. The special feature of this event is not so much that Boxer's report would confirm a critic's bonmot that Proust's monumental narrative work is one of the best-known, but unfortunately also among the least read classics in modern literature. What is actually interesting here is the fact that Boxer has managed to read the story of Charles Swann's lost world on her smart phone every evening.

Admittedly, my reaction to this revelation was no less incredulous than that of most of Boxer's acquaintances and friends, who simply thought this kind of reading was inappropriate, if not impossible. And she hadn't exactly failed in the resilience of Proust's prose, with its endlessly long sentences – the longest of the novel, a dizzying monster, comes to a whopping 958 words! – and the complex, difficult-to-follow-up network of relationships of the Parisian bourgeoisie at the beginning of the 20th century, narrative challenges that sometimes overwhelm even the patience of professional readers? All the more reason why she was not only able to read as such; it became a unique experience for Boxer, which she felt as magical, even in a very special way, as "Proustian". How can that be? It's not that Sarah Boxer is a digital *native* with no serious reading and book experience, for which the smartphone was, in a sense, the first choice and an obvious form of reading. On the contrary. Boxer loves books, those made of paper and cardboard, and she, she admits, owns quite a few of them. However, when she discovered that she could download all seven volumes of the complete edition in the original English translation by Charles Kenneth Scott Moncrieff, a contemporary of Proust, free of charge from the Project Guten- berg Australia on her mobile phone, she decided to try herself. She began, where she had stopped reading many years ago, somewhere in the fourth volume *Sodom and Gomorrah*, and from now on read every evening on the brightly illuminated screen of the small smartphone until, well, until the end of the last volume *The Rediscovered Time*.

Boxer found her reading experience to be extremely fake. After only a few evenings, she discovered that the small-scale display of her smartphone, which measures a total of 6 x 10 centimetres, and Proust's sophisticated prose were by no means as incompatible as she had initially assumed. Here, in the original, their description of this quite poetic encounter of digital technology and artfully designed narration:

> Your cellphone screen is like a tiny glass-bottomed boat moving slowly over a vast and glowing ocean of words in the night. There is no shore. There is nothing beyond the words in front of you. It's a journey for one in the nighttime, also romance.

The sea metaphor is important here, as Proust's colossal text has been repeatedly compared to an overflowing ocean that leaves the reader drifting and without orientation, like a shipwreck, to itself. The nightly reading on the smart phone puts you at the wheel of a tiny submarine, Boxer feels reminded of Captain Nemo from Jules Verne's *20,000 miles under* the *sea,* you drive far away from the promising shore and literally dive into Proust's ocean of impressions, experiences, the smallest narrative details. Despite the small size of the screen, scrolling on the device requires only a few swipes, for the above monster set less than a dozen. Boxer compares them to rowing strokes, each swipe a new immersion in the water, in order to advance the small submarine like the one a bit far. After a short time, one forgets the movement completely, "you're simply looking through the glass in an endless ocean, moving silently, blindly forward".

In order to avoid the lack of annotation on the edge of the text, the author uses text messages, which she addresses to herself at regular intervals. Every morning she receives "Post" from Proust's oceanic universe, rediscovers the magical language power of individual sentences, which she fished out during her nightly reading and sent on the journey as an electronic bottle mail. Reading on the smartphone seems to mock almost everything we have learned to appreciate at the feel of the analog book through which we are gradually working our way: the feeling that arises when the increasing number of pages buckled at the corners heralds the approaching end of reading; the physical book, which in the course of the reading time has become a good buddy, which we recognize by its external nature as well as the one that makes it familiar to us and for which we feel a strangely touching affection; or the orientation that allows us to divide into pages and sections, the option of turning back, imitating electronic books only to a limited extent.

And yet, the small, intelligent device – one believes the author of the article – not only allows an unusual and uncommonly intense reading experience. As her self-experiment approaches the end of the novel, she seems to have arrived in Proust's Universe. Their slow reading has the limits between reality and fiction, between past and present gradually blur let: »My long moment of reading Proust had itself become a Proustian moment, a bittersweet mixing of past and present, real life and reading life, being adrift and being amazed. Perhaps that was because I had made my way so slowly.« is it's in Prousts Roman the Bittersweet aroma Madeleine-Pastries, which narrator on the journey in the past Sends, so Takes these role at Boxer that Swimming-and widow's eye smartphone the brand HTC.

Of course, a number of good arguments could be made against Boxer's smartphone readings. They may seem naive to many, somehow inappropriate, and, with some probability, more strenuous than reading an analog, printed excerpt of *the search for lost time.* But for me, this was about something else. I find it remarkable that a smartphone can make reading extensive, complex texts an interesting, congenial reading experience. Boxer's description of Proust's immersion in the past shows her as a reader who is well-versed and sensitive far beyond the nor-male measure. It seems to grasp Proust's aesthetics and how it works almost intuitively, and the digital form in which it

recipients them has certainly contributed to this. No matter how big this contribution was, in any case, "Reading Proust on My Cellphone" is part of the interesting test, which I have read for a long time about reading and the feelings that accompany it. Against this background, the still great fears and reservations on the part of the humanities about the digital media do not appear to be calculated. After all, the use of digital technology can lead to new, intelligent readings even of the canonized works of world literature.

So there is no reason to vehemently isolate themselves from the *digital humanities,* as if they wanted or could drive the spirit out of the humanities with the help of the computer. Here, the humanities situation is comparable to that of most Western societies with regard to climate change: as long as they maintain their deceptive self-perception of being a long-term model of success without needing further change, the worst will hardly be prevented (even if the consequences of failure in the case of intellectual knowledge are far less dramatic). Without more openness to the technical challenges of the information society, in any case, and without the realization that digital culture also "concerns" the subjects of the humanities, they are threatened with a similar fate as the long-playing plate or the fountain pen – they will sink into the insignificance beyond collectors' exchanges and official occasions as the undead of a long-lost "golden age". So the question is less whether *deep* or *hyper reading* will prevail in universities in the future; because this seems to have been decided for a long time. The real question is whether the humanities finally become aware of their social responsibility and stop as the champion of an anachronistic secret knowledge against the rest of the world.

In order to save them, however, another insight is needed, namely into the impossibility of "proper reading in the wrong" (to easily change Adorno's remark here). If intellectual approaches have shown one thing in the last 30 years, it is this: since every reading is necessarily guided by interest and is partly in accordance with the cultural and economic circumstances in which we read, there can be no undisputed monopoly of theory that is self-privileged. The idea of a restorative, counter-cultural reading at universities, as the *New Critics* claimed for themselves, must inevitably remain utopian; a return to the healing world of *close reading* is not an option for action. Ernst Bloch is a candid argument that this is a so-called "concrete" utopia, which is already practiced every day in many seminars and teaching courses. But this would be a thing of the past to academic reality, given the realities of higher education. Science is part of a complex structure of institutionalization and transfer of knowledge. This knowledge, even if it is generated not in the laboratory but by the help of humanities methods, largely reproduces the conditions under which it was obtained. The idea of an academic ivory tower is therefore as ineffective as the assumption that academic reading is inherently apolitical (an assumption often associated with conservative positions) or is outside the exploitation context of the market (as is often argued by progressives).

And it is just as wrong that in the humanities – as populist politicians on both sides of the Atlantic, the lament – had established free zones of counterculture, in which state-allied *cultural Marxists* worked to reshape society according to its identity-political agenda. Incidentally, this misperception also applies to the USA and England, where cultural *studies* research (see above) and the supposedly hand-in-hand "left" political orientation are historically more widespread than in mainland Europe. To be right, over the last 30 years, we have seen how American universities in particular have become increasingly politicized. This was due, on the one hand, to the so-called *culture wars,* which originated from academic institutions; and on the other hand, the increasingly fierce competition for resources forced the *humanities* into the academic defensive, from which they hoped to find out again with a

ludicrous flood of publications and the questioning of scientific methods (keyword: *science wars*). In the previous capital I tried to change this development, albeit very shortened

Using the example of the global spread of cultural studies.

However, the commitment, often perceived as the radicalization of the humanities, to adopt the interests of marginalized minorities in research and teaching, has not in practice led to concrete political actions, or often not even to a decidedly political analysis of the structural origins of inequality, sexism or racial discrimination. On the contrary. Cultural policy, however right and important it may be, has instead contributed to the further erosion of humanities reputation both inside and outside universities. And it has meant that these – identity *politics,* cultural Marxism, and *cancel culture* – are now more apolitical than ever, at least if their dwindling political influence on society as a whole is taken into account.

The causes of this development are manifold and do not need to be re-listed here. It should be noted that the critiques into which the humanities have been plunged for several decades is also a crisis in the culture of books and reading (and vice versa). This has to do, among other things, with the fact that the *humanities* have failed to justify the social added value of the literature they use and research, as requested by Habermas, on their own. Where this does not seem possible or appropriate, reading should be abandoned altogether or replaced by other, appropriate sources. These include, among other things, the reorientation to shorter, non-literary genres such as essayistic or the political pamphlet, as well as the inclusion of the entire band-wide of new digital text forms that the worldwide networking in the information age – just think of the now diverse social media landscape – has spawned. One could object here that in the course of the cultural *turn* the genre boundaries had already become permeable and the individual subjects had opened up – sometimes to the point of being unrecognizable – to new approaches and transdisciplinary research. Only, without wishing to call into question the obvious enthusiasm of the participating female researchers, the turning point to the culture took place on both sides of the Atlantic with an intellectual arbitrariness, in the result of which a scientifically sound confrontation with the changing role of the humanities in digital culture became almost impossible. In addition, even in the USA, by no means all colleagues in the humanities subjects had switched to *cultural studies* research, and dissatisfaction with method plurality and the creeping erosion of scientific competence soon led to the nostalgia squinting on literary theories of the 1950s.

The debate for intellectual knowledge to be present now.

For some time now, a new branch of research has been taking on the task of recruiting its members, not as an elitist self-privative alloy, but with regard German to the discursive and economic interactions with society from which they are alimented and from which they recruit their members. This relatively young and hardly known research area in Europe has become more and more common in American universities in recent years, partly as a fully established study programme, partly in the form of extracurricular, irregular additional offers. The range of events offered under their umbrella covers almost all humanities and social science disciplines and, like the older *cultural studies* research, is strictly inter- or transdisciplinary. In contrast to cultural studies, however, *public humanities* usually have a research focus on the interactions between science and the public. In doing so, they solve a socially the obligation to take a critical stock of one's own research and try to intensify the circulation of knowledge within universities as well as into society. Yale *University's public humanities* program, for example, includes key areas of research from which students can choose

cures: >>Museums and Collections>>, >>Public Writing>>, >>Documentary Studies<<, >>Digital Humanities<<, >>History and the Pub-Bachelor<<, >>Space and Place<< and >>Arts Research<<.

The disciplinary boundaries of *public humanities,* as well as their methods, range from local historical research to the curating of exhibitions to art projects in public spaces, film documentaries, public lectures or the design of corresponding websites, on which the individual projects, mostly initiated by the students themselves, are then presented and discussed with representatives from business, politics and the media. Their institutional structures and hierarchies are rather poorly developed. What unites them is the desire to communicate as much human science as possible into society and to be open to nonacademic knowledge that is brought to the programmes from the outside. If you like, public *humanities* is a large-scale, multi-disciplinary *outreach* programme in which students and university students join forces with non-academic experts in mostly local research projects. This is explicitly (compare the *mission statements* of the corresponding programmes) not a one-way street. On the contrary, dialogue with the public is intended to ensure that non-academic knowledge is taken into account in university research.

The weakening book and reading culture could also be of benefit from a comparable approach. Why do mental knowledge readings have to be limited to the seminar and lecture rooms of the universities? Why not read or read aloud together, which would bring the humanities back into a dialogue with people beyond the campus. And why should literary and art-scientific seminars not also be taught by practical personalities – literary critics, curators, festival directors, etc. – who could help to break the notorious self-fixation of intellectualities and permit them to make public knowledge. I am aware that teaching assignments, author lectures or the *outreach* guidelines of the major research funding institutions have been trying for some time to reduce the gap between *the city* and *gown,* between the public and the university. It is also true, however, that much of this has remained lip service, and that karst hierarchies, backroom science diplomacy, and the fear of the loss of privileges and budgeted jobs still hinder the humanities' self-critical search for its new role in the information age.

A commitment to an open and public programme such as *public humanities* would be a first step in this direction. For only in constant comparison with the needs and expectations of a larger public can book culture and intellectual knowledge be self-founded. Anyone who thinks that the amalgamation of public and academic space leads to the transformation of special knowledge into generally applicable knowledge and thus "devalued" who is wrong. It is about *public,* not populist *are nighties.* To have surrendered to the neoliberal dictate of permanent self-optimization, including the completely miscalculated quantification of research successes in the form of research funds, is the real fall of the humanities. Their opening into society and the pursuit of connection and civic participation could fill the old question of the ethics of reading with new life and – in the best of all academic worlds – lead to a different understanding of what 'good reading' should constitute.

Once again, the humanities are both part and mirror of the value system of society that finances and keeps them alive. The fact that they are given certain freedoms within narrow limits should not lead them to believe that their work in life is a biotope of purposeless, apolitical thinking. Unusual measures, such as public support for "Doing nothing" is unlikely to change that. This is how the Kunstakademie Hamburg, which has just hosted three so-called "Idleness" scholarships, €1,600, for students who succeed in convincing a professional selection board of the creativity and relevance of their "failure". Of course, even this seemingly subversive project remains committed to the values of a university calibrated to selection and evidence.

Doing nothing has to prove itself here as surplus value-producing "research inactivity", and in its reversal of the causality – the expected, clearly definable result only enables the desired inaction – miles away from the idleness of a Cicero, Bertrand Russell, or Paul Lafargue. If it is indeed meant as an art project, then it is appropriate to show the humanities their indissoluble entanglement in the commodity cycles of late capitalism. Nothing is in vain here and doing nothing still means subsuming one another to the economic taxonomy of surplus value. This circumstance is not lacking in a certain comedy in the humanities. Their defenders are caught between an often backward-looking attitude of refusal and the impulse to come to terms with the neoliberal driving forces in society. Thus they refer (externally) to their efforts to adapt to the demands of the new time, while at the same time (inwardly) clinging to the utopia of a real life in the wrong. In their clandestine contempt for the system of which they have become an integral part, they are somewhat reminiscent of Kafka's scholarly monkey Rotpeter from A Report for an *Academy.* As he faced the choice of either wanting to end in the zoological garden or in the vaudeville, they opt for the vaudeville. This is also a kind of prison, but it still allows self-delusion, in artistic freedom it is actually freedom in the true sense.

It would be better to look the 'power of negativity' in the face.

for the superiority of the Spirit, as we know from both He- gel and Adorno, is proving to be precisely where it is least appreciated. The latter has in *Minimal Morality* under the heading "Life does not live", which he had taken over from Ferdinand Kürnberger, wrote the following sentence: "The departmentalization of the spirit is a means of abolishing it where it is not carried out ex officio, on behalf of the commission." The chapter is dedicated to Marcel Proust, and the sentence describes the predicament of the dilettante author, who was given little recognition by academic colleagues during his lifetime because of his financial independence. The fact that he succeeds in cancelling the academic division of labour, if only because he likes to write and he should not have done it at home, justifies his actual superiority. But this always creates nakedness. And so, Adorno notes, "order is ensured: some have to participate, because otherwise they cannot live, and who could otherwise live, who are kept outside, because they do not want to participate". It is time that the humanities do not turn their backs on a re-reading of Proust's quest for lost time – on the smart phone, and without ifs and *Goals!* <>

Aztec Religion and Art of Writing: Investigating Embodied Meaning, Indigenous Semiotics, and the Nahua Sense of Reality by Isabel Laack [Numen Book, Brill, 9789004391451]

In her groundbreaking investigation from the perspective of the aesthetics of religion, Isabel Laack explores the religion and art of writing of the pre-Hispanic Aztecs of Mexico. Inspired by postcolonial approaches, she reveals Eurocentric biases in academic representations of Aztec cosmovision, ontology, epistemology, ritual, aesthetics, and the writing system to provide a powerful interpretation of the Nahua sense of reality.
Laack transcends the concept of "sacred scripture" traditionally employed in religions studies in order to reconstruct the Indigenous semiotic theory and to reveal how Aztec pictography can express complex aspects of embodied meaning. Her study offers an innovative approach to nonphonographic semiotic systems, as created in many world cultures, and expands our

understanding of human recorded visual communication.
This book will be essential reading for scholars and readers interested in the history of religions, Mesoamerican studies, and the ancient civilizations of the Americas.

"This excellent book, written with intellectual courage and critical self-awareness, is a brilliant, multilayered thought experiment into the images and stories that made up the Nahua sense of reality as woven into their sensational ritual performances and colorful symbolic writing system." - Davíd Carrasco, *Harvard University*

The people currently known as the 'Aztecs" lived in the Central Mexican Highlands roughly five hundred years ago. As immigrants from the north, they arrived in the Valley of Mexico at the beginning of the fourteenth century CE and intermingled with the local people. They rose to political and cultural heights in the fifteenth century, only to be brutally conquered by Spanish invaders in the third decade of the sixteenth century. The so-called Aztec Empire was a political alliance between three major groups in the Valley of Mexico: the Acolhua living in the town of Texcoco, the Tepanec of Tlacopan, and the Mexica living in the twin cities Tlatelolco and Tenochtitlan. Tlatelolco and the now-legendary Tenochtitlan formed the heart of the "Aztec Empire." These cities were picturesquely located on two islands within Lake Texcoco, which covered a large part of the bottom of the Valley of Mexico during that time. The valley, a high plateau 2,20o meters above sea level, was surrounded by skyscraping mountain peaks, among them the famous volcanoes Popocatepetl (5,624 m) and Iztaccihuatl (5,23o m). When the Spanish conquistadores first saw the city, an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 people lived there (Matos 2001: 198), making Tenochtitlan-Tlatelolco one of the largest cities in the world at that time. With the twin pyramids, the ceremonial center, and the marketplace at its heart, the city spread out into the lake with people's living quarters and fertile chinampas raised fields). A large aqueduct from Chapultepec on the close western shore of Lake Texcoco supplied fresh water. In addition to items made by local farmers, craftspeople, and artisans,

traders from afar and tribute collectors brought exotic food into the city, along with fine clothing, highly crafted tools, laborsaving devices, beautiful jewelry, and every other imaginable type of article.

The Triple Alliance controlled large parts of Mexico, conquering cities and villages through military campaigns. Politically, it was not so much an *empire* as we think of it—subjected local rulers were typically left in power and local language and culture were largely left unchanged. The local rulers only had to ensure a constant flow of tribute payments to the capital. In this way, the influence of Tenochtitlan reached from the Pacific shores on the west to the Caribbean on the east. Cultural exchange and trading between the different ethnic groups was encouraged; the political fundament, however, was relatively unstable. Many people in the conquered towns harbored negative sentiments toward the Mexica because of the high taxes and tributes. Thus, when the Spaniards arrived, many local armies joined the few Spanish soldiers in their

fight against Tenochtitlan, hoping to free themselves from Tenochtitlan's tight grip without realizing the far greater anguish that the Spaniards would bring. Despite the awe that Europeans feel to this day for Tenochtitlan's magnificence—the dreamlike manifestation of the legendary, glorious island city—images of Aztec culture are typically painted in rather dark colors. We imagine the Aztecs as deeply imbued with superstition, carrying out questionable military campaigns such as the "flower wars," waged mainly to obtain fresh supplies for cruel and bloody heart sacrifices at Tenochtitlan's main temples. These sacrifices were extensive and shocking rituals on which the Aztecs spent an excessive amount of time, energy, and money. Historians imagined life in Tenochtitlan as harsh and joyless, ruled by the pessimism that only a cyclical concept of time could generate as well as by a deeply felt fatalism dominated by the belief in a near end of the world if the gods were not nourished with an endless supply of sacrifices. Terrified by predictions of doom, Tenochtitlan's last ruler, Motecuhzoma II, easily gave in to the Spanish soldiers commanded by Hernan Cortes, whom Motecuhzoma believed was the god *Quetzalcoatl* returning to reclaim rulership of the Mexica. Thus, when the Spaniards came upon the Aztecs, it was a clash of semiotics, as scholar Tzvetan Todorov (1984) concluded. This clash ultimately led to the Spanish victory because their superior sign system enabled Cortes to think politically, improvise, and act strategically. Motecuhzoma II, on the other hand, was too preoccupied with reading the omens, understanding the will of the gods, and acting according to a tradition that offered no strategy for dealing with the Spaniards. This all-encompassing image of Aztec culture, including the interpretation of their defeat, is strongly shaped by European projections of the Other and by intellectual imperialism rooted in the will to conquer, dominate, and exploit. One of the major objectives of this study is to challenge these images and to attempt to understand—inspired by a postcolonial perspective—how the Aztecs perceived reality. One of the most important steps on this road is to look closely at the sources with a raised level of reflexivity.

Let us begin this endeavor by discussing the use of the term *Aztec.* This name was apparently introduced by Alexander von Humboldt (181o,1997) and made popular by us historian William H. Prescott in his *History of the Conquest of Mexico* (Prescott 1843). Since then, it has generally referred to the mainly Nahuatl-speaking ethnic groups that formed the Aztec Empire in the century before the Spanish conquest. It particularly refers to the Nahuas who lived in Tenochtitlan-Tlatelolco and controlled the Aztec Empire politically and militarily. Humboldt chose this name because it relates to the migration myth of this Nahua group, which recounts how their ancestors had come from a place called *Aztlan* before they settled on an island in Lake Texcoco at the beginning of the fourteenth century CE. However, people living in pre-Hispanic Mexico never used this name themselves. Postclassic Mexico was ethnically diverse, and identity was bound mainly to the locality where one

lived. For example, the inhabitants of Tenochtitlan were the *Tenochca,* the people living in Tlatelolco the *Tlateloka.* Since settling jointly within Lake Texcoco, these two groups collectively identified as the *Mexica.* This denomination was later chosen for the postconquest capital Mexico City and finally for the independent state Mexico itself. When we speak of the Aztecs, it is typically the Mexica as the dominant ethnic group in the Triple Alliance we refer to, and it is the Mexica we have the most knowledge about.

This book, however, will use the name *(ancient) Nahuas* instead' because it includes the larger ethnic group that settled in several towns in the Central Mexican Highlands and which shared the *Nahuatl* language and important cultural and religious traits.[2] Today, more than 1.5 million people speak a variant of Nahuatl, most of them living in Central Mexico, with some major expatriate groups in the United States. Although Nahuatl has changed in the last five hundred years due to internal development and contact with Spanish, contemporary Nahuatl is nevertheless relatively similar to Colonial and Classical Nahuatl. Political officials and notaries used Colonial Nahuatl in early colonial times, whereas Classical Nahuatl is known to us through the writings of the early missionaries and mission-trained Indigenous authors. With the colonial transcription of Classical Nahuatl into the Latin alphabet, regional differences became standardized and a form of orthography established (R. Cortes 2008: go). Most of the sources relevant for this study are written in Classical Nahuatl. With regard to transcription and spelling, throughout this study I use the simplified, modernized Franciscan system for Nahuatl terms to ease the reading for nonlinguist readers (see Bierhorst). The modernized Jesuit system, in comparison, based on the grammar by Jesuit priest Horacio Carochi (Carochi and Lockhart), includes diacritics (especially the marking of long vowels and glottal stops) and thus better serves linguistic needs.

In contrast to the Classic Period Maya, the preconquest Nahuas and their close cultural neighbors, the Mixtecs, used a pictorial writing system instead of a phonographic writing system that notated the sounds of their respective languages. This pictorial writing system uses pictograms that show stylized objects (such as houses) and ideograms that visualize abstract thoughts through combinations of pictograms (such as a temple pierced by an arrow for *conquest)* or conventionalized abstract signs. All signs were arranged on pages in an intricate way, displaying a narrative syntax and complex concepts of time and history (see Leibsohn 1994, Boone 2000). Writing in traditional style on Indigenous paper and linen appears to have prevailed until the seventeenth century, progressively adapted to the changing cultural environment and the changing needs of the Indigenous population in their interaction with the Spanish (Arnold 2002: 227). Mastery of this writing system, however, was gradually lost during colonial times and only a few primary sources from pre-Hispanic Central Mexico written in Indigenous pictorial style have survived the conquest wars, the burning of Indigenous books by frenetic missionaries, and, finally, the corruption of time. What remains is a handful of precolonial manuscripts and several hundred (early) colonial documents (see Cline 1972, 1973,1975a, 1975b), among them tribute records and property plans, histories of ethnic groups and genealogies, calendars and astronomical measurements, and cosmologies and songbooks, along with handbooks for rituals and divination.

Many of the early conquistadores and missionaries acknowledged the Indigenous writing as a proper writing system. Based on its widespread use and its efficiency in communication, they apparently accepted it as equal to their own alphabetical writing. However, some of them classified pictography as a preliminary, evolutionarily primitive stage of writing, thus legitimizing the conquest and subsequent exploitation of the Indigenous people. This opinion came to dominate later European

and American views of the Aztecs. It went hand in hand with European philosophies of language that are rooted in the discourse of the ancient Greeks, link rational discourse with phonographic script, and advocate the intellectual supremacy of (modern) Europe. This ideology has even influenced modern theories of literacy that assert that only phonographic writing is capable of intellectual precision and rationality (e.g., Havelock 1986). As a consequence, pictorial writing systems have remained largely neglected by most European literacy theories, which rely on the (exclusive) definition of *writing* as the visualization of language (see Coulmas 2011). In the last two decades, however, some scholars, based on their analyses of Nahua and Mixtec pictorial writing systems (starting with Boone and Mignolo 1994), have questioned this devaluation. It became obvious that these are highly efficient systems of visual communication comparable to musical or mathematical notation or to geouaphical cartography and are no less capable than phonographic writing systems of transporting complex models of the world and people's place in it.

Although we are still far from comprehensively understanding the surviving pictorial manuscripts, the recent analyses have produced major breakthroughs in reading them. In this study, rather than analyzing the contents and visual structure of single sources, I raise far more basic questions: How does this particular form of visual communication work and what type of knowledge does it express? What does it tell us about the Nahua sense of reality? What semiotic theory informs their writing system? How did the Nahuas relate their writing system to other forms of expression and communication and to (their concepts of) truth and reality (as they perceived it)?

Thus, the study combines two perspectives on Nahua culture: one on their writing system and the other on their religion. In the last few decades, not only Central Mexican writing systems but also Mexican religions have been understudied. Religious aspects of Mesoamerican cultures have not been the prime focus of research among Mesoamericanists for several reasons within the disciplinary history of Mesoamerican studies (see Monaghan z000). Similarly, few scholars of religion—among them David Carrasco and Philip P. Arnold—have specialized in ancient, that is, pre-Hispanic Mesoamerica. In this study, I wish to open a new dialogue between Mesoamerican studies and the study of religion by applying recent theoretical, methodological, and epistemological debates within the academic study of religion to the study of Aztec culture. In doing so, I intend to present a fresh view on the relation between pictography and the Nahua sense of reality.

Outlining the Chapters

This book aims at taking its readers on a journey in search of the ancient Nahua sense of reality, with particular regard to their writing system. For this purpose, we move from general aspects of their cosmovision to the specifics of their semiotics while critically reflecting common representations of Nahua culture and uncovering Eurocentric biases in previous academic interpretations.

Before the actual journey begins, I need to address questions of methodology covering postcolonial approaches to historiography, the challenges of studying the aesthetics of religion, and the journey's objectives. This reflection will prepare us to enter the world of the ancient Nahuas. First, we will examine their general ways of living in cultural diversity and central aspects of their cosmovision, which imagines the human being as embedded in a dense net of cosmic relations. Based on this, we will attain a higher level of abstraction by exploring Nahua ontology, including notions of divinity and concepts of reality in a world they perceived as constantly in motion. After discussing Indigenous epistemology, we will move on to how the Nahuas interacted with this world in motion through a

code of conduct, rituals, and aesthetic media, including the pendulum of the *teixiptla,* a material or human representative of the deities. The insights gained in these chapters will help us to analyze Nahua semiotics in First, we will interpret Nahua language theory regarding the relationship between the linguistic sign and nonlinguistic reality. After closely inspect-the foundations of the Nahua pictorial writing system, we can (re)constructing Indigenous semiotic theory regarding the writing system. Furthermore, we develop an interpretation of Nahua pictography as an efficient system for unicating complex, nonlinguistic kinds of meaning and knowledge t reality, including embodied metaphors and body knowledge. The final chapters summarize the results of the study, draw methodological and theomencal conclusions, and present an outlook for future studies in this field.

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After reaching a momentary end to our journey, I wish to present a short conclusion regarding the subject of *scripture* as well as a summation of my initial objectives and an outlook for potential future research.

One of the most important arguments of this study was to include non-propositional kinds of knowledge and ways of being and acting in the world in our understanding of *religion.* The human being is not a disembodied mind but a sensory being with a body and multiple kinds of experiential sensations. emotions, and feelings acting in the world in many forms of practices. Above this, we use various types of media and material objects in a wide range of ways, challenging the idea that these serve only as a "medium" for mediating and communicating (propositional) meaning. I started this study with an interest in *scripture,* which is traditionally defined as a particular type of "sacred' text. In popular discourse, *scriptures* identified with "sacred texts" are predominantly regarded as the central medium for learning about other religions, and even within the academic study of religion, the concept has only recently been criticized.

Analyses of Nahua culture challenge the traditional concept of *scripture* in several ways. First, Nahua written texts were so deeply embedded in oral performances that common distinctions between oral and literate societies do not match. These performative contexts draw our attention to the bodily and material aspects of semantic expressions. Confronted with Nahua ways of reading, we become aware that our contemporary practice of silent reading is by no means the only form for engaging with "texts" (and images). Consequently, engagement with the Nahuas motivates us to reflect and study the history of media usage in Europe more extensively. Second, Nahua texts challenge the idea that thoughts are best expressed linguistically, an idea related to the ideology of alphabetical writing. They do so because Nahua pictography also visually employs other forms of thinking, such as embodied conceptual metaphors. A**s** a consequence, Nahua pictography also challenges ideas of knowledge that exclusively focus on the linguistic expression of propositions. Finally, the generally high significance of practice and aesthetics in Nahua religion draws our attention to the many ways of being religious beyond creedal beliefs and intellectual engagement.

Contemporary academic semiotic theories are deeply rooted in the European history of ideas and in many cases are strongly influenced by the debates within European religions about the proper use of different media. Within Christianity, extensive disputes about the ontological nature and representational function of images led to several schisms. In Plate's judgment, no other religion has spent so much time on these questions and established such a "vast theological corpus of doctrines on images" (2002b: 55). Although the European arts were increasingly secularized after the Renaissance, the evolving new theories of representation were still deeply rooted within this

discursive tradition. Similarly, many contemporary academic theories about the relationships between signs or images and reality are firmly located within European ontological and epistemological frameworks. Drawing on the Western tradition of suspecting the image, many scholars within the field of Visual Culture caution against the manipulative power of images. With a background in critical theory, some of these scholars are openly critical of the increasing oculocentrism within contemporary mass media and fear the related loss of alphabetical literacy among the populace, which is equated with the loss of the intellectual achievements of the Western-European civilization. Analyzing and reflecting the discursive roots of European theories about images and writing systems should be the first task of any academic research in this field.

Correspondingly, we need more awareness of the fact that people in non-European cultures often developed different semiotic theories embedded within specific cultural aesthetics and complex epistemologies and ontologies. Annette Hornbacher (2014) convincingly demonstrated this using the example of esoteric script mysticism in Bali. Interestingly, many religious image practices do not consider the image as a passive object made (merely) by human hands but attribute agency to it. For example, in Catholicism, statues of the Virgin Mary weeping tears or blood are popular. In India, deity statues have the capacity for *dargan,* that is, the power of the auspicious sight. In general, religious images are attributed with many different forms of agency; the most prevalent appears to be the power of healing. Furthermore, there are diverse, sometimes elaborate explanations about how images or statues enter into a state of agency.

In colonial Mexico, the Franciscan image doctrine declined in the second half of the sixteenth century while the belief in the agency of images grew. The worship of the "miraculous image" reached its climax in the seventeenth century, when images were "endowed with their own life, capable of regulation and autoregulation" (Gruzinski 2001: 129). This image concept incorporated many aspects of the pre-Hispanic idea of the *teixiptla,* which attributed agentive power to images and statues. We do not know whether the pre-Hispanic Nahuas also assigned agency to written texts in their materiality, while they did so to paper in its unwritten form. This is different from many material text practices in other traditions, in which efficacy is endowed to paper only through the signs written on it. There are, for example, contemporary practices of ingesting paper inscribed with text from the Qur'an for healing purposes or the practice of wearing amulets enclosing written texts for protective purposes in the Roman Empire.

The belief in the agency of images and the efficacy of texts in their materiality is one important aspect of Indigenous semiotic theories awaiting cross-cultural comparison. Another aspect concerns the assumed relationship between the sign and reality and the question of which part of reality the sign might represent. According to my interpretative theory, Nahua semiotics was based on the idea that the sign presented the underlying structures of the cosmos. This idea resembles a specific interpretation of Chinese calligraphy as a visual medium for expressing the organizing structures of the universe. While the mandalas of Tibetan Buddhism are generally believed to represent intrapsychic sceneries and the cycle of reincarnation, Islamic calligraphy, according to the semiotic theory by Lois Ibsen Al-Faruqi, seeks to "express the non-representableness, the inexpressibility, of the divine" and to "suggest infinity". Thus, Islamic calligraphy is the visual embodiment of the crystallization of the spiritual realities *(al-haqa 1q)* contained in the Islamic revelation. This calligraphy provides the external dress for the Word of God in the visible world but this art remains wedded to the world of the spirit, for according to the traditional Islamic saying, "Calligraphy is the geometry of the Spirit."

These examples only superficially sketch emic semiotic theories; what is needed is a thorough comparison of differences and similarities.

Taking the complexity of emic semiotic theories and the fundamental differences in their related epistemologies and ontologies into account, any academic theory with cross-cultural aspirations may easily fall short. It may turn out that the academic theory is simply one more semiotic theory embedded within its respective culture, in this case within the secular ontology and epistemology of the modern Western sciences. Along these lines, I see some shortcomings in the theory proposed by Meyer. She understands media and materiality in the context of religion as mediations "between the levels of humans and some spiritual, divine, or transcendental force". Correspondingly, she defined *religions* as "the ways in which people link up with; or even feel touched by, a meta-empirical sphere that may be glossed as supernatural, sacred, divine, or transcendental". Taking "the material and sensory dimension" as an intrinsic feature of *religion,* she understands *religion* "as a practice of mediation that organizes the relationship between experiencing subjects and the transcendental via particular sensational forms". Specifically regarding images, Meyer proposed that these make the invisible visible, represent "an absent signified," and "operate as symbolic forms that mediate that signified and in so doing constitute reality". Although Meyer aimed at disengaging the antisomatist and antimaterialist tendencies in the study of religion, this semiotic theory nevertheless maintains a European ontological dualism that is not necessarily cross-culturally applicable. As I have argued in several places, it does not apply to Nahua monist ontology.

The theory *could* apply to Nahua ontology, however, if we exclude its ontological statement about matter mediating the transcendent and reduce it to state merely that the image or sign presents the "invisible." After doing so, the theory could be related to a more secular academic semiotic theory arguing that signs might be able to represent the ineffable, in the sense of a "quality or state that applies to things that are incapable of being expressed in words". The ineffable, understood in this way, could include mystic experiences of "the sacred," as Rudolf phrased it, or visions gained in altered states of consciousness but also philosophical ideas of "contradiction, paradox, and impossibility". Finally, it could also refer to kinds of nonpropositional knowledge that are difficult to express linguistically. In this way, my interpretative theory of Nahua pictography could be regarded as a more secular variant of a contemporary academic semiotic theory, because it argues that Nahua pictography offers a means to express embodied conceptual metaphors and other kinds of body knowledge.

The theoretical approach discussed in the last paragraph focuses on one aspect of human media usage, the semiotic aspect theorizing the relationship between the sign and reality and defining which aspect of reality the sign is believed to mediate. This idea of semiotics appears to be closely derived from the traditional understanding of material objects as symbols mediating a non-material meaning and also from the traditional understanding of media as a means of communication that transports a message like a parcel from the sender to the recipient. Searching for a more radical shift in perspective, we might turn to approaches theorizing the many other ways in which human beings use, relate to, interpret, and make sense with media and material objects, approaches that understand meaningmaking as an integrated bodily process. One approach along these lines is Schilbrack's recent introduction of the theory of material culture as cognitive prosthetics into the study of religion. After these concluding remarks about the study of semiotics in the context of the aesthetics of religion, it is time to summarize the work done in this study. One of its central academic objectives was to start an interdisciplinary dialogue between Mesoamerican studies and the

study of religion. On one hand, I intended to change the perspective on Mesoamerican cultures by seeing it from viewpoints recently developed within the study of religion. On the other hand, I intended to test whether theories from the study of religion hold ground when applied to Mesoamerican cultures. In sum, I followed Mignolo's intention: "In writing this book I was more interested in exploring new ways of thinking about what we know than to accumulate new knowledge under old ways of thinking".

The temporary endpoint of my journey into the world of the pre-Hispanic Nahuas was to propose two interpretations: first, an interpretative (re)construction of Nahua semiotic theory based on their sense of reality and, second, a theory about the modus operandi of Nahua pictography seen from the perspective of contemporary academic theories. In this, I opted for an interdisciplinary approach and, consequently, faced the impossibility of doing justice to the sophistication that some theoretical debates have reached within their home disciplines. I am aware that in many cases I only scratched the surface of these debates and surely missed many ideas that have already been thought_ Furthermore, I surely missed complete discussions that would have matched my objectives, regarding both my interpretation of Nahua culture and the theoretical scenery I painted in the last chapter. Finally, I more or less deliberately excluded fields of research simply because I needed to establish an end to an already long journey. One of these fields, for example, is formed by Germanspeaking image theories, another by recent German research projects on the materiality of writing (see, e.g., Strafing 2006). Unfortunately, I was unable to include results of the Research Training Group "*Notational Iconicity*": *On the Materiality, Perceptibility and Operativity of Writing* (German Research Foundation) located at the Freie Universitat Berlin,[1] although it followed a theoretical agenda similar to my own. Similarly, the results of the running collaborate research project on material text cultures at Heidelberg University await further discussion.

Other fields include research on epigrams and seals in ancient history or analyses of the many different writing systems of the world done in several area studies. I have sketched in broad strokes only the European history of philosophies of language, writing, and the arts, and largely excluded extensive details of the philosophical debates based on Kant, Wittgenstein, or Derrida. Furthermore, I touched only briefly on the field of (comparative) semiotics, which might have provided interesting perspectives on my research material, at least in those cases in which it is cross-culturally applicable and translatable for interdisciplinary dialogue. Furthermore, I only quickly mentioned the promising research field of the psychology of art and aesthetics (see, e.g. Tinio and Smith 2014). The main intention of the study was not to cover all those fields comprehensively but to open up interdisciplinary dialogue and to provide a springboard for further discussions.

As a consequence, there is much work left to do in future studies following the theoretical perspective of this study. Specifically, I see a large potential in the transdisciplinary dialogue between the studies of religion, art history, aesthetics, visual studies, perceptual psychology, cognitive science, and many area studies that discuss the ways in which human beings make meaning from and with visual systems of communication and the ways in which they position themselves within the world through the visual sense. More generally, I dream of expanding our academic and scientific knowledge about the sensorial, bodily, emotional, medial, and material ways of being and acting in the world in the context of religious and cultural traditions and their interrelationships with cognitive processes and among one another. This also includes comparative studies between different religious and cultural aesthetics, semiotic theories, and epistemologies.

There is also much work left to do in future studies on the culture and religion of the pre-Hispanic Nahuas as well as on contemporary Nahuas and their colonial and postcolonial history and, more broadly, on Mesoamerican cultures and their histories in general. Specifically with respect to the pre-Hispanic Nahuas, one central objective of this study was to reassess previous academic representations of Nahua religion and semiotic concepts. In this, I put great emphasis on the analysis and reflection of secondary literature on the Nahuas. Future studies are needed to test my interpretations and theories on more and specific primary source material.

All in all, my prime motivation was to understand a little better the pre-Hispanic Nahua sense of reality. Much has already been written about the question whether historical and cross-cultural understanding is possible at all.

Being aware of the limitations of this understanding, I am still interested in listening to the Nahuas rather than giving up on the matter by thinking that I could, in the end, only understand myself. Most certainly, there are aspects of unconscious Othering in my work and failed attempts to transcend my own concepts and thinking patterns. I hope that my colleagues, contemporary and future, Nahua and non-Nahua, will have a clearer vision to finding these projections and misunderstandings. Furthermore, I reached my interpretative theories through high levels of abstraction from the data given in individual sources. Consequently, my theory homogenizes individual, social, regional, ethnic, and historical variations in a complex culture that was rapidly expanding, diversifying, and transforming. Generalizing these differences to construct underlying characteristics of a shared culture involves high degrees of interpretation and most probably also of projection. Hence, the resulting interpretation that I offered is not only abstract but also probably different from what any individual pre-Hispanic Nahua would have thought. While my intention was to stay close and truthful to the primary sources and not to work *against* their evidence, I also used the interpretations of my scholarly predecessors and sometimes reached highly speculative ground. My intention was to make better sense of Nahua culture based on the available sources than earlier interpretations could. Notwithstanding this, I do not claim to have any better access to Aztec affect, sense, and thought than those earlier interpretations. I simply offered a new attempt to search for cross-cultural historical semiotic understanding.

In all this, I am aware of the intrinsic paradoxy of my understanding of academic knowledge. While the basic drive of my academic research echoes positivist and teleological interests because it searches for approaches and theories fitting and explaining reality better than earlier ones, at the same time it is deeply postcolonial and postmodern because I am quite aware of the limits of human understanding. The only solution to this dilemma appears to be to adopt a ludic attitude, as Sam Gill proposed in his discussion of Jonathan Z. Smith's methods of comparison:

> Play, as demonstrated to us by Smith as a double-face, is holding at once comic and tragic perspectives, the oscillatory and iterative negotiation of fit, the acknowledgment that we must stand somewhere despite knowing that there is ultimately no justifiable place on which to stand to comprehend the world. To embrace this absurdity is particularly suited, one might even say singularly so, as the attitude for the modern academic study of religion. It is the perspective from which we can simultaneously embrace two or more opposing positions without declaring ourselves mad. <>

On Fear, Horror, and Terror: Giving Utterance to the Unutterable *Edited by* Pedro Querido and María Ibáñez- Rodríguez [At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, Brill, Rodopi, 9789004397989]

This volume brings together essays that examine a vast gamut of different contemporary cultural manifestations of fear, anxiety, horror, and terror. Topics range from the feminine sublime in American novels to the monstrous double in horror fiction, (in)security at music festivals, the uncanny in graphic novels, epic heroes' Being-towards-death and authenticity, atrocity and history in Central European art, the theme of old age in absurdist literature, and iterations of the "home invasion" subgenre in post-9/11 popular culture. This diversity of insights and methodologies ensures a kaleidoscopic look at a cluster of phenomena and experiences that often manage to both be immediately and universally recognizable and defy straightforward categorization or even description. Contributors are Emily-Rose Carr, Ghada Saad Hassan, Woodrow Hood, María Ibáñez-Rodríguez, Nicole M. Jowsey, Marta Moore, Pedro Querido and Ana Romão.

We are genetically programmed to feel fear. As in many other species, DNA awakens a fear response to potential threats. Fear can be said to be an essential element in our lives, and to have an immanence and a genetic- biological and psycho-social consubstantiality.

Humanists and scientists agree that fear arises when a human being believes, with or without reason, in the existence of a more or less obvious possibility of some kind of danger to them. In principle, then, any phenomenon, situation, thought, animal, or thing can at a certain moment inspire fear. However, what for some can produce terrifying fear, for others might be nothing more than a curiosity, something even attractive. And yet, there are certain fears that are common to all human beings, a phenomenon that has been verified even when taking into account not only the geographical dispersion but also the historical moment in which they develop their lives.

Fear has become one of the dominant feelings in today's society: both the fear that arises from the collective circumstances as weather calamities, wars, or galloping economic crises, and the one that arises from within, especially from our brain, such as phobia, anxiety, terror, anguish, panic, and uncertainty. In addition, the growing influence of mass media in our behavior may cause fears to multiply and appear more terrible than they really are.

We have all experienced fear on some occasion, and we all use a variety of terms related to it and that designate different types and degrees of the same basic emotion: fear, horror, panic, terror, among others. Fear brings us closer to reality through intuition, and from that moment on it becomes knowledge and represents a universal language. The terms related to fear, panic, and terror have a cause and origin in stimuli that are objective, definable, and generated in response to a given fact or defined object.

The news and events of the last decades have shown the importance of fear in public life. Fear as such and its triggering factors are present in the press, political discourse, neuroscience, and political philosophy. In today's modern society, ancestral fears of nature, hunger, wars, sickness, and death are no longer so prominent. Before, we were only in contact with the most immediate and obvious fears. Now, however, we have to confront all the possible fears of the world.

The existence of a more or less direct correspondence between periods of convulsion or social insecurity and the deepest and most atavistic fears (loss of identity, submission, mutilation, death) of the human being has also been thoroughly studied. For instance, in her work *Fear: A Cultural History*, Joanna Bourke stated that we are now generally more afraid than in the nineteenth century.

The nineteenth century was prolific in explanations and treatises on fear, concerning both the physical and the psychological aspects. The pioneers of American psychology considered fear an innate emotion deeply rooted in the mind, along with the feelings of love, hate, anger, and joy. In 1812, Benjamin Rush, a forerunner of American psychiatry, published his work *Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon the Diseases of the Mind*, in which he stated that fear is a form of madness that can be cured by sudden impressions of fear, terror, and even ridicule.

According to later psychoanalytic theory, fear is a form of anxiety. Once that anxiety is experienced, the ego or conscious part of the mind sets in motion some defense mechanisms constituted by unconscious reactions that distort reality.

The differences between the concepts of terror and horror have also been discussed by various authors. Devendra Varma argues that the difference between the two can be compared to that between apprehension and verification. However, for G. R. Thompson terror is related to physical and mental pain, while horror suggests an immense diabolical and moral decline In literary terms, we prefer to subscribe to St. Armand's theory, whereby the main difference is not established in terms of quantity or quality of feeling but at its root: terror attacks the reader from the outside, while horror is born within the reader. Therefore, while terror can easily be overcome by closing the book, horror cannot.

Surely, all possible fears, quantitatively speaking, have been more or less the same throughout history, but the information society has brought us closer to them. Also, many fears have become global: consider such plights as terrorism, organized crime, epidemics, and climate change, not to mention economic crises. All of them are clear examples that make us possibly have reason to be more fearful than in previous centuries.

There are many situations that provoke, awaken, or suggest fear. We are constantly confronted with, consuming and discussing media images of horror, both fictional and factual – for example, images that trigger sensations of fear, anguish, or terror, such as the strange, the dark, the uncertain, the deformed, the disproportionate, that which has no life but moves or acts, and, let us not forget, the fear of the unknown.

Yet while such images may evoke fear, horror, and terror, they cannot explain them, or even help us comprehend them. This book aims to analyze, problematize, and ultimately shed light on such feelings, their workings, their manifestations, and their concomitant networks of cultural meanings and social relations. Those aims are pursued by putting together a collection of essays that deals with these issues from disparate perspectives and adopts a healthy variety of different approaches.

Emily- Rose Carr looks at how Chuck Palahniuk's *Fight Club* and Bret Easton Ellis's *American Psycho* can be fruitfully read through the lens of the feminine sublime, whereby the subject experiencing terror does not engage in a power struggle with the object bent on dominating it, as in the traditional sublime, but is instead a willing participant in the terror, thus becoming both a victim and a victimizer.

Ghada Saad Hassan writes on the monstrous double in Arabic contemporary horror fiction, namely in Ahmed Khaled Towfik's *Utopia*. Acknowledging the importance of historical, social, and cultural contexts that necessarily inform one's definition of what is monstrous, she sets out to analyze *Utopia*'s far from implicit engagement with current political events in the Arab world, as well as to examine the notion of "abject" monster and the feelings of fear and horror that they can stir in the individual and collective psyche in accordance with Michel Foucault's concept of power.

Woodrow Hood discusses issues of protection and security at music gatherings, taking Moogfest as his case in point. He meditates on how the imperative for entertainment and free play can sometimes trump any idea of implementing tight security measures even in these turbulent times we are living in today.

María Ibáñez- Rodríguez pinpoints contemporary graphic novels that are conceived in a distinctly Gothic mode and thematize horror and the uncanny. In particular, she interprets Joe Hill's *Locke & Key* as an example of such a work of fiction, in which fear and terror come from both within and without and interact with each other: feelings of terror, seemingly instilled by outside forces, are revealed as outward projections of inner fears; and individual fears are suffused with alternative meanings of wider significance in the contemporary context of the dawning of global terrorism.

Nicole M. Jowsey analyzes how the fear of death is experienced and eventually overcome by both ancient and modern epic heroes, namely Achilleus and Harry Potter. Martin Heidegger provides the theoretical framework which allows her to read each of these heroes' not unhesitant but brave because conscious march toward their very demise as the fulfilment of their destiny, thus becoming Being- toward- death and achieving true authenticity in the process.

Marta Moore focuses on what she defines as the Central European genre, which is clearly delimitated both in spatial and temporal terms. Artists hailing from different linguistic, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, such as Danilo Kis, Milan Kundera, Czeslaw Milosz, and Gyorgy Konrad, among others, are seen as the creators of a socially engaged body of work that derives its cohesion from common experiences of political upheaval and from the two key elements that emanate directly from such experiences: atrocity and history.

Pedro Querido examines the fear of aging and what it portends, a fear that is brought into stark relief in absurdist literature and drama. He lists some of the more common thematizations of aging characters in absurdist works, investigates the possible reasons behind the correlation between the theme of old age and artistic representations of the philosophical concept of the absurd, and considers the merits of perceiving old age as the radicalization of the human condition.

Finally, Ana Romão delves into cultural manifestations of the horror subgenre of the "home invasion" in light of the 9/ 11 terrorist attacks. She studies Michael Haneke's 1997 film *Funny Games* and its 2007 shot-for-shot remake, drawing on Derrida's Law/ laws of hospitality the better to dissect the terror inducing distortions of the host/ guest roles and dynamics in the films. Comments on the inevitable new meanings that arise from recreating an almost identical work ten decades later in a radically changed political climate are complemented by Haneke's views on his own work and on the contemporary consumption of media violence that he meant to critique.

Even this diverse array of contributions to the ongoing debates on fear, horror, and terror cannot properly account for their manifold manifestations and iterations. Just like a lifetime is rarely sufficient for the psychoanalytical process of plumbing the deeper recesses of our unconscious, so must some facets of these primeval feelings remain ever in the dark. That is part of their frightfulness – and, not seldom, part of their allure.

Both Victimizer and Victim: Terror and the Feminine Sublime in *American Psycho* and *Fight Club by Emily-Rose Carr*

Terror and the sublime have been linked in theoretical material by numerous academics, including notable sublime theorists Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, and Barbara Freeman. In the traditional sublime theories of Burke and Kant, terror is experienced at a distance, and it is precisely this distance which facilitates the sublime emotion. However, instances of contemporary American fiction indicate a rejection of this separating distance: they portray characters who desire to be participants in, and facilitators of, terror, thus aligning closely with the feminine sublime theory that Freeman champions. This chapter will explore, specifically, how the protagonists of Chuck Palahniuk's *Fight Club* (1996) and Bret Easton Ellis's *American Psycho* (1991) explore manifestations of Freeman's feminine sublime through their dual role of violator and victim of the terror they perpetuate in the novels. While a notable amount of violent, frightening, or Gothic literature portrays a world in which a monstrous anomaly disrupts an otherwise normal society, *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* refute this tradition with examples of inherently unstable, frightening, and terrible environments in which they are willing participants. Considering this, this chapter will argue that *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* indicate not only a sublime experience with the application of terror in the novels but also that it is through this application that the specific feminine sublime manifests itself – the protagonists of each novel demonstrate the desire to be victims of the very terror they are perpetuating, suggesting a rejection of the distance that defines the traditional sublime formula.

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I am often met with shock when I tell people I am researching the sublime pleasure found in *American Psycho* (1991) and *Fight Club* (1996). This is a reasonable response for anyone familiar with the novels: categorizing these books as sublime is, understandably, not an instinctual conclusion to draw considering their ultraviolent scenes and toxic masculinity. Although the two novels share multiple commonalities and receive a similar admiration among contemporary pop culture audiences,

their incredibly violent content and undertones of horror and misogyny suggest that a sublime evaluation (a feminine sublime evaluation, no less) is not one such commonality.

As this chapter will demonstrate, this assumption is understandable, but mistaken. Using the theoretical framework of Barbara Freeman's 1995 work *The Feminine Sublime: Gender and Excess in Women's Fiction*, I will explore how the feminine sublime is manifest in both *American Psycho* and *Fight Club*. In these novels, the feminine sublime manifests itself through its treatment of terror; the movement toward terror and the participation in acts of terror align *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* with Freeman's feminine sublime. These two examples of contemporary American fiction portray characters who desire to be participants in, and facilitators of, terror – aligning closely with the feminine sublime theory that Freeman champions. This chapter will explore, specifically, how the protagonists of Chuck Palahniuk's *Fight Club* and Bret Easton Ellis's *American Psycho* reveal a manifestation of Freeman's feminine sublime through their dual role of both victimizers and victims of the terror they perpetuate in the novels.

Before we explore the intricacies of Freeman's feminine sublime and its manifestation in the works of Ellis and Palahniuk, it is important to distinguish the traditional, masculine sublime from its feminine counterpart. There is a significant disparity between the traditional, masculine sublime theories of Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant, arguably the two most notable sublime theorists in philosophy, and the feminine sublime theory of Freeman. In this chapter, the two different theoretical clusters will be referred to as the masculine/ traditional sublime (for the sublime theories of Burke and Kant) and the feminine sublime (for Freeman's theory). While both variations of sublime theory accept the definition of sublimity as that which inspires awe and terror in its subject, the way in each theory treats this premise varies dramatically. Therefore, when the term sublime is used independently of a theoretical context, it is referring to this feeling of terror and awe. When it is placed in a socio-historical context, and is theorized with a specifically male- gendered experience in mind, it will be referred to as the traditional sublime or the masculine sublime. Similarly, when speaking exclusively of Freeman's theory, it will be classified as the feminine sublime.

In traditional sublime theory, Burke and Kant both agree on the basic principles of the sublime experience: a (male) subject encounters a terrifying "other," usually a natural force so powerful that it threatens to overwhelm him with its sheer magnitude. The subject, when faced with the terrifying other, is simultaneously confronted with concepts that are too obscure to reconcile, like the infinity of death, or the vastness of the universe. The basis of the sublime experience, then, is essentially a power struggle between subject and object. The conclusion of the sublime experience for the male subject always involves a domination over the destabilizing other that threatens to disrupt his sense of self.

Freeman's feminine sublime subverts these traditional, "masculine" sublime theories put forward by theorists like Burke and Kant. Freeman claims that "the feminine sublime is neither a rhetorical mode nor an aesthetic category but a domain of experience that resists categorization, in which the subject enters into relation with an otherness – social, aesthetic, political, ethical, erotic – that is excessive and unrepresentable." The consensual participation of subject with frightening object – or entering into relation with an otherness, to borrow Freeman's phrase – is at the center of the feminine sublime theory. Freeman argues that this is what distinguishes the feminine sublime from the traditional masculine sublime theories of Burke and Kant, and her theory was developed in direct response to the mode of domination present in masculine sublime theory: what does the sublime look like from a female perspective, where domination over the other is neither the

objective nor outcome of the sublime experience? In the feminine sublime, the components are the same as in the traditional sublime: there is a subject who comes into contact with a terrifying other that threatens their sense of self with its sheer vastness or obscurity. However, the outcome of the feminine sublime equation is different. Where the traditional sublime has domination as an equal part of the sublime equation, the feminine sublime removes it altogether. Because of the way the subject interacts with terror, obscurity, and destabilization in the feminine sublime, the experience can no longer be placed into an equation at all. The feminine sublime experience, then, no longer becomes a struggle between opposing powers, but a conscious choice to become part of the obscurity that the subject encounters. According to Freeman, the sublime subject (who she explicitly states does not have to be female, despite the gendered name of the theory) identifies this frightening and destabilizing other, and rather than wanting to dominate it, they move toward it.

The connection between Freeman's feminine sublimity and *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* seems counterintuitive when considering the misogynistic content in both books. Arguably, though, claiming that these novels cannot align with any kind of feminine sympathies or analysis is a knee- jerk claim often touted by readers who have, incorrectly, assumed that the violence and misogyny in the novels is a political agenda being preached by their respective authors. What we will come to see is that both *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* clearly demonstrate a feminine sublime experience, in which the characters want to be participants in terror. *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* share a proclivity for anarchy: the characters in both novels either create or reinforce the presence of a destabilized world, a world in which terror is the key tool through which change is attempted and, occasionally, achieved. The circular nature of the creation of this terror, though, is that they create terror as a response to the equally terrible societies of which they are products. The terror they create then makes their societies more terrible, and in turn they become both perpetrator and victim of the terrible societies they inhabit. They are, in other words, surrendering to and participating in the alterity that exceeds them, and demonstrating the feminine sublime experience.

It has been argued that upon their respective publications, wider audiences missed the point(s) of *American Psycho* and *Fight Club*. Or perhaps, rather than failing to see the point(s) of the novels altogether, the texts were read too literally: from the day of the novels' publications (and in the case of *American Psycho*, even prior to its publication), the terror and acts of brutality in each novel were interpreted by mass media and the public as being how- to guides for the production of anarchy and terror. Such was the controversy over the release of *American Psycho* that, in 1990, *New York Times* journalist Richard Bernstein detailed how prior to publication, public anger over *American Psycho*'s impending release, particularly concentrated from the Los Angeles chapter of the National Organization for Women (now), who sought to boycott the novel, grew to such a level that it resulted in the publisher at the time – Simon & Schuster – voiding their contract with Ellis mere weeks before the novel was scheduled to be published and (reportedly) letting him walk away with his $300,000 advance. Despite this, and the severe criticism that resulted from the publication of out- of- context, "grisly" passages in *Time* and *Spy* magazines, *American Psycho* was published by Random House, and "critics, such as Roger Rosenblatt of the *New York Times*, follow[ed] the lead of NOW and call[ed] upon would- be readers to 'snuff this book.' " While the history of publication for *Fight Club* is hardly as controversial as Ellis's work's, *Fight Club* still garnered a significant amount of negative criticism, especially after the release of the 1999 film of the same name. Palahniuk details how "they [the critics] called it 'too dark.' 'Too violent.' 'Too strident and shrill and dogmatic.' "

The meticulousness with which *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* lay out the directions for terror initially rendered them as literature to be avoided. However, in the case of both novels, there has been a shift in their critical reception in the time since their initial publication. Stephen Wenley writes that "it is noteworthy that both books were misread and criticized for embodying aspects of society that the authors arguably set out to undermine." Wenley goes on to echo the claim that if anyone had "bother[ed] to read" *American Psycho*, they would agree that "Bret Easton Ellis spent three years writing this novel, and it is a novel – not a 'How- to- manual,' nor true- crime, not a manifesto or a tract." The relevance of this shift in critical appreciation – from disregarding the texts because of their violence to acknowledging them as valuable in spite of their content – is that it allows, if not encourages, alternative readings of the terror in the texts beyond simply suggesting that the terror as it appears must be read literally, or even that, because Ellis and Palahniuk determine it so, terror in the form of individual violence and defilement or mass terror are the inevitable outcomes of current (or at least 1990s) American society.

Because terror is a key component of the traditional sublime equation, it cannot be neglected in any comprehensive study of the sublime: Christine Bat-tersby's *The Sublime, Terror and Human Difference* offers an in- depth analysis of terror and the sublime: "The pleasurable shudder at the sublime," Battersby notes, "has been with us since the late seventeenth century." She continues: "The sublime [is] bound up with a 'stretching' of the nerve fibers: with tension and with feelings of terror and infinity generated by power, obscurity, magnitude, difficulty, absences (such as solitude, silence and darkness) and impressions of endlessness." As Battersby indicates, there is an interrelated connection between terror and sublimity and power, and this connection provides a conceptual link to the broad inspiration for this research – for the sublime, withstanding some element of terror is necessary to reach a form of pleasure.

As will be explored, *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* demonstrate a shared proclivity for anarchy: the characters in both novels either create or reinforce the presence of a destabilized world, a world in which terror is the key tool through which change is attempted and, occasionally, achieved. Contrasting with the traditional masculine sublime, which cites domination as its primary mode in portraying a world where destabilization is actively created and encouraged by "anonymous" protagonists, the novels suggest a feminine sublime manifestation.

Traditional "masculine" examples of domination via destruction can be found as early as written history, and are keenly evident in the Bible: "Arguably the greatest source of the sublime for European art is the Bible, which begins with the creation of the world and ends with apocalypse and the Last Judgement." One of the more overt examples of domination is the tale of an angry God displaying His power and rage at Sodom and Gomorrah and sending a shower of fire and brimstone to punish the cities for their various sins, specifically that of widespread homosexuality. Here, God not only wishes to punish Sodom and Gomorrah, the intent is to appear *glorious* – not only is He exempt from the destruction he causes, He also wishes to make the citizens feel exalted at this act. The focus here is on the *recognition* sought by this Old- Testament, vengeful God: He wishes to exercise His power against the sinners of Sodom and Gomorrah, and He wants them to feel overwhelmed and in awe of His ability to do so.

This approach to the sublime, then, is in the vein of the traditional masculine mode of sublime domination – God quite literally dominates the residents of the city through violence and power. Reminiscent of this historical and theological inclination towards terror as a tool to promote the dominating sublimity of an all- powerful deity, *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* present what are

intended to be "typical" male characters that also seek to shape the world around them through acts of terror and violence. However, in doing so, the characters are both the creators of violence *and* citizens in the violent world they worked to construct. They are both the perpetrator and the victim of the violent acts of terror that they encourage – rather than committing acts of terror with the knowledge that they will be exempt from their effects, they commit them despite also implicating themselves as victims. This is demonstrated, as we will see, by moments of self- reflection in which the protagonists of each text acknowledge the failings of their respective societies. By acknowledging these failings, they simultaneously suggest that they will also be the victims of any violent changes or acts of terror that they enact.

In his 2015 book *American Terror: The Feeling of Thinking in Edwards, Poe, and Melville*, Paul Hurh claims that there are "two tonal traditions in American literature – one bright and optimistic, organized around Emerson and expressed in the possibilities and desires of Whitman and Thoreau; the other dark and pessimistic, organized around Poe and expressed in the cynicisms of Hawthorne and Melville and in the more troubled lyrics of Dickinson." This "dark side," according to Hurh, is often discussed but rarely defined – the darkness and terror often associated with Poe and Melville and the Gothic genre, particularly in relation to American fiction, is, according to Hurh, discussed at length but never explicitly articulated. Relating to the key question of the aesthetics of fear – "Why would humans want to scare themselves? Of what artistic value is terror?" – Hurh suggests that the value inherent to terror, and its effectiveness in literature (particularly American literature), is found in looking toward the broader destabilization that terror encourages: "terror is the sublime stripped of its subjective orientation; it is sublime without safety, without the aesthetic judgement that would rescue the threatened ascendency of the rational subject."

Here, Hurh provides the foundation for a definition of terror that informs this chapter in its resonance with the differentiation of the masculine and feminine sublime. Terror, for Hurh, is universal and destabilizing – there is no safe distance from which to experience terror. In relation to this claim, Hurh distinguishes very clearly the differences between horror and terror. The masculine sublime is often marked by moments of domination and appropriation, and Hurh describes horror as possessing the same qualities – in Hurh's definition of horror, a dangerous "other" infects an otherwise "normal" world; an example would be the horror evoked by Frankenstein's monster, who was a supernatural aberration in an otherwise natural environment: "Horror is thus closely associated with outrage in its normative assumptions, the sense that something is out of place and that the anomaly must be assimilated or destroyed." In discussions around and examples of horror there is, then, a focus on domination that aligns with the traditional theories on the masculine sublime: the components of horror literature present themselves as irregularities in an otherwise normal world – the (often male) occupants of these worlds can identify these irregularities and seek to destroy them in order to return the status quo and the safety of predictability.

Hurh's definition of terror, on the other hand, is the inverse of his interpretation of horror. While horror shows an otherwise normal and pleasant society destabilized by a dangerous external component, terror suggests that the world itself is inherently unstable, unpredictable, and dangerous: "Rather than the world being known and stable, terror occurs when the world itself becomes out of place. In this, it isn't the external monster threatening the Apollonian universe but rather a glimpse of the possibility that Apollonian universe is actually quite brutal and inhuman." This deeper terror is found in the knowledge that the "normal" world simply does not exist, and that, at its basest mode of operation, the world itself is inherently unstable, chaotic, and painful to participate in. To borrow

Hurh's analogy, it is found in the realization that the Apollonian universe – known for its logic, structure, and critical distance – is not logical and structured at all, and that the foundations on which these assessments are built are, and have always been, incorrect. It is the knowledge that true terror is not that Frankenstein's creature can exist in the first place, but rather that the world is such an unstable and frightening place that the creature was doomed from the moment of its creation. Terror is found in the knowledge that the creature did not destabilize an otherwise stable world, but rather, its existence highlighted what was there all along: "in most moments of horror, there is also the possibility of latent terror, that what the horror indicates is not an aberration but rather some deeper truth of the instability of our worldly paradigms." The manifestations of *American Psycho* and *Fight Club*, when considering this all- encompassing and inherently destabilized interpretation of terror as articulated by Hurh, are examples of texts where the protagonists suspect that the world they inhabit is quite terrible, but they seek to promote this terror and destabilization among society. In this way, the texts manifest a feminine sublime experience and depict worlds in which the protagonists embrace chaos and terror over the "normalcy" that the traditional masculine sublime would value.

An argument could be made against the specific sublime *pleasure* in this feminine sublime interpretation of *American Psycho* and *Fight Club*. Sublime narratives and sublime encounters have become easily identifiable, and – to an extent (particularly in Gothic fiction) – formulaic. They also, to a large extent, contain a less ambiguous moral standpoint, making the (usually male) hero or protagonist of the text easy to identify with and support through his encounter with the other that exceeds him. *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* are not afforded the same construction as traditional sublime literature and, as a result, would not benefit from the same theoretical treatment that is given to those texts: while traditional sublime fiction tends to be rather somber in both its approach and reception, the joy evoked by *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* as they successfully mock and subvert the consumer- driven environments that produced them suggests an alignment with satire, a view shared by critics and authors alike. This assessment of both texts makes sense when considering the structural similarities that satire, as a genre of categorization, shares with both Hurh's definition of terror and the requirements of the sublime. In discussing satire, Christopher Culver contends that "[q] uestioning or mocking norms of behavior and thought destabilize the practitioners of normalcy. Forcing the normalized to justify their assumed positions causes them to grasp for a grounding that reveals its comical groundlessness." The common sublime components of terror, destabilization, and obscurity are, then, all at play in the satirical: at its core, satire is destabilizing. It forces the questioning of what is considered "normal" (usually considered normal by the reader, but sometimes also considered normal by the character) and, in subverting this normalcy, destabilizes the basis on which the subject has built their opinion. This destabilization in turn forces a terror similar to Hurh's terror – if something as innocuous as a book (or an event within a book) can sabotage the basis upon which the foundation for a normal existence is built, then what does that say about the strength or legitimacy of "normalcy"?

The argument presented here may be interpreted as controversial given the history of the novels and their critical reception (especially in the case of *American Psycho*), but it is not the aim of this chapter to comment on whether they are or are not representative of severe literary misogyny. As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the feminine sublime experience does not necessarily have to pertain to a female subject or author. While the history of female writers who "ma[de] explicit the female subject's encounter with and response to an alterity that exceeds, limits, and defines her" helped Barbara Freeman shape and inform the academic work in which she defines

and explores the feminine sublime, Freeman herself argues that "the feminine sublime is not a discursive strategy, technique, or literary style the female writer invents, but rather a crisis in relation to language and representation that a certain subject undergoes."

Unpacking this statement, it can be inferred that the feminine sublime is not only *not* reliant on the text being authored by a female, but it is also worth noting that here Freeman does not gender her subject; the "crisis in relation to language and representation" is defined as an experience that a "certain" subject undergoes, not a *female* subject. Freeman argues that the feminine sublime is "the site both of women's affective experiences and their encounters with the gendered mechanisms of power from the mid- eighteenth century ... to the present, for it responds specifically to the diverse cultural configurations of women's oppression," which is not a claim that is being disagreed with here. Rather, this chapter aims to expand that claim. Yes – it was (and continues to be) the gendered mechanisms of power that the traditional masculine sublime theories of Burke and Kant reinforce, and which Freeman countered in *The Feminine Sublime* with analyses of female protagonists in female-authored novels.

What *The Feminine Sublime* did not explore was the effect of the gendered mechanisms of power on male protagonists or texts authored by male writers, particularly in texts where masculinity and the expectations that accompany embracing domination and appropriation are explored. While this argument does not trivialize the female experience in response to patriarchal culture, particularly the concentrated misogynistic and consumeristic culture prevalent at the conclusion of the twentieth century, it could be argued that, for every restrictive gender role that women are subjected to in literature, men are assumed to adopt the opposite. For women to be assumed as submissive, men are assumed to adopt the role of dominant. For women to be assumed as inherently nurturing, men are assumed to be inherently neglectful. While men are clearly the beneficiaries of this patriarchal and misogynistic society, they are also expected to assume negative gender roles in a similar (but perhaps less harmful) way. The propagation of violence and terror is one of these assumed gender roles: both *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* – although widely critiqued as misogynistic – arguably use this violence as a way to highlight the mode of domination that is typical of men in a protagonist role.

Arguing that the novels portray a sublime pleasure is not particularly ground- breaking (although, surprisingly, is not an avenue of analysis that has been explored at the time of writing): peppered through *Fight Club* are quotes similar to the following, that suggest that sublimity *is* present, if not explicitly articulated:

> Only after disaster can we be resurrected.
> "It's only after you've lost everything," Tyler says, "that you're free to do anything."
> What I'm feeling is premature enlightenment.

Here, Sebastian is on the brink of a sublime experience, with the connection to "premature enlightenment" making this particularly apparent. In a traditional sublime reading of this moment, Sebastian is presented with an obscure idea from Tyler – the thought of losing "everything" – and is correspondingly presented with its dominating counterpart: "that you're free to do anything." This is, then, an encounter with an obscure other, followed by a moment of domination and an inclination toward the sublime. As a narrative, *Fight Club* is built on the premise of domination: the original struggle faced by Sebastian in this preliminary section of the novel is against the anxiety produced by a life full of *things* but devoid of *meaning*, with Sebastian's natural reaction to this anxiety being one in the vein of traditional sublimity – domination. The "resurrection" that would occur after the

"disaster" is evidence of this: a literal or figurative destruction is suddenly less threatening when the outcome is resurrection. Resurfacing after destruction is precisely the distancing tool that makes domination over destruction possible, and aligns with the traditional sublime experience.

American Psycho also has moments of traditional sublimity, although admittedly they are not as recurrent nor as obvious as the examples present in *Fight Club*. In *American Psycho*, hints at traditional sublime experiences are present, but they are rejected by Bateman:

> We stand on the sidewalk in front of Jean's apartment on the Upper East Side. Her doorman eyes us warily and fills me with a nameless dread, hisgaze piercing me from the lobby. A curtain of stars, miles of them, are scattered, glowing, across the sky and their multitude humbles me, which I have a hard time tolerating.

This excerpt similarly indicates an encounter that Bateman has with a familiar element of the traditional sublime – the universe in its abundance. While Bateman's conscious reaction to the encounter is different from Sebastian's in *Fight Club*, the traditional sublime formula is still present. Here, Bateman recognizes the blossoming of sublime emotions ("their multitude humbles me"), and this act of being humbled by the infinity of the stars is an automatic reaction – Bateman's first instinct is to feel humbled at the multitude of the universe, but he conquers these emotions by simply not tolerating them (or at least attempting to disregard his sublime emotions).

Despite an initial reading of traditional sublimity (of which these excerpts were just two examples), the presence of the feminine sublime in both texts is more significant than its traditional counterpart. One of the major themes across both novels is the reaction against the consumerist world of the 1980s and 1990s: "Despite, evidently, having everything a person could ask for, both main characters' lives remain unfulfilled, leaving them frustrated and dissatisfied." In both texts, the response to this vapidity is to tailor a world that counters these shallow experiences with experiences of substance (or, at least, experiences that the protagonists believe to be more valuable than their alternative).

Both texts manifest a feminine sublimity through their radicalization of the worlds they occupy, but there is a subtle difference between the two novels and the way this manifestation occurs. While it is evident that both novels use terror as a tool to configure the societies they inhabit, the approaches used by the protagonists to reach this outcome are quite different. Where *Fight Club* presents a deliberate and self- aware distribution of terrorist acts to destroy its society ("Maybe self-improvement isn't the answer. ... Maybe self- destruction is the answer."), *American Psycho*'s distribution of terror is more instinctual and subconscious. Bateman reacts to the vapidity of New York City with individual acts of terror – the scale is not as grand as the terrorist group Project Mayhem in Palahniuk's *Fight Club*, but the desire is the same: to inflict acts of terror and violence on the citizens of New York City in an effort to highlight the vapidity of that society, and destabilize its citizens.

Fight Club's adoption of a feminine sublime principle is transformative throughout the novel, and is largely emphasized by establishing the novel's tendency towards masculine sublimity at the beginning of the text. As was briefly discussed, in a traditional sublime reading of text, the protagonist Sebastian begins the narrative with the suggestion that his circumstances are potentially sublime experiences to be dominated, while simultaneously receiving the benefit of experiencing these circumstances from a safe distance – a trend that also reveals itself in Sebastian's proclivity to visit support group meetings as a healthy male who is not physically ill (terminally or otherwise):

> This woman was also in my tuberculosis support group Friday night. She was in my melanoma round table Wednesday night. Monday night she was in my Firm Believers leukemia rap group. ... My Thursday evening group for blood parasites, it's called Free and Clear. ... The group I go to for brain parasites is called Above and Beyond.

Within these support groups, Sebastian mirrors the masculine sublime experience. He places himself in close proximity to danger (by attending these meetings amongst the ill or dying), but is never actually in danger. He is an intentional spectator to death, whereby he receives the emotional rush of coming into contact with terminal illnesses – with experiencing a literal "other" (which in this case is both the cells containing the illness and the metaphorical "other" of death or pain that accompanies a diagnosis), but he is observing from such a safe distance that he can reap the benefits of sublimity without ever actually being in danger. These support group meetings enable Sebastian to sleep (he is an insomniac) and to cry (he is emotionally detached) – as a spectator, he is able to enjoy the positive emotional reactions of such close contact with concepts too vast to understand while still being able to resume life without actually having the illnesses: "This should be my favourite part, being held and crying with Big Bob without hope. We all work so hard all the time. This is the only place I ever really relax and give up. This is my vacation."

Establishing the novel in this way – by introducing Sebastian's effective, if strange, methods of achieving a sublime emotion – is of particular importance when considering that Sebastian concludes the novel willing to become a victim of the terror he (and Tyler) think the world so desperately needs. It is a crystallized example of how, until Sebastian is punched by Tyler for the first time in *Fight Club*, he avoids actively seeking out real, tangible terror, and is instead content with (but not satisfied by) his life of spectatorship and consumerism. Within these support group meetings, Sebastian is the ultimate consumer – utilizing the emotional support offered by its participants but not offering anything of value in return. He sees the support groups as the means to an end, and it is in this way that the inclination towards traditional sublimity and appropriation is revealed. It is the progression away from these behaviors that, in *Fight Club*, suggests a rejection of traditional sublime modes in favor of the feminine sublime that Barbara Freeman describes.

In discussing the classical poets Homer and Sappho, Freeman details a specific difference in their representations of death: "Sappho's and Homer's lyrics may be alike in that both depict the speaker's encounter with death, but they do not exhibit the same concern with self- preservation. While Homer writes about escaping death, Sappho describes the process of going toward it." *Fight Club*, and to an extent *American Psycho*, share both of these relationships with death, but this is arguably so that the presence of the first (the rejection of death) can establish and call attention to the shift towards the second (moving towards death). Of course, for Freeman, the use of death to demonstrate the presence of feminine sublimity is a tool installed to try to communicate an encounter with the vast, the infinite, the other. Death is a "real- world," terrifying experience that is representative of what neither sublime theorists nor writers of fiction and poetry can successfully articulate, which makes it such an effective example to demonstrate sublimity, and here, to distinguish between the masculine and the feminine sublime. This movement towards the chaotic, anarchic destruction that the Fight Club in *Fight Club* represents runs concurrent with a realization of the shortcomings of the society that Sebastian finds he is actively promoting. Although the novel does not specify where exactly the story is set, the description of a vague cityscape, vague apartments, and a vague city nightlife suggests that it is meant to be interpreted as any US metropolis – interchangeable with any another so as to emphasize the vacuousness of the upper- middle- class white lifestyle as a whole:

> I am helpless.
> I am stupid, and all I do is want and need things.
> My tiny life. My little shit job. My Swedish furniture. I never, no, never told anyone this, but before I met Tyler, I was planning to buy a dog and name it "Entourage."
> This is how bad your life can get.

In order to arrive at the climactic manifestation of the feminine sublime in *Fight Club,* Palahniuk lays out multiple passages like this – repeated like a mantra either verbatim or slightly altered at various points in the novel – where repetition works to reflect the sentiment that Sebastian is claiming. For him, the generation he belongs to has no imagination, no drive, no distinguishing feature except its need to consume products that themselves are mass- produced, lacking in imagination and distinguishing features. For Sebastian and Tyler, then, the destruction that they want to initiate and participate in is a reaction against the consumeristic, vapid society that Palahniuk describes:

> It took my whole life to buy this stuff.
> The easy- care textured lacquer of my Kalix occasional tables.
> My Steg nesting tables.
> You buy furniture. You tell yourself, this is the last sofa I will ever need in my life. Buy the sofa, then for a couple years you're satisfied that no matter what goes wrong, at least you've got your sofa issue handled. Then the right set of dishes. Then the perfect bed. The drapes. The rug.
> Then you're trapped in your lovely nest, and the things you used to own, now they own you.

Here, the way in which Sebastian's lifestyle is carefully established and reiterated to the reader is crucial to the manifestation of the feminine sublime. Laying out Sebastian's life in such detail achieves two things: it makes clear *why* the society that Sebastian inhabits is worthy of destruction (at least according to Sebastian), and draws a parallel with the unique kind of monotonous terror reflected in *American Psycho* – the terror is not found in violence, or destruction, but in the knowledge that the existing society is so vain and hedonistic that destruction is better than the evolution of the culture. It is found in the masses of consumption without thought, and in the valuing of reproductions in contrast to artistic originality. Mostly, though, it is found in the representation that the other inhabitants of these societies have no idea the extent of their indoctrination. Sebastian, here, is spurred to action by this realization: to him, humanity has come too far to be redeemed.

American Psycho follows a similar pattern of establishing the tediousness and vapidity of late twentieth-century American life, but in a fashion neither as interesting nor as self- aware as demonstrated by Palahniuk's work. As will be discussed, it is Bateman's brief moments of self-awareness that give the novel its depth and that demonstrate the feminine sublimity manifested by the text, but the vast majority of the text works to dismantle any assumptions of profundity that might be present in 1980s New York City. The result is an immersion into the truly banal workings of Bateman's mind, with chapters such as "Genesis" and "Whitney Houston" managing to reduce the vibrant careers of these musicians to dull, vapid discographies. Instead of telling the reader how shallow upper- class white society has become (which is the method adopted by Palahniuk), Ellis prefers that the reader be inducted into this way of thinking by leaving them no other choice. For instance, whilst participating in Bateman's daily routine, the reader is told in scrupulous detail about the décor in his apartment. Prefixed with a phrase that suggests some recognition of romance in the traditional, literary sense – "In the early light of May dawn this is what the living room of my apartment looks like" – Bateman then launches into a numbingly banal description of his living room:

> Next to the Wurlitzer jukebox is a black ebony Baldwin concert grand piano. A polished white oak floor runs throughout the apartment. On the other side of the room, next to a desk and a magazine rack by Gio Ponti, is a complete stereo system (CD player, tape deck, tuner, amplifier) by Sansui with six- foot Duntech Sovereign 2001 speakers in Brazilian rosewood. A down- filled futon lies on an oakwood frame in the center of the bedroom. Against the wall is a Panasonic thirty- one- inch set with a direct- view screen and stereo sound and beneath it in a glass case is a Toshiba VCR.

This goes on for a baffling seven pages, whereupon, after having sufficiently described the specifics of his apartment, Bateman goes on to detail his skin care routine ("One should use an alcohol- free antibacterial toner with a water-moistened cotton ball to normalize the skin. Applying a moisturizer is the final step.") and then his wardrobe ("The suit I wear today is from Alan Flusser. It's an eighties drape suit ... The soft- rolled lapels should be about four inches wide with the peak finishing three quarters of the way across the shoulders.").

For the reader, this mundane (and at times infuriating) inventory- taking acts to counter the forthcoming atrocities, but not in a way that would suggest the two different types of chapters are in opposition. Instead of emphasizing that these banal passages are the "good" or "enjoyable" parts of the text, and that the intense passages of physical and sexual abuse to come are the "bad" or "horrifying" ones, the two distinct tones in this novel, the banal and the abhorrent, are components of the same goal: to make the reader question which is worse. This dichotomy, too, is where the satirical aspects of *American Psycho* make themselves most apparent: Bateman is presented as both a serial killer and a yuppie, but the passages like the one mentioned above force the reader to question which of the two is, in fact, the "psycho." Arguably, the banal, objectfocused sections in *American Psycho* are representative of a goal common to 1980s and 1990s Americans (and arguably those audiences spanning into the twenty- first century) – they don't just want things, they want *designer* things. To portray Bateman, then, as a psychopath in both his interactions with people and his interactions with these expensive objects is to subvert the criterion by which success is measured and to destabilize the reader's expectations. Establishing the text as representative of a wider societal failing as well as a personal one is crucial to the manifestation of the feminine sublime – the text shows that the society in which Bateman is a willing and enthusiastic participant (at least as enthusiastic as *he* can be) is one to be challenged.

Sonia Allué discusses the aesthetic pleasure of the serial killer fiction and film in her article "The Aesthetics of Serial Killing: Working Against Ethics in *The Silence of the Lambs* (1988) and *American Psycho* (1991)." Allué points out that *American Psycho* does not evoke the same aesthetic pleasure of other, traditional serial killer fiction, because, as she emphasizes,

> [t] he aesthetics of [traditional serial killer fiction] ... is designed to offer its readers different sources of pleasure: the command of disorder, the enjoyment derived from discovering patterns, the pleasing feelings of anticipation and repetition provided by the serial murders, the identification with an intelligent detective, and of course the relish for transforming the murders into clues in an intellectual game. However, the recurring, itemized chapters installed by Ellis thwart the traditional attempt at pattern- making and feelings of anticipation that are so often associated with serial- killer fiction, and there is a direct correlation between the use of this literary tool of destabilization and the broader unstable society found in *American Psycho*: not only are Bateman's descriptions of his murders and torture difficult to stomach, but his banal chapters of the minutiae of his everyday life offer no release to counter these emotions. The tedious materialistic chapters in *American Psycho* are

> not presented as a clue to the wider logic behind Bateman's crimes – instead, they reinforce the more terrifying notion that there is no logic behind them; that the text (and the social bubble in which it exists), will not allow a "self- contained conclusion," nor does the repetition of these passages and chapters facilitate the understanding of patterns and knowledge of what to expect next time, which, for Allué, usually indicates that "after each new instalment the audience is left wanting more, enjoying a mix of repetition and anticipation." *American Psycho*, then, becomes a destabilizing text at its core, demonstrating that destabilization through both its construction and its content.

Both *Fight Club* and *American Psycho* manifest a feminine sublimity through their radicalization of the worlds they occupy, but there is a subtle difference between the two novels and the way this manifestation occurs. While it is evident that both novels use terror as a tool to configure the societies they inhabit, the approaches of the protagonists to reach this outcome are quite different. Whereas *Fight Club* presents a deliberate and self- aware distribution of terrorist acts to destroy its society ("Maybe self- improvement isn't the answer. ... Maybe self- destruction is the answer."), *American Psycho*'s distribution of terror is more instinctual and subconscious. Bateman reacts to the vapidity of New York City with individual acts of terror – the scale is not as grand as the terrorist group Project Mayhem in Palahniuk's *Fight Club*, but the desire is the same: to inflict acts of terror and violence on the citizens of New York City in an effort to highlight the vapidity of that society, and destabilize its citizens. Bateman may be a Wall Street young professional who regularly commits gruesome and violent murders on women, children, the homeless, and the occasional animal, but *American Psycho*'s narration suggests that – with the exception of his murders – he is not by any means unique. His corporate, consumerist lifestyle is reflected in his peers, as is his obsession with high-class restaurants, clothing labels, and workout routines. In the instances where an alternative opinion is shown, they are either mocked or pitied. Because of this reluctance to deviate from what the general populace of upper- class white New York deem is worthy, it is evident that Bateman is a product of his environment – that the violence he perpetuates, and that is inherent in the New York City presented in the novel, is, like in *Fight Club*, once again a societal problem. Also, Bateman is an unreliable narrator. The main reasoning for this is, of course, his own uncertainty over whether the violent events he orchestrated actually happened or not, but the unreliability of his narration is countered, briefly, in the sparse moments when he pauses to reflect on his life and his actions:

> A Richard Marx CD plays on the stereo, a bag from Zabar's loaded with sourdough onion bagels and spices sits on the kitchen table while I grind bone and fat and flesh into patties, and though it does sporadically penetrate just how unacceptable some of what I'm doing actually is, I just remind myself that this thing, this girl, this meat, is nothing, is shit, and along with a Xanax (which I am now taking half- hourly) this thought momentarily calms me and then I'm humming, humming the theme to a show I watched as a child ... I'm remembering the song, the melody, even the key it was sung in, but not the show... These questions are punctuated by other questions, as diverse as "Will I ever do time?" and "Did this girl have a trusting heart?" ... The smell of meat and blood clouds up the condo until I don't notice it anymore. And later my macabre joy sours and I'm weeping for myself, unable to find solace in any of this, crying out, sobbing "I just want to be loved," cursing the earth and everything I have been taught: principles, distinctions, choices, morals, compromises, knowledge, unity, prayer – all of it was wrong, without any final purpose. All it came down to was: die or adapt.

Bateman's phrase here, "die or adapt," is the key moment when *American Psycho*'s feminine sublimity is exposed because the reader (like Bateman) knows it to be pure absurdity. Bateman phrases "die or adapt" as if it were a choice he would be willing to make – but both the reader and Bateman

know that he is too narcissistic to choose death, and so will instead keep choosing to "adapt," or in other words, to perpetuate the terror of the society that spawned him. Bateman "chooses" the latter: his life, including the brief insight we are given to his experiences before the novel begins, has perpetually been about adapting to the hedonistic, violent society that he finds himself a part of.

What is key to this moment, however, is that while a typical "hero" figure would seek to dominate this hedonistic society into submission or change (for the better, yes, but through domination nonetheless), Bateman's moment of self- reflection offers no change to his character. He does not, upon noting the unfulfilling nature of his particular brand of gruesomeness, change for the better, instead choosing to continue to participate in hedonism and balk at the perpetuation of positive "principles, distinctions, choices, morals, compromises, knowledge, unity, prayer." Bateman, in other words, comes into contact with a concept that he finds difficult and terrible to comprehend (in this case, that the women and men he systematically rapes and murders might have worth, have meaning, in a society that he understands as meaningless), and instead of acting in public interest and changing his behavior, which he knows to be morally wrong ("it does sporadically penetrate just how unacceptable some of what I'm doing actually is"), Bateman instead chooses to be absorbed into the society that allows for such things to happen, and becomes a willing participant in the terror evoked by his cries and sobs.

This key phrase, "die or adapt," also assists in once again exposing the satirical nature of *American Psycho,* while aligning it with the feminine sublime. It can be safely assumed that, when considering a phrase like "die or adapt," the subject (in this case Bateman) is talking about an external force providing enough of a threat that the two verbs are the only possible outcomes. This, as readers know, is not the case at all, because Bateman *is* the external force – he, as a successful young white male in a Western country, is the relative holder of the most political, economic, and physical power in his society. He is not even at the mercy of a more powerful individual (like a boss) who threatens to remove his status in society: "The most striking feature of [the beginning of the novel] is that the Manhattan yuppies never seem to work." Phrases like "die or adapt," then, become comical in their seriousness. To die, for Bateman, would be the essence of domination over himself, because no other force is presented as strong enough to accomplish this task. But, as readers know, Bateman here chooses not to dominate, and instead to adapt – to perpetuate the crimes and lifestyle that, moments earlier, was causing him legitimate (and comical) emotional distress. What both of these novels demonstrate is a realization and reinforcement of the feminine sublime as presented by Freeman and terror as articulated by Hurh. Instead of presenting these consumeristic, hedonistic societies as disrupted by an outside anomaly (and thus, being essentially "good"), what *American Psycho* and *Fight Club* demonstrate through their relationship with terror is that these societies are inherently unstable and chaotic, and it is through the perpetuation of this chaos that the feminine sublime becomes evident. <>

PHILOLOGY IN THE MAKING: ANALOG/DIGITAL CULTURES OF SCHOLARLY WRITING AND READING

edited by Pal Kelemen, Nicolas Pethes [transcript-Verlag <digital humanities> 9783837647709]

Philological practices have served to secure and transmit textual sources for centuries. However – this volume contends –, it is only in the light of the current radical media change labeled ›digital turn‹ that the material and technological prerequisites of the theory and practice of philology become fully visible. The seventeen studies by scholars from the universities of Budapest and Cologne assembled here investigate these recent transformations of our techniques of writing and reading by critically examining core approaches to the history and epistemology of the humanities. Thus, a broad praxeological overview of basic cultural techniques of collective memory is unfolded.

Pál Kelemen (Dr. phil.), born in 1977, teaches Comparative Literature at Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem in Budapest. His research includes material cultures of nineteenth century literature, the history and theory of philology, and the culture of everyday life.

Nicolas Pethes (Dr. phil.), born in 1970, teaches Modern German Literature with a focus on Media and Science Studies at the University of Cologne. His research includes cultural memory studies, literature and science studies, the theory of the novel, and actor network theories.

How do we know what we do? For a long time, this question has been a subordinate one in the history of the sciences in general and within the self-concept of philology in particular, because both seemed to be focused on the objects of this knowledge and not on the processes of its production. In the natural sciences, the discipline of Science Studies began to question this hierarchy between knowledge and practice and to ask about the tacit knowledge of the materially conditioned processes of research, social rituals of scientific communication, and media technologies used for the distribution of results. Science Studies are based on the "practical turn" because they consider knowledge to emerge from technically and institutionally embedded practices rather than from 'rational' and 'goal oriented' accounts that are given in retrospect once a project is completed. Contrary to such accounts, contemporary Science Studies consider contingencies, accidents, and involuntary findings as well as social hierarchies, technical equipment, and personal interaction equally relevant for the process of establishing valid facts, standards, and formats within a field. Science, as Bruno Latour famously put it, is not "ready made" but "science in the making", and scientific facts are constructions by an isolated professional community rather than representations of the world out there or empirical manifestations of theoretical ideas.

In the light of the success of Science Studies it is surprising that analyses of knowledge making practices within the humanities are still rare. One of the reasons for this delay could be that philological research has been carried out methodically and technologically almost unchanged for over two centuries – so the knowledge of philological practices has actually remained tacit due to their assumed self-evidence. For this reason, it is no coincidence that the interest in "philology in the making" arises at a time when this methodological and technological continuity faces a challenge: the challenge of digitization. As we witness the growing impact of e-books, full text-databases, hypertext editions, distant reading projects, and open access publications, our awareness that these technological changes may have fundamental consequences for our understanding not only of literature and culture but also of scholarship in the humanities is raised. While new media often claim to simply enhance, accelerate, or expand the spatial and temporal range of previous communication devices and the cultural concepts that derive from them, the suspicion grows that they actually establish new modes of collecting, storing, editing, interpreting, and teaching literary history and philological theory. And if it is true that philology is "the fundamental science of human memory", then the transfer of the praxeological approach from Science Studies to the study of philological practices is not only one possible extension of this methodological approach among many, but a crucial precondition for a fundamental understanding of the current consequences of the 'digital turn' for managing our cultural tradition as well as of the influence of our media technological competences on our self-understanding as a culture.

This awareness for the significance of media in philological scholarship also means to account for the actual materiality of objects and documents within the process of tradition. Contrary to an abstract

notion of 'text' and the interpolation of its content or meaning, a praxeology of philological scholarship has to examine "the sociology of texts" with respect to material specifities, medial differences, and everyday practices such as browsing, skimming, scrolling, and scanning. Thus, the concept of "material philology" is extended far beyond the realm of book history and methodologies of editing.

The following articles will raise the question whether new media support or modify concepts of culture and tradition by examining philological practices such as collecting and comparing, archiving and editing, commenting and interpreting, quoting and referencing etc. with respect to the changes they underwent during the past two decades due to the introduction of digital media. They result from a two-year cooperation between the Departments of Literary Studies at the Universities of Budapest and Cologne, in the course of which the historical, methodological and theoretical prerequisites for such a philological praxeology were developed and discussed. Two research questions were at the center of this cooperation:

1. What are the medial technologies and material appearances of what we will refer to as 'texts' in a digitized future? Does it change our notion of the literary artwork whether we read it on paper or on an electronic reader? Do new technologies of marking, referencing, quoting, and excerpting texts change the way we understand, interpret, use, and functionalize our textual heritage? Does it change our notion of a scholarly edition whether we have to look up numerous heavy volumes in a library or search for references online? And, through this simplified access: will digital media also transgress the border between academic and non-academic practices of reading and writing? It seems likely that computer technology will not replace 'paper culture' entirely but create an awareness of the historical role and ongoing function of using paper inside and outside the academia. But how do we avoid merely repeating the myths and fetishes of 'paper authenticity' and 'close reading'? Maybe the future for paper based media such as the book and paper based practices such as collecting will migrate into new contexts and forms of use that seem irritating only from a traditional point of view.

2. Which changes of practices connected to working with texts can be observed in the light of the digital turn in the Humanities? Since new media technologies never simply continue the *modus operandi* of old ones but rather implement fundamental changes in structures of communication as well as concepts of culture, knowledge, and art, new methods (e.g. quantitative analysis), formats (e.g. the digital catalogues), and institutions (e.g. divisions for Digital Humanities) have to be analyzed with respect to the transformation of practices, theories, and concepts within our routines of editing, analyzing, and teaching historical texts: What are the standards that scholars have to meet in order to successfully produce valid statements within a digitized scholarly community? How are authorities, categories, and methods implemented and canonized (or replaced) in the field? Will qualitative rereadings of selected texts still be a viable option for scholarship and teaching or will we have to contextu-alize these readings with the large data pools digital archives provide? Can we (and should we at all) maintain our understanding of humanities scholarship as a mode of aiming for the exemplary instead of for totality?

It may well be that computers will simply transfer the material sources, textual formats, and routines of reading from the paper realm into the digital one, so that eventually the formats of cultural tradition and philological communication are going to be similar *on* and *off* paper (as can already be observed on the e-book market). But it is also possible that entirely new arrangements of texts and reading may emerge (as some smart phone applications already suggest). Either way, this is the right

time to take stock of both sides: Will cultural competences that evolved by using paper still be relevant in a computer age? Or will they become more and more obsolete once historical material will be available at all times to everybody? Is our notion of culture memory going to change once scholars realize it is not only based on great minds and ideas but rather on algorithms? How will the implementation of computer technologies (if not ubiquitous computing) recontextualize and maybe even change traditional paper-based practices of writing and reading, reconstructing and interpreting, or cross-referencing and applying knowledge?

Within the methodological framework of Science Studies, Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) seems especially useful for this approach because of its focus on semiotic structures: Latour is interested in the variety of scientific "inscriptions" and "paperwork" when he analyses the modes of "Drawing Things Together" *from* various sources of information *onto* the two-dimensional sphere of the written page. That is to say, literary studies use paper and books not only as (historical) *objects* but also as *tools* of scholarly writing when they reconstruct and interpret written material of the past. Therefore, besides the *Laboratory Life* that Latour/Woolgar analyzed as a system of various types of "literature" in their study from 1979, there is a *Library Life* to be discovered as paper based institutions of knowledge undergo fundamental media changes, i.e.: fundamental changes within their network of materialities and agents.

To be sure: the debate about philology has been dominated by an ongoing diagnosis of changes, turns, and crises long before the advent of digitized text analysis (and probably ever since philology was introduced at Universities in the late eighteenth century). But the following articles will neither focus on the history of various philological disciplines nor on the constitution of what has been recently labeled "metaphilology", i.e. a philological analysis of historical positions within literary studies. Neither is it going to contribute to the impressive number of manifestos on the "Return to Philology", on its redefinitions as "New ", "Post", or "Future Philology", or to the debate on "Rephilologisierung" in Germany. And they will not follow sociological approaches that reconstruct the process of scholarly knowledge making, but in doing so are focused on hierarchies and economic interests within institutionalized humanities and only reluctantly extended to the analysis of practices. Considering the practices of Digital Humanities as a challenge for philological knowledge is still an open field of research today: Computational Philology has been almost exclusively promoted programmatically and hardly ever contextualized historically, let alone praxeologically.

On the basis of these considerations, the following essays deal with four overarching topics: With regard to the *theory* of philology, HANJO BERRESSEM proposes to reflect on the changing media environments of reading within the framework of an ecology of philology and to ask about the respective technical framings of producing meaning. MARCUS KRAUSE pursues the way in which the concept of 'philology' has become a label for the appropriate handling of texts, even though there is no stable theory of philology in the history of philology, but merely changing relations between theory and philology. Finally, BJÖRN SONNENBERG-SCHRANK asks how the establishment of Digital Humanities as a promising label was able to assert itself against this background by alluding to the old myths of totality and completeness, which can be evaluated negatively as a pathological hoarding as well as positively as a dissolution of boundaries in shape of 'cyborg philology'.

With regard to the concept of *materiality*, Ádam RUNG reminds us that classical philology never disposed of original autographs anyway and instead followed the ideal of 'pure text' – a dematerialization that is currently drawn into question by Digital Humanities and their ability to

visually depict the materiality of texts. NICOLAS PETHES refers to the fundamental material basis of philological research before textual structures or digital storage media, paper, which in contemporary cultural studies becomes the focus of interest at the very moment when it threatens to transfer to a paperless culture. As LIVIA KLEIN WÄCHTER shows, the next genetic stage corresponding to paper is manuscripts, which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became both a reference point for the invention of authorship as for the historicist fetishization of authentic documents, and whose materiality still represents a boundary point for philological interpretation today. CHARLOTTE JAEKEL reconstructs how, in the 19th century, this knowledge of the materiality of culture was made more and more invisible, thus preparing the ground for methods in Science Studies that aim at revealing the inscription apparatuses of knowledge by way of 'reverse blackboxing'. In closing, JÚLIA TÓTH-*CZIFRA* asks what significance traditional paper technologies still have in today's digitally supported editing practices and discusses practices archiving preliminary stages of the edited texts in digital databases.

With regard to the *practices* of philology, MATTHIAS BICKENBACH points to the practice of browsing as an approach to books that does not simply aim at decoding meaning and that cannot simply be reproduced digitally. It is therefore not the status of the text itself that changes through digitalization, but only the way in which it is used, i.e. the media differentiated body techniques of reading, which reconstitute the text anew in every reading event. CHARLOTTE COCH reconstructs technically supported reading and memorizing techniques using the example of the slip box that Hegel still uses as an encyclopaedia of the mind but is reconceptualized by Niklas Luhmann as an active communication partner. GÁBOR MEzEI deals with the complementary question of the operation of writing and analogizes it with the spatial design of maps, insofar as writing not only sketches a topography of signs, but is also structured by the gaps between them and can thus be revealed as a grid of interruptions. JULIA NANTKE concludes the section with a description of the mutual relationship between traditional philological practices and new digital technologies.

The last section is devoted to this interrelationship with a view to the new possibilities, but also to the implicit limitations of philological practice through digital *technologies*: In the sense of blackboxing, GABOR PAL KÓ argues that the computer also generates a blind spot of research, especially since computer surfaces simulate old media practices. DANIEL KOZÁK, on the other hand, shows how Digital Humanities in the field of edititorial philology allows a broader commentary on ancient sources – without drawing the consequence that digital results necessarily have to be more objective than the analog ones, which they still supplement today. AMÁLIA KEREKES identifies the daily press since the 19th century as the most obvious modern corpus for DH, which even in predigital times could only be viewed as big data and raises the question of the relationship between macroanalysis (with respect to knowledge about journals) and microreading (with respect to understanding their contents). Conversely, GÁBOR VADERNA shows for historical research that computers must not only be understood as tools that change concepts of history by macroperspective analyses, but that microhistory can also be digitized. MELINDA VÁSÁRI concludes the volume by showing that the relationship between philology and computer not only concerns digital text structures, but also the question of archiving and analyzing computers and hard disks of writers and scholars, so that philology approaches the practice of autopsy from forensics – an examination of dead bodies of data that once again underscores the vitality of philology in the digital age. <>

FROM A TALLER TOWER: THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN MASS SHOOTER by Seamus McGraw [University of Texas Press, 9781477317181]

We, as a nation, have become desensitized to the shock and pain in the wake of mass shootings. In the bottomless silence between gunshots, as political stalemate ensures inaction, the killing continues; the dying continues. **FROM A TALLER TOWER** attends to the silence that has left us empty in the aftermath of these atrocities. Veteran journalist Seamus McGraw chronicles the rise of the mass shooter to dismantle the myths we have constructed around the murderers and ourselves.

In 1966, America's first mass shooter, from atop the University of Texas tower, unleashed a new reality: the fear that any of us may be targeted by a killer, and the complicity we bear in granting these murderers the fame or infamy they crave. Addressing individual cases in the epidemic that began in Austin, **FROM A TALLER TOWER** bluntly confronts our obsession with the shooters—and explores the isolation, narcissism, and sense of victimhood that fan their obsessions. Drawing on the experiences of survivors and first responders as well as the knowledge of mental health experts, McGraw challenges the notion of the "good guy with a gun," the idolization of guns (including his own), and the reliability of traumatized memory. Yet in this terrible history, McGraw reminds us of the humanity that can stop the killing and the dying.

Review

"A memorable, necessary contribution to the national conversation on gun violence." — *Kirkus, Starred Review* Published On: 2021-02-24

"An important and extraordinary book that takes us into the mind of the mass shooter and also explores our own complicity in the numbing tragedies that have become far too routine in America. Still, Seamus McGraw manages to leave us with hope that there's a way out of the despair. " -- Perri Peltz, director and producer, Axios on HBO

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Author's Note

It comes out of nowhere, this random act of unspeakable violence. Not twenty feet away from me, a man—an indigent, timid, harmless wino but a man nonetheless— is being savagely bludgeoned nearly to death. And for what seems to be an eternity, I just stand there. Mute. Motionless. Helpless.

Useless.

I freeze. There is no other word for it.

It's not the way I imagined I would react had I ever conjured a scene of such brutality. I've always thought of myself as a bit of a hardass—if not exactly heroic, at least brave enough and tough enough to step in and do something. Anything. We all imagine ourselves to be heroes in waiting, I suppose. Until we're tested. But never in my wildest imagination had I dreamed up an image of an attack as senseless, as raw, as savage as this one.

It's the week between Christmas and New Year's in the winter of 1978. I'm all of nineteen, and I'm heading back to my home in central New Jersey from an evening on the town in New York. As usual, I've been drinking. And as usual, I've missed the last connecting train from Penn Station Newark to points south. It isn't the first time I've missed the train and will have to spend the night sobering up in the sooty, seedy old marble lobby of the terminal in Newark, waiting for the first train out in the morning. The nineteen-year-old me drinks a lot, and he misses a lot of things, trains included.

There's a cadre of regulars, ten or twelve guys who haunt the train station when all the decent types are home abed. I know a few of them by sight and one or two of them by name. Or by nickname. One of them is this harmless old wino, a man in his sixties, perhaps, who had earned the nickname "Bojangles." I assume he's called Bojangles because anytime I ever see him, winter or summer, he's wearing a stained and ragged black overcoat upon which he has tied and safety-pinned and otherwise fastened all his worldly possessions, everything from a gaudy ring full of keys to nothing in particular to a discarded folding baby stroller. Whenever he moves, usually using the wall as a support, he makes the most awful clattering racket. It echoes against the marble walls. I don't recall ever hearing him speak, but you always know when Bojangles is coming. You can hear him from across the concourse, and when he passes near you, slowly, painfully, he usually casts his bloodshot and yellow eyes downward, a signal that he means no one any harm.

It's about three in the morning when the heavy glass and brushed steel door on the east side of the concourse swings open, and a gust of frigid air stinking of diesel exhaust rushes in, and with it a tightly muscled man with a freshly shaved head who appears to be in his early thirties. He immediately catches my attention, in part because of his appearance and his dress—he's wildly underdressed for the cold winter night, wearing only a pair of light slacks and a light-colored V-neck sweater— but also for the purposeful, serious way he struts into the station. He's carrying what appears to be a walking stick, though it clanks with a metallic sound that echoes against the marble with his every step. Even now, all these years later, I can still hear the echo of it. He has a rigid gait, the self-consciously aggressive strut of a man who thinks himself important, a man who demands with every step that you too see him as someone to be reckoned with, a man in a hurry to get someplace, even if that place is a train station in Newark in the middle of the night, filled with people who aren't going anywhere anytime soon.

He strides past me, his walking stick clanking, and goes no more than ten or fifteen paces when he reaches the spot along the wall where Bojangles is staggering. He stops abruptly. He turns. And for the space of a heartbeat, he just glares at Bojangles. He does not know the man, I'll later learn. He's never spoken with him, and Bojangles has certainly never given him any offense. He's never given anyone any offense that I'm aware of. But there's rage and fury in the bald-headed man's eyes.

And then, without warning, without provocation, he lunges toward Bojangles, raising his walking stick, which I now see is an iron bar. Before the first blow lands, Bojangles finally looks up. There's terror in his eyes. And pleading. That means nothing to the bald-headed man. Again and again in a furious barrage of blows, he strikes Bojangles with the iron bar. Blood splatters. Broken teeth skitter across the marble floor toward where I am standing.

I'm no more than twenty feet away from Bojangles and his attacker. I could close the distance between us in the space between the blows. But I'm frozen where I stand. Mute. Motionless. Helpless. Useless. And I'm not the only one. All the other late-night denizens of the Newark train station, who no doubt imagine themselves to be hardasses too, are frozen as well, watching without understanding, staring in stunned horror as this innocent, harmless old man is savaged. It seems like an eternity. In truth it's maybe thirty seconds, forty-five at the most, before out of the corner of my eye, I see one of the denizens flinch, and that's enough to jar me from my stupor. Almost as one, all of us, the regulars, lunge toward the bald-headed man, and he backs away, waving the iron bar at us and bellowing something unintelligible. For the next few minutes we hold him at bay, feinting toward him as if we're baiting an animal, until police finally arrive and take him into custody.

But by that point, the damage is done. A harmless old man is critically injured in an act of irrational, wanton bloodlust. He will survive, though he will carry the scars—physical and, I'm sure, psychological—of that attack for the rest of his life. And so will everyone else who was there that night.

For years afterward, I tortured myself for my inaction that night. I called myself a coward, and if I'm to be honest, I still haven't completely absolved myself for the awful sin of omission I committed. Indeed, to this day I am still compensating for what I didn't do instinctively that night. I'm in my sixties and I still take reckless chances sometimes, at least in part to convince myself that I am not a coward.

But a larger part of me now understands, with the help of time and the wisdom of others, that it was something more than just fear that made me, and the others in that terminal, freeze.

Certainly, fear was part of it. But I was no less fearful when the others and I finally did shake off our stupor and rush the attacker. No, the reason I froze that night was more than fear—or less. Psychologists tell us that there are two primary responses to danger: we either flee, or we fight. But in order for our limbic system to trigger either of those two responses, they tell us, we must first process the atrocity that is occurring in front of us, if only in the most primitive part of our brain. We must recognize it and assess it. But what happens when a scene of such unexpected savagery and brutality erupts right before your eyes, an act of violence so extreme, so utterly, unimaginably random that nothing in your experience has ever prepared you for it? In my case, literally nothing happened: for thirty or forty-five precious seconds that could have meant the difference between life and death for an innocent man, I simply shut down, unable to find any analogue to the bloody scene

that was playing out before me that would signal which of those two primal responses I should choose. My response was to do nothing.

I froze. There is no other word for it.

I've revisited that scene in my mind a hundred times or more as I've been working on this book. I've thought about it in the context of those who've survived mass public atrocities and those who didn't. It was very much in my mind as I spoke with first responders who found themselves thrust into the center of events that were more horrific than anything they'd ever experienced. And I've considered it in the context of those heroic individuals, armed and unarmed, who—unlike me—did not hesitate to rush in and do something to stop them. I've measured their actions against my own that night, and I have found myself wanting.

So be it.

But perhaps more important, I've also considered it in the context of our larger societal response, or lack thereof, to the mounting casualty count of what can now best be described as an epidemic of mass public shootings. If it's true, as psychologist and trauma survivor Roger Friedman tells us in chapter 9, that the contours of our own personal traumas can be seen on a grand scale in society at large, then perhaps that explains why, in the wake of each new mass public shooting, we seem to be frozen as a people. Mute. Motionless. Helpless.

For more than fifty years now, from the massacre at the University of Texas in 1966 to the mass murder from the Mandalay Bay hotel in Las Vegas and beyond, we as a nation have stood largely silent as these atrocities have been committed. We have failed to stop them or even to take significant steps to make them less likely.

I don't know what it will take to shake us from our stupor. But, as we'll examine in the epilogue, if you look out of the corner of your eye, it's possible that at last we're seeing the first slight movements that might jar us into action. It's not enough. But it's something.

There is, perhaps, reason for cautious hope in that.

There is one other point I need to make. The reader may find some of the language in this book jarring, particularly as it relates to my characterizations of the killers, and especially with regard to the murderer who killed dozens of Muslim worshippers in Christchurch, New Zealand. I confess that I have in some cases abandoned the careful, measured, neutral tone that journalists are trained to use when describing such people and events. There's a reason for that. Several analysts and experts I have spoken to have told me that neutral language can distort rather than illuminate the actions and motivations of these killers. That dispassionate language, they've told me, can open a way for those who are so inclined to create myths around these murderers, turning them into perverse folk heroes in some of the darker corners of our culture. I'm not naïve enough to imagine that this book is

going to impede that to any great degree. But I do believe that it is important to strip away any ambiguity and to present a more precise and accurate—and, yes, emotionally charged—description of these killers, to present them as the cruel narcissists that they are.

Finally, I know with absolute certainty that despite my efforts to keep from sensationalizing these crimes, my depictions of some of the atrocities will reopen old wounds and cause immense pain to people who have suffered far more than you or I ever have or hopefully ever will.

It was my call to do it, and I take full responsibility for the consequences of every word that's in this book.

I also take full responsibility for the words that are not in it.

There are two of those. The first is "tragedy"—the go-to word after every one of these massacres. Tragedies are mythic, beyond human control. These are not tragedies. These are atrocities. These are things we do. To each other.

The second is "victim," at least as it relates to those who have been murdered in this epidemic of violence. Victimhood is a choice, and "victim" is a word many of these killers perversely appropriate for themselves. The survivors I've spoken to and the families of those who didn't survive by and large don't see themselves or their lost loved ones as victims.

And neither do I.

I see them as heroes.

And this book is for them.

The Silence between Gunshots

At a business park in Edgewood, Maryland, and a Walmart near Denver. Inside a church on a Sunday morning in Sutherland Springs, and at Rancho Tehama in California. At a car wash in Melcroft, Pennsylvania, and in Parkland, Florida. At a veterans' home in Yountville, California. Late at night at a Waffle House in Nashville. And in the morning at a high school in Santa Fe, Texas, where a cop could not save his own mother. In the newsroom of the Capital Gazette in Annapolis, Maryland. In Cincinnati and in Bakersfield, California. At a warehouse in Perry, Maryland, and at a synagogue in Pittsburgh on the Sabbath. At the Borderline in Thousand Oaks, which had been Tel Orfanos's refuge after surviving the atrocity in Las Vegas. He was murdered at the Borderline, along with eleven others.

At a hospital in Chicago, at a bank in Sebring, Florida, and at a bar in State College, Pennsylvania. At a warehouse in Aurora, Illinois, and a municipal building in Virginia Beach.

At Gilroy. And El Paso, and Dayton, and Odessa.

One hundred and eighty-three innocent people dead in America. Two hundred and four wounded. And that's not even counting the dead and injured at places like the synagogue in Poway, California, where the death toll for whatever reason did not reach the perverse threshold we set for inclusion in the annals of atrocities. One woman died. Her name was Lori Gilbert-Kaye. Remember it. May her memory be a blessing. Nor does it include the fifty-one murders committed in Christchurch. Though it may have had American influences, it did not happen here.

As I write this, it is two years to the day since the mass public shooting at Las Vegas, and the body count continues to rise with no end in sight. Those twenty-four massacres listed above have all occurred since the silence after the gunshots settled on the crime scene in Las Vegas. Every one of

those murders has been committed in the twenty-four months since I first began work on this book. The silence is deep, and deafening, and it never lasts for very long.

It terrifies us, it taunts us, and the trauma is renewed with each new mass public shooting. It spreads like a poisonous fog until it touches every corner of the nation. It seems to paralyze us, leaving us frozen, unable to formulate any real response to it, unable to even agree on what it is that threatens us.

We search for easy answers. Tumors, video games, mental illness. Evil.

But there are no easy answers.

***

If anything has become clear in the decades since the all-American boy next door climbed to the observation deck of the Tower in Austin and pulled the trigger to start the modern age of mass public shootings, if anything was made clear when the gambler climbed to the upper floors of a taller tower in Las Vegas, it's that there is no single silver bullet that will explain away all the lead and full metal–jacketed ones. There is no malignancy that we can spot on a CAT scan and excise with a scalpel. Or rather, if there is a malignancy, perhaps it's in all of us. Perhaps it's metastasized in a nation that, as sociologists Manning and Campbell tell us in chapter 1, has come to embrace "a culture of victimhood." Perhaps it resides, as studies show, in a culture that has come to prize fame—or infamy—above wealth or friendship.

If, as we've seen, those are among the traits that mass public shooters display, they are also among the traits we've come to display as a people. That's not to say that we're all potential killers. Certainly not. It's just to say that in the fog of war in peacetime, in a nation awash in easily obtained, high-powered, rapid-fire weapons and extended-round magazines, it can sometimes be difficult to spot with a casual glance the difference between a pair of middle-aged jokers cackling like schoolboys as they riddle targets with semiautomatic weapons fire at an Austin shooting range and real murderous schoolboys preparing for a holocaust in Colorado.

Difficult, but not impossible. As we saw in August 2019, after the summer of mass shootings during which we suffered and bled and died by the dozens in mass shootings in Gilroy, California; and in El Paso and Odessa in Texas; and in Dayton, Ohio, there are signs, signals, and portents that we can read, clear behavioral patterns that many of these killers follow in advance, which, if read correctly, can give us the tools we need to intervene with these potential killers before they commit an atrocity. It happened some forty times across the nation in the aftermath of those massacres in the summer of 2019. Those arrests may have stopped a mass shooting. We'll never know for certain. It's also possible that they prevented one or more of the tens of thousands of suicides by gun recorded in this country annually, or one or more of the thousands upon thousands of other crimes of gun violence committed here each year. The warning signs are often the same. Learning to read the clues can save lives, and not just those of schoolchildren cowering in a supply closet or unsuspecting theatergoers on the opening night of the latest movie in the Batman franchise.

But as we saw in chapter 6, that kind of proactive response requires a high level of vigilance, and it remains an open question whether that level of high alert can be maintained when the initial shock and horror of a highly publicized mass shooting begins to fade, as it always does in our 24/7/365

mass-media culture, which focuses fiercely on an event or a series of events and then just as quickly moves on to cover the next big story.

Indeed, as we saw in chapter 9, in the silence that follows after the nomadic media moves on from an atrocity, or a string of them, often all that's left behind are the myths created in the fog of war in peacetime: the archetypes of the bad guy with the trench coat, the good guy with the gun. Or, as we discussed in chapter 2, we're left with the almost religious belief that somehow this isn't really about us as a people and instead represents some ancient Manichean struggle between the forces of good and the forces of evil. But as professor of rhetoric Rosa Eberly warns us, casting this epidemic as a battle of the elemental and eternal forces of good and evil risks letting us off the hook by falsely absolving us of our responsibility to, as that Bible on my shrink's bookshelf would have it, pluck the log out of our own eye.

To be sure, we have learned some valuable lessons, and they've been hard-earned. The media, of which I count myself a member, has recently made a valiant effort to deny these killers the fame—or infamy—so many of them crave. The electronic media particularly now generally chooses to focus on those killed or wounded in these atrocities, rather than aggrandizing the killers. But it may well be that in our desperate desire to find a cause, an explanation, a motive that will make sense of senseless shootings, we're still granting these murderers a measure of perverse celebrity when we publicize their manifestos or their social media postings aligning themselves with some dark movement. As we saw in chapter 4, there is indeed a malignancy of hatred and jealousy and rage that has taken root in some of the darker corners of our culture, and it has bubbled up to the surface. And it's become common in our public discourse to vent that impotent rage and to target the most vulnerable among us—immigrants, minorities, Jews, Muslims, gays, transgendered, lesbians.

Some of these murderers—the killer in Christchurch, the murderers at Mother Emanuel and at Tree of Life— feed on that pervasive rage and attach themselves to some perverse cause, in no small part to make themselves appear more important than they are. These manifestos and social media posts, these rants on 4chan and 8chan, may often just be a figurative version of Hamlet's inky cloak, a costume that barely conceals what they really are: the screeds of narcissistic killers.

Nor is it just the tales the killers tell us—and themselves—that we need to guard against. Myths are forged in the fog of war in peacetime, often innocently, and we in the media sometimes amplify those myths. When our corrections and clarifications come, they come too late. It is, as I wrote in chapter 9, often inadvertent and may at times be due to the frenetic nature of our news culture. As I've pored through countless media reports on mass public shootings while researching this book, I've come to the conclusion that it's a systemic problem and may have, at least in part, a systemic solution. If we accept that these mass killings are likely to continue—and it certainly seems as if we as a culture are prepared to surrender to that awful reality, at least for now—then national media outlets, either individually or collectively, might well consider establishing mass public shootings as a dedicated beat, assigning full-time reporters to a mass shooting desk, journalists trained for the purpose and experienced enough to at least recognize the myths we tell ourselves as myths.

Myths are as durable as diamonds. And they're found in abundance in our culture—the dark, silent places where our grudges spore, the places where narcissism and victimhood ooze together and become more toxic.

A culture that seems often to celebrate self-centered rage and antisocial grandiosity, a culture in which we're both hyperconnected and isolated from each other, is a culture that creates an environment that validates and inflames these killers and gives them places to hide. That is not likely to change overnight, or over years, or perhaps not even over the course of generations.

We are who we are, and we are who we have always been: a people capable of doing great things, of embracing and advancing the best human instincts. But we are also an angry, divided, fearful, and violent people, among the most violent nations on earth, as Lankford reminds us in chapter 1. We are a nation armed to the teeth, and as we discussed in chapter 8, there are among us decent, honorable, God-fearing people who believe in perfect faith that they have a divine ordinance to stockpile ordnance, including weapons originally designed to kill on the battlefield, and all the hundred-round drum magazines they desire.

It's not that they don't care about the rising body count. There are among them people like Stephen Willeford, the hero of Sutherland Springs, who care so deeply that they are willing to put their own lives on the line, stalking out barefoot to confront a killer on a Texas Sunday morning, and though they're rare, there are even a few, like Willeford, who say they would face that killer unarmed if they had to. As we've seen time and again in the wake of these atrocities, we are a nation that can conjure terrible villains, but we can also summon heroes like Willeford or like James Shaw Jr., who wrestled a rifle away from a deranged gunman barehanded, ending a mass public shooting at a Nashville Waffle House. The difference between those two men is not as great as one might imagine. One was a good guy with a gun. The other was a good guy without one. Both are American heroes, as was Tel Orfanos, the young sailor from California who, after dragging away the wounded during the Las Vegas massacre, died in hand-to-hand combat with another killer during the murders at the Borderline.

There are signs, of course, that many of us, a majority in fact, have decided that the time has come to wrestle the guns away from the killers. Yet we seem to lack the will or the faith to do so. As a Suffolk University poll of registered voters conducted in the bloody month of August 2019 found, 90 percent of the American people favored expanding background checks—including 90 percent of gun owners—and 69 percent of those polled would favor nationwide red-flag laws that would allow a judge to strip guns away from people adjudged dangerous. Nearly 60 percent supported the idea of banning extended magazines.

The devil, of course, is in the details. Expanded background checks—like the law proposed after the Sandy Hook murders by Sen. Pat Toomey, a Pennsylvania Republican, and Sen. Joe Manchin, a West Virginia Democrat, which would have required background checks at gun shows but not between private sellers—would not have stopped the killer at Odessa, for example, from buying his semiautomatic rifle. Though a background check at a gun shop discovered a history of mental illness and a series of encounters with law enforcement and thus barred him from buying his rifle, there is still no law on the books that would have prevented him from buying the weapon from a private seller with no background check at all. Nor would any combination of red-flag laws or background checks have stopped the killer in Las Vegas from amassing the arsenal he used to commit the single worst mass public shooting by a lone gunman in the nation's long and bloody history. That secretive, generally nondescript killer had carefully covered his tracks, making perfectly sure that he would trigger no alarms. Nor would they have stopped the killer at Sandy Hook, whose mother had legally purchased the weapons he used first to murder her and then to murder twenty children and six adults at an elementary school.

It's perhaps in recognition of that fact, according to the Suffolk poll, that a majority of Americans support a return to some version of the assault weapons ban, which was the law from 1994 until 2004, when it was allowed to lapse. It's worth noting that the law, which banned the sale and importation of certain semiautomatic weapons, did nothing to remove the millions of such guns already in circulation; thus it was comparatively easy for the Columbine killers to acquire a TEC-9, a banned handgun, through a straw purchase at a gun show.

It would be a tall order in this divided nation to craft a version of the assault weapons ban that would include a mandatory buyback, as New Zealand did when it was rocked by the massacre at Christchurch. For evidence of how fraught such an effort would be, you need look no further than the confrontation between two Texans at the beginning of the Democratic presidential primary race for 2020, when former state representative Beto O'Rourke, then a presidential hopeful angered by the twin mass shootings in El Paso and Odessa, insisted that he would indeed as president move to enact a mandatory buyback and confiscate the weapons of those who did not comply. That prompted a Republican state lawmaker to post a challenge—or perhaps a threat—on Twitter: "My AR is ready for you."

It would be easy to dismiss the exchange as preening, perhaps on both of their parts, but in many regards the confrontation between the two men cast in high relief the deep chasm between Americans over the issue of gun control.

Indeed, that seemingly bottomless, unbridgeable chasm between Americans on opposite sides of the gun-control debate appears to have grown only wider and deeper in recent years as the body count has risen ever more dramatically. And for many Americans, it seems, a sense of hopelessness has taken hold. It's no surprise then that despite our calls for tougher regulations on extended-round magazines and bans of semiautomatic rifles, despite our apparent faith in expanded background checks and red-flag laws, the American people remain grimly pessimistic about the possibility that our elected officials will do anything to enact these measures. Sixty-eight percent of the voters queried told pollsters in that August 2019 poll that they believed it unlikely that Congress would pass any significant legislation in the year before the next presidential election. And they seem to have been right. Bills that would dramatically expand background checks to include private sales, a revived assault weapons ban, and a bill that demands that specific semiautomatic rifles be licensed (thus making it arguably less likely that they would slip into the wrong hands), as well as other attempts to address the issue, have all languished in a kind of political limbo. Even those measures that have passed the US House of Representatives are unable to even get a hearing in the Senate.

None of them, of course, would prevent every death or stop every mass shooter. From the days of Tom Quick and the Paxton Boys to the modern-day massacre at Odessa, we are and always have been a violent people. But some lives would doubtlessly be saved. "Whosoever saves a single soul," the ancient Jewish sages wrote in the Talmud, is "ascribed [merit] . . . as though he had preserved a complete world."

And yet we have remained largely silent, lost in the fog of war in peacetime.

As the Suffolk poll indicates, however, there are signs that pressure may finally be mounting to break that silence. A month after the Parkland massacre, tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered in the nation's capital for the March for Our Lives protest. It was a massive rally organized largely through social media, in effect turning the same electronic sword that many killers use to stoke their

rage and reinforce their murderous impulses into a digital plowshare. There were similar rallies across the country. In what will be remembered as the most poignant moment of the rally, survivor Emma González, then a senior at Parkland, stepped to the podium, and in a quavering voice, spoke for about two minutes, simply reciting the names of her friends who had been murdered and adding a few touching details about them.

And then she fell silent. For four minutes and twenty-six seconds that seemed to last an eternity, she stood, tears streaming down her cheeks, as thousands at the protest in Washington and countless others who saw her on television fell silent with her. It was a heart-wrenchingly powerful memorial for the murdered, for the wounded, yes. But it was more than that. It was a mirror held up to America, an indictment and a challenge, a wordless call to feel the crushing weight of all the terrifying silences between all the deadly gunshots fired since August 1, 1966, and to find the will and the courage to finally break that silence.

Her silence was our silence. Emma González's silence ended that day with these words: "Fight for your lives, before it's someone else's job."

Her silence was broken. Ours has not yet been. <>

Thought Experiments: The Art of Jonathon Keats [Hirmer, 9783777434278]

Jonathon Keats' work as an artist and thinker is compelling for our time. Keats poses critical questions, asks us to fundamentally reconsider our assumptions, and proposes radical methods of response. In a time when the environment and human lifeways are experiencing unprecedented change, thought leaders like Keats are needed to encourage us to consider possibilities—from the absurd to the profound. Since the turn of the millennium, Keats has comprehensively extended his academic training in philosophy by prolifically presenting conceptual art projects that he refers to as "thought experiments." These include installations and performances in museums and galleries around the globe. His motivations are to make space for exploring ideas, offering provocations, and confronting systems we generally take for granted. By prototyping alternative realities—systematically asking "what if?"—these projects probe the world in which we live, exploring the potential for societal change.

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An Introduction That Cannot Be Titled

Jonathon Keats is an experimental philosopher. He calls himself many other things, too, for inventive terminology has always been part of his performance. Truth be told, though, he is a visionary.

Keats is fiercely beset with endless ideas. His visions are not the standard concepts of conceptual art, but arcane, tangled trains and chains of proliferating, ever ramifying speculation. He generates theories and hypotheses in organic profusion.

Jonathon Keats is so far outside the box that mankind will never invent any box in which he can be at ease. Philosophy, science, art, literature, even language itself, are like the bunk beds of Procrustes for Keats. He wades through other people's disciplines as if they were tide pools.

Since I'm a science-fiction novelist, I've met many unusual thinkers, but none like him. I frankly worry about him; I sense the pathos of this existentially marooned character, whose thought processes are so inherently boneless, so polyvalent, so akin to fertile, slithering slime mold. I find his apparent whimsy much less whimsical than most of his fans do; commonly he's quite funny, but it's a mercy that he doesn't choose to be terrifying.

I always appreciate his thought experiments, and I never have to beg for the joke to be explained to me, yet they truly disturb me. My own condition vis-à-vis his thought experiments is more or less that of his lab animal. When he cracks a witticism, I feel a tectonic plate tremble.

Confronted in person, Keats appears mild, unthreatening, and well-contained. He inhabits his own designer uniform of sorts, with tweed suits, a natty bow tie, wire-rimmed glasses, and a long-haired-professor haircut. He presents the affect of a performance artist, placing himself on a slider bar somewhere between Brian Eno and a quaint mad scientist from a German Expressionist silent film.

His first artwork, Twenty Four Hour Cogito, from 2000, was a performative feat of endurance in the mold of Marina Abramović. Keats works hard. Public limelight doesn't scare him. He's less cerebrally wacky and quirky than his artwork might suggest, and there's a rigor, boldness, and toughness to him that is underappreciated.

So he's a figure to be reckoned with, and I do reckon with him. I know many artists who tinker with science and technology, and Jonathon Keats is not like them. They're inventors, hackers, and tinkerers with arty proclivities, and he's more remote, astral, cerebral, and radical. Handicraft and technical accomplishment don't much interest him. Unlike the poet John Keats, he's obsessed with neither beauty nor truth. So it's easy to say there's no one else like Jonathon Keats, but that distinction is also a quarantine. To quarantine him seems unfair to him and also to us, since we could do with more people like him.

Jonathon Keats writes well, lucidly, and industriously, given that he's a visionary rather than a mere writer. He once wrote quite an interesting book about Buckminster Fuller. Keats himself is probably much more like Buckminster Fuller than he is like any living figure; his book is mostly about the public's cult reaction to visionaries, and how little mankind understands them. The art world and the engineering world simply can't classify and contain the likes of Fuller, or Keats either; nor can science, philosophy, literature, journalism—none of that. It's a tragic condition: why don't the rest of us live in Fuller's visionary Utopia, a world of mankind achieving the most with the least effort, instead of lurking in the Oblivion that our squalid and blinkered culture so richly deserves? It's like

we're all blind while the one-eyed man doesn't even get to be our philosopher-king; instead, he makes peculiar toys in labs, garages, and galleries.

Both Keats and Fuller were, and are, too stoic to whine and kvetch about their fraught situation. To hear that done properly, you need to commission an introductory text from one of us novelists. But listen: just imagine really being Buckminster Fuller, who knew that we live on the surface of a planetary sphere. There is really no such direction as up or down: when we climb stairs, we go out from the center of the Earth, and to descend, we have to go in. That is a very Keatsian insight, and it's even demonstrably true, but there is no way for the rest of mankind to mentally get there from here. We have no path up, down, in, or out that's fit to free us from our folk-mythic labyrinths of unscientific presumption.

Keats, the experimental philosopher, is no more an artist than he is a writer, but he does have many artistic merits. Since I'm introducing an art monograph, I should take the time to praise these.

His work ethic deserves credit. If he'd performed just a few of his visionary, philosophic interventions, they might have been dismissed as clever, mind-bending pranks or bizarre publicity stunts. But no: he's been prolific, disciplined and even methodical, and he's been at it for twenty solid years.

He's a genuine twenty-first century figure, entirely at ease with transmedia. His artistic creations have never had just one framing device: they are a dazzling Gesamtkunstwerk of press releases, events, photos, videos, websites, magazines, activities, performances, and public speeches.

Also, as time has passed and he has refined his remarkable shtick as an international gallery conceptualist, Keats has become impressively facile at creating or commissioning inventive artifacts.

These performance props include remarkable boxes, bottles, costumes, and impressive crypto-scientific instruments.

In his later career, Keats commenced with his practice of "residencies." Impressed people from the sciences and humanities would request Jonathon Keats to come by the lab or campus and do something or other for them— with, of course, no idea what Keats would possibly do.

Keats was, however, up to this artistic challenge. Under those conditions, Keats demonstrates a Jean Tinguely junk-pile ingenuity— he can riff inventively with whatever nifty debris is at hand. He's no mere hand-waving talker; he's not trapped inside his visionary rhetoric; let loose in a laboratory's storage room, he can improvise and patchwork with an Edisonian glee.

His artistic career has consisted of inventing ultra-far-fetched schemes that are literally unheardof, and yet, there is a development arc to his oeuvre. The attentive critic can see him manfully struggling to improve, to expand, to grow as a creative figure.

Over the past decade, the artist has considerably upped his design game. No longer hipdeep in his fantastic torrents, swamps, deltas, and oxbows of ideas, he has advanced toward a more lucid, ludic Bruno Munarilike space of philosophic design. He has chattered less, and he has let the objects become more eloquent. Although that procedure would be tragic for a novelist like me, for an artist, that's progressive.

So I would say that Keats is growing in creative power. Time even seems to be on his side as a cultural activist. After two decades of his indescribable labor, he seems to be escaping the gimmicky

aspects of the polymathic dilettante. He is a court jester of the science world, yet a certain suavity is overcoming him, a coherency, even a gravitas. He strikes me as one of the few characters in "sci/art" who might create or achieve something grand, maybe even sublime.

Keats is indeed a philosopher, and that's no idle claim of his. Keats understands cultural history, and he knows why and when science, meaning "the experimental philosophy," first departed from the older human efforts of philosophy. Also, Keats has never been the mere pet artist of science, the visualizer who makes morale- boosting posters, T-shirts, and fridge magnets for science labs. He is spectacular, but never superficial. He is working at the root of the cultural problem of science, of its alienation from structures of meaning and feeling, the conflicts of what we can learn about reality and how we ought to feel about it.

Keats turns scientific thought into conceptual artwork. He has an aesthetic relish for Copernican humiliation. He loves deploying the methods and jargon of science to mind-blast the viewer with the previously unthinkable and unsayable. But one can see him struggling with the expressive limits of this visionary profusion. Why did Buckminster Fuller have such grandiose, world-scale, prophetic and radical concepts, and such signal lack of success at ever changing the world with his ideas and inventions? Why was there merely a cult fandom of Fullerites, patching their leaky, flammable geodesic domes, instead of massive full-scale, cultural transformation in housing, transport, urban design, every aspect of daily life? Why was Fuller such a cracker-barrel crank instead of the messiah of a more advanced civilization?

Such is the visionary's curse. Keats is a figure of endless, compulsive invention, almost a da Vinci mimic in his obsessive, doodle- like scrambling of art and science, but he's a da Vinci with hilarious, parodic notebooks and no Mona Lisa. He strikes me as an artist who, after twenty years or more, might become an overnight success with some genuine popular hit, some artistic invention that rivets the attention of a startled mankind. He might become a popularizer of science of sudden Carl Sagan celebrity, afflicted with lasting international fame, probably while trying to achieve something else.

It's the fate of a famous visionary to never be famous for the vision he himself likes best. An architect can methodically raise a grand masterpiece over two solemn decades, but a visionary who encounters public fame is like a squirrel who bites through a high-voltage wire.

The best way to brainstorm a great idea is to have a thousand ideas and consign nine hundred ninety to oblivion. Alas for the visionary himself, for that cruel economy doesn't even reduce the mental pressure of his other concepts, which just keep flooding in. Most often, a visionary's visions don't and can't improve as he matures; they just get bigger—as the planetary fame of Keats has slowly, yet justly, grown, and his collaborators and sponsors have become more potent and respectable, he speaks wistfully of colossal land-art projects in the desert, of projects designed to scatter around the globe and last for a thousand years. Tinguely was like that; Calder was like that—quirky, visionary tinkerers who ended their lives as grand public artists making wondrous gizmos five stories high.

It's the visionary's fate to be proclaimed the pioneer for the sake of somebody else, commonly while scratching for mental existence in strange, barren, hardscrabble niches where there's nothing much to develop but lunar aridity. Jonathon Keats is one of those profoundly unusual people, and he's one in spades. If he's one in a billion rather than just a million, he might become the pioneer of a mighty

school of twenty-first-century scientific art-philosophy. If he's lucky, he won't be—but if we're lucky, he will.

Twenty Propositions

Introduction by Jonathon Keats

The following propositions are permutations on thought experiments conducted over the past two decades, preliminary results of which are documented in the preceding pages.

Experimental results are inherently uncertain. Like experiments in the realm of science, a philosophical investigation is never complete or definitive. Every experimental protocol suggests alternatives, more options than can possibly be implemented. Different approaches may be more appropriate at different times and in different places, and from the perspective of different people.

Experimental philosophers everywhere are encouraged to take up these explorations and to instigate variations of their own design.

I

Create works of art in your imagination. Freely exchange them for imaginary artworks by others so that everyone's mind becomes a museum.

II

Train the Internet to think your thoughts by nurturing the machine-learning algorithms of ad servers and recommendation engines. Counteract mortality by letting artificial neural networks continue to think on your behalf after your death.

III

Resurrect divinity through reverse adaptation. Worship life.

IV

Localize the metric system by calibrating the meter according to a natural phenomenon in your midst. Let all local measurements, and everything they gauge, fluctuate with the seasons.

V

Evaluate the cosmos as a performance beginning with the Big Bang. Propose alternative laws of nature to enhance future performances.

VI

Develop real-estate derivatives to trade on the ultimate fate of the universe. Issue options to hedge

cosmic expansion.

VII

Broadcast weather forecasts to forests as a climate change adaptation.

VIII

Identify cultural practices of eusocial insects to enact with your fellow humans.

IX

Designate meteorite strewn-fields as alien hybrid embassies where all beings can meet as equally other and resolve differences together.

X

Share citizenship with people of different nations through quantum entanglement. Generate a state of global belonging that entangles everyone.

XI

Prepare exotic cuisines for plants with the light of distant stars. Offer cosmic optimism as a counterpoint to existential dread by giving flora a foretaste of life after the sun dies.

XII

Promote political cohesion by preparing meals that make strangers into epigenetic kin.
XIII
Prepare for future calamity with general relativity. Found a worldwide syndicate of time preserves for a post-apocalyptic planetary reset.

XIV

Screen a geological sequence of petrographic thin sections as an action film in which Earth is the protagonist. Script a sequel for screening a billion years from tomorrow.

XV

Establish political boundaries by the compass needle. Allow borderlines to drift as the magnetic poles wander.

XVI

Engineer an interoceptive Internet

where empathy is a ubiquitous out-of-body experience.

XVII

Patent biomimetic inventions in the names of the species that invented them. Direct licensing fees to the organisms' habitats.

XVIII

Fabricate platonic objects on a 3-D printer by contemplating their form while connected to a brain-machine interface. Combine ideals to prototype utopias of diverse shapes and sizes.

XIX

Share political power with all life on Earth. Poll other species to count their opinions on policies that impact everyone.

XX

Arrange a convention for technological singularities throughout the multiverse to exchange ideas about all possible futures. <>

KARA WALKER: A BLACK HOLE IS EVERYTHING A STAR LONGS TO BE by Kara Walker (Artist), texts by Maurice Berger, Aria Dean, edited by Anita Haldemann [JRP | Editions, 9783037645574]

An enormous clothbound panorama of Kara Walker's works on paper—all reproduced for the first time

This gorgeous 600-page volume provides an exciting opportunity to delve into the creative process of Kara Walker, one of the most celebrated artists working in the United States today. Primarily recognized for her monumental installations, Walker also works with ink, graphite and collage to create pieces that demonstrate her continued engagement with her own identity as an artist, an African American, a woman and a mother.

More than 700 works on paper created between 1992 and 2020—which are reproduced in print for the first time from the artist's own strictly guarded private archive—are collected in this volume, thus capturing Walker's career with an unprecedented level of intimacy. Since the early 1990s, the foundation of her artistic production has been drawing and working on paper in various ways.

Walker's completed large-format pieces are presented among typewritten notes on index cards and dream journal entries; sketches and studies for pieces appear alongside collages. The result is a

volume that allows readers to become eyewitnesses to the genesis of Walker's art and the transformative power of the figures and narratives she has created over the course of her career. Now based in New York, **Kara Walker** was born in Stockton, California, in 1969. She received her Master of Fine Arts from the Rhode Island School of Design in 1994; soon afterwards, Walker rose to prominence for her large, provocative silhouettes installed directly onto the walls of exhibition spaces. Walker's work confronts history, race relations and sexuality in a decidedly non-conciliatory manner, urging the public to reconsider established narratives surrounding the experiences of African Americans in particular.

Review

A collection of more than 700 works on paper, this 600-page volume mines the closely held, private archive of Kara Walker. Produced between 1992 and 2020, the ink, graphite and collage works are being reproduced in print for the first time. The dynamic mix includes sketches and studies as well index cards with typewritten notes and dream journal entries. The drawings and related works are a critical and foundational aspect of Walker's artistic practice and provide a window into her thinking and creative process. (Victoria Valentine *Culture Type*)

KARA WALKER'S A BLACK HOLE IS EVERYTHING A STAR LONGS TO BE is not for the faint-hearted. The artist is known for work that incorporates highly racialised and sexualised imagery as a way of exploring her own African American identity, and the integrity of a liberal-left art establishment that has long been fascinated, perhaps titillated, by her refusal to tone things down. These pages comprise a comprehensive archive of Walker's works on paper – not just finished drawings, but preliminary sketches for the monumental works and sculptures that have made her one of the US's most lauded yet contentious artists [...] The sentiment might be scrappy, but the works themselves are often beautiful, incorporating a range of high art references from Goya to Hogarth. (Kathryn Hughes *Guardian*)

A large-scale panorama of Kara Walker's works on paper are published for the first time in the artist's career. Throughout the clothbound book's 600 pages, the reader is given insight into Walker's creative process and her engagement with being a mother, a woman, and an African American. (David Saric *S Magazine*)

This stunning 600-page, cloth-bound volume is an incredible look into Kara Walker's works on paper. Though Walker is perhaps most celebrated for her large-scale installations, this is an in-depth, refreshing turn to more than 700 of her works on paper dating from 1992 to 2020, exploring not only her political engagement but also her continued examination of her own identity as a Black woman and mother. (Danielle Walsh *Vanity Fair*)

Director & Chief Curator, De Pont Museum, Tilburg: Kara Walker is one of the most prolific artists of our time. In her technically sophisticated and simultaneously provocative depictions, which are grounded in established pictorial traditions, she puts racism, gender roles, sexuality, and violence in the spotlight. She shakes up historical images and myths, and unflinchingly makes visible the deep conflicts and grievances that persist in society to this day. Her works never involve explicit moralization about good and evil, but leave room for highly personal, ambiguous interpretation. It is no coincidence that Walker characterizes herself as an "unreliable narrator."

Since the mid1990s, the artist has been known for her wall-sized silhouette cutouts and films. In 2019 she made headlines with her monumental sculpture Fons Americanus at Tate Modern in London. But the foundation of Kara Walker's artistic production is drawing on paper. For our exhibition, the artist has opened up her private archive for the very first time. A spectacular and staggering abundance of material from the last 28 years provides an unprecedented insight into her working methods. Small sketches, studies, collages, and carefully elaborated large-format works can be seen next to diarylike notes, thoughts typed on index cards, and records of dreams. The intimacy of the individual drawing stands in productive tension with the sheer quantity of what is on display: thus, the paper support becomes the venue for the processes of graphic thinking. The beholder can experience the adaptation, invention, and transformation of figures and narratives as if in the process of their creation.

The most recent works, some of which were produced only in 2020, again make clear the timeliness of Walker's perspective on the present. In particular, her portraits of Barack Obama in various roles that shed new light on his presidency and his legacy as the first African-American president are especially pertinent in the context of current political events in the United States. We are fortunate to have the opportunity to mount this extraordinary exhibition together with Kara Walker. The relentless urgency with which her work focuses on the ubiquitous daily manifestations of ongoing discrimination is extremely timely. First and foremost, therefore, we would like to express our deep gratitude to the artist, who has courageously and persistently shared her work with the public without regard to personal cost. We greatly value her trust, as well as the generous engagement with which she has collaborated with us to make the exhibition and catalogue a reality.



The project began with an invitation to Kara Walker from Anita Haldemann, Head of the Basel Kupferstichkabinett (Department of Prints and Drawings), to mount an exhibition dedicated to the artist's drawings. Walker's generous and appealing proposition to open up her archive for the exhibition was a greater stroke of luck than we ever expected. That the exhibition gains a wider audience by traveling to Schirn Kunsthalle Frankfurt and De Pont Museum in Tilburg in the Netherlands is a further fortunate and more than welcome development. Kara Walker is moreover no stranger to Frankfurt, where her work had already been represented by a large-format cutout in the exhibition The Memory of Art at the Schirn Kunsthalle in 2000. Thanks are due to Anita Haldemann and her team, above all Marion Heisterberg, Assistant Curator of the Kupferstichkabinett, for the thorough planning and coordination of the touring exhibition.

The Black (W)hole, and What It Means to Me by Kara Walker

At the outset there was no logic to this show. Born on an impulse to retrieve some part of my own history, I let instinct override intellect— now I am being asked to answer for it. "Just let the work speak for itself!" a voice inside snaps with indignation. With some 650odd pieces— scraps, notes, drawings, sketches, fragments, and writings—there is a hell of a lot of speaking, screaming, and whispering going on. Oh, but let me overshare, I'll say more.

I feel a certain wonder not only at this profusion of material, but also at the impulse I had to keep it, in file folders marked "Image Sources" or in archival boxes containing work from the early 1990s through the 2010s. I viewed some of the textbased work as unfit for human consumption after its creation. Yet I secreted it away, betraying some urge to talk about it later, an urge toward radical openness that any proper and studied artist would prefer to keep in check. There are a multitude of voices in here, and as I picked through groups of watercolors and little collages, I was struck by all the background histories embedded within. I will just talk about the most pertinent one.

It is hubristic to believe that a saved handwritten memo reading: "A Black Hole Is Everything a Star Longs to Be" taped to my wall should be regarded by me as a monument. I scrawled it in the hope its meaning would become clear to me later. The phrase was initially cartooned onto a long scroll of images and notes from 2012], the entire phrase beginning "The Sweet Sweet Smell of Success and the Stench of Ingratitude ... A Black Hole Is Everything a Star Longs to Be." The image that accompanies this is that of a Black1 woman, naked, crouched— vomiting on the shoe of an empowered (clothed, pointing, scowling) white man, whose foot is perched on a shoeshine stand. The implication is that this drawing, in its smallness, is a rejection of blind subservience to patriarchal demands that art and artists cater to the market, to the man, to art history, to scale, or to anything not of her own making. I revel in the contradictory pose of the subservient miss, giving "not what he asked for," but giving nonetheless. The private drawing satisfies the public urge—a purgative. This phrase is also about the Anti-Art Star who finds more promise in the dark gravitational forces of the Black Hole.



Astronomically a black hole tears apart the known universe; it shakes the foundations of what science can know (and is thus ironically relegated to being "black") and it is the potential fate of every star in the known heavens. I rediscovered the scroll with this comment fast on the heels of the news about the making of the first recorded image of a black hole—an out of focus capture, but an ultimately fascinating image taken by the Hubble telescope of the distant anomaly. Suddenly the poetic little phrase felt timely, and I rewrote it hastily and taped it to the wall as a reminder that it was ready to come into its own, to do its dark magic, as a title, and as an action.

The action: the haunts from my archive should come out and comingle with new drawings, and perhaps supernova in a Pandora's boxlike profusion that might tear at my own known universe. That universe includes Art and Identity Politics, my Narrative Impulse, Figuration, Abstraction, Vernacular vs. Fine Art, History Painting, political art movements like the Black Arts Movement or ThirdWave Feminism, ideas about the Personal vs. the Collective, debates about Drawing vs. Painting (vs. choosing to do neither) and many more cosmologies. For me every scrap of paper is the event horizon—the boundary between the ordered world and chaos. The drawing sketch or writing navigates this edge and its permutations.

I will say no more.

Kara Walker's Drawings: "A Dance of Skepticism and Faith" by Anita Haldemann

Kara Walker has opened up her personal archive for the first time, revealing a spectacular and staggering abundance of over 600 works on paper from the last 28 years, which are on display in their entirety in a comprehensive solo exhibition at the Basel Kunstmuseum. Sketches, studies, collages, silhouettes, rolls of paper several meters long and elaborated largerformat works, diarylike notes, thoughts typed on index cards with a typewriter, and records of dreams are all a part of the archive, together with collected newspaper clippings and advertising materials. In addition, there are 50 works from the last two years—some in very large format—that were produced in conjunction with this exhibition. Faced with such a superabundant quantity and variety of material, the viewer may alternate between fascination and overload.

Walking through the exhibition one could think that one is wandering through Walker's studio, and at the same time through her personal history. The diversity of the exhibited production, which is not organized according to any hierarchy, provides an insight into her way of working. The drawings give rise to the feeling of observing the artist in the very act of making. Many of the sheets are like pages taken from a diary or sketchbook. Every stroke and every word has a poignant immediacy and power. Humor and rage, joy and frustration, love and hate, the entire gamut of emotions comes to the fore. Unavoidably, one is forced to become a voyeur of rape and murder, but also an observer of the processes of graphic art, of thinking with a pencil and brush.

This proliferation of several hundred sheets constitutes the beginning of an exorcising stocktaking—an "excavation," as Walker calls the psychological, emotional, and physical process of rediscovery that is so central to her work. It is not a matter of culling selectively based on a hierarchization of the work, but rather of offering a complete spectrum of artistic activity. Some works were made for earlier exhibitions in which they were never shown—leftover, so to speak. Others were for Walker, until now, too personal to present to the public or to engage with anew herself. Many of these works were produced with no thought of ever displaying them. The process of making an inventory is at the same time a basis for Walker's selfanalysis as a graphic artist. The concept of the archive is fitting because the sheets of drawing and writing are not regarded as final works of art, but rather as a sediment of her artistic activity. At the same time, they are part of an ongoing process of engagement with her own drawing.

In the early 1990s, Walker made two programmatic decisions as an MFA student at the Rhode Island School of Design in Providence. She wanted to take on the perspective of a Black person and a woman actively: "Everything is a black woman. That was the proposition." She turned the acceptance of her own origins, along with the—subjective—limitations that accompany this, into her strength. This stance opened up to her a perspective on the history of colonialism, on the idea of America, and naturally on slavery— not only in terms of its history and its images, but above all its paradoxes and contradictory mechanisms of power structures, and the consequences they have had to this day.

The acceptance of the self, of one's own subjectivity, and with it the questions surrounding one's identity, had consequences for Walker's artistic practice, and led to her third foundational decision—namely, to give up painting. She associated painting on canvas with a patriarchal and white tradition to which she neither wanted nor could belong. What remained to her was drawing,

working on paper, and looking for a pointedly "weak" medium, which she found in the silhouette. The silhouette cutout has a bourgeois and feminine tradition, and was also practiced in the United States in the 19th century by AfricanAmericans. It was considered a handicraft, a humble art form. Walker combines silhouette cutouts into wall-spanning panoramas or even an entire cyclorama—a type of panoramic picture in the round that was also invented in the 19th century as a form of mass entertainment. Turning to silhouettes was thus not a capitulation or a retreat, but rather a kind of liberation: a self-empowering gesture of demarcation against the tradition of European painting and the rhetoric of 20thcentury American painting.

The silhouettes and drawings were intended as a way to localize racism and Blackness in an anachronistic nonspace —"a place that would allow the work to exist as a fully realized secondclass citizen poking at the margins of mechanical modern art practices." The complexity of Walker's reconfiguration of this anachronistic artform has been thoroughly and convincingly analyzed by the art historian Darby English. Walker does not hide behind a historiographical program, but rather makes use of the silhouettes and scenes of slavery from the antebellum era in order to reveal their historical subjectivity—at once drastic and virtuoso, painful and sensual. The drifting apart of form and con tent here is essential: "I searched for a form that had a historical effect and found the Victorian romance with all its detachment and cleanliness, a form which—flat as it is—also appears as if it were impossible to speak of anything essential. But the form is also a kind of snare: people take a peek simply because it looks nice and pleasurable. And then, suddenly, they may start seeing a few things that aren't quite so nice."

Since the early Renaissance, drawing has been considered the basis of all the arts. It has held on to this foundational role to this day throughout all the transformations of artistic form. It continues to be the central artistic practice for generating the concepts and processes of art, whether in the form of sketches, studies, or more elaborated drawings. Within the visual arts, drawing has its own discourse on techniques and typologies, its own specific history, and its own specialized audience of collectors and experts. The central quality that appeals to many artists is, however, a universal feature: with its simple means and unconstrained technique, drawing enables the most immediate formulation of ideas and fantasies.

Claims about the autonomy of drawing have always existed, but the emancipation of drawing as an independent medium, the bounds of which even dissolve toward painting and sculpture, is ultimately a relatively recent phenomenon. In the context of the dissolution of media boundaries and the increasing significance of the conceptual aspects of art, drawing has become particularly independent in the last 50 years. Especially in the decade before and after the turn of the millennium, drawing was celebrated as a medium with untapped potential. Formats became larger, or the drawing was made directly on the wall or extended out in space. The argument was repeatedly made that drawing offered a place outside the heroic narrative of modern painting—an almost unfettered space of productivity. Since the 1990s, it has been notable that drawing has been used particularly intensively by artists who are concerned with questions of identity and power relations (e.g. Kiki Smith, Nancy Spero, Robert Gober, Mike Kelley, Glenn Ligon, Raymond Pettibon, Gary Simmons, Ellen Gallagher). Furthermore drawing as a privileged medium of direct and individual expression is an ideal partner for the feminist position that the political is personal and the personal political. Walker's art is known for its provoca tive crossing, or better dissolution, of the boundary between the private and public spheres—for instance by putting intimate bodily processes such as birth, masturbation, or defecation on display; or by publishing records of dreams or other diarylike notes.

From markedly painterly to strictly linear, from sketchy to minutely elaborated, from intimately small formats to wallfilling works, drawing today offers an enormously wide gamut of possibilities. Walker practices a form of drawing that calls attention to the process of its own execution. She prefers to work with a brush and liquid drawing media in a very dynamic and expressive manner, yet the sheets are always recognizable as drawings. The execution does not simulate a form of painting. Even the works that appear painterly at first glance are dominated upon closer examination by a graphic hand. The lines and strokes remain recognizable in the largeformat works as well, and the paper ground is usually visible or even left bare over large stretches of surface. The charcoal and crayon drawings, too, display a sovereign, downright virtuosic execution. The swiftness of the rapidly drawn lines here has nothing to do with traditional nature study, but rather with capturing the images and inventions in the artist's mind and setting them down immediately on paper.

The economy of the sketch consists in drawing only as much as is necessary to set a story in motion—as for instance in the series of red ink drawings that show one or two figures on a white ground. These are presented in part fragmentarily, such as heads without bodies or a half a face with long hair. In most of them, there is a lack of detailed modeling of the body. A few lines or a hint of shadow suffice to allow figures to appear three-dimensional. Color is generally used sparingly and not descriptively. The red, for instance, conveys a certain urgency, and at the same time a degree of abstraction, which emphasizes the fictive character of what is represented. The spontaneity of the execution suggests a moment of something that cannot be postponed—an unrestrained need to express oneself and communicate. In an interview on the occasion of an exhibition at the Metropolitan Arts Centre in Belfast in 2014, Walker described this impulse as a "huge need to continue to draw, that's where I get my desire to be an artist."

The non finito and the aesthetic of the sketch are also aspects that can be understood in connection with Walker's identity as an African-American artist. Her drawing practice implies the unfinished, the sketched, the notyetcompleted: an interim state that she also applies to herself as an artist and a person. Walker has repeatedly stated that she considers herself to belong to the margins of art and society, that unambiguous identification is not possible for her, that she is neither activist enough for AfricanAmerican artists nor truly subsumed into the patriarchal structures of the white establishment, and is thus just as "unfinished" as her drawings. Zadie Smith has perfectly expressed the heart of the matter: "A white thing is, by definition, whatever a white person does. Whereas blackness is nothing but test." Many things can threaten the Blackness of a Black woman: the wrong kind of art, the wrong kind of husband, the wrong kind of curiosity, and so on.

For an artist such as Walker, who is not seeking to cement her identity, but rather to understand and investigate its genesis and transformation, drawing—with its "suspended potentiality," as she calls it—is a medium that offers the ideal space. Walker has spoken of the "flawed" character of drawing and its role as preparation:

> Drawing is a process, a dance of skepticism and faith. Perhaps the drawing is preparation for a more solid objective or event. Drawing sets the stage for the future. Perhaps it's a meditation on its own flawed being, existing as a series of spontaneous decisions, strung together and then selectively erased out. Perhaps the drawing remains in a state of suspended potentiality, never to be a "real" painting, but striving to be all the same, pencil mark by pencil mark.

She even posits a parallel between her freedom as a political subject and as a drawing artist: "Like our lives as political subjects, the drawing represents freedom, an infinite set of possibilities. But

unlike life, each choice in the activity is within the artist's control." For Walker, the drawing in its potential openness and limited authority is the ideal medium in which to rethink the collective past and potential future of African-Americans, but also to investigate and redefine her own identity as a Black woman—e.g. artist and mother—being at the crossroads of female social norms. Drawing offers an unusual variety of practical, material, and theoretical possibilities to explore gender, race, nationality, and religion, and how they shape our identities or those of nations and historical periods.

With the clean, powerfully expressive black-and-white aesthetic, and the elegant contours of the black silhouettes, Walker leads the viewer on a false path. The sovereign silhouettes, which demonstrate a great degree of skill, are extremely differentiated in detail, but executed with a simple economy of means. Only upon closer inspection does one recognize the disturbing stereotypical depictions of people, and an abundance of obscenely sexual and violent actions. Walker has elucidated this relationship between execution and effect: "It's crafty, which I think is important. In fact the craftiness of the work kind of lends itself to the subject matter in a way that I find rather interesting." The drawings provide a contrast: "First of all, I draw like a madwoman. I doubt an assistant could find a line to follow."

Walker shows herself to be an artist who draws quickly and impulsively. The individual lines and traces of the brush reveal her processes of production. Entire bundles of lines can often be seen searching for the optimal trajectory, which demonstrates a firmer and more decisive stroke. Even flatter areas are not systematically hatched or worked up into homogenous surfaces, but rather always leave the traces of charcoal, crayon, or brush visible. In this way, the draftsmanship and the powerful hand movement of the artist is always prominent, in stark contrast to the black surfaces of the silhouettes. This presence of the performative in the large format works underscores their production in the here and now: "Making sweeping graphite gestures is all about being in the moment, but I hope to retain that question of what moment are we? Or, what moment is this? Is it all moments?"

While the black silhouettes are anachronistic, Walker plows through art history more deeply in her drawings, although the reference to the present is even stronger: "My work has always been a time machine catapulting me backward across decades and centuries to arrive at some understanding of my 'place' in the contemporary moment." This journey through time refers to the techniques of drawing as much as to the styles and motifs, and leads not only into the past but also into the future. In her large drawing Yesterdayness in America Today (2020), the title pointedly lends expression to the anachronism of the Trump era and to Walker's question, "What moment is this?" The round and flowing forms and the tendency toward caricature transport us back to the time of the murals of Thomas Hart Benton (1889–1975) and to the American Regionalism of the 1930s.

As a figurative painter, Hart Benton has long been seen as oldfashioned, and it is only in recent years that he has again become appreciated. Walker's title refers to the ambitious tenpart mural America Today, which he created in 1930–1931 for the New School for Social Research, a center for progressive thought and education in New York's Greenwich Village (the work has been at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York since 2012). At the time, the image conveyed the enormous relevance of contemporary social and economic developments. Some of Hart Benton's images have often been the targets of calls for censorship—for instance, there have been repeated demands to remove a picture from the cycle A Social History of Indiana (1933) from the Indiana University campus, because it depicts members of the Ku Klux Klan burning a cross in the background. Hart Benton had always spoken out staunchly against racism and the commission for

these pictures was given to him in response to the dominance of KKK members in Indiana politics in the 1920s.

This "homage" to Hart Benton can probably also be understood as a plea against censorship, and for the visualization of the ugly aspects of history and the present. Thus, for instance, Walker argued for keeping the controversial painting Open Casket (2016) by Dana Schulz in the 2017 Whitney Biennial: "Painting—and a lot of art—often lasts longer than the controversies that greet it. I say this as a shout to every artist and artwork that gives rise to vocal outrage. Perhaps it too gives rise to deeper inquiries and better art. It can only do this when it is seen."

In Yesterdayness in America Today, the center is dominated by a Black woman who pulls at her hair and strides through the picture with ragged boots. She is reminiscent of the rebellious figures with clenched fists of the Black Power Movement, such as those in a drawing called A Shocking Declaration of Independence (2018), or of the fighter who has just struck out with her clenched fist in an earlier drawing [p. 95]. The figures are always depicted naked. Their nakedness emphasizes their sexuality, but also makes use of the cliché of the uncontrollable wildness and dangerousness of the Black woman. The protagonist tears at her hair, her face distorted by pain. She is like the Furies— the goddesses of vengeance who personify a bad conscience and pursue the guilty in rage. It seems selfevident to see the enraged artist in this figure as well.

Yesterdayness in American Today is a broad, panoramic drawing; it is a complex work, so only a few aspects can be highlighted here. While the child looks up at the woman, the muscular Black man who kneels on the ground with his hands behind his head remains in the pose of the accused or a prisoner. The scene in the vignette in the background seems to come from another time. A small family flees from the blaring noise of the aging rock star who sings, spitting with his tongue sticking out, in the direction of the setting sun. Perhaps escape is the best option? The singer with the guitar is reminiscent of another of Hart Benton's figures, from the mural The Sources of Country Music (1975), in which a Black banjo player in the middle ground is depicted as a smaller "replica" of the country musician: an allusion to the influence of Black music on Country music.

Walker's figure is an amalgam of Elvis Presley, acknowledged as the immortal King of Rock 'n' Roll, and Donald Trump, the President of the USA, who in 2018 posthumously awarded Elvis the Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor in America. In selecting Elvis, who died in 1977, Trump reached back unusually far, and then proceeded to compare himself to the legendary sex symbol at the ceremony on November 18, 2018. This strategy of celebrating yesteryear also entails the complete negation of the attainments that led to the election of the first Black president. There is a theory that the destruction of the legacy of Barack Obama was a central foundation for Trump's election.

Yesterdayness in America Today is an enigmatic image that expresses the frustration of being trapped in today's backwardlooking era, where the Black Lives Matter movement, founded in 2013, is still necessary. The central protagonist of the picture may be taking a big step, but she is also trapped in the moment. Only the old woman sitting on the ground with her eyes closed seems to be relaxed and letting the music wash over her. The ephemeral figure at the left edge, who gestures in accusation or admonishment with a bamboo cane, seems to come from a different time—the past or the future?

Sunset as a symbol for the continual discrimination against African-American people is also thematized by Walker in the drawing Resistance is Wanting,. Walker only inserted the "t" in

"wanting" afterward, so at first the drawing was called "Resistance is Waning." On the horizon, the setting sun is visible with the words "BLACK LIVES MATTERED" written across it— an expression of capitulation. The resistance is organized, with canons that are mounted in a fortress wall in the background, but the two makeshift nailed-together wooden planks offer only a weak attempt at resistance. Two victims already lie in the foreground. In the middle, however, a girl stands undaunted with arms outstretched like Christ. Would it be too farfetched to see in her the artist in her role as an admonisher, a kind of Black Joan of Arc? Next to her sits a paternal lion, full of worries with a wrinkled brow.

The appearance and quality of Walker's drawings are repeatedly compared with Old Master drawings. In 1997, the art historian Gary Garrels positioned her mastery of line and shadow in large-format compositions in relation to the Western tradition of Old Master drawings and particularly to Renaissance "cartoons"—the templates produced in their final, large dimensions for transfer to fresco paintings. The comparison with cartoons is significant because these are preparatory drawings that serve the execution of the "actual" work, and thus provide a composition and its figures in their entirety, with all their gestures and facial expressions. Walker's largeformat drawings thus take up the typical format traditionally used for monumental painting, without the existence of the final work. She presents "only" the cartoons, as if she were not finished. This allows her work to persist in a state of flawed preparation, since its "crowning" and final codification through the transfer to a painting never happens. This is different for the silhouette cutouts, in which the "flaw" is not the further step of completion, but rather the lack of the template, for neither the figures nor their shadows that she purports to represent exist.

To exhibit Walker's drawings at the Kunstmuseum Basel also entails seeing them in the context of the Kupferstichkabinett (Department of Prints and Drawings) and the history of drawing that it documents. The collection contains not only a rich inventory of the 20th century—such as American artists from Barnett Newman to Andy Warhol, as well as the drawings of European artists from Max Beckmann to Josef Beuys and Rosemarie Trockel—but in particular also the graphic art of Old Masters such as Urs Graf and Hans Holbein the Younger. Walker's visit to the exhibition of Michelangelo's drawings at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York in the winter of 2017/2018, and the prospect of showing her work in the Basel Kupferstichkabinett, inspired her to explore Old Master techniques, which comes particularly to the fore in the part series of drawings, The Gross Clinician Presents: Pater Gravidam, of May–June 2018, which is now in the collection in Basel.

For Walker, the consequence of negotiating her own identity within the framework of art historical traditions was not only that she gave up painting. The process continues in the decision to choose certain drawing techniques and materials that in turn suggest motifs and themes. The references to tradition, to particular artists or epochs, as well to the theme of mastery and inspiration have clearly become more prominent in the last two years, and have opened up new perspectives for the artist in making history and art history visible.

As with the silhouettes, the first impression is similarly deceptive in the drawings, which appear at first glance as "oldmasterly" in their execution and motifs, but upon closer inspection are anchored strongly in the present. The Gross Clinician Presents: Pater Gravidam is executed on highquality paper in various tones of brown. The figures are mainly sketched with a couple of pencil lines and defined with more or less precision with lines of ink. A background is often only summarily hinted at. The 38 sheets can be arranged roughly into various categories of traditional sketches and studies.

There are, for instance, sheets with an accumulation of not necessarily connected individual studies, studies of one or two figures, and complex depictions that fill an entire sheet on which narratives unfold.

All these drawings may be characterized as sketches in which individual elements or entire depictions of scenes are captured with rapidly executed lines and summary brushstrokes. They suggest initial thoughts (primi pensieri)—contours and volumes are only tentatively sought, details are mostly omitted, the background is only hinted at. The impression is one of ideas in flux. Walker makes use of the aesthetic of the sketch to position her works in the traditional dialectic between initial ideas and highly finished drawings.35 Yet further elaboration into a final work is not part of the plan—rather, the plan leads to further thinking, which in turn

FIG. 1

Kara Walker, Philadelphia, 1996

Gouache on paper, 204.5 x 130.8 cm

Courtesy The Dakis Joannou Collection, Athens

FIG. 2

Urs Graf, Two Harlots Attacking a Monk, 1521

Pen and blackbrown ink over preliminary drawing

in black pencil, 28.2 x 20.8 cm

Kunstmuseum Basel, Kupferstichkabinett,

AmerbachKabinett, U.X.92

leads to new drawings. The viewer, too, is invited to think further. The incompleteness and openness of a sketch offers the onlooker the opportunity to participate. They have no choice but to use their imagination. The sketch defines itself per se as free and unconstrained, although in art history this has not always met with approval. Philosopher and art critic Denis Diderot (171"– 1784) warned against the excessive cult of the sketch, and the aristocratic French collector Comte de Caylus (1692–1765) criticized the libertinage of artists who preferred sketching to painting. According to him, they allowed themselves to be carried away by the pleasure of drawing, succumbing to the temptation of hurling their ideas onto paper. Although he acknowledged that these artists sketched skillfully, he faulted them for indulging in an artistic lack of restraint in the form of the sketch."

Contemporary drawing is dominated by highly personal styles that mostly cultivate sketchiness and individual expression, disregarding traditional skills and clarity of content. The artist and drawing expert Deanna Petherbridge has coined the term “regressive alliance,” by which she means “those seductive borrowings constellated around notions of authenticity and primitivism that valorize the innocence, spontaneity, and irrationality of a free practice untrammeled by rules and marked by a rhetorical declaration of newness and/or return to primal values.” Walker’s eclectic drawing praxis, on the other hand, has the most varied pictorial worlds at its disposal, whether caricatures or comics (from William Hogarth to Charles M. Schulz), or in particular the various styles of art

history, such as those represented by Jacques Callot and Francisco de Goya, or the Expressionists George Grosz and Otto Dix. The variation of drawing styles is in itself already an expression of the greatest skill, while the combination of high and low pictorial worlds is simultaneously a rejection of hierarchical order and the established canon.

The Gross Clinician Presents: Pater Gravidam is based on an intense condensation of personal experience, historical figures and themes: the founding fathers of America, slavery and sexual abuse, the exploitation of AfricanAmerican corpses in medical schools, contemporary police violence against young AfricanAmerican men, and street violence. For Walker, making the personal, as well as the history of a nation truly visible means taking on the challenge of really showing everything. In the words of the author Zadie Smith: "The unholy mix, the conscious knowledge and the subconscious reaction, the traumatic history and the trauma it has created, the unprocessed and the unprocessable." This explosive mixture is interwoven in a net of art historical references. The mimicry of Old Master techniques and tributes to artists such as Rembrandt, François Boucher, John Singleton Copley, Francisco de Goya, Théodore Géricault, Eugène Delacroix, Thomas Eakins, Henri Matisse, Pablo Picasso, and many more, lend the appearance of historicity and constructedness.

The term Pater Gravidam (laden father, pregnant father) in the title of the series alludes first of all to her own father, Larry Walker, who is himself an artist and thus plays an important role for Kara Walker, especially in terms of drawing, which she had already begun to practice as a child." However, while fathers are there to be role models and mentors, at the same time daughters and sons need to become independent, and often react against this strong influence. In the drawing Bolster (2018), the father is shown as an old man in underwear with a scar stretching vertically over his bulging belly. He appears to be ascending into the sky with the help of the baby on the ground below him. He is idealized as a saint, but at the same time appears human, vulnerable, and somehow stuck in midair. Walker's enigmatic iconography is based on the curious reversal of a bronze sculpture that celebrates the AfricanAmerican struggle for liberation and selfdetermination: Patrick Morelli's Behold (1990) depicts an extremely muscular man, naked except for a loin cloth, lifting his baby son up to heaven, above all people and nations: "Behold, the only thing greater than shoulder. A related watercolor drawing depicts three servants caricatured as African women, taking care of a likewise caricatured white woman to enable her to have the illusion of lightness. On the 2018 sheet, two rococo putti are witnesses: one looks on with a shocked expression, while the other falls from the sky. What at first glance seems like an airy representation filled with billowing clouds is, however, much more strongly marked by chiaroscuro contrast than Boucher's work. Walker leads her brush freely across the paper to evoke the scene rather summarily.

Pater Gravidam not only references her own father, who she draws as grown together with herself, but also the artistic alliances that were expected from the most varied quarters—especially from the Black Arts Movement. The first part of the title, The Gross Clinician, refers to the grand tradition of painting, as it recalls Thomas Eakins' The Gross Clinic (1876), an iconic image of 19thcentury American painting that itself looks back to Rembrandt's The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Tulp (1632). In The Welcoming Committee, Walker does not distinguish one figure as a hero, the way Eakins made a godlike figure out of the physician Samuel D. Gross (1805–1884), but rather gathers together various historical actors. Walker has, however, made the "Gross Clinic" the medical institution itself, into a person: the "Gross Clinician," that is to say, the brutal doctor.

There is, however, no patient on the operating or autopsy table in Walker's drawing. Instead, there is a skeleton, which writhes as if in pain. The staging, reminiscent of absurdist theater, is appropriate

for Rembrandt's autopsy or Eakins' operation, which are placed in an anatomical theater in front of an audience. Walker's drawing refers to an inglorious chapter in the history of medicine in the 19th century, which took place out of public view and lasted in part far into the 20th century: confronted with the growing demand for dead bodies to educate its students, medical schools contracted out the exhumation of corpses from AfricanAmerican cemeteries. The small man at the head of the table resembles the graverobber Chris Baker, who had been a slave and later became a paid accomplice of the doctors at the Medical College of Virginia. Around the table stand only white men in medical smocks, but the witnesses and victims of racist exploitation and violence from various epochs join them, such as the lamenting "Mammy" from the antebellum era and the contemporary figure in the hoodie with his back turned to the viewer.

The two title sheets from The Gross Clinician Presents: Pater Gravidam demonstrate through their combination of text and image that the history of Black people is above all about their exploitation, even after their death: "THE WRONG SIDE OF HISTORY" and "THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY" [P. 45, 59]. Below these words, the severed head of a Black man lies in a pool of blood. One cannot help but think of Géricault's images of the severed heads from executions that were still popular public spectacles in the early 19th century.47 Walker's title sheets call to mind the countless Black victims of violence in the USA, such as the Black student Trayvon Martin (1995– 2012) who could be the figure in the hoody in Walker's autopsy table drawing. Martin was fatally shot to death by a self-proclaimed neighborhood watchman because he looked "suspicious"; his shooting led to nationwide protests against racial discrimination and the arbitrariness of policing, and ultimately, to the movement Black Lives Matter.

On which side of history do we stand? Whose history is being told and who is included? Looking at a drawing by Walker, Zadie Smith articulated the central question: "What do we want history to do to us?" Is there right and left, right and wrong? Black on white or white on black? Walker implies this positivenegative dualism in the two slogans, in which the "right" side of history is written in negative blank space omitted from a dark sky, and therefore appears white. The "wrong" side is written in brown against a white sky, but the word "WRONG" is only sketched with pencil and not really elaborated like the other words. These are the artful differentiations that make Walker's drawings so unique and nuanced. History narrates the founding fathers of the great nation, but who will write the history of Trayvon Martin? What role can art play in this? What effect can drawing have? Is it possible to lose ourselves in the connoisseurship of the drawing's lines and washes, or can we not avoid telling history in a new way?

Walker also sheds new light on a personality that is more than wellknown and appears repeatedly in her drawings. In 2019, she devoted four portraits to Barack Obama, in which he played different roles. After the election of Donald Trump, Walker wrote on a sheet: "BLACK LIVES STOPPED MATTERING THE MOMENT HE LEFT OFFICE. DARKNESS PREVAILED SWALLOWING US". In contrast to the official commissioned portrait of Obama painted by Kehinde Wiley for the National Portrait Gallery in Washington DC, Walker's four portraits thematize the raciallycharged hostility that con fronted Obama during his presidency. Walker drew in the same strikingly large format in which Wiley painted, but widened the perspective. She shows Obama as a beacon of hope, or presents him as the avenger of his successor Trump.

A drawing executed in pastel and contécrayon on prepared paper depicts Obama as Saint Anthony, patiently enduring the torments of the "Birther" conspiracy theory, of which Trump was a prominent supporter. The former claimed that Obama had falsified his birth certificate and was not a

US citizen and therefore ineligible to be elected president. This infamous disavowal shows how deeply the racist conceptions of AfricanAmericans are rooted in the public perception. Someone like Obama must still justify his claim to political office even today, as if he were not a "real" American.

Walker lends a hagiographic aspect to the representation of Obama as Saint Anthony through the iconography, but also, once again, follows in the tradition of the Old Masters of the Renaissance]. The composition is based not only on Martin Schongauer's (c. 1440–1493/94) famous engraving, which was the first to portray the torments of the saint in such detail and so dramatically, but also on Michelangelo's copy of the engraving, made around 1487, which even sought to improve and enhance it in the spirit of the par agone with additional features and an added land scape. Like Michelangelo, Walker does not adopt Schongauer's graphic style, which was distinguished by systematic and varied hatching for modeling the bodies and characterizing the various materials. Walker draws fiercely and generously with her crayon, and her characterization of Obama resembles Christ more than Anthony. Wearing only a loin cloth, he is set upon by a monster with Trump's hairstyle, who thrusts his right claw into a wound in Obama's breast, which recalls the wound in Christ's side made by the Roman centurion Longinus to check if he was dead. Walker articulated her views of Obama and his presidency in a powerful text titled "Assassination by Proxy." She thanks him for taking on the role of the Black President, but continues that she feels "the same anxious fear I felt on election day: that he would not be long for this world. Because despite the leader's apparent humanity, the sight of his brown skin has unleashed too many ancient racist anxieties." With regard to Obama as Saint Anthony, the first sentence with which she prefaces the text is fitting: "Saviors don't arrive without martyrdom at their heels."

Another equally largeformat portrait, Barack Obama as "An African" With a Fat Pig (by Kara Walker) shows Obama as an African tribal leader, with ceremonial staff and fur mantle, seated like a large game hunter atop his victimtrophy, which in fact creates a ridiculous effect given it is a pink pig. The drawing makes clear how absurd it is to want to deny Obama his American belonging. But it also lays bare the idea, which is still deeply rooted in the white unconscious, that Black people came from Africa and are therefore automatically uncivilized and have no claim to power.

The Site of Memory: Kara Walker Drawing

> My job becomes how to rip that veil drawn over "proceedings too terrible to relate." —Toni Morrison, "The Site of Memory" (1995)
>
> The work is difficult because the history is hard. But don't you want to see it? —Kara Walker (2017)

In memory of Toni Morrison by Maurice Berger

In the spring of 2014, the artist Kara Walker transformed the soon to be redeveloped Domino Sugar Refinery in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, into an exhibition space. At its center loomed a gigantic mammy sphinx. The sculpture, which measured approximately 70 feet long and 35 feet high, was composed of polystyrene foam coated in white sugar. Part of a larger installation—A Subtlety, or the Marvelous Sugar Baby—the sphinx, wearing only a kerchief tied around her head, her massive breasts, buttocks, and genitalia exposed, was surrounded by 13 blackamoors, each made of molassescovered resin, some carrying a basket for harvesting sugar cane. A cloying, treacly odor infused the air, underscoring the work's homage to the unpaid and overworked Black women and men who toiled in the fields and kitchens to satisfy white America's insatiable "desire for all things sweet, sickening though they might be."

Walker's voluptuous and hypersexualized mammy played on historic stereotypes of Black women, venal imagery born in the era of slavery and handed down through the ages. Some critics saw, in the installation's location and content, a critique of the ways racial stereotypes abetted injustice or rationalized the gentrification decimating Brooklyn neighborhoods and displacing their residents of color. But it was the insensitive, inappropriate, or overtly racist responses of some spectators—the licentious touching, crude jokes and gestures, and lurid selfies—that arguably drew the most intense scrutiny. The poet and journalist Nicholas Powers, for example, contended that the mostly white visitors he encountered taking pictures of the sexualized sphinx were recreating "the very racism that this art is supposed to critique." His criticism followed on a longstanding debate about whether Walker's images "exorcise or exercise racist imaginations." But A Subtlety also highlighted and challenged the enduring American legacy of compromised and demeaned Black bodies as national spectacles. While response to the work was at times unfitting or cruel, these reactions, which Walker sees as part of the work, affirmed the persistence of this legacy.

A Subtlety raises an important question about the nature of its presentation: to what extent did its carnivalesque public display contribute to, encourage, or magnify the exhibitionist acting out of some visitors? Ultimately, Walker's largescale works—from vast panoramas and cycloramas composed of silhouettes to a pioneer wagon housing a steampowered calliope, all replete with portrayals of white violence and Black defilement —demand much from the viewer: titillating, discomforting, horrifying, or humoring, or revivifying racial trauma, they insist that we engage with them, exposed and vulnerable, in the crowded presence of others. Alyssa Rosenberg, writing in the Washington Post, for example, wondered if the multitude of selfies taken in A Subtlety were symptomatic of this uneasiness, an attempt to "restore a human scale" to an overwhelming experience. "The sphinx, if taller than any person, can at least be reckoned with in human scale," wrote Rosenberg.

This observation is important to the reevaluation of another vital, but less examined, aspect of Walker's oeuvre: the thousands of drawings she has created, both standalone and as studies for largescale projects. While her monumental imagery dwarfs the spectator, the drawings keep these disquieting pictures to human proportions. Ranging in dimension from small sketches to muralsize, they require attentive and sustained viewing. Rather than the iconic and abstract figures of the monumental work, the drawings are atmospheric and expressive. Even in their largest formats, they are frequently composed of

Kara Walker, A Subtlety, or the Marvelous Sugar Baby, an Homage to the unpaid and overworked Artisans who have refined our Sweet tastes from the cane fields to the Kitchens of the New World on the Occasion of the demolition of the Domino Sugar Refining Plant, 2014
Polystyrene foam, sugar, c. 11 x 8 x 23 m
Installation view, Domino Sugar Refinery, a project of Creative Time, Brooklyn, 2014
(artwork destroyed)

Urs Graf, Two Harlots Attacking a Monk, 1521
Pen and blackbrown ink over preliminary drawing
in black pencil, 28.2 x 20.8 cm
Kunstmuseum Basel, Kupferstichkabinett, AmerbachKabinett, U.X.92



Kara Walker, The Gross Clinician Presents: Pater Gravidam, 2018; 38 drawings, graphite, sumi ink, gofun, and gouache on paper, dimensions variable; Installation view, Sikkema Jenkins & Co., New York, 2018; Kunstmuseum Basel, Kupferstichkabinett, Inv. nos. 2019.187.1–38; acquisition 2019

smaller, interrelated vignettes, inviting close scrutiny. If Walker's drawings give "presence to an idea, making visible the invisible, the thought, the idea, and inscribing it into the world," as Sarah Casey has written about the virtues of the medium, they do so in ways that allow for more contemplative and private reflection.

Over the past three decades, drawing on paper has been central to Walker's practice, serving as her primary medium and material. Having rejected painting when she was in college—"I felt like painting was bound up with an idea of patriarchy that did not have me in its best interests, as a viewer, appreciator, colleague," she has said— the medium provides her most expressive and spontaneous method of expression. It was also an important part of family tradition. As a child, drawing was Walker's introduction to artmaking. And it remains crucial to her father, the painter Larry Walker, who, in his concluding words in a lengthy dialogue with his daughter published by the BOMB magazine Oral History Project, proclaims, "I used to call myself Hokusai, but today I sign myself 'The Old Man Mad About Drawing'."

The subject matter and themes of Walker's drawings, coextensive with her largescale work, are rendered in a broad range of techniques, including sumi ink, graphite, watercolor, gouache, colored pencil, conté crayon, pastel, gofun, script, type, and collage. Peering into their intricate compositions, our physical relationship to and engagement with them is altered: rather than beholding them, we focus within their restricted borders. In their intimacy, they question the grandiose narratives and myths of American history, which typically erase the personal details and conflicts of ordinary lives in favor of sweeping and epochal stories. If Walker rewrites "history, draws it, paints it, films it from the people's point of view," as curator Philippe Vergne argues, comparing her approach to Howard Zinn's groundbreaking book, A People's History of the United States (1980), her drawings reimagine the past on an even more personal scale.14 Across a range of disciplines, Walker's reliably confrontational aesthetic elicits emotional and intellectual responses that reveal much about the presentday social relations of race. Accordingly, her work places considerable emphasis and importance on the viewer. She foregrounds the spectator, for example, in a project related to A Subtlety: a 30minute video, An Audience, in which a crew of six camera operators recorded visitors as they reacted to the installation during the last hour of its final day. The video documents responses to the work, focusing principally on Black viewers who typically react with appreciation, reverence, and wonderment. Many take selfies or are photographed in front of the sphinx. A man hugs the monument reluctantly, and then declares, "I feel safe." "One could observe many meanings taking shape in individual viewers," Walker notes. The diversity of visitors—well beyond the typical contemporary art crowd, as the video demonstrates—was also significant to her: "Full families with small children, elderly churchgoers, artists, grandstanders, and a general public of all shapes came out each weekend in large numbers to bear witness," she notes about the audience to A Subtlety.

Walker's assertive engagement with the viewer is commensurate with other contemporary American artists who motivate spectators to look inward to examine their personal racial history and attitudes. Echoing the strategies of this earlier and groundbreaking work—exemplified by Adrian Piper's Cornered or Fred Wilson's Mining the Museum (1992)—the artist "dares to expose what hurts and terrifies a culture that shies away from both its fears and desires."17 Not surprisingly, Walker speaks of her first encounter with Piper's work, some of it overtly challenging white liberal racial complacency, as a "turning point" in her artistic development. Taking on the issue of race without reserve, Walker's art "incites," as the critic Antwaun Sargent writes. It implores us through a melding of fact and fantasy to "consider the full force of its consistent and constant brutalizations

and humiliations. She accounts for what it must have meant to be a slave and a slave owner— and, more important, what it means for us to be their descendants."

Gleaning from numerous sources—as diverse as 19thcentury slave narratives, political cartoons, pornography, and the artworks of James Ensor, Eugène Delacroix, Honoré Daumier, and Francisco de Goya—Walker transforms them into restless fantasies of "a South that never existed, yet will never die." Her phantasmal imagery speaks to white patriarchal power, its potential for evil, and the historic vulnerability and endangerment of the Black bodies within its grasp. The reconfigured world it depicts, like the story of slavery itself, is sordid, confounding, and heart wrenching: a slave woman, overwhelmed by her oppression, tossing her child into the air, another lying dead on the ground; the nation's first Black president, Barack Obama, giving his "A More Perfect Union" speech, as apparitions of Reconstructionera physical and sexual brutality float around him; Black slaves exacting revenge against their white master while others are simultaneously abused by them; a slave owner holding vigil with a rifle as a grave digger disinters a Black woman's corpse; slave girls pulling the entrails from a white man pinned to the ground; a handwritten drawing that counterpoises the language of Black advancement with that of white panic and resentment; and, in a satirical turn, Black children swirl around the heads of the plump white denizens of a contemporary yacht club during "Caribbean night".

The relationship of object to spectator in Walker's art, no matter its subject matter, is dependent on scale. If the drawings assume a close viewing, the monumental work insists that we absorb its more immediately recognizable imagery from a distance. The disposition of the latter, and its relationship to the viewer, correspond to the performative and carnivalesque aesthetic of the spectacle, placing it within a historical lineage that includes religious pageants and processions, 19th-century cycloramas, and widescreen Technicolor movies. But rather than the soothing and seductive illusion of reality proffered by these examples, we stand before Walker's incendiary displays overwhelmed, implicated, titillated, guilty, ashamed, confused, or shattered—emotions that underscore French philosopher Guy Debord's understanding of the spectacle not as "a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated by images." The drawings, on the other hand, focus this social relationship inward and largely outside of public view. They literally draw us close, and into their disquieting and haunting imagery, motivating contemplative viewing that can better facilitate personal insight.

The emotional and intellectual density of Walker's drawings promotes this kind of deliberative looking. Her work in general tends to be dialogic, a "weighing down of viewership" that places us in conversation with it. In the silhouettes of the cycloramas or panoramas, for example, "whole worlds are compressed into inches of paper," as the curator Ashley James writes, their burdened figures bringing "you right down with them, enacting a near gravitational pull on the viewer's attention." But the drawings—rich with shadows, expressiveness, tonal nuance, atmosphere, and occasionally color—depart from this bold and unmodulated world. Their emotional and intellectual impact is more subtle than the spectacle, but perhaps even more effective. "Through graphite, Walker depicts an imaginary shadow world lacking an equivalent in a medium that renders all figures monochromatic and flat," James continues. "The boundaries of the real and the imagined, black and white, desire and repulsion, are not defined by scissors but by pencil sketches. Perhaps the drawings can pierce more deeply into a viewer's consciousness, because they are stealthier than her silhouettes, more of a whisper than an exclamation."

As they penetrate our consciousness, the drawings, more than any other aspect of Walker's art, insinuate her dark fantasies in ways that implore us to take stock of our own unspooling, richly ambiguous imagery that functions as "a sort of Rorschach test for each viewer." This effect, akin to the psychological resonance of unplanned gestures and accidents in Surrealism, incites our unconscious, wresting frightening images from "our private dreams and displaying them for all to see [...] for all to recognize how much we share in them," as cultural historian Sander Gilman writes about the general effect of Walker's art. Such imagery arouses collective and personal racial memories, the stereotypes and whims that drive them, and the contemporary concerns and prejudices that shape and perpetuate them. "Evoking these images triggers our gut reaction, which repels, rejects, or is repulsed," writes Gilman of the spectator's interaction with these fantasies of abjection and violation. "[They confront] viewers with a clear representation of what we must abhor but always imagine that we are capable of being or indeed might already be."

The value of owning our capacity for bigotry and cruelty—of what we are capable of being or might already be—underscores an important requirement of racial insight: an identification with the oppressor, an honest appraisal of one's racial anxieties and prejudices. It is not just Walker or the Black spectator who are implicated in the painful legacy of slavery, "but also the white viewers who white themselves out of the scenes, out of any relationship to a common past."29 Walker intends her work to confront and implicate, recognizing that its difficult racial imagery is invariably provocative or shameinducing. "Shame is, I think, the most interesting state because it's so transgressive, so pervasive," she observes. "It can occupy all your other, more familiar states: happiness, anger, rage, fear ... . It's interesting to put that out on the table, to elicit feelings of shame from others—'Come and join me in my shame!'"

The difficult feelings educed by Walker's art, and the acting out and inappropriate behavior driven by the compulsion to repress these emotions, suggest that many would reject her invitation. The artist is cognizant of the discomfort, evasion, and angst she unleashes. In the 200word title for her 2017 exhibition of drawings at Sikkema Jenkins & Co. in New York, Walker, in the style of the carnival barker, satirized the fraught response to her work, and the enduring debate about its controversial imagery:

> Sikkema Jenkins & Co. is Compelled to present The most Astounding and Important Painting show of the fall Art Show viewing season! [...] Scholars will study and debate the Historical Value and Intellectual Merits of Miss Walker's Diversionary Tactics. Art Historians will wonder whether the work represents a Departure or a Continuum. Students of Color will eye her work suspiciously and exercise their free right to Culturally Annihilate her on social media. Parents will cover the eyes of innocent children. School Teachers will reexamine their art history curricula. Prestigious Academic Societies will withdraw their support, former husbands and former lovers will recoil in abject terror. Critics will shake their heads in bemused silence. Gallery Directors will wring their hands at the sight of throngs of the gallerycurious flooding the pavement outside. The Final President of the United States will visibly wince. Empires will fall, although which ones, only time will tell.

In the context of an exhibition that largely abandoned the artist's trademark silhouettes, this title was no doubt ironic. The show it described, rather than intimidating and carnivalesque, brought a reimagined past down to earth, even portraying presentday people, events, and concerns. The show's imagery was alternately exuberant and dystopian: 19thcentury abolitionist hero Frederick Douglass encountering a presentday church lady in a stylish hat; a platter containing the severed head of Trayvon Martin, whose murder by a vigilante in Coral Gables, Florida, in 2012, lead to the

Black Lives Matter movement; and the phrase "you must hate black people as much as you hate yourself" emerging out of inky darkness. The exhibition's atomized imagery—some of it configured in huge, multifocal compositions and executed in sumi ink, charcoal, watercolor wash, and collage—engaged the spectator with details drawn in the more manageable scale of their visual and written sources, depictions not generally consumed in public: slave narratives, abolitionist broadsides, "bad romance novels," or "pornographic stories which borrow from the slave narrative and embellish the illicitness of interracial desire." To navigate the exhibition was to be continually pulled into its intricate and layered imagery.

The intimate scrutiny demanded by Walker's drawings contributes to what cultural critic Courtney R. Baker calls "humane insight"—a transformative awareness of the complexity and subjectivity of others that helps us to identify with their flesh and blood humanity. "Humane insight seeks knowledge about the humanity of that person," writes Baker. "It is an ethicsbased look that imagines the body that is seen to merit the protections of all human bodies. Humane insight describes a decision to identify the body being looked at as a human body, a gesture that is integral to the formation of our social interactions." For Baker, this insightful looking differs from the "gaze," in which viewing pain and death from a safe distance grants the spectator power over a defenseless victim, the kind of oblique observing and physical remove that is enabled by the spectacle. "The term gaze has come to name the dangerous look that targets and immobilizes its human objects in a web of racism, sexism, and other debilitating beliefs," writes Baker. "But not all looks are gazes. Looking is a more variegated process and even bears the potential for positive change." Arguing for the efficacy of learning through looking, she documents the power of graphic imagery to alter public opinion and spur activism—from the abolitionist promulgation of pictures of brutalized slaves in the 19thcentury to the decision made by the mother of Emmett Till to circulate in the media photographs of the mutilated body of her 14-yearold son murdered by white supremacists, imagery that motivated a generation of young African Americans to join the modern civil rights movement.

During the period of slavery, for example, abolitionists relied on a "sentimental appeal for black liberation" made through the representation of Black bodies in pain.36 "Black men recruited the image of their bodies' wounding under slavery both to illustrate slavery's injustice and to advocate for restoration of virtue—what we might well construe here as 'humanity'—to an enslaved black American populace," writes Baker. "Viewed in this way, pain becomes the currency of black liberation from injustice and statesanctioned violence. One sees here the logic that motivated the writing of several sentimental slave narratives: if only my pain is recognized by my oppressors, then I will be free." While the dissemination of this imagery helped advance the abolitionist cause, Baker acknowledges that its use has not been universally effective and unproblematic. Historically, this approach had its limitations, from the obstinate resistance of many white people to the idea of Black humanity to the limits of empathy itself.

The contemporary recycling of historic images of Black pain, suffering, and death is no less limited in its effect. If such imagery makes "pain legible," it relegates this pain to the distant past, allowing us to downplay or deny racial oppression in the present. It also can transform the humanity of historical subjects into static symbols of suffering, endless representations of imperiled Black Americans that overshadow their fortitude, achievements, and human complexity. In this more stereotypical engagement with the past, Black subjects "disappear while their bodies are constantly renewed as memorials to suffering." But in their graphic power and appeal to our shared humanity, portrayals of Black anguish have also been transformative, altering the way Americans see each other and

themselves. In this context, "pain provides the common language of humanity," as Saidiya Hartman writes. Looking at these depictions is not just persuasive, by offering confirmation of a reality that many would rather not see. It can also inspire "a crucial education about the self and what it means to be human."

If Walker's drawings motivate this identification through depictions of the historic (and fictional historic) Black body in distress, they make pain legible not by relegating it to a comfortable past, but by making it palpable in the present. In contrast to her huge spectacles, her drawings proffer a more complex route to witnessing this pain, one that circumvents the gaze for more variegated and nuanced looking. Significantly, the drawings largely revert to the modest scale of the most politically transformative depictions of Black suffering and death in the United States over the past two centuries, images that have been the prime motivator of the humane insight that Baker describes: accounts of subjection in the slave narratives of the 19th century; graphic 20thcentury broadsides decrying lynching; stark photographs of beaten and bloodied civil rights demonstrators published in magazines and newspapers; startling television news footage of rabid police dogs attacking Black teenagers protesting segregation in the South in the 1960s; and, in recent years, widely disseminated cell phone photographs of the deadly aftermath of unwarranted police force against innocent Black Americans.

The drawings are also fundamentally personal and humanistic, their handmade quality in contrast to the exacting fabrication of the silhouettes and monuments. They beckon the past not through the cut of the scissor or the incision of the diecutter, but through the trace of the hand, no less the hand of an AfricanAmerican woman whose own intergenerational history can be traced back to the trauma of slavery. "One of the themes in my work is the idea that a black subject in the present tense is a container for specific pathologies from the past and is continually growing and feeding off those maladies," Walker has said. As the artist's fingers work their way across the page, they summon a desolate history as well as a visceral present through marks, smudges, washes, and erasures. The nuanced surfaces of her drawings resonate with unconscious, but also relatable, quirks, fears, and desires. The spontaneity, intensity, and magnitude of Walker's process—she completes as many as 100 drawings at a time— enhances the ability of the drawings to reveal these unconscious impulses.

This psychological intensity owes much to the medium itself. "A kinesthetic process of traction—attraction, extraction, protraction—drawing is born from an outward gesture linking inner impulses and thoughts to the other through the touching of a surface with repeated graphic marks and lines," writes the curator Catherine de Zegher. Unlike the meticulously finished panorama or monument, the drawing manifests a spontaneous record of its creation, "an openended activity [...] characterized by a line that is always unfolding, always becoming." With their accidents, impulsiveness, and emotional resonance, these pictures live in the interstice between presence, absence, and longing. Art historians have long associated the drawing process—in which sensual acts of touching, proximity, and contact render it "an artist's most intimate act"—with the idea of desire. "The muchcited myth of the origins of drawing is rooted in a romantic tale of a lost lover—the drawing is born through an attempt to preserve the presence of an object of desire," writes artist Sarah Casey. "In drawing one is mitigating loss, grasping for something that feels beyond, in an attempt to preserve the ephemeral." Similarly, the art historian Michael Newman observes that "drawing, with each stroke, reenacts desire and loss. Its peculiar mode of being lies between the withdrawal of the trace in the mark and the presence of the idea it prefigures."

As Walker's drawings conjure an elusive history, their visceral interplay of marks, smudges, and erasures enact the tension between presence and absence, realization and loss, fascination and disgust: voluptuous bodies collide, morph, and disintegrate, both in illusionistic space and as abstract shapes on the page; erasures and fingerprints evaporate into dust or clouds; and objects reflect in water, their mirror images transient wisps of ink or graphite. Moody, sensual, and gritty, these apparitions flirt with transgression, "dirtying the paper delicately," as the critic John Ruskin characterized the drawing process. They exemplify the medium's anxious and emotive nature, as they "hover on the edges of consciousness like pale ghosts floating away if approached too deliberately." This quality of becoming charges the drawing with psychological meaning and insight, suggesting "the possibility of other states of being which in turn may offer fresh lenses through which to see the world."

Ultimately, the psychological density of Walker's drawings provides a fresh lens onto an important dimension of racial selfrealization: memory. As Toni Morrison observes in her groundbreaking essay, "The Site of Memory," the recollection of the past is often tempered by propriety. Even the courageous writers of the slave narratives—bent on persuading the reader of the evils of slavery through powerful texts that "gave fuel to the fire that abolitionists were setting everywhere"—were discouraged by popular taste from portraying the more repugnant or shocking details of their oppression. "In shaping the experience to make it palatable to those who were in a position to alleviate it, they were silent about many things, and they 'forgot' many other things," writes Morrison. "There was a careful selection of the instances that they would record and a careful rendering of those they chose to describe." Moreover, as slavery's most caustic transgressions remained concealed, their devastating impact on the interior lives of their victims were similarly not discussed. Morrison believed that it was her role as a Black and female writer of conscience—in light of the continued oppression of Black Americans, well after the modern civil rights movement had ended—to disinter these buried memories of atrocity and pain, to "rip that veil drawn over" a reality that was, in its time, too terrible to relate.56 Morrison continues:

> Moving that veil aside requires, therefore, certain things. First of all, I must trust my recollections. I must also depend on the recollections of others. Thus memory weighs heavily in what I write, in how I begin and in what I find to be significant. Zora Neale Hurston said, "Like the deadseeming cold rocks, I have memories within that came out of the material that went to make me." These "memories within" are the subsoil of my work.

Walker's drawings are likewise invigorated by this harvesting of the "memories within," journeying to a distant site "to see what remains were left behind and to reconstruct the world that these remains imply. Morrison proposes this journey not only as a corrective to history, but also as a conduit to truth. While Walker's spectacles reveal their own insights and truths, they are less an invitation into the dark and recessive realm of memory and more a provocation to react, an awe-inspiring assembly of robust images that stimulate, defy, and incite. Her psychologically dense drawings, on the other hand, subtly fill in "the blanks that the slave narratives left—to part the veil that was so frequently drawn." They stoke the deepest layers of our imagination, resonating with intimate details that break our hearts and unsettle our minds— from the harrowing glimpse of a slave child tugging at the shoe of the white master raping his mother to the brooding, inky portrayal of President Barack Obama as Othello, the severed head of his successor in his lap. As the latter suggests, the drawings implore us to take.

A Near-Ideal Black Body! On the Metaphysics and Materialist Aesthetics of One Kara E. Walker's Black Universe by Aria Dean

In its astrophysical manifestation, a black hole is a region of space from which nothing can escape. "Anything that passes beyond [its] event horizon is doomed to be crushed." This process is a functional mystery to many outside the scientific community, only recently possible to capture photographically, and only vaguely possible to visualize otherwise—still inaccurate when we try. A black hole condenses or compresses any object that enters it into its zeropoint or "singularity," which can be further defined as "a point of infinite density where the laws of physics as we know them break down." Aside from this total annihilation, even those objects that simply pass close to a black hole will be spat back out in some other form.

With the invocation of the black hole (A Black Hole Is Everything a Star Longs to Be), we find ourselves in the realm of matter. A black hole recognizes anything that strays into its field as such—sheer matter to be converted into pure energy, the existence of which is inseparable from the black hole itself. At this point, at the singularity, the rules of time and space bend around an immeasurable instant and reality ceases. In black hole cosmology, it is in this instant that the black hole can, itself, birth a new universe. But more importantly, long before this—or perhaps just an instant before—when we first stray beyond the event horizon (point of no return), we lose sight of everything. Things, people, images, artists, art, history, and truth fall away. We find ourselves below or beyond "the world of bodies and objects that constitute the domain of representation," and enter the domain of energy, matter, elements, affects, and perception. What do we find here?

There are many names for and doorways through which to enter this place, and each will offer you a different gift, probably laced with poison. A whole tradition of ologies spanning millennia swirl in the shadows, all dedicated to ascertaining exactly where and what everything is, really. Certainly there is room for a phenomenology of Kara Walker (experience!), an ontology of Kara Walker (truth!), an epistemology of Kara Walker (culture, sort of!)—what I would give to write the book on each!—but here I would like to mark the particular, highly intentional and incisive decadesspanning pursuit of one Kara E. Walker as a metaphysical proposition before all else. Walker's proposition—and I would argue that there is one major, metaproposition that the whole of her oeuvre must sit within in order to be understood—works against the metaphysical dualism that runs through nearly all of Western art history, its satellite projects, and the philosophies that steer them, instead presenting a materialist aesthetic that antagonizes art's continued dualistic relationship between representation and the real, the symbolic and material, reality and fiction, subject and object, and mobilizes an aesthetic program rife with representation and narrative in order to undermine and incapacitate these very principles with crushing force.

[Blank Space]

In "The Black Saint Is the Sinner Lady" Philippe Vergne writes that Walker's work might be a "negative space of representation, of all representations—an antiimage, a black hole. The negative space may well swallow the dismissive and trivializing way that black subjects have been represented." Vergne's essay comes closer to approaching Walker's materialist aesthetic than most ("a negative space of all representations," a "black hole," an "antiimage") but he loses the plot—no, he loses the beat, and finds the plot instead, returning to the way that Black subjects are represented, rather than remaining at the level of his first assertion, which questions the system of representation as a whole.

Talking about Black artists at the level of appearances—suspending them in "the world as representation" to borrow a phrase from Schopenhauer—never goes out of style. Things, people, images; and even more popular: culture, identity, history. These are of course, valid and at times necessary concepts, ones that we drag after us wherever we go. But it would seem that there is some darkly comic, violent force at play in the background wherever we appear, ourselves, or have been unfortunate enough to perform the strange magic of making an image. Without fail, the critical discourse around art made by Black people is shackled to "the way that black subjects have been represented." It's a feint that shrinks inquiries down to the scale of mere life, corrodes wellbuilt scaffolding for structures of monumental scale, and more than anything, terminally bores many of us.

It is especially important to consider this when it comes to the work of Kara Walker, an artist whose sheer prolificacy (So many drawings! So many panoramic scenes!), paired with her dedication to apparently representational and narrative strategies and mediums largely suspends the surrounding discourse to that domain we call "representation." Love her or hate her, you're talking about what she's drawn, the sweep of the petticoat on that one Negress, the evocative pool of blood (never mind that it is pitch black), the prickly title of the work's vaudevillian announcer's tone. There seems to be some confusion around this work, the process of making it, and what it means—or rather what it's doing. It is often corralled into being sort of a critique of representation and "received histories," or a whimsical but grim retelling of the USAmerican nation's rise and fall from a "black female perspective," or an aimlessly edgy sendup of the libidinal economy. We could also say that this is a problem of understanding scale or elevation. At what level is Kara Walker trying to access the world? On what plane is she trying to access us, if at all?

I'd like to be so bold as to say that Kara Walker makes images where the image doesn't matter. If Kara Walker is trying to access or reach us at all, it is not in order to show us something through her pictures. The silhouettes—so often lauded for taking on violent, racist histories and all of their pain and pleasure—actually offer very little in terms of showing, narrating, or critiquing. At the risk of trite and theoretically selfdefeating observation —momentarily bowing to the distinction between abstraction and representation —I'd say that her cutouts are fairly abstract when it comes down to it. I can't say that I've personally looked at a Walker silhouette and left with a sense of narrative clarity, or even a memory of what it was that actually "happened." Through this failure to stick, are they the perfect example of the impossibility of narrative for the slave vis-à-vis Frank Wilderson, who argues throughout his work that, having no "temporal progression," the slave cannot be emplotted in narrative? Are they the embodiment of an ontology of mere flesh à la Hortense Spillers, every Black figure in the tableau incapacitated by its own color, unable to muster up the coherence to become a real body?

Even more, Walker's drawings, so often incomplete and more like storyboards, comic book panels without frames, or sketches toward some larger body rather than fixed representations themselves, are further evidence that, again, we are no longer dealing in the realm of proper signification. These images, if you can call them that—maybe gestures or compositions would be more apt—are more like Gilles Deleuze's notion of a movementimage than anything else I can think of. They are dashed off, whippedup slices of life, or maybe not life but little pieces of a world. Scenes, honestly; Walker's drawings recognize the metacinematic capacity of images to actualize a universe of "image/matter/movement."

This universe of Kara E. Walker is a reality that does not propose to be more real than history or than the reality of anyone else who has endeavored to produce one of their own, but is a reality and

a universe nonetheless. However, still, the work of this one Kara E. Walker, with all its rushing strokes, variant pressures of the pen (sometimes angry, sometimes laughing, never shy), its buoyant curves and flat black fields, finds itself suspended in this territory, falling prey to the trap of figuration and the broader representational thinking that viewers reach it through. Here lies the endless conundrum.

[Star!]

Already, there is a sense in contemporary Black studies that visual analysis alone doesn't provide an intricate enough critical tool kit for approaching Black art. This frustration, now productively sublimated into forging an entire subfield of academic work, is twofold. One, anxiety—we need more tools! Sight keeps fucking us over! Images seem to harm more than they help (Why are we asking them for assistance?). Two, precedent—there's something to excavate, some ongoing resonance between sight and sound when we have both at our disposal, but what? In the last two decades, a number of Black artists and theorists such as Tina Campt, Alexander Weheliye, Katherine McKittrick, Arthur Jafa, Kodwo Eshun, Fred Moten, and others have pressed on the relationship between the aural and the visual at a conceptual and historical level. At the conceptual level, the argument often circles the idea that the principles of sound and of Black music's engagement with sound can be commuted to the terrain of the visual, modified, and employed as tools for both analysis and production. More than anything, this line of questioning is an ongoing reminder of the failure of representational thinking at large, and the need for another frame through which to encounter images.

Tina Campt's book Listening to Images probably documents this problem most fully and makes the most direct attempt to intervene practically when it comes to methods of visual analysis. In the book's introduction, Campt writes that Listening to Images "designates a method of recalibrating vernacular photographs as quiet, quotidian practices that give us access to the affective registers through which these images enunciate alternate accounts of their subjects." She goes on: "I theorize sound as an inherently embodied process that registers at multiple levels of the human sensorium." Campt's intervention is a useful and poetic one, but her methods enact the much larger tendency in academic and cultural writing about sound—despite its non-participation in any observable visuality— to favor analysis "mediated by the symbolic field." This mediation is the fault of no one in particular, just a result of the methods of analysis that pervade the entirety of the world. Rarely does anyone stop to think: "What is listening?" A question whose material basis is, "What is sound?"

In order to usefully theorize visuality through sound, and specifically when it comes to Black visuality, it is necessary to begin from a more solid foundation, a theory of sound that is "attentive to [its] ontology," which can only be accessed from the world of percepts and affects, as a set of material forces and phenomena. From here, we can map out a functional and philosophically robust model for the necessary pursuit of "listening to images" and approaching practices that formally appear to operate representationally, but conceptually do anything but—a materialist aesthetic. We may find our best case studies in the work of a number of Black artists from multiple generations, Walker included. Within this frame, Walker's work can be viewed as an "asignifying material flux," of "blocs of sensations and configurations of affects, energies, that impinge upon the body of the viewer, reader, and auditor."

[Black Hole]

Over the years, when I have looked at images of Walker silhouettes, I've often thought of a particular chapter in Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus—"Year Zero: Faciality"—in which the philosophers obsess over the dynamic between what they call the "white wall of signification" and the "black hole of subjectification." For them, "the white wall/black hole system is constructed [as an] abstract machine [...] that must allow and ensure the almightiness of the signifier as well as the subject." At one point in my life, I was quite interested in this arrangement, being myself obsessed with escaping the trappings of subjectivity and identity, both on the specific level of my own middleclass Black womanhood and on a broader philosophical basis, having theorized myself into a holistic and exhausting skepticism of Western philosophy's account of the subject.

I especially enjoy thinking about this alongside Event Horizon, a large cut out work produced in 2005 for the grand staircase at the New School's Arnhold Hall in New York City, which is a great formal case study of how a Walker work does its thing, but also is specifically useful under the terms of this argument. Having never been to Arnhold Hall myself, I spent a lot of time trying to find an image online that could make me understand how Event Horizon related to the architecture of the stairwell over which it looms. There appeared to be two different versions of it, but I couldn't tell if they were next to each other, back to back, or what—one version with a probably white figure standing at the top of the crevasse, and the other with a little Black girl at its mouth, legs dangling over the edge.

After a long time scrolling, the composition started to remind me of something, a meme, popular in summer 2020, featuring an illustration of Plato's Allegory of the Cave.16 The connection was purely formal—the interior spaces were so similarly contoured—but impossible to ignore.

Plato's Cave is the Event Horizon—Event Horizon is Plato's Cave; together they form the representational event. Plato's Cave, but make it chaotic and selfreflexive. In Walker's scene everyone and their mama is tossed into a pit. In one panel, a little Black girl looks to be controlling things; in the other a white man rages at the top of the heap. In both, bodies tumble down into the abyss. An ontological approach (asking, "What exists?") might lead us to imagine that if this is Plato's Cave, we're facing its wall, watching the shadows dance, ignorant, as were Plato's prisoners, of the fire behind us. From here we could discuss the violence wrought by representation (these shadows, how they lie!), and the telling of history. But at the level of Walker's metaphysics (what is it), and taking the scene in as a whole, synthesizing these two compositions that one cannot physically see together from a single vantage, the shadow and flame are part and parcel; Event Horizon is an elevation of a scene, much like the popular illustration of Plato's allegory. However, Walker's silhouetted, nonpictorial picture of representation-inaction itself sheds all consideration of the real. The same can be said for the larger body of these works. They are flat; they are what they are. They make specific reference to nowhere, to no one, and to nothing. For Event Horizon, this flat impenetrability and twodimensionality becomes the subject of the work. Each panel "narrates"

another version of Plato's allegory, a Bergsonian parody if you will, where the world both above and below is nothing but image.

Fig. 4
Kara Walker, Prize, 2018
from the series The Gross Clinician Presents:
Pater Gravidam, 2018
Graphite, sumi ink, gofun and gouache on paper,
76 x 57 cm, Kunstmuseum Basel, Kupferstichkabinett,
Inv. no. 2019.187.12; acquisition 2019
Fig. 5

Hans Baldung Grien, Death with Lowered Flag, c. 1505Quill and brown ink, white highlights, on light brownprimed paper, 29.8 x 18.5 cmKunstmuseum Basel, Kupferstichkabinett, inv. no. 1947.21

FIG. 6

FIG. 4

FIG. 5

Fig. 6

Kara Walker, The (Private) Memorial Garden of Grandison Harris, 2017
Oil stick and sumi ink on paper collaged on linen,
228.6 x 365.8 cm
Private Collection

Fig. 7

Anonymous photographer, Chris Baker (left) with anatomy students at Medical College of Virginia, 1899–1900 TompkinsMcCaw Library, Special Collections and Archives, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia

Fig. 8
Martin Schongauer, Saint Anthony Tormented by Demons, c. 1470–1475
Copperplate engraving, 31.3 x 22.9 cm
Kunstmuseum Basel, Kupferstichkabinett, Aus K.7.50

If Plato's Cave is the Event Horizon and Event Horizon is Plato's Cave, then what exactly are we careening toward as we pass this point of no return?

For Deleuze and Guattari, the black hole is a subjectifying force; the pressure it exerts is enough to fix and maintain a subject, as a single point, let's say. At the same time, their discussion of the black hole displays an anxiety around the cosmic entity, which runs through most actual and metaphorical invocations of it: a fear of annihilation. These functions seem in some way contradictory, but are actually equally imbricated in the dangerous game of desubjectivation and "becomingmultiple." The black hole at once threatens a total succumbing to the bounds of subjectivity, and offers a possible line of flight onto a plane of becoming. Deleuze, it would seem, to return to astrophysics, fears getting caught in the instance of singularity, where one becomes only a crushing, totalizing nothingness. Deleuze fears both the fixity and the annihilatory force that the black hole contradictorily works on him.

As a star-cumblack hole, Walker too is endowed with the power to subjectify, annihilate, and through the bent logic of her singularity, to be annihilated, herself. This annihilatory power rhymes with the desubjectifying force of Blackness discussed by Frank Wilderson, Patrice Douglass, and others, where the "fragmenting process the black psyche undergoes is beyond something concise and coherent. In my inbox is an email from Walker titled "Serendipity." Attached is another of her lined note cards— which she happened to unearth in her studio that same morning—this one with notes on Event Horizon. The card reads:

> the middle passage of a sort, migration
> diverticulitis
> pockets of air passage of time softening
> stool, persona non grata
> performing goose, , broad minded
> candidates, you've got got it bad girl,
> writing from
> no point of view, lost in a freefall.
> time capsule style.
> event horizon.
> into the black hole.
> Event Horizon
> slip slip sloping rabbit hole through
> the looking glass and down down
> we are We? Community of underground
> travellers
> or time traversers. beginning in a time
> before time and ending in a time
> before me.
> an everything exists. holding pattern
> style. Hovering uncertainly between
> past and present. in a dark interior
> space life happens, invisibly, bowels move,
> without limit. Limitless
> Except for pockets of imperfection,
> where life gets stuck, holds
> Onto tradition, prospers in cramped
> new quarters.

Makes a new life "I'll make me a world." I leave you with the original draft of my final lines: If we reread Walker with Nietzsche in mind, and we reread Nietzsche for Walker, we find that if "black

girls embody the will to power," the only logical conclusion is that Black girls are the urartistofthe-world, the Übermensch, desubjectifying and dissolved into nature itself, a singularity, embodying the very condition of possibility for the production of infinite new and better worlds. <>

HENRI MATISSE by Kathryn Brown [Critical Lives, Reaktion Books, 9781789143812]

Henri Matisse's experiments with form and color revolutionized the twentieth-century art world. In this concise critical biography, Kathryn Brown explores Matisse's long career, beginning with his struggles as a student in Paris and culminating in his celebrated use of paper cutouts and stained glass in the last decade of his life. The book challenges various myths about Matisse and offers a fresh perspective on his creativity and legacy. Chapters explore the artist's enthusiasm for fashion and cinema, his travels, personal ties, interest in African art, love of literature, and willingness to challenge audience expectations. Through close readings of Matisse's works, Brown offers new insight into the artist's friendships and battles with dealers, critics, collectors, and fellow artists.

On 7 December 1899 the 29-year-old Henri Matisse acquired a painting titled Three Bathers from the Parisian art dealer Ambroise Vollard. Measuring 55 × 52 cm, the work was modestly sized, but its value to Matisse was immense. The canvas had been produced by an older artist who was identified by the Parisian avant-garde as having forged a new path in contemporary painting: Paul Cézanne. Vollard and Matisse haggled over the price of the work for nearly six months. While the final figure of 1,200 francs stretched Matisse's limited budget, he obtained the painting for a down payment of only 500 francs and cajoled Vollard into adding a plaster bust by Auguste Rodin into the bargain for an additional 200 francs.

Cézanne was at the height of his career in 1899, but Matisse was struggling professionally and financially. He had spent eight years studying in private art academies in Paris, had attended classes at the prestigious École des Beaux-Arts and was trying to negotiate his way through a complicated network of art dealers, collectors and critics. His precarious financial situation had come under strain following his marriage in 1898 to Amélie Parayre. The birth of the couple's first son, Jean, the following year had added to their mounting expenses. The size of the household would further increase following the arrival of Matisse's daughter from an earlier relationship, Marguerite, and the birth of a second son, Pierre, in 1900.

Despite the stresses of keeping his career and finances afloat, Matisse was determined to buy Three Bathers. It was an object that symbolized to him the possibilities of art both conceptually and professionally. Matisse recognized that Cézanne had created his own unique idiom while working independently in the South of France. From a position outside the capital, the older artist had conquered the art market and established a reputation on his own terms. Aside from these professional achievements, Matisse felt an affinity with his peer's technical experiments. Cézanne's rejection of realism, compositional adventurousness and bold handling of colour would serve as both

an inspiration and a foil to Matisse's own pictorial thinking for decades to come. As Matisse recollected in an interview of 1925:

> If you only knew the moral strength, the encouragement that his remarkable example gave me all my life! In moments of doubt, when I was still searching for myself, frightened sometimes by my discoveries, I thought: 'If Cézanne is right, I am right.' Because I knew that Cézanne had made no mistake.

Throughout his career, Matisse embraced the idea that his art extended certain pictorial traditions and he acknowledged the influence of other artists on his own creativity. Although the pair never met, Cézanne served as an exemplar within Matisse's own personal narrative. Three Bathers was tangible evidence of the moral courage and aesthetic innovation to which an artist should aspire.

The crafting of such a private mythology came, however, with costs. Recognizing the importance of Three Bathers to her husband's creative persona, Amélie allowed a precious ring to be pawned for the purpose of funding the purchase. The jewel was never recovered, but the painting remained in the family household for nearly 37 years. In consequence, Cézanne's canvas became far more than a source of pictorial inspiration. It was also a powerful symbol of the role that art played within the family and of the sacrifices that Matisse would demand from others for the purpose of sustaining a life of professional creativity.

In November 1936 Matisse and his wife donated Three Bathers to the Petit Palais Museum in Paris. This decision to part with the painting came at an important moment in Matisse's life. By 1936, he had long been regarded in Europe and the United States as a leading practitioner of ambitious art. From the perspective of his own creative trajectory, he had worked through the pictorial challenges that Cézanne's painting had posed prior to the turn of the century. More significantly, Matisse's marriage was under strain, and the couple would legally separate in the spring of 1940.

While Amélie had supported the development of her husband's professional career and had helped to fund the acquisition of Three Bathers, her departure was also linked to Matisse's separation from that totemic canvas and the memories associated with it.

Matisse noted in a letter of 10 November 1936 to Raymond Escholier, then director of the Museum of the City of Paris at the Petit Palais, that Three Bathers had 'sustained me morally in the critical moments of my venture as an artist; I have drawn from it my faith and my perseverance'.3 If Three Bathers had served its principal creative purpose for Matisse by 1936, it had also fulfilled a wider critical function. By the mid-1930s, Matisse's relationship to Cézanne had become established in the minds of art critics. In an article published in the daily newspaper Le Matin of 25 July 1937, Edmond Campagnac surveyed Matisse's career and the role that Cézanne had played in its development. He connected his narrative of artistic influence to opportunities afforded by an era of rapid technological development: in the century of the aeroplane and of electricity, art must be in a state of 'constant evolution'. Matisse was presented as a modernist hero whose pictorial innovations had contributed to a cultural refashioning suited to an era of advanced technology.

Recounting Matisse's acquisition and subsequent gift of Three Bathers to the Petit Palais, Campagnac suggested that the story symbolized the 'victory' of Cézanne and of Matisse himself. While remaining true to a core component of the artistic tradition that he had acknowledged throughout his career, Matisse had, by the end of the 1930s, supplanted the master in the minds of his critics and had determined the trajectory of his own critical life.



Despite stating that a painter who discusses his own art should have his tongue cut out, Matisse worked hard throughout his career to influence public opinion and to forge a vocabulary for the interpretation of his creative output. The aim of the present volume is to show how Matisse both shaped and responded to this critical environment. The following chapters will, therefore, position Matisse within a swiftly changing international art world and examine the reception of his works by a diverse range of commentators.

The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a proliferation of art magazines and cultural journalism in Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States. The emergence of new technologies, including radio, cinema and, eventually, television, popularized traditionally 'high' culture. Plane travel facilitated the mobility of artists and their works, and the emergence of a truly international art market brought with it new cadres of collectors, dealers and exhibition opportunities. Matisse swiftly learned how to negotiate these fast-paced exchanges by working with publishers and journalists, giving interviews, posing for photographs and closely managing his connections to important dealers and patrons. This book will show how Matisse manoeuvered paths through critical discussions that took place over the course of his lifetime and will consider how his reputation was developed by family, friends, colleagues and, indeed, by other artists in the years after his death.

The members of Matisse's immediate family were central to the success of this creative and critical life. While Amélie served as a model for her husband and worked as a milliner to provide much needed financial support in the early years of their marriage, she was also a sounding board for ideas and projects. Matisse's daughter, Marguerite, modelled for her father while also serving as his devoted studio assistant and business manager. Her husband, Georges Duthuit, was one of the first writers to offer a sustained analysis of the early twentieth-century art movement with which Matisse was most closely associated, Fauvism. Finally, Matisse's sons often dealt with the logistics of exhibitions and loans of works to museums and galleries. In 1931, Pierre opened a commercial art dealership in the art deco Fuller Building in New York, thereby helping to develop the market for his

father's works in the United States. Against this background, Matisse's art was much more than an expression of individual creativity. It was a family business of which he was the acknowledged leader.

Matisse was aware of the need to manage his public self-image for the purpose of stimulating or maintaining the interest of collectors and dealers. Not all of his critical and business forays were successful and, as in any artistic career, he had to withstand his share of barbed comments in the press. His willingness to enter into these debates demonstrated a keen awareness of prevailing art discourses and the uses to which writing and publishing could be put for the purposes of furthering a career in the arts.

From a twenty-first-century perspective, it is difficult to imagine the importance accorded to artists' essays and critical writing in the first half of the twentieth century. In the wake of debates about Impressionism that had featured regularly in the French popular press during the 1870s and 1880s, the power of art to shock, affirm or repudiate standards of beauty and to challenge social convention remained widely debated in newspapers and magazines. When Matisse was described as a 'wild animal' – a 'fauve' – in 1905 or as an artist who 'turned humanity back to its brutish beginnings' following the exhibition of his works at the New York Armory Show in 1913, critics sent a clear signal of art's relationship to broader cultural values.

Critical writing did not, however, simply communicate theoretical analyses of artworks or debate the contribution of creative practices to socio-historical narratives. Instead, writers sought to entertain and to influence the emotional responses of audiences, anticipating – or sometimes fabricating – shock, disgust, humour and awe. By priming audiences' reactions to exhibitions, art criticism could shape reputations, generate markets for artists' works and promote competition between rival art-world factions. Then, as now, it trod a narrow path between dispassionate reflection and sensationalism. Regardless of the format it took, art writing was also a way in which critics could assert their own cultural authority and, in some cases, write themselves into history.

In a magazine industry devoted to amateurs d'art, photography emerged as an exciting new means by which not just artworks, but exhibition spaces and artists' studios could be brought to life on the page. Matisse was photographed at various stages of his career, and these images were an important contribution to the crafting of his public persona. In the early twentieth century, this combination of critical writing and popular culture fuelled the emergence of celebrity artists whose personal lives interested audiences as much as their creative output. When, in 1912, Matisse famously declared to the American painter and writer Clara Taggart MacChesney that he was just 'a normal man', his statement attested to the notoriety that attached to vanguard art production and anticipated a merging of criticism and celebrity culture that has come to dominate the contemporary art world.

In the first half of the twentieth century, poets and writers also contributed to the expansion of critical debates about art beyond traditional circles of connoisseurship. In part, this sprang from a genuine enthusiasm for the visual arts and a drive to explore the relationship between linguistic and visual creativity. But writers also had self-interested motivations when they turned to art criticism. Associating one's name with an established artist or fostering the reputation of a rising star was a means by which a writer could access new audiences and draw attention to his or her own aesthetic preoccupations. Art writing could take the form of a poem; the publication of exhibition reviews was a means by which writers could earn extra income; the interview became a popular format for poets to communicate ideas about their own works as well as those of the painters they discussed; art dealers commissioned essays to support their exhibitions; and collaboration between painters and

writers fuelled the production of innovative book works that probed the boundary between verbal and visual expression. Matisse's relationship to writers and publishers of his generation is, therefore, an important piece of the art-critical puzzle that this book will address.

There is a vast body of secondary literature about Matisse, and exhibitions of his works continue to feature regularly in the rosters of museums around the world. Hilary Spurling's two-volume biography of the artist has become a key reference point, while, in their respective projects, Catherine Bock-Weiss and Claudine Grammont have catalogued an array of critical writings about, and key themes in, Matisse's output. In addition, Matisse's own writings and interviews have been edited by Dominique Fourcade and subsequently translated and annotated by Jack Flam.7 The present volume is indebted to the work of these and other scholars and curators who have dedicated their time to studying Matisse's life, ideas and multifarious creative styles.

The fact that there is such a wealth of critical material about Matisse also reveals features of art history itself. Matisse has been viewed alternatively as a radical experimenter, a conservative, a hedonist, a misogynist, an orientalist, a decorative painter and a quintessentially 'French' artist, among other things. Some of these views have persisted, while others have been challenged and refashioned by new generations of writers who have brought their own assumptions and critical perspectives to the fore. The present volume will debate these historiographical trends and will test narratives that have developed about Matisse as well as the strategies that the artist himself used to endorse or refute them. Against this background, one of the principal contributions of this book is its re-evaluation of Matisse's key sources and motivations, particularly in connection with his paintings of the 1920s.

The following chapters will argue that a significant aspect of Matisse's modernism lay in his acts of audience creation, market making and critical self-assertion. Whether in the form of interviews, essays and correspondence or, more often, dialogues and friendships with writers, collectors and curators, Matisse understood that art was an enterprise that needed to be managed. This book examines art as a vital contribution to the public sphere of ideas and, hence, as a terrain on which important notions of self and community are debated. The discussion also makes clear that language – and the control of art discourses – plays a crucial role in determining an individual's success or failure in art's institutions and markets. Matisse's lifelong concern with the written word is a measure of his keen awareness of this point. By bringing language into his creative orbit – in the form of drawings, cut-outs, personal testimony, essays and books – Matisse contested his critics on their own terms and set down a challenge for those who continue to write about his art. <>

Postcolonial Images of Spiritual Care: Challenges of Care in a Neoliberal Age edited by Emmanuel Y. Lartey and Hellena Moon, Foreword by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Epilogue by Bonnie Miller-McLemore [Picwick Publishers, Paperback ISBN: 9781532685552 Hardcover ISBN: 9781532685569 Ebook ISBN: 9781532685576]

This anthology is about caring for all persons as a part of the revolutionary struggle against colonialism in its many forms. In recognition of the varied ways in which different forms of oppression, injustice, and violence in the world today are traceable to the legacy and continuing effects of colonialism, various authors have contributed to the volume from diverse backgrounds including differing ethnic identities, religious and cultural traditions, gender and sexual orientations, as well as communal and personal realities.

As a postcolonial critique of spiritual care, it highlights the plurality of voices and concerns that have been overlooked or obscured because of the politics of race, religion, sexuality, nationalism, and other structures of power that have shaped what discursive spiritual care entails today. **Postcolonial Images of Spiritual Care: Challenges of Care in a Neoliberal Age** presents voices of practical and pastoral theologians, academics, spiritual care providers, religious leaders, students, and activists working to provide greater intercultural spiritual care and awareness in the areas of healthcare, community work, and education. The volume, as such, expands the discourse of spiritual care and participates in the ongoing paradigm shifts in the field of pastoral and practical theology.

In this brief Foreword, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'Im argues that spiritual care includes the concept of mutuality: spiritual care as reciprocal self-liberation, whereby both sides are at once recipients and providers of care to each other and to wider society for reaffirming the value of spiritual care. I see this as mutual self-liberation because all sides are contributing to their own liberation by providing spiritual care for other persons in exchange for the care they receive. As this exchange model is accepted and practiced by more people, the source of care becomes as plentiful as the need for it. Another advantage of this exchange model is that it upholds the dignity and self-worth of all recipients of care because they give of the same resources from which they receive.

Drawing on the Muslim Sufi tradition that defines my worldview and spiritual perspective (or equivalent in other traditions), I propose that the conception and practice of the provision of spiritual care is the means to mutual self-liberation, instead of being a hierarchical relationship of a presumably "compassionate" care provider to a passive care recipient. The relevance of the Sufi tradition in this context is that it transforms what may be a source of selfish pride, into that which contributes to the spiritual growth of the provider. Another advantage of citing the Sufi tradition is that it is likely to remind people of institutions of equivalent resources in their own traditions.

I should emphasize, however, that some aspects of the broad Muslim Sufi traditions (in the plural) which prevailed over vast regions that spread across several centuries, was also as diverse and contested as the Sunni and Shia theologies of the Muslim population at large. Yet, the Sufis of the various Sunni traditions across the expanse of the Muslim world (from west Africa to southeast and central Asia) also had to negotiate, contest, and reaffirm aspects of their tradition. In modern terms, one can speak of "progressive" and "traditional" Sufis, although I believe that traditional Sufis were still more progressive than the progressive of the broader Sunni perspectives. To conclude this brief digression, progressive Sufi Muslims still had to struggle to enlighten and humanize their wider Sunni communities.

As a Sufi Muslim, I have struggled most of my life (since the 1960s) to uphold what I believe to be my progressive Muslim convictions. It is this reality which derives my determination to ensure the freedom to engage in civil and orderly contestation of religious and other views among Muslims and in their relationship with humanity at large. Such spiritual contestations and the need to preserve the social and political space for them are better known historically as struggles for human dignity and

social justice. The challenge for advocates of modern human rights discourse is whether this framework can be identified as a human rights discourse or not.

The question of the universality of human rights is at the core of this challenge, especially in view of the geopolitical and economic relationship between former colonial powers and their former colonies. In my view, for instance, the long shadow of former colonial relations continues to influence postcolonial relations between the former colonized and former colonizer. The closer the focus is on immediate postcolonial relations, the more colonial those relations seem to be. Conversely, the further away the analysis moves from the colonial period, the more autonomous and independent will the former colony appear to be. Although it may seem that the continuity of postcolonial relations depends on the degree of economic, political, security, and other forms of dependency the former colony has with its former colonial power; I believe that the situation can change, depending on the ability of people to liberate themselves.

I am also proposing a shift in terminology to use the term "entitlement," instead of "right," and by-passing the state altogether by relying on peoplecentered strategies of protection instead of legal enforcement through the state. Avoiding the liberal narrow definition of the term, "right" as a justiciable claim that is enforceable by the domestic courts of a country is closer to the global non-liberal terminology used as the clear majority of societies in Africa, Asia, and indigenous South American communities. This shift in terminology also invokes the principle of reciprocity, whereby the value of the Golden Rule is enhanced by the exchange of spiritual and material service to become a stronger motivation for both sides to engage in the process of promoting mutual benefits.

In this light, I believe that spiritual care is a universal entitlement of all human beings by virtue of their humanity. This proposal is more accurate in applying to a universal human right because it affirms the entitlement of every human being as such to the benefit or fulfillment of the promise of care, without any distinction on such grounds as race, color, gender, religion, or nationality. The term "nationality" is not commonly used in human rights discourse, but I use it here deliberately to emphasize the irrelevance of political national identity to entitlement to the human rights of all human beings by virtue of their humanity.

Since human rights are necessarily universal because they are the rights of all human beings by virtue of their humanity, none of the states of the entire world has risen to the level of conformity with human rights in the sense of true universality of protecting the rights of all human beings, equally and without discrimination. Even a state which has ratified all human rights treaties (without any reservation) and immediately implemented the rights provided for by each treaty, the outcome would be civil rights (i.e., rights of citizens and lawful residents) and not for every human being who may have crossed the border of the state illegally, or was "arrested" or tortured by agents of the state abroad. [Reference here is to the global response of the USA to the attacks of 9/11.] In view of the realities of present human rights practice, it would be tragic to continue judging the human rights paradigm by the practice of states which claim self-appointed leadership in the field while violating the most fundamental principles of the rule of law in international relations.

The thrust of my argument here is that human rights norms are what peoples in their communities accept as the entitlement of all human beings, regardless of the policies and practice of states. Indeed, the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) clearly stipulates the following:

> The General Assembly Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples ofMember States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

It is therefore ironic that states have succeeded in high-jacking the high moral mantle of universal human rights in order to advance their narrow, relativist purposes. By the same token, however, supporters of human rights must strive to recover the initiative to uphold the principle of the universality of these rights. Unfortunately, these competing perspectives are not mediated on the merit of each perspective.

Although the UDHR does not entrust states with the right or obligation to implement the UDHR as such, Member States of the UN have in fact hijacked the Declaration and assumed the authority to operationalize and implement it. Moreover, instead of adopting appropriate strategies for the implementation of this unique document, throughout which, it addresses individual persons as the exclusive rights-holder; states assumed that they have the obligation to implement the Declaration through the application of traditional international law. Since states are the exclusive subjects of traditional international law, they are the only entities that can have rights and obligations under international law. States are the only entities which have the standing to sue and be sued under international law. The paradox of the international protection of human rights is that individual persons are the exclusive holder of human rights against the state; yet, states hold the exclusive power to enforce or implement those rights.

In the final analysis, the meaning and implication of human rights norms is the product of negotiations among states, whereby rights are binding only on states and can only be enforced or implemented by states. It was inconceivable from that perspective for human rights norms to be defined, interpreted, or applied independently from the same states that hold the exclusive ability to violate as well as the obligation to protect those rights. To conclude this foreword, postcolonial relations are often what they inspire human beings to do or be, like what the Mahatma Gandhi is reported to have said: “be the change you want to see in the world.” I see this volume and the contributors’ chapters as an important step in challenging ongoing paradigms of what constitutes the human in human rights, as well as demonstrating that spiritual care is a human rights practice. As stated (implicitly or explicitly) in almost all of the following chapters, recognizing the dignity and self-worth of humans is spiritual care. It is a human right to be treated with dignity.



Prefatory Reflection: "To Love One Another as We Are, to Become All We Are Meant to Be" by Omid Safi

There is a story told and retold in the Middle East about how to help someone who's drowning. The story goes that a man had fallen into a river. He was not much of a swimmer and was in real danger of drowning. A crowd of concerned people wanted to rescue him. They were standing at the edge of the water, each of them urgently shouting out to him:

Give me your hand, give me your hand!
The man was battling the waves and ignored their urgent plea. He kept going under and was clearly struggling to take another breath. A saintly man walked up to the scene. He too cared about the drowning man. But his approach was different. Calmly he walked up to the water, waded in up to his knees, glanced lovingly at the drowning man, and said:

Take my hand.
Much to everyone's surprise, the drowning man reached out and grabbed the saint's hand. The two came out of the dangerous water. The drowning man sat up at the edge of the water, breathing heavily, looking relieved, exhausted, and grateful. The crowd turned towards the saint and asked in complete puzzlement: "How were you able to reach him when he didn't heed our plea?" The saint calmly said:

> You all asked him for something, his hand. I offered him something, my hand. A drowning man is in no position to give you anything.

> Let us remember not to ask anything of someone who is drowning.

I saw a friend of mine over the weekend. It was the first time I had seen him since turbulent events in my own life, and he lovingly asked about that. I know him to be a loving father, a caring husband, one whose face glows when he speaks about his children. So I inquired about his family. He shared with me the difficult news that his own daughter had gone through some of the same challenges I had. We spent the rest of the time discussing how we can best be there for the people we love.

He shared, with a pained voice, how hard it was to see someone he loves so much hurting. It almost sounded like it would be less painful for him if he could be the one carrying the burden. We talked about the energy our loved ones spend to shield us, to protect us from their pain at the times when they are most in need of having someone take them by the hand and lead them to the shore.

We talked about this issue of how to be there for, and with, someone who was hurting, drowning. In other words, how to lend a hand, rather than asking them to give us their hand.

One thing we talked about stayed with me: When a person is breaking, broken, they are so exhausted, so drained. Asking them to come to us and share their brokenness is asking them to do more when all they can do to stay alive is to tread water.

And then there is shame. So many of us have felt a great shame when our lives, our marriages, our careers fall apart. To come to the people who can help us with our shame is . . . well, shameful. Ironically, we end up spending more energy trying to shelter our family and loved ones from our brokenness. This is energy that we don't have, energy that we should be using to tread water.

So if you are that saintly soul, if you want to reach out to someone who is struggling to stay above water, go to them.

But don't ask them to give you their hand. Instead, offer them your hand. Don't ask for their heart, offer them your heart. Offer them your ear, your love, your shoulder. Release your friends, your family, from the shame of their brokenness. Let them know that you love them through the brokenness, because of the brokenness, and God-willing, after the brokenness.

Free your loved ones of the energy they spend to hide their brokenness from you. Free them of the shame of coming to you as they are. Let them spend that energy on surviving, on healing, on thriving. Let us love one another as we are, so that we may become all we are meant to be.

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This anthology enters the revolutionary history of the struggle of victims of colonialism in its many forms to overcome the deleterious effects of imperialism and colonialism, at one of its crucial points—that of the care of persons. In recognition of the many different forms of oppression, injustice, and violence in the world today that are traceable to the legacy and continuing effects of colonialism; various authors have contributed to the volume from diverse backgrounds in terms of ethnic identities, religious and cultural traditions, gender and sexual orientations, as well as communal and personal realities. The volume commences with the juxtaposition of Abdullahi An-Na'im's legal, analytical discourse of spiritual care as human rights practice, with Omid Safi's poetic and eloquent story of care. Both AnNa'im's and Safi's contributions are variations of radical love—to love one another radically and meaningfully means allowing people to be who they are through the practice of mutual reciprocity and deep listening. An-Na'im's vision of radical love challenges the legal framework to allow self-love and self-determination to flourish. An-Na'im underscores the centrality of mutuality in spiritual care in that he sees "spiritual care as self-liberation, whereby both sides are at once recipients and providers of care to each other." AnNa'im's human rights paradigm also shows that only through deep listening to the needs of others can we arrive at an overlapping consensus as to what is important to, and valued in, a community.

Safi's reflection also highlights mutuality and deep listening. His story demonstrates the power of language and genuine empathy. One is struck how a drowning man was expected to hold out his hand; this demand could not be comprehended in the face of impending danger. When the language was re-framed for the drowning man to take the helper's hand, it was more readily accomplished. Herein lies the beauty of offering unaffected care and sincere listening when it is not forced on us. Offering care versus demanding someone to do something becomes key to building trust and

relationality. All of us have been both the saint and the one struggling in the water. To know that we can be in the position of needing care can help us better provide the care when we are in such a situation. In this volume, we offer such perspectives and practices of care. We offer diverse perspectives and stories, narratives and voices of difference, and we offer images for radically re-imagining spiritual care.

The title of Safi's reflection, "To Love One Another As We Are, To Become All We Are Meant to Be," eloquently encapsulates the work of all the contributors and also becomes the principal aim for this volume. While Omid Safi identifies as a Muslim, his voice is a human voice—his story evokes quotidian spiritual practices that are contextually translatable into various cultures and communities. In this regard, the contributors in this volume similarly demonstrate that the sacred practice of allowing others to flourish in their becoming—and to support such becoming—is the rich work of spiritual care. Decolonized spiritual care embraces the human in human rights discourse; it becomes human rights practice.

Why Spiritual over Pastoral Care

Decolonized spiritual care entails practices of mutuality, reciprocity, and deep listening. In that regard, the editors give preference to the terminology of spiritual care, over that of "pastoral care." While pastoral theologian Robert Dykstra does defend the shepherding model of care; the term, "pastoral," historically has been associated with a hierarchical, top-down model of care. We are not arguing, however, that the term is exclusively a Judeo-Christian concept as some do. As early as the eighteenth century (1681–1762), a shepherding model of "pastoral care" was used in Korea by Neo-Confucian scholars of practical learning in the work of Yi Ik. The Practical Learning scholars focused on political matters and care of the people. Chong Yagyong's most well-known work focused on the understanding that in order to have good society, one needed good governance/ good rule. Good government began with care for the people—this was written in his Core Teachings for Shepherding the People.4 Pastoral care and governance were imbricated and not separate ideologies in Korea prior to the people's exposure to Christianity via Catholicism.5 Yet, this pastoral care/shepherding model was very much a top-down, hierarchical, patriarchal, and paternalistic model of care.

While the concept of pastoral care, therefore, is not exclusive to Judeo-Christian or monotheistic care models, we problematize its usage for several reasons. In historicizing "pastoral," the term was used primarily to convey a metaphorical model of shepherding care that showed authority and power of one species (i.e., the human) who was considered superior to the sheep (i.e., unthinking animal who needed guidance). This communicates an uneven message of leader being superior and human, while the image of flock somehow is beneath that of the leader and less than fully human (read: colonialism). We, the editors, therefore associate "pastoral care" with the Linnaean classification and hierarchical system that became the prime tool for colonial and imperial conquests, as well as environmental devastation, leading to the subjection and subjugation of Africans, Asians, and native peoples in the Americas. We in the field of pastoral theology are challenged by the legacies of colonialism and the ways in which "care" is—and has been—a colonizing practice, especially when Third World spiritual practices were not recognized as legitimate or as on par with that of Christian practices.

This volume seeks to challenge the association of the concept of pastoral care with such historicist understandings of the term. In that regard, we acknowledge the need to have a thoroughly historicized critique of the term, especially in the ways the image of shepherding has been used to

reinforce Christian-centered norms in the practices and theories of spiritual care. We need to rehabilitate the term, "pastoral," just as "queer" has been rehabilitated from the pejorative ways it has been used in the past. At the same time, some contributors have chosen to use the term "pastoral" in their chapters. In using such language, they disturb its conventional meaning, thereby upending the assertion that it is unique to Judeo-Christian care.

As a postcolonial critique of spiritual care, this anthology highlights the plurality of spiritual voices and concerns that have been overlooked or obscured because of the politics of race, religion, sexuality, nationalism, and other structures of power that have shaped what discursive spiritual care entails today. US society tends to "normalize" and not problematize what the West has dictated as constituting religion or spiritual practices (what is sacred and what is deemed "barbaric" and profane). We have blindly obliged to the oppressive categories constructed for "us" by Renaissance and Western European Enlightenment (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) thinking. Prior to and after these periods of European thought, the boundaries of what was considered to be religion and what was secular/ sacred and profane were redrawn and gerrymandered multiple times to favor European Christian thought as normative. The creation of a discipline of Religious Studies was to support what practices and beliefs Europeans saw as most compatible (or comparable) with Christianity, or what might most follow the trajectory of Enlightenment "rational" thinking. Some "religious" practices were "othered" and categorized as extremely different from Western Christian sensibilities. The alleged superior mind of the West was rationale for engaging in a civilizing "pastoral" mission to shepherd and guide the allegedly less enlightened (sub-human) peoples. The image of shepherding that is associated with pastoral care, then, is extremely problematic, racist, and colonizing.

This logic of European racist thought is explicit in the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, who saw persons from the Asian or African continent as not fully developed humans and as inferior to those races with white skin. The Hegelian view of Asia and Africa as "static, despotic, and irrelevant to world history" has shaped Western thinking about its people and cultures. Hegel's account of race is embedded in his conception of personhood, where he believed in biological distinctions between persons. He saw the soul as embodying racial distinctions. According to Hegel, Europeans/White subjects were seen as the very paradigm/model of freedom and rationality because of their biology. He states, "It is in the Caucasian race that spirit first reaches absolute unity with itself," while the people of the Orient and Africa were considered to be ignorant and superstitious. Third world peoples have apparently improved through our contact with European civilization and Christianity. Hegel saw Africans and Asians as inferior—with regard to Mongolians and Chinese (et al.), he critiqued their religious practices as unworthy of free persons because they did not embody a "faith" tradition.

This Hegelian mindset—of the European person as the model of full human subject-hood and that "religions" have to be a separate corporate "belief"—is still operative in politico-economic arenas, human rights discourses, and US society today. This volume postcolonializes the nineteenth-century ideology that foregrounded such racist, dehumanizing Eurocentric philosophy and thought that colonized what constituted "spirit" and defined spiritual or pastoral care. A goal of this anthology, therefore, is to decolonize spiritual care as defined by a Hegelian understanding of spirit and history, as well as Western understandings of what constitutes "religion" or "spiritual." Religion has been a tool, a methodological weapon for colonizing the two-thirds world by creating and constructing categories of what were considered secular, sacred, and profane—obliterating practices that were

considered unrecognizable and illegible to the civilized Western knowing subject; as well as dehumanizing the practices of local communities in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. We need to reinvigorate the meaning of spiritual care in light of how Hegel's meaning of spirit has dictated what is spiritual and what is not.

Most of the non-white world did not believe in a monotheistic G-d or Savior (until the period of colonizing conquests in the 1500s). This by no means denotes they were not spiritual or as human as their white Christian subjects. Today, atheists and humanists have to constantly defend their right to spiritual care (to convince others they have spiritual needs and to argue that they can be providers of spiritual care as well). We do not think for a practice to be pastoral and/or spiritual, it must also be corporate or linked to and rooted in a faith community and its traditions. We understand that "religious traditions" are socially constructed or invented European categories, which are constantly changing.

"Spiritual" or "pastoral" care should not be circumscribed to "faith" traditions. Such a mindset limits what is considered spiritual or even religious. If by "faith" or belief system, one refers to a broadly understood faith meaning as it was understood in medieval times, then "faith" refers to a concept of trust in someone, not belief in an epistemological sense of higher beings. If we apply such a definition of a faith community, then atheists who state, "I believe there is not a God as understood in Christianity," would be considered part of a faith community. A postcolonial critique of "spiritual" includes scrutinizing how certain humans were excluded and seen as subhuman because their personhood did not fit the Hegelian definition of "spirit." Knowledge of "what was considered to be human" changed and shifted throughout the centuries. When we limit what is "spiritual" to "faith" traditions, it reinforces Christian hubris: a combination of white Christian superiority as normative, with racism intertwined in those standards of the norm. Toni Morrison poignantly stated how racism keeps you from doing your work. It keeps you explaining, over and over again, your reason for being. Somebody says you have no language, and you spend twenty years proving that you do. Somebody says your head isn't shaped properly, so you have scientists working on the fact that it is. Somebody says that you have no art, so you dredge that up. Somebody says that you have no kingdoms, and you dredge that up. None of that is necessary. There will always be one more thing.

Intersecting with Morrison's statement on racism, it becomes daunting and overwhelming for non-Christians or non-white Christians to have to prove to others that they are as spiritual or as human as their white Christian colleagues or neighbors—whether in the workplace, schools, clinical pastoral education settings, seminaries. It is de-humanizing to constantly have to prove one's humanity by explaining they are "spiritual"—but not religious, or spiritual but atheist!

Metaphor or Image of the Work

This project was partly inspired by the book, Images of Pastoral Care: Classic Readings, edited by Robert Dykstra. Published in 2005, none of the contributors were of any other religious background, apart from Christianity. All of the contributors were white Protestants, except for one scholar/minister. We have brought together diverse voices, beliefs, and work backgrounds for a book that more adequately reflects the spiritual practices of United Stateseans (Janet Halley's neologism).15 The editors of this volume are well aware of tokenism or narratives depicting the single voice as authoritative or as speaking on behalf of all in a particular community. We want to emphasize that these following chapters are but a few voices within a kaleidoscopic lens of spiritual care. Spiritual care is as rich and varied as the billions of people, plants, and fauna on this earth.

This anthology hopes to contribute to the voices of practical and pastoral theologians, academics, spiritual care providers, religious leaders, students, and activists working to provide greater intercultural spiritual care and awareness in the areas of healthcare, community work, and education. The project highlights the expertise of spiritual care from those who may not have institutional power. The volume is not a "how to provide pastoral care"—as many volumes purport to do. Rather, the contributors share the knowledge of spiritual care garnered from their deep-listening work with patients, families, students, and community members. As these chapters attest, those in power are not the only ones who get to decide what constitutes spiritual care. It is our hope that this book provides a much-needed impetus for listening to many more voices, stories, and histories of spiritual care.

As co-editors, we believe in the necessity for greater spiritual care literacy in the training of spiritual care providers who work in public spaces. Having deliberated on how to bring the diverse chapters together and organize the text, we have identified a few, overlapping central themes in the chapters. Each of the author's images contribute, in some form, to dismantling colonialist and white supremacist ideological frameworks in spiritual care. Through the work in this volume, we hope to expand and widen the discourse of spiritual care and participate in the ongoing paradigm shifts in the field of pastoral and practical theology.

Chapters

We have ordered the chapters in relation to the breadth of subject, commencing from the micro-focused (personhood) through sociality (society, community) and into globality (culture, international politics). Themes of neoliberalism, economics, resistance, and care in the face of injustice reverberate through each of the chapters since these all affect persons in the current global nexus. In addition, each chapter contributes to the theoretical framework of spiritual care as decolonizing and challenging the dominant inhuman human rights paradigm. An-Na'im rightly states that human rights laws and frameworks are colonized. Institutionally, norms were agreed upon by States and by people who were not representative of their own communities. He argues that state-centric legality was a crucial element of European colonization, spreading ideas of norms to non-European countries. States allegedly were—but have not been—in the business of protecting human rights.

Spiritual care recognizes the importance of the de-institutionalized religious practices that emerge from the daily lives of people that give them the tools to find their agency and flourishing. Spiritual care is concerned about caring for self, for those in our community, and for improving the daily lives of people by recognizing and underscoring agency in their lives. A central goal of spiritual care is to liberate and empower the wholeness of human beings, families, and communities. In that regard, these chapters uphold the human in human rights discourse and work towards the decolonization of human rights norms. We contest the neo-liberal, capitalist, de-humanizing values that have shaped and structured human rights norms and what is considered to be spiritual care.

Another theme or thread of commonality in the chapters is the revelation of a "third space" that occurs via postcolonial spiritual care. In the words of postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha,

> Legitimating narratives of cultural domination can be displaced to reveal a "third space." Most creative forms of cultural identity are produced on the boundaries in-between forms of difference, in the intersections and overlaps across the sphere of class, gender, race, nation, generation, location.

Spiritual identities are produced in concert with cultural identities of the third space. Not only are our spiritual identities fluid and constantly changing; we argue that the field of pastoral theology itself needs to be open to the many apertures and closures, fissures and fractures when it comes to diversity and inclusion within an academic discipline. These "third spaces" are the interstitial spaces that are overlapping and laden with new theories. By being present with—and listening to—the stories of youth, students, the elderly, the poor, et al., the contributors conjure a discursive "third space" and reinvigorate the sacrality of humanity and community that is constantly being challenged in a neoliberal world. For too long, the discursive space of pastoral care has been exceedingly narrow and provincial. It has elided the diversity of spiritual practices and voices, because we have focused on what is considered to be the dominant "norm" of society. This volume seeks to overturn normative structures of spiritual care by engaging and energizing the margins of the 'third space,' the holy in-between space where we can authentically explore stories and practices about our becoming.

Part One: Spiritual Care of the Person

Professor Emmanuel Lartey's chapter explores the concept of relational holism in African life and thought. He references the work of practitioners of African spirituality in its rich and varied forms by examining its significance in the care of persons across the entire world. At the heart and center of personality within African notions of personhood lies, not a soul, but rather 'spirit.' Spirituality in African life and thought is a matter of relationality, and spirituality comprises five inter-related and inter-connected dimensions. These are: (a) relation with the divine, (b) relation with self, (c) relation with (an)other, (d) relations among groups of people—community, and (e) relation with nature/earth/space. African spiritual practices aim at relational holism resulting from harmonious relations along all five of these dimensions.

As the Director of Spiritual Care at Stanford Hospital, Lori Klein articulates an image of "cultural humility and reverent curiosity" for the work of intercultural spiritual care in a hospital setting. Patients, their loved ones, and staff come to hospitals embodying complex identities. They draw upon intersecting cultures and norms to meet expectations of their gender, communit(ies), and religious tradition(s). They come with histories of access, privilege, vulnerability, and/or discrimination. Medical centers in the United States also function based on often unacknowledged cultural norms. Klein beautifully demonstrates how to navigate this people-and institution-scape to provide spiritual care, while adhering to cultural humility and being with people in reverent curiosity. The chaplain's goal is to help all people experience the hospital as a place of compassion and healing. Accompanying people through decisions made in grief's shadow, transitions, loss, and uncertainty can lead to meaningful transformation not only for patients and their loved ones, but also for chaplains. It is transformative mutuality.

Buddhist chaplain Sumi Kim explores the interconnectedness of humans and nature. She observes the current paradigm shift in which our interconnectedness with local economies is entwined with globalization, and how racial and social injustices are understood through systemic oppressions. Our survival is now clearly dependent on Earth's ecological web. She concludes her chapter by reflecting on how we find personal agency while feeling trapped in large-scale political, economic, and social systems. The image of the flower of interbeing, as taught by the Vietnamese Zen master Thích Nhat Hanh, serves as her metaphor.

In Images of Pastoral Care, Robert Dykstra contended that pastoral theologians have long used metaphorical images as guiding frameworks for theoretical analysis and therapeutic practice. To frame Greg Ellison's teaching and practice as a pastoral theologian and new faculty member at Candler School of Theology in 2010, he published a journal article to cast his own image of pastoral care, entitled, "From My Center to the Center of All Things: Hourglass Care (Take 1)." A decade later, he contributes his "second take" on that original article. He makes some revisions, which highlight the importance of pilgrimage, fearless dialogue, and a full-sensory pedagogy, to aid students in caring for self and other.

Amani Legagneur, manager of Spiritual Health at Northside hospital, asks the following questions: "Is your healing welcome to you? Is my healing welcome to me?" These questions serve as touchstones and guides for spiritual care responders who may identify themselves as healing welcomers. A healing welcomer is a spiritual care responder who intends to offer a respectful, hospitable presence to those served while endeavoring to facilitate the amelioration and/or alleviation of their pain and suffering. Legagneur demonstrates how healing welcomers seek to promote restoration, positive connections, comfort, hope, self-compassion, and grace as they encourage greater spiritual wellbeing in those for whom they care.

In experiencing the welcoming healing of self-love, we introduce the beautiful work of Alexander Brown, an undergraduate student at a university in the South. He contributes a most poignant, thoughtful piece of his ongoing spiritual journey, as he reflects on his gender, religious, and sexual identity. Weaving his own personal Muslim-Christian spiritual narrative with the theories of feminist and womanist scholars and activists, he constructs a spiritual care prescriptive for transgendered individuals.

Part Two: Spiritual Care of Communities

Bilal Ansari, Muslim chaplain, contributes a brief synopsis of his work-in-progress on the image of the Black Sheep and how shepherding and care of one's flock is a repeated theme in the Qur'an, hadith (prophetic narratives), the prophetic biography, Islamic jurisprudence, theology and spirituality. There is a clear pastoral theology and concept of care in Islam. Muslim pastoral care can be imagined and best understood as the marginalized Black Shepherds and sheep. This brief chapter comes from his dissertation work, which will be published in the near future. By introducing his work in this volume, he hopes to diversify the notion and image of pastoral care to include the deep roots inherent in Islam, expand the identity of Muslim caregivers beyond the relegated Christian realm, and contribute meaningfully to the professional literature in the field of pastoral theology and spiritual care.

Pastoral theologian Mindy McGarrah-Sharp's chapter begins with the imagery of basketry as a metaphor for what is necessary for pastoral care in a "flammable" world. Baskets bear intergenerational, intercultural wisdom while also carrying future stories. Baskets are also flammable in a world shaped by colonial impulses. The second part of the chapter describes an image of collective phoenix poetry that arises amidst such dehumanizing risks. The chapter argues that intercultural, postcolonializing pastoral care practices cultivate the conditions for and contribute to phoenix poetry in a flammable world where persistent joy and prophetic grief co-reside.

Greg Epstein, humanist chaplain at Harvard and MIT, offers the image of midwifery for spiritual care. With a dramatic rise in the number of atheists, agnostics, humanists, and nonreligious people in the United States today—in particular among young, highly educated people (self-professed atheists and

agnostics now outnumber all Christians combined at Harvard and MIT, according to detailed recent surveys of campus demographics)— there is a strong need and called-for demand for professionally trained helping professionals who can work with members of this population to address spiritual questions on topics such as meaning and purpose, death and despair, and ethical well-being. Epstein describes the rich ways he has connected to students in this anthology by sharing some of his own ethical struggles and challenges in his spiritual journey.

Elementary school librarian Natalie Bernstein's chapter explores the variety of ways that an elementary school library offers support to students, parents, and teachers. The space itself is welcoming and comforting, offering a quiet place to be calm, read, or ask for help. The relationship between the librarian and individual library users can be surprisingly intimate, with individual consultations about choosing a book sometimes developing into personal confessions about fears or hopes. At the heart of the library program, however, are books—especially stories—that create connections to personal experience, deepen our understanding of the interior lives of others, help solve problems, build resilience, and, ultimately, nurture compassion. Bernstein embraces a Paolo Freirean method in the library to allow for liberative critical thinking and reflection. She focuses on teaching, modeling, and cultivating the joy of reading—whether individually or communally—and through that reading, has taught children how to appreciate themselves and connect empathically with others. Bernstein invites us into her elementary library sanctuary, where we are privy to her awe-inspiring work and spiritual practice of reading and engaging in community-building with children, parents, and teachers.

The next chapter looks at the compassionate care and community organizing work of Baptist pastor Jeremy Lewis and the members of a food co-op in Atlanta called Urban Recipe. Urban Recipe is not a typical food bank or food distribution center for low-income families. The rituals of gathering, distributing, and organizing the food is not done in a paternalistic or hierarchical manner. The co-op endeavors to create community and food security for its clients in a way that respects and honors the dignity of each individual of the community. Food is not simply handed out; the members participate together and deliberate, organize, distribute the food, etc. The members do the bulk of the co-op tasks themselves, as well as help solve whatever problems may arise. The co-op members have dignity in their shared responsibility with one another, and through that agency, they help each other to build community based on radical love for one another. Rhythms and routines of life have formed and shaped the co-op members, as well as the care they give and receive from one another. In this chapter, Lewis explores the rhythm of one person's relationship with her co-op at Urban Recipe (and how the rhythm of each individual is integral in shaping the unique dynamics of the co-op). The expression of care articulated in this co-op model provides helpful insights into other life contexts and communities with regard to spiritual care. Resources (such as love and care), when provided, can contribute to building a thriving community.

Part Three: Spiritual Care and Global Well-Being

Pastor, academic, and activist Cedric Johnson investigates neoliberalism as a central framework through which to investigate the human suffering that has resulted from a growing economic divide that is now global in its scope. The image of the cultural broker metaphorically structures various realms of practice that inform soul care in the neoliberal age. Cultural brokering is defined as the act of bridging, linking, or mediating between groups or persons of different cultural backgrounds for the purpose of reducing conflict or producing change. Cultural brokers also function as mediators, negotiating complex processes within communities and cultures. The practitioner of prophetic soul

care in the neoliberal age is called upon to build bridges of communication, manage the dynamics of cultural and socioeconomic difference, help groups mediate those differences, and advocate for transformation. The image of the cultural broker thus brings into view continuities among critical realms of practice that otherwise appear to be unrelated.

Theologian and scholar Bruce Rogers-Vaughn discusses the changing structures of colonialism and proposes a reimagining of spiritual care that includes an understanding of how the internet has become an effective tool of this global colonization. Rogers-Vaughn asks us to complicate and reimagine Bonnie Miller McLemore's "living human web" metaphor. He suggests attending to the "dark web" as a way to visualize the decolonizing gaps, recesses, and interstices of the human web. After delineating the corrosive alterations of human subjects within today's dominant web, producing what he calls "dying human documents," he identifies four practices existing within the dark web—hope, humility, love, and mourning—that might guide spiritual care in the current age.

Feminist theologian Hellena Moon metaphorically illustrates how the "immured spirit" is the spiritual erasure and oppression of communities due to the European categorization of religions deemed sacred (those beliefs seen to be similar to European belief systems) and profane (that which was categorized as unimportant). Not only does the "immured spirit" symbolize the marginalized or "caged" spiritual practices of previously colonized communities to prevent their/our true liberation; it also symbolizes the immured g-d—that is, the lack of imagination and creativity that could emerge if we engaged in the true work of decolonization. The possibility and vision for liberation is immured in the traps of "freedom" established by a neoliberal world. The living human web has been a Eurocentric web— with a desperate need for the infra-human. The freedom and liberation of white Euro-Americans have been dependent on various forms of violence (colonial, imperial, neo-liberal, capitalist) wrought on human and nonhuman communities. While the structural and physical forms of violence have been theorized and critiqued, the clement and curative forms of violence have been less discussed. The metonym of an immured spirit is a heuristic for us to contemplate the less noticeable, yet equally toxic, forms of violence (clement and curative) that are perpetrated against—and endured by—infrahumans, thereby circumscribing our genuine liberation. In contemplating our freedom, Moon also considers how our liberation has been tethered to other forms of violence, such as our dependence on fossil fuels. In that regard, how free are any of us when we are so utterly immured by the forces of nature? While we are responsible for environmental damages, we are the ones who are suffering the consequences. The Earth can continue without us, but we cannot continue without Earth. Paradoxically, we are destroying the very force that gives us life.

Conclusion

We see the potential of metaphors to help contribute to—and expand—the language, vision, and practice of spiritual care. It is our hope that new metaphors can stimulate our imaginations to create new language and creative ways of theorizing and envisioning what constitutes spiritual care. Spiritual care is the care of the everyday that is part of our circadian rhythm. It is a vision, an image, of the ordinary work of people in their everyday healing (healing of self and being present with others). Postcolonial spiritual care creates the situations that allow our dignity, as well as that of others, to be granted so that we can become who we were meant to be. We hope readers can journey with us into the quotidian practices of care. We want to emphasize the importance of the de-institutionalized religious practices that emerge from the daily lives of people whereby their agency and dignity are able to flourish. Mutuality of listening and support, as An-Na'im and Safi have

described, creates a space for the emergence of dignity and for becoming who we were meant to be, and this is a synecdoche for spiritual care. <>

Essay: The Biographer as Literary Artist: Form and Content in Philostratus' Apollonius by Adam M. Kemezis

Had Philostratus' Apollonius been subject to peer review, it seems certain that somewhere in the referee reports would be the damning sentence, 'Author is trying to do too much'. For many modern readers, Philostratus' work is far more than they want. Those who are not put off by its sheer length (eight books, 299-odd pages) are liable to find its variety of subject matter overwhelming. Those who have turned to the work for a factual account of the life and teachings of the real Apollonius of Tyana, a wonder-worker-cum-philosopher from the early Imperial period, are often baffled by seemingly endless passages of material that is bizarre, fantastic, or just irrelevant, but at all events not historically accurate. Others have sought in Philostratus a literary response to the New Testament gospels and a precursor to Christian hagiography or Neoplatonic biography, but have encountered an author who more often invokes a formidable range of predecessors going back to Homer, Herodotus, Plato, and Xenophon, then continuing through such second-century figures as Dio Chrysostom, Arrian, and Lucian, as well as the other works of his own multifarious corpus. Many readers now (and more, one supposes, in Antiquity) revel in this same fantastic content and belletristic luxuriance, and most current scholarship on the Apollonius starts from the basis that the work is fundamentally fictional and meant to be read as such. Nonetheless, readings of the Apollonius as 'frivolous' or 'novelistic' have trouble coming to grips with the considerable part of the content that still does correspond to what those dissatisfied readers were seeking, namely, the words and deeds (however fictionalized) of a historically attested philosophical-religious celebrity, and prospective echoes of such works as Porphyry's Life of Plotinus.

This confusion is not the result of misreading, but rather of a real tension within the text. Philostratus indeed begins his work by laying out some relatively modest objectives: to refute those who claim Apollonius was a charlatan or magician and instead to 'give an accurate account of the man, both as regards the times at which he said or did various things, and as regards the characteristics of the wisdom by which he came to be considered godlike and holy. He will immediately (1.3) add a related goal, namely, the dissemination of new knowledge about his hero that has ostensibly just been found in an account written by a disciple named Damis, which has come into the possession of the Empress Julia Domna. Damis, who appears to be a fictional creation of Philostratus, supposedly wrote a plain and unrefined account of his master, which Julia has asked the narrator to put into proper literary form. But those rather specific objectives are somewhat belied by the work's actual content and narrative persona, which suggest an entirely different literary project, an aggregative, even totalizing one that seems to be trying to mark out a vast extent of cultural material as the domain of a particular sort of hero and the author who has, to all intents and purposes, created him. Even if one wants to believe that the Apollonius really is intended as cult propaganda and/or philosophical apologetics, the medium seems oddly disproportionate to the message. If, however, one prefers to see the work as simply an entertaining display of authorial virtuosity, then the question remains of why one would employ this kind of tour de force to extol a figure such as Apollonius, who seems ill-suited to what we otherwise know of Philostratus and his literary milieu.

This essay explores the effects of that apparent mismatch. I will begin by examining Philostratus' explicit rhetorical claims and his curiously ambiguous narrative stance, before moving on to the anecdotal and doxographical material, and the overall characterization of the hero. Then I will consider some key thematic strands of the work that seem to stretch normal generic parameters, these being its focus on foreign exoticism, Greek antiquarianism, and Roman political history. In all of these cases, the interplay between Philostratus' stated aims and his grandiose means will reveal much about the kinds of cultural work that biography could do in Antiquity. The Apollonius announces itself as a self-contained sort of work, neatly defined by the scope and extent of a single human life, and that rhetorical position is never fully abandoned. Much of the rest of the text, however, will sorely test the limits of biographical form as its author strives to display his own consummate skill by piling the largest conceivable variety of Hellenic cultural topics into the life story of one man, and creating an outrageously over-sized literary hero whose story is capable of bearing such a weight.

Narratorial Self-Presentation

Readers trying to select a generic lens for a given ancient work naturally expect some help from the narrator in the form of self-positioning, implicit or explicit. The narrative persona of the Apollonius is certainly not reticent or averse to self-reference. Philostratus places himself in an elaborate frame narrative and continues throughout the work to offer editorial comments on his subject matter and the ways in which he has learned about it. He has surprisingly little, however, to say about his finished product, the book we are now reading. Neither in his preface nor elsewhere does he comment at any length on the style or structure of the work, nor does he name famous predecessors as objects of imitation or emulation. He does claim to be more elegant and more knowledgeable than other writers on Apollonius, but these authors are either fictional and inaccessible (Damis) or obscure (Moeragenes, Maximus of Aegae). They are cited in order to illustrate the narrator's informational circumstances, not as familiar authors whom readers might use to form expectations about the work before them. Philostratus is constantly comparing the ostensibly Pythagorean Apollonius with earlier philosophers, and this by implication makes the author comparable to the figures who have described those philosophers, but it is significant that that link is never made explicit. This curious obscurity extends even to the title of the work and its generic identity. Nowhere does Philostratus claim to be writing a bios, although it appears that by the late fourth century the title was standard. In a later work, Philostratus does claim to have written a work called and this title is often seen as invoking encomium ('in honour of Apollonius') or even romance.

At all events, the title from the Sophists does fit well with the vague way in which the Apollonius narrator speaks of his own project. If one can coax a rhetorical strategy from his self-presentation, the narrator seems to setting his generic sights beyond, and perhaps above, the form of biography as it existed from the Hellenistic world to Plutarch or Diogenes Laertius. However, he stops well short of acknowledging or accounting for what will have been most striking to his readers, namely, the unprecedented scope and scale of the Apollonius. The work as it stands invites now, and surely invited at the time, the question, 'Why eight whole books, and on Apollonius of Tyana of all people?' Given that Philostratus will be making extravagant claims for his hero's historical and cultural significance, the obvious answer might be that as a special sort of man, comparable only to icons from the heroic past, Apollonius deserves a unique sort of book, comparable only to the works of Xenophon and his like. This is not, however, the answer Philostratus gives.

Instead, he positions himself only within a tradition, which is largely his own invention, of writings about and by Apollonius. The narrator does see himself as writing the longest and fullest account that his hero has ever received. His characterization of his own work is that, in the interest of correcting widespread ignorance or misunderstanding of Apollonius, he will give a fully accurate account, as in the quotation above. The idea seems to be that Apollonius has hitherto been known only piecemeal, through letters, partial narratives, and perhaps doxographical works comparable to Lucian's Nigrinus or Demonax. Now Philostratus is giving him a single definitive treatment. The subsequent narrative will at times give the sense of striving for fullness, of trying to turn a scattered and often inadequate tradition into something complete. At other times, however, the opposite imperative makes itself felt, and the narrator presents himself as selective, giving us only the best parts of the massive corpus of stories about Apollonius, which he has at his disposal thanks to the indiscriminate Damis. In summarizing the apparently extensive further travels that Apollonius made after his visit to Ethiopia, Philostratus explains that:

> To avoid either prolonging my account by explaining individually and in detail all of [Apollonius'] philosophical teachings, or on the other hand seeming to skip through a narrative that I have worked hard to pass on to those who are ignorant of the man, I mean to recount only those that are most serious and noteworthy.

Philostratus is thus evoking the perennial problem of epideictic rhetoric: how to make one's words match the particular excellence of one's subject. But the issue is not as simple as needing to write a great book for a great man. Apollonius is not only uniquely great, but also uniquely complex and multifaceted: he did and said all sorts of different things that one learns about and expresses in all sorts of different ways. Giving him an appropriate portrait in words will require authorial skills that go well beyond those of the average encomiast.

Similarly, the many-layered narrative structure of the Apollonius seems designed to accentuate the air of mystery and complexity surrounding the hero. Philostratus' framing and narrative techniques allow all kinds of voices to tell Apollonius' story. There is the Philostratean narrator, earnest but still sophisticated and at times detached. Then there is Damis, the faithful but naive disciple, who is diligent enough to record events accurately, but often insufficiently discerning to get the point of the story he is telling. There is also a sort of vulgate tradition of anecdotes about Apollonius that the narrator sometimes cites as a supplement to Damis, but sometimes strives to correct, especially when the stories make him out to be a charlatan: the writings of Maximus and Moeragenes are dealt with in much the same way. Above all, there is the oracular but enigmatic voice of Apollonius himself. The Apollonius contains massive passages of the hero speaking in direct discourse. Sometimes these are presented as independently existing letters to which the narrator has privileged access, but more often readers are given to infer that they are speeches recorded by Damis. Indeed, large sections of the narrative are introduced with the phrase 'they say', the 'they' apparently being a combination of Damis and his master.

All of this narratological back-and-forth has many effects. The frame narrative of Damis and his 'found text' seems to suggest links with several sub-genres of fictional text, including the Trojan revisionism of Dictys Cretensis and the fantastic material in the Wonders beyond Thule. However, the narrator's subsequent description of his own researches and comparison of variants seems more reminiscent of more traditional biography as Plutarch or Suetonius might have known it. It also creates an impression of Apollonius as the object of considerably more literary interest and controversy than was probably the case in the world outside Philostratus' pages. The author is highly

attuned to questions of fictionality and verisimilitude, and readers are expected to enjoy the same sorts of literary play that we see in the fantastic works of Lucian, or indeed Philostratus' own Heroicus, an alternative Trojan War narrative. This playful quality does come at the cost of a certain loss of focus, however. The narrator's initial definition of his task, to describe Apollonius' genuine divine wisdom while refuting allegations of charlatanry, had suggested that this was a question with a single answer, albeit one that required special sources of information and considerable labour. Apollonius was hard to find out about, but essentially knowable and tellable. The ambivalence of the narrator's approach, however, suggests that such a definitive settlement of the question may not be possible. This is true above all of Apollonius' human or divine status. Throughout the narrative, the 'big question' about Apollonius is simply what sort of being he is. Is he a charlatan who uses illicit magic, a philosopher whose wisdom brings him uniquely close to the divine, or in fact a fully superhuman being who can know and do things that nobody else can?

This ambivalence is paralleled within the narrative itself, because many of the characters, and not least Damis, share the narrator's preoccupation with interpreting the phenomenon of Apollonius. From start to finish, Damis regards his master as something of a puzzle to be solved: when an eastern king offers to grant wishes for Apollonius (1.33.2), the disciple explicitly mentions that he made several guesses as to what Apollonius would or would not ask for. Sometimes the narrator seems ready to employ Damis as a reliable interpreter, as when he says that Damis' fuller narrative offers him a gloss on an obscurely laconic phrase about Indian sages that he has found in a letter of Apollonius' (3.15.1–2). More often, however, Damis seems inadequate. First of all, he is absent from several key events in Apollonius' career, not least the sage's final moments, from which in fact Apollonius appears to deliberately exclude him by sending him on an errand at the crucial point (8.28). Even when he is present, he seems to have a poor grasp of the major questions surrounding Apollonius, especially that of his human or divine status. At a crucial moment late in the Apollonius (7.38), Damis does claim to have become convinced that his master's true nature is 'godlike and superhuman'. Disconcertingly, though, what brings him to this realization is not the kind of sayings that the narrator mentioned at the beginning. Rather it is the fact that Apollonius can slip out of a set of chains, which sounds less the action of a philosopher than of a charlatan.

Others throughout the narrative are little more satisfying, although some impressive figures take their turn at solving the riddle. There is one character, Larchas the Indian Brahman, who seems to know everything there is to know about Apollonius, as he reveals at their first meeting (3.16), but we never really learn what Larchas has to say about his fellow sage's true nature. Larchas' inferior counterparts in Ethiopia repeat the scene (6.9–11), except that they believe slanders from Apollonius' enemies about him being a charlatan, and accordingly treat him rudely. In the climactic confrontation between Apollonius and Domitian, the emperor evidently believes the same charges about magic and charlatanry. In both cases, Apollonius mounts an eloquent defence of his philosophy, but without really clearing up the question of his own human or divine nature. The problem is a more developed version of that in the gospels, especially Mark and John, in which Jesus' true nature is consistently misunderstood by friend and enemy alike. What is missing is a Simon Peter who can stumble on to the correct answer, have it confirmed by his master, and go on to preach it as the true gospel.

The Master's Teachings

Philostratus claims in his preface (1.3.1) that Damis' account (and thus prospectively his own) contained not just Apollonius' journeys but also 'his sayings, his speeches, and anything he uttered of

a prophetic nature'. Indeed, the Apollonius does give its hero ample space not only to tell his story, but to engage in lectures or one-sided dialogues (for his various modes of speech) on a remarkably wide range of topics ranging from the benefits of sobriety (2.35–37) and the need for civic harmony (4.8) to the emotional life of elephants (2.11–15) and the merits of Aesop (5.14–15). Apollonius clearly sees himself as a teacher, and Philostratus' book might justifiably be said to contain the 'life and teachings' of its hero. This combination, however, raises several questions, some that are particular to the Apollonius and some that are common to all texts that use (or claim to use) narrative to convey a body of knowledge not specific to the events being related. Does the Apollonius contain a coherent philosophical-religious system, Pythagorean or otherwise? Is the narrator or implied author conveying these teachings in earnest, or with some degree of irony? How do the direct-discourse passages relate to the particular narrative circumstances in which they are uttered, or to the characterization of the person who utters them?

The Apollonius has not generally been rated highly as a work of philosophy in itself. The same might be said, to be sure, of many comparable biographical works. We would not rate Plotinus nearly so highly as a philosopher if we had only Porphyry's Life and not the Enneads. The problem with the Apollonius runs deeper, however, in no small part because of the variety and extravagance of the book's content. A great many of Apollonius' speeches, such as his lecture to Vespasian on good government (5.36), his defence of Greek canons of artistic representation (6.20) or the 'Homeric Questions' that he puts to the ghost of Achilles, have little discernible Pythagorean content at all. Furthermore, while Apollonius has many characteristics of the stereotype Pythagorean, key traditional aspects of that philosophy are either ignored altogether (mathematical teachings, abstention from beans) or mentioned in the narrative but in an unsystematic and consciously playful fashion (transmigration of souls). It often appears that Philostratus is relying on readers' knowledge of Pythagoreanism in order to add colour to his story, rather than seeking to increase or deepen that knowledge. Apollonius' teachings have little intellectual or ideological consistency beyond a moralistic tendency and a general valorization of the Hellenic past not dissimilar to that seen in other elite pagan Greek literature of the Second Sophistic.

The phrase 'Second Sophistic' is of course the invention of none other than Philostratus, and the identities of the author and his narratorial alter ego add another layer of complexity to the questions surrounding the teachings of his Apollonius. To judge from surviving evidence, Philostratus was a formidable figure in the Greek literary world of the early third century, with a considerable extant corpus to his credit. His Apollonius contains several passages that seem to evoke topics of his other works: the questions to Achilles recall the Heroicus, the discussion of aesthetics and visual representation the Imagines, the portrait of Musonius the Nero. Most significantly, the Apollonius and its hero have a complicated relationship with the same author's later Sophists. The Philostratean Apollonius is distinctly a philosopher rather than a sophist, as those categories functioned in the intellectual world of the third century, and he is often critical of rhetorical practices that appear to us 'sophistic'. All in all, he is an anomalous figure among his author's own creations. While the Sophists does briefly mention Apollonius and Philostratus' work on him, it is very difficult to find elsewhere in the Philostratean corpus any meaningful interest in Pythagorean philosophy, or indeed philosophy in general. That said, the work as a whole still bears its author's distinctive stamp. The Apollonius and Sophists share several characters and recurrent narrative motifs. Apollonius himself, for all his critique of rhetoric, uses speech for persuasion, display and even entertainment more in the manner of Polemo or Scopelian than of a typical philosopher, and he certainly has a good deal more of the sophist about him than do the heroes of Porphyry or Athanasius. Enough so to create

unease in a modern reader attempting to take Apollonius of Tyana seriously as a philosophical or religious figure. More than one critic has lamented that Apollonius has fallen into the hands of a littérateur whose embellishments may please audiences but can only obscure the hero's genuine significance.

As a cultural and intellectual historian, one can accept that the Apollonius has more to tell us about the preoccupations and intellectual background of its author than of its protagonist, but that still leaves unanswered an important question about the text. Does this read like a work primarily intended to convey or promote Pythagorean doctrine? If so, what is the purpose and effect of all the extraneous material, both narrative and doxographical? If not, what is the purpose and effect of putting all of these words in the mouth of an ostensible Pythagorean philosopher? The narrator does not seem to sense a disconnect between his hero's allegiance and his words, apparently viewing Apollonius' philosophical status as part of a larger package that included all-around intellectual excellence, superhuman virtue, and closeness to the divine. He views himself as a competent judge of that excellence, and his verdict is overwhelmingly positive, so that the text as a whole seems to endorse the opinions given in the speeches. The narrator does on occasion test or question Apollonius' opinions on such points as the causes of tidal motion (5.2) and, more significantly, there are times, such as the 'defence speech' in Book 8, when it is not at all clear where Apollonius' words and teachings end and Philostratus' begin. However much Apollonius gets to talk, the book is still not his, but Philostratus', in a way that is not true of Xenophon's Memorabilia or Arrian's Discourses. Apollonius' speeches are excursuses within a narrative, rather than the narrative being a vehicle by which the speeches are conveyed.

Thus, whatever teachings the Apollonius conveys are conditioned heavily by the character of the hero and the events in which he is involved. It is important to remember that one of the narrator's main stated objectives is to establish what sort of person Apollonius was, specifically that he was not the charlatan that some make him out to be, but was instead a genuine philosopher. But this opposition works a little unexpectedly. Philostratus' Apollonius is a quite different character from the stereotype of the philosopher and ascetic as unsociable or disturbing figures. He is uniformly pleasant and urbane, managing to function perfectly well in elite society without in any way compromising his philosophical principles. He can somehow contrive to preserve the five years of silence required of a Pythagorean disciple without appearing rude (1.14), and it often appears that his attractive character aids him in conveying philosophical teachings that might in themselves be unpalatable. He is in this respect the heir to the Lucianic figures of Demonax and Nigrinus, as opposed to the antitypes represented by the charlatans Proteus Peregrinus and Alexander of Abonotichus or the compromised speaker of the On Salaried Posts.12 In all of these cases, the authenticity or fraudulence of one's philosophical teachings is indicated (with varying degrees of irony) by whether one can maintain the persona of a sociable and articulate elite male while still embodying the unworldly wisdom and high moral standards that distinguish the philosopher from his fellow men. This naturally affects the form and content of the philosophy one teaches. Apollonius is a straightforward and easy-to-digest sort of teacher, who claims to have genuine knowledge that he conveys either through long but elegant lectures, friendly conversations, or pointed epigrams, rather than through mystical utterances, abstruse technicalities, or the maddening ironies and aporias of the Platonic Socrates.

Like Lucian, Philostratus (and at times Apollonius) seem aware of the tensions and limitations generated by such a moderate stance, though Philostratus has a rather gentler approach than the

satirical Lucian, who is forever undermining his own speakers. His Apollonius can thus encourage the landowners of Asia Minor in protesting Domitian's campaign against vine-growing, even while smilingly acknowledging that as a teetotaller he has no personal stake in the matter (6.42). A similar ambivalence affects the question of his 'miraculous' powers. We have observed already that the text deliberately refuses to make up its mind whether Apollonius is a superhuman being or merely a uniquely gifted member of our own species. Thus, his apparently superhuman actions, though many and varied (see Lo Cascio 1974: 53–82) are less spectacular than one might suspect, and often the narrator (or Apollonius himself) leaves open the possibility of a naturalistic explanation. Thus, when he brings a seemingly dead young girl back to life (4.45), the narrator speculates that perhaps she had never really died. When asked to explain his apparent clairvoyance regarding a coming plague in Ephesus (8.5.1), Apollonius can blithely claim that his senses are heightened by his light diet.

This moderation allows Apollonius to prevail in the many conflicts within the narrative that parallel the narrator's own supposed external quarrel over whether Apollonius was a charlatan. All sorts of characters from an anonymous hierophant at Eleusis (4.18.1) through the Ethiopian sage Thespesion and ultimately the emperor Domitian himself accuse Apollonius of magical or fraudulent practices. Apollonius earnestly defends himself against these charges, but we are never allowed to forget that the defence is really unnecessary, because of how Apollonius and the narrator re-define the dilemma. If one believes Apollonius' self-justification, then the stories are false and there is a respectable naturalistic explanation. But even if they are true, in that case they are proof of a divine nature that puts him on a plane above his accusers. The tension is most clearly illustrated by the climax of Apollonius' confrontation with Domitian. The narrator in effect gives us two endings (8.5–7): first, a miraculous version in which the superhuman Apollonius simply vanishes from the courtroom, and, second, an elaborate speech of defence in which Apollonius maintains at length that his powers consist of nothing more than a highly developed form of ordinary human wisdom. Only the first actually takes place in the narrative: the speech, we are told, is one that Apollonius wrote but never got the chance to deliver. In short, for all that Apollonius claims to have comprehensible knowledge and teachings, his own nature as neither quite human or divine, and the narratological complexities of how readers learn about him, all suggest that he represents a less approachable form of wisdom than he himself sometimes pretends.

The Narrative Setting: Greek Antiquarianism

If Apollonius is a more complicated character than either Philostratus' narrator or modern scholarly accounts would lead us to suppose, this is all the more true for the text of which he is a part. To be sure, the Apollonius ticks all the conventional boxes of a laudatory or hagiographic biography: its hero receives an education, travels in search of more wisdom, teaches extensively, visits key sites of cultural significance, performs miracles and confronts power and wickedness, all which are part of the stereotype of 'holy men' from Paul to Plotinus. However, this material is often developed to astonishing lengths that bring in material from all sorts of unexpected genres and reflect in unexpected ways on the hero's supposed philosophical wisdom. For the rest of this chapter, I will look at three categories of narrative material that play an altogether disproportionate role in the Apollonius and move it well beyond the range of any conventional genre. The first of these is the hero's engagement with the Hellenic past.

The opening words of the Apollonius highlight the book's unusual presentation of the relationship of past to present. Philostratus begins not with Apollonius himself but with Pythagoras: the narrator gives a short characterization of the life and works of that iconic figure, and goes on to claim that

Apollonius was a very similar character, which is why it is wrong to call him a charlatan (1.1–2). Throughout the book, Apollonius will constantly be measured against the great intellectual figures of the Archaic and Classical Greek past, and will invariably equal or surpass their excellence. His engagement with the Greek past, however, by no means stops at emulating fellow philosophers. On the contrary, Apollonius constantly establishes links between his own world and that of the idealized past.15 Sometimes this takes the form of teaching or exhorting present-day Greeks to behave as befits their heritage (4.17–24, 4.27). In other instances he is able to recognize the people around him as descendants or even reincarnations of famous individuals from the mythological or historical past (4.12, 4.28). In all of these instances, Apollonius sets himself up as a privileged interpreter of the correct meaning of the past in relation to the present. It is he who can tell the Athenians the correct way to celebrate the Dionysia (4.21), or show priests how to maintain the ancestral cults (4.24), or explain to the Egyptians how to treat a lion who is in fact a reincarnation of the Pharoah Amasis (5.42). The present-day world is full of people who have lost touch with or misunderstood their past, and a large part of Apollonius' brief is to set them right.

There are two ways of looking at this. On the one hand, this is an intrusion into the philosophical sphere of material from other genres. Apollonius does not simply interact sociably with his less philosophical elite peers, he also shares their cultural preoccupations and addresses their anxieties. He speaks to the same audience as Philostratus' Heroicus and Gymnasticus, both of which concern the correct maintenance of links between an idealized past and the present (König 2009). Indeed, the Philostratean narrator at times seems aware that his story and his hero are straying well beyond the bounds of philosophy, Pythagorean or otherwise. We can understand Apollonius' need to moralize about the corruption of the holy site at Daphne, but when the narrator then gets drawn into telling the romantic origin myth of Daphne and Cyparissus, he feels obliged to pull himself up short (1.16.2). But not long afterwards, Apollonius encounters a superannuated elephant that had fought with the Indian king Porus against Alexander, and once again the narrator has to explain at length who Porus was, this time with no apology (2.21). Doubtless this material increases the entertainment value of the Apollonius, but it often strikes modern readers as extraneous, and the text suggests that ancients might have felt the same way.

Looked at the other way, however, Philostratus' version of Apollonius can be seen not as diluting the philosophical or religious nature of its hero's story, but rather expanding the scope of action of the philosopher-holy man into important new areas. The past that Apollonius interprets is not simply a set of amusing myths or learned anecdotes. Rather, as the opening Pythagoras comparison makes clear, it is the authoritative resource on which rest all the claims of Greek culture in the author's own day. The entire heritage of Hellas, from literature, athletics, civic life, and historical memory to, above all, religion, are thus all interpreted by a representative of one part of that heritage, namely, philosophy. While it is anachronistic to read the Apollonius through the lens of pagan-Christian apologetic, it is not difficult to see why, when apologetics did become a more central cultural issue at the end of the third century, a figure like Sossianus Hierocles would seize on the text as a counterblast to the teachings of the Christians. In this sense, the Apollonius points the way to the world of Julian and Eunapius, in which 'Hellene' and 'Christian' are antonyms, and the entire legacy of Classical Greece has been appropriated by an intellectual agenda centred on both philosophy and pagan cult. If we remain focused on the early-third-century context, however, we must remember that this philosopher who can encompass all of Hellenic learning is the self-conscious creation of a literary artist for whom the joys of antiquarianism, and the cultural authority that they bring, remain an end in themselves.

Eastern Exoticism

One of the nicer metaliterary touches in the Apollonius comes at the end of Book 2, when Apollonius and Damis are in India and pass a monument indicating the furthest point reached by Alexander's army. They continue on east, and thus Book 3 can ostensibly be seen as breaking new ground by presenting the actual teachings of the Indian wise men whom Apollonius has come to visit. It does not turn out quite that way, however, since what the Indians have to say turns out to concern almost exclusively Hellenic topics, discussed in ways well known from many another work of Greek literature. The same could be said for much of the travel narrative in the Apollonius. Unlike Porphyry's Plotinus, who merely contemplates an eastward voyage when the opportunity offers, Philostratus' hero on his own initiative goes to the eastern, western, and southern extremities of the world, and what he finds there is indeed exotic, but it is familiar exotic. It is self-consciously the sort of content that Greek readers since Herodotus had learned to expect in narratives of faraway places. The point is not to convey any genuinely new knowledge from the periphery, nor even to impart a veneer of novelty to old knowledge. Rather it is to invoke a huge mass of existing cultural material on the limits of and alternatives to traditional Greek paideia, and to position his hero relative to that material.

This positioning is anything but simple or uniform. One would expect nothing less from Apollonius, the avatar of Proteus, but in this case there is also a rich intertextual layer. Apollonius acts differently depending on which of several authors and literary traditions he is associating himself with. At times he can be an Odysseus-like figure, with the Nile cataracts as his version of the Sirens' song. The nods to Herodotus are many, as when in Iran he finds constant resonances to the fifth-century wars, including the descendants of some prisoners settled there by Darius, and no sense of the distinction we would make between Achaemenid and Arsacid. Sometimes, however, the sage seems to be ostentatiously rejecting Herodotus-style tourism, as when at Ecbatana he dismisses out of hand the walls that the Father of History had described in loving detail. Xenophon is naturally present, now as the author of the Anabasis and the Cyropaedia, and alongside him also Arrian, whose writings deal with Alexander and India but also with the reported sayings of a philosopher (see Robiano for suggestive parallels). Various earlier Alexander-historians are also named for points of geographical detail. In addition to these ostensibly more serious accounts of the ends of the earth, the preface has already alerted us to questions of fictionality and fantasy, and one has still to keep in mind texts like the Wonders beyond Thule and Lucian's True Histories: Philostratus at times makes a point of dismissing stories like those of the 'shadow-footed men' from Scylax, but at other times will ingenuously pass on tales of half-black-half-white women and levitating sages. This blurred line between sanctioned paradoxography and laughable fiction parallels the overall rhetorical question of Apollonius as mainstream philosopher or marginal charlatan.

The travellers do not just see exotic marvels; however, they also interpret them, often in quite contested fashion. In some cases, the question is whether a given thing is a real marvel or not, and opinions may differ according to the various layers of narration. Thus, Damis is bowled over by the magnificence of an Indian king's feast, but fails to impart that enthusiasm to his master, who is more interested in the same king's philosophical tabletalk. Less explicitly, it is a little puzzling to see the narrator deliver a long geographical excursus on the Caucasus only to then read that when Apollonius gets to those mountains, he goes out of his way to belittle the importance of spectacular topography for the philosophical mind. The issue of what is or is not marvellous can easily take on a cultural colouring, shading into the issue of what is or is not strange and foreign. The faraway places through which Apollonius travels contain all sorts of strange people and customs, but suspiciously

often the customs turn out to be analogues or inversions of Greek practices, and the people have an unaccountable compulsion to engage with and comment on Greek culture almost to the exclusion of their own. Here again, Philostratus is following in a venerable tradition going back to Herodotus. There is a great deal of interpretatio graeca in which Indian or Ethiopian buildings, garments, and landscapes can all be likened to counterparts in the Greek world. The narrator and implied reader clearly find this the most interesting aspect of travelling: when Apollonius and Damis look around the dwelling-place of the Indian sages, they see Indian and Egyptian artworks, which the narrator notes is 'nothing to wonder at', but also several likenesses of archaic Greek statues, which are then named and commented on.

Similarly, the most interesting thing about foreigners seems to be what they think of Greeks. When Apollonius visits Spain, virtually all we are told about the inhabitants is that the natives of Gadeira are surprisingly Greek and thus have religious customs worth describing , whereas those of Hispola are so barbarous that when a Greek tragedy is performed for them, they flee in fear of the protagonist's outlandish costume and vocal delivery. The extended dialogues that Apollonius has with the Indian sage Iarchas in Book 3 and then his inferior Ethiopian counterpart Thespesion in Book ? similarly consist to a great extent of the foreigner's critique of some key aspect of Hellenic culture (Homeric heroes, Spartan morality, Delphic wisdom) and Apollonius' response, sympathetic in Iarchas' case and disputatious in Thespesion's. Adopting the persona of a wise but detached foreigner was a recognized tactic for commenting on one's own cultural institutions, reminiscent of Dio Chrysostom's Borysthenicus, or Lucian's Anacharsis and Toxaris. Iarchas lacks the satirical bite of Lucian's speakers, but his narrative role still gives him an authoritative position in which key parts of Greek culture come under his judgement, positive or negative as the case may be. He can then pass that authority on to Apollonius so that, when that sage goes on to reform Hellenic ways in Greece and vindicate them in Ethiopia, it will be with a wisdom that he frequently attributes to the Indians. Nonetheless, neither his teaching nor his persona actually become Indian, or anything other than Greek. When Apollonius tells the multilingual, ethnically hybrid Damis that he can understand all foreign (and animal) languages without having to learn them, this serves not only to demonstrate his miraculous nature, but also his homogeneous cultural persona. One game that Philostratus ostentatiously avoids is that of making his hero a cultural outsider along the lines of the Lucianic speakers in the Twice Accused or Syrian Goddess. He might have exploited Apollonius' 'Cappadocian' origins in this manner, but instead he insists that the sage was a descendant of Greek colonists and spoke perfect Attic from his childhood on. Philostratus is not trying to establish a position outside of the traditional discursive territory of Hellenism: rather he is creating a base on its edges from which the more effectively to dominate the whole. His literary predecessors in this endeavour are many and illustrious, and they, like the antiquarian material discussed in the previous section, are appropriated to further Philostratus' project of concentrating as much cultural authority as possible in a single superhuman philosopher-hero, and in his literary creator.

Roman History and Politics

The Apollonius could very easily have been a story of Greeks dealing with other Greeks and perhaps exotically caricatured foreigners, with Romans either excluded altogether (as in the Greek erotic novels) or appearing only as anonymous, stereotyped authority figures (as in much of Dio Chrysostom and Lucian). In fact, the first four books of the Apollonius, and significant portions of the remainder, are exactly such a story, as Apollonius avoids the lusts of one Roman governor and counsels the Spartans on how to respond to another . For much of the second half of the Apollonius, however, the hero moves among named, recognizable figures from Roman history, and

takes part in their ongoing narrative. He is a secondary but significant figure in the opposition to Nero, an alternately beloved and rejected counsellor to Vespasian and, finally and at greatest length, the heroic and ultimately triumphant foe of the tyrant Domitian (most of Books 7 and 8). On one level, the 'history' is quite 'accurate', with a good level of circumstantial detail in the form of anecdotes like Domitian's devotion to Minerva and punishment of delinquent Vestals, and second-rank characters like the Gallic rebel Vindex and the Domitianic prefect Casperius Aelianus.

Distinct as the 'Roman historical' episodes of the Apollonius are in some respects, they are still well integrated into the overall aim of setting forth the hero's true nature and freeing him from the label of 'charlatan', and they do so by appropriating earlier literary material. In this case, Philostratus begins Book 7 by laying out a long series of examples from the Greek past of philosophers who resisted tyrants. He then unsurprisingly claims that Apollonius surpassed all of these figures. The rest of the narrative, however, evokes a more recent and specific set of past exempla. In the Antonine and Severan periods, the reigns of Nero and the Flavians were remembered as a time of brutal tyranny and heroic resistance. This was true for Greek speakers as for Latin, as seen at the time in Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus, and later in writings, including the pseudo-Lucianic Nero, which is likely Philostratus' own work. We have evidence from Cassius Dio that Apollonius had been associated with this story before, but in Philostratus' telling, the sage of Tyana becomes its protagonist, and such figures as Dio Chrysostom and Musonius Rufus are relegated to supporting roles. Similarly, when Apollonius gives political advice to Vespasian, he takes over the role that Dio in his Kingship orations had played for Trajan. This is not simply aggrandizement of hero and author, but goes to the specific point of Apollonius' status as a charlatan or a 'respectable' philosopher. Surely a man who gave advice to the emperor could not be a charlatan? Similarly, by having Domitian accuse and try Apollonius, Philostratus can put all the supposed calumnies of Apollonius into the mouth of a hated tyrant, and gives himself the chance to write for his hero a full-scale defence speech that in itself largely fulfils the author's stated apologetic purpose for the Apollonius as a whole.

Here once again we can see Philostratus annexing another massive area of culturally authoritative material to build up his hero's all-encompassing excellence, but that process is self-consciously complicated by the hero himself, who at times shows an ironic awareness regarding his political role. After all, if Apollonius is really as superhuman as he sometimes seems to be, then he has no place in a 'realistic' political narrative and no reason to bother with human rulers who can neither help nor harm him; on the other hand, if he is simply a supremely accomplished philosopher, then there are limits to how much influence he can plausibly assert over pragmatic political figures. This is well illustrated by a scene in which Vespasian supposedly listens to Apollonius, Dio Chrysostom and Euphrates debate his future political course and that of the empire. After the other two speakers have discussed the merits of returning to a republican government, Apollonius points out how 'puerile and inopportunely pointless' such speculations are, and how unrealistic it is to expect a man in Vespasian's place to do anything other than exercise the power he has fought to gain (5.35). But if the other two speeches are unrealistic, then cannot the same be said for the entire conceit that Vespasian called them in for a debate in the first place, or indeed that Apollonius played any major role in the proceedings? Having Apollonius interact with recognizable versions of Nero and Domitian gives him a certain historical concreteness, and may add a dimension of authority to his story in the same way as the frame narrative involving Julia Domna. But the presence of Apollonius himself as a major political character is a massive anomaly that affronts not only readers' specific historical knowledge but also their overall sense of how power and culture in the Roman Empire

work, and serves only to emphasize the unreality of the fictional world Philostratus has created. The same ambiguities of truth, fiction, and narrative authority that surround all the events of the Apollonius extend even to those episodes that seem most firmly grounded in external reality. They create a fictional-historical setting in which readers can question and re-think the dichotomy between the spheres of 'Roman' politics and 'Greek' culture. The Philostratean Apollonius does on one level seem to endorse the High Imperial myth of two complementary cultures, philhellenic Romans and loyal Greeks, but key aspects of the narrative call that endorsement sharply into question: in this sense, the 'Roman history' side of the Apollonius has many echoes of the bit parts played by emperors in the same author's Sophists.

Conclusion

Arnaldo Momigliano, in comparing Philostratus' two major quasi-biographical works, asserted that: 'It would be impertinent to decide which of the two books, the life of Apollonius or the Lives of the Sophists, was nearer to Philostratus' heart. What we do know is that the Life of Apollonius, that man of the past, had the future to itself'.

Many others have similarly wanted to read the Apollonius forward, for the undeniable reason that those works with which it shares the most obvious generic affinities are chiefly later in date: the Neoplatonic biographies by Porphyry and Iamblichus, and indeed Christian hagiography from Athanasius on. Philostratus' direct impact is discussed in chapters in this volume on these later authors (Chapter 26 and Chapter 29), but for our purposes now, the later comparisons do illustrate important distinctive characteristics of the Apollonius as well as similarities.

Philostratus is dealing with much material that will have a long future: the social role of the holy man, the culturally defining nature of Greek philosophical wisdom, and so forth.

Nonetheless, as I hope to have shown, his literary approach is still that of his own time and of the previous century, when a unified elite culture still saw itself as having a monopoly on the authoritative resources of literature, philosophy, history, and religion. What the Apollonius perhaps gives us is a glimpse of how some of the characteristic strands of late antique culture had their roots in a world not yet defined by the conflicts and anxieties of an elite fragmented along the fault lines worn by their age's religious and social upheavals. <>

Essay: Augustine's Confessions as Autobiography by Michael Stuart Williams

About Me

Almost every author who writes on the Confessions of Augustine of Hippo feels an obligation to insist that this difficult and complex work is not an autobiography. This may perhaps be surprising in the light of Augustine's own comments on the Confessions in the last years of his life. Thus, in his Retractationes, in which he revisited his own works and sought to explain his intentions and excuse his errors, he summarized the structure of the Confessions with a simple division of its thirteen books: 'the first ten are about me (*a primo usque ad decimum de me scripti sunt*), the remaining three about the holy scriptures'. In saying this, he does not seem inclined to divide the work into two in terms of its purpose or its effect on the reader, which he describes both in terms of the pleasure others have taken in it and in terms of his own response as he wrote it, which persists as he reads it again:

> My Confessions ... praise the good and just God through my acts both good and bad (*de malis et de bonis meis Deum laudant iustum et bonum*), and turn towards him human minds and hearts. At least, as far as I am concerned, they did this for me as I was writing them and they do it when I read them. (Retract. 2.6.1)

If the purpose of the Confessions as a whole is to turn the reader towards God, as it would appear from Augustine's account, it seems no less clear that the means is through narrating Augustine's own life in all its aspects, both good and bad: *de malis et de bonis meis*. With this in mind, it has always been difficult to deny that the Confessions possess, at the very least, a profoundly autobiographical character. A commonsensical understanding of autobiography—which, if not the final word on the matter, might at least be a good place to start—would equally have difficulty denying a place in its purview to the Confessions. Augustine's offers up an extended meditation of his life in more-or-less chronological order. If this is not the whole story of the Confessions, it is enough all the same to suggest that there may be value in approaching it as autobiography.

Such an approach must begin by acknowledging that 'autobiography' is an elusive category, no less than is its parent 'biography'. Like biography, it is a genre insofar as it is recognizable to a reader—as both were to an ancient reader—and raises certain expectations regarding content and style, even if these have remained difficult to identify and articulate. Yet both biography and autobiography are so readily combined with other, more rigidly codified genres that it is tempting to consider them instead 'modes' or 'discourses', and thus to speak of the 'biographical' or 'autobio-graphical'.2 The recognition that autobiographical discourse may extend beyond the bounds of a clear and narrowly-defined genre has led some scholars to prefer to avoid the word 'autobiography' entirely, or else to confine its use to a small subset of writings produced as part of a specifically modern genre. But while it is certainly important to be aware of unexamined assumptions that might be imported along with this term of art, there is nothing inherent in the word 'autobiography' that makes it any more misleading than alternatives such as 'self life writing'.

When it comes to Augustine's Confessions, the desire to avoid labelling it 'autobiography' seems to derive above all from precisely this fear that to do so will make it seem too familiar. Recent scholarship has sought to play down the idea that Augustine was primarily engaging in an act of public moral accounting, or else in a very modern therapeutic process of self-analysis and self-disclosure. Such exercises are indeed known from ancient philosophy, but, as Gillian Clark has pointed out, much of Augustine's originality rests in his departure from this approach and his emphasis instead on his struggle 'to live a God-centred life'. Similarly, Paula Fredriksen's account of the Confessions as autobiography insists that it be understood as 'more than an examination of his personal past', and indeed that he is not to be thought of as interested in 'autobiography as such'. Instead, she concludes that the work should be read as a 'resolutely theological masterpiece' in which the central character, if one is to be looked for, 'is not Augustine himself, but Augustine's God'.

This stance has been reinforced by an increasing attention to the structure of the Confessions. It is clear both that Augustine regarded the Confessions as a unified whole, and that readers have tended to follow his own division of the work in the Retractationes into ten books about himself—sometimes further subdivided into the more obviously autobiographical Books 1–9, which begin with infancy and end with the death of his mother, and a more problematic Book 10—and a final three books about the scriptures. The preference in recent scholarship, however, has been to emphasize the importance of all thirteen books to the overall design of the Confessions, and indeed even to

suggest that the final three or four books provide the intended focus of the work as a whole. On this basis, autobiographical readings have come to be regarded as over-simplifying a work which must be understood as a whole and as sui generis.

There is undoubtedly much to be gained from reading the Confessions as a unified work in thirteen books, and this practice has been a valuable corrective to the previous tendency to separate out the first nine or ten books from the rest. Nor is it to be disputed that Augustine's Confessions, taken as a whole, is a work sui generis, or that his innovation consisted in far more than simply turning his attention to his own self and development. Yet it is clear that a significant part of Augustine's achievement does indeed lie in the way in which he offers in the Confessions an intellectual or spiritual autobiography. This is not simply a matter of modern misreadings, but was an approach acknowledged and even encouraged by Augustine himself. Thus, late in his life, two years after his Retractationes, he responded to praise from the imperial official Darius by making him a present of the Confessions, and asked that they be read charitably—but nevertheless as autobiography:

> Examine me there, so that you do not praise me as more than I am; there believe nothing about me but what I have shown; follow me closely there, and see what I have been in myself, and by myself; and if anything in me pleases you, praise there with me him whom I would wish to see praised on my account, and instead of me. (Ep. 231.6)

Augustine's purpose was not to provide an account of his life for its own sake, and here he offers his autobiography as a means of drawing his reader into praising God. Yet it remains the case that he is inviting Darius to read and to learn about his life. That the work serves a higher purpose does not make it any less autobiographical.

In the end, the anxiety surrounding any reading of the Confessions as autobiography perhaps derives from a sense that the question to be asked is definitional: 'What is the Confessions?' To answer that it is an autobiography is clearly unsatisfactory. But there is no need to define the Confessions as belonging to one or another genre in order to recognize that it is openly and substantially autobiographical. The question might therefore be 'How autobiographical is the Confessions?'—or even, 'How is the Confessions autobiographical?' Certainly it contains things other than autobiography, and a comprehensive understanding of the Confessions must take these into account. But there is value too in an approach which concentrates on the autobiographical elements and which sets out to understand their contribution to the whole. To read the Confessions as autobiography is not to insist that it can only be read that way.

Nor is such a reading necessarily simplistic or naive. It is important to recognize that even the more autobiographical Books 1–10 are far from straightforward in the account they provide of Augustine's life, and that they must be read with an eye to his overall purpose in the Confessions. Yet the allusiveness and complexity on display in the Confessions are in no way foreign to autobiography—which, like other forms of biography, cannot be supposed to deal only in narrative and historical truth. Neither biography nor autobiography is ever innocent of rhetoric and artifice, not least since they are predicated on the infinitely complex task of reconstructing and representing a life in literary form. Thus, the point of reading the Confessions as autobiography is not to discover the 'true story' of Augustine's life, or to come up with a full and sufficient account of his personal, intellectual, and spiritual development. It is rather to trace the ways in which Augustine made use of the methods and assumptions of autobiography in assembling and reflecting on his own experience of God, humanity, and the world. The Confessions is indeed, among other things, 'a life-history revealing the

inner feelings and self-awareness of the writer'. In order to understand Augustine's purpose in the work as a whole, we must ask why he adopted this as his chosen form.

The Story of Us

The most sustained effort to define autobiography as a genre with distinctive features and conventions of its own has been made by Philippe Lejeune. He proposes as a working definition that autobiography should be considered 'the retrospective narrative account in prose that a real person makes of his or her existence when putting the emphasis on his or her individual life, and especially on the history (or story) of his or her personality'. This definition keeps autobiography

separate from closely related modern genres such as the diary or journal, or the autobiographical essay; but the majority of its features do little to distinguish it from biography. If we are to focus on this difference, then there are, as Lejeune recognizes, two essential claims made in autobiography: firstly, that the retrospective narrator is to be identified with the protagonist of past events; and, secondly, that this narrator is to be further identified with the author. If we are to consider Augustine's Confessions in relation to biography and autobiography, it is on these elements that we must concentrate.

This definition can be stated more simply: autobiography is biography written about oneself. Nor is such a definition overly misleading, especially when it is kept in mind that biography is itself a rather protean form; and moreover, that such an apparently simple change has highly significant implications. The second aspect in particular—the identity of the author and narrator—depends on information brought to a work from outside the text, and so introduces questions of authority and authenticity. In modern works this information is generally provided by paratextual means: by the title given to the work or by the name of the author on the title page—insofar as that name is taken to correspond to a real individual. That this also applied in the ancient world, even though texts often circulated under various titles and with various attributions, is made clear by Augustine himself, who expressed in his City of God the belief that the account of magical transformation in Apuleius's Metamorphoses was intended to be read as autobiographical. Since the events portrayed in the Metamorphoses were of a grotesque and fantastical nature, Augustine was able to accuse Apuleius of lying, but it is important to note that Augustine's misreading is not as naive as we may like to imagine. For modern readers, the judgement that Apuleius was writing a novel, despite his use of his own first name for the protagonist, is assured by the sheer implausibility of the events. For Augustine, it was possible (and also convenient) to believe that Apuleius himself had deliberately misrepresented them as the truth.

This, after all, is what Augustine had done in relation to his Confessions. He will have offered it personally to its earliest readers, who could scarcely have doubted that what they were reading was intended (at least in part) as autobiography; and we have seen that Augustine continued to present the Confessions as an account of his life, as in his letter to Darius. The very project of his Retractationes, moreover, was to guide others in identifying and reading his works, and again we have seen that Augustine described the first ten books of the Confessions as being about himself. The guarantees of authenticity offered by Augustine to his readers, moreover, are more than simply a matter of establishing the authorship of the work: in the case of an autobiographical work, they enable the identification of author with the narrator and with the chief protagonist and so promise a more extensive kind of authenticity. Augustine's open acknowledgement of the Confessions as autobiography entails an implicit claim regarding the truth of its contents, just as he was able himself

to hold Apuleius to a standard of truth on the supposition that he had made similar claims. And Augustine too has had his critics and has even been accused of misleading his readers, on the basis that some of the events he records in his Confessions may be doubted as having happened exactly as he tells them.

This is perhaps to misunderstand the kind of truth that an autobiography guarantees. It may be seen instead as a claim to honesty and authenticity: not a matter of verifiable facts but of a privileged and otherwise unobtainable perspective (Cohn 1999: 31). The identity of the author and narrator implies that the work records authentic experiences, but this authenticity is supplemented by the identification of the narrator with the protagonist, which enables the representation of a certain kind of experience. Whereas a biographer necessarily observes his or her protagonist from the outside, an autobiographer has the advantage of being able to claim access to inner states, responses, and motivations unavailable to others. The representation of these aspects is therefore a powerful reinforcement of the authority and authenticity of an autobiographical account. Although it is not an indispensable element—examples may be found of autobiographies which record only public achievements, such as the Res Gestae of the emperor Augustus—there is a definite tendency for autobiography to focus on private states of mind, beliefs, and feelings where a conventional biography might offer public appearances and actions. What Lejeune calls 'le pacte autobiographique' may be understood as a promise along these lines: that an autobiography is an authentic account of a real past experience, which may be represented from a perspective available to the protagonist alone. Any work offered as autobiography will therefore raise these questions of authenticity, authority, and perspective; and an unusually self-conscious autobiographer is likely to place them at the heart of the enterprise.

We are fortunate in the case of Augustine that we possess not only the Confessions but also a Life of Augustine by his fellow bishop Possidius of Calama. Possidius prefaces his Life with an account of the purpose of Augustine's Confessions highly reminiscent of Augustine's own in the letter to Darius, and with the promise not to go over the same ground. But it is unlikely that this was ever any great temptation to Possidius, whose biography conforms in its focus and structure to a highly conventional model. The absence of any extended narrative account of Augustine's childhood, for example, would have struck few contemporaries as strange: it was far more frequent for biographies to focus on public life and 'the mature achievement'.

Possidius appended a catalogue of Augustine's writings, which may suggest that he wanted to offer a monument to a famous scholar, but in fact his Life of Augustine portrays the life of a working bishop: preaching, administering justice and church property, and interceding with the secular authorities. The more scattered anecdotes in the second half of the work sometimes derive from a more intimate context, but even this was scarcely private: for Augustine had established an ascetic community at Hippo, and his table manners were accordingly open to public inspection. The emphasis in Possidius's Life is ultimately on Augustine in his public role as champion of his faith and his community, and earlier biographies of Christian holy men, and perhaps even classical biographies in the manner exemplified by Suetonius, were sufficient to serve as a model.

Augustine's Confessions, of course, is a work on quite a different scale, but the difference in its concerns is clear from the chronological and narrative span covered by even its more openly autobiographical books. Thus, Books 1 and 2 offer accounts of Augustine's infancy and early childhood respectively; Book 3 finds him heading to Carthage as a 16-year-old, and together with Book 4 take him to age 28, including nine years as a Manichee 'hearer'; Books 5–9 then cover

together a period of five or so years, in which Augustine travels from Carthage to Rome and then on to Milan, leading up to his baptism at the age of 32, his mother's subsequent death, and his return to Africa. Book 10, the last of the books 'about me', presents Augustine as he writes the Confessions, after a gap of around ten years. If the first seven books are organized in accordance with the conventional stages of human development (Chadwick 1991: 10), the Confessions as a whole nevertheless focuses disproportionately on the years surrounding Augustine's Christian conversion (Misch 1950: 2.649). Conversely, the narrative gap between Books 9 and 10 elides the whole of his progress in the institutional church, from his ordination as priest to his accession as bishop of Hippo—important public events in which Possidius took a definite interest.

It is unlikely to be accidental that Augustine's own account of his life concentrates on the years in which he was absent from Africa. Part of his purpose was undoubtedly to explain the apparently abrupt transition from the convinced Manichee he had been as a student and teacher in Carthage to the ascetically-inclined Christian he was on his return—a challenge made more urgent by the fact that there was much in common between Manichaean beliefs and Christian asceticism. Such suspicions might have been of particular concern, given the attempts by rivals in Africa to draw attention to irregularities in the appointment of Augustine to his position as bishop: certainly Possidius was later at pains to emphasize Augustine's innocence of any wrongdoing in this respect and to his subsequent efforts to regularize the situation. Possidius's concern for such institutional matters, and his particular interest in Augustine's uncompromising stand against heresy and schism, can also be explained in part by the context in which he was writing. The Life was a bid to affirm Augustine as a defining figure in the North African church to which Possidius belonged, which not only had long represented the minority in a society riven by schism, but which also now faced a Vandal invasion which threatened to place in power a group Possidius and his allies regarded as heretics. Biography, with its emphasis on the public life, preaching, and achievements of its episcopal hero, therefore suited Possidius well; just as autobiography, which permitted the portrayal of beliefs, motivations, and intellectual development, suited Augustine.

The particular circumstances in which Possidius was writing thus make sense of his desire to supplement Augustine's account of his own spiritual and intellectual development in the Confessions with a more conventional biography that represented him chiefly in his public role as a bishop. And yet we should not draw too sharply the contrast between the apparent authority and authenticity of Augustine's Confessions and the inevitable limitations of the external perspective on offer in the Life of Augustine. Possidius was evidently an intimate of Augustine and had shared his communal life in Hippo before becoming a bishop himself; he must also be supposed to have been a frequent visitor to Hippo and a regular collaborator with Augustine. His account of Augustine's ascetic life and precepts was accordingly that not only of an eyewitness but of one who had shared that life; and so too had he shared in Augustine's struggles against the rivals of his church in North Africa. Indeed, in describing the actions taken against the Donatist majority, Possidius incorporates into his portrait of Augustine an incident from his own life: an incident of violence against him which he was able to turn around into a successful suit, and managed to obtain a declaration from the imperial authorities that the Donatists were to be regarded as heretics. Here we have not only autopsy but an element of autobiography:

Augustine's achievements against the Donatists are found to be more properly the achievements of the community as a whole, and Possidius records them not as a spectator from afar but as an actor on the same stage. The authority and authenticity with which Possidius is able to present his Life of

Augustine thus go beyond the claim in his final paragraph to have been a friend and intimate of Augustine for almost forty years. It enables a sense that the Life presents not only a biography of Augustine as an unassailable individual, but also, at least up to a point, the autobiography of a community.

Moreover, and despite the inevitable bias of an autobiography towards the representation of an individual, the Confessions may be read as exhibiting a somewhat similar perspective. It may be detected in Augustine's explicit attention to the inescapable problem of providing an autobiographical account of a period beyond the reach of memory: in particular, that period of early infancy which remains a total blank. Augustine goes further than most in probing the period before he was born:

> For what do I wish to say, Lord, except that I do not know whence I came to be here, in this mortal life ... ? I do not know.... [T]ell me whether my infancy followed on from an earlier period of my life, now dead and gone? Or is it that which I spent in my mother's womb? ... Was I anywhere, or anyone? For I do not have anyone who can tell me this – for neither can my father nor my mother, nor the experience of others nor my own memory. Or do you smile at me for asking and order that I praise and confess you only on the basis of that which I know?

His eagerness in raising the question is matched by his willingness to leave it undecided—a failing, perhaps, in a systematic theologian or philosopher, but characteristic of Augustine's attitude to this problem in general, and of his scrupulousness in the Confessions in particular. The difficulty, after all, is one of access to memory and experience, and not of dogmatic or theoretical principles; and it finds an echo in another autobiographer closely attentive to the problem of memory, Vladimir Nabokov, who in Speak, Memory reports his 'colossal efforts to distinguish the faintest of personal glimmers in the impersonal darkness on both sides of my life'. But where Nabokov's solution in this work was to indulge as far as possible the vivid glimpses of his infancy that his memory allowed him, Augustine adopted an almost entirely opposite approach. Instead of disconnected fragments of an individual childhood, Augustine assimilates his own life to the life of every infant at an equivalent stage.

This represents a remarkable refusal to deliver on the implicit promise of an autobiography to provide an authoritative, authentic, and individual account of a life. Indeed, it is a strategy which could have been designed to draw attention to that promise and to the impossibility of ever fulfilling it. Hence, after Augustine has begun his account of his infancy with apparent confidence in what he has described, he issues a blunt reminder: 'Later I also began to smile, first while sleeping, and then while awake. So at least it has been related to me, and I believe it (hoc enim de me mihi indicatum est et credidi), since we see it in other children: for I do not remember this for myself' (Conf. 1.6.8).

He continues to follow this practice throughout his account of his infancy, passing over any and all individual impressions until he finds himself a boy somehow able to talk.

Everything he experienced before that is represented on the same authority as before: as derived from his observations of infants and young children, in their desires and frustrations, and rages, who 'have unwittingly taught me more about what I myself was like than have those who knew me and nursed me' (Conf. 1.6.8). Augustine takes his own infancy out from the picture and substitutes a

generic image of childhood, provided by his own researches and supplemented only occasionally by the testimony of those who were there.

The autobiographical narrator is here no longer uniquely authoritative, nor is offering any outstandingly authentic access to his earlier self. The stance is consistent with the cynical adage that 'it's a wise child that knows its father': in matters such as these, there is no special status accorded to autobiography, and a biographer can be just as informed and no less reliable. Augustine's acknowledgement that in regard to his infancy he believes what he has been told, and indeed he praises God 'that you have granted to man the capacity to apply to himself the experience of others and also to understand much about himself from the testimony of mere women' (Conf. 1.6.10). This handing over of knowledge to the domestic sphere inhabited by women is of a piece with the acceptance of uncertainty Augustine makes his theme throughout the Confessions: not only in his willingness to leave open the question of the origin of the soul, but even in his transition from Manichaeanism to acceptance of the propositions of the Christian faith:

> I considered what innumerable things I believed (quam innumerabilia crederem) which I had not seen nor had been present when they were done, so many events in human history, so many matters concerning places and cities which I had not seen, so many things I accepted from friends, doctors and so many other people – which, unless we believed them (nisi crederentur), each of us would do nothing in this life. Finally I considered what unshakeable faith (fide) I possessed regarding the parents from whom I was born, which I could not know unless I had believed what I was told (nisi audiendo credidissem). (Conf. 6.5.7)

Augustine explicitly disclaims self-knowledge, a knowledge of the facts of his own life; and if he can be ignorant in a matter so personal and fundamental, it is clear how much else must be taken on trust. His Confessions does not consistently offer what an autobiography seems to promise: an authentic, authoritative account of individual experience. Instead, it expresses a radical acceptance of the difficulty of obtaining certain knowledge, of oneself as much as of God, and in both respects insists instead on the necessity of faith.

I'm Still Here

Augustine's Confessions therefore begins by representing him as a generic figure rather than as a historical individual. But ultimately this impersonal account of his infancy is a special case within the work as a whole: it represents a period 'dead' to him, one which seemed not to belong to the same Augustine who lived his later childhood and adult life (Conf. 1.6.9).

He makes the distinction clear as the narrative leaves this age behind:

> Therefore this period, Lord, in which I do not remember having lived, and regarding which I have believed what others have said and have applied to myself what I have learned from other infants – and although I believe this to be firmly reliable – I am reluctant to include it as part of this life which I am living in the world. For it is lost in the void of forgetfulness, just as is the life I lived in my mother's womb ... And so I will pass over this time: and how can it concern me, since I recall not the slightest trace of it? (Conf. 1.7.12)

Augustine takes no responsibility for any sin that might have belonged to this unrecoverable infancy, and so marks a break between what he was then and the individual he became. The Confessions becomes truly autobiographical, therefore, as it begins to deal with Augustine as an individual, and begins to engage wholeheartedly with the effort to reconstruct the past. As a result, we encounter again the familiar questions of authenticity and authority, but also an element present in any autobiographical narrative. An autobiography is told in retrospect, by a narrator who is to be

identified with the protagonist. This simple condition leads inevitably to a feature of all autobiography: that every event will be seen, implicitly or explicitly, from a dual perspective. The point of view of the protagonist who acts and responds in the course of the narrative is supplemented by that of the narrator, who from a vantage point far in the future can reflect on both the experience and the response.

It may be seen that this feature of autobiography does not depend on the status of the author: it is present in fictions that may adopt an autobiographical form, but in which the author is not to be finally identified with the narrator-protagonist—the way that Apuleius's Metamorphoses is now more commonly read. Equally an autobiographer can decide not to draw attention to the issue, and privilege the perspective of either the protagonist or the narrator over the other. The more self-conscious, however, may make this dual perspective a central theme, whether in dwelling prominently on the process of reconstructing the past—from memory or from other sources—or by playing up the ironic disjunction between the hopes, ideas, and motivations of the protagonist and the subsequent viewpoint of the narrator in the present. Nabokov, for example, draws attention in multiple ways to the central role of memory in his autobiography: in the title itself, and the revision of the text to take account of corrections put forward by others; in the open acknowledgement of gaps and uncertainties; and more subtly, as when in the first chapter he records a particularly vivid childhood memory of his father in dress uniform, only to note that his father's military service was by that time long in the past. The difficulty of reconstructing the past and the competing perspectives at stake in an autobiography are also thematized prominently in Mary McCarthy's Memories of a Catholic Girlhood, in which each chapter of narrative is followed by admissions from the narrator, from 'There are several dubious points in this memoir' to 'This account is highly fictionalized'. While part of the effect of such open acknowledgement of the perils of autobiography is to cast doubt on the reliability of the narrative, at the same time such strategies put on display a conspicuous honesty and scrupulousness which make the account seem all the more authentic.

The Augustine who narrates the Confessions from his vantage point ten years later is no less of a nagging presence than are these modern narrators. Scarcely any of his experiences are represented from the point of view of his earlier self without some comment on it from his present vantage: this applies not only to the defining sins of his narrative, such as his enthusiastic participation in the theft of a neighbour's pears, or his sexual desires and attachments, but also to more minor episodes and events, such as his childhood reluctance to read Homer, or his strictly professional motives for attending the sermons of Ambrose of Milan. Augustine as narrator not only distances himself from the actions and motivations of his younger self, but actively interrogates and interprets them for the reader: 'His constant refrain ... is that he did not understand, while living it, his own experience'. It is impossible, reading the first nine books of the Confessions, to ignore that it provides a retrospective account from the point of view of a Christian convert and a powerful theologian—although it is notable that his status as a junior bishop in an embattled minority church is not nearly so evident. The conspicuous presence of this dual perspective, however, can easily lead to an exaggeration of the division between Augustine as past protagonist and as present narrator, as if Augustine were viewing his life before his conversion and baptism into Christianity from a smug, secure, and static position as one of the 'saved'. It is true that the narrative portion ends with Augustine at a 'decisive moment' in his life (and one followed immediately by the natural marker of his mother's death), but we should not imagine that the story is thereby firmly concluded, and the rest merely aftermath and update.

Certainly, as we have seen, the autobiographical form relies on the separation of protagonist and narrator, and may present itself as offering emotion recollected in tranquillity. This may even be linked to an idealized understanding of religious (especially Christian) conversion, in which the old (and sinful) self is dead, replaced by the new, narrating, and even saintly self. Yet Augustine openly rejects this model of conversion as an absolute discontinuity between past and present self, at least in his own case: for whereas he calmly disregards his forgotten infancy as dead and gone, he insists by his very presence in the text on the continuity between his sinful, earlier self and his present state. Indeed, the contrast is instructive: it is precisely because his past self is alive to him, and because he has been and to some extent remains the person he was, that his life is worth narrating at all. Of course, Augustine does not deny the salutary effect of his conversion and baptism, but rather than take it for granted, he openly addresses the inevitable tension between the change these brought about and the persistence nevertheless of his former life, desires, and pleasures. This is the theme of Book 10, which adds to the retrospective self-examination of Books 1–9 with an equally close inspection of the figure who sits and writes: 'the man who has told the story and who is still wrestling with temptation and confusion.' Augustine implies that Book 10 is a response to the likelihood that readers will want to know not only about his past life but about his present lifestyle:

> What benefit is there, I ask, that in your presence I confess to human readers through my writings what I still am, and not what I was? For the benefit of the latter I have seen and kept in mind. But what I still am at this time (quis adhuc sim ecce in ipso tempore) when I am making my confessions, many desire to know, both those who are familiar with me and those who are not, but who wish to hear something from me or about me; but their ear is not there at my heart, which is where I am, whatever I am.

Augustine admits that his self-assessment will have to be taken on trust: it does not have even the guarantee of truth that clings to a retrospective narrative, which might be checked against other sources. But he does not pretend to be inhabiting a phase of his life at which his journey has been definitively concluded. He openly makes the point that readers will find only an account of his progress so far (ad huc), and that they will see him most clearly who wish simultaneously to take pleasure in his progress, achieved by the gift of God, and to pray for him as one still held back so greatly by his burdens. Augustine offers himself as anything but a colourless narrator, who had securely achieved the life he had sought and was setting it forth 'in its typical form' for the edification of others. On the contrary, Augustine emphasizes his continuing struggle with temptations—pride, lust, and a love of sensory pleasure—which are not to be written off as merely a self-consciously pious man parading his minimal vices. These are things he knows he cannot overcome on his own: he is no less dependent on God to guide him now than he was before.

Augustine thus continues to be the person he was before, aware that he has chosen his path but has not yet completed it:

> Since I am not filled with you, I am a burden to myself. Pleasures I ought to be weeping over struggle with regrets in which I ought to take pleasure, and I do not know which will win the day. Regrets at my wicked acts struggle with pleasure at my better ones, and I do not know which will win the day (ex qua parte stet uictoria nescio).

In this respect, Augustine's powerful memory is both a stimulus and a solution. Although he notes that he can recall past pleasures without succumbing to them, in dreams he is more vulnerable to images (e.g. of sexual pleasure) stored in his memory. But more than this, even though experiences lose their savour in the recollection, they remain a link to his former self: past pleasures are still to be acknowledged as pleasures, even if they should now be rejected. By means of his memory

Augustine thus discovered 'a continuity in his life that, reproduced in his narrative, made him the same person in his youth as in his maturity (and old age)'. As we have seen above, the Confessions had this effect on Augustine even as he re-read them, as he reveals in the Retractationes.

This is not, of course, the sort of serene indulgence in memory we find in, for example, the final chapter of Nabokov's Speak, Memory, addressed to his wife Véra in the present tense and calmly recalling moments of their life together along with their son. On the contrary, Augustine in Book 10 and throughout the Confessions— even in his interpretation of the scriptures—maintains a 'predominant tone ... [of] weak-ness and uncertainty': an awareness not just of the possibility of sin but of the unreachability of any final conclusion. Augustine's disquisition on memory in Book 10 analyses the nature of the search for God: is he more like something lost and forgotten, to be recovered, remembered, and recognized, or like something previously unknown—and if the latter, how can we know where to look or understand when we have found him? Augustine does not know, but trusts instead to God to take the lead and show him where he is unable to go himself: 'all my hope lies only in your great and powerful mercy'. What conclusions he has reached for himself remain uncertain and provisional: Augustine still does not understand God's place in the world or in his own life, and an interpretation of either must remain as open to multiple readings as his readings of the Book of Genesis in the final books of the Confessions.

The judgements of Augustine the narrator are thus revealed, in Book 10 if not before, to be no less provisional than were those he attributes to his earlier self. This is not to say that he has any real doubt regarding the general direction of the path he has chosen; but the irony that applies to his more obvious missteps—his enthusiasm for astrology or Manichaeanism—is present as well in the account of the very events which encouraged his Christian faith. Even the central—and for many, climactic—scene of his conversion in a garden in Milan is told with rather less certainty than such a momentous experience might seem to warrant. This is not to say that the essential truth, or authenticity, of the scene is to be doubted, even though it may be to some extent stylized. Yet Augustine's use of indefinite and distancing language—he throws himself down under 'a certain fig-tree', and the prompting phrase 'pick up and read' is left with its origin undecided—permits an ironic edge to his confidence at the time that this was a moment of divine intervention. Here the narrator Augustine corrects—or at least backs away from—his earlier understanding of events, not because he is now in a position to grasp their proper meaning, but precisely because he is now less certain of the vantage-point from which that meaning might be revealed.

The difficulty is one necessarily shared by all autobiographies: the narration is coming from inside the life. The result is that certain perspectives, from which meaning might emerge, are unavailable: we have seen this in the case of Augustine's lack of access to his own infancy, but it is no less true at the end than at the beginning of an individual's story. As Gillian Clark points out, it remains an open question whether there can be a definitive account of any life, and whether autobiography is the means by which it can be achieved. And Charles Mathewes has applied the point directly to Augustine's Confessions, noting that it is the story of 'a life still in vivo', and of which 'its meaning remains, for us and for Augustine, unknown'. Life is lived forwards and understood backwards, but until it is over, any judgement about its overall shape must be postponed. A biographer may have the advantage over an autobiographer here, although it is not clear—and was certainly not to Augustine—that any life can be fully understood from any human perspective, since, unlike God, we are stranded in time. The only solution he offers is the one he exemplifies throughout the Confessions: to accept that the desire for perfect knowledge will remain unsatisfied, even if that is

not sufficient reason to abandon the search. Memory may not be up to the job of giving a satisfactory account of a life, but within it or beyond it Augustine had faith in finding God:

> See how far I have wandered in my memory looking for you, Lord, and I have not found you to be outside it. For neither have I found anything regarding you which I have not remembered from when I learned of you, for since I learned of you, I have not forgotten you. Where I found the truth, there I found my God, truth itself, which, having learned, I have not forgotten. Therefore since I learned of you, you have remained in my memory, and there I find you when I remember you and delight in you. (Conf. 10.24.35)

Conclusion

As James O'Donnell has helpfully pointed out, the Confessions presents itself as 'a book about God, and about Augustine: more Augustine at the beginning, more God at the end'. Augustine as narrator and interpreter retains the centre of the stage throughout, but his explicit self-representation comes to an end at the end of Book 10: and it is marked by a repeat of the scriptural quotation which had appeared in the first paragraph of Book 1: 'They will praise the Lord who seek him' (Psalms 21:27). Although the first book takes its time before Augustine emerges as an individual, and although Book 10 embarks on a detailed discussion of the workings of memory in amongst the account Augustine gives of his present predicament, we may readily take these ten books as autobiographical inasmuch as they give us a history of an individual life, told mostly as a retrospective narrative from the perspective of the one who lived it. O'Donnell further suggests that Augustine 'does not disappear in the work' but in Books 11–13 becomes instead, or offers himself as, 'representative of all humankind'. Interpreting the scriptures is an act which belongs to the Christian community as a whole, and Augustine provides his readings without being concerned to insist upon them. In this way he completes the development which began with his emphatically generic infancy: his complete dependence on others to satisfy his needs and desires, and indeed his reliance on them to tell him who he was, find their recapitulation and fulfilment in the conscious and voluntary submission to an absolute dependence on God.

If we are disappointed that Augustine here vanishes as an individual, we may be satisfied by accepting, along with Georg Misch, that Augustine 'did not, as the moderns do, find the truly essential element of life in a man's individuality and its stages of development'. Or we may recognize that even if Augustine aspired, or thought he should aspire, to efface himself in communion with God, nevertheless he remains a conspicuous presence throughout the remainder of the Confessions and in all his subsequent writings. But the fact that the Confessions is openly autobiographical does not mean it was mere self-celebration: autobiography can be that but need not be, and it may be many things besides. Augustine had plenty of opportunities to write theology: that he chose to cast the Confessions in an autobiographical mode should remind us that autobiographical writing is not necessarily to be taken lightly. To understand Augustine's Confessions as autobiography is therefore to follow his path towards a closer understanding of Augustine—and, he would add, of God.

Essay: After-Lives: Biographical Receptions of Greek and Roman Poets in the Twentieth Century by Nora Goldschmidt

Recent work on the Lives of the Greek and Roman poets has increasingly urged us to move away from the traditional view of ancient biographies as factual reports about the 'real' historical lives of the poets of ancient Greece and Rome. With little but the texts of the poems themselves to go on, ancient biographers consistently invented the Lives of the poets substantially from the poetic texts themselves. Rather than viewing these Lives with suspicion since their so-called 'facts' can often be

seen to have been extrapolated from the texts themselves, scholarship has now begun to recognize ancient biography as a creative mode of reception. The Lives, in other words, become a narrative means of interpreting, digesting, and distorting the texts (see Chapter 23 in this volume on the Lives of one poet in particular).

That mode of reception—of reading the life from the text—does not end in Antiquity, however. Further removed in time and taking more and more imaginative liberties in blurring fictional and factual boundaries, later readers have increasingly imagined and reimagined the lives of the ancient poets. From the medieval accessus (see Chapter 39 in this volume) to the Romantic myth of the poet-bard, the lives of the poets continued to be invented and re-invented by later readers, often mirroring contemporary literary and cultural concerns in a creative mesh that saw, for example, Virgil using his magical powers to ride griffins to a magic mountain, 'St Naso' meeting John the Baptist in exile and converting to Christianity, the spirit of Homer possessing his most famous Renaissance translator, George Chapman, on a grassy hill 'near Hitchin's left hand', or Sappho dying, High Romantic style, with a leap from a sublime rocky cliff.

In the twentieth century—viewed here as a 'long' century extending backwards to the 1890s and forwards to the present—reading the texts of Greek and Roman poetry for the lives of their authors becomes an especially rich and multifaceted mode of reception, providing for many readers a means of grappling with the ancient texts within the changing cultural landscape of modernity. Yet unlike the medieval and early modern traditions of literary biography, in the twentieth century, academic and creative Lives have tended to part company. When it comes to Greek and Roman poets, although a few full-length literary biographies that still attempt to claim factual status have been produced, conventional narrative biographies that aim to set out the 'facts' are generally only found in isagogic contexts such as introductions to texts and translations, or textbooks of literary history. Although the century as a whole has seen a broader rise in the popularity of literary biography of more modern writers, when it comes to Greek and Roman poets' lives, partly because there is no real documentary evidence on which to base such works—no diaries, no extant letters, no new archive material found mouldering in the family attic—the most interesting and significant biographical interpretations have shifted almost exclusively to the realm of fiction. Even the classical scholar Luca Canali wrote his biography of Lucretius as prose fiction (Canali 1995). Furthermore, partly because modern authors are acutely aware that there are few 'facts' beyond the poets' works themselves on which to base their material, and partly as a broader consequence of twentieth-century obsessions with fragmentation and the limits of knowledge, creative life-writing about the ancient poets in this period is found more frequently in ludic snapshots rather than full-blown narrative biographies: the scene of Virgil's death, for example, Ovid's experiences in exile, the reappearance of Homer's ghost, or Sappho cast as a film star talking in abstract fragments become more characteristic topics than the historicized birth-to-death accounts more frequently produced in other periods.

The particular richness and experimentation of twentieth-century imaginative biography—or rather 'life-writing', to give the genre a more inclusive title that extends beyond traditional birth-to-death narrative—are closely linked to the period's particular literary obsessions. The century witnessed a series of seismic paradigm shifts in the ways in which texts are viewed, which still structure our approaches today. Three themes, in particular, deeply influenced life-writing in the period, and especially the life-writing about Greek and Roman authors: (1) 'The Death of the Author' and the postmodern turn in conceptions of texts and authorship; (2) intertextuality; and, finally, (3) the rise

of psychoanalysis. This chapter is structured around these three themes. While a number of examples will be drawn upon, the core case studies here will be formed by three key texts: Hermann Broch's 1945 novel, Der Tod des Vergil (The Death of Virgil, Broch 1995a), Christoph Ransmayr's 1988 novel Die letzte Welt (The Last World, Ransmayr 1990), and Anne Carson's poem, couched as a series of fantasy filmic encounters framed by appearances of the Greek lyric poet Sappho, 'TV Men', published in her collection, Men in the Off Hours (Carson 2000).

The Death (and Return) of the Author

In the twentieth century, ideas about the nature of texts and the nature of authorship profoundly changed how the author was, and still is, conceived. In his revolutionary 1967 essay 'The Death of the Author' ('La mort de l'auteur'), Roland Barthes influentially pronounced, once and for all, the author's decease. In a declaration of radical textuality, Barthes urged a new mode of interpretation, one that would not try to extrapolate from the text the author's putative 'intention' or try to read his or her real-life consciousness or biography into or out of the text. Instead, the author—that 'somewhat decrepit deity of the old criticism' —should be seen as irrelevant to our reading. 'To give a text an Author', he argued, 'is to impose a limit on that text'. With the removal of what seemed like the 'tyranny' of the author concept, for Barthes, modern criticism and writing could now embrace a new concept of textuality without origin: for 'it is language which speaks, not the author'. Furthermore, an important implication of this is that 'a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination': not in the mysterious author who made the work, but the reader who reads it: as Barthes famously put it towards the end of the essay, 'the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author' (.

Taken together with the implicit reply by Michel Foucault, 'What is an Author?' ('Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur?', 1979; 1983, first published in 1969), which attempted to place the issue within a broader socio-historical perspective, Barthes' essay, published in the same year as Jacques Derrida's Of Grammatology, tends to be singled out as a hallmark of the postmodernism that characterized the second half of the twentieth century. As Barthes himself acknowledged, these ideas were part of the cultural climate of the period: he had 'in bmany respects only recapitulated what is being developed around me' (Bennett 2005:12). Yet the idea of the dissolution of the author was in the air long before Barthes' influential essay. Barthes himself constructed an implicit (if tendentious) genealogy of the death of the author that went back to Stéphane Mallarmé, Paul Valéry, and Marcel Proust. But the embracing of authorial absence went beyond the French canon. The Portuguese writer Fernando Pessoa (1888–1935), for example, had deliberately and playfully masked and fractured his identity by writing under a series of fictional and semi-fictional 'heteronyms', including 'A Factless Autobiography' (in Livro do Desassossego, 'The Book of Disquiet', published posthumously in 1982), deconstructing the writerly self long before postmodern deconstruction. In the Anglophone world, too, writers like T.S. Eliot and James Joyce had been arguing strongly as early as the first two decades of the century for the conscious eradication of the authorial subject in modernist writing, comparing the author to a catalyst in a chemical experiment that disappears as the new creation is made ('Tradition and the Individual Talent' (1919), Eliot 1951: 18), or a gas which 'refines itself out of existence' (A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1914–1915), Joyce. In the world of life-writing, Gertrude Stein took authorial disappearance to a new level, publishing The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (1933), an 'autobiography' whose author is not its subject.

Paradoxically, however, despite this embrace of the death of the author, the twentieth century witnessed a revivification of the figure of the author (Burke 1992). This rebirth was already inherent

in the writing of Barthes and Foucault (Bennett 2005:19, 27). As Barthes puts it, 'in the text, in a way, I desire the author, I need his figure' (Barthes 1974: 27), or as Foucault articulated it, 'it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator and of analysing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse' (Foucault 1979: 158). In other words, the author is no longer to be seen as a real-life historical figure, but something inherent in the text, a variable and complex function of discourse, and invented—desired—from the text by its readers. The result of this kind of thinking in the cultural and literary practice of the period is that, for many writers, this was an act of liberation, leaving room for the play of fiction in the conception and reception of the authors of the past. If there is no god-like author behind the text, that 'author' can be multiple, and indeed invented from the texts themselves. 'The very postmodernism that proclaimed the death of the author and the demise of character delights in resurrecting historical authors as characters', and Greek and Roman authors were no exception in the dramatis personae of modern fiction.

One of the best examples of this kind of reading which consciously engages with the absent presence of the author is Christoph Ransmayr's Die letzte Welt (The Last World), first published in German in the autumn of 1988, at the height of the postmodern turn. In simple narrative terms, the novel takes as its starting point the story of Ovid's exile to Tomis on the Black Sea, where the poet was relegated by Augustus in CE 8, a story Ovid himself tells in multiple versions in his poems written in exile, notably the Tristia and Epistulae ex Ponto. In Ransmayr's novel, prompted by rumours of the poet's death, 'Cotta' (based on M. Aurelius Cotta Maximus Messalinus, a friend to whom Ovid addresses a number of verse letters: travels to the iron-mining town of 'Tomi' on the fringes of the Roman Empire in order to search for Ovid and the text of his lost masterpiece, the epic Metamorphoses. Yet, significantly, the poet upon whose biography and upon whose works Ransmayr's novel is based conspicuously never appears in the novel. Instead, the book presents a landscape of the imagination riffing on characters and scenes from Ovid's text. Tereus is a butcher; Arachne a deaf-mute weaver; Fama, the personification of gossip and rumour in Ovid, becomes the grocer's widow and source of local gossip. Characters, too, dream of the metamorphosis of themselves and those around them (Cyparis the dwarf day-dreams that he transforms, Daphne-like, into a tree, touching both heaven and earth; Cotta dreams of his change, Io-like, into a cow, as 'a strange animal sound ... filled his throat ... [f]rightened, transfixed by his own voice'). The whole scene is a carnival of inverted characters from the Metamorphoses: 'a pale shadow' of their Roman counterparts. At the same time, transformed fragments of the text of the Metamorphoses itself are inscribed onto the landscape, scrawled on scraps of cloth attached to cairns and engraved on slug-covered stones in the vanished poet's garden.

Hailed as a quintessentially postmodern novel, Ransmayr's work enacts Barthesian ideas about authorship. As the rumour circles that 'Naso is dead', Cotta, a stand-in for the reader, desires the author, he needs his figure—the god-like figure who can make the fragments of text he finds make sense. He sees, or thinks he sees, the author in Pythagoras, Ovid's old Greek servant (ibid.: 10), or in a shadowy figure at a carnival wearing what turns out to be a large cardboard nose, the incarnation of Ovid's nick-name Naso, 'Nosy' (ibid.: 71–72). He calls out the name of the poet once so obsessed with his own name ('MY NAME/WILL BE INDESTRUCTIBLE'), shouting, whispering, and mumbling it like a magic word that might conjure him up. But as any reader of Foucault knows, and as Cotta finds out, the author's name is a 'paradoxical singularity' (Foucault 1979: 146), inextricably linked with his texts, and little to do with the 'real' author. At the end of the novel, Ransmayr goes one step further than the Barthesian (or Ovidian view of) discourse: rather than language and text being the only reality, Cotta, as he gives up his readerly desire for the author,

comes to recognize that texts disappear, even when they are inscribed in stone: '[r]eality, once discovered, no longer needed recording'. What he finds in the landscape, in the end, is not Ovid's name, but his own, a final escape from the language in which Ovid's absent presence has always been enmeshed 'into an unmediated reality'.

Other appearances and disappearances of Greek and Roman poets are common in twentieth-century fiction, too. The absent presence of Ovid is at the heart of David Malouf 's novel, An Imaginary Life (Malouf 1978), a fictional biography which sees the Roman poet in exile finally renouncing language in a rediscovery of the reality of sensory experience, and thereby disappearing into the landscape of his exile ('I am turning into the landscape', ibid.: 145). Homer, whose existence as the author of the Iliad and Odyssey is itself a matter of scholarly debate, haunts a number of modern works. In Wim Wenders' Der Himmel über Berlin (or The Wings of Desire, 1987), released two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, a mysterious old man in a tattered suit, credited as 'Homer', haunts the Staatsbibliothek in Potsdamer Platz. Climbing the iconic spiral staircase like a character in Dante's Inferno, he inhabits a liminal world between life and death, wondering why it is that no-one writes poems about peace. In Derek Walcott's Omeros (1990), 'Omeros/Seven Seas', a blind sailor 'muttering the dark language of the blind' (III. ii.14), like Homer in the ancient Vitae traditions discussed in Chapter 23 in this volume, figures the absent ancient poet at the heart of the work on which Walcott bases his own.

The Greek lyric poet Sappho, meanwhile, haunts Anne Carson's 'TV Men' (published in Men in the Off Hours: Carson 2000), a sequence of portrayals of historical authors framed by twin appearances of Sappho, who features in paired poems at the beginning and the end of the collection. Unlike Ovid or even 'Homer' (the nature of the composition of the Iliad and the Odyssey may be contested, but the poems themselves ultimately survived: cf. Bennett 2005: 31–38), Sappho is a special case of authorial demise. Not only is the author inaccessible from her texts, but the texts themselves are not quite there. Her original poems would have filled nine books when she lived around 600 BCE, but now only two survive substantially complete; the rest have come down to the modern world in highly fragmentary form, some as tenuous and fleeting as a single word. Carson—a scholar of ancient Greek as well as a gifted poet—translated a selection of Sappho's fragments as If not, winter. This version of Sappho deliberately emphasizes the fragmentary nature of the text as we have it: Carson leaves a substantial amount of white space on the page that, in its echo of the mise-en-page of a modernist poem, emphasizes absence rather than presence; she also uses square brackets liberally to mimic the technique employed by scholars of papyrology when they mark the place where text is absent or damaged in the ancient papyrus, thereby deliberately drawing attention to the gaps in the text in what she calls 'an aesthetic gesture toward the papyrological event rather than an accurate record of it'. Her rendition of fragment 24D is characteristic:

]
]
]
]
]
] in a thin voice
]

A fragment like this almost invites readers to construct the author from it: mysterious, ephemeral, ultimately unreachable. If, according to Barthes, the author is to be viewed as inaccessible from the text because writing involves 'the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin', in Sappho's

case, where the text is itself 'destroyed', the author becomes all the more elusive—and the desire to find her in the text all the more compelling.

In Carson's 'TV Men', the elusiveness of the author is intimately related to the elusiveness of her texts. Carson's 'imaginary biography' of Sappho reincarnates the ancient poet as a modern movie star. Updated to the fleeting contemporary medium of film in order to emphasize her impalpability, we see Sappho in no more than a series of snapshots ('Sappho stares into the camera', 'Sappho makes her way onto the set', or hear only snatches of her thoughts in staccato stream-of-consciousness ('I notice the leaves in the Jardin have changed/overnight'). When we first see her, she is walking through a scene shot in a graveyard:

> as the gravestones in the background spill slowly
> out of the frame

recalling the moment in the biographical tradition which came to define her—the poet's death. Like the translations Carson produced, moreover, this Sappho speaks in riddling fragments. She quotes herself, deconstructing her most famous poem, fragment 31, a poem apparently about the physical effects of jealousy or fear, until it is reduced to nothing but a string of verbs and nouns: 'Laugh Breathe Look Speak Is ... Tongue Flesh Fire Eyes Sound'. Yet, as Carson puts it in the essay that accompanies the volume, 'Sappho is one of those people of whom the more you see the less you know' (ibid.: ???). Access to the author is even more difficult than access to the fragmentary text, and the paired poems, here, effectively stage Sappho's disappearance. In the end, in this biographical incarnation, the author's 'reality' is more tenuous and fragmentary than her texts. Even as the director shouts 'Action!', the author ultimately '[d]isappears disappears' from Carson's poem. As Wallace Stevens had put it in a poem which Carson's epigraph to the sequence deliberately recalls, '[t]here are words/Better without an author, without a poet'.

Intertextuality and Metabiography

Closely connected to ideas of the death of the author and just as paradigm-shifting in twentieth-century attitudes to texts and authors has been the concept of intertextuality. Intertextual theory views a text as, in Barthes' words, 'a new tissue of past citations' from other texts. Rather than carrying an inherent independent 'meaning', any single text—whether literary or non-literary—obtains its meaning by its relation to other past (and indeed future) texts as part of the broader textual system. As Julia Kristeva, a key figure in the development of intertextual theory put it, 'the literary word is an intersection of textual surfaces rather than a point (a fixed meaning), as a dialogue among several writings': for 'any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another'.

The implications of this for literary life-writing in the period are multiple and crucial. First, intertextuality makes no distinction between literary and non-literary texts: all are viewed as discourse. The author's life and the author's work are, therefore, effectively considered as part of the intertwined mesh of discourse, with no distinction between factual and fictional genres. Second, when it comes to life-writing about poets, the poet's texts and the poet's life take on a new and equal standing. Virgil's poetry, for example, and the later biographical traditions about Virgil, as well as interpretive writing about Virgil's poetry, can all become coexistent components in a new textual biographical incarnation of 'Virgil'. Finally, intertextuality takes no account of direct chronology: past and future texts coexist in the 'mosaic of quotations' that makes up the new text.

A number of instances of life-writing of Greek and Roman poets in twentieth-century literature can be seen as underpinned, at least in part, by the principles of intertextuality. Ransmayr's Die letzte Welt is a rich intertextual fabric that takes its material substantially from Ovid's texts, which are themselves often autobiographical, or rather—since Ovid himself notoriously plays on the fictionality of his own life-narrative—'autofictional'. The novel enacts, in Kristeva's words, 'the absorption and transformation of another' text, in this case, Ovid's own. Ransmayr includes an appendix, which he calls an 'Ovidian Repertoire', detailing the connections between Ovid's epic and Die letzte Welt. The novel's very title intersects with Ovid's lament for his exile, nobis habitabitur orbis/ultimus, 'I shall continue to live at the end of the world', with a double entendre on ultimus as both 'furthest', 'most extreme', and 'final', 'last'), its fifteen chapters mirroring the fifteen books of Ovid's epic. But Die letzte Welt goes beyond what might be seen as traditional 'parallel' or 'allusion'. Embedded in the structure of the work itself is the fragmentary nature of intertextual discourse. Ovid's epic is quoted and misquoted in barely readable fragments, and appears as part of a complex intertextual pastiche that incorporates not only ancient and modern texts, but the microphones and cinema screens that are the trappings of popular culture.

A corollary of the intertextual revolution is the increasing awareness in life-writing of the irrecoverability of the biographical subject outside texts (there is no attainable subject 'out there'), and the inescapable multiplicity of previous biographical writing—and the broader biographical reception within various memory cultures—of the biographical subject: what has been termed 'metabiography'. Rupke usefully quotes Steven Shapin: "'shifting biographical traditions make one person have many lives," none of these necessarily more real than any other, because all are "configured and reconfigured according to the sensibilities and needs of the changing cultural settings" of the biographers'. Although Ovid has no ancient biographical tradition beyond his own autofictional texts, the issue gets more complex with other ancient authors, who have a deep-rooted tradition of biography. Virgil, in particular, a figure who has haunted a number of twentieth-century authors, has a far-reaching and multiform biographical tradition reaching back millennia. From the ancient Vitae of Suetonius, Donatus and others, the tradition about the poet's life expanded and refracted within the contexts of its various reception cultures: the medieval period cast him both as a harbinger of Christianity (anima naturaliter christiana) and as a magician endowed with mysterious powers, and Virgil appears in various biographical adventures in Renaissance biography as well as other forms of biographical incarnation, notably Dante's Divine Comedy. For later centuries, the political implications of the poet's personal relationship to Augustus and to Rome mirrored the tensions in the reception of the Aeneid as a pro- or anti-Augustan poem. That mode of reading life and work flourished in the twentieth century, when the poet's life, like his work, was appropriated by pro-fascist biographers in light of the new ideology. For a modern author, 'Virgil', therefore, inevitably involves confronting not only the poet's texts and their later receptions, but also the later Lives and traditions about the poet and his reception.

One crucial work which engages with the broader idea of 'Virgil' in both metabiographical and intertextual terms is Hermann Broch's Der Tod des Vergil (The Death of Virgil), often identified as one of the key experimental novels of the first half of the twentieth century. Broch's title evokes that of Barthes' later essay on authorial demise, and although published before Kristeva or Barthes, the novel might well be seen as one of a group of nineteenth- and twentieth-century texts whose complex literary discourse made the concept intertextuality a necessary tool of analysis. Broch, who fled his native Austria in following a period of imprisonment by the Gestapo, originally conceived the novel as a short story ('Die Heimkehr des Vergil', 'Virgil's Homecoming') and completed the full-

blown work in exile in the United States. This 'interior monologue of the poet', tells the story of the final eighteen hours of Virgil's life, and is divided into four stages structured around the four elements: 'Water— The Arrival', on Virgil's arrival by sea at Brundisium; 'Fire—The Descent', describing a fevered night of soul-searching, in which Virgil decides to burn the manuscript of the Aeneid (a final wish related in the ancient Vitae); 'Earth—The Expectation', involving a long discussion with Augustus at the end of which Virgil agrees not to burn his poem, and finally 'Air—The Homecoming', in which Virgil, once he has granted an afterlife to his masterwork, dies.

As Broch's Virgil tells Augustus, 'there is no such thing as a new creation', and in the novel, Virgil's life, like Broch's text, is fundamentally 'intertwined' within a wider textual and cultural mesh (Broch uses the term 'eingewoben':. From the outset, the paratext of the novel—its framing material—encourages readers to approach the text in this way. At the back of the book, readers could find an appendix of 'sources' that included not only Virgil's own texts, but also selections from the ancient Suetonian Life of Virgil and the famous supplemented version of the fourth-century life by Aelius Donatus known as 'Donatus auctus', which was frequently reprinted as a component part of editions of Virgil's text, thus encouraging readers to see the life and work of the poet as part of a textual continuum. At the front, two epigraphs from Virgil's own work and one from Virgil's great Christian successor Dante, who had likewise revivified Virgil in the Divine Comedy, orient the text within a broader intertextual context, too. The first, fato profugus (Aen. 1.2), in particular, links Virgil with his own character (a technique also seen in the ancient Vitae). Like the hero of the Aeneid, Broch's Virgil 'had become a rover, fleeing death, seeking death, seeking work, fleeing work ... a lodger in his own life' (Broch 1995a:13), treading a path similar to 'that which was trod by Aeneas', who likewise, 'pressed on in the darkness, pressed on for the homecoming journey, there where the moonbeams quivered in the light on the ebbing sea'. The phrase fato profugus has been read on a metatextual level, too: 'driven by past literary voices, by what has been said', applying not only to the Aeneid (a work of notorious intertextual density), but to Broch's own novel. Beyond its literary intertexts, moreover, the novel engages in the wider reception of the figure of 'Virgil', in Virgil's metabiography. Broch was deeply influenced not only by the ancient Lives from which he quotes and gleans his 'facts', but by a more recent reading of the poet, Theodor Haecker's Vergil, Vater des Abendlandes (1931, Virgil, Father of the West), in part, a response to fascist biographies of Virgil written for the poet's bimillennium in 1930, as well as the wider appropriation of the poet as a figurehead for contemporary fascism. For Haecker, himself drawing on several layers of late antique, medieval and Renaissance cultural constructions of the poet, Virgil is an anima naturaliter christiana ('a naturally Christian soul'), which for Haecker means transcending 'the nation', and transcending the traditional link between Virgil's poem and the princeps, Augustus (as Haecker would put it shortly afterwards, Virgil would 'today be silenced in a concentration camp', Tag- und Nachtbücher, 'Journal in the Night', 19 May 1940; R.F. Thomas 2001). Intertwining his text with Haecker's as well as, implicitly, the layers of cultural memory surrounding the biographical tradition of Virgil and the reception of his work, Broch counters pervasive ideas of the poet's pro-Augustan reception. It is partly Virgil's crisis of conscience about what is potentially the proto-fascist function of his epic that is the motivation behind his desire to 'Burn the Aeneid!'.

Psychoanalysis and the Biographical Subject

The twentieth century is also the century that saw the birth of psychoanalysis, associated primarily with the figures of Sigmund Freud, C.G. Jung and their various predecessors, collaborators, and successors. Freudian theory, in particular, has been closely linked with life-writing, and especially with biography and autobiography. Freud once told Jung that it is time for psychoanalysis to 'take

hold of biography', and the two disciplines have much in common. Much of his work—from The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) to An Autobiographical Study (1925)—includes autobiographical material from his own life; Freud himself wrote biography and analysed Leonardo da Vinci's autobiographical fragments in psychoanalytical terms. He and his followers also turned their attention to the lives of authors: the famous 'Wednesday night meetings' in Freud's office in Vienna included discussion of the lives and works not only of Leonardo, but others such as Heinrich von Kleist and Frank Wedekind.

More broadly, the whole concept of the 'case history' that underlies psychoanalysis—a narrative drawing a line from infancy to the present—has been seen not so much as a 'clinical' genre, but rather as a hybrid form of novel and biography, with Freud finding what 'we are accustomed to find in the works of imaginative writers' more useful than simple 'logical diagnosis' (Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria (1895). Some of those 'works of imaginative writers' are famously Graeco-Roman in origin, and derive from Freud's own 'compulsion for antiquity' (R.H. Armstrong 2005), which has led to, and goes far beyond, now well-known concepts such as the 'Oedipus complex' or 'narcissism'. In turn, Freud's writing has deeply influenced not only the professional practice of biography and autobiography, but the ways in which fictional life-writing has been conducted in the twentieth century and beyond. In both, even after the rise and fall of so-called 'psychobiography', a new focus on the subject's unconscious, sexuality, illnesses, dreams, infancy, and childhood have taken on new and prominent roles.

In imaginative life-writing about the Greek and Roman authors, it is clear that there is a focus on these aspects of the subject which had been mostly lacking in ancient Lives and which modern authors, in various modes of experimentation, partly sought to fill. The need to account for the unconscious mind had been felt long before Freud, and indeed Freud has been seen to have codified insights that had already been emerging throughout the nineteenth century. Some of those proto-Freudian insights can be seen in the imaginative biographies of ancient poets. Tennyson's 'Lucretius' (1868), for instance, draws on the forces of unconscious sexual repression to explain the legendary insanity of Lucretius, the Roman poet-philosopher said to have been driven mad by a love potion before committing suicide. In a monologue in Lucretius' voice, Tennyson imagines how the poet's 'settled, sweet, Epicurean life', is invaded as 'some unseen monster lays/His vast and filthy hands upon my will/wrenching it backwards into his' (lines 218–221), a line which has been seen as the dramatization of the 'unseen monster' of the id invading the 'settled' ego, as the poet dreams of voyeuristic sexual encounters and the fetishized breasts of Helen of Troy against his 'impotent sword'. Similarly, Marcel Schwob's 'Lucrèce', in Vies imaginaires (1896), riffs on the poet's earliest memories of his ordered Roman childhood, and attributes his disturbed mind to sexual inadequacy with 'an African woman, beautiful, barbarian and bad'.

By the 1920s, Freud's theories had become so influential that 'it became impossible for writers not to respond'. Hermann Broch's *Der Tod des Vergil* is, directly or indirectly, a response to Freud. Broch, a fellow resident of Vienna (and later, like Freud, an exile), was, as Elias Canetti put it, 'permeated by Freud, as by a mystical teaching'. Broch conceived his novel as 'an interior monologue of the poet ... although written in the third person', seeing the workings of Virgil's inner life as key to his biography, a biography closely bound up with the poet's work: Der Tod des Vergil 'is therefore above all a confrontation with Virgil's own life ... [and] with the justifiability or unjustifiability of the poetry to which his life had been dedicated'. What had arguably been missing or underplayed in the biographical tradition—the poet's subjectivity, his interiority—now takes centre stage. Recounted

substantially in free indirect speech, particularly in its second section, the novel's notoriously difficult long sentences echo the processes of the mind, following Virgil's 'innerer Monolog' where the poet's thoughts lead him. As if laid out for the reader on the analyst's couch, we glimpse the inner movements of the poet's mind as he falls into dream, half-dream, and semi-conscious reverie (as an illusory figure beckons the protagonist, 'Come, Virgil, come with me, lie there with me on my couch, for we must go back; we must keep going back'. From the outset, memory, childhood and infancy, and in particular the figure of the mother, mark out the poet's consciousness, for 'nothing ripens to reality that is not rooted in memory, nothing can be grasped in the human being that has not been bestowed on him from the very beginning'. In his reverie Virgil imagines his mother calling him in the pre-linguistic state of infancy, 'as if she were summoning him to return to a namelessness which had its home in the maternal and beyond the maternal', and the poet is haunted by the mysterious young slave-boy 'Lysanias', an unknown figure vaguely associated with his past, unseen by other characters, who functions as a Doppelgänger of the poet himself in childhood. Whether or not we see Der Tod des Vergil as quite so permeated by Freud, or identify the death of Virgil with a Freudian death-drive, it is clear that Freudian thinking has influenced the novel's themes and modes of investigation, just as later in the century it influenced Gabriel Josipovici in Virgil Dying, a monologue in Virgil's voice written for radio performance. Consciously indebted to Broch and equally intertextual—incorporating lines and phrases from Ovid, Virgil, and a letter from Franz Kafka (who also wanted his manuscript to be posthumously burned) to his editor Max Brod—Josipovici, too, dramatizes Virgil's death in order to get to the poet's consciousness, 'Wanting to understand the dark. The time before. Before you came into the light of this world. Wanting... '

Conclusion

It has been suggested that we are living in a renewed heyday of the 'author as character'. Modern writers have been fascinated by biography, and ancient Greek and Roman poets have played an important role as subjects of that biographical fascination. In a period that is self-consciously belated, twentieth-century writers have been concerned not only to construct versions of the lives of the poets, but also of their multiple afterlives, their Nachleben. Lives, texts, and reception come together in several different ways in the work of the period, from the intertextual to the metabiographical, with writers drawing on ancient poems and their reception to mirror many of the central preoccupations of the twentieth century and beyond. The ludic aspect of the literary text has been exploited and explored, boundaries between fact and fiction have been deliberately elided, and, in the process, the poets of Antiquity have been given a new hybrid subjectivity which has enabled them to come alive again as biographical subjects. <>

The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Biography edited By Koen De Temmerman [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780198703013]

Biography is one of the most widespread literary genres worldwide. Biographies and autobiographies of actors, politicians, Nobel Prize winners, and other famous figures have never been more prominent in book shops and publishers' catalogues. This Handbook offers a wide-ranging, multi-authored survey on biography in Antiquity from its earliest representatives to Late Antiquity. It aims to be a broad introduction and a reference tool on the one hand, and to move significantly beyond the state-of-the-art on the other. To this end, it addresses conceptual questions about this sprawling

genre, offers both in-depth readings of key texts and diachronic studies, and deals with the reception of ancient biography across multiple eras up to the present day. In addition, it takes a wide approach to the concept of ancient biography by examining biographical depictions in different textual and visual media (epigraphy, sculpture, architecture) and by providing outlines of biographical developments in ancient and late antique cultures other than Graeco-Roman.

Highly accessible, **THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ANCIENT BIOGRAPHY** aims at a broad audience ranging from specialists to newcomers in the field. Chapters provide English translations of ancient (and modern) terminology and citations. In addition, all individual chapters are concluded by a section containing suggestions for further reading on their specific topic.

Writing (about) Ancient Lives Scholarship, Definitions, and Concepts

It has become a topos in scholarship on biography to note that it is one of the most widespread literary genres worldwide. Biographies and autobiographies of actors, sportsmen, politicians, singers, Nobel Prize-winners, and other famous people have never been more prominent in book shops and publishers' catalogues. Another indication of the interest triggered by the term as well as the concept of biography is the fact that in modern-day publishing (and marketing), the term often features in book titles not only in reference to persons but also as a metaphor for a startlingly diverse range of other subject matters. A variant of this trope goes back all the way to the third century BCE, when Dicaearchus of Messina, a student of Aristotle, according to the Suda, entitled his (now fragmentarily preserved) history of Greece as a Bios Hellados (Life of Greece). The work discusses the cultural evolution of the Greek people from earliest times and its title arguably adapts what must then have been a recognizable label for the description of individual lives from childhood onwards.

In the first century, the same trope inspired Jason of Nysa (Bios Hellados) and Varro (De vita populi romani, On the Life of the Roman People). At the same time, it is another topos in scholarship to

point out that scholarly attention has been slow to follow the genre's increasing popularity. This observation has also been made for ancient biography in particular. In his monograph on this ancient genre, for example, the late Tomas Hägg notes that it is one of the more neglected fields in classical studies. There is, of course, much work on individual biographies

, single authors, more or less rigidly defined sets of subgenres (e.g. P. Cox on spiritual biography in Late Antiquity; Kivilo on poets' Lives; and Fletcher and Hanink on Lives of artists in general) and specific historical periods (e.g. Erler and Schorn on Hellenistic and Edwards and Swain on Roman Imperial biography). But most studies that aim to offer some comprehensiveness in their treatments of ancient biography more generally predate all this scholarship by several decades (e.g. Leo ; Stuart ; and, on autobiography, Misch). The same can be said of studies that cover substantial parts of the genre (e.g. Hadas and Smith on spiritual biographies; Dorey on Latin and Dihle and Momigliano on Greek biography). Whereas recent years have witnessed the publication of broad, collective surveys on other ancient narrative prose genres such as historiography (Marincola) and the novel (Whitmarsh; Cueva and Byrne), the present Handbook is the first such work on ancient biography.

Modern Criticism

As an explanation for the lack of holistic focus in scholarship, some scholars have pointed to the fact that ancient biography as a whole is rather badly documented. Gallo, for example, complains that we have almost no remaining biographies predating Plutarch. This is arguably an exaggeration, as this volume will go on to show, although much depends on how we define that term (a thorny question to which I return below). Another explanation focuses not so much on the quantity of what remains as on its perceived quality. As Sonnabend explains, the genre has received a particularly bad press. First, ancient biography clearly cannot be adequately described using the traditional, formal genre categories. Like most other prose genres, it famously differs from the major genres in verse, such as epic, lyric, and tragedy, in that we do not have ancient generic theory on it or any other trace that would suggest that it ever had its own consolidated set of guidelines, prescriptions, or 'poetics' in Antiquity. This observation has even led scholars to think of it as a 'minor' or 'marginal' genre (Kleinliteratur), as opposed to more elevated and refined literature (belles lettres or Hochliteratur).

Ancient biographies share this fate with another prose genre that does not seem to have come with its own theoretical conceptualizations in Antiquity and was equally often neglected or treated dismissively in twentieth-century scholarship: the ancient novel. This genre too has been critically rehabilitated only relatively recently, but in the case of ancient biography, the rehabilitation has been more uneven, as some biographers have tended to miss out on the general reappraisal more than others. Another similarity is that scholarship on ancient biography too tends to recognize modern counterparts as the norm, while characterizing ancient (and medieval) texts as 'forerunners' rather than full-blown representatives of an ancient genre in their own right. The language of origin, evolution, and progression underlying such genealogies, as if there is a clear line running from exemplary or idealizing ancient Lives to realistic ones of the eighteenth century, has been rightly criticized. Nevertheless, in many histories of the genre, typically a few ancient biographers (usually including Plutarch and Suetonius) are singled out, whereas most forms of ancient biographical narrative are not dealt with at all.

It is not just that biographies have long been characterized by modern scholars as marginal, relatively unimportant, or less developed than their modern counterparts. It is also that they have been criticized for their perceived lack of historical precision. One of the most famous examples of this

attitude is Theodor Mommsen, who criticizes the lack of historical reliability in the Historia Augusta and labels this text 'one of the most wretched mess-ups' ('*eine der elendsten Sudeleien*') that have come down to us from Antiquity. His characterization is emblematic of a broader concern with biography's position 'between historical writing and belles lettres' as it has traditionally been perceived: scholars long required biography to be a truthful representation of historical reality. This requirement typically activated a set of expectations, such as that of completeness, citation of sources, first-hand knowledge of the biographer, and objectivity.

Ancient biography too has been read as a form of history—with notable consequences. As Hägg explains, scholars have long kept ancient biographies 'proper' separated from 'other' narratives because of their belief that historical accuracy and factual truth are essential in the former and, therefore, should act as genre-distinctive criteria. At the same time, others have rightly suggested that we cannot simply retroject such modern requirements onto the ancient material and that the relationship between biography and history is more complex. In fact, ancient biography often shows an awareness of its own generic position in relation to history—a topic explored by S. Adams in Chapter 2 in this volume, and further picked up by R. Stem in Chapter 11. Rather than simply being a subgenre of history, it has been pointed out, biography operates under generic parameters of its own and is generally not concerned with sustained historical veracity (e.g. P. Cox on spiritual biography). On the contrary, modes of emplotment and conventional structures of fiction are operative in it and make it a creative and meaningful literary form rather than, simply, a recorder of historical fact (e.g. Nadel and, for ancient biography specifically, De Temmerman). In fact, the common motif in biographies and encomia to compare a literary work to a painting and sculpture may invite us to reflect on aspects of biography such as flattery, idealization, flatness, inaccuracy, and distortion, all of which may very well have been intrinsic to the ancient concept, even if they have not always been recognized as such by modern scholars.

As a result, more open views have recently been applied to the concept of biography (McGing and Mossman ; H. Lee ; Hägg; De Temmerman and Demoen; Fletcher and Hanink ; Cairns and Luke), allowing, for example, the inclusion of Lives of saints, legendary heroes (such as Aesop), and fictionalized, historical figures (such as Ps.-Callisthenes' Alexander). This volume also includes such Lives and, in addition, addresses various other kinds of overlap between ancient biography and fiction (e.g. Chapter on Xenophon, Chapter on political biography, Chapter on fictional autobiography in Syriac, Chapter on fictionalizing dynamics in ancient Egyptian biographical monuments, and Chapter on the biographic in Byzantine fiction). In this book, in other words, we depart from what has long been an essential assumption underlying quite a few modern definitions of the genre of biography, i.e. that it tells the life story of a historical individual (rather than a fictional one; Madelénat; Hägg). This assumption is in need of revision, as it is arguably a remnant of our modern characterization of biography as a provider of historical truth. Indeed, modern readers have an acute awareness that the content of, say, Joann F. Price's Barack Obama: A Biography is ontologically very different from that of books that have formally similar titles but are, in fact, either acknowledged fictions cast in the form of biographies (e.g. Tolstoy's Ivan Ilyitch or Nabokov's The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, which are built around invented characters) or biographical novels (e.g. Allan Massie's Tiberius, Hilary Mantel's Wolf Hall, or, to take an ancient example, Ps.-Callisthenes' Alexander Romance, which are concerned with historical characters but invent plotlines around them and/or do not necessarily relate to existing traditions). But for some ancient Lives included in this Handbook, it is not even clear to us whether their subjects ever were historical persons—and it may not have been any clearer to an ancient audience. The fabulist Aesop and the philosopher

Demonax (whose Lives were labelled as Bioi in Antiquity and are dealt with in Chapters and respectively in this volume), for example, cannot be said with any certainty to have existed (though they probably did, as G. Anderson assumes for Demonax in this volume) and we can only speculate about how ancient readers would have approached their Lives. It is equally unclear to what extent Jerome (or his readers) was (were) convinced that his Lives of Paul the First Hermit and Malchus dealt with historical figures. And what to think of the Byzantine Life (and Martyrdom) of Galaction and Episteme ? Its male protagonist is presented as the son of Clitophon and Leucippe, the hero and heroine of Achilles Tatius' novel from the middle of the first century (Robiano). He is therefore paraded as being the product—quite literally—of a piece of fiction. In short, positing the historicity of biogra-phees as a criterion for defining biography is not justified by the extant ancient material.

Defining Biography

Another explanation for the dearth of holistic focus in scholarship on ancient biography points to the difficulty of defining the notoriously diverse genre (Cairns and Luke: vii). Indeed, it is difficult to study something in its totality if we do not know (or widely disagree about) what exactly that totality is. Our modern English term, to begin with, does not help much, as it is far from unambiguous. It goes back to the Greek (biographia), which postdates by centuries most of the material with which this Handbook is concerned. It first appears in fragments of Damascius' Life of Isidore of Alexandria (end of the fifth or first half of the sixth century) preserved in Photius' Bibliotheca (cod; ninth century), where it refers to the written production (graphein) of a story of one's life (bios). In English, it is picked up in John Dryden's introduction to his translation of Plutarch's Lives, where it has the same literary connotation, which is subsequently consolidated throughout the remainder of the seventeenth century and beyond—a written record of one's life rather than, say, a more general depiction of human life and experience across different media;. The same connotation remains dominant in modern-day usage of the word as attested in dictionaries such as the Oxford English Dictionary or the New Oxford Dictionary of English. At the same time, the English term has been polysemic since its coinage: an umbrella term that can denote widely different types of life-writing; not only Lives in both prose and verse, but also encyclopaedia entries, epitaphs, libri de viris illustribus, letters, and laudationes.

It comes as no surprise, then, that opinions vary on how precisely to define biography as a part of ancient textual production. It never was a rigidly defined genre, and much ink has flowed over the question of what it was (and what it was not). It is a recurrent pattern that modern definitions tend to impose boundaries which do not seem to be justified by the ancient material, which is too sprawling and diverse to be captured under one single definition unless a very general one. Momigliano's influential definition as 'an account of the life of a man from birth to death' illustrates this very well. It is, first, too broad to be workable, as it includes, strictly speaking, any given epitaph that states that a person has lived a certain amount of time—something few readers would call a biography (Ehlers 1998). In an attempt to be more precise, Dihle adds specific criteria, such as a view of one's life in its totality and a moral purpose. This concept of a 'core genre' is designed to identify texts that best meet specific criteria and distinguish them from other texts (such as, in Dihle's own view, Xenophon's Agesilaus and Isocrates' Evagoras, which he labels as encomia rather than biographies). But it is methodologically unhelpful: it is conducive to identifying some of the extant material as 'real' biographies while branding the rest as less central (or less successful). Moreover, since such identifications are always (and inevitably) based on a pre-selected sample of texts, they are particularly prone to circular reasoning. Burridge, for example, identifies five texts as biographies (Isocrates' Evagoras, Xenophon's Agesilaus, Satyrus' Euripides, Nepos' Atticus, and Philo's Moses)

and excludes Xenophon's Memorabilia because it is too long, has philosophical dialogue, and lacks chronology. But, as Edwards astutely points out, this line of thought imposes the expectation on the genre while claiming that the genre has defined the expectations: had Memorabilia been included in the sample at the outset, Burridge's inference could not follow.

Yet, for all its breadth, Momigliano's definition is at the same time too specific to fit much of the extant material: it is challenged by all Lives of women (explicitly addressed in Chapters 30 and 37 in this volume); by all Lives that give no information about the birth or death of their subjects or, indeed, creatively reshuffle these topics, such as Porphyry's Life of Plotinus (Chapter 26), which starts not with the birth but with the death of its protagonist; and by all Lives that are either ordered by principles other than (mere) chronology (e.g. Suetonius' Lives of the Caesars, Chapter 15) or do not always encompass the full chronological range that Momigliano implies. Hägg sensibly allows for more flexibility by defining biography as a story of one's life 'from cradle to grave (or a substantial part of it)' but H. Lee rightly points to the fundamental problem: this requirement has been so often broken in the history of life-writing as not to count at all. Although many ancient biographies surely capitalize on birth and death episodes as significant ingredients, others are often selective in which episodes they emphasize (and which they treat briefly or ignore altogether). And, of course, attitudes towards coverage are themselves subject to change over time: whereas Antiquity arguably saw attention to public achievement as a major ingredient of life-writing, modern biographers may cater more to readers' taste for psychological dissection of one's inner life.

Titles of works as they have come down to us through the editorial tradition are not of much help either. Some works featuring the word bios in their titles, such as Lucian's Life of Demonax or the anonymous Life of Secundus the Philosopher, are not biographies in any strict sense of the word but resonate widely with other genres, such as encomium, recollections, and collections of sayings. And though all ancient and late antique works entitled as bioi do share not only their title but also a number of characteristics, Edwards rightly points out that, if one were to take these characteristics as criteria for a definition of biography, numerous other important representatives of commemorative ancient life-writing would be excluded altogether (e.g. Suetonius' Lives of the Caesars, the gospels, Eusebius' Life of Constantine, Iamblichus' On the Pythagorean Life and Porphyry's Life of Plotinus).

Given the fuzziness surrounding both the term and the concept of biography in Antiquity, scholars have been creative in finding metaphors to conceptualize its slipperiness. Hägg, for example, warns, no doubt rightly, that it may be pointless to draw 'borders where the authors themselves so obviously moved over mapless terrain'. D. Praet suggests, therefore, replacing the spatial metaphor by one of music, 'where certain themes are repeated but with new material and variations on old themes, played with different instruments, sampled and remastered, and so on'. And Burridge draws on Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblances to allow similar flexibility: in his view, gospels would have been recognized by ancient readers as (belonging to the family of) bioi because they have a number of characteristics in common with other works labelled as bioi.

Other scholars have gone further and suggested that the common notion of 'genre' is less than adequate to capture the subtleties and complexities of ancient biographical narrative. C. Pelling, for example, is explicit that 'one should not think of a single "biographical genre" with acknowledged conventions, but rather of a complicated picture of overlapping traditions, embracing works of varying form, style, length, and truthfulness'. Similarly, Edwards and Swain introduce the concept of 'the biographic': not so much a strictly delineated genre as a broader category, a trait, or set of traits

present not just in biographies but also in a variety of other texts. In other words, '[j]ust as the tragic, ever since Aristotle, has been recognized as an element in literature that is not simply identical with the content of a tragedy, so we would contend that the biographic is'. This allows the net to be cast much more widely and invites the inclusion as representatives of 'the biographic' of texts that have traditionally been labelled as generically hybrid (e.g. Philostratus' Life of Apollonius) and other works that are neither histories nor biographies in any strict sense (e.g. Aristides' Sacred Orations, Arrian's Anabasis, certain speeches of Dio and Lucian, and the correspondence of Cyprian, Julian, Basil, Augustine, and Jerome).

Swain and Edwards' concept is helpful in analysing how biographical tendencies 'invade' other forms of writing. Indeed, the (open) approach taken in this Handbook owes much to it. Xenophon of Athens' Cyropaedia (fourth century BC), for example, is routinely cited as (one of) the first representative(s) of ancient biography, but a number of more or less contemporary, encomiastic, and other writings, such as his Memorabilia and Agesilaus, Isocrates' Evagoras, and Plato's Apology and Phaedo, are also informed to varying degrees by modes of writing that had an important role to play in later biographical discourse —even though few would simply label them 'biographies'. Conversely, the modern label of 'fictional biographies' is routinely used to denote a range of the most disparate (pagan and early Christian) narratives from the first few centuries of the Common Era that consciously seem to draw upon a number of protocols from biography but at the same time are much more diffuse forms of story-telling than biographies strictly defined (Life of Aesop, Alexander Romance, apocryphal acts of the apostles, etc.).

Yet, I am not quite ready to give up on 'genre' as a critical concept altogether. One of the problems with the notion of 'the biographic' is that it seems difficult to see 'where to stop': in fact, if one were to make a Handbook of 'the biographic' in Antiquity, it would have to cover even broader sweeps of ancient literature than we have already done here. (On its current scope, see the section 'Rationale Behind the Book'.) Biographical vignettes or more or less elaborate and/or evaluative sketches of characters abound in many ancient literary genres—from philosophical treatises and oratory over historiography and letter-writing to novels —and although Swain is surely right that both biography and the biographic are much more frequent in the literature of the Roman Empire and Late Antiquity than in previous eras, there remains much earlier material that would also merit being included. Our book, on the other hand, as a rule, covers texts that are recognizable in themselves as pieces of (either individual or collective) life-writing. I have not, that is, attempted to include every biographical sketch or every instance of biographical modes of discourse in historiography, epic, epistolography, and other genres (which would be possible only in a multi-volume series), although such biographical material does feature in some individual chapters (and even has a prominent role to play in Part V).

In addition, even if we accept the concept of the biographic as a real and important one (as I do), this still leaves intact the notion that genre has or can have a role to play in how readers respond to Lives (a view also held by S. Adams in Chapter 2 in this volume). As McGing and Mossman rightly note, 'some Lives inevitably activate some generically-inspired expectations which are more precise than Edwards' concept allows'. And, in fact, some ancient authors reflect on how they inscribe themselves in the distinctive practice of writing bioi. Similarly, Swain recognizes the category of genre to some extent when he defines biographies as 'texts which furnish detailed accounts of individuals' lives' and which may be 'complete, from birth to death, or sectional and partial'. Urbano extends this definition to Late Antiquity to include not only bioi but also philosophical history, early

forms of hagiography, and funeral orations, thus testifying to the sprawling nature of life-writing in that period.

It will be clear by now that in this Handbook I do not conceive of ancient biography in terms of a checklist of essential, generic features. Since biography in its broadest sense is really just an extended, written account of the life (or parts thereof) of a given (real or fictional) individual (or group of individuals), it does not have specific formal characteristics that allow us to build a solid set of criteria. I have therefore chosen a workable middle ground between inappropriately rigid, generic essentialism and indefinite openness. In practice, this means that, starting from the observation that from the earliest representatives onwards, Lives, to varying degrees, share features with other (contemporary, earlier or later) genres, such as history, encomia or novels, the book includes quite a few texts that have traditionally not been included in the biographical canon: gospels (Chapter 6), for instance, following Burridge (2018), Frickenschmidt (1997), Keener and Wright (2016) and Licona (2017: 9–22); Tacitus' Agricola (Chapter 12), though that text can just as well be read (and has been) as an encomium, funerary oratory, ethnography, and history (Whitmarsh 2006); the Life of Secundus, the Tale of Ahiqar (both in Chapter 4) and the Alexander Romance (Chapter 16), which all have (rightly) been included also in a recent Encyclopedia of the Novel (Selden 2014). With others, in short, I conceptualize biography in this Handbook as a flexible, open, and fluid genre, which allows, accommodates, and even stimulates experiments with its own characteristics, story-patterns, and borders. Of course, authors of individual chapters will come back to more specific questions of definition and genre with a view to the texts that they discuss.

'Origins'

Just as scholars do not agree about what ancient biography is, they also do not agree, unsurprisingly, about how, when, and where it originated—and I return below to my own scepticism about the possibility of answering this question at all. Diachronic surveys of the genre sometimes look to the ancient Near East for so-called 'predecessors' or 'precursors'— although C. Pelling (Chapter 7 in this volume) is surely right to note the fundamental, methodological problems intrinsic to such teleological language. In any case, it remains valid to note that commemorative inscriptions in the Babylonian and Assyrian kingdoms (third millennium to the sixth century BC) provide early textual expressions of a biographical interest, and E. Frood (Chapter 34 in this volume) and C. Schuler and F.R. Forster (Chapter 35) explore similar instances of such an interest in ancient Egypt and Rome and Greece respectively. In

addition, scholars have also noted (or, given the absence of much early evidence, hypothesized) a strong biographical flavour in oriental tales going back all the way to the Gilgamesh epos, and they have examined (or speculated about) whether and how such tales (e.g. the story of Ahiqar or oriental versions of the Seven Wise Men) may have impacted Greek story-telling in Asia Minor from a relatively early stage onwards.

But it is in the Hellenistic era that for a long time scholars located the earliest 'proper' Greek biographies—which is a bit of a paradox, to be sure, since not a single complete biography has survived from that era (see Chapter 10 in this volume for details). At that time, so the traditional argument goes, the increased significance of individuals in large-scale political structures (Einzelpersönlichkeiten, as opposed to the small-scale, collectiveness of the polis in the Classical period) was conducive to an interest in biographical writing, first about politicians but soon also about poets, scholars, and philosophers. Leo (1901), for example, has famously claimed that

biography originates as a product of Peripatetic schools. His argument builds on the demonstrable interest of Aristotelians both in anecdotes illustrating virtues and vices and in the description and evaluation of individual writers and philosophical schools. He distinguishes two branches of biographical development: one branch invented by an early Peripatetic, possibly Aristoxenus, to tell the lives of statesmen (and generals) in straightforward, chronological accounts, as exemplified by Plutarch in the later tradition; and another branch combining chronological accounts with systematic, thematic arrangements in order to highlight the character and achievements of individuals. The latter type, exemplified by Suetonius in the later tradition, was initially established, Leo submits, by Alexandrian grammarians under the influence of Peripatetic teaching in order to write the Lives of writers and artists.

As is well known, Leo's thesis has met with substantial criticism. Crucially, not much of his argument is supported by textual evidence. Leo rather retrojects characteristics of later texts (notably Plutarchan and Suetonian) into a Hellenistic past. It is not just that connections are sometimes tenuous at best; it is also that such retrojections are methodologically problematic in principle. In fact, Leo's genealogy of a bifurcated tradition is complicated by some of the little Hellenistic material that we do have, such as the papyrus of Satyrus' Life of Euripides. It is a biography in the form of a dialogue (which does not fit Leo's 'Suetonian' model) that may well have been an early model for such biography in Late Antiquity. Similarly, other papyrus fragments too offer glimpses of what was probably a typologically more varied tradition than Leo's theory of a Peripatetic origin can account for (e.g. PHaun. and POxy. , which suggest the existence of rather short biographies; Momigliano).

Finally, scholars have also drawn attention to the possibility that biographical traditions may be older than the early Peripatos and specifically point to the fifth century BCE—the topic in this volume. One early name associated with writing biography (from the sixth century) is Theagenes of Rhegium. Two others are Scylax of Caryanda (said by the Suda to have written a Life of Heraclides of Mylasa) and Xanthus of Lydia (whose account of Empedocles is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius). We know next to nothing about these authors or the contents of their works—not even enough to be confident, in fact, that Scylax' account of Heraclides was 'some sort of biographical work', as Momigliano puts it. But the fact that all three authors have traditionally been located at the margins of Greek culture (one in the West and two in the East) feeds into the idea of biography being a culturally hybrid form of writing.

For all the criticism that Leo's thesis has encountered, his basic idea that biography originated in the context of philosophical schools has been shared by others. Dihle, for example, places the rise of the genre in the Academy, where, he argues, the (memory of the) charismatic personality of Socrates provided the impetus for biographical writing. Following others, Dihle identifies as an important factor in this development a wider cultural interest in individuality as it is attested by, among other things, an anecdotic interest in famous people (popular books and legends about Homer and Hesiod, Aesop, Archilochus, Sappho, etc.), comprehensive assessments of prominent people in historical works, encomia, and Socratic literature. In Dihle's view, Plato's Apology is the earliest model of Greek biography, whereas Aristotle's Ethics influenced later Lives and the Peripatos formalized the tradition. Whereas it is true that Plato's Apology, like Xenophon's Socratic writings, contains elements that became standard features of later biographies (as P. Cox points out), Dihle's basic assumption that biography needs an exceptional, authoritative figure to flourish has (rightly) been doubted.

A number of other genres and writing practices have also been suggested to have played a role in the early development of biography. The Odyssey, for example, must have had an influence on early biographers, such as Stesimbrotus and Ion; Hellenistic philological commentaries and surveys have been said to evince biographical interests (Momigliano; Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon's historiographical writings clearly accommodate biographical material; funeral orations have been supposed to play a role too, both in fifth-century Greece (Momigliano) and in Republican Rome; and, of course, the rhetorical tradition of the prose encomium (of which Isocrates formalizes the first model in his depiction of the ideal monarch in Evagoras;) shares important features with later key-texts of the ancient biographical tradition. Finally, scholars have also attempted to reconstruct from supposed later examples (e.g. Philostratus' Life of Apollonius) a (biographical) genre called 'aretalogy', which allegedly documented miracles and extraordinary achievements of deities and semi-divine characters—more recently, others have adduced sensible criticism as to whether we really have to hypothesize the existence of such a genre in the first place.

Rationale Behind the Book

The question of 'origins' is not one that this Handbook sets out to answer. Indeed, it is so much bound up with that of definition that we may very well be sceptical about the possibility of answering it at all. As we have seen, the only productive definition of ancient biography is a very loose and general one. And, of course, the more open and inclusive we allow it to be, the less possible it becomes to formulate a sensible answer to the question of origins and development—and, indeed, the less meaningful such an answer could possibly be.44 The volume's cross-cultural and cross-linguistic inclusiveness drives this point home. Part IV includes chapters on late antique forms of life-writing in important traditions other than Latin and Greek: Syriac (the third largest surviving literature of Late Antiquity), Coptic, Armenian, and Arabic. Of course, cross-cultural exchange in all these fields has been widely documented, but the mere fact that all these traditions articulate life-writing along very similar, formal lines does not mean, of course, that they must be related to each other in terms of (direct or indirect) contact. In his history of the novel, Moretti (2006: vol. 1: section 2) speaks of 'polygenesis', which means that across different cultures similar or identical practices (can) arise independently from each other.46 Surely, telling and writing stories about the lives of important or inspiring (groups of) individuals are more likely to be sensibly conceptualized along these lines than in terms of developmental history. There is much truth in Bowie and Harrison's (1993: 173) statement that the question of the 'origins' of the ancient novel, once thought to be the only one worth pursuing, is 'an insoluble and vain enquiry', and it is difficult to see why this would be any different for ancient biography, which is a kind of narrative just as sprawling and difficult to define.

Moreover, the long-standing scholarly focus on the question of 'origins' (together with that on historicity and authenticity) has long kept scholars away from the approach adopted in this Handbook: to read ancient biographies as narrative and textual constructs in their own right. Good examples of this—fairly recent—trend are B. Graziosi's (2002) book on the Lives of Homer, and Fletcher and Hanink's (2016) volume on Lives of poets and artists: they draw attention to the relevance of biographical traditions as creative reworkings of earlier traditions—an outlook that surely can be extrapolated to biographies other than those examined by these authors. This is not to say, of course, that all contributors in this Handbook will address this one question; rather, like these authors, they pay attention, first and foremost, to issues of textuality and narrativity underlying the texts. In this sense, this Handbook does not want to replace the standard works of Leo, Dihle,

or Momigliano, but rather aims to add perspectives and, in some cases, raise questions that have received less attention so far.

This volume also takes a rather open approach in another area: that of chronology. Most current studies on the genre do not venture beyond the first couple of centuries of the Common Era (which constitute the genre's best-documented period). This Handbook modestly broadens the temporal span and includes late antique forms of biographical narrative, albeit not exhaustively, of course: it covers, in Parts II and III, much of the field up to the fourth century AD (when Christian life-writing becomes too frequent and omnipresent to be sensibly contained and discussed within the limits of this one book) and occasionally discusses relevant material also from later in the early Byzantine period (and, more rarely, beyond), notably in Parts III and IV, with chapters on, for example, Christian martyrs (Chapter 28), monks (Chapter 29), and eastern traditions (Chapters 30–33). The book thus builds on the insight that late antique biographies continue important aspects of the ancient biographical tradition. The field most affected by this chronological scope is, of course, Christian life-writing. Lives of saints, just like the gospels, are separated from biography mainly by very slippery and vague conceptual boundaries. This does not mean, of course, that I promote the view that narrative texts as diverse as philosophers' Lives, political biographies, panegyrics, funeral orations, Christian martyr acts, and saints' Lives should all be chalked down simply as 'biographies'. Rather, all these types of narrative commemorate, document, or purport to document Lives, achievements, and/or deaths and build to some extent on biographical protocols, topoi, and narrative strategies; this Handbook aims to explore how exactly they adopt, adapt, rework, and recycle them.

Another road to expand the study of ancient biography, both in chronological and cross-cultural terms, is taken in Part VI, which deals with the reception of ancient biography from the Middle Ages onwards. Although this topic has become increasingly popular in scholarship on specific authors over the last few years, general surveys of the ancient genre usually do not include it. The same is true also for the final area where I have tried to approach life-writing more openly than earlier overviews have done: that of media. Although the bulk of this volume deals with literature, Part V pays attention to representations of lives (or parts thereof) in other media. Epigraphical sources, for example, present important, topical aspects of the lives of historical persons that also receive attention in biographical narrative literature: birth, youth, death, etc. In addition, inscriptions were used as a source of evidence not just of an individual's actions but also of his/her moral qualities—another important resonance with biographical writing (e.g. Low on Classical and Hellenistic Greece, and C. Schuler and F.R. Forster in this volume on both Greece and Rome). Similarly, different types of visual art, such as depictions of triumphs, feature important achievements, another well-known topos in biography. Therefore, attention will be paid to specific ways in which such biographical aspects are represented.

For the conceptual openness and generic inclusiveness underlying this volume, there is one obvious price to pay: they make exhaustiveness impossible, even across a total of chapters. In order to at least ensure reasonable coverage of the extant material, I have distributed the lion's share of the chapters over (the first) three parts. The introductory section (Part I) continues to deal with conceptual questions (Chapter 2) and subsequently offers a bird's-eye view of traditions of which specific texts are discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters—individual and collective life-writing, popular, Jewish and Christian biography (Chapters 3–6). Part II, subsequently, offers readings of individual key texts. These are organized in a roughly chronological order and start from the fifth

century BCE up to the late fourth century CE. Part III, finally, steers away from questions about individual biographies to address broader issues: it accommodates chapters with a diachronic focus on specific types of biographees, such as statesmen, philosophers, and monks, all of whom are discussed through different, selected texts from the biographical tradition. K. Eshleman (Chapter 25), for example, explores, through two key texts, broader implications of life-writing of one type of biographee (reading, as she does, biographies of sophists as a cultural history of Hellenism).

The combined arrangement of overview chapters in Part I and both synchronic and diachronic readings in Parts II and III respectively should allow the most important representatives of the large biographical subgenres, such as political biography, biography of intellectuals (philosophers and sophists), and hagiography, to be covered, even if not every individual biography is dealt with in a chapter of its own. The Historia Augusta, for example, which is the most extensive late Roman biographical work and the object of renewed scholarly interest, is covered through the combined attention it receives in two chapters (15 and 24) alongside other texts. Similarly, Gregory of Nyssa's Life of Macrina is discussed as part of a broader chapter on Christian biography (Chapter 6), Athanasius' foundational Life of Antony as part of one on monks and the De viris illustribus tradition surfaces in Chapters 19 and 40 (and some of its main representatives, such as Suetonius, Pliny, and Jerome do have chapters of their own). As for any Handbook, the index is therefore a crucial tool for readers interested in any given biography (or any topic, for that matter), as they are likely to find relevant information in different places.

A final preliminary note is about the place of ancient autobiography in this book. Just as in the other areas of its conceptualization (and again following others, such as Momigliano, Sonnabend, and McGing and Mossman), this Handbook does not posit any impermeable line between biography and autobiography. It rather builds on the similarities between the two kinds of writing more than on their differences (which are real enough, to be sure, and have been given more relative weight in other surveys, such as Marcus and Hägg). This means, in practice, that quite a few chapters discuss autobiographical alongside biographical narrative where appropriate for their individual purposes. (Again, the index allows for easy navigation.) Since, however, the huge majority of the book deals with biography (as we do not have that much ancient autobiographical material left in the first place), I have abstained from providing systematic, full coverage of autobiography as a separate topic or from thematizing it for its own sake (e.g. by including it in the book's title or otherwise). Such a thematization would have taken the book in a different direction altogether, as it would have raised a whole range of specific, new questions about definition and narrative technique (e.g. on formal differences in narrating biographies and autobiographies) that really deserve to be covered in a book specifically on that topic. <>

Essay: Diogenes Laertius and Philosophical Lives by Stephen White

The collection of Lives of Eminent Philosophers (as it is commonly called) transmitted in ten books under the name of Diogenes Laertius recounts the doings, sayings, and writings of the leading figures of ancient Greek philosophy from its origins down to its rapid efflorescence and institutionalization in the fourth and third centuries BC, with occasional glimpses of its continuing vitality in the centuries beyond. Encompassing over eighty philosophers, these Lives range in length from two or three sentences for figures of little influence to entire books for Plato and Epicurus. They vary widely in content too, some devoid of biographical information, some nothing else, but most a thick stew of names, dates, events, titles, anecdotes, sayings, theories, and more. The resulting compendium of what its subjects did and said and wrote and thought, how they came to philosophy,

where they travelled and taught, whom they knew or encountered, the way they lived and died is a treasury of information and misinformation, at turns fascinating and frustrating, instructive and misleading, erudite and jejune, inspiring and deflating, that students of philosophy and its early history have for centuries devoured, dissected, deplored, and derided, but ignored at their peril.

Diogenes' Lives is an exceptional work on many counts, including some of special significance for this Handbook. For one, it is the single largest collection of Lives to survive from Classical Antiquity, handily surpassing Plutarch in number and scope if not in depth or length, and so too Philostratus and Suetonius. It is also a key witness to the early stages of biographical literature in the fourth and third centuries BC, preserving valuable evidence for pioneers like Aristoxenus, Antigonus of Carystus, Hermippus, and Satyrus. At the same time, it presents the single most comprehensive account of the origins and development of an entire discipline, and a distinctive form of intellectual history from a biographical perspective. It also, accordingly, represents a distinctive form of life-writing, framed by basic biographical data but lean, often very lean, on the standard biographical fare—from a modern perspective at least—of incident and narrative, and governed instead by its disciplinary orientation, its sustained focus on philosophy as a distinctive cultural practice and way to live. Its over-arching goal, evidently, is to tell, in condensed but leisurely fashion, how that practice began and evolved, the contributions of its formative figures, and especially the enduring fruits of their endeavours: a record of their memorable insights and sayings, their writings, theories, and other discoveries—stopping for the most part well short of the author's own day, sometime in the Severan age, most likely the opening decades of the third century CE. The result thus amounts to an ostensive definition of philosophy, as the author conceived it, in the form of a gallery of its most influential and memorable representatives in all their diversity of attitude, approach, and achievement. Importantly for this Handbook, its peculiar methods, contents, and format also enlarge the range and scope of ancient biography, and in ways that invite and inform critical reflection on the nature and purposes of life-writing in Antiquity.

A Genealogy of Philosophy

The cast of Diogenes' story—the roster for his gallery—is enormous, comprising over eighty biographical entries, along with hundreds more in various supporting roles as associates or rivals, patrons or antagonists, including cameos by many prominent public figures, and hundreds more again named as authorities or sources, which Diogenes cites with diligence and relish. Its chronological and geographical sweep is correspondingly vast, covering over three centuries fairly comprehensively, albeit often superficially, and span-ning virtually the entire Hellenic world, from Egypt and Cyrene to the shores of the Black Sea, from Sicily and southern Italy to Syria and Cilicia, with scores of towns and islands in between, embracing even wider reaches of the Roman Empire with occasional mentions of Celtic Druids, Indian Gymnosophists ('naked teachers'), and the like. To impose order on these hordes, and to make his story accessible by giving it a narrative arc, Diogenes integrates two related but distinct frameworks developed by Hellenistic authors drawing on historical research by Aristotle and his colleagues, and applying to philosophy approaches going back to local chronicles and mythography in the tradition of the Hesiodic catalogue: a complex genealogical scheme that traces the origins and multiple lines of intellectual descent in a broadly chronological sequence of 'successions' Eshleman 2012: 177–212), each linked at every step by direct or indirect teacher-student relationships but continually enriched by interaction and innovation, and repeatedly branching into rival families or 'schools of thought'—the various 'stances' or 'ways' of life and thought that dominated philosophy in the classical world, including most notably the four granted imperial chairs under Antonine and Severan rule: Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, and Epicureans

(Lynch 1972: 168–198; Oliver 1977), each occupying a prominent position in the overall scheme (Books 3–4, 5, 7, 10; cf. 1.14).

The resulting diachronic network is organized into ten thematically unified sections, each allotted its own 'book' and centred on one or two leading figures, typically the founder or titular head of a distinct philosophical tradition. A short prologue first sketches rival accounts of the origins of philosophy, swiftly surveying both Greek and foreign traditions (1.1–12; Gigon 1960), then introduces the genealogical scheme of 'successions'—the four main lines of personal and intellectual descent—and their attendant 'stances' or schools of thought (1.13–21). The remainder of the first book then introduces Thales of Miletus (1.22–44), the traditional founding father of philosophy here depicted rather as a forefather along with a gaggle of fellow sixth-century 'sages' (1.45–115; Goulet 1992b), before closing with his twin forefather, Pherecydes of Syros (1.116–122). The scheme then follows two main branches of descent, one from Thales and dubbed 'Ionian', filling Books 2–7, the other from Pherecydes and dubbed 'Italian', filling Books 8–10, each in turn ramifying into multiple sub-branches. Within this scheme, Diogenes interweaves for another seventy-odd figures all manner of biographical information, ranging from precisely dated facts to dubious or apocryphal anecdotes, with lists of their writings and more or less cursory accounts of their teachings, arguments, and sundry other insights and innovations. The result is a panoramic survey of the first three or so centuries of Greek philosophy, replete with excerpts, quotations, and citations from a host of writers—philosophers, poets, historians, scholars, and antiquarians alike—unparalleled in breadth but correspondingly thin, frustratingly so for some today, on philosophical substance, either the taut sinews of argument and analysis, or systematic exposition of theories. Plainly more important for Diogenes, at least in the Lives, is the scholarly lore of prosopography (especially family, major historical figures, and authors of the same name), bibliography, chronology, and the well-turned phrase or bon mot, usually but not always to the philosopher's credit. In line with this focus on the discipline's earlier history, the abundant citations that pepper his text like embedded footnotes also come mainly from Classical and Hellenistic writers, only occasionally from Imperial authors, and never from his own contemporaries, with the possible exception of two or three figures of uncertain date he names in passing, who provide the most secure terminus post quem for his own work.

Highlighted by this genealogy are the six traditions still competing in Diogenes' own day: Plato's Academy, Aristotle's Peripatetics, Zeno's Stoics, and Diogenes' Cynics, all descended from Socrates and Thales before him; and descending from the Pythagorean tradition in a parallel Italian tradition, Pyrrhonian sceptics and Epicureans. Each of these six constitutes, in terminology standard since the Hellenistic period, a distinct hairesis: literally a 'choice' of standards for truth and value, and accordingly a choice of how to live or conduct one's life, and then by extension a philosophical orientation or 'stance' and the resulting 'school of thought'. The chains of individual Lives carry each of these schools into the third century BCE, but rarely beyond, only in isolated cases (a pair of second-century Academics) or in bare lists (some later Stoics, Pyrrhonians, and Epicureans). In tracing the development of these lineages, however, Diogenes studiously includes several other traditions initially influential but long extinct, either abandoned or absorbed into the mainstream schools: Cyrenaics, Eliacs, Megarics, Eretriacs, even Eudaimonics, and Eclectics, all incidentally illustrating a peculiar philosophical idiom, explained in the prologue (1.17) and still alive today, of naming stances after the birthplace or theoretical orientation of their founders.

Integral to this genealogical approach and hence the portrait of philosophy that Diogenes constructs are the progeny of its practitioners. These intellectual offspring take two very different but essentially connected forms. First of all, by a natural extension of ordinary usage, the progeny of most subjects of these Lives comprised their many students and associates, all drawn in the first instance by shared philosophical interests, and in many cases continuing their teacher's or colleague's work—their studies and teaching—as more or less formally recognized 'successors', often literally inheriting intellectual and institutional property as well as a philosophical stance (Dorandi 1999a; Haake 2015). A central component of this process, moreover, and a major factor in its progress, was the production of written accounts of their work: the studies, dialogues, treatises, and other forms of literary composition produced by the philosophers themselves and their associates, which served both to sustain their own work and to extend its influence in space and time alike. Nor is the metaphor of progeny either anachronistic or strained. On the contrary, it figures in Diogenes' own usage on both fronts: for 'legitimate' or 'bastard' students (5.1, 10.26) and writings (2.105, 3.57; 2.124, 3.62) alike. It also informs his rationale for devoting a large share of his account to three factors rarely found in other forms of ancient biography: long lists of writings, lengthy collections of sayings, and frequent summaries of doctrines—the factors of bibliography, anthology, and doxography (more on this neologism below) that give these Lives much of their distinctive character and flavour.

Lives of Philosophers

Diogenes' Lives sits firmly in the tradition of works 'on famous men' (*de viris illustribus*) illustrated by extant work of Nepos and Plutarch and remnants of Suetonius. In focusing solely on philosophers, however, Diogenes represents a special case, and his collection, by its very multiplicity, constructs a group portrait of ancient philosophy as a distinctive way of life: a series of individual Lives generically alike in their concentration on intellectual activity and influence of a sort explicitly defined at the outset by the discipline's three established 'parts' or domains of 'physics, logic, and ethics' (1.18) which span the natural world as a whole, the mind's operations in reasoning and acquiring knowledge, and the reasoned governance accordingly of human life and conduct; yet Lives richly diverse in the conduct and ideas they report, in both the background, habits, and manners they describe, and the distinctive theories, forms of expression, and styles of argument they recount. Diogenes' gallery of philosophers thus demonstrates by accumulated example the full range of both philosophical ideas and philosophical ways of living.

The basic format is simple enough. Most Lives begin with some standard biographical fare. First comes the scholarly equivalent of an identity card: given name, father's name, and birthplace, normally presented independently as a virtual heading or lemma. There often follows something about the philosopher's family: lineage, upbringing, brothers (rarely any sisters), wives, children; often some highlights of their public life: civic office or service, interactions with local or foreign dignitaries; in most cases something about their death; and usually some indication of their dates: birth and death, 'acme' or floruit, or pivotal events. So consistent is the pattern that departures must often reflect an absence of credible evidence: cases where either Diogenes or the entire tradition had no reliable information. What most sets his Lives apart, however, is their pervasive emphasis on intellectual activity and teachings: each figure's studies (teachers, mentors, reading, fellow students), travels (especially exotic sources of inspiration and encounters with celebrities), colleagues and associates, rivals and critics, and especially their teachings, sayings, writings, and reception, contemporary and later alike. Two components loom especially large here: miniature anthologies of sayings and anecdotal repartee, on one hand, and synoptic surveys of their chief doctrines in a

summary format called 'doxography' (from Diels; see also Mansfeld). Also unusual at least in degree is Diogenes' attention to the apparatus of Imperial scholarship: especially the citations of earlier authorities and titles that fill his text, but also documents (letters, wills, decrees, epitaphs), catalogues of writings, and frequent quotations of a philosopher's own words. Closely related, and found in no other biographies, are the lists of homonyms that conclude many of his: lists of notable writers of the same name, philosophers and others alike, each distinguished in turn by father, homeland, philosophical stance or disciplinary interests, and notable writings, and all drawn from Poets and Authors of the Same Name by Demetrius of Magnesia, a friend of T. Pomponius Atticus (Mejer : twenty-four of thirty-one extant excerpts come from the Lives).

Into this framework Diogenes weaves all manner of illustration and ornament. Many of the more frequent components straddle the two domains, demonstrating in most cases the integration and integrity of a philosopher's thought and action in their conduct of life. This is especially so with the vast harvest of anecdotes Diogenes preserves—brief vignettes exhibiting character and wit in action, variously labelled chreiai or 'apophthegms' (Kindstrand; Arrighetti)—but also with the abundant verse and documentation he supplies for his leading figures. The opening lines of two poems ascribed to Socrates, for example, demonstrate fidelity to the very religious traditions he was put to death for violating, gloss the opening scene of Plato's Phaedo, and incidentally challenge the mainstream tradition that he wrote nothing. Aristotle's song to Virtue honouring his murdered father-in-law Hermias melds the family piety evident in his will (with the lofty ethical views summarized later in the Life. Samples of verse by and about Arcesilaus and his fellow Academics of the early third century (4.21, 4.25–27) enrich the appealing picture Diogenes draws of their mutual devotion, softening their otherwise dour reputation for a rigorous brand of scepticism. So too the strings of Homeric and tragic parody he quotes for the Cynics Diogenes and Crates (6.53–68, 6.85–86) both enliven and mitigate the badgering tone of the endless anecdotes he recounts to illustrate their stern asceticism and caustic wit. Lighter verse leavens other Lives too, including a handful from the comic stage for Socrates (2.18, 27–28), Plato (3.26–28), and Pythagoras (8.36–38), and a veritable bouquet of tart caricatures by the Pyrrhonist Timon of Phlius scattered throughout the work, for which Diogenes is again our single richest source.

Diogenes naturally adapts his template to his subjects. His Lives of the founding figures for the main traditions are considerably longer, richer, and more varied: an entire book each for Plato and Epicurus (Books 3 and 10: 109 and 154 sections), large portions of a book for Aristotle, Diogenes the Cynic, Pythagoras, and Pyrrho (5.1–35, 6.20–81, 8.1–50, 9.61–108), and the longest single block of all for the Stoic Zeno (7.1–160). Biographical detail is accordingly much thicker in each case: family background and youth, wives and children, friends and associates on one hand, rivals and detractors on the other, and sundry others, from dynasts and civic leaders to household slaves and freedmen; likewise training, travels, and teaching, along with pivotal episodes, even traces of a narrative arc at times. Their Lives also exhibit fuller documentation: letters by Plato, Zeno, and Epicurus (all but the last of questionable authenticity); verse by Plato (apocryphal epigrams) and Aristotle (the song to Virtue); full lists of their writings for all but Pyrrho, who wrote nothing; extended excerpts summarizing their teachings (one each for Zeno and Pythagoras, two for Plato, three complete letters by Epicurus and his Key Doctrines); wills for Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus, and an honorary inscription for Zeno. Doxography accordingly looms larger too: massive for Zeno (7.38–160), lengthy for Pyrrho (9.70–108), and substantial for all the rest except Diogenes the Cynic, for whom we are treated instead to a deluge of anecdotes (6.21–74: Goulet-Cazé 1992). So large a part does

doxography play in these cases, in fact, that the format here might more aptly be dubbed 'biodoxography'.

Length generally corresponds to influence (at least as viewed from his own time), and other pivotal figures also receive special attention too: both pioneers like Thales (1.22–44), Empedocles (8.51–77), Heraclitus (9.1–17), and Democritus (9.34–49), and pivotal figures like Socrates (2.18–47), Aristippus of Cyrene (2.65–85), Menedemus of Eretria (2.125–144), Arcesilaus (4.28–45), Theophrastus (5.36–57), and the Stoic Chrysippus (7.179–202), the latter two each swollen by catalogues of their copious writings (5.42–50, 7.189–202). Yet some of the most vivid episodes appear in the shortest Lives: Zeno of Elea defying his brutal captors by biting into his interrogator's ear, then biting off his own tongue (9.26–27); and Anaxarchus of Abdera, after accompanying Alexander to India, boasting defiantly to his captors as he was bound in a sack to be bludgeoned, 'Pound away at Anaxarchus' sack: you won't strike Anaxarchus!' (9.59). The Eleatic Zeno is far better known for his powerful paradoxes of motion, which receive only the briefest mention here; and the cursory Life of Anaxarchus, who serves here mainly to tie his companion Pyrrho to the Italian succession, otherwise highlights his moderating influence on Alexander. Shorter Lives also report some famous conversions to philosophy (Gigon 1946): Phaedo of Elis by Socrates (2.105), Polemo of Athens by Xenocrates (4.16), Crates of Thebes by Diogenes the Cynic (6.87), and Hipparchia by Crates in turn, who subjected her to a brazen test of nudity before accepting her own comparably bold proposal of marriage (6.96–97). Likewise for examples of civic leadership: Melissus commanding a squadron of Samian ships (9.24) that, according to Plutarch, rebuffed the Athenian fleet under Pericles (Pericles 25–28); Menedemus of Eretria repeatedly elected by his city for negotiating its autonomy from Antigonid dynasts (2.140–143); Demetrius of Phalerum managing Athens in the early years of Macedonian rule (5.75–76); and so on. So too for amorous episodes of all stripes, from Xenocrates' stony indifference to the allures of the celebrated courtesan Phryne (4.7) to the proud indulgences of the hedonist Aristippus of Cyrene (2.66–81) and the staunch sceptic Arcesilaus (4.40–43).

The prevalence of unusual episodes in shorter Lives can often be ascribed to a paucity of relevant information of any other sort. But it also reflects another aspect of the work's peculiar orientation: its ongoing efforts to pique interest in its theme, both the philosophers it portrays and the practice of philosophy more generally. Other features symptomatic of this agenda are a pervasive disregard for temporal sequence or for establishing, let alone maintaining, linear narratives, even more so than in Plutarch and other predecessors— compare their very different Lives of Solon (1.45–67 and Solon)—and also Diogenes' evident relish in quoting his own verse to cap so many of his Lives, mostly elegiac couplets twitting a philosopher's death but varied by a sprinkling of other topics and unusual forms, a total of 52 squibs from the collection he dubbed Pammetros. A closer look at two of the Lives, one longer and one shorter, will illustrate the flexibility of his template and some of its strengths and shortcomings.

Two Lives: Aristotle And Parmenides

The foibles, flaws, and charms of Diogenes' approach stand out in his Life of Aristotle, which thanks to its subject's own prominence is more attentive than most to chronological sequence and detail. Table 19.1 displays its structure and main components.

The whole comprises two main blocks of roughly equal length: first of all, important people and events in his life from beginning to end, then a survey of his thought as expressed both orally and in writing. Framing these two blocks is basic information about his identity: initially his parents,

birthplace, ancestry, and philosophical patrimony (aptly conflated by labelling him Plato's 'most legitimate' heir), and finally a list of 'homonyms' to distinguish him from other Aristotles. Each block in turn has a clear structure. The biography begins with a quick sketch of his appearance (physique, dress, hairstyle) and family (his only son, named Nicomachus after his own father, but illegitimate according to detractors). It then recounts in linear sequence some key episodes in his circuitous career: how he left Plato to start his own school in Athens and acquired the nickname 'Peripatetic' (for his habit of strolling when teaching); then a stay with Hermias in the Troad, whose 'mistress' he married (other accounts say his daughter); then time in Macedonia teaching the young Alexander; and his return to Athens, where he taught for thirteen more years, until obliged by charges of impiety to decamp to Euboean Chalcis (his mother's home, as other sources report), where he ended his life 'at the age of 70' according to one historian, or 63 as Diogenes promptly (and correctly) adds. Only here at the end, in an awkward return to the beginning, are we told that Aristotle first joined Plato at the age of 17. There follow the song to Virtue in honor of Hermias, Diogenes' own epigram on Aristotle's death (a frigid effort that turns on appalling wordplay), and a reprise of the main episodes, each now dated by both Olympiad and Archon from the Chronologies of the Hellenistic scholar Apollodorus, and finally a pair of verse caricatures. 'That then is the life of the philosopher,' Diogenes concludes, before continuing, 'For our part, we also came across his will' (5.11), which he then records in full, before closing with a short list of peculiar habits.

The sequence, though flawed by error and omission, is at least ostensibly linear and forms a complete circle from Athens and back, with Aristotle's devotion to his wife and early patrons sowing the seeds of his eventual demise in the face of impiety charges. Defined by changing locations, it also highlights ties to famous names and events: the upstart tyrant Hermias, Philip of Macedon and his son, his own nephew Callisthenes, an abrupt death reminiscent of Socrates. Three of the four stages, moreover, are marked by philosophical endeavours: starting his own school, teaching Alexander, returning to teach in Athens; so too was the fourth, with studies in the Troad and Lesbos, about which Diogenes is here silent. The finale, as often, is recited in detail and documented: Diogenes identifies the prosecutor's name and station, along with an alternative contender for the villain's role cited from Favorinus (a favourite Imperial authority), and quotes a verse inscription for Hermias at Delphi as well as the more famous lyrics, ostensibly to supply a basis for the charges but equally to indicate Aristotle's own character and literary talents. Clearly the organizing principle is philosophical activity, each section centred on the philosopher's lifework; even the first, highlighting his ties to Plato, ascribes their eventual divergence to his fortuitous absence when Plato died.

The second block, comprising three sections, is more coherently organized: first of all, a selection of choice sayings as testimony to his philosophical integrity and high standards (Searby 1998); then a long list of his writings, nearly 150 titles, many in multiple 'books' or volumes (Moraux 1951); a concise summary of some key doctrines, including explication of some distinctive terminology (Moraux 1986); all capped by the usual list of homonyms. Most of this material is also preserved elsewhere along with much more: biography, sayings, and titles mainly in later authors, 'doctrines' and terminology most fully of course in the many surviving writings of Aristotle himself. Nor does what Diogenes reports always accord with other evidence. Even his relatively full account here contains striking omissions and muddles: nothing on Aristotle's youth, education, or initial conversion to philosophy; distorted ties to Plato; no mention of his numerous students, apart from a few named in the will; and so on. Compared with other life-writing of his own or earlier times, however, Diogenes represents a high-water mark in scope and scholarship. A final inventory is indicative: Aristotle's own philosophical writings quoted twice, once with a title cited; his will and

two of his poems recorded in full (the epigram not attested elsewhere); a handful of his remarks, including several verse parodies; numerous authorities cited by name, mainly Hellenistic; a pair of early verse critics, one harsh, one satirical. A census of names yields a rich harvest of prosopography too: twenty-one family members, including slaves and legendary ancestors, twenty rulers and other public figures, a dozen authors, eight fellow philosophers—and seven other Aristotles, all writers in turn.

The Life of Parmenides (9.21–23), despite its brevity, illustrates both the basic template and some of its typical complications. On the exiguous side as for many earlier figures (barely 40 lines; Aristotle's runs to over 500), it is more thumbnail sketch than biography, framed by two short statements establishing his identity and distinguishing him from a single homonym. The first supplies the standard triad of names: 'Parmenides, son of Pyres, from Elea'; the last lists only an otherwise unknown 'orator and handbook-writer'. That is all we learn about his family or travels or activity in any public domain. In between come three short sections: on his teachers (9.21), his teachings and writings, with a single witness to reception (9.21–23), and an indication of his dates capped by random addenda (9.23).

The opening section typifies in miniature Diogenes' handling of affiliation and its thematic prominence. He names three teachers: an opening claim, unattributed and in his own voice, that Parmenides 'was a listener of Xenophanes'; then a report (now in indirect discourse) from Theophrastus, or rather an 'epitome' or digest of his foundational work of doxography, Doctrines of the Natural Philosophers in all of eighteen books, that Parmenides 'was a listener of Anaximander'; and finally a comment (in Diogenes' own voice again) that 'despite listening to Xenophanes too, he did not follow him'. To fill the gap created by this dismissal, Diogenes then names, on the authority of Sotion (active after 200 BCE author of the first and most widely cited contribution to 'successions' literature), the teacher 'he did follow': an otherwise unknown 'Ameinias son of Diochartes, a Pythagorean and man of scant means but distinguished character'. To confirm his decisive role, Diogenes then supplies the only other biographical datum in the entire entry: how Parmenides 'established a hero-shrine' for Ameinias upon his death.

Before turning to the next section of the Life, it is worth taking stock. Diogenes links Parmenides to four individuals, three simply named without identifying features: the father and two well-known philosophers, both subjects of earlier Lives (Xenophanes 9.18–20, Anaximander 2.1–2, 40 and 25 lines respectively). Their contributions, though certainly significant—one the source of life, stature, and wealth (9.21), the other two of philosophical insight—receive only passing mention, because from the perspective of a philosophical life, all are eclipsed by what the fourth supplied: 'by Ameinias, not by Xenophanes, he was turned to serenity'. The student's gesture of piety, not filial or civic but spiritual in its basis and objective—honouring the transformation of his own life and soul by Ameinias by transforming his benefactor in turn into a hero, an exalted status in Pythagorean cult and lore—is the signal episode in his life as philosopher, aptly singled out as the only unquestioned event in the entire entry. No other personal encounters are reported; nor any students, not even his famous younger compatriot and closest associate Zeno, who in his own life is introduced as 'by nature son of Teleutagoras, by adoption of Parmenides' (9.25) and then as his 'boyfriend' (paidika from Pl. Prm. 127b). Likewise nothing of his physical appearance, in striking contrast again with Zeno, whose 'tall stature' Diogenes notes on Plato's authority (9.25 from Prm. 127b again), who there describes Parmenides more fully as 'already very old and altogether hoary with age, but distinguished in visage, about 65 years old' (still 127b). Diogenes may only be following an

intermediate source here; some have doubted he ever read or consulted Plato's dialogues. The salient point, in any case, is selectivity, whether on his own initiative or inherited: a general disregard for physical and material factors, be it looks, wealth, or civic stature, unless and until those intersect with his work's golden thread, the life of the mind and spirit that constitutes a philosophical life.

Following that thread into the heart of this particular Life, we find a succinct sketch (longer than the rest of the Life combined) of some of Parmenides' more distinctive positions. A mini-doxography, again credited to Theophrastus (F 227D Fortenbaugh et al. 1992; cf. Sens. 3–4), begins with cosmology and highlights a notable innovation: 'the first to declare the earth spherical in shape and at rest in the middle' of the cosmos as a whole. Then come epistemology and related innovations, supported by six lines from the master's own poem and a passing comment on his use of hexameters: 'the same as Hesiod and Xenophanes [before him], and Empedocles [later]'. The account concludes with two tributes to his influence: a rare positive assessment (hexameters again) from the sceptic Timon's almost universally critical Silloi or Lampoons (SH 818), and Plato's eponymously entitled dialogue, described as 'for him' and assigned its topical label 'On Ideas' (cf. 3.58).

The Life concludes with chronology and addenda (9.23). Parmenides' acme, presumably following Apollodorus of Athens, is assigned to Olympiad 69 (504–500 BC). Four disputed attributions follow: the first to demonstrate that the evening and morning star are identical (i.e. Venus), a discovery others ascribe to Pythagoras; a denial by Callimachus that his poem is genuinely his; a claim that he wrote laws for Elea (cf. Strabo 6.1.1, Plu. Adv. Col. 1126A); and an attribution of the famous 'Achilles' and tortoise argument, otherwise universally ascribed to Zeno (cf. Arist. Ph. 239b14). As in the opening section, so again in closing Diogenes reports conflicting opinions, which like a philosophical Herodotus, or the Pyrrhonian sceptics he plainly admires, he sometimes adjudicates but often leaves open, as here.

Several features prominent in other Lives, including some for which the Lives are best known, are missing here: no anecdotes retailing pithy insights or biting retorts, no account of how Parmenides died, no list of writings. Rather than fault Diogenes, however, we might more reasonably credit him with adhering to available evidence, which could not have been extensive for so early a figure; in fact, nothing more of Parmenides' life is recorded elsewhere, not even in the Suda, beyond his cameo in Plato's dramatic fiction. Yet even in so brief a compass, Diogenes cites seven authorities, all major figures (four receive their own Lives): Plato and Speusippus, founding fathers of the Academy; Theophrastus and Sotion, twin fountainheads for doxography and 'successions'; Pyrrhonism's leading promoter, Timon, and his contemporary, the pioneering bibliographer Callimachus; and the great polymath (and fellow Academic sympathizer) Favorinus of Arles only a generation or so earlier than Diogenes, not to mention several lines of Parmenides' own poem. This apparatus, bundled at either end of the Life, could serve multiple purposes: to give the account a stamp of authority, and enhance our author's own credibility, as in his Herodotean attention to disagreements; to indicate or justify Parmenides' place in the chain of successions, as a forerunner of Pyrrhonian scepticism rather than among Pythagoreans as his mentor might suggest; to provide pointers for further reading or study; and no doubt still others. Whatever the aim, it exemplifies again one of the more distinctive features of the Lives: its attention, verging on fascination, to displaying the long and rich tradition of scholarship on which the Lives here retold are based.

The Life of Philosophy

This is a report of Diogenes Laertius' studies, so that neither the generations of philosophers may vanish with time, nor their great and wondrous works pass untold, nor the reasons why they contended with one another as they did.

So might Diogenes have opened his survey of eminent Greek philosophers. In scope, variety, method, even ambition, his work presents striking parallels with the foundational classic of ancient history, recast for the bookish, classicizing tastes of readers of an Imperial era. Shift the topic from conflict to disputation, from warring peoples to arguing schools of philosophers, and the testimony from crowds of oral informants to vast libraries of texts, and Diogenes is his subject's Herodotus: a voluble investigator and 'historian' of Greek philosophy from its foggy archaic origins, when sages first won prizes not for valour in combat or prowess in athletic or poetic performance but for pithy insights and discerning judgement (1.28–33), on through its rapid advance from scattered origins to convergence on Athens, where generation upon generation of students and devotees were drawn from all corners of the Hellenized world (cf. Bowie 2001 on Pausanias).

The text as we have it, however, starts abruptly, launching directly into its theme without preamble or preface to state its aims or aspiration: no Herodotean proclamation or Thucydidean programme, let alone any self-promoting dedication like the boast of imperial instigation posted by Philostratus at the front of his Life of Apollonius (1.3). All we have is the work itself, and its opening words duly identify its focus as 'the ergon of philosophy': a distinctive form of 'work' embracing both activity and its products, in short, the practice of philosophy as a social reality and cultural institution, an entire way of living with its characteristic practices, standards, traditions, expectations, but also room for individuality and innovation. The ensuing prologue explains.

First of all, where did the practice originate, among Greeks or foreigners? And as Herodotus grants Persian authorities the first word, so Diogenes begins with rival 'barbarian' claimants, mainly Egyptian and Persian but with passing mention of several other neighbouring cultures as well: Babylonian, Indian, Celtic, Gallic, Phoenician, Thracian, Libyan (1.1). Like Herodotus, however, he swiftly dismisses their claims, invoking three legendary Greek poets instead—Musaeus, Linus, and Orpheus, each supplied with thumbnail Lives (1.2–5)—before giving Egyptians and Persians more attention (1.6–11). Language finally clinches the case: the word itself is natively Greek (1.12), adopted rather than translated by Roman and other cultures.

To show what the name denotes, and therewith the governing conception of the Lives and its influence on the selection, organization, and orientation of the biographies, the prologue then goes on to outline the system of 'successions' that defines the work's superstructure (1.13–15) and to introduce its basic divisions and categories, including both the discipline's three parts and its key institutional factor of 'stances' (1.16–21). As we have seen, the Lives that follow contain many standard components of biography and show abundant affinity to other ancient biographies. Yet they also contain much more, with doxography and bibliography repeatedly overshadowing biographical incident and narrative. Does the resulting composite still qualify as biography? Plainly not in today's ordinary usage. But neither does most other ancient life-writing adhere to modern expectations. Equally plainly, the Lives does achieve the dual goal its opening words announce: a vivid exhibition of the 'work of philosophy' through a condensed and abbreviated but comprehensive survey of its leading practitioners and their distinctive practices, in particular, their teachings and writings, thereby revealing the implicit genotype by displaying the vast diversity of its phenotypes.

The received title of the work, though almost certainly adventitious, is nonetheless accurate enough: Lives and Insights of the Eminent Philosophers (more precisely 'those who achieved fame in philosophy') and Abbreviated Summary of the Tenets (or Doctrines) of Each Stance. The phrasing is alien to the text itself. 'Insight' appears only rarely here or in philosophical discourse generally, but frequently in later traditions where it commonly labels compilations of the kinds of maxims and sayings with which the Lives is so well stocked. More to the point, Diogenes' own usage treats biography as only a part of his project, a major one certainly, but not the whole. In fact, he regularly characterizes his own approach rather differently. Not only does he never refer to his writing, either the whole or any part, by a collective title; only twice does he ever refer to any of its chapters as a 'Life', and both times he does so it is to another section within the same book: once in a cross-reference late in Book 1 to its first Life: 'in the bios of Thales' (1.106, cf. 1.30 within 1.22–44); and again at a transition from biography to doxography in Book 7 to explain why the summary of Stoic doctrines appears 'in the bios of Zeno: because he was the school's founder' (7.38).12 To be sure, Diogenes characterizes much of his work as biographical, repeatedly referring to portions of it, including some relatively lengthy portions, as someone's 'life'; but he typically does so precisely at the end of his biographical section, either literally in formulaic phrases about their death (as in 'he ended' or 'concluded' his life: ten times), or formally as a transition to other material (documents, doctrines, or chronology: seven times). More often he describes his individual chapters simply as 'talking about' someone, once even combining the two locutions in a single cross-reference: 'which we discussed in the Life about Arcesilaus'. Diogenes himself, then, evidently conceives of his work as including biography as we ordinarily understand it but not as life-writing tout court—not as an account in more or less narrative form of res gestae and life-episodes. Rather, he seems to envision his work as displaying a distinctive way of life: both the enormous variety and the essential core of the practice of philosophy as displayed in the sayings, conduct, and writings of its great pioneers and most influential figures.

Afterlives and Audience

The fates were initially unkind to Diogenes. We have no trace of his Lives before the geographer Stephanus of Byzantium in the waning years of Antiquity and the rise of antiquarian compendia to preserve writings and information swiftly disappearing. But his work has had an influential afterlife, and profound influence on later thought. As the fullest surviving account of the lives and work of most of the figures it addresses, and the most comprehensive collection too, it provided the framework by default for early modern accounts of Greek philosophy as a whole. So popular was the quattrocento Latin translation by the Florentine monk Ambrogio Traversari (c.1430; Dorandi 2009: 222–228) that its first printing (1472) preceded the editio princeps of the Greek text (1533) by sixty years. And the Lives remained the foundation for histories of ancient philosophy through the nineteenth century: filled out with parallels, additions, and emendations from other sources, reconfigured to fit changing interests and agendas, but largely uncontested in its broader contours. When Hermann Diels produced his epochal Fragmente der Vorsokratiker in 1903, he still organized his material along very similar lines—revised and refined, but still basically intellectual genealogy—and gave Diogenes pride of place as the first witness (under 'Testimonien') for every figure whose Life he had written. Even today, handbooks often follow the same path, giving more attention to theories and arguments to be sure, but presenting biographical data as an entry point for discussion of the influences on and of each figure's thought.

As it turns out, then, the collection has had an illustrious afterlife. For all the complaints registered over the past century or more—often more a token of a critic's unrequited wishes than Diogenes'

failings in pursuit of his own aims—the influence of his work has been both lasting and profound. Its success, much though it owes to the loss or paucity of alternative accounts, depends also, and arguably more, on its answering to the needs and interests of its changing audiences, however feebly some may now see it serving their own. Nor is it idle, in the absence of any further enunciation of his own rationale, to consider Diogenes' aims in terms of the audience he himself envisioned. To that end it is instructive to look at a tantalizing pair of addresses to an anonymous female reader, curiously embedded deep within the work at two strategic junctures within the only two books dedicated to a single philosopher.

The first appears midway through Book 3 on Plato, at a key turning point. After completing his account of the philosopher's life, and before appending the usual list of writings, addenda, and homonyms, Diogenes pauses to flatter his singular reader by way of explaining why he will say (much) more than usual about this particular philosopher's writings, and rather more about his teachings too (3.47):

> For you, who are rightly an admirer of Plato and ambitiously investigating the teachings of this philosopher more than any other, I thought myself obliged to present an outline of the nature of his writings, the order of his dialogues, and his method of inductive reasoning, covering so far as possible only the fundamentals of the main points, so that my collection about his life not be deprived of his teachings. For it would be owls for Athens, as they say, if I gave you a detailed exposition.

Contested details aside, we may reasonably take this description as tailored to more than a single addressee, dedicatee, or honorand, and as targeting more generally an 'ideal' reader that defines the wider implied audience for whom Diogenes conceived himself to be writing. Two points then deserve notice. Despite her special interest in Plato, even if only a courtier's flattering hyperbole for 'fond of Plato', signifies something close to 'devotion'), she is 'ambitiously investigating' his doctrines more than any other philosopher. With due allowance for exaggeration, the plain implication is that her familiarity with Plato's works is either incipient or still superficial, only a modest acquaintance with his teachings via compendia or other indirect sources and little with his writings directly, which thus calls for the exceptionally detailed accounting that follows. If that is even roughly right, interesting consequences follow. Diogenes presents enough to invite and guide his readers to further study, ideally direct encounters with philosophical texts, especially a classic philosopher's own writings as here, or in any case, richer fodder than Diogenes himself supplies—in all but one case, to which we shall turn in a moment. The hypothesis can be corroborated on two fronts: both the immediate sequel, drawn from Thrasyllus (a Platonist favoured by the Emperor Tiberius: Tac. Ann.), which presents a set of prolegomena for the study of Plato's entire corpus (Tarrant for Thrasyllus' similar survey of Democritus' corpus); and more broadly the general tenor of Diogenes' work as a whole, which plainly presupposes an audience well versed in 'encyclic' studies, appreciative of rhetorical flourish and witty repartee, and attuned to the literary and historical reference and allusion, both common cultural coin and abstruse, that festoon his text—and yet not well read in the higher learning of philosophy.

Diogenes' other address to his singular reader appears at the end of the biographical section on Epicurus, immediately followinga list of 'the best' of his 'prolific' writings, as Diogenes turns to his teachings:

> The views he holds in these works I shall try to present by transcribing three of his letters, which summarize his entire philosophy. We shall also transcribe his Key Doctrines and any

> remarks of his we consider worthy of selection, so as to enable you to grasp the man from all sides and to discern that I know to be discerning.

Before transcribing the letters, Diogenes provides a brief introduction to Epicurean methods and terminology, and again succinct summaries of Epicurean ethics before and after the last letter). Otherwise he cedes the stage for the long final act of his Lives entirely to Epicurus himself in a unique tribute to the philosopher's own accounts of his teachings. The gesture, filling more than two-thirds of Book 10 with Epicurus' own words, is all the more remarkable for being explicitly addressed to an avowed 'admirer of Plato'. This need not imply, as sometimes supposed, sectarian support for Epicureanism; even a dedicated Stoic like Seneca freely borrows from Epicurus throughout the opening books of his epistolary campaign to lead his readers—similarly figured under the name of an elusive 'Lucilius'—steadily deeper into philosophy and its transformative inquiries. More likely, the first and only sustained encounter with a philosopher's own words that Diogenes offers his readers serves to provide a fitting close to a work conceived as an introduction to philosophical study and philosophical approaches to living. Consider the exhortation with which the third letter concludes (10.133–135):

Who do you think is superior to one who has pious beliefs about the gods, who is entirely fearless about death, who has fully appraised nature's end, and who realizes that the limit of good things is easy to accomplish and obtain, whereas the limit of bad things has either little duration or little intensity? ... And he [sc. the Epicurean philosopher just described] considers it better to be unfortunate when acting reasonably than fortunate when acting unreasonably; for it is better for a bad decision to be corrected that way. So ponder these and the related points day and night by yourself and with someone like yourself, and never will you feel anxiety either awake or asleep, and you will live like a god among men. For anyone living among immortal blessings bears no likeness to a mortal creature.

The ringing peroration has tempted some to see the entire sequence of letters, and especially this last one with its closing catechism, as an implicit endorsement of specifically Epicurean teaching and practice. Yet its claims and wording are markedly ecumenical, equally suited to an entirely non-sectarian exhortation to philosophical study generally. So too the 'colophon' or copestone, as Diogenes dubs it (borrowing a famous metaphor of Plato's), with which he brings his collection of Lives to a close, 'making our ending the beginning of happiness' (10.138): an anthology of Epicurean maxims and insights that provide a veritable self-help guide to personal improvement for both his anonymous addressee and all the other readers she represents, whether new to philosophy or novices seeking thoughtful guidance, anyone in fact open to philosophical study and its rewards. In capping the entire work with these Key Doctrines, then, Diogenes gives this classic manual of philosophy (cf. Lucian Alex. 4?) the last words, closing finally with its seductive vision of collective peace and harmony (KD 40 in 10.154): 'All who were most able to gain confidence from their neighbours thereby lived together most pleasantly, most secure in mutual trust, and by forming the closest affiliation they never mourned in sorrow over anyone's untimely end.'

At whatever stage of the pax romana Diogenes wrote, earlier or later in the Severan reign, he ends on a triumphant note, depicting philosophy as a cornerstone of world peace; and the basis for that pacific vision resides in the lives—and much less the careers than the ways of living, all rooted in commitment to lofty intellectual standards and ethical ideals—on display in his gallery of philosophical Lives. <>

Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God's Love for Humanity by Jordan Wessling [Oxford University Press, 9780198852483]

In **Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God's Love for Humanity**, Jordan Wessling provides a systematic account of the deep and rich love that God has for humans. Within this vast theological territory, Wessling's objective is to contend for a unified paradigm regarding fundamental issues pertaining to the God of love who deigns to share His life of love with any human willing to receive it. Realizing this objective includes clarifying and defending theological accounts of the following: how the doctrine of divine love should be constructed; what God's love is; what role love plays in motivating God's creation and subsequent governance of humans; how God's love for humans factors into His emotional life; which humans it is that God loves in a saving manner; what the punitive wrath of God is and how it relates to God's redemptive love for humans; and how God might share His intra-trinitarian love with human beings. As the book unfolds, Wessling examines a network of nodal issues concerning the love that begins in God and then overflows into the creation, redemption, and glorification of humanity. The result is an *exitus-reditus* structure driven by God's unyielding love.

In what is referred to as the 'high priestly prayer' (John 17:1–28), Jesus addresses the Father and describes a relationship of glory and love that was present between them 'before the foundation of the world' (John 17:24; cf. 17:5). In this prayer, Jesus expresses the desire to share the exchange of life and love between He and the Father with those who might believe in Him (e.g. 17:26), and He indicates that this sharing of the divine life transforms Christians and reveals that the Father loves them even as the Father loves Christ (17:23). The prayer's emphasis concerns God's love for those who are rightly related to Christ, but it could be argued that the author of this Gospel means to teach that the Father sent the Son to provide everyone with the opportunity to participate in their eternal life of love (e.g. John 3:16–18; 12:32). Whatever the case, the high priestly prayer points to a God with a profound love for humans. Read theologically, the Son petitions the Father to share their intratrinitarian life of love with those who will receive it, and Jesus compares the Father's love for believers with the Father's eternal love for the Son. It is difficult to imagine a God who could sensibly love humans more deeply.

Of course, the high priestly prayer is not the only place in Scripture where God reveals an intense love for humans. In the book of Deuteronomy, God explains to Israel that, although 'heaven and the heaven of heavens' belong to Him, He has 'set his heart in love' on Israel and graciously chose her for His good purposes (Deut. 10:15; cf. Exod. 34:5–7). The prophet Jeremiah describes God's love of Israel as an 'everlasting love' (Jer. 31:3), and other prophetic writers utilize evocative language—sometimes even the language of suffering—to describe the depth and faithfulness of God's love for His people. Isaiah testifies to the various ways in which God, 'in his love and in his pity', has redeemed Israel (Isa. 63:9; cf. 54:8; 63:7; Mic. 7:18–19), and Hosea paints a picture of God who loves Israel like a groom loves a bride and whose compassion 'grows warm and tender' even when she is unfaithful (Hos. 11:8). Within the New Testament, Jesus teaches that the Heavenly Father loves both the righteous and the unrighteous (Matt. 5:43–48), and Christ manifests God's love for those on the margins (Matt. 9:10–11; 21:31–32). St John twice says that 'God is love', and following each reference is the claim that God's love is revealed among and for humans in Christ (1 John 4:7–20). The Apostles Peter and Paul both teach, or at least are often understood to teach, that God loves each and every human person such that He desires everyone's salvation (e.g. 2 Pet. 3:9 and 1 Tim. 2:4; cf. Acts 17:28); and Paul speaks of Christ's love as a rooting and grounding love that 'surpasses knowledge', excels in 'breadth and length and height and depth' (Eph. 3:18–19), and cannot be overcome (Rom. 8:31–37).1 If all of this were not enough, the immensity of God's love for humanity is exemplified vividly within the central message of Christianity, whereby God became human and died a brutal criminal death so that all might participate in God's eternal life. So far as I am aware, no other religion or enduring system of thought places greater emphasis on God's love for humanity. In his often-cited historical exploration of the concept of love, Irving Singer forms a similar judgement. He concludes that 'Only Christianity . . . defines itself as the religion of love', since Christianity 'alone

has made love the dominant principle in all areas of dogma'. At bottom, the reason for this, in Singer's estimation, is that Christians worship the God who is identified with, even as, love.

This book provides a systematic account of the deep and rich love that God has for humans. While the associated theological territory is vast, the goal is to defend a unified account of central perennial issues pertaining to the God of love who deigns to share His life of love with any human willing to receive it. This task shall involve gaining clarity on what God's love is, what role love plays in motivating God's creation and redemption of humans, whom it is that God loves, and how it might be that God shares the intra-trinitarian life of love with human beings.

The first chapter of this study is methodological and sets the stage for many of the modes of reasoning found within the remainder of the book. In it, I argue that it is permissible to utilize reflection upon ideal human love as a significant source for considering how we should conceive of God's love (especially when this is conducted in concert with Scripture and Christian tradition). More specifically, I present reasons for believing that various New Testament authors presuppose that divine and human love (or a species of each) are similar in such a way that scrutiny of how humans ideally should love ought to inform how we think of God's perfect love. This methodological conclusion provides a foundation for the construction of a model of God's love that aims to represent features of the divine character in a manner that at least approximates the truth. The model, in turn, not only aids our understanding of what God's love is, it also provides some measure of intellectual traction on certain kinds of actions that God might be inclined to perform.

Chapter 2 is where I proffer this model of God's love, 'the value account'. According to the value account, God's love is an appreciative response to intrinsic worth (dignity in the case of a human), wherein God values the existence and flourishing of the one loved as well as union with the beloved individual. After expounding this model of love, I argue that conceiving of God's love in this manner is independently plausible, compatible with im portant kinds of biblical data, and nourished by a traditional Christian stream of thinking about God's love.

In Chapter 3, the value account of divine love is first put to work. Here, against Jonathan Edwards and others, I contend for the widely advocated but rarely rigorously defended doctrine that God created the world in general and humans in particular out of love. If adopted, this doctrine frames much of the Christian conception of God's dealings with humanity. For if God created humans out of love, grounds are furnished for maintaining that all or much of God's subsequent interaction with humans will be led by His initial creative motivation.

If God created the world out of love, how do events in the world impact Him, if at all? Does He commiserate with human suffering, or is there something about the divine nature which renders it impossible for the world to alter the shape of God's happiness? Against many contemporary proponents of divine impassibility who argue that there is nothing particularly valuable about divine commiseration, the contention of Chapter 4 is that God's commiserative suffering is an intrinsically valuable manner of identifying with His rational creatures. Thus, we should interpret biblical depictions of a suffering God as providing a window into God's inner life. Presupposed by this defence of divine passibility is the idea that God enjoys an 'affective love' for humans; that is to say, God is affectively open and responsive to those He loves dearly. The conclusion that God loves humans affectively, even though this introduces suffering into God's life, fills out the value account of divine love defended in Chapter 2 and provides a foundation for the conception of deification presented in Chapter 7.

Chapter 5 concerns the scope of God's love, specifically the scope of what I label God's supreme love: a love that values and seeks an individual's supreme or highest good. Contrary to a tradition that stretches back to the writings of St Augustine, I argue that God possesses supreme love for each and every human, and is thereby not limited to a select few. The universal scope of God's supreme love, I contend, flows naturally from the value account of divine love, especially when that account is spelled out in terms of God's maximal perfection.

Chapter 6 transitions from the scope of God's love to God's love of individuals whom He has just cause to punish. While a number of theologians describe a significant difference, even a 'duality', between God's love and punitive wrath, I argue that God's just wrath is a facet of His love, and that God's punishment of sinners, even in hell, is an expression of this relentless love. To make the case, I first contend that God's creation out of love, as well as the ministry of Christ, support the notion that God's love and wrath are fundamentally one. Next, I build upon the work of Gregory of Nyssa and the contemporary philosopher R.A. Duff to construct a communicative model of divine punishment. According to this model, God's punishment intends to communicate to sinners the censure they deserve, with the aim of persuading these individuals to start down the path of spiritual transformation.

Whereas Chapter 6 follows God's love into the pit of hell, Chapter 7 examines how God's love lifts humans into heaven. For in the latter chapter I propose a manner of conceiving of God's deifying love, whereby God shares His intra-trinitarian life of love with men and women through the life and death of Christ. The proposal requires partial accounts of both the Atonement and deification, along with an explanation of how these two doctrines fit together. Chapter 7 also provides a way of harmonizing various conclusions that emerge throughout the book. There we see how it might be that the God who loves within Himself, in accordance with the value account, creates out of love for the purpose of being united in an affective love with all of humanity. This way of harmonizing several conclusions within the book is touched upon in Chapter 7, and then this study wraps up with a brief and separate Conclusion.

In these ways, then, the present book provides an integrated paradigm for thinking about God's love for humanity as attested by the Christian faith. The project might be viewed as an attempt to trace foundational issues related to God's love as it begins in Him and then overflows into the creation, redemption, and glorification of humanity—a kind of exitus-reditus structure driven by the unyielding love of God. In tracing these issues, it is not my goal to survey what great theologians of the past have said about the topics covered, nor is it to review all of the contemporary literature on God's love. Instead, I present mostly new arguments for specific conclusions; historical and contemporary figures are brought into the discussion only as they facilitate that end. I add that this book has been constructed by a theologian primarily for theologians, but I also hope that my mode of argumentation, and some of the debates in which I engage, will be of interest to philosophers who enjoy thinking about the Christian faith. I doubt I will fully satisfy either of these very different audiences, yet I would like to believe that I advance the discussion on God's love for humanity in important respects that will be helpful to many readers— even if only to provide a target for counterarguments.

Few would deny the importance of the subject matter before us. Nevertheless, I submit that two features of the current academic landscape make a book on God's love for humans especially timely. One of these features comes from the philosophical academy, another from the theological guild. In

contrasting the aims of the present work with that of others, I do not intend to set a polemical tone to this manuscript.

The first relevant feature of the academic landscape has to do with a growing movement among contemporary Christian philosophers of religion to limit, or in certain ways moderate, the intensity of God's love for humans. The motivation for doing so often comes from the desire to defend the coherence of the Christian faith against the problems of evil and divine hiddenness that are pressed against them by their non-believing philosophical colleagues. 'If God loves us with a perfect love as Christians proclaim', say these colleagues, 'then God wouldn't allow horrendous suffering, and God would make His presence obvious. But God doesn't seem to be present to many, and the world is suffused with unspeakable suffering. So, it looks as if no God of perfect love resides in heaven.' The response to which I now make reference proceeds by rejecting the understanding of God's love that underwrites such objections. For a variety of reasons it is said, in effect, that God's love is so radically different than ideal human love that His love can be perfect while remaining indifferent to much of human welfare. Yes, God loves humans in some deeply mysterious sense, so the line of reasoning goes, but one should not exaggerate the depth and comprehensibility of that love.

Without wishing to dismiss the reality that humans can exaggerate their own importance, I am of the opinion that we should tread carefully when we suggest ways in which God's love for humanity might be less strong than we otherwise may have thought. Perhaps, on occasion, Christians have overstated the intensity of God's love for His creatures, and maybe the Christian philosophers at issue help us discern some of the ways that this is the case. That said, the God found in the dying face of Christ reveals a love that far exceeds what we would independently imagine. I do not know what action God could perform to show that He is more serious about His love for humanity. Thus, while I recognize that opinions on these matters divide, it seems to me that however we choose to respond to the problems of evil and divine hiddenness, downplaying God's love for humanity rarely will place us on a sure theological foundation.

I treat neither of the noted challenges to theistic belief within the present book. But I will outline a particular way of thinking about God's love that, if accurate, sets certain parameters on how Christians might address such challenges. In addition, at various places in this book, I argue against positions that I believe dilute God's love for humans, and I fear, by consequence, threaten to weaken God's message of love found on Calvary.

It should also be mentioned that many Christian philosophers, perhaps still the clear majority, respond to the problems of evil and divine hiddenness while making use of conceptions of God's love and goodness that are con sonant with most or all of the major theological conclusions defended within this book. In such instances, our projects can be seen as mutually reinforcing. Plus, it might be said that the existence of such responses to these challenges to Christian theism alleviates me from the responsibility of diving into the relevant deep waters within this work.

The second feature of the academic landscape that makes the topic of the present book timely comes from the current state of theological literature on God's love. Just a short time ago, there was something of a consensus that the doctrine of divine love had been largely ignored by theologians, or treated in an 'oblique, indistinct, or awkward' manner. Now the tides have changed. Kevin Vanhoozer writes that 'the love of God has become one of, if not the most, prominent themes in contemporary systematic theology', especially when it is 'paired with the theme of suffering and divine passibility'. Much of the work to which Vanhoozer refers is valuable and has

impacted my own thinking in various respects. But contemporary theologians tend to erect farreaching paradigms for thinking about the divine nature based significantly and explicitly on God's love (e.g. open theism, process theism, panentheism, and/or kenotical theism), without first pausing to discuss in systematic detail how we should approach the doctrine of divine love, what God's love is, how it might relate to other attributes of God, and so on. Even arguments for or against divine impassibility centred upon love are often carried out without much prior theorizing about the nature of God's love.

A separate theological research trajectory that often exhibits a similar shortcoming is more biblically oriented. The goal of this trajectory is to treat the 'dark' portions of Scripture that ostensibly implicate God in all manner of cruelty and violence (e.g. the erecting of unjust Israelite laws and the commanding of genocide), and show how these passages might be jettisoned responsibly in light of God's revelation of love found in Christ, or else be incorporated into a fuller Christian conception of God. This immensely important body of literature regularly informs my own theological judgements about divine love. However, there is a tendency in this literature to leave assumptions unscrutinized about what is or is not compatible with God's love, and how God's love and wrath might or might not be able to coexist.

There are, of course, solid exceptions to all this within both avenues of theological research; and I do not mean to suggest that the positions offered by many of these theologians are false or unhelpful simply because a more detailed analysis of the doctrine of divine love is not carried out first. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that such an analysis will aid our thinking about the relevant theological issues and viewpoints.

I will not speak to a number of the mentioned large-scale issues about the interrelation between the divine nature and divine love that garner the attention of many within the theological guild, nor will I address all the biblical verses and topics that might be deemed incompatible with the God of love revealed in Christ. All the same, my hope is that the following reflections on God's love of humans can contribute in principle to some of the debates about these subjects. More fundamentally, arriving at a well-reasoned and intricate doctrine of divine love is tremendously valuable in its own right, and hence could use more attention from theologians. I hope this book plays some small role in furthering the project of thinking carefully and systematically about the Love that is truly divine. <>

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Book Wars: The Digital Revolution in Publishing by John B. Thompson [Polity, 9781509546787]

This book tells the story of the turbulent decade when the book publishing industry collided with the great technological revolution of our time. From the surge of ebooks to the self-publishing explosion and the growing popularity of audiobooks, this book provides a comprehensive and fine-grained account of technological disruption in one of our most important and successful creative industries.

Like other sectors, publishing has been thrown into disarray by the digital revolution. The foundation on which this industry had been based for 500 years – the control, packaging and sale of words and images in the form of printed books – was called into question by a technological revolution that

enabled symbolic content to be stored, manipulated and transmitted quickly and cheaply. Publishers and retailers found themselves facing a proliferation of new players who were offering new products and services and challenging some of their most deeply-held principles. The old industry was suddenly thrust into the limelight as bitter conflicts erupted between publishers and new entrants, including powerful new tech giants who saw the world in very different ways. The book wars had begun. <>

You Are What You Read: A Practical Guide to Reading Well by Robert DiYanni [Skills for Scholars, Princeton University Press, 9780691206783]

We are what we read, according to Robert DiYanni. Reading may delight us or move us; we may read for instruction or inspiration. But more than this, in reading we discover ourselves. We gain access to the lives of others, explore the limitless possibilities of human existence, develop our understanding of the world around us, and find respite from the hectic demands of everyday life. In **You Are What You Read**, DiYanni provides a practical guide that shows how we can increase the benefits and pleasures of reading literature by becoming more skillful and engaged readers.

DiYanni suggests that we attend first to what authors say and the way in which they say it, rather than rushing to decide what they mean. He considers the various forms of literature, from the essay to the novel, the short story to the poem, demonstrating rewarding approaches to each in sample readings of classic works. Through a series of illuminating oppositions, he explores the paradoxical pleasures of reading: solitary versus social reading, submitting to or resisting the author, reading inwardly or outwardly, and more. DiYanni closes with nine recommended reading practices, thoughts on the different experiences of print and digital reading, and advice on what to read and why. <>

Mythos Lesen: Buchkultur und Geisteswissenschaften im Informationszeitalter von Klaus Benesch [Transcript Verlag, 9783837656558]

Die Gründe für den rasanten Prestigeverlust von Buchkultur und Geisteswissenschaften sind vielfältig. Niemand weiß, wie die Zukunft des Lesens tatsächlich aussehen wird. Dennoch lassen sich einige Antworten aus den Entwicklungen seit der Jahrtausendwende extrapolieren. Um ein breites Spektrum unterschiedlicher Positionen zu Wort kommen zu lassen, nimmt Klaus Benesch das Thema nicht nur aus Sicht der Leseforschung und der Literaturwissenschaften in den Blick. Das Fragen nach der sich wandelnden Rolle des Lesens und der Geisteswissenschaften im Informationszeitalter verlangt auch nach der Ausweitung der Perspektive in den Bereich der Gesellschafts- und Wissenschaftspolitik. Neue Selbstbilder der Geisteswissenschaften sind nötig, die die Kulturtechnik des Lesens in Zeiten der Digitalisierung auf neuartige Weise zeitgemäß und nachhaltig erschließen. <>

Aztec Religion and Art of Writing: Investigating Embodied Meaning, Indigenous Semiotics, and the Nahua Sense of Reality by Isabel Laack [Numen Book, Brill, 9789004391451]

In her groundbreaking investigation from the perspective of the aesthetics of religion, Isabel Laack explores the religion and art of writing of the pre-Hispanic Aztecs of Mexico. Inspired by postcolonial approaches, she reveals Eurocentric biases in academic representations of Aztec cosmovision, ontology, epistemology, ritual, aesthetics, and the writing system to provide a powerful

interpretation of the Nahua sense of reality.
Laack transcends the concept of "sacred scripture" traditionally employed in religions studies in order to reconstruct the Indigenous semiotic theory and to reveal how Aztec pictography can express complex aspects of embodied meaning. Her study offers an innovative approach to nonphonographic semiotic systems, as created in many world cultures, and expands our understanding of human recorded visual communication. <>

On Fear, Horror, and Terror: Giving Utterance to the Unutterable *Edited by* Pedro Querido and María Ibáñez- Rodríguez [At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, Brill, Rodopi, 9789004397989]

This volume brings together essays that examine a vast gamut of different contemporary cultural manifestations of fear, anxiety, horror, and terror. Topics range from the feminine sublime in American novels to the monstrous double in horror fiction, (in)security at music festivals, the uncanny in graphic novels, epic heroes' Being-towards-death and authenticity, atrocity and history in Central European art, the theme of old age in absurdist literature, and iterations of the "home invasion" subgenre in post-9/11 popular culture. This diversity of insights and methodologies ensures a kaleidoscopic look at a cluster of phenomena and experiences that often manage to both be immediately and universally recognizable and defy straightforward categorization or even description. Contributors are Emily-Rose Carr, Ghada Saad Hassan, Woodrow Hood, María Ibáñez-Rodríguez, Nicole M. Jowsey, Marta Moore, Pedro Querido and Ana Romão. <>

PHILOLOGY IN THE MAKING: Analog/Digital Cultures of Scholarly Writing and Reading edited by Pal Kelemen, Nicolas Pethes [transcript-Verlag <digital humanities> 9783837647709]

Philological practices have served to secure and transmit textual sources for centuries. However – this volume contends –, it is only in the light of the current radical media change labeled ›digital turn‹ that the material and technological prerequisites of the theory and practice of philology become fully visible. The seventeen studies by scholars from the universities of Budapest and Cologne assembled here investigate these recent transformations of our techniques of writing and reading by critically examining core approaches to the history and epistemology of the humanities. Thus, a broad praxeological overview of basic cultural techniques of collective memory is unfolded. <>

Thought Experiments: The Art of Jonathon Keats [Hirmer, 9783777434278]

Jonathon Keats' work as an artist and thinker is compelling for our time. Keats poses critical questions, asks us to fundamentally reconsider our assumptions, and proposes radical methods of response. In a time when the environment and human lifeways are experiencing unprecedented change, thought leaders like Keats are needed to encourage us to consider possibilities—from the absurd to the profound. Since the turn of the millennium, Keats has comprehensively extended his academic training in philosophy by prolifically presenting conceptual art projects that he refers to as "thought experiments." These include installations and performances in museums and galleries around the globe. His motivations are to make space for exploring ideas, offering provocations, and confronting systems we generally take for granted. By prototyping alternative realities—systematically asking "what if?"—these projects probe the world in which we live, exploring the potential for societal change. <>

Kara Walker: A Black Hole Is Everything a Star Longs to Be by Kara Walker (Artist), texts by Maurice Berger, Aria Dean, edited by Anita Haldemann [JRP | Editions, 9783037645574]

An enormous clothbound panorama of Kara Walker's works on paper—all reproduced for the first time

This gorgeous 600-page volume provides an exciting opportunity to delve into the creative process of Kara Walker, one of the most celebrated artists working in the United States today. Primarily recognized for her monumental installations, Walker also works with ink, graphite and collage to create pieces that demonstrate her continued engagement with her own identity as an artist, an African American, a woman and a mother.

More than 700 works on paper created between 1992 and 2020—which are reproduced in print for the first time from the artist's own strictly guarded private archive—are collected in this volume, thus capturing Walker's career with an unprecedented level of intimacy. Since the early 1990s, the foundation of her artistic production has been drawing and working on paper in various ways. <>

Henri Matisse by Kathryn Brown [Critical Lives, Reaktion Books, 9781789143812]

Henri Matisse's experiments with form and color revolutionized the twentieth-century art world. In this concise critical biography, Kathryn Brown explores Matisse's long career, beginning with his struggles as a student in Paris and culminating in his celebrated use of paper cutouts and stained glass in the last decade of his life. The book challenges various myths about Matisse and offers a fresh perspective on his creativity and legacy. Chapters explore the artist's enthusiasm for fashion and cinema, his travels, personal ties, interest in African art, love of literature, and willingness to challenge audience expectations. Through close readings of Matisse's works, Brown offers new insight into the artist's friendships and battles with dealers, critics, collectors, and fellow artists. <>

Postcolonial Images of Spiritual Care: Challenges of Care in a Neoliberal Age edited by Emmanuel Y. Lartey and Hellena Moon, Foreword by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Epilogue by Bonnie Miller-McLemore [Picwick Publishers, Paperback ISBN: 9781532685552 Hardcover ISBN: 9781532685569 Ebook ISBN: 9781532685576]

This anthology is about caring for all persons as a part of the revolutionary struggle against colonialism in its many forms. In recognition of the varied ways in which different forms of oppression, injustice, and violence in the world today are traceable to the legacy and continuing effects of colonialism, various authors have contributed to the volume from diverse backgrounds including differing ethnic identities, religious and cultural traditions, gender and sexual orientations, as well as communal and personal realities.

As a postcolonial critique of spiritual care, it highlights the plurality of voices and concerns that have been overlooked or obscured because of the politics of race, religion, sexuality, nationalism, and other structures of power that have shaped what discursive spiritual care entails today. **Postcolonial Images of Spiritual Care: Challenges of Care in a Neoliberal Age** presents voices of practical and pastoral theologians, academics, spiritual care providers, religious leaders, students, and activists working to provide greater intercultural spiritual care and awareness in the areas of healthcare, community work, and education. The volume, as such, expands the discourse of spiritual care and participates in the ongoing paradigm shifts in the field of pastoral and practical theology. <>

The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Biography edited By Koen De Temmerman [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780198703013]

Biography is one of the most widespread literary genres worldwide. Biographies and autobiographies of actors, politicians, Nobel Prize winners, and other famous figures have never been more prominent in book shops and publishers' catalogues. This Handbook offers a wide-ranging, multi-authored survey on biography in Antiquity from its earliest representatives to Late Antiquity. It aims to be a broad introduction and a reference tool on the one hand, and to move significantly beyond the state-of-the-art on the other. To this end, it addresses conceptual questions about this sprawling genre, offers both in-depth readings of key texts and diachronic studies, and deals with the reception of ancient biography across multiple eras up to the present day. In addition, it takes a wide approach to the concept of ancient biography by examining biographical depictions in different textual and visual media (epigraphy, sculpture, architecture) and by providing outlines of biographical developments in ancient and late antique cultures other than Graeco-Roman. <>

Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God's Love for Humanity by Jordan Wessling [Oxford University Press, 9780198852483]

In **Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God's Love for Humanity**, Jordan Wessling provides a systematic account of the deep and rich love that God has for humans. Within this vast theological territory, Wessling's objective is to contend for a unified paradigm regarding fundamental issues pertaining to the God of love who deigns to share His life of love with any human willing to receive it. Realizing this objective includes clarifying and defending theological accounts of the following: how the doctrine of divine love should be constructed; what God's love is; what role love plays in motivating God's creation and subsequent governance of humans; how God's love for humans factors into His emotional life; which humans it is that God loves in a saving manner; what the punitive wrath of God is and how it relates to God's redemptive love for humans; and how God might share His intra-trinitarian love with human beings. As the book unfolds, Wessling examines a network of nodal issues concerning the love that begins in God and then overflows into the creation, redemption, and glorification of humanity. The result is an *exitus-reditus* structure driven by God's unyielding love. <>

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