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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

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EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. Our Annotated Bibliography will review, list and link the titles under discussion, providing a faithful summary of its content and audience.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

Contents

POETRY, BIBLE AND THEOLOGY FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE MIDDLE AGES edited by Michele Cutino [Millennium-Studien / Millennium Studies, De Gruyter, 9783110687194]

This volume examines for the first time the most important methodological issues concerning Christian poetry – i.e. biblical and theological poetry in classical meters – from a diachronic perspective. Thus, it is possible to evaluate the doctrinal significance of these compositions and the role that they play in the development of Christian theological ideas and biblical exegesis.

This volume contains the proceedings of the International Symposium "Poetry, Bible and Theology from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages" organized on 25– 27 January 2018 in Strasbourg by ERCAM, "Research Team on Ancient and Medieval Christianity", belonging to UR 4377 of Catholic Theology and Religious Sciences of Strasbourg, in collaboration with several French institutions (IEA, "Institut d'Études Aug ustiniennes "-LEM,"Laboratoire d'études sur les monothéismes"-UMR 8584; ÉcoleNationale des Chartres; THAT Association, "Texts for the History of Late Antiquity"; CARRA EA 3094- University of Strasbourg) and international Institutions (Facultad de Literatura Cristianay Clásica "San Justino" (FLCC) of Madrid; Universidad Complutense de Madrid). This conference was attended by the greatest specialists in late ancient and medieval poetry, involving a total of 33 papers, divided into three full days.

All methodological questions concerning Christian poetry– i. e. Christian, Greek and Latin, ancient and medieval, poetic texts, in classical metres– with biblical and theological content, were approached from a diachronic perspective which made it possible to evaluate the doctrinal significance and the role that these compositions play even in the development of Christian theological ideas and biblical exegesis. From a chronological point of view, we have taken into account the period from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages, with particular attention to the adaptation of classical poetic modules to the writings of the Bible in all its forms by Greek and Latin poets of Late Antiquity, and to the new forms of biblical poetry promoted in the West, from the Carolingian Renaissance to the 12th-13th centuries, when the Charters legitimized the use of poetry in the theological debate, and to the later polemics between scholastic theologians (such as Giovanni Dominici and Jean Gerson) and Christian "humanist" poets. Indeed, it can be noted that the use of poetic genres by Greek and Latin-speaking Christians begins much later (especially from the end of the 3rd century/ beginning of the 4th century) than the birth of Christian literary production in prose, which accompanies the very birth of this religion. This "delay" reveals a real difficulty for Christian culture: the creation of a code adapted to the expression of biblical contents, central in this religion, through the cultural tools of Greek and Latin literary production inverse. This difficulty is often reflected in declarations of radical incompatibility between the two areas of reflection of Sacred Scripture and poetry, which is the instrument of expression privileged by profane culture (just think of certain statements hostile to poetry by important authors, such as Jerome or Augustine, who will have a follow-up to the Middle Ages, as M. Zink *Poésie et conversion au Moyen Âge*, Paris 2003. has clearly shown). On the other hand, poetry is at the origin of attempts to integrate the style of biblical poetic texts, psalms, and classical literary forms (this is the path followed, for example, by the type of Responsorial Psalm, which will not be very successful. The solution that ultimately prevails over the others gives rise, using a remarkable expression of Herzog, to the third cycle of poems of Western literature, which flanks the Homeric and Carolingian-Arthurian cycles: the cycle of biblical poetry in classical meters. This is a literary field of vital importance, which, after having encountered prejudices from a certain classicizing perspective, especially from the middle of the 20th century, has been established in the panorama of critical studies because of its chronological cross-cutting. Indeed, the "canons" of biblical poetry developed in Late Antiquity will dominate medieval schools and even those of the humanist era, finding also a favourable ground in the culture of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, to enter definitively into crisis with the cultural renewal of the Enlightenment. This has also been established thanks to the interaction that the field has promoted between emerging cultures, biblical-Christian and Germanic, and Greek-Latin civiliztion in its expressive forms.

The symposium highlighted the socio-cultural importance of this transposition of scriptural content into poetic forms: in fact, according to various modalities and purposes, and in relation to different recipients and reference environments, this transposition aims, first of all, at the "vulgarization" of the biblical interpretation and theological speculation in favor of the *rudes*, i.e. people who are foreign to catechetical schools or to the ecclesiastical careers, but who belong to the cultured/educated elites of their time, through the expressive instrument privileged by them, that is, the production in verse. This is the reason why Christian literature inverse is of great interest in the in-depth evaluation even of the phenomenon of the Christianization of the ruling classes, especially from the fourth/fifth century. A literary genre such as the 'epic' or the 'biblical paraphrase' clearly shows the value of this cultural operation: the transposition principally into hexameters of the books of the Old Testament (mention the paraphrases of Genesis by Cyprian the Gaul, Claudius Marius Victorius and Avitus) or of the New Testament (such as the *Evangeliorum libri* of Juvencus, the *Carmen Paschale* of Sedulius, the *Paraphrase of the John's Gospel* of Nonnos of Panopolis and the *Historia apostolorum* of Arator) isnot reduced to a simple rhetorical exercise or a literary reading. As

M. Roberts (*Biblical Epic and Rhetorical Paraphrase in Late Antiquity*, Liverpool 1985) . Nodes (*Doctrine and Exegesis in Biblical Latin Poetry*, Leeds 1993) have clearly shown, from different perspectives.J. Nodes, such transpositions into verse a re-reading of the biblical hypotext, an "update" of Scripture in relation to the requirements and expectations of the reference environment. So, this production associates scriptural interpretations and doctrinal commentaries with paraphrasing in verse, so that for this genre, we can also speak of a true biblical exegesis inverse, which is often accompanied by very precise theological objectives.

The study of Christian biblical poetry, therefore, requires a global and organic scientific approach, that is, an approach not limited to examining the formal questions related to the transposition into scriptural content, but also to showing how poetic form and exegetical-theological content support each other. On the other hand, there is a need for reflection on the very legitimacy of calling Christian poets true theologians. This is an issue that challenges even our notion of theology .Indeed, from the essay *Gloria. Pour une esthétique théologique* (ed.1962) by the theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, anew attempt was made to recover, within the theology, the aesthetic dimension of theology, underlining how symbolic and metaphorical language can be a very effective instrument of theological language. This is an aspect that medieval theologians were already very familiar with: thus, since Carolingian times, Jean Scot Erigène (*PL*122,146 B-C) has brought the theology of poetry (*theologiaveluti quaedam p oetria*) closer together through this particular use of language for teaching purposes. <>

The Sacred and The Sinister: Studies In Medieval Religion and Magic edited by David J. Collins, S.J. [Penn State University Press, 9780271082400]

Inspired by the work of eminent scholar Richard Kieckhefer, **The Sacred and The Sinister: Studies In Medieval Religion and Magic** explores the ambiguities that made (and make) medieval religion and magic so difficult to differentiate. The essays in this collection investigate how the holy and unholy were distinguished in medieval Europe, where their characteristics diverged, and the implications of that deviation.

In the Middle Ages, the natural world was understood as divinely created and infused with mysterious power. This world was accessible to human knowledge and susceptible to human manipulation through three modes of engagement: religion, magic, and science. How these ways of understanding developed in light of modern notions of rationality is an important element of ongoing scholarly conversation. As Kieckhefer has emphasized, ambiguity and ambivalence characterize medieval understandings of the divine and demonic powers at work in the world. The ten chapters in this volume focus on four main aspects of this assertion: the cult of the saints, contested devotional relationships and practices, unsettled judgments between magic and religion, and inconclusive distinctions between magic and science.

Freshly insightful, this study of ambiguity between magic and religion will be of special interest to scholars in the fields of medieval studies, religious studies, European history, and the history of science.

In addition to the editor, the contributors to this volume are Michael D. Bailey, Kristi Woodward Bain, Maeve B. Callan, Elizabeth Casteen, Claire Fanger, Sean L. Field, Anne M. Koenig, Katelyn Mesler, and Sophie Page.

Review

"This collection of essays brings together two areas that are still often looked at separately: the history of magic and the history of saints, mystics, and more everyday parishioners. As well as celebrating the work of Richard Kieckhefer, Collins's volume showcases the original work being done by leading scholars in the field. It should stimulate new work on the relationship between holiness and unholiness in the Middle Ages." —Catherine Rider, author of *Magic and Religion in Medieval England*

"This fascinating collection explores, as its dedicatee has done throughout his career, the fundamental ambivalence between 'the holy and the unholy.' Perfectly capturing Richard Kieckhefer's eclectic interests, the book includes essays on topics ranging from saints and their hagiographers, to church buildings (and their embodiments of identities and meanings), to heresy, demons, and magic. Kieckhefer once quipped that his scholarship has a right hand and a left hand. Both sides are delightfully represented here." —Laura Ackerman Smoller, author of *The Saint and the Chopped-Up Baby: The Cult of Vincent Ferrer in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*

"Apart from the introduction, this volume contains ten contributions by Anglophone authors—*discipuli, collegae, amici*—which, as usual, prove to be of quite diverse subject matter and quality." —Peter Dinzelbacher, *Sehepunkte*

Flirting Between Heaven and Hell by David J. Collins, S.J.

Richard Kieckhefer began his 1994 article "The Holy and the Unholy: Sainthood, Witchcraft, and Magic in Late Medieval Europe" with a literary comparison. He used the novelistic treatments of two

historical personalities—Dorothea von Montau (1347–1394) in Günter Grass's novel Der Butt (1977) and Gilles de Rais (1405–1440) in J. K. Huysmans's novel Là-bas (1891)—to reflect on the relationship of holy to unholy in medieval culture. In the former work, Grass portrayed an ambivalence in how contemporaries identified Dorothea: sometimes as a saint, sometimes as a witch. In the latter, Huysmans insinuated an ambiguity in Gilles's self- understanding as a necromancer derived from a doubt over whether the origin of his experiences is divine or satanic. While discounting the historical pretensions of both works, Kieckhefer endorsed a historical insight from each: First, sainthood and witchcraft were ascribed roles that could indeed occasion among medieval observers competing identifications, from which could emerge an ambivalence over who was what. And second, a participant's own understanding of the spiritual powers he or she was communing with could be ambiguous, with the effect that the divine and the demonic were allowed to enter into "a rare and fascinating alliance." By Kieckhefer's lights, appreciations of ambivalence, as in Dorothea's case, and ambiguity, as in Gilles's, open to the modern- day researcher understandings of medieval culture not apprehensible if opposition between the holy and the unholy is taken as self-evident and necessary. With an eye to the historical implications, Kieckhefer concluded, "Both the ambivalence in the one case and the ambiguity in the other were deeply disturbing [in the Middle Ages]: . . . orthodox observers understandably felt threatened by such flirtation between heaven and hell."

The aim of this volume, The Sacred and the Sinister, is to advance our understanding of that flirtation, and it is much inspired by Kieckhefer's career-long efforts at figuring out how the difference between holy and unholy was understood in medieval culture—where that frontier was less clear- cut and more permeable than is conventionally imagined—and why the difference mattered. The aim of this initial chapter is to introduce the full volume The Sacred and the Sinister in three steps: first, with a brief overview of the recent and interdisciplinary origins of the pairing of holy and unholy as an object of scholarly analysis, especially in the history of medieval Christianity; second, with a sketch of Kieckhefer's own contribution to framing the questions and shedding light on the problems; and third, with an outline of the volume at hand, which has been organized as a tribute to Richard Kieckhefer on the occasion of his retirement and as an effort to advance the scholarly agenda his work lays out.

Sacred and Profane, an Interdisciplinary Development

Today it is often taken as axiomatic by scholars of medieval culture that postulating the strict opposition between the holy and the unholy is an unwise starting point. Instead, scrutinizing the historical materials for indecision over and conflict between these beguilingly self- evident opposites holds out the greater promise for insight into medieval religious culture. The latter approach requires both the careful selection of tools to interrogate the sources and purposefulness in aggregating the relevant evidence. Kieckhefer's 1994 article makes precisely this point: assembling a coherent body of evidence and applying to it the proper analytical tools are preconditions for ascertaining the complex historical associations (and distinctions) between witch and saint, demonic fascinatio and mystical ecstasia, or exorcism and conjuration. Kieckhefer likewise challenged the modern- day historical researcher to keep in mind who the participants are to whom these associations and differences matter. Indeed, there are several kinds of participants, and they need not, as groups, agree: the historical participants themselves; those who observed, interacted with, and evaluated the direct participants; and the historical researcher today. Each of these interested parties has, of course, specific ways of understanding the problems. Once mindful of this range of distinctions and approaches, one can undertake what Kieckhefer held out as the historian's proper tasks: to strive to draw out the coherent from the seemingly incoherent and, at the very least, to

explain the changes through time, the consistencies and variations between and across cultures, and the distinctive perspectives across social strata.

This approach to the historical materials has its own history, a brief review of which will provide helpful background to the structure and content of this volume. A status quo ante can be determined in the scholarly activities of the early twentieth century. At this point saints were not studied in conjunction with witches, nor seers with mystics, nor exorcists with necromancers. It may be illustrative to imagine an encounter—because none occurred—between two esteemed and representative historians of the period, the early twentieth-century Belgian scholar of sainthood Hippolyte Delehaye (1859–1941) and the German historian of witchcraft and heresy Joseph Hansen (1862–1943). Both were respected scholars in their particular specializations, produced seminal monographs, and were prolific editors of historical texts.2 Both were also deeply committed to principles of a scientific history whose truth claims could be derived from and tested against historical documents. Yet despite drawing from the same well of methodological presupposition and expertise and even sharing an obvious, if incongruous, interest in the West's ecclesiastical past, their research was not mutually informing. One never cited the other, and there was never any scholarly collaboration. Delehaye's saints dwelled in holy isolation from Hansen's heretics.

The roots of the transformation from isolation to discourse can also be traced to this period, and even further back. They were nurtured by the diverse historians who constituted the early phases of cultural history and developed new ways of handling familiar sources to arrive at fresh historical insight. Study of the very centuries under closest scrutiny in this volume also proved themselves fertile for exactly these historiographical developments. Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897) and Johan Huizinga (1872–1945), usually brought out to represent opposing views of the fifteenth century, were in fact both central figures in the "classic phase" of cultural history. They can be referred to here in conjunction because of the ways in which they examined a wide range of sources, restlessly looking across disciplinary frontiers, to draw conclusions about the condition—political, theological, social, and cultural—of medieval society. Decisive accomplishments of the "classic phase" pertinent to this volume include searching for social attitudes and values apart from the more common political historical narratives; removing the necessity of finding explanations for given social phenomena in contemporaneous learned understandings; searching for explanation in such alternative, indirect sources as art and ritual; and being no minder of disciplinary division.

Developments in other fields, indeed in new disciplines altogether, also prompted historians to think beyond the categories derived from Christian theology and Enlightenment philosophy. The contributions of early anthropology, psychology, and sociology to understanding magic in relation to religion and science laid the groundwork for later reevaluations. Anthropological approaches to magic and especially witchcraft and their implications for historical research have been evaluated in detail elsewhere and so will not be repeated here. Suffice it here to highlight, first, the early attempts of such figures as James George Frazer (1854–1941), who strove to comprehend the human efforts to gain advantage from supernatural interventions in the natural world, and Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), whose ideas about the sacred and the profane became the foundation for later analysis of the holy and unholy in societies in and beyond the West. It is also in these earliest generations of sociology and anthropology that a triad was sketched out among magic, science, and religion, which were identified as sustained and systematic ways humans engaged with the sacred and the profane in a world assumed to be supernaturally created. The links among the three were, especially under the branding of functional structuralism, made evolutionary. The analysis claimed a decreasing persuasive power of supernatural explanations for natural phenomena correlating to expanding powers of human rationality even though there was not clear unanimity in the sequencing of religion and magic as antecedent to science.

Evolutionary hypotheses inspired criticism and the formulation of alternatives. Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) and Claude Lévi- Strauss (1908–2009) were leaders among those who reacted skeptically to evolutionary understandings of the three conceptual fields and corresponding practices. Malinowski rejected, for example, the idea that magic was proto- or pseudo- science, arguing that the savage readily distinguishes natural causes from sympathy, similarity, synecdoche, contagion, and other forms of magical causation. Rather, magic would be better understood as religion's competitor. Lévi- Strauss argued for blurred lines between the natural and supernatural orders, and he rejected the cultural possibility of mutually exclusive and clean- cut religion or magic. In any event, it was often wondered whether such a concept as the supernatural existed outside of the West. By the late twentieth century, historians of medieval religion and magic, while still making extensive use of anthropological models and theories, were similarly worrying that these tools neglected too much local variation and subtlety of change over time.6 Kieckhefer's ruminations on "holy" and "unholy" in 1994 reflect both the debt of historical religious studies to more than a century of anthropological reflection as well as a concern that social scientific models, not unlike the theologically informed perspectives of an earlier age, could mislead.

The encouragement to acknowledge ambiguity and ambivalence in the relationship between the holy and the unholy could be taken as a call to abandon the attempt to figure out the difference altogether. Ambiguity and ambivalence could be understood as but one step away from incoherence. This, however, was not at all what Kieckhefer had in mind. To the contrary, the difference between holiness and unholiness mattered to the medieval and early modern European. He clarified this dimension of the historiographical challenge in another seminal article appearing in the same year, "The Specific Rationality of Medieval Magic." Not only was it presumed in the medieval and early modern periods, he argued, that magic worked—that is, effected real change in the created world, including human society—but "its workings were governed by principles that could be coherently articulated" as well. Consequently, it becomes incumbent on the historian to figure out an internal logic, or the specific rationality, of a culture that, in this instance, intuited a difference between witchcraft and sainthood even as it sometimes struggled to discern the distinction in the concrete.

On Their Own Terms, Holy and Unholy: Kieckhefer's Scholarship

Kieckhefer's skill at reframing questions considered settled and proposing compelling new understandings of fundamental aspects of medieval religious culture extends beyond distinguishing between saints and witches. He founds his scholarship on the close reading of historical documents that are aggregated with a skeptical eye toward the conventional categories, placed in careful historical context, and interpreted sympathetically before they are criticized. How this approach itself emerged can be conveniently traced through his five scholarly monographs and his textbook on magic.

The first two monographs built on research he undertook as a doctoral student under the direction of John T. Ferguson at the University of Texas at Austin and the guidance of Alexander Patschovsky at the Monumenta Germaniae Historica in the early 1970s. The research strategy leading to European Witch Trials: Their Foundations in Popular and Learned Culture, 1300–1500 (1976) was as simple as looking for the intellectual and social antecedents of events in one period in the previous one. To figure out the theological, philosophical, and jurisprudential thinking that sustained the early modern witch craze, he turned to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. There he found—crucially—what others had not; and, by testing what was commonly but uncritically repeated, he forced wider reevaluations throughout the field of witchcraft studies. A first seminal insight in European Witch Trials had to do with his organization of multiple interacting layers of medieval society—distinguished as "popular" and "learned"—and how the latter's concern for diabolization transformed more benign popular understandings of magic with horrific consequences.

A second was an inspired skepticism toward nineteenth- century scholarship on the witch craze. His testing of the work of Étienne- Léon de Lamothe-Langon (1786–1864), Histoire de l'Inquisition en France, devastated certain widely held conventions about medieval ecclesiastical inquisition. Supposedly taken from secret archives in the diocese of Toulouse, the blood- curdling accounts of the Histoire had become a major source for popular as well as scholarly understandings of heresy tribunals, judicial procedure and the forensic use of torture, and the prosecution of witchcraft and heresy as crimes. Even Joseph Hansen repeated from it uncritically in his Quellen und Untersuchungen. But Lamothe- Langon had forged his sources, and it was not until Kieckhefer (and independently and concurrently Norman Cohn) attempted to track down the footnotes that the forgery was exposed.

Kieckhefer used a similar approach to trailblazing effect in Repression of Heresy in Medieval Germany (1979). Once again he looked into materials supporting a conclusion taken as foregone and ascertained instead an egregiously faulty interpolation. In this instance, he was able to conclude that medieval heresy tribunals, though numerous, did not constitute an "Inquisition." The term—singular and capitalized—had to be, in contradiction to Henry Charles Lea and so many subsequent historians of "the Inquisition," abandoned. Rejecting other, often materialist and reductionist speculations, Kieckhefer further proposed that the religious motive for the heresy prosecutions was not only adequate but foundational: "the high valuation that medieval society placed on religious orthodoxy" suffices to explain the phenomenon, and indeed explains the endurance and effectiveness of the method through multiple centuries.

Fourteenth- century saints might not appear to have a natural connection to fifteenth- century inquisitors. Nonetheless, Kieckhefer deveo ped insights taken from study of the later in his study of the former in his third monograph, Unquiet Souls: Fourteenth- Century Saints and Their Religious Milieu (1984). His by- this- point–hallmark scholarly sympathy for the objects of his analysis came to the fore again, as he took what appears to be pious frenzy and turned it into theological vision. This work, like his others, eschews any easy caricature of medieval religious expression. When, for example, he analyzed the conflicting perceptions of sanctity and insanity in the same saint, he built on the theoretical groundwork laid in the two 1994 articles. He strove, in the first instance, to understand the historical figures on their own terms and with a respect for the sources at his disposal. The result is not a whitewashing of medieval peculiarities, but a nuanced evaluation. Kieckhefer identified in the prayers, visions, and penances of the "unquiet souls" clear strains of Saint Augustine—yearnings, searchings, strong affective movements oriented interiorly toward the divine—but noted, too, an absence of the Augustine who was restrained, controlled, and self-critical. It is the Augustine who is passionate and impassioned that Dorothea von Montau and the others channel, but without the sober one. The work moves from text to context as Kieckhefer attempts to account for this uneven Augustinian reception by locating these historical figures in their religious milieu, one shaped in the fourteenth century by, for example, burgeoning literacy and new, unsettling forms of religious and semireligious life. Like two other works on sainthood appearing at roughly the same time—And ré Vauchez's La sainteté en Occident (1981) and Donald Weinstein and Rudolph Bell's Saints and Society (1982)—Unquiet Souls was an effort to move a scholarly conversation forward in the field of religious culture and the saints by drawing on advances developed across the humanities and the social sciences. Unlike other pathbreaking historians, Kieckhefer focused in his trademark way on a discrete set of texts that he determined to be emblematic. He exploited these texts for their significance through close reading and careful placement in historical contexts.

Kieckhefer turned to the basics in what is his best- known and most- read volume, Magic in the Middle Ages. Although the abundance of eye-catching examples and poignant quotations reliably

captures the attention of an undergraduate readership and there is a satisfying clarity to the chronological structure and analytical framework, to suggest that the book, labeled a textbook by the publisher, is conventionally propaedeutical undervalues its originality and depth and sells short its service as a catalytic agent for new scholarship on magic. The book proposes a way to understand magic in Western history: what "it" was and how it related to other modes of engagement with a rational and created world. Rationally created, this world lent itself to being known by humans and also to being engaged with by them. Magic was one mode of accomplishing these ends, along with, as the early social theorists had themselves already tried to make clear, science and religion. Kieckhefer needed to engage in the terms of the conversation that stretched back to the nineteenth- century figures we sketched above, and beyond. He argued for the impossibility of isolating magic as a perspective on the world and the powers afoot in it. Rather, magic was a perspective that—in different ways, changing over time and different across cultures and demographic strata—was best understood in conjunction with the religious and with the scientific. His earlier thinking on the differences between popular and elite magic was replaced with a distinction between "common magic," practiced across medieval society, and "learned," practiced especially in schools, religious houses, and courts. He located specific developments of the later Middle Ages, such as the emergence of a concern about diabolized witchcraft as representing a breakdown of distinctions once holding consensus across stratified medieval society. In the final analysis, Kieckhefer situated magic at the intersection of religion, science, and culture.

Kieckhefer pushed his case for the ambivalence between holy and unholy yet further in his next monograph, **Forbidden Rites: A Necromancer's Manual of the Fifteenth Century** (1998). He had elsewhere and en passant already drawn attention to a clerical underworld as the principal milieu for the practice of necromancy, that is, conjuring the dead. His meticulous analysis of the fifteenth-century necromancer's manual from the Bavarian State Library made the case by tracing out the startling but extensive parallels between its rituals and those of sacramental exorcism. As in his previous work, Forbidden Rites demonstrates the promise of the search for the internal logic and contextual relevance of the bizarre and contradictory. It exemplifies again his reverence for the overlooked and the disdained. The analysis required negotiating the natures of and boundaries between the sacred and sinister, the practical and theoretical in ritual (whether divinely ordered or demonically), and social and intellectual history. The inadequacies of facile binaries imposed on the past are laid bare.

Forbidden Rites includes an edition of the manual itself. With mischievous satisfaction Kieckhefer has related the bump in the road of international publishing that this caused, as lawyers negotiated across the Atlantic how liability would be distributed should harm come from using the recipes in the book. The story highlights a dimension of Kieckhefer's tenacity regarding historical documents and especially "the book." The identification and reliance on sources are, of course, something close to the heart of any serious historian. Kieckhefer, in his appreciation not only of manuscript research but also of manuscript editions, shares something with a distinguished class of historian who values direct contact with the evidence as well as the form that it comes in; who loves languages, those that manuscripts are written in and that they are translated into; and who appreciates the need for and the influence of editions in the contemporary scholarly community.

Two additional works appearing in the last decade attest yet further to his commitment to primary materials and their accessibility to scholars and students. The most recent is his translation of two significant fifteenth- century works on magic, Johannes Hart lieb's Book of All Forbidden Arts and Ulrich Molitoris's On Witches and Pythonesses. The other, slightly earlier editing project began with his Schickelesque stumbling across a cycle of theological poems on a quire hidden between the pages of an unrelated book he had purchased online from an antiquarian book dealer in England. His

careful identification and editing of the singular manuscript and the astute commentary he provided the edition, published under the title There Once Was a Serpent, constitute another case in point.

In Kieckhefer's most recent monograph, Theology in Stone: Church Architecture from Byzantium to Berkeley (2004), there is little sinister, unholy, or even profane. It would seem to mark a significant change in course. This is not the case. In fact, if one focuses on analytical framework and overarching question, then one finds in Theology in Stone the other side of the diptych begun with Forbidden Rites. The underlying curiosity sustaining both works has to do with how ritual connects human beings to sentience and power beyond themselves. As in Forbidden Rites, he grappled with the problem of how ritual works. Moving beyond Forbidden Rites, he interrogated the physical spaces in which these rituals take place and the shaping of those spaces according to theological insight and the users' yearnings for spiritual experience. Architectural style, theological expression, and communal expectations change through time; so, too, then, do the sacred spaces that communities construct for their rituals, taking place in time, space, and culture and negotiating the relationship between transcendent and immanent. Kieckhefer demonstrated the dependence of any architectural program on that religious purpose. The dependence creates ambiguity across time, space, and culture: one person's church is another's barn; that person's church is the other one's powder room. Kieckhefer's basic questions thus sustain this work no less than the others. The fundamentals are evident throughout. The questions are ultimately simple, even obvious. Kieckhefer, however, actually poses them and explores the rich infrastructure of ideas and aspirations to which they point.

Sacred and Sinister: Advancing the Program

This volume, The Sacred and the Sinister, is devoted to advancing our understanding of the interplay between holy and unholy, sacred and profane, and supernatural and natural in the history of "Old Europe." The chronological scope encompasses the Middle Ages and the early modern period and concentrates on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; the geographical and cultural scope encompasses the Latin West. Limited attention—for Kieckhefer's liking, surely too little—extends to the larger Mediterranean world. The ideas sketched above provide the two principles inspiring the chapters that follow, as well as axes along which they can be plotted. The first of the principles is that holy and unholy admit of ambivalence and ambiguity in their imputation to phenomena in the medieval and early modern world; the second, that it behooves the modern historian to assume an internal logic and to discern it, as far as is possible, from the sources. The first of the axes allows for a plotting of holy and unholy, sacred and profane, supernatural and natural. The second offers a scale of the social dimension—that is, where what we are analyzing belongs within medieval society. Kieckhefer first proposed in European Witch Trials that the distinction lay between popular and elite and later, in Magic in the Middle Ages, between common and elite. Along both axes, however, the search for interactions is as important, if not more so, as the determination of position. Movement and the absence of clear plotting points are exactly the way to avoid the problem of binaries and capture the ambiguities and ambivalences that are, by Kieckhefer's lights, so much a part of medieval religious culture.

The volume is divided into four parts. The first two chapters examine holiness in a traditional form, in the cult of the saints and the attempt to articulate holiness in the vitae sanctorum. Christina Mirabilis (1150–1224) and Margherita Colonna (1255–1280) could scarcely have taken more divergent routes to sainthood, the former starting as the sickly youngest sister in a family of modest means in the Lowlands, the latter as a privileged daughter of a Roman aristocratic family. The vitae written to demonstrate their closeness to God likewise make that point quite differently. Claire Fanger's meticulous examination of the hagiographical materials about Christina demonstrates that as bizarre and extreme as her behavior seemed to her near contemporaries, as to readers today, the structure and content of hagiographer Thomas of Cant impré's (1201–1272) famous vita of

Christina sanctifies the extremes by highlighting their similarity to a seemingly more mainstream saint, Francis of Assisi (1181/82–1226). In contrast (and as indicated by Sean L. Field in his contribution), the vita of Margherita by one of the saint's early followers, Stefania, argues for her holiness from an opposing vantage: rather than taking what was known through the other sources and arguing for their correspondence to real saintly holiness, the hagiographer adds and subtracts with a heavy editorial hand to the body of sources to create a saint in conformity to an established type, the wealthy female foundress. From opposite directions, Fanger and Field have discovered a common hagiographical endpoint, the thirteenth century's unquiet soul.

In the second section, the unholy manifests itself, and ambiguity and ambivalence take center stage. Kristi Woodward Bain examines the conflict between monks and parishioners over control of a church building in Wymondham, Norfolk. Conflicts over ecclesiastical property in medieval history are hardly unusual, but Bain adds to her study a much broader framework of time, demonstrating not only how mercurial the relationship between religious and laity was but also how simultaneously unstable and determined memories of historical events can be in forming community identities, in this case even to the present. In chapter 4, Elizabeth Casteen draws our attention to a single word, raptus, that acquired opposing connotations with highly gendered implications: on the one hand, suggesting sexual assault; on the other, mystical union.

The connotations and their implications likewise shift over time. She argues that, by the later fourteenth century, raptus became increasingly ambiguous in the law and increasingly eroticized in mystical and chivalric texts. The conceptual overlap that had characterized thirteenth- century hagiography faded as the semantic range of raptus grew wider and more slippery. In chapter 5, Maeve Callan examines the history of syneisaktism—intimate yet platonic partnerships between unrelated men and women, dedicated in religious life to Christ—and analyzes, to the extent the sources allow, the range of forms these partnerships took and the theological reflection, sometimes sympathetic, usually hostile, that the partnerships, real or imagined, inspired in learned writings of the day.

The volume's third section looks to areas where the power of the sacred seems most challenged and that of the sinister most conspicuous. Michael Bailey draws us into these issues in his chapter, which examines the frontier between magic and religion, a frontier that vexed thinkers in the Middle Ages as much as historians today. Bailey develops a framework for his analysis of the problem from Herbert Grundmann and explores whether magic can be fruitfully, if counterintuitively, understood as itself a religious movement. In chapter 7, Katelyn Mesler examines the jurisdictional challenge of determining the circumstances under which the unbaptized might fall under the authority of an inquisitor. It was the Jew whose ambiguity in this regard most disquieted arch- inquisitor Nicholas Eymeric and inspired his treatise "On Infidels Invoking Demons," which Mesler presents in edition and makes the object of her analysis. And in chapter 8, Anne Koenig considers another question that vexed some of the same inquisitors Bailey and Mesler allude to and examines magic as the muddled alternative to medical diagnosis. Her chapter evaluates intersections of medicine and magic to explore the rationality of medieval explanations of madness in fifteenth- century Germany, and she maps out the landscape of beliefs about magic's role in causing and curing insanity.

The last two chapters build on the preceding ones as they look to the ambiguities and ambivalences in medieval links between magic and celestial knowledge. In chapter 9, Sophie Page sketches the range of cosmologies that captured the medieval imagination, some with more, some with less reference to Aristotle as enthusiasm for his thought gained from the twelfth century onward. She explores the often confused and usually permeable boundaries between philosophical and popular cosmologies and thus sheds light on the perennially intriguing question of how and whether scientific

reflections inform popular convictions. In the final chapter, David Collins likewise turns to the Scholastics' embrace of Aristotelian astronomy and looks for it in later medieval biblical commentaries on Matthew 2, the story of the magi and the star of Bethlehem. Scholastics, Albert the Great in particular, brought the latest natural- philosophical tools and insights to the biblical passage. The result was commentary that was new not because the Scholastics had new theological ideas, but because, thanks to Aristotle and subsequent Mediterranean commentators, they were challenged to transform their conventional explanations for the Nativity accordingly.

By way of conclusion, a story. This one is factual rather than literary and takes place in an office so gabled and nooked as to make Hogwarts seem Bauhaus by comparison. There Richard Kieckhefer offered words of encouragement to a prospective graduate student who was unquieted over how the same historian could write both on fourteenth- century saints and fifteenth- century necromancers, the subjects of his most recent scholarly works: "My scholarship," he replied, "has a right hand and a left one." Aside from being an understated summary of a scholarly range that instead requires Kaliesque imagery, Kieckhefer's metaphor indirectly raises a full range of problems pertinent to his research and to this volume. Most obviously, the offhand response addressed and resolved a seeming contradiction within his research. The metaphor allows for the obvious differences between his interests in late medieval saints and in necromancers, yet rejects a mutual exclusivity and hints at a cooperative interdependence. The full range of his scholarship from European witch trials to sacral architecture bears this out, even if the discrete topics of the research seem to beg the question: If not mutually exclusive and incoherent, then what form of relationship does the study of saints and necromancers, of the sacred and the profane, and of the ecstatic and the demonic take? The ambiguities have been a lifetime's project for Richard Kieckhefer. It is this project the volume hopes to advance. <>

Esoteric Transfers and Constructions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam edited by Mark Sedgwick & Francesco Piraino [Palgrave Studies in New Religions and Alternative Spiritualities, Palgrave Macmillan, 9783030617875]

Similarities between esoteric and mystical currents in different religious traditions have long interested scholars. This book takes a new look at the relationship between such currents. It advances a discussion that started with the search for religious essences, archetypes, and universals, from William James to Eranos. The universal categories that resulted from that search were later criticized as essentialist constructions and questioned by deconstructionists. An alternative explanation was advanced by diffusionists: that there were transfers between different traditions. This book presents empirical case studies of such constructions, and of transfers between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in the premodern period, and Judaism, Christianity, and Western esotericism in the modern period. It shows that there were indeed transfers that can be clearly documented, and that there were also indeed constructions, often very imaginative. It also shows that there were many cases that were neither transfers nor constructions, but a mixture of the two.

CONTENTS

Introduction: The Esoteric and the Mystical, Transfers and Constructions by Mark Sedgwick and Francesco Piraino

A recurring theme in some esoteric and mystic movements is their relationship to religious alterity. While in many religious phenomena, identity boundaries—the frontiers between "us" and "them"—are of crucial importance, in esotericism and mysticism the boundaries may be blurred or crossed. This is sometimes due to the focus on individual experience and on instruments of expression such as poetry, metaphysics, and music. Blurriness should not be confused with secular openness, tolerance, or relativism, however. In fact, sometimes it can have purely aesthetic reasons, or be an instance of cultural appropriation.

The relationship between esoteric and mystical currents in different religious traditions has long interested scholars, and this interest has given rise to such classic works as Rudolph Otto's Westöstliche Mystik (Mysticism East and West, 1926) and Toshihiko Izutsu's Sufism and Taoism (1984). The comparative approach became mainstream between the 1950s and 1980s among the intellectuals of the Circle of Eranos, such as Gershom Scholem (1897–1982), Mircea Eliade (1907–1986), and Henry Corbin (1903–1978). Yet this and other comparative approaches implied a "heroic" quest for religious essences, archetypes, and universals, and sometimes a harsh critique against the social sciences and institutional religions, the former accused of reductionism, the latter accused of being of only secondary importance compared to mysticism and esotericism, echoing the concept of "second hand" religion employed by William James.

Scholars have since grown suspicious of such treatments, tending to regard universal categories primarily as constructions, and seeing in such comparative studies the imposition of essentialist (and mostly Western) categories. Just as structuralists once endorsed such approaches, deconstructionists now question them.

The construction of universal categories and the identification of essences have long been among the main objectives of human thought. In the history of esotericism (as we will see in this book) there have been several conceptualizations of a universal human being (see Chap. 13), a universal language, and a universal religion or philosophy (see Chaps. 7 and 12), aiming at harmonizing or dominating the complexity and multiplicity of our lives (see Chap. 6).

Archetypes, universal categories, and structuralism are not the only explanations of similarities between different esoteric and mystical currents, however. There are also transfers between currents, as diffusionists propose, just as there are transfers within currents. This book therefore looks both at transfers between and constructions within esoteric and mystical currents in three different religious traditions: Jewish, Christian or Western, and Islamic. It thus covers its topic from two different but complementary perspectives, diffusionist and deconstructionist. It is based firmly on empirical case studies, aiming in this way to make a soundly based contribution to an important theoretical debate.

The Dreams of Poliphilo

One example of esoteric transfers and constructions is the Hypnerotomachia Poliphili, a title that could be translated as "amorous struggle in a dream of Poliphilo." This beautiful book, most probably written by Francesco Colonna (1433/34–1527), a Venetian Dominican monk, at the end of the fifteenth century, was printed by Aldo Manuzio (1449–1515) in 1499 with 172 woodcut illustrations.

The book's hero Poliphilo (he who loves multiplicity) pursues his love Polia (multiplicity) in a dream, encountering dragons, wolves, and maidens. In his dreams, he falls asleep, continuing his travels in a dream within a dream, during which he encounters Venus and Cupid, who allow him finally to be rejoined with the beloved Polia.

In Colonna's initiatic journey, in which the beloved Polia embodies the inner transformation and purification of the soul, we can find Platonic and Neoplatonic themes that were central in the Italian Renaissance, influencing not only literature and philosophical debates, but also Christianity, as they also influenced Judaism and Islam in other contexts. These Platonic and Neoplatonic themes have not only been transferred into multiple religious traditions, but became a language in their own right for imaging a universal religion or philosophy.

In reading the Hypnerotomachia Poliphili we can trace esoteric transfers, and also the imagination and construction of religious alterity. One example of this is the illustration of three doors labeled in Greek, Latin, Hebrew, and Arabic, reprinted on the front cover of this book. On one side there is "Gloria mundi" (worldly glory), on the other side "Gloria dei" (divine glory), but Colonna's hero Poliphilo chose the middle door: "Mater amoris" (mother of love)—that is, the path of love. The use of Arabic in this book was not for its meaning but for an aesthetic purpose, and was probably meant to underline the universality of the esoteric quest. The Arabic-Islamic alterity in Colonna's book, then, is imagined more than experienced.

The Hypnerotomachia also gives us another perspective on religious alterity through narratives about the body, emotions, and love that could be considered as structural or universal themes. Poliphilo, in his dreamlike journey, describes taste, smell, and touch. Despite his quest for Love with a capital L, the body is of particular importance, as the human desires and even lusts for "furor erotico."

It is often impossible to tell the difference between imagining or constructing the Other and being influenced by it. Hence, transfer and construction can usefully be understood as lying on a continuum, where ideas and practices are lived and understood, but also manipulated, appropriated,

and reinvented. We will see in Chap. 8 of this book how the religious Other could become the imagined ideal place, where values and practices denied in one's own culture could be lived. In other cases, the Other is "robbed" of its ideas and practices, as we will see in Chap. 5. Sometimes the relation with the Other is completely absent: rather than a dialog it is a monolog with a simulacrum of alterity; in fact, thanks to the narrative of esoteric secrecy the author could suggest that the Other is saying exactly what the author wants, bending the meaning completely (see Chap. 7).

Abraham and the Mediterranean

This book's choice of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam partly reflects the theoretical assumption of "Abrahamic harmony"5 that is itself a construction and is thus also problematic, and partly reflects the dominant religions found in one particular region, the Mediterranean, with some extensions to the west and the south. The identification of the Western with the Christian should also be questioned, as one of the things that this book shows is that the West—wherever and whatever that may be—is not only Christian. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all also draw on Greek antiquity, for example.

There have also been important transfers between the three religious traditions this book considers and traditions beyond the Mediterranean, notably the Zoroastrian tradition of Persia and the multiple traditions of India. To attempt to include all these transfers in one book, however, would be excessively ambitious, and so this book restricts itself to the three main religious traditions found around the Mediterranean. Geography has provided multiple opportunities for transfers between Jewish, Christian or Western, and Islamic traditions. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam also extend beyond the Mediterranean, of course, and this book will take us south to Yemen during the premodern period, and west to the Americas during the modern period.

As we will see, during the premodern period the tradition that runs parallel to Judaism and Islam is the Western Christian tradition, written in Latin, and in the modern period there is a Western tradition that is not overtly Christian, usually articulated in French, German, or English. Religious tradition cannot always be neatly paired with language, of course: Arabic was once a great imperial language, not just the language of Muslims, and was used by Jews and Christians as well. French and English occupy a comparable position today.

The Esoteric and the Mystical

That this book looks at both esoteric and mystical currents in some ways solves the problem of distinguishing between them, but even so it is worthwhile to spend a little space on the question of how it understands these two important but difficult terms. The debate about what the "esoteric" is that started with Antoine Faivre's oft-cited definition of 1986 and was initially a debate about "Western" esotericism, a concept that originally arose as an alternative to the "Eastern" esotericism of the Theosophical Society. The Theosophical Society was not a scholarly organization, and it is important to remember that scholarly constructions often have non-scholarly roots. Theosophical constructions of esotericism have been widely influential, as have later constructions by Traditionalists such as René Guénon (1886–1951) and Frithjof Schuon (1907–1998). Scholars such as Eliade and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (born 1933) followed where the Traditionalists led.

The "Western," geographical, or civilizational restriction has subsequently been questioned in a second debate,8 to which we will return below, but it is important to note that the original understanding of Western esotericism, however problematic, allowed an entire new research field to come into being, fostered in North America by the Association for the Study of Esotericism (ASE), in Europe by the European Society for the Study of Western Esotericism (ESSWE), and then by similar bodies in Russia and South America.9 The question of what Western esotericism is, then, can be answered in two ways: in theoretical terms with the aid of the major contributors to the

scholarly debate,10 which could be resumed in three main frames (the approach focusing on the forms of thought; the genealogical focusing on the historical processes; and the discursive formation focusing on narratives) and in practical terms by looking at what topics have been discussed at the meetings of ASE and ESSWE.

The debate on the nature of mysticism is less current than the debate on the nature of esotericism, though there are signs of it re-starting.11 At one level, mysticism can be understood as the same thing as esotericism, since esōterikós at one point meant that which was restricted to an inner circle, and that which was restricted to an inner circle was the mustērion (Latin: mysterium). At another level, however, the phrase "theologia mystica" came to have a very specific technical meaning in medieval and early modern Europe, due to the fact that the particular theology that Pseudo-Dionysius had labeled as restricted or hidden was Neoplatonic and pointed to the "unio mystica," henōsis, the union with God that is (perhaps) known in Hebrew as devekut (attachment) and in Arabic as ittiṣāl (contact), ittihād (union), or fanā (dissolution). The "perhaps" is important, because the extent to which these terms mean the same thing, or indeed quite what they mean anyhow, is much disputed. Part of the problem may be that, as Gilya G. Schmidt has argued in the case of devekut, they have actually meant different things in different places at different times. It is likely, however, that Colonna's middle door, "Mater amoris," has something to do with mysticism; but what is mysticism? Is it an experience—the experiential and bodily knowledge of God—or a specific theological current?

During the twentieth century, the understanding of mysticism developed into a universal category of human experience, which implies all the same problematic issues as all kinds of universalism, such as normativity, ethnocentrism, translatability, reductionism, and essentialism. This development is reviewed in detail in Chap. 11, and so will not be explored further here.

If the term "mystical" is understood not in its widest sense as human religious experience and/or emotion but in a more narrow Neoplatonic sense, the "esoteric" can be understood more widely as denoting that which is hidden, either because it belongs to the world of the unseen (nistar in Hebrew, ghayb in Arabic) or because it is somehow concealed (sod in Hebrew, bāṭin in Arabic). In this sense, "esoteric" has something in common with "occult," a term which many scholars have abandoned because of its negative associations, though other scholars favor its use to describe a particular period in the history of esotericism. Occultism, in turn, brings us to another topic much discussed at meetings of ASE and ESSWE: magic. This is, once again, a contested term, if only because Deuteronomy 18:11–12 condemns a long list of magical practices including generic kishuf (sorcery), a prohibition generally endorsed by the medieval Catholic Church, and repeated in Islam in the many ḥadīth (canonical reports of the Prophet's sayings) that condemn siḥr (magic). Practitioners of magic, then, often had a strong incentive to maintain that what they were doing was not, actually, magic. A further complication is that much of what modern Westerners might classify as magic—for example, anything to do with demons (Hebrew: shedim; Arabic: jinn)—is not, in Jewish or Islamic terms, necessarily magical. One of the chapters of the Quran that is most often used in daily prayer, for example, refers to the jinn (Quran 114: 6), and the jinn are quite as mainstream in Islam as angels are in Christianity. Even though the jinn are not necessarily magical or esoteric, then, magic does refer to the unseen and the hidden, and so may be classed as esoteric,

the Latin label for the door on the left, so that the worldly becomes divine, and the door on the left has the Arabic translation of the Latin label for the door on the right, so that the divine becomes worldly. Fortunately for Poliphilo, the middle door is correctly labeled in all languages.

This is an unusually dramatic (and accidental) transformation, but transformation is not always accidental. Sometimes it is a form of acculturation, as in the case of premodern magical texts that were transferred between Hebrew, Arabic, and Latin, languages with different morphologies and conventions, and also languages with similar but differing bodies of sacred scripture. Acculturation also takes place in the modern period when psychology becomes Sufi.

Sometimes, transfer may also involve appropriation, a difficult issue, and not only because appropriation implies the existence of exclusive cultural property, which may again be seen as essentialist. The difference between legitimate inspiration and re-use on the one hand, and illegitimate appropriation on the other, is not always clear, which is one reason why the topic is so sensitive. One important factor, as so often, is power relations. For some, any transfer that takes place in a context of unequal power relations is appropriation, which transforms most transfers into appropriation, as power relations are rarely precisely equal, even (for example) between Japan and the United States today.16 More importantly, cultural transfer may not just take place in the context of unequal power relations but may actually reinforce the dominance of one group over another, for example when a school system replaces the language of the conquered with the language of the conqueror. This is what Richard A. Rogers would call "cultural dominance," and it is immediately obvious what the problem is: the less powerful group loses something that is central to its identity. It is also immediately obvious what the problem is with another classic form of cultural transfer, when objects that are important to the identity of less powerful groups are whisked across the world into the museums of the powerful. Physical appropriation of a physical object necessarily deprives the former owner(s) of their property. Cultural appropriation can also be problematic when this is not the case and when something that is not physical is appropriated, if the appropriation somehow has a harmful effect on the less prominent group, as when something that is important to the less powerful group is trivialized, commodified, or banalized by the more powerful in the eyes of all. Desecration does not always have to be physical. When late premodern German Christians take Jewish magical texts and Christianize them, maintaining that the Jews can no longer use their own rituals, that is probably appropriation. When an English occultist learns the Islamic ṣalāt (ritual prayers) and incorporates elements of them into a new religion, that may or may not be appropriation, as no obvious harm is done to Islam. When Sufism is merged with psychology, perhaps Sufis are weakened by the adulteration of their faith, or perhaps they are strengthened by the new synthesis.

The debate about whether esotericism can usefully be understood as "Western" raises the question of whether or not there is a Jewish esotericism and an Islamic esotericism, and if so, how these relate to Western esotericism. Wouter Hanegraaff recently proposed that while there may have been occasional transfers between Western, Jewish, and Islamic esotericism, "Jewish and Islamic forms of 'esotericism' have emerged and developed as largely self-contained and relatively autonomous traditions, accessible during most of their histories only to pious Jews and Muslims within their own respective communities." Liana Saif, Mark Sedgwick, and Francesco Piraino have argued against this in the case of Islam. For Saif, the medieval period saw a "cross-cultural transfer of ideas and practices that are central to the conceptualization of Western esotericism," and Sedgwick and Piraino have similarly argued that although Jewish, Christian, and Islamic discursive worlds are undoubtedly partly self-contained, there have also even periodic contacts and transfers. Saif has proposed an "entangled history of esotericism" to replace a dichotomy between Western and Islamic. Alternatively, if we consider esotericism as a discourse focused on an absolute and secret

knowledge that leads to elitist and sectarian organizational structures, we can abandon the geographical and cultural frame altogether, finding esoteric discourses in various cultural and historical contexts. This contributes to the discussion about the relations among different religious phenomena, which could be the fruit of transfers or constructions, or could be universals which are not archetypes or essences, but forms, discourses, everyday life practices, and emotions.

Two Transfers and a Construction

This book is divided into three parts, two on transfers and one on constructions. The first part, on transfers, focuses on the premodern period, ending in the seventeenth century, while the other focuses on the modern period, starting in the nineteenth century and continuing until the present.

In the first part, on premodern transfers, the focus is on Judaism, Islam, and Christianity—not the West. There are four text-based studies, two dealing primarily with poetry and thus with imagery and the mystical and two dealing with magic and thus with invocation and the esoteric. Two of these four chapters deal with all three "Abrahamic" religions, while one deals only with Judaism and Islam, and another only with Judaism and Christianity.

Andrea Gondos starts by stating one aspect of the problem that this book addresses: for whatever reason—and to explain this is not her objective—love is used in very similar ways as a rhetorical tool for the mediation of theological ideals and principles in Jewish, Christian, and Sufi mystical poetry. She analyzes the relationship of theology and language through the prism of how love as emotion is evoked, induced, and even prescribed in mystical sources. She contends that while religious tenets, language, and rituals differ between the three Abrahamic religions, emotional states such as love constitute a common vehicle to approach and access the Divine. To demonstrate this, she explores the caress and the kiss in Jewish kabbalistic compositions, going back to the thirteenth-century Rabbi Isaac Hacohen. From the Christian tradition she takes the commentary of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) on the mythical encounter of Lysias and Phaedrus, and the images of the female mystics Beguine Hadewijch of Brabant (1200–1248) and Teresa of Avila (1515–1582). Finally, for Islam she takes Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207–1273) and Farid al-Din Attar (1145–1221).

Mark Wagner then takes us to a context where it is easy enough to see how transfer might occur, as the majority of the poems of the Yemeni Rabbi Salim Shabazi (1619–c. 1679, also known as Shalom Shabazi) used alternating stanzas of Hebrew and Arabic. Wagner shows that Shabazi's poetry uses many classic ghazal motifs that are also found in Sufi poetry, but which may or may not actually be Sufi, they are also used in secular poetry. There is certainly transfer, but it may not be esoteric or mystical transfer, but purely artistic. Certain phrases and images used by Shabazi, however, are specifically Sufi, notably those shared with the Yemeni Sufi Ahmad ibn ʿAlwan (d. 1266). Here Wagner shows how a form of transfer of mystical themes can happen, and thus indicates one possible answer to the question that Gondos's chapter asks.

Turning to magic, Gal Sofer and Ildikó Glaser-Hille both show the usefulness of very detailed textual studies. Sofer examines Islamic, Christian, and Jewish formulas in the Solomonic corpus, the collection of texts attributed to King Solomon that is used to subdue and bind demons. These demonstrate not just transfer but also one result of earlier transfer: agreement. The consensus among premodern Jews, Christians, and Muslims was that King Solomon had power over demons. Within this agreement, however, there was also difference. First, it was often held that formulas from the relevant tradition should be used when dealing with demons from that particular tradition—one should refer to Jesus when dealing with a Christian demon and the Quran when dealing with a Muslim one. Sofer also traces the less deliberate transformation of names and other formulas over the centuries as texts are translated from one language to another, for example, in the Hebrew, Arabic, and Aramaic sources of the fifteenth-century Latin Liber Bileth (Book of Bileth).

Glaser-Hille then takes us through late premodern German demonic ritual magic, showing how the transfer of Jewish texts into Christian versions not only involved transformations similar to this demonstrated by Sofer but also served to construct Christianity as superior and Judaism as inferior, what she calls "magical supersession theology." Christian versions of the Jewish Hekhalot (palaces) literature, for example, asserted that the Jews had lost the power to use their own rituals effectively, and that this power had passed to the Christians. Christians also modified Jewish rituals by adding the Eucharist to them. The transformations she identifies are, as has been said, similar to those identified by Sofer, but a clear and coherent purpose is now also identified. What is going on, Glaser-Hille concludes, is not just transfer but also appropriation.

In the second part of this book, on modern transfers, the focus is on Judaism, Islam, and the West—not Christianity. There are five studies, drawing on archival material and also in two cases on interviews and anthropological fieldwork. All five chapters deal with the esoteric more than the mystical. One chapter deals not only with two of the three "Abrahamic" religions but with three modern Western systems (Freemasons, Spiritists, and the Cosmic Movement), while three chapters deal only with Islam and modern Western systems (Thelema and psychology). Only one chapter touches on Judaism, and that mainly because its main subject was of Jewish origin.

Alexandre Toumarkine starts with a wide panorama in Tlemcen, Algeria, in the late nineteenth century. Tlemcen, though a midsize town, had a full range of esoteric groups: the Cosmic Movement of Max Théon (1848–1927), Freemasons, Spiritists, Jewish visitors to the tombs of medieval Kabbalists, and a number of Sufi tombs and ṭarīqas (orders). Only Christian mystics are absent. As Toumarkine shows, however, although these groups were all living in close proximity, there were barely any transfers at all between them. Instead, there was a lot of mutually hostile construction. The French authorities first distrusted and then tolerated the Sufis, whose beliefs Théon and the Spiritists dismissed as unscientific, as did some French observers. The Israelite Consistory of France sent Chief Rabbis from Alsace to civilize the local Jews, who were meanwhile excluded by the (often antisemitic) Masons. All these hostile constructions, then, prevented any transfers.

Rasoul Namazi takes us to Germany and then across the Atlantic to the University of Chicago, where the German–American political philosopher Leo Strauss (1899–1973) taught, and later became known for the impact of his "Neo-Straussian" students on the development of Neo-Conservatism. Namazi shows how Strauss's understanding of "esoteric writing" helped him solve what he called "the theologico-political problem," the issue of the relationship between religion and politics. This problem led Strauss to Spinoza (1632–1677) and Maimonides (1138–1204), and Maimonides led him to Alfarabi (Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Farabi, 872–950), who Strauss saw as the great practitioner of esoteric writing, a writing between the lines that allowed an esoteric premodern Enlightenment that preceded the better-known exoteric Enlightenment. Maimonides, too, was part of this premodern Enlightenment, and Strauss finally concluded that "Maimonides in his beliefs was absolutely no Jew." This transfer from the premodern Muslim Alfarabi to the modern Jewish-born Western Strauss, then, allowed the construction of a new view of the history of philosophy, and also of esotericism. Strauss's esotericism was in no way religious; Namazi terms it "philosophical esotericism." Whether or not Strauss was correct, the construction is impressive.

Returning to the Mediterranean, Marco Pasi then examines the relationship with Islam of the English occultist Aleister Crowley (1875–1947), looking at both constructions and transfers. On the one hand, Crowley constructed a particular image of Islam. On the other hand, there were transfers, visible when one finds structural similarities between Islam and Crowley's new religion, Thelema. Pasi starts off by showing that Crowley knew much more about Islam than is generally thought: he even learned some Quran in Arabic, and how to perform the ṣalāt. Crowley's relationship with

Islam, then, is very different from Max Théon's. So far as transfers are concerned, Thelema drew above all on the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, not on Islam, but Islam may have provided the model for some aspects of Thelema, especially its sacred history, and several aspects of its practice may be inspired by the ṣalāt. For constructions, Pasi draws attention to the importance of the model associated with the British explorer and writer Richard Burton (1821–1890), who Crowley much admired. Like Burton, Crowley romanticized Islam, including Muslim attitudes to sexuality, and understood Sufism as pantheism. He considered Islam greatly preferably to Christianity. Pasi does not explore this aspect of his topic, but one might wonder to what extent Crowley's use of Islam might be seen as appropriation, however (relatively) great his admiration for it.

The two remaining chapters in this part of the book examine transfers between Sufism and modern psychology. Francesco Piraino looks at the Italian Sufi shaykh Gabriele Mandel (1926–2010), and how he merged Islam, psychoanalysis, and Western esotericism into one single construction. Piraino reconstructs Mandel's biography to show how he started with psychoanalysis and the de-Islamized Sufism of Idries Shah (1924–1996), and then replaced Shah with the Islamic Sufism of the Jerrahiyya-Halvetiyya ṭarīqa of the Turkish shaykh Muzaffer Ozak (1916–1985), which led to the Islamization of Mandel's Sufism and of his following. Even so, Mandel continued to merge psychoanalysis and Sufism, both in theory and in practice, using "Sufi" therapies based on music, dance, and colors. It is hard to say which element in this combination was uppermost, what the direction of transfer was, or what was being appropriated and what was appropriating. The resulting construction, however, was neither homogenous nor enduring. Even in Mandel's lifetime, different followers focused on different elements, taking what they liked and ignoring what they did not like, to produce what Piraino calls "a fragmented Sufi Order," a fragmentation that did not survive Mandel's death. The Jerrahiyya-Halvetiyya of Milan is becoming ever more like that of Istanbul.

Mark Sedgwick then looks at the history of the Enneagram, a "universal symbol" first used in Russia in 1916 by the Armenian esotericist George Gurdjieff (1866–1949). Sedgwick shows two processes of transfer, which ultimately produced a triangle rather than the pair like those that other chapters have examined. During the first process, from about 1952 to the 1980s, users of the Enneagram in esoteric milieus in Europe, North America, and South America appropriated elements of psychology to produce the "enneagram of personality," which became a widely used personality test that is now often constructed as being of scientific rather than esoteric origin. During the second process, from about 1973 to 1995, a series of Western Sufis appropriated the Enneagram, giving it a mythical Sufi origin. This allowed four other Western Sufis to then transform the Enneagram into a Sufi practice. In the cases of the American Laleh Bakhtiar (born 1938) and the Frenchman Amanoullah de Vos (born c. 1948), both of whom had a background in psychology, the result was a synthesis in which Sufism was dominant. In the two other cases, of Hamidah Torres and Abdul Karim Baudino (born 1969), both Argentinian Sufis, the Sufism was less dominant. Sedgwick argues that while the transfer of psychology into esotericism during the first process examined in the chapter was unidirectional, during the second process the transfer was bidirectional, with esoteric psychology being appropriated by Sufism, and Sufism being simultaneously esotericized and psychologized.

In the third and final part of this book, on esoteric and mystical constructions, the focus is once again on Judaism, Islam, and the West—not on Christianity. There are three studies, again drawing on archival material. Two chapters deal with mysticism, and one with esotericism. One deconstructs modern constructions of one particular topic—the relationship between Sufism and Kabbalah—and two look at modern individuals who constructed grand systems, one an American of Christian origin and one an Albanian of Muslim origin. Just as transfer often involves construction, these two constructions involved massive transfer.

Boaz Huss starts with a study of the construction of Sufism and of Kabbalah as closely related forms of mysticism. Although there may indeed be resemblances between the two and although there were definitely important cultural contacts between Jews and Arabs in other areas, proven contacts between Kabbalists and Sufis were actually few and superficial, as Huss shows, meaning that little actual transfer can have taken place. Despite this, scholars, practitioners, and activists have repeatedly asserted a far closer relationship than the evidence supports. The explanation is in part political, but is most importantly the well-established classification of both Kabbalah and Sufism as "mysticism." This chapter provides an exhaustive study of this construction.

In the next chapter, Vadim Putzu takes us back to North America, providing a detailed study of one man who agreed with the constructions of Sufism and of Kabbalah that Huss has discussed but took them even further. Thomas Moore Johnson (1851–1919) understood Neoplatonism as perennial wisdom and synthesized an all-encompassing system that seamlessly reconciled not only Kabbalah with Plato and Plotinus but also with the Tarot and Sufism. Johnson's construction of "Platonism," which also drew on Western esotericism, was spread and promoted in his journal The Platonist, but his activity was not purely intellectual. He was also an active member of the Theosophical Society and the Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor.

Finally, Gianfranco Bria takes us to Albania, where another grand perennialist scheme was constructed on Western esoteric and Islamic bases by Ferid Vokopola (1887–1969), an important politician and also himself a Sufi. This chapter describes and explains Vokopola's system, which was based around the transmission of "the mysteries" from antiquity to contemporary Sufis, and then shows how it draws on Western esoteric sources, notably Édouard Schuré (1841–1929) and, to a lesser extent, the Theosophical Society and Rudolf Steiner (1861–1925). Bria argues that in some ways Vokopola's system was comparable to that of Guénon. It also drew on Islamic sources, notably on Sufism, especially Bektashism. Bria suggests that Vokopola's motivation may have been in part political, as the ideology of "Albanism" was inherently pluralist.

Conclusion

We have seen, then, how religious identity boundaries have been blurred, crossed, and sometimes reinforced. Boundaries were blurred in premodern Jewish, Christian, and Sufi mystical poetry, where love was used in very similar ways as a rhetorical tool for the mediation of theological ideals and principles. Boundaries were crossed with relatively little modification when mystical themes were transferred from Sufi to Jewish mystical poetry in seventeenth-century Yemen, and with more modification when names and other formulas were translated from one language to another within the Solomonic corpus in the fifteenth century and when Jewish magical texts were transformed into Christian versions in late premodern Germany, the latter modifications being an instance of appropriation.

The diffusionists, then, are not wrong. Between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, esoteric and mystical ideas have often been transferred. This has not always happened, however: despite physical proximity in late-nineteenth- century Algeria, religious identity boundaries were reinforced rather than crossed or blurred through mutually hostile construction.

We have also seen how construction happens. Sometimes it is clear and indeed imposes essentialist categories, as in the cases of the general construction of Sufism and Kabbalah as closely related forms of mysticism, the construction of Neoplatonism as perennial wisdom in nineteenth-century America, and the construction of perennialism as "the mysteries" in twentieth-century Albania.

The deconstructionists, then, are not wrong either. Sometimes, however, it is less clear what is going on. As we have suggested above, transfer and construction can usefully be understood lying as

on a continuum. Was Straussian "esoteric writing," which framed Spinoza very differently, a construction as arbitrary and essentialist as the perennialist constructions were, or was it a case of transfer (with or without modification) from premodern Judaism and Islam into the modern West? Crowley's Thelema was certainly a construction, but elements of Islam were also transferred into it, with important modifications. Was this appropriation? Mandel's Sufi spirituality was again a construction, but it was neither arbitrary nor essentialist, and the Sufism that was transferred into it was only partly modified. The Sufi Enneagram is, equally, a construction, but the Sufism that was transferred into it was more or less modified depending on the Enneagramist. Again, it is unclear whether or not this involved appropriation.

This book's empirical case studies of esoteric and mystical transfers between and constructions within Judaism, Christianity, Western esotericism, and Islam show clear transfers, clear constructions, and intermediate cases. Transfer and construction, then, are not binary alternatives; they are points on a continuum. <>

New Approaches to the Study of Esotericism

edited by Egil Asprem and Julian Strube [Supplements to Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, Brill, ISBN 9789004446441 (hardback) ISBN 9789004446458 (e-book)]

This volume offers new approaches to some of the biggest persistent challenges in the study of esotericism and beyond. Commonly understood as a particularly "Western" undertaking consisting of religious, philosophical, and ritual traditions that go back to Mediterranean antiquity, this book argues for a global approach that significantly expands the scope of esotericism and highlights its relevance for broader theoretical and methodological debates in the humanities and social sciences.

The contributors offer critical interventions on aspects related to colonialism, race, gender and sexuality, economy, and marginality. Equipped with a substantial introduction and conclusion, the book offers textbook-style discussions of the state of research and makes concrete proposals for how esotericism can be rethought through broader engagement with neighboring fields.

Esotericism's Expanding Horizon: Why This Book Came to Be by Egil Asprem and Julian Strube

The academic study of esotericism is currently undergoing a phase of expansion and diversification. This is true whether we look at the topics, geographical regions, and subject languages of new research projects in the field, at the disciplines involved in its study, or the demographic composition of its scholars. The past decade has seen monographs, anthologies, and journal special issues on topics such as African-American esotericism, esotericism in South America, esotericism in South Asia, esotericism in Scandinavia, global esotericism, contemporary esotericism, esotericism in antiquity, Islamic esotericism, cognitive approaches to esotericism, ethnographic approaches to esotericism, feminist and queer analyses of esotericism, and so on. We see new forays into literary studies, art history, colonial and global history, history and sociology of science, the study of popular culture, and many other domains. The study of esotericism always had interdisciplinary aspirations, but recent years have accelerated this trend. With it comes an increased need for generalists in the field to read broadly across an expanding number of disciplines.

Despite this onward rush into new territories and fields of inquiry, the central assumptions, terminology, and theoretical and methodological approaches of the field do not seem to have followed suit. On the contrary: longstanding assumptions and biases about esotericism as "Western," "rejected," "oppositional," and "elite" are becoming barriers to developing the research perspectives necessary for coming to terms with esotericism's expanding horizon. Despite understanding itself as an open and interdisciplinary field, we hold that a majority of work done under the banner of "Western esotericism" displays a tendency toward internalism and isolation from bigger debates in the humanities at large. This issue was in fact raised during the definition debate in the early 2000s, particularly by Kocku von Stuckrad. In a keynote lecture to the First International Conference on Contemporary Esotericism in Stockholm in 2012, with many of the leading scholars in the field present, von Stuckrad explicitly pointed to the field's lacking engagement with theoretical debates about some of its very key concepts, such as secrecy, knowledge, identity, polemics, and the West. We observe that the debate has receded over the past decade, while the field and its key terms remain as undertheorized as they were before.

The current book is conceived from what we see as an urgent need to question, rethink, and revise existing approaches in the study of esotericism. More than simply discussing explicit theorizing, however, what we call for is a deeper, critical look at the often implicit and tacit biases that are built into the field's key concepts. These, we hold, are obstacles, not only to the advance of scholarship within the field, but also to its relationship with scholars outside of it. It is only through the "tough love" of interrogating such biases that the field may flourish for another generation.

The Tacit Biases of "Western Esotericism"

By way of introduction, we may briefly consider some of the most obvious implicit biases attached to the two terms that make up "Western esotericism." The term "Western" has recently attracted

a lot of attention, including a plenary panel debate at the conference of the European Society for the Study of Western Esotericism (ESSWE) in Amsterdam in 2019 for the published debate leading up to it. The term was originally adopted as a qualifying adjective intended to cordon off the field from universalist and perennialist approaches that had assumed a timeless and essential esotericism, manifesting across history in many separate cultures. It was conceived as a marker of historical specificity rather than a precisely defined geographical or cultural area. This, in turn, was linked with a historicist "empirical turn" in the study of esotericism in the early 1990s; out went metaphysical notions of timeless wisdom and transcendent experience, in came a focus on primary sources trapped in the contingency of specific historical circumstances.

At least that was the idea. The newfound identity of a "Western" esotericism construed in historicist rather than essentialist terms also came to introduce a new and largely tacit form of cultural essentialism: whatever else esotericism might have been, it was uniquely "Western," and would retain this unique characteristic no matter where in the world "it" travelled. Tied to widespread exceptionalist assumptions about "Western civilization," the term came to obscure the differences among the material labelled "Western" (e.g. South American, as demonstrated by Villalba, Scandinavian, or South Asian "Western" esotericism) while it accentuated differences between this Western esotericism and related materials elsewhere.

It is worth pointing out that this logic has not only barred a comparative assessment of purely analogous forms of practice in "non-Western" contexts; it has also shut the door on cases where there are obvious historical links between "Western" and "non-Western" materials. For example, in the Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism (2005) the choice was made to exclude both Jewish and Islamic currents from "the West", a choice which, although defended on "pragmatic" rather than theoretical or even historical grounds, did correspond with the explicit demarcation of "the West" proposed by Antoine Faivre in the early 1990s. Since then, the study of Jewish Kabbalah has thrived in parallel with, but has still not been completely integrated into, the study of esotericism, while the study of Islamic esotericism has remained all but ignored until very recently.

As a consequence the entire Islamic world has been treated as a "carrier civilization" of mostly Greek (and hence, one assumes, "properly Western") material that would only become Western esotericism when discovered by Latin scholars in the fifteenth century, while Jews have been relegated to minor supporting acts or "influences" on the same Western actors. This is not only problematic when considering the often somewhat ahistorical approaches to esotericism in (Greek) antiquity. When central currents such as kabbalah or even alchemy, which truly came into its own in a medieval Islamic context, are defined out of "Western" esotericism, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the exclusively "Western" identity of esotericism is an artefact of how the field has been theorized. It is a product of scholarly choices.

The cultural essentialism that sneaks in with the term "Western" has also hampered a comprehensive understanding of the consequences of colonialism and colonial exchanges for esotericism. This is particularly evident in the diffusionist position that some scholars have recently advanced in response to criticisms of the demarcation. Acknowledging that "Western esotericism" has to be viewed as a global phenomenon, at least in the modern period, Wouter Hanegraaff has claimed that this was the result of its unilateral export into a world of passive recipients, who became part of the history of esotericism only after their "Westernization". Here the implicit and unreflected essentialism of Western esotericism becomes clearly tangible: "mutations" have occurred in "originally European esoteric or occultist ideas" when they have been disseminated outside the West; these have then "traveled back to the West, only to be (mis)understood there as the 'authentic' voices of non-Western spiritualities." Hence, Hanegraaff calls for the investigation of

the "globalization of Western (!) esotericism". Apart from its (cultural) essentialist understanding (i.e., esotericism is always Western at core, even after "mutations" occur in "non-Western" contexts), this viewpoint is shaped by implicit assumptions about "authenticity" and actively overlooks the agency of "non-Western" actors. When disembodied ideas are seen to simply "mutate" in a different environment, no attention is given to the local minds and bodies in which such ideas existed, or the intentions and agendas through which they were adopted, adapted, and eventually disseminated further. Behind that viewpoint stands the choice to prioritize elements that are assumed, on a vaguely canonical basis, to be "Western" over the role of "non-Western" elements. Only then can it be claimed that the result of the exchange was "Western" at heart. Again, we are dealing with an artefact of the pre-theoretical assumptions built into "Western esotericism." Scholarship on the Theosophical Society is an instructive case in point, as it tends to exclusively focus on the role of "Western," white Theosophists while practically ignoring the many "non-Western" people who, like in India, actively participated in shaping Theosophy (Strube).

The conceptualization of "Western esotericism" has concrete ramifications, not only for the interpretation of sources, but also for how sources are selected in the first place. This directly relates to the problem that "Western," as a marker of identity, is often coded white. It is pertinent to ask how whiteness bias has structured research on esotericism, not only in its relative lack of interest in asking questions about race, but also in its very selection of material and construction of historical narratives. That the link between Western and whiteness has become even stronger in the identity politics of the last couple of decades only increases the urgency of reflecting on how racialist logics operate in the field, and even on how the field's own narratives stake out positions in broader political discourses on race, culture, and identity.

While the pre-theoretical baggage of the adjective Western is thus exceptionally heavy, the term "esotericism" is itself loaded with a variety of assumptions that must be unpacked. Let us just consider two of them. First of all, scholars in the field have often pointed out that their subject is associated with the weird, unconventional, irrational, and heterodox. This feature is now seen as the product of processes of exclusion that form central parts of current theoretical models of esotericism as "rejected knowledge". Secondly, there is also an awareness that the term has been shaped in important ways by insider, that is to say "emic," attempts at constructing tradition—spinning imaginary webs of relations and transmissions that link mystery cults, Gnostics, and Knights Templars to Rosicrucians, contemporary initiatic orders, and "wisdom schools" of all sorts.

While both features are well-known and frequently problematized in the field, there has been surprisingly little reflection about how they still inform the way scholars select, describe, categorize, and even explain the supposedly "related currents" that they study. Despite an often-explicit distancing from insider constructions of tradition and an emphasis on the need to contextualize and complicate standard narratives, lists of typical "esoteric currents" produced by scholars remain predictably stable. And while admonitions to resist the temptation of conceiving esotericism as a deviant "counterculture" have been around for twenty years, we can still find the rejection of "esotericism" grandiosely described as "the most fundamental" grand narrative of "Western culture" as a whole.

It is important to note that the two features—"deviant," "anti-Establishment" knowledge and grand tradition narratives—are frequently connected by esoteric spokespersons. It is this connection that allows occultists, new agers, and contemporary conspirituals alike to position themselves as oppositional as well as members of an enlightened elite. Rather than complicating such narratives and analyzing the strategic work that they perform in a broader societal context, scholarly accounts produced in the framework of Western esotericism have tended to reinforce and perpetuate them.

When emphasizing how esoteric spokespersons have in fact been marginalized, scholarly narratives can themselves be read as counter-canonical descriptions of "noble heretics," approximating a succession of "great men" whose relevance for the field is precisely that each stands on the shoulders of another (misunderstood or marginalized) giant. In terms of selection of sources, then, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish an academic historical narrative from an insider construction of esoteric tradition (see for example textbook introductions such as Goodrick-Clarke,; Versluis,).

Critical debates pertaining to these issues are rarely taken to their logical conclusion, as the implications of the rejected knowledge narrative illustrates.

This is also the case with the "Western" demarcation, which in fact is related to insider conceptualizations of esotericism as "tradition." Although it was pointed out already a decade ago that the notion of "Western esotericism" is itself a polemical occultist construct of the late nineteenth century, this has not led to the critical reflection on its use that one might have expected. We hold that these examples illustrate a deeper contradiction at work in the scholarly discourse on esotericism. On the one hand, scholars have been careful to state that their aim is to destabilize the category itself by showing how historical actors that only appear through its prism (because they have otherwise been neglected or rejected) are in fact fully understandable in light of the prevailing discourses of their times; on the other, the term continues to function as a convenient way to group, categorize, and relate "esoteric currents" under an umbrella that, for all practical reasons, sets them apart from those other fields and orders them into an alternative canon of "(Western) esoteric thought." There is a widespread tendency to insist that the latter remains useful for pragmatic reasons, perhaps as a kind of "strategic essentialism" that makes the field visible and gives it a voice. However, the field has already been established quite successfully for some time, and continues to produce work demonstrating that there is little or nothing sui generis "esoteric" about the figures and currents that feature as major representatives of "Western esotericism" (e.g. Stengel, about Swedenborg; Strube, about Éliphas Lévi). Ironically, then, the conceptualization of "Western esotericism" prevents the desired normalization of the field's subject matter; it may even function as a self-fulfilling prophecy with regard to the marginality of its subjects—and, crucially, of the field itself.

Preventing the Self-Marginalization of the Field

The latter point concerning the field's self-marginalization is a key reason why we have assembled this volume. The internalist ordering of relevant authors, currents, and concepts that the theoretical apparatus of "Western esotericism" constructs and enforces is creating a barrier for dialogue with scholars in other fields, who either study the same subjects from an entirely different angle (for example as classicists, experts of early modern intellectual history, or historians of colonialism), or deal with the same broader issues that esotericism scholars highlight in their own materials (e.g. heterodoxy, initiation, ancient wisdom narratives, colonial and intercultural exchanges). It is telling that scholars have been able to produce great work on "esoteric" subjects without the concept of "Western esotericism." This is obvious if we think about classics that were written long before the field even existed (e.g. Thorndike, 1923–1958; Yates, 1964). More importantly for the present context, the same holds true for a rapidly expanding literature of cutting-edge research on what esotericism scholars would consider part of their field, covering a vast spectrum from Theosophy, Spiritualism and occultism, early modernity, magic and occult arts in the middle ages, "esoteric" currents in antiquity, or within dynamic new fields such as global history.

In turn, we observe that there is a widespread tendency to only superficially engage with scholarship from outside the field, or to outright ignore it even when it is clearly relevant. The discussion of

"global" esotericism is, again, a striking case in point. Neither Bogdan and Djurdjevic nor Hanegraaff have engaged with the vast literature on global, imperial, (post-)colonial, or related history. In the latter case especially, there is even a lack of engagement with scholarship or historical sources related to the respective geographical areas that serve as examples. It should be noted that this is the case despite repeated attempts to introduce a global perspective to the field.

This has become an especially pressing issue as critical arguments directed at these problems have not always been engaged with in a constructive manner. Instead, we now see polemical broadsides aimed against "those radical theorists who are so eager to deconstruct 'Western culture'". A hazy "postmodernism" is framed as a dangerous "Establishment" opponent, while rallying around a problematic mix of cultural chauvinism (defending "Western") and oppositional posturing (protecting esoteric "rejected knowledge"). A particularly striking example is found in a recent polemic against what is regarded as "critical theory" and "those approaches associated" with it, published in the official ESSWE newsletter.

Criticism or even rejection of certain approaches or scholarly traditions can be perfectly reasonable and is a vital part of scholarly debate. The kinds of reactions we have mentioned here, however, appear less interested in engaging with concrete scholarly arguments, which are absent due to the consistent lack of citations, than in reproducing politically charged polemical narratives embedded in a perceived "culture war." This volume unambiguously rejects these kinds of politicized polarization and instead seeks to offer new, balanced approaches to broaden the scope of the study of esotericism and add substance to its theoretical-methodological toolkit. It should be noted that many of the critical discussions that our authors highlight have long been part of the debate in the humanities at large, and in religious studies specifically. In order to halt what we see as an ongoing self-marginalization of the study of esotericism in its tracks, it is high time that they are taken more seriously in our field as well.

The ambition of this book is thus to facilitate a deeper-going critical self-examination, which we deem necessary for the current push into new regions, domains, and disciplines to succeed, but also for establishing the field more widely and solidly within its existing borders. The aim, to be sure, is not to urge esotericism scholars to change their subjects or to devalue their previous work, but rather to encourage an open and serious exchange with other perspectives, both within and beyond the field. Debating, reflecting, and possibly revising or abolishing key concepts in the study of esotericism must be an integral part of that process.

Overview of Chapters

We have collected eleven chapters by scholars who could, by and large, be seen as belonging to an emerging new generation of esotericism specialists. All chapters address existing limitations, biases, or problems in the field, each in its own way, and each related to the scholar's area of expertise. It has also been important for us that each chapter provides constructive, forward-looking suggestions for how research practices might be improved. Several chapters deal with problems related to the Western demarcation—for this reason we have also spent some time introducing that particular problem in this introduction. Some chapters deal with problems related to how we conceptualize esotericism itself—especially in terms of rejected knowledge or diffusely defined "related currents"—while others address specific topical areas that remain undertheorized, such as issues of race and gender.

Dylan Burns' chapter addresses the old question of whether and, as the case may be, how esotericism might be usefully applied to the study of the ancient Mediterranean world. The religious and intellectual history of late antiquity is a field that overlaps considerably with the typical narratives of esotericism (e.g. "Renaissance esotericism" as custodian of Hermetism, theurgy, Platonist

metaphysics, Gnosticism, etc.), but it has been able to flourish perfectly well without the use of that term. What could "esotericism" contribute to scholars of antiquity? Conversely, scholars of esotericism are frequently pointed back

to late-antique materials by their very sources, but how should they talk about the link between (modern) esotericism and antiquity? In existing scholarship, this latter issue has often been handled through the mediation of fuzzy and promiscuous concepts like "gnosis" and, more recently, "Platonic orientalism." In "Receptions of Revelations: A Future for the Study of Esotericism and Antiquity," Burns provides a methodologically clear-sighted and cogently argued alternative: instead of looking for an emphasis of "gnosis" as salvific knowledge, perhaps associated with "altered states of consciousness," and using this to construct an esoteric lineage, scholars should adopt a strict form of reception history that follows the constantly changing uses of a plethora of late-antique texts into the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and beyond. More specifically, Burns suggests that the term "esotericism" may still be useful in the ancient world if, taking a cue from Kocku von Stuckrad, we (1) see it as a "purposeful implementation of the dynamic of secrecy, concealment, and revelation," and (2) proceed to focus on how "revelatory knowledge" is legitimized in a crowded field of revelation-based claims to authority. This, Burns argues, would allow us to talk heuristically about "ancient (Mediterranean) esoteric traditions," but in a way that would necessitate expanding our relevant sources to include revelatory material that scholars of esotericism still pay little attention to, such as the Jewish apocalyptic tradition. Doing so would only be possible through a closer engagement with the thriving work by biblical scholars, who have long taken an interest in literature on secrecy, concealment, and the establishment of revelatory authority.

In the chapter "Towards the Study of Esotericism Without the 'Western,'" Julian Strube interrogates the current debate on the "Western" in Western esotericism and argues unequivocally that the qualifier should be dropped. Noting that critique of the term's ideological baggage by now has a very long history across the humanities, Strube is unsatisfied with what attempts to introduce the same questions in esotericism research have yielded so far. He diagnoses recent responses to calls for discarding "Western" as a "diffusionist reaction," which depicts esotericism as a ready-made, unchanging European "export," an approach which conceals the agency of non-European actors. He also highlights that a thorough historicization of the term itself must lead to the conclusion that the construct "Western esotericism" has always been a polemical term with a global context, which continues to carry with it a baggage from occultist-internal debates from the turn of the previous century. We can do better, however: subtitled "Esotericism from the Perspective of a Global Religious History," Strube's chapter ends up arguing that the problems with esotericism research's lingering ethnocentrism, many of which became truly explicit only during recent discussions, can be overcome if we embed the study of esotericism in the framework of global religious history. The chapter ends with an overview of what global history entails, and concrete examples of its relevance to esotericism.

Islam is, as we have seen, an outstanding example of what Liana Saif calls the "exclusionary tendencies" expressed by the "Western" demarcation. In her chapter, Saif provides a historical overview of the division between East and West in the study of esotericism, highlighting that predominant narratives within the field sanitize orientalist perspectives. The notion of "Platonic orientalism" serves as a main example of that tendency. As Saif demonstrates, it relegates Islam to a "carrier civilization" while juxtaposing it to an ideologically charged narrative of the rise of "the West." This is not only ahistorical but also fails to take into account decades of scholarship on the intricacies of orientalism, which becomes most tangible in the popularity of the concept of "positive orientalism" in the field. Moreover, Saif examines how perennialist views of Islam have determined approaches to the subject, contradicting the many attempts to distance it from "religionist"

perspectives. Arguing that the current approach to Islam is not sustainable, Saif calls for questioning the ahistorical, Europeanist narratives still informing scholarship on Islamic esotericism, and finally leaving them behind.

Mariano Villalba's contribution investigates another detrimental consequence of the "Western" demarcation, namely the de facto exclusion of South America and the Iberian Peninsula from its scope. This is especially instructive since Hanegraaff used the colonization of the Americas to assert the "globalization of Western esotericism." Villalba forcefully demonstrates the flaws of that perspective, by arguing that esotericism should not be viewed as a Western European phenomenon that spread to the colonies. The conquest of America decisively stimulated its emergence in the first place, and hence that emergence cannot reasonably be restricted to Europe. This is particularly significant as Villalba shows how "the West" has been restricted even within Europe, effectively removing the Iberian Peninsula from its sphere. Villalba introduces a decolonial approach to correct these distortions and unravels the cultural, racist, and ideological implications of the "Western" demarcation. The ambiguous relationship between European occultist perspectives and South American aboriginal traditions serves as an impressive illustration of how racial and cultural assumptions have shaped approaches to esotericism, not only historically but even today.

Exchanges between individuals across the globe have largely unfolded within the context of colonialism, particularly in the nineteenth century. In recent years especially, scholarly and public debates have strived to take this circumstance into account and highlight the role and agency of "non-Western" actors. The tendency arose, however, to frame such exchanges predominantly in terms of oppression and appropriation, for instance with regard to yoga. Ironically, this over-emphasis eclipsed the role of "non-Western" actors in ways similar to their outright neglect. Keith Cantú offers a critical analysis on this circumstance, discussing how more or less implicit assumptions of (pre-colonial) "authenticity" tend to obscure the contributions of South Asians to the emergence of modern yoga and related practices. Putting scholarship on esotericism into dialogue with the field of yoga studies, Cantú highlights the exceptional role of Theosophists and occultists for exchanges with South Asian authors and practitioners. Demonstrating that these exchanges were by no means unidirectional, Cantú argues for the fruitfulness of taking into account both the "local" and "translocal" dimensions of esoteric movements that defy clear differentiations between "authentic" or "inauthentic."

The conceptualization of esotericism as "rejected knowledge" is, as we have seen, one of the most pressing and problematic issues for the advancement of the field today. In his chapter, Egil Asprem provides a stringent criticism of this concept and highlights a range of problems resulting from the persisting lack of systematic reflection on its implications. Asprem argues that a "strict version" of the rejected knowledge model marked an important step within the field, as it shed light on early modern historiographies that had grouped specific currents and individuals together in a category that we today refer to as esotericism. However, Asprem demonstrates that there is also an "inflated version" of that model at work today, which effectively reproduces, rather than historicizes, these polemical narratives. In fact, the notion of a "Grand Polemical Narrative" running throughout "Western civilization" decidedly contributes to the self-marginalization of the field by maintaining an "oppositional" identity of both the subject matter and its scholarly study. Not only, then, does the inflated rejected knowledge model obscure much more complex developments and blur the lines between insider and academic perspectives. In its most problematic manifestations, it turns into outright polemics. Asprem's chapter is not only a potent analysis of the field's unexamined theoretical baggage, but it also proposes a way out of one of its central dilemmas by offering a more sophisticated toolkit to approach aspects such as heterodoxy, deviance, opposition, and marginalization.

In the chapter "Race and the Study of Esotericism," Justine Bakker starts with an observation that should have been obvious: that race matters in and for esotericism and its study. It matters in the formation of esoteric ideas and practices, and it matters for what scholars choose to focus on and which narratives they consequently tell. These basic insights have been almost entirely absent from scholarship on (Western) esotericism. When race appears as an analytic perspective, it is usually to identify unambiguously racist ideological formations among overwhelmingly white forms of esotericism, whether in the shape of Ariosophy or white-supremacist paganisms. As long as such studies remain the only race perspectives on offer, they obscure the fact that race (and racism) is a structural issue that shapes social practices—including the practice of academic research—in a variety of ways, both more and less subtle. It also reinforces the normativity of whiteness, obscuring that whiteness is also constructed through social practices. In her chapter, Bakker uses two case studies to illustrate how an analytic focus on race can bring new insights to the study of esotericism: (1) mediumistic contact with blacks, native Americans, and "great white men" in one white and one black Spiritualist community around the America Civil War era, and (2) processes of racialization in alien abduction narratives. The examples demonstrate how a critical perspective on race allows us to see both how race relations (including whiteness) are constructed in esoteric practices, and how these relate to broader societal realities related to race, but also how the "color line" in American society has influenced the religious experiences of blacks and, consequently, shaped and often twisted their representation in scholarship and the public imagination. Importantly, Bakker shows that there already exists a rich literature on these aspects of esoteric movements, but that all of it has been produced outside the field of esotericism, primarily by scholars in literary and cultural studies. The chapter is a call for esotericism scholars to follow their colleagues' lead and embrace tools from black studies, whiteness studies, and critical race theory to enhance their own work.

The aspect of race in the study of esotericism is further expanded in the chapter by Hugh R. Page, Jr. and Stephen C. Finley. Together with Margarita S. Guillory, they have co-edited Esotericism in African American Religious Experience (2015), a milestone for the study of esotericism that delineated the new field of Africana Esoteric Studies (AES). This field advances a trans-disciplinary approach that highlights the problems of the exclusionary tendencies expressed by both the "Western" demarcation of "Western esotericism" and its prominent conceptualization as "rejected knowledge." While the former effectively functions as a form of academic closure privileging an implicitly canonical set of sources and subjects, the latter neglects those people of color within and outside "the West" who were, first and foremost, rejected because of their bodies. AES therefore directs attention to the idea of "rejected people" whose knowledge was cast aside precisely because of their embodiment. Page and Finley argue that their knowledge has been doubly concealed, not only academically through the conceptualization of "rejected knowledge" within "Western esotericism," but also through the historical fact that they have been forced to conceal and selectively disclose their knowledge to others. The chapter proposes an experimental interpretive method, flash non-fiction, to approach such secretly coded esoteric cultural artifacts. Page and Finley apply this method to African American Soul and Blues lyrics from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, a period marked by civic unrest. Through their analysis—and performance— Page and Finely illustrate the role of African American artists as stewards, creators, and interpreters of esoterica, as well as the ways in which their artifacts become generators of context–specific Africana esoteric worldviews.

Given the extraordinary prominence and relevance of sexuality, sex, and gender for the subject of esotericism, it is telling that the field of "Western esotericism" has long been reluctant to engage, even superficially, with fields of study that are dedicated to these very aspects. As Manon Hedenborg White points out in her chapter on "Performativity and Femininity in the Cauldron of Esotericism Research," most research that has focused on the relationship between gender and esotericism has,

indeed, been conducted outside the field. Through a close analysis of four rituals from the repertoire of Thelema, Hedenborg White demonstrates the fruitfulness of a sophisticated approach informed by gender and queer studies to grasp the many ambiguities and complexities arising from the role of sex and gender in esoteric contexts. The chapter's focus rests on different, and often contradictory, performances of femininities. While it touches the heart of debates that have been unfolding in gender-related studies for decades, Hedenborg White's adoption of the insights from those debates is not only innovative but also highly instructive. It is an impressive illustration of how the role of esoteric practices for challenging hegemonic gender logics and power relations can and should be investigated within the study of esotericism.

While esotericism is often associated with the rejected, the hidden, and the oppositional, today it is commonly packaged as glossy commodities and distributed to a growing global market of consumers. In "What Do Jade Eggs Tell Us about the Category of Esotericism," Susannah Crockford addresses the striking but surprisingly under-researched economic aspects of contemporary esotericism, lifting much bigger issues about how esoteric spiritualities function in the context of neoliberal consumer culture. Crockford starts from the observation that the vast majority of esotericism research is text based, and that even the few social science-oriented approaches that exist have failed to address the material products of contemporary esotericism and the economic power relations in which they are embedded. Through the example of Gwyneth Paltrow's lifestyle company, Goop, which sells a variety of luxury commodities in areas ranging from fashion to wellness to complementary medicine, Crockford analyses how common esoteric tropes such as ancient wisdom, the revelation of secrets, subtle energies, and polemics against a materialist Establishment operate as strategies of branding and marketization within a massive global wellness industry with an estimated size of $4.2 trillion in 2018. What does the perception of esotericism as "deviant," "rejected," or "secret/hidden" mean when it is mobilized in the neoliberal market economy? Crockford argues that analyses of contemporary esotericism ought to pay more attention to the economic relationships through which esotericism is developed, disseminated, and consumed today, which will force us to take a broader look at how the common rhetoric of the esoteric (e.g. about secrets, ancient wisdom, and anti-spiritual establishments) in fact functions to create and uphold unequal economic power relations.

The final chapter by Dimitry Okropiridze provides a philosophical interrogation of how scholars have defined "esotericism" over the past few decades. At the heart of Okropiridze's discussion is a philosophical paradox that he sees as unavoidable in all acts of interpretation, that is to say, whenever we connect a term to some phenomenon. In all acts of interpretation, Okropiridze argues, we have two and only two options: either we say that concepts determine the meaning of phenomena (putting epistemology before ontology), or we say that phenomena determine the meaning of concepts (putting ontology before epistemology). The latter position (which he calls onto-epistemological) is best exemplified by essentialist approaches, while the former (called epistemo-ontological) coheres closer with discursive and constructionist approaches. The paradox, as Okropiridze sees it, is that these two options (or vectors) are mutually exclusive, yet also both necessary for meaning to be successfully produced. The chapter applies these insights to reconstruct the progress of definitions of esotericism from Faivre (form of thought manifesting in discourse), through Hanegraaff (narratives and othering processes), to Bergunder (esotericism as empty signifier), to Asprem (assembly and labelling of cognitive building blocks), arguing that we see a series of pendulum switches from the onto-epistemological (Faivre) to the epistemoontological (Bergunder), with Hanegraaff unresolved in between, and Asprem attempting to reconcile the two through a merger of constructionist and naturalistic approaches. Due to what Okropiridze calls the antinomy of interpretation, however, such reconciliation is impossible. Instead, Okropiridze calls for a "varifocal theory of interpretation" that admits the incommensurability of onto-epistemology and

epistemo-ontology, allows the two directionalities to exist side by side, and encourages scholars to become "questing commuters" between the two approaches.

Together, these chapters address some of the most pressing challenges in the study of esotericism today, and identify a few new ones to boot. They provide a diagnosis of the theoretical state of the field and prescribe remedies which, we hope, will be adopted more systematically in the years ahead. The most significant remedy, as all chapters indicate, is to make "interdisciplinarity," "theory," and "method" more than just buzzwords. To overcome its present-day impasses and deliver on the promise of a more complex understanding of, e.g. modernity, "Western culture," or the relationships between religion, magic, and science, it seems to us that scholars of esotericism first and foremost have to read much broader and engage much wider and deeper with work carried out across the humanities and the social sciences than has so far been the case. <>

Primary Sources and Asian Pasts edited by Peter C. Bisschop and Elizabeth A. Cecil [Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State, DeGruyter, 9783110674071]

This conference volume unites a wide range of scholars working in the fields of history, archaeology, religion, art, and philology in an effort to explore new perspectives and methods in the study of primary sources from premodern South and Southeast Asia. The contributions engage with primary sources (including texts, images, material artefacts, monuments, as well as archaeological sites and landscapes) and draw needed attention to highly adaptable, innovative, and dynamic modes of cultural production within traditional idioms. The volume works to develop categories of historical analysis that cross disciplinary boundaries and represent a wide variety of methodological concerns. By revisiting premodern sources, **Primary Sources and Asian Pasts** also addresses critical issues of temporality and periodization that attend established categories in Asian Studies, such as the "Classical Age" or the "Gupta Period". This volume represents the culmination of the European Research Council (ERC) Synergy project Asia Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State, a research consortium of the British Museum, the British Library and the School of Oriental and African Studies, in partnership with Leiden University.

The present book is the outcome of an international conference held at the Museum Volkenkunde in Leiden in August 2018, organized by the editors within the framework of the European Research Council (ERC) Synergy project Asia Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language, and the State. During the five days of presentations and conversations, the scholars in attendance from Europe, North America, and South Asia shared new research related to the cultural and political history of premodern Asia and explored historical intersections and parallels in modes of state formation, religion, economy, and cultural production in South and Southeast Asia in light of patterns from adjacent regions – the ancient Mediterranean, ancient Near East, and East Asia.

Visiting scholars also experienced some of the rich collections of primary historical sources held in Leiden's renowned museums, libraries, and archives. On the third day of the conference, participants were introduced to the South and Southeast Asian materials at the Museum Volkenkunde by Francine Brinkgreve, curator of Insular Southeast Asia. Professor Marijke Klokke (Leiden University) provided an introduction to the special exhibition on Indonesian bronzes and discussed the production and transmission of the remarkable portable images. In the afternoon, Doris Jedamski and Maartje van den Heuvel guided visitors through a display of some of the University Library's extensive special collections, with highlights including the massive copper plates of the South Indian Cola dynasty, manuscripts of Indonesia's expansive epic La Galigo, and the earliest images of the Borobudur in the form of rare daguerreotypes.

The conference united a diverse group of scholars working in the fields of history, archaeology, religion, anthropology, art history, classics, and philology to explore new perspectives and methods in the study of primary sources from the premodern world. Our inquires converged around topics such as inscriptions and textual sources, material culture and environment, the role of narrative in crafting ideologies, and religious landscapes and monuments. Deepening the discussions that animated the conference event, the present book adopts a more focused geographical perspective, looking specifically at primary sources bearing on premodern South and Southeast Asia.

Primary Sources and Asian Pasts: Beyond the Boundaries of the "Gupta Period" by Peter C. Bisschop and Elizabeth A. Cecil

Stone inscriptions, manuscripts, monuments, sculptures, ceramic fragments: these are just some of the primary sources for the study of premodern Asia. How might scholars chart new directions in Asian studies following these historical traces of past societies and polities? To address this question, this book unites perspectives from leading scholars and emerging voices in the fields of archaeology, art history, philology, and cultural history to revisit the primary historical sources that ground their respective studies, and to reflect upon the questions that can be asked of these sources, the light they may shed on Asian pasts, and the limits of these inquiries.

This volume contributes to a more expansive research aim: the research initiative Asia Beyond Boundaries: Politics, Region, Language, and the State, a collaborative project funded by the European Research Council (ERC) from 2014 to 2020. One of the core aims of this ERC project has been to rethink and revisit established scholarly narratives of premodern social and political networks in early South Asia. In doing so, the scholars involved considered how complex trajectories of cultural and economic connectivity supported the development of recognizable transregional patterns across Asia, particularly those patterns that have been commonly regarded as "classical." Anchored in "Gupta Period" South Asia – a remarkably productive period of cultural and political change that extended from the fourth to the sixth century CE – Asia Beyond Boundaries situates the innovations of these centuries within the broader South and Southeast Asian ecumene through the integration of archaeological, epigraphic, art historical, and philological research.

While the research initiative of the Asia Beyond Boundaries project occasioned both the conference and the volume inspired by it, the current publication also looks beyond it. Situating the "Gupta Period" and South Asia in a broader context, the present volume expands upon some of the core research questions that animate the larger project by considering what primary historical sources may tell us about the premodern world. To challenge traditional boundaries and create a more capacious view of Asian studies, varied sources, methods, and perspectives are joined in conversation. This introduction frames the volume's contributions in light of advances in adjacent fields, augmenting the core methodologies long established as the strengths of each regional discipline as traditionally conceived – philology, archival research, archaeological excavation, field research, etc.

The "Gupta Period": Established Paradigms and New Questions

The "Gupta Period" is a commonly invoked heading used to designate not only an historical period, but also a high point of premodern South Asian culture. It has become synonymous with terms like "classical" or "golden age," a period in which artistic production flourished and great works of literature, science, philosophy, architecture, and sculpture were produced, presumably under the patronage or influence of the Gupta rulers and their associates. Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, for example, in their much-used textbook, A History of India, begin their discussion of "the classical age of the Guptas" as follows: "Like the Mauryas a few centuries earlier, the imperial Guptas made a permanent impact on Indian history."1 A. L. Basham makes an even bolder valuation in his introduction to Bardwell Smith's Essays on Gupta Culture: "In India probably the most outstanding of [. . .] periods was that of the Gupta Empire, covering approximately two hundred years, from the fourth to the sixth centuries A.D. In this period India was the most highly civilized land in the world [. . .]." Despite looming large in the historiography of early South Asia, the term "Gupta Period" is imprecise since it fails to distinguish the influence of the Gupta rulers as historical agents from the extra-Imperial influences and networks that contributed to the cultural and political developments of this period.

In the study of religion, the fourth to sixth centuries have been understood as critical, since they marked the advent of the temple and image centered religious practices that have come to define Brahmanical Hinduism. Identifying these developments exclusively with the Guptas overlooks, however, the temples of Nagarjunakonda, built in the late third century, and the image centered religious practices of Buddhism in the Deccan in the late second and early third century CE. In the field of South Asian art history, Gupta period sculpture is viewed as "classical," a term used to characterize a naturalism and restraint in ways of representing human and other natural forms that distinguishes the works of these centuries from the extravagance of later medieval or baroque forms. Yet attempts to categorize what constitutes Gupta art face significant challenges since the contributions of the rulers to material culture are confined largely to coins, while their allies, the

Vakaiakas, are credited with developments in architectural and iconographic forms that defined the period. Thus, while "Gupta Period" arguably serves as a convenient scholarly shorthand for an significant period of cultural production, it remains difficult to extricate the Guptas from the grandiose and romanticized estimations of their role in South Asian history.

Several studies in recent years have problematized elements of this periodization and the tendency of Gupta-oriented historiography to prize cultural and artistic production from fourth to sixth century North India over and against sources from later periods. Scholars working in the field of art history have voiced criticism of the historian's propensity for the "golden age." As Partha Mittar writes, "Despite the high level of civilization reached during the Gupta Era, the legend of its unique character was an invention of the colonial and nationalist periods." Like many colonial constructs, this legend is an enduring one. A recent exhibition held in Paris in 2017, for example, still invokes the "classical" and the "golden age" as synonyms for the Gupta Period. For criticism of the golden-age paradigm

in relation to the production of courtly poetry (Kavya), one might quote Romila Thapar's gender-based study of the poet Kalidasa's telling of Sakuntala: "The choice today of the Kalidasa version as almost the sole narrative is an endorsement of the views of both classical Sanskrit and Orientalist scholarship, which affirmed the superiority of the play and therefore the centrality of its narrative." The editors' introduction to a recent collection of studies toward a history of kavya literature echoes similar sentiments: "It is thus somewhat ironic that a later perspective has enshrined Kalidasa as the first and last great Sanskrit poet, a changeless and timeless standard of excellence in a tradition that has steadily declined. One result of this stultifying presumption is that most of Sanskrit poetry has not been carefully read, at least not in the last two centuries." As the words of these scholars make clear, the emphasis on the singularity of the Gupta period has often marginalized other forms and eras of cultural production.

While calling attention to the dubious hegemony of the "'Gupta Period" in valuations of premodern South Asian history, the nature of the polity over which these rulers presided and the extent of the territories they controlled are also debated. The vision of a universal sovereignty expressed in the Allahabad pillar inscription of Samudragupta became a widely deployed political idiom, as has been convincingly shown in Sheldon Pollock's model of the "Sanskrit cosmopolis." The legacy of this expression can also be observed in the historian's reference to the Imperial Guptas and their expansive empire. While a significant epigraphic event, Samudragupta's imperial claims and monumental media borrow from those of earlier rulers and, as such, participate in, rather than invent, public representations of sovereignty. Taking at face-value such expansive claims to power and sovereignty neglects the particular contexts in which these idioms were expressed and the specific local agents who employed them for their own political purposes. It thereby subsumes under the general heading "Gupta" what is in fact a disparate range of historical agents, localities, and practices. Instead of a Gupta-centered imperial history, recent studies have emphasized the ways in which localized polities and rulers negotiated the political idioms of their day, challenged them, and created spaces for innovation. The North Indian bias and Sanskritic paradigm that accompanies a Gupta-centered history of India also bears rethinking in light of the equally significant political and cultural formations in the South, such as those of the earlier Satavahanas, who used and supported the writing of Prakrit rather than Sanskrit, or the slightly later Pallavas, who took up Sanskrit as well as Tamil.

Questioning the status of the Guptas in South Asian historiography – both in terms of the political formations associated with the recorded rulers of the dynasty, and the forms of cultural production associated with the period of their rule, has significant implications for our understanding of the

transregional conception of the "Gupta period." As mentioned above, Pollock's hypothesis about the spread of Sanskrit language and Sanskrit-inflected cultural forms positions the Gupta rulers as critical influences in this process. In fact, the complex dynamics of transmission that led certain Indic forms of art, architecture, language, and religious and political ideology to be incorporated within the developing polities of Southeast Asia reveal equal affinities with developments in the southern regions of South Asia in addition to the Ganga-Yamuna doab that formed the ostensible heartland of the Gupta polity. These processes of "Indianization" incorporate a broad spectrum of religious, political, and economic agendas, and much important work has been done, particularly in the field of archaeology, to locate the material evidence of these processes.

In addition to tracing the emergence of early polities, archaeological work in mainland Southeast Asia has located dynamic networks of exchange via the maritime and overland routes – between the two shores of the Bay of Bengal and between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea – that linked these polities. Not surprisingly, the emphasis on economic ties has foregrounded the role of merchants and non-royal and non-priestly elites, social groups who find comparatively little emphasis in the historiography of South Asia, which has long been fascinated by royal personae and genealogy. Returning to the theme of primary sources may account, in part, for the different historiographical emphases that emerge when juxtaposing research trajectories in early South and Southeast Asia. Scholarship on the latter, in particular mainland Southeast Asia, has traditionally been more archaeologically driven and marked by an absence of early literary sources. South Asia, by contrast, preserves an overwhelmingly expansive corpus of Sanskrit texts. Study of these sources has long dominated the field, while developments in fields of archaeology of sites associated with the Gupta Period have been comparatively more modest. This divergence in the availability and use of primary sources has often resulted in a misrepresentation of the dynamics of exchange – i.e. assuming a unidirectional flow of influence rather than recovering patterns of cultural reciprocity. And, as recent studies show, these imbalances have occasioned an overestimation of the "Gupta period" and its usefulness as a heuristic for engaging the Southeast Asian sources.

Structure and Organization

Although many of the bodies of evidence surveyed in the articles that follow may be well known – e.g. the Sanskrit Mahabharata, the Gupta frieze from Ga?hwa, Faxian's "Record of the Buddhist Kingdoms," or the Allahabad pillar inscription of Samudragupta – and the site names familiar, this general familiarity does not imply a critical understanding. By contrast, the individual contributions show clearly that the very material and textual sources integral to the critical recovery of the "Gupta period" – broadly conceived – remain understudied and undertheorized. As a consequence of these serious lacunae in our knowledge, we posit that rethinking the Guptas, the cultural agents involved, the period in which they were active, and its reception history must start from the ground up. By returning to these texts, images, inscriptions, and sites with fresh questions, each of the studies included addresses overarching historical questions through a finely grained analysis of primary sources.

The book explores three related topics: 1) primary sources; 2) transdisciplinary perspectives; and 3) periodization.

- Primary sources: All articles in this volume engage with primary sources – texts (manuscripts, inscriptions, but also genres or aesthetic modes of literary production), images, material artifacts, and monuments, as well as archaeological sites and landscapes. By focusing on primary sources in this way, we aim to expand the categories in which the study of premodern South and Southeast Asia has traditionally been divided – in particular, by troubling the binary of text-focused (philological) or archaeologically driven (centering

around material objects and sites) modes of scholarship. Complicating the parameters of individual categories of sources (e.g. "texts," "material objects") and drawing attention to the interconnections between different bodies of evidence opens up new spaces for dialogue between scholars with a particular expertise in one or more of these categories.

- Transdisciplinary perspectives: In conceiving the sections of this book we have, as a consequence of our understanding of primary sources, identified categories that cross boundaries and intersect with each other in order to represent a plurality of perspectives (e.g. ritual, narrative, landscape, and so on). This arrangement allows us to highlight the ways in which scholars use sources and the kinds of questions we can ask of these sources. The organization of papers, combined with the theoretical framing of the introduction, works to make explicit some of the implicit working assumptions that have long guided the approaches to the sources on the basis of supposedly well-defined categories (texts, objects, etc.). Finally, we highlight the relevance of the individual articles beyond their traditional disciplinary associations in order to facilitate a "transdisciplinary dialogue."
- Periodization: In framing this volume, we also address issues of temporality and periodization. One aim of this discussion is to complicate the notion of the "classical age" or the "Gupta period" (which formed the specific temporal horizon of the original ERC project) by revisiting premodern sources. What is or has been the role of primary sources in categorizing "ages"? By contrast, how might classical sources also attest to the dynamism and innovative potential of a period? While classical modes of cultural production identified in sources of the Gupta period appear to be fixed or crystallized, the papers of this volume reveal highly adaptable, innovative, and dynamic modes of cultural production even within traditional idioms.

To create topical and thematic links between diverse bodies of textual and material evidence, the book is organized into three sections: 1) "Narrative Form and Literary Legacies"; 2) "Political Landscapes and Regional Identity"; and 3) "Religion, Ritual, and Empowerment."

Narrative Form and Literary Legacies

The section "Narrative Form and Literary Legacies" investigates the use of narrative to craft rhetorics of community and identity in the premodern world. The papers in this section are particularly concerned with the ideological dimensions of narrative, and accompanying questions of authorship, audience, and patronage. Destabilizing the association of narrative with textual or literary productions, these papers also consider how stories are told in material and visual representations, and consider the social lives of epic tales and characters as they are transformed by memory and reception history. To what extent did narratives serve as vectors for social change, as stages to contest norms, or as tools to perennialize boundaries? How were narratives embedded in particular places and times? Alternatively, how did narrative forms and literary ideologies transcend spatial and temporal constraints?

This section includes the following four articles:

- James L. Fitzgerald, "Why So Many Other Voices in the 'Brahmin'
- Mahabharata?"
- Peter C. Bisschop, "After the Mahabharata: On the Portrayal of Vyasa in
- the Skandapurana"
- Laxshmi Rose Greaves, "The 'Best Abode of Virtue': Sattra Represented on
- a Gupta Frieze from Ganhwa, Uttar Pradesh"
- Hans T. Bakker, "The Skandapurana and Baha's Harnacarita"

The Mahabharata, a founding epic of the Sanskrit cosmopolis, forms the entry point of this section. The four papers included here move beyond traditional scholarly approaches to narrative form by exploring the social, economic, and historical realities that motivated and informed literary production. Fitzgerald reads the Mahabharata epic against the grain – that is, he focuses on supplemental narratives that depict life outside of the court of the Bharatas and their rivals – and, in doing so, uncovers a diversity of voices that challenge the text's Brahminic ideology from within. These include some remarkably harsh critiques of brahmins and their behavior, reflecting different ideological registers within a single textual tradition that has undergone significant changes in the course of its composition and transmission. Bisschop, by contrast, looks beyond the Mahabharata and considers the historical reception of the authoritative epic, in which one voice, that of its narrator, Vyasa, has been co-opted by later authors. By tracing the translation of Vyasa in new contexts, Bisschop reflects upon the strategies employed by religious communities to develop and expand upon the canon after the Mahabharata, either by continuing the epic's narrative frame or by producing entirely new authoritative religious texts in the form of the dynamic genre of Purana.

The question of genre runs through all four papers in this section. Greaves's paper alerts us to the fact that narrative exists not only in textual but also in visual form. It is well known that Indic cultural agents used visual narratives not just for embellishment but also for rhetorical and didactic purposes (as, for example, in the famous narrative reliefs from Sanchi). In her fresh reading of the imagery employed on the magnificent Gupta-period frieze from Ganhwa, Greaves provides a striking example of the communicative aspects of material form: the elevation and grounding of a ritual practice in a specific locale, through visual reference to the Mahabharata's characters and themes. The question as to how cultural agents work across different genres is taken up by Bakker, who speculates on the interrelationship, and the potential for mutual awareness, between two texts, the Skandapurana and the Harnacarita, belonging to two distinct literary genres – Purana and Kavya, respectively – but operating within a shared geographical and historical space. Recovering the interface between the two texts allows him to make better sense of some formerly obscure references in both texts. In doing so, Bakker brings together textual and material sources, showing, for instance, how a singular object (a Gupta-period seal depicting an enigmatic goddess) can be read in relation to the description of a gruesome place dedicated to the goddess at Kuruknetra in both of these texts.

As presented by the authors, these papers give voice to an eagerness on the part of premodern cultural agents to engage with narrative form as a means to make authoritative claims. Such a claim may be expressed in oblique ways, as in the case of the non-brahmin voices studied by Fitzgerald, which ultimately, and somewhat dramatically, serve to promote the reactionary agenda of the epic. We can observe this process in a more manifest and radical way in Bisschop's paper, in which the Saiva authors of the Skandapura?a portray Vyasa, the narrator and composer of the Mahabharata, as a Pasupata devotee, a role unheard of in the previous tradition. The profound change in meaning of the sattra studied by Greaves, from an extended Vedic ritual to a charitable almshouse, likewise needed to be incorporated within a canonical framework to make the innovation credible. As argued by Greaves, this was achieved through the innovation of the artist(s) of the frieze, who depicted the sattra, perennialized in stone, in an imagined Mahabharata setting. And when the poet Baha evokes the goddess Sarasvati in his description of the recitation of the Purana at the start of his Harnacarita, this serves, as Bakker argues in his contribution, to legitimize Baha's role as a court poet through veiled allusions to his own legendary ancestry. Uncovering such claims of authority requires an act of reimagination on the part of the historian, who is by definition distanced in time and place from the contemporary setting in which such claims mattered and were accepted, or challenged. Much of the literary legacy of these premodern sources depends precisely upon the outcome of this historical process.

Political Landscapes and Regional Identity

The section "Political Landscapes and Regional Identity" engages with recent scholarship on the development, expansion, and transformation of political landscapes. Combining the study of particular sites, [inter]regional economic networks, and imperial geographies, the papers of this section examine the ways in which interventions in the physical and built terrain served as a means of self-styling for rulers of imperial and regionally embedded polities. These studies also raise broader questions concerning the participation and investment of other social groups – e.g. religious specialists, artisans, merchants, and scribes – in shaping a regional identity. Moving between the disciplines of art history, epigraphy, archaeology, and anthropology, these papers use objects, inscriptions, monuments, and physical terrain to access the development of economic, political, and social networks across regions. How were regimes of power articulated and contested spatially and over time? How might we approach disparate objects and sites as evidence of the interactions of humans with their environments over time? Can we conceive of these sources as materialized expressions of identity and community in the premodern world? And to what extent can the lived world of premodern agents be accessed through the surviving material evidence?

This section includes the following four articles:

- Max Deeg, "Describing the Own Other: Chinese Buddhist Travelogues Between Literary Tropes and Educational Narratives"
- Emmanuel Francis, "Imperial Languages and Public Writing in Tamil South India: A Bird's-Eye View in the Very Longue Durée"
- Miriam T. Stark, "Landscapes, Linkages, and Luminescence: First-Millennium CE Environmental and Social Change in Mainland Southeast Asia"
- Janice Stargardt, "Sri Ksetra, 3rd Century BCE to 6th Century CE: Indianization, Synergies, Creation"

The section's title takes its cue from Adam Smith's The Political Landscape, a work that has raised fundamental questions about the spatial and sociopolitical organization of "early complex polities." While Smith's book deals with the manipulation of space in different cultural contexts (Mesopotamia, Urartu, and the Maya state), the active constitution of a "political landscape" has been just as crucial to the various regional and subregional formations stretching across premodern Asia. As the papers in this section make clear, this landscape is not homogenous, but inherently plural and complex. Distinct "political landscapes" were carved out over long stretches of time, even as these frequently operated in a shared space and continuum of cultural and political discourse. While the framework of the "Sanskrit cosmopolis" provides a certain explanatory model for organizing the rich available sources that evince a transregional adoption of certain Indic cultural forms and sociopolitical regimes, the papers in this section each address the inherent tensions between the universalist ideology that motivated the creation of empire, and processes of cultural integration that aimed to bridge both distance and difference.

Of the three sections in the book, the papers included under this heading address the widest geographic range and analyze the greatest variety of primary sources, both textual and material – including pilgrims' records, ceramics, temple landscapes, hydrological systems, and inscriptions. A concern for regional identity within a world of increasing connectivity is key to all the papers in this section. Linked to the subject of genre explored in the previous section, Deeg shows how the travelogues to the land of the Buddha composed by Chinese pilgrims, while not forming a "genre" per se, nonetheless shared distinct features that made them recognizable to the "home audience" at the T'ang Court. Regional identity is carved out in these ideological constructions of foreign regions through literary descriptions of the land and its people as a foil to one's own "homeland." The

following paper by Francis provides a longue durée overview of the imperial language formations in South India on the basis of inscriptions. That the insider/outsider perspective is not at all straightforward becomes particularly manifest from the example of the historical development of epigraphic Mahippiravaham, in which Sanskrit words which were originally marked as such became assimilated to Tamil script.

The last two papers in this section address the vexed question of the formation of regional identities in the complex process of "Indianization." Stark provides a perspective of environmental and social change in mainland Southeast Asia, with specific attention to the archaeological research carried out by her team in the Lower Mekong Basin in recent years. Stargardt presents some of the major findings of her excavations in the Pyu site of Sri Ksetra, arguing for a preexisting network that facilitated the subsequent process of "Indianization." Both papers engage with the formation of regional identity through the study of building practices, reminding us that spatial syntax can be just as, or even more, powerful than textual language in the formation of political landscapes.

Religion, Ritual, and Empowerment

The section "Religion, Ritual, and Empowerment" starts from the perspective that religion, ritual, and power in the premodern world were thoroughly enmeshed. The contributions investigate, more specifically, the various ways that a sense of empowerment created by and associated with objects, places, people, and rituals was integral to the expression and experience of religious authority. Examining texts, ritual practices, and the use of monuments and landscapes, each contribution treats processes and modes of empowerment realized through a variety of religious media. How and why did historical agents – religious specialists, rulers, and other actors – use and manipulate religious media to empower themselves, their lineages, and their regimes? How were practices and ideologies of empowerment co-opted, challenged, or subverted? And, perhaps most importantly, how did the potential of gaining power (ritual, political, or social) make religion persuasive in the premodern world?

This section includes the following four articles:

- Csaba Dezso", "The Meaning of the Word arya in Two Gupta-Period Inscriptions"
- Bryan J. Cuevas, "Four Syllables for Slaying and Repelling: A Tibetan Vajrabhairava Practice from Recently Recovered Manuscripts of the 'Lost' Book of Rwa (Rwa pod)"
- Amy Paris Langenberg, "Love, Unknowing, and Female Filth: The Buddhist Discourse of Birth as a Vector of Social Change for Monastic Women in Premodern South Asia"

– Elizabeth A. Cecil, "A Natural Wonder: From Li?ga Mountain to 'Prosperous Lord' at Vat Phu"

The papers in this section each address the subject of religion in relation to early Hindu and Buddhist communities, although not in explicitly theological terms or as a matter of belief. Religion here is not a category distinct from politics, society, or economy; rather, it is integrated within and informs political and social policies, gender norms, and engagements with place. In these ways, we can see the category of religion expanded and explored as a repertoire of political, social, and emplaced practices – although, it is important to note, these observations are not ones that the premodern authors, ritual specialists, and architects would have us see. Each of the authors reads against the grain and between the lines in an effort to contextualize their sources and, by doing so, subjects them to an analysis that critiques the social institutions that the sources worked to perennialize and support.

Dezso" examines the religiopolitical rhetoric of some of the best-known Gupta inscriptions and reflects on the implications of the poets' use of the term arya – a Sanskrit term with a significant semantic charge: noble, worthy, and, in the case of the Gupta rulers, chosen by the Goddess of Royal Fortune herself. The use of this term to describe Skandagupta served to elevate, at least

ideationally, an illegitimate son to the status of a god-like king and support claims to kingship through divine intervention. The power of language and the weaponization of powerful mantras by religious specialists form the subject of Cuevas's article. Presenting editions and translations of recently discovered Tibetan manuscript sources of the Rwa pod, attributed to the enigmatic teacher Rwa lo tsa ba Rdo rje grags, Cuevas reflects on the tension in Tibetan Buddhist tantric tradition between the violent potential of ritual and the virtue of benevolence. Following Cuevas, Langenberg's explication of Buddhist birth narratives similarly hinges on the power, and often violent power, of authoritative religious discourse. Here she examines the ways in which Buddhist canonical sources ostensibly designed to denigrate women and devalue their creative potential could, perhaps paradoxically, create both discursive and social spaces in which women could explore roles outside of the restrictive "mother paradigm." In the final paper of this section, Cecil returns to Sanskrit epigraphic texts, here from early Southeast Asia, and shows how the development of a royal religious culture centering on the God Siva anchored the emergent Khmer polity. While attuned to the power of Sanskrit poetics, she argues that reading the epigraphic sources in the landscape contexts reveals the formative power of place and natural landscape features in these early expressions of "Hinduism."

In their efforts to situate these religious ideologies and practices, the papers in this section specifically foreground the ways in which religion was a means of empowerment for individuals, institutions, and the norms they espoused – as, for example, in Dezso's discussion of the role of the Gupta inscriptions in political self-styling, Langenberg's argument that repulsive birth narratives support the monastic ideal, and Cecil's emphasis on politics as a spatial and material practice as evinced by the need for rulers to express control of and connection with the land. Accessing modes of empowerment in their respective sources reveals that these practices are plural and can also involve the empowerment of individuals and groups who are otherwise marginalized: women and sons lacking a legitimate claim to the throne. Rituals of empowerment, too, can have recourse to practices that push against established social boundaries and that involve the intentional transgression or subversion of accepted norms, as addressed clearly in Cuevas's work. Finally, while rituals and modes of empowerment might typically rely upon the agency of human subjects, we also see the manipulation of natural places as a strategy for gaining power that recognizes non or more-than-human sources.

In Sum

We began with the question of how scholars of premodern Asia might chart new directions in Asian studies by the study of primary sources in a transdisciplinary dialogue. The papers assembled here manifest a particular interest in discourses on material agency and object-based histories, dynamics of textual production, and modes of narrative analysis that read normative texts against the grain, as well as political and religious ecologies that situate sites and monuments in physical landscapes. Attention to these approaches permits new perspectives on cultural innovation and imagination using sources long deemed "classical" or "canonical." In doing so, these papers engage with larger intellectual and methodological developments within the humanities and social sciences – the archival turn, new materialism, future philology, global history, and digital and spatial humanities, to name just a few. For innovation and progress in the study of past societies, critical dialogue between specialists of the different disciplines and their primary sources is key. <>

Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights: Dissonances and Resonances edited by Carmen Meinert, Hans-Bernd Zöllner [Transcript-Verlag, ISBN 9783837612639]

The demonstrations of monks in Tibet and Myanmar (Burma) in recent times as well as the age-old conflict between a predominantly Buddhist population and a Hindu minority in Sri Lanka raise the question of how the issues of human rights and Buddhism are related. The question applies both to the violation of basic rights in Buddhist countries and to the defence of those rights which are well-grounded in Buddhist teachings. The volume provides academic essays that reflect this up to now rather neglected issue from the point of view of the three main Buddhist traditions, Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana. It provides multi-faceted and surprising insights into a rather unlikely relationship.

Review

[The] transdisciplinary, transcultural, and transreligious approach is the strong point of this book. -- Gudula Linck, *Internationales Asienforum, 3-4 (2011)*

CONTENTS

It is an immense pleasure to see that the revised lectures delivered at the international symposium Buddhism and Human Rights: Theory—Practice—Outlook that took place here in Hamburg in November 2008 have now been made accessible in printed form. The Center for Buddhist Studies at Hamburg University is proud to have been chosen to host the meeting and support the event in various ways in cooperation with the project "Humanism in the Era of Globalization — an Intercultural Dialogue on Culture, Humanity and Values" at the Institute of Advanced Studies in the Humanities (KWI) in Essen, Germany.

Promoting the kind of intellectual exchange that was facilitated by this symposium by bringing together individuals from quite different fields and disciplines is desirable in many ways. Yet such gatherings are far from common at academic institutions in Central Europe. In the field of Buddhist Studies this observation rings particularly true, given that from its pioneering moments in the 19th century until today the textual dimension of research on Buddhism has dominated the field in

Europe. Little attention has been paid to Buddhism's contemporary manifestations or its reactions to the massive social and political challenges of the modern world across Asia and the West. Consequently, one of the foremost aims of the Center for Buddhist Studies at Hamburg is to address this trend and function as a platform for cross-disciplinary dialogue involving all aspects of research on Buddhism. In this spirit, the title of this volume, Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights, reflects a concern with some the most urgent questions of our day: whether there is a trans-cultural and universal entitlement to individual inviolability and freedom; whether religious, doctrinal and ethical standards promote such rights; and, whether this concept of individual entitlement can and should be extended beyond human existence to the realms of other living beings and even ecological systems such as the earth itself. Certainly we cannot expect to find straightforward and ready-made answers to these challenging questions. Buddhist traditions are manifold and their positions have developed and changed over the ages. Some of them have come under the strong influence of Western ideas and practices, whereas others have preserved the specific flavor of their origins.

Buddhism and Human Rights: Theory–Practice–Outlook was a first attempt to become aware of this variety of positions and to reflect on the role Buddhist ideas might or might not play in the political landscape and the issue of human rights in modern Asia. Even if one of the outcomes of this symposium was, in fact, the realization that in many respects Buddhist thinkers over the centuries have not been particularly interested in the political and social dimensions of Buddhist teachings, it is nevertheless true that at the bottom of the search for liberation - the central aim for all Buddhists - we encounter the ideal of individual freedom from the bondage of samsara. Many of the contributions included in this volume suggest that this quest for liberation is not necessarily limited to an inner psychological dimension but includes striving to be unimpeded by outside factors as well. — Michael Zimmermann

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In September 2007, not only human rights activists were shocked when the protests of Buddhist monks in Myanmar against their government — also composed of Buddhists — were brutally put down. Some months later, Chinese soldiers forcibly suppressed demonstrations by Tibetan monks. For the editors of this book, both events provided the initial impulse to reflect upon the relationship once more between Buddhism and human rights. How is it, we asked, that there are obvious human rights violations in places with such a long Buddhist tradition as Burma, China and Tibet?

A quick look into the literature on the theme showed that Buddhism and human rights do not fit together as easily as conventional wisdom might assume. Both realms have their own reasoning — a particular non–theistic religious reasoning, and a secular reasoning, respectively. Whereas the former is based on 2500 years of traditions that developed in various Buddhist schools and are even within Asia embedded (or not embedded) in at least ten different legal systems, the latter is often referred to as a result of a certain breaking with traditional cultures and is thus described as a phenomenon of modernities, most often developed in stable democracies.1 Although there appears to be quite a gap that needs to be bridged in order to bring Buddhism and human rights together at one table, a very prominent interest is already shared in both discourses, namely the wish to eliminate suffering. Whereas in the former this very wish to remove suffering is contextualized within an otherworldly soteriological aim, namely the very attainment of Buddhahood, the latter is confined to the protection of the individual against any form of oppression in this world. What happens when these two perspectives meet was a further question for us.

From the Buddhist point of view of "ultimate truth" (Skr. paramartha-satya, P. paramattha-sacca), the concern of human rights activists to eliminate suffering appears rather limited, namely to the freedom of a human being in a specific social setting in this world. It neither considers all sentient

beings, which is the scope of the Buddhist concern, nor the ultimate elimination of suffering, which entails cutting the ties to worldly existence (Skr. samsara) for all sentient beings and the attainment of peace (Skr. nirvana, P. nibbana). In this regard, to secure human rights may be seen as an "expedient means" (Skr. upaya) to provide through legal codes a setting that is conducive for the individual to develop "wisdom" (Skr. prajña, P. paññā) which may lead to higher spiritual attainments. Thus the Buddhist concerns by far exceed the jurisdiction of any legal system.

However, on the level of "conventional truth" (Skr. samvutisatya, P. sammutti-sacca), worldly reality proves that adherents of both discourses, Buddhist and human rights, do meet or seem to meet. In recent years not only Burmese and Tibetan, but also Thai and Sri Lankan monastics started demonstrating against various forms of human rights violations in the countries concerned. One feature that unifies all of these groups is the experience of some kind of injustice, so that their demand for protection of human rights is an answer to this very experience. Admittedly, one cannot be sure if the term "human rights" adequately represents what a Buddhist monastic in Asia has in mind when he or she is protesting against what he or she regards as unjust actions of the authorities. Likewise, one may argue that within the global village there is no other choice than to answer to experiences of injustice in a "modern" way — if only to be heard and understood by other people around the world.

Anyway, the very fact that Buddhist monastics, the representatives of the various Buddhist traditions, call for the observance of human rights, also alludes to the insight that in modern societies it is not sufficient any longer to demand justice solely based on particularistic religious, in this case Buddhist, ethical norms. And, perhaps more importantly in some respect, such norms prove to be an insufficient means to establish equality within Buddhist traditions as well — for example, to provide equal rights for nuns when monks in power often still act to preserve an unequal status quo in their own interest. Therefore, human rights discourses among Buddhist communities are discovered as an expedient means to protect individuals against powerful institutions threatening or suppressing from the outside and from within. Although in this way, rights may create a conducive culture, through this process there may also develop another non-conducive culture, for example one that is overloaded with false claims of universality coded in the form of legal rights. Thus the big task that still needs to be accomplished in a Buddhist approach to human rights is to find a middle way between these two extremes. And this is, in fact, where Buddhism might be able to offer a great deal and possibly could make a major contribution to the discussion of, and demand for, multiple foundations of human rights regulations.

We, the two editors of the book, have over the years separately observed developments in Buddhist communities and human rights violations, particularly in Burma and Thailand (Hans–Bernd Zöllner) and in China and Tibet (Carmen Meinert) before we, through a series of unexpected events in the winter of 2007/08, at the time of the protests in Burma and Tibet, were bound by common destiny to share room 129 of the Asia-Africa Institute at Hamburg University. As new officemates we decided to make a virtue out of necessity and embarked on a joint project to raise concerns about major human rights violations in Buddhist communities. Our first step was the international symposium on Buddhism and Human Rights held in November 2008, a few weeks before the sixtieth anniversary of the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a joint project of the Center for Buddhist Studies at Hamburg University and the project "Humanism in the Era of Globalization" at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (KWI) in Essen, Germany. The second step in our endeavors is this volume, Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights, which gathers some topics discussed during the symposium as well as later contributions.

The story of the book's genesis, the "room-129-story", might be taken as metaphor alluding to the contents of this book: namely a selection of contingent case studies contributing to a necessary debate within a general context. We see this publication as a continuation of research in this important yet still neglected field, which was first opened up by the publication Buddhism and Human Rights edited by Damien V. Keown, Charles S. Prebish and Wayne R. Husted in 1998.

The contributors of the present volume are either rights theorists, regional or political scientists, practicing Buddhists, or specialists who have studied Buddhism as a living tradition in Asia. Thus the perspective is generally not only that of a theorist of Buddhism. Rather, most of the authors look at these issues in living contexts and try to analyze how Buddhists have actually reacted to human rights problems.

In other words, this volume attempts to look at our topic of interest in an interdisciplinary manner. Besides the variety of the authors' scholarly specialisation, this book brings together case studies from, and remarks on, the three major Buddhist traditions — Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana — as they are practiced in different parts of Asia, and thus provides some insight into the differences and similarities between and within the Buddhist oikumene that is as global and diverse nowadays as within the world's Christian population.

This interdisciplinary and "ecumenical" aspect has its price. This volume does not claim to be exhaustive neither in respect of discussing the variety of Buddhist traditions, nor in regard to the inclusion of all countries with large Buddhist communities that suffer or deplore human rights violations. As such, this book does not cover, for example, Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal, Singapore, Japan or Vietnam.

Even this small selection of articles, however, points to a central problem inherent in the attempt of looking at the variety of Buddhist approaches to human rights, namely the important question: Who is authorized to put forward an "official" Buddhist position towards human rights? In fact the problem of reaching consensus among a group of sangha elders was obvious at the First International Conference on Buddhist Womens' Role in the SaÉgha held in Hamburg in 2007. Here a large number of representatives of all Buddhist traditions worldwide gathered for discussions on how to legitimately ordain women. Yet a formal consensus remained elusive even when there was broad agreement about what should be done. In a volume like this we must not propose any type of "official" Buddhist answers to human rights, as was offered in the above-mentioned volume Buddhism and Human Rights by means of a Buddhist Declaration of Interdependence — no doubt a remarkable and thoughtful objective, graced with an ingenious title pointing to a core conviction of Buddhism, namely, the interdependence of all sentient beings and phenomena. However, we would like to invite the reader to look at the following articles as eye-openers for new questions that could be as valuable as the finding of (semi-)final answers in the promotion of both worldly justice and peace of mind based on other-worldly, transcendental insight. In this sense, each of the contributions assembled here — both in itself and as part of a greater ensemble — is a thrilling walk into still widely unexplored territory.

The contributions to this book can be compared to a collection of snapshots approaching the greater theme from a particular perspective and portraying an appealing subject in some detail. When put together, these shots may reveal the outlines of a greater picture of the conditio humana at the beginning of the 21st century. It will be up to the reader to choose which portrait should be placed at the center of the whole image. And in any case, she or he will necessarily be obliged to add some of her or his own imagination to complete the patchwork of insight assembled here.

If the reader chooses Alfred Hirsch's article as his starting point, she or he will be exposed to the great occidental discourses on how to get along with the "other," the foreigner who despite their strangeness is part of the worldwide network to which "I" belong, and to various concepts of organizing human co-existence within the global village. Alfred Hirsch illustrates his tour d'horizon through the philosophical and historical-hermeneutical approaches of how to reconcile relativism and universalism, forward-looking modernization and cultural heritage, focusing on the example of how the Islamic world might have developed an allergic reaction against Western hegemony. Here, Edward Said's challenging, and thought-provoking thesis comes into view, and can be extended by the deliberation that Western orientalism brought forth occidentalism as its twin. Enlightened by these deliberations, the reader is well-prepared to discover later that a kind of "allergy" against Western crusades for the implementation of human rights does exist in the Buddhists' worlds as well. Nonetheless, it might be added that in comparison to Alfred Hirsch's chosen Islamic example, the Buddhist traditions seem to be more pliable and more able to adjust their teachings to different cultural and social realities, as may be seen in the other authors' contributions.

If Alfred Hirsch's contribution can be compared to looking upon the larger topic of human rights through a wide-angle lens, Perry Schmidt-Leukel's article narrows the perspective a little and thus offers a smooth transition to the variety of case studies on Buddhist approaches to human rights that form the main body of this volume. Schmidt-Leukel stresses the critical function of human rights, and thus establishes a sophisticated argument with regard both to the "relativists" and the "universalists" in the human rights debate. The "Golden Rule" put forward in different contexts, transcending cultural and religious boundaries, may be regarded as a common denominator for Buddhists of different denominations and secular Western human rights activists. It is the Buddhist version of responsibility as a moral obligation to respect and protect the freedom of others that corresponds to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but this correspondence is not without tensions. Buddhist thought contains a fundamental reservation towards the principles of Western liberal rights based on the principle of no-self (Skr. anatma, P. anatta). This concept may lead to a collectivist theory of society, illustrated by the idea of a benevolent "Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism" as conceived by the eminent Thai monk Bhikkhu Buddhadasa and, one may add, practiced in the "Burmese Way to Socialism" with well-known disastrous effects. Such dissonances, Schmidt-Leukel argues, call for efforts for complementing instead of confronting distinct concepts of human nature and their consequences for society and environment.

With Martin Seeger's essay, the reader is invited to take the first close-up view of how human rights are discussed in Buddhist Thailand both in practice and theory. Being a country in which Theravada Buddhism, the "Teaching of the Elders", forms one of the pillars of the nation's official identity, the controversies depicted and reflected upon are closely related to Thailand's manifold troubled internal politics. This holds true for the nun-ordination controversy and the supposedly deviant teachings of two Buddhist sects. While the latter cases touch on the issue of religious freedom, the former concerns the more direct concern of activists advocating women's rights.

Besides portraying and analyzing the respective conflicts and public controversies within the Thai intellectual community, the article provides a detailed portrait of one of the most prominent contemporary Buddhist learned monks, Phra Payutto. Like Bhikkhu Buddhadasa, whose writings are discussed by Perry Schmidt-Leukel, Phra Payutto is also regarded by Thais and sympathetic foreigners alike as a "modernist". The presentation given by Seeger, based on an intimate knowledge of the scholar-monk's writing and public action, shows that such an appraisal is highly problematic. It seems more appropriate to make use of the Buddhist concept of the "Middle Path" to adequately assess Payutto's stance.

Like Seeger, Kenneth Fleming lived in Thailand, where he spent some time as a Buddhist monk. Fleming is, however, a theologian and involved in the Buddho-Christian dialogue to which Schmidt-Leukel has contributed as well. Fleming's contribution takes up the latter's call for an ongoing process of interaction and mutual learning. After discussing the consonances and dissonances of Buddhist approaches to human rights from a broader Theravadin perspective, his article concentrates on the challenges that become visible when representatives of both sides meet.

For the human rights activist, purification of the mind may help to deepen the understanding of their concern and to enlarge their scope of action to the "root causes" of global suffering. On the other hand, Theravadin Buddhists might be asked to consider the challenge of liberating and purifying society as a whole and not just the individual. It is interesting, one may add, that those countries in which the "Teaching of the Elders" dominate — despite many revolutions taking place — have not yet undergone a deep process of "reformation" as it for example occurred in Europe some 500 years ago.

Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, taking up the question of whether Mahayana Buddhism can be called a "humanism", takes us to Thailand's large neighbor China and the "Great Vehicle" of Buddhism, which in China has a history of more than 1500 years. He highlights the different roles of laymen according to Mahayana teachings and thus adds another outlook to Buddhist concepts vis à vis the global world. Schmidt-Glintzer's search for traces of humanism in Mahayana Buddhism is based on a reconstruction of the tradition rather than on an attempt to prove its harmony with human rights. He clearly shows that although the core ideal of Mahayana Buddhism — a bodhisattva who with his or her strong sense of compassion tries to eliminate suffering — is resonant with the human rights approach, the foundations of both discourses are, nonetheless, dissonant; for example, Mahayana Buddhism does not comply with Western theories of human rights based on a certain concept of the individual. His argument that in China Mahayana Buddhists also form a natural alliance with human rights as an expedient means — when it comes to the process of modernization and concomitant suppression of Buddhist institutions — directly leads us to the following contribution on Buddhism and state control in China by Shi Zhiru.

Shi Zhiru, a scholar-nun originally from Singapore, is well-trained in both Mahayana Buddhist theory and practice. Through her lucid essay, the reader may explore discussions of various paradigms followed by Chinese Buddhist leaders during the QingRepublican transition in the first decades of the 20th century, as measures to protect religious rights, and here in particular Buddhist rights, and ensure the survival of Buddhism amid antireligious state policies. Zhiru finds an exemplary Buddhist response to political oppression in the doctrinal and institutional reforms of the progressive Buddhist intellectual Taixu (1890–1947), who literally embodied the ideal of a bodhisattva. Here the reader might sense the potential of social engagement and reform that is inherent in the spirit of Mahayana Buddhism, and by extension in China itself. Taixu may even serve as a model example of a monk ready to break with his traditional Chinese and Buddhist culture, in a certain respect, in order to achieve higher goals for society and the survival of Buddhism in China. He might be seen as a reformminded figure similar to the Thai monks Bhikkhu Buddhadasa and Phra Payutto discussed by Schmidt-Leukel and Seeger above. Taixu's reputation as a "globe-trotting" monk, which he gained due to his international travels at a later stage in his life, might even make him a forerunner of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the Tibetan religious leader and head of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, who similarly travels around the globe for the cause of furthering human rights. Although China under communist rule has not yet allowed Buddhism to recover to its full former extent, this contribution of a Chinese Buddhist nun-scholar about a progressive Buddhist reformer in the early 20th century may offer a sign of hope for forward-looking movements within Chinese Buddhism.

The three remaining contributions of this volume invite the reader to explore different aspects of the relationship between Tibetan Buddhism and human rights. With the recent escalation of violence in the Sino-Tibetan conflict in Tibetan areas of the People's Republic of China, the Tibetan Buddhist response to human rights violations is formed under tremendous real-world pressures. Here the contributions of Jan-Ulrich Sobisch and Trine Brox and of Stephanie Römer discuss developments that stem from the Tibetan exile communities, whereas Jampa Tsedroen's focus is on women's rights in the Tibetan VajraySna tradition.

The joint contribution of Jan-Ulrich Sobisch and Trine Brox is written from the Tibetologist's perspective of a broad knowledge of Tibetan VajraySna Buddhism and of the situation of the Tibetan exile communities in India. Jan-Ulrich Sobisch and Trine Brox critically ask whether traditional Buddhist societies have to bring themselves into line with Western concepts at all. They approach this issue by discussing problems arising in the process of cultural translation of ideas and terms and indicate the difficulties entailed in the assumption of universal ideals and cross-cultural standards. The translation of secular terms proves particularly challenging in the Tibetan context, where the Dalai Lama and many leading politicians still exercise both secular and religious functions. Sobisch and Brox show that despite the public Western perception of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama as a human rights activist, among Tibetans the human rights concept is itself contested. It is the inherent predicament of an exile and the need to respond to various issues of modernity that most likely forced the Tibetan exile leadership to master the language of human rights in order to obtain recognition in the international community. The cultural translation of human rights terminology thus has clear political implications. The authors demand time for an independent autochthonous development of Tibetan (Buddhist) human rights concepts that might in fact enlighten and expand Western concepts as well. Thus their contribution may be seen as another call for multiple foundations of human rights regulations.

Stephanie Römer provides the reader with another snapshot of the intricately linked duo of Tibetan politics and human rights from a political science point of view. Her article illustrates how the concept of human rights is politicized in the Tibetan context. In a similar fashion to the modernists surrounding the Chinese scholarmonk Taixu in the first half of the 20th century, discussed by Shi Zhiru, Stephanie Römer outlines institutional reforms of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile which were implemented in order to facilitate a human rights discourse on an international level as well as a communal level. It is intriguing to read how the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) actually managed to merge Buddhist traditional values with Western political concepts based on democracy. One important promoter of a human rights discourse is the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, set up as an independent office, yet which closely cooperates with the Central Tibetan Administration. The so-called "universal rights strategy" of the CTA advocates human, environmental and women's rights as a vehicle for the Tibetan struggle. Although this concept finds a lot of support in the international community, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama's core motivation and continuous effort of nonviolence to settle the Sino-Tibetan conflict has not shown tangible results — even after fifty years. Is this then also a failure for the democratic voices in the international community.

With the final contribution of Bhikíuñk Jampa Tsedroen (Carola Roloff) the reader may gain insight into issues of gender inequity in the Tibetan Buddhist Vajraysna tradition from the first-hand experience of a German scholar-nun in this tradition. Although the Tibetan Government-in-Exile introduced women's rights in their political agenda, as discussed in the contribution of Stephanie Römer, they are not (yet) rigorously implemented in a religious context. For instance, in Tibetan Buddhist institutions all leading positions are held by men — even in some nunneries. Whereas in secular contexts Tibetans are largely, maybe only out of necessity, embarking on the course of

modernization of a traditional society, similar aspirations in a religious context still meet a lot of resistance. In fact, Jampa Tsedroen is a vocal advocate of "equal opportunities" (Tib. *go skabs gcig pa* or *go skabs 'dra mnyam)* for both women and men. Because of the worldwide Tibetan diaspora it is Tibetan Buddhism that is among all Buddhist traditions most widely exposed to Western modernity in all its facets, including feminism. It is from her position between two cultures that Jampa Tsedroen challenges "the rigidities of established traditions" and asks for a reinterpretation of old texts in accordance with contemporary needs. We are very happy to conclude this volume with the view of an engaged German female "modernist" within an ancient wisdom tradition — in some respects, another voice of hope and an indication of a progressing "individualization" of the great Buddhist tradition.

This process, as with most other societal and academic trends, proceeds with ambivalence. Only if the phenomenon is accounted for can the fruits of an interdisciplinary adventure like this be reaped as the following examples may demonstrate.

The editors of this volume, to start with, gained a lot of enlightenment through the exposure to the intellectual experience and insight of the contributors and hope that the reader might similarly profit as well. On the other hand, a glance at the index at the end of the book demonstrates that a high amount of possibly confusing complexity is necessarily created when one tries to transgress the usual boundaries of academic disciplines and at the same time stick to German scholarly efficiency.

The meeting of Buddhism and human rights results, among other things, in manifold discourses within Buddhist communities challenged to come to terms with tradition in the face of new practical and theoretical challenges which in most cases are intertwined, as the case studies of this volume show. But these discourses do not necessarily point towards the same direction or, even more disappointingly, produce convergence and dissonance at the same time. Imagine how the Dalai Lama, as a virtual political leader of an imagined independent Tibet, would comment on Buddhadasa's concept of "Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism" at a conference of the International Network of Engaged Buddhists that was chaired by both as patrons prior to the passing of the Thai monk.

Finally, the contributions of this book, besides pointing towards the spiritual needs of human rights activists, are useful for assessing the societal and political situation in many Asian countries. But such wisdom might widen the gap between the "enlightened few" and the political authorities both in East and West. <>

ALDOUS HUXLEY AND ALTERNATIVE SPIRITUALITY
by Jake Poller [Aries Book, Brill, 9789004406896]

ALDOUS HUXLEY AND ALTERNATIVE SPIRITUALITY offers an incisive analysis of the full range of Huxley's spiritual interests, spanning both mysticism (neo-Vedanta, Taoism, Mahayana and Zen Buddhism) and Western esotericism (mesmerism, spiritualism, the paranormal). Jake Poller examines how Huxley's shifting spiritual convictions influenced his fiction, such as his depiction of the body and sex, and reveals how Huxley's use of psychedelic substances affected his spiritual convictions, resulting in a Tantric turn in his work. Poller demonstrates how Huxley's vision of a new alternative spirituality in *Island*, in which the Palanese select their beliefs from different religious traditions, anticipates the New Age spiritual supermarket and traces the profound influence of Huxley's ideas on the spiritual seekers of the twentieth century and beyond.

Contents
Dedication

I want to start with the terminology. My first impulse was to title this book *Aldous Huxley and Mysticism*, for the subject of mysticism pervades Huxley's work, from his first collection of poetry *The Burning Wheel* (1916) to his final novel *Island* (1962). Had Huxley died in the mid-1940s, this title would have been apposite, but Huxley's spiritual interests changed over the course of his career and exceeded the parameters of mysticism. The bedrock message of *Time Must Have a Stop* (1944) and *The Perennial Philosophy* (1945), the former a novel and the latter an anthology of mystical writings, was that "man's final end is unitive knowledge of the Godhead". What Huxley is referring to here is what has come to be known as mystical experience, in which one's ego or self is subsumed in, or identified with, the godhead. In Chapter 3, I give several examples of mystical experience and map out some of the more influential typologies of mysticism, but broadly speaking there are two types of mystical experience, which the philosopher W.T. Stace has termed introvertive and extrovertive. In the former, the mystic turns away from the phenomenal world, usually in meditation, and experiences a state of "undifferentiated unity" with the "One" or godhead; in the latter (also known as "nature mysticism" and "cosmic consciousness"), the mystic turns his or her gaze outwards but apprehends that behind the ostensible multiplicity of the phenomenal world all things are One, and the mystic is included in this unifying vision. Both types of experience are accompanied by a profound sense of reality, feelings of peace or bliss, "of the holy, sacred, or divine", and are characteristically marked by "paradoxicality" and "ineffability".

Jeffrey Kripal defines mysticism as "a modern comparative category that has been used in a wide variety of ways to locate, describe, and evaluate individuals' experiences of communion, union, or identity with the sacred". Among the many connotations of the term, Kripal notes that mysticism may involve "nonrational, immediate, or intuitive modes of cognition". In other words, there is often an alternative kind of knowing involved in mystical experience, which gives the mystic a profound insight into the nature of things, and which can result in religious beliefs, writing, sermons and so forth that are considered unorthodox. For example, Huxley was a great admirer of the medieval German mystic and theologian Meister Eckhart, and often quoted his apophthegm: "The eye with which we see God is the same as the eye with which God sees us". This statement illustrates the "paradoxicality" of mystical experience observed by Stace and others: how can our human eye be the same as God's divine eye? Eckhart seems to be suggesting that God is immanent in our eye, and hence there is no distinction between our human eye and God's divine eye, or, by extension, between us and God. But the Christian God is usually held to be wholly transcendent: the world is fallen, the body is profane, and thus to suggest that God's eye and our eye are one and the same is heretical; and this statement was one of several that led to Eckhart being charged with heresy. For Huxley, the teachings of Christian mystics, such as Eckhart and St John of the Cross, were more trustworthy than the dogma enshrined in Scripture, which promoted the fossilised letter rather than the living spirit of Christianity. Moreover, the fact that the mystics Huxley anthologised in *The Perennial Philosophy*, from widely different epochs and religious traditions, produced ethical and metaphysical teachings that were broadly compatible, led him to surmise that the One with whom

these mystics were united or identified was the same. These mystical teachings comprise what Huxley termed the Perennial Philosophy (Huxley assumed that the term *philosophia perennis* had been coined by Gottfried Leibniz, but, as I explain in Chapter 3, it originated with the Catholic Agostino Steuco in the sixteenth century).

The precise meaning of mysticism, though, has been blurred through widespread misuse, and the term has come to cover all manner of otherworldly practices, such as spiritualism, magic and palmistry, and is often wrongly conflated with occultism (which will be defined below). This brings me to the term Western esotericism. According to Wouter Hanegraaff, Western esotericism can be thought of as "rejected knowledge", discountenanced both by normative religion and science. The word "esoteric" was first used in the second century ce by Lucian of Samosata. It refers to things that are hidden, knowledge that is disseminated only to an initiated few, as opposed to the exoteric many. It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that the noun "esotericism" was coined in German. It seems to have appeared in English in the 1840s and is listed in Joseph E. Worcester's *A Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language* in 1846. For Hanegraaff, the discourse of what would come to be known in the twentieth century as "Western esotericism" began to coalesce in the Renaissance when a number of Italian humanists, searching for the true sources of philosophy and religion in classical antiquity, constructed the *prisca theologia* (ancient or venerable theology) tradition that had allegedly been transmitted by Moses, Hermes Trismegistus, Zoroaster, Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato (among others). There existed a number of striking similarities between the esoteric currents associated with these figures, such as Kabbalah (Moses), Neoplatonism (Plato) and Hermetism (Hermes Trismegistus), and thus it made sense to posit that they all derived from an underlying *prisca theologia*. But it should be emphasised that both the *prisca theologia* and the category of Western esotericism under which these currents are studied are academic constructs, rather than tangible traditions with which Kabbalists, Neoplatonists and Hermetists identified in the Renaissance. During the eighteenth century, Hanegraaff argues, these esoteric currents were set up as "the polemical Other of modernity" – superstitious rather than rational, magical rather than scientific, esoteric rather than empirical – and were abjected from Enlightenment discourse. Occultism refers to a more recent current in Western esotericism from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, and its representatives include H.P. Blavatsky, Aleister Crowley and the magicians of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn.

Although Huxley was not a member of the Golden Dawn and showed little or no interest in, say, Christian Kabbalah, he was interested in other esoteric currents, such as spiritualism and mesmerism. In the eighteenth century, Franz Mesmer identified an invisible fluid that permeated both humans and the universe. He developed a treatment for psychosomatic maladies called "animal magnetism", in which he helped to redistribute this invisible fluid by making "passes" over the body of the patient. What is currently termed hypnosis was developed by the Marquis de Puységur, who put his subjects into trances using animal magnetism. Hypnotised subjects often exhibited paranormal powers, such as telepathy and clairvoyance. Animal magnetism was posited by many spiritualists as the mechanism that made possible the entrancement of the medium and the communication between the medium and the dead. The widespread popularity of spiritualism in the nineteenth century led to the establishment of the Society for Psychical Research (SPR) in 1882, which attempted to study mediumistic phenomena in a scientific manner. In Chapter 2, I reveal that Huxley and his brother Julian were involved in investigating mediums for the SPR, which may have been the basis for his play, *The World of Light* (1931), in which he explores the phenomena of spiritualism using the terms of psychical research (telepathy, ectoplasm, etc.). Furthermore, Huxley was also an early advocate of the work of J.B. Rhine and wrote several essays on the subject of parapsychology. In the early 1950s, while Huxley was living in Hollywood, he and his wife Maria held séances and informally investigated other paranormal phenomena, and this doubtless led to Huxley

joining the SPR in 1956. At around the same time, Huxley began to practise hypnotism, and used "magnetic passes" on Maria to alleviate a number of different conditions, and was friends with the psychotherapist Leslie LeCron, an authority on hypnotism. Huxley had long been an admirer of the Scottish surgeon James Esdaile, who used magnetic passes to induce anaesthesia for his patients in Calcutta in the 1840s, and his experience inspired the character of Dr Andrew in *Island*.

On the one hand, Huxley's use of psychoactive substances, such as mescaline and LSD, to facilitate spiritual insights about ultimate reality, conforms to what Hanegraaff has termed "entheogenic esotericism", and his writing concerning entheogens (meaning god generated within) was a source of inspiration for later neo-shamans, such as Carlos Castaneda and Terence McKenna. On the other hand, Huxley tended to explain his psychedelic experiences in terms of mysticism; they bear a marked resemblance to what Stace calls extrovertive experience; and in *Island* the *moksha*-medicine (psilocybin mushrooms) produces the "full-blown mystical experience" of "One in all and All in one". If, then, calling this book *Aldous Huxley and Mysticism* would seem to exclude the full range of Huxley's spiritual interests, to title it *Aldous Huxley and Western Esotericism* would downplay the very considerable influence of mysticism on his work. Which brings me to the title I've chosen, *Aldous Huxley and Alternative Spirituality*. While the term "alternative spirituality" is of relatively recent vintage (according to Google Books Ngram Viewer, it was first used in 1959), what it represents was crystallising out of the cultic milieu of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and includes spiritualism, Theosophy, the Arcane School of Alice Bailey, psychical research, astrology, Eastern religions and philosophy, the new physics, G.I. Gurdjieff, P.D. Ouspensky, Jiddu Krishnamurti and so on. Admittedly, Huxley did not use this term himself as it only gained currency with the New Age culture that emerged in the 1970s, but it is one that usefully encompasses both the several varieties of mysticism (neo-Vedanta, Tantra, Taoism, Zen Buddhism etc.) that interested Huxley as well as spiritualism, parapsychology and his eclectic attitude to spirituality that would become the hallmark of the New Age.

As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, Huxley was a key influence in the formation of the New Age movement. He was an early practitioner of yoga, meditation and the Alexander technique, all of which would later be identified with the alternative spirituality of the New Age. He also adopted alternative therapies, such as the magnetic passes mentioned above, as well as the Bates method to improve his eyesight, dianetics and the E-Therapy pioneered by A.L. Kitselman. In the last decade of his life, Huxley moved away from the life-denying asceticism of the 1940s, in which the ultimate goal was mystical identity with the godhead, and began to advocate this-worldly forms of mysticism that celebrated the body and the world as manifestations of the godhead. Huxley's new attitude to spirituality is exemplified in *Island*, in which the inhabitants of Pala pick and choose their beliefs and practices from different religious traditions, such as Tantra, Zen and Mahayana Buddhism, rather than being indoctrinated by one. Indeed, they are taught to mistrust dogma and institutional religion, and to form their own subjective experiential spirituality through the sacramental use of psilocybin mushrooms. This attitude clearly anticipates (in the sense of being a precursor rather than predicting) the New Age selection of doctrines from the "supermarket of spiritual choices", such as karma, reincarnation and the cakras. The "alternative" spirituality championed by New Age spiritual seekers was an alternative to normative organised religions, with their dogmas, churches and sacred texts. If, as Boas Huss has noted, the adjective "spiritual" began as an antonym to the secular, from the 1970s onwards it began to be used in opposition to institutional religion and culminated in the new category of "spiritual but not religious". Despite the rampant commodification of New Age culture, the "alternative" in alternative spirituality also signifies an opposition to mainstream culture. One of the utopian elements of Pala is its isolation from global capitalism: rather than exploiting the island's natural resources, the Palanese live in harmony with nature and take from it only what they need. With the help of the moksha-medicine, they are able to apprehend the immanent godhead in

the world around them, which inspires in them a reverent attitude to nature. This spiritual approach to ecology was again something that would be eagerly embraced by both the New Age and Deep Ecology movements, as I reveal in Chapter 6.

A few last words on my terminology. Where previous generations of Huxley scholars have spoken of Huxley's "mystical conversion", I have elected to use the phrase "mystical turn", since it is common parlance in academia to speak of the "empirical turn" in Western esotericism, or the "material turn" in the humanities, and I have always felt that the word "conversion" implies a road-to-Damascus moment, whereas the reality was a more gradual process, as I demonstrate in Chapters 1 and 4. I have chosen to capitalise Huxley's Perennial Philosophy in order to differentiate it from other forms of perennialism, such as Traditionalism, Theosophy and the philosophia perennis of Agostino Steuco (for which see Chapter 3). Finally, while it has become customary in the field of Western esotericism to use the word "entheogen", I have elected to use Humphry Osmond's word "psychedelic" instead, since it was one that Huxley used and liked (even if, at first, he tended to misspell it). "Entheogen" was coined by a committee of scholars in 1979, including Carl Ruck, R.G. Wasson and Jonathan Ott, who felt that the term "psychedelic" had become besmirched by its association with unwashed, long-haired spiritual seekers, and wanted a more scientific-sounding term to describe psychoactive substances associated with religious rituals. But, as Christopher Partridge points out, by the end of the 1990s the word "entheogen" had been appropriated by the "psychedelic occulture", and the undesirable associations of "psychedelic" became attached to "entheogen", which promptly lost its scientific pretensions. The term "psychedelic", then, seems the more appropriate term in the context of Huxley's work.

One of the most cogent justifications for a study of the place of alternative spirituality in Huxley's work is that there has been no full-length monograph on the subject for almost four decades. It is customary to point out the shortcomings of previous studies, and I now turn to this invidious task. In 1962, Sisirkumar Ghose published *Aldous Huxley: A Cynical Salvationist*, which seems to be based on a PhD thesis he submitted in April 1945, though Ghose insists, perhaps through an excess of modesty, that his study "is neither a scholarly work nor one of literary analysis". Ghose cheerfully admits that before completing his thesis he had not been able to obtain copies of either *Time Must Have a Stop* or *The Perennial Philosophy*, which are of obvious importance in any consideration of Huxley's work, and in particular one that attempts to analyse the impact of Huxley's interest in Hinduism and Buddhism. In order to rectify this, Ghose writes that he has "added a few references to both [texts] and an appendix on *Heaven and Hell*". Nonetheless, Ghose omits several key texts such as *The Doors of Perception* (1954) and *Island* (1962), and does not differentiate between the different mystical philosophies Huxley championed, so for instance there's no mention of Tantra or Taoism.

The thesis of *Aldous Huxley: A Study of His Novels* (1974) by K. Bhaskara Ramamurty is that Huxley's novels constitute a "pilgrim's progress", in which can be discerned Huxley's "analysis of the ape and essence in man, and his recipe to help the ape realize its essence to achieve transcendence". There's an uncritical conflation of Huxley and his characters: according to Ramamurty, Denis Stone in *Crome Yellow* (1921) = Huxley, since both Denis and Huxley are published poets; Gumbril Junior in *Antic Hay* (1923) = Huxley, since both Gumbril and Huxley were school masters, and so on. And since Denis, Gumbril, Calamy, Quarles, Beavis and Rivers are all essentially Huxley, they represent for Ramamurty the same pilgrim who progresses through Huxley's *oeuvre*. I'm not contesting the fact that Huxley was an autobiographical author, and certainly there are many parallels between himself and his characters, but Ramamurty's naively biographical readings strike the contemporary scholar as reductive. Moreover, since Ramamurty sticks so closely to Huxley's novels and essays, his study lacks context. So while there's a whole chapter on Lawrence's influence on Huxley, primarily

because Lawrence was the inspiration for several of Huxley's characters, there are only two references to Gerald Heard, and none to Jiddu Krishnamurti, who were both significant spiritual influences, as I demonstrate in Chapter 4.

In contrast, *Aldous Huxley and Eastern Wisdom* (1981) by B.L. Chakoo is more sophisticated. However, there is no attempt on Chakoo's part to situate Huxley's Perennial Philosophy among the sundry varieties of perennialism that obtained in the twentieth century, such as Theosophy and Traditionalism. This is perhaps no surprise since the study of Western esotericism still occupied a marginal place in academia in 1981, and Chakoo did not have access to many of the sources I drew upon in my analysis of perennialism in Chapter 3. On the other hand, Chakoo's study would have benefited from an examination of the influential typologies of mysticism offered by William James, Rudolf Otto and William Stace, as well as some discussion of Steven Katz's famous critique of perennialism in the essay "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism" (1978). Chakoo also takes a highly judgemental, Brahminical stance on psychedelic drugs, and claims that mescaline "experiences bring about a wilful damaging of brain-functions", though he does not cite any supporting evidence, notwithstanding a Professor Esser, who affirms that mescaline users usually suffer "a hangover followed by vomiting", which is not something that I've read in the literature on the subject. Chakoo also categorically states that mystical experience "must be earned through mortification or by Grace" and that to "get it by mescalin and LSD would be to get it only momentarily (if at all one gets [*sic*]) and that too by trickery". But Huxley argued that just as mescaline caused bio-chemical changes that led to a greater portion of what he termed Mind at Large (a cosmic mind or godhead) being admitted to consciousness, so too did traditional spiritual exercises and mortifications (Huxley's use of psychedelic drugs will be discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6). Furthermore, Chakoo quotes Huxley from *The Doors of Perception* as affirming that mescaline can only catalyse visionary experience, but, as I note in Chapter 5, Huxley later had what he asserted were full-blown mystical experiences on mescaline and LSD.

Dana Sawyer's 2002 biography of Huxley should also be mentioned. As a professor of philosophy and religion, Sawyer has a superior grasp of mysticism to Huxley's previous biographers, Sybille Bedford, David King Dunaway and Nicholas Murray, who were, to put it diplomatically, a little sketchy on the details. I would argue, though, that Sawyer over-emphasises the influence of "Vedanta" on Huxley's work. For instance, in the concluding chapter of his biography, Sawyer writes: "The Hindu doctrine of Advaita Vedanta comes closest to Huxley's viewpoint, and it's significant that Aldous kept a connection with the Vedanta Society all his life". But, as I point out in Chapters 5 and 6, Huxley moved away from what he regarded as the life-denying asceticism of neoAdvaita and embraced the life-affirming philosophies of Taoism and Tantra instead, and it is telling that Sawyer does not mention these traditions in his biography. It is impossible to deny the influence of Tantra on *Island*, but Sawyer omits any mention of the Tantric practice of *maithuna* in his brief discussion of the book. Moreover, Huxley's disenchantment with neo-Advaita can be seen in his decision to stop lecturing at the Vedanta Society of Southern California. In a letter from October 1956, he declines an invitation to speak at the Society and affirms: "I am not a religious person – in the sense that I am not a believer in metaphysical propositions, not a worshipper or a performer of rituals, and not a joiner of churches – and therefore I do not feel qualified or inclined to tell people in general what to think or do". This illustrates Huxley's mistrust of organised religion and in particular the devotional approach (or *bhakti marga*) of the Vedanta Society of Southern California, with its shrine containing relics of Ramakrishna and the ritual worship practiced by initiates (see Chapter 4 for details).

These studies, then, which were mostly published in the 1970s and 80s, are out of date and do not benefit from the wealth of new scholarly apparatus that has been published in the interim, largely as result of the tireless efforts.

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This book has highlighted the centrality of alternative spirituality in the work of Aldous Huxley. As noted in Chapter 1, Huxley had occasional intimations of oneness with nature as a teenager. As a young man at Balliol College, Oxford, he was drawn to the work of mostly Christian mystics such as Jacob Boehme, St Teresa of Avila and St John of the Cross, and some of his early poetry contains mystical or spiritual motifs. But, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, Huxley's interest in mysticism was held in check by his ongoing allegiance to science and a satirical disposition that sought to reduce everything to absurdity. However, Huxley's relationship with the science writer J.W.N. Sullivan led him briefly to entertain an idealist reading of the new physics, which resulted in the first mystical seeker in his fiction, Calamy, who abandons the barren leaves of science and art and retreats from the sensual world to pursue a contemplative life in a cabin on the Apuan Alps. But Huxley was unhappy with the novel and his mystical inclinations were quashed by a trip to India and Sri Lanka, during which he became convinced that spirituality was the curse of the East since it had impeded the spread of science and civilisation.

On his return to Europe in 1926, Huxley renewed his friendship with D.H. Lawrence, who exercised a significant influence over Huxley until his death in 1930. Although, as noted in Chapter 2, Huxley could not share Lawrence's animistic worldview, he developed a secular version of Lawrence's philosophy that he called life worship, which strove for equilibrium between body and mind, and in his fiction from this period, particularly in *Point Count Point* (1928), he sought to depict the world in its multiple aspects – scientific, religious, emotional, metaphysical and so on. After Lawrence's death, Huxley developed an interest in the paranormal, which was to last for the rest of his life, and led to his closely following the work of J.B. Rhine at Duke University and the British Society for Psychical Research, which he eventally joined in 1956.

The mystical turn in Huxley's work was the result of a confluence of different factors. In 1929, he had befriended Gerald Heard, who was interested in psychical research and Asian religions. In the autumn of 1934, Huxley began to suffer from depression and insomnia and he turned to meditation and *prāṇāyāma* in order to help him relax. Meanwhile, Heard had become involved in what became known as the Peace Pledge Union (ppu) and encouraged Huxley to join. In his propaganda work for the ppu, Huxley began to advance a mystical philosophy that emphasised the unity of humankind. Huxley had been suffering from writer's block, but his mystical turn inspired him to take his novel, *Eyeless in Gaza* (1936), in a new direction that reflected and in some ways anticipated his new commitment to mysticism and pacifism. As a result of his depression, Huxley sought out alternative therapies and practices, such as the Alexander technique and colonic irrigation.

In Chapter 4, I analysed Huxley's move to America, where he became acquainted with two new spiritual influences, Swami Prabhavananda and Jiddu Krishnamurti. While Huxley never identified himself as a Vedantin like his friend Christopher Isherwood, he was closely associated with the Vedanta Society of Southern California during the late 1930s and 40s and contributed to the magazine *Vedanta for the West*. Krishnamurti exercised a greater influence than Prabhavananda, who was too devotional for Huxley's liking. Huxley felt that Krishnamurti was a genuine mystic and derived considerable support from him during World War ii when he was being accused of escapism by critics back in England. He was Krishnamurti's neighbour at Wrightwood in the mid-1940s, acted as a trustee to Krishnamurti's Happy Valley School and wrote a foreword to Krishnamurti's book *The First and Last Freedom* (1954). It was Huxley's conviction that there would never be a lasting peace unless there was a religious philosophy to which all nations could subscribe, and to this end he compiled *The Perennial Philosophy* (1945), which I examined in Chapter 3.

The early 1950s saw a resurgence of Huxley's interest in the paranormal and he and Maria hosted a regular Tuesday-night gathering at their home in North King's Road, where the assembled guests observed hypnosis, séances and psi phenomena. The Huxleys were also enthusiastic adopters of new alternative therapies, such as the Bates method, dianetics and E-Therapy. Huxley practised self-hypnosis to alleviate insomnia and made "magnetic passes" to help Maria manage the pain associated with various disorders.

After World War II, Huxley began to move away from the asceticism of neoAdvaita and was increasingly drawn in his work to the philosophies of Taoism, Tantra, Mahayana and Zen Buddhism. In Chapter 5, I noted how his first mescaline experiment in 1953 reinforced these life-affirming philosophies, since Huxley experienced a mystical transcendence of his ego and an identification with the world around him, which he perceived as sacred. While at first, in *The Doors of Perception* (1954), he asserted that mescaline was a conduit to visionary experience, his later experiments with LSD and mescaline led him to maintain that psychedelic drugs could afford a full-blown mystical experience. One of the most remarkable products of this new Tantric turn in Huxley's work was his treatment of the body: having previously represented the body in his fiction as a source of shame, whose libidinal instincts were antipathetic to a spiritual life of contemplation, in *Island* (1962) the Palanese express their spirituality through the practice of *maithuna*.

Although *Island* was derided by some critics on its publication, it was subsequently embraced by spiritual seekers in the New Age and the Deep Ecology movements, as well as neo-shamans such as Terence McKenna and Carlos Castaneda. As noted in the previous chapter, Huxley's notion of human potentialities was an inspiration both to the founders of the Esalen Institute and the Human Potential Movement. Moreover, Huxley's mystical reading of psychedelic experience had a profound effect both on psychiatrists, such as Humphry Osmond, as well as movers and shakers in the counterculture (Timothy Leary and Terence McKenna).

Given the importance of the Perennial Philosophy in Huxley's work, it comes as a surprise to hear him proclaim, in a letter to Reid Gardner on June 25, 1962: "I remain an agnostic who aspires to be a gnostic – but a gnostic only on the mystical level, a gnostic without symbols, cosmologies or a pantheon".[1] For a start, the verb "remain" implies that Huxley has always been an agnostic and yet this is demonstrably not the case. For instance, in November 1953, Huxley appeared before a judge in order to become an American citizen, and stated for the record: "I was brought up as an agnostic and continued to reject the religious approach to life until about twenty years ago, when I started to feel an ever deepening concern with religious mysticism". In other words, Huxley stopped being an agnostic circa 1934. This was the period in which Huxley began practising meditation and started to promote mysticism as a universal religion that would foster unity and peace. If at first mysticism was a means to the end of peace, by the late 1930s and throughout the 1940s mysticism became an end in itself. The final tenet of the Perennial Philosophy, for example, affirms that: "man's life on earth has only one end and purpose: to identify himself with his eternal Self and so to come to unitive knowledge of the Divine Ground". Variations on this assertion can be found throughout *The Perennial Philosophy*, such as "the fact remains that man's final end is unitive knowledge of the Godhead". These statements manifestly lack the equivocations and qualifications of the agnostic, who would write: *if* there is a "godhead", *if* "unitive knowledge" can in fact be achieved with such an entity, etc.

Furthermore, where *Ends and Means* (1937) is presented as a "practical cookery book of reforms", with the goal of achieving a utopian society of "liberty, peace, justice, and brotherly love", in *After Many a Summer* (1939) Mr Propter maintains that social reforms are otiose since even the most idealistic politicians, trapped on the human level of time and attachment, can merely canalise evil in

different directions, rather than eradicating it. Only mystics like Mr Propter, who can transcend their time-bound human personalities and obtain the "experience of eternity" are capable of doing good. In Huxley's next novel, *Time Must Have a Stop* (1944), Sebastian Barnack's minimum working hypothesis states that to achieve "unitive knowledge" of the Ground, "to realize this supreme identity, is the final end and purpose of human existence". As with *After Many a Summer*, Huxley valorises transcendence over immanence, and salvation lies in transcending time in favour of eternity, in transcending the fallen world in favour of the godhead or Ground. *After Many a Summer*, *Time Must Have a Stop*, *The Perennial Philosophy* – these are evidently not the books of an agnostic.

So how to account for Huxley's profession of agnosticism in 1962 Sally Paulsell points out that in Huxley's next letter to Gardner he affirms that in his psychedelic experiments, he has had the conviction of "the world's fundamental All Rightness", and concludes that Huxley's "inquiring mind typically juxtaposes skepticism with affirmation; the stages of his mystical experience do not fall into a doubt-free steady continuum". K.S. Gill argues that Huxley was a Buddhist at this stage, who, like the Buddha, adopted a stance of agnosticism towards "metaphysical propositions". Dana Sawyer maintains that, on the one hand, "Huxley was most certainly a mystic", and on the other that he only subscribed to the Perennial Philosophy "provisionally" as opposed to "dogmatically", and thus he "must be called an agnostic".

My explanation is somewhat different. In what I have termed the Tantric phase of his career, from around the time of his first mescaline experience in 1953, Huxley valorises immanence over transcendence and once again concerns himself with making the world a better place. As I noted in Chapter 5, mescaline allowed Huxley to perceive the creases in his trousers, the books on his shelves and the blades of grass in his garden as sacred or divine. Granted, even in the earlier ascetic phase of his career Huxley had praised the Mahayana ideal of the *bodhisattva*, who elects to remain in *samsara* in order to help others achieve *nirvana*, nonetheless the emphasis in *The Perennial Philosophy* is on liberation from *samsara*; and while the enlightened *bodhisattva* perceives *nirvana* in *samsara*, this knowledge does not lead him to celebrate the sacred nature of the body through the practice of *maithuna*; consequently, Huxley's mystical heroes from this time, such as Mr Propter and Bruno Rontini, are ascetics who abstain from sex. However, by the end of the 1950s, one senses that liberation or salvation was no longer the ultimate goal for Huxley. In *The Human Situation* (1977), he writes "I think most of us would agree [that] the end of human life is to realize individual potentialities to their limits" and "to create a society which makes possible such a realization". This sounds more like the sentiments of an agnostic, who cannot be certain of other-worldly salvation and thus advocates making the best of his earthly existence in the present. Moreover, in *Island* none of the characters affirm that man's final end is unitive knowledge of the godhead and there is no mention of a perennial philosophy. When Farnaby impugns the mystical experience of the *moksha*-medicine and argues that it merely takes place in one's head, Dr Robert responds:

> So maybe the whole thing does happen inside one's skull. Maybe it is private and there's no unitive knowledge of anything but one's own physiology. Who cares? The fact remains that the experience can open one's eyes and make one blessed and transform one's whole life.

Ranga describes the Palanese as "Tantrik agnostics", and Dr Robert's words bear this out: even if there is no God or Tao or Mind at Large, the experience of the *moksha*-medicine is inherently valuable, as it instils in one compassion and love for nature and one's fellow humans. Pala is no mere proving ground in which the Palanese get to accrue good karma for liberation in some far-flung rebirth in the future, it is Huxley's approximation of a credible heaven on earth in the here and now. In much the same vein, Huxley was dismissive of teleological interpretations of history, in which for instance the present moment must be sacrificed in favour of a fascist or a communist paradise that will be achieved in a hundred years' time; and, as noted in Chapter 6, Huxley rejected Heard's

spiritual evolution, in which humans waited patiently for the new era of "superconsciousness", when it could be enjoyed via the *moksha*-medicine now. In *This Timeless Moment* (1968), Laura Huxley describes *Island* as her husband's "ultimate legacy". She writes that Huxley

> was appalled [...] at the fact that what he wrote in *Island* was not taken seriously. It was treated as a work of science fiction, when it was not fiction, because each one of the ways of living he described in *Island* was not a product of his fantasy, but something that had been tried in one place or another, some of them in our own everyday life. If the way Aldous died were known, it might awaken people to the awareness that not only this, but many other facts described in *Island* are possible here and now. Aldous asking for the *moksha*-medicine while dying is not only a confirmation of his open-mindedness and courage, but as such a last gesture of continuing importance.

One of the reasons for the sometimes scathing reception of *Island* (Frank Kermode in *Partisan Review* judged it "one of the worst novels ever written") was the fact that whereas Huxley had previously struck a successful balance between narrative and ideas (as in *Point Counter Point* and *Eyeless in Gaza*), in *Island* the sheer weight of ideas sinks the narrative ship and the only vividly realised character is the guilt-ridden sex-obsessed outsider Will Farnaby (a stock type in Huxley's *oeuvre*), while the Palanese are mere cyphers who articulate Huxley's ideas with improbable eloquence and erudition. On the other hand, a preponderance of ideas over narrative and lots of turgid exposition is a feature of the genre, and in this respect *Island* is no better or worse than Thomas Moore's *Utopia* (1516) or Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* (1872). "Huxley's skill in describing the ideal was not up to his skill in satirizing the real", writes Alan Watts.

> Yet it must be admitted that for *any* artist the depiction of heaven is the hardest task of all – is thus the task in which he may most easily make a fool of himself. *Island* is a "thinly fictionalized" collection of essays on education, psychology, and metaphysics in which Huxley stuck out his neck as far as it would go. He advocated everything calculated to evoke the ridicule of sensible people – abolition of the sacred American family, free love, Tantric sex practises, drugs for inducing mystical experience, and the fantasy of the island paradise. He made himself a sitting duck for snickers in the literary reviews and scandals in the Sunday supplements.

But it was precisely these aspects – the Tantric sex, holistic spirituality and the moksha-medicine – that made it so fascinating to the next generation.

To return to the subject of Huxley's agnosticism, it seems from one of his Santa Barbara lectures in 1959 that he did believe in the existence of a cosmic mind: "I myself happen to believe that the deeper self within us is in some way continuous with the mind of the universe or whatever you like to call it". But you need not think of it, he adds, in a religious way.

> You can practise mysticism entirely in psychological terms, and on the basis of a complete agnosticism in regard to the conceptual ideas of orthodox religion, and yet come to knowledge – gnosis – and the fruits of knowledge will be the fruits of the spirit: love, joy, peace, and the capacity to help other people.

While the Palanese variously describe themselves as Buddhists and Tantriks and adorn their temples with statutes of Śiva, theirs is an experiential spirituality based on the sacramental use of the moksha-medicine which firmly rejects the fixed dogmas of organised religion. Dr Robert tells Farnaby: "we have no established church, and our religion stresses immediate experience and deplores belief in unverifiable dogmas and the emotions which that belief inspires". The Palanese erect divine scarecrows to guard their crops in order to teach their children that "all gods are homemade, and [...] it's we who pull their strings and so give them the power to pull ours". For Jeffrey Kripal, Huxley "was not an agnostic with respect to radical mystical sensibilities, for he had

actually experienced Mind at Large, and many times", but he was an agnostic "with respect to all traditional religious claims" concerning God.

At the end of his life, then, Huxley was an agnostic regarding organised religion who garnered the fruits of the spirit through a psychedelic gnosis. While Huxley continues to be identified, especially in the academy, with the technocratic dystopia of *Brave New World* (1932), it was his utopian vision in *Island* – of a personal alternative spirituality based on the ritual use of psychedelic substances and the practice of *maithuna*, which inspires in the Palanese a profound reverence for the body and nature – that constituted his chief legacy to the spiritual seekers of the future. <>

White Christian Privilege: The Illusion of Religious Equality in America by Khyati Y. Joshi [New York University Press, 9781479840236]

Exposes the invisible ways in which white Christian privilege disadvantages racial and religious minorities in America

The United States is recognized as the most religiously diverse country in the world, and yet its laws and customs, which many have come to see as normal features of American life, actually keep the Constitutional ideal of "religious freedom for all" from becoming a reality. Christian beliefs, norms, and practices infuse our society; they are embedded in our institutions, creating the structures and expectations that define the idea of "Americanness." Religious minorities still struggle for recognition and for the opportunity to be treated as fully and equally legitimate members of American society. From the courtroom to the classroom, their scriptures and practices are viewed with suspicion, and bias embedded in centuries of Supreme Court rulings create structural disadvantages that endure today.

In **White Christian Privilege**, Khyati Y. Joshi traces Christianity's influence on the American experiment from before the founding of the Republic to the social movements of today. Mapping the way through centuries of slavery, westward expansion, immigration, and citizenship laws, she also reveals the ways Christian privilege in the United States has always been entangled with notions of White supremacy.

Through the voices of Christians and religious minorities, Joshi explores how Christian privilege and White racial norms affect the lives of all Americans, often in subtle ways that society overlooks. By shining a light on the inequalities these privileges create, Joshi points the way forward, urging readers to help remake America as a diverse democracy with a commitment to true religious freedom.

Review

"Smart and timely, energetic and approachable, this book is destined to be one of those touchstone texts that finds its way to a varied audience eager both to learn and to make meaningful change in American culture." -- Philip Goff, Director, Center for the Study of Religion and American Culture, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis

"Insightful and provocative. Taking a social justice approach, this timely book explores how Christianity has been leveraged to maintain and reproduce structures of domination and subordination, a discussion that is much needed and most welcome as debates about borders, migrants, and citizenship inflect public policy and civic engagement." -- Zayn Kassam, John Knox

McLean Professor of Religious Studies, Pomona College

"'In order to form a more perfect Union,' books such as **WHITE CHRISTIAN PRIVILEGE** add enormous value to highlighting the gap between illusion and reality.", *New York Journal of Books*

"Joshi views subliminal privilege in the common metaphors and underlying assumptions of our society. This privilege is sometimes Christian, sometimes White, and sometimes both. **WHITE CHRISTIAN PRIVILEGE** sets forth the history and the evidence for this privilege, and then proposes how to change it." -- David R. Blumenthal, Jay and Leslie Cohen Professor of Judaic Studies, Emory University, retired

"Illuminates the myriad ways that social structures, individual actions, and cultural assumptions have brought White Christians outsized power and freedom from responsibility. Thoughtful people of all races and faiths need to read and heed her words." -- Paul Spickard, Distinguished Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara

"Looking at America's history—including slavery and westward expansion—White Christian Privilege explores how Christian privilege and white racial norms impact the lives of all Americans. The book demonstrates how Christian beliefs have been built into the Constitution and beyond, and the sometimes subtle and overlooked ramifications it has for religious minorities.", *Publishers Weekly*

"Joshi explores the structures of white Christian privilege embedded in American institutions, laws, and culture ... insightful ... outlines examples of those who have the privilege but are blind to it, and some of the inequities suffered by uneven privilege. Recommended for readers interested in historical roots of religious freedom.", *Library Journal*

A pervasive *Christian privilege* prevails in the United States today. The United States is recognized as the most religiously diverse country in the world; yet, at the same time, Christianity—particularly Protestantism—has been integral to US national Identity. Christian beliefs, norms, and practices, and indeed, a Christian way of looking at the world, infuse our society, enjoying countless legal, structural, and cultural supports whose roots reach back to the arrival of Europeans and the founding of the country. Protestant perspectives have become the "truths" at the bedrock of American society. Christianity dominates by setting the tone and establishing the rules and assumptions about who belongs or does not belong, about what is acceptable and not acceptable in public discourse. It is embedded in our institutions and dictates the structure of our weekend, from Sunday closings for the Christian Sabbath to alcohol sales laws. As a result, the "freedom of religion" enshrined in the pages of the Constitution does not always translate into everyday life. Christian

prayer often opens public meetings and graduations all over the US, and the US Congress and state legislatures have always employed chaplains. Christianity has become bound up with US nationalism, with the inscription "In God We Trust" on our currency and our pledge to a nation "under God." This Christian privilege, which undergirds our country's institutions and cultural practices, offers advantages to Christians as they lead their lives, and disadvantages for members of minority religious groups.

This book explains how the effects of this privilege are acted out in our society and provides a historical and contemporary overview of how Christian privilege was created and why it has persisted. It demonstrates that Christian privilege in the United States has always been entangled with notions of White supremacy.

Indeed, throughout US history, *Christian, English, free,* and *White* have been superimposed to form mutually supporting advantages based on the co-construction of religion, race, and national origin.

These advantages—and corresponding disadvantages, for religious and racial minorities as well as for the nonreligious—persist at both the institutional and individual levels of society and stand in the way of fulfilment of the promises of equality that were made in the nation's founding documents and more recent laws. Yet, unlike racism, gender discrimination, or homophobia, Christian privilege often flies under the radar. It is so ingrained in our societal dynamics; it continues to be taken as "normal." By shining a light on Christian privilege and its entwinement with White privilege, this book aims to equip readers with tools and ideas regarding how they can recognize it operating in our society and foster a more equitable environment for all.

Today's religious and racial diversity requires that we do far more than just appreciate and embrace it or consider the ways individual experiences shape us. A social justice approach, in which we create change and mitigate bias, requires us first to recognize present circumstances as the product of history—of long and deeply-ingrained patterns and structures of advantage and disadvantage. This book sets out to examine the cultural, institutional, and legal infrastructure on which the experiences of Christians and religious minorities today have been built. Ultimately, it offers a historically informed road map of how Christian privilege developed and has influenced the American experiment from colonial times to the present. Drawing on interviews and personal narratives, it illuminates the impact of White Christian privilege in our workplaces, classrooms, and broader society, and offers strategies to expose and overcome its dynamics.

The book takes a hard look at three specific, related, and mutually supporting phenomena in the US: Christian privilege, Christian normativity, and Christian hegemony. *Christian privilege* is experienced at the individual level, in the everyday; it is manifest in unearned advantages that Christians receive and in the corresponding disadvantages religious minorities, atheists, and agnostics must deal with on an everyday basis. Many people think about bias and discrimination as dynamics that happen between two people. It can be easy to recognize a religious slur like "kike" or "dothead" as bias. We are conditioned to see bias most easily at the individual and interpersonal level, which makes it easy to think that if we all were to treat people with respect and kindness, bias would stop being a problem.

But there's far more to it than individual cruelty. At the level of our society and culture, Christian privilege is structural. It has provided the Christian majority the historic and contemporary power to shape social norms. This *Christian normativity* makes Christian values intrinsic to our national identity, conveys the way of truth and rightness on Christian culture, and makes Christian language and metaphors and their underlying theology the nation al standard. Christian normativity imbues Christianity with a unique power, situating it as ordinary and expected. As a result, Ai heists and religious minorities who embrace different practices, belief systems, and world views are

disadvantaged relative to their Christian peers.' Very real everyday consequences result from a sit cation in which the Christian way of doing something comes to lie understood as the normal way of living.

Consciously or unconsciously, we may perceive practices outside he Christian norm as exotic or illegitimate. "God," for example, is 1110st often depicted in nonreligious settings, in line with Christian imaginings, as an old White man with a flowing beard. We might also see Christian figures like Jesus and the Virgin Mary representing the divine. Yet it is exceedingly unlikely that in a setting that is not explicitly Hindu, for example, we will encounter a representation of "God" as the Hindu God Krishna, with his blue skin, or as the four-armed Saraswati, Goddess of knowledge, wisdom and learning, or as other Hindu Gods with their colorful clothing and multiarmed bodies. Christianity's images of God are perceived as "normal" images of God because of Christianity's cultural sway. The God images of other faiths may be regarded as idols—"weird" or cultic in comparison.

It is impossible to overestimate the ways Christian normativity influences the dialogue that goes on in America's public square—from the traditional news media to the 24-hour churn of online social media. In fact, it is so pervasive, and often so subtle, that we often may not notice it. While Christianity makes frequent appearances in the media, it appears even more often in the subtext—the impressions implicit in the words and images selected. Consider, for example, the images and associations that come into your mind when you read the word "terrorism." At a meta level, the institutions and legal standards established in the United States over the past 400 years reflect the accretion of Christian privilege and Christian normativity into an infrastructure of Christian hegemony. *Hegemony* refers to a society's unacknowledged and/ or unconscious adherence to a dominant worldview. Hegemonic ideologies are perpetuated through the cultural norms, policies, and practices which set those ideologies up as "business as usual." *Christian hegemony* thus refers to the predominance and endorsement at the national level of Christian observances, beliefs, scriptures, and manners of worship.' Christianity is embedded in our national laws, mores, and expectations as "regimes of truth," and endures there with legal and social power that has spanned the length, breadth, and entire history of the country.

Christian Privilege and White Supremacy

Any discussion of religion in the US that does not explore its interactions with race and racism is incomplete. This book takes an *intersectional* approach, not only grappling with Christian privilege as a single phenomenon, but also attending to the way it interacts with other structures of social, economic, and legal privilege. The advantages Christians receive are not experienced in isolation; every Christian, and every religious minority, also holds other modal identities. Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Middle Eastern Christians thus experience Christianity in America differently from the way White Christians do. Their various origins and histories to way the US have given these groups different experiences. While they share many of the advantages of being Christian in America, that use advantages may be harder to recognize or acknowledge, especially because of the racial discrimination and violence some groups have also faced. In this respect, their Christianity is often "othered," just as racial minorities as such are "othered." They may In. targets of violence, a problem that Black churches, for example, have faced throughout history and continue to face. In some cases, It can be difficult for individuals to distinguish religious identity

from cultural identity. The identities of Filipino Catholics, Black Protestants, and others, for example, interweave religion and culture in ways that make them virtually impossible to separate. This intimate connection between an advantaged identity (Christian) and a disadvantaged identity (racial minority) can make it difficult for Christians of color to recognize and acknowledge the advantages they do possess.

White Christian supremacy in America is the product of a centuries-long project in which notions of White racial superiority and Christian religious superiority have augmented and magnified each other. White Christian supremacy is an ideology that developed before the European "Age of Discovery" and European colonization of Africa, Arabia, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas. Born from theologies that positioned White Christians at the top of a global social and economic order, White Christian supremacy looked to the Bible for rationales that supported the subjugation and genocide of Indigenous peoples, Black slavery, and a view of Asians as threatening, exotic, and heathen.

These principles coalesced in a series of fifteenth-century Papal Bulls (edicts) that permitted the Portuguese monarchy to seize West Africa by deeming any land not inhabited by Christians as available to be "discovered," claimed, and exploited by Christian rulers, and permitting the enslavement of Muslims, pagans, and other "unbelievers." This "Doctrine of Discovery" became the basis of all European claims in the Americas as well as the foundation for the United States' western expansion.' Christianity thus permeated colonial enterprises around the world, both before and after the colonization of North America. In all of these projects, non-Christians were denied the rights to land, sovereignty, and self-determination enjoyed by Christians.

In what would become the United States, White Christian supremacy was developed, rationalized, and spread by theologians, philosophers, and scientists. At the time of the nation's founding, most of its major universities were affiliated with the church, from Puritan Harvard and Calvinist Yale to Anglican Columbia, Presbyterian Princeton, and Baptist Brown. "Scholarship" in these institutions of higher learning helped to create and perpetuate White Christian supremacy. By reproducing and amplifying scientific theories of racial hierarchy and religious destiny, these institutions promoted theologies that rationalized land theft from native non-Christians and enslavement of Black non-Christians.' Far from an anomaly in the theological discipline, Whiteness has been a dominant theological outlook by which non-White, non-Christian persons have been assessed along a hierarchy of humanity. The conquest of the US was a colonial endeavor that combined taking land with spreading the gospel of Christ. In the words of Rev. Dr. Martin Luthier King, Jr., "Our nation was born in genocide. . . . Moreover, we elevated that tragic experience into a noble crusade."

Over the centuries, Christianity has justified race-based segregation of Whites and Blacks within the same Protestant denominanations, be they Baptists or Methodists or Pentecostals. In the present day, Christian normativity perpetuates the societal exclusion of Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs through public resistance id mosques, synagogues, temples, and gurdwaras being built in their neighborhoods, among other means.' The same resistance to sharing space with people of color that characterized segregation is Hiected in the rejection of sharing public space with religious minorities. Both are born of the desire not to see, touch, or encounter those who are different. Today's version directs a "NIMBY" (not in my backyard) attitude toward entire religious communities.

The Immigration Reform Act of 1965 opened the nation's doors to immigrants of a variety of faiths who had not been permitted to enter the country for many decades. In the period since then, many members of religious minorities have arrived who trace their heritage to Asia, Africa, and the Arab world. To understand their religious experiences, we must also consider their racial minority status. My experience of growing up Hindu in the South, for example, cannot be separated from my experience of growing up brown.

Examining our history and the present day, we can see legal, historical, and everyday moments that illustrate the persistent connection and conflation of race and religion. For example, ideas of Black inferiority during slavery drew on not only notions of racial hierarchy but also on the idea that as non-Christians, Africans were depraved and barbaric. More recently, religion has become a powerful method of classifying the "enemy" or "other" in national life, in ways that affect primarily non-

Christian people of color. Muslims, for example, have become particularly demonized in the US. The vicious acts of a miniscule handful of their co-religionists shaped their image in popular culture long before the events of September 11, 2001. Since that date, narratives around "terrorism" and the "war on terror" continue to associate an entire global religion, Islam, With violent, nihilistic movements. Looking more closely at many incidents, we discover that anti-Muslim bias is manifested racially. When Islam is associated with particular physical characteristics—that is, when it is racialized—South Asian Americans like me find ourselves being "randomly" selected for heightened screening at the airport because we look like we might be Muslim. South Asian American Sikhs, Hindus, and Christians, and even Hispanics have been targets of post-9/11 backlash attacks—suffering injury, and sometimes death, because of their brown skin, beards, clothing, or turbans. Their racial and cultural markers are associated with Islam in the popular mind, even though they are not Muslim.

Critical Conversations

Despite contemporary rhetoric predicting the "decline of White Christian America,"[9] the power of Whiteness and Christianity is deeply dyed in the nation's wool, and omnipresent in American rules and structures. Indeed, those three terms—"White," "Christian," and "American"—have been used interchangeably so often that in many contexts, including in the lexicon of non-White, non-Christian immigrant communities, they remain synonyms for one another. When members of White Christian America react defensively against the nation's growing diversity, it is because they fail to understand the hegemony on which their power is built and to see how normative and privileged their faith and their race still are. They feel they are "losing" and need to fight to preserve their vision of a White Christian America, not realizing how the legal and social deck is still stacked dramatically in their favor. They see existential threats in foes like Sharia law or the "War on Christmas" that are trivial in comparison with the benefits Christians enjoy.

This is not to say that Christian people of faith do not face hostility in certain quarters. There is discrimination against and even **toward** religion in general from some quarters. Some popular and academic authors have railed against Christianity in particular, and we can find bias against religion more generally in higher education and social justice or progressive circles. Religion is the last topic some of my progressive colleagues in ethnic and Asian American studies want to discuss. While some scholars are comfortable teaching about the sociocultural aspects of religion, they nevertheless keep their distance from matters of faith.

Unfortunately, the bias against religion in ethnic studies is a longstanding tradition. In some cases, it is the product of scholars' own unease with religion; in others it springs from the perception of religion as mere superstition and Karl Marx' influential triviallzution of religion as the opiate of the masses. Meanwhile, the study of religion and its role in society and individuals' lives is mostly relegated to departments of religion and seminaries. In those spaces, on the other hand, many of my colleagues are uneasy discussing race and racism. This untenable dichotomy—ethnic studies' unease with religion, and religious studies' unease with race—makes integrative works like this one difficult, but all the more necessary.

Many social justice activists are likewise uncomfortable talking about faith. Some have left organized religion because of its role n the oppression of marginalized communities; others are unable to find congruencies between religious participation and political progressivism. People who are ready to talk about homophobia, classism, or racism are ill at ease including religious discrimination **in** the conversation. The anti-religious perspective of certain scholars and progressives can—sometimes legitimately—come across as bias against Christianity.

Even if some Christians may have personally faced real obstacles, criticism, or discrimination related to their faith, such experiences do not negate the power of Christian privilege. This book does not deny the existence of anti-Christian bias; rather, it aims to show that White Christian norms nonetheless remain entrenched in our institutions, laws, and civic culture in ways that set up an uneven playing field in everyday public, social, and work life to the disadvantage of many religious minorities. Moreover, none of the strategies presented here to ameliorate this problem aim to diminish Christianity, but rather to ensure equal opportunity for all religious traditions and for those who embrace no religion.

Religious Oppression Today

There are many different types of *religious oppression* in our society, of which the most well-known are probably antisemitism and the anti-Muslim sentiment sometimes referred to as "Islamophobia." Atheists, agnostics, practitioners of Native Americans traditions, Buddhists, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, and others also frequently face religious oppression in various forms. From the Jew whose synagogue was vandalized to the Sikh man killed in a post-9/11 "backlash" attack, to the Muslim woman who doesn't get a job because she wears a hijab, religious oppression is present wherever we find privilege: in legal policies and structures, in social designs and cultural practices, and at the level of individual discrimination!..

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A social justice approach is reflective, and looks past easy answers. It asks, for example, why we so rarely recognize the religious facet of oppression against religious minorities who are also people of color. We recognize antisemitism as religious oppression, in part because of its central role in twentieth-century history but also in large part because most American Jews are now considered White; as a result, when they are targeted for discrimination, we see that it is directed at their religious identity. By contrast, headlines about violence against Sikh men, or about the "dotbuster" attacks on New Jersey Hindus in the 198os, often describe "racial violence." For so many of the reasons described in this book, race is allowed to eclipse what would otherwise be seen as a *religious* attack. Recognizing intersectionality, and situating the disadvantages that racial and religious minorities face in the context of the structural advantages Christians possess, will let us delve into deeper truths. <>

The Sociological Interpretation of Dreams by Bernard Lahire, translated by Helen Morrison [Polity, 9781509537945]

For Freud, dreams were the royal road to the unconscious: through the process of interpretation, the manifest and sometimes bewildering content of dreams can be traced back to the unconscious representations underlying it. But can we understand dreams in another way by considering how the unconscious is structured by our social experiences?

This is hypothesis that underlies this highly original book by Bernard Lahire, who argues that dreams can be interpreted sociologically by seeing the dream as a nocturnal form of self-to-self communication. Lahire rejects Freud's view that the manifest dream content is the result of a process of censorship: as a form of self-to-self communication, the dream is the symbolic arena most completely freed from all forms of censorship. In Lahire's view, the dream is a message which can be understood only by relating it to the social world of the dreamer, and in particular to the problems that concern him or her during waking life. As a form of self-to-self communication, the dream is an

intimate private diary, providing us with the elements of a profound and subtle understanding of who and what we are. Studying dreams enables us to discover our most deep-seated and hidden preoccupations, and to understand the thought processes that operate within us, beyond the reach of our volition.

The study of dreams and dreaming has largely been the preserve of psychoanalysis, psychology and neuroscience. By showing how dreams are connected to the lived experience of individuals in the social world, this highly original book puts dreams and dreaming at the heart of the social sciences. It will be of great value to students and scholars in sociology, psychology and psychoanalysis and to anyone interested in the nature and meaning of dreams.

Review

Drawing on many disciplines, on little-known works about dream activity and on discoveries about consciousness and the workings of thought, Bernard Lahire puts forward a bold theory: we replay at night the unconscious schemas and determinisms that structure our personality and underlie our behavior. —***L'Obs***

This great theoretical work, which opens up a whole host of questions about what troubles us day and night, about what social structures do to our unconscious and about what the world does to our nocturnal imagination, awaits only its practical application in order to corroborate its stimulating insights. —***Les Inrocks***

"With insight and serious thought, Lahire builds a bridge between sociology and psychoanalysis. Across the bridge travel not only empirical and theoretical contributions to each field, but intellectual spurs to new creativity." —**Craig Calhoun, Arizona State University**

"Bernard Lahire has established himself as arguably the most creative and insightful French sociologist of his generation. A leading global social psychologist, Lahire reveals how dreams transcend the line between fantasy and daytime reality. This masterwork persuades us that that the chasm between sleep and waking is not as deep as easily imagined. Every sociologist will learn from Lahire and every psychologist should learn from him as well." —**Gary Alan Fine, Northwestern University**

A Dream for the Social Sciences

A dream is a sausage mill you feed your life into. (Benjamin Whitmer, *Pike,* p. 168)

Dreams are both extremely appealing and extremely troubling for the sociologist. Their appeal lies in their potential to throw light on an aspect of our experience which generally remains intriguing and yet ultimately unfathomable. For any researcher with a taste for adventure, the prospect of attempting to comprehend the incomprehensible represents an exhilarating scientific challenge.

Yet the curiosity and intellectual excitement provoked by such a phenomenon can quickly give way to anxiety.

Initially this is linked to several characteristics of the object in question. The dream is a mental phenomenon, occurring when subjects are asleep and, consequently, when they are incapable of speaking. It is a product of the imagination but something which the dreamers themselves experience as though they were plunged into the most vivid reality. It is not always remembered on waking and, even when that is the case, is often quickly modified or forgotten, consequently rendering the researcher's task infinitely more difficult than that of getting subjects to talk about their waking activities. Finally, the dream appears strange, incoherent, delirious or incongruous in the eyes of the person who has produced it. The task is therefore theoretically and methodologically extremely challenging for researchers, and the study of dreams can rapidly turn into something of a nightmare.

And that is not all. Like the fairy-tale castle to which we seek to gain access, the dream-object is surrounded by thorns and guarded by a dragon. These thorns, this dragon, which render access to the dream so difficult, represent all the many past attempts to interpret dreams, and especially that associated with psychoanalysis. For a twenty-first-century researcher, it is difficult to dissociate dreams from the name of Sigmund Freud. The extent of Freud's work, with its multiple shifts, whether acknowledged or unspoken, the abundance of commentaries it has inspired, and the schools or trends which have shared its heritage are all enough to dampen the desire for knowledge and to keep the inquisitive at bay.

The social sciences have been notably absent from the history of scholarly study of sleep and dreams. In contrast to the sustained involvement of all forms of psychology, from psychoanalysis to cognitive psychology, or more recently of the neurosciences, from neuropsychiatry to neurobiology, the contribution made by the social sciences in general, and sociology in particular, remains extremely peripheral.

Some people will consider all this as only normal given that dreams are after all an activity which is both universal (everybody dreams), individual (everyone's dreams are unique) and par excellence involuntary. That sociologists, anthropologists or historians can speculate on the way in which the

dream has been viewed, approached, interpreted by different eras, societies or groups is hardly surprising. But for them to try to probe into the logic of dream creation, to see it as the result of a process which is linked to the situation of dreamers within the social world is, on the contrary, far from obvious.

It was during a period spent at the University of California at Berkeley in 1997 that, during the course of my reading, I by chance stumbled, to my great interest, on the beginnings of a sociology of dreams) The research programme which followed, the first scientific formulation of which will be read in these pages, took shape over the course of twenty years of reading and research in parallel with other projects. This knowledge of research on the subject of dreams, both past and present, emerging from very different disciplines (psychoanalysis, psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, sociology, anthropology, history, etc.) has enabled me to formulate a new integrative theory which, by taking as a starting point the knowledge gained from the synthetic model of interpretation imposed by Freud in his time, sets out to correct its weaknesses, its shortcomings and its errors by drawing on the many scientific developments which have emerged since the extraordinary feat of understanding represented by his book *The Interpretation of Dreams,* written on the cusp of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

If we consider the dream-object as *a problem* which needs to resolved, then we must be able to define all the terms of this problem and to express them in a coherent manner in order to reach a satisfactory solution, both from a theoretical point of view and from one which is compatible with the empirical facts. An involuntary psychic activity occurring during sleep, the dream can also be characterised as a specific form of expression through which the dreamer works on all the various problems preoccupying him or her, with varying degrees of consciousness, during waking life. I will attempt to demonstrate that such a form of symbolic expression can only really be understood by taking into account a number of elements relating to the incorporated past of the dreamer, to the recent circumstances of his or her life, and to the specific context of sleep in which the dream occurs and which is characterised notably by a withdrawal from the flow of ordinary social interactions and demands, by the slackening of the reflexive control of mental activity, and by the establishment of a self-to-self communication which is predominantly visual and largely implicit.

These different elements will be explained in detail and set out in a *general formula for the interpretation of dreams* that will allow us to think in a more dynamic way about the process of dream-making. The dream will be more generally thought of as a specific *form of expression* situated within an expressive continuum (dream, daydream, delirium, hallucination, play, literary creation or artistic expression, etc.) that varies depending on the conditions in which the psychic activity takes place. Practical analogy, which is, along with association through contiguity, one of the elementary forms of human psychic life and a feature of its historic nature, will be placed at the heart of oneiric operations (of symbolisation, condensation, metaphorisation, substitution, etc.) which make the expression of the dream so unique. And, finally, we will show how the dream can be scientifically interpreted provided it is associated with a non-dream state which forms its existential background.

This theory of oneiric expression which has been formulated from within sociology, but which also brings together a whole range of multidisciplinary work, allows the dream to make its entry into the social sciences from a perspective that is both dispositional and contextual. Succeeding in making the dream a focus of study for the social sciences is a way of expanding the field of study of these sciences by allowing access to what, even today, still remains very much a *terra incognita.*

Norbert Elias drew attention to the limits which, without always fully realising it, researchers in the social sciences have long imposed on themselves by studying 'societies' within national limits and by concentrating on adult individuals who are already socially constituted, as though they had never

been children. But the list of unexplored domains and dimensions does not end there. For researchers have until now focused their attention almost exclusively on the most collectively organised behaviours of waking individuals, neglecting the fact that approximately one-third of their time is spent asleep and that these periods of sleep are accompanied by dreams.

What do these dreams tell us about the lives of individuals and about the societies in which they live? How are the social experiences of dreamers woven into the fabric of their imaginations, even during those times when the intentional consciousness no longer controls the flow of images? These are the crucial questions that emerge, questions which sociologists have hardly even attempted to answer. When the objects of their investigations fall asleep, sociologists close their eyes.

But a theory of oneiric expression is also, and even more importantly, an opportunity to contribute to the transformation of the social sciences by restoring to them legitimate ambitions which specialisation and a standardised form of professionalism have tended to undervalue. By focusing their attention on such a curious object, and by agreeing to step outside their comfort zones and to embrace multidisciplinary learning, researchers can begin to focus on crucial scientific questions: the fundamental psychic mechanisms peculiar to the historical and linguistic beings represented by socialised human beings; the internalisation of all kinds of social regularities in the form of *incorporated dispositions* or *schema,* ready to find expression at the slightest occasion, even during sleep; the relationship between past and present in human experience; the respective share of conscious and unconscious, of the voluntary and involuntary, of control and absence of control in psychic operations and in human behaviour; and, finally, the freedom and determinism which, today more than ever before, stimulate debate on the 'reasons' for our acts or our thoughts. If the dream is indeed to make its entry into the great house of social sciences, it does so not with the intention of leaving the place unchanged but in order to shake up old habits and to reconfigure the space.

In contrast to what Freud believed (for reasons which will be closely examined), the dream will appear finally as the symbolic arena freed most completely from all the different forms of censorship, whether formal or moral, that lie mercilessly in wait for dreamers the moment they awake. The self-to-self communication in which the dream is expressed, overturning linguistic and narrative conventions, liberating dreamers from any kind of restraint, in a sense represents the most intimate of private diaries, the most unequivocal expression of all forms of freedom of speech. Consequently, for those who are interested in them, dreams thus offer the elements necessary for a deep and subtle understanding of what we are. Studying them essentially enables us to discover *our deep-seated and hidden preoccupations* and to understand what thought processes operate within us beyond the reach of our volition.

In all scientific research, a balance needs to be found between, on the one hand, the formulation of a general theoretical model along with the methods associated with it and, on the other hand, the identification of the socio-historical structures, processes, mechanisms or logics peculiar to specific individuals or groups of individuals within a social reality. In order to achieve such a balance, the results of the research will need to be published in the form of two separate volumes.

Because of its previously unexplored nature, the sociological interpretation of dreams, as a form of expression and as a unique process, initially called for the construction of an integrative and empirically pertinent theory — i.e. one which took into account all the theoretical-empirical knowledge already existent — that would enable the dream (the logics behind its production and not merely its uses and interpretations) to enter the realm of the social sciences. In this phase of the study, the sole purpose of any examples of dreams or of extracts of dreams included is to prove the relevance and the rich potential of the theoretical model or of the methodological tools associated with it. This implies not that such examples are mere illustrations but, rather, that their purpose is

to demonstrate the capacity of the model to take on any example whatsoever and to emphasise the way that it is indeed implemented on the basis of predetermined methods. Such is the purpose of this first volume.

A systematic study of the precise corpus of dreams, such as I began to undertake in order to elaborate and support my theoretical and methodological thinking, implies, on the other hand, that the established theoretical model, even though still subject to improvements and transformations, he applied to the understanding of a clearly determined empirical material. It is then the reality being studied and its specificities which predominate. Roth the theoretical model and the methodological tools take a back seat in order to turn the spotlight onto this reality which they have made it possible to understand. This will be the purpose of the second volume.

It is important, from my point of view, not to see this division into two volumes as representing any opposition between theory and empirical knowledge, given that theory and empiricism will be present in both volumes. It is simply that they do not occupy the same space within the Framework of the scientific task undertaken. If a more specific description of the two phases of research is needed, it would be better to refer to an *experimental phase,* that of putting together an empirically based theoretical-methodological creation (by taking into account any empirical knowledge already accrued in the construction of a synthetic theoretical model), and a *phase of systematic exploration,* theoretically and methodologically orientated, on determined empirical corpora.

A Dream without Any Function

Dreams were invented in order to avoid getting bored during sleep (Pierre Dac)

In the course of this book, I have deliberately left to one side a question which nevertheless continues to preoccupy the world of dream research, On the evidence of the many theorists of the dream, it would appear that no theory would be quite complete unless it stated what the *function* of the dream might be. The answer to the question 'What are dreams for?' would apparently need to be expressed in the singular (function rather than functions) in order to be totally persuasive and perhaps to satisfy the read need for certainty — and, even more so, that of the writers who contort for originality in the race to find new and sometimes surprising function.. My own conviction is that the dream has no unique function and that no amount of wondering what its purpose might be will help us understand it any better.

Freud prepared the way by explicitly proposing just such a function. Although dreams were essentially perceived by him to be the fulfilment of unsatisfied desires or wishes, he nevertheless suggested that the reused would have a permanent structuring aim, which would be to protect sleep, Dreams would therefore be, according to the still famous phrase, 'the GUARDIANS of sleep'.' In a letter to Fliess, written on 9 June 1899, he wrote: 'There is *one* wish that every dream is intended to fulfil, though it assumes various forms. That is the wish to sleep! You dream to avoid having to wake up, because you want to sleep.' Freud himself referred to authors (Burdach, Novalis and Purkinje) who attribute to dreams a healing or calming effect on the wounds inflicted by daily life.

The reader may indeed wonder about all those dreams which are terrifying, harrowing, disturbing or sad, or those which cause dreamers to start abruptly from their sleep in tears, drenched in sweat, choked by anxiety or fear. He or she may well doubt the relevance of this theory in relation to all those dreams which are anything but reassuring or restful. Yet Freud would still maintain that dreams had a unique and urgent function, insisting that, just as the purpose of the stomach is to digest food, the function of the dream is to protect sleep. The function of the dream is indeed to protect sleep, it is just that it does not always succeed in doing so:

> I here is no difficulty in discovering the general function of dreaming. It serves the purpose of fending off, by a kind of soothing action, external or internal stimuli which would tend to rouse the sleeper, and thus **of** securing sleep against interruption. External stimuli are fended oil' by being given a new interpretation and by being woven into some harmless situation; internal stimuli, caused by instinctual demands, are given free play by the sleeper and allowed to find satisfaction in I he formation of dreams, so long as the latent dream-thoughts submit **to** the control of the censorship. But if they threaten to break free and I he meaning of the dream becomes too plain, the sleeper cuts short the dream and awakens in terror (dreams of this class are known as *anxiety-dreams).* A similar failure in the function of dreaming occurs If an external stimulus becomes too strong to be fended off (this is the class of *arousal-dreams)*

As Ernest Hartman points out in a book called *The Nature and Functions of Dreaming,* a great many writers since Freud have put forward suggestions of their own about the function of dreams. Depending on which of these is consulted, the purpose of dreams is to help resolve conflicts, to make up for neglected aspects of personality, to develop the ego, to maintain and develop the self, to regulate mood, to adapt to stress or to reduce tension, to step back in time to an agreeable past, to get rid of useless or burdensome things *(clear the software'),* and so on and so forth.

The Finnish psychologist and neuroscientist Antti Revonsuo even proposed **a function** of the dream in the context of a model of evolutionary psychology. By doing so he takes the opposite position to all those who believe that the dream does not in itself have any natural function. The fact that the phenomenal content of dreams and the forms they take are not random but organised and selective leads this researcher to emphasise the fact that, during the dream, the brain constructs a complex model of the world in which certain types of elements are under-represented in comparison with waking life, whereas others are over-represented. And, rather than wondering which of the dreamer's social frameworks of experience and thought and which events or experiences in their life are responsible for selecting and over-representing these elements rather than any others, he proposes the hypothesis that the biological function of dreams is to simulate threatening events, and thus to rehearse threatening situations along with the means of avoiding them.

This function would make sense in relation to the original ancestors of the human species whose life was short and extremely dangerous. In such conditions, any behavioural advantage when faced with extremely dangerous events would increase the chance of survival and protect the reproduction of the species. A dream-production mechanism which selects threatening events from waking life and simulates them over and over again in different combinations would have been imperative to maintain or develop the skills required to avoid danger. For Revonsuo, the empirical data regarding the normative dream content, children's dreams, recurrent dreams, nightmares, post-traumatic dreams and the dreams of hunter gatherers imply that our dream-production mechanisms are specialised in the simulation of threatening events. He therefore advances the hypothesis that the primary function of dreams is the simulation of danger.

This explanatory leap taking us back to the origins of human life leads Revonsuo to reject any explanation more immediately linked to dreamers' conditions of life and types of experience. He sees the fact that children often dream about animals, and about being attacked by animals, as additional proof in support of the evolutionary hypothesis of the biological function of dreams. Since, in his view, children are less preoccupied by their surroundings than adults (a comment which, in my view, makes no sense at all, given the quantity of research in child psychology, sociology and anthropology which has long demonstrated the determining role of socialising frameworks on the structure of children's behaviour and personality), they would be likely to dream about dangerous animals . . . as in the times of their ancestors. Revonsuo rejects as irrelevant any debate on the role of children's stories (and incidentally ignores the cuddly toys and other playthings which in our

societies often take the form of animals) as a factor explaining this strong presence of animals in children's dreams. Nor does he wonder if the gradual disappearance of animals in dreams as children grow up might not simply be associated with their leaving behind the cultural world of childhood and entering a cultural and imaginary world where animals occupy a less important place.

Ernest Hartmann also claims to see a function in the fact that dreams incorporate highly traumatic events as a way of somehow defusing danger `As connections are made between the terrible recent event and other material, the emotion becomes less powerful and overwhelming and the trauma is gradually integrated into the rest of life.'[8] Nevertheless, not only-does this kind of function apply only to situations which provoke a strong emotional impact on dreamers, but it is also not certain that it is confined only to dreams. Studies of people who have been victims or witnesses of terrorist attacks, accidents, natural catastrophes, fires, etc., would no doubt show that one way of 'coping' with the traumatic event consists in talking about it regularly with other people (spouse, friends, neighbours. doctors, psychologists, firemen, policemen, etc.) in order to share the anger, sadness or fear and to absorb, interpret and work out these issues. If ordinary conversation can have the same function of integration and de-emotionalisation, it must be that the dream has no unique role in this area. In this respect, the dream is only one aspect of the permanent effort we are obliged to make in order to face up to and resolve the problems which confront us, but neither more nor less than the waking consciousness in terms of public action with others, those daydreaming moments when we have time for uninterrupted consciousness, or those moments devoted to personal writing, such as diaries, etc.

Yet why should dreams have only a single function, and should we even wonder which function(s) it fulfils to be fully satisfactory from a scientific point of view? Nothing could be less certain. A stubborn insistence on identifying the function of dreams is akin to trying to determine a single function in language or in our mental representations. What is the purpose of speaking? What is the purpose of thinking? Some might claim that speaking serves 'to give orders' or 'to coordinate actions', while for others speaking serves 'to express feelings', 'to put forward arguments', 'to remember certain things' or 'to predict or anticipate'... In fact, we dream because we have the capacity to symbolise and because, as long as the human organism continues to live, as long as the brain continues to function, the work of representation and of expression can never stop.

Awake or asleep, active or at rest, under the influence of drink or drugs, suffering from sunstroke or a very high temperature, or in perfect health and in full possession of all their faculties, human beings never stop thinking, imagining, feeling and expressing themselves mentally or verbally. 'The brain continues its function during sleep the same as the heart and lungs continue their functions during sleep',[9] wrote with great pertinence Calvin S. Hall and Vernon J. Nordby. Thought is a permanent, continuous process.[10] It is only the different forms it takes that vary, depending on the cerebral, psychic, semiotic and social conditions in which it is expressed.

It could therefore be said that we dream because we live, and that we live the life of a thinking, perceiving and feeling being, with death as the only end. That was the view of Abbot Jerome Richard in 1766: 'The mind is perpetually occupied with images of some kind; its state of spirituality does not allow it a single moment of inactivity; nor does it even have the freedom to be otherwise — its essence is thought. Like fire which exists only in movement, so it exists in continual activity.'[11] This insight[12] is borne out by contemporary experimental research which shows that, even if some people remember their dreams only rarely, it is highly likely that everybody dreams every night, in all the phases of sleep, and that only some of them regularly, and spontaneously, remember their dreams on waking.[13] Researchers experimented with waking sleepers up at various points in the

night, and the result obtained confirmed that on each occasion individuals were able to recall the images and sensations they were in the process of experiencing in their sleep.

And it is again to the metaphor of fire that Antoine Charma turned in 1851 in order to express the same idea of the continuity of cognitive activity from the waking state to sleep and from sleep to the waking state: 'Just as the smoldering brand which rekindles was holding in reserve some hidden spark, so the man who recovers the full and complete exercise of his faculties not only preserved them but, moreover, continued to exercise them, although at a level undetectable to an external observer, in those moments of languor when they seem extinguished. Sleep is not death; waking is not therefore a resurrection.' In the same vein, Paul Radestock defined the dream as the 'continuation of the activity of the mind during sleep'.

To the question: 'Why do we dream?', we should therefore reply: 'We dream because we continue to live during sleep as linguistic beings capable of representation.' The brain continues its activity independently of our will, just as we breathe or digest our food without needing consciously to trigger these functions. As soon as there is capacity to represent the world mentally, the work of representation and of expression is under way, intentionally or not, awake or not. Sleep should be considered not as a ceasing of activity but as an activity in its own right. The cognitive neurosciences have enabled this notion, supported in the past by those researchers who had worked on dreams, to be proved beyond doubt: `On the contrary, even in full darkness, it ceaselessly broadcasts global patterns of neural activity, causing what William James called "the stream of consciousness" — an uninterrupted flow of loosely connected thoughts, primarily shaped by our current goals and only occasionally seeking information in the senses).' It is this diurnal-centrism, urging us to engage fully with the socialised world of waking activities, that leads us, erroneously, to think that sleep is passive and that only waking life is active, that time spent sleeping is a period of inactivity and waking time one of activity. Dreams are anything but passive. They are just one among others of the mind's forms of expression.

Dreams are the products of a capacity unique to the human species which enables them to represent things mentally and symbolically. They are generated by sleeping individuals who have no direct interaction with their surroundings or any means of intentionally or voluntarily controlling their representations. This form of thought or of human expression which arises from the human brain's need to pursue its activity regardless of the conditions in which it finds itself, and therefore also including during sleep, has no clearly determined or specialised function.

Considered from this point of view, the function of 'guardian of sleep' proposed by Freud is something of a tautology. If we accept the fact that the dream is the form of thought which develops when people are asleep, then dreams and sleep are simply indissociable, without its being possible to say that the former's role is to preserve or protect the latter. Dreams do not make us sleep, but they are simply the type of mental activity that unfolds once we are sleeping. Likewise, claiming that the dream serves to enable the brain to stay active during periods of physical inactivity constituted by the sleeping state is merely a way of turning the description of dreams into their function. Rather than *serving* to keep the brain active during sleep, they *are* the kind of mental process which takes place during sleep, given that cerebral activity does not stop when we are sleeping.

The great many examples of dreams published by researchers demonstrate that dreams vary enormously in nature: we dream of stressful events to come (exams, plane travel, job interviews, etc.) or of anticipated or hoped-for events (romantic encounters, professional promotion, etc.), of past moments (which can include catastrophes or wars in the case of post-traumatic dreams, humiliating or embarrassing situations as well as sad or happy ones), of difficult situations (in a professional, familial, social, sentimental, sexual, political, religious, etc. context), of situations we

wish for in our lives but which remain unfulfilled, and so on. There are as many types of dreams as there are subjects of reflection or of emotion, of questioning or of anxiety. And there are as many functions of dreams as there are functions of language. Making one form of language use or one type of dream a function would simply be an unwarranted generalization. It would amount to going unjustifiably from recognising a certain process of functioning (it works *like that)* to the dubious attribution of a *function* (it works *because of that).*

We dream because, as long as we are alive, we have no choice but to continue to produce mental representations. Rather than trying to find answers to the question about why we dream, or what the function of dreams might be, it is therefore preferable to ask ourselves why we dream what we dream (rather than dreaming of something else) and why our dreams take specific forms (rather than any others). And, in order to answer these questions, we need to understand how the human mind functions, to be aware of the dreamer's incorporated past, to be familiar with his or her preoccupations and with the recent events he or she has experienced, and to understand the particular conditions — cerebral, psychic, semiotic and social — which prevail during sleep.

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Dreams, Will and Freedom

Dreams are the mind free-wheeling. Pierre Reverdy, *Le Livre de mon bord)*

In studying the dream, sociology continues Freud's work in its own way by showing that the social sciences still often attribute too much reflexive consciousness and will to individuals (with their stock of representations. tastes or preferences, values and conscious interests) than they have in reality. Freud said that 'the ego is not master in its own house" and that psychic activity was not confined to intentional and voluntary conscious activity. Sociological dispositionalism does not assume that the dispositions and skills carried with individuals are consciously and voluntarily deployed and controlled or that those individuals are even aware of them. But the study of dreams has compelled researchers to become aware of the sheer scale of coherent psychic activity, albeit involuntary, operating within individuals. As a result of their many peculiarities, dream accounts oblige us to see the hidden process of unconscious analogical connections which is constantly at work. Conversely, in waking life, the descriptions of our practices, relatively coherent as they are, too often make us forget , that process.

By comparing dream images to waking accounts framed in conventional linguistic formats and subject to the censorship imposed by institutions (we do not speak within the family in the same way we speak at school or at work), by circumstances (we do not speak at a celebratory meal in the same way as we speak at a funeral) and by our audience (we do **not** speak to a friend from outside the workplace in the same way we speak to our hierarchical superior), we first become aware of all the things that permanently weigh upon us in our waking social life and which have less resonance during sleep. We are so accustomed to adopting conventional linguistic formats,[2] adapted to the particular nature of the situations **in** which we find ourselves, that we no longer notice the constraints impose on our forms of expression. But taking the formal and the visible for the real in its totality, we end up forgetting what lies beneath appearances. Our involuntary psychic activity takes place during periods of sleep, but also in the waking state, in the numerous episodes when we are daydreaming, interrupted by interactions and external demands, and in all those moments when speech or behaviour are disturbed (hallucinations, delirium, slips of the tongue, parapraxes) as a result of fatigue, high temperature, mental illness, drug or alcohol use, etc.

It might be supposed that daydreams, temporary losses of self-control or even certain criminal acts which appear to have been committed by someone other than the self CI was no longer myself) are no more than exceptional moments which do not deserve a high level of sociological attention. And

yet, even active periods, periods of interaction and periods of waking reflection, which have all the characteristics of conscious and even sometimes rationally organised moments, are secretly connected to this same unintentional psychic activity which serves as the backdrop to individual gestures, words, decisions and reactions. Sociologists working exclusively on the waking state of publicly organised human behaviours neglect everything teeming just below the rational, public and official surface of things. Nevertheless, dreams, more than any other symbolic expression, reveal the practical, unintentional analogies which, structured by our past social experiences, constantly guide us and structure our relationships with the world and with other people. And the whole of sociology can ultimately be transformed by the inclusion of dreams in its theory of actors and of action.

We need therefore to ask ourselves what sociology might be were it to examine our waking lives with the same keen gaze as the one it is obliged to cast on the symbolic productions that are at work during periods of sleep. It would in particular be forced to take account of the depth and the opacity of that past experience which is a vital part of both our physical and linguistic acts, our actions and interactions, and of which, for the most part, we are only superficially aware. Yet our every gesture, each word we speak, carries within it the germ of all those past experiences which resonate in them. We see only the conscious or visible tip of all that is stirring within us, seeking expression and shaping our desires, our thoughts and our acts.

At each moment in our lives what 'we' do, say, think or feel is determined by the encounter between the series of relatively analogous past experiences (a series which varies in length depending on our age) and the constraints (limits, demands, questions, orders, obligations, sanctions, etc.) of the present context. And who exactly is this 'we' or this 'I', all too often perceived by us as a conscious and autonomous entity guiding by will and reason alone all these actions and gestures? The ordinary acts of social life are, to a much greater extent than we often realise, shaped by our socially constituted unconscious, permeated by culturally determined practical analogies. Showing that the social world is still present in those moments where groups or institutions seem to be absent, where both personal and institutional interactions and demands are suspended, where will is weakened, where silence, darkness and a relaxing of muscular tone isolate the individual, largely cutting him or her off from their surroundings, is a way of proving that what the social world constrains individuals to experience in their waking lives, from the moment of birth onwards, continues to structure their mental representations during sleep. The era in which Maurice Halbwachs was reproached for his 'sociological imperialism' because he was targeting subjects initially regarded as the domain of 'individual psychology' is well and truly behind us, and it is time for sociology to pursue its research along the route mapped out by the author of *Les Cadres sociaux de la memoire*.

Sociology on the scale of groups and of institutions meant it was still possible to maintain the illusion of a fundamental and irreducible human freedom. When it studies biographical journeys, individual practices and representations, however, sociology already begins to shake the foundations of this myth of individual freedom. But when sociology on the individual scale probes deep into the most intimate heart of individual consciousness, all remaining illusions are completely shattered. As the surrealists wrote in 1924: 'the dream alone grants man all rights to freedom.'

The myth of freedom has even led certain sociologists to make the dream into the last space of individual freedom. Jean Duvignaud, Françoise Duvignaud and Jean-Pierre Corbeau thus suggested that `oneiric dramatizations . . . would be just so many ways of choosing yourself amidst the warp and weft of a collective life and of overcoming its determinisms by a utopian vision.' Failing to understand dreams, the authors envisage a deliberate and utopian escape from determinisms via dreams, a sort of oneiric liberation.[6] They raise the possibility that dreamers "'de-socialise"

themselves through their dreams' and that certain dreams represent 'an attempt . . *magically* to modify social determinisms'. Transforming an inability to understand a phenomenon into an indication of human freedom — this is what certain researchers end up doing. We understand from this how the reference to freedom is both an admission of failure to understand and a refuge of ignorance from where no scientific inquiry can be pursued.

The sociological interpretation of dreams demonstrates, on the contrary, that not a single strand of the various threads woven during our sleep exists independently from genuine social experiences and, as a result, from the multiple social determinisms that make us what we are. Freud was the first to be aware of this, with his close focus on the workings of the various processes which determine psychic activity and behaviour in individuals, largely outside their will or control. In his introductory lectures on psychoanalysis written in 1916-17, he argues boldly in favour of the idea of a psychic determinism: 'Once before I ventured to tell you that you nourish a deeply rooted faith in undetermined psychical events and in free will, but that this is quite unscientific and must yield to the demand of a determinism whose rule extends over mental life.' This is the kind of remark that, if pronounced today, would provoke howls of protest from all those who love freedom, whether essayists, columnists or popular philosophers. Yet what Freud meant, and which is in fact anything but scandalous, was that nothing we think or do is the result of pure chance and that what has happened and will happen always comes with its conditions, motives and logic that can, with a sufficient amount of work, be revealed. Dreams do not represent 'the mind freewheeling' conjured up by the poet, or, if we are prepared to accept the metaphor, we must at least apply a literal interpretation to it and take 'the freewheeling' for what it is in reality, i.e. the result of a specific mechanism which is no less determined than any other.

Exposing determinisms does not mean anticipating or predicting what is going to happen; it is a way of demonstrating that what happens is neither spontaneous, nor voluntary, nor random, nor the result of some form or other of free will without any ties or roots. With far more sophisticated means than those available to the scholars in Freud's day, the cognitive neurosciences show that, if free will exists, it is an objectifiable equilibrium between internal and external, conscious and unconscious forces which are themselves the product of social determinations:

> Our actions can be thought out or not: there are reflexes or actions we carry out under the impetus of our unconscious emotions and others which we choose after genuine conscious deliberation — the latter seem to me to justify the term 'free' will. . . . If I have a difficult decision to take, I can consider all the alternatives for as long as is needed. Each of these alternatives is counterbalanced by my past knowledge, my preferences, consequences anticipated over others, the relative weight I attribute to them, etc. All of that is counterbalanced in this space of conscious work. In that case, I think it is right to talk about free will, even if someone who was able to gain access to all my synapses in advance could have predicted this decision.

It is clear from these remarks made by the cognitive psychologist Stanislas Dehaene that the decision, even when it is thought out or carefully deliberated, is still no less socially determined: our past knowledge and experiences are socially differentiated, as are our preferences and our relations with others, and these deliberations, which are based on a large number of perceptions and unconscious thought processes, do not free us from determinisms.

What happens, both in the social and the physical sphere, on a macroscopic scale as well as a microscopic one, is not always predictable but is, nevertheless, still entirely determined by multiple forces. What makes sociology a particularly complex science, especially when it is working on an individual scale, is the fact that the individuals who are active in society at one and the same time carry within them a whole range of incorporated properties and are constantly subjected to variable

forces which make different demands on these properties depending on the context within which they are acting.

Each of their unique behaviours is as unpredictable as the result of the throw of a pair of dice on a table. It is impossible to predict the numbers which will be thrown, and yet researchers know that the final result is totally physically determined. The numbers which will emerge — the dots which appear on the visible faces of the two dice — depend on the material from which the dice are made (plastic, metal, paper, cardboard, etc.), on their weight, on their size and on their degree of physical homogeneity (we know that loaded dice are designed in such a way that certain configurations are more likely than others), on the initial position of the dice in the hand, on the angle of the throw of the dice, on the strength of the thrower, the resistance of the air and the possible movements of air masses, on the nature of the surface onto which the dice fall, whether smooth or rough, and on which they will slide or roll, on the possible physical interactions between them in the hollow of the hand and even, once thrown, if they collide, etc. All of that is perfectly determined. We know it is. But what we do not know is how to make the necessary calculations so as to combine all the physical data and forces involved and to predict the numbers which will appear once the dice come to rest. If we imagine that, in addition to all that, each of the dice has a history of its own, and that the surroundings in which they suddenly find themselves also have their own history, we start 1 to form an idea of the complexity of the task faced by researchers in the social sciences.

All those who resist the notion of the influence of social determinisms on individual behaviour have both an exclusively collective vision of the social and a simplistic and mechanistic image of determinism. They may very well observe that not *all* prisoners come from dominated groups in society, that not *all* members of Parliament come from the upper classes, that not *all* men are violent towards their partners, or that not *all* children from working-class backgrounds perform poorly at school, in order to provide support for their own interpretation: 'It's about individual responsibility', 'It's a matter of willpower and effort', etc. Roger Bastide already highlighted the suspicion expressed by psychoanalysts about the `sociological theory of crime': 'If it is background that is responsible, we do not understand why, among individuals who belong to the same group, only some will become criminals and others not. It must therefore be that the individual make-up and the psychic structure of the person predominate over social factors.' Determinism would therefore be the unequivocal explanation on the grounds of social background alone.

On the group scale, however, sociology can only advance arguments of probability. It does not say that all men beat their partners but that, in the current state of things, the probability that a woman will be beaten by a man is infinitely greater than the probability that a man will be beaten by a woman. And, when it focuses on the individual level, sociology does not confine itself to sweeping explanations based on background, class or group; rather, it tries to identify the combined effects of a great many social determinisms, both internal and external, those to be found internalised within dispositions as well as those which are to be found outside the individual (characteristics of the people, groups and institutions they frequent). It is these intersecting constraints which determine that individuals from the same group behave differently.

Within the same family, the experiences of one or another member are never perfectly identical, the interactions or situations experienced never exactly the same, the positions within the configuration differing depending on whether the individual in question is a girl or boy, the oldest or the youngest, etc.

The anthropologist Ralph Linton said that 'Even identical environments, if such things are conceivable, will provide different individuals with different experiences and result in their developing different personalities. Even the best integrated society and culture provides the

individuals who are reared in it with environments which are far from uniform.' And Roger Bastide added that 'individuals participate not in the whole of civilisation but only in certain segments of it, depending on their place in society and on their sex, age, occupation, region, religion and, in a country of immigrants, ethnic group', the consequence of which is 'to substitute for general influences of civilisation the specific influences which have acted on the individual.

What is needed more than ever before is as much a sociology on a macro-sociological scale, the one Durkheim described as 'the science of institutions, of their genesis and of their functioning', as this sociology on the individual scale which reveals the traces of social life in the most intimate folds and recesses of psychic activity. The study of dreams in no sense involves stepping outside the social world, with its regularities, its constraints and its problems. It contributes to uncovering the processes through which individuals ceaselessly confront, by *expressing* them, the problems which are unique to them but which nevertheless come from outside.

The sociology of dreams, as a science of the social determinations at work in oneiric expression, therefore represents the ultimate attack on any illusions about the freedom or the will of the subject. By studying dreams, by showing that they are indissolubly linked to the social experiences of the dreamer, both past and present, my intention is to show that the social is to be found in the most intimate depths of individuals, even during those moments of sleep when they seem to be most completely cut off from ordinary social realities. Social logics continue to make their presence felt in the dreamer's psychic activity in the immediate absence of any institution, any group, any interaction or any external demands.

The sociological interpretation of dreams has taken on the task of toppling, over and over again, so endless does the task seem, all the opposition encountered by the social sciences, and in particular by sociology, to their claims of being able to reveal the social processes, and what we must indeed call the social determinisms, at work in the most personal of all human experiences. <>

Inscribing Knowledge in the Medieval Book: The Power of Paratexts edited by Rosalind Brown-Grant, Patrizia Carmassi, Gisela Drossbach, Anne D. Hedeman, Victoria Turner, Iolanda Ventura [Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Culture. De Gruyter, 9781501517884]

This collection of essays examines how the paratextual apparatus of medieval manuscripts both inscribes and expresses power relations between the producers and consumers of knowledge in this important period of intellectual history. It seeks to define which paratextual features – annotations, commentaries, corrections, glosses, images, prologues, rubrics, and titles – are common to manuscripts from different branches of medieval knowledge and how they function in any particular discipline. It reveals how these visual expressions of power that organize and compile thought on the written page are consciously applied, negotiated or resisted by authors, scribes, artists, patrons and readers. This collection, which brings together scholars from the history of the book, law, science, medicine, literature, art, philosophy and music, interrogates the role played by paratexts in establishing authority, constructing bodies of knowledge, promoting education, shaping reader response, and preserving or subverting tradition in medieval manuscript culture.

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Excerpt:

Genette and Scholarship on the Medieval Paratext

Study of the way in which knowledge is inscribed on the written page is fundamentally indebted to the concept of the "paratext" as first propounded by Gerard Genette in Seuils in 1987. So integral is paratext to the organization of the text in the modern world that, paradoxically, it is only when some aspect of the expected paratextual apparatus is missing that we tend to notice it: a scientific paper in a journal that omits to include an abstract; a monograph that lacks an index or a bibliography; an article in a newspaper that consists of a solid block of words with no subheadings. Yet the paratext, like texts themselves, has a history, with key elements such as titles, indexes, and footnotes being invented over the course of many centuries and only becoming standardized long

after the advent of printing. Although Genette did not set out to write such a history, limiting himself to analysis of print culture from its beginnings to the modern period, such a history is slowly but surely being written, as new studies of paratext are constantly appearing, covering a vast chronological range of works from those belonging to Roman antiquity to the fan-fiction of the twenty-first century.

Printed books of the early modern period have proved to be an especially fertile ground for analysis of paratext. While several major publications on this topic have subscribed unquestioningly to one of Genette's key principles, namely that the paratext is constituted by a network of elements accompanying the text and is therefore subordinate to it, a recent volume of essays on the Renaissance paratext edited by Helen Smith and Louise Wilson has offered a sustained critique of his emphasis on paratext as being essentially "auctorial." Thus, rather than seeing the paratext as the direct "emanation" of the author's intention, responsibility, authority, and aim, they have stressed the roles played through paratextual forms by other actors of the book market such as printers, editors, readers, and annotators, who may or may not be acting in accordance with original authorial intentions.

This finding on the nature of the paratext in the Renaissance context is, however, something of a commonplace in the written culture of the Middle Ages which had to depend on the manual and hence unregulated transmission of knowledge. Here, the development of a paratextual apparatus was an essential tool for embodying, disseminating, and updating thought across a wide range of intellectual disciplines. Yet, whether written in verse or prose, whether concerned with a sacred or "profane" subject matter, the medieval text was by no means stable, either in its form or content. Changes of all possible sorts (structure, variant readings, even complete reformulations) could occur, and these are reflected both in the form of the text and in the possible interactions with it on the part of scribes, readers, and owners of codices. In some cases, such as philosophical, legal, or scientific texts, the authority of the work is closely connected with, if not explicitly built upon, its ability to be updated, transformed, and adapted: the idea of an "unstable" text should not therefore necessarily be considered as a negative feature, but rather as a positive one. Indeed, from a paratextual perspective, such adaptation, transformation, and potential for updating arises from a continuous dialogue between author(s) - the "original" one and those who create new versions - and readers, and can be reflected by the interplay, for example, between text and - interpolated - glosses.

Moreover, as well as the text, the medieval codex itself constituted a continually evolving structure and platform for the transmission of content through a multiplicity of changes. In writing forms, for instance, the emergence and the affirmation of Gothic script were accompanied by a substantial and pragmatic treatment of calligraphy exemplified by the increasing number of abbreviations that created a sort of "new encoding" of the text.6 As regards structure, again in the age of Gothic script and of Scholastic culture, we see the consolidation of the folio codex featuring a page subdivided in two columns, which was in all probability connected to the "new attitude to the page" stressed by Richard and Mary Rouse and Malcolm Parkes,' being related to consultation as well as to in-depth reading of the text. In this period, paratextual elements attain a certain degree of sophistication and of standardization. Taking all these characteristics into account, it is clear that text and paratext, in their form, content, and function as purveyors of knowledge and mirrors of acquisition, organization, and transmission of knowledge, are by no means fixed objects in the era before print.

The main consequence of this fundamental mouvance or perennial instability of the medieval book, to cite Paul Zumthor,8 is that even the epistemological development that text and paratext exemplify was not a linear process, being marked rather by change, resistance, innovation, and

revolution, particularly since knowledge itself in this period was a potential site of struggle between different members of the cultural elite and between the competing demands of clerkly and lay producers and audiences. Our understanding of medieval culture and of the ways in which it was disseminated in manuscript form is thus intimately bound up with examining how the paratext itself was meant to function, both as a major feature of the medieval book and as a means of conveying information.

The approaches taken since the 1990s to study of the paratext in manuscripts of the Middle Ages have been wide-ranging and multifaceted. For many scholars, particularly those interested in codicology and paleography, paratext has been seen primarily in terms of page layout, or, better, as an element (or as a group of elements) on the written page. In the rapidly increasing field of codicology in particular, the material features of the medieval manuscript have been investigated in ever greater depth, with some studies offering a systematic description of all the paratextual elements of mise-en-page in the medieval book, and others focusing on how specific types were formed and executed, and even the statistical frequency with which they appear.

An alternative way of looking at paratext in material terms has been to examine the "social life" of the medieval codex. Textual and paratextual changes, additions, and adaptations help us to understand that the book is a mutable object within a developing historical context of social interactions, with its own "life" and "power to influence." Furthermore, the paratext has emerged as being a key element for reconstructing the social and cultural profile of scribes, readers, and communities, as well as for examining different processes of communication or text transmission in this period. Thus, on the one hand, paratextual elements are now seen as one substantial aspect related to the practices of production of the medieval book, by which scribes, patrons, or authors exercised their creativity, could generate innovative intellectual tools, and shape the written culture. On the other hand, the physical spaces of the book which were exposed to any subsequent material intervention, from the binding to the margins of the folios, though long neglected in the analysis of manuscripts, have now been reconsidered as a repository of precious information for the history of reading and collecting practices, and for habits of regulating and stimulating further reception and transmission of knowledge.

Going beyond a codicological or materialist perspective on the medieval book, scholars who have investigated individual paratextual aspects such as colophons, glosses, prologues, and titles, have sought to establish how they actually function across a range of texts from different branches of medieval knowledge or time periods. As an example of the latter approach, analysis of marginalia in the early medieval period has proved to be especially fruitful in helping to identify leading centers of intellectual production and diffusion of texts, instruments of scholarship, as well as strategies of organization and transmission of knowledge and of culture in general, in the Carolingian world. The margins of early medieval manuscripts could also offer a place for direct written communication on actual debates, in the form of comments on controversial texts and replies to other disputants referring to debated theological issues.16 These approaches have also led to a systematic reconsideration of the practices of annotating, of the function of marginalia, especially glosses, in medieval manuscripts, and to an effort to describe their recurring formal characteristics and their multiple functions with regard to their contents.

One particularly significant way in which medieval specialists have expanded and enhanced Genette's typology of paratextual elements is by bringing in the visual dimension of medieval manuscript culture, a dimension entirely absent from his original study of printed books. This methodology involves examining how the visual features of the medieval codex can be related to both the social life of medieval owners and readers and to the text that they variously decorate, illustrate, comment

on, and even undermine. While all art historical analyses of manuscripts beyond those of style contribute to the understanding of visual paratext, classic works like Claire Richter Sherman's study of the cognitive structures employed by Nicolas Oresme as he translated Aristotle into French for King Charles V broke new ground in offering a model for exploring this dimension comprehensively. More recent publications have extended this holistic approach to visual paratext by studying topics as diverse as script as image, the complex social function of marginal or border images within the context of mise-en-page, the political and power relationships established by images, the enhancement of books by alteration over time, and even the use of illumination to oppose, contradict, or compromise the text.

Finally, many medieval scholars have sought to examine how paratext functions within the parameters of a specific branch of medieval knowledge, such as law, literature, medicine, or religion. As concerns liturgical and devotional texts, for instance, not only are rubrics a central paratexual feature, in that they are connected with and introduce the performative aspect of the liturgy by using layout to distinguish different parts and genres such as music, but also the paratextual function of images and special decorated initials themselves offers a visual commentary on the liturgical feasts in question or drives the attention of the pious reader. As for scientific texts, these are marked by the increasingly systematic employment of tables and indexes which were either compiled by authors or added by scribes, possessors, and readers of manuscripts, or by the creation of whole sets of diagrams, both systems being meant to facilitate navigation of the text and to convert ideas into visual evidence.

Beyond Genette: Aims, Organization, and Contents of this Volume

Given, then, the wealth of recent scholarship on paratext in the Middle Ages, notwithstanding some of the caveats expressed at times by medieval scholars about the occasional poor fit between Genette's typology of paratextual elements and premodern manuscript culture, what does this volume of essays propose to bring to the ongoing scholarly conversation on the topic?

First, while acknowledging and experiencing ourselves at times the frustrations expressed by other medievalists with some of the limitations of Genette's methodology, we as editors of the volume think it impossible, and even undesirable, to ban the term "paratext" completely from the scientific language on medieval texts. Indeed, we are convinced that the word "paratext" (or "peritext") can still be productively used in primis with regard to its etymological meaning as a phenomenon which takes place together with, but also "by the text" or "around the text." In this sense we also prefer to speak about "paratextual elements," pointing to the different constitutive aspects of the medieval manuscript mentioned above, and looking at their historical development, functions, and contextualizations within the processes of creating, transmitting, and/or deliberately shaping knowledge. In this way we — with and beyond Genette — also focus on the various situations of communication and reception of texts and medieval sources, examining the cultural, social, and institutional impact of different types of paratext which appear in the manuscript book.

Secondly, this essay collection seeks to differ from many previous studies on paratext in the Middle Ages by taking both an interdisciplinary and transnational approach and a synchronic and diachronic perspective. It thus discusses the role of the paratextual apparatus in luxury and everyday manuscripts written in Latin and a particular vernacular (Middle French), as well as covering a range of areas of the medieval curriculum; at the same time, it also shows how porous the boundaries between these different disciplines could be, especially when seen from the point of view of the paratext.

Thirdly, the originality of these essays also lies in their investigation of the relationship between paratext and power, where power is interrogated in two main ways: as both "authority," in terms of

establishing and contesting graphical, intellectual, and textual traditions, and as "power struggle," in terms of seeing how paratextual elements such as diagrams, glosses, images, prologues, and rubrics both inscribed and expressed the contested relations between the producers and consumers of knowledge in this important period of intellectual history. The volume thus focuses on the ways in which these visual expressions of power that organized and compiled thought on the written page were consciously applied, negotiated, or resisted by the authors, scribes, artists, patrons, and readers who produced, propagated, and responded to these works. In so doing, it aims to problematize simplistic notions of production versus reception by exploring how the insertion of paratexts occurs along a spectrum from the originary moment of production to that of ownership when paratextual markers are added many centuries later, with many stages in between. As will be seen, the use and creation of paratext thereby opened up opportunities for creating new traditions in a formal sense or allowed for purely individual responses on the part of those who annotated, decorated, organized, or transcribed them.

The volume is divided into four sections, the first two of which are devoted to demonstrating how paratext served as a powerful tool by which the many agents involved in the production and consumption of knowledge in the Middle Ages could establish, enhance, and expand authoritative bodies of thought in fields such as law, medicine, philosophy, religion, and science. Thus, for example, in the medieval university, while the gloss is the main paratextual means by which jurists commented on and constructed the first legal collections of Roman and canon law, so enabling students of medieval law to engage with a growing body of legal teachings, the preface could also be used to authorize and disseminate these legal corpora once constituted. In the teaching of science and medicine, visual paratexts, especially diagrams, could not only be an aid to learning but also help to bridge the gap between scholarly theory and practical application. Equally, in the realm of natural philosophy, illuminated initials employing Christian iconography could be used as a means of structuring the reader's approach to the teachings of Aristotle, and possibly even participate in the ultimately fruitless effort to harmonize Christian and pagan thought. Outside the university, among lay aristocratic audiences in the later Middle Ages, the rubric could be wielded by scribes in their bid to facilitate their patrons' access to and navigation of religious teaching in the form of vernacular allegories.

Part 1, on "Constructing Bodies of Knowledge," begins with a chapter by Mario Ascheri and Paola Maffei that shows how the case of legal texts is paradigmatic of the ways in which paratexts are bound up with questions of power and authority. In their detailed teleological overview, paratexts are seen to respond to the particular needs of a society and are thus central to innovations in legal thinking. For instance, the first legal glosses helped to navigate the vast works of Justinian and, whether they were isolated words or more substantial explanations and cross-references, they all show how jurists flexed their power to influence the application of law. Touching upon differences between paratextual practices of canon, civil, and local law, Ascheri and Maffei underline how the thirteenth century brought the problem of new legislation being enacted by popes, kings, and cities. In this context, they argue that legal scholars felt the need to revise glosses and to find new tools and methods of interpretation, as seen in the emergence of the School of Orleans as a specialist center for revising the Accursian gloss. Similarly, new didactic methods appeared along with different scholarly ways of writing, explaining, and lecturing (e.g., summae, lecturae, repetitiones, etc.) which opened up new horizons of legal implementation. Professors had the power to contest or accept authorities as well as to shape the creation of law through paratexts that acquired international eminence and ultimately enabled the circulation of a common legal system.

Continuing the discussion of paratexts in bodies of legal knowledge, Gisela Drossbach explores their power to authorize developments in canon law through the study of prefaces in decretal collections.

The Decretum Gratiani of ca. 1140, the first textbook and summary of the law, marked the emergence of canon law as an academic discipline, and those professors who studied it, known as decre-tists, set out to resolve its contradictions by referencing other, similar texts and producing summaries of the doctrine. In these works, they added prefaces to set out their scientific approach and structure, as well as to provide opinions on the relationship between canon law and secular justice. As Drossbach explains, from the twelfth century onwards, around two hundred private decretal collections were produced, which, despite their many glosses, contained mainly anonymous texts and were disseminated without prefaces. The Compilatio prima, however, of the canonist Bernard of Pavia (d. 1213) was the first collection of decretals circulating outside of the Decretum to have a preface written and signed by the author. Bernard is shown to have used his preface in order to set out his new structuring system inspired by Justinian, the authorizing power of this act seen in the subsequent imitation of this organizational system by all collectors of decretals. Alongside such personal collections, a conscious focus on legal development is visible in the papacy during this period, which initiated attempts to counter the plethora of corrupt decretals, from Pope Innocent III's Compilatio tertia of 1210 to the Liber Extra of Gregory IX (1234). Gregory's preface shows that he intended his book to be the exclusive collection of papal decretals and Drossbach reveals how paratexts are used to serve this agenda: a new layout framed gloss, preface, and decretal texts in different ways, while accompanying images repositioned these legal works within wider medieval text hierarchies, for instance in relation to l*ectio divina* or liturgy. Since canon law is not a finite set of statutes but involves collections of principles that continuously had to reconcile theory and practice, she concludes that prefaces are an excellent example of how innovations in legal thinking could be achieved and authority asserted through the use of a particular paratextual apparatus: a process that began with private decretal collections and ended with papal books.

Moving next to a very different academic discipline, Isabelle Draelants analyzes how a rare Western survivor of a minority ancient tradition made a bid for authority through the use of diagrams, charts, and images in the transmission and transformation of scientific thought. This didactic dialogue between a teacher and his pupil — the Liber Nemroth de astronomia — is a work of cosmogony, astronomy, and computus science produced between the sixth and tenth centuries that is illustrated with a mix of colored graphs and pictures. Draelants's study looks at how auctorial paratexts visually support and complement the doctrinal arguments of the text by supplementing it with new material and explanations. More than fifty diagrams or tables occur in this work, giving it an exceptionally high concentration of paratexts, which, Draelants argues, are not simply decorative or mnemonic but crucial to the understanding of the text, constituting "arguments unto themselves." Paratexts therefore provide insight into the cultural context in which the Liber Nemroth was written: mental images offer ways of conceptualizing the work and its structure, while illuminations reveal conflicts between the text of the dialogue and the conventions familiar to scribes and artists. Pictures are central to the process of knowledge transfer between master and pupil and are used to show the universe in visual rather than deductive demonstrations of astronomical science. Not only does Nemroth (the teacher) explicitly invite his pupil (Ioanton) to consult the diagrams, but the particular form of paratext to be consulted is also mentioned within the text itself and adapted by scribes as necessary (for instance, references are made to the use of rotae). This dialogue between text and image, chart, or diagram reveals their interdependent pedagogical roles in a work where a body of illustrations has as much power as the text itself. In turn, the dialogic construction of power through paratexts helps us better to situate this work in relation to a minority ancient tradition in Mesopotamia by virtue of its possessing an authority unmediated by Ptolemeian or Arabic astronomical science.

While Draelants looks at how auctorial paratexts negotiated between scientific and artistic traditions across geographical and temporal divides, Part 2 of this collection, entitled "Negotiating Tradition,

Creating Practice," extends the discussion of knowledge construction and dissemination by examining how paratexts are not only used to respond to and engage with traditions but also have the power to formulate new kinds of practice. Echoing the non-mnemonic and pedagogical functions of diagrams highlighted by Draelants in the Liber Nemroth, Concetta Pennuto's chapter on the sixteenth-century physician Giambattista Da Monte shows how diagrams were transformed from being illustrative and mnemonic devices into having very contemporary practical applications as diagnostic tools, thus uniting medical theory and practice. Da Monte developed a system of paratextual apparatus - in particular wheels and tables - to tie together healing and teaching and to assist his students with grasping and applying the principles of Galenic medicine. These diagrams reveal not only the pedagogical power of their author but also visualize the power struggles of their readers and users in the context of changing approaches to the teaching of practical medicine in the early modern period. For Da Monte, the paratextual possibilities of diagrams offered a way to link ancient theoretical teachings to practices of clinical diagnosis, acting as tools of synthesis to bring together signs, causes, and symptoms in different manners. Tables and trees, for instance, could distinguish and divide strands of thought, whereas wheels could synthesize yet show oppositions of concepts. His distinctive use of diagrams for teaching and healing could provide recapitulatory explanations of the art of medicine for his students and encourage different processes of reasoning: if diagnosis could be reasoned in a circular fashion via wheel diagrams, tables could help link signs and symptoms and deduce information in a more linear way. Paratexts in this case bolster Da Monte's legacy of enabling physicians to identify and interpret a patient's disease, in the sense that the distinctiveness of his technique corroborated his authority to convey data and influenced others to use his tools, even if such power did not ultimately go unchallenged.

If the union of scholarly theory and practical application can be seen in the visual paratexts of Pennuto's chapter, the manuscripts examined by Hanna Wimmer weave together the seemingly opposing traditions of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian thought. In her study of medieval scholars' manuscripts containing collections of Aristotelian treatises on natural philosophy, Wimmer argues that images were part of the visual organization of these theoretical works and provided particular reading experiences and practices. In such books, pictures are seen to structure as well as to interpret textual content and, as a result, exercise power over the reader's understanding of the treatises. The exact nature of this power, however, is problematic, especially since Christian iconography is often used to accompany Aristotle's treatises, even if it seems incongruous with his principles. In this chapter, Wimmer therefore attempts to understand the prevalence of such Christian imagery in medieval Aristotle textbooks and to think about its paratextual use among scholars. As with the legal works discussed in Part I of this volume, new reading habits of students necessitated new paratextual tools, and images could often show which treatise began at a particular point. Rather than being tied to Aristotelian concepts, however, Wimmer argues that these images may be linked to particular words (e.g., the naked figure to represent the soul in the title of Aristotle's De anima) even if Christian iconography is also sometimes used in more detail, as in the setting of Aristotelian ars and natura within a Christian framework. She concludes that although these images were produced when there was still hope of harmonizing Aristotelian and Christian thought and exerted considerable power over readers, it remains hard to say precisely whether or how they influenced the reader's actual interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy, since this would have been affected by their own habits, knowledge, and agendas.

Joanna Frońska's chapter on visual paratexts in the margins of legal manuscripts similarly foregrounds the role of the reader in the creation and use of paratextual apparatus. Complicating Genette's distinction between editorial and auctorial paratexts, Fronska's study focuses on the functional characteristics of marginal images in medieval law books, mainly those containing Roman law. These are text-related, often figurative or narrative images rather than drolleries, and are closely related to

notabilia; they both tag or draw attention to a concept or term, but the images are less systematically used. Her chapter not only discusses how the placement of these images may show the common interests of legal scholars, but also explores how, for instance in a copy of the Digest held at the Biblioteka Kórnicka Polskiej Akademii Nauk, marginal images are turned into professional illuminations. Fronska's examples show the variety of functions fulfilled by these images: some repeat the meaning of a word or phrase; some are puns; some add humor; some are explanatory; some are updated for the context (e.g., Roman javelin throwers are reconfigured as medieval archers). In this respect, drawings can offer interpretative assistance to readers by referring to extra- or intratextual information. Whether or not these images possess a mnemonic function, they are seen to reinforce the nonlinear reading of the texts and show how paratexts are used to authorize rather than to challenge the norm (or, in other words, the broader discussion of the casus in question). However, given the recurrence if not exact duplication of these glosses, Fronska concludes by noting that it is hard to know whether these images are individual responses to the text or pre-established patterns, even if it is clear that their power is subordinate to that of the text.

Whether scholarly or lay, the power dynamics of individual responses to texts are profoundly implicated in the use of paratexts, as argued by Géraldine Veysseyre in her discussion of manuscripts containing the vernacular works of Guillaume de Deguileville. Focusing particularly on the Pèlerinage de l'ame, she concentrates on the ways in which book makers, copyists, and rubricators could structure and subdivide such vast allegorical works and vulgarize the forms of knowledge they contain. Religious knowledge could be inscribed on the page through the summaries and divisions of scribes and rubricators, exposing their cultural baggage, the interpretations made by each rubricator, and tensions between individual readings and the weight of previous traditions. The decision to delineate chapters by rubrics and the wording of these paratexts emerge as an individual response to Guillaume's text, despite an apparently wider, shared sense of structure. As Veysseyre observes, individual manuscripts therefore employ sets of rubrics designed for specific readers, copyists, or recipients. Yet the paratextual power of book makers is not without its problems: for instance, the rubricator of London, BL, Ms. Addit. 22937 may simplify elements of this allegorical pilgrimage for his aristocratic readers and pay less attention to the didactic aspects of the text, but in so doing he also prevents them from sharing in the amazement of the text's chief protagonist, the Pilgrim, somewhat disempowering both reader and author. As a result, rubricators are seen to occupy strategic positions within open texts that may be continually updated for new audiences. Both the plasticity of the poem and its potential interpretations may therefore be determined by different paratextual apparatus, even if the precise balance of power between author, book makers, and commissioners remains elusive.

The third and fourth parts of the volume discuss how not only those who contributed to the making of the manuscript, such as authors, scribes, and artists, but also the actual owners of these works all flexed their power through paratexts, whether textual, visual, or a combination of the two, in order to shape the reception of individual books and even entire collections as repositories of knowledge of different kinds and as valuable material objects in their own right. Thus, for example, works of history, whether from classical antiquity or from the more recent French past, could be glossed by commentators or updated by translators who added prologues and frontispieces in order to appropriate authoritative historical models of rulership either to legitimize empire-building in the present or to provide political instruction for rulers in the future. Equally, the authorial appropriation of power through paratext, or even the transfer of power from author to reader by this very means, can be related to questions of literary genre, whether at the level of an individual text or in the construction of generic typologies. Likewise, paratext contributes to the process of self-aggrandizement, as for example in the pontificals of bishops, which are decorated with images of themselves as figures of authority in the performing of their role and legitimizing of their office, or in

works from multiple intellectual domains owned by later humanist book collectors, whose inscriptions added to the manuscripts in their libraries attest to the power of their learning and the importance of their standing in the wider community of scholars. Finally, scribal and artistic self-consciousness about the power of paratext to construct the materiality of the book takes on a self-reflexive, even ludic, dimension that is very different from the didactic or navigational role that the textual or visual paratext is so often obliged to play, one that opens up the pleasurable possibility of perceiving the book as a multi-textured object with a life of its own.

Part 3, "Framing Knowledge, Empowering Readers," opens with a study by Sinéad O'Sullivan of how paratexts have the power to make the past contemporary through the use of glosses in Carolingian Vergil manuscripts, actualizing the Roman past so as to assert the authority and legitimacy of present rulers and their imperial aspirations. Early medieval glosses of Vergil are witnesses both to the importance of the poet and of pagan knowledge in the Carolingian world, where the auctoritas of this classical learning was often not repurposed for a Christian audience. O'Sullivan particularly focuses on the interest in ancient Rome and Troy revealed in these glosses and considers how and if this is an interest that coheres with Carolingian imperial ideology, such as via the construction of Frankish legitimization myths. For instance, glosses on Rome often focus on the mythical foundation of the city, on legendary kings, and on aspects of Imperial Rome, where characters from Vergil are paired with historical Roman figures, as is particularly the case in early medieval annotations on the Eclogues. Her chapter continues by exploring the legitimizing of the Frankish—Trojan origin myth within Carolingian ideology in a period that saw the expansion of intellectual life and an increased interest in the use of Roman history for Frankish political ends that was also linked to a kind of classicizing of Charlemagne himself. Carolingian Vergil glosses therefore not only show the cultivation and appropriation of the Roman past but also express Carolingian power and authority by demonstrating the "living heritage" of the antique world in this period.

Of course, actualizing the past for ideological purposes may occur through visual as well as written means, as is the subject of Anne D. Hedeman's chapter, which considers how images shape transitional moments in Middle French vernacular translations of historical works, how they are used to show the translator's contribution to — or even power over — the author's text, and how they promote royal or noble authority. The first of two case studies reads King Philip III's presentation copy of the Grandes chroniques de France in relation to the later extended copy produced around a century later for Charles V. In Philip's fourteenth-century manuscript, the prologue and epilogue images reveal power relations between the king and the manuscript's commissioner (abbot Matthew of Vendome), while the texts of both opening and closing sections express hopes that the work would offer historical models of behavior for the monarch. However, the power dynamics portrayed within and between these paratexts were soon altered thereafter with the addition of the life of St. Louis, which brought an extended epilogue along with an image emphasizing Louis's sanctity and thus France's most Christian kingship. Charles V's later copy is shown to respond to the paratexts of this model, containing amplified prologue images that, Hedeman argues, further promoted ideas of sacred royalty and good government that are also amplified through the addition of a generic coronation image. Hedeman's second case study concerns ducal copies of Laurent de Premierfait's translation of Boccaccio's Des cas des nobles hommes et femmes (completed in 1409-10). Once again, processes of visual amplification relate the historical work to contemporary events, here through the addition of a large extra frontispiece to Laurent's translation. The normalization of this new visual cycle becomes apparent in manuscripts beyond Laurent's control that continue to draw upon his prologue. Through these case studies, Hedeman shows how the visual framing for prologues and epilogues was flexible and could reflect changes in the kinds of power that they sought to express. As a result, she demonstrates how liminal opening, closing, and transitional

images need to be placed in their particular situation and context in order for their legitimizing authority as paratexts to be fully appreciated.

The use of paratexts in the appropriation of history and assertion of personal or familial legitimacy is further discussed in Victoria Turner's study of the two manuscripts containing the curious Middle French text Le Canarien, which recounts an expedition to the Canary Islands by two French knights, Gadifer de La Salle and Jean IV de Béthencourt, in the early fifteenth century. She argues that previous studies of the narrative have overemphasized its chivalric context and underestimated the power of paratexts to draw out its political, even crusading, aspects. Questioning the extent to which the earlier manuscript (London, BL, Ms. Egerton 2709) can be seen as a direct expression of power by Gadifer, Turner shows how closer attention to its opening miniature reveals alternative potential production contexts when reread in relation to elements of Gadifer's biography and when set alongside the text of the prologue. The Canarien's prologue is shown to conform more to the conventions associated with chronicle writing than with romance or chivalric biography; where romance elements do appear, they focus on crusading activity rather than on individual deeds of prowess. With regard to the later manuscript (Rouen, Bibliothèque municipale, Ms. Montruffet/ mm 129) whose images have often been treated dismissively by scholars, Turner shows how a study of text, image, and rubric relations in the later manuscript articulates struggles for power between ancestor and descendant as well as between invaders and locals. Family relationships come to the fore over narratives of individual aggrandizement in a manuscript that uses paratexts as a vicarious display of power. As was the case in Veysseyre's discussion of Guillaume de Deguileville's Pèlerinage de l'ame, the plasticity of the medieval book allows multiple information systems to coexist: narrative divisions and images prioritize acts of homage, treachery, and stages of the expedition rather than conflicts with the indigenous population; likewise, the variety of relationships between text, image, and rubric encourages us to think differently about power relations both within and between chapters. The paratexts of both manuscripts are seen to romance crusade in different ways, appropriating and reframing the historical events they relate.

The conceptual and stylistic parameters of history and romance also lie at the heart of Rosalind Brown-Grant's chapter on the interplay between text, frontispiece, and prologue in a corpus of Burgundian prose romances produced ca. 1450-65 in the Lille-based workshop of the artist known as the Wavrin Master. Her study underlines the need to move away from considering prologues in isolation from their manuscript context both in order to take into account interactions between different kinds of paratext and to explore the relationship between authors and readers. Prose romances construct and affirm authorial and lectorial power in ways that differ from chronicles or chivalric biographies and this is particularly visible in their prologues: while the chronicler or biographer asserts his own authority, the prose romancer sees his role differently, and may not only refer to his authorial act as one of mere transcription or translation but also cast himself as one among a chain of readers. Brown-Grant shows how the Wavrin Master, as an attuned reader and interpreter of such romance texts, uses his frontispieces to emphasize the theme of reading as found in the prologues, such active involvement contrasting with the hierarchical presentation scenes typical of chronicles or those authoritative assertions of authorship common to biography. A comparison between the frontispiece of Gerard de Nevers by the Wavrin Master (Brussels, KBR, Ms. 9631) and one by another contemporary Burgundian artist, Loyset Liédet (Paris, BnF, Ms. fr. 24378), clearly reveals the former's ingenuity since the Wavrin Master's manuscript portrays its own patron as an active reader whereas Liédet's manuscript shows only a very generic presentation scene. As Brown-Grant therefore argues, paratexts serve to transfer power in these prose romance manuscripts from author to reader; furthermore, both author and patron may appear in frontispieces as models for the reader to emulate rather than as voices of narrative authority, so that the act of reception is foregrounded along with, at times, the act of appropriation through the

transfer of power. Ultimately, these tales in prose are not only shown to be just as playful as the earlier verse versions from which many of them are derived, but also capable of inspiring and empowering their readers through their paratextual framing and exploitation of generic conventions.

While Brown-Grant's study demonstrates how hierarchies between reader and author may be redrawn through the use of paratexts, Part 4, entitled "Appropriating Tradition, Expressing Ownership, Embodying the Book," begins with a chapter by Alison Stones that shows almost the opposite: how heraldic paratexts found in the pontificals of medieval bishops showcase possession and assert social status. Stones demonstrates how these paratexts are particularly useful as visual signs of power for their episcopal owners and commissioners, as they often highlight the specific offices and duties of the user in both textual and visual ways, such as through the remarkable images that pictorially summarize the actions that the bishop will go on to perform in the Avignonnais Pontifical made for Juan Guzman de Villacreces, bishop of Calahorra and Calzada (1382-94). Noting how attitudes towards portraiture and heraldry changed between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, she argues that images of the bishop in these liturgical books developed into very personalized expressions of power, so that pontificals were as much symbols of legitimacy and authority as they were practical tools for fulfilling the duties of their office.

Such personalized expressions of power through markers of ownership are further explored in Outi Merisalo's discussion of books owned by the late fifteenth-century humanist doctor, Hartmann Schedel, whose collection shows the spread of humanism and cutting-edge medical knowledge north of the Alps. Hartmann catalogued and added paratexts to his many volumes in a way that not only conveyed his learning but also showcased his social status and awareness of this. As a result, the study of such paratexts allows us to reconstruct his intellectual biography and, as Merisalo argues, their aesthetic quality is testament to the value of the collection as an heirloom. Looking in particular at examples of ex-libris, autobiographical texts, and peritexts (e.g., notes on acquisition), she demonstrates how Hartmann parades his academic authority and self-empowerment, while also situating him as a crucial link in the transmission of Italian medical texts north of the Alps via his inheritance from his cousin, Hermann Schedel. Furthermore, paratexts in this instance reveal how the care and crafting of a library could be seen to contribute to the salvation of one's soul. Hartmann's paratextual acts are therefore ways to make the texts more useful, yet are also religious gestures and, as Merisalo concludes, convey his role in the transmission of knowledge as well as the idea that developing a library was a way to serve God.

The empowerment of readers and owners is set in relation to the self-conscious use of paratexts in the final contribution to this volume, where Patrizia Carmassi's study focuses on processes of perceiving and interpreting them. Looking beyond paratexts as demonstrations of power for writers, makers, and authors, she considers how they engage with and create different levels of perception that evoke and break free from the materiality of the book itself, thereby creating new page "textures." Carmassi surveys the intentions behind the creation of paratexts, whether offering solutions to the problems of combining and displaying texts, engaging with different generic conventions, or exhibiting the accumulation of knowledge. Relationships between text, paratext, and the materiality of the codex are set in the context of contemporary ideas about the medieval book, in particular the metaphor of the book as a body. For instance, in the codex of Richard of Bury's Philobiblon belonging to Marquard Gude (Copenhagen, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Ms. Fabr. 21.2°) books may speak back to their owners through paratexts to criticize their ill treatment in a move whereby paratexts become parabodies: books do not just become extensions of their owners' bodies, as seen in the paratexual marks of ownership and heraldic imagery discussed in this section more generally, but may even be regarded as having bodies of their own where the power of

aesthetic expression is harnessed to express their materiality in ways that offer us alternative glimpses of the human subjects behind them. <>

ORDINARY JERUSALEM 1840–1940: OPENING NEW ARCHIVES, REVISITING A GLOBAL CITY edited by Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire [Open Jerusalem, Brill, 9789004375734]

In **ORDINARY JERUSALEM 1840–1940: OPENING NEW ARCHIVES, REVISITING A GLOBAL CITY**, Angelos Dalachanis, Vincent Lemire and thirty-five scholars depict the ordinary history of an extraordinary global city in the late Ottoman and Mandate periods. Utilizing largely unknown archives, they revisit the holy city of three religions, which has often been defined solely as an eternal battlefield and studied exclusively through the prism of geopolitics and religion. At the core of their analysis are topics and issues developed by the European Research Council-funded project "Opening Jerusalem Archives: For a Connected History of Citadinité in the Holy City, 1840-1940." Drawn from the French vocabulary of geography and urban sociology, the concept of *citadinité* describes the dynamic identity relationship a city's inhabitants develop with each other and their urban environment.

Opening Ordinary Jerusalem by Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire

Is Jerusalem an ordinary city? To understand its history, should we favor a local or global approach? The goal of this collective volume is to take a head-on approach to these two persistent questions, which have long stood as a hindrance to writing the city's history. Taking as a departure point the conceptual framework of Open Jerusalem, a project funded by the European Research Council (ERC),1 each contribution works in its own way to confront, and transcend, a double uncertainty.

First, Jerusalem is an extraordinary city that can be understood only with the greatest possible use of the most ordinary tools of social, political and cultural historical research. Second, Jerusalem's local history can only be reconstructed by reference to archives often located in faraway places, including, among others, Addis Ababa, Amman, Athens, Berlin, Erevan, Istanbul, London, Madrid, Moscow, Rome, St. Petersburg, Sofia and Washington. In transforming this double contradiction into a creative analytical tension, the thirty-seven authors of this volume revisit the ordinary history of a "global city" from 1840 to 1940, a century that covers the later period of Ottoman rule and most of the Mandate years.

New Objects

This new approach has thematic consequences. The new history of Jerusalem, to which this volume aims to contribute, goes beyond a study of geopolitics and religion. Western historians have long concentrated on these dimensions: from the top of the Mount of Olives they observed what they had come to find, that is, a constellation of controversial holy places clustered together on an eternal battlefield. Here we choose to shed light on unexpected actors hidden in the blind spots of the city's history, too long ignored by an expanding historiography, which sometimes is unperceptive and preconceived. These actors include the printers of visiting cards, Ottoman officers in charge of fiscal censuses, angry city dwellers signing petitions in favor of modernizing the water supply system, epidemiologists fighting malaria, municipal civil servants looking to Beirut, Haifa and Nablus for inspiration, an Islamic court judge deciding a case pitting a Russian plaintiff against an Armenian defendant, an Arab parliamentarian in conversation with the creator of modern Hebrew, an orphanage built on and run along American standards, a musician-photographer, and the engineers and investors behind an aborted tramway project. These ordinary episodes are brought to life by ordinary actors who were part of Jerusalem's extraordinary destiny. It is through a history told from below, through small, everyday stories, that the grand history of the city emerges with new colors.

New Timeline

Chronologically speaking, this new approach also has consequences. Though the transition from Ottoman rule (1516–1917) to the British Mandate (1917–48) has traditionally been considered a key turning point in the history of Palestine and Jerusalem, the majority of the volume's contributors do not consider the year 1917 to be useful in their analyses.2 Nor do the historians represented here take a strictly geopolitical approach. Making use of the chronological framework offered by the Open Jerusalem project, they chose to consider the period from 1840 to 1940 as a coherent historical sequence that is well-suited to the study of Jerusalem's history. The commitment to studying these hundred years is in itself a historiographical novelty. Indeed, seeing past the 1917 mark makes it possible to analyze long-term historical factors otherwise overlooked by the geopolitical watershed associated with that year. Between the vigorous demographic renewal and the arrival of the first European consulates in the 1840s, on the one hand, and the rise of intercommunity conflict in the late 1930s, on the other, the 1840–1940 span becomes a seamless historical sequence. This hundred-year period saw the birth, maturity and ruin of a certain model of citadinité, understood here as the way in which city dwellers share urban space, in varying degrees of harmony or conflict.

This relative continuity is particularly evident when one examines the specific institutional structures that largely persisted even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and on which many of the authors chose to concentrate, such as the municipalities, the patriarchates (Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Latin), the Muslim awqaf, the Sephardic kolels, the Islamic courts and the Franciscan Custody. These entities – religious, political, cultural and economic – are proof of an institutional resilience that, through this day, have rendered the "key years" of Jerusalem's history (1917, 1947, 1967) partly meaningless. Certain local political actors, and some of the important Jerusalem families, also contributed to creating continuity between the Ottoman period and the British Mandate. Finally,

administrative practices and daily urban problems such as public health and hygiene, public order, patrimony and public spaces reinforce this chronological continuity and reduce the importance of the geopolitical marker of 1917.

New Archives

This new approach has its most significant consequences in the realm of methodology. The history that we set out to tell here is informed by unpublished archival materials and is, as a result, a collective history founded on collaboration as well as the confidence in the utility of a collective endeavor. It would be impossible for a single researcher to access and analyze documents in Amharic, Arabic, Armenian, English, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Ottoman Turkish, Russian, Syriac, to name but a few. Indeed, almost every language connected to the three Abrahamic religions was spoken, written and archived in the "global city" of Jerusalem. In addition to linguistic obstacles, there are, in many cases, geopolitical challenges. These archives are not always public and immediately accessible. They are dispersed throughout the world and can often be consulted only after passing checkpoints and borders that not all researchers can cross. The trust of archival institutions was secured thanks to the Open Jerusalem project's founding ideas: focusing on the description of archives rather than on their digitization. This approach stands out from most digital humanities history projects, which have often confused accessibility and mass digitization. Open Jerusalem privileges the description, indexing and translation of archives, in the conviction that the mere uploading of tens of thousands of digitized pages with no accompanying description does not necessarily make information accessible. With this approach, information is not merely made visible, but searchable and findable. This new strategy is perhaps the only way to break down the barriers that still limit and challenge community historiographies.

The contributions assembled here illustrate another methodological ambition of the Open Jerusalem project: archival release must not be understood only in quantitative terms, but also, and perhaps especially, in qualitative ones. Renewing the history of Jerusalem requires more than gaining access to a mass of documents. Our aim also is to renew the type of documentation mobilized and fashion the theoretical and practical tools needed to establish links between documents. The articles in the present volume embody this renewal of documentary typology, voluntarily putting aside the most accessible exogenous narrative sources (such as travel narratives), and focusing instead on internal administrative sources. Repetitive as they may be, and requiring extra analytical efforts, these are the only sources that allow for a thorough reexamination of the historical stereotypes of the city. Such documents include baptismal registers, tax registers, meeting minutes, technical reports, collective petitions, accounting documents, payroll records, quotes, invoices, engineering plans, personnel directories, municipal deliberations, lists of indigents who received assistance, judicial reports, offers of concessions, signs and posters. These archives of quotidian lives and daily administrative practices often tell us more about the urban history experienced by Jerusalem residents than external narratives, which are so often interspersed with religious discourse and ideological projections.

Connected History

In addition to unlocking previously inaccessible archives and revising the typology of the documents studied, the Open Jerusalem historians also attempt to establish links between the various documentary collections. This effort is intended to refine analyses by encouraging comparisons between the city's communities. From a practical perspective, it also means that more information is made available about each community. In Jerusalem more than anywhere else, interactions between communities – whether they be peaceful or conflictual – are strong and frequent. They are documented through correspondence, complaints and petitions, and more. Essential information

about a specific community may thus be scattered across many diverse archival holdings, sometimes in multiple languages and in many countries. It is in this way that descriptions and indexes, translations and collaboration, take on primary importance.

For example, in order to document the history of the city's small Ethiopian community, for example, it is not enough to consult Amharic records in the Ethiopian Archbishop's Palace in Jerusalem or in Addis Ababa. Given the relationship of subordination and protection that the Ethiopians of Jerusalem established with the Great Powers in the Holy City, one must also visit the Italian archives in Rome, and the Russian and Ottoman archives, respectively, in St. Petersburg and Istanbul. The history of the Armenian community is also documented in the archives of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, but these archives are largely connected to the Russian archives because of the links between these two major Orthodox churches. The history of Jerusalem's Jewish communities is contained in the British consular archives in London, but also in the American archives in Washington. The examples go on, but all of them show that Jerusalem has always been an open city, open to all influences, interferences and appropriations, be they symbolic, textual, military or territorial. For the historians of the Open Jerusalem project and those participating in this volume, the question is not so much how to open a city that is closed to the outside as it is to deal with a city that is compartmentalized and burdened by internal fractures. In order to begin this process, we must first open pathways that can be used to allow researchers to proceed to make connections between separate documentary collections. This opening process is one of the essential objectives of this collective work.

From New Archives to New Narratives

For the Open Jerusalem project, this volume marks a shift from the identification and collection of archives to their assembly and the synthesis of original narratives. This is not to suggest that the archival work has come to an end. On the contrary, the Open Jerusalem web platform (www.openjerusalem.org) already makes documentation accessible to interested researchers and will keep the project alive, even after the end of ERC funding in 2019. Our ambition, though, is to begin putting concrete meaning on the extensive and unique raw empirical material that exists; to do so, we needed to approach these archives with methodology and theory, with content and structure. Our ambition is to offer a pivotal contribution to the history of Jerusalem of the late Ottoman and Mandate periods, not only by being methodologically and theoretically innovative, but also by challenging well-established ideological narratives regarding the city.

Many of the volume's chapters were initially presented as original papers at a symposium at the Institute for Mediterranean Studies in Rethymno, Greece, in May 2016. Amounting to much more than a simple symposium, this research meeting, held halfway through the Open Jerusalem project, sought to be a forum for the deepening of discussions and the opening of scholarly debates, based on contributions by academics specializing in Jerusalem and Palestine as well as urban historians specialized in other Ottoman cities and related topics. Our subsequent objective was not to publish the symposium proceedings, but to combine the papers with a number of new contributions to produce a coherent volume that privileges interconnectedness. Our effort to link dissimilar approaches is somewhat reflected in the various origins of the volume's thirty-seven contributors. The scholars represented here are mostly young academics, of diverse national, ethnic and religious backgrounds, who in a way mirror the global character of the city that was and still is Jerusalem.

From the very start, our intention was to underline the city's global quality through a comparative perspective and, wherever possible, by adopting a gaze from below. To this end, the archival dimension of the authors' methodological work and analysis has been crucial. Each contributor was asked to include in their chapters a presentation and description of the sources and archives that they used for their contribution. More generally, they were also asked to discuss the available

sources and archives relating to their topic. Seeking a "chronological" history, we asked the scholars to extend time limits when necessary, to include and analyze turning points, changes, shifts and gaps along with various experiences or perceptions of time. We also suggested that they look for connections with other studies, research fields and communities in order to create links between the city's usually fragmented historical narratives. To privilege connection over fragmentation, we encouraged the authors to seek contact points within their complex documentary archipelago and to show the exchanges, interactions and, where evident, hybridization between different populations and traditions. Finally, we asked them to try to bridge their contributions with the other papers that were presented at the symposium. We challenged them to cross-reference their fellow scholars, both in terms of content or methodology, and in terms of comparison or contrast. Our ambition is to open new paths for interconnected historical work.

Looking for Citadinité

In devising a novel historical approach to Jerusalem, our aim has been to publish a collective work structured around topics and questions already raised by the Open Jerusalem project. First, there is the central concept of citadinité, which the authors were invited to discuss critically whenever possible in light of their own research. As most historical studies do for the period under scrutiny, this volume attempts to deconstruct nationalism, colonialism and imperialism as well as to propose a different analytical framework for the study of the city. The concept of citadinité offers such a novel framework since it overcomes the binary scheme of domination/subjugation and regards Jerusalem as an inclusive city.

The notion of citadinité, borrowed from the French vocabulary of geography and urban sociology, describes the dynamic identity relationship city dwellers have with each other and their urban environment. It is also close to the notion of "cityness" forged by Saskia Sassen to reflect on the ability of residents of global cities to "make a city" together. While the Open Jerusalem project borrows from historical geography, it also avails of the tools of urban anthropology. Here, a connected history of citadinité embraces the key notion of "urban citizenship," meaning the identity-forming ties which (individually or collectively) link residents to their city, its history, patrimony, monuments, landscapes and eminent historical figures. Such ties are imagined, manufactured, appropriated and maintained, just like the ties that national citizenship produces. The notion of citadinité is, therefore, crucial to the study of the history of mixed, imperial and divided cities, as it asks a fundamental question: in the face of religious barriers and projections of national identities, how do residents proceed to "make a city" anyway?

Citadinité is not a vague, abstract notion that hovers above the city; nor is it only a discursive category. It is to a city what nationality is to a country, and it is materialized in institutions, actors and practices. Revisiting Jerusalem through citadinité also means revisiting practices related to it such as urban policies and institutions (municipality, waqf, consulates, patriarchates, associations). Contrary to what historiographic tradition has long maintained, the notion of public space is not absent from Muslim cities, where it must be studied simultaneously on the municipal, judicial and imperial levels. The Ottoman administrative reforms (Tanzimat) of the 1840s favored the emergence of institutions such as the municipality, which furthered a shared city identity transcending communitarian barriers. Work on citadinité needs to prioritize such institutions, to which other institutions, notions and concepts are strongly linked, such as public services (transport, hygiene, etc.), public order (police), public knowledge (printing houses, multilingualism), public charity (the poor and orphans) and public opinion (newspapers, petitions, press interviews and debates). These are but a few examples of the investigations, made possible by connections between documentary collections, undertaken in the volume. The contributors revisit these approaches to citadinité along with other notions and analytical categories that have been rarely linked to Jerusalem, such as

gender relations and children's lives. Jerusalem offers an impressive potential for a connected history of citadinité. We hope that this effort to uncover further opportunities will continue even after the ERC funding of the Open Jerusalem project ends.

Four Parts, Four Paths

Apart from primary sources, the authors of the volume put to use local and national historiographies in many different languages and adopted a variety of angles to revisit the aforementioned objects and approaches in the twenty-six chapters of the volume, which are divided into four thematic parts. We invited four prominent colleagues (Gadi Algazi, Beshara Doumani, Edhem Eldem and Gudrun Krämer) to preface these four parts using their sometimes distant but also highly qualified and sensitive perspectives. We asked them to provide a global reflection on their respective part with a short preface and we appreciate their eagerness to do so.

The first part, "Opening the Archives, Revealing the City," is prefaced by Krämer. This part is mostly structured around the archival material recently discovered by the core team and other researchers associated with the project. The opening of these archives provides material proof of the Open Jerusalem project's aim to create new perspectives on citadinité and global entanglements. Doumani prefaces the second part, "Imperial Allegiances and Local Authorities," which brings the city into the logics of imperial and local legitimacy through the analysis of agency and various institutions: municipalities, patriarchates, consulates and court records. Jerusalem has always been a city of schools, teaching and libraries. During the second half of the nineteenth century, there was an increase in the flow and exchange of knowledge in a process of hybridization that helped bring about a shared urbanity. In this respect, the third part, entitled "Cultural Networks, Public Knowledge," is devoted to this reality. With his preface, Eldem offers the perspective of an Ottoman historian. The entire volume proposes a relational ordinary history of the city through links and contacts among people whose narratives of exceptionality and exclusivity are widespread. This is true not only among Jews and Palestinians, but also among Greeks, Armenians and other communities. The fourth and final part, "Sharing the City: Contacts, Claims and Conflicts," is prefaced by Algazi. It shows that the relational history of Jerusalem has never been harmonious, nor has it been a constant battlefield. Our goal is not to deny the existence of antagonisms between communities or to paint an idyllic picture of a city at peace. However, current communitarian, religious and ethnic divisions may obscure or disorient our gaze to the past, either by overemphasizing conflicts between specific ethnic or religious groups or by downplaying differences between others. Here, we seek to go far beyond partisan politics to shed light on a complex and stunning city.

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Jerusalem was never an ordinary city. From an early date, it was charged with religious meaning as a site of yearning and learning, of pilgrimage and travel. For this reason, it was both attractive and contested, even during the long periods when it was quite peripheral in terms of its economic, political, and strategic importance to the larger units to which it belonged. Yet the majority of the city's inhabitants were ordinary people. They were not part of the local sociopolitical elite, and they led normal daily lives. We are still struggling to understand how the lives of ordinary people were actually lived at various points in time, and to what extent they were defined by communal affiliation, be it religious, ethnic, or both.

What kind of boundaries did communal affiliation create between the groups and individuals that made up the local population? Was there a sense of belonging that transcended the smaller units of family and community to include the city's population as a whole – a citadinité that preceded the modern concept of citizenship, or coexisted with it? And if it existed, how did it manifest itself? Answers can be found by delving deeper into Jerusalem's rich and often untapped archives, but this

requires persistence on the part of the researcher. These archives range from Ottoman and other state archives to the archives of various religious communities and their pious foundations, and from public to private collections. The materials they contain range from official to "ephemeral" documents, some of which seem to equal the ego documents that have enriched the study of European history in the early modern period.

The chapters in this volume show that, during the period under study, Ottoman authorities, foreign powers, and observers used religious affiliation, or millet, rather than property, status, class, language and locality, as the chief identifier for the groups and individuals living within the empire. What has been called the "tunnel vision" separating not just Arabs and Jews, but also Muslims, Christians, and Jews of various origins and denominations is therefore not merely the product, and indeed the fabrication, of Western orientalism. It is literally inscribed in the local and imperial archives. The Ottoman census of the early 1880s and early 1900s is so strictly organized along millet lines that it obscures, as Michelle Campos shows in her chapter, a "connected" vision of the city's population, forcing the researcher to compare a whole number of files, or defiers, in order to reconstruct the demographic and social setup of any given neighborhood.

The religious bias was not just imposed from above but actively sustained from below by the leaderships of the religious communities that tended to defend their respective territories, reinforcing the notion that Jerusalem's population was indeed a mosaic, made up of sharply delineated if not segregated religious groups. The Ethiopian community studied by Stéphane Ancel is a case in point. Another example is the Russian mission in Jerusalem, for which Lora Gerd and Yann Potin introduce an important private archive. Both chapters focus on church and diplomatic affairs but also provide information on the level of competition and cooperation among the Christian communities living in the city and the empire at large.

Communal competition was reflected in communal archives. In their chapter on the patriarchal archives of the Greek Orthodox community, one of the most important in the city, Angelos Dalachanis and Agamemnon Tselikas highlight the spirit of distrust and rivalry among the various religious communities that caused them to protect their archives, limit access to outsiders, and prevent sharing their materials with others. Still, there are written materials that, despite being tied to individual communal entities, allow us to catch a glimpse of the very connectedness the state and communal archives tend to hide. The visiting cards printed by the Franciscan Printing Press and found in the Franciscan Library are a fascinating example discussed by Maria Chiara Rioli in her contribution to this volume. To be sure, visiting cards and advertisements are a heterogeneous lot that may be more difficult to explore in a systematic way than an official census. But seen as ego-documents they illustrate connections that might be difficult to document otherwise.

In studying the appointment, promotion, and dismissal registers for the pious foundations of Jerusalem's Maghariba neighborhood, Serife Eroglu Memis deals with a different type of connection that existed between local and wider Ottoman networks of scholars and officials. The archival materials presented in this volume, often for the first time, are full of promise. Carefully analyzed and systematically connected and put "in dialogue," as Dalachanis and Tselikas note in their chapter, with other materials, they make it possible to write a social history of the city that is worthy of the name.

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Producing histories of "Ordinary Jerusalem" from 1840 to 1940, as this volume sets out to do, challenges prevailing public and academic discourses on modern Jerusalem. Why? First, because Jerusalem is a symbolically saturated and religiously overdetermined place in the global imaginary. For residents, visitors, scholars, and rulers, there is nothing ordinary about God's City. In their

minds, it looms larger than history and stands above human machinations. How can Jerusalem be narrated when its biblically-infused temporal scale is measured in millennia rather than centuries or decades? Second, because the 1840–1940 period is historiographically overdetermined as the era of western-inspired modernity. Most narratives in the three academic fields of study in which modern Jerusalem is nestled – Ottoman, Middle Eastern, and Palestine/Israel studies – revolve around a series of ruptures that constitute the fabled "long nineteenth century": the encounter with the West as the beginning of history, top-down reforms (Tanzimat) of the centralizing state as the institutional embodiment of modern governance, and the violence of colonialism/nationalism as the handmaiden of the transformation from empire to states. How can Jerusalem be narrated in ways that transcend stories about the external impact of western hegemony? Third, 1840–1940 lives in the shadows of two traumatic historical moments that are the narrative bookends of knowledge production about Jerusalem: the 1831–40 military conquest and occupation of Bilad al-Sham by Mehmet Ali Pasha's Egyptian army, conventionally viewed as a rupture akin to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt; and the catastrophe (Nakba) of 1948, which witnessed the erasure of Palestine and the ethnic cleansing of the majority of its native population. A powerful narrative logic operates in these shadows: the inevitable destruction of Jerusalem's peaceful, tolerant, multicultural, and global character by colonial forces. How can Jerusalem's long-term inhabitants, inasmuch as they were a local demos (ahali) under Ottoman and British imperial rule, be written into history as agents rather than as hapless observers or victims?

One way to address all three questions is to normalize Jerusalem between 1840 and 1940 by framing its history in terms of a mutually constitutive relationship between the ahali and the state. Hence the title of Part 2, "Imperial Allegiances and Local Authorities." The word "allegiance" troubles the state/society binary by suggesting that the state is co-opted, but also inhabits, the ahali. Likewise, the phrase "local authorities" could mean the primacy of the local and, at the same time, the transforming presence of imperial authority. The chapters in Part 2 are not equally successful in walking this fine line, but they all strive to render Jerusalem "ordinary" by analyzing how empirewide institutions and practices of governance – police stations, petitions, shari`a courts, and municipalities – were instantiated and transformed in the specific historical context and social formation of the city. Like all other chapters in this volume, they do so by introducing new archival sources and/or new research that shed light on actors, events, and relationships that have hitherto been erased and marginalized. The purpose of these chapters is not to come up with a new metanarrative, but, rather to suggest fresh lines of inquiry respectful of and firmly grounded in the messiness and complexity of the social life of the city itself.

It is in this spirit that Noémi Lévy-Aksu speaks of the "forgotten" and "cacophonic" voices of Jerusalem that come to life when one examines less the institution of police as a modern form of governance (which, ironically, can serve to reify conventional binaries) and more the on-the-ground practices of policing that shaped Jerusalem's urban culture. Focusing on the relationship between police staff and the ahali through a social history of institutions, Lévy-Aksu argues that "state-society and central-local oppositions are less relevant to the discussion of citadinité than a careful analysis of the patterns of alliances and exclusion that legitimized some actors and practices while marginalizing others."

The same spirit animates Yasemin Avci, Vincent Lemire, and Ömür Yazici Özdemir's study of collective petitions by the ahali of Jerusalem and its environs in the late nineteenth century. Combining discursive and quantitative approaches to an analysis of over two hundred petitions, the authors map out who sent petitions to whom, why, how, and in what languages and styles. The advent of the telegraph in 1860 and the introduction of new administrative institutions, they argue, increased the number of petitions and expanded the range of social networks that resorted to them.

Beyond reinforcing a large body of literature about petitions as vehicles for both local agency and imperial authority, the authors open new windows on the transformation of political culture and regional identities in Jerusalem during the last decades of Ottoman rule.

It is difficult to think of greater institutional contrast in Jerusalem than between the shari`a court and the Russian consulate. The former, whose rich and voluminous archives date back to the first decade of Ottoman rule in the early sixteenth century, is the symbol of a communally embedded state institution central to all aspects of daily life from property to kinship relations. The latter symbolizes the European appropriation of Palestine as a geostrategic Holy Land. In their study of Register No. 324 (1839–40) of the Jerusalem shari`a court, Abla Muhtadi and Falestin Naïli seek to trouble the notion of rupture. They show, counterintuitively, that the new protomunicipality advisory council (majlis al-shura) founded by the Egyptian authorities was kept intact by the Ottoman government, but subordinated to the qadi of the shari`a court. Irina Mironenko-Marenkova and Kirill Vakh, in a thorough study of scattered archival sources relating to the Russian consulate since its founding in 1858, nuance the geostrategic argument by showing that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed little interest in the consulate. Rather, it was other Russian institutions, especially the Ecclesiastical Mission and its focus on land purchase, that dominated the Russian presence in Jerusalem.

Land and real estate are the measure of power and faith in Jerusalem, and, arguably, the most important factors in understanding the inner life of the city and its relationship to the outside world. This is especially true for the 1840–1940 period, which witnessed major transformations in land relations. In his chapter, Konstantinos Papastathis asks what happens when the largest private landowner – led by a corrupt religious establishment beholden to a foreign country – faces bankruptcy, a highly disgruntled native congregation, a new imperial power after four centuries of Ottoman rule and a European settler-colonial movement obsessed with land purchase. Skillfully employing a wide range of previously untapped sources, he tells the dramatic story of how the British colonial authorities solved the financial crisis of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate by managing the sale of large tracts of land to the Jewish Agency, while keeping in check Palestinian nationalist aspirations that resonated strongly with the Arab Christians of Jerusalem.

When it comes to imperial allegiances and local authorities in the era of reforms, no institution symbolizes the contested modern more than the municipality. Mahmoud Yazbak is keen to distinguish between the notion of public services, which, he argues, is a long-established Islamic and Ottoman practice, and the institution of the modern municipality, which he recognizes as having a strong influence on urban political culture and modes of governance. More importantly, perhaps, his comparative study of the municipal archives of Nablus, Haifa and Nazareth shows that the nature of this influence is far from clear or uniform. Rather, the workings of each municipality, the social composition of the council members, and its local role varied depending on the social structures and political economies of regional social spaces and the imperial strategies in play.

But is it enough to demonstrate the inevitable blind spots, erasures, double standards, and ideologically driven constructions of the past by the big "isms" – such as orientalism, nationalism and colonialism? As Jens Hanssen argues, the circling of the wagons approach of cultural defensiveness and a provincial nostalgia leaves history in the hands of the victors. Rather, the "task at hand is to produce historical theory and method out of the Palestinian experience." That is more than an academic exercise for theorists. Decolonizing knowledge production about the past is, ultimately, a cultural mobilization project for building a different future. Inspiration here comes from the fact that the formation of modern municipalities was rooted in global crises of cities undergoing rapid growth and transformation, and in an insurgent urban democratic ethos by their respective ahali. Jerusalem,

Hanssen rightly notes, is still living in a settler-colonial present and the current struggles of its ahali draw on the not-so-distant past of late Ottoman urban democracy.

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Was Jerusalem an Ottoman city at the turn of the twentieth century? The answer may seem obvious. On paper, most of the actors of Ottoman Jerusalem's cultural and intellectual networks were indeed Ottoman subjects, soon to become citizens. This is certainly true of Khalil Sakakini, Sa'id al-Husayni, Ruhi al-Khalidi, Wasif Jawharriyeh as a child (as Issam Nassar's contribution makes clear), and perhaps even of Pinhas Grayevsky. It was less true, however, of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda (as Hassan Ahmad Hassan and AbdulHameed al-Kayyali discuss), the Franciscan friars of the Custody of the Holy Land, and thousands of Jewish settlers intent on making a fresh start in the Promised Land. Yet labels and nationalities are tricky, and one recalls the bon mot attributed to Yorgo Boso Efendi, deputy of Serfidje (today's Servia, in Greece): "I am as Ottoman as the Ottoman Bank."1 We are still trying to figure out what he may have really meant.

There is no doubt that Ottomanness in Jerusalem before World War I was contextual, and likely to change according to circumstances. As Yair Wallach points out in his chapter in this volume, Sakakini is a case in point when he brandishes his *carte de visite* in a gesture of allegiance to the springtime of Ottoman peoples in the wake of the Young Turk Revolution. Yet should we not instead see Sakakini as an exception, and a short-lived one at that, to a growing estrangement of Jerusalem from a gradually dissolving Ottoman commonwealth? How Ottoman could the city's cultural networks really have been if Arabs and Jews were discussing their ownership rights over Palestine (see the contributions by Wallach and Jonathan Gribetz), if Jewish newspapers were forging the future of the Hebrew language (Gribetz), and if Christian authorities were setting up printing houses that served primarily sectarian goals, as in the cases of the Tipografia di Terra Santa and the St. James Armenian Printing House (cases studied by Leyla Dakhli and Arman Khatchatryan, respectively)? The chapters in this part examine these case studies and, in so doing, address the question of Ottomanness.

The Ottoman archives give a rather telling image of the ambiguous presence of the state in the cultural life of the city. Apart from a number of events typical of the Hamidian period, such as the opening of an imposing primary school in 1890, the state generally seemed to be "in the backseat," trying to catch up with local initiatives by granting (or not) its support and permission. Not surprisingly, requests concerning printing presses and publishing houses were particularly frequent, in ways that resonate with some of the contributions in this part. Thus, in October 1907, the "Latin monasteries of Jerusalem and Jaffa, under French protection" obtained full exemption from customs dues on two August Fomm printing presses weighing two tons, worth 27,000 piasters (£250). In 1903, the central bureaucracy had to deal with requests from Menahem Shmoyil and Aaron Weiss, two Austrian subjects, and Moshe Azrail, an Ottoman subject, to open printing houses in Jerusalem. Shmoyil and Weiss' project involved publications in "diverse languages" (elsine-i muhtelife); Azrail's was deemed particularly important because it would become the first Sephardic printing house in a market dominated by a multitude of Ashkenazi ventures. A few years later, just months before the revolution, an Ottoman subject and Jerusalemite by the name of Nikola Petro obtained permission to set up a press dedicated to the printing of kart dö vizit (business cards).

The voices of Ottomans from the center may give a better idea of the growing distance that appears to have developed between Istanbul and Jerusalem. In his memoirs, Mehmed Tevfik Bey [Biren] (1867–1956), governor of Jerusalem from 1897 to 1901, recalls the awkward position in which he found himself in an unfamiliar cultural and social environment. Particularly striking was his ambiguous stance with respect to the consuls of the Great Powers, whose local power and prestige by far exceeded his own, but whose company he enjoyed much more than he did the locals'. At a public

lecture organized by the Latin community, Tevfik Bey was offered a chair next to a throne-like seat reserved for the French consul. He was spared the embarrassment of having to leave by the consul himself, Ernest Auzépy, "a very civil and delicate man," who chose not to come, "probably realizing how inappropriate the situation would have been." To Tevfik Bey, the French and British consuls had become "proper friends," a qualification he never used for any of the local inhabitants of Jerusalem:

> There were several famous families in the district of Jerusalem, known by the names of Husayni, Khalidi, Nashashibi, Alami, Dawudi. The Husaynis and the Khalidis, who had accumulated the greatest power and had become rivals, could never get along. Those who had the preference of the local government would increase their power and eliminate the others.

Relations with the locals were tense. In July 1898, a local Jew warned the governor to drink only milk that was milked in plain sight, for fear that "the Arabs would put a spell on it, to loosen him up as they had Ibrahim Pasha." Tevfik Bey started drinking cocoa in the morning, instead of milk: "A spell on milk would have done me no harm, but I was worried they would mix it with something or dip their filthy hands in it."

The protracted rivalries between bell and clock towers in the city were arguably the strongest indications of Ottoman fragility in Jerusalem. In 1901, at a time generally associated with the erection of clock towers to celebrate Abdu¨lhamid II's silver jubilee, it was Kaiser Wilhelm II who had a 47–meter tower built to accompany the Church of the Dormition, for which he had, during his visit in 1898, forcefully obtained a plot of land right next to the Muslim-controlled tomb of David. The clock tower became a bone of contention between the Ottoman and German governments because its use as a bell tower infuriated the local Muslim population. The German chancellery tried to justify the situation by arguing that such practice "should have no harm in a city – like Jerusalem – where the population is used to hearing the sound of bells," but it was finally forced to accept that the bells be silenced by removing the clappers, levels, and ropes.

A victory for the Ottomans? Perhaps, if we are to believe that the monks of Mount Zion really kept to their promise. More significantly, the belated realization of the state's own clock tower was a source of Ottoman frustration. The decision was taken only in May 1907, based on a rather clear argument: "While the city of Jerusalem is filled with clock towers showing alla franca time, that there should not be a single clock tower to display the sunset-based (ezani)

time is unacceptable from the viewpoint of both religion and wisdom." It was therefore decided to spend some 1,500 liras, collected from the population, to build "a very strong and beautiful tower in the elegant Arab architectural style." The project was signed and supervised by a non-Muslim Jerusalemite, Pascal Mina. This last-minute effort by the empire to mark the city with its imprint, while at the same time paying lip service to some form of regionalism, was short-lived. It had the misfortune of being on the path of Allenby's victorious march into the city and of attracting British criticism as "an ultra-hideous clock tower." It was dismantled and moved to Allenby Square outside the city walls, only to be demolished in 1934; a tragic end that echoes the fragility of the Ottoman presence and domination in the last decades of the empire.

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This part presents a set of chapters focusing on multiple claims, conflicts, and forms of contact between the inhabitants of Jerusalem. Each chapter is typically based on a distinct archival collection and follows a distinctive methodology – quantitative analysis of distribution of properties or persons (Salim Tamari), a record-based history of the deliberations of a particular institution (Roberto Mazza), or a critique of shared assumptions (Louis Fishman). Behind the archives, however, lurk different social worlds – confessional and ethnic groupings, institutions embedded in local and

supralocal settings, legal forms and repertories, and modes of accounting. While showcasing the value of different collections and forms of evidence, the chapters also exemplify the difficulties involved in linking them to create multilayered accounts from a plurality of perspectives, a true history of the city.

Julia Shatz illuminates an assumption underlying several of the chapters of this section: "By following the trajectories of institutions ... we can traverse narrative and archival chasms that otherwise present obstacles to creating a unified history of the city." The difficulties, however, are considerable; perhaps therein lies the attraction of this part.

History is often about change. Our accounts of change usually depend on some notion of a unified subject acting and undergoing significant changes within a given timeframe: a person, a group, or an institution. These may be narrative accounts in which protagonists make their way through webs of circumstances; or accounts of a process, constructed around heterogeneous yet structured entities – a class, a community, not just "a society" but a "social system" transformed through time. The assumed unity of such subjects might be a pious fiction; its coherence sometimes relies on rhetorical gestures or unquestioned assumptions (consider the transformations of a kinship group through several generations).

In this respect, the following chapters, when read together, raise several intriguing questions. Did Jerusalem, especially around 1900, constitute such a unified subject? Can its economic structure, its internal divisions, the pattern of relations between different communities, its particular position, and the marked presence of distant actors authorize telling a story of the city as a whole? To what extent were institutions, many of them embedded in heteronomous contexts, sufficiently related to enable us to say something about "the city" rather than merely about particular entities or groupings – the Pro-Jerusalem Society, examined by Roberto Mazza, or the Sephardic Kolel, analyzed by Yali Hashash? Could indications for change in specific contexts – the uses of Muslim waqf, meticulously examined by Salim Tamari, or the politics of distinct elite groups – be extrapolated to yield productive hypotheses about others? Can citadinité – a concept used by the authors in different ways and even challenged by Louis Fishman – provide a common frame of reference?

Can we trace the same actors as we move among heterogeneous contexts? Often not: many of them are not likely to appear in records produced in another confessional community or by a supralocal institution. Should we look for structural effects connecting different social milieux, while allowing for variance in the way they affect them? What methodologies are available to do this? Should we privilege a specific factor like disease, as Philippe Bourmaud does, a particular institution (the waqf), a textual form (the list), or a project which cuts across common divisions such as the tramway, studied by Sotirios Dimitriadis? Would any single archival collection shed enough light on others for us to recognize concretely how different they were, or how they were related – or would it just lend credence to impressionistic assumptions about assumed commonalities or radical differences? Jerusalem is a difficult place to think with/in. <>

Jerusalem II: Jerusalem in Roman-Byzantine Times edited by Astrid Kaufmann Katharina Heyden, Maria Lissek [Civitatum Orbis MEditerranei Studia, Mohr Siebeck, 9783161583032] Language: English and German

The present volume gives insights into the shape, life and claims of Jerusalem in Roman-Byzantine Times (2nd to 7th century). Regarding the history of religions and its impact on urbanistic issues, the

city of Jerusalem is of special and paradigmatic interest. The coexistence and sometimes rivalry of Jewish, Hellenistic, Roman, Christian and later Islamic cults had an impact on urban planning. The city's importance as a centre of international pilgrimage and educational tourism affected demographic and institutional characteristics. Moreover, the rivalry between the various religious traditions at the holy places effected a plurivalent sacralisation of the urban area. To show transitions and transformations, coexistence and conflicts, seventeen articles by internationally distinguished researchers from different fields, such as archaeology, Christian theology, history, Jewish and Islamic studies, are brought together to constitute this collection of essays.

Index of Subjects
Maps

The volume is about Jerusalem in Roman-Byzantine Times and part of the series *Civitatum Orbis MEditerranei Studia* (COMES). This series publishes volumes on important ancient places in the Mediterranean. The authors of this volume discussed their articles in a workshop in Castle Munchenwiler (CH) in September 2017 to establish connections and avoid overlaps, thus ensuring the consistency of the compendium. Overall, the volume offers a multi-perspective approach to a city, which in the period under consideration had three names Aelia Capitolina, Jerusalem/Hierosolyma and al-Quds — and which is considered sacred in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In contrast to other COMES-volumes, it does not offer an intellectual history of the city, a representation of theologies and worldviews that arose in Jerusalem. A book on this subject would undoubtedly be an attractive project. But since hardly any sources by pagan, Jewish or Islamic scholars of Jerusalem have survived from the 2nd to the 7th century AD, it would have to be limited to Christianity.

This volume presents a three-part panorama of the city's history: first, the urban development (part one: Shape of the City); second, living together in the city and in the surrounding area (part two: Life in and around the City); and third, the claims different groups of people made on Jerusalem or linked to the city (part three: Claims on the City). It was important to us to present a multiperspective approach in each of these parts, which integrates different academic disciplines and cultures. The introduction discusses the shared insights as well as differences between the contributions and highlights open questions.

We thank all authors for their cooperation, which made this volume an interdisciplinary and international joint effort. Considering the continued relevance that Jerusalem has — as a real city as well as a symbol of conflict in the Middle East until today —, it is not a given that they accepted our invitation to participate in this volume and to discuss the texts together. The academic world is not unaffected by this conflict either. We are very grateful to everyone for the constructive working days at Castle Munchenwiler (CH). This workshop was supported financially by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), the doctoral program of the Theological faculties of Bern, Basel, Zurich, the Johanna Durmuller-Bol Foundation and the Fontes Foundation's Fonds for Ecumenical and Historical Theology. Unfortunately, two authors were unable to complete their articles, which were originally planned and discussed at the workshop. For the social structure of the population of Aelia / Jerusalem, Jon Selig

man's contribution was more than just a substitute. Unfortunately, one could not be found for Eastern monasticism, which had a decisive influence on late antique Jerusalem. To our regret, it is not addressed in this volume in a way that is appropriate to its significance.

Jerusalem: Shape, Life and Claims by Katharina Heyden/ Maria Lissek, translation: Yael Antolovich

The City and the Book: A City Like no Other

Hardly any other city is so strongly influenced by religious history as Jerusalem. To this day, Jews, Christians and Muslims associate this place with memories of events that lead to the origins of their religious communities and have shaped their identity over the centuries. They derive from it claims which until today make a peaceful coexistence in the "City of Peace" — this is perhaps the most popular of many possible (and problematic) interpretations of the city name Jerusalem — difficult. The traces of these competing claims are deeply engraved in the cityscape. Many of these traces date back to the first centuries of our era, when first the pagan Romans, then the Christian Byzantines

and finally, in the 7th century, after a brief interlude of Sassanidic rule, the Islamic Arabs ruled over the former Jewish capital.

Jerusalem's outstanding religious significance entails at least two peculiarities which differentiate from the cities portrayed in the series *Civitatum Orbis MEditerranei Studia* (COMES) heretofore. These two aspects have had, and still have until this day an impact on the architectural shape of the city, life in the city and claims made on it: On the one hand, Jerusalem was and still is primarily a city of pilgrimage. Many people have come to spend a limited, religiously particularly intensive time there and not with the intention of settling and living permanently. For the cityscape, this means that the individual places of religious veneration are more important and formative than classical urban structures (which of course even a pilgrimage city cannot completely do without). This had consequences for the life in the city: the identity as a pilgrimage center meant that it was not the structure and normal everyday life of a Roman civitas that was decisive, but rather the religiously intensified life of immigrants and visitors. Jerusalem was and is less a civitas of its inhabitants than a backdrop for visitors.

What would be a state of emergency for other cities is considered normal in a pilgrimage city like Jerusalem.

The second peculiarity, linked to the identity as a pilgrimage city, is the fact that Jerusalem is both a real and a symbolic city. What does one mean when one says 'Jerusalem'? The actual hills and valleys, places and paths, walls and buildings? Or a place of memory and longing that consists less of concretely visible things and more of meanings, stories and hopes than of stones? What, do the pilgrims see once they finally arrive in Jerusalem after a long journey: A church built by emperor Constantine or Jesus dying on Golgotha? The Temple Mount destroyed and lying fallow by the Romans, the confirmation of Jesus' announcement concerning the destruction of the Temple (Mark 13:1-4), or proof of God's rejection of the Jews? The Dome of the Rock or the night journey of the Prophet Muhammad? The late antique sources prove that these two views are by no means mutually exclusive. Rather, adherents of all religions have usually looked at Jerusalem with one external and one internal eye, charging the sites and stones with traditions and interpretations.

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A Multi-Perspective Book: The Genesis and Conception of the Volume

Concerning this specific character of Jerusalem one may ask: Is it even possible to write a book about this city? Or better said: How can one write a single book about this city? Simon Sebag Montefiore and Max Kuchler have undertaken the venture of writing a monograph in very different ways: one with a "Biography of the City" from its beginnings to the present day, the other with an archaeological "Handbook and Study Tour Guide." Compared to these two impressive works, the present book is both more modest in its ambition and more complex in its layout. It aims to present a multi-perspective view of Jerusalem, its architectural shape of the city, life in the city and the ideological-symbolic claims on the city in Roman-Byzantine times. To this end, the book combines contributions by experts from various academic disciplines and countries. Archaeologists, historians, Judaists, Islamic scholars, art historians, and Christian theologians from Switzerland, Israel, France, Germany, the USA and the Netherlands present the current state of research and their own or foreign new findings.

The contributions were intensively discussed and coordinated at a joint workshop of the authors in autumn 2017 in Münchenwiler Castle (Fribourg, Switzerland). Three topics emerged from the discussions, providing guidelines and cross-connections between the individual contributions. These are:

(1) the relationship between continuity and discontinuity in urban development,
(2) the relationship between the urban area and the surrounding countryside, and
(3) the interdependencies between the real and the imagined city.

In the following, these three aspects are related to the three areas of Shape, Life and Claims mentioned above. In addition, because of the unique religious significance of Jerusalem the question of (inter)religious aspects plays an important role.

We hope to present an introduction to this volume that offers, on the one hand, a systematical synthesis of the contributions, and, on the other hand, opens space for reflection and discussion among the users of this book. In order to achieve this goal, differences and contradictions between individual contributions as well as open questions are not smoothed out, but rather marked and highlighted as such.

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The Temporal Limitation and the Source Problem

Beforehand however, two fundamental problems have to be pointed out, which were discussed by the authors and solved differently in each contribution.

The first concerns the definition of the period covered by this volume: How can "the Roman-Byzantine period" be dated for the urban history of Jerusalem? This question can be answered in different ways with regard to the political history, the architectural history and the life in the city. Thus, although Roman rule began with the conquest and founding of the Roman province by Pompey in 63 BC, the city's population remained mostly Jewish until the 2nd century. Only the destruction of the Jewish city after the suppression of the two uprisings in 70 AD and 135 AD, the change of name to Aelia Capitolina and Hadrian's interventions in the city complex marked a significant turning point. Therefore, many articles in this volume start their analysis in the 2nd century. Nevertheless, the structures of the former city were of course still in use. For this reason, for example, the contribution on the water supply already begins in Hellenistic times. Besides, pragmatic considerations are also included: In research on Jerusalem, which is strongly influenced by biblical studies, the idea of "Jerusalem in biblical times" has established itself, which connects the City of David with the City of Jesus. This period will be covered by the COMES volume "Jerusalem I".

More challenging than the definition of the beginning is that of the end — the period covered by "Jerusalem II". Although the conquests by the Sassanids (614 CE) and the Umayyads (638 CE) make it possible to determine the end of the political Byzantine rule accurately, these changes of rule initially had little effect on the architectural design of the city and the life of its inhabitants. The new Islamic rule in al-Quds only became visible half a century later with the redesign of the Temple Mount, now called Haram: with the construction of the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque, the Haram Gates and the Caliphal Palaces at the end of the 7th century.

A second issue concerns the sources available for the reconstruction of the building history, life and occupation of the city of Jerusalem and their interpretation. Most of the sources handed down for the Roman-Byzantine period are from Christian sources — and are therefore influenced by the Christian "image" of the city. They tend to interpret everything that exists in Christian terms and to suppress non-Christian elements. Sometimes they are also strongly polemically grounded as they represent only one of many varieties within Christianity and try to enforce it against others. A similar problem occurs with regard to Jewish sources: While it is typical for the Talmud to preserve opposing opinions, the Talmud itself represents only one particular form of Judaism, namely rabbinical. All other forms of Jewish life, as undoubtedly existed above all in Palestine, can hardly be found in the sources due to the rabbinically steered tradition.

Finally, as far as the Pagan and Islamic sides are concerned, we are mainly dealing with a silence of the sources. How is this to be interpreted? Most probably by the simple fact that Jerusalem was simply not relevant enough for the Romans after their victory by Hadrian, nor for the Muslim conquerors until the 8th century.

Moreover, all literary sources of antiquity provide a very one-sided picture in terms of social and gender issues. This reflects their common cultural background. If one wants to reconstruct the history of the city from the literary sources, one often has to read these sources against the grain or ask for statements between the lines. It is also important to remember that the mere fact of which sources have been handed down and which have not, reflects the historical power relations of later generations. Oftentimes, the insight into the steered tradition and tendentious character of literary sources is combined with the hope and the claim that archaeological research can provide 'objective' findings. And indeed, oftentimes, archaeological research and findings can shed an additional light on the steered tradition and tendentious character of literary sources. The synagogues in Galilee are a typical example for this case: These synagogues represent a Hellenistic Judaism of 5th and 6th century Palestine that is completely undocumented in literary sources. However, caution is necessary too, as archaeology faces similar methodological challenges as historical studies based on literary evidence. Archaeologists have also to avoid the tendency of finding and seeing what they were looking for. Archaeological findings do not simply speak for themselves and have to be contextualized, compared and interpreted — oftentimes using literary sources. Since almost every stone in Jerusalem evokes symbolical content, archaeological research is as vague as any other academic discipline. In addition, archaeological research in and around Jerusalem has flourished, constantly uncovering new finds in the last decades until today. Therefore, the present volume can only document an interim status. The topics and questions, however, which are outlined in the following, will also remain important for the evaluation of new finds.

Shape of the City: Continuity and Discontinuity

The period considered in this book begins with a great work of destruction for Jerusalem: Emperor Hadrian has the Jewish Temple torn down to its foundations, exiles the Jewish population and programmatically renames the Jewish capital Jerusalem to Aelia Capitolina after his victory over the insurgents in the Bar Kochba revolt (132-135 CE). In the collective memory of Judaism, this will be the final demise of the Jewish capital; in Christian polemics, it is seen as proof that God has cast away his people of Israel. Christian theologians like Eusebius and Cyril saw a new Jerusalem emerging by the church buildings of Constantine since 324. They interpreted the Anastasis Church as proof of Christian triumph over Judaism and as a replacement of the old people of God by the new. In this sense, Jerusalem was a Christian city that ended with the conquest by the Sassanids and then by the Muslim Umayyads in the 7th century. Thenceforth the city was called al-Quds.

Can one therefore speak of a threefold transformation of the city in Roman-Byzantine times: first from the Jewish city to a Roman-pagan city under Hadrian, then from the Roman city to a Christian one under Constantine, and finally from the Christian city to an Islamic one? In any case, this is an established narrative of Jerusalem's urban history. Max Kuchler and Markus Lau give an insight into these transformations, which were, however, accompanied by slowly progressing transitions of the city. Archaeological evidence in terms of church buildings as well as literary sources give the impression of a Christian dominance. But were the Christians really as dominant for the cityscape and everyday city life as the sources suggest?

The three major upheavals in the city's history are often associated with the different names of the city: the renaming of Jerusalem to Aelia Capitolina by Hadrian marks the break between the Jewish and Roman city in the 2nd century. The retreat to the name Jerusalem stands for the "re-

sacralization" of the city from the 4th to the 6th century and is associated with the Christian claim of continuity with the religious center of the Jews. Finally, the renaming to al-Quds manifests the break between the Christian and Muslim city in the 7th century. Max Kuchler and Markus Lau tend towards this classification in this volume, naturally with the necessary differentiations. On closer inspection, however, the matter of the names is not quite as simple since its official name was Aelia from the 2nd to the 7th century. According to the logic of "new name, new city", there must not have been a Christian Jerusalem in Byzantine times — which again contradicts the archaeological and literary evidence.

Life in the City

Can one infer the religious affiliation or even the religious attitude of Jerusalem's population from the sacred buildings? Does a topographical and architectural "paganization", "Christianization" or "Islamization" go hand in hand with the paganization, Christianization or Islamization of the population? This connection is not as compelling as it may seem in the first place for two reasons. Firstly, these buildings were mostly donated by foreigners and built for pilgrims who only stayed there for a limited time. Secondly, as Christoph Markschies argues, the construction of Roman temples and Christian churches could also be understood as an expression of loyalty of the Jerusalem population to the respective rulers and less as an expression of a religious majority of the city's inhabitants.

It has already been mentioned that life in the city cannot be reconstructed simply based on literary sources or archaeological findings. Inscriptions and burial culture provide valuable knowledge about the population structure and social history — and thus approximations of life in the city — above all.

Claims on the City: Continuity and Discontinuity

In Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Jerusalem or al-Quds is considered as a holy city. There is a great continuity in the claims of the respective predominant religion associated with this holiness that has lasted for centuries. Even if holiness has been coded differently in each case, each religion's claim to Jerusalem as a holy city is related to the preceding ones. For holiness is not a given fact but is constructed by claiming it. In this way, the claim to holiness can manifest itself — in the way a city is built, how it is lived in and in the manner it is talked about.

For the Roman-Byzantine period, it is of particular interest who propagated holiness at what time and with what aims. Was it mainly the emperors and their families who, although rarely present, wanted to use the symbolic value of Jerusalem for their political goals? Alternatively, were claims to power and prestige rather formulated and enforced from within the city itself, by the local bishops, clerics and monks with the claim to holiness?

Earlier research tended to interpret the destruction of the Jewish Temple and the construction of pagan sanctuaries in the 2nd century, the church buildings of the 4th to 6th centuries and the planned reconstruction of the Jewish Temple under Julian as works of the emperors and their claims on the city. Concerning this matter, the question arises: Is the focus on the founders of buildings perhaps too limited and abstract and does this view take too little account of the realities on the ground, the everyday life and everything that is not mentioned in the sources? Referring to this, Christoph Markschies questions the sole attribution to the emperors and suggests that the public buildings should be understood as an expression of loyalty of the urban population to the respective rulers in any case. <>

Radical Christian Voices and Practice Essays in Honour of Christopher Rowland edited by Zoë Bennett and David B. Gowler [Oxford University Press, 9780199599776]

Peter Olivi (1248–98) was a Franciscan theologian of distinction who advanced radical views on poverty and property, and a controversial prophetic vision of Church history, in a number of treatises and works of biblical exegesis. In his Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles he argued that the first Christians , in succession to the Apostles themselves (according to his reading of Jesus' instructions to the Apostles and the Gospel narratives), bound themselves to a life of evangelical poverty in the search of perfection, renouncing all property privately and in common. In urging this difficult thesis, Olivi showed an impressive capacity for inventive, sustained, wide-ranging, and relatively unrhetorical exegesis.

On the margins of the biblical canon and on the boundaries of what are traditionally called 'mainstream' Christian communities there have been throughout history writings and movements which have been at odds with the received wisdom and the consensus of establishment opinion. If one listens
carefully, these dissident voices are reflected in the Bible itself-whether in the radical calls for social change from the Hebrew Bible prophets, with Jesus the apocalyptic prophet who also demanded social and economic justice for his oppressed people, or perhaps from the apocalyptic tradition's millenarian visions.

The use of the Bible has been fertile ground throughout Christian history for prophetic calls for radical change within society as a whole and the church in particular. The essays contained in this volume examine aspects of this radical tradition, its doctrine, hermeneutics, pedagogy, and social action. They offer a sustained development of the theme of the Bible and its reception and appropriation in the context of radical practices, and an exposition of the imaginative possibilities of radical engagement with the Bible in inclusive social contexts.

Part 1 treats New Testament texts directly-the Lukan writings, Paul and the Book of Revelation; Part 2 explores some examples of reception history and of radical appropriation of the Bible in history and literature; Part 3 addresses contemporary issues in liberation theology and public theology.

This book is a Festschrift in honour of Professor Christopher Rowland, the Dean Ireland's Professor of the Exegesis of Holy Scripture in the University of Oxford.

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Essay: Peter Olivi on the Community of the First Christians at Jerusalem by Peter Garnsey

Petrus Johannis Olivi, or Peter of John Olivi (1248–98), was an impressive representative of the high-scholastic culture of the Middle Ages. Born near Béziers, he studied in Paris and taught briefly in Florence, but otherwise spent his life in the south of France, teaching in the schools of his Franciscan Order. A prolific writer, Olivi was, among other things, a biblical exegete of major significance and, furthermore, a radical theologian. As such, he is included in Bradstock and Rowland, **RADICAL CHRISTIAN WRITINGS** (2002). Hence he seems an appropriate subject for a chapter composed in honour of my friend and colleague Chris Rowland.

In the last decades of his life, Olivi was a leading light of the rigorist wing of the Franciscan Order, later known as the Spirituals. Franciscans (or Fratres Minores) stood apart from the other Orders in renouncing property both as individuals and in common. They believed that, in this, they were obeying the injunctions of Jesus and following his lifestyle. Unsurprisingly, their claims attracted hostile attention from theologians of other Orders and the secular clergy. In the Bull Exiit Qui Seminat of 19 August 1279, Pope Nicholas III, long a defender of the Order, provided an interpretation of the Rule of St Francis that he pronounced to be definitive; the position of the Franciscans on poverty and property was officially endorsed, and its critics were silenced. Olivi submitted a brief statement on the poverty of the Fratres Minores to the papal commission that advised the pope. But, in addition, he published, in the late 1270s and early 1280s, three major treatises on poverty as part of a campaign against the conspicuous wealth of his Order and the lax lifestyle of some of its leaders. In two of these works, number nine of the seventeen *Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica* and the Tractatus on usus pauper, he argued that the Franciscan vow of

poverty entailed not only the absence of ownership, but also poor or limited use (usus pauper). Granted that the goods that the Franciscans appeared to possess actually belonged to the Church of Rome (a Franciscan assertion that had won favour with earlier popes and was now confirmed in Exiit Qui Seminat), members of the Order should nevertheless use such things only insofar as necessity dictated. Such limited use, moreover, was a matter of precept, whose breach entailed mortal sin. This doctrine, though advanced with subtlety and apparent moderation, evoked a hostile reaction that led to his censure and the confiscation of Olivi's books in 1283. He was shortly thereafter reinstated, but he continued to have to defend himself and his writings.

More controversial still than his views on poverty was his use of the Bible as prophetic of his own times, viewed through a Franciscan lens. Drawing on the ideas of Joachim of Fiore (c.1135–1202), Olivi asserted that the contemporary church was locked in internal conflict, being in a state of transition between a fifth period (status) in its history, marked by expansion, wealth, power, and corruption, and a sixth period of spiritual renewal, of which Francis was the prophet and poverty the hallmark. After Olivi's death in 1298, the attacks on his doctrines and his influence increased. Eventually, in 1326, on the order of the Avignon Pope John XXII, his writings were condemned, he was anathematized, and his followers were persecuted.

Olivi's chequered career ensured that some of his corpus was lost, and many of his extant works are relatively inaccessible. However, his extraordinary originality, versatility, and erudition, embracing fields such as philosophy, economics, and psychology, as well as theology and biblical commentary, are now coming to be recognized.

A good way to approach Olivi as biblical exegete is through his Principia quinque in sacram scripturam, an introduction to the Bible which, according to the leading authority on medieval exegesis, Gilbert Dahan, *'témoigne d'une plus grande maturité que la plupart des autres principia qui nous sont conserves (y compris ceux d'Albert le Grand et de Thomas d'Aquin)*'. The text has recently received a critical edition from David Flood and Gedeon G6l (1997) and an illuminating essay of interpretation from Sylvain Piron (2010). The truths of scripture (we are informed) are veiled; the task of the exegete is to penetrate through the metaphor and allegory to the sundry layers of hidden meaning. Olivi's discussion of the nature of the challenge and the appropriate response is penetrating and inventive. A highlight is his own metaphorical creations, which include the remarkable comparison of scripture to portrait painting: in each case the medium impedes perception of the meaning that lies within.

When we turn from the introduction to Olivi's biblical commentaries, we come upon a novelty in terms of medieval biblical exegesis. While there is a bedrock of solid learning, backed up by a full cast of scriptural and patristic authorities and embellished by elaborate allegorical readings, Franciscan doctrine obtrudes. In the Super Genesim, for example, the authorial voice surfaces from time to time, commenting trenchantly on the carnality of the church, issuing reminders that perfection lies in evangelical poverty, or dropping hints about the pitfalls of property ownership. In contrast, in Lectura super Apocalypsim, Revelation is read entirely in terms of the Olivian interpretation of salvation history and the history of the church, inspired by Joachim of Fiore, but with a Franciscan spin. Otherwise, intrusions may take the form of substantial digressions. In Lectura super Matthaeum, at 10:9–10, Olivi mounts a spirited attack on Thomas Aquinas (Madigan, 2003, pp. 105–13. At this point commentary becomes tract. The argument is about poverty, as it often is; Olivi frequently refers back to his main discussions of the issue, in the *Tractatus and Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica* (Schlageter, 1989). His treatment of Luke's vision of early Christian communality in Acts offers itself for comparison to the exchange with Thomas Aquinas on poverty, in as much as the discussion is lengthy, and a Franciscan reading is imposed. These (few) verses

receive special treatment because they raised problems for Franciscans, at least if they wished to use the first Christians as role models for themselves. In the rest of this chapter I give detailed consideration to Olivi's handling of the passages in question, making use of the critical edition of Flood (2001), and, to some extent, of the translation by Karris and Flood (2007) of the relevant verses of Books 2 and 4.

Olivi on Acts 2:43–7

Luke paints an idyllic picture of the community of the first Christians at Jerusalem in parts of Acts 2, 4, and 5. Thus the ideal of the ecclesia primitiva was born, providing inspiration for monastic coenibitism and for periodic movements of reform within the Church (Garnsey, 2007, ch. 3). It would be understandable if the Franciscans sought their model not so much in the ecclesia primitiva as in the vita apostolica, the lifestyle of the apostles, who followed the example of Christ in obedience to his commands. For it would appear that in the ecclesia primitiva, property was held in common, the first Christians having transferred to the community the profits from the sales of their possessions. Olivi, however, represented them as proto-Franciscans, (p. 38) having renounced all rights over property, both as individuals and as a community. Thus the true heirs of the first Christians were the evangelical poor of his own age, and of his own Order, not the incumbents of monasteries past and present.

Olivi credits 'certain people' with this view, but it was probably he who first argued the case in detail. His line of argument was not in fact acceptable to all Franciscans. A leading Franciscan apologist of the following generation, Bonagratia of Bergamo, in his Tractatus de Christi et apostolorum paupertate (c. 1322), distinguished between the abdication of the apostles and the abdication that the crowd who followed them made, likewise the abdication of monks: the apostles alone were unable to have lordships and possessions in common (Oliger, 1929, p. 494). But Olivi saw the ecclesia primitiva and the vita apostolica as inseparable. Having demonstrated in earlier works that Christ was absolutely poor, the living example of evangelical perfection, and that he demanded the same of the apostles, Olivi now reveals that the first Christians too were perfect. In particular they lacked ius, whether of dominium or of usus, over material goods and property. He concedes only that they were entitled to usus of life-preserving necessities. The basic argument, then, had already been made. If there were difficulties in the narrative of Luke, they could only be superficial. Every obstacle could be removed, once the central principle was accepted that Luke's vision was of evangelica paupertas en masse. Olivi was aware that his reading was controversial, and that he therefore could not deal with the matter in cursory fashion. His coverage of the passages in question is extended and the argumentation elaborate and controlled.

For Luke, this was a community created and pervaded by the Holy Spirit: their unity and harmony, as exemplified in the sharing of resources, were a manifestation of the life of the Spirit. That they were perfect is an inference of our commentator and is crucial to his argument, for it entailed that the Jerusalem Christians were modelling themselves directly on Christ and the apostles.2 Olivi begins with this assertion, and it is a leitmotiv of the whole discussion. The first Christians were perfect in three ways, being respectful of their superiors, each other, and God. The second of these dimensions of perfection receives special attention.

'Habebant omnia communia' (v.44). What were the communia? They were not things that the evangelical poor should not have for use, the very things that were sold off (land, etc.), but necessities purchased with the proceeds of the sales. Those who received were those in need.

What was the nature of the communitas temporalium presented here and in Book 4? On this, Olivi says, two main opinions have been aired. According to (p. 39) the first, individuals had no right (ius) over the things they had for use, having abdicated it, but the community did. This was a right held by

one community or fraternity as distinct from another. So individual abbeys or monasteries have their own rights. Further, 'certain people' among those who hold these views make a distinction between the apostles and other believers. The apostles had nothing whether privately or in common, while the others had nothing of their own, but some things in common. Olivi refers to Bede, who contrasts an order of teachers (the apostles) with an order of hearers (the other believers)—but Bede does not expressly extend the distinction to cover property or rights over property. This seems to be an invention of those whose views Olivi is summarizing. That he is not sympathetic to this interpretation is shown by the stress he places here on the equality that reigns in the community.

There is a second opinion, which Olivi implicitly favours: neither the apostles nor the mass of believers held any right over property, whether in private or in common. Acts 2:44 makes this clear—'omnes etiam qui credebant erant pariter et habebant omnia communia'—and Gratian's Decretum (c. 1140) confirms it. Twice in that authoritative Digest of Canon Law it is asserted that all humankind should share everything. In both instances Acts is cited in conjunction with Plato's Ideal City. Olivi says that two things emerge: the apostles and the company of believers were as one, and there was no common ownership of anything. In this respect it resembled the state of innocence. Gratian's source is a letter of Pope Clement I. Together with other papal letters assembled by Ps-Isidorus in the ninth century, it was exposed as a forgery, but not before the seventeenth century. This letter regularly surfaces in the literature spawned by the Franciscan Poverty Dispute, despite the embarrassing elements it contained. In addition to stigmatizing private property as contrary to natural or divine law, Ps-Clement appears to endorse the sharing of wives. Olivi seizes upon the former point while sidestepping the latter.

Olivi knows that he has not yet clinched the argument against common ownership or possession among the first Christians. In his view the texts themselves, in both Acts 2 and 4, show that there was no common ownership. True, Augustine and some other saints thought the community at Jerusalem and that of the apostles were similar to their own monastic communities. But Luke stated otherwise. Olivi had already made a 'detailed reply' in the Tractatus and Quaestiones de evangelica paupertate, and he pronounced himself unwilling to go over the same ground again. His strategy was, rather, to bring the vita apostolica into play, to show that the first Christians pursued similar ideals to the apostles, that they practised evangelica paupertas. With this in mind, he turns to a second question. He asks whether the first Christians carry out Christ's prescription as laid down in Matthew 19:21: 'If you would be perfect'. Olivi presents a counter-assertion or argument (briefly), refutes it (at greater length), and returns a positive answer to the question.

On the surface the answer is no: the first Christians did not sell everything, and therefore they fail the test of evangelical poverty and do not qualify as perfect: they did not give the money raised in sales to the poor in general, but to the community of which they were members, and therefore in part to themselves. So they did not divest themselves completely. Olivi gives three lines only to the 'pro' argument. The rather longer 'contra' revolves around two main points. One, the company of believers gave nothing to the community except that which was earmarked for the poor to ease penury and need. Two, they sold everything the retention of which would have been inconsistent with the practice of evangelical poverty. When Christ gave his apostles instructions to sell everything, he did not mean by this necessities such as basic clothing or daily bread: rather, he wanted them to renounce ownership (dominium) of all property and attachment to it. He had in mind things whose use was not fitting or needed for the daily use of the poor. Moreover, at that time it was necessary to hand over the proceeds of sales to the community because there was no chance of getting what was needed from other sources ('greedy' Jews and unbelievers). Also, the numbers of believers were large and ever growing, and the proceeds of sales were needed to sustain

them. Of course, if the multitude of believers could have been suitably maintained by daily alms, then the money could have gone to the poor, which would have been more perfect and fitting.

Olivi on Acts 4:32–7

In his short introduction to Luke's second summary account of the first Christian community, Olivi underlines, as before, the communal perfection of the group, which he regards as equal to that of the Pentecost converts. He earmarks for special attention the theme of hierarchy and governance (itself an aspect of communal perfection). He also heralds the discussion of the two exemplary stories of renunciation, the one perfect, that of Joseph or Barnabas, the other (in Book 5) fraudulent, that of Ananias and Sapphira.

In what sense could the members of the community be said to possess things? Olivi denies that there is an implication in the text ('and no one said that any of the things which he possessed was his own, but they had everything in common') that the things they had for normal use were their own property. Rather, Luke was saying here that 'the simple use of the possession of some things, for example, clothing or food or books or houses, can be held without any legal right or dominion or proprietary right'. In effect, Olivi has made of Luke an honorary Franciscan, attributing to him the Franciscan doctrine of simplex usus facti ('factual use'). Formulated by Bonaventura of Bagnoregio, Minister General of the Franciscan Order (1257–74) and an early patron of Olivi, 'factual use' received the seal of approval in the Papal Bull *Exiit Qui Seminat* (1279) and remained official doctrine until it was dismissed by John XXII.

The issue of ownership in common is not directly addressed here by Olivi. However (as earlier), he contrives a link between Bede on Acts and Ps-Clement's evocation of communality in the age of innocence. Similarly, he endorses Bede's vision of the Christian community of old Jerusalem as a prefiguration of the new Jerusalem. The link-up is made at the expense of that community 'which appropriates the things it uses as the common possession of its specific community'; that is, the traditional monastery. This evidently comes from Olivi rather than Bede. Bede's gloss on Acts 4:32 begins: 'Those who live in such a way that all things are common in the Lord are rightly called coenobites'.

Olivi turns next to the theme of apostolic authority, prompted by verse 33. The pre-eminence of the apostles contributed greatly to the grace which embraced the community, as manifested in particular in the distribution of resources in accordance with need. The distribution was carried out 'through the providential care of the apostles'. But one must be clear about the position of the apostles and the rest of the community in relation to the money. To whom did it belong? This is the first of three questions. The answer is: it was no-one's. It did not belong to the apostles, who had been commanded by Christ to have nothing, nor (obviously) to the donors once they had offered it up, nor to the community as a whole, which was modelling itself on the apostolic community. Likewise, birds of the air and fish of the sea do not belong to any particular lord (dominus) or special community (collegium). The money was under the auctoritas of the apostles but under the iurisdictio of nobody.

Olivi proceeds to show how one can have use without jurisdiction, in effect explaining the concept of simplex usus introduced earlier. Such use is of two kinds. There is the use that goes with personal use or consumption of food, clothing, or accommodation; then there is the having of something for the use of someone else, exemplified by cooks and waiters, or indeed by the apostles when they handed out the bread broken by Christ. This second category divides into two, because the apostles in Acts were not physical dispensers of the money, but, rather, governed the distribution (presumably Christ did likewise with the bread in the gospel story). It remains for Olivi to assure potential enquirers and sceptics that this authority to dispense did not entail any ownership or

proprietary or possessory right: 'And that is enough for us.' But he cannot resist a jab at those communities that (unlike evangelical communities) do own things, and for this very reason get involved in litigation, often with unsavoury individuals. His target is the traditional monastic house. This way is 'not necessary for the perfect or those on the path to perfection; it is, rather, for the litigious and avaricious or the imperfect or those who are not yet perfect'.

Olivi poses a second question: did the apostles have a hand in the distribution of the money or only in the distribution of the necessities purchased with the money? The apostles, it seems, are not yet free from the contamination that goes with the handling of money. The text apparently justifies the answer 'yes': the apostles were entrusted with the money. However, this reading has to be weighed against the message of the gospels and church fathers, to the effect that the apostles were forbidden the use of money except in dire circumstances.

Perhaps the apostles were permitted to have money for the sake of those dependent on them or the needy? Olivi takes a hard line here. The apostles were evangelically poor equally as apostles (or 'prelates') and as individuals. He seeks support from a number of patristic sources, of which the most interesting are Jerome and Aratus (cited by Bede), who read into the deposit of the money at the apostolic feet the message that money is to be trampled on. A concession is made: there was an interim period in which it was impossible not to handle the money destined for the purchase of necessities. 'Proceeds' (pretia) covers both 'money' and 'necessities'. The text of Acts confirms at several points that the distribution of food was a repeating act, requiring the periodic temporary handling of money. Olivi considers and rejects the option that the handling of money was entrusted to believers uncommitted to evangelical poverty or to unbelieving camp-followers. Better to decide that the situation was anomalous, and that even those professing evangelical poverty were forced to handle money. At least the turnover would have been quick; Olivi considers it relevant here that the first Christians were for the most part poor.

Olivi summarizes. The apostles did not handle the money. There is a case for saying that the money was received and distributed under their authority, but such authority was exercised by Peter and the apostles not over the money by virtue of some right of ownership or possession, but rather over their followers. Secondly, the apostles did not act as distributors either to themselves or to others. Now comes a qualification: the apostles, when they were sent to preach, could carry food or money for others, though not for themselves. Even Christ made periodic use of a purse for the benefit of the poor rather than himself. Olivi had earlier crossed swords with opponents over the purse, which appeared incompatible with the thesis of the absolute poverty of Christ and the apostles. Here he uses the purse as support for the distinction he is making between the apostles and the multitude of believers. The purse of Christ represents mercy and charity. These qualities are entirely suitable in a prelate, but lie outside the sphere of 'a simple subject and above all, a religious'.

Olivi has a third question: was it fitting for the apostles as leaders of the church ('bishops and prelates') to have some right or jurisdiction over temporal goods, given that this would have been inappropriate for them as individuals and members of a religious order? Olivi labours long over this question. Why does he find it so taxing? He was resistant to anything that diminished the evangelical perfection of the apostles. An affirmative answer to the question might appear to do precisely this.

The case for begins with several claims that extract concessions from Olivi. The first is that the apostles have the right to be supported by those to whom they preach (see 1 Cor. 9). This is hardly a concession at all: it amounts to the right to 'factual use' to maintain life, which underpins the lifestyle of the mendicant religious.

The texts seem to allow the deduction that the apostles had more than this, what amounted to 'total jurisdiction' over the temporal goods of the ecclesia primitiva. This is a major stumbling block for Olivi's general argument and is flagged with a contra. It appears to follow that having some right over temporal goods, because the apostles exercised it, is a higher state of perfection than not having such a right. So prelates of evangelical religious institutes should have a similar power over goods held in common. But this would put them on the same level as 'abbots and chapters of monks and canons'. And Olivi in another work (Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica) has shown that this is incompatible with the truth of the Gospel of Christ and his evangelical poverty.

Olivi has no intention of fighting this battle again. Instead, he will concede the general principle that, if the church is to operate properly as an institution and, in particular, support the poor, then power over some temporal goods must exist within it, at any rate at the top. The apostles were already exercising this power or right. They exercised it, however, only 'in a manner fitting for apostles'. The manner in which power over the acquisition and communal distribution of temporal goods is exercised is crucial. The apostles used it fittingly; that is, having in mind 'the necessities and spiritual usefulness' of the church. In contrast,

> It is not expedient for one who professes the perfect life and the following of Christ to have many and precious and exceedingly delicate things nor to travel on horseback and in carriages with glorious trappings and magnificent appointments. Rather, they are contradictory to and destroy their religious profession and perfection and scandalize people who see such things.

A third objection concerns papal power. The papal office in his time carried very extensive power over temporal things. What follows for Peter, whose power was no less than that of a pope? The answer is that Peter had power equal to the pope's insofar as it 'directly and immediately flowed from Christ and his new law', but lacked all the later accretions,

> both because things of this sort didn't exist then and because it was never becoming or expedient for Peter or Christ himself to get mixed up in such dominions and arrangements, even though for many reasons it has become expedient for the Church of God to get mixed up in such matters in the intermediate time.

In listing the reasons—there are eight—Olivi has before him the broad canvas of the history of the church from the ecclesia primitiva to the end of time. The result bears little resemblance in the detail to the schematic structure of the seven periods of ecclesiastical history outlined in the later work, Lectura super Apocalipsim. Olivi chooses to keep his eye on the main themes of the argument he has been following all along. The gist of what he is saying is this: the chequered history of the church, its decline from its pristine state of perfection, was a predictable consequence of its expansion to include 'the weak or imperfect'. Under these circumstances, he remarks waspishly, 'it was more beneficial to have, for a time, many ministers, even mercenaries, than to have none, or than to have wolves'. It was inevitable, but also fitting, that the ecclesiastical hierarchy should include 'diverse degrees and states of perfections and professions'. Meanwhile, Christ and his apostles and the primitive church stood as the model of the evangelical state towards which God in his wisdom and infinite patience was guiding all humankind.

Olivi now wraps up his lengthy answer to his third question. It was no contradiction to say that, in the ecclesia primitiva as envisaged by Luke, all rights over material things were abdicated, and that the apostles controlled the distribution of usables without incurring imperfection thereby. Looking back at a difficulty raised earlier (the one marked with a contra), he says that the apostles exercised this power only qua prelates with responsibilities of office and governorship. There follows a rare flash (splash?) of humour: 'A sailor with a big ship to manage has more things that he needs to have than if he were looking after just himself, at home or in isolation, or were bathing naked in a little

stream.' His final words put prelates of a religious order of evangelical status in their place. Their position is not comparable to that of the apostles. They must be an example to those under them; no dispensation which contradicts their profession is permitted; that would destroy them.

With verses 36–7, which pick out Joseph, renamed Barnabas, as an example of an honest and humble donor among the faithful, there is a certain relaxation of tension. Olivi returns to the stuff of standard, scholastic commentary, picking out for measured discussion whether Barnabas was one of the seventy-two disciples, and how it was that, though a Levite, he was able to own property. He has by no means, however, lost the scent of his main argument. He chides Bede for even considering the possibility that Barnabas became a disciple of Christ without renouncing his property, and decides that he was renamed in recognition of his perfection. In any case, with the story of Ananias and Sapphira that follows, the themes of apostolic power and the stern requirements of evangelical poverty are again the focus of attention.

Olivi on Acts 5:1–12

In Olivi's hands the story of Ananias and Sapphira confirms the authority of Peter and gives fresh insight into its nature. Peter and the apostles are the inspirited leaders of the new Israel, holding prophetic authority in succession to Jesus. In addition, in the course of putting forward his own interpretation of the story, Olivi will take the opportunity to issue a dire warning to those who profess evangelical poverty, that they should avoid hypocrisy and corruption—or change their ways, if they are already sunk in such iniquities.

There were several things that Peter was not. He was not a mere administrator and dispenser of funds (as already shown). Nor was Peter a secular judge—but rather pontifex et sacerdos—and therefore he did not usurp the responsibilities of a civilian court, as has been alleged. He did not pronounce sentence. God, not Peter, put the couple to death. Peter's role was to 'promulgate a sentence of divine judgement which was hanging over them', having received intelligence of their crime through a 'prophetic revelation' of the Holy Spirit. His power was spiritual, not temporal.

The passage has understandably troubled commentators. Why did God impose such a harsh punishment? At Qumran, where the handing over of property was obligatory: 'If there be found among them any who lies about property and does this knowingly, he shall be excluded from the pure meal of the Many for a year and shall be fined a quarter of his food'. Before addressing this problem, Olivi raises the question—a fair one, as he admits—of the differential treatment of Ananias and Sapphira at the hands of Peter. She was only an accomplice. Later, in the section marked allegory with which Olivi ends the piece, we are told that Ananias is to be understood as 'a prelate in the rule', with Sapphira as a subordinate, standing for 'the rank-and-file followers of the rule'. Ananias is 'the inventor' and 'the prime cause' of the stain that affected 'the religion and the community'. Yet it was Sapphira who had to face the straight question whether the money at Peter's feet was in fact the proceeds of the sale. Peter through his questioning was giving her the chance to make amends and confess the truth. At the same time, of course, he was giving her the opportunity to 'compound her wickedness', which in fact she did. In this way she earned a fate equal to that of her husband.

But, again, why so severe a sentence? Luke's version is that Ananias and Sapphira had lied to the Holy Spirit and allowed their hearts to be taken over by Satan. There are clear points of contact between this story and the apostasy of Judas, including Satan's agency, money, land, and death—land because Judas in Luke's version receives the blood money and invests it in a plot of land. Luke probably made the connection—Olivi also. His discussion of Acts 1:18 is full, and revolves around the money and the land.

Olivi offers three reasons for their punishment. It was important that the company fear God through the agency of Peter and respect Peter's virtue and power. As Peter and his co-apostles did not have worldly power, they had to be seen to excel in spiritual power and through miracles; and this was fitting. Then, the punishment had to be harsh in order to serve as a deterrent and an example, and because the crimes in question were unprecedented. Finally, the crime in question was particularly monstrous, disgraceful, and pestiferous because it was destructive of the status of evangelical poverty (and simplicity and truth) and corrosive of the religion itself. Olivi, for the first time in the whole discussion, slips into emotive rhetoric. Some fantasizing over the names of the evil duo leads into an elaborate metaphor of a three-stage contamination of the wheat crop by Satan-sowed tares, mirroring the spiritual disintegration of Sapphira (in Olivi's imagination) during the three hours that passed between her husband's death (unknown to her) and her own.

Conclusion

Olivi devoted around five hundred lines—twenty pages in the modern edition—to eleven verses of scripture (plus the additional twelve verses given to the appendage which is the story of Ananias and Sapphira). The argument is meaty, concentrated, and controlled. For a holder of strong and passionately held convictions, whose life was dogged by controversy, Olivi shows considerable self-restraint. Feelings ran high in the Franciscan Poverty Dispute, and a great deal was at stake (the image is not inappropriate). Here, however, Olivi stages no hand-to-hand combat, as with Thomas Aquinas in Lectura supra Matthaeum. He permits himself little more than barbed comments and ironical asides at the expense, typically, of property-owning monastic institutions and prominent Franciscans who lived luxuriously while professing perfection. He resists the temptation to reply to his own critics. Thus he lets pass several opportunities to defend usus pauper, a doctrine close to his heart. There is a riposte to criticisms of usus pauper, but it comes later, as a gratuitous addition, in a comment on the attacks on Paul's attitude to Jewish ritual (Acts 21). He writes:

> In a way similar to Paul's detractors, there are people who, without reason, say that they consign Franciscan life to ruin who claim that Franciscans are constrained to poor and moderate use by the profession of Francis' rule. In no way does it follow that this ruins Franciscan life; rather it saves it. Moreover the detractors lie by adding that the defenders of usus pauper say that Franciscan life is always held to extreme necessity and need. The falsification lies in taking extreme materially, whereas it should be taken morally, tempered by the rational latitude of virtue, or with reason's tolerant moderation. In this way, then and now, malicious opponents use lies to twist the truth and malign the truthful in the eyes of common people and make them hateful to everyone.

The language bears witness to the ongoing, bruising conflict in which Olivi was embroiled. It would have been out of place in the earlier discussion, which is characterized by relatively sober and controlled argument.

What is to be made of Olivi as an interpreter of the biblical text? Comparison with commentators writing after the introduction of biblical criticism would be anachronistic and of limited usefulness. Olivi views Acts through the lens of the vita apostolica. His 'take' on the latter was radical—the profession of 'evangelical poverty', that is to say, absolute poverty was required of the apostles in their mission to the poor—but nonetheless well grounded in the sayings of Jesus as recorded in the gospels. As U. Luz has written in his commentary on Matthew's Gospel:

> In the various versions the sayings give us a glimpse into the history of early Christian itinerant radicalism and show how it developed in the first century and adapted to changing circumstances. However, early Christian itinerant radicalism is understandable only as a continuation of the disciples' itinerant life with Jesus. For precisely this reason we may be

> relatively optimistic about the authenticity of most of the logia. Jesus is the initiator of a movement of itinerant charismatics.

Olivi faced an uphill task in making the ecclesia primitiva conform to the vita apostolica. He works hard to convince us that the evangelical poverty of Peter and the apostles retained its pristine purity as they evolved into leaders of a sizeable community. As for their followers, Olivi cannot bring himself to confront the possibility (or probability) that renunciation and poverty were voluntary and not obligatory. Still, one may acknowledge that the imparting of a Franciscan flavour to Acts created problems for the author, without finding his reading short of value as biblical exegesis. There is a lot to be said for a commentator who, while committed to a particular viewpoint, presents his case by means of intelligent, elaborate, and wide-ranging argument, along the way acknowledging, even seeking out, alternative interpretations and showing a readiness to make concessions. To opt for a degree of flexibility in reading scripture was a sensible move, and one consistent with the position he had taken up in his introduction to the Bible. The comparison of scripture with the painting of a king takes its point from the difficulty of penetrating through the distracting externals (the written word, the royal robes, and throne) to the invisible substance within (the 'jubilus caritatis' that lies at the heart of scripture, the soul and virtues of the king). Even an exegete who felt that he possessed the key to the truth of scripture would be wise to be humble in the face of the wide gap between the mystery of the incarnation and the recording of it by men. In Olivi's words:

> When Christ came into the world to save the human race, he delivered to men, by his actions and words, his life and his teaching, many things to believe which seem to be utterly beyond human understanding.

Imagining Jerusalem in the Medieval West

by Lucy Donkin and Hanna Vorholt [Proceedings of the British Academy, British Academy, 9780197265048]

Jerusalem was the object of intense study and devotion throughout the Middle Ages. This collection of essays illuminates ways in which the city was represented by Christians in Western Europe, c. 700-1500. Focusing on maps in manuscripts and early printed books, it also considers views and architectural replicas, and treats depictions of the Temple and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre alongside those of Jerusalem as a whole. Authors draw on new research and a range of disciplinary perspectives to show how such depictions responded to developments in the West, as well as to the shifting political circumstances of Jerusalem and its wider region.

One central theme is the relationship between text, image, and manuscript context, including discussion of images as scriptural exegesis and the place of schematic diagrams and plans in the presentation of knowledge. Another is the impact of trends in learning, such as the reception of Jewish
scholarship, the move from monastic to university education, and the creation of yet wider audiences through mendicant preaching and the development of printing. The volume also examines the role of changing liturgical and devotional practices, including imagined pilgrimage and the mapping of
Jerusalem onto European cities and local landscapes. Finally, it seeks to elucidate how two- and three-dimensional representations of the city both resulted from and prompted processes of mental visualisation. In this way, the volume is conceived as a contribution to manuscript studies, the history of cartography, visual studies, and the history of ideas.

> Contents

This collection of essays considers Jerusalem as it was imagined during the Middle Ages by Christians in Western Europe. While acknowledging the importance of the medieval city as an actual destination for Western pilgrims, traders, and crusaders, the volume focuses on the perspective of those outside the Holy Land, ranging from a Venetian merchant on the opposite side of the Mediterranean to the abbot of Iona on the shores of the Atlantic. The city was valued by Christians both as a witness to the events of the Bible, culminating in Christ's Passion and Resurrection, and as the prefiguration of the heavenly Jerusalem to come. The central importance of Jerusalem for the history of salvation made it the object of intense study and devotion throughout the Middle Ages. As the present volume seeks to highlight, such activities involved a process of imagination, not as a means of envisaging entirely new creations but rather as a way of gaining a closer understanding of distant realities. The chapters concentrate on one aspect of this process, exploring the role of visual representations of Jerusalem, with particular reference to maps and plans. This emphasis reflects the rising interest in cartographical material amongst scholars working in a number of disciplines. The authors of the chapters come from the fields of art history, theology, and literary studies, as well as from the history of cartography, and thus bring a range of perspectives to bear on depictions of Jerusalem and its buildings from the seventh to the sixteenth centuries.

The chapters are arranged thematically. The first four concentrate on plans of individual structures; the next three discuss maps of the city as a whole; and the final two explore views and monumental replicas of Jerusalem and its buildings. The volume starts with Thomas O'Loughlin's discussion of the plans included in the treatise De locis sanctis by Adomnán, abbot of Iona. Adomnán presented his work as drawing on the testimony of a certain Arculf, who had visited the Holy Land in person. Casting doubt on Arculf's role, O'Loughlin argues that the plans should be seen more as a response to the needs and assumptions of the seventh-century monastic community of Iona, which knew of the buildings and topography of Jerusalem primarily through textual descriptions in the Bible and later commentaries and accounts, sometimes partial or conflicting. Noting that plans are provided for only four of the buildings described, O'Loughlin focuses on two examples: the Church of the Holy (p.2) Sepulchre and its surroundings, and the church on Mount Sion. In the case of the former, the presence of altars in the cusped openings in the wall of the Anastasis Rotunda, implying provision

for the concurrent celebration of Mass, is seen as an extrapolation on the part of Adomnán and linked to liturgical practice on Iona itself, while the treatment of the tomb and of the structures to the east of the Rotunda is understood to clarify ambiguities in the textual sources. The plan of the church on Mount Sion is shown to present information not included in the text of the De locis sanctis, with the written account giving priority to the identification of the site as that of Stephen's stoning outside the city walls, while the plan marks several events known to have taken place inside the walls. In this way, O'Loughlin suggests, the plan functioned to retain and harmonize contradictory indications in Adomnán's sources.

Of all the buildings in and around the city, the Temple was the structure most widely mapped during the Middle Ages. It posed a particular challenge to the imagination, not just because the historical Temples of Solomon and Herod had been destroyed, but also because the Book of Ezekiel describes in some detail the prophet's vision of a future Temple, providing dimensions difficult to reconcile with an actual building. In the early Middle Ages allegorical interpretations predominated, but from the twelfth century onwards greater attention was given to the literal sense of the biblical text, and it is in this context that the earliest surviving plans from the Christian tradition are found. In her chapter, Catherine Delano-Smith discusses the plans that accompany commentaries on Ezekiel's vision, characterizing them as instances of graphic explanation. She concentrates first on one particular Temple plan, which she shows can be ascribed to Richard of St Victor. Extant in only a few manuscripts of his *In visionem Ezechielis,* but adapted in two thirteenth-century Bibles, it appears to have been created by Richard to address a practical point regarding the cleanliness of the Temple kitchens. Where the biblical text describes a single river flowing out from the Temple, Richard envisages—and most versions of the plan show—the river branching out within the Temple complex to flow through the kitchens. Delano-Smith suggests that the rarity of the plan may be due, at least in part, to concern over the prosaic nature of Richard's proposal, noting that the idea of the branched river was explicitly denied by Nicholas of Lyra in the fourteenth century. The chapter then turns to other maps relating to Ezekiel's vision: Richard's plan of the division of Canaan between the tribes of Israel, which he adapted from that by the eleventh-century Jewish commentator Rashi; and the plan of the city as described by Ezekiel included by (p.3) Nicholas of Lyra in his Postilla litteraliset moralis super totam bibliam. Delano-Smith traces how Nicholas's plans became more pictorial in manuscripts and printed editions of the Postilla and the Bible itself from the late fourteenth century onwards, suggesting that this responded in part to a broadening readership.

Nicholas of Lyra is himself the focus of the following chapter by Lesley Smith, who examines the drawings and plans in his P*ostilla litteralis*, concentrating particularly on those of the Temple. Nicholas was a Franciscan friar working in Paris, and, like the Victorines before him, he was concerned to elucidate the literal meaning of the Bible, developing the idea of the duplex *sensus litteralis* or 'double literal sense'. Smith presents the images as an integral part of this exegetical approach, which offered proof that even the most challenging of biblical passages could be understood literally. While Nicholas anticipated that readers would need to employ their imagination to compensate for the translation of a three-dimensional object into a two-dimensional representation, the aim of this process was to achieve as close a mental likeness of the original as possible. Noting that images are primarily provided for places where God had promised to be present, Smith observes that representations of the Tabernacle and Temple were relatively uncommon in Christian scholarship before Nicholas, with notable exceptions including the work of Richard of St Victor. Although Nicholas may have drawn on some of Richard's plans, Smith argues that correspondences are more likely to be the result of a shared receptiveness to Jewish exegetical traditions, and especially the work of Rashi. Where authorities disagreed, Nicholas provided visual renderings of the different

possible interpretations. Most of the paired images represent the views of Jewish and Christian scholars respectively, with Nicholas generally preferring the former. Nevertheless, Smith suggests, in showing that Christians too could understand the word of God in every detail, Nicholas's purpose was closely linked to the wider Franciscan mission of conversion.

Understood as exegesis in their own right, Nicholas's drawings could have an independent existence. Mary Carruthers examines an early fifteenth-century manuscript in the Bodleian Library, Oxford (MS Laud Misc. 156), which contains drawings and diagrams from the Postilla, but not the text. These are accompanied by other material: a subject index to the work composed by another Franciscan, and a list of tituli quaestionum deriving from the Postilla, as well as 'the hands of meditation' and the set of diagrams known as the Speculum theologiae, probably also Franciscan in origin. Carruthers discusses the compilation of the volume, and argues that the material contained in it served educated clerics as a resource for both their scholarly activities and their pastoral duties, such as the composition of sermons. In particular, she suggests that the images from the Postilla could aid the visualization and understanding of complex scriptural ekphrases. Plans and elevations could be combined in the mind's eye, assisting scholars to walk in their imagination through the spaces of the Temple—a meditative exercise derived ultimately from Jewish practice. Carruthers notes the increased use of diagrams and plans more generally from the twelfth century onwards, proposing that forms created in a monastic context, within the sphere of mental envisioning, were set down on parchment to enable texts to be studied and taught by a wider and more diverse clerical audience.

Running alongside this interest in specific buildings was a tradition of mapping Jerusalem as a whole. Andrea Worm examines the plan of the city that forms part of the Compendium historiae in genealogia Christi of Peter of Poitiers—active in Paris in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century—and of other chronicles that depend on this work. The Compendium provides an overview of history in diagrammatic form, and includes several schematic drawings. One of these is a circular plan of Jerusalem, with three concentric living areas and six gates, which is positioned in the context of the rebuilding of the city after the Babylonian exile. Worm demonstrates that the structure and legends of the map derive primarily from the Historia scholastica of Peter Comestor, which Peter of Poitiers had extended. The division of the city is understood to reflect an interest in a divinely established social order, which is also expressed in another diagram in the Compendium: the disposition of the tribes of Israel around the Tabernacle. Worm suggests that the reader was invited to draw comparisons between the two, on the basis of analogies of number and form, as evidence of a divine plan of salvation. She proposes a similar dynamic between these circular diagrams and a third showing Christ and the Apostles, included in a fourteenth-century copy of the Compendium. Worm also discusses the adaptation of Peter of Poitiers' diagrammatic approach in the Fasciculus temporum, a late fifteenth-century universal chronicle by the Carthusian monk Werner Rolevinck, which includes Peter's plan of Jerusalem as well as a diagram of the Creed in the form of the heavenly Jerusalem.

Hanna Vorholt explores the relationship between plans of Jerusalem in two manuscripts of the first half of the thirteenth century now at the Royal Library of Belgium (MS IV 462), and the British Library in London (Harley MS 658). She suggests that these plans testify to the existence of a family of maps distinct from those in the Compendium historiae in genealogia Christi of Peter of Poitiers and from those often known as 'Crusader maps'. The two examples show Jerusalem as a circle punctuated by four gates at the cardinal points, and connected to other sites in the Holy Land by a network of lines. One was added to a manuscript of the Historia scholastica along with a list of sites to be visited on a pilgrimage through the Holy Land, arranged in the form of an itinerary; the other is part of a manuscript which contains, amongst other items, the Compendium and a set of diagrams. The content, layout, and transmission contexts of the two maps are seen in relation to wider

developments in Western manuscript production and learning during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, such as the increased emphasis on a systematic structuring and presentation of knowledge. It is argued that the manuscripts containing the maps are indicative of how topographical information concerning the Holy Land was put to use in biblical studies, and of how scholasticism could influence the ways in which Jerusalem was represented and perceived.

While earlier traditions of representing Jerusalem still flourished and were adapted to changing circumstances in the following centuries, new ways of depicting the city continued to be developed. Evelyn Edson's chapter discusses the plan of Jerusalem in the Liber secretorum fidelium crucis by the Venetian Marino Sanudo. Written in the early fourteenth century, not long after the fall of the Latin Kingdom, the work proposed a reconquest of the Holy Land. Edson concentrates on its treatment of Jerusalem's water resources. The city had an ancient and complex system for the provision and storage of water, the strategic significance of which had been noted in texts from the Scriptures onwards. Sanudo, who had never visited Jerusalem, is shown to have drawn his information particularly from the recent description of the Holy Land by Burchard of Mount Sion. The plan of Jerusalem corresponds to Sanudo's text in devoting particular attention to sources of water. Although reflecting some confusion over their identity and location, it renders the topography of Jerusalem as a whole with considerable fidelity. At the same time, Edson points out, it does not depict the contemporary city but shows monuments as they were before its loss to the Muslims. Other levels of meaning are shown to be incorporated in the map, linking it closely to earlier cartographical traditions. Thus, the inclusion of temples to alien gods set up by Solomon may allude to the sins of the crusaders, seen by Sanudo as causing the downfall of the Latin Kingdom, while the marking of sites associated with the life of Christ referred to Jerusalem's spiritual significance.

The final two chapters discuss the representation of Jerusalem in the context of the devotional currents of the later Middle Ages, in which the imaginative process played a role in affective piety. Kathryn Rudy examines a late fifteenth-century manuscript intended as an aid to virtual pilgrimage (Oxford, Queen's College, MS 357). It contains a range of texts relating to the Holy Land, including guides in Latin and English and prayers to be said at particular locations, and is richly illuminated. Rudy explores the relationship between text and image, and argues for a close collaboration between artist and scribe. The six full-page miniatures included in the manuscript are seen to evoke the experience of travel. In a technique shared with contemporary Netherlandish landscape painting, different coloured bands are used to situate Jerusalem variously on the horizon and in the middle distance. The manuscript also contains unusual conjunctions of interior and exterior space, with the Holy Sepulchre aedicule depicted in isolation in a landscape setting, while the miniature of the Nativity presents the scene in an ecclesiastical setting alluding to the medieval Church of the Nativity, with a grisaille silhouette of Bethlehem on a painted arch that resembles a stage set. However, although the manuscript's texts are arranged in roughly topographical order, the images combine a topographical with a chronological logic. The penultimate scene of the Ascension has no cityscape, but alludes, Rudy suggests, to the heavenly Jerusalem, which is then realized in the final image, a historiated initial showing Christ in Majesty. Presenting the contents of the manuscript as bracketed by the depictions of the Annunciation and of Christ in Majesty, she proposes that it offers a 'scale model' of salvation history.

In the final chapter of the volume, Bianca Kühnel approaches the themes of landscape and devotion from another perspective, looking at Western European re-creations of Jerusalem. Arguing for the need both to look beyond surviving buildings and to treat the creation of Jerusalem complexes or 'Holy Landscapes' as an overarching phenomenon, she outlines their development over time. While earlier versions concentrated on the sites of Christ's death and Resurrection, later additions and newly created complexes from the twelfth century on made reference to a larger number of sites.

Complexes could be incorporated within cities or be situated outside the walls, and might map the topography of Jerusalem and its surroundings onto the wider local landscape. This process involved the conflation of existing features such as hills, rivers, and valleys with those in the Holy Land, as well as the creation of artificial mounds, architectural entities, and sculptural groups which represent biblical events. The latter, initially linear in approach, increasingly display more three-dimensional (p.7) arrangements with painted backdrops, drawing the viewer into the scene. While Jerusalem complexes might expand their references beyond the city, they could also grow up around existing sites of local significance. A crucial reason behind these developments, Kühnel suggests, is the growing lay participation in devotional practices in which people imagined themselves witnessing biblical events. Jerusalem complexes, realized in familiar settings, aided the process of internalizing and identifying with these events, here conceived as the remembrance of transcendental realities.

A number of themes run through the volume as a whole; by way of opening up further discussion, we would like to highlight three. Shedding light on plans, views, and architectural replicas produced and disseminated in the Latin West between the seventh and the sixteenth centuries, the chapters emphasize that these artefacts responded as much to developments within Western society, as to the changing nature and accessibility of Jerusalem itself. Several authors highlight the increase in their production from the twelfth century onwards, with particular attention paid to the influence of the scholastic milieu of northern France and England. The rise in schematic maps and plans of Jerusalem and its buildings in this period is ascribed to intellectual and cultural trends such as the increasing importance placed on understanding the literal sense of the Scriptures, itself informed by openness to Jewish exegetical traditions; a growing tendency to organize and display knowledge systematically; and the widening need for study tools brought about by the development of the mendicant orders and the universities. At the same time, the volume also considers ways in which local concerns had affected works produced in a monastic setting, relating the provision of plans in Adomnán's De locis sanctis to the liturgical practices, library resources, and scholarly agendas of seventh-century Iona. Chapters focusing on the later Middle Ages address the impact of further societal and religious changes on representations of Jerusalem, encompassing lay responses to the city. Some are related to political and religious aspirations for reconquest, formed in a mercantile milieu familiar with the Latin East and with new cartographical techniques; others are linked to devotional currents, which fostered an increased desire to witness biblical events and encouraged the practice of mental pilgrimage. These shifts are seen to have manifested themselves not only in the creation of new images and architectural replicas of Jerusalem and its buildings, but also in the ways in which earlier representations continued to be used, adapted, expanded, or reinterpreted over time. A number of chapters examine such processes of transmission, focusing less on a relationship between 'copy' and 'original', and more on the ways in which Western images of Jerusalem are handed down, and on how these re-creations relate to the changing contexts of their reception and use. Consideration is given to the way further images could be added to a single work as it was copied, as in the case of later manuscripts of Peter of Poitiers' Compendium and chronicles based on this work, and to the fact that an image could become divorced from its original transmission context and employed in a new one, such as the adaptation of Rashi's plan of the division of Canaan by Richard of St Victor.

A second major theme of the volume is the way in which images relate to their specific contexts. In asking what qualities of a text—or the place described in it—led to the provision of visual material, a number of authors stress that the purpose of the image is not one of straightforward illustration. In the case of works of scriptural exegesis, focusing on the meaning of the biblical text, the image is seen to function as commentary or visual exegesis in its own right, illuminating ekphrastic passages of particular complexity or ambiguity, and enabling descriptions of places, buildings, or objects to be visualized and understood correctly. Within works of a more historical or topographical nature, schematic plans—like diagrams more generally—are shown to synthesize a large body of material

and bring together information from various sources. Noting that only a minority of passages describing places or buildings gave rise to images or plans, several authors explore how these functioned especially to highlight or resolve contradictions. Thus two plans could serve to clarify different possible interpretations of a biblical passage, while a single plan could provide information at variance with that contained in the associated text, masking where factual sources conflicted with each other or with the ultimate authority of the Bible. However closely integrated with their immediate contexts, plans, views, and replicas of Jerusalem could also relate to other material in the same work, or to other buildings in the landscape, and might thus form part of a sequence with a separate dynamic. In this way, for example, largely topographically arranged pilgrimage guides could be accompanied by images that set out the progression of salvific history.

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Plan of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and its surroundings in a manuscript containing Gregory the Great's Homiliae in evangelia. England, late twelfth century. Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Laud Misc. 241, fol. 85r.

The plan of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and its surroundings on folio 85r of Laud Misc. 241 (Colour Plate 1) is notable for its transmission context and date, and for specific elements of the design.1 It ultimately derives from one of the four plans that Adomnán had included in his work De locis sanctis in the late seventh century, citing a certain Bishop Arculf as his primary source: 'This drawing appended indicates the shape of the round church mentioned above, with the round domed structure placed in the centre of it, in the northern portion of which is the Lord's sepulchre. It exhibits also plans of three other churches…We have drawn these plans of the four churches after the model which (as already stated) the holy Arculf sketched for me on a wax surface.'2 In Laud Misc. 241, the plan is not part of Adomnán's De locis sanctis or the shorter and closely related De locis sanctis of the Venerable Bede, as is usually the case. The only reference to the original context of the drawing is the inscription above the plan—'Hec est forma templi Sancti Sepulcri sicut sanctus Arculfus episcopus depinxit' ('This is the shape of the Holy Sepulchre, according to the drawing of the holy Bishop Arculf'). Instead, it is part of a manuscript containing Gregory the Great's Homiliae in evangelia. The text was copied in the mid-twelfth century, and now ends abruptly on folio 84v, in the middle of Homily 31. The plan and three shorter texts were written and executed in the late twelfth century on what are now folios 85r–86v. It is not entirely clear how many leaves are lost after folio 84, nor whether folios 85–86 were part of the manuscript from the start or added later, but the resulting combination between the Homiliae in evangelia and the plan of the Holy Sepulchre and its surroundings is a potent one. The dating of the plan to the late twelfth century makes it one of the latest surviving medieval copies of a plan from the De locis sanctis, and it is unusual also with regard to certain aspects of its design. The place of the Crucifixion is recorded in the plan (as in other versions) as 'the Church of Golgotha' (Golgatana ecclesia) and marked by a small cross (here labelled crux christi); in addition, Mount Calvary (Calvarie locus) is represented at the top left in elevation, surmounted by 'the Cross of the Lord' (Crux domini), and the two other crosses (alie cruces). This results in an unusual double representation of the place of the Crucifixion, and of the structure that was built to commemorate it. The combined use of elevation and ground-plan for buildings and landscape features, which characterizes the plan as a whole, distinguishes it from most of the other surviving versions.



Plans of Babylon and Jerusalem in the Compendium historiae in genealogia Christi of Peter of Poitiers. Northern Italy, c.1300. Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Lyell 71, fol. 24v.

Plan of Ezekiel's Temple showing the whole of the Temple complex. The plan was drawn on an end folio of a Bible as an expanded version of Richard of St Victor's (see Fig. 2.1). ?Paris. 1230–40. East is at the top. Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Brasenose College 5, fol. 443r.



Plan of the Temple. Nicholas of Lyra, Postilla on Ezekiel 47. Paris, c.1500. Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Canon. Bibl. Lat. 70, fol. 165v.



Map of Jerusalem and the Holy Land. England, first half of the thirteenth century. London, British Library, Harley MS 658, fol. 39v.

Sacro Monte di Varallo, Deposition from the Cross (detail). Photo: Pnina Arad.

Finally, the volume emphasizes the role of the imagination in both creating and responding to images of Jerusalem. A number of contributors discuss ways in which viewers negotiated the relationship between the three-dimensional cityscape and the two-dimensional page, with several presenting the primary act of imagination as the creation of a mental image from a text. This internal visualization of Jerusalem is considered in terms of mental and religious discipline, from the arts of memory as a tool for composition, to devotional practices that encouraged people to imagine themselves as participants in biblical events. Such visualization was not only aimed at imagining presence in a particular place, but also motion through it, whether walking through the Temple to meditate on God's law or following the footsteps of Christ in empathy with his Passion. Visual material is

understood to have acted as an aid to this fundamental activity in various ways. In so far as they represented architectural structures and topographical features, ground plans demanded an act of mental construction from the viewer. While in the earliest versions the superstructure of buildings is left entirely to the imagination, sometimes aided by the provision of separate elevations, later reworkings of the plans might incorporate buildings in elevation and bird's-eye view. Views of Jerusalem and its buildings, on the other hand, are shown to have evoked receding space, inviting the viewer to envisage stepping into the scene, which could be presented almost as a stage set. A sense of progression through the landscape could be evoked both within individual scenes and through turning the pages of the volume, itself a three-dimensional entity. Boundaries between genres were not distinct, so a plan showing disconnected places around a schematic central view of Jerusalem could have been an object of contemplation in the same way as a devotional image such as the Arma Christi. Boundaries between media were also fluid. The creation of Jerusalem complexes in the West can be seen as a further and more comprehensive aid to the imaginative process, involving the re-creation of architectural entities as well as of their disposition in a landscape, and allowing the staging of actual processions. At the same time, they also employed shared viewing strategies. While plans, elevations, and views could facilitate an impression of architectural space, sculptural groups displayed against a wall and seen from a fixed viewpoint might reproduce a scene already familiar from illuminated manuscripts, thus bringing to mind memories of previous imaginings. By focusing in this way on maps, views, and replicas of Jerusalem in the medieval West, the volume seeks to illuminate how Christian representations of the city arose in particular historical and geographical circumstances, and changed over the course of the Middle Ages.

Exhibition

The display at the Bodleian Library in Oxford, which accompanied the conference, consisted of four manuscripts and one printed book from the Library's collection: MS Pococke 295—a twelfth-century manuscript of Maimonides' Commentary on the Mishnah with a plan of the Temple on folio 295r; MS Laud Misc. 241—a twelfth-century manuscript which includes a plan of the Holy Sepulchre complex deriving from Adomnán's De locis sanctis on folio 85r; MS Lyell 71—a manuscript of c.1300 containing Peter of Poitiers' Compendium historiae in genealogia Christi, with plans of Babylon and Jerusalem on folio 24v; MS Tanner 190—an early fourteenth-century copy of Marino Sanudo's Liber Secretorum fidelium crucis, with plans of Jerusalem and Acre on folios 206v–207r; and Douce 223—a copy of the 1486 edition of Bernhard von Breydenbach's Peregrinatio in terram sanctam, with a fold-out view of Jerusalem and the Holy Land. The present volume contains reproductions of the plans of Jerusalem from all four manuscripts: those in Pococke 295 and Tanner 190 are included in the chapters by Lesley Smith and Evelyn Edson; those in Laud Misc. 241 and Lyell 71 have been published previously, but, as we believe them to be less well known, are reproduced here, together with some initial observations.

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MS Lyell 71, written and decorated in northern Italy c.1300, contains several works by Hugh of Fouilloy, as well as the Compendium historiae in genealogia Christi by Peter of Poitiers.6 The plan of Jerusalem, which Peter of Poitiers devised for his diagrammatical chronicle, is found on folio 24v in its usual position, in the period after the Babylonian captivity, when the Jews reconstructed the Temple and rebuilt the walls of the city, as described in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah (Colour Plate 2).7 While the circular shape, the six gates, and the indication of three living quarters are among the characteristic features of Peter's plan, the depiction of the 'Temple of the Lord' (templum domini), marking the area of the king and the priests, is uncommon. It is contrasted here with the Tower of Babel represented in a quadrangular plan of the city of Babylon, which is placed immediately above the plan of Jerusalem in this manuscript, but is not one of the drawings that Peter

originally included in his work. The inscriptions identifying the tower and the city are derived from Jerome's Commentary on Isaiah. Inside the city they read 'templa marmorea' and 'plathee auro lapidibusque fulgentes' ('marble temples' and 'the streets are sparkling with gold and gemstones'); outside the city 'Jeronimus refert babilonem fuisse potentissimam, et in campestribus sitam per quadrum ab [angulo usque ad] angulum muri sedecim milia passuum tenuisse. Ars [correctly: Arx] autem, id est, capitolium urbis est turris edificata post diluvium que in altitudine .iii. [correctly: .iiii.] milia passuum dicitur terere [correctly: tenere]' ('According to Jerome, Babylon was a most mighty city; and, in a square shape in the plains, it comprised 16,000 paces from [corner to] (p.13) corner of the wall. The castle, however, that is the capitol of the city, is the tower built after the Deluge, which was said to comprise 3,000 [correctly: 4,000] paces in height'). The treatment of the two cities on folio 24v of Lyell 71 invites a range of interpretations. Considering that Peter's chronicle runs vertically down the pages, Babylon 'precedes' Jerusalem both on the page and in time. In this way, the plan of Babylon articulates the return from the Babylonian exile and the rebuilding of Jerusalem. At the same time, the combination of the two plans presents the beholder with the opportunity to draw more fundamental comparisons between the two cities, and, in this way, engages with a prominent and complex topos in the Scriptures and in later writings. The theme is mentioned, for example, in Hugh of Fouilloy's De avibus, which is found in Lyell 71 on folios 3r–15v. Hugh writes 'The foreign land is Babylon, our land Jerusalem. Babylon is interpreted as confusion, Jerusalem as the vision of peace. Strangers consume our land when demons ravage the mind by their temptations. We are held captive in Babylon, in Jerusalem we are free.'

Aquinas, Bonaventure, and the Scholastic Culture of Medieval Paris: Preaching, Prologues, and Biblical Commentary by Randall B. Smith, [Cambridge University Press, 9781108841153]

This volume provides a revisionist account of the scholastic culture that flourished in Paris during the High Middle Ages. Exploring the educational culture that informed the intellectual and mental habits of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, he offers an in-depth study of the prologues and preaching skills of these two masters. Smith reveal the intricate interrelationships between the three duties of the master: lectio (reading), disputatio (debate), and praedicatio (preaching). He also analyzes each of Aquinas and Bonaventure's prologues from their student days to their final works, revealing both their artistry and their instructional character. Written in an engaging style, this book serves as an invaluable resource that will enable scholars and students to read thirteenth-century sermons, prologues, and biblical commentaries with greater understanding and ease.

- Reveals the 'protreptic' character of thirteenth century prologues, both in terms of the artistry of its style and its theological significance
- Provides the reader with the knowledge and resources to read medieval sermons through an in-depth analysis of the development in the skill of preaching of Aquinas and Bonaventure
- Provides the reader with the knowledge and resources to read Bonaventure's notoriously difficult Collations with greater ease and understanding

Reviews

This impressive and captivating study changes our view of medieval scholastic culture in Paris. The preparation of students for the art of preaching is much more important than usually thought of, as it influences the method of the two other magisterial tasks of reading (Scripture) and (per implication) debating.' Henk Schoot, Thomas Institute of Utrecht, Tilburg University

'Professor Smith's work reflects his longtime friendships with the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and the spiritual master Michael Sherwin. With marvelous erudition and characteristically winsome prose, Smith leads the reader into the vibrant world of medieval preaching and prologues - and thus into a range of debates about pedagogy, the nature of Scripture, spirituality and theology, social practices, mystical delight, the liberal arts, and philosophical wisdom. In his hands, Aquinas and Bonaventure come alive.' — Matthew Levering, James N. and Mary D. Perry Jr. Chair of Theology, Mundelein Seminary

'Students and scholars interested in the principia of medieval masters of theology have been forced to hunt for obscure articles and dissertations. Randall Smith has done a wonderful service in placing much information and analysis in one place. But Smith's work goes beyond gathering resources. He capitalizes on the richness of the texts he examines and provides something of a fresh entry point into the world of medieval theology itself, through two of its greatest figures. Hopefully this engaging study will inspire further work on this most important genre.' — Joshua Benson, Catholic University of America

This remarkable volume provides an in-depth comparative analysis of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. On the one hand, the analysis illustrates that the sermo modernus style and principia genre are indispensable in interpreting the individual writings of both medieval masters. On the other hand, their comparison reveals how their systems and instructional intent differs. The careful research and inviting prose makes this book an invaluable resource for all who study the scholastic culture of medieval Paris. — Jay M. Hammond, Saint Louis University

'Smith escorts us into that medieval invention, the university, where we meet Aquinas, 'logician', and Bonaventure, 'poet'. Their sermo modenus style of preaching organized their inception discourses as masters of theology and prologues to their commentaries on scripture. Aquinas is no longer mere theologian, nor pure philosopher, but the premier Christian philosopher-theologian; and Bonaventure the most sophisticated Christian writer after Augustine. So much for the 'dark ages'.' — R. E. Houser, 2019 recipient of the Aquinas Medal for eminence in philosophy, American Catholic Philosophical Association

Contents

A Culture of Preaching and Prologues

There are two approaches to intellectual history. The first sets out to provide a synthetic treatment of a host of writers over an extended period of time. The second consists in selecting a few representative or especially fertile thinkers to probe their work more deeply and at greater length. For the purposes of this book, I have chosen the second approach. I will provide an in-depth study of the work of two of the most preeminent medieval masters of the thirteenth century: Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure.

The work of these two men is especially useful, not only because they remain among the best known thinkers of the period, but also because they incepted as masters at roughly the same time. Approaching the two masters in this way would be akin in modern academic culture to comparing the development of two prominent philosophers who graduated from the same institution in the same year, both of whom worked with the same dissertation director, but who went on to have very different careers and distinctively different work.

I will argue, based on an analysis of the work of these two masters, both of whom, although they became preeminent, had a very standard training at Paris, that there was a great deal of continuity among the three skills of the medieval master: lectio, disputatio, and praedicatio — more, perhaps, than has been previously recognized. The three elements we find in the master's inception addresses — a series of disputed questions, a protreptic exhortation to the study of Scripture, and a divisio textus of the entire Bible — are expressions of all three duties. But the relationship between the three runs even deeper.

Although medieval preachers were warned that "preaching" was not the place for "disputation" — a warning that suggests this may have been a common temptation — both practices manifested a similar mindset, one characterized by division of a topic into its constituent parts. Each of those parts was then developed in its own right but always with an eye to how the parts fit together into a coherent whole. This approach also characterized medieval biblical commentaries, which were usually scribal transcriptions of the lectiones that masters delivered at the University. As I will show, the composition of these biblical commentaries was highly influenced by the contemporary methods employed in sermo modernus—style preaching, both in terms of their style and their purpose, That is to say, they were written in a style reminiscent of medieval sermo modernus—style preaching, and they were written with an eye to training prospective preachers with material especially useful for sermo modernus-style preaching. It is for this reason that I have described the academic culture of the University of Paris in the thirteenth century as "a culture of preaching, prologues, and biblical commentary."

It is worth noting in advance that I spend relatively little time on the arts of disputatio in the current volume, not because they are unimportant, but simply because there are plenty of good treatments of that topic available. There has been so much emphasis on disputatio, in fact, that some people associate the word "scholastic" almost solely with texts written in the style of the "disputed question." An unsuspecting student looking up "scholastic method" on the web would before long likely find a comment similar to this one on encydopedia.com: "From its earliest, obscure beginnings there were two essential features of scholastic method: exposition (lectio) and disputation (disputatio). Disputation was undoubtedly the more original and characteristic feature..." Notice that praedicatio is missing entirely from this description.

One of the chief goals of the present work is to show that leaving out praedicatio in this way is to miss one of the primary intellectual and cultural driving forces of the thirteenth century. With this

study, I hope to broaden our current understanding of the term "scholastic." So while I have no desire to de-emphasize the undisputed importance of the "disputed question" among medieval theologians of the thirteenth century, I intent to show that the language of the "disputed question" was not the only language of the schools and that the language and patterns of sermo modernus—style preaching were also a characteristic element of the theological training at Paris.

I suggest that the medieval method of divisio and dilatatio united by a central thema was both an expression of a cultural mindset and a means of transmitting it. Bachelors were trained to craft these principia regularly, and this way of approaching a text or a topic continued to characterize their work, throughout their careers. This way of thinking about the practice of reading — structured, organized, and with an eye toward memory and recollection — would bear fruit in Thomas's and Bonaventure's later works, although in very different ways.

In my analysis, I examine primarily the prologues of these authors and examine everything else in relation to them. My contention is that this in-depth study of a good number of these prologues of various types gives us access to the mindset of medieval scholars, especially how they approached the task of reading. It provides us too with a glimpse of the literary culture that characterized the medieval universities: one that was increasingly "bookish," but still in large part oral.

Getting a good sense of the habits of mind that informed these prologues, however, requires reading a good number of them. So too, seeing the relationship between the style of these prologues and the other work of these scholastic masters is not something that will become evident from reading only one prologue, any more than becoming acquainted with a master's preaching style can be achieved by reading only one sermon. So I have chosen to focus on only two authors and examine a larger spectrum of their prologues, from their earliest novice work to the prologues they wrote as mature scholars shortly before their deaths.

The Structure of the Book

The book is divided into three major parts.

- Part I Preliminaries
- Part II Thomas Aquinas, the Logician Who Learned to Preach
- Part III Bonaventure, the Scholastic with the Soul of a Poet

A few words are in order about each.

Part I Preliminaries

In Part I, I sketch out some of the necessary historical and cultural context that will help us flesh out what I describe throughout the book as the culture of preaching, prologues, and biblical commentary at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century.

Chapter 1, "Preaching and Principia at Paris," traces the historical development of what has been called the "homiletic revolution of the thirteenth century" from its roots in the late twelfth century to its expression in the pedagogy at the University of Paris in the thirteenth.

Because most modern readers would find the preaching style employed in the thirteenth century — the so-called "modern sermon" or sermo modernus style of preaching — odd, difficult to understand, perhaps even off-putting, I review some of the basic elements of this unique style of preaching in Chapter 2.

The culmination of a young bachelor's training in preaching was his inception address. The thirteenth-century development of the distinctive literary forms used in those addresses — the principium in aula and the resumptio — is the subject of Chapter 3.

The remainder of the book is divided into two major parts. In the first, I examine the prologues of Thomas Aquinas, and in the second, I make a similar examination of the prologues of Bonaventure of Bagnoregio.

Part II Aquinas, the Logician Who Learned to Preach

Ibegin the part on each master by examining the principium in aula address the man gave at his inception and then, in a subsequent chapter, his resumptio. The reason for starting with each man's principium and resumptio is that it allows us to compare their proficiency at roughly equal points in their respective careers and to view their development, both prior to their inception and after it, in relation to that key moment.

A word is in order, however, about why I have chosen to consider Aquinas's inception addresses before Bonaventure's, given that Bonaventure likely incepted two years before Aquinas. My reasons are pedagogical rather than chronological.

An anonymous reviewer of this volume noted the remark of R.-A. Gauthier concerning Aquinas's debt to Bonaventure in Quodlibet 7.7 on the question of manual labor. Aquinas held this quodlibet in Lent of 1256, very dose to the time of his inception as master, and he basically rewrote Bonaventure's treatment of the question, channeling and simplifying Bonaventure's dense exposition. To go from Bonaventure's treatment to that of Thomas, says Gauthier, is to pass "from the luxuriance of a virgin forest to a French garden. "Would not this be the proper order to consider these two great masters?" wondered my reviewer.

It is hard to deny a reviewer who is at once so learned and so clever. And yet the quotation the reviewer cites could just as well be used to argue for the order I have proposed. It is precisely because Bonaventure's work is so much more "luxuriant," so much more complex, so much more "overgrown" than Aquinas's, that I chose to treat Aquinas first. A basic pedagogical principle, traceable back to Aristotle, holds that one should start with what is simpler and move to what is more complex. My goal is to get readers accustomed to the sermo modernus style in its simpler form in the work of Aquinas before moving on to the much more "luxuriant" expression of that style in Bonaventure's prologues.

There is also no indication in current scholarship of any influence of Bonaventure's inception on Aquinas's, even if we could say for sure that Aquinas was present at Bonaventure's inception. So although there might have been some value in placing Bonaventure's inception addresses first to indicate to readers that they could search for an influence, interested readers can make that search without my switching the order, especially because I have included an English translation of Bonaventure's principium in the accompanying website.

For these reasons, I begin with Aquinas. And in Chapter 4, I begin the section on Aquinas with an examination of Thomas' principium in aula inception address (Rigans montes).

Chapter 5 follows with an examination of Thomas's resumptio address (Hic est liber), in the course of which I give special attention to the divisio textus of the books of the Bible that were a common feature of these addresses.

In Chapter 6, I examine several prologues Thomas wrote as a lector biblicus and then analyze the general prologue he wrote for his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.

In Chapter 7, I examine in the first part of the chapter two prologues Thomas wrote as a young master at Paris: the prologue to his treatise Contra Impugnantes (1256) and the prologue to his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate (1257-1258). In the second part of the chapter, I examine two prologues from Thomas's later career: the general prologue to his series of commentaries on the epistles of St. Paul (begun perhaps 1265 or 1268; finished 1271-1272) and the prologue to his commentary on the Psalms (1272-1273).

In Chapter 8, I examine what I take to be Thomas's most highly developed and theologically sophisticated prologue: the prologue to his Commentary on the Gospel of John (1272-1273).

In Chapter 9, "Aquinas, Sermo Modernus—Style Preaching, and Biblical Commentary," I discuss some of the scholastic "habits of mind" we see revealed in these prologues and the light they shed on Thomas's other work. I also examine the relationship between thirteenth-century biblical commentary and thirteenth century sermo modernus—style preaching. Many of the methods of commentary were adopted from contemporary methods of preaching, and it is clear that the goal of such commentaries was to prepare young friars to be able to preach in the sermo modernus style.

Part III Bonaventure, the Scholastic with the Soul of a Poet

In Chapter 10, we turn to our analysis of the work of St. Bonaventure and, as was my practice with St. Thomas, we begin with an analysis of Bonaventure's principium in aula address (Omnium artifex), only recently identified by Prof. Joshua Benson.

In Chapter ix, I examine the text Prof. Benson has identified as Bonaventure's resumptio address — the text that, with minor alterations, has been known to scholars for years as the *De reductione artium ad theologiam* ("On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology").

In Chapter 12, I examine the general prologue to Bonaventure's Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. In this chapter as in the others in this part, we are interested in the development of Bonaventure's skill in the use of the sermo modernus style, but we will also be comparing Bonaventure's skill at these early points in his university career with Thomas's at roughly the same points.

In Chapters 13 and 14, I undertake an examination of Bonaventure's early prologues, the products of his student years. As Bonaventure's prologues are much longer and more complicated than Thomas's, it will be necessary to discuss each in its own chapter. In Chapter 13, I discuss the prologue to his Commentary on the Gospel of John, and in Chapter 14, the prologue to his Commentary on the Gospel of Luke.

In Chapter 15, "Bonaventure, *Sermo Modernus*—Style Preaching, and Biblical Commentary," I show the extent to which Bonaventure's early biblical commentaries were done using the methods of sermo modernus—style preaching with an eye to training young friars to preach in the sermo modernus style.

In Chapter 16, I turn to another of Bonaventure's early prologues, although one that was not a product of his student years: the prologue to the Breviloquium, his short summary of the main elements of Christian doctrine.

In Chapters 17 and 18, I turn to several of Bonaventure's later works. In Chapter 17, we examine the prologue to his Collations on the Ten Commandments and the Collations on the Seven. Gifts of the Holy Spirit. And in Chapter 18, we look at his infamously difficult Collations on the Six Days of Creation. With all three Collations, the goal is to show what light can be shed on the complex style of these works by seeing them as employing a creative development of the sermo modernus-style of preaching.

Finally, in Chapter 19, I offer some brief conclusions regarding (r) the changes needed in our understanding of the historical and cultural setting at Paris, especially regarding the connotations we attach to the term "scholastic"; (a) the significance of the inception addresses as revelatory of the fundamental skills of the master and how they were related; and (3) the characters of the authors, their similarities and differences, and how their common education at Paris bore fruit in very different ways.

One final note: I wrote this book aware that different readers will likely use it in different ways. Some will be interested only in Thomas, others only in Bonaventure. Some may be interested only in the historical and cultural "preliminaries" part, others only in the chapters on the relationship between preaching and biblical commentary in the thirteenth century. Still others may pick up the book simply to read about a particular prologue.

So although the chapters are meant to form a coherent whole, I have also done my best to organize the book so that it can be more easily accessed as a reference tool. So, for example, one reason I have divided the major parts into "Preliminaries," "Aquinas," and "Bonaventure" rather than interweaving my analysis of the two masters together is so that readers interested in one master or the other can go right to that part.

I have, in addition, done my best to make each chapter stand on its own, so that a reader studying just one chapter would be able to find nearly everything he or she needs in that chapter without having to refer to earlier chapters. Although I have tried to keep unnecessary repetition to a minimum, crafting each chapter to be able stand on its own in this way made some repetition unavoidable. The goal has been to produce a book whose parts are as useful as possible for a wide range of scholars with varied interests in the subjects covered. <>

Gersonides Judaism within the Limits of Reason
by Seymour Feldman [Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Liverpool University Press, 9781904113447]

Gersonides (1288–1344) was a philosopher as well as an astronomer and biblical exegete. He was also known as Ralbag, and was a philosopher of the first rank as well as an astronomer and biblical exegete, yet this is the first English-language study of the significance of his work for Jewish thought. Seymour Feldman, the acclaimed translator of Gersonides' most important work, The Wars of the Lord - a complete philosophical system and astronomical encyclopedia - has written a comprehensive picture of Gersonides' philosophy that is both descriptive and evaluative. Unusually for a Jewish scholar, Gersonides had contacts with several Christian notables and scholars. It is known that these related to mathematical and astronomical matters; the extent to which these contacts also influenced his philosophical thought is a matter of some controversy. Unquestionably, however, he wrote a veritable library of philosophical, scientific, and exegetical works that testify not only to the range of his intellectual concerns but also to his attempt to forge a philosophical-scientific synthesis between these secular sciences and Judaism.

Unlike many modern scientists or philosophers, who either scorn religion or compartmentalize it, he did not see any fundamental discrepancy between the pursuit of truth via reason and its attainment through divine revelation: there is only one truth, with which both reason and revelation must agree. As a philosopher-scientist and biblical exegete Gersonides sought to make this agreement robustly evident. While philosophical and scientific ideas have progressed since Gersonides' time, his work is still relevant today because his attempt to make prophecy and miracles understandable in terms of some commonly held philosophical or scientific theory is paradigmatic of a religion that is not afraid of reason. His general principle that reason should function as a 'control' of what we believe has interesting and important implications for the modern reader. Indeed, some of his basic arguments are favoured by many contemporary thinkers who attempt to incorporate modern science into their religious belief system.

This book is a comprehensive picture of Gersonides' philosophy that is both descriptive and evaluative. Unusually for a Jewish scholar, Gersonides had contacts with several Christian notables and scholars. It is known that these related to mathematical and astronomical matters; the extent to which these contacts also influenced his philosophical thought is a matter of some controversy. Unquestionably, he wrote a library of philosophical, scientific, and exegetical works that testify not only to the range of his intellectual concerns but also to his attempt to forge a philosophical–scientific synthesis between these secular sciences and Judaism. He did not see any fundamental discrepancy between the pursuit of truth via reason and its attainment through divine revelation. As a philosopher-scientist and biblical exegete, Gersonides sought to make this agreement robustly evident. While philosophical and scientific ideas have progressed since Gersonides' time, his work is still relevant today because his attempt to make prophecy and miracles understandable in terms of some commonly held philosophical or scientific theory is paradigmatic of a religion that is not afraid of reason. His general principle that reason should function as a “control” of what we believe has interesting and important implications for the modern reader.

He was not afraid to make religious beliefs philosophically and scientifically credible; one could say that he pursued an 'ethics of belief' in that he held that there are constraints to what is believable, especially in religion. In this respect he was a precursor of Kant and Hermann Cohen: Judaism is or should be a religion of reason.

Problems in the Three Rings Revelations

Towards the end of his life the German philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote a treatise entitled *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. In it he defended the thesis of the autonomy of philosophical ethics and the inherent rationality of the laws of morality. On the basis of this principle he concluded that if religion is to be admitted as a legitimate mode of thought and practice it would have to be measured by reason. In particular, revealed, or historical, faiths, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, containing dogmas, mysteries, and ceremonial laws, would have to be judged by whether or not they are compatible with and conducive to the promotion of 'pure religion', the religion of morality based upon reason. Using this principle Kant further concluded that of the three historical faiths only Christianity in its Protestant form came close to satisfying the rational and moral conditions that reason and morality prescribe. Perhaps influenced by Spinoza, Kant maintained that Judaism was more a national polity primarily focused upon ceremonial law and having no intrinsic relevance to the moral law; hence it possessed no application or validity to all mankind. Islam fares no better: according to Kant it is simply a religion of conquest and subjugation, in which moral autonomy and reason are despised. Only a religion purified of irrational and compulsory dogma and mystery, containing minimal ritual law, could, according to Kant, attain the status of a 'religion within the limits of reason alone'.

A little over a century later the Jewish neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen accepted for the most part Kant's general conception of a religion of reason but rejected his judgement concerning Judaism. In his last important work, *The Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism*, Cohen attempted to show the essential rationality of Judaism and its foundation in the moral law. Having adopted the common Christian view of Judaism as a legalistic religion, Cohen argued, Kant intentionally glossed over the moral teachings of the prophets and was totally ignorant of the doctrines of the sages and the medieval Jewish philosophers and moralists. Cohen's work was an attempt to correct Kant as well as an argument for the thesis that Judaism is a religion of reason. Nevertheless, for Cohen, no less than for Kant, the guiding principle is that reason is the ultimate authority in religion.

It will be useful here to employ the notion of a 'control belief' introduced by the American philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff. A control belief, or a specific set of such beliefs, serves to determine which other beliefs can be admitted into the whole corpus of beliefs held by a person. Not all our beliefs function in the same way or have the same status; some are more privileged than others. Someone's belief in the theory of evolution, for example, makes it impossible for that person to accept literally the biblical account of the origin of species; in this case evolutionary theory controls all other views about biology. Inversely, someone who adheres to a literal reading of the story of the sun standing still in Joshua 10 would have to deny modern astronomy. When there is an incompatibility between one's control beliefs and some other belief or theory, one may argue that the incompatibility is only apparent. A suitable interpretation or revision of either belief would eliminate the apparent inconsistency. For some people the tenets of philosophy or science constitute their controlling beliefs, and hence whatever religious views they may hold have to be interpreted or revised according to the dictates of philosophical or scientific theory. For others it is just the reverse: the scientific theory has to be interpreted or revised in such a way that it is made compatible with the set of religious beliefs. Some contemporary religious thinkers, for example, have been able to admit modern evolutionary theory by interpreting it in such a way as to allow for 'intelligent design', thus making an opening for theistic religion. Yet others would interpret the Bible liberally, relegating biblical biology to the status of an archaic myth. In either case a specific set of beliefs is taken as controlling all other beliefs, and by appropriate interpretation or even rejection the entire set of beliefs is made consistent. This approach can be called 'compatibilism'.

But one could claim that such an apparent conflict in belief is indicative of a genuine incompatibility between the control belief and some other belief. One should honestly affirm this inconsistency and make no attempt to reinterpret or revise either belief. Instead, one has to choose between them. In the early history of Christianity the Church Father Tertullian (d. *c.*220) sharply formulated this crisis in belief by his rhetorical question: 'What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem, the Academy with the Church?' Although learned in ancient Greek philosophy, Tertullian came to believe that there was a fundamental and ineliminable incompatibility between philosophy and Christianity, between reason and faith. His other famous dictum expresses this either/or predicament in an even more radical fashion: 'I believe precisely because it is absurd.' Candidly admitting that some Christian theological dogmas are from the standpoint of philosophy irrational, Tertullian opted for faith over reason: Christian revelation always trumps Athenian philosophy. In the nineteenth century the Danish theologian Søren Kierkegaard expressed similar views.

Strauss Accepted the Essential Contrast Between Reason and Revelation

The Tertullian antithesis between Athens and Jerusalem was used to reach a set of different conclusions by the twentieth-century Jewish historian of philosophy and political philosopher, Leo Strauss. In several of his studies, Strauss accepted the essential contrast between reason and revelation, insisting that neither can impugn the methods and contents of the other, since each is fundamentally independent of the other. Strauss himself, somewhat ambivalently, opted for Athens, while expressing deep appreciation for Jerusalem, a choice not available to most medieval philosophers. Since they were members of religious communities whose authority they did not question, divine revelation was for them just as much a datum as it was for the non-philosophical believer. Accordingly, Strauss claimed, it was obligatory for these philosophers to show that philosophy is not only compatible with revelation but also that it is permitted by and relevant to it. This was especially urgent for Jewish and Muslim philosophers because of the dominant role that the study of the law plays in these two traditions. Hence, before one begins to philosophize, one has to 'justify philosophy before the Law'. To this end Averroes, for example, wrote an essay entitled *The Decisive Treatise Determining the Nature of the Connection between Religion and Philosophy*. The

introduction to Maimonides' *Guide* also deals with this general issue. Both thinkers were sensitive to the earlier controversies concerning the alleged corrosive influence of philosophy and wanted to show that philosophy was not only safe but permissible, indeed necessary for sound religious belief.

There is a rabbinic *midrash* that exemplifies this principle, although Strauss does not appeal to it. On the passage, 'May God enlarge Japheth and let him dwell in the tents of Shem' (Gen. 9: 27), the *midrash* interprets this verse as follows: 'May the words of Japheth be in the tents of Shem'. The rabbis suggest here that some of the cultural achievements of the Greeks, who in traditional Jewish anthropology are descended from Japheth, can be safely assimilated by the Jews, the descendants of Shem, so long as the former are or can be made compatible with the Torah. Greek wisdom is made 'kosher' by suitable interpretation or modification. Athens is domesticated by Jerusalem through a critical and selective evaluation of what the former can contribute to the fortification and glorification of the latter. In bringing Japheth into the tents of Shem medieval Jewish philosophers were relocating Athens in Jerusalem; or, as Wolterstorff entitled his book, in opposition to Kant, 'reason [is to be] within the bounds of religion'.

In chapter 2 of his *Philosophy and Law*, entitled 'The Legal Grounding of Philosophy', Strauss included Gersonides with Averroes and Maimonides as writers who attempted to show the legal legitimacy of philosophy: '[The] primacy of the Law is just as secure for Levi as for Maimonides and Averroes.' There is no doubt that for Gersonides the Torah was divinely revealed and hence true. In this sense the Torah is primary, at least chronologically and pedagogically. Yet, as Strauss himself indicated, there are some important differences between Gersonides, on the one hand, and Averroes and Maimonides, on the other. Among the differences between Gersonides and Maimonides, Strauss lists their disagreements concerning the creation of the world and their differing attitude towards 'the freedom of public communication of philosophical truths'. In his discussion of the former issue Strauss correctly points to Gersonides' firmbelief that this topic is capable of philosophical resolution. As we saw in Chapter 2, Gersonides was convinced that he had succeeded in proving that the world had a temporal beginning and was created by God. In emphasizing Gersonides' more generous approach to the dissemination of the results of his philosophical and scientific research, Strauss rightly claims that for Gersonides reason has a greater potency than it has for Maimonides. Indeed, it is precisely because reason is competent that the philosopher and the scientist ought to divulge the results of their research. The truths that these modes of enquiry yield are capable and deserving of being publicly revealed to all those prepared and willing to receive them. They are God's gift to humanity, just as the Torah is. Maimonides' reluctance to divulge the 'secrets of the Torah', which his *Guide* discloses, albeit in an enigmatic manner, to the select few, seems to reflect or express a certain intellectual hesitancy or self-doubt, which some recent scholars have interpreted as scepticism. By contrast, Gersonides generally manifests no such worries. Admittedly, no human being can know everything and there may be some questions for which definitive answers may not be forthcoming. But that does not mean we should abandon philosophy or science. The pursuit of knowledge is an ongoing endeavour, inwhichmany participate. In many cases what one generation has failed to discover or solve another generation succeeds in doing. This intellectual optimism entails that one's philosophical and scientific speculations and their results be made available to other participants in this enterprise. The pursuit of knowledge is, then, a co-operative and public activity. Maimonides' intellectual pessimism and esotericism are not compatible with scientific and philosophical progress.

But the differences between Gersonides and Maimonides are more farreaching, so much so that one may wonder whether for Gersonides philosophy and science need to be 'justified before the Law', as Strauss claims. Consider Strauss's point concerning the provability of creation. Gersonides not only differed from Maimonides in his belief that he had shown the provability of this doctrine, but in

addition he rejected the traditional teaching of creation *ex nihilo*, which Maimonides had accepted as the Torah's theory of creation. Indeed, its falsity can be philosophically and scientifically demonstrated. The true theory of creation is creation *ex aliquo*, creation out of some primordial, shapeless body. Here, reason provides the correct interpretation of what the Torah teaches. That Gersonides defies centuries of traditional Jewish teaching concerning creation is of no importance. Biblical cosmology must be 'within the limits of reason'.

Strauss also claims that, for Gersonides, 'one must rely on Scripture in regard to the teaching of miracles'. This is true in so far as biblical miracles were empirical facts observed by our forefathers, whose testimony we regard as reliable. But the more interesting question is, *how* are these facts to be understood? As I have shown in Chapter 6, Gersonides consistently explains these phenomena in naturalistic and scientific terms. The supernatural element virtually disappears. This is most blatant in Gersonides' treatment of what appears to be the most extraordinary of the biblical wonders: the stopping of the solar and lunar motions, described in Joshua 10. In his discussion of this miracle Gersonides preserved the natural motions of the heavenly bodies, insisting that the laws of celestial motion cannot be violated. Whatever the ordinary believer thinks, the miracle must lie elsewhere. Again, science limits revelation in so far as it controls what we can believe about this event and how this miracle is to be understood. Moreover, as we have learned, God himself was not the direct cause of the miracle, which is not what the literal meaning of the story might imply. The proximate cause of the miracle was the Agent Intellect. Although Gersonides' naturalistic accounts of miracles have offended traditional believers, medieval and modern, he was not afraid to use science to explain these phenomena.

Perhaps the most radical and controversial of all of Gersonides' doctrines is his theory of divine omniscience. It has certainly been abhorred and criticized throughout the generations. Nevertheless, although he realized that his theory was not traditional, Gersonides did not shy away from drawing the logical conclusions from what he considered to be true philosophical premises. The conventional belief, supported throughout the Torah, that God knows individual human beings and that he reveals himself to them as individuals, is simply not true. And this means that God does not know the truth-status of propositions about future contingent events. As we have argued, Gersonides pretty much adopted the view of the philosophers on this issue and rejected Maimonides' defence of the traditional doctrine of strong omniscience. This required him to read the Torah in a non-conventional way, as his account of Abraham's sacrificing Isaac illustrates. Before Abraham actually lifted up the axe to kill Isaac, his obedience to God's command was not yet known, even to God.

Strauss Notes that Gersonides Rejects Averroes' Doctrine of Human Immortality as Conjunct to Agent Intellect

Strauss also notes that Gersonides rejected Averroes' doctrine of human immortality as conjunction with the Agent Intellect, citing Gersonides' argument from 'the insufficiency of the human intellect' to know what the Agent Intellect knows. No matter how much any individual knows, this information will never match the whole system of knowledge about terrestrial affairs possessed by the Agent Intellect. Nevertheless, Gersonides does not bemoan this shortcoming as fatal to the belief in human immortality or to philosophy's competence to prove it. Epistemic finitude is not an argument against immortality. Instead, he proposes a different account of human immortality, one that is not defeated by the obvious fact of human intellectual limitations. Yet Gersonides' theory of immortality is not the traditional one believed by most Jews. From Aristotle, Averroes, and Maimonides he learned that immortality is of the intellect, that it is acquired through intellectual activity and perfection. One's immortality consists in what one knows. Moreover, in the world to come there will be no remembering of what we did in this world nor any additional learning in the 'heavenly yeshiva', since the psycho-physical faculties needed for memory and learning—imagination

and sense perception—are no longer available to us. Accordingly, many of the traditional rabbinic ideas about immortality, still held today by many Jews, are wrong.

The claim advanced by several modern commentators that Gersonides' account of immortality manifests a conservative tendency or conciliatory agenda is therefore not entirely correct. It is true that, compared with the views of Averroes and some other Muslim philosophers, and perhaps also in contrast to Maimonides, Gersonides did not accept the conjunction theory of immortality. This theory did imply the loss of individual immortality, an idea essential to the conventional belief in immortality. But Gersonides' own view was by no means more easily squared with traditional themes, such as remembering one's loved ones or regularly learning a new page of the Talmud. True, Gersonides did reject the conjunction theory, but his arguments were for the most part philosophical; nor did they lead to epistemological scepticism, as Strauss suggests. Gersonides did defend individual immortality, but his understanding of this belief was a radical departure from the traditional accounts of this doctrine. Here again, a philosophical theory determines how a religious belief is to be understood. If we are to retain Strauss's thesis, we should reformulate it in Gersonides' case as 'justifying philosophy before the Law *as philosophy understands the Law*'; that is, Athens is the interpreter when Jerusalem speaks.

A reader of chapter 14 of Book 1 of *Wars* might object: 'Doesn't Gersonides say in this chapter that if his philosophical conclusions are incompatible with religious convictions, the latter are to be affirmed and the former rejected? Doesn't this statement imply that revelation "controls" reason?' Yes, but the apparent inconsistency between this statement and some of the conclusions reached in the treatise is not fatal to Gersonides' philosophical enterprise; it is just a sop to the faithful, which should be taken with the proverbial grain of salt. Conscious that some of his ideas may be offensive to more traditional readers, Gersonides feels the need to mollify his audience and express his fidelity to tradition. But note how he concludes this chapter: 'The incompatibility is to be attributed to our shortcomings.' That is, there is no real incompatibility; any inconsistency is to be explained as the result of human error. Sooner or later a more adequate philosophical or scientific theory or a deeper understanding of the religious belief will reveal that it is compatible with true philosophy. And of course the true understanding of religious belief is provided by philosophy.

The heterodox nature of Gersonides' interpretation of several fundamental doctrines of Judaism was clearly perceived by some of his medieval critics, most notably Hasdai Crescas and Isaac Abravanel. Although they recognized his vast and deep learning in both sacred and secular studies, they could not accept his radical conclusions concerning creation, miracles, omniscience, and immortality. They rejected his theory of creation out of a formless body; indeed, Abravanel called it a form of dualism, a doctrine explicitly condemned by the sages. They were also repelled by his super-naturalistic explanations of miracles. Indeed, they were prepared to read Joshua 10 literally and accept that God can change all the celestial motions in such a way that no terrestrial catastrophes result. Gersonides' theory of omniscience fared no better in their hands. It was an affront to God to say that he cannot know individuals as such and that he is ignorant of future contingent events. Indeed, it is a complete misreading of the Torah. Finally, how can Gersonides maintain that immortality is achieved only through intellectual perfection? What about the person who has not studied science and philosophy? Are not *talmud torah* and performance of the commandments sufficient? For these critics, Gersonides, along with Maimonides and the other medieval Jewish philosophers, was an intellectual elitist, restricting divine providence and reward only to those like themselves. To make themselves philosophically respectable they went too far in the direction of the philosophers, whose principles they adopted, explicitly or esoterically, even to the point of subverting traditional Jewish belief. To his critics Gersonides' *Wars of the Lord* was not a defence of God and his Torah but a war *against* God and the Torah.

It appears, then, that Gersonides cannot be categorized by the formulae of Tertullian or those of the rabbis and Strauss. He certainly did not believe that philosophy and revelation are completely at odds with each other and that the latter must be kept pure and untainted by the former. Nor did he really believe that philosophy needs to justify itself before revelation if this means that the latter controls what philosophical and scientific beliefs are admissible. His basic assumption was that reason and revelation are consistent because the source of both is God himself. But it is the task of philosophy to demonstrate their mutual compatibility. Whatever revelation teaches must be consistent with true philosophy, and traditional religious beliefs must be justifiable in terms of philosophy and science. If they are not, they are to be discarded or radically revised. In short, the tents of Shem have to be brought within the boundaries of Japheth.

But how far can this relocation or transposition be carried out? Was Gersonides naive in thinking that Shem and Japheth could cohabit in everlasting harmony? In one sense this ecumenism was easier for Gersonides to believe in than it is for us. We are the heirs of Spinoza, who taught us that the 'Word of God' is not necessarily found in a book and that whatever book we read and regard as canonical must be read contextually as a document written in a specific cultural environment. Accordingly, for many modern religious Jews the Bible is no longer believed to be the actual Word of God. Nor are the 'gates of interpretation' so wide that we can read into it anything we want. Unlike Maimonides and Gersonides, we cannot assume that whatever the Torah teaches, especially about science, is true if properly understood. If we are to take the Bible 'as it is', we have to admit that some of its teachings are false. For those who accept the traditional teachings of the Torah the situation is in one sense simpler: they may either reject philosophy and science altogether or persist in the attempt to reconcile biblical teachings with modern thought by means of an expansive exegesis. But for many these alternatives are not adequate: science cannot be so easily dismissed, and the Torah cannot be interpreted *ad libitum*. What, then, are they to do?

Does this mean that, for the modern Jew, Gersonides is at best just a historical curiosity, of interest only to the scholar of medieval thought? Is there anything to be learned from him? In raising this question, we have to be cautious. We should not look to Gersonides for anticipations of space travel or twist what he says beyond recognition so as to accommodate our ideas or interests. Yet, as many modern historians of philosophy and science have shown, there is something to be gained by reading ancient and medieval texts from a contemporary perspective. In the first place, we can learn to avoid their errors. Secondly, and more importantly, we can discover things in them that illuminate our own problems. In Gersonides' case we cannot, to be sure, accept his science, and modern philosophy has advanced beyond Aristotle. In some instances we shall have to reject his conclusions. The whole doctrine of the Agent Intellect, for example, and the uses that Gersonides makes of it, no longer have a place in our philosophy and science. Nevertheless, Gersonides' attempt to make prophecy and miracles understandable in terms of some commonly held philosophical or scientific theory is paradigmatic of a religion that is not afraid of reason. Prophecy and miracles are in this sense rational, not mysterious. As he was fond of saying, the Torah does not compel us to believe in it; it persuades by its inherent rationality.

Gersonides' general principle that reason should function as a control of what we believe has some interesting and important implications for the modern reader. It may indeed turn out that we have to declare certain traditional religious beliefs untenable; reason and interpretative integrity do not allow us to accept some doctrines. We saw how he rejected the popular belief, shared even by some rabbinic scholars, in demons. In some cases, it may be that Gersonides' philosophical account of some religious beliefs is more reasonable than the traditional understanding of them. His doctrine of divine omniscience, for example, may be the most plausible solution to the venerable dilemma of the apparent conflict between divine omniscience and human freedom, as some contemporary

philosophers have argued. If we believe in free will, this concept should be robust enough to be meaningful. Choices are genuine when we have real options in whatever situation we may find ourselves. In this sense, as Gersonides has argued, the future must be 'open'. The traditional belief in divine omniscience 'closes' the future. We can still maintain that God is omniscient so long as we understand correctly what this theological belief means: God is omniscient in so far as he knows whatever is knowable. However, future contingent events, by their inherent openness, are not knowable. Gersonides' account of divine providence too seems to offer a better explanation of natural evils than many of the traditional doctrines. That earthquakes and diseases result from natural forces and causes independent of divine control is a more credible explanation than those that vainly attempt to fit these phenomena into some kind of divine plan or purpose. Try telling parents that their child's suffering from a painful and terminal disease is God's will and is for the best. Here Gersonides' doctrine of the shapeless primordial body out of which the world was created offers a more believable account of the various imperfections of nature that cause suffering.

Gersonides came to write *The Wars of the Lord* because of his belief that the dogma of creation was crucial to Judaism. It turned out that this topic required the longest book in the entire treatise. Gersonides' discussion of this subject is problematic, but in an interesting way. Like most medieval thinkers he believed that the world had a beginning and that it was created by God. The claim that the universe had a temporal beginning is now part of contemporary cosmology. Aristotle's eternity theory, defended by Gersonides' predecessor Averroes, has been discarded. Nevertheless, to claim further, as Gersonides does, that the world has been created by God is to go beyond what contemporary cosmology allows. This latter thesis is metaphysical or theological, as Gersonides' arguments for it illustrate. But it is noteworthy that his basic argument here—the teleological argument— is one favoured by many contemporary thinkers who attempt to incorporate modern science into their religious belief system. The world may be millions of years old and have evolved according to Darwinian laws; yet it betrays evidence of the 'finger of God'. This is the doctrine of 'intelligent design'. Admittedly, this theory has had a mixed reception in spite of its popularity, and here we may have to depart from Gersonides and the modern proponents of this doctrine. Yet what is most important is that Gersonides was not afraid to make religious beliefs philosophically and scientifically credible. One could say that for him there is an 'ethics of belief': one is not entitled to believe in just anything one wants. There are constraints on what is believable, especially in religion. In this respect Gersonides was a precursor of Kant and Hermann Cohen: Judaism is, or should be, a religion within the limits of reason. <>

Gersonides' Afterlife: Studies on the Reception of Levi ben Gerson's Philosophical, Halakhic and Scientific Oeuvre in the 14th through 20th Centuries edited by Ofer Elior, Gad Freudenthal, and David Wirmer [Officina Philosophica Hebraica Volume 2, Studies in Jewish History and Culture, Brill, 9789004425279

Gersonides' Afterlife is the first full-scale treatment of the reception of one of the greatest scientific minds of medieval Judaism: Gersonides (1288–1344). An outstanding representative of the Hebrew Jewish culture that then flourished in southern France, Gersonides wrote on mathematics, logic, astronomy, astrology, physical science, metaphysics and theology, and commented on almost

the entire bible. His strong-minded attempt to integrate these different areas of study into a unitary system of thought was deeply rooted in the Aristotelian tradition and yet innovative in many respects, and thus elicited diverse and often impassionate reactions. For the first time, the twenty-one papers collected here describe Gersonides' impact in all fields of his activity and the reactions from his contemporaries up to present-day religious Zionism.

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"Levi's works continued to be of importance during the entire Middle Ages. […] Everyone contested his views, no one denied his importance." MORITZ STEINSCHNEIDER (1889)

Levi ben Gershom, known as Gersonides (1288–1344), is doubtless one of the most original Jewish thinkers of the Middle Ages. An outstanding representative of the scientific and philosophical Hebrew Jewish culture that flourished in southern France between the 12th and the 15th centuries, Gersonides excelled in and wrote on mathematics, logic, astronomy, physical science, metaphysics and theology. Additionally, he commented in great detail almost the entire biblical corpus, bringing his scientific-philosophical outlook to bear on the biblical text. All of his researches were interconnected by Gersonides' firm belief that "truth agrees with itself in every respect."

In the last half-century, a growing body of scholarship has considerably improved our understanding of Gersonides' ideas and of his unique originality. By contrast, the impact of Gersonides' multifarious oeuvre on posterity has to a large extent remained under the radar. In 1889 Moritz Steinschneider commented: "Levi's works continued to be of importance during the entire Middle Ages. His daring originality and his independence of mind were severely castigated by the authorities of both camps: the traditionalists and the mystics branded Gersonides the philosopher as a heretic; the Averroists rejected his criticism. *Everyone contested his views, no one denied his importance*." Since these words were written, not much progress has been made in the study of Gersonides' reception.

The three editors of this volume joined hands in an effort to shed light into this "black hole" in intellectual history. We made Gersonides' afterlife into the theme of a conference (held at the University of Geneva on February 17–19, 2014), which is the remote cause of the present volume. ("Remote"—because all papers were subjected to double-blind refereeing, followed by an extended period of repeated revisions.) We are confident that the twenty-one papers gathered in this volume contribute significantly to our knowledge of the role Gersonides played in his time and in later centuries.

We will not present these papers individually—as a rule, their titles give a fair idea of the topics discussed in them. Let us only describe the organizational principle of the volume. It is pragmatic rather than programmatic: it does not have the pretension to map a historical reality, but simply to class together papers of similar theme or scope. Part 1 includes the papers studying reactions to Gersonides within philosophy, notably: three papers describe his reception in entire philosophical traditions; they are followed by four papers focusing on individuals and another two looking at the reception history of two of Gersonides' works; next, one regrettably lonely paper is devoted to the reception of Gersonides' work in Halakhah; lastly, three papers study reading publics and printing history. The three papers in Part 2 bear on aspects of the reception of Gersonides' scientific oeuvre—for obvious reasons this aspect of Gersonides' afterlife is the best studied one. Part 3 shifts the perspective and the epoch: in the 19th century, with the advent of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, most people did not anymore study Gersonides' works because they thought they could teach them something about the world; instead they became the object of scholarly investigation. Last but not least, Part 4 carries a paper surveying the attitudes to Gersonides within religious Zionism.

Gersonides was one of the most brilliant medieval Jewish thinkers, whose oeuvre is impressive by its sparkling originality. That oeuvre, as well as the history of its reception, deserve more scholarly attention than they have received. We hope this volume will contribute to changing this situation.

Ofer Elior, Gad Freudenthal, David Wirmer

"Composition, Not Commentary": Gersonides' Commentary on the Isagoge of Porphyry and Its Afterlife by Charles H. Manekin

For over a thousand years, Porphyry's Isagoge (Introduction) was every student's first text in philosophy.' Written in Greek by Porphyry of Tyre in the second half of the third century CE, it was subsequently translated into Syriac, Latin, Armenian, and Arabic. The text provides definitions of five terms or "predicables" central to Peripatetic philosophy: genus, species, difference, property, and accident. It then considers what all these terms have in common, followed by what each pair of terms share in common with each other, and wherein they differ. Porphyry famously declares at the outset that he will avoid deeper inquiries into what was later called the problem of universals; that is, the ontological status of genus and species, etc. Rather, he will show how the Peripatetics treated these terms from a logical point of view.

This essay deals with the reception of Gersonides' commentary on the doctrines of the Isagoge presented in Averroes's Middle Commentary, which was translated into Hebrew by Jacob Anatoli in 1231. From late antiquity, the Isagoge stood at the head of the logical curriculum (the enlarged Organon); because students began their study of science and medicine with logic, it was a highly popular work. Steinschneider noted that Anatoli's translations of Aristotle's logical writings, in the versions of Averroes, were extant in more manuscripts than any other work written by a non-Jew; this is especially true of the commentaries on the Isagoge and Categories. Similarly, Gersonides' commentary on Averroes's version of the Isagoge is extant in more manuscripts than any of his other works, with the exception of the Wars of the Lord. Together with his commentaries on the Categories and De interpretatione, it was translated into Latin and published in the 1554 Juntine edition of Aristotle with the commentaries of Averroes.6 As we shall see, his commentary on the Isagoge was itself the subject of commentaries, beginning with his contemporaries, Jedaiah ha-Penini and Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles, and continuing into the sixteenth century. There is evidence that Gersonides was aware of some of the criticisms of his contemporaries and that he responded, directly or indirectly, to them. He himself makes occasional reference to explanations by other commentators with which he disagrees. Gersonides often took bold and argumentative positions in his commentaries, a point that was noted by subsequent commentators. In the introduction to his commentary on the books of logic, Gersonides informs his reader that he is not writing a commentary for its own sake, since, in his opinion, the contents of Aristotle's logical works need no explanation. His intention is threefold: to explain "Averroes's abridgments (qissurei Ibn Rusd) in the books of logic, according to my abridgment (le-fi qissuri)"; to mention the places where his views differ from those of Aristotle "according to what Averroes understood from his words"; and to investigate matters not investigated by Aristotle, "according to what Averroes mentioned of his words." Since the original works really need no explanation, he writes, composition (hibbur) and not commentary (beur) is his primary aim. At first glance that statement seems odd, since there is much commentary in the work. But what Gersonides appears to be saying is that the aim of his commentary is not so much to explain Averroes's commentary on Aristotle—although there is some of that as well—but to provide his readers with the correct teachings of logic by commenting on the canonical texts of the Ancients and correcting and completing them when necessary.

Crescas' Relationship to Gersonides by Warren Zev Harvey

The celebrated critique of Aristotelian natural science and philosophy by Rabbi Hasidai Crescas (Barcelona, ca. 1340—Saragossa, 1410/11) in his Light of the Lord ('Or Adonai) was directed primarily against three medieval thinkers: Averroes 1126-1198), Maimonides (1138-1204), and Gersonides (1288-1344). Moreover, Crescas developed his own original scientific and philosophic views in the course of his intense conversation with those three great adversaries. Gersonides his Wars of the Lord (Milhamot 'Adonai) thus played a major role in his book.

In his his classic study of Gersonides, La pensee philosophique et theologique de Gersonides, Charles Touati writes that Crescas was "one of Gersonides' most violent adversaries" and his "most profound critic." However, Crescas was not only Gersonides' fierce critic, but also his unruly disciple. For example, Crescas's proto-Bergsonian theory of time (Light 11.15, 2.11) grew out of his radical rereading of Gersonides' comments (Wars via, 21). Crescas's theory of divine attributes (Light1 3.1-5; 11 1.4; 2.3) began as a frontal critique of Gersonides' theory (Wars it 3; Vc, 12), but ended surprisingly as a creative and sympathetic development of it. Crescas often attacked Gersonides' Aristotelian naturalism, but, like Spinoza after him, his views on divine providence were distinctly influenced by Gersonides' discussions of the preservation of animals and plants (Light II 2.1; Wars I 4, 7; 11 2-3; iv 5; Vc 3-4).

Here I should like to discuss briefly Gersonides' and Crescas's views on three topics: (1) time, (2) divine attributes, and (3) providence. These three topics offer a typical illustration of Crescas's relation to Gersonides. However, many other topics could have been chosen. As Touati well observed, Crescas cites Gersonides' opinions throughout Light; and even where he does not cite him, he often has a text of his in mind.

After discussing these topics and showing the complex and conflicted nature of Crescas's relationship to Gersonides, I will address Touati's troublesome charge that Crescas's criticisms of Gersonides reflected mauvaise foi.5 I will argue, in Crescas's defense, that his contradictory remarks concerning Gersonides' views do not reflect bad faith but rather illustrate his intellectual honesty, that is, his ability to be convinced by an argument and change his mind.

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We have discussed briefly Hasdai Crescas's relationship to Gersonides on three important topics: the theory of time, the doctrine of divine attributes, providence. We have also considered Touati's accusation that Crescas's attitude towards Gersonides exhibits mauvaisefoi. Now let me sum up. Gersonides along with Averroes and Maimonides, was one of the three main Aristotelian philosophers discussed significantly and critically in Crescas's Light of the Lord When Crescas began writing it, his attitude towards Gersonides was negative and combative. He was, in Touati's phrase, "one of Gersonides' most violent adversarieses" but also his "most profound critic." In the course of writing his book. Crescas remained a profound critic of Gersonides but ceased to be a violent adversary. He came to respect Gersonides and to learn from him. He underwent a remarkable transformation. Indeed, I fancy that Rabbi Hasdai himself was very surprised to see how considerably his own mature philosophy was redirected by Rabbi Levi's writings.<>

Quest for Life: A Study in Aharon David Gordon's Philosophy of Man in Nature by Yossi (Joseph) Turner [Emunot: Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah, Academic Studies Press, 97816446931 24]

David Gordon was one of the most interesting and original Jewish thinkers of the twentieth century. **Quest for Life: A Study in Aharon David Gordon's Philosophy of Man in Nature** presents Gordon's philosophy, which was developed in Hebrew at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the English reading public. It discusses the role played by the early Land of Israel pioneering labor community in the development of his thought, and offers a new understanding of its major themes, including: the relation of humanity to nature, human freedom, ethnicity, religion, and ethics. In addition, the book discusses the repercussions of Gordon's thought

with respect to contemporary civilization while suggesting its implicit 'quest for life' as the basis for a re-evaluation of such topics as the meaning of human life, Jewish peoplehood and the idea of a Jewish homeland.

Review

"This is an exemplary book on a fascinating and important subject. It reframes the philosophy of an almost mythical figure who, in his life and work, symbolized what was best in the period of Zionist realization in the land of Israel prior to the establishment of the Jewish state. Through his deep and insightful analyses of the manner in which Gordon treated the problems of Jewish and human existence, in his own time, Turner uncovers Gordon's fundamental intuition that flies in the face of contemporary civilization: that as a result of his unique cognitive abilities, the human being has turned his back on the power of life that joins human culture to the natural cosmos, in order to exploit its resources for increasingly selfish purposes. In this context, **QUEST FOR LIFE: A STUDY IN AHARON DAVID GORDON'S PHILOSOPHY OF MAN IN NATURE** suggests a return to the ethos of natural creation and social solidarity that characterized Gordon's thought as a basis for working through the problems confronting humanity in the present." —Eliezer Schweid, Professor Emeritus, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

About the Author

Yossi Turner is Professor of Jewish Thought and Philosophy at The Schechter Institute of Jewish Studies in Jerusalem. He has published extensively on philosophies of Jewish existence, Jewish religious philosophy, Jewish social thought and the philosophy of Halakha. Turner is also involved in developing an original philosophy of Jewish existence designed to explicate contemporary problems facing Jewish life and humanity.

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Life, for Gordon, is worthy of philosophical consideration only because it is much more than an object of philosophy. For Gordon, life includes the dynamic movement of the natural cosmos in which the human being is born, and in which his or herself and personality develop. In addition, life, in Gordon's philosophy, constitutes the creative power through which a particular individual or community is realized." As such, life itself provides the philosophical predisposition from which Gordon speaks. It is the stuff that all of nature, all of existence, is made of, and like nature, it contains the power and the mystery of creation. His poetic style may be understood, in this context, as the expression of life when perceived in nature as continuous creation, rather than as concept or idea. To free Gordon of his poetical expression would therefore amount to freeing his philosophical consideration of the nature of human and worldly existence from the very occurrence of life that constitutes their reality.

The Character of Gordon's Writings and Method

Generally speaking, Gordon's essays consist of two types that are not, in the end, all that different from each other.

The first type includes essays he wrote and published with the intention of influencing the hierarchy of values, modes of thought, and programs for development of the new Jewish community that was, at that time, being established in the Land of Israel. These essays touch on the function of literature in building a new society, education, the revival of Hebrew as a spoken language, the value of labor, communal settlement, and many other issues relevant to the social, cultural, and political agenda of the Second Aliyah community.

The second type features a more methodical discourse on largely philosophical issues. To this category belongs his primary philosophical essay, "Man and Nature," and to some extent, his "A Clarification of Our Fundamental Idea." "Man and Nature" is essentially a composition that was put together on the basis of the philosophical journal (including assorted notes found on scraps of paper) that Gordon wrote over the years after coming to the Land of Israel. We do not know when he wrote the specific passages in this journal. Rut the first section of the extensive essay known to contemporary scholars as "Man and Nature" was already published under this title in 1909. "A Clarification of Our Fundamental Idea," on the other hand, is an anti-Marxist polemic that he wrote following World War I, when a new wave of immigration, known as the Third Aliyah, brought to the Land of Israel a particularly doctrinaire, institutionally oriented, and militant form of Marxist ideology!

The reason why these two types of writings are not that different from each other is that their topics often intersect. Even in those essays that directly respond to issues of public concern, Gordon roots his positions in the philosophical thinking that he developed most extensively in the texts that eventually formed the expanded version of "Man and Nature:' And the philosophical agenda of "Man and Nature" has as its goal the explanation and justification of Gordon's perception of society and civilization, in a manner that has direct bearing on the practical issues that were discussed at the time of the Second and the beginning of the Third Aliyah.

What is important for us to consider in these introductory remarks, is that there is a strong connection, in Gordon's writing, between philosophy, life, and praxis. As I will show, the interaction between these three provide the dynamic through which Gordon's thought developed over the years into a comprehensive and methodically consistent philosophy. A detailed rendition of the development of Gordon's thought remains for future scholarship, insofar as it requires, among other

things, a painstaking examination of the original form of his philosophical manuscripts and an attempt to date their various sections.

General impressions of Gordon's published writings, nonetheless, appear to support the following two contentions. First, the parameters of his thought are determined by his inquiry into the character of human existence, nature, and the cosmos, alongside of his analyses of the practical issues facing the Second Aliyah community. Second, despite their inner consistency, Gordon's writings do not comprise a unified canon, but rather form an organic development of ideas starting from early philosophical intuitions that gestated over a period of time, with a turn to relative systematization, as a result of his need to respond to the growing complexity of practical challenges that faced the Second Aliyah pioneer community, in his later years.

Structure and Goals of this Book

Shortly before his death in 1922, Gordon asked that in the future his works not be discussed or disseminated unless they are found to be of actual importance at the time. This is in line with his self-perception as an educator whose philosophical interest is pedagogical.

In line with this statement, the present work will pursue two distinct goals. First, it will demonstrate the inner authenticity of Gordon's thought as a manifestation of the creative activity characteristic of the Second Aliyah. Second, it will offer the conception of life in Gordon's overall philosophy of man in nature, as the starting-point for a reconsideration of the fundamental problems of present-day Jewish existence and Western civilization.

Because of the scarcity of literature on Gordon's thought in English, a number of discussions in this book are intended as a broad presentation of the issues that Gordon philosophically confronted and his position on each. On this level of discussion, I shall show that the general character of Gordon's thought is best described, using contemporary terminology, as an ecological philosophy that understands all of existence in terms of a multivalent and yet interconnected and unified whole. I will show that from a philosophical perspective, Gordon's identification of nature with the totality of existence rests upon his belief in human life as a particular aspect of the organic character of nature as a living and breathing ecosystem. Most importantly, I will explicate the methodological implications of Gordon's primary philosophical intuition concerning the rootedness of the human self in the mysterious or hidden dimensions of natural creation, as an alternative to contemporary discourse, in a way that may prove to be critical in regard to the fate of humanity and the Jewish people in our time. <>

The Mystical Life of Franz Kafka Theosophy, Cabala, and the Modern Spiritual Revival by June O. Leavitt [Oxford University Press, 9780199827831]

This book aims to show that the "Kafkaesque" in Franz Kafka may be immediate or residual impressions of the clairvoyance which Kafka admitted he suffered from Those aspects of his writings in which the solid basis of human cognition totters, and objects are severed from physical referents, can be understood as mystical states of consciousness. However, this book also demonstrates how the age in which Kafka lived shaped his mystical states. Kafka lived during the modern Spiritual Revival, a powerful movement which resisted materialism, rejected the adulation of science and Darwin and idealized clairvoyant modes of consciousness. Key personalities who were Kafka's contemporaries encouraged the counterculture to seek the true essence of reality by inducing out-of-body experiences and producing spiritual visions through meditative techniques. Most

importantly, they inspired the representation of altered perception in art and literature. Leaders of the Spiritual Revival also called for changes in lifestyle in order to help transform consciousness. Vegetarianism became essential to reach higher consciousness and to return humanity to its divine nature. It is no surprise that Kafka became a vegetarian and wrote several important narratives from an animal's point of view. Interweaving the occult discourse on clairvoyance, the divine nature of animal life, vegetarianism, the spiritual sources of dreams, and the eternal nature of the soul with Kafka's dream-chronicles, animal narratives, diaries, letters, and stories, this book takes the reader through the mystical textuality of a great psychic writer and through the fascinating epoch of the great Spiritual Revival.

In a long-overlooked diary entry, Franz Kafka admitted to suffering from "bouts of clairvoyance." These bouts of clairvoyance can be seen in his writing, in moments when the solid basis of human cognition totters, the dissolution of matter seems imminent, and objects are jarringly severed from physical referents. June O. Leavitt offers a fascinating examination of the mystical in Kafka's life and writings, showing that Kafka's understanding of the occult was not only a product of his own clairvoyant experiences but of the age in which he lived.

Kafka lived during the modern Spiritual Revival, a powerful movement which resisted materialism, rejected the adulation of science and Darwin, and idealized clairvoyant modes of consciousness. Kafka's contemporaries - such theosophical ideologues as Madame H.P. Blavatsky, Annie Besant, and Dr. Rudolph Steiner - encouraged the counterculture to seek the true, spiritual essence of reality by inducing out-of-body experiences and producing visions of higher disembodied beings through meditative techniques. Leaders of the Spiritual Revival also called for the adoption of certain lifestyles, such as vegetarianism, in order to help transform consciousness and return humanity to its divine nature.

Interweaving the occult discourse on clairvoyance, the divine nature of animal life, vegetarianism, the spiritual sources of dreams, and the eternal nature of the soul with Kafka's dream-chronicles, animal narratives, diaries, letters, and stories, Leavitt takes the reader on a journey through the texts of a great psychic writer and the fascinating epoch of the Spiritual Revival.

Review

"June Leavitt leads us through ethereal and esoteric realms of theosophy and the occult in a pathbreaking attempt to situate Kafka within Europe's Modern Spiritual Revival, associated with the names of Rudolf Steiner, Madame Blatavsky, Annie Besant, W.B. Yeats, Gustav Meyrink, T.S. Eliot, and others. Benefiting from Leavitt's scholarship, we can now understand better Kafka's clairvoyance, dream-life, and mystical experience and their inner relationship to his writings. Contextualizations she provides derived from Jewish and Christian Cabala, Freemasonry, and Gnosticism inform Kafka's notions of reincarnation, transcendence, and transmigration of the soul, as well as the mystical life of animals. Nothing short of a new way of 'experiencing' Kafka is achieved here."
---Mark H. Gelber, Director of the Center for Austrian and German Studies, Ben-Gurion University, Beer Sheva

"This is a book that gets better and better as it goes along. Through her theosophical framing, Leavitt illuminates some of Kafka's lesser known works and brings his more famous texts, such as 'Investigations of a Dog,' to new life. She convincingly interweaves Kafka's dreams, his Nietzsche readings, his early involvement with synaesthesia and modernism - and, of course, his vegetarianism. Kafka declared that he was 'nothing but literature.' **THE MYSTICAL LIFE OF FRANZ KAFKA THEOSOPHY, CABALA, AND THE MODERN SPIRITUAL REVIVAL** broadens that life into its

full, fascinating cultural context." -- James Rolleston, Professor Emeritus of German & Literature, Duke University

"June Leavitt's original study explores neglected moments in Kafka's spiritual landscape and mystical experiences early in his life, and enables a better understanding of some of the uncanny dimensions of his later oeuvre. She describes fascinating aspects of the Prague intellectual ambiance that was permeated with Rudolph Steiner's theories and of Freemasonic approaches at the beginning of the twentieth century, contributing thereby to a new picture of the young Kafka's inner life in this framework." --Moshe Idel, Max Cooper Professor in Jewish Thought, Emeritus, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

"In making her case, the author augments the established views on Kafka's familiarity with the Jewish mystical tradition and Cabala with convincing detective work on Kafka's interest in non-Jewish or secular mystical traditions."--*CHOICE*

"Leavitt strives to demonstrate how Kafka's interest in the occult was shaped not only by contemporary spiritualist discourse but also by his own clairvoyant experiences. In making her case, the author augments the established views on Kafka's familiarity with the Jewish mystical tradition and Cabala with convincing detective work on Kafka's interest in non-Jewish or secular mystical traditions, including Christian Cabala and Freemasonry...Recommended."--*CHOICE*

"Leavitt's Mystical Life remains a valuable work for the boundary zone it manages to expose... **THE MYSTICAL LIFE OF FRANZ KAFKA THEOSOPHY, CABALA, AND THE MODERN SPIRITUAL REVIVAL** ultimately teaches us that what distinguishes Kafka as the central Jewish writer of modernity remains, despite the best efforts of his doorkeepers, precisely what his central parable tells us about his fiction. Franz Kafka, whether conceived of in Jewish or Christian terms, remains the writer of the open door."--*H-Judaic*

Excerpt: In August 1920, the journalist Milena Jesenská wrote an elegy to Max Brod about her former lover, Franz Kafka, whom she had fondly nicknamed "Frank." Although the relationship was doomed for many reasons, including her being Catholic and married, she clarified those qualities about Frank that continued to mesmerize her: "Here is a man who is forced to be ascetic because of his terrible clairvoyance, his purity and inability to compromise" (*Letters to Milena*, 1990 244).

Jesenská's use of the word *clairvoyant* is especially significant in light of how she defined it. She suggests that for Kafka the world was a "mystical secret" (365), something he could not attain, but something he held in high regard. In Jesenská's eyes, Kafka was a man intently aware of a secret substance in the universe, a substance that eluded his grasp. On June 5, 1924, Jesenská again

described Kafka as clairvoyant under entirely different circumstances. In the obituary she composed for Kafka, who had died at a sanitarium in Austria two days earlier, she referred to his over endowment of "clairvoyance and wisdom" as having made him incapable of living (271).

Clairvoyant Kafka

Jesenská's sense that Kafka was in some sense clairvoyant is particularly striking because he himself used the word to describe the agonizing condition that impeded his writing. In a meeting with Dr. Rudolph Steiner on March 28, 1911, Kafka confessed that he experienced altered states of consciousness that corresponded, in his words, to the clairvoyant states Steiner had described (*Diaries* 48–49). Actually, Kafka claimed that the reason he wanted to meet with "Herr Doktor", who was then head of the German branch of the Theosophical Society and one of the most eminent occult figures of his day, was because his bouts of clairvoyance were confusing him, and the works he wrote in this state were not his best.

The implications of this extraordinary diary entry generate the major themes and objectives of this work. Kafka experienced clairvoyant states of consciousness, and he experienced them occasionally while writing. Thus his writings must be examined for signs of clairvoyance however difficult this task may be.

Although Jesenská gave us some idea of what she meant by clairvoyance, initially we have to ascertain what Kafka had in mind the day he spoke with Steiner in that private consultation. He deferred to Steiner's discourse in order to describe an altered mode of consciousness that he yearned for but of which he was terrified. According to Steiner, this altered mode of consciousness was superlative for spiritual development. Transcending rational and sensible cognitive frameworks, it enabled one to make contact with higher worlds. It is obvious that Kafka did not mean clairvoyant in the sense of being able to see newspapers oddly bundled behind the metal door of a locked safe. Like Steiner, he alluded to a modality in which the very concept of substance dissolves. This testimonial fits Jesenská's portrayal of Kafka as being aware of a secret substance in life, and this awareness rendered him incapable of carrying on his daily existence in a normal way.

Kafka's testimonial also fits William James's paradigm of the mystical state. Kafka spoke about being at the "boundary of the human", while James described this mode as being at the edge of something beginning to break apart. One is confronted with the sense of imminent dissolution (James 376) that destroys the rational symbolism of language. Thus its quality can be known only through experience (371). Basing my study initially on James, I hypothesize that the clairvoyance Kafka mentioned was in fact a mystical state of consciousness that could be known only through experience. It is therefore reasonable to adopt the concept of "experiential" to discuss Kafka's type of mysticism, a concept James contrasts to theoretical mysticism (394). The experiential aspect of the mystical mode has to do with transformation in the soul, the very texture of being (394). On the other hand, the theoretical aspect of the mystical mode has to do with study and knowledge, or to put it in Moshe Idel's terms, the contemplation of "noetic propositions" (*Kabbalah* 35).

Judging from his writings, one can say Kafka's mystical life did in fact embrace both aspects of the clairvoyant state. I believe that his literature issued from the experiential, while at the same time it was influenced by the theoretical. The indications of the experiential in Kafka's prose constitute the "subjective", "personal", and "revelatory" strata. The "objective" elements point to outside influences that shaped the personal by providing the motifs, symbols, concepts, and language through which Kafka attempted to express this experience. For this reason he deferred to Steiner's discourse.

In referring to the outside forces that seem to have played a role in Kafka's experiential life, I borrow the concept of "occult" and "occultism" from several sources. Rudolph Steiner called his Theosophical scheme, which he adapted from that of Madame H. P. Blavatsky, "occult science." The word *occult* has also been embraced by Leon Surrette to designate the "birth of modernism", which was accompanied by a phenomenal wave of interest in spirituality and spiritualism. This wave, according to Surrette, spread through Europe beginning in the mid-19th century and continued into the first two decades of the 20th century, influencing for example the poets Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, and W. B. Yeats.

During this era, occult ideologues—epitomized by Blavatsky, her successor Annie Wood Besant, and Steiner—propounded theories about the divine essence of the universe, contributing much substance to theoretical mysticism. However, this era was marked not only by increased awareness of the existence of a transcendental dimension to reality. It also featured a widespread belief that this dimension might be experienced. Thus I use the concept of occult to signify the purposeful culturing of consciousness that allows perception of and interaction with spiritual worlds. The yearning to experience spiritual entities and higher worlds was so pervasive that Sixten Ringbom termed this occult era "the epoch of the Great Spiritual." The fact that the ideologues of this epoch saw themselves as reviving ancient knowledge (Surrette 7), typified by Blavatsky's contention that the source of Theosophy was primordial divine wisdom (primarily Cabala) inspired the title of this book.

A slight digression is in order here. The word *Cabala*, coming from the root of the Hebrew word *kibel*, meaning to receive wisdom from a wise sage or prophet, is usually spelled Kabbalah with *K* as the first letter when referring to Jewish esoteric tradition. Because there is no set system of transliterating Hebrew into English, Christian redactors of Jewish Kabbalah ignored the root word, preferring to begin the word instead with a *C* and spell it Cabala. Because I believe that Kafka was actually influenced by Gentile redactors of Kabbalah, Cabala is appropriate—even though this may antagonize scholars of Judaism and Jewish literature.

Stanzas of Dyzan as Cabala

Madame Blavatsky was perhaps the greatest redactor of ancient esoteric traditions, including Cabala, during the modern Spiritual Revival. Claiming that she received her teachings through an immortal brotherhood of adepts who guard a timeless wisdom from which all religions sprang (Besant, *Ancient* 3), her opus *The Secret Doctrine* (1888) is actually structured as a commentary on an allegedly ancient Hebrew document belonging to these immortal adepts, a document she calls "The Stanzas of Dyzan." Although the "Stanzas" appear to be fictional, her commentaries on them, which were to influence late-19th and early-20th-century European and American cultures, draw heavily from the Zohar and the Cabala of Rabbi Isaac Luria.

As significant as Blavatsky was to the development of the modern Spiritual Revival, she contributed for the most part theoretical material that was to churn the momentous currents of practical and experiential forms of spiritualism. The mystical life of Franz Kafka must be understood as an interplay between his own clairvoyant states of mind and a revivalist spiritualist culture fueled by Theosophical theories and occult practices. This interplay leaves traces throughout his literary enterprise.

To discern experiential mysticism in his writings, it is necessary to scrutinize the prose for signs of clairvoyant or mystical perception. To do this, some sort of taxonomy is required for indications of the dissolution of normal cognition that characterizes the clairvoyant state. Though there have been some attempts to categorize mystical experience, there is a tendency to ground the tenuous taxonomy in religious tradition. Moshe Idel admits that experience may be conditioned by cultural

and sociological factors (*Kabbalah* 37), but his extensive discoveries concern the indication of the mystic's sense of union with God manifested in cabalistic texts. Carolyn Spurgeon's model of mystical textuality (11f) was the writings of St. John of the Cross. Thus Spurgeon, in her survey of English literature, looked for indications of piety and spiritual sentiment in English poetry, believing that "all mystics are devotional and all are religious" (111). Similarly, in R. C. Zaehner's seminal study on mystical experience, *Mysticism Sacred and Profane*, the indication he sought was "a direct apprehension of the Deity" (31). Moreover, Zaehner contended that "the mystic *knows* that God is in him and with him; his body has literally become a 'temple of the Holy ghost'" (32). In Zaehner's estimation, indications of mystical sentiment could only be expressed in theological terms.

The presumption that mystical experience contains strong theological nuances also informs Steven Katz's highly influential *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*, which generated a stream of critical theory that became known as "constructionism." According to the articles represented in Katz's anthology, mystical experience is always constructed through a specific religious tradition. Thus for example the sublime moment of expanded conscious for a Hindu will be shaped by anticipation of revelation concerning Brahman (Katz 26). The Christian mystic's mind will open to a vision of Jesus, Mary, or the Lord. The Buddhist mystic sees Buddha sitting on a lotus throne (86). The mystical moment for a Jew may reveal the chariot of Ezekiel on its way to God's throne (26–27). However, the paranormal moment Kafka described to Steiner on March 28, 1911, contained no images or theological referents at all.

Clearly, Kafka's testimonial to Steiner defies religious contextualization in the traditional sense. Moreover, Kafka did not refer to a joyful state of union with God. He did not feel God within himself at all. On the contrary, he described an agonizing sense of emptiness and void. One might be tempted to call it "negative mysticism", as June McDaniel has done in her classification of different types of religious experience. Kafka's anguished state diametrically opposed the profoundly tranquil or ecstatic and rapturous states ascribed to religious mystics. Kafka himself was keenly aware of the negative quality of his experience. He explicitly told Steiner that the calm of enthusiasm, which was characteristic of the clairvoyant, was lacking in those states (*Diaries* 48).

The fact that Kafka had a model in his mind of the ideal clairvoyant mode, rather than the religiously ecstatic mode, suggests that he was familiar with the occult culture of his day, which idealized clairvoyant consciousness. However, it is important to realize there were profound religious veins in the occult. The modern Theosophical movement, for example, might even be defined as a new religious movement—universalistic and willfully chosen rather than conferred on one by birth and imposed by one's family (Beit-Hallahmi 12). Like a new religion, Theosophy overstepped the boundaries assigned to conventional religion in secular society by advocating beliefs and practices generally concerning the invisible spiritual world. Its credo included doctrines about the immortality of the soul, about gods, and about unseen cosmic forces (12–13).

It is important to understand that Steiner himself believed that Christ was the Messiah, and he wove this belief deeply into his spiritualist utopian scheme. However, Steiner's connection with the Christian Church ended formally before his 14th birthday. Thereafter, he became more and more convinced that true religion required each individual to experience God and the higher worlds for himself.[6] By taking religious experience away from ecclesiastical confines and parochialism, Steiner's occult system provided an alternative system to organized religion: the resurgence of faith based on personal spiritual revelation and clairvoyant modes of mind.

The idea of developing a new faith is a crucial element in Franz Kafka's mystical life. Notwithstanding his passionate interest in Judaism, which began in 1910 or 1911 and was sustained until he died, Kafka continued to shun organized Jewish religious life. In 1919, five years before he died, he wrote a

lengthy letter to his father expressing repugnance for the synagogue and Jewish liturgy. In the letter, he complained that the opening of the Ark in the synagogue reminded him of a shooting range at a fair (Brod 26). He objected to the ritual rite of passage for boys of 13, the *bar mitzvah*, which he had performed. Claiming that it required "a lot of silly learning by heart, for something which was 'purely a social affair' (26), he concluded his condemnation of conventional Judaism with a significant remark: "That was the stuff that was handed on to me to build my faith" (26).

Undoubtedly, synagogue life appalled Kafka, but not because he was an atheist. It appalled him because, in his words, he was trying to "build his faith", and the conventional forms were not adequate. In a letter to Milena, he also discussed "faith", which he equated with a "soul finally having found maternal soil" (*Briefe an Milena* 292). Kafka's concern about faith and the soul make a claim that he did yearn to build a spiritual life.

In effect, when he was in distress he went to meet with Steiner, a preeminent figure in a movement that served as a refuge for artists in their struggle with "Darwin, scientific materialism, European rationalism and religion" (Surrette 81). The clairvoyant consciousness with which Kafka was struggling was, in Steiner's estimation, the ideal means of attaining personal revelation and redemption outside the religious establishment. Kafka's meeting with Steiner and Kafka's testimonial certainly imply that he arduously engaged with an ideology animated by an agenda that found mainstream religion lacking in spiritual vitality.

The need to situate his life and literature within a spiritual-cultural context was suggested by Kafka himself. On Feb. 19, 1911, in the original diary entry for that date, Kafka mused about his writing and claimed that he was the spiritual center of Prague:

> Die besondere Art meiner Inspiration in der ich Glücklichster und Unglücklichster jetzt um zwei Uhr nachts schlafen gehe sie wird vielleicht, wenn ich nur den Gedanken daran ertrage, bleiben, denn sie ist höher als alle früheren und zweifellos bin ich jetzt im Geistigen der Mittelpunkt von Prag. . . .
> [My special kind of inspiration is that I, the happiest and the most unhappy, am now at 2 o'clock in the morning going to sleep. Perhaps it will last, if I can only bear the thought of it, for it is higher than all former ones and without a doubt I am now spiritually the center of Prague. . . .]

According to Mark Harman, translator of Kafka's works, Kafka subsequently crossed out "und zweifellos bin ich jetzt im Geistigen der Mittelpunkt von Prag" (and without a doubt, I am now spiritually the center of Prague). Thus the crucial phrase that his spiritual nature and muse were the center of Prague does not appear in the English editions of his diary or other translations, unless these translations are based on new critical editions of the original German diaries.

This deleted remark has many ramifications. First of all, it affirms that Kafka realized that his inspiration existed symbiotically with his society. Harman, along with Mark Anderson and Sander Gilman, has also noted that Kafka's writings were influenced by his society to a much greater degree than Kafka cared to admit. According to Anderson, Kafka's real voice—that, is the voice that existed before the deletions and editing—betrays historical and sociological contingencies ("Virtual Zion" 311). In Anderson's estimation, Kafka's dependence on his culture caused him much despair and frustration. He would have liked to be able to remove himself entirely from the external world. In Gilman's opinion, Kafka wanted his writings to "generate a sense of their own 'transhistorical nature.'" Although Gilman did not allude to the specific deleted remark about being the spiritual center of Prague, in his opinion Kafka tended to edit all his texts so they would convey the impression of being "universal, transnational and infinitely interpretable" rather than determined and shaped by ideologies that were pervasive in his age and time (2).

The fact that Kafka erased the statement about being the spiritual center of Prague suggests he was uncomfortable with the inspiration for his literature deriving from an outside source. The raw materials for his literary enterprise came from his culture. He was a redactor, a re-worker, not an inventor. Indeed, according to Harman, he crossed out the remark so he would not give away too much about himself. In Harman's estimation, whereas Kafka was undeniably imaginative and ingenious, he never made up ideas: "He soaked ideas up; but apparently he did not want other people to know to what extent he did this."

At the same time Kafka's deleted diary remark points to outside factors that shaped his creative life, the diary entry also points inward to the subjective dimension. From his remark, it can be inferred that he experienced his inspiration and literature as *geistig* or intellectual and spiritual. His life and literature, inseparable from one another, were infused with a religious and noetic quality. The deleted testimonial, taken together with his confession to Steiner that he underwent clairvoyant states while writing, allows me to claim that Kafka possessed the attributes of a mystic or a quasi-mystic. Moreover, these attributes were intricately connected, not only to his literature but to the impulses which animated Prague.

The most dominant spiritual impulse in Prague issued from the Theosophical movement, founded by Madame Blavatsky, which in the German-speaking world at the time was headed by Rudolph Steiner. Indeed, Kafka began his session with Steiner by claiming that his whole being was yearning toward "Theosophie." He concluded the session with a vow: he would continue on the personally tortuous path of Theosophy if Steiner told him to do so. Despite Kafka's ending his March 28 diary entry by describing Steiner picking his nose (and in this way belittling him), the fact remains that Kafka deferred to Steiner's discourse about clairvoyant and mystical modes of consciousness, aimed at creating a new faith for modern man through direct experience of the divine.

Taking my cue from Kafka, initially I rely on Steiner's eloquent critical taxonomy to investigate Kafka's literature for transcendental and supersensible insights acquired during clairvoyant or mystical states of mind.

Although it may be argued that I am foregrounding Steiner far too much. I believe that his role in shaping early-20th-century esotericism has not been sufficiently appreciated by contemporary scholars. Lecturing all over Europe, attracting the greatest minds of the generation, and writing books and treatises that were (and still are) publicized widely, Steiner shared ideas that saturated German-speaking popular culture. A doctor of philosophy known to be a powerful advocate of paranormal experience and experiential ways of accessing knowledge, Steiner was a role model of supreme nonreligious spiritual authority for an alternative culture that was secular yet hungry for the esoteric. I would go as far as claiming that Kafka made an appointment to meet with him on March 28, 1911, because Steiner, and Steiner alone, held out for him the hope that the distress his clairvoyance was causing could be resolved.

The distress was caused, in Kafka's words, because he did not write at his best during clairvoyant moments, which of course means he did indeed compose some of his literature during these episodes! The task then remains to try to determine which works Kafka may have been referring to—which were spoiled, so to speak—because he had lapsed into a paranormal state with pen in hand and ink flowing onto notebook paper. To do this, I will not distinguish, as some academics insist on doing, between Kafka's "nonliterary" texts (represented, in their opinion, in "insignificant diary passages") and Kafka's "literary" corpus (which they believe is represented by his novels and most famous stories). Without entering the debate as to the literary value of seemingly trivial diary entries, I think that indications of spiritual perception could be evident in anything he wrote. My

assumption is based on Kafka's testimony that he experienced clairvoyance, which according to Steiner put one in touch with higher worlds and spiritual beings.

Indeed, in Kafka's 1910 diaries an ethereal being enters the room, and Kafka addresses it in the second person. In the story "Unhappiness" (Unglücklichsein), written in 1910, a disembodied little girl blasts through the wall of his room, and he conducts a dialogue with her. In the series of fragments known as "Description of a Struggle" (Beschreibung eines Kampfes), written sometime in 1904 or 1905, at least one fragment deals with out-of-body experience, something a clairvoyant, even an unhappy and unwilling one like Kafka, would have been familiar with.

It might seem that an analysis of clairvoyant textuality in Kafka should focus only on those pieces written before his meeting with Steiner in March 1911. Since there is no record that Kafka ever mentioned clairvoyance after this meeting, it is plausible that his mystical bouts had passed and no work after this year would show vestiges of them. However, William James maintains that mystical bouts are recurrent and transformative. A person who has engaged with transcendent reality will never return fully to normal reality between the recurring episodes. The episode generates chronic mystical perception (387).

Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that Kafka's post-1911 literary enterprise would also contain indications of an impulse toward the transcendent. The transcendental impulse is one of the criteria Philip Leonard, editor of the anthology *Trajectories of Mysticism in Theory and Literature*, uses to define mystical literature. In Leonard's estimation, mystical prose is often an actual inscription of the religious yearning toward "a direct and personal awareness of a transcendent authority such as God, Providence, the Creator or the Infinite" (preface x); the prose also describes the means by which the awareness of the Infinite is cultivated. Hence in mystical literature one finds inordinate attention paid to dreams, prayers, visions, and ecstatic or intuitive moments (Preface x).

Whereas a survey of Kafka's corpus does not produce any evidence that he used prayer as a means of cultivating awareness of the Infinite, he did pay inordinate attention to his dreams and the intuitive moments within dreams. This raises the distinct possibility that his dream-chronicling project was informed by an impulse toward the transcendental. This project, which began in 1910 when Kafka recorded his first dream, draws to an end in 1922 when his dream world and real world inextricably mingle together on the pages of his diary.

Truthfully, looking for signs of altered consciousness in dreams is like looking for signs of liquid in water. Dreams *are* altered states of consciousness. Rather than looking for signs of altered consciousness in dreams, I ask why Kafka found dreams so fascinating that he continuously wrote about them and tried to interpret them. It could be that he was influenced indirectly by Sigmund Freud, who was a luminous figure in Kafka's lifetime. We know that Kafka was familiar with psychoanalytical theory. It stands to reason that if he was fascinated with dreams because they permitted a glimpse of the subconscious mind as Freud claimed, then he might use Freudian methods of interpretation. But Kafka rejects Freud by and large.

On the other hand, in trying to ascertain whether his approach to dreams and dream interpretation might be oriented to the transcendental, it is necessary to search his dream chronicles for traces of occult theory. The Theosophical approach construes dreams as revelations from higher worlds relayed to the soul during sleep, so Kafka's dream accounts must be read with an eye for spiritualist referents. Despite his claim that he loved the creative power inherent in dreams, there are allusions in his dream interpretations to the powerful "inner core of being" and the "spiritual battle" of his destiny. If he understands dreams as revelations from a higher self possessing divine powers, then he is a monistic religionist, in the way that Theosophists are monistic mystics. This means that the

deeper self becomes identified with the transcendent authority known as God, Providence, the Creator, or the Infinite. The struggle to become aware of the Infinite—a struggle that marks mystical traditions—becomes a yearning to know not God but the divine soul.

Following my argument that Kafka's passion for dream chronicling in his diaries was inspired by a devout yearning to experience the soul, it would stand to reason that we might find a discourse on the soul not only in his dream diaries but in his prose as well. Indeed, in two pieces written in 1917, "The Bucket Rider" (Kübelreiter) and "The Hunter Gracchus" (Der Jäger Gracchus), there is evidence of an underlying principle concerning the immanence of the soul—a principle that is paramount in many religious traditions. The narrators of both stories are spirits who continue to live after the death of the physical body. In one story, the spirit narrator surrenders to no longer having a body. In the other, the spirit narrator claims he is being eternally punished, trapped on the stairway that leads to the higher world. Read together, the two stories represent an eschatological philosophy that may have developed out of Kafka's intimate engagement with altered reality.

To interpret his eschatological philosophy and the motifs in it, a mystical framework is clearly necessary. The two pieces written by Kafka in 1917 about after-death experience have strong correspondences with tropes in Platonic and Buddhist writings, suggesting that parallels exist. From this parallelism, it can be inferred that the mystical nuances in Kafka's own writings were shaped by a mixture of orientations, certainly not by Theosophy alone.

However, there is a trend in contemporary Kafka scholarship to overlook the eclectic mystical nuances in Kafka and to argue that his worldview was shaped exclusively by Jewish esotericism. This trend, in part, is a consequence of Kafka's own perception that Jewish esoteric traditions were an important part of his heritage. Indeed, in his diaries he mentions he was given the name "Amschel" at birth, after his maternal grandfather, who was "a very pious and learned man with a long white beard" (*Diaries* 152). One proof of his ancestor's saintliness, according to Kafka, was the many holy books lining the walls of his house (152). Another proof of his saintliness was that every day he performed the Jewish ritual of purification (*tevila)* by immersing in the river; in winter, he would chop a hole in the ice (152). Kafka claimed that his mother's great-grandfather was more pious; there was a legend concerning his spiritual powers. Once "flames jumped over but spared his house while the houses around burned down." Jews and Christians alike attributed this miracle to his piety (152).

Kafka's reverence for his devout ancestors may explain why he developed a fascination for Jewish religious traditions. The desire to embrace his roots, as it were, contrasted sharply with his father's contempt for provincial orthodox Jews. Hermann Kafka raised his children to be secular Jews, to be part of the German-speaking intellectual elite of Prague and to perform only token rituals in the synagogue. Possibly in an attempt to fill the religious void, Kafka began studying Hebrew and the Old Testament, going to Yiddish theater, and imbibing Hasidic stories. He was particularly inspired by the cabalistic homilies he heard from his friend Georg Langer, and the descriptions of East European religious customs he heard from another friend, Yitzhak Löwy.

For these reasons, attempts were made as early as the 1930s by the historian of mysticism Gershom Scholem and the philosopher Martin Buber to position Kafka's mystical imagination within Judaism. Both men came to the same conclusion on the basis of their readings of *The Trial* (Der Prozess). Kafka's worldview was deeply veined by Cabala, more specifically Gnostic-Cabala, which was an ancient form of Jewish esotericism. Under the colossal influence of Scholem and Buber, which continues to this day, critics insist on arguing that the mystical imagination represented in *The Trial* (1914–1915) was shaped by antiquated forms of Jewish esotericism.

It is at this juncture that I make two radical departures from the dominant critical theory about Kafka's Jewish modalities. In the first, I argue against the school of thought generated by Scholem and Buber that Kafka's Jewish modalities were shaped exclusively by way of theoretical mysticism, that is, through reading and contemplating notions he heard at lectures. According to this school of thought, Kafka read the Zohar, with its strains of Gnostic or *Hekhaloth* celestial-hall metaphysics, (a metaphysics that kept God distanced from his creation by realms—ergo halls—of angels and demigods) and this found its way into *The Trial;* Kafka imbibed Hasidic stories, with their own celestial-hall notions, and these left imprints in *The Trial;* Kafka heard Buber lecture about Jewish mythology, and this also helped shape *The Trial*. Buber claimed that Kafka was contemplating Psalm 82—which suggests the existence of a Gnostic-like cosmos constituted by a hierarchy of angels or lesser gods—at the same time he was writing *The Trial*.

However, the possibility that clairvoyant sensibility informed Kafka's Jewish mystical imagination has never been considered in the vast secondary literature on Kafka. In an article titled "Kafka as Kabbalist", Robert Alter was puzzled by the existence of Jewish motifs in Kafka's early prose when his interest in his own mystical traditions ostensibly only surfaced later in his life. But Alter's conclusion was that Kafka possessed shrewd intuition into Jewish theological imagination. This conclusion makes a claim that Kafka had unusual powers of mind, but it stops short of stating that Kafka was clairvoyant or that he had psychic powers or the ability to convey in writing the quality of a psychic mind.

In addition to arguing that Kafka's mystical modalities were shaped by authentic experiences and not merely exposure to cabalistic theory, I make yet another radical departure from prevailing literary criticism. I believe his mystical imagination, catalyzed by clairvoyance, was shaped to a large extent by Christian redactors of Judaic esotericism. Because the experiential dimension of Kafka's writing has not been acknowledged by literary critics, the cultural forces that shaped the experience have not been appreciated either.

The diary entry dated June 25, 1914, is a case in point. It reveals how cultural forces in the occult may have played a part in fashioning Kafka's mystical imagination. In this entry, Kafka described executing a series of strange motions that climaxed with a vision of an angel. The techniques Kafka employed to bring on the angelic vision and the motifs of the angel remarkably evoke ancient Jewish visualization practices employed by *Hekhaloth* mystics. These techniques not only seem to have been revived by German Theosophists. They seem to have been used by mystical societies which flourished in the modern occult.

Yet the possibility has never been considered that the spiritual center of Prague, which Kafka referred to on Feb. 19, 1911, in the first draft of his diary entry, contained flourishing Christian societies that redacted ancient Jewish esotericism along with cabalistic practices. One hypothetical source for the cabalistic nuances in his prose was the Freemasons, a society that became a major cultural and social force in Europe as early as the 1600s (Dewar 42f). Gaining momentum and power over the centuries, it attracted to its ranks representatives of the cultured and erudite sectors of European society (150). Indeed, in an astonishing diary entry penned by Kafka two years before he died, he wrote about the Freemason society housed on Altstädter Ring, appending his statement with the phrase "The truth there is in every discourse and doctrine" (*Diaries* 421).

The "discourse and doctrines" of the Freemasons are commonly designated as "Masonic Cabala or Cabalism" by occult historians who adduce *Hekhaloth* celestial-hall mysticism as its prototype (Schuchard 21f). The correspondence between Masonic doctrines and celestial-hall mysticism is all the more remarkable because it suggests an immediate source for the scenario of *The Trial*. Bearing in mind that Kafka referred to Masonic doctrine, it is crucial to realize that this doctrine was not

formulated in erudite discourse. The doctrines to which Kafka probably referred were presented by way of dramatic spectacles so that initiates would have an actual experience, a sense of participating fully in the mysteries (Millar 10). In other words, the Gnostic strains of Cabala that Kafka would have been exposed to through the Freemasons reflected experiential Cabala, in which theoretical elements were only auxiliary.

It is most striking that Masons stage their initiation ceremonies in such a way that the candidate, seeking admittance, stands outside a door guarded by a gatekeeper. This Gnostic scenario immediately brings to mind Kafka's parable "Before the Law", suggesting that *The Trial* (of which it was part) is related to Masonic legend and lore, which permeated the spiritual center of Prague.

The "center of Prague", so essential to Kafka's inspiration and spiritual life, was also permeated by the thriving culture of *Lebensreform* or Life Reform, an auxiliary movement of the Spiritual Revival. The movement, which promised realization of the higher self, was based on the premise that rejection of [SEP]materialism in favor of a transcendent worldview had to be accompanied by a transformation in lifestyle and in ways of thinking. If mystical experience "must be located within an objective area of public knowledge, and not kept apart in some Cartesian manner to a subjective area", as Patrick Grant argues in *Literature of Mysticism in Western Tradition* (preface x), then Kafka's attitude toward living, which manifested in his adoption of a strict vegetarian regime, must be located within the large body of occult knowledge made public during the modern Spiritualist Revival.

Within this body of occult knowledge, theories about animals and their spiritual lives were pervasive. Blavatsky argued that animals possessed souls and gave all creatures a pivotal role within her Theosophical evolutionary scheme. Besant continued her predecessor's cosmic schema. For her, animals were creatures with a group soul, which under the influence of humanity would individualize and attain a mental body (*Wisdom* 192), that is, an awareness of its soul. From the credo that animals possessed souls, Steiner (*Theosophy* 45 and 152–153) proclaimed a future day when all human beings would be herbivores and no species of animal would ever die out again. Moritz Schnitzer and Adolph Just, two devout Christian naturopaths associated with the *Lebensreform* movement who appear to have influenced Kafka's life greatly, decreed that the time had come for humanity to return to the Garden of Eden. This meant existing in harmony with divinely created animals by eating only the fruits of trees.

Kafka's ardent vegetarianism could very well indicate that he was product of his age. The idealization of a vegetarian diet, premised on assumptions about the divinity inherent in animal life, may elucidate why Kafka—after having a session with Schnitzer, who based his theories on the Bible—religiously renounced eating meat and fish. It may also elucidate the impulse behind Kafka's spending three weeks at Just's Naturopathic Sanitarium in the Harz Mountains, where the Bible, Christology, and the ideology of vegetarianism went hand in hand with mystification of animal life. Kafka's absorption of Just's ideology may also account for the naissance of his animal story enterprise. It must be borne in mind that Kafka, as a zealous vegetarian, composed an entire corpus of animal narratives—at least eleven stories. In fact, the last three stories, written when he was critically ill, concerned the transcendental burrowing skill of a mole, the sublime power of singing employed by a mouse, and the spiritual gnosis of a dog.

The story "Investigations of a Dog" (Forschungen eines Hundes; 1922), is a good example, if not totally complete, of an animal's sublime moment of spiritual awakening. In an extended paranormal moment (the longest in all of Kafka's writings), the first-person narrator, a dog, exults in that annulled state where *I* consciousness dissolves. The total annulment of the ego that Kafka feared in clairvoyance—a fear he expressed to Steiner—is attained.

The typical predications of Kafka's entire literary corpus, including this story, as "Kafkaesque", "surreal", "weird", "bizarre", and "out of this world" could very well be missing the point. The Kafkaesque in Kafka may very well be the meta-real, if by the word *real* we understand its common designation as what corresponds to the world we perceive through our senses. The jarring shifts of perspective, the disjointed voices and proliferation of objects that have broken away from individual, determinable, allegorical, and symbolic references, are comparable with representations of mystical experience, an experience calling into question the fundamentals of human cognition. That Kafka questioned the fundamentals of human cognition through a narrative in which an animal gains true insight into the nature of the world reflects an ideology that endows animals with the potential of having spiritual visions.

In addition to divulging indications of cultural referents and ideological influences, the story "Investigations of a Dog" reveals a monistic philosophy, which according to James develops in the wake of recurrent mystical episodes. Through enlightening moments, the mystic begins to see the self and soul in all of creation. The cognitive barrier causing one to see oneself as different from others breaks apart as the unifying principle that gives life to the cosmos is perceived.

Yet despite the strong flavor of personal revelation that a significant amount of Kafka's prose contains, spiritualist doctrines are pervasively relevant. Although Katz established it as axiomatic that all mystical experience takes place within a religious tradition, I believe otherwise. Kafka's mystical life, which he first became aware of after his bouts of clairvoyance, did not take place within traditional religion at all. He lived during the early-20th-century development of occult thought that included cabalistic, Christian, and redacted Jewish trends, and it is in this eclectic milieu that the mystical life of Franz Kafka and his concomitant literary enterprise emerge. <>

Divine Images: The Life and Work of William Blake by Jason Whittaker [Reaktion Books, 9781789142877]

Although relatively obscure during his lifetime, William Blake has become one of the most popular English artists and writers, through poems such as 'The Tyger' and 'Jerusalem', and images including *The Ancient of Days*. Less well-known is Blake's radical religious and political temperament, and that his visionary art was created to express a personal mythology that sought to recreate an entirely new approach to philosophy and art. This book examines both Blake's visual and poetic work over his long career, from early engravings and poems to his final illustrations to Dante and the Book of Job. *Divine Images* further explores Blake's immense popular appeal and influence after his death.

Reviews

'an insightful guide to the artistry of William Blake. . . Focusing on how political and religious currents affected Blake's art, Whittaker shows, in particular, how the idealistic hopes raised by the French Revolution among Blake and his contemporaries led him to imagine how his own society could be liberated from oppressive political structures and social strictures . . . Whittaker also exhibits how Blake's work as an engraver and printmaker illuminated his poetry . . . Whittaker makes a strong case for why Blake remains "one of the greatest poets and artists ever to have lived in the British Isles."' — *Publishers Weekly*

'William Blake was influenced by Shakespeare, Milton and the Bible. *Divine Images* re-familiarises the old and powerful stories, disentangles the themes of the prophetic books and celebrates the

ingenuity of the lyric poetry, while contextualising all in the visual and political culture of Blake's day. Jason Whittaker's beautifully written book puts Blake's spirituality and humanism centre stage. He explains what in Blake appealed to the Victorian and Modernist eras and still inspires contemporary artists, writers and musicians.' — *Sibylle Erle, Reader in English Literature at Bishop Grosseteste University and the author of 'Blake, Lavater, and Physiognomy'*

'No one can survive the impossible, irresistible Blake without an introduction. Jason Whittaker's is superior – readable, knowledgeable, comprehensive, up to date. Highly recommended for anyone trying to follow Blake's golden thread.' — *Morris Eaves, Professor of English and Richard L. Turner Professor of Humanities at the University of Rochester and the editor of 'The Cambridge Companion to William Blake'*

'*Divine Images* is the ideal guide for anyone wanting to know the life and works of William Blake – or to return to what they thought they knew. It is excellent both as an introduction to and overview of the historic Blake, exploring his poetry and art in their time and place and his inspiring legacy through the 19th century up to the present day.' — *Joseph Viscomi, James G. Kenan Distinguished Professor of English Literature, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Excerpt: This World Is a World of Imagination and Vision

According to a story by an early biographer, the poet and author Allan Cunningham, three days before his death William Blake was in bed completing a new version of The Ancient of Days. The image, one of the most famous and most easily recognized produced by Blake, had first been printed by him more than thirty years previously. Now, 'bolstered up in bed', according to Cunningham, he took the printed page and 'tinted it with his choicest colours and in his happiest style'. After working on it for a while, according to Frederick Tatham, a friend and follower of Blake who provided Cunningham with much of his information, Blake laid it aside with the exclamation: 'There! That will do! I cannot mend it' His wife, Catherine, realizing that this would be the last of his works, began to cry, whereupon William told her: 'Stay, Kate! Keep just as you are — I will draw your portrait — for you have ever been an angel to me! The story of Blake working until the last hours of his life, painting and drawing in the small rooms in Fountain Court off the Strand, would become a familiar one during the nineteenth century. Alexander Gilchrist, still the most important of Blake's

biographers, recouned the episode, capturing the image of a saintly man and his loyal, loving wife attending his final days before he passed into obscurity after his death in 1827.

`The sublimity of Raffaelle or Michel Angelo'

In the immediate period after his death, the fading of William Blake's memory appeared to be almost complete. By the time that Gilchrist's *Lift of William Blake, Pictor ignotus* was published in 1863, few of his closest friends at the time of his death remembered his life and work. Many of these young men had been known as the Shoreham Ancients because one of their number, Samuel Palmer, had a home in the Kent village of Shoreham. It was they who preserved the memory of one of the most remarkable artists ever to have lived and worked in Britain. After the appearance of Gilchrist's *L*, Blake's reputation exploded among a Victorian audience: he was celebrated by Pre-Raphaelites such as Dante Gabriel Rossetti, who collected his works and edited his poetry. As we shall see in the final chapter, the Rossettis had an important role to play in the transmission of Blake's reputation, as did Gilchrist's wife, Anne, who completed the biography after her husband's sudden death. Such was the spell that the Romantic artist cast on the poet W. B. Yeats, among other late nineteenth-century writers, that one of Yeats's earliest publications was a collected edition of Blake's complete works. In the twentieth century his 'difficult' later writings often became a source for Modernists such as James Joyce and T. S. Eliot, while his ever-popular *Songs of Innocence and of Experience* inspired musical artists and composers as diverse as Benjamin Britten, Bob Dylan and U2. Into the twenty-first century he is continually cited by writers and artists including Patti Smith, Kate Tempest and Alan Moore, and such is the appeal of his art that at the end of 2019 Tate Britain dedicated an ambitious, wide-ranging exhibition on the legacy of his work. The artist and poet who died in poverty has now become one of the most popular and best-known figures of the Romantic era.

THE ANCIENT OF DAYS, C. 1827, ETCHING, INDIAN INK, WATERCOLOUR AND GOUACHE ON PAPER.

There are a few of his works that are known by many: 'The Tyger', with its invocations of forests of the night and the fearful symmetry of the tiger, is familiar to almost every child, while the brooding dystopian vision of 'London' is commonly taught in the English school system. Although a considerable number of people may not know that it was William Blake who composed the stanzas beginning 'And did those feet in ancient time', they will recognize the song, better known as 'Jerusalem, from performances on television or radio, or from sporting events such as cricket and the Commonwealth Games. Nor is Blake's legacy restricted to poetry: he trained as an engraver and artist, and there are a number of his images that occur again and again. His large colour prints from the 1790s have frequently appeared in the popular imagination, with one in particular — a depiction of Isaac Newton as an angelic, sublime figure — reproduced and adapted repeatedly: a large bronze version of it by Eduardo Paolozzi is seated outside the British Library. Likewise, Blake's depiction of the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar as a mad beast of the field is an image that, once seen, is not quickly forgotten. As remarked at the beginning of this chapter, however, The Ancient of Days is probably his most famous artwork.

The image is a striking one, and was reportedly a favourite of the artist himself. Certainly it remained significant to him long after he first engraved the design in 1794. Frederick Tatham told the story of Blake finishing the image on his deathbed, and it was only one of a small handful of designs from the 1790s that Blake returned to in the 182os. The design is striking: in a circle of light that appears as a sun surrounded by clouds, a muscular, bearded figure with long, flowing white hair reaches down into the darkness, extending a compass with which he intends to circumscribe the universe. The engraver and biographer John Thomas Smith, who had known Blake well, said of the piece that it 'must at once convince the informed reader of his extraordinary abilities', and claimed that it approached 'the sublimity of Raffaelle or Michel Angelo'. The final version was commissioned by Tatham for what Smith described as 'the truly liberal sum of three guineas and a half', far more than Blake was used to receiving for individual prints.

For most viewers, the subject at the centre of the print is probably instantly recognizable as a relatively straightforward, if unconventional, depiction of the God of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Such an interpretation would appear even more likely because of the title of the piece: the Ancient of Days is one of the titles ascribed to God in the Book of Daniel, 'I saw in the night visions, and, behold, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him' (7:13). Although the tide was not used by Blake himself in his writings, John Thomas Smith referred to the picture as such in his Nollekens and His Times, published the year after Blake died, and Tatham also called it The Ancient of Days in his letter to Rossetti. Title and image also seem to reference other parts of the Bible, such as the line from Proverbs 8:27 that begins: 'When he set a compass upon the face of the depth'. As the art historian Anthony Blunt was the first to point out, this theme was a common one in medieval illumination and thus would seem to fit well with Blake's painting as a representation of God.

Yet the white-bearded figure is not God but Blake's own demiurge, the creator of our fallen world whom he called Urizen. The scene of Urizen marking out the universe with his compass is not referred to directly in Europe a Prophecy, where this image first appeared, but the poem invokes him several times as the tyrant figure who fights with Orc, the spirit of rebellion in Blake's poetry. Leo Damrosch observes that this particular representation of God is crouched within the sun, his shoulders jammed against its circumference in an awkward posture as he reaches down into the depths: yet while this God is compressed, confined, Damrosch also observes that 'powerful energy' flows through the figure, invoking the lines from Milton's Paradise Lost in which the Son uses compasses to measure out the circumference of the world:

> Then staid the fervid Wheeles, and in his hand
> He took the golden Compasses, prepar'd
> In Gods Eternal store, to circumscribe
> This Universe, and all created things:
> One foot he center'd, and the other turnd
> Round through the vast profundity obscure,
> And said, thus far extend, thus far thy bounds,
> This be thy just Circumference, O World. (Paradise Lost, 7:224-30)

That it is the Son, or Messiah, who creates the universe complicates the source for Blake's depiction of Urizen, who is elsewhere described as the 'Father of jealousy' (Visions of the Daughters of Albion, 7.12). That the demiurge, Urizen, is the creator of a fallen world indicates another important theme that will run throughout Divine Images: the notion of deism. Deism is an obscure term in the twenty-first century but was a respectable doctrine during Blake's lifetime, influencing many major figures such as Sir Isaac Newton, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine. At its simplest, deism proposes a supreme being who sets creation in motion but then no longer interferes in it, and many Enlightenment thinkers considered this the most rational response to religion in the universe: God exists, but as a distant, uninvolved figure. That Blake satirized deism through the Ancient of Days draws attention to how much he despised this attitude. He equated such an approach to natural religion and natural morality, individuals projecting their own prejudices onto a cosmic backdrop and then ascribing them universal value and pretending to make such values scientific. As he wrote in the section of Jerusalem dedicated 'To the Deists', 'Man must and will have some religion; if he has not the religion of Jesus, he will have the religion of Satan, and will erect the synagogue of Satan, calling the Prince of this World "God", and destroying all who do not worship Satan under the name of God' (Jerusalem 52, E201). While Blake was capable of writing some of the simplest and most lucid poetry ever to be composed in English, his verses and artworks were also often complex and profound, wrapped up in a personal mythology that can be hard to decipher, even for experts. The Ancient of Days is an image that demonstrates Blake's highly idiosyncratic reading of the religious and political events of his day, showing his wide-ranging knowledge of other writers and artists, and appears strangely familiar even though its subject matter may be completely obscure. It is the aim of Divine Images to provide a guide to Blake's art and poetry, to untangle some of the meanings of his more complex works by explaining them in reference to his life and the events and movements of his day.

Blake as Artist and Poet

One of the most compelling features about Blake is his combination of artistic and poetic talents. He was not unique in terms of being skilled in both the visual and verbal arts: Michelangelo was a prolific poet as well as painter and sculptor, while Dante Gabriel Rossetti almost certainly enjoyed Blake more because he saw an affinity between the sister arts. Blake began his career as an artist and was better known to his contemporaries in that capacity. In general, his visual work may be considered in three categories: as a painter, a printmaker and, as a special sub-category of engraving, a book artist. As a painter, he loathed working in oils: in the Descriptive Catalogue that accompanied his one-man show of 1809, he remarked, 'Let the works of modem Artists since Rubens' time witness the villainy of some one at that time, who first brought oil Painting into general opinion and practice: since which we have never had a Picture painted, that could shew itself by the side of an earlier production.' Blake's own preferred method was what he called 'fresco', a version of tempera painting mixed with glue that had little in common with classical techniques of fresco. Many of his biblical paintings used this method and while the technique could produce some astonishing works, such as his The Ghost of a Flea, the way that these paintings subsequently darkened and cracked with age does not demonstrate his best abilities as an artist. Alongside tempera, Blake was a masterful watercolourist. That these paintings were often held to be inferior to those of his contemporaries

was owing to the false dichotomy between oil and watercolour that became entrenched during the eighteenth century. Blake would work with relatively thin colours on paper without a ground, so the whiteness of the paper could shine back through his pigments, making them appear to glow. He often used this technique when illustrating other writers, most notably Milton: his paintings of Paradise Last, for example, remain some of the most widely reproduced to this day.

While Blake's results as a painter were often mixed, his mastery of printmaking is second to none. Indeed, in contrast to many of his contemporaries whose names are barely remembered now, other than a very few such as James Gillray and William Hogarth, Blake was experimental and viewed printmaking as an opportunity to produce original designs. In his advertisement for a print of Chaucer's Canterbury Pilgrims, he wrote: 'Execution is only the result of invention.' By this, as Morris Eaves has pointed out, Blake took issue with the separation of painting as an original art of designing or inventing images, and printmaking as the mere execution.' It had been this artificial separation that, among other things, prevented printmakers from becoming full members of the Royal Academy until almost a century after Blake's death.

As a printmaker, Blake's initial training as an apprentice was largely in the craft of engraving. This method, as we shall see in Chapter One, was intensively laborious and required considerable skill, patience and strength on the part of its practitioners. Intaglio engraving required cutting into a copper plate, to produce either lines or stippled effects that could be replicated quickly once the hard work of preparing the plate was completed. Most of Blake's commercial work was produced this way, as well as a number of original designs such as those for the Book of Job. It was through his experimentation with etching, however, that Blake demonstrated his true originality. Experts such as Robert Essick, Joseph Viscomi and Michael Phillips have shown just how unusual were Blake's methods of relief etching, what he referred to as his stereotype method: by drawing upon a copper plate with an acid-resistant ink, Blake could then use nitric acid to burn away the unprotected copper, a relatively fast means of production that still retained enough detail for him to produce his illuminated books. It is for these books, most notably the various printed copies of Songs of Innocence and of Experience, but also his truly magnificent epic poems Milton and Jerusalem, that Blake is often best known. These books show what W.J.T. Mitchell called Blake's 'composite art', a mode of production where he displayed 'an energetic rivalry, a dialogue or dialectic' between word and image.'

As an artist, then, Blake's position in the history of British culture is assured: at Tate Britain he takes his place among a triumvirate of great British Romantic artists that includes Turner and Constable. To this, however, must be added his achievements as a poet, an activity that attracted only a little attention during his lifetime. For the great majority of readers, he is probably better known as a lyric poet, the author of works such as The Tyger', 'London', the stanzas from Milton a Poem and Auguries of Innocence, which famously begins:

> To see a World in a Grain of Sand
> And a Heaven in a Wild Flower
> Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
> And Eternity in an hour

The formal simplicity of such verses, combined with a complexity of temporal and spatial vision, placed Blake alongside contemporaries such as Wordsworth, Coleridge and Keats. In 1818 Coleridge described Blake as 'a man of Genius' and 'a mystic emphatically' (BB 336), while Wordsworth saw more of value in the supposed madness of the engraver-poet than the sanity of Byron and Walter Scott. Although his lyrical poetry has achieved more fame, Blake himself devoted the greater part of his time to the complex works that have come to be known as his prophetic books. He began to compose these at a very early stage — The Book of Thel was printed about the

same time as his Songs of Innocence, for example — and the prophecies fall into two main categories: those produced during his and Catherine's residence at Lambeth during the 1790s, and the later pieces that he began work on following his return from Felpham in 1804. These latter include Milton a Poem andJerusalem the Emanation of the Giant Albion, huge books in comparison to his Lambeth Prophecies and works that attempt to provide truly epic accounts of the complex mythology that Blake began to devise from the 1790s onwards. It is this personal mythology — provided most extensively in an unfinished and unengraved work, Pala; or, The Four Zoas— that is frequently most confusing to new readers of Blake and to which, in part, this current title has been written as a guide.

Religion, Politics and London

The structure of this book is largely chronological, moving through Blake's life as the most straightforward means of exploring his poetical and artistic works. That he lived during a time of rapid political and social upheaval, however, also means that there are some significant themes that cross the various chapters. One important aspect of this book is Blake's attitudes to religion and the divine. Blake himself appears not to have specifically distinguished between religion and politics, an attitude that was familiar to many of his contemporaries but which would soon seem a little old-fashioned a century and a half after the Restoration of the monarchy and dismantling of Cromwell's Commonwealth. For modern readers and critics there may often be a tendency to focus more on Blake's politics, but it is important to note that, as Naomi Billingsley observes, for Blake 'Jesus & his Apostles & Disciples were all Artists', and that his work was a means for readers and viewers to Internalise the process of regeneration and inspiration'. The early radical publisher with whom Blake worked, Joseph Johnson, published radicals such as William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft but was also the distributor of a wide range of Unitarian and Nonconformist religious tracts. A close connection with the spiritual world was a fact of life for many in the eighteenth century, for example in the works of the Swedish engineer Emanuel Swedenborg, who had mystical visions in which he conversed with angels:

> On the grounds of all my experience, which has lasted for several years now, I can say with full confidence that in their form, angels are completely human. They have faces, eyes, ears, chests, arms, hands, and feet. They see each other, hear each other, and talk to each other. In short, they lack nothing that belongs to humans except that they are not clothed with a material body.'

Swedenborg, whose New Church in London was the immediate cause for one of Blake's most startling works, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, is an example of the fact that for many writers the division between religion and philosophy, or religion and science, was not yet complete. The temptation to easily oppose Blake to Enlightenment philosophy is a false one; rather, as with all the Romantics, he was engaged in a dialogue with the most important ideas of the Enlightenment. For Blake, as for Wordsworth and Coleridge, simplistic assumptions about the perceiving subject as a passive recipient of sense impressions in the wake of John Locke's empirical philosophy made art effectively impossible. By contrast, a fuller approach to Enlightened thinking would embolden each person to fulfil their senses and abilities in a way that Blake considered holy, an ideal that was espoused by his maxim in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: 'If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is: infinite.' In terms of religious sentiment, the application of this cleansed perception can be seen in the final stanza of the poem that provides the title for this book, 'The Divine Image':

> And all must love the human form,
> In heathen, Turk, or Jew;
> Where Mercy, Love, and Pity dwell

There God is dwelling too.

The profound humanism of this poem contrasts with one of its sources, 'Praise for the Gospel' by Dr Isaac Watts, included in his Divine Songs

Lord, I ascribe it to thy grace,
And not to chance as others do,
That I was born of Christian race,
And not a Heathen, or a Jew!

Blake's vision of the human form divine is one that appeals to a much wider sensibility than that of Watts. Yet the fact that Blake was responding to Watts comes from a shared tradition of Nonconformism. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the easy assumption among Blake scholars was that he belonged to a Dissenting or Nonconformist tradition, that is, those believers who, following the Restoration, refused to accept the complete authority of the Anglican church. Such a view has been challenged more recently, most notably by Keri Davies who observes that the marriage of Blake's parents and baptism of their children in a parish church, but burial in Bunhill Fields (a favourite site for Nonconformists), suggests that 'the Blake family were members of the Church of England at the time of their marriage and moved toward religious dissent during William's childhood' or that their opposition to the Church was a political stance against its clergy, rather than a religious one against its theology.' The move towards dissent, if it did take place within the family, may have been inspired by Blake's mother, whom recent research has identified as a member of the Moravian Church, one of the oldest Protestant sects, which had its origins in fifteenth-century Bohemia and was very accepting of its members belonging both to Moravian and Anglican congregations.' The relationship between religious and political dissent, then, is an important theme that runs throughout this book.

The appreciation of Blake's works is made easier by an understanding of his religious ideas and of the language of the Bible, which informed his work in a way that is unfamiliar to many readers today. This is by no means to ignore the fact that those works are also profoundly political in their nature: his birth in 1757 was, after all, only a century after the great religious wars between Protestants and Catholics that had torn apart Europe and had been reflected in the civil strife of the British Isles. During his lifetime he witnessed not one but two revolutions, first that by means of which the American colonies were transformed into the United States, and then the revolution in France that led to the bloodiest conflicts in Europe prior to the First World War. David Erdman, in his book Blake: Prophet Against Empire, was one of the first to write persuasively of how the political antagonism between the crown and a largely metropolitan group of `patriots' opposed to the attempt to subdue America shaped Blake's own views from an early age. It was the French Revolution, as with all the great Romantics, that catalysed his own radical views. According to Gilchrist, Blake wore the bonnet rouge, the cap of liberty that was a symbol of adherence to the ideals of the Revolution: 'Down to his last days Blake always avowed himself a "Liberty Boy," a faithful "Son of Liberty". His radicalism became overt in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution: his only conventionally set poem after the early Poetical Sketches was entitled The French Revolution (1791), and during the 1790s he turned to the theme of liberty and tyranny in a series of prophetic books that began with America a Prophecy, a retelling of the American War of Independence in the light of events in France.

Political and religious radicalism infuse Blake's poetic and visual art, providing a context for many of his most original — and often challenging — opinions on psychology, sexuality and all aspects of human relations. He was also affected by the changing urban environment in which he lived. By the time of Blake's birth, London had a population of about three quarters of a million people; by 1815 it was already the largest city in the world with nearly 3.2 million inhabitants. At this stage, many of

those living in London had not, like Blake, been born there, with most flooding into the industrializing city from the countryside as rapid changes in agrarian practices both enabled a population boom and removed the means of subsistence living that had been in place for generations. By the time of his death, the number of people living in the capital would grow even further, especially with an influx of immigrants from Ireland. The changing nature of the city did not escape one of its greatest poets: many readers are surprised to read so much pastoral poetry in Blake's early work, assuming that lyrics such as 'The Ecchoing Green' are fantasias. And yet, as maps of London in 1770 show, areas such as Green Park and St James's Park were not minor incursions upon the urban landscape but actual limits of the city. As a child, Blake could have easily walked from his home in Soho to the farms and countryside that surrounded London, and when he and Catherine moved to Lambeth in the 179os it was to take up residence in new developments that were only just starting to cover the area south of the Thames.

These pastoral surroundings had not entirely disappeared by the time of his death, but London was already well on the way to becoming the City of Dreadful Night envisaged by the Victorian poet James Thomson. The wealthy areas of the West End were increasingly distinguished from the slums of the East End, and by the early decades of the nineteenth century the middle classes were moving from the squalor of the older buildings in central London to the suburbs of Highgate and St John's Wood. Although I am sceptical that the 'dark Satanic Mills' invoked in stanzas from Milton a Poem are explicitly about the Industrial Revolution, Blake was indeed living during a period that saw rapid industrialization and urbanization. In 1812 the docks of London were integrated by Act of Parliament into a growing national canal system, bringing more trade and people to London, and the Albion Mills, the first factory in the capital, was constructed in 1786 by Matthew Boulton and James Watt. Although it burned down in 1791, its steam-powered mechanisms would be adopted by an increasing number of manufactories, especially as the new canals allowed the cheap import of coal. While Blake's own language was shaped by older, more familiar motifs of the blacksmith, it is this city of industry and darkness that Blake mythologizes in his later works such as Jerusalem.

Blake's Legacy

As well as exploring Blake's art and poetry in the context of his life and times, the final chapter of Divine Images is also concerned with the legacy of those words and images. The appearance of Alexander Gilchrist's Lift of William Blake in 1863 was something of a literary sensation. One of the reasons for its success was that, in contrast to more famous contemporaries such as Byron, Wordsworth and Shelley, Blake's very obscurity allowed him to be remade in the image of those who discovered him first. For Gilchrist, he was a saintly figure neglected by the world, while the Rossettis' began the transformation of Blake into a 'complete artist', one who was concerned only with art for art's sake. While appreciating the aestheticism of the Pre-Raphaelites, Swinburne re-created the Romantic as a true poet who was very knowingly of the Devil's party and, slightly later, Yeats would re-imagine him as an occultist and more thoroughgoing Swedenborgian than Blake had ever been. In a sense, this re-creation of Blake in the artist's or writer's own image has continued ever since.

In terms of Blake's influence, the most immediate effects were felt in the art world. This was because of the role played by the Shoreham Ancients, particularly figures such as Samuel Palmer and George Richmond who, in turn, were influential on later generations of artists such as the Pre-Raphaelites, a transmission of Blakean ways of seeing the world that were not always fully conscious in the immediate decades following his death. In the aftermath of the publication of Gilchrist's Life, however, that influence came to be very fully invoked, with Blake playing an important role in such things as the Arts and Crafts Movement. By the end of the century his poetry also had an important role to play in the work of figures such as W. B. Yeats, but it was in the early twentieth century,

with the rise of Modernism, that his complex illuminated prophecies finally began to be appreciated. Writers as diverse as Joyce, Eliot and Auden would invoke Blake as a forerunner of the difficult literary style they were promoting at the same time that his art — so widely emulated by the Pre-Raphaelites and in Art Nouveau — was starting to look rather old-fashioned.

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a pattern of vogues and fashions for Blake become apparent: for a while he would be the new discovery and thus become all the rage, but then, with time, reproductions of Blake's art or his poetry would oversaturate the market. People grew bored of him and so he fell out of fashion, only to be rediscovered by a later generation, so that interest in Blake has often been cyclical. After the Second World War, for example, Blake was adopted wholesale by the Beats but then, from the 1980s onwards, seemed to fall out of favour a little (including, even, in academia, where by the 1990s there were rumblings to remove him from the list of the 'Big Six' as not being a proper Romantic). The change in interest appeared to rise at the end of the 19905 when, among other things, an increasing sense of millennial anxiety seemed a good context in which to revive the works of the most visionary of the figures from the Romantic era.

Much of Blake's legacy has, unsurprisingly, centred on art and writing, but he has been important to other areas such as filmmaking, philosophy and even science: his continual opposition to the worldview of Isaac Newton finally found favour at the end of the twentieth century when the revolution begun by Einstein and quantum mechanics almost a hundred years earlier seemed to require a new paradigm beyond mechanistic philosophies. In one area outside the visual arts and writing, however, that of music, Blake appears to have been more influential than just about any other poet. In the first years of the twenty-first century, I and other critics could place Blake just behind Shakespeare and Robert Burns in terms of the number of times his works had been set to music, but in the intervening time musical adaptations of his lyrical poetry in particular have soared in number while settings of Shakespeare and Burns have remained relatively static. This book can only look at a few examples of Blakean music, but it is a field that is rich and growing.

At his simplest, as in Songs of Innocence and of Experience or Auguries of Innocence, Blake writes in a way that even the smallest of children can understand — yet such works comprise only the smallest fraction of his output. Much that is difficult is so because contexts that were common to Blake, such as a profound knowledge of the Bible, are no longer widely shared. At other times, however, Blake is difficult to understand because he is obscure, sometimes deliberately so: as he wrote to Reverend Dr Trusler in 1799, 'That which can be made Explicit to the Idiot is not worth World of Imagination and Vision.' As anyone who has ever appreciated the work of William Blake will know, this 'World of Imagination and Vision' can sometimes be the simplest thing to comprehend, immediately known by the smallest child: elsewhere, however, a deeper, richer appreciation of Blake's work will come through understanding the range of his works, visual and poetic, and the history of the times in which he lived. Divine Images is intended as such a guide for readers who wish to know more about what motivated and inspired this most original of artists. <>

THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF TRAGEDY: CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES FROM EARLY MODERN TO MODERN edited by Fionnuala O'Neill Tonning, Erik Tonning and Jolyon Mitchell [Studies in Religion and the Arts, Brill, Hardback: 9789004416536; E-Book: 9789004416543] open source

THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF TRAGEDY: CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES FROM EARLY MODERN TO MODERN explores the influence of Christian theology and culture upon the development of post-classical Western tragedy. The volume is divided into three parts: early modern, modern, and contemporary. This series of essays by established and emergent scholars offers a sustained study of Christianity's creative influence upon experimental forms of Western tragic drama.

Both early modern and modern tragedy emerged within periods of remarkable upheaval in Church history, yet Christianity's diverse influence upon tragedy has too often been either ignored or denounced by major tragic theorists. This book contends instead that the history of tragedy cannot be sufficiently theorised without fully registering the impact of Christianity in transition towards modernity.

Historicizing 'Tragedy and Christianity'

Tragedy as a dramatic art form is a subject of enduring popular and scholarly interest. Within the Western tradition it has experienced three great historical flowerings: classical, early modern, and modern. Classical tragedy, of course, considerably predates Christianity. Early modern tragedy and modern tragedy, however, both emerged alongside, and engage with, periods of remarkable upheaval within the cultural, theological, and political history of Christianity: first following the European Reformation, and secondly with the emergence of modernism following the slow and piecemeal 'death of God' during the long nineteenth century. Focusing on these latter two periods, this book offers a systematic and detailed study arguing for Christianity's creative influence upon the development of experimental new forms of tragic drama in the West.

These two periods both reveal a Christian culture in crisis, radically transforming itself in response to the stresses and revolutions of modernity. It is thus a key contention of this volume that the dialogue between tragedy and modernity (which has received considerable recent attention) is inseparable from a dialogue with Christianity and the Christian past. This claim is rooted in the parallel 'turns to religion' over the last twenty years within both Early Modern and Modernist scholarship, where scholars have begun to treat late medieval Catholicism, as well as mid-nineteenth to twentieth century Christianity, as on-going, dynamic, inescapable influences on cultural creativity, rather than as something simply left behind or overcome. The field of interdisciplinary and theoretical tragedy studies has yet to fully recognise the implications of this changed emphasis.

One difficulty in bringing about such recognition is the contested relationship between tragedy and Christianity within this field. Scholars of tragedy too often assume that Christianity, with its message of hope and redemption, has little to say to tragedy. Modern tragedy and tragic theory are sometimes felt to begin at the place where Christianity, confronted with the obscene fact of inexplicable human suffering and agony, discovers its own limits and falls silent. In the past, influential tragic theorists including Friedrich Nietzsche and George Steiner have argued at length that Christianity is not only inherently alien to tragic drama but actively hostile; and indeed that it has been instrumental in the supposed 'demise' of tragedy as a pillar of Western civilization.

In fact, putting the origin of this debate back into its historical context offers one apt illustration of how the 'turn to religion' within a field like Modernism Studies can challenge received ideas. Nietzsche specifically sought to revive tragedy as an antidote to a decadent, bourgeois, soporific, and finally nihilistic modernity that he held Christianity responsible for instigating. His idea of tragedy, which he explicitly conceived of as an 'anti-Christian counter-doctrine', thus became a tonic concocted to cure and revitalise this diseased modernity. For Nietzsche, the project of returning to Greek origins was not just an antiquarian exercise, it reached back before the advent of Christianity's influence to provide new possibilities for the modern era to become rooted in an alternative cultural history. The contemporary revival of tragedy (effected, for the young Nietzsche, via Wagner) thus pointed forward, towards a regenerated, post-Christian culture of the future. As Jeffrey Perl has shown, an ongoing *agon* with Christian thought and culture was fundamental to the influential drive towards a 'Second Renaissance' within literary modernism:

> The central question faced by the modernists was, historically speaking, What is the meaning of the middle period? or, put in its more usual form, What is Christianity? What purpose did it or does it serve, and has it a future? […] In general, the modernists attempt to deconstruct Christianity and its cosmology at the same time that they attempt to construct a post-Christian cosmology based on pre-Christian ones.

In other words, theorisations of tragedy as 'inherently' anti-Christian are often rooted in distinctively modernist ideas, which can be historically situated as rhetorical gestures within a continuing cultural and religious battle of the mid-to-late nineteenth century and beyond. So far from being irrelevant to tragedy, then, Christianity turns out to be a formative influence upon the very terms of modern discussions of the topic.

Similarly, the 'turn to religion' in Early Modern Studies has led to widespread reassessment of the continuing influence of late medieval religious culture throughout the sixteenth century and well into the seventeenth. This has had profound implications for scholarship on early modern theatre, including tragedy. Many scholars are now keenly aware that the rediscovery of and experimentation with classical modes of tragedy were necessarily filtered through established traditions of late medieval theatre. Take, for instance, the centrality of the wounded body to English Renaissance tragedy, and the discovery of its violent power when displayed as tragic visual spectacle. This forms the sharpest possible contrast with classical tragedy, where the wounded body is vividly described, often by a messenger, rather than visually displayed. The emphasis on visual spectacle in English Renaissance tragedy is inherited straight from late medieval Corpus Christi plays, which do not shrink from displaying the graphic torture and murder of Christ or the Massacre of the Infants, and it represents an entirely new departure in the history of tragic theatre.

Furthermore, these lingering late medieval traditions were also being re-shaped under the immense pressure of the Reformation in its many guises: its theological debates, its new crises of doubt and scepticism, and the sweeping and sometimes culturally traumatic changes to visual and material culture, such as the iconoclastic assaults upon devotional images in English churches, that followed in its wake. An emergent new body of scholarship showing how these religious concerns migrated into

the ostensibly secular plays of Shakespeare and his contemporaries is transforming the way we understand both early modern tragic drama and the historical periodization of literature itself. Together they reveal the Reformation as a watershed moment for tragedy; a crucible of late medieval religious and theatrical tradition, cultural loss, and radical new theological and philosophical ideas, from which dramatists drew inspiration to generate new and experimental modes of tragic art.

The essays in this book are thus rooted in two very different historical epochs: early modern and modern(ist). Read together as part of the broader framework of this book, however, they enter into dialogue with larger theoretical and interdisciplinary questions about the history of Christianity as a productive and shaping force upon the development of Western tragedy. The proper theorisation of tragedy has always called for a diachronic and interdisciplinary approach: the willingness to examine works within their specific historical and performance contexts, alongside an approach which plots these historical studies as part of the broader history and recurring problematics of tragedy as a genre. Accordingly, the realisation that Christianity, far from stifling creativity in tragic modes of writing, has been a demonstrably potent force in the historical development of tragedy makes it possible for literary scholars and theorists of tragedy to engage in fresh ways with more theologically-oriented work on the intersection of tragedy and Christianity. Despite a recent attempt by a reviewer to confine the work of Rowan Williams and other theological critics of tragedy strictly to 'the corpus of Christian writing on Western literature [which] will feature on theological bibliographies alongside works by a sub-set of other philosophically minded Christians', there is in fact a rich field here of formative tensions and creative overlaps to explore. The 2011 collection *Christian Theology and Tragedy* notes a number of common concerns including 'the experience of suffering, death and loss, questions over fate, freedom and agency, sacrifice, guilt, innocence, the limits of human understanding, redemption and catharsis', arguing along with Donald MacKinnon that 'tragedy is vital to a properly disciplined Christian theology, and that, by the same token, Christian theology can be a way of vouchsafing the true significance of tragedy'. Thus the theologians can help by sharpening the critic's sense of common, and contested, ground. It is true that Christian theological discourse can sometimes run the risk of appropriating tragedy, thereby losing historical specificity and sometimes blunting the impact of individual works and performances. Equally, though, literary critics of tragedy have at times failed fully to acknowledge the fact that two of the most transformative and experimental periods in the development of tragedy are saturated with Christian influences and creative tensions. Properly interdisciplinary conversations about tragedy and Christianity therefore need to acknowledge more extensively not only these shared conceptual concerns but also the important role of Christian religious history and discourse in shaping the conditions in which tragedy has flourished. Ultimately, to reject Christianity's contribution to tragedy is to risk ending up *critically* confused, reaching in the end the logical extreme espoused by George Steiner of rejecting almost all post-classical tragedy, including much of Shakespeare's, as somehow 'not tragic enough'. This volume contends instead that the history and problematics of tragedy as a genre cannot be coherently theorised without fully registering the impact of different aspects of and traditions within Christianity in transition towards modernity.

Understanding the intertwining relations between Christianity and tragedy is also inevitably complexified by historical events, such as the 'seminal catastrophe' of the 'Great War' in the twentieth century. In **LIFE AFTER TRAGEDY: ESSAYS ON FAITH AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR** edited by Michael W. Brierley and Georgina A. Byrne [Wipf and Stock, 978-1532602283] writers, many based at Worcester cathedral in England, explore 'the tragedy of the conflict from a theological perspective'. Drawing on the life and work of the British army chaplain Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy, the authors explore 'how God … might be spoken of in the midst and wake of tragedy'. Much has been written on the centenary of the First World War; however, no book has yet explored the tragedy of the conflict from a theological perspective. This book fills that gap. Taking

their cue from the famous British army chaplain Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy, seven central essays--all by authors associated with the cathedral where Studdert Kennedy first preached to troops--examine aspects of faith that featured in the war, such as the notion of ""home,"" poetry, theological doctrine, preaching, social reform, humanitarianism, and remembrance. Each essay applies its reflections to the life of faith today. The essays thus represent a highly original contribution to the history of the First World War in general and the work of Studdert Kennedy in particular; and they provide wider theological insight into how, in the contemporary world, life and tragedy, God and suffering, can be integrated. The book will accordingly be of considerable interest to historians, both of the war and of the church; to communities commemorating the war; and to all those who wrestle with current challenges to faith. A foreword by Studdert Kennedy's grandson and an afterword by the bishop of Magdeburg in Germany render this a volume of remarkable depth and worth. ""Padres were given a rough ride by British memoir writers of the First World War. However, Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy, 'Woodbine Willie' to the soldiers, demonstrates how wrong they were. His reflections on the war and its implications for his own Christian faith resonate to this day. The innumerable insights in this powerful book make plain how the conflict's spiritual challenge still reverberates.

LIFE AFTER TRAGEDY is an apposite title, representing an attempt to reflect on living through and in the aftermath of a war that claimed around 19 million lives, with over 20 million wounded. Many writers and theologians were significantly influenced by their own experiences in the First World War trenches or observations of this or other cataclysmic wars. These 'Dangerous Memories' of experiencing actual wastelands informed how tragedy was considered or represented, turning expectations on their heads as theologian Johan Baptist Metz writes: 'The memory of human suffering forces us to look at the public *theatrum mundi* not merely from the standpoint of the successful and the established, but from the conquered and the victims'. Tracing the transformations of tragedy thus includes looking at painful pasts and harrowing representations in new ways, while also bearing in mind that they emerge from diverse religious perspectives, traditions, and histories.

While it is important to recognise the differences between and within Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox traditions in relation to tragedy, a comparative analysis is not one of the aims of this book, nor is exploring the significant role of other religious traditions influencing understandings of tragedy (although one or two of the chapters do touch on the role of non-Christian traditions, see for example Olga Taxidou's discussion of Hellenism and Primitivism in the work of the Cambridge Ritualists). It is also beyond the scope of this volume to delve into the world of Ancient Greek Tragedy, religion, and 'the practices of the worship of Dionysus'. Neither is there space to explore, for instance, how George Steiner's and Gillian Rose's Jewish backgrounds informed their work, nor to analyse how 'The Tragedy of Karbala' is still regularly re-enacted by Shi'a Muslims in Iran and beyond. In aiming for a more limited scope, the editors hope that the parallels between the Early Modern and modern(ist) cases emerge more clearly as a historically specific basis for exploring the ongoing creative tensions at work between that shape-shifting pair, 'tragedy and Christianity', across the whole modern period and towards the present. <>

THE STRIPPING OF THE ALTARS: TRADITIONAL RELIGION IN ENGLAND, 1400-1580 by Eamon Duffy [Yale University Press, 9780300053425]

This important and provocative book offers a fundamental challenge to much that has been written about the pre-Reformation church. Eamon Duffy recreates fifteenth-century English lay people's experience of religion, revealing the richness and complexity of the Catholicism by which men and

women structured their experience of the world and their hopes within and beyond it. He then tells the powerful story of the destruction of that Church - the stripping of the altars - from Henry VIII's break with the papacy until the Elizabethan settlement. Bringing together theological, liturgical, literary, and iconographic analysis with historical narrative, Duffy argues that late medieval Catholicism was neither decadent nor decayed but was a strong and vigorous tradition, and that the Reformation represented the violent rupture of a popular and theologically respectable religious system.

The first part of the book reviews the main features of religious belief and practice up to 1536. Duffy examines the factors that contributed to the close lay engagement with the structures of late medieval Catholicism: the liturgy that was widely understood even though it was in Latin; the impact of literacy and printing on lay religious knowledge; the conventions and contents of lay prayer; the relation of orthodox religious practice and magic; the Mass and the cult of the saints; and lay belief about death and the afterlife. In the second part of the book Duffy explores the impact of Protestant reforms on this traditional religion, providing new evidence of popular discontent from medieval wills and parish records. He documents the widespread opposition to Protestantism during the reigns of Henry and Edward, discusses Mary's success in reestablishing Catholicism, and describes the public resistance to Elizabeth's dismantling of parochial Catholicism that did not wane until the late 1570s. A major revision to accepted thinking about the spread of the Reformation, this book will be essential reading for students of British history and religion.

'Tragedy and Christianity' in the Early Modern Period

The first section of this volume centres on Early Modern studies, where a sharper realisation of the continuities between late medieval and early modern culture, and of the ongoing trauma of religious change, has been spearheaded by revisionist histories of the Reformation such as Eamon Duffy's landmark *The Stripping of the Altars* (1992). Extending Duffy's insights into the cultural field, major studies by, among others, Helen Cooper, Beatrice Groves, Sarah Beckwith, Curtis Perry, and John Watkins have rejected rigid notions of periodization to demonstrate the pervasive continuities between late medieval theatre, culture, and religious practice, and the theatre of Shakespeare and his contemporaries. Furthermore, scholars including Stephen Greenblatt, Huston Diehl, Michael O'Connell, Alison Shell, Brian Cummings, and Gillian Woods have demonstrated how early modern drama was pervasively engaged by Reformation doctrinal and cultural changes, from the abolition of purgatory and changing beliefs in the sacraments, to the transformation in visual culture and the legacy of religious iconoclasm.

The relevance of these scholarly shifts to our understanding of tragedy in the period can be suggested under three broad headings. Firstly, a realisation of the impact of medieval religious culture and drama upon the fundamental assumptions or grammar of what a 'play' *is*, and upon the material culture, visual language, and rhetoric that sustained play-making, play-going, and performance. Secondly, a heightened realisation of the ongoing tensions between cultural memories of medieval Catholicism and the new Reformation language and imagery, leading to a specifically theatrical thematization of religious crisis that also encompasses intense doubt and scepticism as a subject for tragedy. Thirdly, a reconsideration of the influence of Greek and Roman sources on early modern tragedy, in that these were profoundly reconfigured and appropriated by the religious assumptions, dramatic traditions and ongoing theological controversies of a specific Christian culture in transition. The essays in this volume extend the debate in all these fields.

Under the first heading, Helen Cooper's study **SHAKESPEARE AND THE MEDIEVAL WORLD** has shown how the generic mixtures and lack of classical decorum of the early modern stage – with its premise that 'multitudes, space and time' can be staged and enacted with the aid of

an audience's 'imaginative complicity' – would be unimaginable outside a theatrical culture shaped by the great medieval cycle plays and moralities. Helen Cooper's unique study examines how continuations of medieval culture into the early modern period, forged Shakespeare's development as a dramatist and poet. Medieval culture pervaded his life and work, from his childhood, spent within reach of the last performances of the Coventry Corpus Christi plays, to his dramatisation of Chaucer in *The Two Noble Kinsmen* three years before his death. The world he lived in was still largely a medieval one, in its topography and its institutions. The language he spoke had been forged over the centuries since the Norman Conquest. The genres in which he wrote, not least historical tragedy, love-comedy and romance, were medieval inventions. A high proportion of his plays have medieval origins and he kept returning to Chaucer, acknowledged as the greatest poet in the English language. Above all, he grew up with an English tradition of drama developed during the Middle Ages that assumed that it was possible to stage anything - all time, all space.

SHAKESPEARE AND THE MEDIEVAL WORLD provides a panoramic overview that opens up new vistas within his work and uncovers the richness of his inheritance.

In this volume, Beatrice Groves adds further weight to Cooper's argument through her exploration of the material culture of early modern theatre (Ch. 1). For Groves, the physical continuities between medieval and early modern staging practices through richly symbolic objects reveal how early modern tragedy is an 'inheritor of the dramaturgy of the mystery plays'. This is a key source of the unique dramatic power of early modern tragedy, which 'responds to the raw emotional power of the drama of the Passion. And it is often at the moments of supreme suffering that the connection with medieval dramaturgy is at its most palpable'. Stuart Sillars's contribution (Ch. 2) focuses on visual allusions to Christian rite, belief, and iconography in Shakespearean tragedy: a grammar of signs and gestures (such as rites of kneeling in *Richard ii* and *Hamlet*, or funerary monuments and the *pietà* in *Othello* and *King Lear*) that are both recognisable and unsettling in their richly 'dynamic imprecision' or 'generative ambivalence'. His essay also points forward to a comparable modern ambiguity about Christian echoes in Sean O'Casey's *The Silver Tassie*, R.C. Sherriff's *Journey's End*, and J. M Synge's *Riders to the Sea*.

Groves and Sillars discover both medieval and Reformation contextual echoes, thereby reminding us that emphasising the medieval in early modern drama is simultaneously to sharpen our sense of the ongoing religious crisis brought about by the Reformation. Indeed, this crisis itself becomes potentially innovative and productive subject matter for tragedy, through the impact of political-theological revolution, anxiety over disjunction and rupture with the past, and new forms of potentially corrosive sceptical doubt. One topic that naturally generated a theatrical response was Reformation iconoclasm. As Fionnuala O'Neill Tonning's essay recalls (Ch. 3), the commercial theatre, even if divorced from its medieval grounding in religious ritual that implicated the spectator specifically as a Christian believer, was yet accused by the English Puritan anti-theatricalists of falsely claiming to deliver an experience of 'real presence' on the stage through mere pretence. This continuing anxiety about the power of images to mediate any form of contact with the divine thus impinged directly on playwriting and performance. Tonning's reading of *Timon of Athens* as a tragedy that mourns the lost power of art through a broken image of Eucharistic communion, where flesh turns into stone, suggests the complexity of the imaginative clash of liturgical and commercial spectacle on the early modern stage. This also indicates a broader lesson about the relationship between tragedy, Christianity, and the emergence of early modernity in this period. As Tonning argues, tragedy's response to the Reformation is crucially to cast it as 'a problem of representation'.

The third way in which a reconsideration of early modern religious culture affects our understanding of tragedy in this period is through the realisation that appropriations of Classical sources were no

mere 'revivals', but were necessarily filtered through Christian thought and imagery, and yoked to pressing theological, cultural, and political concerns. In this volume, two essays by Adrian Streete (Ch. 4) and Giles Waller (Ch. 5) explore distinctive mixtures of the Christian and the Classical in tragic form. For Streete, John Webster's savage Jacobean tragedy *The Duchess of Malfi* is a searching examination of the value of pity versus control of the passions, explored via the 'interface between Christian and neo-Stoic discussions of the emotion'. Pity, on this reading, is 'mimetically dangerous', and the Duchess's final enactment of constancy offers the audience an 'exemplary neo-Stoical self' that does not embrace persecution as a form of tragic ennoblement but instead affirms such immovability as a form of political resistance to tyranny. Waller's essay examines Hugo Grotius' widely circulated Latin version of the Passion play *Christus Patiens* (1608, translated into English by George Sandys in 1640). Maintaining a strict observance of Aristotle's 'unity of time', the play remains circumscribed within twenty-four hours and ends on Good Friday, so that the risen Christ remains hauntingly absent from the stage. In contrast with those scholars (such as Cooper and Groves, above) who focus on the power of the wounded body in early modern tragedy, and its medieval inheritance, Waller argues that 'the Christianization of classical and neoclassical dramaturgy can be seen to be differently, but no less affectingly powerful, precisely in the haunting *absence* of these wounded bodies'. Streete's and Waller's contributions together provide an acute re-examination of pity, horror, and spectacle as elements of the Christian-Classical compound in early modern drama, demonstrating conclusively some of the theatrically generative possibilities arising from the encounter between neo-classical tragedy and Reformation theology.

'Tragedy and Christianity': Modernism beyond the 'Death of God'

While early modern commercial theatre could provide a liberating space for practical experiments in tragic form that baffled contemporary theorists of tragedy, from the late nineteenth century onwards theorisation itself has often acted as a driving force for generic experimentation and innovative performance practices. The list of theorist-practitioners is extensive: and whether arguing for a more hieratic, mystical tragedy (W.B. Yeats), a democratic tragedy (Arthur Miller), a neo-Christian tragedy (T.S. Eliot), or for a rejection of tragedy itself as a bourgeois, deceptive form (Bertolt Brecht), or alternatively as grotesquely comic in its overassertive heroism (Samuel Beckett), it is clear that a creative contestation of tragic form has itself been a fundamental source of renewal in modern theatre. And of course, the practitioners are themselves aware of the existence of a formidable and sophisticated body of analysis, with thinkers like G.W.F. Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud at the helm. The point made before in relation to Nietzsche therefore bears repeating, and can in fact be generalised: arguably, all modernist discussions of tragedy are indelibly shaped around various kinds of ongoing, creative tension with Christianity. Whenever tragedy is theorised in this period, the question of how to assess the Christian past, and whether Christianity has any viable future, is never far away.

Of course, such epochal thinking stems from a religious crisis that was no less severe than that of the Reformation. Whether characterised in terms of J. Hillis Miller's 'disappearance of God' (a widening gap or withdrawal), or through Peter Berger's stress on the breakdown of the 'sacred canopy' of religious and social order (fuelling *anomie*), or via Charles Taylor's more nuanced account of the multiplication of competing religious and ethical alternatives (as opposed to simplistic 'loss-of-faith' stories) within late modernity, the recurring note here is doubt, tension, conflict, and the search for some form of future renewal. Yet as scholars of modernism such as Stephen Schloesser, Pericles Lewis, Michael Bell, Leon Surette, Suzanne Hobson, Roger Griffin, and Erik Tonning have demonstrated over the past few decades, it is no longer possible to construe this crisis as a straightforward 'secularisation narrative', from faith to doubt to secular scepticism. On the contrary, modernism was fuelled by various religious impulses and replacement religions. Furthermore,

Christianity itself remained an inescapable presence, both for those modernists seeking to somehow overcome it, and for those who appropriated or converted to it in order to advance some version of cultural and spiritual revitalisation. The residually Christian culture of the post-nineteenth century West, then, has created fertile ground for experimentation in tragic form through motivating both theorisation and practice. Yet this volume is the first to explicitly address this creative interaction between the reconfigurations and reinventions of modern tragedy, on the one hand, and the ongoing impact of Christianity, on the other.

Modern theorisations of tragedy begin from G.W.F. Hegel, but it is seldom fully recognised how concerned this thinker was with prefigurations of Christianity (linked to modernity) within the Greek corpus. Peter Valeur's essay (Ch. 6) for the first time brings together Hegel's scattered references to Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, under the headings of undoing/forgetting the past, mourning, and the grave. Hegel was the first to invoke the 'death of God', and Valeur traces the resonances of the ancient Greek cult of graves, Christ's empty tomb, and burial in the syncretic, museum-like Pantheon in Rome, while interpreting Hegel's philosophy of tragic art as itself an ambivalent form of mourning for that death.

Nihilism is the stage beyond such mourning, and Ronan McDonald's essay (Ch. 7) offers an original reading of the intersections of tragedy, Christianity, and nihilism in Nietzsche's work. McDonald traces the 'self-negations' of both tragic and nihilistic views: how the tragic doubles into the aesthetic/valuable, and the nihilistic into the ascetic/renunciatory, while linking this with Christian traditions (the *via negativa* and apophatic theology) emphasising the unknowability of God. For McDonald, Nietzsche's philosophy is ultimately haunted by the Cross, as the perpetual opposite or mirror-image into which both his readings of tragedy and nihilism always threaten to collapse.

Olga Taxidou's essay (Ch. 8) explores a complementary aspect of Nietzsche as inspirer of the Cambridge Ritualists and, in the modernist dramas of W.B. Yeats and T.S. Eliot and the Greek translations by Ezra Pound and H.D., the catalyst for a 'heady fusion of Christianity and Greek tragedy'. The 'death of God' was followed in modernism by a fascination with the potential revitalisation offered by the 'savage God', and Taxidou analyses a range of those sometimes unholy and blasphemous alliances that bring together Classicism and Christianity in ways that help create a specifically modernist theatricality.

Similarly, as Erik Tonning's essay (Ch. 9) shows, Samuel Beckett's ambivalent engagement with tragedy and tragic theory was shadowed by Christian concepts of sin and redemption. His earliest definition, drawing on Schopenhauer, calls tragedy the statement of an 'expiation' of the 'original sin of having been born'. Beckett's exemplary tragic dramatist was thus the Jansenist Jean Racine, whose work, for Beckett, staged a divine condemnation of human desire as such. Yet Racine's characters *achieve* expiation: their final clarity about their own state may point towards redemption. For Beckett, such clarity and hope were unacceptable, and his rejection of an achieved expiation is the basis for his conscious attempt to go 'beyond' tragedy, first in *Waiting for Godot* and later (with many Racinian echoes) in *Play*. While that 'beyond' verges on indifference and nihilism, Beckett's continuing ethical revulsion with Christian theodicy is nonetheless what ensures that suffering remains acute and significant in these plays.

Tragedy and Christianity in Transformation: Towards the Present

The third section of this volume offers a series of soundings of the ongoing dialogue between tragedy and Christianity towards the present. The capacity – or otherwise – of both tragedy and Christianity to adequately recognise suffering becomes an ever more acute question in light of the genocides and catastrophes of the twentieth century, and the resurgence of sectarian terror and apocalyptic fundamentalisms in the present century.

Beckett's stark vision offers a starting-point for reflection here, as his tortured, confined and endlessly interrogated figures in *Play* – almost-already mere ash in their urns – evoke a distinctly post-Holocaust version of Dante's *Inferno*. In his radio talk 'Capital of the Ruins', a report from his work with the Irish Red Cross in the devastated city of St. Lô in late 1945, he argued that only the 'time-honoured conception of humanity in ruins' could give 'an inkling of the terms in which our condition is to be thought again'. Central to Beckett's critique of both tragedy and Christianity is that neither goes far enough in recognising and contemplating humanity in ruins. Nazism had precisely tried to sanitize and expel the 'degenerate': a cancer or poison was to be eradicated from the *Volkskörper*, whether by burning paintings or Jewish bodies. Already in 1937, eagerly in search of 'degenerate' paintings in museum cellars during his German trip, Beckett noted in his diary his visceral distaste for the 'NS gospel': 'the expressions "historical necessity" and "Germanic destiny" start the vomit moving upwards'. For Beckett, German nationalism with its imagery of a 'new dawn' for the *Volk* had exposed the potential grotesqueness and sacrificial underbelly of *all* narratives of redemption. By contrast, an authentic 'fidelity to failure' requires steadfastness in rejecting all false redemptions or renewals of order, whether cosmic, socio-political or personal. Measured against this radical criterion, both tragedy and Christianity ultimately fall short in Beckett's reading.

However, if we step back to consider the genealogy of Beckett's uncompromising identification with the position of the victim, his work can itself be seen as emphatically post-Christian. As René Girard has argued, the very idea of sympathy for the sacrificial victim is biblical and, in its developed form, distinctively Christian, from the 'suffering servant' of Isaiah to the crucified man-God of the New Testament. Anthropologically, this represents a radical departure from the archaic sacred, where a scapegoat victim is unregretfully (often festively) sacrificed for the sake of community cohesion. For Girard, this is done to suppress or contain a crisis of imitative-competitive ('mimetic') desire that might otherwise perpetuate a disintegrative cycle of violence and revenge. Nevertheless, the figure of Christ unmasks and critiques this victimizing mechanism at the basis of human society, in that the peace Christ's cross offers his followers is one that claims to transcend the false sacred of collective sacrificial violence. But as Scott Cowdell's recent study **René Girard and Secular Modernity** points out, this unmasking itself plants the seed of a desacralized modernity in which 'sacred protection is dwindling away and violence is less reliably held in check'. The 'secular' here names a condition in which mimetic desire finds no outlet that is socially cohesive in the old way, since a plurality of competing worldviews proliferates endlessly, and all the gods are doubted. Secular modernity thus releases ever new cycles of violence through its failing attempts to invent substitutes for the gods: an insight that applies to the totalitarian and genocidal political religions of the twentieth century such as Fascism, Nazism, Stalinism and Maoism, no less than to our contemporary clash of a ruthless global consumer capitalism versus resurgent religious and political fundamentalisms that both imitate and seek to destroy the system of substitute desires that postmodern capitalism generates.

In **René Girard and Secular Modernity: Christ, Culture, and Crisis**, Scott Cowdell provides the first systematic interpretation of René Girard's controversial approach to secular modernity. Cowdell identifies the scope, development, and implications of Girard's thought, the centrality of Christ in Girard's thinking, and, in particular, Girard's distinctive take on the uniqueness and finality of Christ in terms of his impact on Western culture. In Girard's singular vision, according to Cowdell, secular modernity has emerged thanks to the Bible's exposure of the cathartic violence that is at the root of religious prohibitions, myths, and rituals. In the literature, the psychology, and most recently the military history of modernity, Girard discerns a consistent slide into an apocalypse that challenges modern ideas of romanticism, individualism, and progressivism. In the first three chapters, Cowdell examines the three elements of Girard's basic intellectual vision (mimesis, sacrifice, biblical hermeneutics) and brings this vision to a constructive interpretation of

"secularization" and "modernity," as these terms are understood in the broadest sense today. Chapter 4 focuses on modern institutions, chiefly the nation state and the market, that function to restrain the outbreak of violence. And finally, Cowdell discusses the apocalyptic dimension of Girard's theory in relation to modern warfare and terrorism. Here, Cowdell engages with the most recent writings of Girard (particularly his *Battling to the End*) and applies them to further conversations in cultural theology, political science, and philosophy. Cowdell takes up and extends Girard's own warning concerning an alternative to a future apocalypse: "What sort of conversion must humans undergo, before it is too late?"

For Girard, both tragedy and Christianity share an emphasis on unflinching recognition of the victim. Where tragedy exposes and analyses collective violence and its scapegoating mechanism, Christianity actually reconfigures the divine itself in the image of victimhood. From this point of view, Beckett's 'fidelity to failure' seems ultimately in alignment with this imperative of recognition, while also offering a useful challenge and corrective to superficial reassertions of heroic virtue or redemptive order. Moreover, this insight can provide tools with which to confront the bewildering variety of postmodern violent mimetic desire. When – and how – do Christianity and tragedy help us in recognising the victim, in confronting and really processing and assimilating failure? This question resonates through the three essays of this section, as well as in the Afterword by Rowan Williams.

In drawing on tragedy as a source of insight for contemporary Christian theology, Paul Fiddes is determined to confront scepticism about tidy theodicies head-on, even to the point of arguing that 'there is eternally a cross in the heart of God'. His essay (Ch. 10) thus poses a forceful challenge to the Steinerian assumption that a story of forgiveness and transformation is inherently un-tragic. Fiddes proposes his own revision of Donald MacKinnon's idea of a Christian 'tragic theology', based on the positive model of Shakespearean rather than Greek drama. Readers of this volume will recognise Fiddes's emphasis on consolation in Shakespearean tragedy not as 'a metaphysical explanation for evil and suffering, but the simple affirmation of human values that death cannot destroy', such as forgiveness in the face of moral frailty. Yet a confrontation with the cross, no less than with the end of a tragedy like *King Lear*, still reaffirms 'all the ambiguity of tragedy: we are left with an open question, "Is *this* the promised end?"' Fiddes's argument may here suggest a key insight about the sub-genre of those tragedies that are creatively transformed by their encounter with Christianity: they thrive on such ambiguities and endure that open question.

If contemporary Christian theology can find in tragedy a source of insight and challenge, so too can political tragedy find itself reinterpreted through different kinds of artistic expression. This is the insight that informs Jolyon Mitchell and Linzy Brady's essay (Ch. 11), which explores how a wide range of portrayals of the Massacre of the Innocents adapted for painting and literature, theatre and film, can become 'like a mirror to the context out of which they are produced'. Spanning several centuries of art and theatre, from the medieval Corpus Christi plays to contemporary revivals in theatre and film, the essay shows how this poignant and powerful narrative has routinely been used to bear witness to wartime killings and child massacres from the slaughter of women and children during the siege of Otranto in 1481 right through to World War Two, with the most recent example being the death of the three-year-old refugee Aylan Kurdi in 2015. Mitchell and Brady show how representations of the narrative vary: some appear to be reticent, leaving the violence offstage or outside the frame, reflecting 'an understandable desire to turn away from the horror and tragedy', others, like Mark Dornford-May's politically-engaged *Son of Man* (2006) show Jesus refusing 'to escape the world of bloodshed and injustice': 'He says, "This is my world," and fully enters in to its suffering and violence'.

The interplay between contemporary political tragedy, Christianity and war is also central to the final essay of the collection. The insight from Modernism Studies that a continuing creative confrontation with Christianity remains indispensable to understanding the modernist revolution in both arts and politics has gained new purchase in light of the more recent 'post-secular' return of religion in public life. Following on from this, the contemporary relevance of Christianity to tragedy is suggested not least by the so-called War on Terror and the related rise of Islamist fundamentalism, a violent ideology which casts itself in an ongoing heroic struggle with blasphemy in a heretical Christian or post-Christian West. In her essay (Ch. 12), Jennifer Wallace argues that whereas 'At the end of the twentieth century, it was a much-repeated commonplace to consider both tragedy and religion as anachronistic concepts … since 2001, religion has become the ostensible premise behind the clash of cultures which constitute the War on Terror and an appetite for tragedy, both the revival of classical tragedy on the stage and the generation of new forms of tragic representation, has been re-awakened'. Wallace is concerned with the function of 'recognition', a key Aristotelian concept which has become a cornerstone not only of tragic theory but of a great deal of post-Holocaust theological, philosophical, and political thought concerning the way we relate to the Other and his or her suffering. If tragic drama has traditionally revealed to us 'the degree to which we both do not want to recognize or acknowledge aspects of ourselves and we do not want to put ourselves in a vulnerable position of shared vulnerability and reciprocity' then it faces new challenges in the age of modern military technologies which allow war to take place remotely, on the other side of a screen, disrupting and distorting forms of recognition between friend and foe. Analysing two recent dramas about the War on Terror, the film *American Sniper* and the prize-winning play *Grounded*, Wallace argues that 'the War on Terror, both because of its technological developments and because of the nature of its ideology and discourse … is producing new forms of tragedy, new ways of thinking about recognition, responsibility, pity and fear, and therefore new forms of religious thinking'.

This volume concludes with an Afterword by Rowan Williams which takes Beckett's 'fidelity to failure' as its starting-point and probes the subtle ways in which such fidelity can be betrayed or distorted, while also insisting that tragedy and Christianity share a concern with witnessing and recognition that still calls for language, for images, for narrative. As Gillian Rose's well-known essay on the Holocaust suggests, there are any number of ways to sentimentalise or appropriate atrocity. In light of this, Williams asks how we can avoid either 'appropriating suffering to the self-interest of the observing ego or dissolving the particularity of suffering into a general edifying pattern'. For Williams, both tragedy and Christianity test the limits of recognition and in doing so pose a challenge to the ego's complacency, namely 'what will upset and finally dissolve that security in such a way that a truly disturbed and self-scrutinising response to the suffering of others is made more possible'. As such, they remain not just historically and thematically interconnected, but also still able to unsettle and transform our capacity for attention to wounded humanity.

Wounded and grieving human forms fill the picture on the front cover of this book: *Golgotha* (1937), by the Jewish artist Bob Hanf. In it, the mix of spiky curved lines and human figures draw the eye towards the central figure fixed on a symmetrical wooden cross. This familiar crucified shape, with a long history of representation, is surrounded by light and then by lines cutting through space. The angles of the other two crucified forms are part of an encircling movement which is continued on the left by a female spectator's outstretched arm. She reaches towards the suffering, as another female figure raises her hand to cover part of her face. The male watcher on the right, with a beard and an angular face, holds his arm back in a contorted gesture. The suffering of the three figures on the crosses appears to provoke different kinds of grieving, questioning or shock from the three spectators. This print, found in Amsterdam's Rijksmuseum, neither sentimentalises nor appropriates atrocity. Instead it captures different, ambiguous responses to suffering.

This is reflected in the life and death of the artist, Bob Hanf (1894–1944), who printed *Golgotha* seven years before his death in Auschwitz on 30 Septembe(be).8(fo)-2.r in 1944. Born in Amsterdam and brought up in Germany, Hanf was a talented and versatile painter, writer, musician, and award-winning compose(be).8(fo)-2. Lat(be).8(fo)-2.er described as one of the first 'anti-fascist artists' in the Nethe(be).8(fo)-2.lands, his haunting music was silenced and his expressionist art banned during the Nazi occupation. It would not be until the 1960s that some of his drawings were displayed and the 1990s that his compositions were performed again.

Golgotha stands out among his artistic work for its very explicit treatment of suffering and grief. Hanf's *Golgotha* is a very different kind of crucifixion from the bette(be).8(fo)-2.r known *White Crucifixion* (1938) by Marc Chagall (1887–1985), which explicitly depicts Jewish persecutions and Christ as a Jewish martyr. Hanf's own Jewish background, and his involvement in the resistance, meant that he himself had to go into hiding during the Second World War, where he wrote a vivid poem under a pseudonym entitled *Mijmeringen over de Nachtzijde des levens*, 'Musings about the Dark Side of Life'. In it he captures the atmosphere of Amste(be).8(fo)-2.dam during the Ge(be).8(fo)-2.man occupation. For example, he describes the reflections in the canals as 'wavering light imprisoned', 'like dead people turned to stone'.

Tfo *Golgotha* print are far from turned into stone. The movement of the observers is inscribed in the picture, which draws the eye towards the muted agony in the background. Tfo centre of the imag *Golgotha* challenges tidy theodicies. But tragedy itself resists watertight definitions and neat resolutions. The same is true of the dramas, pictures and other texts considered through this book. As we unde(be).8(fo)-2.r, the chapters that follow trace a range of theologically creative influences upon attempts to represent tragedy in the West. Like the picture on the front of this book these were often experimental, coming from unexpected sources, presented in
literary, and visual experiments frequently both enrich and interrogate the genre of tragedy itself.
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Other Gods and Idols: The Relationship Between the Worship of Other Gods and the Worship of Idols within the Old Testament by Thomas A. Judge [The Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies, T&T Clark, 9780567696120]

Tfos study questions why the relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of

these two issues as synonymous and others have viewed them as separate commandments.

Nearly every book of the Old Testament wrestles in some way with the worship of other gods or the worship of idols. Interpreters are confronted with laws denouncing them, narratives warning against them, songs, proverbs and prayers cursing them, and prophets ridiculing them. However, the relationship between the two is not static. There is a difference between the biblical depictions of the war against idols before and after the fall of the Northern Kingdom and this difference should inform how interpreters approach the issues in particular texts. In texts depicting the era before the fall of the Northern Kingdom, there is strong reason to distinguish between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols. However, in texts depicting the era after the fall of the Northern Kingdom the issues appear to be fused.

Nuanced approaches to the treatment of these issues in particular biblical texts will recognize that the relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols within the Old Testament is not one that can be defined neatly. The ambiguity is reflected most clearly in the differing enumerations of the Ten Commandments in Jewish and Christian tradition. While Protestant Reformed and Eastern Orthodox traditions see the prohibition of other gods and the prohibition of idols as distinct commandments, Catholic, Lutheran and most Jewish traditions treat them as one. The question of whether these prohibitions should be understood as one commandment or two certainly calls for particular attention to the immediate context of the prohibitions in Deut. 5 and Exod. 20. However, it also calls for attention to the wider relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols within the Old Testament as a whole.

While some interpreters view 'the worship of other gods' and `the worship of idols' as more or less synonymous issues (so that the idea of a 'relationship' between the two might sound somewhat non-sensical), others find significant reason to distinguish between them. This study explains why the relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols within the Old Testament is difficult to define. In order to do so, it is divided into two parts. Part I considers the immediate context ?of the prohibitions. Part II considers the relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols within the wider Old Testament context.

Part I begins with an examination of the relationship between the prohibition of other gods and the prohibition of idols within the Ten Commandments. Here we find a specific case that illustrates the difficulties involved in the broader question of why the relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols within the Old Testament is difficult to define. Interpreters of the prohibitions must wrestle with a linguistic ambiguity, a grammatical ambiguity and a theological ambiguity. Linguistically, they must consider whether an 'idol' should be understood specifically as a 'divine image' or generally as a 'false god'. Grammatically, they must consider whether the plural

pronouns of the prohibition, 'you shall not bow down to them or worship them', refer back to the singular 'idol' or to the plural 'other gods' of the verse before. Theologically, they must consider whether the prohibition of idols stands exclusively against divine images of alien deities, exclusively against divine images of YHWH or inclusively against all divine images whether they are associated with alien deities or the God of Israel. How interpreters deal with these three ambiguities will radically affect their conception of the relationship between the prohibitions.

The linguistic ambiguity is addressed in the first chapter, the grammatical ambiguity in the second and the theological ambiguity in the third. Chapter 4 moves from the narrower question of the relationship between the prohibitions to the broader question of the relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols within the Old Testament. Using the ambiguities present in the relationship between the prohibitions as a starting point, the first three factors that make the broader relationship difficult to define are introduced. The relationship is difficult to define because (1) the 'idol' terminology is notoriously ambiguous, (2) some biblical texts seem to fuse the issues while others distinguish between them and, (3) the texts of the Old Testament not only reject divine images of alien deities but also the worship of YHWH via divine images. Each of these factors makes it difficult to define the relationship neatly.

Part II presents a fourth factor. The relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols within the Old Testament is difficult to define because there is a difference between the war against idols before and after the fall of the Northern Kingdom. This difference creates two literary contexts in which the relationship between the issues may be understood. In Chapter 5, I argue that there is good reason to distinguish between the issues in texts depicting the era before the fall of the Northern Kingdom. In these texts the war against idols is not only fought on a foreign front against alien deities and the divine images associated with them, but also on a domestic front against the worship of YHWH via divine images. In other words, the idols that these texts identify, and attack are not only alien deities and the divine images associated with them but also representations of YHWH. In this context there is a legitimate difference between the worship of the 'wrong gods' (i.e. alien deities and the divine images associated with them), and the worship of the 'right God' in the wrong way (i.e. the worship of YHWH via divine images). The primary texts dealt with in this chapter are the directions for worship at the place YHWH will choose in Deut. 12, the rationale for the prohibition of idols in Deut. 4, the narrative of Micah's idols in Judg. 17-18 and three texts dealing with the golden calves of Aaron and Jeroboam: Exod. 32, Deut. 9 and 1 Kgs 12.

In Chapter 6, I argue that the sequence of events associated with the fall of the Northern Kingdom marks the end of the Old Testament's battle on the domestic front against the worship of YHWH via divine images. First, the golden calves are removed, then Samarian worship is condemned and finally, Hezekiah removes objects from the cult of YHWH that could be taken for divine images of Israel's God (the pillars, the sacred pole and the bronze serpent). Each of these events is a nail in the coffin of Israel's battle on the domestic front against the worship of YHWH via divine images. The primary texts dealt with in this chapter are the description of the fall of Israel, the repopulation of Samaria, Hezekiah's `reform' and the Assyrian siege of Jerusalem as presented in 2 Kgs 17-19, Isa. 36-37 and 2 Chr. 29-31. The battle against idols on the domestic front ends and this provides practical justification for the strong distinction between the gods of the nations that are wood and stone and YHWH who is the living God enthroned above the cherubim.

In Chapter 7, I make the case that texts depicting the era after the fall of the Northern Kingdom appear to fuse the worship of other gods and the worship of idols because the war against idols in these texts is exclusively fought on a foreign front against alien deities and the divine images associated with them. In this context, to worship a divine image is to worship a foreign god—

without exception. Therefore, there is little reason to distinguish between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols within this context. I briefly describe the absence of battle on the domestic front and the exclusive battle on the foreign front. At the close of the chapter, I question two assumptions. I first question the idea that Isaiah fused the issues associated with the prohibitions. I then question the commonly held assumption that the biblical treatment of the gods of the nations as 'the work of human hands' constitutes a shift from monolatry to 'monotheism' within the Old Testament (and conclude that it does not).

The eighth and final chapter returns to the Ten Commandments in order to reconsider the relationship between the prohibition of other gods and the prohibition of idols in light of the Old Testament's war against idols before and after the fall of the Northern Kingdom. While the biblical depiction of the war against idols before the fall of the Northern Kingdom provides a literary context in which there is significant reason to distinguish between the prohibitions, the depiction of the war against idols after the fall of the Northern Kingdom provides a literary context in which the fusion of the prohibitions makes sense.

However, before proceeding to the study itself, it is critical to discuss the presuppositions and hermeneutical approach that underlies the way I will interpret the biblical texts. While there is certainly significant theological diversity in the texts of the Old Testament, I will adopt a synchronic approach that examines the themes within the overall context of the canonical presentation) This work will therefore be an exercise in the interpretation of the received form of the texts of the Old Testament and what those texts have to say about the relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols. It is not a work on archaeology, the religious history of Israel, or even source, form or redaction criticism.

Although I take seriously the sequence of events within the Old Testament narrative, this does not constitute a shift from a synchronic to a historical approach. Having said this, a subtle (though critical) distinction should be made between the nature of the synchronic approach I will take and certain historical approaches. It is one thing to take seriously the sequence of events within an Old Testament narrative and quite another to use that sequence to construct a history of ancient Israel or the development of its religion. The first approach is synchronic, the second historical. This study distinguishes between texts that represent the war against idols 'before' and 'after' the fall of the Northern Kingdom. I do not structure the work in this way because I am attempting to focus on `the world behind the text' but because I am attempting to take seriously the dynamics of 'the world within the text'. Within the biblical narrative, the Northern Kingdom is established and then it falls. I argue that texts depicting the era before the fall of the Northern Kingdom fight a war against idols on two fronts while texts depicting the era after the fall of the Northern Kingdom fight on only one. This is best understood, as John Barton put it, as `diachrony within synchrony'? It is only when attention is paid to this narrative sequence that the difficulty in defining the relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols within the Old Testament becomes apparent. Although attention to this narrative sequence is essential for answering my primary question, it does not constitute a shift from a synchronic to a historical approach.

Although I speak of a war against idols before and after the fall of the Northern Kingdom, I always refer to the biblical depiction of these eras. I approach the text in this way because I am interested in the relationship between the worship of other gods and the worship of idols within the Old Testament rather within the history of ancient Israel or the development of its religion.' The difference is recognized in Benjamin Sommer's discussion of monotheism in the Hebrew Bible and in ancient Israel when he writes, 'The question "Is it really monotheistic?" needs to be asked separately for the Hebrew Bible and for ancient Israelite religion. The religious ideas of the former represent a

subset of the latter (or, more likely, several closely related subsets). Similarly, von Rad refers to the distinction in his discussion of the Second Commandment when he writes, `In the history which Israel herself wrote of herself, she believed that the commandment which forbade images had been revealed from the time of Moses onwards. This view has again and again been vehemently disputed down to the present day.' What has been disputed is not whether the Old Testament says that the second commandment had been revealed from the time of Moses onwards but whether the biblical depiction accurately represents the history of ancient Israel and the development of its religion. While this historical question is certainly valid, it is but one of many questions that can be put to the text. Within this synchronic study I am interested in 'the history which Israel herself wrote of herself' rather than the question of how well that history can be used to create a historical-critical reconstruction of the history of ancient Israel or the development of its religion. If the latter were my concern, it would call for an approach that would prioritize the dating of the texts and the ordering of these texts within a wider historical and religious framework. However, because this is explicitly not my aim, these questions are largely marginalized.

This does not mean that I feel constrained to detach the study from any historical context. I do not intend to create an impermeable barrier between the world of the text and the world behind the text. As Moberly notes, "Certainly the way in which one reads the world within the text can and should be appropriately informed and nuanced by one's best guesses as to the likely world behind the text. Yet to collapse the former into the latter is not to take seriously the dynamics of the text." Throughout the study, a broad ancient Near Eastern timeline is assumed and certain ancient Near Eastern practices that serve to illuminate aspects of the world within the text are considered. For example, I consider biblical idol polemics in light of the Opening and Washing of the Mouth rituals of Egypt and Mesopotamia and Jeroboam's calves in light of Samaria ostracon 41. I also consider how Neo-Assyrian imperialistic propaganda may be reflected in the biblical depiction of the siege of Jerusalem. Reading the texts in light of these practices does not represent a shift from an interest in the dynamics of the world of the text to a focus on the history of ancient Israel or the development of its religion. Neither does it represent 'slippage' between the one and the other. Instead, it represents an essential part of the exegetical task as I define it. <>

The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Body and Embodiment edited by Natalie Boero and Katherine Mason [Oxford University Press, 9780190842475]

In popular debates over the influences of nature versus culture on human lives, bodies are often assigned to the category of "nature": biological, essential, and pre-social. **The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Body and Embodiment** challenges that view, arguing that bodies both shape and get shaped by human societies. As such, the body is an appropriate and necessary area of study for sociologists. The Handbook works to clarify the scope of this topic and display the innovations of research within the field.

The volume is divided into three main parts: Bodies and Methodology; Marginalized Bodies; and Embodied Sociology. Sociologists contributing to the first two parts focus on the body and the ways it is given meaning, regulated, and subjected to legal and medical oversight in a variety of social contexts (particularly when the body in question violates norms for how a culture believes bodies "ought" to behave or appear). Sociologists contributing to the last part use the bodily as a lens through which to study social institutions and experiences. These social settings range from personal decisions about medical treatment to programs for teaching police recruits how to use physical

force, from social movement tactics to countries' understandings of race and national identity.

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF BODY AND EMBODIMENT also prioritizes empirical evidence and methodological rigor, attending to the ways particular lives are lived in particular physical bodies located within particular cultural and institutional contexts. Many chapters offer extended methodological reflections, providing guidance on how to conduct sociological research on the body and, at times, acknowledging the role the authors' own bodies play in developing their knowledge of the research subject.

Toward a Sociology of the Body by Katherine Mason and Natalie Boero

Since the 1990s, sociologists have turned, with increasing interest, toward examining the body and the social experience of embodiment. Bodies once viewed as merely the biological and material vehicles of social actors—the necessary, albeit uninteresting, fleshy conveyances that housed the self—are now being taken seriously by social scientists interested in both the social construction of various bodies as well as the experience of embodiment (Shilling 1993, 2005; Turner 1997). This growing interest led to the founding of the UK-based journal Body & Society, which published its first issue in 1995. And in 2008, the American Sociological Association recognized a new section (a subdisciplinary interest group) on Body and Embodiment.

Prior to that time, Chris Shilling (1993) writes, the body was an "absent presence" throughout much of the history of sociology. Although everyone has a body, sociologists had tended to act as though our bodies are merely biological, not social. And thus, from the perspective of sociology, bodies have been largely inconsequential—we are laborers and political subjects, we have social roles and consciousnesses—but rarely are we treated as bodies.

There are, of course, exceptions. When Friedrich Engels, one of sociology's foundational thinkers, wrote about the living conditions of the British working-class people during the Industrial Revolution, he attended to the bodily experience of visiting urban slums with unusually vivid detail. He wrote,

> A vegetable market is held in the street, baskets with vegetables and fruits, naturally all bad and hardly fit to use obstruct the sidewalk still further, and from these, as well as from the fish-dealers' stalls, arises a horrible smell. The houses are occupied from cellar to garret, filthy within and without, and their appearance is such that no human being could possibly wish to live in them . . . Heaps of garbage and ashes lie in all directions, and the foul liquids emptied before the doors gather in stinking pools. Here live the poorest of the poor, the worst paid workers with thieves and the victims of prostitution indiscriminately huddled together, the majority Irish, or of Irish extraction, and those who have not yet sunk in the whirlpool of moral ruin which surrounds them, sinking daily deeper, losing daily more and more of their power to resist the demoralizing influence of want, filth, and evil surroundings. ([1845] 2010, 46)

Engels lingered on these physical, sensory details to evoke readers' disgust; while he did not explicitly theorize the body, he invoked the bodily to underline his materialist critique of capitalism. Similar references to the body pop up in sociological theory across the twentieth century. In the work of authors like Georg Simmel (1997), Erving Goffman (1963), Pierre Bourdieu (1984), and Norbert Elias (1939) 1978, we see flickers of the notion that the body is more than just a vessel for the mind; it is constituted by—and constitutive of—social life.

Still, for many decades the body remained in the background for sociologists—even when, during the latter half of the twentieth century, scholars from other disciplines began to produce increasingly interesting work in theorizing the body. Feminist scholars interested in sex, reproduction, body image, beauty work, and other issues often centered the female body in their analyses of women's

oppression at home and in wider society (Pitts-Taylor 2015). Although some feminists in the 1970s and 1980s raised

questions about the inevitability of biological, presocial sex differences in bodies (Fausto-Sterling [1985] 2008, 1993; Lorber 1993; West and Zimmerman 1987), most focused instead on what they called gender: the cultural meanings and restrictions overlaid on what Gayle Rubin (1975, 165) calls the "biological raw material of human sex" (see also Chodorow 1978; Firestone 1970; and MacKinnon 1982). Scholar-activists seeking to understand racial oppression and disability justice, too, brought critical perspectives on topics like scientific racism and medicalization (e.g., Baynton 2013; Gilman 1985; W. E. B. DuBois's work, as described by Taylor [1981]). These writers, mobilizing analyses of culture, institutional structures, and social inequality, have challenged the supposed neutrality of science and medicine to show how these fields have historically assigned more value—indeed, more personhood—to some bodies than to others.

These scholars and activists have done significant work to advance our theoretical understandings of bodies in society. They hail from interdisciplinary fields such as gender studies, disability studies, and critical race studies, as well as from a wide range of humanities disciplines like literature, history, philosophy, and more. This in ter disciplinary approach is critical to studies of the body, yet there remains a need for a scholarly articulation of the main topics, trends, and methods in sociological approaches to the body. This volume addresses what is distinct about the sociology of the body and embodiment: its particular focus on empiricism and method.

Why Bodies? The Case for Body and Embodiment Studies in Sociology

The body and its study are already implicitly embedded in multiple sociological traditions (Collins 1994). For symbolic interactionists like Erving Goffman, bodies (and how we fashion them through gesture and adornment) represent one of the most important sign-bearing resources human beings bring to face-to-face interaction. He notes, for example, the difficulties of a middle-class hostess who is unsure about the social status of her guests and how she should signal her relative social position: should she wear "her best afternoon dress or her plainest evening gown" (Goffman 1963, 29)? And for Pierre Bourdieu, class cultural differences are embodied as taste, which "is an incorporated principle of classification which governs all forms of incorporation, choosing and modifying everything that the body ingests and digests and assimilates, physiologically and psychologically" (1984, 190). In this way, all social actors "read" the bodies of others they encounter as a critical first step in determining how the interaction should proceed.

As Engels's earlier quotation illustrates, within the conflict tradition, too, bodies offer a useful object of analysis as a primary target upon which power acts. For example, in Arlie Hochschild's ([1983] 2003) study of flight attendants' emotional labor, she describes how airlines in the 1960s and 1970s set not only strict limits on women flight attendants' weight, docking their pay and refusing to let them board flights unless they came in under weight; they also subjected these employees to "girdle checks" (to ensure that they were wearing them), "wig checks" (to determine if women's hair met regulations), and regulations governing the color of everything from eye shadow to underwear. These rules and their enforcement targeted women's bodies in particular, subjecting them to strict oversight and control by employers while linking the value of their labor to the management of their bodies. More recently, sociologists interested in the intersections of bodies, power, and control have examined the social regulation of fat bodies, gender nonconforming bodies, disabled bodies, and racially "othered" bodies. In these ways, the body itself becomes a focus of sociological investigation, what we call the sociology of the body.

Critically, a sociology of the body must recognize bodies as both cause and consequence of societal forces. The bodies we inhabit shape the ways people react to us, the social and physical habitats we

may access; yet the social and cultural spaces where our bodies develop and reside teach us how to carry ourselves, shape our daily habits of health maintenance and grooming, even influence the way our bones grow and our genes express. Biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling, describing the hesitancy with which second-wave feminists addressed the body, writes,

> Feminists assigned biological (especially reproductive) differences to the word sex and gave to gender all other differences. "Sex," however, has become the Achilles' heel of 1970s feminism. We relegated it to the domain of biology and medicine, and biologists and medical scientists have spent the past thirty years expanding it into arenas we firmly believed to belong to our ally gender. (2005, 1493)

Put another way, the feminist social constructionist model of gender has tended to treat sexed bodies as innate, unchangeable, and presocial, while treating "gender" as the social overlay of learned behaviors, roles, and meanings ascribed to "natural" sexed bodies. Fausto-Sterling challenges feminists—and social constructionists more generally— to push past this unidirectional model wherein nature/the body precedes culture and to examine the ways "our bodies physically imbibe culture" (Fausto-Sterling 2005, 1495). Taking this challenge to heart, a sociology of the body must investigate how bodies change in response to their surroundings: not just through the centuries-long proc ess of evolution but within a single individual's lifetime. Questions such as who, within a society, is more likely to receive adequate nutrition or to engage in strenuous physical activity can help us understand wide variations in bone structure and density. More recently, research on toxic chemical exposures and chronic stress (e.g., MacKendrick 2018) has shown that these influences—which are often a product of class stratification and other social inequalities—affect gene expression within the body through a process known as epigenetics.

However, we also suggest (and in the second half of the handbook, focus on) not only a sociology of the body but also the body in sociology. This approach holds that consideration of bodies—including both the body of the researcher as well as that of the researched—can help to enrich sociological understandings of a wide range of social dynamics and institutions. In sociological subfields ranging from law to labor, and from medicine to migration, attending to the social body has the potential to newly illuminate the mechanisms that underlie our social institutions. This position—calling for the infusion of the bodily into sociological inquiry—has been championed by Loïc Wacquant and others as "carnal sociology," which Wacquant describes has having the goal of "reincarnat[ing] society" (Wacquant 2015, 4). Victoria Pitts-Taylor disagrees with Wacquant's assessment that bodies have been absent from sociological work—she points to the many decades of body-aware work by feminist social scientists like Dorothy Smith (1988) and Patricia Hill Collins (1990)—but shares his view that sociology as a whole would benefit from more carefully considering bodies in social life (Pitts-Taylor 2015).

Why Sociology? The Case for a Disciplinary Approach to an Interdisciplinary Field

As noted earlier, body studies has existed in disciplines and interdisciplinary fields (literary studies, feminist theory, disability studies, and more) even as sociology as a whole has paid relatively little attention to the body. At the same time, sociological perspectives—both the work of individual sociologists and the influences of sociological scholarship on writers in other disciplines—have, we suggest, already made important contributions to body studies. With this volume, we aim to identify and advance those contributions. Taken together, the chapters in this handbook elaborate an agenda for the sociology of the body and embodiment by (1) showcasing theoretically informed empirical work and the research methods sociologists use to gather data; and (2) infusing intersectional analyses of race, class, gender, and more throughout the volume (rather than cordoning off one section of the handbook to deal with "difference").

The first sociological intervention into body studies—emphasizing the empirical— both draws on one of sociology's greatest strengths and remedies one of existing body and embodiment studies' most visible weaknesses. Much of the existing work on body studies focuses on theories of the body and embodiment. Most notably, Bryan Turner's (2012) edited volume, The Routledge Handbook of Body Studies, engages ontological questions about the nature of human bodies and how they have been conceptualized across multiple theoretical traditions. While Turner's handbook serves as an important point of reference on these issues, it is also largely nonempirical. The present volume aims to build on these theoretical insights by centering theoretically informed empirical work on bodies and embodiment. Shilling (2013) notes that the greatest weakness of theories of the body is that they tend to reify the body as either a distinct and static material object, or an infinitely malleable cultural phenomenon. Sociological methods help avoid this false dualism through empirical research in which scholars grapple with both the representation and construction of bodies and the experience of embodiment. Additionally, many authors in this volume write at length about the methods with which they gather data about embodied social life, offering reflections on the affordances and shortcomings of their chosen method(s) as well as practical advice for scholars new to the field.

The second intervention, infusing intersectional analyses of race, class, gender, and more, derives in large part from feminist sociological principles that urge attention to multiple vectors of power and inequality as they combine to shape the lives of individuals and communities. In line with these principles, we seek to decenter the assumption that "othered" bodies should be cordoned off from more "general" work on bodies unmarked by racial, sexual, and ability-based deviations from the norm. Simply put, empirically engaging with the body makes it virtually impossible to ignore that every body is sexed (or, as West and Zimmerman [1987] would argue, every body has characteristics that we learn to read as evidence of a person's membership in a sex category); every body has characteristics that signify membership in a racial group; every body has a particular size, height, skin tone, ability to navigate physical obstacles, and more. And these features of every body carry consequences for the ways we are received by others, for our own sense of identity, and for the physical and social spaces we can access.

Method

This handbook's early chapters focus primarily on method, debating and elaborating the method(s) that the authors find most useful for studying the body in society. Subsequent chapters shift focus toward the presentation of empirical findings and analysis, but with a continuing focus on detailing their methodological choices and innovations. A more detailed chapter outline appears later in this chapter. But, given the significance of method and methodology throughout the entirety of the volume, we offer a more in-depth elaboration of that theme here.

Several guiding principles motivate this focus on method. First, many chapters in this volume emphasize methodological reflexivity; that is, they consider the bodies of researcher and researched alike, asking how those lived, socially situated bodies shape each person's experience and understanding, as well as how they might shape the research relationship. This principle derives from the feminist epistemological concept of "standpoint theory." Standpoint theory holds that no researcher is ever perfectly objective—nor should that be the goal—but, rather, that researchers' and actors' social realities are always grounded in their embodied and social location (or, standpoint): to what phenomena and experiences does someone's standpoint give them particular access, and what areas of social life might they be less able to see clearly? Disability scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (2002), building off of the work of Nancy Mairs (1996), ties this epistemological insight to the body even more clearly by arguing in favor of something she calls "sitpoint theory"—that is, the recognition that living in a wheelchair-using body gives one not a

standpoint, but a "sitpoint," which shapes one's worldview and social interactions. In this view, the social locations in which the scholar or the subject of study are "natives" shape the kinds of insights they can offer about the social world, and those standpoints are tied to the bodies they inhabit.

Other sociologists—particularly those who hail from the tradition of carnal sociology described by Wacquant (2015)—may not be "native" to some area of social life or bodily practice. But by immersing their bodies in a particular place and/or activity through intensive ethnography, they come to experience it as second-nature. Building off of Mills's (2000) injunction that sociologists should "make the strange familiar"— and Weber's view that sociologists should seek deep understanding (verstehen) of research subjects on their own terms—carnal sociologists use their bodies to learn from the techniques and the visceral feeling of participating in a particular social activity. This practice, they hope, will give them access to a set of experiences and understandings distinct from what they could learn about simply by asking participants to report back.

Whereas Wacquant (2015) and others focus on ethnographic methods in particular— where the researcher can come "to know his [sic] object by body," becoming a "vulnerable observer" and embodied participant in social processes (4–5), the present volume expands its reach to other methods within sociology. Empirical research on the body and embodiment in sociology most commonly uses qualitative techniques like ethnography, in-depth interviewing, and qualitative content analysis. The reasons for this tendency are likely multiple: on one hand, body and embodiment scholars often come to the field through their engagement with feminist sociology, a tradition that has historically viewed quantitative methods with some suspicion (seeing them as overly reductive or positivist). Qualitative methods, which prioritize understanding the construction of meaning and experience, are particularly useful when attending to the experience of having and living in a body. In this volume, however, we make no a priori judgments about the appropriateness of one methodological approach versus another when it comes to studying the body in society. Indeed, Samantha Kwan and Trenton Haltom (in this volume) show some of the analytical power that quantitative and mixed-methods approaches can bring to studies of the body, and recent sociologically informed queer methods volumes (Compton, Meadow, and Schilt 2018; Ghaziani and Brim 2019) have, more broadly, been working to radically reimagine the uses of quantitative methods for use in illuminating the lives and challenges of diverse social groups.

Multiply Situated Bodies

The second unifying thread of this handbook is its attention to "multiply situated bodies," our term recognizing that bodies inhabit and display numerous, intersecting group memberships at once. Textbooks and edited volumes—in sociology and other fields— frequently address "identity" or "diversity" concerns by dedicating one discrete unit or chapter to issues of race, gender, sexuality, and other such social categories. This approach, while highlighting work that deals with diverse bodies and lived experiences, runs the risk of letting the remainder of the book focus on unmarked, universalized bodies and experiences. We wish to be clear: there are no universal experiences, no bodies unmarked by culturally specific attributions of racial categorization, gender, and more. There are only people whose bodies and identities are treated as normal or unproblematic within a society, and those whose bodies and identities are viewed as a problem.

With these considerations in mind, we asked all of our contributors to explicitly consider and name the socially significant attributes of the bodies they studied—chapters that deal with (for example) white, male bodies and experiences should be just as attentive to the potential influences of racial and gender norms as those that deal with the bodies and experiences of women of color. Other chapters address the contributing influences of age, sexuality, class, body size, and more.

This approach to designing the volume is a product of our engagement with the feminist concept of intersectionality. Intersectionality, as defined by feminist legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), describes the ways identity groups and characteristics combine to shape different people's experiences and, particularly, the types of opportunities and disadvantages they face in society as a result. Intersectionality is not additive—that is, there is not one constant cost of being Black that we would then add to the cost of being female, of being queer, fat, disabled, and so on. Rather, intersectionality suggests that (for example) Blackness fundamentally shapes Black women's experiences with womanhood and femininity, just as their personal and social identification as women may cause their experiences of race and racism to differ from Black men's.

Inherent, if rarely made explicit, in the concept of intersectionality is the fact that intersectionality is embodied. We use the term "multiply situated bodies" to highlight this fact. Whereas "identity" can tend toward the abstract, we wish instead to emphasize the corporeal presence of bodies. People do not just adopt identities by choice; instead, the advantages and disadvantages they face, particularly within face-to-face interaction, are shaped by the bodies they present to the world and the way other social actors respond to them.

Following from the insights of intersectional feminist scholarship, we argue that bodies are multiply situated within different social identity groups and hierarchies. One's body is not either white or fat, disabled or female. Instead, bodies exhibit multiple types of characteristics all at once, thus causing them to be read by onlookers as members of a variety of social groups.

At the same time, bodies are multiply situated within diverse physical and cultural spaces. While our bodies carry a variety of characteristics from one place to the next as we move through our daily lives—from home to work or school, via public or private modes of transit—those characteristics' salience shifts based on our context.

Our bodies matter differently in different physical spaces (for example, being a wheelchair user in a space that has well-maintained ramps and sidewalks versus one that does not; being larger-bodied in a classroom where desks are affixed to chairs versus one where chairs can be pulled up to tables so as to accommodate multiple body sizes and shapes). So, too, do our bodies matter differently within different social contexts: the skin tone and other "racial" body characteristics that mark a person as a visible minority in their workplace might become unremarkable in another setting—perhaps a neighborhood or a family gathering—where members of their racial group form the majority.

Likewise, in the doctor's office, a disabled or chronically ill body becomes a problem to be cured; in disability activist settings, that same body could function as a resource for expertise, legitimacy, and political clout.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the multiply situated body is unchanging. As our bodies move through various physical and social settings, the shifting meanings that attach to us may compel our bodies to change, too: to go on a diet when we see a parent restricting their eating; to cut our hair or dress differently to fit in with a subcultural group we've begun to identify with; or to medicate a disorderly body to win our doctor's (or teacher's, or partner's) approval. Such changes may be unconscious, as when we emulate the bearing and mannerisms of those we admire; they usually reflect a mixture of personal desires and societal expectations.

In short, our multiply situated bodies influence the social meanings and reception given to our bodies, the "fit" between our bodies' shape and ability and the physical spaces we inhabit, and, indeed, our physical well-being and appearance.

Notably, for the sociologist interested in understanding multiply situated bodies, it is not only the body of the research subject that is situated. Rather, the researcher's body is multiply situated, too. They inhabit multiple racial, gender, sexual, class, and dis/ability identities simultaneously. Their body—in particular, their legibility (or illegibility) as a member of particular groups—may become a resource or a liability when performing face-to-face research with participants (see, for example, the chapters by Barber; Gruys and Hutson; Low and Abdullah; and Randles); the body and appearance work that certain research sites demand may pose physical or economic barriers to some researchers; and, as Nordmarken points out, illness and disability can further impact researchers' ability to conduct research and writing in line with disciplinary standards. Lastly, the norms of academic writing generally, and sociology specifically, enable researchers to make their body and its relationship to their work invisible if they so choose (what Donna Haraway calls "the God trick of seeing everything from nowhere" [1988, 581]). Like Haraway, we have urged authors in this volume to reject the "God trick" of disembodied knowledge claims in favor of "embodied objectivity . . . [which] means quite simply situated knowledges" (1988, 581).

In moving on to the organization of the book, we recognize that asking all authors to attend to multiply situated bodies in their work—and explicitly rejecting an organizational model in which articles are divided by single categories like race, class, and gender—can make it difficult for readers to locate chapters that centrally theorize those or other specific identities. Thus, while the organization of the book itself reflects our desire to focus on "multiply situated bodies," in the section summaries that follow, we also highlight those chapters and sections that have a sustained focus on particular aspects of race and ethnicity, sex and gender, and social class. Additionally, because bodies are always situated within specific national and cultural contexts—and because a great deal of the English-language scholarship on bodies is US- and UK-based—we highlight chapters dealing with bodies outside of those two countries.

Organization of the Book

Part I: Bodies and Methodology in Sociology

The second chapter in this handbook, Maxine Leeds Craig's "Methodologies for Categories in Motion," sets the stage for subsequent chapters by developing the concept of "categories in motion" as a way to move beyond identitarian or additive approaches to intersectional analysis within sociology. In line with this volume's focus on methods and methodology, Craig uses examples from a wide range of sociological studies of bodies and embodiment to show how, by not assuming static contexts, identities, and bodies, these various methodologies reveal "categories in motion," which then allow for a more dynamic and embodied usage of intersectionality within sociology.

As noted earlier, a particular focus of this volume is on methodology: how do scholars utilizing a wide range of sociological methods design empirical projects to capture important data about the bodies and embodiment of their research subjects? The first section Chapters 3–5 of the handbook offer case studies and descriptions of research design across a range of methods: qualitative approaches like ethnography and in-depth interviewing, mixed-methods approaches (especially combining qualitative and quantitative elements), and content analysis. In addition to providing descriptions of their research design and implementation, these authors also discuss the pros and cons of each approach: what kinds of data about bodies might each particular method be particularly well-suited to provide? These and other methods will then be demonstrated across a range of empirical topics in the second section of the handbook.

Face-to-face qualitative methods like ethnography and in-depth interviewing have long been favored by sociologists studying bodies and embodiment. In this section, the chapters by Jennifer Randles and by Kelvin E. Y. Low and Noorman Abdullah parse some of the potential benefits of these methods.

Ethnography and in-depth interviewing frequently bring the researcher face to face with research subjects, granting the researcher access to the physical characteristics of their subjects and, in many cases, the physical settings—schools, gyms, workplaces, and so on—where subjects conduct their daily activities. The richly detailed data that can result from such methods are often critical for bringing the materiality and specific lived experiences of subjects' bodies to life in writing.

In "Sensory Experience as Method," Low and Abdullah describe the uses of researchers' sensing—and sensed—bodies in ethnographic research. In two of the cases they present, Low and Abdullah examine research participants' reactions to the researcher's own body. These cases—eliciting participants' interpretations of the researchers' accents, bodily gestures, racial phenotypes, and scents—allow Low and Abdullah to study the sensory, embodied aspects of social interaction: how do our often-subconscious perceptions of another person's body lead us to label them as similar to or different from us, as well-socialized or deviant? The third case, describing Low's participant observation alongside hikers on Singapore's historical heritage trails, examines how subjects drew on sensory memories of the smells and tastes of their childhoods to assess the authenticity of foods offered along the trail. This chapter also focuses on bodies and embodiment in a non-US/UK context.

In "Pregnant Embodiment and Field Research," ethnographer Jennifer Randles, who was visibly pregnant during much of the time she spent observing state-sponsored "responsible fatherhood" classes for low-income men in the United States, notes that her body could easily have posed a challenge in the research encounter. As a young, white, highly educated woman, Randles was demographically different from her subjects, who tended to be low-income men, often of color. Yet Randles discovered that her pregnant body became a topic of interest when interviewing her participants: occasionally as a distraction or a painful reminder to some participants (such as those who had lost custody of a child), but more often as a means of building rapport. Specifically, Randles's pregnant embodiment—and her admission that it was her first child—offered subjects a chance to connect with Randles as experts, offering her empathetic advice and stories from their own experiences as parents that revealed rich details about their parenting values and beliefs. Not all researchers' bodies and topics will align in this fashion, but Randles urges qualitative researchers to consider what impact their embodied presence might have on research subjects and to think about how, if at all, that embodiment might serve as a resource for collecting high-quality data. In this chapter, Randles pays particular attention to the raced and classed elements of her interactions with her participants.

While both Randles's and Low and Abdullah's chapters represent a more traditional qualitative approach to studying embodiment, in "YouTube Vlogs as Illness Narratives," author Natalie Fullenkamp develops a method for performing body-focused content analysis online. Looking at YouTube video blogs (vlogs) created by chronic illness sufferers to document their bodies' symptoms, Fullenkamp describes procedures for building a sampling frame for web content, sampling within that population, and coding and analyzing the dense audiovisual content that resulted. Bodies filmed and displayed online—or in other media—do not provide the full array of sensory data that a body encountered in face-to-face interaction would, but they do offer some unique opportunities to study vloggers' self-presentation and narrativization of their illnesses in the absence of the presence of a researcher.

Lastly, in "Mixed Methods in Body and Embodiment Research," Samantha Kwan and Trenton M. Haltom review the uses of mixed-methods research for studying bodies and embodiment (where "mixed methods" refers specifically to a combination of quantitative and qualitative elements). Using examples both from Kwan's research on body weight and from elsewhere in the literature, the

chapter discusses various options for combining particular qualitative and quantitative methods (e.g., content analysis, indepth interviews, and statistical analysis of quantitative survey results), as well as different options for the order in which to conduct each piece of the study. While qualitative methods remain an important part of Kwan and Haltom's approach to studying bodies in society, their chapter should serve as an invitation to quantitative sociologists who are interested in studying the body.

Chapters with a significant focus on race/ethnicity or class/caste in this part include those by Randles and Craig. Gender-focused chapters include Randles and Craig. And the chapter by Low and Abdullah has with a non-US/UK focus.

Part 2: Marginalized Bodies

Chapters 6–16 present research on the bodies most often studied by sociologists of the body: nonnormative bodies. These bodies make perceptible the social norms and expectations for how bodies should look and behave by violating those norms. The chapters on fat bodies, gender nonconforming bodies, and ill and aging bodies confront social norms that implicitly assume all bodies will be slender, binary/cisgender, young, and healthy. The chapters on modifiable bodies examine the widespread social expectation that people will manage their bodies to better meet the norms for people of their gender, class, or cultural background. In short, these chapters—and the sociological traditions they represent—offer insight into the often-unspoken social rules for embodiment that govern all members of a society, normative and nonnormative alike.

Chapters with a central focus on race/ethnicity or class/caste in this part include those by Strings; Curington and Kang; Talukdar; Haddow; and Barber. Gender-focused chapters include those by Strings; Hurd Costello; Sledge; Barber; Curington and Kang; and Talukdar. And chapters with a non-US/UK focus include Costello; Curington and Kang; and Talukdar.

Fatness and Body Size

In the last twenty years, fatness and body size have become an increasingly popular focus for studies of bodies and embodiment (e.g., the Fat Studies journal, founded in 2012). At the same time, the emergence of Fat Studies as an interdisciplinary field has further advanced the study of fatness and fat bodies (Braziel and LeBesco 2001; Rothblum and Solovay 2009). Sociological research, theory, and methodology have been central to the growth of both of these projects (Boero 2012; Farrell 2011; Saguy 2014).

The chapters in this section both interrogate and elaborate the historical and contemporary construction of fat bodies and embodiment. In her chapter, "Representations of Fatness." Abigail C. Saguy critically reviews the literature on "fat frames" while also offering a methodological reflection on her own mixed-method work within this literature. This literature maps the various framings of fatness historically, but more predominantly in the context of the American "obesity epidemic." This work largely finds that while multiple framings of fatness exist, for various reasons, medical framings that posit obesity as a social problem and an individual and public health crisis have become and remain dominant.

Studies of fatness and embodiment have been critiqued for not paying enough attention to race and ethnicity. In her chapter, "Fat as a Floating Signifier," Sabrina Strings uses historical data to show how the growth of anti-fat prejudice and "fear of racialized others" came together such that in nineteenth-century America, fatness became a "floating signifier" and, as such, perceptions of fat bodies varied significantly by race. By showing the centrality of race to historical framings of fatness, Strings offers a critical intersectional lens through which to understand the contemporary framings of fatness outlined by Saguy. Natalie Ingraham's chapter, "Health at Every Size (HAESTM) as a

Reform (Social) Movement within Public Health," uses a situational analysis to elucidate the tensions within the HAES movement between more radical/political and reform-oriented efforts to change the ways in which public health views and creates policy around fatness and fat bodies.

Aging and Death

In a rapidly changing biomedical and technological landscape, the promise of new interventions into the challenges associated with aging bodies has forced a re-examination of cultural norms around aging and death which rely on taken-for-granted concepts of binary gender and rigid boundaries between what is human, animal, or technological. In her chapter, "Aging, Gender, and the Body," Laura Hurd offers methodological reflections on how cultural norms around masculinity, femininity, and sexuality intersect with ageism in ways that make interviewing older people about the embodied experience of aging fraught for both interviewee and interviewer. Hurd suggests that greater attention to the diversity of experience and social position of older adults combined with deeper researcher reflexivity may relieve some of these methodological challenges. This chapter will also be of particular interest for those interested in gender. In her chapter, "Animal, Mechanical, and Me," Gill Haddow explores how both older and younger adults think about current and future options in the arena of organ transplantation and the anticipated consequences of these options in terms of both bodies and subjectivities. Together, these two chapters raise questions about methodology, bodies, and embodied subjectivity central to understanding the experiences of a rapidly aging population in an era of rapid technological and social change.

Bodily Sex beyond Binaries

As with race, class, and gender, sexuality and sex are threaded throughout numerous chapters in this volume. Indeed, scholars of gender, sexuality, and sex have long been among those most explicitly theorizing and studying bodies and embodiment. Thus, explicitly sociological work in this area is an important part of this volume. In particular, the two chapters in this section explore how the historical and contemporary imposition of binary sex and gender shape how people navigate their own embodiment within this context. In "Beyond Binary Sex and Gender Ideology," Cary Gabriel Costello offers a broad overview of many ways different societies have understood and organized sex and gender into nonbinary categories, with particular attention to the key role of the European colonial project in the imposition and naturalization of our own contemporary binary understandings of both. Costello then brings this broad history to bear in elucidating the contemporary bodily experiences of four intersex and/or trans people by exploring how these people navigate and negotiate binary sex/ gender ideologies in their own experiences and understandings of sex variance and gender transition. In critiquing Western sex/gender binaries and the European colonial project, Costello focuses intensively on both sex and gender in non-Western or European contexts.

As with much of body and embodiment studies, work on sex, gender, and embodiment has also been heavily weighted toward the theoretical. Thus, Costello's attention to experience meshes well with this volume's focus on empirically driven, sociological body and embodiment scholarship. Central to understanding embodied experience is understanding how ideologies of binary sex and gender solidify into normative expectations of sexed and gendered bodies. In "Male Breast Cancer in the Public Imagination," Piper Sledge uses narratives of trans and cisgender men with breast cancer to highlight the normative expectations of femininity and female embodiment that dominate both popular and medical constructions of breast cancer. Sledge's data point to the presence and impact of rigid boundaries around gendered embodiment, which render only some bodies with breast cancer as intelligible and treatable within current biomedical models. Both Costello and Sledge's chapters point to the importance of furthering an understanding of nonbinary bodies and embodiment rooted in an empirical understanding of nonbinary and trans people.

Modifiable Bodies

Central to both the sociocultural construction of bodies and the experience of embodiment are the various ways in which people choose to, are encouraged to, or are expected to modify their bodies. Chapters in this section offer empirical investigations into the contexts in which various groups modify—or help others modify—their bodies. In "Good-Looking Men Require Hard-Working Women," Kristen Barber covers both levels, using ethnographic observation and interviews with employees and clients at two high-end men's salons to show how the embodied practices of women in these salons reinforce a gender binary and gendered power relations. Further, Barber points out how women employees' embodied practices in these salons negate the potential of men's consumption of beauty products and services to subvert hegemonic and binary conceptions of masculinity and femininity.

Like Barber, in their chapter, "Contrasting Scientific Discourses of Skin Lightening in Domestic and Global Contexts," Celeste Vaughn Curington and Miliann Kang look beyond the consumers of body modification products and services to instead study the social structures that underlie the creation and distribution of such products. Curington and Kang's chapter examines the contrasts in how skin-lightening products are framed by scientists and marketed differently in the United States and abroad. In looking at how these products are framed, not by those using them but by those studying them, Curington and Kang offer new insight into the racialized and gendered constructions and modification of bodies.

In "Feeding and Fasting Bodies," Jaita Talukdar undertakes a Bourdeusian analysis of the dieting and fasting practices of forty-eight women in Kolkata, India. Talukdar highlights that body modification through reduced food consumption does not always represent a capitulation to neoliberal, feminized weight loss culture. Indeed, she suggests that the individualized dieting of women looking to benefit from India's rapidly changing economy must be differentiated from the more collectively oriented religious fasting engaged in by less privileged women, contradicting a narrative that sees fasting as only the result of globalized Western ideals of beauty and bodies.

Part 3: Embodied Sociology

Whereas the previous part's chapters dealt with bodies as the object of analysis, this part treats bodies and embodiment as an analytic lens for sociological analysis. Specifically, Chapters 17–27 serve as models for sociologists in a wide range of subfields and specialties to consider the bodily as they explore how various social traditions, institutions, and structures work.

Readers looking for research with a central focus on race/ethnicity or class/caste should attend to the chapters by Hohle; Joseph; and Kathiravelu; gender plays a key role in the chapters by Gruys and Hutson; Lande; Rajah and Osborn; and Reich. Chapters focusing on bodies in a non-US/UK context include those by Joseph and Kathiravelu.

Bodies and States

The sociological study of states, state violence, and citizenship presents another opportunity to move bodies and embodiment to the analytical center of a subfield in which they have been implied but have remained largely on the margins. The two chapters in this section consider the role of racialized bodies in shaping the experience and construction of nationality and citizenship. Furthermore, they attend to the importance of bodies in the formation of political knowledge as well as understanding state responses to social movements.

In "Unruly Bodies," Randolph Hohle brings bodies and embodiment to historical and political sociology by using the case of the Black Panther Party to explore the impact of bodies on political outcomes. Specifically, Hohle engages the concept of "figurative violence" to understand how movements themselves consciously deploy different embodiments to garner support from allies and instill fear in their foes—in the case of the Black Panther Party, the state. This fear then inspires an embodied and racialized response from states in order to legitimate state violence and criminalization and to shape political discourse and outcomes. Shifting from state violence and social movements to questions of migration and national identity, in "Race, Phenotype, and Nationality in Brazil and the United States," Tiffany Joseph uses in-depth interviews to show how bodies are central to the construction of race and racialized identities in two transnational contexts. Together, these chapters point to the importance of bodies to the construction of and response to racialized citizens and states.

Bodies and Labor

As the quotation from Engels at the beginning of this chapter suggests, bodies and embodiment have always been relevant to understanding work and labor under capitalism. The two chapters in this section sharpen a focus on the relationship between bodies and labor by understanding the conscious emotional and aesthetic labor of employees in retail clothing and retail fitness environments as well as the everyday embodied oppression faced by migrant workers in the hypermodern city states of the Global South.

In their chapter, "The Aesthetic Labor of Ethnographers," Kjerstin Gruys and David J. Hutson use autoethnographic methods to demonstrate not only that embodiment and aesthetic labor are topics for ethnographic research but also that embodied aesthetic labor is part and parcel of the research process itself. Using data from the authors' work in different customer service environments, Gruys and Hutson argue for an expanded intersectional analysis of the aesthetic labor of ethnographers with an eye to both the power dynamics and ethical considerations endemic to the method.

In her chapter, "Bodies That Don't Matter, but Labor That Does," Laavanya Kathiravelu uses ethnographic data to articulate and understand the contradiction between the intensely visible embodiment of Indian migrants in Singapore and Dubai as laborers and the lack of visibility of these same workers during the times they are not working. Kathiravelu explains this contradiction as the result of a number of "body tropes" in which these laborers come to be viewed as pieces of technology which require maintenance as pieces of capital. The consequences of these tropes is that employers and non-migrant citizens view these migrant workers as disposable and less than human with no need for down time, social integration, or decent living conditions. Together, both of these chapters point to the centrality of bodies and embodiment in understanding the conditions of work in areas as disparate as retail, construction, and academic labor in a transnational capitalist system.

Bodies and Institutions

Understanding the place of institutions in social life is a core analytical focus of sociology as a discipline. Thus, the study of institutions is a critical entry point when considering how an embodied sociology can provide a new analytic lens within extant sociological subfields. The chapters in this section employ the lens of embodied sociology to the institutions of science and medicine, specifically clinician practices within hospital Critical Care Units, and the development of new markets for bodily knowledge via direct-to-consumer genetic testing.

In "Embodied Spatial Practices and the Power to Care," Elise Paradis, Warren Mark Liew, and Myles Leslie use ethnographic methods to analyze the spatial practices of health care delivery. In particular, Paradis et al. are attentive to how embodied spatial practices reflect and reinforce relations of

power and hierarchy in medical encounters with an eye to how this knowledge can contribute to greater equity in health care delivery.

In "Contesting New Markets for Bodily Knowledge," Rene Almeling moves beyond the embodied spatial relations of health care delivery to the professional and scientific contestations around the validity and dissemination of bodily knowledge via genetic testing. Using textual analysis methods, Almeling looks at how bodily knowledge continues to be claimed and guarded by experts even as it is both democratized and increasingly monetized by for-profit, direct-to-consumer genetic testing. As Almeling shows, these new markets for bodily knowledge have direct consequences for individuals' access to their own genetic information, given the rapid expansion of both the availability and uses of new forms of genetic knowledge.

Bodies and Medicine

The chapters in our section on Bodies and Medicine all in some way question of how patients and caregivers bring their own embodied knowledges and experiences into the encounter with health professionals and technologies.

Jennifer A. Reich's chapter, "Managing Risky Bodies," draws on in-depth qualitative interviews to understand the personal and structural factors that lead parents—mostly mothers—to reject vaccination and other forms of medical intervention for their children. Reich's insights derive from a larger study of thirty-four Colorado parents (discussed in her 2016 book, Calling the Shots), but this chapter focuses on representative case studies of two mothers: Lauren, a white Evangelical Christian homeschooling mother of four, and Katie, a white, politically progressive mother of two whose children are in private school. Reich's analysis pulls together the macrosocial and the microsocial, examining how widespread discourses of biomedical risk and mother blame create conditions where women come to feel personally responsible for managing their children's health risks, including (but not limited to) refusing some or all vaccinations. By attending to these two women's stories in close detail, Reich challenges readers to recognize these women's motivations as considerably more complicated than simply being "anti-science" or anti-vaccine; instead, these women's choices result from the interplay of structural privilege (that enables them to challenge medical orthodoxy), embodied experiences of medical mistreatment or overtreatment, and social/medical norms that demand that they be responsible consumers of health on behalf of their children.

Anthony Ryan Hatch, Julia T. Gordon, and Sonya R. Sternlieb's chapter on "The Artificial Pancreas in Cyborg Bodies" uses a "biohistory" approach to studying the development of the artificial pancreas. This device is an insulin delivery pump system for type 1 diabetics, worn on the outside of the body, which seeks to streamline and improve diabetes management by automating the processes of blood glucose monitoring and insulin injection (not requiring much active oversight by the patient/user, in contrast to earlier technologies). In particular, Hatch and colleagues contrast the flows of information and user agency enabled by the "closed-source" artificial pancreas marketed by biomedical technology companies to the information and agency associated with do-it-yourself "open-source" software that some technologically savvy type 1 diabetics have developed to run their own artificial pancreases.

Sonny Nordmarken's chapter, "Contesting Lyme Disease," uses autoethnography to examine the author's own embodied experiences of fighting to get a diagnosis of Lyme disease. Like research subjects in the other two chapters in this part, Nordmarken describes how medical control over his body, as well as medicine's failure to resolve his health problems, led him to begin trusting his body's own knowledge more and to use that embodied knowledge as a resource for seeking a better diagnosis and more responsive treatment. Nordmarken argues that living with chronic illness has also conferred him with an "epistemic advantage"—insights that attest to the realness of his bodily

symptoms even as medical providers wedded to conventional diagnostic measures questioned whether he was "really" sick (and, thus, the ability to better comprehend the social construction of medical expertise and certainty). This chapter also outlines, at length, the place of autoethnographic research methods in social science research and demonstrates how to combine personal narrative with sociological analysis.

Bodies and Violence

Making the implicit place of bodies in sociology explicit identifies another critical thread running through core sociological topics like violence and crime. The two chapters in this section both look at bodies and embodiment as critical elements of both the experience of violence and efforts to resist and prevent violence.

In Brian Lande's chapter, "Laying Hands," he moves past a more conventional focus on rules, norms, and attitudes in police training and looks at the "sensorial and tactile education" in workplace socialization of police recruits at a police academy. With recent attention to police violence, Lande's centering of the bodies of officers and the various ways they are taught to "lay hands" on suspects and others gives deeper insight into how recruits come to embody an identity as officers and the implications of that process for understanding policing more generally.

In "The Place of the Body in Resistance to Intimate Partner Violence," Valli Rajah and Meg Osborn use textual analysis to explore the role of body and embodiment in research on intimate partner violence (IPV). More specifically, Rajah and Osborn look at the extant IPV literature to query how this literature frames women's embodied resistance to male violence and understand what this can tell us about embodiment and IPV. Rajah and Osborn conclude with a discussion of how this research can inform policy and result in more equitable outcomes for victims.

Taken together, these chapters offer a new and novel articulation of the sociology of the body and embodiment centered on the empirical insights that result from using multiple sociological methods. In building on the theoretical insights of earlier body scholars, the data presented in these chapters also bring into high relief the importance of attending to multiply situated bodies in articulating both a sociology of the body and an embodied sociology. Yet this volume does not represent a comprehensive sociology of the body and embodiment; instead, it sets the stage for a sociological approach to bodies that prioritizes the empirical and methodological while always seeing the body as central to an intersectional understanding of, in Maxine Craig's words, "categories in motion." <>

Persuasion and Rhetoric by Carlo Michelstaedter, translated by Russell Scott Valentino, Cinzia Sartini Blum, David J. Depew [Yale University Press, 9780300104349]

This translation of Carlo Michelstaedter's **Persuasion and Rhetoric** brings the powerful and original work of a seminal cultural figure to English-language readers for the first time. Ostensibly a commentary on Plato's and Aristotle's relation to the pre-Socratic philosophers, Michelstaedter's deeply personal book is an extraordinary rhetorical feat that reflects the author's struggle to make sense of modern life. This edition includes an introduction discussing his life and work, an extensive bibliography, notes to introduce each chapter, and critical notes illuminating the text.

Within hours of completing Persuasion and Rhetoric, his doctoral thesis, 23-year-old Michelstaedter shot himself dead. The text he left behind has proved to be one of the most trenchant and influential studies in modern rhetoric, a work that develops Nietzschean themes and anticipates the conclusions of, among others, Martin Heidegger.

Carlo Michelstaedter's **PERSUASION AND RHETORIC**

Born on June 3, 1887, in Gorizia, a predominantly Catholic town of five thousand inhabitants to the northeast of Trieste, Carlo Michelstaedter was the youngest of four children in a cultured Jewish Italian family. His father, Alberto, was the Gorizia director of the Hapsburg insurance giant Assicurazioni generali di Trieste and president of a local literary association. His paternal great grandfather, Reggio Michelstaedter, widely known for his learning, was the rabbi of the town's Jewish minority, most of whose members, including Carlo's mother, Emma Luzzatto, and his elder sister, Elda Morpurgo, would later perish in the Holocaust.

Although neither Carlo nor his immediate family was observant, the specific challenges of "Occidental Jewry" arguably played a formative role in the young Gorizian's intellectual persona as, in Ladislao Mittner's phrase, yet another "man without a home." In this he is comparable to such contemporaries as Franz Kafka, Arthur Schnitzler, and Italo Svevo, all of whom underwent similar human and artistic experiences amid the multilingual, multiethnic ambience of late-Hapsburg central Europe. Destined like other sons of the Jewish haute bourgeoisie for more leisured, scholarly, and artistic lives than their fathers, Carlo identified more with Italy than with Austria, in particular with Italian humanism. After graduating from the Gorizia gymnasium and after a brief period in which he considered studying mathematics at the University of Vienna, he turned south in 1905 and enrolled in the Faculty of Letters at the Institute of Higher Studies in Florence, where he remained until 1909.

His years in Florence were filled with study and intellectual growth but also with repeated failures and disillusionment. His attempts to join the editorial staffs of several publications were unsuccessful, as were his proposals for the translation of various works from German. His close friendship with the young Russian divorcee Nadia Baraden ended tragically with her suicide in 1907, and his intended engagement with a Catholic classmate, Iolanda De Blasi, met stiff opposition from his family. His childhood companion Enrico Mreule departed for Argentina, not to return in Michelstaedter's lifetime, and his brother died under mysterious circumstances in New York. In the end, suffering from isolation and a depressive melancholy that would accompany him to the end of his brief life, Carlo returned to the familiar atmosphere of Gorizia in 1909 to prepare his dissertation.

The dissertation, **PERSUASION AND RHETORIC**, together with six critical appendices that expand and further elaborate the arguments of the main part, were submitted by mail to the University of Florence on October 16, 1910. The following day Michelstaedter killed himself by firing, if a contemporary newspaper account is to be believed, more than one shot from a revolver.

Although no action was apparently taken by Michelstaedter's doctoral committee, Persuasion and Rhetoric (without the important preface and the scholarly critical appendices) was published in 1913 by his friend Vladimiro Arangio Ruiz. It was republished by Emilio Michelstaedter, Carlo's cousin, in 1922; again, as part of Michelstaedter's Opere, edited by Gaetano Chiavacci, in 1958; by Maria Raschini in 1972; and finally, in a critical edition based on two manuscripts (A, in Michelstaedter's hand, and C, copied by someone else) that had been deposited by the author's family in the civic library of Gorizia, by Sergio Campailla, in 1982. Campailla's edition, which was translated with editors' notes into French in 1989 (Editions de L'éclat), forms the basis for the present translation, the first into English.

The staying power of a text by an immature author who was never personally in a position to defend his brainchild can be explained only in terms of the continued resonance his work has had for several generations downwind of the crisis of values so deeply etched in it. It is that continuing power, some of which springs from the heightened consciousness and preternatural sensitivity for cultural crisis that those living at the margins of cultures frequently exhibit, that is the main subject of this introduction.

The full title of the manuscript of Michelstaedter's dissertation was The Concepts of Persuasion and Rhetoric in Plato and Aristotle. This names a conventional topic of the sort that might well form the basis of a dissertation in classical philology or philosophy. Michelstaedter's professorial committee, members of a faculty of letters in the high humanist tradition, which stressed the study of modern as well as classical languages and made few forced distinctions between philosophical and literary texts, would have been well placed to judge such a submission. Among the members of the committee was, for example, the classical philologist Girolamo Vitelli. Vitelli's work is, by our standards, very wide in scope (but no wider than that of learned contemporary German philologists such as Ulrich von Wilomowitz-Moellendorff). It includes papyrological reconstructions, editions of Euripides' plays as well as of Philoponus's commentary on Aristotle's Physics, papers about Aeschylus, a handbook of Latin literature, a report about the difference between classical and romantic philology, and a surprisingly recurrent fascination with the work of Giordano Bruno, burned at the stake for opposing the authority of the church in matters cosmological at the dawn of the scientific revolution.

Any philologically informed work on the topic of rhetoric and persuasion in Plato and Aristotle would normally begin from the fact that Plato, reacting strongly to the sophists, condemned rhetoric—addressed speech meant to persuade an audience—as unprincipled, deceptive, and in the service of private advantage. Some of the sophists in Plato's environment, such as Gorgias, were proud of the fact that rhetoric has the power to deceive: Plato was not making the accusation up out of whole cloth. His deepest attack on rhetoric as deception, *apate,* can be found in his dialogue Gorgias. Later, however, Plato seems to have relented in his condemnation of rhetoric, but only because he began to invent a reformed rhetoric—hardly rhetorical at all by normal standards—that would not be subject to the objections he himself had raised. Plato's student Aristotle also approved of rhetoric, indeed regarded it as an art. But Aristotle's rhetoric, with its stress on rational argument and on the authority of the speaker as an ethical persona, was no less hostile than Plato's to sophistic rhetoric as such.

In Michelstaedter's Persuasion and Rhetoric we find none of these traditional issues and topics. Plato and Aristotle are analyzed extensively in only one section of the text (in Part Two, Chapter I, "A Historical Example"), and then in an oblique and parabolic fashion. The conventions of the academic genre in which Michelstaedter writes seem thereby to be subverted, and this is a tactic that he admits to employing as early as the preface: "I do not pay for entrance into any of the established categories," he writes, "or establish precedents for any new category." As Campailla puts it, "The

young writer develops a personal discourse, which breaks free from the premises of scholarly exercise".

A closer look reveals that Michelstaedter writes and indeed writes seriously about the meaning of and relation between the terms "rhetoric" and "persuasion." He discusses these concepts, however, from a perspective that explicitly adopts the tradition of darkly poetic and pessimistic philosophical wisdom first manifested in the pre-Socratic philosopher-poets and in the Athenian tragedians on whom Michelstaedter extensively comments in Persuasion and Rhetoric, a tradition, in his opinion, subverted by the optimistic system-building absolutism of Plato and Aristotle. It is clear, if not explicit, that Plato and Aristotle stand in for the pie-in-the-sky systemizations of Croce and other neo-Hegelian idealists who dominated the contemporary Italian intellectual scene and that Michelstaedter is casting his lot with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Giacomo Leopardi, and others (Tolstoy, Ibsen, Sorel) who called this official wisdom into question.

What Michelstaedter means by "persuasion" is the state of consciousness and being in which an entity, any entity, is entirely at one with itself and the world, entirely present and true to itself and others. Inspection of fragments of the Poem of Parmenides reveals a likely source of Michelstaedter's peculiarly extended, yet quite precise conception of persuasion. Parmenides, having contrasted the "way of being," which the wise discern, with the way of seeming, which the many are condemned to live, comments, "The one way, namely, that which is and cannot not-be, is the path of persuasion (*peithos*), for it attends truth (*aletheia)*". "My life and the world I live are one and the same," claims Parmenides. Thought and thing must be identical, for only thought that grasps an existent object counts as such, and the act of asserting ("it is") must affirm the existent as existing on pain of not being an act of asserting at all. Negative existentials are impossible. From this Parmenides infers that the world as it is must be one, indivisible, and without negativity (which permits us to say "this is not that"). All thought is inherently referential. Hence anything that is referred to must exist. This means that any degree of negativity—a is not-b—is a referential misfire. All things that exist must be one completely homogeneous substance, and it is this ontological state that Michelstaedter appears to use as a symbol, or perhaps more than a symbol, for the psychological state of being fully persuaded: the persuaded, authentic, just person must will one thing alone. It is likely that this Hellenocentric approach leads him to the claim that the Greek way of establishing idealism is far superior to its modern form.

What, by contrast, Michelstaedter means by rhetoric is the endless series of deceptions by which we try to convince ourselves and each other that we are persuaded: satisfied, fulfilled, "happy." By treating the two concepts in this way, the normal relation between persuasion and rhetoric is broken. As Daniela Bini puts it, "The rhetorician speaks in order to persuade and convince through the force of his arguments. *Retorica* and *persuasione*, thus, go hand in hand. Not for Michelstaedter, however, who considered them opposites". The turn away from this truth, exemplified by the systematizing rhetoric of Plato and Aristotle that furnishes the ostensible material for his thesis, has, according to Michelstaedter, recurred again and again throughout the history of European thought. For Michelstaedter, then, no entity can be fully persuaded, for existence is eX-sistence, standing out in a temporally distended space between past and future entirely characterized by desire, striving, yearning for the very presence, satiety, that it never attains on condition of not being what it is. As soon as an entity obtains what it desires, that which was heretofore absent from its wanting state, yet another object of desire presents itself, and then others ad infinitum. This is the image strikingly developed in Michelstaedter's opening discussion of a weight whose yearning for each successive point below it in infinite descent precludes the possibility of persuasion.

In this connection, Michelstaedter places himself in the voluntarist tradition of Schopenhauer, Hegel's great opponent in the early nineteenth century, who regarded life as a disease, permanent lack, endless pain, crucifixion on a cross of ceaseless desires and illusory representations of their fulfillment. The connection to Schopenhauer explains Michelstaedter's invocations of the Buddha. Michelstaedter's Buddha, like that of Schopenhauer, preaches that the extinction of desire is the only possible wisdom for human beings. In this respect, Michelstaedter is closer to Schopenhauer and to Leopardi, whose attitudes and tones he clearly imitated, than he is to Nietzsche. Nietzsche was no less voluntaristic, and no less an adept of dark wisdom, than Schopenhauer. But Nietzsche, especially in the character of Zarathustra, put a decidedly more upbeat stress on how the tragic wisdom of the ancients could facilitate a wholesale personal and cultural transformation of values toward heroic resistance than does Michelstaedter.

The divergence from Neitzsche also throws light on Michelstaedter's divergence from noted voluntarists in his general vicinity. The Italian futurists, in particular F. T. Marinetti, are worth mentioning in this connection. Michelstaedter and Marinetti exemplify two different yet equally extreme outcomes of the spiritual malaise that affected, in the words of Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, the "unhappy intellectual and provincial bourgeoisie, twisted by their 'all-or-nothing' upbringing, spoiled by their taste for definitive ascensions". In response to the modern crisis of absolutes, both authors rejected rationalist and idealist systems of values without relinquishing the will to autonomous self-definition at the origin of such systems. But for Michelstaedter absolute control could be reached only by means of the Schopenhauerean strategy of suppressing or eliminating desire for life. Marinetti, by contrast, attacked the suicidal pessimism of Schopenhauer, "the bitter philosopher who so often threatens with the seductive revolver of his philosophy to destroy our profound nausea for Amore with a capital A." Proclaiming a new, "artificial" optimism, Marinetti assimilated the chaotic forces of modernity—in Michelstaedter's terms, the ultimate realm of rhetoric—as the means to an aggressive program of individual and national regeneration. His futurist *modernolatria* is a far cry from Michelstaedter's apology for the "untimely wisdom" of a timeless truth.

Still, none of this is to deny that when he speaks of *attualità, 'presentness,' 'actuality,'* Michelstaedters explicitly adopts Nietzsche's notion of "untimely wisdom" (*unzeitgemässige Reflectionen*), that is, of saying things, as his first epigraph from Sophocles emphasizes, that are against the spirit of the time. (p.xvii) For Nietzsche, and Michelstaedter after him, German Historismus is a particular object of untimely attack. Historismus, in Nietzsche's view, puts detailed scholarship in the service of a progressive social mythology that, by its very weightiness, kills the spirit of life, will, and innovation. In opposing Historismus, Michelstaedter assumes that there is a philosophia perennis, a truth that wise people have discovered again and again but that is necessarily lost again and again because most people, adrift in what Montaigne and Pascal call "distraction" and what Heidegger, in Being and Time, was to call "the they" (das Mann), cannot bear the truth and will do anything to avoid it. They invent *kallopismata orfnes*, 'ornaments of the darkness,' the rhetorical commonplaces that allow them to live without understanding. And in this, Michelstaedter emphasizes repeatedly, they are aided by the "god" of philopsychia, 'pleasure,' 'attachment to life,' or, as he translates the term in a footnote, *viltà*, 'cowardice.'

In his preface Michelstaedter lists Parmenides, Empedocles, Socrates, the great Greek tragedians Aeschylus and Sophocles, the lyric poet Simonides, the Jewish but Hellenizing author of Ecclesiastes, Christ, and subsequently the humanist Petrarch, then Leopardi, Ibsen, and Beethoven (to whose music Michelstaedter was deeply attached). There is a message in this admittedly incomplete list: people who, in philosophy and literature courses, are usually said to be representative of the philosophia perennis, the great professional philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas, not

to speak of Hegel, Croce, and Gentile, are explicitly said by Michelstaedter not to have this insight. Their optimistic, official, intellectualist philosophy of illusory fulfillment is an ideological product of the desire to cover up the basic truth. In the great battle between intellectualists and voluntarists, they are the intellectualists, who tell us that behind life's curtain lies the possibility of totally satisfactory presence. The philosophia perennis advocated by Michelstaedter invokes a voluntarist pantheon.

This brings us to a second, perhaps more impressive and original, way in which Michelstaedter emulates Nietzsche. As a Greek scholar of considerable skill, Michelstaedter was well prepared to follow Nietzsche's philological lead in looking for the true Greek wisdom not in Academic, Peripatetic, Stoic, or Epicurean traditions but in the often paradoxical and always fragmentary pre-Socratics—Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the tragedians, especially Sophocles and Aeschylus. In his early work The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, Nietzsche, who was a professional Greek scholar, began by quoting a piece of this old dark wisdom in which a wise man, intervening in the conventional debate about how to rank the best things in life, says, "The best thing is not to have been born at all; the second best to die young." Nietzsche would continue this vein in his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. What is most original about Michelstaedter's work is that he was virtually the first person to see that the ancient language of rhetoric, rather than its rival, the Platonic language of philosophy, is the best medium in which both to restore the meaning of true, dark Greek wisdom and to commend it again. By taking this surprising approach, Michelstaedter anticipates a good deal of subsequent and contemporary scholarship concerning the origins of Greek rhetoric in the Logos tradition that was eventually undermined by Platonic philosophy. "The Logos always holds," says Heraclitus, "but humans always prove unable to understand it".

In his highly original, if unsystematic, interpretation of the pre-Socratic fragments, Michelstaedter anticipates in striking ways the work of Martin Heidegger. In **Being and Time** (1926), Heidegger provided a phenomenology of lived experience that makes the awareness of death central in opening the temporal structure of human life (*Dasein*) as a series of desires. Michelstaedter's distinction between "persuasion" and "rhetoric" is close to Heidegger's distinction between authenticity and the inauthentic chatter of das Mann. Like Michelstaedter, moreover, Heidegger eventually saw that he was in a position to appreciate Heraclitus's dialectical view that each thing, being mortal, is interpenetrated with its opposite. "The same thing," says Heraclitus, "is both living and dead". That is why for Heraclitus "all things flow" like a river into which one cannot step twice. The awareness and acceptance of that dark opposite, and the refusal to merely "reflect" the various and sundry *kallopismata* with which rhetoric covers it, are of fundamental concern for Michelstaedter. Long after he had intimated, in Persuasion and Rhetoric, that Parmenides and Heraclitus were proclaiming the same Logos and were not the opposites that Aristotle, Hegel, and other official philosophers considered them to be (the first supposedly being a radical "monist," the second a radical "pluralist"), Heidegger would assert the very same thing. This convergence is not surprising. It was only after his deep encounter with Nietzsche that Heidegger came to grasp the dark Logos of the pre-Socratics.

Few of Michelstaedter's assertions are in themselves altogether new. On the contrary, he is highly intertextual. The reader, if he or she is to gain wisdom—to be persuaded, in Michelstaedter's vocabulary—is expected to work through citations and allusions rather than merely recognize where they come from. In this allusive manner, the book is reminiscent of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, a work that seeks to lead the reader through the gallery of "pictures" of the human condition that must successively be undergone if true illumination is to occur. Thus, when Michelstaedter claims, in Part One, Chapter II, that "nothing is for itself but with respect to consciousness," he

reiterates a key proposition of Hegel's Phenomenology. The opening phrase of Part One, moreover, echoes Hegel's concept of the "Philosopher": "If we want to be nasty, we can say that the Philosopher is discontented because he does not know what he wants. But if we want to be just, we must say that he is discontented because he does not know what he wants. He has desires, like everyone. But the satisfaction of his desires does not satisfy him, as Philosopher, as long as he does not understand them, that is, as long as he does not fit them into the coherent whole of his discourse that reveals his existence". Michelstaedter's treatment, however, moves beyond the philosopher per se, suggesting in the subsequent oblique comparison of himself to a gluttonous chlorine molecule that the absence with which he is concerned is a broadly human rather than a strictly philosophical dilemma.

In the end, Michelstaedter's wisdom is the very opposite of Hegel's, as he makes explicit in the closing chapters. He is, as we have noted, radically voluntaristic rather than intellectualistic in his mode of thinking: the human condition is not oriented toward theoretical appreciation, as it is for Hegel and Hegel's master, Aristotle, but is defined instead by desire and its frustration, as Schopenhauer had insisted. All the figures of whom Michelstaedter approves are voluntarists in this sense or are interpreted by him in this way.

Nor does Michelstaedter think, as Hegel did, that the truth about the human condition becomes much clearer as modernity proceeds. On the contrary, clear thinking—again, conviction, persuasion—becomes ever more compromised by rhetoric as modernity sets in. This too is clear at the end of the text, where Michelstaedter ridicules the pretensions of the self-satisfied bourgeois in ways that recall, and may well depend on, Leopardi, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, and, most explicitly, Ibsen. Accordingly, all the textual materials on which Michelstaedter meditates—even the most up to date—are placed into a frame that privileges the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers and dramatists (and a few brave souls thereafter) as offering an unblinkered peek at the fundamental reality of the human condition. It is these figures who are given defining control over the key term "persuasion," and, by extension, "rhetoric."

One of the first things Michelstaedter shows is that the use of the term *pithenon* meant to the pre-Socratics total conviction. This fact provides a clue to understanding why he at least pretends that he has written a dissertation in classical Greek philology. In some ways he has. In this respect, Michelstaedter once more resembles Nietzsche, a classical philologist who explicitly spurned the fundamental project of German idealism: to unify the Greco-Roman with the Judeo-Christian inheritance and to define modernity as lying at the confluence of both. In contrast to Kierkegaard, who chose the Judeo-Christian side, Michelstaedter instead opted, like Nietzsche, for the hard wisdom of the early Greeks. In this respect he was perhaps at his most innovative, anticipating the path toward the pre-Socrates that Heidegger would later tread. This, we believe, explains one of the fundamental oddities of Michelstaedter's text: when he wants throughout the manuscript to state his own conclusions, he translates them into Greek, as if he were offering a serious exhibition to his readers both of his skill in Greek composition and of the crystalline truth at the center of his thought. The most succinct example of this occurs in the portion of Part One, Chapter III that is concerned with the true meaning of giving, which Michelstaedter defines by means of an exclamation point following the Greek word: "Giving is not for the sake of having given but for giving (δουαι!)." The truth is contained in the word; the word is the truth. A more telling illustration of the unity of philosophy and philology that underlies Michelstaedter's approach, and of the simultaneity of word, truth, and action envisioned in his project, is impossible to imagine.

Although many significant links can be traced between Michelstaedter and German thinkers, it is also significant that no German author makes the famous list in the preface. Indeed Michelstaedter

explicitly warns against the pernicious effect of German writers in a bibliography found among the papers on his desk ("these are contagious, just by looking at them"). We might surmise that their contagious influence has to do with the insidious rhetoric of knowledge. In fact, he recommends playing or listening to Beethoven's music—the untainted voice of persuasion—and condemns reading as an unnatural activity: "Eyes are not made to read books. But if you want at any cost to lower them to this service, read: Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Simonides, Socrates (in the first Platonic dialogues), Aeschylus and Sophocles, Ecclesiastes, the Gospels according to Matthew, Mark and Luke, Lucretius … the Triumphs of Petrarch, and Leopardi's *Canti*, **THE ADVENTURES OF PINOCCHIO** by Collodi, Ibsen's dramas."

Among the modern authors in this bibliography, Giacomo Leopardi had the clearest and most profound impact on **PERSUASION AND RHETORIC**. Commonly regarded as the greatest Italian poet since Petrarch and one of the most erudite men of his time, Leopardi professed an overtly materialistic gospel of despair, which was untimely in an age characterized by a political and religious *rappel à l'ordre* as well as, in the most liberal thinkers, by faith in the progress and perfectibility of humanity Notwithstanding his classical tastes, Leopardi revealed affinities with romanticism in his emphasis on the poetic imagination and in his tragic vision of life, which is consonant with the pessimistic side of the movement—an undercurrent of disenchantment, unfulfilled longing, and melancholy. He gave philosophic expression to this Weltschmerz in a series of dialogue-essays, the **MORAL TALES** (1827). In these satirical prose pieces, long before Nietzsche proclaimed the "death" of God, Leopardi addressed epistemological and moral issues that still define the modern crisis of values. Michelstaedter's central argument resonates with the most fundamental and pervasive element of Leopardi's moral philosophy, the "Theory of Pleasure," which is based on two convictions: "that we have been made with such an intense longing for happiness, and loathing for its opposite, that life itself and this longing are virtually one and the same thing; and that since we yearn for the infinite, and therefore our yearning for happiness is infinite, we can never be satisfied. Our lives therefore by their very nature are 'a violent state of being'" (Creagh 25).

PERSUASION AND RHETORIC echoes other important themes of Leopardi's thought: the critique of both contemporary scholarship and mass culture as synonymous with ignorance; the attack on the optimistic ideology of progress and on the overall cowardice of mankind; and the disillusioned defense of his own grievous philosophy as the sole courageous choice for the honest man. One might add to this list Leopardi's welcoming of death in the epilogue of the volume—the tale titled "Tristan and a Friend" (written in 1832 and included in the 1834 edition), which can be viewed as a reaction to the indifference and hostility that the 1827 edition had encountered. Note, however, that this despairing epilogue does not conclusively negate the "ingrained and ineradicable love of life" that runs through much of Leopardi's work, as he continued to celebrate magnanimous feelings and passions inspired by values such as poetry, justice, virtue, and love, which give purpose and meaning to life. Michelstaedter, by contrast, brings the dark wisdom of philosophia perennis to its extreme conclusion: he radically embraces the "frigid truth" that Leopardi resists despite his own wisdom. The sole remaining value in Michelstaedter's moral philosophy is the honesty of persuasion, which entails a rejection of desire in its self-deceptive wiles as well as in its exploitative (hence violent) relation to nature and to others.

THE MORAL TALES may also be viewed as a model for the stylistic variety of **PERSUASION AND RHETORIC**. Like Leopardi's dialogues, Michelstaedter's text interweaves different styles and tones, from the lyrical to the pedantic, from the biblically solemn to the parodically flippant. The work's first paragraph sets the tone for the entire text by mixing the high register (genus grave) of the quotation from Greek tragedy with the low register of the colloquial, pleonastic opening ("Io lo so che parlo perché parlo," 'I know I am talking because I'm talking') and of a quotation that sounds

like a popular saying: *"è pur necessario che se uno ha addentato una perfida sorba la risputi,"* 'if you bite into a crabapple, you've got to spit it out.'

Beyond such mixing of registers, the most remarkable feature of Michelstaedter's style is its complexity. Whereas Leopardi's prose is difficult in a classically harmonious way, Michelstaedter's writing is expressionistically "dissonant." True to the content of his work, Michelstaedter disavows any intention of "persuading" or "diverting" his readers, as well as any claim to originality, "philosophical dignity," or "artistic concreteness." An ironic interpretation of such a paradoxical statement of (lack of) purpose is possible: we can read it as a rhetorical strategy (*acutum dicendi genus*) intended to produce an effect of estrangement, which makes the reader step outside established patterns of thought (the vie, 'ways' or 'paths,' of which Michelstaedter writes at numerous points). This defamiliarizing effect, which can plausibly be ascribed to Heraclitus or Parmenides as no less intentional, is instrumental to the goal of persuasion as Michelstaedter conceives it. The quest for persuasion requires, as also for the Greek authors he prefers, a break with the normal world, the world Parmenides calls "the way of seeming." To the same effect may be also attributed the obscurity produced throughout the text by complex sentence structures, especially by the frequent use of anastrophe (inversion), ellipsis, and anacoluthon (syntactical inconsistency or incoherence within a sentence). Now, a certain level of obscurity as is appropriate for the genus grave as it calls attention to the importance of the subject matter. Moreover, obscurity is the truth against which, according to Michelstaedter, we attempt to create protective and deceptive screens of light or at least ornament (*kallopisma*).

In view of the author's attachment to poetic and paradoxical thinkers, as well as his refusal in writing his dissertation to obey the conventions of academic prose, and, not least, the agitated state of someone who, in the very text he was writing, appears to have been working through the rationale for his own suicide, it is not surprising that his style would pose great difficulties for readers. Campailla notes that from an editor's standpoint Michelstaedter's punctuation is a "*veritable via crucis*." His sentences are filled with dashes, subordinate clauses, and insufficiently identified antecedents. In translating the text, we have tried to cope with this difficulty by finding a mean between the literalness that Michelstaedter's text deserves and the responsibility to make his meaning at least as plain to English readers as it might be to Italian. The same end is served by the brief introductory statements for each section of Michelstaedter's text, and our endnote commentary is intended to provide references to some of the vast intertextual web in which Michelstaedter's book is woven. <>

The Wreckage of Philosophy: Carlo Michelstaedter and the Limits of Bourgeois Thought by Mimmo Cangiano [Toronto Italian Studies, University of Toronto Press, 9781487504649]

The work of Carlo Michelstaedter (1887–1910) was the first to analyze modernist philosophy in strict connection with social changes in mass society. Revealing how Michelstaedter was able to unveil the relations between pivotal early-modernist philosophies and social restructurings, **The Wreckage of Philosophy: Carlo Michelstaedter and the Limits of Bourgeois Thought** examines the ongoing processes of "specialization," "rationalization," and "atomization." It points out how Michelstaedter connected the main theoretical expressions of modernism with the decisive social transformations of the early twentieth century, taking into

consideration the key players of modernist philosophy, such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Ernst Mach, and William James.

By following Michelstaedter's analysis and strategies, *The Wreckage of Philosophy* focuses on several intertwined issues: the distinct philosophical positions within the modernist area; the connections between philosophy and modernist literature; the relations between intellectual positions and social upheavals; and the early-twentieth-century links among traditional philosophy, critique of language, and epistemology of technique.

Review

"Mimmo Cangiano is extremely well versed in the relevant critical material, especially in the theoretical and literary works of Michelstaedter's time, which he invokes and marshals to build this original interpretation." — (Thomas Harrison, Professor, Department of Italian, University of California, Los Angeles)

"**THE WRECKAGE OF PHILOSOPHY: CARLO MICHELSTAEDTER AND THE LIMITS OF BOURGEOIS THOUGHT** constitutes a valuable tool for students and faculty specializing in history of philosophy, nineteenth-century German philosophy, for instance Nietzsche and Hegel, as well as modernist thought, and the historical context of Italy in the beginning of the twentieth century." — (Valerio Cappozzo, Assistant Professor, Department of Modern Languages, University of Mississippi)

"Offering a brilliant and original reading of Michelstaedter's philosophy, Mimmo Cangiano has written the first book to do so in English since 1992. By providing a detailed interpretation of Michelstaedter's work in English, Cangiano makes this challenging philosopher accessible to an English-speaking audience, while also offering his own powerfully original reading and engagement with the philosopher. Rather than entering into Michelstaedter's corpus through his poetry or painting, as much recent scholarship has done, Cangiano undertakes the challenging task of reading the philosophy itself, putting Michelstaedter's thought back on the table." — (Giuseppe Gazzola, Department of European Languages, Literatures, and Cultures, Stony Brook University)

Conclusion: The Limits of Bourgeois Thought: *Persuasion and Rhetoric* and *History and Class Consciousness*
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Everything is relative and confused down here. — Alberto Michelstaedter (Carlo's father)

Everything is preferable to the truth. — Franz Joseph I (Emperor of Austria)

Carlo Michelstaedter was born into a bourgeois Jewish family with proItalian leanings in 1887 in Gorizia, when that city was still part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had an elder brother, Gino, who committed suicide in New York in 1909, and two sisters, Elda (who would be deported to Auschwitz along with their mother) and Paula (who would escape to Switzerland). As an adolescent he attended the local *liceo* (secondary school) and became friends with two other Gorizians: Nino Paternolli (who owned the garret where Michelstaedter would write his dissertation, *Persuasion and Rhetoric)* and Enrico Mreule (who would go on to live an adventurous life, first in Argentina and then in Dalmatia). Their friendship, which is narrated in the *Epistolario* (his *Tagebuch),* was used as fodder by Claudio Magris for his novel *Un altro mare.*

Michelstaedter had decided to study mathematics in Vienna. But in 1905 he changed his mind: he went to Florence instead, where he focused on the humanities at the Istituto di Studi Superiori — a common destination for many Austrian intellectuals with pro-Italian leanings (among whom could be counted Scipio Slataper as well as the Stuparich brothers, Giani and Carlo). In the early years of the twentieth century, Florence was the intellectual capital of Italy, where the foundations for modernist Italian literature and philosophy were being laid. The militant journal *Leonardo,* overseen by Giovanni Papini, though waning, was still active when Carlo moved to Florence. In the pages of *Leonardo,* Papini and his followers presented readers with articles about the most important thinkers of the time: Henri Bergson, William James, Ernst Mach, and, of course, Friedrich Nietzsche, who in Italy was by then being liberated from Gabriele D'Annunzio's decadent reading of his work. Late in 1908, Giuseppe Prezzolini founded *La Voce,* which would come to serve as a proving ground for the young Italian intelligentsia of the time. It published contributions by authors like Slataper, Stuparich, Giovanni Boine, and Piero Jahier alongside articles by Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile. *La Voce* served as a forum for a variety of issues, such as theological modernism (Alfred Loisy, George Tyrrell, Edouard Le Roy), nationalism (in 1910 the Associazione Nazionalista Italiana would be founded in Florence), and the crisis of socialism. Around this time, *La Voce* published a number of influential writings, including those of Georges Sorel and Otto Weininger, as well as Gaetano Salvemini's thoughts on social reform; Ardengo Soffici's on recent artistic developments in France; and Benito Mussolini's on "*question trentina.*" *La Voce* counted Antonio Gramsci among its admiring subscribers.

Michelstaedter read *La Voce* (he brought a few issues back with him to Gorizia), and though he remained disengaged from the intellectual battles being waged by this squadron of intellectuals, philosophers, and writers, he shared their cultural coordinates — that is, his readings covered more or less the same ground as theirs. That said, his thought cannot be ascribed to any of the modernist orientations vying for ground at the time in what Martin Heidegger would later call the "crisis of the foundations." Indeed, in the last years of his life Michelstaedter would move beyond the main philosophical orientations of his era. Instead, the trajectory of his reflections pointed him towards the Frankfurt School, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Simone Weil. He shared with the latter an interest

in Greek thought, as well as a unique concept of justice and a critique of the conjoined operations of specialization and technology.

Studies of Michelstaedter have long approached his thought as a more or less unified whole, neglecting the transformations it underwent during his five years of intellectual activity The present work posits that we can delineate three general phases in the development of his philosophy. Between 1905 and 1907 — his university years — Michelstaedter's thought was characterized by a decadent, "Dannunzian" influence, albeit with constant attention to the relationship between the individual and society, to everything social that impedes the individual's expression of singularity.

From late 1907 through 1908, Michelstaedter made a key contribution in Europe to the study of the tragic as a possible means of salvaging an immanent meaning, a resistant centre to the "crisis of the foundations" that had transformed existence — in the words of Gyorgy Lukács — into an "an anarchy of chiaroscuro" *(Soul and Form,* 228). In 1908 Michelstaedter added his voice to those of Henrik Ibsen, Otto Weininger, Scipio Slataper, and Giovanni Amendola in Italy, who would turn to "tragic thought" as a response to the abyss opened by nihilism.

In 1909, catalysed by the task of writing a university thesis on the concepts of persuasion and rhetoric in the works of Plato and Aristotle, Michelstaedter's thought underwent a shift — one that would continue after he returned to Gorizia.[1] His analysis now sought to provide the possibility of resisting the abstracting force that social consensus exercised on both philosophical and quotidian forms of thought. It is clear in his later writings that he understood that all philosophical approaches must be analysed in terms of how they are abstracted (alienated) from themselves within the structures of societal consensus. Building on this foundation, he came to understand culture as societal behaviour rather than as something created by the subject; this paved the way for a series of reflections on the relationship between epistemology and ideological consensus that would have more in common with Lukács's ideas in *History and Class Consciousness* (1922) than with the Lukács of *Soul and Form* (1910), to which Michelstaedter's work has often been compared.

On 17 October 1910, after finishing his thesis and its profoundly important appendixes, Michelstaedter shot himself. Besides his thesis, he left behind thousands of pages of poetry, stories, letters, and above all notes on philosophy.

This book sets out to analyse Michelstaedter's intellectual trajectory in its entirety, moving in chronological order through the three phases of his thought (1906-7; 1908; and 1909-10). The main objective here is to demonstrate how Michelstaedter arrived at a thought that was both in dialogue with and radically antithetical to the main philosophical currents of his time. At the heart of my interpretation is Michelstaedter's unique analysis of the concept of "abstraction." For him, abstraction was the means by which society reabsorbed the various ideological and cultural perspectives and (on a material level) the needs of individuals, by adapting them so as to reintegrate them into its mode of operation. A corollary to this was his development of a cultural perspective according to which thought (his own included), rather than being autonomous, is forced to develop on the basis of directions that are ideologically and materially imposed by the social structure and therefore constantly in danger of being absorbed. At the root of this uniform social abstraction — and this is what really sets Michelstaedter apart —we do not find a societal appeal to order, to absolute values or an immutable truth, but rather the same contrasting ideological positions that form the social whole. For Michelstaedter, the uniformity of the social structure (and of thought) was not the result of underlying principles of an essentialistic nature; it stemmed, rather, from the need to manage and rationalize — without ever definitively arriving at a resolution — the relativity of ideologies, wills, needs, and ways of living. The abstraction of this underlying relativity was what Michelstaedter called rhetoric: reproposing the untouched contrast of ideas and existences with the

appearance of being. The goal of rhetoric is to present the contrast of opinions and philosophical orientations in society as Being itself.

The first chapter of this book discusses the cultural context in which Michelstaedter developed his ideas. It begins with an overview of the different philosophical perspectives that were in vogue at the time and a survey of the various critical perspectives from which his work has been interpreted by scholars. It then analyses his writings from 1906 to 1907 in relation to the decadent and aesthetic tendencies of the period and notes how his particular interpretation of those poetics would impact the development of his philosophy. In analysing some of these early writings by Michelstaedter, the chapter emphasizes the emergence of a *tragical* ethical perspective, one that seeks a solution to the contrast between the individual and society — on an artistic-philosophical level — in the genre of tragedy (both classical and Ibsenian). Here I observe how his analysis of the "chorus" as the whole of society in classical tragedy foreshadowed future developments in his thought. His interpretation of the chorus as a social consortium that orders the hero to respect society's laws and shared ideas anticipates the role that society would play in shaping the ideas and actions of the individual.

The second chapter focuses on Michelstaedter's philosophy, beginning with a central element of his thought: the concept of will. His concept of will, which is clearly indebted to Schopenhauer's philosophy, extends beyond the will of the subject to include the subject's state of need. Will is the phenomenological manner in which the subject interprets the world propelled by his state of need; it is a state of dissatisfaction that leads him to situate his momentary will/need as the basis of his entire interpretation of realty. In the moment of need, the subject reads all of reality according to the characteristics of his own needs. When this mechanism is extended from the individual to the whole of society, the result is what Michelstaedter describes as "correlativity," that is, a system of contrasting wills that leads individuals to see everything contained in the real (including other subjects) in relation to their own needs, and thus as objects to be annexed for their "usefulness." Michelstaedter calls this mechanism the "direct mode." At the end of the chapter I introduce the cornerstone of Michelstaedter's philosophy: the passage from the "direct mode" to the "connective mode." I contend that the dichotomy between these two modes, which has been ignored' by critics up until now, represents the core of Michelstaedter's philosophy. Passage from the "direct mode" to the "connective mode" is necessary in order to reconfigure the relativistic contrast of will/needs into a cultural and material code (rhetoric) that, while leaving the contrast untouched, is capable of stabilizing it in appearance.

The third chapter analyses the various aspects of rhetoric, beginning with the forms it assumes in the linguistic sphere. Through a comparison with Giuseppe Prezzolini and some of the principal interpreters of the *Sprachkritik* movement, I show how Michelstaedter's critique of language is different from the nihilist positions of the period that viewed *words* as inevitably separated from the reality to which they refer. Michelstaedter's critique of language focuses on its role as a medium of abstraction in society — as a means to transform words (as in the case of the will) into a code to which individuals must adapt in order to satisfy their needs. I then point out how for Michelstaedter — through his peculiar reading of the Hegelian master—slave dialectic — this code is not constructed on a set of random elements; rather, it is determined by the wills/needs of those who control the social system through property and money. The *power* these two elements give to the subject is such that these individuals dictate the rules of the code itself, ensuring that their will/needs — their interpretation of the real — prevails over those of others. In the "connective mode," the other individuals will find it easier to satisfy their own needs by adapting to interpretations of reality that do not challenge those at the top of the system of correlativity. The last section of the chapter presents Michelstaedter's idea of "consensus." I observe how this idea serves as the basis of his

concept of rhetoric as an imitative principle, and show how Michelstaedter forms this idea through his interpretation of the passage from Plato's to Aristotle's philosophy.

In the final chapter I observe how rhetoric and persuasion (i.e., for Michelstaedter, the capacity to resist the consensus implemented by rhetoric) are historical rather than metaphysical—ontological forms. As the abstraction of relativity, rhetoric can only exist as an ontological form in appearance, transforming itself over time following the changing conformation of social relations within the system of correlativity. In the same way, persuasion, which can only emerge in relation to the present form of rhetoric, must also transform itself over time. As such, the form of rhetoric we find in Michelstaedter is derived from the prevailing scientific—technological perspective of his time. For Michelstaedter this perspective directly shaped modes of pedagogy on the basis of principles of (1) "utility": that which is true is that which is useful; (2) "contemplativity": the apparent inability to intervene in order to modify the system of rhetoric; and (3) "calculation": shaping one's activity, thought, and actions in relation to calculations made on how to best exploit the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of the system, and thereby reducing one's activity to mimetically adapting to the system itself.

In the conclusion, I underscore the uniqueness of Michelstaedter's philosophical findings relative to those of his time and link **Persuasion and Rhetoric** to Lukács's **History and Class Consciousness**, the work that marked the birth of twentieth-century Hegelian Marxism. At this point the Marxist structure of my approach to analysing Michelstaedter's thought, present throughout the book, emerges clearly, as it also does in my observation of the many inevitable differences between Michelstaedter and Lukács. As such, "the limits of bourgeois thought" —limits that have been the object of Michelstaedter's analysis — show themselves to be in part inherent in Michelstaedter himself. This does not of course undermine the profound originality of his thought, which stands at the point of contact between a philosophy that still believes itself to be autonomous and one that recognizes itself as dialectically conditioned by the social-historical space in which it originates. Having set out to reveal the relationships between cultural interpretations and this social space, Michelstaedter arrived at the point past which bourgeois thought was unable to proceed without negating its own modes of operation, without destroying itself. <>

1910 The Emancipation of Dissonance by Thomas Harrison [University of California Press, 9780520200432]

The year 1910 marks an astonishing, and largely unrecognized, juncture in Western history. In this perceptive interdisciplinary analysis, Thomas Harrison addresses the extraordinary intellectual achievement of the time. Focusing on the cultural climate of Middle Europe and paying particular attention to the life and work of Carlo Michelstaedter, he deftly portrays the reciprocal implications of different discourses—philosophy, literature, sociology, music, and painting. His beautifully balanced and deeply informed study provides a new, wider, and more ambitious definition of expressionism and shows the significance of this movement in shaping the artistic and intellectual mood of the age.

1910 probes the recurrent themes and obsessions in the work of intellectuals as diverse as Egon Schiele, Georg Trakl, Vasily Kandinsky, Georg Lukàcs, Georg Simmel, Dino Campana, and Arnold Schoenberg. Together with Michelstaedter, who committed suicide in 1910 at the age of 23, these thinkers shared the essential concerns of expressionism: a sense of irresolvable conflict in human existence, the philosophical status of death, and a quest for the nature of human subjectivity. Expressionism, Harrison argues provocatively, was a last, desperate attempt by the intelligentsia to

defend some of the most venerable assumptions of European culture. This ideological desperation, he claims, was more than a spiritual prelude to World War I: it was an unheeded, prophetic critique.

Review

1910 stands out as a model of interdisciplinary and comparative study. . . . It brilliantly illustrates the complexity of a crucial period in European culture . . . focusing in particular on the intellectual intricacies of Mitteleuropa on the eve of World War I and of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire.--Lucia Re

Compellingly original. . . . In Harrison's work, Michelstaedter and his confreres (Campana, Slataper, Kokoschke, Rilke, Kandinsky, Lukàcs, Trakl, et al.) turn out to be considerably more fascinating and more emblematic of their time than anyone has been able to perceive before.--Gregory Lucente, University of Michigan

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On May 17, 1910, Halley's comet shatters the peace of Europe's skies. As tends to happen at such moments of cosmic disturbance, the event evokes deep-seated anxieties, articulated in newspaper editorials on doom and degeneration. For each collective concern there are thousands of personal ones. Two weeks before the comet, on May 2, Anna Pulitzer, the close friend of the Triestine writer Scipio Slataper, makes her way home from a botched tryst with her friend and shoots herself in front of the mirror. Apparently she has lost some life-sustaining faith. Two weeks earlier, on April 19, and not far from Anna's own home in Trieste, Sigmund Freud and his Vienna Psychoanalytic Society are so vexed by the rise of suicide among the Austro-Hungarian youth that they hold a conference to determine its motivations. Among Italians, the most remarkable young suicide is not Anna Pulitzer but the student Carlo Michelstaedter. Not in Trieste this time but Gorizia, another city on the outskirts of Austria-Hungary, on October 17, 1910, this twenty-three-year-old artist, philosopher, and poet is so determined to end his life that he shoots himself not once but twice with his revolver. It happens on the birthday and in the home of his mother, following an argument with this, her youngest son (the older one had died a year earlier, allegedly also from suicide).

Is there any "idea" at work in these deaths? Two days after Michelstaedter's gesture Sabina Spielrein, the schizophrenic patient and lover of Carl Jung, jots down in her journal an intuition that now, four years before the Great War, is beginning to assume collective proportions. "Secretly," she notes on October 19, "my new study, 'On the Death Instinct,' is taking shape within me." Her completed study, published by Freud in 1912, expresses a thesis that Freud will sign his own name to eight years later, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle—to the effect that love cannot be disengaged from its opposite, or from the impulse toward violence, negation, and destruction. On the same day that Spielrein records her secret, researchers who believe that personal behavior is always a function of larger, communal patterns meet for the First Conference of the German Society for Sociology (October 19-22). Present among the sociologists are Max Weber, Martin Buber, and Georg Simmel.

None of these events can be directly tied to Schoenberg's painting. They occur in widely disparate places, among people whose sexes, nationalities, and cultural formations have little in common. And yet they partake in a strange commonality of atmosphere, a wordless similarity of concern. This concern or mood, this knowledge or perception, is the subject of this book. Called nihilism in philosophy and expressionism in the arts, it comprises a vision of history as nightmare, an obsession with mortality and decay, a sense of human marginalization from the autonomous developments of culture, and the responses they spur. Its protagonists are the student Michelstaedter and a set of his intellectual peers: Georg Trakl, Dino Campana, and Rainer Maria Rilke; Vasily Kandinsky, Egon Schiele, and Oskar Kokoschka; Georg Lukács, Martin Buber, and Georg Simmel; Arnold Schoenberg, Scipio Slataper, and Wilhelm Worringer. Other figures occupy either side of the year in question: Giovanni Gentile, Otto Weininger, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Like Michelstaedter, many were Jewish and citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Many also died young, sometimes, like Michelstaedter, by their own hand. Nearly all had as precarious a grasp on their intentions as the age on its course.

Michelstaedter's suicide occurs the same day he completes one of the most unusual works of the early twentieth century: a university dissertation called Persuasion and Rhetoric. In a sense, however, the real act of completion lies in the suicide itself, for the work on which he had labored so intensely over the course of the year tolerates no breach between theory and practice. Whether the suicide is to be interpreted as an expression or a refutation of the "moral health" described in Persuasion and Rhetoric, as scholars still hotly debate, it cannot be separated from the thinking that

it ends. For one and the same thing is at work in both, something strangely redolent of the voiceless anxiety of Schoenberg's painting.

Nineteen ten is also the date on the most anguished self-portraits of Egon Schiele and Oskar Kokoschka, the younger compatriots of Gustave Klimt. In Germany rather than Austria three occurrences definitively announce the advent of a new and expressionist art: (1) the schism among the artists of the Berlin Secession, giving rise to the New Secession, (2) the transition between the founding of the Munich New Artists' Alliance in 1909 and the inception of The Blue Rider almanac in 1911, (3) the inauguration of the most lasting organ of literary expressionism, the weekly periodical Der Sturm. In this year—when Freud makes his first written mention of the Oedipus complex (Freud 1910) and Carl Schmitt publishes On Guilt and Types of Guilt—Georg Simmel supplements his cultural sociology with "The Metaphysics of Death." The Italian Giovanni Boine counters modernity with religion in the Florentine journal La Voce. The young Austrian drug addict Georg Trakl begins to write the most disquieting poetry of the first half of our century. Simultaneously, south of the Alps, his counterpart Dino Campana lays the foundations for his Orphic Songs, eventually rewritten from memory and published in 1914. Committed to correctional institutions throughout his life, Campana is permanently confined to an asylum in 1918, at age thirty-three. Trakl, incestuously attached to his younger sister, takes his life before reaching his thirties. Schiele, born three years after Boine, dies a year later, in 1918, at the age of twenty-eight. The first artist ever to be imprisoned in Austria for "offenses against public morality," he finds the first model for his tormented nudes in his fourteen-year-old sister Gerti.

In 1910 we also witness a resurgence—perhaps the final great resurgence—of the traditional European ideal to liberate human spirit from the pressures of material reality. It is the moment when the leader of the German lodges of the Theosophical Society, Rudolf Steiner, writes his outline of Occult Science and discovers the principles of anthroposophy; when Arthur Edward Waite publishes his Key to the Tarot and P. D. Ouspensky furnishes "the key to the enigmas of the world" in his Tertium Organum. Italian philosophy, at the same time, experiences the more studied idealism of Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile. Most decisively perhaps, the year signals the astonishing revolution of abstraction in art. Three years earlier the art historian Wilhelm Worringer had linked symbolic and non-figurative art to a "spiritual space-phobia" in the cultural psyche. By 1910 he has perceived the phobia in the age at hand, an age described by Vasily Kandinsky in the first and still most philosophical manifesto for abstract art, On the Spiritual in Art. What was at stake for Worringer and Kandinsky alike was the relation between soul and form, or between intuited truth and its figurative articulation. The most thorough study of such a relation can be found in a book published that year under the very same title: Soul and Form by the twenty-five-year-old Hungarian, Georg Lukács. In a "mood of permanent despair over the state of the world," as he later characterizes this period of his life in Theory of the Novel, Lukács writes yet another essay to include in the book's German edition of 1911: "The Metaphysics of Tragedy." Over the course of that year he sees tragedy as encompassing every effort of the soul not only to reach form but also to act ethically. The good, claims Lukács in "On Poverty of Spirit" (1911), eludes every rule of morality.

As for the forms at the disposal of this "soul," the years preceding the Great War of 1914 see them successively splintered. In one sense the avant-garde destruction of conventional modes of expression follows quite naturally on the liquidation of the word by such poets as Paul Valery and Hugo van Hoffmansthal. But in 1910 still others are bent on distinguishing between meaning and nonsense, especially in that Habsburg empire to which Michelstaedter himself belonged: the philosophers Fritz Mauthner and Adolph Stöhr, the essayist Karl Kraus, and, as early as 1912, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Kraus and Wittgenstein see the expressive content of language as depending less on the conscious intentions of speakers than on the ethics they inherit from their community; and how

fallen ethics seem to be at this moment in time can be gauged by a treasured reading of not only Wittgenstein and Kraus but their entire generation: the best-selling Sex and Character (1903) by Otto Weininger. He, too, a suicide at age twenty-three, Weininger argued that no woman or Jew had the spiritual constitution necessary for moral behavior. Action in accordance with the noblest possibilities of being was beyond the reach of all but the most gifted of men.

Of course, the fact that Kraus and Wittgenstein were of Jewish origin did not stop them from subscribing to Weininger's views any more than it did Italo Svevo or Arnold Schoenberg. After all, Weininger was himself a Jew and, if we are to believe the thesis of Theodor Lessing, at this moment in history Jewish self-hatred was a matter of pride. The Jewish anti-Semite Max Steiner suggested as much when in 1910 he also took his life. Countless thinkers of the prewar years were all too prepared to assume responsibility for the guilt described by Weininger. His Jew was in essence an ideal type, a spiritual outsider in normative, Christian culture, without firm roots or faith, reluctant to accept any principle of belief before examining each letter of its word. Like Adolf Hitler three decades later (himself an "artist" in 1910, though rejected by the same Vienna Academy of Fine Arts that accepted Egon Schiele) Weininger would have spied such "Judaism" in the guiding ambitions of each figure of this study—to build certainty and ethics ex nihilo (Michelstaedter), to articulate singular visions of exceptional individuals (Schiele, Kokoschka, and Trakl), to offer pure representations of soul (Kandinsky, Schoenberg, and the young Lukács), to give systematic order to intuitions one does not consider one's own (Wittgenstein, by his own admission). To Weininger the work of each of these figures would have smacked of the elucubrations of the Jew in exile, wandering through a desert laid bare by the spiritual diaspora of history.

In truth, a good number of Weininger's themes had already been announced by the cultural critics of the turn of the century: a brooding sense of the "Dusk of the Nations" (Max Nordau, in Degeneration), of the utter exhaustion of Western values, of physiological and psychological deterioration that called for the most surgical of operations. Anti-Semitism itself was just a channel for the fear of moral dissolution which such self-styled opponents of decadence as Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Julius Langbehn had inspired in the intellectual classes of Europe. As dozens of sold-out editions of Sex and Character convinced them that "being oneself" was far from an innocent matter, an even more notorious thinker was amassing evidence for the spiritual vacuity of the age. His name was Oswald Spengler and his findings were published in 1918 as volume one of The Decline of the West.

By 1910 the nihilistic visions of Europe begin to worry observers as distant as America:

> Every reader of the French and German newspapers knows that not a day passes without producing some uneasy discussion of supposed social decrepitude; falling off of the birthrate;—decline of rural population,—lowering of army standards;—multiplication of suicides;—increase of insanity or idiocy;—of cancer;—of tuberculosis;—signs of nervous exhaustion,—of enfeebled vitality,—`habits' of alcoholism and drugs,—failure of eyesight in the young,—and so on, without end.

The words belong to Henry Adams, addressed to historians in February 1910. Indeed, it is historians who are most alarmed, for at the moment of which Adams speaks, events that might otherwise appear incidental take on the dimensions of portentous omens: Military Plan 19 of Czarist Russia, to open hostilities on two simultaneous fronts against Austria and Germany; the total solar eclipse; the "calculated insult" to the Austrian monarchy of the Adolf Loos House, constructed across the square from the Habsburg palace in Vienna. In 1910 these occurrences are read as revelations, as warnings, as a call to arms.

The true call to arms, four years later, had been anticipated in the dramatic account of a German attack on Western Europe called The Invasion of 1910 (1906). If the English novelist William Le Queux was "prescient" in staging his war in 1910, it is because this moment best formulates a dialectic that was to inform so many decisions of the belligerent powers of 1914-1918. It was a dialectic that rooted all creation in destruction, all knowledge in blindness, all hope in despair, and attributed value to situations that appeared utterly futile. In the prewar work of Michelstaedter, Kandinsky, Lukács, and Buber, the dialectic is still a luminous one, thinking through its own principle of reversal. By 1914 it has grown darkly literal, fueling the unstudied conviction that conflagration is a means of cauterization, and that razing all life to the ground will purge it of its infections. Did thinkers of 1910 suspect that their own dialectic would fall prey to the negativity it strove to overcome? There is little reason to say yes, and yet something brought Michelstaedter and Trakl to suicide and Campana and others to madness. Nor can we dismiss the fact that unprecedented numbers of young men went mad or took their own lives in the years immediately preceding the First World War—that is, before being able to be conscripted into service. We do not possess a sufficiently sophisticated cognitive science to investigate such an issue, but the syndrome returns, especially before World War II. Nineteen ten is the spiritual prefiguration of an unspeakably tragic fatality, heard in the tones of the audacious and the anguished, the deviant and the desperate, in the art of a youth grown precociously old, awaiting a war it had long suffered in spirit.

Here prescience can be felt in the suffering itself. To those who mistrusted all political leaders, and all practical responses to things not intellectually digested, a belligerent reaction such as war to vague fears of dissolution could only be the disease masquerading as cure. This is not to say that intellectuals rallied to oppose the war; most, in fact, did not. Here the testimony of Rainer Maria Rilke is only one among many: "In the first days of August," he reports in a letter of November 6, 1914, "the spectacle of the war, of the war-god, seized me." Disaster and affliction, he reflects, are not presently more widespread than ever before; they are simply more tangible, more active, more apparent:

> For the affliction in which mankind has daily lived from the very beginning can't be really increased no matter what the circumstances. Insight into man's unspeakable misery does increase however, and perhaps this is what everything is leading to today; so great a downfall—as though new risings were seeking clearance and room for launching!

The thinking and art of 1910 sought precisely such clearance for risings and launchings—but in the context of so articulate a misery, so philosophical and metaphysical a sense of bereavement, that it could hardly be redressed by political solutions. In fact, if what strikes us most today is precisely the nihilism of the prewar period—the gruesomeness of so much of its painting, music, and writing—it is because in it we perceive an alarm reaching beyond every local concern.

In 1910 the first decade of the last century of a dying millennium comes to a close. In the seven years to either side of it we see some of the most startling changes in modern history: drastic reshufflings of nations, economies, societies, and psyches; artistic, scientific, and political revolutions; the aggressive platforms of Georges Sorel and rebelling minorities throughout the continent. Nothing, in 1910, is definitively over and nothing definitively begun. Every attempted beginning is also an end, every end a hidden beginning. The "degeneracy" and "decadence" once identified in its present and its past name phenomena that would inevitably inherit its future. The prewar years were a workshop of *futurisme* and *passeisme* alike, testing every concern of a simultaneously old and new Europe: the borders of its personal, sexual and social identities, the solidity of its moral and theoretical foundations, the effects of technology and urbanization, the value and methods of its human sciences (reflected in the rise of phenomenology, psychology, sociology, and language-philosophy, not to

mention theosophy, anthroposophy, and other, less tangible pursuits). Ten years into the century both a death and a birth seemed to have taken too long in coming.

Can we distinguish any "determining marks" in such a complex, transitional era? To a large extent the distinctions are already made in the very process of research. One chooses, for one reason or another, to investigate a particular series of texts and then notes the questions they raise. One forms a preliminary hunch and goes on to test other documents in its light. One refines and revises the hunch, finally becoming convinced that one has laid hold of something solid. My own method has not been different. I began to conceive of the possibility of this study when I was certain that in the year 1910 a particular set of problems was addressed more singlemindedly than ever before.

My selection of problems was also facilitated by the central role that Carlo Michelstaedter has played in this study from the start. Research into the contexts in which he lived and thought—to illuminate a study of him alone—soon yielded the realization that he was not alone at all: that his nihilistic idealism was an outcome of a quite traditional quest; that his most radical intuitions found support in other, contemporaneous thinkers; that his drawings and paintings belonged solidly to a family of art in that part of the world we call Mitteleuropa; that countless perplexing patterns in prewar art and behavior made sense within the framework of a thinking he made explicit.

What has ultimately resulted, then, is not a study of Michelstaedter so much as a symptomatology of the age to which he belonged, traced in a cross section of intellectual, artistic, and historical events. And this means that it is not a story of what happened in 1910 so much as of what some of these happenings expressed, an account preserving its own individual slant, perhaps in the manner of an expressionist protrait, which does not offer the objective characteristics of a face so much as an imaginative reinscription. Its concern is not "history," but a history of symbols. Yet a history of symbols is history as it is traditionally read, constructed out of such critical years as 1492 or 1776, great transoceanic voyages, world-changing technological inventions, revolutionary events like the fall of the Berlin Wall. Many real cities besides Berlin have been forcibly divided between two states without joining the annals of history, or turning into symbols. One is Michelstaedter's hometown of Gorizia, now split between Italy and the Republic of Slovenia, split before that with Yugoslavia, and in Austrian hands before 1918. And in this city, as in countless others, people and thoughts have come and gone without leaving any trace in memory. For things are historical not merely by happening, but by finding a home in consciousness, in the manner of an Ottoman tower in Bosnia or the flag of Macedonia. This study intends precisely to create such a space in consciousness—for products of a moment which never became symbolic, even though they crystallized developments in the making for centuries. Accompanying this moment are also places—Trieste, Budapest, and Munich, overshadowed by strong memories of contemporary Paris and Moscow. Accompanying the places are a host of "secondary" cultural figures, overshadowed by the more towering icons of Picasso, Einstein, Freud, and Lenin.

What emerges from this twining of texts and strands of texts is a story of notes in the margins of better-known tales in the history of politics, economics, and psychology. It is an admittedly dissonant narrative: at moments jumping rapidly from one unit of coherence to another, at others plodding slowly through the subtleties of a single theoretical point. It sketches only a thumbnail of a complex cultural body, not the hand or the arm or the heart—a blossom, not the branch or the root. And as for the "trunk" that we sometimes believe underlies such a blossom—as if it were some fundamental, historical condition of which thinking and art are offshoots—it is no less symbolic an entity than what it might seem to produce, both constructed out of numberless processes, not one of which can be fully described, even where the blossom one attempts to understand is a single person or a single line of poetry. There is simply too much to synthesize to describe such a "trunk,"

too much to coerce into intellectual order without adequate means, with no explanation for why just this blossom proved necessary or took the shape that it did. Here, thirst for the Why? is better slaked by the What?—or by patient observation of evidence. Recognition of connections, crossings, and analogies in the What may be the only means we have of approaching the Why.

The "blossoms" in this study are works of philosophy, sociology, painting, music, and poetry, as well as existential and ethical gestures like suicide and madness. If Michelstaedter remains the "proper noun" for this flourishing it is because—as philosopher, poet, painter, and moralist—he contains the greatest number of its features. Its common noun is expressionism.

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Expressionism is typically conceived of as an artistic current that begins with the banding together of a group of Dresden painters in 1905 to form the Brücke (Bridge) and ends around 1924 or 1925. In 1910-1911 a more decisive wave of expressionism is set into motion by Vasily Kandinsky and his associates in Munich. Still a third gets under way at the same moment in Berlin, centered around the journals Der

Sturm and Die Aktion. These journals draw Austrians as well into the expressionist fold, particularly Oskar Kokoschka, Arnold Schoenberg, and Egon Schiele, who had been operating independently in Vienna. A confluence of developments in painting, theater, and poetry, expressionism is thus traditionally considered indigenous to Germanic culture. Rarely is it said to have practitioners in Italy, England, or France.

There is another critical line, however, which maintains that expressionism is not a style of its own, but merely a label for the Germanic chapter of avant-garde art, whose innovations receive names such as fauvism, cubism, futurism, orphism, and vorticism elsewhere. Still others claim quite the contrary, to the effect that expressionistic art has clear and distinct features, but that ultimately they overreach geographic, generic, and temporal boundaries, encompassing disciplines as different as philosophy, politics, and dance as well as artists as distant in time as Rabelais and Lucan. This, the most dominant direction in criticism today, is also the one that I will follow, seeking the tones of expressionism in a dissonant, international chorus—in Italy as well as Germany, in sociology as well as painting, in the logic of actions as well as arguments. Radical though it may sound to speak of Georg Simmel, the "impressionistic sociologist," or of Georg Lukács, the "anti-modernist," in the context of expressionism, the provocation disappears the moment we ask what they were trying to achieve in the prewar years. What exactly were the concerns of their work? And how different were these concerns from those of the poets and artists? Was it not Freud who spoke of psychoanalysis as aiming to unveil the "most intimate" of a person's secrets (in 1910 and again in 1912)? As based on the recognition of "psychic conflict"? As viewing civilization as the implacable enemy of the individual? When we inquire into such issues of intention and method, intersections between paths so different in direction become rather more clear.

We need not broaden the definition of expressionism to trace these points of convergence. On the contrary, we can narrow it down to a few salient traits. The expressionism at stake in 1910 is more theoretical than artistic in character. Concerned though it is with art, it thrusts its roots even more deeply into metaphysics, sociology, and ethics. As the term itself suggests, expressionism is interested in the nature, the function, and the credibility of human expression. Artistic procedures always furnish some answer to these "other" types of issues: the conditions at work in the creative process, what kind of person pursues it, on behalf of what and with what probability of success. As I see it, expressionism is a paradoxical undertaking: It manifests both absolute faith and absolute disbelief in the most venerable preconceptions fueling the very project of artistic expression,

including beauty, order, understanding, and truth. In intellectual history it signals the end of a Western, humanistic tradition, the termination, as it were, of its guiding objective. Indeed, in one reading, this simultaneous culmination and negation of a project to give form to universally comprehensible knowledge is precisely what enables so many of the theoretical and artistic changes that succeed this radical juncture: the formal license of avant-garde art, no longer held to common standards; the new objectivist literature of the twenties, returning from the world of potential to that of things; abstract expressionism; the historicizing ontology of Martin Heidegger; the turn of intellectuals in the postwar years toward political and social engagement.

Nineteen ten belongs squarely to the first of the two or three phases into which the expressionist current is typically divided. In this period, its theories and techniques are still fully in process of formation—more tentative than doctrinaire, more daring than programmatic. Art is still considered to be a vehicle for ethical and metaphysical research, not a proven methodology or style. With sympathies more anarchic than socialistic, expressionist thought has not yet assumed stable ideological direction. The prophets of the "New Man" have yet to finish mourning the old one. Agony, at this moment, is stronger than hope, and subjective isolation makes the "brotherhood of man" a still dubious notion. More particularly, in 1910 four expressionist characteristics come clearly into view.

The first is a battle between adversaries that seem incapable of resolving their differences: order and chaos, vitality and death, ecstasy and despair, individuality and solidarity. Whether in concept or form, each arises only in the presence of the other, and struggles in vain to break free. Expressionist art does not offer the centripetal visions of naturalistic or impressionistic works, not even the coherent compositions of cubism or futurism. It heeds no written or unwritten rules about what it should represent or how to go about it. Instead it thrives on what Schoenberg calls the emancipation of dissonance: a willful disruption of harmonic order. Of course this is not to say that expressionist works are not instantly recognizable. They are, but as the scene of a racked vision, of an articulated turmoil unprecedented in the history of art. Matter, in expressionist painting, comes to exude an explosive and brutal power, cohesive and destructive at once, binding as well as loosening all natural relations. Human surroundings undergo sudden and stunning convulsions, bursting with menacing, apocalyptic power. Obvious examples lie in Ludwig Meidner's Apocalyptic Landscapes of 1912-1913, more subtle ones in the paintings of Kandinsky and Franz Marc. In fact, it is partially the mad and transcendent animation of this cosmic condition that makes it "expressionistic," as though the outside world willfully encroached on the space of all interpreting subjects, storming humanity with illegible intent. And this is probably what Marc had in mind when he spoke of the "space and soul-shattering" intent of his paintings. In expressionism a dynamic and conflictual universe addresses a consternated subject, including the subject observing the work. Here spirit and object, essence and appearance, and many other metaphysical oppositions enter into such irresolvable contradictions that they signal the need for a radical revision of the understanding.

The second expressionistic characteristic involves virtual despair over the "negative" element in the contending pair: sickness rather than health, estrangement rather than solidarity, disintegration rather than wholeness. In fact, in a certain perspective the battle of opposites appears to represent disintegration pure and simple, especially in the light of the political realities to which artists find themselves responding. Recognizable in their lurid depiction of the nullifying dimensions of human existence, expressionist works do have their own subject after all: the psychological and metaphysical drama of mere dwelling in the world. And this dwelling is indelibly marked by the ecstasy and suffering of the body. Indeed, to find artists confronting the pressures of the flesh with such intensity one must return to the Gothic. In 1910 the classical, humanist harmony between body and soul has been all but broken. The body itself has become irremediably duplicitous. The only true

locus of soul—or of Henri Bergson's elan vital—it is also the catatonic, irrational form with which that soul contends.

To the subjects of early twentieth-century monarchy the moral and economic structures of everyday life are as materiality to the inner life that it traps: namely, agents of oppression, forces to assail and destroy. No art of the time, including futurism, performs this assault more radically than expressionism. Moreover, its attack on these forces of cultural "rhetoric" is hardly an experiment in form. Rather, it is an anguished critique of form, of form as minister of deformation. The investigation of mortality and disintegration, the resistance to social conventions, and the rebellion against the inadequacies of formal expression—these three reactions to a perceived negativity of being—all lead to the third expressionist move, the envisioned "solution" to this soulless, dehumanizing deficiency, identified with the discovery and liberation of subjective vitality.

"In or about December, 1910," claims Virginia Woolf, "human character changed." In truth, however, what changed was not character itself but the way it was viewed. At the end of King Edward's reign, as Woolf argues in this essay from the twenties, people suddenly became conscious of needs they never knew that they had. Up until 1910, artists had considered the needs of human nature to be adequately reflected by the material and historical conditions in which it was rooted. But at the end of the first decade external situations appeared to have lost their revelatory power, their complicity, as it were, with inner intention. Scientists and philosophers began to wonder whether the most well-established truths were nothing more than matters of impression and mood, of perspective and judgment. Positivism, realism, and naturalism appeared to have forsaken the subject they first intended to serve, but of which they had never really spoken: the human subject, the psyche, self, or however one wished to call it—the innermost truth of subjective experience—which was improperly reflected by historical events.

"When religion, science, and morality are shaken," writes Kandinsky at the time Woolf describes, "and when the outer supports threaten to fall, man turns his gaze from externals in on to himself." Painters and thinkers focus their efforts on freeing Michelstaedter's "persuasion" from "rhetoric," subjective necessity from contingent, objective externals. In one way or another, all expressionists seek to ferret out a naked human essence from under its lifeless qualities. They strive to give voice to what history has not endowed with words: the broad passions and aspirations of this hidden "essence."

The portraits of Schiele and Kokoschka, the atonal music of Schoenberg, the idealism of Michelstaedter and Lukács take the inward turn more sharply than even Woolf imagined, questioning not only the improperly reflected self, but its entire set of operational procedures. Here all efforts are geared to the liberation of "soul," as though it were the seat of all living experience. And thus surface new visions of the artist-seer, the idea of a messianic restoration of the true nature of life through the redemptive power of the courageous social exception. But more often than not, the project results in the "savior's" own self-immolation, and the savior ends up discovering that what is ostensibly "authentic" and "true" and "inner" never lies within the realm of the speakable, and may ultimately be just as rhetorical a construct as all it opposes.

This ethical stance represents the fourth expressionist trait, bringing a romantic project to its final culmination and dissolution. At the moment in time when artists make the most exasperated call for the inward turn, they also discover its dire and inevitable consequence: the obliteration, in the attack on rhetoric, of the basis for even those interiorized narratives that Woolf imagined. Indeed, the commitment to subjective experience in 1910 marks more of an end than a beginning of a tradition, which reaches an impasse at the very moment that it becomes most extreme, giving rise to the suspicion that all seemingly self-expressive persons are silenced by the idioms they use. While

collective group history may offer no counterimages for interiority, interiority is also forced to admit that this history still governs everything it can do and say. Subjectivity has no voice but that which speaks by contorting the same terms it wishes to escape. The avant-garde arts of France and England do not explicitly face up to this problem. They sidestep the project of individual "persuasion" and celebrate instead the incoherent and aleatory rule of rhetoric, as though in it the subject might discover a means of deeper self-certainty. The Italian, Germanic, and Slavic expressionists, by contrast, still cling to the project and its accompanying problem, reassessing persuasion to be at best an intermediate condition between the transcendence of "soul" and its historical oppression. Such a condition is as visible in Emil Nolde's paintings anticipating the emaciated victims of wars that have not yet occurred as in the outright rejection of material reality by Kandinsky. These artists of an era where human nature changes by recognizing that it is already and inevitably changed by living discover that if "expression of self " is not to degenerate into a nostalgic fantasy it must consist of an immanent transformation of the constrictions to which it is destined. Here the resolution of Rilke's protagonist in The Notebooks of Make Laurids Brigge—"to be the heavy heart of all that is indistinguishable"—remains the only true ethos of art: an art of the greatest subjective pathos on the one hand, and of the most brutalizing objectivity on the other. And thus the project of self-realization is thrown back on the experience of self-loss from which it springs. The fourth expressionist trait circles back to the first, revealing that an ethics has always spurred its dissonant, expressionist aesthetic—an ethics of misunderstanding, where no eloquence can be achieved except in its absence and no expression can be more than a form for pregnant but impregnable contents.
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Memory and Autobiography: Explorations at the Limits by Leonor Arfuch, translated by Christina MacSweeney [Critical South, Polity 9781509542178]

This book by one of Latin America's leading cultural theorists examines the place of the subject and the role of biographical and autobiographical genres in contemporary culture.
Arfuch argues that the on-going proliferation of private and intimate stories – what she calls the 'biographical space' – can be seen as symptomatic of the impersonalizing dynamics of contemporary times. Autobiographical genres, however, harbour an intersubjective dimension. The 'I' who speaks wants to be heard by another, and the other who listens discovers in autobiography possible points of identification. Autobiographical genres, including those that border on fiction, therefore become spaces in which the singularity of experience opens onto the collective and its historicity in ways that allow us to reflect on the ethical, political, and aesthetic dimensions not only of self-representation but also of life itself.
Opening up debate through juxtaposition and dialogue, Arfuch's own poetic writing moves freely from the Holocaust to Argentina's last dictatorship and its traumatic memories, and then to the troubled borderlands between Mexico and the United States to show how artists rescue shards of memory that would otherwise be relegated to the dustbin of history. In so doing, she makes us see not only how challenging it is to represent past traumas and violence but also how vitally necessary it is to do so as a political strategy for combating the tides of forgetting and for finding ways of being in common.

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Acknowledgements

Leonor Arfuch is one of the founding intellectuals of post-dictatorship thought in Argentina. Her work, like that of any great theoretician or thinker, reads like a gradual unfolding and deepening of certain questions that seem to have been there from the very beginning — questions about politics, art, language, memory, the image, ethics and the self.

Having lived through the tumultuous years of military dictatorship in her country (1976-1983) — years in which the persecution of leftist militants, torture, forced disappearance, exile and the kidnapping of children were commonplace — Arfuch's critical passions emerged as a response to a present in crisis, as a means to think through that present and intervene in it so as to open greater spaces for the democratization of thought and political action. It therefore shouldn't be surprising that a beautifully edited book she published in 2005 bears the title *Pensar este tiempo: espacios, afectos, pertenencias (To Think This Time: Space, Affections, Belonging)*.' Edited during an academic stay in 2004 as a fellow of the British Academy, the book brings together essays by prominent intellectuals of Great Britain and continental Europe (Scott Lash, Doreen Massey, William Rowe, Chantal Mouffe and others) in an exploration of the relationships among politics, emotions and aesthetics in a political present in which the social bond is under siege by conservative political forces and the power of capital. Arfuch's vision leaves no doubt about the far-reaching implications of her theoretical contributions and intellectual inquiry. The book's title is telling. To think about *this* time, *our* time — a time of crisis, inequality, globalization, capital, war, displacement of peoples, gender inequity, racism and xenophobia — drives her critical act and nourishes her writing to this day. In this sense, the problems she addresses are not just those of Argentina but those of Latin America and the world, always attentive to how *here* and *there, you* and *I,* connect with or diverge from one another.

Like many thinkers 'schooled' under dictatorship, Leonor Arfuch was, in a certain sense and by necessity, an autodidact. From the mid-1960s until the early 1970s, she expressed her political commitments by association with the left. Persecution, of course, was a frequent and constant threat in those years against anyone who openly identified with the left, and universities did not escape the repression. In an environment in which many university professors had been expelled from their posts or suffered direct reprisals by the military junta and its henchmen, Arfuch completed her undergraduate studies in literature at the University of Buenos Aires while the regime was still in power. Though her life in those years transpired with a certain degree of `normalcy', a thoroughly violent atmosphere, coupled with her personal history of militancy, left her acutely aware of what was happening around her and inspired in her both a tenacious rebelliousness and a desire to critique that have marked her professional trajectory and writings. Under dictatorship, Arfuch worked with important mentors such as the famed Argentine critic Josefina Ludmer (1939-2016), whose 'underground' study groups became lovingly known in Argentina as the 'university of the catacombs' *(la universidad de las catacumbas).* In such spaces, many of the country's foremost intellectuals, like Arfuch, found their intellectual beginnings. With her extracurricular mentors she

discovered Lacanian psychoanalysis, literary theory and the French School of semiotics and discourse analysis, among other subjects.

With the dawn of democracy in 1983, the Argentine military junta languished disgraced because of its loss of the war in the Malvinas Islands; this dire loss of prestige paved the way for an initial wave of public discussion on memory, human rights and the need to address crimes that had occurred in Argentina's recent past. In a historical moment in which truth and justice were topics on everyone's lips, in which public trials of the military were recently underway, and in which a truth commission had been convened that would later produce the landmark *Never Again Report* (Nunca Más, 1984), Leonor Arfuch launched her formal academic career as a professor and researcher in the Department of Sociology. By 1988, she had also been appointed as a professor of Communication in Graphic Design. Such a position might seem unusual for someone whose formation was largely influenced by discourse analysis, sociology, language and theory. Yet all of that background served to fuel hybrid, creative, interdisciplinary thinking, something that was particularly noteworthy in a political environment that, by that time, was marked by conservative backlash. We can't forget that the late 1980s and the entire decade of the 1990s were characterized by the privatization of industry, the advancement of neoliberalism and the curtailment of much of the progress that had been made to that point in the areas of truth, justice and reparations for the dictatorship's victims; this same period also saw the approval of Argentina's 'Full Stop' (Ley de Punto Final) and 'Due Obedience' (Ley de Obediencia Debida) laws, which essentially put an end to the possibility of trials until the mid-2000s. In that context, Arfuch championed the design of the 'Cultural Critique' course at UBA, which pioneered the idea that critiques of visual communication, art and graphic design could be applied to the study of areas as diverse as education, communication and memory. These new approaches — and the emergence of cultural critique as a unique mode of inquiry that could be deployed to unpack the complex relationships among politics, aesthetics, ethics and society — impacted an entire generation of students and faculty and left an indelible mark on the tenor of Argentine intellectual life from that moment onwards.

Arfuch's earliest critical work was born in the time of `democratic spring', a time that, in her own words, saw the 'semiotic opening of physical meeting places in the city: the street, the plaza, cafes, tables on the sidewalk, and bookstores'. It was a time in which many voices that had once been silenced re-emerged and began to be heard again: voices of Argentinians who had lived for years in exile or of those who had survived torture or suffered first-hand in the country's vast network of detention centres. This cacophony of voices spoke in genres ranging from *testimonios* to memoirs to interviews (both in the written press and on television or the radio), revealing intimate aspects of experience that gave substance and depth to Argentinians' understanding of history and attuned them to the many challenges that lay ahead.

From a young age, Arfuch had been fascinated by journalism — in fact, in the mid-1960s she thought she inight become a journalist. That early passion never left her and perhaps inspired her first two major works, *La interioridad pública (Public Intimacy,* 1992) and *La entrevista: una invención dialógica (The Interview: A Dialogic Invention,* 1995), both of which engage the 'return of the subject' that dominated the social sciences in the 1980s. Specifically, Arfuch fixed her critical gaze on how this 'return of the subject' took shape in dialogue with public narratives around the economy, human rights and democracy in post-dictatorship Argentina. Her reflections on the interview as `speech genre', in the Bakhtinian sense, gave us the first ever, comprehensive, semiotic and interdisciplinary study to probe the dynamics of the interview: its interlocutors, its power differentials, its silences, its hidden meanings, stagings and performative aspects. In short, the interview appears in Arfuch as an *intersubjective genre,* a dialogic form in which the self acknowledges the other as radical difference and in which responsibility and ethics (or the lack thereof) play key mediating roles.

Arfuch's early work on subjectivity, intersubjectivity and ethics set the stage for a major expansion of her inquiry into first-person genres that would follow on the heels of her first two books. That expansion led her to coin a critical concept that has now become the centrepiece of her work and has gained her notoriety throughout Latin America and beyond: the *biographical space.*

In her seminal book of 2002, *El espacio biográfico: delemas de la subjetividad contemporánea (The Biographical Space: Dilemmas of Contemporary Subjectivity),* Arfuch examines the place of the subject and the role of biographical and autobiographical genres within contemporary culture, arguing that such forms of expression, which range from interviews, autobiographies, memoirs and *testimonios* to talk shows, reality shows, subjective documentary films, social media and *autoficciones,* are part of the structure of feeling of the contemporary era and have proliferated to such an extreme that they can be understood as both symptomatic of and contributors to a reconfiguration of subjectivity itself.' She holds that the contemporary ubiquity of private and intimate histories can be read, in part, as a countervailing force to the impersonalizing dynamics of market logics in the neoliberal era. Autobiographical genres are thus not simply an exercise in self-representation or self-aggrandizement but instead harbour an intersubjective dimension that is crucial to acknowledge. The *I* who speaks and shares his or her intimate life wants to be read, heard and validated by another; and the *other* who reads or watches the autobiographical act discovers in the narrative possible points of identification and disidentification.

Yet autobiographical genres are not simply meant to be read transparently. Instead, critics such as Arfuch, in dialogue with others like Philippe Lejeune, Paul de Man and Sylvia Molloy, have argued that they should be interpreted and deconstructed, their framing mechanisms assessed, their temporalities obviated and their authors even desacralized. Autobiographical genres, including those that border on fiction in a more obvious sense, thus become spaces in which the singularity of experience opens onto the collective in ways that allow reflection on the ethical, narrative, political and aesthetic dimensions not only of the act of self-representation but also of life itself. Put differently, the biographical space invites an 'intimacy between strangers', as Michael Holroyd has suggested, that occurs when the *I* of autobiography resonates with or in the *other* and generates diverse reactions ranging from intimacy, affective ties, empathy and solidarity to outright rejection or abhorrence.'

The potent idea of the *biographical space* permeates Arfuch's *oeuvre* and is indeed a foundational concept (and even a starting point) for understanding the essays contained in *Memoria y autobiografía: exploraciones en los límites* (2013), the first of her books to be translated into English.' Consider, for example, the following passage:

> But here, in the genres discussed, there is something extra that Bakhtin called *biographical value:* that thing which, in every story, every attempt to give — verbal or audio-visual — form to a life questions both the narrator and narratee with respect to their own existence in terms of ethics, aesthetics and, we might even say, politics. That ephemeral communion, that virtual tuning-in, is what surely feeds the constant desire to glimpse 'real lives', while being aware of how vain that desire is, how intangible that reality, how inevitably fictional the whole story.

The passage reveals a key insight that guides Arfuch's thinking: that all autobiographical acts are, in a sense, fictional. They are self-figurations that imply a putting into form that, in turn, necessarily invites critical analysis.

The 'biographical space', as a concept, has far-ranging consequences that extend both backwards and forwards in time. Its roots lie in the birth of the modern subject, which critics like Arfuch have often equated with the publication of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Confessions* (1766), a book that introduced

readers to the internal dynamics of a first-person narrator struggling to expose the intimate aspects of his life and emotions but who spoke with sincerity and sought points of identification with readers. Mindful of this history, Arfuch sees in contemporary first-person manifestations, those of our own times, a straying away from the sincerity of the original Rousseauian gesture; instead of an easy conflation between the author and the 'character' on the page, she understands the first-person as a ubiquitous presence in our daily lives, capable not only of narcissistic self-fashioning but also of an ability to form alliances of solidarity with a range of imagined interlocutors. The subject who speaks the word I is not a coherent whole but rather a series of fractured, multiple selves engaged in a 'search for intimacy [with another] in the face of anonymity and the uniformity of everyday life'. The subject's demand for self-realization in a moment in which collective political projects have foundered or find themselves under constant threat from countervailing political forces begs questions about the responsibility that *I* have to You and that You have to *Me*. We are constantly bombarded by stories of precarious lives, of lives that struggle to matter, to be seen and heard. How we respond when faced with those precarious lives — whether we'll identify or disidentify with them, value them or shut them out — is an ethical challenge that Arfuch raises for her readers, in line with other contemporary thinkers like Judith Butler who also understand the first-person utterance through the lens of multiplicity and intersociality.

Intersubjectivity is not only a key theme in Arfuch's work but also an integral part of her own life and intellectual trajectory. On the one hand, her thinking dialogues with particular intellectual genealogies in which her work is inscribed (e.g. Mikhail Bakhtin, Philippe Lejeune, Walter Benjamin, Paul Ricoeur, Roland Barthes and others), while on the other hand it finds inspiration in (and inspires) certain contemporaries with whom she has long shared close affinities and conversations — *sus compañeras y compañeros de ruta.* Many names come to mind, among them Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Judith Butler, Nelly Richard, Beatriz Sarlo, Doreen Massey and Nicolás Casullo, as well as contemporary artists such as the Chilean visual artists Alfredo Jaar and Nury González and the Argentine film-maker Albertina Carri, whose works she has examined in depth. In fact, some of Arfuch's earliest articles on art and memory appeared in Beatriz Sarlo's journal *Punto de Vista (Point of View,* Argentina) and Nelly Richard's *Revista de Crítica Cultural (Journal of Cultural Critique,* Chile), two publications that served as barometers and pioneering spaces for post-dictatorship debate in the Southern Cone; they tackled topics such as the fierce battles over memory, the paucity of truth in the post-dictatorship, the role of art and literature, the challenges of *testimonio,* the lack of justice and the urgent need for a deepening of democracy. Several chapters in this book continue and broaden these discussions on memory, particularly Arfuch's valiant reflection on the controversial case of Oscar del Barco, a former Argentinian revolutionary from the 1970s whose writings in the early 2000s unleashed bitter debates among militants and intellectuals about both the memory and legitimacy of armed struggle (chapter 5).

In recent years, Arfuch has dedicated much of her writing to the subject of art and memory, attentive to the forms that representations of human suffering have taken in contexts ranging from the Holocaust to Chile, Argentina and the US—Mexico border. Sceptical of sutured, transparent narratives that tend to close off meaning — in critical affinity with her colleague and friend Nelly Richard in Chile — Arfuch has paid special attention to films, art installations and literary works that take distance from direct (sacrosanct) experience and suffering and that approach it in ways that allow the spectator or reader to be interpellated by the text or the image rather than alienated by them. In other words, she is specifically attuned to art that questions us and puts signs into play in ways that don't ossify meaning. Even when she analyses works whose enunciation occurs in the first-person singular, it seems to be less the first-person singular that interests her than the possibility that an intimate life story might open a chance for the *other* to become involved or questioned. This perhaps explains her critical affection for works like Chilean artist Alfredo Jaar's *Geometría de la*

conciencia (Geometry of the Conscience, analysed in chapter 7), in which a spectator, enclosed in a dark room, confronts an infinite prism of unnamed faces of victims of tragedies from around the world and wonders what his or her relationship to and responsibility for those disappeared/reappeared faces might be. Are they the faces of precarious lives that we don't wish to see or that are too painful to acknowledge? And what relationship do those faces bear to us and to one another? Through what mechanisms, power differentials and dynamics are the trans-historical genocides and tragedies of the contemporary world linked to one another or unique in their specificity?

Like Alfredo Jaar's work, which moves freely from one geography to another — naming, questioning and critiquing — Leonor Arfuch's pen moves with equal freedom and a deeply poetic prose. This is evident on every page of **MEMORY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY: EXPLORATIONS AT THE LIMITS**. The book the reader has in hand is not a collection of standard academic papers but rather a series of essays in cultural critique, texts in which images and metaphors as well as rhetorical questions open spaces to interrogate the reader, much like the polyvalent works of art, literature and film that serve as the author's objects of inquiry.

Arfuch's writing is transdisciplinary, indisciplined and fluid. It seeks correspondences and probes humanity's and society's open wounds, weaving metaphor upon metaphor and illuminating both the traps and releases of language and form. It's clear that Arfuch is inspired by Walter Benjamin's method of opening debate through juxtaposition and dialogue (what she calls 'digression as method', *el rodeo como método),* a way of surrounding the object of inquiry, blanketing it, testing it, to open it up and illuminate it. In this way, she creates a constellation of images and words that speak volumes about the contemporary world, moving from the Holocaust (in her analysis of the French artist Christian Boltanski's work) to the polyphonic testimony of five female survivors of the ESMA concentration camp in Argentina, to the troubled borderlands between Tijuana and San Diego. In her analysis of the ESMA survivors' testimonial act, Arfuch illuminates the complex relationship between trauma and autobiography and thinks in dialogue with feminist intellectuals such as Leigh Gilmore and Sidonie Smith."

Arfuch's most extensive chapter (chapter 2) creatively juxtaposes Boltanski's work on the Shoah with Holroyd's reflections on life writing and the work of the famed German novelist and resident of England, W. G. Sebald (1944-2001), taking us on a historical and poetic journey through Sebald's Norwich. Chapter 3 expands the discussion of these same authors, this time by evoking Sebald's main character in *Austerlitz* (2001), who goes by a 'name that is not his own', as well as Boltanski's 1989 art installation titled *Storage Area of the Children's Museum,* which features racks piled with children's clothing, an image that recalls the sheer magnitude of the disaster and the way in which the Shoah stripped its victims of their individuality, identity and dignity. The reference to Sebald evokes the 10,000 orphans who arrived at Liverpool Street Station in London (1938-1939) escaping Nazi persecution. Placed in conversation, these references allude — transnationally, transhistorically, elliptically — to the case of the children stolen by the military and their supporters during Argentina's most recent dictatorship. Today, these children are adults who struggle to recover their true identities, aided in their quest by the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo. In each of these instances, Arfuch shows how artists rescue singular bits of memory and experience, *naming* phenomena that would assuredly otherwise be relegated to the dustbin of history. In so doing, she allows us to understand not only how difficult it is to represent past trauma and violence — to *name* experience — but also how vitally necessary it is to do so as a political strategy for combating the tides of forgetting and for finding ways of being in common. Art and memory, like the 'biographical space', become possible strategies for building community where it has been torn asunder by greed, power and violence.

Children of dictatorship who struggle to reconstruct their traumatic pasts, torture survivors, leftist militants trying to make sense of their participation in the armed struggle of the 1970s, migrants excluded from place and territory, history's forgotten: these are the protagonists of *Memory and Autobiography,* the voices and experiences that Arfuch dignifies and explores through her writing. Writing as an act of debt, writing as an act of thought and inquiry, writing as an act of resistance, writing as an act of justice where there is no justice, writing as an elusive framing of the grey zones of human experience: all of these senses converge in Leonor Arfuch's own critical-biographical space, one that invites us into a conversation, into a community, to share in the Measure and pain of the text and to be transformed by it. — Michael J. Lazzara

A Life of Scholarship with Santayana: Essays and Reflections *by* Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., *edited by* Charles Padrón and Krzysztof Piotr Skowronski [Value inquiry Book Series,Philosophy in Spain, Brill Rodopi, 9789004446649]

An entire lifetime's work by Herman J. Saatkamp is collected here in **A Life of Scholarship with Santayana: Essays and Reflections**. From the first essay, published in 1972, to the latest, in 2017, almost fifty years of scholarship is given a fresh embodiment of expression. Saatkamp is considered by many to be the world's foremost authority on George Santayana's life and thought.

Not only does this volume bring into clear relief Saatkamp's understanding of Santayana, the editing process, and genetic concerns and the future of philosophy, but it also betrays a lucid and humane understanding that aptly personifies a life spent in reflection, a discerning sense of appreciation, and an affirmation of life and learning.

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So much for the idea that Santayana no longer engages the philosophical imagination, that the work of this erstwhile giant of the American literary scene can safely be forgotten. The oblivion was challenged by the tireless work of Herman Saatkamp in starting the critical edition of his writings and in making it a huge success.

The sad fate of literary figures is difficult to escape: the distance between celebrated status and shoulder-shrugging indifference is a case of untreated pneumonia. With Santayana, the ailment was cancer exacerbated by a change of taste on the part of philosophers. Systematic thought, literary style, and ontology went out of fashion, replaced by pseudoscientific precision. By 1960, just relatively a few years after his death, one had to explain who Santayana was and why his work was important.

Saatkamp came across Santayana in graduate school and found him immediately engaging. It did not take long to persuade him that a critical edition was badly needed and that he had the talent and energy to undertake it. His account of the development of the edition provides ample indication of the importance of personal relations. It is not that charm and shared interest carry every day, but a humane and generous attitude is often the foundation of successful collaboration. Saatkamp's description of his relation to Mrs. Cory, owner of many Santayana copyrights, is a case in point.

Saatkamp highlights the influence of Santayana's Spanish heritage and his family's diplomatic background that has been often missed by American scholars. Both provide in-depth understanding to Santayana's concerns about American democracy and capitalism. Although known as a classical American philosopher, he is unique in not being an American. He was a Spanish citizen throughout his life, but he was more a world citizen and traveler, recognizing both the good and the bad in all forms of government, while emphasizing that the challenges for each individual are to live well and to celebrate life in one's individual circumstances and environment and in the choices that are made. Saatkamp organized the first international conference held in Avila, Spain, in 1992. Over 1200 participants from many continents attended. During the Franco regime (1936-1975) Santayana was forbidden to be read in Spain, even while his novel, *The Last Puritan,* and the first book of his autobiography, *Persons and Places,* were among the best-selling books in the US and England. This conference was seen by many as liberating the Spanish influence and impact of Santayana's work. And we now have an fnternational Spanish journal dedicated to Santayana, *Limbo.*

His personal approach and academic standing led to his being the president of several international associations, including the Association for Documentary Editing. And in the second section of this volume, he transforms the mundane work of textual editing into something appealing and worth reading.

One of the fascinating features of this book is the way it displays the parallel development of its author as a philosopher and administrator. Inevitably, the question arises how he could have combined intellectual flowering with administrative success. He burnt through faculty ranks to an endowed chair, two deanships, and eventually the presidency of a university. At the same time, he made himself a premier scholar of the works of Santayana, received and administered multiple large grants and founded and edited the journal *Overheard in Seville,* dedicated to the life and writings of Santayana.

Most remarkably, perhaps, these are not stopping points but intersections on the road to self-development. Saatkamp's parallel interests include medical ethics and genetics, and he has held notable positions in medical schools. These are fascinating extensions of his work on Santayana's notion of the human psyche.

In the last section of this volume, he focuses on the future of philosophy and what can be learned from Santayana. The springboard for his comments are Santayana's views of consciousness as an aftereffect of our animal psyche. These views are often reflected in the contemporary work of genetic and neuroscience research. Saatkamp advances philosophical approaches that engage the natural sciences while underlining the continued importance of philosophical discussion and analysis. The future of philosophy may take different directions to stay relevant to scientific discoveries, but it remains a singularly engaging field of inquiry and exploration. And Santayana's influence will be a guide to new philosophical developments. This volume contains the first fruits in that area; his friends and followers have much to anticipate. — *John Lachs*

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The present collected volume of essays (1972-2018) by Herman Saatkamp recounts his evolution as a scholar of Santayana's philosophy and his formation as a scholar and theoretician of the editorial process. There are also essays that address genetic themes and issues.

The essays cover a time span of some fifty years. Over the period of those years Saatkamp shuttled the course from graduate student to professor to dean to himself being the president of a university. Notwithstanding this academic journey, throughout the entirety of these years he cultivated his primary interests (philosophy and scholarship) continuously.

Many of these pieces have been previously published in various journals, and detailed information (where applicable) has been provided in the *Acknowledgements.* Editorial changes and alterations have been made in concert with the author in order to improve coherence and readability, without however, disrupting the essential ideas expressed or the original language employed.

Santayana and Philosophy

Looking back over fifty years of one's work is rewarding and challenging. One is tempted to suggest a coherent whole with each piece fitting into one's philosophical development in a well-organized, carefully constructed, development of thought. However, that rational and logical progression of thought was not apparent at any stage of my work and, perhaps, can only be assessed when the last of my work is completed, and then only by someone else. Even so, it is rejuvenating to look back over a half-century of work and to see its development and consistency, as well as the many missing pieces and so much left to be done.

The first article, "Animal Faith," was written in 1968 during my first year as a graduate student in philosophy at Vanderbilt University. I wrote it for Dr. John Lachs who led a seminar on naturalism and Santayana, and he indicated my paper could be the basis for a doctoral dissertation. I probably smiled at his suggestion, and I never imagined this would be the beginning of a life-long effort to understand and preserve Santayana's work. I revised the paper and submitted it for its eventual publication in 1972, the same year I completed my dissertation on animal faith.

The journey of scholarship is rarely a straight line and unexpected events may dramatically alter the direction of one's life. Mine was changed by two remarkable individuals and my interest in Caravaggio's paintings, and there is a discussion of this in my introduction to Part 2. This led to The MIT Press publishing the full critical edition and my holding an endowed chair and completing my career in a surprising number of unlikely academic positions that included being a professor of philosophy, a professor of medical genetics and also of pediatrics in medical centers, as well as being a department chair, holding two dean's positions, and the president of a state university. Santayana would have smiled at all these positions and wondered what could possibly lead a Santayana scholar to such endeavors. He once said, "There are three traps that strangle philosophy: the church, the marriage bed, and the professor's chair."' Santayana escaped all three, and although I admired and respected Santayana's views, I accepted two of the three willingly but early in my career abandoned standardized religion. His smile continues to follow me with an ironic warmth.

My understanding of Santayana had two important turns of thought. First, I began to understand that Santayana carefully chose his terminology and his sometimes humorous approach to philosophical discussion, and second, that his approach was revolutionary and turned philosophy on its head**.**

Santayana's Terminology and Philosophical Approach

In "Animal Faith" (1972) I exhibit the perspective of a graduate student, focusing on careful terminology and attention to the details of argument. This was a natural perspective for one just beginning the study of philosophy in the late 1960s, but it misses much of the significance of

Santayana's work. Principally, it misses the significance of Santayana's deliberate choice of language and approach to philosophy that set him apart from the other classical American philosophers of his day that included James, Royce, Dewey, Peirce, and others. Of course, there is much that sets Santayana apart from his contemporaries. His heritage gave him a perspective that eluded his American colleagues, and his ironic humor when recognized causes one to smile or even laugh out loud. John McCormick writes:

> Insofar as a biographer can determine, he was a happy man, and his happiness was contagious. His scepticism nevertheless made him seem chilling to the fervent, and his range of mind and of subject caused him to seem to others superficial, elusive, or merely iconoclastic. He was not elusive, but fastidious, one whose distinctions were subtle but wonderfully available, and not only to specialists.

Much of Santayana's humor was ironic and reflective of his Spanish heritage. As I write in "Santayana: Hispanic-American, Cosmopolitan Philosopher and World Citizen":

> Irony is a strong element in Spanish humor, and it is central to understanding Santayana. Clearly there is much irony in his life: he is one of the founders of American philosophy but never an American; he promotes high regard for religion but is an atheist; he notes that aesthetics and values are useless but sees that as enhancing their importance; he is known for his systematic approach to philosophy but claims there is no metaphysics in his work; he is a voice for solitude and individual values but is a naturalist expounding the commonality of our material and physiological bases; he is a learned scholar and professor who sees scholarship and academia as centers for economic prosperity and domination rather than education.

His heritage is a springboard for his choosing the classical terms of Plato and Aristotle rather than the contemporary philosophical language of his time. During his lifetime, he was the only philosopher writing about realms of essence, spirit, matter, and truth. He views these terms as enriched by their heritage and not as transitory and superficial as the current philosophical language. Hence, my earlier criticisms of his use of language and lack of clarity in argument miss the exact point he was making. Philosophy is meaningful and significant but only in its historical context. Philosophy is not a natural science; it does not reveal hidden worlds or provide evidence for human achievement or activities, but rather it reflects one's time and heritage. Philosophy bears more resemblance to poetry and music than to the natural sciences, and the rich heritage of philosophical discussions enlarge its meaning and significance. In my "Introduction to The Birth of Reason & Other Essays" (1995) I write: "With festive Spanish irony he refuses to yield to fashion and the march of progress. He wrestles with philosophical and literary questions through classical terms and phrases, providing his own elegance of style and withdrawing from absolute standards imposed on him or by him."

Revolutionary Approach to Philosophy

Santayana's heritage and background play a distinct role in his philosophical perspective and contribute to his revolutionary approach to philosophical inquiry. He turns philosophy upside-down in accounting for human action, and it is this aspect of his philosophy that was often missed by his contemporaries. When it was not missed, it troubled them greatly. If American pragmatism is based on understanding the world and working for a better society through pragmatic results and rational argument, Santayana sees such an approach as wrongheaded. It does not recognize the role of our psyche (our individual physiological base with its heritable traits) and the influence of our environment and culture. Santayana's background enabled him to see how his contemporary American colleagues were heavily influenced by the American way of life and the youthful optimism in American democracy and industrialism. For Santayana, these American perspectives are bound by the parentheses of their environment. Principally the twin fears of private anarchy and public uniformity are the basis for Santayana's criticisms of democracy, which he saw as potentially crushing

individuality because of the insistence on conformity. Dewey, Kallen, Lamont, and others found Santayana's inattentiveness to social inequality unacceptable. And Santayana found his American critics unable to understand their situatedness in the American enterprise. For Santayana the American government and its supporting industrialism are only phases within an historic time frame, and the material rush of history will move to other forms of organization in the future. Furthermore, to assume that reason and pragmatism were the guiding forces of human activity only ignores our animal base and the developing scientific explanations of animal activity.

For Santayana, reason and consciousness are not the causes of action. This view is almost singular and startling for his time. Consciousness is an aftereffect of material causes radiating from our physical interaction with our natural environment. Hence, if one is to explain the actions of animals, including human animals, it will not be through conscious reasoning but by the same natural causes as that of any animal. For many of Santayana's contemporaries this approach would seem to remove the importance of consciousness and reason, but not for Santayana. Rather it elevated their significance. At its best consciousness or spirit (as he calls consciousness) is celebratory and should be pursued as central to the art of living well. Consciousness is periodic and rarely continuous, but it is celebratory and more like the music produced by a symphony orchestra, perhaps delightful at its best while ephemeral and not lasting. Still, consciousness or spirit is like art, poetry, and music and is central to human expression and to living well.

Santayana's revolutionary view of reason and consciousness raises many significant questions about the role of government, how individuals may change political structures, what room is left for creativity, and how does one live well in one's current circumstances?

These questions and others have been discussed by many modern-day philosophers including Strawson, Wittgenstein, Nagel, Appiah and others. Current neurophysiological research is investigating consciousness and its interplay with our neurophysiology and the environment, including decision judgments. For those who have read Santayana, these are engaging times and seem part of the forecast of Santayana's philosophical work. But Santayana did not turn to the physical sciences in his own analysis of human endeavor. His principal aim was to describe how individuals live well. For many scholars, Santayana's approach is too individualistic. Although a naturalist who expounds on the common animal nature of all humans, he also advises each individual to seek out the best life possible given their heritable traits and their environment. He often writes that governments are like the weather. One can make some reliable predictions about the weather, and one should find the climate that best suits one's own preferences. The same is true of governments that shift in one direction or another depending on the material circumstances of the times. Hence, one should find the best governmental environment for one's individualistic needs. Santayana loved travel, even being a stranger in other cultures, and in many ways became a world citizen and cosmopolitan, as I explore in "Santayana: Hispanic-American, Cosmopolitan Philosopher, and World Citizen."

Social injustice is inherent in all governments, and individual efforts rarely make a lasting difference in governmental structures, although they may try by joining forces with others and depending on the environmental circumstances they may succeed. But there is no inevitable progress in any governmental form just as there is no inevitable progress for individual development. All depends on the material conditions of one's environment and of one's own nature.

What about freedom and creativity? Are they no longer a part of human nature? They are. But any explanation must come from the physical structures of our lives and are to be celebrated through our spirit or consciousness. Hence, philosophical inquiry not only opens the door to a careful analysis of consciousness and reason, but also provides remarkable opportunities for philosophy and

the natural sciences to coordinate in understanding human nature and activities. Some of these approaches are suggested in "Santayana: Culture and Creativity" (2018).

How does one live well? That is Santayana's principal question and contribution to human thought. For him there were two essential ingredients: (1) accepting one's natural base for life and morality and (2) being humane enough to accept the many divergent ways in which life can be lived with excellence. end with a quote from Santayana:

> Morality is something natural. It arises and varies, not only psychologically but prescriptively and justly, with the nature of the creature whose morality it is. Morality is something relative, not that its precepts in any case are optional or arbitrary; for each man they are defined by his innate character and possible forms of happiness and action. His momentary passions or judgments are partial expressions of his nature but not adequate or infallible; and ignorance of the circumstances may mislead in practice, as ignorance of self may mislead in desire. But this fixed good is relative to each species and each individual; so that in considering the moral ideal of any philosopher, two questions arise. First, does he, like Spinoza, understand the natural basis of morality, or is he confused and superstitious on the subject? Second, how humane and representative is his sense for the good, and how far, by his disposition or sympathetic intelligence, does he appreciate all the types of excellence toward which life may be directed?' (George Santayana, *Persons and Places: Fragments of Autobiography* (Cambridge: The MIT Press,1986), 234-35)

Challenges in Editorship and Assorted Pieces

In 1976 John Lachs asked me to write the first National Endowment for the Humanities proposal for *The Works of George Santayana.* At first, I was reluctant, but John was convincing. The first grant ran from 1977-79, and its purpose was to demonstrate whether completing a twenty-volume edition of Santayana's works in a timely fashion was viable or not. The challenges were many, and I quickly understood why another person who had been asked to write the grant several years before had not. Even so, the challenges were far less than the delight that would emerge in my twenty-seven years of editing the Santayana Edition.

The initial challenge was finding the locations of the manuscripts, typescripts, letters, and other documentation. Because Santayana spent a significant part of his mature life living in hotels and traveling, there was no single reservoir of work and the known Santayana document locations were international. Surprisingly, there was no bibliography of Santayana's works and other documents. John Jones and I began the first full bibliography of Santayana's works along with identifying where the documents were housed. Eventually that work was published in 1982. (Saatkamp and Jones, *George Santayana: A Bibliographical Checklist,1982).* I was both surprised and pleased that I received the NEH grant, and, even more surprising, I was informed they were giving me slightly more than I had asked because they thought I had underestimated my expenses for travel. They were right, and on several occasions, I stayed overnight in not the nicest of places, including one, seven-dollars-a-night hotel in New York City where it seemed that various illegal activities originated in the lobby and where I battled roaches for writing on a small desk and for sleeping room. Because of the grant, I traveled to many locations throughout the U.S. to examine material and artifacts of Santayana's life. I met with Santayana's family in Spain and in Boston and traveled to Rome to meet with Santayana's literary executrix, Mrs. Margot Cory All this was remarkably exciting, enlightening, and encouraging regarding the possibility of publishing a critical edition of Santayana's works. I was pleased with the outcome and hoped I would be able to demonstrate that the material, people, organization and perhaps a publisher would be in place. For my own part, I had not intended to spend the rest of my life editing Santayana's works, but little did I know how small discoveries and meetings would lead to major shifts in my scholarly future.

Completing *The Works of George Santayana* depended on several factors: (1) gaining the support and endorsement of Mrs. Cory for the project; (2) physically locating as much Santayana material as possible and determining its accessibility; (3) developing a staff, editorial board, advisory committees and finding a textual editor; and (4) finding a publisher willing to commit to such a large project.

There is no easy way to sum up a lifetime of editing *The Works of George Santayana.* The pieces in this section indicate some of the principles of producing a critical edition, their implications for future work, and the complications of determining the final intentions of Santayana. The pieces attempt to explicate both foundational issues in documenting editing and technical issues as to how to achieve the final text of a book.

Genetic Concerns and the Future of Philosophy

Santayana inverted the foundation of philosophy in *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (1923), sounding a revolutionary note to the understanding of human action. Prior to Santayana, reason was seen by many philosophers as the top of the hierarchy in explaining human activity Reason set us apart from other animals and inanimate nature. Humans purposely acted on rational principles unlike the natural inclinations of other animal life. The goal of education was to provide the means to achieve judicious approaches to human activity and society as well as to analyze reasons and assess arguments that were the basis for our actions. But Santayana turned all this on its head. In *Scepticism and Animal Faith* Santayana, ironically and perhaps with a smile, pursued the foundation of reason until he came to the "solipsism of the present moment." This *reduction ad absurdum* argument leads to the certainty of a conscious moment which, unfortunately, leads nowhere beyond itself. One is confined to a solipsism with no way out, no connection to the world, even to oneself, but only a momentary awareness of whatever is given without any judgment or decision possible. Then, certainly with a smile, Santayana turns to animal faith. The natural, inescapable belief that attempts to give meaning to what is presented to consciousness based on one's natural animal history and composition. Animal faith is just that, it is a faith not based on reason but on one's natural proclivities, just as it is with all animals, including human beings. The foundation of our actions is our physicality existing in the natural world, whereas consciousness and reason not only evolve later in our development but are merely aftereffects of our nature, not a basis for actions but the echoes of actions and their natural causes.

For Santayana, reason and consciousness are secondary, aftereffects of animals acting in a natural world. Consciousness and reason spring from our physical reality as music springs from a violin. They are caused by the physical interaction of animals with the natural world, interacting based on physical causes that give birth to consciousness, meaning, and reason. What are the causes of our actions? Not reason, but our psyche, Santayana's term for the human physical being, and its interactions with the physical circumstances of our environment. Even in Santayana's earlier writings, there are preludes to his more developed view. Arthur Danto's introduction to *The Sense of Beauty* (1896) carefully notes the underlying naturalism of Santayana's aesthetics, and even in sections of the five-volume *The Life* of Reason (1905-6). But Santayana's strongest themes of his mature views are found in his later writings, particularly in *The Realms of Being* and its introduction *Scepticism and Animal Faith.*

Visually, one might image an historic building that has been in place for centuries suddenly being turned upside down by an earthquake. The fragments of its foundation fragilely hanging above the rest of the upside-down structure and visible only periodically depending from where one viewed this upturned edifice. For Santayana, this was a more accurate account of human action. Someone might surmise that this means Santayana dismisses reason and consciousness as important elements in human life, but that would be wrong. Perhaps surprisingly, he sees reason and consciousness as celebrational and something that brings unique human delight.

Santayana's account was a disruptive approach to philosophy, and one that was at least a century ahead of his time. His naturalism was thoroughgoing, fully natural, fully causal and, for a time, fully ignored. He wrote of others who called themselves naturalists or pragmatists, noting that their work was still based on rational outlooks. The pragmatists thought that one could examine the outcomes of actions and determine what was best for human societies based on a rational discernment of those outcomes and their benefits. But Santayana thought of these views as more metaphysical and claiming a basis that was an aftereffect rather than the natural foundation of human and animal action.

What then could be the rightful work of philosophy and of philosophers if reason is not the basis for action? Did Santayana think his approach was the end of philosophy and how could he now think of consciousness and reason as celebrational?

"Is Animal Faith the End of Philosophy?" raises these questions and is an attempt to answer them. Many may find the answer challenging and less than satisfying. But perhaps he is right. Today, some of our present scientific investigations into the role of consciousness and reason in human action reach conclusions like Santayana's account. Where do such views leave philosophy and our understanding of human action? We have a significant challenge to the role of philosophy and of reason in human life. Indeed, we have a view of philosophy and reason as more like musical symphonies that gain expression from physical interactions with our environment, much like we may view the actions of other animals. And depending on one's own psyche and circumstances these symphonies may be interpreted and given meanings that vary from one human to another and from one culture to another. Of course, this is problematic. How are we to judge what are the best actions, the best societies, the better alternatives? Are we bound by competing sets of rational symphonies where one has no more solid base than another? All are natural creations. Are the reasons and justifications of the hallucinating patient confined to a mental ward or the sociopath imprisoned for life on an equal scale with the "normal, well-educated, socially responsible" human? I do not think so, although the basis for that judgment, as Santayana suggests, is not based on reason but on the underlying natural features of human existence.

So many other questions are raised by Santayana's turning philosophy on its head: *What then is our role in organizing, directing, and hopefully improving society? Are we like bees in the beehive or wolves in a pack, doing what we were destined to do, looking for food, nourishing ourselves and others and finding our place in a natural hierarchy? What are the roles of our heritable traits found through the science of genetics and our interaction with other animals in the natural world?*

These questions are raised in the remaining chapters. We live in a world where nationalism and terrorism are on the rise. Is our destiny set or are we able to take actions that might alter predictable outcomes? Is philosophy simply a celebration of life, like a musical symphony, to be enjoyed while one can in moments of delight and passion but not a guiding light for action and discernment? Are we to stand on a philosophical island watching the currents and tides of the world surround us while celebrating the ineffectual sounds of consciousness? Will genetics and other naturalistic approaches be able to uncover the basis for human actions as they seem to be doing for much of other animal action?

Perhaps more to the point, *What is the point?* If we act based on our physical being's causal interactions with the natural world, what choices do we really have in choosing our future and that of future generations? For me, education is essential to living well, learning from our experiences, and prospering. But what is the role of education if all choices are based mostly on unconscious physical currents in ourselves and our environments. Life is short, so are we simply destined to do

what we must and to try and find ways of enjoying life consistent with our natural heritage and environmental interactions?

If that is our plight, then it may seem we have few true choices in our world. Perhaps, like Santayana, we should find a way of solitude. that permits us to focus on those joyful conscious moments that bring us delight. Santayana's life was full, resonant with living well, traveling the world, and being revered for his insights, poetry, philosophy, cultural criticism, novel, and autobiography. As a young man and scholar, he was much involved with others, the Harvard societies, fraternities, political gatherings, and college amusements. But he had a change of heart, a *metanoia,* around 1894, and began planning for his early retirement from Harvard University. The change was subterranean and slow At the age of forty-eight, he retired from Harvard in 1912 and spent much of the remainder of his life traveling the world, a vagabond scholar, before finally settling in Rome around 1924 until his death in 1952. He enjoyed life, wrote exhaustively of his thoughts and their development, published remarkable insights into the human life through his philosophy, his best-selling novel *(The Last Puritan,* 1936) and autobiography *(Persons and Places,* 1944). But he was disengaged from the world, seeing wars and economic upheavals as natural outcomes of human activity. He experienced the depravity of human life through two world wars and the Spanish Civil War, experienced the loss of family members, friends, and learning of atrocities like the Holocaust. For Santayana, these were not so much surprising revelations of human actions but understandable given our natural heritage and outlook.

Santayana's was one way of life, a life he chose based on his own natural inclinations. And I, for one, delight in his way of living and in his steadfastness to his own nature and the world he lived in. But I could not live such a life. Since I began my work on the critical edition of *The Works of George Santayana* (MIT Press), I have always had by my desk a sketch of Santayana given to me by his grand-nephew. Santayana's father, Agustin Santayana, was a trained artist and his grand-nephew continued that tradition. Hence, all my work had Santayana literally and figuratively looking over my shoulder. I often imagined what he may have said to me if he had actually seen what I was doing.

I have been active in politics and the civil rights movement since the early 1960s, hoping one's actions would lead to a better society. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., described it, I was a part of the ground crew for these movements. In addition, I held a distinguished chair in philosophy, was a department chair and head, dean of liberal arts, chair of a medical school department and president of a state university. I have held professorships in philosophy, philanthropy, medical genetics, pediatrics, and medical ethics. And I have been president of three international professional associations, chair of commissions of the American Council of Education and of the American Association of Colleges and Universities. I have also served on over thirty non-profit boards, including chairing the Southern New Jersey Chamber of Commerce, and I have received a number of civic awards for my community and scholarly engagement.

Looking at Santayana's portrait above my desk, I sometimes could hear his whisper: *What are you doing? Why? Do you not realize that from the perspective of the universe, your actions a small speck of dust that will soon be blown away?* I agree with Santayana. There is no lasting meaning to human existence, and as the universe evolves we are only a very small speck in time.

However, I also agree with Santayana that one should be as true to one's nature as possible and to enjoy life consistent with that. As a person, I have no greater standing in the universe than the sociopath, the psychotic, the autocrat, or any other living animal. But for now, I am what I am. Being a part of one's community, participating in education, family, and even local, national and international relations are important to me. The wellsprings of these actions lie within my being and my relations with the natural world. When I would write general principles for higher education in

white papers or in leading conferences, I knew that these were general, and the actions and activities had to be filled in by others working out of a natural sympathy for what I suggested. I knew that some would find my approaches did not express their natural inclinations and habits, others would find them too weak to meet pressing needs, and others may even be offended by them. All of which was natural to our diverse circumstances, but there was also a sense of community, and the professional associations embodied individuals joined together by commonality that elicited joint actions and common causes.

I am much closer to the end of life than to the beginning. This is a time when one reflects back on the history of one's family, of oneself, of one's culture. These are only reflections, and the realities may have been quite different from one's memory or even documented history. But, for me, they are like a symphony of my life and I enjoy listening to both the high and low notes.

So, I end this book with a brief reflection on a Holocaust Study tour I took with colleagues and two Holocaust survivors in 2013: "We Walk Back in Time to Go Forward." Perhaps a too optimistic approach to a naturalistic world, but one that recognizes the arational aspects of human nature, its tragedies, and an underlying hope that our natural propensity is to make life worthwhile. <>

Why Religious Freedom Matters for Democracy: Comparative Reflections from Britain and France for a Democratic '*Vivre Ensemble*' *by* Myriam Hunter-Henin [Hart Studies in Comparative Public Law, Hart, 9781509904747]

Should an employee be allowed to wear a religious symbol at work? Should a religious employer be allowed to impose constraints on employees' private lives for the sake of enforcing a religious work ethos? Should an employee or service provider be allowed, on religious grounds, to refuse to work with customers of the opposite sex or of a same-sex sexual orientation? This book explores how judges decide these issues and defends a democratic approach, which is conducive to a more democratic understanding of our 'vivre ensemble'. The normative democratic approach proposed in this book is grounded on a sociological and historical analysis of two national stories of the relationships between law, religion, diversity and the State: the British (mainly English) and the French. The book then tests the democratic paradigm by looking at cases involving clashes between religious freedoms and competing rights in the workplace. Contrary to the current alternative between the `accommodationist view', which defers to religious requests, and the 'analogous-to-secular' view, which undermines the importance of religious freedom for pluralism, this book offers a third way. It fills a gap in the literature on the relationships between law and religious freedoms and provides guidelines for judges confronted with difficult cases.

Should an employee be allowed to wear a religious symbol at work? Should the answer depend on the size and conspicuousness of the symbol, the underlying national constitutional tradition, the question of whether the employee is working in the public or private sector, the existence or absence of an applicable neutrality company policy? Should a religious employer be allowed to impose constraints on employees' private lives for the sake of enforcing a religious work ethos? Should the answer depend on the role of the employee within the organisation, on the publicity surrounding the alleged violations, on the status of the employer as a Church or ordinary employer, of the employee, as a minister or lay person, on the constitutional status of the Church, the connection with the employee's tasks and employer's activities? Should an employee or service provider be allowed, on religious grounds, to refuse to work with customers of the opposite sex or of a same-sex sexual orientation? Should the answer depend on whether access to the service is possible, at no extra cost for the customer? Should it make a difference whether the service or product refused involves a high degree of personal involvement of the provider, or whether the provision of the service implies the endorsement of views contrary to the provider's religious

convictions or does not carry any message? This book explores how judges must decide these issues and defends a 'democratic approach', which insists on the normative link between religious freedom and democracy. By democracy, I understand `an open-ended *reason-giving* process of deliberation' woven into the fabric of our *vivre ensemble.* Democracy in that sense cannot be reduced to majority rules and aggregation of interests; its key features are deliberation, participation on equal terms[3] and self-revision. Construed by judges in a way that fosters these democratic features, religious freedoms, I submit, are valuable for believers as well as for democracy.

Goals of this Study

I seek to show that religious freedom is important not only as a negative liberty, to protect believers from intrusions and interferences, but also as a positive value to society, to support pluralism and equality and thereby enrich democracy. As expressed by the European Court of Human Rights:

> Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a 'democratic society' within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.

Following the Court's statement, the book defends a dual dimension of religious freedom: a negative dimension, as a defensive liberty; and a positive dimension, as a welcome principle and source of pluralism. I thus make a conceptual argument and submit that religious freedoms are important for and within democracy as well as for believers themselves. From this conceptual position, helpful guidelines can follow for judges confronted with the abovementioned instances of clashing rights. Drawing on the renowned work of late American philosopher, John Rawls, and moving beyond it, I submit that the connections between democracy, pluralism and religious freedoms ought to rely on the following: a method of avoidance; a principle of inclusion; and a principle of revision.

Summary of the Main Argument

To sum up, against epistemological objections, I propose to demonstrate that legal adjudication and, more broadly, discussions in the public sphere about the legitimacy of particular regulations such as government or work policies may endorse a dialogical function, in which competing views are confronted and explained. Gradually, this process may thus work out a shared *vivre ensemble* (itself under constant review) compatible with individuals' and groups' own (evolving) legal and religious normative overarching framework. Against accommodationists who would allow any religious practices to flourish, I argue for a democratic *vivre ensemble* based on reciprocity in which positive rights of participation come with limits attached. Indeed, it would be inconsistent if the inclusive conception of religious freedom adopted for the sake of pluralism allowed some citizens to retreat from diversity altogether and refuse any exposure to differing views and ways of life. Against those liberals who would dissolve, disaggregate and dilute religious freedom into underlying secular values of liberty and equality, I argue that such an approach would not solve but just divert the epistemological problems associated with the category of religion and unduly undermine the importance of the religious self-definition of religious citizens. My suggestion is not that religious commitments are necessarily more intense than secular ones and that law should therefore give them systematic precedence in case of conflicting rights. The argument is that the category of religion in political philosophy and of religious freedom in law matters — to ensure that legal reasoning itself is open to diversity — and that religious freedom thereby invigorates democratic debate.

In other words, the main argument of the book is thus that religious freedom matters for the construction of a democratic understanding of the *vivre ensemble.* I argue that, properly construed,

religious freedoms ensure a healthy pluralism, which invigorates democracy. Following the trajectory of Rawls, I submit that law can maintain and deepen the connections between democracy, pluralism and religious freedom thanks to three features. The first feature is a method of avoidance, which portrays religious freedoms as negative liberties and protects them against state interference. The second, the principle of inclusion, guarantees equality and fair terms of cooperation between religious and non-religious citizens and, the third and last feature, the principle of revision, implies that the terms of legitimate diversity may be subject to limits and are constantly under review. In that light, religious freedoms not only safeguard a private sphere from state interference (under the method of avoidance); they also positively bolster rights to participation. If construed under the principles of inclusion and revision in an inclusive and open-ended manner, religious freedoms ensure that the voice of the minorities, the marginal and vulnerable members of society may be heard and contribute to the political debate. Religious freedoms would then guarantee `the openness to the other', which liberalism has often been accused of lacking.

Structure of the Argument

In the first part, 'The Broken *Vivre Ensemble* (Observations and Solutions)', I analyse the causes of current tensions and put forward solutions. Opening up with *Contextual Analyses,* I explore the sociological/cultural/historical context in which religious freedoms in Britain (with a focus on England) and France are anchored and make sense.

In Chapter 2, I submit that the French story of laïcité, the French version of secularism, has followed a schematic move from a militant form of secularism, rooted in Revolutionary ideals of democracy, to a separatist type, which contains inclusive elements more amenable to pluralism and minorities. However, in recent times, for fear of Islam, laïcité has reverted towards militant streaks, which I reveal and criticise. Through this analysis of the tortuous and at times violent history of laïcité, I make the too-often-neglected point that laicité does not entail the relegation of religion to the private sphere.

A similar complexity and return towards illiberal trends characterise the hugely different story of church establishment in England, which I synthesise, praise and criticise in Chapter 3. This contextual analysis does not aim to provide a detailed definition of the 'best' secularism but to pick up, from 'within', features, which bring French laïcité and the English church establishment close to a type of secularism amenable to pluralism. Having argued that a type of secularism is *possible and suitable* in both national contexts (but via different manifestations specific to each selected country), I move on in Chapter 4 to arguing that a pluralism-friendly type of secularism is also the most *desirable.*

In Chapter 4, *Conceptual Analyses,* I explore the conceptual links between religious freedom, democracy and pluralism and develop the argument that the concept of religious freedom is vital to ensure a democratic-enriching pluralism. I first start by a dissection of and response to opposing views. I here bring in and discuss authors who identify secular values such as equality as the foundation of democracy as well as scholars who, more radically, doubt that religion and liberal democracy can be reconciled and consider that they should therefore each evolve in their own sphere. Having addressed these authors' objections, I then move on to make the case that religious freedoms have a positive value for democracy and put forward a framework of analysis based on the above described method of avoidance, principle of inclusion and principle of revision.

In a second part, I confront my proposed pluralism-friendly democratic-deepening paradigm of religious freedom with concrete cases and thereby make theoretically-grounded normative proposals for change of some current legal outcomes in France and Britain.

In Chapter *5, Lessons from Acbbita,* I extract an important implication for law of the principles of inclusion and revision defended in earlier chapters, namely that law ought to refrain from assigning pre-political meanings to certain spheres of life or domains of activity. Based on a detailed analysis of the CJEU ruling in *Acbbita,* I demonstrate how the ruling fails in that respect. I submit that the CJEU in *Achbita* confers upon neutrality policies decided by the employer a presumption of legitimacy and emphasises consistency over proportionality. These two features, I submit, muffle the consideration and expression of competing religious interests by employees and thereby risk undermining the democratic-deepening potential of religious freedom and of courts as democratic fora for debating conflicting interests in the workplace. Second, I refute the oft-made observation that the underlying deference to the laïque constitutional setting in that case (for good or bad reasons) allows for the continuation of dialogue at national level. I argue that the deference to laicité was not only misplaced, as the principle of laïcité — as I explain — was actually not applicable, but also contradicts the principles of inclusion and revision. Indeed, far from allowing the national debate to endure, I will show that such undue deference acts as a conversation-stopper[81] both at local level, in the workplace, and in national courts.

In Chapter *6, Ways Forward, I* analyse other concrete cases involving religious freedom claims in the workplace and make suggestions for reasoned and fair outcomes, in line with the democratic approach. Amongst the delicate issues I examine are: the rights of public agents in France to wear religious symbols in the workplace, in the *Ebrahimiam* case; the rights of religious organisations to impose adherence to their religious ethos upon their employees, as in the CJEU rulings of *Ergenberger* and IR, the ECtHR decisions of *Schüth Obst, Fernandez Martinez* and *Travas,* and the US case of *Burwell v Hobby Lobby.* Finally, I look at the rights of employees, as in the British *Ladele* case, or of service providers, as the bakers, in the *Ashers Baker* case, in Northern Ireland and the *Masterpiece Cakeshop* case, in the US, or the hoteliers in *Bull v Hall,* to refuse, on religious grounds, to serve same-sex couples. Many of these cases raise novel and delicate issues. The conflicting interests they reveal not only set public interests against individual rights but confront minority rights against each other, as when equality protection rights of same-sex couples clash with the religious freedom of citizens who hold minority religious views. Whilst the application of an avoidance method and inclusion and revision principles do not lead to one single outcome in each case, they allow the filtering of a few legitimate outcomes and the exclusion of others.

Closing

This book is therefore a reaction (and hopefully a response) to the current failed attempts at devising a harmonious '*vivre ensemble*'." By offering a third way, which requires neither giving up on the notion of shared *vivre ensemble* nor abandoning the concept of religious freedom, the democratic approach fills a gap in the literature and helps us understand the vital connections between religious freedom, pluralism and democracy. The book thus seeks to unleash a more democratic reading of *vivre ensemble,* one that can be sufficiently inclusive to offer a legitimate and fair framework for citizens with different beliefs. To that end, I put forward a democratic paradigm, which offers a method for dealing with contemporary controversies involving religious freedom, under which religious freedom, pluralism and democracy reinvigorate one another. <>

LEAVIS AND LONERGAN: LITERARY CRITICISM AND PHILOSOPHY *by* Joseph Fitzpatrick [Hamilton Books, 9780761871378]

This book illustrates the value of the cross-fertilisation of literary criticism with philosophy, something Leavis advocated in his later writings. Lonergan's epistemology of Critical Realism supports Leavis's account of how we reach a valid judgment concerning the worth of a poem or literary text and his exploration of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity illustrates how close engagement with serious literature can be considered morally beneficial, something Leavis passionately believed in. Leavis and Lonergan are at one in providing convincing arguments against Cartesian dualism and the dominant positivist philosophies of their times. And Leavis's method and practice as a literary critic, which he developed independently of Lonergan, exemplify Lonergan's epistemology as applied to literature and, in this way, illustrate its versatility and fruitfulness.

Review

It is a rare pleasure to find a book in which literary and philosophical themes are treated with equal competence and lucidity. Joseph Fitzpatrick's study of F.R. Leavis and Bernard Lonergan sheds new light on both and on some important issues in modern culture. -- Colin F. Wood, principal lecturer in English, Leeds Trinity University

A fascinating comparison of two figures, both hugely influential in their separate worlds. Fitzpatrick makes us feel at home in both, and his lucid and sympathetic presentations of Leavis's and Lonergan's fundamental ideas brings them surprisingly close together. -- William Charlton

The Benedictine monk, Dom Sebastian Moore, who knew both Leavis and Lonergan, felt his life twice brushed by genius. Joseph Fitzpatrick identifies a commonality of vision, and an enduring potency, in these two influential thinkers. -- Michael Bell, professor emeritus in English and Comparative Literary Studies, University of Warwick

This is a book about mutuality and complementarity. On the one hand, there is the English literary critic, FR Leavis. For most of his long academic career he looked to philosophy in the hope of finding support for his critical approach to literary texts, but, given the dominance of Logical Positivism in British philosophy, for most of that time he failed to find the support he sought. On the other hand, there is the Canadian Jesuit philosopher-theologian, Bernard Lonergan, whose philosophy of Critical Realism, I shall argue, provides exactly the kind of support Leavis was looking for. What is more, Lonergan's scholarly aim was to find a method of investigation for the discipline of theology which

would also, he claimed, serve as a method of investigation for all of the humane disciplines that sought to bring the best of the past into a living and significant relationship with the present and the future—such as literary criticism as conceived by Leavis. That is essentially what this book is about.

Along the way I argue that the scholarly writings of these two twentieth century men of genius have things of importance to say to us today not only in their respective fields of philosophy and literary criticism but things concerning the quality and health of contemporary culture. This is because the affinity between Lonergan and Leavis I discern is not only intellectual but also relates to their moral outlook. My argument, in summary, is

- that Lonergan's epistemology underwrites Leavis's approach to literary criticism
- that it endorses Leavis's contention that English Literature is a valid university discipline
- that Lonergan's exploration of interiority and his analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity provide valuable support for Leavis's claims for the moral benefits of studying English literature
- that Leavis's method or practice as a literary critic, which he developed independently of Lonergan, exemplifies Lonergan's epistemology as applied to literature and, in this way, illustrates its versatility and fruitfulness
- and that Lonergan and Leavis are at one in providing convincing philosophical arguments against Cartesian dualism and the dominant positivist philosophies of their times.

The pairing of the literary critic, Frank Raymond Leavis, with the philosopher-theologian, Bernard Lonergan, might strike some as surprising and, indeed, odd. Temperamentally the two could hardly have been more different. Although a brilliant critic, Leavis, the English academic, was something of a fire-brand, a prickly character, openly critical of many fellow critics and academics; when people talk about him it is often to recall the rude comments he made at the expense of others (although it ought to be added here that his pupils often cite his unfailing kindness and support, and his publisher and others speak of "the personal kindness and consideration" Leavis showed them at all times[1]). Lonergan, the Canadian Jesuit priest, by contrast, had a calming presence; he has been described as a "perfect gentleman," simple and humorous in manner and outlook. It is pertinent to add here that the community of scholars and teachers, mainly Jesuit priests, who staffed the institutions he worked in were very different in ambition and outlook from those who worked in the English School at Cambridge in Leavis's day, with its hot-house atmosphere and academic rivalries. In fairness, it might be added that Cambridge was probably a more exciting place to study than the Jesuit institutions.

Lonergan could, it is true, be devastating and pugnacious in argument and at times gave the impression of being watchful about new ideas or proposals—at least, until he had tried them out and seen how they fitted into his overall outlook. It is, initially, in respect of their overall outlook that we begin to see the resemblances in the thinking of this unlikely pair. Each of them was gripped by a profound moral seriousness resulting in a deep concern about the health of contemporary civilization and the forces that threatened the moral wellbeing of people today, and each proposed approaches and strategies that could be brought to bear on the dehumanising influences abroad in our culture. And while neither deserted their chosen academic field—the literary critical or the philosophical-theological—when their respective methods of inquiry are closely scrutinised a remarkable intellectual affinity between the two begins to emerge. It is this intellectual affinity and shared moral outlook that I attempt to explore and expound in the three opening chapters; I then move on to other interests which, though different and distinct in their own right, relate to and throw further light on some of the issues raised in these three opening chapters. Taken together, the various chapters are an attempt to show how the cross-fertilisation of philosophy and literary criticism is to the benefit of both disciplines, something Leavis began to advocate in his later writings.

I am unable to account fully for the intellectual affinity I discern between Lonergan and Leavis. In their extensive written output neither of them ever refers to the writings of the other; it is possible that neither knew of the existence of the other, although there is a better chance that Lonergan had at least heard of Leavis, who for various reasons was the better known of the two in English-language academia during their lifetimes. However, in his own writing about poetry and literary art, Lonergan, as we shall see, was content to endorse the position put forward by the American neo-Kantian philosopher, Susanne K. Langer. I argue that, although this was understandable, it was in fact mistaken since this position, being Kantian, fails to match key features of Lonergan's Critical Realism.

As for the intellectual affinity between Lonergan and Leavis, a number of clues suggest themselves as to how and why it might have come about. To begin with, they were close to each other in age: Leavis's dates are 1895-1978 and Lonergan's are 1904-1984. And one of the chapters in this book attempts to trace the intellectual and moral debt each owes to the Victorian poet, critic and social commentator, Matthew Arnold. It is my intention in the chapter on Arnold to provide an historical background that will, to some extent at least, enrich and deepen our appreciation and understanding of both Leavis and Lonergan; it would not be too much to claim that Arnold provided both of our authors with an agenda, a basic orientation. If anyone had suggested to Leavis that his closest intellectual "look-alike" would turn out to be a Canadian Jesuit philosopher-theologian, he would probably have been incredulous; but if they had added that the bridge between them could be Matthew Arnold he might have begun to admit this as a possibility.

However, I suspect that the intellectual roots of both go further than Arnold. We know that Leavis was well read in philosophy and, while he was deeply hostile to the positivism that dominated British philosophy in the late 1930s through to the 60s, he welcomed the arrival in later life of philosophical approaches that began once more to place a greater emphasis on the role played by the inquiring subject in epistemology. My suspicion is that he saw in this a return to the philosophical reflections to be found among British philosophers in the era before the rise of positivism. He was certainly of an age to be influenced by these earlier thinkers. And although Lonergan was born and raised in Canada, at age 22 he was sent by his superiors to study philosophy at Heythrop College, at that time a Jesuit study house close to Oxford; and there Lonergan may well have come in contact with the writings of those British thinkers who lived and wrote in the pre-positivist era. Certainly, as well as Arnold, Newman's *Grammar of Assent* (1870), J.A. Stew-art's *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* (1909) and H. W. B. Joseph's *An Introduction to Logic* (1916) are known to have been strongly influential, and there may well have been others. Later English influences include R.G. Collingwood on history and Herbert Butterfield on the origins of modern science, and he also makes references to the writings of Christopher Dawson and Arnold Toynbee. Matthew Arnold, Newman and most of these twentieth century authors mentioned above were familiar to Leavis, their names are mentioned in *Scrutiny,* and some contributed to the journal. Although Lonergan's doctoral thesis was on aspects of the thought of Thomas Aquinas, who was probably the greatest influence on his thinking, the influence of these other English authors, dating from the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century, should not be underestimated. He was heard to say in later life how grateful he was to have studied philosophy at Heythrop at that time (1926-30) and expressed admiration for what he called "the English way."

There are several other areas of similarity between Lonergan and Leavis. First, each developed through their teaching roles and their prolific writings a solid body of followers or "disciples," many of whom went on to teaching roles of their own throughout the English-speaking world; and, in the case of Lonergan, beyond that. Second, despite being out of step with some of the dominant intellectual movements of their time, each manifests a profound self-confidence that they hold positions that are intellectually convincing, robust and, indeed, correct. Leavis, who was conscious of

being a pioneer in the field of literary criticism, was quite confident that his critical method provided an intellectual rigour that had been lacking among the dilettante critics, such as members of the "Bloomsbury Group," who operated before the arrival of what he termed "Cambridge English." And Lonergan was able to exploit the versatility of his originating theory of cognition in various ways, such as in his reading of the history of philosophy,[4] with a boldness that hints at his genius. This inner self-confidence probably explains both the attraction to others of our two authors and also some of the antipathy that has gone their way; it probably goes a long way to explaining Leavis's impatience with those less inclined to accept his brand of moral seriousness as well as his and Lonergan's espousal of self-transcendence as *the criterion* of intellectual and moral authenticity; this is the criterion that stands at the centre or what Leavis calls "the common pursuit of true judgment"[5] that is, at the same time, a feature constitutive of human personality. And third, each was the recipient of public honours, Leavis being appointed a Companion of Honour in 1978, the year he died, and Lonergan being awarded Companion of the Order of Canada in 1970.

It is because of the emphasis Lonergan places on the inquiring subject that I chose to include in this book the chapter on "Reading as Understanding" because, apart from illustrating in another context the versatility of Lonergan's "transcendental method," it explores in greater detail than the other chapters the precise manoeuvres performed by readers and inquirers in their efforts to access and grasp the meaning on the printed page before them; these are not unlike the manoeuvres performed by scientific inquirers, or even by people of common sense as they go about their daily business; in this way it helps us to understand the role of the subject or inquirer in coming to know something. It has been said that Lonergan's master work, *Insight,* might more accurately have been entitled *Inquiry*' , since it explores the questions, anticipations and self-corrections of inquirers and readers when they set about interrogating the data they have chosen to investigate. And as we shall see, the role of the reader when taking "possession" of a poem is also a subject examined in some detail by Leavis. Finally, I have included the last two chapters because, having argued in favour of the cross-fertilisation of philosophy and literary criticism, I felt it incumbent upon me to attempt to illustrate the benefits that literary criticism can derive from references to such disciplines as philosophy and theology, something that Leavis practised and advocated. Furthermore, I hope to have illustrated in the Hemingway chapter how an understanding of a variety of inter-related philosophical positions can be of assistance in gaining an in-depth grasp of a creative artist's fundamental outlook on life.

I chose to focus on Hemingway and Tolstoy in these two chapters because they project two starkly contrasting outlooks on life. By engaging in a close reading of each of these novelists, I hope to illustrate how such an approach builds up to and underpins an evaluative judgment on the moral maturity of the views being artistically realised and presented to us; as such, they reveal, I hope, the validity of the Leavisian criterion of "life" when judgment is passed on a work of literary art, and how, for Leavis, art and life are inseparable. As it is, the theme of authentic conversion explored in the last chapter loops back to the same theme as it appears in the earlier chapters on Lonergan and Leavis, and in this way helps to bind the book into a coherent unit. Suffice it to say at this point that human authenticity is central to the thinking of both Lonergan and Leavis.

It is, perhaps, fitting that Leavis should be found to share a depth of moral concern and an intellectual outlook similar to that of a distinguished Jesuit scholar, since he was known to remark, rather impishly, that Catholics took to him because he had "promoted" one of their number; he was referring to his frequently expressed admiration for the writings of the Jesuit priest-poet, Gerard Manley Hopkins. [8] Expressing his admiration for Leavis as a critic and teacher, the Catholic monk and theologian, Dom Sebastian Moore, who studied under Leavis at Downing College, observes that Leavis was the "only critic of note to discover that an obscure Victorian Jesuit had, in his attempt to spell out his dialogue with the infinite, achieved that combination of emotional honesty with technical

sophistication that is the mark of high poetry. Who else paid attention to Hopkins in the early thirties?" Moore expresses his gratitude that he had the good luck to encounter Leavis: he opens his essay by saying, "It is a rare and awesome thing to have had one's life touched by a genius. The chances against it are astronomical. Yet this luck, or grace, has been mine." In the same essay he goes on to say, "There has been one other such teacher in my life: the Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan. I have long felt that there must be a profound connection between these two crucial influences." I shared this perception of Moore's many years before I came across his memoir of Leavis, and in this book I attempt to explore the "profound connection" between these two remarkable scholars and teachers; this will inevitably lead me to say something about the differences between them. <>

Levinas and Literature: New Directions edited by Michael Fagenblat and Arthur Cools [De Gruyter, 9783110629668]

The posthumous publication of Emmanuel Levinas's wartime diaries, postwar lectures, and drafts for two novels afford new approaches to understanding the relationship between literature, philosophy, and religion. This volume gathers an international list of experts to examine new questions raised by Levinas's deep and creative experiment in thinking at the intersection of literature, philosophy, and religion. Chapters address the role and significance of poetry, narrative, and metaphor in accessing the ethical sense of ordinary life; Levinas's critical engagement with authors such as Leon Bloy, Paul Celan, Vassily Grossman, Marcel Proust, and Maurice Blanchot; analyses of Levinas's draft novels ***Eros ou Triple opulence*** and ***La Dame de chez Wepler***; and the application of Levinas's thought in reading contemporary authors such as Ian McEwen and Cormac McCarthy. Contributors include Danielle Cohen-Levinas, Kevin Hart, Eric Hoppenot, Vivian Liska, Jean-Luc Nancy and François-David Sebbah, among others.

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Levinas and Literature: A Marvellous Hypocrisy by Michael Fagenblat

> Wait for me: I'm going to pull you out of this hell into which I descended. Clarice Lispector, *The Passion According to G.H.*

Long before the publication of Levinas's *Inédits* we knew that literature was the philosopher's great temptation. The three volumes of *Inédits,* however, reveal the far-reaching intricacy of this fascination from unsuspected angles, shedding new light on Levinas's singular philosophical style, themes, and argument.[1] In them we find youthful poems written in Russian between 1921-28 (2013, §IV); tender ruminations by the Jewish prisoner of war on the actuality of biblical literalisms; surprisingly admiring citations of the ultra-Catholic writer Leon Bloy penned in captivity; evidence of the breakthrough provided by Proust, "poet of the social", in thinking of love without communion, intimacy without knowing: extensive, suggestive notes on metaphor that were later modified into publications; transcriptions of poems by Baudelaire with lines Levinas later incorporated, uncited, into his philosophical essays and revealing references to the writers he so admired from Shakespeare through Dostoevsky to Blanchot. Most intriguing are the lengthy fragments of two novels Levinas began to draft in captivity (2009, esp. *Carnet* 5) and continued to work on through to the early 1960's (2013, §§ I-III),[6] in other words, at the very same time that he was composing major philosophical essays, including *Totality and Infinity* (1961), and those on Judaism published in *Difficult Freedom* (1963).

Configured between philosophy, on one side, and religion, in particular Judaism, on the other, it is now clear that literature provided Levinas with a third way of *enacting* the unique *sens* of the Other. More precisely, as both Levinas's aborted novels and his literary exemplars suggest, the advantage of literature consists not so much in *showing* the moral sense of the other—since its truth is strictly "invisible", falling outside the limits of consciousness, beyond empathy and intuition—but in attesting to the formidable difficulty of discerning this sense. It is as if literature affords a way of tracing the sense of goodness under the conditions of its absence. Levinas's novelistic fragments point to a reality lulled into self-content, mistaking the order of the world for its ground, even in the midst of war, until war proves that there is no stable ground to civilized life and that order—even the "immense stability" that is France—is only a veil for the catastrophic chaos that perennially lurks about. War tears away the drapes of civilization, as Levinas describes it in the "scene of Alencon" he envisaged as the moral center of his novelistic ambitions, a scene that speaks "not simply of the end of illusions but of the end of meaning". The torn drapes reveal the horror of being without any order whatsoever, existence without a world.' Far from presenting the Other, then, as does the psychological novel, the literature that interests Levinas explores the implications of a world deprived of the sense of the Other, a world verging toward the abyss of indeterminate, meaningless existence.

To be sure, the exposure of the real behind the stage of civilization and the drapes of intelligibility points to the constitutive role of the Other in grounding the conditions of possibility for meaning. But the sense of the Other is not realized through empathy or intuition; it is indicated or intimated by a phenomenological reduction of intelligibility to humility, epistemic as much as moral, a reduction of the very possibility of meaning to an acknowledgment, without knowledge, of the Other. Interpretation presumes not only `distanciation' but also separation; the latter has ontological priority over intuition and thereby renders interpretation endless. Baudelaire's immortal ennui exposes the weariness of existence itself; Shakespeare's tragedies are marked by the diabolical inescapability of being, which is why death is not just feared but also desired (2009, 174); and Marcel's self-regard converts into love only when faced with the mystery of Albertine's evanescence which her absence finally manifests. Blanchot, ever-present when Levinas thinks of literature, epitomizes the risk that literature poses to the very possibility of ethics; the risk of substituting the Other for an image, reducing the sense of the Other to one's own sensations.

"In Blanchot's art reality becomes truly ghostly, while in romantism ghosts appear in a world with real contours. Influence of Hamsun's "Mysteries", of Gogol's "Portrait", "Nevski prospect"? Reality unfolds like a dream. The fluidity of things and space. Words and actions strike, but not by what is striking in them." (2009, 406f.) Around 1953, still echoing the critique of art *and* literature articulated in "Reality and Its Shadow", Levinas differentiates his account of language from his friends', whose approach occludes the essential role of ethics in the ontology of meaning. "The event of language— . . . Blanchot: Language is situated before the relationship with others — in a strangeness of self to self. Me: Language is . . . invocation. Recognition of the Other as such —Teaching that is not maieutic."

In *Existence and Existents,* the most important of the works published in the wake of the War (1947), Levinas deploys his critique of literature with greatest effect and in consonance with the contemporaneous "Reality and its Shadow". Literature here serves as an approach to the "limit situation" of a world verging toward elemental *il y a* existence, an eidetic reduction of the historical experience of war, of "a world in pieces," "a world turned upside down," that also recalls "the ancient obsession with an end of the world." (Levinas 1978, 21) For Levinas it was war, radically conceived, that raised the specter of a world reduced to elemental worldlessness. "Hitlerism," he wrote in July 1946, was "the presentiment of the denouement of history . . . the drunkenness of the end of the world", and it is no doubt for this reason that the fragments of both novels are set amid the debacle of wartorn France. Behind the opening lines of *Totality and Infinity*—"*war* suspends morality; it divests the eternal institutions and obligations of their eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives"—there is the *mise en abyme* of the tearing away of the drapes of civilization. Today one might think of covid-19, the virus evoking a phenomenological resemblance to Levinas's descriptions of the *there is,* an indistinct menace from which determinate existents "hypostasize" — binding to themselves in fear, physical pain, egoism, possession (think of the hoarding the virus provoked), being *chez soi,* and so on— thereby individuating a self, an existent, within the indeterminate, elemental existence lurking about. It is as if behind the stage of the world and the drapes of civilization lurks a virus, neither living nor dead, an irreal existence threatening the reality of individuated existents which has made visible the fragile interdependence of sense and solidarity, grounding the individuation of entities—the very condition for intelligibility—on the sense that each other's wellbeing is one's own. The ontologically deficient assumptions of liberalism are thereby also made plain. Or one might think, with no less elemental horror, of nuclear or climate change dystopias, as in Cormac McCarthy's postapocalyptic novel *The Road,* in which a nameless father bears the burden of "*impersonal vigilance*" that Levinas describes, watching over a world deprived of beings, a world reverted to elemental being.

> "He walked out in the gray night and stood and he saw for a brief moment the absolute truth of the world. The cold relentless circling of the intestate earth. Darkness implacable . . .The crushing black vacuum of the universe. . .Borrowed time and borrowed world and borrowed eyes with which to sorrow it."
>
> "One vast sepulcher of salt. Senseless. Senseless."
>
> "Perhaps in the world's destruction it would be possible at last to see how it was made. Oceans. Mountains. The ponderous counterspectacle of things ceasing to be. The sweeping waste, hydroptic and coldly secular. The silence."

The nameless father in *The Road,* like the paternal subjectivity defended in *Totality and Infinity,* attains no other redemption from the horror of existence than the desire for his son's life above his own.

> "He carried him up to the camp and covered him with blankets. He tried to get him to drink some water. . . . You'll be alright he said. He was terrified. . . I will do what I promised, he whispered. No matter what. I will not send you into the darkness alone.
>
> They went on. Treading the dead world under like rats on a wheel. The nights dead still and deader black. So cold. . .He'd stop and lean on the cart and the boy would go on and then stop and look back and he would raise his weeping eyes and see him standing there in the road looking back at him from an unimaginable future, glowing in that waste like a tabernacle.

Levinas's abandoned attempts to write his own literature of disaster show that the last thing he can be accused of is moral naiveté or being a moral "perfectionist," as has too frequently been thought. "My literary methods: 1) Describe everything at the level of "sensation", in the elementary, in this elementary where the whole complex is already present. 2) The real situation is soberly described . . . over a precipice". Literature attests to humanity's verging from sense to senselessness, even as the transformations it brings to language are the very signs of our always provisional transcendence of the disaster of being. Literature thus has the potency of a *pharmakon,* at once poison and medicine, descent into egoism and senselessness, but also orientation toward the Other.

On the one hand, then, Levinas adopts a cautious, even critical approach to literature which he conceives, like all art, in terms of the work's "formal structure of completion", the sensations of which draw the subject from reality to its shadow, from objects to their images, from concepts that refer to objects in the world to pure sensations that refer the subject back to the formally complete work of art. Levinas's critique of art and literature is essentially Platonic, reiterating the old suspicion of pleasures roused by mimetic idols. It is articulated most severely in "Reality and its Shadow" and the contemporary work, *Existence and Existents,* where the phenomenological sense of a work of art is again situated in the shadows of being. "Instead of arriving at the object, the intention gets lost in the sensation itself, and it is this wandering about in sensation, in *aisthesis,* that produces the aesthetic effect. Sensation is not the way that leads to an object but the obstacle that keeps one from it . . . In art, sensation figures as a new element. Or better, it returns to the impersonality of *elements.*" Borrowing a term from Jean Wahl, Levinas proposes that works of art induce a "transdescendence" into an elemental realm in which objects become images accessed through sensations disengaged from their worldly referents. The idea implies that the experience of art deviates from the moral and epistemic seriousness of the world.

Levinas's critique of art and literature was so opposed to Sartre's account of the writer as paragon of "engagement" that *Les Temps Modernes,* where "Reality and its Shadow" was published in 1948, prefaced Levinas's article with a defense of its esteemed editor, signed under the auspices of the journal *T.M.* but written by Merleau-Ponty.[n] This is not the place to explicate Levinas's critique of

aesthetic experience in detail. Two brief observations will suffice. First, *T.M.*'s Sartrean defense of the writer as a creator of means of communicating that foster human liberty somewhat misses the point of Levinas's analysis, whose critique of aesthetic experience does not target the ontologically derivative, psychological uses of art, which may indeed serve worldly values, as much as *the original sense* of something-as-art within the economy of being. At stake in Levinas's analysis of aesthetic experience is his lifelong preoccupation with deformalizing the temporal grounds of intelligibility. Approached *as a work of art,* an object never accedes to the temporal grounds of meaning but languishes in a "meanwhile" that falls short of reality, as if the essential experience of art suspends or delays time, abiding in "instants" disengaged from the temporality that opens and maintains the intelligibility of objects in the world. "In this situation the present can assume nothing, can take on nothing, and thus is an impersonal and anonymous instant. The critique of *littérature engagée* was, then, merely collateral damage to Levinas's purposes, whose real ambition consisted in an oblique reductio ad absurdum of recent, remarkable work by Bataille and Blanchot, both of whom prize literature's unworlliness by embracing the elemental ontology Levinas shuns (Bataille, Blanchot). Or perhaps Levinas had in mind Heidegger's account of the work of art as that which "holds open the Open of the world". Far from opening the world, Levinas argues that the work of art induces fascination with the exotic, transforming objects in-the-world into elements of an indeterminate "existence without a world". Art provokes an essentially de-worlding effect, exchanging concepts for de-worlded affects. The second point, of particular relevance to this volume, is that Levinas's critique of aesthetic experience does not differentiate between literature and the other arts. In 1948, poems fair no better than statues, paintings or pieces of music; indeed they exemplify "closed wholes whose elements call for one another like the syllables of a verse . . . disengaging themselves from reality." So too in the contemporary *Existence and Existents* literary examples are extensively deployed and quoted, sometimes without citation, to effect a reversion of phenomena from sense to mere sensation. In poetry, "a word detaches itself from its objective meaning and reverts to the element of the sensible . . . Behind the signification of a poem which thought penetrates, thought also loses itself in the musicality of a poem which has nothing to do with objects and perhaps varies solely in function of what thought sets aside, what it liberates itself from." Literature plunges the subject into a sea of words that resembles nothing as much as the ghostly demarcations of the *there is.*

On the other hand, however, Levinas sometimes adopts a conspicuously different approach to the "poetic word," which he singles out among the other arts for its unique ethical sense. Not incidentally, the ethical exigency given to literature, alone among the arts, coincides with Levinas's deepening appreciation of the ontological import of religious categories like prophecy, revelation, the Book, exegesis, and commentary. The transcendental advantage of literature consists not in uniting subjects through knowledge or communication between separated states of mind but, uniquely among the arts, in the way it inscribes the Other *in the very instant* of aesthetic disengagement from the world, establishing a relation to the Other *at the very moment* of participation in the anonymous irreality of elemental existence. Alone among the arts, literature is proximity to the Other in the instant of apocalypse, when the relational structure of the world gives way. The transcendental advantage of literature consists in its way of awakening the self to the elusive presence of the Other within the elemental conatus of existence, at the very moment when the sense of the world verges toward senselessness—

> zuweilen, wenn
> nur das Nichts zwischen uns stand, fanden
> wir ganz zueinander
>
> at times when
> only the void stood between us we got

all the way to each other

—just like "ethics," the poetic word testifies to the *maintenance* of sense in the midst of the debacle of senselessness. *Il maintient le maintenant—like* a handshake in which the possessive conatus of the body is opened to the other, "ethics" *maintains* the fleeting instant of sensation across the duration of concrete temporality. Citing Celan—"I cannot see any basic difference between a handshake and a poem"—Levinas embraces the possibilities of such a literature; "To make oneself completely into a sign, perhaps that is it." Levinas's theory of literature thus undergoes a decisive bifurcation. On the one hand, literature is placed on the side of impersonal, elemental existence and primitive religion, along with all the arts. On the other hand, due not least to his ongoing reflections on metaphor and their theological implications, literature is redeemed, as it were, from the shadows of art, just as a certain conception of "religion" is distinguished from the primitive and mystical religions that jettison subjectivity and morality. Literature is now able to enact a Saying that leaps out of the dense shadows in which it transpires. If the characters, narrators, and poetic figures in literature remain "fixed images" that draw us away from real people and real responsibilities in the world—as the critique of the aesthetics of literature proposes—nevertheless *a certain literature* is regarded as "a door, in this loosened self, leading beyond being" to a place without a world, but where, as Levinas cites Blanchot's saying, we "are together, but not yet". Levinas's appraisal of Blanchot's work testifies to this bifurcation. Blanchot's writing no longer attests to the self talking with itself as it drifts endlessly into the irreal oblivion of the space of literature; Levinas now finds in Blanchot's work a door leading beyond being toward the Other, the very temporality of being-toward-the-Other, being together, but not yet. While this second conception of literature is reflected throughout Levinas's later thought, the case of Blanchot is particularly instructive on account of the reversal it clearly marks. We have noted how Levinas at first views Blanchot's writings as exemplifying the literature of existence without a world (see also Levinas 1978, 58n.1). In "The Servant and Her Master," however, published in 1966 in response to Blanchot's *L'attente l'oubli* (1997 [1966]), Levinas adopts an entirely different approach to Blanchot's work and, by implication, to a certain literature, which he personifies as a domestic servant in the house of her master, the Logos, "the speaker of truth," "coherent language," "logic". As servant, she indulges her master's pretentions, his "extravagant behavior," his "reputation for loving wisdom"; and yet she knows "the failures, the absences, the escapades of him whom she serves". She must accordingly attend to the ambiguity of her position; on the one hand she must obey the logic that ensures the master's house is kept in good order—through the use of appropriate rhetoric and grammar, for example—, on the other hand she cannot but admit the disorder which her master refuses to acknowledge. This disorder of the poetic word is a "madness" *(folie)* that the master will not tolerate. Inspired by a poem of Lermontov he could doubtless declaim, Levinas translates "(in bad prose)" and avows the "utterances . . . of the madness of desire *(la folie du Mir)* . . . In them the tears of separation, In them the trembling of reunion". The essay concludes with a question suggesting that the servant, literature, is less the subordinate than the lover of the Logos she serves.

Housekeeper or Mistress? A marvellous hypocrite!
For she loves the madness she keeps watch over.

There is little doubt that Levinas sides with the servant who loves the madness, the folly, of literature, even if he also respects the need for an order of truth and logic, its status and validity "in the world". *Otherwise than Being* amply confirms this, not only with its quite mad, disruptive, anarchic style, its writing against the logos of the Said, but also with its explicit descriptions of subjectivity, the soul itself, as a madness in the heart of reason occasioned by the inextricable intimacy of the other. "The soul is the other in me. The psyche, the-one-for-the-other, can be a possession and a psychosis; the soul is already a seed of folly" (1991, 191n3; cf. 50, 84). A similar invocation of the folly or madness of subjectivity, "already a psychosis," refers the metaphor to the female lover in the

Song of Songs, "possessed by the other, sick", the footnote citing *Song of Songs* 6:8, "I am sick with love".

We thus find ourselves in a paradoxical proximity to the very disaster Levinas sought to avert. On the first conception, literature opens reality to an existence without order, tearing the drapes of civilization, isolating experience in pure sensations of images detached from objects, approaching and conjuring the *il a.* By the late 1950's, however, the obverse problem has surfaced, namely, the problem of the excess of order besieging the modern world, the reign of the Said, the inevitable homogenization entailed by concepts and the discursive tyranny of everyday life, modern bureaucracy, and information technologies. It now becomes precisely a matter of the disorderly and disruptive function of literature that is prized, its irony with respect to truth, coherence and logic, its metaphorical extension of thought beyond the correlates of the empirically given, all of which offer a much valued interruption to the merciless orders of the Said in which the singular sense of the Other is suppressed. Levinas thus begins with a critical appraisal of literature's complicity in the dissolution of order and ends with an affirmation of its capacity to disrupt a world that has become immoderately ordered. He begins with an account of literature's collaboration with the conceptlesness of sheer existence without a world and ends with an avowal of literature's way of loosening the concepts that grasp the world so tightly as to stifle the unique sense of the Other. If literature participates in the anonymous, impersonal irreality of aesthetic disengagement, as Levinas still thinks, one nevertheless finds oneself oriented through literature toward the Other—not to others in the world, dear reader, but to the Other, the one without whom no sensibility would make sense—,

> . . . like a man lured on by a syllable without any meaning,
> A syllable of which he felt, with an appointed sureness,
> That it contained the meaning into which he wanted to enter.

Literature is both elemental and personal, poison to a peopled world but medicine to the impersonal, anonymous existence in which we are immersed. Alone among the arts, literature affords the promise of a Saying within the impersonalism of elemental existence, just as monotheism introduces prophetic Saying into primitive and mystical religion. Literature is singled out among the arts for its way of measuring up to the folly of proximity. The "poetic word," like "ethics," like "prophesy," is necessary if one is to evade all that would reduce sense to platitudes—the natural topography of concepts—, dilute it within the insincerity of eloquence, or abandon it to the fallen language that dominates everyday life and so-called social media. A late essay, "Everyday Language and Rhetoric without Eloquence," picks up this theme in order to defend the alliance between the simplicity of everyday speech in which the other is approached directly and types of literary rhetoric that rage against the orders of discourse, "taking eloquence and wringing its neck," as Verlaine famously put it, the "anti-literature" that rebels against the repressive stability of the discursive orders that be. One might note, as Blanchot did in the very year this essay was published, that the language of "ethics" is not immune from the very problem it was designed to solve, since what Levinas calls "responsibility" is a "term which the language of ordinary morality uses in the most facile way possible by putting it into the service of order." Hence the need, *for the sake of the Other,* for a literature that sows seeds of madness into the master morality, which is as much a part of the order of the Said as the discourses of politics, science, social media etc, and sometimes even more so. Indeed, Levinas's essay alludes to the Terror of anti-literature, famously analyzed by Jean Pauhan, longtime accomplice of Blanchot, in his defense of a rhetoric of terror that stands up to false eloquence. *Otherwise than Being* exemplifies this rhetoric of terror without eloquence, "as if in order to regain one's lost sincerity, ordinary language were not enough". Levinas's suspicion of the eloquence of literature, then, left him with no alternative but to be a writer, thus fulfilling Paulhan's dictum that "No writer is more preoccupied with words than the one who at every point sets out

to get rid of them, to get away from them, or to reinvent them". In this lies the marvellous hypocrisy of Levinas's approach to literature, which points not only toward impersonal existence without a world but also toward the mystery of existence made intelligible only by being personal; not only to the *il y a* but also to *Autrui;* not only to 'primitive religion' but also to prophetic monotheism.

The impetus for a second conception of literature coincides with a growing awareness of how metaphor already steers language away from the fascination that reduces words to worldless images. It is clear that metaphor, for Levinas, is not just one literary trope among others but the essential feature that gives language ontological status equal to thought and perception. Metaphor marks the way language approaches *this-as-that,* a structural relation which, following Heidegger's analysis of the as-structure of intelligibility, integrates metaphor into the hermeneutic circle through which the sense of being is accessed. Metaphor is thus not added to understanding but expresses the asstructure of understanding in linguistic form, unsettling any stable hierarchy between language, thought, and perception. For Levinas, moreover, metaphor not only attests to a linguistic way of articulating an understanding of *this-as-that* but orients the horizontal movement of understanding along its implicit, vertical axis. Metaphor exposes the dimension of "height" within the horizontal movement of meaning (see Faessler). If all art, including literature, transdescends toward the *il y a,* literature, alone among the arts, also transascends toward the Other. Levinas provides a metaphor to express this vertical function. Metaphor is language "standing on tiptoes, in a kind of levitation." Metaphor elevates the as-structure of being, bends the curvature of intersubjective space upward in such a way that "the transitivity of being"—the movement of being through which a being maintains its identity—is oriented toward "height". Stevens gives voice to this elevation of the perceived into the sensed:

> How easily the blown banners change to wings . . .
> Things dark on the horizons of perception,
> Become accompaniments of fortune, but
> Of the fortune of the spirit, beyond the eye,
> Not of its sphere, yet not far beyond,
> The human end in the spirit's greatest reach,
> The extreme of the known in the presence of the extreme
> Of the unknown.

Metaphor works as the vertical axis of language, providing an essentially theological orientation, even if God is never invoked, as when the nameless father in *The Road* envisions his anonymous son "glowing in that waste like a tabernacle". The *Inédits* make it clear how Levinas's interest in literature, nurtured from his youth but intensified in captivity as a Jewish prisoner of war, converged with his emerging conviction that theology, without dogma, was indispensable for coming to terms with the moral orientation of meaning—"without God there would be no metaphor. God is the very metaphor of language — the fact of thought that rises above itself. (This does not mean that God is only a metaphor. For there is no other metaphor than the movement bearing towards Him)."

Although this strong formulation was excluded from his published writings on metaphor, the thought persists: the *this-as-that* structure of experience is opened by the inscription of metaphorical height, concealing the trace of God in the as-structure of things, a sense of the Other, the still small voice, in the cleft of the identity of a thing with itself, as in Exodus 33. Levinas's second conception of literature affirms the folly or anarchy of love as a way of interrupting the oppressive, platitudinous or universal orders of the Said; this folly is developed because of his faith in the theological orientation of metaphor as such. Another locution, written on the back of an invitation card from 1953 but omitted from his published essays, dares to wonder if the trace of the Infinite, the endless movement of metaphor that elevates the as-structure of meaning, reaches its finality in the solidarity of a people: "the idea of the culmination of all things in Israel: Love in relation to poetry. The end of

metaphors" Cryptic, but clear enough to show how the *Inédits* constantly bring the question of literature to reckon with the biblical and prophetic tradition, even if one might retort that 'Israel' is not the end but on the contrary the carnal origin of metaphor, "split first of all between the two dimensions of the letter" (Derrida, 92). The essays in this volume reflect and extend on themes the *Inédits* provoke, while further interrogating Levinas's relation to literary works and theoreticians. <>

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Sacred and The Sinister: Studies In Medieval Religion and Magic edited by David J. Collins, S.J. [Penn State University Press, 9780271082400]

Inspired by the work of eminent scholar Richard Kieckhefer, **The Sacred and The Sinister: Studies In Medieval Religion and Magic** explores the ambiguities that made (and make) medieval religion and magic so difficult to differentiate. The essays in this collection investigate how the holy and unholy were distinguished in medieval Europe, where their characteristics diverged, and the implications of that deviation.

In the Middle Ages, the natural world was understood as divinely created and infused with mysterious power. This world was accessible to human knowledge and susceptible to human manipulation through three modes of engagement: religion, magic, and science. How these ways of understanding developed in light of modern notions of rationality is an important element of ongoing scholarly conversation. As Kieckhefer has emphasized, ambiguity and ambivalence characterize medieval understandings of the divine and demonic powers at work in the world. The ten chapters in this volume focus on four main aspects of this assertion: the cult of the saints, contested devotional relationships and practices, unsettled judgments between magic and religion, and inconclusive distinctions between magic and science. <>

Ordinary Jerusalem 1840–1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City edited by Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire [Open Jerusalem, Brill, 9789004375734]

In **Ordinary Jerusalem 1840–1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City**, Angelos Dalachanis, Vincent Lemire and thirty-five scholars depict the ordinary history of an extraordinary global city in the late Ottoman and Mandate periods. Utilizing largely unknown archives, they revisit the holy city of three religions, which has often been defined solely as an eternal battlefield and studied exclusively through the prism of geopolitics and religion. At the core of their analysis are topics and issues developed by the European Research Council-funded project "Opening Jerusalem Archives: For a Connected History of Citadinité in the Holy City, 1840-1940." Drawn from the French vocabulary of geography and urban sociology, the concept of *citadinité* describes the dynamic identity relationship a city's inhabitants develop with each other and their urban environment. <>

Esoteric Transfers and Constructions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam edited by Mark Sedgwick & Francesco Piraino [Palgrave Studies in New Religions and Alternative Spiritualities, Palgrave Macmillan, 9783030617875]

Similarities between esoteric and mystical currents in different religious traditions have long interested scholars. This book takes a new look at the relationship between such currents. It advances a discussion that started with the search for religious essences, archetypes, and universals, from William James to Eranos. The universal categories that resulted from that search were later criticized as essentialist constructions and questioned by deconstructionists. An alternative explanation was advanced by diffusionists: that there were transfers between different traditions. This book presents empirical case studies of such constructions, and of transfers between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in the premodern period, and Judaism, Christianity, and Western esotericism in the modern period. It shows that there were indeed transfers that can be clearly documented, and that there were also indeed constructions, often very imaginative. It also shows that there were many cases that were neither transfers nor constructions, but a mixture of the two. <>

New Approaches to the Study of Esotericism edited by Egil Asprem and Julian Strube [Supplements to Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, Brill, ISBN 9789004446441 (hardback) ISBN 9789004446458 (e-book)]

This volume offers new approaches to some of the biggest persistent challenges in the study of esotericism and beyond. Commonly understood as a particularly "Western" undertaking consisting of religious, philosophical, and ritual traditions that go back to Mediterranean antiquity, this book argues for a global approach that significantly expands the scope of esotericism and highlights its relevance for broader theoretical and methodological debates in the humanities and social sciences.

The contributors offer critical interventions on aspects related to colonialism, race, gender and sexuality, economy, and marginality. Equipped with a substantial introduction and conclusion, the book offers textbook-style discussions of the state of research and makes concrete proposals for how esotericism can be rethought through broader engagement with neighboring fields. <>

Primary Sources and Asian Pasts edited by Peter C. Bisschop and Elizabeth A. Cecil [Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State, DeGruyter, 9783110674071]

This conference volume unites a wide range of scholars working in the fields of history, archaeology, religion, art, and philology in an effort to explore new perspectives and methods in the study of primary sources from premodern South and Southeast Asia. The contributions engage with primary sources (including texts, images, material artefacts, monuments, as well as archaeological sites and landscapes) and draw needed attention to highly adaptable, innovative, and dynamic modes of cultural production within traditional idioms. The volume works to develop categories of historical analysis that cross disciplinary boundaries and represent a wide variety of methodological concerns. By revisiting premodern sources, **Primary Sources and Asian Pasts** also addresses critical issues of temporality and periodization that attend established categories in Asian Studies, such as the "Classical Age" or the "Gupta Period". This volume represents the culmination of the European Research Council (ERC) Synergy project Asia Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State, a research consortium of the British Museum, the British Library and the School of Oriental and African Studies, in partnership with Leiden University. <>

Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights: Dissonances and Resonances edited by Carmen Meinert, Hans-Bernd Zöllner [Transcript-Verlag, ISBN 9783837612639]

The demonstrations of monks in Tibet and Myanmar (Burma) in recent times as well as the age-old conflict between a predominantly Buddhist population and a Hindu minority in Sri Lanka raise the question of how the issues of human rights and Buddhism are related. The question applies both to the violation of basic rights in Buddhist countries and to the defence of those rights which are well-

grounded in Buddhist teachings. The volume provides academic essays that reflect this up to now rather neglected issue from the point of view of the three main Buddhist traditions, Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana. It provides multi-faceted and surprising insights into a rather unlikely relationship. <>

Aldous Huxley and Alternative Spirituality by Jake Poller [Aries Book, Brill, 9789004406896]

Aldous Huxley and Alternative Spirituality offers an incisive analysis of the full range of Huxley's spiritual interests, spanning both mysticism (neo-Vedanta, Taoism, Mahayana and Zen Buddhism) and Western esotericism (mesmerism, spiritualism, the paranormal). Jake Poller examines how Huxley's shifting spiritual convictions influenced his fiction, such as his depiction of the body and sex, and reveals how Huxley's use of psychedelic substances affected his spiritual convictions, resulting in a Tantric turn in his work. Poller demonstrates how Huxley's vision of a new alternative spirituality in *Island*, in which the Palanese select their beliefs from different religious traditions, anticipates the New Age spiritual supermarket and traces the profound influence of Huxley's ideas on the spiritual seekers of the twentieth century and beyond. <>

White Christian Privilege: The Illusion of Religious Equality in America by Khyati Y. Joshi [New York University Press, 9781479840236]

Exposes the invisible ways in which white Christian privilege disadvantages racial and religious minorities in America

The United States is recognized as the most religiously diverse country in the world, and yet its laws and customs, which many have come to see as normal features of American life, actually keep the Constitutional ideal of "religious freedom for all" from becoming a reality. Christian beliefs, norms, and practices infuse our society; they are embedded in our institutions, creating the structures and expectations that define the idea of "Americanness." Religious minorities still struggle for recognition and for the opportunity to be treated as fully and equally legitimate members of American society. From the courtroom to the classroom, their scriptures and practices are viewed with suspicion, and bias embedded in centuries of Supreme Court rulings create structural disadvantages that endure today. <>

The Sociological Interpretation of Dreams by Bernard Lahire, translated by Helen Morrison [Polity, 9781509537945]

For Freud, dreams were the royal road to the unconscious: through the process of interpretation, the manifest and sometimes bewildering content of dreams can be traced back to the unconscious representations underlying it. But can we understand dreams in another way by considering how the unconscious is structured by our social experiences?

This is hypothesis that underlies this highly original book by Bernard Lahire, who argues that dreams can be interpreted sociologically by seeing the dream as a nocturnal form of self-to-self communication. Lahire rejects Freud's view that the manifest dream content is the result of a process of censorship: as a form of self-to-self communication, the dream is the symbolic arena most completely freed from all forms of censorship. In Lahire's view, the dream is a message which can be understood only by relating it to the social world of the dreamer, and in particular to the problems that concern him or her during waking life. As a form of self-to-self communication, the dream is an intimate private diary, providing us with the elements of a profound and subtle understanding of who and what we are. Studying dreams enables us to discover our most deep-seated and hidden

preoccupations, and to understand the thought processes that operate within us, beyond the reach of our volition. <>

INSCRIBING KNOWLEDGE IN THE MEDIEVAL BOOK: THE POWER OF PARATEXTS edited by Rosalind Brown-Grant, Patrizia Carmassi, Gisela Drossbach, Anne D. Hedeman, Victoria Turner, Iolanda Ventura [Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Culture. De Gruyter, 9781501517884]

This collection of essays examines how the paratextual apparatus of medieval manuscripts both inscribes and expresses power relations between the producers and consumers of knowledge in this important period of intellectual history. It seeks to define which paratextual features – annotations, commentaries, corrections, glosses, images, prologues, rubrics, and titles – are common to manuscripts from different branches of medieval knowledge and how they function in any particular discipline. It reveals how these visual expressions of power that organize and compile thought on the written page are consciously applied, negotiated or resisted by authors, scribes, artists, patrons and readers. This collection, which brings together scholars from the history of the book, law, science, medicine, literature, art, philosophy and music, interrogates the role played by paratexts in establishing authority, constructing bodies of knowledge, promoting education, shaping reader response, and preserving or subverting tradition in medieval manuscript culture. <>

Ordinary Jerusalem 1840–1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City edited by Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire [Open Jerusalem, Brill, 9789004375734]

In **Ordinary Jerusalem 1840–1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City**, Angelos Dalachanis, Vincent Lemire and thirty-five scholars depict the ordinary history of an extraordinary global city in the late Ottoman and Mandate periods. Utilizing largely unknown archives, they revisit the holy city of three religions, which has often been defined solely as an eternal battlefield and studied exclusively through the prism of geopolitics and religion. At the core of their analysis are topics and issues developed by the European Research Council-funded project "Opening Jerusalem Archives: For a Connected History of Citadinité in the Holy City, 1840-1940." Drawn from the French vocabulary of geography and urban sociology, the concept of *citadinité* describes the dynamic identity relationship a city's inhabitants develop with each other and their urban environment. <>

Jerusalem II: Jerusalem in Roman-Byzantine Times edited by Astrid Kaufmann Katharina Heyden, Maria Lissek [Civitatum Orbis MEditerranei Studia, Mohr Siebeck, 9783161583032] Language: English and German

The present volume gives insights into the shape, life and claims of Jerusalem in Roman-Byzantine Times (2nd to 7th century). Regarding the history of religions and its impact on urbanistic issues, the city of Jerusalem is of special and paradigmatic interest. The coexistence and sometimes rivalry of Jewish, Hellenistic, Roman, Christian and later Islamic cults had an impact on urban planning. The city's importance as a centre of international pilgrimage and educational tourism affected demographic and institutional characteristics. Moreover, the rivalry between the various religious traditions at the holy places effected a plurivalent sacralisation of the urban area. To show transitions and transformations, coexistence and conflicts, seventeen articles by internationally distinguished researchers from different fields, such as archaeology, Christian theology, history, Jewish and Islamic studies, are brought together to constitute this collection of essays. <>

Radical Christian Voices and Practice Essays in Honour of Christopher Rowland edited by Zoë Bennett and David B. Gowler [Oxford University Press, 9780199599776]

Peter Olivi (1248–98) was a Franciscan theologian of distinction who advanced radical views on poverty and property, and a controversial prophetic vision of Church history, in a number of treatises and works of biblical exegesis. In his Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles he argued that the first Christians , in succession to the Apostles themselves (according to his reading of Jesus' instructions to the Apostles and the Gospel narratives), bound themselves to a life of evangelical poverty in the search of perfection, renouncing all property privately and in common. In urging this difficult thesis, Olivi showed an impressive capacity for inventive, sustained, wide-ranging, and relatively unrhetorical exegesis. <>

Imagining Jerusalem in the Medieval West by Lucy Donkin and Hanna Vorholt [Proceedings of the British Academy, British Academy, 9780197265048]

Jerusalem was the object of intense study and devotion throughout the Middle Ages. This collection of essays illuminates ways in which the city was represented by Christians in Western Europe, c. 700-1500. Focusing on maps in manuscripts and early printed books, it also considers views and architectural replicas, and treats depictions of the Temple and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre alongside those of Jerusalem as a whole. Authors draw on new research and a range of disciplinary perspectives to show how such depictions responded to developments in the West, as well as to the shifting political circumstances of Jerusalem and its wider region. <>

Gersonides Judaism within the Limits of Reason by Seymour Feldman [Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Liverpool University Press, 978190411 3447]

Gersonides (1288–1344) was a philosopher as well as an astronomer and biblical exegete. He was also known as Ralbag, and was a philosopher of the first rank as well as an astronomer and biblical exegete, yet this is the first English-language study of the significance of his work for Jewish thought. Seymour Feldman, the acclaimed translator of Gersonides' most important work, The Wars of the Lord - a complete philosophical system and astronomical encyclopedia - has written a comprehensive picture of Gersonides' philosophy that is both descriptive and evaluative. Unusually for a Jewish scholar, Gersonides had contacts with several Christian notables and scholars. It is known that these related to mathematical and astronomical matters; the extent to which these contacts also influenced his philosophical thought is a matter of some controversy. Unquestionably, however, he wrote a veritable library of philosophical, scientific, and exegetical works that testify not only to the range of his intellectual concerns but also to his attempt to forge a philosophical-scientific synthesis between these secular sciences and Judaism. <>

Gersonides' Afterlife: Studies on the Reception of Levi ben Gerson's Philosophical, Halakhic and Scientific Oeuvre in the 14th through 20th Centuries edited by Ofer Elior, Gad Freudenthal, and David Wirmer [Officina Philosophica Hebraica Volume 2, Studies in Jewish History and Culture, Brill, 9789004425279

Gersonides' Afterlife is the first full-scale treatment of the reception of one of the greatest scientific minds of medieval Judaism: Gersonides (1288–1344). An outstanding representative of the Hebrew Jewish culture that then flourished in southern France, Gersonides wrote on mathematics, logic, astronomy, astrology, physical science, metaphysics and theology, and commented on almost the entire bible. His strong-minded attempt to integrate these different areas of study into a unitary system of thought was deeply rooted in the Aristotelian tradition and yet innovative in many respects, and thus elicited diverse and often impassionate reactions. For the first time, the twenty-one papers collected here describe Gersonides' impact in all fields of his activity and the reactions from his contemporaries up to present-day religious Zionism. <>

Quest for Life: A Study in Aharon David Gordon's Philosophy of Man in Nature by Yossi (Joseph) Turner [Emunot: Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah, Academic Studies Press, 97816446931 24]

David Gordon was one of the most interesting and original Jewish thinkers of the twentieth century. **Quest for Life: A Study in Aharon David Gordon's Philosophy of Man in Nature** presents Gordon's philosophy, which was developed in Hebrew at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the English reading public. It discusses the role played by the early Land of Israel pioneering labor community in the development of his thought, and offers a new understanding of its major themes, including: the relation of humanity to nature, human freedom, ethnicity, religion, and ethics. In addition, the book discusses the repercussions of Gordon's thought with respect to contemporary civilization while suggesting its implicit 'quest for life' as the basis for a re-evaluation of such topics as the meaning of human life, Jewish peoplehood and the idea of a Jewish homeland. <>

The Mystical Life of Franz Kafka Theosophy, Cabala, and the Modern Spiritual Revival by June O. Leavitt [Oxford University Press, 9780199827831]

This book aims to show that the "Kafkaesque" in Franz Kafka may be immediate or residual impressions of the clairvoyance which Kafka admitted he suffered from Those aspects of his writings in which the solid basis of human cognition totters, and objects are severed from physical referents, can be understood as mystical states of consciousness. However, this book also demonstrates how the age in which Kafka lived shaped his mystical states. Kafka lived during the modern Spiritual Revival, a powerful movement which resisted materialism, rejected the adulation of science and Darwin and idealized clairvoyant modes of consciousness. Key personalities who were Kafka's contemporaries encouraged the counterculture to seek the true essence of reality by inducing out-of-body experiences and producing spiritual visions through meditative techniques. Most importantly, they inspired the representation of altered perception in art and literature. Leaders of the Spiritual Revival also called for changes in lifestyle in order to help transform consciousness. Vegetarianism became essential to reach higher consciousness and to return humanity to its divine nature. It is no surprise that Kafka became a vegetarian and wrote several important narratives from an animal's point of view. Interweaving the occult discourse on clairvoyance, the divine nature of animal life, vegetarianism, the spiritual sources of dreams, and the eternal nature of the soul with Kafka's dream-chronicles, animal narratives, diaries, letters, and stories, this book takes the reader through the mystical textuality of a great psychic writer and through the fascinating epoch of the great Spiritual Revival. <>

Divine Images: The Life and Work of William Blake by Jason Whittaker [Reaktion Books, 9781789142877]

Although relatively obscure during his lifetime, William Blake has become one of the most popular English artists and writers, through poems such as 'The Tyger' and 'Jerusalem', and images including *The Ancient of Days*. Less well-known is Blake's radical religious and political temperament, and that his visionary art was created to express a personal mythology that sought to recreate an entirely new approach to philosophy and art. This book examines both Blake's visual and poetic work over his long career, from early engravings and poems to his final illustrations to Dante and the Book of Job. *Divine Images* further explores Blake's immense popular appeal and influence after his death. <>

The Transformations of Tragedy: Christian Influences from Early Modern to Modern edited by Fionnuala O'Neill Tonning, Erik Tonning and Jolyon Mitchell [Studies in Religion and the Arts, Brill, Hardback: 9789004416536; E-Book: 9789004416543] open source

The Transformations of Tragedy: Christian Influences from Early Modern to Modern explores the influence of Christian theology and culture upon the development of post-classical Western tragedy. The volume is divided into three parts: early modern, modern, and contemporary. This series of essays by established and emergent scholars offers a sustained study of Christianity's creative influence upon experimental forms of Western tragic drama.

Both early modern and modern tragedy emerged within periods of remarkable upheaval in Church history, yet Christianity's diverse influence upon tragedy has too often been either ignored or denounced by major tragic theorists. This book contends instead that the history of tragedy cannot be sufficiently theorised without fully registering the impact of Christianity in transition towards modernity. <>

The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400-1580 by Eamon Duffy [Yale University Press, 9780300053425]

This important and provocative book offers a fundamental challenge to much that has been written about the pre-Reformation church. Eamon Duffy recreates fifteenth-century English lay people's experience of religion, revealing the richness and complexity of the Catholicism by which men and women structured their experience of the world and their hopes within and beyond it. He then tells the powerful story of the destruction of that Church - the stripping of the altars - from Henry VIII's break with the papacy until the Elizabethan settlement. Bringing together theological, liturgical, literary, and iconographic analysis with historical narrative, Duffy argues that late medieval Catholicism was neither decadent nor decayed but was a strong and vigorous tradition, and that the Reformation represented the violent rupture of a popular and theologically respectable religious system. <>

The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Body and Embodiment edited by Natalie Boero and Katherine Mason [Oxford University Press, 9780190842475]

In popular debates over the influences of nature versus culture on human lives, bodies are often assigned to the category of "nature": biological, essential, and pre-social. **The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Body and Embodiment** challenges that view, arguing that bodies both shape and get shaped by human societies. As such, the body is an appropriate and necessary area of study for sociologists. The Handbook works to clarify the scope of this topic and display the innovations of research within the field.

The volume is divided into three main parts: Bodies and Methodology; Marginalized Bodies; and Embodied Sociology. Sociologists contributing to the first two parts focus on the body and the ways it is given meaning, regulated, and subjected to legal and medical oversight in a variety of social contexts (particularly when the body in question violates norms for how a culture believes bodies "ought" to behave or appear). Sociologists contributing to the last part use the bodily as a lens through which to study social institutions and experiences. These social settings range from personal decisions about medical treatment to programs for teaching police recruits how to use physical force, from social movement tactics to countries' understandings of race and national identity. <>

PERSUASION AND RHETORIC by Carlo Michelstaedter, translated by Russell Scott Valentino, Cinzia Sartini Blum, David J. Depew [Yale University Press, 9780300104349]

This translation of Carlo Michelstaedter's **PERSUASION AND RHETORIC** brings the powerful and original work of a seminal cultural figure to English-language readers for the first time. Ostensibly a commentary on Plato's and Aristotle's relation to the pre-Socratic philosophers, Michelstaedter's deeply personal book is an extraordinary rhetorical feat that reflects the author's struggle to make

sense of modern life. This edition includes an introduction discussing his life and work, an extensive bibliography, notes to introduce each chapter, and critical notes illuminating the text.

Within hours of completing Persuasion and Rhetoric, his doctoral thesis, 23-year-old Michelstaedter shot himself dead. The text he left behind has proved to be one of the most trenchant and influential studies in modern rhetoric, a work that develops Nietzschean themes and anticipates the conclusions of, among others, Martin Heidegger. <>

The Wreckage of Philosophy: Carlo Michelstaedter and the Limits of Bourgeois Thought by Mimmo Cangiano [Toronto Italian Studies, University of Toronto Press, 9781487504649]

The work of Carlo Michelstaedter (1887–1910) was the first to analyze modernist philosophy in strict connection with social changes in mass society. Revealing how Michelstaedter was able to unveil the relations between pivotal early-modernist philosophies and social restructurings, **The Wreckage of Philosophy: Carlo Michelstaedter and the Limits of Bourgeois Thought** examines the ongoing processes of "specialization," "rationalization," and "atomization." It points out how Michelstaedter connected the main theoretical expressions of modernism with the decisive social transformations of the early twentieth century, taking into consideration the key players of modernist philosophy, such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Ernst Mach, and William James. <>

1910 The Emancipation of Dissonance by Thomas Harrison [University of California Press, 9780520200432]

The year 1910 marks an astonishing, and largely unrecognized, juncture in Western history. In this perceptive interdisciplinary analysis, Thomas Harrison addresses the extraordinary intellectual achievement of the time. Focusing on the cultural climate of Middle Europe and paying particular attention to the life and work of Carlo Michelstaedter, he deftly portrays the reciprocal implications of different discourses—philosophy, literature, sociology, music, and painting. His beautifully balanced and deeply informed study provides a new, wider, and more ambitious definition of expressionism and shows the significance of this movement in shaping the artistic and intellectual mood of the age. <>

Memory and Autobiography: Explorations at the Limits by Leonor Arfuch, translated by Christina MacSweeney [Critical South, Polity 97815095421 78]

This book by one of Latin America's leading cultural theorists examines the place of the subject and the role of biographical and autobiographical genres in contemporary culture.

Arfuch argues that the on-going proliferation of private and intimate stories – what she calls the 'biographical space' – can be seen as symptomatic of the impersonalizing dynamics of contemporary times. Autobiographical genres, however, harbour an intersubjective dimension. The 'I' who speaks wants to be heard by another, and the other who listens discovers in autobiography possible points of identification. Autobiographical genres, including those that border on fiction, therefore become spaces in which the singularity of experience opens onto the collective and its historicity in ways that allow us to reflect on the ethical, political, and aesthetic dimensions not only of self-representation but also of life itself. <>

A Life of Scholarship with Santayana: Essays and Reflections *by* Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., *edited by* Charles Padrón and Krzysztof Piotr Skowronski [Value inquiry Book Series, Philosophy in Spain, Brill Rodopi, 9789004446649]

An entire lifetime's work by Herman J. Saatkamp is collected here in **A Life of Scholarship with Santayana: Essays and Reflections**. From the first essay, published in 1972, to the latest, in 2017, almost fifty years of scholarship is given a fresh embodiment of expression. Saatkamp is considered by many to be the world's foremost authority on George Santayana's life and thought.

Not only does this volume bring into clear relief Saatkamp's understanding of Santayana, the editing process, and genetic concerns and the future of philosophy, but it also betrays a lucid and humane understanding that aptly personifies a life spent in reflection, a discerning sense of appreciation, and an affirmation of life and learning. <>

Why Religious Freedom Matters for Democracy: Comparative Reflections from Britain and France for a Democratic *'Vivre Ensemble'* *by* Myriam Hunter-Henin [Hart Studies in Comparative Public Law, Hart, 9781509904747]

Should an employee be allowed to wear a religious symbol at work? Should a religious employer be allowed to impose constraints on employees' private lives for the sake of enforcing a religious work ethos? Should an employee or service provider be allowed, on religious grounds, to refuse to work with customers of the opposite sex or of a same-sex sexual orientation? This book explores how judges decide these issues and defends a democratic approach, which is conducive to a more democratic understanding of our 'vivre ensemble'. The normative democratic approach proposed in this book is grounded on a sociological and historical analysis of two national stories of the relationships between law, religion, diversity and the State: the British (mainly English) and the French. The book then tests the democratic paradigm by looking at cases involving clashes between religious freedoms and competing rights in the workplace. Contrary to the current alternative between the `accommodationist view', which defers to religious requests, and the 'analogous-to-secular' view, which undermines the importance of religious freedom for pluralism, this book offers a third way. It fills a gap in the literature on the relationships between law and religious freedoms and provides guidelines for judges confronted with difficult cases. <>

Leavis and Lonergan: Literary Criticism and Philosophy *by* Joseph Fitzpatrick [Hamilton Books, 9780761871378]

This book illustrates the value of the cross-fertilisation of literary criticism with philosophy, something Leavis advocated in his later writings. Lonergan's epistemology of Critical Realism supports Leavis's account of how we reach a valid judgment concerning the worth of a poem or literary text and his exploration of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity illustrates how close engagement with serious literature can be considered morally beneficial, something Leavis passionately believed in. Leavis and Lonergan are at one in providing convincing arguments against Cartesian dualism and the dominant positivist philosophies of their times. And Leavis's method and practice as a literary critic, which he developed independently of Lonergan, exemplify Lonergan's epistemology as applied to literature and, in this way, illustrate its versatility and fruitfulness. <>

Levinas and Literature: New Directions edited by Michael Fagenblat and Arthur Cools [De Gruyter, 9783110629668]

The posthumous publication of Emmanuel Levinas's wartime diaries, postwar lectures, and drafts for two novels afford new approaches to understanding the relationship between literature, philosophy, and religion. This volume gathers an international list of experts to examine new questions raised by Levinas's deep and creative experiment in thinking at the intersection of literature, philosophy, and religion. Chapters address the role and significance of poetry, narrative, and metaphor in accessing the ethical sense of ordinary life; Levinas's critical engagement with authors such as Leon Bloy, Paul

Celan, Vassily Grossman, Marcel Proust, and Maurice Blanchot; analyses of Levinas's draft novels ***Eros ou Triple opulence*** and ***La Dame de chez Wepler***; and the application of Levinas's thought in reading contemporary authors such as Ian McEwen and Cormac McCarthy. Contributors include Danielle Cohen-Levinas, Kevin Hart, Eric Hoppenot, Vivian Liska, Jean-Luc Nancy and François-David Sebbah, among others. <>

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